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# THE JOURNAL

OF

## SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

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### THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART.\*

BY GEORGE S. MORRIS.

*Philosophie der Kunst ist nothwendiges Ziel des Philosophen, der in dieser das innere Wesen seiner Wissenschaft, wie in einem magischen und symbolischen Spiegel schaut.*—SCHELLING.

Philosophy is the demonstration of the ideal as the living truth of real things, as underlying, determining, constituting what is figuratively but vaguely termed their blind necessity, as furnishing the origin of their true existence, and the end toward which they tend.

St. Paul says that we live, move, and have our being in God. Philosophy holds no ground antagonistic to that of the Apostle, but rather in strict accordance with it, when it teaches that existence is bathed throughout in the atmosphere of thought and of that which thought, or some other form of the ideal activity of conscious beings, alone apprehends.

The grand old poet-philosopher, Parmenides, sang, before the classical epoch in the history of Greek philosophy, "Being and Thought are one." This seems a paradox to the undisciplined or unreflecting mind, and yet, but for the truth which lies at the bottom of it, human science would not exist. Not to insist, with the

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\* A University lecture, before a class of undergraduates reading Taine's *Philosophie de l'art en Italie*.

literal idealists, like Berkeley, on the fact that what we call reality is, in the first instance, only a form of human consciousness,\* (whence the Berkeleyan conclusion that the belief in external reality is illusory), yet it is evident, from the ordinary point of view, that our knowledge exists and is extended only because so-called real things admit of being brought under the forms of rational apprehension. The knowing, feeling, willing agent in us is the purest form of ideal existence directly known to us. It is this inner, truest reality of our natures which goes on extending the realm of knowledge, and in increasing measure bringing what is called matter under the control, and into the forms of mind. Now this it could not do, if mind and matter were wholly distinct and incommensurable entities. A circle could not know a square. The only way in which it could be imagined to "know" it, would be for the circle to coincide with the square—and this is eternally impossible. The circle and the square are utterly different from each other; there is nothing in which the one could be brought within the comprehension of the other. Not so in the case of man and the universe which he cognizes. Man is an ideal, knowing agent; the universe is knowable. There is something akin between them. Music has been called "speech without words." But not only music, the world itself, which Schopenhauer terms embodied music and in which the Pythagoreans long before discovered a universal, spherical harmony, is speech without words, i. e., it addresses though inaudibly, the reason of man, it is the expression of reason, of thought. The very being of the universe and of its parts presents itself to man under forms which are cognate with the forms of his ideal activity. It appears as the expression of number, in its manifold modifications and relations, of geometrical forms and proportions, of harmony and symmetry. It exhibits the constant and unvarying sequence of cause and effect, which is but the requirement and expression of ideal or rational necessity. In short, it is in all its parts the exhibition of law, which naught but intelligence (i. e., the

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\* And here let me ask you not to suppose this to be the dictum of mere abstract theorists. So reputable a scientist as Huxley says: "'Matter' and 'Force' are, so far as we can know, mere names for certain forms of consciousness." (Lay Sermons and Addresses, p. 340, Am. Ed.) So Helmholtz, who terms matter and force abstractions: Du Bois Reymond, and others. I mention these testimonies, in order that you may see that the dictum in question is not peculiar to mere so-called speculative dreamers, but is held by men who have lived and worked in the purest atmosphere of physical science, and have made great contributions to our positive knowledge of such science.



ideal) can apprehend, and which can originate in nothing but intelligence.

To return to the figure employed a moment ago. As words, verbal forms, are nothing, except as factors of speech, i. e., as symbols of thought or emotion, so the forms of the universe and its contents, which "speak" to us, are nothing apart from the ideas they express. And Plato is right in affirming that all these ideas are summed up in the one grand idea around which they revolve, the idea of the Good, to which may be added, as inseparable from the Good, though in rank subordinate to it, the Beautiful, which is its refulgence. We say, commonly, that what is irrational is absurd, and what is absurd cannot be. Hence Hegel's saying, that "whatever is real, is rational, and whatever is rational, is real." The rational or ideal aspect of things is essential to their being, and the real (though sometimes unconscious and often unadmitted) aim and substance of all philosophy and of all science is to show that this is the constitutive aspect of things, the aspect which is fundamental. that in view of which all things truly are, and are what they are. The world were at best a chaos, i. e., nothing in particular, were it not the expression, the embodiment of complex (and, we may add in passing, organically interrelated, hence harmonious and beautiful) ideas, (etymologically, "forms," *εἶδη*, that which in thought is called an "idea," is in the concrete universe "form").

Such then is the philosophical view of the world; and such too, is the common view, when reduced to definite form. For the philosophical view is not one artificially constructed. It is but the result of reflection upon what all admit. It is but the reduction of that which is contained in the general consciousness of mankind, to scientific expression. The leading characteristics of this view are the two beliefs (1) in the universal presence of the element of spontaneity as lying at the basis of all things (this manifests itself in man as, among other things, freedom of the will), and (2) in the tendency of the world to become what it ought—in other words, the perception of the fact that the forms, the ideal natures of things are their true being, ever imperfectly realized, owing to the limitations which surround them, but ever progressing towards greater and absolute perfection, towards that which Plato terms the "Good." Even those who are unable to see in the ideal, i. e., in spirit, or intelligent mind and goodness, as existing primally and supremely in God, derivatively in man and all things, the real

truth and the true reality and principle of things, bear involuntary witness to the fact that the conclusion above enunciated is the one which human reason, when it philosophizes, instinctively and necessarily seeks. Thus, while denying the existence of free, independent spirit in man or in the universe, they speak (and I use here the very words of noted materialists and atheists) of "Necessity, or the enchainment of causes in the world" as "Reason herself" (Strauss) they imagine an "Instinct of Necessity," an "unconscious creative impulse" in nature (Buechner) through whose operation the world and its phenomena are to be explained. In other words, an intelligence which is not intelligent, an impulse which knows not what it does, and which is far less easy to comprehend (being in fact incomprehensible) than a freely and consciously acting force, is assumed to account for a world in which the ideal elements, as mind, beauty, are the crowning ones.

Such contradictory hypotheses as these, I say, bear indirect witness to the fact that philosophy *must* seek the ideal in nature, and find in it the truth of things. And so too the flutterings and strivings of artists, who reject the idealistic view, and accept the mechanical or materialistic one, tend to illustrate the same conclusion. The artist's business, as I shall hope to make you see, is, if anything, to express the ideal in some concrete, even though imperfect form. What sort of success then must that artist expect, who avows his disbelief in the reality and supremacy of the ideal? And yet the profession of disbelief can not destroy the fact of the kinship of all men and all things in the ideal, and so the sceptical poet still bears involuntary witness, by the very language he is forced to use, by his regrets, by all his intellectual behavior, to the fact that his native element is in the world of ideal, spiritual forces, which he denies. His spirit comports itself like the bird which has lost its nest and seeks in vain to find it. Thus I read in a "Paris Letter," in a recent number of the London Academy [April 24, 1875, pp. 425, 426], of a new volume of poems by Sully Prudhomme, who, it is said, has "earned his right to be ranked in the first order of contemporaneous poets"—a volume entitled "*Les Vaines Tendresses*." The author, we are told, is "not a mystic, but a philosopher trained in the school of Lucretius," i. e., of materialism. "His poems," the writer continues, "are all based on the same idea, namely, the want of harmony existing between man's aspirations and the weakness, the powerlessness, the narrow limits to which nature condemns him," forgetting, I would add, the grand

truth so sententiously expressed by Emerson, that "limitation is power that shall be," that "calamities, oppositions, and weights, are wings and means." This poet, in other words, denies all that which connects man with a world of realities that are not seen without the aid of the inner eye of reason and intuition, and can sing only in accents of regret and despair of the futility of man's higher aspirations, the falseness of his noblest instincts. Each verse of the poem cited by the correspondent as an illustration of the manner of this poet, begins with "A quoi bon?" "Of what use?" and among the subjects of which the question is asked are "plodding science" and human love. The poet is "alike unable either to believe or to refuse to believe in" the "reality" of "the infinite and the eternal." Poems written in such a frame of mind have the beauty—though it be in this case only a beauty of sadness—which is inseparable from all genuine spiritual emotion, a beauty which gives the lie to the author's scepticism; but they have not the beauty which inspires, which exalts, which inflames with the fire of ideal faith and knowledge, which transplants the soul into a sphere where it feels that it has found its true home, and is in the near presence of the Origin and End of all being. Yet they are a powerful evidence of that which the soul, not seeing or believing, must nevertheless regret with infinite and inconsolable sorrow.

I repeat the statement with which I began: Philosophy is the demonstration of the ideal as the truth and substance, the source and end, of real things. True, it is not a complete demonstration: that is to say, it has not reached that point where nothing can be added to it. It is not shut up in any one system. It is a great induction, running through all systems, and to which not only all great thinkers but the very progress of civilization itself contribute. It is not excepted, in a sense, from the law so pregnantly expressed by Lessing in the words: "*In den idealen Gebieten muss man immer mehr suchen.*" ("In ideal things man must always remain simply a seeker"). True it is that when the philosophical instinct (which is essentially universal) awakens in a youth, and he sets about the inquiry as to what is the truth of things, what conception he shall and should hold as to their nature, their meaning, their whence, what, and whither, it is only as the result of a thorough search, often involving painful endeavor, and repeated repulses, that he reaches peaceful ground, whence he may at least espy, even though he may but imperfectly possess, the fair land

of truth. And the same experience is repeated in the history of thought at large.

Now, I hold that what philosophy in its best acceptation thus seeks to demonstrate, art seeks to embody in concrete form. The philosopher thinks the true substance, the ideal—the artist feels, and loves, and is moved by it. The former would exhibit it in reasoned form, the latter in sensible types and symbols. My desire is that you should feel the necessary connection between the true theory and nature of art and such an idea of philosophy or view of the world and its contents as I have now presented to you, in distinction from all opposed philosophies, which assume that there is such a thing as independent brute matter and blind law, and that free intelligence and spirit are but a product and function of the former.

As matter of fact, we find but slight, if any, contributions to the higher comprehension of art in the history of materialistic and sceptical thought. Lucretius, the Roman poet and disciple of the Epicurean and atomic philosophy, a pure materialist and atheist, adopting the Epicurean theory of art as mere imitation—imitation in the most material sense—proposes (in his *De Rerum Natura*) to explain the difference between instrumental and vocal music as arising from the difference of the material sounds which they imitate. While the latter has arisen from the imitation of the song of birds, the former arose, according to Lucretius, from the attempt to reproduce the noises of inorganic nature, as of storms, the rushing of water, and the like (*Schasler Gesch. d. Aesthetik*, p. 210). Such “philosophizing” as this is childish. In the eighteenth century Diderot the French Encyclopædist, pantheist, and sceptic, again insisted on art as being imitation of nature, in opposition to the ideal. But he was unable to carry out the theory without surreptitiously, perhaps unconsciously, substituting for the conception of the natural—i. e., things as they really are in nature—the conception of natural truth, the truth of nature, or things as they ought to be, perfect in their kind, which in reality they never are. Thus the theory ends with a virtual admission of that which it set out to deny, namely, of the ideal as the true object of art. Diderot finds that art, like nature, has its inspiring effects, that these are inexplicable except on the hypothesis of a purely subjective, hence ideal, and invariable standard of taste, and asks whence, if you deny this hypothesis, “come those delicious emotions which arise in the soul with such suddenness and power, whence those tears of



joy, of pain, of admiration at the sight of some sublime natural spectacle or of some magnanimous action?" "Away thou sophist!" he says, "thou shalt never persuade my heart that it has no right to be thrilled, nor my bowels that they do wrong to be moved with emotion"—in opposition to what materialism, consistently applied to the theory of art, would allow. (Schasler, *loc. cit.*, 324, 325). So that, after all, according to Diderot, it is in virtue of the relation (and, I may add, the relationship or kinship) of natural and artistic forms to ideal quantities (thoughts, emotions), that the former have their artistic quality. We shall come to an allied result if, now, we consider positively the nature of art, both by and in itself, and in the light of that ideal philosophy above set forth, which we have reason to regard as the true philosophy of things.

Art is a working, an activity. It is a working with materials. These may be wood and stone, marble, the drawing-board, canvas, tones, words. In short, anything, with or upon which man exercises an external activity, may be artistically treated. But both the stone-cutter and the architect work in stone, and yet both are not artists. The like may be said of him who paints a madonna and him who paints a fence, of the man who howls and the one who sings, of the expounder of a science and of the poet. The artist is then one who works in a particular way, with his materials, and for a particular end.

Art manipulates its materials with a view to please or to move; it addresses the emotions. It does this, in the first place, by the use of forms, lines, colors which please or charm the eye, and of rhythmic forms and intonations, and sequences or combinations of tones, which similarly affect the ear. This is its immediate, sensuous effect, but not its only one. Eating and drinking produce an even greater degree of vivid, sensual gratification, yet they are not fine arts. We may, it is true, eat and drink and do all things to the glory of God, in addition to the satisfaction of our sense-desires and our bodily needs. And so the artist not only may, but necessarily does, minister to something more than a passing titillation of the senses through which his work is apprehended. Were this not so, the foreigner residing in Italy who told me that he cared less for any opera than for such immediate sensual gratification as the country afforded, would have been right. As it is, we all instinctively recognize that that man acknowledged himself more beast than man.

The pleasure which true art produces is disinterested. It is

not connected with any thought of gain or advantage to ourselves individually, whether in our pockets or as increasing the sum of our exclusively personal happiness. We are the rather lifted out of ourselves into the element where petty, personal, selfish distinctions cease. We recognize the influence exerted as ennobling, spiritualizing, and belonging of right to all men, and far from desiring to withhold it from any, we would, in the spirit of that charity which is identical with love, communicate it to all.

Again, the artist's work is free. The workman who hews stone or marble, or follows the painter's trade for his living, is subject to the law of his employers. The expounder of mathematical science uses language merely as a means to an end, as a sort of mechanical instrument of communication. The sculptor, the painter, and the poet, on the other hand, are free from any such bondage as this. Their action is, rather, spontaneous, and if subject to law, the law is given from within, and not from without. The artist, as the Germans significantly say, does not work, he plays. His play is the play of fancy—not of caprice, of personal whim, but of fancy, as the creative handmaid of mind, of the ideal, of God.

For, to complete the present enumeration of the characteristic qualities of art and of the artist, the artist is a maker, an inventor, in a secondary sense, a creator. Art is poetic (in the phraseology of Aristotle). The poet, or maker, is not simply he who makes or creates with words, but he who does this with any material whatsoever. The germ or foundation of art, as an empirical, historical development, lies unquestionably in the instinct of imitation, which is observable in almost all the plays of children. But this is not all. The photographer, in so far as he merely produces by chemical processes a correct likeness of his subjects, is no artist. The sculptor, who faithfully reproduces the bust of a living original, including all the wrinkles which care has worn on the brow, and all the accidental pimples, or even uglinesses, is no artist. Art not simply imitates nature, it idealizes. That is, it represents the natural object, not as it actually is, with its inevitable blemishes and defects, but as it ought to be, as it would be if the idea of it were perfectly realized. Or, it takes, in painting, or in scenes borrowed by poetry from common life, (as well as in other arts) definite types or aspects, and makes them the medium for the suggestive representation of ideal perfections. It is thus creative, inasmuch as it represents, at least symbolically, what does not exist in natural, physical reality. But it is not absolutely creative, in so far as



its inspiration, its ideal, is derived from a world of ideal forms, eternally existent in the mind of the Eternal One, though only caught by the favored few among mortals.

But I am anticipating my conclusion. Is it not evident, I ask, that there is more in art than in the forms and sounds of nature which the physical eye and ear perceive?

Take for example, music, the purest of the arts. The splendid harmonies of Beethoven, which inspire the listener with a whole world of new and thoughtful and most profound emotion, have but the faintest parallel in the sweetest melodies of birds. So in true poetry we are transplanted into scenes and familiarized with forms of thought, feeling, and action, which are not what actual life shows us, but such as we are sure actual life may become and tends to become. So in true sculpture and painting, the aim of which is not the mere reproduction of something seen, but the representation of something which we should like to see, which is akin to our natures, towards which our truest being strives. The Apollo Belvedere does not interest us as the likeness of any one who probably ever existed, but as expressing a phase of noble humanity, a germ of divinity. The Sistine Madonna does not please us as being a fair representation of the way the Virgin Mary may have looked, not as a noble natural form, but as portraying the possessor or parent of divine qualities.

By virtue of what, then, under the guidance of what faculty or power, does the artist work? Psychologists call it imagination, fancy, and ascribe to it, on the basis of their observation of the way in which it works, a power of original, free combination. Others speak of an artistic instinct, which, in so far as it is an instinct, must work unconsciously. It is also otherwise, and with justice, termed genius. Whatever it may be called, it must now be obvious that it addresses the mental and emotional faculties of man, i. e. those, in virtue of which he is an ideal being: that, in so far as its products differ from the products of nature, the difference must be ideally apprehended and weighed.

The ideal philosophy above set forth, the philosophy which sees in matter nothing but the growing life of spirit, in the concretely real, nothing but the expression of the ideal as that which alone is truly real; which sees, in short, in the whole universe nothing but the creation, hence the expression of the mind, of a spiritual being, i. e. of a God of wisdom, and goodness, and love, this philosophy can alone account for art and the artist. If this philosophy be

true, the root of the nature not only of man, but of all things, is in ideal, spiritual being. Such being is conscious, intelligent, intrinsically and necessarily good, and loving. The original fountain of such being, the fundamental and central personality to which its universal consciousness belongs, is called by us God.

And here I may remark, parenthetically, that it is not only those who admit the existence of a personal God who adopt a theory of art like the one here advocated. The whole army of modern pantheists admit more or less explicitly the spiritual or ideal nature and substance of all things, yet deny that the source of this nature is a personal, self-conscious being. The nature and being of things, they say, is God, but God first becomes conscious in man. Others, perceiving the absurdity of employing the word God to denote an existence of which personality is denied, and yet convinced of the truth of idealism as a theory of the nature of things, use instead the expressions "the idea," "will," "the unconscious," as names for the ideal and true essence and source of things. These men are, in my view, inconsistent, in not admitting the existence of a personal God, as the fountain and first substance of all reality. To assume the independent existence of an unconscious idea, will, or other spiritual element, seems like admitting a contradiction in terms. But notwithstanding all this, it is evident that those who hold such a view of the ideal nature of things, can and must hold a theory of art similar to that held by Christian idealism. And this also they do.

To resume: In the assumed universal consciousness are all true and perfect ideas which the one Spirit to whom they belong is seeking to realize, and does approximately and progressively realize, in this world. Indeed, the world is, in its truth, as before intimated, nothing but a complex of ideas, organically united under or within one controlling idea, or rather a complex of spiritual forces of which these ideas may be said to be the light and life, all seeking or tending to find their appropriate embodiment in concrete form. Of course these forces are always to be considered as having their origin in God, the Absolute Spirit. The life of God must be considered as the element in which they have their own true being, and whatever spontaneity they possess must be regarded as subordinate to the will and control of God.

Now, man is such a spiritual force, possessing a more or less complete consciousness of itself and of its parentage and kinship. His daily, transient consciousness excludes largely, in some cases

almost entirely, from his attention the life of the ideal principle, which is his true and best life, the life which ought to be. Hence the assumption of idealistic psychologists—an assumption amply illustrated in the world's best literature and verified by reason and observation—of what may be called a double life of the soul, the one, the lower, involved in all the changing and ephemeral variety of sensible impressions, the other and higher, the life of the soul in the pure and immutable element of the eternally true and good. And just as the whole world, in the language of the apostle, "travaileth and groaneth" in the slowly accomplished endeavor to bring to the birth—i. e. to adequate realization—the complete idea which underlies it, which is its true being, which is what it ought to be, so the higher life of the soul seeks to gain the mastery over the lower, to raise it as nearly as may be to its own level, to bring it under its own direction, and not only thus to shape the thoughts and life according to its own high standard, but also to bring all which it handles into conformity with the ideally perfect, in which it has its true life. True art I hold to be the work of this higher Psyche.

If this opinion be true, we can understand the distinction between the genius which constitutes the real artist, and talent, which makes its possessor only a skilful workman. We can understand also how the fancy of the former, which is popularly said to know no law, and which is yet so unerring in its results, is simply under the guidance of a higher law, the law of the true ideal, to which the natural or lower man rises only with difficulty. Says Schopenhauer, in effect: "Talent is like a rifleman, who hits the most distant mark that is visible to ordinary eyes; Genius is like a rifleman who hits a mark which is only visible to himself." Genius, the true artist, that is to say, works under the guidance of the higher life of the soul, in its true ideal element; talent works according to the laws of the lower every day consciousness. We now see how an "artistic instinct" can be spoken of, and how not only, as Schiller says, in the poetic artist, but in the artist of whatever kind, there is a union of the (so-called) unconscious (say, rather, the supra-conscious) and the reflective. The "unconscious" element, namely, is the true ideal life emerging and taking the life and the ways of ordinary reflection under its control.\*

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\* Reflective science does not discover the laws of genius until *after* genius, proceeding without any formal or scientific consciousness of them, has already illustrated them in its works.

Upon this theory, too, we see how the genuine artistic product may be, as it generally is, called a "revelation." It brings to light something entirely new, for which our experience gives us no standard of judgment, and which nevertheless we as if instinctively recognize as true. How often do the greatest strokes of genius in all the arts impress us as being the simplest and most natural things in the world! Yet we know that we could not by our ordinary powers have accomplished them. It is that our inner selves are at home, however unconsciously to us, in an ideal realm of perfect being, and that when its light is brought down to us and embodied before us, we cannot but feel at home in it. We can understand now the intense and exalting emotion produced upon us by the noblest art. We are elevated by it from the lower to the higher, from an atmosphere of confusion and error into one of simplicity and truth, from clouds and darkness into serene and unchangeable light. We see, too, how the artist may be said to be "possessed" or "inspired." His true being asserts itself and has possession of him, to the exclusion of his lower, degenerate self. We see with what significance he is designated by Plato as "a light and winged and holy thing," "moved by power divine," "divinely released from the ordinary ways of man." On the basis of the philosophy of this paper you may also perceive how the artist can copy natural forms to express an ideal substance. For as before remarked, in connection with the etymology of the word idea, that which in the realm of spirit or thought is idea, is in the realm of concrete expression form, and all forms are but servants, media for the manifestation of ideas in which alone they have their true existence. And we see that if, as is the fact, the artist does not literally reproduce nature's forms, but creates something in a measure different, his work, however idealized, will, if it be truly artistic work, never seem to us unnatural. We shall the rather, as in fact we usually do, term it supremely natural. It presents more or less perfectly the true nature of the object represented—the true idea of it—what it must concretely become in order to attain objectively to its true being.

Our conclusion then is that the artist, in so far as he is truly such, is the representer of true being, in forms which are addressed to the senses. His works have an independent value, the intrinsic value of truth. They are created for their own sake, and not for use, nor, in their truest sense, for pleasure. They excite the deepest emotions, but these emotions are not in them-



selves the true object or end of art. They are only its necessary result and concomitant, arising from the appeal which it makes for comprehension to what is highest, truest, most real in ourselves. True works of art are inspired from above, and not from below; from the more exalted, true life which man leads (whether always consciously or unconsciously) in the realm of real spiritual being, in alliance with the everlasting forms of true being, in direct relation with the Father of all spirits, and not from the lower life and consciousness which are forced upon us from our association with the finite, imperfect scenes of every day life, and which are therefore not of our making, and hence not truly ours—not a part of ourselves. The artist, the man of genius, works spontaneously and freely, and yet in accordance with the perfect, simple law of the idea. There is in his work that mysterious combination of freedom and necessity, which is observable in all the highest types of moral perfection. The same element in which he lives and works, and which lives and works in him, the element which we term, in the last and highest analysis, the Spirit of God, operates throughout the universe in the history of men and nations, and no less in the lower realms of organized and inorganic being, slowly and surely working out, under forms of unerring law, the purposes of the Idea. This operation, viewed often from a narrower point of view, is termed providence. Everywhere there is the spontaneous working of derived force, and the inworking, the inspiration, of true being. By this view we are taught, as Goethe puts it:

“To know our brothers in air, and water, and the silent wood,”

All nature is akin, and art is but the endeavor of man, that part of nature which is most near to the divine mind, (which mind is the truth—but also more than the truth—of nature) to help nature to perfection, to complete the incomplete, to substitute the true and real for the partly true and imperfectly real.

I have not time to show you in detail how this result is practically verified, by reference to the lives of the great artists of all ages. It will be sufficient if you recall the fact that the masters of Grecian art, of mediæval Gothic architecture, of Italian art, of modern music, were all men of deep piety or of a lofty ideal faith. Listen to the words of the giant-soul Michael Angelo, taken from one of his translated sonnets. They indicate the source whence he, at least, sought inspiration:

“Heaven-born, the soul a heavenward course must hold.  
 Beyond the visible world she soars to seek  
 (For what delights the sense is false and weak)  
 Ideal form, the universal mould.”

Listen to the greatest musical composer of all times, a true Platonist in spirit, Beethoven, declaring that his art, “music, is a higher revelation than all wisdom and all philosophy;” and to another, of kindred spirit with the master, saying that wonderful and unfathomable as are its mysteries, yet it “dwells in the breast of man himself, and so fills his inner nature with its generous manifestations, that his whole sense is turned towards them, and a new, transfigured life wrests him, even while he is yet here below, from the crushing weight and torment of earthly things.” It is enough for my purpose to ask you to look further for yourselves into the biographies of the greatest artists and into the moral and intellectual history of their times (into which Taine does not enter deeply enough), and to see how their own faith coincided in substance with the views which I have placed before you.

It remains for us now only to form our judgment upon Mr. Taine’s philosophy of art, in the light of the convictions here reached. I would term it rather incomplete, than false. It would be erroneous to claim that it is a complete theory of that which it would explain, for a reason precisely similar to that which would forbid our admitting the entire sufficiency of a philosophy of things in general, which should proceed only by what is falsely termed the positive method, (as, for the most part, for example, Mr. Herbert Spencer’s philosophy does). There are two ways of looking at things, viz: from without and from within. By the one method we simply record the impressions which phenomena produce on the observer, together with the order in which they are seen to coexist or to follow each other. By the other we seek to enter into the nature of things, to comprehend the force which causes them, and which constitutes their true being. Both methods have their place, and are indispensable instruments of human knowledge. Neither of them can long exist without the other. But only the latter is truly philosophical. The former provides just such results as any animal with fair logical powers, with well developed faculties of analysis and classification, but without the rational insight and emotion of man, would arrive at. By this I do not wish to throw any discredit—to attempt this would be foolish—upon positive science and the positive method. They



are grandly useful, and when their philosophical worth is not unduly estimated, worthy of most grateful praise. I mean simply to intimate that they are the servants of man, and not his master, and that they are therefore the servants of philosophy, which is the highest rational function of man, and not its master. The positive method, dealing only with phenomena, furnishes no knowledge of the real nature of things. Its ablest representatives disavow with reason all knowledge of what matter, force, and cause are. It retains the words as being conditionally necessary to the existence of science. Sometimes it forgets its own limitations, and then proceeding to define, gives to the words in question meanings which it is easy to show are absurd.

Now, Mr. Taine does not belong avowedly to the so-called positivist school, but he follows a positive method. And he incautiously defines these fundamental terms, just spoken of, proceeds theoretically on the assumption of the truth of his definitions, and so passes over or attempts to pass over on to the ground of philosophy, carrying with him his positive method (the method of the science of phenomena), which is only adapted to serve the purposes of scientific or accurate observation, and not of philosophy, the science of principles. Here is his luminous (!) definition of force, taken from his comparatively recent and extensive work on *Intelligence*: "Force is simply the property which one event has of being followed by another of the same series or of another series." The result of this singular and absurd definition (and yet not any more absurd than were to be expected from a substitution of the "positive" method—as above explained—for the philosophical one) is the frank avowal by the author of his disbelief in the existence of what is commonly understood by substance and force. "Nothing exists," these are his words, "but events, their conditions, and dependencies." (What these can be, without substance or force, I know not. M. Taine treats them, at any rate, from the mechanical or positive [phenomenal] point of view only.) Again he says, "the notion of fact or event alone corresponds to real things." M. Taine's positive analysis here leads him away into the mists of an abstract, mechanical phenomenalism. Again, in various works of his he defines cause as equivalent to law, that is, observed law of succession and co-existence. The shallowness of this I have not time to point out. It will, I trust, be sufficiently obvious to you. Now bear these definitions in mind and consider the following definition of the masterpiece in art, taken from his "Ideal in

Art:" "The masterpiece is that in which the greatest force receives the greatest development." Substitute for the word force in this sentence the definition of it above given, and the same for the word cause (which is implied in the word "development"), and see what sense you can make of it. *Philosophy* of art, or of anything else, written from the stand-point of a principle so contradictory and meaningless as this, can end only in the absurd. The cause, says M. Taine, is the law. The law about art is that it corresponds to its environment. Does the law then account for the correspondence? Does it really cause it? No, it simply states what is the observable order of phenomena. That there is such correspondence is what we should expect, from whatever point of view we regard the subject. For the philosopher it follows as the simplest matter of course that in a world where all things are believed to be akin in the foundation of their being, and where this foundation is believed to be rational, there should be, so far as the limitations of finite existence will permit, the strictest harmony between the conditions and the product. And if, as we are compelled to hold, the high and fundamental ideal nature of things, is constantly seeking throughout the universe to realize itself more adequately, we shall of course look for the brightest manifestations of it where there is the most favorable union of conditions—for there it will meet with least resistance. And so we have, in the history of modern times, three great efflorescences of the ideal in art—first in architecture, then in painting, and finally in music—each at the time when circumstances and conditions were most favorable, i. e., when they offered least resistance to the idea, but each the manifestation under a form of its own of the same ideal principle, the same kinship of man with the eternal, the same love of the soul for the perfect simplicities, harmonies, splendors of the ideal world of true thought.

I must consider M. Taine's contributions to the *philosophy* of art as of slight value, as, in fact, false except where, as on pp. 160, 169 of the *Art en Italie*, he admits causes and motives\* which are in contradiction with his general philosophy. But as a contribution to what may be called the natural history of art, his works are of exceeding interest and great value.

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\* The former spontaneous, the latter ideal.

## EMPIRICISM AND COMMON LOGIC.

BY JOHN WATSON.

The aim of a philosophy being to give a full and self-consistent explanation of knowledge, its value may be exactly estimated by its freedom from the presuppositions and inconsistencies of ordinary thinking. The impulse to know necessarily precedes any doubt of the attainability of knowledge, or any analysis of the grounds on which it rests. The unreflecting observer, whose only speculative notions are those that have nourished his mind as unconsciously as food and air have helped to build up his body, can only by an effort comprehend that facts, apparently simple and self-evident, need for their ultimate justification to be brought to the test of philosophical criticism. Least of all has he any tendency to suspect the truth of those beliefs, that concern the nature of the common world of sense, which seems simply to copy itself in the passive mirror of his own consciousness. That there exists, apart in itself, and just as he perceives it, a world of realities, that was before any mind was there to know it, and would be if every mind were annihilated, he does not once begin to doubt. The elements of which this really complex conception is the product were never consciously distinguished, and are now so completely fused together as to seem an indissoluble unity. Hence, when philosophy seeks to resolve knowledge into its primal constituents, the preconceptions of common sense, from which it must needs start, offer a stubborn resistance to the successful completion of the task. To a failure to overcome this hindrance to a thorough analysis and reconstruction of knowledge, the philosophical theory known as Empiricism owes its origin.

The first and crudest form of Empiricism simply formulates what is most obviously in every one's consciousness, maintaining that all real knowledge is of individual things, as manifoldly qualified and self-existent, i. e. as unrelated either to consciousness or to each other. These objects are supposed to be passively apprehended by sense, in their integrity and isolation, without any exercise of thought. A distinction, indeed, is usually made between secondary qualities of body, which are only affections of the sensitive organism, and primary qualities, which have an extra-organic existence; but this in no way affects the fundamental position, that objects exist as they are known, and are known as they exist.

As things with the full complement of attributes that make up their reality, are thus given ready-made to sense, thought is necessarily conceived as purely formal in its activity. Incapable of originating anything, it can only compare one object with another, detach resembling qualities and recombine them after a fashion of its own. In this way general conceptions are formed, which only differ from the real things they are abstracted from in the possession of fewer attributes and in the arbitrariness of their unity. In the language of Locke, "general and universal belong not to the real existence of things, but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding." Hence an abrupt contrast of sense and thought, things and conceptions. To think is to relate, and relation destroys the individuality of objects, putting asunder what nature has joined together. Knowledge, it would seem, takes place only when the mind passively reflects the world; it is adequate when, undisturbed by the "inventions" of the understanding, it reflects that world fully. It follows that we must think in a different way from what we know, and that the understanding can only produce an illusion of knowledge. If the preservation of reality depends upon the exclusion of relation, the only thing left for thought to do is to convert reality into fiction.

This theory commends itself to an ordinary way of thinking, and seems to account for knowledge simply and naturally. True as it seems, however, it is at once superficial and self-contradictory. Its validity depends upon the possibility of keeping intact the isolation of individual objects, for once bring them into relation and they will be infected with the taint of thought. Can the antithesis of things and thoughts, implied in such an isolation, be consistently maintained? If an object, as a complex of qualities, is given to sense apart from relation, it must be known in a simple and momentary act of consciousness; for, were a separate sensation needed for the knowledge of each of its several qualities, a series of relations would be required to combine these qualities into a unity, and the opposition of thing and thought would be destroyed. On the other hand, what are the properties of an object but the sum of its relations to other objects? I can only think of a quality as at once the quality of a thing and as distinguished from, and therefore related to, other qualities of a like kind. "Determination by negation" is the condition of any knowledge whatever of a thing as qualified, and what is so determined is brought into relation with other things. To think of



“gold” as “yellow,” implies a comparison of the sensation by which the quality is known with other sensations of color to which it is negatively related, and, more obviously, the quality of ductility or solubility involves a series of relations to other things. The knowledge of each of the qualities that together make up the object, implies a relation to other objects as qualified. And not only is each of the qualities of a thing determined by its relation to the qualities of other things, but all the qualities that belong to the same thing are determined, by successive judgments, as related to each other. When one property has been judged to belong to a thing, it is conceived as attaching naturally to that thing and forming an integral part of it, and thus a fresh determination of the partially qualified object becomes possible. It is again brought into relation with other objects, and a property, different in kind from that already known, is added. Thus I judge that the object called “gold,” which I already know to be “yellow,” is also “soluble in aqua regia.” In this way, by being successively brought into relation with other things, a thing multiplies in attributes exactly as knowledge concerning it increases. But if so, what becomes of the assumed opposition between thought and reality? Either the real existence of the individual does not depend upon its being completely qualified, or reality is constituted by relations of thought. To accept the latter alternative is to abandon the fundamental position of Empiricism; and hence, still grasping at the antithesis of nature and thought, its advocates try to preserve the reality of knowledge by maintaining that, while sensation does not reveal a variously qualified object, it makes known a quality in its singleness. For the individual, in other words, is substituted the particular; for isolated things, isolated qualities of things. Thought is still regarded as inadequate to a knowledge of the real, from its incompetence to apprehend objects in their unrelated simplicity, but its domain is vastly enlarged, and its method of procedure reversed. Whatever complexity may be shown to attach to knowledge is referred to the inventive activity of the understanding; and, as complexity can only result from the putting together of simple elements, thinking is now regarded as a gradual process of com-  
plication, and not, as formerly, of abstraction, or at least of the former as the condition of the latter. Does this revision of Empiricism successfully avoid the introduction of relativity into the knowledge of real existence?

A negative answer to this question has already been given by implication. The knowledge of a single quality involves relations of thought not less than the knowledge of a multiplicity of qualities. By identifying a momentary sensation with the quality of a thing which is not momentary but permanent, something unaffected by illusion seems to be obtained. This seeming exclusion of illusion, however, is itself illusive. Just because a sensation is in itself simple and individual, and therefore free from relation, it cannot be identified with the quality of a thing which is neither simple nor individual. The latter is a registered result of a series of comparisons between like sensations, and therefore is overlaid by the invention of the understanding. Only as arrested in the moment of its disappearance from consciousness by something other than itself, and fixed by relation to other sensations, whose mere individuality is likewise converted into universality, does a sensation become representative of the quality of a thing. Quality is meaningless except as relative to a substance which it qualifies, i. e., to something which remains identical with itself through a multiplicity of times. Nothing less than this is involved in the distinction of reality and fiction. But as sensation cannot survive the moment of its origination without distinguishing itself as existing at one moment from itself as existing at a different moment, and such distinction involves relation to something that does not pass away. Nor can a sensation be identical with itself, for successive sensations, while they may be similar, cannot be the same. Thus the contradiction implicit in the opposition of thought and reality once more emerges, and again forces upon us the alternative of giving up the knowledge of the real, or of admitting the origínative activity of thought. The attempt to exclude thought from the construction of reality has already compelled the Empiricist to attenuate real knowledge to the reception of single qualities in their isolation; and now, still refusing to adopt the only way of escape that will at once break down the false antithesis of thought and knowledge, and at the same time account for real existence, he clings to the reality of mere sensation rather than surrender his belief in the passivity of the mind. It may be impossible, as it is, to apprehend a complex of qualities, or even a single quality, in a momentary act of consciousness; as it may, and must be admitted that there is no external object, independent of consciousness; but at least the reality of sensation, which cannot be infected



with relations of thought, is indubitable. This is the attitude of the Empiricist, as at last brought to bay. The realm of illusion has now encroached so far upon the world of reality as to threaten completely to submerge it, and the only defence against the advancing tide of scepticism is the thin barrier of individual sensation. That gone, the only way in which the domain of real knowledge can be retained must be by a complete change of method. Meantime, what has to be explained is not the knowledge of a real world, existing apart in itself, but the fiction by which we come to imagine that there is such a world.

The two forms of the Empirical hypothesis now considered, which are not only diverse but contradictory—the one maintaining that knowledge begins where, according to the other, it ends—are not to be found anywhere stated with that explicitness which at once manifests their inherent opposition. But, by stripping off the disguise of ambiguous language and misleading associations, they may be discerned, lying side by side in contrasting juxtaposition, in the pages of Locke, of the Scottish Realists, and, generally, of all Empiricists. This, indeed, is inevitable; for the dialectic which transforms the uncritical assumption of a self-dependent world into its opposite, is continually repeated in the arena of ordinary consciousness itself. The one position to which common sense remains true is that the mind is passively receptive of reality, and that objects are given in an instantaneous act of consciousness. But while, in the main, what is apprehended seems to be the manifoldly qualified individual, there are cases in which qualities are apparently given singly, as when an odor or taste is felt for the first time, a sound newly heard, or a sudden change of color perceived. Formulated, the seeming difference of complexity in the content of sensation comes forth as the two theories of knowledge, whose incompatibility has just been shown. Moreover, common sense, in holding, as it certainly does in an unconscious way, that the test of reality is the immediateness of sensation, virtually surrenders the test of reality as determined by the independence of a material object—the stage at which we have now arrived in our criticism of Empiricism.

This new simplification of Empiricism has been already refuted by anticipation. Nothing of the original theory remains except the antithesis of sensation as real, and thought as fictitious, but even this modest claim to reality cannot be consistently maintained. The workmanship of the mind will manifest itself in the

very rudiments of knowledge, and force the admission of the constructive activity of thought. Not even the mere individuality of sensation can substantiate its plea for exemption from the inventions of the understanding. An isolated sensation cannot be real, because, as indeterminate, it is mere zero. To be in consciousness at all, it must be related to other sensations, to which it is at once like and unlike. Mere sensation cannot account for the appearance of knowledge, not to speak of reality, for in itself it is nothing. This objection cannot be met, it can only be disguised. The individual sensation must be complicated with the constructions of thought, under shelter of ambiguous phraseology, in order that its seeming independence of thought may be plausibly preserved. This is the cue of Berkeley and Hume, as of all their followers. The sleight of hand by which the mystification is effected is a dexterous use of such expressions as "natural relations," and "association of ideas," which cover, but do not dispense with, the creative activity of thought.

It is by surreptitiously investing sensation with relations of thought, while seeming to extract them from it in its simplicity, that Mr. Mill gives plausibility to his "psychological theory of the belief in an external world." He "postulates" the "laws of association," which, as sensations do associate themselves, is tacitly to assume at the outset the manifold relations which only thought can constitute. Following Hume, he starts with the "law" that "similar phenomena tend to be thought of together," i. e., with association in the way of resemblance. Assuming that "phenomena" here means feelings, as it should in a theory which feigns to derive the conception of matter from sensation, as originally given or as reproduced, the law must be interpreted to signify that those sensations which have a natural affinity for each other tend to coalesce and form groups. This clearly implies that one sensation compares itself with another, and, observing the likeness and unlikeness that subsists between them, attaches itself to the other in virtue of their mutual likeness. This, however, is not to derive knowledge from simple sensations, but to destroy their simplicity by investing them with the faculty of comparison, distinction, and identification. If a sensation is competent to perform this act of relation, it is competent to perform any act of relation, however complex. Grant that the sensation "white" may distinguish itself from, and relate itself to, the sensation "red," and we cannot deny that it may equally

retain and compare itself successively with any indefinite number of sensations, until it has compassed a knowledge of the whole universe. In assuming that a sensation carries with it relations to other sensations, we assume what is true not of sensation in itself, but only of the mind as conscious of sensation. Association by resemblance involves the presence of a permanent factor to serve as a bond of connection between fleeting impressions, taking them out of their isolation and relating them to each other, and such a permanent factor can be found in thought alone. It is true that thought does not separately apprehend sensations, and afterward compare and relate them. The relation is given in the consciousness of each, but not the less is the active presence of thought implied; for were there no unifying activity, even the meagre amount of relation required for the consciousness of two sensations in one act would be impossible. To be consistent in excluding the constitutive action of thought, even the seemingly trifling admission that an individual sensation may in itself resemble another sensation cannot be allowed. The admission, however, is not trifling; for, once allow that sensation may perform any act of relation whatever, and no limit can be set to its relating activity. We have but to take association by resemblance to cover association in the way of succession and co-existence, and the belief in an external world follows as a matter of course. The permanence and self-dependence of things, which is what mainly distinguishes them from our subjective states, is tacitly assumed when, under the disguise of association by resemblance, a self in permanent relation to sensation is quickly substituted for sensation in its mere individuality. By its power of universalizing the particular, thought, if granted sensations to begin with, will rear the whole fabric of knowledge. This is the secret of the plausibility of Mr. Mill's reduction of the belief in matter to mere feeling. The laws of association that he postulates at the start, implicitly contain the manifold relations by which knowledge, as it is to a rational being, is constituted. Any one of a group of resembling sensations (in the wide meaning of resemblance above mentioned) instantaneously suggests all the others that, by frequent repetition, have become inseparably associated with it; and, uniformity of association being inevitably confounded with objective connection, permanent possibilities of sensation come at length to appear self-identical and independent of the sensations from which they were

generated. Now, if for "permanent possibilities of sensation" we substitute "permanent relations of thought to sensation," this account of the origin of real knowledge will be fairly accurate, although to do so is not to correct but completely to change the theory. It is, roughly speaking, by a comparison of resembling sensations, i. e., sensations that are at once like and unlike, that that "determination by negation" which is the condition of knowledge, is carried on. But thus to compare and distinguish is not passively to apprehend impressions, but to substantiate them by relations that only thought can constitute. Thus the so-called "laws" of association are seen to be the bringing of the particular under categories. The minimum of knowledge is the judgment "something is here," and "something" is implicitly a "permanent possibility of sensations," because, being the reflex of a permanent self, it is a completely qualified thing in potentiality. Unlike a sensation, it does not pass away with the moment of its appearance, but remains identical with itself. At each fresh stage in the development of thought a more concrete category comes into play, and the goal of perfected knowledge is the thing in the fullness of its relations. But if this is a true account of knowledge, the only thing that can, with absolute truth, be called a "permanent possibility of sensations" is thought itself. Things are so named only in the secondary sense of deriving their permanence from the unifying action of thought. As permanent they are the universalizations of the individual through the particular, as thought is the individualization of the particular through its own universality. Thus substances lose that aspect of hard and rigid isolation which they present to the eye of sense, and become instinct with the life of thought. They are seen to be constituted by a universe of relations, of which self-consciousness is at once the centre and the circumference, the beginning and the end, and to manifest the self-development of an eternal and immortal spirit. The relative positions of thought and nature thus change places. Starting with the familiar opposition of sense and thought, things and conceptions, we have found that, by simply forcing Empiricism to account for itself, one portion of the domain of nature after another has to be given up, until at last there is none that has not come under the sway of thought. When even the individuality of sensation has been wrested from the grasp of the Empiricist, his last hold upon reality is loosened, and with it the possibility of accounting



for even the appearance of knowledge; from all of which we learn the lesson that there is no sure halting-place short of an absolute idealism that recognizes the rationality of the real and the reality of the rational.

The impotence of Empiricism to account for knowledge, or even the illusion of knowledge, having been proved, there can be no great difficulty in showing the futility of common logic, as an explanation of the powers of thought. Formulating the pre-conceptions of common sense, Empiricism gives two mutually contradictory theories of knowledge; maintaining, on the one hand, that the individual thing, as a complex of attributes, is given ready-made to consciousness, and on the other hand that the real as presented is the mere individual. From these opposite views have grown up the two forms of the logic of common sense—syllogistic or deductive logic, corresponding to the form, and applied or inductive logic, based upon the latter—which are really contradictory of each other, with whatever plausibility they may be reconciled.

Syllogistic logic, as its origin necessitates, is nominalism. The concrete thing being assumed to be given, as concrete, to start with, apart from any activity of thought, the only thing left for thought to do is to recombine in an arbitrary manner the attributes it has stripped off. At each stage in the process, thought is going farther away from reality, and when it has reached the goal of its efforts it has succeeded so well that all determination has been removed, and nothing remains but a contentless abstraction. This is the theory of generalization upon which the syllogism is based, and hence reasoning is supposed to be the inverse process of gradually adding on the attributes that have been taken away, until the concrete object, with which thought is supposed to begin, is again reached.

A general conception, according to this account, must be related to reality as its negation. Thus an uncompromising opposition is set up between the world of things and the world of thought. Conceptions, indeed, are said to coincide with things, but only in the sense that their content, being partially identical with the attributes of objects—it can never be completely identical—is not positively contradictory of them. The only reality, therefore, that can be predicated of conceptions, as conceptions, is the meaning of the names by which they are expressed. If this is a correct account of the powers of thought, it follows that



thinking consists, not in the knowledge of reality, but in gradually receding from reality, and that thought will be most perfect when knowledge has been reduced to the unthinkable abstraction of "pure being." This result is simply the logical complement of that reduction of knowledge to the mere individuality of sensation, which is the outcome of Empiricism as a psychological theory; for an individual sensation, as indeterminate, is simply the abstraction of relation to consciousness, and therefore identical with the category of "being." Nor, again, is it possible to add the smallest item to the knowledge we are assumed to start with, for to think is to abstract, and thus to take from the store of knowledge we already possess, not to increase it. Thought is therefore tied down to the analysis of the meaning of names, and the explicit declaration of that meaning in propositions or syllogisms. There is no way of escape from this conclusion, so long as real objects are assumed to be given to consciousness without any exercise of thought. What is called conceptualism is but a less consistent nominalism. To say, as the conceptualists do, that conceptions are as real as the things of which they are more or less meagre outlines, is as contradictory as to maintain that the reflection of an object is real in the same sense as the object itself. As the only reality that can be ascribed to an image as such is borrowed from what it represents. So the only reality of a conception is its relation to things, i. e., the signification of its name. At the most, a conception can only be a greater or less approximation to reality. It is not pretended that the processes of abstraction and generalization in any way affect the real existence of objects, and hence thought must be nearest to real knowledge when it is least exercised. Even the minimum of abstraction, the elimination of the particular place and time in which the individual is presented in perception, must falsify real existence to that extent, as the maximum must completely destroy it. A general conception is admittedly thinkable only through its relations to individuals, which just means that to have real knowledge we must go back to the completely qualified object from which we set out; and this is nominalism.

Refusing, as we must, to accept the conceptualistic correction of nominalism, it follows that no general proposition is adequate to the expression of reality. In every such proposition the subject is a general conception, and therefore the recorded result of a greater or less remove from reality. All conceptions being

formed by a process of abstraction, their connotation is necessarily less than that of the concrete thing from which they are abstracted; and, as thought can originate nothing of itself, judgment can only consist in stating explicitly the attributes which are implicit in conception, i. e., in evolving the meaning of a name. Hence all general propositions at least must be merely verbal. A judgment is simply the analysis of the meaning of a conception already known, and the form of predication an index that such an analysis has been made. In a general proposition there is less expressed in the predicate than is implied in the subject, it being merely affirmed that a given conception contains a certain attribute or attributes among others. Thus, in the proposition "gold is a metal," it is asserted that of the totality of attributes signified by the name "gold," those attributes connoted by the term "metal" form a part. A judgment, on this theory, is not a way of attaining to real knowledge, but a way of getting away from it. It indicates a further advance than conception in that process of abstraction which only ends with the disappearance of the last vestige of reality. One result of this falsification of the process of thought is the impossibility of the science of nature. No aggregation of singular propositions is competent to the expression of a law of nature; for this only a general proposition will serve, and such a proposition, as it seems, is inadequate to express real knowledge. Do we, then, reach a more satisfactory result by limiting ourselves to singular propositions? No, for any predication whatever implies an act of abstraction, and therefore destroys reality. If, in the proposition, "this rose is red," we suppose the subject to refer to a concrete object existing here and now, the predicate expresses the abstraction of the attribute "red" from the complex of attributes given, and therefore converts reality into illusion. The only way, it would appear, in which the reality of things may be preserved is not to judge of them at all; which just means that, thought being impossible without relation, nothing real can be thought. It is hardly necessary to point out that, as the individual cannot be judged of without losing its reality, so neither can it be known, since knowledge implies judgment. But if so, not even the precarious footing that science may seem to have in the singular proposition can be maintained, since a singular is no more competent than a general proposition to express anything real. These results cannot be avoided by changing our point of view from

the connotation to the denotation of terms. This alteration simply makes the futility of syllogistic logic as an account of the process of knowing, more obvious. If the relation expressed by a proposition is that of a part to a whole of extension, the predicate merely states that of a certain number of individuals indicated by a class, the fewer number of individuals expressed by the subject are a part. If the proposition "gold is a metal," means, as is implied in the theory of conversion, that the individuals named "gold" are some of the aggregate of individuals called "metals," evidently we are simply repeating what we are already supposed to know, without advancing a single step. And if we accept the doctrine of "the qualification of the predicate" and its consequences, it is not less evident that, as the individuals composing the class "metals," to which the predicate refers, can only be those which are indicated by the subject, viz: those composing the species "gold," the proposition is but the identical one, "gold is gold," and an identical proposition is merely verbal. This is what is implied in setting up the "law of identity" as the supreme canon of affirmative propositions; for the formula  $A$  is  $A$ , is, like the category of "being," the mere abstraction of relation to consciousness, and only affirms that what is in consciousness is in consciousness.

After what has been said as to the relation of conceptions and propositions, few words are needed to dispose of the syllogism. As the proposition is a more decided departure from reality than the conception, so the syllogism carries the process of abstraction still further. Having reduced the number of attributes of a conception by predication, the syllogism reduces the attributes thus obtained by a new predication. Thus, to retain our former example, the totality of attributes signified by the name "gold" being limited to those connoted by the term "metal," a further limitation is effected by predicating "substance" of "metal," which gives a syllogism in the fourth figure:

Gold is a metal.

A metal is a substance.

Therefore gold is a substance,

in which the conclusion expresses a more advanced stage of retrogression from reality than either of the premises, being in fact simply the subject of the major premise after abstraction has been made from all attributes except those connoted by the term "substance." There is here no real inference, no advance from

the "known to the unknown," but a mere change of name in conformity with a changed point of view. Hence there is no adequate reason for restricting formal reasoning to three terms and three propositions; an indefinite number of terms and propositions may be linked together by simply carrying on the process of abstraction until, by successive acts, we have entirely eliminated detemnation. This is the rationale of the "Sorites," which shows that any number of propositions may be strung together by taking the predicate of one proposition as the subject of the next. The ordinary syllogism is simply the union of two purely verbal propositions, and may be thus stated: a thing which, under one aspect, is called by a certain name, may also, under another aspect, be called by another name, and under a different aspect by a still different name; as, in the example given above, "gold," which is so called from connoting certain attributes, may also be called, when regarded as having fewer attributes, by the name "metal," and, as possessed of still fewer attributes, by the name "substance." Syllogistic logic, when thus reduced to its bare formalism, may well be regarded as admitting only of "trifling propositions." A like result is of course reached by an examination of the syllogism of extension. If the qualified predicates of the premises are really identical with their respective subjects, the quantified predicate of the conclusion will be identical with its own subject. Thus, stated tersely, our former example of the syllogism becomes,

Gold = the metal named gold = the substance named gold.\*

Syllogistic logic is thus based upon a radical misconception of the relation of thought and knowledge. To assume that we already know is not to account for knowledge, and this is what the restricting of thought to an analysis of the meaning of names implies. The actual process of thinking is exactly the reverse of what formal logic supposes it to be. The completely qualified individual is the goal and not the starting-point of knowledge. Thinking is a gradual progress from the abstract to the concrete, and not the reverse, as Empiricism and common logic assume. It is true that of the absolutely abstract nothing can be said, as the absolutely concrete is the ideal mark toward which the individual thinker is continually pressing forward, but to which he never completely attains. The beginning of intelligent con-

\* NOTE.—The validity of formal logic is ably discussed, from a different point of view, by Prof. Vera. *Jour. Spec. Phil.*, Vol. VII., No. 3, p. 60 ff.



consciousness is the opposition of an object to self, as expressed in the formula: "something is present to me which I did not make for myself." Nothing less is involved in any theory which is to account for knowledge at all, and what it implies is that the mere individual, as out of relation to thought, is unknowable. From this minimum of relation, intelligence advances to new and wider relations, so that the most complete knowledge is also the most complex. Hence the substitution of a true conception of the universal for the false conception which identifies it with a class name. The universal is the sum of relations by which a thing is determined as real, the absolute universal the totality of relations of all things to each other. And, as things owe their relations to self-consciousness, from self-consciousness all reality proceeds and to it all must return. The conception of logic, as the science of thought, is thus thoroughly altered and simplified. The false antithesis of nature and thought, experience and reasoning, disappears when it is seen that nature or experience is constituted by relations to universal thought or reason. So, too, the hard opposition of "matter" and "form," "concrete" and "abstract," "connotative" and "non-connotative," breaks down upon a perception of their strict corelativity. Finally, to give one other instance, analysis and synthesis, deduction and induction, are transcended by a process, which at once differentiates and integrates, individualizes and universalizes.

And this leads us to consider the logical system that has grown out of the second form of Empiricism—the so-called Inductive Logic. A more thorough attempt to exclude relations of thought, leads the Empiricist, as we have seen, to maintain that knowledge begins with individual sensations, as representatives of single qualities of objects, and that thought consists in putting together the "simple ideas" thus given to it. Reality is now assumed to lie, not in the complex of qualities constituting a thing, but in these qualities taken separately. As, however, consciousness of the quality of a thing implies relation as much as consciousness of a number of qualities, Empiricism, striving to be consistent in excluding the activity of thought, finally seeks to derive knowledge from simple sensations or copies of sensation. But as no progress can be made from pure sensation to something other than itself, the reality or even the appearance of knowledge can be accounted for only by the reintroduction of that relation to self-consciousness which is ostensibly excluded; and



hence permanent, identical and mutually related things are quietly substituted for momentary and isolated sensations, under cover of habitual associations. Upon this compromise between a pure sensationalism and a thorough idealism the common theory of induction is founded. Were the Empiricist consistent in admitting nothing but feeling as it is to the individual, a science of nature, or even the fiction of such a science, would be inexplicable. Hence, while pretending to deny the origina-tive activity of thought, he tacitly assumes that objects are independent of feeling, and thus brings back the relations he seems to exclude. As was to be expected from its genesis, the ordinary inductive logic is a mixture of truth and error. Unlike syllogistic logic, it correctly represents knowledge as gradually proceeding from the abstract to the concrete, the past to the future, the known to the unknown; but of the ultimate grounds upon which the validity of this process rests it can give no consistent account. That the canons of inductive logic are valid within the sphere of physical science, we have no wish to deny; the point at issue is whether the method which they formalize is justifiable, upon the assumption that all knowledge originates in feeling.

The foundation of induction are those uniformities or laws of nature which, on the Empirical "hypothesis" of their origin, we must suppose to be passively apprehended by experience. If there were no such laws, no general propositions in regard to nature would be possible. These uniformities are mainly reducible to the law of causation, which, upon the supposition that thought has no constructive power, is explained to be an observed uniformity of succession, not between things, but between feelings. There is no necessary connection of events, although there is a fixed order in their succession. Finding that such an order obtains in an indefinite number of observed instances, we generalize our experience, and conclude universally that nature as a whole is uniform. Expressed in terms of feeling, this theory must be interpreted to mean that certain sensations, from being habitually associated in the way of resemblance and of order in time and place, become inseparably associated in consciousness, and assume the appearance of self-identical objects, permanent and independent of consciousness; and that, certain groups of "permanent possibilities" being frequently associated in one definite order of succession, a new form of inseparable association is

created, which is naturally and inevitably confounded with a necessary connection in the sequence of things. The law of causation is thus a uniform, but by no means a necessary connection of associated feelings.

The most obvious reflection upon this theory is that it is a scepticism in disguise, as its parentage in Hume would lead us to expect. It is not, as it pretends to be, an account of the origin of real knowledge, but a disproof of the possibility of such knowledge. Nature is a "fortuitous concourse" of feelings that happen to follow in a fixed order, but which might have followed in any other order, or in no order at all. If knowledge is to be more than a name, the real world must be something that, in virtue of universal relations to thought, may be known by all intelligences; whereas the net result of this theory is that nothing can be known save the order of feelings as they are for the individual consciousness. But how can we call that knowledge, which is merely a succession of feelings as they happen to suggest each other to the individual? As there is no reason why they should not have come in a totally different order, any combination of feelings is equally entitled to the name. The Empiricist is of course ready with the reply that whether observed uniformities of feeling are entitled to be called knowledge, is merely a dispute about words, since to such uniformities the law of causation, upon which induction is based, is demonstrably reducible. Upon the possibility of reconciling this theory of causation with the procedure of the physical sciences, we are willing to rest the whole question.

Such expressions as "uniformity in the succession of phenomena," "fixed order in our sensations," "a constancy of antecedence and sequence," and the like, imply that it is by repeated associations of feelings in a definite order of succession that belief in the uniformity of nature is generated. Nor are these expressions merely an adaptation to the usages of popular language; they are essential to the plausible characterization of the law of causation, upon the denial of necessary connection between objects. But if repeated acts of association between feelings—we are not told how many—are required to create a uniformity among phenomena, it must be impossible to make a valid induction from a single instance. And yet one of the canons of inductive logic—the canon which admittedly formulates the most perfect method of the sciences, the "method of

difference"—is based upon the principle that one properly conducted experiment is sufficient to give absolute certainty of a law of nature. "When a chemist," says Mr. Mill, "announces the existence and properties of a newly discovered substance, if we confide in his accuracy, we feel assured that the conclusion he has arrived at will hold universally, although the induction be founded on but a single instance." Here is a general law of nature, inferred without hesitation from a *single instance*. No words could more flatly contradict the account of causation as the product of an "order of succession" gradually generated by repeated associations of feelings. According to the one view, the belief in a uniformity of natural phenomena should be of various degrees of intensity, varying from the faintest possibility to absolute certainty; according to the other, it is as strong on the first instance as any number of instances could make it. It may be replied that, while frequent acts of association are needed to generate the conception of uniformity, that conception, once acquired, may be directly applied to any new instance. "Only the scientific man," it may be said, "to whom nature is already a system of unvarying laws, could apply the 'method of difference;'" the law of causation is itself an induction, being nothing more than a generalized statement of the observed fact that, so far as our knowledge has gone, there is no exception to uniformity of sequence in events." Now, that the principle of the uniformity of nature is not given to man in the form of a general proposition, but gradually discovered, is of course a mere truism. The question is, whether a regular succession of feelings, as they are to the individual, is sufficient to account for those special uniformities that are inferred from a single instance. Does not the very assertion that causality, as a general law, is but a summing up of special cases of causation, overthrow the derivation of these cases from an invariable order of succession between feelings? If a given instance of succession is not of itself sufficient to establish a causal relation, no reference to the general law of causation can be of any avail. The general law can only warn us that we may expect to find a fixed order of association between every group of possibilities of sensation, it cannot tell us between what groups the uniformity obtains. On the contrary it is claimed, and rightly claimed by Mr. Mill, that the general uniformity of nature, being related to particular uniformities, as the major proposition of a syllogism to the minor,

depends upon no exception being found in the case of special uniformities. Each instance of the law of causation must therefore be determined upon its own merits. Suppose, then, that "a chemist announces the existence and properties of a newly discovered substance," i. e., the association for the first time of certain possibilities of sensation hitherto unassociated; have we any right to "feel assured that the conclusion he has arrived at will hold universally, although the induction be founded on but a single instance?" Assuredly not, if we are to be consistent in deriving every case of causation from a uniform association of feelings. There is no possible meaning in calling that order of succession "uniform," which has occurred only once. But if the connection of feelings is not uniform, it is indistinguishable from associations of feelings, that are notoriously but the play of fancy or the sport of arbitrary suggestion. Once again we find that, by persistently following out Empiricism to its logical consequences, not merely all actual, but even all apparent, distinction between reality and fiction is obliterated. The force of this criticism cannot be destroyed by any change in the form of the theory, so long as the passivity of thought, and the consequent reduction of facts to feelings, is maintained. If thought has nothing to do with the constitution of experience, the relation of cause and effect can only be explained as a sequence of feelings as they are felt by the individual; and if the legitimacy of scientific method is to be even plausibly established, that sequence must be declared to be a uniform one. Only one of two alternatives remains: either to preserve the possibility of science by giving up the derivation of nature from associated feelings, or to hold by the Empirical explanation of knowledge at the expense of denying the validity of scientific procedure. The necessity of accepting the former alternative will be made more apparent by pointing out the relations of thought that are covertly introduced when the law of causation is ostensibly reduced to a uniform succession of feelings.

Our criticism has hitherto proceeded upon the assumption that invariability in the sequence of feelings does not involve more than can be correctly referred to the origin of feeling. We have now to enquire whether even the fiction of a necessary connection between phenomena, which is not denied to exist, can be accounted for upon the principles of Empiricism. In our translation of the law of causation into terms of sensation, it



appeared that belief in the uniform sequence of phenomena involves the presupposition that individual feelings have, by frequent association, assumed the appearance of permanent objects; which, however, can only be correctly defined as "permanent possibilities of sensation." To this it is added that, upon the occasion of an actual sensation being felt, a "countless variety of possibilities of sensation" are instantaneously and unconsciously suggested; which manifestly assumes that the feelings thus suggested are recognized as *identical* with those formerly experienced, for otherwise they would want the characteristic which distinguishes them from the contingent sensation accompanying them. No doubt the theory does not contemplate an identity such as is implied in the continuous existence of an objective thing, but only the repetition of feelings, identical in determination, although not numerically the same, with feelings formerly felt, either under the same or under similar conditions; but at least the belief in "something which," in Mr. Mill's language, "is fixed and the same, while our impressions vary," has to be accounted for. Now, no two feelings can be exactly identical; the sensation I felt a moment ago is different from the sensation I now feel, if for no other reason than that it exists in a different instant of time. And what is true of my actual impressions is equally true of my impressions as reproduced, which, as Hume has shown once for all, only differ in vivacity; no feeling can be repeated, and therefore no feeling can be identical with itself. But "permanent possibilities of sensation" are simply suggested feelings, and therefore cannot be self-identical. The group of sensations, "that I might possibly feel under certain conditions," and which an impression calls up by association, may resemble feelings I have formerly experienced, but they are not identical with them. Uniformity of sequence between feelings, therefore, does not mean, as at first seemed to be the case, a fixed order of succession between the same feelings, but only a regular consecution of similar feelings; and by the law of causation must be understood a uniformity of association between feelings that are like, but not identical. It is assumed, however, that, while no two feelings can be identical, the order of succession between them is unvarying; otherwise the law of causation, as a fixed order in the connection of antecedent and consequent, would vanish entirely, and with it the possibility of a science of nature. But such a uniformity involves the concep-



tion of identity as much as the belief in the permanent existence of things, which it is brought forward to explain. The feelings vary, the relation between them remains the same. Undoubtedly: but this is just to reinstate that originative activity of thought which Empiricism exists to deny. The identity of objects, which was to be explained away, is secretly brought back under the disguise of a uniform succession of feelings. No sooner do we oppose uniformity to change than we reintroduce the whole sum of relations by which the world is constituted. There is no difficulty in plausibly resolving the laws of nature into a uniformity in the succession of feeling, because such a uniformity involves identity; identity implies the permanence of objects; and permanent objects are necessarily related, in so far as they succeed each other as cause and effect. A uniform sequence of feelings implies the relation of feelings to a consciousness that not only feels but thinks—i. e., which prevents sensations from vanishing by bringing them into permanent relations with each other—and therefore that “necessary connection” in the way of causality which is synonymous with the exercise of thought. An attempt will hardly be made to obviate this conclusion by saying that the uniformity spoken of does not imply identity, but only similarity, of succession. Without laboring to extract meaning from the meaningless statement that the law of causation is a similar succession of similar feelings, it is sufficient to say that a similar, not less than an absolute uniformity, involves the conception of identity. Things are only similar in so far as they are both like and unlike, and to judge of their likeness involves an act of comparison and identification, which we have already seen to be beyond the reach of mere sensation. Thus we have successively seen that the Empiricist cannot account for the belief in a necessary connection of events or in the permanence and identity of objects; nor for his assumption of a uniform order of identical feelings or of similar feelings; nor for similarity in the sequence of similar feelings: nor, we may add, for a sequence of feelings, neither similar nor identical, i. e., for succession in time. In its attempt to explain away the necessary connection or permanent relations of things, Empiricism only succeeds in explaining itself away, and thus in unwittingly establishing the originative activity of self-consciousness.

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## FAUST AND MARGARET.

Translated from the German of KARL ROSENKRANZ, by ANNA C. BRACKETT.

The first part of the tragedy may be said in general to lead us over from the unity of heaven into the disruption of the world. The angels, lost in the view of the universe, sing the praise of the Lord:

“The sun-orb sings in emulation  
Mid brother spheres his ancient round:  
His path predestined through creation  
He ends with step of thunder sound.  
The angels from his vision splendid  
Draw power whose measure none can say;  
The lofty works, uncomprehended,  
Are bright as on the earliest day.”

The world of finite relations comes to Faust, with Mephistophiles. He ridicules the longings which drive Faust into distance, like a fool half conscious of his folly, who seeks the most beautiful star out of the heavens, and at the same time the greatest pleasure on the earth. The Lord takes him, in spite of this accusation, into his protection, because the good man in his dim impulse is conscious of the right way. He guarantees success to Faust, while he bids Mephistopheles to try to draw him away from the Source of his being.

After this scene in heaven, we see Faust in his Gothic study, where he has spent so many sleepless nights over his books and papers. He breaks out in wild despair over the empty results of his efforts in the sciences. He has gone through them all. He is called Master and Doctor, but he has the consciousness that he is only making fools of his pupils. He is convinced that we can know nothing of the Truth, and this conviction well nigh consumes his heart. Philosophy is no fit subject for poetry, because it deals with pure thinking, which can admit of no sensuous images. The poet has therefore done rightly in painting this speculative pathos as a mere mood. Thus can philosophy appear as poetry, for the struggle of mankind after the certainty of truth is poetic. The majority of men pass their lives carelessly. They allow themselves to be content with everything in

the world, without troubling themselves to think at all about it. It exists, and they also. Day and night, the seasons, war and peace succeed each other. Man is born, eats, drinks, sleeps, dies, etc. But the philosopher is sick at the estrangement which thinking has created between itself and the world. The very same world with which the simple, average, every-day, believing man feels himself in such harmony, it is, which is torment for him. He does not hesitate to question the existence of the whole world; nay, more, his own. He will no longer deal in words, but he will look at all the active forces and germs in their truth. Since science has failed to satisfy Faust, he will try magic, which can however offer him only a theatrical spectacle. Knowledge, like our theoretical freedom, must be worked out by our own efforts. A knowledge which is conferred upon us contradicts the very idea of knowledge. The sign of the macrocosm shows to Faust the harmony of the universe, how the golden buckets rise and sink, how the divine forces sound forth their harmony through the All, how they press towards the earth laden with blessings. But alas! for him this is only a theatrical display. He knows not how to reach the sources of all this life. While they well forth and give drink to all, he languishes in vain. The sign of the microcosm produces another effect upon him. He feels himself lifted up in spirit, and glows as with new wine, but yet he cannot endure the flaming figure of the Earth Spirit whom he has conjured. A shudder seizes him who fancies himself superhuman, and the busy spirit who works

“In the tides of life, in action’s storm,”

between heaven and earth, tells him, imperiously, that he is like the spirit whom he comprehends—but not like him. The individual man feels himself powerless before the colossal forms of nature. Faust, who restlessly pressing onward, has become filled with despair over the emptiness of all knowledge, cannot but feel himself unequal to this restless, eternal change, always identical with itself in birth and death. Because he has not yet comprehended nature, does she strike him with awe, not, as many interpreters of the Earth Spirit would have it, because she is in and for herself higher than he.

Just here in the midst of the narrative the “Dryasdust” Wagner slinks in. He represents Empiricism, which is necessary to speculation, as the condition which the reality of appearance im-

poses upon thinking. Faust gives him good instruction for the pursuit of scientific investigation, and as soon as he has gone out prepares with serenity to commit suicide. A new day beckons him to new shores! He prepares for this, not because of any petty vexation, not from any sad consciousness of guilt, but because he can no longer endure his life, which is so barren of results. Death is for him an *experimentum crucis*. But it is too cheap from this theoretical standpoint. Passivity in the changing of surrounding circumstances does not correspond to the nature of the soul, which is to make of itself whatever it will. Of his own free will, as out of his own grave, must he rise to renewed life and effort if he would remain true to his own conviction. The memory of the faith of his childhood, of Christian faith, the faith in a possible regeneration, the true faith of the world stirs within him. Now he hears the words of the Easter chorus without having faith in it, but the remembrance of the childlike rest which once made him happy has still great power over him. The tears start, and the earth has again possession of him.

But here closes the sphere of heaven, and that of worldly things makes its appearance. Faust accompanies Wagner on a walk to the Easter festivities. He meets the crowd of people who have come out from miserable houses and the wretched corners of the narrow alleys to celebrate the resurrection of the Lord. But however finely he may comment upon the different groups, he is alone among them. The faith of the common people is foreign to his hypercritical mind. The unconstrained pleasure found in the dancing group around the linden, is entirely out of his life. He carries in his soul the wound of doubt, and of the boundless longing which transcends all. He would gladly fly away with the eagle who soars high over pine-clad heights and seas, or hasten on with the sun as he circles from land to land, from ocean to ocean, in everlasting glow of rosy dawn and setting. Then he notices a poodle which runs hither and thither, and takes it with him into his dwelling, whose retired quiet makes him once more feel an inclination for study.

“ Behind me field and meadow sleeping  
I leave in deep, prophetic night,  
Within whose dread and holy keeping  
The better soul awakes to light.  
The wild desires no longer win us,

The deeds of passion cease to chain ;  
 The love of man revives within us,  
 The love of God revives again.  
 Ah, when within our narrow chamber  
 The lamp with friendly lustre glows,  
 Flames in the breast each faded ember  
 And in the heart, itself that knows,  
 Then Hope again lends sweet assistance,  
 And Reason then resumes her speech ;  
 One yearns, the rivers of existence,  
 The very founts of Life to reach."

This he seeks in an examination of the New Testament, in which, as he expresses it, burns the most beautiful and most worthy revelation. He will translate the opening sentences of St. John's Gospel, and he must translate, "In the beginning was the Word," that is the eternal *Logos* as which God reveals himself in himself, and as which he in human speech reveals himself to the human soul. But this does not suit him. He can make nothing out of it, and after meditating he concludes that it should be Power. This however satisfies him no better, and he reflects till he finally makes up his mind and writes as the most reasonable: "In the beginning was the Deed." Thus is always made the dangerous exegesis [Schluepfrige Exegese]. It turns and twists the text till it suits the preconceived meaning. Faust, in whose veins glows the longing for life, translates by *Deed* what he should have translated *Word*, because he himself inclines toward life, toward a joyous activity. The poodle snarls at the holy words which occupy the whole soul of Faust. Faust adjures him, whereupon he swells to the size of an elephant, and the traveling scholar steps forth from the figure as its kernel.

"The result makes me laugh," exclaims Faust to him, and he is at once on familiar terms with him, for he is like to this spirit. The Earth Spirit had made him tremble, but the Spirit of Evil, or evil-mindedness, is well known to him as his like, and with him he at once strikes a bargain to belong to him wholly as soon as he shall ever once be content with a moment of inactivity. When Mephistopheles completes this bargain, he expects to be able to cheat Faust by means of some trifling thing of little significance, but here he makes his mistake. The Lord, who decreed the confusion of Mephistopheles, knows man better. To begin with, the devil lulls Faust into an undefined and dim expectation of great pleasures. The choir of his spirits sing :



“ Vanish ye darkling  
Arches above him !  
Loveliest weather,  
Born of blue ether,  
Break from the sky !  
O that the darkling  
Clouds had departed !  
Starlight is sparkling,  
Tranquiller-hearted  
Suns are on high,” &c.

The covenant with Faust has made the whole world of spirits resound with sad discords. He has, like a demigod, shattered the whole world. It trembles, it falls. He must begin a new life and build it up anew in his own breast. But the prescribed beginning does not please Faust. Mephistopheles leads him to Auerbach's cellar, to a riotous drinking debauch, so that he shall see how easy life is. But this beastly coarseness, which can be pleased with obscenity, poor jokes and drinking, does not touch Faust. Then Mephistopheles has him drink of the elixir of youth, in the witches' kitchen, so that he shall see in every woman a Helen. Thus comes the transition to Margaret, whom Faust first looks at in the light of sensual pleasures, but the longer he looks the more he goes over into genuine love, and thus disappoints the devil's expectation, who designed that he should feel in his passion only what was sensual and selfish.

If Faust is to represent man in general, woman must come to him that he may be complete. As a man alone, he may be scholar, philosopher, partaker in the world's work, even a hero, but he can rise to complete manhood only through love. No man is fully man except in his relation to woman, for whatever is beautiful in him so first becomes revealed. In the old story the merchant's daughter refuses to give herself up to Faust. She insists upon marriage, which is expressly forbidden to Faust through an article in the devil's compact. From this, Goethe's Idealism has created the beautiful figure of Margaret.

Her story is what constitutes the dramatic action of the first part. But what is her story but the simple tragedy of woman, consisting in the loss of maidenly honor through love, for without love one could have no tragic demerit. Betrayed innocence and the consequences of her guilt, how they desolate and shatter her life ! We must say with Heine :

“ It is the olden story,  
 Yet ever new again ;  
 And whensoever it happens  
 Then breaks a heart in twain.”

Margaret is the crown jewel of all the womanly creations of Goethe. Iphigenia, Leonora, Dorothea, must all yield to her, however perfect they are in themselves, for they fail in her depth and simplicity. Margaret, this lovely child, this soul so full of faith, this shy maiden, longing for love, this sweet, enthusiastic, laughing rose-bud, whose peace is fled, whose heart is heavy after she has seen him, who has after that but one thought—Heinrich—to catch a glimpse of whom she gazes out of the window, who only to be near him goes out of the house—this Margaret is the genuine German maiden in all her peculiarities, even to that charming little snappish way in which she sends the importunate Faust from her side as she comes from church :

“ I’m neither lady, neither fair,  
 And home I can go without your care.”

This is to Faust entirely charming. By means of ornaments and the artful sophistry of her neighbor, she lets herself be led away, and her fall leads on the whole series of evil. The mother dies from the sleeping draught, and the brother, who stigmatizes her as a wanton, perishes on the threshold of the house, where Faust would have tamed the clown with his sword-thrusts.

We have here entered into the sphere of hell, for Guilt has made its appearance, and the consciousness of it, however much it may seek to suppress itself, must and will be recognized. Margaret, who feels the newly developing life at her heart, can no more gossip at the well with the other maidens. She casts herself down before the all-pitying Mother, Mary, but in the church even, the contradiction of her life overwhelms her. The spirit of the church takes up all into itself, rich and poor, young and old, good and bad. But the guilty one trembles before the terrible earnestness of the spirit, of whom the choir sing :

*Judex ergo cum sedebit  
 Quidquid latet, apparebit.  
 Nil inultum remanebit.*

It is as if fury seizes Margaret. She hears the trumpet sound, the graves yawn, and she falls in a swoon.

This picture is wrought by the artist with the most intense, fearful, and yet exquisite, tragical colors. In a few words, touches and scenes, he has painted innocence, beauty, fascination, love, passion, guilt, and the torment of conscience. Faust seeks to fly from the surroundings of his guilt. He tries to forget himself in the solitary brooding of sophistry, in the tempest of inane debauch, in giving himself over to insipid dissipation. But in the midst of the distorted figures on the Blocksberg he sees a beautiful, pale child, her feet bound, and with a red mark round her neck, urged slowly onward. It is Margaret, whatever the devil may say. His consciousness of sin breaks forth. He overwhelms Mephistopheles with curses, that he has concealed from him Margaret's misery. Here Goethe has introduced prose, but with uncommon power, and Mephistopheles, in this dilemma, endeavors, not for the first time, and much in the fashion of tyrants, to overwhelm him with thunder.

Margaret, to escape public shame, motherless, brotherless, has murdered her child—this little Margaret! This gentle, dear, good maiden? Yes, this sweet, this lovely girl, has thrown the child, born in the peril of death, into the pond! The judgment for such a deed of despairing shame has overtaken her. She awaits in prison her execution. But, unable to endure the contradiction of her loving heart, and the actual, terrible deed, she has become insane. She did not desire the deaths of her mother, her brother, her child, and yet they are dead and testify against her. She is, through her love, the source of all this evil. Faust endeavors to lead her away. She loves him although she might curse him, but she always loves him, remaining in the midst of her distraction of soul, always true to the holy voice which promises her reconciliation through the punishment of her sin. Mephistopheles, after his fashion, speaks only of the execution. But even while she is judged she is saved.

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NOTE.—The translations here given from the *Faust* are those of Bayard Taylor.

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A. C. B.

## A QUATERNION.

BY WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING.

### I. THE DULL HEARER.

*“And a part of the seed fell on stony ground.”*

I never enter there,  
I do not love the air,  
The preacher I mistrust,  
Tedious and dry as dust.

To hear the Scripture read  
I feel a prudent dread;  
Give me some lively book,  
That has a modern look.

And worst of all, I rate  
The parson's fallen state,  
Who being no longer clerk,  
Is paid, and does not work.

How great and strong he looks,  
It never came of books,  
And wasting midnight oil,  
Holy with learning's toil.

And if in church he says  
Those same things all his days,  
Must I sleep nodding there,  
And blame his sinful prayer?

Are those my mates who sit,  
And hear his Hebrew wit;  
Are their loud, homely hymns,  
The song of seraphims?

Give me a frosty sky,  
With stars set up on high;

Give me the godless air  
That bloweth anywhere ;

Give me the burning wood,  
Where God and Moses stood,  
As some old fable tells,  
And where He fabled—dwells.

And shut the church so fine  
And feeble, in decline,  
And lock me out of it,  
And hide the bible-wit !

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## II. THE BIRTHDAY PIECE.

If the winter skies be o'er us,  
And the winter months before us,  
When the tempest boreal falling  
Hurls his icy bolts appalling,  
Let us yet thy soul inherit,  
Equable and nice in spirit,  
Who, in turbulent December,  
With still peace, we can remember.

Muses should thy birthday reckon,  
As to one, their foretastes beckon,  
Who in thought and action never,  
Could the right from self dis sever ;  
Taken with no serpent charming,  
By no tyranny's alarming ;  
From thy sure conviction better  
Than from blurred tradition's fetter,  
Would the State such deeds might cherish,  
And her liberties ne'er perish.

Age must dart no frost to harm thee,  
Fell reversals ne'er alarm thee,  
Having that within thy being,  
Yet the good in evil seeing ;—



Faithful heart, and faithful doing,  
Bring life's forces humbly suing.

Now, we bid the dear Penates,  
Inward guardians with whom Fate is,  
And the Lar whose altar flaming,  
From thy household, merits naming :  
And Vertumnus we solicit,  
Whose return brings no deficit,  
Bacchus with his ivy-thyrses,  
And Pomona's friendly verses,  
(Or what other joys may be  
Pouring from antiquity);—  
Let them o'er thy roof displaying  
Happiest stars, stand brightly raying :  
In thy thought poetic splendor,  
This late age spontaneous render,—  
Fit for thee and fit for thine,  
Shed o'er acts of love divine.

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### III. A DIRGE FOR THE DEAD.

Called from this trance of life—the dream of pain,  
Thy soul, no more this thirsting day, shall see,  
The lonely hour, the chill and sobbing rain,—  
Nor hear that trace of far-off melody,  
That sometime taught there was another shore,  
Where softly breaks a wave darkling no more.

I saw from out that life, which was *not* life,  
A shadow from thy soul—reversed on time;  
I would improve that thought, and cease this strife,  
With inconclusive fictions past their prime,—  
And life, and hope, and joy, once my despair,  
How still your fading sunshine touched the air.

Forsaken, on the plain the warrior sinks,  
Swells past the ruddy tide that bore him on;  
Afar, in distant vales the home he thinks,

Ne'er knows him more, magnificently gone,  
His love, her pallid hope assenting sees,  
Shiver with anguish, in the cruel breeze.

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## IV. SPRING ON THE ISLAND.

Come to my heart, thou first and spring sunshine,  
Warm a chilled frame where wintry winds o'erlay  
Some clusters of an old and famous vine,  
Whose dancing tendrils frost had pruned away.

Here as I sit, and hear the withered grass,  
While waves the thorn-bush to the swift March-wind,  
Oh how I wish my weary life could pass  
With this fresh air, nor leave its trace behind !

And how I prayed that I could die like thee,  
Thou first spring sunshine on a loved one's heart,  
Hear the dark breeze hiss by yon stricken tree,  
Where every leaf is dead, and every part,—

Fixed by transfusion of a killing frost,  
Icy and cold must now forsaken stand,  
Wrecked like my past, upon a rock-bound coast,  
Snapt by the finger of the death-king's hand.

Come to this weary breast, thou sunshine dear,  
For thou and I are now the same to all,  
And have for the indifferent a cheer,  
And o'er the beaches lone unwelcomed fall.

In yon far hills that line the water blue,  
In those few pines that dot the neighbor strand,  
And in that proud and overarching view,  
That lifts our souls above the lovely land :

In withered grasses, on the wide-spread moor,  
Whereon the prickly furze, and tall reeds grew,  
And where the sluggish creek pervades the floor  
With slow pulsation, old yet ever new :

And in those fitful pauses of the blast,  
 And in the tall dark spars that touch the sky,  
 What find I there?—that joy has speedier past,  
 Than all those winds, to lifelong misery.

O God, why wert thou God—to thus o'ergo  
 My soul in torture, like this sunshine sere?—  
 Away, I feel the cold March breezes blow,  
 And little waves are sparkling bright and clear.

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## THE IDEA OF THE VENUS.

BY H. K. JONES.

Venus is beauty, and her offspring is love. And there has been given beneath the sun no age in human history in which this goddess has not been adored. All generations have erected statues and temples in this worship, and she has been celebrated in their music, and poesy, and sculpture and painting—and by the praise and adoration of all human hearts.

This subject has therefore been the preferred and most fertile theme of art from the most ancient times.

Venus is beauty, and beauty has two most general orders—immortal and mortal, or spiritual and natural—or celestial and terrestrial—and accordingly in ancient mythologic science and art, of which we may assume the Greek wisdom to afford the purest type: there are two Venuses, the celestial and the terrestrial.

These are both the daughters of Jove. All beauty is of divine *paternity*. In the poetic myth, these are respectively the daughters of Jupiter and Harmonia, and of Jupiter and Dione. The one of supermundane, the other of mundane *maternity*. But universally and in philosophic myth, the Venus, in the soul's participation—love, is born of the foam or spray of the sea.

The idea of this philosophic myth is the key to the whole subject in its unity and universality. The sea is the symbol and representative of life, in that it is the deep that moveth from

within itself. It is inspired and quickened into movement by a visible goddess in the natural heavens, whose effigy and effulgence it bears in its bosom—the beautiful “*Selene*,”—unto whom it perpetually aspires and lifts itself up in universal tides of respiration, and pulses of waves, and it followeth her whithersoever she goeth. And out of these soul-motions, these respiring tides and pulsing waves, fanned by the breath of the heavens, issues forth the beautiful spray, a creature white and pure, and as beheld upon the expanses, a creature the very top and spirit of the aspiration of the waters—light, translucent, graceful, gay—skipping, hopping, dancing, joyful and instinct with life and the spirit of beauty. And this is the philosophic *image* of the Venus.

Let us now look for its *Idea*. And first, as nearest in order, the terrestrial Venus. The soul, in natural generation, is an abyss that moves from within itself. It also is inspired and quickened and determined by some vision of the beautiful—its heavenly—whose image in its own bosom and whose effulgence there, is the secret of the potency and rhythm of its respirations and pulses. This beautiful object, like the moon to the sea, is however but the reflection of the splendor of the true, and is not the absolute beauty. It, too, is a sublunary image. Yet unto this as its final good, in yearning and aspiration the soul ever lifteth itself, and followeth whithersoever this goddess leadeth. And out of this aspiration—the spray of the waters of the soul—ever springeth a spirit bright as the light, beautiful according to the image, joyful, graceful, leaping, skipping and dancing upon the waters of the soul—the queen, the crowned promiser, and bringer of all earthly bliss. She is Venus, with her ever attendant train of daughters—Thalia, Aglaia, and Euphrosune, youthful, ardent Desire, vivacious, bewitching Imagination, and exuberant, joyful Hope. All mortals tender their votive offerings at the shrine of this goddess—the terrestrial Venus, the effigy of the True. And of these votaries are they that “Have such seething brains, such shaping fantasies, that apprehend more than cool reason ever comprehends,” “That behold Helen’s beauty in a brow of Egypt.”

“A celebrated, royal fount I sing,

From foam begotten and of loves the spring;

Those winged, deathless powers, whose general sway,

In different modes, all mortal tribes obey.”

Even mortal love is of divine paternity and plenitude, the daughters of Jove and Dione,

And yet the moon and all beneath her sway,  
Are but reflections of the Fount of day.

Let us next distinguish between the reflection and the subject reflected, between the image and the subject imaged. And as in nature, so in spirit and mind, must we cognize other *forms* than those of mere terrestrial corporeality. Says St. Paul, "There are bodies celestial and there are bodies terrestrial," "and the glory of the celestial is one, and the glory of the terrestrial is another."

Terrestrial objects are not in themselves luminous, their lumen is a participation and reflection of a celestial body. And so the beautifulness of sensible forms is not of themselves, but participations and reflections of the celestial form, and the soul liberated from sense, possessed consciously of the vision of this celestial beauty, will of this contemplation experience that of which nature and sense are but symbols and prophesies. As the sea, the universal symbol, is lifted up in motion and aspiration unto its sensible image of beauty, so now, most eminently, is the soul that is quickened and alive in the true light of life, aspirant and enamored of the essential beauty. And the movement and the aspiration inspired and begotten of this beholding is love divine, love immortal. This fountain is the celestial *Venus*.

She giveth her votaries "beauty for ashes," and nourisheth the life with the ambrosia and the nectar, and her attendants, the graces, are youth, and beauty, and joy immortal.

Said Diotima, "To go, or be led by another correctly in the affairs of love is this: Beginning from the beautiful things, to keep ascending for the sake of the beautiful itself, by making use as it were of steps, from one beautiful object to many, and from the beauty of bodies to the beauty of souls, and from the beauty of souls to that of arts, and from the beauty of arts to that of disciplines, until at length from the disciplines he arrives at that single discipline which is the discipline of no other thing than of that *supreme beauty*, and thus finally attain to know what is the absolute beauty itself. Here is to be found, dear Socrates, if anywhere, the blessed life, the ultimate object of desire to man; it is to live in the contemplation of this *consummate beauty*.



“Whoever then has been instructed thus far in the mysteries of love, and has beheld in due order and correctly the things of beauty, he will when he arrives at the consummation, suddenly discover, bursting into view a beauty astonishing in its nature, that very beauty to the gaining a sight of which, all his previous labors have been undertaken. “What think you then,” said she, “would take place, if it were in the power of any person to behold beauty itself, clear as the light, pure and unmixed, not polluted with human flesh and color, and much of other kinds of mortal trash, but be able to view the God-like beauty in its singleness of form? Think you,” said she, “that the life of that man would be of little account who looks thither and beholds it with what devotion he ought, and is in company with it?”

“Perceive you not,” said she, “that then alone will it be in the power of him who looks upon beauty itself with the eye by which it can be seen, to generate not the shadowy semblance of virtue, as not coming in contact with semblances, but true virtue as coming in contact with the substantial and the true? and to a person begetting true virtue and bringing her up, it will happen for him to become God-beloved, and, if ever man was, immortal.”

“Thus, friend Phædrus, and ye the rest here,” spoke Diotima, “and I am myself convinced, and being convinced, I am endeavoring to convince the rest, that no one would readily find a better assistant to human nature for the attainment of such a possession than love, and hence I assert that every man ought to hold love in honor, and I do myself pay all honor to the things of love, and cultivate them particularly, and exhort others likewise, and both now and ever I celebrate as far as I can, the power and the excellence of love.”

Beauty generates love—terrestrial beauty, mortal love; spiritual beauty, celestial love; and this is the celestial Venus, the ideal Venus, the fabled goddess Venus, and yet not formed of gold, nor ivory, nor marble, but of the ideas and thoughts inspired by the muses; that divine form, which is the ultimate end and purpose of pure art, the typical form existing in the comprehension of the artist; in its terrestrial effigy representing the idea of the fairest earthly loveliness and beauty, and in its celestial type containing the idea of the celestial beauty and loveliness in its absolute sublimity. And thence does art endeavor to express the realization, at once, of the most beau-

tiful soul by means of the most beautiful body. She is a World-spirit, a divinity that shapes our ends.

“Celestial Queen!

Expel base passions from the wandering soul,  
And once more raise her to true beauty's light,  
Averting far the irritation dire,  
And rage insane, of earth-begotten love.”

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## ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA.

BY D. J. SNIDER.

Rome had conquered the world. The stern spirit of the Republic could suffer no limitations; it was impelled by an irresistible impulse to reduce to its sway all the nations of the globe. Whatever was not Roman had no right to be; existence could only be purchased by submission to the Roman principle and by adoption of Roman institutions. The national spirit which gradually arose in the small hamlet along the banks of the Tiber was simply illimitable; hence it sought to sweep away the boundaries of nations, and could only be satisfied by the absorption of all other peoples. Assimilation was its strongest and most abiding principle, the world must become Roman. It is this colossal strength and intensity of nationality which gives to Rome her eternal charm and inspiration. But just here, too, we must look for the one-sidedness and imperfection of her deeds and character. Though the Romans, of all peoples that have ever existed, were the most intensely national, their whole career is, on the other hand, but one continued assault upon nationality; in the conquest of other countries they were logically destroying their own principle.

Hence when the world was subdued, republican Rome was no more; when she had obliterated the bounds of nationality, she had obliterated herself. The process is manifest; the conquered peoples which were incorporated into her life changed her character; the world absorbed Rome quite as much as Rome absorbed the world. Not captive Greece alone captured her conqueror, as

a Roman poet sings, but all other conquered States assisted. Hence she was changed, was no longer Rome, could not extend her conquests, her republican vitality was gone. Thus we pass to the Empire, whose chief destiny will be not to conquer but to hold together, not to bring about an external addition of territory, but an internal organization of the manifold nations, and their consolidation through laws and institutions.

Now it is just this transition from republican to imperial Rome which Shakspeare has made the subject of his two greatest historical dramas. The theme is not merely national but world-historical, in it the whole world participates, for it was then under the sway of Rome, except an outlying circle of unhistorical peoples. On the plains of Pharsalia the old system of things was permanently overthrown, the Empire was essentially established in the complete supremacy of one man. This first phase of the conflict which ends in the triumph of Julius Cæsar is not given by the poet, though it would almost seem as if he had entertained some such design. The struggle with Pompey is always hovering in the historical foreground, and the party of Pompey is one of the colliding elements in both these later Roman plays. The character of Julius Cæsar, which is so inadequately portrayed in the drama of that name, would thus be exhibited in its full development and amid the greatest exploits of the hero. Other slight indications might be pointed out which lead to the same inference; still it would be rashness to assert positively that Shakspeare ever intended to complete the missing link. As it is, the Roman Trilogy is a matter of conjecture, and we should gladly accept the two dramas which have come down to us upon this subject.

The play which goes by the name of *Julius Cæsar* presupposes the hero as having attained the summit of his power and glory; he is really the sole supreme authority in the State, though a formal recognition to this effect has not yet been embodied in the laws and institutions of the country. The crown is offered to him, but he hesitates. Now the embers of the old republican spirit of Rome begin to glow anew, the supporters of Cæsar's old antagonist are not idle. The result is, a conflict between imperialism and republicanism, between the new and the old. Brutus, and pre-eminently Cassius, stand as the representatives of the ancient Roman constitution; they succeed in assassinating the autocrat, and seem for a moment almost to have won. But

they in their turn fall before the reaction, the principle of Cæsar even without his personal guidance and prestige is far stronger than the old Roman principle. The Triumvirs, his friends and supporters, avenge his death, republican Rome is defeated by her own citizens, the Cæsarean movement is restored, and will now pass on to its complete realization.

Such in general is the collision in Shakspeare's *Julius Cæsar*. It is clear that the play does not give the full solution of this great world-historical problem; the Triumvirate was but a brief phase of the transition to imperialism. The three must be reduced to one, such is the tendency of the world; it is logically impossible that this neutral order of things should endure. Hence another drama becomes necessary in order to portray the completion of the movement. That drama is *Antony and Cleopatra*, whose theme is therefore the reduction of the Triumvirate to the Empire. The principle of Rome was stated to be assimilation of nations, hence it cannot suffer itself to be divided into three or even two nations. The intimate connection not only of thought but also of treatment between *Julius Cæsar* and *Antony and Cleopatra* has often been observed; incidents, motives, characters are often merely touched upon in the former play, in order to prepare for their full development in the latter play.

The material is very large and almost unwieldy, and it will aid us in obtaining a complete survey of the whole subject, if the various collisions both of State and Family are pointed out separately. These constitute the basis of all dramatic action, and are always the pivotal points of interest and development. In the play of *Antony and Cleopatra* they are in general the following: First, is the collision between Rome and the still unconquered portion of the world. It is still the glimmer of that spirit of conquest which shone with such intensity throughout the life of the old republic. But now it has become feeble and unimportant, though by no means extinct; the poet has given to it only one short scene besides several allusions scattered through the drama. Indeed, the Roman generals dare not conquer too much, on account of the envy of their superiors, the zeal of the soldiers is quenched in the fear of degradation. Thus Ventidius is afraid of winning too great military glory by his defeat of the Parthians. The second collision is within the Roman Empire, between the Triumvirate and the younger Pompey. Here we behold another renewal of the struggle which was temporarily

ended on the plains of Pharsalia, which was rekindled by Brutus and Cassius to be again extinguished on the plains of Philippi—it is the struggle between republicanism and imperialism. But the old Roman consciousness has passed away forever, again the star of the republic sinks beneath the horizon, and will rise no more. The second Pompey is destroyed by the second Cæsar, the representative and heir of the Empire. The third collision is with the Triumvirate, and is the essential one of the play. Lepidus, the peace-maker, where no peace is possible, is speedily eliminated; then the struggle between Antony and Octavius breaks forth in its full intensity. The former seems satisfied with the threefold division of the world, and above all desires to be let alone in his Oriental enjoyment. But Octavius has the thought of unity as his deepest principle and as his strongest ambition; he thus is the representative of the world-historical spirit and conquers, must conquer. Such are the three political collisions of this drama, each one of which becomes more intense as it becomes more narrow: the external collision of Rome against the rest of the world, the internal conflict of the old Roman principle against the Triumvirate, finally the disruption of the Triumvirate and the triumph of the imperial principle.

Amid these purely political elements are mingled the domestic collision of Antony, his violations of the ties of the family. He has abandoned his first Roman wife for the unethical relation to Cleopatra; after a time however he leaves the latter and returns to the Roman Family with new resolutions; but his second Roman wife he also deserts and returns to Cleopatra. Thus he abandons both the Roman State and the Roman Family for an Oriental country and an Oriental mistress; it is clear that he can make no claim to being the champion of the destiny of his country which he has thus forsaken. Rome has already subordinated the Oriental world, but Antony goes back to it, hence his fate is clearly written in its fate.

This enumeration gives the principal factors of the play, though by no means in their true dramatic order. But the material of the work is so multifarious and complicated that the mind must have some guide to which it can turn when it gets lost in the labyrinth of detail. The universal complaint is that *Antony and Cleopatra* is wanting in dramatic simplicity, and the complaint is certainly well-founded. To the less careful reader or spectator its movement seems confused, at times chaotic, and



there is hardly a doubt but that the poet has undertaken to compass too much in the limits of one drama. Still it has his language, his thought and his characterization in their highest potency. We shall now pass to consider the organization of the play as a whole, and attempt to unfold its various parts, stating their meaning and relation.

There are manifestly two grand movements, though other divisions are possible, according to the stand-point of the critic. The first division exhibits the various conflicting elements of the Roman world, and ends in their apparent reconciliation. It has three distinct threads or groups of characters, each of which has a locality of its own. The central figures of these groups are respectively Antony and Cleopatra, Octavius, Pompey. The second movement shows the disruption of the truce and the struggle of the hostile principles and individuals, till their final and complete subordination to one man, Octavius. Here there are essentially two threads, that of Antony and Cleopatra on the one hand and that of Octavius on the other; the minor groups are more or less intimately connected with these leading personages. The elaboration of this scheme will show all the elements of the work in their proper order and signification.

The first thread of the first movement may be called the Egyptian thread, and is the fullest in its portraiture as well as the most interesting. The first speaker is an old Roman soldier who strikes at once the key-note of the drama. He complains in bitter scorn that the illustrious warrior, the "triple pillar of the world" has sacrificed his grand historical destiny to sensuality. But here come the pair, what is their conversation? They are talking of love, whose power Antony expresses in the strongest language, it is illimitable, subdues all, it demands "a new heaven and a new earth." Note must be taken that this is not the ethical affection of the Family, but sensual love. Here is indicated the strongest principle of Antony's nature; he will often fluctuate between his contradictory impulses, but in the end will always return to the "Egyptian dish." Just now he is feeling some satiety and shame, which he seeks to disguise carefully from Cleopatra.

She however, with a true instinct of the situation, suspects him, and we shall now behold the successive waves of jealousy, anger, affection, despair, which heave and surge through her nature. The fundamental trait of Cleopatra is passion, passion in

all its forms and in its fullest intensity. As love, as hate, as irascibility, as jealousy, it has the same colossal manifestation. There is absolutely no ethical subordination in the woman. She recognizes no duty, submits to no institution. She seems to have admiration for the heroic element of Antony's character, and with the true instinct of her sex she adores his courage; but her love for him springs mainly from his boundless capacity for revelry and sensual indulgence, in which she participates along with him. Corresponding quite to the degree and intensity of her passion, the poet has portrayed her power of fascination, indeed the one arises from the other. It is curious to note how the greatest personages of Roman history have in turn submitted to her spell: Pompey the Great, Julius Cæsar, and now Antony. The contrast is apparent; it would seem as if the adamantine Roman character must always sink before this gorgeous Oriental enchantress. But she is destined to meet with her master; the cool and wary Octavius sees her, she tries her sorcery upon him without success, and then—dies. It is her destiny that if her charm be once withstood, she, like the Sirens of old, will destroy herself. Her attractiveness therefore does not consist in youth, in grace, in figure, in personal beauty; it lies in the sensual intensity of her whole being, which appears to set on fire all who dare look upon her. Such is the central principle of her character.

At first she torments Antony with her suspicions, because she sees the conflicting principles in his bosom. Her sarcasms are directed against the "married woman," Fulvia, wife of Antony, and also against Octavius, who, a "scaree bearded" youth, undertakes to dictate to the old warrior. Her purpose is manifest; she wishes to sever Antony from all Roman connections. Hence she tries to engender a conflict which may lead to a separation of the Orient from the Roman Empire; at least she is seeking to detain Antony by every means in the East. But also she sneers at his domestic relation, and above all desires to detach him from the Roman Family. The purpose which runs through all her conversation is, to break off the two main ethical relations which still have some power over him; namely, those of family and country.

But Antony is resolved to go, the death of Fulvia causes him even to long for a Roman wife, and the political occurrences demand his immediate presence in Rome. Now comes the separation: it is what might be expected; to follow her through the

careenings of her passions is unnecessary; as the cynical Enobarbus intimated, she dies instantly, dies twenty times and more. But Antony holds fast to his purpose with a Roman firmness, amid all her extravagant ado; which for a time leads us to hope well for his future. Again we behold her during the absence of her lover; imagination excited and intensified by the deepest trait of her nature, by her passion, now controls her; his image is always present to her mind, it surpasses all the memories of the other Roman heroes who yielded in times past to her enchanting wiles. Next we behold her under the influence of bad news, word has come that Antony is married, again has allied himself to the Roman Family. Her passion now reaches its climax in the form of anger, she becomes simply irrational in her rage, she beats the innocent messenger, and even prepares to kill him. Her seeming justification is that she is subject to moral self-control no more than the elements:

“Some innocents ’scape not the thunderbolt!”

