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[No. 1.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REAL PRESENCE.¹

In speaking of the philosophy of the Real Presence, it is not my aim to prove that Christ ever used the exact words of its alleged institution, or that the words which are attributed to him must be taken in their literal sense, or that, when taken in their literal sense, they imply transubstantiation or consubstantiation, or any other theory as to how He is bodily present in the appearance of bread and wine. These are questions of criticism and theology rather than of philosophy. Philosophy deals only with universal and necessary principles, and it is by them I wish to try the doctrine which has been philosophically objected to on the ground that it contradicts the pure spirituality of the Infinite in presenting Him for worship in a material form and at a definite point of space. And, if I am not mistaken, it will appear at the end of my argument that the grounds which the objection urges against the Real Presence are the strongest of all reasons for believing in it as accordant with the very essence of religion, the nature of God, and the constitution of man.

1. As accordant with the essence of religion, which neither af-

¹ A lecture delivered before the Philosophical Society of Chicago by Rev. R. A. Holland.

firms nor denies the Infinite as infinite and only knows Him in finite conceptions. It is aware that these conceptions do not contain the whole truth, that while they reveal much they also conceal much: but they are the truest form of truth to the religious man, who must feel as well as think God in order to worship him; and truer by far than any so-called philosophic idea which would find Him at the end of a series of abstract postulates and leave Him a mere empty abstract definition. Such definition may give a correct intellectual form of God, and yet lack all of his concrete, living fulness, and the form without the filling would be as untrue as the most indefinite filling without the proper form. Philosophy is only philosophy as it explains the world of nature and man without explaining it away.

The world is, and is what it is. Whether right or wrong, good or bad, it at least is real, and philosophy must first accept its reality and then seek the ideas involved in it. Now, in this real world of humanity we find religion, not as an accident, exceptional and temporary, but as one of its universal and permanent principles. From the fetish-worshipping savage to the Christian saint, however sundered by impassable oceans or supposably diverse in origin, whether in Africa or Asia or Europe or America or the South Sea Islands, all peoples have a religion which grows with their growth in civilization, and which for the same degrees of civilization has a broad similarity of type in creed and ritual, so that the history of the race as a race is simply the history of its religions and of their influence on the manners, customs, laws, and speculations of its various nations.

Now, it is absurd to say that a phase of human nature so universal and constant is a trick or device or scheme or plot of a certain class to gain and keep power over their kind. Such a conspiracy might happen and succeed here or there, but not everywhere without possibility of collusion, unless it were the very norm of human nature so to deceive and be deceived. And if deceit be the root and pith of humanity, that which humanity must unfold in its development, the sooner we stop talking against it the sooner shall we get into line with our destiny, and the more rapidly ripen toward the perfect manhood of mendacity. No, religion, like morality, like art, is the manifestation of a constitutive element of man's nature. It is not the business of philosophy, then,

to create religion or to take its place any more than it is to create or take the place of the world. Here religion is—a great world-fact, and philosophy has nothing to do but to account for it. If Philosophy cannot do this, it may be a good dreamer of what the world might have been or ought to be, and of what religion might have been or ought to be in such a visionary orb; but it can never be a philosophy of the world that really is, and of the religion that is no less really one of the world's prime, essential principles.

Now, religion, as I have said, conceives absolute truth in finite, pictorial, and suggestive, rather than in logical and definitive forms. Religion is akin to art. Indeed, art is her offspring. In the divinities of sculpture and painting she saw and touched with outward sense, which made them seem more real, the truths which were already imaged in her mind. Art, in its first and highest significance, is simply the art of religion. Its masterpieces, which are as young to-day, with promise of immortal beauty, as they were when they first came from the artist's hand, centuries ago—the statued gods of its classic era, and the “*Ecce-Homos*,” “*Transfigurations*,” and “*Madonnas*” of its romantic maturity—were not, as some superficial writers on æsthetics have declared, created for amusement, but for worship. Their immortal beauty comes from their religious inspiration. God was as truly in the hand that wrought them as in the mind of the prophet who described His glory in some mental image, as a King of nations, with crown and trailing robe, or as a Captain of hosts, riding forth to battle in his chariot of clouds. The image is equally an image whether it be sensuous, as in art; or intellectual, as in religion; or both sensuous and intellectual, as when religion employs art in her worship.

It were just as rational, therefore, for philosophy to complain of plastic art that it is not chemistry as to find fault with religion because she does not worship God in the formlessness and timelessness and spacelessness of a purely speculative and unworshipful definition. Her thought of Him may be only an image, but it is a true image of His truth. In a word, her language is poetry, not prose.

With these prefatory remarks, which are necessary to guard what I have to say against possible misinterpretation, I now submit that religion, if she worship at all, must worship the God who

is out of time, as in time; who is out of space, as in space; who is pure spirit without body, parts, and passions, as having all three—passions such as she ascribes to Him in speaking of His anger and vengeance, His pity and love; a body with parts or members such as she gives Him in the thought of His sitting on a throne, bowing down His ear to hear, stretching forth His hand to help, smelling the sweet savor of prayers, having eyes to see the righteous and a countenance to be seen by them in beatific vision. Thus in time He is the God of historic revelation; in space He has a celestial capital where He dwells, whence He sends His angels and His son, and whither His saints shall go to be near Him when they quit the earth. Whatever, then, He may be in speculative definition, to religion He is necessarily a temporal, spatial, and corporeal God. Every objection, therefore, to the doctrine of the Real Presence as presenting Him for worship in material form and local site bears as strongly against the whole mode of religious conception—indeed, against the nature of religion itself. If we cannot regard Him in the forms of bread and wine because they are sensuous, neither can we speak of Him in any such sensuous relation as that of a father who has begotten a son. The sensuous image is equally sensuous whether outside or inside the mind.

If God is not to be worshipped as present on an altar, because the altar fixes his presence within a spatial limit, neither can he be worshipped as in the no less spatial fixity of a seat in heaven. So far as there is any difference between these representations, the altar gives the mere spiritual idea of the manner of His presence. For it brings Him down to earth and makes Him accessible to men not only hereafter but now, localizing Him in so many places at once and for spiritual discernment under such elementary forms, as must be spiritualized to have any significance whatever, that its very localization displays the ubiquity of his presence, even as the light that is seen in a diamond's sparkle shows the unseen light that fills all the air.

And without such a placing and visible sign of Deity, there can be no consistent act of worship. Men may adore Him as a thought by some inner rapture of thinking, but they cannot make their adoration an external act without implying some external object to which it is paid. The same principle that forbids a sensuous object of devotion forbids a sensuous ceremony. Ritual, elaborate

or simple, has no reason except in the faith of a Real Presence. Why go to church to meet a God who is not there? Why build the lofty minster, with its sky-like nave and pillared aisles and "storied windows richly dight," and mural decorations of emblem and of image, and solemn chancel towards which all the minster's other architecture and ornament lead eye and foot, except as the palace of a God who dwells within it? Why kneel down before an absent God, or sing choral anthems to an unsensuous God who has no delight in sound?

Is all this a mere make-believe? Do you build the church for your own pride of sight? When you go there, is it with the thought that you might as well have met the Omnipresent in your sitting-room? When you kneel and stand, utter aloud your prayer and praise, are you only feigning physical worship for the effect it will have on your religious feeling? Then not God but yourself is the real object of your devotions. You are the end which He serves as a humble means and instrument. You call and dismiss Him with a beck, and consciously falsify His nature that the deceit of outward devotion to a counterfeit divinity may make your religion more sincere and spiritually-minded. And thus in the effort to get rid of an enshrined and visible Deity, and at the same time keep your religion, you have ended by deifying yourself. For if He be the means and you the end of your worship, surely that worship sets you above Him, and renders you your own supreme god. And such a god! So utterly dependent on local surroundings and ceremonial gymnastics of bone and lung that he may come to a consciousness of that absolute self-stultification which constitutes his godhead.

"So be it," you say, "but the argument proves too much. By demonstrating that the Real Presence is as true as any other truth of religion, it has simply demonstrated that all religion is as absurd as the Real Presence. I, for one, shall be consistent and stay at home, and think the Infinite not as He seems in finite symbols, but as He is in His infinite verity—a pure spirit unconfined by space, untainted with a touch of matter."

Very well, my honest friend, essay the thought, get the exact prose of Jehovah, and when you have got it give it to the deluded souls who only know Him now in religious tropes.

"Pure spirit," you say, "He is, without finite form or taint of

matter." But, if so, He cannot be the Creator, for as Creator he is only known in creation. All of His nature that is not manifested in creation is uncreative. And creation is material, or reveals whatever of spirit it contains in material moulds.

Neither can your Infinite be providence, for as providence He must appear in the events of history, the most important of which have been brought to pass, in a measure, not only by the bodies, but also by the bodily passions of men—the drunkenness of an Alexander, the brutal timidity of a Pilate, the lust of a Henry VIII. Evidently your pure infinite spirit is not in the universe, and, if He exist at all, must be outside of it. But there is no room for His infinitude outside the universe. The universe would bound His outer being; where the universe begins He would have to end; all that the universe is He could not possibly be. He would thus fall a whole universe short of that infinitude which you deem essential to any true conception of His divinity. Your attempt to escape finite images of God has brought you to a god more finite than any image of Him; a God thinned down to a negation of everything you know. Nothing is all that is left of Him. Nothing is the only name you can call Him by—the pure, imageless, shrineless, formless, spaceless, unpicturable, unadorable, utterly immaterial, perfectly spiritual, divinely prosaic, scientifically exact, infinitely finite nothing; or, as the same idea or rather no idea of Him is sometimes euphemistically entitled by modern doubt, "the absolutely unknown and unknowable." And absolutely unknown and unknowable He is, simply because there is nothing of Him to be known. All that He could be known by has been taken away with the universe of knowledge. What remains is the ghost of an absurd definition. For if scientific knowledge means definition, and definition means de-finite-ing, and the infinite be defined as the not finite, or in-definite, He is prevented by the very terms of His definition from ever being defined or known. Such an infinite simply means the meaningless, and it is not science but buffoonery to use a meaningless word as if its import were too mysterious rather than too nonsensical to be understood.

The truth is, there can be no positive infinite that is not also finite. An infinite not finite would, as I have said, be limited and estopped by the finite, and so made only another finite. The true

infinite, instead of being mere indefinite or blank negation of the finite, is both infinite and finite, an infinite that finites itself and appears in its self-finitings—a living whole, whose members are its own self-differentiations, and preserve the very unity they seem to break—an absolute mind which is distinct from all its thoughts and yet is only as it thinks, and in thinking manifests while it maintains its essential activity. Such an infinite, such an organic whole, such an absolute mind is God.

2. And this brings me to my second plea for the reasonableness of the Real Presence—namely, that it accords with the nature of God, who, as infinite, must eternally become finite, as organic whole must develop His unity into differences, as absolute mind must think Himself in thoughts which, because they are the thoughts of an absolute mind, are not merely thoughts but *things*. God cannot exist without the visible universe any more than the visible universe can exist without God. The universe is His symbol of Himself, a symbol identified with the truth it types, and therefore a sacrament—the outward and visible sign of His inward and spiritual presence. It is as such that science regards it, if science only knew the import of her own knowledge; for what is science but the recognition of reason or spirit, in nature by reason or spirit in man? So, too, art sees and worships it; for what is beauty but the soul's glimpse of its archetype and ideal, half hidden and half revealed in the noon twilight of deep woods, or just vanishing where valleys bend into secret mountain folds, or standing tip-toe on the crest of some breaking sea-wave, veiled from head to foot in its spray, or coming down from heaven to earth in far-off inaccessible pomp of sunset clouds?

Why, then, should religion be despised for her simple faith in a sacramental presence which science discovers and art lives to portray. If she worship God in symbol, she worships Him as He reveals Himself. It is He that creates the symbol; she only hails it as translucent with His inner glory. Unless, in His necessary and universal self-symbolization, He falsifies Himself, her symbolic knowledge of Him is not untrue nor true only in an accommodated and equivocal sense, but one of His own essential forms of truth. He is by His very nature a sacramental God.

“Perhaps,” remarks the scientific mind, “the universe, as a whole, might be taken as an adequate symbol of God, since it is

the sum of all our finite knowledge, and, therefore, the nearest approach of our thought to the infinite. Thus symbolized, however, we should conceive Him as cosmic force rather than any particular thing such as religion represents Him in her sacred wafer and wine.

"Science has long ago got beyond things, and knows that they are not the final realities they seem, but only semblances—vanishing sparks made by the meeting of forces. Let, then, the universe be our type of the infinite, and force, our definition of the universe. And because the universe as a whole is unseen and the forces which distribute its universal potency are unseen, we shall bow down to no visible fetish like ignorant savages, but worship God subjectively in our growing knowledge of the secrets of nature."

But religion, with its fetish, proves to be more scientific than the science which fancies that forces are any more real without things than things are without forces. For though things be only the meeting-points and centres of forces, the truth still remains that the forces are unknown except as they meet and centre in things. Heat is known only in the heated thing, light in the luminous thing, motion in the moving thing, magnetism in the magnetic thing; and so only do they exist, for, by the law of their correlation, none of them acts except as it is acted upon, and hence cannot exist (since forces are naught but activities) except at the points of intersection, which are things. Thus science, no less than religion, is fetichistic. That divine light which fills nature does not appear in it as the white lustre of one smooth-surfaced abstraction, but broken as by a lantern of prismatic lenses into the many hues of things. And you cannot know one of these things, the least and simplest of them, without knowing the whole universe and God.

See that bunch of grapes hanging among the broad leaves of its vine, a mere handful of perishing fruit. Yet transmuted into its tiny globules are a soil which it took glaciers millions of years to grind off primeval mountain-sides; a climate which nothing less than the exact configuration of the earth as it is with its mountains and plains, continents and oceans, could make genial enough for their delicate life, and a daily bath of dew or rain drawn from distant seas and brought by winds that search for their little nurslings from equator to poles and back again. Notice

how their stem bends with their weight, which is nothing less than the weight of the world that draws them down, and how the great sun glows in their purple, which is not theirs, but his, who, though far away, has, by strange magic, stolen near and condensed himself into each of their pretty orblets. And yet to know that they are soil and air and ocean, and the shape and weight of earth and the solar fire, is to know only the surface and beginning of their nature, which could not be fully understood until the mountains had told whence came their granite, and the seas whence their water, and the atmosphere whence its gases, and the earth whence its gravitation, and the sun whence its perpetual flame—not until all the other worlds and suns which these recitals would introduce had accounted for their being by the introduction of still remoter relations, and the whole universe at last had owned itself really present in the little cluster of grapes. Change the gravity of Sirius but an ounce, and the change will be felt in their fragile stem. Let the faintest breeze stir in Alcione's air, and the commotion will quicken their sanguine pulse. I speak of them as if they had some substance of their own which was related to all the universe besides. But they have not. Their substance is simply the conjunction of these universal relations, the knot and sphere which these relations form in their present place and proportion. The grapes are nothing but so much vitalized earth, air, and sunshine; and sunshine, air, and earth are nothing but the self-same cosmic relations grouped in a different order and degree. You need only watch them to discover for yourself what they are. The grapes, if unplucked, will fall away from the vine and wither, and fade into the gases that have conglobed themselves into their form for a little while, even as for a little longer while they have gathered—so the spectroscope tells us—into the larger clusters of suns and planets. And these gases—what are they? “Manifestations of a force,” science answers, and we are not inclined to dispute her latest word. “Manifestations of one force—which, whether in its various modes as relative forces like heat, light, electricity, or in the forms of atoms, which are only moving points of balanced attraction and repulsion—still remains one and the same force everywhere, and, therefore, the one and only substance of the universe.” This one force, this solitary substance which the universe, in all its special phenomena

manifests, is God. As such, Tennyson, our great philosopher-poet, recognizes it in his hymn to the wall-flower :

Flower in the crannied wall,
 I pluck you out of the crannies,
 Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
 Little flower—but if I could understand
 What you are root and all, and all in all,
 I should know what God and man is.

Do you ask the reason for calling the absolute force God? I answer that force, as the term is generally used by science, denotes an activity which moves only as it is moved by outward inducement—the effect of some external cause. Heat causes electricity, electricity magnetism, magnetism motion, motion heat again: but none of these causes itself, and the term “force,” as applied to them, never signifies a self-causing, self-inducing, self-determining activity. But the one force which includes all forces must be just such an activity. For being itself all, it leaves none outside itself or other than itself to move it, cause it, act upon it. It transcends the scientific laws of inertia, cause and effect, and correlation. It moves itself, causes itself, and through all changes abides within itself. Certainly, then, we must give it some other name than the misleading one of force that denotes the very properties which this total activity contradicts while taking them up into its own transcendent unity. Now, what can we find in the range of our empirical knowledge that so resembles this total activity, or seems to resemble or comes, near enough resembling it, as to be its best analogon and worthy to lend it a veridical name? What but mind—mind which, in every act of self-consciousness, is both active and passive, because both knowing as subject and known as object, and which, because it is essentially self-conscious, exists only as this contradiction and its reconciliation. Mind or thought has the form of totality. Thought can think nothing alien to itself. For should it try to think aught as alien to thought, the alien to thought would still be its thought, and, therefore, not alien to thought. It can make no distinction which does not remain within its own unity. Matter itself, though in a certain sense opposed to mind, cannot be thought except as a thought or mode of mind—mind, perhaps, utterly objective to it-

self, but, because objective, existent still in implicit relation to the subject knowing, and whose act of knowledge must always bring both together in the identity of self-consciousness.

Mind, then, absolute mind, or God, is the true name for the one self-related force and omnipresent substance of the universe and of its phenomena. Not only, then, are the clustered grapes a possible symbol of God, but, when rightly known, they prove to be nothing else than his symbol, as he is their sole substance.

Press out their juices now, and pour their sweet red fermentation into a silver chalice, and tell me what that chalice contains. "Wine," says the vintner, promptly; and he speaks the truth, for wine it certainly is. "Money," says the merchant; and he, too, speaks the truth, for the wine is a commodity, and, as such, represents money. "Fermented juice of a certain species of plant called *Vitis vinifera*," says the botanist; and he, likewise, describes it truly, for so its vine is designated in botanic classification. "A certain fluid stage and state of protoplasm, a puff of cosmic gas, a little whirlpool in a universal ocean of atoms, a fleeting phase of an unknown force which is known, however, to be *one*, and to persist through many phases which fleet," says the nature-philosopher, who thinks nothing can be known outside the categories of nature; and he also tells the truth, for it is true that the wine may be relatively described as protoplasm, or condensation of gas, or eddy of atoms, or a phase of that total force which the nature-philosopher does not know, and can never know, in categories that refer only to dead mechanical parts that lie outside of each other as if they had no mutual involution through one all-containing, all-animating whole. But the priest elevates the chalice of wine above these lower meanings of sense, and merchandise, and vegetable classification, and external relation to other symbols, which have no more substance than its own, elevates it to its sole substantial truth, and, with words that consecrate it to the divine import they reveal, names it "The Blood of God."

Which, I ask you, men of candid thought, is the wine's truest truth—the truth of taste, or the truth of merchandise, or the truth of vegetable species, or the truth of phenomenal identity with phenomenal nature, or the one substantial truth of religion

—blood being the sign of life and the universe, an organism whose only and all-pervasive life is God?

And, surely, if there be idolatry in any religious view of the consecrated cup, the idolatry is not the worshipper's, who scarcely sees the symbol in his rapt contemplation of the divine presence it so transparently symbolizes to his faith, but the unworshipper's, who is so anti-materialistic in his conception of worship that he sees the symbol as a mere opaque material thing, apart from the spiritual substance it stands for, as if it, too, were substantial and stood by itself, an end to thought rather than thought's medium of intercourse with the Mind which is in all matter—a separate, independent entity other than God, and, therefore, another God. This latter, I submit, with all his protestings against idolatry, is an idolater of the very worst type, for ordinary idolaters behold God in the object that images him, but this protester against idolatry fancies that there can be an object to image God independent of the God it images—which fancy invests that object with a separate self-sufficiency that makes it no longer a mere symbol of a divine substance, but itself divinely substantial and very God.

“But,” interposes the sceptic, and, perhaps, even the churchman jealous of the peculiar sanctity of his eucharistic worship, “does not your view of the Real Presence render it very common? Are not all things else—rocks, weeds, insects, reptiles, beasts—just as true exhibitions of it as the wine in the chalice? Why, then, a supreme and unique sacrament?” No better reason could be desired, it seems to me, than the one stated in the question itself—namely, that God's presence is in all things. For a truth so universal and so universally glorious needs some special mark and token to impress it on minds which are prone like ours to see things as animals see them, to whom they are naught but objects of sense and appetite, or which, if they see further, still regard things as the first and surest realities, and ideas as mere abstractions from them, God being the last and most shadowy abstraction of ideas; or which, if they recognize God in them at all, recognize him only in the rare, the strange, the astonishing, the miraculous, and not in familiar scenes and every-day occurrences. Secular genius had watched man many centuries before Goethe discovered that his character was not complete, nay, that his education was not rightly begun, until he had learned the

three reverences—reverence not only for what is above and what is within, but also for what is beneath him; and Poetry had grown quite old and lost the freshness of her voice when in Wordsworth her youth was renewed by the divination that the meanest flower that blows could give “thoughts which do often lie too deep for tears.” And yet, week by week, and day by day, for a thousand years and more, religion had been lifting up before the eyes of worldly wisdom and poetic vision man’s homeliest fare of bread and wine as her holiest types of a presence which hallows the very ground whence they grow, and should hallow all man’s life upon it. Thus, while the Real Presence could not be divine unless universal, the disposition of the natural man to ignore or neglect it for mere sensuous pleasures requires that it should be emphasized to sense itself by some singular memento and type which shall have all the magnificent meaning, and all the solemnity, and all the adoration of the divinely universal and universally divine fact it brings to mind and typifies; even as the fact that all the days of the week are sacred renders it meet that we should set apart a certain day among them to celebrate, and inspire us to observe their common sanctity as alike days of the Lord—which otherwise we might forget in the hurry and distraction of selfish cares and enjoyments.

3. And this reminds me that I have already reached my third and final plea for the reasonableness of God’s presence in a sensible form for worship—namely, that it accords with the constitution of man. Man is mind manifest in matter. His spirit exists in and by a body which it cannot shed as a cocoon, and fly away from in naked, formless independence, but which belongs to the spirit as the condition of its selfhood. By his body man is individualized and distinguished from its fellows. By his body man enters into communion with the universe which is the means, if not the object, of all his knowledge. By his body man qualifies himself to receive that revelation of God which is given in the analogies of sense; and by his body he becomes conscious that he has a mind, or even exists, for it is only in relation to a world which is not self that he has any knowledge of self. This body may be always changing, as it is from infancy to age; may cast off its earthly casing by the completion of an inner and celestial shape, as the expanding blossom bursts and casts away the rough

burr that encloses it ; still body of some kind, and that a right human kind, the spirit must have, in order that it may be a spirit, individual and self-conscious.

More than this, the body is not, as we are accustomed to represent it, altogether outside the spirit ; its apparent outsideness is only apparent ; it is within as well as about the spirit—the spirit's own efflorescence and extirpation. For while man may think as if he were naught but mind, and feel as if the mind were dormant and the body alone awake, yet his sublimest thoughts are those which he feels as well as thinks, and his mightiest feelings those which glow seraph-like with the inner flame of thought. That revelation, then, will be most perfect which is given to his whole nature—to both sense and intellect as they co-exist in the sacramental unity of sentiment. Such a revelation must have a sacramental form—must display its infinite spirit in some finite and corporeal sign. Addressed to man's intellect alone, it would be no revelation, but a vague, impotent definition—a mere wind of metaphysical words whistling through a hollow skull ; addressed to his sense alone, it would be a dead, unmeaning fetish. But addressed to the intellect in his senses and to the senses in his intellect, his whole manhood vibrates with it into music of adoration, as Memnon with the dawn.

Moreover, the man who cannot understand all that the symbol signifies will feel a mystery beyond his understanding which will invest his defective knowledge with the awe of worship ; while he who thinks he knows the reason of the symbol will know it all the more clearly and vividly because presented to his thought in visible picture. Indeed, the sacramental is the only universal form of revelation—the form which is adapted to all sorts and conditions of men—to the illiterate hod-carrier, who has little wit beyond his senses, and who, if he has any idea of God, conceives him as in some way an object of sense ; and to the philosopher, who regards all sensible things as but vanishing glints of God's eternal splendor. Side by side, they can kneel before the same eucharistic symbol, as at once the divinity of simplest faith and most comprehensive reason.¹

¹ Goethe, an impartial observer of the educating power of religions, and certainly one without sacramentarian bias, says :

“The sacraments are the highest part of religion, the symbols to our senses of an

This we might infer from the evident popularity and power of secular sacraments. Love, even the most spiritual, is not content that the loved one should dwell across the sea to be spiritually thought about and communed with as a pure and excellent character, but because the character is so pure and excellent, wishes its near and palpable presence in its typical beauty of flesh. And while the flesh is absent, some keepsake of photograph, or pressed flower, or lock of hair, which its warm life has touched and animated, must take its place as the token of that spiritual presence which the token makes more real to thought than any unaided meditation can. Indeed, the truest, holiest expression of love is the sacramental embrace of wedlock wherefrom man himself, the perfect sacrament of soul and body, is born.

This same sacramentality he evinces in his national character. The nation must have its flag, in whose colors all its wealth, power, law, watchfulness, beneficence, and aspiration become concrete and visible. Where that flag is planted the whole strength of the nation gathers for defence and protection. Whither it leads the way, the whole valor of the nation follows for conquest. When its folds are unfurled in battle, the arms that fight beneath them smite with more than individual strength, and there the slain fall in thickest heaps, while the living rush to take their places as if the shadow of their ensign were the shield of eternal grace. Call it a painted rag if you will, still the painted rag has more spiritual force, more direct sway over the thoughts and passions and wills of men than all the wisdom of your statesmen, and eloquence of your orators, and songs of your poets, unaided by its spell. For

extraordinary divine favor and grace. In the Lord's Supper earthly lips are to receive a divine being embodied, and partake of a heavenly under the form of an earthly nourishment. This sense is just the same in all Christian churches, whether the sacrament is taken with more or less submission to the mystery, with more or less accommodation as to that which is intelligible; it always remains a great holy thing, which in reality takes the place of the possible or the impossible, the place of that which man can neither attain nor do without. But such a sacrament should not stand alone. *No Christian can partake of it with the true joy for which it is given, if the symbolical or sacramental sense is not fostered within him. He must be accustomed to regard the inner religion of the heart and that of the external church as perfectly one, as the great universal sacrament, which again divides itself into so many others and communicates to these parts its holiness, indestructibility, and eternity.*—"Autobiography," vol. i, p. 245, Bohn's edition.

it is the nation's sacrament, the real presence of her otherwise diffuse, abstract, undiscernible majesty.

And what love were without embodiment or keepsake, what the nation were without ensign, that the church would be without the sacramental presence of her Lord, which, though recognized and cherished by faith, is yet by reason proved to be in perfect harmony alike with the essence of religion, the nature of God, and the constitution of man.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRAYER AND THE "PRAYER GAUGE."¹

BY HIRAM K. JONES.

All men pray. The totality of the affections and desires in the Will-spirit is the prayer of the man. The Will-spirit in man is self-motive and self-determining, and hence the will is free, and freely turns itself towards good or towards evil. And if the totality of the affections and desires in the Will-spirit be selfish and depraved, then must the prayer be for what is evil and impious.

When the Will-spirit is determined in ambition and pride and covetousness and avarice and envy and malice and hatred and revenge and sensuality, such must be the spirit and the nature and the aim of the prayer; and how shall such an one not pray for evil things, as surely as the body is determined to earth by gravity?

Whereas, on the other hand, when the soul is exalted in its affections and thoughts and aims to what is honorable and just and pure and true and beautiful and good, think we not that the totality of these affections in the Will-spirit, the Prayer-spirit, will surely ask for things honorable and good? Nor will it then ask God, or any one else, to do for it anything that it can do and ought to do for itself, with the use of its own faculties and powers in the resources of its sphere of existence.

Now, the spirit of the Will, the spirit of prayer, is the receptiv-

¹ Delivered at the Concord School of Philosophy, July, 1881.

ity of the soul; and this voluntary receptivity is the only condition of benedictions or of imprecations in answer to prayer. The heavens are as near to the soul as the soul is to the body, and the *only good* influent into all intelligent natures is not far away, but is more immediate in the soul than the soul is in the body; and in the deep silence even knocketh at the door of the dwelling-place of the soul, but always waits upon its Will-spirit. The Author of its existence will not violate its freedom to turn it towards good or towards evil.

And if the human nature be quickened and alive with that spirit which is the life-quality of the angelic and Deific natures, that life and its good will as surely flow into its prayer receptivity as the life of the sun enters into the opening bud, and the flower, and the fruit; while if the human nature turn not this way in the spirit of its will and deeds, but towards the evil, and its life and delights and appetencies and habits be such as the Devils have, then must it be receptive of the life and the fortunes which the Devils have. We cannot here serve two masters. We shall ask for that and we shall receive that, and we shall assimilate that, and we shall go to our own in *that*, to which we are freely self-determined.

And if, out of the love of righteousness and truth and holiness in the soul, the prayer ascendeth to God, he will surely give good gifts to them that ask him; and if out of ungodly and selfish and vain ambitions and greed, and grovelling desires, the soul shall seek, it may find abundance of tyranny and avarice and sensuality; and so, as has been said, Sir Isaac Newton receives knowledges of the stars, and Sir Isaac's dog receives plenty of dog's bread.

The philosophy of any age is the highest thought of the age adequate to the solution of its soul problems. It effects the legitimating of the institutions of society by establishing them in their fountains and Divine reasons, even in the Oracles and the Forms of the Faith. Philosophy comes not, therefore, as an unsympathetic critic, but as the loving friend of the principles and powers of the particular Faith of which it is a philosophy.

The Christian dispensation, therefore, must, in this sense and idea of it, realize a philosophy, and its appellation must be *Christian Philosophy*. Its business must be the dissipating of the mists and fog of sense, and the discovering in the very fountains and streams

of our life Divine energies and powers of the God of the generation, who now sitteth enthroned above. He is not dead nor absent. This truth is ere long to be revived in the thought and in the heart of this age, and to become the thought that shall lead the social Genesis to marvellous fulfilments of reverence and obedience and faith beyond the present fruitions.

The subject of prayer and the offices of prayer are of the most common and practical interest, involving more or less problematical experiences, with which every one must sooner or later engage. They may be mistaken who are able for a term of life to imagine themselves to be independent of this resource; it is probable that Jonah had but little thought or foresight of the very practical uses of prayer until he got into a great calamity in which he realized its necessity and availability.

It is hoped, therefore, that the attempt to review and identify the *idea* of prayer may not be deemed foreign and unrelated to the practical life, nor a trenching upon grounds not properly philosophical.

“What is the Almighty that we should serve Him? and what profit should we have if we pray unto Him?” This is a question always new, and always old, in the generations of man.

True religion comprehends knowledge of the Supreme Being, and of *subsisting relations* between God and the soul. And this knowledge embraces as mediate instrumentality the worlds of nature and of the spirit.

This knowledge to every generation is of the wisdom which descends from above. Every historic faith is archetyped in heaven, and is thence the thought and the will of God. And so He giveth and subsisteth all Faiths and their Works, individually and collectively.

And therefore every great historic movement in the world is recorded as fountained and shaped in a distinct form of oracular, authoritative dispensation from on high. And in every historic generation this descent has realized itself in the social institutions. And prior among these, as pillar and ground, and custodian, and witness and irradiation of the truth and the life, is the *Church*, in order that these forms may, through a local habitation and home and name, also be endowed with permanency and perpetuity among mankind.

On account of man's acknowledged finitude, with the preponderant determinations of his self-hood, his self-will and sensuous consciousness, and sublunary intelligence, and ignorant self-sufficiency in the terrestrial Genesis—on these accounts the common tendency and disposition in the practical working of affairs and interests of the world are to the sophistication and corruption of the claims, and the witness, and the authority, and the presence of Divinity in the institutions of society, and in the motions and maintenance of its life.

Accordingly, the faculty of *apprehending* and *loving the truth*—the available and indispensable element of human nature unto its moral and redemptive purification—becomes weakened and subordinated. And so the poorer nature which is in us is ever disarming and distorting and adapting to its own limited conceptions and pusillanimities the higher and better thought of Divine natures and Divine interests, and even the higher doctrines and spirit of the *God spell*.

And hence it is that the nearer we approach, historically, the sources of a faith, the Diviner and the more heroic are the age and the manhood. Humanity in the terrestrial Genesis gendereth downward and outward spiritually, and the savage is the remnant of exhausted systems of society. And, accordingly, the renewal of the race is not from the fountain of a savage stock, but by means of a new seed, a new dispensation from the heavens, a new seed from the hand of the Sower falling into new and good ground, whose generation is a new age—new in its forms of thought and manners and sciences and arts. And this is the reason why we cannot convert the savage races back to a constituency of a new civilization. We cannot make a new man—a young man—out of an old one.

In the processes of the social Genesis, therefore, the perpetual tendencies towards immersion in the Kosmos, and oblivion to the Logos, towards a science and a literature of *abstract, sensible cognitions*, with the loss of the sciences of intelligible and Divine natures, gendereth individually and socially unto the outer darkness, to the "wailing and gnashing of teeth," the grim despair and the mere rattle of the dry bones of *skeleton systems*.

If it be a possible realization, it must be the reproach of a mental age, when the current thought—thought exalted to the place of

the *lead* of the social life—shall have discarded the *ideal* as scientifically invalid, the *ideal sphere*, the ideal forms, the immutable part of the universe, pre-existing in logical order, and producing *matter*, and the *actual* circles of the sense sphere—the celestial Hyarxis—the substance and establishment of the historic faiths and philosophies of all the great ages, in this fatuous light and witness, indicted, refuted, and discarded as phantasy! And the inventory of this achievement of science and wisdom exultingly proclaimed to be the repudiation of all knowledge not exclusively derived from the senses as cognition of sensibles—at its top and best a mere *abstract* physical realism, and so only agnostic. And so, verily, the despair of knowing—“the outer darkness and the gnashing of teeth.”

Let us imagine—but, indeed, we are not left to the imagination—we see the instance—a brawny, stalwart fellow, with his broad back up against the heavens, and his eyes and face and hands and muckrake in *abstract things*, seriously crying aloud: “Now convince me who can that *I see* anything else than these husks of time and sense; and so *where* else is God than down *there*; and *what* else is God than down there—natural law? and what is *that* else than dead mathematical, chemical, mechanical fixture—a *fated* and *fating externality*? Let us pray, and see whether that will move him!” My friend, rather let us tarry awhile at Jericho, till our beard shall grow.

The source and substance and sustenance of the soul is not beheld in that outlook. It is not approximated in that cognition. The soul cometh not hither from that bourne. Nature is the nature of something else than itself. It is the Nature of mind. It is born (natus = born). It is not a parentage of the soul. Nature is *related* to man. Humanity is planted in Nature—immured in the earth. Humanity is *life conditioned* temporarily in the earth and in her physics. And when we pray, our face and our eyes and our hands must be uplifted unto another outlook—another source; and in this contemplation Humanity and Nature and Deity are distinguished.

Whatsoever a man offers on the altar of his heart is the confession of his devotions. And his offering is either of the fruits of the *ground*, or of the firstlings of the *living creatures*. He will love and pursue as an end either that which is earthly, or

that which is heavenly. Every one who devotes himself goes to that which he desires; that which genders in the soul grows by assimilating its kind—the lesser or the greater good alike, and so his prayers are answered.

"He that devoteth himself to the Devatas, goeth to the Devatas, and he that devoteth himself to the *Supreme Good*, goeth to the *Supreme Good*," says the Purana. "Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap." "Men do not gather grapes of thorns, nor figs of thistles." Of the end he pursues in the ruling love of his heart, man makes himself worthy, and this is his Worthship (Worship), and this also is his prayer. In this Worthship he deserves to know and to receive—whether of poverty and dearth, or of life everlasting; whether of the false or of the true Riches.

And it may be fairly questioned, if, indeed, it be questionable, whether our characteristic and boasted empirical corpuscularian physico-real philosophizings have not too much engrossed the public mind and the public interest, some portion of which it might have usefully engaged; and whether this speculative lead, principal among conceiving causes, has not borne downward our higher faculties, even unto a fearful degree of debasement and stupefaction: which down-grade must continue so long as the public mind rests in the conviction that the measure of Truth and Being is in *sense*, and in the *experience of Animal Life*. Verily, "if we be devoted to the Devatas, we shall go to the Devatas, and if we be devoted to the *Supreme Good*, we shall go to the *Supreme Good*."

Says the Veda, "What the sun and light are to this visible world, that, are the *Supreme Good* and *Truth* to the intellectual and invisible world; and as our corporeal eyes have a distinct perception of objects enlightened by the sun, thus our souls acquire *certain knowledge* by meditating on the light of Truth which emanates from the Being of Beings: that is the light by which alone our *minds can be directed* in the path to Beatitude." Therefore, "Let us adore the supremacy of that Divine Sun—the God-head who illuminates all, who recreates all, from whom all proceed, to whom all must return, whom we invoke to direct our souls aright in our progress toward His holy seat."

The soul instant in this meditation will behold this light; and

if it desire good gifts, this is the light of *The Good*; and in this contemplation it will love this light, it will seek this light, it will walk in this light, it will assimilate the influences of this light, and it will grow unto the likeness of the source of this light. This desire and this contemplation are its Prayer, and this assimilation and growth are the answer to its Prayer.

Wherefore, "Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you: For every one that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh findeth; and to him that knocketh it shall be opened."

"Or, What man is there of you whom if his son ask bread will he give him a stone? Or, if he ask a fish, will he give him a serpent?"

"If ye then being evil know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father which is in Heaven give good things to them that ask Him?"

"But without Faith it is impossible that thou be *well-come*, for it is necessary that he that cometh to God must believe that *He is*, and He becomes in them who diligently seek Him a bestower of reward."

And again: "And this is the confidence that we have in Him, that if we ask anything according to His Will, He heareth us; And if we know that He hear us, whatever we ask, we know that we have the petitions that we desired of Him."

The trust in this wisdom and efficacy of this prayer of *Faith* is declared in the idiom of the Greek, incidentally, in many and such as the following instances:

Says Plato, "It is for you, then, Oh, Timæus, to begin the discourse, having first of all invoked the gods, according to the usual custom."

Timæus, "Well, Socrates, this at any rate is true—that those who have even the least share of wisdom always invoke the Deity on entering every undertaking, whether small or great; and so we, likewise, who are now about to speak concerning the Universe, whether it be generated or without generation, shall (if we be not very unwise) make it our *first duty* to invoke the gods and goddesses, and pray that what we speak may be first of all pleasing to them, and also in consistence with ourselves. And as respects the invocation of the gods, so have I acted for myself."

And, again, we hear Socrates praying in private petition: "Grant me to become beautiful in the inner man, and that whatever outward things I have may be at peace with those within. May I deem the wise man rich, and may I have such a portion of gold as none but a prudent man can either bear or employ."

And, again, "O Zeus, Father, King! give us good things, whether we pray or pray not for them; but withhold evil things from us, though we should pray never so earnestly for them."

Soc. "Are you going, Alcibiades, to pray to the Deity?"

Alc. "Just so, Socrates."

Soc. "You appear to have a serious look, and to be directing your eyes to the ground, as if thinking upon something."

Alc. "Of what should a person be thinking, Socrates?"

Soc. "Of things, Alcibiades, of the greatest moment, as it seems to myself, at least. . . . Does it not seem to you that there is much need of forethought in order that a person may not unconsciously pray for great evils for himself, while thinking he is praying for good; and, on the other hand, that the gods may not happen to be in such a disposition as to grant whatever he happens to be praying for? . . . You see of our own fellow-citizens, of such as longed for and obtained the command of an army, some are even now exiles from the city; and others have ended their lives. . . . And with respect to children, you will find in the very same manner how that some persons, after having prayed for them to be born, have, when they are born, come into the greatest calamities and sorrows. For some, whose children have been thoroughly wicked, have passed the whole of their lives in sorrow; and some, whose children were well behaved, have met with the misfortune to be deprived of them, and have come into calamities in no respect less than the others, and, like them, have wished rather that their children had never been born." . . . "Nor would the majority refrain from absolute power, if offered them, or the command of an army, or many other things, which, when present, do more harm than good; but they would, on the contrary, pray for their possession." . . . "And again, after waiting a little time, they sometimes recant and pray the very reverse of what they prayed before. I have, therefore, my doubts that men do in reality accuse the gods unjustly in saying that their evils come from them.

"Should the god, then, to whom you happen to be going, ap-

pear to you even now, and ask you, before you had prayed for anything whatever, whether it would be sufficient for you if any of those things first mentioned were given, or should he leave it to yourself to make a request, how, think you, could you avail yourself of the opportunity?"

Alc. "Now, by the gods, Socrates, I should not know what to say in such a case."

Soc. "The Lacedæmonians, therefore, having themselves considered the matter, put up on every occasion, in private and in public, a prayer, requesting the gods to grant them ever—' Things Good, and Things Honorable;' and no one has ever heard them pray for anything more. Accordingly, up to the passing time, they have been fortunate less than none others."

Man immersed in Nature—an alien realm, drawn by desire and urged by ambition, and, for the most part, ignorant of the nature of the soul and of its chief good, and of the fruits of all various experiences—cannot provide and provide his own way; he cannot, therefore, prudently and safely assume to know of himself what particulars—what things do, and what things do not, make for his good. But he may, and with profit, pray for things honorable and good, leaving it for the Divine Wisdom to decide as to the form of the gift. Wherefore the injunction, "When ye pray, use not vain repetitions as the heathen; for they think that they shall be heard for their much speaking. Be not ye, therefore, like unto them; for your heavenly Father knoweth *what things* ye have need of before ye ask him. After this manner, therefore, pray ye." Instead of Things, let us ask for Godliness within the soul, for unto this shall all good things be added.

Says Plato: "Some of the Greeks are wont—after placing by the altar oxen with gilded horns, and others presenting the gods with offerings to be hung up in the temples—to pray for *whatever* they *happen to desire*, whether it be good or evil. The gods, therefore, on hearing their impious addresses, accept not their costly processions and sacrifices; so that there is much need of caution and consideration as to what is to be spoken and not. For the Divine Nature, I conceive, is not such as to be seduced by presents, like a knavish judge. But we are giving a silly reason if we think to get the better of the Lacedæmonians in this way. For it would be a dreadful thing, indeed, if the gods

looked to gifts and sacrifices, and not to the soul, whether the person happen to be holy and just."

"Do you remember, then, saying that you were much at a loss lest you should unconsciously be praying for evil things, fancying them to be good? . . . It seems to me, therefore, that it is best to keep quiet. For through your high spirit—for that is the fairest of names for folly (that is, through pride and vanity)—I think you would not be willing to make use of the Lacedæmonian prayer." That is, you will fall into the fashion of the heathenish mind of praying on the street-corners and the house-tops, to be seen and heard of men—making long, heathenish stump speeches to be reported in the newspapers.

"It is necessary, therefore," says Socrates, in this case, when pride and worldly vanity get into the place of prayer, "for a man to wait until he has learned how he ought to conduct himself towards gods and men."

Alc. "But when, Socrates, will that time be? and who is he that will instruct me? for I should be very glad, I think, to see who he is."

Soc. "It is he of whose care you are the object. But it seems to me, as Homer says of Minerva, that she removed the mist from before the eyes of Diomedes

'That he might clearly see both gods and men.'

So must he, in the first place, remove from your soul the mist that now happens to be present there, and apply those things through which you will be about to know both good and evil; for now you seem to be unable to do so."

Alc. "Let him, then, remove the mist, or anything else that he pleases, as I am prepared not to fly from anything ordered by him, whoever he may be, if I am about to become a better man."

Soc. "And *he* also has a very wonderful yearning in your behalf."

Alc. "Till that time, then, it seems to me to be best to put off my sacrifice."

Soc. "And rightly it seems so to you, for it is safer than to run so great a risk."

"There is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding," and most and highest of all, the spirit

and wisdom of prayer descendeth from above; and so the Apostle Paul—"Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmities: For we know not what we should pray for as we ought: but the Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with yearning that cannot be uttered."

" The Lord is in his holy Temple
In the pure and holy mind,
In the reverent heart and simple,
In the soul from sense refined."

The mists of sense and ambition, and pride and vanity, must be dissipated ere the soul may stand in this Divine realization; and for this office, both in the Greek and Christian Idiom, there standeth One who maketh this intercession for us with yearnings unutterable; and without this, man "knoweth not what he should pray for as he ought."

Now, the most noxious of these mists are the low forms of knowing. One has wisely said of this cause of Mephitis in the soul, that, "To acquire knowledge merely to know is *low curiosity*. To acquire knowledge merely to be known as knowing is *low vanity*. To acquire knowledge merely to profit by it is *low venality*. To acquire knowledge in order to build up is *charity*. To acquire knowledge in order to be built up is *wisdom*. And only the two latter do not pervert knowledge and corrupt the soul."

Low curiosity and *low vanity* and *low venality* assail society and the individual alike; and it is a great public calamity when a nation and a generation of people have grown wise above their own oracles. The Institutions of Religious Custom are determined from Saper-Natural *Influence*, and are Divine Forms adapted to the wants of their age such as man could not provide nor provide. They include, as the primary aims, the doctrines of life and death, affording suggestion and instruction unto true opinion and belief respecting the Living and the Dead.

The Divine Mediatorship is a universal. Neither the origin nor the subsistence of the order of human souls, in the alien order of Physics and Matter, is effected without this Divine Providence. And the uplifting and salvation of Human nature, individually and collectively, proceeds from the *Influence* from that higher Nature which is introduced into it from above.

The Mediatorship is the Link which binds humanity with Divinity, from which humanity must be perpetually begotten and quickened and sustained and born again unto *Eternal Life*. And thus the Christ, the *Lord* of the dispensation, as Mediator, is the *Living Way*. He does not represent Mediatorship. He is Mediator. And this is "the Door." This is "the Way, the Truth, and the Life." Here must we enter; from hence must our prayer ascend. He that is purified from selfish and vain-glorious ambitions and pride, and dishonorable debasements of sensuality, and loves truth and virtue and holiness and justice and wisdom, has found the "Prayer Gauge."

"For if a man love Me, he will keep my words; and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him." And, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my name, he will give it you." From this fountain descendeth every good and every perfect gift. And, "A man can receive nothing except it be given him from Heaven." And thither must our prayer ascend; and so, and only so, the "prayer of the righteous availeth much." And so has Plato well said: "This at any rate is true—that those who have even the least share of wisdom always invoke the Deity on entering every undertaking, whether small or great."

THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE PRESENT TIME.¹

BY EDWARD CAIRD.

In complying with the request which you have done me the honor to make, to deliver the introductory address to this Society, I think that, instead of treating of any special philosophical subject, it will be more profitable to make some general remarks on the nature and objects of the study to which the Society is devoted. I propose, therefore, to say something as to the general

¹ An introductory address delivered to the Philosophical Society of the University of Edinburgh.

problem of philosophy, and the special forms which that problem has taken in recent times. In doing so, it will not be possible for me to avoid an appearance of dogmatism, as I must make some assertions which are much disputed, the objections to which I shall not have time to discuss. But, instead of interpolating weakening phrases, such as "it humbly appears to me," and the like, I venture simply to make this apology once for all, and to ask you to adopt, for the time, a point of view which may not be your own. Afterwards you can avenge yourselves for this temporary submission by subjecting my words to what criticism you think fit. A philosophic temper is shown, above all things, in the power of entering into the views of another, and taking them for the moment almost as if they were your own, without prejudice to the subsequent critical reaction, which will be effective just in proportion to the degree of your previous sympathetic appreciation of the ideas criticised.

What, then, is the task of philosophy? What is its task in general, and how is that task modified by the circumstances of the present time? To the first of these questions, I answer that, stated in very general terms, the task of philosophy is to gain, or rather perhaps to regain, such a view of things as shall reconcile us to the world and to ourselves. The need for philosophy arises out of the broken harmony of a spiritual life, the different elements or factors of which seem to be set in irreconcilable opposition to each other; in which, for example, the religious consciousness, the consciousness of the infinite, is at war with the secular consciousness, the consciousness of the finite; or, again, the consciousness of the self, with the consciousness of the external world. It is easy to see this, if we reflect on the nature of the controversies which most trouble us at present. They all, directly or indirectly, turn upon the difficulty of reconciling the three great terms of thought—the world, self, and God: the difficulty of carrying out to their legitimate consequences what seem to be our most firmly based convictions as to any one of these factors in our intellectual life, without rejecting in whole or in part the claims of the others. Thus, for example, many writers in the present time find it impossible to admit the truth and solidity of the principles and methods of physical science in relation to the material world without extending their application beyond that world. Yet, if we make this exten-

sion, and treat these methods and principles as universal, we inevitably reduce consciousness, thought, and will, to the level of physical phenomena, and make even their existence an insoluble problem. Others, again, find it difficult to assert the truth, that the consciousness of self enters into all our experience, without reducing that experience to a series of states of the individual soul. And others, like Mr. Spencer and Professor Huxley, poised between these two conflicting currents of thought, have adopted the odd, and we might even say irrational, expedient of telling us that we may regard the world *either* as a collection of the phenomena of mind, *or* as a collection of the phenomena of matter, but that we can never bring these two ways of looking at things together—a view which supposes man to be afflicted with a kind of intellectual *strabismus*, so that he can never see with one of his mental eyes without shutting the other. Again, looking beyond this conflict of materialism and subjective idealism, the intellectual unity of our life is disturbed by the opposition of the consciousness of the infinite to the consciousness of the finite. To many of our scientific men it seems axiomatic that all our real knowledge is of that which belongs to the context of a finite experience, and that all religious and metaphysical efforts to reach beyond the finite are attempts to think the unknown and unknowable. Yet such men often feel strongly the need, and, from their point of view, the extreme difficulty, of finding anything to give to the moral life of man that support which was once found in the belief that these dreams are realities. On the other hand, there are not a few men in our day—like the hero of that remarkable little book called “Mark Rutherford”—men whose very life is in religious ideas, yet who have imbibed from the literature of the time a conviction that such ideas must be illusory, and who therefore dwell, as it were, in a world of eclipse and paralysis, neither able to find a faith nor to do without one, sitting

“by the broken springs of life,
Waiting for the morrow that shall free them from the strife.”

Now, it is impossible, so long as our ultimate thought of the world is thus in discord with itself, that our lives can be what human lives have sometimes been—impossible that we can rise to that energy of undivided will and affection, that free play of con-

centrated intelligence, that sense of the infinite resources of the spirit that moves us, out of which the highest achievements of men at all times have sprung. Nor, after the unity of our first instinctive faith has been broken by difficulties such as those I have mentioned, is it possible entirely to recover it, except by some kind of philosophical reflection. Bacon said that in the last period of ancient civilization philosophy took the place of religion, and the same is to some extent true now. In face of the modern spirit of criticism, it is rarely possible for educated men, and for students of philosophy impossible, to rest for the entire support of their spiritual life upon the simple intuitions of faith. For them the age of unconsciousness is past, and they must call in the aid of reflection, if it were only to heal the wounds of reflection itself. As the builders of the second Temple had to work with arms by their side, so, in our day, those who seek either to maintain, or to replace, the old Christian synthesis of life, must provide themselves with the weapons of philosophy. It is not of our own choice that we have been born in an age of criticism; but, being here, and being by our education brought face to face with all the prevalent currents of thought, we have only two alternatives before us: we must face our difficulties, or we must suppress them. To suppress them—we see often enough what kind of moral temper comes of that—the fevered fanatical spirit that founds its faith on the impossibility of knowing anything, and determines to believe, because it dare not do otherwise. Yet, if we are not content with such faith, we must seek the reconciliation of the contradictory elements of our consciousness in some new reflective synthesis; in other words, in philosophy.

The task of philosophy, then, I repeat, is to rise to such a general view of things as shall reconcile us, or enable us to reconcile ourselves, to the world and to ourselves. This vague statement, however, might easily be admitted by many who will be startled and repelled when we draw out its meaning. For it means no less than this, that philosophy, by the very condition of its life, is forced to attempt what Comtists have called an "objective," or what perhaps might more properly be termed an "absolute" synthesis. It is true that many philosophers, and even great philosophers, have tried to evade this necessity, and to narrow the problem of philosophy within limits which made its solution seem

easier. Especially in times of transition, when social bonds have become relaxed, and religious faith has been weakened or destroyed, philosophy also has generally lowered its claims, and has been content to abandon the great world to chaos, if only it could secure some little cosmos of its own. To these causes of diffidence in philosophy others in recent times have been added; for our very widening knowledge of the universe has thrown a shadow of suspicion upon the attempt to measure it, and has inclined us to narrow our views to a solution of the problem of human life, and to disconnect it from the problem of the unity of all things. Can we not, it is natural to ask, find a meaning in our own lives without spelling out the secret of the universe? Can we not build our fragile houses of mortality on something less than an eternal foundation? With the growth of our knowledge grows also the consciousness of our ignorance, and more and more the latter seems to reduce the former into something merely relative and transitional. Looking out upon the wide sea of knowledge, with some measure of appreciation of its extent, it seemed but reasonable for one like Comte to say that an "objective synthesis," a systematic view of the world as a whole, was beyond the reach of man; and that, if his life was to be brought into harmony with itself on a basis of knowledge, he must content himself with a "subjective synthesis," a synthesis which leaves out all speculation in relation to the greater whole of the universe, and attempts only to gather knowledge to a focus in the interests of man. In taking up this position, Comte, it has been urged by his followers, showed a true insight into our needs as rational beings, who must desire to bring our lives into harmony and unity with themselves, and to found that harmony and unity upon an intelligent view of the facts of our condition; and he showed at the same time an intelligent appreciation of the limits which are set around us as finite creatures, standing in the face of a universe, the ultimate meaning of which is hidden from us by the weakness of our mental capacity and the narrowness of our opportunities. Comte's view of things is thus based upon two incontrovertible facts—the limitation of man's powers, and the imperative wants of his moral being. The old aspiring religious and philosophical synthesis, he argues, has been discredited forever by our knowledge of the immensity of the universe and of our own feebleness.

It is impossible for the creature of a day to see things *sub specie aternitatis*, for a finite mind to carry back the infinity of the universe to its central principle, to view it as a harmonious system, and, like a god, to pronounce it "very good." But yet there remains the inextinguishable requirement of a rational and moral nature to rise above chance impulses and energies and to find some one guiding principle of thought and action which shall make his life harmonious with itself. And this principle, since we cannot find it in an Absolute, whom we do not know, we must find in man—man individual, or man social—whom we do know. Renouncing, therefore, all questions as to the system of the universe, even the question whether it *is* a system, we can still draw back upon ourselves and find and produce system and harmony in our own lives. Or, if this is impossible for us as regards the fragmentary existence of the individual, we may yet detect in the history of the human race a tendency towards unity and organization to which all the great and good of the past have contributed, and we may give value and completeness to our individual lives by making them the instruments of this "increasing purpose."

The question which Comte thus brings home to us is, as I have already indicated, not a new one. It is the question whether it is possible to have a religion—*i. e.*, "a free convergence of all man's affections and energies" to one object—without a God; and a philosophy—*i. e.*, a synthesis or gathering to one focus of all knowledge—without an Absolute.¹ And this is a question that has been raised more or less distinctly in every era of transition, when the "native hue" of human resolution has been "sicklied o'er with a pale cast of thought," and when men have been fain to gather up the fragments that remained in the shipwreck of their greater faiths and hopes. The individualism of the stoics, epicureans, and sceptics, for example, corresponding as it did with the decay of ancient religion and social morality, was in great measure a result of such a temper of mind. As men gave up the hope of organizing their own social relations, and of understanding the world as an intelligible order, they fell back upon the idea of an inner life, which might maintain harmony with itself in the face

¹ Cf. *The Unity of Comte's Life and Doctrine*, by J. H. Bridges. London: Trübner & Co., 1866.

even of an outward chaos. Philosophy, it began to be said, is needed, not to penetrate into the secret of the world, which is impenetrable, but to teach us our limits and to make us content with them. *Tecum habitu et noris quam sit tibi curta supelleæ.* Yet that *curta supelleæ* is enough; the peace of inward unity may be attained, even if we know nothing and can do nothing in the world without. Sure of nothing else, the individual may be sure of himself, and, in the strength of a mind centred and at rest in itself, may cease to concern himself with things that can only touch the outward life.

*Si fractus illabatur orbis,
Impavidum ferient ruinæ.*

Now, I need not dwell on the self-contradiction of this extreme of "subjective" synthesis, in which all that is without is abandoned to chaos or uncertainty, in order that the integrity of the inner life may be preserved. It is a commonplace of philosophy that we cannot thus withdraw into ourselves and leave the world to wander its own wise or unwise way, inasmuch as the two terms thus separated by abstraction are essentially united, and our experience of the world *is* our experience of ourselves. The life of reason or consciousness is essentially a life that goes beyond itself, and in which the inward cannot be absolutely fenced off from the outward without itself ceasing to have any meaning or content. It is a life of *knowledge*, in which we can know ourselves only as we know the universe of which, as individuals, we form a part. It is a life of *action*, in which we can realize ourselves only by becoming the servants of an end which is being realized in the world. Concentrate consciousness entirely upon itself, and its unreflected light will cease to shine. The world without and the world within are not two separate worlds, but necessary counterparts of each other; and, just in the extent to which we succeed in withdrawing from the world without, we narrow the world within. The attitude, therefore, of the stoic or sceptic who turns away from a world which he surrenders to chaos and unreason, or in which, at least, he gives up the hope of seeing or producing any rational order, and who seeks thus to find all truth and happiness within, is essentially irrational. He is striving to realize in isolation a life whose essential characteristic is community. He is

seeking to save the life of the seed, which must be cast into the ground and die, that it may live, by keeping it shut up from all external influences. For the Christian law of self-sacrifice, "he that would save his life must lose it," is nothing more than the transcription into terms of morality of that which is the general law of spiritual life—a life whose riches are always for the individual exactly measured by the extent to which he breaks down the limits of a self-centred individuality, to find himself again in larger existence of the whole.

But if this be the case, and if it is impossible to solve the problem of the inner life without solving the apparently wider problem of the outer life, or to base on a purely subjective synthesis a reconciliation of the spirit with itself, such as was formerly based on the objective synthesis of religion or philosophy, equally impossible is it to draw any other absolute line of division, such, for example, as that between the life of the nation and the life of humanity, or, again, between the life of humanity and the course of nature. In every similar division we are separating elements so correlated that the meaning of each one of them begins to evaporate so soon as we realize what we have done in separating it from the rest. To make such an abstraction must introduce a fatal discord between the practical life of man and the facts upon which we pretend to base it. And, indeed, as I think can be shown in the case of Comte, such an attempt involves the self-deception of treating that as absolute and divine which we at the same time admit to be uncertain and transitory.¹ How, for example, can we make a God out of humanity if we think of mankind as a race of beings which is not really organic, but in which there is only a general tendency to organization—a tendency which again is subjected to an immeasurable external contingency. Comte's attempt to escape the great difficulties which confessedly beset an optimistic creed—the creed that in some way all things work together for good—by thus falling back from the assertion of system in the universe to the assertion of system only in the life of man, like most com-

¹ I have attempted to show this in a series of articles on "The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte," which appeared in the *Contemporary Review* in May, June, July, and September, 1879. _____

promises, unites all the difficulties of both extremes it would avoid ; the difficulties of an absolute philosophy which seems to go beyond the limits of human knowledge, and the difficulties of a scepticism which leaves the moral and intellectual life of man without a principle of unity. The Stoic or Sceptic who bids us concentrate ourselves on our own soul, and the Positivist, who bids us worship humanity, are equally bidding us treat a part, which we can know and understand only *as* a part, as if it were the whole. They are attempting to break in one place only the indivisible unity of the intelligence and the intelligible world ; but if that unity be broken in one place it is wholly destroyed. *Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*. For it is a unity which is not like a particular hypothesis, that may be asserted or denied without detriment to the rest of our knowledge, but it is *the* hypothesis, if we may so call it, which is implied in all knowledge whatever, the hypothesis which constitutes our rational being. Hence Kant showed a true sense of the conditions of philosophical synthesis when he said that, if it could be shown that there was one metaphysical problem with which his *Critique of Pure Reason* was incompetent to deal, it must be regarded as an entire failure. If philosophy is incapable of a universal synthesis, it cannot make any synthesis at all. If it admit any absolute division, whether between the ego and the non-ego, or between man and nature, or even between the finite and the infinite, it is driven of necessity into scepticism. Unless it reconciles us with the universe, it cannot even reconcile us with ourselves. The present is a time in which there are many voices to echo the well-known saying of Pope—

“ Know well thyself, presume not God to scan,
The proper study of mankind is man ; ”

but the simple, yet demonstrable, answer to such partial Agnosticism is, that, if we cannot, in the sense I have indicated, know God, we cannot know anything.

But if this be so, if we cannot give up the idea of a universal synthesis without practically giving up philosophy altogether, we must not hide from ourselves the enormous difficulties with which philosophy has to contend—difficulties which seem to grow every day with our increasing knowledge of man and of the world in

which he lives. For all this knowledge seems to be making wider and wider the division between the individual and the universal, between short-sighted, changeable creatures such as men seem to be, and the all-embracing whole. These difficulties, however, though they by no means disappear, yet somewhat change their character, when we consider that the work of philosophy is not in the first instance constructive, but rather critical and reconstructive: that its business is not to seek for something transcendent, some hypothesis as to things hitherto unknown and alien to our experience, but rather to bring to light the hypothesis, if we choose to call it so, on which our rational being is founded. Philosophy must necessarily seem to be something extravagant and wildly ambitious to any one who does not discern that the problem it would solve is not one which arbitrarily, or as a matter merely of curiosity, we *choose* to solve, but one which we have in some way been solving, or of which we have been presupposing the solution, at every moment of our lives. To rise from the finite to the infinite were impossible unless the consciousness of the infinite were already involved in the consciousness of the finite, and developed along with it. Philosophy is not a first venture into a new field of thought, but a rethinking of a secular and religious consciousness which has been developed, in the main, independently of philosophy. It was the great work of Kant to show that experience itself is possible only through the necessity and universality of thought. But in thus proving the relativity of the finite objects of experience to the intelligence (which is not itself such an object), he really showed—though without himself being fully conscious of it, and almost, we might say, against his will—that we cannot admit the validity of the empirical consciousness without admitting the validity of the consciousness of that which, in the narrower sense of the word, is beyond experience. Hence, to one who follows out the Kantian principles to their legitimate result, it becomes impossible to treat the objective synthesis of religion as the illusion of a finite mind trying to stretch itself beyond its proper limits. The religious takes its place beside the secular consciousness—the consciousness of the infinite beside the consciousness of the finite world—as the consciousness of a real object, or rather of the ultimate reality upon which everything else rests. And philosophy, in dealing with

one as with the other, is discharged from the absurd and impossible feat of finding its way into a transcendent region beyond all consciousness and experience. In both cases, in relation to the infinite as in relation to the finite world, the work of philosophy goes beyond the primary unreflected consciousness of man, only in this aspect, that it brings that consciousness to a deeper understanding of itself. In both we have a right to begin our task of criticism and reconstruction with a faith in the great work achieved in and by the spirit of man in the past; and we ought to begin it with the consciousness that *our* criticism and reconstruction can have value only as a continuation of that work. For it is this consciousness that alone can justifiably raise us above the feeling of our own weakness for the task which is laid upon philosophy in our time, and can save us from the intruding suspicion that in his religions and his philosophies man has been perpetually renewing the history of Babel—attempting to build a tower that shall reach to heaven, only to find the work again and again stopped by the confusion of languages among the builders. If, therefore, philosophy may be described as a critical reconstruction of belief, we must recollect that this reconstruction, from a higher point of view, is merely development; or, to put it more simply, we must remember that, in philosophy as in other things, the hope of mankind for the future must be a vain illusion, unless it can reasonably be based on a deep reverence for the past.

In the "Faust" of Goethe, the poet who of all others has most deeply fathomed and expressed the conflict of the modern spirit with itself—though it may perhaps be said that, like a physician strong in diagnosis but not in therapeutics, he often stops at the description of the disease, and finds his own poetic deliverance from it simply in thus describing it¹—we find some words that may be applied to the work of philosophy. When Faust utters all his despair of life in that comprehensive curse in which he dis-

¹ "Physician of the iron age,
Goethe has done his pilgrimage.
He took the suffering human race,
He read each wound, each weakness clear,
And struck his finger on the place,
And said: *Thou ailest here, and here!*"

owns every faith, and even every illusion that has hitherto supported mankind, the chorus of spirits breaks in with a song, in which lament over what has been lost is mingled with a far-off hint of the only possible restoration—

“Woe, woe, thou hast destroyed it,
The beautiful world,
With mighty blow ;
It trembles, it falls to ruins.
A Demigod hath broken it down.
We bear away the ruins into nothingness,
And lament over the lost beauty.”

And then the song goes on—

“Mighty One
Of the sons of earth,
With greater majesty
Build it up,
In thine own soul build it up again ;
A new course of life
Begin,
With fresh unclouded sense,
And let new songs rise
In place of those that are silenced.”

“In thine own soul build it up again”—this is the ever-repeated call to philosophy at all times, such as the present, when the first unity of faith and reason is disturbed. But the task has become, if in some respects a harder, yet in other respects a more hopeful one in modern times. That this is so may be shown by a short comparison of the form in which the problem presented itself to Plato and Aristotle with the form in which it presents itself to us. In Plato’s “Republic” we find an attempt to “build up again in the soul” of the philosopher the falling edifices of Greek civilization, to restore its religious and political life, by going back to the ideal principle on which it rested. But the difficulty of such restoration lay in this, that the first intuitive synthesis of Greece was a synthesis of the imagination, in which that which was essentially limited and national was treated as unlimited and universal. Greek morality did not look beyond the boundary of the nation, seldom even beyond the boundary of the civic state. Greek re-

ligion, as it was an apotheosis of the special gifts of the Greek genius, was in some measure a consecration of the national spirit of exclusion. Hence, neither religion nor morality could offer an effective resistance to the disintegrating power of reflection. As it was the poetic imagination mainly which had peopled Olympus with the fair humanities of the gods, the power of Greek religion disappeared almost as soon as the people became capable of distinguishing poetry from prose. And, as, in the ethical life of the Greek state, the local and temporal was rather confused than reconciled with that which is universal, it fell an easy prey to the casuistry of the Sophists. On the other hand, the scepticism of the Sophists remained superficial and rhetorical, just because it found so little power of resistance in the institutions which it attacked. When, therefore, philosophy in Plato and Aristotle set itself to the task of reconstructing the synthesis upon which the moral and intellectual life of Greece was founded, and restoring the broken harmony of faith and reason, its reconciliation was necessarily imperfect, because of the imperfection of the positive and negative elements which it sought to reconcile. It tried to combine the freedom of thought which had shown itself in the Sophistic movement with the substantial contents of Greek life, morality, and religion, which Sophistry had rejected. But the freedom and universality of thought were in essential conflict with the limited character of the contents; and even to Plato himself a merely imaginative religion could not be more than a "noble lie," *i. e.*, a truth veiled under an inadequate sensuous form. The element of philosophy in which the reconciliation was attempted was itself fatal to the reconciliation aimed at. Hence, already in Plato we find the beginning of that withdrawal into the inner life from an unideal world, which was carried out in subsequent philosophy, and which of necessity ended in the self-contradiction of scepticism.

The modern movement from faith to reason bears a striking analogy to the movement of ancient thought. Yet there are important differences, which make the struggle of tendencies in modern times harder and more obstinate, but which also for that very reason enable us to anticipate a more satisfactory result. Here, too, we have a system of religion apprehended by the intuitive consciousness of faith, and manifesting itself in definite

forms of intellectual and social life. Here, too, we have the spirit of reflection after a time awaking and subjecting the whole religious system, as well as all the institutions founded upon it, to a searching, and often a destructive criticism. And here, too, we find philosophy attempting to restore the broken harmony of man's consciousness of himself and of the world by separating the permanent from the transitory elements of his earlier faith. But beneath this general similarity of development there are many points of contrast—which we may roughly sum up by saying that the first synthesis of Christendom took the form of a religion which was not national, but universal, and that the negative movement against it has been not merely analytic and sophistic, but also scientific, and, therefore, within certain limits, constructive. Hence, also, just because of the deeper spiritual meaning and fuller development of the two seemingly opposed powers that divide our life, we have some reason to think that it may be possible to combine what is good in both, and to attain to a philosophical synthesis, which may be not merely provisional, but of permanent value for mankind. Let me say a few more words on each of these points.

