


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THE JOURNAL

OF

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VOLUME XV.

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THE JOURNAL
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SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

VOL. XV.]

JANUARY, 1881.

[No. 1.

ON MEDICINE AND THE THEORY OF ORGANIC
NATURE.

TRANSLATION OF THE THIRTEENTH LECTURE OF F. W. J. SCHELLING ON "THE METHOD OF
UNIVERSITY STUDY," BY MRS. ELLA S. MORGAN.

As organism, according to the most ancient opinion, is nothing but nature in the microcosm, and in the most complete self-contemplation, so the science of organism must bring together, as in a focus, all rays of the general knowledge of nature, and make them one. At almost all times the knowledge of general physics has been considered as, at least, a necessary step and introduction to the sanctuary of organic life. But what scientific conception could the organic theory of nature borrow from physics, which, itself without the universal idea of nature, could only burden and distort it with its own hypotheses, as has generally been the case since the barriers have been more or less broken down which were believed to separate nature in general from living nature?

The enthusiasm of the age for chemistry made it the principle of all organic phenomena, and reduced life itself to a chemical process. The explanations of the first forms of life by elective affinity or crystallization and of organic motion, and even the activities of the senses, by means of changes of composition and substitutions, are all excellent enough, except that those who give

them must first explain what elective affinity and changes of composition are, a question which they doubtless feel able to answer.

It is not answered by merely carrying over and applying one branch of natural science to another. Each is absolute in itself, no one is deducible from another, and all can be truly one only when in each for itself the particular is comprehended in the general and from an absolute conformity to law.

Firstly, in order that medicine must become a universal science of organic nature, of which the separate parts are all branches, and that it may gain this breadth and internal unity, as well as give it the rank of a science, the first principles upon which it rests must be not empirical or hypothetical, but in themselves certain and philosophic. It is true that for some time this has been felt and recognized, more generally than has been the case in regard to other departments of the science of nature. Here also philosophy should have no other business than to bring an external, formal unity into the existing multiplicity, and to restore a reputation to the science of physicians, which has been made ambiguous by poets and philosophers for many a year. If Brown's theory were distinguished by nothing more than by the purity from empirical explanations and hypotheses, the recognition and development of the great principle of the merely quantitative difference in all phenomena, and the consistency with which they follow from one first principle without the addition of any other, and without deviating from the scientific method, its originator would still be eminent in the history of medicine and the creator of a new world in this realm of knowledge. It is true that he stops with the idea of excitability, and still has no scientific knowledge of it, but at the same time he refuses all empirical explanation of it, and warns against the uncertain investigation of causes, which is the ruin of philosophy. Doubtless he did not deny that there was a higher sphere of knowing in which that idea could itself be derived and construed from a higher, as he derived that of forms of disease from it.

The idea of excitability is a mere conception of the understanding, whereby the single organic thing, but not the essence of the organism, is determined. For the absolute ideal, which manifests itself in it objectively and subjectively at the same time, as body and soul, is in itself outside of all determination. The single

thing, the organic body, the temple which it builds for itself, is determinable and necessarily determined by other and external things. Since now the absolute ideal watches over the unity of form and essence in organism, as that in which alone the latter is the symbol of it, so it is determined—by every determination from without which affects the form—to a restoration of unity, and hence to action. Hence it is only indirectly determined, that is, through change of the external conditions of life, and never in itself.

That through which the organism is the expression of the whole subject-objectivating is this, namely, that matter—which at a lower point is the opposite of light and manifests itself as substance—in it is one with light (because both united are related to each other as attributes of one and the same), and becomes a mere accident of the essence of organism, and hence becomes pure form. In the eternal act of transition of subjectivity into objectivity, objectivity or matter can be only an accident, the opposite of which is subjectivity as the essence or substance, which, however, in the antithesis lays aside its absoluteness and appears as mere relative ideal (in light). Hence it is the organism which presents substance and accident as completely one and as in the absolute act of subject-objectivation.

This principle of matter creating its form not only determines the knowledge of the being of matter, but determines also that of the separate functions of the organism, whose type must be the same as the universal type of living motion, with the difference that the forms, as before said, are one with matter and pass over into it. If we review all the attempts of empiricism to explain these functions in themselves, as well as according to their particular determinations, we do not find in one of them a trace of the idea of comprehending them as universal and necessary forms. The accidental existence of imponderable fluids in nature, for which in the same accidental way there are in the construction of the organism certain conditions of attraction, combination, and separation, is the last forlorn asylum of ignorance. And even with such assumptions as these we have reached no explanation for any organic movement, for instance, of contraction. They do not even make such movement intelligible from the mechanical side. It is true that the analogy between these phenomena and those

of electricity was early noticed; but, since the latter were known only as particular, not as general forms, and there was no idea of "potencies" in nature, the former, instead of being placed on the same if not on a higher plane with the phenomena of electricity, were deduced from electricity as mere effects of it. Hence, even assuming the electric essence as a principle of activity, still other hypotheses were necessary to explain the peculiar type of their mutual attraction.

The forms of motion which in inorganic nature are expressed by magnetism, electricity, and chemical process, are universal forms, which appear in the latter in a special manner. In their shape as magnetism, etc., they manifest themselves as mere accidents, differing from the substance of matter. In the higher shape which they attain in organism, they are forms which are at the same time the essence of matter.

For corporeal things, whose idea is merely the immediate idea of themselves, the infinite potentiality of all falls outside of them; in organism, whose idea is also immediately and at the same time the idea of other things, the light falls into the thing itself, and in the same relation that matter which was before perceived as substance is posited as accident.

Now, either the ideal principle of matter is confined to the first dimension—in which case matter is only penetrated with form and is one with it as dimension of the being-in-itself; the organic being contains merely the infinite potentiality of itself as individual or as species—or, light in the other dimension is united to weight, and consequently matter is posited as accident for this, which is that of being in other things, and the organic being contains the infinite potentiality of other things outside itself. In the first relation, which is that of reproduction, potentiality and reality were confined to the individual, and thus were themselves one. In the other relation, which is that of independent motion, the individual passes beyond his own circle to other things. Hence potentiality and actuality cannot here be united as one and the same, because the other things are posited as expressly other and outside the individual. But when the two just-mentioned relations are united in a higher, and the infinite potentiality of other things coincides with the reality, then we have the highest function of the whole organism. Matter is in every

respect and wholly, accident of being or of the ideal, which is productive in itself, but here in connection with a finite thing is, as ideal, sensuously productive, and hence as sense-perception.

And as universal nature consists only in the divine self-perception and is the effect of it, so in the living being this eternal self-creation makes itself recognizable, and becomes objective. No proof is necessary to show that in this high realm of organic nature, where it breaks through its natural limits, every explanation which rests on the ordinary conceptions of matter, as well as all hypotheses which inadequately account for lower phenomena, is altogether insufficient. For this reason empiricism has gradually given up this department of science, and withdrawn partly behind the idea of duality, partly under the shelter of theology.

Next to a knowledge of organic functions in the universality and necessity of their forms, the most important is the knowledge of the laws according to which their relation among themselves is determined in the individual as well as in the collective world of organization.

The individual in this respect is confined within certain limits, which cannot be transcended without making its existence as product impossible. Hence it is subject to disease. The construction of this condition is a necessary part of the general theory of organic nature, and inseparable from what is called physiology. In general terms, it may be deduced entirely from the highest antithesis between potentiality and reality in the organism and from the disturbance of their equilibrium. But the special forms and appearances of disease are capable of being known only from the changed relation of the three fundamental forms of organic activity. There is a double relation of the organism, the first of which I prefer to call the natural one, because, as a purely quantitative factor of the inner functions of life, it has at the same time a relation to nature and external things. The other, which is a relation of both factors with reference to the dimensions, and denotes the perfection in which the organism is an image of the universe, and in expression of the absolute, this I call the divine relationship. Brown referred only to the former (the natural) as the most important for the art of medicine, but did not therefore positively exclude the latter, whose laws alone teach

the physician the reasons for the forms, the principal seat of the maladjustment, which is at the bottom of disease; which direct him in the choice of remedies, and make intelligible that which a lack of power in seizing the abstract has called specific in the effects of the remedies and in the phenomena of disease. According to this view, it is self-evident that the theory of medicinal remedies is no special science, but is only an element of the universal science of organic nature.

It would be a mere repetition, of what has been often and well said, if I should prove that the science of medicine in this sense presupposes not only a philosophical culture of the mind, but also the principles of philosophy, and if more beside general reasons were necessary to convince intelligent men of this truth, it would be the following considerations: that, in respect to this subject, experiment, the only possible mode of construction in empiricism, is impossible; that from its very nature all conceivable medical experience is ambiguous, and can never decide on the value of a theory, because in each case there is a possibility of its having been wrongly employed; and, finally, that in this department of knowing, if anywhere, experience is first made possibly by theory, as is proved by the complete change in the aspect of all past experience, caused by the theory of excitability. It is superfluous to call attention to the works and productions of those who, without an idea or any scientific knowledge of the first principles, borne onward by the force of the times, teach the new theory in books and lectures, in spite of its being unintelligible to them, making themselves ridiculous even to their pupils, because they attempt to harmonize that which is inharmonious and inconsistent by treating science as if it were a historical subject, and while speaking of proofs are still unable to do more than relate fictions. One would like to apply to these what Galen said of the great body of physicians of his time: "So unpractised and uncultivated, and at the same so ready with proofs, although they do not know what a proof is; why should we longer contend with these unreasonable creatures, and waste time over their pitiful state?"

The same laws which determine the metamorphoses of disease, determine also the universal, abiding transformations which nature effects in the production of the different *species*. For they also depend entirely on the continual repetition of one

and the same fundamental type under constantly changed conditions, and it is evident that medicine will not completely ascend into the universal organic theory of nature until it construes the species of disease of these ideal organisms with the same certainty with which true natural history construes the species of real organisms, which must both manifest themselves as necessarily corresponding each to the other.

But what else can guide the historical construction of organisms, which the active mind pursues through its labyrinth, except the form of external structure, since, by reason of the eternal law of the reflection of the subject in and as object, the external in all nature is the expression and symbol of the internal, and changes with the same regularity and certainty?

The monuments of a true history of organically procreating nature are, therefore, the visible forms of living structures, from the plant up to the animal, a knowledge of which until the present time has been called, in a one-sided sense, comparative anatomy. It is doubtless true that in this kind of knowing comparison is the first guiding principle, but not comparison with any and every empirical example, least of all with the human structure, which, as the most perfect in one direction, stands at the limits of organization. The former restriction of anatomy to the human body had a very obvious reason in the use which was made of it in the art of medicine, but it was of no advantage to science itself, not only because the human organization is so obscure, that in order to perfect its anatomy even to the point it has now attained was the comparison with other organisms necessary, but also because from its potentialization it distorted the view of the other organisms and rendered it difficult to ascend to simple and universal insights. The impossibility of giving any account of the principles of such a complicated structure in particulars, after themselves having barred the way, led the way to the separation of anatomy and physiology—which ought to correspond as internal and external—and also brought about that mechanical method of exposition which is the common one in most text-books and universities.

The anatomist who wished to treat his science as naturalist, and at the same time in the universal spirit, should, above all, first recognize that an abstraction, an elevation above the ordinary con-

ception, is necessary in order to describe the real forms even historically. He must comprehend the symbolic nature of all forms, and see that in the particular there is always a universal form, as in the external an internal type is expressed. He need not ask what is the use of this or that organ, but rather, how did it originate? and then show the pure necessity of its formation. The more general, and the less the view is directed to the particular case from which he derives the genesis of forms, the sooner will he attain to and comprehend the ineffable *naïveté* of nature in so many of her structures. Least of all, will he exhibit his own want of wisdom and reason while admiring the wisdom and reason of God.

He will constantly keep the idea of the unity and inner affinity of all organizations, the descent from one primal type, whose objective side only is variable, the subjective side unchangeable, and will consider it his only true work to present the former (the unity). Above all, he will search for the law according to which that variation takes place; he will recognize that, while the original type always remains the same, that also which is its expression can be changeable only as to its form, and that therefore an equal sum of reality is consumed in all organizations in different combinations; that, in the absence of one form, there is substitution by another, and the equilibrium is thus preserved. From reason and experience, he will make a schema of all internal and external dimensions into which the creative impulse can throw itself, by means of which he will gain for the imagination a prototype of all organizations, unchangeable in its external limits, but capable of the greatest freedom of motion within those limits.

The historical construction of organic nature, complete in itself, would make the real and objective side of the universal science of nature the complete expression of ideas in the latter, and thereby make them truly one.

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE THIRD PART OF HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION," BY F. LOUIS SOLDAN.

We shall proceed in the following to discuss the realized idea of religion, or perfect religion, in which the idea has become its own object [of contemplation]. Religion has been defined as self-consciousness of God; self-consciousness, as consciousness, has an object, and is conscious of itself in the same; this object is also consciousness, but consciousness as an object, and for this reason, finite consciousness, a consciousness distinct from God, from the absolute; this implies limitation, and therefore finitude. God is self-consciousness, he knows himself in a consciousness distinct from himself, which is, in itself, the consciousness of God; but it is this also for itself, since it knows its identity with God, which identity, however, is mediated by the negation of finiteness. This idea constitutes the content of religion: that it is the nature of God that he can distinguish himself from himself and be his own object, and yet remain in this distinction strictly identical with himself. He is spirit. This idea is now realized; consciousness knows this content, and it knows itself to be intertwined with it. In the idea which is the process of God, it itself is one of the elements and phases. Finite consciousness knows God only in so far as God knows himself in it; hence, God is spirit, and, more particularly, the spirit of his church, that is, of those who revere him. This is perfect religion—the idea that has become objective to itself. In this it is manifest what God is. He is no longer a something beyond, something unknown, for he has made known to man what he is, not merely in an external historical way, but in his consciousness. We have, therefore, here the religion of the manifestation of God, since God knows himself in the finite spirit. God is simply manifest. This is the relation here. The transition was, as we have seen, that this cognition of God as free spirit was, according to its content, still burdened with finitude and immediateness. This finite element has to be cancelled by the work of spirit; it is nugatory. We have seen how its nugatory character has become manifest to consciousness. Misery and wretchedness, the pain of

existence, were the condition, the preparation of the subjective side for the consciousness of free spirit, as an absolutely free and thereby infinite spirit.

(A) We shall first dwell on the general aspect of this sphere.

1. Absolute religion is manifest religion. Religion is obvious, manifest only after the idea of religion exists for itself; or, religion, its concept, has become an object to itself, not in limited finite objectivity, but in being an object to itself according to its idea. This may be more adequately expressed thus: Religion, according to the general idea, is consciousness of the absolute essence. Now, consciousness distinguishes, and thus we have two: consciousness and absolute essence. These two are external in their finite relation, namely, empirical consciousness, and essence in another sense.

They stand in finite relationship to each other, and in this respect they are finite to each other, and so consciousness cognizes absolute being as something finite only, and not in its truth. God himself is consciousness, distinction of himself in himself, and, as consciousness, he gives himself as object for what we call the side of consciousness.

Thus we have always two things in consciousness, which are finite, and external to each other. If religion seizes and comprehends itself, then the content and the object of religion are themselves this totality, which is consciousness related to its own essence, the cognition of itself as essence, and the cognition of essence as itself; that is to say, spirit is thus the object of religion. We have in this way, two: consciousness and its object; but in religion, which is filled with itself, which is revealed, which has grasped itself and comprehends itself—religion itself and its content is the object; this object is the self-cognizing being, is the spirit. In this alone, spirit becomes the object and content of religion, and spirit exists for spirit only. In thus being content and object, spirit is self-cognition, self-distinction, and places before itself the other side of subjective consciousness, which appears finite. This is religion filled with itself. This is the abstract determination of this absolute idea, or religion is, indeed, the idea. For the absolute idea, in the philosophical sense, is the idea which has itself for an object, or, in other words, which has determinate existence, reality, objectivity, which is no longer merely internal or subjective, but has made itself objective, and whose objectivity is at the same time a return

into itself; that is to say, in as far as we call the idea the end and aim, it is the realized completed end and aim, which is likewise objective.

Religion has for its object its own existence, namely, the consciousness of its own essence; it is therein objectified; it *is* now in reality what it was in the first place as mere idea, when it was nothing but an idea, or when it was only our idea. Absolute religion is the manifest one, it is the religion which has itself for its content and for its subject-matter. This is the perfect religion, the one which is the being of spirit or mind for itself, the religion which has become objective in itself—Christian religion. It contains inseparably the universal and the individual spirit, the finite and the infinite; their absolute identity forms this religion and its content. This universal power is the substance, which, since it is just as much subject in-itself, now posits this being-in-itself, and thus creates a distinction from itself, and makes itself known to cognition or to the finite spirit; yet, since this is but a phase (moment) of universal spirit itself, the latter remains in itself, and in this separation or distinction returns to itself inseparable and entire.

Theology has, commonly speaking, for its aim the cognition of God as an object, which remains strictly in separation from subjective consciousness, and as such is an external object like the sun, sky, etc., an object of consciousness; in all these the object has the invariable characteristic of being something else, something external [a mere relative]. The idea of absolute religion, on the contrary, may be said to lie, not in the consideration of these external elements, but in that of religion itself; that is to say, the unity of this representation which we call God, with the subject.

We may look upon this as being the standpoint of our present time, namely, that religion, religious life, piety, are the chief things after all, and that the object does not matter so much. Men have different religions, the principal thing is, that they are pious; our time thinks that God cannot be known or cognized as an object, and that, after all, our subjective manner and attitude are the only things of importance. This is the standpoint which may be traced in what has been said before. It is the standpoint of our own days, but at the same time an important progress, that has established the validity of its infinite element, namely, the consciousness of the subject as an invariable phase. There is the

same content on both sides, and this "being in itself" (potentiality) of the two sides is religion. It is the great attainment of our time that subjectivity has been cognized as the absolute element: this determination is essential. The main point, however, is *how* it is determined.

The following may be said of this great progress: Religion in the determination of consciousness is so constituted that the content flees beyond, and thus seemingly remains estranged. Whatever content religion may have, if this content is seized from the standpoint of consciousness, it remains something that is beyond; and even when the determination of revelation is added to its content, it is nevertheless something external, something given. The view set forth above, namely, that the divine content is given or simply posited, and therefore cannot be cognized, but should rather be embraced passively by faith, will, on the other hand, also lead to the subjectivity of feeling, which is the end and result of divine worship. The standpoint of consciousness is therefore not the only one. The worshipper gives his whole heart, his devotion, his will to his object, and loses himself in it; in the depth of this devotion he has cancelled the separation which exists in the standpoint of consciousness. The standpoint of consciousness arrives at subjectivity as well, which is non-estrangement, which is the sinking of spirit into a depth which is not remote but near and present.

This annulment of separation may, however, be conceived as something alien, as the grace and mercy of God, as something alien, to which man must submit, and in relation to which he occupies a passive attitude. Such separation is controverted by the limitation that religion is the principal thing, or, in other words, that the main point is the subjective which holds in itself that which God wills. In the subject there is still the inseparable state of subjectivity and the other, the objectivity. In other words, the subject is necessary throughout the whole extent as the real relation. This standpoint, therefore, raises the subject to an essential determination, and is connected with the freedom of spirit, which it has restored. There is no standpoint in which spirit is not in itself. The concept of absolute religion holds for its content that religion is objective to itself. But only the idea holds this content. The idea is one thing, the consciousness another.

Thus in absolute religion the idea may have this content in it-

self, but consciousness is a different matter. This is the side of which we have become conscious, and which has shown itself in the characterization set forth above, namely, that it is religion which is the principal thing. The idea itself is as yet one-sided, being taken merely as being in itself; it appears in the same one-sided form where subjectivity itself is one-sided; it possesses the determination of one of the two only; it is only infinite form, pure self-consciousness, the pure cognition of itself. In itself it is void of content, because here religion is taken simply in itself; it is religion in the still unreal form, since it has not yet objectified itself nor given itself any content. Non-objectivity is absence of content.

It is the privilege of truth that knowledge should possess in religion its absolute content. Here, however, this content is not the true one, it is truth crippled or dwarfed in its growth. The content, of course, is there, but it is contingent, finite, and empirically limited, and shows a certain resemblance to the age of the Romans. The time of the Roman empire has much resemblance with ours. The subject as it is, as it exists, is conceived as infinite, but, abstractly taken, it changes into its opposite, and is simply finite and limited. Freedom in this sense is only one which allows a world beyond to exist; it is a longing which negates the distinctions of consciousness and in this rejects the important element and principle of spirit, and therefore is naught but spiritless subjectivity.

Religion is the spirit's cognition of itself as spirit; this pure cognition does not know itself as spirit, and is therefore not substantial but subjective cognition. But the fact that this knowledge is simply subjective, and therefore limited knowledge, does not exist for subjectivity in its own shape, that is, as knowledge, but as its immediate being in itself, which subjectivity finds in itself; it finds it in its cognition of itself as of something strictly infinite in its feeling of its finitude, and involved in this the feeling of infinity as its transcendental being-in-itself opposed to its being-for-itself, the feeling of longing for the inexplicable beyond.

Absolute religion, on the contrary, contains the category of subjectivity, or of infinite form as identical with substance. We may give the name of cognition, of pure intelligence, to this subjectivity, this infinite form, this unlimited elasticity of substance

which can disembody itself and become its own object. The content remains identical with itself because it is the infinitely substantial subjectivity which makes an object and content of itself. In this content the finite subject is again distinguished from the infinite object. God as spirit conceived as remaining beyond, or not as a living spirit in his church, is looked upon in the one-sided limitation of an object.

This is the idea. It is the idea of the absolute idea and of its perfect realization; spirit is now the reality which exists for spirit, which has itself for its object, and therefore this religion is the manifest religion; God reveals himself. To reveal means this judgment of infinite form which can determine itself, which can be for another; this self-manifestation belongs to the essence of spirit itself. A spirit that does not manifest itself is not spirit. In saying God has created the world, the same is expressed as an act completed and finished, as something which could be or could not be; God might have revealed himself or not; it is, so to say, an arbitrary predication which does not belong to the idea of God. But God as a spirit is essentially this self-revelation; he creates the world not once, but is eternally creating; he is an eternal self-revelation, and an everlasting actus. This is his idea, his definition.

Manifest religion, which manifests spirit to spirit, is as such the religion of spirit, which does not close itself against another; and this other is therefore but temporarily another. God posits the other and removes the difference in his eternal movement. It is the essence of spirit to be its own phenomenon; this is its deed and its life; this is its only deed and it itself is but its deed. What is it that reveals God, if it is not that he is this self-revelation? What he reveals is the infinite form. Absolute subjectivity is the activity of determination; this is the positing of distinctions, the positing of content; what he reveals in this way is, that he is the power to create these differences in himself. His being is, to make these distinctions eternal, to take them back, and in all these to be in himself. What is revealed is that he is for another. These are the characteristics of revelation.

2. This religion which is manifest to itself is not only the manifest religion, but also the one which is called revealed religion; by this is meant, on one side, that it is revealed by God, that God has made himself known to man, and, on the other side, that

it is revealed religion, and positive in the sense that it was bestowed upon man, given to him by a power outside of himself.

On account of this peculiarity connected in our mental view with the idea of the positive, it will be interesting to us to know what the positive really is.

Absolute religion is indeed positive, in the sense in which everything that exists for consciousness is something objective for the latter. All things must come to us in an external way; in this sense the sensuous is positive; for there is nothing so positive as what presents itself immediately to our senses.

Everything spiritual comes to us in the same way, as finite or historical spirituality; this mode of external spirituality, and of all self-expressing spirituality, is just as positive. A higher and purer spirituality is that in the ethical element, in the laws of liberty. But according to its nature this is no such external spiritual principle, not an externality, a contingency, but it is of the nature of pure spirituality itself; it comes to us, however, externally, in the first place as instruction, education, doctrine. In these it is given to us, and we are shown that it is valid. The civil laws and those of the state are also positive; they extend over us, they are for us, they are valid; they have existence; not such existence simply that we can let them alone, that we can ignore them, but rather in such a way that in this externality they are for us subjectively something essential, something which binds us subjectively.

When we comprehend, cognize, the law, that crime should be punished, and find it rational, it is essential for us not only in the sense that it is valid for us *because* it is positive, or because it exists, but it has also internal validity in our reason as something essential, since it is internal, rational.

The fact that it is positive does not deprive it in any way of the characteristic that it is rational and our own. The laws of freedom have always a positive side, a side of reality, externality, contingency, in their manifestation. It is necessary to determine laws; in the determining of the quality of penalty, and, still more, in that of the quantity, we have already this external element.

The positive element cannot be omitted in penal laws; it is quite necessary; this last determination of the immediate is something positive, something that is not rational. In pronouncing penalties, for instance, a round number is usually taken; no reasoning

can tell what measure is absolutely just. Whatever is positive according to its nature, is irrational: it needs determination in a way that has nothing rational in it.

This side also is necessary in manifest religion: since there is in it the historical, the externally manifest element, there is also necessarily the positive and contingent element in it, which may exist in this form or any other. So we see that this contingent element is found also in religion. By virtue of the external, of the phenomenon which is posited with it, the positive always exists.

But we may distinguish the positive as such, the abstractly positive, and the positive in the form and as the law of freedom. The law of freedom is valid not because it exists, but because it is the characteristic of our own rationality; it is no longer something positive simply, something that happens to prevail, when it has become known as this characteristic. Religion, too, appears positive in the whole content of its teaching, but it must not remain thus a mere matter of memory, a mere conceptive image in the mind.

In regard to the verification of religion, the positive element has the signification that the external must bear testimony of the truth of a religion, and is to be looked upon as the ground of the truth of a religion. In some instances this verification has the form of the positive as such. There are miracles and evidences which are to prove that the character of the individual giving these revelations is divine, and that he has taught this or that doctrine.

Miracles are changes in the natural order of the sensuous world, which are perceived, and thus perception itself is sensuous, because it concerns sensuous changes. In regard to these perceptive elements, these miracles, it has been said that they furnish a verification for sensuous man, but it is only the beginning of a verification, an unspiritual verification by which the spiritual cannot be verified.

The spiritual as such cannot be directly verified by the unspiritual or the sensuous. The main thing of this side of the miracles is, that they are set aside in this way. Reason may attempt to explain miracles in the natural way, and may say much that is probable against them, that is, it may dwell on the external, on the occurrence as such, and reason against them. The main point of view of the reason in regard to miracles is that the spiritual cannot be verified externally. For the spiritual ranks higher than the

external and can be verified only by itself and in itself; it can prove itself only in itself and by itself. This is what may be called the evidences of spirit. This is expressed in the history of religion itself: Moses performs miracles before Pharaoh; the Egyptians did the same with their enchantments; this certainly means that no great value is attached to it. The most important thing, however, is that Christ himself says: "There are many that will say that they have done many wonderful works in my name, and then will I profess unto them that I never knew them." Here he himself rejects miracles as a true criterion of truth. This is the principal consideration and we must hold to it; the verification through miracles is a sphere that does not concern us; the evidence of spirit is the true evidence. This evidence may be manifold. It may be indefinite, general, as something that satisfies the spirit, and, by appealing to it, calls forth its silent approval and is in harmony with it. Thus in history the noble, sublime, moral, and divine, appeal to us; for these, our spirit bears evidence. This may remain a kind of general harmony, an approbation given by our inner nature, our sympathy. But it may also become connected with our insight and our thinking; this insight, in so far as it is nothing sensuous, belongs directly to thinking; no matter what it is, whether it has the form of reasoning, distinctions, etc., it is activity according to our own determinations of thinking, that is, according to the categories. It may be more or less elaborate, it may form the principal presupposition of his heart and his spirit in general—presuppositions of general maxims which are valid for him and accompany him through life. It is not necessary that these maxims be conscious ones, they may be the mode and manner in which his character is formed, they may be the universal which has gained firm footing in his spirit; this then has become something fixed, something firmly established in his mind; it will then rule him.

On such a firm basis and presupposition, his reasoning and determining process may begin. There are many degrees of culture, many walks of life, and there are various needs. But the highest need of the human mind is thinking (which is the evidence of spirit), in such a way that it does not exist merely in the harmonious response of a first sympathy, nor in the other manner in which there are certain firm bases and principles in the mind on which

conclusions and inferences may be built. The evidence of spirit in its highest form is philosophy, in which the conception purely as such develops the truth from itself; and, developing, we cognize and see the necessity of this development in and through itself.

Faith has often been contrasted with thinking in the saying, that there is no conviction about God and religion possible in any other way, except by thinking; thus the proofs of the existence of God have been sometimes considered the only way of knowing the truth and of arriving at conviction.

But this testimony of spirit may exist in various, different ways. We must not demand that truth shall be apprehended by all men in the philosophical way. The needs of individuals differ according to their education and free development, and, according to these various stages of development, we find the demand of and the confidence in the belief in authority.

Miracles also find their place here, and it is interesting to see that they are limited to this minimum. There is therefore the positive element also in this form of the testimony of spirit. Sympathy, this immediate certitude, is on account of this immediateness something positive, and ratiocination, which starts from something posited or given, has the same basis. Man alone has religion, and religion has its ground and seat in thinking activity. Heart and feeling are not the heart and feeling of the animal, but the heart of thinking man, thinking heart and feeling; and whatever religion exists in this heart and feeling, exists in the thinking activity of this heart and feeling. Whenever we begin to infer, to reason, to state the cause, we do this by thinking.

In so far as the doctrines of Christian religion are contained in the Bible, they are given in a positive manner, and when they become subjective, when spirit gives its testimony for them, this may be done quite in the immediate way, so that it strikes the innermost nature of man, his spirit, his thinking, his reason, and they are harmonious with him. Thus the Bible is for the Christian the basis, the main basis, which has this effect upon him, which harmonizes with his soul, and gives this firmness to his convictions.

But it follows that, because he thinks, he can not stop at these immediate testimonies and admissions, but must proceed to thoughts, contemplations, reflections, on this subject. This then leads to the further development of religion, and in the higher,

most perfect form, it is theology, or scientific religion, when this content is known, in a scientific way, as the testimony of spirit.

Then the antithesis is presented in the assertion that the Bible is in itself enough for this purpose, and that we ought not to go beyond it. This is in one respect a perfectly correct principle. There are men that are very religious and do nothing else but read the Bible and recite its verses, who possess a high degree of piety and of religiousness; but they are not theologians, for there is no science, no theology, in them. Goetze, the Lutheran zealot, had a famous collection of Bibles. The devil may quote Scripture, but this alone does not constitute the theologian.

As soon as there is more than the mere reading or repetition of the verses, as soon as so-called explanations begin or the reasoning and exegesis in regard to the meaning, man has begun the process of ratiocination, reflection, and thinking, and then the principal point is, whether his thinking is correct or not, and how the thinking is carried on.

It is of no use to say that these inferences or assertions are based upon the Bible. As soon as they are no longer the words of the Bible, a logical form is given to this content; the content receives its logical form, or, there are certain presuppositions made in this content, and with these we proceed to the explanation; they are the permanent element in the explanation; we bring with us mental views which direct our expositions. The expositions of the Bible show the content of the Bible in the form and mode of the thinking of the time when they are made; the first exposition was quite different from the present one.

Such presuppositions are, for instance, that man is good by nature, that God cannot be cognized. What a distorted idea of the Bible must he have, who harbors such a prejudice in his head! Man carries these prejudices with him to his task, although it is very essential to the Christian religion to cognize God, and in it God has even revealed himself and shown that he is.

The positive may enter here, however, in another way. It is therefore important to know whether this content, these notions and assertions, are true.

For this is no longer the Bible, but words, which the spirit conceives internally. If the spirit utters them, they assume a form which the spirit has given to them, a form of thinking. The form

given to this content is to be examined. There the positive element enters again. Here it has the meaning that the formal logic of the syllogism, for instance, the thought-relations of the finite, are presupposed.

Then, according to the nature of the syllogism, the finite alone and only what belongs to the nature of the understanding, can be grasped; it is not adequate to the divine content. The content is thus radically spoiled.

Wherever theology is not merely the quoting of the Bible, but goes beyond the mere words, wherever it addresses itself to the feelings and the heart, it uses forms of thinking, it enters into the province of thinking. If theology uses these forms by chance, accidentally, as it were, in as much as it has presuppositions, prejudices, the process is something contingent and arbitrary, and the investigation of these forms of thought belongs to philosophy alone. Theology turning against philosophy is either unconscious that it uses these forms, that it thinks, and that it is important to proceed according to the laws of thinking, or this effort is not meant in earnest, but is a deceit. In that case it wishes to reserve for itself this arbitrary, contingent thinking, which is here the positive element.

The cognition of the true nature of thinking will disparage mere arbitrary thinking. This contingent, arbitrary thinking is the positive element which enters here. Only the idea for itself frees itself truly from this positive element; for in philosophy and in religion is found this higher freedom which thinking as such is in itself.

The doctrine, the content likewise, receives the form of the positive, it is validity, it is valid in human society. All law, all that is valid, has this form, namely, that it is being and as such it is for everybody the essential, the valid. But this is only the form of the positive; its content must be the true spirit.

The Bible has this form of the positive; one of its verses says: "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life;" here it makes some difference what spirit we carry in us during the reading, and what spirit animates the words. It is necessary to know that we bring with us the concrete spirit, the thinking, reflecting, or feeling spirit, and we must be conscious of this spirit, which is active and grasps this content.

Grasping or comprehending is not a passive act of reception: on the contrary, when the spirit comprehends, this comprehension is at the same time its activity; in the mechanical alone one side is passive in receiving. The spirit comes in contact with the object to be grasped; this spirit has its apperceptions, its concepts: it is a logical being, it is thought-activity, and this activity the spirit must know. Thinking may proceed in this or that category of finitude.

It is the spirit which begins in this way with the positive, but the essential point is, that it be the true, right, and holy spirit which comprehends and knows this content and the divine as divine. This is the testimony of spirit which may be more or less developed.

The main point in regard to the positive is therefore that the spirit is thinking, that it is an activity in the categories and determinations of thinking, and that the spirit is active in all this, whether it feels or reasons, etc. Some people do not know this, and are not aware that in receiving they are active.

Many theologians, in their exegetic activity, while they believe that they are purely receptive, do not realize that they are active in this, inasmuch as they reflect. If this thinking is thus contingent in its proceeding, it surrenders itself to the categories of finitude, and with this it is rendered incapable of comprehending the divine element in the content; it is not the divine but the finite spirit which proceeds in such categories.

By such finite conceptions of the divine which is in and for itself, by this finite thinking of the absolute content, it has happened that the fundamental doctrines of Christianity have, as far as the greater part is concerned, disappeared from dogmatics. While philosophy is not the only science that is orthodox, yet it is at present preëminently so; the principles which have always been valid, the fundamental truths of Christianity, have been preserved and maintained by it.

In considering this religion we do not proceed historically after the manner of the spirit that begins externally, but we begin with the idea. That activity which begins with the external is receptive on one side only; on the other hand, it is activity. Our mode here is essentially such activity, and, moreover, activity accompanied by the consciousness of thinking directed towards such

activity, towards the course of the categories of thinking; of thinking which has examined and cognized itself, which knows what it thinks, and knows which are the true and which the finite categories of thinking. That we begin, however, with the positive, is a part of our education and necessary there; but here we must leave this mode behind us in order to proceed scientifically.

3. Absolute religion, as it appears from these considerations, is the religion of truth and freedom. For truth means that we do not look upon what is objective as upon something strange or alien. Freedom expresses the same as truth with the limitation of negation. The spirit is for the spirit, and *it is* this; it is therefore its own presupposition; we begin with the spirit as subject; it is identical with itself, it is the eternal perception of itself, and it is therefore at the same time comprehended only as a result, as an end. It is self-presupposition, and, in the same manner, the result, and is only as the end. This is the truth, this attribute of being adequate, this power of being object and subject. That the spirit is its own object is the reality, it is the idea, the absolute idea, and this is the truth. In the same way absolute religion is the religion of freedom. Freedom, abstractly, is the relation to something objective, as to something which is not strange or alien; it is the same as truth, the only difference being that freedom has also in it the negation of the difference of estrangement, and this appears in the form of conciliation. The latter begins with this, that there are different existences standing opposed to each other: God who has over against himself an estranged world, a world which has become estranged from its essence. Conciliation is the negation of this separation, this disunion, and consists in the cognition of each other, in finding in the other one's self and one's essence. Thus reconciliation is freedom; it is neither passive, nor in the state of Being simply, but it is activity. Each of these, reconciliation, truth, freedom, is a general process, and can therefore not be expressed, without oneness, in a single sentence. The principal concept is that of the unity of the divine and human nature: God has become man. This unity is, in the first place, only in itself [or potential], but in the sense that it is eternally created and actualized; this creation or actualization is liberation and reconciliation, which is possible only by this potentiality ("durch das an sich"). It is the substance which is identical with itself, that

forms, as such, the basis; but as subjectivity it is that which eternally actualizes and creates itself.

The result of all philosophy is that this idea is the absolute truth; in its purest form it is logic, but it is just as much the result of the observation of the concrete world. This is truth: that nature, life, and spirit are organical throughout, and that each separate one is but a mirror reflecting this idea, so that it appears in it as particularized, as a process in it, so that this unity is manifested in the difference.

Natural religion is religion on the standpoint of consciousness merely; absolute religion contains this standpoint as well, but it is only comprised in it as a transitory element; in natural religion God is represented as something alien in natural shape, or religion has only the form of consciousness. The second form was that of spiritual religion, of spirit which remains limited finitely; in this respect it is the religion of self-consciousness of the absolute power, of the necessity which we have seen; the One, the power is the insufficient element because it is only abstract power, and, according to its content, is not yet absolute subjectivity; it is only abstract necessity, abstractly-simple being-by-itself [i. e., undeveloped being].¹

The abstraction in which power and necessity are conceived, as yet, on that stage, constitutes finitude; and the special powers, God's, determined according to spiritual content, constitute the totality by adding to this abstraction the real content. And, lastly, the third religion is that of freedom, of self-consciousness which forms at the same time the consciousness of the comprehensive reality and determinateness of the eternal idea of God himself, and in this objectivity is at one with itself. Freedom is the characteristic of self-consciousness.

THE METAPHYSICAL CONCEPT OF THE IDEA OF GOD.

(B) The metaphysical idea of God means here the pure idea only, which becomes real through itself. The definition of God in this

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—This stage has not yet arrived at the insight that there is identity between the irresistible, external power and the spiritual element in man; there is, therefore, consciousness of this power above, but not yet the self-consciousness of identity with it.

connection is, that He is the absolute idea, that is to say, that He is spirit. But spirit, the absolute idea, has the meaning that he is the unity of concept and reality, so that the idea is in and by itself as in its totality, and in the same way as the reality. This reality is the revelation, manifestation existent for itself. In so far as this manifestation has in itself the attribute of difference, there will be found in it also the determination of finite spirit, of human nature, which is finite contrasted with that idea; while we thus call the absolute idea the divine nature, the idea of spirit is to be the unity of divine and human nature. But the divine nature is nothing but absolute spirit, hence this unity of divine and human nature is the absolute spirit itself. But the truth cannot be expressed in one proposition or sentence. The two are different, the absolute concept and the idea, as the absolute unity of its reality. Spirit is therefore the living process by which the unity in itself of the divine and human nature becomes for itself and is produced.

The abstract definition of this idea is the unity of idea with reality. In the form of the proof of the existence of God, the proof is formed by this transition, this mediation, that the existence of God follows from the idea. It must be remarked here that in the other proofs we started from finite being which was the immediate, and from which we reasoned towards the infinite, towards true being which appeared in the form of infinity, necessity, absolute power, which is at the same time wisdom having end and aim in itself. Here, however, we start with the idea, and pass over to being. Both are necessary, and this unity must necessarily be shown by starting from one as well as from the other, for the identity of the two is the truth. The idea as well as being, the world, the finite, are one-sided determinations, each of which reverts into the other and exhibits itself first in the phase of being a dependent part, and secondly in the phase of being able to produce the other determination which it carries in itself. In the idea alone they have their truth, i. e., both are posited, neither can have the exclusive function of remaining a beginning, or original element, each must present itself rather as the transition into the other, i. e., each must be something posited. This transition has a contrary signification, each is represented as a stage in this process, i. e., it is the transition from the immediate to the other, so

that each is something posited; on the other hand, it has the signification, that it is something which produces and posits the other. In this way it represents the one side of the movement as well as the other.

If we were to show in the idea the transition into being, we should say first, that the category Being is in itself quite empty and poor; it is abstract self-identity; this last abstraction and affirmation is in its ultimate abstraction entirely indeterminate immediateness. If there were nothing else in the idea, this last abstraction, at least, would still be attributable to it, namely, the idea *is*. Even when determined simply as infinity, or, in a more concrete signification, as unity of the universal and particular, as universality which particularizes itself and thereby returns into itself, we find that this negation of the negative, this relation to itself, this being, is taken quite abstractly. This identity with itself, this category, is at the very outset contained essentially in the idea.

It must be said, however, that the transition from the concept to being is rich and full, and contains the deepest interest of reason. The comprehension of this relation between concept and being is an important interest of our time. It requires to be said, why this transition is of such interest. The appearance of this contrast is an indication that subjectivity has attained the culmination of its being for itself, and has arrived at the totality of knowing itself as infinite and absolute. The essential determination of manifest religion is the form by which the substance is spirit. One side in the contrast is the subject itself, that is, the realization of the idea in its concrete signification. The reason that this contrast appears so difficult, so infinite, is that this one side of reality, this side of subjectivity, the finite spirit, has attained to the comprehension of its infinity. The subject cannot be Being before it is the totality, before it has attained this freedom; then, however, it will be true also that the subject is indifferent to this Being; and that the subject is for itself, and that being then stands on the other side as an alien, other thing. This is the special reason why the contrast may appear as infinite, and there is therefore at the same time a lively impulse to cancel this contrast. This demand to cancel the contrast lies also in its totality, but this annulment has become infinitely difficult because the contrast is so infinite, and the alien, the other,

is so entirely free. It is being that is beyond, that is on the other side.

The greatness of the standpoint of the modern world is this absorption of the subject in itself, the cognition which the finite has of itself as the infinite, while the contrast still clings to it, which it feels compelled to cancel. For thus the infinite stands over against an infinite, and the infinite posits itself as finite, so that the subject on account of its infinity is compelled to cancel this contrast which has deepened itself to its infinity. The contrast or antithesis is: I am subject, free, I am a person for myself, and therefore I let the other, the alien, go free which is on the other side and remains there. The ancients never arrived at the consciousness of this contrast, nor at this dilemma, which only spirit, that is for itself, can bear. Spirit itself is only this: to comprehend itself as infinite in its opposite. The standpoint, as it presents itself here is, that we have on one side the idea of God, and on the other side we have being, contrasted with this idea; and the demand is then to effect the mediation of both, so that the idea should unfold itself and become being, or that the other, the antithesis, should arise out of being. We must give a brief exposition of the manner and mode in which this is done, and also of the form of reasoning.

The form which this mediation has is the ontological proof of the existence of God, in which the idea is made the starting-point. Now, what is the idea of God? It is that of the most real, it must be grasped affirmatively only, it is determined in itself, its content has no limitation, it is the whole of reality, and only as reality it is without limit, and thus it might be said, there is nothing beyond this but a dead abstraction, as has been remarked before. The possibility of this idea, i. e., its identity free from contradiction, is shown in the form of the understanding. The *second step* is, that it is said that being is a reality, non-being is a negation, and compared with it a privation; the *third* is the conclusion: Being is reality, therefore, which belongs to the idea of God.

What Kant has said against it resulted in the destruction of this proof, and has become the opinion of the world. Kant says that, from the concept of God, his existence cannot be inferred by any sophistry or quibble; for Being, he says, is something different

from concept; since we distinguish them, and the two are opposites, and therefore the concept cannot contain being: for it stands on the other side. He says further: Being is no reality, all reality is attributed to God, and therefore it is not contained in the concept of God, namely, because being is no determination of contents but pure form. Whether I imagine a hundred dollars, or possess them, the money itself is not changed thereby; it is the same content whether I have it or not. Kant thus takes the content to constitute the concept or idea, that being does not belong to what is contained in the concept. One may indeed say this, provided one understands by concept the determination of content, and distinguishes content and form, which comprises the thought, and these, on the other hand, from being. All content is therefore on the side of concept, and on the other side remains nothing but the determination of being. Briefly expressed, this is as follows: The idea or concept is not being; they differ. We can cognize nothing of God; we can know nothing; we may form concepts of him, but this does not show that our concept is correct.

We know well enough, indeed, that anybody can build castles in the air, which have no existence. It is an appeal to popular prejudice, and in this way Kant has produced a negative result in the common judgment, and has gained the multitude over to himself.

Anselm of Canterbury, a thoroughly learned theologian, has presented this proof in the following way: God is the most perfect being, the essence of all reality; now, if God is a mere concept of imagination, a subjective concept or idea, He is not the most perfect being, for that only we consider perfect which is not merely an imagined concept, but has at least being. This is quite correct, and a presupposition which everybody has in himself, namely, that what is merely an image of conception is imperfect; that only is perfect which has also reality, that only is true which *is* in the same way in which it is thought. Now, God is the most perfect, therefore He must be in reality and being just as He is in concept. Even in our own image-concepts we find the truth that image-concepts and ideas are different; and we find there further that whatever is only an image-concept is imperfect, and also that God is the most perfect being. Kant does not prove the difference between concept and being, he simply assumes it in a popu-

lar way, and it is allowed to stand—but it is only of imperfect things that common-sense has any image-concept.

Anselm's proof, as well as the form it has received in the ontological proof, contains the idea that God is the embodiment of all reality, and therefore he contains also being. This is quite correct. Being is such a poor and empty determination that it is predicable of the concept immediately. The other is, that being and idea or concept are also distinct from each other; being and thinking, ideality and reality, are distinct and opposite, and this contrast is to be cancelled, and the unity of both determinations is to be so exhibited that they become the result of the negation of the contrast or antithesis. Being is contained in the idea. This reality, unlimited, yields empty words, empty abstractions only. It must therefore be shown that the determination of being is contained affirmatively in the idea, and this would be the unit of idea and being.

But they are different at the same time, and so their unity is the negative unity of both, and the important step is the cancellation of the difference. The difference must be discussed, and the unity restored after this difference, and exhibited. It is the office of logic to show this. The logical sequel, namely, that the idea or concept is just this movement which determines itself as being, that it is the dialectic, the movement to determine itself into being, into the opposite of itself, all this is a further development which is not given in the ontological proof, and this is its defect.

As regards the form of the thought of Anselm, it has been remarked that the meaning of the content is, that the idea presupposes reality, because God is the most perfect being. Here it is necessary that the idea should objectify itself for itself.

God is thus the most perfect thing, as posited merely in mental representation or image conception; but, measured with the most perfect, the mere concept of God appears deficient. There the concept is the scale of measurement, and then God, as a mere concept, as a mere thought, is inadequate to this scale of measurement.

Perfection is but an indefinite mental representation, or image-concept. And yet, what is perfect? The determination of perfection we see immediately only in that which is opposite to what it

is here applied; namely, it is the thought only of God, and therefore the perfect is the unity of thought, or concept, with the reality, and this unity is therefore here presupposed. When thus God is posited as the most perfect, He has here no further determination; He is only as such, and this is his determination. It appears from this that the question turns simply on this unity of concept and of reality. This reality is the determination of perfection, and at the same time that of the deity itself, and this is really also the determination of the idea. More, however, is required for the determination of God.

In the Anselmian expression of the idea, the presupposition is in fact the unity of idea and reality; and, on account of this circumstance, this proof does not give satisfaction to reason, because the supposition is just the point in question. The thought that the idea limits itself, in itself, and that it objectifies itself, is a later insight which results from the nature of the idea, and could not be there at first. This is the insight into the way in which the idea itself cancels its one-sidedness.

If we compare this with the opinion of our age, which bases itself upon Kant's view, we find this: man thinks, perceives, wills, and his volition exists side by side with the thinking; he thinks and also conceives, he is a sensuous-concrete, and at the same time rational being. The concept of God, the idea, the infinite, the unlimited, is according to this view a concept only which we form for ourselves, but we must not forget that it is nothing but a concept which is in our head. Why do we say, it is only a concept? The concept is something imperfect, since thinking is but one quality, one activity among many others in man; e. g., we measure this concept by the scale of reality, which we have before us in concrete man. Man, of course, is not only a thinking being, he is also sensuous, and may have sensuous objects even in his thinking. This, indeed, is only the subjective side of the concept, we find it imperfect on account of the scale by which we measure it, because the latter is concrete man. It may be said that the concept is taken to be nothing but a concept, the sensuous to be reality, that what is seen and felt is reality. This may be said, and many hold this view who recognize nothing as reality but what they feel and taste; but let us hope that it is not quite so bad that there are people who ascribe reality to the sensuous, but not to the spiritual.

It is the concrete, total subjectivity of man which is before the mind as the scale of measurement, and, measured by it, conceiving is nothing but conceiving.

If we compare them with each other, the thought of Anselm and the thought of modern times, we find that both make presuppositions—Anselm that of infinite perfection, the modern view that of concrete subjectivity of man in general. The idea, when compared with this perfection, or, on the other side, with this empirical presupposition, appears something one-sided and unsatisfactory. In the thought of Anselm the attribute of perfection has, however, the meaning that it is the unity of idea and reality. In the doctrines of Descartes and Spinoza, God is likewise the first principle, the absolute unity of thinking and being—*cogito, ergo sum*, the absolute substance. The same is true of the doctrine of Leibnitz.

What we have on one side is a presupposition—which, in fact, the concrete is—namely, the unity of subject and object; and, measured by this, the idea appears deficient. The modern view says: Here we must stop and insist that the idea is the idea only and does not correspond to the concrete.

Anselm, however, says: We must not maintain that the subjective idea is fixed and independent. We must, on the contrary, correct its one-sidedness. Both views have in common that they have presuppositions. The difference lies in this, that the modern world takes the concrete for its basis, while Anselm's view, which is the metaphysical one, builds on the absolute thought, on the absolute idea, which is unity of idea and reality. This old view is the higher one, inasmuch as it does not take the concrete in the sense of empirical man, in the sense of empirical reality, but as a thought. It ranks higher also in this, that it does not eling to what is imperfect. In the modern view the contradiction between the concrete and what is only an idea is not cancelled; the subjective idea is valid, must be retained as subjective—it is the real. The older side has here decidedly the advantage, because it lays the principal stress on the idea. The modern view, in one respect, is further advanced than it—positing the concrete as the unity of idea and reality, while the older view stops with the abstract idea of perfection.

C. DIVISION.

The absolute, eternal idea is—

1. God, in and for himself, in his eternity, before the creation of the world, outside of the world.

2. Creation of the world. This created and alien being dirempts itself in itself into the two sides of physical nature and finite spirit. What has thus been created is the other, the alien, something that is posited in the first place as external to God. But, it is essential to God that He conciliates with himself this alien and this particular that has been posited as separated from him, and, when the idea has dirempted itself and has fallen away from him, leads it back to his truth.

3. This is the way and the process of conciliation by which the spirit has united with himself what it had separated from itself in its diremption and in its self-antithesis, and by which it is the holy spirit and spirit in its church.

These are, therefore, not distinctions in an external manner which we make, but the activity, the developed life of the absolute spirit itself. This is its eternal life, the development and return of this development into itself.

The further explication of this idea is that it is universal spirit, and that it posits the totality of all it is; that it posits itself, develops, realizes itself in its three determinations, and, only in the end, becomes completely what was at the same time its presupposition. It is at the beginning as a totality, it presupposes itself, and is the same also at the end. Spirit must be considered, therefore, in the three forms or elements in which it posits itself.

These three forms, as has been said, are: (*a*) eternal being in and for itself, or the form of universality; (*b*) the form of the phenomenon, or that of particularization or being for others; (*c*) the form of the return out of the phenomenon into itself, or of absolute singularity.

In these three forms the divine idea unfolds itself. Spirit is the divine history, the process of self-distinction, of diremption, of self-return—it is the divine history and must be considered in each of the three forms.

In regard to subjective consciousness, the three forms may be defined as follows: The first form has the element of thought—

God, in pure thought, is as he is in and for himself, as he is manifest, but has not yet become phenomenon; God, in his eternal essence, in himself, but manifest. The second form is that he is in the element of mental representation or image-concept; in the element of particularization, where consciousness is involved in the relation to others, to the alien—this is the phenomenon. The third element is that of subjectivity as such. This subjectivity is partly immediate as sensibility, mental representation or image-concept, emotion, partly as subjectivity, as idea, as thinking reason, as the thinking of the free spirit, which is free only by its return into itself.

In regard to place or space, the three forms are to be explained as development and history, which, as it were, proceed in different places. Thus the first divine history is outside of the world, and, spaceless, outside of finitude—God as he is in and for himself. The second is the divine history as real in the world—God in perfect existence. The third is the internal place, the church which is in the world, but at the same time lifting itself to heaven, and, as a church, having already in itself heaven, that is full of mercy, active in the world, and present.

It is possible to determine these three elements distinctively in regard to time also. In the first element God is outside of time; he is eternal idea in the element of eternity, in eternity as it is contrasted with time. Thus, time existing in and for itself, unfolds itself, and spreads out as past, present, and future. Divine history, secondly, is as phenomenon, as history. It is as existence, but as existence descended into phenomenality. As phenomenon it is immediate existence which at the same time is negated, and this is the past. The divine history is thus as the past, as history in the proper sense. The third element is the present, which is limited present only, not the eternal present, but the one which distinguishes the past and future from itself; it is the element of sensibility, the spiritual *now* of the immediate subjectivity. But the present must also be the third: the church lifts itself to heaven. Thus it is a present which elevates and essentially conciliates itself, which is completed to universality by the negation of its immediateness, a perfection which, however, does not yet exist, and is therefore to be conceived as future. A *Now* of the present, which has perfection before itself; but this per-

fection is distinguished from this now (which is immediateness), since it is posited as future.

We have to consider, in general, the idea of God as divine self-revelation, and this revelation must be taken in the three determinations that have been mentioned.

According to the first, God is for the finite spirit purely as thinking. This is the theoretical consciousness in which the thinking subject is quiet and passive and is not yet posited in this relation, in this process, but lies in the entirely unmoved repose of the thinking spirit. There God is thought for and by the subject and through the self-distinction which remains in the pure ideality and does not attain phenomenal existence, he manifests himself, and is immediately in himself. This is the first relation, which is for the thinking subject only, which is filled by the pure content alone. This is the realm of the Father.

The second determination is the realm of the Son, in which God is for the image-concept or mental representation, as an element of representation—which is the stage of the particular in general. In this second standpoint, that which was other than God and alien, without having this determination, receives the determination of being other and alien. In the first standpoint, God as the Son is not distinguished from the Father, and is expressed only in the mode of emotion. In the second element the Son receives the determination as the other or alien, and we thus step out of pure ideality and thinking into image-concept or mental representation. If, according to the first determination, God there created only the Son, here he produces nature. Here nature is the other or alien, and the difference thus receives its due. The alien is nature, is the world in general, and the spirit which relates to it is the natural spirit; what we called subject before enters here as the content—man is here involved with the content. If man is here related to nature and is natural himself, he is so only within religion: this is, therefore, the religious view of nature and man. The Son enters the world, and this is the beginning of faith. We speak already in the sense of faith when we speak of the entering of the Son. God can not properly exist for finite spirit, as such, since, in so far as he is for it, it is implied immediately that the finite spirit does not grasp its finitude as being, but that it stands in a relation to spirit and conciliates itself with God. As finite spirit it is posit-

ed as departure, as separation from God; and thus it is a contradiction to its object and content, and this contradiction forms the necessity of its annulment. This necessity is the beginning; the consequence is that God must assume being for spirit, and that the divine content presents itself to the latter; and, since this spirit exists empirically and finitely, God's existence will become apparent to him in an empirical manner. But, since in history the divine element becomes evident to spirit, it loses the character of being merely external history and becomes divine history, the manifestation of God himself. This forms the transition of the realm of the spirit, and contains the consciousness that man in himself is conciliated with God, and that conciliation *is* for man. The process of conciliation itself is contained in the form of worship.

It should be observed that we do not distinguish here, as we did in previous places, between idea, shape, and form of worship, for we shall see in this treatise how the form of worship has everywhere immediate influence. We may make the following general observations: The element in which we are is the spirit; the meaning of spirit is that it manifests itself, that it is absolutely for itself, and, as it is conceived, it is never alone, but always with self-manifestation for another, for *its* other, e. g., for the side which is finite spirit. A form of worship is the relation of finite spirit to the absolute, and therefore we have a form of worship in each of these elements.

We must distinguish in this how the idea in the several elements is for the idea, and how it appears in mental representation and image-conception. Religion is universal, not only for the perfect and conceiving thought, for philosophical consciousness, but the truth of the idea of God is manifest also for the representative consciousness, and has the necessary determinations which are inseparable from mental representation or image-concepts.

THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION.

A PARAPHRASE OF DR. KARL ROSENKRANZ'S "PEDAGOGICS AS A SYSTEM," WITH ADDITIONAL REFLECTIONS. BY ANNA C. BRACKETT.

(*Second Part.*)

SECOND DIVISION.

INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION OR DIDACTICS.

§ 80. *Mens sana in corpore sano* is correct as a maxim of pedagogics, though often false in the judgment of the empiric, for we do really sometimes find *mens sana in corpore insano* as well as *mens insana in corpore sano*, and yet all normal activity should strive to secure a true harmony of soul and body. The development of intelligence presupposes physical health. The science of the art of teaching is what we call didactics. As has already been said, it is conditioned first of all by orthobiotics; but, besides this, it depends in the sphere of mind on psychology and logic. In its process it must unite a careful consideration for psychology with a logical method.

FIRST CHAPTER.

The Psychological Presupposition.

§ 81. If we would have any sound philosophy on this subject, we must, before we touch the subject of didactics, have examined somewhat closely the nature of mind itself, as it is unfolded in psychology. Any other treatment of the subject would be premature and ill-considered. We, therefore, take for granted some knowledge of those subjects on the part of our readers, as it would be out of place to unfold the entire subject in a treatise on pedagogics. We speak then of psychology only so far as is necessary to substantiate our propositions with regard to the educational work in hand, which is conditioned by it.

§ 82. The most important conception of all those taken from psychology is that of *attention*. Mind is essentially self-activity.

What it does not make its own does not exist for it. We often speak as if something external did of itself make an impression on the mind, but this is never really the case. Nothing produces any effect on the mind, if the mind has not itself rendered itself receptive to it. Without this self-excited activity, the object produces no impression upon it, and it passes unaffected by it, because it has not been conscious of it. An illustration might here be drawn from medicine. The germs of disease do not affect that body which from its perfectly healthy activity offers no fruitful ground for their reception and growth; while the enfeebled or diseased organism welcomes them, and there they take root and grow. One man passes physically unconscious of danger through a plague-stricken city, while another is at once attacked because his body offers a welcoming ground for the all-present germs. It might also be illustrated in the moral world—one is unconscious of and untouched by evil, while another drinks it in. Every individual has his own horizon line of perception, which varies with his character and cultivation: As no two of us can ever see the same rainbow, or have precisely the same horizon; as no two can ever be conscious of precisely the same thoughts. This illustration may, however, perhaps mislead, for spirit does not exclude spirit as matter excludes matter. And, though we do exclude others from our material horizon, we need not necessarily exclude them from our spiritual horizon. Attention is the directing of the mind to a certain object of thought with the purpose of comprehending it in its unity and in its distinction from other objects. The mind voluntarily relinquishes its hold upon other objects for the time, in order to fix upon this one; and, if this essential, spontaneous activity of the mind be lacking, it gains absolutely nothing. All success in teaching and learning depends upon the clearness and strength with which we distinguish objects and thoughts from each other. If, as the old Latin proverb¹ implies, he who does not distinguish clearly does not teach well, it is as true that he who cannot draw clear distinctions well cannot learn.

§ 83. Since the art of attention depends on the self-determination of the person, it can be fostered, and the pupil can be made attentive by his teacher. Education must accustom him to a

¹ Bene qui distinguit, bene docet.

sharp, quick, and many-sided attention, so that he shall gain by his first examination of the object of attention an exact and true idea of it, and shall not be obliged to make repeated efforts to acquire this. We must have no patience with that half-attention, that sort of twilight and half-light of intelligence in which one is obliged to correct and re-correct his first impression, because the attention was not sufficiently awake to make that first impression correct.

Nothing is of more vital importance to the teacher than to be convinced that it is his business to create and to cultivate the habit of close attention, and to know that, if his pupils are not attentive, it is his own fault: It is his business to make them so. That is what his vocation means, and, when he has done, this, he might almost be said to have done his work. But how often we hear teachers speaking of their pupils as inattentive in much the same way as they might say, "Poor boy, he is humpbacked!" as if want of attention were a natural deficiency for which allowance was to be made. Make a child thoroughly attentive to what you say to him at all times, and show him where to go for mental food, and your work is done. All that is then wanting, time will accomplish. It is the teacher's essential business to make his pupils attentive, and, if he fail here, he fails as a teacher, whatever else he may be.

§ 84. We must never forget the principle of psychology, that the mind does not consist of a bundle of faculties as a collection of different powers, but that all which it does proceeds from different activities of the one and identical subject. They are all a part of his very nature, so that education must not omit to foster and strengthen them all. It is quite correct to say, according to the old principle *a potiori fit denominatio*, that man is distinguished from brutes by his power of thinking, and that in his thinking he distinguishes several volitions as inclinations; but we must never forget that to be a perfect man he must also possess feeling and imagination. The special directions which the cognizing intelligence may take in its activity are: (1) Perception or Observation; (2) Conception or Representation; (3) Thinking. These are all interwoven and interdependent, and thus act by and through each other. Perception does not, however, only rise into conception, or conception into thinking; but thinking returns into conception,

and conception into perception. We might say that in the infant the perceptive faculty is most active; in the child the conceptive, and in the youth the thinking faculty; and then we might with some reason distinguish here in the development of the youth an intuitive, an imaginative, and a logical period.

Serious errors arise if we do not carefully observe these different elements, and the way in which they are actively related to each other, and if we confuse the different forms in which they appear in the different stages of growth. The child thinks, while he perceives, but his thinking is as it were concealed from him, because it is unconscious; and when he has acquired perceptions he makes them into conceptions, and demonstrates to himself his own freedom by playing with them; his play must not be looked upon as simply enjoyment. The child in play is occupied in trying the various perceptions which his consciousness has accumulated, by his own self-determination and by his power of idealizing—i. e., he has gathered material for use. Now he takes a pleasure in establishing the fact that he is the master of this material, and not it of him. He will do with it what he, the master, pleases; a board shall be a ship, the grass the ocean; anything shall be what he wills it to be. We do not mean that the child consciously tries the validity of his perception-material as against his will, but he does it nevertheless, and his most enjoyable plays have the most of this element in them. The stories that children most like are those that have the most of this element. All these stories transgress the narrow limits of actuality, and their caprice is not attractive to the abstract understanding, which would rather present to the children the commonplace tales of "Charitable Ann," "Heedless Frederick," or "Inquisitive Wilhelmina." It praises above all "Robinson Crusoe," which, while it relates curious and uncommon things, yet contains nothing which is absolutely impossible. But the desire of the child, wiser than the schools, laughs these to scorn, and revels in impossibilities—"Jack the Giant-Killer," "Puss in Boots," the "Arabian Nights," and all sorts of delicious fairy fancies; and thus, and only thus, it grows healthily into youth, where, with the assuming of the earnest duties of life, imagination grows less vivid, and the understanding and reason come to the helm.

I. The Intuitive Epoch.

§ 85. Perception, the first act of intellectual culture, is the unfettered grasping by the mind of an object which is directly present to it. According to this definition, education can have nothing to do with the act, because the act must be entirely uninfluenced from without, and the mind be left to its own innate power. It can only render aid so that the grasping may be more easy, i. e., 1. It can isolate the object which is to be apprehended. 2. It can facilitate the transition from one to another. 3. It can call attention to varied points of interest, so that the return to an object once examined may not become wearisome or monotonous, but have an ever-fresh charm. Here, at the very beginning, comes in for the teacher the principle of repetition which is one of his main tools, and the necessity of making that necessary repetition so varied in its aspects as never to weary the pupil by monotony. Lacking the ingenuity necessary to do this last, any one might as well decide to embrace some other calling than that of teacher. The way in which one amuses an infant illustrates the helps which education may offer to the art of perception. We hold up a ball, i. e., 1. We isolate it from the mass of surrounding objects in which it was lost; 2. We transfer the interest from the ball to the string which holds it, or to its own motion as we roll or toss it; 3. We call attention to its color or size or softness.

§ 86. But direct perception of many things is impossible from their extent or distance, and yet it is necessary that we have perception of many things, and, therefore, we make use of pictures to enlarge the field of the sense of sight. But we cannot have many objects represented at their actual size, and this implies the necessity of a reduced scale of measure, and this again implies some need of care that the representation may not convey to the mind an idea of too large or too small a real object. To the picture, then, explanation must be added.

§ 87. The picture is a wonderful aid to the teacher when it is correct and characteristic. Especially those pictures should be correct which represent natural objects or historical persons or scenes. If they are not correct, it is better not to use them, as they will do no good even if they do not do harm.

Picture-books seem to have been first used as a means of instruction in the second half of the seventeenth century, or after the decay of the art of painting, and to have followed from miniature painting. Up to that time public life was more given to the picturesque in its arms, furniture, houses, and churches, and people were more weary of actual seeing because they led a constantly wandering life. After this time, when, in the fury of the Thirty Years' War, all arts of painting and sculpture and the Christian and Pagan mythology had died out, there began to be felt a need of picture representations. The *Orbis rerum sensualium pictus*, which was to be also *Janua linguarum reserata*, appeared in 1658 and was reprinted in 1805. It has been followed by a mass of illustrated books on all subjects. The historical illustrated books were divided into two classes: Biblical and secular. These are in countless numbers, but most of them very poor. It is deplorable to see what daubs are put into the hands of children. They are not wanting in high color but in correctness, to say nothing of character, they are good for nothing, and the most annoying thought about them is that for the same money and with the same labor something quite different could have been produced with a little application of conscientiousness and scientific knowledge. The uniformity in the books offered in our stores is really disgraceful. Everywhere are presented to us the same types, especially in the ethnographic department. How much better would it be if, in representing the Hindoo nation, we were shown types of the four castes which have conditioned the history of the nation! Instead of this, we have perhaps a picture of a dancer. In natural history we have too often the representations of some imaginative artist, or the drawing of some miserable specimen. But there are signs of improvement here. In architectural drawings and in landscapes much has already been done.

§ 88. Children seem to have a natural desire to collect specimens—such as plants, butterflies, beetles, shells, skeletons, etc.—and this desire can be strengthened and directed so that their powers of perception shall gain in exactness and vividness. They ought especially to be practised in drawing, so that they can make good copies from the real objects. Drawing in schools is not to be regarded so much as a practice in art as a means of educating the sight so that the child may judge somewhat correctly of distance,

size, and color, and if he can be thus led by carefully graded lessons to a knowledge of the elementary forms of nature, he will have gained a power which will, in many ways, both theoretical and practical, be of great service to him.

Although we should not expect much æsthetic effect from pictures given as illustrations, inasmuch as the child must concentrate his attention on the distinguishing features of form and color rather than on the harmony of the whole and the style of execution, yet we should never omit to give children some idea of what true art is. If real works of art are to be found in the neighborhood, we can trust to the power which these will exercise over the child, and we must patiently await their moral and æsthetic effect. Our American children are greatly at a disadvantage in this matter in comparison with the children in any European capital, for we have none of the art treasures either in painting, sculpture, or architecture, which must have so powerful an influence on the children brought up in their atmosphere. The art of photography in its various forms will, in some degree, assist us here. As it is certainly the study of the human spirit and its manifestations, and not the study of the works of nature, which has the greatest humanizing and developing effect upon our minds, we should make every effort to bring the study of art to bear on the child's mind.

§ 89. But the study of pictures may become only a means of mental dissipation without any gain to the mind if it be not accompanied by explanation. Pictures are not instructive in and by themselves. They must be interpreted by means of human thought: the mere looking at them is utterly valueless. The tendency in our time is now to amuse children by looking simply, and to avoid all real effort of hard thinking. But as Gladstone remarks: There has as yet been no way found to make attention and inattention equal in their results. It is not alone the thing in itself that we want. We must go behind the thing itself for a knowledge which shall not be merely empty and useless. But illustrations are the order of the day, and in the place of enjoyable descriptions we often find only miserable pictures. We can reach beyond mere things in order to gain a comprehension of their real nature, only and solely by the power of hard thinking. The danger of *Kindergartens* lies exactly here. If they turn out chil-

dren with an utterly dissipated habit of mind and with an insatiate desire to be amused, they have done the children irretrievable harm. But in good hands the Kindergarten may prove the best means for the correction of thoughtless, unsystematic mental activity.

§ 90. The ear as well as the eye must be cultivated. But, while we must look at music as an educational means, we must not forget its ethical influence. Hearing is the most internal of our senses, and is, therefore, to be treated with the greatest care. Especially should the child be led to consider speech, not merely as a means by which he can obtain the gratification of his desires and make his thoughts known, but as a something from which real pleasure is to be derived in itself. He should be taught to speak distinctly and expressively, and this is possible only through a higher degree of care and deliberation. Nothing is more neglected in English-speaking schools than a proper study of the mother tongue. Matthew Arnold has recorded this in his "Report on the Schools of the Continent" with regard to English schools, in comparison with those of Germany and France, and the criticism would have applied to American schools as well. American voices are not good, therefore they should be treated with special care. The high and shallow tones should be lowered and deepened, and this can be done in our schools. And with regard to the language itself, it should be made an object of special exercise and study from the earliest school years. That time would not be wasted which was given daily to a conversation exercise in which the pupils should be led to express their own ideas correctly in their own language; at any rate, it should be a teacher's constant duty to demand and enforce the use of pure and correct English in every word spoken in school.

The Greek nation gave the greatest care to the musical¹ education of their youth. We find the evidence of this set down with the greatest clearness in the Republic of Plato, and in the last book of Aristotle's Politics. With modern nations also, music occupies a large share of attention, and is a constant element of educa-

¹ "Music," with the Greeks, included what we should call belles-lettres—the arts over which the nine Muses presided—not only music proper, but rhetoric, poetry, and the drama and stage presentation.

tion. Pianoforte playing is very general, and singing is also much practised; but the ethical significance of music is sometimes overlooked. It is too often considered as a means for social display only, and the selections played are of an exciting or even bacchanalian character. This style greatly excites youthful nerves. But speech, the highest form of personal manifestation of the mind, was treated with the greatest veneration and respect by the ancient world. We moderns write and read so much that the art of speaking clearly, correctly, and agreeably has much degenerated, and we do not gain any compensation for this loss by the art of modern so-called "declamation." We are left to hope for an improvement in this respect by means of the greater freedom of speech which now prevails in our political and religious life.

II. *The Imaginative Epoch.*

§ 91. Through our forms of perception, aided by reflection, we gain mental pictures which the mind has the power of summoning at will at any time, and in the absence of the object which originally produced them. This power we call imagination. The mental picture may be (1) exactly like the perception which originally gave rise to it; or (2) it may be at its pleasure changed and combined with other pictures; or (3) it may be held in the form of abstract signs or symbols, which the mind invents for it. Thus we have the powers of (1) the recognition of perceptions; (2) of the creative imagination, and (3) memory; but, for the full development of these subjects, we must turn to psychology.

§ 92. (1) The mental picture which we sketch from an object may be a correct one, or it may be imperfect, or very faulty, according as we have observed it without prejudice as it properly exists; or as we have beheld it accidentally confused with other objects, and have thought its qualities to be essential, which were really only accidental at the time of observation. Education must form a habit of comparing the observations which we make with our conceptions, in order to distinguish in the object those qualities which are essential and really belong to it from those which are accidental, and, therefore, foreign. On this critical examination depends the correctness of our conceptions.

§ 93. (2) Our conceptions are to an extent limited by the mate-

rial found for them in our previous perceptions, but we exercise a perfectly free control over the combination or altering of them. We can at our will create out of these elements innumerable pictures, and these we do not recognize as anything presented to us from outside, but as our own creation. This is a pleasurable action of the mind, but it is not as a mere pleasure that the science of education has to consider it. The student of education sees the reaction which our power of idealizing sets up against the limits necessarily fixed by our receiving chance impressions from without, and the conditions under which we can reproduce them by means of our creative imagination. Thus we do not paint for ourselves merely the actually existing world, but we create for ourselves and out of ourselves a new world of our own.

§ 94. This faculty is most surely and most easily cultivated by means of poetry, which pedagogies must therefore employ as a valuable means. The imagination must learn to appreciate what is good taste here by a study of the classical works of the creative imagination in this field. And for youth the classical works are those which nations have produced in their early or childish periods. These works present to the mind of the child the picture of the world which the human mind in the necessary stages of its development was forced to sketch out for itself. This is the real reason why children never tire of the stories of Homer, or of the Old Testament. Polytheism and the heroism which belongs to it are as real elements of childish imagination as monotheism and its prophets and patriarchs. Our view is above and beyond both, because it really contains them both as elements, while it comes to us by means of both of them.

The most genuine stories for children, from seven to fourteen, are always the same: those which are always to be honored as an inheritance from the nation and the world. For example, we can not fail to notice in how many thousand forms the stories of Ulysses have been reproduced as tales for children. Becker's "Tales of Ancient Times;" Gustave Schwab's beautiful "Stories of the Olden Time;" Karl Grimm's "Old Stories," etc., what were they if deprived of the legend of the silver-tongued wily favorite of Pallas and the divine Swineherd? The stories of the Old Testament up to the separation of Judah and Israel are equally inexhaustible. These patriarchs with their wives and daughters,

these judges and prophets, these kings and priests, are made nothing but models of virtue by the slipshod morality which would strike out everything hard or uncouth from the books which it prepares for "our dear children." Precisely because the dark side of human nature is not wanting, because envy, vanity, evil desire, ingratitude, craftiness, and deceit are found among the fathers and leaders of the "chosen people of God" have these stories so great an educational value. Adam, Cain, Abraham, Joseph, Samson, and David are as truly world-historical types as Achilles and Patroclus, Agamemnon and Iphigenia, Hector and Andromache, Ulysses and Penelope.

§ 95. Each nation and people has in the primitive epochs of its own history enough material for pictures which will fill the imagination of children, and will make familiar to them the characteristic traits of the past of their own people.

The Germans have a great number of such stories. Such are the "Horn-covered Siegfried," the "Heymon Children," the "Beautiful Magelone," "Fortunatus," the "Wandering Jew," "Faust," the "Adventurous Simplicissimus," the "Schildbürger," the "Island of Felsenburg," "Lienhard and Gertrude," etc., etc. Also the art-works of the great masters which have a national significance must be included, as, e. g., the "Don Quixote" of Cervantes. Such books as these should be left where the children will find them and pick them up. They should not be urged to read them, but allowed to come on them, as it were by chance. They will not absorb what in them may be coarse, but they will gain a somewhat of health and nobleness from them, and a taste for such food as will make them turn away with disgust from the sensational so-called children's stories of the present day. Of those which it were desirable for children to read in English, for instance, are Swift's "Gulliver's Travels," Lamb's "Essays," "Don Quixote," Cooper's novels, Scott's novels, "Arabian Nights," Johnson's "Voyage to the Hebrides," etc., etc., Homer and Virgil in rhymed translations. They will not read much of Lamb's "Essays," and yet, after all, they will get a flavor from them which will be a good influence for them.

§ 96. The most general form in which the imagination of children finds exercise is that of fairy stories. Education must see to it, however, that these are the genuine stories, the product of a

nation's thought, and not in the form in which modern poets have sometimes dressed them up, and which are really only frightful caricatures.

The fairy stories of India are really at the head here, since they proceed from a nation of children, as it were, who lived almost wholly in the imagination. As we have them given to us through the Arabians in the time of the caliphs, they have lost their exclusively Indian character, and have become, in the tales of Scheherezade, a book whose fame is as broad as the world, and with which no local traditions, as, e. g., Grimm's collection of German stories, though they are indeed admirable, can in any wise compare.

The stories which have been written especially for the improvement of children, which are full of moral teachings and hints, are very repulsive to the liberty-loving imagination of children. They do not have the true ring in them. We must acknowledge, however, that there seems to be some improvement in this respect, since we have learned the difference between the natural poetry of a people, which is perfectly artless and not reflective, and poetry which is conditioned and limited by criticism and an ideal. Even the picture-books of children show symptoms of improvement. We do not have so often now those useless books in which the letters of the alphabet, highly colored, form the chief attraction. But such writers as Hofman, who gave us "Sloveniy Peter" have shown that even seemingly trivial things can be treated with genius, provided one is blessed with it, and that nothing is more opposed to the imagination of the child than *childishness*, an effort after which has ruined so many would-be authors of books for children. They have attempted to come down with dignity from their own lofty standpoint, and have fallen into the bottomless pit of inanity, and the children have spurned their works as they deserved. We have begun to understand that, when Christ promised the kingdom of heaven to little children, it was possibly for other reasons than because they had, as it were, the privilege of being thoughtless and foolish.

Hans Christian Andersen in our day has given us a perfect specimen of what genuine children's stories are; and Lewis Carroll has also nearly, but not quite, approached him in his "Alice in Wonderland," and "Through the Looking-Glass," in which the unchecked fancy is allowed to run perfectly wild, as it does in

the mind of a healthy child. But too many of our "Children's Magazine" writers fall into the error of supposing that stories about children are necessarily stories for children.

§ 97. As the child grows towards manhood, the stories given to him should take on more of the earnest character of real life, and imagination must yield to reality. We must learn to look on the world no longer as an aimless play, but as it really is, a genuine battle. In the place of the entrancing epic poem he must now be given tragedy, which will, through sensations of fear and pity, present to him human destiny with all its darker shadows of sin and atonement. Biography now becomes of value in the department of history, such as Plutarch's "Lives" in ancient history, and in modern, the autobiographies of Augustine, Cellini, Rousseau, Goethe, Varnhagen, Jung Stilling, Moritz Arndt, etc. In these autobiographies the youth can see how the individual characters grew as they came in contact with surrounding circumstances, how they were influenced by these, and how these in turn influenced them. These, as well as memoirs and letters of distinguished men, are of great use to the youth who, by studying the battles of others, thus learns how he shall best fight his own. He will learn to know nature and ethnography by means of volumes of travels, which will make him a sharer in the charm and joy of the first discovery, and this is a much more delightful possession than the mere general consciousness of the results of the achievements of the race.

But, while we thus widen the horizon of knowledge of facts by instructive literature, we must not omit, at the same time, to secure wider views of the realm of ideas. This we can do best by what we shall call philosophical literature. Of this there are only two kinds to be recommended: (1) well-written treatises which endeavor by a thorough treatment to solve the conditions of some single problem, and (2), when the mind is strong enough, some standard works of philosophy. German literature is especially rich in works of this kind, as those of Lessing, Herder, Kant, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Humboldt, and Schiller. Nothing ruins the mind of a youth more than the study of works of mediocrity, or those of a still lower grade. Nay, they even devastate, spoil, and narrow his powers of appreciative feeling by their empty, hollow, and constrained style. People are apt to say

that the real classical works are too hard, and that the student must approach these by means of those of less depth and difficulty. This is a wide-spread and most dangerous error, because these so-called Introductions, Explanatory Essays, Easy Expositions, Comprehensive Abstracts, are very much more difficult to understand—for the reason that they lack all originality and all sharply-drawn distinctions—than the classical works to which they pretend to open an approach. Education must inspire the youth with courage to attack the real classics, and must never allow him to think (as a discretion born of prejudice will often tell him) that he cannot understand such works as Fichte's "Science of Knowledge," Aristotle's "Metaphysics," and Hegel's "Phenomenology." No science suffers so much as philosophy from this false popular opinion, which understands neither itself nor its authority. The youth must *learn how to learn to understand*, and to this end he must know that all things cannot be understood at first glance, but that there are ideas so valuable and life-giving as to demand that he have patience, that he read over and over again, and then that he think over what he has read.

§ 98. (3) The imagination is always going back into perception for the materials out of which to create its images. These perceptions may have some resemblance to the perception which lies at the root of the conception, in which case they are more or less symbolic, or they may be only arbitrary creations of the imagination, and then they are pure signs. The voluntary holding fast of one of these perceptions created by the imagination, the recalling of the conceptions denoted by them, we generally call *Memory*. This is not a special power which the mind has of recalling things, e. g., names or persons or dates. But, properly speaking, memory is as to its form the stage of annulment of the mental image; as to its content, it arises from the interest which we take in a subject. When we are very much interested in anything, we give it on that account a very careful attention, and if we give it a careful attention the reproductive imagination can easily recall it. These states of the mind being given, the fixing of a name or of a date which relates to the action in which the mind was so absorbed presents no difficulty. When the interest and attention are so vivid, it seems that no effort is needed to impress the memory. All so-called mnemonic aids only make more instead

of less difficult the act of memory. This is in itself a double action, consisting of (1) the fixing of the sign, and (2) of the conception which rests upon it. But a mnemonic sign adds yet another conception by means of which the data about whose memory we were concerned shall be more firmly held, and since this is arbitrary we add another stage to memory which is already two-fold. We must first recall the sign, however arbitrary or artificial it may be, and then also its relation to the thing we wish to remember. To be of any real help to the memory, we must not try to help it at all. We must simply place the object clearly before the mind in the presence of the infinite power of the self-determination, which is the prerogative of mind.

It will thus be seen of how immense importance is the cultivation of the power of attention which has been before spoken of. All the teaching in the world will do no good if the attention is not vividly excited, if the child has not attained the power of self-control, self-management, by which he can at once and steadily give his attention to any required subject. And if this power has been acquired, then the teacher has nothing to do but simply to place the object in the focus of these rays of attention, and it will be firmly memorized, even without voluntary effort on the part of the pupil. The problem of instruction is thus perfectly simple. First teach the child control over his own mind, and then simply lay before him what you wish him to make his own.

Lists of names, as, e. g., of the Roman emperors, of the popes, of the caliphs, of rivers, mountains, authors, cities, etc., also numbers, as, e. g., the multiplication table, the melting-points of minerals, the dates of battles, of births and deaths, etc., must be learned without aid. All indirect means only make the matter more difficult. We should use them only when the interest or attention has been weakened, and they should then be invented by each one for himself.

§ 99. We can fix information in the memory by pronouncing and writing down the names and dates, and then by constant repetition. By the first means we can gain exactness, and by the second, certainty.

There is no artificial contrivance which aids the memory like writing down what we wish to remember, always provided that we do not write simply for the purpose of relieving the memory

of its proper work. It is, so far as we are concerned, a mere matter of chance that a name or a number should be thus or so; we cannot change it, and must thus learn it as it is, if it is worth learning at all, but there is no reason in it, and it calls for no exercise of intelligence.

In science proper, as, e. g., in philosophy, our reason helps us to distinguish the meaning by the connection, and the names have a reason for them, so that we should invent them for ourselves if they were not already invented.

III. *The Logical Epoch.*

§ 100. In conception the mind attains a sort of universality, for it is not bounded or limited by any definite present object, and the accidental details can be brought into some classification or *schema*, to use Kant's expression. But the *necessity* of the connection of these details is wanting. To produce this is the work of the thought which can free itself from all figurative forms, and with its simple determinations transcend the conceptions. This thought purifies itself in its process of conception and perception; notion, judgment, and syllogism, develop into forms which, as such, have no power of being perceived by the senses. It must not, however, be understood that the thinking person cannot pass out of the region of thought and carry it with him back again into that of conception and perception. Genuine thinking activity shuts itself out of no sphere, and deprives itself of no content. That abstraction which affects a logical purism and looks scornfully down on the regions of conception and perception as forms of intelligence quite inferior to itself, is a false thinking, a sickly error of scholasticism. Education will guard itself against such an error, in proportion as it has carefully led the pupil by the established road of intellectual development to thinking, through the paths of perception and conception. Thus memorizing is an excellent preparatory school for the thinking activity, as it gives exercise to the intelligence in dealing with abstract ideas.

§ 101. The surest way of leading the child into the power to think is carefully from his earliest years to foster the *sense of truth*. If we can teach him to give himself up unreservedly and freely to truth when it is presented to him, and to form a habit of dili-

gently hunting out and exposing error and false appearance, we shall have done the greatest thing toward producing strength of the reflective powers. He will then not be liable to be deceived into accepting anything less than the true and genuine connection and dependence of thought in other ways.

[This is one of the places where Rosencranz touches in a masterly way upon the principle that true intellectual and true moral instruction cannot be dissevered. The teacher who demands from his pupils always the exact statement of the facts they have to give and requires them to seek for and expose the false, who creates in them the habit of thoroughness in their intellectual work, is doing more for them in a moral way, though he never says a definite word upon the abstract subject of truthfulness, than he who delivers long lessons upon its necessity while he allows careless and superficial work in himself or his pupils, and does not show himself willing and eager to acknowledge his own errors. This demand for the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, in lessons, is the most important moral lesson which can be given to our youth, and will bear the most plentiful harvest. This is a most fruitful thought for the student who is to be a teacher.]

An illusion as a pleasing play of the intelligence is quite allowable, but a lie is never to be tolerated. Children like to mystify and to be mystified. They like to pretend to tease and to act another part than their own. This inclination toward some kind of illusion is perfectly normal with them, and, therefore, to be encouraged. It gives ground for the glorious kingdom of art and the poetry of conversation which is jest and wit, and this, although often stereotyped into prosaic conventional forms, is preferable to the clumsy honesty which takes everything in its simple, literal sense. It is easy to discover when children in such play, in the activity of their joyousness, incline to the side of disorder and confusion, by their showing a selfish interest in it. Then they must be stopped, for the delight of harmless artifice degenerates into crafty premeditation and dissimulation.

§ 102. The study of the logical forms is doubtless a special pedagogical help in the logical training of the intelligence. Practice in mathematics is not sufficient, because it presupposes logic. Mathematics is related to logic in the same way as grammar,

physics, etc. But these logical forms must be presented in their pure independence, and not implicitly in their objective form as propositions.

ANALYSIS¹ AND COMMENTARY.

BY WILLIAM T. HARRIS.

Education is the development of reason innate in man—theoretical as intellect, practical as will-power. It is a labor that changes an ideal into a real, making what is potential into an actual; transfiguring the “natural” man, so to speak, into a spiritual man. Education forms “habits.” It develops ideal human nature into real human nature by means of this formation of habits. (Play differs from Labor in this, that it does not seek to transform an ideal into a real, but to make a semblance of contradiction between the ideal and real; it makes a reality *seem* to be what it is not.) There are three special elements in man, each of which needs education: these are life (bodily organism), cognition (knowing faculty or intellect), and will. To some extent there is a succession of periods based on this distinction: (1) the period of nurture, lasting till the sixth year, or during infancy, in which the education of the body is more important than the education of the mind; (2) the period of the school, lasting through childhood—say to fourteen years—in which *general* or intellectual education is most important; (3) the period of youth—from fourteen to eighteen—in which the most important education is specializing the practical application of knowledge and strength to particular forms of duty, hence will-education. While these periods are thus distinguished by the relative importance of the three different disciplines, it is essential that no one of these disciplines shall be neglected in any period.

§ 52. The classification in pedagogics is based on the distinction of the three elements in man that require education. (1) Physical (correct living = orthobiotics); (2) intellectual (correct perceiving, knowing, and thinking = didactics); (3) practical (correct action, proper habits = pragmatics). Æsthetic training, or the sense for the appreciation and production of the beautiful, falls, in a threefold division, into the second—into theoretic education. Social, moral, and religious training belong to

¹ This contains also additional reflections, often substituted in place of analysis where the text is clear without restatement.

the third division, as they concern the will and its utterance in deeds. "Pragmatics" signifies the doctrine of human deeds, and includes the spheres of ethics, politics, and religion. There may be defined a fivefold system of education, basing the distinction on the institutions of civilization: (a) Nurture = the education of the family; (b) the school, or education into the conventionalities of intelligence; (c) the art, trade, or profession that forms the vocation in life = the education of civil society; (d) the political education into citizenship, resulting from obedience to laws and participation in making and sustaining them; (e) religious education. These five forms of education depend on (a) the family, (b) the school, (c) civil society, (d) the State, (e) the Church. The school is properly a transition between the family and civil society, and forms the institution of education *par excellence*. Hence, while education, very properly, is defined so as to include all of human life, there is a period specially characterized as "education" which transpires in the school, a special institution that partakes of the character of the family on the one hand, and of civil society on the other. In the school, of course, there should be some attention paid to all spheres of education, but its main business should be the acquisition "of the picture of the world such as mature minds through experience and insight have painted it" (see § 51 near the end), or, in other words, those conventional items of information, insights into laws and principles, and the elementary processes of their combination. This makes the "view of the world" which each civilized human being is supposed to possess. It is important to know the exact province of the school, and to see that it is only one of the five forms of education that civilization provides for man. Much of the carping criticism leveled against schools, in times of financial distress or general social depression, is based on the assumption that the province of the school is *all* education instead of a small, but very important, fraction of it. The school may do its share of correct education, but it cannot correct the effects of neglect of family nurture, nor insure its youth against evil that will follow if civil society furnishes no steady employment, no opportunity for settled industry, and the State no training into consciousness of higher manhood by its just laws, and by offering to the citizen a participation in the political process of legislation and administration, carefully guarding its forms so that its politics does not furnish a training in corruption. Nor can the school insure the future of its pupils unless the Church does its part in the education of the individuals of the community. "The scientific arrangement of these ideas"—*i. e.*, life, intellect, and will—"must show that the former, as more abstract, constitute the conditions"—*i. e.*, life is the condition of intellect, and both intellect and life the conditions of

will—while “the latter, as more concrete, are the ground of the former” —*i. e.*, intellect is the ground of life, or, in other words, its final cause, and so will is the ground and final cause of intellect. Intellect contains all that life contains, and much more, namely: While life realizes its totality of species only in many individuals, and each individual is a partial and special half of the species as male or female, the intellect as consciousness is subject and object in one, and each individual intellect is potentially the entire species—each thinking being can think all the thoughts of the greatest thinkers. So, will contains all that intellect contains, and more. For what is potential in intellect (the identity of subject and object of thought) is real in the will. The will makes objective its internal subjective forms, and in its highest ethical activity it becomes conscious freedom.

§ 53. The rules of hygiene are derived from an insight into the two-fold process of assimilation and elimination which goes on in the living organism with relation to the inorganic substances which it uses.

§ 54. Perpetual change goes on in the living organism, converting the inorganic into organic tissue and then reconverting it. This alternation is the basis of the demand for the alternation of productive activity with rest and recreation in the whole physical system.

§ 55. Fatigue defined. It may occur with the whole organism or with a part. The idea that total rest is healthy is a misapprehension. The organism requires alternation of rest and activity, which alternation itself is activity because it is change. Hence, “true strength arises only from activity.”

§ 56. Physical education treats of (a) the repairing activity or nutrition, (b) the motor or muscular activity, and (c) the nervous activity, as far as they concern children and youth.

§ 57. Dietetics defined. Details here are trivial.

§§ 58, 59, 60, 61. Food for infants.

§ 62. Why children need much sleep.

§ 63. Clothing of children should allow free play of the limbs, and not compress the vital organs. Its clothing should not be a source of anxiety to the child, nor the occasion of vanity or of humiliation.

§ 64. Cleanliness means “a place for every thing and every thing in its place.” To take a thing out of its proper relations is to “deprive it of its proper individuality,” and in an “elemental chaos” every thing has lost its proper relations to other things, and has no longer any use or fitness in its existence.

§ 65. *Gymnastics.* The voluntary and involuntary muscles distinguished—the former depend on the brain direct, while the latter depend

on the spinal cord; the voluntary muscles form the means of communication with the external world, and also react on the automatic functions of digestion, sensation, etc. Gymnastics seeks to develop the voluntary muscles in a normal manner, and through these indirectly to affect favorably the development of the other bodily systems and processes.

§ 66. Gymnastics affected by the national military drill. The ancient tribes and nations found special bodily training indispensable to success in war, and even to national preservation. Gunpowder and the improved arms that use it have almost rendered gymnastics obsolete—the successful army, other things equal, being the one composed of men thoroughly disciplined in manœuvres, and possessed individually of tact and versatility necessary to manipulate the destructive fire-arms now used.

§ 67. Gymnastics, therefore, in modern times must aim chiefly at developing the body for the sake of physical strength and endurance, with a view to the demands of useful industry and mental culture on the bodily health and vigor. Health requires harmonious development; the exercises must develop the parts of the body so as not to produce disproportion. The result of gymnastics is to give the mind control over the body as a whole—the will interpenetrates, as it were, the various organs, and by this means the conscious mind can reënforce the automatic functions of the body; the will-power can to a certain degree even ward off disease.

§§ 68–71. Gymnastic exercises classified: (1) of the lower extremities: (a) walking, (b) running, (c) leaping (including varieties and modifications, such as walking on stilts, skating, dancing, balancing, etc.); (2) of the upper extremities: (a) lifting, (b) swinging, (c) throwing—including also the modifications of climbing, carrying, pole and bar exercises, quoits, ball and nine-pin playing, etc.); (3) of the whole body: (a) swimming, (b) riding, (c) fighting.

§ 72. The gradation of exercises chronologically corresponds in some degree with their classification—(a) walking, running, leaping, to infancy; (b) lifting, swinging, throwing, to childhood; (c) swimming, riding, bodily contests, to youth, and to manhood so far as manhood continues athletic sports. The period of sexual development begins with youth, and needs special attention at the hand of the educator.

§ 73. Great care must be exercised in the period of youth as to food—its regularity, and proper quality and amount; the physical exercise, too, must be strictly observed. These precautions may prevent a premature diversion of the nervous power of the body to a manifestation of the sexual instinct.

§ 74. There must be no overstraining of the brain or morbid excite-

ment of the feelings in the period of youth, if we would have a healthful development of the sexual instinct. Novel-reading should be carefully limited as to amount and character.

§ 80. Education has to note bodily conditions of the mind, and to prescribe methods of physical training. It has more especially to note also the nature of mind, or psychology, and prescribe the methods of developing the several powers of the mind.

§ 81. Psychology, as a science, is unfolded within the philosophy of spirit as an antecedent presupposition of the science of ethics (which forms the third part of the science of spirit, see "Analysis" § 1, page 38, of this work). Hence pedagogics, which belongs to ethics (or social science), presupposes psychology, and refers to it as already established. Pedagogics, in treating of intellectual education, may give only an outline of it.

§ 82. The conception of attention—the most important one in pedagogics. Nothing exists for the mind unless the mind gives attention to it—*i. e.*, voluntarily entertains it. [Attention is self-activity, not a passivity of the mind. It is the will acting upon the intellect, and hence a combination of intellect and will. Out of the infinitely manifold objects before the senses—and each object is capable of endless subdivision, there is no part so small that it does not possess variety and the possibility of further subdivision—attention selects one special field or province, and refuses to be diverted from it. It neglects all else and returns again and again from the borders of the field of attention, and takes note of the relation of the surrounding objects to the object of special attention. It makes it the essential thing, and considers every thing else only as related to it.]

[It is interesting to note how the higher faculties (*so-called* "faculties"—one must not, however, suppose these faculties as isolated "properties" of the mind, existing side by side, like properties of a thing) all originate from the process of attention; they are higher powers or "potencies" of attention. Isaac Newton ascribed his superiority to other men in intellectual power simply to the greater power of attention. Attention appears: *first*, as a mere power of isolating one object from others—a power of concentration upon it to the exclusion of others; *secondly*, it discriminates distinctions within the object or *analyzes* it: thus analysis is continued attention—the second power or potency of attention; *thirdly*, it seizes again upon one of the distinctions found by analysis, and becomes *abstraction*; abstraction might be named the third power or potency of attention; *fourthly*, the attention may be directed to essential relations of the elements formed by analysis and abstraction—their essential rela-

tions to each other. This is a process of synthetic thought, a grasping-together, a comprehension—a higher activity of mind—a fourth potency or power of attention. It is the most important matter in psychology, this process of synthesis, through necessary relation. To find that one object of attention, A, involves another, B—possesses essential relation to it, such that A cannot exist without B—is to find a necessary synthesis. It is to discover that instead of A by itself, or B by itself, there is one existence having two phases to it, one phase being A, and the other phase being B. It is a finding of one instead of two, and is a synthetic act of mind. The synthesis is not an arbitrary one. It is a discovery of truth—A and B were really two aspects of one and the same being which we may call A B, but they *seemed* to be independent. The process of attention, up to its fourth power, is thus an ascent from *seeming* to *being*. The perception of *dependence* (“essential relation” is *dependence*) is the perception of synthesis, and belongs to the activity of *comprehension*. Reflection, as a mental activity (or “faculty”), is the process of discovering relations and dependencies among objects—hence it is a stage of synthesis—belonging to what we call here the “fourth power of attention.” The student of educational psychology should follow out this mode of exploring the mind, and define for himself all of the so-called “faculties” and mental acts, in terms of attention (see the Outline of Educational Psychology, especially VI). He must note, too, that the act of attention is an act of the mind, directed upon itself because it *confines* its own activity (*i. e.*, the perception in general) to a special field (*i. e.*, makes it perception of a special object to the exclusion of others). This synthesis is, as just remarked, the most important theme of psychology—it is also the most wonderful—a veritable fountain of surprise. For the strangest thing to learn in psychology is that the process of reflection (the direction of the mind in upon itself) discovers the truth about the objects or things in the world. The first activity of sense-perception notices objects as independent of each other, as having no essential relations. Reflection, or attention in its higher powers, discovers necessary relations, and forms more adequate ideas of the truth. Isaac Newton saw the sun and planets as one gravitating whole—a *system*—and his knowledge certainly came nearer the truth than did the knowledge of previous astronomers who merely knew the sun and planets in their separate existence. In going into the truth of objects the mind goes into itself at the same time. Thus psychology points backward to the great fact that reason made the world as well as the human intellect.]

§ 83. Attention (depending as it does upon the voluntary power of the mind) can be developed or educated. [The fact that the child is

capable of exercising his will-power on his intellect is the fundamental fact that makes all intellectual education possible. There is no intellect, strictly speaking, until the will has combined with the perception.]

§ 84. (Note what has been said above in § 82). Perception, conception, and thinking are named as the three stages of intellect. [Perception (German word, *Anschauen*) here refers simply to the contemplation of objects by the senses. Conception (German word, *Vorstellen*) makes in the mind a picture of the object, but a *general* picture—a representation of the object in its outlines—a representation that will correspond not only to the particular object, but to all objects of the same class. Thinking perceives the essential relations of the object, its dependencies on its environment, and the reciprocal action. Education produces in the pupil the ability to carry back the activity of the higher faculties into the lower ones, as stated in the text. In the presence of perception the mind learns to be able to recall the general representation of the type or class of objects, and compare the object before the senses with the general type. It enables it also to think in the presence of the object, and to perceive essential relations at the same time that it is occupied with perception and conception. Thus it elevates the lower faculties to thinking perception and to thinking conception. The child delights in fairy tales because they play with the fixed conditions of actuality, and present to him a picture of free power over nature and circumstances. Thus they, to some extent, prefigure to him the conquest which his race has accomplished, and is accomplishing, only it is made to appear as the exploits of some Aladdin, or Jack the Giant Killer. To modify, change, or destroy “the limits of common actuality” is the perpetual work of the race. It molds the external world to suit its own ideas. Play is the first education that the child gets to prepare him for this human destiny.]

§ 85. Perception can be assisted by isolation of the object to be perceived. The pupil should be trained to look for certain properties and attributes, and to note their peculiarities. The categories under which one may classify these properties and attributes are furnished by reflection. Hence, when one in the so-called “object-lessons” trains the pupil to note in all objects certain constantly recurring predicates, such as color, shape, frangibility, solubility, size, number, taste, smell, etc., he is bringing thought and conception “back into perception” (see previous section) and elevating mere perception into *thinking perception*. The difference between ordinary perception and scientific perception lies just here: the former is unsystematic and fragmentary, the latter is systematic and exhaustive. Thinking gives the system. Hence, the training of perception

is the subordination of it to the will, and the introduction of complete systematic habits of activity in place of accidental perception.]

§ 86. All perceivable objects should be learned by actual perception so far as is possible. When remoteness in space and time or inaccessibility on account of size prevents this, a good substitute offers itself in the way of pictorial representation. [The picture, of course, idealizes much—it magnifies some objects and reduces others, and it never presents all of the features found in nature. But it omits unessential details for the most part, and this fact makes a picture much easier to learn than the real object, although the knowledge is not so practical. The picture is commonly nearer the *type* or general form of the object than real specimens; the real specimens have much about them that is accidental, and need much comparison to discover what is the normal type. The picture gives this type at once, and hence gives assistance to the pupil—half digests his mental food for him, in fact. Hence the pictorial representation has advantages (easy of apprehension because it is a perception reduced to conception) and disadvantages (because the pupil does not get the strength that comes from reducing the specimens of nature to their types by his own efforts).]