But she bethinks herself; she knows the power of her sensuous attractions, she too knows their deep hold upon Antony. What then are the years, the beauty, the disposition of Antony’s new wife; “let him (the messenger) not leave out the color of her hair?” By patient questioning she discovers that the personal graces of Octavia must be far inferior to her own, and above all, is wholly wanting in fervid intensity of passion:

“She shows a body rather than life,  
A statue than a breather.”

Cleopatra is so well satisfied, indeed delighted with the result of the examination, that she now rewards the messenger with gold. She has the most unerring instinct which tells her the deepest principle of Antony’s nature; she knows that Antony must in course of time turn away from the cold and unattractive Octavia, and go back to the enjoyment of sensual love which he can find in the highest manifestation only in her. This inference is not and can not be falsified by the event. Antony returns because he must obey that which is strongest within him. Such is Cleopatra, the embodiment of all that which is most fascinating to the senses of man, and at the same time the victim of her own powers of fascination. For she is tortured with her own passion

even more than she tortures, her gift so painful and fatal to others is equally painful and fatal to herself. Her world is a carnival of enjoyment, no ray of duty or of ethical devotion enters there, physical agony is the sole retribution which comes home to sensual indulgence.

We can now go back and take up the second thread of the first movement. The two colleagues of Antony are at Rome, the true centre of the nations at that time; their conversation turns upon the man who has sacrificed his Roman destiny to Oriental indulgence. We catch a glimpse of the Triumvirate, with the relation and character of its three members. Octavius is the man of cold understanding, who has grasped his ultimate end with clearness, and who pursues it in politic disguise but with inflexible determination. Already we can see his grand purpose looming up in the future; we also see that he plainly comprehends the conflict which he must pass through in order to attain his object. His great obstacle is Antony, who surpasses him in every quality except the greatest, namely, the mind to grasp and the will to accomplish the world-historical destiny of Rome. This is for Octavius the highest end, to it everything else is subordinate. For this reason his character has often excited moral aversion. He sacrifices his colleague, his sister whom he seems really to have loved is thrust by him into a short and unhappy marriage to further his policy, he disregards the most sacred promises, in fine all the emotions of man and all the scruples of conscience he subordinates to his grand purpose, the union of the nations in one empire. He himself says in one place that he is seeking universal peace, the harmony of the whole world in a single government. He is one of those world-historical characters whose fate it is to be always condemned for trampling upon moral considerations when they collided not merely with his own subjective purpose but with the absolute movement of humanity which he represented. Now Antony in this fundamental trait is the contrast to Octavius. He is one of the triumvirs, he is a great soldier with heroic elements of character, he was the victor at Philippi, he was the friend and supporter of Julius Cæsar. His opportunity is really greater than that of Octavius. But he has not the clear ultimate end, he is not at one with himself, his deepest controlling principle is enjoyment, gratification of the senses, though he is capable of enduring the most terrible hardships of war. Hence he falls into the lap of Orientalism, yet



struggles to return to his Roman life and destiny, but finally relapses completely and thus loses the great opportunity. Between these two men, Antony and Octavius, the struggle must arise; the question is, which one will unify the Triumvirate? From the very beginning the poet has elaborated the dramatic motives so forcibly that the result is plainly foreseen.

But there remains the third triumvir, Lepidus. He is the peace-maker though peace is impossible; he tries to compromise two contradictory principles which are on the point of embracing in a death-struggle. Conciliation is possible between individuals but not between principles. If one principle be truer, that is, more universal than another, the former must subordinate the latter, for otherwise it is not more universal. The higher truth must realize itself, must make its superiority valid in the world; this means always the subsumption of what is lower. Lepidus therefore has no perception of what is going on around him, he placed himself between the two jaws of the world, and is speedily ground to death. His basis is the peaceful continuance of the present condition of affairs, of the Triumvirate, which is in reality a fleeting phase of the great transition to imperialism. A man with good intentions but with a weak head amid a revolution, what is in store for him but annihilation?

The first utterance of Octavius is a complaint against Antony, he is disgracing his office and his country by his conduct in Egypt, he has insulted his colleagues, but above all he has permitted through his inactivity the enemies of the Triumvirate again to muster their forces and threaten Italy. In other words he is faithless to his high calling and to the destiny of Rome, which is the most serious thought of Octavius. Here is seen plainly the difference of their characters and their ends. But Antony has shaken off the Egyptian enchantress, has come to Rome; the two rivals are brought face to face in order to settle their quarrel. Antony answers the complaints of Octavius with such success that they are seen to be mere pretexts for the most part; still the old veteran asks pardon of his youthful confederate, and thus tacitly points out the superior to whom he acknowledges responsibility and submission; in this act the destinies of the two men are truthfully foreshadowed. But Octavius is not yet ready to strike the final blow, he must first unify all the rest of the Roman world against his antagonist. He therefore consents to conciliation; and to tie the hands of Antony for a time,



his sister he gives in marriage to the latter, as suggested by his wily counsellor, Agrippa. The tether works well, it holds Antony till both Lepidus and Pompey are absorbed by Octavius. But now they are reconciled, and hasten to unite their powers against the common foe of the Triumvirate.

Such are the transactions of Antony at Rome, their nature and consequences are now foreshadowed in two very different ways through two very different characters—through Enobarbus and the Soothsayer. Enobarbus is a most wonderful delineation; he is the mirror which reflects the results of the deeds which are enacted by the high personages of the drama; in particular he adumbrates the conduct of Antony, his friend and companion. His chief trait is therefore intellectual sagacity, he foresees with the clearest vision and foretells with the most logical precision. But he possesses at the same time the reverse side of human nature in colossal magnitude; glutton, debauchee, sensualist, he seems immersed in the very dregs of Egyptian license, and when he is absent, his memory is filled with Egyptian orgies. The two extremes meet in him, the keenest intelligence and the grossest sensuality; the mediating principle between them, namely, moral subordination, seems not to exist. He is the peculiar product of an age of corruption in which even mental cultivation aids in blasting the character. He appears to have anticipated the main consequences from the beginning; he tried to keep Antony in Egypt, then he sought to prevent the reconciliation with Octavius; he also intimates that the marriage will in the end intensify the enmity which it was intended to forestall. For he knows that Antony will return to the Egyptian queen; his highly-colored account of her appearance when “she pursed up his heart upon the river Cydnus” indicates the power of her fascination over the senses, and the deep hold which she must consequently retain upon Antony. Enobarbus manifestly thinks that his master ought to go back at once to Egypt, though his appetite seems to favor such a decision quite as strongly as his judgment.

Such is the intellectual reflection of Antony's conduct and destiny; now follows a second reflection of the same through a wholly different medium, namely, through the prophetic emotion. Its bearer is the Soothsayer. This man, too, urges very strongly the return to Egypt; the reason whereof he says he has not in his tongue but in his feeling, in his instinctive perception of the future. Antony is warned that

the daemon, "thy spirit that keeps thee," cannot resist the might of Caesar, becomes afraid in the presence of the latter. Antony feels the truth of the declaration, resolves to go back to Egypt, and gives the true ground, "in the East my pleasure lies." The Soothsayer thus utters in his peculiar form that which has already been told; the principle of Antony is subordinate to the principle of Octavius, the higher end must vindicate its superior power. This is not only known but is now felt; the poet has indicated the same result both through intelligence and through feeling. The Triumvirate is however reconciled within itself, and must turn its attention to its external foe.

This is Pompey, who is the central figure of the third thread of the first movement, which thread may now be taken up and traced. Pompey from the first exhibits no great strength of purpose, no firm reliance on his principle. He stands as the representation of the old republican constitution of Rome, in opposition to the tendency to imperialism; he cites as examples of admiration those "courtiers of beauteous freedom," pale Cassius and honest Brutus, who drenched the capitol,

"That they would  
Have one man but a man. And that is it  
Hath made me rig my navy,"—etc.

He also has a personal ground, to avenge the fate of his father. But he is clearly not the man to be at the head of a great political movement. He has moreover a scrupulosity which makes him sacrifice his cause to a moral punctilio. Such a man ought never to begin a rebellion whose success is not his highest principle. His main hope is that Antony will remain in the East; but when the latter returns and is reconciled with Octavius, Pompey becomes frightened at their hostile preparation and compromises for a certain territory. That is, he really joins the Triumvirate in the division of the world, and thus utterly abandons the principle which he represented. Logically he is now absorbed in the new idea by his own action, he disappears as a factor of the drama.

His position is wholly due to the fact that he was the son of the great Pompey; birth, the most external of grounds, makes him leader. But by the side of him is seen the genuine old Roman republican, to whom the cause means everything, though he is

called a pirate by his enemies. This is Menas, who sees and condemns the folly of the new treaty, who reflects the weakness of Pompey as Enobarbus reflects the weakness of Antony. Now comes the supreme moment of Pompey's career. All three of the triumvirs are on board of his galley, holding high festival in honor of the peace; the rulers of the world, the enemies of his principle are as it were bagged and placed at his disposition. Menas urges upon him immediate action with the greatest vehemence: but no, his "honor" will not let him, the nature of which honor is seen in his declaration that he cannot advise the doing of the deed, but he would applaud it if it were done. Menas now deserts, for he to whom the good old cause is the highest principle of existence, cannot endure to see the destiny of Rome and of the world sacrificed to a moral scruple. However great may be our admiration of Pompey's motive, it destroys his world-historical character; both he and Antony are therefore alike in surrendering their grand opportunity, though the one yields it to sensual love and the other to conscience. Pompey hence keeps his agreement, but Octavius who subordinates both emotion and morality to his great political purpose, breaks that same agreement when his plan is ripe, and slays his confederate in return for the latter's fidelity and conscientiousness. The character of Brutus in *Julius Caesar* is in this respect repeated in him.

Now if the moral test be the sole and absolute test of the deed under all circumstances, it is manifest that Pompey is the hero of this play as Brutus is by the same criterion the hero of *Julius Caesar*. But if there be a national, indeed a world-historical duty as well as a moral duty, and if these duties come into irreconcilable conflict in which one side must be subordinated to the other, the question can by no means be so easily dismissed. The solution of Shakspeare is plain, and it is the same as that of history. The national or the world-historical principle always subsumes the moral, because it is the truer, the more universal. This very drama is condemned by certain critics because it is said to have no noble, that is, moral characters, and because it represents the political principle as triumphant. The complaint is frivolous, the poet has written from the complete reality and not from a one-sided abstraction, which however valid in its sphere has limitations which it ought not to transcend. The ultimate criterion of these critics is the moral one, which is certainly not that of the poet.

Indeed there is just this struggle between the moral and political elements going on at all times in all countries. The purely moral man is in a condition of chronic disgust at public life and public men, he generally judges by altogether too narrow a standard, and is hence unjust. But the public man is also too apt to sacrifice moral considerations to some supposed expediency when in reality there is no conflict of duties. The relations of the individual in society must ordinarily be controlled by morality; this is just its function. But in revolutions, in periods of political disintegration, the collision between principles arises in its fullest intensity. One side must be chosen, still the choice is a violation which calls forth a retribution. In our own recent struggle we all thought it our duty to sacrifice every moral tie to the imperilled nationality, if the two conflicted. In that prolonged and intense effort, the moral consciousness of private and public life disappeared, for it was immolated; though the nation was saved, the Nemesis of violated morality still scourges us; this is the real price, the spiritual price, and not the blood or the treasure spent, which we paid, are now paying, and shall continue to pay for our national existence.

In the final scene of this thread, when the banquet is portrayed, we behold the fate of all the leading characters foreshadowed in the most subtle manner. Here are collected the representatives of the main conflicting principles of the drama, Antony, Pompey, Lepidus, Octavius, with their chief subordinates. They indulge in a drunken carousal, symbolical of the mad confusion of the period. Who will keep his head clear and retain his senses amid the wild revel? Lepidus first yields to the wine, and is carried out; the others sink into an Egyptian debauch; but the cool-headed Octavius never for a moment loses his self-control, and when he finds himself touched with the wine, he hastens away from the company. No sensual pleasure can conquer his understanding, he will remain master.

Such is the first general movement of the playing, ending in the reconciliation of all the colliding characters. The Triumvirate is restored to internal harmony, Pompey is admitted to a share of its authority, Antony is restored to the Roman Family and State. Even external conquest breathes for a moment. Nothing is settled however, principles have been compromised, but they are as antagonistic as before. Suddenly comes the disruption. The poet does not portray it in full, he merely indicates

the result. Cæsar and Lepidus united to destroy Pompey, then Cæsar turned upon Lepidus; which important events are all announced in one short scene. Antony leaves Octavia, next we find him with Cleopatra. Such is this rapid separation which introduces the second general movement of the drama. There are now essentially but two threads, namely, the two antagonists with their respective adherents. Of this last movement there are three distinct phases, the first defeat of Antony, his second defeat and death, the death of Cleopatra.

Antony, when he fully comprehends the inexorable purpose of Octavius to subordinate him also, takes his departure from Octavia. She is the true Roman wife, who is by no means devoid of deep emotion, but it is the quiet, pure emotion of the Family; her feeling is confined to the bounds of an ethical relation, and herein she is the direct contrast to Cleopatra, whose passion is hampered by no limitations. She tried to perform her duty to both husband and brother; but that husband had as his deepest impulse sensual instead of conjugal love, and that brother had as his strongest principle political supremacy instead of fraternal affection, even if he possessed the latter also. Octavia with the most beautiful devotion tried to conciliate the conflicting individuals, but was sacrificed by both. Thus the Family sank before the thirst of passion and before the thirst for power.

The poet having elaborated the motives of all that is to follow, passes at once to the scene of the struggle which is to decide the fate of the two colliding personages. The infatuation of Antony is brought out in the strongest colors, he fights a naval battle against the advice of all his soldiers from the commanding officer down to the common private in the ranks. The ground of his conduct is the control exercised over him by Cleopatra. Then during the crisis of the fight she flies, Antony follows: the result is utter defeat by sea, universal desertion by land. His oriental connection has thus brought to ruin his world-historical opportunity, he has sacrificed everything Roman, even his Roman courage. The internal struggle now begins, he feels the deep degradation of his behavior, the memories of his Roman life again awake in him, he seems ready to reproach the cause of his fatuity; but the weeping enchantress by her presence subdues him more completely than Octavius had done in the battle just fought, and again his deepest trait asserts itself:



“ Fall not a tear, I say ; one of them rates  
All that is won and lost : give me a kiss ;  
Even this repays me.”

But even a stronger evidence of his love is given. He suddenly comes upon Thyreus, the messenger of Cæsar, toying with the hand of Cleopatra ; there ensues a fit of jealousy so violent that he totally forgets his generous nature and orders the man to be whipped. The thought of her infidelity crazes him, he has loved her more than the whole world in the literal sense of the expression, since he has sacrificed the world for her sake. What if another shares with him the possession ? The strongest element of his nature revolts. But a declaration of Cleopatra lulls his wrath, again harmony prevails. Now however their union is threatened from without by the approach of the victorious Octavius, a conflict which must arouse all his dormant energy.

Octavius is true to his aim throughout these scenes, his cool calculation is never disturbed by a whiff of passion, his politic cunning is everywhere paramount. His enemy is surrounded by a net-work of espionage, while his own movements are artfully concealed. He acts with a celerity and secrecy which are incomprehensible to Antony ; his insight into the real situation is never clouded for a moment, he orders the battle to be fought at sea with every advantage in his favor. His imperturbable understanding which grasps clearly the end in view and the means to reach the same, shines through all his actions. He will after the victory grant no terms to Antony, who must be entirely eliminated from the world in order to produce unity. But Cleopatra he attempts to detach by specious promises, he has no faith in her fidelity and but little trust in women under the most favorable circumstances. She seems to listen to his proposals, her conduct is at least ambiguous, two opposite impulses divide her purpose.

We pass on to the second phase of the second movement, embraced in the Fourth Act. Antony now has a new motive for action, his union with Cleopatra is in jeopardy. His heroic character returns in its fullest intensity, he fights not to save an empire, but to preserve his relation to the Egyptian queen. It will be noticed that the deepest principle of his nature is assailed : he might dally away the world, but he cannot surrender the tie to Cleopatra. Again we behold all the noble elements of his nature

in full play, his generosity, his warm-heartedness even to servants, his activity, his heroism. Nor is the other side of his character omitted, there must be a final debauch before departure for the battle-field. Still there is the dark reflection of the future, music in the air is heard by the common soldiers, who express their feelings in ominous words; their belief is that the god Hercules, tutular deity of Antony, is now leaving him; his cause is lost beyond hope.

A second battle is fought, a temporary advantage is gained on land, but the Egyptian fleet yields to the foe, traitorously as Antony supposes and as we also may suppose. The internal conflict now arises more fiercely than ever, she to whom he has sacrificed a world has betrayed him. What agony could be more intense? She appears before him, but neither her presence nor her language can assuage his revengeful anger this time, she has to leave him. But is his love entirely gone, that which was the strongest principle of his nature? She will put the matter to proof, the test being death—absolute separation. Accordingly word is sent to him that she is no more, that she died with his name on her lips. He answers the test in the fullest degree, separation from her means death, which he at once proceeds to inflict upon himself. Other motives too influence his resolution, as the sense of shame, the fear of dishonor, the loss of his opportunity; but the main impelling power which drove the last blow was the thought of being forever disjoined from Cleopatra. Thus his deepest principle asserts itself with an absolute supremacy; he had already sacrificed an empire, and a world-historical destiny for his love; it is easy and consistent now to give his life in addition. His career is made up of a series of external conflicts on account of his passion, and internal conflicts with his passion.

The third phase of the second movement is embraced in the last act. Cleopatra is now the central figure. The difference between her and Antony is seen in the fact that she is willing to survive him, but he was not willing to survive her; separation does not mean death in her case. There is however no doubt about her love for Antony, but there is as little doubt about her readiness to transfer it to another person. She has been making provision for the future, she has been laying plans to catch Octavius in her toils. He comes into her presence but he is not charmed, his cool head cannot be turned by sensuous enchantment. This seals her fate, she has met her master, she has found the man who is

able to resist her spell. The proof is manifest, she learns that Octavius intends to take her to Rome to grace his triumph. This secret is confided to her by Dolabella, who seems to be the last victim of her magical power. That power is now broken, nothing remains except to die. Still she shows signs of a better nature in this latter part, misfortune has ennobled her character :

“ My desolation begins to make a better life.”

The heroic qualities of Antony, now that he is gone and she can captivate no new hero, fill her imagination; she will go and join him in the world beyond. Her sensual life seems purified and exalted as she gives expression to her “immortal longings.” Her deepest trait is however conquest through sensual love; she will live as long as she can conquer; when her spell is once overcome she will die, dwelling in imagination upon the greatest victory of her principle and upon its most illustrious victim.

The fate of the immediate personal dependents of Antony and Cleopatra is connected with that of their master and mistress; the relation is so intimate that they die together, the devotion of the servants will not permit them to survive. But Enobarbus is the most interesting of all these subordinate personages; his character too undergoes a change in this second part. His sharp intellect has foreseen and tried to avert the consequences of Antony's folly, but without avail. Now begins his internal conflict. Should he follow interest and desert a fool, or preserve fidelity and cling to his fallen master? It does not surprise us that he goes over to Caesar, that he was led by his sagacity and not by his moral feeling. He saw the rising star of Octavius, and followed, but bitter is his disappointment. The conqueror will not trust a traitor. Enobarbus finds out that he has “done ill,” his intelligence has failed utterly. But this is not all. The generous Antony sends his treasure after him with kindly greetings; now he calls himself not fool but villain, the moral elements, as honor, gratitude, fidelity, conscience, burst up in his soul with terrific force. This mediating principle, which was previously so inert, is now supreme, asserting itself over both pleasure and intellect. He repents of his conduct but is not reconciled; he slays himself, an irrational act, but one which shows that remorse was stronger than existence. So intense is his anguish, that he will not retain a life without moral devotion.

Octavius has passed his final and supreme conflict, which the poet seems to make the most difficult as well as the most glorious of all the conflicts in the drama. This victory is greater than the victory over Antony, who had already been subdued by Cleopatra; now the mighty conqueress is herself conquered. The man who can resist the fascination of the Orient is the true Roman, is the ruler capable of maintaining and perpetuating the Roman principle and the Roman empire. Alexander even was absorbed by the East, and his realm passed away like a cloud. Octavius can spend a tear of pity over his illustrious foes, but his emotions never clouded his judgment or hindered the clear, definite pursuit of his political end. When the play terminates, we feel that a great epoch with its external and internal throes, with its weak men and mighty heroes, has passed away. All the struggles are overcome not by temporary compromises but by the subordination of the lower to the higher principle; the world finds unity, peace, and law, in the empire. This epoch is therefore the true date of Imperialism.

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## THE IDEA OF MATTER AS THE GROUND OF ALL PHENOMENA OF THE UNIVERSE.

(An attempt to solve Tyndall's Problem).

BY K. TH. BAYRHOFER.

[Translated from the author's manuscript by MRS. ELLA S. MORGAN].

Tyndall, in his well-known Belfast address, as well as in several passages in his "Fragments of Science," declares that in matter he discerns the promise and potency of life and spirit, but that the idea of matter, in order to justify this, must be more profound and comprehensive than it has hitherto been apprehended to be. He says that until now the idea of matter as the basis of nature, had been considered only from its external and mechanical sides. But then Tyndall confesses that he cannot give the truer idea be-

cause the connection between spiritual life and mechanics or organism, the movements of the Universe, is still obscure. If we now ask "What is the conception of matter in the general consciousness and in natural science?" we receive the universal answer, "Matter is the substance extending through and filling parts of space, considered as independent existence in and for itself, whose universal predicates are this extension and divisibility, resistance or the impenetrability of all its parts, and perhaps weight, the gravitation of all its parts towards each other." Matter is sometimes defined as that which is impenetrable and movable in space. If we now take these phenomena as the manifestation of internal essence (*innerer Grunde*) then we may consider matter as filled with forces or principles of inter-action, especially the power of attraction and repulsion. From the standpoint of such a theory it is therefore presupposed that the particles of matter themselves, being separate members and bodies, can never reciprocally penetrate each other, and that all apparent penetrability is only a nearer approach of the particles and a penetration of matter into the hitherto empty spaces lying between. It is also now universally presupposed that the so-called forces are wholly bound up with matter, are in fact only its qualities inseparable from it. In the same way it has often been supposed that matter was *originally* in motion, which (motion) is consequently an absolute fact just as incapable of derivation as matter itself. And now since in order to explain phenomena, scientific investigation of nature conceives visible matter as itself made up of invisible, minute, material particles or bodies (the so-called atoms or molecules) it is claimed that from the forces and motions of these atoms and molecules we are to comprehend all nature as a mechanism; and logically consistent scientists declare that even the spiritual life of man must also originate in this mechanism, because the nervous system, more especially the brain, is evidently the material ground out of which spirit is born, and of which we know nothing without this base—for immaterial spirits are only fantastic images or chimeras. Matter being, according to this, the root of all phenomena of the universe, materialism is esteemed as the only true system of knowledge (based upon one principle) in contrast both to an original dualism of matter and spirit, and to a spiritualistic unitary basis, as is claimed by Christian theology, or in another way by the philosophy of Berkeley.



We cannot deny that empirical, reflective science has always held fast to the materialistic basis of all phenomena of the universe, and taught that an immaterial spirit is out of the question, i. e., any spirit not bound to matter or not conditioned by matter—unless we wish to put poetical fancy in the place of science.

If therefore to the real empirical conception matter is the only basis of the universe, out of which arise all phenomena—revelations of nature and spirit—to the reflective mind still remains the question, “What is the essence or idea of matter itself?” For speculative analysis cannot rest until it has become an absolute analysis, until it has reached the point where no further pre-supposition is possible, until it has reached the ultimate hypothesis. And as empirical, inductive investigation stops either with the mere conception of *one* infinitely extended and divisible matter, or with the atom as the ultimate element of matter, having extension but still being indivisible: the first theory asserts a simple logical contradiction; the second asserts the construction of matter *en masse* out of minute particles of matter, which themselves involve the contradiction of being both indivisible and extended. The problem of philosophy or speculative thinking is precisely to find an idea of matter that does not involve contradiction, the final solution of this fantastic knot of ideas. The solution of the problem of matter is the solution of all problems.

It may indeed be said—from the standpoint of modern empirical science—that the real essence of things, matter, is still hidden, is an insoluble problem, is “unknowable absolute force,” (Herbert Spencer), or is the unknown and in itself unknowable (Kant, Herbart). It might be said that it is sufficient for us to know that all phenomena, of nature as of mind, inhere in the eternal, material substratum. And on the other hand we might say with Herbert Spencer that since all knowledge consists in a relation of the subject to the object, the absolute being, the unity, or at all events the unifying root, of both sides, it would therefore be one-sided to set up a mere materialism, and true philosophy may as rightly be called spiritualism if we give the chief weight to the subjective side of knowledge. For all conceptions of matter being but mental images of it, spiritual phenomena and not the thing itself, it is after all more credible that matter is but the expression of spirit than vice versa. Still the absolute being is in truth only the unknown unity of both sides, neither materialism nor spiritualism is the true expression of

philosophy. In the same way, but in another form, Spencer advocates Shelling's "absolute indifference" and Hegel's "absolute idea."

But as regards the unknowableness of being, we ask on what grounds is the mind of man *justified* in denying *knowledge of being*? Being, matter with its metamorphoses and phenomena lies before us. Phenomena being its (matter's) revelations, posited by it, necessarily contain the essence, the kernel, and are utterly inseparable from it. Hence while the thinking mind analyzes the phenomenon it must posit its being as the plainly existing unity which lies at the foundation. And that would be conceded by all, if in this attempt at absolute comprehension thought did not involve itself in logical contradictions which seem insurmountable (cf. Kant's Antinomies and the contradictions shown by Hegel and Herbart in all notions of experience.) But thinking is not a fixed something, it is a process, a development in the thinking subject. Thought itself generates all the inconsistencies, and drives on to their solution—on account of its own certainty of its real existence—unhindered by contradictions, it cannot rest until it has developed a system of thought which is entirely consistent with itself, that is, one which has solved the contradictions, the *inner illusion*, the confusion of the subject. All proceeds from the belief that the subject has objectivity within as well as without itself; that every real, concrete, sensible being is the union of subjectivity and objectivity (hence the dualism of subject and object is disposed of, once and forever), and this belief is confirmed by all experimental science. In regard to the other theory of Herbert Spencer, viz: that the unitary system can be called spiritualism as well as materialism, we are not to forget that spirit is *essentially* mediated as through nature, the material system; while matter is conceived as the substance, the mother of things and phenomena, and so under all circumstances life and spirit exhibit themselves as the phenomenology of matter. But of course we recognize that in a certain sense matter itself is phenomenology, is the eternal chain of egos, of real souls, and that even the notion of matter is inconceivable without including the potentiality of spirit, and conversely, the idea of spirit presupposes matter. Hence we may call the true system the unitary system of the material-spiritual, the external-internal, and also the unitary system of living substance, which as we shall see is the eternal chain of being; abso-

lute synthesis. Speculative analysis will advance this to certainty. We now pass to this analysis.

The real phenomenal world, which we perceive through the senses (not excepting the animal organism as the only bearer of spiritual life, in the strictest sense)—this world lies before us extended in space, consisting of parts and members near, but apart and separable from each other. This appearance in space, conceived as the positive, the self-existing, essence, or self, is called matter, which, in order to make form and content identical, is defined as extended being. Conceive the phenomenon to have the *form* of space, or of continuous external being, without the essence, the substance, then we have the mental image of pure or empty space. It is well known that the old Atomic philosophy conceived the universe as made up of the atom and the void, being and nothing. The actual which lies before us as a visible, material, is the entire heavenly and earthly world, which latter of course, according to the true scientific theory of the universe, is only a member of the cosmic whole, of the starry host with its illimitable spaces and varied forms.

Now while empirical science continues by the induction of experience, to verify the forms and laws of this material universe by a relative analysis referring to relatively simple elements (viz. atoms and forces) speculative thinking carries the inquiry up to the notion, or to the perfect analysis of material existence, which is after all only an empirical conception. Thought tries to establish the absolute analysis of this being, while recognizing that matter (defined as an extended, resisting, somewhat capable of rest and motion) in order to be comprehended, involves presuppositions which for the sake of scientific knowledge must be posited and comprehended in thought, and in so far as matter is the sole basis of all phenomena (as the unitary system of materialism supposes) must be recognized as the principles of all phenomena of the universe, the physical as well as spiritual, or else the whole theory would fall asunder as a one-sided and therefore false hypothesis.

From the standpoint of Tyndall, Huxley, and other great scientific investigators, we are confronted with the remarkable phenomenon, that matter is presupposed as the absolute essence, but that nevertheless its spiritual side is put down as from its very nature incomprehensible, or at least uncomprehended, whence Tyndall (as we have already seen) rightly demands a truer con-

ception of the idea of matter than men of science have hitherto had.

If matter is conceived, as it is universally, that each of its parts or components is essentially extended and divisible, then according to this idea, matter would be composite, *ad infinitum*. Of course it makes no difference whether we speak of ideal or actual divisibility, since infinite divisibility involves a state of being infinitely divided, i. e., the so-called separation only represents the original separation as made visible. If we deny this, we are met by Spinoza's illogical notion of the divisibility of the form without the divisibility of the essence or substance, as if form could stand in opposition to essence, or as if there could be form without essence. Spinoza's absolute, indivisible, extended substance would not be able to exist as extended, because all of its parts and components are from the beginning absorbed and dissolved in the unity of the substance. The infinite, extended, but indivisible substance of Spinoza contains an internal logical contradiction, just as the simple extended substance, divisible but not in and for itself discrete, is a similar contradiction.

It is therefore agreed that if matter is extended and divisible then it must be composite in itself or limited, and it therefore passes continuously through these limits, and this internal limitation must of course be infinite, i. e., must continue to the simple ultimate element, for the analysis of thought can be satisfied with nothing short of that. Hence matter must be resolvable into pure simple elements, and would without these become a chimera of so-called absolute empty space, of a merely negative identity, devoid of essence, and of a pure logical contradiction. This is the truth in the Atomistic Philosophy, only that in speculative analysis the atom necessarily becomes a monad. Hence Leibnitz was justified in setting up the system of monads against Spinoza's one extended and thinking substance, and had therein seized the actually true principle of the unity of nature and spirit, extension and subjectivity. Herbart also recognized the principle of the universe in the community of souls. And Hegel without more ado, posits matter as the continuity of the discrete, the unity of independent somewhats which have sunk together into the unity of space and time, i. e., motion, in which differences have vanished, unity of repulsion and attraction of the for itself existent; although he has not adequately

developed this true principle, and in his inverted method derives the concrete from the abstract, instead of first comprehending the perfectly concrete principle by a speculative analysis of the content of experience, and then developing science from this concrete principle. Had Hegel but continued on this true road upon which he entered with his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, from this phenomenology of the real spirit he would have developed the universal metaphysical principle of the universe, and from the latter would have followed the real genesis of the same as a complete system of nature, in which self-conscious spirit is nothing more than the final blossom of nature. Philosophy from its very nature must (since scientific knowledge is only the final reflection of being) begin with a regressive movement, in which experience elevates itself to speculative thought, and in which are shown the unity and commensurability of subject and object, ego and non-ego, science and nature. Then philosophy must pass over to a progressive movement, to a construction of the universe from one principle, upon whose summit the mind returns to itself. The real principle, the real ground of nature is not space and time and motion, abstractions which as such are empty nothings; and this Hegel well knew, but he offered this discipline to the mind in order to lead it, through these nothings, to the real. The true principle of nature is the eternal unity or synthesis of real monads, as we shall see, and not until this principle is postulated can we understand space and time and motion, matter and its forces, life and mind, which without this presupposition all vanish into nothingness. We saw that the speculative analysis of matter leads to the immaterial and non-extended, as the elements of which matter is composed. Matter is only a combination of simple beings, the chain of souls or egos, as it were. Infinite divisibility is only the ever unsuccessful attempt on the part of sense-perception to explain composite being as derivative from simple being. The conception of matter as the conception of being is only the unsolved and confused notion of a series of monads. The infinite sought by the sensuous conception is reached in thought, and with it is reached the eternally abiding existence in the changes of phenomena in the mutable synthesis of the monads. The universe is the ceaseless process of the system of monads. All matters, forms, laws, forces, conscious and unconscious powers are the offspring of this system. We have reached the point in which,



atoms and molecules of the scientists (into which the abstract chimera of continuous extended entity has been resolved) find their explanation in the absolute analysis of reason, in the interaction of the centres of life.

Our problem is now (*a*) to show that the idea of the simple essence, though not really perceivable by the senses, nor capable of being pictured in the mind, still contains no contradiction, and carries the element of visibility in it. (*b*) That the idea of an original aggregate, and of interaction of simple entities, can be conceived without contradiction. (*c*) That the universe with all its material-spiritual phenomena, forms, laws, forces, is to be comprehended or explained through this interaction. (1) Simple being is the opposite of composite being, and all composite beings can be reduced finally to simple beings. We will not here dispute as to whether we may call a composite being "a being." We probably may so call it if the compositeness is understood as an absolute composition—taking place through mutual interaction—being therefore an essential one, for here all beings reciprocally assume their predicates of phenomena—the external and internal phenomena are interlinked with each other from within out, and so form a real whole. In the same way a row of marbles, books, stones, etc., would not be called one being; but we should speak of one stone, one plant, one animal, because each exists only as a chain of parts and members, each through the other, not as a mere external juxtaposition; and we shall see that the universe is an eternal and internal chain of simple elements, an original manifold, an original form of unity, and so far as the One infinite (i. e., a being limited only through itself) can be defined, is self-articulated, i. e., is made up of simple elementary causal factors. Instead of composition the word *interpositing* (*fuereinander-setzung*) could be used if we wished to keep in mind that this interpositing is imagined only as a reflex of beings in antithetic relation to each other, in order to preserve their mutual independence of each other. Interaction is an appropriate and correct expression.

Leibnitz places at the beginning of his Monadology the proposition, "There are composite beings, hence there must be simple beings." Much as this fundamental idea has been criticised (e. g., lately by Stallo) it still remains unrefuted, and the negative of this proposition would be a simple logical contradiction, unless those critics intend by it to posit an extended, divisible being,

*without composition, without articulation.* But that again is a pure logical contradiction. Therefore the so-called continuity of substance can in truth be only a middle term between unity and separateness of substances, an internal-external chain or interaction of simple elements, from which eternal chain the universe proceeds.

Simple substance is that indivisible (because not composite) being which is identical with itself. It cannot therefore be conceived as extended, disparate, that is as consisting of parts in juxtaposition, and so far cannot be really perceived by the senses because sense-perception is a function of a composite somewhat directed towards a composite somewhat. But should it be posited for thinking intuition, then the *indivisible point* must be conceived as interactive, as centre of action. This indivisible *one*, this simple ultimate is in itself free from logical contradiction, because it is conceived as consisting of pure identity, of that which is like itself, and this is what it is in its simple unity. Its further quantitative and qualitative predicates are gained in the interaction *in which it defines itself*. In any case as this simple unity it is not perceivable by the sense, not susceptible of analysis, indivisible, imperishable; it is the invisible root of the phenomenal world, which it is true can be conceived only as a totality of such roots in a state of interaction.

So far as these simple beings or constituent parts of being (according to whether we have in view the particulars or the whole, synthesis or analysis) offer themselves as the limits or as the original points of all real sense-perception, of all quality and quantity, we may perhaps say that they are inconceivable, mere abstractions, nothings; i. e., they are negatives of phenomenal reality just as the point is the limit, the negative, the nothing of the line and of space. And this consciousness of the negative, this rejection of simple elements from the standpoint of a reality picturable for the senses, would be perfectly justifiable, and the existences would be resolved into nothing if we could find in them no bridge as it were, to sense-perception, that is if they were not combined in everlasting unity as a totality, through whose interaction they are able to represent the sensible world, whereby each element is a necessary collection, a centre of life, without losing its simple identity. So they appear as dynamic central spheres, as we shall see, and not as separable into material particles, not as atoms. So, conceived as central spheres of life

and motion, as centres of relatively minute spaces which they create, they are in the element of sense-perceptibility, and can develop the phenomenal world in time and space. No other hypothesis (neither that of continuous matter, nor the atomic theory,) can overcome logical contradiction. Both inevitably crumble into nothing. Only in the interaction of the monadic factors can we obtain a fixed point of rest for the flowing current of the phenomenal world. Hence thought must posit it. It must posit the absolute, infinite discreteness in the continuity of the whole, unless it allows the manifestation of the discrete in the continuous, and vice versa, in a contradictory manner.

Our standpoint is nothing more than the infinite analysis (i. e., in thought) of the world as perceived through the senses. It is the unity of the totality, the ultimate synthetic-analytic unity, in which absolute positivity includes all affirmations and negations. Only as the combination of primal elements, monads, can a so-called primal matter, primal substance occupying space, be comprehended as a thinkable reality in which all phenomena rise and set. While with the taking away of this *x*, this simple self-subsistent, the universe would vanish into mere relations without subjects, into a dreamy line-drawing in an empty space. So we must now recognize as valid the doctrine of monads, and if we find in it the grounds of all material and spiritual phenomena of experience, then we shall recognize in primal matter the universal and ultimate root of the universe. And this doctrine annuls the fancies or anthropomorphisms of the various religions, and transforms Hegel's entire speculative logic (as well as religion) into the phenomenology of the universe as reflected in the human mind, into a subjective abstraction from human experience. The self-emancipation of the so-called "Absolute Idea" into Nature is a pure chimera or farce, a juggler's trick of thinking, like the notion of a divine creation of the world out of nothing. That essential whole (of monads) present in the universe, is all in all, and *there exists nothing behind* the universe, and over and above the universe—no absolute idea, no God, no immortal human spirit. In this sense is Hegel the last of the scholastics through whose new departure science is first completely freed from the dogmas of phantasy, and the only possibility is given for a reconciliation of philosophy and natural science. This analysis is now in full progress, this consciousness is increasing more widely, and

therein is the great importance of Tyndall's address, the independent scientific value of which is a mere cipher.

2. *Absolute Combination and Interaction of Elementary Essences.*—We posit a totality of simple ultimates, of unities of being and action. We posit them simply *together*, that is reciprocally present in one infinite centre, for nothing is presupposed but them, there is therefore nothing which could separate or keep them apart but their own activity. We presuppose no space, no time, in short absolutely nothing but the monads. For all such presuppositions would be mere logical contradictions, existing nothings. There is therefore nothing between the monads, or that which is between is only their product. They are therefore necessarily combined, undivided, the *positive, infinite whole*. The basis of the universe is not the monad, but the *unity of monads*. Apart from this the monad would sink back into ineffable being, devoid of quality or quantity or power of manifestation; it would be the uncognizable "real" of Herbart. Herbart's fundamental error is that he assumes that the "reals" could in the beginning be combined or not combined, as a matter of accident. Their not being combined leads to a logical contradiction, because it must presuppose an independent, sundering nothing. All real space vanishes if the system of monads is taken away. The monad gets its real attributes (outside of its simple identity) only in combination, in relation. This is the truth in the theories of such men as Moleschott, Stallo, Lewes, and the relativists in general. The mistake is that they posit the whole relative phenomenal world without independent existent things, without real centres. The relation without the terms between which the relation exists, is a form without essence. They eliminate the *x*, and so make the universe a relativity, a phenomenon of nothing. For all continuous primal matter, primal forces which may be presupposed in addition, are of no assistance, for they themselves are resolved into relativity. The logical contradiction consists in a relation without the terms of the relation.

The thought of the monad can be repudiated only at the expense of reducing the world to a desert waste. Without the monad all existence becomes an illusion. In every element, in every point of the universe, must be posited the independently existing into-themselves-reflected monads, the ultimate, or else all relations vanish.

What is now the notion of the monad-totality? The monads

are not simply in and through each other, for then they would collapse into one centre, one existence, their being would be posited as nothing, we should have no extended world, nor the sense-perception of a world. So Leibnitz degrades the monads to a mere illusion by the contradictory fancy of an emanation ("effulguration") of monads from the primal monad; he makes their origin and disappearance a miracle, as he himself expressly acknowledges; in other words he also remains captive in the religious stage of phantasy. Nor are the monads simply external to each other or in juxtaposition. For then they would represent a rigid, dead mass, like Herbart's rigid line, and could not even be conceived in this totality, because the contact of simple beings (real points) would necessarily be the coalescence of the same, consequently their annihilation; pure externality would return into pure internality, or rather it would never have proceeded from it. Of course the agglomeration of monads can be only an *eternal process* of the same, in order to continually transform their *positive* unity (penetration, attraction) into *negative* unity (externality, repulsion) and *vice versa*, the negative into positive unity; in other words the monads are permanent impulses and activities against each other. This is their *perpetual contact*, which can be conceived in no other manner. They are thus because their absolute combination, their self-preservation in negation or limitation is reciprocally possible only in this way, but the annihilation of existence, being impossible, is a logical contradiction, because that which is posited would appear as not posited, or objectively expressed, the existing somewhat would appear as nothing. Only through this eternal conflict, this eternal play of monads, can the phenomenal world of time and space be founded. Hence the universe is combined from infinitely minute, simple, active elements, which as in eternal contact (combination) become impulses for each other and centres of spheres of motion, thus creating the spaces between them, the attractive and repulsive forces; and as this chain they establish the phenomenon of matter, which consequently is formed everywhere and always, and ever exhibits in specific forms the various matters or bodies. Therefore all matter as interaction of its real centres, occupies space, is impenetrable and heavy.

But does there not lie an internal contradiction in the development of simple beings that are in contact, into central spheres of action? Is there not here a centre of action in a surrounding



sphere of space, consequently a centre that acts where it really is not? Is it not therefore really resolved into an externality? To be sure we posit being or the substance of the central sphere, as point, as centre, and the spatial sphere of activity (the dynamic atmosphere, so to speak, or the combining, ideal æther, posited in the reflexion from one centre against other centres, in other words, objective space) cannot be being or substance, existing in and for itself, nor can it be merely nothing; it must therefore be a shining, a reflex of being, the positive negation of being, originating from being by contact or combination. And this is no logical contradiction, because the positive identity of being itself is not negated, is rather posited, but as mutual interdependence of beings, whereby is given with logical necessity, a reflex in every being, a shining of being, in and from itself, against other beings. The beings—if they are to exist over against each other—as they must, because they are simply accepted from negation—must preserve themselves in combination and in their reciprocal limitation; also must discriminate themselves in unity, returning from the others into themselves. And this discrimination and returning is not our thought of them, but their own process, their own life, and must be their self-activity for each other, hence their positing of an appearance, of a continuous externality between them, an oscillation and a tension between them. This is the process which we are obliged to substitute for Herbart's contradictory notion of an incomplete interpenetration of the "reals." We must convert Herbart's spheres into central spheres. At any rate it is clear that through self-activity of monads, without which the idea of the contact or the combination of real points cannot be realized, an externality (space and time) would be constructed, a juxtaposition and consecutiveness. Thus the centre creates a periphery out of itself, forced by the negation posited in it through the other, it (the centre) is an internality in an externality, an internality which posits an externality, in which it exists. All real space, time and motion, follow from this, that the active elements in their unity limit themselves for each other, really discriminate themselves. In this manner the ultimates draw elementary lines for each other, hence space-lines, a form to the essence, which form is posited out of the essence and is reabsorbed into the essence, in repulsive and attractive activity, in oscillation, in the

electric play. Matter, the phenomenon of this internal construction is therefore absolutely elastic, although in the most different forms and grades.

In this way we must consider the lines between real points (the so-called empty space, whose central points are the monads) as a posited appearance, as a direction of force, a perspective of action in the monad, whereby it positively and negatively coheres with the other monads, so that the forces, the impulses of motion change into motion itself. At a relative minimum of distance the positive becomes negative, at a relative maximum distance the negative becomes positive, and so a continual oscillation of motion is posited, whereby maxima and minima of distance are relative according to the different standpoints of single members in the *system of the whole*. The immediate and mediate chains of monads extending in all directions, the impulse to activity and the spaces and times are universally evolved and brought into relation and become specific. So phenomenal matter with all its forms and forces is the *interaction of monads*, always having a certain but mutable form. The universe is the eternal positing, analysis, and transmutation of all matters in infinite revolution, whilst the eternal self-included totality has primally the differentiations of activity within itself, which, continually comprehended in the impulse to equilibrium, let one condition proceed from another, thereby showing the *necessity* of the causal chain. This process is eternally one with the essence of the totality, because in it the primal difference and the impulse toward equilibrium are eternal.

Finally the question arises: Is not space as an *existing*, empty externality *between* the monads, in contradiction with the conception of space as an appearance—a direction and line of being? As existing it (space) must be a being, and consequently, as it seems, must coalesce with continuous matter. We should thus be led around in a circle, to the contradiction of a pure continuous matter, which would be identical with continuous space. But space as an existing being, is only an *abstraction* of the fancy. In truth it is only the relativity of existences posited and cancelled by them. It is the negation posited by beings, their distance from each other, in which coherence is preserved only through the *perspective* of beings, as the differing intensity of the impulse of the same for each other. It is therefore the objective appearance of being, a product of motion. The separa-

tion of beings is effected by their negative motion, and space is nothing but this separation, which is continuous and indivisible. It therefore varies as the motion which creates it varies, thus making a larger or smaller space. Hence objective space vanishes with the coalescence of the monads, is proved to be a posited nothing, an appearance. The *space of the universe* is the perpetual *product* of the universal chain of monads in its movements and articulation, and in this space exist and move all members which at the same time originate it. If all the members were to combine perfectly into one, which is impossible, then space would disappear as an illusory appearance; nothing would remain but the subjective conception (assuming it were possible) of an infinite void, an infinite nothing, in truth only the idea of a universal possibility of a here and there. This empty space would not be perceived through the senses, because it could exercise no effect upon the ego, on account of its emptiness. The apparent perception of space through the senses would be only a fancy in the life of the brain, an internal subjective movement (assuming a brain were possible without the presupposition of a universe).

A logical contradiction consists in abolishing a determination at the same time within which it is posited, in predicating of a thing that which is irreconcilable with its idea, e. g., a quadrilateral circle or wooden iron. If we now posit beings or egos in contact or in relation to each other, then determinations will be developed from them which could not be those of isolated beings. Logical contradiction cannot forbid our positing interdependent beings; for one is not posited *as* the other but *with* the other, they are self-identical in the negation which strikes them, and must be posited as this self-identity mediated by negation in order to avoid contradiction. So each must be posited as self-preservation, but self-preservation is something other than mere self-existence, it is mediated by the attempted negation, it is negation of negation. The universe is therefore the eternal negation of negation, appertaining to all egos in their relation to each other, so all are self-limitations, are beings which posit the limits in themselves, in other words self-preservation. The impulse, motion, space and time are only these negations of negation, these activities and manifestations of the egos for each other. The eternal egos could not exist reciprocally combined if they did not eternally originate the objective appearance of the universe. The universe can be only the eternal process of self-preservation of

the monads in reciprocal conflict and reflex. It is an objective appearance, as is evident from the fact that all its forms are transitory, although necessarily transmutable into others. Only the monads, their combination and their primal impulses in combination are eternal; the form of the combination changes while the relativity of the monads varies. In this sense the immortal always-identical somewhat, is *matter with its primal instincts* without which it cannot exist a moment. The final question is, "How then is developed perpetually the manifoldness of forms (of matter with its forces) in the primal essence, the monad totality"?

3. *The Universe as the Necessary Consequence of the Totality of Monads, or of Primal Matter.* — Of course we shall not here attempt to give a theory of the construction of the universe, which in any case would probably be premature. But we will show in brief that a world of motion, articulation (organization) and metamorphoses necessarily follows from the principle, that in particular the forms and laws of nature follow from it, and the forms of intelligence in animals and man result from it.

(a) We see that sensible matter has for its presupposition the interaction and motion of the elementary unities. We call the monads central spheres in so far as they appear as *central points* of *spatial spheres*, by means of which they cohere and oscillate reciprocally. These lines in the immediate interdependence of the centres of activity, we may call the smallest elements or real differentials of spatial, sensible reality, which elements are in every respect *relative*, discriminated according to the differentiation of matter in the whole. At the same time that all elements are united, in part immediately, in part mediately, by intervening members, and hence form a chain, the so-called *actio in distans*, and entire spheres of space are developed in which we find the universal *polarity* of the series [of monads] in attractions and repulsions, contractions and expansions, elasticity, motion of molecules and of masses, vibrations and wave lines; in light, heat, electricity, magnetism, crystallization, chemie force and organic force. If we now posit *the whole*—which as existing reality can not be *sought* in the *infinite* but *must* be a totality complete and entire in itself—as the positive maximum (as *vice versa* divisibility in the monad terminates as the infinitesimal)—if then we presuppose the positive totality as an *original irregular whole* (not as the *one* possible case among an infinite number of abso-



lutely perfect spheres) which presupposition being *absolute* admits no cause, but is only made in order to explain the real universe; then we immediately have in this whole, with the universal internal *molecular motion* (so to describe in brief the motion of the smallest parts of the monads and their smallest constellations of atoms and molecules) an original *motion of the mass*, by virtue of the universal gravitation or attraction within the series, which in the unspherical whole seeks to create the absolute sphere, and so establishes in the eternally existing being an eternal goal for its strivings, a universal motion toward the creation of universal equilibrium.

The partienlar motions in general must unite in a common rotation, and create the universe as a rotating spheroid, in which spheres separate themselves from spheres (rings) and finally become separate bodies, and the system of the starry universe is formed. At the same time the molecular determinations must arise, and there must be special forms of combination, i. e., molecules, (whose most primitive members are the so-called atoms) thus forming the so-called *elementary matter* or material elements, which then by new and closer unions originate concrete matters and bodies, all in mathematical necessity conformable to law. And as the primal atoms (monads) are all of equal value for the phenomenal world, since no difference of essence can be conceived in the *simple*, then the identically combined primal forms (elementary atoms) must be identical, must be capable of reciprocal substitution; the differently combined on the contrary must be different in quality and quantity and in their neutral combination, their respective unions and separations must exhibit the chemical processes, the synthetic and analytic processes. So primal matter, (the totality of monads) is comprehended in an eternal process of progressive and regressive specification. And this process of molecular and mass motion, of artienlation, dissolution and re-artienlation, can *never* cease, because the difference is originally in the absolute and hence must appear to all infinity. The universe is the never-dying *life*, an eternal circular motion. It needs neither the chimera of Spencer's infinite nor Winchell's God in order to be resurrected from its death.

(b) The forms of primal matter as artienlated we call *the whole of nature*, which is therefore all in all. For what in contrast to it we call mind, sensation, consciousness, thought, will, is as reality only an *internal appearance* in a form of nature, in the ani-



mal organism, and at its highest potency in man. But since feelings, thought and will inhere in the same matter (although located in special organs) which (matter) also forms the crystal and the plant by other forms of combination, then the principle or the potency of spirit must lie in all nature, therefore in the monad itself, and every other conception of the monad and of matter is simply unthinkable, would take from the monad its ego, its internality, and thereby annihilate it. The essence of mind is self-manifestation of being, it is the objectivity become internality or self-determining. Now this internality is inseparable from the monad in its interaction; it is its ego, its self-preservation in limitation. Without this it would have to vanish as one empty point of space vanishes in another. Consequently, with Leibnitz, Herbart, Schopenhauer and Hartmann, we must posit in the whole of nature, (hence simply and altogether in matter) *idea and will* as the quintessence of every force and motion: so that this ego is as manifold as the monad, and in such combinations appears like the monad and so is more or less a universal, combined ego in the special members of the universe, and a most universal and most abstract world-ego. But the ego is raised to consciousness only in the animal organism. Cognition and will in the strictest sense, inhere only in a certain highest concrete and organized reflex form of matter, and act first of all even here as unconscious formative instinct to the further organization of matter, always emerging from unconsciousness to consciousness and *vice versa* returning from consciousness to unconscious force of nature, in a continual metamorphosis of forces. Leibnitz thus rightly says, "The monads are in the so-called lifeless nature in the state of sleep, in the animal in the state of dreaming, in man in the state of awakening." The forces of nature are therefore nothing but the exhibitions of the necessity of the sleeping ego, of every monad in the conflict of monads, the continual evolution of the centre in the periphery, in motion. The spiritual forces in the narrower sense, are the taking back of motions into centrality, that is the self-perception of the same, or the continual metamorphosis of motion into sensation and will-instinct, which then resolve themselves into motions again. In this idea alone are solved the contradictions of Tyndall, Huxley, and Spencer; in it is reached the true notion of matter which Tyndall seeks. Nature is everywhere merely sleeping spirit, no more and no less. And in the animal and in man it awakes, *matter*

*itself* awakes, and herein is solved once and forever the dualism of matter and mind, object and subject, thing in itself and cognition, non-ego and ego—absolute cognition is established, natural science and philosophy reconciled.

(c) And because *nature in itself is mind*, then the mind in nature can awake by a higher reflexion of natural force. It is awakened in the animal organism whose highest form is man, created by development, by an ever fuller reflexion of the animal, by its own perfect self-production in the course of millions of years. The highest result of this process is the *human brain*, to which finally the simple nerve-ganglion has developed, and so is enthroned above all lower forms. Were nature only a system of dead atoms then mind would never awake. Such chimeras as are set up by Challis and others, believers in soulless mechanics, with their impossible, self-contradictory fundamental notions of the material universe, demand for compensation separate souls and gods. The true, universal essence of the universe, is individualized, living, primal matter, everywhere in which life and mind in a special sense can appear. The life of the mind as brain-life demands on the one side the foundation of the same in the *construction of the brain and nervous system*, on the other side the comprehension of the same as a development in its own element, the development of consciousness, thought and will, which are as incomprehensible from the exterior mechanical brain form as the articulation of organism is from unorganized chemic force. Organism is the continual reaction upon chemical forces, and consciousness is the continual reaction upon the brain or upon organism. Higher concrete reflex points are formed from lower ones, upon which they react. Such a reflex point is life, appearing out of the unorganized synthesis, such a higher reflex point is sensation, appearing in life. And every such point surrounds itself with its own organization, forming its own pre-supposed basis from itself, reaching out in order to transform the lower into its form of growth so far as the nature of the lower will allow. Nature is a system of reflex-stages, on the summit of which stands man and spirit, all based in the living chain of monads.

#### CONCLUSION.

Matter, then, is the *chain and interaction of living unities*. Therefore matter is extended, divisible, moving and equilibrating, resistant and elastic, articulated and organized, perceptive and

impulsive, and the promise and potency and actuality of life and mind.

*Tyndall*, a very thoughtful experimentalist and a man of the noblest character, has the true image of Matter and Nature. To him Nature is a living organized whole, an interaction, oscillation, equilibration of moving atoms, and a power or potency of sensibility and will. In his preface to the last edition of the "Fragments of Science," ("Popular Science Monthly," Dec., 1875, p. 129-148) he has gone farthest in his ideal intuition of matter as *universal vitality and sensibility*, which he does not deny even to the elemental and mineral world. That is the most which we can ask from the standpoint of mere *empirical induction*. That standpoint lacks only the cognition that no matter at all, not even the smallest atom can really be thought as *existing* without *continuous* subjectivity or reflection into itself, that is without *vital points*; that no predicates, relations, forces, and therefore no movement and mechanism are at all *possible* without *subjects*, that is, simple beings reflected into themselves as well as into others. All attraction, repulsion, impenetrability, movement, translation of movement, resistance to movement, consequently all mechanism *presupposes monads* becoming vital by their positive-negative reaction to other limiting monads. The speculative thinking alone, and not the mere empirical inductive imagination can understand and illuminate the ultimate processes of things; it *posits* the *absolute presupposition* of the phenomenal world. For the speculative thinking, the universe is the totality of living differentials and integrals of being, manifesting themselves in chains of space and time or movement. Matter as the mere *passive*, extended, impenetrable and moveable substance, is the most irrational of all ideas.

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## NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

*What is Truth?*

*Editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy:*

SIR:—Some comment on the article entitled "WHAT IS TRUTH?" by Mr. A. E. Kroeger in the October number of the JOURNAL I will endeavor to express, although in the gossip style of one whose brains are not well settled either as to Truth or as to anything else. Very commendable the article is in several respects, to wit: that it is brief, and it is clear, and it has at least an ambition to stand alone. The last is not the least respect, as due to that Greek simplicity which holds the problem close in view and still attempts to state it, or at least to declare some strong conviction in regard of it, whereas too much is usually said, in discussions, of other previous discussions—indulging and expatiating in the "literature of the topic." Not that I would claim for the method which I here approve much hope from past examples of success. No: I do not remember any absolute stand-alone apothegms which are in themselves explanatory, or of any use or meaning save to those who know and learned their truth otherwise, and who might as well have said them themselves. Thus the saying: "the more is thought," or "the more is the thought," (as Dr. Stirling reads it) has occasioned words enough to make one wish Parmenides had taken a few more words and explained himself. So the saying of Heraclitus: "Strife is the father of things," brings with it after-thoughts which defeat it as an explanation—for the father and children are of one species, and we are only set at referring the father to the grandfather, with little hope of reaching the great-great-grizzly grandfather of All. So the saying of St. John: "All things are made by the logos," brings after-thoughts as to whether the logos is another "thing," and whether there are realities which are not things, yet are principles of things—some-thing made by no-thing, yet not nothing. The sayings of Jesus also, pregnant with general truth, are but contradictions to all who have not by their own thinking forestalled the use of them. "My doctrine is not mine," he says; "the words I speak I speak not of myself," etc. So when Master Emerson says, "We are wiser than we know," we can but ask, what if not-knowledge is competent to itself? how can we know and not *know* we know? Yet this is clear and suggestive to him who holds the general as the life of the particular, and not all revealed in the particular—that the genius moves the man (who builds better than he knows,) and not that the man manipulates his genius—we being in this regard like those toys on the stove pipe, where a little busy figure seems to be turning a wheel, which in fact is turning him. And so in this light we can understand Goethe when in his later years reviewing his

earlier works he said there was much in them which he did not know, when he wrote them, and which could not have been written had he not been submissive in spirit—or as his detractors might say, full of the conceit that he was inspired. But in regard of making absolute and uncontradictable statements, I do not see how there is to be a philosophy outside of the philosopher's own head, and left behind when he dies, unless there is some method invented to preserve it, so that it can be immediately taught and communicated to a novice. It is of no use teaching philosophy to one who already knows it. What could be more ridiculous than two philosophers with their heads together, cooing and congratulating over an interior revelation which neither could tell the other or anybody else? But bring your philosopher to the test of writing a dictionary—make him say that which shall stand self-explanatory, and then let us ask if either of Mr. Kroeger's answers to Pilate's question would be satisfactory. One answer is: "truth is simply a word." That would never do in a dictionary: boot-jack is also a word, yet not like truth, although it has a double tongue. The other answer is in effect: "truth" is a phenomenal relation to the mind, like "causality:" but this would not pass, for many reasons, not the least of which is that explanatory knowledge cannot be phenomenal because knowledge alone is competent to itself—while "causality" is an illusion of sense and time, and is invisible from the standpoint whence all things always are, under the form of eternity. *Death* also is a word for a relation to the mind, but it is a fair question what death is, as aside from what it appears.

And, by the way, how have the lexicographers met this demand upon their philosophical skill? Certainly no better than other folk of less pretension. What says Mr. Webster to Pilate's question—or rather, what says another professor who does the unabridged philosophical in Webster's dictionary? Truth is thus defined: "Exact accordance to that which is, has been, or shall be;" I shall not dispute this as an aphorism, but some vulgar questions arise: Besides what is, is there more which accords to it? What accords to that which is?—that which is not? or does that which is accord to itself in a self-relation? Take another of his definitions—Being: this he defines as "existence;" that is, the being of "things." But it does not require much study to perceive that being, pure and simple, were the same whether as the being of these things or others or none at all; that being is supposed to be thought. Take another of his definitions—identity: this is defined "sameness." Yet this same is another; sameness is of two or more; and the identity of otherness is one with the identity of sameness, etc., etc.

This is not very successful defining we will all admit, but who gives us any better? or *can* a word define a thought, or put it where it was not before? Can you tell a man what *black* is, if he does not know beforehand? no better than you can tell him the truth of the tooth-



ache. Even so, Mr. Kroeger infers a man must have the phenomenal relation of truth in his own experience, and it is not to be referred or explained but identified, and raises no question if only it is called by its conventional name. This may be a correct statement, but is it not empirical? Is it not in the spirit by which Fichte said, "Ask not for the *how*; be satisfied with the *fact*?" Is it in the manner of one who would make self-determination the final explanation?

Pilate might have heard all that Mr. Kroeger has said of truth, and then have said impatiently: "Yes, yes! I know—I want the good man to tell me of this 'relation to the mind,' what distinguishes it from false conviction, etc." And haply he had dreamed that being was thought, and that thought was the universe—was All and at once the knowledge of All, and as knowledge was all, the truth of All was the relation of thought to itself. Now why did not Mr. Kroeger say that truth was thought's one and only relation to itself?

I have a notion as to why he did not say this: it was because this answer is as dark as the question; it was because there is at least an immense difficulty in using generals without particulars—in telling pure reason—in giving out a "content of the speculative." If the mind can think the mind and think erroneously, the relation of thought to the thinker is not necessarily truth.

In any method of immediate thought with which we are acquainted self-relation impeaches itself. Truth as a relation to the mind infers a likeness, an accordance, a correlation in thought, which splits thought as All in two, and declares that truth is when thought is as it knows, or when the two items of being and knowing are—what? alike? or the same? or one? when the two are one! and the one is other, and the same! According to Mr. Kroeger being and thought are not the same; the *words* indicate a distinction; yet only in their identity is truth possible—and in their difference.

The difficulty in the mind of Pilate may have been as to whether the particular truly represents the general, or is at all necessary to the general; and if we are to hold that the general is not obtained through the particular—that our ideas are not all from the senses and experience (which is the only hope of immortality because, if all our ideas did not come through the senses, some of them may survive the senses)—and that there may be generals which have no particulars (for example the infinite,) then it may be correct to say that pure reason does not descend to nor rise from formal expression, and philosophy does not survive the senses and the formal imagination, which now make philosophy by trying to embrace the general as speculative content.

But Mr. Kroeger attempts to knock Pilate down with his Fichtean "*is*." Truth does not *is*, says Mr. K., and it is silly to ask how it *ises*; a thing *is* according to *our* knowledge of it, or its appearance, and its reality may not all have *ised*; the thing in itself we may not know,

for it may *is* out other appearances hereafter, etc. I do not see this clearly. If the "thing in itself" is mind, or thought, and self-knowledge is the universe, it would seem that the "thing in itself" is known, and there is nought else to be known.

If we could get thoroughly at this "*is*," then we might better decide whether and how truth is. I have a notion that the content of the speculative, though now it *is* not, must be made to *is* before there can be Philosophy taught. And let not Mr. K. be discouraged, but set right off and go measuring the infinite, and if by pursuing a straight course he comes upon his tracks again he may swear that he has made a circle, and the All, though infinite to sense and imagination, is One in reason; then by counting his tracks he may construct a method, or system, which may be relied upon in predicating forms of the formless—which will put the back and the front of his head together, the general and particular together, and find an *is* which shall not only predicate the ex-istence of Being, but shall serve as well for Seyn as for Daseyn. Now truth according to Fichte would occur thus: Being ex-ists, or *is*: the existence or manifestation of Being, whereby and wherein it *is* (or *ises*,) is Knowledge; and Truth will occur when the knowledge or existence and the Being or inherence shall—what? conform? no, for existence is itself the "form" of the otherwise formless being; the general cannot conform to the particular, but dwells only in the "form of eternity." And see how utterly empirical all this is. Knowledge comes forth according to Being, and is secondary and not a principle; all first is, and only secondarily is known—or, fate is the basis of being. But the truth which we seek, and the only truth which is now held to be explanatory, is not in an observation of a process of being or becoming or existing, but in a process of perceiving that which eternally abides; for in truth all things always are. So that if we are anywhere near correctness when we declare that the only possible explanation or truth of the total is self-relation—a possibility or truth only to the general faculty of mind, and to the particular faculty a contradiction—and if this self-relation is self-knowledge, which not by any exertion but by a necessity of reason is self-determination, and if this cannot be thought out and understood in any immediacy of imaginative or formal thought, but must be confessed as the conclusion of an approved process of thinking—if truth is to be sought and gathered by the application and test of the right system, rather than formally pictured by the mind's eye, then is it not a fair question: What is truth? and the same whether we refer to truth in general or in particular? If it is not a fair question then we particulars should be as well contented to abide as we are, or to set back deeper into our particularity and sensual limits, and filling our bellies with wine, to hoot at reason and the gods. Mr. K. surely does not mean us to infer that we all know the truth already. You, Mr. Editor, designate truth as "the form of

the total," and you believe "truth can be known by the thinking reason." I suppose Mr. Kroeger also to know the truth, but he pays me too great a compliment if he says that I know it also, in any other sense than that in which Euthydemus said Socrates knew all things, for of course the latter could not mention anything in instance of what he did not know. I know enough of truth to mention it, and to distinguish it from whiteness and sourness, etc., and even so I know the number of sands on the seashore; but to say I know "the form of the total" in such a sense that I see how the positive is constituted out of the negative—how all eternally abides—were to say a good deal. To say I know that Being and Nought are equal, simply because both are alike undetermined, and that the particulars under the general Being, need no more invention nor explanation than so many void spaces—that because positive infers negative, and light infers darkness, so a certain region in general nothingness infers a cotton-gin—or that any amount of sleep and death and darkness infers conscious soul—or that because the reason of things is and must be reason, the reason of things is *my* reason, or reasonable to me without further inquiry, is to hold me at least wiser than most folks. I should know also the False, and the Grotesque—for the wise Greek who carved the statue of Jupiter cut a baboon's head on the arm of his throne. Shall not truth as the form of the total embrace the false and the illusive? Is not the illusive, as empirical fact, as true as the real? death as true as life? When I think of these things, and remember how we weary of monotony and sameness, I dread lest the knowledge of an unchanging total should stale within the soul, and make her pine for a Mystery, a Contingency, a Fate, and make her cry with Tithonus "release me and restore me to the ground." Many evidences indicate that the truth is just this mixture of certainty and uncertainty. Moreover, in the anæsthetic revelation I have a "light that was never on land or sea," a light which belongs and abides only about the anæsthetic condition, and which normally I can neither utter, remember, nor think of, and of which all the books I can read fail utterly to remind me. Still I read on, cherishing for the professors of philosophy a most cordial fraternal feeling, and hoping yet to "know how it is myself." If a man says he knows, I am ready to believe him; but if I knew, it seems to me I should be that happy and contented that I would not call even a dog "silly," much less lament over the shallowness of Plato, whose private conclusions are not very well known to us. But this is a matter of personal disposition.

Now let me sum up, and set forth Mr. Kroeger's position, and see what he says. Truth in the vulgar acceptance is the likeness or correctness of any pretended representation; but on second thought, to represent a thing absolutely were to double it in place and time, and hence all pretense of actual representation is questionable to the vul-

gar mind; the substance is not in the picture, nor is the actual life in the story that is told. The question then arises, what is *absolute* truth? and we see that absolute truth is possible only when knowledge is itself the objective substance of knowledge; and here the after-thought arises that the truth of knowing-being, in order to retain the vulgar notion of likeness, must have two items in order to likeness of them—for if knowing-being were absolutely one, truth would be squeezed out of it. But to hold being and knowing as two, is to have one element in the world which is beyond knowledge, has not its principle in knowledge, and therefore is blind and unsafe. To obviate all this a new art of thinking became necessary—the art of thinking self-relation—an art above the antagonism of sense and reason. Now it is the progress (whether individual or collective) of this art of thinking, wherein the old duplexity is obviated, which raises in lower minds a question to the higher as to what is meant by truth, or, *what becomes of the likeness between the two sides of the old duplexity when the absolute becomes one.* In the new method of thinking the immediate is not the true, in knowledge, and the conclusion is formless save as it has the form of a system by which truth is found but not seen. But when this process has obtained such a perfect technique or mechanism that it can be used for immediate knowing, then the old likeness will be restored or retained by absolute dialectic. Now Mr. Kroeger seems to believe or think that as truth is a common phenomenon of intelligence, all question in regard of it only presupposes the mind's consciousness of such a relation, which, like pain, we all have by experience, and any question of "what it is" is silly if we only use the word conventionally; if a man shouts "Oh!" when he is hurt, that settles the question of what is the matter with him. So in all our uneasiness and perplexity in this existence, if we so state the phenomena of our condition that other men identify it, all curiosity looking to the solution of our doubts and the relief of our anxiety by solving the puzzle which we are, is impertinent and vain. To me it seems that Mr. Kroeger has not spoken relevantly of his rubric, and that at least a part of life's puzzle is *to tell what the puzzle is*—that is, to state the problem of philosophy: What is Philosophy? And on this theme I would be glad to hear him.

With high regard for all who even try to know the truth, I remain  
your obedient servant,

BENJAMIN PAUL BLOOD.

AMSTERDAM, N. Y., December, 1875.

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*Exposition of the Human Form in its Three Degrees: as Sensory and Physical; Rational and Moral; Sophial and Divine.*

INVOLVED ELEMENTS.	{	I: The <i>Sensory Powers</i> deal with things—with sense-properties only.
		II: The <i>Rational Powers</i> deal with things and ideas in the interest of special science, or to special designs in knowledge.
		III: The <i>Sophial Powers</i> deal with things and ideas in full divine order; under the laws of <i>unitary science</i> —knowledge upon principles of universal unity.

ANALYSIS AND DEFINITIONS.

I.

SENSORY FORM. (Animal).	{	1st. <i>Senso-Sensory</i> , consists of merest animal sensibilities as allied to things and states, under express natural conditions.
		2d. <i>Ratio-Sensory</i> , consists of merest animal reason; reason prompted and controlled by the wants of the animal nature.
		3d. <i>Sophia-Sensory</i> , consists of the <i>animal instincts</i> , which are dominant in the animal nature, to direct and fulfil its needs.

II.

RATIONAL FORM (Human).	{	1st. <i>Senso-Rational</i> , consists in merest human sensibilities, allied, by feeling, to things, states, qualities and ideas, as subject to human discrimination and use.
		2d. <i>Ratio-Rational</i> , consists of distinct human powers in rational discrimination and use; investigating special conditions, or analyzing and comparing, on limited grounds.
		3d. <i>Sophia-Rational</i> , uses the human powers in associating, combining, synthetizing or ordering in the domain of rational science, but subject to the limitations of partial and special methods peculiar to human reason, even at its best.

III.

SOPHIAL FORM. (Divine).	{	1st. <i>Senso-Sophial</i> , involves those divine sensibilities which feel or know—in general or involved form—the universality of Love, Wisdom and Power, and the essential harmony thereupon pending.
		2d. <i>Ratio-Sophial</i> , reflects, and conducts all quests upon grounds of universal unity in creative law as standard rule of all intellectual endeavor in whatever realm the thought explores.
		3d. <i>Sophia-Sophial</i> , carries all feeling, thought and action upon the infallible principle of universal unity as fixed science; thus classifies, associates, concludes, or determines desired results upon the comprehensive grounds of immutable law.

SUMMARY STATEMENT.

{	This Form, as a unit of personality creatively matured in Divine Human Order, exhibits the full play of all these elements in normal realization of the whole Sensory, Rational, and Sophial nature, as one majestic complex of infinite Love, Wisdom and Power, duly embodied and active, in created realms.
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## EXPLANATORY.

The above is an attempt to make a very concise index of the forms and forces of character that combine to make mature MANHOOD—"the perfect man in Christ Jesus." The animal form is essential as a base sensibly lodged; the human form is essential to fix and unfold spiritual subjectivity or proper self-hood, as a requisite vessel given for the inflow of Divine Life; and the Divine Form—ininitely perfect—is essential consummating power, by which alone immortal bliss and glory can become a conscious reality to man.

In this method of analysis and definition, mental forms, or forms of character, have been mainly in view. Truest estimates take account of these, rather than of mere physical form, which only serves as house or vehicle to such conditions.

Without due estimates of the design and bearing of the whole thing, the leading phraseology of the different moments may seem far-fetched and awkward. But when it is considered that it is intended to make a verbal investiture of a whole conception as a measured diversity, in a comprehensive unity, the propriety of such terms will readily appear. The conception is one which embraces creative diversity in scientific unity, under a formal law of trinity. Any phraseology that would consistently present this conception in a comprehensive analysis, must be shaped to carry, constantly, the specials in the general, and the general in the specials. Unquestionably the great need of the times is a scientific ordering of all thought, all conduct, and all conditions of life, upon the ground of the integrity and constancy of the special or individual in the universal or public, and the integrity of the universal, public, or associate, in the fulfilled specials.

A special that does not in its form and degree partake of the universal, or a universal that is exclusive of the least special, is simply impossible. Hence Swedenborg, treating of creative order, says substantially, "the least is in the greatest, as the greatest is in the least."

Now, in classifying mental characteristics, and defining the various degrees as *Sense*, *Reason*, and *Wisdom*, we are directly led, on the ground above stated, to this process, namely: We proceed to find reason and wisdom in sense in their sensory character or degree, sense and wisdom in reason in their rational character or degree, and sense and reason in wisdom in their sophial character or degree. Thought conducted upon this method can never be exclusive or partial, but fully comprehensive. It cannot be thus limited to the *simplistic* in form; but it arises to the fully *consistent* and *composed*, according to the commanding order of serial law.

Knowing this process of analysis and classification to be in strict accordance with fundamental creative law and believing the definitions adduced sufficiently indicate its validity, let us come closer to

the question of phraseology, or verbal investiture. If the major term is thus constant in the minor and the minor is equally constant in the major, we must, in order to be duly explicit and exact, construct verbal terms that will consistently hold and carry the precise conception; hence in dealing with the sensory degree we must find its dominant character under the head of *sensory*, and its subordinates under the terms *reason-sensory* and *wisdom-sensory*: Then, in dealing with the *rational*, as the next higher form, we must find the sensory and sophial in form appropriate to that degree, and invest them with verbal terms accordingly; and, proceeding to the next form, *wisdom*, we must find sense and reason there sophially conditioned, and give them verbal vestiture accordingly. Thus we are led to construct and apply forms of investiture befitting the actual conditions apprehended by strict conceptions of immutable law; the terminal form of that investiture indicating the constant *one* and the prefixes thereof indicating the variable conditions of the *one*.

This is held to be a true method of procedure, to whatever extent analysis may be carried; though it is deemed impracticable, and generally difficult, to carry an analysis beyond the extent indicated in the formula.

If this method be regarded as simply speculative and curious, and void of practical availability in the affairs of experience, I would say that, as a comprehensive principle of creative law fundamental to all whole thought and all well-ordered conditions, I do not hesitate to propose it as a practical solvent of the knotty problems of the times, and as basic in a commanding science of mind and mind's essential conditions. If capable of such construction and use, there will be found no limit to practical reordering and reconstruction to be realized thereby, except in the actual consummation of Divine-Human Order; wherein the flow of life must be continually accordant with perfected scientific organization.

Let no one suppose this presentation assumes to be more than a faint outline, with briefest hints in definition. Nor must it be overlooked that the elements indicated will be found wearing very different aspects, in their productive function in development, and in their function of organic use in the play of fully developed conditions—all of which may be explicated on occasion.

Theron Gray.

CONCORD, N. H., Sept., 1875.

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### Dr. Hickok's Definition of "Transcendental Logic."

IN the last number of this journal Dr. Hickok explained and defended in a concise manner his position in regard to the chief systems of German Philosophy, whose principle he characterized under the

name of "Transcendental Logic." (See J. S. P. Vol. IX., pp. 222, 328, 430). Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, he thinks, reached only an abstract generalization from experience as their highest principle, and this, whether called by them "absolute Ego," "absolute Identity," "Idea," "God," or "Self-determination," is only a totality of all potentialities, things, men. "The universal is but the total of empirical thought; Life, cognition and will are forms of thinking, and creating can be conceived only as a process and result of interminable thought-activity." He would make the whole philosophy of Kant and his successors turn on the question of *form* and *matter* in judgments.

In contrast with this principle he defines that of the "Logic of Reason": "Instead in any way of a deduction from what is in experience, it is an induction from without and so a production of somewhat that is wholly new knowledge. It sees in the experience a clear implication of a somewhat that must have already been, or the experience itself had been impossible [i. e., not derivable by analysis from experience as contained under the latter but inferable as the logically necessary condition of it]. It knows the conditions on which alone experience can be, and with which the experience must be and could not otherwise have been than it is. It is not therefore in any sense an arbitrary *presupposition* taken just because it has been needed; it is a legitimate *prerequisite* taken because known *a priori* to have been in order to the experience, and in which is the primal 'sufficient reason' for the experience."

Limiting as he does the work of the so-called "Transcendental Logic" to mere abstraction and generalization from human experience, he affirms life, cognition, and will as found in Hegel's system to be only "forms of thinking." The "Idea in its identity" contains "all matter and form, thinking and being, in one," and is therefore pantheistic.

Here, however, it is claimed that the Transcendental logic is not accredited with what is its due. Even for Kant it may be claimed that he did not abstract from experience but added to experience synthetically his "pure intuitions" and ideas. Looking at sense-perception he saw that in order to make it possible there must be a logical condition ("prerequisite" as Dr. H. calls it) viz: Time and space must be conceded as *forms of mind* existing *a priori*. Time and space as forms of mind antedating all possible experience are not generalizations from experience, or as Kant expresses it they "are no discursive or as we say general conceptions of the relations of things, but pure intuitions." This he demonstrates by showing that we cannot think particular spaces or times without presupposing one universal space or one universal time as the logical condition thereof. The particular spaces or times can be thought only as limitations of the one all-embracing space or time. So too with the Ideas of God,

Freedom and Immortality. If sense-perception has its *a priori* form transcending all human experience, so too has the Will certain logical conditions which are required to make even the least of its acts possible. These are *first*, its own spontaneity (Freedom); *second*, its immortality (freedom implies responsibility and the latter implies immortality); *third*, God or the personality of the absolute (for man as rising in nature and the last link of its series can be neither free nor immortal unless the highest principle of the Universe is a free, personal one, transcending Nature and any form of fate whatsoever.) And if the highest principle of the Universe is free and personal, it is certain that Nature, emanating from such a source, will close its series in a final product which will transcend it (Nature) and reflect the highest principle by means of and through its own self-activity. So much is in Kant, on the surface or near the surface of his "Critique of the Practical Reason." To sum it up: Any, the slightest act of human will, preferring duty to sensuous desire, postulates God, Human Freedom, Responsibility and Immortality, just as much as the perception of any space-occupying object implies out-lying space extending *ad infinitum*. To a logical mind, as Kant shows, the briefest manifestation of that human will reveals in it an immortal individuality, and the personality of the highest Principle of the Universe.

What is in Kant is likewise in Fichte with still more intensity of expression and strictness of demonstration—(not, perhaps, to be found in any of the exponents of Fichte that have written popular summaries of his system, because they have studied first of all to be epigrammatic and sensational in their account of it, and hence have exaggerated all its insights into paradoxes).

Schelling's earlier system needs to be read in the light of his latter. His Mysticism must interpret his Philosophy of Nature. If one bears this in mind he will not find Schelling's system pantheistic.

As for Hegel, his Logic and his Phenomenology of Mind everywhere show up mere abstractions or generalizations from experience to be inadequate. He uses the method of *presupposition* or "*prerequisite*" constantly, and points out that it was the moving principle of the far-famed Platonic Dialectic. In his *Republic* (Book VI., Chap. XX. and XXI.) Plato defines the dialectic method as one that proceeds from the immediately given or assumed ( $\tauὰς \psiποθέσεις$ ) back to its ultimate presuppositions, cancelling the first assumed on finding them inadequate, until it arrives at the first principle. In his Logic (Vol. III., 3 Abschnitt, Kap. III.) Hegel describes the nature of the "Idea," which he has reached as the ultimate principle of the Universe: "The highest, steepest summit, is the pure personality \* \* \* which possesses freedom." "The Absolute Idea is not merely *soul* but free subjective cognition that comprehends speculatively, and exists independently as person and will, an impenetrable, atomic subjectivity, as



personal will and as theoretically cognizing all truth." Again in the *Encyclopædia* (Vol. I., §236) he says: "This [the Absolute Idea] is the *νόησις νοήσεως* which Aristotle characterized as the highest form of the Idea."

In his *Logic* he first examines whether truth or true being is immediate or absolutely simple, whether, in short, being exists out of relation. If any being or any somewhat exists entirely without relation, it cannot in anywise be determinate or have particularity or specialization: it cannot exist for another or even for itself; it can have no difference from aught else. The simple immediate is absolutely null.

Such categories as quality, quantity and measure are used by the mind with a presupposition that there is an independent simple immediateness. In fact the sensuous consciousness thinks all things as essentially existing, as self-subsistent, and while it does not deny relation between them, it supposes all relation to be an accidental, unessential affair.

The dialectical examination of the categories of Being (which is conducted in detail in the three volumes of Hegel's "Complete Logic") results in proving that Relation is essential to all beings. That dependence is a necessary characteristic of individual existences. Each is in and through something else. Mediation is the basis of immediateness. Pure immediateness is consequently the illusion of immature thinking. Immediateness is apparent and phenomenal.

The second task of logic is to examine the character of Phenomenality (manifestation, appearance, seeming) and essentiality. Negativity is shown to be relativity. Relativity is duality, and to it belongs all finitude. Spinoza says: "All that is, is either in itself or in some other," i. e., it is either through its relation to something else, or non-related, or self-related. The category of dependence is solved by the principle of self-relation. The general formula is: (a) All is negative or relative; each depends on another. This is the status of cause and effect, of force and manifestation, of form and matter, &c. (b) Dependence and Relation however are impossible, except as grounded through independence and self-relation. Otherwise we should have a dependent that did not depend on anything, or a relative that did not relate. (c) The independent is self-relating because it cannot be a simple immediate somewhat—such would be a form of being and devoid of relation, hence devoid of determinateness, and therefore null. It is relativity regarded as a whole, or totality. For the relative by itself must be relative to itself. The negative by itself is the negative of itself. Self-relativity or self-negativity is self-determination, and, (a) involves pure universality as its first phase or determining-activity; such pure identity is an Ego, (b) as determined it is the phase of particularity—self-objectivity—reduction of identity to opposition and difference—consciousness, (c) as self-determining or totality it is a pure activity which con-



tinually generates difference, and yet continually dissolves this difference into unity with itself through recognition, hence it is self-consciousness. This, then, is the highest principle of all.

How the self-conscious One is related to the world we discussed in the note on "Pantheism, or God the Universe," (J. S. P. for July, 1875). It would be a mistake (according to our view) to suppose this totality of self-relation a sort of indifferent totality or dead result. The essential point to note is that its self-relation reduces its differences to identity, and yet the same self-relation is self-determination, and hence generative of difference. Such an activity is exactly what we find in self-consciousness, and is not possible as a dead identity. It is a living activity. As highest Principle of the Universe, it must next explain the world and the multiplicity of "potentialities, things, men." This it does, as we have endeavored to show in the note referred to.

EDITOR.

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*An Old Picture.*

Wrapped in a charmed indolence  
With slothful lashes half-dropped down,  
On cheeks just flushed with quickened sense  
Of some sweet pain that she has known—

'Tis so the artist paints her, well  
If we could break the silences  
Of long-forgotten years to tell  
What followed on those hours of peace.

If we could read in those calm eyes  
The story of her after years—  
If any ship, sailed any seas  
And brought her costly freight of tears.

If agony held secret power  
To pale the sweetness of her mouth—  
And rob her of her pictured dower  
Of beauty, or her heritage of youth,

What then? we know that she was fair—  
We know that through immortal years  
The canvas boasts the unfaded hair,  
The glorious eyes, undimmed with tears.

How much of joy or pain was hers,  
What curious soul should guess or care?  
We stand among her worshippers  
And only know—that she was fair.

BOSTON, October, 1875.

MARY CHRISTINE KIPP.

*Editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy:*

The argument of Mr. Spencer, (First Principles), shows that evolution is attended with loss of heat, citing, *inter alia*, as an instance, the earth, the contraction of which was coincident with loss of heat. According to Mr. S.'s view, it is further shown that evolution ends in dissolution. But he shows that dissolution is attended with acquisition of heat. Will Mr. S. explain how it is that evolution, which is attended with loss of heat, can end in dissolution, which is attended with the acquisition thereof?

M. M. COHN.

LITTLE ROCK, Ark., Dec. 25, 1875.

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## BOOK NOTICES.

*La Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane, Rivista Bimestrale contenente gli atti della Società promotrice degli studj filosofici e letterarj. Roma.*

The first appearance of this philosophical periodical was noticed by this journal in 1871 (Vol. V., p. 94). In 1872, upon the commencement of the fifth volume, its place of publication was transferred from Florence to Rome, where it has remained. A table of contents to the first three volumes and to two parts of Vol. IV. has been given (J. Sp. Phil., Vol. VI., p. 189). In order to make the notice of this able periodical complete, a translation of the contents of the numbers that have appeared since is here given. Two volumes of three numbers each appear annually. The editorial corps, commencing with the fifth volume, included Count Terenzio Mamiani *editor-in-chief*, with G. M. Bertini, L. Ferri, F. Bonatelli, and G. Barzellotti *associates*. It will be noticed that each number contains a report of the transactions of *The Society for the Promotion of Philosophy and Letters*. In fact this review is the organ of that society.

*Vol. IV.. Part 3—Contents*—(1). Transactions of the Society for the Promotion of the Study of Philosophy and Literature in Italy; a circular to the members of the society. A list of the members resident in Rome. An account of the proceedings of the society during the years 1870-71. Letter of the secretary, Augusto Franchetti, concerning the general assembly of the 29th October, 1871. (2). Philosophical Conversations, by F. Bonatelli. (3). The Second Revival of the Academy in Italy. Letter to Dr. G. Descours di Tournay, by Terenzio Mamiani. (4). The Influence of Philosophy upon the National Spirit of Germany, by Dr. Giuseppe Descours di Tournay. (5). Philosophy of Religion, Church and State, by Terenzio Mamiani. (6).

Analysis and Criticisms of new works: Essay upon "The History of Philosophy in Italy in the Nineteenth Century," by L. Ferri; Paris 1869, (by Prof. Francisco Lavarino). Notices of Philosophy and Literature in America, England, Switzerland, Germany and Italy. Index to Vol. IV.

*Vol. V., Part 1.—Contents.*—(1). Programme by the editors. (2). Transactions of the Society for the Promotion of the Study of Philosophy and Literature. (3). The Form of Philosophic Thought or Method, by L. Ferri. (4). Upon Count Terenzio Mamiani's Theory of the Objectivity of the Idea, by A. Franchi. (5). Notes upon the preceding article, by T. Mamiani. (6). The Oriental and Occidental Tradition, by A. Severini. (7). Formation of the Idea, a dialogue between a Kantian and a Platonist, by T. Mamiani. (9). Necrology; Adolph Trendelenburg, by G. Barzellotti. (10). Bibliography, by S. Turbiglio. Notices. *Part 2.—Contents.*—(1). Transactions of the Society, &c. (2). Common Sense in Philosophy, and its History, by L. Ferri. (3). Philosophy of Nature, The Method of Positive Science, by L. Barbera. (4). The Origin of the Idea, according to the Peripatetics, a letter to Prof. Valerga, by T. Mamiani. (5). Reply of the Abbot Pietro Valerga. (6). Upon Perception, a letter to Count T. Mamiani, by F. Tocco. (7). Upon the same subject, a letter to Prof. Tocco, by T. Mamiani. (8). Other Considerations upon Theories of Perception, by G. Jandelli. (9). Synthetical Judgment *a priori*, in the Philosophy of Kant and in the Italian Doctrine of the Nineteenth Century, by L. Ferri. (10) Notices. Circular. *Part 3.—Contents.*—(1). Transactions of the Society, &c. (2). The Mind According to Spinoza, by S. Turbiglio. (3). Philosophy of History in the Latin and Teutonic Races, by T. Mamiani. (4). Necrology, by G. Barzellotti. (5). Letter to Terenzio Mamiani, by Nicola Mameli. (6). Conception of Cause in the School of Herbart, by L. Ferri. (7). Count T. Mamiani's Theory of the Objectivity of the Idea, by F. Lavarino. (8). Bibliography, by S. Turbiglio. Recent Publications.

*Vol. VI., Part 1.—Contents.*—(1). Transactions of the Society, &c. (2). The Mind According to Spinoza, by S. Turbiglio. (3). Perception According to Positive Philosophy, by Settimio Piperno. (4). Character of the Italian Philosophy, and the Latest Sketch of the Platonic Doctrine, by T. Mamiani. (5). Other Considerations of the Theory of Perception, by G. Jandelli. (6). Dr. Julius Hermann Kirchmann's Theory of Knowledge, translation, &c., by L. Ferri. (7). Prolegomena to every past and future Criticism of Reason, by G. M. Bertini. (8). Count T. Mamiani's Theory of the Objectivity of the Idea, by F. Lavarino. (9). Bibliography—thirty lectures, &c., by (S. Turbiglio). Count Cattera Lettieri's Introduction to Moral Philosophy and the Strictly Rational, (by the editors). Recent Publications. New circular by the Eleventh General Assembly of the Italian Scientists. *Part 2.—Contents.*—(1). Transactions of the Society, &c.

(2). Philosophy of Religion—Critique on Revelation. by T. Mamiani. (3). Philosophy of Religion; upon Revelation in Religion, &c., a letter to T. Mamiani from L. Ferri. (4) A Letter to L. Ferri from T. Mamiani. (5). Prolegomena to every past and future Criticism of Reason, by G. M. Bertini. (6). Count T. Mamiani's Theory upon the Objectivity of the Idea, by F. Lavarino. (7). Upon the Origin of the Idea According to the Peripatetics, by Pietro Valerga. (8). Conclusion Concerning Kant and his Critique of Knowledge, by T. Mamiani. (9). Bibliography; The Philosophy of Statistics: Introduction of Prof. A. Messedaglia, (by S. Turbiglio). R. Mariano's "The Religious Problem in Italy," (by L. Ferri). Foreign Philosophical Reviews. In Memoriam: Dr. Lorenzo Cerise, (by L. Ferri). Notices. *Part 3.—Contents.*—Transactions of the Society, &c. (2). Benedict Spinoza, part third: of the Mind and Cognition, by S. Turbiglio. (3). Philosophic Conversation Concluded, by F. Bonatelli. (4). Notes on Political Philosophy, Principles of Radicalism and Conservatism, T. Mamiani. (5). Count Terenzio Mamiani's Theory of the Objectivity of the Idea, by F. Lavarino. (6). Bibliography, Sermon of a Layman, &c., (by S. Turbiglio). General index of the six parts for 1872.

*Vol. VII., Part 1—Contents.*—(1). Programme by the Editors. Transactions of the Society, &c. (2). Philosophy of Religion; Critique on Revelation, by T. Mamiani. (3). Perception According to Positive Philosophy, by S. Piperno. (4). Upon the Principle and Idea of Cause, according to the School of Herbart, by Luigi Ferri. (5). The Conception of Logic, by F. Bonatelli. (6). The "Italian School" and its Works. (7). Bibliography. Recent Publications. *Part 2—Contents.*—(1). Transactions of the Society, &c. (2). Philosophy of Religion; Critique on Revelation, by T. Mamiani. (3). The Doctrine of Berkeley and his Theory on Association, by T. Collins Simon. (4). Contemporaneous Psychology, and the Problem of Consciousness, by G. Barzellotti. (5). The Doctrine of Perception, by S. Turbiglio. (6). Bibliography, by the Editors. (7). Philosophical Journals. *Part 3, Contents.*—(1). Transactions of the Society, &c. (2). The Doctrine of Berkeley and the Theory of Association, by T. Collins Simon. (3). A Letter in Reply to T. Collins Simon, by T. Mamiani. (4). Fragments of Girolamo Clario's Philosophy, by F. Bonatelli. (5). A Short Commentary upon an unedited letter of Prof. Castagnola, by T. Mamiani. (6). The Ideal and the True in Art; a dialogue between a poet, a professor and a painter, by P. E. Castagnola. (7). Upon External Causes, letters to Prof. Luigi Ferri, by T. Mamiani. (8). Study of the Phædrus of Plato, by E. Ferrai. (9). Bibliography (by the editors). Recent Publications.

*Vol. VIII., Part 1—Contents.*—(1). Transactions of the Society, &c. (2). Critique on Revelation; a letter to Prof. Bertini, by T. Mamiani. (3). The Philosophy of Nature and the Doctrine of Ber-

nardus Telesius, by L. Ferri. (4). Fragmental Remains of the Philosophy of Girolamo Clario, by F. Bonatelli. (5). Italian Psychology; a letter to Prof. Jacopo Barzellotti, by T. Mamiani. (6). The Practical Philosophy of Herbart, by A. Paoli. (7). The History of Philosophy Respecting the Cognition of God, by C. Antonaci. (8) Bibliography. Review of Foreign Philosophy. Recent Publications. *Part 2.—Contents.*—(1). Transactions of the Society, &c. (2). The Dialectic Unity according to the Ancients and Moderns, by B. Labanca. (3). The New Prolegomena to every present and future system of Metaphysics, by T. Mamiani. (4). Upon Sentiment (or Feeling), by C. Cantoni. (5). The Conception and Limits of Anthropology, by F. Tocco. (6). Bibliography, (by A. Valdarnini and L. Ferri). Review of Foreign Philosophy. Recent Publications. *Part 3.—Contents.*—(1). Transactions of the Society, &c. (2). New Prolegomena to every present and future Metaphysics, by T. Mamiani. (3). Upon a Preliminary Question in Every Philosophy, by G. M. Bertini. (4). Anthropology and Pedagogy, by F. Bonatelli. (5). The Dialectic Unity according to the Ancients and Moderns, by B. Labanca. (6). Bibliography, Review of Foreign Philosophy. Recent Publications, M. J. H.

*Die Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik.* Edited by Dr. J. H. v. Fichte, Dr. Hermann Ulrici, and Dr. J. U. Wirth. Halle: E. E. M. Pfeffer.

We translate the table of contents of the 66th volume of this ably edited periodical: 1, Dr. A. Dorner on the Principles of Kantian Ethics continued; 2, Prof. E. Grapengiesser's third and last article on The Transcendental Deduction; Kant and Fries (with references to the works of J. Bona Meyer, O. Liebmann, Kuno Fischer, Ed. Zeller, Herm. Cohen and Edm. Montgomery); 3, Dr. J. Wolff's third article on The Platonic Dialectic, its Nature and Worth for Human Knowledge; 4, Unprinted Correspondence of Kant and Fichte, communicated by Prof. Teichmueller at Dorpat; 5, Dr. J. Wolff on the Platonic Dialectic as method.

The most important book reviews are the following: *By Prof. Erdmann* of Prof. K. Werner (*a*) on the Psychology of William of Auvergne, and (*b*) on His Relation to the Platonists of the Twelfth Century, also (*c*) on The Cosmology and Natural Science of the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages. *By Dr. H. Siebeck* of G. Teichmueller's History of the Idea of the *παρωνσία*. *By Dr. Wirth* of Dr. Ed. Pfeiderer's Empiricism and Scepticism in David Hume's Philosophy, as the final sundering of the English mental, moral and religious sciences. *By Dr. P. Schuster* of H. Siebeck's Investigations of Greek Philosophy. *By Prof. Ulrici* (*a*) of the Province of Logic, with special reference to E. Sigwart's Logic; (*b*) of Kant's treatise on the Power of the Heart to achieve the mastery over its abnormal feelings by mere resolution (of the will); (*c*) of T. K. Abbott's translation



of Kant's Theory of Ethics or Practical Philosophy; (d) of B. P. Bowne's Examination of the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer; (e) of Robert Flint's Philosophy of History in France and Germany; (f) of G. S. Morris's translation of Ueberweg's History of Philosophy. By Dr. von Fichte of Maximilian Perty's Anthropology as the Science of the Corporeal and Spiritual Nature of Man, second article. By Dr. Pfleiderer of Idealism and Realism as found in Baumann's "Philosophy as the Means of Orienting one's self in Regard to the World." By Dr. A. Richter (a) of Franz Hoffman's Philosophical Writings; (b) of Demetrius von Glinka's "Human Society in its Relations to Freedom and Law (Rechts);" (c) of Carl D. A. Roeder's edition of Carl Chr. Fr. Krause's Lectures on the Philosophy of Law, (Rechts). *Appendix*: Adolph Steudel's Reply to Dr. Schwartz on the Question of Monism and Dualism.

*Verhandlungen der Philosophischen Gesellschaft zu Berlin.* Erstes Heft. Leipzig: Erich Koschny, 1875.

*Contents.*—(1) Professor A. Lassen's lecture on Mechanism and Teleology, delivered before the Philosophical Society of Berlin, Sept. 26, 1874. (2). Dr. Frederich's Lecture on The Principles of Critical Idealism, delivered at the session of the society Oct. 31, 1874. A brief report also is made of the discussions which took place at the close of the lectures.

The second part of the same work contains (1) Professor Michelet's Lecture on Idealism and Realism, delivered at the session March 27, 1875. (2). Dr. A. Vogel's Lecture on the Problem of Matter, delivered at the session April 24, 1875. It is the intention of the society to continue the publication of its proceedings, and a committee of editors composed of Dr. Ascherson, Dr. Frederichs and Dr. von Kirchmann, is appointed to take charge of the preparation of the work. Inasmuch as the members of the society represent the greatest diversity in their philosophical views, their discussions are rendered all the more interesting. We notice among the names of the participants in these discussions those of von Kirchmann and von Heydebreck, besides those of the lecturers before named.

*Philosophische Monatshefte* unter Mitwirkung von Dr. F. Ascherson und Dr. J. Bergmann, redigirt und herausgegeben von Dr. E. Bratuscheck. Leipzig: Erich Koschny, 1876.

The ten numbers of the twelfth volume, 1875, have been received. We translate from the rich table of contents the following:

I. TREATISES published during the year: 1, on Positivism in Science, by Prof. E. Bratuscheck of Giessen; 2, on the Study of the Human Sciences, of Society and the State, by Prof. W. Dilthey of Breslau; 3, The Philosophy of Religion of Averroes, by Prof. Merx of Heidelberg; 4, The Present Attitude of the Cosmological Problem,

by Dr. H. Vaihinger of Leipzig; 5, The Law of Codification, by Prof. Merx; 6, Arthur Schopenhauer, by D. José del Perojo of Madrid; 7, An Investigation of the Perceptibility of Phenomena, and of the Imperceptibility of Essence, by Maximilian Drossbach of Donauwoerth; 8, Correction of a Mistake on the part of a Translator and Expounder of Plato, by Dr. Wiegand of Giessen.

II. BOOK REVIEWS—(a) *Relating to the Philosophical Theory of the World*; 1 and 2, Edm. Pfeiderer and Prof. Wundt, The Province of Philosophy in the Present Time; 3, Dr. von Kirchmann on the Principle of Religion; 4, Rev. Kluge, Philosophical Fragments; 5, Dr. Strauss and Belief in Miracles; 6, Dr. Vitringa, Man as Animal and Spiritual Being. (b) *Relating to the History of Philosophy*; 1, Prof. Rud. Eucken on the Value of the History of Philosophy; 2, Prof. George S. Morris's translation of Ueberweg's History of Philosophy; 3, Prof. Alfr. Weber's History of European Philosophy; 4, Robt. Zimmermann, Kant and Positivism; 5, Prof. Carriere and Count von Bothmer; 6, Rev. Pötter, History of Philosophy, and The Personal God and the World; 7, Thilo on Herbart's Claim as a Philosopher; 8, Dr. Duehring, Critical History of Philosophy; 9, Prof. Rosenkranz's "New Studies;" 10, Dr. Wiegand, Literature of the Letters of Plato. (c) *Relating to Psychology*; 1, Prof. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint; 2, Ochorowics, Conditions of Consciousness. (d) *Relating to Logic*: Prof. Harms, The Reform of Logic. (e) *Relating to Modern Nature-Philosophy*: Alex. Waissner, The Atom. (f) *To the Philosophy of History*; Prof. Flint's Philosophy of History in Europe. (g) *To Religious Questions*: 1, Dr. Asmus, The Indo-Germanic Religion; 2, Prof. Grau, Origin and Goal of our Culture-Development.

Besides these there are many notices of books and periodicals; many discussions of questions of current interest. We note that Dr. Porter of Yale College contributes three articles on Philosophy in North America. There are excellent indexes of current philosophical literature, as well as of notices and reviews of philosophical works appearing in contemporary journals.

*Mind, a Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy.* Edited by George Croom Robertson, M. A., Professor of Logic and Mental Philosophy in University College, London. London. Williams & Norgate. No. 1, Jan., 1876.

Our readers will greet with cordial interest the appearance of a new philosophical journal in the English language. The first number of the new enterprise is before us with the following table of contents:

Preparatory Words by the Editor.

The Comparative Psychology of Man, by Herbert Spencer.

Physiological Psychology in Germany, by James Sully.

Consistency and Real Inference, by John Venn.

The Theory of Evolution in its Application to Practice, by Henry Sidgwick.

Philosophy and Science, by Shadworth H. Hodgson.

Philosophy at Oxford, by the Rector of Lincoln College.

Early Life of James Mill, by Professor Bain.

Critical Notices, Reports, Notes, &c., by G. H. Lewes, Professor Flint, J. G. McKendrick, Professor T. M. Lindsay, and others; Books of the Quarter and News, including notices of Brentano's Empirical Psychology, Lassana's Physiology of the Nervous Centres of the Encephalon, Hughlings Jackson's Researches on the Nervous System, Spencer's Principles of Sociology, and Cairne's Logical Method of Political Economy; Reports on physiological journals and German philosophical journals, Psychology in Holland, &c., &c.

We insert the prospectus, which gives account of the scope and design of "Mind."