The religion of Greece was, as I have said, national, not universal, and for that very reason it was essentially a religion of the artistic imagination; for it is the imagination which lifts the part into a whole, and makes a particular into a substitute for the universal. It has been called an anthropomorphic religion; but, as Hegel has remarked, in the higher sense it was not anthropomorphic enough—it lifted some human qualities into the divine, but not humanity itself as such. Its gods were ideal figures, humanized, rather than human—fixed like statues in the eternal repose of beauty, and lifted above all the narrowing conditions of human life. Christianity, on the other hand, brought down the divine into the form of an individual life lived under those conditions, struggling with the wants and pains of mortality and the opposition of fellow-mortals, and undergoing and accepting the common lot of renunciation, sorrow, and death. It thus idealized, not choice specimens of intelligence and valor, but humanity itself, in its simplest and humblest form of life. It taught the world not to regard the ideal as something which a few elect spirits might reach, by escaping from the commonplace of existence, but to

find it in the commonplace itself; to make the limits of mortality the means of freedom, and to turn pain, death, and even evil, into forms of the manifestation of good. Now, this optimism on the very basis of pessimism, whose Christ has "descended into hell," this idealization of ordinary reality as it stands without selection or change, just because it was *this*, was no religion of phantasy, of art, of the poetic imagination merely. It did not flinch from the facts of life, however dark and threatening, or seek to turn its eyes to some earthly paradise lifted above the clouds and the winds. Art in it was secondary, not primary; in its poetry truth was bursting through the sensuous veil. And from this it necessarily follows that it is not a dream that vanishes with a waking of the prosaic consciousness in either of its shapes, either as the distinct common-sense apprehension of fact, or as the reflective analysis of thought. Whatever changes of form, therefore, it has been and may yet be subjected to (and I do not say that these will be small), the Christian view of the world in its essence is based upon such a simple acknowledgment of the truth and reality of things, that it need not fear overthrow, either from our widening knowledge of the facts of life, or from the deeper self-consciousness to which reflection is gradually bringing us. In the midst even of apparent rejection its ideals have maintained and increased their hold over the emancipated intelligence of Europe, and its fundamental conception of life penetrates and moulds the social and religious speculations of those who, like Comte, seem to have most thoroughly renounced it.

On the other hand, if the first intuitional basis of modern life is thus strong in itself, strong, too, it must be acknowledged, are the powers that assail it. The sophistic culture that undermined the old beliefs of Greece, and the morality founded upon them, was but a feeble solvent, compared with the disintegrating force of negative reflection and scientific criticism to which our faiths are subjected. The boldness of the ancient sceptic was chilled by a sense of the weakness of his own position. He might set the human against the divine, the individual against the State, the finite and relative against the infinite and absolute; but he was paralyzed by the negative character of his own teaching, by the consciousness that his emancipation of the intellect was a process whereby it was emptied of all contents, and that his liberation of

the individual from limited social bonds could lead to nothing better than anarchy. In modern times, on the other hand, it has ceased to be so. The world of finite interests and objects has rounded itself, as it were, into a separate whole, within which the mind of man can fortify itself, and live *securus adversus deos*, in independence of the infinite. In the sphere of *thought*, there has been forming itself an ever-increasing body of science, which, tracing out the relation of finite things to finite things, never finds it necessary to seek for a beginning or an end to its infinite series of phenomena, and which meets the claims of theology with the saying of the astronomer, "I do not need that hypothesis." In the sphere of *action*, again, the complexity of modern life presents a thousand isolated interests, crossing each other in ways too subtle to trace out—interests commercial, social, and political—in pursuing one or other of which the individual may find ample occupation for his existence, without ever feeling the need of any return upon himself, or seeing any reason to ask himself whether this endless striving has any meaning or object beyond itself. Nor need we wonder that the prevailing school of philosophy is one which renounces all such questions as vain, and bids us be content to know that we know nothing. The very wealth of modern life and science, both because it makes the ultimate synthesis more difficult, and because it supplies us with such a fulness of interests independent of that synthesis, tends to drive us back to the old, simple Agnostic philosophy of the Persian poet, Omar Khayyam :

"Myself when young did eagerly frequent
 Doctor and sage, and heard great argument
 About it and about, but evermore
 Came out by the same door that in I went.

"With them the seed of wisdom did I sow,
 And with mine own hand wrought to make it grow ;
 And this was all the harvest that I reaped ;
 I came like water, and like wind I go.

"There was a door to which I found no key,
 There was a veil through which I could not see.
 Some little talk awhile of Me and Thee
 There was : and then no more of Thee and Me."

The Agnosticism and Secularism of these latter days, however, has a far deeper meaning than that which we can attribute to the verses of Omar Khayyam, or to any similar phase of opinion in past time. It is like in expression—as, indeed, in the first aspect of them, all negations seem to be much alike. But just as the ordinary commonplaces about the sorrows and trials of life have a greater significance when they fall from the lips of age and experience than when they are merely the utterance of the first dawning thoughtfulness of youth, so our modern Agnosticism implies a deeper consciousness of the problem of human existence than could possibly have been obtained by Omar Khayyam. For it is based, not on a mere Epicurean concentration upon the individual life, nor on the materialism of passion, but on our knowledge of the greatness of the universe, and on the complexity of finite interests, both practical and scientific, which seem to stand on their own merits, and to need no reference to anything higher, in order to recommend them as sufficient objects of our lives.

A consideration of these two main elements of modern thought enables us to understand why the struggle of positive and negative tendencies—of the consciousness of the infinite with the consciousness of the finite, of the religious with the secular spirit—should be so much more violent and protracted than the analogous conflict in earlier times. A religion which is universal and not merely imaginative, and a reflection which is scientific and not merely analytic or destructive, are each of them charged with interests vital to man; and, so long as they are opposed as enemies, they are necessarily involved in a contest which is incapable of being decided by any final victory on one side or the other. Man, as he has an understanding, cannot but acknowledge the facts of his finite life, and, in view of them, he must sooner or later withdraw his allegiance from every ideal that does not prove itself to be real, and renounce every belief which is found inconsistent with the laws of thought or the nature of experience. Yet, on the other hand, as he is a self-conscious being, who knows the world in relation to the self, and who, therefore, cannot but realize more or less distinctly the unity of all things and of the mind that knows them, he must equally reject any attempt to confine him to the finite world. Nor, however he may seek, in accordance with imperfect theories of knowledge, to limit himself to that world, can he ever

really succeed in confining his thoughts within it. All our knowledge of the things of time is, so to speak, on a background of eternity itself. The scientific impulse itself presupposes the presence in our minds of an idea of truth as the ultimate unity of being and knowing, which in all our inquiries into the laws of the universe we can only develop and verify. For it is just because we are obscurely conscious, even from the beginning of this unity, that we regard every apparent discord of things with each other as a mystery and a problem, and so are continually seeking law and unity—in other words, seeking thought, in things, with the confidence that ultimately it must be found there. In like manner the practical impulse, whenever it goes beyond, as in every conscious being it must somewhat go beyond, a craving for the satisfaction of immediate sensuous wants, implies the presence in our minds of an idea of absolute good, which is at once the realization of the self and of a divine purpose in the world. What, indeed, could we possibly hope from our feeble efforts after a good, which is only gradually defining itself before us as we advance, if we did not believe that they unite themselves with the great stream of tendency which is independent of us? How could we think to attain our “being’s end and aim” if we did not regard it ultimately identical with the “divine event to which the whole creation moves?” Hence a sober philosophy, admitting to the full all that can be said by the Agnostic about the feebleness of the powers of men as individuals, and the greatness of the universe, can yet reject the Agnostic conclusion from these premises, and can maintain that an absolute or objective synthesis is no mere dream of the childhood of the human race, when the distinction between the possible and the impossible had not yet been made, but rather that it is a task forced upon us by our rational nature, and which, as rational beings, we cannot but attempt, with more or less distinctness of consciousness, to fulfil. All thought and action, all moral and intellectual life, presupposes in us the power of looking at things, not from the point of view of our own individuality, but *in ordine ad universum*; and whatever presumption there is in the idea of a universal synthesis is already involved in our existence as rational or self-conscious beings. Philosophy may, therefore, begin its work by a vindication of the religious consciousness—the consciousness of the infinite—as presupposed in that very

consciousness of the finite which at present often claims to exclude it altogether, or to reduce it to an empty apotheosis of the unknown and unknowable. And having thus taught us to regard the consciousness of the infinite as no mere illusion, but as the consciousness of a real object, an Absolute, a God, who has been revealing himself in and to man in all ages, philosophy must go on to consider the history of religion, and indeed the whole history of man as founded on religion, as the progressive development of this consciousness. Nor can it fail to discover that the idea on which the higher life of man is founded—the idea of the unity of man as spiritual with an absolute spirit—has in Christianity been brought to light and made in a manner apprehensible by all. Whatever, therefore, may be the change of form to which this idea may have to submit in being applied to our ever-widening knowledge of nature and man, and whatever developments of it may be necessary ere it can solve the difficulties suggested by this increasing knowledge, we have good reason to be confident that we have in it a principle of universal synthesis which is adequate to the task.

On the other side, while this is true, it is also true that philosophy cannot conclusively meet the attacks of scientific criticism, except by coming into closer relation with the work of finite science than it has ever hitherto done; for the only true answer to such attacks is to show that the facts and laws upon which they rest are capable of a higher interpretation than that which has been drawn from them by those who have attended to these facts and laws alone. Philosophy, therefore, in face of the increasing complexity of modern life, has a harder task laid upon it than ever was laid upon it before. It must emerge from the region of abstract principles and show that it can deal with the manifold results of empirical science, giving to each of them its proper place and value. If it ever could sit "upon a hill remote" to reason of "fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute," it may not do so now. Within, as without, the special province of philosophy, the times are past when, to give spiritual help to men, it was sufficient to have a deep intuitive apprehension of a few great principles of spiritual life, and to denounce the representatives of empirical knowledge and finite interests as sophists, "apostles of the dismal science," and "apes of the Dead Sea." We may be thankful to

our Carlyles and Ruskins, as we are in higher measure to the great men of their type in earlier time—men who utter in powerful language the primary truths of morality and religion—even when they express these truths in a one-sided and intolerant way, refusing to pay due regard to the achievements of finite science, and treating with contempt every improvement that does not involve a fundamental change of man's moral being. But it is, after all, a mark of weakness to address the modern world with the unguarded utterances of an ancient prophet. To repeat against men like Mill and Darwin the old watch-words with which Plato attacked the sophists is, to say the least of it, an anachronism; for it is to refuse to recognize how far such men are from being sophists, and how much of the spirit of Plato they have imbibed. And it is to forget, on the other hand, that philosophy has a different task from that which it had in the days of Plato, that it has abandoned the Greek dualism of form and matter, and thereby accepted the task of idealizing interests and objects from which Plato might have been excused for turning away. He who would further the philosophical work of the future must renounce once for all this questionable luxury of contempt, which in this, as indeed in almost all cases, is the mortal enemy of insight. For the speculative labor of the future is one that requires the patient consideration of every partial truth, and the persistent effort to give it its due place in the whole, as well as a firm apprehension of the principles that underlie all truth. And the practical labor of the future is not merely by a shock to awaken men to the reality of spiritual things, but to follow out the spiritual principle in its application to all the details of our physical, economical, and social condition, till we have seen how the life of each human being, and every part of that life, may be made worth living for itself. Plato speaks of an "old quarrel between the poet and the philosopher," which is to be reconciled only if poetry can be shown to be truth, or truth, in its highest aspect, to be poetry. In like manner, we may say of this almost equally "old quarrel" between the prophet and the man of science, that it can be healed only by carrying back our scattered knowledge of the facts and laws of nature to the principle upon which they rest, and, on the other hand, by developing that principle so as to fill all the details of knowledge with a significance which they cannot have in themselves, but only as seen *sub specie æternitatis*.

ANTHROPOLOGY OF IMMANUEL KANT.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY A. E. KROEGER.

PART FIRST.—ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIDACTIC.

Concerning the Manner in which to cognize the Internal as well as the External of Man.

BOOK FIRST.—CONCERNING THE POWER OF COGNITION.

§ 45. *Mental Diversion (distractio)* is the condition of a turning off of attention (*abstractio*) from certain dominant representations, by distributing them among others of a dissimilar kind. If it occurs purposely, it is called *dissipation*; if involuntary, it is termed *absence of mind (absentia)*.

One of the weaknesses of the human mind is this: to be nailed to some representation or another to which we have applied great or permanent attention, and from which we are now not able to relieve ourselves—that is, not able to again make our power of imagination free. When this defect becomes a habit, and is always directed to one and the same object, it may turn into insanity. To be absent-minded in society is *impolite*, frequently also ridiculous. Women are generally subject to this infirmity, unless they have turned their attention to study. A servant who is absent-minded when attending at the table has generally something evil in his mind—either some evil of which he fears the consequences, or some evil which he purposes to do.

But to *divert our mind*—that is, to give a diversion to our involuntary reproductive power of imagination—for instance, when a clergyman, having finished his memorized sermon, desires to prevent its afterward haunting his mind—this is a necessary, and in part also artificial, proceeding for the taking care of the health of our minds. A protracted pondering upon one and the same object leaves behind an echo, as it were, even as the music of a dance, if long continued, still keeps humming in the ears of those who return from their revels; or as in the case of children who incessantly repeat one and the same *bon mot* of their fancy, especially if it sounds rhythmical—an echo, which annoys the mind and can be stopped only by diverting and directing the attention to other objects, such, for instance, as the reading of newspapers.

The *regathering* of our faculties (*collectio animi*), so as to be prepared for every new business, is a restoration of the balance of power of our mental forces, which promotes the health of the mind. Social entertainments and amusements of varied character are, like games, the most wholesome means for this purpose. But such entertainments must not skip abruptly from one thing to another against the natural association of ideas; for, in that case, the social party disperses in a condition of distraction of mind—the hundredth being mixed with the thousandth, unity of conversation lacking altogether, and the mind thus finding itself utterly confused and in need of a new diversion wherewith to disperse the former.

From this it appears that there must be an art (not a common art) for busy people to diet their minds in order to gain new strength. But when we have gathered our thoughts together—that is, have prepared ourselves to do with them as it pleases us—we cannot, on that account, call any one who intentionally gives way to his thoughts in an improper place, or improperly in his business relations to another person—taking no notice of such place or relations—distract, but only absent-minded, to be which in *society* is certainly impolite.

Hence it is not a common art to divert ourselves without ever becoming distract, which latter condition, if it become habitual, gives to the man subject to this infirmity the appearance of a dreamer and makes him useless for society, since he follows his own imagination in its free play, uncontrolled by reason.

The *reading of novels*¹ has—among many other disturbances of the mind—also this result: that it makes a habit of mental diversion. For, although by sketching characters, which can actually be found among men (though they be somewhat exaggerated), it gives a connection to thought, as if the novel were a real history—which must always be told in a certain *systematic* manner—it nevertheless allows the mind, while reading, to switch off, as it were; that is, to insert still other events as fictions, whereby the mental operation becomes *fragmentary*, and we permit our representations of one and the same object to play in our mind

¹ In these days of cheap novels, and inveterate novel reading, it may be not out of season to direct special attention to this paragraph.—*Tr.*

disjointedly (*sparsim*) and not connectedly (*conjunctim*), or according to the unity of our understanding. The teacher in the pulpit or in the academic lecture-room, likewise the prosecuting attorney or the lawyer in the court-room, must exhibit *three* kinds of attention: firstly, as to what he *says now*, so that he may express it clearly; secondly, as to what he *has said*; and thirdly, as to what he is *going to say*. For, if he omits to attend to any one of these things—that is, to arrange them in this precise order—he distracts his own mind as well as that of his hearers or readers; and an otherwise good enough mind can, under such circumstances, not escape the charge of being in a state of confusedness.

§ 46. An itself healthy understanding—one that has no mental weaknesses—may, nevertheless, be accompanied with weaknesses in regard to its application, which necessitate either *postponement* until it attains proper ripeness by *growth*, or the being represented by another person in regard to his business matters which are of a civil character. The natural or legal incapacity of an otherwise healthy man to use his *own* understanding in civil affairs is called *Unmuendigkeit*;¹ if it is founded on unripeness of age it is called *minority*; but, if it is founded on legal institutions for the transaction of public business, it may be called the *legal* or *civil Unmuendigkeit*. Children are naturally *unmuendig*, and their parents are their natural guardians. *Married women* are held civilly *unmuendig* at any age, the husband being the natural curator. But it is different when a wife holds property apart from her husband. For, although a woman has, by virtue of the nature of her sex, sufficient mouth-tools to represent herself and her husband before court, so far as talk is concerned, in all cases relative to the mine and thine, and hence might be considered even *uebermuendig*² in this respect, still, as little as it becomes woman's sex to enter the army ranks, even so little does it become her to de-

¹ There is no equivalent for this word in the English language. It means literally "mouthlessness"—that is, without a mouth, a voice, in court, or at the polls. For such a condition, when owing to want of the necessary age, the English language has the word *minority*; but for the other cases it has only roundabout expressions. I have, therefore, thought it best to use the German word.—*Tr.*

² *Uebermuendigkeit* = mouth-superfluity. KANT indulges here in one of his bachelor jokes. He means to say that in money and property matters women have more mouth-tools (tongue, etc.) than enough to take care of themselves and husbands, though the law declares them mouthless—*unmuendig*—even for themselves alone.—*Tr.*

defend her rights in person and carry on legal business for herself. She needs a representative for this purpose; and this legal *unmündigkeit* in regard to public transactions gives her all the more power in regard to household affairs, wherein the *right of the weaker party* becomes a factor, to revere and defend which the male sex feels itself bound by its very nature.

Still, however degrading, it is very comfortable to make one's self *unmündig*—to be under tutelage—and, of course, there is no lack of leaders, who make use of this pliancy of the large masses—that are not like to unite of their own accord—and who know how to represent to them that it is dangerous to use one's *own* understanding without the leadership of another; nay, that this danger is great, and probably fatal. The head of a State calls himself the *father of his country*, because he knows better than his *subjects* how to make them happy; but the people are, for their own benefit, condemned to perpetual tutelage; and when ADAM SMITH says improperly of the rulers, “that they themselves are, without exception, the greatest spendthrifts of all,” he is, nevertheless, powerfully refuted by the (wise?) laws regulating luxury passed in many countries.

The *clergy* keep the *laymen* strictly and persistently in their tutelage. The people have no voice and no judgment in regard to the path which they have to take in order to reach heaven. It needs not man's own eyes to reach that place; they will guide him sure enough; and though they put holy writings in his hands, so that he may see with his own eyes, he is, at the same time, warned by his leaders “not to find anything else than what they assure him they have already discovered in them.” Everywhere the mechanical direction of men under the rule of others is considered the surest means to make them follow a legal order.

Scholars love, as a rule, to remain under the tutelage of their wives in regard to household affairs. A scholar, buried among his books, on hearing a servant cry “There's fire in one of the rooms!” replied: “You know that those matters belong to my wife!”

Finally, a man may become *unmündig* again after having been *mündig*: for instance, when he has turned out a spendthrift, or when, after having acquired legal majority, he exhibits a weakness of the mind in the administration of his property,

which stamps him a child or idiot. But the consideration of this matter lies beyond the field of anthropology.

§ 47. *Dull* (*hebes*), like an unsharpened knife or axe, we call any one whom we cannot teach anything, who is incapable of learning. A person who is capable only of imitating is called a *simpleton*; whereas he who can himself originate products of the mind, or of art, is called a *genius*. Quite different from both is *simplicity*—in opposition to artificiality, of which latter quality we say that “perfect art again becomes nature,” and which quality we attain only at a late period of our lives. This simplicity is a faculty to attain the same object by an economy of means; that is, without circumlocution. He who possesses this gift—the wise man—is, with all his simplicity, not at all a simpleton.

Stupid we call pre-eminently any one who cannot be used for business purposes, because he possesses no power of judgment.

A *fool* is a person who sacrifices things that are valuable to objects that have no value; for instance, his home-happiness to outside show. Foolishness, when it becomes offensive, is called *folly*. You may call a man foolish without offending him; nay, he may confess himself to be a fool; but to be called fool, as signifying to be the tool of knaves (in *Pope's* use of the word), no one can bear quietly.¹

Haughtiness is folly; for, firstly, it is foolish to ask of others that they should esteem themselves little in comparison with me; and hence my requests result only in neglect. But such a request involves also offence, and this effects deserved *hate*. The word *fool*, when applied to a woman, has not that harsh significance, since a man does not believe that he can be offended by the vain presumption of a woman. Hence the word folly seems to be applicable only to the conception of a man's haughtiness.

When we call a person who has injured himself—for time or for all eternity—a fool, and when we thus mix contempt with hatred of him, although he has not offended us, we must consider

¹ When we say to a person in reply to his jokes and tricks: “You have *no sense!*” this is a somewhat flat expression for “You are joking!” or “Are you not smart?” A smart person is one who judges correctly and practically, but without art. Experience can make a smart man a sensible man—that is, enable him to use his understanding with art, but nature alone can make a man smart.

the offence as one committed against all mankind, and hence as committed against another person. He who acts directly contrary to his own legal advantages is also often called a fool, though he hurts only himself. *Arrouel*, the father of *VOLTAIRE*, told some one who congratulated him on his celebrated sons: "I have two fools for sons; the one is a fool in prose, the other a fool in verse." (One, having embraced Jansenism, was persecuted; and the other had to atone for his satires in the Bastile). As a general thing, the fool places the greater value in *things*, whereas the man of folly places a greater value on himself than he rationally ought to do.

When we call a man a *gawk* or a *fop*, we take as our basis the conception of their *want of sense*, or foolishness. The former is a young, the latter is an old fool. Both are misguided by knaves or rascals; and, though the former still claims pity, the latter draws upon himself only our bitter ridicule. A witty German philosopher and poet expounds the French words *fat* and *sot* (under the generic name of *fou*) as follows: "The former is a young German who goes to see Paris; the latter is the same young man when he returns from Paris."

That total weakness of the mind, which either suffices not even for the animal use of the vital forces (as in the case of *cretins*), or suffices at the utmost for the merely mechanical imitation of external acts, such as even animals can perform—as, for instance, to saw, to dig, etc.—is called *idiocy*, and cannot well be called a disease of the mind, since it is rather an utter deficiency of mind.

GOD AS THE ETERNALLY BEGOTTEN SON.

HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION." THIRD PART, "THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION," II, 3.
TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY F. LOUIS SOLDAN.

3. This requires that we should remember and define what the nature and definition of man is, how it is to be considered, how man ought to consider it, and what he ought to know of himself. Here we arrive at once at

(1.) The two opposite definitions: Man is good by nature; he

is not divided in himself, but his essence and concept is, that he is good by nature and that he is in harmony and peace with himself; on the other side [we find]: man is bad by nature.

The first definition is, therefore: Man is good by nature; his universal, substantial essence is good; opposed to this is the second. These are the contrasts for ourselves, for external contemplation, in the first place; the further consideration is that it is not only a view, a speculation which we form and create for ourselves, but that man naturally possesses self-knowledge, that he knows how he is constituted and what his determination is.

In the first place, the one proposition—man is good by nature—is the undirempted, undivided [phase]; on this standpoint he has no feeling of the need of atonement. If he needs no atonement this process and the whole matter considered here are superfluous.

To say that man is good by nature means, essentially, man is spirit in himself, rationality; he is created with and after the image of God; God is the Good, and man as spirit is the mirror reflecting God; he is the Good in himself [or potentially]. The possibility of his reconciliation can be based only on this very sentence; the difficulty and ambiguity, however, lie in the Potentiality.

The fact that man is good in himself [*i. e.*, potentially] does not express everything; for it is just the potentiality [*dies Ansich*] which is one-sidedness. Man is good in himself [potentially], *i. e.*, he is so only in an internal manner, according to his concept, and, therefore, not according to his reality. Since man is spirit, whatever he is truly he must be actually, for himself; physical nature remains in the Phase of potentiality [*beim Ansich*]; it is the potential concept, and in it the concept does not attain to actualized existence. The point, that man is good potentially only, this very Potentiality [*diess Ansich*] contains this deficiency.

The potentiality [*das Ansich*, in-itself] of nature means the laws of nature. Nature remains true to its laws; it does not step outside of them, and herein lies its substantial element by which it is surrounded with Necessity. The other side is that man should be in actuality also [*für sich*, for-himself] that which he is potentially [*an sich*, in-himself]; he must become this for-himself.

Whatever is good by nature is so immediately; it is the nature of spirit not to be something natural and immediate, but man as spirit has the characteristic that he steps out of naturalness and

passes over to the separation of his ideal and his immediate existence. This separation of an individual from its law, which is its substantial being, does not occur in physical nature, for the reason that the individual is not free. Man has for his essence that he places himself over against his nature and against his potentiality, and that he enters into this separation.

The other proposition arises immediately from what has been said: that man must not remain as he is immediately, but must transcend his immediateness: this is the idea of spirit. This overstepping of his naturalness, of his potentiality, constitutes the first ground for the diremption, and is that by which the diremption is immediately posited.

This diremption is the transgression, or the overstepping, of this naturalness and immediateness; but this must not be taken as if this overstepping were in itself the Evil, for this transgressing is contained already in naturalness itself. *Potentiality* and *Naturalness* are the immediate; but we are here speaking of spirit, and the latter in its immediateness oversteps its immediateness, and is thus the falling off from its immediateness or potentiality.

In this is contained the second proposition: man is bad by nature; his potential being, or his naturalness, is the Evil. In this his naturalness, his deficiency is contained at the outset; for, since he is spirit, he is different from naturalness; he is in a state of diremption. One-sidedness is immediately contained in this naturalness. If man is according to nature only, he is bad.

Natural man is he who is good in himself, according to the idea; in a concrete sense, however, that man is natural who follows his passions and impulses, who is hedged in by his desire, and to whom his natural immediateness is law.

He is natural, but in this state of naturalness he is also a willing being, and he is bad; his impulse and inclination form the sole content of his will. Considering the form—that is to say, considering that he is a will-ing being—he is no longer an animal; but the content, the aims of his volition, are as yet the [merely] natural. So far this standpoint; this higher standpoint is, that, if man is bad by nature, he is bad because he is a natural being.

That state, which is represented as the first state and one of inf-
of innocence, is the state of naturalness, or that of the animal. Man's guilt must be imputable to him; in so far as he is good, he

should be so, not in the manner in which a natural thing is good, but it should be his merit, his will; it should be imputable to him. Guilt [and merit] imply imputability [*i. e.*, responsibility].

A good man is so with and by his will; it is his own merit [*Schuld*]. Guiltlessness or innocence [*Unschuld*] means, to be without will, to have nothing in one's composition that is bad, and, therefore, it means also to have nothing that is good. Natural things, for instance animals, are all good, but such goodness cannot be attributed to man; in whatever respect he is good he is necessarily so with his will.

The absolute demand is that man should not remain a [merely] natural being; his should not be a [merely] natural will. It is true that man has consciousness, but he nevertheless, even as man, remains a merely natural being, when Nature constitutes the [whole] aim and end, content, and characteristic of his will.

More stress must be laid on the following characteristic: Man is man as subject; and, as a natural subject, he is a special, single subject; his will is a special, single will, and his volition is filled with the content of this special singularity. In other words, natural man is selfish.

From a man who is called good we demand that he be at least guided by general considerations, and act according to laws. Naturalness of will is properly selfishness of will; it is different from universality of will, and opposed to the rationality of that will which has been raised to universality. This bad element, or Evil personified in a general way, is the devil. The latter, as the negativity which wills itself, is in this respect identity with itself, and must, therefore, also have some kind of affirmation. Such is the case in Milton's work, where the devil in his characteristic energy is better than some of the angels.

But by the circumstance that man is bad, inasmuch as he is natural will, the other side, that he is good in himself, is not annulled; according to this idea, he always remains good. But man is consciousness; this implies that he is distinct, that he is a reality, a special man [*ein Dieser*], a subject; he is distinct from his idea, and, since this subject exists immediately only as distinct from its idea, having not yet returned to the unity of its subjectivity with its idea, its reality is, therefore, the natural reality, and this is selfishness.

The being bad presupposes at once the relation of reality to the idea; there is nothing posited in it but the contradiction of potentiality, of the idea, of singularity, of Good and Evil. It is a mistake to ask, "Is man good by nature, or not?" It is a wrong position; it is just as superficial to say that he is good as well as bad.

As regards, in particular, the point that will is arbitrariness, since it may will the good or the bad, such arbitrariness is certainly not will. Will exists only when it has determined itself; as long as either one thing or another is willed, it is not yet properly will. Natural will is the will of desire, of that inclination which wills the immediate, that does not yet will any special thing [*"diess"*], for the latter would require rational will—will which is cognizant of the fact that Law is Rationality. It is enjoined upon man not to exist as natural will, not to be what he is by nature. The idea of will is another matter; as long as man exists therein [in natural will], or remains in it, it is only potential will, and not yet real will, nor as yet will as spirit. This is the universal; the particular must be eliminated. What belongs to the defined sphere of morality can only be considered as concerning a special condition; it does not relate to the nature of spirit.

On the other hand, when we say that the will is bad, it is evident that we speak of will when we consider man concretely; and this concrete and real object cannot be merely negative. The bad will, however, is posited as mere negative volition, and this is an abstraction only; for when man, according to his nature, is not what he ought to be, he is nevertheless rational in himself, since he is spirit. This is the affirmative element in him, and the circumstance that he is not by nature as he ought to be concerns the form of the will simply: the essential is that man is potentially spirit. That which is potential abides when natural will is relinquished—it is the idea, the abiding and self-producing element. When we say, however, that will is bad by nature, it is only negative will which has this quality; and in this, therefore, we have the concrete before us, of which this abstraction is a contradiction. This has so wide an application, that when, for instance, the existence of the devil is asserted, it is necessary to show what affirmative element there is in him—strength of character, energy, consistency. In the concrete, the affirmative predicates are at once

emphasized. We forget in all this, when we speak of men, that they are men educated by customs, manners, laws, etc. We are told, "Men are not so bad, after all; just look about you." But then they are already, ethically and morally, educated men, who are in the phase of reconstruction and conciliation. The principal thing is to know that we must not think of such states as that of the child when we speak of religion; the fact is rather that in the representation of truth there is essentially placed before us the successively unfolded history of that which man is. The contemplation here is a speculative one; the abstract differences of the idea are here presented as occurring successively, in time. If educated man is to be considered, we must find in him the change, the reconstruction, the discipline, through which he has passed; he must exhibit the transition from natural to true will, and his immediate, natural will must appear as annulled in this.

(2.) If the first attribute is that man immediately is not what he ought to be, we must remember that man should also recognize himself as immediately imperfect; thus, his being bad or evil becomes the subject of contemplation. This might easily be interpreted to mean that man is assumed to be bad in and by contemplation only, so that this contemplation is looked upon as a kind of external injunction or condition; and that if he were not to contemplate himself thus, the other attribute—that of his being bad—would also disappear.

Since this contemplation is made a duty, it might be imagined that the contemplation is the essential point, and that without it no content existed. The nature of contemplation is also regarded as if it were contemplation or cognition which made man bad, or as if contemplation were bad, and that [therefore] there ought to be none, since it is the source of evil. This image-concept implies the connection of evil and cognition. This is an essential point.

The more particular manner in which this representation of this Evil is conceived is, that man becomes bad by knowledge, or, as the Bible represents it, that he eats of the tree of knowledge. In this way cognition, intelligence, the theoretical principle, and the will, enter upon a closer relationship to each other, and the nature of Evil is more closely considered. It should be remarked here that it is, indeed, cognition which is the source of all Evil, for cog-

tion or consciousness is the act which posits the separation, the negative, the primal division into subject and object, and the diremption of the several categories of potentiality. Man's nature is not what it ought to be, and it is cognition which discloses this to him, and which produces [the idea of] the Being which he ought not to be. [The ideal of] what he ought to be is the idea underlying man, and the knowledge that he is not this arises from the separation only; it arises from the comparison with that which he is in-and-for-himself. Through cognition only is the antithesis posited in which Evil has existence. The animal, the rock, the plant, are not bad; Evil exists within the circle of cognition only. It is the consciousness of Being-for-itself in contrast with another, but also in contrast with the object which is potentially universal, in the sense of the idea, of rational will. By this separation alone I am for myself, and in this the Evil is implied. To be bad, means abstractly to isolate one's self, the isolation or separation which has severed itself from the universal—which is the rational, the law, the categories of spirit. But with this separation arises [on the one hand] Being-for-itself and [on the other] the universal spiritual element, the law that ought to be.

This must not be understood as if a Contemplation or Cognition had any external relation to Evil, but Contemplation itself is the Evil. Man, since he is spirit, must proceed to this self-apposition; he must be for-himself, so that he has his antithesis before him as an object, [namely] that which is for him, the Good, the Universal, his Destiny. The Spirit is free, and freedom has the essential phase of this separation in itself. Being-for-itself is posited by such separation; in it the Evil has its abode; here is the fountain-head of the Evil, but it is also the point where atonement has its ultimate source. It is the cause of the disease and the fountain of health. We cannot show here more in particular how this comes about in the history of the Fall.

Sin is described in the account which tells that man ate from the Tree of Knowledge, etc. Thereby arise knowledge, diremption, separation, and with them the Good begins to exist for man—but, in consequence, Evil as well. It is represented as forbidden to eat thereof, and thus Evil or sin is represented, formally, as a transgression of a divine command, no matter what the content of the latter might have been. Here the command

has essentially this knowledge or cognition for its content. The rise of consciousness is posited by this, and, at the same time, it must be conceived as a standpoint on which one must not remain, which must be annulled; for it is not proper to remain in the diremption of Being-for-itself. The serpent says, furthermore, that by eating man will be like God, and thus appeals to the pride of man. God says to himself: Adam is become as one of us. The serpent, therefore, did not lie; God confirms what it said. Great labor has been devoted to the explanation of this passage, and some have gone so far as to assume that it was meant ironically. The higher explanation, however, is, that by this Adam the second Adam, or Christ, is meant. Knowledge or cognition is the principle of spirituality, which, as has been said, is also the principle which heals the wound of separation. In this principle of cognition there is also posited, indeed, the divine principle which, by further harmonization, must attain its conciliation and truth. In other words, it implies the promise and assurance of the recovery of the position of being an image [of God]. This prophecy is also found expressed metaphorically in what God says to the serpent, "I will put enmity," etc. Since by the serpent there is represented the principle of cognition as existing independently and externally to Adam, it is quite consistent that man (who is concrete cognition) should contain in himself the other side of the return movement and of reflection, and that this other side "shall bruise the head" of the former. [In the German Bible, as quoted by Hegel, "shall crush the head," etc.]

It is stated that first man did this; this is again the sensuous mode of expression. According to the logical meaning, "first man" signifies man as man, not any special, arbitrary one, not one out of many, but The First Man absolutely—man according to his idea. Man as such is consciousness, and with this he enters into this state of diremption—consciousness which, in its further determination, is cognition.

Since universal man is represented as "first" man, the question arises, Since it is only he that did this, how can it affect others? Here, then, we have the image-concept of Original Sin [*Erb-suende*, *lit.*, Inherited sin]; by it the deficiency is corrected that man as such is represented as a first man.

The diremption lies in the idea of man in general; the one-

sided conception by which it is represented as the deed of an individual is supplemented by the conception of Original Sin.

Labor is mentioned as the punishment of sin, etc.; this is, in general, a necessary consequence.

The animal does not work; it works only when forced, not naturally. It does not eat its bread in the sweat of its brow. It does not produce its food; it finds all its wants immediately supplied by Nature. The human being finds the material for all his wants [in Nature], but it may be said that the material is the least important element for man. The unceasing mediation of supplying his wants is carried on by work only.

Labor in the sweat of the brow, physical labor, and also mental work—which is harder even than the other—stand in immediate connection with the knowing of good and evil. That man must fashion himself to be what he is—that he eats his bread in the sweat of his brow—that he himself must produce what he is—all these belong to the essence, to the characteristics, of man, and they are necessarily connected with knowing good and evil.

It is said, furthermore, that the Tree of Life stood in the midst of it; this is the language of simple and childlike image-conception. There are two gifts for the wishes of man. The one is, to live in undisturbed happiness, in harmony with one's self and external nature; the animal remains in this unity, but man must transcend it. The other wish, perhaps, is, to live forever. According to these wishes the image-concept is made. If we look upon this more closely, it shows itself to be nothing but a childlike image-concept. Man as an individual living being, his individual life, his naturalness, must die; but when the narration is examined more closely, this appears to be the wonderful, the self-contradictory, element in it.

In this contradiction man is defined as Being-for-himself. Being-for-itself, as consciousness, self-consciousness, or infinite self-consciousness, is abstractly infinite; man's infinite self-consciousness is that he is conscious of his freedom, of his quite abstract freedom; this had not thus been brought to consciousness by former religions, in which the contrast never proceeded as far as this absoluteness, as far as this depth. By the fact that it is done here, the dignity of man is raised to a much higher standpoint. The subject has thereby received absolute importance, and

has become the essential object of God's interest, for it is self-consciousness, being-for-itself. It is pure self-certitude in one's self, and the point of infinite subjectivity exists in it. It is true that it is abstract, but it is abstract being in-and-for-itself. The form of expression for this is, that man, as spirit, is immortal, that he is the object of God's interest, that he is superior to finitude, dependence, and external conditions, and that he has the freedom of abstracting from everything, and it is implied therein that he is removed from mortality. In religion, because its contrast is infinite, the immortality of the soul is the principal phase.

That which may die is mortal, but whatever is capable of attaining a state in which there is no death is immortal. [When we speak of] combustible and incombustible, combustion is simply a possibility which approaches the object from without. The category of being, however, is no such possibility, but an affirmatively predicated quality which the object has already in itself.

Thus the immortality of the soul must not be conceived as something which will have reality only at some future time, but as a present quality. Spirit is eternal, and it is, therefore, present now. Spirit in its freedom is not within the circle of limitation. The thinking, purely cognizing spirit has the universal for its object, and this is eternity which is not merely duration—as the mountains endure—but it is cognition, or knowing. Here the eternity of spirit is brought to our consciousness by this cognition, by this separation itself, which has attained Being-for-itself, and is no longer entangled with the natural, contingent, and external. This eternity of spirit in itself is, that spirit, in the first place, is potential; the next standpoint is that spirit is not to remain as it is as natural spirit, but that it is to become what it is in-and-for-itself. The spirit must contemplate itself, and with this step the diremption arises. Spirit must not remain on this standpoint on which it is not as it is potentially; it must become adequate to its idea, and be universal spirit. From the standpoint of diremption the spirit looks upon its potentiality as Another, an Alien, and spirit itself is natural will; it is dirempted in itself. This diremption is in this respect the spirit's feeling or consciousness of the contradiction, and with this there is posited the need of an annulment of this contradiction.

On the one hand, it is said: Man in Paradise without sin is

immortal—terrestrial immortality and the immortality of the soul are not distinguished in this account—man will live forever. If this external death is to be merely a consequence of sin, man would be potentially immortal. On the other hand, the representation is also, that, if man ate of the Tree of Life, he would live forever.

The gist of the matter is this: Man is immortal by cognition, since only because he is a thinking being he is no longer a mortal animal soul, and thus only is he a free and pure soul. Cognition or thinking is the root of man's life and immortality, as a totality in itself. Animal soul is corporeity [materiality], but spirit is totality in itself.

The next step is, that this view, which we have formed in thought, should be made real in man—that is to say, that man should be made to arrive at the infinity of the contrast in himself; this contrast is that of Good and Evil, and that man should know himself, as a natural being, to be bad, and should become conscious of this contrast not only in a general way, but as existing within himself. He should know that it is he who is bad, in order that there may be aroused in him the injunction to be good, and with it the consciousness of the diremption and the grief about the contradiction and the contrast within him.

We have met with the form of Contrast in all religions; but the antithesis with the power of nature, the moral law, moral will, the ethical principle, fate—all these are subordinate contrasts, and contain a contrast to a particular only.

Man who transgresses a commandment is bad; but he is bad in this particular case only, in contrast with or in opposition to the particular commandment alone. Good and Evil appeared in general opposition to each other in the Persian religion; there the contrast is outside of the human being, and man is outside of it; it is not this abstract contrast within himself.

The injunction that man, having this contrast within himself, should conquer it, does, therefore, not mean that he disobeys some commandment or other, but that he is bad in-himself, that he is bad in general, strictly bad, bad in his innermost heart, and that this category of Evil is a category of his idea—and of this he must become conscious.

(3.) This depth is important. Depth means the abstraction of

the contrast, or its pure generalization, so that its two sides attain this very general determinateness toward each other.

This contrast has two forms: On the one side it is the contrast of Evil as such, [the feeling] that it is he himself that is bad; this is the contrast to God. On the other side there is the contrast with the world. He feels that he is at variance with the world; this is the origin of unhappiness or misery, which is the diremption on the other side.

In order that the need of universal atonement, and with it the divine atonement, or absolute atonement, may exist in man, it is necessary that the contrast attain this infinity, so that this universality comprehend the innermost soul, and that there be nothing not encompassed by this contrast, and the contrast is no longer a particular [but general or universal]. This is the profoundest depth.

a. We first consider the diremption in relation to one extreme: God. Man carries the consciousness within himself that he himself is, in his innermost heart, this contradiction; and this is the infinite sorrow for himself. Sorrow or pain exists only in contrast to [the idea of] what ought to be [the condition of man] in contrast to an affirmation. That which contains no longer anything affirmative, no longer contains any contradiction or pain. Pain is nothing but negativity in the affirmative, since the affirmative is thus in itself self-contradictory and torn.

This pain is only one phase of the Evil. Evil, merely for-itself, is an abstraction, and exists only in contrast to the Good. And since it is within the unity of the subject, the contrast to this diremption is the Infinite Pain. If there did not thus exist in the subject the consciousness of the Good, if there were not in his deepest soul the injunction to be good, there would be no pain, and badness and Evil would be empty nothing; they exist only in this contrast.

Evil and this pain can be infinite only because the Good, or God, is known as One God, as a pure spiritual God. It can be infinite only because the good is this pure unity, and when there is a belief in One God. Only in relation to the latter can and must the negative proceed to the category of the Bad or Evil, and the negation proceed to this universality.

One side of this diremption thus exists through man's elevation to the pure spiritual unity of God. This pain and this conscious-

ness is man's absorption in the depth within him [*die Vertiefung des Menschen in sich*], and with this his absorption in the negative phase of diremption, of Evil.

This is the negative internal absorption (*Vertiefung*) in Evil; the internal absorption, affirmatively, is the absorption in the pure Unity of God. At this point we see that I, as natural man, am inadequate to that which is the True, and that I am hemmed in by many natural particularities; but the truth of the One Good is just as unshakably firm within me, and thus this inadequacy exhibits itself as that which ought not to be.

The task and the injunction are infinite. One might say: Since I am a natural man, I have, on one side, consciousness of myself; but naturalness consists in the absence of consciousness in regard to myself and the absence of will; I am a being which acts according to its nature, and, as is often said, I am without sin or guilt, because I have no consciousness of what I am doing, and because I have no will in the proper sense; I, therefore, am acting without inclination, and am taken by surprise by impulses.

But this guiltlessness disappears in this contrast. For it is this natural, unconscious, will-lacking Being of man which ought not to be, and which has, therefore, the predicate of Evil, in the light of the pure Unity, of the perfect Purity which I know to be the True and the Absolute. It is implied in what has been said, that, at this point, the Unconscious, the will-lacking state, must in itself essentially be considered the Evil.

But the contradiction still remains, no matter how we turn it; since this so-called guiltlessness determines itself as the Evil or Bad, there remains inadequacy of myself compared with the absolute or with my essence, and in one direction or the other I know myself to be that which I ought not to be.

This is the relation to the one extreme, and the result or more definite mode of this pain is that it is my self-humiliation; it is the contrition involved in the feeling that it is pain caused by myself, because I, as a natural being, am inadequate to that which I know myself [to be my ideal self], and which both knowledge and will tell me I ought to be.

b. As regards the relation to the other extreme, the separation there appears as unhappiness: man cannot find satisfaction in the world. His satisfaction, his natural needs, form neither a right

nor a claim. As a natural being, man is related to others, and others are related to him as powers; and, so considered, he is as contingent as the others.

But his demands in ethical respects, his higher ethical demands, are postulates and categories of freedom. Since these postulates, legitimate in themselves, and based on his idea (he has a knowledge of the Good, and the Good is in him), cannot find satisfaction in life, in the external world, he is unhappy.

It is unhappiness which drives and impels man back into himself; and since this fixed injunction of the rationality of the world dwells within him, he renounces the world and seeks happiness and contentment in himself through the harmony and accordance of his affirmative side with himself. In order to attain this, he renounces the external world, places his happiness in himself, and thus finds in himself satisfaction.

Of this command and of this unhappiness, we have mentioned these two forms: We saw that pain which proceeds from the universal, from above, in [the history of] the Jewish people, there the infinite postulate of absolute purity remains in the individual's naturalness, in his empirical knowing and willing. The other, the retrogressive movement out of misery within, is the standpoint where the Roman world suffered its downfall—this universal unhappiness of the world.

We have looked upon this formal inwardness [Subjectivity] which finds satisfaction in the world, upon rule and empire, upon God's purpose, which is represented, known, and understood as worldly dominion. Both sides have their one-sided features: the first may be said to be the feeling of humiliation; the other is the abstract elevation of man in himself; it is man who concentrates himself within. It is thus Stoicism and Scepticism.

The Stoic, Sceptic philosopher was thrown upon himself; he had to find satisfaction in himself alone, and in this self-contained independence and rigidity he was to attain happiness and harmony with himself; his abstract, ever-present, self-conscious inwardness was to be his basis.

In this separation, or diremption, we have said, the subject defines and conceives itself to be the extreme of abstract Being-for-itself and of abstract freedom; the soul sinks into its own depth, its whole abyss. This soul is the undeveloped *Monad*, the naked

Monad, the empty, content-lacking soul; but since the soul is in itself the Idea and the Concrete, this emptiness and abstraction is contradictory to the soul's predicate of being concrete.

This, then, is the Universal, that in this separation, which is developed as an infinite contradiction, this abstraction is to be annulled. This abstract Ego is in itself also a Will; it is concrete, but its immediate potential content is the natural Will. The soul finds naught in itself at first but appetites, selfishness, and the like and this is one of the forms of the antithesis that the Ego, the soul in its depth, is therein distinguished from the side of reality; that the side of reality is not one which is constituted adequately to its idea and brought back to it, but that it finds, on the contrary, only natural Will in itself.

The antithesis to which the side of reality develops itself is that of the World; in contrast to the unity of the idea, there is, thus, a universality of the natural will, whose principle is selfishness and egotism, and which appears in its realization as corruption, brutality, etc. The objectivity which this pure Ego possesses, and which belongs to it because it is adequate to it, is not its natural will, neither is it the world; its adequate objectivity is the universal Being alone, which it [the Ego] does not possess as its [natural or original] content, and which has the whole content, the world, for its antithesis.

The consciousness of this contrast, of this separation of the Ego and the natural will, is that of an infinite contradiction. The Ego stands in an immediate relation to the natural will, or the world, and is at the same time repelled by it. This is the infinite pain, the world-sorrow. The conciliation which we have thus far found on this standpoint is only a partial one, and it is, therefore, insufficient. The congruity and consonance of the Ego within itself, which the Ego attains in the Stoic philosophy, where it knows itself as the thinking agent, and its object is the Thought-thing [*das Gedachte*] or universal—(and where the Ego looks upon all this strictly as the All, the Totality, as the true essence, and where, therefore, all this appears to it as a Thought-thing, as something of which the subject knows that it itself has posited it)—is a merely abstract atonement, for this Thought-thing is deprived of all determination; it is only formal self-identity. From this absolute standpoint there cannot and there should not be such an ab-

stract atonement; neither can the natural Will find satisfaction in itself, for it and the state of the world do not contain sufficient satisfaction for the man who has comprehended his infinity. The abstract depth of the antithesis necessitates the infinite sorrow and suffering of the soul, and with it an expiation which is just as perfect.

These are the highest and most abstract phases; the contrast is the highest. Both sides form the contrast in its greatest universality, in its deepest inwardness, in the universal itself; they are the contrasts in their greatest depth. Both phases, however, are one-sided: the first contains this pain, this abstract humiliation; and there the highest [element] is simply this inadequacy of the subject to the universal, and the separation and diremption which has not been abridged or annulled; it is the standpoint of the contrast of the Infinite on one side, and of a fixed Finitude on the other. This finitude is abstract finitude, and what belongs to me as mine in this, is thus the Evil only.

This abstraction finds its complement in the other, which is Thinking in itself, which is my self-adequacy, that I am satisfied within myself, that I can be satisfied within myself. But, by itself, this second phase is just as one-sided; it is only the affirmative, or self-affirmation within myself. The first phase—that of contrition—is negative only, without affirmation within itself; the second is to be this self-affirmation, this self-satisfaction within. But this satisfaction of myself within myself is only an abstract satisfaction by means of [an abnegation of or] flight from the world through inactivity and quiescence. Since this is a flight from reality, it is also a flight from *my* reality—not from external reality, but from the reality of my will.

The reality of my will, or the Ego as a special subject or will that is filled with a content, does not abide with me, but there remains for me the immediateness of my self-consciousness. It is true that this self-consciousness is a perfectly abstract one, but it contains the profoundest depth, and I am preserved in it.

This abstraction of my abstract reality does not exist within myself or in my immediate self-consciousness; it is not found in the immediateness of my self-consciousness.¹ On one side, there-

¹ The contrast which Hegel here speaks about is that of dependence and independence. In the former the soul feels its inadequacy to the injunctions of the higher

fore, the affirmation, free from that negation of the one-sidedness of immediateness, preponderates. There the negation is the one-sided element.

From these two phases the feeling of the need of a transition arises. The idea of the preceding religions has purged and cleared itself, until this antithesis was attained; and the fact that this antithesis has shown itself as an existing need has been thus expressed: "When the time was fulfilled," etc.—which means, that the spirit, the need of the spirit, exists which contains the reconciliation.

c. The atonement. The most profound need of the spirit lies in this: that the antithesis has been pushed in the subject to its most universal—that is to say, its most abstract—extremes. This is the diremption spoken of, the pain. Since these two sides are not separated, but exist as a contradiction in one [individual], the subject proves itself to be the infinite power of Unity; it can endure and outlive this contradiction. This is the formal, abstract, but, at the same time, infinite energy of the unity which the subject possesses.

That by which the need is supplied and satisfied is the consciousness of the expiation and of the cancellation and nugatoriness of the contradiction; it is the consciousness that this contrast is not the truth, but that its meaning is, that the Unity can be attained only by the negation of this antithesis. What is needed is peace and conciliation. The subject feels the need of

principle which it recognizes, and the subjective result is sorrow and suffering; the feeling of inadequacy is a negative feeling. The other pole of this antithesis is the standpoint which Hegel illustrates by an allusion to the Stoics. In it there is self-sufficiency and the feeling of independence. It is not real independence, but the ignoring of dependence. Man, as it were, considers the nutshell of his existence absolute space. It is the principle of abnegation which turns away from the activity of life, and, therefore, Hegel calls it a desertion of reality, an abnegation of real will. But the fact that this standpoint is an abnegation of reality, of a dependence which after all exists, is one of which the Stoic is not conscious himself. He does not tear himself away from dependence and combat it; he simply does not know of any; he is sufficient unto himself. Since this standpoint is, therefore, unconscious of any negative element, of any dependence, Hegel may well call it an affirmation, and say of it that the consciousness of the one-sided character of such seeming independence is lacking, and that "the abstraction of such abstract reality does not exist in man's immediate self-consciousness as long as he occupies this standpoint."—*Translator's Note.*

conciliation, and it has this need, because it [the subject] is infinitely One and self-identical.

The annulment of the antithesis has two sides.

The subject must attain the consciousness that this contrast has no existence in itself, and that the truth and the inner meaning is the cancellation of this contrast. And by this means, since the contrast is annulled in itself, according to its truth, the subject as such in its Being-for-itself may attain the annulment of this antithesis, and peace and conciliation.

(1.) The annulment of the antithesis in-itself constitutes the condition, the presupposition, the possibility of the power of the subject to annul it also for-itself. For this reason it is said that the subject does not attain conciliation by its own power, not of itself as a special subject, nor by its own individual deeds and doings. It is not by its acts and relation as that of a subject that the conciliation is brought about, or can be brought about.

This is the nature of the need, as regards the question how it may be satisfied. The conciliation can be brought about only when the need finds the separation annulled, and when the antithesis, whose extremes seem to flee each other, is null and void, and when the divine truth appears to this need as the annulled contrast in which both extremes have divested themselves of their mutual abstraction.

The former question arises, therefore, in this place once more: Cannot the subject bring about this conciliation of itself, through its own power, by making its heart worthy of the divine idea with piety and prayer, and by expressing this through its actions? And, if the single subject cannot do this, cannot at least all men who will the right receive into themselves the divine law, so that there would be a heaven on earth, and the spirit with its grace would be living and present, and would possess reality? The question is whether the subject, as subject, could not bring this about through itself. It is a common opinion that it could do this. We must remember and keep before our minds that we speak of the subject which rests on an extreme, which is for itself. Subjectivity has for its category that the positing [which is undertaken] is done by myself. This positing, doing, etc., is my own work, no matter what the content may be, and the Producing is, therefore, but a determination, one-sided in itself, and the product is

simply posited, and it remains for this reason in abstract freedom only. The question means, therefore, whether the subject cannot produce this by its [act of] positing. This positing must essentially be a presupposition, so that that which is posited is also in-itself. The unity of subjectivity and objectivity, this divine unity, must be as a presupposition for my Positing; then only can the latter have a content; the content is spirit, substance [*Gehalt*]—otherwise it would be subjective and formal—and thus only it receives a true, substantial content. With the determination of this presupposition, and according to the significance of such presupposition, it deprives itself of this presupposition and loses it. Kant and Fichte say that man can do good only in the presupposition of a moral world-principle; he cannot know whether it will grow and thrive; he acts simply with the presupposition that the Good possesses growth and success in itself and for itself, and is not merely something that is posited, but is objective according to its nature. The presupposition is an essential determination.

The harmony of this contradiction must, therefore, be represented as a presupposition for the subject. As soon as the idea cognizes the divine unity, it also cognizes that God is in-and-for-himself, and with this it attains the cognition that the activity of the subject is nothing by itself, and that it exists and endures only under that presupposition. To the subject the truth therefore must appear as a presupposition, and the question is, in what shape truth can appear on the standpoint on which we are; it is the infinite pain, this pure depth of the soul, and for this pain there shall be a cancellation of the contradiction. The latter is necessary, in the first place, as a presupposition, because it is this one-sided extreme.

The subject's activity and attitude is, therefore, that of positing activity on the one side only; the other is the substantial side, and the basis which contains the possibility. The latter is that this contrast in-itself does not exist. More explicitly expressed, it is, that this contrast eternally arises, and in the same way eternally annuls itself, and is likewise eternal conciliation.

We have seen that this is the truth, in the eternally divine idea; it is the nature of God as living Spirit to distinguish himself from himself, to posit Another and to remain in it identical with him-

self, and to possess in this Other the identity of himself with himself.

This is the truth, and this truth must constitute one side of what must obtain in the consciousness of man—namely, the substantial, potential side.

More explicitly this may be thus expressed: The contrast is simply Inadequacy. The contrast, the Evil, is the naturalness of human being and willing; it is immediateness; such is naturalness, and with immediateness there is posited also finitude, and this finitude and naturalness are inadequate to the universality of God, which is the strictly free, self-contained, infinite, eternal idea.

This inadequacy is the starting-point which constitutes the feeling of need. It is not a better definition to say that for our consciousness the inadequacy disappears on both sides. The inadequacy is; it is implied in spirituality. Spirit is that which distinguishes and differentiates itself; it is the positing of distinctions.

Since they are differentiated, they are, according to this phase, distinguished and not the same: they are different from and inadequate to each other. This inadequacy cannot disappear; if it did, the primal attribute of spirit [to be subject and object], its ever-active life, would vanish, and it would cease to be spirit.

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE STATE.

TRANSLATED FROM HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT," BY EDWIN D. MEAD.

[The numbers of the paragraphs of the original are inserted for convenience of reference.—EDITOR.]

535. The State is the *self-conscious* ethical Substance—the union of the principle of the Family and of Civil Society. This same unity exists in the Family as the feeling of love, and is its essence; and this receives, at the same time, the *form of self-conscious* Universality through the second principle named, viz., the principle of knowledge and self-active Will. This has for its content intelligent subjectivity, inasmuch as its characteristics unfold into cognition; and this is its absolute purpose, so that it will come to exist as rational for itself.

536. The State is (α), in the first place, its own formative process as self-related development—the internal system of political regulations (*Staatsrecht*), or the form of its Constitution (written and unwritten) (*Verfassung*). It is (β) particular individual State standing in relation to other individual States—its foreign relations (*außere Staatsrecht*). (γ) These particular States or nations (national spirits—“*Geister*”) form constituent elements in the process of development of humanity—the development of the *World-history* (*Entwicklung der allgemeinen Idee des Geistes in seiner Wirklichkeit*).

A. *The Internal System of Political Regulations.*

537. The essence of the State is the Universal in and for itself, the reasonable forms of the Will—as self-knowing and acting, pure subjectivity, and, as reality, one individual. Its *work* in general, in reference to the extreme of particularity, as the multitude of individuals, is twofold—first, to protect the individuals as persons, consequently to make *the Law* necessary reality; and next, to promote their *welfare*, the primary object of the efforts of the individual, but which has a universal side, to guard the Family and to guide Civil Society. Secondly, however, the State must lead back both these and the entire feeling and activity of the individual, inasmuch as the individual strives to be a centre for himself, into the life of the universal Substance, and, in this sense, as free power, rid itself of those spheres subordinate to the universal Substance, and hold them in substantial immanence.

538. *The Laws* express the determinations of the content of objective Freedom. In the first place, they are limits for the immediate subject, for his independent arbitrary will and particular interest. In the second place, however, they are absolute *object and end* and the common product of all, and are thus produced by the functions of the various social classes, which, rising from the general division, specialize themselves further, and by all the activity and private care of *individuals*; and, thirdly, they are the substance of their Will, which is therein free, and of their disposition, and are thus represented as validly determining usage.

539. The State exists, as living Spirit, only as an organ-

ized whole, differentiated into the particular activities, which, proceeding from the one Notion (*Begriff*) of the rational Will (if not directly known as Notion), continually produce this as their result. The *Constitution* is this clear expression of the power of the State. It contains the determinations of the way in which the rational Will, so far as it is in the individuals only *in itself* the universal, comes, on the one hand, to consciousness and understanding of itself, and is found, and, on the other, through the operation of the government and its several branches, becomes realized, and is maintained in reality, and is thus protected as well from the accidental subjectivity of the government as from that of the individuals. It is the existing *justice* as the reality of *freedom* in the development of all its rational determinations.

Freedom and Equality are the simple categories which fully sum up that which should constitute the fundamental principle and the final aim and result of the Constitution. True as this is, it is as true that these principles are defective, in the first place, in being entirely abstract; maintained in this form of abstraction, they are what prevent or destroy the concrete—*i. e.*, an articulation into classes within the State, *i. e.*, a Constitution and government in general. With the State appears inequality, the distinction of the governing and the governed, authorities, magistrates, directors, etc. The logical principle of Equality rejects all distinctions, and does not allow the existence of any sort of difference of rank. These [ideas of freedom and equality] are, indeed, fundamental in this sphere, but, as the most abstract, they are the most superficial, and so the most liable to run away with men; it will, therefore, be interesting to consider them somewhat more closely. As concerns Equality, in the first place—the popular idea, that *all men are by nature equal*—contains the mistake of confounding the natural with the Notion [or the ideal of man]; it must rather be said that *by nature* men are only *unequal*. But the Notion [ideal] of Freedom, as it exists, in the first place, as such, without further determination and development, is abstract subjectivity as *person*, competent to possess property; this single abstract determination of personality constitutes the real *Equality* of men. That this Equality exists, however—that it is *man* (and not, as in Greece, Rome, etc., *some men only*) who is ac-

knowledged as person and has legal worth—this is not *by nature*, but it is rather only the product and result of the consciousness of the deepest principle of Spirit and of the universality and perfection of this consciousness. The proposition that citizens are *equal before the law* contains a high truth, but, so expressed, it is tautology; for only the *lawful* condition in general, the fact that the laws rule, is thus expressed. But in reference to the concrete, citizens, aside from personality, are equal before the law only in that in which they are equal otherwise, outside the law. Only the otherwise accidentally existing equality of fortune, age, physical strength, talent, cleverness, or of crime, etc., however brought about, can and will make possible, in the concrete, an equal treatment before the law—in reference to taxes, military duty, admission to civil offices, etc.—punishment, etc. The laws themselves, save in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality, presuppose unequal conditions, and define the unequal legal conditions and duties arising from them.

As to Freedom, in the next place—this is taken partly in the negative sense, as opposed to the arbitrariness of others, and illegal dealing, partly in the affirmative sense of subjective Freedom; great breadth is given to this Freedom, as well in regard to individual arbitrariness and activity for one's particular purpose as with reference to the claim of individual insight, participation, and activity in general affairs. Formerly the legally determined rights, as well private rights as the public rights of a nation, city, etc., were called the *freedoms* of the same. In reality every true law is a freedom, because it contains a rational determination of objective Spirit, consequently a content of freedom. Nothing, however, has been commoner than the idea that the freedom of each individual must be limited in relation to the freedom of others, and that the State is the condition of this mutual limitation, and the laws are the limits. In such conceptions, Freedom appears only as accidental choice or arbitrariness. It has thus been said, also, that Equality is possible only in modern nations, or Equality more than Freedom, and this on no other ground than because it was impossible, with an accepted definition of Freedom (chiefly, the participation of all in the affairs and the business of the State), to deal rightly with the reality, which is more rational and at the same time more powerful than abstract pre-

suppositions. On the contrary, it is to be said that the high development and perfection of modern States produce in reality the greatest concrete *inequality* of individuals, yet, by the deeper rationality of the laws and the strengthening of the legal condition, make Freedom so much the greater and securer, and can permit and endure it. Even the superficial distinction which lies in the words *freedom* and *equality* indicates that the first has a reference to *inequality*; yet the current, popular Notions of Freedom, on the contrary, lead back only to Equality. But the more Freedom, as the security of property, as the possibility of developing and making available one's talents and good qualities, etc., is strengthened, the more it seems to be a matter of course; the consciousness and the prizing of Freedom are directed to it chiefly in the *subjective* sense. This subjective Freedom, the Freedom of activity, testing itself on all sides and working according to its own pleasure for particular and for universal, spiritual interests—the independence of individual particularity, as the inner Freedom, in which the citizen has principles, individual insight, and conviction, by which he wins moral independence—contains for itself, on the one hand, the highest development of the specialty of that in which men are unequal, and, through this culture, make themselves still more unequal, and, on the other hand, it grows up only under the condition of that objective Freedom, and has grown and could grow to this height only in the modern States. If with this cultivation of specialty and detail, the multitude of wants, and the difficulty of satisfying them, the popular discussion and discontent, with their unsatisfied conceit, extend themselves indefinitely, this pertains to the exclusive particularity, for which it remains to give itself up to the production in its sphere of all possible complications and to satisfy itself with them. This sphere is, indeed, at the same time, the field of limitations, since Freedom is buried in naturalness, caprice, and arbitrariness, and thus has to limit itself, and this, indeed, according to the naturalness, the pleasure, and the arbitrariness of others, but chiefly and essentially according to rational Freedom.

Concerning *political* Freedom, however—that is, in the sense of a formal participation of the will in the public affairs of the State and the activity of those individuals who otherwise make the

special purposes and business of Civil Society their principal vocation—it has become somewhat usual to call the Constitution only that side of the State which concerns such a participation of those individuals in public affairs, and to regard a State in which this does not formally have place as a State without a Constitution. Concerning this understanding of it, there is, in the first place, only this to be said, that under the term Constitution the definition of the laws—*i. e.*, the *freedoms* in general, and the organization of the means of realization of these—are to be understood, and political Freedom can in any case constitute only a portion of the same; of this the following sections will treat:

540. The *guaranty* of a Constitution—*i. e.*, the necessity that the laws be reasonable and their realization secured—lies in the Spirit of the people as a whole in the definiteness with which it has self-consciousness of its Reason (Religion is this consciousness in its absolute substantiality)—and, secondly, in the *real organization* conformable to it, as *development* of that principle. The Constitution presupposes this consciousness of the Spirit, and, *vice versa*, the Spirit the Constitution, for the actual Spirit itself has the definite consciousness of its principles only so far as they are present to it as existing.

The question to whom, to what authority, and how organized, the power belongs *to make a Constitution*, is the same as the question who has to make the Spirit of a people. Such a separation of the conception of a Constitution from that of the Spirit, as though this Spirit of the people exists or has existed without possessing a Constitution suitable to it, only proves the superficiality of the thought concerning the connection of the Spirit and of its consciousness of itself with its reality. What is in this way called *making a Constitution* has never, on account of this inseparableness, occurred in history, just as little as the *making* of a law-code; a Constitution has *only developed* itself from the national Spirit coincident with its own development, and with it gone through the degrees of formation and alteration which the Notion [ideal] made necessary. It is the indwelling Spirit and History—and History, indeed, is only *its* History—by whom Constitutions have been made and are made.

541. The living totality, the maintenance—*i. e.*, the continuous creation and preservation of the State in general and of its

Constitution—is the *Government*. The naturally necessary organization is the origin of the Family and of the social classes of Civil Society. The Government is the *universal* part of the Constitution—*i. e.*, that which has for its object the maintenance of Family and Civil Society, but at the same time comprehends and exercises the universal purposes of the whole, which are above the spheres of the Family and of Civil Society. The organization of the Government consists, likewise, in the distribution of its powers, and their functions are determined by the Notion,¹ but interpenetrate each other, in the Notion's subjectivity, and form real unity.

Since the most immediate categories of the Notion are those of *universality* and *individuality*, and their relation is that of the *subsumption* of *individuality* under *universality*, it has happened that the legislative and executive powers have arisen in the State, and have become so distributed that the former exists *for itself* as the supreme; the latter divides itself again into *governmental* or administrative power and *judicial* power, according to the application of the laws, whether to general or private affairs. The *distribution* of these powers has been regarded as the essential correlation, but preserving their *independence* of one another in existence, and with the connection mentioned of the subsumption of the powers of the particular under the power of the universal. The elements of the Notion are to be recognized in these determinations, but they are connected by the understanding in a relation of unreason instead of to the self-uniting-with-self of living Spirit. That the affairs of the universal interests of the State, in their necessary distinction, are organized also *in separation from one another*—this division is the one absolute moment of the depth and reality of Freedom; for Freedom has depth only as it has developed into its distinctions and secured their existence.

¹ [Notion = Begriff = generic process, involving universality, particularity, and individuality. Hence, to be "determined by the notion" means to assume the phases of universal, particular, and individual. In the following paragraph this thought is developed:

The Function of Universality is the law-making or legislative power. It makes laws for all. The Function of particularity is the Judicial power. It applies the law in particular exigencies. The Function of Individuality is the executive or administrative power, which sees that the laws and judicial decisions are carried out.—EDITOR.]

But to make the work of legislation (and this entirely with such an idea as that a Constitution and the fundamental laws were ever *first to be made*—in a condition where an already existing development of distinctions is supposed) into an independent power, and, indeed, the *first* power, with the further provision of the participation of all in it, and the governmental power dependent upon this, only *its* executive—this presupposes the lack of the knowledge that the true Idea, and with it the living and spiritual reality, is the Notion, uniting itself with itself, and, consequently, *subjectivity*, which contains universality as only one of its moments. Individuality is the first and the highest determination pervading in the organization of the State. Only through the governmental power, and because this includes in itself the special offices (to which also the special, *for itself abstract* office of legislation itself belongs), is the State *one*. Thus, here, as everywhere, the essentially and only true is the rational relation of the logical, as opposed to the external relation of the understanding, which only comes to the subsumption of the individual and particular under the universal. That which disorganizes the unity of the logical and rational likewise disorganizes reality.

542. In the Government as organic totality there exists (*a*) *subjectivity*, as the *infinite* unity of the Notion with itself in development, the all-supporting, decreeing Will of the State, the highest point of the same, the all-penetrating unity, the *princely* governmental power. In the perfect form of the State, in which all moments of the Notion have attained their free existence, this subjectivity is not a so-called *moral person*, or a decree *proceeding from a majority*—forms in which the unity of the decreeing Will has not a *real* existence, but exists as real individuality, the will of one decreeing individual—Monarchy. The Monarchical Constitution is, therefore, the Constitution of the *developed* Reason; all other Constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason.