§ 87. Accuracy is, above all, demanded in pictorial representations. The picture-book came into use chiefly after decline of painting. Comenius (1658) gave a great impulse to education by his book, which attempts to convey a knowledge of the world by pictures.

§ 88. Children should be exercised in classification. They should collect and arrange cabinets for themselves. [This will give them ability in recognizing the type in the specimen, the general in the particular. Drawing, too, is excellent practice, if from objects direct, inasmuch as it requires the pupil to omit all that is not characteristic of the object. How far lines suffice to delineate an object, and fix it unmistakably, and what these few lines are, the art of drawing teaches. Characterization must be learned first before any attempt at aesthetic effect. But true works of art must be placed where the child will receive a silent education from them, although no positive instruction is given in them.]

§ 89. Pictorial representation is of little service, unless accompanied by analysis and explanation. [Mere gazing upon a picture is like the thoughtless gazing upon real objects—it is not systematic, and does not separate the essential from the accidental, nor exhaust the subject.]

§ 90. Training of the ear by music and by correct speaking. [Tones are of all kinds—solemn, joyous, lively, sad, contemplative, discordant and suggestive of hate and bitterness, harmonious and sweet and suggestive of love and agreement, etc. There is a long scale of degrees to

each one of these feelings and passions, and music can present all shades of each. Even the keys have each a special character. The German composers have used these and other properties of tones to advantage in constructing great musical dramas, in which pure music accomplishes results similar to words in poetry.]

§ 91. (1) Verification of conceptions through comparison of the conception with the perception; (2) creative imagination, which modifies or combines images; (3) memory, which holds fast perceptions by attaching them to arbitrary or conventional symbols, such as words.

§ 92. Method of verification and its function.

§ 93. [Emanipation of the mind takes place through its ascent into formative power, and this is realized in two ways: (a) in reaching the general types of objects, the mind finds the one form that stands for many, and gains ability to see the one in the many, the power to hold the essential and permanent without depending on any one particular object or specimen or sense-perception; (b) in reproducing, by aid of the general conception or abstract definition, a number of special examples, it is able to fashion them in various ways, and yet endow them all with possible attributes and characteristics. The mind thus has free scope of realization, and can, in an ideal world of its own creation, participate in creative activity.]

§ 94. In the epoch of the development of the imagination comes in the study of art and literature.

The first classics for youth are those which have been developed by nations in their earliest stages. Not only the light sides, but the darker sides of character in these *naïve* stories, are essential to their educative effect. They furnish types of human character, and types of human situations, a knowledge of which constitutes wisdom. The conception of the characters of Cain, Joseph, Samson, David, Saul, Ulysses, Penelope, Achilles, and the like, furnishes a ready classification for special objects of experience.

§ 95. Every child should read as indispensable the stock of stories which furnish these general types of character and situation. ["Robinson Crusoe," "Gulliver's Travels," "Don Quixote," the "Arabian Nights," the dramas of Shakespeare, should be read sooner or later. Earlier than these, the old English stories and fairy tales, and even Mother Goose's melodies. A scale thus extending from the earth to the fixed stars of genius furnishes pictures of human life of all degrees of concreteness. The meager and abstract outline is given in the nursery tale, and the deep comprehensive grasp of the situation with all of its motives is found in Shakespeare. The summation of the events of life in "Solomon Grun-

dy" has been compared to the epitome furnished by Shakespeare in the "Seven Ages," and the disastrous voyage of the "Three Men of Gotham" is made a universal type of human disaster arising from rash adventure.]

§ 96. Importance of avoiding morbid tendencies in the stories for children. They must be *naïve* and not sentimental; but mere childishness is to be avoided.

§ 97. Earnestness must predominate over play, as the child advances into youth and youth into riper age. The biographies of Plutarch present well-executed pictures of men of colossal characters placed in difficult situations. Philosophical works, if taken up in later youth, should be classical treatises on special problems of thought. Abstracts and summaries are generally to be avoided.

§ 98. Memory. [The German word *Gedaechtniss* is contrasted with the word *Erinnerung*; the former may be translated "Memory," and the latter "Recollection"—Recollection, the reproduction of the perceived object in its particular existence, and Memory the reproduction of it by its general type. With the general type the mind is able to master the infinite diversity of nature and reduce all to a few classes. Mnemonic artifices are to be eschewed. "Memory is the stage of the dissolution of the conception;" this means that the power of representation becomes less and less, a mere recalling of what has been perceived, and, as the mind strengthens, it passes over into a faculty which calls up universals, or general concepts in the place of particular images. Memory, in this technical sense, deals with words—each word standing for some universal concept. Language is therefore something that can be used by a whole people—its words, standing, as they do, for universals, express for each individual the contents of his observations, no matter how peculiar they may be.]

§ 99. Repetition and the writing down of names and numbers are the best means for fixing them in the memory.

§ 100. In the general images of the faculty of conception, necessity of connection is yet wanting. Thinking, technically so called, discovers necessary relations.

§ 101. A sense of truth may be fostered from childhood up. Prejudice and self-interest must be habitually set aside for the truth—for the perception of things as they actually are. Great care, therefore, must be exercised to prevent illusions (the activity of the productive imagination, however essential it may be) from weakening the sense of truth.

§ 102. An acquaintance with logical forms is important for the thorough education of the intellect. Logical forms give the archetypes

or simplest shapes of all problems that occur elsewhere. Neither mathematics nor any other application of logic in the sciences can supply the place of a logical training.

KANT'S ANTHROPOLOGY.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF IMMANUEL KANT BY A. E. KROEGER.

(Continued.)

Concerning the Weaknesses and Diseases of the Soul in regard to its Faculty of Cognition.

A.

GENERAL DIVISION.

§ 43. The defects of the faculty of cognition are either *weaknesses* or *diseases* of the *mind*. The diseases of the soul, in their relation to the faculty of cognition, may be subdivided under two chief divisions. The one is called the *mood disease* (*hypochondria*) and the other is called the *perturbed mind* (*mania*). In regard to the former, the patient is well aware that the current of his thoughts is not all right, his reason not having sufficient self-control to direct, check, or hurry on the direction of that current. Untimely joy and untimely sorrows—hence moods—change as does the weather, which we have to take even as it comes. So far as the second is concerned, it is a voluntary flow of thought, which has its own—subjective—rule, but runs contrary to the (objective) current of thought, which harmonizes with the laws of experience.

In regard to the sensuous representation, a disorder of the mind is called either *idiocy* or *insanity*. As an upsetting or topsy-turvy of the power of judgment and of reason, it is called *craziness* or derangement. The man who in his imaginations habitually neglects to compare them with the laws of experience (*i. e.*, who dreams while awake) is a *phantastic person*—a man of whims; if he does so with *pathos* (*Affekt*) he is an *enthusiast*. Unexpected promptings of a phantastic person are called *moods* of phantasticity (*raptus*).

Simpletons, stupid, numskulls, blockheads, and fools are distinguished from deranged people not only in regard to degree, but also in regard to the different qualities of their moods; and the former are not yet qualified for the insane asylum, which is a place where men must be kept in order, by another's reason, in spite of the maturity and strength of their own age, in view of their inability to attend to themselves to the smallest affairs of life. Insanity when allied to pathos is *madness*, which may often be original, but, at the same time, may come involuntarily, in which case it comes near to *genius*. Let one instance the poetic inspiration (*furor poeticus*). But such an influx of the more gentle but unruly current of ideas, when it touches reason, is called *flightiness* (*Schwärmerei*). To brood over one and the same idea, which yet has no possible object—for instance, over the death of a husband—who, after all, cannot be called back to life—simply in order to find rest in the pain itself, is dumb *craziness*. *Superstition* is rather allied to insanity (*Wahnsinn*), and *flightiness* rather to *craziness* (*Wahnwitz*). The latter sort of mental disease is also often called, in a milder phrase, *exaltation* or *eccentricity*.

To talk wildly when in a fever or an attack of aberration—say, in a state of epilepsy—which is often excited sympathetically by a powerful imagination through the mere fixed gaze of a madman (for which reason persons of very excitable nerves should not extend their curiosity to the very cells of such unfortunates), is, nevertheless, not to be treated as insanity. But that which is called a conceit is not a disease of the mind, for that is generally understood to be a moody aberration of the inner sense, but is usually a *haughtiness* which borders on insanity; and its claim that others should, in comparison with such a person, despise themselves, runs entirely contrary to its own purpose; just as in the case of madmen. For, by raising such a claim, he excites those same people to curtail his vanity in all possible respects; to ridicule him, and expose him to laughter on account of his offensive foolishness.

More mild is the expression, he is *crotchety* (German, “he has a cricket in his head”), (has a *marotte*), a principle which is claimed to be popular, though it nowhere finds approval among the wise. As an instance, let me cite the case when a man claims the gift of certain presentiments, similar to the inspirations of SOCRATES, or of certain influences said to be based on experience, though they are

utterly inexplicable, such as sympathy, antipathy, idiosyncrasy, etc. (*qualitates occultæ*), which chirp like a cricket in the brain, and which, nevertheless, no one else can hear.

The mildest of all manners of overstepping the limits of sound reason is the riding of a *hobby-horse*; a disposition to employ one's self purposely with pet objects of the imagination, which the understanding merely plays with for its occupation, as with a real business, and thus, as it were, a busied idleness. For old people of competence, and who have retired from business, this disposition, which retreats again, as it were, into careless childhood, is not only healthy, as an agitation which always keeps the vital forces astir, but also amiable. At the same time it is ridiculous to such a degree that the ridiculed himself must good-humoredly join in the laugh against him. But even with the young and busy people this hobby-riding serves as a recreation; and those wise-aeres who criticise such petty, innocent follies with pedantic seriousness deserve STERNE'S admonition: "Why, let every one ride his hobby-horse up and down the streets of the city, *provided he does not force you to mount behind him.*"

B.

Concerning the Weakness of the Faculty of Cognition.

He who lacks wit is called *dull* (*obtusum caput*). Nevertheless, he may have a very good mind for matters that concern only the understanding and reason. But let no one ask him to attempt the poet; as in the case of CLAVIUS, for instance, whom his tutor was about to apprentice to a blacksmith, because he could make no verses, but who, when he got a mathematical book in his hands, became a great mathematician. A mind of *slow* comprehension is not necessarily a weak mind; even as a mind of *quick* comprehension is not always thorough, and often very shallow.

A lack of judgment without wit is called *stupidity* (*stupiditas*); with wit it is called *silliness*. He who shows judgment in business affairs is called *clever*; if he combines wit with judgment, he is called *smart*. He who merely affects either of these qualities—that is, the pretentious *wit* as well as the would-be *smart* man—is disgusting. Failures and missteps *sharpen the wit*; but he who

has reached such a height in this school that he can make others smart through their failures, has *dulled* his own wit. *Ignorance* is not stupidity; as in the case of the lady who, to the question of an academician, "Do horses eat also at night?" replied, "How can so learned a man be so stupid?" But it is a proof of good understanding if a person knows only how to question well (so that he may be properly advised on the subject, either by nature or by some other person).

A person is called a *simpleton* when his mind is unable to comprehend *much*; but this does not constitute him stupid, unless he comprehends it wrongly. Honest but *stupid*—as some people improperly describe. "Pomeranian servants," for instance, is a false and very censurable expression. It is false, because honesty—fulfilling duty on principle—is practical reason. It is very censurable, because it presupposes that every one who feels himself able thereto would cheat, and that his not cheating arises only from his inability. Hence the proverbs: "That man has not invented powder"; "He will not betray his country"; "He is no wizard," etc., betray misanthropic principles, namely, in this, that even when we presuppose the good-will of those persons whom we know, we cannot be sure of it; but can be sure only in regard to their inability or incapacity. Thus, as HUME says, the Grand Sultan does not confide his harem to the virtue of those whom he appoints its guardians, but to their inability—by appointing black eunuchs.

To be very limited (narrow-minded) in regard to the *extensiveness* of one's conceptions does not of itself constitute stupidity; it all depends on their *quality*—on the governing principles. When people allow themselves to be gulled by treasure-finders, gold-makers, and lottery-dealers, this must not be ascribed to their stupidity, but to their evil will; that is, their purpose to become rich at the expense of others, without a proportioned exertion of their own. *Craftiness*—cunning, slyness (*versutia, astutia*)—is the ability to cheat others. The question now is, whether the cheat must be *smarter* than he who is easily cheated, and whether the latter is stupid. A *warm-hearted* person, who readily *trusts*—that is, believes, gives credit, etc.—is often also, though improperly, called a *fool*; because he is an easy catch for rascals; in accordance with the proverb: "When fools go to market the salesmen

rejoice." It is true, and a maxim of prudence, that I should never again trust the man who has cheated me once; for he is corrupt in his principles. But not to trust *other* people, because *one* man has cheated me, is misanthropy. The real fool is the cheat. But how if one great fraud has enabled him to place himself in such a position that he no longer needs the confidence of others? It is true that in such a case the character in which he *appears* undergoes a change, but only to this extent: that whereas the cheated cheater is *ridiculed*, men *spit upon* the lucky cheat; and thus there is, after all, no advantage to be gained by cheating.*

* The Palestines who live among us have fallen into the not unfounded reputation of being for the greater part addicted to cheating ever since their exile, owing to their usurious tendency. Now, it is true that it seems strange to conceive of a *nation* of cheats. But it surely is quite as strange to conceive of a nation composed altogether of merchants, the greater part of whom, united by an old superstition, recognized by the State wherein they live, aspire to no civil honors, but try to replace the loss of it by the advantages to be obtained in overreaching the people who extend to them protection, and even in overreaching each other. Now, it is true that this cannot be otherwise with a whole nation of merchants—they thus being non-productive members of society (like the Jews in Poland); and hence their constitution, sanctioned by old traditions, and even recognized by us, among whom they live (and who have certain holy writings with them in common), cannot be abrogated by us without our becoming guilty of *inconsequence*; although they make it the highest principle of their morality in dealing with us, that "Every purchaser ought to keep his eyes wide open." Instead of entering upon idle plans to make this people moral in regard to the points of cheating and honesty, I prefer to express my notion concerning the origin of this curious constitution—namely, a people composed solely of merchants.

Wealth was carried in the most ancient times by commerce from India across the land to the western coasts of the Mediterranean and the ports of Phœnicia—which includes Palestine. Now, it is true that it could also have taken its way across many other places; for instance, Palmyra, and in older times Tyre, Sidon, etc.; and, likewise, with a slight turn, across the sea, as Eziongeber and Elat; perhaps, also, from the Arabic coast to Thebes, and thus across Egypt to that same Syrian coast; but Palestine, of which Jerusalem was the capital, was also advantageously situated for the caravan trade. Probably the phenomenon of the ancient Solomonic wealth was the effect of this commerce; and the surrounding country of Palestine, even at the time of the Romans, was filled with merchants, who, after the destruction of Jerusalem—having previously established communications with other tradesmen of the same language and religion—gradually spread, together with these, into far-removed countries (into Europe), always keeping in communication with each other, and finding protection from those other countries on account of the advantages derived from their trade. It thus appears that their dispersion over the whole world, together with their union in religion and language, cannot at all be placed to the account of a *curse* pronounced upon this people, but must rather be considered a *blessing*; especially as their wealth, estimated by individual possession, probably now exceeds that of any other people of the same number of persons.—*Note by Immanuel Kant, the Author.*

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

BERKELEY'S IDEALISM.

The outlines of Berkeley's doctrine may be stated briefly as follows: The individual experience is made up of "ideas." These ideas are inert, fleeting existences, which do not have an independent being of their own, but subsist only as they are perceived. They exist or have their reality in active, indivisible "substances" or "spirits," which act, and think, and perceive them. I know that I perceive such ideas—that is to say, I am directly conscious of my own spirit or mind. Since the essence of this spirit is to perceive and not to be perceived, I cannot have an idea of it; ideas, being passive and inert, cannot represent that which acts; but since I am conscious of my spirit I may be said to have a "notion" of it. Further, I may reason by analogy that other men have spirits of which they are conscious, for, though I cannot directly perceive these other spirits—that is, cannot have an idea of them—yet I perceive certain combinations of ideas which lead me to infer that particular agents or spirits like myself accompany such combinations of ideas and perceive them. Therefore I have a notion of other spirits as well as of my own. In like manner I am conscious of relations which exist between ideas and spirits. I am aware of a relation between my mind perceiving and the ideas which it perceives; and I may be said to have a notion of this relation, though I do not have an idea of it. Ideas, spirits, and relations, then, make up the whole extent of human knowledge. Furthermore, many of my ideas are not the product of my own activity, but are given to me from without, and I have no control whatever over them. Some other spirit, then, must be their cause. This cannot be a finite spirit like my own, for it would have no more power to cause ideas than I have. Therefore the cause of my ideas must be an infinite, divine spirit. They exist in my spirit as a result of God's spirit. In God they have a permanent existence by virtue of his own infinite power. Lastly, the soul or spirit must be naturally immortal, because, being indivisible, incorporeal, and unextended, it cannot be subject to the changes which affect the body.

Bearing in mind this summary of the leading points of Berkeley's doctrine, let us see how far his results are logically deduced from the princi-

ples with which he sets out ; and how far, if at all, Berkeley has failed to develop adequately the germs of his theory.

In the first place, Berkeley starts by positing the existence of ideas, which mean, as the earlier portions of his work would imply, merely momentary sensations. Then, since these sensations are perceived, there must be an active, causal agent or spirit—which is something entirely different from passive, inert ideas—to perceive them. But why, from the mere existence of ideas, does the existence of an active spirit follow ? Why, from the fact that our experience is made up of a fleeting series of momentary sensations, does it follow that there must be a single, identical, permanent subject of these sensations ? Berkeley himself gives no logical answer. His only argument is an appeal to consciousness. But powers are not objects of consciousness. “A power,” says John Stuart Mill, “is not a concrete entity which we can perceive or feel, but an abstract name for a possibility.” The efficient power of which we are conscious is no more than a sensation, which is distinguished from our other sensations or ideas merely by coming before them. Upon Berkeley’s theory we should have no assurance that the spirit of one moment was the spirit of the next. If experience is made up of momentary sensations, each of which implies the existence of a spirit to perceive it, what reason is there for assuming the identity of any spirit over an interval ? What right have we to say that the spirit which perceives the sensation of one moment is the same spirit as that which perceives the sensation of the next moment ? Berkeley would probably have said that just as we are directly conscious of the spirit, so we are also conscious of its permanence. This is true ; we are conscious of its permanence ; or rather we are conscious of it as permanent ; but this is as much as to say that consciousness is not detached and momentary, as Berkeley makes it. In fact, we are never conscious that we are feeling, but only that we have felt ; we are never conscious that we *are* conscious, but only that we have been so. There is no present moment of consciousness. Look for it, and it is already past. “Consciousness,” says Hodgson, “is like a man walking backward, who does not see each step as he takes it, but only immediately after it has been taken.” Now, upon Berkeley’s theory it would be absurd to say that any of these past consciousnesses are ours ; or, in other words, it would be absurd to say that any consciousness is ours. We could not be conscious of self at all if our life could be made up of momentary, individual experiences, unrelated to each other. There must, then, be an element in cognition which Berkeley ignores.

The fact is that, in positing the reality of our ideas—that is, the reality of the world around us as we experience it and know it—Berkeley posits

more than he is aware of. He is right in positing this; he is right in recognizing that the world exists only as perceived, but he failed to recognize the part which thought plays in this perception of the world. The world of ideas is the only real world, but it is such by virtue of the relations of thought. If our ideas are only fleeting, single sensations, without permanence or bond of union, then, from the world which they compose, all relation disappears. Thus Berkeley's premises would not allow him to recognize the existence of relations, but yet he cannot move a step without tacitly recognizing them. He cannot even get out of his world of ideas—of his mere sensations—without arbitrarily supposing that these ideas imply—that is, are related to—a subject which perceives them. He saw that his doctrine would destroy spirit as well as matter, unless he admitted the existence of something which was not an idea—a spirit which perceived, but was not perceived in turn; and so he felt the necessity of admitting the existence of relations—namely, the relation which the perceived ideas bear to the perceiving spirit, and of which we may have a notion, though not an idea. In this way Berkeley stumbled upon his distinction between idea and notion. In his introduction on abstract ideas he says that universality does not consist in the absolute positive nature or conception of anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified or represented by it. Here he recognizes that relation constitutes the universality of ideas. In the second edition of his "Principles" he was even led to recognize relation as a third kind of existence, the knowledge of which is given to us by a notion, as we have just seen above. Thus the natural course of his thought leads him to see that his idea implies something more than mere feeling, that cognition is more than momentary, that the concept or thought-element plays a prominent part in our knowledge of the world. But his adoption of the notion was an after-thought, and he never pushed it to its legitimate consequences; he never remodelled his earlier theory in the light of his new discovery. If Berkeley had recognized the full importance and significance of the thought-element at the beginning of his work, he might have understood, as Green says, by the *percipi* to which he called *esse* equivalent, definitely the *intelligi*. If he had known how much he really posited when he posited his world of ideas, he would have been saved from his inconsistencies and contradictions.

What, then, is the full significance of that thought element in cognition at which Berkeley only hinted? What is the true ground of our knowledge of self? In positing the world which we know, we posit something more than mere limited, independent, individual experiences. Each of our experiences has a meaning for us only in relation to the whole of

which it is a part. To know the part we must recognize its conformity to the whole. Each part implies the whole. Existence is not, as Berkeley would make it, a state which depends upon a single relation to an individual mind, but it is position in a rational, unified system. What Berkeley calls knowledge is, in fact, no knowledge at all, for the mere perception of single objects is nothing by itself; it becomes knowledge only by being referred to something not perceived—only by being subject to a universal law known by the understanding.

The function of such laws of the understanding is precisely what Berkeley overlooked in his earlier days. He felt the need of this thought-function in his later time, and, as we have seen, even caught a glimpse of its significance; but he never saw its full bearing upon his system. These laws of the understanding are what have been improperly termed "innate ideas." They are the necessary forms of thought which the mind imposes upon its sensations. They make knowledge possible, but are possessed by the mind only so far as they act upon the sensations. If not in operation, they are nothing. But given the data of sensation, and these forms of the understanding—these antecedent conditions of experience enable us to view the world as a rational whole, and to recognize the relations in which each single datum of experience stands to this rational whole of which it is an insignificant yet necessary part.

Having seen the true significance of the thought-element in cognition, we understand why Berkeley's neglect of it led to inconsistencies in his theory. His great step was made when he shook off the old notion which had been Locke's fundamental idea—namely, that the world first exists, and then is thought of. He was the first to discern the truth that the world really exists only so far as it is thought of. But, having advanced thus far upon the right road, he was blinded by the ambiguity of his term "idea," and, failing to recognize the true meaning of thought, stumbled, and lost his way. He makes idea mean a single, momentary experience, and thus confuses thought and sensation. He does not see that there is anything more in cognition than mere single, detached sensations. The permanent thought-element escapes him entirely for the time. As Green says, "Berkeley failed to distinguish the true proposition, 'there is nothing real apart from thought,' from this false one, its virtual contradictory, 'there is nothing other than feeling.'" He "merged both thing and idea in the indifference of simple feeling." If he had recognized that the idea was real by being thought, and not merely by being felt, he would not have held that knowledge consists only of individual, momentary ideas. If he had recognized the forms of thought as the antecedent conditions of experience, he would not have been obliged to posit a spirit for

the subsistence of his ideas; for then he would have seen that the spirit—the self-conscious subject—is the first and highest form of all experience. It is true that the world of ideas implies a thinking subject, but it is not true that a fleeting succession of ideas implies such a subject, which is substantially what Berkeley posits. If we recognize that relation constitutes the nature of ideas, we see that ideas are real in so far as they are related; that therefore the world is real because it exists in relation to a thinking subject. It is true that the thinking subject also implies the existence of the world; we are conscious of self only by envisaging something which is not self, to which the self stands in a necessary relation. It is by this synthetic principle of thought—the principle that each part of existence implies all other parts—that we come to know both world and ego as existing each for the other. Each is real because it stands in a necessary relation to the other. Berkeley overlooks this synthetic principle when he regards the world as a mere succession of separate sensations; but, as I have shown above, he tacitly recognizes it when he asserts that each of these single sensations implies a relation to a perceiving subject. But his neglect of this principle in the material world makes his recognition of it in the connection of world and mind useless, and drives him to an appeal to the testimony of consciousness in support of his theory of mind.

We are now in a position to see why the appeal to consciousness, as to its self-identity, is not valid, according to Berkeley's method. First, in regard to the identity of ideas. Berkeley makes coherence one test of the reality of ideas. But what right has he to assign coherence to a fleeting series of experiences? Coherence in sensations implies a permanent element in those sensations. Berkeley recognized this in so far as he saw that certain sensations come back in the same form whenever perceived, and consequently must have remained in existence in some other mind; but he failed to see that the sensations of one moment are not the same as those of a past moment, but only similar to them, and that what has been kept in existence is a law, by virtue of which similar sensations will again occur under similar conditions. Thus the permanent element in sensations is a law, and all coherence must depend upon such law. Mere succession of feelings cannot be called coherence, for coherence can be affirmed only of a system of relations. Thus it is with the permanence or identity of consciousness. A fleeting succession of single sensations can not imply, as we have seen, the existence of a thinking subject. Far less can they imply the existence of a permanent subject which is identical with itself over an interval of time. For such identity can be known only by a consciousness of the relations which the subject bears to

the rational whole of existence. Berkeley is driven to account for the permanence of ideas and spirits by the theory that God ordains such an order, or by the theory of continuous creation.

The neglect of the synthetic principle of thought is again evident in the weakness of Berkeley's argument for immortality. Since the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, and unextended, he says, it cannot be subject to the changes which affect the body, and must, therefore, be immortal. But, as Green points out, if being unextended constitutes immortality, then sounds and smells must be immortal. And, even though the fact that a series of sensations are not influenced by time may prove them endless, it does not follow from this that they possess an immortal soul, for the being of a soul needs something more for its constitution than a mere series of sensations; it needs the presence of a thinking subject which is identical with itself through time. Such a subject, as we have seen, the synthetic principle that one part of experience implies all other parts makes possible. Upon such a principle, and upon such a principle alone, can we rationally found a doctrine of immortality.

As Berkeley infers the existence of his own spirit from the existence of his ideas, so from the existence of his own spirit he infers the existence of others in the world around him. Since we have a notion of ourselves as spirits, and have ideas of bodies which move as if they were controlled by like spirits, we infer the existence of such spirits. This bald inference becomes an induction amounting to certainty when we consider that the beings which we call our fellow-men stand in the same relation to the universe as we ourselves stand, and that, if we do not conceive of them as embodying a self-conscious subject, we cannot conceive the whole of the universe to be a rational whole.

Berkeley solves the problem of extension by reducing the idea of extension to a series of single sensations. He thus gets rid of extension as a relation between ideas, or, in other words, gets rid of it entirely, for the only meaning of extension is a relation between ideas. If extension is equivalent only to a series of single sensations, there is no one moment at which it can be said to exist, for no two parts of a series can exist at the same time. If Berkeley had recognized the true function of the understanding, he would have seen that extension was not a sensation or a series of sensations, but such a relation between ideas as can be thought of apart from all sensation; and that, far from being the result of sensations, it is one of the antecedent conditions which make sensations possible, and form them into what we call knowledge. The infinite divisibility of extension, then, no longer troubles us. If extension were made up of a series of sensations, it could not be infinitely divided, because sensations cannot

be infinitely small; but, since it is not made up of a series of sensations—since it is a form of the mind—it is ideal, and therefore potentially capable of infinite divisibility, though not actually capable of such divisibility for our experience.

Berkeley posits a God still more arbitrarily than he posits finite spirits. We are conscious of our own active power, and we are also conscious of possessing ideas over which we have no control. The source of these must, then, be some other active power. All those ideas which are not the product of finite spirits must be the effect of an infinite spirit. The world—that is, the sum of those primary qualities of which Locke made matter the substance—must have a single, self-conscious subject as its cause. But, even if we are conscious of our own activity, what right have we to infer from this another activity of which we are not conscious? Since we cannot have an idea of this activity, we might turn against it Berkeley's own argument against the existence of matter, in which he says that it makes no difference to us whether such a matter exists or not, if we can have no idea of it. He would admit that we could have no idea of God, but he would not admit for an instant that his existence was a matter of indifference to us. He would say that, if we do not have an idea of God, we at least have a *notion* of him. Why, then, have we not a notion of matter? The fact is, that we do have a notion of matter, and, in denying this, Berkeley cut away the only logical props of the spiritualism that he sought to uphold. We have a notion of matter as "a basis of intelligible relations." Locke came nearer the truth than Berkeley in his doctrine of a deity when he said that the world was a system of relations, and as such must have a present and eternal subject of those relations. But Berkeley, having made his world a series of single sensations, of which the only logical subject would be a mere "feeling substance," finds himself driven, in his zeal for an intelligent deity, to posit arbitrarily an infinite activity as the cause of the world of his experience. Berkeley sees that such a being must be in relation to the world. Thus relation comes to him as an after-thought, and he says that we must have a *notion* of the deity. This strikes nearer the truth. If we start with relation, if we recognize that every idea—or, better, every thing—has its nature, not in sensation, but in relation, then we see that the universe is a rational whole, implying the power of an eternal consciousness; we see that an intelligible world can exist only in relation to a self-conscious subject, and that the condition of our knowledge of such a world is the presence of that subject in us. Indeed, what is a rational whole but a universal reason—that is, God himself? "What I mean by God is the reason which meets me on every side, and is the law of my being."

To sum up the preceding argument, Berkeley's idealism is briefly this: I posit ideas, by which I mean sensations. They compose the world of my experience. But I find that something more is necessary to knowledge; the world would be annihilated if sensations were all that existed, and so I infer spirits which feel the sensations. I am directly conscious of my own spirit, and therefore have a right to infer that other men are conscious of their spirits. But this is not quite all that the world contains. I have ideas which are certainly not the products of my own spirit, because I have no control over them; nor can they be the product of the other finite spirits whose existence I have inferred, because they are spirits like my own, which can no more control their ideas than I can control mine. These ideas must, then, be the product of the activity of an infinite spirit—a self-conscious subject of the universe. Since I have inferred the existence of spirit, I must have some knowledge of spirit, and yet I am certain that I cannot have any idea of it. I do not *feel* it. It must be, then, that I am conscious of the relation which spirit bears to my sensations, and so have a *notion* of this relation. This notion is something very different from the knowledge which is given to me by my sensations or ideas.

The more rational idealist says: I posit ideas, by which I mean not merely sensations, but those data of knowledge which have two sides—a side of thought and a side of feeling—both of which are equally essential to ideas, and can be known only with reference to the rational whole of which they form essential parts. These ideas constitute the world of my experience. They are real for me, because the only test of reality is the test of relation. But what have I posited in positing ideas as the data of my knowledge? Obviously, not merely their *feeling* side, which is the element that the outer world contributes to them, but also their *thought* side, which is the element that I contribute to them. I have thus posited my own existence, and that of all beings which are capable of having similar ideas. But this is not all that I have posited. I have said that the condition of my having ideas is the fact that I recognize them to be parts of a rational whole. I have thus posited a rational whole in which these ideas exist—that is, I have posited a God in whom we see all things. *Vision in God* is the logical result of my premises. "We apprehend anything in so far as it is a manifestation of one permanent reason—all that we mentally are we see in God."

Berkeley was the discoverer of a great truth. The fact that he saw but a part of the consequences of his conception only illustrates how little any one mind, however gifted, is permitted to contribute to the progress of human thought. The great problems of the world are too vast to find

completion within the narrow limits of a single intelligence. But, if Berkeley advanced only a short way upon the right road, he pointed out to his successors the way which they should follow, and at the present day mankind are still working under Bishop Berkeley's guidance.

CHARLES WESLEY BRADLEY.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS., June, 1880.

THE CONCORD SUMMER SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY.

JULY AND AUGUST, 1881.—This institution seems to have been still more successful the past season than the first: the attendance nearly doubled, and receipts from fees proportionate. A gift from Mrs. Elizabeth Thompson enabled the managers to build a hall for the better accommodation of the school. The following circular gives all details necessary to answer inquirers. We published last year's programme in this Journal for January, 1880.

THE CONCORD SUMMER SCHOOL will open for a third term on Monday, July 11, 1881, at 9 A. M., and will continue five weeks. The lectures in each week will be eleven; they will be given morning and evening, except Saturday evenings, on the six secular days (in the morning at 9 o'clock, and in the evening at 7.30), at the *Hillside Chapel*, near the Orchard House.

The terms will be \$3 for each of the five weeks, but each regular student will be required to pay at least \$10 for the term, which will permit him to attend during three weeks. The fees for all the courses will be \$15. Board may be obtained in the village at from \$6 to \$12 a week, so that students may estimate their *necessary* expenses for the whole term at \$50. Single tickets, at 50 cents each, will be issued for the convenience of visitors, and these may be bought at the shop of H. L. Whitcomb, in Concord, after July 1, 1881, in packages of *twelve* for \$4.50, of *six* for \$2.50, and of *three* for \$1.25. It is expected that the applications for course tickets will exceed the number which can be issued. Any one to whom this circular is sent can now engage tickets by making application, and sending with the application \$5 as a guaranty. For those who make this deposit, tickets will be reserved till the first day of July, 1881, and can then be obtained by payment of the balance due. Course tickets at \$15 will entitle the holders to reserved seats, and \$10 tickets will entitle to a choice of seats after the course ticket holders have been assigned seats.

All students should be registered on or before July 1, 1881, at the office of the Secretary in Concord. No preliminary examinations are required, and no limitation of age, sex, or residence in Concord will be prescribed; but it is recommended that persons under eighteen years should not present themselves as students, and that those who take all the courses should reside in the town during the term. The Concord Public Library, of 16,000 volumes, will be open every day for the use of residents. Students, coming and going daily during the term, may reach Concord from Boston by the Fitchburg Railroad, or the Middlesex Central; from Lowell, Andover, etc., by the Lowell and Framingham Railroad; from Southern Middlesex and Worcester Counties, by the same road. The Orchard House stands on the Lexington road, east of Concord village, ad-

joining the Wayside estate, formerly the residence of Mr. Hawthorne. For fuller information concerning the town and the school, we would refer applicants and visitors to the "Concord Guide-Book" of Mr. George B. Bartlett.

LECTURES AND SUBJECTS, 1881.

MR. A. BRONSON ALCOTT, Dean of the Faculty. Five Lectures on *The Philosophy of Life*.
Mr. Alcott will also deliver the Salutatory and Valedictory.

MR. E. C. STEDMAN will read a Poem at the opening session, July 11, 1881.
Professor W. T. HARRIS. Five Lectures on *Philosophical Distinctions*, and five on *Hegel's Philosophy*.

PROFESSOR HARRIS'S FIRST COURSE.—PHILOSOPHICAL DISTINCTIONS.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Philosophy Distinguished from Opinion or Fragmentary Observation; the Miraculous vs. the Mechanical Explanation of Things.</i> 2. <i>Nominalism of Locke and Hume; Pantheistic Realism of Hobbes, Spinoza, Comte, and Spencer vs. the Realism of Christianity.</i> 3. <i>The Influence of Nature upon the Human Mind. The Emancipation of the Soul from the Body.</i> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. <i>Sense-Impressions and Recollections vs. Memory and Reflection. Animal Cries and Gestures vs. Human Language.</i> 5. <i>The Metaphysical Categories used by Natural Science—Thing, Fact, Atom, Force, Law, Final Cause or Design, Correlation, Natural Selection, Reality, Potentiality and Actuality.</i> |
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PROFESSOR HARRIS'S SECOND COURSE.—HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Hegel's Doctrine of Psychology and Logic; his Dialectic Method and System.</i> 2. <i>Hegel's Doctrine of God and the World—Creator and Created.</i> 3. <i>Hegel's Distinction of Man from Nature. Two Kinds of Immortality, that of the Species and that of the Individual.</i> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. <i>Hegel's Doctrine of Providence in History. Asia vs. Europe as furnishing the contrast of Pantheism and Christianity.</i> 5. <i>Hegel's Theory of Fine Arts and Literature as reflecting the development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness.</i> |
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DR. H. K. JONES. Five Lectures on *The Platonic Philosophy*, and five on *Platonism in its Relation to Modern Civilization*.

FIRST COURSE.—THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>The Platonic Cosmology, Cosmogony, Physics, and Metaphysics.</i> 2. <i>Myth; The Gods of the Greek Mythology; The Ideas and Principles of their Worship, Divine Providence, Free Will, and Fate.</i> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. <i>Platonic Psychology; The Idea of Conscience; The Dæmon of Socrates.</i> 4. <i>The Eternity of the Soul, and its Preëxistence.</i> 5. <i>The Immortality of the Soul, and the Mortality of the Soul; Personality and Individuality; Metempsychosis.</i> |
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SECOND COURSE.—PLATONISM IN ITS RELATION TO MODERN CIVILIZATION.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>The Social Genesis; The Church and the State.</i> 2. <i>The Education and Discipline of Man; The Uses of the World we Live in.</i> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. <i>The Psychic Body and the Material Body of Man; The Christian Resurrection.</i> 4. <i>The Philosophy of Law.</i> 5. <i>The Philosophy of Prayer, and the "Prayer Gauge."</i> |
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MR. DENTON J. SNIDER. Five Lectures on *Greek Life and Literature*.

REV. J. S. KIDNEY, D. D. Three Lectures on *The Philosophic Groundwork of Ethics*.

MRS. JULIA WARD HOWE. Two Lectures: 1. *Philosophy in Europe and America*. 2. *The Results of Kant*.

MR. S. H. EMERY, JR. Two Lectures on *System in Philosophy*.

MISS ELIZABETH P. PEABODY. Two Lectures: 1. *Dr. Channing*; 2. *Margaret Fuller*.

REV. F. H. HEDGE, D. D. A Lecture on *Kant*.

MR. J. ELLIOT CABOT. A Paper on *The Basis of Kant's Doctrine of Synthetic Judgments*.

MRS. E. D. CHENEY. A Lecture on *The Relation of Poetry to Science*.

PRESIDENT NOAH PORTER. A Lecture on *Kant*.

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| <p>Mr. F. B. SANBORN. Three Lectures on <i>Literature and National Life</i>: 1. <i>Roman Literature</i>; 2. <i>English and German Literature</i>; 3. <i>American Literature and Life</i>.</p> <p>Mr. H. G. O. BLAKE. Readings from Thoreau.</p> <p>Mr. JOHN ALBEE. Two Lectures on <i>Faded Metaphors</i>.</p> <p>Rev. Dr. BARTOL. A Lecture on <i>The Transcendent Faculty in Man</i>.</p> | <p>Dr. E. MULFORD. A Lecture on <i>The Philosophy of the State</i>.</p> <p>Professor GEORGE S. MORRIS. A Lecture on <i>Kant</i>.</p> <p>Professor J. W. MEARS. A Lecture on <i>Kant</i>.</p> <p>Professor JOHN WATSON. A Lecture on <i>The Critical Philosophy in its Relation to Realism and Sensationalism</i>.</p> |
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PROGRAMME OF LECTURES.

JULY, 1881.

- 11th, 9 A. M. Mr. Alcott (Address).
 10 A. M. Mr. Stedman (Poem).
 7.30 P. M. Professor Harris.
- 12th, 9 A. M. Mrs. Cheney.
 7.30 P. M. Professor Harris.
- 13th, 9 A. M. Dr. Jones.
 7.30 P. M. Professor Harris.
- 14th, 9 A. M. Mr. Alcott.
 7.30 P. M. Miss Peabody.¹
- 15th, 9 A. M. Dr. Jones.
 7.30 P. M. Professor Harris.
- 16th, 9 A. M. Mrs. Howe.
- 18th, 9 A. M. Mr. S. H. Emery, Jr.
 7.30 P. M. Mr. Alcott.
- 19th, 9 A. M. Dr. Jones.
 7.30 P. M. Mr. Blake.
- 20th, 9 A. M. Dr. Jones.
 7.30 P. M. Mr. S. H. Emery, Jr.
- 21st, 9 A. M. Dr. Kidney.
 7.30 P. M. Mr. Albee.
- 22d, 9 A. M. Dr. Jones.
 7.30 P. M. Mr. Albee.
- 23d, 9 A. M. Dr. Bartol.
- 25th, 9 A. M. Mr. Snider.
 7.30 P. M. Professor Harris.
- 26th, 9 A. M. Dr. Kidney.
 7.30 P. M. Mr. Snider.
- 27th, 9 A. M. Dr. Jones.
 7.30 P. M. Professor Harris.
- 28th, 9 A. M. Mr. Alcott.

JULY, 1881.

- 28th, 7.30 P. M. Dr. Jones,
 29th, 9 A. M. Mr. Snider.
 7.30 P. M. Mr. Snider.
 30th, 9 A. M. Dr. Kidney.

AUGUST, 1881.

- 1st, 9 A. M. Dr. Jones.
 7.30 P. M. Mr. Snider.
- 2d, 9 A. M. Dr. Hedge.
 7.30 P. M. Mr. Cabot.¹
- 3d, 9 A. M. Professor Watson.
 7.30 P. M. Professor Harris.
- 4th, 9 A. M. Mr. Alcott.
 7.30 P. M. Dr. Mears.
- 5th, 9 A. M. Professor G. S. Morris.
 7.30 P. M. Mrs. Howe.
- 6th, 9 A. M. President Porter. The Kant Centennial.
- 8th, 9 A. M. Professor Harris.
 7.30 P. M. Mr. Sanborn.
- 9th, 9 A. M. Dr. E. Mulford.
 7.30 P. M. Mr. Sanborn.
- 10th, 9 A. M. Dr. Jones.
 7.30 P. M. Professor Harris.
- 11th, 9 A. M. Mr. Alcott.
 7.30 P. M. Mr. Sanborn.
- 12th, 9 A. M. Dr. Jones.
 7.30 P. M. Professor Harris.
- 13th, 9 A. M. Miss Peabody.¹
 11 A. M. Mr. Alcott.

A. BRONSON ALCOTT, *Dean*.
 S. H. EMERY, JR., *Director*.
 F. B. SANBORN, *Secretary*.

CONCORD, 1881.

BERKELEY, THE NEW MATERIALISM, AND THE DIMINUTION OF LIGHT BY DISTANCE.

Editor Journal of Speculative Philosophy:

MY DEAR SIR: Allow me to draw your attention to three subjects, one in Physics and two in Metaphysics, all of them now occupying very generally the thoughts of the scientific, both in Europe and America, but on

¹ These Lectures are announced conditionally, and may be withdrawn or changed.

which very few people think themselves competent to express an opinion, much less to controvert, in regular discussion, the discoveries or conclusions arrived at in connection with them. And I do not allow myself to be deterred from making this request by the mere circumstance of my own studies having been very intimately connected with two of these subjects, nor by the circumstance that I am entirely opposed to the conclusions of one of them. What we want on all of them is discussion. These three subjects are: (1) Berkeley's grand doctrine that there is no material *Ding an sich*—that all material substance consists wholly of phenomena—that the Hard and the Heavy, and the Large and the Solid, are all phenomenal—all things which exist by means of percipient nature. (2) The New Materialism, sometimes called the French Materialism, according to which nothing exists but thoughts, there being no thinker, no percipient, no immaterial *Ding an sich*, no distinct entity that knows or perceives any thing. (3) The fact, in Physics, that Light does not dilate, enlarge, or expand (as air does when heated), which has been until quite recently the universal conviction of the learned—that the solar system has consequently an equal amount of the solar light in every portion of it, even if, as was supposed, such expansion would not also have had this effect of equalizing this light throughout the system, and that all the planets are equally illuminated, notwithstanding the great difference in their distances from the sun; a strange discovery to have been made at so late a period of Physical Research.

I do not propose to do more here than offer the few remarks necessary to exhibit the position of each question, for the purpose of directing your attention to the great advantage which must result to scientific progress from a prompt and thorough discussion of them in your country. For what we want everywhere on these three subjects is, as I have said, discussion—not one-sided talk, not that sort of controversy in which the answer and the question have a year, or ten years, or twenty years between them—aye, in which very often half a century or a century intervenes between the objection and the reply. That sort of discussion is really none at all, as those well know who seek to avoid discussion and adopt this as the best mode of doing so. Even a quarterly discussion is very slow, and too slow. A quarterly journal, to be in this respect quite effective, would need to publish the letters which pass between controversialists during the intervals of its appearance; and I can believe that the facilities afforded by your great national journal of free and careful thought will tempt some vigorous controversialists into this arena. As for me, as far as I can be of use, I pledge myself to take whatever share of such discussions you desire.

BERKELEY.

With regard to the Berkeleyian proposition, it is true that this great discovery is received by all the deepest thinkers on your side of the Atlantic, as well as by almost all among us, and by most others who are at all versed in such subjects—to say nothing of the four celebrated Germans, whose doctrines, whether right or wrong, had confessedly no other starting point, no other ground to rest upon except that proposition. What we now want is its discussion and exposition for the millions everywhere. There has been, it seems, but the one exposition of the doctrine since Berkeley himself wrote, and this one has been made in Europe. Why has there been not even one made in America? In all countries those who *write* on this doctrine seem to be only those who can criticise it and find fault with it. Nor as yet, that I know of, has there been a single discussion of the subject in America—nothing but, as with us, some one writing from time to time, to say he cannot understand what Berkeley meant—that in the doctrine he sees nothing but nonsense; that he finds nothing *a priori* in it, as so many others profess to find—nay, that Berkeley himself came at last to recognize the unreasonableness (the non-understandableness) of his own doctrine, and in his old age renounced the whole thing. For such, as you probably are aware, is one of the modes in which Berkeley's proposition has been recently attacked in America as well as among us. This mode of attack, however, would seem to have originated here. The last and by far the ablest of Berkeley's critics on our side of the water, and perhaps even, you will admit, far abler and far more laborious in his researches and his efforts than any other that has ever written, is my distinguished friend, Professor Fraser, of Edinburgh. And he has declared not only that he could give no rational account of the doctrine, nor see any thing rational in it, but that Berkeley himself in his old age was in the same predicament, and has in his last work fallen back into the old theory of an occult matter—a material *Ding an sich*—that, in short, he renounced his own grand discovery.

To show further the position of this question, I will, with your permission, here cite from my Expository Edition of Berkeley the following summary of what has been done to explain and defend the doctrine:

“Besides the prize of £100 offered in 1847–8, to our opponents, then a considerable party, for any refutation upon which they should themselves be able to agree within a year, which refutation they declared themselves unable to produce; and a further prize of £500, offered in 1850, to one able writer among them—Mr. Jobert—on the sole condition that he should obtain the approbation of any three others of the party

for such arguments as he might be able to adduce; in which effort, however, he also was entirely unsuccessful, as he himself candidly states in the treatise called 'Pure Sounds,' expressly written on that occasion by himself; besides these two prizes, I published, at the same time as the first, a full explanation and defense of the doctrine in octavo, 'The Nature and Elements of the External World'—a work in which all objections were fully discussed, and the first work, as far as I can learn, that, since Berkeley's own writings, has ever been written to point out the reasonableness and a *priori* character of his doctrine. I gave another thorough exposition of the whole subject in 1870, in an article in the 'Contemporary Review' for the March of that year, with the title 'Hegel, and his Connection with British Thought,' and one unassociated with the name of Berkeley, under the title of 'The Thinking Substance in Man,' in our 'Anthropological Review' for May, 1865. I may also mention some discussions abroad; one, in the 'Halle'sche Zeitschrift,' with my able and lamented friend, Professor Ueberweg, left unfinished at his death; another with Baron Reichlin-Meldegg at the same time, in the same journal; another soon after in the 'Monatshefte,' of Berlin; and one in the Roman review, 'La Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane,' with that highly distinguished metaphysician and statesman, the Count Mamiani, who has done so much for the philosophy of Italy and the philosophical literature of the world; in all which writings and discussions will be found the fullest explanations of every difficulty supposable in the doctrine" (p. 50-1, Editor's Introduction).

THE NEW MATERIALISM.

The New Materialism is the subject adverted to, in a letter of mine, a few years ago in "The Journal of Speculative Philosophy," with the title, "Is Thought the Thinker?" The Old Materialism was to the effect that there is nothing existing but the *Ding an sich* of Kant, or what used to be understood as the bearer of material qualities, but which itself had no material qualities whatever; that everything which exists consists of that; and that this occult matter, when it is connected with a particular shape, secretes Thought—that Thought of all kinds is one of its secretions. Berkeley pointed out that this sort of matter does not exist at all; that immaterial matter is a physical impossibility, and that the matter with which we are acquainted—not which *has*, but which *consists wholly* of, material qualities—has the nature of Thought, *i. e.*, is Thought—is a Phenomenon. But, this being seen, it was at once seen that matter could not possibly perceive anything nor think; for a phenomenon could not think nor perceive anything. This was seen at once. There was, therefore, no alternative but to recognize an imma-

terial entity as the nature which perceives and thinks; this was the corollary of Berkeley's Proposition; for that such a nature exists we have upon even a higher evidence of consciousness than we have the fact that the things themselves which are perceived, exist. And this nature which perceives—this immaterial entity—is what we call "Spirit." Professor Ferrier fully recognized the truth of Berkeley's proposition, and also the truth of its natural corollary; but he held that the Percipient and the thing perceived—the Thought and the Thinker—were so essentially united that they constituted in every case but one thing. He does not, however, appear to have denied the distinct reality of the two elements in this union, although he has left it very difficult to see how, according to him, they could be separated. Hegel had previously, and from reasoning somewhat similar, arrived at the same union as Ferrier, not, however, regarding it, like Ferrier, as a union of two distinct elements, but as only one element, one nature, and this he called indiscriminately the Percipient, or thing perceived—the Ego or its thoughts, frequently repeating that they were one and the same thing: *Das Denken ist das Ich*. M. Renouvier, in France, and simultaneously but quite independently Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, in England, take up this theory of nature where Hegel left it, and, making in it but a verbal alteration, tell us that Thought is not the Thinker, that Thought is a phenomenon, and a phenomenon does not think; but that, nevertheless, Thought is the whole of nature—the whole of what exists; that, if we examine with a little care, we shall find there is no thinker wanted, and no trace in nature of a thinker or perceiver. According to these writers, then, without any equivocation, all is Thought—*i. e.*, all is of the same essence as Matter—is, in short, matter; nothing exists but the material substance. This is the New Materialism; the only difference between it and the Old being that those who held the Old held that *their* material substance could think and perceive things and be conscious, whereas those who hold the New Materialism tell us that *their* matter does not think or perceive anything, and is not conscious; and, moreover, that nothing can think or perceive, and that there is nothing conscious. If the propounders of this New Materialism could be induced to explain themselves, and thought their doctrine could bear a little manipulation, a full discussion of it could not fail to be attended with much interest and with great advantage to the removal of metaphysical confusions; for its living propounders are men of no ordinary talent. Until they do so, however, it can only seem very unreasonable to suppose that there can be perceptions without a nature that perceives, or thoughts without a nature that can think. I may add that Shadworth Hodgson is one of our ablest writers upon metaphysical

subjects. His admirable work on "Time and Space" is well known, which was followed by the "Theory of Practice," in two volumes; and in 1878 the "Philosophy of Reflection" appeared, which contains his exposition of this New Materialism, also in two volumes.

THE DIMINUTION OF LIGHT BY DISTANCE.

The third subject of which I now write to you is wholly unconnected with metaphysics. It is in every sense of the term a physical subject; but needs discussion as much as the other two to bring it thoroughly before the minds of those who are not habitually engaged in such inquiries. Until quite recently it has been the common idea of the learned and unlearned alike, that the solar system is most unequally illuminated; that Neptune's light from the sun is *nine hundred* times less than ours; that portions still more remote from the sun than Neptune are almost in darkness, and that Mercury's light would so dazzle us that we should there be much in the same predicament as darkness would reduce us to—we should see nothing. Now, through a large amount of false theories and false reasoning, and the bigotry which too surely goes with these, it has been at length discovered that, on the contrary, every part of the system has the same degree of the solar light—that the most distant planets have as strong a light as those nearest to the sun, although the sun is the sole source of this light to all.

This equality of the solar light throughout the system is abundantly proved, for the unsophisticated mind, by the fact that outside the atmosphere of the planets there is no medium that can diminish light to any sensible degree at any distance from the sun. All the diminution of light by distance, with which we are acquainted, is effected in and by a medium depending entirely, as we experience, upon the length and density of the medium. But there is no medium perceptibly to diminish light between the planets and the sun. The medium in that space is *two hundred and fifty millions* of times—some say *millions* of millions of times—less dense and less obstructive of light—less absorbent—than the air we live in, and in which light is diminished so much at a very short distance from the source. This fact is proved by the immense velocity with which the planets move in that medium. So rare, in fact, is the medium between the planets and the sun that many astronomers have imagined there could be none. Such a diminution, then, as would result from that attenuation, could not be discernible by sight like ours within the limits of the system. This, which no scientific man disputes, is less known to the less scientific public; but even for them it can be attended with no difficulty.

Why, then, it will be asked, have scientific men so long taught that Neptune's light was only the nine hundredth part of that degree of the solar light which reaches our orbit ?

The answer is, that they have hitherto supposed all light proceeding from a single source to be diminished in *two* ways *at the same time*—by the medium and by the enlargement of the space to be illuminated. They admit that the sun's light, in passing through the system, is not to any perceptible degree diminished by the medium ; but until quite lately they held—and some still hold—that light is diminished when the space to be illuminated is enlarged ; and they professed to give the law for this diminution—a law founded upon the reversal or inversion of a geometrical law, and which is attended, as might be expected, with several extraordinary blunders of its own ; but it is unnecessary here to speak of the law ; it is enough that I should now speak only of the diminution itself for which this law was assigned.

It was held, *first*, that light is diminished when the illuminated space is enlarged, and, *secondly*, that this space was enlarged in proportion to its greater distance from the sun ; and certainly we can see that, if these two assertions were true, the sun's light would become immensely diminished in consequence of the vast extent of the solar system. The theory involved in the first of these two statements, and which was adopted without the least experiment, was, that light expands, enlarges itself, and becomes more and more dilated, in proportion as the space around it is enlarged ; that the quantity of light, therefore, given out by the sun, and which, in the comparatively small spheres of space near him, would be considerable, becomes very much attenuated and impoverished by the time it has spread throughout the whole system.

Now, the only two things which I need here point out are, that this Dilatation Theory for light can be shown, experimentally, to be a fiction ; and that, even if it were true, it would still leave the solar light perfectly equal throughout the system, for the illuminated area remains always the same. If light sought its own equilibrium, as this theory pretends, and expanded to the space it had to fill, there would be (and there would *have been* from the origin of things) as much of it in one part of the solar system as in another, day and night continually, without any modification in any part.

But the Dilatation Theory is a fiction, as is at once manifest from our most familiar experiences. “The light in a room, with folding doors in each of its four walls, is not diminished when the folding doors are successively opened into other rooms, in which other four rooms there was previously no light. There is in such a case no ‘diluting’ whatever,

no thinning out or spreading going on, with regard to the light of the first room. The large additional amount of light which, in Nature, we here see to be the *true* result from the enlargement of the space—the light now in the additional rooms—is supplied from the same single source, without any of this thinning or expanding; without withdrawing from the center room the smallest amount of its original illumination.” (Sol. Ill. of the Sol. Sys., p. 61.)

Although scientific men are now pretty generally convinced of the truth of the fact here pointed out, the teaching of so many ages has produced a large amount of misapprehension which, like all error, can best be removed by discussion, for which none are better qualified, on their side of the question, than those few professional men who still remain unconvinced, either in America or in Europe.

I may mention that, as in the case of my Berkeleian expositions, I, on this occasion also, offered a prize for the purpose of making it clear to the uninitiated that no one could disprove the facts I indicate. I offered a prize of fifty guineas, through my publishers, to professional men in all countries, for the best disproof of my facts, or best justification of their own theory, which any four or five of them could agree upon among themselves as sufficient, *I requiring no further arbitration*. It was open for one year; and, as in Berkeley’s case, here also my opponents, as I expected, were not able to send in a single essay.

Such are three questions now calling for discussion, and such the position in which each question stands.

I remain, my dear sir, faithfully yours,

COLLYNS SIMON.

RUGBY, ENGLAND.

PHILOSOPHEMES.

SELF-KNOWLEDGE.

Know first thyself, then all things see,
 God and thy fellow find in thee;
 Around, above, to thee is naught,
 Save as thou findest in thy thought.
 Deeper thy depth, sense more profound,
 Than heart or head avail to sound.

THE HEART.

Heart, my heart, whose pulse’s play
 Repeats each moment’s destiny,
 Dost all thy life’s terrestrial day
 Dial, on time, my past eternity.

THE ONE.

One is One in holy Three,
Unlapsed in Self's duplicity.

CHARITY.

Her tenements and estates
She letteth fair and free,
Taketh nor rents nor rates,
Asketh not usury ;
Earth, air, and fire, the sea,
She loveth to dispense,
Nor stints necessity,
Nor doleth Providence.

MANHOOD.

Success, success ! to thee, to thee,
As to a god, men bend the knee ;
The gold alone the gold can buy,
Manhood 's the sterling currency.

INNOCENCE.

Blest Pair ! all beautiful, unblamed,
Naked are they, chaste, unashamed,
No fruits forbidden them to taste,
Till shame despoils the sweet repast ;
Life's brimming cup, if once we spill,
Time's longest term shall not refill.

PRE-EXISTENCE.

Alas ! how little thought is spent
On our birth-song, preëminent ;
Fond recollections, vague and vast,
Glad tidings of our ancient past !
This did the blest Messiah teach,
And this his ministers must preach.

ATONEMENT.

Love loves to suffer, sacrifice ;
He suffers so, and stoops to rise,
His head upon his breast he bends,
And, resurrect, to heaven ascends.

DEATH.

O Death ! thou utterest deeper speech,
A tenderer, truer tone,
Than all our languages can reach,
Though all were voiced in one.

The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

Thy glance is deep, and far beyond
 All that our eyes can see,
 Assures to fairest hopes and fond
 Their immortality.

INFANCY.

Nurseling, underneath the sky,
 Finds itself a shapen I ;
 Feels itself, through all it sees,
 Loveliest of mysteries.
 Yet wondering why its real age
 So blotted is on time's strange page,
 And all life long with ceaseless fret
 Conning the puzzling alphabet.

HUMAN LIFE.

Pause and reflect ;—benignant Fate
 Wreathes not with flowers life's narrow gate,
 Rather her pleasant plots adorns
 With hedge-rows round of prickly thorns ;
 Hard were our lot, esteemed severe,
 Were it all smiles without one tear.

PARADISE.

Up, onward, and ever,
 Be thy brave endeavor,
 Yet know thou shalt not find
 Paradise, save in thy mind ;
 Forth from self thou canst not flee,
 Thou tak'st bale or bliss with thee.

THE TRINITY.

The Three he saw, the One adored,
 The Father, Son, Inspiring Word,
 Blest Three in One, while One in Three,
 In undivided unity.

CHRISTIANITY.

The gracious faith, our heart's felt need,
 Love's sovereign grace fused in our creed ;
 Its genial truths set forth in lovely guise,
 And read anew with newly christened eyes :
 What were Christ Jesus' life, and gospel sweet,
 If not in loving hearts he fixed his holy seat ?

HUNGER.

“Take this, my child,” the Father said—
“This globe I give thy mind for bread.”
Eager he seized the proffered store,
The bait devoured, then asked for more.

THE SPHINX.

Gaze not upon this Charmer's face
In an unguarded hour,
Lest, caught and clasped in dire embrace,
Thyself the Maid devour,
Unless thou straight apply the key
That opes her fearful mystery.

SINGLENESS.

When thou approachest to the one,
Self from thyself thou first must free,
Thy cloak duplicity cast clean aside,
And in the Being's Being be.

FACE AND SURFACE.

Pure mind is face,
Brute matter, surface all,
As souls, immersed in space,
Ideal rise, or idol fall.

ORGANIZATION.

Forth from the chaos dawns in sight
The globe's full form in orb'd light ;
Beam kindles beam, kind mirrors kind,
Nature's the eyeball of the mind ;
Its fleeting pageant tells for naught,
Till shaped in mind's creative thought.

LIFE.

Life omnipresent is,
All round about us lies,
To fashion forth itself
In thought and ecstasy,
In wonder and surprise ;
Each thing with life is fraught,
Matter precipitate of thought ;
Round the wide world thought ceaseless runs,
Its circuit suited to superior suns ;
From mote and mountain hastes to flee,
Darting at its infinity.

ADAM.

Man omnipresent is,
 All round himself he lies,
 Osiris spread abroad
 Upstaring in all eyes;
 Nature his globed thought,
 Without him she were naught;
 Cosmos from chaos were unspoken,
 And God bereft of visible token.

THE SEEMING.

The mind's sphere
 Is not here ;
 The ideal guest,
 With ceaseless quest,
 Pursues the best.
 The very better,
 Meanwhile her fetter,
 Her prescient desire,
 Higher and still higher,
 Is ever fleeing
 Past Seeming to Being ;
 Nor doth the sight content itself with seeing ;
 While forms emerge, they fast from sense are fleeing ;
 Things but appear, to vanish into Being.

A. BRONSON ALCOTT.

CONCORD, MASS.

DR. WILLIAM JAMES ON GREAT MEN AND GREAT THOUGHTS
 VERSUS ENVIRONMENT.

In the *Atlantic Monthly* for October, 1880, Dr. James contributed an article on the subject of the production of genius by the environment. Our readers are familiar with the clearness and cogency of this writer through his interesting articles in this Journal on "The Brute and the Human Intellects," "Mr. Spencer's Definition of Mind," "The Spatial Quale," etc., and with similar articles that he has published in M. Ribot's *Revue Philosophique*, and in "Mind" (the great English organ of psychology and philosophy). The article under present consideration in the *Atlantic* seems to us the best of all that has come from his pen. We copy two paragraphs from the article containing summary statements of his position:

"The evolutionary view of history, when it denies the vital importance of individual initiative, is, then, an utterly vague and unscientific conception, a lapse from modern scientific determinism into the most

ancient Oriental fatalism. The lesson of the analysis that we have made (even on the completely deterministic hypothesis with which we started) forms an appeal of the most stimulating sort to the energy of the individual. Even the dogged resistance of the reactionary conservative to changes which he cannot hope entirely to defeat, is justified, and shown to be effective. He retards the movement; deflects it a little by the concessions he extracts; gives it a resultant momentum, compounded of his inertia and his adversaries' speed; and keeps up, in short, a constant lateral pressure, which, to be sure, never heads it round about, but brings it up at last at a goal far to the right or left of that to which it would have drifted had he allowed it to drift alone."

"The plain truth is that the 'philosophy' of evolution (as distinguished from our special information about particular cases of change) is a metaphysic creed, and nothing else. It is a mood of contemplation, an emotional attitude, rather than a system of thought; a mood which is old as the world, and which no refutation of any one incarnation of it (such as the Spencerian philosophy) will dispel; the mood of fatalistic pantheism, with its intuition of the one and all, which was, and is, and ever shall be, and from whose womb each single thing proceeds. Far be it from us to speak slightly here of so hoary and mighty a style of looking on the world as this. What we at present call scientific discoveries had nothing to do with bringing it to birth, nor can one easily conceive that they should ever give it its quietus, no matter how logically incompatible with its spirit the ultimate phenomenal distinctions which science accumulates, should turn out to be. It can laugh at the phenomenal distinctions on which science is based, for it draws its vital breath from a region which—whether above or below—is at least altogether different from that in which science dwells. A critic, however, who cannot disprove the truth of the metaphysic creed, can at least raise his voice in protest against its disguising itself in 'scientific' plumes. I think that all who have had the patience to follow me thus far will agree that the Spencerian 'philosophy' of social and intellectual progress is an obsolete anachronism, reverting to a pre-Darwinian type of thought, just as the Spencerian philosophy of 'force,' effacing all the previous phenomenal distinctions between *vis viva*, potential energy, momentum, work, force, mass, etc., which physicists have with so much agony achieved, carries us back to a pre-Galilean age."

Dr. E. Gryzanowski (known to us by his able articles in the *North American Review*) has written from Leghorn a letter of recognition to the author, the following extracts from which we are permitted to use:

“Whatever I may have written seven or eight years ago, I have now the liveliest moral and intellectual interest in the triumph of that truth which is embodied in your thesis. I need not disown the passage quoted by you, but, if I were to write it again to-day, I should not leave it without the correction pointed out by you; that is to say, I should lay greater stress on the germ and its typical potentialities than on the soil and its purely nutrient capabilities. I not only agree with you on the subject, but I almost feel inclined to go a little farther than you, and to reinstate spontaneity in all the rights and honors it used to enjoy before the advent of materialism. I would, with you, say: There is a soil, or menstruum, of outward circumstances, which must be under the sway of known and knowable laws of causation. There are, imbedded in this soil (or immersed in this menstruum), the germs (or ferments) of typical individuation, which seem to be under the sway of unknown and mostly unknowable laws of cellular (not molecular) causation, and, I would add, the causal *prius* of these germs or ferments—*i. e.*, that which, though unknown itself, manifests itself as spontaneous differentiation, and which, *pro tanto*, negates causation and can modify it or bid it stop—this causal *prius* must belong to a third sphere, not of causation and necessity, nor of absolute arbitrariness, but of self-determination (*selbst Bestimmung*). God has been called the *causa sui*, the point where cause and effect coincide. But we need not go so far; what we want is the relation of cause and effect in the lower regions of finite and imperfect *selbst Bestimmung*, called human ethics. Here I maintain (inducting, not postulating it) that, if the reign of law is absolute in physico-chemical causation (so that effect can be calculated from cause, and cause inferred from effect), and if the reign of law begins to be, to say the least, ‘parliamentary’ in the world of organic evolution (which is a world of instincts and emotions), remaining absolute only in so far as the cell, though autonomous as *form*, is subject to the law as a piece of molecular matter—his Majesty becomes a mere citizen in the world of conscious volition, which would be a world of free-will or of freedom, if the willing agents did not continue to be animals, and, as animals, pieces of matter, so that necessity, contingency, and freedom must coexist in these complex beings.

“Or thus: If, in the inorganic world, we have the equation *causa = effectus*, so that cause and effect are mutually calculable, we have in the organic world the inequality *causa < effectus*; we see the whole effect, but only part of the cause, *viz.*, the physico-chemical part. To make here, too, the cause equal to the effect, we must add to it the physiological fictions called *soul, life, instinct, emotion*. And, thirdly, we have in the sphere of self-conscious volition nothing but apparent effects, the cause being evanescent, inconceivable, irrational. Both from the materialistic and from the rationalistic (or utilitarian) standpoint, these effects (when moral actions) appear foolish and insane. How can there be law and causation in morals? In the name of what logic or common sense must I practice self-denial, altruism, heroism, martyrdom, *Mitleid* [compassion] (which is *Leid* [pain] not pleasure), not to speak of honesty, frugality, and other devices of human torment and botheration? Was it ever easy to do one’s duty, and does not this world belong to the strong, the clever rogue, the surviving fittest, rather than to the guileless, kind, and honest man? That which avenges itself always, and for which there is no forgiveness on earth, is the error of calculation—the error of judgment, not the curmudgeon’s sins. If, then, we are told to be altruistic rather than egoistic, bad reckoners rather than *cœurs méchants*, if we are told, when wronged or insulted, not to chase, bite, scratch, or kill our enemy, but to forgive him (so that his action, which would be a cause of certain effects called revenge, shall be no cause at

all)—these commandments imply that we, as morally quasi-free agents, belong to a sphere in which the working of causation may be stopped by an autonomous force called 'will.'

"This world, as a mass of metals and gases, is an indifferent world, neither good nor bad. It became a bad world through the advent of organic life, where passion and revenge reign supreme, and none but the fittest survive. And it continues to be a bad world, even after the advent of man, who can choose between revenge and mercy, between good and evil. It continues to be a bad world, not because man always chooses the evil, but because, when choosing the good, he ceases to fit into this world, he ceases to be the fittest in the realm of causation, and causation destroys him, slowly or quickly, as the case may be.

"Free-will, as a moral agency, is and must be at war with causation, *i. e.*, must be able to act on principles which are not those of pure reason.

"What stands behind the will we do not know, but, if pressed for an answer, I should not consider myself defeated by accepting Mr. Spencer's deputy-god, or anything of that kind.

"Mr. Spencer, I dare say, admits the existence of such things as axioms of pure reason, drawn not from experience by induction, nor from principles by deduction, but *a priori*. The deniers of free-will are, consequently, in the same necessity of seeing in pure reason or in the '*a priori*' either a quality of matter or a 'deputy-god.' They all believe in pure reason; but, if pure reason has its *a priori*, why should not free-will have its *a priori* of intuitive axiomatic obligation?

"I confess I cannot get on in philosophy, or arrive at any comprehensive world view, without the assumption (inducted, not postulated) of such a third sphere of (conditioned) spontaneity. This mechanizing, mathematicizing, and calculating of every thing in the world, from the unseen heroisms of private life to railway accidents, and from the death of Jesus of Nazareth to the yearly number of mis-directed letters, is beginning to be tiresome and provoking. In Mr. Spencer's sociological world there is no room either for self consciousness, or for genius, or for morals. In it all action, whether in speech or motion, is reflex action, and the causes of obligation, in so far as this obligation transcends calculable utility, must be sought in folly inherited or acquired. I, therefore, cling to my belief in three worlds:

"1. The inorganic world: reign of law and necessity.

"2. The organic world: reign of law and necessity, *plus* dawn of spontaneity (in form of individual life, instincts, spontaneous variation).

"3. The human world: reign of law and necessity (in so far as man is a mass of matter), *plus* dawn of spontaneity (in so far as man is an animal), *plus* dawn of free volition (in so far as man *can* defy nature and causation, and *can* refuse to be guided by pure reason alone).

"Each of these spheres has its own evolution. The survival of the fittest remains true in all, but the standard of fitness changes, and, in the Christian religion, the lowly and the weak become the terror of the strong.

"People have tried hard to reconcile evolutionism with morality, the survival of the fittest with the institution of hospitals and almshouses, etc. But it is useless to try the impossible, and I rejoice, for it is this very irreconcilableness which will sooner or later free us from the incubus of materialism. The dilemma being either materialism without morality or morals with materialism relegated to its proper sphere, mankind will, I think, in the long-run pronounce in favor of the second horn, and if it does not (for there is no telling), it will go to the dogs, and below the dogs to molecules, and below the molecules to atoms and chaos."

THE CENTENNIAL OF KANT'S "KRITIK."

Professor Mears, of Hamilton College, has agitated the question of a formal celebration of the centennial of the publication of Kant's *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, as appears by the following circular. We are happy to add that his efforts have met with success. The 6th of July, 1881, at Saratoga, is fixed for the date of the meeting. We publish a full programme of the meeting in this number.

"DEAR SIR: I herewith inclose a copy of an article printed in the 'Penn Monthly' of December, 1880, to which I ask your attention. If the proposed celebration strikes you favorably, will you not signify your approval of it to the undersigned as early as possible? And if you are disposed personally to aid in the affair by being present and by reading a paper on some aspect of the subject, will you not communicate your intention at least by the 15th of April next?"

"The time and place of meeting remain to be fixed, but the early summer would doubtless be the best time, and the place would probably be somewhere in New England or New York State. Your own opinion on the subject is respectfully solicited.

"JOHN W. MEARS.

"Next year (1881) will complete the century since this remarkable production was given to the world. It made an epoch in the history of philosophy, not only in Germany, but all over the thinking world. It revealed and vindicated the inherent power of the mind, and the independent activity of thought to a degree and in a manner never before attempted. The thoroughness, depth, and logical character of the author's investigations may be said to have introduced the rigorous method of science into metaphysics, and delivered it forever from the reproach of vagueness and dogmatism. All the thinking of centuries preceding seemed, in contrast to the "Kritik," to be shallow and purblind. All the thinking that has followed it has been amenable to a higher standard of judgment, and must render a stricter account of its attitude toward those fundamental conditions of knowledge of which Kant has shown that thought cannot legitimately rid itself. No one dare attempt to construct a system of philosophy today without reference to the work accomplished by Kant. He cannot be passed by a flank movement; his lines extend across the whole field; his positions must be met and fairly captured, or incorporated into and harmonized with the new principles of the proposed new system.

"What this wonderful speculative reformer accomplished for the thinking of Germany can only be learned by a survey of the progress and development of German philosophy during the century. The whole of that mighty movement has been the direct outgrowth of the "Kritik." And in these last days, after speculation has wandered widely and wildly from the original path, the countrymen of Kant are coming back to the soberer and soldier principles of the "Kritik."

"The thinking of Scotland has been immensely widened through the influence of Kant. In the greatest representative of the Scottish school, Sir William Hamilton, the Kantian spirit and tendency struggle constantly with the older and simpler tendency derived from Reid. Almost every thing in Hamilton which is stirring and stimulating, which widens the view, which is disciplinary and tonic, which is fresh and original, may

be called Kantian, either in its source or in its spirit. His school, if we may speak of such, is Scoto-German, just as Kant himself by extraction was.

"Dr. McCosh, in one of his recent writings, has proposed to the new generation of thinkers, especially in America, the problem of discrimination between the good and the bad in Kant. That there has been not a little to condemn in Kant (especially the *proton pseudos* of the "Kritik," that the primary principles of knowledge may possibly be true only for human minds), the writer would unhesitatingly admit. But the honored President of Princeton College appears disposed to recognize extremely little of good in Kant, and, perhaps, would discourage any considerable awakening of interest in the study of the "Kritik" in our American colleges.

"For our part, we believe the general American mind has arrived at a stage of thought and has attained a capacity of speculation where it can profitably occupy itself with the problems of the "Kritik." Nor will any one doubt that the national mind needs to be pinned down to close thinking, not only upon such topics, but needs also to acquire that habit of close thinking on all topics which will be cultivated best of all by the study of the "Kritik." Using the experience of a whole century, chiefly that of Germany, as a test of the good and bad in Kant, our youth, with little peril to important principles, can enjoy the incomparable advantages of the study of this great author. I cannot doubt that the "Kritik" itself ought to form part of the curriculum of the higher classes in every college; they ought not to be put off with lectures, criticisms, or scanty abstracts, but the author himself, with all his difficulties and in his own way of stating and deducing his principles, should be put into their hands in a faithful translation.

"The object of this paper is to propose to all interested in the study of the higher problems of philosophy in this country a *celebration of the centennial of Kant's "Kritik"* some time in the year 1881. It is believed that there are enough so interested to secure success, if not to give *éclat*, to such an occasion, provided their attention can be turned to the subject. There are thinkers among us competent to handle every aspect of the critical philosophy which would demand attention. Their essays and discussions would give an impulse to higher philosophical studies, and would elevate the standard of instruction in those branches. The celebration would help to establish or diffuse more widely among us those fundamental and impregnable principles of the spiritual philosophy which are so powerfully assailed by the materialistic tendencies of our time. It would help to concentrate, crystallize, and organize an American school, or, if not that, a recognized American sentiment favorable to the cultivation of exact thinking in pure metaphysics, parallel to the demand for exact calculation and experiment in natural science, vindicating and demonstrating the logical priority and superior comprehension and depth of the former to the latter.

"Such a centennial celebration might be made an adjunct to some of those regular educational gatherings which are held every summer. Possibly it might come off at Concord, but the movement would gain immensely in dignity and efficiency if it could be carried on independently of every other interest.

"While the work of the celebration ought to be substantially the presentation of the Kantian barrier to all the loose and materialistic thinking of our time, it ought not to exclude the opposition to Kant on metaphysical grounds. It would indeed be essential to such an occasion that the defects and errors of the "Kritik," and the wrong tendencies and great evils which grew out of it, either by misconception or exaggeration, or as legitimate results, of Kant's own teachings, should be fully exhibited. The purpose of the celebration should not be the indiscriminate eulogy of the famous

thinker, but the attainment, as nearly as possible, of a just estimate of his work. Thus guarded, there is no good reason to fear a recurrence of the long train of evil consequences which followed the original acceptance of the Kantian philosophy in Germany. The age and time would not admit of such a glaring anachronism.

“ A few of the topics which might be profitably treated on such an occasion would be :

- “ 1. The higher problems of philosophy.
- “ 2. The utility of the study of Kant, its relations to the sensationalist and materialist schools of to-day.
- “ 3. Kant and rationalism: evils and defects of his teachings.
- “ 4. Kant and the Scottish schools. Is a return from Hamilton to Reid logically admissible?
- “ 5. Fortunes of Kant in Great Britain and America.
- “ 6. Revival of Kantian studies in Germany.
- “ 7. Is Realism the teaching of the “Kritik?”
- “ 8. Can the “Kritik” be fairly treated from the ground of Hegelianism?
- “ 9. The interdependence of empirical and of metaphysical knowledge. The harmonizing of divergent tendencies of thought.
- “ 10. The first and second editions of the “Kritik.”
- “ 11. Metaphysics as a science and metaphysics in the sciences.
- “ 12. Is a return from Hegel to Kant logically admissible?
- “ 13. Historical relations of the “Kritik,” before and after. Under this topic an immense field is opened, which it would be useless to attempt to cover.
- “ 14. A compendious statement of the main principles of the “Kritik,” in the nature of an introduction to the study of the work itself.

“ Many more suggestions might be added, as to topics to be discussed, as to the place of meeting, and as to the disposition of the valuable material which would then be accumulated. If published in a volume, it would not only form one of the best introductions to the study, but would be no unworthy monument to the hundredth anniversary of the appearance of the “Kritik.”

“ JOHN W. MEARS, D. D.,

“ “Albert Barnes” Department of Philosophy, Hamilton College, Clinton, N. Y.”

PROGRAMME OF THE CENTENNIAL OF KANT'S “KRITIK.”

It will be celebrated in the parlor of Temple Grove, in Saratoga, New York, on the 6th of July, 1881. The exercises, according to the following programme, will commence at nine o'clock A. M.:

I. The Lord's Prayer, Book of Common Prayer. II. Organization. III. Reading of Correspondence. IV. Opening Address, “Significance of the Centennial,” Professor John W. Mears, D. D., Hamilton College. V. “The Higher Problems of Philosophy, Introductory to the Study of the ‘Kritik,’” Professor George S. Morris, Johns Hopkins University. VI. “Can the ‘Kritik’ be fairly treated from the Ground of Hegelianism?” William T. Harris, LL. D., Editor of the “Journal of Speculative Philosophy.” VII. “Kant's Distinction between the Speculative and the Practical Reason,” President Bascom, Wisconsin University. VIII. “The Present Influence of Kant upon Philosophic Progress,” Professor Josiah Royce, University of California. IX. “The Antinomies in the Light of Modern Science,” Lester F. Ward, United States Geological Survey.

Papers are also expected from Messrs. Halstead and Burt, Fellows of Johns Hopkins

University, and others; while the presence and coöperation of President Porter, of Yale; President Anderson, of Rochester University; Professor North, of Hamilton College; Professor Torrey, of the University of Vermont; President Dodge, of Madison University; Mr. James M. Libbey, of the "Princeton Review;" Rev. Dr. Millard, of Syracuse; and many others, are confidently expected.

The New York State Teachers' Association, meeting in Saratoga, July 5th, 6th, and 7th, through their President, Professor Jerome Allen, of the State Normal School, Geneseo, offers to the recognized attendants upon the Kant Centennial the same privileges, "in all respects," as are enjoyed by themselves, in respect to railroad and steamboat fares and hotel accommodations. Your presence is cordially invited.

JOHN W. MEARS.

KANT'S "CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON."

The following article, which appeared in the *Boston Advertiser*, from the pen of Mr. Edwin D. Mead (whose translation of *Hegel on Jacob Boehme* for this Journal will be remembered), is so appropriate to the time, and so full of interesting information, that we reprint it entire:

It is just a hundred years since the appearance of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," the most revolutionizing work in the whole history of modern thought. The centennial is being observed with great devotion in the scientific world of Germany, and will be appropriately recognized everywhere. The Concord School of Philosophy announces a special Kant week, and the reviews will all be stimulated to active discussion of the great thinker's varied work and influence. The "Critique of Pure Reason" is, of course, Kant's *magnum opus*, but it is only one of the three constituent parts of his philosophical system. It is quite impossible to understand Kant's purpose and significance without reading the "Critique of Practical Reason" and the "Critique of Judgment," especially the former. In the *Kant-Cyklus*, arranged for the last Semester by the Philosophical Society of the University of Leipzig, in commemoration of the centennial, the thesis maintained by one of the essayists was that the principal aim of the "Critique of Pure Reason" was the establishment of a moral theology. This conception, not a new one, to be sure, is not without very much reason. The "Critique of Practical Reason" is the exposition of this moral theology, and the most important ethical work altogether which has appeared in modern time, or, perhaps, in any time. It is the positive portion of Kant's system and the foundation of the philosophy of Fichte. Yet it is only within a year or two that this great work has become accessible to the English reader, through Mr. Abbott's careful translation. The "Critique of Judgment" has never yet been translated, though it is understood that a competent scholar is engaged in the work, and we may hope presently to have a fairly complete English edition of Kant's greater works. There are translations of the "Prolegomena," of the "Metaphysics of Ethics," and of the "Religion of Reason"—good translations, for the most part, but students do not seem to be so well aware of this as they should be. As to Kant's other works, so little is generally known that the complete list of his writings, which follows, will, it is hoped, be read just now with interest by many. The writer does not know of any such list in English. Kant's intellectual activity extended to almost every province, and in politics, æsthetics, and the natural sci-

ences, as well as in ethics, religion, and metaphysics, he has written what will last forever. The dates of the publication of the various works are given for the convenience of those who may be interested in tracing the development of Kant's thought. Kant was born in 1724, and was consequently fifty-seven years old when the "Critique of Pure Reason" appeared. Of all the works which he published before 1781, that which probably attracts most attention to-day is the essay upon the "Theory of the Heavens," published in 1755, in which the nebular hypothesis was propounded and maintained forcibly and in detail. The theory of Laplace should be called the theory of Kant, and, indeed, is beginning to be called so by many scientific men. Of the other smaller works of Kant, none is more remarkable than that entitled "Eternal Peace," which was the first loud note of internationalism, and contains a distinct programme for the "federation of the world."

1747. Thoughts upon the true estimate of Working Forces, and a consideration of the arguments of Herr von Leibnitz and others in the mechanical controversy, with preliminary remarks upon the force of bodies generally.

1754. A consideration of the question, Whether the earth, in its revolution around its axis, has undergone any change?

1754. The question, Whether the earth grows old, physically considered?

1755. A General History of Nature and Theory of the Heavens, or an Inquiry into the Constitution and Mechanical Origin of the Universe, from the standpoint of the Newtonian Laws.

1755. Some brief remarks upon Fire

1755. A New Examination of the First Principles of Metaphysical Knowledge.

1756. Upon the Causes of the Earthquakes from which the western parts of Europe suffered toward the end of the preceding year.

1756. Descriptive Account of the most remarkable incidents in connection with the Earthquake which shook a large portion of the earth at the end of 1755.

1756. Supplementary remarks upon the recent Earthquakes.

1756. On the use of a Geometrical Metaphysics in Natural Science.

1756. New Observations, explanatory of the theory of the Winds.

1757. Outline of a proposed course of lectures in Physical Geography, with a brief appendix upon the question, Whether the reason why the west winds in this section are damp is that they have swept over a great stretch of sea?

1758. A New Theory of Motion and Rest, with a consideration of the effects of the theory upon the first principles of natural science.

1759. Some brief observations upon Optimism.

1760. Thoughts upon the untimely death of Herr Joh. Friede. von Funk, in a letter to the mother of the deceased.

1762. A Demonstration of the subtle deceptiveness of the four syllogistic forms.

1763. A Letter to Fräulein Charlotte von Knobloch upon Swedenborg.

1763. An Attempt to introduce the conception of Negative Quantities into Philosophy.

1763. The only possible ground for a Demonstration of the existence of God.

1764. Opinion concerning the adventurer, Jan Pawlikowicz Zdomozyskich Komarnicki.

1764. A Study of the Diseases of the Head.

1764. Observations upon the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime.

1764. An Inquiry into the soundness and clearness of the principles of Natural

Theology and Morals; in answer to a question proposed by the Berlin Royal Academy of Sciences in 1763.

1765. Programme of Lectures for the Winter Semester of 1765-66.

1766. Dreams of a Clairvoyant, illuminated by Dreams of Metaphysics.

1768. Upon the ground of distinguishing particular divisions in Space.

1770. Upon the Form and Principles of the world of Sense and the world of Thought.

1771. Review of Moscati's work upon the difference in the structure of Men and Animals.

1775. Upon the different Races of Men.

1776-78. Essays and Reviews upon Basedow's Philanthropin.

1781. CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.

1783. Prolegomena to every future Metaphysic which can possibly rise in the form of a science.

1783. A Review of Schulz's Attempt to establish an Ethical System for all men without distinction of Religion.

1784. Idea of a Universal History from a cosmopolitan standpoint.

1784. An answer to the question: What is *Aufklärung*?

1785. Reviews of Herder's Ideas upon the Philosophy of the History of Mankind.

1785. Upon Volcanoes in the Moon.

1785. Upon the injustice of Publishers' Piracies.

1785. A Scientific Principle of Classification for the Races of Men.

1785. First Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics.

1786. Conjectural Beginning of Human History.

1786. Review of Gottl. Hufeland's Inquiry into the Principles of Natural Law.

1786. What is it to fix one's latitude in thought (*sich in Denken orientiren*)?

1786. The Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science.

1786. Remarks upon Ludw. Heinr. Jakob's Criticism of Mendelssohn's *Morgenstunden*.

1788. Upon the employment of Teleological Principles in Philosophy.

1788-91. Seven short essays: Is the Fact of Thinking an Experience? Upon Miracles; Refutation of Problematical Idealism; On Special Providence; On Prayer; On the Momentum or Velocity of Bodies at the First Instant of Falling; On the Formal and Material Significance of Certain Words.

1788. Critique of Practical Reason.

1790. Critique of the Judgment.

1790. Upon a Discovery by which an already existing Critique of Pure Reason shall enable us to dispense with all new ones.

1790. Upon Fanaticism and the means of guarding against it.

1791. Upon the Miscarriage of all philosophical attempts in Theodicy.

1793. Religion within the limits of Reason.

1793. Upon the common saying: A thing may be good in Theory, but not in Practice.

1794. Something upon the influence of the Moon on the Weather.

1794. The End of all things.

1794. Upon Philosophy in general: an introduction to the Critique of Judgment.

1795. Eternal Peace: a philosophical scheme.

1796. Upon the Organ of the Soul: a letter to Sömmering.

1796. Upon a certain genteel Tone which has recently made itself apparent in Philosophy.

1796. Settlement of a Mathematical Controversy which rests upon a misunderstanding.

1796. The Announcement of the approaching Conclusion of a Treaty of Eternal Peace in Philosophy.

1797. The Metaphysics of Ethics. First Part: Metaphysical Principles of Law. Second Part: Metaphysical Principles of Morals.

1797. Upon an alleged right to Lie from motives of Humanity.

1798. Upon Book-making and Publishing: two Letters to Friedrich Nicolai.

1798. The Conflict of the Faculties. [This work contains the well-known essay upon the Power to overcome bodily affections and disorders by the pure exercise of the Will.]

1798. Anthropology, Pragmatically considered.

1800. Prefatory note to Laehmann's Examination of the Kantian Philosophy of Religion.

1800. Prefatory note to Mielcke's Lithuanian Dictionary.

1800. Logie: A Handbook for use with Lectures. Revised for publication, at the author's request, by Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche.

1802. Physical Geography. The author's MS., revised by Dr. Fr. Theod. Rink.

1803. On Pedagogy. Edited by Dr. Fr. Theod. Rink.

1804. Essay upon the question: What are the real advances which metaphysics has made in Germany since the times of Leibnitz and Wolf; a prize question proposed by the Berlin Royal Academy of Sciences in 1791. Edited by Dr. Fr. Theod. Rink.

The complete editions of Kant's works contain, in addition to the above, various public declarations of Kant, poetical tributes to deceased colleagues, collections of apothegms and interesting observations from his note-books, and portions of his correspondence with Lambert, Moses Mendelssohn, Marcus Herz, Reinhold, Jacobi, Fichte, Schiller, and others.

EDWIN D. MEAD.

BOSTON, MASS.

BAYARD TAYLOR'S INVOCATION OF GOETHE.

(A free translation of his "*An Goethe*," prefixed to his translation of Faust.)

Exalted soul, to spirit realms translated,
 Wherever thy bright dwelling-place may be—
 To higher being art thou new created,
 And singest there the fuller litany.
 From chosen striving—tasks divine thou'rt learning,
 From purest ether where thou breathest free,
 Oh, bend thee to the fav'able returning
 Of these last echoes of thy minstrelsy!

The wreath, dust-covered from the ancient Muses,
 In splendor new thy daring hand did bear—
 Thou solv'st the riddle of remotest ages,
 Through newer faith, intelligence more rare.

And when man's active, working thought, is bounded,
Canst claim a world-wide Fatherland and Home,
While thy disciples see in thee astounded,
Embodied now the century to come.

What thou hast sung, all joys and lamentations,
Life's contradictions ever mingled new,
The harp re-struck, whose thousand voic'd vibrations
Once Shakespeare woke, once Homer sounded too—
Dare I translate, in accents strangely sounding,
All that the many have essayed in vain?
Oh, let thy spirit, through my voice resounding,
Inspire my soul to imitate thy strain!

CAROLINE ELIOT LACKLAND.

ST. LOUIS, MO., *January*, 1881.

SOCIAL SCIENCE.

The Committee on Education of the American Social Science Association has issued the following circular, with a view to draw the interest of parents to the stadia of mental development in their infant children. The project originated in the mind of the zealous and active Secretary of the committee, Mrs. Talbot, who has already collected a great mass of interesting facts, from which we hope to present selections from time to time in this Journal:

We have been made familiar with the habits of plants and animals from the careful investigations which have from time to time been published—the intelligence of animals, even, coming in for a due share of attention. One author alone contributes a book of one thousand pages upon "Mind in the Lower Animals." Recently some educators in this country have been quietly thinking that to study the natural development of a single child is worth more than a Noah's Ark full of animals. Little has been done in this study, at least little has been recorded. It is certain that a great many mothers might contribute observations of their own children's life and development that might be at some future time invaluable to the psychologist. In this belief the Education Department of the American Social Science Association has issued the accompanying register, and asks the parents of very young children to interest themselves in the subject.

1. By recognizing the importance of the study of the youngest infants.
2. By observing the simplest manifestations of their life and movements.
3. By answering fully and carefully the questions asked in the register.
4. By a careful record of the signs of development during the coming year, each observation to be verified, if possible, by other members of the family.
5. By interesting their friends in the subject and forwarding the results to the secretary.
6. Above all, by *perseverance* and exactness in recording these observations

From the records of many thousand observers in the next few years it is believed that important facts will be gathered of great value to the educator and to the psychologist.

FIRST SERIES.

Register of Physical and Mental Development of (give the baby's full name).

Name and occupation of the father? Place and time of father's birth? of mother's birth? of baby's birth? Baby's weight at birth? at three months? at six months? at one year? Is baby strong and healthy, or otherwise? At what age did the baby exhibit consciousness, and in what manner? At what age did the baby smile? recognize its mother? notice its hand? follow a light with its eyes? hold up its head? sit alone on the floor? creep? stand by a chair? stand alone? walk alone? hold a plaything when put in its hand? reach out and take a plaything? appear to be right- or left-handed? notice pain, as the prick of a pin? show a like or dislike in taste? appear sensible to sound? notice the light of a window or turn toward it? fear the heat from stove or grate? speak, and what did it say? How many words could it say at one year? at eighteen months? at two years?

Will the mother have the kindness to carefully answer as many as possible of these questions and return this circular, before July 15, 1881, to

Mrs. EMILY TALBOT,

Secretary of the Education Department of the American Social Science Association,
66 Marlborough Street, Boston, Mass.

BOSTON, 1881.

PROGRAMME OF THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, AT SARATOGA
MEETING OF 1881.

The Papers invited and the General Order of Business for the Saratoga Meeting of 1881, so far as can now be announced, appear in the following list. The sessions will be held in Putnam Hall, and the head-quarters of the Association will be at the United States Hotel, as in former years:

I. THE GENERAL SESSION.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 5.—At 8 P. M., Opening Address of PRESIDENT WAYLAND, of New Haven. At 9.30 P. M., Reception of members and guests at the United States Hotel.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6.—At 9 A. M., Report of the GENERAL SECRETARY. At 9.30 A. M., Other Reports and Communications. At 8 P. M., a Paper by CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER, Esq., of Hartford, Conn., on *American Journalism*.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7.—At 8 P. M., an Address by HON. FRANCIS A. WALKER, Superintendent of the Census, on *Some Results of the Census of 1880*, followed by a Debate.

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 8.—At 8 P. M., an Address by GEORGE WILLIAM CURTIS, Esq., of New York, on *Civil Service Reform in America*, followed by a Debate.

II. DEPARTMENT MEETINGS.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6.—*Department of Education*.—At 10 A. M., Address by the Chairman of the Department, Prof. W. T. HARRIS, of Concord, Mass. At 11 A. M., a Report by the Secretary, Mrs. EMILY TALBOT, on the Work of the Department. At 11.30 A. M., a Paper by Senator BROWN, of Georgia, on the *Relation of the Federal Government to Common Schools*. At 12 M., a Paper by Gen. JOHN EATON, on the question

of *Education in the Southern States*, followed by a Debate. At 1 P. M., a Paper by Prof. G. S. HALL, of Cambridge, Mass., on *The Religious Training of Children*. At 4 P. M., a Debate on the *Education of the Deaf*, opened by Dr. EDWARD M. GALLAUDET, of Washington, D. C.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7.—*Department of Health*.—At 9.30 A. M., an Address by the Chairman of the Department, WALTER CHANNING, M. D., of Boston. At 10 A. M., a Paper on *House Drainage*, by EDWARD S. PHILBRICK, Esq., of Boston, followed by a Debate. At 11 A. M., a Paper on *The Success of Women as Physicians*, by Dr. EMILY POPE, of Boston. At 12 M., a Paper on *The Moral Treatment of Incipient Insanity*, by Dr. MARY PUTNAM JACOBI, of New York. At 1 P. M., a Report by the Secretary, E. W. CUSHING, M. D., of Boston.

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 8.—*Department of Jurisprudence*.—At 10 A. M., a Paper by Prof. W. C. ROBINSON, LL. D., of the Yale Law School, on the *Unification of our Jurisprudence*. At 11 A. M., a Debate on the *Temperance Question*: Hon. P. EMORY ALDRICH, of Worcester, Mass., will advocate *Prohibitory Legislation*; Rev. LEONARD W. BACON, of Norwich, Conn., will advocate a *License Law*; Hon. F. W. BIRD, of Walpole, Mass., will advocate *Unrestricted Traffic*. At 12.30 P. M., a Paper on *Divorce Legislation*, by Ex-President T. D. WOOLSEY, D. D., LL. D., of New Haven.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 9.—*Department of Social Economy*.—At 10 A. M., Address by the Chairman of the Department, Prof. W. B. ROGERS, of Boston. At 10.30 A. M., Reports from a Special Committee on *Homes for the People*, by ROBERT TREAT PAINE, Jr., Esq., of Boston, and others, followed by a Debate. At 12 M., Reports from a Special Committee on *Art in its Relation to the People*, followed by a Debate.

Other announcements will be made later, and some changes in the above order will doubtless be made.

The presence of the members of the Association is invited at the Eighth Annual Conference of Charities, to be held in Boston from the 25th to the 30th of July, 1881. Governor LONG, of Massachusetts, will preside at the opening of the Conference and several of the Governors of States are expected to be present, as well as delegates from a majority of the States and from Canada. The retiring President of the Conference (Mr. F. B. SANBORN) will give the annual Address on Monday, July 25, and one of the six Standing Committees will report on that day, and on each of the other days of the session. The forenoons will be given to these reports and to the debates following, the afternoons to visiting institutions of charity and correction in the vicinity of Boston, and the evenings to a session for papers and debates.

Members of Boards of Charities and Prison Commissions are *ex officio* members of the Conference, as well as the delegates appointed to represent States. All persons officially connected with public charitable, penal, or reformatory establishments, who attend in that capacity, are also members of the Conference; and all persons regularly delegated to represent private charitable organizations are admitted as members on presenting their credentials. All other persons interested in charitable work are invited to be present.

BOOK NOTICES.

Meditations on The Essence of Christianity. By R. Laird Collier, D. D. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1876. [Contents: (1) The Only God; (2) The Real Christ; (3) The Known Spirit; (4) The Right Religion; (5) The Sure Hell; (6) The True Heaven. [The introduction commences: "After reading Feuerbach's 'Essence of Christianity,' Buechner's 'Force and Matter,' and other books of like tendencies, I was led to look into my own heart to see if my faith in Christ and Christianity had been either destroyed or disturbed. I meant to make honest work of it. The *forms* in which I had held the 'Old Faith' had in many cases been modified, and in some wholly given up. But the 'things essential,' the 'things which remain,' became more real and more dear to me as I disencumbered them of their traditional and conventional phraseology, and consented to conform their outward expression with modern consciousness, and the original and permanent spirit of Christianity itself."]]

The Logic of Chance, an Essay on the Foundations and Provenance of the Theory of Probability, with especial reference to its Logical Bearings and its Application to Moral and Social Science. By John Venn, M. A., Fellow and Lecturer in the Moral Sciences, Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. Examiner in Logic and Moral Philosophy in the University of London. Second edition, re-written and greatly enlarged. London: Macmillan and Co. 1876.

[From the Preface: "Not only, to quote a common but often delusive assurance, will 'no knowledge of mathematics beyond the simple rules of Arithmetic' be required to understand these pages, but it is not intended that any such knowledge should be acquired by the process of reading them." Part I treats of the Physical Foundations of the Science of Probability (chh. I—IV); Part II, of the Logical Superstructure on the above Physical Foundations (chh. V—XIV); Part III, of the Various Applications of the Theory of Probability (chh. XV—XVIII). (Chapter XV treats of *Insurance and Gambling*.)]

Bacon versus Shakespeare: A plea for the Defendant. By Thomas D. King, Montreal, and Rouse's Point, New York: Lovell Printing and Publishing Co., 1875. [Page 14: "Bacon being Shakespeare is inconsistent with all precedent and all subsequent literary combinations. With the object of helping the reader to form a conclusion, I have put in parallel columns a list of authors and their works, and a list of poets and dramatists, in a sort of chronological order, to show at a glance that the poet's mind is of a different stamp or kind to that of the philosopher.

Ancient.

THALES, the father of Greek Philosophy.	HOMER, the father of poets.
Socrates and Plato.	Æschylus and Sophocles.
Archimedes and Aristotle.	Pindarus and Anacreon.
Pliny and Cicero.	Horace and Catullus.

Modern.

Roger Bacon, Experimental philosopher.	Geoffrey Chancer, Canterbury Tales.
Richard Hooker, Ecclesiastical polity.	Edmund Spenser, Faerie Queene.
Bacon (Lord Verulam), <i>Novum Organum</i> .	William Shakespeare, England's Dramatist.
Sir Kenelm Digby, Metaphysician.	Ben Jonson, Dramatist.
Ralph Cudworth, Intellectual system.	John Milton, Paradise Lost.
Thomas Hobbes, <i>The Leviathan</i> .	Samuel Butler, <i>Hudibras</i> .

Let any one read, even cursorily, the works of these philosophers, dramatists, and poets, and I feel certain he will come to the conclusion that Bacon never wrote the plays and poems of Shakespeare.”]

An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. By Jeremy Bentham, Esq., M. A., Bencher of Lincoln's Inn, and late of Queen's College, Oxford. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1876. [“The First Edition of this work was printed in the year 1780, and first published in 1789. The present edition is a careful reprint of ‘A New Edition, corrected by the Author,’ which was published in 1823.” *Publisher's note*, Page I: “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think; every effort we can make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire; but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The *principle of utility* recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and law. Systems which attempt to question it deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprices instead of reason, in darkness instead of light. . . . By utility is meant that property in any object whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness (all this in the present case comes to the same thing), or (what comes again to the same thing), to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered; if that party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community; if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual.”]

Emmanuel, ou La Discipline de l'Esprit. Discours philosophique par Jean Wallon. Paris. G. Charpentier, Éditeur. 1877. [*Contents* (translated): (1) Of truth in general; (2) Of man and his faculties, or the three temporal forms of the soul; (3) Of the True and of the understanding which is the totality of our ideas acquired or received; (4) Of the Good and of the Will, whose determinations are always present; (5) Of the Beautiful and of Love, which is the consciousness of anticipation of some future state; (6) Of the Soul and of Religion, whose object it is to restore daily the unity of our Being which we constantly destroy; To young men; The truth.]