MIND will be an organ for the publication of original researches, and a critical record of the progress made in Psychology and Philosophy.

Psychology, while drawing its fundamental data from subjective consciousness, will be understood in the widest sense, as covering all related lines of objective inquiry. Thus, due prominence will be given to the physiological investigation of Nerve-structures. At the same time, Language and all other natural expressions or products of mind, Insanity and all other abnormal mental phases, the Manners and Customs of Races as evincing their mental nature, mind as exhibited in Animals generally—much of what is meant by Anthropology and all that is meant by Comparative Psychology—will come within the scope of the Review.

Beyond Psychology, account will be taken of Logic, Æsthetics and Ethics, the theory of mental functions being naturally followed by the doctrine of their regulation.

The practical application of psychological theory to Education will receive the attention it so urgently claims at the present time.

For the rest, "Mind" will be occupied with general Philosophy. Even as a scientific journal, it cannot evade ultimate questions of the philosophical order, suggested as these are with peculiar directness by psychological inquiry. There is, also, a function truly philosophical which only the investigator of mind is in a position to discharge, the task, namely, of collating and sifting the results of the special sciences with a view alike to insight and conduct. But "Mind" will, farther, expressly seek to foster thought of bold sweep—sweep that can never be too bold, so be that it starts from a well ascertained ground of experience, and looks to come again there to rest.

Nor, in this connection, will the History of Philosophy be overlooked: whether as it involves the critical appreciation of the systems of thought, more or less speculative, which eager minds in every

age have been impelled to frame; or as it seeks to understand important thinkers in the record of their lives; or, finally, as it may take note of what is being done or left undone in the present day at the intellectual centres where thought and inquiry should be most active.

"Mind" will include among its contributors some of the foremost workers in psychology and philosophy on the Continent and in America.

Writers will sign, and be alone responsible for, their contributions. "Mind" will not be the organ of any philosophical school, unless it be held the mark of a school to give prominence to psychological inquiry.

Correspondence will be printed if it communicates new facts of scientific importance or expresses *reasoned* opinions.

"Mind" will be published quarterly on the first of January, April, July, and October, and may be purchased of all booksellers at 3s per number.

*Revue Philosophique* de la France et de l'étranger, dirigée par Th. Ribot. Première Année. 1. Janvier, 1876. Paris: Libraire Germer Baillière et Cie.

Cotemporaneous with the appearance of "Mind," the English organ of Psychology and Mental-Philosophy, appears a philosophical review in France, devoted mainly to the same movement. While the former is a quarterly, however, the latter is a monthly, each number being of the same size as a number of the JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY. The contents of the first two numbers are as follows:

*January, 1876, No. 1.* (a) Preface; (b) H. Taine on the Acquisition of Language by Infants and Primitive Races; (c) P. Janet on Final Causes; (d) Herbert Spencer on a Comparative Psychology of Man; (e) Analyses and Notices: (1) Horwicz's Psychological Analyses upon Physiological Bases; (2) Despine's *De La Folie, &c.*; (3) Schmitz-Dumont's "Time and Space"; (4) Giraud Teulon's "Origin of the Family"; (5) Guarin de Vitry's Sketch of Sociology; (6) Kuno Fischer's Francis Bacon. (f) Reviews of Foreign Periodicals: (1) *Philosophische Monatshefte*; (2) *Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik*. (g) Bibliography and announcements.

*February, 1876, No. 2.* (a) W. Wundt on the Mission of Philosophy in the Present Time; (b) Ch. Bérard on Contemporary Aesthetics in Germany; (c) G. H. Lewes on the Hypothesis of the Specific Energy of the Nerves; (d) P. Tannery on the Nuptial Number in Plato; (e) Analyses and Notices: (1) of W. Wundt's Influence of Philosophy upon Experimental Science; (2) of E. von Hartmann's Religion of the Future; (3) of A. Lemoine's Habit and Instinct; (4) of A. Brentano's Empirical Psychology; (5) of J. H. Jackson's Localization of Cerebral Movement. (f) Reviews of Foreign Periodicals: (1) *Mind*, a Quar-



terly Review of Psychology and Philosophy; (2) The Journal of Speculative Philosophy; (3) Notes and Announcements.

In his preface the editor announces that his review will be open to all schools of philosophy. It proposes to give a complete and exact view of the actual movement in philosophy, without exclusiveness or special proclivity towards any one school. It offers a neutral ground for writers of all classes, upon which they can present their systems for criticism and study. Here, therefore, is an opportunity afforded for the removal of wrong impressions and for fair, impartial judgment. While, therefore, eclecticism is avoided as of no value, it gives room to each school to represent its claims. There is Positivism, the Experimental School of France, Germany and England, the Critical School following Kant, and Spiritualism inspired by Maine de Biran. Of the questions which the editor hopes to discuss he names the following: Psychology in its connection with Anatomy and Physiology, Mental Pathology, History and Anthropology. Logic and Æsthetics are regarded as departments of Psychology, "the former studying the mechanism of the human reason, the latter a certain form of pleasure — that which the beautiful excites in us." Ethics—relating to human actions is to be discussed in its relation to religion, to positive science, to social and natural bases. The theories of natural science will be examined in the light of Philosophy, especially those relating to the principle of the correlation of forces, to the hypothesis of evolution, to chemical theories and to theories of Life. Finally, the questions regarding the possibility of Metaphysics as a Science. Meanwhile the *Review* is to demand of Metaphysicians the facts on which they base their conclusions, being convinced that no one can neglect experience without running the danger of basing himself upon creations of his imagination and upon mystical effusions; but a pure Empiricism it avoids. Its great value to French thought will be manifest in its influence in behalf of a more thorough study of the previous works in each department. The labor of solitary students who waste their time in going over useless and sterile investigations will be spared. Oriented by the history of Philosophy each will make the best use of his time and opportunities.

A very interesting list of articles is advertised for the future numbers, and we shall gladly lay before our readers from time to time an account of the progress of this and the English journal ("MIND,") together with some notice of the contents of the several discussions.

*Metaphysics; or the Science of Perception.* By John Miller, Princeton, N. J. 426 pages, 8vo. New York: Dodd & Mead, 1875.

This work, within the compass of a single volume, treats the mind in all its aspects, theoretical, practical, and divine: Book I. investigates "Psychology, or the Science of Perception as Such"; Book II.,



"Logic, or the Science of Perception as Knowledge"; Book III., "Ontology, or the Science of Perception as the Knowledge of Being"; Book IV., "Pathics, or the Science of Perception as Emotion" (aesthetical and moral); Book V., "Theology, or the Science of Perception as Knowledge of the Being of a God."

The author says at the outset: "It is a doctrine of this book that there are no simple ideas. It has been a usual doctrine that simple ideas cannot be defined. It is a doctrine of this book that no ideas can be defined; that definition is a near approach to a boundary; and hence the endless lists; no thought ever having attracted much discussion without great vagrancy in defining it; that vagrancy being greatly increased as thought wanders off from the concrete; abstract thought, and, above all, speculative thought, being endlessly at sea, and hard to fix by any understood limits."

With this view, we see why he has given so wide a scope to the word "Metaphysics." Wolff made it include only theoretical philosophy with four divisions: (1) Ontology, (2) Cosmology, (3) Rational Psychology, and (4) Natural Theology. The philosophy of ethics, economics and politics he includes under "practical philosophy," i. e., the philosophy of the will. Co-ordinate with metaphysics and practical philosophy, he makes logic a third discipline treating of that which appertains to the general use of reason. Thus with the exception of cosmology (fragments of which are to be found in his fourth and fifth books) Mr. Miller treats the entire field of philosophy as falling within the province of metaphysics. He holds perception to be all in all in philosophy, there being "nothing consciously in the mind but perception;" "nothing intuitively known but perception"; hence no being cognized except as perception; that "emotion is numerically the same as perception; that "unless God is perception He is not intuitively known." Agreeing with Berkeley he makes all *esse* to be *percipi*. But when he makes will to be only a species of perception, and explains attention by the law of the strongest emotion, he encounters a difficulty which he seems unable to surmount: Perception is not morally good or bad; and to make volition a species of perception is to deprive it of responsibility and render virtue impossible.

The author has taken great pains to present the results of the principles and method of which we have a glimpse in the above, in a popular colloquial style, so as to attract and hold the common reader.

*Philosophy of Trinitarian Doctrine: A Contribution to Theological Progress and Reform.* By Rev. A. G. Pease, Rutland, Vt. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1875; pp. XII., 183.

This little volume, the fruit of the thoughtful and loving meditations of one long separated from the active affairs of life by painful disease, has, it is true, on the face of it, apparently a theological,

rather than a philosophical, bearing. The work is, to a considerable extent, an exegesis of verses in the Gospel of St. John. But this exegesis is philosophical. It aims at real explanation. It would facilitate rational comprehension. Proceeding on the evident assumption that a revelation to man is to be received with all man's faculties, and is therefore to be apprehended with the reason, just as much as (though not more than) it is to be taken up into the heart and life, the author, whose thoughts run in sympathy with the best philosophical idealism of the world, seeks to show the *organic* relation between God the Father, the Word His Son, and the world (more especially, humanity, which lovingly receives the Word). It is not the place, in a philosophical journal, to discuss the bearings of a work like this on dogmatic theology. But every thoughtful reader will find the book in a high degree mentally stimulating and in the best sense practically helpful.

In "a Plain Word with Prof. Tyndall," at the end of the volume. Mr. Pease tersely and plainly expresses what he terms the "Gist of the [assumed] controversy" between science and religion. A. S. M.

*The Influence of Descartes on Metaphysical Speculation in England.* By W. Cunningham, B. A., Scholar of Trinity College, Cambridge. Liverpool: Printed by T. Brakell, Cook Street. 1875.

An excellent monograph which shows both powers of thought and a philosophical erudition very unusual in the English metaphysical literature of the present time. In an introduction the author elaborates the speculative principles which govern his work. His first chapter is devoted to discussing the "Internal Connection of the Various Systems." Next he passes to Descartes and gives an exhaustive review of the Cartesian philosophy. The succeeding chapters are: The Contemporaries of Descartes; John Locke and his School; Geo. Berkeley; David Hume. These writers are discussed in their relation to Descartes mainly. The fundamental stand-point of the author can be seen when he states the central principle to be "the Notion and its Moments." An acquaintance with the best German works which treat of his subject is a leading feature.

D. J. S.

*Notice to Shakespearian Students.*—We deem it our duty to call attention to the remarkable work of Dr. Alexander Schmidt of Königsberg, Prussia, entitled "Shakespeare-Lexicon, a Complete Dictionary of all the Words, Phrases and Constructions in the Works of the Poet." It is our opinion that Dr. Schmidt has furnished here the most important contribution yet made to Shakespearian literature.

D. J. S.

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### KANT'S REPLY TO HUME.

BY JOHN WATSON.

David Hume, as Carlyle has said, was the true intellectual king of the eighteenth century. Nor is his authority any the less real now, because he receives little outward homage. The dead but sceptred sovereign still rules the spirits of many who refuse to be called his subjects. No one who has followed the course of philosophic thought with any care will be surprised either at the real influence or the apparent neglect; for the singleness of purpose and clearness of thought which lend an especial charm and value to the work of the master, are but rarely met with in the halting disciple. And hence there are not a few writers of eminence of our own time who show that they have not been able to receive the lesson it was Hume's mission to teach, by occupying themselves with the futile task of raising a dogmatic system upon a foundation that he has proved to have no stability. One thinker, of remarkable subtlety, seeks to formulate the canons of a science of nature, after expressly reducing nature itself to a procession of vanishing sensations. Another, whose speculations have won the confidence of many leading physicists, maintains that thought is in its very essence

self-contradictory : that neither Materialism nor Idealism is true, but both; that the universe is resolvable into the feelings of the individual, and is yet absolutely independent of those feelings ; and that nothing hinders us from saying unconditionally that consciousness is synonymous with nerve-vibrations, but the equally demonstrable fact that nerve-vibrations are nothing apart from consciousness.

The eager reception of such self-contradictory and anachronistic systems as those of Mill and Spencer, can only be accounted for upon the supposition that, while the premises of the master have been accepted without hesitation, the spirit which animated his philosophy has fled. For Hume has proved, once for all, that absolute Skepticism is the legitimate outcome of the assumption, made by all Empiricists, that knowledge may be explained by an inspection of the individual consciousness. In the supposition that the individual mind is the final court of appeal, it is already implied that subject and object, thought and nature, are abstract opposites, which can in no way be reconciled, and which therefore logically annihilate each other. This however is what the followers of Hume are unable to see; and hence, instead of letting each side of the opposition develop itself until both vanish, they either preserve the one at the expense of the other, or they allow each alternately to destroy its opposite, and yet very strangely suppose that both survive in their integrity. The former method gives rise to Sensationalism or Materialism, according as the subjective or objective term of the relation is preserved; the latter to what may be called Indifferentism. Of the three, the two former involve a less sacrifice of logical consistency, while none can put forward any valid plea for acceptance. It thus becomes a matter of the last importance that this veiled Skepticism should be forced to disclose its true nature, and that some estimate should be made of what has already been done for its overthrow and for the reconstruction of knowledge upon a secure foundation. And as the Skepticism latent in Empiricism appears with little disguise in Hume, and the philosophy of Kant was at least believed by its author to be a reply to that Skepticism, a comparison of the main points in the system of each cannot fail to be profitable.

Knowledge, if it is to be more than an empty name, must contain a permanent element that is unaffected by the perpetually changing phases of the individual consciousness. If no such

element can be shown to exist, the supposition that truth is attainable must be rejected as a delusion. Now common consciousness and the special sciences are at one in believing that truth is within the reach of human faculties, and that they are themselves to some extent actually in possession of it. The objective validity of the conceptions of substance and causality—the permanence of objects and the permanence of their connection—is a presupposition which it does not occur to common sense to doubt. The physical sciences in like manner take for granted that there are objects independent of the individual consciousness, and that the laws of their connection are discoverable; while it is a postulate of mathematical science that its axioms and demonstrations are necessarily and universally valid. There is therefore in the direct or unreflective consciousness in all its forms an unhesitating *belief* that there is in knowledge a universal and permanent element, which is raised above the mutations of the individual mind. This belief may however be incapable of justifying itself; being assumed as a ready-made fact that does not stand in need of proof, it is possible that science, as well as common sense, has been all the time deluding itself by an assumption of stability which a critical investigation will show to be baseless. That such a universal delusion besets the fundamental beliefs of mankind is what Hume, following out the line of thought first consciously entered upon by Locke, has to tell us. Unlike the extreme school of ancient sceptics, he has no quarrel with the facts of consciousness as facts. He admits that people do imagine that substances persist, and that effects flow by necessary sequence from causes; that there is an appearance of knowledge he not only allows but contends; but appearance is not reality, belief is not demonstration. When we come to examine the supposed necessary and universal notions, which the possibility of knowledge presupposes, but which the uncritical mind makes no attempt to justify, we find that their objective validity disappears and gives place to a flux of individual sensations, each of which perishes in the moment of its origination. Nevertheless the delusive appearance of knowledge—the belief that there is in knowledge a universal and necessary element—has to be accounted for, and this is the task with which Hume mainly occupied himself.

Formulating the presuppositions of common sense, Locke had held that all real knowledge is given in a simple and momentary



act of consciousness, and hence that the mind is purely receptive in its acquisition of knowledge. There are two sources of knowledge, sensation and reflection, or inner and outer sense. The relations introduced by the spontaneous activity of thought—and thought is in all cases a faculty of relations—do not constitute but destroy reality. But if relations of thought are consistently excluded, no assistance in the derivation of real knowledge can be obtained from the assumption of an external world or of an internal self. Locke however allowed himself to take advantage of both assumptions, and was thus enabled to account for the knowledge of reality, although at the expense of logical consistency. His illegitimate assumption of the relation of individual feeling to an external world was pointed out by Berkeley, his unproved supposition of its relation to an internal self by Hume. All reality has therefore to be sought in unrelated ideas of sensation and reflection, or, in the language of Hume, in impressions of sensation and impressions of reflection. These indeed do not exhaust the phenomena of consciousness; impressions are not only originally felt but reproduced, and that in two ways—either in their original or in a new order. These are called by Hume respectively ideas of memory and ideas of imagination. The distinction of an impression and an idea cannot be found in the relation of the former to an external object or an internal self, nor does it consist in any difference in the content of either; and hence Hume places it in greater or less vivacity. An impression is a more vivid, an idea a less vivid feeling; as again an idea of memory is more vivid than an idea of imagination. Whatever reality an idea has, it possesses in the secondary sense of being a copy of an impression; and hence to impressions of sensation and reflection all reality is reducible. The Skepticism of Hume thus lies ready to his hand. The only connection in the objects of knowledge he can admit is that arbitrary order in which feelings succeed each other. There can therefore be no necessary element either in common experience or in the sphere of mathematical or physical truth. There can be no objects in the sense of permanent and identical substances, nor consequently can there be any necessary connection of objects in the way of causality. All reality is reducible to a series of feelings, as they are to the individual, and the supposed identity and causal relation of objects must be explained as an observed uniformity in the order of succession among feelings. Now a feeling, as Hume

himself tells us, is a "perishable passion," and hence all feelings taken together form a mere series, each of which is over before the other begins. No two feelings can be identical with each other, because no feeling can repeat itself: in one word feeling is a multiplicity and nothing but a multiplicity. No real knowledge therefore is possible. There is no object to be known, and if there were, no self to know it; and the belief in the identity and necessary connection of objects is a natural delusion, produced by confounding the subjective necessity of custom with the objective necessity of things.

This sceptical result cannot be consistently avoided by any one who follows the psychological method. The immense superiority of Hume over his recent disciples and imitators is especially manifested in his clear perception of the really crucial question. He saw plainly that, if no necessary relations can be shown to be involved in experience, knowledge in any intelligible sense is a contradiction, and that, on the principles of Sensationalism, which he inherited from Locke, such a necessary element is inadmissible. One cannot but be surprised that, both by Hume's immediate opponents and by his recent followers, the difficulty as to the possibility of knowledge is supposed to be solved when it is said that all knowledge must be based upon the facts of experience. For what is this but a re-statement of the untested *belief*, that what is in consciousness is in consciousness? So understood, the explanation is the mere tautology: consciousness is consciousness, experience is experience. The real point at issue—viz: whether our conscious experience has in it a permanent and universal element, and whether therefore knowledge in any sense that is not unmeaning is possible—is not in this way so much as touched. The true problem of philosophy, as Hume showed with unequalled clearness and force, is: Is knowledge possible at all? or, more definitely, Are the conceptions of substance and causality necessary and objective, or subjective and arbitrary? Moreover, in showing that, if the mind is purely passive in its apprehension of reality, all knowledge must be reduced to immediate and unrelated states of consciousness, none of which persists beyond the moment of its origination, Hume indirectly suggested a way by which the reconstruction of knowledge might be attempted. Neither his mode of stating the problem, nor his suggestive failure to account for knowledge, was lost on Kant. Generalizing the problem of philosophy, Kant saw that

the possibility of knowledge depends upon our capability of returning an appropriate answer to the question, Does experience involve, as its condition, universal and necessary notions? And, as Hume had shown that upon Locke's assumption of the passivity of thought such notions cannot be established, it was suggested to Kant that thought does not passively apprehend objects of experience, but is instrumental in their construction. The relation of Kant and Hume is thus of the closest and most suggestive kind. Both start with experience as it is for the unreflective consciousness; they are agreed in holding that there is in consciousness a belief in the necessity and universality of certain notions, and that truth is unattainable unless this belief can be justified; and both are agreed in holding that feeling in itself is a mere multiplicity, and that if thought is purely receptive nothing but feeling is knowable. On the other hand, Kant denies that mere feeling can be known at all, as Hume had assumed in order to explain the appearance of knowledge; and hence he is led to see that, starting from the facts of consciousness, as apprehended by common sense and the special sciences, we must, to account for their existence, hold that they imply an element which, as contributed by thought, is necessary and universal.

This partial account of the genesis of the *Critical Philosophy* may serve to explain the ambiguity that attaches to certain of Kant's technical terms, and to account for that appearance of contradiction between the earlier and later portions of his work, which obscures his real meaning and has caused the true development of his thoughts to be misunderstood. Beginning with experience, as it is for the individual, Kant's object is, by a critical analysis of it, to separate the contingent element due to feeling from the necessary element contributed by the mind, and thus to prove how experience itself is possible. Hence the term experience is at first used in the ordinary sense as equivalent to the untested facts of consciousness. And, as all untested facts are from their nature received passively, this meaning naturally passes into that in which it is applied to the element of knowledge given to the mind by sense. Finally, the term experience is employed in its strict critical sense, to designate real knowledge, i. e., experience that has been proved to involve a necessary element originated by thought, as well as a contingent element contributed by sense. Closely connected with the difficulty arising from ambiguous language, is an imperfection in Kant's expo-

sition of his system, in which the order of thought is inverted; the consequence of which is that he has to speak provisionally, and make assumptions that have afterwards to be justified. Thus, in the earlier part of the *Kritik* he seems to infer that there is in experience an *a priori* element contributed by thought, because experience contains necessary and universal judgments; whereas his real thought, as we discover in the sequel, can only be correctly expressed by saying exactly the reverse, the proof of the universality and necessity of judgments being that experience is inconceivable except upon the supposition that there is in it an element which as originated by thought is *a priori*.\*

The task of Kant then was to prove that the real knowledge which common sense and science suppose they possess, but which remains in them an unproved assumption, is not hopelessly infected by delusion. As has been said, he accepted the conclusion of Hume that sense of itself can only give a multiplicity of isolated impressions, and that if there is no other source of knowledge truth is unattainable. But unfortunately, while he saw the necessity of deducing the necessary element of knowledge from Reason, Kant did not entirely free himself from the false assumption that had led to Hume's skepticism; and hence, biased by the influence of the Wolfian dogmatism, he retained the absolute distinction of subject and object, upon which the Empiricism of Locke rested, even when advancing a theory which rendered it superfluous. Accordingly, while all known phenomena are reduced to the unity of thought, he yet holds that beyond consciousness there is a real object and a real subject, which are not known in themselves but are only implied in their known effects. This dualistic assumption has partially destroyed the purity and harmony of the Critical Philosophy, and, in conjunction with the imperfection of Kant's exposition just referred to, has given color to the false impression that it is only another psychological explanation of knowledge. The psychologist starts from the supposition that the problem of philosophy is to explain how the individual mind, of which the known object is supposed to be the abstract opposite, comes to have a knowledge of that object.

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\*Mr. Laurie (*Jour. Spec. Philosophy*, Vol. VI., p. 224) charges Kant with assuming that there is a "necessary in propositions," and upon this assumption basing his proof that there are *a priori* judgments. It would be very strange if Kant had assumed that which the *Kritik* was mainly written to establish.



But when the question is thus stated, we are inevitably driven back to the theory of which Hume's skepticism is the logical result, that thought is a purely formal activity. If therefore we insist upon interpreting Kant's system from the dualistic point of view which it undoubtedly presents, we may show it to be infected by the psychological method. The truth is however that the assumption of a noumenal subject and object, while it could not but make its influence felt in Kant's exposition, is quite incompatible with the whole scope and aim of his philosophy. What imperfections exist in his theory from the intermingling of the psychological with the speculative method, will appear as we proceed.

Sense in itself, as Hume has shown, is a mere multiplicity. But a mere multiplicity, as he ought to have maintained, but did not, cannot account even for the phenomena of the individual consciousness. Although Hume was much more consistent than Locke or Berkeley, or their recent followers, he was forced, in order to explain even the appearance of knowledge, inconsistently to assume that sensation is more than a mere multiplicity; that it not only gives the particular, i. e., isolated differences, but also the individual, i. e., a combination of differences. What Kant does is to insist that we shall not surreptitiously foist into the conception of mere difference the contradictory conception of identity, and thus make a show of extracting from sense a unity of differences. Sensation as purely immediate and unrelated, is mere difference. But, in our unreflective consciousness there are individual objects, each of which, as in space, is external to every other, and each part of which for the same reason is external to every other part. Moreover these objects are regarded as persisting through successive moments of time, no two of which co-exist. Whether, therefore we attempt to account for the unity of differences involved in the spatial and temporal relations of objects, or for the unity of determinations of individual objects themselves, we must have recourse to something essentially different from sense. For sense of itself can only give difference; it has no possibility of integration, and therefore is incompetent to account for that unity of differences which even the simplest phenomena of consciousness imply. Before, therefore, we can explain how the individual mind could have a conscious experience of external objects, or of space and time, we must suppose that the differences of sense have been success-



ively apprehended and in that apprehension combined and reduced to unity. While then the differences are receptively apprehended, their combination must be spontaneous. This act of combination Kant calls *Synthesis*, to indicate its spontaneous character, and the faculty which produces synthesis he terms the *Understanding*. That in our ordinary experience a synthesis of the differences of sense is implied, is overlooked when it is supposed that the understanding is a purely analytical faculty. This is the fallacy that vitiates the theory of Locke, as of all Empiricists, and which has as its result the skepticism of Hume. The very fact that we can analyze our ordinary conception of objects, is of itself a proof that a synthesis of the understanding must have gone before: for although knowledge in its earliest stage is in a confused and partially indeterminate state, and therefore stands in need of analysis, still had there been no prior synthesis of differences, there would have been nothing whatever to analyze.

The necessity of a synthesis by the understanding of the mere difference of sense, as the condition of even the simplest experience, has been proved; but much more is required to establish that there is in knowledge a necessary and universal element. The combination of differences evidently cannot be effected by sense, as the Empiricist supposes, but must be produced spontaneously by the understanding. It is competent however for an objector to say that the synthesis of the understanding is perfectly arbitrary, and hence that we can have no certainty that truth is attainable. If we can combine determinations in any way we please, obviously the product of this combination will not be objective knowledge. To place knowledge upon a sure foundation we must be able to show that there is a supreme principle which regulates the synthesis of the understanding; that the unity to which sensuous determinations is reduced is not the result of an arbitrary combination, but on the contrary that the combination is itself absolutely conditioned by a necessary unity.

And here it may not be out of place to point out that Kant does not regard sense and thought as giving different kinds of knowledge, but only as contributing elements of knowledge, which in themselves are mere zero. We should hardly have thought it necessary to insist upon this distinction had not Mr. Lewes in his recent work repeated the charge, first advanced by

him in his "History of Philosophy," that Kant absolutely separates the sensibility from the understanding, and regards the one as capable of being exercised apart from the other. Kant, says Mr. Lewes, "after first defining knowledge to be the product of a subjective element and an objective element, henceforward treats the subjective element as if it alone contributes a peculiar kind of knowledge, and not simply one of the factors of knowledge."\* Now if we are resolved to adhere to the mere letter of the *Kritik*, many statements might be produced which, taken by themselves, would seem to substantiate this charge. But the doctrine that sense in itself affords but a possibility of knowledge, which only becomes actual upon the exercise of the synthetic understanding, is so fundamental a distinction in the Critical Philosophy that to overlook or obliterate it is to render the whole system meaningless. If sense in itself gives one kind of knowledge, it must of course be a knowledge of individual objects, and hence thought necessarily takes up the place of a purely formal activity, which has no other task than that of abstracting certain attributes from the completely determined object, and recombining them in a perfectly arbitrary way. It thus becomes not synthetical but analytical; and when Kant represents the problem of philosophy as comprehended in the question, How are synthetical *a priori* judgments possible? we must suppose that he did not understand what he himself meant, and thus fell into an elaborate *ignoratio elenchi*! On the other hand, there is a side of the Kantian philosophy, to which reference has already been made, that may be said logically to overthrow the relativity of sense and thought; but only because it destroys the possibility of any knowledge whatever. By absolutely opposing the noumenal self to the noumenal object, Kant lent countenance to the fundamental fallacy of Empiricism—a fallacy which Mr. Lewes endorses, and which therefore it is not competent for him to object to in another—that the mind is purely passive in its apprehension of knowledge. If we carry out this assumption to its consequences, we shall no doubt be led to say, not only that sense gives one kind of knowledge, but that it gives all knowledge worthy of the name. The ultimate issue of this mode of thought we have already seen to be the skepticism of Hume, which, on the ground that sensation is immediate and moment-

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\*Problems of Life and Mind, American Ed., Vol. I. p. 405.

ary, denies the possibility of any knowledge of reality. But this psychological point of view, although it is distinctly countenanced by Kant, can only be regarded as a superficial flaw which leaves his philosophy in its essential features unimpaired. The thing-in-itself is in Kant an unwarranted presupposition, which may easily be separated from his system, and very much to its improvement in simplicity and self-consistency. As it is, it necessarily exercised a pernicious influence, which may be traced in the most purely speculative part of the *Kritik*, the reduction of all knowledge to the unity of self-consciousness, to which we now proceed.

To prove the possibility of real knowledge we must be able to show that there is a primal unity, which is the necessary condition of the synthesis of the understanding. In our ordinary experience we have a consciousness of individual objects as existing in space and time. Such a consciousness cannot be accounted for upon the supposition that sense gives us a knowledge of objects, for sensation is in itself bare difference. The mind must not only apprehend the difference of sense, but by an intellectual synthesis combine it. But such a synthesis is only possible if there is something which contains in itself no difference—something which is absolutely self-identical. Now it is evident from a mere analysis of our ordinary consciousness that in each of our perceptions the consciousness of self is implied; for an unperceived perception—a perception that is not in consciousness—is a contradiction. This consciousness of self is however simply accepted as a fact, without being proved or in any way accounted for: and hence it may be said, as Hume did say, that self, like the object, is an illusion which philosophy dispels. It will not therefore do to prove the reality of self by a mere appeal to the individual consciousness: for all that can in this way be established is that there is in our ordinary consciousness a *belief* in the reality of self. What we have to show is that the consciousness of self is the necessary condition of the belief in self. Now it has been shown that sense *per se* is a mere multiplicity, and hence that, to account for the empirical consciousness of objects, the understanding must combine this multiplicity. The possibility of such a combination has to be accounted for, and that which is to account for it must have in itself no difference, or a higher synthesis would again be required to reduce this difference to unity. The conscious *I* however exactly meets the requirement.

The *I* is a pure identity; it is absolutely one and the same in all perceptions, as an analysis of the empirical consciousness is sufficient to show. The various determinations which in their totality constitute one perception would not be in consciousness at all, did they not belong to one and the same self-consciousness. It is only by going through the separate determinations of sense and summing them up that they can be in one consciousness, and being in one consciousness they are related to an absolutely identical self. Were there no universal self lying at the basis of knowledge, we could not have even the consciousness of the difference of sense as a difference; and on the other hand if there were nothing but the identity of self we could not have the consciousness of self as identical. Actual experience and the possibility of its extension, alike involve as their condition a synthesis of sensuous differences by an absolutely identical self. The fact that when I analyze my empirical consciousness I detect the presence of self in each perception, implies that self-consciousness is the necessary condition of synthesis, just as synthesis is the condition of analysis. The synthetical unity of self-consciousness is thus the highest principle of all knowledge, and hence it may be called the "original unity of self-consciousness;" and as it is the condition of the necessary element of knowledge, it may be termed the "transcendental unity of self-consciousness." The possibility of experience thus involves that the variety of sense should be reflected upon the identity of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is therefore the absolutely necessary condition of all knowledge.

The synthetical unity of self-consciousness, as it is the central truth of the Critical Philosophy, so it is the highest point of pure speculation to which Kant attained. Interpreted in its true spirit, and liberated from a certain inconsistency (to be immediately considered) that vitiates its actual presentation, it ought to commend itself to the "inductive" logician not less than to the speculative thinker. To the former it should appeal as a successful instance of the advance of knowledge "from the known to the unknown" by the verification of an hypothesis. Starting from admitted "facts of experience," it goes on to explain them by a principle that binds them together by a necessary law; setting up the hypothesis that self-consciousness is competent to explain the given phenomena, it tests the hypothesis by the phenomena, and finds that it, and it alone, is competent to account



for them. Nor can it be said that Kant flies beyond the bounds of possible experience in search of his principle of explanation; for surely, since Descartes' "*Cogito ergo sum*," all are agreed that the consciousness of self is the simplest and most certain of "facts." Why then do our Empiricists obstinately refuse to accept so irrefragable an instance of induction? May it not be that their favorite formula of the progress "from the known to the unknown," and their no less favorite maxim that induction involves the "verification of hypotheses," are barren truisms that no sane person would dispute, but which tell us no more than the "trifling propositions" that stirred the wrath of Locke by their pretentious emptiness? Surely we are all agreed that if any advance in knowledge is to be made, it must be by knowing something we did not know before; and that to find out the law which regulates any given phenomena we must hazard a conjecture, which can only be accepted if it turns out to be correct. But after these "wise saws" have received due homage, the only really important question—the value of the explanation offered—is as far from being settled as ever. Now in the present instance, that which prevents the Empiricist from gratefully accepting Kant's solution—as he certainly ought to do, seeing that it places "experience" upon a solid basis—is the preconception that the object of thought stands in absolute opposition to the self that thinks it. Under this false supposition he seeks to overthrow the logical law of contradiction (for which he should have more respect) by trying violently to bring the object into relation with the subject, each being implicitly defined as the contradictory of the other. Hence when Kant brings forward a principle which is to explain knowledge by showing that self and not-self, as strictly correlative, are meaningless when taken in abstraction from each other, the Empiricist replies reproachfully that this is to take the "high *priori* road" that leads away from experience and loses itself in mist. The charge is undoubtedly just if by "experience" is to be understood the object in isolation from the subject; but if it means, as it ought to mean, the *totality* of experience, the synthesis of subject and object, it is the Empiricist, and not Kant, who violates the integrity of experience.

But, however innocuous may be the assaults of Empiricism, the disturbing element, to which reference has more than once been made, would not allow the central doctrine of the Critical Phi-



losophy to remain uncontaminated by contradiction. Taken strictly, the conception of self-consciousness as the principle which unites subject and object in a higher unity, is fatal to the presupposition of a thing-in-itself, which as beyond consciousness is unknowable. By simply holding fast the two correlatives, we get the conception of a self-consciousness that is neither an abstract universal nor a mere particular, but at once universal and particular, and therefore individual. To suppose that there is an unknown self and an unknown object, in addition to the known self and the known object, is to advance an hypothesis that is at once unnecessary and self-contradictory. But Kant was not prepared to surrender the thing-in-itself, and hence we find him, after he has enunciated the strict correlativity of self and not-self, falling back into the psychological point of view which Hume had shown to be contradictory of knowledge. For immediately after he has spoken of self-consciousness as the unifying principle of all knowledge, and therefore in effect as the unity of subject and object, he goes on to remark that the *I*, being an absolutely simple unity, contains no difference in itself, and must therefore have difference given to it by sense. Hence he deliberately and emphatically rejects the suggestion that the understanding may be perceptive. There may, he admits, possibly be a self-consciousness which originates the determinations of which it is conscious, but of such a self-consciousness we can form no positive conception. In other words, the difference of sense, although it has no existence apart from consciousness, is nevertheless in its origin due to the noumenal object and not to reason. Now by thus denying to thought any capacity of originating difference, Kant virtually makes the original self-consciousness a bare unit, and thus identifies it with the abstraction of self, which is the negation of not-self; and hence he is debarred from giving any consistent explanation of the relation of subject and object. Even in this imperfect form, his theory successfully explodes the fallacy of Empiricism, which assumes that sense of itself gives a knowledge of objects, i. e., of a unity of differences. But, on the other hand, a purely abstract self is as incapable of accounting for the *difference* which all knowledge involves, as mere sense is of explaining its *unity*. No doubt if knowledge is possible at all there must be a synthesis of differences; but how can any synthesis be produced by a self-consciousness which is so defined as to exclude all difference? That

the self is in its own nature a unity—or rather a *unit*, for unity necessarily implies difference—does not help us to understand how it introduces unity into that which is conceived as its abstract opposite. Self is a mere unit, not-self is mere difference, and so they must remain in eternal isolation, unless we can point to a principle which is in itself a synthesis of unity and difference. This principle must be neither self nor not-self, but that which in transcending combines both. Kant sees this clearly enough; but, unable to break loose from the fetters of the thing-in-itself, he confuses self-consciousness with the abstract self, and stumbles in the very moment of victory. Hence if we mete out praise to him strictly upon the ground of what he has achieved, without taking into consideration the scope and intention of his efforts and the near approach he made to complete success, we may say that he has rather given an exceptionally clear statement of the problem of philosophy than a true solution of it. The follower of Kant has therefore only two courses open to him: either to hold fast by the unknowable thing-in-itself, and the consequent abstraction of self; or to deny the reality of the indemonstrable noumenon, when the conception of self-consciousness as a unity that transcends the opposition of self and not-self, will follow as a matter of course. If he decides to adopt the former alternative, he must be prepared to throw in his lot with Empiricism, and therefore with Skepticism, which attends it as its shadow. For when self is conceived as the abstract of not-self, thought can only be a formal activity; and hence the wealth of reality is thrown out of the orderly domain of Reason and given over to the lawless realm of Sense. If, on the other hand, he choose the alternative that self-consciousness is implicitly both subject and object, he will see that knowledge is placed upon a foundation that cannot be moved; being the self-evolution of Reason, which, in universalizing the particular, realizes itself in the concrete individual.

After establishing that the difference of sense is reduced to unity by a synthesis of the understanding, of which self-consciousness is the only possible condition, Kant goes on to ask what are the special forms that that synthesis takes. Hitherto it has only been shown that no knowledge is possible unless we suppose that sensuous determinations are combined by the spontaneous activity of thought. We can easily see that, however contingent may be the sensuous material given to thought, the

various modes of reducing this material to the unity of self-consciousness must be necessary. But to find out what these modes are, and to be sure that we have discovered them in their completeness, we must have some clue to guide us in our search. All intellectual synthesis being a manifestation of one absolutely identical self, the understanding is a complete unity; and hence it must be possible to find some one principle that will lead to the discovery of all the ways in which it combines the variety of sense. Now to reduce variety to unity is to judge, and hence all thinking is judging. Judgment is either analytical or synthetical; and, as all analysis implies a prior synthesis, the various forms of the analytical judgment will afford a clue to the different manifestations of the synthetical judgment. Formal logic, which abstracts from all content of knowledge, has already tabulated the forms of the analytical judgment. In our ordinary experience we have a consciousness not only of individual objects, but of general conceptions. It is with the formal relation of these conceptions to each other that common logic deals. Conceptions are generalizations from individual perceptions. Comparing a number of individuals together and noting their points of agreement, we form general conceptions. We may next compare together the conceptions thus obtained, and by a like process of abstraction, form higher conceptions; and this process we may repeat until we have obtained a conception that includes all individuals under it. The act by which we reduce a number of perceptions to conceptions, or a number of conceptions to others of a higher degree of generality, is judgment. And as conceptions can only be employed in judging, the only office of the understanding is to judge, i. e., to refer conceptions to objects through perceptions. An analysis of the various forms of judgment thus affords an infallible clue to the different conceptions used by the understanding in the synthetical judgment. Applying this principle, Kant finds that all judgments may be classified according to their quantity, quality, modality and relation, each of which has under it three phases, and that to these phases there correspond as many pure conceptions, or categories. These categories then are the different ways in which the understanding reduces the material of sense to unity. Thus the permanent element of knowledge, which Hume had denied to exist, has been found. The categories, as belonging to the very constitution of thought, cannot be reduced to an arbitrary order in our

feelings, inasmuch as, without presupposing them, no experience even of a series of feelings as they are to the individual could have taken place. They are therefore necessary and universal.

In this account of the way in which he was led to the discovery of the categories, Kant attempts to comprehend the analytical and synthetical judgments under one formula. To think, he tells us, is to judge, and judging consists in referring conceptions to objects through perceptions. Now in strict propriety this formula is only applicable to the analytical judgment, the common view of which rests upon the supposition that individual objects, with the full complement of their attributes, first exist full-formed in consciousness, and are afterwards referred to an abstract universal. If, following the analogy which the account naturally suggests, we attempt to assimilate the synthetical to the analytical judgment, we shall naturally be led to think that objects as such being given by perception, the understanding proceeds to apply to them its categories. We might suppose, e. g., that on entering a room our senses reveal to us a number of individual objects, which the understanding afterwards combines by means of such categories as unity, plurality and totality. It must be under some such misapprehension that Mr. Lewes charges Kant with holding that sense and thought contribute different *kinds* of knowledge. Kant's real thought is, that by the application of the categories to the *element* of knowledge given by sense, objects are first constituted as objects. This, no one who has apprehended the relation of the categories to the synthetical unity of self-consciousness, can fail to understand. Self-consciousness, as we have seen, is the absolute condition of all knowledge, no matter how rudimentary or confused it may be. The isolated impressions contributed by sense would have no existence even in the changing consciousness of the individual, were they not reduced to unity by an all-pervasive and identical self. But to refer the manifold of sensation to a universal self is to think it, and therefore to bring it under the unity of the categories. The categories are thus the condition of the perception of objects; and hence we must suppose the analytical judgment to imply the synthetical, as the analytical unity of consciousness presupposes the synthetical unity. For the analytical judgment in all cases brings one or more individuals under an abstract universal, either mediately or immediately; and hence it assumes



the individual to be already known. This assumption has to be justified, and its justification lies in the necessity of supposing a prior synthesis of individual impressions to account for conscious experience. It is true that the office of the categories in the synthetical judgment is not only to constitute objects as such, but also to connect them; but the process by which they are connected with each other is not divergent from that by which they are constituted, but strictly continuous with it.

Interpreted in its spirit, Kant's derivation of the categories is inconsistent with the assumed opposition of the synthetical and analytical judgments. If self-consciousness is conceived, as Kant in his higher moments does conceive it, as the unity which transcends the opposition of subject and object, the analytical must be regarded as strictly correlative with the synthetical judgment. The isolated impressions of sense are only knowable in so far as they are distinguished from each other, and in that distinction related to a universal self. But this implies on the one hand an analytical judgment which distinguishes one determination from another, and on the other hand a synthetical judgment which unites the determinations thus distinguished. Take away either the judgment which differentiates or the judgment which integrates, and knowledge becomes impossible. Thus knowledge is neither mere synthesis nor mere analysis, but a unity of both. It is the self-determination of Reason, which in manifesting itself at once differentiates and integrates. For how can the synthetical judgment combine elements that without analysis would have no existence? and how can there be any analysis without a corresponding synthesis? These are not separate processes, but correlative aspects of the same process. The same presupposition, however, that prevented Kant from clearly apprehending and retaining the absolute unity of subject and object in self-consciousness, led him to contrast the synthetical and analytical judgments as distinct and opposite processes. That presupposition, it need hardly be said, was that the particular is given to the mind by the unknown thing-in-itself. For, the particular being thus taken up ready-made, the only task left for thought to perform is to reduce it to unity. Hence the understanding, in so far as it is constructive, is supposed to form synthetical judgments alone; and hence also the categories are conceived as empty forms of combination that receive their filling from an external source. The result is that the analytical judgment is de-



graded to the rank of a purely formal activity, instead of being regarded as not less constitutive of knowledge than the synthetical judgment.

Kant could not overlook the fact that analysis plays an important part in the development of knowledge; but, misled by the false assumption that all necessary relations are constituted by the synthetical judgment, no other course was left open to him than to hold that analysis merely resolves objects, that are already known in their completeness, back into their original elements. Accordingly he plays into the hands of the formal logician, maintaining that thought as analytical refers objects to abstract universals, or, in other words, separates from them the attributes by which they are already constituted. But this is to identify judgment with memory, and to fall into a lifeless nominalism. If objects in their completeness, i. e., in the sum of their relations to other objects, already exist in consciousness, thought can only by introspection recall them as they are suggested by a given name. In strict propriety therefore we cannot say that the analytical judgment brings individuals under the unity of a conception, for the attributes designated by a term are already supposed to be given as united. And hence Kant, in assuming that the analytical judgment is a reliable guide to all the forms of the synthetical judgment, goes upon a false principle, the influence of which is shown in the incompleteness and want of connection of his list of categories. That he was led to a discovery of certain of the categories, notwithstanding his derivation of them from the superficial analysis of common logic, is due to the fact that the analytical judgment, as he conceived it, is a repetition in an inverse order of the actual process of thought. The syllogism is a disintegration of the elements put together by thought in its constructive activity; and hence it does serve as a clue, although an imperfect one, to the discovery of the categories.

Little more is needed to complete Kant's proof of the possibility of a real knowledge of objects in their connection. The difference of sense, it has been shown, must be referred to the unity of self-consciousness in order to be known at all; to refer sensuous differences to a universal self is to think them, and thus to bring them under the categories. But here the difficulty arises that the categories are merely the ways in which thought may combine a difference that is given to it, and the differences of

sense are in complete isolation from each other; and hence we cannot, without supposing something that shall mediate between the categories on the one hand and the sensuous differences on the other, explain how actual knowledge can take place. But if we look again at what is involved in experience, we shall see that the consciousness of objects, as possessed of qualities and as related to each other, implies that they exist in Time and Space. And here we come upon the last element required to constitute experience. For Time and Space can be resolved neither into the mere difference of sense, nor into the unity of thought: not the former, because they must be presupposed before we can explain to ourselves how sensuous differences can come within the sphere of consciousness: not the latter, because Space and Time are complete unities in themselves. It was by supposing that sensuous differences are given as coexistent and successive that Hume was able to make a show of deriving Space and Time from sensation. But when we simply hold fast by what he himself states, that sensation *per se* is bare difference, we see that Space and Time, as unities, must be referred to some other source. They are therefore not given from without, but supplied from within, and hence they are *a priori*. And just as little can they be identified with the categories of the understanding as with the differences of sense; they are indeed unities, but not unities which may comprehend under them an infinite variety of differences supplied from some other source; their unity and their difference are implied in themselves, all parts of space and time being limitations of one space and one time. They are therefore perceptions. Space and time have thus the peculiar characteristic of being akin on the one hand to the categories, and on the other to the differences of sense; and hence they are fitted to mediate between the two. As pure forms they lie *a priori* in the mind, and thus thought can act through them upon the manifold of sense supplied by the transcendental object. Thus we can understand how we may have experience of objects in their connection. When we analyze experience we find that it involves these elements: (1) isolated sensations, (2) the pure forms of space and time, (3) the categories and (4) self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is absolutely the highest condition of all knowledge; the categories stand under it, as its modes of reducing the manifold of sense to unity; space and time are the formal conditions of the apprehension of sensation; and through them

the latter is brought into connection with the categories, and thus referred to the unity of self-consciousness.

Thus the possibility of knowledge has been proved, and by implication its limits prescribed. That there is a necessary and universal element in experience is established from the impossibility of accounting for experience upon any other supposition; and that we can have no knowledge except within the bounds of experience is involved in the fact that sense must contribute the element of difference before we can even be conscious of self as identical. For thought can only be exercised upon condition that a manifold of sense shall be given to it; and as this manifold is itself conditioned by the forms of space and time, we can have no knowledge of the thing-in-itself, which is out of space and time. It is true that thought could reduce any manifold whatever to unity, provided only that it were sensuous; but so far as our knowledge is concerned this capacity is valueless, since we can have no sensible experience except that which is given in space and time. While therefore within the limits of experience, our knowledge is beyond the assaults of Skepticism, the conditions of possible knowledge preclude us from ever knowing more than phenomena.

We had intended to point out, somewhat in detail, how completely the Critical Philosophy of Kant meets the philosophy of Hume, both in its positive and negative aspects: proving on the one hand that mere sensation cannot account even for a series of feelings, as they are to the individual, and therefore not for that limited amount of certainty which Hume inconsistently allowed to the mathematical and physical sciences; and on the other hand destroying the basis of his Skepticism by showing that the necessary element of knowledge cannot be the product of custom or repeated association, since custom itself implies the constructive activity of thought. Had space permitted we should also like to have made some remarks upon Kant's conception of space and time as purely subjective—a conception which, like the other imperfections in his system, to which reference has been made, flows from the assumption of an unknown thing-in-itself—and upon his limitation of knowledge to phenomena. But perhaps enough has been said to show that the Critical Philosophy, while its purity is so far polluted by the intermingling of absolute Realism with absolute Idealism, nevertheless gave the death-blow to Empiricism; and that it clearly pointed out the way to a thor-

oughly consistent philosophy, which should explain all reality as the externalization of Reason, working through and yet independent of the consciousness of the individual. The Empiricist should learn from a study of Kant that the only reality his own premises will allow him to retain is that which remains after all thought and existence have vanished; and the less prejudiced reader, in making the thought of Kant his own, may perhaps be led to see the necessity of cleansing it of all taint of Empiricism.

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### DARWIN'S DESCENT OF MAN.

(A Few Thoughts and Queries Suggested on Reading Darwin's Introduction to his fifth edition of "The Origin of Species, and Descent of Man").

BY J. H. PEPPER.

Darwin commences by begging the question and talks at the commencement of "*prejudices against his views*;" as much as to say that he alone is right, and that other people are so stupid and bigoted, they will not change their minds on a subject that nature alone can teach them, and the knowledge thus acquired appears to ignorant observers to be all against Darwin, because no one has yet heard or read of a monkey being anything but a monkey, a codfish a codfish, a jelly fish a jelly fish, a cell a cell, &c., &c., &c.

Darwin says "man must be included with all other organic beings in any general conclusion respecting his manner of appearance on this earth." Granted as we allow (at least a large section of the Christian world) that Father, Son and Holy Ghost is one God, but each separate and distinct, as we allow that red, yellow and blue waves come from one wave of white light, but all distinct and having separate qualities. "Species are the modified descendants of other species." Very true again, but each species belongs to its species, and you cannot raise a continuous species by uniting a horse and a donkey, and if you do it the result is a mule, which can no longer generate its species,

but ends as a mule. Mules do not and cannot increase and multiply. If you name three species, A, B, C:

A—Monkey,	{	A cannot generate with B,
B—Dog,		B with C, or
C—Man.		A with C.

It is Darwin's business to get over this great and fundamental difficulty, and he must be able to prove that the reverse of the story of the confusion of languages at the building of the Tower of Babel must happen to living animals, viz: that the multiplicity of organisms and varieties of animal life possessing the common instincts of their species, must be all as the people were said to be before the confusion of languages, i. e., all speaking one language, or in other words having "*one common seed*" of generation, so that the seed of a jelly fish is really by some refined and long time process, gradually to evolve itself from an humble and ignoble condition to the more glorious and perfect estate called man. Darwin's postulate seems to be that the story of the "Tower of Babel" may be paraphrased into that of the "*Tower of Mental Activity—Man*," the confusion of languages, the confusion or differentiation of species, did not occur in nature, but that the Architect of nature used only one language, one seed, out of which came all living things from the jelly fish to man. "Natural Selection" meant that the weakest or least perfect seed was destroyed, the strongest as most perfect, only lived.

Darwin allows he may have overrated the importance of "Natural Selection," and he compliments the old and honored chiefs in natural science and says: "*Many unfortunately are still opposed to evolution in every form.*" Darwin admits that he has never deliberately applied these views to *a species taken singly*.

"When we confine our attention to any *one form* we are deprived of the weighty arguments derived from the nature of the affinities which connect whole groups of organisms, their geographical distribution in past and present times, and their geological succession. The homological structure, embryological development, and rudimentary organs of a species, whether it be man or any other animal to which our attention may be directed, remains to be considered, but these great classes of facts afford us, it appears to me, ample and conclusive evidence in favor of the *principle of graded evolution*."

First it may be noted that Darwin obtains no proof of evolution by studying *one species*; he then begs the question again,



and asks to be permitted to argue on "groups." Very good: let him do so, and still group A is different from group B, and that from C. If he can prove that the seed of group A will beget B, and B beget C, we must then pay strict attention to this great and awful fact, and say that it may then be possible to conceive the world peopled only with monsters such as the Pagan Satyrs or Centaurs, and in process of time by the degradation, or rather in this case the evolution of species, we may realize semi-animals—half dog half man, half horse half cow; but fortunately this imaginary cataclysm is arrested by the stubborn, incontrovertible obstinacy of nature in declining to permit a mule to generate with another mule.

It would appear that the world is more likely to become degraded than elevated, if Darwin's doctrines are to be paramount, and as we proceed with the analysis of his pleadings, we perceive that like a drowning man he snatches at straws.

Darwin is undoubtedly a great philosopher, but like other monomaniacs appears to be insane on one point, viz: that man came from the seed of a jelly fish by "Natural Selection," (the strong destroying the weak) occurring through millions and millions and millions (make your left hand figures stand well in this discussion) of years.

Darwin states that "the sole object of this work is to consider firstly, whether man like any other species, is descended from some pre-existing form? Secondly, the value of the differences between the (so-called) races of man." Ye gods! so-called!! as if a negro (so-called) was not different from a white man. When human beings of weak intellect have escaped into the forest wilds, it would appear that they become in certain cases covered with hair almost like an animal, they tear their food with hands and teeth, and live on berries, or whatever they can masticate, swallow, or digest.

This is the degradation of the species called man. The idiot is one of a degraded species, and may have sprung from some incestuous connection, or from the intermarriage of relations too closely connected and within the ties of consanguinity, as usually happens when first cousins marry. Even the same seed in the same species, man, is fatal to longevity—the offspring being weak, languid, and die early.

If man generating with his species, and intermarriages in one community or family, may breed idiots or other people of weak

bodies and intellects, what would it be if the *same seed* permeated all living things belonging to the mammalia? Why gradual decay, and the earth should be empty and void of human beings by this time.

Darwin says "the high antiquity of man has recently been demonstrated by the labors of a host of eminent men." Very true—let that pass. Why not very ancient? when a thousand years in Thy sight are but as yesterday.

And this, the distinguished author goes on to say, is "the indispensable basis for understanding his origin." One would have thought the contrary, because antiquity shrouds much that is ordinarily regarded as historically in comparative darkness, and "as distance lends enchantment to the view," so distance of time provokes the most fascinating narratives, which, unhappily, like the "Evolution Fairy Tale," cannot be proven—and yet are most amusing because they wear a rag of probability of truth about them. It seems that this vaunted antiquity shuts the door and hides the key that might open the domain of knowledge respecting the actual date of the origin of man. Darwin continues, "Nor shall I have occasion to do more than allude to the amount of difference between man and the ape, for Professor Huxley says the opinion of the most competent judges has conclusively shown that in every single visible character man differs less from the apes than these do from the lesser members of the same order of primates." True again, in all time man has observed the remarkable similarity between himself and his "poor relations," the monkeys. There is a great similarity between a horse and a mule or a donkey, but "the difference" just makes the two perfectly distinct. Man and apes are alike "with a difference" profound and immense; no monkey has ever been tried in a court of justice for a crime or conduct unbecoming a gentleman; they are irresponsible members of the animal world, endowed with remarkable instincts and a great imitative faculty, but there it ends; individual apes, chimpanzees and ourangs, with continued kind treatment may perform remarkable acts, and by these and facial expressions simulate their lord and master, man; the record is full of such cases, with the usual sequel of attempted civilization of the poor wild animal viz: death, as the ape dies of consumption; whereas, if allowed to roam its own native forests and feed in its own way, the poor relation (as Charles Lamb called the monkey) shifts for himself and lives his appointed time.

So, on the contrary, when man is turned adrift in the forest, as has happened with children of weak intellect, they have hardly been able to sustain life, because they require the opposite conditions of life to the monkey; if by accident they are of the family of Esau, i. e., hairy, and nature has furnished this natural suit of clothes or skin covering, they may manage to exist. When hair does not grow profusely, death probably ensues from exposure, unless it be in a warm or temperate climate.

Darwin is a most sincere and truthful enthusiast; it is not disrespectful to call him a monomaniac in the sense one would speak of the "perpetual motion" inventors, or "Biblio-maniacs," or other men who harp so long upon one string that a slight lesion of the brain apparatus probably takes place.

Darwin's modesty charms the thoughtful reader—thus he says: "This work contains hardly any original facts in regard to man; but, as the conclusions at which I have arrived after drawing up a rough draught, appeared to me interesting, I thought that they might interest others." Very nice, very prettily put, and quite refreshing as compared with the self-assertion of Tyndall and others.

"It has often and confidently been asserted that man's origin can never be known, but ignorance more frequently begets confidence than does knowledge, it is those who know little and not those who know much who positively assert that this or that problem will never be solved by science." True, very true, an undoubted truism.

The conclusion that man is co-descendant with other species of some ancient, lower and extinct form, is not new in any degree. See Haeckel's remarkable work, a book so perfect that even Darwin says his own essay should not have appeared if it, the book, had appeared before his own was written.

Possibly true again. We need not oppose the idea of the gradual improvement of the race of man, although we are entitled, with Agassiz, to reverse the process of "Evolution" reasoning, and say that the first creations called "man" were more perfect than anything we now see, more beautiful, and cast in the mould of the Apollo Belvidere and Venus of Milo.

Out of tens of thousands of horses only one wins "the Derby." Out of tens of thousands of men and women, only one here and there is perfect in form and conspicuous from intellect.

Were the first creations of man Apollos and Venuses? or were

they ugly, brutal, and simply animal, with or without a wild and scanty form of language? How did the divine gift of speech originate? The answer to these simple questions is impressive, because silence is the result—except we say because man was originally endowed with the organs of speech. Then if man had the vocal organs, why did not the monkeys have the same gift? Can we cultivate a monkey's voice to speak like a Washington or to sing like a Kellogg or a Titians?

Darwin says that "Sexual Selection has played an important part in the differentiation of the races of man." Of course it has, or we should not be able to recognize the pluck and endurance of the Anglo-Saxon race as distinct from that of other races of white men. We know that intermarriage, and mixture of varieties of white men, climate and food, work great changes, as we speak of a beef-eating Englishman.

Darwin's arguments fail to show us "that the differentiation of the races of man" brings him nearer to the race of apes.

If it pleased the Creator to form monkeys and men with the same kind of skeleton and external form, it also pleased him to leave great barriers of distinction, by endowing the flesh and blood of man with a nervous system that monkeys have not, and even if they had it, does not give the monkeys the power to express their thoughts in words or to reason upon or indite their ideas. Monkeys may communicate with other monkeys by cries and signs, but they cannot speak to man. Has any monkey learned talk within the period, since the *Antigone* of Sophocles was written, viz: about 450 Before Christ? If any change had taken place in the forms of apes it must have been recorded during the last 2,000 years. The conversion of monkeys into men would have been too startling a fact to have escaped notice in the Greek works published during that period. But then Darwin's reply would be: give me more time, and count the evolution of living persons by thousands of centuries, and the most perfect work of the Creator, viz: man, will be the result.

After reading Darwin one regrets that it is difficult if not impossible to agree with him, and if we take all he says for "gospel," there is still a bond of connection, theoretical of course, like Darwinism, between matter and a first great Creator.

"We may extend our vision backwards," is the high-flown and pedantic language of Tyndall, or in other words dream a dream,

which put into words, suggests the following queries to the "speculative" but "philosophical" readers of this journal:

I. Might not the principles of "evolution" and "natural selection" lead up from cell life to divine perfection?

II. If there is a beginning in "cell life," which is the lowest form of vitalized matter, unless we begin with the chemical compound called protein, whose vitality is doubtful, may there not be an end somewhere in the very highest condition of "vitalized matter"?

III. Do not extremes meet, and may not "cell life" and divine majesty be the two ends of a long chain?

IV. If cell life began the reign of vitality, why should it not be asserted that the highest order of "spiritualized vitality" has started first into "Power," and unrolling itself like a scroll, shows the Powers from whence *it*, the "Divine Spiritual Essence or God-head" proceeded, but ending in a cell?

V. Upon the "Evolution Theory," we may dream that millions and millions of years ago, matter gradually formed itself into an Essence and Divine condition, i. e., "Perfection." This once achieved would give the control over matter, and constitute a "Divine, Absolute and Perfect Power," which may forever repeat itself in the creation of countless worlds.

VI. As a "moral code" is the basis of true happiness, the same perfect "God-head" that repeated itself in the creation of worlds, would provide for this want. Without a code of morality man would abandon himself entirely to brutal lusts: man would destroy man, ergo, man would destroy himself. It was necessary to subjugate the powers of "Ethereality," viz: "the operations of the mind," by permitting reason to assert itself as a co-existent power with mere animal, nervous, electrical, chemical, and mechanical "cell life."

VII. The ten commandments are the grandest examples of what should constitute a moral code. The civilized world has mainly accepted this code, and embodied nearly all of it in laws. Whoever breaks the laws must in the end bring upon himself or herself unhappiness and misery, as punishment follows the breaking of the laws. The upright and prudent man obeys the laws (if acknowledged by all to be just), and if industrious may enjoy that degree of happiness which our senses can receive; but even the good and industrious may through ignorance break some minor branch of the law, or in other terms



“make mistakes,” and so a lack of knowledge is almost a crime, for it frequently brings the punishment of want and penury, as shown by unsuccessful speculations. Parents cannot too early inculcate and insist upon rigid economy and habits of saving, for without “means” even the best “go to the wall.”

VIII. All denominations are certainly begging for money, declared to be “the root of all evil,” ergo, they ask for evil.

After Moses and the letter of the law, come a still more wonderful “evolution” of “Divine Essence” of highly spiritualized reason and thought to occupy Darwin’s improved and higher order of “cell life,” viz: the marvellous life of “Him who is called the Saviour of the World,” whose code of “Mental Ethereality,” if once firmly established, would end all wars, and destroy forever the love of the “root of all evil,” and lead to sustained, pure, and everlasting happiness, by the angelic purity of the lives of men.

IX. When this last result of “Evolution,” or continual destruction of the weak and evil, takes place, then we must have the uprising of the highest condition of “Mental Essence,” as shown for our example in the “Life of Christ.” And now has arrived the Millenium.

But alas, it is only a dream caused by an attempt to digest the tough theory of good, truthful, learned Darwin.

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## TURNER.

BY W. E. CHANNING.

“He sat—and talked  
With winged messengers; who daily brought  
To his small Island in the ethereal deep  
Tidings of joy and love.

The measure of his soul was filled with bliss,  
And holiest art, as earth, sea, air, with light,  
With pomp, with glory, with magnificence.”

Joseph Mallord William Turner, was born April 23, 1769, and died December 19, 1851, at Chelsea, England.

In the last ten years of the eighteenth century, there sprang up in Britain the fashion of publishing illustrated books of local scenery. Draughtsmen at leisure, and sketchers or amateurs, were thus employed. Turner, in 1794, made the first sketch for a work of this kind. He had been for some time acquiring the rudiments of drawing and coloring, and was now sent into the field to make sketches from nature, a practice he never abandoned during his extremely industrious artist-life. In these early sketches we find his later traits, his love of reality, his strong yet essential contrasts of light and shade, and the natural style of his work—an elevated realism. Never would he make a purely fanciful and traditionary picture. We see less clearly what he at length became, as superior by art to nature, as the latter is to the unversed spectator—his tact and complete address of manipulation, came latest. The author of “Modern Painters,” of whom Turner says: “He sees things in my pictures that are not in them,” and to whom, “A thing of beauty is a snare forever,” makes no allusion to these early works—so uncommonly quiet and literal, needy performances, by which the first of artists was educated, and confirmed in his purpose to be a painter. Thus, face to face, he came with sea and shore, in calm and storm, hand to hand with their beauties and their merciless exactions, never this picturesque attitude of the world absent from his eye, using his pencil before the thing he painted, putting in his colors, in the brilliant sunshine on an open deck at sea, as sweetly as at home:

“All he desires, all that he would demand,  
Is only that some amicable hand,  
Would but irrigate his *fadeless* bays  
With due, and only with deserved praise.”

This man was one to whom experience cries: “Little child, the path of human life is something dark and crooked. I will lead you up to the blazing sunshine, yet you shall not know it. Rude and pitiable you must seem, awkward in the cunning appliances of men and things.” Never could Turner unbind his thought save in the wave of his color, even if he knew most distinctly what he liked. This environment restricted him from metaphysical expression, an instinctive, irrepressible sense of creating beauty, only possible in his art, lay forever seeking its

outlet through that cramped exterior; he could draw, but never spoke his thought.

From the outset he shows his every-day, humane tendency, and by symbols homely in their kind. He lived a realist. He says: "I must paint the world as I think it. Men have human affections, they live by work and work by tools; I will not shut human sympathy out of my picture. Beauty must there be, and love; and humanity must have *its* place. They laugh at my wheelbarrows and pickaxes, the shows of toil and labor in my compositions; the plough left in the furrow, the fishing-net drawn up to dry; such *are* the things I really sympathize with in the scenes I draw." Raphael, having a like respect for home-truth, paints a view of Florence into the "back wards and dark abyss" of a "Holy Family," and Titian finishes every single stamen of the wild-rose, in his "Bacchus and Ariadne."

No weight, nor mass, nor beauty of execution can outweigh one grain of knowledge. Three penstrokes of Raphael make a better picture than the most highly sweetened Madonna Carlo Dolei ever coddled. In Turner's great drawing of "Whitstable," with its shadowy, sweeping middle-distance, and an interminable infinity of moving sky, we see a stone in the right-hand corner, with a memento of man, "Whitstable Oyster Beds, Notice." All the rest is pure, fascinating poetry :

" With his Yemen sword for aid;  
Ornament it carried none,  
But the notches on the blade."

This quality of human truth appears the more forcibly in his boats, those lumps of fate, as in the "Hastings" and so many others. Here pitched to the seat swings like a wash-kettle on the surge, the fisherman's hammock, which suggests: "It's nae fish ye're buying, Monkbarns:"

" Wha'll have my caller herring,  
Wives and maithers most despairing  
Ca' them *lives* o' men."

With round bows, heavy and forcible, he builds that salt-fish craft, now sunk in the waves, now with a wave on board, and perchance the figure-head of some unheavenly fisher bolt upright, and staring bravely with fishy eyes at Providence. Then

there is the amiable artist's buoy, dashy and shining on salt sea wrack, with a streak of rusty crimson from the angry sunset, or shivering under the wash of a bankrupt cloud, yet a useful buoy, morally prepared to do his duty. In one drawing he has a stout brig resting on the very crest of a foaming wave, *lifted bodily* out of the sea-level, and calculating the plunge for a second.

He crowds hosts of figures, as in the "Zurich," where we see a hundred and more washerwomen, raising their morning hymn to the Virgin of Linen, or as in the "Valhalla," and its endless procession, sauntering along the shores of the rapid, sparkling river. A domestic symbolism prefaces the unutterable glories of color—this foreground must and shall be an objective outlook at humanity—art must be brought by me into friendly social relations. Here are native sympathies which can be counted on as certain. It is his paying excellence to have invested a long, painstaking life, in improved art-copies from common facts. Those lines from the "Blind Highland Boy" would not have displeased him :

"A Household Tub, like one of those  
Which women use to wash their clothes ;  
This carried the blind boy."

He feared not truth, nor like good society "lied on principle," as a comfort to the other side. Veracity in expression was his from his earliest education, and from his after practice, brought up by sketching for his bread. The picture must be a recognizable likeness of the thing painted, if it must also be paid for. His work thus became a personation of that old romance of reality :

"The light that never was on sea or land."

To the last—*limited*—if vaporeing about one's self is counted for substance ; what he sought *not* to do. Is not the planet, the cost of limitation, the monotonous march in an orbit, and the absence of the accident, by which we *are* not what we had imagined—on credit ?

With him, his landscape shall have an earnest, life-giving purpose. It is meant to satisfy the desire after property, which haunts the human breast. It must not be dry and meagre ; if not more than a dozen lines, these must record a rich and varied experience, to be so many, by right. In his progress to his sec-

ond style, he had learned to execute through unspeakable endeavors. How, as in the "Southern Coast," he ventures to contest with the exasperating differentiation of distance, the trailing of sudden showers across wide spaces, the yeasty waves with a shipwreck in their mouth, rainbows, or glittering, wet strands, painting moonrise and sunset at opposite corners of the picture, as nature also can.

—"Such delights  
As float to earth, permitted visitants."

From nothing that appears in Turner's manner was he heart-broken or repining, as men inspired through their individual cracks reflectively assert he was. His native fashion was to be resigned—he could symbolize grief, and see terrors that lurk like serpents, in the undertow of human expectation, and wrote "Fallacies of Hope," but he felt the consciousness of immeasurable endowment, and that he possessed the power of setting forth a portion of the Providential glory of the lower world. Never was any man broken-hearted in any calling or craft wherein he had worked and lived with earnest and successful industry. The outset and culmination of a practised artist's life, that moral lesson, the result of certain, well-directed effort, shines forth, for he was not anywise *born* a painter, but forcibly made himself one, by the "struggle for existence," which is a saving strength to the soul. He never looked to cast stones at his humble apprenticeship—"it was," he said, "good practice." It taught him scrupulous fidelity in work. Every first line in his unfinished drawing betrays the same truth as the last magnificence of his creative whole. He had humility, and he had ease. He exacted everything from himself, and everything he also did perform—always the two sides to the building of success. In a small space he analyzes a great outline, and he rejoices to find much room may be packed in an inch. He produces storm-fed skies that clutch up and indignantly reject the prose of earth. He is as peculiar by his numberless varieties of manner, as the mass of painters by their variety of one. He composed a delightfully picturesque architecture, found books in the running brooks, sermons in stones and humanity in everything. The cataract and the woodland could be set in skies such as no poet has conjectured; the hues of peaches and violets melting upon soft mountain castles, with



their purple shadows sleeping in the sweet distances of heaven, far beyond all beauty that thought or speech can suggest. His color soon lost its first close precision and mechanism, and he was at length blamed, even ridiculed, for his indefiniteness. A great and overpowering landscape painter cannot be such save by daring variations and unexpected conclusions. But what pen could ever portray, or what pencil ever copy, those perfect and simple effects? Simple in expression, and of countless design, they melt, they fade—those outlines seemingly firm as stone, of the floating mountain-walls—the subdued light of the sinking sun from the torn edges of the crimson sky falls over the sea in that shimmering haze. We thought we had seen it all over and over again. Never, till now; for it is alone through the great artist's eye we can ever truly see at all. Turner was most inspired artistically in his infinite adaptations, his multitudinous natural expressions. There are artists who all their lives repeat their one success, and more, the many failures. Then the genius comes with his heroic affluence of possibility.

*“Quia delectasti me, Domine, in factura tua,  
Et in operibus manuum Tuarum exultabo.”*

(Thou, Lord, hast made me glad through Thy works.  
I will triumph in the works of Thy hand).

In these sublime words we read the meaning and the impulse in which Turner lived and wrought. His life was a worship of that one God, who dwelleth not in temples made with hands, who inspires the puffing Isaiahs or Samuels, and will inspire all God-seeking men, whatever their profession or sect—saint, sinner or sage—so long as creation repeats the joyful anthem of the stars. If there was anything Turner did not, and could never do, it was to have the supercilious atheist's liver complaint, and above all that of the despairing, thin-skinned, over-cultivated atheist. No child rocked in its mother's arm to peaceful slumber, ever more confided in that mother's heart than he in the mysteries of the Creator, so purely worshipped.

If we contrast the work of Turner with that of J. F. Millet, the distinction lies in the superhuman character of the former, whereby transcendent beauty escapes from the dull environment of earthly form. Millet's manner does not yield in vitality of surface. He too knows that shadow is perforated with light.

There are enough of smooth daubs across the surface—work of artists—nature contrives light and life to pulsate beneath her drawing. Millet's picture may be three inches by two, a bit of wood-road, water beneath a low bank, on which crouch a few scrambling trees or bushes, or loose stones with a stream over them, like the subject of some French song. "You see in the meadow, through an opening in the thicket, the lengthened shadow of a horse and cart in the setting sun, and from time to time the end of the fork loaded with hay appears and disappears above the hedge." So here the glimmering, unsteady pool, the frowning trees, olive green or brown, with just a mere shimmer in one spot of soft, sun-lit green, and trees, stones and ground drawn in by diagonal lines, make up the whole: but all is crammed with thought. A tree in the distance, not the tenth of an inch, is perfect. There is no littleness, no effort, all is strong, free and well alive. The water positively stirs as it reflects, under the shimmering half-transparent bank, and the cassimere-yellow middle-distance, with a single dot on the outline, that you *feel* should be a house, speaks French. Such is the possibility of art, on a strip of paper you could put in your pocket. Turner rises superior to Millet, as the sky is superior to ground. He has that religion which gently leads his thoughts to flow out in creations of otherwise impossible beauty. With one it is the garden or the vine, with the other the radish and the sip of tea—one heaven, the other—earth. And to-morrow what will constitute the style?

"Y pensez vous, ils sont fanés, ces nœuds?  
Ils sont d'hier? Mon Dieu, comme tout passe!"

(And think you then my ribbons are soiled? Yesterday's purchase. Good God, how it all spins!)

A few traditions of Turner follow, which might be taken *cum grano salis*. Mountains possess a different hue according to the standpoint of the looker-on. The supposed date of his birth, in a parish register, is 1775; he said he was born on the twenty-third of April, 1769, the birth-day of Shakspeare as to the month, and in this same year Wellington, Napoleon, and Sir Thomas Lawrence were also born. As for his mother's family name it is not known, nor where his parents married, nor where *he* was born. His luck in dates, that pneumonia of bores, was small, and that upon his parents' gravestone, written by himself, is

wrong by a year. In his last move, to Chelsea, where he died, the widow whose rooms he hired asked him his name. "Name," said Turner, who had an apathy of questions, "Why, what is your name?" "Booth," was the reply. "So, so, Booth," said he, "well, I am Mr. Booth," and by that name he went, and was so called by the doctor who made his last pill, and who knew Turner, the artist, well. The malaria of the great is discounted as over-soul. Turner kept seven Manx cats with no tails, and a lady, Mrs. Danby, to form their society, and had that horror of mending and moving, that the damp and rain streamed down over his pictures. His nickname was "Avalanche Jenkinson," and he was usually so addressed by his friends, which by no means accuses him of ill-humor, nominally.

He did not spend his days in recounting the fact that he was a genius (the ear-mark of an ass) and had no envy; he was a little humorous with his brother artists. On visiting the handsome gilded gallery of Thompson, in Edinburgh, after looking slowly about and musing, he said thoughtfully, "You beat me—in frames." Mulready disposed a little bird inconspicuously but very effectively on a pillar, in one of his taking pictures. Turner quietly said, "I saw your robin," at once catching the motive.

He had a pleasant turn. Sometimes he leaves a parasol in a foreground, without a figure, to show that one has been there. In his lovely, warm spring landscape, a sweet idyl of misty morning sunlight, "Rain, Steam and Speed," there is a hare running before the engine which is crossing the viaduct, but he is almost inconspicuous; the little beastie and the puffing iron-horse, the morn as lovely as a dream of youth, life, fate and God, somewhat antithetically put. In the old proverb to see a hare running before you denotes calamity. In one of his plates, named *Wickliffe*, he introduced a burst of light, in touching the proof, not in the drawing. The engraver inquired about it. Turner replied, "That is the place where Wickliffe was born, and there is the light of the glorious Reformation." "Yes," said Mr. Pye, satisfied: "but what do you mean by these large geese?" "They are the old superstitions, which the genius of the Reformation is driving away." In the original sketch of *Elgin Cathedral*, by an amateur, the windows of the nave were built up. Turner, in his drawing, left them open, and on being asked why, replied: "They should be open. How much better to see the light of day in God's house, than darkness."

Once driving home with a friend, at the pike his host found he had no money, and borrowed sixpence of Mr. Turner. After a superb dinner, sitting over their wine, the gentleman gravely said: "Let me see, Mr. Turner, I think I owe you a little money." "What money?" cried Turner, clapping down his glass, "what for?" "You paid sixpence for the gate when I drove you down." "Oh," said Turner, with an odd look of disappointment "never mind that—*now*." One of Sir Thomas Lawrence's rich friends at Clapham Terrace ordered a picture at a great cost, and Turner went down to see it hung. After a noble dinner, with the ladies, who praised the magnificent work, his host saw that the artist was restless, and when they were alone said: "Now to business. I'll go and write you a cheque." He came back, handed Turner the cheque, who held it and looked at it, turning it over and over, but did not put it up. His host said, seeing something wrong: "I have made it guineas. I think it was to be —— guineas, Mr. Turner." "Yes," replied the artist, in his awkward fashion, "the guineas are right, but I paid *six* shillings for the coach; that's not down."

He gained a great fortune for an artist. He left it all beyond a doubt, *as he believed*, as a fund for the benefit of "Decayed Male Painters." Out of this will the lawyers strained the truth. This sum, painfully scraped out of the dirt, straw and ashes of a long, penurious life, was by him faithfully economized for this one good end. His art-remains went to the English people; the relief for the "Decayed Male Painters," with their distressing company—to Hades.

Some hints follow from "Modern Painters," a book that unfolds in its lengthening chain and long drawn out, good bits of Turner. There are gemmy sparks scintillating from a maze of vertiginous obscurity.

Yorkshire scenery greatly influences him, he feels a strong local attachment to its minutiae. With his feeling for beauty of line, the broad wooded steepes and swells reappear, in the infinite massiveness of his mountain drawing. They contain finish and quantity of form with aerial perspective, and light without color; they are studies in light and shade, very green blues being used for the shadows, and golden brown for the lights. France, in its perfectness of foliage and forms of ground—lowland France, the valleys of the Loire and Seine, and the district between Calais



and Dijon was grateful to him. He is still the one sufficient painter of French landscape.

He felt the true colors of nature had never been attacked by any artist. He went to the cataract for its iris, to the conflagration for its flames, asked of the sea its intensest azure, of the sky its clearest gold. Color is a god-inspired commandment to him. He is the one painter who has drawn the sky, a mountain or a stone; the stem of a tree, the surface of calm, or the force of agitated water; the effects of space on distant objects, and the abstract beauty of natural color.

He boldly takes pure white for his highest light, and lamp-black for his deepest shade. He associates warm with cold light. In his sunsets he has the gray passages about the horizon, where seen through its dying glory, the cool and the gloom of night gather themselves for the victory. As in the "*Old Téméraire*," beneath the blazing veil of vaulted fire which lights the vessel on her last path, there is a desolate, blue, deep hollow of darkness, out of which come the sad and lonely voices of the night-wind, and the sorrowful anthem of the unresting sea. A single dusty roll of Turner's brush is more expressive of the infinity of life, than the niggling of Hobbima, if he had niggled on till doomsday at the spiculæ of hay stacks or the ear of a donkey.

Where Turner gives blue, it is atmosphere. Nothing near enough to have details, is painted sky-blue. Sunset skies, the moment before the sun sinks, when his light turns pure rose-color—when the whole sky becomes one molten, mantling sea of color and fire, the intense hollow blue of the upper sky melting through it all, Turner has painted that. Or, as in the "*Napoleon*," the stormy blood-red of the horizon, the scarlet of the breaking sun-light, the rich crimson browns of the wet, illumined seaweed; the pure gold and purple of the upper sky, and shed through it all, the deep passage of solemn blue, where the cold moonlight falls on one pensive spot of the limitless, unthoughtful shore. He sheds through every hue a dazzling intensity of light. He has points, where the system of each individual color is concentrated by a single stroke. There is no warmth which has not gray in it, and no blue which has not warmth in it. Grays, as with all perfect colorists, are the cherished, the inimitable portions of his color. In the "*Mercury and Argus*," the pale and vaporous blue of the heated sky is broken with gray and pearly white, but there is not a grain of pure blue. All is sub-



dued and warmed by the mingling gray and gold, up to the very zenith, where, breaking through the flaky mist, the transparent and deep azure of the sky is expressed with a single, crumbling touch. He gives a dash of pure white for his highest light, the other whites are pearled down with gray and gold. He gives a fold of pure crimson to the drapery of his nearest figure, all his other crimsons will be warmed with black, or deepened with yellow. There is a general current of gray pervading the whole of his color. The highest lights and the local touches of pure color are the key-notes, flashing with intense brilliancy. He never leaves a quarter of an inch of canvass without a change in it. No richness nor depth of tint can atone for the loss of one particle of arranged light, no splendor of hue must interfere with the depth of a determined shadow. And color is the climax of his excellence—that dream all beauty—that illusion of the soul.

Turner depends on attaining brilliancy of light by clear and perfect drawing of the shadows, not by blackness, but by excessive evenness, unity and sharpness of edge. The finer and vaguer shadows throughout give a thrilling influence to the light they leave—its passion and its power. On each stone, and leaf, and cloud, the light is felt to be passing and palpitating, which chooses one thing and rejects another, glowing, or flashing, or scintillating, and then losing itself in doubt or dimness, or perishing in drifting mist, or melted into melancholy air—living light, which sleeps but never dies. Search all the foregrounds that Claude ever painted, and you will not find so much as the shadow of one leaf upon another.

The conception of each individual inch of his distance is complete in the master's mind. Not one line of the myriads there, is without meaning. A distinct, sharp, visible, yet unintelligible and inextricable richness. In the capital on the foreground of the "Daphne," not one jog of the acanthus leaves is absolutely visible. The lines are all disorder, but you feel in an instant, *they are all there*. Or, look at his treatment of the highest clouds—the cirri, which have symmetry, sharp edges, multitude, purity and variety:

"Multitudes of little floating clouds,  
Through their ethereal texture, had become  
Vivid as fire; clouds separately poised,  
And giving back, and shedding each on each

With prodigal communion, the bright hues  
Which from the unapparent fount of glory  
They had imbibed."

When serenity of sky and intensity of light are needed, Turner uses the cirri. At times, a ray of light calls them to existence from its misty shade; in greater repose, a few detached, equal rounded flakes hang motionless in the deep zenith-blue, each other's shadow, or burn in fiery, flying fragments, with separate energy, or are woven with fine threads of intermediate darkness, melting into the blue. He beautifully uses the low, horizontal bars or fields of cloud, the cirro-strati. In some of his skies the whole space of the heavens is covered with the delicate, dim flakes of gathering vapor, the link between the central region and the rain-cloud. Then we have the haze of sun-lit rain, or the half-exhausted shower, when the white torrent flings up its white jets of spray, which vanish in the shafts of the sunlight—wind-woven sunlight, sending them as messengers of peace to the far mountain summits yet unveiled, and hoarse with the down-rush of the plunging freshets. Or, we may have clouds, without rain, at twilight, enveloping the cliffs of the coast, but concealing nothing, every outline visible through the gloom, intense in its pure warm gray, without blackness or blueness. Or, high and far above the volumes of the swift rain-cloud, are seen through their opening, the quiet, horizontal, silent flakes of the highest cirrus, resting in the repose of the deep sky. In his storm-drawing we witness angular outlines, vastness and energy of form, infinity of gradation and depth, without blackness.

In the "Jumieges" there is the haze of sun-lit rain, the gradual retirement of the dark wood into its depth, and the sparkling and evanescent light, which sends its variable flashes upon the abbey, figures, foliage and foam. In the "Long Ship's Lighthouse" we have clouds without rain, at twilight, intensity of gloom in pure warm gray without blackness or blueness, full of storm-energy, fiery in haste, with fitful swirls of bounding drift. In the "Coventry" the great mass of cloud is characterized throughout by severe right lines, but no one entirely parallel to any other, and made up of the most varied curves. Those of the falling rain are equally varied. Impetuous clouds, twisted rain, flickering sunshine, fleeting shadow, and oppressed cattle, all speak of tumult, fitfulness, power and velocity. One thing is wanted, a passage of repose—we find it in the highest cirrus, rest-

ing on the deep sky. But the color of the delicate and soft forms of these pausing vapors, and the exquisite depth and pulsing tenderness of the blue with which they are islanded, never could be portrayed by aught else than the artist's soul from which they sprang, or ever were else created, far beyond man's lower nature, and its herd of self-sufficient averages :

“ My course is run, my errand done,  
I lived to Him from whom I came.”

In Turner, the *dash* of the brush is as much under the rule of thought and feeling as its slowest line, and cannot be varied a hair's breadth without changing the expression of the whole. To them who have never seen a cloud vanish on a mountain-side, we cannot indeed hope to tell what the morning mist is like in mountain air. How soft, how soothing, how ineffably agreeable its perfumed breath, the incense of the hills, and that delicious contrast with the loving, cheerful, far away sun-lit valleys, that spring from out the changing mist-cloud with their brief green, glad life, bathing the soul in thankfulness to God for those adornments of earth which lift it to the skies ; *he* paints it all.

In the “Lake of Lucerne” we see the recess of near mountain form, not into dark, but into *luminous* cloud, the most difficult thing to do in art. In the “Battle of Marengo,” we feel that Turner is as much a geologist as a painter. However the light may fall, mountain peaks are marked with sharp and defined shadows. They rise in the morning light, rather like sharp shades cast up into the sky, than solid earth. Their lights are pure, roseate and cloud-like, their shadows transparent, pale and opalescent, and often indistinguishable from the air around them. The mountain top floats like a flake of motionless fire in heaven. In Turner's distance we see transparency or filminess of mass, with excessive sharpness of edge. Slurred and melting lines do not characterize large objects. In the “Mount Lebanon,” there is not one touch or shade on the rock that does not show the strata. Every shade is understood at once, you can step from block to block, till you reach the top. In the “Daphne,” the mountain is simple, broad, the surge of a swelling sea, an unbroken line along the valley. In its mass there are ten thousand hills. On this side, a range of tower-like precipices. The clinging wood along the ledges, with waterfalls gleaming through, stealing down from shadowy point to point, with evanescent foam and

flashing light, here a wreath and there a ray, through the deep chasms and hollow ravines, out of which rise the soft, rounded slope of mightier mountains, surge beyond surge, immense and numberless, of delicate and gradual curve, accumulating in the sky until their garment of forest is exchanged for the shadowy folds of slumberous morning cloud, above which the utmost silver peak shines islanded and alone. The most essential qualities of mountain line, are to be explained alone by appeals to our feeling of what is beautiful, they cannot be reduced to line and rule—intangible, incalculable, to be *loved* not comprehended, to be *felt* not understood,—a music of the eye, a melody of the heart:

“O they are fairer than the evening air,  
Clad in the beauty of a thousand stars.”

In the foreground of the “*Mercury and Argus*,” we have earthy crumbling banks, cut away by water. The whole distance is given by the retirement of solid surface. If ever an edge is expressed, it is only felt for an instant and then lost—heaving here, sinking there, now blending now breaking. In the foreground of the *Llanthony*, the rocks are not divided by joints, but into their horizontal and united beds, cut by the torrent one above another, with the eddying, water-worn edges showing beneath. In the *Ulleswater*, the rock surfaces seem to move under the fine touch of the waves, a soft swell, or a gentle depression. You cannot find a single *edge* in Turner’s near rock-work; there are everywhere *round* surfaces, and you go back on these, you cannot tell how. In “*Penmaen Mawr*,” there is soft soil, beautifully modulated by descending rain. He who cannot make a bank sublime, will make a mountain ridiculous, and the painter’s rank is shown by his use of minutiae. Turner’s foregrounds are united in all their parts. The eye cannot take them by divisions, and we discover new truths by approaching them in a new direction. Without effort, he showers knowledge into every touch. His slighted passages, part by part, contain the universal working of his deepest thought. Like a sonata of Mozart, every note is necessary to the whole, the gradations of tone and color perfectly agreeing, from the highest line of the sky to the lowest line of the ground.

In his smooth water there is a peculiar texture given to the most delicate tints of the surface, when there is little reflection from anything save sky or atmosphere. This gives the appear-



ance of substantial liquidity. In the "Lucerne," we see the melting of the mountain promontories, below into the clear depth, above into the clouds. He obtains the force of falling or agitated water, by fearless and full rendering of its forms. He never loses himself or his subject in the splash of the fall. Nature gives more than foam, she shows beneath and through it, a character of exquisite form, on every wave and line of fall. This character Turner seizes. In the "Llanthony," the chief light falls on the surface of the stream swelled by recent rain. Its mighty waves roll down, close, green and clear, but pale with anger. A race of mad motion, the waves dragged into lines and furrows by their swiftness, but drawn with the most studied *chiaro-scuro* of delicate color, grays and greens, with that thoughtful refinement of profound execution which the eye strains itself with looking into, and the vividness of foam is obtained by a general middle tint.

The right painting of the sea must depend, at least in all coast scenery, on the power of drawing foam, in good part. It is not usually from the shore Turner studies his sea, but twenty or thirty yards from it. In the "Laugharne" especial attention is given to the flatness of the lines, as in his mountain drawing. Sublimity is not given by the height but by the breadth of masses, and there is a peculiar expression of weight in his waves. The surges roll with such prostration against the shore, we feel the rocks shaking under them. The wind has no power on this tremendous unity, and there is only an indication of a line of torn spray along the beach. The same lines show the violence and the swiftness of the rising wave, as were used to give the fury of the torrent. Two waves which spring high into the air, in the distance, show their encounter with the recoil of the preceding wave. In the "Land's End," the whole surface of the sea becomes one dizzy whirl of rushing, writhing, tortured, undirected rage, subdivided into myriads of waves, not each a separate surge, but part and portion of a vaster one. There is not one false curve given, not one that is not the expression of a visible motion. The color of the sea is a solemn green gray, its foam seen dimly through the shadows of twilight, modulated with the fullness, changefulness and sadness of a deep, wild melody. In the "Slave-ship" the storm is somewhat lulled, the torn and streaming rain-clouds are moving in scarlet lines to lose themselves in the hollow of the night. The surface makes two ridges of enor-



mous swell—between these the fire of sunset falls along the trough of the sea, an intense and lurid splendor, which burns like gold and bathes like blood. The tossing waves of the swell lift themselves restlessly in dark fantastic forms, leaving between them treacherous spaces of level and whirling water, now lighted with green and lamp-like fire, now flashing back the gold of the declining sun, now fearfully dyed from above with the indistinguishable images of the burning clouds. Purple and blue, the lurid shadows of the hollow breakers are cast upon the mist of night, which gathers cold and low, advancing like the shadow of death upon the guilty ship as it labors amid the lightning of the sea, its thin masts lined upon the sky in crimson :

“Such is the eve of tropic sun :  
With disk like battle-target red,  
He rushes to his burning bed,  
Dyes the wide wave with bloody light,  
Then sinks at once,—and all is night.”

It has been said no men but Titian and Turner ever drew the stem of a tree. The woody stiffness hinted through muscular line, and the inventive grace of the upper boughs, have never been rendered except by the latter. The boughs if finely grown, bear among themselves such a ratio of length, as to describe with their ends a symmetrical curve, constant for each species.

Any engineer could have drawn the steps and balustrade, in the “*Hero and Leander*”: Turner alone could have thrown the accidental shadows upon them. Generally his management of color and tone is so absolutely exceptional in fineness and variety, it may be said no one but he ever made a beautifully perfect water-color drawing. Engravings and copies from him may possibly give, if extremely skillful, a partial idea of his design. Chromos from his works, are a vulgar caricature. He has not one dot or line whose meaning can be understood without knowledge, and nothing is in one that knowledge will not enable us to understand. He aims at the deep final truth, which is the ripened fruit of reflection and experience. He does, or omits nothing, without comparison of results, after careful selection, and thoughtful arranging, of all that can be thought of and arranged. Turner’s word for finishing a picture, was always this : “*Carry forward.*”

He fell in flashing splendor,—like a star,  
 (Down through a clouded chasm of worn-out days)—  
 Veiled in celestial blooms; such skies as saw  
 Far-freighted isles all loveliness, with fanes  
 Of columnar splendor clustering round  
 Bays in their depth of foliage; sun-bright meads,  
 Held to their dream by guardian heights of rock,  
 And looking in soft lakes, on whose smooth cheek,  
 Like down upon a maiden's lip they lay,  
 Wondering what was their beauty.

When the storm  
 Beat high and rocked the humble shore, upon  
 Its haughty arm, and tossed it in mid-heaven,  
 With rock and surf, and many-pebbled weed,  
 Loaded with purple tresses like a nymph's,  
 Born in the sea-deep grotts, he too was there,  
 Drinking that ocean-chorus, till the swell  
 Danced in long lines of light, and filled his soul;  
 Or on the main, launched in the fiery ship,  
 Saw unremorseful ocean seize his prey.  
 Beauty must find a voice, nor always speak  
 By one aperture. Hers, a thousand tones,  
 Of smallest flower, or gleam of serpent's scale,  
 Or touch of waterfalls o'er glittering stones,  
 And in the mind of man, we know not how,—  
 Something that should be said, albeit no ear  
 May take it in, human or otherwise.  
 For yet that starry vault and crystalline air,  
 And the blue throbbing worlds roll on unheard,  
 Utterly unheard, in their old round!

The many—come and fade;—they fade, they fly,  
 Like leaves at autumn, and the cold, deaf wind  
 Heaps up their stricken multitudes! What thought,  
 What utterance of the early gods, had they,  
 In such unvaried paths, all toil and care?  
 And less the fluttering gnats that fashion swarms,  
 The beautiful and fine, dancing the sunset's gold,  
 Splendid as gems, all Ormuz in the blaze,—  
 Motes in the shadow, desolate as scorn!

Not thus, the seer!  
 On earth, if once he comes, she lifts an eye,  
 (Old nature weary of old forms) to see,  
 A being made to re-create more than hers.  
 So far as man, the last—perchance the best,  
 Of time's long products, in his choicest sons,  
 Material shapes, infinitely outdoes  
 Those pebbles on life's shore, dry and ungraced,

Until a shining surge floats o'er their souls,  
 And in a fairy touch so gilds their face  
 That it becomes the mirror of the wave,  
 And earth and sky and air uplift their prayer,  
 And the sweet music of the low-voiced sea  
 Says: "Take us, we are Thine, do as Thou wilt,  
 Slaves to Thy bidding, O, too glad we serve."

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## THE TWO KINDS OF DIALECTIC.

[We have received the following valuable contribution from Rev. Dr. L. P. HICKOK, for our "Notes and Discussions." We insert it here, and will reserve our comments for another place.]—EDITOR.

*Editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy:*

SIR—You have written so clearly that I readily take the standpoint from which you view *a priori* truth. I am not so sure that I can give to you my own so completely. My attempt to do so, as concisely as I can, is as follows—

Logic gives the law of thought, and is logic proper when connecting phenomena into judgments; but when carried beyond phenomenal connections into questionings of thought itself, it then becomes dialectic and is of two kinds only, though the logic may have many varieties. The logical law will regulate the dialectical process, but in one kind the dialectic will be within the ruling of the Logic of Reason, which has no varieties; and in the other kind it will take the regulation of the Logic of the Understanding, which will be modified into many varieties. The logic of reason will carry the dialectical process from universals to particulars, and the logic of the understanding in all its varieties will take the dialectical process from particulars to the universal. The former process will be by continual concretions, and may be termed the concrete or Platonic Dialectic; the latter will be by perpetual abstractions, and may be known as the abstract or Aristotelian Dialectic.

I. THE PLATONIC DIALECTIC. When we observe an acorn as it grows onward to an oak, it is phenomenal only through all the

course, but beyond this sense-observation, the reason-insight detects the inner life-power which has all along been determining the passing phenomena, and which has been the real acorn and oak through all the process. And just so with every natural and artificial object; a stone, and a brick, have each in them their efficient working-force which both fixes and moves the appearances, and this inner efficient is the real entity. Now, this reality connecting the appearances is the Platonic Idea, not at all as mentally *made* but a real rationally *known*, and every observed object of whatever sort has its idea, and that idea is the only real object. This idea holds the many phenomena together *indivisibly* in the object and so makes of the multiplicity an *individuality*, and therein also a concrete universality. All sense-phenomena become known as individual objects, only by the reason-insight detecting their respective real ideas, and thus it is that the entire phenomenal world has its entity as a reality in the ideas; and in this is found the Platonic logical law for thinking sense-appearances into valid judgments.

And now, beyond this logical connecting of the phenomena comes a dialectical mental questioning; how may these ideas be known in their connections? The like reason-insight, which knew the phenomena conspiring in one, knows also all ideas to be conspiring in unity, each holding others and all holding each determinately, so that one being taken all others may be known, and thereby is the individual completely known only in the universal. And further still, the reason sees in the universe of the phenomenal and real that it has also its comprehending fountain of all efficiency and rationality, and this is the Good, as called by Plato, standing independent in personal self-sufficiency, and both sustaining and ruling the dependent Universe. The phenomenal in the real occasions the Universe to be known in the distinctions of space, and time, and individuality; but the Good, as reality beyond all sense appearing, necessitates that to him all distinctions of space, and time, and substantial divisibility, must be utterly impertinent.

So, moreover, the one common space and common time give occasion for all possible pure figures and numbers to be constructed within them; and since they cannot be regulated by the real ideas, in their purity, and only ruled in reason by definitions and axioms ultimate and universal, they give rise to a middle science between the phenomenal and real, viz: mathematics, to which the

absolute space and time are concretes, and every figure constructed within them is a concrete, and every demonstration a law for and not a deduction from the Empirical, and so they afford for the reason a field of known truth ultimate and eternal.

We have here then a *prior*, independent of our form of representation, both in its reality and its ruling. In the physics, the idea rules the phenomenal experience and is no abstraction nor deduction from the experience. The phenomena can be intelligible only by the idea, the ideas only by their union in the cosmos, and the Universe only by its comprehension in the Good. And in the mathematics, the demonstration can be convincing only as ruled by the definitions and axioms, and these must be alike for all rational beings. In none of these can the posterior have any meaning but as interpreted in the light of the prior. Just as soon as the insight flashes through the constructed diagram, the demonstration is irrefragable; and just so soon as the phenomenal world is apprehended in its logical ideas, the dialectic shoots up, as the minaret from the mosque, and at a glance the Universe and its God are known as the dependent on the Absolute.

II. THE ARISTOTELIAN DIALECTIC. The logic in this will ever be an abstraction and deduction from a precedent experiment, and so a logic of the understanding only, and attaining its universals only from what appears in the particulars; while some minor modifications of the logical will so far modify the dialectical process. Any *a priori* knowing will be only of that which we ourselves put into the objects.

1. *The Variety of Logic that Regulates the Knowing by the Object.* This is Aristotle's own method, and it of course rules his dialectic. The prime principle is that of contradiction, viz: that of two universal opposites one only can be true; and he trusts so little in reason and will so invariably have experiment, that he seeks to prove its truth by showing that any opposer to it can be made to contradict himself, as if contradiction by an example could be a more repulsive absurdity than when only in the light of reason alone. The logic begins with the known in experience and seeks by this to reach the unknown. Particulars are sorted in species and graded genera till the conception of abstract being is reached, in which is universal essence exclusive of all difference, and here logic must terminate, since all predication ceases. Below this, all syllogistic forms may be arranged and deductions concluded, but all questioning beyond is dialectic and belongs to



First Philosophy, or Metaphysics. All essence is here just as found in experience, and the dialectical querying is, what more can analysis and abstraction get from it? It is then found *potential* for all changes, which will give *matter* and *form*, the one merely capable for any changes and thus *passive*, the other *active* in passing into form and taking the essence along with it. In the actual is *material, formal, moving, and final causes* in combination, in which the movement attains the end and is satisfied. Here, movement and end are identical in that the moving has its object, just as the eye acts and objectifies in the acting, or as mind thinks and is satisfied in the thinking, even so the universal energy ever grasps the Universe and in that satisfies its aim. This is Aristotle's grand ENTELECHY, the eternal *thinking of thought*.

We pass now all critical remark, that nothing is here satisfactory in the presumption that nature has any substantial and causal connections, and is truly a Universe; that we can apprehend a self as free personality, either as creature or creator; and that there is no opening for morality or religion; we only note that there is and can be here no *a priori* knowledge. All the known given is in the phenomenal, and the only way to the unknown is through the sense-known. We may abstract and deduce, we have no insight to verify presuppositions and prerequisites. Neither the logic nor dialectic can reach anything *prior* to the Empirical. The only semblance of *a priori* knowledge is in making a limited induction stand for universal observation. We cannot perceive all; we have observed so much and so well, that we may take this as receipt for the deficit. We presume that the future is mirrored in the past, and that what has been is a warrant for what will yet be. Indeed this logic does not claim, but disdainfully discards all *a priori* knowing.

2. *The Logic which Regulates the Knowing by the Subject.*—Spinoza might be here adduced who takes the understanding to be distinct from the universal substance, and constitutionally gives to the substance the attributes of thought and extension, mind and matter, in complete harmony; or Leibnitz might be cited, whose view of mind and matter is that in distinct substance they are monads representing together each by itself according to a pre-established harmony, the former in consciousness and the latter in unconsciousness; both Spinoza and Leib-

nitz, acquiring such instruments for representing, could then *a priori* speak of the knowing. But under this variety, Kant is the fullest and fairest example. We observe man representing by sense, and judging by understanding, and both in such a manner that we are induced to give to the sense constitutionally the forms of space and time as intuitions, and to the understanding those of the categorical conceptions. We find him competent to know only by ordering the intuitions in and by the conceptions. That Empirical intuitions may be given to the constitutional intuitions of space and time, a *noumenon* as "thing-in-itself" is assumed, but cannot be known since it cannot of itself be envisaged. Beyond these intuitions and conceptions, there are constitutionally the formal ideas of the Infinite and Absolute in the Reason, but as these forms cannot be filled through sense, their objects cannot be reached by human intelligence.

Taking thus, from experimental trial, what the human mental constitution is, we may say *a priori* what it is competent to do. Such a mind may know what can be envisaged in space and time and ordered in the categorical conceptions, but nothing beyond. The Empirical intuitions *in* space and time may be ordered in all the categories of Quality, Quantity, Relation, and Mode; but not in the ideas of the infinite and absolute; they may be perceived and conceived, but never so as to have known infinity and absolute being. Space and time themselves can go into the category of Quantity so far as they may be limited, but not as infinite and absolute, and can never so be known by man. Substance can hold the accidents, and cause connect the events just as supposed or assumed in the *noumenon*, but never as real entities in reason. We may know the necessary and the contingent as fixed or potential, but nothing as free and personal, for in this dialectic we can prove as much *against* as we can *for* freedom. Presuppositions in philosophy, and postulates in morality, can stand under no forms and come within no judgments of the sense and understanding, and if they are to have validity they must be known by some other faculty. Our *a priori* knowing can reach only to our constitutional making, and if supposed to reach further, this logic should admit the contradiction or find some place for a new faculty.