The uniting of all concrete State-powers into one existence—as in the Patriarchal condition or, as in the Democratic Constitution, the participation of all in all affairs—is opposed in itself to the principle of the distribution of powers—*i. e.*, to the developed freedom of the moments of the Idea. But just so surely must the division, the perfection of the moments which had advanced to

free totality, be brought back to *ideal unity*—i. e., to *subjectivity*. The complete unfolding, the realization of the Idea, contains essentially this, viz., that this subjectivity as *real* moment has risen to *actual* existence, and this *actuality* is only the individuality of the monarch—the subjectivity of the abstract, final decision, present in one person. To all those forms of a *common* decreeing and willing which proceed from the atomism of particular wills, democratically or aristocratically, pertains the unreality of an *abstraction*. All depends on the two determinations, necessity of a *moment of the Notion* and the form of its *reality*. The nature of the speculative Notion alone can give a true explanation of the matter. The mentioned subjectivity, since it is the moment of abstract decision in general, on the one hand, causes the name of the monarch to appear as the external bond and the sanction under which generally everything in the government occurs, and, on the other, that it has, as simple relation to self, the determination of *immediateness*, and thus a natural one, wherewith the providing of the individuals for the dignity of princely power, through *heredity*, is fixed.¹

543. (b) In the *special* governmental power there is, on the one hand, the *division* of the work of the State into its otherwise determined branches, the legislative power, the maintenance of justice or the judicial power, the police, etc., and the consequent allotment of these powers to special authorities, who, instructed

¹ This conclusion will not greatly commend itself to the American mind, and the course of reasoning which leads to it must impress most thinkers as crooked and forced. The principle of the division of powers is, indeed, the characteristic of the developed State, but that the division should be determined and maintained by various, independent forces, is opposed to the spirit of Hegel's own admirable remarks, on a subsequent page, upon the collision of the legislative and administrative departments—a collision, I submit, least likely to occur in the State whose legislature and executive are determined by one Will, acting in one way. The Law of Spirit is Freedom, and the Law of Nature is Necessity—and it must strike most unprjudiced minds as incongruous, that Freedom should be most perfect in the State which gains through keeping the Law of Nature—here Heredity—in place of its own self-conscious determination. The development, in Reason and Morality, of the State of which this is true, is certainly not the highest development. Is not this, too, the lesson of History? Has not the Monarchy always succeeded the Republic because of a decline, not a higher development, of the State's Reason and Morality? And has not the development of the State's Reason and Morality been always accompanied by the decline of Heredity and the growth of—"formal Freedom," if you will?—Tr.

by the laws concerning their work, are, moreover, and for that reason as well, independent in their operation, as at the same time subject to higher supervision; on the other hand is seen the participation of many individuals in the work of the State, who constitute together the class devoted to the common interest, so far as they make work for the common interest the essential vocation of their particular life.

544. (c) The authority which represents the classes of society has to do with a participation of all such as belong to Civil Society in general, and are in so far private persons, in the administration, and, indeed, in legislation, *i. e.*, in the *universal* phase of interests which do not concern the action of the State as an individual (as in war and peace), and so do not belong exclusively to the nature of the princely power. In virtue of this participation, the subjective freedom and conceit and their general meaning can show themselves in actual efficacy and enjoy the satisfaction of having influence.

The division of Constitutions into Democracy, Aristocracy, and Monarchy indicates most accurately their difference in relation to administration. They must be regarded, at the same time, as necessary forms in the course of development, consequently in the history of the State. It is, for this reason, superficial and foolish to represent them as objects of choice. The pure forms of their necessity are connected partly, so far as they are finite and transitory, with forms of their degeneration, mobocracy, etc., partly with earlier forms of development—neither of which is to be confounded with those true forms. Thus, because of the common fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the State, Oriental Despotism is included under the vague term Monarchy, as is also Feudal Monarchy, to which latter, indeed, the favourite title of Constitutional Monarchy cannot be denied. The real distinction of these forms from the true Monarchy rests in the content of the *valid principles of law*, which have their reality and guaranty in the administration. These principles are those developed in previous spheres, of the freedom of property and of personal freedom, of civil society, its industry and religious bodies, and the regulated, lawful operation of the special authorities.

The question which attracts most attention is as to the sense in which the participation of *private persons* in State affairs is to be

conceived. For as *private persons* the members of Assemblies or Parliaments are, in the first place, to be considered, they appear as individuals for themselves, or serve as representatives of *many*, or of *the people*. It is customary to call the aggregate of private persons the *people*; as such an aggregate, however, it is *vulgus*, not *populus*: and, in reference to this, it is the chief object of the State not to let a people, *as such an aggregate*, come to existence, to power, and control. Such a condition of a people is the condition of injustice, immorality, unreason in general; the people would be, in such a condition, only a deformed, wild, blind power, like that of the agitated, elemental sea, which still does not destroy itself, as the people, or a spiritual element, would do. We have often heard such a condition represented as that of true Freedom. In order that a people have understanding, that it be admitted to the question of the participation of private persons in universal affairs, the unreasonable must not be presupposed, but an already organized people—*i. e.*, one in which an administration exists. The interest of such participation, however, is to be placed neither in the superiority of special insight which the private persons possess above the State officials—the contrary is necessarily the case—nor in superiority of the good-will for what is universally best; the members of Civil Society are much rather such as make their particular interest and (as especially in the feudal condition) the interest of their privileged corporation their regular business. Consider England, for instance. Its Constitution is regarded the freest, because private persons have a preponderating participation in State affairs; but experience shows that that country, in civil and criminal legislation, in the right and freedom of property, in institutions for art and science, etc., is, compared with the other civilized States of Europe, the farthest behind, and objective freedom—*i. e.*, reasonable right—is much more sacrificed to formal Freedom and particular private interest (this even in the institutions and possessions said to be devoted to Religion). The interest of a participation of private persons in public affairs lies partly in the concreter and, therefore, more pressing sense of universal needs, essentially, however, in the right that the common Spirit also attain the appearance of an *externally universal Will* in an orderly and express influence in public affairs, and, through this satisfaction, receive inspiration for itself, such as sways the admin-

istrative authorities, to whose consciousness it is thus ever kept present, that, while they have strictly to exact duties, they have just as essentially to respect rights. The citizens are in the State the disproportionately greater mass, and a mass of such as are acknowledged as persons. The existence of the willing Reason is, therefore, represented in them as plurality of the free or as universality of reflection, to which reality is guaranteed by participation in the State power. It has, however, already been noticed,¹ as a moment of Civil Society, that the individuals raise themselves from the external to the substantial universality—*i. e.*, as *particular* species—*ranks*; and it is not in the inorganic form of individuals as such (by the *democratic* mode of choice), but as organic moments, as ranks, that they enter into that participation; a power or activity in the State must never appear and act in shapeless, inorganic form—*i. e.*, from the principle of multitude and mass.

For this reason Parliaments have wrongly been described as the *law-giving power*, since they constitute only one branch of that power, in which the special administrative authorities essentially participate and the princely authority has the absolute power of final decision. Legislation, moreover, in a civilized State, can only be a perfecting of the existing laws, and so-called new laws can only be extremes of detail and particulars, whose content has already been prepared, or, indeed, previously settled, by the practice of the courts. The so-called *Financial Law*, so far as it comes to the joint determination of the various ranks, is essentially an *affair of the government*; it is called a *law* only figuratively, in the general sense that it covers a wide, indeed, the entire, extent of the external means of government. The finances concern, if indeed the entire State, still, according to their nature, only the *particular*, varying needs, which are ever producing themselves anew. Were the chief component—that of need—viewed as a constant element—as it indeed is—the provision for it would have more the nature of a law; but, in order to be a law, it would have to be given once for all, and not yearly, or every few years, anew. That which varies according to time and circumstances concerns, in fact, the smallest part of the sum total, and the provision for it has so much the less the character of a law;

¹ In previous sections of the "Philosophy of Spirit."

and yet it is and can be only this unimportant, variable part which is disputable and can be subjected to a variable, yearly determination, which, therefore, falsely bears the high-sounding title of the *Granting of the Budget*—*i. e.*, of the *whole* of the finances. A law given yearly and for one year is clearly incongruous, even to the common sense, which distinguishes the in-and-for-self universal, as the content of a true law, from a universal of reflection, which only outwardly covers what, according to its nature, is a manifold. The title of a law for the yearly settlement of the financial needs only serves, in the presupposed separation of the legislative from the administrative power, to support the delusion that this separation really exists, and to conceal the fact that the legislative power really has to do with government affairs proper, since it settles concerning the finances. The interest, however, which is attached to the power of ever fixing anew the financial conditions, *viz.*, that the Parliament possesses in this a means of coercing the government, and thus a guaranty against injustice and violence—this interest is, on the one hand, a superficial illusion, since the ordering of the finances necessary for the *existences* of the State cannot be conditioned by any other circumstances whatever, nor the existence of the State be placed in yearly doubt; as little as the government could allow and arrange the administration of justice, for instance, always for a limited time only, in order, by the threat of suspending the working of such an institution, and by the fear of a resulting condition of violence, to keep to itself a means of coercing private persons. On the other hand, however, ideas of a relation in which it could be useful and necessary to have means of coercion at hand rest partly on the false conception of a contract between government and people, partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence of the minds of the two as would make it impossible to think further of Constitution and Government at all. If one places before one's self the bare possibility of helping things through such coercive means as existing—such help were much rather the ruin and dissolution of the State, in which there would be no longer government, but only parties, and for which force and the suppression of one party by the other would be the only remedy. The regulation of the State as a mere Constitution of the understanding—*i. e.*, as the mechanism of a balance of powers

mutually exclusive internally—is opposed to the ground idea of that which constitutes a State.

545. The State has finally the side of the immediate reality of a particular and naturally limited people. As particular individual its position towards *other* individuals of the same kind is *exclusive*. In their relation to each other arbitrariness and casuality find place, since the *universal* of the law, on account of the autonomic totality of these persons, is only an ideal between them, which *really* is not. This independence makes the strife between them a relation of force, a condition of war, for which the nobility determines itself to the special work of maintaining the independence of the State—*i. e.*, to bravery.

546. This condition shows the substance of the State in its individuality proceeding to abstract negativity, as the power in which the particular independence of the individuals and the condition of their submersion in the external existence of property and in the natural life is felt as a nullity, and which effects the maintenance of the universal substance through the sacrifice of this natural and particular existence, which occurs in the feeling of the same, through the bringing to naught of interfering trifles.

THE HERO AS ARTIST.

BY GERTRUDE GARRIGUES.

“Man’s strength lies in resigned obedience to God.” In *resigned* obedience! This resignation which, in its essence, is the only escape from the bonds of necessity; which is, in fact, victory over necessity; and hence freedom is the content of the Christian religion, Christian philosophy, and Christian art. In it is involved the regeneration of man, that new-birth, which is in reality a life-long process from natural to spiritual life. The individual who, in his own person, attains this freedom, and who has the ability to, and does, either in his works or through his life, communicate the process, is a world benefactor, a world-great hero and he possesses an inalienable right to the worship of his fellow-man. In this sense we can point to many heroes of religion, and

to not a few heroes of philosophy; there is but one hero of art—Michel Angelo.

Like Goethe, Michel Angelo gave to the world a life which was a work of art. His mission among men was to exhibit, under sensuous forms, the only possible method by which "human will shall conquer fate." He lived to accomplish this victory himself, and his works are the biography of his soul. Each of these works has for its basis a universal thought, and it is by viewing them as a whole that we desery the hero in the man.

We have no desire, even were it possible in so small a space, to consider all his productions; it will suit our purpose better to divide them into groups, and to treat each group as in itself a totality, not depending upon, but developing into, the succeeding one. The first group includes the works of his youth, which are chiefly sculptures; of these the "Moses" is the most characteristic, as it is immeasurably the greatest example. It is true that this statue remained in his *atelier* for forty years, but its conception and modelling belonged to the period of his early vigor; the forty years merely finished and elaborated it. The most prominent members of the second group are the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel and the Medician Tombs; to the third and last period belong "The Last Judgment" and the Dome of St. Peter's. This, as we hope to prove, is no mere formal classification arrived at by external analysis, but is rather a vital exposition of the process by which this great character developed.

Michel Angelo's was a thoroughly plastic nature. Art was his proper atmosphere, and he uttered himself in all its modes. Sculpture, painting, and architecture served him at his call; or, if either of these arts ever failed him, it was in his power, at every moment of his life, to pour the whole force of his fiery soul into verse. In his effort to attain personality, his spirit, in order to become completely reconciled with itself, made use of every form of art; but he was essentially a sculptor. His intense temperament led him to compress the whole cumulative force of an emotion into a single moment of time, and then to represent this moment. This is what gives such a sculpturesque appearance to his paintings. In them there is no slightest hint of progression; each particular work, and each part of each particular work, represents a single given phase of activity.

We all know how early the boy discovered his vocation ; how swift and unerring was his instinct to find, how tenacious his will to hold it. Friends and relatives used their every influence to make of him a merchant, a manufacturer, to turn him from his "idle whim;" but the twelve-year-old lad knew better than they what was good for him—for, that it was good despite all the misery, the weary struggle of his life, who shall doubt? His own words have left us no room for question as to which he would have preferred—truth or repose.

"Were I but he! Born for like lingering pains,
Against his exile coupled with his good
I'd gladly change the world's best heritage!"*

"He would be an artist; that was settled finally. A year later the generic choice was succeeded by the particular one; he would be a sculptor, and a sculptor he was, and always remained, even when they forced the painter's brush and architect's compass between his unwilling fingers.

The first step planted upon the pathway toward fame, his onward journey was sure and swift. Obstacles disappeared before his arrogant and almost omnipotent will. His choice of a vocation was his first victory, his admission to the Gardens of San Marco and to the palace of the Medici the second. At six-and-twenty he willingly undertook a commission from which all other sculptors had shrunk; he engaged to convert Florence's unwieldy block of marble into a statue, and the "David" was the result. At nine-and-twenty he eagerly sought a trial, on his own ground, with the foremost painter of his time, Leonardo da Vinci, and triumphed. But, in doing so, he laid a pitfall for his own feet. The cartoon of the "Battle of Pisa" established the possibility of his being great in fresco. The following year he was invited to Rome by Julius II.

And now the summit of his ambition was reached. Inflexible, and relying unflinchingly upon himself, he had gone resolutely onward until now he felt that fame—the recognition due to his greatness—lay within his grasp. We can imagine his overmastering exultation, his sense of power—for it was to himself alone that he owed his advancement—when the order for the Mausoleum

* From poem on Dante by Michel Angelo.

leum, a work of such extent and grandeur that it would serve to establish his reputation and perpetuate it forever, was placed in his hand. He at once set about fulfilling the commission. He drew all the plans and made some of the models; he even blocked out in marble several of the figures. To this period belong the conception and partial execution of the "Moses," and this figure of the sovereign prophet and law-giver was a fitting symbol of what was then in the artist's mind.

The statue of "Moses" is the absolute incarnation of unreflected *will*—personal force. There is something divine in this assumption of independent individuality; there is a reminiscence of the antique demigod in this marble! We have heard much of the wrath of Achilles, the petulant rage of the boy whose individuality has been invaded; we behold here the wrath of the man, quiet but deadly. His command—the command of Jehovah, with whom he, as chosen instrument, feels himself one—has been disobeyed; and, in the full reliance that *his* will is unquestionable, he thunders forth: "Put every man his sword by his side and go in and out from gate to gate throughout the camp, and slay every man his brother, and every man his companion, and every man his neighbor."

We are told that the "Moses" was, of all his works, the one which gave Michel Angelo the greatest satisfaction; and we may well believe it, for it was probably the last entirely spontaneous one. It is the adequate reflection of the unconquerable will which was the master-key of his whole character, and, in its immediacy, its predominating youthful principle.

It is quite common to compare Michel Angelo with Raphael and Da Vinci, and, from the circumstances under which they entered art, deduce their subsequent development. There is much truth in this procedure; the circumstances among which a man is placed must have undoubted influence upon his life, his circumstances united to his temperament almost every influence. Raphael was an artist, a painter, by birth and education; painting with him was both an art and a trade; it expressed him, but never overmastered, never *drove* him. He could paint a "Transfiguration," in which his whole soul seemed fused and which should be the crowning effort of romantic plastic art, and at the same time employ and direct an army of workmen who, under his leadership,

produced masterpieces, but without him could produce only mere daubs. And all this with healthy, happy ease. Raphael's life was filled with the repose of unconsciousness; there is no incident of his history, no slightest indication in his works, to show that he had ever been at war with himself; there is no appearance anywhere of a collision with fate. He was a thoroughly happy man; he "found his condition suited to his special character, will, and fancy, and so enjoyed himself in that condition."

Raphael's whole life corresponds to the first period of Michel Angelo's. It is true Raphael was born to his art, and Michel Angelo was obliged to force his way to his; but, allowing for this and for the difference in their temperaments, their works exhibit the same spontaneity, the same self-identification with a pursuit—with this distinction: what is undeveloped will in Michel Angelo is heavenly sensibility in Raphael.

Da Vinci was negative from the beginning, and all the accessories of his life served to foster his proud rebellion. Rich, and admired from his birth, possessed of a commanding intellect, of which he was fully conscious, his tastes drew him with almost equal force toward both science and art. He was at all periods of his life irresolute, and utterly unable, with all his subtlety, to fathom his own wants. His doubting temper led him to discredit his own opinions and question his own success, no matter what pains he may have taken in forming the one or compassing the other. He was able from his position to despise alike the praise or blame of men, but even this fact was an additional element of discord. The artist's characteristic is dependence; sympathy and recognition are necessities to him. Da Vinci all his life warred with, but was at the same time under the absolute dominion of, fate, and all his works of art display the fact; they are all marked by a sad though brilliant restlessness. The "Cenacola," his masterpiece, and in many respects the greatest psychological picture ever painted, is the complete embodiment of unrest and disquiet. He took one step farther than Raphael, to his sorrow, for far better is it to remain forever unconscious than to be roused and not tranquillized; to be roused to struggle but unable to conquer.

To the conflict that never ended for Da Vinci, Michel Angelo was about to be called. The time had come when he was to lose hold on reality and descend into the depths of his own soul; the

discipline, by means of which his uncontrolled natural will was to be rendered subservient to a universal principle, was about to begin. In receiving the order for the Mausoleum, he was at the point of accomplishing his highest hopes; his particular independence was about to be realized, his free-will acknowledged. This is the point at which necessity always appears. Man must learn his finitude. In the full tide of success, in the moment of fruition, an insurmountable obstacle appears. With Michel Angelo it is the will of Pope Julius. His Mausoleum may wait. Instead, Michel Angelo may paint for him the Sistine Chapel. The artist resists, bitterly and fiercely; he is a sculptor, he cannot paint. But that is all nonsense; cannot paint? For what, then, was the cartoon at Florence prepared? He seeks to save himself by flight. In vain. Fate, in the person of Julius II, had issued its mandate: "Hitherto, and no farther." He was now himself to feel the force which he had deified; he was now to bow to a will as haughty and despotic, and, from its position, mightier than his own.

This was only the beginning of the end. Julius II was worthy to be the patron of Michel Angelo. He denied him his will, it is true, but he gave him glorious compensation. As much cannot be said of all of the line of popes whom Fate set successively to break the will of this masterful but noble soul. The employment of Michel Angelo, during four of the best years of his life, in the quarries of Carrara and Seravezza, is a stain upon the pontificate of Leo X which all its glory cannot cleanse away.

Michel Angelo had pursued his aim with a passionate and unswerving consistency. He had lived alone for his purpose. He desired to achieve fame for his own particular and personal satisfaction, with no thought of connecting his views or his aims with any universal sentiment. His independence was mere self-assertion, his freedom arbitrary. Such freedom is of a low and limited order, and, when it continues to exist, must necessarily develop into tyranny; for, that the one individual is entirely free to exercise his will in every particular instance presupposes the most abject slavery on the part of those who must be the ministers or the victims of his caprice. Such enormity is never suffered long. The eternal process of Spirit—call it necessity, or what we will—moves on, slowly perhaps, but inevitably, and the self-interest and self-seeking of man are buried beneath its resistless march. "There

is a soul at the centre of nature, and over the will of every man, so that none of us can wrong the universe."

Had Michel Angelo been able to compass his desire, even though he had produced scores of statues to rival the "Moses," he would have portrayed but one phase of the process the whole course of which he was born to represent—and that phase the one in which Raphael far surpassed him—the immediate positive. Michel Angelo was born to exhibit humanity in its universality; to round, sensuously, the whole circle of culture. He and Da Vinci were the only artists possessed of sufficient intellect to accomplish this, and Da Vinci lacked the will. He could depict the second stage; he advanced to mediation, but remained there. We have already said he was negative from the first. For Michel Angelo alone was it possible to mediate this mediation and arrive at the absolute positive. And with this great mission ordained him, of what moment was it *what* he as an individual suffered? In the fatality which deprived him of his particular aims, who now fails to perceive the highest justice, as well to himself as to the world? It was his greatest glory, as it was his highest happiness, before the close of his long life, himself to recognize the truth.

But before that blissful consummation, what years of agony, of bitter, burning revolt, of useless conflict with the inevitable, lay before him! His obdurate heart was hard to subdue. Youth and prime had passed, and old age pressed hard upon him before the lesson of his life was coned; before he yielded to the truth—of which he had often caught a glimpse—that it is only through the renunciation of the unessential, arbitrary will that true freedom can be realized.

Nothing could better illustrate the poverty of the natural will than the fact that it is only valid so long as it is all-powerful; it must always have an object outside of itself upon which to exercise itself. This object removed, or grown more powerful than it, the will is turned back upon and preys upon self, whence discontent, doubt, and internal contradiction. At the time Michel Angelo painted the roof of the Sistine he was suffering all the pain and agony of nothingness, the torment of baffled endeavor; and it needs no biographer of his to tell us that this lonely vault was the scene of a mighty though impotent contest with Fate. He has covered every inch of available space with figures whose

writhing muscles betray now the activity of protest, and now the stillness of despair.

The compartments of the ceiling were, in a measure, mapped out for him; he only lent them his *terribilità*; but in the general ornamentation, and in the Prophets and Sibyls, he had an opportunity of expressing his own thought, of exercising his own imagination. So great was this thought, so overwhelming this fantasy, that nothing less grand than the human form could possibly express it. And in all this restless company there is no single centre of repose, nothing to form a central unity, a fixed point; each figure is lost in *self*-contemplation or in *self*-activity; no one has any connection with or interest in another. The only common link is the thought which engages them; they are all either combating to the utmost, or sinking beneath, the conviction that Christ upon the cross is the symbol of and index to renunciation.

When Michel Angelo came out of the Sistine Chapel he had learned the lesson of passive if not of active obedience. To the work of erecting the façade of San Lorenzo—which involved what he himself called the “very great ignominy” of his life, his employment as quarryman and road-builder—which was forced upon him, he yielded, merely saying: “Verily, there is need of patience.” But when the same pope, Leo X, who had insulted him with this commission, placed in his hand the contract for the Medician Tombs, thus allowing him to return to his favorite pursuit, though divorcing him from the object upon which he would have preferred to exercise it—the Mausoleum—he found vent for all the deep bitterness of his soul in that wonderful but woful statue of “Night.”

The figure of “Night” is that of a being held down and trampled upon by Fate. With power radiating from every lineament of her face and form, she is yet helpless and despairing. Hating and cursing life and her own thought, yet unable to lay down the one or rise above the other, she is the image of the soul of her creator when he wrote: “My brain turns when I think of these things.”

When he sculptured “Night,” “The Dawn,” and “Lorenzo the Thoughtful”—which were all produced in the same spirit and under the same pressure of circumstances, and have almost the same content—Michel Angelo had reached the crisis of his life

without knowing it; the bow could have been bent no farther. If his contemplation of self had continued longer, his reason would indeed have tottered. It was at his moment of deepest suffering that the event occurred which turned his attention outward. When the news of the sack of Rome reached Florence the anti-Medici party arose. Michel Angelo, always at heart a Republican, eagerly joined the Liberalists, and, in the absorbing interest with which he threw himself into the defence of his country, for a time forgot himself.

It was not long before, partly through treachery, but still more through their own folly and want of unity, the Liberalists were constrained to surrender; and the Medici, not unwelcomed, entered Florence. Then Michel Angelo yielded everything—the hope of seeing his country free, the hope of ever being able to control his own outer life. But, at the same time that he began to recognize the fact that the freedom which he had desired for Florence was not what really suited her, the perception must have dawned upon him that perhaps he was equally mistaken as to what was best for himself. His biographers tell us that, “having seen the hopelessness of the Florentine cause, Michel Angelo submitted to the inevitable.” He did more; he accepted and acquiesced in the inevitable as best and right, as *just*. He had always submitted. How could he do otherwise? We must all submit, whether we wish or no; it is the spirit in which we yield that counts. Whether, freely and uncomplainingly, as if it were our own will—thus making it our own—or, bound hand and foot, and crying out against the universe, we are dragged onward to our fate. *This* had been Michel Angelo’s submission heretofore; he now rose to the heroism of obedience.

The instant of renunciation is at the same time the beginning of a new life. Three months after the capitulation of Florence, Michel Angelo was again at work upon the tombs in San Lorenzo; and, as in the statue of “Night” he portrayed his deepest misery, in that of “Day,” which he now commenced, he sought to commemorate his latest victory—the conquest of himself. This marble is instinct with the repose of conscious power, and fervent with mighty resolve. A great thought—a thought which it must have forever remained incapable of articulating—was striving to extricate itself from the massive stone when Michel Angelo was called

away from it to the supreme effort of his life—the representation, upon the wall of the Sistine, of “The Last Judgment.”

Nearly thirty years intervened between his first work in the Sistine Chapel and his last, and in that time he had never touched brush to fresco. Yet we are told that in all this immense composition there is no slightest trace of hesitation or embarrassment; the thought itself was so stupendous that it broke over all barriers, and was king of mechanism. Alone, in the presence of his own handiwork, he lived over again the whole tremendous conflict, and, mindful how he had himself solved the problem, he painted its solution here. The “Moses,” as we have said, represents unreflected will; his works of the second period display the will thrown back upon itself, and finally, conscious that its error has been to suppose that its act had any right to extend beyond itself, “The Last Judgment” was now to represent the final return of the will into and reconciliation with itself, the consciousness that “the deed returns upon the doer,” that the will has power over the individual alone.

The principal figure of “The Last Judgment,” its central point, is the Christ foretold upon the ceiling above it. The same and not the same. That sorrow-stricken Renunciator has conquered Death. Christ appears here as spirit triumphant—spirit which, through the cancellation of its finitude, has become reconciled with God—as God himself. Symbolizing as He does the whole process of spirit, He appears now as the exemplar by which each man is called upon to judge his own life. In His countenance there is no promise of clemency. “Eternal justice may involve infinite love, but no mercy;” still less can it know malice. That wounded side, those passion-marked hands and feet, are not exhibited to threaten or condemn, but as a summons for each man to confess to himself in how far he has reflected the divine process as presented to him in the history of Christ. In how far he has crucified *self*, and, by so doing, arisen to the consciousness of a new self—a life in God. To those who have brought their lives into conformity with His, He is a vivifying power which raises them to equal heights with Himself; to the wicked He is a consuming fire into which their own deeds plunge them.

In this picture Michel Angelo displays his conviction that, for good or ill, man is his own creator. That it is only by making

himself one with God, by subjecting his will to His, that he can obtain blessedness; it is only thus that the agony of expiring personality can be changed into a return to self, into happiness, satisfaction, and tranquillity.

When a man has reached the point of view at which he discerns that all things are governed by immutable, irresistible law—"law which executes itself," which is in reality universal justice; when he feels that, in obedience to this law, no thing and no person can work him harm save only himself—he has reached a summit of repose far above and beyond the vicissitudes of earthly life. At the time he was called upon to endure the two great sorrows of his life, the loss of father and of friend, Michel Angelo had attained this elevation, and, though he suffered deeply and mourned sincerely, he was not overwhelmed. He could even write of Vittoria Colonna :

"Not love, nor thy transcendent face,
Nor cruelty, nor fortune, nor disdain,
Cause my mischance, nor fate, nor destiny,
Since in thy heart thou carriest death and grace
Inclosed together, and my worthless brain
Can draw forth only death to feed on me."

His latest work—the one which rounded the circle of his achievements in art and proclaimed him as great in architecture as he had already proved himself to be in sculpture and in painting—was the crowning symbol of his life. The Dome of St. Peter's is alike the emblem of a faith which, leaving behind the formal universality of mediævalism, has—through the mediation of Protestantism—attained to the possibility of a higher universality which recognizes and admits of individual freedom; and of the soul of Michel Angelo, which, through the heroism of its submission to a divine principle, had found its reconciliation within itself.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

CHILDHOOD.

Not Wordsworth's genius, Pestalozzi's love,
The stream have sounded of clear infancy.
Baptismal waters from the Head above
These babes I foster daily are to me.
I dip my pitcher in these living springs
And draw, from depths below, sincerity.
Unsealed, mine eyes behold all outward things
Arrayed in splendors of divinity.
What mount of vision can with mine compare?
Not Roman Jove, nor yet Olympian Zeus
Darted from loftier ether through bright air
One spark of holier fire for human use—
Glad tidings thence these angels downward bring,
And at their birth the heavenly choirs do sing.

A. BRONSON ALCOTT.

CONCORD, MASS., *September, 1881.**HEGEL'S DIALECTIC METHOD—A PRIZE ESSAY.*

The Berlin Philosophical Society, founded in 1843, by the disciples of Hegel, but now numbering among its members men of the most various philosophical creeds, has applied the surplus of funds recently collected for a monument in memory of Hegel to the foundation of a Hegel Institution, the object of which is the furtherance of philosophical research. The society has just issued the following prize theme: "A critical and historical account of the dialectical method of Hegel."

No. 1. The development of Hegel's Method, as shown in his writings. How his dialectic is related to his logic and metaphysics.

No. 2. Comparison of Hegel's Method with the methods of his predecessors. Is his method derived from them?

No. 3. The significance and value of Hegel's Method. Does it fulfil the requirements of a philosophical method or not?

The treatises may be in German, French, English, or Italian. They must be sent in by December 31, 1883, to the secretary of the society—either to Prof. Dr. C. L. Michelet (Bülow Strasse, 28, S. W. Berlin), or to Stadtgerichtsrath a. D. Meineke (Kurfürsten Strasse, 56, W. Berlin).

Each essay must be headed by a motto and accompanied with a sealed envelope containing the motto and the name of the writer and his address. The envelopes with the unsuccessful essays will be burned. The manuscript of the successful essay will remain the property of the society, the right of publication remaining with the author.

The prize of 450 "Reichsmark" (about 110 dollars in our money) will be paid on the first of July, 1884.

A copy of the programme can be obtained, on application, from the librarian of the University of Berlin, Dr. F. Ascherson.

(Dated) Berlin, June 25, 1881. (Signed by the two secretaries above mentioned.)

D. J. SNIDER'S "A WALK IN HELLAS."

Mr. D. J. Snider, whose profound studies into the composition of Shakespeare's dramas were, some of them, printed in this journal (volumes v to xi),* has brought out a volume of studies upon the scenery and population of the part of Greece lying between Athens and Parnassus. The title is "A Walk in Hellas, or The Old in the New;" "privately printed" (but can be had, at the price of two dollars, of the author; address, St. Louis, Mo.). He divides the book into twelve "Talks," whose subjects are as follows: (1) From Athens to Pentelicus; (2) From Pentelicus to Parnes; (3) From Parnes to Marathon; (4) Marathon; (5) From Marathon to Marcopoulo; (6) Rainy Day at Marcopoulo; (7) From Marcopoulo to Aulis; (8) Aulis and Chalkis; (9) From Aulis to Thebes; (10) Thebes and Platea; (11) From Thebes to Lebadea; (12) Stop at Lebadea.

The author has charmingly woven reminiscences of the ancient events in Greece with the scenery he finds now, and no book of travels has given us so vivid a realization of the old Greece in the new as this one does. Mr. Snider is a student of the philosophy of history, and, almost as a consequence, an enthusiast for ancient Greece. He endeavors to find, everywhere, traces left that indicate the Greek of classic times. In the

* Published in two volumes, under the title of "The System of Shakespeare's Dramas," by George I. Jones & Co., St. Louis.

course of his walk over that small, but most significant portion of the globe, he makes entertaining and instructive reflections on the meaning of the Greek principle in civilization and on the movements celebrated in history and poetry, that have their beginning or end in this region. There is a vein of humor that enlivens the book, although it is written in a style so intensely personal that it does not need other attractions. One can almost make the tour from Athens to Lebadea vicariously, through Mr. Snider's description, especially if he is already familiar with Mr. Snider's previous writings. W. T. II.

SENTENCES IN PROSE AND VERSE.

SELECTED BY WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING.

IV.

But t'other young maiden looked sly at me,
 And from her seat she ris'n;
 Let's you and I go our own way,
And we'll let she go shisn.—Berkshire Ditty.
 Then old age and experience, hand in hand,
 Lead him to death, and make him understand,
 After a search so painful and so long,
 That all his life he has been in the wrong.—*Anon.*
 Tommy Linn is a Scotchman born,
 His head is bald, and his beard is shorn;
 He had a cap made of a bear-skin,
 An elder man is Tommy Linn.
 Tommy Linn, and his wife, and his wife's mother,
 They all fell into the fire together;
 They that lay undermost got a hot skin;
 We are not enough! said Tommy Linn.—*Ritson.*

She never was aware that more can be said in one minute than can be forgotten in a whole lifetime.—*Landor.*

Slight those who say, amidst their sickly healths, thou livest by rule.
 What doth not so, but man?

Houses are built by rule, and commonwealths.
 Entice the hasty sun, if but you can,
 From his ecliptic line: beckon the sky!

Who lives by rule then, keeps good company.—*Anon?*

Not a monodrame, but a monologue, not at all *dramatic* [Manfred].—*Macready*.

Bring the year's expenditures and receipts to a balance, for which I have great reason to be grateful to Almighty God.—*Ibid*.

Walked into the fields taking the two puppies with me, returned to the subject of myself and my destinies.—*Ibid*.

Acted particularly well, the audience felt it; I spoke in my own manly voice, and took time to discriminate; I was much pleased.—*Ibid*.

I mean discrimination, not in one's own mind, but made palpable to and impressed on an audience.—*Ibid*.

Acted Lear—how? certainly not well, crude, fictitious voice, no point; in short, a failure.—*Ibid*.

The use and the end of life, what is it all worth?—*Ibid*.

The other old woman talked of the florid Gothic style of architecture, preceding the Roman.—*Ibid*.

My course seems near its close [1842—he died 1873].—*Ibid*.

One sees the warm and transparent tints of Claude in it, and hears the sound of the leaping rill [Horace's *Fons Bandusie*].—*Ibid*.

Hard students are commonly troubled with all such diseases as come by over-much sitting; they are most part lean, dry, ill-colored, and all through immoderate pains and extraordinary studies. If you will not believe the truth of this, look upon great Tostatus, and Thomas Aquinas's works, and tell me whether these men took pains!—*Burton*.

That noble and passionate grief, which protests against the illimitable *torture* of all creation, and the terrible *silence* of the creator.—*Ouida*.

In all the list of the world's deadly errors, there is no mistake so deadly as age.—*Ibid*.

All that remains of thee these plaits unfold,
Calm hair meandering in pellucid gold. [Lucretia Borgia's hair.]
—*Landor*.

Nor ever had the veil-hung pine outspread
O'er Tethys then her wandering leafless shade.—*Ibid*.

Whether where Castro from surrounding vines
Hears the hoarse ocean roar among his caves,
And, thro' the fissure in the green churchyard,
The wind wail loud the calmest summer day;
Or where Santona leans against the hill,
Hidden from sea and land by groves and bowers.—*Ibid*.

My hopes retire ; my wishes as before
 Struggle to find their resting-place in vain ;
 The ebbing sea thus beats against the shore ;
 The shore repels it ; it returns again.—*Ibid.*

As oftentimes an eagle, ere the sun
 Throws o'er the varying earth his early ray,
 Stands solitary, stands immovable
 Upon some highest cliff, and rolls his eye,
 Clear, constant, unobservant, unabased,
 In the cold light above the dews of morn.—*Ibid.*

Come from dark ages forth, come Drimacos!—*Ibid.*

He (*Wilkie*) could no more have painted *Christ* than he could have raised *Lazarus*.—*Haydon*.

“Poor Mrs. Burgess died in childbed, poor Tom Burgess much afflicted ; wind W. N. W.”—*Haydon's father's journal*.

Marriage prevents a man's mind eating him up, which is the case in too much solitude.—*Haydon*.

Came home, took out our Savior, and tried him walking in the garden. He would not do, so put him in again sitting and reposing.—*Ibid.*

Impulse is but a quicker perception of reasons that prove the truth.—*Ibid.*

Let any man reflect that on the loss of a beautiful infant we were obliged to pawn our winter things to bury her. . . . that on the night of my most brilliant success [as a lecturer] I took my coat out of pawn, and had the torture of being obliged to return it next day.—*Ibid.*

Sent the tea-urn off the table and got 10s. for the day.—*Ibid.*

Festina lente ; celerity should be contempered with cunctation.—*Sir Thos. Browne*.

It is, I confess, the common Fate of Men of singular Gifts of Mind, to be destitute of those of Fortune ; which does not any way deject the Spirits of wiser Judgments, who thoroughly understand the Justice of this Proceeding ; and being enriched with higher Donatives, cast a more careless Eye on those vulgar parts of Felicity.—*Ibid.*

Yet should there hover in their restless heads
 One thought, one grace, one wonder at the best
 Which into words, no virtue can digest.—*Marlowe [on his mistress]*.
 Enough that she alone has looked at him
 With eyes that, large or small, have won his soul.—*Mrs. Browning*.

Mid the blue fields of starlight, thou art sailing—

Adelaida!

—*Ballad.*

Still lives the song, tho' Regnar dies.—*John Sterling.*

"*In nix beguzared,*" This too will pass away. [The motto on the cabin-wall of the Austrian Arctic ship "Tegethoff."]—*Payer.*

The single-nostriled animals, monorrhina, originated during the primeval period out of the skullless animals, by the anterior end of the dorsal marrow developing into the brain, and the anterior end of the dorsal chord into the skull. Man is descended from the catarrhini, or narrow-nosed apes. This is the twenty-first *special* stage in man's development.—*Haeckel.*

"What," said Amelia, "have you never been in love, Thomas?" "Yes, forsooth," replied the valet; "sometimes, of a morning."—*Fielding.*

The poets wrote the best prose, Milton excepted; it is more extravagant than his verse, as if written in ridicule of the latter.—*C. J. Fox.*

Good humor is too often confounded with good nature, which has a much less *servile* character.—*Burke.*

In India I never undressed, and for many years in the Peninsula I undressed very seldom; never for the first four years.—*Duke of Wellington.*

The divine greyhound, Saramâ, who guards for the Lord of heaven the golden herd of stars and sunbeams, and for him collects the nourishing rain-clouds as the cows of heaven to the milking, and who, moreover, faithfully conducts the pious dead into the world of the blessed, becomes, in the hands of the Greeks, the son of Saramâ, Hermeias.—*Mommsen.*

I was so wet, and everything was so wet, every table and chair was so wrecked, that it was impossible to touch a pen or paper.—*John Adams [at sea].*

Michael Angelo is a strong low character, rather than exalted or great. He could do nothing pure or grand in beauty. His characters are often as if they had been studied from deformity or beggary. Coarse strength and reality are his power.—*David Scott [copying Last Judgment].*

Melt the handle off my teapot, burn my fingers, break the lid, knock it over, and put out the fire.—*Ibid. [Bachelor Housekeeping].*

Whose dust the solemn antiquarian turns,
And thence, in broken sculptures, casts abroad,
Like Sibyls' leaves; collects the builder's name,
Rejoic'd, and the green medals frequent found,
Doom Caracalla to perpetual fame.—*Dyer.*

To mark o'er ocean the thick, rising isles ;
 Woody Chaetta, Birter rough with rocks,
 Green-rising Barmur, Mincoy's purple hills,
 And the minute Maldivias, as a swarm
 Of bees in summer, on a poplar's trunk,
 Clustering innumerable.—*Ibid.*

The fluctuating world of waters wide,
 In boundless magnitude, around them swells ;
 O'er whose imaginary brim, nor towns,
 Nor woods, nor mountain-tops, nor aught appears,
 But Phæbus's orb, refulgent lamp of light,
 Millions of leagues aloft : heaven's azure vault
 Bends overhead, majestic, to its base,
 Uninterrupted clear circumference.—*Ibid.*

Seek the sacred rests
 Of Maro's humble tenement ; a low, plain wall
 Remains ; a little sun-gilt heap,
 Grotesque and wild ; the gourd and olive brown
 Weave the light roof ; the gourd and olive fan
 Their amorous foliage, mingling with the vine
 Who drops her purple clusters thro' the green.
 Here let me lie, with pleasing fancy soothed ;
 Here flow'd his fountain ; here his laurels grew.
 Here oft the meek, good man, the lofty bard,
 Fram'd the celestial song, or social walk'd

With Horace.—*Ibid.*

He that will serve men must not promise himself that he shall not anger them.—*De Foe.*

What! a river that wriggles at right angles through a stone gutter, with two tansy puddings that were dug out of it, and three or four beds in a row, by a corner of the wall, with samples of grass, corn, and of *en friche* (waste land), like a tailor's paper of patterns.—*H. Walpole [Boutin's garden].*

I am slow to feel—slow, I suppose, to comprehend, and like the anaconda.—*Hawthorne.*

Its aspect disappointed me [Abbotsford], but so does everything.—*Ibid.*

Not often one sees a homelier set of features than this ; no elevation, no dignity ; the bridge of the nose depressed, and the end turned up,

and no chin whatever, or hardly any [Walter Scott's mask]. The last record there is of Scott's personality, and conveying such a wretched and unworthy idea of it.—*Ibid.*

A wide-mouthed, long-chinned, uncomely visage, with a triangular English nose in the very centre [Cromwell's cast].—*Ibid.*

Southport is as stupid a place as I ever lived in; our life here has been a blank.—*Ibid.*

All this praise and more, gave me the idea of an intolerably irreproachable person [Lady Byron].—*Ibid.*

When the cathedral had sufficiently oppressed us by its beauty, we returned to sublunary matters.—*Ibid.*

"I have been bullied by an usurper, I have been neglected by a court, but I won't be dictated to by a subject: *your man shan't stand.*"—*Ann Dorset [to Williamson]*.

Words of daily use, which have the chance of remaining on the surface, even in so *porous* a state of society as that of nomadic hordes.—*Bunsen.*

The Algonkin god of sleep is Weeng, whose ministers beat with little clubs on the foreheads of men, producing slumber.—*Dunlop.*

Rising from this task and going away again, I just pointed to that obscurity, which appeared so mystical and so sacred, where are deposited, in disorder and dismemberment, the spiced abortions of an illusory meretricious philosophy.—*Landor [Platonism]*.

I never court the vulgar. Perhaps about thirty people may be accepted, and never more at a time.—*Ibid.*

He is among the many poets who never make us laugh or weep; among the many whom we take into the hand like petty insects, turn them over, look at them for a moment, and toss them into the grass again.—*Ibid.*

The loud, clear challenge, the firm, unstealthy step, of an erect, broad-breasted soldier [Æschylus].—*Ibid.*

I walk out in all weathers six miles a day at least [æt. 70], read generally from 7 to 12 or 1 in the evening; I sleep twenty minutes after dinner, and nearly four hours at night; I rise at nine, breakfast at ten, and dine at five.—*Ibid.*

God alone is great enough for me to ask anything of twice.—*Ibid.*

All the winter I pass five days in the week without walking out, and sit often by the fireside till seven in the evening. When I do go out,

whatever the weather is, I go with both glasses of the coach down, and so I do at midnight, out of the hottest room. I have not had a single cold, however slight, these two years.—*Horace Walpole.*

He [Percival, the poet] had three rooms. His library and minerals were in one, his study in another, his bedroom in another. His bed was simply a cot with mattress above. There were no sheets, and a block of wood placed under the mattress served for a pillow. There were two woollen blankets on the bed very dirty. Places at the foot showed he had lain down with his shoes on, and it was evident he had often slept in his clothes. The rooms were very untidy, and probably never swept. There were perhaps two inches of rolling lint on the floor. There was a beaten path from his bed to his stove, to his writing-table, to his library, and to the door.—*Pliny Jewett.*

Varius Sucionensis ait, Æmilius Scaurus negat; *utri creditis Quirites?*
—*Val. Maximus.*

The third of the Kettle Sipahi, or chief men of Bokhara, is the Per-
vanedji, the *butterfly-man*, who is sent on important errands by the emir.
—*Vambery.*

Here lies Prince Fred,	Had it been his Sister,
Who was alive, and is dead!	There's no one would have missed her;
Had it been his Father,	Had it been his whole generation,
I had much rather;	Best of all for the nation:
Had it been his Brother	But since 'tis only Fred,
Sooner than any other;	There's no more to be said.

Epitaph on Prince Fred [by himself, 1751].

I say, 'tis as like Shakespeare as a glass of peppermint water is to a bottle of the finest French brandy.—*Mrs. Piozzi.* [Walter Scott compared with Shakespeare.]

The color of the wind—the tint of the storm.—*Ibid.*

Only two books in Weston-supra-mare, a *Bible* and a *Paradise Lost*; I bought them both.—*Ibid.*

I have a great deal more prudence than people suspect me for; they *think* I act by *chance*, while I am doing nothing in the world unintentionally, and have never, I dare say, in these last fifteen years, uttered a word to husband, or child, or servant, or friend, *without being careful what it should be!*—*Ibid.*

I used to walk incessantly, squeezing the flag-stones of our South Parade [at Bath] with my feet, in order to obtain relief for my head.—*Ibid.*

My fearlessness in the water attracts the women to the rocks, where it seems such fine sport to see Mrs. Piozzi swim [æt. 78].

When the house of his [Thrale's] favorite sister was on fire, and we were all alarmed with the account of it in the night, I well remember that he never rose, but bidding the servant who called us go to her assistance, quietly turned about, and slept to his usual hour.—*Ibid.*

Women bear crosses better than men do, but they bear surprises worse.—*Ibid.*

“But I forgot to tell you how one of my great casks [1,000 hogsheads] is burst, and all the beer run out” [after talking of a thousand trifles, a remark by Thrale].—*Ibid.*

We must not ridicule a passion which he who never felt never was happy, and he who laughs at never deserves to feel—a passion which has caused the change of empires and the loss of worlds—a passion which has inspired heroism and subdued avarice [love].—*Dr. Johnson.*

“The king spoke : O sage ! since thou dost not count a thousand miles far to come, wilt thou not, too, have brought something for the weal of my realm ?” [in the Chinese idiom] “King spoke : Sage, not far thousand mile and come, also will have use gain me realm, hey ?”—*Schleicher [language.]*

Dry general truths are a sort of algebra acquired by the mind slowly and after much trouble, against our *native* inclination to observe outward things.—*Taine.*

This curtailed deity [the Eighteenth Century god] is but a residuum at the bottom of the crucible. The reasoners of that time, having no metaphysical inventiveness, kept him in their system to stop a gap, like an Alexandrine.—*Ibid.*

But I have waited long indeed to hear
These rivers break in song, or bluely dark,
Behold these mountains rank in rolling verse,
Or our red forests light the landscape's line.—*E. G. Tuckerman.*

Yet one had loveliness which the spirit wins
To other worlds—eyes, forehead, smile, and all,
More softly serious than the twilight's fall.—*Ibid.*

How shall I array my love ?
How should I arrange my fair ?
Leave her standing white and silent
In the richness of her hair ?

Motion silent, beauty bare,
In the glory of her hair?—*Ibid.*

A weather-cock in the waving weed,
A clock-face in the sky.—*Ibid.*

The meadow with the herd in its green heart.—*Ibid.*

My Anna! tho' thine earthly steps are done;
Nor in the garden, nor beside the door,
Shall I behold thee standing any more—
What tho' beside my feet no other one
May set her own, to walk the forward way?—*Ibid.*

The fall in few, the statelier in the less.—*Ibid.*

That courageous soldiers, led on by a courageous Wooden Pole with
Cocked-hat on it, will do very well.—*Carlyle.*

This big glaring geometrical bully in red wig [Maupertuis].—*Ibid.*

The happy man, a duke of Montenero, ill-built Neapolitan, complexion
rhubarb, and face consisting much of nose.—*Ibid.*

Transcendent self-conceit, intrinsically insane!—*Ibid.*

In life, as on railways at certain points, whether you know it or not,
there is but an inch this way or that into what tram you are shunted,
but *try to get out of it again.*—*Ibid.*

Worldly, my dear—so is the world—worldly; and we must serve it as
it serves us, and give it nothing for nothing.—*Thackeray.*

Our favorite birch-tree, it was yielding to the gust of wind with all its
tender twigs. The sun shone upon it, and it glanced in the breeze like
a flying sunshiny shower. It was a tree in shape with stem and branches,
but it was like a spirit of water.—*Dorothy Wordsworth.*

I told him that I used in my childhood to chase butterflies, but was
afraid of brushing the dust off their wings.—*Ibid.*

I never saw daffodils so beautiful. They grew among the mossy
stones about them. Some rested their heads on these stones as on a
pillow. The others tossed, and reeled, and danced, and seemed as if they
verily laughed with the wind, they looked so gay and glancing.—*Ibid.*

Far off in the west, the coast of England like a cloud, crested with
Dover Castle, the evening star and the glory of the sky. The reflections
in the water were more beautiful than the sky itself—purple waves
brighter than precious stones forever melting away upon the sands.—*Ibid.*

Where'er my footsteps turned
 Her voice was like a hidden bird that sang;
 The thought of her was like a flash of light
 Or an unseen companionship.—*Wordsworth [of his sister].*

Wordsworth and his exquisite sister are with me. Her information various; her eye watchful in minutest observation of Nature; her taste a perfect electrometer.—*Coleridge.*

THE STOIC.

Fearless, regretless, invincible, impassive,
 Unwounded with wounds, and in sickness still whole,
 At large when in prison, more free when a captive,
 The gods cannot break his adamantean soul.

ANTI-STOIC.

Soft, sensitive, wayward, full of hopes and regrets,
 Cast down with a look, only strong with caresses,
 Changeable as water, save when love him besets,
 Wine, the Muses, and women he life-long blesses.

J. ALBEE.

BOOK NOTICES.

SENECA AND KANT; OR, AN EXPOSITION OF STOIC AND RATIONALISTIC ETHICS, WITH A COMPARISON OF THE TWO SYSTEMS. By Rev. W. T. JACKSON, Ph. D., late Professor of Modern Languages in Indiana University, Dayton, Ohio. United Brethren Publishing House, 1881.

This essay is an extension of a thesis originally prepared for the degree of Ph. D. in Michigan University. It contains a short but clear statement of the historical origin of stoicism, and of the ethical doctrines of stoicism, and especially of the stoicism of Seneca, as well as of the ethical system of Kant, and a comparison and criticism of the systems of Seneca and Kant. The most original part of the essay is undoubtedly the presentation of the views of Seneca, as based upon an examination at first hand of that writer's *De Providentia*, *De Tranquillitate Animi*, *De Brevitate Vitæ*, *De Vita Beata*, and *Epistolæ*. This part of the treatise is worthy of high commendation, although, perhaps, the dialectical movement by which the purely negative side of stoicism developed into the positive doctrine of cosmopolitanism might have been more clearly brought out. The corresponding statement of Kant's ethical system, while it rests upon the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ethics*, and is very clear so far as it goes, cannot be regarded as adding much to our knowledge of his rather complex and by no means self-consistent

ent theory. The truth is that it is impossible to do justice to Kant without a comprehensive study of his three great *Critiques* of Pure Reason, Practical Reason, and Judgment, and an exhibition of their mutual relations; and it may be doubted if Dr. Jackson has done wisely in severing them from one another. The distinction of *noumena* and *phenomena*, which plays so important a part in the Critical Philosophy, cannot be presented, except in its more superficial aspects, unless a careful distinction is drawn between the thing in itself in the vulgar sense of a mere unknown something lying beyond the boundaries of knowledge, and in the high sense of that which, while beyond sense-experience, is yet within the grasp of reason. That both of these conceptions are implied in Kant's doctrine is beyond question, and the expounder of his ethical theory must perforce enquire how far he consciously distinguished them, and whether the rejection of the former is incompatible with the acceptance in some sense of the latter. In making these reservations I should not wish to be understood as denying the value, to students of Kant's ethical theory, of Dr. Jackson's clear and precise statement of the purely ethical part of it, but only as indicating a region of enquiry which it might be profitable to follow out, and the following out of which would lead to most important results.

The analogy of stoical and Kantian ethics is one that cannot escape the observation of any thoughtful student of both systems. In the "autonomy of reason and the subjection of passion," as Dr. Jackson points out, Kant and the stoics are at one; to which might be added the assertion of the negative and non-sensuous character of what Kant calls "reverence for the moral law." But it soon appears that the points of divergence are even more numerous. It is, perhaps, somewhat beneath the dignity of the subject to insist on distinction in literary style and intellectual capacity—things which are outside of the subject proper. Nor do I think that Seneca's philosophy of nature can quite justly be called "inextricable fatalism," while Kant's distinction of *noumena* and *phenomena* "leaves man a sphere of freedom." Fatalism is not identical with conscious subordination to law, and Kant's *noumenon*, literally interpreted, as indeed Dr. Jackson himself suggests, admits of no freedom but that which consists in willing nothing in particular. The criticisms of Kant's ethics, however, while some of them are not exactly new, and while others have a slight savour of theological dogmatism which should be avoided in a purely philosophical treatise, are on the whole stimulating and suggestive.

JOHN WATSON.

THE HIBBERT LECTURES, 1881. On the Origin and Growth of Religion as Illustrated by some Points in the History of *Indian Buddhism*. By T. W. RHYS DAVIDS. London: Williams & Norgate. Pp. 262.

Mr. Rhys Davids has not fallen behind the lecturers of former years in power to interest and edify. He has the merit of a sympathetic perspicacity, that, not encumbered or deflected by the details and niceties of his scholarship, goes straight to the heart of his subject. And his intuition is not more sure than his expression of it is clear and vivid. These lectures have the distinction and intensity of religious discourse. And it is no disparagement of Mr. Davids' part in this effect on the reader to say that his happy choice of passages from the Buddhist sacred writings in no small degree contributes to it. These Scripture readings almost invariably lead to eloquent comment. Yet, perhaps, the essential note of the book is the judicial comprehensiveness of his comparative view of Buddhism and Christianity. There is in it no special pleading for either one or the other; and out of this impartial consideration of their difference and agreement Mr. Davids brings away much that is instructive, and throws

light on what it is the business of a Hibbert lecturer to elucidate—the origin and growth of Religion in general.

A careful perusal will make it evident that a first principle of his treatment is, that Religion issues from the heart of man, and Revelation comes from within; and, accordingly, that no church can claim the prerogative of a unique and preternatural origin and consequent exemption from a criticism and comparison that ought to be perfectly free amid its reverence for what is in every case so eminently human. That a religion may be *prima inter pares* is enough. In venturing to attribute these latent convictions to Mr. Davids, no wrong will be done him, if Religion in its inwardness is carefully discriminated from its after-growth and shell of creed and ceremony, however natural and inevitable these may be seen to have been as vehicle—like as you must carry precious perfume in a vase. This distinction is another undercurrent that rules his thought throughout. Again, while he claims that a right use of the comparative study of religion leads to the discovery of “general tendencies,” he holds out no present hope of finding “laws” of religious development and decay in any sense that would establish “a science of religion.”

In the first lecture, his just sense of perspective recognizes Buddhism to be comparatively in the foreground of religious development as we ought to picture it; and he gives a rapid but none the less effective sketch of the beliefs and ideas that led up to it through the long dim foretime. When Buddhism arose, universal Animism had, by selection and promotion of fittest “ghosts,” given issue to the polytheism of the Veda, while still itself surviving as manifold superstition in the popular mind and the Atharva-Veda, which may be called the book of the lesser spirits or souls. When Gotama came, he found these ghosts or spirits inside everything. Nothing was inanimate. The “internal spirit” of every one had existed in other bodies or things before, and would do so again. Further, even a single act of carelessness consigned the noblest and purest ghost to a degraded and miserable tenement on his current lease expiring, and so on without hope of end. Such was the doctrine of the Transmigration of Souls, which Mr. Davids thinks must have at times engendered in most men “a vague feeling of helplessness and hopelessness.” There may have been a feeling more than usually strong in Gotama’s time that the Sankhya and Vedānta had broken down; and the saying, that “there is always a metaphysical shipwreck connected with the rise of such great sorrows,” may have a share of truth, and help to account for the conception of Buddhism in the mind of Gotama; just as the post-Kantian Absolutisms, first received with enthusiasm and implicitly trusted, but afterwards found wanting and forsaken, may be fairly taken to have provided in great part the emotional motive of German pessimism. What Buddha did for the world-weary, heavy-laden toilers of life was to effect a change of front for them along the whole line. He swept away the entire soul-theory, from the grossest animism up to Deism, with all its dogmas and rites. This absolutely new departure is the central and signal fact in Buddhism. Yet, unfortunately, he dealt with Animism “as some Broadchurchmen deal with beliefs accepted now.” “He endeavored to bring it into harmony with his new ideas by putting new meanings into the old phrases”—the new wine into the old bottles; and such compromise, Mr. Davids thinks, has been one of the main causes of the practical failure of Buddhism, as well as Stoicism, Christianity, Comtism, and Confucianism, in the sense that they “have so far disappointed the hopes of their founders and of their earliest disciples.” “Each is the natural outcome of an immeasurable past,” and, unable to shake off its inheritance, has naturally preserved many of the old phrases, and so

left a soil for the old weeds to flourish in and choke the Word. Gotama retained the doctrine that whatsoever a man reapeth that hath he sown. Karma took the place of souls. Karma is the aggregate or resultant of an infinite series of lives. It is "persistent force." The same continuous Karma makes identical and continuous the individual links in each chain of lives, and so the sense of injustice excited by the inequalities of life is appeased. The transmission of Karma prefigures "the conservation of energy" from an ethical point of view and with ethical motive. But what determines the same Karma, presently embodied in any given individual, to perpetuate itself in a particular series of individuals? Gotama gives a similar answer to Plato in the *Phædo*. It is the weak, craving thirst for further life in the creature flickering out that brings the Karma to a focus in the birth of a new creature. Otherwise, it would disintegrate and disperse. There is some obscurity about the author's exposition here. But it does not appear that Gotama contemplated the *destruction* of Karma, but only of its extrinsic principle of individuation. The Arhat, or perfect man, having traversed the noble Eightfold Path, has ceased from all base craving from the lust of the flesh, the lust of life, and the pride of life, and from "the inward fires of lust, hatred, and delusion," and has so attained Nirvâna, Rest. The Kingdom of Heaven is *within* him, and the peace that passeth understanding. This peace is no annihilation of a soul that never was, nor extinction of any desire that is not base, nor even, it would appear, of Karma, but only its dispersion, and that *merely by the way*. Nirvâna is its own reward and end, the *summum bonum*; and not to be thought of or aimed at as a means. To obtain Nirvâna, one need not accept the Karma-theory. To aim at it is not hedonistic self-seeking, but at the same time it is not *intentionally* an altruistic endeavor to prevent a new person from falling heir to the accumulated Karma. It never occurred to the early Buddhist teachers any more than to the early Christians to inculcate a duty towards the beings that will exist in the ages to come. It is a "modern conception," though the Nirvâna of the Arhat included a "heart of love, far-reaching, grown great, and beyond measure." "It is only the evil desires, the grasping, selfish aims, which the Arhat has to overcome." This he does by "insight." In the Book of the Great Decease, "Insight" is assigned as important a function as *τὸ φρονεῖν* in the *Philebus*. The wicked man who breaks faith for the sake of worldly advantage is a *fool*, and his hungry eyes glare restlessly under a straitened forehead. Yet "insight" is not the privilege of the learned or shrewd. It rather appertains to the childlike and poor in spirit, and resembles the justifying faith of St. Paul. The first two insights are into "impermanency and non-individuality."

"Transient are all component things!

Growth their nature and decay:

They are produced, they are dissolved again:

And then is best—when they have sunk to rest!"

This refrain, ever-recurring in Buddhist literature, is the Πάντα ῥεῖ of Heraclitus at once affirmed and resolved. There is no immortal soul, nothing abides, but the Arhat finds in Nirvâna an *intensively* eternal life, stable amid the flux in its indifference to it. He has reached a haven outside of the realm of death.

It has been impossible to do more than touch some salient features of Mr. Davids' portraiture of early Buddhism. In his lecture on the Buddhist Biographies he concludes that "the Cakka-vatti Buddha was to the early Buddhists what the Messiah Logos was to the early Christians." Cakka-vatti was the pre-Buddhist ideal king of Righteousness; Buddha the ideal perfectly wise man, or personification of wisdom.

"And it is the Cakka-vatti Buddha circle of ideas in the one case, just as the Messiah Logos in the other, that has had the principal influence in determining the opinions of the early disciples as to the person of their master." So "Buddhism may be found as useful for the true appreciation of early Christianity as the Vedas are useful for the true appreciation of classical mythology."

It is the inculcation of such principles for use in the study of Religion in general that makes this book most valuable; and it will be esteemed by the student as a discipline, even more than as a store of information. J. BURNS-GIBSON, M. A.

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HEGEL'S FOUR PARADOXES.

Hegel has chosen to express many of his doctrines in the form of paradoxes. According to him, all highest philosophical truth is paradoxical to the unphilosophical consciousness. He finds, quite naturally, all other philosophers, also, paradoxical when writing truths of speculative depth.

Take the basis of any philosophy—and all philosophic systems set up a First Principle through which to explain all things—and it will be found that this states some ultimate fact as the explanation of all particular facts. All particular facts, when seen in their truth or reality, are only modifications of the one fundamental fact. Any statement of this ultimate fact or principle is paradoxical to one who cannot see its genesis. To Thales, water is the ultimate fact; Anaximenes thinks that it is air. Common consciousness sees various forms of matter besides water and air, and thus finds these doctrines paradoxical. So, too, the doctrine that matter alone is the explanation of all things is paradoxical to common consciousness, because the latter perceives also motion and force. Any explanation whatever involves paradox, because it attempts to substitute one fact for two or more. What was previously seen as disparate, isolated data, is, by explanation, made

into one, all the differences being accounted for by modifications of one fact. Strictly speaking, the paradox disappears through the potency of the explanation. This incongruity between appearance and ultimate fact is so much a relative matter that any explanation, no matter how simple, will propound a paradox to all orders of intelligence too feeble to understand it. "To that Dutch King of Siam," says Carlyle, "an icicle had been a miracle; whoso had carried with him an air-pump and phial of vitriolic ether might have worked a miracle. To my horse again, who unhappily is still more unscientific, do not I work a miracle and magical 'open sesame' every time I please to pay twopence and open for him an impassable Schlagbaum or shut turnpike?"

Paradox being a relative affair, and incident to all generalization, or, what is the same thing, to all exercise of thought or reason, it is clear that Hegel has not overstated the case when he makes it co-extensive with the results of speculative thinking.

It is very important to see that paradox arises when a higher generalization unites into one, what had before appeared to be many irreducible facts. The paradox exists only for the intellect too feeble to grasp the synthesis involved, and not for him who is capable of seeing the mediation which constitutes the generalization.

Generalization is the process of discovering what is involved in a fact or thing—what its existence implies. By this investigation we always discover that the object under consideration is a part of a larger whole that includes it as one of its phases or results. We thus explain the particular characteristics of the objects by finding them to be products or effects of a common cause. The same cause that produces these characteristics produces also many others, and no one of them can be seen properly or truly except in this synthesis with the cause. Sense-perception sees what is present before it as a "this"—or that which is here and now—and, consequently, what is essentially fragmentary. For every "This" is a member of a series in time, and is connected by a relation of dependence with a line of antecedents and consequents. It is, moreover, related on all sides to an environment extending indefinitely, and constituting a system of dependence resolvable into chains of relation, in every one of which the "This" is a dependent link. It is impossible to analyze the

"This" so minutely as to find an ultimate simple or atomic "This" sundered from its environment. The minutest result of analysis always finds a synthesis of two terms—the somewhat and its environment. Any fact is, therefore, a relative synthesis—it is contingent on the seeing mind. It contains more or less, according to the grasp of insight. The fact of the fall of the apple meant one thing to the swine who ran to devour it, and an immeasurably greater fact to the mind of Isaac Newton, who saw in it also universal gravitation. In generalization we subsume a particular "This" under the larger fact which includes it as one of its incidents. According to this view, all thinking is essentially of one character, and identical with the simplest act of perception—being in all cases a distinction of something from its environment, and a uniting, a synthesis, or an identification of the two. What thought has already done becomes for it a dead result, and it assumes it as a natural product, simple and irresolvable, and, starting with it for the first term, makes its new act of thought a new synthesis with the environment.

But thought is distinguished into discrete stages by a further principle—the principle of reflection. Superadded to the primary or fundamental synthesis which forms the substance of all thinking, there transpire acts of reflection. Reflection is, in all cases, directed to the form of activity. The substantial thinking is an act of synthesis, and the accompanying act of reflection is a perception that all thinking presupposes the relativity of things—that dependence is essential and necessary to each: in other words, that every "This" is a fragment of a larger "This." Now, this stage of thinking, as thus modified by reflection, is the stage of thinking known as the Understanding or Intellect. Its fundamental distinction consists in the perception of relativity or dependence, this perception of dependence arising from reflection upon the fact of synthesis which it discovers to underlie all thinking.

Another stage of thought is distinguished from that of the understanding by the fact that it arises through a new reflection, whose object includes both the previous reflection and its object. It sees the general form of relativity—and hence the form of totality. This is consequently a higher or highest form of reflection, and is called, or may be called, the Reason as distinguished

from Understanding, and insight or intuition as distinguished from discursive intellect.

The discrimination of the reason from the understanding is the most important, although the most difficult, part of psychology. The first stage of reflection (understanding) sees relativity as the general form or condition of all thinking or knowing. It sees this, moreover, as an objective condition—the condition of particular existence. The second stage of reflection sees that relativity itself is fragmentary, being a phase of correlativity. Correlativity taken as a whole is independence. From the insight of first reflection arise a series of categories which express the nature of finitude, or the characteristics of what is fragmentary and dependent. From the second reflection arise a series of ideas which state the nature of the totality or the independent.

The understanding considers a thing or fact as a cause or effect, a force or its manifestation, a thing or its properties, a potentiality or reality, etc., or in respect to its quantity or quality, etc. The reason, in the technical sense, always deals with the totality and with the predicates which it implies. For example, the totality is not the effect of something else, nor the cause of something else, because such relation would connect it with something else beyond itself or with an environment, and, therefore, make it a fragment instead of a totality. The totality is *causa sui*. The totality does not have quality through another, and through this become subject to change; but it produces its own quality—it is self-determined. The totality is self-related; it is its own other; it ends in itself, and is therefore infinite.

In the case of finite or dependent beings, all determinations or characteristics arise through an energy or process from beyond their limits—they depend on others. The independent being is an energy itself; it is self-determined. Self-determination is the fundamental characteristic of the totality; reason cognizes as true and ultimate only what is consistent with self-determination. Whatever is dependent is a fragment of an independent being. Whatever is determined or modified through another is a fragment of a total that is self-determined.

In self-determination there are two phases—the determining or active, the determined or passive. The determining is the universal as opposed to the particular, which is the determined. The

two phases universal and particular belong to one process of self-determination. The determining energy of the universal originates distinctions or particularity; the nature and quality of its energy are manifested and revealed through this determination of particularity; but the self-determining energy acts persistently, and by new determinations modifies or changes the particularity already caused. The annulment of particular determinations is a second and further revelation of the self-determining universal. The realm of particularity is in its creation and annulment a complete manifestation or revelation of the universal or self-determining.

The stand-point of reason—the principle of totality—explains all facts and things as fragments of a great process of creation—the self-revelation of a Creator. Reason sees that a totality must be self-determined, and that there must be a realm of manifestation or revelation wherein change and finitude exist as well as pure self-determining activity.

Again, the conditions of the totality imply that the self-determined, the realm of particularity, is a realm of progress or evolution wherein the finite things are annulled, because of their inadequateness to reveal or manifest self-determining. The finite changes or passes away through external influence, because it did not already possess that external influence within itself. It perishes through the addition of what it lacked. But it perishes, losing its individuality in a higher individuality. Or rather it is the process that abides, while the particular realization or individuality disappears. All particularity is to some degree the revelation of the universal, and hence to that extent individuality (for individuality is particularity that is universal). Abiding individuality is reached when the power of self-determination is attained; for then all change is self-change and manifestation of the self, and hence a development or growth rather than decease.