Philosophische Schriften von Dr. Franz Hoffmann, ord. prof. an der Universitaet Wuertzburg, etc. Vierter Band. Erlangen, Verlag von Andreas Deichert, 1877. [Containing sixty-two short articles, mostly book notices, averaging about eight pages each, being reprints of the author's critiques of the philosophical literature appearing in the years 1861-1871.]

Theorie du Fatalisme (Essai de Philosophie Materialiste) par B. Conta, Professeur de droit civil à l'Université de Jassy. Bruxelles et Paris: Germer Baillière Libraire, 1877. [Contents (translated): (1) chapter I, physical and physiological phenomena; chapter II, social phenomena—historical and statistical facts; chapter III, psychological phenomena; (a) nature and seat of the soul, (b) teachings of physiology, (c) the author's hypotheses, (d) faculties of the soul, (e) dreams, (f) generalizations and résumé; chapter IV, practical value of the theory of fatalism. Page 12, (translated): "Statistics furnish us the most convincing proofs of the existence of fate in the domain of social phenomena." Page 23: "In the present state of the positive sciences, it can be proved that there exists in the universe—so far as we can know—no other substance than matter. On the one hand experience proves that there exists nothing in the world without properties. Properties of matter come under the generic designation of *force*. Hence there is no matter without force, and no force without matter. In virtue of its properties, matter changes continually, but not at a uniform rate of motion. It varies conformably to the law of *universal undulation* (the author's work, 'Theorie de l'ondulation universelle,' is referred to), and there arises a metamorphosis of matter which assumes an infinity of transitory forms in time and space."]

BOOKS RECEIVED.

The Scottish Philosophy, Biographical, Expository, Critical, from Hutcheson to Hamilton. By James McCosh, LL. D., D. D., President of the College of New Jersey, Princeton. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1875.

The Literary World. Boston, May 22, 1880. (Containing contributions in prose and verse on the occasion of Emerson's seventy-seventh birthday, thirty or more eminent literary persons taking part in this worthy undertaking.)

Gage's Mathematical Series: The Teacher's Hand-Book of Algebra; containing Methods, Solutions, and Exercises illustrating the Latest and Best Treatment of the Elements of Algebra. By J. A. McLellan, M. A., LL. D., High-School Inspector for Ontario. Toronto: W. J. Gage & Co. 1879.

The Ultimate Generalization: An Effort in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Charles P. Somerby. 1876.

Elements of Natural Philosophy: A Text-Book for High-Schools and Academies. By Elroy M. Avery, Ph. M., Principal of the East High School, Cleveland, Ohio. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1878.

The Public Library and the Common Schools: Three Papers on Educational Topics. By Charles F. Adams, Jr. (Containing: I. The Public Library and the Public Schools; II. Fiction in Public Libraries, and Educational Catalogues; III. The New Departure in the Common Schools of Quincy. Boston: Estes & Lauriat. 1879. Pp. 1-51.

Outlines of Etymology. By S. S. Haldeman, LL. D., M. N. A. S. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1877.

Love or Fame, and Other Poems. By Fannie Isabelle Sherrick. St. Louis: W. S. Bryan, Publisher. 1880.

Oddments of Andean Diplomacy, and Other Oddments, including a Proposition for a Double-Track Steel Railway from the Westerly Shores of Hudson Bay to the Midway Margin of the Strait of Magellan, etc. By Hinton Rowan Helper. St. Louis: W. S. Bryan, Publisher. 1879.

Shakespeare: A Biographic, Æsthetic Study. By George H. Calvert. Boston: Lee & Shepard, Publishers. 1879.

Art-Life, and Other Poems. By Benjamin Hathaway. (Second thousand, revised.) Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co. 1878.

The Child's Catechism of Common Things. By John D. Champlin, Jr., late Associate Editor of the "American Cyclopædia." New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1879.

Thirteen Papers in Support of Mr. Helder's Scheme for constructing a Longitudinal, Double-Track Steel Railway through North and Central and South America. St. Louis: Wm. S. Bryan, Publisher. 1880. Pp. 1-24.

Il Positivismo e il Razionalismo ossia Missione della Scienza in questo ultimo Decennio 1870-'80 per Sac. Antonio Maugeri M. O. (Prof. di Filosofia razionale in questa R. Università.) Catania: Tipografia Nazionale di A. Elia. 1880.

Alcohol in Health and Disease. By R. M. Bucke, M. D., Medical Superintendent of the Asylum for the Insane, London, Ontario. Price, 10 cents. London, Ontario: William Bryce. 1880. Pp. 1-28.

History of the Christian Religion to the Year Two Hundred. By Charles B. Waite, A. M. Chicago: C. V. Waite & Co. 1881.

Sein und Erkennen. Eine fundamental-philosophische Untersuchung von Dr. Jul. Bergmann (ord. Prof. Phil. an der Universität zu Marburg). Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn. 1880. Pp. 1-191.

The Centennial Outlook in Education: Address at the Nashville Teachers' Centennial, May 7, 1880. By Professor Edward S. Joynes, of the University of Tennessee. Pp. 1-8.

Address of Superintendent A. P. Marble, Worcester, Massachusetts. (Reprint from the "Pittsfield Sun" of June 9, 1880.) "Kearneyism in Education, or Public Schools and their Critics." Pp. 1-10.

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THOUGHTS ON THE BASIS OF AGNOSTICISM.

BY WILLIAM T. HARRIS.

The very numerous treatises on Ethics of the present time indicate the whereabouts of philosophical activity. The philosophical *common mind* (so to speak) stands where the mind of Kant stood more than one hundred years ago. It is the positive side of the "*Aufklärung*"—the clearing up of consciousness—first a negative movement of revolt from all tradition, all customary beliefs, all habitual modes of thought, all conformity to institutions—a cleansing of the mind from all that is imposed upon it from without. Next, the mind begins the positive movement of taking an inventory of its possessions, of its own inalienable matter and force, its inseparable ideas and principles. From these innate ideas and principles it proceeds to reconstruct its view of the world, and to find what there is in it that is demanded by man's nature. He asks for the nature of the first principle of the universe, his own origin and destiny, and the true form of the conduct of life.

The first question of all concerns the Conduct of Life: that is the most practical of all questions, and a matter of daily and hourly concern to each human being. The negative movement repudiates all that it finds *prescribed*—all prescription—hence all use and

wont, all moral customs. But these most essential relations to every-day life cannot be ignored. There is an external constraint here, in case of violation. Society, as organized into an institution of justice, will not permit the practical violation of its laws, no matter how much one's theoretic views are opposed to them. The moral basis of social and political organizations is felt and acknowledged by all, or by the vast majority. Hence "free thinkers," or emancipated spirits, must set themselves to account for the ethical world in which they live and must live. If ethics is left as something alien—something entirely artificial and imposed on the individual from without—his emancipation will be incomplete in essential particulars. His first business must be to find a ground for moral customs, habits, and conventionalities in his own nature.

This first effort at reconstructing the world of institutions produces ethical philosophies. We know with what wonderful depth and completeness Kant and Fichte have behaved in this field. But all labor in this direction arises from a desire to preserve the freedom of thought which the first protest had asserted. Hence even the utilitarian systems and the mechanical systems of morality are on the positive, or constructive, side of the *Aufklärung*. They concede morality as necessary and substantial, and endeavor to deduce it from the constitution of man. The immense development of empirical science in the past century has brought the common consciousness of educated people up to the contemplation of the problem: Are right and wrong mere conventional distinctions, or do they rest on the nature of man and the structure of the universe? If we arrive at "free thinking," what basis for morality have we then? Scarcely a thinker of the materialistic school but has deemed it necessary to explain the origin and importance of ethical ideas.

Universal and necessary ideas, if there are any, must all have the same explanation which is given to the moral ideas. If habitual association is the origin of all our universal and necessary ideas, including the moral ideas, and physiological conditions are the cause of habitual association, the authoritative power of such ideas is very much abated. For it is our negative conditions, the limitations incident to our finitude, that furnish the origin of these ideas. Sir William Hamilton had gone so far on this road as to

suggest that the idea of causality is due to a mental impotence. If physiological conditions are the basis of necessary ideas, it follows that these ideas are subjective, and neither universal nor necessary in any objective sense. They *may* be universal and necessary throughout the universe, but it by no means follows from the fact that we seem to see their universality and necessity. "How do we know but that somewhere in the universe there are," etc., etc., is the general form of agnosticism resulting from this first phase of explanation of our ideas.

At this point there is a chasm yawning between the objective universe, as it is conceived to exist in itself, and our knowledge of it. Moral ideas, and other seemingly universal and necessary ideas, must appear to us to represent the absolute nature of objectivity, the trend of the absolute purpose which animates the universe. But the consciousness of the *Aufklärung* perches itself outside of itself and its necessary ideas—outside of the universe even, and says: "To me it is not given to know things in themselves. What I know is subjective only. It may or may not have its correspondence in things in themselves. Were I differently constituted things would appear differently."

This physiological standpoint for psychology determines at once the character of the ontology. It was Victor Cousin who laid so much stress on the fact that the theory of psychology determined that of ontology. John Locke and Immanuel Kant both began their systems with an investigation of the faculty of cognition. So did Hobbes, so did David Hume.

Kant's theory of psychology is, after all, not so widely distinct from that of the physiologists of our day—at least in one important respect. He holds that our mental constitution (and it may be material or spiritual) furnishes the forms for all our knowing, and that all our knowing is subjective. For that reason, we are limited to our own subjective forms of the mind when we generalize. Of the objective constitution of the world we are, and always must be, ignorant.

It is true, says Kant, that we have certain postulates—moral principles and regulative ideas, which are *practically* objective for us; we must assume their universal validity. But in this the Kantian is little better than the physiological psychologist, who also admits the practical necessity of moral principles and logical

laws of thought, but explains them by habitual association, based on physical constitution. If our "constitution is the negative limit to our knowledge which confines us to a purely subjective field of cognition," it matters little whether it is physiological or spiritual. With the physiological view we feel certain that the soul perishes with the body, but with the Kantian view we find only that our supposed insight into the soul's immortal nature is illusory—a "paralogism of pure reason." After this discovery of the fallaciousness of our insight, we may believe in immortality, if we can: it is a postulate of our practical activity, and so forth. We have nothing but subjective ideas wherewith to discriminate between physiology and psychology, and we cannot say that Kant finds for us any sufficient refuge from materialism.

Nevertheless, Kant is so much more subtle and discriminative in his thinking than the other sceptical thinkers of modern times that he is unequalled as a discipline for the training of philosophical thinkers. He teaches us how to find exactly the essential objects and the crucial problems of *method*. He teaches us how to concentrate the rays of our mind into a focus on these essential questions. He shows us, by the way, the criticism of innumerable shallow views, and enables us to dispose of them. He furnishes us just the critical data with which to arrive at positive results.

Kant's standpoint is easily turned from a negative one, essentially agnostic and sceptical, into a thoroughly positive one furnishing a basis for a philosophy that is not merely dogmatic, though positive; and not sceptical, though critical; but an exhaustive, speculative view elevated above the realm of possible doubt or scepticism. His post is one on the utmost advance of scepticism—the turning point where it proves the *reductio ad absurdum* of scepticism, and renders insight into the objective and absolute nature of things.

This *reductio ad absurdum*—the self-refutation of scepticism or agnosticism—may be briefly given:

Self-Refutation of Kantian Agnosticism.

Thesis: We cannot know things-in-themselves.

Proof: Because all our knowledge is determined by certain general forms which are forms-of-the-mind—the general constitu-

tion or nature of the mind. Some of those forms are the ideas of Time and Space, which are forms of sense-perception; other forms are ideas of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Mode, which are forms of our reflection upon objects, or forms of generalization of experience. These forms are subjective—the mental coefficient in the product of knowledge. It is impossible to tell what the objective factor of knowledge is, or would be after this mental factor has been removed.

Antithesis: Our knowledge is not merely subjective, but extends to things-in-themselves.

Proof: Because our universal and necessary ideas are all of them seen to possess universality and necessity, for the reason that they are logical conditions of the existence of the world, and of its contents. They are seen to be necessary forms for all experience in the fact that they are the only forms in which objective existence is possible—and hence this necessity and universality arise wholly from the function they have as conditions of the existence of objective reality. Therefore, the universal and necessary ideas of the mind—Time, Space, Quality, Quantity, Relation, Mode, and all others—possess the characteristic of subject-objectivity—*i. e.*, of being equally conditions of thought and Being. That which makes them “universal and necessary” is their obvious character of *exhaustiveness*—they are not *some* attributes of objectivity, *accidental* to its being, but *essential* conditions of it, without which objectivity were impossible.

Resolution of the Antinomy.

I. The Thesis and Antithesis agree in acknowledging universal and necessary ideas. But the thesis affirms their subjectivity only, while the antithesis affirms both their subjectivity and objectivity.

The thesis as well as the antithesis recognizes universal and necessary ideas by this characteristic: they furnish an essential condition for objective existence; the latter would be impossible without them. But the thesis infers from this necessity their exclusive subjectivity, and forgets that its ground for their subjectivity is their essential objectivity.

III. The antithesis sees their subjective character, and does not forget their objectivity on which it is based. Hence it concludes

that they are universal—that is to say, both objective and subjective.

IV. Hence the antithesis is no part of an antinomy; the thesis disappears in the antithesis, and the latter becomes the concrete principle, expressing the whole truth.

Proof: Any assumed attitude of scepticism denies objectivity to ideas. In denying objective validity to ideas, it posits a limit to the subjective, and posits a field of objectivity over against the subjective. In thus assuming a judicial attitude in regard to the two provinces, the subjective and objective, it has assumed to transcend subjectivity and take for itself a universal point of view in order to give each province its just dues.

The critical philosophy posits a distinction between a sphere of cognition and a sphere of things in themselves. This distinction is a quality-distinction—a sphere in which *somewhat and other* mutually limit each other. But to make quality apply to the subjective and objective in this way is to subvert its own doctrines, which hold quality to be merely *subjective* and hence no principle that will apply to objectivity.

By no possibility can a philosophical doctrine assume a sceptical attitude in regard to the objectivity of ideas, without assuming for itself what it denies to ideas. It must make an objective application of ideas in order to prove their subjectivity and their non-objectivity.

Space and Time, if made purely subjective, do not lose their character of being the logical condition of the existence of all bodies and movements. Time and Space are the logical condition of the existence of the world, whether we choose to call them objective or subjective. Hence it becomes a play on words; we might as well say: "We can know only the subjective because all objective is subjective." The world is likewise subjective if Time and Space are subjective.

Quantity, quality, relation, and mode, if made purely subjective, do not lose their character, but only make all that partakes of their nature subjective.

Hence whatever is *Quantity*—one, many, or a totality—is subjective.

Whatever is *Quality*—*i. e.*, reality, negation, or limitation—is likewise subjective.

Whatever is Relation—*i. e.*, involves dependence or influence of any sort, whether of causality or of substance, or any other relation—is also subjective.

Whatever possesses Mode—whatever is either possible or impossible, existent or non-existent, contingent or necessary—is subjective.

Now a purely “objective” that possessed no mode—was neither existent nor possible—would be just the objective that is left for Kantian agnosticism; but this is not at all the unknown “thing-in-itself” meant by such agnosticism. They have not observed the fact that their inventory of what is subjective has exhausted the possibilities of Being and left no space or time or existence, or possibility for Things-in-themselves outside of the subjective. The very category of “objective” itself is a category of relation, and itself therefore a subjective distinction.

Physiological Agnosticism.

Again, supposing the sceptic or agnostic were to take the standpoint of physiological psychology and not the Kantian—still the self-refutation would be quite as real, although not so obvious. Kant has developed the elements of contradiction in scepticism to the last degree. This is the merit which gives to his works their great value as a propædeutic in philosophy, and furnishes so fruitful a germ for new systems of thought. The physiological psychology, on the other hand, is not critical, but naive and dogmatic. Instead of discriminating to endless extent the various categories of thought, it confuses them with utter unconcern. It thinks that quantity and quality are interchangeable; that no ideas are universal and necessary. It assumes, without critical examination, that thought is a determinate, a product, a particular kind of secretion—or at least a function—of the brain. Being thus determinate, it is *qualitative*, or has limits as regards an outlying sphere of reality. The view of the world and things is determined by the physical constitution of the organ of the mind. Were the body different the mental view would be different. If surrounding conditions, such as food, climate, hereditary descent, etc., vary, then mind varies. This is carried out to its ultimate consequences when one holds that our minds might be so constituted that we should regard $2 + 3$ as making 4, or $2 + 2$ as making 5.

But in all cases the criticism of the faculty of cognition is performed by that faculty itself. It is a self-measurement. In measuring there must be a scale or measuring-rod to which the object to be measured must be applied; and the scale must extend beyond that which is measured by it, or else the limits of the object will not be ascertained. But here the same faculty must serve in one capacity as the scale or standard, and in another capacity as the object measured by it. Hence whatever results are reached with regard to the object measured, the same results will be true of the faculty of cognition regarded as scale or measure. Hence the cognition will be unable to place itself side by side with something else and mark off its own limits. It is obliged to posit for itself whatever other it may regard as a limit. Hence it is always self-determined and not *qualitatively* determined at all. (A qualitative determination is one in which somewhat and its other mutually *limit* each other.) Any criticism that attempts to fix the limits of human cognition will meet this difficulty. *It will presuppose that it has before it as its object both itself as limited and the object which limits it.* The theory that mind is a function of brain, and limited by the structure of the brain, is formed by an intellect that knows not only the structure of brain, but the structure of an indefinite number of other bodies. Not only this, it knows the nature of those general conditions, space and time and movement, which are the logical conditions of all physical existence. Hence there are no limits to be found in the intellect that indicate any qualitative limits known to belong to brain.

In general, the position taken by agnosticism, that there is a possibility that necessary ideas do not apply to things in themselves, is itself a position taken as regards objective possibility or non-possibility; hence it is self-contradictory. Reduced to its lowest terms, it says: "Objective possibility is sufficiently known by the human mind to affirm of it its difference from any human knowledge of it."

THE UNIFICATION OF SCIENCE.

BY ALFRED ARNOLD.

“The Law of Relativities” implies a universal science. This law—that phenomena or things perceived are only the effects of methodical relations or interactions of other things—is an accepted scientific fact, evident in our experiences.

The following paper gives the final analysis of all Being; harmonizing, and bringing into the field of science, physics, metaphysics, and religion.

First Principles.

Principles and phenomena, jointly, constitute all Being—the inner and outer worlds—self, and not self. Principles are indestructible, inner and outer relativities; and Phenomena, or things perceived, are effects of their unstable relations. What we perceive as matter is a phenomenon; it exists only as an effect of unstable interactions or relations of inner and outer principles. It has no abstract existence, either in the outer or the inner world. Professor Huxley, in “Lay Sermons,” says: “Matter may be called a form of thought.” Dr. Tyndall, in “Virehow and Evolution,” says: “Matter is that mysterious something by which all has been accomplished.” Physicists, generally, accept the Boscovitch theory, that matter consists of immaterial atoms of force. These irrational, contradictory definitions result from considering matter as an abstract, indestructible substance. Mistaking unstable, phenomenal matter for indestructible physical principles leads to belief in personal annihilation. But, as that which appears as the material body results, like all physical phenomena, from the interaction of outer physical and inner conscious principles, we know that neither the phenomenal body nor the interacting physical principles *cause* consciousness; and, as neither the creation nor annihilation of these interacting physical and conscious principles is thinkable, we are forced to conclude that they are ever-existing; hence immortality of mind and body; so-called death being only a change in the conditions of the phenomenal body. Anni-

hilation and creation are only changing the adaptations of constant means to unstable phenomenal ends, so that, the creation of new ends being the inevitable annihilation of the old, all creatable things are destructible; only physical and mental means or principles always will and—though little of the past is remembered—always did exist; that either conscious or physical principles, or that *any* indestructible thing had a beginning is unthinkable; whatever can be done can be undone; to alternately do and undo phenomena is the Order of Nature, but the Principles of nature can be rationally thought of only as constant; without beginning or end.

The following deductions from Natural Science give the constituent parts of all Being and their general modes or methods—the Inexorable Order of Nature:

I.

Relativities, and their realized relations, constitute all being. The relativities are constant inner and outer principles, and their changing methodical relations or interactions result in states of consciousness or phenomena—definite, unstable, perceived, physical and mental being. (2) We know that a phenomenon results from a relation, because, like no other thing than a definite relation, its annihilation is the inevitable creation of another. And as only principles are potent and indestructible, they are, inevitably, the elementary relativities. (3) Methodical annihilations and creations of specific relations of principles—phenomena, or things that appear—constitute the order of nature. Appearances are not unlike the things that appear, because the appearance is the identical and only thing that appears. As this appearance, or thing that appears, results from the interaction of both inner and outer principles, previous to this interaction, not the thing, but only its cause existed. As the forms, motions, and forces of waves, which appear to us through physical sense, result from the interaction of inner and outer principles, they are only joint inner and outer existences; therefore undulating ether is an imaginary substance used to give a definite idea of the modes of outer principles whose realized relations with inner conscious principles are heat, light, color, etc. (4) Atoms, molecules, and molecular mo-

tions are only working hypotheses employed to fix a vivid, definite idea of principles, their combinations, relations, and methodically changing relations. (5) Science has resolved all matter to force, and force to potentiality; and, as we know that potentiality is only a relation of principles in the order of nature, we know that force is only a relation; its annihilation being the creation of the potential relation. (6) We know that phenomena are the realized relations of dynamical and conscious principles, because only modes of motion pass to and from the seat of consciousness.

II.

Consciousness inevitably implies personality—self—the Ego. Sensation, thought, emotion, memory, want, volition, power or effort to relieve, and relief are, as persistent principles, properties of self; and their unstable, methodical, realized relations with each other, and with other principles, are phenomena or experiences. (2) Harmonious relations are pleasurable, discordant relations are painful; therefore pleasurable relief from our several wants is proportionate to our knowledge of the essential principles, and of the essential methods of bringing them into the essential relations. Hence the value of knowledge, and our incentive to acquire it. (3) We cannot reasonably assume that any specific thing is unknowable, because only infinite knowledge can know the limits to future finite knowledge; only abstractions—nonentities—are impossible to knowledge. (4) Self and not self imply each other; they are joint existences. They consist of both principles and the relation of principles, and are, therefore, ever existing, remaining constant through the successive changes of their phenomena. But, as memory does not extend to our known personal identity of early childhood, our previous identity is of course forgotten; present memory comprises nothing before, and only an infinitesimal part of our momentary experience since, birth. Self, or personality, consists, either of ever-existing principles, or of only unstable phenomena subject to creation and annihilation—there is no middle ground. And it is absurd to assume that infant body and mind is not a new relation of previously existing personal, as well as physical, principles; assuming that personality results from only impersonal principles is

equivalent to assuming that it results from nothing, which is absurd.

III.

As states of consciousness—phenomena—result from physical and mental interaction or relations, mind and body are inevitably inseparable; and the study of Biology is only searching for the physical, sensiferous, and mental principles; the indestructible personality discerned only through our reasoning faculties. (2) We have the same evidence that our bodies, perceived in dreams, trances, etc., distant from the torpid body, are seats of consciousness or self, as that our wakeful bodies are—viz., they are, to self—materialized seats of conscious, personal identity; they are sensiferous, thinking, emotional bodies. Therefore, as these several bodies comprise the material, sensiferous, thinking, emotional principles—consciousness or self—it matters as little how long or short the duration of any specific body, as of any other unstable phenomenon; for each body being only a specific relation of physical and personal principles is, when destroyed, as inevitably followed by another as are the properties of matter when destroyed, or as the relation of a moving man on a chess-board is followed by another and different one. (3) As phenomena are relations of both personal and external principles, like phenomena are inevitable to like inner and outer relations, but unlike phenomena result when the inner relations differ, as in the color-blind, lunatics, clairvoyants, and dreamers, who perceive phenomena not perceived by others at the same time and place, and others perceive phenomena not perceived by them. The usual state of personal relations is called the normal state, and unusual states abnormal; all states are, of course, equally natural, and the most pleasurable state proportionate to pain, whether usual or unusual, is the most desirable state. (4) Sensiferous organs present only unstable, physical phenomena. The so-called indestructible elementary substances are unstable materialized relations, and their disappearance in chemical combinations is their total annihilation, and the creation of other specific relations, or wholly different material things. (5) Time and Space are principles or relativities, from whence the phenomena extension, form, limitation, motion, succession, etc., are derived.

IV.

Self and not self are, then, jointly Nature, as inseparable as God and the intelligence that Nature displays. God is in us, and we in him. "In him we live, and move, and have our being." As principles are only methodical designs, they are attributes of him. He is Universal Being—the ever-existing, omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent "I AM"—and all conscious beings are integrals. Our knowledge of him is infinitely greater than our knowledge of man, because we discern in man only an infinitesimal part of the intelligence we discern in Nature.

Creation and Annihilation.

Physical force and all other physical properties are subject to practical creation and annihilation. Physical force is static when it pertains to rest. It is created and annihilated by changing the space relations between the fulcrum and two ends of a lever. As the substance of the lever remains constant, the static force created is only the physical realization of a relation of principles pertaining to space—only the result of modes or methods—and we create it and annihilate it by methodically changing the space relations of these principles—*e. g.*, the static force of gravity is increased and diminished by less or greater distance.

Force is dynamical and effective when it pertains to motion. A body at rest on the surface of the earth is moving round the centre of the earth more than a thousand miles an hour; to stop this motion, the body must be moved in the opposite direction with a like velocity relative to its then position on the surface of the earth; so that both motion and rest are constant conditions of every mass and molecule of matter. They are two relations in space. The changing space relations between molecules or masses we call motion, and the unchanging relations we call rest; and the interchange of these relations we call force or energy. The body at rest on the surface of the earth had not, nor has it now, any mechanical force, but it was subject to a potential relation of principles pertaining to time and space, and changing that relation destroyed that potentiality, created force, destroyed that force, and created another and different potentiality in the oppo-

site direction. There is no conservation of physical energy. There is no more energy in a lifted than in an unlifted weight, in a bent than in an unbent bow, nor in motion than in rest. So-called potential energy is a specific, inert relation, which must be totally destroyed and another created to bring energy into existence.

The potentiality of a pound weight moving eight feet per second equals one foot-pound of power. Now change the relation of space to time, from 8:1 to 16:1, and it increases the potentiality fourfold. As the same constant pressure or force that gave the velocity of eight feet per second, or one foot-pound in one quarter of a second, applied through one foot of space, gives sixteen feet per second, or four foot-pounds in half a second, applied through four feet of space—all else but relations pertaining to time and space having remained constant—it follows that motion and dynamical force are only relations of principles pertaining to time and space, and we create and annihilate them by methodically changing the relations of these principles. The force that sinks an enemy's ship exists not in the powder and ball, but is a specific relation of dynamical principles pertaining to time and space, to which powder, ship, and ball are, as our analysis of motion showed, equally subjective; and this relation is created by methodical action of finite mind or will. Therefore, that mental effort which, *through whatever means*, changes the relations of these constant principles—as immaterial as the will to which they are subject—creates and annihilates physical force, motion, and rest, whether they relate to masses, as cannon-balls, or to the molecules of the brain. And as these methodical principles are intelligent designs in the Order of Nature, it follows that the elements of the Universe are only attributes of Supreme Mind, of which finite minds are integrals.

When the mind brings the proper dynamical principles into proper relations, and then, through the brain, nerves, muscles, hand, and cue, realizes the relations as physical sense, by moving hand, cue, and billiard-ball, each impact of cue, balls and cushions of the table, is a creation of a specific physical force, secondary to the will-force. The player, previous to each stroke, mentally brings the proper principles of dynamics into proper relations, thus originating a special law to govern the ball after it leaves the

cue, and then will-force, by giving proper motion to brain molecules, muscles and cue, executes this law through all its ramifications of secondary forces and motions in accordance with his original design. When the dynamical principles are brought into proper relations, the created forces are as truly realized to mental sense as they are to physical sense when, afterwards, physically expressed. The first is cognition, the second recognition. Though we are physically insensible to the will's action on the brain, we *are* sensible of its effect on the hand and cue, and tracing the physical force back, from the cue to the first impulse of the brain, inevitably traces the will force *to* that impulse.

Now imagine that physical force is indestructible, and that the force of each impact of the cue was communicated to it, from molecule to molecule, throughout all time and space, governed only by physical, which is mechanical law. Imagine that this mechanical force, in the form of chemical action, in the brain of these players evolved the thought that they would play this game of billiards one year thereafter, and at the end of that year evolved another thought that they would postpone the game another year. And then that this persistent force evolved the thoughts, wills, and physical actions of these players during these two years which resulted in the written history of England by one, and that of America by the other, and at the appointed time, to a moment; this indestructible force gave the molecules exact, proper directions and velocities, at each proper impact of the cue, and at the same time deluded the players into the belief that *they* and not *it* originated all this. Imagine all these experiences to have originated only in physical or mechanical law, and we comprehend the absurdity of that "scientific imagination" which "discerns in matter all the promise and potency of life."

As changing the relations of anything is—like moving a man on a chess-board—the annihilation of the old relation, and inevitable creation of another, so all so-called decompositions of matter are total annihilations of the old matter, and actual creations of the new. In the decomposition of water the relation of principles which constitute hydrogen and oxygen are brought into being only when those which constitute water are annihilated; metals are oxidized in water only by destroying water relations and creating others; if water were hydrogen and oxygen, it would be

combustible and explosive, because things exist only in their qualities; decomposing water with the poles of a battery distant from each other is a practical demonstration that water is not *combined* hydrogen and oxygen. Inertia exists not in rest, nor in constant velocity; but changing these relations to either accelerating or retarding motion creates it. Chemical discoveries of new kinds or qualities of matter result only from methodically changing the relations of chemical principles; hence the persistence of these discoveries. Experimental research is only searching for unknown methodical relations of principles essential to the existence of some specific physical thing. Matter, then, persists only as a constant succession of annihilations and creations; its persistence being the joint persistence of relativity and relation.

Pleasures and pains are realized relations of physical, mental, and moral principles, and knowledge of these principles enables us to create the former and destroy the latter—as fire, wisely employed, results in pleasure; but pain, caused by incendiary fires, is a specific relation of physics, vice, and folly, created by the incendiary.

Physical things, then, are brought into being by methodical mental power, whether it be the fiat of God in a physical universe, or of finite power in the vocal expression of thought, or the movement of a steamship—as when, in practical affairs, the principles of chemistry, mechanics, law, trade, morals, etc., are carefully considered and brought into proper relations by voluntary mental power, which then physically demonstrates, or realizes as physical sense, the desired relation. Not these constant principles alone, but the Supreme, or the finite designer and creator of their several essential relations, is the *cause* of definite physical being.

Evolution.

That the Order of Nature is inexorable and consists, in part, of the freedom and power of finite beings to create pleasurable and destroy painful relations, to the extent of their knowledge of its methods, and that its modes of progress is “survival of the fittest,” is evident. But that theory of evolution which wholly subjects mind to physical law is contradicted by science, and by every

willed action of its self-deluded believers. Man's physical power is proportionate, not to his muscle, but to his knowledge and wisdom. Suspend all will-power over matter for one minute in any great city, and no more would be heard of the evolution of intelligent automata. Human progress comes not from waiting, Micawber-like, for something to turn up or be evolved, but from the consciousness and execution of personal power to create pleasurable relations from omnipotent, constant principles.

The existence of will power over matter, being as evident as the existence of reason, can, no more than reason, be reasoned out of existence.

Supreme law, or the Order of Nature, is founded on justice; and human law, or the order of State, is intended to be so founded; not justice to an isolated person—no such person exists—but to the person as a part of the Universe, or as a part of the State. Most pleasure results from knowledge of, and obedience to, these laws; but each subject is free to disobey them through ignorance or through vice—which is ignorance of true policy—and suffering the penalty tends to his education and virtue. Thus, Supreme design or law makes progression—"survival of the fittest"—inevitable, and secures, without amendment, all the harmony and pleasure possible to individual freedom and finite knowledge, in every stage of progress. And, moreover, law, penalties, and freedom are essential to the existence of conscious beings—no suffering, no wants; no wants, no action; *no* action, no life. And life is possible only to freedom; to be *wholly* subjective is to be wholly passive, and to be *wholly* passive is death. Thus, by analyzing phenomena, we find absolute perfection in what otherwise appears like imperfection.

It needs no argument to show that Supreme Intelligence reigns in the order of nature, because all get intelligence from there, and none can suppose it comes from where it is not. And, furthermore, as intelligence implies personality, and personality emotional, sympathetic feeling; answer to prayer—sincere, ardent supplication for a harmless object, either uttered or expressed in thought—evidently accords with the Order of Nature. But, through unwisdom, few just and needful prayers are offered, and few are answered.

Two States of Personal Being.

Self occupies two alternate normal states of being—wakeful and sleeping states. The so-called abnormal states—sommambulism, clairvoyance, hallucination, and illusion—may be called semi-sleeping states.

The fact that some persons are, at the moment they wake, always conscious of dreaming, though the dream may escape memory the next moment, and that we often discern consciousness in others in partial or unrestful sleep, though they do not remember having dreamt, and that pleasant dreams make sleep no less refreshing and invigorating to both mind and body, and that somnambulists and clairvoyants retain self-consciousness, but retain no memory of it, makes it reasonable to conclude that consciousness and mental activity are constant in sleep, and in all other torpid, inoperative conditions of the material body.

That physical things perceived in dreams, including a new body distant from the torpid, sleeping body, are as real as those perceived when awake, is demonstrated so far by the real physical light seen by clairvoyants and somnambulists, and as all physical things are relations, all realized relations must be equally real and practical for the purposes to which they are adapted; the shadow is as real as that which casts it—in fact all being is real; the question Science puts to Nature is not *What is real?* but *What is?* The words unreal, unnatural, and supernatural have, in our present state of knowledge, no meaning whatever. The body realized in dreams is to self a vivid, materialized, sensiferous, thinking, emotional body, and the wakeful body is to self only this; all physical phenomena of either state are, to the person changing states, destroyed, and others, differently conditioned, appear in the other state. Both physical and mental sense being equally real in both states, it is absurd to assume that they are relations of real things in one state and of nothings in the other; from nothing, nothing proceeds; but physical phenomena proceed from inner and outer means then and there existing, and changing the existing means changes the phenomena. All means, modes, and methods are subjects for experimental research. As the organs of sense are inoperative in the sleeping, torpid body, mind in dreams is as dependent on the body distant from the torpid body, and on

other physical things then perceived, as it is on the torpid body, and things perceived when awake. Greater rapidity of thought, with less circulation of blood in the brain, is almost conclusive that self is not in the sleeping body, but is in the dreaming body distant from the sleeping body.

To explain these phenomena by the words "abnormal," "imagination," "delusion," "indigestion," etc., is only expressing ignorance of the principles in nature of which they are all the realized relations. And as our lives are nearly equally divided between these two states of being, and as changing states without interruption of consciousness suggests immortality of personal identity, mind and body, in their several states or conditions, should occupy the first place in scientific investigation. Religious Faith has done its work well, but advanced minds now want demonstrative proof of a future life more than they do any other new discovery.

Universal Science.

Rational pleasure being the sole object of knowledge, Science may be best defined as knowledge of specific methods of preventing and destroying specific pains and creating specific pleasures. It enables us to create pleasurable relations known to the ignorant only as "favorable circumstances," or "good luck," and to avoid or destroy painful relations, known as unfavorable circumstances, or "bad luck;" and as pleasures and pains are the realized relations of physical, mental, and moral principles subject to our wills, to the extent of our knowledge and wisdom, Science should include all, in one general method.

We know, then, from a rational analysis of our experiences, that physical and mental phenomena are unstable, realized relations of constant principles, and as these principles form the basis of universal being, they are the proper basis for a Universal Science broad enough to include self-respect, knowledge of God, profound, logical, religious sentiment, and evidences of immortality.

GOD IN HIS ETERNAL IDEA.

TRANSLATED FROM THE THIRD PART OF HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION" BY
F. LOUIS SOLDAN.

If God is thus contemplated in the element of thought, he is, so to say, before or outside of the creation of the world. Inasmuch as he is so in himself, he is the eternal idea which is not yet posited in its reality, and is, therefore, as yet, the abstract idea.

God in his eternal idea is in this form still in the abstract element of thinking, not in that of comprehension. This pure idea is what we have already become acquainted with in the preceding sections. It is the element of thought, the idea in its eternal Present as it is for free thought which has the fundamental determination of being unobscured light, of being identity with itself; it is an element which has not yet the attribute of alienation or otherness in it.

In this element there is :

1. A determination necessary, since thinking in general is different from thinking which comprehends [things as a whole]. The eternal idea, in and for itself in thought, is idea in its absolute truth. Religion has, therefore, a content, and the content is object; religion is the religion of man, and man, among other things, is thinking consciousness. The idea must consequently exist for thinking consciousness; man, however, is not merely this; in thinking alone he becomes truly man, for thinking alone the universal object exists, for it alone exists the essence of the object, and since in religion God is the object, he is essentially the object for thought. He is an object inasmuch as the spirit is consciousness, and he is for thinking, because it is God who is the object.

God cannot exist as God for the sensuous, reflecting consciousness—that is to say, not according to his eternally in and for itself existing essence; his phenomenality is something different; it exists for sensuous consciousness. If God existed in sensation only, man would not rank higher than the animal; he certainly exists for feeling also, but only in his phenomenality. Neither does he exist for the ratiocinative consciousness; reflection is, in-

deed, thinking, but it is also contingency for which the content may be ever so arbitrary, or limited. God may be such a content, or may not. Essentially he is for thought. This must be said when we start from the subjective, from man. But we reach the same conclusion if we begin with God. Spirit exists only as revealing itself, as distinguishing itself for the spirit for which it exists; this is the eternal idea, the thinking spirit, or spirit in the element of its freedom.

In this, God is self-revelation, because he is spirit; but he exists not yet as a phenomenon. It is, therefore, essential that God exists for the spirit.

Spirit [as object] is the [same as the] thinking spirit. In this pure thinking the relation is immediate, and there is no difference which could separate them; there is nothing between them; thinking is the pure unity with itself, where all that is dark, all that is obscure, disappears. (See note on p. 136.) This kind of thinking might be called pure intuition since it is the simple activity of thinking, in which there is not separation between subject and object; and, properly speaking, these two do not yet exist. This kind of thinking has no limitation; it is universal activity; its content is the universal itself; it is pure circulation, or pulsation within itself. It will, however, arrive also at:

2. Absolute diremption. How does this act of distinction take place? Thinking, in *actu*, is unlimited. The first distinction is, that the two sides which we have looked upon as the two modes of the principle are different according to their points of departure. The one side, subjective thinking, is the movement of thinking by which it rises from immediate, particular being, and elevates itself therein to the universal and infinite, as is the case in the first proofs of the existence of God. In so far as it has reached the universal, thinking is unlimited; its end is infinitely pure thinking, in which all the mists of finitude have disappeared. It then thinks God; all particularity has disappeared, and thus religion, the thinking of God, begins. The other side is the one which has the second point of departure, which starts from the universal, from the result of that first movement, from thinking, from the idea. The universal, on the other hand, is movement in itself, which consists in its power to distinguish itself in itself, and to contain this distinction in itself, but in such a way that it does not ob-

secure the universality. (See note on p. 136.) Universality here has a difference in itself, and proceeds in its entirety. This is the abstract content of thinking, and this abstract thinking is the result which has been arrived at.

Both sides oppose each other thus: Subjective thinking, the thinking of finite spirit, is a process as well, it is mediation in itself; but this process lies outside of it, behind it, and religion begins only when this thinking has arisen. It is thus in religion pure, motionless, abstract thinking. Concrete thinking, however, coincides with its object, for it is the thinking which begins with the universal, which distinguishes itself and goes on in union with this distinction; the concrete is the object for thinking as thinking. This thinking is, therefore, abstract thinking, and, in consequence, it is the finite; for the abstract is finite, but the concrete is the truth and the infinite object.

3. God is the spirit; in abstract determination he is determined as the universal spirit which particularizes itself; this is the absolute truth, and that religion is the true one which has this content.

The spirit is this process, it is movement and life; in other words, it can distinguish and determine itself, and the first determination is, that spirit exists as this universal idea itself. This universal contains the whole idea, but it only contains it [implicit]; it is idea only in itself.

In the judgment, there is the alien, which stands over against the universal, the particular; there is God, as that which is distinguished from himself, but he is so in such a way that this distinct thing is his whole idea in and for itself. Thus these two determinations are the same for each other; they are identity, they are one, and this distinction is not cancelled merely in itself, not merely for our knowing, but rather in such a manner that their identity is posited, and that these distinctions cancel themselves. It is implied in this distinction that the difference is posited as negatory, and thus each [distinct phase] is in the other as in itself. In this process lies the nature of spirit itself, or, expressed in the form of feeling, it is eternal love. The holy spirit is eternal love. If we say: God is love, it is a very sublime and true saying, but it would be meaningless to take it simply as a simple determination, without analyzing what love is.

Love is a distinction of two, who yet, for each other, are simply

not distinguished. The feeling and consciousness of this identity is love. Love is this being-outside-of-myself: I have my self-consciousness not in myself, but in another; yet it is another in which alone I am satisfied, and at peace with myself (and I exist solely because I have peace in myself; if I lack this peace I am the contradiction which disintegrates itself); this other or alien, while thus being outside of me, has its self-consciousness in myself alone, and the two are only this combined consciousness of this sundered being and of their identity. This perceiving, this feeling, this cognizing of unity, is love.

God is love, *i. e.*, he is this distinguishing, and [at the same time] the nugatoriness of this distinguishing, this playing with distinction without being in earnest with it, which is posited as being cancelled, *i. e.*, [he is] the eternal, simple idea.

This eternal idea has found expression in Christian religion in what has been called the holy Trinity—that is, God himself, the eternally triune God.

God exists here only for the thinking man, who quietly remains withdrawn within himself. The ancients called this enthusiasm. It is the purely theoretical contemplation, the highest repose of thinking, but it is at the same time the highest activity in grasping the pure idea of God and in becoming conscious of it. The mystery of the dogma of what God is, is here communicated to mankind; men believe in it, and are already blessed with the highest truth when they receive it in their image-conception only, or as a mental representation, even when they are not conscious of the necessity of this truth, and do not comprehend it. Truth is the disclosure of what spirit is in-and-for-itself; man is spirit himself, therefore truth exists for him, but truth as it comes to him at first does not have for him the form of freedom; it is something that is given to him, something which he has received, but which he can receive only because he is spirit. This truth, this idea, has been called the dogma of the Trinity—God is spirit, the activity of pure cognition, activity which is by itself. It was principally Aristotle who conceived God in the abstract determination of activity. The pure activity is a knowing (*Actus Purus*, in the time of the scholastics), but pure activity, in order to be posited as activity, must be posited in its phases (*Momenten*). In the process of knowing, an other, an alien which is known, is necessary, and when the knowing

cognizes it, the other becomes appropriated by it. In this process it is contained that God, who is eternally in-and-for-himself, begets himself eternally as his Son, and distinguishes himself from himself; it is the absolute [diremption as exhibited in the form of] judgment (*Urtheit*). What he thus distinguishes from himself does not have the form of otherness, of alien being, but the thing distinguished is immediately nothing but that from which it is distinguished. God is spirit; no dimness, nor tint, nor blending enters this pure light.¹ The relation of father and son has been taken from organic life, and is used as an image-concept only. This natural relation is only a simile, and therefore does not quite correspond to what it is intended to express. We say God begets eternally his son, God distinguishes himself from himself, and in these expressions God forms the starting point of our exposition. We say: He does this, and is in the posited other strictly by himself (the form of love), but we ought to know that God himself is this entire activity. God is the origin [the cause]; he does this, but he is in the same way the end, he is the totality; and, as totality, God is spirit. God as merely father is not yet the full truth. (The Jewish religion cognizes him thus, without the son); he is, on the contrary, beginning and end. He is his own presupposition, he makes himself such (this is only another form of the distinction), he is the eternal process. The statement that this is the truth, and the absolute truth, may, perhaps, appear to have the form of a

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—Hegel takes his similitudes here and elsewhere, at times with preference, from Goethe's peculiar work on the "Theory of Colors." Goethe considered Newton's theory erroneous, and believed that colors were produced by the joint action of two elementary principles—light and darkness—that is to say, by an admixture of the two. A small degree of darkness mingling with light, for instance, produced yellow; darkness with little light, blue. "To produce color, light and obscurity, darkness and brightness, or, if we wish to use a more general expression, light and non-light are necessary. Nearest to the light we have the color called yellow; another, nearest to darkness, we call blue. . . . These two primary colors, each by itself, may produce new colors, by their condensation or obscuration. . . . Colors are to be looked upon as half lights, or half shadows, and thus when mixed together they lose their special qualities and produce a shade of gray." ("Goethe's Theory of Colors," Introduction.) "Colors are the effect which colorless, transparent, and opaque bodies have on the light." (*Id.*, iv, 688.) "The dimness of the medium is often the necessary condition (*i. e.*, for light to produce the phenomenon of color"). (*Id.*, iv, 691.) "Every modified light may be looked upon as colored; indeed, we may call every light, in so far as it is seen, color. Colorless light, colorless surfaces, are, in a measure, abstractions." (*Id.*, iv, 690.)

postulate. But it is the task and whole content of philosophy to make it known as that which is true in and for itself. In philosophy it is shown that the whole content of nature and of spirit gravitates dialectically towards this centre as its absolute truth. It cannot be our object here to prove that the dogma, this still mystery, is the absolute truth, for this is done everywhere in philosophy. The following may be said in further explanation of these determinations :

A. When it is predicated of God what he is, the attributes are given first : this is God ; he is thus determined by predicates ; this is the manner in which the idea is grasped by the image-conception or mental representation, and by the understanding. Predicates are determinations, particularizations : goodness, omnipotence, etc.

These predicates are not, indeed, natural immediateness, but they have become current through reflection ; and thereby the determined content has become as immovably fixed as the natural content is, as which God has been represented in natural religion. The natural objects, like sun, sea, etc., *are* ; but the determinations of reflection are just as identical with themselves as natural immediateness.

The Orientals have the feeling that this is not the true way of expressing the nature of God, and say, therefore, that he is *πολύωνμος*, and that he cannot be exhausted by predicates ; for names, in this sense, are the same as predicates.

The true defect of this manner of determining God by predicates lies in the circumstance which gives rise to this infinite number of predicates, namely, that these predicates are particular determinations only, and that there are *many* such particular determinations given to a subject which is indeterminable and without differences in itself. Since they are particular determinations, and, since these particulars are considered according to their determinateness, since they are *thought*, they contain a contrast and contradiction ; and, in this view, the contradictions are not cancelled.

The same appears in the assertion that these predicates are to express the relation of God to the world ; the world is another thing than God. As particulars they are not adequate to his nature ; in this lies the other manner of regarding them, namely, as

relations of God to the world—as omnipresence, omniscience of God in the world.

They do not contain the true relation of God to himself, but his relation to something else—the world; thus they are limited, and fall into contradiction. We have the consciousness that God is not represented living and real, when so many particulars are enumerated in succession. Their contradiction is not truly cancelled by the abstraction of their determinateness, when the understanding demands that they should be taken only in *sensu eminentiori*. The true cancellation of the contradiction is contained in the idea, which is God's self-determination to be what is distinct from himself, but the idea is also the eternal cancellation of this distinction.

The distinction, if left in this condition, would be contradiction: if the distinction remained fixed, finiteness would be the result; the two elements are independent of, and yet in relation to, each other. It is not the nature of the idea to let this difference remain, but also to cancel it; God posits himself in this distinction, and likewise cancels it.

In asserting predicates of God which are particulars, we endeavor first to cancel this contradiction. This is an external activity; it is *our* reflection, and the circumstance that it is external, that it falls within us, implies that the contradictions cannot be cancelled. The [absolute] idea itself is the cancellation of this contradiction; its own content and determination is to posit this distinction and to cancel it absolutely, and in this lies the life and animation of the idea itself.

B. In the metaphysical proofs of the existence of God we see that mode of procedure which, starting from the idea, arrives at being, and we see that the idea is not only ideal, but that it *is*; that it has reality. In this standpoint, which we now occupy, originates the interest to pass from idea to being.

The divine idea is the pure idea, the idea without any limitation; the absolute idea involves this: that the idea determines itself, that it posits itself as what is distinct from itself. This is a phase (*moment*) of the divine idea itself, and, since the thinking, reflecting spirit has this content present and before itself, there lies in it the need of this transition and movement.

The logical element of the transition is contained in those so-

called proofs : it is intended to proceed, by means of the idea, from the idea and through the idea itself, to objectivity and being in the element of thinking. This process, which appears as a subjective need, is itself content, is one phase (*moment*) of the divine idea itself.

When we say God created a world, it is nothing but a transition from the idea to objectivity, but the world is here determined as something essentially other than God. It is the negation of God, and is external to him ; is without or outside of him, is godless. Since the world is determined as this other thing, we do not have before us the distinction as inhering in the idea itself, and remaining within the idea ; *i. e.*, being, objectivity, shall be shown to lie in the idea as activity, consequence, and as the self-determinating process of the idea.

It is demonstrated thereby that this content, in itself, is the same as the one which is a requirement in the form of the mentioned proof of the existence of God. God, in the absolute idea, or in the element of thinking, is this simply concrete universal ; *i. e.*, he posits himself as an alien or other thing, but does it in such a way that this other is immediately and directly posited as God himself, that the distinction is ideal only, that it is cancelled immediately, and that it does not attain the form of externality ; this is what is meant by saying that the distinction must be demonstrated by means of and in the idea.

It appears from logic that it is the nature of each determinate idea to cancel itself, to exist as its own contradiction, to become in this what is distinct from itself, and to posit itself as such distinction. Thus the idea itself is still marked with the one-sidedness and finitude of being something subjective, since the determinations of the idea, the differences are posited only as ideal, and not as actual differences. This is the idea which makes itself objective.

When we say God, we have expressed his abstraction only ; or, if we say God the father, the universal, we have expressed him only according to finitude. His infinity lies in this, that he cancels this form of abstract universality of immediateness, and by this the difference is posited. But he is also the cancellation of this difference. In this alone he becomes true reality, truth, infinity.

This idea is the speculative idea ; *i. e.*, the rational, since it is

thought, since it is the thinking of the rational. On the other hand, the non-speculative thinking, the thinking of the understanding, stops at the difference as a difference, and in the same way at the finite and the infinite. The quality of being absolute is ascribed to both [of the latter], and hence relation to each other, and thus unity [is predicated], and with it contradiction.

C. This speculative idea stands in contrast with the sensuous, and also with the understanding; it is, therefore, a secret for both—for sensuous contemplation and for the understanding. It is a *μυστήριον* for each; *i. e.*, in regard to the rational element in it. The nature of God is not a secret in the ordinary sense, and least so in the Christian religion, for there God has made himself known, has shown what he is, there he is revealed; but it is a secret for sensuous perception, for the image-conception, for the sensuous mode of contemplation, and for the understanding.

The sensuous has, on the whole, externality for its primal principle; it is being-outside-of-itself; differences are beside each other in space, after each other in time; time and space are the externality in which differences exist. The sensuous view and mode of contemplation is accustomed to have before itself such difference as is outside itself. The basis and presupposition of this view is, that the differences for themselves thus remain separated from each other.

That which is [contained] in the idea remains, therefore, a secret to this mode of contemplation, because the idea has quite another mode, relation and category, than sensuousness. The idea is this distinguishing which is at the same time no distinction, and which does not remain in this distinction. God views himself in that which is distinguished from him; in his other he is allied to himself only, is only in himself therein, is linked but to himself; in his other he sees himself.

This is quite contrary to the sensuous [view]. In the sensuous, one thing is here and another is there; each is looked upon as something independent; it is looked upon as not having such a nature as to have existence by having itself in another. In the sensuous, two things cannot be in one and the same place; they exclude each other.

In the idea these differences are not posited as excluding each other, but as existing in this connection or joining together only

of the one with the other. This is the true supersensuous and not the ordinary supersensuous, which is said to be *above*, for the latter is also sensuous; *i. e.*, it is disjoined, external, and contingent. Only because God is determined as spirit, externality is cancelled; and this is, therefore, a mystery for the senses.

In the same way this idea stands above the understanding, and is a secret for it. For it is the nature of understanding to remain in the categories of thinking, to cling to them and to look upon them as being simply outside of each other, separated from each other, as being opposed to each other, and as being fixed. The positive is not what the negative is; [nor is] effect, cause.

But it is just as true for the idea that these differences cancel each other. Because they are distinct things they remain finite, and it is in the nature of the understanding to remain in the finite; and even when looking at the infinite, understanding sees on one side the infinite and on the other the finite.

The true standpoint is, that the finite and the infinite which stands opposed to the finite, have no truth, are but transitions in themselves. This is, therefore, a secret for the power of sensuous representation and the understanding, and they rebel against the rationality of the idea. The opponents of the dogma of the Trinity are found among those only in whom the sensuous element or the understanding predominates.

Nor can the understanding grasp anything else—that is to say, the truth of anything else. Even animal life exists as idea, as the unity of idea, of soul and body. For the understanding each appears separated, but it is at the same time true that the difference is in a process of cancellation; living is nought but this perpetual process.

What is living *is*, it has impulses, wants, and with this distinction and difference in itself, they rise in it. Thus it bears a contradiction in it, and the understanding looks upon the differences with the idea that the contradiction cannot be cancelled, and that, when these differences are brought in relation to each other, there subsists nothing but the contradiction which cannot be cancelled.

This is correct enough; the contradiction cannot cease when these are insisted upon as perennial distinctions, but the reason of it is, that understanding stops at these differences. Whatever

is living has needs, and therefore is contradiction; but the gratification of these wants is the annulment of the contradiction.

In my desires, impulses, needs, I am self-distinguished within myself. But life means the annulment of the contradiction, or the gratification of the desire; it seeks to set it at rest, but in such a way that this contradiction may rise again. It is the alternate succession of distinction, contradiction, and the annulment of it.

These phases differ in regard to time; there is sequence; one occurs after the other, and therefore they are finite. But the understanding, in considering desire and gratification, does not even comprehend that in the affirmative [element], in self-consciousness, the negation of self-consciousness, the barrier, the want, exist at the same time, but that I, as self-consciousness, at once stretch forth my hand beyond this want.

This is the definite idea of the *μυστήριον*. Mystery is the name which we also use for the inconceivable or incomprehensible; that which is called incomprehensible is the idea itself, the speculative, the thinking of the rational; but it is by thinking that the distinction [or inward diversity of contents] stands out clearly and distinctly.

If we think an instinct or desire, it is but an analysis of what the instinct or desire is. Affirmation and, in it, negation, self-consciousness, gratification, and desire. To think it means to cognize the distinct element that lies in it. When the understanding approaches this, it says: This is a contradiction, and on this it insists; it adheres to it, quite contrary to the experience that life means nothing but the annulment of these distinctions.

When the instinct or desire is analyzed, the contradiction appears, and one might say: The desire is something incomprehensible. The nature of God is just as much incomprehensible. What is called incomprehensible is nothing but the idea itself, which contains this attribute in it: namely, that it distinguishes, and the understanding stops at this distinction.

Understanding says: This cannot be comprehended; for the principle of the understanding is the abstract identity with itself and not the concrete identity, where these differences are in one. God is the One, the being of beings for the understanding. This identity, which is empty and lacks distinction, is a delusive fabric of the understanding and of modern theology. God is spirit, that

which makes itself objective to itself and knows itself therein ; this is concrete identity ; and thus the idea is at the same time an essential phase (*moment*). But, according to the abstract idea, the one as well as the other are independent for themselves, and at the same time they are correlatives, and thus the contradiction is there.

And this they call the incomprehensible. The idea is the annulment of the contradiction ; understanding can never achieve the annulment of the contradiction, because it starts from its own presupposition, namely, that they are and remain simply independent of each other.

The saying that the divine idea is incomprehensible may be attributed in part to the fact that, since religion is the truth for all men, the content of the idea appears in sensuous form, or in the form of the understanding. It appears in sensuous form, and thus we have the expressions father and son, expressing a relation existing in the life of man, a designation taken from sensuous life.

Truth is revealed according to its content in religion, but this content exists also in the form of the idea of thinking, of the idea in speculative form. No matter how happy those forms are which faith possesses, as "son," "begotten son," etc., they are perverted at once when the understanding begins to meddle with them and to carry over into them its categories ; it can show contradictions therein to its full satisfaction whenever it pleases. Understanding has the power and the right to do this by its distinction of these forms from their reflection in itself. But it is God, the spirit, who himself cancels these contradictions. Spirit has not waited for the understanding to remove the determinations which contain the contradiction. It is the nature of spirit to remove them. But it is its nature at the same time to posit those determinations, to distinguish itself in itself, to produce this diremption.

There is another form which the action of the understanding takes. We say : "God in his eternal universality has for his nature that he distinguishes himself, determines himself, that he posits what is alien or other to himself, and then also that he cancels the difference so that, in it, he is in himself ; by this self-creation alone spirit *is*." But here understanding steps up and carries with it its categories of finitude, counts one, two, three, and thus mixes the unfortunate form of number with it. But number has nothing

to do with this; counting is here totally empty of thought and meaning, and thus, if this form is therefore carried over into the question, there is emptiness and absence of idea in it.

Reason can use all the categories of understanding, but it also annuls them; this is what it does in this instance; but this is a hardship for the understanding, for, because its categories are used, it believes itself to have gained a right in them; but they are misused when used as they are in the understanding, in saying: three are one. It is therefore very easy to point out contradictions in such ideas, distinctions which are antithetic in form, and the bare and empty understanding thinks that it is doing something great when it collects them. All that is concrete, all that is living, bears, as we have shown, this contradiction in itself; dead understanding alone is identical with itself. But, in the idea, the contradiction is annulled also, and only in this annulment the spiritual unity exists.

At a first glance it looks as if it were a matter of course, something natural and artless to count the phases or stages (*momente*) of the idea as three and one. And yet if, according to the nature of number which has thus been mixed up with it, every determination is fixed as one, and then three ones must be comprehended as only one one, it becomes, as it seems, the hardest, or, as it may be expressed, the most unreasonable demand. For the understanding conceived only of the absolute independence or self-dependence of the one and absolute separation and disintegration. Logical contemplation, on the contrary, shows the One to be dialectic in itself and not truly independent. It is only necessary to think of matter, which is the real one that offers resistance, but is heavy; *i. e.*, it shows the tendency not to be as one, but to cancel its self-dependent existence, its being for itself, and thus itself pronounces the latter something nugatory; of course, since it remains only matter, this most extreme externality, this remains only a tendency; matter is still the poorest, most external, and unspiritual mode of being; but gravitation, this cancellation of the one, constitutes the principle of matter.¹

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—The characteristic of matter is gravitation. Gravitation is the striving of matter toward the centre of gravity. The centre of gravity is a geometrical point. A point is immaterial. Thus matter has for its characteristic the tendency towards and dependency on the immaterial.

The one is, in the first place, quite abstract; these "ones" are still more deeply expressed in a spiritual way by being defined as persons. It is the nature of personality that it is based on freedom, on primal, deepest, innermost freedom; but it is at the same time the most abstract mode in which the freedom manifests itself in the subject when the latter knows: I am a person, I am for myself; that is simply a fixed and rigid principle.

The determination of these differences as each being one, or even as each being a person, this infinite form in which each phase (*moment*) is to be as a subject, seems to be an insurmountable obstacle to our complying with what the idea demands, namely, that these distinctions be considered as not distinguished, but as simply One, as the cancellation of this difference.

Two cannot be one; each person is something rigid, inflexible, independent; each is existence for itself. Logic shows the category of One that it is a poor category, that it is One quite abstract. As regards personality, the contradiction seems to be carried so far in it that it becomes incapable of any solution; but the solution lies, nevertheless, in this, that this threefold person is but One, and the fact that the personality is posited therewith as a vanishing phase (*moment*) only expresses that the antithesis must be taken, not as a contrast of lower order, but in the absolute sense; and just in this extreme it cancels itself. The nature and character of this person, or rather subject, is so constituted as to cancel its isolation and separation.

It is the nature of morality and love to give up one's particularity, one's particular personality, and to expand it into universality. The same is true in the family, in friendship, where this identity of one with the other exists. In doing what is right towards the other, I consider him identical with myself. In friendship and in love I give up my abstract personality and thereby gain it, namely, the concrete personality.

The truth of this personality is indeed this, that we gain it by merging it into the other. Such forms of the understanding prove themselves immediately in experience such as cancel themselves. The person retains his identity in love and in friendship; by love it has its subjectivity, which is its personality. If the personality is abstractly retained in religion, in this instance, the result is three Gods, and in this the infinite form, the absolute negativity,

is forgotten. If the personality is not severed or dissolved, the result is the Evil or the Bad, for the personality which does not surrender itself to, and disappear in, the divine idea, is the evil or bad principle. In the divine unity personality is posited as dissolved, and the negativity of the personality is only in the phenomenon distinguished from that by which it is cancelled.

The Trinity has been reduced to the relation of Father, Son, and Spirit; this is a childlike relation, a childlike, natural form. The understanding has no such category, no relation which can be compared with this in regard to fitness and adequacy, but it must be remembered that it is only an image, a simile; spirit does not clearly enter into this relation. Love would be a still better expression, but Spirit is the true one.

The abstract God, the father, is the universal, the eternal, comprehensive, total particularity. We stand on the basis of spirit; the universal here comprehends everything in itself; the other, the son, is the infinite particularity, the phenomenon; the third is the individuality or singularity as such; but the universal, as totality, is itself spirit, all Three are the Spirit. In the third, we say God is spirit, but the latter has also a presupposition; the third is also the first. This must be remembered as essential. For, when we say: God in himself, according to the idea, is the immediate, self-dirempting power which returns into itself, he is this only in so far as he is Negativity immediately related to itself—*i. e.*, absolute reflection in itself, which is in itself the determination of spirit. In wishing, therefore, to speak of God in his first determination according to his idea, and then to pass over to the other determinations, we find that we have already spoken of the third; the last is the first. If, in order to avoid this, or on account of the imperfection of the idea, we begin abstractly and speak of the first only according to its determination, we call it the universal; then that activity of creation, or of producing, is in itself a principle differing from the abstract-universal, and may appear, and appears, as a second principle, as manifestation or phenomenon (*Logos, Sophia*), and the first as the "Abyss." This is explained by the nature of the idea; it appears in every aim, in every animated principle. Life sustains itself. To sustain means to proceed to differentiation, to a struggle with particularity, to find one's self distinguished from inorganic nature. Life is a result only when it has created itself; it is a product

which, in the second place, continues producing, the product is life itself; *i. e.*, it is its own presupposition, it passes through its process, and nothing new arises; what is produced has existed from the beginning. It is the same with love and reciprocating love. Only because love exists, the beginning, and all further activity is the confirmation by which it is at the same time produced and sustained; but the product had existence already; it is a confirmation, and there is no result which was not there at the beginning. In the same way the spirit presupposes itself. It is the beginning.

The difference through which the divine life passes is not an external one, but must be determined as an internal one, in such a way that the first, the father, must be conceived in the same way as the last. Thus, the process is nothing but a play of self-sustenance, the assurance of self-existence.

This determination is important because it forms the criterion by which many conceptions of God may be judged, and their deficiencies judged and recognized; the latter are frequently caused by the fact that this determination is overlooked or misunderstood.

We consider the idea as it is determined in pure thinking, and by pure thinking. This idea constitutes all truth, and is the one truth, and every particular that is to be comprehended as truth must be comprehended in the form of this idea.

Nature and the finite spirit are the product of God, and there is, therefore, rationality in them; that a thing is made by God implies that it contains truth, divine truth in general—*i. e.*, the determination of this idea in general.

The form of this idea is found in God as spirit only; if the divine idea is given in forms of finitude, it is not posited as it is in and for itself (only in spirit is it so posited), but exists there in a finite manner; the world, however, is something created by God, and, therefore, the divine idea always constitutes the basis of what it is. To cognize something means to cognize and determine it according to the form of this idea in general.

In former religions we have traces of this trinity as the true determination, especially in the Indian religion. Consciousness there became aware of this threefold existence; it conceived that the One could not remain One; that it is not as it truly should be, that the One is not the truth, but must be comprehended as this

movement, as this differentiation, in general, and as relation. The *Trimurti* is the rudest form of this determination.

But in this the third element is not the spirit, and true conciliation, but birth and departure—coming, going, and changing—which latter category is the union of differences, but a very subordinate union.

The idea is perfect, not as an immediate phenomenon, but becomes so when the spirit has finally come to dwell in its church; when spirit—the immediate, believing spirit—has risen to thinking. It is of interest to consider the fermentations of this idea, and to learn to recognize its principle in the wonderful phenomena which present themselves. The defining of God as the Triune has, at last, been quite discontinued in philosophy, and theology is no more in earnest with it. In both it has been attempted to belittle the Christian religion by saying that this determination is older than the Christian religion, and was taken from this or that source. Such historical matter, in the first place, has no force at all in regard to inner truth. In the second place, it is quite clear that those older nations and individuals did not know, themselves, what they possessed in this idea; they did not cognize that it contained the absolute consciousness of truth; hence they possessed it only [as one] among other predicates or determinations, as something other than it is. It is a very material point whether such a determination is the first absolute determination which forms the basis of all the rest, or whether it is one form which occurs among many, as, for instance, Brahma, who is One, but is not even the object of a form of worship. In the religion of beauty and external utility, this form, indeed, could appear last of all; the limiting, self-returning [symmetrical] means cannot be found in this, in this multitude and particularization. Still this religion is not without traces of such unity. Aristotle, in speaking of the Pythagorean numbers, the triad, says: “We do not believe ourselves to have invoked the gods, if we have not called them thrice.” The abstract basis of this idea is found in the Pythagoreans and in Plato, but the determinations have remained quite in this abstraction, partly in the abstraction of one, two, three. In Plato it is found in a little more concrete form: the nature of the one and of the other, that which is different in itself, *ἑαυτερον*, and the third, which is the union of the two.

It is found here not in the same form as with the Indians, but as pure abstraction. These are determinations or categories of thinking, better than numbers, better than the category of number, but still they are, as yet, quite abstract categories of thinking.

Especially at the time of Christ, and for several centuries later, a philosophical conception is seen to arise which is based on the conception of the relation of the Trinity. It is found either in philosophical systems like that of Philo, who had familiarized himself by study with the Pythagorean and Platonian philosophy, and, later, in the Alexandrians, or it is found in the intermingling of the Christian religion with such philosophical conceptions; this intermingling tendency constitutes the greater part of the heretical doctrines, more especially of the Gnostic. On the whole, in these attempts at grasping the idea of the triune we see that occidental reality, under the influence of oriental ideality, is converted into a world of thought. These are, of course, nothing but first attempts, which do not proceed beyond obscure and fantastic image-concepts. We see in it, however, the struggling of the spirit after freedom, and this demands recognition.

A countless multitude of forms may be pointed out in this. The first is the Father, the *Ἦν*, which is designated as the Abyss, the Depth—*i. e.*, as the void, inconceivable, incomprehensible, as that which is beyond all conception.

It must be conceded that the void, the indefinite, is the inconceivable; it is the negative of the idea, and it is its determination to be this negative, since it is but a one-sided abstraction, and constitutes but a phase of the idea. The One for itself is not yet the idea, not yet the truth.

If the first is determined as being universal only, and then the determinations are given only as a kind of sequel to the universal, or the *Ἦν*, the latter becomes indeed an incomprehensible thing, for it is without content. What is conceivable is concrete, and is conceivable only when determined as a phase (*moment*). Here, then, is the deficiency, that the first itself is not grasped as a totality.

Another representation is that the first is the *βυθός*, the abyss, the depth, that it is the *αἰών*, the Eternal One, whose abode is in unspeakable height, who is exalted above all contact with finite things, out of whom nothing has been developed, who is the prin-

inciple and Father of all existence, *propator*; who is Father only in mediation, *πρωάρχη*, before the beginning. This representation determines this revealing of this abyss, of this hidden God, as self-contemplation, as reflection in itself and concrete determination in general; self-contemplation is creative, it is the creation of the only Begotten Son; the eternal becomes comprehensible therein, since this depends on determination and realization.

The second (which is the being other or alien, the determination or the activity of determining in general) is defined in the most universal determination as *λόγος*, which means the rationally determining activity, or, as it may be called, the word. The word is the simple activity of giving utterance to itself, which does not make any fixed distinction, and does not become a fixed distinction itself, but rather has been heard immediately; yet the word, immediate as it is, is received by the internal, and thus returns to its origin; it [the second] appears also as *σοφία*, or wisdom, as the original, entirely pure man, as something existing and other than the first universal something which is separated and determined. God is Creator—that is, in the determination of the *λόγος*, as the self-uttering, self-speaking word, as the *ὄρασις*, the seeing of God.

By this it has been determined as the archetype of man, as Adam Cadmon, as the only Begotten One; there is nothing accidental in this, no contingency, but it is eternal activity, and not merely at one time; in God there is but one birth; activity is as eternal activity; it is a determination that belongs essentially to the universal itself.

In this there is true distinction which concerns the quality of both; and yet this latter is one and the same substance, and the difference is, therefore, only superficial, even when determined as person.

The essential point is that this *σοφία*, the only Begotten One, remains in the bosom of God, and that, therefore, the difference is no real one.

Such are the forms in which the idea has fermented; the principle from which they must be judged is that we must bear in mind that these phenomena, crude as they are, are rational; we must remember this in order to see how they have their ground in reason, and what reason there is in it. But we should also know

how to distinguish the form of rationality which, while it is there, is not yet adequate to the content.

The idea has frequently been placed above and beyond man, beyond and above thought and reason, and has been so contrasted with the latter that this determination, which is all truth, and which alone is the truth, has been considered as something which is peculiar to God alone, as something that remains beyond [man], and does not reflect itself in the other which appears as world, nature, or man. From this it appears that the fundamental idea was not considered as the universal idea.

To Jacob Boehme this secret of the Trinity unfolded itself in another manner. His mode of thinking, imagining, and conceiving is rather fantastic and wild; he never elevated himself to the pure forms of thinking, but his tendency to see the Trinity in everything, everywhere, was the ruling principle in the ferment and struggle of his life [he says], for instance: It must be born in the heart of man. This [mode of thinking] is the universal basis of whatever is considered according to truth; it is in this form a finite thing, it is true, but, in its finitude, as [representing] the truth which is in it. Thus Jacob Boehme tried to represent in this determination the nature, heart, and spirit of man.

In more recent times the thought of a threefold principle (die Dreiheit) has been brought forward again by the Kantian philosophy in an external way, as a type, as a schema, so to say, and has been used in very definite forms of thought. It is a further advance to know this [Trinity] to be the essential and one nature of God, to know that it must, therefore, not be taken as something alien, something far removed, and that the idea must not be taken as being something beyond [the grasp of our thought]. It is, on the contrary, the aim of cognition to cognize the idea in the particular as well, and, if it is cognized, whatever is true in the particular will be found to contain this determination.

To cognize is to know a thing in its determinateness; its nature, however, is the nature of the determinateness itself, and the latter has found its exposition in the idea. It is the logical exposition and necessity that this idea is the True in general, and that all categories are the movements of determination.

ON THE SCIENCE OF THE FINE ARTS.

BEING THE FOURTEENTH AND LAST LECTURE OF F. W. J. SCHELLING ON "THE METHOD OF UNIVERSITY STUDIES." TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY MRS. ELLA S. MORGAN.

The science of art may, in the first place, mean the historical construction of art. In this sense its external condition requires an actual consideration of the existing monuments of art. Since this is possible as regards the art of poetry, this art is explicitly included among the subjects of academic study as the science of philology. Nevertheless, philology, in the sense we have defined it, is scarcely taught at universities—which is not a matter of surprise, since it is no less an art than poetry itself, and the philologist, like the artist, is born, not made.

Still less is the idea of an historical construction of the plastic arts to be sought at universities; for they lack the means of study by actual observation; even where, as a matter of pride, lectures are attempted, with the aid of a complete library, they are necessarily confined to presenting a knowledge of the history of art.

Universities are not schools of art. Still less can they teach the science of art with a view to practical or technical ends.

There remains, therefore, the purely speculative view, which is concerned with the intellectual conception of art, and not with its empirical development. But this presupposes a philosophical construction of art, in opposition to which serious doubts arise from the side of philosophy as well as of art.

The philosopher whose intellectual intuition should be directed to the truth that is open only to the mind, and remains hidden to the perception of the senses—what has he to do with the science of art, whose sole object is the creation of a beautiful appearance, which either deceives with illusive images of truth, or is wholly directed to the senses? Most people, indeed, think of art as a delight for the senses, as a recreation for the mind fatigued by other and more serious occupation, or else as an agreeable excitement, whose only advantage is the refined medium which it employs. To the philosopher this latter quality of art, aside from the fact that he must regard it as the effect of the sensuous impulse, is the stamp of its perishable nature, and of its injurious tendencies. If

this is the idea of art, philosophy must utterly condemn it in order to protest against the sensuous tendency to which art seems to incline.

I speak of art in a more sacred sense, art which, in the words of the ancients, is an instrument of the gods, the revealer of divine mysteries, the discoverer of ideas, of that beauty whose holy light illumines only pure souls, and whose form is as invisible to the sensuous eye as the form of truth itself. The philosopher can have nothing to do with what is called art in the ordinary sense of the word. Art to him is a reflection of the divine, a necessary and immediate image of the absolute, and only as this can be shown and proved has it any reality to the philosopher.

“But did not Plato himself condemn imitative art in his ‘Republic,’ banish the poets as not only useless but dangerous members of the ideal state; can there be more convincing authority for the antagonism of art and philosophy than this judgment of the greatest of philosophers?”

It is essential for us to recognize from what particular point of view Plato utters his condemnation of the poets, for he, more than other philosophers, observed the importance of the point of view taken, and without this distinction it would be impossible, especially in regard to this point, to comprehend his complexly related theories, or to harmonize the contradicting statements found in his works on this same subject. We must first consider that the higher philosophy, and Plato's in particular, was the peculiar antithesis involved in Greek civilization, not merely as regards the sensuous conceptions of religion, but also as regards the objective and real forms of the state. Is it not possible that, in an ideal and at the same time unrealized state like Plato's “Republic,” there could be no other conception of poetry, and that the limits he assigns to poetry may be necessary from its very nature? The answer to this question would lead us too far. This opposition between all public forms and philosophy itself must necessarily produce such an opposition between the latter and the former. Plato is neither the first nor the only example. From Pythagoras and still earlier, down to Plato, philosophy knows itself to be an exotic on Greek soil, a feeling which is indicated in the universal instinct which led those who were initiated into higher doctrines, either by the wisdom of earlier philoso-

phers or by the mysteries, back to the Orient, the motherland of ideas.

But, apart from this merely historical, not philosophical, antithesis, what is Plato's rejection of the art of poetry, especially when compared with his praise of "enthusiastic poetry" in other works; what is it but the natural polemic against poetic realism, a prophecy of the general intellectual tendency of later times and of poetry in particular? And such a judgment could least of all apply to Christian poetry, which as a whole reflects the character of the eternal as unmistakably as the poetry of the old world reflected the finite. The fact that we are able to determine the limits of the latter more exactly than could Plato, who did not know the contrast between the ancient and modern world, the fact that we can rise to a more comprehensive idea and construction of poetry than he, and that what he considered the degradation of the poetry of his time, we see as its beautiful limitation. This advantage we owe to a riper experience, and it enables us to see fulfilled what Plato prophesied and missed. The Christian religion, and with it the whole intellectual tendency, which in classic poetry could find neither complete satisfaction nor the means to express it, has created its own poetry and art in which it finds itself reflected. Hence we see that the objective theory of art, consequently of classic art itself, is limited by these conditions.

Hence we see that the construction of art is a worthy subject of the philosopher, but especially of the Christian philosopher, whose particular business it should be to measure its universal content, and demonstrate its necessity.

But, to look at the other side of this subject, is the philosopher able to penetrate to the very essence of art, and represent it truly?

I hear one say: "Who dare hope to speak worthily of that sacred principle which moves the artist, that spiritual breath which vivifies his work, unless it be one who is himself warmed by the divine fire? Shall we attempt to subordinate to law that which is as incomprehensible in its origin as it is wonderful in its influence? Can we determine and bring under dominion of law that which in its very nature recognizes no law but itself? Are not ideas as powerless to comprehend genius as law is to create it? Who dares to rise in thought above that which is the freest,

the most absolute thing in the whole universe ; who dares to strain his sight to the utmost limits of vision, there to find only new limits ?”

These may be the words of an enthusiast, who has only seen art in its effects, but who knows not what it is in truth, nor what the domain of philosophy is in the universe. For, even if we concede that art is not to be conceived as the expression of something higher than itself, it is still an immutable law of the universe that everything which is part of it has its type or antitype in other parts. So absolute is the form of the universal antithesis of the real and the ideal, that, at the limit between the infinite and the finite, there, where the antitheses of phenomena vanish in pure universality, the same relationship asserts itself, and returns in the final potency. This is the relation which exists between philosophy and art.

The latter, although absolute and complete identity of the real and ideal, is related to philosophy as the real to the ideal. In philosophy the last antithesis of knowing is resolved into pure identity, while at the same time it remains ideal in its relation to art. Thus at the highest point they both meet, and, by means of the absolute nature common to both, become type and antitype. For this reason philosophy penetrates scientifically into the essential nature of art, and it is even true that the philosopher sees more clearly into the *spirit* of art than the artist himself. As the ideal is a higher reflection of the real, so the philosopher necessarily has a higher ideal image of that which the artist possesses as real. From this it is evident that in philosophy art may become an object of knowing ; nay, more, it is clear that, except through and in philosophy, nothing absolute can be known of the nature of art.

The artist—since in him the same principle is objective which in the philosopher is subjectively reflected—stands to the latter, therefore, not as subjective or conscious, although it is not impossible that through a higher reflection he may become conscious ; but in the quality of artist he does not become so. As artist, he is impelled by this principle, consequently he does not possess it ; if he brings it to the state of ideal reflection, he elevates himself as artist to a higher power, but still his relation remains objective in so far as he remains an artist. That which is subjective in

him becomes objective, just as in the philosopher the objective becomes subjective. Hence philosophy, in spite of its essential identity with art, is always and necessarily science, that is, ideal, while art is always and necessarily art, that is, real.

How the philosopher is able to follow art even to its secret and primitive source, to the first workshops of its creation, is incomprehensible from the purely objective standpoint, and would be impossible in a philosophy which does not reach the same height in the ideal that art attains in the real. Those rules which genius can dispense with are those which are prescribed by the mechanical understanding. Genius is its own law; it rejects foreign authority, but acknowledges its own, for it is only genius in so far as it is the highest law. Philosophy recognizes the fact that genius is an absolute law unto itself, because it is itself not only self-governing, but aspires to the principle of all self-government. It has been seen in all ages that true artists are calm, simple, great, and necessary, like Nature herself. That enthusiasm which sees in the artist only genius untrammelled by rules, is a reflection of the negative side of genius. It is a second-hand enthusiasm, not of the kind which inspires the artist, and which in its god-like freedom is at the same time the purest and highest necessity.

But we may ask: If the philosopher is the ablest to demonstrate that which is incomprehensible in art, to recognize its absolute nature, will he be equally skillful in seizing that which is comprehensible, and which may be determined by rules? I mean, of course, the technical side of art. Will philosophy be able to descend to its technical execution, to the means, and the conditions of its existence as an art?

Philosophy, whose concern is with ideas alone in respect to the empirical side of art, must show forth only the universal laws of phenomena, and this only in the form of ideas, for the forms of art are the forms of things in and for themselves, as they are in the archetypes. So far, therefore, as they are universal, and can be seen independently in the universal, so far their presentation is a necessary part of the philosophy of art, but not in so far as these forms contain rules for the execution and practice of art. Therefore we say that the philosophy of art is a presentation of the absolute world in the form of art. It is only the theory of art which is immediately related to the particular (as opposed to

the universal), and has an end in view. It is the practical means by which any special work of art can be accomplished. The philosophy of art, on the contrary, is unconditioned, and has no end outside of itself. If, in answer to this, an appeal is made to the fact that the technical part of art is the means by which it reflects truth, it devolves on the philosopher to answer that this truth is itself only empirical. That which the philosopher sees in it, and which it is his duty to demonstrate, is truth of a higher kind, is identical with absolute beauty, the truth of ideas.

The condition of antagonism and conflict, as regards even the first notions of art, which is inevitable in the art-judgment of an age which is ambitious to realize by intellectual reflection the hidden sources of art, makes it doubly desirable that we should scientifically investigate the absolute view of art, as well as the forms through which it is expressed. For, so long as this is not done, both the criticism and the practical execution of art have no defense against vulgarity and commonplace, and are subject to narrow, one-sided, and capricious views.

The construction of art in each of its particular forms down to the concrete leads of itself to the determination of these forms as conditioned by each particular age, and, consequently, passes over into historical construction. And there is little doubt that such a history is entirely possible, including the whole history of art, since the duality of the universe, in the contrast between antique and modern art, has been most thoroughly demonstrated in this department, partly by means of poetry, partly by criticism. Since construction in general is the cancellation of antitheses, those which belong to art being the result of its dependence on each particular age, they must be like the age itself, temporary and conventional. But the scientific construction will consist in the demonstration of their common unity, out of which particular forms arose, and which, therefore, transcend and comprehend all particular forms.

Such a construction of art is, of course, not to be compared with anything which, up to this time, has existed under the name of æsthetics, theory of the fine arts and sciences, etc. In the general principles of the originator of the first designation there was at least an intimation of the true idea of the beautiful, of the primitive type of the beautiful, reflected in the concrete, phenomenal

world. It gradually became more and more definitely dependent on the ethical and practical view of the world. In the psychological theories, its phenomena were explained away as if they were ghost stories or some other superstition, until the appearance of Kant's formalism introduced a new and higher insight, in spite of the fact that it was burdened by many empty theories about art.

The germs of a true science of art, sown by great minds since the time of Kant, have not yet developed to the scientific whole of which they give promise. A philosophy of art is the necessary aim of the philosopher, who sees the true nature of art in his science as clearly as if he looked into a magic mirror. As a science, art is interesting to the philosopher in and for itself. Just as the philosophy of nature or the construction of the great products and phenomena of the world, or construction of a world complete and independent, or as nature itself is interesting and important. The enthusiastic investigator learns from them the true archetypes of forms which he finds confused and obscure in nature, and recognizes them in works of art as sensuous images which have their origin in nature.

The internal bond which unites art and religion, the impossibility, on the one hand, of any poetic world outside of religion and through religion, and the impossibility, on the other hand, of making religion really an objective phenomenon except by means of art—these considerations make a scientific knowledge of art a necessity in genuine religion.

And, finally, let me say that it is a disgrace for those who have a direct or indirect part in the government of the state to lack either a real love or a real knowledge of art. For nothing honors princes and those in authority more than to prize the arts, to admire their products, and to encourage their creation; and there is no sadder or more disgraceful sight than when those, who have the means to promote the highest perfection of art, spend their money to encourage bad taste, barbarity, and insinuating vulgarity. Even if it cannot be generally understood that art is a necessary and essential part of a state founded on ideas, we should at least heed the example of antiquity, whose festivals, eternal monuments, whose drama, and the acts of whose public life were all only the various branches of one universal, objective, and living work of art.

PSYCHOGENESIS.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF DR. W. PREYER, PROFESSOR OF PHYSIOLOGY, AND DIRECTOR OF THE PHYSIOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF JENA, BY MISS MARION TALBOT.

Psychogenesis, or the development of the soul, has been not infrequently the object of consideration by prominent investigators in ancient as well as in modern times. Exhaustive works have been written on the history of the spiritual development of mankind in general, and on the progress in perception, action, and knowledge in particular. The whole history of philosophy is cited as a progressive development of cognition. Psychologists recognize that it is necessary to compare the spiritual life of man with that of animals, and to follow it out through all its stages. Since this requirement has not been met with sufficient readiness, modern physical empiricism, strengthened by many great victories in the contest against speculation, has undertaken the gigantic enterprise of answering for itself, as its own legitimate property, even the highest problems of psychology. Doing away with the extreme differences between man and animal, it maintains that all human spiritual activity is developed gradually and naturally from the spiritual disposition and instincts of animals.

But whether the privileges of the human race will ever lose their inner value by such experiments, or will gain by the records of natural history, these efforts have already brought about this good, that the psychical indications of animals, their feelings and instincts, their volition and reflection, are more carefully examined than formerly. The development of the human soul is certainly not shown by that of the animal soul alone, however closely connected they may be.

But, in any case, the theory of psychogenesis will receive more aid from this side than from the cleverest hypotheses of the connection between soul and body. It is not that such hypotheses are to be rejected because they make use of the imagination; on the contrary, they can be very useful, on account of the incitement which they give to the investigation of facts.

Thus, the remarkable work of the Abbé Condillac, "A Treatise

on the Sensations," which appeared in 1754, and to-day, as then, exercises a fascinating influence on the reader, is indeed fantastic in its suppositions, but it is a powerful stimulus, because of its uncommon acuteness. A statue, in whose place the reader must continually imagine himself to be, first receives only the sense of smell, next hearing and taste, then sight, and finally touch. At every stage the spiritual state of the statue is described. But can we comprehend through this description the mental state of a man born with one or more senses? Not in the least.

Why give life to artificial images, which are the product of a human hand, and attribute spiritual properties to them, while the full natural life, in its entire immediateness, is daily revealed anew in the closest proximity?

He who wishes to watch the growth of the human intellect must, above all, make the mind of the child the object of methodical investigation. Even the new-born infant, in all its pitiable helplessness, is an extraordinarily interesting object for physiology, which must furnish the foundation for all empirical psychology. And then the young child! It is almost incomprehensible that the gradual development of its senses, its will, its understanding, its passions, its virtues, attracts the attention of its relatives alone. For thousands of years children have been born and lovingly tended and watched by their mothers, and for thousands of years learned men have disputed over the mental growth of the child, without even studying the children. As a rule, the experimental physiologist seldom visits the nursery, even when he is a father. The history of the psychological development of a child, during the first years of its life, has never yet been scientifically written.

Physicians have labored much over the diseases and great mortality of infants, over their nourishment, care, and growth, and many works have been written on the subject. On the contrary, observations on the spiritual growth are scanty and incomplete. Several inquirers, indeed, in ancient as well as in modern times, imparted, in short treatises on the senses of the new-born human being, some wonderful observations, which acquire a higher value because they are so few in number, but no right conclusion was reached with these observations and experiments. The physicists, physicians, and linguists, who have recently taken part in psycho-

genetic investigations of new-born and very young children, have until now brought forward but little material based on fact for a history of spiritual development. The same is true of teachers, at least in respect to the earliest period of life. Before methodical instruction begins, during the time which belongs to the child's mother, no tutor speaks a word. But precisely then the bud is unfolding. The child's brain grows as much in the first year as in the whole of its after-life.

Education is certainly a difficult work, but it is still more difficult to understand that it is successful. Each one cannot learn all that another learned before him. Only certain qualities are born with every man. The true educator must start from the given, hereditary qualities, and take into account their differences; he must not measure all with the same rule, nor dress all after the same pattern. The one has these capabilities, the other those. So it is from the practical standpoint of the educator also a matter of great importance to investigate exactly the very first impressions and expressions of the child.

On this account it might be desired that more educated men, thoroughly versed in physiology, should carefully and independently observe a larger number of young children, and compare the results, or that fathers should exchange observations made on their own children, and should supervise and critically arrange those made on the children of others. A single individual easily falls into the error of generalizing that which applies only to his own children. Moreover, every father has his own principles of education.

To begin with, it is necessary that each one should keep as exact a journal as possible concerning his child from its very birth. I can assert, from my own experience, that during the first two years hardly a day passes in which there is not an observation to enter in the diary, which is of value psychogenetically. This only is necessary: to busy one's self with the little creature for some time, at least several hours a day; to strictly forbid that discipline of even the youngest children which is to-day, unfortunately, too highly esteemed, and to seek to answer stated questions by means of constantly repeated observations and harmless experiments.

To what these last must relate follows from the consideration

of that which in general is the indispensable and primary condition of spiritual expression even in adults.

In every case there must be a free entrance for the *senses*. Without them there is no spiritual activity. Impressions must be there, garnered in great numbers; recollections must be stored up and constantly recalled, before the soul can manifest itself, before *comparison*, the lowest function of the understanding, can take place. On this account no spiritual activity is recognizable in deep sleep. The sleeper is blind; his ears do not hear, the organs of taste and of smell are at rest. The sensation of touch, every feeling, is extinct; the muscles of sight asleep; even the silent mouth is frequently open. It is impossible to distinguish in sleep the spiritual capabilities of the blind mute from those of the most intelligent boy. There is, besides, the examination of the manner and the order in which the senses of the new-born child develop their activity.

However, the senses are not the first thing, but the *motions*; for, before any sense is awakened by external impressions, to the mother's delight, the child moves. The peculiar motions of the limbs of a new-born child must, like all those of a later period, have their cause. These causes must be sought for in the first place. Accordingly, the movements and sentient activity of the new-born and nursing child make the starting-point. Their changing relations lead a step farther, and the development of the *will* can then begin. When this asserts itself, the understanding appears, and, finally, united with the will, gives the germs for the control of motion, for the realization of perceptions, and for the communication of personal opinions by means of speech.

The attempt to follow this ascending psychical development is attractive and instructive, through the nature of the problems which it reveals.

The primary conditions of all spiritual life are the child's will, perception, and thought.

First of all is the development of the will. Screaming, the first expression of life in the new-born child, is pointed out as the first expression of will. The great Immanuel Kant thought that screaming had in it the sound of indignation and angry wrath! Not because something pains him, but because something vexes him, does the new-born human being scream, and the reason is

that he wishes to move, and feels that his inability to do so is a fetter which takes away his liberty! On that account the child loudly proclaims its existence, thinks Kant. Did he perchance, in his long unmarried life, ever see and hear new-born children? He would then surely have judged otherwise.

There is also little value in the general notion that the cause of the first scream, as if a conscious expression of pain, is a painful or at least disagreeable sensation, a feeling of cold on the entrance of air into the lungs. The older view is as valuable, that the peeping of the chicken in the egg, before it creeps forth, and the first scream of the new-born child, are cries for help; as if the young being had a suspicion of its helplessness and of anything beyond itself!

These and similar hypotheses are untenable, because it must be seen that children born without understanding can scream precisely as well as sound children, from indignation and anger, from a feeling of pain and discomfort, in general from a conscious spiritual state. On the other hand, it is very probable that the reflex sounds from brainless animals, which occur regularly after slight irritation—for example, after stroking the back—will give the key to the explanation. For the question is on the purely reflex excitations of the voice, just as in laughter, when the nerves of the skin are excited by tickling. There are frequently new-born children who do not scream at their first breath, but sneeze. Sneezing is a purely reflex action, conditioned by the excitation of sensible nasal nerve-fibers, which is transferred to the respiratory nerves and muscles without the participation of the will, and results mechanically in a convulsive breath. Emotion, passion, deliberation, and intention ordinarily cause or accompany the first scream or whimper precisely as little as they do the sneeze. It is of no greater psychological importance than a snore.

But the motions of the limbs of the new-born child? Are they not a sign of free-will, or expressions of an uncomfortable state?

The reaching forth of the arms and legs, now slowly, now quickly; the spreading out of the fingers and toes; the slow and then impulsive motions; the pulling of the feet and hands, as well as the remaining in a cramped, almost egg-shaped position—make an impression of aimlessness on every impartial observer. The repeated frowns and distortions of the face might sooner be

taken for voluntary contractions of the muscles. But if with these is compared the helplessness which accompanies all the movements of the infant, if the fact is considered that it does not prevent its head from falling, cannot take hold of anything for some months, nor make other simple and co-ordinated movements which come at the will of a grown person, then the first peculiar motions of the extremities will not be taken as the expression of reflection or free-will.

Of what kind, then, are these muscular contractions which never reappear in after-life. They seem to take place in a similar manner only in animals suddenly awakened from their winter sleep, and sometimes in ordinary sleep and on awakening.

There is no external excitation present, which either works as a direct irritation upon the nerves of motion or contractile fibres, or excites the nerves of sense reflexively, and thus causes the motions. As the sleeping infant moves like the one awake, only more seldom and more slowly, nothing can be said about an attempt to imitate at first. Imitative movements occur for the first time in the second half-year of life.

If no external causes for the wonderful movements of new-born human beings and animals can be found—for the well-fed, warm, dry, comfortably-placed infant also performs these aimless exercises of its limbs—internal causes must be sought. Such are either acquired or hereditary.

Acquired causes of motion presuppose a manifold experience. Whoever moves with forethought, in other words, acts, has been able to acquire the motive for his action only from many perceptions, and from observations on the conduct of others. The new-born child is wholly incapable of such actions, because it is entirely without experience. It does not act, but only moves.

But there are still other acquired muscular actions, namely, certain movements of expression—those which arise from imitation and those which are constantly employed because they show themselves to be necessary in the interest of self-preservation. All such *expressive* movements, which are characteristic of uncivilized people and vivacious South-Europeans, presuppose a conception of one's own existence. They are to express this condition, announce it to others, or give others a knowledge of one's own self. Such gesticulations acquire great energy in passion.

This incomplete description of them will suffice to show that the new-born child, who has no idea of its condition and knows no passion, cannot possibly speak the language of passion. Whether the stretching out of the little arm appears so much like a categorical command, whether the withdrawing of the hand, as if before an invisible power surrounding the little being, seems to be the result of fright, whether the unconscious demeanor appears so similar to the symptoms of a desire to act or to the expression of a wish to free itself from an uncomfortable condition—in no case does the appearance afford the right explanation. For the little child has not yet had any experiences of all these conditions and the means of expressing them. It does not yet know them.

So only direct hereditary causes of action remain. It is not that the human being moves itself as it does because its father and ancestors did so when they were young; that would only be removing the difficulty another step back; but it moves itself in this peculiar way because its principal nervous motor organs, its ganglion cells of motion, if they are developed, discharge irregularly the inherited superfluous stock in impulsive movements. The steam-engine discharges its superfluous steam. The fire of youth burns at first without need of stirring; the full life's cup overflows.

Because an external cause for the first movements of the new-born child cannot be found, they have been called instinctive. But instinct, which is intelligible only when conceived as inherited memory, has, without exception, a definite aim. It is adapted to something useful to the organism for many generations. For instance, a new-born child sucks instinctively; it is not a purely reflex action, for then the child whose appetite had been appeased would still suck. On the contrary, the movements of the extremities of very young animals and children are directed to no specific purpose. They are neither reflex nor instinctive, but impulsive. They have also been named automatic and spontaneous. These expressions, however, can easily be misunderstood. The nerve of motion, with its muscular fibres, follows the slightest central impulse of the spine in the brainless infant as in the fully developed. It depends upon the soundness of the spine. New-born children are spinal beings, as Virchow appropriately remarked. They still lack the controlling power of the understanding. The controlling

nerves are not yet developed, hence hyperkinesis, the tendency to convulsions, the vivacity of youth, which never recurs later, and knows nothing of self-control. The more the intellect, and with it the understanding, develops, the more restrained will be the superfluous movements. But, even in later life, only a few succeed in performing purely useful muscular contractions. In sound health it is a sign of the highest distinction and most perfect education to make, under all circumstances, no superfluous motion. This rare degree of self-control and volition forms a strong contrast to the unrestrained mobility of the child, and shows the powerful influence which example, firm command, and especially external impressions, have upon the development of the will—on the *development*, not the *genesis*, of the will. It is an error to think that the will arises from impressions in youth.

As one cannot put a plant together artificially from the constituents by which it perfects itself, but can only let it develop itself from the germ, be it the tiniest seed-corn, so a will can never be created in a child from external experiences, but can only be suffered to develop itself from the inborn germ of will. At first the child is ruled only by its impulses, its bodily needs—for instance, hunger—and follows its instinct to satisfy them where and when it can, without the slightest regard for anything else, without reflection and without will. The contact of the lips with a finger suffices to produce sucking, and the reflex action of swallowing follows regularly upon this instinctive movement.

No will is yet apparent here. After hunger is appeased, the contact of the lips does not result in sucking. And this state, too, is neither an expression of will nor volition, but only a sign that the instinctive impulse has been gratified. When a bird has built its nest, it does not straightway build a second, because it has satisfied its instinct by the formation of the first.

The first appearance of the awakening of the child's will seems to be given rather in the holding of the head than in the movements of the limbs and lips. Even the chicken which has just left the shell cannot raise its head during the first hour. I have often noticed this inability. And when it can raise its head, it cannot yet stand. And when it has half raised itself, it often remains for some time picking at bits of grain near by, or peeping in a loud voice, without changing its position, before it takes a step.

From that to running, the time for exercise is short indeed. But in the beginning it stumbles frequently. What occurs here within a day at most requires more than a year in the case of a human being. If the infant is held upright at first, its head falls forward or sidewise. It cannot hold it straight. At the end of fourteen weeks I found that attempts to hold it straight were more often successful. Here plainly began a voluntary exertion. After four months the head became well balanced, and no longer fell forward or backward or sidewise. The cause here is not weakness of the muscles, because, at a much earlier period, turning motions of the head were accomplished, conditioned through reflex action. To be sure, the muscles of the child, which are in many respects like the tired muscles of an adult, are at first too weak to hold up the head, but they are no longer so after three months.

The poise of the upper part of the body follows that of the head. The first successful attempts to sit or get up usually occur in the second quarter-year. The efforts of the child, which has been placed in a sitting posture by means of cushions and props, to maintain this are plainly repeated every day for weeks, to its own amusement, until finally, at about the tenth month, security in maintaining equipoise in sitting is attained for the whole future life. The will has subdued the muscles, which were disobedient at first. The advantages of the new position, especially in eating, have fostered the desire to sit, and thereby strengthened the will. The child *will* sit.

Thereupon, it generally learns to stand soon—when healthy, at the end of the first year. After countless unsuccessful attempts to stand by chairs, tables, or against the wall in a corner of the room, it suddenly succeeds in standing for the first time. This upright position, natural only to man among mammals, is especially noteworthy, because he appropriates it quite by himself without any instruction. Let the infant be left to himself, when he throws himself hither and thither upon a blanket in the greatest helplessness, then begins to creep, next grasps firm objects which he can reach, let him not be disturbed in his efforts, daily repeated with wonderful persistence, and undertaken again and again, in spite of their fruitlessness; then he will certainly be seen some day—in his fourth quarter-year—raising himself and standing upright.

Whence come these first purely human expressions of will, which at a stroke bestow upon the child the majesty of the dignity that belongs to mankind? He stands upright before his happy parents. He does not fall down immediately. He has taken unspeakable trouble to raise himself, has reached his goal, and has thereby given proof that his will overcame the weight of his body and the stiffness of his limbs. Herein lies a further victory of his soul over matter. An explanation of this cannot at present be given. For the desire alone for objects above him or for his friends can as little explain his great efforts to raise himself as imitation alone, especially since that desire is satisfied to the fullest extent by assistance from all sides, and efforts to imitate ordinarily begin later. We can thus only admit that the great advantages which the upright position affords in the universal competition of living beings with each other made it long ago habitual, so that it became hereditary. But it is not yet clear why the well-nurtured child, who is in want of nothing, busies his growing will in this direction particularly.

The same holds good for the further acquisition of walking, which equally makes its appearance by itself even when a child grows up alone. It is problematical in its beginnings, because no ground appears for the alternate bending and stretching of the limbs, when the child first stands upright. Only upon the constantly repeated raising and lowering of the foot of the child, supported by some one or supporting himself, does the possibility of learning to walk depend. The same flexions and extensions take place also when lying down, or in the bath or the cradle, but the regular alternation of the two, when the child is placed upright, is something different and probably hereditary, like sucking. Several months elapse before the first successful attempt at walking, and if the child is allowed to creep and move itself hither and thither, without hindrance, it soon begins to walk without any instruction. It is impossible to attribute to it the knowledge of the advantages which walking gives, the understanding that it will be better able to control its surroundings by eye and ear, and attain more easily everything desirable; the will, rather, comes into account, developing at the same time with the growth of the muscles and nerve-cells and nerve-fibres of the brain, bringing the muscles into condition for contraction, as is shown in later life to

be most advantageous, and as likewise happened regularly in the case of its ancestors. So firmly have the marks of that impulse for motion impressed themselves on the nervous central organ, so frequently has the will trodden these nerve-paths and no others, that soon, after the first steps of development in the motor apparatus of every new-born child, they show themselves to be the most customary. In other words, the first movements in walking are instinctive; the impulse to change one's place is so strong that it is not satisfied by creeping alone.

It is on this account much to be condemned that in the nursery special instruction in walking is given, with or without appliances, such as go-carts and the like. Moreover, this is ordinarily begun too early—much earlier than is good for the child, on account of the slow growth of its bones. The frequent occurrence of bow-legs is, in part at least, attributable to this circumstance. Creeping is too often forbidden, although it is the natural school preparatory to walking, and contributes much to the child's spiritual development. For the beginner, longing for new impressions, should not be deprived of the liberty of moving to a desired object, of beholding and touching it, nor of the opportunity of making countless little journeys of exploration.