3. *The Logic Regulating the Phenomenal in Thought.* Fichte and Schelling may here be included in Hegel, last and greatest of transcendental thinkers, and for present purpose we need refer-

ence to Hegel's philosophy only. It is wholly by abstraction from the phenomenal and passing from particulars to a universal, and thus is thoroughly Aristotelian; admitting nothing of Plato's reason and using nothing of his ideas in real entity. Kant's *noumenon* is also discarded, and while thus phenomenal, it is also of the inner or mental phenomena alone. Hegel first takes his "voyage of discovery" and records the movement and attainment gained in his experiment, in his *Phenomenology*, and which turns out to be an abstraction thinner and broader than had before been used. The vision taken is mental inspection rather than rational speculation, and what is found is as nakedly "a mode of motion" as is Tyndall's notion of heat. He knows only phenomenal acts, and these exclusively thinking acts, and all their appearances are wrought in us by our own movement as surely as in our dreaming.

The appearance first taken is immediate, and thus indeterminate, and the act has nothing further of it than a "this," wholly indefinite. But *this* means nothing without a *that*, and so the act discedes into two counterparts and *this* and *that* limit each other, and yet we cannot take one without the other, and in such unity we get a middle-third, which has now become for us a *this determined*. And just such movement is perpetuated to and through common consciousness, self-consciousness, and into reason, wherein the objective of common consciousness and the subjective of self-consciousness become known in the one reason-act, and in this we have the truth of all our discoveries in a self-cause, potential for all self-manifestation. This may be known as Idea, not at all Plato's reality but Aristotle's potentiality and actuality. Applied to abstract being in the above method of stating, disparting, and reuniting, through all occurring categories, it is science of Logic; then applied to abstract externality it is science of Nature; and then combined with internality it is made science of Mind, wherein we have found universal Spirit—the God-thinking to be also God-manifesting throughout all created phases.

Here then is the most marvelous system of abstract thought that the world has had from a human understanding, all produced from one activity, working after one method, and conforming with surprising exactness to our outer knowledge and our inner thinking; and yet the whole is the phenomenal in merely thinking-act. The unsound part is in the closing assumption that such a movement can attain to a self-knowing and freely

willing personality in reason. So constituted, it could only act on in its method endlessly, with no capability to presuppose any other mode of movement than that of its past experience. It is not competent to forecast, but only to know as the thinking-act reveals itself.

The knowing is in and by the moving, and the method of the movement has been found in experiment, by an actual discovery of what passes in consciousness from immediate appearance to self-recognition, and in the logic by actually carrying the abstract conception of being through all categorical judgments. We are warned against all prompting to anticipate what is to come, and bid just to look on the movement and see what does come. It can only say what *must* be from having discovered its constitution in what it *has done*, and so knowing what must be its own making. If it were guided by Plato's reason, it would know the reason's space and time as concrete in themselves, illimitable, immutable, and not mere abstract externality. It would see that these must be, in order that place and period might be in them; and that place and period must be held persistent or pass successive by a common object for all, in order that all may in common know the same place and period. This would be true *a priori* knowing, as it would be knowing in reason what must be for all reason, and not merely for a specially constituted understanding. The reason space and time is prior to place and period, and the persistent real ideas must be prior in the places and periods for all, and give their connected phenomena to all prior to the perceiving, and known as so being, or we cannot *a priori* know how all must know in common. Such knowledge the thinking-process cannot gain except as in connection with quite another faculty for knowing.

III. THE CONCLUSION. We now know Plato's dialectic as recognizing and using a process peculiar to itself. It takes fleeting phenomena with no intelligent consistency in themselves, which yet in their grouping and flowing have enough of method and order to indicate infallibly some existent efficiency working in the standing and flowing appearances; and thus he both saves and harmonizes the two sides of what had then been a long dispute, viz: whether the standing or the flowing had real being. This is effected by attaining being for both, but each after its own fashion. One is perceived in sense, standing in and passing off the field of consciousness; the other evinces its reality, to an in-



sight sharper than sense, as perpetually existing and working in those sense-appearances. This penetrating organ is the Reason, which, as apprehended by Plato, is competent with quick glance to detect, and with steady gaze to comprehend, the real entity determining the appearing; and which he terms *idea*, since it is an object the reason attains beyond all sense-perceiving. And yet, in Plato's age the observation of phenomena had been too partial to admit of a full expression of its meaning to the reason. Nature had many mysteries, and seemed abortive in frequent occurrences, or monstrous and wayward in her occasional productions. The way the phenomena were connected with the idea, and the method also in which the ideas were themselves bound together were but obscurely seen, although the fact of these connections was to him unmistakable. More especially were the ineffable perfections of the Good, as Author and Ruler of all, held to be forever inscrutable secrets without some divinely communicated revelation. He knew the fine thread his reason saw was a real guide through the labyrinth, though there were many tangled loops he could not unravel. He knew that matter and mind made up a cosmos, and that the Good held and moved the Universe in wisdom; and he has spoken out his message so well that the ages since have kept and studied the record as the wisest word among its philosophical teachers.

Aristotle was still greater than Plato, but only in his own distinct field of thought and utterance. Cautious and careful, patient and persevering, he will feel out the thread he does not see by analysis, abstraction and deduction, and will never take one step in the dark except as literally he can keep his clew in his hand. The working philosophy of the world has, since his day, been, nearly entire, kept within the compass of his dialectic, varying the logic as each found he might best leap the abysses which he could not fathom. It has done much for Platonism, while that has been held in abeyance till the materials shall be found and gathered for its universal prevalence. Reason reads by its own light, and yet only as the printed book is laid before it. It makes for man no new truths nor reveals to him hidden wisdom garnered up in stores of its own, and only takes from legible characters the meaning previously put within them and expressed by them. This is the full import of *a priori* human knowing, viz: seeing in nature's phenomena the veritable entities which already were, prior to the appearing, and necessary condition for



the appearing, and the more clearly seen by so much as the expression has been the more sharply cut. And it is just here that so much has been done for future Platonic questioning. The physics and metaphysics studied and taught under Aristotelian masters have made both matter and mind a plainer book now, for reason, than Plato ever had in hand. What of fact physical science is gaining in the modern doctrine of the conversion and conservation of forces, and what especially German logic and dialectic have discovered in profound abstract thought, have opened wide occasion for expounding the connections of phenomena and idea, and idea with idea, in ample plainness and fullness, that until his death remained dark and unsatisfactory to Plato. But much as Platonism owes to Aristotelian dialectic, the latter begins and ends within the natural, while the former only can *a priori* know the supernatural; and sure as the ages the time is coming, when every logical grist shall be carried to Plato's old mill, and there together all be ground in one logic and one dialectic, which will make of all the one Philosophy.

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## HERBART'S IDEAS ON EDUCATION.

Translated from the German of Dr. KARL SCHMIDT\* (*Geschichte der Pädagogik*), by HUGO HAANEL.

John Frederick Herbart was born the 4th of May, 1776, in the

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\*Dr. Karl Schmidt's sketch of Herbart's Pedagogics is herewith presented with notes designed to prepare the way for a review of Herbart's system, which may appear in a subsequent number of this journal. These notes have been added with a view to compare Herbart's views with those of other systems better known, and thereby interpret them. Though the additions to the text are not only quite free, but, at times, imply criticism, the general connection of the remarks will bear evidence that they have been conceived in the spirit of Herbart's arduous undertaking to make the formation of moral character the aim and end of public education. The text and the comments being separated by brackets, the latter may be disregarded without much inconvenience.—[TRANSLATOR.]

city of Oldenburg, where he received his collegiate education, and exhibited a much stronger inclination for investigation than for erudition. In 1794 he attended the University of Jena, joining the law department, but studying philosophy under Schmid, Reinhold, and Fichte for three years, when he became private tutor in Switzerland. He was admitted as academic lecturer into the University of Goettingen, 1802; went as Professor of Philosophy to Koenigsberg in 1809, and returned as such in 1833, to Goettingen, where he died August 14, 1841. Herbart has paid more attention to pedagogics than any other philosopher; in fact pedagogics was the aim and end of his best efforts in psychology. He says himself: "I have summoned and kept employed metaphysics and mathematics in addition to self-observation, experience and experiment for the space of twenty years, that I might discover the foundation of true psychological knowledge. The cause of these not very easy investigations was chiefly, and still is, my settled conviction that a large share of the tremendous gaps in our pedagogical knowledge is attributable to defects in our psychology, and that we first have to possess the latter science; nay, first of all, that we have to do away with the illusion called psychology at present, before we are able to pronounce with any degree of accuracy whether a single lesson has been taught well or otherwise."

The chief works resulting from Herbart's practical interest in pedagogics are:

(1) "Pestalozzi's Primary Principles (*Idee eines A, B, C*) of Object Lessons (*Anschauung*) Developed Scientifically (*wissenschaftlich entwickelt*) into a Course of Preparatory Training (*Voruebungen*) for Perception of Form. 1802."

(2) "General Pedagogics Deduced Scientifically from the Aim and End of Education." 1806.

(3) "Concerning Public Co-operation in Matters of Education." 1810.

(4) "Relation Between Idealism and Pedagogics." 1831.

(5) "Sketch of Lectures on Pedagogics." 1835.

(6) "Letters Concerning Psychology Applied to Pedagogics"—(fragments).

All these works have their deepest root in the "Text-book of Psychology," and "Psychology as a Science, Founded in a New Manner upon Experience, Metaphysics and Mathematics."

Herbart considers an outside influence upon the person under

age necessary in order that he may grow mentally in the same [continuous] manner as he does physically, because he (Herbart) maintains, as a principle of his psychology, that there are by no means fixed, predetermined capacities in the human soul, similar to those in plants and animal bodies; that man—only as far as his body is concerned—brings his future form with his germ into the world; *that the human soul on the contrary, resembles rather a machine entirely constructed out of perceptions.\** [The impressions furnished by circumstances being without order or plan,] a systematic education has to nurture the mental capacities of the pupil and thereby save them in [for and against] a world from which they neither can nor should be isolated, and to train them to a conscious attitude of moral freedom. [All] possibility of education involves the fact and idea (*Begriff*) of a plastic nature (*Bildsamkeit*) exhibiting a transition from something indefinite to a fixed form (*Festigkeit*.) The aim of education is the harmonious development in manifold directions of spontaneous activity, subordinated to moral culture. "Let each one be an amateur in all things, but let each one be master in one branch of business," is a fundamental principle of Herbart.

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\*This should read: That the human mind may be made to resemble an organism, but under different circumstances with very different degrees of perfection, and that this mental organism or system is created by the soul out of the material furnished to the senses. Herbart holds that the soul is active, not passive, in forming perceptions out of the momentary sensations of color, sound and the like, that these elementary sensations are reactions of the soul, corresponding to outside influences; that we know nothing of soul, self, or faculties, save what we have learned by induction from the works of the human mind, that other faculties—being likewise the result of work and comparison—may be produced purified and strengthened but in no other manner than by induction, and that the faculties both as regards their separate functions and their joint operation, will approach the closer to the perfection of a living organism, or of the system of mathematics, or of a machine, the more thoroughly we use our energies in the removal of definitely given difficulties and the solution of definitely given problems, first and before such application is followed up by broad and exhaustive comparison with other objects operated upon by the same energies of the soul; whereas a psychological theory which rests satisfied with a number of disconnected faculties for an ultimate basis, to the neglect of their unity in application, and without inquiring into the cause of their unity in the soul, is apt to unfit man for the business of life, and at best to degrade him to the rank of a laborer, whose sense of freedom, and natural enthusiasm for unity in the different departments of society is reduced to smoking embers.—TRANSLATOR.

Pedagogics is, according to Herbart, closely connected with ethics and psychology; it really depends upon both. He commences by showing that pedagogics depends upon ethics, and proves [indirectly] that those opinions are erroneous which do not let the process of education begin and continue as well as terminate in the individual subject, but which place the pupil in such a relation to certain ideal objects (happiness, usefulness, family, State, humanity, God) that the future actions of the individual are defined by such objects as the end and aim of education. This proceeding has to be reversed, and it must be maintained that the individual person is and remains the exclusive and true centre for the purposes of education. Nothing of an objective nature has to be fixed in such a manner that value and safety is transferred to the actions of the individual from outside, but on the contrary, any and every kind of objective reality receives [all] its importance and value from the individual person, and if such importance has been attached to it already, it will not be recognized or assimilated unless it is found to be consonant with the highest standard of individual endeavor and action. It is thereby not denied that humanity, age, State, family, mean great things, but it is not permissible to hold up any one of them as the one ideal standard; they are alike parts of a system centring in him whose idea of right is realized in his individuality. This realization is morality or virtue, and [if] concentrated and embodied [in the idea of self] it is personified force of habitual morality (*Characterstaerke der Sittlichkeit*).

Pedagogics, according to this principle, should be defined as the sketch of a plan designed by means of ethics for the realization of the latter, and executed under the presupposition of a systematically artistic activity in individuals, necessarily supposed to be susceptible of its influence.

[The part which ethics perform in Herbart's system, and especially in his pedagogics, may be explained briefly by comparison with the corresponding views of Hegel.

Hegel and Herbart agree that the chief end of education is to raise the individual to fixed habits of subordinating all to moral activity; neither of them proposes to attain that end by the explanation of moral texts; the spirit of their systems is evidently in emphasizing correct habits of methodical observation and work, which, at the age of mature reflection, may be employed in the culture of our moral self, directly and systematically; both

undertake to educate by means of instruction, and to develop the moral judgment of the individual while it is assisted in taking possession of the indispensable results and conditions of civilization. They further agree that the life of the individual owes fruitfulness and scope to society, while unity and harmony of the departments of society rest upon the moral strength of the individuals, and furthermore that the perpetuity of life, whether of society or of the individual, depends upon the "idea," if we understand by the term "idea" the consciousness of the necessary conditions of such perpetuity. We may therefore conclude that if Hegel had elaborated pedagogics himself, the speculative problem would have been for him as it was for Herbart, how to realize the "idea" within the province of education. Now, though Hegel subordinates everything to one absolute idea, while Herbart co-ordinates his five ideas, viz: Freedom, Perfection, Right, Equity and Benevolence, it is nevertheless not difficult to harmonize the latter five with the one absolute idea, for practical purposes. For, whereas complementary opposites are equally necessary to life, and the knowledge thereof to responsibility: non-interference between such co-ordinate powers constitutes the basis of rights; compensation in proportion to the number of complementary opposites united in any purpose and multiplied by the number of actual repetitions, constitutes equity of reward and punishment; both, Rights and Equity limited to the domain of intention and spiritual intercourse, i. e., where the assistance of physical organs and forces is precluded, constitutes Benevolence, the principle of morality in contradistinction from those applications of Rights and Equity which may be enforced; the agreement between intention and action, both being governed as stated above, constitutes individual Freedom. All subordination is governed by the relative term Perfection. Setting aside differences of quantity, any one of the complementary opposites is imperfect as compared with their unity; the richer unity is perfect in comparison with the object embodying a less number of complementary opposites. But whatsoever severs that which is jointly necessary for life, liberty and happiness, actually and with the intention of keeping it severed, is physically bad, legally wrong, spiritually untrue, and morally sinful.

The general manner in which Herbart facilitates the application of the above practical (ethical) ideas, is termed *aesthetical judgment*. The statement: "It pleases," as to the harmony of



colors, sounds, tastes, the symmetry and proportion of forms, the exhibition of unity in variety by the works of nature and of man, is a judgment only in appearance, but in fact an inference, the major premise of which is a fixed, *a priori*, though unconscious relation of complementary opposites, outward or inward experience furnishing the middle term. The introduction of inventive dialectics into schools in such a manner that the scholar should discover for the elementary forms of drawing their counterparts, symmetrical to an axis or a centre (inventive drawing), or for the definite qualities of objects as to form, size, number, color, sound, use (object lessons) their opposite qualities and the objects corresponding to their varied combinations (lessons on natural science); or, for the geographical conditions of one place, the opposite conditions and the commercial reciprocity of exchange (physical geography); or for the given grammatical combinations of number, gender, case, voice, tense, mode, &c., their corresponding opposites (elements of composition), or for the algebraical expression the geometrical construction (analysis)—these and the like obvious applications of inventive dialectics cannot be attempted directly, but every master of a specialty prepares his scholars by means of the æsthetical judgment. He writes, draws, sings, speaks, reasons well, i. e., embodies the harmony of opposites in his work; its perfection pleases because it is agreeable to true human nature, the pleasure stimulates imitation, successful imitation develops into knowledge of the method, and critical application of the method to works of art and nature widens, by means of classical education, into “æsthetical conception of the world”—the goal of Herbart’s pedagogics].

Pedagogics depends not less upon psychology [than it does upon ethics]. Ethics may point out the goal of education, but they cannot decide as to the connection between the general method and the given individuality to be educated, nor as to the probability of success. All that is business belonging to psychology, [namely] to that science which treats in general of the internal constitution of substances which are the foundation of things that appear.

Psychology, (Herbart’s), teaches that the soul is a simple substance, indivisible by physical forces, and not liable to any change of its identity; pedagogics should not, therefore attempt to treat the human soul like impressible matter to which every possible impression might be given. And no more

are we permitted to conceive the soul as changing its identity in time (*Werdendes*) than we are allowed to admit a change of the internal constitution of the soul at any moment; the soul is what it is [retains its nature] absolutely and perfectly, and is and remains this identity (dies) always, unmodified by differences of quantity. The soul is the real, unchangeable, concrete centre of all conscious activity whatsoever (*Vorstellungen*), which latter, being susceptible of change, may assume all these forms, the totality of which is called Mind and among which [conscious products] we find even the conception of Self (*Ichheit*).

[Herbart demands as an act of justice to himself, and repeatedly, that such a construction should be put upon his words as may be obtained by a comparison of all his works. This is not easy to be done with reference to the doctrine of the simplicity of the soul. This theorem has its proper place in his metaphysics as basis for a philosophy of nature; it may, therefore, be permissible to construe simplicity as unity indivisible by physical forces; for he admits that the mind may distinguish between the various actions of the soul, that the latter are different, according to the various objects acted upon, that difference of quality is the principle of physical attraction, that all attraction does not end when substances touch each other, but that it may continue until one occupies the place of the other, that millions may be absorbed by one, that the substances have an internal constitution or permanent relation of qualities necessarily joined which act as a unity in case of self-preservation against outward forces. This and much more cannot be understood unless the simplicity of a soul endowed with the above practical ideas, means concrete unity. On the other hand, if such a rendering is allowed, we think that his views are not only plain but may be illustrated by every equation above the first degree].

The opinion, according to which a certain [and fixed] number (*Anzahl*) of higher and lower faculties are ascribed to the soul, is a psychological myth.

[The enumeration of faculties in psychology is as faulty as the mythology of Greece. Neither in these gods nor in these faculties is there to be found harmonious co-operation, well defined subordination to ethical ideas, or help for the practical concerns of life; both the gods and the faculties are imperfect productions of the mind. All those gods are in every human breast, all the faculties in every thought. Extraordinary strength of faculties

may be explained by greatness of purpose, i. e., objective unity of faculties and zealous purity of character (subjective unity of faculties) both being curtailed by given circumstances].

Everything which enters our mind [appears to] act as a force, on account of its contradictory or complementary qualities with respect to other matter of thought with which it is connected by means of [in] the soul, and the effect is considered as [the result of reaction against some] interference which may be more or less transient, reciprocal and extensive. The general activity in the great variety of thoughts is thus accounted for, but it is also evident that categories, unities of categories according to their complementary relation and different degrees of application of both these primary and higher faculties [Psychology, Complete Works, Vol. VI., p. 361] will be produced, from the fact that the relation of opposition is different in degree, existing in part only with reference to some, being entirely absent with regard to other perceptions, and that [therefore] the material will be dialectically graduated and concatenated from extremes towards the centre, (a scale of electro-positive and negative bodies): and lastly that these [ideal chains of things] will be interwoven in consequence of identical or similar links. The thinking, feeling, and perceptive activities, are nothing but the same general action of the soul to preserve its identity limited in different ways: they are, as such limitations, solely [subjective] relations among that which is real: [but] consciousness is the totality (*Summe*) of such relations existing between the soul and other substances. These relations, and the corresponding acts of consciousness not being of equal intensity, some of them [may and] do interfere with, oppose, [or] throw into shadow others; those which are suppressed, keep waiting at the very threshold of consciousness until they are at liberty to arise again, when they associate with cognate perceptions and press onward with united strength. Such associations [temporarily] repressed, but continuing to act with the least degree of distinct consciousness, and working in the dark [as it were], are denominated *feelings*. A somewhat higher degree of action is termed *desire*, namely, when the work of assimilation is more or less successful. Desire develops into *will*, when supported by probability of success. That which we call imagination, memory, understanding, desire, reason, will, and-so-forth, in popular phraseology, and whatever other [mental operations] are supposed to be, and are introduced as primary faculties of the

soul [in addition to metaphysical categories and mathematical operations] are nothing but a certain activity observed in, and limited to (*vorhanden*) a definite number of intellectual facts systematically connected—the correlation of stages of mental action with reference to the same or different objects.

[The faculties of psychology are secondary faculties; they cannot be influenced directly; they can be affected only by means of the primary faculties, or categories; the latter are always ready for action and require nothing but to be directed; their union the soul controls, by means of the co-operation of the physical organs, and more especially the correlation of eye and ear by means of language and mathematics].

The [general] question, how any kind of education is possible, [how man may transfer his remembrance, imagination, will, self-consciousness by means of sound, form or color,] necessarily presupposes that certain processes are going on in the mind of the pupil, though without distinct consciousness, which the educator must have it in his power to control though with certain limitations, and he can direct his action only upon the co-operation of these primary actions, but not upon their real unity from which they proceed, and which as soul we conceive to be the unchangeable foundation of conscious life, [nor] upon the rich variety of intellectual events resulting from the association of primary faculties which gradually unite, multiply, improve or deteriorate, and which exhibit the predominant functions in which the operations characteristic of human nature are perceived. Pedagogics can reach a satisfactory degree of scientific generality and applicability only by means of true psychological knowledge, and it is only by this means that education as a profession will take rank among the fine arts. Psychology accounts [also] for the causes which render minds vacillating between error and truth, between that which is good and that which is bad, and convinces us that there is a natural demand for education, and that education is a matter of necessity. The application of pedagogical means attains scientific accuracy and connection, the [entire] business of education attains unity and systematic use from Psychology alone.

The complete work of education may be divided into discipline, (*Regierung*), instruction, (*Unterricht*), and training, (*Zucht*). The child comes into the world without ability to concentrate the action of his organs upon one object, to the exclusion of the rest;



his individual will is the result of practice; this gradual result is interrupted by all manner of disordered inclination; to hold the latter within proper bounds, is the office of discipline. What experience and society teach, outside of school, is too one-sided and desultory, it is disconnected and fragmentary: a systematic activity must supervene which is able to complement, to digest and to unite the material collected as a mere aggregate. This methodical business, complementary of experience and society, is instruction. The term training (*Ziehen, duco, educo, education*) contains allusion to that which is not yet existing [the harmony of opposites controlling insubordinate tendencies] something hoped for [the strength of the complementary opposite, now being weak in the individual] which exists only as purpose, and toward which the pupil has to be led: this action, devoted more especially to the culture of the will, but also, in part, to knowledge and understanding is designated by "training."

1. It is the office of discipline to keep order, and to subject the naturally predominant and unruly inclinations of the individual. Such subjection has to be effected by a power strong enough, and acting so frequently as to be completely successful, before indications of a genuine will [persisting in wrong] are exhibited by the child. Measures within the reach of discipline are: (a) to keep the pupil so busy that he can find no time for mischief; (b) detective supervision which, however, is useful only during the first years of life, and during periods of special danger; (c) commanding and forbidding, with respect to which great caution has to be exercised, lest discipline be rather weakened by it; (d) threats and punishments, which must be superseded by respect and love, wherever possible. Discipline, [assisted by physical means] has, at all events, to cease long before training ceases, and should, as soon as possible, be relieved by the latter. The [apparently] limiting power of discipline [resembling the restraint of prison] cannot be discontinued so long as great temptations are offered to the pupil by his surroundings.

2. Instruction ought to be and must be educative: the aim of instruction should not be solely, or even predominantly, the amount of knowledge, nor should it be the acquisition of merely technical skill, but culture of the Personality [executive ability for ethical ideas]; this most essential part of education should be rooted and grounded. To be more definite, instruction is methodical production and culture of representations of objects



[as definitely constructed applications of the categories and ethical ideas], such representations being the true germs from which to develop the unity of all faculties until said elementary unities of object and subject seem to assimilate subordinate facts with spontaneous rapidity, embracing the complementary opposites in such an exhaustive manner that executive ability and energy for action are the direct result, as well as tact or [more generally] the quick decision as to the ethico-aesthetical value of a given fact.

The operations of the soul which are performed both with and without distinct consciousness (*psychisch*), have to be studied to solve that problem. Attention is, among these psychical operations, one of the most important, and a correct theory thereof a momentous question for pedagogics. Attention is [accompanied with consciousness of the relations between the object and the aims of the person, or it is not; it is] either artificial or natural. Intentional attention, produced by conscious direction of the will, or by aims more remotely subserved, or by the directive power of the teacher, transferred by his methods of discipline and training, is more especially required for [unprejudiced reception of facts by] observation and memorizing, though it is of less importance for the theory of culture on a large scale [as observed in the onward march of history]. Unintentional or natural attention has to be divided into primary and apperceptive attention. The former exists, when notice of a fact (*Vorstellung*) [appears] to work of itself and for itself [by means of its antithetical novelty]; the latter exists when the action [of the consciousness of the object upon the subject which, for the time, is unconscious of his operation] is supported by correspondence with expectations *a priori*. The following four rules are of use with reference to primary attention: Let the sensuous objectivity have a sufficient degree of intensity; the exhibition of the real object, and, if the latter cannot be had, a picture thereof is to be preferred to the combination of categories embodied in the construction of sentences without the help mentioned. 2. Excess, however, in quantity and quality of that which is novel [compared with what is known] is to be avoided, lest the susceptibility [unconscious synthetical action] might be discontinued too soon. 3. Instruction [i. e., the operation of construction, conscious in the teacher, unconscious in the pupil] must be careful not to heap that which has to succeed [the more concrete] upon that which has to pre-

cede [the complementary opposites] too fast; the subject matter has to be analyzed, factored and the corresponding parts of opposition have to be fixed step by step. 4. The teacher must allow well selected periods of review, before presenting to the perceptive function difficulties of a higher order, in which the diffusive richness of the newly acquired material may be digested symmetrically.

When the mind is apperceptively attentive, the new matter is assimilated directly [though unconsciously] by previous habits of thought, and is intelligible and interesting on account of such relation.

[To understand thoroughly] the action of the mind in the construction of objectivity, it is of chief importance to perceive the correlation between the unity of the categories in the object (*Vertiefung*, adding depth, third dimension, perspective-centre, self-forgetfulness) and the unity of the categories in the subject (*Besinnung* : *sinn*=sense; *sinnen*=using senses in matter of memory; *nog*=according to their correlation; *Be*=jointly: methodical recollection). The more exclusively the pupil forgets himself in such objects as are agreeable to his idiosyncrasies, the more danger there is that every fact will be distorted: [culture of] self-recollection must, therefore, alternate with that of self-application. Personality is rooted in the unity of conscious actions, [which proceed either without reference to past and future or with reference to both, and are, therefore, either] presence of mind (*Sammlung*) or methodical reflection (*Besinnung*). Both operations preclude, as such, and for the time being, self-forgetfulness in the object (*Vertiefung*); the former have, nevertheless, to be united in the latter [to-wit: by the stages of speculation, where, by suppression of self, and projection of the faculties into the object, objectivity becomes conscious embodiment of the powers of the subject, as far as in activity]. If the acts of attention concentrated upon objects never unite in the attention bestowed upon the subject, the objects remain disassociated for general purposes, and the individual is inattentive; if the objects unite on account of their relation to the person, but the conscious factors of personality by which objects have been analyzed is not exhaustive, and their unity, therefore, weak, though without contradiction of the parts, the individual becomes one-sided. Ethical self-forgetfulness proceeding with freedom from predilections

and selfish aims, projects the distinctive particularity in relief. The progress from one act of objectivation to the next [complemental of the preceding], is the cause by which the results are associated, and the reciprocal reproductions arising among the multitude of associations, are personified as imagination; the latter [seems to] perceive the complementary relation (*schmeckt* = tastes) of every mixture, and ought not to reject anything [whether real or imaginary] except what is insipid, [the superfluous repetition of identity]. The undisturbed concentration of freedom seeks objective unity; the undisturbed self-recollection of freedom seeks the [genetic] relation of the several orders [and to comprehend] every single thing as organ located among the associations according to its intrinsic capacity. The rich organization of a rich genetic construction is called system. The upward step of genetic construction is called method; it is by means of the method that we sweep through the system of thoughts, in order to produce new constructions, and to watch over the consistency of its application [when the latter presents itself with seeming spontaneity].

Building upon such knowledge and such motives of action as have been prepared by experience and society outside of school, instruction has now to offer material of importance for the operations mentioned: for it is such material [only] that objective attention has to complement and subjective attention has to survey. Matter of interest may be divided [by our concern for things and persons] into matter important to be known and matter important to be concerned about [*Theilnahme*—participation.] Facts of interest derive their value either from the novel varieties presented by experience, or because they embody laws, or on account of their æsthetical [complementary] correlations; concern is directed either upon man as individual, or upon the moral persons of society, or upon the relations of both to the Absolute Person. Accordingly, there are six chief classifications for whatever may be of interest or concern: (1) Empirical interest in specific differences, the mind seizing upon nature in whatever way it may present itself. (2) Speculative interest as to the manner in which laws are realized, the mind endeavoring to discover the [necessary] connection between matter and form in nature. (3) Æsthetical interest in complementary and supplemental relations arising from the perception of the objective reality of the beautiful. The stages of "concern" are: (4) Sym-

pathetic concern in humanity as such, reproducing the longings discovered in human hearts without criticism and in the manner in which they are presented by society or the fine arts. (5) Civil, Political and Social concern [in co-operation by means of co-ordination and subordination.] (6) Religious concern originating when the concern for the whole is redistributed among the individuals by reflex considerations combined with the preceding stages of concern—both, therefore, interest in actions, as well as concern for motives take, in their lowest stage, what nature, society, humanity offer; both seem to lose themselves, the one in empiricism, the other in sympathies [and antipathies]. But the development of things urges both beyond these limits; empiricism is left behind by the [eternal] marvel (enigma) of creation; the free submission of society to law results from the [conviction that] conflict between might and right, between virtue and happiness, [cannot be settled] by merely sympathetic action. The spirit of freedom invents laws; speculation discovers laws. The whole heart is lifted to the recognition of the law identical in subject and object by the speculative freedom of æsthetical relations [in teleological organisms]; it is lifted by [universal] sympathy, as to the inadequacy between man's aspirations and his individual capacities, out of its bondage to the spiritual law of inertia, into—[transcendental liberty, into the necessary faith that man can commence anew upon an ever broader basis of thought and action, into the recognition of the remedial agency of the necessarily creative power of the Spirit, into]—Religion.

Instruction enriches and fecundates desire and ability by means of the stages of interesting knowledge; it leads, on the other hand, up to the other aim, to ethical judgment in treating matter of interest by the stages of concern. This is effected by the genetic reproduction of any work, exhibited in its essential stages of interest and concern, that is, by means of the construction of any systematic result of life presented exhaustively according to its [antithetical and synthetical] stages, in such a manner that the ideal correspondence between human freedom and action is reflected, either directly [by their agreement] or by their contrast. It would hardly do to take works of the present age for illustration; the sphere of the adult in an age of culture is too complicated and too much limited by conditions of life which we do not wish the pupil to understand even if we could render them intelligible. Classical representations of an idealized boy-



hood, such as are found in Homer's poems, especially in the *Odyssey*, are proper to begin with. Instruction in language even need not commence with Latin, but may begin with Greek, and proceed as speedily as possible to the study of the *Odyssey*, we mean, when the boy is just stepping out of the period in which care for his body engrosses the attention—say, at least before he has finished his tenth year.

[To be more general], the subject matter of instruction [for any age, whether of the pupil or of the country] has to be selected with reference to the fact how fully the objective and subjective unity of the faculties and the subordinate stages of interest and concern are represented by means of it. No factor, indispensably necessary for the maintaining of freedom at any given historical stage of the country, no science or art which is systematically developed and universally recognized should be excluded entirely. Notwithstanding the division of labor required for [the harmony of] life, talents, and inclinations, the conditions are offered for, and allowed to, one part of our youth a systematic culture of philological studies, [to-wit: a consideration of literary works from all stand-points of society] which may be more complete and fundamental [than that which is obtainable within the sphere of any one of the different organizations of society], while an education predominantly mathematical, and by means of the exact sciences, to the postponement of classical studies, in point of time and duration, is imperatively required for another portion of our young men. Higher schools may, therefore, be organized [by means of the method which engrafts the totality of the stages of any science or art without exhaustive treatment of the subdivisions] on such a plan that [after the encyclopædia of philosophy illustrated by means of the results of exact and historical sciences has been finished by all students] one set of classes carries to greater perfection the ideal and æsthetical culture of objective unities by means of thorough application of the principles of ancient literature; without, therefore, completely excluding the modern and realistic foundations [of inductive experiment], including mathematics and natural sciences—while the application of exact sciences may preponderate with another portion of students, the culture of ideals being, nevertheless, nurtured by application of modern languages and literature, especially by the use of the works of one's own country.



The business and the successive stages [recurring in each and every branch or topic] of instruction [whether belonging to exact sciences or otherwise] are, to exhibit [definite objectivity]—to engraft the same upon previous knowledge—to generalize the predicates separately for the purpose of obtaining their limits, to speculate [i. e., discuss the possibility, reality or necessity of constructions by means of predicates contradictory or contrary to the actual predicates of the thing exhibited].

[Likewise] in matters of ethical concern—to commence with a case in point—to engraft it upon the ethical functions *a priori*—to generalize into objective ethics of society—and to realize higher possibilities.

[All] instruction, therefore, presents objectivity, and the facts have to be narrated and pictured [as nearly as possible] in such a manner that the pupil may seem to see and hear what is only related and constructed, as if it were actually present. [Then and only then] should instruction proceed to analysis [and continue the latter solely] for the purpose of a higher synthesis. Concerning the sphere of empirical knowledge, analysis teaches qualities of things and divides into parts by means, and for the purpose of affixing signs and names—concerning speculation, it dissects observations to show the connection between purpose and means; concerning matters of ethical judgment, analytical instruction should take care that whatsoever is truly expressive of the idea be lifted out of its associations with what is immaterial, or imposing by physical proportions, or pleasing by changes without purpose; the master-pieces of nature offer abundant material, not more, however, than the life of man and society, to contrast what is sublime and good forever, with the reverse qualities; concerning sympathy for man, it should turn to historical and poetical representations of his [tragical or comical] actions, to give depth to the distinct emotions of compassion in the heart of the pupil; concerning the interest in social freedom, the attention should be extended to the variety of institutions required for its safety, and the necessity should be impressed upon the pupil that men have to adjust themselves and be mutually helpful, and that the forms of co-ordination and subordination arising from that source are not inconsistent with liberty of the individual [provided the individual lives the life of the whole in performing his duties like part of a machine]; concerning religion, humanity's utter dependence has to be shown [upon provisions

of nature without and within the individual], and also the weakness and limits [of actions contradictory to nature and right], and all exclusive reliance upon works, physical or social, own or foreign, instead of trust upon the purity of method or motive, has to be distinctly referred to the false and dangerous imagination of power [in any existence against the sleepless spirit of dialectic revolution].

The office of synthesis is, to arrange the possible combinations of the elements of culture [thus obtained].

The general process of synthesis, the mathematical operation of combination [to-wit: the juxtaposition of varieties and elimination of identities] corresponds to [the purpose of complementing] empirical observation. We find, among its applications, grammatical instruction [constructing new sentences by changing adjective and adverbial relations, tense, mode, voice, &c., into their opposites] and [the combination of opposite], arithmetical operations [e. g., "Grube's method"].

Speculative synthesis rests upon the correlation of comprehensions [by means of the ideas, according to which the totality is void when one factor is void] and this instruction [e. g. in the explanation of the Constitution] presupposes objective or visual apprehension of the speculative problem [e. g. of organic causality or teleology in science-lessons]; concerning æsthetical synthesis, instruction takes for pattern definite masterpieces of the various forms of art [such, e. g., as are contained in the readers, and changing the conditions of the persons or things treated of] combines with them the distinctively pleasing manner of presentation, as far as it can be perceived clearly, or gives and practices such variations directly, as in the variations of a musical theme, [or in those of inventive drawing].

Concerning sympathy for [progressive] men, synthetic instruction leads the pupil to discover in himself the germ of the most different failings and excellencies of struggling humanity [by the graphic and sympathetic rehearsal of their adversities and triumphs] and selects matter from the purest poets and historians [but above all, from the lives of those who discovered the facts and laws now taught in school, and who invented the tools of civilization, in order that, from the appreciation of the sacrifices made and the battles fought, the natural desire to go and do likewise, may gather strength].

As to concern for liberty of society, synthetical instruction

takes the ideas of co-ordination of men by inalienable rights, and subordination by corporations for special rights and duties from the analytical part, and shows that the conflicting [and disconnected] powers of societies are appeased and united [in proportion] as a special case of wrong or distress is both generalized and individualized [political freedom being the one self-remedial agency of all social ills, while the policy of despots and their schools, is to keep apart complementary opposites, faculties, people, or organizations].

Synthesis of religious instruction confines itself to the generalization of such a spirit of the family, as results from the harmonious co-operation of all ethical ideas; the family serves as type for analogies (symbol) concerning the purpose and spirit of the government of the world, and the explanation of the attributes of the Godhead is taken from the idealized qualities of parental care.

[A brief review will serve to clear up what follows :

It has been shown that all instruction is the result of three concurrent operations, namely :

(1) Of discipline, or limitation of one-sided thoughts, which are relatively too strong.

(2) Of training, or the exercise of complementary knowledge and skill, which are relatively too weak ; and

(3) Of government, or the joint application of the results of discipline and training.

To express the inseparable connection of the three operations, and for the sake of brevity, we may now call them by the term, under which they are known more widely ; for, from a psychological point of view, they appear to be essentially identical with the dialectical process.

To prove the necessity of dialectics for all instruction, it has been shown, by exhaustive analysis, that there is no kind of attention, and that there is no matter of interest, or concern, which does not contain the dialectical process, either explicitly or by implication.

To complete the argument, it is admitted that teaching can do no more than interfere, aid, or direct the education which the pupil would acquire without systematic help, but that this indissoluble union and reciprocity of interference, aid and direction, or dialectics, is the fundamental faculty, not only of the teacher, but of the pupil also, perfecting and uniting the secondary facul-

ties, each and all, whereas the common faculties of the soul, so-called, as also the ethical and æsthetical approval of harmonious opposites are classified results of dialectics applied to matter of experience, and that therefore neither memory, will, imagination, &c., nor the sense of rights, love, &c., and the like, can be cultivated directly without a more or less conscious application of dialectics. In other words, it can be shown, that the measure of success with which any one cultivates the faculties and ideas mentioned, is attributable to the degree in which he is a dialectician by nature, or training, and that any one, using dialectics, necessarily educates the above faculties and ideas.

The great obstacle to the plan of making every step of instruction an illustration of dialectics, and of thus developing truth and freedom together, is found in the inherited, and otherwise necessary division and subdivision of studies and lessons, by means of which different kinds of knowledge and skill are cultivated separately, and in such a manner, that, psychologically speaking, discipline and training preponderate, while government does not receive that share of time and attention which practical life and social freedom demand. The tendency of this oversight is more especially evident in schools above the grade of common schools, as tendency to impair directive energy, and to overtrain the analytical judgment of the understanding, at the expense of skill in using the knowledge so acquired.

The gist of the remedy proposed by Herbart is, to start from, and to return to concrete topics.

The topic, whether obtained by observation or by testimony of others, is the unit of operations, embodying the function of mental concentration.

To start from that unity of the topic, means to analyze the different parts, qualities, properties, actions, effects, purposes. The successive attention bestowed upon the grammatical or logical categories, as far as contained in the topic, is training; the exclusion of every other object and part, is discipline.

To return to the topic is, to find the complementary opposites embodied in other topics, and to enrich it by such association. This is termed synthetic instruction, and means composition, whether it is oral, as in lessons on natural science, or written, or by other means, as in the constructions of the Kindergarten and inventive drawing.

The most elementary application of the whole process is illus-



trated by the following method: An object is presented and analyzed orally; the word is then written by teacher and pupil in full; next comes the analysis of sounds and practice of the constituent letters. After a few words are fixed, the synthesis of the elements for new words commences].

Herbart's Pedagogics now proceeds to consider how directive force may be educated by means of written compositions:

The term [dialectic] training embraces all direct action upon the disposition of the pupil which is prompted by the intention to purify and supplement his energies, and to lead him towards objective liberty. Dialectic training has to deal [with the limitations of the person fixed by way of inheritance or association] or, in other words, it has to deal with the character of man. Character manifests itself by individual preferences [and is twofold, either objective or subjective. The objective portion or factor of character consists of] the individual's particular construction of inclinations, indicated by the relative proportion or percentage of action; the subjective factor of character consists in the enjoyment of complementary opposites criticizing the individual inclinations. The historical conception of both our objective and subjective character (*Sitz* = centre of geometrical locus) constitutes the totality of actual energy, and this is produced continuously by means of complementary natural desires into acts of responsibility. The difference of the causes wherewith persons identify themselves, defines such or another character. It is, nevertheless, the internal act, as described, whether purely internal or whether conceived as possibly external, which produces balanced energy out of the material of desires [in every species of character].

Faculty, [i. e., power of one of the complementary opposites which would act independently if it was not restrained and directed] is, without doubt, the condition of acts of responsibility, and [adopting this definition of faculty, we see that] every individual is peculiarly endowed or disposed, according to the physical constitution of his body, according to the conscious connection of his personality with his habits of thought, and according to the relation of these mental habits among each other, character gradually develops and matures [by suppressing dispositions which are relatively too strong, and training such complementary inclinations as are relatively too weak.] [Hence we perceive that] opportunities, influence of the mode of living, influence of



the sphere of thought, are of essential importance for the culture of character [though it is quite as evident, that they are of such importance as means for developing freedom, but are not to be regarded as independent or necessary causes of action].

Among psychical actions which develop character, is foremost "the memory of will" [the knowledge that the higher unity, in favor of which insubordinate attention, affections, or energies have suppressed, retains and embodies said energies unimpaired, though the latter have been disengaged from the objects to which they were attached originally]; this kind of will [the unity of sacrifice and faith] must manifest itself without a process of reasoning (or categorically), as often as occasion requires [that is, as often as any desire exhibits the tendency to throw off subordination to conscience] if such a conception as character involves may be realized, [i. e., a perfectly free and perfectly reliable person].

One of the following stages of this process is the act of choice, that is, preference [to unity] and subordination [of preparatory extremes]: this act of choice settles the gradation of energy, it imparts organic or systematic construction to the inclinations, it attaches limited valuation to each separate act, and each separate cause of action, rendering the person aware of the relation between what he ought and ought not to sacrifice, between what he ought and ought not to own, or, between what he ought and ought not to do.

Objective freedom [or harmony of the individual will with nature, and with the will of society] by means of the ethico-æsthetical judgment appears to be a third stage of the process, though it [is manifest that the susceptibility and attention for what is good and beautiful is in reality the reward for rejecting what appears to be otherwise, and that this act of rejecting] precedes and determines the act of choice. The act of identifying one's moral self with a cause follows next [or the determination to stand, fall and rise with said cause] accompanied by the definite knowledge of the duties, responsibilities and sacrifices involved, and is succeeded, finally, by self-observation, [or scrutiny how far our acts are expressive of moral resolutions, and in case of inadequacy] by reaffirmation of the original resolution against further obstacles.

The individual is thus carrying on a policy at once conservative [the energies not being impaired by suppressing or govern-

ing the objects of one-sided tendencies], restorative [in training functions weakened by the overgrowth of others], and reformatory [by concentrating the energies thus controlled and trained upon the right cause]—in fine, the individual is carrying into effect the true principle of self-education.

An enlightened warmth for acts of objective liberty, unabated by selfish desires, compatible alike with courage and prudence, by means whereof the truth of objective liberty becomes an individual impersonation, cannot grow out of any root other than the power of faith, which leads to sacrifice for duty's sake, resulting from ethical application of dialectics.

Distinct measures of dialectical training [to be carried into effect by the teacher in separate lessons] are required, on account of faults inherent in all schooling [more particularly in schooling of a higher order, where the culture of directive energy by means of composition is not made the leading aim, and the necessary faults referred to arise from the fact that systematic excellence in the plan of studies, together with the best possible standard in the separate lessons, cannot alone, and without aid from systematic use of knowledge in lessons on composition, overcome the discrepancy between the claims of practical life and the one-sided culture of theoretical or abstract judgment, which results from any division of labor by means of teachers, subject-matter, time and methods, without adequate and scientific correction].

Measures of dialectical training are also required for realizing the general purposes of education [to-wit: the perpetuation of justice and freedom. The future juror should practice the art of looking at opposite phases of a fact without bias; the future citizen might, in some degree, be prepared to give a fair hearing to opposite views advanced by different papers and parties, without introducing political or religious questions into schools; and, why should the future legislator not contract the habit of looking at the consequences of an act from different stand-points, even in his youth? Or, how is the foundation of constitutional liberty to remain intact, if the harmonious co-operation of the judicial, executive and legislative functions in the individual is weakened, instead of carefully trained?]

Among measures for dialectical training of an external nature, we find, first and foremost, the deportment of the teacher towards the pupil, [the balanced harmony of firm self-esteem for

discipline and kind self-forgetfulness for training, representing, as well as circumstances permit, the power from which his share of authority is delegated]; after that, the degree to which the teacher permits or refuses [the pupil's individuality and circumstances to modify the application of prescribed laws], and, consequently, the consistency with which he aims to produce methodical habits of thought, or to cancel habits which interfere: training is, in this last case, [manifestly] combined with discipline [suppression of wrong, or faulty use of faculties], but is distinguished from the latter by its aim, to apply the faculties, which have been set free, for the appropriate object. ["Use your anger for your problem"—said Stonewall Jackson, as professor of mathematics].

[Hence it appears that dialectical training, or rather government, consists in this: to concentrate different and opposite knowledge and skill upon imperfect work, for the purpose of transforming such work until it exhibits conformity with the ethical ideas. The illustration, most widely accepted, is the solution of equations, by means of their transformation. But, inasmuch as the ethical ideas of Right, Equity, Love, Freedom and Perfection result from, and express the process of dialectics applied to finite objects, dialectical government may be defined more briefly, as the aid afforded by the teacher to the scholar to transform imperfect work by means of dialectics.

Dialectic government subserves the following purposes essential to education:

(a) Dialectic government prepares a proper disposition for [subsequent] instruction. [Analysis and criticism of imperfect, one-sided, incomplete work, creates demand for a higher, more complete and harmonious unity].

(b) Dialectic government gives distinctness and balance to the scholar's natural aspirations [in presenting and explaining the harmonious relations of the comparatively perfect work] in such a manner that the ethical and æsthetical conception and approval is freed from opposing predilections.

(c) Dialectic government affords time for the various germs of ethical conception to develop according to the individuality of the scholars [by comparing the different properties of the less perfect work (a) with the qualities of the higher treatment or unity (b)] and assists by means of correcting or generalizing the judgment.

(*d*) Dialectic government helps the scholar to cultivate the "memory of will" [inasmuch as any lesson or composition treated dialectically, affords an additional illustration of the principle that nothing is lost by suppressing attachment to one-sided extremes in favor of a higher unity].

(*e*) Dialectic government observes, nurtures, cultivates and directs the spirit of sacrifice, of acquisitiveness, of industry, and prompts the pupil to choose [the more concrete conception, treatment and comprehension, because the higher unity contains greater possibilities and is in consonance with duty].

(*f*) Dialectic government regulates [the adjustment of ethical ideas] when one-sided dispositions of the scholar are formulated as maxims or principles, and the subjective factor of character preponderates [by criticism of the one-sided and composition of the balanced character].

(*g*) Dialectic government quickens the voice of conscience, [whenever the might of passion is seen to crush the right of the complementary opposite, and thus to arrest the dialectic progress toward higher unity].

(*h*) Dialectic government aims to fix the system of ethical doctrines adopted in recognized text-books as a system of actual freedom with which the scholar may be in hearty accord, and to bring it about that the culture thereof and its actual realization may appear to him as the most important concern of his after life.

[It is not denied that unlimited freedom of inquiry into facts, and unlimited publication of truth, by means of the press, cannot be restricted without danger to right, freedom and progress. Freedom of speech and of science are held sacred for the defense of truth, right, charity, liberty and progress; that freedom is, however, not upheld against the ethical ideas named. The ethical ideas are the acknowledged and constitutional support of the free press. The support and superstructure contract and expand together, as a matter of history. It is evident to common sense that the comparative strength of ethical and selfish tendencies in the individual and the community determines how far inquiry into the truth of facts will be pushed, and how soon it will be abandoned. If, then, freedom of the press and strength of moral freedom in the community stand and fall together, it is the right and duty of the press, as an act of self-preservation, to insist that ethical instruction and practice, by

means of composition or otherwise, be introduced into the schools of the people. But when these ideas of Right and Equity, of Love, and Freedom, and Perfection, are shaped into an eye, to see with, to sift, to complement, to embrace, to recognize experience, such eye is called Dialectics. It is true, dialectics may result, without ethics, in sophistry. But let dialectics, regulated by ethics, be welcomed. For what are ethics, without dialectics, but a series of commands, which do not impart the ability to obey?]

Finally: (i) Dialectic government fosters grateful acknowledgment of, and glad submission to the necessity of complementary arrangements in nature and society, without which individual life could not be sustained, and actions, whether good or bad, could yield no returns, but it fosters such tendencies solely by the results of undoubted experience and by matter of instruction universally recognized, in order to protect [the religious germ] against that superficiality [which is satisfied with pious imagery without making use of complementary relations for better work or broader knowledge] and against that despotic extravagance [which under cover of some theory, would substitute a mediator between man and the Author of all providential arrangements, other than the eternal law of mind. Dialectics, for the same reason, disclaim affinity with physical or dogmatical assumptions which destroy or impair the responsibility of man. But responsibility is impaired to the extent to which any belief is strengthened against the axiomatic faith of dialectics, that everything returns to its author. Dialectic government harmonizes with true religion, representing such faith, and calling upon men to do as they wish to be done by], it points to such religion as the condition of virtue and true knowledge.

[The educational value of speculative philosophy since Kant, results from its systematic effort to separate morality from creeds and churches, in order to evade the dilemma spoken of; the special value of Herbart's Pedagogics consists in the fact that it is an attempt to demonstrate the necessity and feasibility of making morality the aim and end of public education, while he insists upon a separation of moral principles from dogmas of any and every kind, in the most uncompromising manner.

Reading, writing and arithmetic, classics and mathematics, natural science and history may, do and did serve, not only the cause of freedom, but all manner of evil. We feel interest in



the question, how sciences and arts may best serve the cause of freedom; for the discussion of this question elevates the profession of teaching from the consideration of very trivial matters to that of a sublime theme, even in case no result of economical value should be apparent at the outset. The general plan also of the foundation appears to be quite simple. If we take a free act to be an act of choice effected in accordance with our inbred desire for unlimited progress, we exclude wrong, i. e., choice inconsistent with the general conditions of life; we exclude whatever does not yield an equitable return and also any choice without general validity under like circumstances, or choice without love. For all such choice limits or defeats progress. And to arrive at a decision as to what is preferable relatively, it seems that the preference given must result from quality or quantity, and that, in either case, that must be preferable which contains and includes the other. But to exclude such a choice, the general reflex action of which would be self-destructive, and to include in the choice the self-limiting extremes is, at once, application of all the above principles of ethics. But this operation is precisely what we mean by dialectics: dialectics, therefore, are the method by means of which ethical principles apply themselves, as it were. Nothing further is needed, no new set of rules to apply dialectics. The attempt to educate the will by teaching a system of moral philosophy would be as ridiculous as the attempt to teach a foreign language by means of a scientific grammar. Both things are done, but Herbart is radically opposed to trifling away time and strength in such a manner. Educate by means of instruction says: help the scholar to choose, to reject the errors and mistakes which, happily, make their appearance in pairs, to seek and present facts which belong together essentially, to find the harmonious unity, to prefer the more concrete to the more abstract; it says: cultivate his practical judgment, determine his choice in accordance with moral principles, enlarge and intensify freedom by means of dialectics.

We are referred to his psychology for further information. This information is two-fold. We learn first, that any and every theory, true or false, may be supported by the theory of inbred faculties. Let us be miseducated first, and it will be easy to find the predetermined germ therefor in consciousness. Let us suppose our miseducation and complementary faculties will be developed by susceptibility for complementary truths. What we

may be, can be determined only by actual trial, and such trial is either the categorical assertion of some one-sided abstraction, faculty and habit, or the exercise of freedom; the former weakens and its objects fade, as the tediousness of each repetition increases; the latter is the true progress *in infinitum*, gathering strength by every complement of our individuality.

We learn, secondly, as a positive result, that the categories of *being*, *essence* and *morality* are the true primary faculties ("Psychology based upon Metaphysics") these categories being necessarily involved in the idea of free personality, but that no one can know their full stretch nor their joint intensity without first using them separately and jointly. Do, and you will know; act first, reflect upon it afterwards; art precedes its theory; not only the binomial theorem has been discovered in this manner, but every valuable generalization has been effected by developing the possibilities of isolated cases. It would, of course, be utter perversion to apply this precept to physical as well as to mental action, or to admit it with reference to the latter when not controlled by moral principles. To act physically without having used our reason, and to use our reason independently of our conscience, is the very origin of crime and sin, which education seeks to prevent.

As result of the application of moral principles to our sensuous or immediate conceptions by means of dialectics, we obtain the theory of attention substantially as follows: Let every conception be analyzed by as many primary faculties or categories as possible. The object presents the unity of these faculties, and such apparent analysis is, in fact, synthesis, and culture of directive energy, but is termed accidental view, because it does not exhaust the categories. This being done, we have a common measure; quantitatively, we may compare one thing and another by means of the same category; qualitatively, we may compare one thing or person and another by the number of categories inhering in the same, or the exponent of concreteness. We educate the primary faculties separately by quantitative comparison, we educate them jointly by qualitative comparison, and educate self-consciousness by means of both. We commence by concentrating our attention upon objects, we end by concentrating it upon the subject: self-application terminates in self-recollection; instruction in education; between the original and final synthesis we have comparison as means.

Synthesis in the object is instruction; union of categories in the purpose is moral discipline; comparison by means of methodical review is government.

All interest results from the reciprocal influence existing between object and purpose by means of thoughts. If change of objects enlarges or restricts the scope of purpose, we have æsthetical interest, if change of purpose increases or diminishes the sphere of experience, we take empirical interest; the methods of reflection, by means of which the bonds of reality and purpose may be loosened or tightened constitute our speculative interest.

These bonds are, correspondingly, practical judgment, comprehension and conclusion. The exercise of each and all of them depends upon the faculty of faculties, to be able to conceive the opposite properties, attributes and actions comprised by the things or persons which we apprehend by senses, thoughts or conscience. Logic tells that there is no logic without freedom. To every focus of predicates may correspond a focus of opposite predicates, and foci containing the means. Truth realizes the possibilities of freedom, if freedom is the motive power for the discovery of truth.

But every truth now taught, and every safeguard of freedom now enforced, is a legacy left to us by men who believed in infinite progress, and, therefore, stepped over the boundaries of the past. They educated themselves not by "culture studies," but by identifying the development of their faculties with the realization of a moral purpose. To teach in their spirit, instruction and education is inseparable. A general outline of the applicability of this principle is obtained by the reflection that all instruction concerns persons or things and their relations, while faculties are developed by actions. Things may be considered, *a priori*, in themselves (natural history), in their relation to each other (physics), and in their relation to us (geography.) The knowledge of persons is exhausted, correspondingly, by the knowledge of their characters, their relations in society, and their historical stand-point. It has been explained that matter of instruction, whether relating to things or persons, may be prepared, by means of analysis and comparison, in such a manner that an involuntary judgment is elicited from the scholar as to their comparative value and worth. Nor need we fear to preju-

dice him, if we confine ourselves to preferences settled by arithmetic and the constitution. But it is to be feared that the mere mass of empirical knowledge, without such aim in view, may crush instead of developing the faculty to use it.

On the other hand, reading, writing and arithmetic, spelling, grammar, and the like exercises of indispensable faculties, should, it is contended, be joined, as directly as possible, with the desire to impart useful information. This, we may take to be the settled conviction of our age. The cry against culture studies unites the most extreme parties. Many things are being done in this direction, but nothing will give thorough satisfaction, unless we unite them by means of composition. Most schools will discover some useless culture studies, for which composition may be substituted profitably.

The purpose for which composition is recommended would be defeated, if form and matter were separated, if the matter were not elicited by questions, and the form were empirical analysis, instead of harmonious synthesis.

Analogies are the gems of diction, the source of mental fertility, the key to the secret, how one set of faculties educates another. By analogy we understand the reciprocity or reflex-action by means of which the correspondence between things or persons is discovered. To develop a fruitful analogy is an exercise which, by its very nature, sets all our faculties, moral, mental and sensuous, to work; it is competitive comparison; it is the flower of dialectic discipline. Papers and books teem with excellent analogies; let us use this wealth in exercises of composition to educate the desire for progress, freedom and truth].

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## THE TWO GENTLEMEN OF VERONA.

BY D. J. SNIDER.

This is no doubt one of the youthful plays of Shakespeare. Its theme is the passion of youth, fullness and warmth charac-

terize its descriptions, and at the same time there is a feeling of resignation to the power of love which amounts to weakness. The coloring is peculiar and uniform throughout; there is felt the lassitude of the stricken shepherd; there is seen the complete absorption of the individual in the fancy and emotions. The mood of the Poet is diffused through the entire work, giving it the fragrance as well as the languor of early Spring, the season which in so many ways represents youth. The tone often resembles that of the pastoral romances of Spain and Italy; it is the feeling of the lorn lover who has lost himself and wanders around in a dreamy quest like a shadow. Such is the artistic hue which colors this drama, and gives its distinctive characteristic; it is the true poetic element which no analysis can reach and which can only be felt. For the poetry, therefore, the reader must go to the poem; criticism may unfold the thought which is the controlling principle in every work of art, though it cannot be expected to take the place of that work.

In the present drama the thought is not so profound, the organic structure is not so perfect, the characterization is not so rich as they will hereafter become. But the germs of many of the most beautiful parts of Shakespeare are to be found here. The reader is continually reminded of scenes, incidents and motives which occur in other plays. But the peculiar and striking fact is, that the Poet now gives the outlines of his most notable literary form, namely, the special drama together with the introduction of the idyllic realm to harmonize the conflicts of life. Here it is, though in an incipient stage; the outlaws in the forest form a world of their own, which becomes the great instrumentality for doing justice to the wronged, for inflicting retribution upon the guilty, and for restoring to society its banished members.

We may now pass to consider the organization of the drama. There are three movements, though they are not marked with such precision as in some other plays, nor have they quite the same order and signification. The first movement exhibits the two chief male characters as devoted friends on the one hand, and as devoted lovers on the other. The emotional unity which cements one individual to another, and makes both as it were a single person, is here shown in its two most important phases. Friendship and love, therefore, constitute the theme, the former existing in its highest and truest manifestation only between people of the same sex, the latter only between people of differ-



ent sexes. The second movement shows the disruption of this unity in both directions; through the faithlessness of one person the friends are separated and the lovers torn asunder. Here occur the struggles and conflicts which give to the drama its serious tone and remove it from the realm of pure comedy. The third movement portrays the return out of this state of disruption, the restoration of friendship and love, and the harmonious solution of all the conflicts. The instrumentality is the world of outlaws.

The two friends are first introduced, who, however, at once separate; the one, Valentine, is eager to set out on his travels, the other, Proteus, remains at home because he is enthralled by love. Valentine derides the condition of his friend who is so utterly absorbed by his passion, and then departs. The thread of which Proteus is the centre may now be followed to its conclusion in the first movement. Julia is the name of the loved one, through her shrewd waiting woman she has received a letter from Proteus containing a declaration of his affection. After a pretended resistance and various strange caprices she yields to the influence of the winged god; the sufficient reason being because she is loved and must requite the affection unless there is some good ground for not doing so. Nor is any motive given for the love of Proteus, except that he loves. Man and woman belong together and will come together unless there is some excellent reason for their remaining asunder; the burden of proof lies on the side of separation, not of union, which can always be taken for granted. Nature with a whip of scorpions drives the human being as an isolated individual into his rational existence in the Family. Love with its unrest is just the manifestation of insufficiency; the single person is not adequate to the truest and happiest life. Proteus and Julia thus in a rapid whirl, love, declare, pledge.

But now comes the painful separation. The father of Proteus is not yet satisfied with his son's education, he is determined to send him abroad to see the world and to gain its experience. Proteus, while reading a missive from the fair Julia, is surprised by the old man; the boy fibs stoutly, but thereby falls into his own trap. Off he must; the parent will not be trifled with. There ensues the parting scene between the lovers, and the oaths of eternal fidelity soon to be broken, with the customary accompaniment of tears and sighs. Such is the external separation.

The destination of Proteus is the court of Milan, where he will meet his old friend Valentine.

We shall now go back and pick up Valentine's thread and see what he has been doing. We beheld him setting out upon his travels with many a jibe and derisive taunt against love and its thralls; but retribution has come, and the mighty traveler has been stopped in his journey at Milan by the eyes of Silvia, the Duke's beautiful daughter. But the most gratifying news comes through his knowing servant, Speed: his affection is reciprocated. Indeed, the young lady herself writes a note which conveys the same information in a somewhat circuitous yet quite intelligible manner. But alack-a-day! the course of true love never did run smooth, at least in a comedy; the much-employed, time-honored obstacle rears its front, papa is opposed. Also the old wealthy suitor, that goblin of youthful lovers and favorite of parents, puts in his appearance and is of course supported by the father. Thurio is his name. The conflict is inevitable, it opens with a few flashing sky-rockets of wit between the combatants, but it is clear that heavy artillery will be brought in before the war is over. The principles which collide are, the right of choice on the part of the daughter against the will of the parent. The outcome of the struggle is indicated in the mere statement: the daughter must triumph, her right must be maintained even at the expense of disobeying and deceiving her father. If he demands conditions which render the Family impossible, the Family must set him aside; such at least is Shakespeare's solution.

Just at this most interesting point of the struggle, Proteus arrives at court, and by his conduct changes the whole attitude of affairs. Instead of the ordinary two-sided combat, it becomes an intricate triple fight, with abundance of stratagem and treachery. This part will be developed in the next movement. We have had brought before us the double relation of friendship and love; there has also been an external separation in each; still the internal bond has not been destroyed by absence, fidelity to both principles remains as yet in the hearts of all.

A word may be said here upon the two clowns and their function in the play. It will be noticed that both Valentine and Proteus are each provided with such an attendant. The main duty of the clown is to give a comic reflection of the actions of his master. The latter is in earnest, employs elevated language, moves in high life, and the Poet usually puts his words in a met-

rical form; while the former belongs to low life, deals in coarse jests, and speaks the rude slang of the hour. It is the same content viewed from the poetic and from the prosaic stand-point, from refined sensibility and from gross sensuality. Nor is the most serious and even affecting theme to be treated without presenting its ludicrous side. Thus there is always a double reflection of the action, which makes the work complete. The clowns seem to be partly imitating and to be partly mocking the manner and circumstances of their superiors; the effect is that of a burlesque. Their prototype is to be found in Spanish and Italian comedy, from which Shakespeare in his earlier plays was in the habit of freely borrowing. Hereafter he will elevate these somewhat stiff and conventional figures into living beings; instead of a clownish and monotonous imitation he will pour into them a varied and independent comic character, which is connected with the main theme through itself, and not through another person of the play.

Between Launce and Speed a close examination will find a few but not very important differences. The perplexing fact is that each is so different from himself at different times. Launce, for instance, is in one place a stupid fool, while in another place he manifests the keenest intelligence. The same discrepancy may be noticed particularly in the case of Valentine. In fact the characterization in this drama is by no means fine and consistent always; it betrays the youthful, uncertain hand. Still the outlines are all here; the interest is to trace the development of these rude features into the most beautiful and ideal forms.

The second movement which portrays the conflict and dissolution of the ties just mentioned, is next in the order of explanation. Proteus has come to the court of Milan, is immediately admitted into the Duke's confidence upon the recommendation of his friend, who also received him with affection and joy. But he at once falls in love with Silvia. This sudden change rests in his susceptible disposition; it requires the presence of the fair object to keep up his fidelity. He is unable to subordinate emotion to reason; in his soliloquies he states the true principle of his action: love is above duty. The result is, he commits a deed of triple treachery: he is faithless to friendship, to love, to hospitality. He is truly the victim of passion, the thrall of love, which drags him from one object to another in hopeless bonds. Such is emotion without the permanent, rational element, it drives man into a violation of all honor and virtue.

The conflict of Valentine with the will of the parent, the Duke, has been already noted. To bring his purpose to a triumphant conclusion he proposes an elopement, the time and manner of which he confides to Proteus, who goes at once and tells it to the father. The Duke, by a very ingenious scheme of dissimulation, succeeds in making Valentine reveal his plan, and then upon the spot pronounces his banishment. Thus results another separation of lovers. Throughout this scene the reader is continually reminded of *Romeo and Juliet*, both by the incidents and the coloring. Proteus now must continue his treachery, he has to be false to Thurio and the Duke. But his suit is unsuccessful; Silvia, whose character is fidelity to love, reproaches him for his faithlessness to his betrothed, and thrusts home with logical keenness the nature of his deed: you have been untrue to her, you will be untrue to me.

The clowns perform their function as before, they give a distorted but comic reflection of the main action. The romantic love of the high-bred suitors is caricatured in the affair concerning the milk-maid, whose homely qualities show the force of real life; Launce foreshadows the faithlessness and villainy of his master; he too has a subordinate, namely, his dog; this relation is a humorous image of his own relation to those above himself. Launce makes long speeches, and has more to say than Speed, who seems to be the more prying and the less clownish character. Lucetta, the serving-woman of Julia, ought perhaps to be placed in the same general category with Speed and Launce, though she surpasses both in refinement.

The second thread of this movement is the actions and adventures of the two women, Julia and Silvia. The Poet has not made the separation here implied by these threads except in a few scenes, but for the convenience of the analysis some such division may be permitted. Both these characters have the fundamental type which is seen in all of Shakespeare's women: devotion to the Family. Those whom he wishes to portray as good, are endowed with this one highest purpose, to which all their other qualities are subservient. They are depicted with various degrees of intellectual ability, and with various degrees of power of will; but they are all women, and ultimately unite in the single trait of supreme womanhood. Julia here, so modest and gentle in her nature, assumes the garments of a page in order to go to Proteus; her devotion supplies the courage to



accomplish such a bold act, though its audacity in no sense taints her innate modesty. She discovers the faithlessness of her lover, the premonition of her waiting maid has turned out true. With her own eyes she beholds Proteus wooing Silvia, indeed she carries to the latter a missive of love and her own token of betrothal from the perfidious gallant. What will she now do? Not revenge or even jealousy fires her bosom; she remains true to her principle; her feeling with Proteus is so intimate that she even pities his unrequited love for Silvia. His case is also her own; her affection blends with his suffering and partakes of it, though her success depends just upon his want of success. Love has here reached quite the point of self-contradiction, it hugs the object which destroys the end of its being. Essentially the same character and essentially the same incidents will be repeated by the Poet in at least four of his later plays.

Silvia has also the characteristic trait of devotion, and manifests it in its full intensity. Her struggle is different from that of Julia, it lies with the will of her father. She has also to withstand the importunate suits of Thurio and Proteus, but this does not cost her much trouble. She has been separated from her lover by the violent mandate of her parent, but the separation is only external, both are still one in emotion though asunder in space. Julia's case is more difficult, for the separation is internal, since Proteus has proven faithless. Silvia thus has only to get rid of the intervening distance in order to reach her purpose, which requirement she at once proceeds to carry out. For the true existence of the Family is her highest end; her courage and daring will rise to the emergency; she will even defy an otherwise valid ethical principle, namely, parental authority. Now follows her flight; she finds a certain Sir Eglamour who lends both sympathy and aid. But whither will she go? She must follow Valentine, and hence it is necessary for us to go back and look after him.

At this point we observe one of Shakespeare's most peculiar and effective dramatic means. It is the transition to a primitive or idyllic state in order to cure the wrongs of society. The latter falls into strife and injustice, it becomes destructive of institutions which lie at its own foundation, man can no longer find his abode in it but must leave it in order to get rid of its oppression. Valentine and Silvia desire to form a family, placing it upon its true and only possible basis; the parent, who is also the



ruler of the State, interferes to disrupt the union. The Family must flee unless it cease to exist, since its very essence is assailed by the supreme authority. It must find a spot where there is no such authority; hence it betakes itself to the woods, to a pastoral life in which it is free from the conflicts of society. The lovers thus have gone to a forest whose sole inhabitants are outlaws, that is, those who have renounced the civil authority of the land.

The third movement, which now follows, will portray this world of outlaws, and that which it brings about through its influence. Already in the first scene of the fourth act is a description of its nature and origin. The outlaws tell what they have done; it is some offense against the laws of the country which they have committed and which compelled them to flee from society; yet the Poet has shaded lightly their deeds, for though they were guilty they were not mean in their crimes. The allusion to Robin Hood, the English ideal of chivalric brigandage, gives the true tinge to their character. The superior breeding and learning of Valentine, who happens to pass through their abode, conquers at once their esteem: he consents to become their chieftain on the honorable condition that they "do no outrages on silly women and poor passengers." But they have never done this, and strongly asseverate that they "detest such vile practices." Robin Hood is clearly the model of these Knights of the Forest. They have violated and deserted the institutions of men, but they still seek to preserve personal honor.

Silvia also flies in order to avoid the conflict with the mandates of society; she must therefore go where she will find no oppressive social order standing in the way of her purpose; there she will find Valentine, who has been forced to depart for the same realm. Union is now possible, since all restriction is removed; the Family can be built up from the foundation. But this world has now become antagonistic both to the authority of the parent and to the authority of the ruler; it has also defrauded the two unrequited lovers of their prey; the result is that when the flight of Silvia becomes known, the Duke, Thurio, Proteus, attended now also by the faithful Julia, follow at once the runaway to the forest. Society thus attempts to assert itself against this other world which has sprung up at its side; its representatives try to restore by force what it has lost; it will be seen in the end how they succeed.

Silvia is at first captured by some of the outlaws, but is retaken by Proteus, who seizes the opportunity to press his suit anew. She rejects his advances with her old reproaches of his infidelity to Julia; then he assays to do her violence. At this moment Valentine, who has heard the whole conversation in his hiding place, comes forward; he has discovered the treachery, his supposed friend has been the cause of all his misfortunes. But now follows the sudden change. Proteus repents of his conduct and expresses the deepest contrition. Surprise awaits us again. Valentine just as suddenly forgives him, which alacrity may be tolerated on account of the previous friendship; but when Valentine offers to surrender to him the devoted Silvia, to subordinate true love to treacherous friendship, both feeling and reason protest to Heaven. But Julia is here to settle the difficulty; she now throws off her disguise, her presence restores the affection of her inconstant lover, the two pairs are thus free from both the internal and the external conflict, friendship and love have passed through their struggle into complete harmony and reconciliation.

Now comes the final act, the restoration to parent and to society. The Duke and Thurio are brought in by the outlaws, Thurio cowardly resigns his claim to the hand of Silvia in the presence of Valentine, the latter has the true element of union, viz: requited love, whose right can now in this realm be enforced. The father then relents and is reconciled, this obstacle is thus swept away. Finally the Duke as ruler pardons the bandits at the intercession of Valentine, and they all go back to the place whence they had fled. Thus the world of outlaws is dissolved, and no longer stands in hostility to legal authority, the internal disruption of society is also healed, and the conflict in the Family has received its solution. This is the return to the world of institutions, the reconciliation with Family and State is complete, and the personal relations of friendship and love which were so disturbed, are restored to their pristine energy.

The elaboration here presented is no doubt fuller than the mere text of this play warrants. But for the sake of the light which is thrown upon a whole series of the Poet's works, and for the sake of illustrating his most peculiar and original dramatic form, the present play is worthy of the most careful study and analysis. It is, however, only a germ which has not yet unfolded, but which shows the future flower in all its details. A comparison

with his later procedure in the Special Dramas will demonstrate the immense advance in depth and completeness of treatment, but will also prove that every essential element is to be found embryonically in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*. Hereafter he will free his idyllic realm from its present taint of illegality and crime, for now he almost seems through its use to excuse the wicked deed; he will also portray it with far greater fullness and beauty, and give to it a more definite place in the action. Hereafter too he will assign supreme validity to repentance, which is now so lightly and so unsatisfactorily dismissed. The restoration also will be more strongly emphasized, and indeed will be of itself elevated to an entire movement of a play. Finally the divisions of the action will be changed to their true logical order: the Disruption, the Mediation through an idyllic world, the Restoration. It will be seen that this play belongs to the class of Special Dramas whose form and instrumentalities it has throughout; it cannot be called either a comedy or a tragedy.

Such is unquestionably the species to which *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* belongs, but its other relations to the works of the Poet are worthy of notice. Julia with her disguise and her situation is reproduced in *Twelfth Night* in the person of Viola, though the latter is in every way more complete. In fact no comparison can better show the difference between the youthful possibility and mature realization of a great artist than a comparison of these two characters. A less distinct adumbration of the same traits will be found in Portia, Imogen, Helena, and others. Then again the reflections of Valentine in the forest recalls vividly the soliloquy of the gentle Duke in *As You Like It*. But the resemblance to *Romeo and Juliet* is the most intimate of all. The two stories of the dramas often seem to run together; there is the same collision with the parent and with the rejected suitor; there are often noticed the same incidents and the same instrumentalities, even down to the ladder of ropes; there is the same style of imagery, language and versification; we observe a like extravagance of the emotions, particularly of love; there are the same general outlines of characterization. But the quality which links these two dramas together most closely is the tone which runs through each, the indescribable coloring which leaves all its hues in the feeling and fancy, so that the mind is strongly impressed with the conclusion that both plays must have been written in the same mood and at about the same time.

## THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO ART.

The three forms in which man attains communion with the highest life, and enters independent spiritual existence, are Art, Religion and Philosophy. In Art, as contradistinguished from the "arts," by which we understand the mechanic appliances and dexterities designed and employed for man's well-being—for ministration to his wants of food, clothing and shelter, and social, secular necessities—in Art—as thus contradistinguished, we include all realizations of the beautiful, all the diverse forms under which nations or peoples have endeavored to body forth in matter a *manifestation* of the Highest in their consciousness. The Divine, which in the consciousness of all peoples is an invisible—for it represents the highest mediation, the completest generalization of which that consciousness is capable—shall become a VISIBLE somewhat. That which is far withdrawn from mere local and temporal existence, shall descend into time and space, and become embodied in a THING which we can perceive with our senses. Art makes the invisible, visible.

Religion has for its object a far higher function than Art. It is not sufficient that some æsthetic feeling of the presence of the Divine may be experienced—it is not sufficient that our outward senses alone shall give us intimations of the great ultimate fact of the world. We must be able to form conceptions which shall realize for us in the depths of our minds and hearts the Divine. In what we see with the senses we are relatively passive recipients, and we are limited by external conditions, the time and the place, but in our power to call up images and conceptions we are in the exercise of greater freedom. We can call up the religious representations under any and all circumstances; they become as it were a present consolation which cannot be taken away by external foes, but only forfeited through internal personal lapse from holiness.

Not only is religion superior to art in this relation of freedom from the external limits of locality and time, but it has a more important prerogative in the fact that the portrayal of the Divine is far more adequate than in art. Religious conceptions violate the demands of æsthetic truth in order to present a deeper and truer idea of essential, spiritual existence. In the external form or shape we can have only the *effects* of spirit—its *manifestes*—



tation. But in Religion we have REVELATION, and revelation is essential to all religion. Revelation is superior to manifestation in the fact that the latter gives us only the dead external results while the former gives us the moving, creative causes. The self-active—spontaneous—*free*—cannot be immediately presented to our senses. We can see or perceive only some disposition of matter so shaped and formed as to indicate the action of creative intelligence. The Apollo Belvedere has no limb or posture that does not seem fully possessed of the indwelling purpose of the grand personality that animates the figure before us. The classic beautiful achieves its triumph in incarnating the free soul so completely that no phase or outline of the sculptured block shall remain that seems to be in the way or not needed for the expression of the purpose of the divinity dwelling in the flesh. There is nothing more than this in classic art, and this is certainly enough. Ask yourself in examining a work of classic art, is there an outline that looks as if it portrayed an external limitation which the individual had not been able to vanquish. If you find any such limitation you will find something anti-classic, something that is not quite up to the highest standard which the Greek spirit conceived. But with its highest realization—take the Apollo Belvedere—what is it more than an *intimation* of the Free Personal Might? It is not a *revelation* of it, but a manifestation. The religious contemplation of Apollo would dwell upon his generic attributes, upon his spiritual disposition and character, and thus upon the creative cause of any or all of the moments which art might seize and portray. The religious conception may avail itself to a greater or less degree of artistic embodiment—thus it almost always uses allegory—but it always transcends the æsthetic limit and introduces a negative element that destroys and makes null any sensuous manifestation. Take the Hindoo art, essentially the portrayal of incessant incarnation of vitality. The Greeks reproduced the same thing under the myth of Proteus, but did not make statues of Proteus. The East Indian made a statue with four faces and eight arms, or the Egyptian made a compound of animal, mineral and human, a god Osiris or a Sphinx. In the corresponding religious conception there was not merely the creative descent into form, but the negative idea of desertion of that form—death, transmutation, change.

An illustration of this thought occurs in the present aspect of



natural science. In early attempts to construct a science of Physics, men imagined the phenomena of heat, light, electricity, and sometimes even gravitation or attraction in general, to be occasioned by fluids, or at a later period ethers or *auræ* were introduced to explain them. Still later these are explained by vibrations and vibratuncles. There is a passage from mere images of the fancy to a process of thinking the destruction of these images. The step from *thing* to *force* is a very important one in culture. The unenlightened thinker tries to conceive everything under the form of *thing* and its properties. When he has dissolved thing into an equilibrium of forces he has accomplished a great feat. Even the elevation from the thought of heat as a fluid to that of heat as a vibration of matter, is the elevation from the thought of a thing—a dead result—to the thought of a *relation*. Heat as vibration is a relation—an activity of something. When we consider that heat is a relative term and that all bodies have some heat, we see at once that all bodies must be in a state of continual vibration, which vibration is in a continual process of interaction, every body through its vibration influencing every other body. Then again the form of bodies and their properties, whether solid, fluid or gaseous, whether visible or invisible, whether luminous or opaque, tangible or intangible—all these depend on calorific vibrations directly or indirectly. Thus we see that by the mere change of the hypothetical conception under which we conceive an object in Physics, we enable ourselves to penetrate far into the essence of the material world about us. A thing is a fixed dead result, but a force is a pure relation, that which exists *in transitu*—in its passage from one manifestation to another. All forces are manifested in their activity—in their passage from one state to another. One force becomes another continually. All that seems fixed is really in transition, and the permanent is the *law* of forces and not the individual force—still less the temporary phase of the play of forces, the objects of our senses, what we call “things.”

Similar to this elevation of the understanding from the idea of things to that of forces, is the elevation of the Reason from the sphere of Art to that of Religion. In Art the Divine is presented to the senses as a thing—but a thing moved and swayed by free spiritual might. In Art our point of departure is the thing, and we are thence elevated toward the conception of free personality; the latter is intimated and not directly revealed.

But in Religion the Divine appears as creator and destroyer of natural things, as the dominant ruler elevated above nature, now manifesting Himself in the material as the Beautiful or Sublime, now manifesting Himself as the negative might that destroys the material form and reduces it to higher uses. These two phases combined make revelation, and hence it will be seen that revelation contains manifestation and its opposite, or annulment. In the annulment of the beautiful the ugly reveals itself, and hence Religion essentially contains the element (or moment) of the ugly. The phase of formation is followed by the phase of de-formation, and this precedes the genesis of higher forms.

The true essence revealed in Religion has still another form of existence to man. In his pure thinking it may be cognized as the scientific truth of the Universe. Philosophy includes the systematic unfolding of this knowledge. Thus we may say Art sensuously perceives the Absolute as the Beautiful; Religion conceives or imagines the Absolute as revealed in its traditions and mode of worship, while Philosophy comprehends the Absolute as defined in pure thought. Thus in the language of Religion the three may be defined as follows: Art is the piety of the Senses, Religion the piety of the Heart, and Philosophy the piety of the Intellect. The impiety of these faculties is easily formulated: senses that cannot discern the beautiful, but are content with what is ugly, have that form of impiety which we call bad taste; the heart which does not find its consolation in the great doctrines of Religion, the intellect which sets up as its highest principle any other than Absolute, self-conscious Reason or Personality—these are the other species of impieties.

Looking again at the correlation of these three forms in which the individual communes with the Highest, we see a frightful chasm between the last results of abstract thought and the facts that appeal to the senses. It is the Whole which is beautiful. Thus matter as matter—as a system of gravity—must be beautiful as a solar system. But our senses cannot perceive the Universe, hence Art strives to create a visible semblance of it in a convenient compass. The old mystics talked much of the macrocosm and the microcosm. The microcosm, or man, was the miniature Universe, as indeed he possesses self-motion and the power of reflecting in his mind the macrocosm. It will be remembered that Leibnitz in his system of monads has each one possess the power of representing in and to itself the rest

of the universe of monads, all existing ideally in each. To Leibnitz then, the progress of the individual history of each monad was a progress in the clearness with which it represented the universe to itself. Very profound and suggestive is Leibnitz's system when applied to the world of souls, for souls only are true monads. The lowest monad, buried in itself, has only a dim capacity for feeling. Finally there is a monad that can sensuously perceive the Beautiful—some Greek soul. Then a long distance beyond this soul is a soul that can represent to itself not only the Beautiful but also the causal process which makes it; here is a theistic, a Jewish soul. Another soul may in its representation be able to consciously mirror the conditions which lie at the basis of the two former stages of representation. In each stage of progress the soul adds, to the content of its representation, the counterpart which was lacking to its previous representation.

This process of evolution or development suggested by the system of Leibnitz, brings up the second phase under consideration, of the Relation of Art to Religion :

*The Reciprocal Influence of Art Upon Religion.*

That there should be a unity in man's higher endeavors is to be expected. His relation to the Absolute if three-fold is still *one* relation. Thus Art subserves the interests of Religion, and in the form of Speculative Theology, Religion and Philosophy become one. The onward progress of each produces more and more a complete union of all in one. Art becomes religious, and Religion uses æsthetic form, and Philosophy comes to be at home in either of the two provinces as well as its own. But in the history of this progress there is likewise developed difference in manifold forms. Out of the germinating acorn pushes downward the root and upward the stalk in antithetic tension. Thus Religion in its first distinction from Art develops antitheses which are sharply in contrast with what is æsthetical. In a previous analysis we have traced out the element which Religion adds to the Art element. The phase of creative power that destroys or subordinates the immediate sensuous existence is clearly perceived in Religion, and Religion accordingly feels *devotion* instead of *æsthetic enjoyment*. Devotion involves a subjective side, a perception of what a work of art does not possess. Every act of worship presupposes a conscious Being with which

the worshipper seeks to commune. All subjectivity withdraws itself at once out of and beyond the sensuous.

But from the lowest spheres up, there is an increase of adequateness on the part of Art to present the content of Religion. But Art that should completely do this would vanish entirely beyond the appreciation of the senses, or would form a species of art like Browning's poetry, half æsthetic, and half abstract and addressed to the understanding. The paintings of Kaulbach belong to this order. There is however genuine Art that accomplishes true miracles in this direction.

Beethoven's *Symphonies*, Michael Angelo's *Last Judgment*, Dante's *Divine Commedia*, Goethe's *Faust*—these are some of the works that present us both the æsthetic and abstract or negative phases, and yet present us Beautiful Wholes. It is interesting to examine how this is accomplished, for in this we shall find the most profitable answer to our inquiry as to the reciprocal influence of Religion upon Art.

We have already shown how foreign to the definition of Art such attempts to portray the negative must appear. The first attempts to do this are accordingly deeply impressed with this contradiction. It is Romantic Art that makes such attempts. After Classic Art had died and been buried for hundreds of years by the new religion—the Christian religion—there began again an aspiration to give sensuous realization to the Divine—in this instance, the Christian form of the Divine. There had been a hard fight indeed to root out the Greek sensuousness sufficiently to make the religion of Jesus of Nazareth flourish, and a race of iconoclasts had even to come first. But the West—Italy—where the internality of the conception of justice had developed with Roman power—there might with impunity develop an æsthetic tendency—one not hostile to the Christian idea. Painting could portray such meekness and holy resignation in the face, and such fortitude under bodily suffering that it should be employed first to represent our Lord in the events of his world-historical career, and secondly to do the same service for the saints and martyrs. Stiffness and awkwardness in the pose of the limbs of the body; emaciated forms, unkempt, unshorn, careless of raiment—as if purposely in contrast to the studied grace of classic forms—these saints invariably exhibited in their faces a perfect, implicit trust in the invisible. The visible which Art



portrayed said plainly, the visible is nought, the invisible is all. Utter neglect or contempt for worldly gratifications, and perfect repose in their faith, is seen in the early Italian paintings. Religious in a certain sense these paintings are, but in such a sense as to exclude æsthetic. When after a period Raphael came, we find very much that is æsthetic simply by itself, and yet every picture, even of his, admits the negative or ugly element as a *memento mori* at a feast. The Transfiguration presents to us the grand "contradiction" of this species of Art. The family of the insane boy—whose figure is strangely non-æsthetic—look to the nine disciples supplicatingly, while the latter point up to Christ—the latter, in his highest moment, with transfigured face, gazes with faith and trust longingly into the glories that hide the invisible Source of all strength and power. Thus the family show or manifest dependence on the disciples; the disciples manifest dependence on Christ, and the latter on an invisible beyond. The whole picture is an index finger pointing to an object that is not revealed. This and its class of paintings plainly say: "I manifest that which cannot be presented to the senses at all." Here the negative side preponderates, and the chasm between the *Transfiguration* and the *Apollo Belvedere* or *Venus of Milo* is enormous. In the latter is the perfect repose of attainment of utter freedom in the body; they triumph in their incarnation. In the former there is the ecstasy of repose in the freedom *from* the body, and incarnation is incarceration only, to them. With Michael Angelo indeed we stop our flight to the Beyond, and begin to realize that the sharp contradiction in Romantic Art may be surmounted. That daring genius everywhere unites the classic completeness and repose to the Romantic striving and aspiration. In the Last Judgment there is the totality of the finite mortal world placed *under the form of Eternity*, and the infinite responsibility which attaches to the individual, portrayed in the looks with which each one meets the fruits of his actions. Each one sees his life through the perspective of his own deeds. Thus there is totality which gives the æsthetic again and does not by this omit the negative. The separate statue of Moses all will remember as the grandest and noblest form in stone. The Apollo Belvedere is a beautiful child, but Michael Angelo's 'Moses' is a full grown man, transfigured with the growth of noblest human experience.

For the purposes of modern Art as indicated by Michael An-



gelo, music is a far better instrumentality than painting or sculpture. Music already deals with the formless, with the phantasy, direct. It portrays by means of harmony and its opposite, and can represent an event in its inception, its progress, catastrophe, *denouement* and final consummation. Thus it is exactly fitted to present the modern Art which requires that not only the manifestation of the divine shall be made to the senses but also the negative elevation of the same above the sensuous, shall likewise be portrayed in the same work of art, in order that the content of Art may be adequate to that of Religion. A work like Schumann's *Pilgrimage of the Rose* portrays first a naive, infantile innocence and ignorance of life, and its experience—an abstract, moonshiny music to which fairies dance and bathe in the dew-drops of the flowers. Second, the experience with human life with its cares and trials, its discipline, turns the music to the expression of pain and the accompaniments of mockery and scorn. The experience with death brings in the solemn requiem which in the presence of the nadir of human life lifts itself in trust and consolation to the invisible Helper, and soothes the complaints of the disappointed soul which sought earthly pleasure alone. Lifted above the earthly and its pleasures as well as its torments, the soul gathers strength and attacks the real world with that independent spirit which is assured of an infinite refuge if obliged at any time to retreat from the battle. The *finale* gives us complete and healthy conquest over the evils of life.

Any one of Beethoven's symphonies or sonatas will give somewhat in the same form a collision between the sensuous and spiritual in human life, and the victory of the latter, although frequently with very bitter struggles and plentiful self-sacrifice.

In poetry we have at start far less of the sensuous to deal with, for it appeals only to the ear rhythmically and in Romantic poetry with rhymes also; but relies for its sensuous effects chiefly upon the reproductive imagination to bring up such images as it will portray. Its form therefore permits it to hold the whole compass of the matter of Art from its genesis to its complete annulment. It was to be expected that poetry should lend itself to Religion from the very first, and that its content should generally involve religious collisions. Secularity indeed, as in Shakespeare, when portrayed in its totality or entire extent, gives the Divine will, just as Religion does, in its separate moments. For the spectacle of the will of the individual presents first its spon-

taneous, impulsive acts, colliding it may be with right, human and divine. In the end comes the reaction upon the individual from the social and religious worlds of humanity, and the result certainly is the annulment of the individual and of his one-sided strivings, or else a reduction of his deed and intention to harmony with the ethical and divine will, as made valid by the institutions of the church and civil society. Thus Shakspeare may be said to be a religious poet, in the sense that he presents other than sensuous mediation in his plays.

In his great essay on Dante's *Divina Commedia*, Schelling has characterized the true province of modern Art and its difference from the antique: "The antique world is that of classes, the modern that of individuals—the law of modern Art is that each individual shall give shape and unity to that portion of the world which is revealed to him, and out of the materials of his time, its history and its science, create his own mythology."\*

That is to say, he shall make all the material of his time significant as type of the Divine purpose "that moves at the bottom of the world." Mythological figures are simply individual instances elevated to types and thus transmuted from natural facts to spiritual facts and means of expression or portrayal—manifestation and revelation of the spiritual.

"Into the struggle," he continues "between science [which creates abstractions and generalities] and Religion and Art [which demand something definite and limited] must the individual enter; but with absolute freedom seek to rescue permanent shapes from the fluctuations of time, and within arbitrarily assumed forms, to give to the structure of his poem by its absolute peculiarity, internal necessity and external universality." [This Dante has done, as he shows at length; this has Goethe done in the *Faust*. No element of his own time or of the past history of humanity but is taken up into the work.] "It unites the outermost extremes in the aspirations of the times by a very peculiar invention of a subordinate mythology in the character of *Faust*." The action begins in heaven and passes through the world to hell and back again to heaven. In such works as *Faust* and the *Divine Comedy* is found the highest achievement of reconciliation between the realms of Art and Religion, and one feels that what was in its earliest germs indis-

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\*Longfellow's Translation.

tinguishably Art and Religion, as in the Edda or Hymns of the Vedas, perhaps may yet become one in the final perfection of Art, in spite of the incongruities which appear in the middle period of development.

There is however another thought suggested by the consideration of Dante's *Divina Commedia*. This first great Christian poem is regarded by Schelling as the archetype of all Christian poetry; its study in our time is to be regarded as a favorable sign. Of the thirty English translations of it, ten have been made within the past twenty years. The poem embodies the Catholic view of life, and for this reason is all the more wholesome for study by modern Protestants. The three-fold future world, *Inferno*, *Purgatorio*, *Paradiso*, presents us the exhaustive picture of man's relation to his deeds. The Protestant "hereafter" omits the purgatory but includes the *Inferno* and *Paradiso*. What has become of this missing link in modern Protestant Art? we may inquire, and our inquiry is a pertinent one; for there is no subject connected with the relation of Religion to Art which is so fertile in suggestive insights to the investigator.

To conduct one through Dante's great poem which, as Tieck said, "is the voice of ten silent centuries," is not to be attempted here. Only a few hints as to its significance will be ventured, and then some of the traces of the same insight in subsequent literature, pointed out.

One must reduce life to its lowest terms, and drop away all consideration of its adventitious surroundings. The deeds of man in their three-fold aspect are judged in this "mystic, unfathomable poem." The great fact of human responsibility is the key note. Whatever man does he does to himself. If he does violence he injures himself. If he works righteousness he creates a paradise for himself.

Now, a deed has two aspects; first, its immediate relation to the doer. The mental atmosphere in which one does a deed is of first consideration. If a wrong or wicked deed, then is the atmosphere of the criminal close and stifling to the doer. The angry man is rolling about suffocating in putrid mud. The incontinent is driven about by violent winds of passion. Whatever deed a man shall do must be seen in the entire perspective of its effects to exhibit its relation to the doer. The *Inferno* is filled with those whose acts and habits of life surround them with an atmosphere of torture.

One does not predict that such punishment of each individual is eternal, but one thing is certain: that with the sins there punished, there is special torture eternally connected.

“Through me ye pass into the city of wo.  
Through me ye pass into eternal pain.  
Justice the founder of my fabrie moved  
To rear me was the task of power divine,  
Supremest wisdom, and primeval love.  
Before me things create were none save things  
Eternal, and eternal, I endure.”

Wherever the sin shall be there shall be connected with it the atmosphere of the *Inferno*, which is its punishment. The doer of the sinful deed plunges into the Inferno on its commission.

But Dante wrote the *Purgatorio*, and in this portrays the secondary effect of sin. The inevitable punishment bound up with sin burns with purifying flames each sinner. The immediate effect of the deed is the *Inferno*, but the secondary effect is purification. Struggling up the steep sides of purgatory under their painful burdens go sinners punished for incontinence—lust, gluttony, avarice, anger, and other sins that find their place of punishment also in the Inferno.

Each evil doer shall plunge into the Inferno, and shall scorch over the flames of his own deeds until he repents and struggles up the mountain of purgatory.

In the *Paradiso* we have doers of those deeds, which being thoroughly positive in their nature, do not come back as punishment upon their authors.

The correspondence of sin and punishment is notable. Even our jurisprudence discovers a similar adaptation. If one steals and deprives his neighbor of property, we manage by our laws to make his deed glide off from society and come back on the criminal, and thus he steals his own freedom and gets a cell in gaol. If a murderer takes life his deed is brought back to him, and he takes his own.

The depth of Dante's insight discovers to him all human life stripped of its wrappings and every deed coming straight back upon the doer, inevitably fixing his place in the scale of happiness and misery. It is not so much a “last” judgment of individual men as it is of deeds in the abstract. For the brave man who sacrifices his life for another, dwells in paradise so far as he contemplates his participation in that deed, but writhes in the

*Inferno* in so far as he has allowed himself to slip, through some act of incontinence.

If we return now to our question, what has become of the Purgatory in modern literature, a glance will show us that the fundamental idea of Dante's purgatory has formed the chief thought of Protestant "humanitarian" works of art.

The thought that the sinful and wretched live a life of reaction against the effects of their deeds is the basis of most of our novels. Most notable are the works of Nathaniel Hawthorne in this respect. His whole art is devoted to the portrayal of the purgatorial effects of sin or crime upon its authors. The consciousness of the deed and the consciousness of the verdict of one's fellow-men continually burns at the heart, and with slow, eating fires, consumes the shreds of selfishness quite away. In the "Marble Faun" we have the spectacle of an animal nature betrayed by sudden impulse into a crime, and the torture of this consciousness gradually purifies and elevates the semi-spiritual being into a refined humanity.

The use of suffering, even if brought on by sin and error, is the burden of our best class of novels. George Eliot's "Middlemarch," "Adam Bede," "Mill on the Floss," and "Romola" — with what intensity these portray the spiritual growth through error and pain!

Thus if Protestantism has omitted Purgatory from its Religion, certainly Protestant literature has taken it up and absorbed it entire.

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## THE SONG OF THE SPIRIT OVER THE WATERS.

[Translated from the German of Goethe, by FREDERIC R. MARVIN].

The Soul of Man  
Is like the water;  
From heaven it cometh,  
To heaven returneth,  
Then to earth again descendeth—  
Ever and forever changing.



From lofty rocky walls  
 Swift leaps the glowing flood ;  
 Then in the valley spreads it gently  
 O'er the rocks in cloudy billows—  
 Billows ever kindly welcomed—  
 Veils its murmur as it wanders  
 Downward to the waiting deep.

Cliffs projecting  
 Oft oppose it :  
 Angry foaming  
 Downwards moves it,  
 Step by step.

Now in smoother channels  
 Through a flowery meadow winds it,  
 Till, within the lake reflected,  
 Gaze entranced the constellations.

Wind is the loving  
 Wooer of the waters ;  
 Wind together blendeth  
 The all-foaming billows.

Soul of Man,  
 How like the water !  
 Fate of Man,  
 How like the wind !

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## BOOK NOTICES.

*Norse Mythology*; or The Religion of Our Forefathers, containing all the Myths of the Eddas, systematized and interpreted. With an Introduction, Vocabulary, and Index. By R. B. Anderson, A. M., Professor of the Scandinavian Languages in the University of Wisconsin, Author of "America Not Discovered by Columbus," "*Den norske Maalsag*," &c. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co. London: Trübner & Co. 1875. (St. Louis: Gray, Bak r, & Co.).

A scientific work on the Mythology of Eddas has for a long time been a desideratum among persons unacquainted with Danish and

German. The present work undertakes to meet the need. It is written with first-hand knowledge of the subject, with more than sufficient enthusiasm, and with a boldness and sledge-hammeriness that would not ill become Thor himself. Prof. Anderson is a Norwegian, and like an old-time Viking, does with might whatever his hand finds to do.

It is a most ungracious task to call attention to faults in a work in which there is so much that we are glad to see placed within reach of the public. The free citizens of America ought to be thankful to Prof. Anderson for bringing them face to face with the foundations of their political existence, which are so overgrown by the civilizations of Greece and Rome as to have well-nigh been lost sight of; and literary men ought to thank him for helping to bring into our feeble-growing, feeling-analyzing, subjective literature, that element of objectivity and heroic strength which is so characteristic of all that comes from the Northland. At the same time, one cannot help feeling that the literary part of Prof. Anderson's work might have been much better done—and that the author himself, had he taken time, could have done it much better. His enthusiasm prevents him from being a scientific expositor, and makes him a propagandist. He feels himself in fact an apostle of the *æsir*, sent forth to turn men of taste away from worshipping the gods of Greece, who had not sense enough to live in a climate where clothes were absolutely necessary, and to lead them to the æsthetic truth as it is in the heroes of Valhalla, drinking mead from the skulls of their enemies. It is this spirit of propagandism that is the source of all the short-comings in Prof. Anderson's book, of its long-windedness, crudeness, and frequent irrelevancy.

Of the first 115 pages, a full hundred might have been spared with great advantage both to the book and to its author's reputation. The whole introduction is crude, and in many places badly written. Chapter V., for example, begins with the dreadful Yankeeism: "*Considerable* has been said on this subject." In the body of the book we miss what is all-important as preliminary to any attempt to interpret the Norse myths, viz: a discussion of the origin and age of the songs of the Edda, and the conditions of society in which they were produced. The very fact that so many names in the Norse mythology are significant, renders interpretation indeed easy, but at the same time comparatively worthless; for so long as the name of a mythic personage remains in that condition, he is a mere abstraction or poetic fiction—as are, for example, many of the names in Hesiod's *Theogony*, which never attained any permanency. Prof. Anderson has not endeavored to draw any line between unconscious myths and conscious mythologizing, of which latter there is a great deal even in the elder Edda. His book simply reports, without criticism, the myths

as they stand; but often fails to interpret those that most need interpretation. For example, we are told, upon page 177, that "Mundilfare was father of the sun and moon;" but not a hint of interpretation is added. Now it *would* be interesting to know something about Mundilfare, and how he came to have such a brilliant progeny. A reference to a brief article in the first volume of Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, (p. 473), would have enabled the author to give us a little information.

We are very glad to see Prof. Auderson's book; it is a contribution where contributions are much needed. It is pleasant reading, and will doubtless be widely read, with much profit to many readers. At the same time, with his information and enthusiasm, he can, and doubtless will, do much better. When he prepares a second edition, he will, no doubt, give us a much more polished and scientific work, and avoid wandering into regions, like that of the plastic arts, in which he is evidently a stranger.

T. D.

*The Physical Basis of Immortality.* By Antoinette Brown Blackwell. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1876. Price, \$1 50. For sale by Gray, Baker, & Co., 407 North Fourth Street, St. Louis, Mo.

The author of this volume shows a genuine appreciation of the true issue of to-day, when she states it to be the question of *the nature and duration of personal life*. "Between Professor Tyndall and his friends on the one side," she remarks, "and the Christian community on the other, the really vital point at issue concerns the Personality or Impersonality of Uncreated Being—the Ultimate; science has not proved that this Ultimate is Conscious and Infinite Intelligence. The religious man knows that if he cannot cling to a Personal God, he must equally let go his firm and assured hold upon an immortal consciousness for himself." Mrs. Blackwell occupies several chapters in considering chemical theories; correlation of forces and the changes of form in nature; the atom as unit of matter; force and extension as the essential conditions of matter; force, extension, and sentient force as essential conditions of mind; the relation of extension to force—as two phases of one unity, force being active, and extension passive. She regards an atom as a centre of many activities—as a group of interdependent conditions. Force and extension condition each other, and motion is the resultant. Rest is an impossibility. The "mind-atom" has "sentient force and intention" as well as force and extension. "Thought is a voluntary, sometimes an involuntary, train of past perceptions or conceptions, related either capriciously or according to the necessary laws of legitimate thinking." "Consciousness is individualized; it is the all-embracing sentient nature, within which arises every fresh experience, several moods of experience being often present at the same time." These sentient moods are limit-

ed in number by physical conditions—one excluding another or involving another in necessary succession. "Sentient moods are convertible among themselves." "The laws of things and the laws of thought are one."