Self-determination, moreover, implies mind—that is to say, consciousness and thinking furnish us the only beings that we know which correspond in attributes to the definition of the self-determined being. Consciousness has a subject which is self-determining, inasmuch as it freely forms its ideas, creating in them distinctions for itself. Its further acts of distinction modify its thoughts, and cause to arise new particulars in the place of the

old. Consciousness realizes in every act its own power to annul the distinctions that it has made, and thus its activity is returned to itself, and objectivity is only its self-determination. Only that which is determined can be in space and time; the subject of self-determination transcends time and space.

Consciousness and freedom belong to self-determination; hence reason, because it sees the totality, sees everywhere the manifestation of consciousness and freedom, although it may be in a fragmentary manner. Perhaps it may not trace out the entire mediation which connects a dependent thing or fact with the independent whole; but it is assured that the form of the whole is and must be that of self-determination, and that it admits only of such finite phases as originate in its energy and pass away through the same. It is not at all necessary that the individual fact shall be traced up to the ultimate fact in order to demonstrate to us its origin in mind, provided we have reached the insight into the pre-suppositions of the finite and dependent, and know that their pre-conditions are the self-determining being, and that this is mind.

In the foregoing considerations I have chosen to consider the first stage of thinking as unaccompanied by reflection. The second and third stages of thinking are then to be designated as the first and second stages of reflection respectively. This is not strictly correct, inasmuch as the fundamental synthesis of thinking is in itself an act of reflection. This is evident, if we consider that it fixes the object in time and space, or, what is the same thing, perceives the general forms of sense-perception or of material existence.

In the foregoing sketch of the stages of knowing I have indicated the grounds for the existence of paradoxes. The conclusions reached in the second stage of knowing are paradoxes to minds in the first stage; so likewise the conclusions in the third stage are paradoxes to minds in the second stage. To men who have not attained the perception of the necessity of dependence, all the conclusions based upon that stand-point seem contrary to reason. How, for instance, can one thing have its being in another? How can the destruction of one thing affect another? How is it possible to think that the facts of our perception are merely phenomenal? The first stage persists in denying relativity to things.

The second stage of thinking, as we all know, finds the conclu-

sions made on the stand-point of the third stage of thinking paradoxical. All assertions regarding the totality seem utterly unwarranted. Predications based on the nature of the absolute seem to contradict the necessary inferences of reflection and observation.

The most celebrated paradox of Hegel states that thought and being are one. This, together with another—"whatever is, is rational"—relates to the third view of the world above discussed. Two other paradoxes—the denial of the principle of contradiction, and the assertion that being and nothing are the same—relate to the second stage of thinking, and do not require any deep speculative insight to justify them.

PARADOX I.—*Thought and being are one.*

It is not true that mere fancy and existence are one. Thought, here, does not mean fancy, and being does not mean existence. There is no identity between mere reflection and being. Thought and being are one in the sense that the divine thinking is also the creative act. The third stage of thinking finds mind to be the absolute, and, in the absolute, thinking and willing are one. Reflection upon the totality discovers self-determination, and careful identification of the characteristics of self-determination reaches the conclusion that mind is the absolute. Plato and Aristotle, and all the greatest thinkers of the world, have reached this result. It is no specially Hegelian doctrine. If one understands by thought mere images in the mind, mere personal convictions and opinions, the doctrine sounds absurd to him. If any one understands by the term "being" the immediate existence of things as he sees them, then, too, the doctrine is absurd. By "being" a person might mean the persistence of force—the ultimate energy in whose process the things of the world arise and perish. Evanescent things could be identical only with evanescent ideas. If the true being is self-determination, it is identical with thought, if the self-determination of absolute mind is absolute thinking.

PARADOX II.—*Whatever is, is rational.*

It will be observed that the solution of this paradox is identical with that of the first. All depends upon the answer to the question, What is? Hegel finds that the true being, the moving purpose of the world, is reason. If absolute mind is the creator of the world as its own revelation, the world must be, at bottom, rational. As in the case of the previous paradox, if one takes the

facts of sense-perception for what is, it is the height of absurdity to say that whatever is, is rational.

This paradox and the previous one turn on the distinction between "true being" and the being known to sense-perception; also upon the distinction between thought or reason, as found in the third stage of knowing, and the same in the first and second stages.

"Being," in the paradox "Being and nothing are the same," does not signify "true being" in the sense just explained. Still less does it refer to the being of sense-perception.

PARADOX III.—*Being and Nothing are the same.*

This does not mean that *existence* and nothing are the same—that existing things are all nothing. Hegel has in mind Spinoza's dictum—*omnis determinatio est negatio*—and means to say that if every determination that makes anything specific or particular is a negation, then pure being, without any tinge of negation, must be thought as devoid of all particularity, and, consequently, as devoid of all distinguishing attributes, because distinguishing attributes are determinations, and belong to negation and not to being.

Thus pure being would have to be defined as having no distinctions, and thus as indistinguishable from nothing.

If the mind holds back its assent from this proposition, and affirms that there is a distinction from nothing, it affirms being as determined, and therefore as possessing negativity, and therefore as not pure being.

But this affirmation of distinction of being from nothing falls on another less desirable horn of the dilemma. It denies the possibility of analysis; it asserts that marks and attributes cannot be separated in thought from their ground. Hence, too, it affirms the identity of the particular being with the universal; it denies the possibility of process and activity, whereby accidents originate and pass away (and thus are separated from their ground and annulled).

It does not matter about the words in which this idea is described. One may use the word "Substance" for "being." Or he may use the term "Thing," or "Thing-in-itself." Essence, Noumenon, Identity, Infinity, Matter—such expressions may be used for the same idea—*i. e.*, as a result of abstraction from all de-

termination or particularity. But the result is the same identity with nothing.

The second figure of the syllogism has been employed to state this conclusion :

Being is undetermined ;

Nothing is undetermined ;

Hence being and nothing are the same, or hence nothing is being.

Here the figure of the syllogism will not permit a conclusion that is affirmative, because the predicate or middle term is not "distributed" or exhausted quantitatively by the subjects, respectively the major and minor.

If the undetermined as a class includes two species, being and nothing, then, of course, "to be undetermined" does not warrant complete identity, but only identity as far as the predicate "undetermined" is concerned.

We could say "being and nothing are the same so far as they are 'undetermined.'"

But the fact is, that here we do not have any syllogism of the second figure at all. Nor do we have any syllogism in which the terms of the Notion appear: there is no relation of universal, particular, and individual. Each of the terms is individual or singular. Being is all of the class "undetermined"—it is the whole of it, because there is no distinction within "undetermined" that admits of sub-genera. So, likewise, Nothing is all of undetermined, because Nothing possesses no sub-genera, and "undetermined" has no sub-genera, and each is a universal negation, each is a denial of all differences and distinctions. To suppose any distinctions in the "undetermined" is to contradict its definition. It cannot have any provinces—say one province containing being, and another containing nothing, for such provinces would be determinations within it. It is the form of the mathematical syllogism, if it be syllogistic at all. A is A ; and A is A ; and hence A is A . We find that we have two or more words for the same idea. That is all.

Once we used the term "nothing" for the thought, but, on reaching the thought by the road of abstraction or generalization, we call it being.

Nevertheless, it will be found that there is contradiction even

in this view of the matter. For the careful exclusion of all distinctions is just as well a preservation of distinction. It becomes the distinction of simplicity from diversity—of the one from the many. To put the indeterminate in the form of a judgment is to put it in the form of contrast, and hence to make it one term of a distinction.

PARADOX IV.—*The Principles of Contradiction and Excluded Middle are not absolute laws of thought or of existence.*

This paradox justifies itself by showing that whatever is finite is a vanishing phase in some process; hence it is not perfectly self-identical, but only a becoming. The becoming is not exclusively being, nor not-being; it is not the somewhat that is approaching, nor entirely the somewhat it is developing out of. It is identical, not as a static, but as a movement or evolution. This means that it has its identity in its universality, and not in its particularity. Again, when we speak of the total, the principles of contradiction or of excluded middle do not exhaust the statement of it. It is identical, but only as a process of differentiation. The generic process is self-determining—which means that its identity does not exclude self-difference.

It is seen that these so-called laws of thought are not practical. All thought has the implication of a totality in which these principles are not absolute but subordinate.

USE, BEAUTY, REASON;

OR, SCIENCE, ART, RELIGION.

BY MEEDS TUTHILL.

"I desire not to seek the deep-hidden Reason of Beauty,
Lest it should vanish like haze when it is sought to be grasped."

SNIDER'S "DELPHIC DAYS."

USE, BEAUTY, AND REASON: each of these is a ruler of men. But Use rules by a sort of Exterior Necessity, which at first seems tyrannical, since no justification, or reason, for it is found,

except in the useful result. Beauty, on the contrary, enralls us by an interior Necessity, not known as Reason, hence mysterious. But, since it is pleasing, and not irksome, like the Necessity of Use, we yield ourselves to its dominion cheerfully; and, like the poet quoted above, we declare, in the spirit of the Greek, that we wish not to seek the mysterious Reason of this Beautiful tyranny, lest its mystery be profaned, and it vanish from our eyes.

But Reason, also, is a ruler of us; and in it there is an Absolute Necessity. The Necessity here is a known necessity, both as external and internal. There is no waiting for experiment or for result to test it, as in the case of Use; for the Reason shows itself, at once, as necessarily developing, of itself, into manifold results. Nor is it mysterious, as in the case of Beauty, but clear as crystal, and unperturbed by doubt or fear. Its enjoyment, therefore, is rather a peace than a joy; it is not an excitement, a stimulant, but a calm repose,¹ where one is sure of his object.² For it is the Necessity of the thing in itself which is here regarded. This is, to be sure, a felt Necessity, as in the case of Beauty; but it is also a seen Necessity, as in the case of Use; for here the Reason develops itself Objectively into its results; the Idea, of itself, creates infinitely, and this with an absolute Certainty. Yet this is true only of the last Reason—the ultimate, Divine Reason, which is both in us and without us. So that this Reason, thus taken as no longer mysterious as in Art, nor merely proximate as in Science, can be found only in Religion, as the Divine Relation, the communion of Man with God.

Yet this Reason develops itself gradually, though covertly, through all the preceding phases of Science, Art, and Philosophy; and, in each of these, takes its threefold form of Use, Beauty, and Religious Act. To trace this development or transformation may be worth an hour's attention. For this development is not only patent in historical form as that of Mankind in general, but is also the manifest, and even necessary, course of development

¹ *I. e.*, Beauty, in *Motion*; Reason, in *Rest*; Use, in *both*.

² Certainty of the universal, as against sense-certainty of the *particular*. Yet *neither* of these can give the other's form of certainty? As Stavolo answers his query, whether he can know his dead wife's presence, or whether she *sees* him now: "Je le crois, mais je n'en suis pas sûr." Here, to see or *touch* would have made him "*sure*." (See Stallo *v. Mill*.)

for every individual, in his progression through the life and death of Nature, into the eternal life of the Spirit.

I.—THE USE.

1. We may say, in general, that the Reason of every thing¹ is in its use. This is a "World of Uses," says Swedenborg. And it is true that, when we look only to proximate reasons, the best reason we can give for a thing is its Use.² For in the Use the Reason shows itself as Cause: it is there closed together with and in its Effect; so that it is really and veritably Cause, final, and not proximate. In other words, Cause is there no longer, merely "Succession," as Hume and Mill call it; nor is it mere condition; but it is realized as Cause in its Effect. Hence Science, considered merely as Inductive—as seeking for conditions which result in effects, and thus show a concrete instead of an abstract Cause—is a Useful Science—but only a useful one. This kind of Science is completed in finding the particular Use. The result justifies the Use of the means, and the Use is the Reason of the process followed. Such a Science, then, is only knowledge of an Art—of a way or method to produce particular results.

But this is only a particular Science—not a universal one. Its "reasons" are only proximate reasons, because its Uses are only particular uses. This is very clear when we notice that what is useful for one purpose may be either useless, or destructive, for another. The VISHNU becomes SIVA, and vice versa. It is very narrow-minded, then, to ask merely for the Use, if meaning only the particular Use—some use to me, some use to the body, some use that can be seen with the eyes (which to some seems the only "demonstration")—for uses are innumerable. This fact does not show Use to be an Unreasonable; but, on the contrary, is just what demonstrates it to be Reasonable—not finitely, however, but *infinitely*. The Scientist finds this out by discovering that there is none of his particular means for use, around which (however he seeks to isolate it) does not centre itself this Infinite Without as a necessary factor in the Effect; that is to say, the Absolute Whole, Outer and Inner, must be there in order to produce even

¹ *I. e.*, as thing, as particular?

² The most "visionary" of men sees all as Use.

the least thing. The Use, in general—as GENERIC—is the REASON Itself, just because it is thus Infinite, and thus self-contradictory when thrown into finite form, or when deemed particular only. No one form suffices for it; it demands infinity of forms and hence contradictory ones; for this name of “Use” does not suffice for it, does not measure what it is. In any particular form, it shows itself both as Useful and as Useless, both as beneficial and destructive. The farmer observes that the birds destroy some of his grain, yet that they preserve it, on the whole, by devouring the insects and worms. But does he suppose that the bird is itself designed only to be useful to him in this way, and is only taking its pay for work done, though not on his pay-list, and without any design to benefit him? Perhaps he does think so, when in a pious mood and sees dimly the One Cause working in all this, and for him only, and gives thanks. For in the first instance we look only to present use and proximate cause. And if we go beyond this to find final Use, then this infinity of forms which Use takes on quite confuses us, and compels our return to the present Use—so long as we regard only the Useful.

“What is the use of this?” is, therefore, a proper question to ask. But it is not answered by saying: “I don’t see any use of it.” Such an answer only declares our own ignorance, our inability to see the Reason of it. Everything that exists has its *raison d’être*, or it would not exist. Its conditions for being *are* its being, and its right to be, so long as these conditions exist. These conditions are used to create it; and if we knew these, and could control them, we also could create the thing; just as now, by knowing them to some extent, we can modify or destroy it.¹ But since we perceive but a small part of the infinite relations which enter into this creating, as the absolute conditions for the existence of any, the least thing, we have to content ourselves with changing and modifying what is created, according as we learn the means therefor. We accept, or destroy, or modify, according as we find, or deem, useful to us. Thus we take things only on their useful side. This is for us their reasonable side.

¹ Man cannot, it seems, control the life-process; his power ends in the chemical sphere, and is scant there. It does not enter the *vital* realm, but seems quite unlimited in the inorganic or abstractly mechanical.

The other side of them, seeming to us useless, seems also unreasonable.

2. But, since we consider only the use to us, this, also, is an unreasonable side. For it is not reasonable to suppose all made for Man's use, especially in the way in which he here first regards it, as for his bodily use—his food, drink, and shelter. For infinitely more things are outside of these uses than are within them. And, besides, the final use of everything is in itself, and is for all, as is shown at once in the fact that there are numberless persons seeking for it there; and whose "rights" of use contest with each other, and go into an endless conflict, as particular only.¹ There seems to be no Reason whatever, then, in this point of view, of mere Utility, when taken thus as only particular use, or as egoistic use, my use only. This resolves it wholly into self-contradiction and universal conflict. My use is another man's injury; my gain is his loss. If I first find and eat, another starves. The "reason" is here lost in utter irrationality. "It is not Reason," we argue, "that makes things useful; but it is Use, only, that makes them reasonable. Thus we try to deny the reality of any Absolute Reason, because, as we say, if that existed it would make things harmonious. So we resort to Utility, and declare it to be "absolutely the Only Reason," not in so far as it is infinitely Relative and so truly absolute, but in so far as it is finite, and particular utility—my use only. But we see that this Utility, as "Absolutely Only Reason," turns itself into just that conflict which we declare to be inconsistent with Reason. After all, then, we have to worship this Utility, not as Reason, but as Use only, when we take it in this particular way, and declare that

¹ And are at war with them; and this is all that makes them merely "useful;" so that they really find their Reason in their destroyers, their opposites. Abolish that, and they cease to be merely useful, and must take some other aspect, such as "pleasant," "beautiful," etc. Here is the dialectic finding of the third term by which one proceeds from a first unity of opposites to a new form of the notion. The "pleasant" is the next *sensuous* result. And this at once parts itself into infinite relativity again in a witch's dance with the unpleasant, so that there is no *peace* for the *Pleasure*-philosophers, either as a more or less of pleasure, nor as a zero between + and -, where the *sum total* is either a nothing or an unknowable. But this *Peace* shows itself, after all, as the only possible unity of *Feeling* as both pleasure and pain; it is a Rational, Divine peace, which must necessarily be lost in every finite form and be found there only as a more or less of Joy, *promising* to be peace in its Infinite form.

utility is the only reasonable thing, or motive, or Worship. For the god also must show himself useful to this utilitarian spirit; and so the Chinaman trounces his gods when they fail to answer his paper prayers, or serve him to his notion. (And John Chinaman is not the only "utilitarian" [or "John"] who likes to see "the god" draw well, and judges of him accordingly.)¹

Hence, this is the state of mind out of which spring the "*Useful Arts*." Man's Art comes in here to modify the conditions of his existence. He has found Nature stepmotherly, driving him to his own inventions, in proportion as he rises above mere Nature's wants. She makes nothing for his ideal wants; he must himself make what he finds needful to satisfy them.² Thus she, too, is wholly unreasonable, for she treats him only as an animal, good to him as a baby, bad to him as a man. Nature abhors this spirit in the man—the Spirit that overlooks her, pierces through and beyond her; and, with a poetic discontent, is ever seeking to mould her Universal forms into something exclusively his own, for himself alone, and in which she has no share. Thus she is "a jealous god." And he, looking upon her as unreasonable, undertakes to put his Reason into her, and make her rational.

But at first this is all mere dreaming—anything but useful, apparently. And yet it is the first beginning of Science. Science begins in the Useful Arts; and these Arts begin as an imitation of Nature. If some one had not dreamed or fancied there was some connection between the seed which fell from the tree and the new tree which sprang from it, where would have been our sowing and reaping? Yet the man who first planted a seed must have wondered whether it would be a success, and also whether he had not committed a sacrilege. For who, pray, even now, can give any reason why the seed should become a plant, other than

¹ For one of these men with an eye so open for use, it must be a *right cunning* god that can pass his critical inspection.

² And *if it be true* that she develops him from the gorilla, so also it seems to be true that, like the gorilla, who loses his *youthful* intelligence when his *growth* gives him a *strength* which no longer *needs* it, so Nature makes this *ancestral* taint cling to the man: for when he has learned the "*laws* of Nature," and grown strong thereby, he suddenly becomes "agnostic"—"knows nothing!" Such is the secret malice of Nature for him. Her love is one that would always keep him at the breast; *her law*, one that would nullify his spirit.

that it has been tried and found so? And would not the first experimenter be more sensible of this mystery of Life by far than we Moderns, grown callous in our habitual handling of these inmost laws, so that we have lost the finer tact, ceased to feel the heart-beat of "the God" in them? We have come to regard them as abstractions, and no longer as a deity who acts. That first instinct, *insight*, of the primitive man is, then, the truer one, after all, for it goes beyond all our proximate causes, and Useful Reasons, to the Divine Cause, the Absolute Reason of the thing. The Divine reveals itself here—*inwardly*, to the mind, as the REASON of this thing; and *outwardly*, in the object, as *Useful*. It is a narrow view, to be sure; yet it may compare favorably with any Modern Science which aspires to find the Divine wholly as an abstract Law, and system of laws, and so be able to turn it wholly into Use, and destitute of Reason, except such relative Reason as Man himself puts into it. For since Man here looks upon his own Reason as a Nothing, the Divine is thus made a Nothing, and as Use, only a material Use—a machine; and Man himself will be thus found to be only material, and God as only his idea. The wonder then will be, how the Man can contrive to thus know how to use the whole Universe, if there is not already a Divine Knowing of it, and an Absolute Reason in it, which he can use for this purpose!¹

3. But this Inductive Science, as we have seen, proceeds only by experiment, since it seeks only the Use, the result, or the thing, in a particular form. And so, also, with the Useful Arts, so long as they aim only at the present use. The reason for doing thus or so is only that thus the thing has been done aforetime. In this way the Useful Arts may descend from generation to generation; but in this way they make no progress; and this fact

¹ The Schellingistic (and perhaps Boehmian) error here seems to be that *it* uses *him* to know *itself*, to become *self-conscious*. Thus the Divine is originally an *Unconscious*, and its development a mechanical one. But the truth rather is that *he* (Man) uses *it* to know what *is*, and it *uses* him to know what is *not* (this reverse side of itself which is not, can never *be*, but only unconsciously *appear* as a Creation of the mind). Thus the act is made *reciprocal*; not arbitrary, but necessary relation of the two terms; the one a knowing of the Appearance as Finite, the other a knowing of the Reality as Infinite. For *Knowing* is not something which can *be* developed, but must develop itself. As finite its relation is to the Unconscious as what *it* as particular is *not*. But as Infinite its relation is to the finite in general as what *is not*—not *I* as Divine.

shows they are still without Reason, mysterious. Since the only reason given for them is experiment, no change or progress can be made except by experiment.¹ There is a certain truth in this; for experiment alone can show objectively the last Reason in its actual operation in the effect. But it is not yet suspected that this "*last* Reason" also resides (as the *first* Reason) in the Thought of the inventor, and has been used by him in forming his idea before he threw it into objective realization. All "demonstration," then, must be actual—to the eyes. "Your *idea* may be good, but we don't understand it; let us see the thing; I find it useful after our way of thinking." When a Frenchman first introduced the potato (planted from *peelings*) into a district where, yearly, people died of starvation, there was rather an anxiety to have him fail than succeed. For the vanity of prophesying failure was strongly interested; and its taunts nearly drove the poor man frantic before his potatoes showed their heads and promised plenty hereafter to his starving tormentors. Such is the folly of human nature while it can see no Reason, except outwardly. For such people "there is no use" of doing a thing new until it is done; and as for thinking, no use at all of that." "Let others think for us, and tell us what to do." And obviously this is the necessity of the situation in primitive times; a few must think for the many, teach them the Art only, since they cannot, or worse, will not, learn the Science. After all, then, there seems to be a natural need of "revelators," and a "natural selection" of "superstitions;" and what fathers them is precisely this inductive way of thinking, this seeing nothing except outwardly, and as present Use.

Science, Art, and Religion are all very tenacious of this first form of Utility, the particular and present Use. Very loth and slow are they to break away from any such form once found and tested. They may even hold it sacred; and rightly: for the Divine is indeed formally actualized in everything really useful.

¹ This shows how Buckle, who charges the hindrance wholly to "*superstition*" (which is indeed its first form, since the Art is held to be "revealed," and hence *sacred*), himself ends by making a *superstition* of experiment; the *inductive* process has become *sacred*, a sort of fetich which no man must dare to even speak against, or question its infallibility!

² That "butters no parsnips!"

But if they consider this Use as of Divine authority in its form,¹ which is fixed, rather than its Idea, which is self-transforming, then do they become fairly crystallized, as in China. And just so far as there is failure to recognize that (before-mentioned) infinite transformability which Utility has in respect to form, so far is there a stagnation of invention, or a halting and suspected progress of it. As, for example, in England, where there is no authority except in trying the thing, and yet to get it tried is like pulling teeth, since it is "against all custom!" and hence shocks the very moral sense of Great Britain! Now, this view of things is certainly the safest, as well as the only one for those who regard ideas with suspicion, and consider deductions from them dangerous, and induction from "facts" the only real Science. But it is clear that, with such a view, every advance must be an Art before it can become a Science, must be known practically before it is theorized, must be seen Objectively before its inner idea gets any official recognition. Thus IDEAS, though supposed to be *in us* (if anywhere), is really made to stand without,² "knocking at the door," as the Great Master represents himself, petitioning to be let in "to sup with us," and illumine us with a new and Divine Light. Yet we, wedded to some mere form, encrusted in a crystallization of prejudice, reject the Divine Revealer, and say to him: "At another time (may be) I will let thee in. I fear and distrust thy Lordly tread, thy infinite, soul-dissolving flights!" Or, we meanly say to ourselves: "First show thyself useful! Beautiful thou mayest be, lovely as the Sons of the Morning! But what Use have I for Beauty? This stern Necessity shuts me up to the Useful."

Yet Death is not Beauty; and just because it seems not so, we shun it. And all our present "Uses" have, more or less, this aim to put out of sight, or out of mind, this unbeautiful Death. Thus, negatively at least, our worship of Use is a worship of the Beautiful, as a hate of the Ugly.

But so also does Empirical Science find the Beautiful lurking

¹ True, also, of forms or methods of thinking—philosophic forms, etc., etc.

² This is the phase of "Being"—the Idea beheld as Outer only. Then in "Essence" it seems *Inner* only—Reflective. Lastly, in "Notion" it recognizes just this necessity of showing itself in the *real* Outer act and not merely in the *Apparent* act, which as *Essence* it posits in the merely *Art-object*.

in all its forms, at least trying to be, in a positive way. Even in the cold crystal which seems Death itself it works a radiant transformation. And in the Useful Arts, as Science progresses, it is found that the shape most perfect theoretically—least wasteful, since every part is made to serve, and not to drag by excess—and hence the most useful shape (*c. g.*, in a tool, or a bridge), is also a beautiful form.¹ There is no waste of material, no loss of strength, no crude and useless disproportion in Beauty. And so Beauty issues from the tossing waves of Utility, like the ancient Goddess of Love, riding on their crested spray.

II.—BEAUTY.

1. But, though Beauty seems to be thus born of Use, or of Utilities, yet it seems, also, to be something quite independent thereof.² We may say it rises away from Use, like the bouquet from a wine, or the odor of a rose, and floats in the ether as a being apart and different—the soul of a thing which disdains its mere body—the spirit which shakes itself free, and would be by itself.

To express this fact in a form less seemingly fanciful, and to show its necessity, in what may be deemed a more “practical” aspect of it, may not be easy to do in a general or universal way. But it is not very difficult to do this in respect to those proximate reasons with which most people readily content themselves. For here we have found Beauty issuing from Use, and purely in a formal way. For example, the shape of a tool or a column has been determined by Science, with view only to Use; and the most economic and strongest form has been found to be a beautiful one. Now, this is a mere matter of Form, apparently, quite independent in its effect as Beauty, of its effect as practical Use. The tool is to work with; the column is to sustain a weight; but the Beauty is only for the eye—a “joy forever” for the spirit.

¹ So also in the human form it has been observed that, though the *rude* line, *straight* line, may give the impression of physical strength, yet the *strongest* has always the curved line; and the *great* man—the spiritually strong (see the faces of Cæsar, Napoleon, Goethe, Dante, Shakespeare)—has always the feminine mark upon its form and features. Thus sex shows itself as a unity when it realizes itself in the Spirit again as Strength and Beauty, Use and Art.

² Like Quantity, merely as *relation*, independent of the *particular* Being, or like Essence, merely as *Inner* relation, independent of the Outer relation.

This form, then, may be taken merely for its Beauty. A model of the Parthenon, or of other Beauty realized from Use, may give the same sense of Beauty. Hence copies of such Use-objects become Art-objects for the mind alone. This Outer Beauty seems to thus transform itself into something Universal, and to address itself to something Universal and *Inner*—within *us*. And so, if there be any Use in this Beauty, it is an Infinite Use, for these Forms go down the ages forever, and they are not for one, but for all.

And, in like manner, Natural objects are severed from their uses, and even pictured, so that they may be seen and prized for their Beauty alone. This is as much as to say that the Beautiful in Nature is something that can be severed from her, and from her mere usefulness; and that it is the only thing worth keeping, or that can be kept; all the rest is mortal; this is immortal. Thus it is that Beauty, though derived from the Useful, though necessary to the best form for Use and so hinting that Man's best Use must be always found in the Beautiful, and that Nature would be all Darkness and only Death to him but for this Beautiful in it, necessary to him as a spirit, though needless to him as a body; thus it is that this Beauty seems of itself to be Form only, and, as such, to be wholly separated from the Use, both in the Outer object and also in the inner conception of it.

In short, Beauty, of itself, is thus made useless, apparently. It is wholly severed from the outer or finite use. It is no longer a Use, but a luxury—not necessary. Its use is only for itself alone; it does not perish in the using, but lives in the thought which alone can use it. As Objective Form, it justifies itself by only seeming Beautiful; and if it do this, its particular use is no longer regarded—is lost to view. Hence its Use, as Beautiful, becomes Universal; it is for all; and no one's use of it interferes with another's; it divides itself, like the spiritual loaf, into a miraculous feast, whereas a particular use is only for him who uses the object, and, in using, destroys it; here the Object is wholly for each, and is also indestructible. What can it be? There is a mystery here. But it is evident that, even when we fix our eyes upon some particular object and find this Beauty possessing it, it is the very fact that every particular Use has disappeared from it, and ceased to limit it, that gives it this Universal Use of Beauty. Just what makes it Beauti-

ful is, that it is for all. It is even impertinent to seek for its finite use. It is destructive of its Beauty to try to find anything particularly useful in it as object; that belongs to the object itself, and brings us at once to Earth. The Beauty, as for all, is independent of this object. It is mine; it is thine; yet it is neither mine nor thine. It stands for itself in a sort of Infinitude, that makes one dream rather than think in this finite and particular way, which looks only (like the animal) to present use, or my use. Such is the conclusion which Kant arrives at respecting Beauty. The Judgment of Beauty, he says, is one for which we can *assign no reason* (*i. e.*, no *particular* reason), and yet we feel it to be an apodictic one—a Universal Judgment. It is a Judgment in which all must feel the same inner necessity to affirm the Beauty, he thinks, without our being able to give any reason why. It is not to be explained how Beauty thus imposes itself upon us. It is like the vital spark, in that all finite reasons fail to account for it. It shows itself, without Reason,¹ then; or, if there be any Reason for it, it must be the Infinite Reason, which man can only feel, but not utter—can recognize in its Outer forms, but not within him. And so Snider, echoing the Greek spirit, which revelled in this sense of External Beauty, says:

“Not any origin wish I to seek of the beautiful object;
Not any Use shall I ask when it before me doth lie;
Simply I try to surrender myself to its waters of beauty,
There unconsciously float, while I am rocked to repose.”

2. Now, in this mood, Beauty seems to be for us a mere passive enjoyment.² And this Beauty, which reveals itself as a Necessity in us,³ has come upon the man, we may say, by a sort of accident. In his search for the most useful, most scientific form, he has kept paring away the wood, the iron, or the marble, till, unsuspectingly, he has ‘reached this Beautiful Form. The form of “the god”

¹ Thus, in Nature, Beauty is the *Irrational*, if viewed on merely *Inductive* principles.

² We reach the form of “Pleasure” here instead of Use; but since we are dealing with Reflective- or Thought-forms, rather than *sense-form*, we reach this “pleasure” in its *highest* form, the Infinite joy of Beauty, which will show itself as involving also an Infinite *Suffering*.

³ Just as Use enforces itself by *External Necessity*.

⁴ Same “accident” in Nature’s *chancing* upon Beauty. It is not *chosen* by her; but as a merely mechanical process Nature finds Beauty *necessary* for greatest *force*. The

stands revealed to him. This Divine Form of Beauty lifts him out of himself into infinite dreams. He is no longer himself, but *its-self*; and he feels himself transforming with it into infinite forms all of this one and same Beauty, yet all different—an infinite variety. Or, this same revealing, and its consequent inner transformation, comes to him from his regarding Nature's own forms with an eye lifted above mere present Use, not clouded nor preoccupied with mere egotistic desire, but free and clear in a moment of spiritual vision. And then, too, all *without* seems to have a spirit in it. The elf, the sprite, disport in the waters and in the air, the naiads in the fountains, the nymphs in the forests, the gods in the heavens—the Infinite One, in all.

But this is a mere seeing, mere outlooking—a mere passion¹ of enjoyment. And just because it is an infinite outgoing of the soul, and takes the man wholly out of himself, it is an Experience which returns, reacts upon himself with an awakening shock. He has experienced the Infinite. He would fain be no longer himself. His spirit, when steeped in these celestial dews of Beauty, seems veritably dissolved therein, and afloat on an infinite ocean of joy. No longer any cares annoy, nor needs besiege this being of his which no longer seems to him finite. But, alas! this new, this Infinite life has been, after all, a deathful exchange for him! He has lost sight of his finite want only to find an infinite need.² This Beauty is what is necessary for him. Without its infinite delights he shall henceforth find nothing Useful to him. Nothing else is worth the possessing, still less worth the pains of getting. His spirit is revealed to him as a something which truly lives, only in this Beautiful; all else is death for it.

Thus the joy of Beauty comes back into a cutting pain. It is a two-edged sword that cleaves the spirit asunder from its Object, and hence from itself, since without that Object it is no longer

Infinite of Power and Beauty meet in the same point as generative centre. But neither Nature nor man need choose Beauty; it is only the Best, not the only form of power. Were it the only, there could be no choice.

¹ Because an *Exhaustion* of one's self in this supposed reaching out, unconscious that the process is a development within? Or because a mere *resistance* to the pulsing of outer motion-form growing infinitely *concentrated* and *rapid*?

² This is the first *unconscious Religious Experience*—not yet recognized as Religious, but only as *Sentiment*.

itself—its new-found self—no longer spirit, in this free and infinite way. The sense of this fact is what renders the mind, through its suffering, perceptive of its own self as active, and no longer as a merely passive recipient. Out of this intense craving¹ for Beauty comes the irresistible impulse to create it. Since it has vanished into this inner blackness—this suffering of the spirit—that shall be its birth-pangs. The spirit shall say to this Darkness: "Let there be Light!" And Light shall be: First playing, like an aurora, on this background of Darkness, and, finally, struggling into Divine sunrise for the soul, glorying in its own self-made Day. This is a Day that will endure; for it is not this Nature's finite day, with its sunrise and sunset, but that Spiritual Day which the Spirit Divine has wrought in the Spirit Human, as this latter's own struggle into full consciousness—a consciousness of what is not this or that, or here or there, but of what Eternally and Infinitely is—the Beautiful and Divine.

3. Thus the spirit of Beauty, by its necessary operation in the mind,² proclaims itself as creative. It makes its own objects. It does this, at first, inwardly, in Idea. But then it wishes also to externalize them, as if it sought to make them creative also—at least seemingly so; for do not they also seem to create, since they, at least, suggest this same idea of their Maker, and thus recreate it in others as Idea? Thus they are Words,³ Words of Life to others. They speak of this Beautiful life, which is the only true life, since it is Eternal. Thus they illumine the Darkness: they shed the light of Spiritual life. Nay, then, there seems to be a

¹ It would seem that the Divine can give us only *hungers*, and the means to *feed* them, so far as this is a matter of mere *sensibility*. But *we* can create only the finite food for these, though infinitely, whereas the Divine can create only the Infinite, though *finutely*, as *Creation*.

² As its Absolute Essence, or its Infinity of *Inner* Relation, where it *joins on* to the Infinity of *Outer* Relation, which is mere Quantitative Relation of *Form*, as different and *separable* from the Relation of *Idea*, though not from essence merely as *Force*, but *one with that*.

³ *I. e.*, the External *Form* is Middle Term; yet, like Words, mere *means* arbitrarily posited, and to be learned only by *experience* as *sign*. This does not *destroy* the actuality of the *symbol*, yet shows its *meaning* can be got only by *Inner* purely Ideal comparison and Reflection. Thus the *necessity* of the *Inductive* Method is shown as well as that of the *Deductive*, and *their* necessary unity, in respect to the *Outer*, while the *Deductive* is independent in respect to the *Inner*, the purely Spiritual Relation.

still deeper Reason for their production thus outwardly, instead of being kept within as mine alone. They are not mine; they belong to all, they are for all. They would not be, completely, therefore, unless thus presented to all. But still this is not the final Reason for externalizing them. It is only a proximate or "a sufficient" reason why an Artist should create for others. May he not also create for himself alone, since he can see no reason why his creations should suggest anything at all to others? He learns that fact only by experience, and an experience not always affirming it. And so in Nature we may say that the Divine Creator has revealed himself in the Useful, only as finite and hence contradictory; but in Beauty as an Infinite. Yet this Revelation in Beauty, as we have noted, is, just because it is Infinite, rather a cruel than a loving one, since it seems to appeal to sensibility only, and thus divides itself, for the sense, into a mere Infinite Appearing and Vanishing—a life and death of finite forms. Thus, instead of a joy only, it is rather a Cupid's shaft of suffering—the sight of a God who flees—elusive and Unknowable, though no longer Unknown. This is only making of Man a *Tantalus*. So the REASON of Beauty is still to seek beyond the Beauty as Outer and Formal¹ only; and this Outering of it is still a mystery, although it seems to reveal. Mayhap we shall fall upon that elusive final Reason by tracing the course of ART, and noting whither its tendency points, or where its infinite development centres itself at every step, as always, essentially, a one and same Relation.

(a.) As for Use, so for Beauty, Man begins his creative efforts by imitation.² As in the case of Use he saw no reason in doing

¹ So with the Reason of "Essence" merely as *inner* Beauty of Outer Form, for this, after all, can be *only* the Infinite Form as Form—the Form of the whole as *External*—not the Idea which *creates* it.

² Imitation is instinctive, because, in fact, a necessity for sensible knowing; it is the mode of sensibility as a knowing. Imitate a motion, and you know what it signifies. Yet this meaning is also casual, accidental, like the motion, and hence open to an arbitrary choice of meanings as *finite* relations; only in its infinite relation is this motion fully rationalized as *Rest*, and its meaning made to begin as *definite* relation of Outer form correspondent to the relations of *Idea*. Thus Motion is first *imposed* upon us as a trial—an experience in finite relations of the Infinite whole. To imitate *these* is to learn only a part and a falsity. Yet the impulse to know urges on. And this gives a joy even to the suffering. So much so that even the *malign*, the diabolic, is *imitated* in order to know it. The *fatal* nature of this imitative instinct when habitual, and its

thus or so, except in the result, so he finds no reason why this Natural object is beautiful, except that he so feels it to be. It seems safest, therefore, to imitate, to reproduce exactly. "For (he reasons) the same effect will follow the same cause." Here he is not aware that both cause and effect must be in himself, if it is only a matter of his feeling. Nor does he consider that if the cause is really external, as he argues, then his reproduction cannot possibly be the same cause, and hence cannot have the same effect. Nevertheless, his reasoning is practically correct, that an exact imitation is the surest way to reach the desired result, so long as he recognizes no other reason for this result than a mere external object. That is, he must obey an outer teacher till he finds an inner one.

(b.) Hence the Rules of Art, in respect to the Beautiful as well as the Useful, are at first rules of experience. There is no science of it except that of experiment. The artist tries his "causes," and tries again. Thus he ventures beyond the road of mere imitation. What he can try, as means, is infinite. In this way, then, he gains a certain freedom. He at least breaks loose from Nature and is thrown upon his own invention.¹ And now, if he reflects, he must soon see that the very fact that this way of trying by mere experiment is endless, renders it childish and arbitrary. Its necessity turns itself into chance. Since he has an infinite choice, it is no choice, but only haphazard. No credit to him if he succeeds; it is only a chance stroke, like that which an old painter, in a fit of anger, gave to his work to spoil it, and thereby happily perfected it.

nature not recognized as *merely* Emotional, is seen in the disposition to jump from Table Rock, *e. g.*, in accord with the falling waters of Niagara. To know only what *seems*, we must *be* it in the form of motion.

¹ *I. e.*, finds that Quantitative Relation as *Formal* is quite *separable* from the Outer *thing* as of *other* qualities; but does not yet see that his own ideal activity in invention is also equally and as absolutely separable from all *Externality* taken as a Created Whole. That is of one Form only essentially from bottom to top—merely repeated—iterated eternally from centre to circumference, while he is ideally a capacity for infinite variety of forms all qualitatively different, yet independent of quantity; and it is *these* which he seeks to put in *outer* forms because he *seems* to see them in outer forms, although they are not and cannot be there. He tests this fact by his Art-Creations. These have the same *seeming*, the same *conductive* power as those of Nature. But the *qualities* cannot be attributed to these, since they lack *motion*, which imposes our delusions on us through the senses.

Hence, here comes again that reaction into the self, before described—a reaction into what seems a total inner Darkness, out of the very infinity of the supposed external “causes.” If one is to “try” all these possible causes, where is the end of it? The very impossibility of this shows the Artist that, in so doing, he is working without Reason. Then he reflects: “Is this Beauty, then, irrational? Pray, why do I try these causes or means? Merely to see if the effect follows. But where is this effect? Why, in myself: there alone I find it. When this effect is produced in me, I know it, though I know no reason for it.”

Evidently he is speaking of some particular reason, and is still looking for that without. Hence he does not, even yet, conclude that the cause must also be in him, if the effect is. He only recognizes himself free as to means, and left to his own sensibility to judge of their results. Thus he makes of himself not yet a creator, but only a Judgment; not yet an Artist, but only a critic. Yet he becomes, in a sort, unconscious of his means. It seems rather an inspiration, than a reasoning, that guides his hand. Hence the Rules of Art now become imitation of “Masters,” of men, instead of imitation of Nature. The Reason is thus taken from Nature, and given to Man—but not yet as his, or rather only as his, as a particular man.¹ The “master-pieces” are taken as models. Their forms, colors, arrangement, are studied. These methods have been found successful—that is, the “Reason” for them.

(c.) But this is only a finite reason, only a reason for imitating them. These works, as Man’s own, seem nearer the creative source than Nature’s, or more specially adapted as models for Man’s Art. So this is only a change of base from the Outer form to the Inner, ideal form, as what is to be imitated, and its process of forming divined, if possible, by imitating it. Man has this instinctive sense, that in imitating a sensible motion he will catch the meaning of it; and in imitating an ideal process, he will see at least the Reason in it, even if he cannot express it as a particular “reason.”

¹ Hence as a particular Reason it is still an Unknowable, even to the man himself; since it is self-contradictory that Reason in general should be a particular reason only, or that what is for all can be thus monopolized.

So here. Beyond all these mere means—these colors, forms, and their proportions—is the reason why the “Master” chose these out of an infinite number. But he can give no reason except that he felt their success, or that he divined them by a sort of imagination which he cannot describe as a method. And here it is noticed that different Masters equally succeed, though by different means.¹ Hence each has his own “*style*,” in respect to which “*tastes*” may differ as our nervous motions, or sensibilities, to them do; yet judgments must agree that each is Beautiful in its way. Thus this Infinite Beauty particularizes itself in Man’s Art, as it does in Nature; yet each particular form suggests the Whole, the One and indivisible Beauty.

No wonder, then, that this final Reason for it cannot be grasped, since it shows itself in forms infinitely various. This Outer form of it is then really indifferent to it in itself; it cannot be tied to any one of them; it can leave them all and exist only in the mind. In fact, it does thus disclaim them all, as mere means—mere wax in its hands—of which even an arbitrary use may be made, and Beauty spring therefrom, like the spray of a wave in Nature, or as Conventional Beauty in Man’s Art (as, for example, in fashions, which are beautiful only because they are changing).² Thus Beauty’s only real form is in the Mind—ideal, infinite. This important fact is apparent from the inherent self-transformability which every Outer form must seem to possess as *Form*, of course, not as Outer *thing* before it can seem Beautiful. As before noted, the *Beauty* of it must seem to be something which severs itself from every particular Use of the object, as merely Form, and at first as its form. But, thus³ freed from

¹ *I. e.*, Beauty as ideal begins to show itself wholly dependent on ideal form, and the outer form is mere wax in its hands, a mere *arbitrary* material which has no meaning save what is *put* into it; and this *varies* with the idea which forms it.

² “Because they change and *can* change.” *Tyrants*, yet *popular* tyrants, *chosen* despots.

³ This is *analogous* to the escape of “Essence”-form from “Being”-form in its *first* aspect as “Reflection,” and its *third* phase as latent *Idea*. But the *second* phase of the Essence is only a change from Form as Passive in Quantity to Form as Active in *Force*, and the *view* of it is still as an Outer and the *relations* of it still *spatially formal*. This represents only the *means* of Creation of Outer Form *Being* as *Inner Force*. But this is *all* external, and as a whole Being-Essence is posited absolutely by and as *opposite* to the *Idea*.

the merely passive phase of the outer object, no longer dominated by the fixedness of that, this Form of Beauty seems to us to live and speak; it has become spiritual, and there is no limit to the variety in which it appears to us, or to the suggestion it awakens in us. Thus, instead of passive form, it becomes Form as Active. The infinite self-transformability of this specific form demonstrates its origin in, its generation by, the Infinite (Active) Form. In other words, this particular Form, when thus idealized, shows its ancestor to be the Universal—the active Creator of all forms. That must be why all can recognize it.

But this infinite transformation evidently goes on only in idea, and can exist only there. It is not possible in fixed outer form; it can exist there only relatively; it is not for the sense in itself. Hence, as outer representation approaches to it, the Art takes higher grade, as in dramatic poetry, or dramatic music, or in panoramic or dissolving views, which may be called dramatic vision. But it is this inner transformation of the outer form, by and in our idea, which alone can approach the infinite. This it is, then, which gives the sense of Beauty as both a joy and a pain, just as a nerve-motion, when excessive, lingers on the summit of a wave which touches Heaven yet looks into a yawning Hell. But in the Idea, alone by itself, this Beauty may part from the sense; and then it is the Infinite Beauty indeed, serene and peaceful, because Divine. "Grant me this Absolute Beauty," said Socrates, "and I will prove the immortality of the soul." Well said; for if the soul cannot part from this mere sense of Beauty, then it can have no idea of it, nor dwell with it in its Eternal nature.

In fact, however, it is this constant self-transformation of the idea of Beauty within us which alone gives the impulse and the power to create it. For this is the very process which goes on in the mind of the Artist himself while creating. Hence it is no marvel that he finds it difficult—nay, even sad—painful in a moral sense, also—to fix this being of life in a form which must apparently be only death for it—a veritable crucifixion. Only they who shall look upon this crucified of his with the same love which he had for its inner Beauty can resurrect it, restore its life, see in it again its Infinity. For the Artist is impelled to this Outer Creation of Beauty only by his love for it, and its fixed form is

only a necessity of his material.¹ No one can thus really create the Beautiful except out of his love for it. That is what conceives it. That is what guides the hand in forming it, and divines what form best befits it. That is the ultimate REASON, both of its being and of its way of being. And, after all, the created object is only a mere seeming, an Appearance only; and its finitude and fixity belie the Infinite transformability which it represents. Hence, it is purely arbitrary; it must be seen as he sees it, and then it will disappear as object and become idea only so far as it is Beauty. This is but saying that its Reason is an Infinite Reason; it is in him and all others who can behold Beauty, for that has shown itself to be an Infinite in itself. It is also saying that this Infinite Reason only seems to be in these fixed forms—does not dwell in them, but in the mind, where alone it really appears, since there it appears as Infinite. It is not, then, his reason for creating, not his love of Beauty as a particular love. For, since this Love, as his only,² really crucifies its Idea, it seems the most unreasonable of all things.

Thus the REASON, as such, is not found in Art, regarded as only Subjective—as my Art, my Creation. As a One Love, it calls for many loves, as we have seen, or it is not really created as Beauty. Hence its Objects cannot be passive ones, as in Man's Art, and merely seeming, but must be active and spiritually real. There is a mystery here which only Religion can solve. For this creation of Beauty, merely as Art, shuts itself up in the Idea, and belongs to the Idea as contemplative only, since it returns into that as result. The Outer object is a sheer sacrifice;³ and it must be insensate to justify this crucifixion, which for it is a parting it from its Use. Its particular glory is in its own use; and even

¹ This, as spatial necessity of *fixed form*, of course, reflects itself (by *motion* as unity of space and time) into a necessity for *sense* also, which is in Time-form taken *abstractly*, and hence can really be nothing save in unity with Space-form through Motion.

² *I. e.*, Love also as a *particular* proves self-contradictory—demands the *Many*, and cannot be isolated in the One. Cannot have *passive* objects, as it *seems* from the point of view of a merely Subjective Art.

³ So with the resolution of "Essence" as merely active Outer Creation. Yet the Art-Work still stands without in its own "material"—an *arbitrary* one, etc.

The outer object ceases to have any *use* when turned to the infinite Use of Beauty, in *Art* merely; but in Religion, the *Use*, being made Infinite and Divine *Use*, also becomes beautiful; and so Use and Beauty go together in the final Reason.

though this Art-Object is a light and glory in the world, or a star in the heavens, what is that to it? it knows not of it; just as the Man, wedded to his finite use, sees no infinite, or Religious, relation which gives him the Beautiful glory of an infinite Use.

And so, also, is there necessity for sacrifice in our resurrecting of this Beauty from that outer form in which it is fixed and dead. This restoring to its ideal being can take place only in other minds than that of the Artist, and, after all, must be also a painstaking.¹ The thought must go down upon this Outer object, concentrate in it, and recreate that Beauty which it only suggests. And then this Beauty wings itself away from it, like a spirit, and the object itself is again left to its cold and lifeless existence. Thus Subjective Art stands ever isolated from its Object, if this be taken as either a finite or as an Outer object. The Artist's love in creating it is only a self-love, which for it is hate, were it at all sensible to either love or hate.

DANTE'S EPOCHS OF CULTURE, AND THE RELATION OF THE "CONVITO" TO THE "DIVINA COMMEDIA."

BY H. K. HUGO DELFF. TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY A. E. KROEGER.

Let me be permitted to give in advance a general sketch of my views, preliminary to illustrations and proofs. I distinguish three periods in the development of the poet's mind and character. The first period is the time of his youth, characterized by the relation to an earthly love, and recorded in the *Vita Nuova*. It is Dante's love for Beatrice, which is here to be taken in the sense of the Old German adoration of woman, in which, according to Tacitus, the present *numen* is worshipped; for we behold devel-

¹ *I. e.*, as to sensibility—sense-knowing; for this Outer Art-Object must be resolved through that. The same may perhaps be said of objects of *historical* representation, at least in part, since there is to some extent a necessity, and, still more, a disposition, to see them as *sensible* objects.

oped in woman, so far as we look upon her in her ideal, that which is so holy in the childlikeness of the child and in childlike innocence: the immediate unity with the divine roots of individuality, from which the energetic will of man separates or dirempts itself in decided individualization. Dante conceives Beatrice as a revelation of the Infinite; in his love-ardor for the earthly beloved he was with and in her, at the same time, in an unconscious manner One with the Infinite, even as he, in ardor for her, was at the same time in ardor for the Divine, the Infinite. This was *la diritta via* of the first song of the Divine Comedy—the direct way; that is, the immediateness for the reflection, which enters here and purposely loses itself in the current of the Divine; this was the innocence to which the opposition had not yet disclosed nor contradiction yet opposed itself, and which, therefore, followed the drift of her nature, which, according to Dante, is the drift of God, the instinct of the soul, which carried her upward on its wings. In regard to scientific investigation, we shall still find independent thinking slumbering; and, politically, the poet seems to have been either indifferent, or else following his Guelphic family traditions.

The perturbation caused by the death of the Beloved soon ripened his manly independence; and we see the poet enter upon the second period of his life. In regard to mental development, this epoch is characterized by the abstract, reflecting understanding—the scientific phase whereof was at that time the Oriental Arabic Philosophy and the begetter of the Scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas and Dun Scotus, whereas its ethical phase was Liberalism. We find both sides of this epoch recorded in the *Convito*.

This second period led Dante into his third, partly by reason of the fruitless endeavors of abstract and formalistic science—fruitless, because they could not be brought into connection with the vital issues of the day—and partly by reason of the painful experience resulting from the consequences of his liberal principles; that is, from the demagogy of the Guelphic nobility in Florence, as well as from the general selfishness of parties, that took the marrow out of all the good and great enterprises of that time. This third period is characterized, in its intellectual aspect, by intellectual contemplation, by Dante's concentration on that same

contemplation with the living, divine truth—Mysticism. This is, in its ethical or political respect, a sentiment which one might call conservatism, provided that this word be not taken in a partisan sense; a sentiment which insists that all the figurations of the World and of History are ordered by God—that is, by the idea of a universal and independent principle of organization. Dante characterizes this third epoch as a *return* to the *diritta via* of the first, and, hence, as a restitution of the immediate unity with the Infinite of the time of youthful innocence, now accomplished by reflection and purpose, and, penetrating contradiction, also going beyond it. The second epoch, on the other hand, is to him a wandering in the desert, in the *selva erronea* of this life. The literary records of this epoch are the Divine Comedy, and, I believe, also the book *De Monarchia*. The letters of Dante's later life, as well as some sonnets and canzonets, might be added.

This division of Dante's periods of culture and literary epochs may perhaps meet approbation on this account: that it bears the impress of universally typical, generally human, traits, and that, if not every man, at least the most of men, develop in the same manner (that is, they learn wisdom by knocking themselves against the wall), and that the whole race of man passes through the same process.

It is known from the History of Philosophy that after an epoch of abstract philosophy has passed away, and has been either paralyzed by the combination of scholasticism with mysticism, or previously overcome by mysticism (on the one side take Hugo of St. Victor, on the other side take Richard of St. Victor and Bernard of Clairvaux), the publication of the Aristotelian writings and their Arabian commentators, which was accomplished by the exertions of Frederic II von Hohenstauffen, created a new epoch, which was by no means altogether thrust aside by the masters of scholastic theology, and to which, on the contrary, scholastic theology became again serviceable, by dissolving altogether in logical ratiocination and arbitrary casuistries, after the death of those masters, and, notably, of Thomas Aquinas.

It is also well known that Mysticism placed itself in decided opposition as well to that philosophy as to that theological scholasticism. Now, Dante in his second epoch was such a philosopher and scholastic theologian, and the product and recorded document

of this tendency of his mind is the *Convito*. Hence the *Convito* stands, as it were, in opposition to the *Divina Commedia*.

The fact that Dante had to complain of an intellectual aberration he himself confesses in the Divine Comedy; but at the same time he indicates this aberration unmistakably. When he asks Beatrice (*Purg. XXXIII, 82*) why her words flow so much higher than his comprehension that he seems to lose them in proportion as he seeks to gather them, she replies:

“Perchè conoschi . . . quella scuola,
Ch' hai seguitata, e veggì sua dottrina,
Come può seguitar la mia parola . . .”

How far finite science, seized in the finite understanding and in its abstractness and eccentricity, is removed from the wisdom which is concentric with the Infinite—

“E veggì vostra via dalla divina
Distar cotanto, quanto si discorda
Da terra il ciel, che più alto festina . . .”

He sees the opposition of both—that is, of Scholasticism and Mysticism, which is like that of Heaven and Earth, the Finite and the Infinite, Nature and God, Transcendence, etc.

Again, *Par. III, 28, 29*, Beatrice says:

“Ti rivolve, come suole, a voto,
Vere sustanzie sono . . .”

The opposition cannot be more sharply expressed than by the *rivolversi a voto* and the *vere sustanzie*. In the same manner I look upon Beatrice's reproach, *Purg. XXXI, 58*:

“Non ti dovean gravar le penne in giuso
—Ad aspettar più colpi—o pargoletta,
O altra vanità con sì breve uso.”

Pargoletta is philosophy; the *donna gentile* becomes *pargoletta*, with other vanities. Bonaventura counts pretended Wisdom among vanities in his *Soliloquia*. Beatrice is not the earthly beloved, who lives merely in memory; she is the Bride of God—that is, the Platonic World of Ideas, the World of God, which

contains the root of all created worlds and orders of the world, and hence is at the same time the *Mother of True Wisdom*.

It is, therefore, beyond a doubt that Dante had to repent of intellectual sins, and that these sins lay in the direction of the philosophy and scholasticism—in other words, of the Aristotelism—of his time. We have no definite expressions in regard to his political sins, though repentance on that score is by no means excluded. Beatrice's reproaches, preceding the passage just quoted, are quite general. She says, *Purg. XXX, 126*:

“Questi si tolse a me, e diessi altrui—”

that is, to other Gods, but not to other women, for Beatrice is here a potentiality of the Godhead.¹ In this sense she continues, *130*:

“E volse i passi suoi per via non vera
Immagini di ben seguendo false,
Che nulla promission rendono intera”—

Immagini di ben, in the sense of *Par. V, 7*, as is also made immediately manifest by the opposition, *XXXI, 22*:

“. . . perentro i miei desiri,
Che ti menavano ad amar lo bene,
Di là dal qual non è a che si aspiri.”

Dante answers quite as generally, *V, 34*:

“. . . le presenti cose
Col falso lor piacer volser miei passi,
Tosto che il vostro viso si nascose.”

The sensual presence, the sensual and finite relations, had imprisoned him. But I believe that this general framework includes especially Dante's political activity. For Dante's picture in history has only two important aspects, the one philosophical and the other political. Nay, the poet introduces himself, not in his

¹ This is not to be taken as a denial of the fact, repeatedly substantiated (for instance, in the letters), that Dante was not in love once or many times. But this is, after all, no crime, unless it exceeds in sensual consequence the sixth consequence, or is permanently and recklessly absorbing, which is not to be assumed in Dante's case. There was no occasion to make of this a separate chapter in the *Divine Comedy*; indeed, it would have been downright ridiculous to have done so.

private relations—compare the principle expressed in *Convito I, 2*: “nella camera de’ suoi pensier se medesimo riprendere dee e piangere li suoi difetti e non palese”—but, in so far as he was a public person, as philosopher, author, and politician.

But we find a direct allusion to his political change of views in *De Monarchia*, in the well-known phrase *populi vana meditantés, ut ipse solebam*. The political sentiments of this work are altogether in the manner of the *Divina Commedia*. The fundamental principle of the Empire is here complemented by reverence for history, the recognition of the historical element, and the significance of hereditary nobility. The special attention devoted to the religious ends of mankind and the affairs of the Church is altogether in the vein of the Mystic. I would therefore believe that this book belongs to the third period. Now, in that confession I see it stated that there was a period in Dante’s life when freedom was also to him a bride—that is, when he was enraptured with that “false freedom” whose regulative principle is unbridled “desire,” the she-wolf of the *Inferno*, and whereof Dante speaks in his letters to Henry VII, to the Italian Cardinals, to the Florentines, and in many passages of the *Divina Commedia*. This freedom, or liberty, is followed by equality. This is generally understood by intelligent people, as we know, in this way, that not external historical rights, but internal rights, or otherwise merit (labor, acquirement, etc.), deserve advancement. Taken in this sense, this equality is the fundamental principle of the industrial faction of a nation, and the basis of a monetary nobility, of a patriciate or optimate. In the year 1295 or 1296—five or six years after the death of Beatrice—Dante became a member of the “societies,” and therewith began his political activity. It is my opinion that this step, as indeed it could not have been otherwise expected, was not a means to an end, but a conviction. In the conflict between the *Donati* and the *Cerchi*, he embraced the latter cause. The former were unquestionably the degenerate nobles or feudal lords, who attempted to obtain supreme rule at any price—the very reason why we find them subsequently leagued together with the lower populace as true demagogues. The latter, on the other hand, were the wealthy descendants of the money nobility, the representatives of the *bourgeois* class. The former gained the victory, and the latter, after their banishment, naturally sought a

support in the party of order—that is, in the Imperialists, the Ghibellines. In doing so, they abandoned liberty in the sense of the Florentine Democracy, but not equality in their own interpretation. For this was their vital element, and, abandoning this, they would have had to abandon themselves. Whatsoever man acquired and made his own, for the sake of his own and of general existence, was, after all, a token of his validity. Dante participated in this change, and the record of it is the fourth book of his *Convito*. In this book Dante is a Ghibelline, an Imperialist, but also an embittered enemy of rank privileges, and an inspired advocate of the principle of universal claim to distinction through personal merit.

He goes even so far as to say that his reply to the demand that nobility should be based only on historical claims would be a reply not in words, but “by the knife.” Thus it turns out that in the *Divina Commedia* his own party becomes a “malicious and stupid set,” of whose bestiality its passing away will furnish the proof. He separates from them altogether, and becomes a party unto himself; nay, it is even known that he violently condemns the industrial greed of gain as well as the arrogance and ambition resulting therefrom, a state of things wherein no one remains any longer within his order, but each individual and each class endeavors to equal, if not to rise above, the other; and that he longingly looks back upon the old times of simple ancestral morals, when the old gifted families (since broken up by adventurers) were the rulers. Indeed, we see how, in evident opposition to his *Convito*, he glories in the historical continuity of his family even in heaven—a matter upon which he does not neglect to lay stress.

In the second part of the *Convito*, Chapter xiii, Dante reports that after the death of his beloved, nothing was at first capable of giving him comfort.

Soon afterward, *dopo alquanto tempo*, when he began to think of a cure, he hit upon the celebrated book of Boëthius, *De consolatione philosophiæ*, and Cicero's *Lælius*. And “as it happens that one who seeks silver may find gold,” so he not only found here comfort, but was also led to the study of other authors and scientific works, reflecting on which he finally came to the conclusion that philosophy was the *Donna*, the object of adoration, of those authors, and, consequently, the very highest matter.

Hence, from that time he began to hunt up the places where "she shows herself truthfully," *le scuole de' religiosi e le disputazioni de' filosofanti*. We know from the History of Philosophy what those "schools" and "disputations" signified.

A new passion, *nuovo amore*, took, therefore, hold of Dante. In conformity with the language and the spirit of that time, he represented this new love, philosophy, to himself as a *donna*, bending down upon him, the abandoned one, in an act of pity. This *donna gentile* is held to be the same one who is also mentioned towards the close of the *Vita Nuova*. But in the *Vita* the new passion has already been conquered again by the old one, and, since the composition of the *Vita Nuova* belongs to a much earlier period than that of the *Convito*, it may, after all, be possible that Dante was in a state of self-deception, and that the *donna gentile* of the *Vita Nuova* is a real person. This, it is urged, fits also more with Beatrice, who there also appears as a real person. But, after all, it is not exact. Even the *Vita Nuova* is in so far allegorical and symbolic, as Beatrice is unquestionably more to the poet than the daughter of Portinari—namely, a revelation of the Infinite. Hence, I believe that the victory of the old love, recounted in the *Vita Nuova*, was only a preliminary victory. A fight was necessary, and then victory wavered. At one time, when Dante closed his elegy to the beloved, he thought that the whole matter was decided. But the new principle pressed itself forward anew, and finally the poet himself was compelled to submit to it altogether.

When Dante says, in the first chapter of the first part of the *Convito*, that he does not intend thereby to disavow the *Vita Nuova*, but rather to supplement it, he does not mean to say that both works have one and the same theme—namely, the rights of the Empire. What he does wish to say is this: that both works have the same object in view—the Divine; but that this object is represented differently in each work, according to the status of internal development within him. For, as he expresses it directly afterwards, one must speak and act differently at different periods of life.

Thus we have arrived at the point from which to illustrate the contrast between the *Convito* and the *Divina Commedia*. In the very first chapter we read :

“Ciaseuna cosa, da providenzia di propria natura impinta, è inclinabile alla sua perfezione; onde, acciochè la scienza è l'ultima perfezione della nostra anima, nelle quale sta la nostra ultima felicità, tutti naturalmente al suo desiderio siamo soggetti.”

Now, compare with this, for instance, the XXXIII Canto of the *Paradiso*. Here we have God (v. 46), and the union with God, *il fine di tutti i disii*, and hence also that, wherein *sta la nostra ultima felicità*, outside of it everything is imperfect (v. 106), within it all is perfection. But this unity with God in the transcendence (the *trasumanar*, *Par. I, 64*) is also, as we shall see, the express negation of the *Scienza*, or of that principle, from which Dante in the *Convito* causes the final blessedness and perfection to emanate. The distinction is not to be mistaken; here science, there unity with God in actual contemplation. But this distinction is one of the opposition.

The next words—“Per li miseri alcuna cosa ho reservata, la quale agli occhi loro già è piu tempo ho dimostrata”—I also relate to the canzonets. For these, as we know, were composed by Dante as early as his residence in Florence, and in the first glow of his new passion. Subsequently political activity took hold of him, interrupting for a while his scientific studies. They were resumed in the leisure which he found in exile, and the fruit of that new return was the commentary to the canzonets, the *Convito*.

It remained unfinished, when that great revolution in the poet's mind and mode of thinking began to break forth, which has its expression in the *Divina Commedia*.

In that same chapter we find science still called “il pane degli angeli. O beati quei pochi, che seggono a quella mensa ove il pane degli angeli si mangia, e miseri quelli, che colle pecore hanno commune cibo.” The angel is of an intellectual nature, and God himself is only the *actus purissimus* of conceptions (of λόγος—that is, the conceptions of the understanding, which are abstract; that is, externally formal, and in themselves separate and apart in contradistinction to the ideas of reason, which are truly concrete; that is, wherein thought and essence are identical). In the *Divina Commedia*, on the contrary, God himself is this angel's bread, whereof the souls feed without ever being satiated (*Par. II, 11*). Simplicity has equal share with high intelligence in this bread,

and only vulgar pride of learning could think of ranking this simplicity with the faculties of the brute creation.

In the Second Tract, in the sixth chapter, the mode of deducing the system of angelic hierarchies from the trinity is characterized as empty, scholastic phantasy of the same kind, which is so energetically condemned, for instance, *Par. XIII, 91*.

In the third chapter Dante says that, although we can have no sufficiently sure knowledge of the arrangement of heaven, there is in the speculations of reason (of the understanding, *della ragione*) an independent interest of their own, which exceeds in value likewise the certainty of sensuous cognition. I should think this ought to characterize sufficiently the one-sided theoretical stand-point of the *Convito*.

In the fifth chapter we read: "Li movitori sono sustanze separate di materia, cioè intelligenze le quali *la volgare gente* chiama angeli." Theological phraseology is here, therefore, lowered to a level with vulgar mode of expression in an unmistakably contemptuous way.

In the eighth chapter Dante says that the highest nobility of man consists in the understanding (*la ragione*), and that the peculiar act of the *ratio* is thinking. This is further explained (*III, 2*) as follows:

"Il Filosofo nel secondo 'dell' Anima' partendo le potenze di quella, dice che l' anima *principalmente* ha tre potenze, cioè vivere, sentire e ragionare . . . È quella anima, che tutte queste potenze comprende, è perfettissima di tutte l' altre. E l' anima umana, la qual è colla nobilità *della potenza ultima* cioè ragione, partecipa della divina natura a guisa di sempiterna intelligenza; perocchè l' anima è tanto in quella sovrana potenza nobilitata e dinudata da materia, che la divina luce raggia in quella; e però è l' uomo divino animale da' filosofi chiamato. In questa nobilissima parte dell' anima sono piu virtù . . . *E tutte queste nobilissime virtù si chiama insieme con questo vocabolo, cioè mente.*"

It results from this, that on the stand-point of the *Convito* Dante regards *ratio*, or the understanding, the organ of abstract philosophy, of "panlogism," as the highest intellectual capacity of man, and as in itself concentric with the Divine intellect, and that he in no way distinguishes from it the faculty of reason, the *mens* or *intellectus*. This is a natural consequence, indeed, of the

Aristotelian point of view, which looks upon God also as only the *actus purissimus* of the *rationes* or *λόγοι*. But this view is in decided contradiction to that of the *Divina Commedia*.

For the latter work distinguishes reason, as the organ of the infinite, from the understanding, which belongs to the finite, and holds that the latter, having no direct relation whatever to the Divine, ought to be transcended, as I have shown elsewhere. The understanding, as the intellectual activity in the sphere of the finite, is simply the organ of the pagan or extra-Christian philosophy, which never measures the endless path, but in its unquenched yearning remains excluded from the heights of absolute truth. To unlock this organ of the Infinite was the great achievement of the Redeemer.

In the *Convito*, on the contrary, the *ratio* is excluded from the contemplation of the Divine only in an accidental way—namely, by its connection with matter. This exclusion is a consequence of the human constitution in this earthly life, and a consequence which neither can be removed, nor is desired to be got rid of in this life. We shall recur to it again.

Referring to the words, *II, 9*: “Sarà bello terminare lo parlare di quella viva Beatrice beata, della quale più parlare in questo libro non intendo,” Fraticelli observes: “Non intende più parlare della Beatrice, vera donna ‘in carne e in ossa e colle sue giunture,’ perchè vuol parlare della Beatrice allegorica, cioè della sapienza.” Here the Divine has assumed another form of representation—that is, the garb of philosophy.

This form is (*II, 16*) the *better* donna, for whose sake he leaves Beatrice with honest regrets. We must also regard as conclusive the solemn assurance in the same place: “*Dico e affermo*, che la donna di cui io innamorai appresso lo primo amore fu la bellissima e onestissima figlia dello imperadore dell’ universo, cioè la filosofia.” What more can one do than to swear on the honor of a man that what one says is true? It would be rather superwise to charge him with self-deception.