The time of the first successful attempts at walking varies, even with children of the same family. One runs quickly at eight months; another is still awkward at two years. Much depends on the surroundings, as is well known. If a child grows up with other children who can walk, or are learning to do so, it will, as a rule, walk earlier without support by emulating them than if it grew up alone. But, in the latter case again, the constant repetition of artificial instruction or training can considerably shorten the natural length of time. In general, the child will first begin to walk when it wishes to walk. It was at the beginning of the fifth quarter-year that a child, which I was observing carefully, standing freely on its feet, suddenly and for the first time trotted around the table, tottering or staggering, indeed, like an intoxicated person, yet without falling. And from that day on it could walk, at first only quickly and hastily, little less than trotting, with arms outstretched, as if it were intent on preventing a tumble forward, then more slowly and surely. Within the following month it stepped over a threshold an inch high, clinging at the

same time to the wall, and frequently, at this time, it was seen dangling its outstretched foot, or raising it too high, or setting it down with a stamp, like a person suffering from spinal disease. The will but imperfectly controlled the muscles of walking. The impulse to move was at times too strong, and at times too weak. The proper degree of strength was lacking. Long before this widely-developed activity of the will is shown, the gradual growth of the will power can be observed in another spontaneous movement, namely, the first grasping motions. Great attention is required to follow the development of grasping, because, at times, it rises at a bound from lower to higher steps, and at other times advances so slowly that progress is generally seen only after weeks and months.

In the first quarter-year a pencil placed in the little hand is grasped by the fingers; even in the third month the thumb also is employed in grasping, not independently, but as if it were a finger, and the infant, in general, does not notice that it is now holding something in its hand. It holds the little object "mechanically" fast, "without knowing anything of it," as we would say of an older person in the case of absent-mindedness. At this time every child when awake moves its arms aimlessly about in the air. So it naturally happens that a finger of an approaching hand meets the child's little hand, and is held fast by it with the help of the thumb, so that it seems as if it had been grasped; this is the more delusive the more passively the captive finger with the arm is allowed to be led hither and thither. In truth, there is no trace present here of an intentional grasp; but only accidentally does the little hand hold the objects put in it longer and more firmly than formerly, without stretching toward them, somewhat as a crab clings to a finger placed between its claws.

The introduction of the hand into the mouth, which occurs regularly during the first months, is likewise wholly involuntary. If the arms move aimlessly about in the air, a hand easily reaches the mouth, and the fingers are then sucked like every other properly-shaped object which comes between the lips, because sucking is associated from the beginning with an agreeable feeling. So it comes to pass that this sucking the hands soon becomes a habit, even before there is any capacity for grasping. The child does not see its mouth, and is only conscious of it after touching it, and can

therefore have no desire at first to reach after it. It is rather the chance contact with the lips, after the involuntary movement of the arms, which results in sucking the fingers. The movement of the hand to the mouth is repeated later, because it has that agreeable effect without any knowledge of the causal connection.

In the seventeenth week I saw for the first time eager efforts to grasp an object to which the attention was directed. It was a small India-rubber ball, which was beyond reach—but the child reached after it. When the ball was placed in its hand, it held it for a long time very firmly, put it to its mouth, held it close to its eyes, and looked at it then with a peculiar new and more intelligent expression of countenance. On the following day the awkward but energetic attempts to seize all kinds of objects which were held out within sight of the child were more frequent. Thus it fixed its gaze either on the object—*e. g.*, a pencil, and grasped three times in succession at it when placed twice its arm's length away, or on its own hands, especially when these had once grasped successfully.

At the same time the expression of countenance betokened the most eager attention, like that of the zealous botanist when he sees a new or peculiar flower. After another day the repeated reaching out for everything within range of the arms seems to cause the child pleasure. But wonder is aroused at the same time, and then a great step forward has occurred. The Greek philosophers were not wrong in thinking that the child's first astonishment denoted the awakening of its soul.

In these efforts to grasp objects, even when they fail, the little fingers are beheld with astonishment by all infants. Probably the child has expected the contact, and when it takes place wonders at the novelty of the sense of touch. The object, which has once been grasped, continues to be held, watched, and put in the mouth, and passes hither and thither from one hand to the other. The examination evidently becomes more thorough. But soon the stretching out of the arms, as if to grasp something, will be the expression of the strongest desire.

At the end of the fourth month the child, for the first time, uplifts both arms toward its parents with an indescribable expression of longing. This transition from reaching after inanimate things, in order to get hold of them, to reaching after the

parents in order to be nearer them, is sudden. On the other hand, its own arms and feet appear to the child for months to be something strange, not belonging to it, which it wonders at, beholds attentively, examines like interesting objects. It takes hold of its own feet with its hands and puts them to its lips; even in its fifth quarter-year it bites its own arm so that it cries for pain; it offers a cracker to its own feet for a taste just as to the wooden horses with which it plays. No trace is evident of self-knowledge or self-consciousness. Still later the child strikes itself, as if for rebuke, upon the hand which broke the toy, as if the hand operated in some sort on its own account. But the grasping carried on indefatigably leads gradually to handling and to the knowledge of the individuality and the unity of the ego. That is to say, the newly discovered fact, that the thing which has been seen and longed for is also the one which has been touched and gives new sensations, excites the child's attention. The light and the dark, the colored, the bright, now appears also smooth and rough, heavy and light, hard and soft, warm and cold, and this combination of two and three kinds of sense in one object causes satisfaction. It is one and the same apple which appears red and green, smooth and heavy, cold and hard, and also smells and tastes agreeably. This union of sensations from seeing, touching, smelling, and tasting at the same point, excites astonishment and meditation, and awakens the inborn, insatiable impulse of the human soul for the causes of its sensations.

Nourishment is afforded this unconscious instinct of causality through gradual perfection in grasping, especially by means of the growing sense of touch. The child scrapes, scratches, rubs the objects it has seized, turns them round and round, takes them apart and tries to put them together. At the time when it seizes the candle-flame with its hand, when it puts its bread against its cheeks, chin, or nose, instead of in its mouth, and wants to reach out through the window-pane, the connection of sight and grasping has already been so perfected that the child deliberately puts from one hand into the other a single hair, which has by chance been found by it on the carpet. It grasps with deliberation.

Now the will is developed. If the causes of the sensations of sight and taste, especially of all the excitations of the sense organs,

occasioned by external impressions can be found in part by grasping objects, then grasping becomes arbitrary. The will has developed from the original longing. The remembrance of the satisfactory state of things which followed a successful attempt at grasping awakens the idea of grasping at the sight of a new object, and at the same time the psychomotor impulse to effect the necessary movement. This impulse is called will. It is, indeed, quite weak with the child, for self-control is lacking, but the stubbornness of early youth shows frequently enough how far the untrained will-power can deteriorate. In its little sphere the passionate refusal of the boy often accomplishes more than is wished by the parents, and, very early, will stands irreconcilably opposed to will.

But is it not precisely so in later life among grown men? The man's will reveals itself in varied modes. He calls to life and slays, he builds and tears down, he wages war and concludes peace, he unites and separates, threatens and flatters, wounds and heals, blesses and crushes. He changes the earth's surface, and designedly interferes with the natural development of the animal and plant world; in the course of his development he constantly subdues more and more the forces of nature, and constantly controls more and more the most intractable. The will-power is the mightiest weapon in the struggle for existence. Other men follow the example of a man with strong will, and he shapes his surroundings according to his own laws.

But even such a one, even the strongest, was once a child, and had at first no will, then a weak one, and not until late could the strong will be developed from this. This can only be done by means of opposition to the will of others. Therefore in education there is nothing of so much consequence as the management of the child's will while it is still manageable. Simple commands do not suffice, and only have the desired effect when they are conducted with consistency and never violated by him who gives them. The educator must also be a pattern to the child, not only preaching truth, but being sincere; above all, directing the child's will to the taming of the passions from which it is descended. It is important, therefore, that the child should see nothing, hear nothing, and especially perceive nothing, which could be detrimental to the education of its will. The impressions on the

organs of sense must also be regulated. But the senses are at first not very susceptible. How is it with them?

If the development of the senses in new-born children and infants is observed, the slight sensitiveness of the skin will first strike the beholder. To be sure, a scream can be caused in the very first hour of life by means of a blow or a rough touch, but this scream can hardly be conceived as an expression of a special feeling of pain. It is rather reflex, like the first breath, for infants can be handled in all sorts of ways which would be painful to adults, without reacting in the least. So, when the nose, lip, or hand is pricked, no sign of discomfort is noticed, frequently not even a movement; and yet, to try the sensitiveness of the skin, a needle was introduced so far that a drop of blood appeared. (Genzmer.)

I have not tried such experiments with children, but in other ways I have recognized the slight sensitiveness of infants. When the eye is touched, they close it much more slowly than they do later, and also imperfectly. Wetting the eye in the bath, too, does not cause the lid to close.

These and many similar observations can be carried on with every infant. After one or two days an increase in the sensitiveness of the skin is easily ascertained, and at the very beginning the child is in the highest degree susceptible to warmth. The first bath is at the same time the first agreeable sense-impression which the world affords the infant.

But the first perceptions of temperature seem to have much less of a direct specific psychogenetic meaning than the first perceptions of touch. Anaxagoras did not assert too much when he said that man differs from animals in having hands. A child's hands are the feelers of its soul. They are the pioneers of its army of longings, eager for the conquest of the world. By means of the excitation of the organs of touch—in the finger-tips and the lips—the infant receives the first intimation of things without him, and, by means of the difference of the sensations in touching its own skin and extraneous objects, the foundation is laid for self-consciousness on the one side, and for gaining knowledge on the other. The infant's fingers are in reality the instruments with which it strives to investigate everything which comes within reach. Its methods have the greatest similarity with the methods

of natural philosophy. For the investigator isolates, takes to pieces, observes from all sides, and then endeavors to put together what he took apart. Every child is a born naturalist, and wishes to penetrate into the very essence of things. The importance of the touch appears best from the fact that, in certain cases, persons who early became blind and deaf, have, with the aid of the sense of touch alone, attained a relatively high intellectual development. But these cases are exceedingly rare, and the instruction is extremely laborious.

No one sense can take the place of another; an exchange is impossible in man, and one is only imperfectly represented by another. On the contrary, all the senses, even at the outset of life, share in the development of perception and sensibility, even the most undervalued, taste and smell.

In relation to the former, Professor Kussmaul, more than twenty years ago, in a short but interesting treatise on the "Spiritual Life in New-Born Children," gave several important observations which he made for the first time. He found that strong sensations of taste are distinguished from each other by all infants, since the effect when the tongue is moistened with a solution of sugar is quite different from that of quinine, vinegar, or salt. In these three cases, children, even directly after birth, make all kinds of grimaces and unmistakable signs of dislike, and the "sour" face is quite different from the "bitter," while the lively sucking movements, together with the expression of extreme satisfaction when sugar is offered, leave no room for doubting that the nerve of taste is endowed with a natural power of discrimination.

The old opinion, that the new-born child takes everything indiscriminately which is offered it, is erroneous. This is true only in the case of fluids with a weak taste. The child takes medicines without opposition only when they are sugared, as is usually done. And if some new-born children respond to an intense sweet with the expression of bitter, as I have observed likewise in older infants, the reason may be found in its surprise at the novelty of the strong sensation, for after the first trial more is wanted.

Every strong and new impression is disagreeable at the first instant, a kind of terror. Surprise at the strangeness of it prevents the child from distinguishing whether the feeling was agree-

able or disagreeable. The adult too often has this experience. All new-born children take sugar gladly after the first feeling of surprise has passed. Then it is craved.

I found the same true of new-born animals, which show especially by their astonishment that, without having had any experience in tasting, they distinguish the most diverse substances—*e. g.*, camphor crystals, thyme, and sugar candy, since they gnaw and lick the latter alone.

The chicken, too, which has just been hatched, can distinguish the food which is placed before it by the taste. When I put before it the white of an egg cooked, the yolk cooked, and some meal, it picked at all three, one after another, as it did at the bits of egg-shell, grains of sand, spots, and cracks near it, but most frequently and eagerly at the yolk of the egg. I took this away, and when I put it back an hour after the first trial, the chicken sprang at it immediately and began to eat, persistently scorning the rest. At the first trial it had only tasted the white of the egg and swallowed a single grain of the meal. This preference for the yolk rests, therefore, upon an inborn ability to distinguish tastes.

The sense of taste, as Sigismund remarks in his delightful essay on "Child and World," is the first of all the senses to furnish clear perceptions, which are appropriated. The taste of the first milk which is taken remains, so that another kind is often only tried and then refused, after the strange taste and smell are compared with the first taken.

Memory and judgment first appear with certainty in the realm of the sense of taste.

But throughout the whole of life, and in its beginning also, the sensation of smell can not be easily separated from that of taste. Without any doubt, infants in the first hours of their lives can have no sensation of smell without taste, at least cannot distinguish them. For breathing through the nose, drawing in the air, and filling the nostrils with air, are indispensable to the excitation of the nerves of smell. Neither can be realized in the beginning, yet most children recognize very soon, after the breath is once in operation, whether they are receiving the same nourishment as at first, or another kind, and often refuse to make the acquaintance of a new nurse whose presence is disagreeable to them.

Otherwise, there are no sure experimental modes of determining the capability of infants during the first days for distinguishing fixed smells. The experiments with strong odors which have been tried in this direction have been uniformly successful only with sleeping children, and the sensory nerves of the organ of smell, ending together with the nerves of smell, might easily have been excited, so that they would have been the chief cause of the change in the child's physiognomy through a reflex action. It is known that young animals born blind are led principally by their sense of smell in seeking their first nourishment, the mother's milk. Experiments, especially those of Biffi and Gudden, show the relatively high development which the sense of smell attains in very young animals. For they show that when the nerves of smell are cut the little animals no longer succeed in finding their mother. They have to be nourished artificially. I have, likewise, made many observations on new-born animals, and have found that some substances are extremely repulsive to them, tobacco-smoke, for example, while others, camphor especially, are agreeable.

Seventeen hundred years ago Galen carried on a similar experiment. He brought a young kid, which had never seen its mother, into a room where several open dishes were standing filled with wine, oil, honey, meal, and milk. The young and inexperienced animal soon arose, shook itself, went from one dish to another, smelled of them all, turned to the dish of milk, and drank it up. In this case the sense of smell alone could have determined the choice, and the preference for the milk must rest upon an inherited remembrance.

Hearing and sight are incomparably more significant for the further development of the mind than the two lower senses.

In relation to hearing, it is necessary to note that all new-born human beings are deaf at first. Even the very strongest react from a loud noise only after six seconds, many not for a day, and very many not for two or three days. The awakening of the sense of hearing is recognizable by the trembling of the arms and the whole body, and then by a quick pulsation of the eyelid, when a loud noise or tone takes place suddenly. These reflex movements are the same throughout life in excitable people. If a pistol-shot is unexpectedly fired quite near, everybody winks

quickly. The same, to be sure, happens from other causes, and a tone or a sound of slight intensity can be heard without the occurrence of the lid pulsation. But the non-appearance in very little children of any and all responsive movements, after strong sensations of sound, and their utter indifference to the same, are sure signs that they cannot hear, because after several days they respond to every loud noise in the accustomed manner.

The reason for the early deafness is well known. It rests on the fact that the external auditory passage is not yet open—its partitions are still united—and the middle ear contains too little air at first. The tender little bones of the ear cannot yet move. By means of breathing and swallowing, air first gets through the eustachian tubes into the cavities of the drum; add to this that at first the tympanum is very slanting—too slanting to be easily set in motion by the vibrations of the air. Hence comes the difficulty of hearing during the first days and weeks, and the profound sleep which not even loud noises easily interrupt.

But after the ear, through no other sense organ does the child receive so much that is important for its spiritual development. The backwardness in intellectual relations of children born deaf in comparison with those born blind shows the superiority of the ear over the eye in this relation.

At the beginning of life it is, as a rule, the voice of the mother and the nearest relatives which furnishes the first impression of sound. Very soon these voices are distinguished, tones and noises responded to differently. It is especially interesting in the second month to compare the quieting effect of songs and lullabys with the extraordinary animation at hearing dance-music. Certain noises too, like *sh*, *st*, and a deep man's voice, cause quiet, a cessation of screaming, and a new effort of the attention, and the infant can be made to scream by a strange, very strong, sharp noise, such as a locomotive whistle.

All these observations, which might be easily multiplied, show how early the child distinguishes ear impressions, in spite of its first deafness.

The same is true for impressions of light; at first there is a kind of dread of light, inasmuch as only twilight or a weak artificial light is endured. When a candle is brought near, the new-born child squeezes its eyes firmly together. Light and dark, or at

least "very light" and "very dark," can be distinguished; indeed, the activity of the eye is exhausted by it at first. Colors, forms, distances, differences in size, motions, are not recognized at first. The movements of the eyes are still quite irregular like those of the hands. One looks toward the left, the other toward the right. One is open, the other shut. One is still, the other moves. It appears natural that among all the manifold movements of the eyes they should be turned simultaneously to the right and left. The conclusion must not be drawn from this curious behavior of the first six days that there is a natural symmetry in the contractions of the eye-muscles. Symmetry is acquired slowly. The empirical theory of the perception of space, especially advocated by Helmholtz, receives strong support from the facts established by me with unusual care. There is no consciousness of space even after three weeks. It is possible only through experience. At first the field of sight is composed only of light and dark patches, and there is only a perception of light. Yet even this excites the attention, so that many children, one day old, turn their heads toward the window, which I nevertheless observed for the first time on the sixth day.

Then begins staring, which is frequently but erroneously taken for seeing. With fixed gaze, the infant looks into vacancy, so that it might be thought it was locating an object, all the more as a candle-light is stared at continuously by most children after the ninth day. But it is easily perceived on a closer examination that the child does not see. Only when the light is brought in the direction of the staring does the perception of it seem to exist. The look is not directed to the light until after the third week, and then for the first time the inexperienced eye follows it, if it is moved slowly, partly with movements of the head, and partly without. But how small a share the understanding has in this can be seen from the fact that frequently the turning of the head and the direction of the glance are quite opposed. Longet has remarked, too, that deaf people without great intelligence follow with their eyes a candle-light which is moved about. Nevertheless, the countenance of a child, a month old, acquires a remarkably knowing expression when it looks with both eyes at once on a slowly moving object like a swinging lamp, and moves them simultaneously with it. The stupid, almost animal expression

comes again afterward and disappears only in the second quarter-year. The appearance of the human spiritualized physiognomy is really conditioned by the independent location of clear, bright objects, which is now beginning. Accommodation, or the power of voluntarily causing plane surfaces standing at unequal distances from the eye to reflect themselves clearly upon the retina, one after another, is then in process of development, and the unsymmetrical movements of the eye gradually cease entirely.

Now, also, begins the ability to distinguish colors. One child prefers yellow, another red; but all dislike black and very dark colors; likewise a dazzlingly bright color. It is difficult to determine when the finer shades of color and their degrees of brilliancy are first clearly recognized, and the time varies with individuals. One child learns to distinguish the tones of the scale very early, and another not after many years. I know no case of a child who could always correctly point out the colors red, green, yellow, or blue, before the beginning of the third year. But in the twenty-sixth month this degree of knowledge of colors can be attained by practice, and blue will be the last to be correctly named.

The distinction of forms, too, advances extremely slowly. The experiences of such as are born blind, but have their sight restored by operations when they are able to talk, are of remarkable importance here. They show that the ellipse cannot be distinguished from the square, nor the sphere from the cube, by means of the eye alone, but only after the touch has been exercised. The same is true, without doubt, for every little child.

Many observations show how defective is the estimation of distances during the first years. The attempt to seize the moon is well known. In this relation even long practice seems to be successful only when the child stays a great deal in the open air, and great mistakes in estimating distances remain throughout life, unless special practice is had in the matter.

The same is true for the recognition of differences in size. A child, even in the third year, attempts to crowd its large playthings into a small receptacle, to put great pieces of bread into its little mouth, and to span the largest objects with its tiny hands.

It is further of peculiar importance to every theory of knowledge, that the first perceptions of change of position within the field of view, the disappearance of a bright surface from the same,

as when a lamp is extinguished, and the appearance of a new, bright object, as when a lamp is lighted, makes a deep impression on the inexperienced infant every time. During the first two months, even the quickest approach of a hand to the child's face is not noticed. Only after the third month comes the much discussed pulsation of the lid, which thereafter throughout life occurs regularly at the unexpectedly quick approach of any object to the eye, even when the eye is not touched and a pane of glass is before it.

The difference between hereditary and acquired actions in seeing may be clearly recognized from this behavior. For example, the contraction of the pupils on the appearance of a bright light, and their enlargement when the face is shaded, which every infant shows, are hereditary. On the other hand, the quick opening and closing of eyes on the sudden approach of the hand are acquired. It is a defensive motion, conditioned by the disagreeable surprise, for the child knows nothing of danger at this age. Every defensive motion becomes later, through constant repetition, habitual, and then reflexive, like other defensive contractions of the muscles.

By the multiplication of similar observations and experiments in very little children, it is possible to follow the advancing development of sight in detail. This also applies to the other senses; only a great deal of material must be collected before the sentient groundwork of the child's spiritual development can be clearly manifested. Helmholtz is right in saying that observations on new-born animals, carried on accurately and critically, are in the highest degree desirable, in order, above all, to decide on the admissibility of the dominant theories of space. The sense-perceptions are the only material from which every human being builds up its world. Their content, that which is perceived, is likewise the foundation upon which the feelings and passions grow. The child's emotions, its likes and dislikes, the awakening of its sense of duty, the beginnings of its character development, the first dawn of its talents—all these depend in a direct line on the development of its senses. But so little that is legitimate or has any connection has been as yet discovered in this realm, that an exposition of this side of psychogenesis would result merely in a compilation of disconnected facts.

The only medium of explanation, the child's talk, is to be in-

vestigated previously. And this study is most important to the knowledge of the child's spiritual condition and the operations of its intelligence. It promises the greatest enlightenment concerning the dark secret of the soul's development. Man announces the existence of his reason, not only in the safest way, but in the only safe way, by the independent management of language. I have therefore spared no trouble to put down on paper daily everything which can be conceived as a lingual expression, every noise which can be fixed somewhere, within the first two years, and shall shortly publish in a separate work a history of the development of speech, based thereupon. Only single instances of general interest can be brought forward here.

Above all, the most careful observation of the mien and behavior of the child who cannot yet talk is important in answering the question, "How have I learned to talk?" or that associated with it, "How did the understanding develop?"

Too great an influence has been constantly attributed to imitation in explanation of the mimical movements and gestures of the child. The first smile and laugh, for example, are in no wise imitative, but hereditary, like the scream and moan for pain. Many a gesture, like placing the hands together when making a request and nodding at being carried out doors, are learned through training; affirmative motions of the head are acquired partly through imitation, partly through training, and partly, apparently, are inherited.

It is exceedingly difficult to exclude from the child the influence of imitation, one of the mightiest impulses of nature, and to distinguish it from hereditary transmission when it is not excluded. The study of the features and gestures of those who are born blind is of the greatest service here. But persons who are born totally blind are rare, and those who become blind later show a less decided play of features than those who have their sight, because imitation is then lacking; but the remembrances of imitated looks abide in them, so that it is hard to distinguish inheritance and acquisition.

How is it with talking, with articulate speech, which is recognized by all parties as the single radical difference between man and animal? It will scarcely be asserted that a child can be born who can speak immediately, for surely no child can learn to talk

without imitation. But articulate speech should not, therefore, without further consideration, be absolutely designated as something acquired and by no means hereditary. For all properties of the organism (which continually and periodically repeat themselves) are finally called hereditary. It can be said that the quality of being hereditary is one form of the law of inertia, or of the power of inertness in the realm of organic nature. Whatever continues regularly through many generations for a long time is called hereditary. It is a matter of indifference to the ordinary understanding whether the question is concerning the organs which govern the formation of tone, as the larynx and tongue, or concerning such actions as screaming and singing, or even the voice itself. If through hundreds of generations, not language, indeed, but speech, keeps on, partly improving, partly deteriorating, there is no reason for not calling it hereditary. Hereditary and inborn are not synonymous terms. The teeth and the beard are hereditary, but not inborn; only a tendency to them is inborn. So, too, speech is hereditary and not inborn; but the tendency, the predisposition, is born in the child. If any part of the extremely complicated mechanism of speech is lacking or defective—if, for example, the vocal chords or the ear refuse to perform their task, or if the tongue is paralyzed—the child does not learn to speak articulately as is customary; but a proof that the tendency to speak exists, lies in the fact that the child often learns quite the same language, as its friends, yet in another way, frequently by indirect methods, such as writing, finger-language, etc.

There is no fact which demonstrates as clearly as this the original independence of the faculty of speech from the separate organs of speech, and yet the dependence of the highest development of speech on the integrity of the vocal mechanism is recognized, for the slightest defect in the organs is audible. But it is not the organs which determine speech, but *vice versa*. The need of communication created the organs of speech; these were transmitted, and then had a direct influence upon the child's manner of speaking.

If the child's utterances are noticed daily from its birth until it can use the mother-tongue independently, the Ariadne thread will be found, which leads through the perplexing labyrinth of phenomena. There is hardly any greater intellectual enjoyment for

the psychologist than observing the early period of human life, within which speech is developed from the first reflex cry, at first indiscernible, gradually flowing slowly and uninterruptedly from undiscovered sources; then gradually gushing forth more quickly and with apparent irregularity; next slowly freed from unnecessary accompaniments, more orderly and plain, clear and fluent, until finally the quiet stream of coherent speech testifies to the rule of intelligence over instinct, to the victory of the will, and to the formation of thought.

Whoever holds to observations, independently of any opinion concerning the origin of speech, will recognize how erroneous in part the dominant notions are; as, for example, when the child, before it learns its parents' or teacher's language, must forget its own—a peculiarly articulated childish talk, which it found for itself.

At first only vowels can be uttered, particularly ah and ā. But, in spite of their uniformity, the utterances within the first five weeks are so different that from them alone the child's spiritual state is known. The periodically interrupted screaming, together with contracted eyelids when hungry, the persistent whimper when cold, the high, piercing tones when in pain, the laughter at a shining button, the crowing for joy, the peculiar announcements of a wish to change position, connected with animated movements of the arms, are varied, easily distinguishable, acoustic expressions of life, partly reflex, partly instinctive.

In the seventh week I heard the first consonant, m. The indistinct utterances of the infant at this time, particularly during the first half-year, cannot be written down. The child also moves all the muscles which are at its disposal, without any external cause. To these belong, above all, the muscles of the larynx, tongue, and lips. It often happens, when the indefatigable movements of the tongue are made at random, that the mouth is wholly or partly closed. Then, in breathing, the stream of air makes its way out, and thus many sounds arise involuntarily, even such as do not occur in the English language, and in whose repetition the infant delights. Most of the consonants which arise through the irregular use of the tongue and lips can be fixed as little as the movements of the limbs, continually becoming more animated, continuous, and varied, can be delineated or described. In the

seventh month only m, b, d, n, r are plain, occasionally g and h, and very rarely k in a prattling monologue.

Now the voice is gradually modified, so as to be more surely an expression of the mood. If the child longs for a new object, it not only points out the direction with outstretched arms and a glance, but makes known its wish by the same noise which it utters before taking nourishment. This combination of intricate movements of the eye, arm, and vocal muscles is a great step forward. At the same time the syllables pa, at, ta, ba, da, ma, na, which almost all children of all races utter, become plain and oft-repeated. They have no meaning, and are only the involuntary result of the gymnastic exercises of the vocal apparatus.

Toward the end of the first year the first imitative sounds usually begin, but in the most imperfect manner. Many children are skilled in them earlier. But this early and clever imitation or mimicry is probably less a sign of intelligence than of lack of mental independence. The latter is, in any case, recognized much more at this time by the nascent power of distinguishing audible words. The child turns its head when it is called. It is easily trained to perform little tricks, such as giving its hand, and the like. Yet, at the beginning of the second year, the infant's comprehension of its nurse's jargon is usually not greater, and its repertory of words is not richer, than that of a well-trained hound for its master's utterances. The enormous intellectual difference between the child and the trained animal is shown less by the fact that it associates more thoroughly the idea of a certain object or a certain variation with a sound which it hears than that it can itself express a syllable, a word, although in a whisper, so that the corresponding sensation recurs. One of the first expressions of the kind, with almost all children, is *atta*. In some countries the parents train the child so that by "*atta*" or "*atte*" it means one thing, in others it has quite a different meaning. The association of the syllables "*pa*" and "*ma*" with the parents, or other grown men and women, is taught the child with great pains months after it has uttered the syllables devoid of any meaning.

The imitation of sounds makes considerable progress in the third half-year. Many objects are now also rightly pointed out on inquiry, after they have been constantly and repeatedly shown and named; the child likewise rightly uses by itself mutilated

forms of the words it has frequently heard ; for example, " peas " for " please," when wishing something, " mik " for " milk." It does not strike me that such primitive attempts of the child to employ the words it has often heard, like a sudden enlightenment, stamps it at once as a rational being. The gestures and bearing are still the most important medium of the understanding, and such distorted syllables, attendant phenomena.

On the other hand, the first sign of the nascent formation of ideas is undoubtedly noticeable in the highest degree because of its unexpected appearance. The child had formerly regularly said " atta " when carried off or taken out. Now, when the lamp was lighted at evening and somewhat protected by a shade, it likewise said " atta." This happened in the fifteenth month. Whether the word was heard frequently when going out, and appropriated to that or not, it had never been used in connection with dimming a light. The formation of the idea is in any case shown in this way. The child had itself discovered a similarity in the strikingly different incidents of going out and dimming a light. It represented the disappearance of the most dissimilar impressions of sight by the same sound. Then the closing of a fan and the emptying of a glass were soon designated in the same way. There is, then, reflection without language, for in these cases " atta " was the only word which the child employed at the time it was forming ideas. Reflection, however, appears much more through gestures and actions than through sounds, in spite of the fact that at the beginning of the fourth half-year the articulation had been very much improved through imitation. To be sure, all the sounds of the language could not yet, nor even in the third year, be rightly and voluntarily employed, but they come of themselves to a certain extent, when the child indulges its inclinations and, for example, spreads open a newspaper and imitates the reading it has so often noticed. At this time the intelligent child understands more words than it can repeat, but it repeats many which it cannot understand in a parrot-like way, without any instruction and for its own enjoyment, particularly such words as delight its hearers. The demeanor of the latter is not only of consequence, but prescribes the child's choice of expressions. By this means the articulation is developed more quickly, and the incredible activity of the tongue, whose evolutions no adult can imitate,

is, at the same time, of use to the child learning to play. Every little child of any nationality can learn to speak any language perfectly — the Italian, Russian, the Esquimau, Arabic — while in later life the finer shades of pronunciation are no longer easily acquired. But the child learns its mother-tongue by a different method from that used by the adult in mastering a foreign idiom. It begins by understanding the meaning of what is said, and learns to pronounce the words afterwards. The scholar, on the other hand, learns the pronunciation of the sounds first, learns the words by heart, and finally the meaning of strange sentences. The so-called child's talk is composed of inarticulate sounds, of gestures and actions, and of distorted fragments of language, mutilated almost beyond recognition, and the child employs only a few onomatopoeic expressions which represent no language. Bow-wow, cock-a-doodle-do, mew-mew, are said before children, and their memory, not yet overladen, is impressed by what is perceptible. The wonderful creative fancy of the child quickly masters the new animal voices, and makes blocks of wood or paper dolls talk together, before the child itself can speak.

The preparatory work which the child requires is so manifold that the process of learning to talk seems incomprehensible even to the most sharp-witted. The child screams, laughs, hums, sings, smacks, crows, squeals, etc., and understands what is said to it long before it speaks. And after it has touched, looked, listened, and tasted countless times, after it has pleased itself with manifold attempts at imitation and has then become weary, after the time when it could not repeat what was said, and later would not — then it speaks of its own accord. But what it says does not have a single meaning, but one word stands at the same time for several entire sentences. "Hot" to-day means "The milk is too warm for me;" yesterday it was, "The stove is too hot; I must not touch it." Next comes the time when two, then three, words are spoken together. At last comes the first little story of the two-year-old: "Julia breaked doll." It is still far from this beginning to a correct construction of sentences. The use of prepositions, verbs, and articles is very difficult for many months, but the way is opened. The child's infinitives and proper names gradually disappear, the construction gradually becomes more correct, until finally the child gives more striking evidence of its reasoning

faculty from sensible questions than from answers. The first questions relate to space. The child asks, Where? whither? also which? long before it gives any meaning to When? Why is understood and used later still.

If the poverty of a child's language is compared with that of an adult who has suffered from disease, there will be found a parallel which is uncommonly interesting and surprising because of its completeness. Various kinds of derangements in speech caused by illness, and not a few in number, are miniaturized in the child. During an illness an adult is no longer in a condition to speak correctly; during childhood the undeveloped being is not yet in a condition to speak correctly. In one the existing functions are disturbed, in the other the functions of the phonetic system and the vocal organs are not trained. The one state helps to understand the other. I must forego an explanation of this matter in this place, because the rich material allows of no abridgment. It was only my wish here to sketch a few of the essential and fundamental conditions of the spiritual development of the child apart from current and fashionable opinions, and to bring into prominence the extraordinary significance in the study of the child's soul. Its poetry remains untouched. Nothing of the magic of a glance from the child's eye will be taken away in the opinion of the mother if the father interests himself in the movements of this eye in which pure truth abides.

When I look at my work, at the efforts repeated daily for years to fix upon the incidents of development, it seems to me as if I were standing on the bank of a shining stream which is constantly widening, constantly flowing on more quickly, and into whose clear water I look without finding the bottom, even when no surging waves disturb the surface. We stand amazed and dumb before the eternal enigma of existence. Before we are aware, the helpless child is transformed into a being which resembles us. Our own youth, like that of our children, passes by before we know it. We are astonished at development, and do not understand it.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

SENTENCES IN PROSE AND VERSE.

SELECTED BY WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING.

III.

Self-limiting diseases should be left to run their course. In some temperaments, action and character fall under this head. There are defects we cannot cure, errors we cannot atone for.

To know a little, and to know that well, gives a person a certain importance in these diffusively informed times, when each one crams his cheek like a squirrel with a *tout ensemble* of nutshells.

External events impress us less as youth retreats; but the perception of youth is not obliterated by age. To *others*, we look old; to *ourselves*, there is no perceptible change, as age is not of the mind, but the body.

Memory is that amber of thought which preserves the flies once buzzing so loudly against the ceiling of our kitchen. Here is a museum with magic mirrors, whose reflection faithfully repeats long-past illusions. On this hearth lie the ashes of spent affections, the precipitate of possibilities, dusty bas-reliefs of a shadowy existence, which this ever-shifting, transparent varnish recalls to a moment's life.

Certainly J. B. is a woman almost trying to understand what is said to her; and what lack of art or nature spills all that Xeres wine from her cellars? It came near to be a thought in her, and fades to a feeling, lively, rapid, and flexible, but without the due assignable limit. All she asked of this life was the permission to die. When she spoke of this, a flood of sunbeams transfigured her pale and weary face, as if she were already smiling at a banquet in the skies.

The total of most men's lives is an unwieldy mass, barely informed by a flash of expression. They have great faith in dulness to endure it at the rate they do.

Cold, dry, and self-satisfied persons are of value to the wayward and susceptible, as mixtures make the best mill-stones.

New books are like new cider: they soon grow hard, and next turn to vinegar.

All things and men flow to the fortunate man. Where he was born or what he has is a little matter; favors drop down on him like rain from the sky. The public caress, his private circle worships him. Without his seeking, the best persons of every class surrender themselves at discretion to his purposes. He is the wax which receives all impressions, and is injured by none.

Some prudish, half-developed women are so faithful to falsehood they cannot even believe that another can offer himself to be their friend; and consider it personal disgrace if they are incorrectly supposed to possess the thinnest mockery of a female heart.

Hold by thyself, since the laws of the moral constitution are believed by some to owe thee a fit return for self-reliance. Be clad in shreds or patch, nurtured on a spare fast, alone and unknown, thy own servant and thy own master. So shalt thou not give way to the vacant air, nor resign thy surroundings to sun or star. Vines cut low produce a grape.

The coffin-maker is a spare, smiling, gray-haired man, always spoiling for a corpse. Over his work-bench hangs a bit of pine board, on which is written in pencil the length, breadth, and height of coffins for persons of different ages.

The scholar should sit in a serenity as calm and inaccessible as those beautiful and noble monuments some god has deposited out there, and which men name Nature!

Can ye make diamonds of granite and pomegranates of corn? In human character there is, too, a tough specification. Men develop, they never change.

Homer is gone; and where is Jove, and where
The rival cities seven? His song outlives
Time, tower, and god—all that then was, save Heaven.—*Festus.*

Think not so fondly as thy foolish race,
Imagining a Heaven from things without;
The picture on the passing wave call Heaven;
The wavelet, life; the sands beneath it, death;
Daily more seen till, lo! the bed is bare—
This fancy fools the world.

There are points from which we can command our life,
When the soul sweeps the future like a glass;
And coming things, full-freighted with our fate,
Jut out, dark, on the offing of the mind.

There are no traces to be found of either Rime or Metre in our language till some years after the Conquest. And from those old Roman Poets they took their first lessons in Riming, when Rime was tough and stringy like the cocoanut rind.—*Tyrwhitt*.

He is born for a limited sphere who thinks of the people of his own time. Others will come after him who can judge without offence and without favor.—*Seneca*.

Shaking between them the skin suspended between three stakes, and filled with milk to be thus churned to butter.—*Layard* [“*Nineveh*”].

I cannot but think Schiller’s turn for philosophy has injured his poetry. It led him to prefer ideas to nature.—*Goethe*.

“Do not our lives consist of the four elements?”—“Faith! so they say; but I think it rather consists of eating and drinking.”—*Shakespeare*.

Not to know at large of things remote
From use, obscure and subtle, but to know
That which before us lies in daily life
Is the prime wisdom.—*Milton*.

The instrumental cause is constantly adjoined to the principal cause. An active, in order to be efficient, must always have a passive conjoined with it.—*Swedenborg*.

Forms ascend from the lowest to the highest, in order and by degrees, as do also the essences and substances of all things.—*Ibid*.

In youth, when we either possess nothing, or know not how to value the tranquil possession of anything, we are democrats; but when we, in a long life, have come to possess something of our own, we wish not only ourselves to be secure of it, but that our children and grandchildren should be secure of inheriting it.—*Goethe*.

A score of airy miles will smooth
Rough Monadnoc to a gem.—*Emerson*.
As sings the pine-tree in the wind,
So sings in the wind a sprig of the pine.
Dear friend, where thy shadow falls,
Beauty sits and music calls;
Where thy form and favor come,
All good creatures have their home.

When thou dost shine, darkness looks white and fair,
Forms turn to music, clouds to smiles and air.—*Vaughan*.

The light of the understanding is not a dry or pure light, but drenched in the will and affections, and the intellect forms the sciences accordingly,

for what men desire to be true they are most inclined to believe. The understanding, therefore, rejects things difficult, as being impatient of inquiry, things just and solid, because they limit hope, and the deeper mysteries of nature, through superstition; it rejects the light of experience, through pride and haughtiness, as disdaining the mind should be meanly or waveringly employed, it excludes paradoxes for fear of the vulgar. And thus the affections tinge and infect the understanding numberless ways, and sometimes imperceptibly.—*Bacon.*

In all their laws and strictest tie of their order, there was but this one rule to be observed: Do as thou wilt.—*Rabelais.*

For six weeks their history is of the kind called barren; which, indeed, as Philosophy knows, is often the fruitfullest of all.—*Carlyle.*

Men's words are a poor exponent of their thoughts; nay, their thought itself is a poor exponent of the inward, unnamed Mystery wherefrom both thought and action have their birth.—*Ibid.*

The forced rolling of sand down a bank under the pressure of water produces a species of foliaceous development, like buds and leaves, a kind of sand-plant, or like a system of blood-vessels or intestines. The pressure of the wheels of a railroad train over mud and water upon the rails produces a like imitation, as well as dripping water partly frozen, frost on windows, and stalactites, which are all semblances of vegetable shapes.

And whereas Mahomet, that his writings might continue, has forbidden them to be read, Moses, that his might last, has commanded everybody to read them. Moses was a very able man; this is indisputable.—*Pascal.*

Between us and Heaven or Hell, or Annihilation, there is nothing interposed but *life*, the most brittle thing in all the world.—*Ibid.*

Every work of art must show on the face of it that it is such; and this can be done only through what we call sensible beauty, or agreeableness. Plastic art relates especially to the human form.—*Goethe.*

Unless we are accustomed to them from early youth, splendid chambers and elegant furniture had best be left to such as neither have nor can have thoughts.—*Ibid.*

Every conception, every mental affection, is followed by changes in the chemical nature of the secreted fluids; every thought, every sensation, is accompanied by a change in the composition of the substance of the brain.—*Liebig.*

Whoever considers the final cause of the world will discern a multitude of uses that enter as parts into that result. They all admit of being

thrown into one of the following classes : commodity, beauty, language, and discipline.—*Emerson*.

Truth and goodness and beauty are but different faces of the same all. Beauty in nature is not ultimate. It is the herald of inward and eternal beauty.—*Ibid*.

Nature is that which is in perpetual growth and progress, and which subsists in continual change of form and internal development.—*Carus*.

All things unto our flesh are kind
In their descent and being ; to our mind,
In their ascent and cause.—*George Herbert*.

I ever desired to discern physical phenomena in their widest mutual connection, and to comprehend nature as a whole, animated and moved by inward forces.—*Humboldt*.

For right as she can paint a lily whit,
And red a rose, right with swiche peinture
She painted hath this noble creature
Er she was borne, upon hire limmes free,
Whereas by right swiche colours shoulde be ;
And Phebus died hath hire tresses grete,
Like to the stremes of his burned hete.—*Chaucer*.

Flakes of snow form stars upon ice. This is the expansion of radii from a centre. Drops of water are perfect globes. Undoubtedly these are radiated. By crystallization they become flakes, and by falling are flattened into superficial spheres, whereof the true circumferences have been by motion driven into centres. Thus raindrops contain the principles of the star.

Trees are extended circles, or spirals. The diminution of branches above, where other branches are sent off, is a division like the opening of the seed-leaves, and the expansion into twigs and branches resembles nervous and muscular expansions, or that of blood-vessels.

Whatever is displayed in the outermost, flows from a nature which resides in the innermost.—*Swedenborg*.

The least in every series comprehends an idea of its universe.—*Ibid*.

Can lines finite one way be infinite another ? And yet, such is deathlessness.—*Festus*.

And earth, like man her son, is half divine.

Can this be the same heart which, when it did sleep, slept from dizziness, and pure rapidity of passion, like the centre circlet of the whirlpool's wheel ?

Friendship hath passed me like a ship at sea.

How strangely fair
Yon round still star! which looks half suffering from,
And half rejoicing in, its own strong fire;
Making itself a loneliness of light.

The lakelet now, no longer vexed with gusts,
Replaces on her breast the pictured moon,
Pearled round with stars.

The cloud-like laurel clumps sleep, soft and fast,
Pillowed by their own shadows, . . . the sharp firs
Fringe, like an eyelash, on the faint blue west,
The white owl wheeling from the gray old church.

Dreams are the heart's bright shadow on life's flood.

The world shall rest, and moss itself with peace.

In the tranquil landscape, and especially in the distant line of the horizon, man beholds somewhat as beautiful as his own nature. The simple perception of natural forms is a delight.—*Emerson*.

The separation of subject from object, the faith that each creature exists for its own sake, and that cork-trees do not grow merely that we may have stopples for our bottles, this, I share with Kant.—*Goethe*.

The Mohammedans give their young people for a religious basis this doctrine, that nothing can happen to man except what was long since decreed by an overruling providence; in philosophy, that nothing exists which does not suppose its contrary.—*Ibid*.

The stomach has two curvatures or arches, and on its concave surface respects poles, axes, and foci; by these through their radii, which are so many circular forms, circumferences; and by all points of these again, their poles, axes, and foci; and so on, in an *everlasting gyre*. A similar form occurs in the intestines, or in the *ultimates* of the body; likewise, in the brains, or in the *principles* of the body; and also throughout in the *intermedials*. This form must be called the perpetual, circular, or the spiral form—the essential mode of motion, or fluxion of organic substance.—*Swedenborg*.

Learn of the little nautilus to sail.—*Pope*.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF CHICAGO.

We print the following prospectus of this prosperous society, which was organized in 1873.

PROSPECTUS FOR THE SEASON OF 1880-1881.

The Philosophical Society of Chicago enters upon the eighth year of its work, and offers to the public its programme for the coming season. It invites the coöperation of all the thoughtful people of our city who are interested in the dissemination of truth in the departments of speculative philosophy, social science, moral science, and of natural science and history in their philosophical aspects.

The Society has no creed but that put forth in the preamble to its constitution—that Truth is One, and is of infinite value to mankind; and that ignorance, prejudice, and superstition have fearful blinding effects upon the human mind. Upon this basis of common agreement the Society seeks to bring together earnest, thinking men and women to listen to, and to share in, discussions of important topics; to develop clear views, wise thoughts, and just practice; to foster a love of philosophy, and a taste for the discussion of principles.

A society with such purposes must necessarily include persons holding a great variety of views. It has enrolled in its ranks at the same time materialists and idealists in philosophy; orthodox, heterodox, catholics, and atheists in religion; and scientists of opposing theoretical views. No one should impute to the Society any opinion or set of opinions because of doctrines put forth in its lectures, or by its members individually, or because of questions suggested for discussion. It is our doctrine that the surest way to destroy error and to make truth illustrious is to bring them both alike into the light of reason and the fire of discussion. Nowhere can a lecturer find a freer platform, nor greater surety of various, discriminating, and candid criticism.

The principal exercises are lectures, every Saturday evening from the middle of October in each year to the end of the ensuing April. At the close of each lecture, a discussion of it is opened by one or more of the members of the Society previously appointed by the president; these are followed by such other members as see fit to join in the discussion; but no member is allowed more than five minutes in which to discuss the lecture, except the appointees of the chair, who are allowed ten minutes; the lecturer himself closes the discussion. In these discussions, adversary and conflicting views are freely and frankly presented.

An Executive Committee of five persons has charge of the exercises, and is responsible for the lectures which are delivered before the Society. Only such persons are invited to lecture by the Committee as are believed competent to treat topics with philosophical candor, learning, and completeness. We avoid "popular" lectures, and, so far as possible, lectures "which, dealing wholly with details, manifest no perception of the bearings of these details on wider truths." We aim to keep from our platform hot-headed enthusiasts, people of one idea, and visionary schemers. We do not ask nor care what views our lecturers hold on controverted questions; but we expect them to treat adversary views with judicial calmness, and "to be slow to assume that error is more likely to be on the other side than on their own."

The following list of subjects, carefully prepared by the Executive Committee, and from which lecturers in the coming course have been invited to choose their themes,

gives a fair idea of the special field of our work ; but our lecturers are not limited to this list, as will be seen in the programme below :

NATURAL SCIENCE.—1. Effect of the Destruction of American Forests. 2. The Germ Theory of Disease. 3. Relation of Brain Nutrition, through Circulation of the Blood, to Mental Traits. 4. The Relation of Sun-Spots to Meteorology. 5. Transition and Transmutation of Species. 6. Relation of Cerebral Condition to Mental Delusions. 7. Specialization of Function in the Brain. 8. The Glacial Theory in its bearing on the Theory of Early Incandescence and Gradual Refrigeration. 9. Lower Life and its Lessons. 10. Light, Heat, and Electricity ; are they Identical ? 11. Elements ; are they Many or One ? 12. Astronomical Research ; its Results and Probable Limitations. 13. Philological Researches concerning the Origin of Society. 14. The Present Status of the Atomic Theory. 15. Fallacies of Physics.

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.—1-9. The Philosophies of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Hume, Hamilton, Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant. (Lectures presenting synoptically, critically, and clearly the doctrines of any of the philosophers are suited to our course.) 10. Theories of the Absolute. 11. The Antinomies of Municipal Law. 12. Idealism. 13. The Doctrine of Immortality. 14. Metaphysics in Early and Mediæval Christian Theology. 15. The Genesis of Religious Faith. 16. The Value of Faith. 17. Memory ; its Nature and Education.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.—1. Can Moral Science rest on Intuitions and Experience without Religion ? 2. The Relation of Wealth and Poverty to Morals. 3. The Essential Characteristics of Right-doing and Wrong-doing. 4. Relation of Art to Morals. 5. Psychology as the Basis of Morals. 6. Evil ; can it be accounted for without being also justified ? 7. Relative Moral Influence of the Ascetic or Stoic, the Epicurean or Utilitarian, and the Fourieristic or Harmonial Theory of the Passions. 8. Moral Influences of the Doctrines of Predestination and Free-will. 9. Do the Beneficial Effects of Sects partly or wholly founded on Delusions compensate for their Evils ? 10. Which of these two Theories is most promotive of Morals : (1) The Universe is Governed by Inflexible Law ; (2) The Universe is governed by a Self-Originating Will which Prayer can change or influence ? 11. Rationale of Suicide. 12. Spencer's "Data of Ethics." 13. Mallock's "Is Life Worth Living ?" 14. Belief in Immortality as an Inducement to Virtue. 15. Spencer's Doctrine of the Unknowable as the Basis of the Religion of the Future.

CURRENT HISTORY.—1. Rationale of Russian Nihilism. 2. The Present and the Future of the American Indian. 3. The Relation of Imperialism to Democracy. 4. The Experiment of Free Trade in England. 5. The Administration of Andrew Jackson. 6. The Russo-Turkish War as ended by the Peace of Berlin. 7. The Career of Garibaldi. 8. Causes of the Condition of Ireland. 9. Bismarck. 10. The Future of Egypt. 11. British Dominion in India. 12. Rise and Probable Future of Mormonism. 13. Panama Canal. 14. Political Socialism in America. 15. The Present French Republic. 16-20. The Present Condition and Prospects of Russia ; of Italy ; of the Papacy ; of Austro-Hungary ; of Mexico. 21. Progress of Liberalism in England.

SOCIAL SCIENCE.—1. Does Local Self-Government result in the Best Government ? 2. Should Government seek to promote Industry, or merely to preserve the Peace ? 3. Ought Government to issue Paper Currency ? 4. Is Compulsory Education feasible ? 5. The Means of preventing Breaches of Trust on the Part of Individuals and of Officers of Corporations. 6. The Benevolent *vs.* the Vindictive Method with Crime. 7. What shall be done with the Morally Insane. 8. Transportation compared with Penitentiary. 9. Prevention of Pauperism. 10. Would Woman Suffrage aid or hinder Good Gov-

ernment? 11. Is Marriage the Expression of an Eternal and Unchangeable Law? 12. Has Christianity ameliorated the Social Condition of Woman? 13. The Relative Health, Beauty, Strength, and Vitality of the Ancients and the Moderns. 14. Should a Representative obey the Will of his Constituents? 15. Rules of Evidence observed in Courts. 16. Rationale of Political Revolutions. 17. The Value of the Novel. 18. The Elements of Criticism. 19. Tendency to Formation of Class Distinctions in American Society. 20. Sewage in Great Cities. 21. Value and Legitimacy of the Party Principle in Politics.

The Executive Committee takes pleasure in announcing the following programme :

October 16th—Professor Rodney Welch, Transportation as an Agency in Civilization; 23d—Rev. Dr. H. W. Thomas, The Past and the Future of the Philosophical Society; 30th—Austin Bierbower, Esq., Thomas Aquinas, or Scholastic Philosophy in Modern Theology. November 6th—Rev. Dr. D. S. Gregory, British Dominion in India; 13th—Rev. Dr. R. A. Holland, Atomism; 20th—Dr. H. A. Johnson, The Germ Theory of Disease; 27th—Rev. L. P. Mercer, Comparative Mythology and the Origin of Religion. December 4th—Miss Frances E. Willard, The Temperance Question philosophically and critically considered; 11th—Dr. J. S. Jewell, On the Influence of our Present Civilization in the Production of Nervous and Mental Diseases; 18th—James K. Applebee, Esq., The Philosophy of David Hume; 27th—W. P. Black, Esq., Socialism as a Factor in American Society and Politics. January 3d—Fred. P. Powers, Esq., Predestination in Science and Religion; 8th—Dr. D. R. Brower, Specialization of Function in the Brain; 15th—Chas. H. Ham, Esq., Tendency to Formation of Class Distinctions in American Society; 22d—Professor Samuel Willard, Historical Criticism; 29th—Mrs. Maria A. Shorey (subject not announced). February 5th—E. O. Brown, Esq., The Relation of the Catholic Church to Scientific Investigation; 12th—Colonel A. N. Waterman, Legal Reform; 19th—Dr. Sarah Hackett Stevenson (subject not announced); 26th—Professor Van Buren Denslow (subject not announced). March 5th—Hon. L. L. Bond, Does Local Self-Government result in the Best Government? 12th—Rev. Dr. Galusha Anderson, Huxley; 19th—Professor W. S. Haines, The Present State of the Alcohol Question; 26th—Mrs. Celia P. Wooley (subject not announced). April 2d—Paul Shorey, Esq., Schopenhauer and his Critics.

Invitations have also been extended to the following persons, from some of whom lectures may be expected during the season: Hon. Henry Booth, General I. N. Stiles, Professor W. T. Harris (Concord, Massachusetts), Mrs. Amalie J. Hathaway, John W. Ela, Esq., Dr. George M. Beard (New York City), Dr. A. Reeves Jackson, Professor A. A. Lambert, Dr. Julia H. Smith, Hon. Henry Strong, Hon. John N. Jewett, George P. Hanson, Esq., Dr. H. W. Boyd.

Tickets are sold at the door on lecture evenings, and may be had of the Treasurer, Mr. Emmett C. Fisher, office of Continental Fire Insurance Company, No. 30 Lakeside Building. Price for the course, \$2; single lectures, 25 cents. Every purchaser of a course ticket is considered a member of the Society, with all the rights and privileges of membership. This course of lectures is thus offered at a merely nominal price, the Society wishing to make its advantages easily obtainable.

The sessions of the Philosophical Society are held every Saturday evening, at eight o'clock, in the club-room on the parlor floor of the Palmer House.

JOSIAH H. BISSELL,
Secretary.

MRS. HELEN S. SHEDD,
SAMUEL WILLARD,
EDMUND BURKE,
MRS. CELIA P. WOOLEY,
GEORGE D. BROOMELL,

} Executive
Committee.

ARCHIMEDES.

Although I build you engines new,
 As to my native city due
 When foes surround our citadel,
 These endures not Science well;
 Not thus, she would freely use
 Archimedes of Syracuse.
 He lifts Marcellus' ships on high,
 Or fires them with Apollo's eye.
 Know, these are mercenary arts—
 Of Science but the meaner parts—
 Such as the noble mind most fears,
 In its own home 'mong stars and spheres.
 There, with beauty and subtility,
 It knows no mixture of utility.

JOHN ALBEE.

NEWCASTLE, NEW HAMPSHIRE, *December, 1880.*

LUCRETIUS ON "THE NATURE OF THINGS."

[One of our correspondents, who has been studying Lucretius, sends us the following analysis of his remarkable poem on "The Nature of Things." (It is a better analysis than our own in *Jour. Spec. Phil.*, April, 1873, vol. vii, p. 94.)—THE EDITOR.]

BOOK I.

The entire of things is infinite. Proved by the argument of imagination. Made up of solid "Atoms," eternal, indivisible, and void "Space," also eternal. Atoms have no qualities. The qualities of things are "*Conjunctions.*" History is "*Events.*" "Time," "from the mind alone produced."

"Nought from nought by power divine has risen."

All the early theories—Earth, Air, Water, Fire, Becoming, *Noûç*, etc., criticised and repudiated.

Gravitation and the Antipodes considered quite justly.

BOOK II.

The process of composition of existing things, by the perpetual motion, contact and reaction, of an infinite number of Atoms, of various kinds, rough, smooth, fine, coarse, etc., and of various, though not infinite, shapes. The Immortal Gods dwell apart from man in perpetual peace. After many efforts, the mass of Atoms formed "the unchanging rudiments of things sublime." Nature is "self-potent and uninfluenced by the

Gods." The World decays, Colors, Tastes, Odors, etc., arise entirely from the combinations of Atoms.

"The sire of all is Ether; he full oft
In dulcet drops descends of genial rain,
And the bland Earth impregnates."—[*Origin of Life.*]
"Perception springs amain and instantaneous,
Wastes again to nought."

He says, "and propagate their kinds," but without explanation.

BOOK III.

Soul ("Anima") or Mind ("Animus") is a *part of body*, not a "Harmony," as the Greeks say. What we commonly call Mind *pervades* the heart and *rules* the total frame. The remnant soul is *diffused* through every part of the body, obeying the mind. Total soul does not always perceive what Mind is experiencing, but when Mind feels a *severe shock*, the whole soul responds and *moves* the body. Nought can act except by touch, and nought can touch unless corporeal; hence Soul, as it acts on the body, must be corporeal. Mind composed of finest, subtlest Atoms (Heat, Vapor, Air, and something subtler), hence its rapidity of action and *departure* without apparent diminution of bulk of body. Neither soul nor body can act without the other. *Soul* (Anima) may be mangled and life continue; but *Mind* (Animus) must remain entire or we die. The sympathy of soul and body in disease, their cotemporaneous growth and decay, the difficulty of the soul's holding together without the protection of the body, the fact that the soul does not re-endow itself with new organs after leaving body, or that, if it does, we have no memory of former life—all prove that soul is born and dies with body.

"Were, too, its date immortal, man no more
At his last hour would mourn the severing blow."

In connection with my study of the law of Real Property, this sentence, turning on legal distinctions, quite amused me :

"and life exists
To none a *freehold*, but a *use* to all."

BOOK IV.

On Images of Things. The will, aroused by these images, spreads the commotion through the total soul, which moves the body then. They are a "steam that from the face of things pours forth perpetual." What the senses notice must be true.

"Who holds that nought is known, denies he knows
E'en this, thus owning that he nothing knows."

BOOK V.

Cosmogony. The Gods did not construct the material world. Too many defects for that. *Nature* made it, and will destroy.

“For as the train of causes first uprose,
And the young world its earliest features found,
Things follow things in order most exact.”

He traces evolution from chaos through physical gradations, and then moral and social, in accordance with the doctrine of “Natural Selection.” “All reach at length perfection’s topmost point.” And all will return to Atoms again.

BOOK VI.

Meteorological phenomena—Disease. Physical changes of all kinds explained by the combinations and release of Atoms.

The whole poem is an exposition of Democritus and Epicurus, and the motive stated to be—to take away the fear of death by proving that we are not immortal. The doctrines of Atoms and Void—of the construction of the Universe without the interference of the Gods (immortal would not mix with mortal)—of the corporeal nature of the soul, proven by its intimate connection with the body, and of the process of Evolution by Natural Selection, are as conclusively stated as ever they have been since, I should judge. I find a truer insight as to Time, however, than is found in modern Materialism, viz., “Time from the mind alone produced.” He unfortunately missed, however, the necessary consequence that the whole series of development is therefore (Time being the necessary ground of change) grounded in the *Mind*. Of course he overlooked, also, the “*Proto*” when he took Atom as Protoplasm as the ground. As to the Gods, he stands on about the same ground as the modern doctrine of “Unknowable.” Have the Moderns any advantage over him in *any* respect?

S. H. E.

CONCORD, MASS., *November*, 1880.

THE TRANSMIGRATION OF BRAIN TISSUE.

“The Medical and Surgical Reporter” (of Philadelphia) for June 4, 1881, notices a book, recently published on the subject of Dyspepsia, which goes so far in the direction of physiological-psychology as to ask:

“Is it too visionary to imagine that some of the particles of brain tissue which, in the mind of Julius Cæsar, originated and worked out the details of military campaigns which resulted in making Rome the master of the world, may, after centuries of wanderings and vegetable life, and residence

in minds of inferior calibre—poor pasture, as it were—finally have been eaten by and assimilated into the brain of Napoleon Bonaparte, and meeting there with conditions and surroundings like to those of their ancient Roman home, planted in good and well-manured brain soil, they may have grown vigorously, labored with some of their ancient energy, and enabled Napoleon, through their agency, to make France mistress of Europe?”

DR. FRIEDRICH HARMS ON THE FORMS OF ETHICAL SYSTEMS.¹

In a separate reprint from the proceedings of the Royal Academy of Sciences at Berlin for 1878 we find a lecture of Professor Harms, of Berlin, read by him before the Academy, in May and July, 1878. The following extracts translated from the lecture will prove of interest, and suggest a field of profitable thinking in the department of ethical studies, now attracting so much attention on the part of thinkers. The entire treatise ought to be translated and published in English.

“In the history of philosophy we find five forms of ethics come down to us: The Greek, the East Indian, the ethics of the Middle Ages, the ethics of naturalism in modern philosophy before Kant, and the ethics of the historical point of view which we find in post-Kantian philosophy. These five forms characterize the epochs in the history of ethics—each one of these epochs having its own peculiar theory of social or moral (*sittlich*) life.”

“In Greek ethics we find subordinate tendencies; on the one hand the ethics of the Stoics and Epicureans, which asks whether the object of life is for happiness or for activity, supposing that the one or the other—happiness (Epicureans) or activity (Stoics)—will suffice for the explanation of life without the other. The Stoics and Epicureans form together one side of Greek ethics in antithesis to the system of Plato and Aristotle. . . . In this general antithesis the question is this: Whether the active or the happiness-seeking life is to find its true place in the isolated life of the individual, or in social combination. . . . Incontestably the standpoint of Plato and Aristotle is higher than that of the Stoics and Epicureans, because it takes ethics as a science of the life of man as it is found in the social community in the state and the family, and not in the personal life of the isolated individual. Even down to the present time that view of the Stoics and Epicureans has prevailed and limited ethical theories to mere collections of examples of all sorts of curious questions of dispute. . . . It is quite recently, in the post-Kantian philosophy, that this individual-

¹ Die Formen der Ethik. Von Friedrich Harms. (Aus den Abhandlungen der königl. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 1878.) Berlin: G. Vogt. 1878.

istic form of ethics has been given up, and, through the labors of Fichte, a return has been made to the form of treatment which was set up by Plato and Aristotle. . . . Schleiermacher's Ethics, Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit, and Herbart's Practical Philosophy—all three works agree in treating together all phases of spiritual and ethical life as constituting one whole.

“The East Indian ethical system has a different basis from the Greek. The Greek ethics took shape in a polemic against the sophists regarding the foundation of science. The East Indian ethics, on the other hand, sets out from the principle that all life is an evil, full of pain and sorrow. It seeks in science the means through which the soul can free itself from the might of pain which oppresses its life. This relief from pain can be found only in science and self-knowledge. This self-knowledge consists in the knowledge that the soul does nothing for itself, produces nothing, but merely contemplates; that all that is, is produced by matter, corporeal nature.

“All that happens in the world is produced by nature; the soul is only the spectator of the event. . . . When the soul comes to recognize all events as produced by nature, and to be alien to itself, it becomes indifferent to all, and contemplates all in quiet. . . . It recognizes itself as free from external events and as self-subsisting. This oblivion to the external is attained only for brief intervals in life, but perfectly in death. All pain and suffering in life arises through the union of the soul with nature. The soul gets emancipation through the knowledge that all phenomena are only a spectacle for the soul in order that it may learn science and self-knowledge. It does nothing; the world is only an illusion which does not touch the soul. . . . This view of the East Indians is in direct opposition to that of the Greek. The relation of matter to spirit is completely changed. To the Greek, matter is the passive principle, and spirit the active principle. According to the Indian ethics, matter is the active, and spirit only passive contemplation. The mind only contemplates and is lame, while matter is only blind. From this arises a difference in the value which they set upon life as a means of attaining the object of the soul. The pessimistic Indian finds life utterly worthless as a means for attaining his ends, for it is only through the negation of life and its torments—pain, suffering, and sorrow—that the soul reaches its rest. For the Greek, life has a positive value, and Greek ethics do not seek the removal of life but only its regulation. Ethical life to the Greek means life in conformity to the principle of moderation. . . . The Greek believes life to be not merely for contemplation, but for action also.”

“As a third to these two forms may be added the ethics of the Middle

Ages—including under this head the scholastic and patristic writers. (The patristic are, of course, not included in the Middle Ages if the classification is strict.) In this system of ethics we find a new idea added to that of the Greeks and Hindoos—an idea of the history of the human race. For the Christian fathers hold that there is a plan in the history of the race—it is the education of the race through divine revelation; this is an ethical process. In India this thought cannot appear; for life is an evil, and a greater evil the longer it endures; the Indian idea is well expressed in the utterance of Schopenhauer: ‘History is an eternal monotony—it is only the long and confused dream of humanity.’ But, according to the Christian fathers, life in its totality is a valuable means for the realization of its purpose in the history of the human race. Even the Greeks did not conceive this universal destiny of the human race, although they conceived (in the system of Plato and Aristotle) a personal life and a life in the community. This idea takes two forms in the Middle Ages: the ethics of the Church and the ethics of the secular life in the state. The Church takes the form of an universal, all-inclusive community, while the state assumes the form of a limited and narrow community by the side of the Church. The state cannot give peace to the soul; it can give only justice in a province of external action. A separation arises between Church and state, between political and religious life, such as never appeared in the ancient world. . . . The concept of sin stands in contrast with the Indian idea of life as the source of all evil and pain. It is not physical, nor metaphysical, but something moral—something that springs from a deed. Sin presupposes a normal form which may be realized, and from which there is a departure by the one who sins. (In the Indian ethics there is no such ideal presupposed, but all form is abnormal.) The antithesis of Church and state, and the antithesis of sin and holiness, both enter as determining elements into the ethics of the Middle Ages. . . . Hence, too, the ethics of the Christian fathers makes the will the principle of the world and of spiritual life. . . . The problem of the freedom of the will becomes the chief object of investigation. In the will lies the explanation of the ethical world. . . . In the will, Saint Augustine finds the true being and essence of man and the cause of all his works. Thomas Aquinas defines that as good which all will. An absolute will is, according to Duns Scotus, the ground of the creation of the world. Hence, too, the will of God is the norm of all ethical life, the latter being judged by its conformity to the will of God. . . . God’s will is conceived as without change or variability, as an eternal law, as impressed upon all being—the world being regarded as a divine work and as a revelation of God’s will, and hence throughout as an

ethical process. Augustine presents these contrasts of secular life and religious life, of sin and holiness, of grace and depravity, in such a manner as to bring out strongly their incompatibility. The secular and theological virtues are contrasted: the secular are the four cardinal virtues of the Greeks: the theological virtues are faith, hope, and love. The heathen virtues are the negative of the celestial. . . . The secular state arose from the fall; Cain murdered his brother Abel, and so, too, Romulus murdered his brother Remus; but the city of God is in contrast with this. . . . Albertus Magnus reaches the highest form of ethics in the Middle Ages; with him the secular life is esteemed far more highly than with Saint Augustine. . . . Every individual being something special and limited, the division of labor arises in the secular world. The spiritual life compensates with its wholeness for the division and partiality of the secular vocations. Faith, hope, and charity do not come from the natural exercise of the soul, but from divine grace. Each one shall be and have all that the other is and has (in the secular, each takes only his share, but in the spiritual each has the whole, undivided), for what the one knows all may know, and herein the limitation of individuality which prevails in secular life is abrogated. The secular life becomes a means for the spiritual life, and the performance of the cardinal virtues a preparation for the celestial virtues."

"A fourth form of ethics is found in the modern philosophy before Kant. It offers us the naturalistic point of view in opposition to the supernaturalistic view of the Middle Ages, which made the will of God the principle of the world and the norm of life. 'The nature of things' is assumed as the ground for all events and as the norm of life. To this belongs 'natural theology,' which proposes to explain the religions of the world by natural religion. 'Natural rights' are in like manner to explain the laws of the state. . . . According to Hobbes, the law of nature is self-preservation; and this is the condition of all well-being. All natural impulses are egoistic, and seek the pleasure of the individual. According to Spinoza, nature is the power of the absolute, and each individual that strives to preserve itself is only a part and mode of the absolute, which is the power and working force in all individuals. This leads to quietism. Shaftesbury holds nature to be natural impulse that produces all—is social, benevolent, useful, and directed to the general happiness.

"In the ethics of the historical point of view, ethics and the philosophy of history are united; Lessing and Herder on the one hand, and Kant on the other, contributed to it. Fichte combined the two modes of view. Schelling and Hegel sought the same end in their philosophy of spirit; Schleiermacher and Herbart also. Freedom, says Fichte, is the

highest good, and the temporal life has worth only as it is free. The sole aim of life is to achieve freedom, and temporal life is a struggle for freedom. Only through freedom is man a member of the true world and born into true being. The will is the absolute origin of being, and there is nothing higher than the will. It might appear as if Schelling had departed from this standpoint, and had made a principle of material nature the ground of all existence. This is not the case; for, though the principle of freedom seemed to be subordinated in his system for a long period, yet it came forth at last as the true and higher principle—philosophy, according to Schelling, having to do with the problem of freedom as a reconciliation of necessity and freedom. He endeavors to show how freedom can be joined with the necessity which it encounters in nature; while Kant and Fichte attempt to treat freedom apart by itself as negative to the world. The world could not be God's creation or revelation if there were no freedom in it. In freedom alone is to be found independence and responsibility; all being is in its last and highest instance a will. . . . It is the same with Hegel. According to him, freedom is the essence of mind; and the vocation of spirit is to give objective realization to its freedom in the sphere of civil laws, morality, the family, civil society, and the state, and still further to reach a consciousness of this freedom in art, religion, and science. It is a great merit of Hegel that he has shown how freedom and law do not exclude each other, but mutually imply each other. He says that laws are the forms in which external objective freedom expresses itself. Schleiermacher has called attention to the fact that freedom is not only the self-legislation of the will, but at the same time individual fulfilment of law. There must be individual recognition of its self-determination on the part of the special person, or else the freedom is not complete. . . . According to Herbart's practical philosophy, the internal freedom is not only the first but the highest ethical idea in spiritualized society. It includes within it the actualization of the other ethical ideas which Herbart places beside it, and is, therefore, the principle of the whole, and gives the normal standard and the guide for all the others.

“The five forms of ethics correspond to their epochs of historical development: The Indian ethics as well as the ethics of naturalism are the widest departures from the true idea of ethics, inasmuch as they lack practical deeds, and recognize only subjective aims of the will. Both are anti-historic—both deny historic evolution of ethical life. The Greek and the mediæval ethics have decisive advantages in their setting a high value upon the uses of life and in the place which they give to consciousness in human life. The Greek ethical system seeks to regulate life ac-

ording to rational insight. The mediæval ethics adds to the idea of ethics that of human history as a constituent, but it remains in a discord within itself (not reconciling the secular and the religious). Ethics, since Kant, has become universal in its scope, like that of Plato and Aristotle, since it has the social life for its content; but, in addition to this, it has also an ethical historical element, for in history freedom attains objectivity in the realization of its ends. It is not involved in a mere process of becoming without attainment of being, but it has found the way that leads to the goal."

THE EDITOR.

SOCIAL SCIENCE.—INFANT EDUCATION.

[In our January number we printed the circular of Mrs. Talbot, Secretary of the Educational Committee of the American Social Science Association. The following letter has been received from Mr. Darwin on the subject of interest.—EDITOR.]

BECKENHAM, KENT, RAILWAY STATION, ORPINGTON, }
S.-E. R., July 19, 1881. }

DEAR MADAM: In response to your wish, I have much pleasure in expressing the interest which I feel in your proposed investigation on the mental and bodily development of infants. Very little is at present accurately known on this subject, and I believe that isolated observations will add but little to our knowledge; whereas, tabulated results from a very large number of observations systematically made would probably throw much light on the sequence and period of development of the several faculties.

This knowledge would probably give a foundation for some improvement in our education of young children, and would show us whether the same system ought to be followed in all cases.

I will venture to specify a few points of inquiry which, as it seems to me, possess some scientific interest. For instance, does the education of the parents influence the mental powers of their children at any age, either at a very early or somewhat more advanced stage? This could, perhaps, be learned by schoolmasters or mistresses, if a large number of children were first classed according to age and their mental attainment, and afterward in accordance with the education of their parents, as far as this could be discovered.

As observation is one of the earliest faculties developed in young children, and as this power would probably be exercised in an equal degree by the children of educated and uneducated persons, it seems not impossible that any transmitted effect from education could be displayed only at a somewhat advanced age. It would be desirable to test statistically in a similar manner the truth of the often-repeated statement that colored children at first learn as quickly as white children, but that they afterward fall off in progress.

If it could be proved that education acted not only on the individual, but by transmission on the race—this would be a great encouragement to all working on this important subject. It is well known that children sometimes exhibit at a very early age strong special tastes, for which no cause can be assigned, although occasionally

they may be accounted for by reversion to the taste or occupation of some progenitor; and it would be interesting to learn how far such early tastes are persistent and influence the future career of the individual. In some instances such tastes die away without apparently leaving any after-effect; but it would be desirable to know how far this is commonly the case, as we should then know whether it were important to direct, as far as this is possible, the early tastes of our children. It may be more beneficial that a child should follow energetically some pursuit of however trifling a nature, and thus acquire perseverance, than that he should be turned from it, because of no future advantage to him.

I will mention one other small point of inquiry in relation to very young children which may possibly prove important with respect to the origin of language; but it could be investigated only by persons possessing an accurate musical ear. Children, even before they can articulate, express some of their feelings and desires by noises uttered in different notes. For instance, they make an interrogative noise and others of assent and dissent in different tones; and it would, I think, be worth while to ascertain whether there is any uniformity in different children in the pitch of their voices under various frames of mind.

I fear that this letter can be of no use to you; but it will serve to show my sympathy and good wishes in your researches.

I beg leave to remain, dear madam, yours faithfully,

CHARLES DARWIN.

To Mrs. EMILY TALBOT.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

The Philosophy of Religion must be acknowledged on all hands as the most important work of the human intellect. In explaining religion as a phenomenon of human life, it is found necessary to expound the idea of the first principle of the world—the absolute. In defining his idea of the absolute, man defines his idea of his own origin and destiny, and the idea of the relation which he holds to nature and to the absolute. All practical activity of man is conditioned through this idea of the absolute. Man's immortality and freedom are conditioned directly through the nature of God. If God is an unconscious natural power, man can have no other destiny than to be absorbed at some time into this unconscious power, and lose his individual being. Indeed, on the hypothesis of an unconscious first principle, it is impossible to explain how a conscious being ever came to exist at all. For consciousness is directive power, and the rationality which manifests itself in consciousness is an indefinitely growing potency in the control of the world, perpetually imposing its own forms on brute matter, and subordinating it to the service of man just as if man had made it originally for his own use. The hasty and general outlook is sufficient to give the presumption that the absolute is not only an all-powerful might, but an all-knowing might. The one most important truth of all is the truth in regard to the resemblance or differ-

ence of this first principle from man. If man, as consciousness, is in its image, then the trend of the universe is in the direction of the triumph of man's cause. His development will be an ascent towards the divine. In knowing himself, man will know with some degree of adequacy the divine.

Another consideration of equal importance following from this is the doctrine that God is a revealed God, if He is a conscious Being. His works reveal Him. His creation is a manifestation of His will, and in the creation of intelligent beings He reveals His own intelligence. Hegel has laid great stress upon this thought in his "Philosophy of Religion." In the third part of that treatise he expounds the religion of the revealed God,¹ calling it "The Absolute Religion," conceiving Christianity to be this absolute religion, and showing by strict analyses of the contents of the other religions that no one of them makes God a revealed God, and that the reason for this is that the idea of God in the pantheistic and polytheistic religions is the idea of a first principle which cannot be revealed in a created world. Neither man nor nature can reveal Brahm, because Brahm is utterly transcendent, not only to the world, but to man in his highest development. Brahm has no form, but transcends consciousness as much as he does material form. With this we have the world of nature and the world of man, not as creations of Brahm, not as revelations of that principle, but as pure illusion—*Maya*. This illusion is to be accounted for on the hypothesis of the fall of man into individual consciousness, wherein he distinguishes himself from the all. It is "the dream of the drop that hath withdrawn itself from the primal ocean of being," and which colors all its seeing with the defect of its own finitude—consciousness being regarded as the origin of all division and particularity. Its form is that of subject-objectivity; *i. e.*, of a subject which is its own object, and yet a subject which looks upon the object as a world of alien existence—"It says 'thou' to the rest of creation." What momentous import this theory has for the people who believe it we know through the history of the Oriental world—a history which Hegel prefers to exclude from the world-history as being a history that contains no principle of secular progress within it. For it looks upon all as negative

¹ See page 10 of this volume of the *Jour. Spec. Phil.*, where the translator renders the word "offenbare" by "manifest" and "obvious," which is certainly the ordinary signification of "offenbare." But Hegel had in mind the word "Offenbarung," which signifies "revelation" in the technical sense of the term. It is as if Hegel would have used the word "revelate" had he been writing in English, so as to suggest that his "offenbare Religion" is the religion of a God that reveals Himself in His creation as well as in a special "revealed word."

to the divine, and hence as not being capable of improvement, but only fit for annihilation. The highest is Nirvana, or the rest of unconsciousness. Progress towards the annihilation of conscious being is progress towards the divine, as understood in the Orient. Such progress as that we call decay and decease.

With the idea of a revealed God we discover a radically different solution to the world. We find that man has a positive work to do; an active stage of civilization takes the place of Oriental quietism. Man has the vocation to render himself divine by learning the form of God's will as revealed, and then forming his own will in its pattern—adopting God's will as the form of his human will. He must learn the divine will, and make an utter sacrifice of his own will to it, so that his deeds shall be inspired through the divine will, all finitude of the creature being offered up by renunciatory act to the divine, so that the conflict between the divine and human shall be ended by the self-devotion, the utter sacrifice of all selfishness on the part of the individual. The sacrifice of the Oriental devotee relates to the substance of his consciousness, and ends in annihilation, if he can achieve so much as he aspires for. The Christian renunciation does not go so far; it recognizes in God the Absolute form, instead of an absolute formlessness. God has the form of Consciousness, of Personality. Hence, with this idea of the divine, the sacrifice of the individual for the divine is no annihilation of individuality, but rather the putting on the form of the freest and highest individuality. The sacrifice which the Christian devotee makes is no sacrifice of his human form, but only of its content; he takes into the form of his will and knowing a divine substance, the substance revealed as the will of God, and by this he preserves his individuality, and yet removes the barrier between himself and the divine through utter abandonment of self to the will of the divine will, which, being the will of a conscious personality, restores to man his sacrificed individuality in a transfigured form. Man, by his religious sacrifice, therefore, gains all and loses nothing but finitude and defect. The doctrine of Grace, as the highest principle of divine action towards the world of man and nature, is the only doctrine in harmony with the idea of a revelation of God through creation. Were God any other than conscious personality, man and nature would reveal something essentially different from Him. A world which offers us a series of beings ascending from the inorganic to the organic, and crowns all with a human race, reveals a conscious first principle by pointing towards it as the final cause of its progressive series. It points towards such a divine principle, and only towards it.

Man, too, is a being who can develop within himself—he can collect

experience from the individuals of his species and redistribute this experience to the individual—thus elevating the life of the individual into the life of the species, and without destroying the latter's individuality, but, on the contrary, increasing it. For in our human affairs the man goes for most who has taken up into himself the life and experience of his fellow-men most effectually. Shakespeare and Goethe, Homer and Dante—these are vast individualities, comprehending human nature almost entire within each. Man is great when he avails himself of the power of his species. Even the Cæsar or the Napoleon is great through his representative character—summing up in his will the will-power of his nation and distributing it again to them as directive power. Each humble individual, too, who serves under the Cæsar or the Napoleon participates to some extent in the greatness of individuality of the great leader, because he is led out of and beyond himself to live for others and through others and in others. Thus each one gains individuality while he gives it to others. Here, in secular affairs, is the same principle which the doctrine of Grace enunciates for the religious consciousness. Since the day of Saint Augustine, who was the first to see the absoluteness of the principle of Grace (among the Christian Fathers), we have had, as the chief interest in the history of the Church, the attempt to realize this principle in all its consequences.

It is possible to seize the principle of Grace in an abstract manner, and set it over against other principles, such as justice and free-will. Or it is possible to misunderstand it altogether, as in the case of naturalistic theories which can think of no possible view of interrelation except the materialistic one, which admits of no participation but only of exclusion. Justice is not a principle which is to be thought as limiting grace; grace itself assumes the form of justice in proportion as it meets the free responsibility of the individual. Without responsibility there can be no justice; for justice returns upon the individual only what he has uttered in freedom. But the principle of grace extends below the realm of free responsibility to the lowest manifestation of the creation. It is grace that draws up all creation towards the highest, and endows beings with progressive degrees of individuality and realization of the divine image. The animal, it is true, is not immortal, but so much life as it has is the life of the species, and is a gift of grace which gives him the light of life, not for his having a right to it, but for the sake of divine love which pours itself out in creation, from freedom and the desire of good. When the human being arrives, he progresses into knowledge and will-power, and this brings responsibility, and with it the principle of justice. Justice is the principle of grace applied to free beings, because justice is respect shown

to the responsibility of the individual who acts. Justice assumes the actor to be self-determined and free and to own his deed ; whatever his deed is, it is returned to him. To return the deed of an irresponsible being upon it would be to annihilate it. To treat a free being as though it did not own its deeds would be to offer indignity to it and annihilate its freedom. But freedom is itself the last and highest gift of grace, and grace will preserve that before all else. Freedom is self-determination, but not the self-determination of a mere particular individual in its isolation, but rather as participation in the life of the species—in the life of God, rather. Freedom, which should energize to will only its particularity, apart from the divine and from the human race, would merely set up for itself a limit in the race and in God. This would be the hell which selfishness makes for itself. Even grace, which seeks to give to others, receiving naught in return, would be the highest pain to the isolated will that seeks to find itself alone in the universe. Dante makes his “*Inferno*” to be caused by the fall of Lucifer, through pride, he striking the earth and hollowing out the vortex with its terraces on which sinners are punished. Pride is the worst of mortal sins, because it loves only itself and repels God and man and all that is valued by them. Grace is the most repugnant to pride. Next to pride is the sin of envy. But envy is not so deadly as pride in that it does not hate all that is from others. It hates God and man, but it loves the temporal blessings which they possess, and desires to possess them exclusively itself. Next above envy is anger, or that which does violence to its fellows and against God. Anger is not so deep a sin as envy or as pride ; for it strikes the particular individual or special persons, but not the foundation of all society and of all union with God, while pride and envy are hostile to all association whether with man or with God.

Christianity defines the “mortal sins” from this view of divine grace. Freedom is turned against itself for its own annihilation in these sins, because it wills against participation in the life of the species as well as in the divine life. It is the principle of grace, which Goethe, in the second part of his “*Faust*,” calls the eternal-feminine, “*Das Ewig-Weibliche*,” which is the moving principle of all progress towards the goal. Goethe, like Dante, makes divine love or grace the very element that is most painful to the devils who undertake to seize Faust’s soul. Association is the most destructive agency which fiendishness can come in contact with. The angels appear in the clouds strewing roses (of love), which the devils find to be the most exquisite torture when they are struck by them. Even the association of devils for a purpose is liable to undermine the absolute hate which is the ideal of the perfect devil. Slavery would

undermine it, for the slave would be forced into submission of his will to another; and to toil for another is to sacrifice one's self for that other, and to some extent to realize the principle of grace. So if Mephistopheles controls other devils he realizes his purposes in and through them, and they subordinate their individual wills to his will—thus simulating the principle of grace—thus deep is the principle of grace constitutive of the nature of the human world and of the forms of human life. Even slavery has a positive side to it, which is medicative towards those worst of spiritual ills—pride and envy. Goethe had come to this view of grace during his life, starting with the pantheistic theory, and finding its consequences inhuman; not even devils could live under such a theory. There was a glimpse of the true theory of the world in his mind quite early in life, and he tells us that he saw the Faust problem then in its entirety, first and second parts. He had seen that the universe is based in its deepest laws on the principle of “saving grace.” The three phases of holiness in the Christian church are portrayed by him in the last scene of “Faust.” There comes first the Pater Ecstaticus, who calls upon arrows to transfix him (as they did St. Sebastian), and for lances, bludgeons, and lightnings to martyr him, so that his “pining breast” may be rid of its “vain unrealities, and see only the star of everlasting love.” This view is simply negative to the finite and earthly. Pater Profundus comes next as the representative of a more perfect state of holiness. He looks upon nature and sees it as the spectacle of God's love forming and preserving created beings. Not only this, but he sees that even the lightning and the terrible mountain torrent are messengers of love, bringing fertility to the vale and purity to the air; he sees the world as instrument for the realization of spirit. There is next Pater Seraphicus, who is a higher saint, because he does not spurn the world and seek only his own bliss in ecstatic contemplation, nor see merely the mediatorial process in creation, like the Pater Profundus, but he “takes up into himself the blessed boys . . . brought forth at midnight hour, with a soul and sense half shut, lost immediate to the parents, by the angels straightway gained . . .”; lets them see the world through his eyes, and, by allowing them participation in his human experience, equalizes their fate which had denied them earthly life. Here we see that the soul is represented as gaining something positive from the earthly life which must be made up to it by the gracious aid of some Pater Seraphicus if too early death has deprived it of human experience. But Dr. Marianus (“in the highest, purest cell”) sees the Virgin as the symbol of divine grace (as the feminine is especially the bearer of human tenderness and mercy on earth, so it becomes properly a symbol of divine grace), and thus celebrates divine grace as the deep-

est principle of the divine nature, and as containing all other principles within it.

Milton, in representing the fallen angels as having society and combination, in the form of a hellish commonwealth, with a legislative assembly over which Satan "exalted sat," has painted the demoniac as possessing divine elements. It is Dante alone who has consistently presented to us the symbolic portraiture of the degrees of sin in its effects upon the soul, and has shown us Lucifer "immersed to his midst in ice," his pride repelling all the universe, and thus freezing him with isolation—for warmth is the symbol of association—even our clothing warms us by contact, and we warm our spiritual capacities into activity by association, contact with other souls, so that love is regarded as spiritual warmth. The institution of the State and of Civil society, of the family, and still more the institution of the Church, weave for human life a spiritual clothing—the universal enwrapping the particular—and preserve vital heat within it.

If these views are correct, it is not wonderful that the great fathers of the Christian church, who have seen this principle of grace revealed as the ground of true life and the solvent word that alone explains creation, have laid so much stress upon it as to make it seem often as the exclusive principle rather than the inclusive principle. Hence justice has been opposed to grace and stern legality made to stand over against grace, simply because the principle of grace was interpreted in a one-sided manner. Then, too, freedom has been thrust back as if it had been impossible with divine sovereignty; when, in fact, it is grace alone that makes freedom possible. For freedom is participation in the form of the absolute, and hence the realization of independence which alone can be conceived through the idea of love or grace which freely imparts itself to others and lives in their living.

Even the knowing or consciousness is made possible through the participation in the divine. "We see all things in God," says Malebranche, but the remark is not original with him, for it is simply a statement of the doctrine that he had learned in the Catholic teaching of the college of La Marche and of the Sorbonne. For four hundred years the Catholic schools had been teaching the doctrines of Aquinas and Albertus Magnus, which taught that the very simplest form of knowing, the simple sensuous certitude, is a consciousness that the me and the not-me are united in one predicate—that of BEING—which is perceived to be both subjective and objective at once, the ground of the me and of the not-me. This is "lux intelligibilis" which Aquinas speaks of (in *librum Boet. de Trin.*, Qu. 1). He says that this intuition of Being in the first act of sense-perception is an intuition of God (in an imperfect manner it is true, but still)

the knowing of that which is utterly universal as regards any mere subjective point of view. He calls this knowing of the primal intuition whereby all knowing of things becomes possible INTELLIGERE. (*Obiectum intellectus est ens vel verum commune.*—*Quaest. lv, Art. I, Summa I.*) This common or universal principle which is the criterion of truth is that through which we reduce the unknown objects to known ones—resolving them by means of this common principle which is both subjective and objective (*Illud quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens.*—*Quaest. Disp., quaest. I, De Veritate, Art. I.*)

This primary category of the mind through which we cognize (see *Jour. Spec. Phil.* for Jan., 1879, page 90; also *Introd. to Phil.*, Chap. iii, page 115 of *Jour. Spec. Phil.*, Vol. I) is, according to Italian philosophy, a divine light, the intuition of God as the Absolute, although, of course, only the most incomplete act of knowing possible, because it cognizes merely the abstract being and not the concrete nature of the divine. Yet it is grace, inasmuch as it imparts itself, reveals itself to the mind, and makes the mind see itself and its object in the light (*lumen*) thus given it. The retention of this insight by the Italians has kept them from the tendency to subjective idealism, like that of Berkeley and Hume, and has made the German philosophy proceeding from Kant seem to them a most unwarranted procedure, for the reason that it solves a difficulty that is itself purely imaginary. For why should it solve subjective idealism by admitting it and then proceeding to construct the world according to it, when all subjective idealism rests on a mistake in regard to the first and most simple act of knowing? For, according to the psychology of the school that comes down from Thomas Aquinas, the category of Being is seen to be both subjective and objective at once, and this perception is what constitutes cognition. Hence cognition cannot be merely subjective when it relates to the recognition of objects.

Connected with this idea in psychology is the ontological proof of the existence of God by Saint Anselm. This sets out by showing that in all cognition there is implied the idea of a Totality to which all our ideas are referred, as a norm. "*Illud quo majus cogitari non potest*" is the thought of the totality and the thought of God as to its general form, but an inadequate thought, only the true first condition in the thought of God. This thought of the totality becomes the thought of God, adequately, in proportion as the determining thoughts are added which make our idea clear as to the attributes of God. The idea of totality involves that of independence and freedom, as well as that of self-determination; and self-determination involves, again, that of self-consciousness and will.

It is true that the concreter ideas of consciousness and will are not directly involved, so that one can see them immediately following from the statement of the former, but, nevertheless, they follow as strictly, though by many intermediate steps. The opponents of the ontological proof of God always assume the same standpoint that the proof assumes, but naively overlook the fact and make the proof to be merely fanciful. Gaunilo asserts that the thought of the lost island in the Atlantic does not prove its real existence, wherefore Anselm's "Than which no greater can be thought" is a concept which does not imply necessary existence. But this very objection rests on the assumption that Anselm's concept may be a merely subjective one, and that there may be an objective which transcends it, and that the objective plus the subjective make up the totality. He would not find it possible to think a greater than the totality, nor to think the totality otherwise than as existent. "The All exists," is the purport of Anselm's assertion. To this he adds that the All is perfect (because it lacks nothing, there being nothing outside it for it to need; and, besides this, it is no becoming or process of development because it is total and has arrived at its goal—only finite time can separate that which is potential from its realization, and in a totality this time has been long since transcended). He concludes, too, that the All is good (for good implies self-end and self-mediation for that end, and in the totality there can be no conflict of end and means with the self). The totality is God, therefore, and the thought of it underlies all thinking—even the thinking of the fool, who says in his heart that there is no God. But the All must not be taken in the sense of a mere collection—a "tout ensemble," as the French call it. Such a totality would be only quantitative unity, which would, however, be soon modified in thought into the idea of a process of determination of each part by the influence of the totality of conditions in the world. This would result in the idea of fate or blind Power, which, as a universal might, destroyed the particular beings of the world. The further thought upon the nature of fate would discover that self-determination was the basis to any possible form of totality, and hence that the totality must be personal and free, and that a world of particular beings with origination, change and decay, was to be explained, not as a part of the totality, but as its manifestation, as its creation. Then would follow the thought of the creation of beings which reflect the total or absolute person, and finally thought would begin to understand the world in which it finds itself.

THE EDITOR.

BOOK NOTICES.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By JOHN CAIRD, D. D., Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Glasgow. Glasgow: James Maclehose, 1880.

The substance of this book, as the author tells us, was delivered as the "Croall Lecture" for 1878-79. He acknowledges obligations to many works bearing on his theme, but "Above all, to Hegel's *Philosophie der Religion*, a work to which he has been more largely indebted than to any other book." Thoughtful readers of this book will express equally warm obligations to this labor of Principal Caird, if we mistake not. It is a work which will find its place in the hands of sober-minded men and women in all English-speaking countries, for the unrest of scepticism has affected so many that there is no longer a demand for religious books of simple devotion, but there must be something to appeal to the intellect. The theoretical soul must not be divorced from religious participation. And is this not good—that there should be a wholeness in religion, that the intellect, too, should arrive at piety, as well as the will and the affections? If the intellect thinks materialism, while the heart loves God the Spirit, the mind will be like that house swept and garnished, which, however, is soon to be filled with the devils which scepticism brings along with it. There never was a greater mistake than that which supposes that religion may exist in the heart, while impiety of thought flourishes side by side. The Christian religion is a religion which carries with it a view of the world (the Germans call it a "Welt-Anschauung"), and it is impossible to separate this view of the world, or intellectual religion, from that feeling which the heart is to have, and which is to be the essential part of religion. For example, let us suppose a pious man who reads and believes Professor Bain's books on the brain as the producer of mind, and who comes to hold that there is no hereafter for the soul—that there is no soul, but only a function of brain and nerves. What can his heart say to itself in view of this conviction? Certainly nothing that can sound like Christianity. Or, suppose that one reads Feuerbach and Strauss, and comes to think that the entire Christian history is a myth—in short, that all religious histories base themselves upon natural phenomena, if not on "sun-myths," then on historical experiences. The Christian world is responsible for the perpetual readjustment of its theoretical view of the world so that there shall be no error without its refutation, no unworthy view of the soul without the true view grounded in its place. The intellect is not to be regarded, either, as a *bête noire*—as something which is unessential to religion, and which were better avoided altogether in religion if possible. Such a view would look upon theology as only a necessary evil, and would, in fact, imply a theory which made God not an intellect, not a God of truth, but only a God of goodness and love, only a blind goodness and love. This view forgets, when it thinks of piety in ancient times—of piety which said "Credo ut intelligam," or even "credo quia impossibile"—how that such piety took its view of the world from Christianity, and thought nature as perpetually the theatre of divine manifestation, and human history as immediate revelation of divine providence. If we in modern times have come to look upon nature as manifestation of Law, it is indispensable that we shall readjust our view of the world and learn to recognize the conscious personality of God in the world of laws, just as our fellow-Christians of the ninth century did recognize him in the immediate events of daily life.

In the ten chapters of this work Principal Caird treats first of the function of philosophy and the criticism of the organ of knowledge; next of the objections to the scientific treatment of religion, with especial reference to the theories of the unknowable and the relativity of knowledge; with further reference to the theory of immediate or intuitive knowledge *versus* logical or mediated knowing; and, further, with reference to the view which holds that revelation excludes the activity of reason. (The very acceptance of a revelation implies the activity of the intellect, and that the intellect be guided in its interpretation by consistent intellectual views. Without the highest exercise of the reason the revelation may be misunderstood—in fact, is certain to be misunderstood.) The necessity of religion is shown to be the necessity, which underlies the intellect, of tracing out “the steps of that process by which the finite spirit transcends its own finitude and rises into communion with the things unseen and eternal”—to show, in other words, how it is necessary to mind, to relate itself to God, and to determine that idea of God which its religious experience involves. He next discusses the proofs of the existence of God, and shows the real significance of the famous proofs that satisfied the intellect once, but are now not regarded with favor. In his sixth chapter he comes to treat of the nature of the religious consciousness, as containing feeling, and knowledge as well. He proceeds to show the defects of the representative or figurative form of knowledge—how it proves to be inadequate for grasping the unity of spiritual subjects and for solving their seeming contradictions. In Chapter VIII he examines the expedients of the discursive intellect for giving unity to knowledge, and shows the falsity of pantheism and anthropomorphism as theories of the relation of the human to the divine. He defines the province of morality, distinguishing it from religion, and closes his treatise with showing the relation of the transient to the permanent in religion—the contribution of history to religion, and the contribution of philosophy to it. We give the following quotations:

“Morality is, and from its nature can be, only the partial solution of the contradiction between the natural and the spiritual; and its partial or incomplete character may be said, in general, to arise from this, that while the end aimed at is the realization of an infinite ideal, the highest result of morality is only a never-ending approximation to that ideal. It gives us, instead of the infinite, only the negation of the finite.” “The spiritual life of man, as we have said, rests on the fact that reason or self-consciousness is the form of an infinite content, and has in it the never-ceasing impulse to make the actual life adequate to its ideal form.” “I am not one individual in a world of individuals, having a will of my own which is not theirs, as they have wills which are not mine, so that where my will ends their will begins; but, on the contrary, it is in ceasing to have a will of my own—to will only what pertains to my private, exclusive self, in entering into the life, identifying my will with the will and welfare of others—that I realize my own spiritual nature and become actually what, as possessed of a moral will, I am potentially. All truth is knowable as *my* knowledge, all good is willable as *my* will; and in the impossibility of being determined by anything foreign to my thought and will, of being negated by any thing or being in which I am not at the same time affirmed, lies the infinitude of man’s spiritual nature.” “Religion rises above morality in this, that while the ideal of morality is only progressively realized, the ideal of religion is realized here and now. In that act which constitutes the beginning of the religious life—call it faith, or trust, or self-surrender, or by whatever name you will—there is involved the identification of the finite with a life which is eternally realized.” “For religion is the surrender of the finite will to the infinite, the abnegation of all desire, inclination, volition, that pertain to me as this private individual self, the giving up of

every aim or activity that points only to my exclusive pleasure or interest, the absolute identification of my will with the will of God. Oneness of mind and will with the divine mind and will is not the future hope and aim of religion, but its very beginning and birth in the soul."

THE REPUBLIC OF GOD: AN INSTITUTE OF THEOLOGY. By ELISHA MULFORD, LL. D. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. The Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1881.

Spinoza has left as his most important contribution to the history of philosophy a few technical expressions, such as *causa sui*, *infitum actu*, *infitum imaginationis*, *sub specie eternitatis*, and the like, some of which are borrowed from earlier writers—as Giordano Bruno, for example. The phrase "sub specie eternitatis" is not only descriptive of the form in which all universal and necessary ideas appear to us, but it paints for us the subjective state of mind in which such ideas are contemplated. The book of Dr. Mulford on Theology, named above, is one which may be said to be "sub specie eternitatis," in that it fixes its mind on the contemplation of God, and proceeds from the first page to the last without distracting itself by consideration of the standpoints of finite, discursive reasoning. It, therefore, appears to the latter standpoint as if it were wholly dogmatic, and even lacking in proper respect for the difficulties of conception which the latter finds in studying Christian theology. Notwithstanding this appearance, we must protest that this book contains more illumination of the dark and difficult points in theology than any other book of its epoch. It is one of the fruits of slow growth, from the mind of a man who ponders his subject for a decade, looking at its various phases from every conceivable standpoint, and looking quite through all the partial views before he begins to put his own thoughts into shape as a book. He has found a point of view whence the infinitely various attitudes of discursive reflection may all be seen at one glance, and harmonized by the larger synthesis which complements them, and thus refutes them as theories of the subject. Dr. Mulford's book on our national form of government, published many years since ("The Nation," 1870), is a book of the same style and method of composition, and of a like elevation in insight. It treats all partial views from the standpoint of the ideal nation, and is able to criticise the one-sidedness of imperfect theories from that view *sub specie eternitatis*.

Truth is not something that can be immediately received as soon as it is expressed in language. There is not such a thing as expressing profound philosophic or religious truth in language "so clear and simple" that the fool (*insipiens*) can understand it. It is true enough that he who runs may read—many things, doubtless, but of all that he reads he may not understand one jot or one tittle. The seeing of truth *sub specie eternitatis* requires the third stage of knowing. There is sense-perception, reflection, speculative knowing. The sense-perception knows things out of their relations; reflection knows them only in their relativity and dependence; the speculative knows them in the totality of their relations, and this alone is true knowing.

Dr. Mulford reviews, in his first chapter, the arguments for the being of God, and points out the defects of the reasoning as usually conducted. This is done, however, not in a negative manner, but in view of the true insight which sees that the being of God is a postulate of all knowing whatsoever. (See the article on "The Philosophy of Religion," in this number, in the Notes and Discussions.) For the first act of cognition is one that recognizes Being as the common predicate for both subject and object, and therefore recognizes Being as an Absolute category, valid to the extent of the reality of the absolute; for it transcends the mere subject which is opposed to an object, and likewise transcends the object as a mere alterum of consciousness. Hence the category

of Being postulates an Absolute which is neither me nor not-me in limited identity, but which is the identity of both as regards being the totality in which each participates, but which both do not constitute. "Man is conscious of the being of God, and lives and acts in this consciousness, and the reality of the being of God so comes to him." He dismisses Kant's refutation of Saint Anselm's ontological proof in a quiet way, with the remark that Kant assumes the difference between thought and being, a difference which holds only in case of finite things—"imperfect and incomplete things." The idea of God differs from the idea of things, inasmuch as it is the idea of that, than which there can be none greater, using the language of Anselm. God is totality, not a being over against some other. It is true that other beings exist, but only in so far as He gives them being and sustains them. There are thus two orders of Being—primitive and independent, and secondary or dependent. God alone belongs to the first, and his creation to the second. He gives to some a mere transient existence (*sub specie temporis*), and to others the form of spiritual beings with freedom and progressive realization of himself (*sub specie eternitatis*). "The idea and the being of God are one. In Him is the oneness of the ideal and the real." The ideal and real in God are one simply because of his totality. Any being whose ideal or potentiality is different from his reality cannot be an abiding form, but only a transient being which is in a state of change or development. But such a being would not be God, but would presuppose God as the ground of its possibility.