The present work claims to have gathered evidence which to the mind of its authoress is as strong as demonstration, that the "mind-atom" is immortal; but acknowledges that the demonstration is not complete; it is only a probable inference. "What more probable than that, co-acting with its ever changing organism, the mind-unit is able to steadily provide itself with allies which shall outlast the perishable form with which it is temporarily associated? Still this is but tracing possible analogies. It all very possibly, very probably, may be; we cannot say positively that it actually is. But we can as I think assume without a shadow of doubt, from sufficient evidence of an affirmative character, that there is an indestructible atomic identity for every ultimate atom; that in minds, physical and mental properties inhere together in mutual dependence. In what way consciousness will associate itself with coöperative energies in the future, when and in what state we have been in the past, must, at present be matter of surmise. But that life, in all orders of being, has a physical basis through which it can ally itself to a willingly coöperative universe, is not left to any contingency."

One cannot but regret that the earnest woman who has pursued her path for twenty-five years through these mazes of physical science, had not given a moiety of her time to the philosophic thinkers who have viewed the question from the standpoint of pure thought. She has sought her alphabet in matter wherewith to spell out the solution of mind, as though atoms were the absolute elements of the universe. Had she tried to find the alphabet in psychology, it is quite possible that she would have spelled out the solvent word in a less problematic form.

For us who are conscious beings, and who start therefore from conscious thought, the problem is to find mental equivalents for material phenomena. Therefore the first truly scientific step is to derive and establish the functions of mind—to ascertain its elements or simplest terms, and reduce its empire to equivalents corresponding to them. Starting from consciousness it is evident that mind lies nearest to us and matter the farthest off. Hence, after settling our philosophy of mind, we may go out and endeavor to find equivalents in the realm of matter. [See *J. Sp. Phil.*, Vol. VI., p. 2.] Kant is the chief founder of modern methods in this research. His clear exposition of time and space and of their relation to phenomena and to noumena, although not by any means the last word to be said on the subject, has at least rendered unnecessary any further speculations on the atomic nature of the soul, if indeed he has not settled the question against the atomic nature of matter itself even.

A preliminary investigation is necessary—on the question whether there is or can be in the nature of things any permanent individuality whatever. If this should be answered affirmatively, the answer will also indicate whether this is conscious or unconscious being. It will moreover indicate whether many beings participate or only One Being participates in this eternal consciousness. After this preliminary research into the nature of the problem, one may inquire profitably into the relations held by chemism, organism, and human life, to immortality. Then it is profitable to become minutely acquainted with the data of science. But to discuss these data in such reference before such preliminary investigation, is like attempting to measure the earth and the stars before establishing and tabulating any geometrical formulæ wherewith to work out the solutions. One should not forget that in traveling over the bridge which shall connect mind and matter, man at least starts *from* mind (consciousness) and arrives (if he arrives at all) at insensate matter as the more remote and undiscovered country.

EDITOR.

*Shakespeare's Romeo und Julia.* Von Eduard v. Hartmann. Leipzig. J. F. Hartknoch.

No one must expect to find in this little pamphlet of 38 large printed pages, anything like an essay on or an analysis of the characters of Shakespeare's great drama. The only question which Dr. Hartmann raises and proceeds to answer negatively in his pamphlet is, "whether the drama of *Romeo and Juliet* is really the dramatic *Cantica Canticorum* of love; the exhaustive, poetical expression of this world-moving power of love; the erotic model poem not only for its own but for all time. Is the love between Romeo and Juliet the deep love of the heart and soul, which is the ideal of Teutonic peoples, especially of our German mode of thought and feeling, or is it not rather the excitation of a fancy-wreathed sensual glow, peculiar to a more hot-blooded and easy-going people, from whom Shakespeare borrowed his fable? Can the poem of the great Briton satisfy our modern German feeling as the representation of the ideal of our love, or shall we not rather be compelled to acknowledge here a characteristic foreign and somewhat repugnant to us, the cause of which might be found in a greater profundity and polish in our modern views concerning the nature of love, as compared with those of the days of the Elisabethan age? These few words sufficiently characterize the scope of Dr. Hartmann's criticism. One incidental observation, however, we cannot bring ourselves to pass over. Many critics, especially German, have thought it a fine stroke on the part of Shakespeare, that he should have represented Romeo as having a sweetheart, Rosalind, before he fell in love with Juliet. Dr. Hartmann, on the one hand agrees to this; but adds that Shakespeare has made nothing of that fine psy-



chological and physiological circumstance, since he paints Romeo's love for Rosalind as of the same kind with that he subsequently makes Romeo exhibit for Juliet. His love in either case is, to speak it coarsely, that of a dreamy booby, ready to fall in love with any woman—a duplicate of Beaumarchais' Figaro. I, for my part, never could see any fine art in the bit of Rosalind episode with which Shakespeare opens his drama—though generally his openings show special artistic taste. It always jarred upon my feelings, and I think that if Dr. Hartmann would rid himself of his notion in favor of keeping up the Rosalind episode, and if he would look upon Juliet as Romeo's first, youthful love, their whole love the first passionate, almost exclusively sensual—because never thinking of anything else—love, he would change his view of Shakespeare's sweet work, and would not urge that Romeo, having exhausted his first love in Rosalind, should now woo Juliet in ordinary every-day fashion, and that his courtship be received by her with the demure timidity of a German *Mädchen*.

A. E. K.

*Zur Reform des Höheren Schulwesens*, von Edward von Hartmann. Berlin. Carl Duncker's Verlag. 1875.

In this work Dr. Hartmann discusses the same question that has for some years past excited more than usual exchange of opinion also in this country, the kind of education to which our higher classes of schools and colleges ought to be devoted. The school system of Germany is so different from ours, and the schools are named and classified in a manner so peculiar, that a sketch of Dr. Hartmann's proposed reforms in the schools of Germany would be unintelligible to an American reader without a previous detailed description of that system, for which we have no room here. In a general way we may state, however, that Dr. Hartmann is, as a whole, strongly in favor of giving education a more practical character, abandoning useless branches, and substituting for them studies in natural science, &c. He also strongly protests against too many school hours per day, as being ruinous to the health of the children. Four hours he considers amply sufficient. In regard to the vexed question as to the study of the ancient languages, Dr. Hartmann strongly advocates the substitution of Greek for Latin in all schools where Latin is taught. Let the few, he says, who want to learn Latin for practical use in life, learn it like any other special study; but in public schools the study of Greek is far preferable, as being not only the most philosophical and practical of all languages, but also that one of the ancient languages which most resembles ours (the German) in its structure.

A. E. K.

*Ueber das Princip des Realismus*, von J. H. v. Kirchmann. Leipzig. 1875.

This is the first published of a monthly series of philosophical essays or lectures prepared and delivered before the Philosophical Society of Berlin, of which Mr. Kirchmann is president. The main part of the work is devoted to a criticism of Hartmann's "Philosophy of the Unconscious," to which we shall probably have occasion to refer at length hereafter.

A. E. K.

I. *R. Museo D'Istruzione e di Educazione: Discorso del Professore G. Dalla Vedova*. Roma: Collegio Romano, No. 216.

II. *Giornale del Museo D'Istruzione e di Educazione*. Anno 1. Num. 1. Roma, 15 Novembre, 1875.

III. *Giornale*, &c. [Same as above.] Num. 2. Dicembre, 1875.

On the nineteenth of June, 1875, was inaugurated the Royal Museum of Instruction and Education of the "*Collegio Romano*." Profr. G. Dalla Vedova, the director of this museum, delivered the inaugural address, setting forth the objects and aims of the new institution.

One of the most important results of this museum, is the publication of a monthly journal of Education, of which two numbers have come to hand. We shall notice the contents of this new journal from time to time. The Editor desires to exchange with American Educational Journals, and to receive educational treatises for the Library of the Royal Museum. These can be sent direct to the above address, or (better), through the Bureau of Education at Washington.—[ED.]

## BOOKS RECEIVED.

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1. *Loi Generale de L'Evolution de L'Humanite*. Introduction au Livre de L'Autonomie de la Personne Humaine. Par Le Professeur Emile Acollas. Paris: Garnier Freres, Libraires-Editeurs, 6, Rue des Saints-Peres. 1876.

2. *L'Economie Politique et le Droit*. By same author.

3. *La Philosophie de L'Histoire et le Droit*. By same author.

4. *L'Anthropologie et le Droit*. By same author.

*Zwei briefe ueber Verursachung und Freiheit im Willen gerichtet an John Stuart Mill*. Mit einem Anhang ueber die Existenz des Stoffes und unsere Begriffe des unendlichen Raumes. Von Rowland G. Hazard. Im Auftrage des Verfassers aus dem Englischen uebersetzt. New York: B. Westermann & Co. Leipzig: In commission bei Bernhard Hermann. 1875.

- Insanity in its Relations to Crime. A Text and a Commentary. By William A. Hammond, M. D. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1873.
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- Denkschrift zur 25 Jaehrigen Erinnerungsfeier der Stiftung des Deutschen Schulvereins und der Freien Gemeinde von St. Louis und Bremen—am 6 November, 1850—veranstaltet in der Halle an 17 und Dodier Strasse, am 7 November, 1875. Druck von M. Seiffarth, 21 Suedliche Vierte Strasse, St. Louis.
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THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

[IN OUTLINE].

BY WM. T. HARRIS.

The definition of Philosophy must distinguish it from various forms of literature, critical, æsthetic or religious, as well as from the special sciences. These forms of literature and the special sciences may however assist in realizing the grand purpose of Philosophy. Their function is a part of the greater one of self-cognition in which man as man is engaged. In its Philosophy each nation attempts to solve the problems of the world as they appear to it from the stand-point of its national life. The Philosophy of a given epoch endeavors to state in ultimate terms the elements of the problem as it occurs in that epoch. The peculiarity of the philosophic solution consists in this: it attempts to reduce the immediate and contradictory elements as they are given in life to the ultimate terms or expressions which indicate the universal and necessary conditions out of which those elements have arisen. Hence every Philosophy presents us (1) the *form* or principle which explains the multiplicity of existence (this being something eternal, infinite—a permanent, unchangeable idea), and (2) the empirical elements that are to be explained—the multiplicity



of existence. The difference between systems of Philosophy is not to be found so much in the explanatory principle adopted as in the empirical elements which it attempts to explain. The life of man continually presents new phases. Consequently his world changes, and in one age he has one set of conditions to solve, and in another quite a different one. The solutions he gives in his Philosophy have a substantial agreement, but the systems seem very diverse, because the facts of the world are described from different points of view.

In the most rudimentary form of knowing, i. e., in sense-perception, there is a synthesis of the two extremes of cognition—1st, the immediately conditioned content which is the particular object as here and now perceived—2d, the accompanying perception of the self or Ego which perceives, that is, the activity of self-consciousness—the knowledge that it is I who am subject in this particular act of perception. Hence in sense-perception two objects are necessarily combined: (*a*) the particular object here and now presented, (*b*) the universal subject of all activity of perceiving.

This universal subject which is thus its own object in all forms of knowing, appears in two characters: 1st, it is absolutely particular, i. e., present in this special moment now and here and in this special act of perception: and, 2d, it is absolutely universal, retaining its self-identity under the constant change or flux which essentially belongs to the process of the immediate now and here, or present moment. The present now is a point in time and thus has no endurance except through the synthetical addition of past or future times which *are* not but either *were* or else *will be*. Thus such a thing as the perception of the permanent or a *relation of any sort* (for example, the one of identity, or of difference, the most elementary and fundamental ones) cannot transpire without attention on the part of the subject who perceives, to the perception of self, or to the universal factor which is present in perception. This act of attention to self is reflection—self-perception entering all perception.

The degree of the power of reflection, or of attention to self-consciousness measures the ability to generalize or the ability to think—in other words, the strength of thought. For the minimum of this power of reflection admits barely the possibility of combining the perceptions of time-moments that are slightly sepa-

rated, and hence its results are the mere perception of identity or difference without quantity or quality thereof. Sense perception increases in richness of knowledge in proportion as the power of synthesis or of combining the successive elements of perception increases. And this power of combining such separate elements is contingent on the power of reflection or of attention to the self-activity in perception. Such reflection has been called "second intention," and is the condition of all generalization. Self-consciousness is therefore the basis of all knowledge; for all predication—from the emptiest assertion: "this is now"—up to the richest statement involving the ultimate relation of the world to God as the highest principle, is possible only through a withdrawal of the mind out of the limiting conditions of the particular here and now, by means of attention to its own activity, which, as already pointed out, comprehends the two phases of absolute particularity and absolute universal potentiality in one.

This is the psychological basis of the general principle laid down regarding the identity of systems of Philosophy and their phases of difference. The naive state of mind of the uncultured human being, alike with the acute philosophical intellect or the intuition of a religious mystic, involves in all its activities and at every moment thereof this phase of attention to the self-activity, or to the subject which knows. The naive or non-philosophical stage of consciousness differs from the philosophical stage in the fact that the latter sets up some one of its cognitions as the highest principle, through which it attempts to explain the totality of said cognitions, while the former makes no such attempt. The Philosophical activity of the mind is therefore a *third intention* or act of attention which has for its object the reference of individual cognitions to an assumed supreme principle.

This Philosophical act it is evident, therefore, is a species of reflection different from that reflection which is implicit in all cognition. It is an act of withdrawal of the mind from immediate cognition (which arises through the first and second intention, or perception and reflection) and a concentration of the attention upon the relation of that immediate cognition as existing in its separate details, to all cognition as totality. It is therefore systematic knowing. Moreover, it may posit as its supreme principle any one of its cognitions, taking for example an empty one lying close to the sensuous pole of cognition, or a concrete one lying close to the pure Ego. Thus it may make matter, or some

form of matter, as water, air, fire or ether, the philosophical principle which is to explain all things—being universal and particular at the same time: or it may take for this purpose Reason (*νοῦς*), the Will, the Idea, the Good, *Causa sui*, the self-representing monad, or some form nearly approaching the pure Ego for its principle. But the psychological presupposition underlying all Philosophy, whether materialistic or spiritualistic, is the fact of withdrawal or abstraction of the mind from its first stage of cognition and the contemplation of the same under the form of relation to a single principle, i. e., to an absolute totality.

This contains the remarkable result that in this species of knowing the mind views its first principles, or the primitive existences by which it explains things, as *self-activities*—which means that mind sees under all its knowledge its own form as the ultimate truth of all. Take the stand-point of materialistic philosophy for example: matter is the ultimate principle, the whence and whither of all. Matter is thus posited as a universal which is the sole origin of all particular existences and also the final goal of the same.\* But “matter,” as such idea, is a cognition which arises only through reflection; it is perceived by “second intention,” for first intention only refers or relates to immediate particular objects and not to general objects like “matter” which is only a term for the persistent activity which recurs in the perception of whatever objects in time or space. As cognition of the mind, therefore, “matter” is a product of “second intention,” but as philosophic principle it is more than this; it is this special cognition of matter posited as the absolute or as the totality and

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\*Hence matter is active, giving rise to special existences, and also changing them into others with all the method and arrangement which we can see in natural laws. For matter must contain in it potentially all that comes from it. Hence matter is creative, causing to arise in its own general substance those particular limitations which constitute the differences and individuality of things. It is negative or destroyer in that it annuls the individuality of particular things, causing to vanish those limitations which separate or distinguish this thing from that other. Such a principle as this matter is assumed to be, which causes existences to arise from itself by its own activity upon itself and within itself, entirely unconditioned by any other existence or energy, is self-determination, and therefore analogous to that factor in sensuous knowing which was called the Ego or self-consciousness—an activity which was universal and devoid of form, and yet incessantly productive of forms and destructive of the same. All this is implied in the theory of materialism, and exists there as separate ideas, only needing to be united by inferences.

entirety of cognition, and hence not as limited through other particular cognitions, but as containing within itself all limitations necessary for the particularization of other cognitions. Hence it is a pure Ego in so far as the possibility of all special ideas are concerned, and an active process so far as actual particular existence arises from it. Thus the position even of materialistic Philosophy implies the thought of totality, which is purely universal, and a pure activity originating particular existence at the same time. And here we meet the most important distinction which belongs to the definition of Philosophy.

The degrees of consciousness are various, and differ through the completeness with which they grasp the determinations of the self-activity of the Ego. On the stage of Philosophy consciousness grasps determination as a totality, and hence as self-determination. But this may happen in all shapes from the emptiest up to the fullest and concretest. Even in materialism, the attempt to explain the world through an ultimate principle, indicates the certitude of the mind of the objectivity of its principle of self-determination, and it therefore implicitly asserts and presupposes that the truth of things is self-determination. And yet it may under this form so far contradict itself as to place for its content "matter," thinking under the term a vague abstraction as the origin of all immediate particularity, and as the final cause thereof, without distinctly defining to itself these attributes as belonging to matter as highest principle.

There are then various forms of Philosophy, differing in the degree of completeness in which they consciously define their highest principle as the concrete universal which originates the particular by its self-activity, and thus realizes itself in its own externality.

The distinction of Philosophy from Religion—which would be thought, at first, to be a reduction of all specialty to an absolute principle in the same manner as defined for the province of Philosophy, lies in the fact that while Philosophy attempts to comprehend the totality of things through its absolute principle, Religion *represents* its absolute, and thus may exist for all stages of theoretical consciousness: for its revelation, although of the highest, is not immediately addressed to the theoretical reason, but rather to the Will. Hence it presents its absolute, not for assimilation, but for practical reconciliation with the individual. The relation of Theosophy to Philosophy is here to be defined.



Setting out from the stand-point of Religion, and positing the Absolute of Religion as not only principle of human action, but also of theoretical cognition, the Theologian explains the world of Nature and of History through it. This constitutes Theosophy. It purports to arise through special illumination of the mind by the Absolute, and may be very profound and complete, and even concrete in its theory of things, but will of necessity use categories borrowed from Religion, and consequently tinged with pictured representations, while Philosophy uses its thoughts abstractly and derives them from the activity of reflection.

With these distinctions in view it will be seen that very important presuppositions are involved in the passage of a Philosophy from a stage of dogmatism to that of criticism, or from criticism to the construction of a new system upon the critical basis.

A dogmatical system of Philosophy proceeds psychologically from the third intention of the mind, inasmuch as it not merely perceives general principles or forms (as in the act of "generalization" or the second intention of the mind) but it perceives their inter-relation—the subordination of all to one principle, selected as the ultimate explanation of all. Within Philosophy itself arises a *fourth intention*. The attention of the mind in its fourth intention is directed not merely to the relation of the ultimate principle to the world (regarded under the phases of particular and general existences) but to the method by which the relation is traced from one to the other. Each higher intention of the mind has for its object the previous intention of the mind and its relation to those (if any) preceding it. Thus the second intention (ordinary generalization) notes the relations between sensuous perceptions by attending to its own activity in perception. The third intention of the mind notes the relation of all objects of the mind, whether general (of the second intention) or special (of the first intention) to one principle (of course selected from the objects of second intention)—and it does this by attending to its own activity in the act of second intention. The fourth intention notes the activity of the mind in its third intention, and hence recognizes the form under which the many are related to the one—it notes the *method* of the philosophical system.

The "fourth intention" as here described makes its first appearance in Philosophy as Scepticism. No one of the naive or dogmatic systems of Philosophy can resist Scepticism, for the reason that it rests on a relatively deeper and truer insight. It



perceives the method and bases its strictures on a criticism of that method. But Scepticism is only a rudimentary form of the higher insight. The result of a thorough critical investigation of method leads to a consistent system based on the fourth intention—a system which may be called the dialectical system, inasmuch as it exhibits everywhere the ultimate principle as the vital element of the multiplicity of existences.

The richest phases of Philosophy for the study of one who would gain an insight into its living growth, are therefore those of Scepticism: for example, in ancient times the dialectic of the old and new tropes as found in Sextus Empiricus—in modern times the dicta of Hume and Kant. Scepticism surveys the thought-movement of its time as a totality, and begins the study of method. It awakens the speculative mind and prepares it for new and vigorous studies. The sceptical reaction of the Sophists—especially of Gorgias—leads to the glory of the triumvirate, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. The reaction of Hume and the counter-reaction of Kant leads to Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. The reaction against Averroism leads to Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart.

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The first question in a History of Philosophy is: where to begin? At what period and in what country did human thought first direct itself to the task of finding a one principle through which it could explain all else? In the definition of Philosophy given above, this characteristic of philosophic thought as such has been pointed out. Common sense, ordinary knowledge, religion, the special sciences, literary art, moral science, &c., have been distinguished from Philosophy by the application of this test.

The first writer who has treated the History of Philosophy in a thoroughly sympathetic spirit is Hegel. He endeavors with great depth of speculative insight, imitative vitality of reproduction, and acuteness of general criticism, to interpret and expound the different philosophic systems to the reader. Taking the point of view of the system he is treating, he exhibits the course of thought by which its members originate, and the limitations which react upon it and cause it to give way to subsequent systems.

#### CHAPTER I. ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

Hegel and his followers have excluded the Orient from the do-

main of the history of philosophy, alleging as a ground for this that Oriental thinking is not emancipated from the religious phases of mind. Among peoples who have not yet achieved political freedom, he thinks philosophy impossible.

Although this view possesses such strong claims for adoption that it has widely influenced the recent writings on this subject outside of the Hegelian school, it must not receive a too literal interpretation. Imperfect accounts of Oriental systems, and these mostly given a theological bias by their European expounders (whose original authority is frequently Christian missionaries) have been hitherto, and are doubtless at the present time our only accessible sources of information.

1. *Chinese Philosophy*.—It would seem as though the Chinese systems of Lao-Tzu (604 B. C.) and Confucius (550 B. C.), possessed the requisite characteristic of philosophy. They undertake to explain the Universe from a substantial principle. *Tao* is the name of the first principle of the former, and is the indeterminate primitive substance "without name it is the [masculine] principle of the heavens and the earth; with name it is the mother of the Universe." This has been interpreted (unjustly) as the "Supreme Reason." But it is simply an abstract substance (or negative unity). The system of Confucius is not materially different. It calls the primitive substance *Tai-ki* and makes two principles emanate from it, the one masculine (*yang*) symbolized by a horizontal line (——) is the perfect, the father, unity, or the affirmative; the second, feminine (*yin*) represented by the first line broken into two (—— —) is the imperfect, the mother, duality, or the negative. The four combinations which arise from combining these (==, ==, ==, ==) signify perfect matter and imperfect matter, each in its strength and weakness. A further combination by threes gives rise to eight *kua* signifying heaven, cloud-mist, fire, thunder, wind, water, mountains, earth. Further combination by fours is given.

Herein we note the Chinese principle of the family as the basis of the national state and religion, reappearing in its philosophic system. The parents, male and female, are transfigured into abstractions and become the two originating principles of all things. This crude quantitative expression by means of broken lines is inferior to the Pythagorean system of symbolism by numbers, for number possesses a far higher universality than horizontal lines.

2. *Indian Philosophy.* — East Indian Philosophy possesses greater interest to people of the Occident than does the Chinese system. In Sanscrit literature we find the embryonic shapes and metamorphoses of modern literature. Indian thought is a kind of pre-historic adumbration of European thought. For the reason that the will and the intellect are not yet, in the Orient, so far developed as to present the modern contrast of theoretical and practical, philosophy as independent thinking goes but little way either in China or India; it very soon takes a practical direction and becomes moral or ethical. The arbitrary will of the despot (whether in state, church, the family or the community) everywhere prevails; there is no constitutional limitation of the will of the tyrant of the State, or code of laws to limit the will of the other species of tyrants. The only amelioration of this condition lies in the personal sense of justice, or the magnanimity of the ruler or master. Hence the wise men of China, India and Persia have left ethical treatises rather than philosophemes seeking to curb the arbitrary will by moral principles and to kindle the sense of duty in the minds of the rulers and masters. In our age and country it matters little whether the ruler is of a tyrannical disposition or not, the people are protected by constitutional limitations, and the one in power finds an impersonal mould in which he must act, if he acts at all. When the moral forms of freedom get realized in statutes, the wise man gives less attention to the ethical view and more to the purely theoretical. The lack of established institutions of justice in the shape of civil laws and constitutions produces the intensity of moral inspiration which we see in such teachers as Confucius, Mencius, Zoroaster, Saadi, Vyasa, Gautama, Patanjali, and their peers.

This explanation must be borne in mind in studying the systems of Asiatic thought. The moral precocity of its wise men must not blind us to the compensating defect which is its occasion.

The translation of the *Bhagavad Gita* by Wilkins, (1785), is the source whence the current ideas regarding Indian Philosophy have come. This remarkable episode in the National epic, the Mahabharata, contains nearly all of the grand mysteries of the Brahmanic religion. Its system of philosophy is the Yoga or ascetic doctrine, of which there are two branches. The one of Patanjali enjoins avoidance, of temptation, and tends to renuncia

tion and quietism, while the other, called the *Karma Yoga*, which enjoins the combatting of temptation, and arms its devotees for the active contest with evil, is the doctrine of the *Bhagavad Gita*. The Yoga systems are founded on the *Sankhya* or rational system founded by Kapila (*Sankhya Karika*,\* translation by Colebrooke published in 1837). Independent of the *Sankhya* or rationalistic system is the *Nyaya* or logical system of Gautama, with its modification in the atomic system of Kanada, called the *Vaisheshika*. Besides these there is the Vedic system, full of mysticism, including an earlier school of commentary on the Veda, called *Purva Mimansa*, founded by Jaimini, and a later one called *Uttara Mimansa* founded by Krishna Dwaipayana, the supposed compiler of the Vedas. The Vedic system is reactionary against Philosophy.

The most important of these is the *Sankhya* system, inasmuch as it stands opposed to the religious form of authority, and approximates the proper form of philosophy. It has an atheistical left wing, a theistical centre, and the Yoga systems for its right wing. The general point of view of Indian thought is that of emanation. Individuality is regarded as having arisen from limitation of the abstract essence or being of the deity. Hence the individuality of material things and also of souls is a negation of true being and must perish. That which distinguishes one being from another is an addition from without, involves externality, and is a fetter and hindrance preventing the attainment of the divine.

Emancipation—"liberation of the soul"—is accordingly the great object, first of the Indian religion and next of its philosophy. From individuality arises pain: for complication of one being with another outside of it is the source of all pain. Hence the *Sankhya Karika* begins with the announcement of its fundamental problem: "Our inquiry is into the means of avoiding the three sorts of pain; for pain is embarrassment," i. e., external limitation. Here we have the fundamental characteristic of Oriental thought exhibited at the outset, even in the purest and most abstract of its philosophic systems. It seeks liberation of the soul, an object which belongs equally well to ethics, and is the especial end and aim of religion, and thus justifies Hegel's rejection of it from the domain of Philosophy. "By seven

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\*See Jour. Spec. Phil., Vol. II., p. 225.

modes Nature binds herself by herself, by one she releases herself for the soul's wish. So through the study of principles, the conclusive, incontrovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither I AM nor is aught mine, nor do I exist. Possessed of this [self-knowledge] the soul contemplates, at leisure and at ease, nature; [thereby] debarred from prolific change, and consequently precluded from those seven forms." "When separation of the in-formed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished." Whether this doctrine is to be interpreted as that of the annihilation and absorption of the soul into the nothingness of the absolute, or whether we are to understand it as a statement of the theory that when mind recognizes the external world to be phenomenal, (*Maya*) "nature desists" or ceases to be regarded as an independent (from mind) existence, and the soul is "debarred from prolific change" because it now knows the fundamental truth and no longer wanders about in error, now taking this and now that natural principle for the highest,—is in dispute. The *Vishnu Parana* says: "Until all acts which are the causes of notions of individuality are discountenanced, spirit is one thing and the universe is another to those who contemplate objects as distinct and various; but that is called true knowledge, or knowledge of Brahma which recognizes no distinctions, which contemplates only simple existence, which is undefinable by words, and is to be discovered solely in one's own spirit."

It is notable that while the Chinese Philosophy descends from the pure substance to special individuals in accordance with its monarchical State principle, the Indian Philosophy is a reaction against its social and political system of caste. The limitations through caste are so irksome and galling that theoretical mind seeks relief from the rigid particularity of the distinctions (tedious, ceremonial observances) which it encounters in life, by flight to the indefinite, vague and empty ground and substance of all things, and finds solid satisfaction in contemplating the pure identity wherein neither caste-differences nor the bewildering luxuriance of tropical nature, nor even the prolific creations of its own active fancy and teeming intellect, any longer find subsistence to vex and weary it.

3. *Buddhistic Philosophy*.—In Thibet and Farther India Buddhism, which is a comparatively modern reaction against Brah-



manism (initiated by Sakyamuni, 550 B. C.) replaces the aristocracy of the caste system by a monastic democracy. Instead of one caste only, the Brahman, all society may participate in a divine life, and each family has the possibility that one of its sons may become the Grand Lama, i. e., the visible manifestation of the Absolute. Rejecting with the caste system the burdensome ceremonies of the Brahmans, it retained the principles of the right wing of the Sankhya Philosophy, the *Yoga* doctrine, and added very little that is of metaphysical importance. Its doctrine of the *Nirvana* or deliverance of the soul from pain and illusion, is substantially the same as the 'liberation' of the *Sankhya Karika* or of the *Yogas*, and the same ambiguity attaches to it. While some hold it to be annihilation of the soul, others make it to mean merely the conquest over our animal passions and desires, the annihilation of selfishness described in the common language of mysticism. Its doctrine of *Sansara*, or of the mundane life is identical with that of *Maya* or illusion. The *Sansara* ceases in respect of the soul when the latter arrives at the knowledge of the illusion (i. e. phenomenal nature) which belongs to individuality, (a manifest repetition of the *Sankhya* doctrine).

4. *Philosophy of Persia, Syria, and Egypt*.—With the Persian race we arrive at a new and important element in philosophic thought, although thought scarcely yet deserves the name of Philosophy, being rather religious dogma. While the extreme East (China, India and Thibet) have seized true being as one and have regarded all multiplicity and individuality as mere illusion, the Persian seizes the thought of negation as something valid.

In the *Zend Avesta* of Zoroaster (*Zarathrusta*), the good and evil, light and darkness, are in perpetual conflict. Ormuzd (*Ahura Mazda*) and Abriman are the deities who wage this warfare. With dualism arises the principle of activity as the basis of substance, and its unity is a concrete one, possessing individuality.

This doctrine is only germinal in the Persian dualism, and as we come westward to Phoenicia and Egypt we find no philosophic systems preserved. But in the outlines of the religious systems of those peoples and their influence upon the Greeks, we can trace a further growth of the consciousness of individuality as essential principle. The Adonis-worship of the Phoenicians recognizes pain as something positive and necessary to man, indeed as that through and by which he realizes his feeling of Self.

Heracles-worship (Melkarth) also originated here. By his labors, by renouncing his ease and comfort, by suffering in the service of man, he becomes a demi-god. Thus here pain is the agency by which the natural man becomes spiritual—involving the doctrine that individuality is something substantial.

In Egypt this tendency becomes still more noticeable. The immortality of the individual is celebrated in a variety of ways, and seems to have been the chief thought of the Egyptians. Their attention to the preservation of the bodies of the dead, their gigantic pyramids built as tombs for their kings, their incessant endeavor to symbolize in art the question of immortality of the individual—the sphinx, (rock, animal, man,—inorganic, organic, spiritual), the veiled goddess Neith (nature as mother of spirit) the Memnon statue, (matter becoming vocal when the light enters it), these show the fervor of their belief in the ascent of the soul out of nature, and of the permanence of its individuality. Their doctrine of Osiris, his death and resurrection, variously typical of processes in nature such as the cycle of the seasons, and of the life of the plant as buried seed, sprouting up, bearing seed again, &c., had a direct significance also in their theory of immortality, and corresponded in many respects to the Phœnician doctrine of Adonis.

These phases of thought agitated by the thinkers of Western Asia, whose systems of Philosophy have failed to reach us, perhaps because of the destruction of their nations by wars, reappear in Greek thought as presuppositions, which it has preserved in its mythology. Again in Neo-Platonism, which developed about Alexandria as a centre, a profound study is made of the symbols which embody these thoughts.

## CHAPTER II. GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

In Greece, what Philosophy owes to the theogonies and cosmogonies of Homer and Hesiod, and especially of Orpheus, is not certainly known, but can only be inferred, partly by the reactionary tone of the Ionic systems, and partly from the mystic tendency of the Pythagoreans and Platonists.

1. *Pre-Socratic Philosophy.*—Philosophy proper begins with Thales (640–550 B. C.) of Miletus, who proclaimed water to be the original source of all things, a doctrine still defended by Hippo of Samos in the time of Pericles. Anaximander (611–547 B. C.) and Anaximenes (528 B. C.) both of Miletus, follow next

in order; the former holding that the origin, which he called ἀρχή or principle, was indefinite (ἄπειρον); the latter holding that air is the first principle, and that all things are produced from it by condensation or rarefaction. Diogenes of Apollonia (468 B. C.) and Idaeus of Himera held the same doctrine. Heraclitus of Ephesus (500 B. C.) completes the list of Asiatic Greeks who agree in setting up a material principle as the explanation of things. Heraclitus takes particular notice of the process in nature, and asserts that all things flow and naught abides. Fire seems to him the material embodiment of this process. Cratylus, an extreme disciple of Heraclitus, was a teacher of Plato, and to his influence we owe the frequent reference in Plato's dialogues to Heraclitus. In his doctrine of the strife of opposites as the origin of all things, recent writers have discerned the Zoroastrian doctrine, received by him from Persians in Asia Minor.

From the Greek colonies in the East, in Asia Minor, we turn to those on the West, in Lower Italy, where Pythagoras of Samos (582 B. C.), who is supposed to have been a pupil of Anaximander and to have traveled in Egypt, had founded a society (in Crotona). To him is attributed the doctrine that numerical harmony is the essence of all things. His followers, Philolaus, Ocellus Lucanus, Timaeus Locrus, Epicharmus, are best known. Scarcely any Pythagorean writings however are believed to be genuine. The Neo-Platonist, Jamblichus, wrote his life, collecting the remarkable myths that seem to have circulated among his disciples.

Of the Eleatic Philosophers, Xenophanes of Colophon (569–480 B. C.) is the founder of the doctrine that unity is the principle of all, a doctrine aimed perhaps against the Polytheism of his countrymen. Parmenides (515–450 B. C.), the pupil of Xenophanes, is the greatest of the Eleatics. His doctrine: "Being is and nothing is not," is the most elementary phase of pure thought. Zeno of Elea (490 B. C.) and Melissus of Samos (440 B. C.), defended the doctrine of Parmenides, the former by inventing the dialectic, showing that the supposition of the many in opposition to Being involves contradictions, while the latter uses similar polemics, ("*Ex nihilo nihil fit*," there is no transition possible from nothing to being or *vice versa*).

Empedocles of Agrigentum (492–432 B. C.), (influenced by the doctrines of Heraclitus) set up the principles of love and hate as

moving principles in the origin of things, from four elements, earth, air, fire, and water.

Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ (500–428 B. C.), is famed for his announcement that Reason (*νοῦς*) is the principle of things.

Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera (460–370 B. C.), were the founders of the Atomic Philosophy. They posit the full and the void as principles of things, the full being indivisible atoms from which all things arise by agglomeration. "Atoms differ in shape, order and position."

Up to this point we have had the physical system of the Ionics (water, air, fire and earth); the numerical proportion of the Pythagoreans, the abstract thought of the Eleatics, Reason of Anaxagoras, and the atomic system of Democritus. All things are explained (*a*) as physical aggregates, or (*b*) as phases of a process of being, becoming, number, harmony or reason.

The sophists turn their attention toward the thinking subject in his individual character: Protagoras of Abdera (500–411 B. C.), taught "man is the measure of things," and "all truth is relative"; Gorgias of Leontini (483–375 B. C.), held the doctrine that "nothing exists"; Prodicus of Ceos (420 B. C.), was the teacher of Socrates.

2. *Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.* — With the appearance of Socrates (470–399 Before Christ), Greek Philosophy assumes a world-historical significance. He made the investigation of universals his specialty, seeking in the will the principle of virtue, and in the knowing the unchangeably true. He employed irony, keen definition and induction to remove old prejudices. His close connection of virtue with knowledge, and his definition of the good as the highest principle, furnish the foundation of the systems of his successors. Dialectics and ethics are thenceforth the chief philosophic disciplines. Of his immediate disciples there is the school of Euclid of Megara, that of Phaedo of Elis, both chiefly occupied with dialectics; the school of Antisthenes the Cynic, and of Aristippus the Cyrenaic, both occupied with ethical questions.

But the real successor of Socrates is Plato of Athens (427–347 B. C.), whose school extends through all intervening time to the present. Thirty-six of his compositions, in fifty-six books, have been transmitted to us, as genuine. Much ingenious speculation has been devoted to the subject of the order of composition and the internal connection of these works. The dialectic portion of

Plato's Philosophy is to be found best developed in the dialogues named the *Phaedrus*, the *Theatetus*, the *Phaedo*, the *Sophistes*, the *Philebus* and the *Parmenides*. His doctrine of ideas—is the centre of his system, and is inseparably connected with the investigations of his master, Socrates, into the permanent and universal elements of thought. The Sophists had seized the principle of Anaxagoras that *νοῦς* is the principle of things, and interpreted it that individual mind is the measure of all things, and proceeded on this basis to make all fixed convictions, whether in regard to religion, morals or truth, wavering and doubtful. They proved by trial that the activity of the intellect could undermine the whole fabric of conventional knowledge, and thus that reason is the negative might over the world which exists for man.

The appearance of Socrates constitutes an epoch, inasmuch as he discovers the existence of positive principles in reason that are valid and constructive, transcending the particular who announces them, and giving to the well-nigh empty assertion of Anaxagoras a wonderful depth of meaning. Plato's investigations clear up this subject still further, and Aristotle, who labors in the same general direction, leaves a system wherein the world is inventoried in its details, and shown to be throughout the work of *νοῦς*.

The first step in the inquiry consisted in tracing the changing and variable through its metamorphoses until its entire round of possibilities was exhausted. It is evident that the reality of a thing embraces only a small portion of its possibility, water at a given moment being either liquid or solid (ice) or vapor, but not all three at once. We can look upon its entire round of possibilities as its complete ideal, as its pure form, or in short as its *idea*. At this point the theory of Plato stops, and he leaves us with a world of ideal forms eternal in their nature, and containing the necessity of the things in the world, all of which are mere fragmentary realizations of their archetypes or patterns, the ideas. Particular existences are participations, imitations or images (*εἰδωλα*) of their ideas. The further thought of Aristotle cleared up the relation of these archetypal forms to each other so much as to reduce them to one rational principle or Personal Reason. The total round of potentialities belonging to an individual thing is identical with the totality of possibilities of every other thing, and hence there is one totality of pos-



sibilities and consequently one necessary ideal to the world. This ideal unity is the highest principle and its fragmentary realization in the particular things of the world becomes very complete and exhaustive when the world is taken also as a whole. The infinitude of things complementing their mutual deficiencies makes as a whole an adequate image of the divine archetype.

That Plato had glimpses of this thought we see from the *Timæus*, which indicates doctrines that were probably expanded much more fully in his oral discourses (*ἄγραφη δόγματα*), which related to the Good, and have not been reported to us. God as the absolute good does not grudge anything to the world, but has given all possible perfections and "begotten the world as a blessed god." This view is quite in contrast to that which makes the hypostatic ideas to be eternal in their independence and multiplicity, and shows that Plato stood quite firmly on the ground attributed to Aristotle, although he did not more than hint this in his dialogues, which were polemical and therefore negative in their stand-point. Besides this, the thought was new, and such a life with such opportunities as Aristotle had was needed to develop from this germ a vast system of consistent truth. Plato's physics was, accordingly, the least developed of the three parts of his Philosophy (being confined chiefly to his sketch in the *Timæus*.) His ethics is more fully developed. The larger part of the dialogues have for their object the uprooting of loose ideas of morality, and the inculcation of his doctrine of the highest good, "the attaining to a likeness to God who is the highest good"; "virtue is the fitness of the soul for good works," each part of the soul, theoretical and practical, having its specific good work to perform. The State, according to Plato, was a vast institution for the training of its citizens in virtue, making education its chief function. The rulers were to be chosen from the Philosophers.

The resemblance of the Platonic State to the Christian hierarchy of the Middle Ages has been pointed out by at least one writer, its resemblance to the Spartan State in important features, by many others. The Chinese State is not a bad example of it. Although he places justice at the head of the virtues to be taught by the State, yet he adds piety, modesty, bravery and wisdom, making his State rather an indistinguishable unity of

the principles of the family, civil society and religion, than a truly political organization.

Among the professed disciples of Plato are distinguished five schools: (a) that of the old academy to which belong Speusippus, Xenocrates, Heraclides, (who taught the revolution of the earth on its axis), Philip the Opuntian, Hermodorus, and others; (b) the sceptics Arcesilas and (c) Carneades, both of the middle academy; (d) Philo of Larissa, and (e) Antiochus of Ascalon, belong to the new academy, and prepare the way for Neo-Platonism.

Aristotle of Stagira (384-322 B. C.), is however the third (with Socrates and Plato) in the philosophic triumvirate of the ancient world. His Philosophy investigates the possibilities of natural and spiritual existences, and takes an inventory of them with a view to reaching an exhaustive statement or definition of the ideal totality of each existence or totality of existences. Thus he maps out the paths of the several particular sciences, and defines their several principles.

Since the totality of the possibilities of any one thing involves other things, or perhaps all things, (in its metamorphoses it will become these successively as it realizes its potentialities) it is evident that natural science will be synthetic and continue to trace out the unity not only of particular things in a common process, but also of entire departments of nature. When science exhausts the potentiality of a thing, or completes its inventory of it, it will possess a definition of the idea of that thing, i. e., its eternal archetype, its essential nature. Within this round of possibilities will circle forever the changes of the thing, and in the definition of its ideal will be revealed the final cause of its whole process. The circle of its potentiality includes the entire circle of its dependence and hence of its moving principles and resulting motion.

Thus the idea must be a self-determining form. This may be regarded as the general point of view of Aristotle, who unfolds it in logical, ethical, æsthetic, physical and metaphysical works. (a) His logical treatises are united in the organon, which discusses single terms, judgments, syllogisms, and their application to the practical use of the intellect. (b) His ethical treatises include an exhaustive discussion of morals, politics, and economics or social science, in which he is more careful than Plato, not to confound the province of the State with that of the family or

civil society. (c) He gives in his "Poetics" the fundamental ideas which are accepted to-day in æsthetical science; to this department belongs also his Rhetoric. (d) His work on Physics is a sort of rational cosmology; his works *De Coelo*, *De Generatione et Corruptione*, on meteorology, on the history of animals, and finally *De Anima*, each make an epoch in the history of science. (e) His work on metaphysics is a sort of history of philosophy and theology combined.

These writings formed the sacred scriptures of human thought for well nigh two thousand years, and their influence is just now greatly on the increase in Germany. Through Aquinas they are immovably fixed in Christian theology.

To give an account of the details of Aristotle's application of his fundamental principle and of his immense inductions would require a book, or several books. Even an outline of them cannot be given here. As their most important bearings will continually recur in later Philosophy (which in one sense is only commentary on Aristotle), such outline is unnecessary. The most important principles in which he has realized the general insight given above, are: (a) the necessary existence of each idea in its reality, as an individual, being either a system of interdependent things or else the soul of an organized, living being. Substance, (*οὐσία*), is therefore not an abstraction, it is concrete and individual; it is the union of matter (*ὑλὴ*) and form (i. e., ideal totality = *εἶδος*, *μορφή*, *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*); it can possess true individuality only because it contains the total of potentialities, and hence is identical under all changes that fall within it; (b) the doctrine of first and second entelechies, or of self-actualizing entities, the first being germinal or rudimentary shapes and the latter being the complete actuality (*ἐνέργεια*); on this distinction is based the doctrine of the immortality of man. (c) The distinction between *νοῦς ποιητικός* as the *actus purus* which makes intellect and will possible, and the *νοῦς παθητικός* (or the activities of sense, memory, phantasy, discursive thought, and the appetites) is so important that all Christendom, with the assistance of Mohammedanism, devoted the best part of two centuries to getting an insight into it.

The Peripatetic school that followed closely the master, included the famous names of Theophrastus, Eudemus, Aristoxenus, Dicaearchus, and others. The most famous commentators on Aristotle are Alexander of Aphrodisias (A. D. 200), Porphyry, (A.

D. 233), Themistius (A. D. 387), Simplicius (A. D. 500), and later, Avicenna and Averroes. Zeno of Cittium (350-258 B. C.) founds the Stoic school, combining Aristotelian logic, Heraclitean physics, and other doctrines derived from the Socratic Schools, into a popular eclectic system whose chief end is ethical; it claims to be a continuation of the Socratic Philosophy. Epicurus (341-270 B. C.) modifies the doctrine of Aristippus and combines it with that of Democritus, founding a system of atomic materialism, whose ethical aim is happiness as the highest good. Pyrrho (360 B. C.), Timon the Sillograph (325 B. C.), Sextus Empiricus (A. D. 200), are important Sceptics, and preserve for us valuable fragments of ancient dialectic. Cicero gives us the results of his Greek studies at Athens and Rhodes—a summary of the school traditions of the time.

3. *Neo-Platonism*.—The last phase of Greek Philosophy exhibits its struggle to define its relation to spiritual religion. The polytheism of Greece had no essential influence upon its Philosophy except the negative one of furnishing the best possible condition for free, untrammelled speculation. Transferred by the Alexandrian conquests in the Orient, Greek thought came necessarily into collision with forms of religion which were substantial inasmuch as they contained the entire spiritual life of their peoples. Alexandria was a kind of focus wherein centred the East and the West. The implicit unity of religion, politics, art, and philosophy, which had been found in the Persian Empire (Parseeism, Judaism, Egyptian Mysteries, &c.,) had to be comprehended and assimilated by Greek Philosophy, now that the West had subdued the East.

First are the Jewish Greek philosophers, of whom Philo (A. D. 30) is the chief; his doctrine of the "Logos" is the first interpretation of the doctrine of divine incarnation. Next come the New-Pythagorean eclectics, foremost of whom is Apollonius of Tyana (A. D. 50). Numenius of Apamea (A. D. 150) elaborates the idea of a Logos. Finally Neo-Platonism transforms the entire fabric of Philosophy, and subordinates it to a new method. Its principle is the transcendence of the Deity. Ammonius Saccas (A. D. 175-250), who was educated in the Christian faith but returned to the Greek stand-point, is the founder of this movement. Among his pupils are Plotinus and the two Origenes (one of them the Christian).

Plotinus (204-269 A. D.), developed the doctrine in a system-



atic form, teaching that the primordial essence, the original unity (*ἔν*), or the Good, is neither reason nor cognizable by reason. From its emanation arises its image, which is the *νοῦς*, or mind, which in its endeavor to behold the One produces its image = the soul. From the latter arises the body, which is the image of the soul. Thus descending through degrees of reflection by means of images, the lowest depth is reached in matter, which is farthest removed from the One. From its theoretical concept, that of emanation, arises its practical doctrine that the business of man is to return to God, from whom he, as a sensuous being, has estranged himself. This return can be accomplished by, first asceticism, secondly by philosophic (discursive) thought, and thirdly by ecstatic intuition, through which the soul unites itself again with God and becomes the One. Porphyry (A. D. 233-304) his disciple, edited and published the works of Plotinus in six Enneads. His own introduction to the Categories of Aristotle is so valuable that it is usually printed with the Organon. It exercised a great influence on the thought of the Middle Ages, a passage from it giving rise to the celebrated controversy of Nominalism and Realism. Jamblichus of Chalcis (A. D. 330) a pupil of Porphyry, founded the Syrian School of Neo-Platonism, and, intoxicated with the influence of Orientalism, posited an absolute One above the already transcendent One of Plotinus. The absolute One was wholly without attributes, not even being the Good, as Plotinus had made it.

With Proclus (A. D. 411-485) who, at Athens elaborated the whole body of Greek Philosophy and gave it the form of his own system, Greek Philosophy ends. His system resembles that of Plotinus, being a descending system of triads. Boëthius (A. D. 470-525), through his *Consolatio* and his translation of a portion of the Organon and his commentary on Porphyry, transmitted almost all that was known of Greek Philosophy by the Christians in the West for several centuries.

#### CHAPTER III. THE PHILOSOPHY IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

1. *Gnosticism*.—Within Christianity, Gnosticism arose in the 2d century, as an attempt to construct a religious philosophy on the Christian basis. The Gnostics investigated the relation of Christianity to Judaism, and next its relations to the Hellenic religions. Valentinus (A. D. 160) was the most important representative of Gnosticism. He connected the doctrine of Christ's incarnation with a system of supramundane Æons (evidently



influenced by Parseeism.) The Nous was the "only-begotten," and from it came the Logos. More and more this doctrine (Gnosticism) became involved with Orientalism, until it degenerated to a form of Magianism, and entirely corrupted practical life. Origen and Clement of Alexandria also strove to assimilate some of the doctrines of Gnosticism.

2. *Orthodoxy*.—After Christianity had assumed a definite form through the action of the Council of Nice, more attention was given to the work of demonstrating its dogmas on philosophic grounds. Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, St. Augustine (A. D. 354–430), Synesius (A. D. 375–430), Æneas of Gaza, Philoponus, and more especially the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, are important names in this connection. In St. Augustine may be found, at least in germ, the entire body of Christian Philosophy and Theology. Christian mysticism is generally based on the writings of the Areopagite, and their translation into Latin by Scotus Erigena in the ninth century gave rise to Scholasticism.

3. *Scholasticism*.—The teachers of the seven liberal arts (*trivium* and *quadrivium*) in the cloister schools of Charlemagne were called *doctores scholastici*—whence the term "scholasticism" as applied to the system of philosophy within the church during the middle ages. The whole ground of the relation between religion and philosophy had to be brought under discussion and the attitude of the church readjusted toward the numerous questions which the new intellectual activity of the time brought forth. Belonging to the first period of Scholasticism which is characterized by the assimilation of Aristotelian logic and Neo-Platonic principles by the doctrine of the church, the most noted names are Johannes Scotus Erigena (843–877), whose translation of *Dionysius* has been referred to, Anselm (1033–1109) the "arch-realist," Roscellinus (1092) the most famous of the early nominalists, Abelard (1079–1142) the so-called "conceptualist," William of Champeaux (1070–1121) Gilbertus Porretanus, (1154) Amalrich of Bena (1206). The disputes between nominalism and realism which arose in this period generally resulted in favor of realism, especially after the time of Roscellinus who had been so bold as to apply the nominalistic doctrine to the dogma of the Trinity and to deny the unity of the Godhead. Only individuals exist really, and a general name has nothing objective corresponding to it but is only *flatus vocis* (an expression of Anselm.) Hence there are three Gods and the Godhead is a mere concept or name without

reality. The Council of Soissons (1092) forced him to recant this doctrine, and nominalism although it continued to exist was silent until William of Occam used it to overthrow all scholastic philosophy in the interest of faith. In Porphyry's Introduction translated by Boëthius (as already mentioned) occurs the passage which occasioned the disputes of nominalism and realism: "whether genera and species have substantial existence or exist solely in our thoughts, whether material or immaterial" he declines to say ("dicere recusabo"). The followers of Plato held the doctrine *universalis ante rem*, (in God), *in re*, (in nature), and *post rem* (in our minds) and this doctrine was endorsed by all the realists while the nominalists or conceptualists taught *universalis post rem* only. Nominalism was closely connected with the rise of independent thinking and the study of nature, but inevitably led to scepticism through the inadequacy of its principle to explain spiritual existences.

The conquests of the Saracens aroused and united Christian Europe for several centuries and finally produced the reaction of the Crusades. In like manner the intellectual activity of the Arabians as it developed in the schools and universities challenged the sluggish intellects of Christendom and incited them to strenuous efforts. The oriental principle of abstract unity in the Godhead which had made its appearance in the early Christian Church and had been finally eliminated by violence after the Council of Nice, made its way through the preaching of Ebionitic Christians in Arabia into a new religion—Mohammedanism.\* A rigid monotheism sprang up and became a menace to Christianity. Its philosophic thinkers quite naturally had a proclivity to adopt the emanation theory and to deny permanence of identity to the individual. In the eighth and ninth centuries and much earlier, Nestorian Syrians lived among the Arabs and introduced a knowledge of philosophy, especially of Neo-Platonism and the system of Aristotle. They translated first into Syriac and later into Arabic the works of Aristotle and of his most eminent commentators. These were used by Alkendi (870) Alfarabi (900) Avicenna (Ibn Sina) (980-1036) Averroes (Ibn Roschd) (—1198) and through their instrumentality Western Europe was impelled again to the study of Aristotle. The unity of system in the Peripatetic philosophy quite fascinated the Arabian intellect already occupied with the same principle in its religion. The great com-

\* (Sprenger: *Das Leben und die Lehre des Mohammad*, Berlin, 1868.)

mentators, Avicenna and Averroes accordingly followed Alexander of Aphrodisias in his interpretation of the *De anima*, and limited immortality to the world-soul which should find its particular existence in individual men, capable, it is true, of cognizing universal ideas through participation in this general intelligence, but who could not survive as individuals the death of the body, inasmuch as the faculties of perception, memory, appetite and reflection (*νοῦς παθητικός*) are corporeal. Christian thought was aroused and it grappled resolutely the question whether any particular individual can be immortal, that is, whether the individual can be universal and particular at the same time. This added to the zeal with which realists combatted nominalism. Is the universal or generic only a fiction of the mind? If it is really existent, is it immanent in or separable from the particular individual? If the latter is the case then individuals are merely phenomenal and there is no immortality, and the whole fabric of Christianity is destroyed at once.

The discussion of these questions was no idle quibbling, as is sometimes supposed, but an altogether serious affair in those days. The Christian dogmas establishing the Trinity, human responsibility and immortality had hitherto been accepted on faith and few thinkers had arisen since the downfall of the Western Empire, with any inclination to follow the direction of St. Augustine and attempt to gain theoretical insight into the dogma. Against pagan religions such as Christendom had encountered in the north and west there was no need of a metaphysical system for there was none to oppose. But with the Moslem came a philosophical system as complete as Aristotelianism and skillfully interpreted in the interests of pantheism. There arose a series of great minds who made it their work to master Aristotle and to interpret him in the interests of Christianity: Alexander of Hales (—1245), Bonaventura (—1274), Albertus Magnus (1193–1280), his pupil Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), and Duns Scotus (—1308). Of these, Aquinas is the greatest, and through him Christian theology gained a consistent, systematic form. Aristotle was thoroughly studied and each portion of his system explained in the light of the whole; he accordingly became the great pillar of the church and was compared to John the Baptist, being "*precursor Christi in naturabilis*."

Roger Bacon (1214–1292) and William of Occam (—1347) did not participate in the prevailing movement—the former being a

great experimental physicist born before his proper time, and the latter being the invincible opponent of the current logical realism and the first nominalist who succeeded in sustaining himself against the current schools. He used his nominalistic arguments against the philosophical basis of realism and not against the dogmas of the church, inasmuch as he denied the authority of reason altogether and proclaimed that of faith. Scholasticism rapidly went down during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

#### CHAPTER IV. MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

1. *Translators and Commentators.*—Upon the downfall of the Eastern Empire many learned Greeks came from Constantinople westward and kindled at Florence and elsewhere the direct study of Plato and Aristotle, thus dispensing with the commentators whose views had been taken hitherto as genuine interpretations. Distinguished translators and original commentators of this epoch were Gemistus Pletho, Bessarion, Ficinus, George of Trebizond, Theodore Gaza, Pomponatius, Scaliger, Zabarella and Melanchthon. The epoch closes with naturalistic opponents of the traditional philosophy of the schools: Nicolaus Cusanus (1401-1464), Jerome Cardan (1501-1576), Telesius (1508-1588), Patritius (1529-1597), Ramus (1517-1572.)

2. *Emancipation from Authority.*—The epoch of emancipation from authority opens with three great names: Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and René Descartes (1596-1650). The first of these, Bruno, developed the doctrine of Nicolaus Cusanus and Copernicus, in an anti-ecclesiastical direction, having quitted the Dominican order. He left Naples for Geneva, and afterwards lived in France and England; after remaining several years in Germany he returned to Italy where he was burned at the stake, after several years imprisonment, by order of the Inquisition. Bruno's system attempts to reconstruct the theory of the world in accordance with the view of Copernicus. His doctrine of monads anticipates much that is found in the system of Leibnitz and his optimism is identical. Lord Bacon's great merit was in his attempt to separate natural science from religion so as to allow the former to develop with freedom. He is the founder of empirical philosophy rather than induction in natural science, although he laid the greatest stress upon the value of useful discoveries. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1624) developed Bacon's principle in the direction of politics, favoring an absolute monarchy. It is somewhat singular that, while he was



an extreme nominalist theoretically, Hobbes should have been a realist in regard to the State, characterizing its generic existence as a "mortal god" and making it the substantial existence and that of the individual only contingent. Descartes completed the emancipation of philosophy from scholasticism by bringing its doctrines to the test of immediate consciousness and throwing off the authority of tradition. His distinction between spirit and matter was so sharp that his followers had much labor to explain their connection. Geulinx held that on the occasion of each act of the will God effects the corresponding motion of the body, and Malebranche explained sense-perception by the doctrine that we see all things in God.

Spinoza (1632-1677) avoided the Cartesian dualism altogether by his one substance which has the two attributes, thought and extension. He excluded all finitude from his substance making all limitation to be negation. In the place of arbitrary free will which had been emphasized so strongly especially by Duns Scotus, he laid great stress on the necessary nature of truth (*sub specie eternitatis*) and excluded all final causes from God. He would seem to deny immortality to man or personality to God by his principle and yet in the fifth book of his *Ethics* he portrays human freedom as intellectual love of God, and makes this love reciprocal. His use of the geometrical method of definitions and axioms shows the influence of the reactionary spirit of the time, which repudiated dogmatic authority and sought the certainty of scientific demonstration.

3. *Empiricism and Eclecticism*.—John Locke (1632-1704) in his "*Essay Concerning the Human Understanding*" attempted to take a critical survey of the power of the mind to cognize truth and thus to determine its limits. The origin of our ideas, is accordingly, his chief theme. Innate ideas he repudiates and makes the mind to be a blank tablet before the activity of sense-perception furnishes it with ideas of the external world. "Knowledge is the perception of the connection and agreement or of the disagreement and repugnancy of several ideas." He adduces a proof of the existence of God and regards the immateriality of the soul as probable. Berkeley (1685-1783) drew out the ultimate consequences of Locke's doctrine in a system of "Universal Immaterialism" denying the existence of the material world as well as of abstract ideas and making (like Malebranche) nature to be a regular succession of ideas called forth by God. Pierre Bayle



(1647–1706) author of the famous pantheistic dictionary, Cudworth (1617–1688) author of the “Intellectual System,” Henry More (1614–1687) Platonist and mystic, Gassendi (1592–1655) reviver of the atomism of Democritus and Epicurus, Grotius (1583–1645) and Puffendorf (1623–1694) writers upon the law of nations—are important names in this epoch. Samuel Clarke (1675–1729) a disciple of Newton and Locke, defended his masters against Leibnitz.

4. *Mysticism or Theosophy*.—German philosophy previous to Leibnitz was chiefly theosophic. The teacher of Thomas Aquinas, and the first to present the entire philosophy of Aristotle in a systematic order, illustrated by Arabian commentary and interpreted in harmony with Christian doctrine, was Albertus Magnus, a Swabian by birth, coming from the same country which afterwards produced Schelling and Hegel. While he taught at Paris or more probably at Cologne, it is supposed that Meister Eckhart of Strassburg (1250–1329) attended his lectures and received the first impulse to that wonderful theosophic speculation which afterwards gave rise to the Rhenish school of mystics, prominent among whom were Tauler of Strassburg (1300–1361), Heinrich Suso of Constance (1300–1365) John Ruysbræk of Grunthal (1293–1381), the Teutonic Knight of Frankfort whose “*Theologia Germanica*” discovered by Luther, gave so much impulse to later mysticism. Thomas à Kempis in the following century (1380–1471) may be mentioned as belonging to this school, and Nicolaus Cusanus of Treves (1401–1464) forms a connecting link between theosophic speculation and the later metaphysics. The profound speculations of Albertus Magnus and Aquinas were popularized and preached at large by Eckhart and his followers. Not content with the limits which had been placed by Aquinas and adopted by the church, distinguishing the dogmas that may be demonstrated from those which transcend human reason, Eckhart boldly pushed his speculations into the dogma of the Trinity, and seizing its expression of the concrete universal (i. e. a unity in different individuals) built upon it a comprehensive system of thought, as elaborate and consistent in its details as the great cathedral begun at Cologne in the year of his birth. In this theosophic system may be found all the cardinal doctrines of the latest bloom of German philosophy or at least their germs. His hearers learned to demand for the intellect its participation in divine doctrines, and a wonderful illumination

appeared in subtle minds—the piety of the intellect was attained. Man not only can will the divine which he receives implicitly as dogma of faith, but he can also think the divine and, indeed, according to Eckhart, he can theoretically become a participator in divine knowledge.

God's personality as revealed in the Trinity is the basis of his system. God's necessity to exist, hence to realize or reveal himself is involved in the fact that He is to be a person and Self-conscious. He makes himself an object to himself, and without this objectivity to himself He would remain a mere abstract possibility of existence, and not be the living God. This self-knowledge unfolds as the Trinity: I. God the father (the subject knowing): II. God the son (object known); III. God the spirit, the return or reconciliation, or mutual reunion. God beholds himself as the real object of his knowledge. Such act of beholding is the creation of the object beheld—it is nature—the world in time and space—the Son eternally begotten. His object as nature exists in externality as separate from Him through this act of diremption involved in knowing. But His act of recognition of himself in it (i. e., in nature) brings out of it the image of himself, i. e., intelligent souls who aspire again to their source, and love and recognize the Father. Thus out of the abyss of God's "not me" involved in his consciousness, arises the creation ascending through all its stages from inorganic matter, plant, animal, to man, in whose immortal soul, gifted with free will and speculative intellect, He sees His own image. Thus the whole universe of stellar systems may be regarded by Eckhart's theory as existent for the evolution of rational souls.

In this bold system he transcended the limits set by the Romanic Scholasticism. For this he was summoned before the inquisition (in 1327) and his doctrines condemned in a bull. To take the chief mystery of theology and expound it as the solution to all problems, could not be allowed by the Latin mind. It savored of Pantheism, from which the church was just then happily escaped through the thinking of Thomas Aquinas. Indeed this interpretation of the Trinity has been generally denounced by theologians, Protestant as well as Catholic, for Pantheism. If, however, one defines Pantheism as the doctrine which denies the personality of its highest principle—setting up for example a blind force, or principle of evolution, or abstract mundane intelligence—then Eckhart's system is not Pantheism. It holds in

fact with all Christian theology that the Absolute is a person, and that the world of nature is his free creation, whose purpose is the production of His image. It is, to use the words of Richard Rothe, the conversion of His pure not-me (or chaos) into a manifestation of Him, and thus the realization of the fullness and blessedness of His own divine being in a creation independent of Him.

But Eckhart held (like Rothe) the existence of an eternal world of ideas in God as well as a temporal world of creatures in time and space. This is essential, moreover, since God's creation of an image of himself were incomplete without a return out of the limits of time and space to pure ideas again. Without the contemplation of pure ideas He would remain beholding His opposite, or the world of finitudes limited and necessitated in time and space. "God has externalized his inmost essence," says Eckhart. "The end of all creatures is to be soul and to cognize God." Theosophy always makes this mystic union of the soul with God the destination of man, and for this reason lays great stress on internal contemplation, and undervalues external forms and ceremonies, which the church is obliged, however, to employ not only for the sake of the non-speculative ordinary minds, but for the reason that it is essential for each man as a denizen of the world to stand in practical relation to his fellow men. This relation involves participation in the common recognition of the Highest, and its celebration through visible spectacles as in the church service. Hence it has happened that Theosophists have been regarded as heretics in their day.

Whatever view may be held of the orthodoxy of Eckhart's system, it is certain that he prepared the way for the Reformation by his ethics, and for the later German Philosophy by his metaphysics.

Holding a similar relation to his time so far as doctrines were concerned, came Jacob Böhme of Gœrlitz (1575-1624) contemporary with Descartes and Lord Bacon, and called *Philosophus Teutonicus*, because, being ignorant of Latin, he wrote in German. Although a poor shoemaker he was one of the subtlest minds that Germany has produced, and numbered among his followers Henry More, John Pordage, Pierre Poiret, and more recently St. Martin, Baader, and Schelling. His insight into the necessity of the negative in the highest principles was his chief *aperçu*. The Absolute should be a spiritual activity, and

hence involve self-opposition, self-determination, self-negation in it. While Lord Bacon proclaimed the English stand-point for modern times, Bøhme proclaimed the German. These two individualities, as different as one may find, agree in this that they both find the content of thinking mind not in the dogma but in concrete being—the former in the world of time and space, the latter in the immediate internal life existing for each man in his own soul. Like Eckhart Bøhme finds in the Trinity his highest principle and the solution of all mysteries. His “chief yea” is the attempt to grasp all in an absolute unity—all antitheses are reconciled in God. The holy Trinity is to be shown in all things and all things are its revelation; all things are by and through it. The universe is to him one divine life and revelation of God in all things, so that from the essence of God is born the totality of all qualities and forces, as the eternally begotten Son who reveals himself in those forces. The internal unity of this light, or divine essence, with the substance of the forces, is the Spirit.

Johann Scheffler (1624–1677) or “Angelus Silesius” (*The Chérubinic Wanderer*) was born the year of Bøhme’s death. He continues the line of mystics, and celebrates in the poetic form of short verses doctrines identical to those of Eckhart and Bøhme. God’s need of his image in man to reflect His essence, and man’s need of God to develop in him His essence. “God loves himself alone, and thus becomes His Other in His beloved Son.” “God’s son has been for aye and yet is first brought forth to-day.” “Thyself maketh the time, its works thy senses be; but checkest Thou their unrest, then thou from time art free;” “I know without me God cannot a moment live; If I to naught should turn, He too would death receive.” His expression of the necessity of God’s image seems quite extravagant unless one attends carefully to the philosophic content of the doctrine, and sees in it only an expression of the doctrine of the Trinity as necessarily involved in the most important of all principles, that of the *Personality of the Absolute*. This is the kernel of all German mysticism and Theosophy. Personality involves consciousness and will, each of these involve self-objectivity or the contemplation of self, and thereby the actualization of self; hence creation as a progressive manifestation of the Absolute from the pure empty externality (time and space or chaos) up to internality—the immortal soul which completes the “Image” of the Absolute, by



reflecting God in its intellect (Truth) and will (the Good). (Schelling's Mysticism and Theosophy will be mentioned later).

Franz von Baader (1765-1841) is a genuine theosophist of the old school. Contemporary with Schelling and influenced by the study of the latter, but more especially by the study of Bœhme and St. Martin, he held that our knowledge is a participation (*consentia*) in the divine knowing. The immanent vital process of God reveals him and in the first place makes him tri-personal; furthermore in his creation he creates and comes into final union with his image which must be distinguished from him in his eternal Selfhood.

In Richard Rothe (1799-1867), theosophy becomes identical with the philosophical movement as developed to its highest form in Hegel.

These are the most noteworthy names among the German theosophists. Attention must be called to the fact that difference of opinion exists as to the definition of pantheism, and that all theosophy may be regarded as pantheism by strict theologians. Hence there is a struggle on the part of educated theosophists to avoid the appearance of pantheism by separating the creation of the world from the self-revelation in the Trinity. This appears even in Eckhart occasioned by his collision with the theology of the church as developed by Thomas Aquinas. It is more clearly manifest in Baader; and in Rothe perhaps we have the clear escape from any tinge of pantheism.

The category of necessity is sometimes not carefully discriminated into internal or logical necessity and external necessity or Fate; and again internal necessity is not distinguished into unconscious self-determination or evolution, and conscious self-determination—freewill. Necessity of efficient causes is Fate, necessity of final causes is freedom. If as Lessing taught, thinking, willing and creating are one and identical in God, then his self-consciousness is his eternal act of creation and creation is inseparable from God, as self conscious Person. But it constrains Him no more than the consciousness of self constrains man and destroys his freedom. Self consciousness is the complete realization of freedom for in it all externality appears as a mere product of the self-activity. Thus two kinds of pantheism may be distinguished, (a) materialistic and (b) theosophic: (a) materialistic pantheism according to this view would include the doctrine which holds God to be a blind, unconscious force vitalizing



nature and thus making conscious being to be merely phenomenal and not essential or immortal. All things would thus originate from an unconscious principle and return to it. (b) But theosophic pantheism is the opposite of the former and holds the first principle to be a self-conscious Person from whom nature eternally proceeds; out of nature proceeds man as a return to the absolute through his thinking and free willing. Thus in the former pantheism fate or blind force is the highest; in the latter, free spirit. The latter is called pantheism solely for the reason that it connects the creation of nature necessarily with God. Those who hold the latter, disclaim the charge of pantheism on the ground that the manifestation of God does not limit Him any more than self-consciousness involves fatalism. God's contemplation of his image is not only a creation of that image but a process of annullment of all inadequateness in the image and hence the process of change and evanescence going on in all the lower forms of nature.

5. *Dogmatism.*—Theosophy becomes metaphysics in Leibnitz, (1646–1716) whom we find holding the same relation to the English and French Philosophers as his Theosophic countrymen had done in earlier times. Leibnitz is usually called the founder of German Philosophy, and certainly in the writings of his follower Wolff, his doctrines became systematized, and held sway down to the time of Kant. Indeed in Herbart's system some of its essential features are revived, and through it a wide school of recent thinkers receives its principles from Leibnitz. His Monadology presents his point of view in sharp and clear outline. Over against the mechanism of Descartes, he sets up the system of monads, which have no mechanical relation to each other, but only the ideal or psychological one of representing each other—each monad mirroring in itself all the others (the entire world of monads appearing in each)—the macrocosm in the microcosm. Thus there is unity and harmony without mechanical constraint, and independent individuality is preserved. In the doctrine of pre-established harmony, the monad of monads appears as God, the absolute person in His relation to the world of souls. Each monad is a potential soul, and unfolds into the highest by its own activity.

In their freedom the individual monads are the image of the absolute monad who in turn recognizes himself in them. This

mutual recognition is the highest principle. Independent existences in complete unity or harmony suggest the idea of the Trinity again, which is evidently the underlying thought in Leibnitz's system, just as it had been the central principle of the theosophic systems of his countrymen. Independent persons and yet one in a mystic sense, is the paradox which when seen in its necessity becomes the luminous principle that explains all. In opposition to the sensism of Locke who holds up the principle of passivity or emptiness of the *Ego* (*tabula rasa*), Leibnitz proclaims the native spontaneity of the intellect and its self-generation of universal ideas. "*Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu*" says Locke. Leibnitz adds "*nisi ipse intellectus*" and founds the principle which through Kant becomes the corner stone of the great structure of the nineteenth century.

Wolff of Breslau (1679-1754) combined into a system the doctrines of Leibnitz with a truly Aristotelian spirit. From his labors arose the Leibnitzo-Wolfian school which prevailed until the advent of the Critical Philosophy. Wolff made the first reduction of philosophy to an encyclopædic form.

6. *Scepticism*.—David Hume (1711-1776) is the point of departure of the chief systems which have appeared during the last hundred years. His most important earlier years were spent in France, and his strongest mental tendencies bear the impress of French culture. Taking the standpoint of Locke that all perceptions are either impressions (of the senses) or ideas, he finds all ideas reducible to copies of sense-impressions, "they are the faint images of such impressions in thinking and reasoning." The idea of cause and effect "is derived from experience, which, presenting us with certain objects, constantly conjoined with each other produces such a habit of surveying them in that relation that we cannot without a sensible violence survey them in any other." His ethical doctrine is that "sympathy of man with man causes the approbation of an action performed in the interest of the common welfare." No inference from empirical data to the nature of the soul or the existence of God is permissible. Hume's influence on English, French and German thought has been immense, and is due to his unparalleled clearness of statement, more than to the essence of his doctrines.

The French philosophy of the eighteenth century was a reaction against church and State. A sweeping movement towards

individualism and scepticism, it rejected all realized forms of reason whether embodied in institutions—the church, the State and civil society—or existing in a systematic form as theology or philosophy. It placed all validity in the immediate judgment of the individual, and private opinion was to have all rights except that of doubting the infallibility of the principle of private judgment. Bayle, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Condillac, Diderot, D'Alembert, Robinet, (who anticipated Darwinism and the Spencerian "evolution"), La Mettrie, and Baron Holbach, individually and collectively attacked every phase of realized intelligence in the interest of the formal freedom of thought. In France this movement culminated in political revolution. Germany participated in it in its own way. Lessing commenced the reaction, and the war for literary independence of France. But the true reassertion of the German principle of thought is to be found in the philosophy of Kant, which contains the French negative principle within it, although annulled and subordinated.

7. *Criticism.*—With Kant (1724–1804) therefore begins the career of the highest phase of German philosophy. Kant pondered the scepticism of Hume, and sought a principle elevated above the dogmatical stand-point and, for this reason, unassailable by scepticism. Armed with this, the Teutonic principle should be triumphant over scepticism and abstract revolutionary protest whether British or French. Indeed it should subsume all negative positions of doubt or scepticism under a higher principle. So great a design was to be the fruition of modern philosophy. On this critical standpoint, securely placed, one shall no longer dread the polemics of shifting systems. Kant essayed to take such an inventory of the possessions and capacities of the mind as would forever set at rest all dogmatic polemics.

Locke's inventory was not exhaustive or trustworthy; he had not sufficient power of inward seeing. Kant pierces the obscurity, and beholds the problem of cognition in its entirety. The mind is both receptive (as regards sensation) and spontaneous or self-active (as regards the origination of its general forms; time, space, the laws of causality and the other general predicates which enable the mind to give unity to the multiplicity of its impressions). Its act of judging, i. e. of predicating, is an act of unifying or bringing a manifold into a unity, and this act is always an act of reflection; that is to say, it is an act of attention, not to an outward object, but to the mental activity by which

feeling, sensation and sense-perception are performed. Sensation or feeling which underlies the perception of objects, is a process and therefore consists of a series, or succession of acts. Consciousness is able to direct its attention upon this succession in its own activity, and thus to unite the elements of it, self-activity being the thread connecting them. Thus in sense-perception there is united a perception of the particular object in the present instant, now and here, with the perception of self (or the thinking activity). The self is the pure Ego—the most general concept possible—inasmuch as it involves the subject underlying all possible modifications of thought. Thus every act of cognition involves the act of reflection, that is to say, the act of self-perception—and this act is the pure spontaneity of the Ego. This self-activity which is thus related purely to itself, is the general condition of every act of knowing. Without it there may be feeling and sensation, or irritability in the organism which may give rise to impulsive reaction, but there can be no cognition whatever of the relations of one object to another, nor consciousness of self. To sum up this doctrine: cognition of relations—hence all generalization, inference or predication—depends upon cognition of self-activity. The existence of the science of mathematics, containing, as it does, truths relating to the conditions of existence which are universal and necessary, furnished Kant the clue to his system. Such *a priori* knowledge of the conditions of existence in the outer world proved incontestibly, in his view, the identity of those conditions with the forms of activity of thinking.

Thus Kant by a critical examination of the mind overthrew at once the entire fabric of systems founded on dogmatic assumptions, or empirical psychology, whether materialistic or idealistic. To the materialists he showed the spontaneity of the mind as the logical condition of any perception whatever of the external world; the mind gets at the external world only through becoming conscious in itself of the conditions (time, space, causality, etc., etc.) of the existence of that world. If these necessary conditions were not part and portion of its own essence, it could not know the world of nature. To the idealists he pointed out the exclusive application of these *a priori* conditions to the content of experience, and demonstrated the futility of attempting to apply the categories of the understanding to anything transcending time and space.

This attitude of Kant towards dogmatic idealism seemed hos-



tile not only toward the Leibnitz-Wolffian and the Cartesian systems, but it also seemed to threaten the basis of theology. For a speculative cognition of God, Freedom and Immortality is denied. All application of the categories to that which transcends experience is forbidden, as productive only of illusion. This is the result of the "Critique of Pure Reason." But in his "Critique of Practical Reason," Kant shows that God, Freedom and Immortality are necessarily postulated by all acts of the Will as "regulative ideas." Just as all experience presupposes an *a priori* activity in the mind, generating the essential conditions of said experience, so every act of the Will presupposes the necessary existence of God, Freedom and Immortality as its logical condition. Although we cannot theoretically establish the existence of these objects which transcend the forms of the theoretic intellect, Time, Space, Causality, &c., yet every act or deed of man asserts them. In this doctrine of Kant the meaning and significance of "theoretical" is limited to the act of subsumption of perceptions ("intuitions") under conceptions ("or categories.") With this definition Kant stands upon solid ground. We cannot perceive immediately objects which transcend the laws of experience. It would destroy these objects to predicate of them quantity, quality, causality, and modality. And yet Kant may be said to have established these objects philosophically. He analyzed the understanding and found it impossible to derive those ideas from it; but a similar analysis of the will discovered them. Surely both of these analytical processes were theoretical. Why then speak of the illusory nature of a knowledge of God, freedom and immortality?

The speculative spirit of Germany, aroused to its utmost intensity by the critiques of Kant, refused to rest satisfied within the barriers which he had set up. The systems of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel followed as attempts to re-adjust the speculative attitude of the mind toward the infinite. Kant's influence penetrated into every realm of thought, and its effects are discernible alike in the materialistic and idealistic systems of the day. Even the greatest work of art of modern times, Goethe's *Faust*,\* portrays the collision of Scepticism with institutions and civilization—the problem that the French Revolution suggested. The result of *Faust's* investigations is that nothing can be known

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\**Jour. Sp. Phil.*, Vol. I., p. 178.



(the conclusion of the Critique of Pure Reason) and he turns in his despair to the Epicurean enjoyment of the world. He finds however practically (second part of Faust) that the institutions of society are all needed (conclusion of the Critique of Practical Reason) and thus learns through his will the postulates that he could not establish theoretically.

Distinguished followers of Kant who were not founders of systems were Reinhold, Schiller the poet, Schultz, Bouterwek, Krug, Tennemann, Buhle and others. Distinguished opponents were Schultze, ("*Ænesidemus*") and Jacobi. From the latter sprang Fries, who blended the doctrines of Kant and Jacobi. The genesis of the Post-Kantian systems may be clearly seen, if one will bear in mind the fact that Kant obtains his transcendental ideas (God, Freedom, Immortality) not through an analysis of the intellect but of the will, and that this may be regarded still as a theoretical analysis. It will result that his followers will lay stress on this point. Since each and every act of the will implies the reality of God, Freedom and Immortality according to Kant, it will be the attempt of later philosophizing to show the presupposition of these ideas under the theoretical activity. For the result of the theoretical investigation is—as Fichte (1762–1814) shows—that all cognition is a self-activity which perceives only its own self-activity. This moreover can easily be derived from the Critique of Pure Reason. Then it follows that the theoretical activity is conditioned by the will, and therefore presupposes the existence of the transcendent objects (God, immortality, &c.) which the will presupposes.

8. *German Philosophy After Kant.* — Fichte's "Science of Knowledge" attempts a strict deduction of the pure intuitions and categories of the mind from the principle of the Ego (self-identity) and under his searching analysis there disappears all that had remained of the sensuous standpoint of empirical psychology as developed by Locke and Condillac, and with it the external world of experience likewise vanishes as something independent of, or co-ordinate with, the Ego. The only objective world left to Fichte is the moral world. Nature almost entirely disappears except as a postulate of morality. As the will becomes all in all, and clear consciousness alone is recognized as valid, the one-sidedness of this system produces the reaction of Schelling (1775–1854) who does justice to the phase of the world wherein unconsciousness still prevails and

wherein the conscious will (morality) has not yet developed. The philosophy of Schelling consequently lays great stress on Art (æsthetics), the philosophy of nature, mythology, religion, and the realms wherein the consciousness of freedom has not as yet fully developed. While Fichte lays stress solely on the world of free, spontaneous activity, and accordingly makes ethics the centre of his system, Schelling is always engaged in tracing the self-evolution of unconscious organism, whether in nature or human history. The centre of his system is therefore Art, wherein the unconscious reaches its completest expression. His method led him to the study of Theosophy, and through him the study of Bœhme was revived.

Schelling's school includes the distinguished Theosophist Baader (as has been already mentioned) and the naturalists Oken, Carus, Oersted, Steffens, Burdach, the theologians Schleiermacher, Eschenmayer, Blasche, Goerres, besides Solger, Stahl the jurist, Schubert the cosmologist, Jacob Wagner, Krause, Esenbeck, and others.

Unconscious evolution is the opposite of conscious method. It was quite natural that Schelling's philosophy should be unsystematic and fragmentary, everywhere throwing deep glances, but nowhere finding the all-connecting thread which is seen only by reflection on self-activity and is the acme of self-consciousness. Hence arose a new philosophy, that of Hegel (1770-1831) which strove to grasp all the content of nature and mind with self-conscious method. He undertook to deal with Schelling's breadth, and reduce it to Fichte's unity and strictness of system. He designed to interpret nature and history in their evolution by means of a corresponding *a priori* deduction or evolution of the ideas of the necessary conditions of reality in time and space. It was only a further development of the logical result of Kant's system.

If the mind's own form (time, space, causality, etc.) is the logical condition of all reality in nature and history, then an *a priori* evolution of these ideas one from another, if found valid and seen to be necessary and universal, will likewise prove to be objective and the law of reality. This is the famous "unity of thought and being" which is not, properly considered, anything paradoxical. For it does not mean that a so-called "mere idea" i. e. a fancy, or mental image, or arbitrary thought, is objective, but only that universal and necessary ideas are objective as well as

subjective, and not only necessities of thought but also necessities of being. Mathematics enunciates the logical conditions of the existence of matter and motion. When a mathematical proposition is demonstrated it is seen to be universal and necessary; in other words to be the necessary condition of all existence in space. Thus the metaphysical ideas of causality, substantiality, force, form, the principle of contradiction, etc., are seen to be logical conditions of phenomena in time and space—the *a priori* thought being the conditioning form of reality. Kant showed that these were the necessary subjective forms of experience and hence of all phenomena that we can know. The entire world in time and space thus necessarily conforms to these ideas. Now of course our psychological evolution of these necessary ideas cannot be other than the evolution of the conditions of existence of phenomena in time and space. A denial of this position can be established only by showing that there are no such universal and necessary ideas, for to admit them is to admit their necessary validity as conditions of reality, and such denial would destroy the science of mathematics. Moreover, it is possible to show that such denial is inconceivable, and that no one can think of the opposite of one of these ideas, although he may frame a denial in words.

One may, after the example of Stuart Mill, deny universality and necessity to the proposition that two and two make four, asserting that it may make five in the mind of some being, thus annulling the principle of contradiction. If two and two make five and "five" is a word signifying one more than four or two more than three, then two and three are made identical and the principle of contradiction destroyed. In fact in the very denial of the objective validity of what is necessary in thought, there is an affirmation of the very thing denied. For in such denial one affirms the objective possibility of existence under other conditions than that enunciated in the necessary idea, and the validity of such affirmation of objective possibility or impossibility is the very thing which he attempted to deny. The old elenchus attributed to Eubulides of Miletus, called "The Liar," is the type of this self-contradictory argument. It asserts a universal negative which annuls even the formal statement in which it is made. To say "No one ever tells the truth" is to make a negative content so general that it contradicts the form of the assertion and thus

proves self-nugatory. If the assertion is true, it subsumes itself and thus contradicts itself.

Hegel traversed the entire ground of his system in his first great work "The Phenomenology of Mind," tracing up the internal evolution of the great phases of human thought as they had appeared in history and showing their connection and logical necessity. He afterwards unfolded this into (a) Logic, or the Science of Pure Thought, unfolding dialectically the definitions and relations of all general ideas such as quality, quantity, difference, form, cause, etc.; (b) Philosophy of Nature including the science of the conditions of reality in the natural world and their application to actually existing things; (c) Philosophy of Spirit or Science of Man as exhibited in human history, including an explanation through the idea of freedom, of all his institutions, family, society and state, and his systems of art, religion and science; together with an account of the obscure phenomena wherein mind still struggles impotently under its physical conditions—sleep, dreaming, somnambulism, insanity, racial characteristics, instinct, etc.; and the relation of consciousness to mere animal life: developing positive grounds for the immortality of the soul.

With Hegel, therefore, German speculation is supposed to reach the point of complete reconciliation with the world and recognition of its forms. It would explain history as the development of conscious freedom; art as the portrayal of it to the senses; religion as the revelation of it in its spiritual relation to the will, the Christian religion being regarded as the absolute form of religion. The whole circle, pure thought, nature, spirit, being embraced in one system, we arrive at a completion of a cycle of philosophy, corresponding to the encyclopædic completeness which Aristotle gave to the science of his time. Subsequent philosophic activity has been partly a popular restatement of the encyclopædic form of Hegel, partly investigation in special spheres in accordance with Hegel's dialectic method or criticisms on the same; partly a return to the stand-points of previous philosophers.

The most eminent of the school of direct exponents of Hegel are Marheineke, J. Schulze, Gans, von Henning, Hotho, Förster, Michelet, Rosenkranz, Weisse, Göschel, Erdmann and Kuno Fischer. A school of psychologists has also arisen which approximates, more or less, in methods the English and Scotch schools of empirical psychology. Its most eminent names are

J. H. Fichte, Wirth, Zeller, Ulrici, Bona Meyer, and Liebmann. Many of these thinkers commenced as adherents of Hegel and afterwards gradually withdrew their assent from his doctrines and assumed positions more or less antagonistic to them.

These three phases of the Hegelian dialectic (*a*) immediate assertion, (*b*) mediation through grounds more or less foreign to the subject, (*c*) self-mediation, through which the transition is made from the previous idea to the more concrete one which follows it—furnish the ground of this divergence. Warm adherents like Strauss and Feuerbach in their first career, dazzled by the penetration of the system into all realms of activity, cling to the dialectic with a sort of faith, and seize it as real objective evolution—a kind of development theory—and do not notice that it exhibits self-annulment of all subordinate ideas and categories in the ultimate and highest one—the idea—which is the notion of absolute self-conscious Personality. Accordingly the whole system is seized as a necessary evolution wherein unconscious impulse or principle plays the most important *role*. Hence with Strauss and Feuerbach a return is made out of the doctrine of the transcendence of conscious spiritual personality to that of Pantheistic genesis and re-absorption of the soul; and the system of Hegel as presented by its author is completely inverted.

Contemporary with Hegel appeared Schleiermacher (1768–1834) Herbart (1776–1841) and Schopenhauer (1788–1860). Schleiermacher (incited by Schelling) attempted to modify the Kantian Philosophy so as to co-ordinate its realistic and idealistic elements. He held the objectivity of the categories and allowed validity to feeling and emotion as of equal rank with conscious intellect. Schopenhauer likewise modified the Kantian doctrine and laid stress on the Practical Reason or the Will as the transcendent object or “thing-in-itself,” underlying phenomena. The theoretical faculty is made by him to be subordinate to the will and a transitory phase of the same. This world is the worst of possible worlds; a true life in it should be one of strict asceticism.

Herbart went back to Leibnitz through Wolff and influenced by Kant and Fichte, produced a subtle system of psychology, partly empirical, partly mathematical, partly metaphysical. His school has been prolific in distinguished thinkers, whose writings present a current of doctrine quite in contrast with the doctrines of the other schools that proceed from the influence of



Kant. Of these Beneke (1798-1854) was the most eminent. He omitted the mathematical and metaphysical phases of the system of Herbart, and added many valuable suggestions on the subject of the disappearance of characteristics of ideas and their reappearance in subsequent ideas, thus throwing light on the unconscious process of thought. With him empirical psychology is the basis of all philosophy and metaphysics. Among the thinkers of the school of Herbart may be counted Drobisch, Exner, Hartenstein, Steinthal, Lazarus, Waitz, Spir, and others.

The study of Aristotle has been revived in Germany to an extent almost as great as among the schoolmen; a circumstance perhaps due to the influence of Hegel, who said that Aristotle was worthy of having a special chair devoted to him in each university. In the lecture courses for the *winter semester*, 1874-5 there are reported in twenty-nine universities of Germany, nineteen special courses exclusively devoted to some work or works of Aristotle, besides numerous courses on ancient philosophy, in which Aristotle constitutes the central figure. Trendelenburg (1802-1872) is the most eminent of this German Aristotelian school, and has founded a system in which Kant's doctrines are modified through those of Aristotle. He adds to the two pure intuitions of Kant—time and space—*motion* as a third pure intuition and therewith attempts to explain the difficult problems of logic and psychology. His attitude towards Hegel is very hostile, especially to the dialectic method. Lotze deserves special mention for his original modifications of the ideas of Leibnitz and Herbart.

The present great struggle of philosophic thought in Germany is to realize in common consciousness the results of the vast systems of thought built up by its great thinkers, and to find a way from all other systems, ancient and modern, to these systems. The immense impulse given to empirical science has had its effect in withdrawing the attention from psychology and metaphysics. From the stand-point of physical science, indeed, have arisen some of the boldest materialists, such as Carl Vogt, Moleschott, and Büchner, whose principle is well summed up by one of them in the statement that "Thought is a secretion of the brain, just as bile is of the liver."

The decay of philosophical systems does not indicate a want of success on their part. The most successful system is the most exhaustive and finished one, and its establishment is fol-

lowed by a certain sense of completeness and security which enables investigators to turn their attention to special provinces, and elaborate them. This specializing tendency (notably following the appearance of Aristotle's encyclopædic system, and following in like manner that of Hegel in Germany) soon carries its devotees far away from the central principle of the system, and produces very distorted versions of it. Thus it is the very perfection of a philosophy that does most to produce divergence among its followers and their successors. This is the explanation of the present aspect of German thought, which seems fast deserting the great system that arose in the first quarter of the present century, and likely soon to lose itself in a multitude of individual points of view, or perhaps to adopt altogether the stand-point of empirical psychology.

#### CHAPTER VI. ITALY, FRANCE, ENGLAND AND AMERICA.

##### (A List of the Principal Philosophers of the Past Century.)

1. *Italy*.—Among the Italian philosophers after Vico (1668–1774) who founded the philosophy of history, are to be mentioned Galluppi (1770–1846) a psychologist influenced by the critical philosophy; Rosmini (1797–1855) founder of a new school of Idealism (also influenced by Kant); Gioberti (1801–1852) a Realist in the scholastic sense of the term, author of a system of ontology internally resembling the system of Leibnitz; Mamiani (1799—) holding the Scottish doctrine of presentative perception and of intuitional cognition of ideas; he is at present editor of *La Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane* (a journal of speculative philosophy) with a corps of co-laborers including F. Bonatelli, A. Franchetti, F. Lavarino, G. Barzellotti, P. Ragnisco, Luigi Ferri and others; A. Vera (1817—) the chief Italian disciple of Hegel has translated many of his works into French and Italian; R. Mariano, B. Spaventa, also Hegelians, Giov. Ventura, the chief representative of the scholastics, Gin. Ferrari the positivist.

2. *France*.—In France, after Condillac (1715–1780) the follower of Locke, Cabanis (1757–1808) the physiological psychologist ("thought is a secretion of the brain"). Destutt de Tracy (1754–1836), Laromiguière developed and modified the system of sensationalism especially by studying the influence of the will in the formation of ideas. Royer Collard (1763–1845) and Maine de

Biran (1766–1824), the former by the introduction of Scotch philosophy and the latter by a subtle psychological analysis, broke the influence of Condillac. Victor Cousin (1792–1867) the eclectic, is the most influential among modern French philosophers. He adopted the principle of Leibnitz, "Systems are true in what they affirm, false in what they deny," and illustrated his views by his writings on the history of philosophy. His disciples, Jouffroy (1796–1842), Janet, Remusat, Ravaisson, Haureau, Damiron and many others have won distinction at home and abroad. The Socialists, St. Simon, Fourier, Leroux, have exerted a wide influence upon the common mind. August Comte (1798–1857), the founder of the Positivist school, holds the evolutionary standpoint, making human thought to pass through the theological and metaphysical stages successively before reaching the highest stage, that of positive science, and laying great stress on the classification of the sciences in the order of necessary evolution (a) mathematics, (b) astronomy, (c) physics, (d) chemistry, (e) biology, (f) sociology; his system has been supported and promulgated chiefly by E. Littré.

3. *Great Britain.*—The history of British philosophy after Hume, is (a) that of reaction through the school of empirical psychology: the Scotch school of Thomas Reid (1710–1796), who set up the doctrine of "common sense" and substituted the doctrine of immediate presentation in sense-perception for that of representation (or perception through ideas). Dugald Stewart (1753–1828), Thomas Brown (1778–1820) and Sir William Hamilton (1788–1856) are the most important disciples of Reid. The last named has exerted a wide influence in Europe and America through his great erudition and his application of it to doctrines of present interest. His doctrine of the quantification of the predicate is claimed as a great discovery in logic; his "law of the conditioned"—that human cognition is equally incapable of seizing the infinitely great and the infinitely small—has been adopted by many thinkers, both in the interest of theology and in the interest of scepticism. (b) The Positivist school of G. H. Lewes, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, who write in an independent spirit, not so much influenced by the method of Comte as by the general spirit of the movement known as Positivism, is predominant in England and America. Its chief psychological doctrines rest on the basis of Locke and Hume, with, in Spencer's system, some tenets borrowed from Hamilton's doc-

trine of the unconditioned. The doctrine of evolution is also much emphasized by this school, and the writings of Charles Darwin have had a wide influence in all fields of scientific investigation in Europe and America. (c) The influence of Coleridge and Carlyle in promoting the cultivation of a more spiritual tendency in speculative and moral philosophy, should be noted. Recently an able school of thinkers has appeared, largely influenced by a study of German philosophy, and many of them are translators and interpreters of that philosophy, especially the system of Hegel. T. H. Green, editor of Hume's philosophical works; B. Jowett, translator of Plato; William Wallace, translator of Hegel's Logic; J. F. Ferrier, Henry Sidgwick, J. Sibree, Robert Flint, S. H. Hodgson, G. C. Robertson and others are to be named. A periodical, "Mind," a quarterly devoted to psychology and philosophy has been started. J. Hutchinson Stirling, the translator and expounder of Hegel ("The secret of Hegel") has given a strong impulse to the study of that great thinker.

4. *America*.—American Philosophy counts Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) as its first representative. He was the founder of New England Calvinism, and is chiefly known for his treatise on the will. Timothy Dwight, N. W. Taylor, H. P. Tappan, Chas. G. Finney and others, have discussed the results of his system with especial view to theology. The so-called "transcendentalist" school in America arose partly from the study of Kant and his followers and especially through the study of Coleridge—who was made known in America through the efforts of James Marsh. R. W. Emerson, A. B. Alcott, Margaret Fuller, Theodore Parker and J. F. Clarke were active in founding this school. George Ripley, one of the editors of *The Dial* (1842) was instrumental in introducing Cousin to his countrymen, and the eclectic system became widely popular, and has exercised a great effect upon literary and philosophic thought here, down to the present time. O. A. Brownson, first a disciple of the eclectic system, became a profound student of Aquinas, and for many years conducted a journal in the interest of Catholicism and its school of modified scholasticism. Cousin has found other translators and expounders in C. S. Henry, O. W. Wight and Asa Mahan. Noah Porter, author of "The Human Intellect," has discussed in a temperate spirit all of the great problems of Philosophy from the standpoint of modern empirical psychology. James McCosh, the ablest of the representatives of the Scotch Philosophy, has pub-

lished "Intuitions of the Mind," and an "Exposition of the Scottish Philosophy." L. P. Hickok, with great originality and depth of speculative insight, has written various works bearing upon rational psychology and cosmology, following in the main the direction of Kant, but adopting a positive attitude in his conclusions. "The Nation," a work on the philosophy of politics, by E. Mulford, and "The Science of Thought," a work presenting the Hegelian method of treating logic as a system of psychological ontology, by C. C. Everett, give the essential views of the Hegelian school in the form of original able elaborations. A. E. Kroeger has translated and published many of Fichte's works. Tayler Lewis in his studies upon Plato, Mark Hopkins in his moral theories, R. G. Hazard in his profound investigations of the Will, Francis Bowen in his critical expositions of logic and the systems of Cousin and Hamilton, W. D. Wilson in his metaphysical theories, Joseph Haven in his text books on mental and moral philosophy, are widely known and appreciated.

The most noteworthy writers on the History of Philosophy are the following: Stanley (date of his work 1655), following closely Diogenes Laertius; Bayle (*Dict. Hist. et Crit.*, 1697); Brucker (1767—his work was abridged by Enfield, 1791); Tiedemann (1797), from the stand-points of Leibnitz and Locke; Buhle (1804-5), a Kantian; Tennemann (1819), also a Kantian; Reinhold (1830); Ritter (1838); Hegel (1842); Schwegler (1848—his work has been translated into English by J. H. Seelye, N. Y., 1856, and J. H. Stirling, Edinburgh, 1867); Erdmann (1834-1866); J. H. Scholten (1861); Cousin (1828); G. H. Lewes (1846); Zeller (1844-69); Kuno Fischer (1854-76); Luigi Ferri (1868).

Periodicals devoted to Speculative Philosophy are (1), *Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik*, published at Halle; (2), *Philosophische Monatshefte*, published at Leipsic; (3), *Die Neue Zeit*, published at Prague; (4), *La Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane*, published at Rome; (5), *Mind*, a Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy, published in London; (6), *Revue Philosophique*, published in Paris.

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## HEDONISM AND UTILITARIANISM.

BY JOHN WATSON.

A theory of conduct is, or ought to be, the exact counterpart and reflection of a theory of knowledge. The recognition that all known objects are constituted by relations to a Reason that, however it may change, always remains at one with itself, is already by implication the complementary conception that all human actions are originated by the self-same unchangeable Reason. The indirect proof of either view lies in the self-contradictions that dog the footsteps of the theorist who tries to explain the simplest object of consciousness, or the least important act, without having recourse to the conception of an originaive Intelligence. And as human error is to be explained, not as the absence of rational elements, but as a misapprehension of the mutual relations of those elements, so human guilt consists in self-identification with an object that Reason declares to be incompatible with itself. Thus knowledge and virtue, ignorance and vice, fall into their places as component parts of one comprehensive structure. Nor is the close fellowship of metaphysical and ethical speculation less evident when the work of Reason is overlooked, than when it is appreciated. Hedonism is as inseparable from Sensationalism as soul from body: the denial in the sphere of knowledge of the originaive activity of thought, leads directly in the realm of action to the negation of absolute moral distinctions. If Thought is purely formal, having no higher task than that of arranging in an arbitrary order a material passively apprehended by it, Will must in like manner move this way or that, as the pleasure imagined to be most preferable impinges upon it. But the correspondence is still more exact. Sensationalism as a philosophical theory exists in virtue of its attempted reduction of all objects of knowledge to individual feeling. The supposed improvement cannot be proceeded with, for unrelated feelings, as they cannot be known at all, are not capable of being made a basis of operation from which the reality of knowledge shall be overturned and the illusion of knowledge put in its place; but the impotence of the attempt may be concealed by the fiction of self-association, granted to feeling by a pure act of

mercy. Experience has thus to be explained as, primarily, the drifting together and coalescence of stray impressions under the guidance of chance, and, secondarily, as the suggested sequence of an object seemingly permanent and stable, but really fleeting and evanescent, upon the consciousness of one of the single impressions constituting it. Volition will therefore, by parity of reasoning, be the association of one feeling with another that has been suggested by a group of feelings already formed, and action a re-arrangement of one or more such groups. The parallelism of Sensationalism and Hedonism is therefore complete. As knowledge is a sequence of individual sensations, so action is the customary association of individual feelings of pleasure. The order of succession is indeed reversed, the group in the one case going before and in the other coming after; but this makes no essential difference, as in either case nothing is ostensibly admitted but a succession of individual feelings. It is evident however that, taken strictly, Hedonism does not account for morality any more than Sensationalism for knowledge. For if action is the invariable association of feelings, no other course except that actually followed is possible. Hence, just as the Sensationalist identifies momentary sensations with permanent and self-identical objects, under the disguise of "facts of experience," in order to explain the possibility of a science of nature, the Hedonist speaks of "Happiness," which really involves universal relations to self-consciousness, as if it were synonymous with pleasurable feeling, and in this way apparently accounts for a right and a wrong in conduct. And, again, as happiness may be conceived either as an end which the individual pursues with a view to his own satisfaction alone, or as that which he regards as best for the community of which he forms a part, Hedonism may, to adopt the terms of a recent writer,\* be either Egoistic or Universalistic. It is more particularly upon the latter form of the theory, usually called Utilitarianism, that we propose to make a few remarks; although what we have to say will apply with equal force to the fundamental position of the former.

Universalistic Hedonism, or Utilitarianism, maintains that "right and wrong, as well as truth and falsehood, are questions of observation and experience."† If this only meant that man

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\*Sidgwick: "Methods of Ethics."