In the same place we find these significant words: “Questa donna è la filosofia; . . . gli occhi di questa donna sono le sue dimostrazioni, le quali dritte negli occhi dello ’ntelletto innamorano l’ anima, liberata nelle condizioni. Oh dolcissimi ed ineffabili sembianti e rubatori subitani della mente umana, che nelle

dimostrazioni apparite, veramente in voi è la salute, per la quale si fa beato, chi vi guarda, e salvo dalla morte della ignoranzia.”

Let the reader here compare the following verses from the *Divina Commedia*:

Par. II, 40:

“ Accender ne dovria più il disio
Di veder quell' essenza, in che si vede,
Come nostra natura e Dio s' unio.
Lì si vedrà ciò, che tenem per fede,
Non dimostrato, ma fia per se noto
A guisa del ver primo che l' uom crede.

Par. XXIV, 91:

“. . . la larga ploia
Dello spirito santo, ch' è diffusa
In su le vecchie e 'n su le nuove cuoia
È sillogismo, che la m' ha conchiusa
Acutamente sì, che 'n verso d' ella
Ogni dimostrazion mi pare ottusa.

Here we hear of a *morte dell' ignoranzia*, just as (*III, 5*) of a *fango della stoltezza*, and (*IV, 24*) of the *selva erronea di questa vita*. By comparing parallel passages from the *Inferno*, it will be found that death, the morass, and the labyrinth are not ignorance, simplicity, and error, but sin—that is, pursuit of finite matters and interests, be they of an intellectual, moral, or political character.

According to *III, 11*, knowledge, *il sapere*, is its own purposes. Dante despises the practical man, who desires knowledge only for a utilitarian purpose.

In the last chapter of the Third Tract the author declares again in the most unmistakable manner the divergence of his ideal in the *Convito* from that of the *Divina Commedia*. Salvation through union with God can be attained by all, the simple as well as the wise. This is not the case with *la ultima felicità* of the *Convito*. He says: “*Se tutti al suo cospetto venire non potete, onorate lei ne' suoi amici.*”

We now touch, in conclusion, those numerous passages wherein the nature of the science praised by Dante is conclusively described. In *II, 15*, he says that the ultimate principles of knowl-

edge and being are attainable to us, so long as the soul is enchained by the body, only through a reflex, just as a vague gleam of light penetrates the closed eyelid, or a ray enters into the pupil of a bat. Those principles are not directly accessible to us; we are only able to draw conclusions from their effects. According to *III*, 18, and *IV*, 22, we can act or meditate on them only according to their effects; we can approach them (*III*, 15) only in the way of negation—that is, of the abstraction of finite and sensuous predicates, which is far removed from a positive determination, giving hint thereof only in nebulous outlines, as it were. But he does not (*III*, 5) find this limitedness of human knowledge regrettable, since it is God's own arrangement, He having had the fixed will to deprive us in this life of transcendent light. This must suffice us. But in that same place, in the fifteenth chapter, he holds that, since desire does not go beyond the limits of natural possibility, man cannot naturally be desirous to cognize those highest principles of life and science.

Now, these concise explanations are as much in direct contradiction with the views of the *Divina Commedia* as they abundantly illustrate the scientific stand-point of the *Convito*. In the *Divina Commedia* the limitedness of common human knowledge is, in truth, a fact for which man himself is to blame. It is the consequence of man's lapse from God, and the real hereditary sinfulness, which is, indeed, nothing but man's isolation from finity and sensuousness, and is not God's arrangement, but the fault of man himself. It was Christ's work to eradicate this original sin; his divine human nature forms the bridge on which the finite man returns to the Infinite (*Par. VII*, 25; *Purg. III*, 34, etc.). Again: According to the *Divina Commedia*, man is by nature desirous to become One with the infinite in immediate contemplation. Even the noblest productions of science and art cannot satisfy him. The limbo is the play of eternally unstilled sighs and painful resignation. In Christ this desire finds fulfilment. See the words, *Par. IV*, 124. Dante soon sees that there is no rest except in God. Arrogant science, like all "other vanities, *con sì breve uso*"—that is, which have value and validity only for this short span of time—can, after all, give no true inner satisfaction:

"Io veggio ben, che giammai non si sazia
Nostro intelletto, se 'l ver non lo illustra,

Di fuor dal qual nessun vero si spazia.
Posasi in esso come fera in lustra,
Tosto che giunto l' ha: e giunger puollo;
Se non, ciascun disio sarebbe frustra."

Here, therefore, the spirit is no longer an externality to truth, but absolute truth lives internally in the spirit, and, absorbing it in its own movement, gives it by that means the internal light, wherein the spirit recognizes the truth of all things. This is the true end of all investigation (*nasce appiè del vero il dubbio*), and can be absolutely attained, in this life as well as in the next. *In hac vita*, says Dante, in his letter of dedication to the Can Grande, man can attain contemplation.

On the other side, we well recognize Dante's stand-point in the *Convito*. It is the Aristotelianism of that time, as it must form itself, when combined with pious reverence for faith and the dogma, a well-known mixture of empiricism and abstract logicism, which is now joined, in an external sort of way, by limiting traditional faith. In the words, *III, 15*: "Cioè Iddio, e la prima materia, che certissimamente non si veggono, e con tutta fede si credono essere."

This Aristotelianism is the inspiring element—that is, it is what the author has at heart, while faith is to him only a matter of respect, of learned knowledge. This can be readily felt. I will mention only one thing. At *II, 15*, we read: "Noi siamo già nell' ultima etade del secolo e attendemo veracemente la consumazione del celestiale movimento." Evidently we have here a general theological-physical opinion set forth as a scholarly note. Compare with it *Purg. XXIV, 79*:

" . . . il luogo u' fui a viver posto,
Di giorno in giorno più di ben si spolpa,
Ed a trista ruina par disposto."

We might also refer to *Convito III, 7*, where we read that faith is based chiefly on the miracles of Christ and his successors, while *Par. XXIX, 100*, seems to lay stress on the internal miracle, by means of which Christ is born in us. At any rate, this is the meaning conveyed all through the *Divina Commedia*.

The spirit of Dante's philosophizing in the *Convito* is altogether Aristotelian. Its principles have all an Aristotelian sense. The

preference of a theoretical life, as divine and angelic, over a practical life, and, above all, the sense and meaning of such a theorizing as abstractly comprehensible, is altogether Aristotelian. We find Aristotelian citations everywhere; and by the side of them Arabian commentaries. We also meet Thomas Aquinas, but under far other titles than those which he wears in the *Divina Commedia*, and which make him appear, in the *Convito*, not as a piously faithful theologian, but as the philosopher and exponent of THE Philosopher, and as a Scholastic. The other sides of the man, and hence, also, the sympathies which he always has for mysticism, are fully revealed only in the *Divina Commedia*. But on this Aristotelian basis I fancy that I perceive several important corner-stones of Platonism, which probably are taken from the Aristotelian New Platonism of Proclus and Iamblichus. It is well known that the book *De Causis*, which is ascribed to Proclus, and which Dante cites in the dedicatory letter to the Can Grande, and of which Philalethes has given us a luminous extract, was very current in the Middle Ages. It is Platonic when we are told (*II, 5*) that the effect has no proportion to its cause; Platonic is the thought (*III, 7*) of the continuous sequence of all Beings from out and towards God; Platonic is (*III, 12*) the marriage which philosophy (as the world of ideas) is said to have concluded with God; and Platonic is (*IV, 19*) the thought that the nature of man is nobler than that of the angels, since it unfolds its effects and fruits in a manifoldness which the simple nature of the angels does not possess. According to Plotinus and the Kabala, this is the mission of man. Finally, we cannot misconceive the Platonic character of the thought in *III, 12*, where it is said: "God, contemplating Himself, beholds all things together, but in so far as He also has in Himself the difference of things (in the ideas as *causae primordiales*), he beholds also all things in their differences. The doctrine of ideas in the sixth chapter gives a further confirmation.

PHILOSOPHY IN RELATION TO AGNOSTICISM AND TO RELIGION.

BY R. A. HOLLAND.

It is alike the boast of those who doubt, and the lamentation of those who believe, that our age is sceptical. Its scepticism is not confined to philosophy, but pervades literature and household thought. As its philosophy is without certitude, so its poetry is a dispute of two voices, or,

“An infant crying in the night,
An infant crying for the light,
And with no language but a cry;”

while its popular mood seems to be one of indifference, though not so indifferent as it seems, to all absolute aims, destitute of which it tries, but vainly tries, to find a law of right in utility, and a test of utility in pleasure. Nor is religion exempt from the prevalent scepticism. Religion is not only doubted by the unreligious, but, if I may use such an expression, doubts itself. It has lost the simple faith that never asked for proofs. It is dissatisfied with the proofs which, at a later period, when faith had begun to fear, were sufficient to tranquillize and confirm it; and, though still holding the creed of early days as the staff its very life leans on, holds it with an uneasy clutch rather than with a calm grasp of assurance. For Religion, like recent Philosophy, is suspicious of Reason, and tends to agnosticism. And which kind of agnosticism is the worse it would be hard to tell—that of Philosophy, which quits the search for God, or that of Religion, which despairs of finding Him otherwise than by accident of outward authority or by blind brute-like feeling. I say “accident of outward authority,” because all authorities as such are equally authoritative, and he, who does not by reason choose which among them he will submit to as the most rational, submits to accident. I say “blind brute-like feeling,” because feeling as such knows not the character of its object, whereas it is the divineness of this character—which reason, comparing it with the low and gross, alone can recognize

—that distinguishes the feelings it excites as religious rather than animal. For feelings as feelings have no distinction among themselves except that of greater or less intensity; and hence, inasmuch as an error may be as intensely felt as a truth, fanaticism would be the only sign of true religion. Not that Religion is to be unfelt any more than authority is to be despised, but that both its feeling and its submission to authority imply rational discrimination. It cannot shun Reason even if it would. Had it never doubted, it might have lived on in primitive simplicity of faith, but the doubt, once excited, can be allayed only by reason. If bidden not to reason, Religion must have a reason for not reasoning. Distrust of the Reason it would renounce is trust in the Reason that prompts the renunciation. Its very flight to Feeling and Authority seeks them as a more *reasonable* way of knowing God than the way of Reason itself. German folk-lore tells of a hare who fancied he could easily outrun a clumsy hedgehog. The hedgehog having stationed his wife, "who was exactly like himself," at one end of the course, he and the hare started from the other with a dense hedge between them all the way. When nearing the end of the course, the hare, who thought his competitor far behind, was surprised by a voice in advance, which said, "Here I am before you." Meanwhile, his competitor, who had run but a little way and then retired to the starting-point, was awaiting the returning race; and, when the hare came flying back, greeted him with the same salute—"Here I am before you." Again and again the challenge was renewed, but whether the hare ran back or forth, the hedgehog's voice was always before him. The story is a fable of Faith, whose efforts to outrun Reason always meet Reason at the end of the race.

Religion, then, cannot deny the jurisdiction of Philosophy without denying its own right to exist. Its problem is the problem of Philosophy, its destiny the destiny of Philosophy. And this requirement that Religion should become philosophic, and Philosophy religious, is the import of modern Scepticism, whose wide extent and radical questioning are its most hopeful signs. For, if it were the doubt of a few individuals, or of a school of thought, it might be attributed to caprice or to chance of association, and would have no rational significance. But the doubt of an Age, expressed alike in its philosophy, religion, and common life, must

have some reason for its existence in the mind of man as man. Now, all rational doubt is relative. It marks the transition of the general mind from a less to a more perfect comprehension of truth. It is the necessary motion and growth of Thought, which never leaves wonted beliefs except for ideas that transcend them, and in whose transcendency they are found again, as it were, risen from the dead and glorified. It comes to fulfil, not to destroy. Seeing that the reason of the Present is born of the reason of the Past, it regards the Past with filial reverence. The principle of heredity does not lead it to expect wisdom as the most probable offspring of a pedigree of folly. Progress, it knows, is by preservation as well as by acquisition. As the shell-fish outgrows its shell only to enlarge it with new and wider whorls, so, if rational, the doubt that leaves old forms of faith leaves them only to add new and grander forms in one consistent development of truth. Moreover, the radical reach of the doubt gauges the importance of the faith it anticipates.

The questions of the ages are a Nilometer that marks the depth of Thought's current through time, and its promise of an overflow that shall fertilize all barren places of the mind. In these questions the reason of the race has uttered its sense of contradiction between an implicit standard of truth and customary beliefs. So much as any age assumed, so much did it leave outside of thought, and, consequently, outside of knowledge. Only by taking it up and transforming it into thought can the mind know whether what seems to be knowledge is true or false, is knowledge or ignorance.

Now, all the ages of Christian civilization before ours, whatever else they may have doubted, have assumed the Absolute. They have questioned neither an absolute object of knowledge, nor that such an object could be absolutely known. Individual thinkers may have puzzled over this problem, but the popular mind did not. It has come, however, into the consciousness of our time, and, with its coming, brought the fear that what the Past had taken as absolute was indeed relative and finite. Hence the depth of that sense of contradiction which does not merely array against each other certain truths, like faith and works, grace and freedom, authority and private judgment, but goes to the very bottom of knowledge, cleaving it asunder as with a Ginunga-gap. How can

knowledge exist, it cries, in such utter self-opposition? How can antagonistic truths be equally true? How can the infinite be in finite and not finite when, if not finite, it is set over against the finite as that which limits it, and so proves it finite after all? How can the mind, which knows only its own states, know that there is a real world beyond them? How can freedom exist in an order of necessary causation, or necessary causation in a universe which as a whole can have no cause beyond itself, and yet cannot be thought as altogether causeless? How can there be a self simple, permanent, and substantial when all that is known is known in complex relations? Is knowledge possible? Is there any self that knows? Or am I and my knowing alike illusory—the dreams of a dream? Do I know that I know? What is knowing—the knowing of knowing?

This is the multiform question of our time. First given philosophic utterance by Hume and Kant, it was repeated by Goethe with a great shout of poetry that caught the ear of the world. Then other strong voices took it up—Comte and Mansel with differing accents in religion, and Herbert Spencer in Physical Science, until at last colleges heard it, and novels and newspapers made it multitudinous, and now the cry is a clamor—a clamor that expresses the deepest longing of humanity, none the less a longing because its expression has a tone of despair. For the very despair of absolute knowledge implies an absolute in knowledge. Only by comparison with an absolute can any knowledge be known as not absolute. The mind must have an absolute standard in order to judge that any truth falls short of absoluteness. If this standard be false, its judgments must be false, and, therefore, are not to be credited when they pronounce any system of knowledge merely relative. But this standard cannot be pronounced false without assuming some other standard of absoluteness whereby to test it, and so asserting, in endless retrogression, the very truth it would deny.

Thus, in every act of declaring the Absolute unknowable, Agnosticism declares it already known. Its confusion comes from the fact that it has not brought into clear consciousness the hidden implications of its own thought. Its fault is not that it denies too much, but too little. It will find the Absolute it denies, whenever it makes its denial absolute. For such a denial denies itself. If

absolute knowledge be impossible, how can there be an absolute knowledge of its impossibility? Knowledge must itself be absolute in order to know that any of its special objects are only relative. In judging them relative, it simply asserts that they are partial or particular through lack of its own total form. Their antinomies are nothing but the failures of a part to include the Whole—of any single category of intelligence to equal intelligence itself. Thus, Space is a category of parts that are outside each other, and therefore it cannot apply to the Whole, which, as the Whole, can have nothing outside it. Time is a category of parts that succeed each other, and therefore it cannot apply to the Whole, which, as the Whole, has nothing else to precede or follow it. Cause and effect is a category of parts which change into each other, so that, given one, another must follow as its next phase by constraint of the whole—a law that evidently cannot govern the Whole itself, which cannot become other than it is, and has no higher Whole to constrain it. Instead, then, of accepting these categories as final, modern doubt must be thorough enough to doubt them. They, too, no less than the truths they bring into contradiction, are contradictory. Why should absolute knowledge be criticised by canons of Space and Time and Causation, and they left entirely unquestioned, as if each of them were an independent and well-known Absolute? What is this but the *superstition* of Agnosticism? To deny one god it has to assert many gods. It vacates Heaven for Olympus. But even Olympus has a Jove, and perhaps among these categorical Absolutes one may be found of Jovian rank. Which is it? Can Space account for Time, or Time for Space, or both for Causation, or Causation for either or both of them? Is Space or Time a cause, or can Causation work out of Space and before Time to produce either or both of them? And if they confess ignorance of each other, what right have they to sit in judgment on the very nature of knowledge? Does not their mutual ignorance prove their need of some generative principle higher than they, to relate them to each other, and give them the co-ordination and unity of knowledge? For they are certainly one in that they are *known*. Knowledge has somewhere a law for their being—a heat that can melt their stiff, hard, dogmatic forms, and make them flow together. They cannot stand the test of absoluteness. Try any of them by that test,

and forthwith the flow begins of one category into others, and finds no rest except in the oceanic fulness of Thought itself. Make Space absolute, and it changes into Time; for Space is pure externality, and absolute externality would be external to itself, and, therefore, pure internality, which is what it is only by this process of self-negation, so that its outer or static being ceases as fast as it begins. And what is this blank abstraction of Becoming but Time—the Saturn who lives by eating up his own offspring? Make Time absolute or whole, and it changes into Eternity. For a whole of Time must contain at once all times, having no beyond whence the Future can come into the Present, or whither the Present can go out as the Past; Past and Future must be always present within it; it is their eternal Now. So, too, with Cause and Effect, which are but this necessary transition of Space into Time, of co-existence into succession through things. Make Causation absolute, and it must cause itself, and so be its own effect—an effect that is the cause of its own causing. But this is only possible when a final cause or conscious end precedes and prompts its own realization, or, more completely, as self-consciousness, which is the absolute form of thought. Test it and see.

Think, if you can, of a space beyond the reach of Thought; as soon as you *think* it, the space beyond thought is a thought. Think, if you can, of a time when Thought was not born, or when it shall have died; as soon as you *think* it, it is a time of Thought which stands thus ever ready to play midwife at its own birth and sexton of its own burial. Think, if you can, a noumenon or thing in itself apart from its appearance to thought; as soon as you think it, the thing that was to be in itself, and out of Thought, comes out of itself into Thought. So, too, Matter, which is by some supposed to be the source of Mind, cannot be thought as other than a thought. All feelings, intuitions, imaginings, volitions, loves, must be regarded as modes of thought which can only *think* them as among its many kinds of action. Nor is the thinker himself excepted; he too is Thought—Thought come full circle, and containing all possible phases within its perfect orb. How can he think himself except as the very self of Thought? Thought is the absolute, the all.

And this is St. Anselm's proof of the existence of God. God, he says, is that being than whom no greater can be thought. But

if that being than whom no greater can be thought lack reality, then a being can be thought greater than it by the addition of existence in reality to mere existence in the mind. In other words, absolute Thought must contain reality, which cannot be conceived as out of Thought; for even there it would be still within the thought that *thinks* it as out of Thought. And this absolute Thought which contains all reality within itself is God. To object to this argument that the conception of a hundred dollars in the pocket does not put them there is to confuse a finite conception, which, because finite, is contingent, and may or may not have outward reality, with a universal and necessary idea, whose universality and necessity constitute objective existence. For objectivity simply means that which all minds think and must think, or do violence to the very nature of Thought. One does not need to compare a triangle within the mind to a triangle without the mind to discover that everywhere in the universe, and no matter what its shape, its angles are equal, really as well as ideally, to two right angles.

Do you call this Idealism? I answer that if you cannot think any reality which is not brought within Thought by the very act of thinking it, this Idealism is just as much Realism. Do you charge that it violates Common-Sense? I answer, So does the motion of the earth about the sun; so do the hues of the landscape which are not in the landscape, but in the light that palpitates against your eye; so, indeed, does all Science, for Common-Sense is but another name for unscientific sense.

Thought, then, is all and infinite. And this is precisely what the Agnostics confess unawares when they say they know that the Infinite *is* without knowing *what* it is: whereby they mean that none of the particular determinations of knowledge equal its universal activity. If they would look a little deeper into the nature of this knowledge, they would see that to know that the Infinite *is* implies, at least, the knowledge of infinite *Being*; that infinite Being in knowledge, which has no further determinations, is simply the Being of Knowledge itself; that, if Knowledge alone be infinite, it can have no infinite object but itself, and that, in having itself for object, its determination does not limit or narrow its activity—in a word, that self-knowledge or self-consciousness is the infinite characterization of any Infinite that can be known to

be. But infinite self-consciousness means infinite personality, or God.

Such a God cannot be the formless identity or substance of Pantheism. He *is* only as He knows himself, and His self-knowing generates distinction within His identity. As knowing, He is active; as known, passive: as knowing, essence; as known, existence: as knowing, idea; as known, image: as knowing, spirit; as known, Nature: for the self that is known gives to its entire content the note of Otherness that marks its relation to the knowing self, which in knowing keeps the subjective form of identity; and this note of Otherness is the characteristic of Nature. Nature has no inherent being. Its stablest things are transient. They never pause in any one condition. They cease while they begin, and their ceasing is the beginning of other ceasings like their own. And whether we view them as the ceasing of those things from which they begin, or the beginning of those things into which they cease, their existence is elsewhere than in themselves. They are but the wing-beats of a restless flight that says at every point it passes, "Not here, nor here, nor here; my destiny is the Elsewhere, which I am always reaching, yet can never reach." They shift and melt into each other like the colors of sunset. Colors they are—the perpetual after-glow of a sun that shines below the horizon of sense. That sun is the whole of Nature's process, which, while changing its phases or phenomena, keeps in them ever equal to itself, and abides. And this whole is the other self of God, whose law is change, because its being is to be *other*; whose changes remain within its unity, because, though other, it is still a *self*; and whose order of changing is from the utmost otherness and evanescence of finitude towards the divine form of an all-containing, and hence permanent, unity, because it is the other self of *God*. As sang Synesius, the Platonic bishop of the Early Church:

Thou art the begetting
 And the begotten.
 Thou art the illumining
 And the illumined.
 Thou art the manifest
 And the hidden—hid by Thy glories
 One and yet all things, Thou.

One in Thyself alone,
And throughout all things, One.¹

¹ Towards this summit unity—all things certainly *do* aspire, from the mud of subsident oceans to man, who, born of Nature, yet has Nature's wholeness in his knowledge, who knows himself, and in such cognition has the image of God; yea, more, who apprehends God, and thereby reveals that in man, as the perfection, total significance, and Christ of Nature, God apprehends the self of God. Says Meister Eckhart, meaning by *I* not an exceptional Ego, but every Ego that has been, is, or shall be: "God and *I* are one in knowing. God's essence is His knowing, and God's knowing makes me to know Him. Therefore is His knowing my knowing. The eye whereby I see God is the same eye whereby He seeth me. Mine eye and the eye of God are one eye, one vision, one knowledge, and one love." And a greater than Eckhart says: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. All things were made by Him, and without Him was not anything made that was made. . . . In Him was life, and the life was the *light* of men. . . . This is the true Light that lighteth *every man* that cometh into the world."

For God cannot know Himself correctly unless the self known is in every respect the same as the self that knows—intelligent as well as intelligible, essence as well as existence, Reason as well as Word. Hence, the complete form of His consciousness is no longer as object against subject, but as subject-object, no longer as self other to self, but as a self whose very selfhood is knowledge of self. And neither the first nor the second self could have subsisted unless from eternity each of them had been subject-object or personality like that third which brings them together; while

¹ Σὺ τὸ τίκτον ἔφους
Σὺ τὸ τικτόμενον
Σὺ τὸ φωτίζον
Σὺ τὸ λαμπόμενον
Σὺ τὸ φαινόμενον
Σὺ τὸ κρυπτόμενον
Ἰδιαίς ἀργαῖς
Ἐν καὶ πάντα
Ἐν καδ' ἑαυτὸ
Καὶ διὰ πάντων.

all three personalities exist as such only in one and the same act of eternal self-consciousness. Wherefore there can be no Absolute that is not tri-personal, no God except a Trinity, knowing as Father, known as Son, and recognition in the Holy Ghost. Be careful to note that this divine Intelligence is not by successive stages, as if in Time. Time is change, and change is the fate of finite things which do not include all their possibilities in their individual forms, and must perish to realize them; the swamp-fern perishing to become peat, the peat perishing to become flame, and the flame losing its entity in the air. But divine Intelligence is always, and by the same act, distinction and unity of distinction—a total process that forever returns to itself, that ends in its beginning, and begins in its ending, like a whirlpool whose waters rise as they descend, and coil to their centre while rounding out to their rim; or, better still, like the rainbow Dante saw as the highest glory of Heaven. “Within,” he tells us,

“ the deep and luminous subsistence
Of the High Light appeared to me three circles
Of threefold color and of one dimension,
And by the second seemed the first reflected,
As Iris is by Iris, and the third
Seemed fire that equally from both is breathed.
O Light eterne! sole in thyself that dwellest,
Sole knowest thyself and known unto thyself,
And knowing, lovest and smilest on thyself.
That circulation, which being thus conceived,
Appeared in thee as a reflected light,
When somewhat contemplated by mine eyes,
Within itself of its own very color
Seemed painted with our effigy.”

Here, then, Philosophy and Religion meet. Within the triple rainbow of Religion, Philosophy sees the effigy of Reason. And the Agnostic also might see it but for a mental squint caused by using two distinct and contrary meanings of Relativity as one and the same. For Knowledge may be considered relative as related to an Absolute beyond its reach—in which sense it would be relative only because imperfect; or it may be considered relative as involving relation in its very nature. Now, the latter con-

ception is true. It is true that knowing is essentially relating, the discovery of difference in identity and of identity in difference; and, consequently, that all knowledge, the most perfect knowledge, must be a knowledge of relations. But, if perfect knowledge be a knowing of relations, knowledge cannot be called, as the Agnostic calls it, relative in the sense of imperfection because it does not know the unrelated. As well call it relative because it cannot understand the false to be the true. It is the perfection, not the imperfection, of Reason that it cannot think what contradicts its nature, and by such contradiction is proved absurd. The unthinkable is the absurd, not the absolute, unless the latter be absolute absurdity. But even the mock Absolute of the Agnostic is not quite so relationless as he conjectures. Though out of knowledge, it still stands in some relation to knowledge; for *out* is a relation as well as *in*, and to be known as out of knowledge is to fall within the relations of that knowing which knows it to be out of knowledge. And within these relations it is easily and well understood as Nonsense—an abstraction blown out to illimitable bulk by the gas of its utter deadness. Its nameless Name is *Nothing*. No wonder that the worship of its votaries is chiefly of the *silent* sort.

But though an Absolute of no-relation can only be understood as the Nothing which it is, the Absolute of Self-relation fills and satisfies alike the mind of Religion and Philosophy. True, they behold its glory with distinct visions—Religion at first sight, Philosophy only after inferring its existence as a reflection of divine thought, and then looking for its triple reciprocity of radiance; but neither vision will be perfect until it sees through the other's eyes, and Religion becomes philosophic, while Philosophy grows devout. Nor need Religion fear that philosophic analysis will take aught of reality or beauty from her imaginative beholding of Truth. As the earthly rainbow does not lose, but gains reality and beauty by having its woof of sunbeams unravelled and reweven by science in a manner that shows the fine art of the sun in its ethereal tapestry, so the reflection of divine truth appears not less, but more divine and true when the Mind which it reflects evinces itself as mind to mind, and by this self-evincing proves the correspondence of the image with its rational archetype. It is not Philosophy, but philosophic blindness, that abandons the image of

divine truth in seeking an imageless light behind it. No doubt it is the light that makes the image, yet but for the image with its many colors there would be no manifestation of the light. God is not rightly known unless known in every degree of his self-revelation—in feeling, in imagination, and in the concepts of the understanding as well as in pure reason. Indeed, that reason alone is pure which thinks Him in the entirety of His communion with man's entire character.

What Religion has to fear, then, is not so much that Philosophy will fail to think her creed, as that, through ignorance of Philosophy, she will fail to let her creed be thought. If, mistaking her symbols for ultimate definitions, she attempts to formulate them into a logical system, she will defeat her own end, and cause doubt rather than conviction. Symbols reveal, but do not define, God—as rocks, hills, rivers, clouds, landscapes, reveal, but do not define, the soul of Nature. Symbols are for worship, not for argument. Worship sees God through them, but argument takes them as God's very self, and, by thus making their finite and mediate forms infinite, encounters hopeless contradiction. And just in this sorry posture you will find what are called the evidences of Christianity. For want of a philosophy of religion they are confounding symbolic with rational truth, and trying to demonstrate the existence of Infinite Spirit by categories of Sense that necessarily finitize Him into a mere phenomenon. Then, in order to save at least an appearance of infinitude in this utter finitizing of his nature, the phenomenon is magnified without bounds so as to seem an infinite phenomenon, which is only another name for infinite absurdity.

Thus Apologists, who never dream of taking creation literally as a series of explosions of divine breath in Hebrew sounds, will argue, as if pleading for the life of religion, that there are tokens of design in Nature which prove the existence of an all-wise Designer—an argument that regards Nature as some waste, unmanageable stuff, which only marvellous cunning could turn to account. For if the stuff had been alive with an interior aim which it was to evolve as the seed evolves the tree, it would have needed no external designer to shape it to some strange end. But if not alive with its own organic purpose—if only dead matter that needed rare ingenuity to overcome its stubbornness and util-

ize its waste—the question arises, “Who created it so? The God whose wisdom is displayed in adapting it as a means to an ulterior end?” Then his wisdom must consist in repairing the blunder of his first creation. For the wisdom of design is measured by the difficulties it overcomes. If to overcome them shows infinite wisdom, to have created them shows infinite folly; and thus the argument of Design only proves God to be all-wise by first proving Him to be all-foolish.

Moreover, the very conception of Creation, while good as a symbol of the truth that Nature has no existence independent of God, likewise leads to contradiction as soon as it is employed as an exact and final explanation of Nature's becoming. It pictures God as existing in Time before Nature, as if He were subject to change, and had spent countless ages in indolence or sleep, or some other mood of virtual nonentity, before He began to do anything that would denote divine activity, and then, when He began to act, His action created a universe that was outside of Him, and bounded Him, and so put a cage over that infinitude which He had enjoyed during His long solitary pre-creation slumber; that is to say, He ceased to be God as soon as He became creator.

Equally sad are the attempts to demonstrate, in evidence of Christianity, that God is the great First Cause, as if in a chain of causes which are each the effect of some previous cause, any one effect rather than another could be arbitrarily seized as causeless, and called First Cause, or as if the God who were truly First Cause were not also second and third and thirteen-thousandth. All finite representations of the Infinite as cause, or as subject to change, like a thing, bring him under the categories of Physical Science, and Physical Science speaks the exact truth when it says that Nature has no place for such a fictitious God—not a crack broad as the edge of a knife-blade, between phenomenon and phenomenon, in which he might by any possibility lie hidden. God belongs to a higher category than any that controls the thinking of *things*. He is absolute Mind itself—the Mind which thinks all categories, as well as the things which are known under their laws. He is not a designer external to Nature, because Nature is nothing but His thought. He is not a creator who begins in Time to make worlds, because his eternal thinking has been eternally manifest in thoughts which constitute the Universe. He is not

first cause, because he is also last effect; Himself the effect of His own causing.

“Thou seekest Him in globe and galaxy,
He hides in pure transparency;
Thou askest in fountains and in fires,
He is the Essence that inquires.”

And it is only as Essential Reason, without as well as within the reason which inquires—that He can ever be rationally demonstrated; for any other idea of Him, however attractive in picturing His relation to Nature or Man, must prove unequal to his Godhead. By what method, then, shall this demonstration proceed? Surely not by deduction from finite Nature, according to the fashion which our modern evidences of Christianity have borrowed from the Science of Things. For by such deduction God would not be self-grounded, but would have the ground of his being in things. He would depend on them, not they on Him. They would be the supreme reality, He the sentimental inference.

There is another method of demonstration. The Church followed it, though with steps that often halted or strayed, in the Middle Ages, when her theologians had such names as Scotus Eri-gena and Bonaventura, Anselm and Albertus Magnus, Thomas of Aquin and Eckhart—saints of the intellect as well as of the heart. It is the method of philosophy which post-Kantian thinkers have opened through to its end, so that demonstration need not halt nor stray in it any more. It shows, by a dialectic which carries on each partial thought to what it lacks of completeness, that things have no substantial being of their own—that they are fugitive appearances of a Whole which is not merely their sum, but an organic unity present in them everywhere, and abiding through all their swift transitions; that this organic unity or Whole, which, as the Whole, has naught beyond it to determine it, must be self-determining, and, if self-determining, then infinite Reason—since Reason is the sole self-determining power known to man, or within the possibility of thought; that, hence, all natural appearances are appearances or revelations of this infinite Reason, which reveals itself not only in Nature but in Man, who grows with the gradual revelation through a crescent order of religions culminating in Christianity, for Christianity comprehends

all their scattered and imperfect symbols in its one perfect symbol—perfect, because both symbol and the essential truth symbolized, identifying, as it does, the divine with the human mind in its God-man, the Christ.

Until Christianity is thus demonstrated, men who demand the reason of faith will continue to doubt its absolute claims. But whenever this demonstration shall be made popular—as it may be, by press and pulpit, to a public intelligence, which, meanwhile, however, will have to learn other than empirical modes of thought—then our epoch of doubt shall give way to an epoch of holier faith than the world has yet seen—a faith that shall be knowledge, knowledge of the Most High Reason by reason, leaving naught in the universe alien to man, bringing his Heaven down to earth and making every moment of his time eternal with the eternal truths and principles that fill it, rebuilding the Church, now half in ruins, on the firmer foundation, and under the serener sky of his own spirit, with an architecture of thought more ornate and aspiring than was ever typed by cathedral of stone, and for a worship whose silences shall be full of harmony, and whose songs shall seem audible echoes of the voice of God.

GOD AS THE ETERNALLY BEGOTTEN SON.

HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION." THIRD PART, "THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION," II, 3.
TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY F. LOUIS SOLDAN.

2. The next point is, that the two are identical, this inadequacy (incompatibility) notwithstanding, and that the alienation, the weakness, and frailty of human nature, cannot detract from that unity which is the substantial element in the reconciliation.

We have recognized all this in the divine idea: for the son is other than the father, and this Otherness or Alienation is difference, or it could not be spirit. But the Other is God, and has all the fulness of divine nature in it, and the attribute of alienation does not detract from the fact that this Other is the son of God,

and therefore God; nor does it detract, if the Other has the form of human nature.

This Alienation is eternally annulling itself, eternally positing itself, [and again] eternally annulling itself, and this self-positing and self-annulling of Alienation is Love, is Spirit. The Evil has been defined abstractly to be only what is Alien, the finite and negative, while God, as the good and true, was placed in contrast to it. But this Other, this Alien, contains in itself also the affirmation, and the consciousness must arise in finite being, that the principle of affirmation is contained therein, and that within the principle of affirmation there is implied the principle of identity with the other side. God, as the True, is not only abstract identity with himself, but has the Other, the negation, the positing of himself as an Alien for his own essential category; and these are the peculiar attributes of spirit.

The possibility of Reconciliation lies in the knowledge of the potential unity of the divine and human natures—this is the necessary basis. Through it man may know himself received into God, since God is not Alien to him, and he does not stand in the relation of something external and accidental to God, but can be received into God according to his freedom and subjectivity; this is only possible because in God himself there is this subjectivity of human nature.

The infinite pain must become conscious of this potentiality, and see in it the potential unity of the divine and human natures which, however, exists only as potentiality, as substantiality, so that this weakness, finitude, and alienation do not detract from this substantial unity of the two.

The unity of the divine and human natures, or man in his universality, is the thought of man, and is the in-and-for-itself-existing Idea of Absolute spirit. In the process by which the alienation annuls itself, the idea and objectivity of God are potentially real; they are so, immediately, in all men: "Out of the cup of the entire spirit realm there foams for him infinitude." The pain which the finite feels, in this its cancellation, does not pain, since it rises thereby to a phase of the Divine.

"Can that pain torment or pain us which increases e'er our joy?"

Here, on this stand-point, however, the question is not as to the

thoughts of man. Nor can we stop with the category of particularity in general, which is itself universal and belongs to abstract thinking as such.

3. If the consciousness of the unity of the divine and human natures, or man's determination as man, is to be conveyed at all to man, or if this cognition is to enter into his consciousness of his finitude like a ray of eternal light, shining to him through finitude, this cognition must reach him as man in general—that is to say, without presupposing culture and higher education in him, but it must rather reach him as immediate man, and it must be universal for the immediate consciousness.

The consciousness of the absolute idea which we possess in thinking must be produced not for the stand-point of philosophical speculation or speculative thought, but for mankind in general, in the form of certitude. Men do not possess this idea in the form of thinking, or as a cognition and knowledge of the necessity of this idea, but the essential point is that it shall become a certainty for them, or, in other words, that this idea, the unity of the divine and human natures, shall become a certainty, that it shall assume for them the form of immediate sense-perception or external existence; in short, that this idea shall appear in the world, and be seen and experienced. Therefore, this unity must exhibit itself to consciousness in an entirely temporal and perfectly common phenomenon of reality in a special man—in a special man who is at the same time known as the divine idea, not simply as a superior being, but as the highest, the absolute idea, as the son of God.

Divine and human natures contained in One is a hard and difficult expression; the image-concept usually connected with it should be ignored, however, and we should think of the spiritual essence; in the unity of the divine and human natures everything that belongs to the external particularization, and everything that is finite, has disappeared.

It is the substantial element of the unity of the divine and human natures which enters into the consciousness of man, so that man appears to him as God, and God as man. This substantial unity is the potentiality of man; but, since it is for man, it is above or beyond the immediate consciousness, common consciousness, and knowledge; this removes it from the subjective con-

sciousness, which is the same as common consciousness, and has the same determinations.

This is the reason why this [unity of the divine and human nature] must appear to the others as single, exclusive, man. It appears not in all men singly, but in One from whom they are excluded, but in whom it is no longer a potentiality which remains removed and beyond them, but as a singularity on the plane of sensuous certainty.

It is this sensuous certainty and this appearance appealing to sense-perception which is the salient point, and not merely the divine teacher (who, it should be remembered, was not simply a teacher of morality); neither is the salient point merely that there was once a teacher of this idea, nor is it the image-concept, or the conviction, which is of importance, but the immediate presence and sensuous certainty of the divine are the points in which we are chiefly concerned. For the immediate sensuous certainty of the Presence in time is the infinite form and manner by which the "Is" exists for natural consciousness. This "Is" destroys every vestige of mediation; it is the highest point, the last touch of light which is added to the picture. This "Is" is found in none of the mediations by the feelings, by image-concepts and reasons, and is found only in philosophical cognition through the idea and in the element of universality.

The Divine should not be understood as if it were only a universal thought, or as if it existed only as potentiality; the objectification of the Divine must not be understood as one which is in every man, for in this way it would be conceived as the general multiplicity of the spiritual only. The development which the absolute spirit has in itself, and which must proceed until it attains the form of the "Is," of immediateness, is not contained in that.

The *One* of the Jewish religion exists in thought, and not in sense-perception, and for this reason he has not attained completion and perfection in the form of spirit. Perfection to [the form of] spirit means the subjectivity which objectifies itself infinitely and, from the absolute antithesis, from the extreme point of phenomenality, returns to itself.

Although the principle of individuality had already existed in the Greek ideal, it lacked there that infinity which is in-and-for-itself universal; the universal posited as a universal exists only

in the subjectivity of consciousness; this alone is the infinite movement in itself in which all determinateness of existence is dissolved, and which is at the same time found in the most finite existence.

The individual, then, which is for others the phenomenal manifestation of this idea, is this Single One [this special individual Christ], not several, for with Several the divinity would become an abstraction. Several would be a bad excess of reflection—an excess because it is opposed to the idea of the individual subjectivity. Once, in the idea, is all times, and the subject must turn without choice towards One Subjectivity. In the eternal idea there is but One son, and thus there is but One, to the exclusion of all others, in which the absolute idea appears. This perfection of reality to immediate singularity is the most beautiful feature of the Christian religion, and the absolute transfiguration of finitude is made in it an object of sense-perception.

The doctrine that God must become man, in order that the finite spirit may have the consciousness of God even in finitude, is the most difficult phase of religion. According to a common image-concept, which we find especially among the ancients, the spirit or soul has been cast out into this world as into something foreign to it: its abode in the body and its specialization in an individuality were considered a degradation (lapse) of spirit. There is implied in this the doctrine of the untruth of the merely material side of immediate existence. But, on the other side, immediate existence is at the same time essential, and is the highest culmination of the spirit in its subjectivity. Man has spiritual interests, and is spiritually active; he may feel hampered in it by the feeling of physical dependence, for he must toil for his food, etc., and he is turned away from his spiritual interests by his dependence on nature. The phase of immediate existence is, however, contained in spirit itself. It is the attribute of spirit to unfold into this phase. Naturalness is not merely external necessity, but spirit, as a subject, in its infinite relation to itself, has the attribute of immediateness in itself. Therefore, since it is to be revealed to man what the nature of spirit is, and the nature of God is to become manifest in the entire evolution of the idea, also this form must appear in it, and it is the form of finitude. The divine must appear in the form of immediateness.

This immediate presence in time is naught but the presence of spirit in the spiritual shape, and that is the human one. In no other form is this appearance, or manifestation, a true one—not, for example, the appearance of God in the fiery bush, nor the like manifestations. God appears as single person, and with such immediateness all physical wants and frailties are connected. In the pantheism of the Hindoos innumerable incarnations occur; there the subjectivity, or existence in human shape, is only an accidental form. In God, it is a mask, which Substance assumes and changes at its pleasure accidentally. But God as spirit contains in himself the phase of subjectivity and singularity; his phenomenal appearance can, therefore, be but a single one, and it can occur but once.

Christ has been called by the Church the God-man; it is this monstrous combination which is contradictory to the understanding; but in it man is made conscious and certain of the unity of the divine and human natures, and he sees how the alienation, or, as it may be called, the finitude, weakness or frailty, of human nature is not incompatible with this unity; he is told that in the eternal idea alienation does not detract from the unity, which is God.

This is the monstrous [conception] whose necessity we have seen. It is taken for granted therewith that the divine and human natures do not differ in themselves. God [is] in human form. The truth of it is that there is only One reason, One spirit, and that spirit, as finite, has no true existence.

The essence of the form of phenomenal appearance has been explained. Since it is the phenomenality of God, the phenomenality is essential for the Church. Phenomenality is existence for another, and this other is the Church.

This historical phenomenon may again be considered in two ways. First, as man, according to his external condition, as an ordinary man as he appears to irreligious minds. And then it may be considered in spirit, and with spirit penetrating to its truth, because spirit has in it this infinite diremption, this pain which wills truth, which will and must have the need of truth and its certainty. This is the true mode of contemplation in religion. These two sides must here be distinguished—the immediate contemplation, and that through faith.

Through faith this individual is known to be of divine nature, and with it God is no longer merely something above and beyond—the infinite separation is removed. If Christ is looked upon as we look upon Socrates, he is considered as an ordinary man. In this way the Mohammedans look upon Christ as a messenger of God, and in this way all great men are messengers of God. If a person does not assert more of Christ than that he is a teacher of mankind and a martyr of truth, he does not stand on the Christian stand-point, and not on that of true religion.

The one side is this human side; it is his phenomenality as a living man. An immediate man lives within the limits of every external contingency; he is influenced by all the temporal relations and conditions; he is born, and as a human being he has all the needs and wants of other men. The only difference is that he [Christ] does not become involved in the corruption, the passions, and the special inclinations of other men, nor in the special interests of worldly affairs (although in them also probity and the discipline of instruction may find a place), but he lives exclusively for truth, and to proclaim the truth; his mission is simply to give a content to the higher consciousness of man.

To this human side belongs, in the first place, Christ's doctrine. The question is, How can this doctrine be—how is it constituted? The first doctrine cannot be identical with the doctrine of the Church afterwards; it must have peculiarities which necessarily receive another definition in the Church, or in some cases are entirely set aside. Christ's doctrine, in so far as it is an immediate one, cannot be Christian dogmatics, cannot be the doctrine of the Church. When the Church has become established, and the kingdom of God has achieved its realization and existence, this doctrine can no longer have the same shape as before.

The principal content of this doctrine can only be universal and abstract. When something new—a new world, a new religion, a new idea of God—is to be given within the world of image-conception, the first thing must be the universal basis, the second the special, definite, and concrete. The image-conceiving world, in its thinking, thinks abstractly only—it thinks only the universal; for comprehending spirit it is reserved to know from the universal the particular, and to make the particular rise through itself out of the idea. For the image-conceiving world, the basis of the

universal thought and particularity and development are separated. This universal basis for the true idea of God can, therefore, be set forth through the doctrine [taught in the Church].

Since the aim is a new consciousness of men, a new religion, it takes the form of the consciousness of absolute reconciliation ; with it is conditioned a new world, a new religion, a new reality, a new state of the world, for external being or existence has religion for its substance.

This is the negative polemic side in the consciousness and faith of man against remaining in this externality. The new religion proclaims itself as a new consciousness — consciousness of the reconciliation of man with God ; this reconciliation expressed as a state is the kingdom of God, eternity as a home for the spirit, reality in which God reigns. The spirits, the hearts, are reconciled to him, and it is God who has become king. This, therefore, is the universal basis.

This kingdom of God, the new religion bears in it potentially as a negation of the existing world ; this is the revolutionary side of the doctrine which partly casts aside existing things, and partly annihilates and subverts them. All mortal, worldly things are discarded as valueless, and are pronounced as such. That which has been, now changes ; the previous relations and conditions, the state of religion and the world, cannot remain as before. The aim is to draw man, in whom consciousness of conciliation is to be roused, away from the world, and enjoin upon him this abstraction from the existing reality.

This new religion is as yet concentrated, and does not exist as church, but as the energy which constitutes the sole interest of man, who is struggling and striving to preserve it for himself, because it has not yet been reduced to harmony with the state of the world, and not yet in connection with the world-consciousness.

This first appearance contains, therefore, the polemic side, the injunction of an abnegation of worldly things : it is enjoined that man should rouse himself to the infinite energy with which the universal demands itself to be grasped, and compared with which all other ties must become indifferent to him, and to which all other things otherwise ethical and right must yield

“ Who is my mother or my brethren ? ” “ Let the dead bury their dead. ” “ No man having put his hand to the plough, and

looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God." "I came not to send peace, but a sword."

We see expressed in this the polemic struggle with the ethical conditions. "Take, therefore, no thought for the morrow." "Go and sell that thou hast and give to the poor."

All these relations referring to property disappear; but, on the other hand, they bear in themselves their own annulment; if everything is given to the poor, then there are no longer any poor people. These are doctrines, statements, all of which belong to the first beginning, where the new religion is the sole [remaining] interest of which man must apprehend the loss, and when, as a doctrine, it appeals to men that have done with the world, and with whom the world in its turn has nothing more to do. The one side is this renunciation; this forsaking and slighting of all essential interest, and of all ethical ties, forms an essential phase, the concentrated phenomenal appearance of truth, but which at a later time, when truth has secure and firm existence, loses part of its importance. Nay, when this beginning of the suffering shows itself towards the external world only as suffering, resigning itself and offering its neck, its inner energy, by the time it has grown to strength, will culminate in violence just as extreme towards the external.

The next step on the affirmative side is the annunciation of the kingdom of God: into it, as the kingdom of love to God, man must place himself by casting himself immediately into this truth. This is expressed with the uttermost freedom of speech at the beginning of the sermon on the mount, for instance: Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God. Such words belong to the greatest ever spoken; they form a final central point which annuls all superstition and all that is unfree in man. It is of infinite importance that through Luther's translation of the Bible a people's book has been put into the hands of all, in which both heart and spirit can find satisfaction in the highest (even in an infinite) manner. In Catholic countries there is a great defect in this respect. In the former [in Germany] the Bible is the means of salvation from all the thralldom of spirit.

No mediation is spoken of [as necessary] for this elevation, or for producing it in man; there is posited therewith, on the contrary, this immediate being, this immediate self-translation into the

kingdom of God. It is the intellectual, spiritual world, the kingdom of God, to which man must belong, and it is will and disposition alone which give worth to him—not abstract disposition, not any particular sentiment or intention, but the absolute disposition which has its basis in the kingdom of God. In this appeared for the first time the infinite value and worth of the inner nature of man.

This is proclaimed in the language of enthusiasm and inspiration, in those thrilling tones which stir the soul and draw it out of the body, as did Mercury, the conductor of souls, leading it from the temporal sphere to the eternal home. "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness!"

There are contained everywhere, in this elevation and total abstraction from all that the world considers great, the melancholy and grief which were felt at the debasement of his people and of man in general. Jesus appeared when the Jewish people, in consequence of the danger to which their form of worship had been exposed, clung to it all the more tenaciously, and were in despair as regards reality, since it had come into contact with a universality of mankind whose existence it could no longer deny, and which, on the other hand, was as yet in itself entirely devoid of spirit; in short, he appeared at a time when the feeling of helplessness and despondency prevailed among the common people: "I thank Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes."

This substantial, this universal, divine heaven, in more definite reflection, leads to moral commands which are the application of that universal to special relations and situations. These commands partly contain only limited spheres, and partly are of no extraordinary value for this stage which concerns itself with absolute truth, or they are contained already in other religions and in the Jewish one. These commandments are all comprised in their centre, the commandment of Love, which has for its aim not the rights, but the welfare of others, and therefore relates to their particularity. "Love thy neighbor as thyself." Taken in the abstract and more extended sense of its scope, as love to man in general, this commandment requires love to all human beings. But thus it is made an abstraction. The human beings whom

we can love, and towards whom love becomes real, are a few particular ones; the heart which is ready to enclose all mankind is naught but an empty inflation into a mere image-concept, which is the opposite of real love.

Love in the sense of Christ is, in the first place, moral love to our neighbor in the special relation in which we stand towards him; above all things, love was to be the relation of his disciples and their successors—the tie through which they are One. And it must not be taken here in the sense that each was to have his special business, interests, and conditions in life, and, in addition to these, was to exercise love, but, in the exclusive, abstracting sense, love was to be the centre in which they lived—their business. They were to love each other—nothing but that—and therefore they were not to have any aim and purpose of particularity, no aims of the family, no political aims, no love for the sake of these particular aims. Love is rather the abstract personality, and the identity of the same in One consciousness where there remains no possibility for particular aims and ends. Besides this love there is, therefore, here, no other objective aim and end. This love, independent and made a central point, becomes, finally, the higher divine love itself.

At first this love, since it is still without any objective aim, is as yet directed polemically against all that exists, and especially against the Jewish existing world. All the actions commanded by the law which men otherwise thought of the highest value to themselves, and which had nothing in common with love, were characterized as dead, vain, and empty activity, and Christ himself heals the sick on the Sabbath day.

In these teachings there appears presently this phase also—this distinction—which, since it is immediately expressed and enjoined in this wise: “Seek ye the kingdom of God,” sink yourself in the truth, appears as if it were expressed subjectively, so to speak, and for this reason the Person [or personality] comes in consideration.

In this relation Christ does not speak merely as the teacher who presents what is his subjective view, and who has the consciousness of his productivity and activity, but rather as a prophet. He is himself immediate, as this injunction is; he speaks this immediately from God, and God speaks this through him.

That the life of spirit is contained in the truth, that it is without mediation, is expressed prophetically in the fact that it is God who says this. The principal element in this is that it is the absolute, divine truth which has being in and for itself; the proclamation of this truth and the will tending in the direction of this truth—which is in and for itself—are represented as the act of God, it is the consciousness of the real unity of the divine will, of its harmony with it. In this elevation of his spirit, and in the certainty of his unity with God, Christ says: Woman, thy sins are forgiven. There that tremendous majesty speaks through him which can make everything undone and thus ordains such events.

This form of expressing it lays the main stress on the fact that he who says this is at the same time essentially man, that it is the son of man who expresses this, and in whom this expression and actualization of self-existent Being, this activity of God, are essentially as in a human being and in whom it does not exist as something superhuman, as something which appears in the form of an external revelation. This divine presence is essentially identical with the human element.

Christ calls himself the son of God and the son of man: this must be taken literally. The Arabs spoke of each other mutually as sons of a certain tribe, kin, or clan; Christ belonged to mankind: this is his kin. Christ is also the son of God: the true sense of this expression, the truth of the idea which Christ was for his church, and the idea of the truth which was in him in his church, might be explained away. It might be said: all the sons of man are children of God, or they should render themselves children of God, and so forth.

Since the doctrine of Christ for itself alone appeals only to the image-conception, to the inner feeling and the heart, it finds a complement in the representation of the divine idea as expressed by his life and fate. The kingdom of God, as constituting the contents of the doctrine, is as yet the universal idea in the form of an image-concept, but through this individual it steps into reality, so that those who wish to attain to that kingdom can do so only through that One individual.

There is, first, the abstract compatibility of the doing, acting, and suffering of this teacher in relation to his own doctrine, the

fact that his life was entirely devoted to it, that he did not fear death, and by his death gave testimony of his faith. That Christ became a martyr of truth stands, therefore, in close connection with this course. Since the founding of the kingdom of God is in a complete contradiction to the existing political state which is based on another mode and determination of religion, the doom (speaking from the human stand-point) of being a martyr of truth stands in connection with his course.

These are the principal points connected with Christ's appearance in human form. This teacher collected friends about him. Christ, since his doctrines were revolutionary, was tried and crucified, and by his death he has thus borne evidence of the truth of his doctrine. So far even unbelief accepts this story; it is quite similar to that of Socrates, but in a different country. Socrates, too, made the consciousness of man realize its inward depths. His *δαιμόνιον* has no other sense than that. He taught also that man should not be satisfied with the commonly accepted authority, but should gain a conviction of its truth personally, and should act according to his conviction. These are similar individualities and similar fates. The internality of Socrates was incompatible with the religious belief of his people and with the constitution of the state, and for this reason he was executed; he, too, died for truth.

Christ lived among a different people, and his doctrine has in this respect another tone, but the kingdom of heaven and the purity of heart contain, nevertheless, an infinitely greater depth than the internality of Socrates. This is the external history of Christ which appears to unbelief in the light in which the history of Socrates appears to us.

With the death of Christ the return-movement of consciousness begins. The death of Christ is the centre round which it turns; in the conception of it lies the difference between external conception and faith; *i. e.*, of contemplation with the spirit, from a spirit of truth, from the holy spirit. According to that comparison, Christ is a human being like Socrates, a teacher who lived virtuously during his life, and who made man conscious of what constitutes the True in general, and what should form the basis for man's consciousness. The higher view, however, is, that in Christ was revealed the Divine nature. This consciousness is

reflected in the general expressions that the Son knows the Father, etc.—expressions which have in the first place a certain universality of their own, and which exegesis can drag over into the field of general consideration, but which faith, by its conception of Christ's death, receives in its truth; for faith is essentially the consciousness of absolute truth, of what God is in-and-for-himself. We have seen, however, what God is in-and-for-himself: he is this history of a life, this Trinity, in which the universal places itself over against itself, and is therein identical with itself. In this element of eternity, God is self-concatenation, the linking together of himself with himself. Faith alone has the consciousness, and conceives that in Christ this in-and-for-himself existing truth is viewed in its process, and that by him alone this truth has been revealed.

It is only with this contemplation that the religious element, as such, arises, in which the divine itself is an essential phase. In the friends, acquaintances who had [thus] been taught, there arise a foreboding, an image-concept of and a desire for the new kingdom, for a new heaven and a new earth; this hope, this certainty, has cut its way through the reality of their hearts, and in the reality of their hearts it has taken root.

The suffering of Christ, however, his death, has annulled the human relationship of Christ, and it is in this death that the transition to the religious side appears; everything depends there on the meaning, on the manner of looking upon this death. On the one side it is the natural death, caused through injustice, hatred, and violence. But it is already established in the hearts and minds that the relevant point is not morality in general, not the thinking and willing of the subject within and without, but that the interest lies in an infinite relation to God—to the God who is present; it is the sensuous certainty of the kingdom of God, a satisfaction, not on the moral nor the ethical side, nor in conscience, but a satisfaction besides which nothing that is higher exists, and which is absolute relation to God himself.

All other modes of satisfaction imply that they exist according to some determination of a subordinate kind, so that the relation to God remains a something that lies beyond and above, something distant, or perhaps something that does not exist at all. The fundamental determination of this kingdom of God is the

presence of God, and thus to the people of this kingdom not only love to man is recommended, but they are conscious also that God is Love.

In this it is expressed that God is present, and that this must exist as one's own feeling, as self-feeling. The kingdom of God, the presence of God, is this determination. For this determination the certainty of the presence of God is necessary. Since the subject has, on the one side, a need or a feeling, it must, on the other side, distinguish itself from the latter; it must distinguish from itself this presence of God, but in such a way that this presence of God is manifest to it. This manifest certainty can exist here only in the mode of sensuously appearing phenomenality.

The nature of the eternal idea itself is to exhibit the determination of subjectivity immediately as a real one, distinguished from a mere thought. On the other side, it is the faith arising out of the sorrow of the world, and resting on the evidence of faith, which in this explains to itself the life of Christ. His doctrine, his miracles, are conceived and understood in this evidence of faith. The story of Christ has also been related by those upon whom the Holy Ghost had descended. The miracles are conceived and related in that spirit, and the death of Christ has been comprehended in it in its truth to mean, that, in Christ, God and the unity of divine and human natures have been revealed. Death is, then, the touchstone, so to speak, on which the value of faith is tested, since it shows how faith essentially understands the meaning of the phenomenality of Christ. The death has in the next place the meaning that Christ was God-man, the God who had also human nature, even unto death. It is the fate of human finiteness that it must die; thus death is the highest proof of humanity, of absolute finiteness; and, moreover, Christ died the intensified death of the criminal; not only natural death, but even the death of shame and dishonor, on the cross; humanity appeared in him even to the extreme point.

As regards this death, stress must be laid, in the first place, on a particular aspect, namely, its polemic side towards the external. Not only the renunciation of natural will is therein placed before us, but with it all peculiarity, all interests and aims towards which the natural will may tend, all eminence and whatever the world esteems—all these are lowered therewith into the tomb of the

spirit. This is the revolutionary element by which an entirely different form is given to the world. But in the renunciation of the natural will this finite element, the alienation, is at the same time glorified and transfigured. For alienation has a wider scope besides that of immediate naturalness and a further determination. It is an essential attribute of the existence of the subject that it should be for others also; the subject is not merely for itself, but it also exists as the image-conception of others; it exists, and is valid and objective, just in the measure in which it can make itself felt by others and valued by them. Its validity is the conception of the others, and rests on the comparison with what they esteem, and with what is valued by them, as its essential nature. Since death, besides being natural death, is also the death of the felon, the ignominious death on the cross, there is not only natural death in it, but also the social dishonor, the disgrace before the world; the cross is transfigured; that which is the lowest in conception, that which the state intends for a disgrace, is raised to the highest position. Death is natural; every man must die. When the cross has been elevated so as to become a standard—a standard whose positive content is at the same time the kingdom of God—then the innermost disposition of the mind, the heart, is withdrawn in its deepest recesses from the life of society and state, and their substantial basis is removed, so that the whole structure is no longer a reality, but an empty phenomenon which will soon crash and tumble into ruin, and which must in its existence also manifest the fact that it has no longer any essential being in it. The imperial power, for its part, dishonored everything that enjoyed respect and authority among men. The life of each individual was subject to the caprice of the emperor, which was limited by nothing externally or internally. But, besides life, all virtue, dignity, age, position, sex, everything—was thoroughly dishonored. The slave was the highest power after the emperor, or perhaps had more power than even he; the senate dishonored itself in the same way in which it was dishonored by the emperor. Thus the majesty of worldly government, as well as all virtue, right, dignity of institutions and relations, the majesty of everything that has validity for the world, was dragged into the mire. Thus the worldly ruler of the earth, on his part, degraded the highest to the lowest, and radically per-

verted man's disposition, so that there was nothing within to be opposed to the new religion, which, on its part, had for its standard the change of what was in greatest contempt to the highest position. All that was fixed, ethical—all that was established in public opinion as valid and powerful—was destroyed, and, for the existing world against which the new religion turned, nothing was left but death—the quite external, cold force, which the disgraced Life, feeling itself infinite within, then indeed no more dreaded.

Here a new consideration appears. God has died, God is dead—the most dreadful thought is that nothing that is eternal, nothing that is true, has existence, that negation exists in God himself; the highest pain, the feeling of the perfectly helpless despair, the renunciation of all higher principle, is connected with it. The process, however, does not end here, and now the return movement begins; for God maintains and preserves himself in this process, and the latter is but the death of death. God arises again to life; there is, therefore, a change to the opposite.¹ The resurrection thus essentially belongs to faith: Christ appeared after his resurrection only to his friends; this is not external history for unbelief, but this apparition is for faith alone. The resurrection is followed by the transfiguration [ascension] of Christ, and the triumph of the elevation to the right hand of God closes this history, which, conceived in this way, is the self-explication of the divine nature. If in the first sphere we conceived God in pure thought, this second sphere begins with the immediateness which exists for sense-perception and for sensuous representation. The nature of the process here is that the immediate individuality

¹ This refers to the resurrection and the ascension of Christ. In the same way in which all the rest, so far, has become a [sensuous] phenomenon for the immediate consciousness, in the manner of [objective] reality, this elevation takes this form as well: "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption." In this way there exists for sense-perception this death of death, the victory over the grave, the triumph over the negative, and this elevation to heaven. The subjection of the negative is not a mere stripping off of human nature, but its highest proof and vindication even in death and in the highest love. Spirit is spirit only as the negation of the negative, which therefore contains the negative in itself. Hence, since the Son of Man sits at the right hand of the Father, there is placed before the spiritual eye in this elevation of human nature, in the most marked way, the dignity and worth of the same, and its identity with the divine nature.—(From the manuscript of the lectures of 1821, written by Hegel himself.)

is annulled: in the same manner in which, in the first sphere, the self-seclusion of God ceased and his first immediateness, as abstract universality, according to which he is the essence of all beings, was cancelled, there is in this sphere the abstraction of [his] humanity annulled, the immediateness of existing individuality, and this is done by death; the death of Christ, however, is the death of death itself, the negation of the negation. We have found the same course and process of the explication of God in the realm of the father; here, however, it is found in so far as it is the object of consciousness. For there existed the natural desire for perceiving the divine nature through sense-perception. Finally, in the death of Christ the phase should be emphasized that it is God who has killed death by passing through it and coming out of it; with all this finitude, humanity and humiliation are posited as an alien element in Christ, since he is strictly God: it becomes evident that finitude is foreign to him and assumed from another; this other is the human beings who stand over against the divine process. It is their finitude which Christ has assumed—this finitude in all its forms, and which in its extreme point is the evil or bad. This humanity, which in itself is a phase in the divine life, is now determined as an alien, as something not belonging to God. But this finitude, in its being for itself in relation to God, is the evil—it is something alien to him; but he has assumed it to put an end to it through his death. The ignominious death, as the gigantic union of these absolute extremes, is in this at the same time infinite love.

Infinite love is manifested in that God has posited himself identical with what is alien to him in order to put it to death. This is the signification of the death of Christ. Christ has borne the sins of the world, has reconciled it to God, so we are told.

This death is not only extreme finitude, but also the annulment of natural finitude, of immediate existence, and of alienation—it is the removal of constraint. This annulment of the natural must be essentially conceived in the [category of] spirit to be the movement of spirit by which it comprehends itself, and to ascend to the natural by death. It is therefore the abstraction from immediate will and immediate consciousness, and it is the sinking of the Ego into its own self, and out of this mine it brings forth only its determination, its true being, and its own absolute universality.

What is valid for spirit, what is of value, it can realize only in this annulment of its natural being and will. The suffering and the grief of this death that contains this element of reconciliation of the spirit with itself and with what spirit is in itself, this negative element which belongs only to spirit as such, is the inner conversion and transformation. But death is here not represented in this concrete signification; it is represented as natural death, for, when joined to the divine idea, the negation in question can have no other representation. If the eternal history of spirit is represented externally in the natural, then the evil which is actualized in the divine idea takes on the form of the natural, and its subversion appears only as natural death. The divine idea can proceed no further than to this realm of the natural. This death, however, although a natural one, is the death of God, and thus it is satisfaction and atonement for us since it represents the absolute history of the divine idea, that which happened in itself, and which eternally happens.

In order that individual man may be able to do, achieve, or accomplish anything, it is necessary that the thing be in accordance with its idea. The fact, for instance, that a certain criminal can be punished by the judge, and the fact that this punishment is the execution of and atonement to the law, is not owing to the judge, nor to the criminal suffering his punishment as a particular external occurrence, but it is due to the nature of the thing, the necessity of its idea. Thus we have this process in a twofold form before us: Once in thought, in the representation of the law, or in the idea, and, secondly, in a particular case, and in this particular case the process is as the nature of the thing causes it to be; and without the latter neither the action of the judge, nor the suffering of the criminal, would be the punishment and the satisfaction of the law. The ground, the substantial element, is the nature of the thing.

Such is also the case with that atonement for ourselves; *i. e.*, the principle which underlies it is, that this atonement took place in and for itself: not a foreign sacrifice or victim has been offered, not another has been punished, in order that there should be some punishment. Every man must out of his own subjectivity or guilt be that or do that which he is commanded or destined to be; but what he is thus for himself must not be contingent and acciden-

tal, not his arbitrary will, but it must, on the contrary, be a truth. If he therefore produces this conversion and the renunciation of his natural will in himself, and is within [the commandment of] love, then this is the thing in and for itself. His subjective certainty and feeling is truth; it is the truth and the nature of spirit. That history [of Christ] is therefore the ground of redemption, for it is the thing in-and-for-itself; it is not an accidental, individual deed or event, but it exists in truth and perfection. The confirmation of its truth lies in the fact that that history [of Christ] presents itself in a form which can be grasped by the senses, and through which the individual can comprehend the merit of Christ. It is not the history of an individual, but it is God who brings this to pass; *i. e.*, it is the sense-intuition or sense-perception of the fact that this is universal history—history existing-for-itself.

Other forms, as, for instance, that of the expiatory death, with which the idea is connected that God is a tyrant calling for victims or sacrifices, reduce themselves to what has been said, and are set right by it. Sacrifice means: to annul the naturalness of alienation. It is further said: Christ has died for all; this is not an individual thing, but the divine, eternal history. It means, likewise, that all have died in him. In the nature of God this too is a phase; it has taken place in God himself. God cannot be satisfied through another, but only through himself. This death is love itself, posited as a phase of God, and this death is reconciliation. In it absolute love is seen through sense-perception. It is the identity of the divine and the human, since God is in the finite in himself, and this finite, even in death, is a determination of God. God has reconciled the world by death, and reconciles it eternally with himself. This return out of estrangement is his return into himself; by this he is spirit, and the third is therefore that Christ has arisen from the dead. The negation is conquered thereby, and the negation of the negation is thus a phase of the divine nature.

Suffering and dying in this sense is contrary to the doctrine of moral imputation according to which every individual is for himself, and each is the doer of his deeds. The fate of Christ seems to contradict this imputation; but the latter has a place only in the scope of finitude, where the subject stands as an individual person, and not in the scope of the free spirit. On the plane of

finitude it is a principle that everybody remains what he is; if he has done what is bad, he is bad: wickedness is in him as his quality. But in morality, and still more in the sphere of religion, the spirit is known to be free and to be affirmative in itself, so that the constraint in him to do evil and wickedness is null and void for the infinity of spirit: spirit can make undone what was done; the deed remains in recollection, it is true, but the spirit washes the sinner clean. Imputation, therefore, does not extend to this sphere. In the death of Christ the finitude of man has been put to death as far as the true consciousness of spirit is concerned. This death of the natural has thus general significance: the finite, evil, is annihilated in general. The world has in this way been reconciled, and its evil in itself has been taken from the world by this death. There enters in this way in the true understanding of death the relation of the subject as such. The mere contemplation of history here ceases; the subject itself is drawn into the process; it feels the pain of evil and of its own estrangement, which Christ has taken upon himself by assuming humanity, and which by his death he has annihilated.

This relation of the content is the religious side, and in this begins the origin of the Church: this content is identical with what has been called the pouring out of the holy spirit. It is the spirit which has revealed this; the relation to mere man changes into a relation which is changed and transformed by spirit, so that the nature of God discloses itself therein in the way that this truth receives immediate certainty and the form of phenomenal manifestation.