The style of Dr. Mulford is that of Aristotle, the review and criticism of the standpoints of reflection from the insight into the comprehension of the totality. The true itself is that which furnishes the only basis for criticism. Everywhere the book gives evidence that its author knows well the great affirmative results of German philosophy. Any one who possesses the thought of Aristotle can easily get at the secret of Hegel, but those who fail to see the Greek solution, and who miss the Christian idea, will not get more than pantheism from the German philosophy.

In his second chapter Dr. Mulford comes to the consideration of the nature of God. God is self-determined, and is therefore personal. The thought of God as *quo majus cogitari non potest*, or as the total, implies his self-determination. His determination can come from no other source, for there is no other source than the total, and He is therefore determined by himself, or else altogether undetermined. But an altogether undetermined God would be unconscious, and without attributes of any sort—a Brahmi whose being is formless, so that he is neither good nor bad, holy nor wicked—an utter indifference to himself and to whatever else there may be. God is self-determined or else nothing. "The personality of God does not involve limitation; the only limitation is self-limitation—the limit which it sets in its own self-limitation." "Personality does not involve limitation. . . . Personality with God is the same as personality in man, . . . the personality of God, however, being infinite. Thought and will with him are one. God suffers the limitations of the finite that man may rise to the life that is infinite." "The personality of man has its foundation in the personality of God." Personality grounds also the relation of man to God, and is the condition of the communion of man with God. "The realization of personality brings man nearer to God. Through the deeper knowledge of himself, through self-knowledge, man comes to the knowledge of God." "The personality of God is also the foundation and the condition of the freedom of man. The self-determination of God in righteousness and freedom is the ground of the self-determination of man." Immortality, too, is conditioned on this personality of God. "The personality of God is the ground of the continuous being of the personality of man."

So, too, the divine attributes are involved in the fact of his personality. "God is person; the chiefest attribute of God is freedom; he is the self-determined one, his determination is the perfect manifestation of himself; this is the significance of the will of God; the holiness of God is the central principle in that will, the principle in which he cannot become other than himself; the righteousness of God is the assertion of that will on the earth; the love of God is the expression of a person toward those who are persons."

In chapter third Dr. Mulford discusses the precedent relations of religion and philosophy to the revelation of God. He quotes the definitions of religion given by Van Osterzee, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hagenbach, and others, and then proceeds to discriminate philosophy from religion: "The process of the one is in thought, of the other in worship; the one moves through reflection, the other through emotion; but each, in its development, involves the other, as it has for its aim the truth." Hegel had said: "The object in philosophy is upon the whole the same as in religion. In both, the object is truth, in that supreme sense in which God, and God only, is truth." He now comes to his great distinction: "The Revelation of and in Christ is not a religion, and it is not a philosophy." This paradox turns out to be the expression of a very important truth. He distinguishes religion from a revelation in the fact that religion means a ritual rather than a revelation. Maurice is quoted as saying: "In other books you have the records of a *religion*. You are told how a people introduced this worship and that ceremony; how their priests enforced new propitiations; how their soothsayers told them of services that they had neglected. Here you have nothing of the kind. All the religion which the priests of the people introduced—the worship on hills and in groves, the calves, the altars to a Baal—is noticed to be denounced: a righteous king proves his righteousness by sweeping it away." Both the Old Testament and the New reveal God, and do not set up a ritual merely. "Not here nor at Jerusalem; they that worship the father must worship him in spirit and in truth." "He that doeth the will shall know the doctrine." "Christ institutes no cultus of worship, and prescribes no system of dogma. There is no suggestion of form of worship or formula of doctrine. The blessing which he gives is of those who act and suffer in the life of humanity. It is of the gentle, of those who mourn, of those who suffer persecution for righteousness, of those who hunger after righteousness." "The difference between the revelation of the Christ and all religions is ultimate. But it consists with the fact that this revelation is manifested to and in humanity."

In succeeding chapters he speaks of The Revelation of God, of His Revelation in the Christ, of The Conviction of the World, of the Revelation of Heaven to the World, the World's Justification and Redemption, and The Life of the Spirit.

"This revelation is the revelation of God; it is *from* God, but primarily it is *of* God." So that God is no longer a far-off being, transcending consciousness and unknowable by man; He reveals his own being and will to man. "It says: 'Fear not; there is nothing hidden which shall not be known.'" "Its revelation is through the light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world."

This revelation comes as a person in Christ. "This revelation is not in a life that is external to God, or external to man."

"The consequence of wickedness is eternal punishment, and this is the assertion of an immutable principle. The punishment is eternal. But to identify this with an irrevocable doom is to set a finite limit to the divine redemption and to its perfect realization. It brings a section of the human race into an ultimate condition of fate, and

not of freedom. The spiritual law is eternal, but not the necessary continuance in sin of one child of earth and time."

"To the enquiry, 'Are there few that be saved?' the answer is: Strive to enter in at the strait gate. . . . It asserts that he that believeth shall be saved; and he that believeth not shall be condemned. . . . It does not assert in any moment, for any man, in the here or in the hereafter, an irrevocable doom. Its end is to save man from sin and from the doom involved in sin. It does not place any without hope; it makes hope a virtue, difficult as all virtue is in this world, but still one with faith and love; and if illusive, then also faith and love, for which the same ground and end is revealed, are illusive."

KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS: A COMPARISON OF CRITICAL AND EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY. By JOHN WATSON, M. A., LL. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Queen's University, Kingston, Canada. Glasgow: James Maclehose, St. Vincent Street, Publisher to the University. 1881.

This being the centennial year of the publication of the Kantian Critique, we have many books relating to the famous critical system, as well as celebrations, in a more formal manner, of that great event in the history of modern philosophy. The study of Kant is being cultivated by the schools of thinkers who have close affinity to materialism, as well as by the spiritualistic thinkers. The physiological psychologists must needs try their skill at refuting the supposed demonstrations of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in order to disarm their opponents, the believers in the soul as a separate entity apart from the body. But all who are interested in moral philosophy are bound to study Kant as the founder of ethics on a stable foundation. The philosophy of ethics is the only positive result of the Kantian system.

This work by Professor Watson may be divided into three parts—which, however, are not formally separated from one another—viz.: a statement and defence of Kant's Theory of Knowledge, a criticism of English empirical philosophy, as represented by Spencer and Lewes, and an examination of Kant's own theory, conceived in the spirit of the Hegelian philosophy. The first chapter contains an exposition of the problem and method of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and also a defence of the critical or "transcendental" method against the animadversions of Mr. A. J. Balfour, whose *Defence of Philosophic Doubt* will be familiar to some of our readers. The problem of philosophy, according to Mr. Balfour, is to show "how much of what *pretends* to be knowledge we must accept as such, and why?" and the transcendental method consists in showing that we cannot admit the reality of the simplest perception without seeing that such principles as those of substance and causality are "involved" in them. To this view our author replies that Mr. Balfour has failed to see that Kant does not admit the superior validity of immediate perception, but, on the contrary, argues that a purely immediate perception is not a constituent in the intelligible world at all, and hence that to attempt any deduction of a philosophic principle from such a datum is absurd. The force of the critical argument is, therefore, altogether missed when it is supposed to lie in reasoning from immediate sensation to universal principles! Kant rather maintains that, as immediate sensation is not knowledge, but only an element in knowledge, intelligence must inform sensation before there can be any knowable world for us. In the second chapter the basis of mathematical truth, as expounded by Kant in the *Critique* and the *Prolegomena*, is stated, and it is contended, as against Mr. Henry Sidgwick, that Kant has only one method of refuting psychological idealism, his argument in both cases being that, on the supposition that knowledge is reducible

to a mere series of passing feelings, we should not have a knowledge even of the self as the subject of such feelings, since the self can only be known as an object in so far as we contrast with it a permanent world in space. Chapter III contains a full statement of the Deduction of the Categories and the Schematism of the Understanding, and points out what, in Kant's view, is the philosophical justification of the absoluteness of the laws of nature as embodied in the special sciences. In the next chapter Lewes's conception of Psychology is compared with that of Kant, and a full examination of the empirical origin of knowledge, as held by the former, is made. In contrast to Lewes's view, that sensation and consciousness are functions of the organism, it is pointed out that, unless by an abuse of terms, the organism cannot be regarded as the subject of knowledge, but only connotes physical and physiological properties. The "psychogeny" of Lewes is also held to rest upon a confusion between the transmission in a modified form of organic structure with the transmission of self-consciousness. The author then goes on to indicate Kant's reason for distinguishing between "mathematical" and "dynamical" principles, and contends, as against Dr. Stirling, that the principles of judgment are not subsequent to actual knowledge, but logically prior to it. The half unconscious evolution of those principles, as set forth by Kant, is pointed out, the progress being from the less to the more complex of them. Chapter VI contains a statement of the "proofs" of the principles of judgment, and a good deal of space is devoted to the accurate characterization of the proofs of substances and causality, about which there has been so much controversy of late. The next chapter is a further illustration of the same subject, and contains replies to the objections advanced to the proofs of Substance and Cause by Balfour and Stirling. Those objections are held to arise from an imperfect conception of the critical character of the proofs—*i. e.*, from not seeing the transformation in the ordinary dualism of intelligence and nature effected by Kant. The following chapter is devoted to Kant's metaphysic of nature, or categories of reflection, and contains the fullest statement of the contents of the *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* that has as yet appeared in English. In Chapter IX a comparison is drawn between the third chapter of Spencer's *First Principles* and the treatise analyzed in the preceding chapter. The method of Spencer is shown to be analytic or dogmatic, while the method of Kant is synthetic or critical. The comparison of Kant and Spencer is continued in the next chapter, in which the Noumenon of the one and the Unknowable of the other are shown to have only a superficial resemblance. Spencer's self-contradictory doctrine of the relativity of knowledge is carefully examined, and its source in his imperfect psychology is pointed out. The third part of the work, as contained in the last two chapters, consists of an examination of Kant's own theory of Knowledge. The provisional character of the contrast of the "manifold" as "given" and the "forms" as "originated," and of *a posteriori* and *a priori* Knowledge; the want of development in Kant's general theory; the absence of connection in the system of categories, and especially in those of Substance, Cause, and Reciprocity, and the untenability of the contrast of "pure" and "mixed" categories—forms the subject of the first of these chapters. The last chapter of all contains a very complete examination of the various elements of Knowledge distinguished by Kant, and endeavors to show in what points his doctrine, while right in principle, is burdened by "incoherent elements incompatible with its unity and completeness."

We think that Dr. Watson has done well in taking up Kant's metaphysic of nature and in discussing it in the light of the criticism from the standpoint of the physiolo-

gists. The views of Kant are in themselves of the greatest interest, but as related to the subjective idealists, as well as to the evolutionists, they are a sufficient fortress. The minute analysis of the fundamental concepts of nature and the physical world of matter and force, furnishes the best field on which to overthrow the theories of Materialism, and to discomfit mere idealism, so-called. The conception of matter as a synthesis of attractive and repulsive forces; the refutation of the atomists; the correct idea of quantity of matter, as correlative of quantity of motion; the three laws of Mechanics; the relativity of motion and what follows from this fact—all this relates vitally to the labors of the English school of evolutionists in so far as they have undertaken to treat of first principles. Dr. Watson has presented these things with great clearness, and, we think, opened a new and very important phase of the Kantian doctrine for discussion.

DIE PHILOSOPHIE DER GESCHICHTE. VON C. L. MICHELET. 2 Bände. Berlin, 1881.

This is the final work in Professor Michelet's extensive *System der Philosophie als exacter Wissenschaft*. The publication of the system was begun five years ago, and three volumes have appeared before the present, viz.: *Logik*, *Naturphilosophie*, and *Geistesphilosophie*. The first of the two volumes composing the Philosophy of History is devoted to the primeval world, the Orient and Greece; the second to Rome, Christian Europe, America, and the future. The brief introduction contains Professor Michelet's definition of his work, an interesting discussion of the literature of the subject, or, rather, of the conceptions of history held by the author's great predecessors in this field—Montesquieu, Lessing, Herder, Hegel, etc.—and an explanation of his principle of division. The absolute purpose or goal of history Professor Michelet pronounces the full realization of truth and freedom. In the working out of this he is greatly influenced by the conception most clearly stated by Schiller, that the object of man in history is the recovery by reason of what he possessed unconsciously as instinct in his primitive condition, and from which he fell. The process is from a state of nature, an Eden, through a period of struggle, the present to a future golden age, in which the moral conflict shall be ended and the race shall rest in the enjoyment of perfect social relations. This process is pronounced to be in accordance with a certain geographical principle—and it is in the elaboration of this that most readers will think Professor Michelet fanciful, true as the general principle seems to be that "Westward the course of empire takes its way." According to him, Japan must have been the cradle of the race, and Australia is to be the utopia towards which "Sanct-Humanus" is irresistibly pressing. This will certainly stir up the local pride of the good people of Melbourne and Sydney. Meantime we Americans can take genuine satisfaction in the high place which Professor Michelet assigns us for the present and the immediate future. We have certainly seen no work emanating from Germany in which the significance of America has been more fully recognized and more intelligently discussed. America is the land of the present, and here the principle of political freedom seems to Professor Michelet to have been first realized in institutions. "America has attained full political majority, which is true of no European nation. In Europe it is still heroes and statesmen who rise, push to the front, and draw to themselves the majority of the people. In America the majority controls the statesman. The statesman is not the controller, but the servant of public opinion, as President Lincoln expressly declared of himself. 'A European village,' says Philarète Chasles, 'cannot govern itself; there is the priest, the land-owner; there are the heads of the old historical parties, Royal-

ists, Republicans, Bonapartists, who manage everything!' Under the American self-government, on the other hand, nothing is expected of the state, but everything from the people's own initiative. This is the true democracy." Professor Michelet discusses the social and family life of America—education, the relation of church and state, and the leading principles of our constitution—everywhere with clear insight and hearty sympathy, touching with enthusiasm upon the general educating influence of our polity, and putting in some words of defence for us against some common charges, such, for instance, as that of our absorbing devotion to money-making. Europe, he says, can scarcely claim to be free from the passion; and this is certainly true of the rich man in America, that, far more generally than in Europe, he is not an idler, but employs his money in active enterprises which promote the common weal. Indeed, Professor Michelet's praises of us altogether are so unstinted that in self-satisfied enjoyment of them we have, perhaps, been seduced into dwelling upon them to the neglect of more important features of his work. Yet, on the whole, we do not think that there is anything more important in it than its clear recognition of America's political significance; and those who may be prompted to read it for this will find what of importance there is besides.

E. D. MEAD.

BOSTON, MASS.

FAITH AND FREEDOM. By STOPFORD BROOKE. Edited, with an Introduction upon Mr. Brooke's Life and Works, and the significance of his New Movement, by Edwin D. Mead. Boston: Geo. H. Ellis, 1881.

Stopford Brooke's "Life of Robertson of Brighton," and his volumes upon "Christ in Modern Life," and "Theology in the English Poets," have already secured for him a large circle of readers in America, and recognition everywhere as one of the finest religious thinkers of our time. The editor of the present volume pronounces him the greatest preacher that the Church of England has had since Robertson of Brighton; and this high praise does not seem too high. It has not been in the pulpit that Stanley has exerted his greatest influence, and perhaps it was not there that Maurice was most powerful. This new volume, selected chiefly from Brooke's later works, has been prepared for the special purpose of illustrating his theology, and the general character of his religious thought, which have now become matters of such peculiar interest by reason of his separation from the Church of England. An appendix contains the much-discussed Letter to the Congregation of Bedford Chapel, in which Mr. Brooke announced his withdrawal from the Church, and the sermon, "Salt without Savor," in which he more fully stated his reasons for the step. The casual reader will naturally turn first to these, and the latter, with its lofty conception of the doctrine of the Incarnation, and its stirring plea for sincerity, liberty, and the democratic idea, is certainly most interesting. But the real value of the book lies in such sermons as the second, entitled, "God is Spirit," that upon "The Light of God in Man," the two upon "The Fitness of Christianity for Mankind," and the series upon "Immortality." These last are very great sermons. Their discussions of Comtism and Secularism, of the dangers of an absorption in secondary causes, and of those peculiar conditions of our present intellectual and social life which have so weakened the belief in immortality in so many, ought to have a wide reading. Mr. Brooke is very much of a Fichtean in philosophy, and owns his obligation for very much in his argument for immortality from the consciousness of the moral law to the *Vocation of Man*. Mr. Mead's Introduction is excellent.

E.

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THE KANT CENTENNIAL.

DELIVERED AT THE CENTENNIAL OF KANT'S "KRITIK," AT THE CONCORD SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY, AUGUST 4, 1881, BY JOHN W. MEARS.

It is certainly rather to the partiality and over-kindly estimate of my services, than to their intrinsic merit, that I owe my presence and place to-day amid this distinguished group of lecturers and savants. Most happy, indeed, am I to be among them, to breathe the inspiring atmosphere of this home of American meditation, to share the repose of this centre of idealism in American literature, and to dwell under the roof-tree where once a beautiful idyl of a domestic life was enacted, and where now is transpiring that combination of profound and definite thinking, that harmonizing of faith with philosophy, of which the scientific world has been in chronic need from the beginning until now. Mine is the privilege, the advantage is mine. Yours may be the suffering and the penalty, which ought to be endured solely by the over-indulgent managers who have drawn me within this charming environment.

For it is no profound knowledge of the illustrious thinker whose first great work we are here to commemorate, no subtle criticism of his splendid achievements, no comprehensive study of his lofty place in the history of philosophy, no athletic wrestle in his spirit

with the deep problems of thought, which I can contribute to the grand cumulus of treasures which are gathered and laid at the feet of the learners in this Concord School of Philosophy. Mine has been the humbler task of calling the attention of American thinkers to the fact that a suitable time had arrived for bringing into general notice, and subjecting to a fresh investigation, the inestimable services of Immanuel Kant. A type of thinking so wholesome in its limitations, and yet so inspiring in its impulses, so satisfying to all who sought depth and thoroughness in contrast with the superficial, the sensational, and the presuming, seemed to me eminently worthy of a wider celebrity and of a more urgent commendation to the leaders of thought and of education than it yet enjoyed, at least in our own country. Now, evidently, was the time; the centennial of the publication of the "Kritik" appeared to be the supreme opportunity for rendering this service to the memory of the philosopher, and for rendering to the American mind the service of unfolding to it as fully as possible the grandeur of the man and the primacy and originality of his methods. American thought had been slowly growing into a state of competency, preparedness, and especial need of this service. Heralds of Kant had been crying in the wilderness. Hamilton and Edinburgh had actually merged the Scottish School of Psychology into a kind of semi-Kantianism, so that we in America, receiving as we so generally did our instruction in philosophy through the Scottish schools, imbibed a Kantian atmosphere without knowing it by name. De Quincey and Carlyle in literature, Coleridge in vague rhapsodizing, and Wordsworth, in whom Sir William Hamilton detected Kantian ideas, have aided mightily in this preliminary work of casting up a highway, of removing obstacles, or of indicating the time and better direction which thought must travel. Meiklejohn, with his really meritorious and intelligible translation, put the "Kritik" itself in reach of English readers. While Professor Hedge in Harvard, Professor Marsh in the University of Vermont, and Professor Hickok of Auburn Seminary and of Union College, had, in various ways, labored to introduce into the curriculum of metaphysical study the Kantian principles and methods. Dr. Hickok, who is now enjoying a green old age in the classic retreat of Amherst, Massachusetts, deserves special mention as the constructor of a comprehensive system of philosophy, embracing

psychology, morals, metaphysics, and the elements of natural theology, in which the impulse and impress of Kant is everywhere perceptible, and whose students of the not remote past unite a reverence for their teacher with an enthusiasm for Kant; in fact, forming an early anticipation of the feeling now diffusing wherever advanced learning has a foothold in America. These were isolated workers with no common understanding or systematic educational plan.

The era of ripeness in America for the general study of Kant was rapidly hastened by the appearance of the "Journal of Speculative Philosophy" and the truly extraordinary amount and quality of the work which was steadily put into that bold, that heroic literary venture. In that journal the West answered the East: St. Louis responded to Concord, and it is a fair question whether the oracular transcendentalists of Massachusetts were not themselves transcended by the clean-cut but profound speculators of Missouri and Illinois. It was a happy omen for philosophy in America when they came together and harmonized so beautifully in this Concord School of Philosophy. When I received from the lips of the venerable but buoyant Alcott on the one hand, and deciphered from the chirography of Dr. Harris on the other, a hearty approval of the proposal to celebrate the centennial of Kant's "Kritik," you will not wonder if I felt that no further endorsement was necessary, and that a certain fulness of time indicated by these coincidences for the emphatic recommendation of the study and the teaching of Kant among all our higher educational circles in America had arrived.

A sudden and timely increase in the number and character of the specific helps to the study of Kant now also appeared, the work of those earlier students who meanwhile had been pioneering their way little aided by their predecessors. For it seems to me those who first accomplished the great task of fairly comprehending the "Kritik" must have been men of nearly the same acumen and metaphysical endurance as the author himself. And great is our indebtedness to these predecessors and guides, who save us so much of our time, though they deprive us of some of the discipline which would be derived from making our unassisted way into the entirely new world of thought created by the author of the "Kritik." But art is long and life is fleeting, and we who

wish to know something beside Kant, thankfully accept the aid of such efficient helpers as was Kant himself in his "Prolegomena," as well as Mahaffy, of the Dublin University, in his as yet unfinished translation, condensation, and annotation of the "Prolegomena" and the "Kritik," the latter of which is as yet unfinished; of Monek, of the same institution, whose "Introduction" I was sorry to find out of print when I tried to get a copy; of Edward Caird, through whose enlarged Hegelian vision we get a wonderfully attractive, readable, and intelligible view and criticism of the "Kritik," and finally of Professor Watson, of Queen's University, Kingston, Canada. His book just published is an octavo of four hundred pages, entitled "Kant and his English Critics," in which Kant himself is explained in that most lively method by the way of contrast and vindication, in the line of refutation of his opponents, in which Kant's opinions are set in bold relief against the contrary opinions of every school of thought with which he can be placed in contrast. A rich fund of information upon these schools is thus advantageously grouped with the Kantian investigation, and the book becomes one of the most valuable of modern additions to the history of philosophy in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

The article proposing a centennial of the "Kritik" was published in the "Penn Monthly" of Philadelphia, and was promptly and favorably responded to, among others by Mr. Libbey of the "Princeton Review," by the "Boston Advertiser," the "Utica Herald," and the "New York Evangelist." The article was reprinted as a circular and sent to all the leading collegiate institutions of the country as well as to the managers of the Concord School. Most pleasing and abundant were the responses which the circular drew forth. They came from Harvard, and Amherst, and Yale, and Brown, and Vermont; from Johns Hopkins, from Union, from Madison, from Cornell, from the University of the City of New York, from Syracuse, from Lafayette and the University of Pennsylvania, from Grinnell in Iowa, from the University of California, from the United States Government Survey in Washington, from the Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, and the McGill University in Montreal.

Already at Saratoga a celebration of the centennial has been held, and papers of importance and interest upon Kant have been

read. But here, in this atmosphere of philosophic repose, in this Academe of the western world, you, by devoting thrice the time and thrice the discussion to the great German, are more nearly approaching that adequate treatment of the "Kritik" which the hundredth anniversary of its appearance justifies and demands.

My standpoint is one of purely practical interest. I address, or aim to address, an audience which, unlike many of my present hearers, has not waked up sufficiently or at all to the commanding importance of the study of the "Kritik," and has not gone into or through those preliminary studies which would qualify them for understanding, far less for criticising, the work of Kant. I would if possible, through this celebration, infuse a wholesome discontent through the minds of those instructors in philosophy who have hitherto dispensed with the speculative element in their teaching. I go upon the analogy of the new convert to Christianity, who, even before he has learned by any extensive experience the nature of his new position, is zealous and enthusiastic that others, too, shall enjoy his deliverance and share his happiness in the enlargement of his mental vision and the elevation and freshness of his new consciousness. This is my view of the significance of the centennial.

Immanuel Kant (born 1724, died 1804) during his whole life of eighty years travelled scarcely out of the shadows of the paternal roof-tree. His famous book, "The Kritik," fell nearly dead from the press. Yet to-day, one hundred years since that issue, and here, three thousand miles from Königsberg, we are met to celebrate the appearance of the "Kritik" in the world. We are assembled to ponder the work of a philosopher who has thrown doubt upon the reality of time and space, and to whom things in themselves stood in broad contrast with phenomena. How unreal are time and space in their relation to his reputation and influence, and how deceiving were the phenomena which attended upon the publication of the "Kritik." We may safely affirm that nowhere in the history of philosophy has the contradiction between appearance and fact been so striking and overwhelming. Certainly at no point in the history of modern philosophy is an epoch more definitely marked and a new departure more clearly determined than has been done by the "Kritik," which for two years gave

scarcely a sign of animation, and seemed destined to pass away without recognition by the public.

What, then, is the secret of the interest which attends the name of Kant, which has brought together this group of American thinkers and educators, and inclined them to stamp the year as worthy of commemoration? It is not that England and Scotland and France and America have no honored names in their lists of philosophers. It is not that a more elegant phraseology than the downright technical and even uncouth style of the German has not been found to clothe profound thoughts. It is not that the higher problems of philosophy have been avoided by such thinkers as Jonathan Edwards, Sir William Hamilton, and Cousin. It is not that profundity and subtlety and thoroughness and scientific clearness died with Kant, in the land of his birth. If Kant himself was a marvel, equally was the line of thinkers that followed Kant a marvel—a resplendent procession of the crowned kings of philosophy. It is not that we blindly bow to the authority of Kant, and make him who was the most searching critic of authority an object of indiscriminate reverence. It is not because we derive from Kant new and valuable material which we may incorporate and weave into the old web of our thoughts. It is because we find in Kant and his "Kritik" a real beginning from which the age and from which we ourselves may recommence and reconstruct our thinking upon a higher plane. It is because the great questions which give to philosophy its reality, its undying charm, its incalculable value, when on the point of being betrayed by errorists, or surrendered by a shallow advocacy, were rescued at vast labor and pains by Kant. It is because he restored the brightness and legibility of the divine inscription upon the nature of man, which asserted the everlasting primacy and supremacy of mind over matter in the universe, but which an earthly-minded and perverse speculation sought and still seeks to obliterate, and had at least succeeded in grievously obscuring. It is because the philosopher of the year 1781 after Christ reasserts in substance the positions of the philosopher of 351 years before Christ—Kant making good against the materialists what Plato had maintained against the atheists, viz., the cause of all impiety and irreligion among men is that, reversing in themselves the relative subordination of mind and body, they have in like manner in the uni-

verse made that to be first which is second; and that to be second which is first; for while, in the generation of all things, intelligence and final causes precede matter and efficient causes, they, on the contrary, have viewed matter and material things as absolutely prior in the order of existence to intelligence and design, and thus departing from an original error in themselves, they have ended in the subversion of the Godhead.

The conscious purpose of Kant was not, indeed, to combat atheism or materialism, but sensationalism. Locke, in his reckoning of the furniture of the mind, had overlooked the inherent qualities and the very nature of the mind itself. It was a piece of white paper, and all its acquisitions were but records inscribed upon it from without. This assuredly was the impression which Locke made upon the minds of his contemporaries, whatever may have been suggested to more careful students by later utterances of the philosophers. Hume showed that sensationalism, as thus taught by Locke, had no place for the idea of cause; the pen of experience could not write upon the mind that which it did not possess. The characterless and void intellect was only the passive recipient of knowledge, and if sensationalism were true, then necessary, *a priori* ideas were pure illusions, no better than dreams. The ideas of Plato, the forms of Aristotle, the supersensual realities which had filled the souls of philosophers and sages and saints, were groundless fancies. Metaphysics was discredited or driven to dogmatism as a last resource. The queen of the sciences was disenthroned. Kant compares her position to that of Hecuba, quoting the lines of Ovid: "Once mightiest of things, powerful in progeny and in connections, now a poor exile stripped of her resources, an object of contempt and scorn."

No matter what specific doctrines Kant taught, or in how many respects his work may be open to criticism, and exception and criticism is what we are called to exercise on this occasion, it remains true that Kant achieved the grand work of arresting the sensationalists, and of vindicating to mind its lofty prerogatives of spontaneous and independent powers and possessions. He turned the tables on the sensationalists by showing that experience itself must depend upon those powers and possessions in order to its very existence and meaning as experience, to a thinking being. And this he did, not by treading over again the worn pathway of dog-

matic assertion, not by unscientific appeals to consciousness, but by the keenest research amid the obscure and intricate processes of thought, where he was the heroic pioneer without a blaze or a footprint to guide his steps. He has turned to us the other side, the inside, the underside of the mind. His marvellous penetration and luminous intellect have made mental facts not before detected glow with an inherent distinctness and originality. If philosophy be admitted the most effective gymnastic of the mind, Kant has raised this discipline to the highest potency by teaching us the philosophy of our philosophizing, by teaching us to think systematically upon our systematic thinking; by leading us to trace to their source, to transcend our first principles, our *a priori* ideas.

Locke and his school have taught us abundantly what it is to compare and associate objects; Kant has taught us to compare the very processes of comparison themselves. We had learned what it was to classify objects, and again to classify classes of objects to the utmost range of the universe; Kant has taught us to classify and to unify the acts of classification, to think ourselves thinking abstractly, to behold the thinking faculty evolving and imposing its own laws upon its own thinking.

Before Copernicus, students of natural science and mankind generally regarded the material universe, the starry heavens, as revolving around the earth, and in a certain sense dependent upon it. Before Kant, philosophy showed a marked tendency to regard the mind as little more than an observer of the external world around which it revolved, and a mere recipient of sensations impressed upon it from without. As with Copernicus the supposed relative position of earth and heaven was reversed, and the earth was found to revolve and to be subordinate, while heaven was independent and stable, so with Kant mind became central and *gave* law, while the external world moved around it and showed its conformity to the laws which the mind, from its own spontaneous activity, proposed as alone valid and explanatory of the processes of the material universe.

It was no servile pupilage of nature which acquainted Kepler and Galileo and Torricelli and Faraday and Agassiz with the great physical discoveries connected with their names. It was the application of principles evolved from the fertile sources of their

own versatile minds. Even Tyndall in our day demands the exercise of scientific imagination as the herald of discovery, and President Porter, in his "Human Intellect" and "Elements," clearly vindicates a place for the imagination in the domain of physics. (See p. xxvii, Bohn's edition.) Reason, says Kant, must approach Nature with her own principles, which alone can pass for laws in one hand, and with the experiment which she has planned in the other, to be instructed, indeed, by Nature—not as a pupil who is to accept everything the master chooses to say, but as a judge who requires the witness simply to answer the questions which he proposes.

Thus, according to Kant, reason had already taken the central position relatively to the material universe in the progress of physical discovery, and had indicated its supremacy, although the discoverers themselves were unconscious of the fact. And it was a great, though only preliminary, service rendered by Kant to philosophy, and a heavy blow already dealt at sensationalism, when he pointed out the changed position of mind when purely mental conceptions were applied successfully to the solution of the problems of the physical universe, and when he led men to recognize the fact.

And Kant's triumph in metaphysics is his extension of this principle from the brilliant instances of discovery in physics to the wide field of experience in general. He is the greater Copernicus who shows the elements of experience in the humble relation of satellite, revolving around and obeying the native conceptions of the understanding, which are the real centre of the universe of knowledge. Instead of an inner life, built up of impressions borne in upon us from without, the inner life is the active, incessant manipulation, the artistic transformation of the raw unmeaning materials presented to us by the inner and the outer sense. These materials are not objects, and their presence does not constitute them experience, until they have passed through the pre-existing moulds of the mind and have taken their shape. They are not in space or in time of themselves; they are neither one, nor many, nor all; they are neither like nor unlike; they are neither substance nor qualities, neither cause nor effect; they have, in fact, no being, except as the mind by its own insight recognizes or affirms it of them. They are not qualified to bring

such report of themselves to the mind. Above all, they do not possess in themselves that unity, either in subordinate groups or as a whole, of experience which it is the prerogative of consciousness alone to bestow and to enforce upon them.

Intuitions as Kant names them, original perceptions as we might call them, are, indeed, the indispensable raw materials of experience, but of themselves they are no more experience than gold and silver bullion of themselves are coin of the realm. Conceptions without intuitions are empty, but intuitions without conceptions are blind. Blind sensationalism! we are done with that since Kant, and it is worth while to celebrate our deliverance and the deliverer once in a hundred years at least.

The centennial of our own national existence only preceded the centennial of the "Kritik" five years. We celebrated the hundredth year of our national life with a pomp and an *éclat* that have faded as yet but little from our memories. But the victory of Kant over sensationalism, the centennial of which victory we celebrate to-day, involves principles that cannot be too urgently commended to the nation now well entered upon its second century. We demand a pure and an elevated philosophy for the youth of America. We seek to emphasize the best elements of Kant's teaching as an invaluable wholesome tonic and stimulus to the minds of our students.

The value of the study of the "Kritik" as a mental gymnastic is too evident to be discussed here. If Mr. Gustave Masson, in his "Recent British Philosophy," could fairly applaud Sir William Hamilton for "doing more than any other man to reinstate the worship of Difficulty in the higher minds of Great Britain," much more may we esteem and welcome the "Kritik" as an instrument of mental training. Mr. Mahaffy, in fact, declares that "apart from the actual knowledge attained by the acute analysis and large insight of such a thinker as Kant, the mastering of his system implies a mental gymnastic superior to that which can be obtained even from the study of higher mathematics." ("Princeton Review," July, 1878.) Mr. Mahaffy falls into a fashion, becoming quite too fashionable just now, of disparaging the merits of Sir William Hamilton. Not satisfied with declaring that his teachings may be called extinct, he asserts with a discourtesy that must cause a reaction in those who hear it: "It will be difficult

in the history of philosophy to find a man more overrated while he lived, and despised as soon as he was unable to defend his own opinions." With similar unpardonable rudeness he speaks of a doctrine "more like old Reid's than anything else." On the contrary, we wish just here to emphasize the merit of Sir William Hamilton (if for nothing else) as preparing the way by his teachings for the reception of Kantian ideas in the minds of multitudes of English and American thinkers. Trained as the great majority of us have been, under the influence of the Scottish school, the teaching of Sir William formed a necessary transition from the psychological speculations of his predecessors to the grapple in dead earnest with the higher and subtler problems of philosophy. One might say that all that is difficult and aspiring in Sir William was appropriated more or less consciously from Kant, and those who have drilled themselves thoroughly on the former pass without a shock, and by a process already made familiar, into the likeness of the latter. As long as there are minds which need to be led across the same intervening ground, the teaching of Hamilton will not be extinct, even with those who esteem the "Kritik" as an instrument of intellectual training as highly as does Mr. Mahaffy. We shall look in vain for a better means of raising the ordinary thought of Great Britain and America to the plane of Kantian than the philosophy of Sir William. Or does any one suppose it possible to begin with Kant or with advanced Kantian ideas?

For an individual mind of a peculiar mould, as determined by race and training, to remould and modify its own habits of thought so far as to recognize, appreciate, and in part adopt a style and method of thought belonging to quite another type of mind only remotely connected in race with its own, and that style of thought really original and peculiar in the race to which it belonged, is an achievement costing an immense amount of mental effort. Even the most active and laborious of Scotch and English thinkers refused at first to undergo the prolonged and patient endeavor which was necessary to the understanding of the "Kritik." It was a struggle for them to admit the possibility of any other than their wonted methods of psychological analysis and dogmatic treatment of first or ultimate truths. And then to bring into play unused powers of thought, gradually to work themselves to the

utterly novel standpoint of Kant, to catch first a mere glimmer of the meaning of his highly technical nomenclature; after gaining detached parts of his meaning to begin again in the hope of making an intelligible synthesis of the fragments; to gradually see that a great, a valuable, and yet a never suspected truth is there if you can only get a firm hold of it—this is a process which gives unwonted suppleness to the process of meditation and observation, which widens the grasp and enlarges the vision and deepens the insight of the mind. And if one seeks those equally high, perhaps higher, grades of discipline to be found in the study of Kant's successors, and in the subsequent epochs of German speculation down to our day, and including even schools of distinctly opposite tendency, let him understand that the only introduction to those studies is through the "Kritik" and its accompanying treatise, the "Prolegomena."

2. In the powerful current which sets towards physical studies, and which is too likely to end in the vortex of materialism, American students, in order to maintain their footing, need to be thoroughly versed in the chief doctrines of the "Kritik." They need not and cannot be drawn away from the pursuit of physical sciences, but they must be made to see that there is no conflict between those branches and a true philosophy. They must be shown that the true spirit in which to study the physical is the metaphysical. We must seek to permeate the physical with the metaphysical as its proper and wholesome atmosphere. We must learn to appreciate the discovery of Kant, that the knowledge of the empirical is not itself empirical knowledge; that the empirical, as such, cannot be known at all; that the metaphysical is fundamental, and the physical is derivative; that the very assault upon the metaphysical must start from metaphysical premises; that materialism itself is compelled to make assumptions which are essentially metaphysical, and can scarcely construct a definition of matter except with material derived from metaphysics.

"To proceed from sense to consciousness," says Caird, "and to explain consciousness by sense, is a gigantic hysteron-proteron; for it is only in relation to consciousness that sense, like every other object, becomes intelligible. To explain time and space psychologically or physiologically is to explain them by phenomena which are known only under conditions of time and space. The 'physiologist

of mind,' who asserts that mind is essentially a function of the material organism, may fairly be met by the objection of Kant, that his objection is transcendent. To go beyond the intelligence in order to explain the intelligence is to cut away the ground on which we are standing. So, again, when the psychologist applies the laws of association to the genesis of mind he is obliged to presuppose a fixed and definite world of objects, acting under conditions of space and time upon the sensitive subject, in order by this means to explain how the ideas of the world and of himself may be awakened on that subject. The theory is stated in terms of the consciousness if he pretends to explain." ("Caird's Criticism," p. 398.)

In a recent work of fiction one of the leading characters is made to speak in the positivist and sceptical tone frequently heard nowadays. "For my life I cannot get beyond what I see and hear, smell, taste and feel. Nature is big enough and beautiful enough for me. I cannot get beyond it, and I do not wish to. Whenever I hear people wrangling about things unseen, about what is called spiritual things, it reminds me of children. Did you ever hold out your hands, when a child, and whirl round and round until you were so dizzy you could not walk straight when you stopped? I find too much to do without going into that, and I won't do it." On the contrary, as we are taught best of all by Kant, it is the unseen and the spiritual which gives to the seen and the material its entire significance. We do and we must get beyond nature in order to know it as "nature," and in order to measure and to value it as "big" or as "beautiful." It may, indeed, at first confuse us to attempt to see ourselves exercising those wonderful spiritual functions, but when our admirable teacher has once pointed them out to us, we see that it is the positivist and the materialist who has no footing except as he borrows it from the metaphysician and the transcendentalist. And as the first principles of the "Kritik" enter into the teaching of our age and country, we shall cease to hear such ignorant assumptions in educated circles, and shall find a nobler estimate of the nature and works of the thinking faculty generally diffused even among the masses.

3. Mr. Mahaffy makes it a great point against the Scotch philosophers before Hamilton, that they laid stress upon the supposed

injurious tendencies of systems which, as he says, they could not otherwise discredit. "Any one," he says, "who is familiar with the works of that time will remember how much more frequently *alarming* conclusions are avoided than false ones refuted. Provided, in fact, that a theory could be shown *alarming*, it had been sufficiently answered." ("P. R.," July, 1878, p. 225.) This is in the spirit of Mr. Buckle's assault upon Reid (3, 348), whom he accuses of timidity "amounting almost to moral cowardice," because he took into account not only the question of the falsity, but that of the danger, of Hume's opinion. A philosopher, he claims, "should refuse to estimate the practical tendency of his speculations." In a similar spirit, M. Taine criticises M. Cousin, and would even deny to him the title of philosopher, because he allows considerations of human welfare to influence his philosophical speculations. The claim that the scientific spirit is utterly indifferent to and unconcerned about results is in fact heard everywhere to-day. The gospel idea, and the prevalent and instinctive idea, of testing a tree by its fruits is scouted as inapplicable in the field of pure science. The good or the evil which plainly results from a speculative system is not recognized as a leading or as a subordinate test of its truth.

We cannot subscribe to this dogma in its length and breadth, nor do we believe that it can ever prevail. The highest good cannot thus be separated from the highest truth. The man who earnestly seeks the one necessarily embraces the other from any fairly chosen point of view. The practical and the speculative share a common life. Speculation will annihilate itself when it severs the vital cord which connects it with practical issues. Intellectual philosophy must advance, if it advances at all, in view of the best results of moral philosophy.

If this is not true of professional thinkers and theorists, it is doubtless true of teachers and of those who would recommend and propagate any speculative system or doctrine. They must expect to be confronted at once with questions as to results and tendencies. To deny the validity or pertinency of such questions would be ill-humored and futile. Certainly a gathering like this must expect to be closely questioned. A centennial of Kant's "Kritik!" *Cui bono?* Was not Kant, and especially Kant's "Kritik," the beginning of the curse of rationalism, the signal

for the drying up of the religious sentiment and the disappearance of spirituality from the inner life of Germany, turning it into a dreary waste? Did it not give the signal for that movement of German thought which, through the whole century, has startled the sober portion of mankind with the unparalleled audacity of its claims to absolute knowledge, and which now, as if the wings with which it promised to mount the throne of day were of wax, tumbles ignominiously into the Serbonian bog of pessimism, with the deeper depth of nihilism yawning beneath it? Did not Kant turn religion out by the front door, and then try to bring it in by the back door of speculation? Surely such questions are not altogether unnatural, and it is idle in any one, in the name of pure science, to attempt to brush them aside.

The absurdity of the charge, that such questions are unscientific and to be left unnoticed by the genuine seeker of truth, is proved by the example of the master of scientific thinkers, Kant himself. Anticipating and deeply concerned for the possible evil results of his speculations, if left as they stood in the "*Kritik*," he imposed upon himself supplementary tasks only second in importance to the "*Kritik*" itself.

One need only cursorily examine the latter part of the preface to the second edition of the "*Kritik*" to see how honestly and ingenuously the author was concerned for the practical aspects of his work. He there (p. xxxvi) speaks of the important service which it will render to reason, to the inquiring mind of youth, and especially of the inestimable benefit it will confer upon morality and religion. This it will do by showing that all the objections urged against them may be silenced forever by the Socratic method—that is to say, by proving the ignorance of the objector. Criticism alone, he claims, can strike a blow at the root of materialism, atheism, free thinking, fanaticism, and superstition, which are universally injurious, as well as of idealism and scepticism, which are dangerous to the school.

I am aware of the accusation made against the second edition of the "*Kritik*"—an accusation inspired probably by the same spirit which dictated the dogma already referred to, requiring the absolute divorce of the speculative and the practical. It is the accusation of Schopenhauer that the alterations in the second edition were the result of unworthy motives, and are a proof of servile

weakness. If Schopenhauer meant only to affirm that a reference to practical ends is unworthy of a scientist and a proof of weakness, we can let it pass. The objection will not in the least hinder our celebration, but rather add a new element to our enthusiasm. Kant himself encourages us to enjoin upon the thinkers and students of America the duty of weighing the practical objections to the "Kritik." We urge it as one of the important disciplinary advantages of the study, that it thus suggests and invites to dispassionate investigation of its true tendencies. It is an element in the impulse which we wish by this celebration to give to Kantian studies in this age and country.

But, first of all, let us labor to understand the "Kritik." That is our first business. Objections and tendencies can be fairly weighed only after we have made ourselves thoroughly acquainted with the work. Superficial and cursory examination will start suspicions and prejudices without yielding any of the grand advantages which we ought to and can derive from the study. And while we cannot give assurance that the fairest and most careful study will clear up difficulties and relieve the "Kritik" of every particle of the opprobrium which has fallen to its lot in the course of the century, yet the dear-bought experience of the century is at our command to guard us against a repetition of its errors, and we may hope, in a shorter time and with less toil, to reach a clear air and a firm ground of speculation.

Aside, therefore, from the purely scientific interest involved in such a celebration, we wish our centennial to promote the study of the "Kritik:" (1) as a mental gymnastic of the highest efficiency; (2) as an effective mental tonic against the relaxing and debilitating tendencies of sensationalism and materialism, and (3) as itself inviting enquiry into its own practical tendencies and pointing to the means of testing them in further works of its author, and to the splendid attempts which have been made by his successors to supplement and to develop his doctrines.

KANT AND HEGEL IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

READ AT SARATOGA, N. Y., JULY 7TH, AND AT CONCORD, MASS., AUGUST 2D, 1881, BY WILLIAM T. HARRIS.

That Immanuel Kant is the greatest figure in modern philosophy there can be no doubt. One would say, in the same sense, that Socrates is the greatest figure in ancient philosophy. Not that the ideas of Socrates were not very immature compared with those of Plato and Aristotle, but that Socrates alone gives the immense impulse and the true direction, and the method which Plato and Aristotle elaborate and make fruitful. So Aristotle comes *after* Plato in greatness if we regard this matter of original discovery of ideas—but Aristotle towers much higher in the perspective of time as we look back down the ages of human thought. All scientific thinking in our Christian civilization is Aristotelian, and Aristotle is “The father of all those who know,” as Dante says in his “Inferno.”

So it is with Kant. We should not find in him the world-historical personage that we do if he had not been the impulse to raise up widely differing schools of thought, and carry philosophy far above and beyond the limits of the system which he presented to us in person. Socrates, according to the trustworthy portraiture of Xenophon, only practised *dialectic*, and sought to bring to consciousness the wide distinction between universal and particular cognitions and show the substantiality of what is universal. His endeavor was for the most part negative—a breaking down of the conceited wisdom of the Athenian professors. Plato made this arrival at general ideas something positive—an arrival at the eternal forms of created things—a reaching of the Divine.

Aristotle seized the standpoint which Plato reached in a few of his writings as his highest thought—that of the creative Intellect and Will—the identity of the Good and the Pure Thought, and with it, as his principle, consistently explained the worlds of Nature and Man as they presented themselves in the fourth century before our era to the Greek consciousness. Kant's significance in the world arises from the discoveries which he made in the realm of

Psychology, especially as regards the antithesis of Subject and Object in consciousness and their mutual limitations and interpenetrations. The importance of this investigation on the part of Kant depends upon the fact that modern consciousness is a movement, as a whole, towards inwardness and subjectivity, and, accordingly, modern philosophy is bound first of all to ask itself: "What is the criterion of certitude?" The Greek asked: "What is Truth?" If he could find the abiding, it was sufficient. Thales, for example, set up the principle that water or moisture is the fundamental abiding whence all originates and whither all goes. Anaxagoras set up *Noûs*—Reason—or the principle of the universal—as this abiding somewhat. The psychology of Plato and Aristotle is a sort of objective affair, treating the mind like the world, and finding within it what is transitory and fleeting and what is abiding. Aristotle discovers that the eternal substance of mind, its true form, is *Noûs Ποιητικός*—Self-active Reason.

Aristotle and Plato both classify correctly the various powers or faculties of the soul, and leave us correct statements of the scope of those faculties. Sense-perception, opinion, discursive reasoning, theoretical insight by aid of pure ideas—the "Seeing by totalities" (as Plato calls it)—these are expounded and their limits defined.

Aristotle's great distinction of the phases of life or soul into vegetative, feeling and rational, is the solid basis of all that has been thought on the subject.

But the problem of certitude could not be a problem to the ancient mind, though ancient philosophy gave the impulse that developed into this subjectivity in consciousness which now needs to enquire for the criterion of certainty. The Christian religion moves the soul in the same direction towards the learning to know the constitution of the soul as *subject*.

This subjective tendency of thought, which is the characteristic of modern times, leads to a peculiar species of scepticism—a scepticism based on a partial insight into method. Method is the form of activity. The modern tendency seeks to know the form of the mind's activity—all faculties of mind exist only as active. Hence the problem of certitude arises only when the mind is directed upon its own method or form of activity. If the insight into method is partial it cannot be sure of the results of mental activ-

ity. All wrong views of method lead to wrong philosophical views.

Not to dwell upon this position, but assuming it as granted, let us define the position of the work of Immanuel Kant as the Columbus in the voyage of discovery into the realm of method, using "method," in the largest sense of the term, as the form of all mental activity—the will, the intellect, and the heart, or emotional nature. Understanding the importance of method, and the fact that any glimpse into the forms of activity will give a basis of scepticism that no amount of objective philosophizing can remove, we see at once the significance of that philosophy which will explore method in its entire extent—map out the provinces of all mental activity. The Critique of Pure Reason attempts this work as regards the intellectual faculties, and accomplishes a vast result. The Critique of Practical Reason defines the forms of the Will, and the Critique of Judgment one of the functions of the emotional nature.

This insight into method, which is the want and necessity of the modern mind, is the object which Kant successfully pursues. It relates essentially to the antithesis already named—the subjective and objective—what pertains to the ego and constitutes its forms, and what pertains to the object as object. It regards all cognition as composed of two factors, and it investigates and defines them. The ancient thinking also had two factors to investigate in cognition, but it did not regard the one as subjective and the other objective. It defined one factor as the universal and the other as the particular; hence arose the structure of formal logic of Aristotle as the chief contribution on the part of ancient philosophy to the world's science.

All modern philosophy has sought to bring together in some way these two antitheses—(Subjective *versus* Objective, and Particular *versus* Universal)—and show their relation. The movement of modern philosophy developed negative results at first. The distinction of subjective *versus* objective seemed to destroy that of particular *versus* universal, and to reduce the universal to an arbitrary aggregate, or to a mere *flatus vocis*. The war between Realism and Nominalism has this great meaning in the history of philosophy and in Christian Theology—it is the first attempt to assert subjective *versus* objective against the Greek par-

particular *versus* universal which tradition had brought down to the Middle Ages as the heirloom of speculative science. This accounts also for the great place which Aristotle's *De Anima* held in the controversy. The great Arabian commentators taught that the human mind is essentially *Noûs Παθητικός*, and hence not immortal, as individual human soul of John or James. That which differentiates—that which belongs to the particular—is perishable; the species lives, but the individual dies. Aristotle had shown how an individual may become an entelechy—that is to say, how a particular may unite within itself the attributes of the universal as a totality. Change and perishability happen because the particular is not adequate to the universal—the universal has *many* particular attributes or phases, while the special individual realizes only one, or at best some, of those phases. The process of the universal—and all true universals are active processes—annuls some of the particulars and realizes others; this changes the individuality, and it perishes or becomes another. Aristotle's entelechy is an individual that has realized within itself all of the potentialities, or phases, of the universal, and hence it possesses self-identity; its change does not change it; its activity is only the continuance of its function—a circular movement—what Hegel calls “a return into itself.” The “first entelechy” possesses this immortal individuality, and yet has not realized the universal within itself by self-development. The acorn possesses individuality—the universality or *species* of the oak is in it, but only potentially. When the acorn grows, it realizes *all* the phases of the oak that were potential in the acorn and becomes a “second entelechy” or species realized in the individual, so far as this can take place in the vegetable realm, or, as Aristotle calls it, in the “Nutritive Soul.” Such ascent from “first entelechy” to “second entelechy” is not as a fact possible except to the human soul, although the vegetable and animal souls manifest a *semblance* of it—a mere appearance of it in a sort of mimetic spectacle—the dramatic play simulating the ascent of the individual into the species—which is, however, only a *play*, and does not constitute an immortal individual as in the case of man. The great scholastic “fathers,” commencing with Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, gained this insight of Aristotle, and were able to defend Christianity against the Moslem pantheism which denied true universality to

human personality, or, in other words, denied that man as a subjective being could be essentially universal, and hence an immortal individual. The distinction of subject *versus* object had appeared only in the obscure form of nominalism at that early period. With the close of that period of the history of thought nominalism seems to have gained the ascendancy, and William of Occam marks its triumph. He also marks the utter eclipse of the great insight of Aristotle in theology, and a divorce of faith and reason.

It is one of the most mysterious phases in the history of Philosophy, this triumph of nominalism at the close of a most wonderful and most triumphant career of profound thinking—realistic thinking. Christian theology had been almost completed. Very little has been added, or is likely to be added, to the wonderful system left us by Thomas Aquinas—familiar to more people through Dante's *Divina Commedia* than through St. Thomas's *Summa*. The mystery clears up when we consider the momentous importance of seizing in its entire compass this antithesis of subjective *versus* objective, in philosophy. We discern the providential purpose in what seems to us at first dark and inscrutable. Christianity, alone among world-religions, makes the individual man worthy of immortal life in a continued *human* existence of growth in intellect, will, and love. For Christianity holds that God himself is Divine-Human. Hence the human being need not lose his humanity in approaching the absolute, or when he is placed "under the form of eternity"—*Sub specie eternitatis*—as Spinoza describes it.

If the human form is divine—the human mind being the image of the divine mind—it follows that to know the nature of the mind is to know in some sense the nature of God. In the two worlds—the world of man and the world of nature—we may find a revelation of God. In man—in our minds—we may find the adequate revelation in each individual—but not in each individual of nature; there it is found only in species and genera. The Christian doctrine of the infinite importance of each human soul and of the transcendence of the soul over all merely natural existences, through the fact of its immortal destiny, generates the impulse towards subjectivity as already asserted. It sets human consciousness over against nature: I am above and beyond nature—a soul

belonging to the supernatural order of existences. This leads to the perpetual recurrence of the antithesis of subjective *versus* objective, and by and by to the unfolding of all its negative phases. Nominalism, or the denial of the existence of universals, is the complete sum of all that is negative and sceptical in philosophy. It makes all that possesses abiding in the form of genera and species a product of the subjective synthesis of thought—a classification only for convenience. The reality consists of isolated individuals, each valid over against the other. The result of this is atomism, and the principle that “composition does not affect the parts or atoms of which things are composed.” When once reached it is impossible to explain anything by atomism without inducting a principle from the outside, a directing, arranging, combining intelligence which produces all that we find in the two worlds of nature and man. The atoms become pure simples—without properties in their isolation—and thus everything is transferred to the other factor in the world—to the ordering intelligence. Then the atoms become an empty fiction, utterly useless.

The only thing positive about nominalism is its attribution of all universality—of all abiding and substantial being to the subjective mind. It implies a great deal, but does not itself become aware of this wonderful endowment which it claims for the subjective mind.

It is wonderful to see how the most negative phases, the scepticisms, the heretical doctrines, the most revolutionary phases in history, all proceed from the same great principle of thought as the most positive and conservative doctrines, and that all of these negative things are destructive only in their undeveloped state and when partially seized. By and by they are drawn within the great positive movement, and we see how useful they are become. Through these negative and sceptical tendencies, arising from this great antithetic object of thought, the subjective *versus* the objective, we ascend into a knowledge of self-determining activity as it is in Mind, and this knowledge is far in advance of the old objective view of mind such as the world has inherited it from the Greeks. It is a proximate insight into the nature of the divine creative process itself. We ascend through a philosophic mastery of the relation between the modern and ancient antitheses—subject *versus* object and universal *versus* particular—to the plane

that is above all scepticism. Scepticism is directed only against method—this is its essential nature. With the sceptics of old, as Hegel points out, the doubt was objective, and touched the method (or transition) between the particular objects of sense and the universals cognized by reason. Modern scepticism touches the method (or transition) between subjectivity and objectivity. The ancient sceptic doubted or despaired of the truth of the objects of sense-perception. It seemed that they wore out and perished in the course of their process. They were all in a flux, becoming each moment something else, presenting new phases of their universals (or their total processes). Modern sceptics doubt the truth of the objects of reason—the universals—species and genera—and are unwilling to accord real being to aught but the objects of sense-perception—to the very objects which ancient scepticism doubted. A strange inversion of standpoints within the history of scepticism!

But the cause of this is the turning of the mind in upon itself for the truth—a partial movement in this direction producing doctrines in which there is utter disharmony between the two antitheses, respectively the objects of ancient and modern thought. It is a movement that justifies and will justify the doctrine of a Providence in History—a true Theodicy.

Up to the time of David Hume the outlook might have been dubious enough to the realistic thinker. Nominalism had begun to see the ultimate consequences of its subjective point of view. There is no causality in the world, so far as we know—only sequence in time. “All our knowledge consists of impressions of the senses, and the faint images of these impressions called up in memory and in thinking.” Even the Ego is only a subjective notion—a unity of the series of impressions called “myself.” This is the subjectivity *of* subjectivity.

This is the point in the development of modern philosophy at which Kant rises and offers his more complete sketch of our subjective nature as an explanation of the world of man, and the world in Time and Space.

His sketch of the nature of mind has become familiar to all persons who make a pretence of cultivating philosophy.

The Subjectivity of man, as Will, Emotion, or Intellect, has native forms of its own—forms not derived from experience or from

anything external. These forms make up the constitution of the mind itself. If we wish to know the truth we must be aware of the subjective factor in knowledge and make due allowance for it. Things-in-themselves are modified (in our cognition of them) through the constitution of the mental faculties that know them. What we actually know of things-in-themselves will be ascertained only after we eliminate from our cognitions the subjective element due to our mental forms.

All this was so simple and in accordance with the spirit of the subjective scepticism of the pre-Kantian period that it would have recommended itself at once as the best of good sense.

But who can paint the amazement of subjective scepticism when it first begins to comprehend the Critique of Pure Reason! It looks over the inventory of the possessions of our Subjectivity—"the forms of our mind"—and sees

Time, Space, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Modality, God, Freedom, Immortality, the Beautiful, the Just, and the True! It takes away one's breath to see such things written down in the inventory of what is our subjective constitution. How rich we are!! "Ah, but all these are only subjective." "They do not apply to any object in itself, whatever; not even to the Ego-in-itself." "You cannot think your Ego as an object-in-itself because you cannot think it except in these categories. These categories apply to objects thought, but not to the subject thinking, as a thing-in-itself."

Well, we reply, what of that? What is the net result when we take all this into account?

To take this into account it was necessary to recall the great insight of Aristotle, and review ancient philosophy in the light of this Kantian discovery of the nature of subjectivity. After Socrates, came first Plato and then Aristotle; the third philosopher could *use* the philosophical insight which the first and second had jointly discovered and elaborated. So it was this time. Fichte and Schelling developed respectively the practical and æsthetic phases of Kantianism, Fichte unfolding those subtle phases of mental activity by which the mind determines itself as universal categories or forms of thought—Time, Space, Causality, and Substantiality—the fourfold form of reflection superinduced upon mere feeling or sensation. Schelling devoted his attention to the

explanation of the world as a phenomenon of which the constitution of our mind is the noumenon. Here the pure Kantian movement begins to impinge upon the ancient view of the world—the classic world of Art and Philosophy. In the school of Schelling, Hegel first appeared. He is the first one of the post-Kantians to take up the Aristotelian philosophy and perceive its profound truth. He is the first one to draw parallels from the psychological, subjective basis of Kantianism to the vast objective, world-comprehending system of Aristotle. It is Hegel's advice that has been followed in Germany, now that in each university of that country there are from one to five courses on Aristotle's philosophy given each semester! Even the attacks against Hegelianism which have arisen in Germany came chiefly from the Aristotelian studies inaugurated by Hegel, and not a single new insight or great idea in Aristotle has been added by any one of Hegel's Aristotelian opponents to the list of those ideas and insights inventoried by Hegel himself in his *History of Philosophy*! Even Trendelenburg, who blamed Hegel for using *Bewegung*—(which we may in English translate by the word "activity")—in his logical treatment of the categories of "Pure thought," and accused him of borrowing the idea from experience, and yet tried to establish *Bewegung* as a category of pure thought in his own system, has no acknowledgment to make for assistance obtained through Hegel's explanation of Aristotle, and often, indeed, fails himself to see Aristotle's deep thoughts where they have been fully expounded!

Hegel's significance in the history of philosophy consists in the fact that he mastered the Greek philosophy, and did not, at the same time, recede from the Kantian.

Hegel ascends to a standpoint wherein are united the two antitheses which lead, respectively, the ancient and the modern worlds of thought—the antithesis of subjective *versus* objective, and the other antithesis of the universal *versus* particular. Hegel does not reconcile the two antitheses by omission or suppression; he finds that Kant maintains a subjective result simply through an inconsistent application of his own principles, by which he surreptitiously made objective use of his categories, while claiming for them subjective application exclusively. If made consistent throughout, and the Fichtean discovery of the deduction of the

categories superadded, the Kantian system falls into perfect harmony with the system of ancient thought, and philosophy becomes doubly firm on its twofold foundation of psychology and ontology.

The insight into Aristotle's thought of the unity of all potentialities in the true actuality, the thought of the entelechies, makes for Hegel the great luminous principle to which he always returns for light to explain all problems. With it he newly defines the thought of *Begriff* (German word for what the English call the "Notion," and we Americans "the logical concept," or simply "the concept") as the total of form of a thing or being. The "*Begriff*" is the complex of the entire round of potentialities, and signifies much the same as Aristotle's *τὸ πᾶν ἦν εἶναι*. Having the *Begriff* as signifying the *Totality of Form*, he finds the highest category to be the self-determining Reason, which he calls *Idea* (German *Idee*). Here is Aristotle's *νόησις νοήσεως*, as Hegel himself tells us.

In other words, Hegel has discovered that Kant's Subjective constitution of the Mind is only hypothetically Subjective. In reality it is subjective, and objective too. For considering the wonderful character possessed by those categories which Kant inventories as the forms of the mind, it is almost impossible to regard Kant's claim of pure subjectivity for them as other than a deep piece of irony. As if he had said:

"Scepticism is right. We can never get at the Truth and know things as they really are—things-in-themselves.

"We can know only what is radically modified through our own subjective spectra; but look and behold what these subjective forms are, and learn to subtract them and find the remainder, which is the true Thing-in-itself.

"In the first place there are Time and Space: these are the forms of the Sensory, and are purely subjective. It is true that they are the logical conditions of the existence of what we call the World of Nature. They are more objective than the world of nature is, because they are its logical condition. That is the way we know Time and Space to be Subjective, and to belong to our mind only.

"This makes the science of mathematics possible. The world in-time-and-space, it seems, then, is subjective because the very

logical condition of it is subjective. True, we have called it 'objective,' and have been satisfied if our subjectivity attained validity throughout all time and space. Nevertheless, if we are to make serious business of inventoring our subjective possessions, we must begin with writing down Time and Space at the head of the list.

"True enough, things-in-themselves, deprived of time and space, will never trouble us nor anybody else—for, you see, they cannot have extension nor change. Yes, it is worse off for them than that. They cannot have unity, nor plurality, nor totality, hence they cannot be spoken of as 'they'—it is a courtesy on our part to lend them our subjective category of 'plurality' to which they are not entitled. Nor can the thing in itself (singular or plural) have quality or existence for anything else—nor relation, nor mode of being either as possibility or necessity, or even as *Existence*. The 'thing-in-itself' cannot *exist* without borrowing one of our subjective categories (found under 'modality'). As for the objective, then, which is opposed to our subjectivity and unknowable by us, it cannot be found in the world of nature or in the world of man. It is a pure figment of the imagination, and cannot exist in any possible world without becoming 'subjective' at once."

In fact, Kant's subjective has taken up within it the entire antithesis of subjective and objective as understood by scepticism, and has become purely universal through the fact that its forms are universals. Such a subjective mind is Aristotle's *νόησις νοήσεως* and a Self-Knowing Being. Whether Kant intended it or not, his remarks on things-in-themselves and on the limits of our knowledge make no sense unless they are taken as ironical.

Hegel has treated again and again the system of Kant in the course of his works, praising its wonderful features and criticising its inconsistencies and its mechanical presumptions. In his history of Philosophy he does justice to the significance of the system in relation to preceding ones. In his large logic he discusses in appropriate places (a) Kant's idea of the construction of matter out of Attraction and Repulsion; (b) Kant's theory of Time, Space, and Matter as regards divisibility or indivisibility; (c) The application of degree, or intensive quantity to the soul; (d) The so-called "Synthetic judgments *a priori*;" (e) The limitation of the world

in space; (f) Kant's "Thing-in-itself"; (g) Infinite divisibility or atomic nature of matter; (h) The beginning of the world in Time; (i) The paralogism involved in the proof of the nature of the soul. In his philosophy of Religion he discusses in full the Kantian refutation of St. Anselm's famous proof of the Existence of a God. Hegel's thought of the "Begriff" as the totality of potentialities, and of the *Idee*, as the absolute Totality, enables him to rescue St. Anselm's proof from the Kantian objections (which are not unlike the objections brought up by Gaunilo in the lifetime of St. Anselm himself).

For convenience, as it seems, Hegel has brought together his chief criticisms on Kant in the "Second Attitude of Thought towards the Objective World," contained in his Introduction to his Logic in the *Encyclopedia*, and so admirably rendered into vernacular English by Mr. Wallace.

The limits of my paper prevent me from quoting largely from Hegel's own writings, and from attempting to expound some of his more subtle polemics.

I must refer to one more thought of Hegel—and it is also a thought of Aristotle: it is that universality is always self-particularizing, for it is self-determination. He always condemns the indefinite, indeterminate Absolute as empty. Hence his thought does full justice to European, Christian philosophy as against all orientalism and pantheism.

With a general reference to the full details of Hegel's critique of Kant, found in Wallace's translation above referred to, I must close this paper without attempting more than this statement of Kant's Significance in the struggle between ancient and modern thought, and of Hegel's position as the one who harmonizes Greek and German thought.

KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF CATEGORIES.

READ AT THE CONCORD SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY, AUGUST 5, 1881, BY GEORGE S. MORRIS.

The "transcendental exposition" of space and time, in the "Æsthetic" of Kant, consists in showing how, on the supposition—and only on the supposition—that time and space were of the nature indicated in his "metaphysical exposition," pure mathematical science, with its universal and necessary propositions, was possible; and so answer was given to the first general inquiry raised by the *Critique*.

The "transcendental deduction" of the categories consists, in like manner, in showing that on the supposition—and only on the supposition—that the categories are *a priori*, or universal and necessary, synthetic conceptions of the understanding, knowledge through sensible experience, or pure physical science, which is nothing but "determinate knowledge of phenomena in time and space," is possible; and so the second question of the *Critique* is answered.

The question of fact has been settled. The categories, as pure conceptions of the understanding which "borrow nothing from experience," have been demonstrated to exist as elements which enter, with form-determining influence, into the whole structure of our experimental knowledge. There remains only the question of right. By what right does the non-experimental mix with the experimental and constrain the latter to obey its laws? And the answer is, that on no other conceivable condition than this can the "experimental" be in any way known, or, which amounts to the same thing, possess reality for us. The result is that the psychological empiricist's conception of experience and of experimental knowledge has to be radically revised and extended.

First we had to ask, What is that, common to all sensible consciousness, and consequently to all "objects" revealed in sensible consciousness, by virtue and on account of which both it and they are all alike called sensible? And the answer was, Sensible consciousness and sensible objects are such by virtue of

their all wearing, necessarily and universally, a garment woven for them by mind out of relations of space and time, themselves its own creation.

But does sensible consciousness *know* itself and its objects simply in virtue of this ideal garment that it wears? No; for we have been seeing that what is called sensible consciousness is but the receptive condition of knowledge, and not knowledge or intelligence itself. Strictly speaking, sensible *consciousness* is an abstraction and a misnomer. *Pure* sensible consciousness is the same as no consciousness. It is not *sense*, but *self*, or *mind*, or "understanding," that is conscious or knows in and by means of what is called sensible consciousness. This is what has been incipiently, yet distinctly enough, implied in the result of the analysis of space and time. These are not "ideas" received by us through sensation, but forms of perception, due to the productive activity of the imagination, which, as Kant perceives and declares, is a manifestation of one and the same spontaneous, *mental*, *self-activity*, which manifests itself otherwise in the functions of the understanding. But imagination and all its works are, as we have seen, blind, and for us as good as naught, until distinguished by the understanding. It is the understanding, then, which makes sensible consciousness and sensible objects real for us, and understanding, as we are about to see, is nothing apart from the unity and identity of *self-consciousness*. There is no real consciousness, accordingly, which is not self-consciousness, and no real "experience" which is not *self-experience*. If, then, we now ask, What is that, common to all sensible or experimental *knowledge*, by virtue and on account of which alone it is really knowledge for us? the answer is that, since all such knowledge must take the form of distinct ideas or conceptions, and since no conceptions are possible except in agreement with those master-forms, the "categories," which determine the nature and form of all our conceptions, therefore no experimental knowledge, no knowledge of "objects," no experience, is possible for us, except, as a predetermining condition, it be clad in the forms of the categories as pure conceptions of the understanding or of the self-centred, and self-knowing, and spontaneously active human mind. Just, therefore, as mind, working under the guise of imagination, creates in space and time the fixed form and condition or the only intelligible element of

sense, so, working under the guise of understanding or intellect, it creates the like form and condition, or the truly intelligible element in experimental knowledge—the element by virtue of which it is indeed knowledge. The understanding is thus the “author of experience” and of its objects, in any sense in which these latter are intelligible, are real objects for us. It is thus the author of “nature, regarded as the sum of all phenomena,” and prescribes to it *a priori* its universal and necessary, if not its particular laws; it prescribes to nature the laws to which all its special laws must conform.

In order, now, fully to understand Kant’s “deduction” of these truths, it is specially necessary to bear in mind just what sensible consciousness, taken purely by itself, as a series of passive states or impressions, is, and what are its limitations. The truth in regard to this matter Kant learned through Hume, and we are to consider Kant as having this constantly in mind as he proceeds with his deduction. The relevant facts of the case have been repeatedly alluded to elsewhere. It is enough to repeat here that the states or impressions—for the whole aggregate of which sensible consciousness is but the collective name—are, in Hume’s phrase, so many atomically “distinct existences,” and that, if these make up the whole of “mind,” knowledge is impossible. For (1) these impressions or states are passive and can do nothing; but knowing is an activity; (2) had they the power to know, each could know only itself, since each is distinct from and out of “real connection” with the other; but (3) one impression—to say nothing of the other absurdities of the supposition—could not even know itself, for the reason that every original impression is atomically simple; it is not only out of relation to all other impressions, but is void of relation or distinction in itself; and where there is no distinction there is no knowledge. But now let us suppose that these impressions are not the whole of mind, but that there is, as Hume practically assumes, an indefinable mental power, or, better, *eye*, to which impressions—otherwise called “objects”—are simply presented for observation, and that all that this “eye” does is languidly and inertly to view the impressions as, with “inconceivable rapidity,” they pass before it. This “eye” or “mind” could still never be aware of more than one impression at a time, and each impression as it came would immediately vanish, leav-

ing no trace behind it, and be followed by another quite "distinct" from it. Still there would be no knowledge—not even a conscious "picture" or "image" of an "object." For to such an image a simultaneous combination of several simple impressions is necessary, and to such combination an active *work* of mind, called *remembering*, would be necessary in order to keep the evanescent impressions from completely vanishing, and so to hold them together in one mental embrace or view. But to suppose such a power and reality of active mind as memory is to add something to the data of sensible consciousness, and the necessity of making this addition—which sensational psychology always, but surreptitiously, makes, and which Hume thus made—is the first and simplest, and the universal historic, proof that a purely sensational psychology and a purely sensational theory or explanation of knowledge are absolutely impossible.

A summary name, therefore, for that which sense, or sensuous consciousness, with its purely receptive nature, does not include, is *combination* or "synthesis." Sense furnishes a multiplicity of elements ("impressions") for the material of knowledge, but these elements, as they are simply given and received, absolutely lack that connection, which is, as matter of fact, necessary to render them really conscious objects of knowledge. This deficiency of sense is perceived and declared by Kant, who adds that, of all our ideas, the idea of combination, union, or synthesis among the manifold elements of our sensible consciousness is the only one which is not and can never be immediately furnished us by such consciousness. It "can never come into us through the senses," or be "given" us through impressions. Combination, relation, synthesis, is not a mere inert, finished, objective, and observable "fact," impressed upon us from without through the action of "objects" upon our "minds," nor is it a "conscious state" induced upon us through the like agency. It is not a "fact;" it is an *act*, a synthetic, or combining, or relating act, accomplished by the spontaneous and independent activity of "the knowing subject itself." A line, for example, is a combination or "synthesis of manifold elements" or parts, which is not seen by the eye of the body or by the imaginary eye of sensuous consciousness, but only by the eye of the mind, which is the understanding. The line is not seen till it is thought, and "we can not think it with-

out *drawing* it in thought." We can—to make this clear—and, from the fictitious point of view of mere sensuous consciousness, we must imagine the line as made up of an indefinite number of points joined to each other. For sense each of these points gives off its separate impression, and these are received, not simultaneously, but in succession. Physically speaking, we cannot see all of the points together; we can only see one at a time. There is and can be no physical or sensuous vision of the *line*. The physical organ and its function, or, in the case of the ideally perfect lines of geometry, space, which is the pure form of external sense, are only the condition of vision, which is a synthetic act performed by the intellect, the mind's true eye. The intellect, namely, or "understanding," *attends* to the multitudinous impressions in their order, and brings them to a *stand*, keeps them from fleeting, fixes them in the field of mental vision, which is memory, and so holds them together in a true synthesis or union, whereby the *impression* of their multitudinousness is lost in the clear and distinct *thought* of the unity, or one mental object, which (for sense) they seem to compose. This thought, as such, is strictly the product of our thinking, or of the "spontaneity of our understandings." The line is no object of thought or knowledge until, by actively "drawing the line in thought," we really think and so know it. And the like is true for all sensible objects of knowledge. For in all of them there is involved a like combination or synthesis of multitudinous parts or "impressions."

But to say that all synthesis in sensible knowledge is the work of the understanding is the same as to say that all distinction in knowledge and all unity are to be ascribed to the same active and efficient source. For synthesis is nothing but viewing that which is intrinsically, or at least sensibly, manifold as *one*. So Kant declares that "the conception of combination involves, in addition to the notion of multitudinous elements and their synthesis, the notion of their unity. Combination may be abstractly defined as the idea of the *synthetic* unity of the manifold."

Let it not now (*a*) be said or imagined, after the manner of the uncritical descriptive psychologist, that *this* idea of complex unity is not original, but derived and transferred from an idea of simple unity, which is involved in the idea of a simple impression, and is conveyed, along with the impression, through the senses into the

mind. For we have seen, abundantly, that there can be no such conveyance of the single, simple impression itself, and, consequently, of the mathematical or numerical unity which alone belongs to it. On the contrary, the simple impression and its unity are, in the order of our knowledge or conception, late products of analytic abstraction. All sensible objects of knowledge are synthetic wholes, and it is we who having, by the very act and process of our knowing, made them such wholes, afterwards analyze them into imaginary elementary units. Nor, on the other hand, (*b*) can the idea of this unity be logically or historically posterior to the idea of combination. On the contrary, as Kant declares, it is the very superinduction of this idea upon the multitudinous elements to be combined which first makes combination possible; so that the idea of unity is logically prior to, or the condition of, the idea of combination. And, finally, (*c*) the unity in question is not identical with the mathematical "unity" mentioned in the table of categories. The latter unity is essentially the same with that contemplated under "*(a)*." It results from a "logical function," or process of thought, in which such combination of ideas is presupposed, as, according to "*(b)*," must follow and depend on—not precede and condition—the "qualitative" unity under discussion. The origin of this unity must be sought, Kant declares, "in a higher region; namely, in that which itself first renders the understanding, as a judging faculty, possible, by rendering possible the union of different conceptions in one and the same judgment." The unity in question must transcend all other unities, and must be at once their universal condition, and, as such, present and discoverable in them all.

This unity is none other than the unity of pure self-consciousness. Where there is thinking, "having of ideas," or being conscious in any shape, there is a *somewhat* that thinks, has the ideas, or is conscious. This somewhat calls itself *self*, a self, one identical self or person. It was the pronoun of the first person, and says: "*I* think, have ideas, or am conscious;" or "All these thoughts and ideas are *mine*." Accordingly, Kant declares the condition of all thought and real or completed consciousness to be this: that it be either explicitly and actually accompanied by the reflection expressed in the phrase "I am thinking," or that it be

possible for this reflection so to accompany it. I need not, of course, stop to reflect that all the thoughts, ideas, or "objects of consciousness," of which I am aware, belong to me; but unless it were true that, if I did then reflect, I should find that they were indeed thus all *mine*, they would have no existence for me; and, not existing for me, they would not exist at all. The one common aspect, then, that belongs so essentially to all thoughts or ideas, that without it there would be no thoughts or ideas at all, is this: that they all belong to a me—to a me whose nature is to be always one and the same, or identical. So that I may say that the "*common* expression" for "all my ideas" is, that "*I* am thinking." The consciousness thus expressed is pure self-consciousness. The unity involved in it may be termed the "transcendental unity of self-consciousness," inasmuch as it conditions, and so explains, as we shall see, the possibility of certain forms of knowledge *a priori*.

The unity of pure self-consciousness, it is seen, is present in and comprehends all other consciousness. It is the true and original unity, without which no other unity in knowledge is possible. It is the synthetic or comprehensive unity in which all other syntheses are strictly included, and on which they depend. Whatever may be necessary to this unity, or intrinsically involved in it, will bear a like relation to all our knowledge whatsoever.

Pure self-consciousness is distinguished from all other consciousness. The "I" who thinks, regards all his thoughts as belonging to him, but not identical with him; as being his possessions, but not himself. The expression "I" denotes nothing which is sensibly perceived, no conscious image like that of a tree, for example. It is not definable or describable in terms of sensible consciousness. The idea is not *received*, and no object corresponding to it is *presented*. It can, therefore, originate only in the pure "spontaneity" of mind. It denotes a pure, ideal, strictly continuous, self-originating and self-illuminating act or activity, and no "substance"—in which latter case it would have to be sensibly perceived, presented in the forms of space and time, and exist before it was perceived. And the context shows that it is a synthetic activity, since it draws within its embrace all other activities and holds them together in an organic whole.

On the other hand, and from another point of view, self-con-

sciousness is identical with all consciousness. Whatever may be our thoughts or ideas, whatever our consciousness and its "objects," the consciousness of "the identical self" is in them all, and they are all in it. It permeates all other consciousness, and, by making the latter its own, at the same time makes it to be real consciousness. Thus pure self-consciousness gives itself a content which it makes practically identical with itself, while it remains master of the content, and so ideally distinguishable from it. In short, consciousness in general, and self-consciousness in particular, reveal themselves as organically one, separable only through abstraction, bound up in a living, actively synthetic and complex unity, of which the determining element or original unity is that universal "act of spontaneity" expressed in the phrase, "*I* am thinking." Thus we see that, at least in some sense, all consciousness is necessarily, or contains, self-consciousness, and the former cannot be conceived, even in abstraction, except as subject to the forms which the latter imposes.

All combination of ideas or of their elements in unities, in wholes, or in "objects," is, then, a work of the understanding, and is consequently *a priori*, or primarily, independent of the elements combined; and the understanding "is itself nothing but the faculty of thus combining." The original and master combination on which all other combination depends is the union of all consciousness in the synthetic embrace, or "under the synthetic unity" of self-consciousness. "Thus the synthetic unity of self-consciousness is the highest point of all, on which all use of the understanding, even all logic, and, after it, all transcendental philosophy, must depend; nay, the faculty of such unity is the understanding itself." And the "highest principle in all human knowledge" (Kant means here especially sensible knowledge) is, that the manifold elements presented in sensible consciousness must, in order to become elements of a real consciousness, be in relation to "the original synthetic unity of self-consciousness," and conformed to the conditions of the latter.

Now let us look, by way of recapitulation, at the ground as it lies at present before us. The deficiency of sensible consciousness consisted in the utter unrelation and absence of union among its elements. Owing to this deficiency, sensible consciousness could not furnish, since, as such, it did not contain, any ideas of things

or objects; for such ideas always consist of a definite and orderly combination of elements. Still less could it furnish or account for our ideas of relations among different ideas of objects, such as causation, interaction, etc. Yet we have such ideas, of both kinds, or, what amounts to the same thing, we are aware of what we call objects as existing, and of fixed and even necessary relations as subsisting among them. Or, in other words, combination, both among the elements of our ideas and among our ideas themselves, is a fact, and this combination exists in determinate forms, without which it would be indefinable and unrecognizable. Now we have found an explaining source of apparent combination in the peculiar activity of the understanding, which is nothing but a pure, combining activity, effectuating a reduction of the chaotically multitudinous (viz., elementary sensuous "impressions") under the synthetic unity of orderly wholes (ideas of objects and their relations); and, further, as a work absolutely essential to the completeness and effectiveness of the foregoing, bringing all these wholes under the all-comprehending unity of one identical self-consciousness which permeates and dominates them all. So essential, indeed, and so fundamental has this latter work appeared, that we have been enabled to recognize in it the characteristic nature, nay, the very essence, of the understanding itself, and to perceive that, instead of the grand synthesis of self-consciousness being simply incidentally necessary to all other syntheses, all other syntheses were the rather but necessary and incidental parts of the synthesis of self-consciousness, and must accordingly adapt themselves to its requirements.

On what condition, then, is sensible experience, and the knowledge thus derived, of what we call nature possible? Or, on what condition is "pure physical science" possible? The condition is obviously an important one, and has been plainly indicated in the foregoing. It is that our consciousness of nature be, at least in form, strictly a consciousness of self—a *self*-consciousness—or necessarily involved in and determined by that combining activity of the understanding, whose highest and original and essential and universal potency is manifested in the realization of self-consciousness. Would we know an object, it is not enough that we simply feel or have the impressions it produces. Indeed, *simply* to feel them is impossible. In order to know the object we must also

think it. But to think it is simply to combine the elements suited to compose it in the synthetic, conscious unity of an idea, and to do this implies the combination of this idea, with various others of similar nature, in the grander unity of one unbroken and uninterrupted consciousness, which latter, again, is impossible, except it be brought under the one central and all-pervading light and activity of self-consciousness. The activity by which an object is thought is part and parcel of the activity whereby consciousness is made and continues *one*; and the latter, again, is but part and parcel of the activity whereby self-consciousness constantly creates and sustains itself. Objective reality—or that an object should be real for us, or really enter into our consciousness—depends on the “union, in the notion corresponding to it, of the manifold elements contained in a given perception.” This union is effectuated by the understanding, and that only under, within, and by means of the synthetic unity of self-consciousness. Consequently, this unity is the determining source of all unity in objects as known by us, and so of the “*objective* validity,” truth, or reality of all our ideas of objects. “The transcendental unity of self-consciousness is that unity through which all the manifold elements given in a perception are united so as to form the notion of an object. It is, therefore, to be called *objective*”—or, this unity is identical with the unity of consciousness, regarded as a consciousness of “*objects*.”

So, then, whatever a natural object definitely is for us—namely, its distinguishing form and relations—is determined, at least in its larger and vital lineaments, by the nature of the combining activity of the understanding, as centring in and radiating out from self-consciousness. The very notion of “object” is, *a priori*, created from within and not received from without, and whatever is essential to the notion of an object, as such, or of objects as existing in relations of coexistence and sequence, must, in like manner, be, on the one hand, *a priori*, and, on the other, enter into and form the condition of the very possibility of all our experimental knowledge, however otherwise determined. The “categories” express whatever is thus essential.

Our ideas of natural objects are considered with reference to their matter and not to their form, sensuous perceptions, containing multitudinous elemental impressions of phenomena in space

and time. When the understanding combines them, it exercises what, logically described, is an act or function of judgment. Through this act it puts that perception in one of those determinate but universally synthetic forms which it must have in order to become a part of real consciousness. These forms are, as we have already seen, nothing but forms of syntheses, or combinations and relations, in space and time, wrought by the imagination under the determining influence of the understanding. They are essential to the respective forms of logical judgments, in which they are employed, determining their characteristic nature and alone rendering them possible. They are called categories, or pure and primary conceptions of the understanding. So, then, the elements of perception can be combined only by the understanding; the understanding can combine only by judging; and it can judge only through the use and application of the categories. Consequently, "all sensuous perceptions are subject to the categories, as conditions, under which alone their diverse elements can be united and enter into any consciousness whatever."

The "transcendental deduction" is now completed. It is shown that, and how, sensible experience, or the foundation of pure physical science, which is the determinate knowledge of phenomena in space and time, is impossible except through the categories as pure *a priori* conceptions of the understanding; and it is shown that, and how, these conceptions all depend on "the original synthetic unity of self-consciousness, which is the form that the understanding assumes in relation to space or time, as original forms of sensible consciousness." If we would know a sensible or physical object, it must first be clad in that form of thought which thought supplies, and without which it cannot enter into the presence-chamber of thought or be known. In other words, it must take the form of a substance. Only as a substance can it be conceived, and, on the other hand, it is only in consequence of our conceiving it, or operating upon it with the synthetic activity of the understanding, that it appears to us as a substance. We do not perceive substances: we only conceive them; the notion of substance is not introduced into our minds through the senses. But it is a necessary and universal notion for sensible knowledge, or physical science, and that because it is, in the way indicated in the transcendental deduction, *a priori* and an essen-

tial form of the activity of the understanding in creating sensible or "natural" objects of knowledge out of the confused elements of sensuous consciousness.

In like manner, the notion of a causal relation as existing between successive phenomena, or between successive aspects of the same phenomenon, is the result, not of our perception, but of our conception. Hume is right in saying that we never "*perceive*" any necessary, nor any other real, connection between phenomena or "objects." We do not, and cannot, as has been pointed out, even *perceive* the phenomena themselves, unless we also conceive them. And so the "causal connection" which we recognize between them is but a form which they must necessarily assume in our conception and consequent knowledge of them. *This* relation of cause and effect, which is but a relation of necessary and irreversible order in time, is necessarily conceived by us as universal, because the category of causation is one of those *a priori* mind-determined forms of our conception of sensible objects which the latter must adopt in order to be known at all. And the demonstration of the necessity and universality of this relation among phenomena is only tantamount to a demonstration from a particular point of view, that no knowledge of a universe of sensible objects in time is possible unless the relation among these objects be one of necessary and fixed "law" or order.

Thus it is that, in Kant's language, it is our general conceptions of objects which render objects, as such, possible for us, and not objects which render these conceptions possible. And thus, too, it is we who, incapable, through sensuous consciousness—the only way in which "Nature" affects us or communicates herself to us—of reaching Nature herself and deciphering any laws which may belong to Nature as a complex of "things-in-themselves," "prescribe laws to Nature *a priori*," compelling her, in our knowledge of her, to conform herself to them, and not allowing her to dictate them to us. Indeed, the notion of Nature itself is *a priori*; it is *our* notion, our creation; and the categories which determine the form of the universal laws of Nature are but the constituent elements of this mind-created notion itself.

Should this result still seem incredible and enigmatic to the reader, Kant replies by reminding him anew of that commonplace of sensational psychology which the transcendental aesthetic

has reaffirmed, viz., that all our knowledge of sensible nature is, after all, only a knowledge, not of things in themselves, but of things as they appear in our ideas of them—*i. e.*, of phenomena. It is no more difficult, he declares, to understand how the laws of phenomena (thus understood) in nature should agree with the *a priori* combinatory forms of the understanding, than how phenomena themselves should agree with the *a priori* forms of sensible perception. “Laws do not exist in phenomena; they only exist relatively to the understanding mind or subject, in which the phenomena inhere; just as, also, phenomena themselves have no independent existence, but exist only relatively to a being endowed with senses through which he may be affected. If things in themselves have laws, these laws no doubt belong to them necessarily and inherently, and without reference to any understanding that may know them. But phenomena are only ideas of things, of which latter it is impossible for us to say what they may be in themselves. But, as mere ideas, they are subject to no law of combination whatever, except that which the combining faculty prescribes for them.” Then follows a very brief recapitulation of the points involved in the general argument of this chapter, from which it results that “all phenomena of what we call ‘nature’ are, with respect to their combinations and relations, under the law of the categories, in which is the original source of necessary law in nature—if we consider Nature, not in her more particular and accidental, but in her universal lineaments. . . . Particular laws, which relate to the contingent, and not to the universal, qualifications of phenomena can, for this very reason, not be completely deduced from the laws of the categories, although they must all be in conformity with the latter. To become informed respecting them, we must have particular experience of them; but as to what experience, as such, or viewed in its essential and universal character, is, and as to what must be the universal nature of any object in order that it may be known through experience, the laws of the categories, and these laws alone, give us *a priori* information.”

The general result of the “transcendental deduction” is summed up by Kant as follows:

“We cannot think an object, except through categories; we cannot know the object of our thought, except through percep-

tions, which conform to the categories. Now all our perceptions are sensuous, and all our knowledge, relating, as it therefore does, to objects which, on their particular, sensuous side, we do not create, is empirical. But empirical knowledge is experience. Hence no *a priori* knowledge is possible for us, except in relation to objects of possible, sensible experience."

The operation of our understanding, namely, for the purposes of real knowledge, is limited to cases in which material of knowledge is independently supplied, in the shape of sensuous impressions subject to the forms of space in time. Our understandings can only think; they cannot perceive; and it is only what we perceive that we objectively or really know. Kant repeatedly supposes the case of an understanding not subject to this condition—an understanding through whose own independent, purely self-conscious operation the multitudinous elements of perception should be created—an understanding which should have but to think or imagine (*vorstellen*) in order to have the object of its thought "exist." Such an understanding, he declares, would perceive; its possessor would be favored with the power of "intellectual perception." But our understandings can only think. It is not necessary to discuss, at this point, all that may be implied in the case here supposed by Kant. It is only necessary to remind the reader that he has here before him another of those suggestions of Kant's which were developed at length by the post-Kantian philosophers.

It is enough if we perceive, as we easily may do, that, much as Kant has accomplished in the way of demonstrating the nature and conditions of physical knowledge, his assumption that such are also the nature and conditions of all real knowledge, or of all knowledge of reality, is purely dogmatic, and hence a delusion and a snare, as well as a source of needless confusion.

Notwithstanding that Kant has signally demonstrated that no sensible consciousness, no consciousness of sensible objects is possible, unless it be thoroughly permeated, moulded, and sustained by a *self-conscious* activity of mind, which creates for it its universal forms and, through these conditions, all its particular ones; and notwithstanding that he has thus shown that the point of view of *mere* sensible consciousness, as distinguished and separated from self-consciousness, is an artificial and really impossible abstraction,

and that any assumptions respecting the nature or being of subject or object, which this exclusive point of view suggests, are necessarily premature, if not absurd; yet, in commenting on the conditions of all knowledge, he uncritically adopts and proceeds upon these very assumptions. To sensuous consciousness—as we have seen elsewhere—unmindful of its organic dependence on and involvement in self-consciousness, its true objects appear as something wholly foreign in nature to itself. It is one thing, they are something else wholly different from it, though possessing the purely mechanical, but absolutely miraculous and inscrutable, power of affecting it or producing impressions upon it. The having of the impressions is called perceiving the objects, but sensuous consciousness soon becomes aware, on reflection, that, in and through the impressions, it perceives, not the alleged foreign objects, but simply the impressions themselves. So it is compelled to give up all pretence of knowing the objects, though still clinging to the indemonstrable assertion that they nevertheless exist “in themselves,” and that, too, in the possession of a nature so wonderful and so utterly incommensurate with our own, that, if the knowledge of it could enter into the earthen vessels of our consciousness, it would unquestionably shatter them. “Such knowledge is too wonderful for us!”

And to this absolute prejudice Kant, instead of “correcting it altogether,” still clings! While thoroughly undermining it, he yet continues to assert it! The very notion of thing, substance, or object, he shows to be a creation of self-conscious mind, operating in forms of space and time, which, too, are the mind’s own creation. The very notion of cause, as applied to “sensible objects,” he shows to be of like origin. The objects themselves, therefore, apart from our knowledge of them, are not objects, substances, or things at all, nor can they cause the impressions which we ascribe to them. Why, then, continue to assert what can neither be known nor imagined? The appearances—which by common consent are all that we can know through sensible consciousness—are saved, even if we deny the inconceivable things.

All this confusion and inconsistency result from failure or neglect to correct the hasty inferences of sensuous consciousness respecting the nature of objective reality, in the light of that self-consciousness, through which alone sensuous consciousness is seen

to exist, and of which it is but an organic or dependent function. In this brighter and truer light the apparent opposition in nature between subject and object in consciousness gives place to organic identity.

Suppose, for example, the hand endowed with sensuous consciousness to receive the mental impression or image of the head. The hand would be the "subject," the head the "object" of consciousness. The hand would view the impression of the object within itself, and, shaking its own imaginary head, would say, wisely, "Ah, here is an impression of what I call a head, which doubtless denotes what I may term a head-in-itself. But this impression in my *manual* consciousness I perceive to be wholly determined in form by the nature of my consciousness, and the impression itself is nothing but a modification of myself, and so only shows me how I may be modified or 'affected,' but not what is the essential nature of that head-in-itself which causes the affection. Plainly, the head-in-itself possesses a wonderful and inscrutable nature. In it is lodged true reality, and it, whatever it may be, and although it is forever unknowable *to me*, must doubtless furnish the type of true reality, while I am nothing but a fragile mirror; or, rather, I cannot distinguish myself apart from the wholly insubstantial hand-form, which determines and perverts the form of my consciousness---as being anything in particular other than the images of true, but, alas! unknowable objects, which are reflected in me." Should we, from our larger point of view, call these oracular utterances of "the hand" wisdom? Should we not the rather term them pitiable nonsense? And should we not be constrained to say to the hand, "O hand, the hard and fast opposition which thou, as conscious subject, pretendest to find existing between thyself and that nominal object of thy consciousness, which thou termost the head-in-itself, so that the true knowledge of the latter can never enter thy poor consciousness, is wholly an affair of thy own creation, and thy show of meekness, in reducing thyself to the quality of a mere shadow and exalting the 'unknown' object of thy consciousness to the position of sole occupant of the throne of being, or sole possessor of absolute reality, is wholly uncalled for, and hence ridiculous. Thou beginnest by wilfully cutting thyself off, in imagination, from all relation to aught but thyself. Thou arbitrarily viewest thyself as one dis-

distinct and independent thing, self, or subject of consciousness, complete in thyself, a wholly individual and self-included entity, atomically separate from all other existences, and not needing them in order to thine own existence. Upon this supposition, any impressions which other existences may make upon thee must necessarily appear mechanical and inscrutable. Thou, *as individual*, canst not go out of thyself to see whence they come and know what reality lies back of them. On reflection, thou findest also that all thou knowest or canst know of thyself, in the way in which thou hast determined to look upon thyself, is confined to the consciousness thou hast of the affections or impressions produced in thee by objects other than thyself. It is no wonder, therefore, that in place of thy original supposition of thyself as something, thou art now led to regard thyself or thy consciousness as but the insubstantial and inexplicable shadow of other things, which must lie forever hidden from thy view. But all this helplessness of knowledge, this conversion of knowledge into ignorance, results only from the circumstance that thou hast arbitrarily chosen to consider the case from the lowest and narrowest, and not from the highest and most commanding, point of view within thy reach. I, who occupy this latter point of view, perceive that thou art not a distinct and independent individual, complete in thyself, nor is thy consciousness a mere shadow. In like manner I see that the head, the object of thy consciousness, is not simply a distinct and independent thing in and by itself. Both thou and it may indeed be thus regarded, but, when thus regarded, each is viewed only in a light which is partial and incomplete, and hence may and does mislead. Thou, O hand! and thy fancied distinct object, the head, are both inseparably bound together as co-ordinate members of a complex, but organic and 'synthetic,' unity or whole, viz., the human body. In this whole you and all other members are so intimately and vitally united that the complete separation of any one of you from the rest would involve the complete and immediate extinction of your true and real and characteristic nature or being. The whole necessarily implies each one of you, and each of you necessarily implies the whole; while all of you, through your relation to the whole, are necessarily related to and imply each other. Since, therefore, to the true existence and function of each one of you, the whole, to

which you belong, and all its other members are necessary, no one of you, in your purely individual and separate aspect, can claim to be a true and completed and independent self or entity. On the contrary, you are an individual self, or your distinct nature is what it is, only by virtue of your inclusion and participation in a universal self or idea—the self or idea of the whole body. The universal ‘self’ (the idea of the whole body) is the key to unlock the mystery of your particular self. It is in this sense *your* self, and you are its, and all your different members strictly belong to and are a part of each other. Thus, O hand! thou seest that the idea of the head—the special object of thy present consciousness—is but a part of the completed idea of thine own self, since thou canst not adequately think of thyself except as involving the head and all other members of the one body, to which you all belong, as essential to thine own completeness. You all are in one and one idea, one life; one indiscernible power and light of soul is in all of you. Thou wilt see, therefore, that thou art what thou art, not solely nor principally by that which makes thee numerically distinct from the head and the rest of the body, but by virtue of thy participating in and having as thine own a universal life, an ideal quality, a spiritual force, which is present in every member. Thus, so far as thou art concerned, existence is obviously not purely atomic, individualistic, separated off by impassable gulfs into wholly unrelated and unlike realms. And so, if thou, my friend, wilt cease to fix thy stupid, staring gaze exclusively upon thine own *individual* impressions, and wilt rise to such a completed and *universal* self-consciousness as thou mayest easily attain, thou wilt see that that previously inscrutable object, the head, is indeed thy twin-brother, thine *alter ego*, or, better, a true and complementary part of thyself, and no more mysterious than thou thyself art. Moreover, this sense-begotten mystery, which has shrouded for thee thine own existence, will disappear. Thou seest, indeed, already that thou existest only through, by, and for an idea, a use, a purpose, which is but an integral part of a larger idea. This idea does not exist as an inert, lonely, sensible object, but as a spiritual force, all-comprehensive, all-permeating, and all-sustaining within its range. Through thy participation in and identification with it thou seest how thou art able to go out of thy separate individual sphere, as a mere hand, and to know the head

and all the other members of the body as a part of thy larger and completer self. And thou must now see that it is primarily in this ideal force, this effective power of spirit—which is not inscrutable, but self-revealing and translucent as the light of day—that true being and reality for thee reside. In this reality, as thou perceivest, both thou and thine ‘object’ alike participate. Through it you both exist and are what you are. The talk of a head-in-itself, as a separate and independent entity, was, therefore, nonsense, and the impressions which led thee to postulate its existence, were nothing but the form of thy knowledge of the head, considered on what we now perceive to be its relatively unreal side, namely, the side of its apparent, but in fact unreal and impossible, independence and distinction from the knowing ‘hand.’ Thus thy ‘impressions,’ or sensuous perceptions, pointed to that which is accidental rather than truly substantial, or independently and abidingly real, or to that which is unknowable because it is absolutely and independently considered non-existent, and not because it is transcendently exalted above or removed beyond the reach of ‘knowledge.’”

It is in a strain similar to the foregoing that we must address Kant when he treats the limitations of sensible consciousness and of physical science, which is but the accurate deciphering of the letters and syllables of such consciousness, as universal limitations of all “theoretical” or real knowledge. Individual, sensible consciousness, which is a panorama of so-called impressions, or “internal” *states* of appearance, is, as Kant himself has shown us, absolutely dependent on individual self-consciousness, which is a purely ideal, but none the less real and synthetic or combining *activity*. But even this larger interpretation of consciousness, true and supremely significant as far as it goes, falls short of the true and complete interpretation. Individual or unipersonal self-consciousness reveals itself as not merely numerically one and self-identical, but as the one which pervades the many, the individual which is one with the universal, and which makes or has the many and the universal as an organic part of the consciousness of itself. The self-consciousness of the individual thus leads him directly away from the mere consciousness of himself as purely individual and sets him down in a land in which he at first appears to himself as a stranger, but where he quickly realizes that he is at home.

This land is his land; it is the land of his larger self, or of his self on the side of its universality. It is the land of universal self, reason, or spirit. It is his land, it belongs to him, just as, in our illustration above, the whole idea or "land" of the body belonged to and was involved in the completed consciousness of the hand. Individual self-consciousness thus finds that in that synthetic, combining, universalizing activity whereby alone it grasps objects, it is throwing about them simply the threads of that larger self, in which both itself and they are included—the self which lives in them, as they too all "live and move and have their being" only in it. This larger self is divine, it is universal, living, effective reason—it is Absolute Spirit. The individual's sufficiency "to think anything of himself" is, thus, "of God." It comes from his participation in a light which can be, in its completeness, no less all-embracing and all-creative than divine reason.