†J. S. Mill: "Utilitarianism."

in a primitive state—the so-called “state of nature”—is destitute of moral ideas, and that these are slowly and gradually developed by the interaction of social forces, no reasonable objection could be made. But much more than this is intended. Some courses of action, it is implied, give rise to pleasurable feelings varying in intensity; others to different degrees of pain. Every man naturally desires to have as much pleasure and as little pain as possible; and hence virtue is but another name for conduct that is fitted to produce a maximum of pleasure. Reason, therefore, as it does not originate feeling but only contemplates it when originated, has nothing to say to the rightness or wrongness of an act. No act is in itself, and apart from the pleasure or pain it is calculated to produce, either virtuous or vicious. The only thing that is or can be desired is pleasure; the only thing towards which an aversion is felt is pain; and right conduct is that which, upon the whole and irrespective of the amount of pleasure or pain experienced by the individual actor, tends to an overplus of pleasure; wrong conduct that which results in an excess of pain. The truth or falsehood of Utilitarianism, therefore, depends upon its competency to account for morality by a mere calculus of pleasurable feelings, without the introduction of elements that feeling in its purity excludes. The choice is not, as it is usually represented to be, between the derivation of moral conceptions from Experience, or their foundation in Intuition; on the contrary, it may easily be shown that these rival methods, however they may pretend to differ, are at bottom beset by essentially the same imperfection. Both alike deny to Reason any share in the constitution of objects; for although Utilitarianism affects to obtain all moral distinctions from experience, while Intuition claims that right and wrong are given in an immediate judgment, still the former resolves experience into a series of feelings, and the latter has no test to apply save the variable convictions of individuals. To make good its right to exist, Utilitarianism must be able to show, not merely that moral conceptions have grown up in time, and that the virtuous man adopts as his rule of life the good of his kind, but that an ethical system may be raised upon a purely Hedonistic basis. It has to be proved that, in the words of Bentham, “pleasure is in itself a good; nay, even setting aside immunity from pain, the only good: pain is in itself an evil, and indeed, without exception, the only evil:”

and that, consistently with this fundamental postulate, legal, moral and social relations can be accounted for.

Right conduct, then, we are to suppose, is that which tends to produce the "greatest happiness altogether." "Happiness," in the mouth of the Utilitarian, does not of course mean a conceived end of action, pursued from its adequacy to satisfy the rational nature of man; it is simply a synonyme for a sum of feelings—"pleasure and freedom from pain," as Mr. Mill says. "Greatest happiness" will therefore be the largest sum of pleasures that can in any way be obtained. Are we, then, in weighing pleasures against each other to take note only of their *quantity*? or are we to regard the *quality* of a pleasure as an essential ingredient in the estimate? The latter alternative is openly or tacitly adopted by all Utilitarians; and indeed it is impossible to see how universalistic, can otherwise be distinguished from egoistic Hedonism. Mr. Mill at least is of opinion that "it is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some *kinds* of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone." The "absurdity" we willingly concede; the "compatibility" we deny. For if the sole end of right action is the production of a maximum of pleasure, it is manifestly of no importance *how* the pleasure is obtained; not the means employed but the end achieved is important. "All desirable things," as Mr. Mill tells us, "are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the prevention of pain." But after the exclusion of everything except pleasure and pain, nothing is left as residuum except feeling as experienced by the individual subject of it. Now, feeling as it is to the individual is not transferable: no man can experience the feelings of another. When therefore we are told that the true end of action is the production of the greatest amount of pleasure to men in general, the conception thus suggested is that of a number of isolated individuals, each of whom is the single subject of feelings that can be felt by no one but himself. Thus understood, the pleasurable feelings which have to be measured against each other, are transient states of consciousness momentarily changing upon the subject of them. Can we, then, say that pleasures or pains, as mere feelings, differ from each other in quality? The pleasure incidental to the sat-

isfaction of appetite, in so far as it is a feeling, is taken out of relation to a permanent subject, and therefore appetite cannot be conceived as it might otherwise be, as the means of preserving life. All that can be said of one such pleasure as compared with another is that it is more or less pleasant. Does the pleasure arising from the realization of one of the higher desires differ in kind from a pleasure of appetite? The satisfaction I derive from the consciousness of being an owner of property is no doubt of a different quality from that which attends the gratification of my lower needs, if I am allowed to think of property as a means of developing my nature, and of bringing me into beneficial relations with my fellow men. But by the introduction of such conceptions, an element altogether different from the momentary feeling of pleasure I experience is introduced. Excluding all the relations which constitute the peculiarity of the feeling of proprietorship, and contemplating it simply as a transitory state, nothing can be said of it that is not equally true of the satisfaction of animal appetite, except perhaps that it is a pleasure of greater intensity. In the same way, not to multiply instances, the pleasure connected with any social affection, such as benevolence, does not differ except in quantity from the pleasure incidental to the gratification of appetite, or the pleasure derived from the possession of wealth. Hence the Utilitarian is not entitled to suppose that pleasurable feelings differ in their "intrinsic nature." It is only by investing feeling with relations of thought incompatible with its transiency—by covertly bringing back the conditions of it which are ostensibly excluded—that generic differences can be predicated of one feeling as compared with another. To say that one feeling differs from another in kind, is to employ language the self-contradictory character of which is concealed because pleasure as a momentary feeling is confused with a determinate object, conceived as fitted to satisfy a rational being. The assertion that intellectual pleasures are higher than bodily pleasures, carries conviction with it only because the one class is regarded as more compatible with the higher nature of man than the other. The man, it is implied, who seeks to satisfy himself with the pleasures of sense, is either ignorant of, or wilfully ignores the higher gratification he might obtain through the exercise of his intellectual faculties. But here the data from which a generic difference is inferred, are not mere feelings of pleasure, but pleasure as related to a being who "looks before



and after," and whose rational nature will not be cheated by an object utterly inadequate to it. When Mr. Mill tells us that "it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied;" he carries our sympathies with him at the expense of his own consistency. For, unless in the fact that a human being converts momentary feeling into an object of thought, how does he differ from the pig that finds its complete satisfaction in a sufficiency of "pig's-wash and ground barley?" and wherein is the fool inferior to Socrates except in identifying his highest good with objects incompatible with his own ideal nature? The Utilitarian has thus to face the dilemma: either pleasures differ only in quantity, or pleasure is not the true end of action. To accept the second alternative is to admit that action is not based upon feeling at all, but upon that which at once includes and transcends it, and therefore to admit the failure of Utilitarianism to account for morality. The question now to be considered is, therefore, whether quantitative, any more than qualitative, distinctions belong of right to individual feelings of pleasure.

Right conduct may now be defined as that which produces the greatest quantity of pleasure that, by any method of distribution, can be obtained by a given number of persons. This quantity may be either extensive or intensive; but as extensive quantity is manifestly reducible to a succession of momentary feelings of indistinguishable intensity, it will only be necessary to consider how pleasures differ from each other in degree. Now the assumption that pleasures and pains may be separately summed up and a balance struck between them, implies that each feeling has a fixed and unchanging quantity, that admits of being expressed in numerical symbols. But is anything more evident than that the quantity of pleasures or pains is not definite but infinitely variable? Are the pleasures of appetite greater or less in degree than the pleasures arising from the operation of the intellect, or from the exercise of the affections? The question must be answered by each individual for himself. The epicure receives intense pleasure from a rare vintage; to the man of frugal habits one wine tastes as pleasantly as another. The connoisseur feels a keen delight in listening to the successful performance of the music of a master; the man to whom a fine ear and a cultured taste have been denied is better pleased to hear some simple melody. There is therefore no fixity in the quantity of pleasure

or pain when we compare together men differing in natural or acquired characteristics. But neither is pleasure unvarying in the same individual at different times. The intensity of a pleasure changes with one's bodily or mental state: that which in a healthy condition of mind or body gives intense delight, will in sickness or mental prostration produce pain rather than pleasure. Pleasures and pains are, therefore, *per se* not constant quantities. But this is simply another way of saying that as feelings they have no quantity whatever. The only way in which the intensity of a pleasure can be determined at all is by bringing it into relation with the circumstances and conditions under which it originates. We cannot say: "Intellectual pleasures are superior in intensity to bodily pleasures," without adding the qualification, "to the man who values the one more than the other." If we are consistent in excluding all relations of thought, we can only express the quantity of a pleasure or pain by the tautology: "This feeling has the degree of intensity which it has." Pleasurable feelings having no quantity, it is absurd to speak of a sum of pleasures. But even supposing that pleasures and pains were individually as definite in quantity as they are variable, we should not be one whit nearer to the ideal "greatest happiness" the Utilitarian requires to have granted to him. For however exact and constant may be the amount of each feeling taken by itself, no synthesis of feelings can take place so long as no element but feeling is introduced. Each feeling perishes in the moment of its appearance, and passing from consciousness ceases to be available as a unit in the feigned sum of feelings which Utilitarians assume. The only way in which feelings can be comprehended in one sum is by being related to a permanent subject of them, and so related, they are transmuted by the alchemy of reason and come forth as universalized feelings, i. e., as a conceived object, with which a rational being may be supposed without contradiction to identify himself. A particular feeling cannot be judged of without ceasing to be particular; and it is only by the unwarrantable confusion of pleasure as a mere feeling with an object that gives satisfaction because it is, rightly or wrongly, conceived as calculated to satisfy one's spiritual nature, that Utilitarianism seems at first sight so convincing, but is really so inconclusive. Examples of this identification in the writings of its representatives are abundant, but one instance may suffice. When a difficulty arises as

to the relative quantity of two pleasures, Mr. Mill tells us that "the judgment of those who are qualified by a knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final." Here the contrast between pleasure as feeling, and pleasure as an object of thought, is so plainly implied that he who runs may read. Mistake as to the quantity of a pleasure is admitted, and a comparison of various feelings is stated to be required before the doubtful quantity can be determined. But, as any one who is careful in the use of his terms at once sees, the intensity of a feeling of pleasure or pain can neither be increased nor diminished: its *esse*, as Berkeley said, is *percipi*. When therefore an appeal is made from the narrower experience of one person to the wider experience of another, the implication is that pleasures can be said to have a definite quantity, or indeed any quantity whatever, only as they are fixed by relations to each other and to a self-consciousness that is present to all alike. The same tacit assumption of relations of thought is of course implied in the appeal in the last resort to "the majority;" for if this only meant that a greater number of persons are the subjects of some feelings than of others, it might reasonably be doubted whether the feelings of the minority were not the more correct criterion of the two. The only reason that can be given for accepting the judgment of the majority is the greater probability of a fuller and more accurate comparison having been made. But fullness and accuracy have no meaning when applied to mere feelings; each feeling is to the individual exactly what it appears to be, and as no feeling can repeat itself, a comparison of feelings that shall exclude rational elements is a manifest contradiction. The decision of the majority may be accepted as a rough test of the value of different courses of action—although a thing is not made right merely because it has a preponderance of votes in its favor—but only because that decision is more likely to be in accordance with the demands of reason. The quantity as well as the quality of feelings being therefore a fiction, no further refuge now remains in which the Utilitarian may conceal the self-contradictory character of his theory. This conclusion will be strengthened and enforced by a comparison of the principle of "greatest happiness" with the conception of Duty, which every ethical system must account for on pain of extinction.

The conception of right and wrong in conduct implies the op-

position of what *is* and what *ought to be*. Any explanation of human conduct that omits the notion of moral obligation fails at a vital point, and, however plausible it may be, is beset by some radical imperfection. Could the notion of duty have originated at all, upon the supposition that pleasurable feeling is the sole end of action? We are not forgetting that the pleasure of which the Utilitarian speaks is the greatest pleasure altogether, and not the maximum of pleasure which any individual may secure for himself. The distinction is of the highest importance; but it has no force in the present connection, unless there is first established, without the introduction of any element save feeling, such a radical divergence in the character of different acts as shall warrant the opposition of moral and natural. Now, as has already incidentally appeared, the Utilitarian is bound to conceive the aggregate of individuals among whom a supposed sum of pleasures has to be divided, as independent atoms: no man can have another's feelings because no man can be another. The volitions, therefore, of each separate individual are determined by what is to him most preferable. As all Hedonists are forward to tell us, the will is always governed by motives, and the motive which prevails is the desired pleasure which seems strongest. If the "strongest desire" is but another name for that which is preferred, we have the perfectly innocent affirmation: "A man always prefers what he prefers;" a proposition it can be no one's interest to dispute. Nevertheless, this barren truism is sometimes put forward as if it were a most important discovery. Thus Bentham tells us that "there is no such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad one;" a remark which he expands by saying that even when "a man's motive is ill-will, malice, envy, or cruelty, it is still a kind of pleasure that is his motive." This seems to amount to no more than the assertion, that a man never prefers what he does not wish; which may be at once granted, the important and only important point being, whether the motive to all actions is a feeling of pleasure or an object constituted by reason. The Utilitarian is bound to adopt the former alternative, and as a matter of fact all Utilitarians do adopt it. The relation of desire and volition will therefore consist in a peculiar kind of transition from one feeling to another. The feeling imagined to be the most pleasant is the most pleasant, for a feeling exists only as it is felt. No matter, therefore, what the feeling may be, it is the only one the individual is capable of having.



That which he actually does, and that which he ought to do, are synonymous; or rather the distinction of an "ought" from an "is" can never present itself at all. Granting, then, that a man may make the production of the largest sum of pleasure upon the whole his motive of action, his conduct will not for that reason be in the least degree more praiseworthy than that of the man who acts from the most selfish of motives. The only way in which the feeling of another can become a motive of action is by being imagined as the most pleasurable of a number of competing feelings present to the doer of the act. But this does not make conduct so determined moral, the individual being incapable of acting otherwise than he does. He cannot be unselfish any more than selfish, virtuous any more than vicious; such distinctions have here no meaning whatever. Nor is this conclusion avoided by saying that the actions of men can be improved by the influence of public opinion, education or punishment being brought to bear upon them. This may account for an alteration in conduct, but it does not make it moral. For as such influences can only operate upon the self-enclosed individual by increasing or diminishing the intensity of certain feelings, the latter state of the man will be in no way superior morally to the first: volition will still follow the pleasure imagined to be most desirable just as before. When, therefore, Mr. Mill tells us that "men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it to be less valuable," he states a fact which, just because it is undeniable, overthrows the supposed derivation of morality from purely Hedonistic principles. As objects of desire there is no difference between "nearer" and "remoter good," when by "good" we are to understand imagined pleasure; for as imagined every pleasure is present. And as that which makes one pleasure "less valuable" than another is its inferior intensity, which is never different from what it appears to be, we are not entitled to speak of "infirmity of character" in a morally depreciatory sense. Conversely, neither the hero nor the martyr is entitled to moral approbation, since the motive that actuates him is that which to him is the greatest pleasure of which he is at the time capable, even though it be a pleasure that the majority of men would not in like circumstances feel.

Strange as this conclusion may seem to be, it is deliberately adopted by eminent Utilitarians. Thus Mr. Mill, following Ben-



tham, says: "The morality of an action depends entirely upon the *intention*—that is upon what the agent *wills* to do. But the motive, that is the feeling which makes him will so to do, when it makes no difference in the act makes none in the morality." At first sight this seems to be an unqualified affirmation that morality lies entirely in the act, apart altogether from the relation of the act to the doer of it. But upon looking more closely we see that this cannot be what is meant. It will not be held that the soldier or public executioner is deserving of moral reprobation for the mere fact of destroying a human being's life, although the act in itself does not differ from willful murder. We are to consider the "intention," i. e., whether the deed is attributable to a given person, or is something with which he has nothing to do. But the mere fact that an act is *mine* does not make it either right or wrong; and when we ask how the act has come to be mine, the only answer we can get from the Utilitarian is that it follows the strongest desire. Thus we come back to the old difficulty, that the act is determined by the most pleasant feeling, and the feeling is not under the control of the agent. There can therefore be no propriety in saying that a given act is mine, if by this is meant that I am responsible for it; take away the motive and you at the same time destroy the act and therefore the intention; alter the motive and you also alter the intention. It does not seem, then, that the mere distinction of motive and intention will account for the rightness or wrongness of actions. And in fact Utilitarians virtually admit as much when they judge of the morality of actions by the amount of pleasure they are fitted to bring to the majority. While an act must be done intentionally before it can have any moral value, it is further required that it should be in itself of a nature to produce the greatest happiness of the community. What, then, is the nature of the connection between an act and its consequences? The Utilitarian, excluding all relations of thought, is bound to hold that it is simply a uniform sequence between feelings. As, however, feelings cannot associate themselves, any order among feelings and therefore any uniformity is inconceivable; and hence we are compelled to have recourse to relations constituted by thought. To determine that an act is moral, we must view it, on the one hand in relation to the doer of it, and on the other hand in relation to the effects it is fitted to produce upon others. Here, therefore, we have introduced the complex relations implied in

the reference of an act to a permanent self that is in essential relation with other permanent selves; we have in short gone entirely beyond individual feelings and based the notion of morality upon reason. It is unnecessary to show in detail that the same result is reached by considering the "disposition" or "character" of a person. If no element save feeling is introduced, the distinction of a good and bad disposition becomes meaningless, since by disposition must in that case be understood, simply the way in which feelings are accustomed to follow each other in consciousness—a thing over which the individual has no control. Only in relation to a universal self can we speak of character or disposition at all; and if, as we are told, a good disposition is that "bent of character from which useful actions are likely to arise," we come as before to appraise acts as right or wrong only as they are related to a self-conscious being, who may identify his own good with that of others. This conclusion will perhaps appear more evident by now changing our point of view. Having inquired what meaning morality has for the individual, upon the supposition that the end of action is the greatest happiness of all; let us now ask upon what grounds the Utilitarian maintains that a maximum of pleasure is the true end of action, when it is granted to him that each individual is ruled solely by the desire of pleasure—in other words, what is the proof of Utilitarianism.

"No reason," says Mr. Mill, "can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it attainable, desires his own happiness. Each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness therefore a good to the aggregate of all persons." The inference here is from what men actually do desire to what they ought to desire. It therefore carries its own condemnation with it: for there is no passage from what is to what ought to be without the introduction of some intermediate conception to bridge over the gap. Upon examination, this "proof" will be found to be either tautological or self-contradictory, or a truism, according as we interpret the ambiguous term "happiness." If by the happiness each person desires is to be understood "greatest happiness," it is a tautology; for—waiving altogether the objection that there is such a thing as selfishness—if each man desires the happiness of the community, it is an identical proposition to say that all men desire it. Perhaps, however, by "happiness" is meant one's

own pleasure irrespective of, and even in opposition to, the pleasure of others. This again is palpably untrue, and it is negatived by Mr. Mill himself, when he cites the hero and martyr as instances of men who voluntarily do without happiness, "for the sake of something which they prize more than their individual happiness." But supposing it true, we have then the inference that because each man seeks his own pleasure, he should not seek his own pleasure; that universal selfishness is a proof of universal unselfishness. Finally, if "happiness" is to be identified with the degree of satisfaction that accompanies or rather constitutes desire, we fall into a truism. Yet this must be what Mr. Mill means when he says that "desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same phenomenon; to desire anything except in proportion to the idea of it as pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility." As "desiring a thing" means simply the feeling of desire, it must be granted that the desire is proportionate to the pleasure, simply because the desire and the pleasure are one: no matter what the desire may be, it must be pleasant, for the sufficient reason that it is desire. If therefore the statement that "each one desires his own happiness" is only the truism that every desire involves an imagined satisfaction, no proof that the "greatest happiness" ought to be desired can be extracted from it. It would seem, then, that, interpret "happiness" as we please, so long as we assume it to be identical with pleasurable feeling, no reason can be given why a man ought to seek the "general happiness." Mr. Sidgwick attempts to escape this difficulty by saying that "the fact that 'I am I' cannot make my happiness intrinsically more desirable, more fit to be accepted by my reason as the standard of right and wrong in conduct, than the happiness of any other person." But does "the fact that 'I am I,'" make my happiness *less* desirable? Can any reason be given, from the nature of pleasure alone, why I should forego my own pleasure merely in order that the pleasures of others should be increased? Unless it can be shown that, when a conflict arises between individual and general happiness, the pleasures of others ought to be preferred, it is morally a matter of indifference which alternative I adopt. The mere universalizing of pleasure does not in any way alter its essential nature; and unless there is something in the abnegation of individual pleasure which renders it moral,

proof of the superiority of unselfishness over selfishness is impossible. Such proof can only be given by a theory which is based upon the negation of individual feeling. Not that all morality is comprehended in the Stoic's contempt of the natural desires: the mere negation of passion does little more than explain the abstract notion of duty, the essential presupposition of right action. But even to account for the initial conception of morality is more than Hedonism in either of its forms can do, unless allowed to make assumptions it is incompetent to verify. If it were possible for a human being to be what he is, and yet to go on, without let or hindrance, gratifying each impulse as it arises, it is inconceivable how the most rudimentary moral conception should ever shape itself in his consciousness. But because he is higher than any of his desires, the perceived inadequacy of an object to satisfy the claims of his reason may become to him the beginning of spiritual life. The man who prefers intellectual or æsthetic pleasures to the evanescent pleasures of sense, has perceived the unsatisfactoriness of one of two courses open to him, as a means of satisfying his universal nature; and in so far as he consciously sacrifices the lower, he has begun that process of self-abnegation that repays itself a thousand-fold in a fuller and deeper life. The relation is essentially the same when the social affections come into collision with the self-regarding impulses. No one can be conscious of selfishness without at the same time perceiving that the uncontrolled pursuit of his own pleasure conflicts with the reasonable claims of others; no man can be unselfish until he recognizes that, if he only chose to give way to the promptings of his unregenerate feelings, he might throw off the burden of obligations heaped upon him by the higher needs of others. Here the moral tie lies not merely in identification with others, but in a surrender to the faith that is in him, that a universal end will best realize his universal nature. Such a universalization of feeling by negation of immediate impulse creates a new and fairer world, from which an infinity of spiritual relations emanate. The "greatest happiness of the greatest number" may be defined to be the end of action, if it means that the noblest are those who count no individual feeling dear to them, provided they win their true place in the Universe, and be found to have the likeness not of the natural man, but of the spiritual. But Utilitarianism will not give itself up freely and unreservedly to this faith; it coquets, now with Hedonism, and now with Spir-



itualism; refusing to give up untransformed feeling, and yet unwilling to let reason go. It cannot even be defined without contradiction; for a "universalistic" Hedonism is as unthinkable as a complex atom. It falls into compromise—the unpardonable sin in philosophical speculation. Like those worldly saints who keep one eye on heaven and another on earth, it makes friends with the mammon of unrighteousness even while professing to have a soul scornful of all things base.

The application of the Greatest Happiness principle to the sphere of subjective morality does not at once do violence to the convictions of mankind. There is one sphere, however, where the contradiction inherent in Utilitarianism comes clearly to the surface. The absoluteness of the moral obligation to respect the rights of others has so strongly impressed itself on the human mind, that a shock is felt the moment it is hinted that the conception of Justice is resolvable ultimately into a desire for the general happiness. It is usually assumed that those acts classed as just differ in essential nature from those that are only expedient; being right in their own nature, quite irrespective of any consequences they may have. A contrast so decided the Utilitarian cannot admit, without giving up the derivation of morality from a calculus of pleasurable feelings; and hence the necessity of a special explanation of the conception of justice. Mr. Mill devotes a whole chapter to this topic; attempting to reconcile the apparent infinity of the claims of justice with the asserted origin of it in the desire of general happiness. His efforts are directed to the end of showing that the supposed difference in kind between acts of expediency and acts of justice is really a difference of degree, subjective necessity being confused by the influence of well-known laws of association with objective validity. That which constitutes the specific difference between justice and other obligations of morality is the fact that the former implies a correlative *right* in some person or persons. No one has a moral right to our generosity or beneficence, because although these are virtues, we are under no obligation to practice them towards any definite person, nor at any prescribed time. Justice, on the other hand, implies that there is something which it is not only right to do, and wrong not to do, but which some individual person may claim from us as a moral right. This being the distinctive character of the idea of justice, we can explain how the sentiment or feeling accompanying it has grown



up. The essential ingredients in the feeling are, the knowledge that there is some definite individual or individuals, to whom harm has been done, and the desire to punish the person who has done the harm. This desire is the spontaneous outgrowth of two natural feelings, the animal impulse of self-defence, and the feeling of sympathy with those closely connected with us; both of which either are or resemble instincts. These impulses men possess in common with the animals. The superiority of man lies in the capacity he has of enlarging his sympathy beyond those to whom it is naturally directed, so as to embrace all human and even all sentient beings; and in his more developed intelligence, which enables him to perceive that the interest of others is also his own interest. The peculiar energy of the feeling of justice arises from the animal element of retaliation implied in it; its apparent necessity from the supreme importance of the interest it guards—security, the very condition of human happiness. This account of the origin of justice implicitly explains why there is a moral obligation to practice it. The feeling of retaliation in itself has nothing moral in it; it only becomes moral when exclusively subordinated to the social sympathies, i. e., to a desire for the general happiness. The moral obligation, then, to respect the rights of others lies in the fact that in no other way can the same amount of pleasure be produced, while every violation of justice strikes at the very basis of those interests which are the very condition of human happiness.

It must be at once apparent to any one who has got the clue to the *equivocal* latent in Utilitarianism that this account of the origin and binding force of the sentiment of justice involves, from first to last, a confusion between pleasurable feelings and objects that reason alone can constitute. It endeavors to explain in the first place, the origin of the feeling that accompanies the idea of justice; and, secondly, the moral obligation to observe rules of justice. The rights of others ought to be respected (to take the last point first) because a violation of them tends to diminish the ideal sum of pleasures the community is entitled to. The feeling of retaliation has nothing moral in it, but the same feeling when universalized so as to include an aggregate of individuals, takes on a moral hue and becomes a duty. Mr. Mill is in doubt as to whether this feeling is an instinct or only something resembling an instinct. If it is an instinct, it cannot in the first instance be a desire for pleasure, since pleasure must be ex-

perienced before it can be imagined as desirable. It may, however, be said that although it is at first blindly thrown out at an indefinite object, it afterwards takes the form of an imagination of pleasure. This assumption must be made, if the sentiment of justice partly derived from it is to be explained as a generalization of pleasure. The desire for one's own pleasure, we are to suppose, shows itself negatively in resentment against the person who, by harming us, decreases the amount of satisfaction we should otherwise have had. This natural desire for individual pleasure becomes moral when it is widened so as to include the pleasure of the "greatest number." But if there is nothing moral in the desire of the greatest amount of pleasure one may secure for himself, how does the mere fact that the desire is for a maximum of pleasure, to be distributed among an aggregate number of individuals, alter the essential nature of the feeling? The mere diminution of pleasure admittedly does not constitute injustice, for it is held to be right to lessen the pleasure of the wrong-doer. If, as Mr. Sidgwick says, the mere fact that "I am I" does not make my pleasure of more importance than that of others, neither does the mere fact that "they are they" introduce any new element into the calculation, unless it can be shown that the good of the community is of more importance than the experience of pleasure by the individual. The inference here again is, that desire for one's own happiness involves the admission that desire for the general happiness *ought* to be the end of action—a conclusion that will not conclude. It may be replied that the capacity of sympathy is an essential ingredient in the sentiment of justice: that man not only by his intelligence comprehends an infinite number of individuals within the area of his vision, but also appropriates their feelings, making them his own. But upon the exclusion of everything but pleasurable feeling, sympathy can only enable the individual to imagine the greater amount of pleasure that will accrue to a given aggregate of persons by the observance of rules of justice, and the less amount that will follow their violation; it can afford no criterion of the rightness or wrongness of action determined by the desire of either amount. Introducing no new element, sympathy with pleasurable feeling does not account for a generic distinction between just and unjust acts, and therefore affords no reason, to the man who seeks to gratify his natural desire for the largest share of pleasure he can in any way obtain for himself, why he

should give up part of what he finds pleasant in deference to a sentiment which he may regard—and which the Utilitarian cannot prove he is wrong in regarding—as over-refined and unreasonable.

The explanation of this failure to account for any moral superiority of just over unjust acts, is easily seen by an examination of the Utilitarian account of the origin of the sentiment of justice. It has already appeared that Mr. Mill hesitates to say whether the natural feeling of retaliation is an instinct or only resembles an instinct. This vacillation is an unconscious testimony to the intrinsic distinction of an immediate feeling and an object of reason. The ambiguous term "harm" covers things that differ not only in degree but in kind. The feeling of resentment may be an "instinct" when it takes the form of an immediate impulse to return a blow. Such an impulse, as Mr. Mill rightly says, is not moral but natural; it can only be shown to be right or wrong by being brought into relation with a law that is expressive of the essential nature of reason. Now this relation is tacitly implied when the term "harm" is employed to designate a wrong which strikes at me, not through my immediate sensations, but through an object that is mine only because it has been brought within my consciousness by thought, and has been made a means of expressing my personality. Mr. Mill, however, treats intelligent self-interest as if it only differed from the immediate impulse to retaliate a bodily hurt in the extent of its range. Rights of property, for example, are conceived simply as a permanent possibility of securing pleasure, the negation of which is supposed to call up the instinct of self-defence solely because the essentials of happiness are endangered. But here there is implied the permanent relation of an object to a universal self—a relation which converts an indifferent thing into a means of expressing personality—and the negative relation of that self to others. It is neither an unreasoning instinct, nor a desire for mere pleasure, that is the basis of self-interest, but an object conceived to embody right through its relation to reason. It is this latent reference to a rational will that makes it possible for the individual to attach the notion of moral delinquency to the violation of his own rights by another, or the violation of another's rights by himself. The obligation to respect rules of justice implies, as Mr. Mill admits, a correlative right in an individual or individuals, and such a relation is only possible be-

tween persons, each of whom, as rational, conceives of himself and of others as universal and permanent. When, therefore, we are told that the ultimate justification of rights lies in their tendency to promote the general happiness, we may admit the statement to be true in the sense that rights, being made for man, ultimately rest upon their capacity of ministering to the spiritual satisfaction of man. But happiness, so understood, is not pleasure at all, but that "blessedness" which springs from the realization of reason by a being who in his essential nature is rational.

And this leads us to remark that in Mr. Mill's account of sympathy, the same covert assumption of elements contradictory of pleasurable feeling is made, as vitiates his explanation of the nature of self-interest. Sympathy with the pleasure of those related to us by natural ties, which is said to be or to resemble an instinct, is widened so as to embrace one's tribe or country, or even all mankind. But a mere extension of a desire of pleasure cannot account for morality, unless upon the supposition that there is an identification of one's own good with the interests of other rational beings. The moral element is made conceivable only because it is assumed that self-sacrifice for the good of others is demanded by the very law of man's being. Except as a relation between persons, rendered possible by the substantial unity of their nature, the social feelings cannot be shown to be more praiseworthy than the purely self-regarding desires. And this recognition of what is involved in the expansion of sympathy enables us to solve difficulties that have baffled all the efforts at explanation of hedonists: for example, why selfishness should be condemned as immoral, and enlightened self-love approved as right; and why self-sacrifice for irrational ends should be blamed, while self-denial in the interest of a good cause, such as that of country or religion or mankind, is praised. So long as no difference in the objects of desire except degree of intensity is admitted, no line can be drawn at which selfishness ends and self-love begins; the limit must be as variable as the changing feelings of individuals. But when the morality of an act is seen to be constituted by its perceived adequacy to the spiritual nature of man, self-love is distinguishable from selfishness, as the conscious subordination of the natural tendencies to rational ends differs from an immediate surrender of oneself to their influence. Sacrifices undergone in a bad cause, at the prompting of natural affection

for others, cannot be opposed to the heroism, philanthropy or piety, that leads to a negation of individual pleasures, unless on the ground that reason condemns the one course as a violation of its own inalienable rights, and approves of the other as a realization of itself. Thus the belief of Intuitionism in the absoluteness of moral obligations, which Utilitarianism opposes but cannot overthrow, is established by means of a principle which embraces while it transcends the measure of truth appropriated by either system; changing subjective conviction into objective necessity by exhibiting reason as that which realizes itself in the laws, institutions, social relations and religion of a people. And this conception of reason alone explains how it is possible for one phase of civilization to be at once the condition and the prophecy of the next; how change becomes progress; and how a moral principle may extend its range and widen its sweep while its foundation remains unmoved and immovable.

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## SCIENCE IN GOVERNMENT.

BY THERON GRAY.

In an endeavor to make a tolerable exhibit of my theme, I make, first, an

### ANALYSIS AND DEFINITION OF FORMS.

1st. *Anarchy*, (Non-government.) A chaotic commingling of particles as nomadic human form, void of distinct human personality.

2d. *Monarchy*, (Simple Government.) Absolute authority, operating to hold the particles in tolerable place.

3d. *Du-Archy*, (Complex Government.) Authority modified and diversified, with individual rights measurably affirmed, and personality striving to controvert and subject authority to human power.

4th. *Tri-Archy*, (Composite Government.) Authority lodged



in the whole people, institutions subjected in use, and the right of all to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," affirmed in theory and attempted in act.

As no governmental system can be *scientifically fulfilled*, according to its true nature, until it has been consistently developed and built up upon its principles, this fourth form can only become *actual*, according to its theory, through a rigid course of development and structural endeavor accordingly. Only upon such conditions can it exhibit its true character and excellence as theoretically involved. When thus matured it presents what may be termed *Hierarchy*, or Sacred Government—government "of, by, and for, the people," *scientifically developed and organized* as such.

Let us now consider

#### HOW THESE FORMS ARE DEVELOPED, AND TO WHAT END.

Anarchy, as basic root or seed-form of all government, must have a productive root in itself; else no higher form could be derived from it. It is clear enough that the earliest conditions of the human mind—the most rudimentary human state—must have been void of institutional methods of any kind, and therefore without government—anarchically conditioned. The problem that thence arises is this: What is the inherent projectile power of such condition, and what its method of operation?

The human mind itself—as the vital power of all movement—must be the primary power to bring gleams of order out of chaos. I mean the human mind as creatively constituted and prompted. Implanted in the human soul, as an unconquerable power, are intuitions of lordship, or magisterial sway, as rightly its own. Here resides the germ of destiny; for, in intrinsic nature, man is the magisterial power in creation, and institutions are, in their nature, wholly ministerial to him. Man, being destined for the realization of perfect freedom and power, in perfect order, could surely find no rest in the freedom of anarchical chaos. The struggles of a freedom that has no law of *meum et tuum*—no law of *mine and thine*—no institutional limitations and definitions of personal power and rights—but which finds its limitations solely in the physical power of its competitor, must cry out for some relief; must struggle for some advanced condition, that ministers somewhat to human interests in protecting the weaker in

their manifest rights, against the aggressions of the stronger. In obedience to this cry of the weak for help and protection against mere physical strength, Divine Providence raises up some *master mind* and prompts it to seize upon the elements, and shape and direct human forces to human ends. Thus, out of anarchy arises government—human conditions needing, and human power effecting it. And the form is by necessity that of monarchy, because of the general inexperience and helplessness. At this period no higher form were possible; for no other could minister to human needs during those infantile conditions. It is a form born of the distresses of anarchy; which distresses are felt because of the incipient operations of divine life in the human soul, prompting it with constant unrest in any condition short of destined mastery in full lordship. Thus we see that monarchy, in its primary state or initial degree, is divinely dictated and accordant with the rights and interests of mankind. But as progress, of whatever nature, involves a fall from primitive excellence into the devious methods or antitheses of self-assertion or subjective formation under the guise of transgression, monarchy is sure to lapse from its first estate of rightly disposed patriarchalism—service to human needs everywhere—into a system of self-serving and human oppression. And this is accordant with a most beneficent economy of Providence. Man as man, is destined to be more than the dependent child, stupidly reclining upon the parental bosom and parental arm for support and protection. Hence “the maternal breasts become shrivelled and the paternal arm is withdrawn,” in order that he may be pressed to strive for himself, and so develop a consciousness of power and a sense of manliness in his own right. He would not duly incline to this if the patriarchal economy remained fixed in service, and actually supplied all his natural wants. Thus under the rule of absolute authority perverted to self-service rather than devoted to public service, man is pressed forward into the conscious possession of personal powers and rights which will make himself an intelligent factor in government, and lead him to establish institutions that will in some measure respond to, and represent, the forces of a common personality or manhood. And so this conception and experience of the rights and interests of man as man, begotten of monarchy as that was begotten of anarchy, projects new institutional forms better suited to advancing human conditions. Constitutional government comes thus into play; and under its

various forms certain compromises are effected. By these man is admitted as a power in his own right as man. Still, authority is largely lodged in institutions under the dictation of certain representative men and bodies, because the voice of the people is not yet properly known as the voice of God, and thus to be fully empowered in human affairs.

And here we find the elements of a conflict more fierce and unrelenting than aught known before. Man is admitted to prominence on the public stage, and becomes conscious of rights and powers of supreme moment, and yet is not educated to a scientific conception of the laws and methods of final conditions wherein he is to be fully qualified and thereupon fully endowed. But as he, in his essential nature is undoubted master, there can be no abatement of the conflict between him and limitary institutions, till man is fully acknowledged as supreme power and authority by virtue of his manhood, and national organization is commenced accordantly.

Thus we see that inevitable strife between man and institutions—the conflict between freedom and authority—born of the practical duplicity everywhere bred and active under duarchal order, presses man to the assertion of his full magisterial rights, and so opens directly into triarchy, as the institutional degree befitting highest manhood and promising the fruition of man's hopes by actually making him master of the situation. This principle of trineism, or composite order in civil affairs, comes to find enunciation in a general or involved manner, in our national system, which lodges authority wholly in the people and makes institutions wholly subservient to their wants. Indeed, it is very manifest that a nation of sovereign persons, endowed with equal rights and powers, can only be associated or united in the interests and pursuits of life in a way to make the national theory a practical fact, through some composing law of organization, duly recognized and instituted. Thus the law of universal freedom and power as basic to "a people's government," carries with it a demand for a composing or associating law by which these numerous factors shall be harmoniously related. But neither the one nor the other could by possibility become actual experience at first. Neither the freedom and power of the individual, nor the order and harmony of the public or associate form were possible to actual experience, till all were rightly conditioned and properly associated through a long era of qualifying develop-

ment, and the exact adjustment of relations by positive civic science. This principle of trineism, or composite order, comes by regular progressive sequence to be announced, and initial forms given accordingly; but they are only initial, and remain to be organically rendered through the requisite processes of development and final embodiment. Full scientific consistency in institutions must give consistency and permanence of order; hence the reign of science in government cannot be consummated till growth or development shall have passed through all its forms and come to adequate fruition. We see, therefore, that the true order in human affairs can by no means be *directly* organized as actual experience at its birth; when its principles are first declared in general terms and its initial forms are given. The laws of development can in no case be set aside till the full course of the productive process shall have transpired: wherefore, when the *principle* of final order in human affairs is conceived and announced in general terms, and initial forms are instituted accordingly, another fall is sure to occur, under which man is pressed to new struggles and toils—to new efforts under the new problem given—which is a problem of universal adjustment, by which powers before conflicting and destructive are to become accordantly related and truly productive. The problem contemplates universal reconciliation and marriage of opposing forms and forces before ignorantly lacerating and destroying each other; and, through such scientific conjugation, the production of all forms of beauty and worth.

And such fall, with the struggles for attainment which follow, is a necessity, because the nature of the human mind is such that it can intelligently comprehend and appropriate in use only that which it experimentally unfolds or achieves as if it were solely through its own resources and native powers. Thus when any new form is first given as a contribution to supply human needs, it must proceed to a formative process, true to its designs, in the hands of man—must be experimentally unfolded and built up in strict accordance with its true nature as germinally planted at first; so becoming intelligently incorporated in experience, and thus appropriate in use. In no other way can the provisions of Providence become truly appreciable and actually subserve their true purpose in experience.

We see, therefore, why it is that, after man is empowered to see and proclaim the principles of a new order in civil affairs,



there must be a fall or lapse therefrom, whereby the new light becomes mostly obscured, and solid attainment is only secured finally through struggles and toils proportioned to the magnitude of the object. And we see that such conditions must enter into the developing processes which come variously into human experience. So, we find the law that rules the composite or final degree of institutional development to be, *in this respect*, the same as that which went before and ruled inferior degrees. And although man is compelled to fight valiantly for advancement upon any new line in order to win final victory and peace, thus earning his right by proving himself master, he is sure to march steadily onward to the end, providing, only, his affections remain fixed in the purpose to overcome every obstacle and win and hold the prize partially revealed in the conceptive or initial degree.

In the developing career of the human race the Christian era gives the final form; wherein man is to unfold and finally organize, with utmost exactness, all special forms, so that one comprehensive system of universal unity shall embrace and operate all minor forms and powers in the whole system, in perfect divine order.

As we have seen, every varied conception, as humanity advances in its great march to destiny, must be humanly wrought out and converted in use as if man were sole motor and instrument; "for it is God that worketh in us both to will and to do of His good pleasure," while man of necessity must *feel* that he is working out his own destiny solely by his own exertions. Hence the fundamental conception of Christendom—the conception and special revelation of the truth of universal harmony and order in human experience through the complete marriage of divine and human, universal and special, public and private, to the utmost must be buried and apparently lost, as the seed is buried in the earth, that it may there take root, shoot forth and grow, and finally yield its proper stores to the husbandman. As the ripened grain (which through all forms of growth is the only object and inspiration) remains more or less obscured by the stock and husk during the various stages of growth, so the Christian life and truth—the life and truth of universal harmony and order on earth through the mighty working of God's love and wisdom in all human forms and uses, have been buried in earthiness and obscured in growth. So, looking upon the rank stock, we mostly forget the vital power that at heart throbs and moves towards



the promised issues; and give little heart, and less intelligence, to the prayer: "Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done on earth as in heaven." While professed votaries of the GOD-MAN, we have come to accept discord and pain as the inevitable lot of man while in the body, only hoping, at best, for some degree of relief in the mysterious realms of *post mortem* existence. Thus the life and immortality of majestic lordship brought to light by the Christ, have given place in men's minds to some diluted conception of existence beyond the grave; and the hope of, and efforts for, divine order here are mostly abandoned in consequence. Instead of believing that the new city is to come down out of heaven to wed the new earth adorned as a bride for the bridegroom, we have mostly given over the earth and all that belongs to it, as hopelessly involved in depravity that makes sin and pain a perpetual necessity. But let us awake from our stupor, to some realizing sense of God's matchless providence in *humanity as a natural body*, and so dispose ourselves to seize the instruments proffered us, by which to work manfully for the end.

Returning from this seeming digression, to consider a little further the matter of formal development in institutional methods: We had found the most advanced thought of the age, as foreshadowed in our own national theory of freedom, equality, and unity in citizenship to utmost extent, directly urging the problem of actual scientific unity in such citizenship, through a corresponding order in civil institutions. Hence we were brought face to face with the problem whose solution must surely open into final composite order, as the ripe result of all painful toils in growth or development.

Here the rude and destructive collisions witnessed on every hand warn us that we, the American people, must soon solve this final problem, and through positive social science open into the inspiring order of man's earthly destiny, or the wheel must again turn and carry down to the base earth that which was raised so high in the heavens. Divine Providence commands, and there is no possible way of evasion. Perfect scientific adjustment in full Hierarchal Order must respond and bid the turbulent billows "peace, be still," else we must go down in a general wreck, to await a new resurrection to a new effort. It is clear enough that our national principles of universal freedom and equality lead directly into Hierarchal Order—full scientific organization—but there are no great leaps in movement, nor overlappings in the

line of progress. It is only by a steady course of structural endeavor, consistent with both final end and immediate ends and needs, that real progress can be made and best results achieved.

Just here arises the danger that perils our own great national promise. Theoretically, or in its principles, our national system is perfect. In those principles as first declared in general terms there is a full accordance with all divine-human order. But for the full embodiment and actual working of those principles there were wanting right qualities of citizenship in conditions of intrinsic manhood, and, institutional methods competent to invest and serve in the various operations of such character in citizenship. In short, it presented the principles and seminal form of true order in human affairs, but was wanting in both human material, in quality of manhood, and institutional forms suitable to embody and express the same according to best possibilities. In other words, it was a planting for ripened manhood and equally ripe institutions, but was *only* a planting. It *involved* all that was essential to the system, but had experienced nothing of the toilsome evolutionary processes requisite to actualize the same in *evolved* conditions accordant therewith. In a word, it was a beginning of the end, but not the end itself actually attained. Thus it was a new national order given mankind,—glorious in its principles—but it must necessarily be developed and organized upon its principles before it could exhibit the requisite token of success in a people of true national character and power, with institutions amply ministering to the wants of such character and power. It stood to coming statesmanship, as the plan and specifications of an edifice stand to the builder, with materials given in their unwrought state. Faithful building of the nation, according to its declared principles and plan, was certainly as essential to proposed results as such building of the edifice to the realization of architectural designs. But our statesmanship overlooked this necessity for national development, and so commenced to occupy and use as if it were an accomplished structure from the first; whereupon the most flagrant wrongs were inevitable. For the methods of structural endeavor in building the system were entirely unlike the methods of occupancy and use in the structure fully achieved—which occupancy and use are the only proper exponents of the nature of the system. Building must take crude materials and proceed to give them proper form and final consistency of relation through a long process of well-

directed effort, while occupancy and use consist in the fullest and freest operations of maturest human power under institutions equally perfect and adjusted in amplest service to all human wants. Building stringently commands and subordinates all that is unformed and out of place, with a view to perfect ends according to given designs in use. The structure achieved presents this consummation of design, and thus opens fully into the joys of occupancy and use according to that design.

We have seen that our national design contemplated a commonwealth of character in citizenship, and a commonwealth in the conditions which result from such exalted worth in human character. But it was only a design, and could not become an actual experience excepting through a process of qualifying endeavor that would make and fix the requisite conditions.

In overlooking this need of national development upon national principles, our statesmen made the shocking mistake of trying to operate the principles of a perfect system with means totally unfit; both character in people and conditions of institutional investiture being so far below the true national standard, that disastrous and painful commotions and conflicts were sure to ensue. Our national experience heretofore has so emphatically verified this, that master minds have come to regard the manifest principles of our national system as fallacious and impracticable. Hence the late Mr. Rufus Choate did not scruple to pronounce the declaration of principles in our primary instrument, "an impracticable mass of glittering generalities."

Mr. Choate had some aptness in logical perception, but very small philosophic discrimination; hence he boldly repudiated the truth in theory, simply because it was perverted by the false in practice, and so appeared at disadvantage. Practice had surely failed to realize what that theory affirmed; and, if that practice was correct, then, of course, the theory was just what Mr. Choate assumed. But we have shown that the theory was perfect, as to all human powers and needs; appearing at disadvantage solely because of a wrong course of national conduct, which proceeded to clutch and convert the promised fruit without first having commanded the essential conditions of true fruitage. Hence Mr. Choate's gross error, and the equal stupidity and error of thousands now who stand as he did.

Let me now try to outline the consistency of true national development under our system; not simply for the purpose of ex-

hibiting more distinctly the national misconduct heretofore, but also to point the way to national recovery through a "new departure" upon strictly national principles.

Under this idea of national development, the demand is that we shall unfold and qualify character accordant with the national standard—both as to citizenship and to institutional forms—before we can safely empower and operate them. Wherefore, we see that efforts during development must be mainly experimental, tutelary and educational. And, as the system is one which embraces every personal factor as an essential integer, this educational system must provide for all the needs of all citizens without exception. And it must infallibly hold all, who may be indifferent or averse, to the right use of such means. The highest good of the public or associate form being dependent upon the best conditions of every individual factor thereof, the public must suffer no particle to drift away in adverse currents to deplete and distract the system. Educational provisions must be sufficiently broad to meet all the needs of every citizen. The human form is one of diversified powers. It is a complex of physical, intellectual, and moral powers; and until all are developed in best measure and assured in true expression, the individual falls below his true stature, and the associate body in like manner falls below its best conditions. The public intelligence and virtue being presumably the better exponents of the public needs, (and also of the individual's, they being one in our system) must duly provide qualifying means, and sternly hold all who are wrongly disposed, to the use thereof. Thus, when we come to build the nation truly in accordance with its principles, we shall make large drafts upon our public domain in order to convert it into industrial establishments, so conducted that all human powers will find due expression and culture. Besides, all branches of manufactures and mechanics will come to be publicly organized with the same purpose. Thus, with schools of various grades of industry, art, science and philosophy, the varied genius, taste and skill will be provided for. Then we must "go out into the highways and by-ways and compel them to come in." Then "the dreary waste of our *slums* and *stews*" will be carried into new channels which conduct surely to the realization of human excellence of power, instead of perversion and waste. Then will our social cesspools become disinfected, and the insatiate avarice, which at present finds its victims bred



mostly of helplessness and want, will stand dismayed, crying, "Alas, alas, that great city! for in one hour is Thy judgment come!"

During all these qualifying conditions the public authority must assume command of all individuals and families that incline to degrading habits, which tend to undermine the *commonwealth*, and hold them to worthy endeavors; even though superficial views regard such authority as contrary to the personal rights asserted in our system. During these qualifying conditions, the individual can rightly have no freedom which tends to subvert the public interests. All forms of grossness, perversity and weakness, must be subject to public dictation; because the public wisdom—actuated by the true national designs—is competent to advance the interests of those in such conditions; whereas, they of themselves are totally incompetent. The public is thus warden or guardian, not to deplete or despoil, but to serve them far better than they would or could serve themselves. Let there be kept a clear discrimination of the difference in the requisite processes of the nation during its structural and constructed conditions, and it will be clear that the public is not only authorized to subordinate and direct, as here argued, but actually obligated to do so. It is this clamor for personal freedom and power of the citizen in public affairs, without regard to any proper qualifications in an intelligent and virtuous manhood, that threatens to annul our national hope and promise; and we must begin to stay the bad tide, lest we become wholly submerged. It is for such reasons that I desired to give some reliable clew to the matter of government as a positive science—man being constantly objective and institutions subjective—and thence to indicate pending conditions in our own national system. It is because I would have the national idea duly embodied in institutions, and operative thus to fulfil its promise, that I wanted to give a valid clew to our national mistake and misconduct, and show the only true way of recovery and final success.

Manifestly, mere hap-hazard and confused efforts of current statesmanship cannot suffice to accomplish requisite results. Only the vision that is fixed upon and comprehends fundamental principles, and the practical sagacity which can shape public methods in strict conformity thereto—both as to developing means and finally organizing means—can serve the nation truly in its present perilous conditions. Only a positive science of



government, that shall overlook the whole ground and see clearly all the needs, can serve to direct anew and recover the real powers and energies of the nation and make sure of its final promise. The hope of the nation is not mainly in the direct augmentation of its *material* resources, but in bringing out its latent *human* resources, as fundamental to the other. Science in our civil affairs will attend to this, under a true conception as to what constitutes national development. It will show that such development consists in the gradual evolution and organization of such human character and power, and such institutional methods as will surely set forth the ideas fundamental to our system. It will aim to educate and employ the full power and genius of every citizen, and make such power and genius the ground of rivalry between different individuals; thereby displacing the mean and cruel strife for outward wealth which now degrades and destroys on one hand, and only grossly aggrandizes the few on the other hand, who gain its possession. Wealth of character, in true genius and power, presents the greatest and noblest incitement to personal activity; especially so under a true national diction that regards man first, and his surroundings as only secondary in importance. Let the aim of the nation be to bring out and give full expression to these, in all its citizens, and the inglorious strife now prevalent under the inhuman greed for material aggrandizement, and which prostitutes citizens and nation at the same time, would be surely supplanted, giving place to consistent emulation infinitely more potent. But the freedom our statesmen erroneously contemplated, was the freedom for person to compete with person for greater possession in the external show of things. It overlooked the fact that a commonwealth of character and power, according to the measure of every citizen, was first in order; and this achieved, according to the national idea and theory, a commonwealth of outward means would surely follow, making the mean distinctions of present rank of very trifling account. Development in mere externals—in population, territory, commerce, financial power and the like, gives no distinct index of *national* growth; for all these are common to every nation, hence cannot constitute distinctive national development. Such growth in mere surface conditions has been mistakenly regarded as national development, and so absorbed the nation's energies, and perverted its vision, that true structural methods were lost to sight, and consequently made no part in the national

conduct. True national growth would have embraced and carried up all such thrift, immensely increased, as auxiliary to consistent life and character in the national genius itself. But with this present aim alone, which mostly regards gross externals, and forgets and neglects national soul or genius, all true vitality is sure to be quenched, and outward body itself go to decay sooner or later. Let it therefore be urged continually, that the nation was at first a mere planting of a germ for a new national order, distinctly unlike those that had been known to history; that consequently it must be carried through a course of development before it could, by possibility, exhibit that order in mature form; and that such development must be perfectly consistent with the principles announced, and thus proceed with the intelligent design to effect the involved end in a government actually "of the people, by the people, for the people"; thus, in this end, showing a united power of ripest human character, and a corresponding solidity in institutional methods.

The evils that have arisen under the national misconception and misconduct are innumerable.

*Unregulated* diversity, where freedom and power are distributed to all, as by our system, is fruitful of more disorder and distress than may easily be named. With the various particles (individuals) empowered and wrangling in innumerable conflicts under the guise of personal freedom, the evils that ensue are almost without limit. The national code of principles clearly involves organized diversity—all individuals actually related in accordant interests and efforts, co-operating in all worthy endeavors—"each for all and all for each." Instead of this, we find individuality empowered and basely incited to contests which serve to distinguish the few with the show of inordinate wealth and luxury, and to debase the many in poverty and distress, or the constant burdens of toils which smother the higher elements of true character and genius. Instead of the practical co-operation innate to our system, we find the ruling fact to be, "every one for self, and devil take the hindmost." The result is, all—higher or lower—rich, poor, and commoners—are likely to come to the "evil one" together. The flagrant perversion of the national genius in these habits of cruel contention, is begetting baseness everywhere. The more crafty and capable in the common strife easily defy competition, and distance all in coveted distinctions; while those less adroit and powerful are pressed along in the

jam, without freedom or the recognized personality which all so vitally crave; and the weaker and lower grades still are practically trampled down and crushed. And yet easy-going statesmen, civilians, churchmen and all, complacently land the system as one under which "all are free to shape their own destiny and make their own fortune"; which is all rank mockery, and bitter as gall to legions who are held, by circumstances, in destitution and want with an unconquerable grasp. Mere theoretic, unorganized freedom, is of little avail when various obstacles and inequalities of condition cripple the many and hold them to tasks that bar out the higher human culture needed, and tend to degrade and brutify continually. Looking still lower down to see what comes of these conditions, we find men becoming more and more daring and reckless in criminal arts and general depravity. In the general contest for self all will fight as best they can, and each on his own ground. The more base and inhuman will naturally employ arts and take ground in the contest suited to their conditions; determined to dodge the missiles thrown amongst them by those who, in respectable society, manage to conquer for themselves and their's more than they can well employ. So penal and moral laws are losing their restraining power; the rights of property are fearfully contemned; organized aggressions are added to the weaker endeavors of individual rapacity, and the very foundations of our *disordered order* are fast settling away. The wealthy are thus coming to distresses and perils which make their conditions less enviable, in many respects, than those of honest poverty; for, the hordes of desperadoes, bred by the national perversions, are coming to make life of little account when it stands in the way of their designs.

Thus, "we the people" of this nation of vaunted excellence go on, preying upon and devouring each other, some in one way, some in another; each in a way consistent with his peculiar conditions of calling, culture, power, and character; but all tending to swell the tumult and discord, where ought to be general repose and harmony.

One of the most deplorable effects of this belligerent state of the system—this rank national perversion—is, that it distempers the common mind, infuses in the whole body a spirit of reckless deviltry that amounts to organic insanity. This crops out in individual deeds like those of Jesse Pomeroy, Evans, the mur-

derer of his little niece, "the dynamite fiend," La Page, and others of similar turpitude on every hand.

If we turn to the affairs of civil service and public conduct, we find like disorders and distresses there prevalent. An unqualified and corrupt ballot carries its power into legislation equally wanting in character and integrity. Legislation seems to be neither intelligent of, nor anxious for, the public interests. It is not a steady, intelligent consecration of delegated power to common needs, and thus a public service, as it surely ought to be under our system, but is largely a private and partial service. It mostly regards immediate aims of party, sect, ring, special enterprise and private interest, rather than the good of the whole people. In fact it cannot be relied upon to effect the tolerable aims which sometimes find expression through the ballot; for crafty intrigues of leaders and lobbyists are found nullifying the people's designs thus indicated; and, even, usurpations by executive powers and courts of judicature are sometimes made the instruments of controverting the people's rights and interests. As to the ballot, there is scarcely the faintest relation between it and the legislation it purports to effect. The relation of the lobby to legislation is far more clear, although it tries to veil itself. So, we see special designs and interests mostly attended to, while public interests get only meagre recognition and less embodiment. Self-service, contravening the general good, everywhere rules and supplants the weaker efforts towards public service. Hence here again are strife and conflict on every side. Special aims in special interests are not only thus pitted and potent against public interests, but they are also impelled, by the same motive, to perpetual strife between themselves; making intrigues, plots and counter-plots, in furtherance of base selfishness, legitimate conduct, to common regard: the victor being honored with applause and the vanquished contemptuously derided.

In view of the failure of legislation to organize the enterprise and power of the whole people in orderly production and distribution of abundant wealth in supplies of every kind, the people betake themselves to side-shows, with hope of relief. Hence arise Labor-reform movements, Protective Unions, Granger Leagues, mutual guarantee organizations, and all manner of combinations designed to fortify special effort and interest. In truth these conflicts and collisions are almost without limit, and are bound to become more numerous and violent so long as the na-



tion is operated in direct controversion of its real character. Even the ravages of extreme Communism cannot be averted if present methods are continued. It is a most shocking anomaly that exhibits capital and labor in an open fight under our system, and the military called out to prevent riot and destruction. One step more in this direction, and Communism takes the field with an intent which, if realized, would carry us back to the dead level of anarchical chaos; for there is no other issue to Communal aims, however generously inspired its immediate designs may be in some respects. Let the leading intelligence of the nation become aroused to a conception of the real needs, and thence become united to initiate and carry forward measures surely consistent with the national genius, and the shadows of Communal night will never cast their gloom over this fair land; for then the light of a new day will steadily open upon us, and finally warm and illumine with the steady glow of Hierarchal Order; which in its nature is as opposite to Communism as mid-day is to midnight.

Notwithstanding the present drift of the nation into diversities so appalling and painful, it were well now to understand that the prevalent clamor of pulpit, press, and rostrum, for reforms, and honest manly conduct, is perfectly impotent to effect desired results. The difficulty is not superficial, but basic; not in branch and fruit, but at the very root; as I have constantly shown. There we must go to produce right flow and quality of sap, when fruit and foliage will be all right. The evil is not in parties and persons (excepting as instruments) but in those deeper conditions which sway and pervert both parties and persons to basest lusts and fratricidal deeds. Hence there is not the slightest ground of hope for remedy in any change of parties and persons; no hope for remedy of real evils. And those who spend their energies in denunciations and clamors in this direction, only prove thereby the shallowness of their vision and worthlessness of their efforts. Resort to new parties and men for public place and power; load down the gallows and prisons with the criminals of to-day, and the same perverting powers that were the inspiration of the old misdeeds, will produce a new crop of the same nature, from the new planting, in other parties and persons.

No doubt different parties are actuated by different aims; some more and some less generous and humane; but none will much mitigate present evils, nor do aught to make the true national



designs actual, except by new conceptions and a new departure upon strictly national grounds—a departure clearly comprehending the verities involved by the system, and aiming steadily to embrace and consistently realize all in the structure perfected.

Conceptions and endeavors of this nature will not anticipate such results short of several generations of clear *scientific effort*; hence will not look for final fruits before the normal harvest time. They will daily ply themselves to the uprooting of weeds and other obstructions, and to the due nurture of the crop in fresh appliances according to the needs, looking only for a slow and steady growth, nor expecting ripe fruit on the appearance of bud or blossom.

Scientific vision and effort will not be impatient of results; for they not only know what are the proper means for the time being, but they also know what are the right results, as related to final results. Thus true national endeavor will grapple resolutely with present resistant forces, knowing how they are to be managed to right purpose, rejoice in every step taken, and through the rapt vision of positive science, will see in the mellow hues of the harvest time the bending sheaves of ripened grain in amplest abundance. The worker under the inspirations of such vision will never falter because he may not actually enter into the harvest. As one "in the spirit of the Lord's Day" he is moved with delight and vital energy even though he knows that neither his children nor children's children may be parties in the joys of full achievement. Let us therefore endeavor henceforth to give our best thought to the true problems of the day, and resolutely "lend a hand" in the work of preparation for full scientific reconstruction.

Lest the spirit of my essay seem ascetic and querulous, I would here protest that I only criticise to cure. Right estimates are truly indulgent and conservative of all human force, however harmful the evils that come of it; knowing that perversions and wrongs are rooted more in the head than in the heart. Primary aspirations are right, for they are obedient to man's constant intuitions of lordship. The conditions and methods by which those aspirations are expressed are largely wrong; whence come the numerous jolts, afflictions, and horrors of our present experience. It is, therefore, a better understanding of commanding methods that I urge; insisting, meantime, on the wrong of present methods, and citing some of the evils they beget, in order to

make a call for reform in new qualifying methods more effectual.

And I would have it understood that the true end of all tutelary authority in government is the ultimate supreme authority of science in full hierarchal order, wherein man is constantly magisterial and institutions perfectly ministerial.

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## THE BASIS OF INDUCTION.

[Thesis Sustained Before the Faculty of Letters, in Paris].

BY J. LACHELIER.

Translated from the French by SARAH A. DORSEY.

Induction is the operation by which we pass from the knowledge of facts to that of the laws which govern them. The possibility of this operation is doubted by none; and yet on the other side it seems strange that some facts, observed in a time and place thus determined, should suffice to establish a law which may be applicable to all places and to all time. The best experience teaches at most only how phenomena connect themselves under our eyes; but that they should connect themselves in the same manner always and everywhere—that, no experience can teach us, and yet we do not hesitate to affirm this. How is such an affirmation possible, and upon what is it founded? This is the question, equally as difficult as it is important, which we mean now to essay to solve.

Apparently the most natural solution consists in pretending that our mind passes from facts to laws by a logical process, which does not confound itself with deduction, but which rests as deduction does upon the principle of identity. Without doubt a law is not logically contained in any portion, be it small or great, of the facts which it regulates; but it seems as if it might be contained at least, in the whole of these facts, in their totality—and we might even say that it does not in reality differ from this totality, of which it is only the abridged expression. If this

should be so, induction might be subject to some practical difficulties, but it would be in theory the simplest thing in the world. It would suffice to form, by force of time and patience, a complete collection of facts of each species. These collections once made, each law would establish itself by the institution of one term for several, and would then be above the shadow of all contestation.

This opinion seems to be that of Aristotle, if we judge him according to the celebrated passage of the *Analytics*, where he represents induction under the form of a syllogism. The ordinary syllogism, or at least that of the first form, consists, as everybody knows, in the application of a general rule to a particular case; but how is this rule to be demonstrated, when it is not itself contained in a still more general rule? It is here that intervenes, according to Aristotle, the inductive syllogism, whose mechanism he explains by an example. It is proposed to demonstrate that animals without galls live a long time. We know, or are instructed to know, that man, horses and mules, are the only animals without galls, and we also know that these three sorts are long lived animals. We can reason therefore thus :

Man, the horse, and the mule, live a long time. *Now*, the only animals without galls are man, the horse and the mule, *therefore*, all the animals without galls are long lived.

This syllogism is irreproachable, and does not differ essentially from ordinary syllogisms of the first form; but it differs in matter, in that the middle, instead of being a general term, is a collection of particular terms. Now it is precisely this difference which expresses the essential character of the inductive conclusion; because this conclusion consists, contrary to the deductive conclusion, in drawing from the complete collection of particular cases a general rule, which is only a resumé of the whole.

Whatever may be the bearing of this passage, it is easy to show that laws are not for us the logical result of a simple enumeration of facts. In truth, not only do we not hesitate to extend to the future laws which would represent at most under this hypothesis the totality of past facts; but a single fact carefully observed appears to us a sufficient basis for the establishment of a law, which at once embraces both the past and the future. There is then no conclusion properly so called, from facts to laws; hence the extent of the conclusion will exceed, and in most instances exceeds infinitely, the premises. Otherwise each fact is

*contingent*, considered in itself, and any sum of facts, however great, presents always the same character. A law, on the contrary, is the expression of a necessity, at least presumed; that is to say that it carries with itself the sequence that a certain phenomenon should follow or accompany such another, if always understood that we are not to take a simple coincidence for a law of nature. To conclude then from facts to laws, would be to conclude not only from the particular to the universal, but yet more, from the contingent to the necessary; it is therefore impossible to consider induction as a logical operation.

As to the authority of Aristotle, it is much less decisive upon this point than it appears at first to be. It is evident, in fact, that Aristotle did not seriously admit that man, the horse and the mule were the only animals without galls, nor that it was possible in general to arrange a complete list of facts, or of individuals of a determined species; the syllogism which he describes supposes therefore, in his thought, a preparatory operation, by which we tacitly decide that a certain number of facts or of individuals may be considered as representatives of an entire species. Now it is evident from one side that this operation is induction itself, and from the other that it is founded not upon the principle of identity, since it is absolutely contrary to this principle to regard *some* individuals as the equivalent of *all*. In the passage cited, Aristotle preserves silence upon this operation; but he has described it in the last page of his *Analytics*, with a precision that leaves nothing to be desired. "We perceive," he says, "individual beings, but the object proper to perception is the universal, the human being, and not the man called Callias." Thus from the avowal even of Aristotle, we conclude not from individuals to the species, but we see the species in each individual; the law is not for us the logical content of the fact, but the fact itself, seized in its essence, and under the form of universality. The opinion of Aristotle upon the passage of the fact to the law, that is to say, the essence itself of induction, is then directly opposed to that which we are disposed to attribute to him.

We are thus obliged to abandon the proposed solution, and to recognize that induction is not founded upon the principle of identity; this principle is, in truth, purely formal, that is to say, it truly authorizes us to announce under one form, what we have already announced under another, but it adds nothing to the contents of our knowledge. We have need, on the contrary, of a

principle in some sort material, which adds to the perception of facts, the double element of universality and necessity, which appears to us to characterize the conception of laws. To determine this principle we shall make now the object and end of our researches.

The existence of a special principle of induction has not escaped the notice of the Scotch school; but this school does not appear to have clearly seized the character and the value of it: "In the order of Nature," says Reid, "that which shall come, will probably resemble what has already come, under similar circumstances." This declaration is inexact, and "*probably*" is superfluous. For it is perfectly certain that a phenomenon which produces itself under certain conditions, will produce itself continually, whenever all these conditions shall be reunited afresh. It is true that the vulgar deceive themselves nearly always about these conditions, and that science itself has great difficulty to assign them exactly; from thence it comes that our attempts are so often deceived, and that we know perhaps no law of Nature which does not suffer from some exceptions.

In fact, induction is always subject to error; in law (*droit*) she is absolutely infallible. For if it is not certain that the conditions which determine to-day the production of a phenomena, will determine it to-morrow, the foresight founded upon an imperfect knowledge of these conditions would not even be probable. Royer Collard is more happy when he founds induction upon two judgments, of which one announces the stability and the other the generality of the laws which govern the Universe: but scarcely has he posited this double principle, before he compromises it, or rather destroys it by the strange commentary he adds to it. According to him, in truth these two judgments are neither necessary nor evident by themselves; the stability and generality of the laws of Nature are a fact for us, which we believe because it is so, and not because it would be absurd or impossible for it not to be so. But then who guarantees for us the existence of this double fact? Is it universal experience, or may it be, by chance, an induction anterior to that which it is requisite to explain? No, replies Royer Collard, it is our nature herself. It is difficult to imagine a more complete confusion of ideas. Our nature cannot instruct us *a priori* of a fact of experience; now outside of the experience of facts, there are for us only the truths of reason, of which the opposites are absolutely impossi-



ble. A judgment which is empirical, without being nevertheless necessary, is a veritable monster, which has no place in human intelligence. Reid seems to doubt his own principle. Royer Collard does not hesitate to pronounce, himself, the condemnation of his.

An illustrious savant of our day has formulated the fundamental axiom of Induction, in saying, that among living creatures as well as among bodies of dead matter, (*corps brut*), the conditions of existence of all phenomena are determined in an absolute manner. This expression is as just as it is precise, and explains perfectly how our minds can pass from facts to laws; for if each phenomena produces itself under conditions absolutely invariable, it is clear that it suffices to know what these conditions are in any case, in order to know by that only, what they should be in all. Only there is perhaps in nature room to distinguish two sorts of laws; the one applies to simple facts, as that which states that two equal and opposed forces will form an equilibrium; the others on the contrary announce between phenomena relations more or less complex, as that which declares that among living creatures the like will engender like. Nothing is less simple than the transmission of life, and it is certain that the formation of a new being demands a concourse of a prodigious number of physico-chemical actions. It is certain also that these actions do not always act themselves in the same way, because sometimes monsters are born from them. Now if we know only *a priori* that the same phenomena takes place under the same conditions, we should confine ourselves to affirming that the product of each generation will resemble its authors, IF all the conditions requisite are reunited; and whenever we pronounce contrarily, in absolute terms, that like engenders like, we evidently suppose, in virtue of some other principle, *that all the conditions are reunited*, at least in the majority of instances. It is this secondary principle which M. Claude Benard has, in some sort, personified in physiology, by calling it the *directing* or *organic idea* (*idée directrice, ou organique*); but it appears equally indispensable in brute matter as in organized beings. There is not, in fact, a single chemical law, which does not suppose, amidst the sensible phenomena whose relations it proclaims, the intervention of insensible phenomena whose mechanism is absolutely unknown to us; and to believe that this mechanism will act always in a way to produce the same results, is to admit in nature

the existence of a principle of order which watches, as we may say, over the existence of chemical species, as well as over that of living species. The conception of the laws of nature, with the exception of a small number of elementary laws, seems to be founded, therefore, upon two distinct principles: one in virtue of which the phenomena make a series in which the existence of the antecedent determines that of the successor; the other in virtue of which these series make in their turn, systems, in which the idea of all determines the existence of the parts. Now a phenomenon which determines another in preceding it, is what has been called from all time an efficient cause, and a whole which produces the existence of its own parts is, according to Kant, the true definition of a Final Cause. We are able to say then, in one word, that the possibility of Induction rests upon the double principle of Efficient Causes and Final Causes.

So far we have limited ourselves to the search after the principle in virtue of which we pass from the knowledge of facts to that of laws. Now that we think we have found it, it is needful to establish that this principle is not an illusion, but may conduct us to a veritable knowledge of Nature. In a word, it is necessary that the establishment of the fact should follow the demonstration of the law. To demonstrate a principle may seem in truth rather a bold enterprise, and it is one which the Scotch Psychology has not accustomed us to undertake. They say, not without appearance of reasonableness, that proof cannot go as far as the Infinite, and that we must indeed come to a certain number of truths absolutely first, which are the basis even of our thought, and which impose themselves upon us in virtue of their own self-evidence. But without speaking of the difficulty which one has always found in determining the number of these first truths, what right have they to affirm that a proposition absolutely denuded of proofs, is a principle which expresses the constitution of the mind and of things, and that it may not be a pure prejudice the result of education and of habit? They allege the impossibility in which we are of conceiving the contrary of these truths; but the question is always that of knowing if this impossibility belongs to the nature of things or to the subjective disposition of our thought; and the skeptics of to-day reply reasonably, that there has been a time when nobody believed that the earth turned around the sun. Without doubt it is absurd to suppose that principles may resolve themselves into

other more general principles which may serve them for proofs; for, either this resolution would go on to infinity, and the demonstration of principles would never be achieved, or it would end in a certain number of undemonstrable propositions, which would then be the veritable principles. But it is not necessary that all demonstration should proceed from the general to the particular; for even when the knowledge is most general in all, it remains still to be explained how this knowledge is found in our minds, and to be established also that it represents faithfully the nature of things. Now there is a means of resolving these two questions at once. It is to admit that our thought begins only in generalities and abstractions; and to seek, on the contrary, the origin of our knowledge in one or more concrete and singular acts, by which the thought constitutes itself by immediately seizing the reality. Either our science is but a dream, or the principles upon which it is founded are in their turn the expression of a fact, which is the fact even of the existence of the thought. It is then in this fact, and not in a primitive axiom, that we should essay to solve the principle upon which Induction rests.

It remains now to learn in what this first step consists, by which the thought enters into commerce with reality; and we are not able, it seems, to represent it to ourselves except in two ways, since contemporaneous philosophy admits only two definitions of reality itself. Either, in fact, reality consists exclusively in phenomena, and all knowledge is in the last analysis, a sensation; or reality is, in some sort, divided between phenomena and certain entities inaccessible to our senses, and in these cases human knowledge ought to burst forth at once from the sensible intuition of phenomena, and by a sort of intellectual intuition of these entities. We will go on then, adequately, in demonstrating the principle of Induction—from Experience, strictly so-called, to the intuition of things in themselves (*choses en soi*); and it is only in the event of discovering that neither of these two ways will lead us to the conclusion sought for, that we will deem ourselves authorized to try a third way.

## II.

It is not necessary that we should essay to make for ourselves an empirical demonstration of the principle of Induction. This demonstration has already been given by Mr. Stuart Mill in his

System of Logic, and as we could not possibly hope to do this better than he has done it, we will content ourselves with the examination of this. We must recognize in advance that an enterprise of building upon sensible experience a proposition which pretends to the title of a principle, does not promise great chance of success, in spite of the skill of Mr. Mill; but the demonstration, even if insufficient, of a principle, after making all allowances against it, is of more value, and attests a thought more philosophic than the complete absence of all demonstration.

For the rest, it is easy to infer that the principle demonstrated by Mr. Mill is not precisely that which we formulated above, and presents neither exactly the same elements nor the same character. Rigorously speaking, there should be no more question in the philosophy of experience, of efficient causes than of final causes. For, if our senses do not teach us that a series of phenomena may be directed to a certain end, neither can they teach us any more, that each term in the series exerts upon the succeeding one any influence whatever. There is nothing to be astonished at in Mr. Mill's keeping absolute silence upon the finality we believe that we have discovered in phenomena; but in what sense can he say that one phenomena is cause of that which follows it, and thus found Induction upon what he calls the Law of Universal Causality? There is here a singular compromise between the exigencies of his system and the scientific tendencies of his mind. For, on one side he rejects as an illusion, all idea of a necessary connection, and in consequence all true causality; and, on the other, he does not hesitate to preserve the word and up to a certain point, the thing, in admitting between phenomena an order of succession absolutely invariable. Which constitutes, in fact, the most inflexible Determinism. He does not fear extending the empire of Determinism even so far as the human will; but he assures us at the same time that he does no wrong by this to free will, since the causes of our actions limit themselves to preceding them invariably, without exerting upon them any real influence. As to the character of the principle of Induction, there is evidently nothing in experience which could teach him that all phenomena *should* or *must* have an invariable antecedent, and his law of causality can only be the expression of a fact; but, fact or law, as it may be, what must we think of the universality which Mr. Mill attributes to it? We find here a second compromise stranger than the first, between the needs of



science and the logic of Empiricism. The law of causality is valuable, not only for our planetary system, but also for the group of stars of which our sun forms a part; it will be still in vigor not only in a hundred thousand years, but according to appearance, in a hundred million years; but beyond these limits, it may well be, that it will have the fate of the particular laws for which it serves as a basis, and that phenomena *may* succeed each other—as Mr. Mill expressly says—at hazard—that is an order of succession, contingent and limited to the phenomena upon which our thought can exert itself reasonably. Behold here definitely, all that the principle includes whose demonstration remains for us to examine. This demonstration seems to be very simple. We only know facts immediately, and the sole means through which we can distinguish general truths from these facts (that may be contained in them) is induction; the principle of induction then must be in itself the result of an induction, without there being a circle to apprehend in this. In fact, there are two sorts of induction; the one is the scientific induction, which consists in erecting into a law one single fact, well instanced, and which supposes evidently that every fact is the expression of a law; the other is vulgar induction, which proceeds by a simple enumeration of examples, which supposes nothing before itself, and which consequently may very justly serve as a basis for the principle which serves in its turn to justify the first. It is true that since Bacon, this latter form of induction is abandoned as a process without value; and it is certain that it wants in confidence when it concerns particular laws of nature, because here the enumeration can never be complete, and one hundred examples confirming it does not exclude the possibility of one hundred contrary examples. But it is not the same when it concerns the law of Universal Causality. As there is not a single case in which it may not be applicable, there has not been a single fact, since man has watched Nature, which is not called upon either to confirm or contradict it; and as it has been confirmed by all without being contradicted by a single one, it rests upon a complete enumeration, and possesses an irrefragable certitude.

If there is not a circle in this demonstration, there is at least a begging of question so manifest, that it is necessary to look twice before attributing it to a mind so penetrating as that of Mr. Mill. The enumeration of examples, they say, is never



complete for the particular laws of nature. Is it any more so for the laws of Universal Causality? Can we assure ourselves that this law may never be contradicted, even within the limits already so narrow, of human experience? Have not men believed a long time, following Mr. Mill himself, in a sort of partial and intermittent reign of chance? But in all these cases, the enumeration which he speaks of can only affect the past? Now it is needful to know whether the law of causality is valuable for the future, since this law should serve as a foundation for Induction, and that induction consists practically in a conclusion from the past to the future. We establish to-day a relation of succession between two phenomena, and we wish to know if the same relation will occur to-morrow. Yes, they say to us, because the phenomena have observed until now an absolutely invariable order of succession. But who knows whether they will be able to preserve it to-morrow? And if the particular laws of nature have need of being guaranteed by the law of universal causality, in what superior law shall we search for the guarantee of this law itself?

But we take ill, perhaps, the thought of Mr. Mill. He has not perhaps believed that the inference of the future from the past, illegitimate and impossible in itself, in each particular case, becomes possible and legitimate in virtue of a general rule, founded itself upon a similar inference. He is persuaded, on the contrary, that man makes the induction spontaneously, and without the aid of any principle. He declares expressly that the law of universal causality, far from preceding in our minds the particular laws of nature, follows and supposes them; and it is from these laws themselves that it draws, according to him, the authority which it needs in order to guarantee them. The spontaneous inductions which would suggest to the first men the regularity of the most ordinary phenomena, would not inspire them, really, with more than a mediocre confidence. They might believe, without being very sure of it, that all fire would burn and that all water quenches thirst; and when they are advised to reunite all these provisional laws under a common title, they have believed, without being more sure of it, that general phenomena are subjected to laws. But their confidence accrues naturally in the measure that experience confirms the result of their first inductions; and every fact which comes to confirm a particular law, deposes by that much in favor of the law of caus-

ality, which gathers thus to herself many favorable testimonies, as there are others collected. There is therefore nothing astonishing in that this law finishes by being invested with an absolute certitude, whilst others only attain by themselves to a degree of probability more or less elevated; and it is quite simple also that this certitude would react, in some sort, upon each one of these particular laws, of which the law of causality is at once the resumé and the sanction. The principle of induction reposes then, neither upon a sterile accumulation of past facts, nor upon a system of laws capable of sufficing to themselves; it is the last utterance of a spontaneous induction, whose results, more or less probable whilst they remain isolated, become certain in being concentrated in a single one. It is the key to the arch which crowns and sustains at once the edifice of science.

Thus understood, the theory of Mr. Mill contains neither circle nor a begging of the question (*petitio principii*); but it reduces itself to two arbitrary suppositions, of which the second is (what is more important) contradictory. We do not see, to begin, how the result of spontaneous induction, *only probable*, if you choose, in all that touches upon the particular laws of nature, can become certain when it concerns the law of universal causality. This law, it is said, governs so many phenomena, and therefore it is confirmed by experience more often than all the rest put together. Admit that the probability of induction increases by virtue of success and in ratio of it, the number of proofs of causality favorable to the law, will always be finite, and therefore not able to clear the infinite distance which separates probability from certainty. To say that this law succeeds in all cases, is the abuse of an equivocation; because this expression can only be extended evidently to the past, and in order that it may include all cases without restriction, it would have to be certain that there would be no more facts ever to come, and consequently no further inductions to make. In the second place, what is this spontaneous induction, and what place does it occupy in a system where experience is presented as the unique source of our knowledge? Is it then one and the same thing to observe the production of a phenomena, and to judge that the same phenomena will reproduce itself in the same circumstances? But this is not all: in supposing that from the first observation (for the hundredth will not teach us any more on this point) men have a right to conclude from the past to the

future, how is it that this conclusion was only probable at first? From two things come really one; either at the moment of this first observation, their minds contain nothing more than the perception of an external fact, and there is nothing in this perception which could suggest the lightest anticipation of the future: or, to this perception they add, drawing apparently from their own recesses, the conception of a durable nexus between phenomena, and this conception, as all *a priori* judgment, had an absolute value, which the ulterior results of experience can neither add to nor diminish.

There is a means of escape from all these embarrassments; but as this means is not expressly indicated in the work of Mr. Mill, we can only propose it, without knowing whether the illustrious author would have consented to subscribe to it. Suppose first, that induction (spontaneous) is not a judgment declared by our thought upon the objective succession of phenomena, but a subjective disposition of our imagination to reproduce them in the order in which they have struck our senses. It may be granted without overleaping the limits of Empiricism, that this disposition, at first purely virtual, would develop in us under the influence of our first sensations; and we conceive at the same time that, feeble in its debut, it would be incessantly fortified by the invariable order in which all our sensations follow each other. Suppose in the second place, that probability consists for us in a powerful habit of the imagination, and certainty in an invincible habit; the passage from probability to certitude has no more, in its turn, anything of the inconceivable, *provided* that we do not attach too absolute a sense to the word *invincible*, and that we acknowledge that our belief in universal causality, founded on a prodigious number of impressions (confirmatory), may be shaken in the course of time by a repeated shock of contrary impressions. Logic in this case has nothing more to say; but what becomes of the science, that is to say, the objective knowledge of nature? Will Mr. Mill say that he does not admit the vulgar distinction between nature and our thought, that is to say, between the system of our sensations and a system of things in themselves (*cho-ses en soi*)? But that which holds the place of nature in his doctrine, is our actual sensations, and not their traces which they leave after them in our imaginations. They are these sensations and not their images, between which science ought to establish the connection and foresee the return. Now because we have adopted

the habit of associating in a certain order the images of our past sensations, does it follow that all our future sensations should follow in the same order? This interior nature, whose course does not order itself according to the play of our imagination, does it not escape from us in the same way as the external nature in which the vulgar believe? And the sequel of this theory—is it not pure skepticism, which destroys all reasonable foresight, and leaves us only a mechanical prudence like that of animals?

For the rest, whether Mr. Mill desires it or no, it is certain that skepticism is the natural fruit, and the ever renewed fruit of Empiricism. If nature is only for us a series of impressions, without reason and without connection, we can readily establish these, or rather submit to them at the moment they are produced; but we can neither predict, nor even conceive the future production of them. That which Empiricism calls our thought, by way of opposition to nature, is only a whole of enfeebled impressions which survive of themselves; and to search for the secret of the future in that which is the vain image of the past, is to undertake to discover in a dream what will happen to us during our waking hours. We wish to settle induction upon a solid basis. Do not let us search for her longer in a philosophy which is the negation of science.

[To be concluded in the October number.]

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## ANTHROPOLOGY.

Translated from the German of Immanuel Kaut, by A. E. KROEGER.

### CONCERNING THE FIVE SENSES.

§13. Sensuousness in the faculty of cognition—the faculty of representations in contemplation—comprises two parts: Sense and the power of imagination. The former is the power of contemplating in the presence of the object; the latter is the power of contemplating also without that presence. But the senses are

again subdivided into external and internal senses (*sensus externus, internus*); the former being those in regard to which the human body is affected by bodily things, whereas by means of the latter he is affected through his mind. It is to be observed, however, that the latter, as a mere faculty of perception (of empirical contemplation) must be distinguished from the *feeling* of delight and disgust,—that is, from the capability of the subject to be determined through certain representations in the preservation or the renewal of the condition of those representations—which feeling might be called the inner sense (*sensus interior*). A representation through our senses, of which we become conscious as such, is called specially *sensation*, when the sensation attracts at the same time attention to the condition of the subject.

§14. We may divide primarily the senses of our bodily sensation into the vital sense (*sensus vagus*) and the organic sense (*sensus fixus*), and as we meet these senses only where nerves are found, into those which affect the whole system of nerves, and those which affect those nerves only, which belong to a certain member of the body. The sensations of warmth and cold, even when produced by the mind, through sudden hope or fear, for instance, belong to the vital sense. The shudder, which runs through men at the notion of the sublime, and the shivering wherewith nurses scare children to bed late at night, are of the latter kind; they penetrate the body as far as there is life in it.

But of the organic senses we cannot well count more nor less than five in so far as they relate to external sensations.

Three of these, however, are more objective than subjective; that is, they contribute more as empirical contemplations, to the cognition of the external object, than they excite the consciousness of the affected organ. But two of them are more subjective than objective; that is, our representations through them contribute more to enjoyment than to a cognition of the external object. Hence in regard to the former, we can only come to an agreement with others, but in regard to the latter—although the same external empirical contemplation and the same external connection may take place—the mode in which the subject is affected thereby may be very different.

The senses of the first class are those of touch (*tactus*), sight (*visus*), and hearing (*auditus*). Those of the second class are the sense of taste (*gustus*), and that of smell (*olfactus*); both being



purely senses of organic sensation, that is, entrances prepared by nature for the animal, in order to enable it to distinguish objects.

*Concerning the Sense of Touch.*

§15. The sense of touch lies in the finger-tips and their nerves (*papillæ*) in order to discover by touching the outside of a solid body its peculiar form. Nature seems to have given this organ to man alone, in order that he may form a conception of the form of a body by touching it at all sides; for the feelers of the insects seem to have in view rather the discovery of the presence of an object than the discovery of its form. This sense also is the only one of *immediate* external perception. Hence, while being the most important and the safest to teach us, it is also the coarsest sense, since the matter, of the form of which we desire to become advised, must be solid. (We do not speak here at all of the vital sense, whether the surface of a body is soft or rough; still less, whether it is warm or cold to the touch.) Without this organic sense we should not be able to form a conception of any bodily form. Hence the two other senses of the first class must be originally related to this sense, in order to make empirical knowledge at all possible.

*Concerning the Sense of Hearing.*

§16. The sense of hearing is one of the senses of merely mediated perception. Through the air which surrounds us, and by means of which a distant object is made known to us, and which is put into motion by means of our organ of voice, the mouth, men can most readily and perfectly place themselves in communion of thoughts and feelings with each other, especially if the sounds, which one person makes the other hear, are articulated, and in their proper connection constitute a language. The sense of hearing does not furnish us with a notion of the form of the object, and the sounds of the words do not present us immediately with an image of the object; but for that very reason, and because they are nothing in themselves,—at any rate no objects, but at the utmost only internal feelings—they are the most appropriate means of designating conceptions; and people who are born deaf, and hence must also remain dumb, i. e., without a lan-

guage, can never arrive at any higher stage than an analogy of reason.

But so far as the vital sense is concerned, this sense is indescribably, vividly, and variously moved, and also strengthened by *music*, as a regular play of the feelings of hearing; music being thus, as it were, a language of mere feelings, without any conceptions. Here the sounds of words are tones; and these are for the ear precisely what colors are for the sight; a communication of feelings in the distance, in a space to all who move in that space, and a social enjoyment, which is not lessened by the fact that many participate in it.

*Concerning the Sense of Seeing.*

§17. The sense of sight is also a sense of mediated sensation through a moved matter called light, and which is sensible only to a certain organ, the eye. This moved matter is not, like sound, a mere undulatory motion of a fluid element, which expands itself in space in every direction, but is an exudation, by means of which a point in space for the object is determined, and by means of which the Universe becomes known to us in so immeasurable a degree, that—especially in regard to self-luminous stars, and in comparing their distances with our standards here on earth—we get weary over the vast series of numbers, and have cause to be astonished almost more at the tender sensitiveness of our eye in beholding such weakened impressions, than at the vastness of the Universe itself; especially when we add to it the microscopic world, as shown, for instance, by the infusoria.

The sense of sight, although not less dispensable than that of hearing, is nevertheless the noblest; since it is of all our senses the most removed from the sense of touch, as the most limited condition of our perceptions, and since it not merely contains the largest numbers of those perceptions in space, but also feels its organ the least affected—since otherwise it would not be mere seeing; and since, therefore, in this respect, it comes nearest to a *pure contemplation* of the immediate representation of the given object, without any mixture of perceptible sensation.

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These three external senses lead us through reflection to a recognition of a thing outside of us. But if the sensation gets so

strong that the consciousness of the movement of the organ grows stronger than that of the relation to an external object, in that case external are changed into internal representations. To perceive the smoothness or roughness of a surface in touching an object, is something quite different from obtaining a knowledge of the external form of a figure by that means. In the same way, if some person, for instance, speaks so loud that one's ears ache on account of it; or if some one steps suddenly out of a dark room into bright sunshine and winks his eyes, in that case the latter becomes blind for a few moments, through a too strong or too sudden illumination, and the former becomes deaf through the screeching voice. That is to say: both persons, by reason of the violence of their sensuous perceptions, acquire no conception of the object. Hence their attention is directed solely to the subjective representation, that is, the change of the organ itself.

*Concerning the Senses of Taste and Smell.*

§18. The senses of taste and smell are both more subjective than objective; the former in that the organs of taste, the tongue, the gums and the throat are *touched* by the external object; the second in that we inhale along with the air the exhalations of foreign substances, though the exhaling object may be at a distance. They are closely related to each other, and a person who lacks the sense of smell, has also, as a rule, only a coarse taste. We may say that both organs are affected by salts (solid and volatile) the one kind of which must be dissolved in the mouth by a fluid, while the other requires to be dissolved through the air, which fluid or air must penetrate the organ, in order to affect it by the peculiar sensation they create.

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## BOOK NOTICES.

*The Religious Sentiment, its Source and Aim: A Contribution to the Science and Philosophy of Religion.* By Daniel G. Brinton, A. M., M. D. New York: Henry Holt & Company. 1876. (Price, \$2 50. For Sale by Gray, Baker, & Co., St. Louis).

In whatever he writes, Dr. Brinton exhibits breadth of view, singular acuteness of perception, and an unusual command of literary form. After "The Myths of the New World," it is gratifying to receive the above work, indicating as it does the probable devotion of a life to the elucidation of the ethnological phases of religion. Only the converging of all the rays of the mind upon one focus, and long-continued application, are of avail in the production of great books. But the mind in collecting its rays must do this from the uttermost breadth of culture. A Leibnitz, an Albertus Magnus, or a Lessing, has so conducted his studies that every department of human knowledge throws light upon every other. Again, when the individual scholar lives in an organized community of scholars, such division of labor is possible, and such recombination of special results that wonderful completeness of insight may be reached, and in a comparatively short time. Such division and recombination of labor is realized in Germany more than elsewhere. The inter-relation of its fifty universities, constituting a single system, has produced this state of coöperation in the realm of scientific research for a hundred years. Constant coöperation, and the reference of each author to the labors of all others, have caused a certain conciseness and technical style of writing among German professors that renders it extremely difficult for a foreigner to avail himself of their labors until after years of study, as it were, upon their entire literature. A brief word or phrase ("*Ding an Sich*" or "*Identität*" or "*Reflexions-Bestimmung*" or "*Monad*" or "*Logos*") suggests the entire argument of an "epoch-making" book, or even a whole cycle of discussion, out of which grew a complete literature relating to the subject. This is the famous so-called "technic" of German books—not as is usually supposed, a "technic" arbitrarily adopted by the individual without the formal sanction of the community of scholars with whom he worked, but a conventional technic that received the sanction of the literature growing up around the theme. Without such conventional technic, more or less transitory in its designations, any literature on a theme is impossible. He who would study a given period of our political history would have to learn the current technic of the newspapers—the presuppositions of such words and phrases as "*Credit Mobilier*," "*Reconstruction*," "*Green-back*," "*Tariff*," &c., &c.,—before he

could make any progress in gaining an insight into the political issues.

Such books as Creuzer's *Symbolik und Mythologie*, Schleiermacher's *Reden ueber Religion*, Pfeiffer's *Deutsche Mystiker d. 14 Jahrhunderts*, Sprenger's *Das Leben und die Lehre des Mohammad*, Erdmann's *Philosophie des Mittelalters* (in his *Grundriss*), serve as examples taken from an immense number of works that combine the labors of thousands of scholars, silent as well as speaking. Such a work as Overbeck's *Geschichte der Griechischen Plastik* combines not only all the labors of preceding and contemporary authors, but also the hints and suggestions obtained from the thought and researches of troops of students who have studied under his direction during the quarter of a century in which he has been professor at Leipsic. It is sometimes forgotten that all memorable books carry with them technical words and phrases, and that each one of these may have been the centre of great battles. Aristotle's *νοῦς ποιητικός* and *νοῦς παθητικός* (in his *De Anima*) are phrases about which the most important of all philosophical and theological disputes raged for at least fourteen hundred years. Without these, where were Neo-Platonism, or Arabian Pantheism, or the four centuries of scholastic philosophizing? It was not the mere words that caused these disputes, but the seizing and defining of important thoughts by these words. The active and passive intellects—whether only the former is immortal or whether both are separable from the body—what momentous issues hinge on these questions! With Alexander of Aphrodisias and Averroës, the human personal existence perishes with the body—the pure intellect alone being immortal, and the individualizing characteristics being derived from the body, upon the death of the latter all conscious individuality ceases. (Even our author, Dr. Brinton, returns to this question again and again, as e.g., p. 270, where he places the immortality in the intellect, exclusive of sensation, and speaks lightly of the “dogma that every man has an indestructible, conscious soul.”) If personal existence closes with the death of the body, it was quite distinctly perceived by the Schoolmen that Christianity is in great error, and if the truth becomes known it must shortly cease as a world-religion.

In his seventh and concluding chapter Dr. Brinton treats of “The Momenta of Religious Thought,” first showing what may properly be called “Historic Ideas in Religious Progress,” and their permanence in relation to their truth and to consciousness. “The percentage of true concepts which makes up the complexity of a historic idea gives the principal factor towards calculating its probable recurrence. A second factor is the physiological one of nutrition itself.” Defective cerebral nutrition, according to him, tends to cause a disappearance of a “historic idea.” He finds the historic ideas in religious progress to be three in number: I. The Idea of the perfected individual. II. The Idea of the perfected commonwealth. III. The Idea



of personal survival. "These have been the formative ideas in the prayers, myths, rites and religious institutions of many nations at widely separated times."

The ideal of individual perfection was placed in physical strength, in such gods as Allah, Eloah, Hercules (Melkarth), Thor, and others. In Greece it became physical symmetry or the beautiful in art, as in Apollo and Aphrodite. The latest form of this worship is the ideal of culture of which Goethe is high priest. "Self-government founded on self-knowledge wards off the pangs of disappointment by limiting ambition to the attainable. The affections and emotions, and the pleasures of sensation as well, are indulged in or abstained from, but never to the darkening of the intellect. All the talents are placed at usury; every power exercised systematically and fruitfully with a consecration to a noble purpose." The failure of this idea in its first phase of brute force is accounted for by the theory of Novalis: "The ideal of morality has no more dangerous rival than the ideal of physical strength, of the most vigorous life. Through it man is transformed into a reasoning beast whose brutal cleverness has a fascination for weak minds." The æsthetic ideal fails because its spirit is repose, whereas that of true religion is active struggle to eliminate imperfection. The culture-ideal tends to exclusiveness and isolation, and to the destruction of the very root of all religion—the feeling of dependence (as Schleiermacher makes it).

The idea of the perfected commonwealth "lies at the basis of all theocracies, forms of government whose statutes are identified with the precepts of religion." "Certain national temperaments tend to individualism, others to communism." "The ideal of the commonwealth is found in those creeds which give prominence to law, to ethics, and to sentiment, the altruistic elements of mind." Like the idea which tends to independent individuality, this idea which tends to the absorption of the individual in organized institutions has its imperfections. Our author finds that this phase carried to its extreme tends to destroy all religion, inasmuch as its supreme principle is authority, and is thus antagonistic to the search for the true. The utter surrender of the intellect to authority, is not only destructive of individual power of thought, but of all morality—in that morality demands personal responsibility and individual conviction.

In the idea of personal survival, or the immortality of the soul, Dr. Brinton finds "the main dogma in the leading religions of the world to-day. In Christianity, Islamism, and Buddhism, the three religions that embrace three-fourths of the human race, with trifling exceptions," this doctrine of immortality of the individual is the "main moment." The ills of life however great, and its pleasures as well, sink into insignificance before the faith in a future eternal life. It is a singular fact that the three religions which make this idea their cen-

tral thought are the three proselyting religions of the world. "The central doctrine of the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth, the leading impulse which he gave to the religious thought of his age, was that the thinking part of man survives his physical death, and that its condition does not depend on the rites of interment as other religions then taught, but on the character of its thoughts during life here."

"The Christianity preached by his immediate followers was not a philosophical scheme for improving the race, but rested on the historical fact of a transaction between God and man, and while they conceded everlasting existence to all men, all would pass it in the utmost conceivable misery, except those who had learned of these historical events, and understood them as the church prescribed."

"I have called this idea a new one to the first century of our era, and so it was in Europe and Syria. But in India, Sakyamuni, probably five hundred years before, had laid down in sententious maxims the philosophical principle which underlies the higher religious doctrine of a future life. These are his words, and if through the efforts of reasoning we ever reach a demonstration of the immortality of the soul, we shall do it by pursuing the argument here indicated: 'Right thought is the path to life everlasting. Those who think do not die.' Truth alone contains the elements of indefinite continuity; and truth is found only in the idea, in correct thought."

"A man's true ideas are the most he can hope, and all that he should wish, to carry with him, to a life hereafter."

"While the religious doctrine of personal survival has thus a position defensible on grounds of reason [N. B.] as being that of the inherent permanence of self-conscious truth, it also calls to its aid and indefinitely elevates the most powerful of all the emotions, *love*. This, as I have shown, is the sentiment which is characteristic of *preservative* acts."

"A Supreme Intelligence, one to which all truth is perfect, must forever dwell in such contemplation. Therefore the deeper minds of Christianity define man's love of God, as God's love to Himself." This is an apparent reference to Spinoza's Ethics (Part. V., Prop. XXXVI): "The soul's intellectual love towards God is itself God's love wherewith God loves Himself, not as God is infinite, but in so far as God can be explained by the essence of the human soul considered *sub specie aeternitatis*; in other words, the intellectual love of the soul toward God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves Himself."

After this, one is surprised to meet the following:

"Attractive as the idea of personal survival is in itself, and potent as it has been as a moment of religious thought, it must be ranked among those that are past. While the immortality of the soul retains its interest as a speculative inquiry, I venture to believe that as an idea in religious history, it is nigh inoperative; that as an element in

devotional life it is of not much weight; and that it will gradually become less so, as the real meaning of Religion reaches clearer interpretations."

What this "real meaning of Religion" may be we ask the author, and look carefully to his remarks in the sequel. The influences, he tells us, that are daily leading to the devitalizing of the doctrine of immortality, are not brought about by the opponents of religion, by materialistic doctrines, but are owing to the development of the religious sentiment itself—a development which, he predicts, will ennoble its emotional manifestations and elevate its intellectual conceptions. But in enumerating the main agents of religious development, he mentions (1) recognition of the grounds of ethics (i. e., the discrimination of the grounds of ethics from those of religion, and the separation of the two); (2) the recognition of the cosmical relations (i. e., of the insignificance of the earth as a cosmical body, and consequently the absurdity of the accepted Christian eschatology); (3) the clearer defining of life (i. e., as a result of physical force, and the recognition of mind "as a connotation of organism"); (4) the growing immateriality of religious thought (i. e., the elimination of egoism from it through the loss of the expectation of future life). Our author, it is seen, deals in paradoxes: for while denying that the changes in religious views are owing to "materialistic doctrines," he proceeds to enumerate as the main agents of religious development precisely the cardinal doctrines of materialism, but does it with such coolness and candor and with such apparent regard for the "supremacy of the religious sentiment," and such faith in its ultimate triumph, that one almost suspects him of covert sarcasm.

He says, regarding the second "main agent": "The extent and duration of matter, if they indicate any purpose at all, suggest one incomparably vaster than this; while the laws of mind, which alone distinctly point to purpose, reveal one in which pain and pleasure have no part or lot, and one in which man has so small a share that it seems as if it must be indifferent what his fate may be. The slightest change in the atmosphere of the globe will sweep away his species forever."

Regarding the closer definition of life as a main agent in religious development, "but," as he says, "at the expense of the current notions of personality," he remarks: "True thought alone is that which does not die. Why should we ask for more? What else is worth saving? Our present personality is a train of ideas base and noble, true and false, coherent through the contiguity of organs nourished from a common centre. Another personality is possible, one of true ideas coherent through conscious similarity, independent of sensation, as dealing with topics not commensurate with it. Yet were this refuge gained, it leaves not much of the dogma that every man

has an indestructible, conscious soul, which will endure always, no matter what his conduct or thoughts have been." "Not only has the received doctrine of a soul, as an undying something different from mind and peculiar to man, received no support from a closer study of nature,—rather objections amounting to refutation,—but it has reacted injuriously on morals, and through them on religion itself."

In conclusion he says: "Where are we to look for the intellectual moment of religion in the future?" \* \* \* \* "The religious sentiment has been shown to be the expression of unfulfilled desire, but this desire peculiar as dependent on unknown power. Material advantages do not gratify it, nor even spiritual joy when regarded as a personal sentiment. Preservation by and through relation with absolute intelligence, has appeared to be the meaning of that 'love of God' which alone yields it satisfaction. Even this is severed from its received doctrinal sense by the recognition of the speculative as above the numerical unity of that intelligence, and the limitation of personality which spiritual thought demands. The eternal laws of mind guarantee perpetuity to the extent they are obeyed—and no farther. They differ from the laws of force in that they convey a message which cannot be doubted concerning the purport of the order in nature, which is itself 'the will of God.' That message in its application is the same which with more or less articulate utterance every religion speaks—Seek truth: do good. Faith in that message, confidence in and willing submission to that order, this is all the religious sentiment needs to bring forth its sweetest flowers, its richest fruit."

"Such is the ample and satisfactory ground which remains for the religion of the future to build upon. It is a result long foreseen by the clearer minds of Christendom. One who more than any other deserves to be classed among them, writes\*: 'Resignation to the will of God is the whole of piety,' &c."

If we interpret one statement by another we are left to believe that religion as Dr. Brinton understands it, does not involve an eternal relation of conscious man to conscious God, but rather a relation of the conscious man to his own final annulment in unconsciousness. His "resignation to the will of God" is therefore meek submission to the fate of annihilation, since mind is a connotation of organism. If however we believe that self-conscious personality is the highest principle in the universe and that man is formed in its image, the otherwise glittering generalities of religion assume a more concrete signification, and one that is accordant with the sentiments of the soul, and quite different from that indicated in this book. That the current doctrines of physiological psychology are utterly incompatible with the spiritual views of the Christian religion, we may be assured.