He who in the first place was considered teacher, friend, and martyr of truth, assumes through this an entirely different position. So far it is only a beginning, which will be led by spirit to the result, to the end, to truth. Christ's death is, on the one side, the death of a man, of a friend who died through violence; but it is this death which, if spiritually understood, becomes salvation, and becomes the centre of reconciliation.

It was only after the death of Christ that it was disclosed to his friends that they had had before their eyes the sense-perception of the nature of spirit, and that they had looked with their senses upon the satisfaction of the needs of spirit. The conviction, therefore, which they could have derived from his life was not yet

the exact truth, but this was to be obtained only through the spirit.

Previous to his death he was among them as an individual perceptible to their senses. The proper solution was given to them by that spirit of which Christ said that it would guide them to all truth. "When he, the spirit of truth, is come, he will guide you into all truth."

With this his death becomes in this respect that death which forms the transition to glory and glorification, which, however, is naught but the rehabilitation of the original glory. Death, the negative, is the mediation by which the original glory is posited as attained. With this begins the history of the ascension of Christ and his elevation to the right hand of God, the point where this history begins to be spiritually conceived.

With this, then, it came to pass that the little Church had received sensuous confirmation that God is manifested as man; this humanity in God, and the most abstract form of it, the greatest dependence, the greatest weakness, the extreme stage of frailty—this is what natural death means.

"God himself is dead," runs that Lutheran hymn; this consciousness expresses that the human, the finite, the frail element, the weakness and negation, are themselves phases of the divine, that they are in God himself; that the alienation, the finite, the negative, is not outside of God; that, as alienation, it does not prevent the union with God. Alienation, or negation, is known as a phase of the divine nature itself! The highest cognition of the nature of the idea of spirit is contained therein.

This external negative element changes in this wise to an internal one. Death, on the one side, has this signification and meaning, that with it humanity is stripped off and the divine glory appears again. But death is at the same time the negative, the last extreme of what man, as natural existence, and, consequently, God, is subject to.

Through this whole process men have arrived at the consciousness—and this is the truth which they have attained—that the idea of God has received sensuous confirmation for them that the Human is the immediate, present God, and, more particularly, that in this history, as the spirit conceives it, there is contained the representation of the process of what man is and what spirit

is. God in himself and dead, this mediation by which the human is stripped off; and, on the other side, Being-in-itself returns to itself, and thus only becomes spirit.

The consciousness of the Church, which thus makes the transition from mere man to God-man, to [the idea addressed to] sense-perception, to consciousness, to the sensuous confirmation of the unity and union of the divine and human natures—this is what the Church begins with, and what constitutes the truth upon which the Church is based.

The explication of the reconciliation is, then, that God is reconciled with the world, or, rather, that God has shown himself as being reconciled with the world, and that the Human is not something alien to him, but that this alienation or differentiation, the finitude, as it has been expressed, is a phase within himself. It is true that it is but a vanishing phase, but in this phase he showed himself and revealed himself to the Church.

This is, for the Church, the history of the manifestation of God; this history is the divine history, by which man has become conscious of truth. From it the consciousness, the knowledge arose that God is the triune.

The reconciliation, which is implied in the belief in Christ, has no meaning, if God is not known as the triune, if it is not cognized that he IS, but that he is also as the other, as self-differentiation, as the alien, and in such a manner that this alien is God himself, that it has in it divine nature in itself, and that the annulment of this difference, of this alienation, that this return, this love, is the spirit.

In this consciousness it is contained that faith is not the relation to something alien, but that it is relation to God himself. These are the phases which are of importance here, that man arrives at the consciousness of the eternal history, the eternal movement, which is God himself.

This is the exposition of the second idea, as the idea in its phenomenal manifestation, of the exposition of the manner in which the eternal idea has arisen for the immediate sensuous certainty of man; or, in other words, how it became manifested. The certainty to which it attains for man is necessarily sensuous certainty, but a sensuous certainty which at the same time makes the transition to spiritual consciousness, and which is also con-

verted into immediate sensuousness, but in such a manner that there can be seen in it the movement and history of God, the life which is God himself.

HEGEL ON THE STATE.

TRANSLATED FROM HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT," BY E. D. MEAD.

B. *The Foreign Relations of the State.*

547. By war, the independence of the State is put in jeopardy. But the mutual acknowledgment of free individual nations is effected (by war) and through treaties of peace, which are to be lasting, this general acknowledgment, as well as the special rights of peoples in their mutual relations, is established. The foreign relations of the State are governed partly by these positive treaties, containing, however, in so far, only laws which lack true actuality; partly by the so-called rights of nations, whose general principle is the presupposed acknowledgment of the States, and which, therefore, sets such bounds to their otherwise unrestrained dealings with each other that the possibility of peace remains; it also distinguishes individuals as private persons from the state; and it rests in general on established usage.

C. *The World-History.*

548. The particular national spirit, since it is real, and its freedom exists as nature [unconscious usage], has, through this natural side, the moment of geographical and climatic influences; it is in time, and has, according to the content, essentially a special principle, and must pass through a development of its consciousness, and of its reality, determined by that principle; it has a history of its own. As circumscribed spirit, its independence is a subordinate one; it passes over into the general world-history [*i. e.*, it loses itself in the process of the World-History], whose events represent the dialectic of the special national spirits, the judgment of the world [*i. e.*, the verdict of History on the validity of what is contributed by each nation].

549. This movement is the course of the emancipation of the spiritual substance, the act through which the absolute design and purpose of the world is fulfilled in the world, through which spirit, first existing only in itself [potentially], comes to consciousness and self-consciousness, and so to manifestation and reality of its in-and-for-itself-existing essence, and becomes also externally universal, world-spirit. Since this development is in time and existence, and is thus history, its particular moments and stadia are the national spirits; each, as particular and natural in a qualitative determinateness [a qualitative determinateness is a portion of a function allotted to a single agency], is fitted only to the working out of one stage, the fulfilment of one function in the whole work.

The presupposition in history of an in-and-for-itself-existing purpose, and of determinations developing themselves out of it according to the notion, is called an *a priori* consideration of history, and the charge of *a priori* writing of history has been made against philosophy. Concerning this charge, and concerning the writing of history in general, we will make some, more definite, observations. That a final purpose in-and-for-itself lies at the basis of history, and has been and will be actually realized in it—the plan of providence—that, in general, reason is in history, must be determined for itself philosophically, and therefore as in-and-for-itself necessary. To presuppose arbitrary conceptions or thoughts, and to try to find and to represent events and deeds in conformity with these, deserve only censure. Of such an *a priori* method of procedure, however, those are to-day guilty who pretend to wish to be pure historians and at the same time take occasion expressly to declare themselves opposed to philosophizing—partly in general, partly in history. Philosophy is a troublesome neighbor to them, because it is opposed to what is arbitrary and capricious. Such *a priori* writing of history has sometimes prevailed where we should least expect it—viz., in philological quarters, and in Germany more than in France and England, where historical writing has risen to a stronger and riper character. To write fictions—about an original condition and an original people which possessed the true knowledge of God and all sciences; about nations of priests; or more specially about a Roman *epos*, which has been the origin of all narratives which pass for historical concerning the earliest history of Rome, etc.—this has taken the place of ex-

planations of history on psychological grounds and connections, and it seems to be regarded in a large circle as the requisite of a learned and clever historian who draws from the sources, to hatch out such hollow representations, and to combine them daringly with remote external circumstances derived from an erudite sweeping, in defiance of the most authentic history.

If we set aside this subjective treatment of history, the strictly opposed demand that history shall not be considered according to an objective purpose is equivalent on the whole to that which seems more fully justified—viz., that the historian proceed with impartiality. It is very common to make this demand upon the history of philosophy as something in which no inclination to any conception or opinion ought to show itself—as a judge is to have a special interest for neither of two opposing parties. At the same time, it is held of a judge that he would administer his office pettily and poorly if he had not an interest—indeed, exclusive interest—for justice, if he had not this for his aim, and his sole aim, and if he abstained from exercising judgment. This requisite in the judge we can call partiality for justice, and we are very well able to distinguish between this and a subjective partiality. But in the impartiality demanded of the historian this distinction is, in the juiceless, self-conceited talk, obliterated, and both kinds of interest are thrown away when it is demanded that the historian shall bring to his work no definite purpose and view according to which he shall separate, regulate, and estimate affairs, but shall narrate them precisely in the accidental fashion in which he finds them in their unrelated and thoughtless particularity. That a history must have a subject—for instance, Rome, its fate, or the decline of the greatness of the Roman empire—is conceded. Little deliberation is necessary to comprehend that this is the presupposed purpose which lies at the ground of the events themselves, as well as of the judgments concerning them which have for the history an importance—*i. e.*, nearer or remoter relation to the subject. A history without such purpose and without such judgment were only a weak series of representations—not even a child's fairy-tale; for even the children demand in stories an interest—*i. e.*, at least, the hinted aim, and the relation of events and treatment to it. In the existence of a people, the substantial purpose is to be a State, and to maintain itself as such; a people without political

organization (a nation as such) has properly no history, as the peoples that now constitute the great States existed before their political organization, and others still exist as uncivilized nations. That which happens to a people and proceeds within it has its essential significance in relation to the State; mere particulars concerning individuals are the farthest removed from the real subject of history. If the universal spirit of a time imprints itself on the character of the distinguished individualities of the time, and their peculiarities are also the remoter and dimmer mediums, in which it plays in weakened hues, and if even the particulars of a small event, or a word, often express not a subjective particularity, but a time, a people, a civilization, with striking perspicuity and power (the selection of such points being only the work of an able historian); on the other hand, the mass of other particulars is superfluous, and, by the faithful gathering of these, the subjects worthy of history are oppressed and darkened—the essential characteristic of the spirit and its time is contained in the great events. A correct sense has led to the banishment of such picturing of particulars and selection of special features to the field of romance (for instance, the works of Walter Scott, and the like); it is in good taste to unite pictures of unessential particular life with an unessential matter, such as the romance takes from private events and subjective passions. But to weave individual trifles of events and persons into the representation of universal interests, in the name and for the sake of what is called truth, is not only contrary to judgment and taste, but contrary to the conception of objective truth in the sense of which only the substantial is true, not the emptiness of external existences and accidents. It is perfectly indifferent whether such insignificant matters are formally authenticated or, as in romance, characteristically invented to meet the necessities of characterization, and names and circumstances ascribed to this or that. The interest of Biography, which may be referred to in this connection, seems to stand directly opposed to a universal purpose; it, however, has indeed the historical world as the background with which the individual is complicated; the subjectively original, the humorous, etc., reflect themselves upon that world, and enhance their interest by it. But the simple agreeable or temperamental has another ground and interest than history.

The demand for impartiality in the history of philosophy, as also in the history of religion, partly general, partly church history, usually contains the yet more express exclusion of the presupposition of an objective purpose. As previously the State was named as that to which the judgment had to refer events in political history, so here the truth must be the subject to which the particular acts and affairs of spirit were to be referred. The contrary presupposition, however, is much rather made, that these histories shall have only subjective aims—*i. e.*, only opinions and conceptions, not the in-and-for-itself-existing object, the truth—for their content, and this, indeed, on the simple ground that there is no truth. According to this acceptance, the interest for the truth appears likewise only as partiality in the ordinary sense—*viz.*, for opinions and conceptions which, equally empty, are counted altogether indifferent. Historical truth itself has, consequently, only the sense of accuracy, an exact account of the external, and with no other judgment than concerning this accuracy itself—to which simply qualitative and quantitative judgments are admissible no judgments of necessity and the notion. In fact, however, if, in political history, Rome or the German Empire, etc., is a real and true object, and the purpose to which the phenomena are to be related, and according to which they are to be judged, so in universal history is the universal spirit, its consciousness, and its essence, still more a real and true object, content and aim, which in and for itself all other phenomena serve as even their existence through relation to it—*i. e.*, the judgment through which they are subsumed under it and it inherits them. That in the course of spirit (and it is spirit, which not only moves upon the face of history as it did upon the face of the waters, but it weaves within it, and is alone the moving power) freedom—that is, the development determined by its notion is the determining, and its notion is its aim—*i. e.*, the truth since spirit is consciousness—or, in other words, that reason is in history—will be partially, at least, a plausible belief; partially, however, it is knowledge of philosophy.

550. This emancipation of spirit in which it comes to itself and realizes its truth, and the work of this emancipation, constitute the highest and absolute right. The self-consciousness of a particular people bears in its existence the stage of the development of the universal spirit at the time, and the objective reality into

which it puts its will. Against this absolute will the will of other particular national spirits has no right; that people rules the world. But the absolute will steps beyond its temporary abiding-place as a particular stage, and gives it over to the tribunal for judgment.

551. Since such process of realization appears as action, and therefore as a work of individuals, these are, in reference to the substantial content of their work, tools, and their subjectivity, which is that peculiar to them, is the empty form of activity. That, therefore, which they have attained for themselves through the individual participation in the substantial work prepared and determined independently of them, is a formal universality of subjective conception—fame, which is their reward.

552. The national spirit contains natural necessity, and has external existence; and in this its in-itself infinite moral substance is for itself particular and limited, and its subjective side is exposed to accident, and becomes unconscious custom, and consciousness of its content as temporally present and related to an external nature and world. But it is spirit thinking in the form of morality which annuls in it the finiteness which it has as national spirit in its state and the State's temporary interests, in the system of laws and customs, and lifts it to knowledge of itself in its essentiality. This is a knowledge which still itself has the imminent narrowness of the national spirit. The thinking spirit of the world-history, however, since it, at the same time, tears off those limitations of the particular national spirits and its own worldliness, comprehends its concrete universality and raises itself to the knowledge of absolute spirit, as the eternally real truth in which the knowing reason is free for itself, and necessity, nature, and history only serve for its manifestation, and as vessels of its honor.

Of the formal process involved in the elevation of spirit to God I have spoken in the introduction to my logic. In regard to the starting-point of this elevation, Kant's conception is in general most correct in so far as he considers faith in God as proceeding from the practical reason. For the starting-point contains implicitly the content or matter which constitutes the content of the notion of God. The true concrete matter is, however, neither Being (as in the cosmological proof), nor mere teleological activity

(as in the physico-theological proof), but Spirit whose true nature is the working Reason—*i. e.*, the self-determining and realizing Notion itself—Freedom. In the Kantian representation of the elevation of the subjective Spirit to God, which takes place in this conception of the true nature of man as freedom, this conception is reduced to a postulate, to an ideal [that is, to be striven after, but never reached]. This is the immediate restoration to truth and validity [of the human reason] out of the previously [in the "Critique of Pure Reason"] discussed impotence, the [immersion in the] antithesis of finiteness; and the annulling of this impotence is itself that elevation to truth.

Of the mediation which the elevation to God constitutes, it has previously been pointed out that the moment of negation through which the essential content of the starting-point is purged of its finiteness, and through this becomes free, is especially to be considered. This moment, which in the logical form is abstract, has now attained its most concrete significance. The finite, which is here the point of departure, is the real moral self-consciousness. The negation through which it raises its spirit to its truth is the purification of its knowledge from subjective opinion and the emancipation of its will from the selfishness of appetite, which are really accomplished in the moral world. True religion and true religiousness proceed from morality, and are morality in its thinking activity—*i. e.*, becoming conscious of the free universality of its concrete essence. Only from morality, and proceeding from morality, is the idea of God as free spirit known; it is, therefore, vain to seek for true religion and religiousness outside of the moral spirit.

But this proceeding takes at the same time this meaning—as occurs everywhere in the speculative—*viz.*, that that which in the first place is posited as consequent and derived is much rather the absolute *præius* of that through which it appears to be mediated, and is also known here in spirit as the truth of spirit.

This, therefore, is the place to enter more closely upon the relation of the state and religion, and in that connection to examine categories which are here commonly current. The immediate consequence of what has been said is that morality is the state in its substantial internal being; the State is the development and realization of morality; the substantiality of morality itself, how-

ever, and of the State, is religion. The State rests, according to this relation, on the moral sentiment, and this in turn upon the religious sentiment. Since religion is the consciousness of the absolute truth, that which is to avail as right and justice, as duty and law—*i. e.*, as true in the world of free-will—can avail only so far as it partakes of that truth, is subsumed by it, and follows as a consequence from it. But, in order that the true moral be the consequence of religion, it is requisite that religion have the true content—*i. e.*, that the conscious idea of God in it be the true one. Morality is the divine spirit, as immanent in self-consciousness in the real existence of this as a people and the individuals composing it; this self-consciousness, proceeding from an empirical reality into itself, and bringing its truth into consciousness, has in its faith and in its conscience only that which it has in the certainty of itself in its spiritual reality. The two are inseparable. There cannot be two kinds of conscience—one religious and another one that is moral, different from the former in worth and content. According to form, however, *i. e.*, for thought and knowledge—and religion and morality belong to intelligence, and are a thinking and knowing—the religious content, as the pure in-and-for-itself existing, therefore the highest truth, gives its sanction to the morality which obtains empirical reality. Thus, religion is for self-consciousness the basis of morality and of the state. It has been the monstrous error of our time to try to regard these inseparable things as separable from one another; indeed, as mutually indifferent. The relation of religion to the state has been viewed as though the state already existed on its own account through some power or other, and the religion, as the subjective of the individuals, as something desirable merely to strengthen the state, had been added, as it were, or were indifferent even, and the morality of the state—*i. e.*, rational law and constitution—stood firmly for itself on its own ground. In connection with the declared inseparableness of the two sides, it is interesting to consider the separation as it appears from the side of religion. It concerns, in the first place, the form—*i. e.*, the relation—of self-consciousness to the content of the truth. Since this is the substance in its reality, as Spirit dwelling in self-consciousness, self-consciousness has thus immediate assurance of itself in this connection, and is free in it. The state of non-freedom can exist, however, according to the

form, although the in-itself-existing content of religion is absolute spirit. This great distinction is to be found within the Christian religion itself, in which the element of Nature does not constitute the content of God, nor does such enter into the sphere of the same as a moment; but God, who is known in spirit and in truth, is the content. And yet this spirit is in reality, in the Catholic religion, set rigidly over against the self-conscious spirit. In the first place, God is presented in the host as an external thing for religious worship, whereas in the Lutheran Church the host as such is first consecrated and elevated to the present God, and only by inner appropriation—*i. e.*, in the annulling of its externality and in faith—*i. e.*, in the spirit at the same time free and self-knowing. Out of that first and highest relation of externality flow all the other external, and therefore unfree, unspiritual, and superstitious relations, particularly a laity which receives the knowledge of divine truth, as well as the direction of the will and the conscience, from without—*i. e.*, from another order which does not itself come to the possession of that knowledge purely in a spiritual way, but requires for it essentially an external consecration. Further, the praying that is mere moving of the lips: that is unspiritual, because the subject renounces direct access to God and prays others to pray; the direction of devotion to wonder-working images, indeed, to bones, and the expectation of miracles from them; in general, the justification through outward works, merit that is to be earned through actions that may indeed be transferred to others, etc.—all this binds the spiritual under an outwardness-to-itself, through which its notion is misapprehended and perverted in the innermost, and right and justice, morality and conscience, the sense of responsibility and duty, are corrupted at the roots.

To such a principle and to this development of the unfreedom of spirit in the religious, only a legislation and constitution of legal and ethical unfreedom and a condition of injustice and immorality in the real state correspond. The Catholic religion has more logically been and is still often, praised so loudly as that by which the permanence of government is insured; in fact, of such governments as are joined with institutions which base themselves on the servitude of the spirit, that should be lawfully and morally free—*i. e.*, on institutions of injustice and a condition

of moral corruption and barbarism. These governments do not know, however, that their fearful power lies in a fanaticism which does not step forth hostilely against them only so long as, and under the condition that, it remains enslaved under the bondage of injustice and immorality. But yet another power is present in spirit; in opposition to that existence out-of-itself, and its broken condition, consciousness collects itself into its inner free reality; it awakens the World-Wisdom in the spirit of governments and peoples—*i. e.*, wisdom concerning that which in reality, in and for itself, is right and reasonable. The production of thought, and, more definitely, philosophy, has been justly called World-Wisdom [or secular wisdom]; for thought gives actuality to the truth of spirit and introduces it into the world, and thus frees it in its reality and to itself.

The content takes with this an entirely different shape. The consequence for the moral content of the want of freedom of the form—*i. e.*, of knowledge and subjectivity—is that self-consciousness is represented to it as not immanent, that it is represented as removed from self-consciousness; so that it is to have true existence only as a negative to the reality of self-consciousness. In this untruth the moral content is called holy. But the self-introduction of the divine spirit into reality through the emancipation of reality into it, that which is said to be holiness in the world, is supplanted by morality. Instead of the vow of chastity, marriage now first passes for the moral, and, consequently, the family, as the highest institution in this human aspect. Instead of the vow of poverty (to which, involving itself in contradiction, corresponds the merit of giving away possessions to the poor, that is to say, enriching them), the activity of personal earning through intelligence and industry asserts itself with probity in this exchange and use of property—morality in civil society. Instead of the vow of blind obedience stands obedience to the law and lawful regulations, which obedience is itself true freedom, because the state is properly self-realizing reason—morality in the state. In this way only can justice and morality come to exist. It is not enough that religion first commands, “Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s,” for it remains necessary to determine what Cæsar is, *i. e.*, what belongs to the temporal government; and it is well enough

known how the temporal government has arbitrarily arrogated everything to itself, as the spiritual government has also done on its side. The divine Spirit must immanently permeate the secular; thus is wisdom concretely in the secular, and its title to itself determined. That concrete indwelling is, however, constituted by the forms of morality referred to—the morality of marriage as opposed to the sanctity of the unmarried state, the morality of the activity of property and gain as opposed to the holiness of poverty and indolence, the morality of obedience to the law of the State as opposed to the sanctity of obedience devoid of right and duty, the bondage of conscience. With the need of law and morality, and the insight into the free nature of spirit, appears the struggle between these and the religion of unfreedom. It is of no avail that the laws and the ordinances of the state have been brought up to the standard of rational organization, if the principle of unfreedom in religion is not given up. The two are incompatible with each other; it is a foolish notion to wish to assign separate provinces to the State and religion, with the opinion that their difference will exercise a peaceful influence on them and prevent contradiction and strife. Principles of lawful freedom can only be abstract and superficial, and the state institutions derived from them must of themselves be untenable if the wisdom which gave birth to those principles understands religion so poorly as not to know that the principles of the reason of reality have their final and highest guarantee in the religious conscience in the subsumption under consciousness of the absolute truth. If, no matter how it happens—*a priori*, so to speak—a legislation which had the principles of reason for its foundation came into contradiction with the popular religion based on principles of spiritual servitude, the test and actualization of the legislation lies with the individuals of the government as such, and the entire administration branching out through all classes, and it were only an abstract empty notion that it were possible that the individuals would act only according to the sense or the letter of the laws, and not according to the spirit of their religion, in which their innermost conscience and highest obligation lie. The laws appear, in this opposition to that which is declared holy by religion, as something made by man; they could maintain, even if they were sanctioned and practically introduced, no lasting op-

position to the contradiction and the assault of the religious spirit. Such laws, even if their content is true, are wrecked upon the conscience whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and does not sanction them. It is a folly of modern times to alter a system of corrupt morality, the constitution, and legislation, without a change in religion; to effect a revolution without a reformation; to suppose that a constitution opposed to the old religion and its sanctities can have rest and harmony, and that stability can be given to the laws through external guarantees, for instance, so-called Chambers, and the power given them to determine the finances, etc. We can only regard as a last resource the endeavor to separate justice and the laws from religion, in case there exists an incapacity to descend into the depths of the religious spirit and elevate it to its truth. Those guarantees are rotten supports against the consciences of the subjects who are to administer the laws (and to these belong the guarantees themselves). This it is, much rather, which is the highest, unholy contradiction, the attempt to bind and subject the religious conscience to the worldly legislation which it counts unholy.

Plato had a more definite understanding of the break which had come about in his time between the existing religion and the constitution on the one hand, and, on the other, the deep demand which freedom, now becoming consciousness of its inward being, made on religion and the political condition. Plato grasps the thought that the true constitution and life of the state are grounded more deeply on the idea, or on the in-and-for-itself universal and true principles of eternal justice. To know and recognize these is certainly the vocation and business of Philosophy. This is the point of view which Plato occupies in the place where he lets Socrates very emphatically declare that philosophy and political power must be united, the Idea must rule if the misfortunes of the nations are to have an end. Plato had in this the definite conception that the Idea, which in itself is in truth the free self-determining thought, can also come to consciousness only in the form of thought; as a content which, in order to be true, must be raised to universality, and in the most abstract form of universality be brought to consciousness.

In order to compare the Platonic stand-point more precisely with the point of view in which the State is here considered in reference

to religion, it is necessary to be reminded of the distinctions in the notion [these are universal, particular, and singular] which have been essentially indicated in the foregoing. The first distinction is that, in natural things, the substance of the same, the genus or species, is different from its existence in which the substance or species exists as subject. This subjective existence of the genus, however, is further distinguished from that which the species or the universal in general obtains in the image-making thinking, which makes of the universal an abstraction. This deeper individuality, the ground of the free existence of the universal substance, is the self of the thinking spirit [this individuality arises from the self-determining universal, which produces within itself its own particularity]. Natural things do not receive the form of universality and essentiality through themselves; and their individuality is not itself form, which is alone the subjective thought for itself, which in philosophy gives to that universality existence for itself. The human being, on the contrary, is the free spirit itself, and comes to existence in its self-consciousness. This absoluteness, which is the concrete Spirit in itself, is precisely that which has the form, the thinking activity itself, for its content. To the height of thinking consciousness of this principle, Aristotle raised himself in his conception of the entelechy of thought, which is *νοήσις τῆς νοήσεως*, above the Platonic Idea (the species, the substantial). Thought in general, however, contains, and this indeed for the sake of the specified determination itself, also the immediate being-for-self of subjectivity as universality. And the true idea of spirit in itself concrete exists just as essentially in the one of its determinations—the subjective consciousness—as in the other—universality—and is the same substantial content in the one as in the other. To the first form, however, belong feeling, contemplation, representation, and it is much more necessary that consciousness of the absolute idea be grasped first in order of time in this form, and be present in its immediate reality earlier as religion than as philosophy. Philosophy develops itself only from this basis, as the Greek philosophy is later than the Greek religion, and it has attained its perfection only in seizing and comprehending in its complete definite essence the principle of Spirit which first manifested itself in the religion. But the Greek philosophy could only take a position opposed to the religion, the

unity of thought; and the substantiality of the idea could only sustain a hostile relation to the polytheism of fantasy, the glad and frivolous sportiveness of that poetry.

The form in its finite truth, the subjectivity of Spirit, now first broke forth as subjective free thought, which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself, so that this was not yet conceived as Absolute Spirit. Religion could thus first become purified only through the abstract for-itself-existing thought, through philosophy; but the form immanent to the substantial, which philosophy fought and overcame, was that poetic fantasy. The State, which in like manner, but earlier than philosophy, develops itself out of religion, represents in reality as corruption the one-sidedness which its in-itself true Idea has in it. Plato, in common with all his thoughtful contemporaries, recognizing this corruption of democracy and the real defectiveness of its principle, emphasized the substantial, but was unable to impart to his idea of the State the infinite form of subjectivity which was still hidden from his spirit. His State is to himself, on this account, without subjective freedom. The truth which should dwell in the State, regulate and rule it, he conceived, therefore, only in the form of truth, in conscious thought—philosophy—and so pronounced that judgment. So long as philosophers do not rule in States—or those who are now called kings and rulers do not profoundly and comprehensively philosophize—so long will there be no emancipation of the State or of the human race from the evils which exist; so long can the idea of this constitution not arrive at possibility, not see the light of the sun. It was not possible for Plato to proceed to say that so long as the true religion does not appear in the world, and does not rule in States, the true principle of the State has not come into reality. So long, however, it was impossible for this principle to come into thought, the true idea of the State to be conceived from this—the idea of substantial morality with which the freedom of the for-itself-existing self-consciousness is identical. Only in the principle of spirit, knowing its essence in itself absolutely free, and having its reality in the activity of its liberation, exist the absolute possibility and necessity that the power of the state, religion, and the principles of philosophy fall together in one; that the reconciliation of reality in general with spirit, the State with the religious conscience, likewise with philo-

sophical knowledge, be accomplished. Since the for-itself-existing subjectivity is absolutely identical with the substantial universality, religion as such, and also the State as such—as forms in which the principle exists—contains the absolute truth, so that this, since it exists as philosophy, exists only in one of its forms. But since religion in its own development develops also the distinctions contained in the idea, so being can appear in its first immediate—*i. e.*, one-sided—form, and the existence of religion become corrupted to sensual externality, and, consequently, further, to the oppression of the freedom of the spirit and the perversion of political life. But the principle contains the infinite elasticity of the absolute form to overcome this corruption of its determination of form, and, by this means, of the content, and to effect the reconciliation of spirit in itself. Thus, at last, the principle of the religious and the moral conscience becomes one and the same in the Protestant conscience, the free spirit knowing itself in its reasonableness and truth. The constitution and legislation, like their working and trial, have for their content the principle and the development of morality, which proceeds, and only can proceed, from the truth of religion restored to its original principle, and thus first, as such, real. The morality of the state and the religious spirituality of the state are thus the state's reciprocal and sure guarantees.

THE METAPHYSICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF MATERIALISM.

BY JOHN DEWEY.

Discussions regarding materialism have been, for the most part, confined to the physiological and psychological aspects of it. Its supporters and opponents have been content to adduce arguments pro or con, as the facts of physical and mental life bear upon the case in hand. It is the object of the present paper to discuss its metaphysical phases.

Hume suggested that possibly one might escape from the nihilistic consequences of his philosophy by means of "the sceptical

solution of sceptical doubts." In a somewhat analogous manner we would attempt to render explicit the metaphysical assumptions (*i. e.*, assumptions regarding the real nature of things) latent in all materialism, and, by showing the relation of these fundamental assumptions to materialism itself, show the self-destructive character of every scheme of this kind—whether actual or possible.

What is materialism? It is that theory which declares that matter and its forces adequately account for all phenomena—those of the material world, commonly so called, and those of life, mind, and society. It declares that not only the content of mind, but that which we call mind itself, is determined by matter. We notice first, then, that it is absolutely monistic. But one substance exists—matter. All phenomena of mind are really phenomena of matter. The intellect is a function of the brain and its subordinate nervous organs. The laws of matter are therefore the laws of mind. Mental phenomena are expressible in terms of material. And since all material phenomena are expressible in terms of the atom and molecule (or whatever names be given to the ultimate forms of matter), therefore all mental are similarly expressible. The ultimate form of matter contains, then, implicitly, all phenomena of mind and society. In short, the coarsest form of matter with which you can begin, as well as the highest organism with which you end, must contain all emotion, volition, and knowledge, the knowing subject and its relations. Beginning, then, with a strictly monistic theory, and keeping directly in the line of materialistic reasoning, we have ended with the conclusion that the ultimate form of matter has dualistic "mind" and "matter" properties. Nor is there any escape from this conclusion on a materialistic basis. Therefore on its physical or constructive side we find such a theory suicidal.

To be sure, a materialist might reply that ultimately the "matter"-molecular-property accounted for and caused the "mind"-molecular-property, but proof, or suggestion of proof, or suggestion as to method of finding proof, all are equally absent. If a materialist were to say that this double-sided substance is what he means by matter, we could only reply that he is playing with words—that it is just as much mind as it is matter.

We have now to consider the strictly metaphysical assumptions of materialism.

First, it assumes the possibility of ontological knowledge, by which we mean knowledge of being or substance apart from a mere succession of phenomena. The substance which is so known is matter. Now, since it is this statement that a belief in the possibility of ontological knowledge is an inherent necessity in all materialistic reasoning, which is the basis of our criticism, the statement must be examined more fully. Suppose for the moment that it is not such an inherent necessity—that it is possible to found materialism on something besides an ontological basis. If there be no knowledge of substance as such, there is either only knowledge of phenomena produced by the activity of the Ego (pure subjective idealism), or of phenomena entirely unrelated to any substance whatever (Humeian scepticism), or of those related only to objective spirit (Berkeleyian idealism), or of those related to an unknown and unknowable substance (H. Spencer), or of those brought into unity by the forms of knowledge which the mind necessarily imposes on all phenomena given in consciousness (as Kant). Now, since none of these can afford a sufficient basis for a theory, which posits matter as the universal underlying unity, we must admit that materialism exists on the basis of a belief in the possibility of ontological knowledge of such objective reality. If a materialist, who still believes that we have no knowledge of substance as such, replies that while we have knowledge of phenomena only, yet we know them as the effects of matter, the answer is obvious. Either we know this substance, matter, which is the cause of them, or we do not. If we do, it is ontological knowledge. If we do not, then it is as much assumption to claim that it is matter as it would be to name it mind. We must conclude, therefore, that a knowledge transcending phenomena is the sole thinkable basis for materialism.

Starting from this, we have to consider the relation of such knowledge to materialism. What is involved in knowledge of matter as substance?

To know, requires something which knows. To know material phenomena, are required mental phenomena. A thing is for the mind non-existent until it is an idea or phenomenon of the mind. To know substance, matter, is required substance, mind. If materialism merely posited knowledge of material phenomena, there would be required to give it validity only mental phenomena,

which do, on every theory, exist. A theory, however, which posits knowledge of a substance besides, must also posit something more than phenomena in order to know this substance. If there be no substance, mind, then there are only series of mental states or successions of mental phenomena. But it is a mere truism to say that phenomena cannot go beyond phenomena. Successions of consciousnesses unrelated, or related only in time, can but give knowledge of phenomena similarly related. Undoubtedly the former may be but subjective, while the latter are objective, but that does not constitute knowledge of substance. To have real knowledge of real being, there must be something which abides through the successive states, and which perceives their relations to that being and to itself. To say that the mind, if itself a mere phenomenon or group of phenomena, can transcend phenomena and obtain a knowledge of that reality which accounts both for other phenomena and for itself, is absurd. But there is no need to multiply words to show what is, after all, self-evident—that phenomenal knowledge is phenomenal, and that to transcend phenomena there must be something besides a phenomenon. We find materialism, then, in this position. To prove that mind is a phenomenon of matter, it is obliged to assume the possibility of ontological knowledge—*i. e.*, real knowledge of real being; but in that real knowledge is necessarily involved a subject which knows. To prove that mind is a phenomenon, it is obliged to implicitly assume that it is a substance. Could there be anything more self-destructive?

Secondly, it assumes the reality of the causal nexus, and the possibility of knowledge of real causation. In declaring that matter causes mind, it declares that the relation is one of efficiency and dependency, and not one of succession—antecedent and consequent. For, if it be the latter, then there are only succession and conjunction of material and mental phenomena, unrelated or related only in time, in which case it would be absurd to say that matter caused mind.

We have therefore to consider what is involved in real causation, and the knowledge of it as such, and what relation the involved facts bear to the theory of materialism.

How, on a materialistic hypothesis, can the knowledge of a real causal nexus be obtained? It cannot be a primary, necessary

intuition of the human mind, nor yet a universal mode of viewing things, for both of these imply the reality of substantial mind. Nor can it be a concept obtained from experience, and generalized by unconscious habit. For, in the first place, such a concept is necessarily subjective, and belongs only to the mind which framed it. It may or may not obtain as an objective relation among objective things. There is no ground for positing objective validity of any mental conception, except by *a priori* mind necessity, which a materialistic theory must reject. But, secondly, and chiefly, such a theory as to the origin of a knowledge of the causal nexus contains a *petitio principii*—*i. e.*, it presupposes real causation to account for our knowledge of real causation. For this generalized belief, being a result of experience, is itself an effect of the phenomena given in experience. To ensure, therefore, that it is a true concept—*i. e.*, one holding good objectively—we must assume that it was produced by a true causal nexus, which in turn is the thing to be accounted for. It certainly is begging the question to say that our knowledge that causation is real is a result of experience, when to prove that experience can produce a correct result we have to assume that very reality of causation which is to be proved. Nothing can be more illogical than to deduce knowledge of real causation from that which has for its own basis that same reality. After accounting for the one, the other still remains to be accounted for, which can be done only by reasoning in a circle. There is yet available one resource to materialism—to claim that, although our knowledge of true causation is not generalized from a series of experiences, it is obtained directly from the knowledge of phenomena—that in any two or more phenomena there is also given the causal nexus and the knowledge of it. Now, we might object to this, that it approached the position of the strictest intuitionist, and that, as *mere* phenomena, there is in them nothing but the relation of co-existence and succession. Objective phenomena are not labelled “this is the cause of that;” and, therefore, if the mind thinks it finds in them such a relation, that relation must be brought to the phenomena by the mind itself. Or we might also say that, if a series of experiences is incompetent (as we have seen it is) to give a knowledge of causation, on a materialistic hypothesis, *a fortiori*, a single experience is. But waiving these, we have to see what is contained in this

theory, granting the truth of materialism. According to it, the knowledge of these objects, and that of the causal nexus between them, is the result of matter, and therefore is a dependent "effect"—the first effect in the perfect blank, which is to change that blank into what we call mind and its content. (The *first*, because by the theory the knowledge of causation, not being derived from experiences, must be contained in the first two phenomena given in consciousness.) But as an effect it is, of course, a phenomenon, and for a phenomenon to transcend phenomena, and attain the reality behind them, is, as before shown, impossible. Ontological knowledge is not possible to the mind when the mind is considered as a phenomenal effect. Knowledge of causation cannot be reached, then, on a materialistic theory, either through experiences or a single experience without intuitional or ontological knowledge. Only one way remains—that it should be reached through the activity of the Ego itself. The mind is a true cause, and gives knowledge of true causation. So, to prove mind an effect, materialism would have to postulate it as a cause. It is again suicidal.

To sum up: To prove a strict monism, materialism has to assume an original irresolvable dualism. To prove the mind a phenomenon of matter, it is obliged to assume a substance to give knowledge of that matter. To prove that it is an effect of matter, it is obliged to assume either an intuitional power of mind, or that mind is itself a cause, both equally destructive of materialism.

We conclude, therefore, that as a philosophical theory materialism has proved itself a complete *felo-de-se*. To afford itself a thinkable basis, it assumes things which thoroughly destroy the theory.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

THREE AGES.

'Twas morn, and o'er my little window ledge
 Flew many a wild bird of plumage bright;
 They sang sweet songs, and left the truest pledge
 Of love, of love and truth, by day and night.

'Twas afternoon, and through my stately door,
 In soberer dress, stepped the too tame birds,
 Calling our former themes so vain and poor,
 Twittering now in philosophic words.

It is night now; life, love, and thought are done;
 What is it comes and sets my heart aglow?
 Of all the wise and learned tongues not one—
 Only the foolish songs of long ago.

JOHN ALBEE.

STAGES.

I.

Once life was joy, not joyous service done—
 Quick days of selfish rapture, broad, not deep;
 The world was like a picture, and the sun
 Rose for the gilding of a dreamy sleep.

II.

We woke: and life was labor; naught of glee
 Was left, for deepest-rooted toil remained;
 And as we delved no end was there to see,
 ' And suns but glimmered on the dross we guined.

III.

But now, or in the perfect time, we know,
 The joy returns while labor yet abides;
 Life's round and fair, and, delving deep below,
 We find the joy that early pleasure hides.

BENJAMIN R. BULKELEY.

THE GOLDEN RULE.

Is there one word, O Master! Tsze-Kung said,
By which through life one may be wisely led?

Confucius thus replied: I say to thee
That such a word is Reciprocity.

For what would give thee pain in word or deed,
That thou dost not to others do, take heed.

THEODORE HARRIS.

OBITUARY.—MRS. HATHAWAY.

CHICAGO PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY.

Editor Journal of Speculative Philosophy:

DEAR SIR: In accordance with the request of the Philosophical Society of Chicago, I transmit to you a copy of the resolutions unanimously adopted at the last meeting of the Society, before which she had spoken so many of her best thoughts, and by the members of which she was so much respected and beloved.

Respectfully yours,

JOSIAH H. BISSELL,

Corresponding Secretary, Chicago Philosophical Society.

CHICAGO, January 14, 1882.

To the Philosophical Society of Chicago:

Your committee on the death of Mrs. Hathaway present the following preamble and resolutions for your action:

"Whereas, The Philosophical Society of Chicago has with sorrow learned of the death of Mrs. Amalie Johns Hathaway, wife of Mr. Benjamin Hathaway;

"And Whereas, That lady gave her earliest lectures upon philosophical topics to this body, and the Society has since been a delighted witness of her rise in power and reputation;

"And Whereas, further, The Society desires to bear public testimony to its estimation of her distinguished ability and high moral worth;

"Therefore, Resolved, (1) That the Philosophical Society of Chicago deploras the untimely death of Mrs. Amalie Johns Hathaway as a loss to philosophical culture in America; as the loss of one whom native power and special study had fitted for eminence in that department of investigation, and who possessed rare skill in presenting to common audiences the results of her ripe scholarship and deep thought.

"Resolved, (2) That we recognize in Mrs. Hathaway a woman of noble type; a woman so simple and modest that no success could destroy the fine balance of her mind, and no praise intoxicate her; a woman of sweet, unostentatious philanthropy and broad views; a woman genial in society, dear to her friends, and full of the patience, hope, and strength that can alike adorn a home and vivify social life.

"Resolved, (3) That we offer assurances of our earnest sympathy with the bereaved husband of this lady in the heavy affliction that has befallen him.

"Resolved, (4) That copies of these proceedings be sent to Mr. Hathaway, to the 'Journal of Speculative Philosophy,' and to the city press.

"Respectfully submitted,

"SAMUEL WILLARD,

"JULIA HOLMES SMITH,

"HELEN DOTY COMPTON."

HERMANN LOTZE'S WORKS.

We have received a circular from the publisher, S. Hirzel, of Leipzig, announcing an edition of the works of the distinguished philosopher named at the head of this article. This edition contains the works collected, partly from manuscript and partly from the notes taken at the courses of lectures by the pupils or students. It makes a series of small volumes. The first volume, the "Grundzuege der Psychologie," which was sent out to try the public demand, proved so much of a success that the publisher is encouraged to continue, and now comes out with the "Grundzuege der Praktischen Philosophie—dictate aus den Vorlesungen von Hermann Lotze." This will be followed by the outlines of six other expositions of Lotze: Those of the Philosophy of Religion, of the *Æsthetic*, of the History of Philosophy since Kant, of the Philosophy of Nature, of Logic and the Encyclopædia of Philosophy, and of Metaphysics. These will appear during the present year.

There will, of course, be an eager inquiry after these outlines, and we believe that they will prove much more useful than the heavier works of the same author—his "Mikrokosmos" and "System der Philosophie," and other works published during his life—as is suggested by the circular before us. [Ed.]

SENTENCES IN PROSE AND VERSE.

SELECTED BY WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING.

V.

Facts unably related . . . may prove the worst sort of deceit; and mere lies, judiciously composed, can teach us the truth of things beyond any manner. But to amuse ourselves with such authors as neither know how to lye, nor tell the truth, discovers a taste which methinks no one should be apt to envy.—*Shaftesbury*.

If God acts for an end or purpose, he necessarily desires something which he is without.—*Spinoza*.

Men deceive themselves in the conceit of their free-will from this:

because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of their causes.—*Ibid.*

The dark background of neglected duty.—*Arthur Helps.*

Those subtle portions of our frames, those tiny filaments—the nerves—require more repose than perhaps any other part of the body; and they are very silent creatures.—*Ibid.*

What is wanting cannot be numbered.—*H. Martineau's Lije.*

New works of solid and enriching character, but of long replacement of capital consumed, are the very raw material of a (financial) crisis.—*Bonamy Price.*

This, too, is probable, according to that saying of Agathon: "It is a part of probability that many improbable things will happen."—*Aristotle.*

As neutral as an alligator.—*Mrs. Lewes [George Eliot].*

The beginning of an acquaintance, whether with persons or things, is to get a definite outline for our ignorance.—*Ibid.*

In these delicate vessels is borne onward through the ages the treasure of human affections [young girls].—*Ibid.*

The desire to conquer is *itself* a kind of subjection.—*Ibid.*

She was one of those satisfactory creatures whose intercourse has the charm of discovery, whose integrity of faculty and expression begets a wish to know what they will say on all subjects, or how they will perform what they undertake, so that they end by raising not only a continual expectation, but a continual sense of fulfilment.—*Ibid.*

What construction of another's mind is not strong wishing equal to?—*Ibid.*

Genius consisting—in a power to make or do, not anything in *general*, but something in *particular*.—*Ibid.*

Self-satisfaction is an untaxed kind of property which it is very hard to find depreciated.—*Ibid.*

The word of all work—love.—*Ibid.*

That element of tragedy which lies in the very fact of frequency.—*Ibid.*

We gain a clear notion of instinct by admitting that animals have, in their sensorium, images or constant sensations which determine their actions. It is a species of dream which haunts them constantly, and, as regards their instinct, animals may be regarded as a kind of *somnambulists*.—*Cuvier.*

BOOK NOTICES.

Text-Book to Kant. The Critique of Pure Reason: Æsthetic, Categories, Schematism. Translation, reproduction, commentary, index. With biographical sketch. By James Hutchison Stirling, LL. D., Foreign Member of the Philosophical Society of Berlin. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, Tweeddale Court. London: Simpkin, Marshall & Co. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1881.

This work is called a text-book to Kant because it exhibits what is peculiarly constitutive of Kant's doctrines with the fullest details, and in a threefold form. It contains a translation, a commentary, and a reproduction. Of the 548 pages octavo which the body of the work contains, the reproduction occupies 111; the translation, 226 pages; the commentary, 100 pages. A biographical sketch occupies 14 pages in smaller type. Dr. Stirling's great power of biographical characterization reappears in this sketch, and, short as it is, it pictures for us all the essential traits of the man. The publication of this work, most of which was written long since by its author, is a contribution to the centennial anniversary of the appearance in Germany of the great "*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*." It forms, unquestionably, the most important contribution to the exposition of Kant's theoretical doctrines that has appeared during the hundred years. The fact of the renewed study of Kant's works—"The Return to Kant," as it is called—gives it additional importance at the present time. In American colleges and universities the study of Kant continues to grow upon the attention of the ethical and philosophical faculties, and it is American students especially that are to be congratulated upon the appearance of the long-needed text-book on this difficult subject. It is more and more, every year, coming to be the practice with instructors in mental and moral philosophy to rally and concentrate the best forces of their students upon the mastery of the thoughts of Kant. It is becoming the conviction that philosophy is not to be learned by memorizing names and dates, anecdotes and *bon mots*, with abstract dogmatical summaries of doctrines delivered in the style of "views," "opinions," or "curiosities of human thinking," but rather by the mastery on the part of the student of a higher power of reflection, a closer and deeper habit of thinking. Sense-perception is not philosophy; its feeble power can grasp only isolated facts or items. Ordinary reflection is not philosophy; its power of generalization, though amply sufficient for the discovery of scientific truths, and for the details of relations and dependencies that exist between things or phenomena, is not adequate to the grasp of a single principle as the unity of all. For philosophy is distinguished from special sciences and from desultory thinking by its demand for a first principle—an explanation of all phenomena—while other thinking seeks only subordinate or relative unities. Whenever a thinker stops in his act of subordinating or co-ordinating his discovered principle to others, and entertains the thought that this principle is supreme, and the final explanation of all phenomena of mind or matter, he has entered the third stage of knowing, and is properly a philosopher, no matter how absurd or inadequate his first principle may be in fact. His thought concerns the totality—it is a transcendental unity. Whether this first principle be air or water, matter or mind, it is, as a first principle, the source of all things, and therefore an activity; a self-activity because it is the first and ultimate; self-determining, creative, self-revealing in its manifestations or its phenomena because its activity is necessarily the revelation and manifestation of its own power. The law of the finite is that of relativity to something else beyond it.

The law of the infinite or the totality is that of self-relation. It is as easy to name the general conditions of the infinite as of the finite. The correlative of the finite always lies beyond or outside of it; the infinite always contains its correlative within it. The finite presupposes the infinite, while the infinite does not presuppose but posits the finite.

The third stage of thinking implies, logically, as its premise, the principle of self-determination as the highest. But the majority of systems of philosophy do not realize what they imply, and thus are inconsistent.

Besides such philosophical thinkers as set up a first principle that is inadequate because it lacks self-determination, there is a large class who are philosophers, although they deny in a sense the possibility of philosophy. Those who assert that all our knowledge is relative and concerning the relative seem to deny the possibility of the third species of knowing. In fact, however, their assertion relates to the totality of knowledge, and more than this, strange as it may seem, to the totality of things. It looks beyond all unities of generalization, all conditioned principles, and lays down an ultimate principle. The individual transcends his own knowledge, and predicates concerning the knowledge of his race. He looks at the nature of knowing as he finds it within himself, and makes an unconditional affirmation that knowledge is relative. All things known and knowable are relative—that is to say, they are not independent and self-sufficient, but dependent and correlative. The thought of the dependent and correlative is the thought of an existence that forms an element of a totality that includes it with that on which it depends and to which it relates. A thing is relative and dependent just in so far as it exists, not in itself, but in another. It is likewise known to be independent and relative only in so far as its totality is known to transcend it. By this assertion of universal relativity, therefore, relation is posited in the totality. Moreover, by the distinction made between our knowledge and a possibility of an existence of things in themselves beyond our knowledge, the idea of a totality makes its appearance again. Certainly, the subjective, and all that is opposed to it as objective, both the knowable and the unknowable, constitute together a totality. And just as the law of the finite is the law of relativity or dependence, so the law of the totality is self-relativity and independence. In setting up the universal law of relativity there was implied unconsciously the self-relative totality as the ground of relativity, and including it.

Hence all theories of knowledge in general, whether sceptical or otherwise, are philosophical in their nature, and they imply a positive knowledge of the totality and self-conditioned, just as much as do the dogmatic systems of philosophy.

To Kant belongs the immortal honor of having set forth with exhaustiveness the conditions of sceptical philosophizing. The ten old tropes, and their completer statement in the five new ones, as given by the most able of the ancients in this school of thought—Sextus Empiricus—form a fragmentary and unsystematic exposition of the basis of scepticism. The Kantian Critiques do not accomplish everything that can be desired, but they open the true road to insight into philosophic method, and in doing this lay bare the causes and occasions of all scepticism. For scepticism arises only from partial, incomplete insight into method. Method relates to the connection between the first principle and the world of things that proceed from it. It concerns, therefore, the genesis of the world.

Besides the methods inductive and deductive, so called, we may discriminate other forms as subjective and objective methods. The method by which the individual passes from opinion to truth—from immediate certainty to the cognition of universality and necessity—the passage from crude first views of a subject to an exhaustive comprehension of it in its totality—this is subjective method. The method by which an object

develops in time the possibilities of its being—the process by which it realizes its several phases in time—in short, its historic evolution—the exposition of this is the objective method of treating a subject. If development or evolution is from the simple to the complex, it is obvious that the method of development may correspond to the subjective method, which also would appear to begin with what is simple and proceed to the complex. Moreover, the subjective method proceeds from partial, accidental phases of opinion to a knowing of the totality and necessity. Hence the subjective proceeds towards a knowing of universal forms, or logical conditions of existences. It results in the discovery of how we must know the objects of the world.

The Kantian Critique isolates this problem of the subjective method, and investigates it more profoundly than any previous system of philosophy has done. All philosophy previous to Kant was constructed on the foundation of Aristotle—Induction itself being no new system of philosophizing, but rather a process of collecting data from nature for the purpose of classification and explanation much after the manner used by Aristotle in conducting his own investigations. His was essentially an objective method. The ancient sceptics impinged on difficulties of subjective origin, and possible of solution only through an exhaustive investigation of subjective method. After the sceptics, the scholastics discover the same difficulty, discussing it in the terms of nominalism and realism. Do universals—that is to say, the ideas of genera and species—exist solely in the mind formed for subjective purposes of classification, or do they subsist objectively—are they corporeal or incorporeal—in brief, are universals *ante rem, in re, or post rem*, one or all of these? Scholasticism, it is said, found its historical occasion in a passage of the “Isagoge” of Porphyry, as translated by Boethius: “*Modo de generibus et speciebus illud quidem sive subsistant sive in solis nudis intellectibus posita sint, sive subsistentia corporalia sint an incorporalia et utrum separata a sensilibus an in sensilibus posita et circa haec consistentia, dicere recusabo.*” (Almost the only logical writings known to the Middle Ages up to the twelfth century were the translations from Aristotle and Porphyry by Boethius.) This question of the objectivity of universals is fundamental in modern philosophy, and it is singular that the Baconian induction takes for granted the doctrine that universals exist in nature, and may be discovered by empirical investigation, while almost all writers on psychology from the same school of philosophizing hold tenaciously that universals are subjective creations.

The very culmination of the difficulty involved in this problem is reached by David Hume's statement of it. Dr. Stirling summarizes the chief points as developed by Hume (Enquiry): 1. Sensation is the source of all elements of knowledge. 2. There is internal as well as external sensation. 3. Sensation externally is not more product of a sense than sensation internally. 4. What to us are the ideas of our thoughts are, in reality, only copies of our sensible impressions. To these we may add: 5. That, for knowledge, we are shut into our own subjective state of affection or impression: “nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception—this house and that tree are nothing but perceptions in the mind.” Impressions of sense, according to Hume, are our more lively perceptions, and all our ideas, including universals as well as recollections of particular sense-impressions, are the less lively perceptions derived from the former by reflecting upon them. With this doctrine we are left entirely without a bridge over which we may pass from subjectivity to objectivity. With this result the scope of philosophy is a narrow one, and a tolerably complete exposition of its positive doctrines may be written in a single chapter. But the negative bearings of this view may require more books than can be counted. For the

philosopher is called upon to explain the genesis of all ideas of species and genera, of all views of the world, or of departments of the world, or of all relations between objects perceived, or, what is more fundamental, explain how the mind erects a world of objects existing in space from the material given to it as feelings or impressions within itself, and existing only in time. To these themes for philosophic treatment may be added the explanation of the history of philosophic systems that shall account for the almost universal prevalence of error in human thinking.

Here it is, with Hume's clear statement of the question, that Kant takes up the enquiry. He finds in every state of consciousness, not alone particular impressions which may be elaborated into universals (but which are not accompanied by universals of equal or superior validity); he finds, on the contrary, both universals and particulars in every state of consciousness, the universals being the forms and logical conditions of the very existence of the particulars, or, rather, the conditions of our perception and thinking of those particulars. The mind, therefore, does not and cannot derive all general ideas from particular ideas. Its own activity must furnish all those general ideas that make experience of particular objects possible. Kant finds Time and Space, for instance, to be necessary as general ideas, in order that any sense-perception may be possible. Without Time and Space experience would remain mere impressions without unity either as objects or as events. He finds, further, the categories of quantity, quality, relation, and mode, and chief of these the category of relation which is called causality, as likewise indispensable to all experience, and, accordingly, as underrivable from experience. The exposition of this doctrine is the immortal service of Kant. There are further conclusions which Kant thinks necessary to draw from his doctrine—one, a negative one, unfolded in his treatise on the antinomies of pure reason, and another, his doctrine of the basis of morality, found in his "Critique of Practical Reason," considered by many to be the best fruit of all his thinking. The validity of his "Critique" of the antinomies is seriously questioned by later philosophy, and is, perhaps, only valuable as a stimulus to speculative enquiry. Dr. Stirling's translation and reproduction omit all consideration of the antinomies, and close with the second book of the first division just before the transition to the transcendental dialectic or discussion of the antinomies, which is found in the chapter on the ground of distinction of all objects in general into phenomena and noumena. In his preface he remarks, touching the part here translated, "It is all that, properly and peculiarly, is *constitutive* either *of* or *with* Kant (anything else, unless the categorical imperative, being either only negative and regulative, or simply a corollary)."

The reproduction here given amounts to a rewriting of the treatise, giving its essential thread of connection in a style equally remarkable for clearness, brevity, and completeness. The thought is faithfully reproduced, even with Kant's peculiar side reflections and transitions. It should be said, however, that this reproduction is not the entire work of Dr. Stirling, but only extracts from his entire work as it exists in manuscript.

It is in the translation that we discover best the great powers of the translator to perfectly grasp the difficult German of Kant, and express it again with faithful accuracy in pure English. No philosophic writer of our time is master of a style that so well deserves the rubric which Fichte placed at the beginning of one of his minor treatises: "A sun-clear statement to the public at large . . . an attempt to force the reader to an understanding."

This text-book to Kant, therefore, we conceive to be what its title implies—precisely the book needed by the students of philosophy, whether found in colleges and universities, or pursuing their investigations by themselves.

W. T. H.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

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Anglicanism, Old Catholicism, and the Union of the Christian Episcopal Churches: An Essay on the Religious Question of Russia. By the Rev. Cæsarius Tondini. London: Basil Montagu Pickering. 1875.

Appendix to First Principles, dealing with Criticisms. By Herbert Spencer. London: Williams & Nergate. 1880.

Jewish Mediæval Philosophy and Spinoza. By W. R. Sorley, M. A. Reprinted from "Mind," July, 1880.

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Boletín de la Institucion Libre de Enseñanza. Numbers 80 and 81. Madrid: June and July, 1880.

Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle. Compiled by Edwin Wallace. Oxford and London: James Parker & Co. 1880.

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The Berkeley Quarterly: A Journal of Social Science. January, 1880. Published by the Fortnightly Club, Berkeley, California.

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Separat-abdruck aus dem archiv für Anatomie und Physiologie. Herausgegeben von His u. Braune und von E. Du Bois-Reymond. Leipzig: Verlag von Veit & Comp. Physiologische Abtheilung, 1879. Inhalt: Ueber die Abhängigkeit der Reactionszeiten vom Ort des Reizes. Von G. S. Hall und J. von Kries. Die willkürliche Muskelaction. Von Hugo Kronecker und G. Stauley Hall.

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- Grunddragen af Emanuel Hvalgren's Filosofiska System. Göteborg. 1879.
- Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der mathematischen Wissenschaften. Auf Grundlage der heliocentrischen Philosophie dargestellt von Alfons Bilharz und Portus Danneger. Sigmaringen. 1880.
- L'esprit de l'economie politique par François Mosser. Naples. 1879.
- ΛΟΓΟΔΟΣΙΑ ΤΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟ ΔΕΚΑΤΟΝ ΤΕΤΑΡΤΟΝ ΕΤΟΣ.
ΦΕΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ ΥΠΟ ΕΜΜΑΝΟΥΗΛ ΔΡΑΓΟΜΑΙ ΠΡΟΕΔΡΟΥ.
Athens. 1880.
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- Preadamites; or a Demonstration of the Existence of Men before Adam; together with a Study of their Condition, Antiquity, Racial Affinities, and Progressive Dispersion over the Earth. By Alexander Winchell. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co. 1880.
- The Free School System of the United States. By Francis Adams. London: Chapman & Hall. 1875.
- The Verdendorps: A Novel. By Basil Verdendorp. Chicago: Charles M. Hertig. 1880.
- Ideality in the Physical Sciences. By Benjamin Peirce. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1881.
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- Dr. Appleton: His Life and Literary Relics. By John H. Appleton and A. H. Sayce. London: Trübner & Co. 1881.
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- English Literature in the Eighteenth Century. By A. H. Welsh. With an Introduction by R. G. Hutchins. Columbus, O.: G. J. Brand & Co. 1880.
- The Schoolmaster—Past and Future. A Lecture. By the Rev. R. H. Quick. Cambridge. 1879.

The Influence of Language on Thought. By Prof. Wm. D. Wilson, of Cornell University. (From the Proceedings of the University Convocation of the State of New York, July 8-10, 1879.)

Interpretation of Greek Mythology. St. Louis: G. I. Jones & Co. 1880.

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On Mr. Spencer's Formula of Evolution as an Exhaustive Statement of the Changes of the Universe. By Malcolm Guthrie. Followed by a *résumé* of the most important Criticisms of Spencer's "First Principles." London: Trübner & Co. 1879.

The Fundamental Concepts of Modern Philosophic Thought, Critically and Historically Considered. By Rudolph Eucken. Translated by M. Stuart Phelps, with Additions and Corrections by the Author, and an Introduction by Noah Porter. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1880.

Theory of Music. By H. R. Palmer. Cincinnati: John Church & Co. 1876.

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Some Thoughts concerning Education. By John Locke. With Introduction and Notes by the Rev. R. H. Quick, M. A. Cambridge. 1880.

Exile: A Dramatic Episode. By Lewis J. Block. St. Louis: G. I. Jones & Co. 1880.

Through Rome on: A Memoir of Christian and extra-Christian Experience. By Nathaniel Ramsay Waters. New York: Charles P. Somerby. 1877. *Page 4*: "The conclusions reached by me and published now . . . are the fruit of long, diligent, and conscientious study." *Page 5*: "More than thirty-five years ago I began to seek for truth and peace in religion. . . . My search showed me that the dogmatic foundations of Protestant Christianity rest on sand, and brought me to acceptance of the Roman Catholic religion as the embodiment of Divine Revelation. . . . After eight years in the belief and practice of Catholicism, I found myself in early manhood arrived, by the inevitable working of my intellectual and moral constitution, at the rejection of the premise of the Infallible Oracle, on which all dogmatic Christians build their systems of faith. From this renunciation of the underlying assumption of all the creeds, my progress was rapid to the views and state of mind set forth in the later pages of this volume."

The Children of Light. By Rev. Wm. W. Fair. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1877. The Fletcher Prize Essay for 1877. *Contents*: Lights and Shadows, a Survey; Part First, Coming to Light; Part Second, Mistaking Darkness for Light; Part Third, Standing in the Light; Part Fourth, Walking in the Light; Part Fifth, Working in the Light.

Ethik oder Wissenschaft von Seinsollenden. Neu Begründet und im Umriss ausgeführt von Dr. Phil. Rudolf Seydel, A. O. Prof. der Phil., Univ. Leipzig. [Pages 58 to 67 contain a hitherto unpublished treatise of C. H. Weisse, on "The Principle of Ethics," written in the summer of 1864.]

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[No. 3.]

PHILOSOPHY IN RELATION TO ITS HISTORY.¹

It has occurred to me that no topic could be more usefully or appropriately dwelt upon, at the opening of the present session of the Aristotelian Society, than the relations which obtain between the History of Philosophy and Philosophy itself, the light which they reciprocally throw upon each other, and the assistance which the study of each may derive from the study of its complementary member. The Society wisely determined to begin its labors with an outline of the History of Philosophy; and this was carried in our former session down to the end of the Greek or classical period. I venture to say *wisely*, because the method imposed upon us by our circumstances being that of self-instruction, and therefore tentative, and not dogmatic, the very first outlines of the subject-matter of philosophy itself are best learnt from its history by seeing what sorts of questions have occupied the attention of philosophers, or those reputed to be such, and not from any manual or general view of the problems of philosophy, or of the distinction of its various branches.

We are now, in the present session, about to enter upon a simi-

¹ An address delivered before the Aristotelian Society of London, October 11, 1880, by Shadworth H. Hodgson, Hon. LL. D. Edin., President.

lar outline of the remaining part of the history of philosophy; and the occasion seems opportune for bringing forward into distinct consciousness what sort of assistance we may expect, what sort of information we may derive, what sort of questions, relatively to philosophy itself, we may look to have raised, and how far these questions are to be answered, by a general conspectus of the course which philosophical speculation and philosophical investigation have followed down to our own times.

Taking these points, then, as the text of the following remarks, we must, in the very first place, begin by asking ourselves what, in the most general and provisional manner, is our conception of philosophy; what is that subject-matter the history of which we are to trace; in short, of *what* is it the history? I say, in the most general and provisional manner we must answer this question, because a more definite answer would trench upon controverted ground, and would, in fact, involve some theory or other about the nature of philosophy, which is among those very questions which we are going to the history of philosophy to get light thrown upon.

Now, I think we may best avoid dogmatic assumptions if we imitate the method of our great *Eponymus*, Aristotle, in setting out on an inquiry, at the very origin of it, by asking what we ourselves, and reasonable men in general, *mean* by the term in question. If we ask what we, and reasonable people in general, mean by the term *philosophy*, I apprehend we shall find it something of this kind. In any subject whatever, great or small, we come to the philosophy of that subject when we come to explain to ourselves the facts or the conceptions which lie at the root of the laws governing it, or at the root of the axioms, if any, upon which its laws depend: facts or conceptions, therefore, which *connect* that subject with higher or larger subjects, at the same time that they are presupposed by the laws and by the axioms which are appropriate to the subject itself. The axioms and the laws of that subject are its *science*, the connection of its axioms and laws with a higher or larger field of thought is its *philosophy*, showing whence it comes and whither it tends. In order to have the philosophy of a subject, it is not enough to have an intelligent knowledge of the facts and laws and method of the subject itself; it is requisite also to have its *rationale*—that is, its connection with

other subjects, and its place and title to its place in the order of nature.

For instance, a man may be a thorough master of the art of brick-making, he may know what bricks are, what sort of clay is the best, and what are the best methods of making them; but he does not possess the philosophy of brick-making until he connects brick-making with architecture.

So in verse-making; a man may have a perfect knowledge of metres and rhythms, of sounds long and short, rough and smooth; but he does not possess the philosophy of verse-making until he connects it with poetry, until he sees the place which verse-making holds in the greater art of conveying and enforcing imaginative pleasure by means of the articulate sounds of language.

Again, in mathematic, a man may be an excellent mathematician if he possesses the axioms, the definitions, the methods, and the practice of calculation founded on them; but he does not possess the philosophy of mathematic until he connects the axioms, definitions, and methods with certain most elementary and ineradicable notions of the human mind, and with the more general method of logical thinking.

Every subject, from the least to the greatest, both in practice and speculation, has its *rationale*—that is, its philosophy—or, in other words, its rational connection with a larger whole, a whole of greater comprehensiveness, of more elementary conceptions, of simpler, fewer, and, at the same time, more fundamental and more universal facts. Every special branch of knowledge thus leads up, by its philosophy, to a sphere of knowledge wider and more general than itself; and since this is the case with *every* special branch of knowledge, while the branches together constitute our picture or conception of the universe at large, and this universe is necessarily seen by us, who look at it mentally from within, as one single universe and not several (which indeed is expressed by the name *universe*), therefore it happens that philosophy *par excellence* is the highest and largest *rationale* we can frame to our minds of the facts which the universe contains, and of the connection between its parts; and also points forward to a higher and larger *rationale* still, which is *ex hypothesi* beyond our reach, but which also *ex hypothesi* would, *if* we could reach it, contain the *rationale* of that *rationale*, and be the philosophy of *our* philosophy, what

ever the height or largeness of comprehensiveness *our* philosophy may at any time have reached, or may yet reach in the future.

I feel myself, gentlemen, to be here verging on controverted ground, and therefore I shall say no more on this point. I mean that the nature, scope, and powers of philosophy, of our human philosophy, are matters of great debate and contention, especially whether we are or are not justified in taking into account, in any way, the possible existence of a knowledge beyond our human philosophy; that is to say, whether our human philosophy has anything whatever to do with the possibility of an existence beyond its own reach; or, again, in other words, whether that *infinity*, which is *apparently* involved in the conception of ever-widening spheres of knowledge, is or is not an illusion to which it may be pernicious to attend.

This is one of the questions which are to be answered, if at all, only by a thorough investigation of philosophy itself. For whatever may be the answer, it is clear that philosophy has no *other* branch of knowledge beyond or larger than itself. Its *rationale* can be given at any rate only by itself; or, in other words, philosophy and the *rationale* of philosophy are one and the same thing in point of kind. I say no more, therefore, on this point. But I would suggest—and this brings me back to the more immediate subject of the present address—that this question should be kept present to the mind in studying the History of Philosophy as we are about to do in the present session. I mean that it will form a useful clew or light, in reading any philosophical author, to keep asking ourselves, from time to time, how his views bear on what I may perhaps call the question of the infinite or finite character of philosophical truth.

In taking, then, the History of Philosophy as our subject, we are really taking the series of those writers who have made it their aim to discover what I have described as the *Rationale of the Universe*. This aim it is which constitutes them *philosophers*, and the series of their theories the *history* of philosophy; for it is the history of the progress made towards a satisfactory rationale of the universe, as mentally visible from a human centre.

Now, two things in this progress seem to call for special remark. The first is, that there is a definite progress in it, and a definite direction; there is a main highway, and there are side-ways

branching out from it, consisting either of subsidiary and auxiliary inquiries, or it may be of false routes struck into and followed from time to time, which seemed or seem promising, but in reality do not lead to the satisfactory rationale which is the final aim. This, then, is another question which ought to be present to the mind in reading the history of philosophy: Is the work or the theory before us in the highway of philosophy, or is it a subsidiary inquiry, or is it a false start?