In this view all reality or absolute "being" is living and spiritual, not dead and "substantial." The appearance of the latter is a mere appearance, arising from the natural operation of the former, but possible, as appearance, only for a consciousness which is naturally restricted, or voluntarily restricts itself, to the purely individualistic point of view of "sensible" consciousness. Every self is a self-realizing intelligence—its peculiarities resulting only from the peculiar, only from its special place or function, in point of view of its place in the universal realm of spiritual power and reality. All of *its* "objects" are manifestations or "phenomena" of what must in the last resort be regarded as similar intelligences (of higher or lower degree) or "energies of mind."

In this view, too, the distinction to which Kant adheres between subjective and objective falls away. The subjective and objective are organically one. The same ideal life and power are in and constitute them both. The "forms of thought" are not simply *our* forms, having no ontological significance, and serving merely to bind sensuous perceptions together in "objects" for our convenience. They are the true life and reality of the objects, as well as of ourselves. We and they are organically one in that Logos, in expressed power of divine spirit, which is not only "above all," but also "in and through all," and without which nothing was or is "made."

"To this complexion" the collective body of Kant's three *Cri-*

tiques, as a whole, effectively point, but, at most, only "practically" come. It was necessary here to develop, at least to the foregoing extent, the outlines of the positive philosophical theory of knowledge, which Kant's discussions imply, and which subsequent philosophers more clearly exhibited, in order that we might see that the limitations, which Kant places on all "theoretical" knowledge in the "Transcendental Deduction," were dogmatically asserted, and hence to be looked upon with absolute distrust. When Kant, therefore, declares that the "identical self," the "I," which asserts itself in the activity of self-consciousness, knows not *what* itself is, but only *that* it is, and this, too, simply because of that which is expressed by the pronoun "I," we have, and, from the nature of the case, can have, no sensible impression, perception, or image; when he says that we can "think," but not "know," ourselves, and implies that effective reality or true being belongs only to unknowable things which appear, and yet do not appear, in those sensible perceptions which we call phenomena; when he says all this, we shall, let it now be hoped, be able to take his utterances at their true worth—or worthlessness. We shall decline to adopt as solemn truth the mere prejudices of that phantom which imagines and terms itself purely and merely individual, sensible consciousness.

And, finally, we shall see that the extension of the aforesaid "limitations" to the whole field of knowledge is irrelevant to the immediate subject of discussion. The question was, How is pure physical science, or sensible knowledge of objects, possible? And the answer was, substantially, Such knowledge is not possible without fixed and definite conceptions and invariable relations or "laws," which can be traced to no other source than the synthetic activity of self-conscious mind. From this source is derived the universal and necessary form of sensible knowledge. Its material, on the other hand, must all be given in the shape of conscious perceptions, appearances, or phenomena. These, on the one hand, *must* be given; and, on the other, beyond them physical science, through its necessary organ, sensible consciousness, cannot go. Thus the question is answered. To go further, and assert that all knowledge is strictly confined to the same conditions, is, compared with the requirements of the discussion, simply a work of supererogation. Still, this might be endured were

the assertion proven. Not being proven, it is a source of double confusion. It diverts attention from the immediate problem in hand, and lands it in a bog of sophistry.

We may recognize, however, with gratitude, and study with profit, the positive work which Kant has accomplished. He has determined the nature, conditions, and limitations of pure physical or sensible knowledge. He has shown that the knowledge of the human spirit is not to be compassed by the methods of such science or by any mere analysis accomplished through empirical psychology. And by showing that knowledge, even upon its lowest, sensible terms, implies a combining and illuminating activity of mind, he has done the work of a hero in undermining sensational psychology, and even the dogmatic metaphysics which rest on it, and in which, too, Kant himself continues, in too great a measure, complacently to rest; he is really, however unconsciously, pointing all the while, in a way which is most significant for the thoughtfully observant mind, to the philosophic conception of being, as ideal, universal, spiritual, and self-knowing power, and not atomic, impenetrable, and unknowable "substance."

THE RESULTS OF THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

BY MRS. JULIA WARD HOWE. [READ AT THE CONCORD SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY, AUGUST 5, 1881.]

When this topic was first assigned me by an officer of this school, I felt great pleasure at the thought that I might be able to render a most willing homage to a master to whose great services I have long felt myself personally much indebted. This feeling of pleasure was followed by one of dismay when I considered the historic scope of the task to be undertaken. Our own study of an author may give us a satisfactory idea of his merits. But to analyze the intellectual history of the last hundred years and find the Kantian element wherever it was present, would require a very voluminous course of reading, and an assured judgment. I happen also to have read very few comments upon him, or on the modern German philosophy generally. Difficult as is

the study of these profound thinkers, I have always found it easier to understand them at first hand than with the help of some other metaphysician's interpretation. With the author himself, we read and reread. Presently the sense and coherence of his statements explain themselves to us. But the commentator, especially if he have any original metaphysics of his own, will be very apt to mix them with the essence of the master of whom he treats.

In approaching this subject, I have made such use of comment and history as my limited time would permit. I have ascertained that the Kantian philosophy has been little known at first hand in England. Coleridge and Sir William Hamilton have been its chief expositors. Of these, the first certainly transmitted it in a form modified by his own mental peculiarities, while it is hardly to be supposed that the second gave it exactly as it gives itself. In France, Degerando has given the best exposition of it in his "History of Philosophical Systems."

I do not know how far it may have been read and commented upon in Italy. The only metaphysics that I have known of in that country are those of Aristotle and the scholastics among conservative thinkers, and the little knot of Hegelians who reside in or emanate from Naples. In Germany itself, Kant has been much laid out of sight beneath the voluminous and varied writings of his successors. The watchword of the foremost philosophy of to-day in that country is: "Back to Kant." Nor is there anything shameful in this retrogression to the ashes of a master long dead and sometimes forgotten. The soul of such a master is a deep source of life and light. Society uses and wastes such intellectual capital as she has. She must often return to kindle her torch at the fires by which she lighted it. A true and deep philosophy, moreover, weaves itself but slowly into the life of the world. It may be received with quick enthusiasm, but even if this should spread to the four corners of the globe, the understanding and application of its principles might be the work of centuries. It oftener happens that the appearance of a new philosophy is hailed by no such outburst of good-will, but is greeted more after the manner in which the London "Punch" represents two colliers as treating a stranger who happened to pass near them.

"D'ye know 'un, Bill?" says one.

"No, I don't," says the other.

“’Eave ’arf a brick at ’un, then,” rejoins the first.

It is, perhaps, through this very savagery that philosophy is most largely introduced to the knowledge that most people get of it. With more polite habits of thought we shall rather take for our motto the line of Hamlet :

“Then, as a stranger, give it welcome.”

In this country, I find that the early Unitarian divines were not students of Kant, nor even of German literature. Drs. Kirkland, Buckminster, Norton, and Channing drew none of their inspiration immediately from this source. I opine that Dr. Hedge and the historian Baneroff are the only well-known Americans who were familiar with the Kantian philosophy fifty years ago. Both of those gentlemen received their early education in Germany, and brought this acquisition back with them, bringing also a knowledge of its value. The Massachusetts Transcendentalists were inspired by an enthusiasm for German literature, which some of them studied in its own tongue, and more, probably, in translations. Among these, Mr. Ripley was certainly a reader of philosophies, although to him metaphysics were more valuable as an element of general culture than congenial as a special pursuit. To the greater number, even among the Transcendentalists, the German philosophy was best known through that mediative office of poetry, of which Mr. Alcott spoke so aptly the other day. Goethe, himself a student and admirer of Kant, was the medium through which the Germanic influence flowed most largely into the mind of this country. Margaret Fuller was especially a reader of Goethe. Theodore Parker no doubt perceived the importance of German literature at an early period of his culture. It was interesting for us to learn from Mr. Sanborn, the other day, that an article, written by Parker, in “*The Dial*,” first directed the attention of Mr. Harris to the study of the German philosophers. But the merit of first introducing Kant to students in America belongs to Dr. Hedge, who in 1833 published in the “*Christian Examiner*” an article on Coleridge in which he had much to say concerning German philosophy. Dr. Hedge, in a letter lately written to me, tells me of this, and adds that, long after the appearance of this paper, Parker wrote to him asking for information on the subject.

I myself remember in my early youth to have heard the late

Rev. Leonard Woods speak with great glee of a commencement part at Harvard in which it was suggested that the German Kant should have a C, instead of a K, for his initial. This truly mediæval man never got beyond the philosophy of the schoolmen. Such logic as was in them led him to the conclusion that the Pope of Rome was Christ's true representative on earth, and though he remained outwardly a Congregationalist, and the president of a Congregationalist college, his ideal millennium would have been the supremacy everywhere of a stolid and shaven priesthood.

I remember also an Episcopal divine, very prominent in his time, who frowned with great severity upon my early study of the German language. He assured me that modern German literature had done more to undermine the religion of the community than any other known agent. "Avoid it, turn from it, and pass away!" was his exhortation. I asked him if he understood the German language. He replied: "Not at all." I could not help further asking how he could possibly form an opinion concerning a literature whose language was unknown to him, and of which, as he also told me, he knew little through translations. I need not say that he found my question very impertinent.

In the impossibility of ascertaining by historical data when, where, and how the philosophy of Kant has penetrated into the world of modern thought, I may, perhaps, be allowed to follow the method of general induction, and to say briefly where I see his influence and where I do not see it. To begin, I am quite sure that the statesmen and politicians of Christendom are very little acquainted with it, and only less with one other thing, viz.: the true meaning of the Christian religion. I am also sure that Kant has been but little studied in England. Much that is irrational and illogical in English politics and in English society would by this time begin to resolve itself into true order and harmony if the Kantian philosophy were well understood by the teachers of that country.

If Kant's philosophy had been understood in France, that country would have been spared both Napoleons. The revolution would have been intelligent and bloodless. But, oh! where can it be less understood than in Germany itself, where to-day men of education say: "Give us the sword in preference to the tribunal."

What an "if" was that which I mentioned just now! If every

country were governed upon principles of true philosophy, where would be war and crime, the scourges of the human race?

And here we may ask what the influence of any philosopher can be in his own time, and after it? Truly, the influence of philosophical opinions is very wonderful when one considers the thoughtless stupidity of masses of men, the ineptitude even of the studious for abstract considerations, and the difficult and involved character of metaphysical procedures. There must be subtle and intangible processes, whereby, as in the invisible fertilization of plants, the fine effluvium of philosophic minds penetrates the common thought of the age, and is likely even to modify the mental operations of the classes who never heard of philosopher or philosophy.

History furnishes much to justify this assertion. I at least learn from it that very important social and political results can often be traced to the teaching of certain philosophers. Wisdom crieth in the streets, and no one gives heed to her warnings. The city melts away, the race is exiled. Wisdom survives, and her warning is handed down to later generations by those who in their time could not profit by it. Here I must quote the inspired line of Mr. Emerson :

“One accent of the Holy Ghost
The heedless world has never lost.”

Wonderful truth! The Divine, knowing the value of its own utterances, appoints for each some abiding-place, from which, in due time, it reappears, is recognized, and remembered.

One of the visible and tangible results of Kant's philosophy was to beget a series of *doctrinaires*, whose list, already long, is by no means to be considered as ended in our time. These thinkers seem to have given especial heed to the master's declaration that a true student of philosophy must, above all, learn to philosophize for himself. After Kant, and from him, sprang Fichte, Hegel, Schelling. From these fathers, sons too of such a father, what widespread ramifications may be traced in the world of thought to-day! In the domain of philosophy proper, behold St. Louis and Concord clasping hands across the Western Continent.

Philosophy produces some of its most important effects outside of its own immediate domain. It is a leaven which leavens the whole

lump, and while we descant upon its mischievous innovations, our own bread, just drawn from the oven, is full of them. The destruction of the mythical shams and assumptions which have been so long imposed upon the world in the guise of religious truth was assured from the day on which Kant made evident the utter futility of the postulates upon which they were made to rest. The strong, simple, indisputable truths which he dared to utter have largely freed religion from the venerable falsities which were once installed and homaged everywhere. From the east to the west of this vast continent, from its northern to its southern limit, wherever liberal Christianity or free religion is preached, the work of this great master is multiplied and perpetuated. Those who ignorantly deride him know not that they owe to him a great, an inestimable boon, viz. : the philosophical confirmation of their religious freedom. Praise and thanks are due to him, *in sæculâ sæculorum*. For philosophy is she that shutteth and no man openeth, that openeth and no man shutteth. And Kant's logic of limitations closes the door of spurious authority, and opens that of candid enquiry leading to true judgment.

The world that knows Kant is very different from that which knows him not. The present age has been said to be "nothing if not philosophical." Most people whom we know, perhaps, reason more or less, affirming, denying, inventing, supplementing, with a mingling of good faith, activity, and intelligence which belongs to this time.

Where question runs into scepticism, and belief into enthusiasm, there we feel the sequence of the great master, Kant, to be broken. Of the materialists and agnostics of to-day, the first have ignored and the second have misunderstood him. He belongs in the Christian sequence, not out of it.

To think at all for one's self is an act of freedom. Descartes said : "*Cogito, ergo sum.*" He might better have said : *Delibero, ergo liberor.* Consistent, harmonious freedom comes out of thought trained and disciplined, square set upon square, and corner fitted to corner. An intelligent world will give us a world of equalized conditions, a world in which human values shall be recognized, and human labor wisely apportioned and duly honored. Christ, and the Christ-like souls who culminated in him, have given us the devout, prophetic vision of this world, the New

Jerusalem coming down from heaven. But Kant has surveyed it before us with the square and plummet of philosophy. And having received both the ideal vision, and the practical plan and measurement of a truly wise society, mankind can now begin to labor intelligently for a happiness which shall at once be comprehensive and consistent with itself.

I find in Degerando's account of the Kantian philosophy the statement that it was at first received with comparative indifference, and was afterwards adopted with unexampled enthusiasm, creating a revolution in the whole domain of philosophy. A third stage still awaited it, in which it gave rise to a new and violent polemic, friends and foes meeting each other with singular acerbity, when one considers the abstract character of the propositions contended for and against. The most intelligent of its friends, Fichte, Schelling, and Reinhold, while standing by it with their might, yet added much of their own to complete, each in his own way, what appeared to them wanting in the work of the master. As Degerando has given a much better account of the Kantian philosophy than has as yet appeared in our own language, I will venture to quote one or two of his judgments concerning it, which are interesting as coming from so admirable a Frenchman, writing at a time so near the life of his subject. He says, then :

“The Professor of Königsberg united in himself the greater part of the qualities essential to the author of a great revolution in philosophy: the vast *coup d'œil* which enables one to gather and to arrange a great variety of information; the art of finding for one's self new points of view even in ideas already familiar; the power of analysis which leads to the most subtle distinctions; the strength of combination which establishes systems; the boldness which puts unexpected questions; the address which avoids great difficulties; the regularity which delights in classifications; the severity which commands the respect and confidence of men; finally, the habits of a mind familiar with the depths of all departments of learning, the encyclopædic genius which, in an enlightened age, is indispensable for giving laws to the motive science upon which all others depend.”

Degerando is not a Kantian. His sense of justice compels him to give Kant so much praise as this. But, seeking for a *per contra*, he remarks that, while the Kantian doctrine satisfied some of the

legitimate needs of the human mind, it also, and still more prominently, flattered the weaknesses of human nature. The vanity of neophytes was gratified, he thinks, by the use of the obscure and difficult nomenclature of Kant, and ordinary minds lost sight of their own mediocrity when they found themselves summoned to exercise the lofty functions which he assigns to human thought. This praise and this dispraise are alike interesting. The first is just, the second I think most undeserved. A smattering of philosophy is as dangerous as are all the illusions of a fancied knowledge. But the Kantian writings seem to me as little calculated as any that I know of to feed the self-love of sciologists. They are a dead letter to those who do not study them deeply, and the vanity of the student is not flattered by the difficulty of mastering a subject. Degerando mentions various reasons which would tend to keep a Kantian student always faithful to the traditions of his master. One of these will make us smile. He says that the greater number of those who have mastered the system will, in so doing, exhaust their intellectual faculties to such a degree that they will not possess the energy necessary to a critical judgment of its doctrines. And this suggests a danger which this school of philosophy would do well to keep in mind. Are the minds of pupils here to be so exhausted in following the thoughts of others that no man shall have power left to know what he thinks himself? Do let me, then, suggest that, as the physician stands by, in cases of flogging, to see that the vital energies of the person suffering punishment shall not sink too low under the operation; do then, I pray, let there always be here a *psychiatros* who, after a difficult exposition of Kant or Hegel, shall go about among the hearers and ascertain what sense they have left.

“I wrong myself and them to jest.”

This French *aperçu* seems to me to miss the whole honest, helpful intention which pervades the Kantian writings—the democratic desire that all who care to investigate the mysteries of thought shall really be guided to their simplest solution, the conservative warning that this solution cannot avail in any case without laborious study. The categorical imperative of duty does not commend itself as a statement to the Frenchman’s mind. But here, perhaps, we come upon a national difference. The Germanic idea of right

is the hammer of Thor—simple, direct, absolute. The Gallic idea has a vague enthusiasm, and a more vague conviction.

It will not be expected that I should here attempt any detailed exposition either of the Kantian system or of those which Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel founded upon it. I suppose that the department of historical metaphysics is well looked to in this school of philosophy, and that most of my hearers are well up in these matters.

I am unwilling to speak at all of Hegel's philosophy in this place, because you have quite recently had a very full account of it from one who is himself an expert in the use of its difficult methods. It is now many years since I have wrestled with an Hegelian book. I remember having read with great interest the *Æsthetik*. I remember also Hegel's *Logie*, which I borrowed from Theodore Parker, and over which I made many despairing efforts. Parker himself told me at last that he thought the work scarcely worth the great trouble of studying, or, as he said, of enucleating it. I found it impossible to get any clear idea of a system of thought from the Hegelian books, and so relinquished them with a sigh of incapacity. Possibly if I had studied them in their true order, after reading Kant and Fichte, I might have understood them better.

Having made this confession with regard to Hegel, I will only say two things more about him. One of them is, that I find in one of Schelling's works, in which Kant and Fichte are much appreciated, the mention of a philosophy "much more mechanical and less genial than that of Fichte," and of a dialectic so difficult that a considerable number of Germans in following it "had come to seek no longer the grist at the mill, but only the clatter of the mill-wheel."

I will only add to those unimportant remarks a brief reminiscence of a conversation which I held twenty years ago with Francis Lieber, well known as a college dignitary, and eminent as a writer on political economy. He had attended Hegel's lectures in his youth, remembered his unpleasant accent and manner, and particularly recalled the acerbity with which he on one occasion desired "those foolish young men who had latterly taken part in a battle against the French forces" to leave his lecture-room, and return there no more. Lieber thought, as I did, that Kant was the greater man of the two, and shared the general impression that

Hegel had never desired to make himself clearly understood. I mention this conversation because one does not every day receive so near or so clear an impression of an eminent philosopher.

Concerning Fichte, I will trust myself to say something, very briefly, and with no attempt to reason either for or against his well-known system. When I first took up the Fichteian writings I felt utterly amazed and puzzled at the strangeness of their immediate object, which seemed to be the dissolution of the world of sight and sense. The proposition that all which I can see, hear, and perceive is but the creation of my own mind, seemed to me both objectless and senseless. At the same time, I could not but feel in Fichte himself the presence of an intellectual grasp, of a moral power which commanded my attention, and compelled me to follow his fine-spun and complex reasoning with interest and attention. I felt, too, that, while dating from Kant, Fichte had added to the work of the former an original conception of his own. Kant had asserted and proved that our objective knowledge is simply that of appearances and impressions. Fichte went much further, and made their very appearances and impressions the reflection of our own mode of being. The *ego* thus became an absolute *prius*, and was shown to be not only prior but sole.

I cannot but think that Kant's agnosticism had an immediate relation to the thought of his age. It was, I think, a philosophic protest against the dogmatism of the then popular theology and the irresponsible assumptions of the metaphysical systems then in vogue. Schoolmen and divines enforced their own conclusions upon the believing and thinking world as the dicta of absolute knowledge. Kant denies them the authority of any such knowledge. Their *ποῦ στῶ* assumed to be not only without the sensible world, but within the unseen world. Kant asserted that they had no such position, while he still held to religious ideas as the substance of things hoped for, and to the moral law by the evidence of things not seen.

Fichte's more advanced position is justified by Schelling as the logical perfecting of the Kantian theory. In his view, Kant's reasoning failed in its explanation of the *thing in itself*, which we might, perhaps, translate as the object absolute. This object absolute, source and end of all knowledge, is, in Kant's view, an algebraic x , an absolutely unknown quantity. He places it be-

yond the region of the categories, while we, obliged to think of it as existing and real, must apply to it the conditions of those very categories. Fichte explains this *x* as the *ego*, and, indeed, as the *ego* of human consciousness. The *I am*, the awakening to consciousness of every rational being, determines for him the whole system of outward appearances. Thus, nothing exists but the human race. As Fichte explicitly states, all else has no existence save in the necessary representations which the *ego* makes to itself.

As I do not wish to place either myself or my audience in the acrobatic attitude necessary for the entertainment of this theory, I will dismiss it at once as a metaphysical fiction which, like some mathematical fictions, may have or may have had its use in remedying the excess of other logical or psychological statements. A moral truth it undoubtedly has. We are *a priori* to our lives. Our predominant affections, and the relation of those to our human will, do, indeed, create for us all that is intrinsic in our experiences, and much which might pass as the result of adventitious circumstance. So much I find in the Kantian doctrine. Fichte's negation of external things is for me simply dialectic, and affords no rule by which to live.

In Fichte's other writings we find the noblest ideals of public and of private life. The spirit of self-sacrifice is with him the central point of obligation, inducing in the individual devotion to ideal right and the interests of the race, and rendering possible the coördination of the state. It is human, he allows, to pursue one's own advantage and neglect that of others as far as the institutions of society will allow. But it is also and still more human to suffer for the right, to put wealth and reputation out of sight for conscience' sake, and to lay down one's life for one's friends.

In his theory of the state, the predominant maxim is this sacrifice of the individual to the interests of the race, which the state is supposed to represent. In this sacrifice he recognizes no limits—he presents it as absolute and universal. Every individual in the state should take part in it, and recognize the right of the state not only to a part but to the whole of his life and power. The dignity of citizenship then becomes the right of all, since each bears his part in the general sacrifice out of which the state comes. The agents of government are not the state. Princes

and rulers are only citizens. The poorest man is not less, nor the greatest more. The natural aim of the individual is enjoyment. The aim of the state is culture. And this aim is assigned to it by what Fichte calls "the art of nature." He elsewhere describes this as a *zweckmässig* direction in higher nature—*i. e.*, in the destiny of the human race—through which the race, without its own knowledge or desire, is led towards the legitimate ends of its being. In such a statement the feudal theory of the state disappears like a dissolving view. The saying of Louis XIV, "*L'état c'est moi*," would make one laugh, if it did not recall the tears and blood which wiped it out forever. "I am the state!" Well, then, might thy successor say, "After me, the deluge." Fichte's theory of the state will hardly be adopted among us without some controversy. It is, indeed, an over-statement, and has so much the tone of a compulsory abnegation of personal considerations that it may appear to us tyrannical. "Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" is a more congenial statement. But this is defective, because it does not mention among its objects the promotion of the common good. The idea of self-sacrifice, made so prominent by Fichte, belongs to the working of the state, and, without it, no state can long endure. Our greatest danger in America is lest this idea should vanish, as the "lost arts" have done. Fichte further insists that from the earliest times there must have existed a normal society, whose manners and customs were in strong contrast with the barbarous life which surrounded it. The growth of civilization, according to him, could only have come out of the encounter of those opposite forms of society, since this growth consists in the gradual conquest of barbarism by culture, out of which come improved laws and stable institutions. Whether Fichte in this adopted as his normal group the Greek or the Hebrew people does not appear, since he omits to name the ideal race, whose historical existence he assumes as an inevitable fact.

The philosopher Schelling comes next in the order of our present considerations, and must be mentioned, though within very brief limits. This eminent man seems somehow to have been dropped by the studious public between Kant and Hegel. His name is familiar to all who know the names of German philosophers, but his doctrines are so little discussed even among studious people that I was surprised at hearing Dr. Hedge say, quite

lately, that he considered him a more remarkable and original man than either Fichte or Hegel. The reason for giving in this connection more than a passing mention of Schelling is in the fact that, more than Fichte, perhaps, he founds upon Kant, and that his comments upon both of these philosophers are acute and interesting.

Schelling has left among his published writings a brief paper entitled "Immanuel Kant," in which he has more to say concerning the master himself than concerning his doctrines, of which he treats very fully in his lectures on "The Philosophy of Revelation," and possibly elsewhere. He recognizes the *naïveté* and personal excellence of the master, and finds in the perfection of his work and the elegance of his simple tastes some confirmation of his supposed French descent.

Schelling couples in thought the revolution made by Kant in philosophy with the French Revolution. He ascribes to this terrific agency the rapid spread of the Kantian doctrines, and explains the simultaneous decline of the two revolutions by the fact of their negative character, and of their having attempted to settle the controversy between the abstract and the actual—a controversy which, he says, Kant found as irreconcilable in speculative thought as the fathers of the French Revolution found it in political action.

Schelling calls his own work on "The Philosophy of Revelation" the grounding of a positive philosophy. He, perhaps, hoped to do what Kant had left undone, and, taking the work of his predecessor as purely critical, designed to supplement its negations by a system of positive authority and acceptance. His rehabilitation of Bacon and the Empirics tends in this direction, and many in the present day will be grateful to him for the justice which he renders to the intentions of the Experimentalists. Yet I demur at the interpretation by which Schelling considers the system of Kant to be one of pure negation. For these terms, negative and positive, are terms of interchangeable significance. Were I, for example, in chains, the chains would be positive, and my freedom negative. Should some one break my chain for me, his action might be called negative, so far as regards the chain, but in relation to my freedom it would be positive. A system of thought which limits the spontaneous and normal action of the

human mind is negative. A system which forbids the imposition of relative concepts as absolute truths I must consider as positive in its results, even if negative in its procedure. The corrective negations of philosophy are like the breaking of the chain which I have imagined. They rectify the errors which accompany human thought, and which often in their accumulation so obscure the truth that nothing positive can be taught until they are swept away.

Schelling says that Kant's table of categories had in Germany for twenty years an authority as absolute as that of the ten commandments. Writing, perhaps in the neighborhood of 1830, he speaks of Kant, and even of Fichte, as already superseded in the philosophical predilection of the time. He yet abides by his belief in the permanent value of their work, and in the great and lasting service which the greater man and the lesser had rendered to the cause of philosophy.

Leaving for the moment this question of the negative and positive aspects of philosophy, it will perhaps be important to explain here the way in which, according to Schelling, the French Revolution was helpful to the spreading of Kant's philosophy. This philosophy, he avers, led the German nation to an earlier recognition of the true features of the Revolution, and this recognition brought with it a renewed conviction of the eternal, self-sustaining power of right and of the social order. Kant's work was recognized as establishing the groundwork of their steadfast and immutable principles, and it thus became a work of universal acceptance, available to world's people and statesmen. This we must call a positive service.

One more result of an availing study of Kant will be that the student will be induced by it to part with certain cherished cobwebs which the ingenious brain is apt to weave for its own delectation, and in which the mind itself becomes entangled, like a spider caught in his own web.

Among these cobwebs we may class such devices as Swedenborg's spirits, degrees, and localities of the unseen world. Now, if Kant teach us nothing else, he will teach us that all this mechanical construction of circles, of ranks, of entities, of shelves upon which spiritual things are laid away in their order—he will teach us, I say, that systems of this sort have neither foundation

nor place in true philosophy, whose first principle is that we can have no sensible perceptions regarding *noumena*. 'Akin to this is the saying of Holy Writ that spiritual things must be spiritually discerned.

I am zealous against these inventions because their imagined mechanism in the end materializes the mind that gives it room. All manner of unverifiable and unsubstantial hypotheses may come to us with these baseless visions, and claim entertainment and authority.

The equilibrium of thought, it is true, appears to have a certain mechanical character, and we all make large use of similes borrowed from the action of visible things, such as moral rising and falling, imaginative soaring, floating, weaving, and the like. But this mechanical expression should always be held for what it is—a mere subjective self-help for the mind, not binding on other minds, and having nothing to do with the essentials either of reason or experience.

I remember that the studies in philosophy which I made before I became acquainted with the Kantian writings induced or allowed me to consider most of the evils of society as constant factors in the economy of individual and national life. In my mind I made various efforts to explain and illustrate the working of the great social machinery, and so to dispose of the seeming evils as to give them the office of weight and retardation in movements which without them might run into indefinite and fatal acceleration. Among the mystics whom I mentioned the other day, Swedenborg and Spinoza had, I think, established me in this idea. The eternal hells of the one, and the massive passivity of the other, led me to look upon wrong and suffering as permanent institutions.

In Kant's writings I heard the eternal "Thou shalt" in its trumpet tone of victory. No longer did it seem a command of transcendent excellence, which mankind would probably always continue to evade. Its positive command would enforce obedience in virtue of its very beauty and perfection. The reason of mankind, nobly appealed to, would nobly respond. The motto of Constantine, "τούτῳ νικά," "By this thou shalt conquer," gave the cross a certain subservience to his personal ambitions. "This shall conquer thee by thy heart's best love" is a more fitting pre-

diction. And that trumpet sound which I have just described brought me out of the ranks of those who pray, and suffer, and scarcely hope, into view at least of the army of great hearts who so trust the great command that hope itself becomes confirmed into certainty.

The claims of original creation in all departments of literature may be more or less contested, because much that literature expresses was in the minds of men already, and philosophers inherit much from each other and from antiquity; but I do think that no philosopher has stated so simply or so strongly as Kant has done the proper relation of the moral law to man, no one has made so clear the universal heritage of the race in the domain of unbounded and undying good.

The world does move. There is a good deal of philosophizing done in Kant's direction, though few heads are strong enough to entirely explore and repeat his analysis of human faculties, and his synthesis of human life. Kant was certainly a metaphysician *par excellence*, and felt the joy of an athlete or an artist in struggling with difficulties which he felt sure of overcoming. Yet his humanity was larger even than his philosophy, and he held most dear the very objects which the apostles of progress write on their programmes, or emblazon on their shields. Peace, universal and enduring, was in his thoughts and in his heart. He saw that it could only come through obedience to law; but the law to which he did homage was that of every man's right, everywhere secured and respected. His conception of human nature was noble, hopeful, inspiring. He possibly underrated the power of common sense in the great community at large, which cannot be thought of as a community of philosophers. But in his day and in his country free institutions and popular education had not done what they have to-day to raise the whole intellectual average of the community. We may say to-day that while students of philosophy are not many, and philosophers are very few, many of the best results of philosophy are becoming adopted and embodied in the administration of society. The possibility of a rational solution of social and national difficulties, the superiority of reason over force, and the applicability of the first to what has been always generally deemed the province of the latter—are not these the results of applied philosophy? Again, the association of groups

of the most thoughtful people with the object of studying the needs of humanity and meeting them with its resources, the peaceful coming together of men and women of opposite opinions for the purpose of reasoning out their differences, and building upon the final harmony a common house of faith—what are those but philosophical procedures?

On a late occasion I expressed to Dr. Hedge the extraordinary sense of emancipation which I had felt after reading the principal Kantian writings. The learned man confessed to a similar experience, and the conversation ran upon the reason to be assigned for it.

The moral reason for this sense of enfranchisement I conceive to reside in Kant's positive assertion of the moral power and obligation of man. Its intellectual reason I find in the *a priori* attitude of the mind to the world of perception which is so marked a feature of the Kantian philosophy.

Margaret Fuller once said that she accepted the universe, and Carlyle laughed heartily on hearing of it, and said, "I think she'd better." But each of us has an attitude towards the universe. We partly accept and partly make ourselves accepted by it. It seems to me important to set us before this great problem of life, this great plexus of interwoven forces, with a weapon in our hand, viz.: the inborn human judgment to which all the phenomena of experience are to be referred.

When Christ said, "I have overcome the world," did He not tell us that He had so stood before it, and decided what of it He would accept and what should accept Him?

This is a practical question, because this faculty of judgment, so precious in man, may be lost or perverted through defective training or false education. I think I may say that the downright ignorance of one who has labored but not studied is less likely to pervert or destroy this faculty than are the forms of mental training which we may call absolute and tyrannical. I know whole classes of people whose merit in the eyes of their spiritual directors is precisely this, that they have abjured all spontaneous exercise of their own power of judgment. How trite is this statement! Is not the right of private judgment still a debatable question in polite circles?

I know others, women especially, who glide along through life under the influence only of its surface impressions. The *haut ton* of fashion in my youth had much of this indifferentism. The age preceding must have had, I think, still more, since old plays and novels represent for us that high-bred languor which had no answer for the most important announcement but to adjust its eye-glass and drawl out: "Is it so, indeed? How very singular!"

The pedagogic attitude of the Kantian philosophy to such persons is that of a master with a rod in his hand. He says: "Do not play the fool. You are no such ninny as you pretend to be. Lordly reason is your birth-gift. Assert its dignity, and govern yourself accordingly."

I wish that I could sum up in a more satisfactory manner the appreciable results of Kant's labors. I will do this, however, as well as I can, asking you, first of all, to remember that he who is now an inhabitant of the book-shelf was once a living, breathing man, who passed many years in the exercise of a laborious profession. Many a set of pupils met him face to face, heard his brave words, and followed his profound teachings. He took part also in the general literary work of his time, and printed in divers periodicals his views of the writers whose works came within his extended observation. He has left us in his lesser writings keen *aperçus* of manners and of character. His views of womankind were neither adequate nor prophetic; but we must remember that the woman of the present day was not invented in Kant's day, or, if she was, he never saw her in Königsberg.

From what I have just said we may infer, to begin with, that Kant was, in his own sphere and place of living, a person of great influence, sure to leave his mark upon those who came in contact with him. Then we must remember that his doctrine, coldly received at first, was soon widely embraced throughout his native country as the surest antidote to the wild confusion and reign of terror which in his day fell upon Europe. Then let us recall the fact that a trio of eminent philosophers took his work for their starting-point, and, though diverging from him and from each other, yet wrought, each and all, as they could not have wrought if they had not had his legacy to work by. Then remember that Coleridge and Sir William Hamilton made him somewhat known in England; that Villers translated his works into French; that

Degerando gave an admirable synopsis of his system in his "Comparative History of Philosophy"; and that Victor Cousin recognized and proclaimed his merits. Remember that Italy, which has Hegel, has in him a man who passed over the Kantian bridge. Remember that in this country a few ripe scholars as long as fifty years ago were intimately acquainted with his doctrine, and that this acquaintance has grown slowly but solidly among the studious public. Can you add up the sum now? Can you measure the extent of the debt we owe to this great thinker, who has, beyond any man of modern times, resolved doubt, confirmed faith, repressed dogmatism, and vindicated humanity? No. Such debts cannot be measured. One little vista opens to us when we see that Theodore Parker received his instruction, and added it to that great wisdom and culture out of which he fed a hungry multitude, and judged the men and manners of his day. William T. Harris, in turn, receives from Parker some inkling of Kant's value, and himself becomes first a disciple and then a teacher of philosophies. In all this, remember, there is following and leading; and he who can follow intelligently can also lead. Perhaps our last and briefest word about him may be that, having produced a work which remains one of the wonders and treasures of philosophy, he understood and helped to direct the progress of humanity, and, by influencing the noblest minds of modern times, has left his impress upon the fate and history of the world.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

THE CENTENNIAL OF KANT'S KRITIK AT SARATOGA, N. Y.

HAMILTON COLLEGE, July 30, 1881.

WM. T. HARRIS, LL.D., *Editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy.*

DEAR SIR: In response to your request, I herewith enclose a brief account of the celebration of the Centennial of Kant's *Kritik*, observed at Saratoga, N. Y., July 6th and 7th, as prepared chiefly by the Secretary, Mr. Taylor.

JOHN W. MEARS.

PROCEEDINGS AT THE CENTENNIAL OF "KANT'S KRITIK."

Temple Grove parlor, Saratoga, witnessed, on the 6th of July, a select gathering intended to honor the memory of the great German philosopher, Kant, in this the hundredth anniversary of the publication of his greatest work, "The *Kritik of the Pure Reason.*" There were present President Seelye, of Amherst College, who was chosen chairman; President Bascom, of Wisconsin University; Professors Morris, of Johns Hopkins University; Mears, of Hamilton College; Bennett, of Syracuse University; Bliss, of Vermont University; and A. S. Lyman, of Yale College; also Dr. Herrick Johnson and lady, of Chicago; Mr. Libbey, of the "Princeton Review"; Mr. Thomas H. Pease and lady, of New Haven; Rev. C. E. Lindsey and lady, of New Rochelle; Mr. A. L. Blair, of Troy; Mr. E. M. Wheeler, of Dover, Delaware; Miss Eliza A. Youmans, of New York City; Messrs. A. C. White, Frank S. Williams, F. W. Palmer, and R. W. Hughes, of the graduating class of Hamilton College; Rev. C. F. Dowd, Rev. Dr. Stryker and Miss Stryker, with others from Saratoga and other places.

The company joined in the Lord's Prayer, led by Dr. Stryker. President Seelye was elected chairman, and W. C. Taylor, of Saratoga, secretary. A large number of letters endorsing the proposed Centennial were read by Professor Mears (as given below).

The chairman called upon Professor Mears to read his paper on the "Significance of the Centennial," in which the writer showed how the philosopher, who had scarcely wandered from the shadow of the paternal roof, and whose work—*The Kritik*—fell almost dead from the press, now, at the end of a hundred years, and four thousand miles from Königs-

berg, was honored by this group of thinkers and educators. He claimed, 1, that the study of *The Kritik* was a grand mental gymnastic; 2, would prove an effectual antidote to materialism; and 3, led to the correction of its own errors by inviting us to study the further supplementary works of the author.

He was followed by Professor George S. Morris, on "The Higher Problems of Philosophy." These are the true theory of knowledge and the true theory of being. The immediate problem of philosophy is to correct the narrowness of sensational psychology and the narrow conception of "being" expressed by the word "substance."

President Bascom read a paper on Kant's distinction between speculative and practical reason. He took the ground that Kant did more for true philosophy by his dogmatism than by his logical reasonings.

The paper of Professor Josiah Royce, of the University of California, was read in part by Mr. F. S. Williams, and in part by Mr. A. C. White, both of the graduating class of Hamilton College. Professor Royce argued that philosophical progress could be best secured by a reform of *The Kritik*, in its definition of experience. He proposed three "forms" of thought in the place of Kant's "Categories," viz.: memory, anticipation, and a recognition of the existence of an external universe, with every separate sensation. This paper was discussed by Professors Mears and Morris and by President Bascom.

The paper of Lester F. Ward, of the United States Geological Survey, on "The Antinomies of Kant in Relation to Modern Science," was read by Mr. R. W. Hughes. Mr. Ward endeavored to show that modern science had given the preponderance to the negative and rationalistic side of the famous antinomies of *The Kritik*.

Dr. W. T. Harris's paper on "The Relations of Kant's *Kritik* to Ancient and Modern Thought," having arrived by express on the 7th inst., was read by Dr. Mears on the evening of that day in the Temple Grove parlor. The ancients doubted of objective reality; the moderns doubt the reality of their subjective affirmations. True philosophy must solve both these forms of doubt. The course of philosophical speculation is under the guidance of Providence. A novel turn was given to the discussion by attributing to Kant's subjectivity an ironical significance, which was combated by Professors Bennett and Mears. References to Trendelenburg in the essay called forth reminiscences of this great thinker by Dr. Bennett, who had studied philosophy under his lectures in Germany.

A vote of thanks was given to Dr. Mears for his success in bringing about the Centennial, and to Mr. Dowd, of Temple Grove, for the use of his parlor, and for his invitation to use it for similar purposes at any fu-

ture time. Dr. Mears, President Seelye, and Professor Morris were made a committee to consider the expediency of arranging for future meetings in the interest of philosophy, after which the meeting adjourned.

CORRESPONDENCE.

From Professor R. E. Thompson, of the University of Pennsylvania.

We should be most happy to have your paper for *The Penn Monthly*. I am glad to hear that you are working so hard at Kant. I have not had much time for him of late years, but I shall never cease to value what I learned from him, and I can imagine no better service for a college student than to make him familiar with the man who cleared the way for the new philosophy.

I have read part of Kuno Fischer's great work on Kant in the translation, and I think it most admirable. I have only his *Vorlesungen* on Kant's Life and Doctrine (a small book), and his *Anti-Trendelenburg*, which turns on his interpretation of the *Critique*. Mahaffy I have only seen, and that in the old edition. I have (1) Mirbt's *Kant und seine Nachfolger*, an incomplete work on the history of the controversies; (2) Herder's *Metakritik*; (3) Renk's *Möcherley zur . . . Metakritik*, showing that Herder cribbed from Hamann; (4) F. Baader's *Ueber Kant's Deduction des practischen Vernunft und die absolute Blindheit der letzten* (1809), which seems to me to hit the weakest point in the system; (5) Hartenstein's first edition of Kant's *Werke*, excepting vols. 2 and 3, and Born's Latin translation excepting vol. 3, and Semple's translation of the *Metaphysic of Ethics*; (6) Paul's *Kant's Lehre v. radik. Boese*; (7) Jachmann's *Prüfung der Kantische Religionsphilosophie* (1800); (8) Erdmann's *Entwicklung der deutschen Speculation* (I, 25-114); (9) C. L. Michelet's *Geschichte der letzten systeme der Philosophie* (I, 37-178); (10) E. Reinhold's *Geschichte der Philosophie* (II, 3-67); (11) H. C. W. Sigwart's *Geschichte der Philosophie* (III, 21-165); (12) C. Fortlage's *Gesch. d. Philosophie seit Kant* (10-84). These books and all I have are *Thomsonii et Amicorum*.

I know nothing of Meiklejohn, and little of Mahaffy. The latter seems always to do good work and yet to come short of the best. Kant is not strong among the English at present. Hegel has more disciples, but the greater part are taken up with Evolution, *pro* or *con*. The weakness of Kant's philosophy is exactly that which Herder felt with a poet's instinct but could not express adequately. It is also the weakness which alienates the modern naturalistic school from him. It is his unnatural dualism—"Nature spiritless, spirit natureless, and both lifeless." And

yet the truth he did see most clearly—the truth of human freedom, and responsibility based on freedom—is just the truth our age needs and Ezekiel taught before Kant.

From Mr. James M. Libbey, Editor of the "Princeton Review."

I have just read your suggestion in *The Penn Monthly* in reference to the Kantian philosophy, etc. I am delighted that some one should have spoken out upon the subject of a demonstration next year, and I hope that such a convention of scholars as you propose may be effected.

I believe that much power now latent could be brought into play by such a meeting. I believe also that there is in America a genuine, wide-spread, and rapidly-growing interest in philosophical matters, but which, on account of peculiar political and commercial conditions, has not yet fully realized itself.

I believe that if you could get some eminent man of thought and action, such as Dr. Harris, interested in this matter, you would be doing a great service to the "American School of Philosophy" so called.

From Professor Francis Bowen, of Harvard College.

Your letter reminds me that just a century has elapsed since the publication of Kant's great work. And during that time what an influence it has had over opinions in philosophy and theology throughout the civilized world! Most of that influence, however, has been indirect, for up to 1850 how few persons out of Germany really knew anything about the "Critique of Pure Reason"! And even now I doubt whether there are more than a dozen scholars in the United States who really know and understand Kant in the original. Hence I fear that the public are not numerous enough to make a celebration successful.

I wish you all success in your undertaking, but I cannot promise any active coöperation with it. *Solve senescentem equum.* With my advanced years and declining strength, I shrink nervously from any new engagements, and confine myself entirely to my necessary college work.

From Rev. Dr. Hickok, of Amherst, Mass.

Yours of the 7th instant was duly received, and I thank you for the communication. I have not read your article relative to a Kantian Centennial, but think there must be a growing number who may favor such a movement.

I have nearly recovered from a successful operation for cataract, and find on hand some unfinished undertakings which press too strenuously to permit that I should let in any outside work.

I shall watch with interest any movement in the proposed direction, and commend most cordially your good attempt to your best judgment and effort.

From Dr. Noah Porter, President of Yale College.

Your circular is before me proposing a conference in honor of Kant, to be held at some time during the present year.

I am very much interested in the return to Kant in modern thinking. I have made a considerable collection of the essays which are occupied with him in the last few years. I am free to say that Kant has treated more questions than any philosopher of the last century, although I am far from thinking that he has answered all these questions satisfactorily. Indeed, the critical philosophy is open itself to the second criticism on many fundamental points and many points of detail. No writer repays study so well, and no writer needs to be studied more than he in order to be understood. I should be glad to aid in any practicable scheme in the way of accomplishing what you propose, but cannot with my present engagements promise anything very definite for myself, nor propose anything very definite for others. I see a plenty of topics in your list which I would like to have discussed.

From Lester F. Ward, of the U. S. Coast Survey.

I intended sooner to have expressed my approval of your proposed Centennial of Kant's *Kritik*, made in the *Penn Monthly* for December, 1880, which I read with pleasure and interest. In case a convention is held, I would be glad to receive notice of it at least, even though I should not be able to attend. If I contributed anything, it would probably fall under your second rubric, and treat of the Antinomies in the light of modern science. I am acquainted only with *The Kritik* and the "*Theorie des Himmels*," which I have read in the original and annotated somewhat. Everywhere I felt that I was communing with a master mind, whatever might have been its *objective* deficiencies.

From Rev. Nelson Millard, of Syracuse.

Your able and admirable circular in regard to the "Kant Centennial" is at hand. I heartily hope the Centennial will be held, and shall esteem it a privilege should my duties be such as to admit of my being present and enjoying its discussions.

From Dr. Albert B. Watkins, of Adams, N. Y.

Your circular regarding the "Kant Centennial" is at hand.

While I can get time neither to write nor to attend, I feel like writing

to say that I think you are doing a good and right thing, and one which, I hope, will do much to promote interest in metaphysical study in this country.

From Dr. J. H. Seelye, President of Amherst College.

President Seelye desires me to acknowledge his receipt of your circular respecting the Centennial of Kant's *Kritik*, and to say that, while his other engagements are at present so engrossing that it will be impossible for him to prepare any paper for such an observance, he is heartily in sympathy with the proposed measure, and would be glad, if it were in his power, to contribute towards its success. (*Private Secretary.*)

From Dr. E. G. Robinson, President of Brown University, R. I.

Your circular relating to a proposed celebration of the Centennial of the publication of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" has been received.

The revival of attention to Kant in Germany, England, and this country is certainly one of the significant signs of our time. And it is hardly possible to overstate the necessity of a right understanding of Kant on the part of any one who would criticise modern thought intelligently.

It seems to me you have well stated the aspects under which the Critique, and, in fact, the whole philosophy of Kant, might be viewed in different papers. There are several of them to which the attention of every well-read man must have been drawn.

From Dr. E. Dodge, President of Madison University, Hamilton, N. Y.

Your circular reached me some days ago, and would have been answered at once but for a severe indisposition.

I am in full sympathy with you in regard to all you suggest with regard to Kant's philosophy, except I would not like to speak as you have done of the "proton pseudos." I should want to be present at any gathering in Kant's honor. But do not attempt too much. Do not have too many papers and too little discussion of them. I would have *absolute liberty of thought*.

From Mr. John P. Coyle, Princeton, N. J.

DEAR SIR: A circular in reference to a Kant Centennial has fallen into my hands. My name is of no account to it, but a sense of obligation to the author of *The Kritik*, as well as a deep interest in the future of American thought, constrains me to record my vote, however insignificant, in its favor. I belong to that class of young men, not small I believe, yet too small,

who have been rescued by the study of Kant from intellectual chaos, from utter distraction. I know I am expressing the opinion of a respectable proportion of the younger Princeton men when I say that the one movement that will most benefit philosophy, and thus theology and all higher thought in America, is a revival of the zealous study of Kant, not as an authority—I hope we are beyond that—but as a propædeutic. He is the Euclid of modern thought.

From Dr. George F. Magoun, President of Iowa College, Grinnell, Iowa.

I received some days since the Kant circular, but sickness prevented my replying. The matter of a celebration of the Centennial of The Kritik has awakened very great interest in my mind, and I heartily hope it will succeed. It would give me very great pleasure to be present and read one of the proposed papers. I presume the time will be the summer vacation of the colleges. My recent ill health makes it possible that I may be abroad then, but nothing definite can now be anticipated about this; and so I write to assure you that all the reasons for the Centennial which you have named strike me with great force, and I entirely approve of the movement. I am specially gratified at the broad plan of discussion which you propose. It ought to promote not only interest in “divine philosophy” and in Kant, but also most vital and necessary truth.

From Dr. J. Clark Murray, President of Gill University, Montreal.

Your circular has been handed to me by Principal Dawson. I am glad to know that some movement is being made to celebrate the Centennial of the K. d. r. V.

On Friday evening last I delivered a popular lecture on Kant in the city, with immediate reference to the Centennial, and at the close of our University session I intended to gather a few friends at my house for a quiet celebration of the occasion.

I shall be happy to hear from you about the place of your meeting, and other arrangements. As a Scotsman, a pupil of Hamilton, and an expositor of his philosophy, I should like especially to know who will take up the fourth of the subjects in your list.

From Professor Benjamin N. Martin, New York University.

In reply to your enquiry about my own interest in the Centenary, I have only to say that I should feel a certain interest in it, but not perhaps of the deepest kind. As the initiator of a great movement he will always have a claim on the world's respect; but the incompleteness of

his work forms so great a drawback upon its usefulness that I can never refer to it with any enthusiasm. I am afraid that I cannot promise any important aid in the matter. At the same time I do not like to say this to one who is assuming the laboring oar in so honorable and public-spirited a work. Your list, too, of topics is so suggestive and fruitful that it seems as though I might certainly find opportunity for a brief paper on some one of those topics. You make us all your debtors by so earnest and generous a labor.

From Dr. W. C. Cattell, of Lafayette College, Easton, Pa.

Your circular, *anent* the proposed celebration of the Centennial of Kant's Kritik, is at hand. It strikes me favorably, but I leave for Europe this month, and shall not be back until the close of the year. I cannot, therefore, aid in the affair, as you suggest; but please use my name in whatever connection you see fit with those who are heartily in accord with the object you have in view.

From Professor John Watson, LL. D., of Queen's University, Kingston, Canada.

I think your idea of a Centennial celebration of The Kritik a good one, but, unfortunately, I fear I cannot personally take part in it. I suppose you are not aware that I have in the English press a work on "Kant and his English Critics; a Comparison of Critical and Empirical Philosophy," which I expect to be published (by Macmillan & Co., London and New York) towards the end of this month. Should the proposed celebration take place, I should be glad to submit a copy of that work to the convention.

From Professor H. A. P. Torrey, of the University of Vermont.

I feel great interest in your proposal to celebrate the Centennial of Kant's Kritik, and heartily approve of it.

I am the more interested because the philosophy which has been taught at Burlington since the days of President James Marsh has been so largely derived from the metaphysical writings of German philosophers, particularly from Kant. I should be very glad to attend such a celebration. There are undoubtedly a sufficient number of American scholars versed in The Kritik whose presence and contributions would make such a celebration memorable and of great service in the promotion of sound philosophy.

From Dr. M. B. Anderson, President of the University of Rochester, N. Y.

I have been absent, or very much pressed with work, since I received your note.

So far as I understand your views regarding the importance of the labors of Kant, I am in sympathy with them. It is true that both the strength and the weakness of Sir William Hamilton's thinking were due to his studies of Kant. I should be glad to emphasize in any way within my power the value of Kant's metaphysical labors. All adequate criticism of the modern materialistic schools must start out from the Kantian methods so far as the necessary laws of thought are concerned. The defects of his system you refer to, and they are obvious to every student.

From Professor Borden P. Bowne, of Boston University, Mass.

I was away from home when your letter arrived. I am inclined to think the proposed Centennial of Kant's *Kritik* more to be desired than to be expected. If a survey of the philosophical field, and especially of the problem of knowledge and its implications, could be had, it would be of great use. Such a survey, however, must be had from a standpoint which Kant has made possible rather than from Kant's own position. The advance of philosophy is possible only along the way which Kant opened, but a return to Kant in himself would be a regress rather than a progress. Hence I cannot regard the recent Kantian revival in Germany as likely to produce any good fruit. It is too uncritical and passive.

The desirability of such a meeting as you suggest is evident; but I can form no opinion as to its probability. The most of our teachers of philosophy have only a hearsay knowledge of Kant; and the students of Kant very often read their own views into him. If the discussion were confined to strictly Kantian views, rather than to more general problems suggested by Kant, there would be a risk of turning a philosophical discussion into one of exegesis and interpretation. This would be deplorable, but it is no uncommon result of Kantian studies. The advantage of the meeting would consist, I think, entirely in calling the attention of thinkers, alleged or otherwise, to the problem of knowledge and its manifest implications. It would thus serve as a protest against the shallow confidence of our present speculators, who think that philosophy is to be constructed from the side of physiology.

From Professor George P. Fisher, of Yale Theological Seminary.

I owe you an apology for my slowness in answering your printed letter respecting a proposed meeting in honor of Kant.

I should cordially approve of some such method as that which you suggest of paying honor to the illustrious philosopher, and, at the same time, of lending some stimulus to the prosecution of philosophical studies. I could not, however, count upon the privilege of personally taking part in it.

From Dr. W. T. Harris, of Concord, Mass.

. . . I am very glad of your undertaking the Kant's Centennial. I had not seen your article in *The Penn Monthly* . . . Although we shall do something to commemorate the anniversary in the Concord School (devote a week to discussions of topics relating to Kant), yet I think that the anniversary should be kept by American philosophers in an independent celebration, as suggested by Professor Morris. It ought to be held in such a manner that it will not imply an endorsement of any special institution. I shall notice your circular in "The Journal of Speculative Philosophy." . . . Our celebration of Kant is not in any sense a fulfillment of the plan you proposed, but only a contribution of a humble sort, undertaken by a few individuals interested in a special phase of philosophy.

I shall coöperate in your enterprise in any way you find me useful, and do whatever you ask of me. The January number of my Journal is very much delayed. My trip to Europe has cost me delay in all my work.

From Dr. James McCosh, President of the College of New Jersey, Princeton.

I had arranged months ago to go to San Francisco this summer, and I am just setting out. In these circumstances it is not in my power to show my reverence for Kant and his philosophy by attending the celebration on the 6th of July. You know that I hold the opinion that the American student should labor to take from Kant all that is natural and true, and reject all that is artificial and false.

From Professor Jerome Allen, President of the New York State Teachers' Association.

You and your associates will have all the privileges of the rest of us in all respects. [This refers to reduction in fares on the railroads to delegates coming and going, and to reduced rates at hotels.] I will attend to that personally.

From Mr. Charles N. Dowd, of Temple Grove (Hotel), Saratoga, N. Y.

We should be pleased to see you at Temple Grove during the convention of the New York State Teachers' Association. The parlor of Temple Grove will be placed at the disposal of the Kant Centennial, July 6th.

THE KANT CENTENNIAL AT CONCORD.

[The following verbatim report of the discussions at the Concord School of Philosophy on occasion of the Kant Centennial has been received from the secretary, Mr. Sanborn:]

CONCORD SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY.

SATURDAY, August 6, 1881.

The session opened at nine A. M. with a poem by Mrs. Julia Ward Howe, who explained that the poem was written many years ago (dated 1866), and that she now presented it "as a little offering to the Centennial of the great master."

ON LEAVING FOR A TIME THE STUDY OF KANT.

Dull seems the day that brings no hour with thee,
O Master! lapsèd to eternity.
I am as loath to leave thy guiding hand
As babes to quit the mother's knee and stand.
My memory shows the rude chaotic ways
Wherein I walked ere thou re-form'dst my days.

Truth was the airy palace that I sought,
Through many a wild adventure dreamed or wrought.
Lo! at thy touch its crystal turrets rise,
Set in the golden gloom of evening skies.
Experience widening Wisdom's sacred scope,
The fixed ideal, the everlasting hope.

[Dr. Kedney then read Professor Porter's paper on "The Relation of Kant's Philosophy to Ethics and Religion."]

DISCUSSION.

Mrs. Julia Ward Howe—If any comment upon the essay is desired or permitted, and I might venture to suggest a criticism, it is an effort to make the theory carry too much theological baggage. It seems to me to put theology and philosophy too much together, as if the one was bound to do all the work of both. I do not think that they are. I suppose different people see very different things in their philosophy. But I see in Kant one good thing, that while he shows what is the domain of philosophy pure and simple, he does not at all go into the province of theology, which is a province by itself.

Mr. Emery—Do you mean, Mrs. Howe, that Kant considered his

“Critique of Pure Reason” as covering the whole domain of philosophy proper, or would you include his “Critique of the Practical Reason” in the statement that he did not intend to consider questions of theology?

Mrs. Howe—I confess I realize a little of what I quoted last night from a French author: that it requires too much effort to follow such a discourse to be able to do much in criticising it afterwards. I do not think that Kant in the “Critique of Pure Reason” assumed to exhaust philosophy any more than any man can. I do not think he attempted to shut the door. We see that, because those who followed him and added so much have felt rather invited to do so than forbidden by his attitude.

Dr. Jones—There are people who seem to expect to find as a result of philosophic thought something consummated, round finished marbles or balls of conclusion, that we can fill our pockets of memory with, and carry with us as a result. The greatness of this thinker appears in the fact that he raised to view the never-ended problems of human life and human society; that his *thinking* is his philosophy; not his RESULT of thinking, but his thinking itself. His is the force that acts upon the thought of the world; that moves us again to think, and not to the vanity of seeking to clutch some result of thought, some last word, some completed philosophy that will supersede all philosophic thinking. He is the great philosopher who, by thinking most regally, moves the philosophic thought of the race, not unto consummations and conclusions. For these themes of philosophy, we must remember, are universal. Is man to exhaust the thought of the universe? He may find the key; he may find the process of thinking; but shall we have a system of thought in the world which shall consummate and end the philosophic thinking of mankind? No such thing has ever appeared, or shall appear. He is the greatest thinker who most impresses and moves to thought those who think. And, after all, philosophy, as a body and unity of philosophic thought, is not an abstraction. It is not an abstract unity; it is a concrete unity. It is comprehensive of all schools of thought in the history of philosophizing. And when we shall have received and comprehended these impulses of those various great thinkers, and shall have incorporated them into our processes, we shall have made our use of them. They will have contributed their light, their treasure, to the thought of the world in that form.

So I am occupied but very little with the question of the deficiencies, the limitations, the want of “*consummation*” in this thinker. What does he say that is true? That is my interest in the able paper that we have heard this morning. Neither Aristotle, nor Plato, nor Kant, nor Schel-

ling, nor Hegel is to be looked to as having spoken the last word, as having given us the consummation of philosophic thought. They are all too wise to think that, and we should accept their contributions without doing them that injustice.

Mr. Alcott—So far as I have been able to comprehend Kant's distinction between the Pure Reason and the Practical, I should say that in the first treatise he was endeavoring to explore the possibilities, the reach of the pure intellect, or the reason unilluminated by faith, or, by what he calls the "categorical imperative," the conscience. So I will take these two terms—reason and conscience—as expressing, in a generalized form, the two phases of Kant's thinking.

In the first treatise he does not seem to have taken into his thought what he called the Practical Reason in the other; he uses "reason" in two senses. But really does he not mean faith, or the necessary influence which the affections have upon reason, or which the moral sense or conscience within us has upon reason? He finds in this first treatise that the reason cannot solve moral questions, and, as our essayist has said, he becomes confused because he is seeking to find depths by the pure reason which of itself it cannot fathom. He finds he can come to no sure conclusions, and he ends in the unknowable, and must be classed as an agnostic with Spencer and Huxley and all that class. The Free Religionists largely, and even Unitarians to some extent, appear to have fallen into that error, and may quote Kant as authority.

Thus he settles nothing satisfactorily. He merely shows the infirmity of reason by itself. Then taking it up again in his Practical treatise, he speaks of the Categorical Imperative. "You ought," he says. "There is ought." There is something more in that ought than in pure reason. Pure reason is not sufficient. The conscience, the moral sentiment, ascends above it. All that we can do is to strive to find it, to find in the conscience the voice of God, the Holy Spirit descending and taking possession of the human soul, and thus empowering the reason to make new discoveries, extend its horizon wider and wider under the illumination, the inspiration of faith.

Now, putting those two facts together—conscience and reason—and trying to find a term which will express all that can be thus received or conceived, we say *revelation*. For, unless a revelation is made to the heart, the love in us, and also to the reason through the moral sentiment, revelation is incomplete; it is but a doctrine, a dogma.

So, treating Kant with all hospitality, I conceive of him as a Columbus exploring unknown regions. We might say to-day, after the essay we have heard, that here was a grand mind to whom we are all indebted;

and we shall no longer go into that realm where went the deists and that class of people, and tried to solve the riddle of the world through their senses. Kant lifted us from that, and showed us that there is something in our minds not derived from the senses, that the senses can only reflect what is in the mind. What a step that was! to take us out of our senses and show us that these can only reflect in images the ideas in the mind; which are innate, eternal; that we brought them with us here at birth as truth, justice, love, mercy, and beauty, being all revelations and intuitions. They are the counters by which we measure everything we know. Take any act. We have an idea of justice in our minds; no act comes up to it in our senses. We never see beauty itself with our eyes; we see it in our minds. Where did we get it, then? We never saw perfect holiness out there, save in one divine instance. The perfect holiness, then, is a revelation in one being in human form. And so the Church is planted on that faith alone.

Thus, I conceive Kant says nothing contrary to that. Kant is an explorer; he goes on to unfold relations, and tells us, with an absolute honesty of conviction, what he saw, and no more. When he saw anything, he has reported it to us; and when he put out his sounding-lines and brought up nothing, he said so. Is not that what he did, this Columbus? That is the man we are here celebrating in this chapel. And have not all the lecturers shown that he was a splendid genius? Though he does not speak in Biblical phrase or theological, but ethically; where our teaching has its root and grounds, we need ethics to interpret the revelation. We need life to inspire the reason, the heart, and make the will docile and obedient—our will, our reason, and our affections all precipitating themselves into a righteous and perfect deed.

Mr. Cohn—If I may venture to offer a criticism, I would say that not enough attention is generally paid to the titles of Kant's two greatest works. I come, after all, exactly to the same conclusion as Mr. Alcott. Kant wrote first the "Critique of Pure Reason," then the "Critique of Practical Reason." I want to call attention to that word "practical," the meaning of which includes action; in Greek, *πράττειν*, to do, to act, to make. It seems to me that the great philosophical discovery of Kant is this: As long as we remain in the domain of pure thinking, our mind criticising itself, we fatally come to utter scepticism. But we are in a world of action; we cannot withdraw ourselves from it. We *have* to act, and so truth is to be found not in the abstract simplicity of thinking, but in the concrete complexity of life, so that we must not go from philosophy to ethics, but from ethics to philosophy. That is why Kant comes to more definite conclusions in his "Critique of Practical Reason" than in the

“Critique of Pure Reason,” although the conclusions at which he arrives may be criticised. The whole is a question of method.

Professor Harris—I think we call Kant the Columbus, not because he was like the three wise men of Gotham who went to sea in a bowl, and lost his adventurous craft in the deep, but because he went through the voyage and discovered something. He did not drop his line in and catch nothing; he found *something*. It is possible he did not know what he found; did not know what to call it, and made a mistake as to its value and that the philosophers of later times know how to appreciate the results and the greatness of his discoveries better than he did. I would venture to say that, in order to appreciate the results of Kant and the results of the whole German school, we should remember the conclusions that we had given us in the essay of Professor Morris yesterday morning: that we are to interpret those results by aid of the Greek philosophy, and not by the German philosophy, German philosophy being not well able to state itself in terms of ontology.

I would like to repeat and emphasize Dr. Jones's statement that philosophy does not come to give a finality to things. Even if a philosopher has found an absolute system of philosophy, that is not the last word. That is the first word. When he has found a solution of things, he must now begin to apply it, for it is a solution which may be applied to explain the world, and nobody pretends that the world is finite. It is a perpetual evolution in fact; and if you explain all that there is to-day, you would have more to explain to-morrow, because it is an infinite revelation of the Infinite Being. And therefore the solution or result which may have explained to the Greek the world in which he lived, may not be an explanation to-day; because each philosophy has not only to explain the world, but it has to explain the world plus the explanations made by the previous philosophers, and the effect of those philosophies upon the world. The general tendency of our papers for the past three days has been in the direction of an attempt to explain the great influence of the Kantian philosophy upon the history of the world since his time.

Now philosophy, we must remember, seeks to find one principle with which to explain what is. If that one principle is not central, is not fundamental, of course its explanations will be imperfect. But in proportion as that principle is central, it will give us rational explanations and reduce the many to the one, and show that the many belong to a system, because the finding of the one in the many is reducing the many to a system—not as with a rope of sand, but reducing the many to an organic whole, through the discovery of dependence and essential relation.

Philosophy is in possession of this one principle, and has not arrived at it in this generation, but arrived at it long ago. The whole Oriental world celebrates the fact that the universal is the nature of the divine, though it has failed, according to our standards, in explaining how the particular is to be reconciled to the universal. It seems to me they were unable to do that. It must be confessed, however, that the Greek philosophy succeeded where the Oriental failed, and that it has left in eternal forms that solution, the relation of the universal to the particular; it has shown how the universal is an activity (as was emphasized in Professor Morris's paper yesterday)—is an activity of some independent being. The universal is no abstract generality; it is a concrete process. All mind is concrete, individual, and appears in no other way. There is no general mind which is not at the same time individual. That has been said by Aristotle.

We have, too, the principle of participation, the *μέθεξις* of Plato. That is the greatest principle, because in it lies all freedom, all development of society in modern times—the development of free republics, the separation of the functions of government, so that from one despotic whole we have by and by a republic, with local self-government, and the functions of government divided among independent departments—the legislative, judiciary, and executive—each perfectly independent, but forming one organic whole. That is the *συστοιχία*. Then we have the first and second entelechies, explaining how there can be a being which comes out of nature, and is first a natural being—which stands there as a product of nature—totally depraved you may say as an outcome of nature, because everything in nature is determined from outside. He is there as a first entelechy, and he must realize his ideal, and must become the second entelechy. Then he has realized the divine within himself, and attained real independence where before he had only potential independence as first entelechy. When he begins his being, potential independence is there. There is spontaneity. He may will anything; he may will a contradiction; he may put himself into the meshes of fate by sin, because the worst fate that comes to any one is the fate that comes of a misuse of his will, twining ropes around his neck and destroying himself; that is the worst fate which arises, that from the misuse of the human will—sin and immorality.

He is then to realize his ideal. That ideal will enable him to put his freedom into the form of consistency, and then he will grow into independence; not that independence which he uses to injure himself, to reduce himself to dependence, to fetter his soul, to "nail it to the body." Therefore we say that this first entelechy must realize in itself the divine

idea of the universe in order to become really free, or the second entelechy; that is, to make its freedom into actuality, to make its independence perfect. This is the view of the world that Aristotle gives us, the growth from the first entelechy to the second entelechy—to that *ἐνέργεια*—energy, which we have borrowed in our English as a word expressing so much.

This is ontology without any thought of the distinction of subjective and objective, but the subjective and the objective will loom up with the development of Christianity, which holds to the infinite importance of the human soul. Not to the soul as an abstraction; but the importance of each individual soul; for each has a destiny which he can solve only by his own activity. Nobody can endow him with a divine being or with holiness; he cannot be made good by external additions. He can only be developed through his own freedom. And with the idea of freedom comes out the great problem of philosophy in modern times. The old problem was the resolution of the universal and the particular; in modern times it is that of the mediation between the objective and the subjective. This problem looms up and develops into the scepticism of Hume. Then Kant comes and takes this inventory of the subjective. And the inventory of the subjective contributes what? It finds all those things that the Greek thought found to be the substantial principles; it finds that they are the frame of the mind itself. Kant found all that. He did not drop his line into the sea and bring up nothing; he brought up the same treasures that the Greeks found. And so we see how Kant came to the same results as Aristotle did. Aristotle's process was a logical one, taking up time and space in his physics, and then in his metaphysics taking up the various categories and leading them out to their ultimate premise. What is the ultimate presupposition of this world as a whole—man, nature—what is it? This presupposes something. It is not complete in itself. You see in this the great meaning implied in the Platonic idea—namely, that the realities of nature are not fully realities; they are only partial realities, because they only realize a part of their own definition. It is only man that has all the potentialities and becomes an entelechy. Other things only participate in their archetype; they have to go through a process of change in which they lose their individuality; but here is man who can complete himself *in* himself. His change and development can go on within himself. The wise man who has the experience of life in himself is more free, more intellectual, has more within himself, is more independent, and more of a revelation of the divine Being, than the child or the savage. They are potentially free; he is actually free. This, then, is the problem before Aristotle: man and nature. What is the ultimate

presupposition? He takes it up in common, natural objects, and then in man; and he does it wonderfully, taking up the categories which the Greek language had worked out so remarkably. (A philologist of insight would know when he saw the Greek language, and the form of its sentences, that there was a nation designed under Providence to solve the theoretical problem of the world.) He carries these things back to the idea of a self-active being whose self-activity is pure intellect. Herbert Spencer has grown to the idea of an ultimate Force which is no particular force, although it makes all particular forces. It is an Energy acting in itself. Therefore its activity is self-determination. Mr. Spencer does not say that; but it lies in the thought of persistent force, and there is no escape from it. That is Plato's Idea, and Aristotle's *Actus purus*. You can identify self-determination with intellect, because that which makes self-limitation objectifies itself, and both limits and annuls the limit; but when it annuls limit, as you do when you remove that limit out of your mind, the limit is no hard limit; but when you remove the object of your thought, you return to yourself. And the only possible being that can do that—the only realization of that process—is mind. Mind does that all the time. That which is able utterly to annul this limit, as well as to make it, transcends time and space. When you annul the thought of the things of sense, and form in the mind the thought of the genus or species, you transcend time and space utterly and totally. And the being that can do that has a subjectivity elevated above time and space, and, therefore, a personality that does not descend into change and decay.

Just think of natural science and what it has to do to elaborate this thought of Aristotle, and to see it throughout nature in every direction. Talk about philosophy being a finality! Why, its work has only begun. I cannot help thinking of the fine image which Mrs. Howe's poem of this morning suggested. I was reminded also of that hymn of Coleridge before Mont Blanc, in the Valley of Chamouni, when he sees those majestic forms rising there in eternal light above the clouds, above change and decay. All around us below, as in Church's "Heart of the Andes," we see growth, multiplicity, and vegetation, and evidences of human life in the villages and cultivated fields; and then we see the stream that produces this fertility of the valley. Whence does it come? It springs from the glacier up there, where the conflict between the sun-God and the ice-God takes place. It is there that this principle of fertility and variety is produced.

So philosophy does not come as something that is abstract and has no relation to concrete life; but it has come for the very purpose of explaining things as they are, and of directing them to their ideal forms. And

so we look up above the valley and see what sends down this multiplying, fructifying impulse, and we see Primal Philosophy and Theology—the sources of rational insight and directive power in human life. Those lines of Tennyson come into my mind where he speaks of the sunshine land :

“ And then I looked up toward a mountain tract
That girt the region with high cliff and lawn ;
I saw that every morning far withdrawn,
Beyond the darkness and the cataract,
God made himself an awful rose of dawn.”

But what shall we think of the technique of philosophy ? Why should philosophy have technique at all? It has been objected to as being unnecessary and pedantic. The language which speaks of finite things and their relations speaks of fragments of the universe broken off and considered apart ; is that language adequate to define and describe the totality and its unchangeable conditions, its eternal verities ?

“ But on the limits far withdrawn
God made himself an awful rose of dawn.”

Far above change and decay we see the great shining light that streams from those lofty heights of Being inviting us up, but which we cannot ascend in a capricious and arbitrary mood ; we can ascend only with those celestial virtues of faith, hope, and charity. And when we become inspired with those virtues we shall be ready to receive the language of philosophy and theology which states those things adequately, although it states them in a language unfamiliar with sense. Will not, in fact, the spiritual insight demand other and more adequate terms in which to describe the eternal verities than this style of gossip and prating of the vanities of the day ? The thoughts of fragmentary reality must be mended by synthesis in order to be adequate to the real of all reals. So must the expression be mended, and we must have a technique for philosophy.

The voice that cries up the slope its questions of destiny will not hear the reply in the language of village tattle. To such it will be as to those in *The Vision of Sin*,

“ To whom an answer pealed from that high land,
But in a tongue they could not understand,
Though on the glimmering limit far withdrawn,
God made himself an awful rose of dawn.”

Dr. Mears—My interest in this Kant celebration is a practical one as a teacher, desiring that our teaching in philosophy should take a higher

platform than it has done. One difficulty about teaching Kant has been, not, as Mrs. Howe has intimated, that he had "too much theological baggage," but that he had too much infidel baggage. We could not get the people to study him, because they thought he was the father and source of all the so-called rationalism of Germany. Now I am indebted to President Porter for bringing out the fact that that sort of thing was there before Kant, but that Kant gave it its death-blow. Now if we can get men to take that view—and I do not know any man in the country that is better able to dispose and persuade our teachers to take hold of Kant—we have done the best thing we could in this Centennial celebration.

AFTERNOON SESSION.

Professor Bascom read a paper on "The Freedom of the Will, Empirically Considered," prefacing it with some criticisms of Kant, and also some remarks upon philosophical technique, in which he contended that terminology should be capable of translation into common language. If philosophy be ultimately a settling of the limits of authority of human knowledge, then it must take hold of human knowledge where it exists in the minds of the mass of men and explain it there, and apply all its limitations and principles there and not elsewhere.

DISCUSSION.

Immediately following the paper *Mr. Emery* said: There are two points in that paper which I want to speak of while somebody else is getting ready to speak. The first one is the striking instance which President Bascom has furnished of the true criticism of the Kantian philosophy. It does not differ in result from the criticism which we have heard several times this week. It calls attention again to the trouble which Kant got himself, or us following him, into when he called space and time and the categories subjective. The criticism of President Bascom, as I understand him, is that if the term "subjective" is used there as meaning individual—which is the only sense in which it can be used to make it correspond with any true antithesis between subjective and objective—then no experience at all would be really possible. If each individual mind itself creates space and time and the categories, there is no conjunction between his experience and mind. It might be doubted whether Kant intended to be taken exactly in that way; but if he did not, why not say that space and time are objective? Indeed, Kant did say that the *Categories* are objective also. But the criticism directed against Kant's system was, as I understand it, if space and time are not objective, then no experience is possible. And that point struck me as being a point of

criticism which had been developed before and reached by rather a different method.

Then in regard to the second part of the lecture—that is, the paper on liberty—I was particularly struck by the way in which President Bascom comes to his positive results. I never happened to read or hear before a treatment of freedom by exactly this method, and yet the result arrived at is exactly the result which I have been accustomed to consider the true one. The illustration in regard to Aladdin is a very forcible one. There could be but one Aladdin. That is to say, such liberty as Aladdin's destroys itself. There is no such thing as liberty in that sense. Liberty which does not make itself into law is not liberty, as the lecturer well said.

Professor Harris—I would point out also that there was a very close agreement with the paper yesterday of Professor Morris on the point that a higher advance in knowledge is an advance away from form. The word "form" has a thousand technical meanings. Of course he (Dr. Bascom) means "shape." The Platonists and Aristotelians would say the mind goes *towards* pure "form" in another sense from that in which President Bascom says it moves away from it. "Form" is also an Aristotelian technical term; but the Aristotelian would hold that going towards pure form is the same as going towards the pure "act;" because they hold that the pure form is the same thing as pure energy. It is a process of going away from determination or shape and the lower finite categories, and towards the Absolute, which is pure intelligence and will. I could not help thinking carefully, as Professor Bascom was reading, about the point he made in regard to technical terms, and which I could not quite understand. Because the paper used technical terms derived from a good many systems, and it is evident, therefore, that there could have been no intentional disparagement of technique, although it appeared so in his first statements. Technique is absolutely necessary in philosophy, because philosophy undertakes to look at the world in a different way from common sense. Common sense gets hold of facts and generalizes, but it does not generalize to the same extent that philosophy does. Philosophy undertakes to reach the universal and the one, or, rather, to explain the world by one principle. It is very interesting in the history of philosophy to see how many different techniques have been made, and it is also interesting to see how each language has its own way of cutting up the world into concepts, and expressing it in different classes. No two nations take the same view of the world; each one classifies objects in its own way, and hence the words do not exactly cover the words of another people. And it is very interesting to go from one language to another,

and get to understand the different standards of looking at the world used by different peoples. And so in philosophy these technical expressions may seem to be walls which hide one man's thinking from another. Our only refuge is to translate each technique into others. We shall find something in each technique that has a certain advantage. In the history of philosophy we meet hundreds of different techniques, and each one can give us some aid. Each philosopher started out with some special view of the world, and colored his whole philosophical system with the tinge of the peculiar technique that he used. Of course, if we seek to adopt a technique for ourselves, we must look for that of the philosophical system that is the most perfect, and this would be the Aristotelian technique. And yet it is desirable that every one should study many systems of philosophy, and should endeavor to find the equivalent of these technical terms in the Aristotelian system as being the one that has most widely spread and entered into all languages, and has expressed and systematized the bulk of the thinking in all modern languages. I doubt if natural science has an advantage over philosophy in avoiding technique, or whether it can possibly get along and state its conclusions in common language. The technical term used in the paper, "molecular changes," talks about that of which common sense knows nothing. So when natural science talks about "atoms," and about "laws," and "matter," and "force," it uses those words in a sense that the unscientific mind does not understand at all. The unscientific mind confounds all the time universals and particulars. As President Bascom knows well in his long experience of teaching philosophy, one has all the time to call attention to the fact that often a person thinks he uses common sense and is speaking of particular things, and yet is using universal terms. I think he will agree with me that the most fearful technique in philosophy is that of the person who uses a common term in a special sense and yet leaves the reader to think that he is using it in the ordinary sense; for the common language differs from the scientific in using terms vaguely, being unconscious of most of the specific content. It is as if a dwarf should put on clothes that were made for a giant, using only a small part of the room in them. Philosophical culture has to draw out the grasp and meaning of words, and make common sense conscious of those universals. Socrates did this by showing that the person who used those words without appreciating them is all the time contradicting himself. Socrates finds a person going about Athens with one of these great words on his tongue; he draws him on step by step, and makes him conscious what a great world of meaning is contained in the word, and the person finds that the meaning of the word is wide enough to contain

many contradictory meanings of such a narrow scope as his little mind harbors.

So in regard to the use of common terms. If there are words expressing familiar ideas, the mere common sense has a right to those words, and they should not be taken away from it. Therefore, too, if in the language there are these general terms, which the spirit of the language has made to express higher thoughts of great compass and depth, we can find them out and use them for technique in philosophy. It makes a better philosophical technique to use these rarer words than those common, familiar words whose meaning is so shallow—for, when they come to the ear, the person does not say, "I know all that that means." He sees that it is a little larger than his habitual thought; it calls out reflection; it shocks him, as it were; it makes him come back again and again to it. I know the experience of reading Kant, after reading Cousin, who writes in a popular style, though very excellent in its way. Coming to Kant's Critique, the person reads a sentence and strikes his head, and says: "I am sleepy; I don't know what the matter is with me." And he tries another sentence then and there, and he reads on down to the bottom of the page, and finds that he does not know at all what it means. That was my experience. I read Kant for ten months, and couldn't understand anything he was talking about. The words seemed to be put together all right, nouns and verbs; but what the sentences meant I didn't know. I found out in the progress of my study this curious fact, that whereas before I commenced the study I had been subject to hypochondria when I went into a library, saying, "I never shall be able to master all these books; it will take me a whole lifetime to read a single alcove," I found that I was gaining greatly in power to get through a book in a short time. I found that there were some books that would have taken me three weeks before that I could now read in three minutes. I could take the table of contents and find what the author was driving at, and all that he could tell me.

But by and by the thought of Kant began to dawn on my intellect; and by and by I saw also the results that flow from it, and which have been mentioned. With regard to the view of this paper, I would like to suggest it as a question: Whether we may not take a different standpoint in regard to mind, and say that mind is not individual mind in the sense of being special mind; whether, in fact, the knowing consciousness does not deal with universals, the principle of mind being that of participation (the Platonic thought); so that this mind, Johu's, for instance, in knowing takes hold on the same things and participates in knowing with all the rest of mankind. That is, throughout it is participation and uni-

versal all the time. Therefore it makes it possible with that view of the mind to see how the Kantian philosophy may be true, if it is expounded through the idea of participation. If we know through illumination from the divine Mind, and He makes the world so that time and space are his forms creating it, and he endows us so much above other beings in nature that we can enter, as it were, into his creative act by which he makes the world; that we can see time and space as forms of our mind; it is not the form of our particular, individual, special mind; it is the form of the divine Mind. So we would say that time and space are external to us. But we could say, on the other hand, that time and space are internal to us, and that we hold that which is common to each other, because each of us has this divine element in the form and matter of knowing. And in participating in that, we find the world, as it were, within us; within that subjectivity. That is, we find within us rationality, time and space, the categories, and universality; and we find them through the fact that God has made us in his own image. If we include the world of ideas as logical conditions of this world of extension, we include the world of atom and matter and fact. Therefore the world stands to us as based upon mind, because all its logical conditions are ideal, therefore it is knowable. But mind, as the divine Mind, is the absolute real.

Thus some of us have been trying to show how, if rightly interpreted, Kant's subjective philosophy falls into harmony with Aristotle's objective philosophy, wherein he showed that divine reason makes the world, and, therefore, reason or mind is the substance of things, of matter, and of everything else, not in the pantheistic sense, but in the creative sense. So that, on the one hand, looking at it ontologically, we trace it back to Mind as the fundamental presupposition of everything; and Kant, on the other hand, comes to the same conclusion. He comes to it, not as his individual mind—the private property of Immanuel Kant, though he comes to it subjectively—but as mind which has an infinite form to it. And so we say that absolute Mind and Reason is the foundation of things.

I am satisfied myself with the Greek basis. I should not fall into the subjective scepticism in any case. But those who do take that subjective basis and reach scepticism have been answered by Kant. Kant says: "Just take a good inventory of your subjective mind, and see what comes of it." And so he takes that thorough inventory, and without seeing himself clearly what he had arrived at, he comes to the same result as Aristotle, and therefore he solves that antithesis, and bridges the chasm between subjective and objective.

Mr. Sanborn—I have not had the pleasure of hearing all the papers and discussions of this week touching upon the life and philosophy of Kant. Many things have been said, some of which I may perhaps repeat. I would say a word on a subject of which Professor Harris and others have spoken—terminology and of method—and to remind the school of what one or two great poets have said on this subject.

Mention has been made, and very properly, of the interest which Goethe took in the philosophy of Kant. No doubt it was real and profound. Yet, when he came to review his life, after he had reached the age of seventy or eighty years, he said to Eckermann that he had given too much attention to the study of philosophy; and he thought that Schiller had occupied himself and his friends rather too much with the study of metaphysics. And he made this remark in 1829, in another connection—he was then eighty years old—“Schubert’s book is chiefly intended to prove that there is a standpoint without philosophy—that of the healthy human understanding; and that art and science have always thriven best independent of philosophy. This is water for our mill. For my part I have always kept aloof from philosophy; the standpoint of the natural human understanding was the one I preferred.” There is a great element of truth in this, and also in what President Bascom has said this afternoon in regard to the practical value of philosophy—that it must deal with the things and facts of life as they are. Not the outside material existence or the ordinary events of life; but it must deal with the experiences that come to men in this world, otherwise it is not of much importance. Now a poet like Goethe, who was both poet and philosopher, and our own poet here (Mr. Emerson), who is also poet and philosopher, but whose preëminence lies in his poetic faculty—these men are to be excused from following very long and very steadily in the path of philosophic method, because they have a path of their own by which they reach their results in a more natural and effective way.

Many just tributes have been paid here to the influence of Kant’s philosophy; we can see what a prodigious influence it exerted; not, however, so much directly as indirectly. Reference has been made to his successors—to Fichte—concerning whom we shall hear a paper next week by Mr. Mead—and to Schelling; and of course we have heard much of the Hegelian philosophy. Now I incline to think that up to this time, when perhaps the condition of things may be changing, the spirit of the Kantian movement in Europe—I mean by that its higher and more active spirit (not dwelling upon those secondary results to which Dr. Porter called our attention this morning)—has more affected America through Mr. Emerson than it has through all other persons combined. For Em-

erson, like Goethe and unlike Kant, has been one of those men who directly and by their own personality affect mankind. Wherever Goethe appeared, wherever his personal presence was seen or felt, or his works were read, he excited a very warm interest—sometimes for him, sometimes against him, but always a direct and profound influence. The effect has been sometimes a repugnant one, stimulating hostility, or, at any rate, a collision of some kind; but it has also produced a very favorable feeling towards him, and an interest in the things which he stood for. Now, so far as I can observe, such influences proceeding from Mr. Emerson are the strongest literary and poetic and spiritual influences—without including the interest attaching to systems of religion—which have heretofore existed in America. Emerson himself was strongly influenced, no doubt, by the German thought; not so much directly by Kant as through Goethe, and also through Fichte, and Emerson's influence, extending to the friends immediately about him—to Theodore Parker, who was very much awakened by Mr. Emerson, to Dr. Hedge (who, notwithstanding his early studies in German philosophy, I fancy, was quickened more by his personal friendship for Mr. Emerson than by anything that happened to him in Germany), to Margaret Fuller, and others—the influence, I say, radiating from these persons who lighted their torch at Emerson's, has affected our country very much.

I would also refer to a matter which has been mentioned here, but which needs to be mentioned more directly—the fact that Mr. Emerson, through *The Dial*, communicated to the American public their most distinct knowledge of what Schelling was doing in those later years when he was brought to Berlin, at the instance of the Prussian king, an opponent of the Hegelian philosophy. In July and October, 1842, and in January, 1843—the number is dated then, but really relates to the year 1842—Mr. Emerson called attention to what was going on in Berlin in these words: “The King is discontented with the Hegel influence which has predominated at Berlin, and with this view he summons the great Schelling, now nearly seventy years old, to lecture on the Philosophy of Revelation. These lectures began in November, 1841. The lecture-room was crowded to suffocation; the pale Professor, whose face resembles that of Socrates, was greeted with thunders of acclamation; but he remained pale and unmoved, as if in his own study.”

Mr. Emerson, I think, was indebted for that information to Mr. Elliot Cabot and Mr. Charles Stearns Wheeler, both of them graduates of Harvard College, who had gone abroad to study in Germany. This introductory lecture was described by Mr. Cabot in a letter and translated by Mr. Wheeler, and the translation is published here. In this letter of Mr.

Cabot there is a description of Schelling's course after lecturing at Berlin in 1841-'42.

In a subsequent letter he gives Mr. Wheeler's translation of the introductory lecture itself. I will read one or two passages in this lecture as having some bearing upon the remarks which have been made here during this week.

"At no time," said Schelling, at Berlin, in November, 1841, "has philosophy encountered so mighty a reaction from the side of life as at this moment, a proof that it has penetrated to those life-questions in relation to which indifference is neither lawful nor possible to any. Philosophy at present affirms itself religious in its conclusions, while the world denies that it is so, and regards particularly its deductions of Christian dogmas as mere illusions. Such is even the confession of many of its faithful or unfaithful disciples. . . . It is a great thing that philosophy in these days has become a universal concern. The very opposition that I have mentioned shows that philosophy has ceased to be an affair of the schools, and has become the business of the nation. The history of German philosophy is, from the beginning, inwrought with the history of the German people. In a time of deepest debasement, philosophy held the German erect. In the schools of philosophy—who in this connection remembers not Fichte, Schleiermacher?—many found in philosophical contests the resolution, the courage, the self-possession, which in far other battle-fields were afterwards put to the test."

Schelling referred here to that extraordinary scene at the close of the Napoleonic wars, when the philosophers of Germany, headed by Fichte, were in fact the leaders of the German people, and contributed more than any political combination to the overthrow of Napoleon, that pest and scourge of Europe.

Mr. Alcott—Human faculties are differently cast into different types. It is in vain for persons of a certain type to attempt, without very long effort and a probable failure, to look at things in a purely philosophical manner; and it is equally impossible, ordinarily, for those of another type to look at them in any other than a poetic manner. For, if imagination and fancy predominate in us, we look at things symbolically, and adopt a symbolical language by which to express our ideas. Such is the poet. He is so cast. He does his work so. For, although he may study philosophy, and possibly put himself into that predicament, seeing things as the philosopher does, logically—by the reason and the understanding—yet these not being his strongest faculties, he does not succeed. So, on the other hand, one who has the logical faculty and the understanding, and wants to put things into strong logical speech and formulas, will not succeed

ordinarily in writing poems, or in looking at things poetically. Do not seek to put your minds, those of you who are not logical, into logical forms, thinking that you must learn that alphabet to know anything; neither shall I say to you who are logical, Put your thoughts into poetic forms. The good God who has sent us here gives different types, and our methods are different. There can be no enthusiasm or great work in the world that is not done in harmony with our faculties as we receive them from God himself and as we follow out their law. So we should be very much disappointed if persons should go away from the teaching here and suppose that they must necessarily do their work in a certain way. Goethe and Emerson and Shakespeare and Dante, and the great poets of the past, occupy a wide space in the world's history, and interest a large class of people in their manner. So do the great thinkers, Aristotle, Plato, Kant, Hegel, Schelling, and Fichte. But do you not see that you could not put each one into the other's brains? It could not be done. Put a poet into a logician's head, or a logician into a poet's head, and see what he will do with those faculties. They do not work so.

The beauty of this school is that we have those who speak from these different aspects, so that we gather an idea of the different modes in which thought works. We call it a School of Philosophy, it is true. Mr. Emerson puts his philosophy into warm tropes, and paints pictures with his words. But Hegel and that class of thinkers strip off the image and give you the pure, absolute truth as it lies in their minds. Mr. Emerson could not have had his influence on the world had he endeavored to do his work as Hegel did. Indeed, he reads those books very little; he has no success in reading them. He dips into them and gets the substance of them; but to follow out any logical method would not be his way. This is the poetic side, the light side; that is the logical side, the darker side, which is to be brought out into the light. Imagination and reason are the opposite poles of one sphere. The poet and the philosopher work differently, but they do the same work.

LETTER OF DR. S. H. HODGSON.

To the Editor of The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

SIR: When Mr. Collyns Simon, your correspondent in the number for January last, characterizes Hegel, M. Renouvier, and myself, as *Materialists*, he shows either an incapacity, or shall I say, a perversity, of judgment so great as to disqualify him for being profitably argued with. It is ludicrous to call Hegel a materialist. Equally so to call M. Renouvier one. As to myself, I hold that I am protected from the appellation

by my fundamental distinction between Nature and History (see, among other passages, "Philosophy of Reflection," Vol. I, pp. 225-227), as well as by my "Constructive Branch of Philosophy." But Mr. Simon apparently calls everything materialism which is not Berkeleyanism. His "New Materialism" is a pure mare's nest. I do not imagine he will induce any metaphysician to discuss the question with him. Certainly not myself.

I am, sir, faithfully yours,

SHADWORTH H. HODGSON.

LONDON, July, 1881.

[The pages referred to by Dr. Hodgson are quoted below from his work on Reflection.—EDITOR.]

"But it will be asked—fairly, and, indeed, necessarily asked—Where do you look for the cause, the substance, the agent, the conscious thing (call it what you will) of consciousness? If you refuse to put together cause and consciousness into one thing, you can have no conscious soul or mind, as well as no conscious transcendental apperception or ego; or, in order to place the causal nexus somewhere, do you call the soul or the ego a *series of conscious states becoming conscious of itself as a series*? For, if you do, you will only be again attributing causality to consciousness in the words 'becoming conscious,' and it will be just the same essentially as if you fairly adopted the expression soul, or ego, or transcendental apperception.

"I fully admit the necessity of the question and the justice of the last remark, and my reply is this: I put the enquiry into cause, agent, source, force, or however may be expressed the notion of *what makes*, into a separate and a subordinate department of the enquiry. I place first subjective analysis, an enquiry into the nature, the *τί ἐστιν* of things; and, secondly and subordinately, I place the enquiry into the genesis and the history, the *πῶς παραγίνεται* of things. The first enquiry is a branch of philosophy, the second and subordinate one is a branch of science; the first is, in the case of consciousness, metaphysic, the second psychology.

"This premised (and the distinction between nature and history is one of the most fundamental in my whole theory), I proceed with my answer. The nominal definition I would give of the soul or mind is a series of conscious states, among which is the state of self-consciousness. And the agent or substance which becomes conscious, or in which resides the force of becoming so, or which has the states of consciousness, is not the series or any one or more of the states which compose it, but (in man) the brain or nerve substance. When we draw the above necessary distinction between nature and history, then the question so often put, Materialist or Idealist? is to be answered, in the first place, by the further question, Do you mean in philosophy or in psychology? For the two domains are essentially different; and those who answer this question with me will probably reply also with me to the first question, Idealist (or rather reflectionist) in philosophy, materialist in psychology, and, indeed, in all the sciences. The causes and the genesis of this and that individual conscious being, as well as of each and all the states and processes of his consciousness, depend upon matter in motion. And if you tell me that matter in motion is nothing but sensations in coexistence and sequence, I reply that this is an analysis of the nature of matter, not an account of its genesis or history. The first cause that we can discover anywhere is

matter in motion; and that we can analyze this cause subjectively, only shows the truth of my assertion that the domain of genesis, of history, of science, is subordinate to the larger domain of nature and philosophy. I do not profess to assign the prior condition, the substantia, or cause or agent, of consciousness at large. I exclude that question from metaphysic. And I say that if a prior condition of that combination of states of consciousness which we call matter could be assigned (which smaller question is not necessarily unanswerable), it would be by an insight into the unseen world—by a theorem belonging to the constructive branch of philosophy. Materialism, then, which is worthless as philosophy, inasmuch as it gives no account of what matter and motion are, or in what the efficiency of physical causation consists, is the only sure standing ground in science, where the problem is, assuming these phenomena as given, to measure, weigh, and predict their sequences and coexistences.

“Now, to take consciousness and its phenomena to examine, as if they were objects of direct, and not, as they are, of primary and reflective consciousness, is to treat them as objects of science and not of philosophy, is to clump together causality and consciousness, is to assume that they have force or causal efficiency in them. This would lead, and has led over and over again, to an *a priori* psychology. And with an *a priori* psychology (to say nothing of an *a priori* philosophy) metaphysic has henceforth nothing to do. Fortunately, we possess a genuine *a posteriori* experimental psychology, a true science, which is daily yielding results of the highest value to many able and distinguished investigators—fortunately for the world, and fortunately also for metaphysic; for metaphysic will derive from that psychology an independent support and verification.”

ROMAN LOVERS.

Not that I loved her more
 Than he could claim his store;
 Not that she showed him sign
 That was outranked by mine.
 No, neither could claim it all,
 Its splendor could forestall,
 Which like some broad river flowing,
 For either bank no preference showing,
 Bending toward one awhile,
 Blessing other with its smile,
 Ever bearing on its course
 Toward heaven from heavenly source.
 Ah! too small is man's estate,
 Cares not woman for its fate.
 Pour from your flagon in my cup,
 Thou lovely one! and fill it up;
 And fill again, to him, my peer,
 Without envy, without fear.
 The cup, it holds but all it can—
 Too small for thee, enough for man.

JOHN ALBEE.

SCHOPENHAUER'S SELECT ESSAYS.

Two admirers of Schopenhauer have ventured to test the public appreciation of their favorite philosopher by publishing an excellent translation of five of the best of his brilliant essays. They have selected the following: 1. The Misery of Life. 2. Metaphysics of Love. 3. Geniuses. 4. Æsthetics of Poetry. 5. Education. To these articles they have prefixed a "Biographical Sketch," which, as they inform us, is "Mainly an excerpt from Gwinner's Life of Schopenhauer." Hoping that many will buy this book, we print the following extracts from the author's circular:

"THE SELECT ESSAYS OF ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.

(Translated from the German, with a biographical sketch, by C. A. P. Daxsel and Garritt Droppers. In one volume. Price, \$1.25.)

"Schopenhauer, though comparatively new to fame, stands to-day acknowledged one of the greatest philosophers of all times. In combining depth of thought with clearness of expression and conciseness of style, he is without a rival among German thinkers.

"No translation of his works has ever appeared. Our aim in selecting these essays has been to enable the general reader to gain a clear conception of those peculiar views which distinguish him from all other writers.

"No philosophical author of ancient or modern times is so frequently alluded to; none so frequently plagiarized. . . . Ideas are so abundant, especially in Schopenhauer, that it seems no great crime to steal a few of them. . . . His chapters are brilliant aperçus, in some of which he anticipated important discoveries of modern physiologists. . . . Goethe is the only one of his countrymen who can be compared with him as a literary artist. If any one doubts this, he will be convinced by reading the wonderful chapter on genius. . . . And Schopenhauer, although he never wrote any verse, must yet, like Hawthorne, be ranked as a great poet."—*The Nation*, December 23, 1880.

It can be obtained from Sentinel Co., publishers, or Des Forges & Co., Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

GERMAN PHILOSOPHY FOR ENGLISH READERS.

[We have received the following prospectus from the enterprising publishers, and we rejoice at the impulse which is promised to the cause of philosophy in this country by the series of philosophical classics herein named.—THE EDITOR.]

PROSPECTUS.

Messrs. S. C. Griggs & Co., Chicago, announce that they will begin, early in the year 1882, the publication of a series of "German Philosophical Classics for English Readers and Students," under the general editorial supervision of George S. Morris, Ph. D., Professor of Logic, Ethics, and the History of Philosophy in the University of Michigan, and

Lecturer on Philosophy at the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, and with the co-operation of the eminent scholars named below.

Each volume will be devoted to the critical exposition of some one masterpiece belonging to the history of German philosophy. The aim in each case will be to furnish a clear and attractive statement of the special substance and purport of the original author's argument, to interpret and elucidate the same by reference to the historic and acknowledged results of philosophic inquiry, to give an independent estimate of merits and deficiencies, and especially to show, as occasion may require, in what way German thought contains the natural complement, or the much-needed corrective, of British speculation.

It is intended that the series, when completed, shall consist of ten or twelve volumes, founded on the works of Leibnitz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. It will thus furnish in effect a history of the most conspicuous and permanently influential movement in the history of German thought, and its general object may be stated to be to render reasonably accessible to the intelligent English reader a knowledge of German philosophic thought in its leading outlines, and at the same time to furnish the special student with a valuable introduction and guide to more comprehensive studies in the same direction.

The volumes now contemplated, together with the names of their authors, as far as at present determined, are as follows :

Leibnitz's "New Essays Concerning Human Understanding."

Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason." The Editor.

Kant's "Ethics." President Porter, of Yale College.

Kant's "Critique of Judgment" (*Æsthetics and Natural Theology*). Professor Robert Adamson, of the Victoria University, Manchester, England.

Fichte's "Science of Knowledge."

Schelling's "Transcendental Idealism." Professor John Watson, of Queen's University, Kingston, Canada.

Hegel's "Logic." Dr. W. T. Harris, editor of "The Journal of Speculative Philosophy."

Hegel's "Philosophy of Religion."

Hegel's "Æsthetics." Professor J. S. Kidney, of the Seabury Divinity School at Faribault, Minnesota.

Hegel's "Philosophy of History and of the State."

The volumes will not necessarily be published in the order above given. The first one, on Kant, will be issued early in the spring of 1882, and the others at convenient intervals thereafter.

Probable price per volume, \$1.25.

THE SADDEST OF THOUGHTS.

The saddest thought that ever found its way
 Into the curious chamber of the mind,
 Is, that to close the latest earthly day
 Sums all of life; that all is final blind.
 Dispose of elements, nor shall we find
 Rest other than the dusty remnants have
 Which were our bodies and the soul enshrined,
 Then to be parted like th' unmeaning wave,
 The friendly atoms all, forth wandering from the grave!

R. R. BULKLEY.

CHICAGO, November 30, 1878.

BOOK NOTICES.

ILLUSIONS: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY. By JAMES SULLY. "The International Scientific Series." Vol. XXXIV. London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1881. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

Mr. Sully's book will be welcomed as the latest contribution to "The International Scientific Series" by those who have, perhaps, been inclined to feel that psychical and speculative sciences have not as yet been quite fairly represented in the development of the publishers' undertaking. Out of thirty-four volumes now extant, there have been only nine or ten dealing with subjects other than physical. The present volume, apart from its intrinsic merits, which are great, has this relative value: that it is one more weight in the higher scale, and goes to restore the balance of the series as symmetrically mirroring the encyclopædia of science.

It deals with illusions, not of external perception merely, as most treatises do, but also of introspection or reflection, memory and belief, and concludes with an epilogue of considerable length and fulness, which will have special interest for the readers of "The Journal of Speculative Philosophy," inasmuch as it points the way from the science to the philosophy of illusion—a speculative *critique* and review of the whole field of error. This interest will be the greater that this contribution to the philosophy of illusion is from the hand of a man of science, and shows in him much breadth of culture and open-mindedness of regard.