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\*Joseph Butler, Lord Bishop of Durham.



Buddhism, and indeed all true Orientalism, fails to reach the concept of personality, and is hence more in accord with modern materialism than with Christianity.

That Dr. Brinton, though standing in advance of the thinkers of the physiological school, has conceded too much to their conclusions seems evident. While he is a thorough Spinozist in system, perhaps he understands too literally the Spinozan repudiation of free will—the same being a reaction against the tenets of Duns Scotus and Occam, and their followers, who held the tenet that truth depends upon the arbitrary will of God. The necessity of Reason is a necessity of freedom, inasmuch as truth is that which is in and for itself, and not fixed or limited by alien constraint. The mutual recognition of God and man as portrayed in the fifth book of Spinoza's *Ethics*, and his third species of knowing (*sub specie aeternitatis*) which he identifies with *love*, warrants us in interpreting his doctrine as spiritual instead of fatalistic. The same ambiguity in regard to the perishing of individuality is found in Aristotle's *De Anima*, which led to the diverse commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius, and to the opposite interpretations by Albertus Magnus and Averroës.

That psychological evolution in man is a progressive emancipation or disenchantment from corporeal sensation, involves of course the appearance at every step of the corporeal as a real conditioning factor in the process. A study of this factor is by all means important, but no study of it can ever discover facts that transcend this limit: in other words, no facts have been or can be found, *that imply the corporeal factor to be the creative cause of mind rather than the restricting limitation to its form of manifestation*. Mind is self-activity, and in the corporeal it reveals this through and by means of a contrary and refractory medium.

Looking at absolute self-consciousness as that on which all depends and toward which all aspires, we as self-conscious beings may rejoice in the fact that we participate in the ultimate form of being. We may energize to complete in ourselves and make real all the potentiality of consciousness, thereby elevating ourselves to the Divine in progressive degrees of adequateness.

While Dr. Brinton's book exhibits everywhere wide scholarship and a judicial tone of mind, its author fails to reconcile the two sides which he presents. He states the materialistic side with greater clearness and definiteness; the spiritual doctrines are vaguely asserted or implied, and left without other support. The pathological phases are treated with the greatest ability. While he pulls up wheat and tares alike in his endeavors to separate the transient from the permanent in religion, yet the general effect of the book will be valuable as holding back alike the naive materialist from his rash conclusions, and the intrepid dogmatist from his indiscriminating defense of defi-



nite physical theories, because tradition has attached them to the mode of presentation of great religious truths.

*Transcendentalism in New England: A History.* By Octavius Brooks Frothingham. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1876. For sale by Gray, Baker & Co., St. Louis. Price, \$2 50.

Among the many worthy attempts to gather up the threads of the significant movements that have had their origin and development within this Nation during the century just completed, there is none more commendable than the one above named. All things must be studied as processes of evolution if they are to be understood. Seen in the perspective of its history each thing first becomes intelligible. What are the spiritual impulses and combinations that have sunk together into the present result of our National character? What social and political embryos have quickened—the whence of their parentage? What religious revolutions—what literary epochs, have transpired? The old-time precept “Know thyself” means, as Carlyle tells us, “Know what thou canst work at,” and the introductory chapter to this self-knowledge is an initiation of the individual into the history of his kind—what his fellow men, his species, his kith and kin have worked at. If the stock from which I spring has done these deeds, there is so much of promise and potency in each scion of that stock, and thus in me: Knowledge of one's kind is self-knowledge.

The so-called transcendental movement in New England seems to have been a sort of struggle for literary independence rather than a philosophical or even religious movement. Emerson, writing the inaugural address of the editors of *The Dial* to the reader, in 1840, says: “The editors have obeyed, though with great joy the strong current of thought and feeling, which, for a few years past, has led many sincere persons in New England to make new demands on literature, and to reprobate that rigor of our conventions of religion and education which is turning us to stone, which renounces hope, which looks only backward, which asks only such a future as the past, which suspects improvement, and holds nothing so much in horror as new views and the dreams of youth.” He describes the spirit of the time as casting its light, for each individual, “upon the objects nearest his temper and habits of thought; to one, coming in the shape of special reforms in the state; to another, in modifications of the various callings of men, and the customs of business; to a third, opening a new scope for literature and art; to a fourth, in philosophical insight; to a fifth, in the vast solitudes of prayer. It is in every form a protest against usage, and a search for principles.”

Whether its friends or its enemies gave to the movement the name of “Transcendentalism” is not told; but it is generally agreed that the appellation is misleading, inasmuch as it suggests the doctrines of

Kant as the creed of the school, while in fact the Kantian critiques had very little to do with it. But the above quotations from Emerson clearly enough paint the tendency of the so-called transcendentalists to come out from or to reform existing institutions, creeds, and principles. In the *Dial* for July, 1842, the editor speaks of the name "Transcendentalism," which "by no very good luck, as it sometimes appears to us," had been applied to the "more liberal thought of intelligent persons in our time." He quotes a Calvinist as claiming of Trinitarianism that its whole system is transcendental; "The sinfulness of man involves the supposition of a nature in man which transcends all limits of animal life and of social moralities." "The mystery of the Father revealed only in the Son as the Word of Life, the Light which illumines every man, outwardly in the incarnation and offering for sin, inwardly as the Christ in us, energetic and quickening in the inspirations of the Holy Spirit,—the great mystery wherein we find redemption, thus, like the rest, is transcendental." The Calvinist goes on to blame the Transcendentalists so-called, not for excess but for defect: "they do not hold wild dreams for realities; the vision is deeper, more spiritual than they have seen. They do not believe with too strong faith; their faith is too dim of sight, too feeble of grasp, too wanting in certainty. I regret that they should ever seem to undervalue the Scriptures." A Quaker is further quoted as claiming the identity of Transcendentalism with the doctrines of George Fox: "It is very interesting to me to see, as I do, the essential doctrines of the Quakers revived, modified, stripped of all that puritanism and sectarianism had heaped upon them, and made the foundation of an intellectual philosophy, that is illuminating the finest minds and reaches the wants of the least cultivated."

In December, 1840, Emerson delivered his lecture on Transcendentalism, in which he says: "What is popularly called Transcendentalism among us, is Idealism; Idealism as it appears in 1840. As thinkers, mankind have ever divided into two sects, Materialists and Idealists; the first class founding on experience, the second on consciousness; the first class beginning to think from the data of the senses; the second class perceive that the senses are not final, and say the senses give us representations of things, but what are the things themselves, they cannot tell." And again: "You think me the child of my circumstances: I make my circumstance. Let any thought or motive of mine be different from that they are, the difference will transform my whole condition and economy. I—this thought which is called I,—is the mould into which the world is poured like melted wax. The world is invisible, but the world betrays the shape of the mould. You call it the power of circumstance, but it is the power of me." Again: "Transcendentalism is the saturnalia or excess of Faith; the presentiment of a faith proper to man in his integrity, excessive only when his imperfect obedience hinders the satisfaction of

his wish." "This way of thinking falling on Roman times, made Stoic philosophers; falling on despotic times made patriot Catos and Brutuses; falling on superstitious times, made prophets and apostles; on popish times, made Protestants, and ascetic monks, preachers of Faith against the preachers of Works; on prelatical times, made Puritans and Quakers; and falling on Unitarian and conservative times, makes the peculiar shades of Idealism which we know." "The Idealism of the present day acquired the name of Transcendentalism from the use of that term by Immanuel Kant of Koenigsberg, who replied to the skeptical philosophy of Locke, which insisted that there was nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the experience of the senses, by showing that there was a very important class of ideas or imperative forms, which did not come by experience, but through which experience was acquired; that these were intuitions of the mind itself; and he denominated them *Transcendental forms*."

If the transcendental movement be made to include the tendency towards the form of practical protest—demanding reform in State, church, the callings and occupations of men, the customs of business—as Emerson sums it up: "in every form a protest against usage, and a search for principle"—it was a very wide-spread movement—extending far beyond the limits of New England, and is still productive of important results in social and political directions.

At bottom this protest against institutions however, has its root in the literary and scientific instinct. Man's great want is to portray his life to himself. Aristotle's designation of him as a "symbol-making animal" has been often quoted. Portrayal implies clear consciousness of the lineaments or characteristic features. Human institutions are at once the product and the revelation of human nature, and this art-impulse aiming at self-knowledge and self-portrayal must occupy itself with human institutions. Insight is the perception of what is necessary and universal in things—it is the perception of their essential nature. What is essential or necessary can be discovered in no other way than by testing, *a priori* or *a posteriori*, the reality by successive omission or change of its various phases—i. e., by the test of abstraction. When it is discovered that neither omission nor change can transpire without destruction of the object considered, an insight is obtained—the mind no longer depends on the external tradition of the reasonableness of an ordinance but sees that reasonableness itself. It is a change from dead formality, mechanical prescription—to living thought, to intelligent endeavor.

Hence in its general aspect Transcendentalism is a literary movement—the result of which has been to remove every phase of life from the region of dead use-and-wont, and place it under the form of consciousness and spontaneity.

It is evident that to any movement of this kind there are incident various degrees of negation—iconoclasm and sacrilege. When the

activity of thought awakens, its first deed is a challenge to reality. It generalizes, omits the accidental. Successively its attitude must be negative to all the facts of life; it strives to think away, or abstract from, the family, civil society, the State, art, and religion. Its Transcendentalism consists in the assertion of its own self-determination—of its own freedom to create its world of institutions, arts and usages.

The original sinfulness of Transcendentalism consists in its confusion of the concrete and abstract self-hoods—of the finite and infinite Egos—of caprice and rational will—of selfishness and duty—of opinion (*δόξα*) and rational insight (*ἐπιστήμη*). The continuance of the transcendental process gradually cures itself—eliminates the mere individualism and fortifies the personality, i. e., replaces what is particular and accidental to the individual man with what is universal and of the substance of all men. This achieved, the Transcendentalist becomes a defender of institutions as they are, and may even go to the extreme of conservatism. As Goethe describes him: "He can now do even the humblest work allotted to him with quietness and utter content, feeling all the time in him its oneness with the greatest work which falls to man."

Mr. Frothingham, without dispute, has done right in making Emerson the prophet of this movement. He alone of all saw the end from the beginning, and therefore never participated in any of the merely negative excursions of the Transcendentalists. In his lecture on "The Conservative" (at Boston, December, 1841,\*) he sets forth in his masterly and inimitable style the positive good which institutions actually give to man in return for what they seemingly deprive him of. If the institution of property seems to deprive the individual of his birth-right to a piece of land to live on, yet in turn it has preserved for him all the rational culture of the race—"libraries, museums and galleries, colleges, palaces, hospitals, observatories, cities—Rome and Memphis, Constantinople and Vienna, and Paris, and London, and New York." It has summed up for him the total net product of mankind—of his larger self-hood—the "Grand Man," of whom he, the little man, is the potentiality—and thus presented to him a revelation of himself such as the Ages only could make. Without the help of this revelation he would inevitably be a savage—with its aid he can become a civilized human being within a score of years, achieving thereby what required many thousands of years for his race to accomplish. Such is the virtue of vicarious atonement.

Mr. Frothingham's own life has peculiarly fitted him for the task of writing this volume, so far as external surroundings are concerned. His personal acquaintance with the representative names in Transcendentalism, his own participation in it, and finally his finished scholar-

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\*The Dial, Vol. III., p. 189-192.



ship are all in his favor. Perhaps in his book we miss something of the enthusiasm that would come from an author who had brought away the great treasure of his life from the school of thought he is describing; or some of the interpretative criticism that we could reasonably expect from one who had been initiated into the transcendental technique. At all events we feel as if the object portrayed by Mr. F. was not quite properly focused before our eyes, and the consequence of it is an imperfection in definition. However this may be, he has brought together very suggestive materials and made a book that cannot fail to be interesting and instructive to all earnest readers. Even if one is unwilling to accord its author the position of adequate critic, he must concede the great merit of its literary composition, and the wealth of material presented. It must be stated, too, that he does not attempt so much a criticism as an historical picture.

After discussing Transcendentalism in its beginnings in Germany, its development under Kant, Jacobi, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel; its theology and literature as wrought out by Schleiermacher, Goethe, Richter, and others; its advent in France under Cousin, Constant, Jouffroy, and in England under Coleridge, Carlyle and Wordsworth, Mr. Frothingham comes to New England and discusses the peculiar and original phases which Transcendentalism assumed there, and describes its practical and religious tendencies. After this preliminary he considers its representative names, beginning with "Emerson the Seer," and following with "Alcott the Mystic," "Margaret Fuller, the Critic," "Theodore Parker the Preacher," "George Ripley the Man of Letters," and closing with "minor prophets," and a glance at the literature of the movement.

In his list of representative names one is surprised not to find that of Henry Thoreau, who is certainly one of the most eminent representatives of the movement, so far as his permanent influence on American literature is concerned.

In conclusion we repeat our sentiment that in this our centennial account of stock in hand, it is excellent to be told of this movement that has "affected thinkers, swayed politicians, guided moralists, inspired philanthropists, created reformers."

*La Filosofia della Scuole Italiane, Rivista Bimestrale contenente gli atti della Società promotrice degli studj filosofici e letterarj. Roma. 1874-75.*

*Vol. IX., Part 1—Contents—*(1). Transactions of the Society for the Promotion of the Study of Philosophy and Literature. (2). New Prolegomena to all Present and Future Systems of Metaphysics, by T. Mamiani. (3). The Form of Philosophical Thought and the Platonic Ideal of Philosophy, by L. Ferri. (4). Philosophy of History: The



Empire and the Kingdom of Italy, by D. Carutti. (5). Reply to the Letter of Count Mamiani to Prof. Bertini upon his Critique on Revelation, by G. M. Bertini. (6). Bibliography. Foreign Philosophical Journals. Recent Publications. *Part 2.—Contents—*(1). Transactions of the Society, &c. (2). Moral Science in France, by L. Ferri. (3). The Ethics of Spinoza, part fourth, of the Relations between Matter and Spirit, by S. Turbiglio. (4). Upon the Doctrine of Berkeley, by Collins Simon. (5). Critique on Revelations—reply to the letter of Bertini, by T. Mamiani. (6). Philosophy of Religion, critique on revelation, by T. Mamiani. (7). Bibliography Recent Publications. *Part 3.—Contents—*(1). Transactions of the Society, &c. (2). Concerning the Theory of Perception, letter to Count Terenzio Mamiani, by F. Bonatelli. (3). Letter replying to Prof. Bonatelli upon the Theory of Perception, by T. Mamiani. (4). Italian Philosophy Applied, by T. Mamiani. (5). Principles of Practical Philosophy according to Prof. Ulrici, by L. Ferri. (6). Bibliography. Foreign Philosophical Reviews. Recent Publications.

*Vol. X., Part 1.—Contents—*The Religious Question in Geneva, by G. B. Gandolfi, (2). The Philosophy of Religion, appendix to the letter of Mamiani in reply to Bertini. (3). Upon the Religious Question, a letter to Count Terenzio Mamiani, by A. Tagliaferri. (4). The Doctrine of Love according to Plato, by L. Ferri. (5). Bibliography. *Part 2.—Contents—*(1). Transactions of the Society, &c. (2). The Moral Problem according to Spinoza, by S. Turbiglio. (3). Philosophy of Religion, by T. Mamiani. (4). A Chronicle of the Philosophical Press, by G. Barzellotti. (5). The new Fancies of Justus the Cooper, edited for the first time with a continuous commentary, by a Della-Crusca academician, by T. Mamiani. (6). Bibliography. Recent Publications. *Part 3.—Contents—*(1). The Moral Problem according to Spinoza, by S. Turbiglio. (2). New Fancies of Justus the Cooper, edited, &c., dialogue second, by T. Mamiani. (3). Essay upon the Ontological Function of the Ideal Representation, by F. Bertinaria. (4). The Italian Philosophy Applied, by T. Mamiani. (5). Bibliography. The Religious Question of Geneva, Correspondence by G. Gandolfi. Recent Publications.

M. J. H.

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NOTE BY THE EDITOR.—In the "Outline History of Philosophy," printed in this number, on page 270, omission was accidentally made of the title of *Ueberweg's History of Philosophy*, to the excellent translation of which by Professor Morris (N. Y., 1872), the author is mostly indebted for the material of his summary.

# THE JOURNAL

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## SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

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### THE BASIS OF INDUCTION.

[Thesis Supported Before the Faculty of Letters, in Paris].

BY J. LACHELIER.

Translated from the French by SARAH A. DORSEY.

### III.

It is strange that the school of M. Cousin should have, in general, considered the principle of induction as primitive and irreducible. For the doctrine of this school upon substance and its causes, should offer, it seems to us, an easy means of explanation. If, in truth, phenomena are sustained and produced by entities, abstracted from the vicissitudes of sensible existence, what would be more natural than to search in the uniform action of these entities, the reason of the constant succession of phenomena? And what more satisfactory than to attach the principle which serves as a basis for science to that which is regarded as a basis of metaphysics and of the supreme law of thought? In this school the principle of induction is formulated ordinarily, by saying that there is order in nature: but there is not given perhaps a sufficiently precise idea of this order. Do they wish to say

that the elementary phenomena which compose the hidden woof of things (*la trame cachée des choses*) are connected by virtue of an inflexible mechanism, which mechanism ought either to maintain or subvert the exterior and apparent order of nature? Do they mean to say, on the contrary, that nature is engaged in maintaining the harmony of beings, the distinction of species, organizations, life, and the means, in short, which she ought to take in order to attain to this? In a word, is order in the means or in the results? This question will no longer be doubtful if one consents to attach the idea of this order to the doctrine of substance and causes. It is believed, generally, that the number of these entities is equal to that of the constant groups of phenomena that we call beings; and their presence appears indispensable above all in organized beings, for which they are a principle, at one time both of unity and of action. Their function is not then to connect each phenomenon to a preceding one by the tie of a blind necessity, but rather to co-ordinate many series of phenomena following one law of agreement and of harmony; if these are not final causes in the sense of Aristotle and of Kant, they are at least causes which act for ends. The conception of universal order is then according to this doctrine, exclusively teleological. Now if it is important to men in power, to count upon the regularity of phenomena more or less complex, upon which their preservation depends, the proper object of science, that which she pursues to-day more ardently than ever, is, on the contrary, to determine the elementary conditions of these phenomena. She has need then of a principle which will guarantee to her the relations of causes to effects, rather than those of means to ends, of a principle of necessity rather than of harmony. If each sensible individual is the work of a thing-in-itself, (*chose en soi*), which employs his wisdom to conserve it, it suffices to establish by a superficial observation the ordinary results of this secret labor: but it is absurd to follow from experience to experience a mechanism of phenomena which will only serve to fetter it, and in which it will vanish even as far as the distinction between individual beings. The principle of universal order, thus understood, is the formal condemnation of science, properly so called.

Whatever may be the insufficiency of this principle, it is interesting to examine if the metaphysic of the school which has adopted it offers it at least a solid foundation. The difficulty does not consist in deducing the notion of universal order from

that of things-in-themselves: For, besides that this latter notion is vague enough, all that one believes that he knows of the mode of existence and action of things is so fitted to explain the maintenance of an exterior order in nature, that we are tempted rather to see in it an ingenious hypothesis than a principle certain in itself. But this is not understood in this manner, and the existence of things-in-themselves is regarded as the corner stone, and nearly as the whole edifice of metaphysics. Let us see how it is proved, and if indeed it is proved.

The most simple process, if not the most sure, is to invoke in favor of this existence, the witness of common sense. Can any one conceive, it is sometimes asked, a property which does not reside in a substance, an event which may not be determined by a cause? Certainly not: but it is important to know what common sense means by cause or substance. All the world believes that an odor comes from an odoriferous body, and that a savor belongs to a sapid body; but we should profoundly astonish a man, a stranger to philosophic speculation, if we assured him that this body which strikes his eye and which resists his effort, is itself only a superficial indication of an entity which can neither be seen nor touched. *Substance*, for the vulgar as for the savant, is synonymous with matter; and the conviction that all reality is material is so profoundly rooted in most men, that only moral or religious reasons can decide him to make an exception in favor of the human soul. As to the word *cause*, it signifies for them one phenomenon which determines another; they are not of the opinion of Mr. Mill, who admits only a relation of succession, without any real influence, between phenomena, but they are still further off from believing that phenomena appear or disappear at the will of mysterious beings, armed with a sort of magic wand. Even examples which they use react against this doctrine, because, when a man has been assassinated, justice searches for the immediate cause of this event in the motion of a weapon pushed by a hand, and it is frightened from the pursuit of an entity which it would have small chance of catching. If one dared to speak in the language of Kant to common sense, we might say, that it believed firmly in *substances* and in *phenomenal causes*, but that it had not the slightest suspicion of *noumena*. If we should renounce the construction of common sense upon a question which is after all strange to it, there only would remain, it seems, for us to sustain that we know substan-

ees and causes by an immediate intuition, analogous to that of sense; for to say we know because we do know without explaining how, is to avow that we know nothing and have nothing to say. If we have no intuition of these entities, we have no idea of them, and the word which designates them has no sense; the affirmation of their existence even is without foundation, and the necessity which is alleged can have only a subjective and illusory character. We must leave to the Scotch school these verities of air, which impose themselves upon the mind in virtue of pretended evidence; and it is perhaps because the doctrine of substances and causes has for so long a time preserved this abstract form among us, that it has been judged useless to resolve the principle of universal order into a principle which had not any more solid foundation. On the other side, we must acknowledge that intuition, to which recourse has been had equally, has not so far furnished us with notions that are very precise upon the nature of these entities and upon the manner in which they operate. All that is known upon this latter point is that they develop or manifest themselves, that is simply to say that they contain the reason of sensible appearances; and, as to the first, not only is their essence still unknown, but their number even is so illy fixed, that one often employs the words *substance* and *cause* in the singular number; as if a phenomenon could be produced by the general idea of the *cause*, or as if all the phenomena were the immediate effect of a single and infinite cause. But if intuition scarcely teaches us anything about the substance and cause of a given phenomenon, it is still less fitted to teach us that *all* phenomena *must* have a substance and a cause; because it can have respect only to a determined object, and the intuition of a principle, outside of all actual application, is a contradiction in terms. The existence of a thing-in-itself outside of a phenomenon, even if it were given to us to perceive it, would be for us only a particular and contingent fact; and if all things should appear either in succession or at once before the eyes of our intelligence, this experience of a new kind would only reveal to us a universal fact, not a necessary truth. It is then useless to attempt to found metaphysics upon what is called the *principle of substance* and the *principle of cause*; because if knowledge of things-in-themselves is intuitive, it cannot be clothed with the form of a principle, and if it is not, it cannot pretend to any objective value. Lately the influence of Maine de Biran has



given birth in the school of M. Cousin to a middle theory, equally distant, it is believed at least, from an abstract dogmatism and from what may be called the *empiricism* of pure reason. According to this theory, and contrary to the primitive doctrines of the school, we seize immediately, not by reason but by consciousness, a substance and a cause, which is *ourselves*; and the office of reason limits itself to giving to this primitive knowledge a universal and necessary form, in revealing to us that the phenomena which are strange to us, have not less need of substance and cause than those of which we are the subject. But whether the operation of reason may be either primitive or secondary, it imports equally for us to prove that this operation is legitimate; and if it is demanded of us by what right we extend to all phenomena the conditions of existence of some, we have always to return to the one idea, whether it may be of a science without assignable origin, or whether it may be an intuition like that which is regarded as the exclusive privilege of consciousness. On the other hand, there may be raised some doubts upon the reality, or at least upon the extent of this privilege; and without contesting the original character of the notion of Ego, (*moi*) it is permitted to demand of one's self whether consciousness puts us in presence of a substance and a cause, in the sense in which these words are taken—that is to say—of a thing-in-itself, distinct from internal phenomena. It does not appear that we are well convinced of this—after all, since the spirituality and immortality of the soul are still continually established by arguments which this hypothesis, if it be verified, render absolutely worthless; and if it is incontestible that the *Ego* concentrates in its unity and enchains in its identity all diversity submitted to consciousness, perhaps it is just to see in this unity and this identity only the formal conditions of consciousness itself, and not the attributes of a substance charged to explain the apparition of it, and to guarantee the duration of it. It is not doubtful that our actions proceed freely and immediately from our faculty of *willing*; and from another point, if, as Leibnitz and Kant have taught, the succession of our internal states is not submitted to laws less rigorous than those of physical phenomena, we must acknowledge that we do not find within us, any more than outside of us, the trace of that absolute initiative which seems to characterize the action of a supra-sensible cause. But let us admit that we have consciousness of such an initiative. Is it then upon this model that causes distinct

from us must be conceived, and are we able to confide the care of maintaining the order of nature to entities endowed with a liberty of indifference?

A later and profound modification of the doctrine of substances and causes consists in substituting for these two words that of *Force*, and of saying that we perceive immediately, by a sort of special sense, the conflict of our forces with the external forces. The fact is certainly established, but it is also certain that content with establishing the fact, the principle is not demonstrated: For the sense of which mention is made truly does teach us that our movement is produced by a force, and even makes us indirectly recognize the action of another force in the resistance we meet: but this sense is evidently powerless to teach us that all the movements which are executed in the Universe are produced or arrested by similar forces. Still more, when they speak of forces as things in themselves, we figure to ourselves under this name. I know not what sort of spiritual beings each one of whom is charged with the impulsion of the movement, whether it may be of a living body or of an inorganic mass: now this is a supposition which is not only gratuitous, but which is absolutely rejected and contradicted by experience. It may be said that a star in motion is animated by a single force, but it is absurd to represent this force as a simple and indivisible being: For if this star breaks into many fragments each of which continued to go on in its own orbit, we are obliged to acknowledge that the total force which animated it is decomposed into as many partial forces as there are fragments to impel. We know that our muscular effort can, under the influence of our will concentrate itself in one single effort, but we do not know if it proceeds from one single focus, or rather we do certainly know the contrary: because while a part of this energy remains submissive to our control, another part may determine, in some one of our members convulsive movements which do not in themselves differ from voluntary motions. Thus not only is there nothing which authorizes us to affirm that the Universe may be a system of forces, but the existence of our own force, in the sense in which the word is taken, is an unsustainable fiction. Force is no more a thing-in-itself, than extension from which it is, for the rest, inseparable, and the particular sensation which attests its presence in us, does not lift us one single step outside of or beyond the sphere of phenomena. Only when

we are limited to saying that phenomena repose upon a *substratum* inaccessible to sense, if they do not give us a precise idea of that *substratum*, we are left at liberty at least to conceive it at our will, or rather are determined almost irresistibly to look for the type in our own thought. When we believe on the contrary that we seize immediately this *substratum* in each voluntary effort it is declared without circumlocation that the tendency to movement proceeds only from itself: The chimerical entities in which it is essayed to realize it, do not linger, but vanish away and leave us definitely in presence of a pure phenomenon charged with explaining itself and also all others. A Metaphysic which looks for its sustaining point (*point d'appui*) in experience is very near its abdication in the hands of physical science.

The doctrine of substances and causes and that which recognizes nothing beyond phenomena is shipwrecked then equally upon the problem of Induction, but from different reasons. Empiricism attempts vainly to settle itself upon the solid but too narrow ground of phenomena: The contrary doctrine, giving a larger basis to this principle, builds upon empty air, and does not succeed in establishing a necessity of thought, whilst thinking it satisfies it. Substances and Causes are only a *desideratum* of the Science of Nature, a name given to the unknown reasons which maintain the order of the Universe, the enunciation of a problem transformed into a solution by an artifice of language. Of the two paths we have followed so far, and between which our choice seemed limited, neither have conducted us to any goal: Does there exist a third? Where shall we find it?

#### IV.

However embarrassing this question may appear at first view, our hesitation cannot be long, because we have absolutely only one part to take. Outside of phenomena and in default of distinct Entities there remains only the thought itself: It is then, in the thought, and in its relation with phenomena, that we should search for the basis of Induction. But before attempting a solution of this kind, let us essay to give a precise idea of it, and to dissipate in advance, the prejudices or hindrances it may awaken.

There are only three modes, possible in which principles may be presented, because there are only three modes of conceiving reality and the act by which our minds enter into

commerce with themselves. We may admit with Hume and Mr. Mill that all reality is a phenomenon and that all knowledge is in last analysis, sensation: principles, if there may be question of *principles* in such an hypothesis, will then be only results, the most general results, of universal experience. We may suppose with the Scotch school and Mr. Cousin, that phenomena are only the manifestation of a world of Entities inaccessible to our senses: and in that case the principal source of our knowledge ought to be a sort of intellectual intuition, which would disarm at once and reveal to us, the nature of these entities and the action which they exert upon the sensible world. But there is a third hypothesis which Kant introduced into philosophy and which merits at least to be taken into consideration: it consists in pretending that whatever may be the mysterious basis upon which phenomena rest, the order in which they succeed each other is determined exclusively by the exigences of our own thought. The most elevated form of our knowledge is, in this hypothesis, neither an intellectual intuition nor a sensation, but a reflection, by which the thought seizes immediately its own nature and the relation it holds with phenomena: it is from this relation that we are able to deduce the laws which it imposes upon phenomena, and which are nothing less than principles.

It will be said that this hypothesis is absurd and destroys itself, since each phenomenon can not obey as many different laws as there are distinct thoughts: but it is easy to reply, that here we consider only the faculty of thought in the mind, and that faculty is acknowledged to be identical in all, by the world. When we suppose, for instance, that principles exist in themselves, and outside of all thought or at least beyond the thought of all who inhabit a world like ours, we suppose that all thoughts like ours are equally capable of understanding these principles: It is not therefore wronging their unversality to seek a basis in the very faculty through which they are known. But, we shall be asked, how can we deny that the existence of principles may be independent of our consciousness, or how shall we conceive that the thought may be able to modify, in some measure the nature of its objects? It is true, that there is nothing impossible in a principle's or a thing in general's existing outside of all commerce with our minds: but it will be granted to us, at least, that it is impossible for us to know anything about it, since a thing begins to exist for us only at the moment in which our



minds enter into intercourse with it. We willingly grant upon our side, that the existence of principles is independent of our actual knowledge, and that they do not cease to be true because we cease to affirm them internally: but it suffices for that that there should be a reason which will determine us to affirm them every time that we do think of them, and that this reason may be found in our own faculty of knowledge or in things external to our minds. In short we do not pretend that thought can modify by an arbitrary intervention, the nature of its objects: We assert only this, that in order that these objects should exist for us, they should possess in themselves a nature which would render possible the exercise of the thoughts. It is true, that it remains to know, whether thought is an empty capacity, which may be filled indifferently by all sorts of objects, or if the knowledge which we have of phenomena supposes one or several conditions upon their part: but we could not deny at least that in this latter case, these conditions ought to constitute, for all the phenomena, with which we have any business, the most inflexible of laws.

But the hypothesis which we propose is not only admissible in itself: it is the only admissible one, because it is the only one which permits us to comprehend how we can know *a priori* the objective conditions of the existence of phenomena. We may speak, it is true, of innate consciousness, which presents itself to our minds under a universal and necessary form: but it can not be proved that this consciousness connects itself with its objects, and that it is a true knowledge, and not a vain dream. To say that there exists a sort of pre-established harmony between the laws of thought and those of reality is to resolve the question by the question itself: How, indeed are we able to know that our knowledge accords naturally with its objects, if we do not already know both the nature of the objects as well as that of our intellect? It is needful therefore to recur to the direct intuition of reality, of which at least no one will contest the objective value: but whether this intuition bears upon simple phenomena, or upon things-in-themselves, it is equally certain that it cannot serve as foundation for principles, that is to say for universal and necessary knowledge. Things-in-themselves, which become objects of intuition for us, would be, in fact, only the phenomena of themselves: We might very well say what they were at the instant of appearance, but we could not question what they might be



every where and always, nor above all could we declare what they could, or might not be. But if the conditions of the existence of the phenomena are the conditions of the possibility of thought, we come easily out of this embarrassing alternative: because on one side, we can determine these conditions absolutely *a priori* since they result from the nature of our mind itself; and we can not doubt on the other hand, that they apply to the objects of experience, since, outside of these conditions, there is for us neither experience nor objects.

Now, how does this hypothesis, if we must call it so, permit us to render account in particular, of the principle of induction? We believe that we should resolve this principle into two distinct laws: one, according to which all phenomena is contained in a series, where the existence of each term determines that which follows it; the other according to which all phenomena is comprised in a system, where the idea of the whole, determines the existence of the parts. These are the two laws which it is needful to establish by showing that if they do not exist, human thought would be impossible: We shall begin with the first of these.

The first condition of the possibility of thought is evidently the existence of a subject which distinguishes itself from each of our sensations: For if these sensations existed alone, they would entirely confound themselves with the phenomena, so that there would remain nothing that we might be able to call ourselves or our thought. The second is the unity of the subject in the diversity of our sensations, as well simultaneous as successive: because a thought which was born and which perished with each phenomenon, would be for us only a phenomenon itself, and we should have need of another subject in order to gather all these scattered and ephemeral thoughts into the unity of a real thought. Now, how can these two conditions be filled, or how can they represent to us the unity of the subject thinking and the relation it sustains with the diversity of its objects? Shall we say that the subject is a substance, of which the phenomena, or at least the sensations which represent them to us, are the modifications? No, because, after the idea we usually form of substances they only manifest themselves by their modifications, and cannot, in consequence, be distinguished from them as a subject from an object. Shall we say that we are ourselves in our own eyes, a phenomenon, or rather a durable act, that of

voluntary effort, which opposes itself by its duration, and by its active character to the passive and ephemeral modes of our sensibility? No, because this effort which renews itself at every awakening, or rather at every single instant, and which is probably only a bundle of actions exerted separately by every one of our muscular fibres, does not present the character of absolute unity which appears to us indispensable to the subject of consciousness. Shall we search for the unity of this subject in that of a thought turned in upon itself, which contemplates itself outside of time and of all sensible modification? This hypothesis satisfies better than the preceding, the two conditions which we laid down above; but it seems to us still further removed from satisfying a third condition, which is nevertheless inseparable from the two others. We have indeed established, that sensations without subject and without connection cannot constitute of themselves any consciousness: but it is evident that consciousness does not any more consist in the solitary action of a subject shut up in itself, and external in some sort to its own sensations. It does not suffice therefore, to explain in a more or less plausible manner, how we are able to have consciousness of our own unity: it is necessary to show at the same time how this unity manifests itself, without dividing itself, in the diversity of our sensations, and thus constitutes a thought which is not only the thought of itself, but still more, that of the Universe. Now this is evidently impossible, if the subject thinking is given to itself by an act independent of all sensation and purely special: because not only could this simple and durable act, have not possibly anything in common with the multiple and successive acts which are related to phenomena, but we have no reason to believe that two functions, so strange one to the other, could be exercised by the same mind. The thought would find itself placed then before its own existence as an insoluble enigma: because it could only exist if our sensations were able to unite themselves in a subject distinct from themselves, and a subject which distinguished itself from them, would seem by that, incapable of uniting them. There is however, a means of escaping from this difficulty, and there is only this means: It is to admit that the unity which constitutes us, in our own eyes, is not that of an act but that of a form, and, instead of establishing amongst our sensations an external and factitious connection, to say that it results from a sort of affinity

and of cohesion natural to these sensations themselves. Now the relations natural to our sensations among themselves can be only those of the phenomena to which they correspond: The question then of knowing how all our sensations unite themselves in a single mind, is precisely the same as that of knowing how all the phenomena compose a single Universe. It is true that this latter unity is easier to admit than to comprehend: How, indeed, can several things, of which one is not the other, and which succeed each the other, form *one* thing? Why an infinite number of phenomena, of which each occupies a distinct place in time and space, should be in our eyes elements of a single world, and not of as many distinct worlds as they are different from each other is difficult to explain. Is it because these places, however different or distinct they may be between themselves, belong all to one single time and one single space? But what prevents our saying that space ends and begins with each of these bodies or rather atoms which occupy it, and that time dies and lives again at each vicissitude of the movements it measures? Space and time, in spite of the perfect similarity of their parts, are not in themselves one unity but on the contrary, an absolute diversity: and the unity which we attribute to them—far from serving for a basis for that of the Universe, can only repose itself upon the internal links of the phenomena which fill them. The question reduces itself then to the discovery of what makes this relation: and we are only able it seems, to represent to ourselves under this title an order of succession and of concomitance, in virtue of which the place of each phenomenon in time and in space may be assigned by relation to all the others. But always unity which results from such an order is still only a unity of fact, of which nothing guarantees to us the continuance: and we cannot even say that simple relations of time and place establish between phenomena, a veritable unity, in as much as these relations may vary at every instant, and that the existence of each phenomenon rests not only distinct, but still independent from that of others. It is not then in a contingent relation, but in a necessary connection, that we might be able to find at last the unity we look for: because, if the existence of a phenomenon is not only the constant sign, but still more, the determining reason of the other, these two existences are only then, two distinct moments of one existence, which continues itself by transforming the first phe-

nomenon into the second. It is because all these simultaneous phenomena are, as Kant has said, in a reciprocal action, universal, that they constitute one single state of things, and that they are the object of a single thought upon our part; and it is because each one of these states is only, in some sort, but one new form of the preceding, that we are able to consider them as the successive epochs of a single history, which is at once that of thought and that of the Universe. All phenomena then, are submitted to the law of efficient causes, because that law is the only basis that we can assign to the unity of the Universe, and that this unity in its turn, is the supreme condition of the possibility of thought. But the law of efficient causes not only renders possible our knowledge of phenomena; It is also the only explanation which we can give of their objective existence, and that existence furnishes a new demonstration consequently of it.

We can not seriously doubt that sensible things exist in themselves, and continue to exist after we have ceased to feel them; and, on another side, we cannot understand that there can be a color without an eye to see it, a sound without an ear to hear it, and, in general a sensible phenomenon outside of any modification of our sensibility. It has been believed that the existence of the world might be assured by concentrating it, in some way, entire, within the phenomenon of resistance: but this phenomenon is as relative to what is called justly, the sense of effort, as the other qualities sensible to our other senses; and, if it has the privilege of making us know the distinction of our body from other strange bodies, it certainly has not that of surviving itself or of guaranteeing to us, that these bodies and ours will continue to exist, when we cease to have consciousness of their contact. We may say, at the risk of not comprehending it ourselves, that existence does not belong precisely to phenomena, but to the substances in which they reside. But, whether we grant to skeptics that phenomena vanish with our sensations, and, in that case, it is useless for us to preserve pretended entities, which are for us, as if they were not; or whether we hold with the vulgar, that the visible sun loses nothing of its brilliancy in quitting our horizon, it is then equally indifferent whether its disc subsists in itself, or reposes upon an entity inaccessible to our gaze. Perhaps by the substance of the sun, one means not, an entity distinct from the visible sun, but the enduring existence which we attribute to the sun itself, and which



one wishes to distinguish from the passing impression which he produces upon our senses: but we find ourselves then in presence of the difficulty itself, which it is attempted to solve, and which consists in comprehending how a pure phenomenon can exist in itself and independent of all sensation. For the rest, we shall find looking closer at it, that such an existence is not seriously admitted by any one: because, when we speak of a phenomenon which produces itself in the absence of all sensible existence either we deprive it of the form under which it offers itself ordinarily to our perception or we become ourselves, in despite of our own supposition, the imaginary spectators. We might be able, then, it seems, to limit ourselves, to the recognition that phenomena, or, what is the same for us, our own sensations possess, beyond their actual existence, a sort of virtual existence, that is to say, that, even when we do not experience them, we might experience them, if we were placed in convenient conditions of time and place. One might be able even to suppose, with Leibnitz, that no phenomenon is absolutely excluded from our consciousness, and that not only the smallest parts, or the most distant parts, of the Universe are represented in us by some insensible perceptions, but that the past and the future are in some sort present to us, whether it be by the traces of past perceptions which mingle with our actual perceptions, or whether it be by the germ of future perceptions which an eye more piercing than ours might be able to discover in these very perceptions. We should make then, out of our own thought, according to an expression dear to Leibnitz, a Universe in abridgment; and we should be equally removed from the vulgar prejudice which places sensible things outside of all sensibility, and from the sceptical paradox which admits nothing beyond the grossest and most pronounced sensations, always, however, if we should succeed in procuring thus a sensible sort of existence for the world, we must acknowledge that this existence is still altogether subjective and relative to our individual sensibility: because we can not deny that common sense compels us, to distinguish sensible things not only from our actual sensations, but to detach them entirely from ourselves and to assure to them an existence absolute and independent from our own. Shall we say, with Leibnitz, that there exists an infinity of minds, each one of whom represents the same world to himself but under a differing point of view? But minds which represent bodies, are not bodies; and otherwise,



since we have any business only with our own representations, how shall we be able, not only to establish, but even to suspect, that there exist other minds outside of our own? For the rest, whatever the system may be, that is adopted we can never go outside of ourselves; we must then either shut ourselves up in a subjective idealism, very nearly related to scepticism at its best, or find in ourselves a basis capable of supporting at one time, the existence of the sensible world, and that of other minds. Now what can there be in us, which does not depend upon us, and which represents or rather which constitutes, an existence distinct from our own? This cannot be the phenomena themselves, which are only, at least for us, our own sensations. It is not their juxtaposition in space and their succession in time, since time and space seem to be only the forms of our own sensibility, and that it is impossible to assure ourselves that they may be anything else: but, if the place of each phenomenon in space and in time appears to us so determined by those which precede or which accompany it, that it is impossible for us to remove the thought of them, this necessary determination is doubtless something distinct from ourselves, since it imposes itself upon us, and it resists all the caprices of our imagination. Will it be said, that this necessity resides itself in us, and that it is not less relative to our understanding than the phenomena themselves to our sensibility? Let there be shown to us then an existence, or in general, a truth pure from all relation to our thought: but let us be permitted to say, in the meantime, that we are, in so much as we are individual, only the whole of our sensations and that a necessity of which our sensations, as such, cannot render any account, constitutes by that itself, an existence as distinct from our own as one could reasonably demand. It is not because we feel certain phenomena, one after the other, that they necessarily link themselves in a chain, but, on the contrary, it is because they should develop themselves in a necessary order under the point of view which is special and particular to them: and, as soon as we recognize that the series of our sensations is only a particular expression of universal necessity we conceive at the least, the possibility of an infinity of analogous expressions, corresponding to as many points of view possible upon the Universe. The necessary determination of all phenomena is then at once for us the existence even of the material world and the only foundation that we can assign for that of other minds; and if

one should prefer, in spite of all, to admit without proof existences absolutely external to our own, it is easy to show that one has more to lose than to gain by the change. The supposition of such existences has in truth, nothing impossible in itself: but if it is demanded what they are for us, it will be found that since they are situated outside of us, they can be given to us only by some impression they exert upon our intelligence: they will then only appear as a modification of ourselves, and will become absolutely subjective precisely because it is wished that they should be absolutely objective. An existence is only objective for us when it is given to us in itself, and it cannot be given to us in itself except it leaps in some sort out of the bosom of our own existence: between the subjective idealism of Hume and the objective idealism of Kant, it is for common sense to choose.

As to the rest, if the law of efficient Causes explains at once our own knowledge of phenomena and the existence which we attribute to them, these two things are strictly united, and can only form in reality one thing. The property of thought is in reality, to conceive and to affirm the existence of objects: and it is evident that a thing can exist for us, at least, only when it is of the number of objects of thought. But thought is nothing in its own eyes outside of the necessity which constitutes the existence of phenomena. How otherwise would it have consciousness of them, if it is substantially distinct from them, and how will it represent this necessity itself, if not as a sort of blind thought pervading the things? We do not know either what may be the existence of a thing-in-itself nor what consciousness we may be able to have of ourselves in another life: but in this world of phenomena of which we occupy the centre, thought and existence are only two names of the universal and eternal necessity.

## V.

Not only does the law of efficient Causes result *a priori* from the relation of thought with phenomena, but this law permits us to determine in turn, by a new deduction the nature of phenomena themselves.

It is evidently necessary that the laws should be applied to phenomena, since otherwise they would have no signification; and this application could take place only by a simple act of thought, which conceives each law in perceiving the phenomena

it governs. But, for this act to be truly simple, it is necessary that it should consist in seizing under two different forms, one only and the same thing, it is needful that the law should be only the abstract expression of the phenomena and that the phenomena should be only in their turn, the concrete expression of the law. Now this correspondence between phenomena and laws may be established in two ways: either, the conception of laws is determined by the perception of phenomena, or it must be on the reverse, the perception of phenomena which governs the conception of laws. We proceed in the first manner when we say, for instance that heat expands bodies; For we then only announce under a general form, what our senses have already represented to us in one or several particular cases. But it is not the same when it concerns the universal connection of causes and effects: We conceive here the law before having perceived the phenomena, and it is the secondaries who are in some sort made to furnish us with the sensible representation of the first. It is necessary then that we perceive even in the diversity of phenomena, a unity which links them together: and, since the phenomena are a diversity in time and in space, it is necessary that this unity should be that of a diversity in time and in space. Now a diversity in time is a diversity of states: and the only unity which can conciliate itself with this diversity is the continuity of a change, of which each phase differs only from the preceding by the place which it occupies in time. But a diversity in time and in space is a diversity of states and of positions altogether; and the unity of this double diversity can be only a continuous and uniform change of position, or in a word a continuous and uniform movement. All phenomena then are movements, or rather one movement which follows the same direction and with the same rapidity as far as possible, whatever may be the laws according to which it may transform itself, and whatever may have been upon this point the errors of the Cartesian mechanism. But what Leibnitz has never contested with Descartes, and what seems to us above all contest is, that all, in nature, ought to be explained mechanically. For the mechanism of nature is, in a world subject at once to the form of time and space, the only expression possible of the determination of thought.

Doubtless, we do not perceive movements only, but also col-

ors, sounds, and all which it is agreed to term the secondary qualities of matter: but we must not confound simple appearances which exist only in our sensibility, with veritable phenomena, which can alone pretend to a subjective existence. The phenomena in truth, should offer to us, in their diversity even, a sort of realization of the unity of thought: and this unity can not realize itself except in a homogeneous diversity, which may be, so to speak one in power, as that of time and space. Secondary qualities on the contrary are of a heterogeneous diversity, which has by itself or in itself nothing in common with that of time and space: because color is only extended through accident, and we cannot say that it augments or diminishes, when the surface it covers becomes larger or smaller. We can not admit either that these qualities have duration in themselves: because we cannot measure directly, either the time during which each one of them affects our sensibility, nor that which passes in the passage of a sensation to another sensation entirely different. But if they do not appear to us under the form of space and time, they are nevertheless given to us in space and time: and it would be impossible to render an account of the place they occupy in them, if no link attached them to a phenomenon which, alone, fills by itself both the one and the other. The perception of these qualities is then only, as Leibnitz believed, the confused perception of certain movements; and if they cannot give place for a direct and express knowledge, nothing prevents us from seeing in them, the object of an indirect and in some degree a virtual knowledge. If they are not phenomena, they are at least well founded appearances, and not vain dreams; They exist, not in themselves, but in movement, upon which they rest, and which they follow faithfully in all its vicissitudes: they are in us by themselves and outside of us by what they express. The movement is the only veritable phenomenon, because it is the only intelligible phenomenon; and Descartes was right in saying that every clear idea, was a true idea, because the intelligibility of phenomena is precisely the same thing as their objective existence. But there ought to be something true, even in the most obscure modes of our sensibility: because there is no place in our thought for an absolute illusion, and nothing of that which is given to us, can be absolutely excluded from the sphere of thought and from that of existence. The secondary qualities are in some sort, the matter set at a distance, (*matière éloignée*) of



existence and of thought: between the absolute diversity of this matter and the absolute unity of its form there must be an intermediate, and we find this intermediate, in the continuity of force.

If all, in nature, should be explained mechanically what becomes of spontaneity of life and the liberty of human actions? Must we subtract from the law of mechanism a considerable part of phenomena, or hold with Descartes, that beasts have no souls, and with Leibnitz, that our own movements are executed no otherwise than those of the magnetic needle? This is the double question which remains for us to examine now.

We cannot misunderstand the harmony which sustains the life whether it be of plants or of animals; It is required now to know whether this harmony is a simple result of general laws of motion, or if it is the work of a special agent, distinct from each organism and subject to laws exclusively teleological. Now this latter hypothesis seems to us, independently of all *a priori* consideration absolutely inadmissible. We can at first raise some difficulties upon the number or the division possible of these agents in plants, and in those of animals, who multiply themselves by a sort of budding out. We can demand in general, whence they come, whether they are created *ex nihilo* at the moment of each generation, and how they perish in spite of their simplicity, when the body which they animate comes to be dissolved. We can still further recall the provisional character of the explanation of vitality, and the ground upon which they have yielded, and upon which they continue to yield every day to mechanical explanations; but we will content ourselves with demanding from the partisans of this hypothesis how they prove what they advance, and by what sign they are able to recognize, in the formation and play of an organ, the intervention of an immaterial agent. Whatever opinion one may adopt upon the cause of vital phenomena, one cannot deny that these phenomena may be in themselves movements: The question is reduced to knowing whether all these movements are connected in virtue of laws of mechanism, or whether some begin and stop, changing in swiftness and direction, without being determined in these by other movements. Now how shall we penetrate profoundly enough into the structure of living beings, to assure ourselves that a suitable movement, which produces itself suddenly in a portion of their body, is not the consequence of impercepti-



ble movements which execute themselves first in the parts of this part? How shall we ever undertake such a research if we think that the division of these parts may go, and without doubt does go, as Leibnitz believed, into the infinite? More, it is impossible to accord to a spiritual agent the least influence upon vital movements without investing it, in regard to these movements, with a true creative power; for not only he could not suspend them without annihilating them, or without impressing upon the same parts, an unequal and inverse movement, which as Descartes has said, is the direction of the motion and is inseparable from the motion itself; this agent then could not change the direction of an organic motion without replacing it by another, or at least without producing a movement in a different sense, which would combine itself with the first. Now a creative power is, in its nature itself, absolutely illimitable. Behold therefore in the Universe as many sources of motion as there are living beings, and sources of which each can produce an infinite quantity. From whence comes it then that the quantity of motion, in consulting experience only, does not vary in the Universe? From whence comes it that our forces are so limited, and what hinders us, as Leibnitz asked, from leaping beyond the moon? From whence comes it, that they are so soon exhausted, and that they have need of being incessantly repaired by slumber and food? From whence comes it that each soul is so slow in constructing the body it inhabits and so prompt to let it perish?

The hypothesis of a spiritual agent, exclusively determined by final causes, seems above all, difficult to conciliate with the anomalies and the disorders which the organs and functions of living beings, often present. It is indeed impossible to hold seriously that this agent does its best to maintain harmony in the organism, but that all its good will is shipwrecked, as it were, against the blind power of matter: because there is no agreement nor possible conflict between material molecules which can only preserve or transmit a finite quantity of motion, and a spirit capable of creating at every instant an infinite quantity. We must then place within this spirit himself, the cause which limits or alters the action which he should exercise upon the organism. It would have to be said that there are ignorant souls, who confound the traits of the type they are charged to realize, and feeble or perverse souls who after having achieved their work, neglect to preserve it, or even take pleasure in hast-

ening its ruin. Now it is difficult to conceive how a simple being, who tends naturally to produce a certain effect, can encounter in itself an opposed tendency, or at least an insurmountable obstacle: and it must be conceded that things pass then in the soul, no otherwise than they would pass in the body, if the greater part of the organic movements tended in themselves, to accomplish themselves in the most convenient order, although this concert was destroyed in part by some irregular movements. But if the simplicity of this hypothetical being, seems compromised by aberrations and failures, that we are forced often to attribute to him, is it easier to conceive, even when we regard its action in the most wise, and sustained manner? It is necessary in truth, that it should represent itself under some form, and the system of organs that it constructs and the sequence of movements that it impresses upon them: it is necessary then that it should include in its pretended simplicity a precise diversity equal to that of the organism, and also a consciousness more or less obscure of this diversity: therefore what does it serve, and why, if we must admit such a consciousness should we not place it in the organism itself? In short, how is the plan after which it works, formed in the intelligence of this being? This plan, cannot be the work, either of his will, or even of the will of a stranger: because this will must have been directed by an anterior plan, which would suppose in its turn another will, and so on to infinity. It must be therefore that the plan of each organism should be formed in itself, before all reflection and all knowledge: it must be that the materials of this ideal organism, at first scattered and without form, should be assembled and polished in virtue of laws which are apparently inherent in them: but what prevents us then from saying as much of the real organism, and what is there absurd in explaining the formation of the body by a mechanism which ends by compelling us to transfer it to the soul? That this mechanism may be, in some sort, penetrated with final causes, is what we do not dispute, and is indeed what we reserve to ourselves to demonstrate later. We wish only to establish that nothing authorizes us to realize this purpose or design in a special agent subtracted from the general laws of matter and of motion. There remain only then, the actions of man which seem to derogate from universal mechanism; and it is needful for us to take our part of this derogation, if there is no other way to save freedom in the sense in

which it is bound to the fulfillment of the moral law; because we are bound by this law itself, to believe that we possess all that is requisite to fulfill it. But perhaps it is not necessary in order that we should answer for our actions, that there should be in the time preceding them, any reason which determined them; and it seems not less conformed to common sense, to explain in some sort historically, an action which may be guilty, than to condemn it in the name of conscience. All know how Kant essayed to put reason in accord with itself on this point, by placing moral liberty in a sphere superior to that of time and phenomena; and inasmuch as the falsity of this hypothesis has not been demonstrated, it will be permitted to us to examine whether our actions, considered as simple events, and an abstraction being made of their moral character, obey or not the general laws of nature.

Now, if we refuse to vital spontaneity the power of modifying the movements which are executed of themselves in our organism, it is clear that the same reasons ought to prevent our granting this to our will; and the external mechanism of our actions would not be the object of a single doubt, if internal experience did not pronounce, according to some philosophers, in favor of a liberty of indifference absolutely irreconcilable with this mechanism. The question reduces itself then to knowing whether we will without motive, or what amounts to the same thing, without taking account of the motives which solicit our will; and it is easy to show that upon this point the pretended decision of internal experience is contrary, not only to the supreme law of all experience, but still more to the facts acquired by an attentive observation. No one believes, in fact, or dares to pretend that a wise man, on an important occasion, will take indifferently the part he judges to be the better, or that which seems to him the worse; and it would be a waste of our time to weigh, in such a case, whether the for and against (pro and con) of our deliberation was an affair of pure curiosity, and that it ought not to exert any influence upon our conduct. We are reduced then to cite the example of those who act from caprice, as if their vanity and their idleness were not for them the most powerful of interests; insignificant actions are assigned to us, which we accomplish almost mechanically, and it is asserted that we are determined in these without reason, because we do not observe the reasons which do determine us. It is certain that a man who has

need of a guinea, and whose purse is filled only with pieces of this nature, will take at hazard the first one his fingers may encounter; but place only two guineas upon a table, and try to select one of them without motive; or lift up your hand, as Bossuet proposes, and see whether, in virtue of your free will, you can incline it to the left or to the right. Will it be to the right? No, because that movement will probably appear to you the most natural. It will then be to the left? No, because you have now a motive in avoiding the right. It will tend then to return to the right, but it is clear you have not advanced in this; and the question might remain lingering and hanging, if fatigue did not cut it suddenly short during a moment of distraction, in favor of the most comfortable movement.

It is sometimes said that if free will did not exist, all human life would be upset; but it seems that a liberty of absolute indifference, which would leave us without any hold upon the will of our kind, and would make of their future conduct an enigma to which they would not themselves have any key, would be more likely to produce the effect spoken of. It would not suffice to recognize that men ordinarily decide after certain motives, if we have no reason to think that these motives will decide them still upon given occasions; and it would be impossible to form the least conjecture upon this point, if their decision was not subjected to laws absolutely certain in themselves, however uncertain may be the knowledge we have of them. We are doubtless very far from being able to calculate the conduct of a man with the same precision as the path of a star; but there is also no proportion in the difficulty of these two problems, since this conduct is determined not only by inclinations whose relative strength varies from one instant to another, but yet more by the reflections which contribute to put them in play, and whose circle may extend to the infinite. It is none the less true that a mediocre knowledge of the character of a man and of the circumstances in which he is placed will suffice ordinarily for us to judge without great danger of error, of the part he will take; and the influence which men exercise over each other, whether in private or public life, depends in great measure upon the sagacity which they may exhibit in this way, and which for some men seems almost to be a sort of infallibility. But there is still another case in which it is given to us to understand almost certainly of the will of our kind; it is where we operate, not upon



individuals but upon masses, and where we endeavor only to determine a certain number of actions of a certain nature, whatever may be otherwise in particular those who are to accomplish them. It is thus that a skillful merchant is able to assure to himself a constant number of buyers, of which each one is personally unknown to him, and when he sells his business to another, he values in money not only the merchandise that is in his store, but still more the *good will* presumed, of these unknown persons who come to seek his merchandise. These calculations, in which human will is treated almost like a physical agent, have doubtless something in them humiliating to our nature; and nevertheless they are not only indispensable in our private transactions, but they have become, above all in our day, under the name of statistics, one of the principal elements of the science of government. There is a statistic of production and exchange, according to which political economy seeks the means proper to increase the wealth of nations; there is even a statistic of crime, upon which penal legislation ought to be regulated, in order to establish a sort of balance at each epoch, between the violence of passions which menace public security, and the degree of fear necessary to restrain them. What is there then surprising in that our actions obey externally a physical mechanism, since human society is founded upon a moral mechanism, which each one of us, in his sphere, finds it necessary perpetually to know and to manage the secret springs of?

A whole of movements, of which no external cause comes to modify the direction and swiftness, whether it be of living bodies, whether it be even of those in which intelligence is joined to life, such is then the sole conception of nature which results from what we know, so far, of the essence of thought. This conception, if it should be exclusive, would be a sort of idealistic materialism; but we should not forget that it responds only to one-half of the principle upon which reposes our knowledge *a priori* of nature, and we must go now to seek its completion in passing from the consideration of efficient causes to that of final causes.

(To be Concluded).

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## FRIEDRICH EDUARD BENEKE'S EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Translated from the Fourth Volume of Richard Lange's Revised edition of Dr. Karl Schmidt's History of Pedagogics, by LOUIS F. SOLDAN.\*

In his Psychology Beneke starts from the fundamental idea—derived from careful observation, that the soul is not a simple being, but that it consists of a multitude of simple powers or faculties. These however are quite different from what had been before considered elementary faculties. Beneke divides them into elementary faculties such as are born with us and may become subject to continual development, and into developed faculties that are formed out of the primary faculties, which have grown under the influence of the external world and by their own inner activity, and then exist as “formations” (i. e., as representations, concepts, desires, feelings, judgments, acts of the will, &c.) If we have been in the habit of ascribing to man one imagination, one memory, one reason, one will, these terms must be considered as mere abstract names like the terms forest, mankind, &c., in which the particular (trees, men) is comprehended. This abstract unity was taken by Psychology as single powers; what was homogeneous in regard to form was taken to be one. But, says Beneke, experience teaches the opposite. We see that the same person knows how to do a certain thing very well, but is a very poor hand at some other; or that he has a powerful will in one direc-

\*Friedrich Eduard Beneke was born in Berlin the 17th of February, 1798. He was a pupil of the Friedrich Werder Latin High School when he enlisted as a volunteer to take part in the German war of independence, in 1815. In 1816 he attended the University of Halle for the study of theology; he went to Berlin in 1817 to devote himself principally to the study of philosophy under Schleiermacher. In 1820 he became connected with the Berlin University as teacher (“privat docent”). In 1822 his lectures were prohibited by the government, which caused him to go to Göttingen in order to teach there. When that prohibition had tacitly been removed in 1827, he returned to the University of Berlin, where he was appointed *professor extraordinarius*, and after 1841 received a salary of 200 thalers a year. Having not been well for some time, he was seized in 1853 with *insomnia*. On the first of March, 1856, he disappeared suddenly, and on the fourth of June, 1856, his body was found in the water.

tion, and a very weak one in another. How can you make this agree with the theory of one understanding, one will?" The same is true in respect to memory. One and the same person can remember subjects of a certain kind easily and perfectly, but he cannot remember names: or, if his memory should happen to excel equally in regard to names, he is perhaps not able to remember numbers. Whence these different kinds of memory? If memory were but one power, the same person would remember all things with an equal degree of perfection. Antiquated psychological views hold that memory is *substance*, while the concept is the *accident*, i. e., that memory is the permanent principle, the reservoir, which receives into it the changing concepts. The new (Beneke's) psychology shows beyond contradiction, that memory does not exist at all as something outside of the concepts, but in and with them only, as their attribute, or more distinctly speaking, as their inherent principle of stability.\*

Every concept that vanishes from our consciousness exists with more or less force in the inner (unconscious) life of the soul: this is memory, and memory is naught but that. Each "formation" or product of this kind, which in this manner continues an unconscious existence, Beneke calls a "vestige" or "trace." From this follows that there can be no general, formal culture.† no general culture of the memory, of the understanding. Formal culture does not extend beyond the subject or study that is taught, it does not affect the mind in general. The committing to memory of Latin words, for instance, does not give culture and power to the memory in general, but merely as far as the faculty of learning words is concerned. In the same way mathematical instruction cultivates perception and judgment in regard to mathematical matters only. Whereas memory exists merely as something inherent in

\*Concepts when they arise show a certain power to continue to exist, a certain tenacity of life. They continue in existence in the mind and may be called into consciousness. This inherent attribute of each concept, says Beneke, is what is called memory.—*Tr.*

†Formal and material culture are words but too well known in German educational writings and polemics. *Material culture* means the fact knowledge gained by instruction, *formal culture* the training which the different faculties of the mind receive by education and in the acquisition of knowledge. We usually call material culture knowledge, and formal culture discipline of the mind, or culture.—*Tr.*

the "vestiges or traces of concepts" as their principle of stability, how can the power gained in regard to the concepts of Latin words become in any way useful for the remembering of physical perceptions, or the perception of plants, of men? And whereas judgment depends on concepts, the power gained in the direction of judgment by the acquisition of certain concepts, cannot go beyond the special contents or the subject matter of such concepts.\* And so with all the rest.

In the construction of his psychological system Beneke considers everything genetically; he explains that all mental activities, for instance, imagination, conception, syllogizing, inclinations, originate in sensuous formations. Sensuous perceptions furnish the material for the imaginative representations and for the concepts relating to the external world; these concepts again are the basis for judgments, syllogisms and for all the combined mental activities; inclination, likes and dislikes have their roots in the sensuous formations of pleasure and pain (or displeasure.) Whatever has come into the mind from the external world can be separated in consciousness from what is internal, so that the purely psychical elements can come into our consciousness by themselves, and by this process of abstraction arise the purely mental formations; as for instance the concepts, to think, to imagine, to will, to remember, etc. Still perception is not a simple element; the simplest elements are the sensuous impressions. A being that has only these, as the infant in the first period of his life, is incapable of distinct perception and still more of observation. Frequent reproduction of like sensations, that continue as vestiges or 'traces' and unite according to the law of the *mutual attraction* of the similar, is required in order to potentiate sensation and to raise it to a perception. The same process is necessary to potentiate the like parts of perceptions, in order to elevate them into concepts and finally by a like manner the similar material in lower concepts is potentiated and raised to a higher concept. From this the reason becomes manifest why the scientist, the chemist, the physician perceive and observe more

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\*The position Beneke takes is simply this: You cannot gain general culture from the study of special sciences. The culture which a person gains is culture in the science he studies, but not culture in general. A good arithmetician has certainly acquired strength by his mathematical work, but it is strength in regard to arithmetic merely, not mental strength in general.—Tr.

acutely and clearly than a person without special training in as much as the former does not see through his eyes merely ; his sense of sight is assisted by his concepts.

The primary faculties which we possess at our birth, are void of objects, but not absolutely void for all that. They contain a greater or less degree of vigor (ability to retain impressions) vivacity (lively impulse for action) and a healthful susceptibility or irritability for impressions. These innate qualities, which inhere in those primary faculties, as well as those that arise at a later time, constitute a significant content of these faculties even before they are developed.

The primary faculties, being connected with the physical organs of the body without losing their character of being purely mental powers, are divided into several higher and lower classes into which they grade themselves systematically on the basis of their relative vigor, forming thus what is called the higher and lower senses of man ; in this expression the physical side of man's nature (the organs) is not yet considered.\*

The primary faculties are graded according to the remaining two qualities (i. e. vivacity and irritability in regard to impressions), but this gradation is not the same in different persons, it is unequal. Sight is the strongest faculty in man, almost as strong is the faculty of hearing. The faculties of taste, smell, touch and the vital faculties constitute the lower senses, for they are not in as high a degree capable of holding and retaining what they have grasped, as the faculties of seeing and hearing, and hence no one can recall (reproduce) the impressions of the former as vividly as he can those of the latter at any time. The physical organs of sense have merely the function to assist the psychical primary faculties when they receive impressions (irritation). For this reason they should be in a healthy state. In the continuation of the process by which sensations are idealized so that they can enter the soul, the primary faculties are no longer in need of the external organs. A person may have become deaf or blind, but whatever has been developed in his mind retains its untrammelled activity (in thinking, imagining, judging, willing). The muscular forces are purely physical forces which

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\*It is important to notice that Bencke recognizes the spiritual element in perception ; the organ of sense is capable of physical sensation, but mind is necessary to raise a mere sensation to a perception.—*Tr.*



however stand in the closest connection with the psychical faculties.

The first development of the mental senses is caused, according to constant experience, by impressions from outside which in Beneke's Psychology are called irritations or excitations. There are not two persons in whom this development takes place in the same way, for there are two causes that prevent this. In the first place the primary faculties, although they are everywhere graded into higher and lower faculties, are not found with all persons to possess the same degree of vigor. Some people have for instance a very strong power of sight, others less so. In the second place, no two human beings possess the same power of being affected by external influences (or the same amount of irritability), even if they have grown up together. This causes great diversity and difference in the development of individuals.

Irritations or excitations occur with different ratios of intensity or force; and there are five principal grades or degrees which frequently, however, pass over into each other almost imperceptibly. The excitations or irritation as affecting the primary faculties can be (1) insufficient, (2) adequate, (3) abundant, (4) gradually becoming too strong, (5) being too strong suddenly. From the first (insufficient irritation) results the sensation of displeasure, from the second (adequate irritation) the sensation that leads to distinct perception, from the third (abundant irritation) the sensation of pleasure, from the fourth (gradually excessive irritation) the sensation of surfeit or satiety and aversion; from the fifth (sudden excessive irritation) the sensation of pain. Hence each of these sensations is two-fold: it consists of faculty and irritation, and the faculties are developed in a different way by each sensation. The primary faculties are strengthened by the second class of sensations more than by the third: in the first class they experience a relaxation, in the fourth they suffer a gradual and in the fifth a sudden overstrain and hence are weakened. Whatever has become a clear concept by the accumulation of a number of "vestiges" or "traces," (impressions received into the memory) has its origin in the second grade of irritation or excitation as given above, i. e., only irritations that are neither too strong nor too weak, but simply adequate, lead to a clear concept. Mental formations or products that fill us with dislike and repugnance must have their origin in the first, fourth or fifth degree of irritation or excitation (i. e., in insufficient, gradually exces-



sive, and suddenly excessive irritations.) Whatever mental product assumes the form of desire has its origin in the third kind of irritation or excitation (abundance of irritation). In a healthy state the soul desires only what pleases it, and it is adverse to what gives it displeasure or tones down its faculties. Whatever presents itself on the neutral ground between pleasure and displeasure, is conceived by the soul in the form of thought or representation. The soul is neither attracted by it as by the impressions of pleasure nor repulsed as in the case with objects that cause displeasure, surfeit or pain. The impressions produced by the second kind of irritation or excitation and worked into concepts and judgments by the mutual attraction of what is similar, make man a theoretical or thinking being; but he becomes a practical or acting being by the impressions that find their source in the other degrees of irritation. The mental formations or products that cause pleasure or displeasure (the "affectives" or "appreciatives") give the impulse for activity or passivity, both being regulated by the accompanying concepts. Even a mere sensation may make itself felt as an impulse; by the accumulation of vestiges or traces which the repeated impulses leave in the mind, the impulse develops into desire or aversion and in the continuation of this process of development these elements change into inclinations, which in a still higher stage are called propensities, passions or even vices. Volition we call a desire that is connected with a series of concepts, in which we already anticipate that we shall obtain what we desire, because these concepts tell us that the means for the attainment of the desired end are within our power.

The sentiments are not independent or fundamental formations or products, in the way that concepts, desires and aversions are. Sentiments are caused by the fact that two different fundamental formations or products may arise side by side in our consciousness, by which their difference, their distance from each other becomes manifest. This manifestation is and is called sentiment. Hence sentiments may be simple or compound.

From the affections which are the class of formations or products to which the sentiments or feelings belong, arise the concepts of affection by the law of the mutual attraction of the homogeneous and, like the concepts of representation or thought, become transformed into judgments and syllogisms. This process consists simply in this, that in each judgment the corresponding

thought-concept (*Begriff*) arises in our consciousness and connects itself with the image-concept (*Vorstellung*). Thus the judgment is cleared from its subjective character, inasmuch as a thought-concept is a clearer psychical formation than the products from which they have arisen, because it is a psychological law that if like impressions unite in our mind they assume a clearer shape in our consciousness.

According to Beneke the soul is altogether a spiritual being. He proves that even the primary faculties (the sensuous faculties) are spiritual in their elementary shape. They bear in themselves the germ of consciousness, which develops into actual consciousness under the exciting cause of external irritations. By the accumulation of mental vestiges or traces according to the principle of homogeneity, this germ grows into clearer and more perfect consciousness in the shape of perceptions, concepts, ideas, syllogisms, judgments, &c. Thus problems are solved which could never be explained by the old psychological doctrines, for instance, why certain concepts never arise, as in persons born blind the concepts of light, day, color, or with persons born deaf, the concepts of music, sound, noise, harmony. These concepts cannot arise because the sensuous-spiritual primary faculties cannot develop in these persons. What we call the faculty of understanding is a natural consequence of our having concepts, and of the clearness of consciousness inherent in them; for the expression: I understand this, is but another form for: This is clear to me. Hence there can be no understanding of anything unless we have the requisite concepts, and these will be missing in the cases referred to, since their source, the primary faculties, could not receive any culture, because the diseased organ refuses its co-operation. Persons who are born blind, obtain the power of sight after the cataract has been removed by successful operation. They learn to see by degrees, and the concepts of color, day, &c., arise in them. Understanding, therefore, is the result of concepts, and these again are formed by the mutual attraction of the homogeneous elements in our perception. Hence the faculty of understanding does not create the concepts, as it is simply their result. In the lower senses we never obtain very clear concepts, but we do in the higher senses, those of sight and hearing. Taste and smell recur to consciousness in a very indefinite, obscure, and vague way. From this follows that consciousness as it exists in our concepts, and in a modified way and lim-

ited extent in our perceptions find its origin in the greater vigor of the higher senses; this quality of our senses is therefore the main source of consciousness. For this reason animals, even those that show the highest organization, possess no clear developed consciousness, although they have the same senses as man, and frequently exhibit in them a greater susceptibility to irritations, and greater vivacity. But their senses lack human vigor entirely; compared with those of man they are altogether lower senses. Hence even the most intelligent animals have merely a kind of *analogon* to the human understanding. Whatever has made an impression on them is retained in a very inefficient manner. These statements show that there is no ground for the accusation of materialism which has been brought forth against Beneke; with him even the sensuous is of spiritual character, and it has the name "sensuous" for the sole reason that it is capable of receiving external impressions. The primary faculties are spiritual-sensuous faculties; they are not physical but psychical powers in elementary form. In Dressler's essay: "Is Beneke a Materialist?" the supposed materialism of Beneke has been thoroughly refuted.

The value of the pedagogical results of Beneke's Psychology should not be underestimated. True enough it is that Pestalozzi's system of instruction already required the teacher to appeal to the senses of the pupil by beginning instruction with the training of the perceptive powers. But Pestalozzi's adherents have never considered the question sufficiently how much the value of their method depends on the manner in which it is applied. Beneke demands with good reason that care must be used in regard to the very first impressions on the infant soul, as all future development depends on the sensuous beginning. (On this observation he bases his argument in favor of the corresponding views and demands of Friedrich Froebel). "Guard the weak faculties against all injury by excessive irritation or excitation, but look to it that the first perceptions are of sufficient copiousness, variety, vigor, vivacity and freshness. Do not present too many nor too few impressions to the child; do not hurry it from one impression to the other for by such a method the child will be prevented from observing and perceiving objects properly. Neither pictures nor models but the objects themselves are the best illustrations at the beginning: for they impart the freshest impressions and lead to vivid and vigorous perceptions. Memory should not

receive training by mere words when objects are concerned, nor should it receive a kind of general training, but should be trained on definite objects that are to be remembered. Similar principles are valid in respect to the training of the understanding. The perfection of the faculty depends on the degree of perfection with which the particular image-concept was formed originally and is retained. Perfection of the power of understanding is dependent on the growth of sensuous perception, sensuous attention and on the development of memory and imagination. For this reason nothing is more injurious to the culture of the faculty of understanding than a careless and vague manner of perceiving and observing. As the thought-concepts originate in image-concepts, in which the dissimilar elements are obliterated (a process which is called abstraction) the educator should take care that the child receive a copious number of these fundamental image-concepts. The more numerous they are, the more homogeneous elements they supply and the clearer will the thought-concept be in our consciousness. Hence we must patiently await the growth of these original image-concepts and avoid leading the child prematurely to deal in abstractions. The sooner perceptions are used for the formation of abstractions, the less fact material for abstraction can be collected. Soon the latter will be exhausted and further progress crippled. Let children remain children. It is nature's will that at the beginning the sensuous element preponderates in the young human being, that afterwards reproductive intelligence, and lastly productive intelligence, experience their principal development. This order should not be disturbed by the educator. In regard to the training of character and of the feelings we meet in Beneke's philosophy with similar practical results. Absence of moral dimness and weakness is the basis of all that is good in man. Practical virtues can be reduced to six classes. (1) General vigor of the practical mental formations or products. (2) Agreement of inclination and interest with the true value of things. (3) Proper extent and limitation of inclinations or interests and their harmonious agreement. (4) Clearness, firmness, connection and culture of the practical faculties. (5) Copiousness, correctness, refinement in the acquired training of such series of image concepts as relate to the finding of adequate means for any definite aim. (6) Training and culture of the faculties for action so that they result in suf-



ficient skill and useful habits. A thoroughly vigorous training of the soul may be regarded as the basis of all other virtues. We can educate a powerful will to the extent only in which we can keep the soul free from hurtful and confusing impressions. There is nothing more injurious to a vigorous development of the will-power than obscure and confused image-concepts or expectations : we should be careful to guard the child against these. Avoid the growth of all strong, violent and lasting desires and appetites by satisfying every needful demand of the child which is natural and not excessive. Above all other things let the educator guard the child's soul against envy, jealousy and similar passions as they arise even in the youngest child by unreasonable preferment of, praise of, and rewards or presents to, other children. If we give to the child an occupation adequate to his powers, if we abstain from useless commands and prohibitions, if we are careful not to cause wants and desires that cannot be gratified, if we banish from education all petting that is at once effeminating and weakening, there will be no obstinacy. Should it make its appearance nevertheless, punishment ought to be inflicted, but there must be no scolding nor subsequent ill will or resentment on the part of the educator.

If tendencies to recur often to certain classes of frequent image-concepts of pleasure and desire, combine and unite in the mind, we call this an inclination. In case these elements that produce inclinations are very strong and numerous, we call their result propensities and passions. "There is nothing innate in the human soul except the general character of the primary faculties, i. e. a certain degree of susceptibility to irritations or excitations, vivacity and vigor." The same is true in regard to the moral principle and the appreciative faculty by which the mind judges of right and wrong, good and evil. As the moral code of law is not given to the mind originally, no consciousness of its value exists in the young mind, nor is there any estimation of the Good before the development of the soul has reached the point which is requisite for the growth of such moral inclination or appreciation. Hence, educational science must suggest the following as the task of moral education. (1) To cause and favor the development of the higher moral appreciations or estimations in regard to all the conditions and all activity of life that are based on these appreciations. (2) To keep under the right control the development of the lower moral ap-



preciations or estimations, so that they do not arise too frequently and become too strong.

As regards religious culture, less depends on comprehension of its principles than on their harmony with the higher moral and psychical needs, on enthusiasm, devotion, strength and character. As these can be gained by a great number of "vestiges" or "traces" only, religious training must begin with the earliest childhood. In religious instruction prudence and care is necessary in regard to whatever is yet removed far beyond the feeling of the child, because otherwise mistaken views and prejudices may arise that will last through life. The positive characteristics of the different forms of religions should not be presented in the earlier period of youth nor should any stress be laid on the contrast in which one form of religion stands to others. True religious culture must be built on a deep foundation in the innermost heart, it must be strong enough to give to the human being character and strength of resistance when the world surrounds him on all sides with its allurements or attacks. This strength can be acquired by a great variety of adequate vestiges or traces only. Mere instruction is insufficient. The principal condition is that the soul of the educator himself be filled and animated with the religion he teaches. He must carefully select the time when the child may be expected to be most susceptible, and should guard against connecting the conception of God with the sensation of fear. True religious belief will be acquired only when all the surroundings of the child religiously co-operate.

Instruction, says Beneke, deals almost exclusively with image-concepts and the acquisition of skill; education, however, concerns itself principally with the training of the feelings and the formation of character. Both should pass over into each other continually: education must work for instruction. Without attention, for instance, instruction cannot be successful. In the same way instruction that deserves its name should serve the purposes of education. The distinction between formal and material culture is void: There is neither purely formal nor purely material culture; each mental vestige or trace of instruction is at the same time mental power. Neither is the distinction between studies that teach practical knowledge and studies that give ideal culture or mental discipline a valid one. Culture-studies impart knowledge as well as the others, although the knowledge may be of a different kind, and ideal culture is certainly practical in at

least one respect, as it gives mental training that may be utilized in any practical activity.

The principal rules for instruction are: 1. Instruction must find the conditional factors for its future educational results in the soul. Hence instruction should be connected, continuous and unbroken. It should begin with the particular or with whatever presents itself immediately to external or internal perception. Thus, for instance, arithmetic should not begin with the abstract number but with objects, grammar with examples from which rules and definitions may be derived, moral or religious instruction with immediate feelings.

2. The several factors in instruction must be made to lend their co-operation in as perfect a way as possible. In order to cause the image-concepts required by the study to rise in the soul it is advisable to have but a single principal study taught for some length of time. The pupil should be made to prepare the lesson; he may assist weaker pupils in their work or instruct them. The teacher should manifest love for his work, earnestness and thoroughness, should not withhold warm praise when he notices the progress of his pupils, should point out the usefulness of the study and should make instruction as interesting as possible. A study should neither be too difficult nor too easy, should not overcrowd the pupil with facts, should require self-activity and give information not merely for the wants of the school room, but for life. The subject matter of instruction, says Beneke, is taken partly from the external, partly from the internal world. The image-concepts of the external world rest on the basis of sensuous perception; those of the inner world on the basis of the perception of consciousness. The most concrete perceptions of the external world we find in purely descriptive geography and astronomy, in purely narrative history, in as far as it relates to the external world. A half abstract view of the external world is contained in natural history and philosophy and chemistry and a highly abstract view in geometry and arithmetic. The inner world appears in the most concrete representation in language, more abstractly in grammar, still more so in logic, psychology and in the science of morals and religion. External skill and dexterity may be considered first in respect to the support which the psychical element receives from the physical, and next, in how far the physical is made to serve the development of the psychical in its relation to the external world. To the

first class belong calisthenics and gymnastic exercises, to the second penmanship, reading, drawing, painting, music, &c. Instruction in language is, according to Beneke, the central point of all instruction. We have to distinguish in it four elements: 1. The acquisition of language as such. 2. Communication of mental combination by language. 3. The practice by which the pupil learns to use his vocabulary for the expression of thought with certainty and skill. 4. The acquisition of clear and conscious knowledge of the relations and forms of mental development: their comprehension in a special kind of image-concepts and thoughts—i. e. grammatical instruction in the widest sense of the term. Of these elements the child when he enters school brings with him a more tolerably complete preparation for his mother tongue than for any other part of the study of language. The new knowledge that the school is to furnish in this study is instruction in the visible characters of written language, and their synthesis in orthography. The mental associations that have instinctively been formed in regard to language have to be analyzed and their rational basis be brought to clear consciousness. This method of instruction in the mother tongue that begins with analysis is peculiar to it and distinguishes it from the instruction in other languages, where instruction must begin with the particular and use synthesis to rise to more complex forms.

The means for instruction in orthography (spelling) are the analysis of words, etymological explanations, practice in the use of words, copying, comparison of the copied words with the original, reading during which attention is paid to the spelling. In teaching grammar to children belonging to the higher classes of society, it is not necessary to go beyond the general logical basis of the science; but with children from the lower classes of life instruction in grammar must go further and present to them a great many examples of correct writing and speaking, &c. The aim of all instruction should be productivity in the mother tongue; all other instruction should be brought into immediate connection with instruction in language. In instruction in foreign languages both the audible characters or expressions and their connections with the ideas for which they stand must again be learned; hence by this the mind receives culture also in this direction. The intellectual horizon grows very much wider, and we are more thoroughly freed from the narrow view by which

our form and expression of feeling, conceiving and thinking, have appeared as the only possible and necessary ones; by stripping ourselves from the one-sidedness which is the unavoidable consequence of isolation, we train our mind into a many-sided susceptibility and versatility.

Ancient languages afford the highest culture of this kind. In studying them the pupil assimilates the views and modes of thought which underlie these writings, and by admitting into his soul these ideas, he gives to his mental development such a breadth, to his mental power such a versatile and many-sided culture as cannot be imparted by the study of any modern language.

Instruction in history is the complement of that in language, inasmuch as it presents psychical effects and phenomena; another complement is found in instruction in morals and religion. While instruction in history lies more in the field of conception, of logic and æsthetics, morals and religion deal more with the training of the emotions and of character. Mathematics is an invaluable study for formal culture on account of its clearness, thoroughness, the stringency and the objective character in its scientific construction; to this may be added its material importance and extensive use in life, and the fact that it governs in the highest degree most of the other sciences, and hence must be considered an essential element of human knowledge in general.

The natural sciences and geography are of less educational value, for with the exception of the part in which they admit of the application of mathematics, they require no intellectual activity beyond the formation of groups or series of image-concepts. The acquisition of talent for the latter, however, is not without importance, when we consider the value of the habit of grasping external phenomena with wide-awake readiness and energy.

The only kinds of skill and dexterity that are of relatively high value are those that are purely the manifestations of physical strength, and those that express certain activities of our emotional nature. While the former are important for the bodily health of the child, the external activity which is symbolic of certain intellectual and emotional processes, such as we find it in declaiming, gesticulation, singing or music in general, in drawing, in the manual production of form of any kind, is of great importance in the culture of intellectual faculties as well as in



the training of emotional nature and character. But whereas their higher development requires certain special talents, it cannot be made subject of instruction in general.

These studies, taking them as a whole, are of different importance to the different kinds of schools. The different kinds of schools and institutions of learning are conditioned, on one hand by the nature of the human being, and on the other by circumstances and the requirements of life. In the common school those are educated whose calling it will be to operate with the physical world by their physical strength. Hence it might be said that the preparation for their calling lies beyond the limit of school instruction. But granting that the pupil's vocation required his physical powers exclusively, they are not to work as pieces of machinery, but as human beings, that is, with conscious understanding. The pupils, moreover, as human beings, will stand also in other and higher relations to mankind. Hence we must initiate them, as far as time and circumstances permit, into the intellectual progress of their surrounding world. Such instruction need not go beyond the immediate surroundings, nor is it necessary to lead to fundamental causes even in this. Hence there is no need for teaching any language in the common school except the mother tongue, and instruction in the history and geography of foreign nations should and must be limited to a most general outline.

The pupil of a grammar school or "Real-schule" [English high school] may be supposed to find his future calling in an activity that deals not with the intellectual but with the physical world; but this activity is an intellectual one. Inasmuch as the pupils will have to deal with the physical world, they must be made acquainted with its objects and laws; in as far as the pupils' activity is to be intellectual, we must make them feel at home in the intellectual world also; they are, however, not to be led to the fundamental, philosophical, and historical presuppositions. It is sufficient to make accessible to them the nearest or immediate culture, that of the present day, such as can be gained from the study of modern languages and modern history. The fundamental idea of the Latin high school or the academy (German *Gymnasium*) is the preparation for some intellectual activity in regard to the intellectual world. The main study in schools of this kind is that of ancient languages, not for their sake, but as means for the before men-



tioned end. No important province of human knowledge or activity must remain entirely unknown to the pupils of a school of that order, as they are expected to acquire the highest culture, and general directive ability. They should obtain a general knowledge of the material sciences and mathematics, and should study the elements of the science of morals and religion. By these studies the faculties of the pupil should receive sufficient training, to form a basis upon which the college or university can build the superstructure of the highest culture available in our times.

The psychological and pedagogical views of Beneke have found favor with many German teachers, but have not attracted so much the attention of philosophers. Mr. Dressler was the first person who called closer attention to it, by a popular treatise: "Beneke on Psychology as a natural science." F. Ueberweg also assisted in the attempt to obtaining recognition for Beneke's Psychology and Pedagogics by the essay "The Development of Consciousness by the Teacher and Educator." Among other writings of this class the following may be mentioned: Otto Boerner "The Science of Consciousness in its Didactic and Pedagogical Applications," and "The Freedom of Will, Responsibility and Punishment in their Fundamental Principles," and especially the works of Fr. Dittes, which are so very suggestive for teachers: "The Human Consciousness, its Psychological Explanation and Educational Training;" "The Principle and Educational Importance of *Æsthetics*;" "Religion and Religious Training;" "The Natural Science of Morals and the Art of Moral Training;" "Treatise on Ethical Freedom with Special Reference to the Systems of Spinoza, Leibnitz and Kant." The work that did most for the propagation of Beneke's psychology is "Dr. F. C. Beneke's New Psychology, presented to the friends of Objective Truth in a popular form" by Dr. G. Raue, Professor of the Medical Academy of Philadelphia, fourth enlarged and revised edition by Joh. Gottl. Dressler, Principal of Normal School in Bautzen, (Published in Mayence, Germany, 1868). A translation of this book into the Dutch language appeared in 1859.

There have been many opponents to Beneke's Psychology, as might be expected. Karl Schmidt finds fault with it because it is the product of self-observation, which in itself is always of very doubtful success. "Self-observation" says Waitz "is almost impossible, because our life is subject to continuous chang-

ing and flowing. By far the greater part of the changing states of the mind can neither be produced nor retained at our will. The statement that we can observe our mental self involves an error of observation, as every state of the soul loses intensity when the soul is at the same time observing it. For the mind must split itself into two parts in this process, it cannot sink itself altogether in an activity, if it wants to observe this activity at the same time. But how can such an unavoidable error of observation be corrected? The state of the soul must have weakened to a certain degree before it lays itself open to observation. In the strictest sense self-observation is impossible, because the observation of a psychical state, or the occupation of the soul in its contemplation is a new state of the soul that succeeds the one that is to be observed. Hence this second and the subsequent state of the soul would have to be observed again, to know the totality of the phenomena that arise in the soul." "As long as Beneke"—says Schmidt—"besides observing the activity of his own soul observes that of others, this observation is one belonging to natural science, but he leaves this basis the moment he deals exclusively with self-observation and assumes that whatever belongs exclusively to him, to his inner life is true in general of the soul-life of all human beings." Beneke's adherents maintain in opposition to this objection that every mind unbiased in the observation of mental phenomena will find confirmation of Beneke's view in himself and others: that the practical teacher in particular has the opportunity almost every hour to observe how souls will obey if treated according to the principles of the "new" psychology.

Schmidt says furthermore: "Beneke did not recognize the emotional and volitional nature in its true principles. Hence in the development of the pupil he does not know how to make use of all the elements of culture which religion contains. Hence, he does not recognize the full educational import and value of natural sciences: he sees in them merely groups and series of conceptions. Nor has education the power which Beneke attributes to it: according to him all the faculties and gifts which a pupil may have by nature consist of the ability to receive and retain sensuous perceptions and sensations, to group and separate them according to similarity and dissimilarity. &c. And lastly Beneke errs in his view of the essence of education, when he says that the aim of education is to raise untrained reason to

a state of training and culture and to elevate the pupil to the position occupied by the educator. This is, as Graefe says, the very excess of egoism, and as G. Baur remarks, the pupil remains without any divine impulse and education without a divine aim." In answer to this the adherents of Beneke's psychology reply that the founder himself acknowledged that his work as well as any other work of human hand was capable of improvement. They think on the other hand, that Beneke's system is beyond all doubt the most perfect one ever set forth in Psychology or Pedagogies. The formerly obscure doctrine of the emotions is elucidated and the principle of religion is more clearly explained than had been the case before. The distinction between education and instruction is more sharply defined than was possible previously, and the success of practical education is better secured on the basis of this "new" psychology than according to the principles of the old science.

Gieseler raises the following objections to Beneke's system (Diesterweg's *Rheinische Blaetter*, November—December 1861): According to this psychology the human soul is an absolute void out of which the primary faculties emerge continually like the unrestrained arms of a polypus to grasp things, to hold more or less of what has been grasped, to utilize into new strength the nourishment that has been greedily devoured, and at the very last all this is barely fused together into the common stock of general consciousness. These primary faculties are to be homogeneous and to condition all knowledge, otherwise they cannot be the original principle; they must not have any positive content in order not to exclude the universal validity of his natural law. Except a formal difference of these primary faculties (in regard to vigor, vivacity and susceptibility) no gift or disposition that is born with us is admissible, no natural talent, no innate ideas, no ethical tendency. But can any educator close his eyes against the very contrary experience? Are there not talents that develop from the very beginning in a definite and limited direction? If Beneke's views were true and if these talents consisted merely of a greater vigor &c. of the primary faculties, would it not follow that these talents should manifest themselves not in a definite direction but in a wider sense as general talent? Does not a definite predisposition manifest itself in the child's inclinations? Whence, otherwise, the well known psychological fact that kleptomania develops in persons whose previous condi-

tion in life makes another explanation impossible? Has not every educator frequent opportunities to observe, that of two children, one like a bee gathers nought but honey from even a poisonous plant, while the other will find but the poison even under the most wholesome influences. The infinite variety of dispositions and inclinations which are found even in little children cannot be explained by the theory of a mere formal difference of primary faculties. Our decision about the question of natural talents has a far higher significance in another respect. If there is any principle in man that is divine, free, eternal, it must be something original that is born with us. If the higher spiritual wants, views and aspirations, the ideas of the true, the good and the beautiful, the religious and moral sentiments and free will are merely the products of a fortunate combination of psychical forms, then Beneke may be right in saying that the sole distinction between the human and animal souls lies in the relative vigor of the primary faculties. The ethical principle according to Beneke is shown to be the highest good by means of our appreciative faculty. But this does not explain how even a child may have the feeling of duty, the sense for the ethical commandments, as with him the appreciative faculty could not have developed itself for want of any empirical basis that determines ethical value. But we know how frequently this ethical judgment is found in children in its purest form. It is likewise inexplicable how it is possible to gain such a normal basis or scale for moral estimation or appreciation, of which Beneke says that it underlies all ethical feeling, without having these feelings first. Conscience is said to be the feeling that our action varies from the estimation of right which is valid for all human beings. But how can we obtain this consciousness of universal validity without previous ethical feeling. If right ethical estimation depends on the higher or lower development of our psychical faculties it remains inexplicable how by wrong doing that injures others the development of our own is lessened or interfered with. Perhaps by the formation of other groups of emotional concepts? But such formation would presuppose sympathetic sentiments, which must be innate as they cannot be accounted for by natural development.

The attribute of novelty, which Beneke's psychology claims for itself, is not admitted by the adherents to Herbart's doctrines. J. W. Nachlowsky in the "*Magazine for Exact Philos-*



ophy" says: "If Beneke says that the 'new' psychology stands so high above all former knowledge of the soul, that it can hardly be called the same science, it becomes an indispensable duty to examine in how far Beneke's psychology may claim the credit of being a novelty. Can Beneke's principles be said to be new? Not at all for Herbart advanced the idea long ago, that the soul was a simple being and hence could not have a plurality of faculties, dispositions, powers, nor any innate ideas, categories, tendencies &c.—whatever of this is found in the grown soul is of temporal origin. Hence he deemed it necessary to inquire into the elements of the life of the soul. He did not assert this merely but demonstrated it sufficiently by means of metaphysics, experience and mathematics, and applied it many times in his educational writings before Beneke published his psychological work. Herbart has the merit of stringent consistency; for it is not he that ejected the abstract faculty of the soul from his system on one side to allow the concrete primary faculty to steal in on the other, as is the case in Beneke's system. Beneke's method is neither new nor is it the method of natural science in the proper sense. Herbart, however, long before Beneke, examined the forces that influence the soul in an empirical way and exhibited fully and exactly the laws according to which they work in his 'Statics and Mechanics of the Mind' in the mathematical way in which scientists pursue their investigations.

"Beneke instead of entering upon the details of the phenomena, deals with vague generalities. Instead of considering the true active forces, the elements of psychical life, he falls into a quite unlogical dualism and attempts to talk us into a belief into 'two species of elements,' (the primary faculties and the irritations) but fails to supply the necessary, close connection between the knowledge derived from inner experience and the explanatory hypothesis. Is Beneke's philosophy new in its results? Just as little. The loudly announced "highly important disclosures" are after all merely formal distinctions in many cases, and we find in the end that we have received new words instead of new ideas, nor are we in any way satisfied with the result presented to us. According to Beneke the soul appears (1) as an altogether immaterial being, consisting (!) of certain primary systems which are not merely in themselves but also among themselves a unit and form one being. (2) As a sensuous being, i. e., the primary faculties of the soul are susceptible of certain impres-



sions from without by irritations, which are seized by these faculties and retained by them. On the distinction between man and animal Beneke says 'We can express this distinction best by ascribing to the former a *spiritual* sensuousness.' Whoever can accept such assertions as new disclosures or as disclosures at all, is easily satisfied as far as speculation is concerned. Neither are Beneke's Fundamental processes of psychical development new." In many places we find rather weak reminiscences of (Herbart's) "threshold of consciousness, the weakening and strengthening of susceptibility, the impulse toward equilibrium, fusion, complication of image-concepts, apperception &c." But all these are so defaced and tarnished by the slime from the bottom of the 'primary faculties' that a distinct outline cannot be discerned. The great fault of these primary faculties, their obscurity, aye, their utter inconceivability become most obvious when we speak of their application. We are told that for each successive sensation a special primary faculty is consumed in such a way that each new sensation of this kind requires the re-formation of a new corresponding primary faculty. But although we are told that one of these primary faculties is consumed every time in this process, every mental trace or vestige (i. e., the reproduction of a former sensation) is to consist of two elements, the primary faculty and the irritation. (!) From this it appears as if the former had been consumed and were unconsumed at the same time. The adhesion of the irritations to the primary faculties; the mutual permeation of the two species of elements which is sometimes very complete and lasting and at other times less so, the loosening and falling off of the irritations; and last but not least the connection into which the primary faculties enter with the other mental formations—all this let him understand who can. Beneke talks continually about natural laws and natural science, but ignores and almost abominates the natural sciences, especially physiology even in questions where it is indispensable to psychology (as in the theory of sensation &c.). Judging from all this we may in regard to the main principles venture to assert without any scruples: Whatever can be maintained of this 'new' psychology is not new and whatever is new cannot be maintained."

The adherents of Herbart's as well as those of Beneke's Psychology admit that the system to which they give the preference is as little free from blemishes and faults as another human

work. The veil which surrounds the mysterious Image at Sais—our Psyche—has not been altogether lifted. Since this Psyche appears, as far as we know, to be the highest development of existence, its entire unveiling would be equivalent to the solution of the world-problem, a solution in which we shall hardly succeed here in our sublunary sphere." It cannot be doubted however that education has been benefited much by both Herbart's and Beneke's doctrines. The earnest study of such thought-systems frees the spirit and elevates the practical activity of teacher and educator from routine work and pedantry to the dignity of an artistic and creative worker. It supplies the fixed fulcrum for the lever of education. The question that remains is: on what ground is there more firmness, assurance and fertility. Karl Schmidt finds Beneke's unquestionable merit mainly in his doctrine of the relation of concept-series and his critique (based on Herbart) of the psychical faculties as taught by the Psychology and Pedagogics of his time.

## THE IDEA OF MIND; OR, THE INTERNAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF MATTER.

BY CHARLES THEODORE BAYRHOFER.

In a former essay (*Journal of Spec. Phil.*, No. 37, Vol. VII.,) I have shown that matter, or the extended, sensible substance, is the chain and interaction of monads or simple selfs. These monads are the many primitive points or limitations of the one universal whole of being. The many or the multitude of units can never be *created* by a single universal unity, nor the universal unity by the many monads, because either of these ideas involves a logical contradiction, inasmuch as every side of the whole, the multitude and the universal unity, to *create* or generate the other one, must *presuppose* the other one. The absolute unity must be *self-contradictory*, to create the many. It must be the one and not the one, the *negation* of the one; and to be this negation, the

negation must all the time be *presupposed* in the unity, else its simple positivity could never become negated. Now the negation of the one is the many. Therefore the many are presupposed. The absolute unity never could be *living*, creating, if it were not primitively a self-interacting unity of being, i. e., a chain of units. In the same manner the many units must presuppose the universal unity, to become united they must primitively be in continuity or for each other. An empty, absolute space, dividing and uniting the units, is a self-contradictory nothing. Therefore the *Absolute* is the *eternal, uncreated, infinite whole of eternal differences*, which absolutely posited are simple units, inasmuch as all composite units presuppose simple units. Substance, being, can be nothing else than uncreated self, and all relations, forces, phenomena, are nothing else than the interactions of selfs.

So we must say: there is one universal centre, one totality of a multiplicity of centres. The multiple real centres are the *monads*, the one ideal centre is the contiguity and continuity, the shining into each other, of the monads. The monads we call *living units*, inasmuch as they are affected by mutual negation, representation, and self-conservation.

Now I call *matter* the *immediate* existence and process of the monadical totality. So the Absolute is the material Universe, which is, so to say, the eternal kaleidoscope of primitive matter. Therefore matter is the system or articulation of monads, simple substances, and consequently there is no *phenomenal* (by the senses perceived or perceivable) matter, which is not self-articulated. In and with the continuity, mutual negation, representation and self-conservation, the monads are necessarily for and against each other *shining* or *phenomenal* units, that is *reflexes*, reflecting units, *forces*. Now the mutual representation is a shining of other monads *in every monad*. The other monads are positive negations, *limitations* of every monad. But this limitation is posited in the simple unity of the monad, is therefore a negation posited from without and reflected in the simple unity, in the self. So it is a *self-determination* in the self, an inner particularity determined or necessitated from without in the identical unity. The unit becomes a shining, a force, an irritation, a positive negativity, a living point. That shining has therefore its origin in an *affectio*n of the identical universal simple self from without, and this affection of the simple units is a *perception* of another one, a *sensitivity* in the largest sense of the word, another one posited

in the first one as a negation, and a negation of the negation, that is a *self-radiation*. For the reflex in the simple unity *can be nothing else* than an *inner* determination, that is a perception, a representation, an ideality, a finding of an externality, a negation in itself. *That reciprocal perception is the root of all nature*, the *intelligence*, as the *primitive unitary force* and the universal germ of all manifold forces of matter. There is no force at all in nature but has primitively sprung from self-determination necessitated from without. Therefore matter as the system and interaction of monads cannot at all exist, cannot be thought existing, without *mind* in the largest sense of the word, without the reciprocally percipient monads. The monads I call *living* in the largest sense of the word, inasmuch as they are, by interdependence, intelligent units, *sensibilities* which are moving to and fro by *impulses* from sensibility, representation of an externality in the unit. We shall see the necessity of these impulses and self-movements. First I must here expressly state that this universal intelligence of all ultimate parts of nature is not and cannot be *immediately* the feeling-unity, or the consciousness of animals or men, but that this latter intelligence, called *mind* in a *specific* sense, is only the highest reflex-form, that is the *internal phenomenology* of universal mind in the centralized nervous system of the animal organism. We shall see that the concrete self of man (and animal) is *not* bound to one central monad in a system of monads, as is imagined by Leibnitz and Herbart, but that the same is the concentrated or centralized universality of a democratic republic of sentient molecules.

We saw that the first result of united monads is a mutual perception or sensitivity. Now this sensitivity implies a real contradiction (not a logical contradiction—an internal antithesis that impels it to dissolution, an ideal to be realized, not a logical absurdity which only destroys the thought) in every self. Because the absolute uncreated self is affected and negated or limited by other selves, is the sensation of negation by other selves. So it becomes in consequence of that contradiction of its simple unity and of the negation of the same in the perception of the other one, the *impulse* to annihilate the other one by absorption into itself, to dissolve the same into itself. So the monads are seeking themselves mutually, moving to each other to penetrate themselves—attraction of the monads. But inasmuch as they go together, the negativity becomes more intense, because being, self,



cannot be annihilated, but they have the sensitivity through which they become annihilated by the other one. So to preserve themselves the movement at last becomes negative, they move again from each other, they are flying themselves—repulsion of the monads. But they are living, excited, enhanced by and through each other, and seek to preserve their vitality, which they have only through the other one. Therefore as the line of repulsion widens and their natural negation becomes weaker, they return again to each other; move together. So they are in continuous oscillating movement, and their movement is in reality their eternal contiguity. Their being-together is this positive-negative *process*, and can in no other manner be thought or imagined. So the monads are the eternal sentient impulses realized in process of movement, forces of uniting and flying each other, attraction and repulsion, selfs living in conflict; and the spaces and times between them are the shining products of the conflicting monads. And these forces and self-movements of the monads are the *fundamental energy* of every natural phenomenon, in the smallest molecules and in the largest bodies and their interaction.