The second thing to be noticed is the essential and inevitable anthropomorphism of *all* philosophical theories. It is not only in theology that anthropomorphism is found, but in all philosophical speculation also. Everything comes to man through the medium of his faculties, through modes of his sense-perceptions, through the mode in which he thinks, or his logical faculty, and also through the modes of his more inward sensibility, his sensibility to emotions, as well as to the various kinds of pleasure and pain both of emotion and of sense, and, most important, perhaps, of all in its influence on philosophy, through his moral sensibility or perception of what is morally right and wrong.

It is mainly by noting the consequences of this latter circumstance that we can trace a progress in a definite direction in the history and distinguish the character of the various theories in the series. The aim of a Rationale of the Universe was at first perceived but dimly; I mean that what it *involved* was not clearly perceived at first. But the conception expanded, and disclosed differences from within, in proportion as thought was fixed upon it, and as former theories supplied a starting-point and pabulum for new speculations.

We have at the beginning the physical theories of the Ionic school. Even these were anthropomorphic in the sense that certain constructions of the sense-faculties of man, I mean material substances, were taken as *realities* which were considered, at any rate tentatively and provisionally, as ultimate realities. The anthropomorphism of the theories was not the less real because it was naive and unsuspected by the theorists.

It was a step in advance when moral conceptions, such as love and hate, were brought in to complete the materialism of the earliest theories, notwithstanding that these conceptions were derived directly from the innate mythological and imaginative tendency

of the mind, and, when combined with the materialistic theories, robbed them of their strictly *scientific* character. The moral element thus introduced gave the theories a more comprehensive and, therefore, a more philosophical scope, separated them from theories which were scientific only, and sent the streams of science and philosophy to flow thenceforth and forever in different but connected channels.

It was again a great advance when logical conceptions were brought in, as they were by the Eleatic school, the conceptions of the One and the Many, the Permanent and the Changeable, and *real* existence sought for only in the former. This was logical anthropomorphism.

Moral considerations of a higher order were made the staple of philosophy by Socrates; and by Plato these were combined with speculative considerations, in his theories regarding Ideas, depending on the one supreme Idea, τὸ ἔν, which was also τὸ ἀγαθόν. This may be called the issue, result, and transfiguration of the lower and cruder forms of love and hate. Moral Good, according to Plato, had originally ordered and continued to rule the universe.

Aristotle presents us with a further elaboration of these conceptions. His definite distinction of four kinds of causes—the material, the efficient, the formal, and the final; the conceptions of substance and attributes; his great distinction between potentiality and actuality, as, respectively, the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of every strictly natural process; and the full separate treatment which he gave to so many branches of the world of thought—mark the culminating point of Greek philosophy.

Systems there were, also, which made moral considerations the centre of speculative theories; such were Stoicism and Epicureanism. This was a transposition of the speculative centre of gravity, which marks, as it seems to me, a side-way of philosophy, leading to no final rationale of the universe. I do not wish to dogmatize on the point. I would merely suggest, on the occasion of mentioning these two great schools, the question which they seem to raise for students of the history of philosophy—the question whether a *practical* principle can be made the centre, pivot, or basis of a theory of the *universe*, which, as something far transcending man's minute powers of affecting it, is to an enormous

extent removed from the practical *application* of that principle, though remaining always the object of theoretical inquiry.

In Neo-platonism we have an attempt to combine theology and morals with philosophical speculation in one comprehensive theory based upon Plato's τὸ ἀγαθόν. What are we to think of a system of this kind? I know not whether I am right, but two things occur to me which seem to militate against its sufficiency. In the first place, it was already ruined beforehand in its base, inasmuch as Plato's own theory had been already transcended by Aristotle's analysis. The theory that Ideas were efficient forces was no longer tenable; the realistic doctrine, as it was afterwards called, namely, that universals were real things, real forces, was no longer tenable. It was one thing to say with Aristotle that the real thing was to be apprehended by way of definition—that is, by the intersection of two universals—and quite another thing to say with the Realists that a single universal could express a single reality.

In the next place, Neo-platonism, supposing itself to be the true philosophy, aspired to make this philosophy into a religion, to exhibit it as the truth of mythology and of cultus, from whatever origin they might have sprung, whether Greek or Oriental. Now, it is one thing, having a religion to begin with, to formulate it in philosophical language, to clothe it with a philosophical creed; and it is quite another thing to formulate first a philosophical system, and then to bring religion into it and make it serve as a creed. Religion will not be at home in a dwelling so fashioned. These things seem, in my eyes at least, to be flaws which mark Neo-platonism as a by-way, leading away from any final rationale. The first affects it in its character of a philosophy the second in its character of a religion.

We are now at the point reached by the Society in its former session. And we stand also at the threshold of a renovation in philosophy from a totally different source. We have traced it in its Greek stream; and we have traced it to its glorious result, the elaboration not merely of a theory, but of a *system* of theories, a philosophical system of many theories, some strictly and solely scientific, others strictly philosophic, but all connected into a great philosophical whole, the work of our own *Eponymus*, Aristotle. In Aristotle we find a system of various branches. First, there are his Physics, then his Astronomy, then his Natural History,

then his Psychology: this series begins with matter and ends with mind; then we have another series which begins with mind and ends with the universe: first, the *Organon*, that is to say, the theory of Logical Thought, and the theory of its application to the discovery of the Laws of Nature: then we have the practical sciences of Ethic and Politic, and the subsidiary science of literature in the Rhetoric and Poetic; and finally we have the crown of the edifice in the unfinished treatises of the Metaphysic, or First Philosophy, or, as Aristotle also named it, Theology.

We have in Aristotle's system the very type and mould of all genuinely philosophical speculation. But was this system final, in the sense that it required only filling up of its outlines, and correction of details by fuller knowledge and further discoveries? Did it *so* take in all human knowledge as to be secure from being overturned in its principles? I put these questions not as being about to suggest an answer to them, but, on the contrary, to remark that, in my opinion, the true answer is yet to be given by the course of philosophical history which is to us at the present day *future*. We have not yet seen, mankind has yet to see, what the result upon the main principles of Aristotle's philosophical system, as a system not of science but of philosophy, what the final result will be, of the introduction into human life and thought of that moral and emotional principle, of that *spiritual* power, which is designated by the word Christianity. It may be that the Aristotelian outlines will expand to contain it; it may be that a new system of conceptions will be demanded for the purpose.

That principle of spiritual life which we call Christianity had its own battle to fight, with internal or at least intimately connected foes; in struggling against which it was compelled to cast itself into the mould of a philosophical creed or theological philosophy, in which form it was, when reached, that it imposed itself upon the nations composing modern Europe, after the breaking up of the Roman Empire. The struggle which resulted in its being constituted as a theological philosophy, the battle fought by the Christian principle of spiritual life, was fought against Gnosticism, and such heresies, as they were called, of the first few centuries, as were more or less of a Gnostic character. Gnosticism also was a theological philosophy, and had its home in the East, on the

border-land between the Greek and the Semitic intellect, a territory which was long debated between it and Christianity.

The nature of this struggle you may read vividly depicted by one who was himself involved in it, in its later stage, by St. Augustine (A. D. 354 to 430) in that part of his *Confessions* which relates his inner struggle with, and final conversion from, Manichæanism. This little book, the *Confessions* of Augustine, ought to be familiar to every student of philosophy. Besides the deep personal interest of it, and besides its historical interest, the direct and searching philosophical analysis which it contains on many points, the theory of Memory and Association of Ideas, for instance, renders it most instructive.

By St. Augustine's time the battle had really been won. Christianity had in the course of it invested itself in the panoply of a theological philosophy, which in later times was destined possibly to be more of an encumbrance than a help, when the enemies of the spiritual life which is its essence were of a totally different order. But such as it was, it was a system which was capable of harmonizing with the Aristotelian system, or at least with a particular reading of that system, which by the fusion of the two became fixed and authorized as the true one. The system which arose from the union of the Aristotelian and Church philosophies is that system which is known as *Scholasticism*; the great philosophical construction which employed the intellectual energies of the Middle Ages, and which still looks down upon us like a vast cathedral of thought, promising itself a duration even longer than the material cathedrals which are its coevals and its counterparts.

Here I will pause for a moment to remark that the title by which the new spiritual life of Christianity comes into philosophy lies in its containing *new facts* in human nature. There were certain phenomena in human nature which were developed in the consciousness of the Hebrew nation, and were all but unknown to the Greeks, all but unknown to the Romans. These phenomena are generally summed up in the word *Revelation*. But it makes no difference, for the present purpose, whether we call them a revelation from God or not; they are at any rate *facts* in human nature and human character. And facts in human nature and character are as much facts upon which philosophy is to be built as are facts in the physical constitution of the material world.

Man as well as nature, or, in other words, nature in *all* its branches—inorganic, organic, and consciously organic—is the subject-matter of philosophy, which aims at a rationale of the universe. It would be the *play* of *Hamlet* without the *part* of *Hamlet* to omit them. That is not only why we have a theology in place of a philosophy in modern Europe, but also why we cannot contest the right of this theology to be really a philosophy. Philosophy must make room within itself for a religious philosophy just as much as it must make room for a philosophy of morals, or for a philosophy of poetry and poetical imagination.

I will mention one of the most cardinal of the facts which I have spoken of as developed in the consciousness of the Hebrew nation, and necessitating a renovation of philosophy. It is that sense of standing in immediate relation to an Infinite and Omniscient Power, a sense which made *humility* appear as the true attitude of man, the creature of a day, a finite and imperfect Being, in the hand of a Being infinite and perfect. Humility towards God became thus a distinguishing mark of Christianity, and, regarded as a virtue, was a virtue unknown to Greek ethic. And the change thus wrought extended not only to man's relations with the Divine; it modified also the whole aspect of his relations to his fellow-men. But it was not in the character of an ethical theory that this sense of the Divine Infinity necessitated the renovation of philosophy; it was in the character of a *fact* in human nature which had to be accounted for and made room for in speculative theories. Human nature was a different thing, in respect of this fact, from what it had been conceived to be by Greek philosophers. The question was, What was the origin, what the permanence, what the bearing on other facts, of this profound sense of a personal relation to the Divine Infinity? This was one of the new ingredients which entered into Christian philosophy, and finally combined with Aristotelianism in the great system of Scholasticism.

The question concerning Scholasticism is not whether it is a philosophy; for its aim and scope of being a rationale of the universe guarantees this, just as the same scope guarantees the same title to Hegelianism, or to Agnosticism, or even to Comtian Positivism; though with regard to this last it must be remembered that, since Comte expressly repudiates the attempt to deal with

the *universe*, and substitutes the expression *world*, as the proper object of philosophy, we can only bring Comte's system under our present large definition of philosophy by adding a limitation and defining it, say, as a rationale of the universe so far as such a rationale is *profitably* to be sought for—a limitation whereby a practical consideration is made the pivot upon which that philosophical system turns. The question, I say, with regard to Scholasticism is not whether it is a philosophy; the question is simply this—and this ought to be present to our minds in considering its history—whether its rationale of the universe is a true and sufficient one.

Its claims are actually present claims. We are too apt to forget, in Protestant countries, that it survived the Renaissance; survived it not only in Roman Catholic countries, where it is still taught officially, but in Protestant countries also, our own for instance, where the ordinary notions current on philosophical topics being derived from Church teaching, are all of a Scholastic character, fragments, so to speak, of Scholasticism, though we have forgotten out of what rock it is that they are hewn. Every one at the present day who has, or rather thinks he has, no philosophy at all, and does not aim at having one, not being at the same time a pronounced sceptic, is really an adherent of Scholasticism. And hence also in some cases it is, that those who reject either Scholasticism, or the previous theological philosophy on which it was partly based, are sometimes taxed by their adherents, not with philosophical error only, but also with the religious error of infidelity. The term *infidelity* is an easily discharged missile, but one that is rarely discharged by artillery of precision, for it is an ambiguous term, meaning both disloyalty to God and disbelief of a creed concerning him. It is a fact which throws much light on the present situation, that every religion, the moment that it clothes itself with a creed, clothes itself with a philosophy, and to that extent becomes amenable to philosophical criticism. Now, the line between a religion and its creed is a line not easy to draw.

The history of philosophy entered on another phase at the time of the Renaissance, along with all other branches of knowledge and culture. Partly the general development of thought, partly the new acquaintance made with classical antiquity, partly the

new progress made in scientific invention and discovery, gave a new impulse and direction to philosophical speculation also. Various currents arose and crossed or blended with each other. The activity of thought was immense. The reaction against Aristotle which was so prominent a feature in the turmoil, in Giordano Bruno, for instance, and in Bacon, was at bottom far less a reaction against Aristotle than against Scholasticism, with which his great name had been identified. Thus was opened the modern era in philosophy—an era of mental activity recalling, and indeed repeating, on a higher and more complex stage, with new ingredients in philosophical questions, ingredients more especially of a spiritual or religious character, the philosophical activity of Greece before Aristotle.

In reading this part of philosophical history it will be well to keep the question constantly before the mind, In what precise ways these three, or other similar causes, operated to change or broaden the current of philosophical ideas, I mean Religion, Greek Literature, and Scientific Progress. What were the relations of the Reformation to philosophy? What those of general culture? What those of science? The effect of the last seems to have been, and still to continue in our own days, most marked and definite. Everywhere, in instance after instance, in explaining the properties of things, the scientific conception of relations took the place of the Scholastic conception of *causes*—causes which were inherent in the nature of substances and destined for the production of their specific effects. Gravity, for instance, was no longer regarded as a specific property, inherent by nature in heavy matter, causing it to fall; but the phenomena of rising and falling bodies were shown to be resolvable into the relative composition of volumes or masses of matter and the relative movements of their parts according to certain laws. Everywhere the short and easy solution apparently offered by occult causes, inherent in the nature of particular classes of things, was shown to be delusive. And while in this way our apparent knowledge vanished and our real knowledge grew, the prospect of an *ultimate* solution became ever more and more remote; the philosophical horizon receded, and the philosophical problem had to be restated.

A rationale of the universe was still the problem before the philosophers of every school and every tendency. In this point

the modern philosophy differed not from the Greek. But was there not some general and pervading difference between the two, common to all the modern schools, and differentiating them all alike from the ancient, besides the difference of the higher stage of scientific knowledge on which they stand, and besides the possession of the new religious ingredients in the problem?

The *general* difference between ancient and modern philosophy is a question well worthy of being kept before the mind in reading its history. How does a modern differ from an ancient in his way of viewing philosophical questions; or is there no other difference besides those I have mentioned? It has been often suggested, and I think correctly, that an increased predominance of *subjectivity* is the general mark distinctive of modern philosophy; by which is meant, that we moderns approach philosophical questions not so much by asking what the things *are* into which we inquire, as by asking what we *know* about them, and what they *appear* to us as being. Here, as it seems to me, is the distinctive and general mark of modern philosophy.

Observe where and at what point, or rather at what period, in the history of philosophy the distinction assumes reality and manifests itself as operative. It was during the period of the Renaissance, it was when men's minds assumed the attitude of self-guided inquirers, tentatively learning to see and read the book of nature and of man, instead of the attitude of developing a dogmatic system from principles supposed to be beyond the reach of doubt. It was, in other words, during the period when men turned away from the elaborate system of Scholasticism, based upon the Aristotelian conception of *Substances*, and asked themselves what in fact either they, or Aristotle himself, knew about substances; asked, in short, not what substances *were*, but what they were *known* to them *as being*.

The importance of this change of attitude, as bearing on the history of philosophy, consisted in this, that it turned men's attention inwards, to the analysis of the mind's endowments and modes of operation. It turned men's attention to what is sometimes called *psychology* as distinguished from *metaphysic*. It sent them to look at the facts of consciousness as such; instead of deducing endless strings of conclusions from the definitions of the various entities, or substances, their attributes, accidents, and relations. It

sent them again to *facts*, and this time more especially to *subjective* facts. I do not myself adopt the terms *psychology* and *metaphysic* in the meanings I have just assigned to them. But that is matter of nomenclature. The facts indicated are, I think, indisputable; the study of the definitions of abstract entities, treated as realities, was neglected for the study of the facts of consciousness as they lay open to introspective analysis.

The connection of this analysis with physiology was another step in the same direction. And this is a branch in which, as I need hardly remind you, the most significant discoveries are being made by modern research at the present time. Physiological psychology is an indispensable auxiliary of philosophy proper. It is not by itself philosophy, for its purpose is not to find a rationale of the universe; but as controlling the speculations which are directed to that end, by showing what the material and organic conditions are upon which all feeling and thought depend, it furnishes an aid to philosophy which is daily and yearly becoming more considerable and more definite.

From Descartes downwards, through all the series of philosophers of the seventeenth and the greater part of the eighteenth century—in Gassendi, in Spinoza, in Hobbes, in Malebranche, in Leibnitz, in Locke, in Berkeley, in Hume, in Wolf, in Mendelssohn—the problem which chiefly occupied attention, and upon which the rest were made to hinge, was the large and complex one of the Relation between the Soul and the Body. It was a vast problem, including many subordinate ones, which presented various faces for examination, and gave rise to various theories, as, for instance, those of “physical influence,” of “occasional causes,” of “pre-established harmony,” of “innate ideas,” of the “ideality of matter.” I do not mean that this problem was taken as the whole of philosophy, but that it was that part of philosophy upon which men’s minds were predominantly engaged. Not only the subjective, but more particularly the psychological, side of philosophy was therein uppermost.

But the most decisive step in the direction of subjective analysis, and away from the method of deduction from definitions of entities, was taken at the end of the last century by Kant. The time was ripe, and the man appeared. I will not dwell upon what he did for philosophy, or how he did it. We shall no doubt have

this well discussed when his turn arrives, in the course of the present session. I will content myself with remarking that, so closely do we still stand under the shadow of Kant's great theory of the nature and mode of knowledge, for us the study of philosophy and the study of its history almost coincide in the study of Kant.

Kant, we may say, brought entities to the surface, made the irreducible, insoluble, foreign matter in the body of knowledge show itself in its true colors; but he did not himself expel it from the system. I allude, of course, to the *Dinge-an-sich*, *Things-in-themselves*, of which he gave us the subjective theory in his "Critique of Pure Reason." From that time to this, what we have had in philosophy is either attempts at systems or rationales of the universe constructed without *Things-in-themselves*, or attempts at bringing in *Things-in-themselves* again by systems of an openly or covertly Scholastic character.

I do not know that it is needful to enumerate the principal philosophies which are urging their claims at the present day; nevertheless, for the sake of precision and definiteness, it may be advisable to do so. First, there is Scholasticism, of which we have already spoken; then there are the two German systems, Hegelianism on one side, Schopenhauer's system, and Schopenhauer's system as modified by Von Hartmann, on the other; then there is Comtian Positivism; then there is what may be called Philosophical Phenomenism, of which M. Renouvier is the chief exponent; then there is Mr. Herbert Spencer's system, which, having "The Unknowable" for its basis, may fairly, I suppose, be called Agnosticism. All these aim at some rationale of the universe, and therefore come within the description of *Philosophies*; the question, of course, being reserved, how far any of them is a true or sufficient rationale, or capable of being developed into one.

Besides these there are numerous philosophical theories or systems, which it would be impossible to enumerate here, even if I could do it, associated with the names of distinguished writers, and founded some mainly upon Leibnitzian, some upon Spinozistic, others upon Kantian or upon post-Kantian ideas, and striking out lines and methods of inquiry more or less important and original. The post-Kantian epoch, to which we belong, has been, and has not yet ceased to be, fruitful in speculations, the issue of which is

not at present visible; it is comparable, in complexity at least, to the Renaissance period in philosophy.

Finally, there ought to be mentioned, to make our sketch complete, two tendencies rather than systems of philosophy, always at least latent in the world, and sometimes prominent; I mean, first, philosophical Scepticism, which denies the possibility of any tenable philosophical theory at all; and, secondly, philosophical Materialism, which regards solid resisting matter as the be-all and end-all of existence.

Such is a brief, necessarily a very brief, sketch of the chief features in the philosophical world in which we live. Such is the last and now present stage of that course of the history of philosophy which we either have traced in our former session, or have now to trace in the present one. I have made no mention of the philosophies or philosophers of other times or countries than those which are our own immediate forerunners; have said nothing of the systems of China, or of ancient India, or of ancient Persia. Not that these are not of extreme interest in many ways, or that they do not throw great light on our own philosophical history; but that I think it is of prime importance to realize this great fact, namely, that philosophy itself, at *any* stage, and therefore our own philosophy at the present day, is the outcome and the product of its own previous history, and that this history at every stage has been influenced and conditioned by the social and political circumstances surrounding the men who devoted themselves to philosophical study.

Just as in any other branch of history, just as in social and political history at large, so also in the history of philosophy, the past is the parent of the present, and both together of the future. Students of philosophy, those who labor either at discovering some new fact which may be built into a rationale of the universe, or at removing some old error or dispelling some old obscurity, are in fact helping to make philosophical history as well as to make philosophy; are making philosophical history in the same sense as those are making political and social history who take part in political and social life with the view of promoting some distinct line of policy. Let no one think that he is not philosophizing unless he produces a *system* of philosophy. Every step made towards clear and distinct thinking, on any subject, and on any point how-

ever minute, if made with a view towards a philosophy or rationale of the whole of knowledge (for that is the important point), has a true philosophical value, and may help others as well as ourselves.

The study of philosophical history is, therefore, chiefly important for this, for the light it throws upon the state of philosophy itself at the present time; it shows us the significance and the drift of philosophical questions, just as the history of a nation is important as throwing light upon the significance and the drift of institutions, laws, and political measures. That is the main and immediate *use* of the History of Philosophy; that is the main service which it renders to the students of philosophy itself. And this it is, this point of view it is, which it is important before all things to keep in mind while studying the history. The history serves as a lantern to show us where we are going, and what we are doing, in philosophy.

We may learn much, no doubt, from the writings of philosophers, from their controversies, from the method in which they handle philosophical questions. But in so using them we are using them *not* as history but as philosophy, we are taking them not on their historical but on their philosophical side. The works of the great masters, Plato, for instance, or Aristotle, or Kant, are in this respect imperishable and indispensable sources of instruction. They form the mind for philosophy, and are as fresh and living now as they were when they first saw light. The systems perish, the methods remain:

“The form remains, the function never dies.”

But, I repeat, there is a wide difference between studying the works of those who have made a name and a place for themselves in the history of philosophy, as works of philosophy, and studying them as parts of the history. In the former case we are really studying, not the history of philosophy, but philosophy itself.

Such is the true connection, gentlemen, in my opinion, between philosophy and its history. But before concluding I will briefly contrast this with two other ways of studying the history, which will bring out my meaning perhaps more clearly. In the first place, the history of philosophy being, as we have seen, a part or branch of the general history of mankind, we may study it *in that*

character. We may study it, I mean, not so much in connection with its subject-matter, philosophy, as in connection with other branches of general history, and in order to throw light on the general history rather than on philosophical problems. This would be treating it as a portion of general mental development, and in this way it is part of the general field to be trodden by the historian of mankind. It is then studied without any express reference to the truth or error, the sufficiency or insufficiency, of the rationales of the universe which are or have been proposed from time to time in the course of the history, but solely with regard to the *fact* that such and such theories have been proposed. It is not needful to a student of this kind to have any interest in philosophy as such: to him a philosophical system may have the interest which a rare plant or animal, or a curious fossil in some geological formation, has to the mere amateur in zoölogy or geology. But though this way of studying the history of philosophy is not only perfectly legitimate, but also has a great value and interest to the student of the general history of mankind, I question much whether a real and true understanding of any part of philosophical history is attainable in this way; I mean without the interest which springs from the subject of philosophy itself. Just in the same way I should be inclined to distrust the depth and accuracy of a history, say, of Literature or of Poetry, which was written by one who took no direct and immediate interest of his own in the beauty of a literary or poetical style. I should think him apt to be a Dryasdust.

The second way of treating the history of philosophy which I will mention is the very opposite of this. It consists in treating philosophy as already attained, the true rationale of the universe as already known, and from that height contemplating the progress made by the history as a progress up to the attainment of the true philosophy, and looking forward to its future history as a further development of the same theory. This way of looking at the history of philosophy is, of course, only possible to those who think that they have attained, at least to some considerable extent, a grasp of the true and final and sufficient theory of the universe. Their philosophical theory, their rationale of the universe, then furnishes them with a clew to the history; they judge every event and every stage in it, attribute importance or unim-

portance, look on it with favor or disfavor, according as it leads up to or away from the establishment of that philosophical position on which they have taken their stand.

This way of looking at the history of philosophy must be more or less, in greater or less degree, adopted by every one who believes himself, I do not say in possession of, but even on the high road to, a true theory of philosophy. In proportion as he is convinced of his theory, and in proportion as that theory is a complete one, will he be led by it into a *dogmatic* treatment of the history of philosophy. Any knowledge really attained becomes the stepping-stone to further knowledge—that is, becomes the basis from which you start, as an *a priori* foundation; that is, originates a method to some extent dogmatic.

Extreme instances of this way of treating the history of philosophy are those of Hegel and of the Scholastics. The latter make all history centre round the doctrines and discipline of the Church, and judge every theory and every event in history by its leading either up to or away from that central system. The former sees in all the history of philosophy, as in every other branch of history also, the development of the Logical Concept, *Begriff*, in its three stages, his theory being that the development of the Logical Concept is the true rationale of the universe.

Similar to these in some degree, but by no means so strictly or minutely dogmatic, is Comte's reading of the history of philosophy by the light of his "Law of the Three States," which supposes that the final stage of thought—that of positivism without metaphysic—has been reached and is possessed by the true leaders of thought, and will be finally taken possession of, with fuller knowledge, by mankind at large, who are to follow in their steps. But this law is not originally due to a theorem in philosophy itself, like those of Hegel and the Scholastics; it was in the study of the history of philosophy that it came to light, and, what is more important, not in the study of the history of philosophy as such, but in the study of it as a branch of general human history. On the one hand, therefore, it does not prescribe so minutely as the other two theories the course which philosophy has taken or is to take in the future; but then, on the other hand, it is not like them a law founded on a theorem of philosophy itself. It thus stands midway between the two modes of dealing with the history of

philosophy, which I have signalized, and draws some of its characteristics from the one and some of them from the other.

I think, gentlemen, that neither of these two ways will recommend itself to us for practical adoption in the present session. As to the dogmatic method, we are not yet, as a Society, in a position to accept any philosophical theory sufficiently complete to afford us the necessary vantage ground. And as to the other method, that of treating the history of philosophy as merely a part of the general history of civilization, we are, I presume, bent, as a Society, to trace out and to use the history of philosophy with the aim, and for the end, of deriving from it light upon the great subject of our study, philosophy itself. No other ultimate aim than this is expressed by the name which the Society has adopted. Our purpose, I apprehend, is to make out, and by combining our efforts to help each other to make out, whether any Rationale of the Universe is attainable; to what degree, whether of comprehensiveness or of minuteness, such a rationale can be carried; and what system or set of principles has the best claim to be such a rationale in both respects; I mean, in respect both of the comprehensiveness of its range, and of the thoroughness and stability of its principles of explanation. Adopting, then, the position and aims of inquirers in this whole matter, and keeping this position and aim in view, let us proceed to the study of the efforts of former laborers in the same field, to gather from them what help we can towards the attainment of the one common aim, theirs and ours, a complete and true philosophy, so far as it is attainable by human powers.

THE SOURCES AND FACULTIES OF COGNITION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE POLISH OF E. TRENTOWSKI (the first volume of his *Logie*) BY
I. PODBIELSKI.

Analysis of the sources and faculties of our cognition, together with its certitude and immediateness.

God, as the source of all things, is essence; the world is existence; and man is essence and existence in union. For the reason that in man essence and existence are united, it follows that in

man are found both godliness and worldliness [a divine element and a secular element].

Man, as essence, as godliness, stands in absolute unity with God. As worldliness, he stands in absolute unity with the world. This absolute unity makes possible to him the cognition of God and that of the world, and hence the cognition of the universe, or cognition in general. Without it he would not be capable of cognition.

We can demonstrate this in another way. God, the world, and man, have alike truth and knowledge for the factors of their being. Truth and knowledge unite in God and constitute His idea (*notio*). God is the first [primordial] focus [radiant-point] of the universe, or he is its perception, consciousness, and its own feeling of self, on the bosom of eternity, for this reason solely, that he is absolute idea (*notio*), that in Him truth and knowledge melt together and constitute God's selfhood or *I am*. Truth and knowledge, in the realm of nature, give rise to a Dualism. Truth is here, in nature, and knowledge is there, in God. Truth and knowledge do not unite here in the temporal nature's cognition (*notio*), and for that reason nature has no consciousness, nor its own feeling of self, its selfhood. God's creation was imperfect, because it did not have its own focus [or unity of consciousness]. God, wishing to complete it, breathed His essence into the most perfect of natural beings, or into the last being that he had created he breathed truth and knowledge by means of His idea (*notio*). And hence arose man as the being capable of cognition.

Man attains to cognition, and by this means realizes God's breath (*notio*). He is the second focus of the universe, or he is its perception, consciousness, and its own feeling of self, only because he has in himself the breath of God—that is, God's idea (*notio*)—because in him truth and knowledge melt together and constitute his selfhood or *I am*, and make him the image of God. Man, then, is capable of cognition, because he is an essence and existence; and, therefore, he constitutes the absolute unity of the universal essence and existence. Moreover, he is enabled, by the breath of God, to become the focus of his own and of all other truth and knowledge. Cognition is the specific attribute of man, it has its foundation in man, and its perfect development in the world and in God. It is, in general, like a plant striking its roots

into the earth and lifting its crown and summit toward heaven. Cognition is the bond uniting man with the creation and with its Creator—it is the end of existence returning into its beginning.

We know that man is perception, consciousness, and his own feeling of self; or that he is the focus and consciousness of the universe in time. We know also why he is so, and must be so; we know, finally, that this, and nothing else, makes him capable of cognition.

Now arises the question, upon what basis in him does this perception, this consciousness, and this feeling of self rest? On the answer to this question depends the discovery of the sources of cognition. Perception, consciousness, and feeling of self or selfhood, being the breath of God, God's idea (*notio*) in man, constitute man's being. What is this being? It is a created deity, a selfhood, or the soul. It follows that the soul or selfhood is only in man, or in the [only] being capable of cognition. Perception is of an empirical nature, consciousness of a speculative, and personality of a philosophical nature. Our selfhood is also triple: empirical, speculative, and philosophical. Perception, then, is the special attribute of empirical selfhood, consciousness of speculative, and personality of philosophical selfhood. What is the empirical selfhood? It is a body. But body is only an abstraction, a dead reality. It is a living body, or a body regarded as a total selfhood, in its external aspect. In such a body only is found the capability of perception. Upon what does this capability rest? Upon the passivity of body, upon its susceptibility and its feelings; upon the fact that it can be the looking-glass of the external world—*i. e.*, by means of the senses.

The senses, therefore, are the substratum, bearer, vehicle of perception, and, therefore, the first source of cognition. They are the eye of the selfhood, seeing the external form of all truth and knowledge.

What is the speculative selfhood? It is a spirit. But spirit is only an abstraction, a dead ideality. It is a living spirit, or a spirit regarded as the total selfhood, viewed in its internal aspect. Only in such a spirit [*i. e.*, as viewed internally] lives consciousness. Upon what does this consciousness rest? Upon the fact that spirit thinks, and knows that it thinks, that it is thinking. What is the foundation of this thinking in spirit, or what is the

faculty of pure thinking—thinking *a priori*? It is Reason. Reason, then, is the total ground of consciousness, and, therefore, it is the second source of cognition. It is the eye of the selfhood seeing the internality of all truth and knowledge.

Finally, what is the philosophical selfhood? It is the soul, as selfhood itself in itself; that is, God's breath in us, the focus of body and spirit, the core of personality, a deity. Personality, or the feeling of self, is the quality of this philosophical selfhood. And no wonder a deity, feeling itself to be deity, comes to its own feeling of self or personality. Upon what does this personality rest in the philosophical selfhood? Upon the capacity for its own feeling of self, or upon the all-including mind. All-including mind, then, is the foundation of personality, and, therefore, is the third source of cognition. It is the eye of the soul, as total selfhood seeing the basis of all truth and knowledge, seeing God's word, deity, God Himself. Therefore, only because we have the senses, reason, and the all-including mind, are we capable of perception, consciousness, and our own feeling of self or personality, and also of cognition. The senses and reason have the all-including mind for their principle and organic unity. The all-including mind is God's breath in us, or the capacity for cognition given us by God. It makes us the temporary focus of the universe and the image of God. We have, then, three sources of cognition—senses, reason, and all-including mind.

These three sources of cognition constitute relative difference, absolute indifference, and philosophical difference in indifference. It is properly the one and the same source of cognition, but regarded, first, from its external, secondly, from its internal, and, thirdly, from its fundamental side. From these sources flow certain streams, which are their powers, and are called the faculties of our selfhood. As there are three sources of cognition, so there are three classes of these faculties. Each of these classes is a system in itself, and all three together create one organic system. To the domain of the senses belong perception, memory, and the understanding (their higher powers); to the reason, judgment and imagination; and to the all-including mind, reflection and attention, as its lower powers, or precedent and dawning activities.

Wishing to facilitate the subsequent exposition of these sources

and faculties of cognition, we present them here in a systematic arrangement. There is a sacred tree growing up in our selfhood, making it the mirror of all truth and knowledge, and forming also the substratum of its capacity for cognition.

± Selfhood = the Soul, Personality = Feeling of Self.		
+ Body, Perceptive Consciousness.		- Spirit, Consciousness.
a. <i>Senses</i> , the first source of cognition, and their internal focus, <i>perception</i> .	c. <i>Attention</i> , the principle of mind.	b. Imagination, the principle of all reasonings.
a ¹ . <i>Memory</i> .	c ¹ . <i>Reflection</i> .	b ¹ . <i>Judgment</i> .
a ² . <i>Understanding</i> (Intellect).	c ² . All-including <i>Mind</i> , the third source of Cognition.	b ² . <i>Reason</i> , the second source of Cognition.

We will describe these sources and faculties of cognition in the most concise manner possible.

Sense (Latin, *sensus*; German, *Sinn*, *Sinnlichkeit*) is our total selfhood standing forth in its empirical externality, and opening itself to the external world of existence; it is our selfhood pervading the body, and enkindling therein physical feeling for the world surrounding us; it is a corporeal truth and knowledge, entering into contact with the universal corporeal truth and knowledge; it is our real knowing (*notio*) seeking for our real cognition.

Sense is passivity, with all that appertains to it; it is also a means of reaching wholeness, infinitude, universality, necessity, reality, affirmation, extension in space, substance, objectivity, egotism, co-existence, and perception. As the living passivity, and gifted with perception, it is the temporary mirror in which all nature sees itself, finds also its focus, its image, and its word. The empirical selfhood is on the one side, and the external truth and knowledge, belonging to all existence, on the other. These are two poles, on one great magnetic needle. Sense is the bond of the difference in indifference, or union, between the empirical selfhood and the external world existence; it is the central point in that magnetic needle. Without senses, external truth and knowledge within us would not be able to enter into contact with external truth and knowledge outside of us; these two truths and knowledges would not be able to become conscious either of their

relative difference, or of their absolute indifference, or of their philosophical difference in indifference—that is, of their harmony or mediated union.

(To be continued.)

THE PANTHEISM OF SPINOZA.

BY JOHN DEWEY.

The problem of philosophy is to determine the meaning of things as we find them, or of the actual. Since these things may be gathered under three heads, the problem becomes: to determine the meaning of Thought, Nature, and God, and the relations of one to another. The first stage of thought being Dogmatism, the first philosophy will be that of the common uneducated mind—Natural Realism. God, self, and the world are three independent realities, and the meaning of each is just what it seems to be. If, however, they are independent realities, how can they relate to each other? This question gives rise to the second stage of Dogmatic Philosophy, which, according to the mind of the holder, takes either the direction of Dogmatic Idealism or a Dualism with God as the *Deus ex Machina*, like that of Descartes. The reconciliation of the elements here involved leads to the third stage, where God becomes the Absolute, and Nature and Self are but his manifestations. This is Pantheism, and the view-point of Spinoza. Thought and being become one; the order of thought is the order of existence. Now a final unity seems obtained, and real knowledge possible.

The problem of philosophy being to determine the meaning of the Actual, its final test must be the completeness with which its answer agrees with and accounts for the Actual. By this we do not mean, of course, that its interpretation must agree with the common interpretation. There is certainly no shadow of reason for supposing that the metaphysic of the uneducated mind is the final one to which all metaphysic must conform. But every philosophy must answer this question: Does it provide the factors which in their development account for the Actual as it is inter-

preted by that theory, *and* for other interpretations also? In short, it must account not only for things as they are, but also as they *seem* to be. To stop at the first point is simply to beg the question. The best answer to any question is the one which enables you to understand and to account for all other possible answers.

Has Spinoza done this? It must be confessed that to many minds he seems to have done so. That we may attempt to see whether he has or not, let us state the problem again. It is to reconcile the Infinite, and the apparent finite, by the hypothesis of the Infinite alone; to show the unity between the Absolute and the seeming relative by the hypothesis of the Absolute alone. A hard task; but in reading the Ethics of Spinoza, we seem to find it accomplished, and the two elements, side by side, deduced from a common principle. To aid the mind to determine whether this accomplishment is *only* seeming, or is real, is our object now.

We shall endeavor to show that the solution of the problem by Spinoza, the reconciliation of the two elements, is brought about only by the assumption of contradictory elements in his premises, and the surreptitious bringing in of new ones as he proceeds. As we begin, we can do so with no better thought than that of Kant. A system which proceeds geometrically, like Spinoza's, must either draw synthetic or analytic conclusions, the analytic being conclusions which simply unfold what was already contained in the given conceptions, the synthetic being those which go beyond the given ones and add something to them. If the former, then, unless you would beg the whole question, you must show the validity and reality of your definitions; if the latter, you must show whence you obtain your material for going outside of the given conceptions. We shall endeavor to show the existence of contradictory elements in Spinoza's premises, not by a direct examination of them, but indirectly by drawing from them conclusions in plainest contradiction to those which he draws.

The object of the First Part of Spinoza's Ethics, "De Deo," is to demonstrate the existence of one substance infinite in infinite attributes, and to show the relation of this substance to finite things—viz., that they are but its accidents. That our exposition may be as clear as possible, we shall for the occasion adopt Spinoza's method, and, taking his axioms and definitions as our prem-

ises, draw conclusions from them in geometrical form. To distinguish, our propositions will be designated by Arabic, and Spinoza's by Roman numerals.

Definit. I. By that which is the cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature can only be conceived as existent.

II. That thing is said to be finite in its kind which can be limited by another of the same nature.

III. By substance I understand that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself—*i. e.*, whose conception does not need any other conception by which it must be formed.

IV. By attribute I understand that which the mind perceives, in substance, as constituting its essence.

V. By mode I understand the accidents of substance, or that which is in something else, by means of which also it is conceived.

VI. By God I understand the being absolutely infinite—*i. e.*, the substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence.

VII. That is called free which exists by the sole necessity of its own nature, and is determined to action by itself alone.

VIII. By eternity I understand existence itself, in so far as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition alone of the eternal thing.

Axiom I. All things which are, are in themselves, or in something else.

II. That which cannot be conceived by means of another must be conceived through itself.

III. From a given determined cause an effect follows necessarily, and, on the other hand, if there be no determined cause, an effect cannot follow.

IV. The knowledge of an effect depends upon and involves the knowledge of the cause.

V. Whatever things have nothing in common with each other cannot be understood by means of each other, or the conception of one does not involve that of the other.

VI. A true idea must agree with the object represented.

VII. The essence of whatever can be conceived as non-existent does not involve existence.

Prop. 1. An attribute must be conceived through itself, and through itself alone.

Dem. An attribute is that which the intellect perceives to constitute the essence of substance (Def. 4), and hence must be conceived through itself (Def. 3), which was the first point; and through itself alone; for if an attribute could be conceived through something else, since it constitutes the essence of substance, a substance could be also thus conceived, which is absurd (Def. 3). Therefore, etc.

Prop. 2. No attribute can possess a mode.

Dem. A mode, if it exist, is an accident of substance or (since attribute constitutes the essence of substance) of attribute, or that which is in something else, by whose means it must be conceived (Def. 5). But an attribute must be conceived through itself alone (Prop. 1), and hence cannot possess a mode. Q. E. D.

Prop. 3. Nothing exists but attributes and modes.

Dem. For all things can be conceived only through themselves or through something else. But that which is conceived through itself is an attribute (Defs. 4 and 3, or Prop. 1), and that which is conceived through something else is a mode. Therefore, etc.

Cor. 1. Nothing exists but attributes. If not, suppose something else exists, which (by preceding Prop.) must be a mode. But since a mode (Def. 5) cannot be in itself alone, it must be in something else (Ax. 1), which can only be an attribute, since nothing else exists. But this is absurd, since (Prop. 2) no attribute can possess a mode. Therefore, etc.

Cor. 2. Things can be distinguished only by their attributes. For nothing else exists.

Cor. 3. Two or more attributes of the same nature cannot be given. For since things (preceding Cor.) can be distinguished only by their attributes, if there were two of the same nature they could not be distinguished—*i. e.*, would be one and the same (Ax. 4). Therefore, etc.

Prop. 4. Every attribute is infinite.

Dem. For if finite it must be limited by an attribute (Cor. 1, Prop. 3) of the same nature (Def. 2), which is impossible (Cor. 3, Prop. 3). Therefore, etc.

Cor. There are no finite things. For nothing exists but attributes (Cor. 1, Prop. 3), and they are all infinite.

Scholium. It will now be immediately seen that we have arrived at a denial of one of Spinoza's fundamental conclusions—viz., the existence of finite things as modes or accidents of God. It has not been sufficiently pointed out, I think, how surreptitiously Spinoza introduces this conception. It will be found in Prop. XXVIII, where he states that any particular thing which is finite, and has a determined existence, cannot exist or be determined to action except it be so determined by another finite object similarly determined, and so on infinitely. But it will be noticed that this is a conditional judgment, stating only that *if* there are finite things, they are so determined. But the very question is: *are* there such finite objects? and Spinoza only assumes that. He has made his synthetic judgment only by smuggling in one of the very things to be accounted for. The question as to *how* finite objects are determined possesses no relevancy or validity until it is shown *that* finite objects can exist at all. But Spinoza proceeds as if his conditional judgment possessed validity not only in its conclusion, but also with regard to its predicate—the existence of finite things. In short, he begs the whole question, and the greater part of his second book rests ultimately on this petitio. An examination of the demonstration of this 28th Prop. will show what conclusion Spinoza *ought* to have arrived at regarding the existence of the predicate of his major premise. He first shows, by reference to previous propositions, that whatever has been determined has been so determined by God, and that a finite thing cannot be produced from the absolute nature of any attribute of God, nor from any attribute modified with a modification which is eternal and infinite. Hence, he concludes, it must be produced by some modification which is finite. In other words, the condition of a finite thing is a finite thing, and so regressively in an infinite series. In other words, again, the existence of finite things is not accounted for at all; it is only assumed. The conclusion he should have drawn is the following: A finite thing, if it exist, must depend upon another finite, and so on forever. Hence God, since he is infinite, could never cause a finite thing; but since he is the cause of everything, no finite thing could be caused at all, or have existence. Hence the hypothesis is false. That Spinoza did not see that this was the only conclusion to be logically drawn from his arguments, shows how completely his mind was preoccu-

pied with the realistic assumptions which he had unconsciously derived from previous systems. In a similar way we may demonstrate that the hypothesis regarding determination to action or change must be false if we admit the previous conclusions. For they show that no attribute can change, or produce change, since it is eternal and immutable (Cor. 2, Prop. XX). And if a mode can change, the change must depend upon a change in some other mode, and so on in an infinite regression. That is, God could not produce the first change, which is absurd. Therefore, the hypothesis of change is absurd.

Prop. 5. One attribute cannot be produced by another.

Dem. For since they have nothing in common (Cor. 3, Prop. 3) they cannot be conceived through each other (Ax. 5), and, accordingly, one cannot be the cause of another (Ax. 4). Q. E. D.

Prop. 6. It belongs to the nature of attributes to exist.

For since one cannot be the cause of another (preceding Prop.), it must be its own cause—*i. e.* (Def. 1), it belongs to its nature to exist.

Cor. Attributes are eternal (preceding Prop. and Def. 8).

Prop. 7. An infinite number of attributes exist.

Dem. If you deny it, imagine, if you can, that there is not an infinite number. Then the essence of each will not include existence, which is absurd (Prop. 6). Therefore, the hypothesis is absurd, and an infinite number, etc.

Scholium. The reader will observe that this is precisely the argument of Spinoza in Prop. XXI regarding the existence of God.

Prop. 8. An infinite number of substances exist.

Dem. Proved like the previous proposition, or

Aliter. Since an infinite number of attributes exist, each of which constitutes the essence of substance (Def. 4), an infinite number of substances must exist.

Cor. God, or *one* substance with an infinite number of attributes, does not exist.

Scholium. The reader who may have been prepared for the demonstration that the existence of finite things was contradictory to the remainder of Spinoza's philosophy, will perhaps be surprised to see this denial of God's existence, and think that it may depend upon some trickery of words, and not be logically involved in Spinoza's premises. But that it is, may be shown, I think.

In Prop. XI, where he attempts to prove the existence of *only* one substance of infinite attributes, he really proves only the existence of an infinite number of substances, or of an infinite number of attributes. The subsumption of these latter under unity is entirely unjustified by anything in the proposition. In scholium of Prop. X he seems to realize the difficulty of having an infinity of attributes belonging to one and the same substance, but attempts to escape from it by saying that nothing could be clearer than that the more reality or being anything has, the more attributes it must have, and hence a being absolutely infinite must have an infinity of attributes. This would be true if he had before proved that for substance, as he defines it, to have such a number was possible, or implied no contradiction. But he has not done this, and it may be shown in the following that he cannot. An attribute is that which constitutes the essence of substance. Hence, if there are two or more attributes (*a fortiori*, if an infinity) in the same substance, they must either constitute different essences, which is absurd, or the same essence, in which case they will be one and the same attribute. Two things only are possible to Spinoza. He may have either an infinite number of attributes existing in entire independence of each other, hence constituting an infinite number of substances; or one infinite substance, with one infinite attribute. But to unite the two conceptions involves contradiction, as before shown. Yet this is what he does practically, using either, as the exigencies of the case require.

We now see Spinoza as a magician, supplied with his conjuring material. With two infinites—one the very negation of the finite, the other existing only in relation to the finite; with two substances—one with a number of attributes, the other with but one—he can proceed by dexterous substitutions to produce any required results before our astonished eyes.

This concludes our examination of Part First. We hope that our original statement regarding the existence of contradictions in the premises, and the introduction of new conceptions from without, will be seen to be justified. The contradiction is now seen to be this: In definitions three and four a substance is posited which can be conceived only, and, consequently, can exist only in itself, constituted by attributes necessarily existing in the same manner. But in the fifth we have the idea of something which can exist in

something else. If the third and fourth are accepted, this latter must be necessarily denied, unless we hold that there exists something besides substance and mode, which is contradictory to the first and second axioms. The similar contradiction between the two former and the sixth has been sufficiently brought out in the scholium to our last proposition.

It would not be much better than a waste of time to follow Spinoza through his other Parts and show that in every case his apparent reconciliation of the finite and the infinite is brought about either by the introduction of the thing to be accounted for, or that it is contradictory to some other part of his system, or both. The clew is now in the possession of the reader, and any one who wishes to, may develop it at length.

We wish, however, to simply direct attention to a few points in Part Second, "De Mente." Axiom fifth of this book, upon which he relies for his proof that the object of the idea which constitutes the real existence of the human mind is the body (see Prop. XIII, Pt. 2), declares that we neither feel, nor perceive, any particular objects except bodies and modes of thought. But Prop. XVI, Pt. 1, declares that infinite things in *infinite modes* must exist, from each of which (Prop. XXXVI, Pt. 1) some effect must necessarily follow, which effect must involve the knowledge of its cause (Ax. 4, Pt. 1). Again, as the first book attempted to explain finite things as accidents of substance, so the second attempts to explain error as nothing positive, but simply inadequacy or privation. To do this he is obliged to assume three kinds of Gods. First, God in so far as he is infinite (Prop. XI, Cor.: *quatenus infinitus est*), in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind (*ibid.*: *quatenus humanæ Mentis essentiam constituit*), and in so far as he is considered as affected with the idea of a particular object actually existing (Prop. IX, *quatenus rei singularis actu existentis idea affectus consideratur*). It is needless to say that these different notions are either meaningless or else contradictory to each other, and brought in as the exigencies of the case happen to require one rather than the other. But the reader can easily demonstrate for himself, that error, even in the sense of privation or inadequate knowledge, is impossible by using the propositions of the first book. Another contradiction may be shown as follows: In the scholium to Prop. XV he shows that

matter can be regarded as divisible, or composed of parts, only in so far as it relates to the imagination; but in the second book, when he comes to account for the imagination, he is obliged to assume these same parts for an adequate explanation (see the Postulates, and Props. XV, XVI, XVII, with Cor. and scholium, of Pt. 2).

In truth, Spinoza is a juggler who keeps in stock two Gods—one the perfect infinite and absolute being, the other the mere sum of the universe with all its defects as they appear to us. When he wishes to show God as the adequate cause of all, to explain truth, inculcate morality, his *legerdemain* brings the First before us; when finite things, change, error, etc., are to be accounted for, his Second appears—the God who does things not in so far as he is Infinite, and who is affected with the idea of finite things.

We might have known, *a priori*, that such contradictions must occur in a pantheistic system like Spinoza's. It rests upon the basis that the only real knowledge is immediate knowledge. In this case the Absolute becomes mere Being, an Abstract Universal, possessed with no determinations whatever, for determinations are negations. Such, when Spinoza is truly logical, is his God. But, in this case, he cannot account for particular concrete objects. The two elements are necessarily irreconcilable from such a standpoint as Spinoza's regarding knowledge.

Two logical pantheistic systems are possible. One must start with the conception of an Absolute Perfect Being in whom are all things, but this theory cannot account for things as we find them. It must deny that they are what they seem to be, and elevate them into the Divine. But the rock on which every such theory must split is the problem: If, then, all things are divine, how, then, do they appear to us otherwise? Here is where Spinoza failed. The other theory must start from the conception of things as they seem to be, and produce its Pantheism, not by elevating them into God, but by bringing God down to them. Such a theory, of course, can never arrive at the conception of the Absolute, the Perfect, and the Infinite. Strictly speaking, it is not *Pantheism* at all; it is Pancosmism. But this is not a solution; it is merely an assumption of all that is to be explained.

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE SECOND VOLUME OF HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION" BY
F. L. SOLDAN.

III.—*The Idea in the Element of the Church,¹ or the Realm of the Spirit.*

The first point considered was the idea of this stand-point for consciousness; the second, which is taken for granted on this stand-point, was that which exists for the Church; the third is the transition to the Church itself.

This third sphere is the idea in its determination as individuality, but in the first place only the representation of the One Individual, the divine, the universal individuality, of individuality as it is in-and-for-itself. One is in this way all; once is all times, in itself, according to the idea, a simple determinateness. But the individuality, as being for-itself, is the emancipating of the differentiated phases into free immediateness, and is exclusive. It is the nature of individuality to be at the same time empirical individuality.

This individuality, being exclusive, is immediateness for others, and is the return from the other into itself. The individuality of the divine idea, the divine idea as one man, completes itself really only by having in the first place for its opposite the many individuals, and by leading them back to the unity of spirit, to the Church, and by existing in this as real, universal self-consciousness.

When thus the transition of the idea has been developed to the point of sensuous embodiment, the distinctive characteristic of the religion of the spirit shows itself in the fact that all the phases are developed to their extreme determinateness and completeness. Even in this extreme antithesis spirit is sure of itself as absolute truth, and therefore it has no fear of anything, not even of sensuous embodiment. It is the cowardice of abstract thought to fear

¹ The German word is "Gemeinde," literally community, congregation; but these English terms are not wide enough for the meaning which Hegel attaches to the German word. We shall therefore translate it by Church, which is the sense in which Hegel uses the word "Gemeinde" in most instances.

and shun the sensuous embodiment, after the manner of monks; modern abstraction shows this disgusting affectation of superiority over the phase of sensuous embodiment.

On the individuals in the Church the demand is made to worship the divine idea in the form of individuality, and to become like it. This is easy for the tender, loving mind—for woman; but the other side is, on the contrary, that the subject to which this demand of love is addressed is absolutely free, and has seized the substantiality of his self-consciousness; for the independent idea, therefore, for man, this demand is an infinitely hard one. Against this union of the human and divine implied in the worship of a single, sensuous individual, as God, the liberty of the subject rebels. The Oriental does not refuse it, but he is nothing; he is in himself cast away, without having cast himself away—*i. e.*, without having the consciousness of infinite freedom within himself. But this love, this recognition, is the very opposite of that Oriental feeling, and this is the highest miracle, which then, indeed, is spirit itself.

This sphere is the realm of spirit for the reason that the individual has infinite value in himself, knows himself as absolute freedom, possesses in himself the most rigid firmness and consistency, and gives up this consistency and preserves himself in what is strictly an other; love harmonizes everything, even this absolute antithesis of dependence and independence.

The object of contemplation in this religion requires the renunciation of all other sensible objects, of everything which otherwise has value; it is the perfect ideality, which opposes polemically all the splendor of the world; in this single person (of Christ), in this present immediate individual in which the divine idea appears, all worldliness has been sunk, so that he is the only sensuous presence which has value. This individuality is therefore strictly universal. In ordinary love this infinite abstraction from all worldliness is also found, and the lover places his whole satisfaction in a special individual; but this satisfaction still belongs to particularity—it is the particular contingency and the sentiment which is in contrast to the universal, and which tries to become objective to itself in this manner.

This particular, on the other hand, in the form of which I will the divine idea, is strictly universal, and it is therefore, and at the

same time, removed from the observation of senses; it passes away; it becomes past history. This sensuous mode must disappear, and must elevate itself to the sphere of image-conception. The formation of the Church has for its content the fact that the sensuous form passes over into a spiritual element. This purification from the immediate being still retains the sensuous element, but as passing away; this is the negation in the way in which it is posited, and appears in a sensuous special form of existence as such (*am sinnlichen Dasein*). This object of contemplation is given only in an individual instance; it is no heirloom, nor is it capable of a renewal like that of the substance in the Lama. It cannot be of that nature, because sensuous phenomenality, according to its nature, is but transitory; it is to be spiritualized, and it is therefore essentially a past phenomenon, and is elevated to the sphere of thought.

There is also another stand-point possible, where the Son and his appearance remain permanent. Such is Catholicism, where Mary and the saints are added to the mediating and reconciling power of the Son, and where the spirit exists in the Church as a hierarchy only, and not in the Church as a congregation and community. But in this way the second element in the determination of the idea remains an image-concept instead of becoming spiritualized. In other words, the spirit is not known objectively, but rather in a subjective manner only, such as the Church has in its immediateness, or which lives in tradition.

Spirit in this form of reality (*i. e.*, the Church) is, as it were, the third person.

For that stage of development which stands in need of it, the sensuous embodiment can be continually reproduced by pictures; not by pictures as works of art, but miracle-working pictures, or, in short, in any sensuous aspect. And then, also, it is not only the corporeity and the body of Christ which can satisfy the sensuous need and want, but it is the sensuous element found in his bodily presence in general—the cross, the places where he dwelt. To this, relics, etc., may be added. Where there is a need there is no lack of such mediations. But for the spiritual Church the immediate embodiment and the now (of Christ's mortal life) have passed away. The sensuous image-conception supplements the past, which it finds to be a one-sided phase, since the present in-

cludes as its phases the past and the future. Thus the sensuous image-concept supplies the idea of the second coming (of Christ), but the essentially absolute return is the turning from externality to the internal; it is a comforter who cannot come before the sensuous history, as such is past.

This, then, is the point of the formation of the Church, or it is the third point; it is the spirit. It is the transition from the external to the internal. The important element in it is the certitude of the individual subject of its own infinite, unsensuous essence, knowing itself to be infinite, eternal, and immortal.

The retrogressive impulse towards the internal self-consciousness which is contained in this return movement is not that of the Stoics, which, through thinking, has received value by the strength of its own spirit, that seeks the reality of thinking in nature in natural things, and in the comprehension of the same, and which, therefore, is without the Infinite Pain, and at the same time stands in a thoroughly positive relation to the world. It is rather that self-consciousness which renounces without end its particularity and individuality, and has infinite value in that love only which is contained in the infinite pain and arises out of it. All immediateness in which man might possess value is cast away, and it is mediation alone through which such value—although it is an infinite one here—is attributable to him, and in it subjectivity becomes truly infinite and self-existing. Man exists by this mediation only; he is not immediate, and therefore at first he is merely capable of having that value; but this capability and possibility is his positive, absolute destiny.

In this determination lies the reason for the fact that the immortality of the soul becomes a definite doctrine in the Christian religion. The soul or individual subjectivity has the infinite eternal destiny to become a citizen in the kingdom of God. This is a destiny and a life which is removed from time and transitoriness, and, since it is opposed to these limited spheres, this eternal destiny determines itself at the same time as a future. The eternal postulate—to view God, that is to say, to become conscious in spirit of his truth as a present one—does not yet find satisfaction in this temporal present, so far as that consciousness which is image-consciousness is concerned.

When subjectivity has apprehended its infinite value, it relin-

quishes with this all distinctions of dominion, power, position, and even that of sex; before God all men are equal. In the negation of the infinite pain of love alone lies the possibility and root of the true universal rights—the realization of freedom. The formal Roman legality starts from the positive stand point and from the understanding, and has in it no principle for the absolute test of the legal stand-point: it is altogether secular.

The purity of this subjectivity, which mediates itself in love out of infinite pain, exists by that mediation only which finds its objective shape and existence for contemplation in the suffering, the death, and the ascension of Christ. On the other side, this subjectivity has at the same time in itself this mode of reality: it is a multitude of subjects and individuals; but, since it is in itself universal, and not mutually excluding individuals, the multitude of individuals must be posited to be nothing but a seeming, and the very fact that it posits itself in itself as this seeming is the unity of faith, in the thought of faith, and therefore contained in this third element. This is the love of the Church which seems to consist of many subjects, a multiplicity which, however, is a seeming only.

This love is neither human love, nor philanthropy, nor sexual love, nor friendship. People have often wondered why such a noble relation as that of friendship is not among the duties which Christ commends. Friendship is a relation to which particularity attaches, and men are friends not so much directly as objectively in some substantial connecting link, in a third element, in certain principles, in studies, in science; in short, the tie is an objective content, and not attachment as such, as that of man to woman as a special personality. But this love of the Church is mediated at the same time by the worthlessness of all particularity. The love of man to woman, and friendship, may well take place, but they are essentially determined as subordinate; they are determined to be something imperfect, not as evil, not as indifferent, but as something which is not permanent, since they are themselves sacrificed, and must not be an obstacle to that absolute direction and unity.

The unity in this infinite love, arising out of infinite pain, is, therefore, strictly not a sensuous, worldly union, not a union existing between still valid and remaining particularity and natural-

ness, but unity in spirit strictly; this love is the very idea of the spirit itself. It is object to itself in Christ, as the centre of faith, in whom it appears to itself in infinite, distant majesty. But this majesty is for the subject at the same time infinite nearness, and kinship, and its own peculiar possession, and what thus as a third element connects the individuals is at the same time that which constitutes their true self-consciousness—their innermost and most characteristic life. Thus this love is spirit as such—the holy spirit. The spirit is in them, and they are, and constitute, the universal Christian Church, the communion and congregation of the saints. The spirit is the infinite return into itself, the infinite subjectivity, not as an image concept, but as the real, present divinity, and therefore it is not the substantial potentiality [*Ansich*] of the Father, not the Truth in the objective form of the Son, but the subjective (*i. e.*, self-conscious) presence and reality, which is just as much subjectively (*i. e.*, self-consciously) present as it is the external manifestation in the form of an objective presentation of love and of its infinite pain, and as the return in that mediation. This is the spirit of God, or God as present, real spirit, God dwelling in his church. Thus Christ says: "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." "I am with you always, even unto the end of the world."

In this absolute significance of spirit, in this deep sense of absolute truth, the Christian religion is the religion of spirit, but not in the trivial sense of a spiritual religion. The true determination of the nature of spirit, the union of the infinite contrast—God and the world, the Ego, this *Homuncio*—these form the content of the Christian religion, and make it the religion of spirit; this content exists in it for the ordinary untrained consciousness also. All men are called to blessedness; this is the highest, and the only highest, principle. For this reason Christ says: "All manner of sin . . . shall be forgiven, . . . but the blasphemy against the holy ghost shall not be forgiven unto men." The offence against absolute truth, against the idea of that union of the infinite contrast, is pronounced thereby to be the greatest wrong. People have at times been perplexed by the question as to what constitutes a sin against the holy ghost, and have in many ways made this definition shallow, in order to ignore it altogether. Everything may be annihilated in the infinite pain of love, but

this annihilation exists only as the internal, present spirit. What is without spirit seems, in the first place, to be no sin, but to be innocent; but this is the innocence which has been judged and found wanting in itself.

The sphere of the Church is, therefore, the peculiar region of the spirit. The holy ghost was poured out over the disciples: it became their immanent life; from that moment on they have gone forth as a church, and they went joyfully into the world, in order to elevate it to a universal church, and to spread the kingdom of God.

We must consider, therefore, (a) the origin of the Church, or its idea; (b) its existence and preservation—that is, the realization of its idea; and (c) the transition of faith to science—the change, transformation of faith into philosophy.

(a) The idea of the Church.

The Church is formed by the subjects, the individual, empirical subjects, who are in the spirit of God, but from whom this content—this history, the truth, is distinguished, and to whom it is opposed. The belief in this history, in this reconciliation, is on one side an immediate knowledge, a faith. In the next place the nature of spirit is in itself this process which has been considered in the universal idea, and in the idea as phenomenality, and the conscious subject is spirit, and becomes a citizen of the kingdom of God only because he passes through this process in himself. The other, which exists for the conscious subjects, is, therefore, in this divine spectacle, objective to them in the same sense in which the spectator finds himself objectified in the chorus.

The subject, the human subject, man, in whom it is revealed what through spirit becomes for man the certitude of reconciliation, has been defined in the first place as the individual or singular, as that which excludes the other and is different from it. Thus, the representation of the divine history for other subjects is an objective one for them. They also must, therefore, pass through this history, this process, in themselves.

For this purpose it is necessary that they presuppose that Reconciliation is possible, or, to speak more definitely, this reconciliation has come to pass in-and-for-itself, and is a certainty.

This is in-and-for-itself the universal idea of God, but its certainty for man, the fact that this truth exists for him not merely

through speculative thinking, but is a certainty, this is the other presupposition, namely this: it is certain that the reconciliation is accomplished—*i. e.*, it must be represented as a historical fact, as one that has been brought about on earth, in phenomenality. For there is no other mode of what is called certainty. This is the presupposition in which we believe in the first place.

1. The origin of the Church is described as the pouring out of the Holy Ghost. The source of faith is in the first place a man, a human, sensuous phenomenon, and in the second place the spiritual conception [of it], the consciousness of the spiritual: it is spiritual content, the transmutation of the immediate into spiritual determinateness. The testimony is spiritual; it is not contained in the sensuous; it cannot be brought about in an immediate, sensuous mode; it is therefore always possible to raise some objection or other to the sensuous facts.

As regards the empirical manner, the Church is right when it declines inquiries like the one into the nature of the apparition of Christ after his death, for such inquiries take the view that importance should be attached to the sensuous element in the phenomenon, as if in such narrations of what is represented by image-conception as a historical event, in a historical way, there could be found the proof and evidence of spirit and of its truth. The latter, however, stands for itself, independently, although it has such an origin.

This transition is the pouring out of the holy ghost, which could happen only after Christ was removed from the flesh and the sensuous, immediate presence had ceased. Then the spirit comes forth; for then the whole history is completed, and the whole image of spirit stands before sense-perception. What the spirit produces now is another, has another form.

The question as to the truth of the Christian religion divides itself, immediately, into two questions: (1) Is it really true that God is not, without the son, and has sent him into the world? and (2) is this man, Jesus of Nazareth, the carpenter's son, the son of God, the Christ?

These two questions are usually mixed together, as though, if this particular individual had not been the son sent by God, and if this could not be proved of him, then his mission would amount to nothing. In that case, it is further said that either we should

have to wait for another, if another were to be expected, either through prophecy or because necessary in and for itself, in the idea. Or since the truth of the idea is made dependent on the proof of the mission of Jesus of Nazareth, then, that being disproved, nothing more is to be expected.

But we should ask, first, is such a phenomenon true in-and-for-itself? It is so, because God as spirit is the triune. He is this manifestation, this objectification, and this remaining identical with himself in this objectification, he is eternal love. This objectification is the development completed to the extremes—to the universality of God and to finitude, to death—and this return into itself in the cancellation of the rigor of this contrast—love within infinite pain, which at the same time is healed in it.

This truth in and for itself, that God is not an abstraction, but something concrete, is made explicit by philosophy, and it is modern philosophy alone which has arrived at this depth of the idea. It is useless to discuss this matter when we have unphilosophical shallowness for our opponent, and its contradiction is without any value, and senseless in and for itself.

But this idea should exist not only as contained in philosophy alone; it is an idea true not in itself only; it is, on the contrary, the function of philosophy to comprehend that which is, that which has antecedent, real existence for itself. All truth begins with its phenomenality, *i. e.*, with existence in the form of immediateness. The idea must therefore exist in the self-consciousness of man, in spirit in itself; the world spirit must have conceived itself in this way. Self-conception, in this manner, is necessity as the process of spirit, which represented itself in the previous stages of religion, in the Jewish, the Greek, and the Roman religions, and which had for its result the idea of the absolute unity of the divine and human natures, and the reality of God—*i. e.*, his objectification of himself as his truth. Thus the history of the world is the representation of this truth as a result in the immediate consciousness of spirit.

In this, God is represented as the God of free men, but viewed as yet in subjective and narrow national conceptions, and in the accidental form of phantasy; there is also the pain of the world after the destruction of these nations. This pain was the birth-place of the impulse of spirit, to seek to know God as spirit in a

general form, stripped of finiteness. This need was created by the progression of history, and by the development of the world spirit. This immediate impulse, this longing which wills and demands a definite matter, and which, so to speak, is the instinct of spirit which is impelled towards such aim, has required such manifestation of God as infinite spirit in the shape of a real man.

“But when the fulness of time was come, God sent forth his Son,” *i. e.*, when the spirit had penetrated its own depth so as to know its infinity, and to comprehend the substantial in the subjectivity of immediate self-consciousness, but a subjectivity which is at the same time infinite negativity, and is therefore absolutely universal.

The proof, however, that this is the Christ is different from this; it relates only to the determination that it is this special person and not another person, but it does not relate to the question whether the idea has an existence at all. Christ said: “Neither shall they say, Lo here, or Lo there! for behold the kingdom of God is within you.” Many others among the Jews and the Gentiles have been revered as divine messengers, or gods. John the Baptist preceded Jesus; among the Greeks statues were erected, to Demetrius Poliorketes, for instance, as to a god, and the Roman emperor was worshipped like a god. Apollonius of Tyana, and many others, were looked upon as workers of miracles, and Hercules was for the Greeks a human being who, by his deeds, which were at the same time deeds of obedience simply, had risen to the gods and had become a god, not to speak of the number of incarnations, and of the deification mentioned in the elevation to Brahma in the religion of the Hindoos. But the idea, when it was ripe and the fulness of the time was come, could only connect itself with Christ and see itself realized in him. In the deeds of Hercules the nature of spirit is as yet but imperfectly expressed. But the history of Christ is history for the Church, since it is strictly in accordance with the idea, while the principle which is to be recognized in those former embodiments, and which underlies them, is but the struggle of spirit in the direction of this determination of the potential unity of the divine and the human. This is the essential point, this is the evidence, the absolute proof; this is what is meant by the testimony of spirit: it is the spirit, the inherent idea which has given evidence of the mission of Christ,

and this is the confirmation for those who believed, and for us, in its developed idea. This is, moreover, the confirmation which is a power spiritually, and not an external power, like the Church dealing with the heretics.

This, then, (2) is the knowledge, or the faith, for faith is knowledge, but in a peculiar form. This is to be considered.

We have said that the divine content is posited as self-conscious knowledge of it in the element of consciousness, or of internality. On the one hand it is held that the content is the truth, and that it is the truth of the infinite spirit in general—*i. e.*, its knowledge, so that it has its freedom in this knowledge, and is itself the process of shaking off its special individuality and of making itself free in this content.