In a modest way he apologizes for his intrusion, as he takes it, into the field of "divine philosophy"! But we shall say nothing about that, and only take what he gives us with gratitude, though not without discrimination.

Science is description, classification, and explanation by psychical and physical conditions. Science assumes a great deal to begin with. It is for philosophy, he says, to

deal with these faiths and assumptions, and to justify them if it can. This distinction between science and philosophy, which is his immanent and latent guide in the first eleven chapters, directing and limiting therein the strictly scientific treatment of his subject, is brought out by him in the last chapter, and set forth with articulate perspicuity.

To teachers and scholars the educative value of the book is great, as showing how much need we have to watch ourselves living, lest we fall from sanity of thought and life through the devious ways of error and illusion into insanity. The lesson of the book is that there is no line of demarcation—nothing to pull us up in our too easy descent.

The sum of his first chapter is that illusions are fallacies that have gone together into themselves and assumed the mask of immediacy and self-evidence. He goes some way towards admitting that all knowledge is mediated. In the second chapter he has to consider his classification. He sees well enough that a thorough scientific classification would be one based on derivation, and, therefore, according to origins. But he chooses to reject this ideal, because illusions, as immediately given, may be diverse, though possessing a common origin in the same false process of reasoning.

He also rejects the distinction of Hallucination and Illusion as a ground of classing because it concerns degrees and not kinds. In the superposition of fiction upon fact, when the superstructure becomes exorbitantly great relatively to the sense-stimulus or initial percept at its base, we call the result hallucination; but, though the initiative sense-impression may be minimized, it may be doubted whether it is ever quite absent—and so the question between hallucination and illusion proper remains one of degree only. Accordingly, he adopts the popular division as above given; a good working one, though, no doubt, Mr. Sully could have written a book more recondite and thoroughgoing, and more suggestive to experts, on the *derivative* basis. Such a perfectly symmetrical *rationale* of the genesis of illusion remains a *desideratum*.

When in the chapter on "perception" our author proposes "to distinguish between a *sensational image*, e. g., the representation of a color, and a *perceptual image*, as the representation of a colored object," one is a little inclined to take exception to the phraseology. Is not a color that you can make an image of both an "object" and a percept? And how can you have either a presentation or representation of a "sensation" or feeling which is only an inchoate element of a percept—distinguishable in reflection but not separable?—not an object or existent that can be perceived and imaged? Apparently by a "sensation" Mr. Sully here means a single initial (ultimate in analysis) percept, like the vision of one homogeneous piece of color; and by a "percept" a complex of such percepts. Yet he goes right to ignoring the thought-element in every least percept. In this chapter he describes the probable "physical basis" of perception. But when he tells us that the nervous process underlying a sensation occupies the same region as that which underlies the interpretative image, and that the two processes differ in *degree* of energy *only*, and that the peripheral regions of the nerve organism may come to be involved just as much in the one case as in the other, one cannot help seeing that the physics or physiology of perception, while explaining, as Mr. Sully shows with the latest and most lucid exposition, many subsidiary points, fails to give us that difference in *kind* which subsists between true and illusory perception. When the molecular movements that are represented as the physical bases of the interpretative image on the one hand, and of the sensation on the other, become assimilated in momentum, as they are supposed to do at the instant when "pre-per-

ception" becomes "perception proper," nothing remains to distinguish them. They occupy exactly the same time and space, and representation has actually become, in its physical aspect, presentation. Imagination and perception, according to this physical interpretation of them, are all one and indiscernible. But this is the ground of difference between illusion and truth in sense-perception, obliterated. Physiology, therefore, affords us no criterion of illusion, and is irrelevant.

Mr. Sully, however, soon disengages himself and his readers from the toils of physics and other such entanglements. The recoil and return to sanity of view are quick and sure. Thus, "Illusion is deviation from the common and collective experience." In short, solidarity and consistency is criterion. Illusion is dislocation or isolation. That is the drift of his doctrine, and it tends towards the recognition of a universal consciousness or reason. It is in him to come to that eventually. And, meantime, the tendency gives a certain philosophical quality and tone to his writings. When a man of science can say, "What we call a 'sensation' is really compounded of a purely passive impression and the mental activity involved in attending to this and classing it," you can see he is on the right road, though he may not have gone very far. A little farther, and he will discern that "sensation" without thought is simply pure nonsense. Take another strikingly suggestive utterance, considering the quarter it comes from. He is speaking of the frequent organic unity and coherency of dreams, and trying to account for it by "the intellectual sentiment of consistency," the synthetic instinct, and he ends by saying: "In touching on this intellectual impulse to connect the disconnected, we are, it is plain, approaching the question of the very foundations of our intellectual structure!" Such an one is not far from the kingdom of philosophy.

His treatment of the question of "personal identity" is empirical, and from the standpoint of the imagination and "understanding." It is, therefore, not quite satisfactory as *speculation*. What the radical notion of selfsameness is, he leaves us still to conjecture.

Is the continuous intuition of Time its basis? We have to place every phase and moment of our changing empirical selves in this time-continuum. Does its continuousness *compel* us to fill up any lacunæ with similar tracts of empirical consciousness? Mr. Sully says we *may* do so, or "manage" to do so; but the question is, *Must* we? And, if we *must*, then the time-continuum and the continuous selfsame act of reflection filling it up are the obverse aspects of what we call personal identity and continuity. The image of continuous selfsame time, and not the "collective image" of the empirical ego, would be the true *Vorstellung* or "idea" of personal continuance and oneness. He endeavors, in the chapter on belief, to establish a thoroughgoing distinction between memories and expectations or forecasts. He says anticipation need not be grounded on memory, and, in proof, "anticipation is pretty certainly in advance of memory in early life." Granting this, what of his "prenatal memories" or ancestral experiences wrought into the infant's brain, and determining its instinctive expectations? Again he says, "As a *mode of assurance*, expectation is clearly marked off from memory, and is not explainable by means of this." Certainly, as modes of assurance they differ—*i. e.*, in their emotional aspect. The emotional accompaniments of forecast and those of memory are different. But have they any other differentia? I think not. As *representation*, forecast, or expectant belief, is made up of memories and percepts.

The epilogue begins with some paragraphs, rather hesitating, yet fairly, and on the whole indicating that, as already suggested, illusions are fallacies collapsed, and that what is phenomenally for the individual consciousness immediate knowledge is, in

truth, mediated knowledge masquerading. To be sure Mr. Sully says that illusions can only be so described "by a kind of fiction." But a "fiction" cannot be the basis of a science. How could there be any science of illusion, such as his own, if illusion could not be exhibited as a process, in very truth? There could only be cataloguing and "natural history."

But the main question of this last chapter is, What prospect of deliverance from error and illusion? What does science answer to that? "There is the familiar method of the evolutionist." "It might seem possible to prove by it that *common cognition* must in general be *true cognition*." Mr. Sully has his doubts. There are others the reader may have. The evolution of true cognition is "an incident of the great process of adaptation, physical and psychical, of organism to environment." But "organism" and "environment" are both highly complex and abstract *representations* of Mr. Spencer's. Why may these not, as represented, be illusions? At least we do not seem to be entitled, for the purpose of a comforting argument, to assume that they are not. If, in order to show that all knowledge is gradually being freed from error and delusion, we assume that our whole department of all knowledge—that relating to "organism" and "environment," and Spencerian evolution-theories generally—is already free, it looks very much like begging the question. Moreover, if "evolution-theory" be true, itself is a product of evolution; and, unless the force of evolution has spent and happily consummated itself in evolving Mr. Spencer and his theory as a *final* effort, then "evolution-theory," like theories innumerable gone before, is only a transient moment in the process of approximation to "perfect adjustment." What will be left of it when its illusions have been eliminated in the course of evolutions? How can we trust that which, on its own showing, must be a thing provisional and passing away?

"Experience, like a sea, soaks all-effacing in!"

Then when we are told that "all correspondence means practical efficiency," and that the practically efficient individuals and communities will of course survive in the struggle, and so illusion come to be eliminated by natural selection, it occurs to us to ask whether "practical efficiency" is anything more than adjustment of one hemisphere of human consciousness to the other? All is within consciousness. Hence, from the wider imaginative point of view, in the face of *possible* worlds of knowledge and intelligence beyond humanity, the doubt still stands, and the survival of the "efficients" and of their happy "consensus" does not exclude the *possibility* of persistent common illusion. But to come back to "the strictly scientific standpoint," let us see whether "all want of correspondence means practical incompetence." Mr. Sully admits, on the contrary, that the illusion of self-esteem mostly helps men in the race for life and survival. And again, shall I certainly come to grief by obstinately insisting on believing in the Ptolemean or the Mosaic Cosmogony? Will it affect my success as a shipmaster or practical miner? As a practical breeder of cattle, does it matter one whit whether I hold with Darwin or "special creation"? Then there is "the *direct* process of adaptation." "External relations that are permanent will stamp themselves on our nervous and mental structure." But what about Galileo and Copernicus? The "permanent relations" were all for Ptolemy and against Copernicus. Everybody had always seen sun, moon, and stars rise and set, and go round, and the earth had been perennially a fixture. Just as often as not, true science has to erect itself against and in spite of "permanent relations between organism and environment."

Science failing him, Mr. Sully turns to philosophy. And here there occurs a memorable sentence: "If philosophy finds that there is nothing real independently of mind,

science will be satisfied, so long as it finds a meaning for its assumed entities, such as space, external things, and physical causes." Alas! "Philosophy is still a question and not a solution," and Mr. Sully finds little more help here. His conclusion appears to be that the hopefulness of science is, in the last resort, based on faith, implicit, inexplicable—faith in reason, yet itself beyond reason, seeking no justification and finding none. If it be said, There is no reality in consciousness, no truth for reason, we must just say: "Illusion then be thou my reality." "Pro ratione stet voluntas."

Of course we may, if we choose, postulate an "*objectively* real," in the sense of a universal permanent consciousness or conscious reason—a perfect experience which, as "environment," is assimilating us to Himself. And it may be said that this is our framework in which it is possible for the ultimate optimistic hope and confidence to embody itself when it would view itself represented and named.

But this is not ground and justification of the initial act of faith. It is ideal representation and after-thought.

Implicitly, inexplicably, we must believe that whatever is in consciousness is real, and that on this reality, and out of it as material, reason can build up Truth, and that, taken at infinity, illusion is a vanishing quantity. But to take a thing at infinity is to lay hold on an ideal. And to some it may appear that the Ideal of Truth has a twin sister in the Ideal of Immortality. They would say that, if we must postulate or frame the unattainable ideal of truth to enable us to get up and keep up fire and steam for our journey of search, just so are we under an equally natural and inevitable compulsion to frame the ideal of endless active approximation of living reason to the unattainable elimination of illusion.

Mr. Sully is not to blame if some of his readers see visions, and dream dreams like these. It only shows how he sets one a thinking—how stimulating and pregnant his book is.

J. BURNS GIBSON.

LONDON, *April*, 1881.

LITERARY ART: A CONVERSATION BETWEEN A PAINTER, A POET, AND A PHILOSOPHER.
By JOHN ALBEE. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1881.

"The scene of the conversation," the author tells us in the preface, "is the margin of the Concord River; the time, a summer, not long past; and the speakers three: a painter, a poet, and a philosopher. These three grew up in the country together, went to the same school, academy, and, finally, college, maintaining their friendship then, and subsequently, unbroken. For upon entering life they had followed different vocations—painting, teaching, and farming—and no one of them had as yet become so celebrated or prosperous as to make him forgetful of the other.

"Almost in their boyhood they had heard something, but indistinctly, of a new movement in thought and philosophy, which at college they came to know more fully of. But never had they visited the seat of the new ideas until the present time, when, in a summer vacation, they make together a pilgrimage to Concord; and having seen the famous men and monuments of the town, they come in the afternoon to the bank of the river. There, near the old bridge, under the pleasant shady trees, they sat down, and fell into the conversation which I—happening to be the guest of one of them in his own home, whom it was awkward to leave behind, and scarcely less so to take, having none of their associations or curiosity—listened to in silence, have remembered for a long time, and now attempt to relate."

The author has placed in the mouth of each interlocutor such theories as he finds it convenient, in order to develop his views of literary art, and is not careful to make

each person present a well considered, systematic doctrine. He is all the more careful to bring out the various sides of his theme with as much fairness and profundity of treatment as he can command.

Mr. Albee is a master of a fine literary style, and is at the same time more than a literary artist. He is a man possessed of a wise experience, and has evidently been through many of the saurian periods of development which gifted young American poets are likely to grow into. There are flashes of the negative wit of Byron, also of Burns, also of Goethe, in this book. But the negations are matched by positive generalizations and helpful insights.

We quote the following passages as specimens of style and treatment from different parts of the book. The painter, it will be seen, is most of a philosopher.

Poet speaks. "Others may prize us for more mature achievements; we prize ourselves most for finding the paths that led to them. I have tried to say the same thing in verse. If you would like—"

Painter. "Of course; I knew by your manner you were coming to what you supposed was a good thing. What a pity artists cannot capture unawares a spectator! But let us have it."

Poet. "In spring we wear a green and leafy suit,
If happily the Muse permit her light;
Then flowers, and, last of all, for others, fruit;
But most the leaf and flower ourselves delight."

Painter. "That is enough. It was just as good in prose, I think. Let us stick to prose; interjected poetry is an unfair advantage, is apt to put out every light, even when a quotation."

Painter. "You know I am fond of the sea-shore in winter. Then the idlers are gone where they can again be comfortable, and the sea and shore have all the lonely grandeur which is their peculiar property on the New England coast. Walking there every day I often see old footprints that look remarkably large and strange, as if some of the ocean gods had been up and down the beach; but, reflecting, I know they are my own, enlarged, and the individual outlines a little obliterated by some chance eddy of the tide. We are always rediscovering ourselves. Either we once lived and conversed with some whom we read, or they come back to think their thoughts in us."

Painter. "All we can do is to stop at some famous place, enlarge or particularize it, and be humble interpreters to our masters; holding a candle to the objects over which their full sun has once passed.

"We are taught that man is the measure of everything, and every man that measure; and all that is sensuous is frowned down as wanting the refined, ideal characteristic."

Poet. "Your grievance sounds suspiciously personal. Take care not to generalize from anything you have yourself suffered. The world immediately detects the tone of the unsuccessful; and it stops to listen only to the more fortunate."

Philosopher. "There is nothing for us who speculate but to go forward in search of pure reason and final causes. We know they are unattainable, but not unapproachable; and we expect, with that mark, to come nearer than on those short lines that are forever crossing each other, doubling back upon themselves, because they find some pleasant shade where it is easy and sweet to rest."

Philosopher. "Do not mistake our somewhat fixed and arbitrary nomenclature for the circle in which you charge us with moving. We have too much neglected the proprieties and elegancies of language, intent on what we thought more important."

Philosopher. "First, let us see if there be any such thing as literary art; next, if we conclude that there is, let us examine what it consists in, and of how much importance."

Philosopher. "You would then accommodate your style and subjects to the level of their capacities and interests?"

Painter. "By all means; how else will they hear?"

"I call that successful literary art which adapts itself so to the reader's conditions that he knows all that is said; or he has heard of others who know. Literary art must follow the tone, the standards, the spirit of the time; or else I hold it is no art, but caprice, an idiosyncrasy."

Painter. "It is in vain to be cosmopolitan before we are even provincial, to obtain a whole success before a half, or a quarter of one. What you long for, if you do not find here, you will not find elsewhere. Europe does not make one cosmopolite, but an inward creative faculty touches the walls of the world from its own centre without locomotion."

Painter. "And you complain that there is no career, no public, and no actor! All that is left us is to sit down at the second table of some Greek banquet, or curse the stars that did not allot our career in the French capital. Only yesterday I saw your latest lament of this kind, in the weekly organ of all that is un-American. I suppose you have the paper in your pocket."

Poet. "I? no; I have not even seen it, and do not care to. For I never print anything but I wish to recall it; not, however, on account of the matter, but the workmanship."

Philosopher. "I think I can help you; I was reading the paper this morning, and when we started I wrapped up some fishing-lines in it." . . .

Painter. "Will you hand the verses to the poet and let him read?"

Poet. "No; you shall read them yourself. I should like to hear if they sound through your voice as they did once in my ears without a voice. Usually that is a mortifying test. But I am ready."

Painter (reads):

"Ages ago the larger, riper fruit
Which crowned the topmost boughs of those fair trees
That in Hesperides stood thick and tall,
Was plucked by elder poets in its prime,
And through the orchard rose majestic hymns.
Some windfalls here and there to us remain,
For which we slender men must stoop, not climb;
Or shrivelled crab among the lower limbs,
The season's laggard, setting teeth on edge,
More fit for vinegar than Chian wine,
And puckering up the mouth in some shrill song."

Painter. "Yesterday was the invention of the regretful; to-morrow of the indolent. Who lives in either loses two days. The present is all that really is, and precisely the spot where we are the only tangible point of the universe.

"In my next vacation I mean to complete my 'Poet's Almanac.' . . . I have already received one contribution. . . .

"Hear what this writer of mine has to say of his year in comparison with that of other astronomical calculators.

"POET'S ALMANAC.

- "The gods to man give months and years,
For forethought and the ward of ill;
That, armed with active hopes and fears,
He learn to master fate by will.
- "For him are fruitful clouds and suns,
From field to field, from plant to plant,
He as their friendly shadow runs,
And husbands well whate'er they grant.
- "He sows and reaps the earth's broad fields,
Trusting to autumn, springtime's care;
The season lost, no profit yields
The year, and profitless is prayer.
- "Let him be prudent then and wise,
Since for itself is not the day
Alone; and no to-morrows rise
On him who casts to-day away.
- "May nature give him blest increase
Who trusts her aid and lends his own;
And unto him who has no piece
Of earth, be still some bounty shown.
- "The Muse gives only day and hour,
Blind to the future and the past;
That poets, missing fortune's dower,
May hold the present moment fast.
- "But other grace the Parcae show
The poet, doomed the world's wide steep;
He reaps the fields he does not sow,
And sows where he will never reap.
- "He counts that season's harvest good
When verse in heat or cold waxed strong;
When day and night forgetful stood,
And the whole year bore but one song.
- "Write, Muse, for him, a calendar—
The poet's own creative week;
When to his fiat is no bar,
And clay is taught sweet words to speak."

Painter. "I think it is likely the good poet does invent his subjects, inasmuch as he endeavors to find those so insignificant that his treatment gives to them their only importance; for nothing in nature or life is of any value until it becomes the subject of reflection or imagination; or else those already so famous in history or fable that he must furnish out something so probable and apposite to their character that all men, easily, and with delight, recognize it as what might have been justly the deed and the word. Now this elevation of the unknown and trivial into something beautiful or interesting, and the clothing of the better known and always significant in appropriate garments—these two efforts are probably what the poet means by inventing his subjects."

Painter. "To determine the moment of chiefest expression for detachment and representation, to detach it and give it an existence of its own—this is the aim of art. The expression ought, however, to suggest all that belongs to the subject, both before and after it has been precipitated into a single moment or form. It has been attempted successfully a few times: in the Laocoon, in the frescos of Michael Angelo, and in several of the tragedies of the Greeks and of Shakespeare. It is this that, in a peculiar manner, allows us to read into certain creations so much of what we call the suggestive. It is truly the characteristic of all works that have seized the transcendent moment, the central idea, and neglected trifles. . . . Art makes us free to every special art. All the terms of each, all the aphorisms and axioms, are transferrible and usable in every other. . . . The artist intervenes to represent the contact of man and nature. The resemblance, if only realistic, is only vulgar—that which the uninitiated desire, see, and wonder at; sparrows that fly at the cherries in the picture; sheep that are so much like sheep, yet, after all, only sheep. Nature can make a better single thing than the artist can represent, and it is vain to compete with her in her own province. But let the artist arrange, discover, and bring together something inexpressible or only accidental to nature. Then is he man, the artist; a being not superior to nature, but more universal and adaptive; as an individual capable of making permanent his way of seeing objects, and of establishing a new relation of objects."

Painter. "Opportunity passes by the unprepared, and they wonder at their ill-luck. . . . There may be those now standing aloof only forbidden by an erroneous opinion of the severities of your studies, heightened by seeing the obscurities, the bizarre terminology, and labyrinthine construction of your philosophical parlance. . . . I will not insist upon all the graces of style in your philosophy if you will compromise, by clearness, neatness, and more illustration, an occasional figure, by way of bait for the more frivolous, and such a vocabulary as is common to the best English prose. For, after all, these are the foundation of literary art, which, I suppose, we all three agree begins to be necessary only when one has a genuine message to deliver to his fellow-men."

Poet. "Consider how the conception of the devil has been transformed by being taken up into literature as an actor without moral intention. It was long before Milton's characterization of him began to be noted. Readers read out, at first, what they were in the habit of believing, a pure evil essence. It was a great step in the extirpation of the popular conception when a certain grand air was impressed upon his wicked image."

Poet. "What is this original power, genius, insight, which you repeat so often?"

Painter. "It is not an easy matter to define them. They ever take some new form. We know them when we see them, but cannot very well describe them beforehand. Some say they are a larger receptivity, observing ten things where others observe one, and, by means of ideals in the mind, setting them in feigned relations, which become symbols of truth and nature. Sometimes, on the contrary, they are a more concentrative vision, seeing, not the ten things, but the one, with such intensity that it is resolved into all and stands for all. And well it may, for there is nothing which is not related and representative. There is a vision which can take in the complex and deliver the simple, which can measure variety and detect unity."

Poet. "The Greeks had measure in everything, and propriety; whether their minds were unagitated by the complexities that overwhelm us, or because they had attained to repose through the perfection of their arts of architecture and sculpture and literature, I know not."

Painter. "Most that was painful, tragic, pathetic, they placed among their gods and heroes, and it was softened by memory, elevated by the sublimity of the actions and the majesty of the actors. There was no room for tears; pity there was, mingled with pride and reverence for destiny. Sophocles was a great critic as well as a great general and dramatist. He said Æschylus did right without knowing it. He said of himself that he was wont to describe men as they should be; but that Euripides described them as they are. Now, I suppose that Euripides's realism was the source of his pathos and power over his audience. He alone, among mortals, has fairly succeeded in elevating commonplace to sublimity."

Poet. "When literature loses faith in itself as the interpreter of man's being and all we know of divine and of nature, its degradation is complete. It begins then to be capricious, without dignity or motive, except emolument and amusement. Then men put themselves in training to write a book, as the athlete to develop a particular muscle. They study men and women and nature at strange and unfrequented points, and ransack the world for novelties to write about. They make literature a profession and a business, and follow it after professional and business principles. I deny the name of literature, though obliged to use it, to their work."

Painter. "There has been a revelation in regard to environment, and we have discovered the law of heredity, which relieves us of the necessity of considering our great men at all remarkable; distributing their gift along seven generations, one contribution from that, another from this, you see how neatly and unsuspected we can deprive the latest representative of much credit for what he may have accomplished. That there should be such a man as Mr. — cannot be left unaccounted for. Twenty times a year I read the ancestral explanation, which seems to me always to say: 'My dear sir, you had a remarkable grandfather and a remarkable great-grandfather, and grandmothers are always remarkable, and it is not very, only a little, remarkable that you are remarkable.' So, while we have this deep personal interest in the men who create literature, I think there is hope for us."

Philosopher. "'See thou nothing that is base?' was written by a poet of our day. It was the practice of the most celebrated of ancient men. They lifted their eyes from

the earth; but benefited it more by what they saw and reported than do those who go on all fours, mousing in every pestiferous recess. There are unquestionable maladies, and the doctors are too plentiful, and the remedies."

Painter. "Philosophy assumes the self-evident, and employs itself in proving it, picking up on the way many truths. I value it not so much for its noble intention as for the freedom and light which have ever, unawares, accompanied its exercise."

THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE SUBLIME: AN ANALYSIS OF THESE EMOTIONS AND A DETERMINATION OF THE OBJECTIVITY OF BEAUTY. By JOHN STEINFORT KEDNEY. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1880.

The object of the author of this treatise has been to discuss the fundamental questions underlying æsthetics, rather than to make a text-book on the subject. With this in view, he has been careful to avoid all applications of his results to particular questions in art criticism, except so far as is necessary for illustration. He has also avoided the question of æsthetic culture, for the reason that it is a part of the question of culture in general, and its consideration belongs after the consideration of ethical culture. Book I considers the subjective aspect of the sublime and beautiful, while Book II treats of beauty as objective.

In Chapter I he defines certain terms: "The human soul is called a *self*, because in its consciousness it distinguishes and relates the two realms, or materiel therefrom; and all of its states are determinations from both sources, amid which it determines itself, and out of which it constructs its own world." The soul has "susceptibilities," or modes of passivity—namely, sensation, registration, memory, and emotion. It has "faculties," or modes of activity—such as perception, recollection, fancy, insight, understanding, judgment, reason, imagination. "Reason" is used by Dr. Kedney to mean not only a faculty, but a light—as the sum of the special human elements super-added to the animal soul. Consciousness is regarded as belonging to animals as such, and to be distinguished from human self-consciousness, which exists because of reason. He distinguishes a third form of consciousness (Chapter III), which arises when objects are seen in their essential ideas. He finds a feeling of enjoyment connected with every perception and with every recognition of an idea. "This consciousness of enjoyment," he says, "or of the deprivation of that once had, or of pain, is the first spring, and always a chief spring, of all human activity; nor can any concrete form of being, involving self-consciousness, be conceived as without this accompaniment of feeling penetrating throughout."

This enjoyment he finds to be connected with reciprocity of some sort, and not to be thought as belonging to an utterly solitary self-conscious being. The discovery of a limitation to his being, and the further discovery that he can modify his environment, leads him to an ideal of a possible or desirable life or state of conscious enjoyment, which enlarges and enriches itself with his constantly growing knowledge.

"No ideal of life as desirable can be dwelt upon, or even formed, which does not include this our relation to the physical universe. Any ideal of a perfect state must extend beyond that of perpetual intuition of thoughts, and include the wealth that can come from a possible environment between which and the soul's desire all contradiction is removed. The ideal of a perfect life, even for the philosopher, is, then, still a physical life."

Dr. Kedney sees in the beautiful a suggestion of freedom to the spectator. Freedom

is the spiritual burden of the work of art, whether in sculpture, architecture, or painting or music :

" Nature, at first glance, and at the latest glance for some, seems under the dominion of necessity—to be fixed, inexorable, fateful; but a second look, and, perhaps, the final look, finds suggestions and tokens of freedom. The former impression is depressing and mournful; the latter elevating, inspiring, joyous. Nature's most welcome use at least, possibly its true use, is to furnish *re*-flections of human freedom, wherein it helps to convince the latter that it is real and not a delusion."

In an appendix our author discusses the doctrines of Kant, Schiller, Hegel, and Day, in some of their æsthetical bearings.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

The Three Americas Railway. An international and intercontinental enterprise, outlined in numerous formal disquisitions and five elaborate essays, all strongly advocating free and fast and full and friendly intercommunication between the sixteen adjunctive and concordant republics of the New World. By various earnest and confident supporters of the scheme, among whom are Hinton Rowan Helper, Frank Frederick Hilder, Frederick Anthony Beelen, William Wharton Archer, Frank Deyeaux Carpenter, Francis Augustus Deekens. St. Louis: W. S. Bryan, publisher. 1881.

Jahresbericht ueber die koenigl. Studienanstalt in Speier fuer das Studienjahr. 1880-81. Mit einem Programm ueber Sprache und Kritik des lateinischen Apollonius-romanes von Dr. Ph. Thielmann. Nebst einem doppelten Anhang: (1) Verbesserungen zum lateinischen Konstantinroman von Dr. Ph. Thielmann; (2) Die Vulgata als sprachliches Vorbild des Konstantinromanes von Dr. Gustav Landgraf. Speier. 1881.

The Pathway of Angels. A Lecture by Spirit Emanuel Swedenborg, delivered through the Mediumship of Mrs. Cora L. V. Richmond. Boston, 1881.

The Platonist. Edited and Published by Thomas M. Johnson, Osceola, St. Clair County, Missouri. A monthly periodical devoted to the dissemination of the Platonic philosophy in all its phases. Pp. 17-32. \$2 per annum. [Contents of No. II: (1) Pearls of Wisdom gathered from Platonic Sources (consisting of short sentences); (2) Editorials; (3) Translation from Plotinus, from Enn. 5, Lib. 5: "That Intelligibles are not External to Mind," and "Concerning the Good;"; (4) Platonic Demonstration of the Immortality of the Soul, from the Greek of Hermeias, by Thomas Taylor (reprint from "The Classical Journal"); (5) Hymn to the Muses (from the Greek of Proklus, by Edwin Arnold); (6) General Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Plato, by Thomas Taylor; (7) Iamblichos: a Treatise on the Mysteries (new translation, by Alexander Wilder); (8) Platonic Technology: a Glossary of Distinctive Terms used by Plato and other Philosophers in an Arcane and Peculiar Sense, compiled by Alexander Wilder, Professor of Psychological Science, etc., in the United States Medical College; (9) Book Reviews.]

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THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ITS RELATIONS TO
REALISM AND SENSATIONALISM.

READ AT THE CONCORD SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY, AUGUST 3, 1881, BY JOHN WATSON.

A philosophy must not be regarded as less perfect than another because it has less of consistency within itself. There is such a thing as the weakness of one's strength. A man who is not afflicted with a strong and energetic nature will not very readily leave the beaten track for devious courses, but, on the other hand, he will as certainly not lead others into fresh fields and pastures new. A man or a philosophy is to be judged by a standard other than that of its mere external completeness. As time goes on the world becomes for the thinker much more complicated, and therefore he who tries to make a conception, which was adequate enough when the world was less complex, do under the altered condition of things, will produce a system apparently adequate, because of its very inadequacy. To Parmenides pure being seemed sufficient as a formulation of the universe, but to whom does that notion appear sufficient now? Not even to Mr. Spencer, prone as that thinker is to rest satisfied with categories of exceeding simplicity. We shall, then, judge unfairly of any philosophy, and especially of the philosophy of Kant, if we endeavor to estimate it by the somewhat external standard of self-consistency. No doubt such a

method of looking at a system has its own value; for a philosophy which is hopelessly illogical—I mean one which is incoherent within itself—is, in all probability, at the same time hopelessly inadequate. But there is something much higher than mere consistency between parts; there is that noble sort of inconsistency—the inconsistency of genius—which arises from the fierce struggle between the new and the old. Of want of development in the system of Kant there is enough and to spare; but there is not less evidence of an insight into the infinite complexity of the modern world, which is only seen by the man of genius, or seen by others when time has made it clear. To appreciate Kant we must therefore view him as the exponent of a new synthesis, and not simply as giving a new solution of the same old problem. The problem given to Aristotle to solve, he solved for all time; but he did not solve the problem of Kant, for Kant's problem implied the intermediation of Christianity and the changed aspect of the modern world, which followed in the train of Christianity.

Kant, it has been said, is constantly asserting that metaphysics are independent of the teaching of experience, and that they must not call in experience. That to a verbal critic of Kant this should seem a fair representation of his teaching is intelligible enough, but it is hard to believe that any one who has once clearly realized what Kant's problem was, and how he tried to solve it, should put the matter in this way. Idealism does not spin the universe out of the individual consciousness, or construct the world independently of facts. Idealism, in any sense in which it is held outside of a lunatic asylum, does not deny that we know real objects, nor does it assert that objects are dependent on the individual consciousness of any man, or of all men; on the contrary, it affirms as emphatically as the realist that there is a real world, and that this world is not constructed by the individual mind. The idealist takes exception, not to the facts of experience, whether these concern the world of nature or the world of mind, but to a realism which assumes a world existing independently of intelligence, and to a sensationalism which explains the world as the product of association acting upon the particular and evanescent feelings of the individual man. To the first idealism replies that a real world, existing independently of all intelligence, is a world that by definition cannot be known, and therefore cannot be known to exist.

Such a world, even granting it to be real, can only be thought of as an unknown something mysteriously operating upon a mind that is shut out from any direct relation to it. Realism, in fact, leads to agnosticism. For, when we attempt to explain how a self-dependent world comes to be known, we are compelled to acknowledge that all that gives definiteness to it, all the properties by which it is known, exist only in relation to a being that thinks, as distinguished from a being that simply feels. The world as known being thus resolved into intelligible relations, the world as it is supposed to exist beyond knowledge is necessarily deprived of all motion, change, and life, and only survives as a ghostly thing in itself, indistinguishable from the Spencerian Unknowable. Realism can only save itself from this fate by becoming assumptive and dogmatical; it can but asseverate, as loudly as possible: "There is a real world, and we all know it!" Who denies the truism? The question is not, whether there *is* a real world—a fact which admits of no dispute among sane people—but what the *nature* of this real world is. Is it independent of intelligence, or is it not? This is the question, and, until the necessity for putting it has been clearly perceived, we may have a robust dogmatism, but we cannot, properly speaking, have a philosophy.

Kant did not deny the facts of experience. Like all philosophers, he began with the world of experience, as it exists for the unphilosophical man, and the problem he aimed to solve was: What are the intellectual elements which must be presupposed in order to a complete and adequate explanation of experience? His method was in essence identical with that of the scientific discoverer when, assuming certain facts as given to him, he asks what hypothesis will account for them in their completeness. There is, in truth, more reason for objecting to Kant that he was too ready to assume the facts of experience than for asserting that he set up a theory independently of them. For Kant looks too much at the world of experience as a ready-made material, which must indeed be described and explained, but the several parts of which do not admit of interconnection among themselves. The world of experience means for him the world as it exists for the reflective thinker of modern times, who has not only a practical acquaintance with men and things, but is also tolerably familiar with the results of scientific discovery. Before him lies this world

in its bold outlines; objects spread out in space, and events following on each other in time; things as extensive and intensive *quanta*; substances as changing, as connected in the way of cause and effect, and as acting and reacting upon each other. These elements he takes up very much as they stand, and assumes, without hesitation, that the broad distinctions that seem to divide them from each other are absolute. Space and time belong to one sphere, sensations as they occur in the individual mind to another sphere, categories of quantity and quality, of relation and modality, to a third, and distinct from all is the one universal self-consciousness. Moreover, even within these separate circles of existence, Kant finds abstract separations. Space has no bond of connection with Time, except that both belong to the one world of fact; sensations form a single series within a separate individual mind; quantity is apart from quality, substance from cause, and reciprocity from both. But, analytic or separative as Kant has a tendency to be, he cannot be accused of neglecting the world of experience in its broad and essential features. The world he deals with is the real world, and he never dreams for a moment of philosophizing without perpetual reference to it. If he fails to explain it thoroughly, this was only what was to be expected of a pioneer in a new and untrodden realm, and what, it may be added, must, more or less, be true of any theory that attempts to formulate the infinite variety of existence. To charge Kant with "overriding" or "mutilating the facts," is to talk at random. The facts are simple enough. But "facts" do not constitute a philosophy. No amount of ingenuity can extort from the command, "Stick to the facts," a single philosophical principle, and it is misleading to talk as if there were some cabalistic virtue in the use of an empty formula. "Certainly, we must keep to the facts," Kant would have replied, "but the point is, how you are going to explain them. Here they are, and we are all pretty well agreed about them! There are objects in space and time, there are individual feelings, there are things apparently, if not really, connected together; now, How do you *interpret* these facts?" "It is a fact," remarks the realist, "that the world is independent of consciousness." "Excuse me!" we can imagine Kant replying; "you are now confusing individual and universal consciousness, and, under disguise of that confusion, making the facts give a

theory of themselves. What we actually know is a world of objects in space and time, not a world independent of thought. Now, the problem of philosophy is to explain how we come to know that world."

The source of the realist's mistake is not far to seek. No attempt to account for experience can be made until experience has been well developed, and then we are apt to substitute a mere repetition of the facts for an explanation of them. Such a method, besides explaining nothing, is incidentally a perversion. Common sense neither affirms that real objects are independent of intelligence, nor, on the contrary, that they are dependent on intelligence; it simply affirms nothing whatever about the matter. If interrogated, and asked whether he believes the world to be independent of the mind, no doubt the "plain" man, when he once gets a glimpse of what is meant, will answer: "The world is certainly independent of the mind." But what he means to affirm is merely that the world does not come into being when he awakes, and is not annihilated when he goes to sleep. The realist, having extracted a reply that has no proper bearing upon the problem of philosophy, parades it as a "universal deliverance of common sense," a "fact of consciousness," a "fundamental belief." Now these, and many other high-sounding platitudes, well suited to catch "the ears of the groundlings," really amount to nothing but a misstatement of the point at issue. The realist gets the suffrages of common sense by asking a question not worth asking, and he triumphs over his idealistic opponent by the easy method of asserting what is not denied, and neglecting what is asserted. When it is affirmed that the world only exists in relation to intelligence, it is no answer to say that it exists independently of any individual consciousness. The difference between these two views is simply infinite, and, by confusing the one with the other, the realist but fights with a phantom of his own creation. The truth is, that to refer the matter to common sense at all is just as absurd as for a scientific man to appeal from the judgment of his compeers to the mere layman in science. No valuable answer can be obtained from those who have to be plied with leading questions before the answer desired is wrung from them. The idealist, it should be remembered, was at one time a "plain" man himself, and the "plain" man, if sufficiently instructed, might easily become

an idealist. It is surely time that this foolish appeal to the "vulgar" should be given up. But, if the question is to be referred to the common sense of men at all, it ought to be put in a way to be understood, and the only fair way to represent the issue is to ask: Does the world exist apart from an Infinite Intelligence? The only real objection to this form of the question is that it anticipates the result of a speculative philosophy; but, as the ordinary man cares only for the results of speculation, not for speculation itself, this mode of stating the problem is the fairest that, under the circumstances, is available.

Kant's problem was: What are the essential conditions of any knowledge whatever of real things? More particularly, How are we to explain the fact of a world in space and time—a world whose objects possess quantity and quality, and are connected together by the real or apparent bonds of causality and reciprocity? These were his facts. Now, the difficulty attending the solution of this problem was greatly lessened for Kant by the labors of his predecessors, especially Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. The last especially had virtually proved that the true explanation cannot be found in a theory that starts from the absolute opposition of thought and nature. Locke, like Dr. Reid, began with this misinterpretation of the facts. It seemed clear to him that the world was independent of his individual consciousness, and this he interpreted to mean that the world is an independent, self-complete object. The question of philosophy, as Locke figured it to himself, was: How am I, an individual man, confined to the succession of my own mental states, to get a knowledge of a world lying outside of me? Put in this way, the question is insoluble. If the world is a thing apart by itself, and I am shut up within my own individual mind, I can never get a knowledge of the world at all. That this was hidden from Locke, as it is still hidden from his sensationalistic followers, is due to the fact that the theory is not consistently carried out to its last results. Locke was a man of great vigor of mind, but he was very far from being a consistent thinker. Philosophical consistency demands that a theory should not only harmonize in all its parts, but should borrow nothing from the fact to be explained. Locke's system satisfies neither the one requirement nor the other. In borrowing from the world of experience to clothe the nakedness of his theory, Locke is a flagrant sinner.

He pretends to prove that from "simple ideas"—in plain words, from unrelated, particular sensations—we can account for the actual experience we undoubtedly possess. But nothing is plainer than that, when we consistently exclude all that is not sensation—when we do not allow ourselves to take advantage of relations of thought—we cannot get beyond the passing states of our own sentient nature. A consistent sensationalism may account for the unconscious sequence of sensations in the mere animal, but it utterly fails to explain a world of objects as experienced by a self-conscious being such as man. In bridging over the gulf between the mere series of feelings and the actual world as known, Locke attributes to sensation what only exists for thought. Sensations of touch he identifies with the conception of extended and solid bodies, and space he explains as the interval between bodies. By this conversion of sensation into its opposite, the difficulty of getting beyond the fragmentary sensations in the individual mind is concealed. Need it be pointed out that the explanation is plausible only because it assumes what it has to account for? Keep to a simple series of sensations, and you cannot get more than that simple series. By no amount of intellectual contortion can a mere sensation be identified with the quality of a real object, an aggregate of sensations with an object having various properties, or any association of such aggregates with a world of objects. Besides being inconsistent in borrowing from experience what he supposes himself to be explaining, Locke is also inconsistent in introducing elements that are only in place in a philosophy that recognizes the constitutive activity of intelligence. These elements, if developed, might, no doubt, lead to a true explanation of reality. But in Locke they are not developed, but simply put side by side with other elements inconsistent with them; and, if they were developed, the sensationalistic basis of his theory would have to go.

Hume was much more consistent than Locke, but even he, endowed as he was with a philosophical capacity probably unsurpassed, could not make bricks without straw. The ideal of sensationalism, which he rightly sees admits of nothing but feelings as originally felt or as reproduced in a fainter form, he is compelled quietly to abandon, from his inability to account even for the fiction of a real world. No doubt, as Dr. Stirling points out, Hume started from the facts of experience as they exist for us

all; a world of objects in space and time, with relations of quantity and quality, and apparently connected by the bond of cause and effect. But Dr. Stirling does not, as it seems to me, sufficiently distinguish between Hume's theory and the unwarranted assumptions he is led to make in trying to give it plausibility. It is no doubt true that, in speaking of causality, Hume "*did*" mean a really necessary connection, though . . . he *philosophically* could find no origin for it but the customary experience of constant conjunction." But it is under this very notion of "constant conjunction" that Hume slips in one of the most unwarrantable assumptions in the whole of his theory. If we grant "constant conjunction" to him, we allow him everything he needs. The real difficulty goes farther back, leading us to ask how—defining sensations as "perishable passions," and ostensibly allowing nothing but transient feelings, felt for the first time or repeated in a fainter form—Hume can get a "customary experience" or a "constant conjunction" at all. If the mind, as he asserts, is not different from the series of feelings, and if the object is to be resolved into that series, what is there to connect the feelings in a uniform order, or, indeed, in any order whatever? Unable to explain the permanence and causal connection of things from a number of scattered and unrelated feelings, Hume has to adopt the tactics of Locke, and to borrow from experience what he ought to explain. It is in this way that experience is apparently resolved into a stream of feelings, in defiance of the palpable fact that experience is not a stream of feelings. Still, Hume had at last brought the method of Locke to a tolerably clear consciousness of itself, and, in doing so, had indicated generally wherein its weakness lay. Kant was quick to perceive the source of that weakness, and, because he did so, he found his great problem: What are the elements necessary to account for real experience? a soluble one.

The simplest point of view from which the world of experience may be contemplated—and this is the fact to be explained—is that of a number of objects existing side by side in space, and a number of feelings in the individual mind following upon each other in time. What is the relation of the objects to the feelings? The first superficial answer naturally is, that the objects exist apart from the feelings, and, by acting upon the mind, give

rise to them. But this brings up a new difficulty. If the object exists independently, how is it known to exist? "Through the sensations it produces," it may be answered. We do not, then, know the object as it is in itself, but only as it is revealed in our sensations? "No." But, if we are confined to our own sensations, why should we assert the existence of anything distinct from them? "We cannot tell *what* the object is," answers the Spencerian, "but we can tell *that* it is, since we know it as an effect." But you can not know it to be an effect, objects Hume, without bringing the sensations under relations of thought, and, to do so, is to go beyond sensations. The relation of cause and effect cannot for us mean a relation in independent objects, because these are not known by us, upon your own showing; cause and effect, in fact, can only be for us some sort of association of feelings. We must, then, concludes Hume, discard the fiction of real objects and confine ourselves to that series of feelings which alone is knowable by us. Now, it is at this point that Kant joins issue with Hume. The latter, discarding all reality except that implied in the immediate consciousness of feelings, yet speaks of these as a series. But, objects Kant, feelings do not of themselves form a series, for succession implies Time, and apart from the connection of feelings there can be no consciousness of Time. And, even supposing feelings to constitute a series, that would not account for the coexistence of objects in Space, in which the parts do not follow each other, but exist all at once. Sensations, as merely particular or separate, cannot be formed into objects in space and time, each of which is a combination of properties, while all exist together in one space and one time. We may regard sensations as the unformed materials out of which objects are put together by a power higher than themselves, but in themselves they are not identical with objects, because in themselves they are not knowable at all. A being who had only a number of disconnected feelings could by no possibility have a consciousness of objects as they exist in our intelligent experience. The supposition that by sensation alone a knowledge of real objects is possible arises from a confusion between sensible *objects* and pure *sensations*. We speak of "sensible things" and the "sensible world," and for the ordinary purposes of every-day life our language is accurate enough. But when, by a confusion of thought, we transfer what

is true of the sensible thing to mere sensation, we fall into the gross mistake of affirming of unrelated feelings what is true only of related feelings—*i. e.*, of objects as they exist in our intelligent experience; we forget that the so-called “sensible” world is really an intelligible world. But if we hold tenaciously by what Hume has shown to be the character of sensation—*viz.*: a “perishable passion”—we at once see that objects in space and time are not resolvable into a mere multiplicity of sensations. It is because sensationalism, while pretending to account for our actual experience of objects from sensations alone, yet introduces elements foreign to sensation, that it is enabled to give a plausible explanation of a real world of objects in space and time. We must therefore insist upon the fact that sensations in themselves are a mere multiplicity, or, in other words, are not related to each other even as successive, far less as permanent and coexistent.

Sensations being definable as a pure multiplicity, which can only be reduced to unity by something different from themselves, it is absurd to suppose that they give a knowledge of real objects. They form an *element* in knowledge, not a separate *kind* of knowledge. The supposition that by pure sensations objects may be known, is partly due to the false assumption that Space and Time are independent objects immediately apprehensible by sense. And, certainly, if we hold with the realist that the real world is altogether independent of consciousness, we must suppose Space and Time to be independent objects in which other objects are arranged. Such a supposition, however, contradicts itself by destroying the very thing it sets out to explain. If Space and Time are real objects, existing apart from consciousness, how do we come to know them at all? It must be through our sensations, which we judge to be produced by them. Then, we do not know the real Space and the real Time, but only Space and Time as they appear to us. Thus we are brought round once more to the Spencerian point of view. But we cannot rest here. If we are shut up within our separate consciousness, and directly know only our own sensations, what right have we to assert that there is any Space and Time except that which is given in our sensations? We have no right whatever, and are thus driven to the view of Hume, that Space and Time are objects only in the sense of being somehow the product of sensation. But a pure sensationalism, as Kant

shows, cannot account even for the apparent reality of Space and Time. A sensation cannot be determined as "here" without being referred to something other than itself, in contrast to which its transience is perceived. To go beyond our immediate sensations, and refer them to objects in Space, is only possible to a being that is much more than a thread of sensations. So we cannot be conscious that "now" there is a sensation without going beyond the mere "now," the passing feeling, and connecting it with other feelings before and after. We suppose that sensations in themselves are located in space, and determined in time, because we forget that, when we contrast our feelings as transient with objects as permanent, we are already beyond mere feeling, and have effected the transformation of particular states of consciousness into real objects. And this just means that we are not selfless animals, but self-conscious men. An animal, with its mere flux of sensations, cannot locate *objects* in space, or place *events* in relation to each other in time, because it does not go beyond the disconnected impressions that serve it in lieu of intelligence; or, at any rate, if animals do arrange objects in space and time, they must be conscious beings.

Space and Time, then, are not independent objects, lying beyond intelligence, nor are they due to sensations. The only other hypothesis conceivable is, that they are in some sense contributed by the mind. Kant's view is that they belong to man as a perceptive being; in other words, that they are not abstract conceptions, but definite individuals. There are not several distinct spaces and times capable of being brought under an abstract conception different from each of them; there is only one Space, of which each space is an integral part, and one Time, in which each time is a particular unit. It must be observed, however, that, considered in themselves, Space and Time are not capable of being known, and therefore are not capable of accounting for our experience of them. Nor, even in conjunction with the material of sense—*i. e.*, with unrelated sensations—do they account for external objects as we know them in our developed experience. *Without* them, there could be no consciousness even of sensations, and therefore no consciousness of objects, as in space and time; but it does not follow that even *with* them a knowledge of real objects is possible. They are the perceptive conditions of such a knowledge, but they

are no more. Hence we may call them *forms* of perception. By "forms" we must not understand that Space and Time are pre-existent moulds in which objects are arranged, but simply that they are the essential conditions, without which there could be no perception of objects as existing side by side, or of feelings as following on each other. We are now entitled to say, then, that objects as existing in space and time can not be explained without presupposition of the multiplicity of sense, and of the perceptive forms of Space and Time.

This view of Space and Time as not objects that can be directly apprehended, or that exist apart from their relation to consciousness, begins that transformation of current notions which is the result of every earnest effort to explain the facts of experience. To those who speak of objects as independent of intelligence, Kant's reply is that they confuse externality *in space* with externality to *thought*. Real things are certainly "external" in the sense of being arranged in relation to each other in space; our sensations are certainly "internal" in so far as they are arranged as successive or coexistent events in time; but objects are not external in the sense of being *without intelligence*, nor are feelings internal because they alone are *within intelligence*. "External" and "internal" could have no meaning to a being destitute of intelligence, and hence to speak of objects that are external to intelligence is pure nonsense. I call a thing external either because I perceive it to stand apart from another thing, or to stand apart from my organism, and in both cases I am speaking of externality in the sense of position in space, not in the sense of independence of consciousness. I say my feelings are internal, because they are not made up of parts that stand out of each other, and because two feelings do not stand apart from each other like two objects in space; in other words, my feelings are internal because they are not in space, but only in time. But, although I distinguish in consciousness objects as external from feelings as internal, the objects and the feelings alike exist only for me as a conscious being. What Kant proves, then, is, that Space and Time exist only in relation to intelligence; or, otherwise, that the opposition of external objects to internal feelings is a logical distinction within consciousness, not a real separation without consciousness.

It may serve to illustrate what has just been said if we con-

sider that the distinction of qualities of body as "primary" and "secondary" in no way affects the Kantian explanation of the nature of space and time. A primary quality, according to Locke, is a property of objects in themselves, a secondary quality a property in us, or, more properly, an affection of our sensitive organism. This distinction only seems to bear upon the question of the relation of the inner to the outer world, because objects with their properties are opposed, not merely to the organism with its affections, but to consciousness itself. But this is to confuse objects as existing in space with objects as independent of consciousness. It is inferred that objects with their properties are independent of intelligence—in Kantian language, are things in themselves—because they stand apart from our bodies in space, and that the affections of the organism are alone in consciousness, because, as sensations, they are not in space, but only in time. Now, here there is a double confusion. In the first place, it is supposed that, because the primary properties belong to things external to the body, they are therefore external to, or independent of, consciousness; and, on the other hand, it is assumed that, because the affections of the organism are as sensations internal in the sense of being in time, they alone are included within consciousness. This opposition rests upon the confusion already pointed out between objects without the body and objects without consciousness. But these two meanings of externality, so far from being identical, are diametrically opposed to each other. An object in space is knowable because special distinctions exist only in relation to consciousness; an object beyond consciousness, as unknowable, is out of relation to consciousness. In other words, the contrast of things in space is relative to the contrast of feelings in time. A similar remark applies to the affections of the organism regarded as sensations of the subject. The fact that they are internal in the sense of being in time does not make them internal in the other sense of being independent of real things. Feelings as only in time are no more in consciousness than objects in space, since the distinction of outer and inner is a distinction within and not without consciousness. In the second place, the primary qualities are not purely external, nor are the secondary qualities purely internal. The property of an object is not only in space, but also in time, and an affection of the organism, viewed

on the outer side, is in space just as much as the quality of an extra-organic body. The organism, in short, may be viewed as an object in space, and the bodies lying apart from the organism do not exist out of time. This second mistake of Locke is, however, of less importance than the first, and, in fact, is only worth pointing out because it gives color to the view that consciousness is confined within the material organism, like a bird within the bars of its cage. But this view is seen to rest upon a false analogy of consciousness and material things, when it is remembered that the limits within which consciousness is supposed to be confined are really limits constructed by consciousness itself in the logical separation of internal and external existence.

Space and Time, we may now assume, are not objects independent of intelligence, nor, indeed, are they objects in any sense; they are simply the essential conditions of the perception of objects. Without them there could be no experience of external and internal objects, but even with them there could be no real experience. The pure forms of Space and Time, together with the separate sensations to be arranged under them, are but the perceptive element implied in a full act of knowledge. The unconnected sensations must be combined, and the blank forms differentiated, before real experience can possibly take place. A merely perceptive being—a being having only unrelated feelings and undifferentiated forms—cannot be conceived to be more than potentially intelligent. For experience is a knowledge of objects each of which in itself unites several properties, has parts both extensive and intensive, and is capable of undergoing change without being destroyed; it is a knowledge of objects all of which are connected together as cause and effect, and are in mutual action and reaction. What is wanted to explain experience in its completeness evidently is some combining or integrating principle that is capable of operating in different ways, in accordance with the different kinds of unity to be produced. This universal principle of synthesis is Self-consciousness, and its several modes of activity are the Categories.

The Deduction of the Categories virtually contains all that is essential in the philosophy of Kant, and in this sense its importance cannot be overrated. There is a tendency, however, in commentators on the *Critique*, to employ it as a kind of bugbear to

frighten the reader. No doubt the exposition, as it stands, is by no means a model of clearness, but it is capable of easy comprehension by any one who has once fairly put himself at the critical point of view. It amounts, in brief, to this: that the world of objects is constituted by the synthetical activity of self-conscious Intelligence, which, on the one hand, unites the scattered impressions of sense, under the formal conditions of space and time, into extended and qualified objects, connecting them together as cause and effect and as in reciprocal action; and, on the other hand, combines subjective feelings under the unity of a single self, that exists only in relation to the objects so constituted. Kant proves, therefore, in the first place, that objects exist only in relation to consciousness; secondly, that the self is known as identical only in the process of producing objects; and, thirdly, combining these inferences, that the world of experience, in its two phases of outer and inner, is constituted by Intelligence.

Sensations, let us repeat, are in themselves a mere multiplicity of unconnected units; in other words, there is in them no principle of combination. But combination is essential, if we are to explain the world of objects as known in our experience. Now, Thought or Understanding is usually supposed to be, in the first instance at least, only capable of analysis; it breaks up the concrete object presented to it in perception, and in this way forms abstract or general conceptions. On this view, Thought may combine the properties that have been presented to it by perception into a new unit, but it cannot combine, except on presupposition of a prior analysis. It may manipulate what is supplied to it, but it can supply nothing of itself. Now, if Thought is a purely analytical faculty, or only secondarily synthetical, it evidently cannot constitute objects as such, but can only analyze them if they are given to it by Perception to be analyzed. Synthesis presupposes a prior analysis. It seems, therefore, as if we should not be able to account for experience at all. If there is no capability of synthesis in sensations, or even in sensation combined with the forms of space and time, and if Thought is not synthetic either, how are we to account for the fact that single objects, and objects in connection with each other, alike manifest complexity in unity? Both Perception and Thought being, to all appearance, merely analytic, where is the synthesis to come from? The answer is virtually implied in what

has already been said. It has been shown that objects as in space and time exist only in relation to intelligence, and that Perception but supplies the disconnected materials out of which a world of such objects may be formed. But, as we have discovered Sense to be only an element in knowledge, not a kind of knowledge, we must alter our view of Thought correspondently. That Thought is purely analytic or separative, can be true only upon the presupposition that Perception is synthetic, or, in other words, that individual objects are known in the fulness of their attributes by simple apprehension of a world existing independently of intelligence. This presupposition, however, has been proved to be absurd; a world lying beyond consciousness could never be perceived at all, much less perceived to be made up of individual objects. We must, therefore, completely reverse our conception of the nature of Thought. If Sense does not reveal to us individual objects, but only unrelated perceptions, Thought must be synthetic. Now we can get an intelligible explanation of how experience is possible. The old notion that thinking consists in a mere analysis of objects given in their completeness beforehand is no real explanation, for it does not tell us how we come to know a world of real objects, but assumes that world to be already known. In maintaining all thinking to be analysis or abstraction, it opposes the process of knowing to the process of thinking, and this first leads to sensationalism, and then by an easy descent to scepticism. Thought must therefore be regarded as constituting objects by combining the scattered perceptions given to it. In this way alone can we explain the facts of experience. There can be no possible doubt as to the absolute necessity of synthesis to the existence and connection of real objects; and synthesis, as has been shown, it is vain to attribute to sensation, or to the forms of space and time. The unity of individual objects, and of the whole world of objects, is due to Thought, which puts together the separate differences of sense, and thus constitutes them into individual things, and combinations of individual things. The mere act by which separate objects are formed presupposes the synthetical activity of thought, as operating upon the material of sense, in conformity with spatial and temporal conditions. The world of experience is, however, not a collection of independent objects, but a connected whole, in which each object, and each part of an

object, has a definite place. We have therefore to explain not only the combination of sensations into the unity of single objects, but the connection of all objects of experience in the unity of one world. The fact to be explained—the world of ordinary experience—includes not only things in space and time as complexes of qualities, but things that undergo change without losing their reality, that are joined together by the bond of causality, and that are in mutual action and reaction. And if this immense variety in existence is yet compatible with unity, there must be not only syntheses of Thought, but there must be a single principle that connects together the different modes of synthesis in a perfect unity. This supreme unity is self-conscious Intelligence. Apart from a single identical self, to which by the synthetical activity of Thought all differences may be referred, there could be no unity in experience, and, therefore, no single world of real objects. The unity of the real world of objects must be due to the unity of self-conscious Intelligence.

Thus, it appears that without synthesis there could be no known objects, without various modes of synthesis no world of objects as we know it, and without a single identical Self no unity in that world. Looking at experience from the other side, we can see it to be equally true, and, in fact, already implied in what has been said, that without synthetical acts there could be no consciousness of Self. Isolate the Self, and conceive of it as purely abstract, and it has no difference in it. Intelligence only becomes conscious of itself in the process by which it constitutes objects. A purely perceptive being—a being who had but detached states not connected by a synthesis of thought—would never become conscious of itself. It is, therefore, no explanation to say that we perceive the identity of consciousness by “looking into our own minds,” for we could never discover self to be identical if it were merely given in successive perceptions. The recognition of self as identical presupposes that self is identical in its own nature, and this again implies that it is the sole source of the various kinds of synthesis. A self that existed only in each separate mental state would pass away with the transient state, and hence, as Kant puts it, would be as “many colored and ever changing” as the several states in which it was present. Such a Self would be no identical Self, and, therefore, no Self at all. The

consciousness of self, as in time, is only explicable on presupposition of a self which is not itself in time, but is yet the condition of all synthesis in time; and the consciousness of such a self is possible only in the actual process of combining the manifold of sense under the unity of the categories.

Putting together these two propositions—that real objects only exist in relation to the “synthetical unity of self-consciousness,” and that the consciousness of self as identical is only given in the process by which objects are combined—we reach the inference that the Object is correlative to the Subject, or, as we may also say, that Nature exists only in relation to Intelligence. Thus, we have as completely reversed the old method of explaining experience as Copernicus altered the Ptolemaic conception of the material universe. We have discovered that the world of experience does not act upon a consciousness only fitted passively to receive what is presented to it from without, but that, on the contrary, consciousness is the condition of there being for us any world at all.

In what has gone before there will be found, as I believe, all that is really valuable in Kant's general theory of knowledge. The fundamental principle of the Critical Philosophy, that distinguishes it from all previous systems, is its interpretation of the world of experience as the product of self-conscious intelligence; and if Kant himself was not perfectly true to this principle, there is no doubt that he followed it out as consistently as he could. It is quite true, as a matter of fact, that, after all, he held the world of experience to be distinct from the world as it truly is behind the veil; but the opposition of a noumenal and phenomenal world is seen to be superfluous when it is considered that intelligence cannot go out of itself and establish the existence of that which by definition lies beyond it. The thing-in-itself is simply an illusive fiction which survives for Kant only because he was untrue to the central idea of his philosophy. Other imperfections in Kant's exposition, intimately connected with the hypothesis of an unknown thing-in-itself, will be immediately referred to. Meantime it will help to illustrate the Critical explanation of the facts of experience, if we look at the application of the category of causality to the world as known, and see how Kant endeavored to meet the sceptical doctrine of Hume, that causal connection means

a purely arbitrary sequence of perceptions, not a real connection of objects.

In estimating the validity of Kant's reply to Hume's doctrine of causality, it is essential to bring each into connection with the system of which it forms a part. Now, as has been already pointed out, Hume, in his account of experience, ostensibly admits of no principle of explanation except the immediate feelings of an individual subject, as originally felt or as repeated in a less vivid form. With such materials he cannot possibly build up even a world of experience apparently stable, and hence he is compelled to attribute to feelings more than properly belongs to them. A succession of feelings has no principle of unity in it, and therefore cannot give rise to the unity implied in the experience of a world of objects, all of which are connected together. Hume endeavors to show, not how things are *actually* connected together in a real world—for on his theory there are no things to connect—but how there *seems* to be a connected world of objects. Two things happen to be frequently perceived, the one directly after the other, and, as a natural result, a subjective tendency to associate them together in the order in which they are perceived is created, so that the presence of either in sense or memory calls up the other. Hence, when the one is felt or remembered, there is at the same time a belief in the precedence or sequence of the other. This belief arises from the transference of the vividness of the impression to the idea with which it is associated. The apparent connection of objects or events is only a special sort of transition from one feeling to another. "We remember to have had frequent instances of one species of objects, and also remember that the individuals of another species of objects have always attended them, and have existed in a regular order of contiguity and succession with regard to them. Thus we remember to have seen that species of object we call *flame*, and to have felt that species of sensation we call *heat*. We likewise call to mind their constant conjunction in all past instances. Without any further ceremony, we call the one cause, and the other effect, and infer the existence of the one from the other." There is, then, according to Hume, no real connection of objects or events, but only an apparent connection produced by custom. The official passage in which the counter-theory of Kant is set forth is the proof of the Second Analogy

of Experience; but as this proof, or, more properly, explanation, of causality presupposes the First Analogy, and, above all, the Deduction of the Categories, and likewise involves great difficulties of interpretation, it seems better to show what reply may be given by an interpretation based upon the spirit of the Critical Philosophy.

It is important to see clearly what Kant has to prove in regard to causality, and what he is entitled to assume. He is not called upon to show, from a mere consideration of the nature of intelligence, that we can determine beforehand *when* to apply the law of causality. Should such an *anticipatio naturæ* be attempted by him, he would be justly chargeable with endeavoring to construct the world independently of experience. Kant commits himself to nothing so absurd. He starts with experience as it exists for us all before the need for any metaphysical justification of it is felt, and he endeavors to prove, from the nature of that experience, what must be presupposed in explanation of it. In the present case, the facts are that we actually believe certain events to be bound together in an irreversible order, while other events are viewed as not connected together in reality at all, or at least not directly connected in the way of cause and effect. There is no dispute whatever as to the fact that we ordinarily do distinguish between a connected series of events and events that have no apparent connection. On this point Reid, Hume, and Kant are perfectly at one. The issue raised does not concern the fact of our belief in causal connection, but the philosophical explanation of the fact. The moment, however, the interpretation of the apparent connection of events begins, a difference emerges. Reid, starting from the misconception that externality in space is equivalent to independence of consciousness, is unable to do more than repeat the fact he ought to explain. We immediately perceive that things are connected together by the bond of cause and effect, and have an "intuitive conviction" that the future will resemble the past. But this view can only maintain its ground so long as we refuse to go beyond the fact of experience in search of an explanation of it. When we try to realize to ourselves what it means, we are straightway led by an inexorable logic to the denial of any real connection in the way of causality. The steps by which this sceptical result is reached have been already indicated. Objects

exist independently of consciousness, and are simply apprehended ; but this means that we only know them through our immediate sensations, and hence in these sensations the asserted connection must be found. Now, so long as reality is not sought for in the nature of intelligence itself, while it cannot be explained from a world that has now disappeared, so far as our theory is concerned, we *must* resolve what at first seemed to be a connection of real events into a constant association of feelings. Hume's theory of causality is but the legitimate result of the separation of reality from intelligence. The reply of Kant must therefore consist in showing that the belief in a real sequence of events is intelligible, and alone intelligible, on the presupposition that reality is constituted by intelligence.

The apparent sequence of real events is, on Hume's theory, but a customary sequence of feelings as they are for the individual subject of them. In answer to this, Kant points out that to deny a real connection of events is to deny all *change*. We never in our ordinary experience suppose that there is before us an instance of causality, unless when there are two events distinguishable from each other. The mere difference of determination, however, does not of itself involve causal connection, or, rather, we do not suppose that a difference in what is presented to us necessarily amounts to such a connection of one event with another as implies that without the first there could not be the second. I can run my eye up and down a house, and in each successive moment have a different perception ; but I do not therefore conclude that the parts perceived in succession are so connected that the one *must* go before and the other come after. Our ordinary notion of real sequence thus implies more than a mere difference of perceptions. What more does it imply ? Evidently, for one thing, that there is not only difference, but difference that exists *in relation to identity*. There must not only be one determination and then another, but each determination must be referred to that which is constant. In other words, real sequence implies that that which changes yet remains the same ; or, the category of causality presupposes the category of substance. Change, however, involves still more than this. Difference of determination and unity of determination—a difference and a unity that mutually presuppose each other—are implied in our ordinary conception of causality ;

but, in addition, *time* is evidently an essential part of the notion. Corresponding to the difference of determination there is time as a series of moments, and corresponding to the unity of determination there is time as one or undifferentiated. These two aspects of time, like the two aspects of the reality, are strictly correlative; there is one time, because there are many moments of time. From this analysis of the conception of causal sequence it is quite evident that it presupposes *synthesis* of a complex kind. There could be no notion of change if there were no synthesis of separate perceptions uniting them into unity. Such synthesis, as has been shown in the Deduction of the Categories, is only possible upon the presupposition that there is a special function of thought by which the union is effected, and this again implies that there is a self-identical intelligence, by which this and other functions of synthesis are made possible. He who denies that there is a real connection of events must virtually deny the possibility of experience. But, while the category of causality must be presupposed as a rule by which separate determinations are capable of being united, it does not follow that we have sufficiently explained a real sequence of events when we have shown that *without* an intellectual synthesis there could be no belief in an irreversible order in events. For, as has been pointed out, by causal connection we mean a change *in time*. There must, therefore, be a synthesis of the moments of time, or rather a differentiation of the one time in its successive moments. Time itself is not Knowable, any more than a category is applicable without the presentation to it of a sensuous material; and hence the synthesis by intelligence of the separate determinations of sensible perception, under the condition of time, and secondarily of space, is the necessary presupposition of our experience of a real sequence of events. Any one, therefore, who denies the actual connection of events must show, first, how there could be any conception of change without a synthesis by intelligence of the detached perceptions of sense; and, secondly, how, apart from a constitutive intelligence, there could be even the consciousness of a succession of feelings in time. That this is impossible may be seen by simply pressing upon Hume the consequences of his theory.

By a real or causal connection of events we do not mean a mere succession of particular appearances in two objects that only exist

in the succession; on the contrary, we suppose that, despite the alteration that takes place in the objects, the objects themselves are permanent. "The sun warms the stone," but the change in the sun and in the stone leaves each unaffected, so far as its identity and permanence are concerned. Hume attempts to explain away the apparent connection of the two objects, but in doing so he really assumes their permanent identity, and this, as has been shown, means that he assumes real change while apparently disproving it. Thus, in the passage above cited, he says: "We remember to have seen that species of objects we call *flame*, and to have felt that species of sensation we call *heat*." Now, here Hume takes advantage of popular language to introduce the notion of permanence, although his aim is to show that permanence in any real sense is a fiction. It is natural to say that we recognize an object to be permanent because we perceive it to exist in successive moments of time. To this realistic view Kant objects that it goes upon the supposition that objects lie ready-made in a space and time independent of consciousness. But this brings us back to the sensationalistic point of view, that objects are known only as they are immediately perceived. We cannot, then, say anything about their existence when they are not perceived, and must, with Locke, limit ourselves to the judgment: "I know this object to exist so long as I perceive it." But, having gone so far, we are compelled to go still farther. If the object can be known to exist only so long as it is perceived, and if for us it exists only in our sensation, we not only cannot affirm it to exist when it is not felt, but we cannot affirm it to exist at all. Hume sees this clearly enough, and expressly asserts, when it suits him, that there is not, on the one hand, an object, and, on the other hand, a sensation, but that the sensation *is* the object. In treating of causality, however, he speaks as if the only point were whether an object exists when it is not felt, whereas the only consistent view for him to take is that no object is ever felt at all. He assumes, first, that there is an object distinct from sensation, and, secondly, that this object persists so long as it is felt. Both assumptions are inconsistent with his exclusion of all relations of thought, and his ostensible reduction of existence to a series of feelings. He is only entitled to affirm that at a certain moment there is one feeling, and at the next moment another feeling. Upon with-

drawal of the notion of a permanent object, there is nothing left but a sequence of feelings, and hence the permanent identity presupposed in the conception of causality disappears. Time, however, the other element implied, seems still to survive. But it is easy to see that, if there is nothing but a series of feelings, there cannot even be a consciousness of these feelings as a series. A self that is only present in each feeling as it arises could not be conscious of feelings as successive, and therefore could never even come to suppose that there are permanent objects, or a series of changes in permanent objects. Such a self, as Kant says, would be as "many-colored" as the feelings; in other words, it would be no self at all, and could have no conscious experience. We are thus brought back to the demonstration of the possibility of experience, as based upon the "synthetical unity of self-consciousness," a demonstration which need not be repeated. Kant's reply to Hume on the question of causality, therefore, amounts briefly to this: causal sequence presupposes the permanent identity of objects; permanent identity implies a sequence in time; temporal succession is possible only if there is a self-identical intelligence, present to all feelings in turn, but identifiable with none of them. Hume cannot deny one of these elements without virtually denying all the rest, and he can give plausibility to his denial of any one of them only by assuming the others; hence, the belief in a real sequence of events cannot be shown to be delusive.¹

KANT'S RELATION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHIC PROGRESS.

READ AT THE KANT CENTENNIAL, AT SARATOGA, JULY 6, 1881, BY JOSIAH ROYCE.

The general law of the progress of human thought is the Law of Parsimony—*i. e.*, of the greatest adaptation of old methods, principles, theories, dogmas, formulæ, terminology, to new needs and to new facts, with the least possible change in the form of these traditional possessions themselves. Even revolutions in

¹ On Hume's doctrine of causality, see Green's *Hume*, pp. 244 ff.

thought often turn out to be reactions in disguise, conservative efforts to substitute for the traditions of the elders some more ancient and authoritative law, not to destroy old truth, but to fulfil it.

This general tendency leads us at present to the study of Kant, with what justice or usefulness only the result can show. And the study of Kant must imply some notion on our part of the relation that his thought bears to our present progress in philosophic investigation. The following paper undertakes to establish certain theses concerning this matter. The method will consist in the application to certain modern doctrines of tests suggested by Kant's *Kritik*, and in the effort to find by what modification, both of the doctrines now in favor, and of Kant's position itself, we can hope to make the next step in advance in philosophy. The occasion and our limits will confine our hasty sketch to a study of a few purely theoretical questions, and will exclude all direct consideration of the ethical aspect of modern philosophy.

I.—*Kant's Relation to Modern Attempts in Ontology.*

The whole question of the significance of the *Kritik* for modern progress turns on the relation in which the critical philosophy stands to the numerous modern efforts to formulate an Ontology. If any one of these is a success, then the critical philosophy joins the well-filled ranks of the *überwundene Standpunkte*. If none of the efforts can be accepted as good, then progress must consist in a direct development of the Kantian thought. For the rest, in beginning our discussion with the relation of the critical philosophy to ontology, we are but following the bent of most philosophers as well as of the intelligent public. To all such, ontology is the chief philosophic concern. Of the theory of knowledge the general public will barely endure to hear so much as is darkly outlined in an average text-book of logic; but men listen to an ontological speculation, when once they catch the drift of it, with eager interest. There is something dramatic, or often perhaps rather to be called romantic, in an ontology. A vast universe of beings of various perfection, all striving after the highest development, all mimicking more or less divinely the self-contained majesty of the First Mover; or a world of wondrous, fairy Monads, living in a miraculous pre-established harmony; or a tremendous all-

embracing World-Spirit, growing from less to more, unfolding his infinite possibilities, casting down in god-like and terrible irony all he has once builded to build anew grander temples; or even a weary universal Will, dreaming amid the blind warfare of its own existence about Nirvâna and peace; such a doctrine appeals to the fine myth-making spirit that never deserts us. If philosophy has such things to offer us, then philosophy is a game worth playing. But it has always stood in the way of the critical philosophy that the little fragment of an ontology that was retained in it could satisfy nobody's poetical instincts, and could furnish only a cause for complaint to those who regarded it as inconsistent. To quench some craving, Kant kept the Things-in-themselves. But these things-in-themselves pleased no one, appeared very soon to be, as the old Xenie¹ very broadly hinted, useless lumber, fit to be sold at auction, and at their best were not shapely enough to be ornamental. If, then, we look at modern post-critical thought in relation to this part of Kant's *Kritik*, we shall see in it a constant effort to correct in Kant's shadowy ontology either the shadowiness of the shades (viz., of the *Dinge an sich*), or else the mistake of assuming them at all. Where are we to-day in this controversy?

Leaving aside for the time the momentous question as to Kant's own theory of the things in themselves, let us first ask ourselves what we to-day have in the way of a philosophical ontology. If our progress seems unsatisfactory, then, possibly, even the vague struggles of Kant in the transcendental darkness with those terrible Noumena may not be un instructive.

Among us, as among the thinkers of all ages, opposing ontological hypotheses are warring together. But it is a characteristic of our own time that the most important ontological hypotheses now in favor agree in being monistic in tendency. Monism is, in fact, often mentioned as if it were an invention of the nineteenth century. Such is far from being the case, but there never were so many intelligent and thoroughgoing Monists in the world as there now are. Representative thinkers differ about what may be known or knowable of the nature of this One; but we hear, in

¹ "Da die Metaphysik vor Kurzem unbeerbt abging Werden die Dinge an sich Morgen *sub hasta* verkauft."

almost wearisome repetition, of Matter and Spirit, of Force and Intelligence, of Motion and Sensation, as being opposite aspects, or faces, or manifestations of one ultimate Reality, until we wonder whether clear thinking is not in danger of losing itself altogether in the contemplation of a mere empty form of words. From whispers and low mutterings with bated breath about the inscrutable mystery of the ultimate unity of Being, one turns with satisfaction to efforts towards some intelligible account of the sense in which all things can be regarded as manifestations of one power or actual Existent. Yet even these efforts have thus far failed to satisfy the demands of criticism. Where they are clearly stated they are inadequate. Where they resort to figures of speech and tell us about the two sides of the shield, or the convexity and concavity of the same curve, as illustrations of the ultimate oneness of nature amid the various manifestations of experience, there these efforts merely sink back into the primitive incoherency so dear to all dogmatic metaphysics. The same curve is, indeed, convex and concave; but matter and spirit are simply not the two faces of a curve, and the relevant circumstance on which this metaphor turns will never be clear to us until we learn, quite literally, wholly apart from fables about shields, just how, in what sense, and by what evidence, matter and mind are known to be of like substance. The failure of dogmatic Monism, if it should take place, ought, indeed, not to throw us over into the arms of an equally dogmatic Dualism; but we must refuse to accept the monistic hypothesis until it has been freed from all trace of mysticism.

How shall this be done? Let us begin with the attempts that have been made to interpret the results of modern physical science in a monistic sense, by regarding the ultimate physical or chemical units as endowed with some form of actual or potential consciousness. Organisms of the highest sort are combinations of atoms. The whole is the sum of its parts. Why may not the mental possessions of these highest organisms be the sum of the indefinitely small mental powers of the atoms? An atom in motion may be a thought, or, if that be saying far too much of so simple a thing, an atom in motion may be, or may be endowed with, an infinitesimal consciousness. Billions of atoms in interaction may have as their resultant quite a respectable little consciousness?

Sufficiently complex groups of these atoms of Mind-Stuff (to use Professor Clifford's ingenious terminology) might produce a great man. One shudders to think of the base uses to which the noble mind-stuff of Shakespeare might return; but the theory tries to be an expression of natural phenomena, not merely an æsthetic creation, and must not pause before such consequences.

Such is an outline that will suggest to the initiated thoughts common to several modern theories of being. Are these theories in a fair way to satisfy critical needs? The writer is not satisfied that they are. Time does not permit any lengthy discussion of the matter here, but let us remind ourselves of the considerations that a study of Kant will most readily suggest to any one that is disposed for a moment to accept one of these modern forms of monism.

Can consciousness be regarded as an aggregate of elementary facts, such as sensations or as atoms of pleasure and pain? If so, what aggregate of sensations forms a judgment, such as, "This man is my father?" Evidently here is indeed an aggregate of sensations represented, but also something more. What is this more? A product, it may be said, formed through association from innumerable past experiences. Granted for the moment; but the question is not as to the origin of this consciousness, but as to its analysis. This act of consciousness, whereby a present sensation is regarded as in definite relation to real past experiences, as a symbol, not merely of actual sensations now remembered, not merely of future sensations not yet experienced, but of a reality wholly outside of the individual consciousness, this act of acknowledging something not directly presented as nevertheless real—is this act of judgment possibly to be regarded as a mere aggregate of elementary mental states? Surely, at best, the act can be so regarded only in the sense in which a word is an aggregate of letters. For and in the one simple momentary consciousness, all these elements exist as an aggregate, but as an aggregate formed into one whole, as the matter of a single act. But in themselves, without the very act of unity in which they are one, these elements would be merely an aggregate, or, in Mr. Gurney's apt words,¹ "a rope of sand." Consciousness, then, as a continual

¹ *Mind* for April, 1881, article, "Monism."

synthesis of innumerable elements into the unity of active judgment, is more than an aggregate, and can never be explained as an aggregate of elementary atoms of sensation.

Nor may we say that the ultimate atomic states of consciousness may be, as it were, chemically united into a whole that is more than an aggregate. Physical atoms in space, if endowed with sufficiently numerous affinities, may unite into what wholes you will; but a mental fact is a mental fact, and no more. An ultimate independent unit of consciousness, conceived after the analogy of a sensation, can have to another like unit only one of three relations. It may coexist with this other unit, or it may precede or follow it in time. There is no other relation possible. Affinity, or attraction, or approach of one pain or pleasure, of one sensation of pressure or of motion to another, is a meaningless jingle of words, unless, indeed, such an expression is used to name figuratively the relations that in and for a comparing, contrasting, uniting and separating, active consciousness two sensation-units are made to bear. Thus, then, this atomic monism brings us no nearer than before to the relation between the data of consciousness and the facts of physical nature. For the rest, how mechanical science can be satisfied to regard its material points as nothing but independently existing fragments of mind, whose whole being is intensive; how, out of these intensive units, space-relations are to be constructed at all—these questions we may for the present neglect. Atomic monism, a synthesis, or, rather, a jumble of physiological psychology with doctrines that are incompatible with any science whatever, has never answered these questions, and doubtless never will. The memory of the *Kritik* is still present to control modern progress, and to recall it, as we may hope, from these most ingenious but most dangerous ventures into dogmatism.

But let us not be over-hasty. There are other forms of monism now extant. The purely materialistic monism, for which the hard and extended atoms of naive realism are already and in themselves potentially mind, the old-fashioned materialism of days when Mind-Stuff and physiological psychology were alike undreamed of, may indeed be neglected. That doctrine needed not critical philosophy, of more than a very undeveloped sort, to do away with it once for all. Modern monism knows of supposed atoms

that are in their ultimate nature psychical, and of supposed psychical forces or agents that, when seen from without, behave much like extended atoms. But the old fragment of matter that, being no more than what every blacksmith knows as matter, was yet to be with all its impenetrability and its inertia a piece of the soul, has been banished from the talk of serious philosophers. There remain, then, the numerous efforts that see in the world the expression of psychical powers as such, not mere mind-stuff atoms, but organized wholes, related in nature to what we know by internal experience as mind, yet higher or lower, subtler or mightier, wiser or more foolish, than the human intelligence. These views may be divided into two classes—those that see in nature the manifestations of a logical or intelligent power, and those that see in it the manifestations of an alogical or blind though still psychical power. Each of these classes again may be subdivided according as the power is conceived as conscious or as unconscious in its working. How do these ontological efforts stand related to the critical thought? Has any one of them escaped from the boundary that Kant set for future thought?

The logical Monism necessarily tends towards the historical method of explaining the world. I say *tends*, because logical Monism, following Kant afar off, may look upon time as what Dr. Stirling calls, in his criticism of Kant, a *mirage*, not belonging to the truth of things. But, in fact, since human intelligence is itself an activity, a working towards an end, and since the logical Monist thinks the universe after the analogy of the human reason, the constant tendency is for him to conceive the world as a process whereby the world-spirit makes actual what was potential, and the world-history therefore as an Evolution. Modern science, in fact, when viewed speculatively, though it does not confirm, yet lends itself easily to such efforts, and we can always, if we choose, imagine the evolution of the organic kingdom as possibly the process of self-manifestation of one eternal reason. Only in this way we are very far from a satisfactory ontology. A world, the manifestation of the universal reason, developing in time, how can any reflective mind be content with this account of things? The universal reason surely means something by its process, surely lacks something when it seeks for higher forms. Now, on a lower stage the universal reason has not

yet what it seeks, on the higher stage it attains what it had not. Whence or how does it obtain this something? What hindered the possible from being forthwith actual at the outset? If there was any hindrance, was this of the same nature with the universal reason, or was it other? If other, then we are plunged into a Dualism, and the good and evil principles appear once more. But if there was no external hindrance, no illogical evil principle in existence, then the universal reason has irrationally gone without the possible perfection that it might possess, until, after great labor, it has made actual what it never ought to have lacked. The infinite Logos thus becomes no more than the "child playing with bubbles" of the old philosopher. Everything about the process of evolution becomes intelligible and full of purpose—except the fact that there should be any process at all where all was in, and of, and for the universal reason at the outset. The infinite power has been playing with perfection as a cat with a mouse, letting it run away a few æons in time, that it might be caught once more in a little chase, involving the history of some millions of worlds of life. Is this a worthy conception? Nay, is it not a self-contradictory one? Evolution and Reason—are they compatible? Yes, indeed, when the evolution is ended, the hurly-burly done, the battle lost and won; but meanwhile—? In short, either evolution is a necessity, one of the twelve-labors of this Hercules-Absolute, or else it is irrational. In the one case the Absolute must be conceived as in bonds, in the other case the Logos must be conceived as blundering. Both conceptions are rank nonsense. This kind of Monism will not satisfy critical demands.

And then there is the other objection, stated by Schopenhauer, and by I know not how many before him, that every historical conception of the world as a whole, every attempt to look upon Being as a process in time, as a perpetual evolution from a lower to a higher, is shattered upon this rock: that after an infinite time the infinite process is still in a very early stage. Infinitely progressing, always growing better, and yet reaching after all this eternity of work, only the incoherent, troublous, blind imperfection that we feel in ourselves, and that we see in every dung-heap and sick-room and government on the earth, in every scattered mass of nebulous matter, in every train of meteor-fragments

in the heavens—what is this but progress without a goal, blind toil? The world would be, one might think, after an infinity of growth, intensively infinite at every point of its extent. We mortals know of no one point in the universe where one might lay his hand and say: *Here the ideal is attained.*

Yet I should be very far from dreaming of accepting the opposing dogmatic theorem, the antithesis of this sublime Antinomy, viz.: "The world is the product of an irrational force. The One is blind." Schopenhauer undertook the defence of this antithesis, and, in bad logic, as we all know, he somewhat surpassed even that arch blunderer, the universal Will of his own system. This Will, after all, desired a good deal of trouble, and got his wish. But Schopenhauer desired a consistent statement, and, with all his admirable ingenuity and learning, he produced a statement whose inconsistencies have been exposed too often to need much more discussion. Schopenhauer is a sort of dealer in deadly weapons. We go to him for a pistol or a knife when our intents are murderous, for he often supplies the most effective means for argumentative success when we want a dialectic victory. He is a literary gardener, too, and sells many very pretty thought-flowers. But an ontology—no, to the defenders of the alogical hypothesis, as a dogmatic doctrine, it has not yet been given to make out more than the purely negative case that we have stated above. Dogmatic panlogism can be assaulted, as I hold, with much show of success. The opposite doctrine has not yet been dogmatically maintained without even worse confusion.

Panlogism and Alogism are difficult enough in themselves, but how much worse becomes their condition when, as in the *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, of Von Hartmann, either one of them, or a hybrid of the two, is burdened with yet another hypothesis, viz.: that the One Being is unconscious, and yet in nature psychical. Founding himself on certain physiological facts, very doubtfully interpreted, on a monstrous perversion of the mathematical theory of probabilities, on an ingenious view of the history of philosophy, on a like ingenious criticism of Kant, Von Hartmann has expounded an ontological doctrine of which, as I cannot but hold, serious thought can make nothing. This unconscious being, existent not for itself, for it knows nothing, nor for others, because all else is a part of it (and, for the rest, nobody ever thought of it before

Von Hartmann), shall be the maker and upholder of the universe. When we regard this product of a fertile brain, we can, I think, only say of it that a philosophy of round squares may be an entertaining problem for a winter's evening, but cannot be taken very seriously. This discussion of the Unconscious is no genuine philosophical cookery; only a kind of making of mud pies, useful, no doubt, as a cultivation of industry.

Of course the previous criticism is absurdly inadequate to the magnitude of the problems involved, and is intended only as the merest sketch, dogmatically stated, of critical objections to ontology. Seeming irreverence, in this hasty style of doing battle, must be pardoned. Only against dogmatic metaphysic as such do I war. The critical philosophy holds no theoretical opinion sacred, just as it regards no earnest, practical faith as other than sacred. The question is here not what we are to believe, but what we can in argument maintain, and what our method of search ought to be. Absolute and Infinite, Logos and not Logos, Mind-Stuff and Spirit—what are they all for critical philosophy but, in the first place, mere ideas, conceptions of reason, to be mercilessly analyzed without regard for consequences?

One way remains whereby the paullogical monism can still hope to reach a satisfactory statement of the world-problem. Suppose that, once for all, the historical form of statement is abandoned. This may be done in either of two ways. The universal reason may be conceived as manifesting itself in time, but not in a series of events that are united as the parts of a single process. The world-life may be conceived not as a single history, but as an eternally repeated expression of the One reason, a process ever renewed as soon as finished, an infinite series of growing and decaying worlds—worlds that are like the leaves of the forest, that spring and wither through an eternity of changing seasons. The rationality of the world-process is thus saved for our thought by the hypothesis that reason is not like a belated traveller, wandering through the night of time, seeking for a self-realization that is never reached, but, rather, like the sun that each day begins afresh his old task, rejoicing as a giant in the fulness of his attained power. Whoever regards the world as it now is as a sufficient expression of infinite reason, is at liberty to accept this hypothesis; but he must not expect to convince those of his doctrine to

whom reason means perfection, and to whom the world will not appear as just at present more perfect than the world of *Candide's* experiences. For every one but the blind optimist there is difficulty in regarding this wind-swept battle-field of human action as the fitting theatre for a drama of unhindered infinite reason, to be repeated with unwearying tautology through an unending future. Thus, then, we are tossed back and forth between the possibilities suggested by our hypothesis. "*The world is the manifestation of infinite reason;*" good, then, but how? "*The world is a rational growth from lower to higher.*" How, then, is this possible if the infinite reason rules all and desires the higher? Was it not always at the goal? So, then: "*The world is not one process merely, but an eternal repetition of the drama of infinite reason, which, as infinite, is thus always active and always at the goal.*" But this hypothesis is utterly overthrown by the appearance of the least imperfection or irrationality in nature. The first starving family, or singed moth, or broken troth, or wasted effort, or wounded bird, is an indictment of the universal reason that, always at the goal, has as goal this irrational wrong. The other possible hypothesis leaves us, after all, in the same quandary. Time may be a mere "mirage." For the eternal One there is, then, no process; only fact. This notion of a timeless Being is, no doubt, very well worth study. It is the Prometheus that steals fire from the critical philosophy itself. But, then, the eternal One is thus always at the goal, just as in the other case. The One cannot be infinite and rational and yet coexistent with the least trace of wrong, absurdity, error, falsehood. Again our Monism fails.

The one objection thus far urged against all these doctrines is, not that they are pleasing or displeasing, but that they involve contradiction. But if they did not involve inner contradiction, what then? Would any one of them be established? No, the terrible passage through the gates of the Kantian Dialektik would remain for each, and over the door of the critical philosophy is written: "Abandon all hope, ye dogmatic theories of Being that enter here." The great problems of the theory of knowledge would demand solution. How the individual mind, shut up in a world of sense, of momentary judgments, of dim memories and expectations, of slowly-moving, discursive reasonings, can possibly

know and grasp this all-enfolding Unity of Being, can distinguish the conception of it from any chance product of imagination, can reach the heart of things, although by nature living, as Lotze has remarked, in the uttermost branchings of reality—this is the great mystery that critical philosophy seeks to remove by denying the premises upon which the belief in this mystery rests, viz.: the possibility of an Ontology, and the supposed nature of the ideal absolute knowledge. Critical philosophy knows, as Mr. Shadworth Hodgson says, nothing of an Ontology, but much of a Metaphysic.

Thus, then, modern thought, with all its labor, remains as far from an Ontology as ever. We need, in fact, only glance at the efforts made in our own time to prove the existence of independent things in themselves of any sort, in order to see how ill ontological speculation fares. To assure us not what these things are, but that they are, modern thought toils in vain. One admits that uncritical consciousness accepts things in themselves; but one fails to learn how this uncritical consciousness is justified. Who can be content with Mr. Spencer's transfigured Realism? A more critical writer, Professor Baumann, of Göttingen, in his *Philosophie als Orientirung über die Welt*, elaborately shows the impossibility of establishing the existence of an external reality, and then assumes things after the fashion of the most downright and simple every-day realism, simply because of the "unavoidable desire for explanation" that dwells in us. Idealism cannot, as he thinks, explain, but only describe, our inner experiences. Realism can do something in the way of explanation. Explanation by means of a myth is an old device of mankind; but how about explanation by means of a conscious myth? Professor Riehl, in his book, *Der Philosophische Kriticismus*, defends the realistic element in Kant from all assaults, and seems to regard as a sufficient proof of an independent reality the fact that we cannot trace the whole of consciousness to the action of the subjective forms of sense and understanding. And there be numerous thinkers whose realism is founded on a verbal quibble about appearance implying something that appears (a quibble, by the way, to which Kant's own words, in a few passages, have given countenance). But in all this there is no argument for the existence of things in themselves so strong as the loneliness that enters the minds of many people when you take the things in themselves away.

Thus, then, without an ontology, without proofs founded upon solid ground for even the first elements of an ontology, modern speculation turns back to Kant to see what hope there is that a new edifice is possible on a Kantian basis. To be sure, in Kant himself there was the old obscurity about the things in themselves not yet removed, but mayhap in the *Kritik* the way has been shown whereby this, its own disease, can be remedied.

II.—*The Needed Reform of the Critical Philosophy.*

What modification of the elaborate system of the *Kritik* is needed in order that we may substitute for these tumultuous assemblies of quarrelling ontologies, these famine-riots of hungry Being-hunters, an orderly organization of critical doctrines, related to one principle, and conscious both of their limits and of their attainments? To this question we must devote the brief remainder of our sketch.

The fundamental thought of the *Kritik*, the one that we all take away from its study, however vague our notion of the details of the system, is the thought that the forms and laws of the universe as known to us are conditioned by the nature of our own knowing activity. But how conditioned? Here begins the difficulty. Two main problems are thus suggested: First, if we accept the fundamental critical thought, what can we say of the relation of this knowing activity to its matter? How can and does the knowing activity form or affect its matter? Second, what can be said of the matter upon which the knowing activity operates, when we view this matter apart from the activity that affects it? Is the matter anything apart from the forming activity? If so, what is it? These two problems, themselves but opposite faces of one problem, cannot be treated wholly apart, and yet fall asunder when you try to combine them into one. Let us begin with the first.

Given a crude conscious experience of sense, and given also, as we may for mere argument's sake suppose, this experience as already in the subjective forms of space and time, by what action can this experience be transformed into a knowledge of a real universe? Or, in other words, what active element, added to sense, makes of it knowledge? Modern science, following Locke, says reflection, the noting and comparing of the data of this sense-

experience. This reflection is something foreign to the direct experience, but follows after experience, noting with the devotion of a Boswell the words that sense may utter. No, says Kant, this cannot be; a mere Boswell cannot introduce into sense more necessity than its data already possess, and they possess none. An active power, applying categories by means of the transcendental Schema, making of sense for the first time true experience, not merely sucking in like a sponge the pre-existent waters of experience, introduces necessity into this confused manifold of sense. But still we ask, How? The transcendental deduction and the system of principles are to furnish the answer. And this answer of Kant's *Kritik* seems to have satisfied comparatively few thinkers, even among those that accept the critical thought, in its general statement, with readiness. One great class of objections we may find summed up in Dr. Stirling's late Kant articles in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. Take these objections in concrete form as applied to one problem, that of causal necessity.

The assertion of causal necessity is the assertion that there are throughout experience cases of existences upon which certain other existences must always follow whenever the first occur. Now what is this conception of causal necessity if not applied to experience? By Kant's own confession it is nothing. But how can it be applicable to experience? Only in case sense-experience itself furnishes instances of uniform succession. But if sense-experience furnishes these instances, what does the category of causality, applied through its schema, add to them? The idea of necessity? But this idea is empty if sense does not justify it, superfluous if sense does justify it by containing the desired uniformities. Experience either has regular sequence—and then why the category?—or has not regular sequence, and then the category is as helpless as a hen with her brood of ducklings. The hen's transcendental schema contains the idea of water as fatal to her brood, and her sense-experience contains the perception of her brood as thriving in water. Alas, poor category! Sense and understanding, thus regarded, are like fragments of rare but broken china, which we in vain try to piece together.

A more or less clear notion of this objection has driven certain eminent scientific men, who (as E. Dühring maliciously said) *ein*

wenig philosopheln, to a kind of modification of the Kantian view, so plausible that to me, I confess, it once for a time seemed the true Kant, and to others less ignorant it doubtless still seems the last word of philosophy on the subject. According to this view, the category of causality is applied to sense-data by active intelligence merely as a "Postulate of Comprehensibility," a sort of demand, or an humble petition, as it were, to his majesty experience, that he will be pleased to be uniform, since otherwise we shall be unable to do anything with him or his data. An humble petition of the before-mentioned hen, that the water will be graciously pleased to drown her ducklings, would be a fair instance of the "Postulate of the Comprehensibility of the World" as thus stated. If this postulate means that we shall be delighted to find in the world what uniformity we can find, it is an innocent wish. If it means that without uniformities experience can furnish no laws, it is a tautology. If it means that by this postulate we render one whit more probable (not to say necessary) the actual existence of uniformities in future experience, then it is a manifest error. There are the sense-data, here is the intelligence "postulating" about them. Postulate me no postulates, says sense. I go my own way unharmed by you. And sense does so. Nothing can be clearer than that in this way the active intelligence does not affect the sense-data at all, nor create the least show of a law of nature. Yet, Kant said, the understanding is to give laws to nature. How?

Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, attacking this great problem, assumes not an understanding affecting a sense-experience, but a primary consciousness in time and space forms, subjected to a sort of retroversion called reflection, and to a sort of dissection called the conceptual process, whereby the data of continuous direct consciousness are distinguished, represented, separated, classified, named, and so made into a complex thought-structure. This theory regards necessity as having, after all, its foundation in the simple data of primary consciousness, in which, if there were no uniformity, active reflection could introduce none. An effort is, however, made to regard the stream of consciousness as nevertheless certainly subject to the law of uniformity of sequence; but readers of the *Philosophy of Reflection* may judge whether this effort is successful. For my part, no account of the principle of

causality which sees in it only a particular instance of the principle of identity can satisfy my needs. The assertion, *events of the class A are followed by events of the class B*, cannot possibly be reduced to an identical assertion unless it is such at the outset. Nor can any reflective collection of data from a series of passively given conscious states be warrant for this assertion if it is to apply universally to all possible series of conscious states. Mr. Hodgson is doubtless one of the greatest living masters of metaphysic, but we must suspect anything that looks like giving up the very central citadel of the critical philosophy, the doctrine of the spontaneity of intelligence. "We can think nothing as united in the object that we have not ourselves united." Those are Kant's golden words. By them we yet hold, though the mechanism of this *uniting* still seems questionable.

Mr. Caird and Professor Watson (whose new book, *Kant and his English Critics*, has come into my hands since I began to write the present paper) have attempted to overcome this difficulty by building beyond Kant's separation of sense and understanding up to the point where sense and understanding are seen to unite into one fact with two aspects. Sense, they say, is not given apart from thought, to be conquered by thought from without. The categories do not come to the sense-data as the water to the woman. The fact given is a manifold of sense and category indissolubly joined. Kant's discovery really is that sense apart from thought-forms is impossible. Kant's mistake it is that he speaks of sense and thought as if they were two separate streams. We must reform him by making of the two one flesh, not through the act of knowledge put already in it.

I have no doubt that these thinkers have properly suggested the direction in which we must look for the solution of the problem, but I am not convinced that thought can so readily swallow sense in the way that Professor Caird seems to suggest. Kant's error lay, no doubt, in supposing sense to be a datum wholly apart from the active setting of the house in order through the category. Sense once thus given, how could the category rearrange its facts? Sense either would be in itself conformable to the category, and would so need no rearrangement, or would be at variance with the category, and then inexorable. But still the fact remains that we are constantly bound to sense-facts, and that there is in

consciousness a contrast between the passive reception of sense-data (*e. g.*, of locomotive-whistles, of toothaches, or of the sounds of hand-organs) and the spontaneity of thought. How explain this contrast and yet give the spontaneity its rights? Let us make one more attempt.

What is the ultimate fact of intelligent or knowing consciousness? Is this consciousness wholly a receiving, or wholly a making, of its own content? If wholly, neither is it yet in part each, and so both at once? Both at once, answer many Kantian thinkers. But how both, and in what sense each? First, then, something is received, and by the word *received* I mean no implication about a cause or source from which received; I mean only to point out the fact that in every moment of knowing there is a sense of the positive irresistible presence of some sense-content, a presence wholly unquestionable, absolutely certain. A toothache, a blue color, a loud sound, a vague feeling of weariness, explain them as you will, in consciousness the data signified by these words are, when present at all, in and for any instant of their actual presence simply irresistible facts. There is in these facts, as facts, no conscious spontaneity of thought. The unconscious *non fingo*. In the second place, if the sense-data of any moment have the form of space, they have this form also as a simple irresistible fact, such as Dr. William James has aptly called a spatial *Quale*. Geometrical theorems, even geometrical axioms, in general the relations of what Mr. Hodgson names Figured Space, are never such ultimate data, but the mere fact of spatial *bigness* (to follow Dr. James once more) is a possible ultimate datum. Again, besides these data of space-form, succession in its simplest form, not the relation of past, present, and future, but the relation of instantaneous sequence, such as you may observe in the ticks of a watch or the beats of your pulse when you pay direct attention to them, and perceive immediately, without the conscious use of memory, the present fact of a succession of three or four distinct beats, this is also an ultimate datum. But now, in the third place, besides the sense-data and their ultimate forms of extensive and successive magnitude, there is present in the moment of knowing an active judgment. What does this do to the sense-data more than to be conscious of them? The following thing I answer: the intelligent act does, if no more. Take up the thread of knowing conscious-

ness where you will, and you find in every moment when there is knowledge a reference, more or less definite and significant, of the content here given to something beyond this present moment. But this something beyond need by no means be an external cause of the present sense-datum. On the contrary, the notion of an external cause seems to me a very complex product of thought, impossible without an earlier, simpler, ultimate tendency to refer the present datum to something beyond the present. What is this something? First, and simplest of all of the forms that are taken by the active judgment upon a present datum, is the form of referring this present to a past datum. In every act of reflection, in all definite memory, in clearly conscious recognition, in every assertion of a uniformity in experience, there is present in consciousness, first, the sum of immediate data; second, the form of extensive or successive magnitude taken by these present data; third, the assertion that these data, or a part of them, stand for, symbolize, recall, resemble, or otherwise relate to data that were real in a past experience now no longer existent. Plainly these present data are no proof of the existence of a past. Plainly, as present, they are not the past that they symbolize. Plainly, then, the past is no sense-datum. But notice, the whole of experience, except the meagre little sense-datum of this moment, is past. Hence, experience is possible as an object of knowledge only in and for the act by which the past is created, as it were, out of the material of present data. This act of asserting more than our data can possibly contain, by projecting from the present moment the scheme of a well-filled actual past, no longer existent or directly knowable, but simply made by the judgment—this act I call the act of *Acknowledgment of the Past*.