I suppose, then, that the Universe is the eternal product of contiguous interacting simple elements of being, the eternal moments or differentials of the eternal whole; that all these real differentials as simple units are of identical nature, and that they are equivalent centres of equal definite, minute, shining or spatial, spheres, spheres of mutual representation and movement, which are at the same time dynamical extensions, and indivisible in themselves and from the centres. They are the centres contemplated as interacting spheres, as minute dynamical indivisible spaces, because in no other manner can we represent to ourselves their interaction, their oscillation and self-conservation in mutual inter-penetration. They are thus the centres involved in a pure dynamical ætheric sphere. In so far the centres and the spaces are *immaterial*, indivisible, and matter is the chain of these *centre-spheres*, composed by and divisible into the same as the differentials and integrals of matter. If the distances of the spheres are transgressed, the centres are without immediate interaction, their point of perspective vanishes. Notwithstanding there is no absolute vacuum in the Universe, because all vacuities are filled in the moment they arise by the equilibrium of the totality



of monads. So all monads are interlinked, either immediately or mediately, and all movement and formation is a movement and formation in the whole. But the monad can in many grades immediately be united with another one and with many other ones, so that their connecting spheres are more or less inter-penetrating. That is the origin of the different species of primitive molecules with their different physico-chemical qualities and quantities. The so-called chemical atoms in reality are molecules, and the atom in the strictest sense is the monad. By the eternal primitive differences and their evolution in the self-concluded or self-terminated whole, as we saw in the former essay, the totality of monads becomes articulated into partial, equal or different wholes, mechanico-chemical molecules, and their syntheses and analyses in concrete bodies become articulated into the heavenly bodies and the heavenly æther, and the heavenly bodies into the elements, minerals, plants and animals; and in and with them the specific forces of gravitation, cohesion, elasticity, light, heat, electricity, magnetism, feeling, idea, will evolve in the specific forms of æther, gaseous fluid, and fixed bodies and their compositions. All the partial wholes are connected organs of the universal whole (the Universe), which is in eternal synthetico-analytical circular motion, progression and retrogression. The theory that the Universe might die by universal equilibration of heat, and similar thoughts, are only one-sided empirical reflections, which are *a priori* refuted by the necessary eternity of the differentiating living whole. The difference in the whole is eternal, and so the process goes on in all infinity. All equilibration is only relative and goes over into new differences. The Universe is an eternal seeking and striving.

Now the Universe, the total system of progressing and retrogressive system, in every progressing or articulating period and part is a progression from the external phenomenology of the sensitive impulses, or the construction of unconscious (by-the-senses-intuited) nature, to an internal phenomenology of the same, or the construction of feeling and conscious systems. In so-called unintelligent nature the primitive power is the same as in intelligent nature. The universal forces of the monads in interaction, as we have seen, are nothing else than perception and impulse. But in unfeeling and unconscious nature these primitive forces continually evanesce or dissolve themselves in movements and constructions of sensible, extended, or external forms. Sensi-

bility and will, therefore, are so to say sleeping powers, through the entire body. Their living is their dying, their dying their living. The souls, the selves of nature die in externality, in continuous movement and external equilibration. Therefore if there shall be feeling and conscious organisms, there must be a reflecting of the moving and constructing power out of movement into itself, the intelligence must persist, continue itself in moving and constructing, a part of movement must be metamorphosed into feeling. So the external phenomenology becomes internal phenomenology, an ideal world, or internal shining (manifestation) in the body. That has been done by the highest act of nature in the animal organism. In it the intelligence, the ground of phenomenal matter and nature, has itself become phenomenology, has become MIND.

Now we must remember that all nature is a continuous concatenation of the monads from within, that is by sensitivity and reaction in contiguity and continuity. All bodies, material forms, are not only external juxtapositions of dead atoms, merely driven together from without, (which would involve a knot of logical contradictions), but penetrations of the monads by their central spheres, their infinitesimal shinings or dynamical extensions, and so they are definite cohesions from within. They live mutually in each other. And as the parts of matter, in consequence of their immediate and mediate penetration, create from within an external central point of equilibrium, that is, a point of gravitation and oscillation, attraction and repulsion of the mass; in the same manner the sensations and impulses are connected and become mediated through the impenetrating, external shinings (manifestation) of the monads, and are born as feeling and volition in an inner, concrete, central point. Generally the inner shinings are not only the forces or inner sources of motion and life, but are the forces returning to themselves through the outward shining, through the spheres of space and time, or of movement. Therefore the inner shining presupposes the outer shining, and the point of inner gravitation the outer point of gravitation. In this manner the whole of inner shining is nothing else than the continuous returning of the forces out of movement into themselves, and the continuation of their reflexion without instantly dissolving itself again into movement. It is therefore an irritation of the shining centre, without movement or outward reaction, the objectivity made internal, the primitive sensibility realized as in part a self-

reflexion or a merely internal excitation of a living equilibrium of forces, but in a presupposed movement or external form of shining.

Now such a state can only exist in concrete or total bodily forms, in equilibrated forms of mechanico-chemical molecular syntheses, which at the same time are highly irritable, and really irritated from without. And these irritations must be centralized in a concrete point of inner gravitation, where all interpenetrate and find their ultimate reflex, and may return outwards in movements. This centralized internal shining of a bodily system, which presupposes the material organism and therefore all nature, is the only reality of *Mind* as a feeling and conscious centre of sensation and will-reaction. The mind abstracted from nature, isolated, presupposed, is nothing, a chimera. But the unconscious mind of the interacting monads is the inner life of all nature, and is the very mind which becomes feeling and conscious by reflection. The universal mind of nature becomes the soul and mind of animal and man, in specific, individualized, organic forms.

If we take the word "Nature" in the broadest sense, all the Universe is nature, and mind is only its blossom. If we take Nature only as material phenomenology, as objective or sensible externality, it is opposite to mind, and mind exists only by transformation of nature into subjective ideality. But under all circumstances mind is mediated by nature or matter, is an evolution, in and out of nature. Therefore nature is the real presupposition of mind, which, *vice versa*, as potency and pure internality, as the pure force of perception and impulse of the monads, is the real presupposition of nature. Mind in the strict sense is the self-reflection of universal intelligent power, this power shining for itself, (appearing to itself) the objective form made subjective, the mind awakened.

Let us now see in what manner nature itself effects its metamorphosis into ideal life, into mind.

Our own self-consciousness and the feelings, sensations, ideas, and volitions contained or included in the same, and on the other side, our manifestations of the inner life in external shinings, must be our starting point. In this manner we grasp together all real life which represents similar manifestations, that is all animal organisms. In the same time we analyze the animal organism, and try to state the specific organic mediations of

mind. So we conclude in an indisputable manner that the immediate ground or basis of mind is contained in the nervous system, but only in so far as the same lives by continuous interaction with the other systems of animal organism, and further with the total outward world. By inner experience and by experiments, this fact is proved. Therefore we must conclude: in the living nervous system of the animal organism has been reached that form of nature in which the internality, the perception of all nature not only is dissolved in movement, but has returned into itself, and has become a free shining force contained in matter, a higher reflexion or potence of material force itself. Up to the animal organism nature is an evolution, which is wholly spent in motions and mechanical forms, which indeed all are teleological, inasmuch as they are all equilibrating systems of monads, molecules, concrete bodies in the parts and in the whole. The most essential specifications of the whole are the different chemical atoms and their aggregation in the different so-called elements. All the chemical atoms are the closest systems of monads. Every kind of atom is a definite molecule of monads, united in a definite number and form, in a mathematical equilibrating necessity. Therefore all atoms of the same kind are identical, can replace each other. These primitive concrete individuals are confined in intellectual forces, total systems, which against other such systems move and oscillate as wholes, as concrete centralized individuals.

- The different kinds of atoms are all opposite individualities, polar toward each other, and uniting by polarity to equilibrate themselves create the chemical syntheses, and the syntheses of syntheses, every time becoming weaker cohesions. Now the bioplasm and the nervous system created out of the same is a connection and series of molecules composed of four and more kinds of atoms, not, I suppose, in simple electrical antitheses, but in one continuous circle of equilibration of the individual atoms. So is posited a continuous (by-many-opposite-individuals-immediately constructed) circle of force in every bioplastic molecule, and there is a system of such molecules every time creating new similar molecules out of the outer world, centralizing in the same time and differentiating in specific organic forms. In the primitive organic molecule the antithetic atoms, neutralized by third ones, &c., can never quite dissolve the antithesis in movements and form, but part of the force remains unequilibrated, that is, remains sensitiveness and impulse, but such a one, that it has a



shining, the other part of sensibility resolved into impulsive movement, in itself. As this part of liberated force the bioplastic molecule is the real possibility of feeling, of ideas, the abstract universal ego. But only through a system of such molecules and a continuous differentiation in space and time from without, and a centralization of the differences in a central part of the nervous system, the real possibility of mind becomes feeling and conscious self, most perfectly evolved in the brain of man. The free sensibility becomes an organism in itself, reflecting the bodily organism.

The nervous system pervading the total organism is the organ of the free sensibility. It is a system of central ganglions, to which and from which radiate centripetal and centrifugal nerve filaments, collecting and dissipating the forms of movement, which become feelings and volitions in the centre of the ganglion. Now there are lower immediate and higher mediate centres. And in the same time as in the former the excitation of the centre from without, dissolves or dissipates itself in the reaction of outward movement (reflex-movements,) the same in the latter continues as undissipated and in part free force, that is as a feeling, which may dissipate itself by the correspondent impulse, the will as the discharge or release of the feeling. And inasmuch as the molecules of the ganglions and the ganglions themselves all are bound together to a chain, and communicate by filaments with the various forms and movements of the objective inner and outer world, the differentiations of the nerves in the total central organ, the brain, are series of central affections bound together to one articulated but coherent life, which again concentrates in one unique concrete centre, where all affections interpenetrate from all sides, and so create an (in space and time) undivided and indivisible centre of feeling and free impulse, the living and ever evolving ego. So the real ego is not bound to one monad, but an inner centralized phenomenology of a chain of monads. Therefore it is divisible in space and time and subject to dissolution by the separation of the organic constituent parts. In this manner a homogeneous feeling subject, like a polypus, may become separated into many parts, every one of which may now be a separate individual by creating a new centre in itself. Even the human ego by disease of the brain may become separated into two or more egos, like its plastic matter into many germs of new individuals. Indeed the real human self is a centralized democratic republic of



particular minute selfs, for example of a seeing, a hearing, a smelling self, &c., all interpenetrating in one ego. And even the molecules and atoms of the nervous system, namely of the ganglions and the central ganglion, may by degrees by-and-by change, without separating the unity of the ego, because all new moments are immediately metamorphosed into the form of the ego. The ego is a phenomenology of united forces or monads, not one monad. So it is mortal, and becomes annihilated by organic dissolution, as a human society would become annihilated by separation into individuals without a central power. And like the human society the ego is all the time an evolving self, a new one and an old one.

Now we call objectivity the antithetical external positing of other being by sensitive feeling and conscious being or subject. Objectivity is the positing of external phenomenology by the ego. In this manner to every monad and every individual monadical system, the whole Universe, as antithetical, is its object. It is so posited by the subject because it is the limitation of the subject and is tainted with this external limit. As pure natural force it reacts against the limit by movement, attraction and repulsion, seeking and flying. But so soon as the perception of the other one, of the external, becomes a free returning force, the object, by whatever mediations, becomes ingrafted into the perception and is now posited as an internal image, as an idea in the largest sense of the word, and this image, created by the specifications of the nervous oscillations, becomes the internal object of the subject, the feeling and conscious ego. This identical ego is the concrete, extended interacting point, a nervous central point of the many nervous excitations, in which point the excitations from all sides interpenetrate in a miniature form, one in the same time distinguished and undivided, in a similar manner as in the germ-point of every organism, the total individuality of the parent is posited as natural force in miniature. And inasmuch as the inner movements of the nervous system and specially of the brain, become so to say daguerreotypes, inclinations or dispositions of movement, and stay in the brain, they may from within be renewed as images of the ego (memory and phantasy). In the consciousness of man the ego, that is the individualized subjectivity of nature, has become a free antithetical reflexion, so that the world of images becomes a free object of analyzing consciousness, and an analytico-synthetical world of notions or concep-

tions. That is the reign of intellect, by which nature may become teleologically reconstructed, and a world of art rise over nature. The highest form of that intellect is speculative science, comprehending the Universe as the eternal manifestation of absolute being.

But let us understand: free intelligence is nothing else than the primitive intelligence returning to itself out of motion and nature. The moving power itself has been metamorphosed into idealism, into mind. Therefore the idea is mediated by movement and bodily form. Part of movement continues, part is transformed into idea. With the centres of the nervous system the reflex movements are connected naturally, and the sensitive centralization dissipates again into outward movement (nerves of sensation and motion). In the highest centre the immediate dissipation is checked, because part of the moving power is transformed into feeling power. In this manner for example the thinking of the movement of my right hand is nothing else than the moving organism of this hand reflected into the brain, where the moving nervous filaments have their last issue. But the thinking or imagination of such movement is the cancelling of the same, is its transformation into idea in the brain. Now the ego, the universal individuality of idealisation, comprehends this particular idea of hand movement in itself, and this is by nature at the same time the impulse to movement, only momentarily, checked. But the ego may intensify this impulse, that is may metamorphose the idea of the same into impulse, and so become volition, and its consequence is the annihilating of the check, and the dissipating of the idea into movement of the hand. Only by continuous returning into idea the same continues, is all the time born anew. The dissolving of the idea is not effected by the idea of the volition, but by the transformation of the idea into will, by the free discharge of the idea. Here we have a real, not a chimerical self-emission of the idea (see Hegel). The impulse of motion is primitively the emitting of perception, of sensitivity, the reaction of the monad. The voluntary motion is the free reaction of free perception by metamorphosis of idea into impulse, by transformation of the inward tendency into outward tendency. It makes no difference what is the motive of this transformation: for example, it may be to get nutriment. The natural power of reaction all the time is presupposed in the nervous and muscular system. In the feeling centre this reaction is partially cancelled by

metamorphosis of the impulse of movement into idea. In this manner it cannot break through the limit. But by free emission or externalization of the idea the same becomes realized.

Therefore mind indeed is a metamorphosis of natural forces, and the voluntary motion a re-metamorphosis of mind. It is a mistake of Huxley and other men of science, to think that sensation and motion does not fall into the mutual correlation and metamorphosis of forces. Indeed the motion always dies in sensation, and the sensation in motion, but both become resuscitated. But animals and men are not thereby mere organic machines or automata, in which besides the mechanism of motion there lives an ego or an ideal system, not coming out of and not discharging into the former, coming out of nothing and going to nothing, or perhaps coming out and going into the—*Unknowable*. Mind is the last metamorphosis of nature, but is antithetic to the total immediate external phenomenology of nature as the internal phenomenology of the same, an ideal world in the natural world, a total ideal reconstruction of the latter, bound to the same primitively by perception and impulse as the sources of all natural phenomena. The perceptive and impulsive monad, mediated by outward shining (nature), has become inward shining (mind).

And now we understand Hegel's articulation of philosophy into logic or abstract idea, nature, and mind, as a circle of the idea returning into itself through the mediation of externality. Hegel's Logic, which at the same time is metaphysic, is an obscure intermixture of logic, metaphysic, and science of knowledge. Therefore the absolute idea, the final result of logic, is affected with ambiguity. It may be either the highest form of human cognition, or the metaphysical objective principle, and as the latter it may be either an impersonal absolute principle, or even the personal God, before the creation of the Universe. It is well known that the disciples of Hegel quarreled and disputed over the proper meaning of Hegel, and divided into right and left wings. The right wing supposed the "absolute idea" to be the veritable Christian premundane personal God, and the free self-externalizing of the idea to be the creation of nature or the material universe by God. The left wing declared the absolute idea to be no God, but only the highest stand-point of thinking, and this impersonal thinking, this abstract principle, to be at first the self-manifestation in nature, and then returning to itself in mind,

so that really the human mind is the only mind, and philosophy its highest, all-knowing stand-point. Then the Christian religion is only the most perfect image of the true philosophy, only an unscientific creed, which must dissolve itself into philosophy. The truth is that Hegel thought, in an obscure manner, a universal ideal ground of the Universe, which as such ground (not immediately) is personal mind; but that this ideal ground, the substance of the thinking mind, at first evolves itself as nature, or as externality, as an external shining; and that thirdly the ideal ground conquers its own externality, and so becomes the real human mind, whose absolute universality is seen in religion, and at last in speculative philosophy, the *absolute thinking which thinks itself*. If we now transform Hegel's logic into the theory of speculative cognition, in which human cognition becomes raised to the cognition of the absolute principle of the Universe, all ambiguity vanishes. And in this manner we come to the

#### CONCLUSION.

There is an eternal uncreated principle, the whole (totality) of monadical selfs living by interaction. Living signifies reacting against each other by perception and impulse, universal intelligence. The process of this eternal interaction is the Universe. Immediately it is confined to the form of external shining, (manifestation), a material Universe, pure nature. But by this process itself, it liberates the internality, and so becomes in living organisms an internal shining, a reproduction and reconstruction of intelligence, the feeling and conscious mind. Therefore nature and mind are identical, are one and the same substance, but in antithetical and convertible forms. Nature generates mind, the true internality of nature, by liberating its ideal source. And mind reverts to nature by art, a second nature. Therefore the laws of nature and mind are identical, but shining (manifested) in antithetic form, the inner discharging itself in space and time, and space and time reflecting themselves into the inner. So the antithesis of nature or matter and mind is fundamentally cancelled, because each transforms itself into the other. That was the ever-recurring idea of Schelling, Hegel, and Goethe, the identity of the inner and outer being, of nature and mind as two forms and sides of the same substance, so that all the time and everywhere mind is in nature, and nature in mind, on the one side under the exponent of matter, on the other side under the exponent of mind.

## SHAKESPEARE'S TROILUS AND CRESSIDA.

BY D. J. SNIDER.

The frame-work of this drama is the the Trojan war. It has nearly the same limits as the Iliad; for it presupposes the quarrel of Achilles and Agamemnon and the withdrawal of Achilles till the death of his friend Patroclus, when he again goes into battle and slays Hector. Many Homeric incidents and motives are retained, while many are introduced which would have made the old Greek bard stare with wonder. The famous heroes of the Iliad are brought before us, but we can hardly recognize them in their modern shape; the beautiful plastic outline is not lost but is subordinated to the inner element of character. The statue is transformed to flesh and blood. Shakespeare has taken these antique ideal forms and poured into them the subjective intensity of the modern world. This is the greatest and most enduring ground of interest in the present drama. The old Greek hero is now moved not by the god from without, but by himself from within, the divine influence is transmuted into his own intelligence. Ulysses, the favorite of Minerva, no longer meets the goddess upon the highways and addresses her in familiar accents, but communes with his own spirit. In other words, the ancient Epic has changed into the modern Drama. The meaning is the same both in Homer and in Shakespeare, but how different is the form! Yet it must not be forgotten that the outside is Greek though the inside is Anglo-Saxon; the Hellenic mould is always visible, though it is not the sole nor even the most prominent object of interest.

The contrast is certainly striking, and is often so incongruous as to convey the notion of a humorous purpose. In the mouths of these old Homeric personages the Poet has placed the most abstract statement of what may be called his philosophy, that is to be found in any of his works. His views of society, of life, of institutions, are here expressed in a language as direct and definite as that employed by the thinker trained to the use of the abstruse terms of the schools. What these principles are, and their influence upon his literary activity, will be discussed further on. The reflections are mainly political, but are sometimes



psychological, and show a mind most subtly scrutinizing its own processes. Those who hold that Shakespeare was the supremely unconscious poet, would do well to study this play till they understand it, if indeed it can be fully understood without some philosophical culture and knowledge.

But the strangest and most incongruous element which is foisted into this old Homeric company is the manners of chivalry. It amounts to downright burlesque, and such beyond any doubt it was intended to be by the author. The best passage for illustrating this phase of the drama is the challenge borne by Æneas from Hector. All the heroes seem to be transformed into medieval knights, each one of whom is ready to prove the supreme beauty of his mistress by ordeal of battle. The climax of humor is attained when the aged Nestor, who has lived three generations of men, comes forward and offers to demonstrate to Hector by proof of arms, "That my lady was fairer than his grandam." The principles of honor, valor, love, hospitality, with which these personages are endowed, give to the whole action the pleasing aroma of the Middle Ages. The reflective element before mentioned, which was injected into the characters of the old heroes, is serious rather than humorous, but the chivalrous element is purely humorous, and turns them all into Don Quixotes. With Shakespeare the age of chivalry is past, and it is with him an object of ridicule as much as with Cervantes. The hoary shapes of antiquity he thus places in a modern institution, which however was already worn out in his own time and laughed at by the whole world.

Such is the Homeric group which is introduced into the present drama, but there is also another set of persons here whose principle and whose actions are unknown to the *Iliad*. Love is now the main business, not war. The legend of *Troilus, Cressida* and *Pandarus* is the creation of the later romancers, which was grafted on the old story of *Troy*. It portrays the struggle of the tender passion in one of its phases, the fidelity of man and the falsity of woman. The burning intensity, the fierce conflicts, the supreme power of love, find their expression in this part of the fable, which is indeed a later development of human spirit. Still the relation between the two groups must be traced; the *Trojan* war was caused by the faithlessness of a woman whose restoration is demanded by the Nation; the refusal calls out the heroes who are seeking to bring her back by force. Female infi-

delity is the theme ; in the one case it involves the Family merely, but in the other case it involves the State. Helen and Cressida therefore resemble each other ; both perform the same deed, though in different relations which also produce different results.

Such are the two threads running through the play ; they may be named according to their leading tendency the love-thread and the war-thread ; though parallel in action, in thought the first is the source of the second. The movements also are two, the division being manifest not only by a difference in principle, but also by a difference in merit. The first movement in general passes from strife and separation to unity. The parted lovers are brought together by the mediation of Pandarus, and are made happy by mutual vows of devotion. In Troy the division of opinion which previously existed is healed ; in the Greek host the angry Achilles is wrought upon by the cunning of Ulysses, and seems to resolve to take part again in the war ; thus the hostile armies come to internal harmony preparatory to the external struggle. The second movement portrays the passage from union to disruption and conflict. The lovers on the one hand are torn asunder by an unforeseen occurrence ; Cressida proves faithless, and thus the bond of emotion is broken. The combat on the other hand arises between the two hostile forces, after many fluctuations, Hector, the Trojan hero, is slain, his countrymen cease from their attack and retire to the city ; things are left as they were before. The negative termination of the play is striking ; Troilus and Cressida are separated, and the foes still confront each other with warlike preparation.

Taking up the love-thread and following it through the first movement, we observe that the divine passion has been already excited in the bosoms of the lovers, and moves on speedily to its fruition in the betrothal. Troilus is first introduced to us : he is still young and impulsive, he is completely swayed by his strong and intense emotions. He has met the fair Cressida, though the circumstances are not told : at once we see him literally consumed with the sacred flame. She dances before his mind continually, sighs burst forth unbidden from his heart, every duty or purpose is swallowed up in the whirlpool of his passion. Such is the lover pure and simple, the Romeo of the world. But Troilus has another trait which gives him dignity and elevation of character, and which stands in the most direct opposition to

his absorption in his feelings. He is a man of action, a warrior second only (if not equal) to Hector, and a patriotic defender of his country. But these two elements of his nature are now in deadly struggle, in his own breast is the conflict between Love and War. Honor and ambition call him to the field, where the destiny of Fatherland is being decided. But passion has seized him in its firmest grasp, its supremacy is declared in the very first line of the play, where, after arming himself for battle, he calls out

“I'll unarm again;  
Why should I war without the walls of Troy,  
That find such cruel battle here within?”

Such is the first triumph of Love over the bold warrior, it has tamed him till he is “weaker than a woman's tear,”—which, notwithstanding the contemptuous expression of Troilus, is an instrument of considerable power. But now there is another combat which he has to wage, fierce, incessant, lachrymose. The favor of the fair Cressida seems very uncertain, her uncle cannot wind up the negotiation with sufficient speed. Troilus therefore feels in his heart that most painful of all pangs, the pang of unrequited love. Still he has hope, though he is very impatient, and Pandarus keeps alive his imagination by recounting the charms of his beautiful mistress. At last the mediator brings about their meeting; Troilus is all fervor and passion, he makes the first declaration of devotion, which is followed by that of Cressida. Open, sincere, even unsophisticated is the youthful suitor, the best model of the love-hero that Shakespeare has left us. His emotion is so pure, intense and direct that its beauty has no flaw, while at the same time his character rises out of a mere emotional existence into the region of the noblest manly activity. It is true that love asserts its mastery for the time being, still it does not quench his zeal for his country. But now, as the conflict within him is soothed to repose by his union, Troilus will be himself again if jealous Fate will but refrain from interference. Such good behavior, however, can hardly be expected of it in a drama. Let the reader, with gloomy foreboding, await the outcome of the story a few pages ahead.

Pandarus has been just mentioned as the mediating power between the two lovers. His function is not very important, since both the man and the woman are touched with a mutual passion,

which is sufficient to bring them together without any assistance. Pandarus is rather a busy-body, active yet harmless. He is certainly not a villain, the alliance which he seeks to bring about is worthy, his means can hardly be condemned by the rigid moralist, though his jokes are a little too free for the modern ear. Assuredly the odious word "pander," which is supposed to be derived from his name, cannot justly be applied to his conduct in this drama. Moreover his understanding is not strong; the artful Cressida stands far above all his schemes and makes fun of him, though he is able to exercise a good deal of control over the ardent and simple-hearted Troilus. His name has brought upon him a legacy of abuse which his deed in no sense justifies. There is not an enterprising mother in the land who does not do as much without a breath of condemnation.

Cressida receives after Troilus a visit from the industrious match-maker, who tries to excite her love and admiration for the youthful hero in every manner possible. The name of Troilus is continually introduced in the conversation; his beauty, intellect, youth, are the themes of great praise, but it is his valor which is the main subject of laudation. The famous heroes of Troy are made to pass in review one after another, the noble Troilus is superior to them all, even Hector is no exception. But the adroit Cressida listens to the encomiums bestowed by her uncle, with a complete penetration of their object, parrying his questions, tormenting him with a feigned opposition, uttering words of detraction against Troilus, indulging in the most wanton jests; in fine she teases her dear uncle to desperation, and conceals from him completely her real feelings and purposes. He confesses that he cannot understand her, while she probes him to the bottom by her blunt words: "You are a bawd." Her character comes out plain in this interview, she is shrewd, witty, and wanton, no person of the calibre of Pandarus can touch the depths of her mind: the cool understanding effectually controls the emotions.

Such a woman is now to be seen in love; for she all the time has cherished a secret affection for Troilus. What will she turn out to be? Her admiration is genuine, in her monologue in which she has no motive for concealment, she says that she sees in the actual Troilus a thousand fold more "than in the glass of Pandar's praise may be." But feeling must be suppressed, she therefore does just what might be expected, she refuses subordi-

nation to love. Her argument is without the trace of passion, and is directed against passion :

“ Things won are done, joy’s soul lies in the doing—  
Men prize the thing ungained more than it is (worth)—  
Achieved, (we), men still command; ungained, beseech ;  
Then, though my heart’s content firm love doth bear,  
Nothing of that shall from mine eyes appear.”

That is, consummation dampens ardor, suspense keeps it alive. Led by this specious reasoning, she intends to keep under the rising flame, and make the true love of her devoted suitor her sport and his instrument of torture. The emotion which she feels must be concealed, and converted to a means for some other end besides mutual union. She is the intellectual coquette.

The fundamental distinction between the characters of Troilus and Cressida is now apparent. The man resigns himself to his love, many great interests are pressing him but they are brushed aside, his sacrifice is complete. But the woman subordinates her love to her understanding, to her planning and scheming, she refuses the absolute surrender to the feeling of Family. She therefore must be declared to be untrue to the deepest principle of her sex. Her falsity hereafter is adequately motived by this single trait ; love, devotion to the one individual, is not the controlling impulse of her nature. But we must advance to the next stage : the good offices of Pandarus bring about their meeting ; it has already been noticed how Troilus, true to character, makes an immediate and unreserved declaration of the most fervent devotion. But Cressida is also true to her character : she hesitates, suspects, makes abstract reflections of various kinds ; when she does whisper her love, she repents, reproaches herself with having “ blabbed,” and is forever recalling what she has said. “ Where is my wit ? ” she asks ; for wit is her boast, to it she is always trying to subject her words and actions. There is no full, free resignation, but she is continually catching herself and her utterances, as if her thought had to go back and take a glance at itself. Her mind is her pride, she is really ashamed of her love. Cressida is best designated by calling her the opposite of that which Troilus describes himself to be :

“ I am as true as truth’s simplicity,  
And simpler than the infancy of truth.”



For she is full of falsity and stratagem. Both take a vow of eternal fidelity, yet with a wonderful difference of manner, which is prophetic of the future.

To this love-thread must be added the appearance of Helen and Paris. They hardly belong to the action, and the pretext upon which they are introduced is very slender. But thereby we are forced to cast a glance into the remote background of the war and observe their relation to Troilus and Cressida. Their life is a sensual resignation to love, for its sake all ethical ties are disregarded, even nationality is jeopardized. But it is the god to whom absolute submission must be yielded: the song of Pandorus declares its almighty power as well as its pang. Paris is kept out of the fray by the spell of Helen while all his guiltless brothers are fighting in the front rank of battle. So, too, Troilus disarms himself when his heart is subdued, the spirit of love is stronger than the spirit of war. Helen has already manifested the infidelity which Cressida will hereafter manifest: the husband, Menelaus, who seeks to recover his wife by force of arms, is not less devoted than Troilus the lover. It is the story of women faithless and of men faithful; the ordinary romance is reversed. Thus the famous couple are dismissed, they will not further be employed by the Poet, who must not repeat his theme, and hence must pass to the consequences of that memorable elopement, namely the siege of Troy. But we catch a glimpse of their world, its sweet dalliance and sensual indulgence; there is enthroned the queen of beauty whose might none can resist; even Hector, it is declared, Hector the true husband and stern warrior would yield to the blandishments of this mortal Venus:

"Sweet Helen, I must woo you  
To help unarm our Hector: his stubborn buckles,  
With these your white enchanting fingers touched,  
Shall more obey than to the edge of steel,  
Or force of Greekish sinews: you shall do more  
Than all the island Kings—disarm great Hector."

We now pass to the war-thread, the structure of which is somewhat complex and therefore must be carefully analyzed. In the first place there are two sides, the Trojan and the Grecian, which are arrayed against each other in war. But in the second place each side has two parties or factions which are opposed to

each other mainly though not wholly on questions of policy. These internal differences are now to be portrayed, the characters which maintain the conflicting opinions are to be grouped and designated, the means are to be shown whereby each side arrives at a substantial harmony within itself. Such is the first movement, from separation to union.

The siege has lasted seven years, and still the walls of Troy are standing. The Grecian princes have lost hope, and seem ready to abandon the enterprise. Failure has to be acknowledged, there can be no longer any disguise. It is a situation of despair, a great national undertaking must be given up, whose abandonment comes next to the loss of civil freedom. This is the trying political situation; what is its cause, and what is its cure? The heroes have to address themselves to the dangerous condition of affairs, their various characters will be manifested according to their conduct in the present emergency, it is a time which tries men's souls.

The first speaker is Agamemnon, commander-in-chief. He utters the word of hope. It is true that their plans have hitherto failed, but such is the course of all great enterprises, something always arises to obstruct them, the realization never equals the thought. "Persistent constancy" is the supreme test of manhood, let us not give way to adverse fortune. The language of Agamemnon is full of dignity and encouragement, in him centre the aspirations of the Greek army, he represents its desire, its purpose, its endurance, but not its intelligence. He does not speak of the cause of the ill success of the war, nor of the remedy for the present evils; he can only attribute them to the caprice of fortune—a solution which always indicates blindness. Empty hope, perseverance without reason, good intention without power he possesses in a high degree; as leader, he is hardly more than a respectable figure-head. But it must not be thought that he is out of place, he brings to his office rank, character, experience, and personal dignity, which perhaps could not be found so happily blended in any other chieftain; the brain however must be supplied from a different source. Thus Agamemnon, notwithstanding his high position, seems a puppet to a certain extent, for he does not furnish the ultimate moving principle.

Next comes Nestor, "the old man eloquent," who echoes the sentiments of the commander, and enforces them by new arguments and illustrations. In him the orator appears, he adorns

his speech with the graces of diction, employing a great profusion of figures and speaking in a vein of strong enthusiasm. The distinction in their styles of address is plainly indicated by Ulysses: the words of Nestor are beautifully ornamented, "hatched in silver," while those of Agamemnon are more strong and homely, and should be held "up high in brass." But the character of the old hero is the interesting point. Nestor is not the man who creates, but is the man who appreciates and gives utterance to the thought of others. The new plan is laid before him, his opinion is decisive. Too old for invention, his powers of judgment have increased with age, none of the passions of youth or the jealousies of leadership obscure his vision, his mind grasps the thing as it is without the least taint of prejudice. But the thought must first be brought before him, he cannot originate it, the choice of what is best is his strength. Appreciation and expression are the salient points of the white-haired sage of the Greeks.

Now to complete the triad of characters we must have the originator, the man of creative intelligence. Here he appears and is on the point of speaking. Ulysses, for such is his name, is the supreme personage of the drama, the proportions of his intellect are truly colossal. He understands the difficulty at once, and sees the remedy; above all human beings he possesses insight and invention, he clearly comprehends the causes of the existing evils and knows their cure. He will not be content to utter innocent platitudes, that fortune is fickle, that men must be patient, that reverses show the true worth of the warrior. Failure has overtaken the expedition, there is some good reason for it, and he intends to go to the bottom of the matter. The disease however deep-seated must be discovered, and then the medicine can be applied. Such a discussion will lead Ulysses to examine the whole organization of the Greeks before Troy, and his argument will draw in the general principles of all social institutions and even of individual conduct.

Such is the representative group of the one party in the Grecian army; it is the positive, patriotic party, which believes in prosecuting the war to a glorious termination. This element is common to the three, but the fine gradation in their characterization should be distinctly noticed. Agamemnon is the embodiment of all the lofty impulses of the grand national enterprise, and hence is truly the leader of the people: but his limitations

are his feelings; faith, hope, perseverance, good intention, cannot take the place of knowledge. Nestor rises higher, he has appreciative intelligence united with the golden gift of persuasion; he first repeats the somewhat empty exhortations of Agamemnon, but when the deeper nature of Ulysses opens its treasures for his judgment, he yields an unhesitating assent. The apex is of course occupied by Ulysses, whose crowning gift is, as before said, creative intelligence.

Let us now listen to what such a man has to say about the nature of the existing evils and their remedy, for certainly his words will be worthy of attention. "The specialty of rule hath been neglected;" the individual has not performed the particular function allotted to him; there has been no subordination and hence no organization in the Grecian army. To illustrate his principle Ulysses goes through the physical and intellectual universe, the same law of harmony prevails everywhere. The planetary system with its central power, "Sol, in noble eminence enthroned and sphered" is a striking example which is here elaborated in great detail. But it is the social fabric, the institutions of man in which the necessity of degree, of subordination is most plainly manifested. Without it the whole realized world of right would crumble to ruin, there would be no security for the weak, no respect for age or consanguinity, *Astræa* would again take her flight to the skies:

"Strength should be lord of imbecility,  
And the rude son should strike his father dead;  
Force should be right; or, rather, right and wrong—  
Between whose endless jar justice resides.—  
Should lose their names and so should justice too."

Ulysses sees plainly that subordination is the primal law of institutional life; each person must fill his place in the community and must freely submit to what is above himself. But why not let institutions perish? Then man perishes. The individual is reduced to the wild beast of nature with all its voracity, he will at once proceed to devour his own species. This ultimate reduction is also stated in all its force and abstractness by the old Greek thinker, or rather by Shakespeare:

"Then everything includes itself in power,  
Power into will, will into appetite,  
And appetite, an universal wolf,



So doubly seconded with will and power,  
Must make perforce an universal prey  
And last eat up itself."

Such is the logical outcome of "this neglect of degree," it is the destruction of institutions, and the destruction of institutions is the destruction of man. The result springs from the most severe dialectical process: the individual is resolved into appetite, and appetite being universalized, must consume all, which includes itself. No words could more distinctly prove that the Poet was in the habit of *thinking* in the true sense of the term, that is, of testing every principle by the form of universality. If this were written by a poet of to-day, it would be laughed at by many a critic as a specimen of pure German transcendentalism. That the inference before mentioned is not far-fetched, note again the language with care. Man becomes mere appetite which is a *universal* wolf, this wolf must of necessity make an *universal* prey, till it finally comes back to itself and at last *eats up itself*. With what absolute precision is the negative result drawn, with what remorseless vigor is the whole philosophy of sensualism burnt to ashes in two or three short sentences! And must the confession be made?—be merciful, oh ye gods—the statement has the very manner, or, if you please, the very knack of the Hegelian Dialectic, the most terrible of all metaphysical goblins. Having said this, let us pray, now or never—"Angels and ministers of grace defend us."

There is such a determination on the part of many writers to reduce the greatest and wisest of poets to the same dimensions as themselves, that any attempt to exhibit his thought, is met with a storm of ridicule. To be sure Shakespeare is the supreme genius of the world, but I can exhaust him at a single hasty reading; to be sure his intellect is most profound, but I can probe it to the bottom at a glance. It is so flattering to human vanity and so easy compared with the tediousness of study to say, I did not see that meaning when I read the play and therefore it does not exist at all. But the fact remains that Shakespeare gives many indications of being acquainted with former systems of thought; his allusions to Plato and Aristotle even in his earliest works would show that he had already in youth delved in the richest mines of ancient speculation. His power over abstract expression can be seen in all his writings, but it is the great and abiding interest of this drama that he gives the most direct and purest



statement of his views of nature, man, and society. That there should be striking coincidences of ideas and even of method between the greatest thinker and the greatest poet, without either's borrowing from the other is most credible; both have the same ultimate thought, though its utterance is, in general, very different; each expresses the deepest and subtlest principle of his age, the one employing mainly the abstract forms of thought, the other mainly the poetic forms of imagination.

Such is the argument for the institutional world put into the mouth of Ulysses by Shakespeare. Never did thought defend more sternly and successfully the choicest acquisitions of the race. Still to careful students of the Poet the doctrines are not new. Though he has nowhere else expressed them so completely, they really form the ground work of all his dramas, and are the inspiration of his poetical activity. Why is Shakespeare the greatest of poets? Not because of his language, or of his imagery, or of his constructive ability, or even of his characterisation; these are all very wonderful indeed, but they have been reached by lesser minds. His supreme greatness lies in his comprehension and embodiment of the ethical, that is, institutional world; its profoundest collisions he penetrates with his inevitable glance, he knows too their mediation and final solution. It has been the object of these essays, as the reader doubtless has perceived, to drop all minor points of view and hold the eye unswervingly upon this one element. It is truly the Shakespearian world into which a person must be initiated if he would wish to stand face to face with the great bard. If we suffer the mind to lose itself in the externalities of his art, in the words, in the figures, in the versification or even in the characters, we can obtain but a very partial and very cloudy reflex of the total man.

A further observation may be added. The importance of this institutional element is not confined to the study of Shakespeare; it is the deepest moving principle of that which is vital and permanent in all literature, from the Homeric epos to the modern novel. Men will cherish and hold on to what is highest in themselves, and the work of art must adumbrate something which is of eternal interest; such are the conflicts in the Family, State, Society and institutions generally. Criticism would do well to pay attention to them, if it would rise out of the realm of mere subjective opinion to the dignity of a science, for thus it abandons caprice and fastens itself upon the most objective realities.

Ulysses has now laid bare the evil under which the Grecian army is suffering, its logical consequence also has been unfolded. But these words are still general. Who are the authors of this present state of affairs? This question brings us to the other party of the Greeks. Achilles, the mightiest warrior of them all, has withdrawn from active participation in the conflict and stays in his tent mocking their discomfiture. The motive is offended vanity, he has grown "dainty of his worth," he has not obtained the position which he thinks that his merit deserves. He also disapproves of the manner of conducting the war, there is too much strategy and too little fighting. An additional motive is given later, his tenderness for one of Priam's daughters, Polyxena. To Achilles is joined Patroclus, his friend, who here appears as a merry mocker caricaturing the leaders of the opposite party. But his humor has nothing malicious or bitter in it, his chief object is to make the weary hours fly more swiftly by some amusement.

Ajax too has turned sore-head and refuses to fight; his grievance also seems to be mainly unappreciated merit, though he is infected with the example of Achilles. Ajax represents mere physical strength without brain, he is an immense mass of muscle. The difference between him and Achilles is that the latter has also bodily dexterity, and is possessed of more mind, though this is not excessive. Still both maintain the side of force against the intellectual direction of the war as upheld by Ulysses. To Ajax is joined Thersites, one of the most prominent characters of the play, whose utterances have impressed some critics so strongly that he has been considered to represent Shakespeare's own opinions concerning the Trojan war and its heroes. The main purport of the whole drama has thus been found in his sayings. Thersites reflects the negative element of the Grecian enterprise; he sees the weak side and only the weak side of everybody and everything; in this field lies all his intellectual shrewdness. He is therefore the supreme fault-finder, his speech is nothing but biting satire, his "gall coins slander like a mint." He cannot comprehend that which is universal and supreme in such a national undertaking; but he has the keenest eye and the sharpest tongue for the petty faults and foibles of the leaders who are after all only the instruments for the accomplishment of a great principle. Ajax sets him to reviling the chiefs of the opposite party, though little of his abuse of

them appears in the play, for Thersites evidently appreciated the intellect of Ulysses; but upon Ajax and Achilles he pours the full flood of his bile. Thersites and Patroclus are both attendants and to a certain extent take the place of clowns: but the latter is a sportive humorist who can laugh at the ridiculous phase of a cause which he at last dies for, while the former is the pure satirist whose soul is blasted with its own curse and who can have no principle to die for. He is therefore an arrant coward.

Such are the two parties which have developed themselves in the Grecian army. It is the struggle between the hand and the head, between force and intellect. Ulysses states the difficulty: the carefully elaborated policy of the leaders is called cowardice, wisdom is counted no member of the war, brain is to be governed by brawn:

“The still and mental parts  
That do contrive how many hands shall strike  
When fitness calls them on, and know by measure  
Of their observant toil the enemies' weight—  
Why this hath not a finger's dignity,  
They call this bed-work, mappery, closet-war,”

and so withdraw from the field of battle. These are the public reasons which Achilles and Ajax give for their course, though their private and doubtless more potent reason has already been stated to be a lack of due appreciation of their deserts.

But now comes the remedy, for intelligence here too must assert its supremacy and control in some way these men of muscle; they must be won. Ulysses will be equal to the emergency; the challenge just received from Troy furnishes the opportunity. His plan is to divide the opposite party. Ajax can be secured by a little flattery, which is at once administered with astonishing effect, for it even turns him into an enemy of his fellow-grumbler, Achilles. But the latter is a far more difficult case to manage, for he is not stupid and really knows his own worth. No extravagant laudation can catch him, indeed he has long been used to it, and must have yielded ere this, if such means were sufficient. On the contrary the extraordinary marks of admiration which are still shown him by the Greeks serve to keep alive his haughty pride. Therefore the opposite method must be employed with

him, instead of praise neglect. Since it is applause which ruins him, Ulysses proposes to elevate another man over him :

“ By device let blockish Ajax draw  
The sort to fight with Hector: among ourselves  
Give him allowance for the better man,  
For that will physic the great myrmidon,  
Who broils in loud applause, and make him fall  
His crest that prouder than blue Iris bends.”

How clear the diagnosis and how suitable the medicine ! It will be noticed that Ulysses always takes Nestor into counsel, the two then control Agamemnon. Nestor is the man of supreme appreciation ; he too had his plan, for he first advised that Achilles be selected as the antagonist of Hector ; but he at once abandons his own scheme when he hears the better one of Ulysses. He is not good at origination, but his judgment is without a cloud, without a trace of personal vanity.

The plan is carried into execution. Achilles is passed by without the customary marks of respect from the Greeks, he notices the slight and muses on the fickleness of popular favor. While in this mood Ulysses passes before him, perusing a book with great intentness. A strange book was that for camp reading in Homeric times. Ulysses cites from it the remarkable statement that man

“ Can not make boast to have that which he hath,  
Nor feels not what he owes, but by reflection.”

What can this mean, asks the horrified modern reader with the metaphysical bugbear rising in his imagination. But Achilles, though rather lean in intellect, clearly understands the passage, for he illustrates it with a striking and appropriate comparison ; indeed to him “ this is not strange at all.” Wonderful men were those old heroes ! The seed has fallen on good ground, and Ulysses enforces the same doctrine a second time with a much stronger turn of expression :

“ No man is the lord of anything,  
Though in and of him there be much consisting,  
Till he communicate his parts to others :  
Nor doth he of himself know them for aught  
Till he behold them formed in the applause  
Where they are extended —”



The metaphysical deluge is again upon us; is there then no plan of salvation? But the matter keeps getting worse. We might have pardoned that former abstruse discussion on institutions, for it was a theme so dear to the Poet; yet now he plunges remorselessly into the deepest psychological question known to philosophy. But what has the devout man to do except to struggle after, with the prayerful hope of soon touching bottom? Ulysses here states the doctrine of reflection, and what is more strange he uses for its designation exactly the term employed in modern systems of thought. Man cannot truly possess anything unless his possession is reflected through others; nay, he cannot truly know anything till his knowledge is reflected back to himself through others. Then both possession and knowledge are real, objective; otherwise they are idle figments of the brain.

All this reasoning, however, only prepares the way for a practical application of the doctrine to Achilles, who is thus caught in the web of his own principle. He has retired from active warfare; can he be surprised then if he finds himself no longer reflected in the applause of the Greeks, but that Ajax has taken his place? The case is clear, all past fame is lost unless rescued by present activity. The controlling motive of his character is now reached, and to it is added the stinging reproach that he, the great warrior of Greece, submits to be the lover of one of Priam's daughters. Ulysses departs, and it shows the character of Patroclus that he has before urged and now again urges these same views upon his friend. Patroclus is at bottom a patriot, though he must have his joke at the expense of the leaders. The opposition of Achilles is manifestly broken, though he does not directly say that he will return and take part in the war. But afterwards he is present with the other Greek leaders at the intended combat between Ajax and Hector, and there challenges the Trojan hero.

So harmony seems again to be restored in the Greek army. It is the brain of Ulysses which is everywhere seen in these transactions, the feat is purely intellectual. When the fighting comes he steps into the background, and the interest diminishes. The great error of Grecian discipline, lack of subordination, he exposes; the breach between the leaders he heals by winning Ajax and then Achilles. Such is the one side in this war; we are now ready to pass over to the other side and take a glance at its inter-



nal condition. The Trojans have also two parties within their walls, the division springs from a question of policy, namely the surrender of Helen. A message has been received that her delivery to the Greeks will end the war; upon this subject we are now to hear the deliberations.

Around Priam who presides and who seems rather to favor the surrender is gathered the wonderful group of his sons. Hector advises to give her up; the hazards of war are uncertain, many lives have been lost, and moreover Helen is worthless in character. It can be seen that Hector advances the ethical view, caprice and passion cannot sway his judgment, the Good is something real and not an individual whim, "value dwells not in the particular will;" this last expression again sounds like a technical term of the schools and vividly recalls *der besondere Wille* of German philosophy. But the strongest argument of Hector is based upon the right of the Family, of which the abduction of Helen was a gross violation; "the law of nature and of nations" demands to have the wife restored to the husband. The religious element of Troy represented by the priest Helenus and the prophetess Cassandra urge the same view of the question after their own peculiar methods. But Paris and Troilus are strongly opposed to her surrender. The former claims that he had the consent of them all for his act; still if this were not the case, he would cling to his prize, for his controlling principle is not moral goodness, but sensual love which has its completest embodiment in the beauty of Helen. Troilus argues decidedly in the same direction, his own relation to Cressida renders him susceptible of the passion which now darkens his judgment; but he has also another and better motive, the maintenance of the majesty of the king his father and of the dignity of his country. To this last aspect of the subject Hector finally assents, clearly against his notions of right. National honor, but chiefly personal glory quench the claims of conscience. Retribution will overtake both in accordance with the nature of their deeds, as we shall see hereafter. So the great warrior is won, the two parties have fused, and Troy is substantially united in the determination to keep Helen.

Here ends the first movement with its two threads, both of which have a tendency toward unity. The war-thread which has just been developed has perhaps the most purely intellectual tinge found in the works of Shakespeare. So much reflection

and so little action, so much deliberation and so little passion, cannot be pointed out elsewhere in his dramas. Then there is Ulysses, the supremely intellectual hero, in a far higher sense than Hamlet. For Hamlet's mind is defective if not diseased, it is forever caught in its own cobwebs and cannot march forward to the deed. But the thought of Ulysses, so profound yet so transparent, never destroys itself but proceeds by necessity to realization; it must find itself reflected, to use his own term, in the world around him. But now the character of the whole drama begins to change, the thought becomes more jejune, the structure more fragmentary and confused. The second movement which commences here is far inferior to that which has preceded, and grows worse till the end. But the two threads can still be followed, though their demarkation is by no means as plain and sharp as it was in the previous movement.

The love thread which portrayed the happy culmination in the emotional union of the pair, Troilus and Cressida, is now to exhibit their separation both external and internal, both in space and in spirit. Calchas, the father of Cressida, who has performed many important services for the Greeks, demands that she be exchanged for a noble Trojan prisoner and brought to the Greek camp. The request is granted, Cressida has to leave Troy and Troilus, Diomed is sent to bring her to her parent. The parting-scene of the lovers manifests anew their characters. Troilus feels the possibility of Cressida's desertion, she will be unable to resist the grace and flattery of her Grecian suitors. To be sure, she spurns the imputation of infidelity, but devotion has never been her supreme principle, hence her readiness to change individuals. The chivalrous bearing and sweet compliments of Diomed seem to touch her favor, even in this scene where she is taking leave of Troilus, who shows decided marks of jealousy, not without cause. She passes to the Grecian camp where each hero gives her a kiss in turn, though Ulysses, the wise man, passes judgment upon her character. That judgment is very severe, it implies that she is without modesty and without fidelity.

She is already in love with Diomed, the tie of affection which bound her to Troilus is broken. The latter comes from Troy and beholds with his own eyes her faithlessness, and hears with his own ears her declaration of desertion. The struggle is a most intense one, but he gives her up and slips "the bonds of Heaven." She says that her eye leads her mind; her love is for the last

man whom she looks upon. The sensual side of her nature is here most strongly emphasized, whereas in the first movement her striking trait was the cool understanding which held control over her emotions; this is not a contradiction perhaps, but certainly a difference. There is no retribution for her act; judged by Shakespeare's usual method, her treatment is incomplete. But Troilus has tasted a little of his own advice before the Trojan council; he would not permit the wife Helen to be restored to her husband: the advocate of violent separation is himself separated from her whom he loved. Still the fact remains that the faithful man is punished and the faithless woman goes free.

The war-thread is next to be carried forward from the point where it was left. The hostile sides, having come to internal unity, are prepared for the external fight. Diomed is the messenger, and while he is among the Trojans, he has occasion to give his opinion of the war. It is an intensely satirical view, both Paris and Menelaus equally deserve Helen since they make no "scruple of her soilure," and the whole commotion is only a scramble for a strumpet. Diomed, like many a soldier since his time, evidently wishes that he had not enlisted, and damns the war. It has been already noticed that Thersites holds the same view; "nothing but lechery; all incontinent varlets," is his unvarnished characterization of the struggle and the heroes. But Diomed is a warrior and a chivalrous gentleman, while Thersites is the universal fault-finder and base coward. These two persons represent in the main the satirical element which some critics have found in the entire play, notwithstanding its far more elevated positive characters.

The single combat between Ajax and Hector now takes place, in the true medieval fashion. But there is not satire here in the proper sense of the term, for satire selects the weaknesses, the finite elements of an individual, society, or great enterprise and holds them up to scorn and indignation. There is however burlesque in the entire account of the challenge and the duel, for burlesque puts its content into an alien form, as in the present instance the old Homeric personages and occurrences are thrust into the manners of chivalry. But notwithstanding this humorous coloring the collision of the two nations is genuine and earnest. The combatants meet; after a little fencing, sufficient to clear the honor of both, Hector refuses to fight Ajax since the latter is his cousin. Hector, though of the loftiest courage and

generosity, is without pride, he is the antithesis of Achilles. He will not shed the blood of his own family even if hostile; though the disgrace of the surrender hangs over him, he offers to throw down his weapons and to embrace his "father's sister's son."

So ends the first combat. Hector visits the Grecian princes, he receives knightly welcome and sumptuous entertainment. He there is greeted with a challenge from Achilles who however will first honor him with the most gracious hospitality. There is a vein of incongruity running through these scenes which added to the merry bantering of the chieftains produces a ridiculous effect. But the challenge of Achilles is countermanded by a secret letter from Troy, love in his case too triumphs over war, his "major vow" is the pledge sworn to Polyxena. Thus the persuasive words of Ulysses are lost, the strongest motive of Achilles is here not wounded pride, but his passion for Priam's daughter. But there is still another change in the motivation, his friendship for Patroclus is more powerful than his love, since the death of Patroclus rouses him to go to battle in which he slays Hector, though in a manner most cowardly and wholly inconsistent with both his previous position and character. It will thus be seen that the most elaborate and most profound part of the play, the reconciliation of Achilles through the dexterity of Ulysses is without a purpose, it is a colossal instrumentality which produces no ultimate effect. On the contrary a motive almost unknown, and certainly not developed in the drama is dragged in from Homer to determine the result. Hector the most noble, generous, and humane of all the chieftains Grecian or Trojan, perishes, though there is an attempt to justify his fate through his disregard of the entreaties of parents, sister and wife, and of the omens of Heaven. But the deeper ethical retribution was prepared in the Trojan council when he surrendered conviction mainly to desire for personal glory; the result is, he is destroyed in its pursuit. But the parting scene at Priam's palace is clearly the motive intended here.

The termination of this drama resembles a goodly ship going to pieces amid the breakers; gradually it splits asunder, and nothing is seen but the disconnected fragments floating on the surface of the angry waters. The play is literally wrecked. The characters become different and even inconsistent, the great preparations of the first movement are inadequately carried out, or entirely dropped, the action and the structure are confused, un-



necessary parts are introduced, and necessary parts are omitted. To name the work has given great difficulty; it is not comedy, tragedy, history, or special drama; inasmuch as the true end is wanting, there can be no complete proof for any designation. As it stands, the war-thread ends in the death of Hector which must pass for tragic; though Hector is not the leading character of this thread. But the love-thread terminates in mere separation, which is no solution at all, as there is no requital for the deed. The usual method of Shakespeare is to reward the fidelity of the woman with a restoration of her estranged lover—Julia, Helena, Hermione, Imogen; but the fidelity of the man to a treacherous or unreciprocating beauty is compensated by bestowing upon him another mistress who will be faithful, as is seen in the first and second loves of Romeo, and in the case of Duke Orsino. The devoted Troilus deserves a change of individuals. Certainly none of the characters of this thread have a tragic motive. On the whole the tendency is to the special or mediated drama, though that tendency is by no means fulfilled. The course of the war-thread might be: Achilles, under the influence of the intellect of Ulysses, is reconciled with the Greeks, goes forth to meet Hector and slays him, the restoration of Helen follows with peace between the contending peoples. Thus the national collision is solved, and in the first movement of the play there is much to indicate some such conclusion. In this manner the present negative end is brought to a positive reconciliation in both the threads; namely, war ends in peace, and fidelity is rewarded with fruition. To reconstruct Shakespeare is an act of temerity, but it may be permitted to his faithful readers to think as complete what he has without doubt left incomplete.

The purport of the whole play has been supposed to be satirical and also humorous. That both these elements are present in it must be at once granted, but they are subordinate. The collision is serious, between nations, and on both sides there is violation and justification, a wrong and a right. The Greeks vindicate the Family but assail the State, while the Trojans vindicate nationality but violate the Family. It is a genuine conflict in these institutions, and not a delusion. Moreover the leading characters on both sides are imbued with deep earnestness. The satirists and merry-makers in one form and another are found in all conflicts of society, and hence they are not absent even from the tragedies of Shakespeare. To account for the marked inequality



in this drama conjecture has not been idle; the weak part is variously supposed to have been written by the poet in his youth, or in a bad mood, or not at all by him but by some other playwright or playwrights. It is perhaps immaterial which view is adopted, they have all quite the same degree of probability, and rest upon equally good evidence.

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## KANT'S ETHICS.

BY JAMES EDMUNDS.

[Continued from Vol. VIII., p. 351].

### VI. — *Ethical Worship.*

§101—As the lightning that lightens out of the one part under heaven shines into the other part under heaven, so does the Kantian doctrine of the indefinite series illumine the whole universe. All phenomena lie in series of indefinite extent: and the completion of every series is THE INFINITE, “for in Him we live and move and have our being, as also some of your own poets have said.” All antinomies consist just herein: \* that the human understanding cannot determine the relation of THE INFINITE to any given series (§78); and the indifference of every antinomy, sole indubitable deliverance of every reason, is THE INFINITE.

§102—All thought proceeds in a sensible series, a series therefore *a priori* infinitely divisible and infinitely protensible. Consciousness, “needed conditionally only to make the perception clearer or more perspicuous” (KANT’S Religion, book IV., apotome II., section IV.), whether regressing, progressing, or envisaging, finds in this series that INFINITY, which is moreover required to constitute that unity without which consciousness were itself impossible (§§16, 98).

§103—Hence, according to the most enlightened philosophy no less than the common understanding, ethic issues naturally and

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\*The proper place for the proof of this is the transcendental dialectic, which clears illusions and fallacies out of the way of those practical principles upon which alone ethics and religion are securely founded.

inevitably in religion. The DIVINE IDEAL, hypostatized and throned in the field of the supernatural, occupies no doubtful place, but holds and verily is the solid substratum of all understanding, the omnipresent indifference of the ceaseless antiphony of nature. The synthesis is transcendent and the representation anthropomorphic: the IDEAL can therefore be objected solely for a practical behoof: but that subjective use which cures all the imperfections of the world of woful sense quite consists with and consoles the self-prescribed limitations of the understanding.

§104—Anthropomorphism is of the very essence of all rational representation. Not anthropomorphism is obnoxious to philosophy, but only irrational inferences from anthropomorphic syntheses: *ex gratia*, the postulation of an indemonstrable reality. Uncultivated reason, ever seeking the hidden springs of her venerated law, continually overleaps herself, incautiously climbing upon the drifting clouds of hyper-physical worlds. True religion need not so much restrain as instruct and regulate ethical ambition. Philosophy, eradicating unwarrantable inductions and pruning away fallacious fancies, retains the supreme central thoughts of anthropomorphism intact and sacrosanct, perennial source whence are deduced faith, hope, and everlasting love.

§105—The reverence inspired by the unconditioned law may at the will of the law's subject be directed upon the law's last end and aim, the DIVINE IDEAL (§97). Answering to the contemplative call, like magnetic current from opposing pole, the PEACE OF GOD (§87), as it were a dove descended out of heaven, comes upon the head of the bowed worshiper and there abides, ravishing his soul with supernal grace, the while purifying his secret thought and renovating his corrupted will. The blessed influence melts the cold intellectual reverence into a sensible tenderness, so wondrously analogous to human love, so inexhaustible, so infinite in delight, so unspeakably precious, that astonishment is no longer felt in hearing the delirious song of SPINOZA\*: "the love wherewith His creatures love one another is the love wherewith GOD loveth Himself."

§106—It were manifestly useless to search the physical world for the originary springs of voluntary action. The spontaneous volition, although eventuating in time, is itself no phenomenon

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\*BENEDICTUS, qui venit in nomine Domini.

and cannot be subjected to the law of the causal nexus. Since we know no other law of causation, we can only subsume under bare principles the will's conformity or nonconformity to the pure law of reason (§58). We therefore predicate an unsearchable hyper-physical subjective ground of adopting maxims ordaining obedience to the supersensible law, which ground may be called man's connate predisposition for righteousness, or his good principle: and likewise a subjective bias, also hyper-physical and inscrutable, "whereby the choice leans to maxims that postpone the spring afforded by the moral law in favor of other and immoral springs," which bias may be called man's depravity, or his evil principle.

Both predisposition and bias must be regarded as distinct from the will, which freely adopts the one or the other as its last governing ground or spring.

§107—It seems scarcely necessary to add that the evil principle is as rational and necessary a postulate as the good\*. For if it be contended with regard to any action that the ground (whether physical or hyper-physical) of the determination of the choice does not lie within the reason of the subject himself (see the definition of appetite, §45), it must be conceded that that ground (whatsoever) has been by the will freely adopted as *mobile*, which free adoption can only take place by virtue of a maxim subsumed under the will's supreme rule. For the supremacy of reason practical (§§23, 47), were an idle dream, were not the universal validity of her law self-declared and obedience unconditionally commanded (§§ 56, 58). Any violation of the law can only be in pursuance of a predetermined maxim negating the law's supremacy; which supremacy cannot be defeated unless the last subjective ground (manifestly hyper-physical and inscrutable) of adopting the vicious maxim has been already made the supreme rule of conduct. (It is not meant here to deny that the good principle may practically cover a subsidiary rule which may have erected into a spring an end which *AS END* is right and just but *AS SPRING* immoral. §84 et supra. But such impurity of motive is itself offensive and imputable).

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\*"I find then the law, that when I desire to do good, evil is present with me. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man. But I see ANOTHER LAW in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members."—*Paul to the Romans*.

§108—We have termed the good principle man's predisposition for righteousness, and the bad principle man's bias to evil. By the term "bias," KANT understands "The subjective ground of the possibility of acquiring all at once inveterate habits, so far forth as such habitual desire is in itself only adventitious and casually superinduced upon human nature." "Since evil can arise only from a perverse determination of one's free choice, which choice again can only be deemed good or evil when regard is had to the maxims it has adopted, it follows that the bias to evil can only consist in the subjective ground of the possibility of an agent-intelligent's maxims swerving from the moral law," which ground is voluntarily adopted by the agent as his supreme rule.

The answer to the natural question, "How then is the law alone and always supreme?" is found in the difference between natural and moral necessitation. For the upright man, the law of GOD BOTH IS AND OUGHT TO BE the supreme rule; while he who IS GOVERNED by the evil principle, OUGHT NEVERTHELESS TO OBEY the law which ever declares to him its rightful supremacy.

Hence arises the propriety of distinguishing the good principle as a predisposition, of necessity preredquired toward the possibility of man's being precisely what he is, from the evil principle as a bias, as matter of acquisition, entailed by the man upon himself. The distinction is a valuable addition to the ethical ascetic, though it is nothing but a logical enforcement of the ethical OUGHT. (§77).

§109—Why we are born into the flesh subject to an ineradicable bias perverting the moral spring afforded by the pure law, is a problem which lies beyond the bounds of understanding; since the material benefits of subordination to the law would as surely flow from necessitation as from free conformity. But it is cogitable that the evil principle is implanted by the LAWGIVER, in order that the necessity of the principle of good\*, being incessantly thrust forward (§89), may continuously direct His creatures to Himself (§96). In this view (which, though transcendent, is not constitutive, but merely affords a grateful contemplation),

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\*"We have this treasure in earthen vessels, that the exceeding greatness of the power may be God's and not of us," says PAUL.

the two principles may be regarded as connate and essentially coexistent.

§110—Man's "susceptibility for such reverence toward the moral law as is of itself sufficient to make the law the immediate spring of will," is the subjective ground of the possibility of his intelligible character, so far forth as this character can be apprehended by the merely human reason. KANT calls it his "predisposition for personality," by which last he signifies the naked idea of the moral law. But, if this were so, with the solution of the antinomy would personality quite fall away. Holiness, for a merely practical behoof, an invaluable cogitation, annihilates the conception of the law in the fulfilment thereof; and reason forbids the assertion that by no increment or evolution can she replace her present supreme law by a higher mobile\*.

(§43).

But except upon unattainable hyper-physical ground, it must be held that both principles, predisposition and bias alike, are ineradicable.

§111—According as the one or the other principle is voluntarily made the last ground of choice, is man morally either good or bad. And since as an individual intelligent it is impossible that he should at the same time be governed by two conflicting supreme rules, he must be esteemed at every point of time either wholly good or wholly bad.† For that upright or this perverse mindedness he is at all times strictly accountable, having as a free agent wilfully adopted the supreme motive in accordance with which his maxims are determined; and the good or evil consequences therefrom flowing, are at all times justly imputable.

But when we come to consider him as a phenomenon, whose intelligible character is strangely compounded with the complexity of nature, we discover that in actual fact and event he is so swayed by an impurity of commingled motive that at no moment of his physical existence is he able to conclude with certainty

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\*But the fact that a superior faculty may exist without reason, does not concern the argument, which is not addressed to angels. Its weight appears in the transcendental dialectic.

†"For is he in any one point morally good, then has he made the moral law his maxim; but should he at the same time be in some other points bad, then, since the moral law is but one and yet universal, the maxim referring to it would be at once a general and a particular maxim, which is a contradiction."  
—*Kant's Religion, Book I., explanatory scholium to the exordium.*



upon his supreme rule. He must therefore at every point of time be esteemed neither wholly good nor wholly bad, but frail and corrupt, continually deflecting from that his proper standard of holiness which reason incessantly plants in the forefront of the battle of this mortal life.

§112—He who has adopted the evil principle as his supreme rule, may nevertheless during the whole course of his physical existence exhibit only just actions, strictly conformed to the outward requirements of the law. But when the choice is determined to good deeds by merely evil maxims, which last “might possibly just as easily invite to transgression,” the character contains no moral worth.\* The term DEED or ACT, says KANT, “may signify that primordial use of freedom whereby the supreme and ruling maxim (contrary to, or in harmony with, the law) was determined on, or it may equally well denote that derived exercise of will whereby outward actions themselves (acts materially considered, so far forth as they are objects of choice) are actually brought forth conformably to such maxim. The indwelling bias toward evil is a deed in the former sense (PECCATUM ORIGINARIUM), and at the same time the formal ground of every illegal deed in the second sense (PECCATUM DERIVATIVUM). The guilty demerit of the first subsists even while that of the second is most carefully and successfully eschewed by dint of springs differing from the law. The one is A DEED COGITABLE, patent to reason *a priori*, independently of all conditions of time; the other is A DEED SENSIBLE, *a posteriori*, exhibited in time (FACTUM PHENOMENON)”.

§113—The ground of evil does not lie in the sensory, but in that immoral mindedness whereby the law is not at all times made the supreme rule. True virtue, therefore, wars upon appetite only so far as this last contravenes the law (§86). The sensuous appetites are in themselves neither good nor bad: they are merely the media through which appears the goodness or badness of the man. The springs taken from sense may be the sufficient determinators of every act; and that they are permitted so to be, irrespective of the law, is precisely what makes man morally evil. “Appetites do no more than throw difficulties in the way of EXECUTING maxims that may happen to thwart them: whereas evil consists properly herein—that mankind WILLS not

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\*LUKE XVIII., 1-5.

to withstand those appetites when these last [maxims] invite to transgression; which evil mindedness it is strictly, that is the true inward enemy."

§114—Man cannot escape from the law, which by force of his moral nature thrusts itself unremittently upon him; he therefore does, whether consciously or unconsciously (more often the latter), adopt into his maxims springs taken from the law. Neither can (nor ought) he eradicate his sensuous impulses; hence his physical nature compels the adoption also of the springs of sense. It is therefore evident that if the moral quality of his maxims depends upon the DIFFERENCE OF THE SPRINGS which they contain (which may be called the MATTER of the maxims), he is at once both morally good and morally evil, which is a contradiction (as regards a single consciousness, and can only be predicated of an aggregate). It follows that that whereby a man is morally good or morally evil depends solely upon the SUBORDINATION OF THE SPRINGS (adopted by him into his maxims, which may be called the FORM of the maxims): "WHICH ONE HE CHOOSES TO MAKE THE CONDITION OF THE OTHERS." (§94).

§115—The supreme duty of every man, at every moment of his physical existence, therefore is **now, by an instantaneous act of will, to reinstate the good principle in its original supremacy** as the highest rule of his life, stating it in his maxims as at all times the sole and sufficient condition of all the springs of the will. What manner of life hence results may be in general inferred from the deduction of the ethical principle (chapter IV. *supra*; or the same may be extensively gathered from the didactic of the New Testament, while the historic portions of that scripture sufficiently illustrate the ethical ascetic).

By this constant reinstatement of the law, which may be called "a transvolving of the cast of thinking." "when by one single inflexible determination mankind retroverts his will's perverted bias for choosing evil maxims," is the evil principle (not eradicated, but) continually outweighed. More than this is not within human power; for evil could only be extirpated by force of maxims WHOLLY good, and these can never be adopted by man, whose last subjective ground of choice is already radically corrupted.

§116—And it is by reason of this his natural depravity that no man is able to declare with certainty (even to himself, much less to others), whether that good resolution does in strict conformity

to the law dominate his thought, and does thereby so far reform the bent of his sensory as to bring forth into act "fruit worthy of repentance." (§89). The fixity of his principle can only be INFERRED from the careful observation of a long course of conduct. But whatever the law ordains that he OUGHT TO DO, that is he entitled by his reason to believe that he CAN DO. He may therefore well hope that the good principle, "chosen as his dominant rule of life, will suffice to keep him unswervingly steady along the good though narrow railway of a perpetual progression from bad to better. This progression is for Him to whom the unknown depths of the heart are patent, and in whose ALL-SEEING EYE the moments of the series are envisaged in their sum, an integral unity," completely satisfying the sacrosanct requirements of His most holy law.

"I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of GOD, to present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, well-pleasing to GOD, which is YOUR RATIONAL SERVICE. And be not conformed to this world; but BE TRANSFORMED BY THE RENEWING OF YOUR MIND, that you may discern what is the will of GOD, the good, and well-pleasing, and perfect." So PAUL of this matter.

Heed also JAMES THE JUST: "But be DOERS of the word, and not hearers only (deceiving yourselves). For if any one is a hearer of the word, and not a doer, he is like to a man beholding his natural face in a mirror. For he beheld himself, and has gone away; and immediately he forgot what manner of man he was. But he who looked into THE PERFECT LAW, THE LAW OF LIBERTY, and remained thereby, being not a forgetful hearer, but A DOER OF WORK, this man shall be happy in his doing."

§117—Against the proposal to man's self of the self-amelioration unconditionally by the law commanded (§91), it can by no means be objected that the HABITS of depravity (whether inherited, or self-imposed, or by any power physical or hyperphysical) present insuperable obstructions; "for by no cause in the world can he ever cease to be a free, *id est* a spontaneously acting being." No physical forces (whether entirely without, or also within man) can determine a free act; and to resolve upon the doing of any wicked deed, under no matter what pressure of circumstance, is "an ordinary use of choice." Moreover, to know the relation of his every act to the law is the duty of every rational agent; and to permit himself to be hurried without due reflection into sin (of commission) is itself sin (of omission) no

less imputable than deliberate wickedness. Whether the consequences of former free immoral acts may be entirely overcome by immediate transvolution of choice and incessant inflexibility of will, or must henceforth be endured (the PUNISHMENT of past guilt, inflicted by inexorable law), is a question which cannot be entertained; because it is the instant duty of man NOW to amend, and any delay or refusal whatever is just as much a transgression as though he were now for the first time falling out of a state of original innocence into evil.

§118—In consequence of his connate principle of evil, man cannot go forward in an upright life, as though he were by nature innocent; nor, in presence of his connate principle of good, ought he, as though hopelessly wicked, supinely to await supernatural regeneration, imploring with tears that that may be done for him which it behooves him instantly to do for himself. He must begin by counteracting (§82) his perverted choice, “and (because the bias to evil is ineradicable) by unremittingly wrestling, and so making stand against it. Since now this issues in an endless progress from bad to better, it results that the converting of the sentiments of the wicked into those of the good takes place by so changing the innermost and last ground whereupon maxims of life are determined on, that these last [maxims] become henceforward conformable to the law.” The COMPREHENSIBILITY of such a change is beyond the reach of understanding (which indeed cannot explain any event into time, but must content itself with arranging under laws those events which it apprehends); but so far as concerns the POSSIBILITY, let him who deems it advisable to co-act the representation of the law consult the examples of the illustrious dead. (§§80, 92).

§119—But having done what he can for himself, and steadfastly continuing in the doing, man is entitled by his reason to believe that the law will not fail of completion. “For verily I say to you, till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall not pass from the law, till all be fulfilled.” He may therefore (and in truth inevitable does) HOPE that whatever HELP (whether natural or supernatural, whether merely external aids or also within himself) may be needful to obviate the obstructions which beset his course, to subdue opposing circumstances, and so to conduce to his ultimate well-being, will (without price) be added to him. (§103). To understand either wherein this WORK OF GRACE consists or whether it be possible or indeed exist at all, cannot assist



him either in the performance of his own duty or in the knowledge of the law. "It is not essential," says KANT, "and consequently not necessary, for EVERY ONE to know what GOD does or may already have done for his salvation; but it is undoubtedly requisite that all should know WHAT THEY THEMSELVES HAVE TO DO in order to render themselves worthy of His aid."

And so is the series of finite phenomenal actions, morally considered, though faulty and imperfect at every point of time, at last (like every other indefinite series) made perfect by the glorious completeness of the INFINITE.\*

§120—In all these things we are more than conquerors through Him who loved us. For I am persuaded that neither death nor life; neither angels nor principalities nor powers, neither things present nor things to come, neither height nor depth, nor any other created thing, shall be able to separate us from the love of GOD. And now remain faith, hope, love, these three; and the greatest of these is love. Pursue after love. Love works no ill to one's neighbor; therefore love is the fulfilment of the law.

"Now faith is the assurance\* of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen." And the faith which ASSURES us that whatever aid (physical, hyperphysical, or supernatural) may be needful to eke out the imperfections of man (who must invariably account himself to have come short of the glory of GOD) may be made available by a good will, though all the while totally unacquainted with the matter," does moreover give rise to a CONVICTION OF THE GRACE OF GOD which cannot be shaken by any assaults from without, nay also or from within, so long as the path of an upright life is rigidly pursued. This faith (FIDES SACRA), being the pure reflex of speculative reason, subjective and not constitutive, is well-grounded, and cannot properly be called superstitious. Unlike (and exactly reversing the course of) dogmatic faith (FIDES IMPERATA, SERVILIS), it comes from beyond (EX TERRA INCOGNITA), a light into the world, solely that the

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\*The superficial reader will observe that this is Universalism. It is indeed universal completion—of salvation of them that obey, and no less of damnation of them that refuse. For as many as sin with the law shall be judged by the law; and he who apes the perfection of the devil will necessarily expect to find (in precise accordance with the law) the series ultimately closed by infinite degradation.

†The version of King JAMES is ridiculous. Vide Hebrews XI., 1.



world may not abide in darkness. Beatific handmaid of blessed love!

§121—Through faith we perceive, then, that works of grace are possible, and if real may inure to our need. But the voice of reason forbids us either to transcend our limited knowledge of nature, vaingloriously presuming that the boundless mercy of the MOST HIGH hath wrought in our behalf any work of grace, or foolishly to stray into the realm of the hyperphysical, where our feet have no foothold and our lamps no oil. As to that fanaticism, neither the immediate witness of conscience nor the deductions of observation and experience can possibly afford any man any warrant to assert that he in his own person exhibits a preternatural effect of the Divine Benignity, or anything further than the legitimate sequent of his own previous action; while as to this folly, the boldest pretender to insight can never demonstrate that the works of those gone before have not followed them, constituting there as here the sole external title to character.

And furthermore: he who seeks by any means whatsoever to bring about within himself a work of grace, does thereby delude himself; since he is required by his reason to look for none other than natural effects from those natural means which alone are within his power. And if, in this delusive evagation from the bounds of understanding, he pretermits in favor of any supposititious thaumaturgy any part of his rational service, he is therein guilty of a heathenish worship which cannot advance his moral amendment, and must infallibly repress the spirit of true devotion.

By faith (apart from works of law) we reckon that man is justified. Do we then make void law through the faith? Far be it! Yea, we establish law.

§122—Out of "our consciousness of the moral law, coupled with the need felt by reason of assuming somewhere a higher power able to procure to that law whatever whole and entire effect a created universe will admit of, and to make that effect conspire and harmonize with the moral scope of all things, comes forth the hypostasis of the DIVINE IDEAL as the Supreme Governor of His universe, King of kings and Lord of lords. We cannot concern ourselves with transcendent theology (as to what GOD may be, objectively: §16, parenthesis), but only with the relations which the Rational Ideal bears to us as rational agents.

and with our duty in view of that Ideal. Those relations may be conveniently arranged under the threefold aspect of legislative, executive, and judicial, (regarding OUR FATHER as Omnipotent Creator, Benignant Guardian, and Righteous Judge); and this duty is the acknowledgement, recognition and performance of all our obligations as if they were divine commandments." "And the scribe said to him, 'Well, teacher; thou saidst truly that He is One, and there is no other beside Him: and to love Him with all the heart and with all the understanding and with all the soul and with all the strength, and to love his neighbor as himself [§70, 84], is more than all the whole burnt offerings and sacrifices.' And JESUS, seeing that he answered intelligently, said to him, 'Thou art not far from the kingdom of GOD.'"

§123—So that the religion of reason differs from theologies, revelations, and statutable confessions, as subjective from objective, as ideal from imaginative. The objective phase of the only true religion is in the realization of its practical principles, whereof the inculcation is conveyed in the didactic of ethics, and whose application is itself the ethical ascetic. "Everything mankind fancies he can do, over and above good moral conduct, in order to make himself acceptable to GOD, is mere false worship of the Deity." "The true worship of GOD, rendered by the ethical believer (at once a subject in the Divine realm, and at the same time a free denizen of the moral state), is (like the heavenly kingdom) itself invisible, an inward service of the heart, consisting in the spirit and truth of a real moral sentiment within; and this service can alone consist in that moral-mindedness which discharges all the incumbent offices of humanity as if they were Divine commandments."

§124—The careful student, who has followed the master in philosophy from the first contact of the rational faculty with the sensory, thence through the schematism of the understanding up to ABSOLUTE UNITY (§§16, 24, 96—7—8), thence again returning in a complete deduction with THE LAW OF LIFE, a law whose utmost speculative reach leaves no nook of the universe unexplored and whose practical application leaves no need of man's moral nature unsatisfied, requires now no further assurance that the TRANSCENDENTAL SYSTEM OF KANT is one single and complete whole and positive (§100), negating only the Hegelians and the Philistines. The architectonic resurvey of the entire philosophic domain lately traversed now exhibits the landmarks then hast-

ily cast up free from any shadow of doubt, and does thereby (for if a trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself for battle?) mightily embolden valor (§86) to take on the whole armor of GOD, that he may be able to withstand in the evil day, and having fully done all, to stand. (§118). For GOD is able to make him stand.

§125—It remains to observe that religion issues out of ethic, and cannot in the rational procession precede it. And here, because by no rescript of our own can we add force to the master's words, or improve the matchless elegance of SEMPLE'S English version, we conclude by inviting the reader's most punctual attention to one of the great KANT'S grandest climaxes:

"There is a practical knowledge based entirely upon reason, needing no historic authentication, lying so near every one, even the most simple, that it looks as had it been written in detail on the tablets of his heart: a practical knowledge I say, of a law that cannot be named without commanding universal assent to its authority, and which is ushered into every one's soul with the IMMEDIATE consciousness of its unconditioned obligatory force. This practical knowledge is besides sufficient of itself to guide to a belief in GOD; or should this belief have been suggested aliunde, then it fixes and defines our idea of Him as a moral law-giver; thus furnishing a religion that is at once comprehensible by all, and that puts on the greatest dignity and honor that can possibly be represented; nay, the above mentioned practical knowledge issues so naturally in this religion, that it admits of being questioned Socratically out of every person's understanding, although he had never heard of it before. It is consequently not merely expedient to commence with this obvious truth, and to make the historical belief wherewith it is so much in harmony follow only as an accessory: but it is even a very duty to regard those notices, the birthright of every human reason, as the principal and supreme index pointing out the only legitimate and infallible way through which we can become partakers of whatever bliss a historical belief may promise: for in truth we can allow a narrated creed to pass validly current to such extent only as the former [practical knowledge] warrants; whereas, whenever this search into its inner texture and contents has been warily gone about, then is THE ETHICAL BELIEVER always left fully open to make a transit to so much of THE HISTORICAL BELIEF as he may find conducive to the quickening and enlivening of his pure moral and religious sentiments, in which event alone can such belief possess any inward moral worth, as it is then free and unextorted by any threat.

"There is yet another question which may be asked: whether the lectures publicly delivered in a church ought mainly to set

forth doctrines of GODLINESS, or those of pure VIRTUE. The former term (*godliness*) is perhaps the only one still used that can convey (even in part) the meaning of the foreign term *religio*.

"GODLINESS may be figured as containing under it two different moods in regard to our relation to the Deity. FEAR OF GOD is such a cast of thinking as obtains when we observe GOD'S LAWS as SUBJECTS in His realm, id est from the awe of duty. LOVE OF GOD, on the other hand, obtains then, when we offer Him the obedience of dutiful children, id est from a free and ingenuous approbation taken in His law. Either frame of mind is consequently above and beyond the bare moral determination, accompanied by the attendant idea of a supersensible Being, invested with such attributes as may be needed for placing within our reach that *sovereign good* aimed at by a moral mind, and eking out our inability to realize and attain it. This Person's *nature* does, whenever attempted to be fixed by any predicate, save those immediately arising out of the moral relation perceived to obtain betwixt our *idea* of Him and our duty, stand always in the greatest hazard of being anthropomorphously distorted, and consequently of endangering, displacing, and even supplanting to that extent our moral sentiments. Accordingly, we saw in the *Critiques* that this idea could not be received as of objective validity by pure speculative Reason, and that its origin, and still more its main use, was grounded entirely on the self-begotten and self-upholding law of our ethical economy. This being the state of matters, what, it will naturally be asked, ought to constitute the first rudiments of instruction when addressing the young, or when prelecting from the pulpit? Ought *virtue* to be explained before *godliness*? or godliness in preference to, and perhaps without even so much as mentioning, *virtue*? Both go of necessity hand-in-hand together: but a necessary conjunction of this sort can only obtain where the one is *the end*, the other no more than *a mean*. Again, the whole theory of virtue has its complete and entire subsistence by itself, dispensing even with the Idea God; whereas tenets of godliness deal only with this idea, so far forth as it serves to depicture to us how the grand end of morality (viz. the sovereign good) is to be gained. Hence it is manifest that godliness cannot *by itself* be the aim and end of morality, but can only serve as a mean, strengthening mankind's honest-mindedness, by ascertaining and warranting to him every good, even holiness, for which his natural efforts might be insufficient. The Idea Virtue, on the contrary, is exculpated in most prominent relief on every human soul. Each man bears it fully about within, however it may for a while be partially submerged; nor does it need, like the religious Idea, to be arrived at through any chain of ratiocination. In the august magnificence of its purity, arousing quite unsuspected energy, empowering man to smite down and overthrow the greatest possible obstacles within; in the dignity



of his nature which mankind has to uphold inviolate in order to reach that moral destination after which he strives; in this recognition of his excellency and purity, there does, I say, lie something so soul-exalting, yea heavenwards wafting, placing mankind as it were even in the presence of the Deity (§99), who merely by His holiness and legislative guardianship of virtue is an object of adoration, that every man, even though as yet far removed from giving this idea any motive-purchase on his maxims, gladly entertains it in his thoughts, as it then fully reveals to him, and stamps on him, the feeling of the original nobility and state of his rank. How different are the inward phenomena when this order is inverted! The idea of a Supreme Governor, imposing upon us duties of His law, lies primordially at an incomputable distance, and is observed, when we set out with *it*, to damp and dash man's courage—which, however, is of the very essence of all virtue—and the godliness is exposed to the risk of sliding into an abject, servile, and adulatory submission to the will of a despot. The energetic valor aroused, set free, and disengaged by virtue, encouraging and enabling mankind to trust confidently to his own resources, is likewise capable of becoming fortified and made inexpugnably secure when followed up by a doctrine of expurgation, announcing an amnesty for that in past transgressions beyond man's power to undo or counteract; whereas even here, were this ethical order transposed, then must inevitably doubt as to the appropriation of the *grace* unnerve and break the spirits: abortive expiations to make what has been done undone then creep in: doctrines of our utter inability to perform of ourselves any spontaneous ingenuous good, follow in their train; these, by begetting anxious and uneasy apprehensions touching his possible lapse backward into evil, transplant the unhappy sufferer into a whining, whimpering, passive moral state, incapable of aiming at anything either great or good—only of sighing after it with prayers or vows. In founding and uprearing a moral character, everything depends on the leading and dominant idea whereunto everything else must be subordinated. When to the worship of God is allotted the foremost place to which virtue is postponed, then is such *deity* an *idol*; for God is then an agent not to be won by good moral deportment executed in the world, but one whose approbation is to be gained by invocations and adulatory addresses: *religion* is now *idolatry*. Godliness can therefore never be a *surrogatum* of virtue, assisting us to dispense with it. Godliness can only be its plenary consummation, crowning it with the hope of that ultimate success which will one day put wholly within our grasp the chief and last end of all our moral labors.”

CORRECTIONS.—The reader will please note the following: In §12 (Vol. V., p. 31) for “Mr. Semple, the shrewd and masterly translator of the Ethics of Immanuel Kant, in his introduction to the *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der*



*Sitten*," read "Dr. Henry Calderwood, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, in his introduction to Semple's translation of Kant's *Ethics*." In §100 (Vol. VIII., p. 350) for "Semple," read "Calderwood." In §17 (Vol. V., p. 34) for "Mr. Semple," read "Dr. Calderwood." In §71 (Vol. V., p. 298) for "Apelles," read "Timanthes." In §67 (p. 296) for "judicial duty," read "juridical duty." In §75 (p. 301) last line, read [§24] instead of [§54].—J. E.

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## NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

### *On Pleasure and Pain.*

[Dr. Brinton, writing editorially in the *Medical and Surgical Reporter*, discusses in recent numbers the subject of Pleasure and Pain. We quote here the greater part of the two articles which he devotes to it.—EDITOR].

When Socrates was about to drink the cup of hemlock, and the jailer had loosed the fetters which had galled his ankles, he rubbed them with a feeling of relief, and exclaimed to his disciples: "How singular is the thing called pleasure, and how curiously related to pain which might be thought to be the opposite of it: for they never come to man together, and yet, he who pursues either of them is generally compelled to accept the other also. They are two, and yet they grow together out of one head or stem. I cannot help thinking that if Æsop had noticed them, he would have devised a fable about some god trying to reconcile their strife, and when he could not, tying their heads together; and that is the reason why when one comes the other follows."

Such, according to the record in the *Phædo* of Plato, were the reflections of the greatest philosopher of Greece, on these discrepant sensations. Up to the present time so far as we can find, no satisfactory doctrine of their relations has been taught. Something much better than an Æsopian fable has indeed been brought forward to explain them. Theories, with more or less testimony to their truth, have been adduced. Pain, says Beclard, is an excess of the sense of touch: *Physiologie*, p. 883. It is, says another physiologist, hyperæsthesia of the sensory fibres. The lexicographers seem to have been puzzled with it. Professor Dunglison calls it "a disagreeable sensation which scarcely admits of definition." The *Dictionnaire des Sciences Medicales* gets over it by the convenient statement that it is so well known that to define it is superfluous! While Dr. Gardner in his

Medical Dictionary, has a still neater device. Turning to pain, we read, "pain, see dolor." Hunting up dolor we have the pleasure of finding "dolor—pain." Professor Erb, in Ziemssen's *Cyclopaedia*, Vol. XI., p. 12-15, discusses the point at length, and comes to the conclusion that pain is a new sensation, experienced when excitation of the nerves reaches a certain intensity.

These quotations only show how little is understood of the origin of pain and its brotherhood with pleasure. To reach a better understanding of them, let us turn to the simplest conception of existence. It is change, motion; beyond this we cannot go. Individuality, the existence of the unit organism, this means motion in definite composition, what mechanicians call a resultant of motion, wherein many motions are united in a solidarity of action. But an organism is not this only, or it were merely a complicated machine. That in which it differs from a machine is in its power of keeping up its motion. This it does by the process of *nutrition*.

The first law of motion, as defined by Huyghens, and later by Sir Isaac Newton, is that "*every body continues in a state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line, unless acted on by some external force.*" This law is usually said to result from "the property of inertia"—a meaningless explanation, as there is no such property. The real explanation was hinted by the philosopher Kant, when he showed that *time* is a condition of perception, not a form of force or quality of matter, and, therefore of itself can never influence motion, which belongs essentially to matter.

This first law of motion becomes the first law of philosophical biology, modified so as to allow the phenomenon of nutrition. In this form it is given by Auguste Comte in the following words: "Every condition, static or dynamic, tends of itself to remain without any change, opposing itself to external force." (*Système de Politique Positive*, Tome IV., p. 178).

The new element which is here brought in is a resistance to external perturbations. In tissues this is seen in the qualities of elasticity, contractility, and irritability. When the primitive motions of an organism are interfered with, these resist the interference, and that which enables them to do so is *nutrition*; the antagonizing force they expend is at once supplied by the blood up to a certain point. Beyond this, nutrition cannot go, waste exceeds repair, and the primitive motions suffer loss, which, pushed to its extreme, means death of the part or system.

All external forces or perturbations whatever interfere with what we call the primitive motions. Every movement of our bodies, all action does so, but so long as the repair is equal to the waste, the motions are strengthened by rhythmic action, and do not decrease. Hence exercise, not in excess, is beneficial.

The principle of opposition to outside influence, thus derived from

nutrition, is the fundamental fact in self-preservation. As such it is confined to organism and is a quality of it, not dependent on inertia nor on time as a condition of perception. Hence the famous maxim of the philosopher, Benedict de Spinoza:—" *Una quæque res, quantum in se est, suum esse perseverare conatur*," is true only as to organic things. No *conatus* exists in inorganic life.

Thus the sentiment of self-preservation is prompted by nutrition, and to this also is referred repair and waste. Can we connect with these fundamental qualities of life the sensations of pleasure and pain?

No one knows better than the physiologist how false is the old maxim, "Seeing is believing." He knows that sight and all the other senses *never* show us things as they are. "No kind and no degree of similarity," observes Professor Helmholtz, "exists between the quality of a sensation and the quality of the agent inducing it and portrayed by it." Our sensations tell us nothing of the real nature of the external world. They are mere symbols, every whit as remote as the written word *horse* is from the animal. Their value depends, however, not on the fidelity of their correspondence, for this is null, but on their fidelity at all times to the same impression. The color red is always the color red, the scent of the rose is the scent of the rose, and it is this logical law of identity which gives sensations their value, not the objects which call them forth.

The laws which govern the correspondence of sensations to impressions are those of transmission: In other words, of nutrition. By an accidental variation of structure at some remote epoch, a cranial nerve became sensitive to light; this aided the animal in its efforts to nourish and preserve itself, and strengthened by descent, gave rise to an eye. All the senses arose and were ripened in a similar manner. The stimulus of all of them is their preservative powers.

Now it is conceded by students of sensations that all of them partake either of the nature of pleasure or of pain. Every impression is either one agreeable or disagreeable. It is further experimentally demonstrable that an agreeable sensation is one which is produced by a sustained and continuous impression up to the point of fatigue, a musical tone, for example; while intermittent and discontinuous impressions, as tones of different pitches, or a flickering light produce disagreeable sensations. This is the inductive axiom on which Helmholtz bases his celebrated *Lehre der Tonempfindungen*.

Continuous impressions, short of fatigue, mean, as shown above, increased nutrition, repair exceeding waste, preservation strengthening itself. Pleasure, therefore, is physiologically the quality given to sensation by nervous action not in excess of nutrition. The utmost pleasure is derived from maximum action with minimum waste.

This generalization offers many instructive corollaries. That which

we call the beautiful in art depends upon it. Hogarth drew a "line of beauty," which he found to be that which in its variations most gratifies in outline and form. It is a double curve, and an analysis of it shows it to be that which the muscles of attachment of the eye permit our sight to follow with least labor to themselves. A curve is preferred, in art, to a rectangle, for the same reason. The changes in languages toward greater brevity and sonorousness are dependent upon the rising preference for action with least waste, which the use of such idioms implies.

Waste exceeding repair produces a disagreeable sensation, reaching as it increases to actual pain. As such it incites to action, but to deterrent and evasive action. Pain is the sensation attendant on the death of the part or system. As the sensation opposed to self-preservation and continuity, as contrary to the first law of existence or motion, it is avoided by all organisms. "To move *from* pain and *to* pleasure is the fundamental law of organic beings," says Professor Bain.

The reader may still be dissatisfied with the explanation, and ask, through the operation of what general law are deterrent sensations, that is, painful ones, associated with waste? Is it an *a priori* arrangement in "the fitness of things?" The question is a proper one, and the reply is, not at all; it is a mere accident; not hardly as much as an accident, but a piece of unconscious choosing. There is nothing in waste itself which necessarily ties it to pain. No god fastened their heads together.

Probably many creatures have been born whose nerves felt pleasure in waste of tissue. Their race is not extinct. "There are," says the Baron Holbach in one of his works, "some men who find no pleasure except in actions which will bring them to the gallows." Fortunately, human law generally brings them there. And natural law with infinitely greater certainty soon or forthwith destroys that organism which finds pleasure in waste, but preserves that one which feels pain from waste and transmits this feeling, strengthened by descent, to its progeny. The vices which conceal waste under pleasure, such as alcohol and opium-taking, are the most dangerous ones.

This physiological discussion shows how erroneous that doctrine is which regards pleasure as the negative of pain, (pessimism), or pain, the negative of pleasure, (optimism). The Scandinavian mythology represented Odin, the god of action and effort, as accompanied by his two brothers *Vili* and *Ve* (*Wohl* and *Weh*, pleasure and pain). So in fact every action disturbs the pre-existing relations of nutrition, and brings out agreeable or disagreeable feelings. But as repair is one definite thing and waste is another definite thing, so are the feelings to which they give rise.

This inquiry does not stop with physiology. All religions are founded on some theory of pain. They all teach "purification by

suffering;" they all connect pain with sin, death with evil. pleasure with goodness, life with joy. In much that they teach the confusion of sensation and thought is evident; pain and death, as has been shown, cannot have come into the world by sin, for the latter can exist in the intellect alone, while the former is common to all organic existence. But that in which the better religions are right, is that in preservation in continuous life, in obedience to law, lies man's true happiness; that through the destruction of those who disobey, consciously or unconsciously, the race is purified; and that sin, wrongfulness, conscious evil-doing has a punishment as certain, as eternal, as irrevocable as Calvin ever taught. The easy doctrine that "bad is good in the making," or that "an error is a truth half seen," finds not a vestige of support before the merciless laws which take no steps backward, hear no prayers, and admit of no moment of truce. The ground maxim of all morals lies in pleasure and pain, and is embraced in this sentence from Schopenhauer: "No error is harmless; every one will sooner or later do him who harbors it a hurt."

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*Michael Angelo's Poem on the Death of his Father and Brother.*

While during the four centuries which have elapsed since his birth, ample justice has been done to the magnificent creative genius and commanding intellect of Michael Angelo Buonarrotti, yet few have recognized the high moral worth, and still less the warmth of heart and tenderness of feeling which rounded out the perfection of his nature, and which are essential to the ideal of an artist's life. The strength of his character, his proud and often passionate speech, and his stern moral purpose in strong contrast to the laxity and corruption of his time, often placed him in conflict with the interests and prejudices of his contemporaries, and his superiority could not but excite envy and jealousy among his rivals. A few anecdotes have preserved the memory of these unworthy passages, and have cast into the shade the genial and loving traits of character of which there is ample evidence. The late researches of his biographers have brought out his letters to his family, and his poems as he originally wrote them, and thus revealed to us the sacredness and strength of his affections.



The poem of which we offer a translation, is the most striking proof of these feelings, and it reveals the inner life of the man as fully as the great productions of his chisel do the power of his imagination.

The poems were collected and published by his nephew and namesake after his death, and in his great tenderness for the reputation of the master, he thought it his place to polish and improve them according to the effeminate taste of the time. He completed what was unfinished, he changed the rough, terse expressions which came warm from Michael Angelo's heart, into soft, pleasing phrases, and inserted whole lines of his own. He did this with such perfect confidence in his own intentions, that we must be thankful that he left so much of the original as has endeared the poems to us even in their mangled shape. In fact, the power of Michael Angelo's thought revealed itself through all this disguise. The poem we have given suffered more than any one from this smoothing process—scarcely a line remained unchanged, and the original was almost wholly a surprise and delight when first revealed to us.

Yet even in its travesty Grimm recognized its great autobiographical value, and has given a very free German version of it in his life of Michael Angelo. The poem was left unfinished. The thought rises to its climax and abruptly breaks off. Can the human mind grasp that idea of infinite, eternal progress?

In 1863 Signor Cesare Guasti, who had access to the original documents, published a fine edition of all the poems, precisely as they were originally written, with the various readings of different manuscripts. To these he added a reprint of the old form of the poem according to his nephew, and also a prose version of each poem, which should assist the modern reader to an understanding of the ancient text.

An interesting preparatory discourse and a few historical statements give all the help necessary to the Italian scholar, for the study of these interesting poems.

To make one of them, and that one of the greatest biographical value, accessible to the American lover of Michael Angelo, is the object of the present version. Our aim has been to give as close a copy of the original, both in thought and form, as we possibly could. We need not speak of the difficulty of the task to any one who has ever attempted the like. If it serve no one else, the translator has had ample reward for the labor in the intimate familiarity thus gained with the great artist's thought on this greatest of earthly mysteries. The poem is true to the deepest feelings of human nature, and every chord is sounded with such depth and sweetness as gives strength and peace even in its revelation of suffering.

Michael Angelo's family affections were very strong. His father was a warm-hearted and warm-tempered man, and through the ill offices of others there had sometimes been dissension between the father and son. But the son always held his father's interests first in his

thought, and supported and guarded him through his long old age. The father died about 1534 or 1536 at the age of ninety years.

The brother, to whom the poem also refers, is called Buonarotti. He died on the 2d of July, 1828, in the arms of his great brother. His disease was of a contagious character, probably the plague, so that it seems almost a miracle that Michael Angelo's life was not sacrificed.

He was the only one of the brothers who left children. His son, Leonardo, was the artist's executor and heir, and his son, Michael Angelo, was the nephew, who with more zeal than taste, devoted himself to the publication of his great uncle's poems.

### TRIPLETS

On the death of his father, Lodovico Buonarotti, which followed soon on that of his brother, 1534 or 1536. By Michael Angelo.

1.

Deep grief such wo unto my heart did give,  
I thought it wept the bitter pain away  
And tears and moans would let my spirit live.

2.

But fate renews the fount of grief to-day,  
And feeds each hidden root and secret vein  
By death that doth still harder burden lay.

3.

I of thy parting speak, and yet again  
For him, of thee who later left me here,  
My tongue and pen shall speak the separate pain.

4.

He was my brother, thou our father dear;  
Love clung to him and duty bound to thee,  
Nor can I tell which loss I hold most near.

5.

Painted like life my brother stands to me;  
Thou art a sculptured image in my heart.  
And most for thee, my cheek is tinged with piety.

6.

Thus am I soothed; death early claimed the part  
My brother owed, but in full ripeness thou.  
He grieves us less who doth in age depart.

7.

Less hard and sharp it is to death to bow  
As growing age longs for its needful sleep,  
Where true life is, safe from the senses now.

8.

Ah! who is he who sadly would not weep  
To see the father dead he held so dear,  
He ever, living still, in frequent sight did keep?

9.

Our griefs and woes to each alone are clear,  
As more or less he feels their fatal power ;  
Thou knowest Lord to me the loss how near.

10.

Though reason holds my soul some calmer hour,  
'Tis by such hard constraint I bind my grief  
The lifted clouds again more darkly lower.

11.

And but this thought can give my heart relief  
That he died well and resting smiles in Heaven  
On death that brought in life a fear so brief.

12.

For deeper grief would grow and crush me even  
Did not firm faith convince my inmost mind,  
Living well here, he rests himself in Heaven.

13.

So closely doth the flesh the spirit bind  
That death the weary heart can most oppress  
When erring sense forbids the truth to find.

14.

Full ninety times in Ocean's deep recess  
Of cooling shade, the sun its torch had laid  
Ere peace Divine thy weary heart did bless.

15.

Oh ! pity me who now art left here dead.  
Oh ! thou through whom Heaven willed me to be born,  
Since Heaven at last thy suffering life has stayed.

16.

Divine thou art, Death of Death's power is shorn,  
Nor fearest thou life's changes ever more ;  
I write almost with envy here forlorn.

17.

Fortune and Time which bring us grief so sure  
With joy uncertain, claim no more their right,  
Their fickle changes enter not your door.

18.

There is no cloud to dim your shining light,  
No chance nor need to bind your onward way,  
No time to urge you with its rapid flight.

19.

Your splendor grows not dim by night nor day,  
Though dark the one, the other heavenly clear,  
Nor when the sun sends down its warmer ray.

20.

By thine own death, Oh ! Father ever dear,  
I learn to die, and see thee in my thought,  
Where the world rarely lets us linger near.

21.

Think not, like some, Death only evil wrought  
To one whom Grace to God's own seat has led  
And from the last day to the first has brought.

22.

Where, thanks to God, thou art, my soul has said,  
And hopes to meet thee if my own cold heart  
By reason rises from its earthly bed.

23.

And if 'twixt son and father, Love's best art  
Grows yet in Heaven, as every virtue grows—

BOSTON, June 18, 1876.

EDNAH D. CHENEY.

## BOOK NOTICES.

*La Filosofia della Scuole Italiane, Rivista Bimestrale contenente gli atti della Società promotrice degli studj filosofici e letterarj.* Roma, 1874-75.

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