But acknowledgment of a reality beyond present data is not confined to the assertion of a past. Reference of present data to a future forms a second class of acts which may be called *Anticipations*. Reference of present data to external reality, in the acknowledgment of other conscious beings besides ourselves as real, and of other experience besides our own as possible, in brief, *Acknowledgment of a Universe of Truth*, forms the third class of conscious acts by which present sense-data are transcended through a reference of them to a reality of which in themselves

they give, and can give, not the faintest evidence. And through these three classes or forms of activity, experience as a whole is created. Experience beyond this instant is for sense nothing, for active thought everything. Thus, then, it is true both that sense is beyond the control of judgment, and that in the activity of judging we build upon the data of sense the whole universe of reality. Thus, then, the objection that the category comes to the sense-experience too late to give it any necessity is evaded altogether by a new conception of experience. Sense-facts do not follow in a given order, in a presented time, to be reflected upon and rearranged later by an officious understanding. The true fact is that sense is momentary, and fills no past at all; so that the whole of time is made and filled up by an understanding that gets its cue from present sense, but that acts in its own way, actually constructing, body, bones, and soul, out of the little dry dust of the puny present moment, that whole vast world of experience to which Kant had supposed that it was merely to give form.

This account differs from Kant's in some important respects, although it is an effort merely to recast the Kantian doctrine. Kant said that, in order for the succession of sense-impressions to become an object of thought, the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of recognition must take up the sense-data, and, while uniting them, must make them appear in consciousness as real, and as members of the united experience. The view here maintained is that the past data, instead of being picked up, as it were, by the synthesis of apprehension and of recognition, and carried bodily into present consciousness, are really projected out of the present data, into a conceived past, by the momentary activity of judgment. Kant made the unity of apperception, like a sea-fog, enter, pervade, float through, and fill experience, so that the categories could work, and so that a disunited experience could become one. Our view would make all the world of reality immediately subject to a unity implied in that present act by which this world is projected from the present into a conceived but not given infinite space and time. Like Kant, we should regard activity that is not concerned with sense-data as empty, and the sense-data themselves as blind; but we should maintain that an utter divorce of sense and intelligence is not only meaningless, but impossible.

If this is the solution suggested for the problem of the relation of form and matter in consciousness, the other question—that about the nature of the matter when viewed apart from the form—will detain us little. The three impostors of the Kantian *Kritik* (impostors because they so well deceived Kant himself), whose names are *Ding an sich*, *transcendentaler Gegenstand*, and *Noumenon*, vanish into thin air. The *Ding an sich* was what sense became when you left out the form first, and then the matter, and then put a "*selbstverständliche Voraussetzung*"¹ in the place to fill up the empty space. The *transcendentaler Gegenstand*, or *Ding überhaupt*, was precisely what one thinks of when one thinks of nothing. The *Noumenon* was what a being with a totally different form of sense from our own would perceive if he turned his attention to the *transcendentaler Gegenstand*. Peace to the ashes of these noble objects of critical reverence. I hold the true critical theory of Reality to be thus briefly summed up :

1. Real is the sense-content of the present moment.
2. Real is the form of this content in the extensive or in the successive order.
3. Real is the act by which we acknowledge a past that is not given, nor now existent as having been ; real is the act by which we acknowledge the existence of other consciousness than the individual consciousness, other possible experience in space and time than the given experience ; real is the act by which we anticipate a future not yet given.
4. For the objects of these acts no possible theoretical evidence can be given more nearly ultimate than the one great fact that through acknowledgment and anticipation they are projected from the present moment into the past, future, and possible world of truth, conceived as in space and time, and as the object of actual or possible consciousness.
5. No other reality is conceivable than that contained in these data and in these acts of projection. For to conceive of a reality is to perform an act of projection.
6. Apart from the act of projection, no reality is attributable to the objects that are not data. For to attribute reality to them is

¹ V. Benno Erdmann, "*Kant's Kriticismus in der ersten u. in der zweiten Auflage der Kritik*," *passim*.

to acknowledge or to anticipate them—*i. e.*, to perform an act of what I have called projection from the present moment.

7. At the same time no doubt can be entertained of the existence of the objects in question; for doubt is inability to acknowledge or to anticipate. But as a fact we do acknowledge and anticipate just these objects.

8. Real are, therefore, the objects of the intelligent activity just in so far as they are products of this activity of projection. For that is real for us whose existence is for us indubitable.

9. The great object of critical philosophy is, therefore, not to toil in the vain hope of constructing an ontology, but to devote itself to the study of the forms of intellectual activity, with a view to separating in these the insignificant from the significant. The concrete content of space and time is the subject of special science.

10. The goal of philosophy can be reached only in an Ethical Doctrine. For since the ultimate fact of the knowing consciousness is the active construction of a world of truth from the data of sense, the ultimate justification of this activity must be found in the significance—*i. e.*, in the moral worth—of this activity itself, a matter only to be discussed in the light of Ethics.

Such is the modification that the writer would suggest as bringing the Kantian thought more into harmony with the present needs of philosophic progress. Only a very few problems have been considered, but these are fundamental. I had wished in this paper to discuss the relation of the Kantian thought to that other problem of modern discussion; whose roots are in the transcendental æsthetic and its branches everywhere (even in spiritualistic newspapers); I mean the great problem of the nature of space-knowledge. Here one of our greatest steps forward is plainly soon to be taken; and Kant is the author of the whole controversy, although, indeed, not responsible for the spiritualistic phase, of which Slade and Professor Zöllner are the sole beggetters. I had wished also to trace the Kantian influence in some of the discussions of modern psychology, and even to point out how, as in the physiological doctrine of "specific energies," Kant, half-understood and quite misused, has often acted as an awakening force, a source of suggestion, in sciences that lie far beyond the boundary of his own chosen work. But all this wish was plainly foolish

for I have far exceeded proper limits already, without half treating the few fragments of doctrine that I have attempted to discuss. The one conclusion that this paper has in a very hasty way tried to maintain, is that the critical philosophy, as a negative assault upon all ontological dogmatism of the theoretical reason, still stands fast, and that progress therefore lies in a reform of the Kantian *Kritik* by means of a new and yet more critical definition of experience and of the work of thought.

KANT'S ANTINOMIES IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN SCIENCE.

READ AT SARATOGA, JULY 6, 1881, BY LESTER F. WARD.

It has become fashionable to regard all controversy as mere logomachy, in which some mere word is the true "bone of contention."

"And for the word itself we fight
In bitterness of soul."

This view finds strong support in the undeniable fact that the intensity of sectarian antagonism increases in proportion as the essential doctrines of sects approach each other, until, as well stated by an able writer in "Macmillan's Magazine," "if you want to see men fling away the very thought of reconciliation, and close in internecine conflict, you should look at controversialists who *do not differ at all*, but who have adopted different words to express the same opinion." Such views are strengthened not only by facts of every-day observation, but by such memorable events of history as the two greatest schisms in Christianity, the first arising from the attempt to add a single letter to the Nicene shibboleth, and the second growing out of the appending of a word to the Latin creed.

But while admitting that a large amount of human controversy is of this more or less verbal character, a deeper study of human nature cannot fail to reveal glimpses of more general causes which may even be found to underlie the apparently most base-

less disputations. Indeed, the existence of antithetical types of mind, to a large extent incapable of interpreting phenomena in the same way, has been vaguely seen in all ages and by many writers. The Platonic and Epicurean schools of Greek philosophy body forth this conception, and, in fact, seem to have exemplified it with almost as great clearness as any subsequent event. Between these schools nearly every philosopher since that day has, in however vague a manner, seemed to take sides, so that the general cast of his mind upon the fundamental problems involved in them may be deduced from his writings. "Melius autem est naturam secare quam abstrahere," said Lord Bacon; and he adds, "Id quod Democriti schola fecit, quæ magis penetravit in naturam quam reliquæ." This passage, besides its value in fixing Lord Bacon's position in this regard, serves well to suggest one of the chief distinctions between the schools. "Secare naturam" might be taken as the first step in the Baconian method, and the one by which science is specially characterized. Ernst Haeckel, speaking from the point of view of the biologists, defines this constitutional antithesis of the human mind as follows: "If you place all the forms of cosmological conception of various peoples and times into comparative juxtaposition, you can finally bring them all into two squarely opposing groups—a *causal* or *mechanical*, and a *teleological* or *vitalistic* group." He further invents the terms "monistic" and "dualistic" to distinguish these two conceptions, the last of which refers to the recognition of a power outside of nature acting upon it and in addition to it, while in the former nature is conceived as acting alone.

This wide-spread intellectual polarity may perhaps be in part explained. All philosophy aims to account for phenomena. The human mind is so constituted that no power can prevent it from perpetually striving towards this end. All systems of thought naturally fall under two general divisions. One of these explains phenomena as the product of will and design. A rock, a tree, or an animal is explained on the same principles as a watch; it exists, therefore it has been made. This is the teleological explanation. The other mode of thought claims to recognize a distinction between these two classes of objects or phenomena, and while admitting design in the latter denies it in the former. The rock, tree, animal, are not made, but *have become* what they are. This

conception let us call the *genetic* mode of explanation. The teleological and the genetic modes of explanation are therefore the respective foundations of the two great schools of human thought which severally embrace all men. The only system which ever claimed to disavow both these bases is that of Auguste Comte, and which, in so far, must be regarded rather as a revolt against philosophy than as a system of philosophy.

Under both these general divisions there have grown up numerous more special doctrines which have, each in its turn, formed nuclei for minor systems, to which, according to the special mental proclivities of each individual, men have given in their adhesion. To the teleological division, for example, properly belong the doctrines of pure theology or divine free-will, of predestination, and of fatalism. To this also should in part be added that modern truly dualistic school, who hold that all phenomena are the result of unvarying laws once arbitrarily impressed upon the universe. This school, on the other hand, however, except in so far as the primal origin of these laws is concerned, may consistently be classed in the genetic division.

This last-named general class, the genetic, does not possess the number or variety of special sects found in the other, and in all their essential tenets its adherents may be regarded as practically at one. Though apparently of modern origin, the genetic school of philosophy is as old as the fully-developed mind of man. As already remarked, there have always existed the two antithetical ways of looking at the world, and no age has been without adherents to both of these systems. But there are reasons in the nature of things why the teleological habit of thought should, down to within a quite recent period, have maintained an overwhelming supremacy over the genetic habit of thought.

The only philosopher who seems to have clearly perceived the true nature of this fundamental antithesis, and to have attempted a systematic analysis of the principles upon which it rests, was Immanuel Kant, whose centennial anniversary we are here to celebrate. In his immortal "Antinomies," and the profound discussion which follows them, he has laid the foundation in psychology where it properly belongs, for a thorough understanding of this most vital and practically important condition of human thought. His Theses and Antitheses differ only in the character of the

examples given from the primary postulates of the modern teleologists and genetists respectively, which latter class are, strictly speaking, the modern evolutionists, and his choice of terms by which to characterize the defenders of these propositions, while they are not those which either party would now select, are perhaps as little objectionable to the one as to the other of these classes of persons.

He calls the one the *dogmatic*, and the other the *empirical*, view of the universe, but in his time and country the former of these terms had not yet acquired that stigma which has since been gradually fastened upon it, and meant a very different thing from that which Douglas Jerrold defined as "puppyism full-grown;" while as to the latter, the practice of opposing empiricism to quantitative scientific determination has also principally grown up since Kant's day. Still, as if somewhat unsatisfied with this word, he sometimes employs a substitute for it, and calls this the *critical* or the *sceptical* method.

In using the term *dogmatic* as applicable to the teleological school, Kant, doubtless, had in view the fact, so apparent to all, that it was this school that assumed to teach philosophy, being greatly in the ascendancy; and in the words *empirical*, *critical*, and *sceptical*, he, no doubt, recognized the tendency of a few minds at all times to revolt against the prevailing conceptions, examine their assumed principles, and subject them to logical, mechanical, and numerical tests, and to rationalistic criticisms. For he declares that in favor of accepting the former or dogmatic view of things there exist three principal arguments: 1. That derived from *practical interest*, since upon it appear to rest the claims of religion and morality; 2, that derived from a *speculative interest*, since by its aid the entire field of speculation can be compassed by the mind and the conditioned directly derived from the unconditioned; and 3, that derived from *popularity*, since he conceived that the great majority would always be found on that side.

It is interesting and remarkable that so great a mind should be able to find no higher motives than these upon which to base the claims of dogmatism, which meant, and still means, the acceptance of the main body of beliefs of the age. The first is of so low an order that it would seem to be beneath the dignity of a philoso-

pher to entertain it. For what has a man's practical interest to do with philosophy, with the attainment of truth in the domain of abstract thought? The argument employed by Bishop Butler, that a particular religion should be embraced on the sole ground, if on no other, that there could be nothing to lose and might be much to gain by so doing, while in the failure to do so there was nothing to gain and might be much to lose, has been generally condemned as of a low order in appealing to practical interest where a question of abstract truth was involved. But Bishop Butler was avowedly a sectarian writer, defending his particular religion, and such low appeals were to be expected. How, then, could Kant justify an analogous argument? As a disinterested philosopher, this would seem impossible. Yet Kant's justification, from his own peculiar point of view, though somewhat amusing, will appear to be quite satisfactory. It is this: Neither the thesis nor the antithesis of any of his antinomies is capable of proof, or rather both are capable of absolute demonstration; and, being contradictories, all argument becomes absurd. With him the universe is a great dilemma, of which any one may take either horn with exactly equal chances of reaching the truth. Of course, therefore, if there is any difference in this respect, he had better choose the one which is most to his interest, and this, Kant thought, was unquestionably the dogmatic.

Fully as much might be said of his third reason for preferring that side, viz.: the advantage to be derived from its greater popularity. If possible, this claim possesses a still lower moral weight than that of practical interest, of which it is, indeed, merely a temporal form. Only politicians now urge it as a means of influencing men's opinions. It certainly could never be decently urged except in just such a case as Kant conceived this to be; a case in which it would, otherwise, be absolutely immaterial which side one took. The truth itself was hopelessly unattainable, and, if any ulterior consequences were, as a matter of fact, to follow either decision, one was as likely to escape them by the one course as by the other. The only guide left, therefore, was simply present advantage; and, be that the least greater on the one than on the other side, this should be sufficient to determine the decision.

Kant's second ground for accepting the thesis rather than the antithesis of his antinomies—*i. e.*, the dogmatic rather than the

empirical or sceptical view of the universe, viz.: that of speculative interest—being highly philosophical, deserves more attention. And, logically enough, we find him enumerating among the advantages which the mind is to derive from this course that of *ease* or *convenience* (*Gemächlichkeit*). Nothing is truer than that teleology is a relief to the overstrained intellect striving to build a universe between two infinities. It is the philosophy of the indolent brain, the *ignava ratio*, and is thus adapted both to the childhood of the world and to all those who weary of intellectual effort. These may be good reasons where all hope of arriving at objective truth is renounced; they could scarcely be admitted under any other circumstances. That there is any greater intrinsic dignity or nobility in a universe created by design than in one created by evolution, few men with scientific habits of thought will probably be able to admit. These qualities are not objective, but subjective. They do not belong to the world, but to those who contemplate it, and thus so much of the supposed speculative interest is carried back to the class of practical interest.

The empiricist of Kant loses all these advantages. In embracing the *antitheses* he removes the foundations of religion and of morality, the latter conceived as deriving all its sanction from authority. "If there is no Primordial Being (*Urwesen*) distinct from the universe, if the universe is without a beginning, and, therefore, without a creator, our will not free, and the soul of the same divisibility and perishability as matter, moral ideas and principles lose all validity, and fall with the transcendental ideas which formed their theoretical support." In this passage Kant evidently fails to distinguish the fine shades on the strength of which many modern scientists so stoutly reject the charge of materialism. Yet he has clearly in view the stern mechanical connection between phenomena which constitutes the basis of the causal philosophy of science.

Empiricism, as thus defined, is not, however, entirely without its advantages. It, too, possesses a certain speculative interest, in defining which the great philosopher still more clearly shows that he had in mind that same universal antithesis in the constitution of the human mind which we sought to describe at the outset.

"Empiricism," he says, "affords advantages to the speculative interest of the reason which are very fascinating, and far exceed

those which the dogmatic teacher of rational ideas can promise. In the former the intellect is always on its own peculiar ground, viz.: the field of mere possible experiences, whose laws it can trace back, and by means of which it can expand its own certain and comprehensible knowledge without end. . . . The empiricist will never allow any epoch of nature to be assumed as the absolutely first, or any limit of his outlook into the surrounding world to be regarded as the outermost, or any of the objects of nature, which he can resolve by mathematics or by observation and bring synthetically under his contemplation (*Anschauung*)—the extended—to pass over to those which neither sense nor imagination can ever represent *in concreto*—the simple—.” Surely, his “empiricist” is here none other than a modern genetist, evolutionist, or scientist.

Even admitting all that Kant maintains for and against the two opposing views, it may still be a question whether the manly independence of the empiricist would not be preferable to the idle respectability of the dogmatist.

Still better to illustrate these two antagonistic phases of thought, Kant asserts that they embody the contrast between Platonism and Epicureanism. Whether the teleologists can fairly regard Plato as the founder or first great representative of their views in philosophy may, it is true, be open to some question; but that Epicurus foreshadowed, as faithfully as could be expected from the state of knowledge in his time, the teachings of modern science and the principles of the genetic causal or evolutionary school, cannot be candidly denied. And, if his sect did nothing else, they clearly proved that this apparent question of opinion really has a psychological basis, and exists deep in the constitution of the human mind, more or less independently of the condition of human knowledge in the world. There always have existed a few minds unwilling to accept the dogmatism of the mass. There always crops out in society a more or less pronounced manifestation of rationalism as opposed to authority. While this class of views finds few open advocates, it always finds many tacit adherents, and, when uttered, a large, though usually irresponsible, following. Criticism of received beliefs is always sweet to a considerable number who rejoice at the overthrow of the leaders of opinion or the fall of paragons of morality. And this it is which

often renders the peace of society insecure. The established code of morals is dimly felt by the lower classes to be in some respects radically unsound. The broad contrast between men's nominal beliefs as spoken and their real beliefs as acted is apparent even to children. The standard of conduct is so much higher than that which the controllers of conduct can themselves live up to, resulting always in the punishment of the weak and the poor for the same transgressions as are daily committed with impunity by the rich and the powerful, that the lowest miscreant sees that there is some fundamental wrong underlying the entire social fabric, although he can not tell what it is.

All this must be regarded as the legitimate consequence of the undue supremacy of dogmatic ideas and teleological conceptions in society. So far from favoring morality, they are the direct cause of the most dangerous form of immorality, viz. : a mutinous revolt against too severe and unnatural moral restraints. Rules of conduct based on these conceptions are necessarily arbitrary, while the normal intellect naturally demands a reason for its obedience.

While these truths are equally applicable to all classes of conduct, we will illustrate them here only in one. That the prevailing sentiment of society on the question of the purity of actions which spring from love is in large measure false, and in so far injurious, is evident from many indications. The steady refusal of the popular pulse to beat in unison with moral precept respecting it may be counted among the most significant of these indices. In fact, it is very curious, and suggests the demoralizing tendency of too high moral standards, to observe to how great an extent the moral code is upheld in word and violated in action. Many persons, when questions of this class arise for discussion, will defend the side of dogmatism who at the same time are really in sympathy with the side of scepticism. The real popularity of this side, when it finds an opportunity to express itself through channels that are deemed respectable, and where its real nature is likely to remain concealed, is well shown by the manner in which works of fiction are demanded and the stage is supported. These agencies are the natural defenders of the critical side of this question, which constitutes almost their only mission and *raison d'être*. They usually aim to demonstrate the essential

purity of such acts, dictated by the sexual emotions, as the ethical canons declare impure. A romance or a drama which should fail to administer some such rebuke to the accepted tenets of orthodox morality would be adjudged tame, and would prove a financial failure. Every one knows with what avidity this class of critical literature is devoured by the public and its dramatic representation is applauded. In fact, as already remarked, there exists throughout society, and probably always has existed, not only with respect to this class of acts, but with respect to many others, a deep-seated rebellion against much that claims to call itself *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, moral or right—as it were, a vague consciousness, which the average intellect cannot formulate, of the arbitrary and factitious character of the moral and social codes, through the shadowy form of which may be dimly seen the half-unconscious recognition that human action is the product of fixed mechanical laws, that there is no absolute good or bad, but that these qualities are relative to the benefit or injury done to beings susceptible to pleasure and pain, and that the arbitrary rules of society based on the negation of these truths fall far short of their extravagant claims in regulating the conduct of men.

But returning to the antinomies themselves, and considering the problems presented by the thesis and the antithesis of each in the light of what is now known, and by the aid of modern methods of investigation, we shall see that it is *not* true that both sides admit of equal proofs and disproofs. Disregarding Kant's logical demonstrations as worthless at his own showing, since they reduce the argument on either side to an absurdity, and appealing to the inductive method, which, without claiming infallibility, has wrought such mighty results for man, we may with safety maintain that the side of these questions which Kant calls the empirical has gained upon that which he calls the dogmatic in about the same proportion as the knowledge of the nature of things has increased in the world. The spirit of opposition to teleological conceptions could make no headway as long as so little was known of natural processes. Lucretius might write *De Rerum Natura*, but what he could say that was true must go unsupported by facts and be discredited, while much that he must say that was false would be disproved and throw still greater discredit upon his system. In a state of profound ignorance of the universe, teleo-

logical explanations were the only ones the world would accept. They could be understood; genetic explanations could not. Appearances were all on one side. The deeper truths could not be comprehended. The greatest paradox which nature presents is that of *adaptation*. The word itself contains an ambiguity. It possesses both an active and a middle or reflective sense. The former is teleological, the latter genetic. Adaptation in a purely passive sense is admitted by all. No one denies that there exists a great amount of correspondence between apparently very distinct objects. It is evident that they have in some way been made to correspond. The vital question is: How and by what power have they been so made? The teleologist says: By a power from without; by design. The genetist says: By a power from within; by adaptation. Just here is the grand schism.

It is easy to see, too, why the teleologists should at first and for a long time enjoy a supremacy. The teleological answer to any question requires comparatively little intellectual effort. It is the easiest way of explaining things, the first explanation that suggests itself. Not only is it intrinsically more simple, but it is more in accord with human experience and the natural habit of thought. In other words, it is anthropomorphic. It is most natural to explain natural phenomena in the same way that artificial phenomena are explained. A garment is adapted to the body that is to wear it. A duck's foot is adapted to the water it swims in. The explanation of the first of these facts is known; that of the second is unknown. Why not infer it from that of the first? There exists no other *known* explanation. To sit down and evolve one of an entirely different kind is not only a laborious task, but, when announced, it must remain unproved until a vast amount of scientific investigation shall have established a broad basis of induction. The sceptic, therefore, who in the infancy of human thought had the temerity to suggest that things may have worked out their observed relations of correspondence through the inherent activities residing within themselves, was met, naturally enough, with derision. Yet every step that science has taken has been in the direction of disproving the popular and confirming the unpopular view. It has been gradually but steadily vindicating reason as against analogy, and establishing a causal as against an arbitrary connection between related facts.

To sustain this statement, let us consider the principal antinomies somewhat more closely. For this purpose the first and third may be selected. As regards the second, it seems scarcely applicable to this discussion. If there is any difference between its two propositions, in this respect, the one Kant calls the antithesis would seem to be the more dogmatic. So far as the facts of science are concerned, they tend to sustain the view that matter is a reality, and as such must possess a real ultimate unit—the atom—not, indeed, of chemistry, but of a *transcendental chemistry*, which is the domain of reason, as it reaches down below the sensible world of phenomena. Those are usually regarded as the dogmatists on this question who, like Boscovitch, and, we might add, Herbert Spencer, seek to resolve matter into “centres of force,” and other ontological conceptions.

Let us examine, then, Kant's first antinomy: “The universe has a beginning in time, and is also enclosed within limits in space;” the antithesis of which is: “The universe has no beginning, and no limits in space, but is eternal in time and infinite in space.” Has science anything to say on this question, and, if so, which side does it espouse? Undoubtedly science has to do with it, and it also clearly takes sides upon it. Quantitative chemistry, scarcely born in Kant's time, has practically demonstrated the infinite duration of the universe in establishing the indestructibility of matter. Astronomy, to which Kant's own immortal “*Theorie des Himmels*” helped to give its rational impetus, has now so expanded the conception of space that it has become habitual to regard the universe as absolutely without limits. If any one doubts this, let him make an effort to go back to the old dogmatic conception, and figure to his mind a beginning or end to its duration, or boundaries to its extent. He will find this impossible, and this impossibility is wholly due to the increased knowledge of the universe which science has given to the world. It was once possible, it is still possible to the ignorant, to set bounds to time and space, but inductive science has swept away such crude scaffoldings and opened up to the human mind a view of the infinite.

It is no longer a transcendental question. It is a scientific one, to be solved, like all other scientific questions, by the accumulation of facts. Nothing in concrete science is demonstrated

a priori. The practical truths of the universe are established *a posteriori*, by massing the evidence. In many of the questions now regarded as settled the evidence has long been conflicting, and much still remains in some to be removed. Yet these residual facts are admitted by all to be overborne by the weight of evidence opposed to them. Such is the character of the greater part of the scientific truth of the world. But the questions involved in Kant's antinomies differ from ordinary scientific problems in two respects. On the one hand, infinity must be proved, which demands, of course, better evidence; but, on the other hand, there are no facts opposed to infinity, but all the evidence is on one side. Not one circumstance can be named which points to a beginning or end of either time or space, while every fact and every law that human observation and reflection have brought forth point to the boundlessness of both in all directions. Only ignorance of these facts, and failure to exercise the rational faculty, can prevent the mind from conceding this truth.

The third antinomy has the following for its thesis: "Causality, according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality from which the phenomena of the universe may be derived. It is still necessary to assume a causality through freedom for the explanation of these phenomena." The antithesis is: "There is no freedom, but everything in the universe takes place according to the laws of nature."

The great issue is here squarely stated, and here it is that accumulating knowledge of the nature of things is working steadily and uniformly against the dogmatic, and in favor of the empirical side. Absolutely no facts are being discovered in favor of freedom, while everything is ranging itself on the side of universal law. From one department of knowledge after another, and in inverse proportion to the complexity of the phenomena, and hence in direct ratio to the ease with which they are comprehended, science is eliminating all the facts which require the hypothesis of freedom for their explanation. From astronomy, from geology, from physics and chemistry, these eons have been successively expelled; they are now being driven from their fortifications in biology to their citadel in psychology. Even here they are vigorously attacked by the school of Bain and Spencer on the one hand, and that of Flourens and Ferrier on

the other. The very freedom of the human will is shown to be a delusion, and the interval between morals and physics is spanned by the heartless clinics of Maudsley.

We need not go further and state the fourth and last of Kant's antinomies relating to the existence or non-existence of a "Necessary Being." The first and third Antitheses, established, constitute the premises for the establishment of the fourth. Eternal matter, with its equally eternal activities, suffices to account for all the phenomena of the universe, which are as infinite in causation as in duration or extent. Again, all departments of science confirm this truth. When Laplace was asked how he could have written so great a work as the *Mécanique Céleste* on the subject of the system of the universe, without once mentioning its Author, he replied: "Je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse là." All the more complex sciences are, one by one, and in the inverse order of their complexity, also dispensing with this hypothesis. Like many other once useful hypotheses, that of *theo-teleology*, which, as already remarked, was suggested from analogy with the fact of *anthropo-teleology*, has ceased to be useful, and where still adhered to becomes a burden to the progress of truth. In astronomy the nebular hypothesis which Kant founded, and Laplace demonstrated, has completely superseded it. In chemistry and physics, the atomic theory, formulated as a philosophy by Democritus, and established as a science by Dalton, renders it redundant. In biology the law of adaptation, clearly stated by Lamarck, and that of selection, cumulatively demonstrated by Darwin, and the inter-operation of these and that of heredity, thoroughly set forth by Spencer and Haeckel, have freed this field from teleological trammels almost as completely as those of the less complex sciences have been freed from them. And thus is science marching relentlessly forward, and reclaiming one field after another that had been so long given over to dogmatic conceptions, until there is now scarcely room to doubt that its conquest must ultimately become complete.

But what is this that has thus been accomplished? It is nothing less than the establishment of the Antithesis or empirical proposition of Kant's antinomies. They have been removed from the domain of transcendental philosophy, subjected to scientific methods, such as are applied to all other truths, and proved, as

other propositions are proved, by the accumulation of legitimate facts. The eternity of matter and motion and the infinity of space have passed into scientific postulates, and the uninterrupted and unlimited causal dependence of all phenomena in their relation of antecedents and consequents is the fundamental axiom from which all scientific investigation now proceeds.

Though these truths may seem clear to us to-day, though we may have become so thoroughly imbued with the spirit of modern scientific thought that they are little more to us than truisms, we must not forget that the mental atmosphere we now breathe has been purified during the past century, and that what we are, as it were, born in possession of, Kant could only gain by the profoundest meditation. And, when we further contemplate that great mind as constitutionally of a teleological or dogmatic cast, we may realize the immense power it must have possessed to penetrate the mists of both the objective and subjective darkness in which he lived, and formulate, even for his opponents, the arguments by which they were to win their victories. It is the misfortune of the teleological school of to-day that they are incompetent to contend with the genetic school on the same plane of activity. The latter find no difficulty in transferring their base of operations from a scientific to a dogmatic field, and giving battle on the enemy's own grounds. This is doubtless because they are, for the most part, themselves converts from dogmatism, which still constitutes the bulk of most men's early education, and they know how temporarily to return to their old, familiar haunts; but those who have never crossed this boundary are either unable or unwilling to look over and see what is beyond. In their attacks upon science, therefore, they confine themselves chiefly to the free use of epithets which have a stigma only for dogmatists, and cannot, of course, fail to display such a profound lack of acquaintance, not with science alone, but with the very ways in which science carries conviction to the mind, that the effect upon the only ones they would influence is usually little more than amusing.

The concluding thought of this paper is therefore to hold up the great thinker, whose hundredth anniversary we are here to commemorate, as an example to be followed, so far as that is possible, by all those who feel that the empirical, the critical, the

sceptical method is advancing too rapidly, and who would impose upon it a wholesome restraint. For, just as in the field of battle a thorough knowledge of the enemy's position, force, and movements is of the highest possible value, so in the field of philosophy, in its broad, practical developments, the secret of successful logic lies in the power to impress the contestant with a complete mastery of his side of the controversy as well as one's own. This power, of all logicians, Kant most pre-eminently revealed, even pointing out to his opponents elements of strength and grounds of justification which they in their blind zeal had only intuitively perceived, if at all. And there can be no doubt that science and rational philosophy would not only welcome a contest of this enlightened kind, but would seek to profit by it, as they profit by every means of advancing the cause of truth in the world.

GOD AS THE ETERNALLY BEGOTTEN SON.

TRANSLATED FROM THE THIRD PART OF HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION" BY F. LOUIS SOLDAN.

II.—*The Eternal Idea of God in the Element of Consciousness and Image-Concept, or, the Difference, the Realm of the Son.*

This idea must here be considered as it steps from its universality and infinitude into the category of finiteness. God is present everywhere; the presence of God is this very truth which is in everything.

The idea was at first in the element of thinking. This is the basis, and we began with it. The universal, and, therefore, the more abstract, element must precede in science. In the category of science it is the first; in [the category of] existence, it is a later element; it is being-in-itself [potentiality], but it appears later in cognition; it arrives at consciousness and cognition, later.

The form of the idea attains phenomenal existence as a result, which, however, is essentially being-in-itself. The content of the idea is so constituted that what is last is first, and what is first is last, and, in a like manner, that which appears as a result is

[also] presupposition, being-in-itself [potentiality], and basis. This idea must now be considered in its second element—in the element of phenomenality. The absolute idea, as objectivity, or in itself, is complete, but not so the subjective side; neither in itself as such, nor the subjectivity in the divine idea as for itself. We can look upon this process from two sides.

The first is: The subject for which this idea has existence is the thinking subject. The forms of image-conception do not alter the nature of the fundamental form; they do not prevent this form from existing for man as a thinking being. The activity of the subject is that of thinking; it thinks this idea; but the subject is [also] concrete self-consciousness, and hence this idea must exist for the subject as concrete self-consciousness, as a real subject.

Or: This idea is the absolute truth; the latter is for [= is cognized by] the thinking faculty; but for the subject the idea must exist not only as a truth, but the subject must also have the certitude of the idea—*i. e.*, the certainty which belongs to this subject as such; that is to say, belongs to him as to a finite, empirically concrete, sensuous subject.

The idea exists as certitude for the subject, and the subject is certain of it only in so far as the idea is perceptible. The idea has certainty as far as it *is* for the subject. That of which I can say: This is, has certainty for myself, it is immediate cognition, it is certitude. The further mediation consists in proving that that which is, is at the same time necessary, and that that which is certain is true. Such proof forms the transition to the universal.

Having begun with the form of truth, we must now proceed to the phase in which this form receives certainty, or that it is for myself.

The other mode of proceeding is to begin with the side of the idea.

1. It is [the nature of] Being to be eternally in and for itself, to unfold itself, to determine itself, to evolve subject and object, and to posit itself as its own difference; the difference, however, is in the same process eternally cancelled; the being that is in and for itself [potential and actualized being] eternally returns into itself in this process, and only in so far as it does this it is spirit.

To the differentiated element attaches the determination, that

the difference has vanished immediately, and that this [process] is nought but a relation of God, or of the idea to itself. This differentiation is but a movement; it is love's play with itself, and does not amount to serious alienation, to separation and diremption.

The alien or other is determined as Son. In the form of sentiment it is love, in a higher category it is spirit, in-itself and free. Within the idea the category of difference is not yet completed with this determination; it is only the abstract difference in general, and we have not yet reached the difference in its peculiarity; the difference is only *one* determination.

We may say, for this reason, that we have not yet arrived at the difference. The differentiated things are posited as the same; the phase has not yet been reached in which the differentiated ones have different predicates. On this side the diremption of the idea should be so understood that the Son receives the predication of otherness [or alienation] as such, and that he is free, for himself, that he appears [phenomenally] as a reality, outside and without God, as something that is.

His ideality, his eternal return[ing] into that which is in-and-for-itself, is posited as immediately identical in the first idea. In order that the difference may be, and receive its due, alienation is necessary; the differentiated thing must be alienation which possesses Being.

The absolute idea alone determines itself, and, in determining itself, is absolutely free and secure in itself; it is this in determining itself to send out this its determination as something free, so that it be an independence, an independent object. What is free exists only for what is free itself; for the free man alone is another man free.

It is the absolute freedom of the idea that in its determinations, and in its diremption as subject and object, sends forth [its] other as free and independent. This other sent forth as something independent, is the world in general. The absolute diremption into subject and object which gives independence to the side of alienation, may be called Goodness; it lends to this side, in its alienation, the whole idea to the extent and in the manner in which it can embody this idea in itself and can represent it.

2. The truth of the world is only its ideality; it has no true reality; it is its nature to be, but it is only to be something ideal,

and not to be something eternal in itself; it is to be a created thing; its being is posited being only.

The nature of the being of the world is that it has an element of being, but that it cancels this separation or alienation from God and is nothing but there turn to its origin, and thus it enters into the relation of spirit, and of love.

This is the process of the world, by which it passes over from the fallen state, from separation, to reconciliation. The first element in the idea is only the relation of father and son, but the other receives also the predicate of alienation, or otherness; that of being.

It is in the Son, in the category of difference, that the further determination proceeds to the next differentiation by which the difference receives what is due to it—namely, the right of being different. Jacob Boehme expressed this transition in the phase of the Son thus: That the first only begotten one was Lucifer, the bearer of light, the bright, clear principle, but that he “imagined” himself into himself—*i. e.*, that he posited himself for himself, and proceeded to being; that he thus fell away, but that the eternally only begotten one was immediately posited in his place.

From the first stand-point the nature of this relation is, that God exists in his eternal truth, and that this state is thought as being before time, as the state in which it existed when the blessed spirits, the stars of morning, and the angels, His children, praised God. This relation is thus expressed as a state, but it is the eternal relation of thinking to the object. Later, it is said a fall took place; this is the positing of the second stand-point; on one side it is the analysis of the Son, the sundering of the two phases contained in him. The other side, however, is the subjective consciousness—the finite spirit—[which knows] that this, as pure thinking is in itself the process, that it started with the immediate and elevated itself to truth. This is the second form.

Thus we enter the sphere of determination in space and the world of finite spirit. This must now be expressed more particularly as the positing of predications, as a momentarily held or sustained difference; it is God coming forth and becoming phenomenal in finiteness; for finiteness is properly the separation of what is identical in itself, but is conceived and apprehended in separation. On the other side, on that of subjective spirit, this is posited

as pure thinking; but in itself it is a result, and this must be posited as it is in itself as this movement. The pure thinking has to return into itself, and by this alone it posits itself as finite.

Considering it from this stand-point, the other or alien is not conceived as the Son, but as the external world, as the finite world which is outside of truth, which is the world of finiteness, and where the Other has the form of Being, while, nevertheless, according to its nature, it is only the *ἕτερον*, determined, differentiated, limited, and negative.

The relation of this second sphere to the first is thereby determined in this way, that it is the same idea in-itself, but in this other category; the absolute act of the first diremption is in itself the same as the second one; image-conception alone holds these two apart as two totally different grounds and actus.

In fact, they ought to be distinguished and held apart; and if it has been said that they are the same in themselves, it must be strictly defined how this is to be understood lest there might arise the false meaning and erroneous conception as if the eternal Son of the Father, the Son of the deity which is object to itself, were the same as the world, and as if under the former we understood the latter.

We have said, however, and, indeed, it is self-evident, that only the idea of God, as explained above in what was called the first sphere, is the eternal, true God; and then, also, his realization and manifestation in the explicit and full process of spirit, which will be considered in the third sphere.

If the world, as it is immediately, should be taken as being in-and-for-itself, if what is sensuous and temporal were taken as Being, either that false meaning would be attached to it [“that the Son and the world be the same”], or it would be necessary to assume two eternal ACTUS of God. God’s activity, however, is always purely one and the same, and not a variety of distinct activities, not a Now and Then, a Separation, etc.

As it is, this distinction of independent being is nothing but the phase, negative for itself, or otherness, or of extraneousness, which, as such, has no truth, but is only a phase, and, according to time, it is only a moment, and not even a moment, since it has this mode of independence only for the finite spirit, because the latter itself in its existence has only this manner and mode of independence.

In God himself this [quality of] being now and for-itself is nought but the vanishing element of phenomenality.

It is true that this phase has the width, breadth, and depth of a world, that it is heaven and earth, and is their organization infinite within and without. If we say that this other is only a vanishing phase, that it is only the flash of the lightning which in the phenomenon disappears immediately, or that it is the sound of a word which, in being spoken and heard, disappears as far as its external existence is concerned: In these momentary phenomena we are apt to see too much the transitory element of time with its before and after, but it *is* neither in the one nor in the other. Every predication of time must be kept out, be it that of duration or of the Now [= present], and we must hold fast the simple thought of the Other or Alien, the *simple* thought, for the Other or Alien is an abstraction. That this abstraction is expanded into a world in time and space, rests on this, that it is the simple phase of the idea itself, and that it therefore receives the latter entire in itself; but, since it is the phase of otherness, it is the immediate, sensuous expansion.

Questions like the one: Whether the world, or matter, is from eternity, or has a beginning in time, belong to the empty metaphysics of the understanding. In the phrase, "From eternity," eternity itself is only an image-perception of infinite time; it is represented as defective infinity; it is nothing but the infinity of reflection, and belongs to its category. The world is properly the region of contradiction, and in it the idea is in a category that is inadequate to it. Whenever the world is the object of the faculty of image-conception, the element of time, and, by reflection, also that [conception] of eternity arise, we must remember, however, that this predication does not concern the idea itself.

There is another question, or, partly, another side of the former question; the world, since it is said to be from eternity, is uncreated, and is immediately for itself. The distinction which the understanding makes between form and matter underlies this question; but matter and world are, on the contrary, according to their fundamental determination, rather this Other, the negative which is in itself but a phase of posited being. This is the opposite of independence, and the nature of its existence is to cancel itself and to be a phase of the process. The natural world is rela-

tive, it is a phenomenon—*i. e.*, it is so, not only for us, but it is so in itself, and it is its quality to be in transition and to betake itself back into the last idea. The various metaphysical determinations of the $\epsilon\lambda\eta$, which we find with the ancient as well as the Christian philosophers, especially the Gnostics, have their basis in the category of the independence of otherness.

It is by reason of the otherness of the world that it is simply the created thing, and is not a world that has being in-and-for-itself. If the distinction is made of a Beginning, as the creation, and the preservation of what exists, it is because image-conception assumes that such a sensuous world really exists and has being. It has, therefore, been stated very properly at all times, that since being and self-existing independence are not attributes of the world, preservation is creation. It might be said that creation is also preservation; this would be said for the reason that the phase of otherness is itself a phase of the idea; that is to say, the presupposition would exist, as mentioned before, that being preceded creation.

Since otherness is now determined and predicated as the totality of phenomenality, it expresses in itself the idea, and this is in general what has been designated as the wisdom of God. Wisdom, however, is yet a general expression, and it is the province of philosophic cognition to cognize this concept in nature, to comprehend it as a system in which the divine idea mirrors itself. The latter, then, is manifested, but its content is the manifestation itself, to distinguish itself as an Other and to take this back into the former, so that this return is just as much a Without as a Within. In nature these stages lie outside of each other as a system of the kingdoms of nature, of which the highest is the kingdom of living creatures.

It is, however, the nature of life, which is the highest representation of the idea in nature, to sacrifice itself (this is the negativity of the idea turned against this, its existence), and to become spirit. Spirit is [this progression] this stepping forth by means of nature—*i. e.*, it has in nature its antithesis, by whose annulment it is for itself, and is spirit.

The finite world is the side of difference as distinguished from the side which remains in its unity. Thus it divides itself into the natural world and the world of the finite spirit. Nature does

not enter for itself into relationship to God; it enters into such relationship only in its relation to man. For nature is not cognition; God is spirit, and nature knows nothing of spirit.

It is created by God, but it does not enter from itself into relationship to God, inasmuch as it is not a cognizing agent. It stands in relation to man only, and in this relation to man it constitutes what is called the side of his dependence.

Inasmuch as it is cognized by thinking, cognized as created by God, and as containing reason, understanding, it is known by thinking man. It is in so far placed into relationship to the Divine as its truth is cognized.

The manifold forms of the relationship of the finite spirit to nature can find no place here; their scientific treatment belongs to the phenomenology, or philosophy of spirit. Here we must consider this relationship within the sphere of religion, so that nature is for man not only this external, immediate world, but a world in which man cognizes God; nature is thus for man a revelation of God. This relation of spirit to nature we have seen previously, in the ethnic religions where we considered the forms through which spirit ascended from the immediate—where nature is taken as contingent—to the [form of] necessity, and to the form of an agency which is wise, and acts conformably to a purpose. Thus, the finite spirit's consciousness of God is mediated by nature. Man sees God through nature; nature remains but the investment and untrue form.

That which is differentiated from God is here really another, and has the form of an Other; it is nature which is for God and for man. By this means the unity is to be consummated, and the consciousness is to be brought about, that conciliation is the end, aim, and category of religion. The first [stage] is the abstract consciousness that there is a God, that man rises from nature to God; this we have seen in the proofs of the existence of God. To this [stage] belong the pious contemplations, How magnificently God has made everything! how wisely he has arranged everything! These elevating contemplations proceed directly to God, with whatever point of the subject-matter they begin. Piety institutes such edifying contemplations; it begins with the most particular and the lowest, and cognizes therein, in general, something higher. Very frequently there is mingled with this the

distorted view that what occurs in nature is looked upon as something higher than what is simply human. This contemplation itself, since it begins with the singular or particular, is inadequate. Another consideration may be opposed to it. The cause should correspond to the phenomenon; it should itself contain the limitation which the phenomenon has in it; we demand the special reason which has caused this particular. The contemplation of any particular phenomenon contains always this inadequate element. These particular phenomena, besides, are natural ones; but God is to be comprehended as spirit, and, therefore, that in which we cognize him must, therefore, be something spiritual. "God thunders with his thunder, they say, and still he is not known;" spiritual man demands something higher than the merely natural. In order to be known as spirit, God must do more than thunder.

The higher contemplation of nature and the deeper relation to God, in which it is to be placed, consists rather in that it is itself conceived as something spiritual—*i. e.*, as the naturalness of man. Only when the subject is no more directed towards the immediate being of the natural, but is posited as what it is in itself, namely, as movement, and only when it has gone into itself—then only finiteness as such is posited. It is then posited as finiteness in the process of that relation in which it feels the need and want of the absolute idea, and in which the phenomenon of the latter arises. Here the first is the need and want of truth, and the second the manner and mode of the manifestation of truth.

The need and want, in the first place, presuppose that there exists in the subjective spirit the demand to cognize the absolute truth. This need implies immediately that the subject is in a state of untruth but the subject, as spirit stands above this, its own untruth, and for this reason this untruth is an element which must be conquered.

This state of untruth may be more explicitly stated as the subject in disunion with itself; the need finds expression in the demand that this disunion be cancelled in the subject, and this demand implies that it be cancelled by truth. The demand means that the subject be reconciled, and this can only be the reconciliation with truth.

This is the special form of the need; the characteristic is this,

that the disunion or diremption is in the subject in general, and that the subject is evil, that it is diremption in itself. The subject is contradiction; not the contradiction which is merely disconnecting, but that which also holds together; and it is by this means only that the subject is disunited as a contradiction within itself.

FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE: KANT'S REFUTATION
OF THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF OF THE BEING
OF GOD.

BY W. T. HARRIS.¹

In the history of philosophy we have a record of the discovery and exposition of a series of deep insights. The mastery of these insights is a sort of ascent of the individual into the insight of his race—and not the acquirement of mere information regarding the opinions of his fellow-men.

The constant lesson of social science is the dependence of the individual upon the aid of the community for the supply of his wants of food, clothing, and shelter. The dependence of the individual upon the race in spiritual matters of knowledge and wisdom is more wonderful. The science of nature and mind rests upon a vast mass of experience made up of the collected observations of mankind. Not merely the data of observation are included in this mass of experience, but the results of reflection on those data. Reflection concentrates experience, reduces it to unity. Each principle stands for many facts. The results of reflection are stated in the form of generalized principles and expressed in technical terms.

By availing one's self of these results of reflection, he can traverse the field of experience of the race in a very short time and arrive at the view of the world which the individual could not reach unaided, but the social whole of man has attained.

Without participating in the results of the reflection of his race, it would avail little that the individual could assist his own

¹ Read at the Concord School of Philosophy, August 3, 1881.

observation of facts by participation in the fund of sense-perceptions of the total of mankind. These sense-perceptions, without classification and generalization, would only confuse him all the more. The individual, unaided by the reflection of his fellows, already knows more facts than he can do anything with. He stands in the presence of an infinitely multiple world—no limit to the process of analysis which he may perform on the minutest piece of the world before him, no limit to the process of synthesis that he may make through discovering new realms to add to the ones he has already inventoried. The being that cannot generalize, cannot, in fact, observe what we call “facts,” although we are in the habit of assuming that mere sense-perception can perceive distinct facts. The unity which converts the series of sense-impressions into a perception of one object, is generalization. If we reflect on the form of a “fact,” we discover that it involves multiplicity, inner relations, to endless extent. It, moreover, belongs in a series, and has been severed from its connections to preceding and subsequent “facts” in the series. If one had taken a more comprehensive view, the fact would have included preceding elements or subsequent elements. The “fact,” therefore, is an arbitrary synthesis, grasping together these particular phases and no others, when it might have united more elements, or fewer elements. The swine that saw the apple fall saw a fact of very small scope, while Newton saw in the same fact the fact of universal gravitation—a fact that included the whole physical universe. The perception of a fact presupposes that the mind has cut off from the flow of events in time a portion and isolated it from the rest by means of attention. It implies, moreover, that the indefinite multiplicity within the limits cut off is united in one thought. To unite many in one is to perceive identity in the elements; it is to perceive a common relation. In an event we include the objects related to the realization of one purpose, and we include also the movements and activities that serve to determine in some way the same purpose. The perception of relations is called an act of reflection; it certainly is no act of direct perception, for it in some way perceives one direct element in another—reflected in that other, as it were. The relation involves two termini—a *from* and *to*—and it is a synthesis of these two termini in one relation. When we think the relation, both termini

hover before the mind, in unity. Direct perception only sunder, the termini. But such sundering does violence to the true nature of objectivity, for the latter is relative, even down to its ultimates, as our reflection teaches us. An isolated object is no terminus, is out of relation, and, therefore, possesses no common element by which it may be united with another. Hence it is, to all intents and purposes, a nothing; it cannot even occupy space or time without involving community with others, and hence relativity of being.

Since, therefore, the correct knowing of the world is a knowing of the relations of things, and since the knowing of the essential nature of these relations is the perceiving that the relations constitute the nature of the object, and these are the joint product of the reflection of the race, it follows that the participation of the individual in the results of reflection achieved by his fellow-men is essential to his arrival at the truth of things. Self-activity on his part, then, is necessary for the reception of the generalizations of others. Reflection is self-activity, and its results can be communicated only to beings capable of self-activity.

The individual cannot receive the generalizations of the race without making generalizations himself. The generalizations of others assist him by stimulating his activity and guiding it to the object. Without the demonstrated theorem in the geometry before us to guide us to the problem, and to stimulate us to think it out, we should have waited, perhaps, a lifetime for an occasion in which we should have stood face to face with the problem clear and distinct before us, eliminated from its complications and obstructing our progress as we undertake the accomplishment of some deed. Moreover, Euclid indicates the course of his analysis, the path of his thought from distinction to distinction, the synthetic steps which he takes to get the result laid down as the theorem. We follow, active in our minds, and it is our activity alone that enables us to follow him. Euclid points out the steps, but we must take them by our own intellectual effort. We receive only what we can think over or verify within ourselves, so that it seems as if we can receive no thought from another except what we create anew within ourselves.

If we are forced to rely upon our fellow-men for the essential part of what we accept as knowledge, it is evident that Faith is

the most important element in our spiritual life. It is necessary, however, not to overlook the fact of our self-activity. We are not passive recipients, and faith must not be taken in a narrow sense. We depend upon our fellow-men for most of the data that we possess regarding the world, and for most of the conclusions that thought has produced as inferences from the data. Here is the element of faith, but we must try to verify the data we receive by our own perceptions or by cross-examination and comparison with what we know through our own knowledge. Still more independent is our activity which is necessary to receive the conclusions which the reflection of others have reached regarding the world. If we receive them for all that they meant to the original thinkers, we shall see the internal necessity of thought as much as they did, and have as deep insight. If we accept their results as decisions of authority, without seeing their necessity for ourselves, of course our insight will be very far inferior to the insight of the original authority.

From this point of view we see the truth of the famous dictum of Saint Anselm, "*Credo ut intelligam*," and it seems to have a validity based on the nature of thought itself. Perhaps Anselm himself had a glimpse of this meaning which may be given to his paradox. "I believe [in the capacity of my fellow-men to see and report correctly the data of sense-perception, and to draw correct inferences from those data by means of reflection, and I have faith in what they report to me], in order that I may understand [*i. e.*, accepting their results, I have something to verify for myself, and may proceed, with that endowment of knowledge and insight from the race, to understand the world]." Whatever he may have meant, it is nevertheless true, that men do derive their view-of-the-world from the consense of their fellow-men. If one had to collect all his data for himself, and work out all his generalizations without aid, it is evident that he would get very little way into a knowledge of the world.

Since our view of the world is given us primarily by the human race, and is not first reached by independent observations, we may say that the light of our seeing, and the lenses through which we see things in nature and history, are borrowed from our fellow-men, and are matters belonging to the social community of men. The help that we get from our fellows is not a gift from mere

individuals, but is something generic. Ten men in combination are not merely ten times as strong as one man, but a hundred or a thousand times as strong. The united effort of a social whole is something incommensurable by the individual standard. Like the process of involution, the social process is a multiplication of each factor by all the rest, and not a mere addition or aggregate of parts. The individual is first reinforced by the total of society; next, in turn, he adds his mite to society—but not the elementary, unaided mite of his primitive self—he adds his contribution already reinforced by the social whole. Thus the social process is essentially a process of involution, a process of investment of talents and gifts to be returned with usury.

These reflections upon the utterance of Saint Anselm—“*Credo ut intelligam*”—suggest the point of view we should take in our study of the history of philosophy. The process of reading into authors what they have never thought is more likely to happen on the part of those who find only shallow and crude views in the systems of famous thinkers, than on the part of those who discover deep and still valid ideas.

Saint Anselm's famous proof of the being of God is an example of a statement of deep insight which has had the fate of being partially or wholly misunderstood by later thinkers, although it has been reproduced under other forms not suspected as identical with it.

One of the most famous of Kant's critical achievements is his attack upon the validity of the ontological proof of the existence of God, an attack upon the Cartesian form of Anselm's proof.

The dogma, as fixed by the Church, is accepted by Anselm as absolute truth, to begin with. Taking “Faith” in the sense already discussed, Anselm has faith in the Church as the representative of the human race in its most authoritative expression. It has the truth in the highest form that has been revealed to man. We, too, have a highest authority in the conviction of our time against which we do not venture to protest, but in whose name we challenge any conclusion whatsoever that is set up as opposed to it, though it claim logical justification. The “invisible Church,” which includes the communion of all wise and good of whatever age and clime, is at bottom the “consensus” (as Cudworth calls it) of leading minds as regards truth.

The thinking of the individual in philosophy, according to this view, should conform to this authority found in the consent of the Church. If it results in something contradictory, we must reject it, or, at least, re-examine its foundations. If an evolutionist in our time finds that his discoveries are subversive of the ethical prescripts of society, he rejects them or suppresses them. If he does not do it himself, his fellow-evolutionists will do it for him.

Saint Anselm, while accepting the dogmas of faith from the Church, holds that it is the business of the human intellect to try to comprehend them. He, therefore, takes up, in his "Proslogium,"¹ the idea of God, and seeks to find it among the presuppositions of the intellect. If the intellect bases all of its processes upon the assumption of the existence of God, it will be true that the fool, though he says in his heart that there is no God, at the same time presupposes God in the very act of setting forth the denial of him. Is God, then, the highest reality, presupposed as the necessary ground of whatever reality? This is the question that Anselm investigates.

The ultimate presupposition of the intellect is, to use his words, "*Id quo nihil majus cogitari potest*"—or that, than which, nothing greater can be conceived—not the thought of the greatest of existences (among other existences). It has been suggested (by Gaunilo, in the lifetime of Saint Anselm, and later by Kant and others) that the conception of a thing does not imply its corresponding existence—as though this were something that had not occurred to Anselm (or to Descartes, who thinks that the idea of a "most perfect being"² implies its existence). This refutation, therefore, proceeds upon the assumption that the ontological proof appealed to a suppressed major premise: "Whatever can be conceived as an idea in the mind must have a corresponding objective reality." This presupposition could not be in the mind of any sane human being for a moment, and certainly was not in the mind of Anselm or in that of Descartes. It is claimed by both that the thought of the existence of God is unique, and a thought whose reality is presupposed by all other thoughts, but that no other thoughts contain the ground of their real-

¹ See Appendix I to this article.

² See Appendix II to this article.

ity in themselves but only as grounded through this thought of God.

The form in which this thought retains its validity for us now is the thought of the totality. We all recognize at once the necessity of the existence of a totality as a precedent condition to the existence of a part. Whenever anything is posited as existent, it is at once presupposed that this existent is either in itself a whole or a part of a whole. The totality is an existent which possesses a reality in a higher sense than the part, or limited existence. For the limited existence owes some of its properties to the existences that are supposed to limit it—*i. e.*, to the environment. But both the limited existence and its environment are included in the totality, and all their reality is in the total.

If there is a part, there is a whole in which it exists, and which contains all of its reality and all of the reality of the other parts which limit it. The thought of a part contains the thought that it is transcended by a whole, a greater reality than it. No part could possibly exist unless there were an existence that transcended it; were it not so, then the part were incorrectly defined as a part; itself were the totality, and not a part.

Take the thinker who thinks the thought: if he knows himself to be a part, it must be because he knows of other existence than himself, and knows himself dependent. The thought presupposes the thinker of the thought, and they presuppose a totality as the basis of their existence, without saying as yet what this totality must be, as regards its nature. Whatever is found to be essentially and necessarily implied as the nature of a totality, must be posited as the essential presupposition of intellect or thought.

That, than which, there can be thought nothing greater, is the totality. The thought of the totality is not a merely subjective thought, but has a necessary reality corresponding to it. Any possible objection to this will presuppose the thought of a totality as the basis of its validity. Let it be objected by Gaunilo, or by Kant, that any thought whatever is subjective only, and that there can be no conclusion from it to the reality. The statement of this objection, it will be seen, nay, its very conception, rests upon the assumption that thought or intellect, or the conceptive faculty, is one side of an antithesis, standing over against an objective somewhat called "reality" which is to be distinguished from any

and all conceptions of it. This thought or conception, therefore, transcends itself and thinks a totality of subjective and objective opposed to it. All thought of quality or quiddity involves a limit in which two factors appear—the limiting and the limited.

Gaunilo and Kant¹ both attempt to refute the ontological argument, therefore, by presupposing it as the basis of their discrimination between conception and reality.

That a totality must necessarily exist is the basis of all thought, whether it be dogmatic, or sceptical, or critical. No part can exist by itself; for then it were the all, the totality itself. If there be an ego which thinks, even if it be the ego of the fool (*insipiens*), then there is a whole of existence. This does not as yet say anything of the nature of this whole; it may be the fool himself, for aught that is yet affirmed. It is further examination of the presuppositions of the thought of the totality which we need to determine for us what kind of a being this necessary being is, and whether it is worthy to be called God, or anything else.

The thought of "*Quo majus cogitari nequit*" is not yet the thought of God, although it is the foundation of it. Whatever is implied as necessarily appertaining to the existence of the totality must be thought as necessarily appertaining to the character of the absolute existence, for the total is absolute, or by itself, and not co-ordinated with any other existence. The thought of the totality is the thought of an independent being. As regards its attributes, or qualities, or its properties—all, in short, called its determinations—these must be the product of its own activity, for they cannot be produced upon it by its environment, simply because it has no environment.

The answer to the question as to its nature, then, is that the totality is self-determined, so far as it has determinations or distinctions within it or belonging to it. Any totality that had a nature impressed upon it from some other source than its own energy would be dependent and presuppose a complement outside itself, and thus it would not be the total, but an element of the total. The nature of the total is Self-determination.

It is very important that the technical terms in which this problem is stated be those implying dependence or independence,

¹ See Appendix III to this article.

or determination and self-determination. Many categories of thought have been used in the history of philosophy to express these distinctions, and, by reason of some ambiguity of import, have lost their logical hold on the mind. The terms Finite, Phenomenal, Partial, Transient, and the like, have been used as designations under which one was supposed to think the dependent. It was thought that from these could be inferred as ground their correlatives: The Infinite, or the Noumenal, or the Total, or the Eternal, in a sense that would be adequate as designations of the Divine Being. But all of these, including that of the Total, lack speculative content, or are ambiguous as regards it. Even that of "the total" may be taken immediately as an aggregate of finitudes or as a "*Tout ensemble*," a merely quantitative collection. Within a quantitative whole the parts have no essential relation, but only indifference towards each other.

It may be asked why we are bound to consider the totality as under the category of dependence or of independence rather than as under that of finite or infinite, etc.; and the answer is that the category of dependence or independence is the category of essential relation, while the others are merely subjective distinctions as ordinarily used, and carry no objective implication with them. If something is dependent, it implies a greater reality than itself, of necessity. If finite, or phenomenal, or part, or transient imply a higher reality, it is because they contain the idea of dependence in them." It is the latter category alone that is not ambiguous and liable to be understood in a subjective import. It was the use of the term "Majus" by Saint Anselm that made it possible to misunderstand his argument and give it a quantitative interpretation. It was the use of the term "Perfect" by Descartes that made it possible to misinterpret it and to give to it a merely subjective validity, as a discrimination implying no objective complement of reality. It made it possible to regard those thoughts as co-ordinate with other thoughts. Gaunilo instanced the island "Atlantis," whose ideal conception did not in the least prove its actual existence. Kant instanced the idea of a hundred dollars, the conception of which as being in my pocket did not at all enhance my actual wealth. In neither case was the instance an example of a dependent being whose actuality was the total and independent being. On the contrary, their actuality itself

would be only the protasis whose apodosis would be some independent being.

The dependent being posits, as necessary ground of it, the independent being. This is not to be thought as another dependent being, which, again, depends upon another dependent being, and so on to infinity. For the complement upon which the finite or dependent is affirmed to depend, if itself dependent, belongs to the dependent already posited, and with it constitutes the dependent which demands the independent upon which it can repose. The dependent cannot depend upon a dependent again, because the dependent has nothing of its own to give to the dependent. All that it gives is merely transmitted from the self-supported or independent. The series must be thought as complete, or, if thought as incomplete, we have the thought of the dependent by itself, without its complement, and hence as without anything to depend on, and consequently as NOT-dependent, or as independent already. It is impossible to escape this necessity of thought by any sophism or subterfuge—even under the respectable name of “Antinomy of Pure Reason.” We always find ourselves face to face with the dilemma: Either the dependent depends upon that which can yield it support of its own (and is a final term, for this reason, because self-supported), or else the dependent depends upon nothing that can give it any support, and hence it is not dependent upon anything, but is really independent so far as it is at all. To think an infinite series does not help the matter at all. The question always recurs: Does this being really depend or not? To think a series of terms in the complement of the dependent term is a purely arbitrary matter, and is a matter of division simply. You may think the complement as made up of a quantum infinitely divisible if you choose—nothing prevents—it is indifferent to the question. It is the same whether we say it once or repeat it forever, says Simplicius in regard to the sophism of the “Achilles,” which depends upon the infinite division of space and time—Achilles being unable to overtake the tortoise while you are engaged in completing your division of space into its ultimates! The conception of a “*Regressus in Infinitum*” is the alternative set up by Kant in his antinomies in order to humble the intellect into admitting the insolubility of the problems of pure reason. All such forms of

Regressus or Progressus already presuppose the actual solution of the antinomy by the intelligence that can state such a Progressus as necessary. A *Progressus in Infinitum* is set up only when the intellect discovers a necessary connection between two terms and then tries to think them as in succession. After A must be thought B, and after B must be thought A, again. Here is a *Progressus in Infinitum*: for you cannot leave off with either term; each implies the other as its limit. In that case the thought is that of self-determination, and self-determination is therefore the solution of the antinomy. This will become evident if one considers it as follows: (a) A implies B; (b) but B implies A; (c) hence, A implies itself (through the implication of B); (d) and, likewise, B implies itself (through the implication of A).

It reduces to the general formula: A determines B; B determines A; hence, A determines itself through B.

While the conception of a dependent being implies the conception of a corresponding including totality that is independent, the conception of a dependent being by no means implies the existence of that dependent being. It may or may not exist, it is entirely contingent. *If* the dependent being exists, *then* the independent being exists which is its ground.

What else follows from the concept of an independent being? That is to say: what attributes if any must necessarily be predicated of a being that is a total and independent being? Are its attributes to resemble such as we attribute to a dependent being? An answer to these questions ought to settle for us whether the totality is divine or diabolical, or of an indifferent nature.

First, is the totality anything more than the aggregate of finite existences? If not, it is merely a quantitative sum and no unity in a qualitative sense. Such a totality, though it were the reality, would be no concept of God, for it would be the sum of realities and not the sum of reality. Each reality within the all would be independent. But this would imply its limitation by the others, and it would thus be qualitative instead of quantitative. Each would have an environment. Each would be what it is because of its environment, and then the All would determine each, and, therefore, the All would be the source of the determination of each, and would, therefore, destroy the independence of the sep-

arate realities. The total, therefore, cannot be a quantitative aggregate of separate, independent realities.

In place of such indifferent realities, we should have a negative unity—that is to say, a unity in which the parts or particular realities lose themselves and in which their reality is destroyed. The unity would determine all the parts within it as a totality of conditions is conceived to determine each thing, or necessitate its nature.

This standpoint of necessity is a deeper reflection than that which conceives the totality as an aggregate of independent realities. The latter view denies all validity to universals and makes them a mere convenient artifice adopted by the mind for classification. Each atomic thing is regarded by this theory as a plenum of reality, and all else has only a conceptual existence. But such a thought cannot bear the test of reflection. Such a world of independent things loses its aspect of independence when we think it more carefully, and is seen to be a world of relative existences—each thing dependent on its environment. In the place of independent, self-existent things, we have dependence upon relation to others—external necessity. According to this view, if you destroy a grain of sand you destroy the equilibrium of the universe of matter.

If the totality of conditions determines or necessitates each thing to be what it is and will not let it become other, there is no freedom on the part of individual realities and no self-activity. But the totality, being a determining unity, and being itself the all, cannot be co-ordinate to anything, and still less subordinate to anything else. Its activity is accordingly self-activity—or activity originating in itself and by itself and for its own purpose. This makes the totality a free activity.

The doctrine of Fate or necessity, therefore, presupposes freedom as its ground, freedom as the form of the activity of the whole, or totality. Necessity is conceived as the relation existing between the part and the whole—the part gets its determinations from the whole. Any finite object like an atom or atomic thing finds its limits derived from outside of it, and yet those limits are its quality, its distinguishing characteristics, its individuality, in short. This makes the essential quality or quiddity of a thing a relativity. But this is so only because the necessity

or the total is assumed as having all the energy or determining-power.

The concept of "*Quo majus cogitari nequit*," therefore, involves the thought of a self-determining being as the absolute. With this thought firmly fixed in one's mind as the ultimate presupposition, the idea of the totality is not an idea of a diabolic, nor an indifferent being, but the idea of a divine being in the sense taught in religion. A negative unity in which all things lost their individuality, and which was itself devoid of all attributes and relations, would be diabolical in its conduct towards the existences of the world: for it would be unmerciful towards them and destructive of them. Indifferent to all their distinctions, it would serve the good the same treatment that it offered the bad.

"Shadow and sunlight are the same,
The vanished gods to me appear,
And ONE TO ME ARE SHAME AND FAME."

But a self-determining being as the Absolute or total would be a creative being; for there is involved in the determination of the self an activity, the determining; and likewise a passivity, the determined. But the duality of determining and determined, of active and passive, cannot be absolute or final, for the reason that it is the self that is both. The self determines itself, therefore, not as passive—as determined—but as active as determining. If this were not so there would be self-contradiction, nay, even self-annihilation; for the activity would act simply to produce the extinguishment of activity.

This thought of the necessity of equality in the two phases that appear in a self-determining being is the thought which develops a concrete idea of the divine nature.

Only by the sameness of the second phase with the first phase can the first have identity with itself: only by the identity of the determined with the determining—the identity of the passive with the active—can the self-determined being be and remain itself. This necessity of thought is the ground of the proof that the totality which all thought presupposes is God, and not pure nought or Brahm. The self-determining, therefore, determines itself as self-determining; that is to say, the self-determined determines itself, and is thus identical with the first self-determining.

In the second phase, the first reflects its independence, freedom, and self-activity.

But there is another phase: the self-determined that makes itself self-determining has its object or passivity to annul in order to become identical with the first. This is a process of making real its passivity and its activity as annulling that passivity. Thus arises a world that contains both elements—fate or passivity (determined-ness) and activity (determining-ness). It appears as a Creation beginning with chaos or pure space and rising through nature to man; with man begins the realm of the manifestation of freedom or the self-determining-ness. In the world of humanity, as developed throughout the cosmos in an infinity of worlds, there is an ascent into the identity with the First. The First is primordially self-active; the Second is BECOME self-active, but from eternity; the third is BECOMING self-active, and is in all stages of progress, from the passivity of chaos, or pure space, up to the most perfect humanity that has developed on any one of the infinite number of worlds.

The relation of the First to the second is that of freedom, because it is created in the very act of freedom. The relation of the second to the first is that of freedom; for it has annulled its derivativeness from eternity and is free activity; the relation of the third is that of ascent into freedom, having begun in passivity or nature, and received energy or freedom from the second.¹

Whatever one may find by investigation of the necessary presuppositions of the absolute self-determined being will be also ultimate data of consciousness even for the fool (*insipiens*). If these conclusions from the logical presuppositions are not warranted, it makes no difference so far as the validity of the argument of Anselm is concerned. Whatever does follow, is the idea of the divine—and it is impossible to escape having some idea of the divine.

The principle of "*Progressus in Infinitum*" has been referred to as used by Kant in establishing his antinomies.

It has been used in negative philosophy ever since the time of the Sophists, and in our own time it has been adopted from Kant

¹ In an article on "The Personality of God" in the "North American Review" for September, 1880, I have treated this subject further.

by Sir William Hamilton and his disciples, and again by Herbert Spencer. The inconceivability of an infinite progress is made a sufficient ground for pronouncing the inconceivability of anything that may involve an infinite progress. Self-Existence (by Herbert Spencer), the infinitude of space (by Hamilton), and all notions that relate to the divine, are made unthinkable because they imply what is inconceivable. But, in the first place, there is nothing in the universe that does not involve an infinite progress in some shape or other; in the second place, the infinite progress, so far from being inconceivable, is the most conceivable of ideas. In fact, it is an element in all that is conceivable.

Since any finite thing is divisible, and division does not change the nature of that which is divided, so as to make the parts reached by division indivisible, it follows that the operation may be repeated *ad infinitum*, or, in other words, that things are infinitely divisible. Hence nothing can be conceived at all if involving an infinite progress prevents us conceiving it.

Moreover, since the conception of quantity is the basis of the conception of thing in general, and quantity involves the unity of the ideas of discreteness and continuity, it follows that infinite divisibility is inseparable from the conception of thing, but that it makes its thought possible through the fact that infinite divisibility is another name for the union of discreteness and continuity—the elements or factors of the idea of quantity. It will be seen that this holds true not only of space but also of time, quantity being constituent of both thoughts. Remove quantity and endeavor to think things or events: you will remove the ideas of discreteness and continuity, and your object will become devoid of succession and extension. It will then become devoid also of all relation to others or to itself, and will then become in very fact inconceivable—but inconceivable because it is a non-entity, and a non-entity cannot be conceived without elevating it out of its non-entity into at least a conceptual existence. All forms of relativity involve infinite progress, because Relativity involves Identity and Difference in unity. If you undertake to think identity and difference in succession, you have an infinite progress—and this is only a result of trying to think the conceptual elements of Relativity singly. In thinking each, its other appears as the attribute of it. Each “shines,” as Hegel says, “in the

other," or is reflected in it. Hence, in thinking relativity we imagine, first, two terms, one of which depends upon the other; next we think dependence also in the second term, and it, too, depends upon a third; approaching the third, we apply, again, the same category of dependence, and at once the depended-upon (*i. e.*, the complement of the dependent) flits away into a more remote term. The basis of this thought-play is the necessity of thinking difference as well as identity, and of thinking them in the same term. The naive intellect, unaware of its laws of reflection, fails to note the implied unity of the two elements in one being. When it recognizes the necessity of the unity in one being of both conceptual elements, it changes both into the higher concept and finds no longer the progress or succession. The thought of quantity is infinite as regards discreteness and continuity. The thought of Relativity is infinite as regards the thoughts of difference and identity. But the true idea of relativity is self-relation, for that is the union in one of difference and identity. The inconceivability of the infinite regress of causality—the effect presupposing a cause that is again an effect and again posits a cause antecedent, etc.—is solved the moment we think cause and effect in one being and have *causa sui*. Hegel uses "Begriff" to mean this idea of *causa sui*, or the self-determined being.

The solution of the Infinite Progress is the solution of the difficulty in the way of acceptance of Anselm's proof of the being of God. We have all of the elements present in our mind, but do not recognize them. We discriminate and yet unite the terms, affirming, on the strength of our perception of the necessary unity, that neither is a whole without the other, but separating them in order to comply with our insight into the necessary distinction. We posit the subjective as incomplete and as implying an objective which is different from the concept. This difference from the concept is conceived as independence of the concept—"The concept of a hundred dollars does not add anything to my possessions." But there is an objective, and hence the subjective is characterized as defective. The objective is distinctly posited as independent of the subjective, and as not conditioned by the latter. Here is, therefore, the necessity of the objectivity of one of our ideas made the basis of our discrimination between another

idea and its object. We see the independence of the objective, and, never doubting the objectivity of this our idea of objectivity, we proceed to discriminate between all concepts and their corresponding reality. The totality is the union of subjective and objective; this totality is presupposed as the basis of our critical attitude when we side with Kant or Gaunilo. Let go the conviction of the unity of thought and being in this, its last stronghold, and at once all idea of the distinction between thought and being vanishes, for the idea of objective being vanishes utterly, and there is now no distinction possible between thoughts that are adequate to the existing reality and those that are not. Hence we have a dialectical procedure in Hegel's¹ meaning and not in the Kantian import of the term dialectic. We find ourselves in the dilemma that makes us affirm an objectivity corresponding to our thought, and, if we take the horn of denial, we are likewise affirming the same thing as the basis of our denial. As already shown, they attempt to refute the ontological argument by denying necessary objectivity to *Quo majus cogitari nequit*, or to the thought of a totality, but they presuppose in this all validity for their discrimination between a mere concept and its corresponding reality, and hence they parade their idea of reality as of superior validity to the idea of the totality as expressed by Anselm and Descartes. But it is only the same idea of totality, after all, which is in the thought of Anselm and Kant. Anselm calls this idea of totality God, and finds in it the ultimate presupposition of all thought; Kant posits a reality which does not correspond to the concept, and, therefore, posits the reality of the totality as including both subjective and objective.

APPENDIX I.

PASSAGES from "Saint Anselm's Proslogium." (From the translation in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Volume viii., beginning at page 529; the refutation of Gaunilo and Anselm's rejoinder begin at page 699 of the same volume. Translated by Rev. J. S. Maginnis.)

From III. *That God cannot be conceived not to exist.*

"Indeed, so truly does this exist, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For it is possible to conceive of the existence of something which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than that which can be conceived not to exist. Wherefore,

¹ See Appendix IV to this article.

if that, than which a greater cannot be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, then this something, than which a greater cannot be conceived, is something than which a greater can be conceived; which is a contradiction. So truly, therefore, does something exist, than which a greater cannot be conceived, that it is impossible to conceive this not to exist. And this art Thou, O Lord our God! so truly, therefore, dost thou exist, O Lord my God, that thou canst not be conceived not to exist. For this there is the highest reason. For, if any mind could conceive of anything better than thou art, then the creature could ascend above the Creator and become his judge; which is supremely absurd. Everything else, indeed, which exists besides thee, can be conceived not to exist. Thou alone, therefore, of all things, hast being in the truest sense, and, consequently, in the highest degree; for everything else that is, exists not so truly, and has, consequently, being only in an inferior degree. Why, therefore, has the fool said in his heart there is no God? since it is so manifest to an intelligent mind, that of all things thine existence is the highest reality. Why, unless because he is a fool, and destitute of reason?"

From XV. *That the greatness of God transcends conception.*

"Therefore, O Lord, not only art thou that than which nothing greater can be conceived, but thy greatness transcends all conception. For since it is possible to conceive that there is something whose greatness transcends all conception, if thou art not this very thing, then something greater than thou art can be conceived, which is impossible."

From XX. *That God is before all things, and beyond (ultra) all things, even things which are eternal.*

"Therefore Thou dost fill and embrace all things; Thou art before and beyond all things. Before all things, because, before they were brought forth, Thou art. But how art Thou beyond all things? for, in what way art Thou beyond things which have no end? Is it that these things can in no wise exist without thee, but that Thou wouldst nevertheless exist even if these should return to nothing? for in this way Thou art in a certain sense beyond these things. It is also that these things can be conceived to have an end, but that no end can be conceived of Thee? For in this way they have an end in a certain sense, but in no sense can this be affirmed of Thee. And surely that which, in no sense, has an end, is beyond that which has an end in some sense. Dost Thou transcend all things, even eternal things, in this sense also, that Thine entire eternity and theirs is present before Thee; while of their eternity they see not as yet that which is to come, and behold no longer that which is past? For, in this way Thou art always beyond these things; since Thou art always present at that point, or rather that point is always present to Thee, at which they have not arrived" [*i. e.*, The *esse* of "Quo majus non cogitari potest" transcends any *feri*].

From XXIII. *That this supreme good is equally the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; that he is the only necessary being; that he is the whole, the absolute, the only good.*

"Thou art this good, O God; the Father; and thy Word that is thy Son, is this good. For in the Word, by which thou dost declare thyself, there can be nothing else than thou art, nor anything either greater or less, since thy Word is as true as thou art veracious. And therefore thy Word is, as thou art, truth itself, and not another truth than thou art; and so simple art thou that nothing else than what thou art can spring from thee. This same good is love identical with that which is common to thee and

to thy Son; that is to say, it is the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son. For this same love is not inferior to thee nor to thy Son; for, so far as thou lovest thyself and the Son, and so far as the Son loves thee and himself, so great art thou and he; this cannot be anything different from thyself and thy Son, which is not unequal to thyself and to him; nor can anything proceed from absolute simplicity, but that itself from which it proceeds. But that which each is, this the whole Trinity is, at one and the same time, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, since each is no other than simple and absolute unity, and supreme, absolute simplicity, which can neither be multiplied nor be now one thing and then another. Moreover, there is but one necessary being; and he in whom is all good is this one necessary being; nay, he is himself the whole, the one supreme and the only good."

The following passages from the original will convey an idea of Anselm's style and use of technique:

From Chapter II. "Bonum, quo majus nihil cogitari potest, intelligit utique quod audit, et quod intelligit utique in ejus intellectu est, etiam si non intelligit illud esse.

"Convincitur ergo insipiens esse vel in intellectu aliquid bonum quo majus cogitari nequit, quia hoc quum audit intelligit, et quidquid intelligitur in intellectu est. Ad certe id quo majus cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim quo majus cogitari non potest, in solo intellectu foret, utique eo quo majus cogitari non potest, majus cogitari potest. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re."

From Chapter III. "Hoc ipsum autem sic vere est, ut nec cogitari possit non esse. Nam potest cogitari aliquid esse, quod non possit cogitari non esse, quod majus est utique eo, quod non esse cogitari potest. Quare si id, quo majus nequit cogitari, potest cogitari non esse, id ipsum quo majus cogitari nequit, non est id quo majus cogitari nequit, quod convenire non potest. Vere ergo est aliquid, quo majus cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse, et hoc es tu, Domine Deus noster."

APPENDIX II.

PASSAGES from Descartes' "Third Meditation." (Translated by W. R. Walker. *Jour. Spec. Phil.*, vol. iv.)

"Now, it is a thing manifest by the natural light that there should be at least as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect: for whence can the effect derive its reality, if not from its cause? and how can this cause communicate it, if it has it not in itself? And thence it follows, not only that nothing cannot produce anything, but also that what is more perfect—that is, which contains in itself more reality cannot be a consequence of and depend upon the less perfect; and this truth is not only clear and evident in the effects which have that reality which philosophers call actual or formal, but also in the ideas in which are considered only the reality which they call objective: for example, the stone which has not yet been, not only cannot now begin to be if it is not produced by something possessing in itself formally and eminently all that enters into the composition of the stone—that is, containing in itself the very things, or others more excellent, which are in the stone; and heat cannot be produced in a subject which was before devoid of it, except by something of an order, of a degree, or of a kind, at least, as perfect as heat; and so of other things.

"Now, among all those ideas within me, besides that which represents me to myself, as to which there cannot here be any difficulty, there is another which represents to

me a God; others, things corporeal and inanimate; others, angels; others, animals and others, finally, which represent to me men like myself. But as regards the ideas which represent to me other men, or animals, or angels, I easily conceive that they might be formed by the mixture and composition of other ideas which I have of things corporeal and of God, although outside of me there should be no other men in the world, neither any animals, nor any angels. And as regards the ideas of things corporeal, I do not recognize in them anything so great or excellent, that might not, as it seems to me, come from myself; for if I consider them more closely and examine them in the same fashion in which I yesterday examined the idea of the wax, I find that there occur but very few things which I conceive clearly and distinctly—namely, magnitude, or rather extension in length, breadth, and depth, the figure which results from the termination of this extension, the situation which variously shaped bodies maintain among themselves, and the movement or change of this situation, to which may be added substance, duration, and number.

“There remains only the idea of God, as to which it is necessary to consider whether there is anything in it which could come from myself. By the term “God,” I understand a substance infinite, eternal, immovable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which myself and all other things that are (if it be true that there are any that exist) were created and produced. But these prerogatives are so great and exalted, that, the more attentively I consider them, the less am I persuaded that the idea I have of them can derive its origin from myself alone. And, consequently, the necessary conclusion from all that I have before said is that God exists: for although the idea of substance is in me from the very fact that I am a substance, I, who am a finite being, should not, however, have the idea of an infinite substance, if it had not been put within me by some really infinite substance.

“And I ought not to imagine that I do not conceive the infinite by a real idea, but only by the negation of what is finite, just as I comprehend rest and darkness by the negation of motion and light; since, on the contrary, I see manifestly that there is more reality in the infinite substance than in the finite, and, consequently, that I have in some fashion within me the notion of the infinite rather than of the finite—that is, of God rather than of myself; for how is it possible that I can know that I doubt and that I desire—that is, that something is wanting to me, and that I am not altogether perfect—if I had not in me any idea of a being more perfect than my own, by the comparison with which I may know the defects of my nature?

“And it cannot be said that perhaps this idea of God is materially false, and, consequently, that I could derive it from nothing; that is, that it might be in me by reason of my defect, as I have just said of the ideas of heat and cold and other like things; for, on the contrary, this idea being very clear and distinct, and containing in itself more objective reality than any other, there is nothing which of itself is more true, or which can be less suspected of error and falsity.

“This idea, I say, of a Being sovereignly perfect and infinite is very true; for although, perhaps, one might pretend that such a Being does not exist, it cannot, however, be pretended that the idea of him does not represent something real, as I have just said of the idea of cold. It is also very clear and distinct, since all that my mind conceives clearly and distinctly as real and true, and which contains in itself any perfection, is entirely contained and included in this idea. And this remains none the less true because I do not comprehend the infinite, and there are in God an infinitude of things which I cannot comprehend, or perhaps even reach by any stretch of the

mind; for it is of the nature of the infinite that I, who am finite and limited, cannot comprehend it; and it is enough that I understand this, and judge that all the things which I conceive clearly, and in which I know there is some perfection, and perhaps also an infinitude of others of which I am ignorant, are in God formally or eminently, in order that the idea which I have of them may be the most true, the most clear, and the most distinct of all those that are in my mind.

“But it may also be that I am something more than I imagine, and that all the perfections I attribute to the nature of a God are in some fashion potentially in me, although they are not yet brought forth and are not made apparent by their actions. Indeed, I already experience that by degrees my knowledge is increasing and being perfected; and I see nothing which could prevent its being thus more and more increased to infinity; or why, being thus increased and perfected, I should not be able to acquire in this way all the other perfections of the divine nature; or, finally, why the power which I have for the acquisition of these perfections, if it be true that this power is now in me, should not be sufficient to produce the ideas of them. However, regarding the matter a little more closely, I discover that this cannot be; for, in the first place, although it were true that my knowledge every day acquires new degrees of perfection, and that there were in my nature many things potentially which are not actually there, yet all these advantages do not belong to or approach in any sort the idea I have of the Divinity, in which there is nothing that is only potential, but everything is there actually and in reality. And, indeed, is it not an infallible and very certain argument for the imperfection of my knowledge, that it grows gradually and increases by degrees? Moreover, although my knowledge should grow from more to more, yet I ought not, therefore, to conceive that it could be actually infinite, since it would never reach a point of perfection so high that it would not be still capable of acquiring a much larger increase. But I conceive God actually infinite in so high a degree that nothing can be added to the sovereign perfection which he possesses. And, finally, I comprehend clearly that the objective being of an idea cannot be produced by a being which exists only potentially; which, properly speaking, is nothing, but only by a formal or actual being.

“But perhaps this being on whom I depend is not God, and I may have been produced either by my parents, or by some other cause less perfect than he. Far from it—that cannot be; for, as I have already said, it is very evident that there should be at least as much reality in the cause as in the effect; and, consequently, since I am a thing that thinks and that has in itself some idea of God, whatever may be the cause of my being, it must be admitted that this cause is also a thing that thinks, and that it was in itself the idea of all the perfections that I attribute to God. Then we may investigate anew whether this cause derives its origin and existence from itself or from anything. For, if it derives its origin from itself, it follows, from the reasons I have before advanced, that this cause is God: since, having the virtue of being and of existing by itself, it must unquestionably have the power of actually possessing all the perfections of which it has in itself the ideas; that is to say, all those that I conceive to be in God. But if it derives its existence from some other cause than itself, it will be asked once more, for the same reason, as to this second cause, whether it exists of itself or is from another cause, until, step by step, we arrive at length at a final cause, which will be found to be God. And it is very manifest that in this there cannot be progress to the infinite, since the question here is not so much as to the cause which before produced me as to that which now preserves me.”

APPENDIX III.

PASSAGES from "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason," "Transcendental Dialectic," Book II., chap. iii., section 4 (translation of Meiklejohn) "Of the Impossibility of the Ontological Proof of the Existence of God."

"If, in an identical judgment, I annihilate the predicate in thought and retain the subject, a contradiction is the result; and hence I say, the former belongs necessarily to the latter. But if I suppress both subject and predicate in thought, no contradiction arises; for there is nothing at all, and therefore no means of forming a contradiction. To suppose the existence of a triangle and not that of its three angles, is self-contradictory; but to suppose the non-existence of both triangle and angles is perfectly admissible. And so is it with the conception of an absolutely necessary being. Annihilate its existence in thought, and you annihilate the thing itself with all its predicates; how, then, can there be any room for contradiction? Externally, there is nothing to give rise to a contradiction, for a thing cannot be necessary externally; nor internally, for, by the annihilation or suppression of the thing itself, its internal properties are also annihilated. God is omnipotent—that is a necessary judgment. His omnipotence cannot be denied if the existence of a Deity is posited—the existence, that is, of an infinite being, the two conceptions being identical. But when you say, God does not exist, neither omnipotence nor any other predicate is affirmed; they must all disappear with the subject, and in this judgment there cannot exist the least self-contradiction.

"It is affirmed that there is one, and only one, conception in which the non-being or annihilation of the object is self-contradictory, and this is the conception of an *ens realissimum*. It possesses, you say, all reality, and you feel yourselves justified in admitting the possibility of such a being. (This I am willing to grant for the present, although the existence of a conception which is not self-contradictory is far from being sufficient to prove the possibility of an object.) Now, the notion of all reality embraces in it that of existence; the notion of existence lies, therefore, in the conception of this possible thing. If this thing is annihilated in thought, the internal possibility of the thing is also annihilated, which is self-contradictory.

"I answer: It is absurd to introduce—under whatever term disguised—into the conception of the thing, which is to be cogitated solely in reference to its possibility, the conception of its existence. If this is admitted, you will have apparently gained the day, but in reality have enounced nothing but a mere tautology. I ask, is the proposition, this or that thing (which I am admitting to be possible) exists, an analytical or a synthetical proposition? If the former, there is no addition made to the subject of your thought by the affirmation of its existence; but either the conception in your minds is identical with the thing itself, or you have supposed the existence of a thing to be possible, and then inferred its existence from its internal possibility—which is but a miserable tautology. The word reality in the conception of the thing, and the word existence in the conception of the predicate, will not help you out of the difficulty. For, supposing you were to term all positing of a thing reality, you have thereby posited the thing with all its predicates in the conception of the subject and assumed its actual existence, and this you merely repeat in the predicate. But if you confess, as every reasonable person must, that every existential proposition is synthetical, how can it be maintained that the predicate of existence cannot be denied with contradiction—a property which is the characteristic of analytical propositions alone?

"I should have a reasonable hope of putting an end forever to this sophistical mode

of argumentation by a strict definition of the conception of existence, did not my own experience teach me that the illusion arising from our confounding a logical with a real predicate (a predicate which aids in the determination of a thing) resists almost all the endeavors of explanation and illustration. A logical predicate may be what you please, even the subject may be predicated of itself; for logic pays no regard to the content of a judgment. But the determination of a conception is a predicate, which adds to and enlarges the conception. It must not, therefore, be contained in the conception.

“Being is evidently not a real predicate—that is, a conception of something which is added to the conception of some other thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations in it. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition, God is omnipotent, contains two conceptions which have a certain object or content; the word *is*, is no additional predicate—it merely indicates the relation of the predicate to the subject. Now, if I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being one) and say *God is*, or, *there is a God*, I add no new predicate to the conception of God; I merely posit or affirm the existence of the subject with all its predicates—I posit the object in relation to my conception. The content of both is the same; and there is no addition made to the conception, which expresses merely the possibility of the object, by my cogitating the object—in the expression, it is—as absolutely given or existing. Thus the real contains no more than the possible. A hundred real dollars contains no more than a hundred possible dollars, for, as the latter indicate the conception, and the former the object, on the supposition that the content of the former was greater than that of the latter, my conception would not be an expression of the whole object, and would consequently be an inadequate conception of it. In another sense (in my possessions), however, it may be said that there is more in a hundred real dollars than in a hundred possible dollars—that is, in the mere conception of them. For the real object—the dollars—is not analytically contained in my conception, but forms a synthetical addition to my conception (which is merely a determination of my mental state), although this objective reality—this existence—apart from my conception, does not in the least degree increase the aforesaid hundred dollars.

“By whatever, and by whatever number of, predicates—even to the complete determination of it—I may cogitate a thing, I do not in the least augment the object of my conception by the addition of the statement, this thing exists. Otherwise, not exactly the same, but something more than what was cogitated in my conception, would exist, and I could not affirm that the exact object of my conception had real existence. If I cogitate a thing as containing all modes of reality except one, the mode of reality which is absent is not added to the conception of the thing by the affirmation that the thing exists; on the contrary, the thing exists—if it exists at all—with the same defect as that cogitated in its conception; otherwise not that which was cogitated, but something different, exists. Now, if I cogitate a being as the highest reality, without defect or imperfection, the question still remains—whether this being exists or not? For, although no element is wanting in the possible real content of my conception, here is a defect in its relation to my mental state—that is, I am ignorant whether the cognition of the object indicated by the conception is possible *a posteriori*. And here the cause of the present difficulty becomes apparent. If the question regarded an object of sense merely, it would be impossible for me to confound the conception with the existence of a thing. For the conception merely enables me to cogitate an object as according with the general conditions of experience; while the existence of the object permits

me to cogitate it as contained in the sphere of actual experience. At the same time, this connection with the world of experience does not in the least augment the conception, although a possible perception has been added to the experience of the mind. But if we cogitate existence by the pure category alone, it is not to be wondered at that we should find ourselves unable to present any criterion sufficient to distinguish it from mere possibility.

“Whatever be the content of our conception of an object, it is necessary to go beyond it, if we wish to predicate existence of the object. In the case of sensuous objects, this is attained by their connection according to empirical laws with some one of my perceptions; but there is no means of cognizing the existence of objects of pure thought, because it must be cognized completely *a priori*. But all our knowledge of existence (be it immediately by perception, or by inferences connecting some object with a perception) belongs entirely to the sphere of experience—which is in perfect unity with itself; and although an existence out of this sphere cannot be absolutely declared to be impossible, it is a hypothesis, the truth of which we have no means of ascertaining.

“The notion of a supreme being is, in many respects, a highly useful idea; but, for the very reason that it is an idea, it is incapable of enlarging our cognition with regard to the existence of things. It is not even sufficient to instruct us as to the possibility of a being which we do not know to exist. The analytical criterion of possibility, which consists in the absence of contradiction in propositions, cannot be denied it. But the connection of real properties in a thing is a synthesis of the possibility of which an *a priori* judgment cannot be formed, because these realities are not presented to us specifically; and, even if this were to happen, a judgment would still be impossible, because the criterion of the possibility of synthetical cognitions must be sought for in the world of experience, to which the object of an idea cannot belong. And thus the celebrated Leibnitz has utterly failed in his attempt to establish, upon *a priori* grounds, the possibility of this sublime ideal being.

“The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of a Supreme Being is therefore insufficient; and we may as well hope to increase our stock of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas, as the merchant to augment his wealth by the addition of nougts to his cash account.”

APPENDIX IV.

PASSAGES from “Hegel’s Encyclopædia,” §§ 49, 50, 51, “the second attitude of thought towards the objective world,” treating of the Kantian philosophy. (Translation of Wallace.)

“The third object of the Reason is God; He also must be known and evaluated in terms of thought. But, in comparison with an unalloyed identity, any evaluation in precise terms seems to the understanding to be a limit, and a negation: so that all reality must be invested with boundlessness or indeterminateness. Accordingly, God, when he is defined to be the sum of all realities, the most real of beings, turns into a mere abstraction. And the only head under which that most real of real things, or abstract identity, can be brought into articulate form, is the equally abstract category of Being. These are the two elements, an abstract identity, on one hand, which is spoken of in this place as the Notion; and Being on the other, which Reason seeks to reconcile into unity. And their union is the ideal of Reason.”

“To carry out this union, two ways or two forms are admissible. Either we may begin with Being and proceed to the abstraction called Thought; or, the movement may begin with the abstraction and end in Being.”

“The other way of union, by which we seek to realize the Ideal of Reason, is to set out from the abstractum of Thought and seek to characterize it; for which purpose Being is the only available term. This is the method of the Ontological proof. The opposition, which is here presented solely from the subjective side, lies between Thought and Being; whereas, in the first way of junction, Being is common to the two sides of the antithesis, and the contrast lies between individualized and universal. Understanding meets this second way with what is implicitly the same objection as it met the first. As it denied that the empirical involves the specialization, which specialization in this instance is Being. In other words, it says: Being cannot be deduced from the Notion by any analysis.”

“The unexampled favor and acceptance which attended Kant’s criticism of the Ontological proof was undoubtedly due to the illustration which he made use of. To mark the difference between Thought and Being, he took the instance of a hundred sovereigns, which, for anything it matters to the Notion, are the same hundred whether they are real or only possible, though the difference of the two cases is very perceptible in their effect on a man’s purse. Nothing can be more obvious than that anything we only think or fancy is not on that account actual; and everybody is aware that a conception, and even a notion, is no match for Being. Still, it may not unfairly be styled a barbarism in language, when the name of Notion is given to things like a hundred sovereigns. And, putting that mistake aside, those who like to taunt the philosophic idea with the difference between Being and Thought might have admitted that philosophers were not wholly ignorant of the fact. Can there be anything pettier in knowledge than this? Above all, it is well to remember, when we speak of God, that we have an object of another kind than any hundred sovereigns, and unlike any particular notion, conceit, or whatever else it may be styled. The very nature of everything finite is expressed by saying that its Being in time and space is discrepant from its Notion. God, on the contrary, ought to be what can only be ‘thought as existing;’ His Notion involves Being. It is this unity of the Notion and Being that constitutes the notion of God.”

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

THE SADDEST OF THOUGHTS.

[In printing these lines in our July number we made so many mistakes that we reprint them entire in this place.—EDITOR.]

The saddest thought that ever found its way
Into the curious chamber of the mind,
Is, that to close the latest earthly day
Sums all of life; that all is final blind
Dispose of elements, nor shall we find
Rest other than the dusty remnants have
Which were our bodies and the soul enshrined,
Then to be parted like th' unmeaning wave,
Unfriendly atoms all, forth wandering from the grave!
B. R. BULKLEY.

*PROFESSOR PREYER'S ARTICLE ON PSYCHOGENESIS—
CORRIGENDA.*

[We are requested by Miss Talbot, whose translation of Dr. Preyer's interesting paper on Psychogenesis appeared in our April number, to print the following *Corrigenda*.—EDITOR.]

P. 162. "The muscles of the face relaxed," instead of "the muscles of sight asleep."

Ibid. "First development of the will," instead of "first of all is the development," etc.

P. 163. Read: "Children born brainless can scream precisely as sound children, therefore the first scream cannot be derived from indigestion, anger," etc.

P. 166, l. 3. "Brain," instead of "intellect."

P. 176. Read: "New-born animals, which astonish us by distinguishing diverse substances without having had any experience in tasting."

P. 178, l. 5. "Impressions," instead of "sensations."

Ibid., l. 9. Read: "The auditory canal is not yet open—its epithelial coatings being pasted together."

Ibid., 2d paragraph. Read: "But after the ear is developed, through no other sense-organ," etc.

P. 179, l. 6 from bottom. Read: "Pigeons without the hemispheres of the brain," for "deaf people without great intelligence."

P. 182. Read: "Vocal sound which can be fixed somewhere," for "noise which can be fixed somewhere."

P. 183. Read: "All the properties of the organism which continually reappear periodically must finally be called hereditary. It may be said that heredity is a form of the law of inertia or the power of inertness in organic nature."

Ibid., l. 10. Read: "Meaning of the word," for "understanding."

P. 188, l. 10. Read: "Aphasia," for "an illness."

Ibid., l. 5 from the bottom. Read: "Evolution," for "existence."

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The Science of Beauty: an Analytical Inquiry into the Laws of *Æsthetics*. By Avary W. Holmes-Forbes, M. A., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister at Law. London: Truebner & Co., Ludgate Hill. 1881.

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The Essence of Christianity. By Ludwig Feuerbach. Translated from the second German edition by Marian Evans, translator of Strauss's "Life of Jesus." Second Edition (being the fifteenth volume of Truebner's English and Foreign Philosophical Library). London: Truebner & Co., Ludgate Hill. 1881.

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Das Problem des Boesen. Eine Metaphysische Untersuchung. Von A. L. Kym. Muenchen: Theodor Ackermann. 1878.

La Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane; Rivista Bimestrale. Diretta da Terenzio Mamiani e Luigi Ferri. Anno XII, Vol. XXIII. Disp. 1, 2, and 3. Febbraio, April, and June, 1881. Roma coi tipi del Salviucci. [Contents for February: (1) Concerning the Ultimate Synthesis of Knowing and Being, a Letter to Professor Bertinaria, by T. Mamiani; (2) Roberto Ardigò's Morals of the Positivists, by Pasquale d'Ercole; (3) Aristotelian and Baconian Induction, by Tullio Ronconi; (4) Two Words addressed to the Civiltà Cattolica, by Luigi Ferri; (5) Bibliography and Book Notices. Contents for April: (1) Philosophy of History—History as the Educator of the Human Race, by Franc. Bonatelli; (2) Sociology: The Precursor of Malthus, by G. Jandelli; (3) Bibliography; The Course of Study in Philosophy in the Italian Universities; The Course in Æsthetics by Professor Tari; Recent Publications. Contents for June: (1) Concerning the Ultimate Synthesis of Knowing and Being, A second Letter to Professor Bertinaria, by T. Mamiani; (2) The Philosophy of Kant: Phenomena and Noumena, by Felice Tocco; (3) On the Philosophic Method of Socrates, by Giuseppe Zuccante; (4) Bibliography Notices; Philosophical Periodicals; Recent Publications; and Index to the Volume.]

Mind: a Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy. London: 1881. [Contents of the January number: (1) Illusions of Introspection, by James Sully; (2) Our Control of Space and Time, by J. Venn; (3) M. Renouvier's Philosophy—Logic, by Shadworth H. Hodgson; (4) The Summum Bonum, by Daniel Greenleaf Thompson; (5) Replies to Criticisms on the Data of Ethics, by Herbert Spencer; (6) Notes and Discussions; (7) Critical Notices; (8) New Books; (9) Miscellaneous. Contents of the April number: (1) Monism, by Edmund Gurney; (2) M. Renouvier's Philosophy—Psychology, by Shadworth H. Hodgson; (3) The Logic of Dictionary-Defining, by Rev. William L. Davidson; (4) Buckle and the Economies of Knowledge, by Alfred W. Benn; (5) Notes and Discussions; (6) Critical Notices; (7) New Books; (8) Miscellaneous.]

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Rivista di Filosofia Scientifica diretta da E. Morselli, R. Ardigo, G. Boccardo, G. Canestrini, G. Sergi. Redattore: G. Buccola. Anno I. Luglio, 1881. Num. 1. Fratelli Dumolard, editori. Torino, direzione della rivista, via della scuole, 5. Milano, Amministrazione della rivista, Corso Vittorio Em., 21. Contents (translated): (1) By Morselli—Philosophy and Science; (2) Ardigo—Individuality in positive Philosophy; (3) By Sergi—The color-sense in perception; (4) By Buccola—Studies in experimental psychology: The duration of the sensations in the elementary psychic acts (with plates illustrating the apparatus for measuring the limits of sensation by means of electric currents); (5) By Delpino—Elements of the biology of plants—1, Introduction; (6) By Canestrini—On heredity in individual characteristics; (7) By Cantoni—Galileo's method in the study of natural law; (8) By Siciliani—On Scientific pedagogy in Italy. Analyses (of books): De La Calle's La Glossologie; book notices and notices of periodicals.

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ΠΑΡΝΑΣΣΟΣ. ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑ ΠΕΡΙΟΔΙΚΟΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΜΗΝΑ ΕΚΔΙΔΟΜΕΝΟΝ [Vol. V, No. 8, September 30, 1881. Published at Athens, at the Parnassean Printing-house, 1881.]

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
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