But the content exists, in the first place, for the immediate consciousness, and the truth might have appeared for it in a variety of sensuous ways, for the idea retains its unity in all things; it is universal necessity, and reality can be nothing but a mirror of the idea; the consciousness of the idea may therefore spring from anything, for there is ever the idea in this multitude of drops, in each of which the idea sparkles, and by each of which it is reflected. The idea is represented, known, foretold, in the seed which is the fruit; the fruit all perishes in the earth, and out of this negation only does the plant spring forth. Such history, visible existence, representation, phenomenon, may be raised by spirit to a universal, and thus the history of the seed, or of the sun, becomes the symbol of the idea; but it is a symbol only; they are forms which, according to their proper content, their special quality, are not adequate to the idea. That which is known in them lies outside of them; their significance does not exist in them as significance. That object which exists in itself as the idea is the spiritual subjectivity, it is man. He is significance in himself; it does not lie outside of him; he can think all, he can know all, he is not a symbol. On the contrary, his subjectivity, his inner form, his Self, are essentially this history itself, and thus the history of the spiritual element is not lodged in an existence which is inadequate to the idea, but it is in its own proper element. Thus it is necessary for the Church that the thought, the idea, should become objective. But this idea exists, in the first place, in an individual, an object perceptible by the senses; this must be stripped off, and the

significance, the eternally true essence, must be brought out. This is the faith of the incipient Church. It begins with the faith in the individual; the individual man is transformed by the Church and becomes known as God, and, moreover, that he is the Son of God, involved in all the finitude which belongs to subjectivity as such in its development; but as subjectivity he is distinguished from substantiality. The sensuous phenomenon is then changed into a knowledge of a spiritual element. Thus the Church begins with faith; on the other side this is also produced spiritually. The different meanings of faith, and of its confirmation, must be considered.

Since faith begins in a sensuous form, it contemplates a history in time; what it takes to be true is external, ordinary event, and the evidence is the ordinary, historical, or legal one which is used in establishing a fact; it is sensuous certitude. The representation of the basis of this implies, also, the testimony of other persons in regard to certain sensuous facts for its basis, and connects other things with it.

The history of Christ's life is thus the external evidence, but faith changes its signification; for the important point is not merely faith as a belief in this external history, but in the doctrine that this man was the Son of God. There the sensuous content becomes quite a different one; it is changed into another, and the demand or postulate is, that it should be proved by evidence. The subject is changed completely; from a sensuously, empirically existing subject it becomes a divine one, an essentially highest phase of God himself. This content is no longer sensuous; when, therefore, the demand is made to prove it in the former sensuous manner, this mode is inadequate, to begin with, since the subject is of an entirely different nature.

Miracles, which are asserted to contain the immediate proof, are in and for themselves only relative proofs, or an evidence of subordinate nature only. Christ says, by way of reproof: "Except ye see signs and wonders ye will not believe." "Then will many come to me and say: Have we not in thy name done many wonderful works? And then I will profess unto them, I never knew you; depart from me." What interest is there left here for this working of miracles? The relative element could have interest for those only who stood outside, for the instruction of the Jews

and Gentiles, so to speak. But the Church, when once formed, needs this no longer: it has in itself the spirit which guides to all truth, and which by its truth as spirit is the true power over spirit, *i. e.*, a power in which its entire freedom is preserved for spirit. The miracle is a power over natural relations only, and therefore a power over that spirit merely which is limited within the consciousness of these limited relations. How could the eternal idea itself enter into our consciousness by the representation of such a power?

If the content is conceived in such a manner that the miracles of Christ were themselves sensuous phenomena, which can be proved historically, and his resurrection and ascension are considered in the same light, the relevant point in regard to the sensuous element is no longer the sensuous proof of these phenomena. The point raised is not that the miracles of Christ, his resurrection, ascension, even as external phenomena and sensuous events, have no adequate proof, but the inquiry deals with the relation of both the sensuous verification and the events themselves to the spirit, to the spiritual content. No matter what content the proof of the sensuous may have, and whether it is brought in the form of evidence or by personal inspection, as eye witness, it remains subject to infinite objections, because it has the sensuous and external for its basis, and the latter remains an alien, an other for the spirit. Here consciousness and object are separated, and this fundamental separation prevails, and involves the possibility of error, illusion, lack of ability to perceive a fact properly. It is, therefore, possible that an individual may doubt, and may look upon the holy scriptures, as far as regards the merely external and historical part of it, as mere profane writings, without distrusting in the least the good-will of those who give the evidence. The sensuous content is not certain in itself, because it does not exist through the spirit as such, because it has a different basis, and is not posited by the idea. It might be supposed that the matter could be settled by the comparison of all the evidence and the circumstances, or sufficient reasons might be found for some points or others, but this whole mode of proof, and the sensuous content as such, must be ranked as unimportant and subordinate, when the need and want of spirit is considered. Whatever is to be a truth for the spirit, whatever spirit is to believe, must not remain a matter of

sensuous credence ; what is true for spirit is that whose sensuous phenomenality has been subordinated. Inasmuch as spirit starts from the sensuous, and attains what is more worthy of itself, its attitude towards the sensuous is at the same time a negative attitude. This is one of its principal characteristics.

There remains, nevertheless, the curiosity which asks how the miracles should be looked upon, how they are to be comprehended and understood—that is to say, understood in the sense that they were no real miracles, but natural effects. Such inquiries presuppose, however, doubt and disbelief, and seek a plausible pretence to save the moral virtue and truth of the participating persons. In that case, they assume that it was unintentional—*i. e.*, that there was no fraud—and they are so kind and considerate as to allow Christ and his friends to remain honest people. The shortest course, in that case, would be to reject the miracles altogether ; if one does not believe in miracles, and finds them contrary to reason, it is of no avail if they are proved. They are said to rest on sensuous perception, but it is an irrepressible and unconquerable tendency in man not to consider valid that whose sole proof is of this kind. For here all proofs are but possibilities and probabilities—*i. e.*, only subjective and finite reasons.

Or the advice might be given : Do not entertain these doubts, and then they are solved. But I am compelled to have them ; I cannot put them aside ; and the necessity of answering them rests upon the necessity of having them. Reflection makes these claims absolute : it clings firmly to these finite reasons ; but in piety, in true faith, these finite reasons and the finite understanding have long been set aside. Such curiosity in itself arises from absence of faith ; faith rests on the evidence of spirit, not in regard to the miracles, but on its evidence of the absolute truth, of the eternal idea, and, therefore, on the true content. On that stand-point the miracles have but a minor interest, and may either be mentioned in a passing way as subjective reasons, or they may be neglected altogether. On account of this it is that miracles, if they are to prove anything, must themselves first be proved. That which is to be proved by them, however, is the idea, which does not need them, and, therefore, does not need to prove them.

Moreover, the following must be said : Miracles in general are successful on account of the power of the spirit over the natural

order of things; they are an interference with the eternal laws of nature. But spirit is this miracle in general, this absolute interference. Life in itself interferes with these so-called eternal laws of nature, it destroys, *e. g.*, the eternal laws of mechanism and chemistry. Still greater is the effect of the power of spirit and of its weakness upon life. Terror can produce death; grief, sickness; and, in the same way, infinite faith has at all times made the cripple able to walk, the deaf able to hear, and so forth. The basis of modern unbelief in such results is the superstition concerning the so-called power of nature, and its independence in relation to spirit.

But this evidence touches only the first contingent form of faith. The true faith rests on the spirit of truth. That evidence concerns only a relation to the sensuous, immediate presence; true faith is spiritual, and in spirit the truth has the idea for its basis; and since the idea is at the same time in sense-perception, in a temporal and finite mode, found in the particular individual, it can appear realized in this individual only after his death, and after his removal from temporal existence, when the process of phenomenality has itself been completed to a spiritual totality. That is to say, that the belief in Jesus implies that such faith has no longer the sensuous phenomenon as such before it, whose sensuous perception would otherwise constitute the evidence.

It is the same with all cognition which concerns a universal. Kepler, as is well known, discovered the laws of the heavens. They have a double validity for us; they are the universal. The beginning was made with some individual cases; some motions were reduced to laws; but these are individual cases only, and one might think that there were a million times as many cases in which bodies did not fall in this manner; and in this way, even when applied to the heavenly bodies, it is no general law. It is true that induction has thus led to these laws; but it is the interest of spirit that such a law should be true in and for itself, *i. e.*, that reason should have in it its image or reflection, in which case it could recognize it as true in and for itself. Compared with this, that sensuous cognition recedes and loses prominence; it is a starting-point, a beginning which should be acknowledged gratefully. But such a law stands for itself, and thus it has other evidence and proof; it is the idea, and the sensuous existence is now

reduced to a dream of earthly existence, above which there exists a higher region with peculiar and fixed content.

The same relation takes place in the proofs of the existence of God which begin with the finite; the defect in them is that the finite is defined in an affirmative manner only, but that the transition from the finite to the infinite is made by leaving the ground of finitude, and by lowering it to a subordinate position, to a distant image which exists only in the past and in recollection, but which does not exist in spirit, which is strictly real in the present moment, which has left that starting-point and stands on a ground of much higher dignity. Piety finds thus occasion everywhere to edify itself; this, then, is the starting-point. It has been proved that several of Christ's quotations from the Old Testament are incorrect, so that what is to be conveyed by these expressions cannot be found in the direct meaning of the words. The word, indeed, must remain fixed, but spirit makes of it that which is the truth. Thus, the sensuous history is the starting-point for the spirit, for faith, and these two determinations must be distinguished; but it is the return of the spirit into itself, the spiritual consciousness, which is the salient point.

It is clear from this that the Church produces the content of this faith, and that, so to speak, it is not produced by the words of the Bible, but by the Church. Not the sensuous presence, moreover, but the spirit, teaches the Church that Christ is the Son of God, and that he eternally sitteth at the right hand of the Father in Heaven! This is the interpretation, the evidence, the decree of spirit. Grateful nations raise their benefactors to the stars; spirit acknowledges subjectivity as an absolute phase of divine nature. The person of Christ has been declared by the Church to be God's Son. In this we do not enter upon the consideration of the empirical manner, the definitions of the Church, the councils, etc. The question considered is the nature of the content in and for itself. The true Christian content of faith is to be justified here by philosophy, and not by history. What the spirit does is not history; it is concerned with that only which is in and for itself; not with the past, but with what is strictly present.

THE IDEA OF THE HOME.

BY MAY WRIGHT SEWALL.

The phrase Ideal Home is often on our lips in these late days, and of the Ideal Home the world has heard much within the last century. Yet this institution—neither defined in dictionary, explained in cyclopædia, nor as yet elaborated by any school of metaphysicians—is apparently not dependent on latitude, longitude, or situation, is equally indifferent to size, surroundings, and interior equipments, and is not less variable in its occupants than in its furnishings. Is bewilderment not indeed justifiable? And may not one well inquire, What, after all, *is* an Ideal Home?

The home may, perhaps, be defined the meeting-place of the family, the form or sphere under which these abstract relations exist and manifest themselves. An ideal used, as in this instance, synonymously with model, means the perfect realization of an idea, or the idea itself embodied in tangible form. So, to study the ideas which together constitute the home, and to discover the central idea which dominates it, we must discover the ideas underlying the family relations.

To us here and now the family, in its germinal form, means one man and one woman leagued together—indissolubly leagued for life—against the world. But it is certain that to penetrate to the idea of the family we must study its earlier and less perfect incorporations; for even now the idea of the family germ above mentioned is realized but among a fractional part of the earth's inhabitants.

Unthinking people are accustomed to assume that the patriarchal form of government was the first form, and that this originated in, and was an extension and continuance of, the family. This assumption is based upon another assumption: viz., That the family is itself an immediate creation. But all tradition, archaeological and prehistoric research, as well as the philosophical analysis of History, tend to show that Humanity was created not *in* institutions, but with a capacity for forming institutions, and that the germinal family as *we* know it, far from being the initia-

tive institution of humanity, is rather the condition of its development, and also its final, its finest, and yet unripened fruit.

The historical review of the form is necessary to the analysis of the idea of the family; but the review shall here be very brief. The most palpable object of the family, and the first, indeed, the only one recognized by Oriental peoples, was reproduction. This result was capable of being secured through any mingling of the sexes; and historical testimony establishes the following as the order in which various modes have followed one another: 1. Promiscuity. 2. Polyandry and Polygamy (or Polygyny), each unlimited. 3. Polyandry and Polygamy, each under certain limitations. 4. Monogamy. The first form rests on a basis of simple animalism, and has existed only when and where humanity has not developed a consciousness of continued identity, and the consequent idea of permanence, in individual relations. This has never been practiced by any race sufficiently developed to assign reasons for its customs. Polyandry, which is that form of family based on plurality of husbands, has obtained among many peoples, and has endured over great periods of time. Some of the most cultivated branches of the Aryan race, including the Greek, admit the form to have prevailed among them in their earlier historic stage. It was not unknown among the early Egyptians, the Basques, the Britons, the Malays, the Hindoos, and the American Indians, and it yet remains the established form of family life among thirty millions of the inhabitants of Central Asia, and is not limited to these Thibetans. Among ancient authors, Aristotle and Herodotus inform us of the system of Polyandry. Among modern writers, those who have treated this subject with most intelligence and calmness are Mr. Herbert Spencer, in "Principles of Sociology"; Lecky, in his "History of European Morals"; Mr. McLennan, in "Primitive Marriage"; and Mr. Wilson, in his "Lands of Suow."

This, which, next to promiscuity, is the most revolting form of family existence, finds defenders only among nations so immature as not to have developed a belief in possible female chastity; it is a form always attended by a manhood submerged in unnatural crimes. Polyandry explains, and tries to justify itself, on two grounds: First, on the necessary uncertainty of fatherhood, which renders it unsafe to calculate descent in the male line, and on the equally necessary certainty of maternity, and the consequent in-

fallible accuracy with which ancestry, through the female line, can be traced. As a second excuse it asserts that the creative function is that in which resides the most, and the most intensely, selfish form of affection; and that a positive knowledge of their real offspring would unfit men for their duties, which, it must be remembered, in the semi-civilized life which permits Polyandry are *always* attended by danger, and often rewarded by violent death. Even thus debased, we see the human heart prophesies the intensity of paternal tenderness, and fears that it would be too much softened for its duties should its sweet flavor once be tasted in its entirety through a knowledge of its real object. Under Polyandry, woman is the mistress—the head of the family; it is her family name that is transmitted; the female children are the inheritors, and the male children are but moderately portioned. These odd facts are an overwhelming refutation of the plausible statement so frequently made—that the civilization of a people may be measured by the relative place of woman. This is one of those generalities whose glitter blinds the eye to its untruth. In the degree to which individual freedom is recognized, and to which justice and equality regulate material relations, does civilization exist. Polygamy (or Polygyny), the reverse of Polyandry, unlike the latter, is a practice characterizing southern countries, and maintained by sensual rather than by stoical peoples. With its introduction came the demand for female chastity and an unlimited permit to male indulgence. This form of the family is accompanied by male supremacy in the household; by a continuance of the father's name, and of that only, in the male line. Where Polygamy exists in its purity, female children do not take any second or family name, and have no share in the inheritance.

Polygamy among the peoples first practicing it was maintained on the assumption that the mother had no essential relation to the child; that qualities were not transmitted through female ancestry, nor continued in the female line; that parenthood was an exclusive unshared function of men, and that women are, as a quaint old author expresses it, "parents but by courtesy." This idea rested upon the belief, universal among some early peoples, and finding defenders in the English tongue as late as the last century, that the seed of the race is with man alone; that woman is no

more than a repository provided for it during its period of secret development. She is but the soil, contributing no more and no differently to the character of the child born of her, no more determining that character, than the earth contributes to or determines the different natures of oak, maple, strawberry, and bean which spring from seeds sown upon its soil. In Polyandry we see that a conviction of woman's inevitable frailty and a stoical desire to escape the pain and burdens incident to natural affection, and a cognition of its legitimate objects, and in Polygamy that a sensual temperament and a false science, continued, if indeed they did not originate, these revolting forms of family existence. But, even under these forms, the unfolding spirit of man, struggling with the coarser instincts which acted as a check, and yet, without doubt, as a salutary check upon its development, was unconsciously striving to realize these underlying ideas of family and home which it had not yet recognized.

I have invited momentary attention to this outline of the forms of family life preceding that form with which we are acquainted, in order to prepare our minds for regarding the home as susceptible of modifications, and for the labor of separating that which in the idea of the home is transitory from that which in its idea is essential, and therefore abiding. As humanity recognized permanence a requisite element of power, the desire for permanence of family ties grew, and finally upon this condition of permanence the monogamic family arose. But the idea of family permanence cannot be grasped until the imagination has anticipated the fact, later established by scientific observation—viz., that the qualities of both lines of ancestry are alike transmitted to offspring. As corollaries of this discovery, Law proclaims that inheritance shall be reckoned in both maternal and paternal lines; and Society says that she will hold parents responsible for their children until they shall have reached the age of individual accountability.

So we shall say that permanence is one factor in the complex idea of the home; it is, however, a factor recognized by many minds before there is any intellectual perception of its tremendous consequences. At this stage the common interests of the family, recognized as conditioned upon permanence, are chiefly material: viz., common interest in food and in shelter. This

may be called the Gaelic stage of development, since the two Gaelic names for *family* signify, first, *the persons who eat together*; second, *the persons having a common residence*. The monogamic family was established in leading nations prior to Christianity; but Christianity, by changing what had hitherto been a vague fancy, or an intermittent hope of immortality, into a conviction of its certainty and its universality, confirmed the monogamic form of family life, and dignified inestimably the aspect of parenthood. Another influence of the Christianity of the Middle Ages upon the home will be discussed later. So soon as a people, or a single family group, have reached that degree of civilization and consequent possession in which their whole strength and their whole time are no longer consumed in maintaining the shelter above their heads and procuring necessary food—then, if the family relations are to continue, the family must grow into a deeper significance. The Gaelic definition no longer suffices. The family must now mean those persons who, besides eating together the bread that perisheth, eat also together the divine manna; those persons who, besides sharing together the common shelter of thatch and shingle, also consciously share the protection of the Spirit's dome. Shall we then add to permanence, as another underlying idea of the home, a consciousness on the part of its inmates that they are all related by sympathy and effort to common interests? Emerson says: "Any other affection between men than this geometric one of relation to the same thing is a mere mush of materialism." This fine, clear phrase enables us to name the relations existing in many nominal homes, which will prevent them from ever being homes after the spirit of that sweet term. In homes where the wives regard their husbands simply as "good providers," and where the husbands value the wives only as "notable housekeepers," where "bed and board" are the only meeting-grounds, there is indeed a mere, a pitiful "mush of materialism." We all know such homes; and in the modern family, where, to maintain the complicated style of living, every one is cumbered with much serving, in order to resist this tendency towards mere materialism, we must be willing to recognize and to name the danger. We would not, however, speak with contempt of the material appointments of a home. "Bed and board" are, indeed, important factors, since the health of its

inmates must always be one element in the ideal home, and this is preserved, if not indeed originally secured, by the rule of a wise, chaste, and vigilant temperance in the material relations.

The participation of all members of a family in immaterial interests is made possible only by an approximately equal culture of its heads, and by a culture of both extraneous to their respective lines of work. If we can imagine a blacksmith, for instance, who has absolutely no knowledge concerning anything outside his shop, with a wife who knows nothing but how to scrub, cook, and nurse; when said blacksmith returns, after his day's work, to his home, I see no alternative, if any communication take place between them, but for husband and wife to exchange the day's labors; when each has imparted a rehearsal of his labors and their results, interflow of thought is at an end, and both must have become doubly wearied.

Do we not know families whose home conversation is almost limited to categorical question and answer concerning the performance of their separate tasks? Yet one idea at the root of the home is, that its inmates shall reciprocally vitalize one another's intellects, and expand one another's vision. Not long ago a lady said to me, in substance, the following: As matters are accounted in this world, our family has seen a great deal of trouble; but I cannot remember, and indeed I do not believe, that we ever sat down at table, not even when we were little children, that my mother did not suggest some great world subject, or, at least, some quite impersonal topic, and lead us all into talking about it. With the mother of this friend my acquaintance is slight; but I never shall think of her without reverence—the deep reverence due a woman who has not misused the hours when families sit at meat—precious hours which often afford the best, and sometimes the only, opportunity for the intellects of all to approach one another; the deep reverence due a woman who has not debased such hours to personal gossip, to fretful complaints concerning her domestic cares; to an enumeration of tradesmen's blunders and a repetition of servants' impertinences; to querulous questionings of a husband's affairs; to a rehearsal of children's mishaps, or to the reproof of their errors. Shall we not then add to the ideas of permanence, and the consciousness on the part of each member that all are related to common material interests,

the third idea that one function of the family is to quicken intellect and to direct it to problems of universal moment ?

So soon as we admit intellectual vigor and growth to be one factor in the idea of family life, another element proclaims itself necessary. The sole condition of unwarped intellectual vitality is freedom. As we recall the historic growth of the family, our first impulse is to reject freedom from our conception of domestic life ; we are inclined to say : " Instead of freedom's being essential to the idea of the family, the freedom of one individual is formally relinquished, and that of the other tacitly compromised when the family is formed." True, the family is a bondage of mutual obligations, but, also, it is true that the perfection with which each obligation is performed is (other things being equal) proportional to the degree to which individual liberty is observed, nonrished, and revered. At this date all enlightened peoples begin to perceive that the tyranny based on physical strength and religious assumptions, formerly exercised by husbands, defeated the very ends that husbands most desired ; and to-day, among Aryan peoples, this form of tyranny in domestic life is exerted chiefly by husbands in the poorer and lower classes of society, while a more refined, but not less paralyzing, tyranny is in polite circles exercised by wives ; the latter form is now in our country hardly less common than the former, and is as much more dangerous as redress from it is more difficult. The wife of a brutal coal-beaver can take into court her bruised arms, broken clavicle, and black eye, as proofs of her husband's tyranny ; but the business and professional man, forced into a style of living which exceeds his means and violates his tastes, forced into an external conformity to creeds which he inwardly disavows, perhaps abhors, forced to yield the guidance and discipline of his children to systems with which he has no sympathy, forced to these sacrifices by the relentless will of an elegant wife—the sufferer can testify only by his sullen humor, gloomy countenance, and generally downcast and dispirited air, to the tyranny of which he is the hopeless victim. However, that both these forms of domestic tyranny are yet widespread does not disprove that freedom inheres in the idea of the family. How does freedom in the home affect intellectual vitality ? As the exhausted receiver of an air-pump to plant-life, so is the atmosphere of suspicion, hyper-

criticism, and restraint to intellectual. It is in the free home only that children unconsciously grow into possession of themselves—that real self-possession in which the unfolding, the application, and the enjoyment of their powers is possible. It is in the free home only that grown-up people use their faculties with ease. In the free home people utter their best word with no fear that it will be called an affectation; and such utterance of one's best word gives rise to a better thought. There only is the unpremeditated witticism spoken without terror lest it be distorted into bitterness. There only are mild philosophical generalizations stated with no danger of their being warped into mean, personal applications. Some of the laws governing intellectual activity are so subtle as to defy analysis, yet I believe it safe to assert that while occasionally an intellect is piqued into high effort by unbelief and criticism, as a rule mind is spurred to best endeavor and finest achievement by generous expectation. Under the comfortable consciousness that no cavil bickers about its boundaries, and that no ridicule awaits its flights, it will explore widely and soar high. I know a few young people who always talk their best and brightest before their parents (I am sorry to say I know *very* few who do this). I have two or three intimate friends among intellectual women who are always most brilliant in the presence of their husbands. Under the stimulus of a home atmosphere, and in the strength imparted by the confidence of friends, faculties work without effort and without friction. To analyze, explain, and illustrate the idea of freedom in a home, I should need to devote an entire paper to this branch of my subject. Attempting no such full discussion, I assume we all agree that freedom enters into the idea at the basis of family life. It must be added that great freedom in a home is made possible only by the accompaniment of great reserves. The home is not alone the place for the freest meeting of mind, for the frankest, sincerest, and the most unrestrained intercourse, but it provides for the strictest privacy and retirement of each individual. This provision is indeed the home's final seal of its respect for individual liberty.

The poetical substitutes for the word Home, *haven*, *retreat*, *refuge*, all figure another of the elemental ideas at the foundation of the family—viz., *Repose*. This idea, like that of privacy, is also conditioned on the idea of freedom. "Home is where a

man's washing and mending are done," says the modern court. "Home is where a man finds habitual lodgement," says the formal eighteenth century essayist. "Home is the sacred refuge of my soul," sings the religious poet. In these statements jurist, critic, and rhapsodist alike assert as inhering in the home the ideas of repose and refreshment. There, protected by privacy in freedom, one may lounge from one easy-chair to another, indifferent to posture and attitude. There one may stretch, yawn, shake off, play away, or sleep out fatigue. In the spiritual conditions of a real home similar repose for the soul will be provided. The harrying worries of the world drop at its threshold. There the tension of timidity, emulation, ambition, anxiety—of a hundred conflicting emotions and exhausting conditions—is removed, and the relaxed faculties in the attitude of unuse, or through conscious, fearless rising to the limit of their bent, find refreshment.

The true solvent for all the ideas thus far enumerated, for the recognition of common interests and the reverence for individual freedom, for intellectual stimulus, and for repose, the sentiment which secures and unites all these ideas, and which is also the guarantee of permanence, that idea which we have to underlie the monogamic family—this solvent is affection. The quality of that affection which justifies the establishment of a new family, the signs of its existence, the modes of its manifestation in family life, have been a matter of varying opinion and of warm discussion since the world first recognized love as the true sponsor of marriage. Here I have not time for even the briefest reviews of these theories, but, without proof or citation, will state what the world has discovered this affection is *not*. It is not sensual abandon; it is not instinctive passion; it is not mandlin sentimentality. Rationality and the purest morality enter into it; without discussing these or other of its elements, I will name that which it seems to me most needs emphasis.

The affection that can give stability to family life, that can cement its members into a unit which shall permit diversity and insist upon freedom—the affection that can do this has in it the quality of exaction.

Viewing one set of relations and their correspondent duties, we are wont to say that, in the ideal family, forgiveness, forbearance, conciliation, is the habitual attitude of each to each. This is the

stand-point occupied by the poet when he sings: "My darling cannot sin beyond my love." Viewing the relations of the family to certain eternal principles of purity and growth, we say the members of a family forgive nothing to each other—*i. e.*, they forgive in one another no abatement of allegiance to these principles. Occupying this stand-point, the German poet exclaims:

"Liebling, nie kannst du erreichen
Die Befehle meiner Liebe;
Was mein Ehrgeiz für dich hofft
Das ist höher als dein Muth."

I believe that the deterioration in this respect, in the idea of affection, is one of the commonest sources of weakness, selfishness, and corruptness of character. Such enervated affection permits the indulgence of the lowest and most unworthy desires of its objects, instead of demanding from them a life on the highest plane of their possibilities. This kind of love betrays itself in the commonest as well as the loftiest affairs of domestic life. This kind of love leads mothers to say, "I know so much candy, chewing-gum, and cigarettes are bad for Johnny, but I love him so I can't bear to cross him by prohibiting their use. I know her present associations are making Nellie vain and idle, but I love her so I can't bear to hurt her feelings about it." This kind of love fills the heart of the maiden who, acknowledging the defective character and the dangerous practices of her lover, adds: "Well, I can't help it—and I love him so that, so long as he loves me, I don't care what he does." This kind of love causes husbands to humor petulance, obstinacy, and unreason in their wives, and causes wives to ignore, or tacitly encourage, little vices in their husbands, both justifying their course on the ground of their great fondness. This is not the quality of love I mean when I speak of affection as the paramount idea in the home. According to the height of one's affection is the depth of one's care for its object, the susceptibility to offence, the capacity for clear-sighted inspection, the duty of deliberate, honest criticism, the demand of noble being and generous doing.

A stranger's defects are matters of indifference to me; an enemy's evil or ignoble act may fill me with complacency, if not a sort of gloating pleasure (because such acts prove him unfit to be

my friend, and reconcile me to his enmity). But what the man, woman, or child of my love, of my closest kin, may do, this is my concern, and my affection is their severest critic. This is the health, this the virtue, and the power of family affection, that it raises an exalted standard of character for its objects, and helps them to attain it by the mere force of its exacting expectations. The counterpart of exaction in the idea of family affection is generosity. Through this quality the home becomes the centre of friendships. That is no ideal home where the husband's friends are not welcomed by the wife and enjoyed by her, where the wife's friends are not greeted by the husband, and where the affections cannot widen for a real inclusion of these new objects. You remember how Charles Sumner's heart was gladdened and surprised by the discovery that the wives of his two most intimate friends (whose marriage he had been at first inclined to regard with a sort of melancholy jealousy) had also, like their husbands, the capacity for (intellectual) genuine friendship. Too often affection in the family is limited to its own members, and the home devoted only to their uses. This type of selfishness is figured in the order for a new carriage given by a young man who stipulated that it was to be just large enough for "me, my wife, and my baby."

The affection in the idea of the home has its necessary quality of exclusion, yet its influence is to increase sympathy with all humanity outside one's home. The family is not an insulated institution, nor can it be insulated without vitiating its character and decreasing its power. The scene of the most intensely personal interests, the arena for personal qualities to meet and grow; it is, however, founded on universal ideas by virtue of which it continues. All currents of motive have access to it, and its life issues into all channels of activity. The attempt to live unto itself is fatal to the single family; it is fatal to the family as an institution.

The affection that warrants permanence to family life is of the quality that lifts for the entrance of new persons, new relations, new interests. It is this quality in family affection which makes possible all the sweet uses of hospitality; not merely the hospitality of lunches, dinners, and lodgings, delightful as these are, but the hospitality which welcomes new ideas and foreign opinions to a sympathetic consideration.

In this brief and necessarily sketchy analysis I have attempted no details. If true principles are once recognized, the details will follow. When the sun shines we do not have to count the candles and be careful about their placing. Once can we perceive the fundamental principles of home life, and act in harmony with them, and the doilies will be of exactly the right size and pattern, pictures will be hung at just the right height, curtains will be draped at precisely the proper curve and angle; all externals will conform to the laws of beauty so soon as all internals have submitted to the laws of health, justice, freedom, activity, and love.

When humanity shall have become so generous, so pure, and so true as to be capable of an affection altogether exacting, which warrants permanence; altogether generous, which secures common interests, yet grants personal freedom and expands to friendship; altogether inspiring, which compels intellectual activity; altogether provident, which guards repose and privacy—then the idea of the home will begin to be realized, and ideal homes will become as common as they now are rare.

THE ORACLES OF ZOROASTER.¹

TRANSLATED BY THOMAS STANLEY, AUTHOR OF "LIVES OF THE PHILOSOPHERS."²

I.—THE MONAD, DUAD, AND TRIAD.

. . . Where the Paternal Monad is. The Monad is enlarged, . . . and generates Two, for the Duad sits by him, and glitters with intellectual sections—both to govern all things and to order every-

¹ Τα τοῦ Ζωροάστρου Λόγια. Known also as *The Chaldean Oracles*. A few of them were first published by Ludovicus Tiletanus at Paris, with the Commentaries of Plethōn, to which were subsequently added those of Psellos. The rest were collected by Franciscus Patricius from the works of Proklos, Hermias, Simplicios, Damaskios, Synesios, Olympiodoros, Nikephoros, and Amobios, and published, together with the "Hermetic Books," at the end of his *Nova Philosophia*.

Jamblichos has remarked that it was the custom in Egypt to ascribe all sacred writings to Hermes. It would seem that the Assyrian sacerdotal writers were in the practice of crediting their religious compositions to Zoroaster. Hermippos says that there were two million verses, or *gathas*, of this character, which, it is conjectured, were de-

thing not ordered. For in the whole world shineth the Triad, over which the Monad rules.¹

This Order is the beginning of all section.² For the Mind of the Father said that all things be cut into three; whose will assented, and then all things were divided.

For the Mind of the Eternal Father said: All things into three, governing all things by the Mind. And there appeared in it [the Triad] virtue and wisdom and multiscient Verity.

This way floweth the shape of the Triad, being pre-existent—not the first [essence], but where they are measured. For thou must conceive that all things serve these three principles. . . .

. . . The first is the Sacred Course; but in the middle, Air; the third, the other which cherisheth the earth in fire.

The fountain of fountains, and . . . of all fountains. The matrix containing all things. Thence abundantly springs forth

stroyed by Alexander at Persepolis, and by the Parthians who succeeded to his dominion. Thus much is certain, that Zoroaster and Zoroastrian writings are of conjectural genuineness. Whether the personage of the *Avesta* and *Yasna* was an actual individual, or the titular high-priest, and whether he was Aryan, "Turanian," or Semite, are matters of curious study. It is certain that the *Logia* here copied differ widely in style and purport from the *Gathas* of the *Yasna*, which are more according to the tenor of the *Vedas*, whereas the *Oracles* are Sabean.

Passages, it will be observed, are often incomplete, as well as not coherent.—A. W.

² This translation has been edited for this reprint by Dr. Alexander Wilder, at my request. Proclus, the greatest and most learned of Neo-Platonic philosophers, used to declare that he wished that nothing had come down from antiquity except the *Timæus* of Plato and these Chaldean Oracles.—Ed.]

¹ *Proposed Version*: "The Sole Unity is extended; . . . the Two generate; for the Duad abides with the One, and glows with spiritual potencies: thus is effected the directing of all things, and the arranging of everything that is not in its proper order. For the Trine, which the Sole One precedes, shineth in all the Universe."—A. W.

² I suggest the following reading of this passage.—A. W.

"The origin of every separation of essence is Order. The Father-mind proposed that everything should be divided threefold; his will confirmed this, and already all were divided. The Mind, the Father Eternal proposed the division into trines, directing all by intelligence.

"In this way the figure of the Triad issued forth, before it had existed; not the figure of the First Es-ence, but of that which they measure. For understand: everything is subservient to the three principles. . . . First is the Sacred Road; then between is the Dark Air; and third, the other which warms the earth with fire. *This is the source of fountains, even of the fountains of all things—it is the womb containing all things. Carried on high, there issues from it the creation of diversified matter; thence the trailing Flame, flower of the Dark Fire, penetrates into the cavities of worlds. Thence all extend downwards their wonderful radiations.*"

the generation of multifarious Matter. Thence extracted a *Præster*¹ the flame of glowing Fire, flashing into the cavities of the world : for all things from thence begin to extend downwards their admirable beams.

II.—THE FATHER AND MIND.

The Father hath snatched away himself ; neither hath He shut up his own fire in his intellectual power.

For nothing unfinished proceedeth from the Father's rule (*ἀρχή*). For the Father perfected all things, and delivered them over to the Second Mind, which the whole race of men call the First : Light begotten of the Father, he alone having cropped the flower of the Mind from the Father's vigor.

For the Paternal self-begotten Mind understanding [his] work, sowed in all the fiery bond of Love, that all things might continue loving forever.

Neither those things which are intellectually context in the Light of the Father in all things : that being elements of the World they might persist in love.

For by understanding he hath the power to instil the Paternal Mind into all fountains and beginnings. For it is the bound of the Paternal Depth (*βάθος*), and the fountain of the intellectuals.

Neither went he forth, but abode in the Paternal Depth, and in the Adytum according to divinely-nourished Silence. For the Fire once above shutteth not his power into Matter by actions, but by the Mind.

For the Paternal Mind hath sowed symbols through the world. Which understandeth intelligibles and beautifieth ineffables—wholly division and indivisible.

By Mind he contains the intelligibles, but introduceth Sense into the worlds.

By Mind he contains the intelligibles, but introduceth Soul into the worlds.

III.—MIND, INTELLIGIBLES, AND INTELLECTUALS.

(*Νοῦς, νοητά, καὶ νοερα.*)

And of the one Mind, the Intelligible (Mind). For the Mind is not without the Intelligible ; it exists not without it.

¹ *Præster*, a flame, a serpent, or tongue of fire.—A. W.

These are Intellectuals and Intelligibles, which, being understood, understand. For the Intelligible is the aliment of the Intelligent.

Learn the Intelligible, since it exists beyond the Mind; and of the Mind which moves the empyreal heaven. For the framer (τεχνίτης) of the Fiery World is the Mind of the Mind.

You who know certainly the supermundane paternal depth (βυθός).

The Intelligible is predominant over all section.

There is something Intelligible which it behooves thee to understand with the flower of the Mind. For if thou inclinest thy mind thou shalt understand this also. Yet understanding something (of it), thou shalt not understand this wholly; for it is a power of circumlucid strength, glittering with intellectual sections (rays): but it behooves not to consider this Intelligible with vehemence of Intellection, but with the ample flame of the ample Mind, which measureth all things except this Intelligible. But it behooves thee to understand this; for if thou inclinest thy mind, thou shalt understand this also; not fixedly, but having a pure turning eye (thou must) extend the empty mind of thy Soul toward the Intelligible—that thou mayest learn the Intelligible; for it exists beyond the Mind. But every mind understands this God; for the Mind (νοῦς) is not without the Intelligible (νοητόν), neither is (ὑπάρχει, existeth) the Intelligible without the Mind.

To the intellectual Presters of the intellectual Fire all things by yielding are subservient, to the persuasive counsel of the Father, and [both] to understand and always to remain in a restless whirling: fountains and principles, to turn, and always to remain in a restless whirling—by insinuating into worlds (κοσμοίς) the Venerable Name in a sleepless whirling, by reason of the terrible menace of the Father.

Under two Minds the life-generating fountain of the Souls is contained. And the Maker who, self-operating, framed the world. Who sprung first out of the Mind. Clothing fire with fire, binding them together to mingle the fountainous craters, preserving the flower of his own fire. He glittereth with Intellectual Sections,¹

¹ By sections Mr. Stanley appears to understand *rays*. I opine that the word denotes the interior substance, corresponding with the nobler intestines of the body.—A. W.

and filleth all things with love. That things unfashioned may be fashioned. Like swarms they are carried, being broken about the bodies of the world.

What the Mind speaks it speaks by understanding (τῶ νοεῖν). Power is with them (ἐκείνοis). Mind is from her (ἐκείνου).

IV.—IYNGES,¹ IDEAS, AND PRINCIPLES.

(Ἰνγες, Ἰδέαι, Ἀρχαί.)

These being many, ascend into the lucid worlds; springing into them, and in which are three tops (ἀκροτήτες). Beneath them lies the chief of Immaterials.

Principles, which have understood the intelligible works of the Father, disclosed them in sensible works, as in bodies; being (as it were) the ferrymen betwixt the Father and matter, and producing manifest images of unmanifest things; and inscribing the unmanifest in the manifest frame of the world (κοσμοποιά).

The Mind of the Father made a jarring noise, understanding by vigorous counsel Omniform ideas: and flying out of one fountain they sprung forth: for from the Father was the counsel and end, by which they are connected with the Father by alternate life from several vehicles. But they were divided, being by intellectual fire distributed into other Intellectuals; for the King did set before the multiform world an intellectual multiform pattern, the print of whose form He promoted through the world, according to which the world appeared beautified with all kinds of Ideas, of which there is one fountain; out of which come rushing forth others undistributed, being broken about the bodies of the world; which through the vast recesses, like swarms, are carried round about every way. Intellectual notions from the paternal fountain cropping the flower of Fire in the point of sleepless time of this primigenous Idea, the first self-budding fountain of the Father budded. Intelligent Iynges do (themselves) also understand from the Father by unspeakable counsels, being moved so as to understand.

¹ Iynx, the torquilla, or wryneck, a bird having a singular power of rotating its head and neck. It would seem in this connection to have some relation to the *Mihr* or genius in the wheel, the cherub.—A. W.

V.—HEKATÊ, SYNOCHÊS, AND TELETARCHS.

(Ἑκατή, Συνοχεῖς, καὶ Τελετάρχαι.)

For out of Him spring all implacable thunders, and the prêtèr-receiving cavities of the entirely lucid strength of Father-begotten Hekatê. And he who begirds—*i. e.*, the flower of Fire and the strong spirit of the poles, fiery above—he gave to his Prêtèrs that they should guard the tops, mingling the power of his own strength in the Synochês.

O how the world hath intellectual guides inflexible! because she is the operatrix, because she is the dispensatrix of fire-giving life. Because, also, it fills the life-producing bosom of Hekatê, and instils in the Synochês the enlivening strength of potent fire. But they are guardians of the works of the Father. For He assimilates Himself, professing to be clothed with the print of the images.

The Teletarchs are comprehended with the Synochês. To these intellectual Prêtèrs of intellectual fire all things are subservient. But as many as serve the material Synochês, having put on the completely-armed vigor of resounding Light; with triple strength fortifying the Soul and the Mind to put into the mind the symbol of variety, and not to walk dispersedly on the empyreal channels, but firmly; these frame indivisibles (ἄτομα), and sensibles, and corporiforms, and things destined to Matter.

VI.—SOUL, NATURE.

The Soul being a bright fire, by the power of the Father, remains immortal, and is mistress of all life, and possesseth many complexions of the cavities of the world (κόσμον πολλά πλήρωματα κόλπων). For it is an imitation (μίμημα) of the mind; but that which is born hath something of the body. The channels being intermixed, she performs the part of incorruptible fire.

Next the paternal conception (δίνοια) I, the Soul, dwell; warmth heating all things, for He did put the mind (νοῦς) in the soul, the soul in the dull body.

Of us the Father of gods and men interposed. Abundantly animating Light, Fire, Æther, Worlds. For natural works co-exist with the intellectual light of the Father. For the Soul which adorned the great heaven, and adorning with the Father. But

her horns [rays?] are fixed above; but about the shoulders of the goddess, immense Nature is exalted.

Again indefatigable Nature commands the worlds and works; that Heaven, drawing an eternal course, might run, and the swift Sun might come about the centre as he useth.

Look not into the Fatal Name of this Nature.

VII.—THE WORLD.

(Κόσμος.)

The Maker who, operating by Himself, framed the world. And there was another bulk of Fire, self-operating all things, that the body of the world might be perfected. That the world might be manifest, and not seem membranous. The whole world of fire and water and earth, and all-nourishing æther.

The inexpressible and expressible watchwords of the world. One life with another, from the distributed channels. Passing from above through the opposite part through the centre of the earth; and another fifth the middle.¹ Another fiery channel, where it descends to the material (*ύλαιων*) channels. Life-bringing fire. Stirring himself up with the goad of resounding light. Another fountainous, which guides the empyreal world. The centre from which all (lines) which way soever are equal.

For the Paternal Mind sowed symbols through the World.

For the centre of every one is carried betwixt the Fathers.

For it is an imitation of the Mind; but that which is born hath something of the body.

VIII.—HEAVEN.

(Ούρανός.)

For the Father congregated seven firmaments (*στερέωματα*) of the world, circumscribing heaven in a round figure, and fixed a

¹ The strong temptation to make new versions of these disjointed, obscure, and indefinite passages, is held in check by the consciousness that they have been collated from several works and places, and thrown together, perhaps fortuitously; so that their connection to each other is uncertain, if not improbable. At the risk of deserving criticism, the emendation of this paragraph is offered:

“The arcane and the published passwords of the universe. One and another form of life from the distributing channels. From above proceeding [*geniive case*] over through the centre of the earth, even the fifth medium, another vehicle of fire descendeth thence, to the channels of material substance, a life-bearing fire.”—A. W.

great company of inerratic stars. And He constituted a Septenary of erratic animals,¹ placing earth in the middle, and water in the middle of the earth; the air above these.

He fixed a great company of inerratic stars, to be carried, not by laborious and troublesome tension, but by a settlement which hath no error (*πλάνη*). He fixed a great company of inerratic (*ἀπλανών*) stars, forcing fire to fire; to be carried by a settlement which hath no error. He constituted them six, casting into the midst the the seventh fire of the Sun; suspending their disorder in well-ordered zones (or orbits). For the Goddess brings forth the great Sun and the bright Moon.

O Æther, Sun, Spirit of the Moon, guides of the Air, and of the solar circles, and of the lunar clashings, and of the ærial recesses! The melody of the æther and of the passages of the Sun and Moon, and of the Air. And the wide air, and the lunar course, and the pole of the sun, it collects it, receiving the melody of the Æther, and of the Sun, and of the Moon, and of all things that are contained in the Air.

His hair pointed is seen by his native light. Hence Kronos. The Sun-Assessor beholding the pure pole, and the æthereal course, and the vast motion of the Moon, and the ærial fluxions; and the great Sun, and the bright Moon.

IX.—TIME.

(*Χρόνος.*)

The mundane god, eternal, infinite. Young and old, and of a spiral form, and another fountainous, who guides the empyreal heavens.

X.—SOUL, BODY, MAN.

(*Ψυχή, Σώμα, Ἀνθρωπος.*)

It behooves thee to hasten to the Light, and to the beams of the Father, from whence was sent to thee a soul clothed with much mind. These things the Father conceived, and so the mortal was animated. For the Paternal Mind sowed symbols in souls, replenishing the soul with profound love. For the Father of Gods and men placed the mind in the Soul; and in the body he estab-

¹ i. e., the seven planets which were believed to be ensouled.—A. W.

lished you (τε). For all divine things are incorporeal, but bodies are bound in them for your sakes, incorporeals not being able to contain the bodies by reason of the corporeal nature in which you are concentrated.

And they are in God, attracting strong flames. Descending from the Father, from which descending the soul crops of empyreal fruits the soul-nourishing flower. And therefore conceiving (*νοήσασαι*) the works of the Father, they avoid the audacious (*ἀναιδής*) wing of Fatal Destiny. And though you see this soul manumitted,¹ yet the Father sends another to make up the number.

Certainly these souls are superlatively blessed above all souls; they are sent forth from heaven to earth. And these rich souls, which have inexpressible fates as many of them, O King, as proceed from shining Thee, or from Jove himself, under the strong power of his thread.²

Let the immortal power of thy soul be predominant; let thine eyes extend upwards. Stoop not down to the dark world, beneath which continually lies a faithless depth and Hades dark all over, squalid, delighting in images, unintelligible, precipitous, craggy, always involving a dark abyss, always espousing an opaque, idle, breathless body. And the light-hating world, and the winding currents by which many things are swallowed up.

Seek Paradise. Seek thou the way of the Soul, whence and by what order, having served the body, to the same place from which thou didst flow, thou mayst rise up again, joining action to sacred speech.

Stoop not down, for a precipice lies below the Earth. Drawing through the Ladder which hath seven steps, beneath which is the Throne of Necessity.

Enlarge not thy destiny.³

The soul of men (*μέροπων*) will in a manner clasp God to herself; having nothing mortal, she is wholly inebriated from God. For she boasts harmony, in which the mortal body exists.

If thou extend the fiery mind to the work of piety, thou shalt

¹ Greek, *ἀποκατάστασαν*, restored to its former estate.—A. W.

² Or, "Those that sprung from thee resplendent, O King, or from Zeus himself, by the forceful thread of Necessity."—A. W.

³ Or, "Add thou not to that which destiny has allotted."—A. W.

preserve the fluxible body. There is a room for the image (εἶδωλον) also in the circumlucid place.

Every way to the unfashioned Soul stretch the reins of fire.

The fire-glowing cogitation hath the first rank.

For the mortal approaching to the Fire shall have light from God.

For to the slow mortal the gods are swift.

The Furies are the stranglers of men.

The bourgeons even of ill Matter are profitable and good.¹

Let fiery Hope nourish thee in the angelic region.

But the Paternal Mind accepts not her will until she go out of Oblivion and pronounce the word, inserting the remembrance of the pure paternal symbol.

To these he gave the docile character of life to be comprehended. Those that were asleep he made fruitful by his own strength.

Defile not the spirit, nor deepen a superficialities; leave not the dross of Matter on a precipice.

Bring her not forth, lest going forth she have something.

The souls of those who quit the body violently are most pure.

The ungingers of the soul which give her breathing are easy to be loosed.²

In the side of Sinister Hekatè there is a fountain of virtue, which remains entire within, not omitting her virginity.

O Man, the machine of boldest Nature! Subject not to thy mind the vast measures of the earth, for the plant of Truth is not upon Earth. Nor measure the measures of the Sun, gathering together canons; he is moved by the eternal will of the Father, not for thy sake. Let alone the swift course of the Moon and the progression of the stars; for she runs always by the impulse of Necessity; and the progression of the stars was not brought forth for thy sake. The æthereal wide flight of birds is not veracious, and the dissections of entrails of victims. All these are toys, the supports of gainful cheats; fly thou these if thou intendest to open the sacred paradise of piety, where virtue, wisdom, and equity are

¹ Or, "Even the germs of Evil Matter are benefits and advantages."—A. W.

² Perhaps this would be better rendered: "The aspirations which impel onward the soul are easily relaxed" (εὐλύστοι).—A. W.

assembled. For thy vessel (*ἀγγειον*) the beasts of the earth shall inhabit, and the earth bewails them even to their children.

DEMONS, RITES.

(*Δαίμονες. Τελεταί.*)

Nature persuades that there are pure demons.

The bourgeons even of ill Matter are profitable and good.

But these things I revolve in the recluse temples of my mind; the fire extending sparkingly into the spacious air, or fire unfigured whence a voice issuing forth, or light abundant—whizzing and winding along the earth. But also to see a horse more glittering than light, or a boy on thy shoulders riding on a horse—fiery or adorned with gold, or divested (of clothing), or shooting, or standing on thy shoulders.

If thou speakest often to me, thou shalt see absolutely that which is spoken, for then neither appears the celestial concave bulk, nor do the stars shine; the light of the moon is covered, the earth stands not still, but all things appear in thunders. Invoke not the self-conspicuous image of Nature, for thou must not behold these before thy body is initiated; when soothing souls they always seduce them from these Mysteries. Certainly out of the cavities of the Earth spring terrestrial dogs, which show no true sign to mortal man. “Labor about the Hekatic Strophalos.”¹

¹ The skilful reader will quickly perceive that the topic of this section is the initiation-scene of the arcane rites. The text is not very clear; certainly the translation is obscurer still. I venture, not without trepidation, to suggest the following as more accurately expressing the meaning of the original:

“But I will contemplate these matters of thought in the consecrated halls: the fire rising into the air like a swelling billow, or the formless fire which sends out a voice, or the bright light trailing on the ground and hissing. But the steed aglow with electric flame is a worthier spectacle than even the light, or the lad upon thy shoulders, radiant with fire, adorned with gold or naked, that guides the steed, or even throws a dart and keeps himself erect upon thy shoulders.

“If thou shouldst speak to me often, thou wouldst find out everything desired; for then the concave vault of the sky does not appear, nor do the stars shine; the moonlight is hidden, the earth does not stand still, but everything is seen by the flashes of lightning. Thou mayst not invoke the autoptic image of Nature [*i. e.*, the image of *Démêtér* or *Rhea* at the *Autopsia* or *Personal Vision*]; for it is not lawful for thee to behold it before thy person has undergone initiatory rites. When they cast a charm over the souls, they always lead them to the place of initiations. And then upleap from the bosom of the earth the dogs of the Underworld, exhibiting, perhaps, no real body to mortal man. They are active in the circuit of *Hekatô*.”—A. W.

Never change barbarous names, for there are names in every nation given from God, which have an unspeakable power in [Mystic] Rites.

When thou shalt see a Sacred Fire without form, shining flashingly through the depths of the world, hear the voice of Fire.

USE, BEAUTY, REASON;

OR, SCIENCE, ART, RELIGION.

BY MEEDS TUTHILL.

III.—REASON.

The only Reason for Man's Art, then, is his love for it; which, after all, is self-love. That is what he judges by in creating it; it is "good" when *his sensibility* is pleased.¹ And his justification for it is, that the object he creates is *destitute* of sensibility. He is not working *in* it, but only² *on* it. *It* knows not *itself* in any way: hence neither does it know or reck aught of him or of his doings. *Its* sacrifice is, therefore, after all, not a self-sacrifice; it is only a passive and barren one. And this crucifixion of *his* idea in it is only an imaginary and seeming one. We may *impute* it to the form, find it suggested there, but it is really not there,³ but elsewhere, if at all.

¹ Thus, to represent the Divine as pronouncing its Creation *good to look at* is in itself a promise of *woe*, a foreboding of Evil.

² A fine ground for arguing both the mortality of *all* Outer forms and the immortality of all spiritual ones. For that which is worked *in* can only be *transformed*; its sensibility is the *means* of this its own transformation. But that which is worked *on*, *i. e.*, by such external means as *impact, contact*, external relations in general, can be only a finite in *itself*, only a form as force-form, hence ending necessarily in the infinite abyss of Force as Outer Relativity.

³ And so Vera's interpretation of Hegel as making of Nature, as such, a Crucifixion of the Idea, *i. e.*, the Christ, the Second Person of the Trinity, is a false and monstrous conception. It can be only as Spiritual Person, that there can be a Divine *Suffering*; hence not in the insensate nor in the Whole of Nature as a Merciless Force. That is rather the Diabolical, the Arbitrary, of which the very interpretation, as *means* of Knowing *finitely*, must be a Suffering, a learning by Experience.

This disposes of the Outer phase of Art as only an Appearance; but only by making its Reality revert with total and concentrated force upon the *inner* Man. In him, then, is all this creating, all this suffering of sacrifice, all this crucifixion of the Idea. For *he* is *not* destitute of sensibility. And he it is who concentrates this Infinite idea of Beauty into some special form, shapes it into his own "style," and thus seeks a sort of peculiar possession of it. And since it is there alone, within him, that it develops and transforms itself, there also must be the final Reason of it,—the Reason which is both Cause and Effect. But this Reason of Beauty escapes from all particular forms. No rules, no Experiences, suffice for it. It rejects all merely proximate "reasons" as not *its* Reason. In a word, it shows itself manifestly as Infinite, and hence, as Divine Reason. Hence Art, considered in this creative nature and impulse of it in the human spirit, resolves itself essentially into the Spiritual and the Religious. In other words, Man's relation in that is the Religious Relation. The *final* Reason for his Art-Creation must be a religious Reason.

But what is the Reason of Religion? Evidently it must be the Divine Reason itself;¹ since Religion is a relation which spiritually unites Human and Divine. Now Beauty, as we have seen, seemed at first useless, since not of *particular* Use; yet, for this very reason, as of the highest Use in revealing this Infinite and Divine relation of the spirit. But Religion differs from Art, in that Art satisfies itself by *feeling* the final Reason only in one's self; whereas Religion seeks also to find it in the Object—in *every* Object. For there is no object finite or isolated for Religion, which finds all as necessarily related to God. Hence Religion restores the *Use* to objects—the highest use—the Beautiful Use. And since this use is now a Divine Use, the Reason is now, in the Use, no longer as a merely proximate reason, but as a final Reason. For the *religious* use, strictly speaking, Means do not exist *as means*, but are at once transformed into *ends*. For example, the Reason of a good act is the *act itself*, *as good*, whether considered as *external* act or as *internal design*; for it is not *complete* till it is in *both*, each is *means* for it. And

¹ Otherwise it is no Reason at all.

so, in general, the Religious process is not a running-on, *ad infinitum*, to find a Cause; but the Cause, for it is always the One Same Infinite, and hence immediate and concentrative at every step, realizing itself at every point. And such also is the operation of Reason in its Divine Form. This is what makes Reason and Religion identical, when considered only as *Method*; and it is also what makes them *differ*, when Reason is taken as only a *Knowing*, and Religion as *both* a knowing and a *Doing*.¹ Hence Religion includes in *its* Reason both Use and Beauty, both Practical and Theoretical; whereas Reason, if taken as Knowing only, or as Philosophical, includes only the theoretical phases of Science, Art, and Religion. This is a distinction which will be rendered clearer, perhaps, by what follows. And it is to be borne in mind that we are now seeking for the *final* Reason, hence the Divine Reason, not the merely human or finite Reason which has found its way, through Use and Beauty, through Science and Art, up to the Religious Relation.

1. Art seemed to discard all Use, yet found in Beauty the highest use, as a Revelation of Man's capacity to *feel*, and even to *express*, an *Infinite relation*, an Infinite Reason. For this Reason of Beauty shows itself, in Creative Art, as eventually discarding all particular "reasons," and as concentrating itself within the Artist himself, as an *Inner Reason* which *impels* him to create, yet tells him *how* only in the *act* of creating—reveals itself as *Reason* only in and by its own *operation*. But though Man is thus rendered creative of Beauty in Art, by an apodictic, or Necessary Reason, and though he is impelled to make Outer exhibition of his Art, yet is this *outer* act only a *formal* one. It is not vital in itself, and has no result except to demonstrate in others, what he feels in himself, that this Reason is only an Inner one, subjective only, or *else it is one that no man can utter*.

(a.) And its *first* phase is that of mere *Sensibility*. The Artist only "feels" the Reason; *seems*, at first, to feel it in the *senses*, but finally, only in his *love*; for, in its *infinite* form, this Reason of Beauty rises above the sense. So in Religion, Man at first only *feels* the Divine; but, so long as he mingles sense with it, he

¹ i. e., the former does not account for *Creation* at all. It is mere Science, and *inductive* only necessarily, till through *Art* it rises to the Religious point of view.

abases the Divine. So, in Science, he only *feels* the Truth without being able to “*give*,” that is, *express* a reason for it; his last reason, in the form of *sensibility* (and this rises above *sense*), is his *love* for Truth as harmonious in itself. Now, in all cases, to say we “can give no reason for it,” is to say that our power to *recognize* is greater than our power to *recreate*; we can *feel* a Beauty or a Truth which we cannot express. In other words, we can recreate within, in *ideal* form (for that is *recognition*), what we cannot recreate in *Outer* form¹—this latter will not hold *all* there is in Idea—and what we call our sensibility or feeling, when it takes the form of love for Truth, for Beauty, *holds* more than can be expressed by *sense*. Yet there is, at first, also a defect of sensibility, of power to recognize. The man, as animal, does not recognize either Truth, or Beauty, or Reason. For these develop themselves within him as *spiritual*; and hence only as he raises himself out of the animal nature. And when he is able to posit these for himself in an absolute way, as in Art, or in necessary Truth, by that *act* he bids a final farewell to Nature, as *merely* Formal and Outer and Arbitrary; separates himself as Spiritual therefrom, and takes up for himself, as a *thinking* activity, a nature indifferent to all Outerness, and of that *fluid* sort which can penetrate all, and take *all* forms, yet remain unchanged.

(b.) However, he does not attain this escape from his Natural chrysalis at once, nor without a long and weary struggle. And some seem to pride themselves upon being “sensible” in never *trying* to escape from it. So it is no wonder that theories are in vogue which say Reason is *in the senses* only. This theory is, in fact, “sensible,” but *only* sensible. Like the theory of Utility as only particular use, which goes into a universal contradiction of *uses*, so this theory of sense-Reason resolves itself into *my* sense as alone reasonable, yet into perpetual irrationality in that, and into a general conflict of senses. It does not perceive that *habit*

¹ Same of Divine Creation; the Outer an *inefficient* though a *coefficient*, mere arbitrary, medium posited only as means of *Separation*; *external* relation, whereby the absolute relation (*triple* necessarily) of Outer and Inner Worlds as Knowing and Unknowing may be realized. In *fact*, no knowledge can be *expressed* in this Outer: its meaning is *put into* it from the Inner development of relation of Spirit to Spirit; it is only the conventional *Word*, the mere symbol between them, the *wax* to be made to mean what one will.

is not only "second nature," "and ten times Nature," as Wellington called it, or that, as Napoleon said, "what *repeats itself* is what *takes possession* of us," but that, in fact, this repetition, this *habit* is the whole of Nature for us—the whole of our "sensible" nature. Nature is nothing for us except as we habitually view it. Hence it has ceased to be for us what it was to the Ancients—a deity. We form Nature for ourselves in our ideas of it; and, since we cling to these notions we have formed, they become for us fixed forms from which we are loath to tear ourselves. Thus the transformation we *see* in Nature must be really *in* ourselves and *of* ourselves. It is *easier* here, and so far *pleasanter* to *repeat* than to *reform*. The senses, being mechanical, prefer repetition: it is the spiritual alone that does not wish to be "possessed," and urges to *change*. And the sensualist theorist forgets, or is unaware, that what he calls "sensible" notions are only his first notions, or habitual notions, which he himself has formed, and in which he *chooses* to abide, partly because they are fixed, and thus *seem certain*, and partly because they seem *pleasant* as easier, or otherwise accordant with the mechanical senses.

Now, the Reason, as we have seen, the final Reason, as *actual* in *knowing*, is precisely in this inner, infinite *transformability*, *felt* as infinite in its *process*, if not in itself. Hence this *first* form of mere half-unconscious feeling—of capacity to recognize the Reason, but not to develop it in ourselves, or to recognize it in *one* form and not in another; and this tracing it gradually through its many forms, and tearing ourselves loose from the lower, though habitual and easier, to reach the higher—this is every man's school of trial and "experience." Here he begins with his imitative Art and his Inductive Science, both as necessary *means* for him. His Science is to collate results and reduce experiments to *Rules* in other words, he is discovering the *practice* of this final Reason, as it appears in the Outer World as Relation or "Law," and is *using* this Reason by imitation of *its* practice, *in respect to what is mechanical*. His Art rises to the realm of *inner* experience—experience of a Reason necessary and certain in itself, yet evolving itself in the thought as free for *it*, and for its ideal uses. And this experience goes so far, in Creative Art, as to discover the important fact that "*practice alone makes perfect*." Only *using gives* use of this final Reason.

This is the *first* lesson in Religion—the perceived necessity of the True, in order to clearly *perceive* the True. This is not merely a matter of attention enforced, and observation enlarged, by constancy of operation. That is part—the *outer* part, of the means whereby a man is brought to see the Reason of a Rule or of a Method given him to work by. But in merely useful arts, looking only to present or particular use, this may lead to vast variety of inventions, yet *only* of the useful, since only proximate reasons and limited relations are seen in the outer objects. Hence, though here the Reason develops itself in an infinite diversity, it is not found as One. But in *Beautiful Art*, where the man is thrown back at once upon the *final* Reason, if he is to find any at all whereby he can *invent*—create *ab initio*, and *for all*—this *practice* is essential for quite another purpose, and with quite another result for the consciousness. The Artist, though he still judges only by his sensibility, yet feels that the reason appears to him as developing itself *in* him whenever he follows the right practice. To imitate the *Perfect* is not merely to imitate, but also to *know* it. For, since this imitation must be an inner and Spiritual one, it is also to feel and recognize, in this activity of the Spirit, the Reason itself at work. Thus the Reason is recognized in its *Method*, *if this be put into practice*. And *without* this actual practice the Reason *cannot* reveal itself; for it is itself an activity, known by its infinite transforming, and must be so realized, or not at all. How can any one expect to *see a Reason* without *thinking* it?

(c.) Here, then, is the fundamental Reason for all methods, all prescriptions in Art or Religion. The Reason is a Spiritual activity which must be discerned *by* and *in* the practising of it rightly. Thus the final Reason, the Reason as Divine, lends itself to Use, and reveals itself only in the using of it. To do the right thing rightly is to know the Reason of it as revealing itself, at least, to this primary sensibility of the *spiritual* nature. The CERTAINTY is *felt*, though it cannot be stated. And hence, in Religion, as well as in Art and in Science, it is necessary to *first* teach the *practice*, the rule, the precept. And here, it is necessary for all, and *always*: not merely for the child or the tyro, but for all, in all ages, at all stages of progress, and for evermore. Religion is the sphere of the “forever,” the Eternal: and here the *Use* again

shows itself as a Reason in itself, and *always* a Reason, and hence as having its infinity now in *Time*, in the spiritual sphere, instead of in spatial forms, as in respect to outer objects. But in this form, as *practice*, it will also diversify itself infinitely. And, as already intimated, it will differ from mere Art-practice in demanding a unity instead of a separation between the inner act and the outer act, and thus truly and completely imitate the Divine in its *spiritual* creativeness. For here, the Reason to be found is the *last* Reason—the Divine Reason; and this can never be learned, save in *doing* as well as *knowing* its will, in *acting* under its guidance, and thus *partaking* of its activity, its Spirit.

Hence, in this first phase of mere rule and practice, *all* religions are prescriptive. The Jewish religion is, however, the only one proper to note here, since it recognizes the Divine fully as “Spirit,” and as precisely in that severance of Subject from Object¹—of God from Man as a “*potter’s vessel*,” which the Art-intuition brings about between the Artist and *his* created object. It confines itself *wholly* to precept; as if to say, “You can know the Reason of this Divine Relation only by *obedience* to it;” only by constant practice of acts which, no matter how indifferent otherwise, yet *suggest* this relation—keep it in mind. Not to dwell, or even insist upon, the special aptitude for this purpose of the Mosaic Law, it must be at least admitted that, in regard to the Jews as between themselves alone, this law was most wisely devised. And that the sense of Eternal Right and Justice was in it, is, perhaps, best illustrated by the manner in which a novelist² makes a Jewish Rabbi (who had just made a Jew shrink from a false oath) boast of this law, as sanctioned not merely by a sense of fear, but also by a sense of Right, which is *durable* and *lovable*. The Rabbi says: “Only reflect a little, how often *you* [of other religions] have split up and fought each other for these two thousand years; how many sects and religions you have formed. But

¹ Natural that this incompleteness of conception should paralyze Fine Art with the Jews; since the idea of *Beauty* was at *once* absorbed in that of the Divine which *cannot* be created, and *must* not be imaged. But, that this Art-intuition was *there* in this locked-up form, is evident from the present skill and almost precedence of Jews in Art, especially in that most *infinite* of Arts—music, *e. g.*, Meyerbeer, Mendelssohn, and a score of others!

² Ereckmann-Chatrion, “L’Ami Fritz,” p. 219.

we are always the same since Moses—we are ever the *Sons of the Eternal*. You are the sons of *Time* and of *Pride*; with the least interest, one makes you change opinion. And we, poor, wretched—all the universe combined has not been able to make us abandon a single one of our laws.”

The Jewish Religion may, then, be described as wholly a Religion of Use, and even of *present* use. For, though all that is essential to it is durable (such as its prescriptions of Right, Justice, Obedience to the *Divine One* as against all particular interests or selfish aims), yet are even these limited, for the individual, to the present life, and have their future interest for him only as one who hopes for continuity through his descendants. Thus *Family* is the essential idea with the Jew. His is not the Church as Universal Family, but it is the Family as Church. It is *his* Family, both as State and Church. As he is a “son of God,” so would he be a “father of many.” Thus the merely *selfish* interest he has in obedience is lifted above himself and found by him as of an infinite extent. And so the Use becomes, for his thought, an infinite Use, although, for him individually, it is only a present Use. The infinite of it is not in him, but external to him in others. So, in like manner, though his religion is inwardly only a religion of Fear, in respect to God, yet it is *outwardly* one of Love for his descendants. This is the only form in which there can be seen any *Use* for immortality, by one who does not recognize the Divine through *Love*. For we can see that the Divine may have use for us *temporarily* only as working-creatures, and even as thinking-beings, if we think only the finite. But what use would He have for us as immortal, unless he loved us? Or of what use would eternal life be to us, except in such a case? The Jewish scheme is therefore silent on this point, and only *suggestive* of immortality. It would be *unreasonable* to impose *eternal* penalties on a merely *formal* obedience. So also would it be to awaken

¹ This points to where the *final* Reason must be found—not in a mere “thinking,” but in what seems to be conceived in a way by Swedenborg when he says, “The Divine Love and Wisdom are *Substance* and *Form*”—[as if to say, “In the *Spiritual* Sphere there is a wholly other *material* as well as other *Form*”]. But, of course, this *supposes* the immortality. To demonstrate it, the *Form* as well as the *material* must be found to be imperishable. In respect to the Outer material, only one of these bears the test. In respect to the inner, the difficulty is as to a supposed or imputed *formlessness*, except the perishable forms, etc.

imaginary hopes or terrors which would run into superstitions and thus defeat their own purpose. But the *Family* is a positive and real object of foresight. And here is a Creation in the Family of what we wish to see *live*. Is not the type very suggestive of immortality for "sons of the eternal" ?

By-the-way, there is a curious resemblance here to the Comtian "religion," the "Positive Philosophy" which, as *Sentiment*, worships *Humanity* in Love, and God only as an Unknowable. The logic of this *resemblance* is, that each of these religions finds the External only as an Indefinite, and thus without any union with the Internal, except as an *impulse* which drives it *out*—out of Eden, we may say—and *keeps* it out with a flaming sword. Yet the *difference* is world-wide. For the Comtian religion finds Use, and prescribes *practice* only for the Scientific reason, the Useful reason, the *Finite*: whereas the Jewish practice is an *Art-practice*, not of finite art, but of the Infinite Art of "seeing God" *always* and everywhere. Hence its Art-creation is *stilled*. The idea of Beauty is here at once and wholly absorbed in the Divine, which cannot be created, and must not be debased by image. The *child* is the only work of Art, and of a Divine Art—a sensitive object which seeks, yet fears, its Creator.

Moreover, there is in this Jewish Code another subtle Suggestion of the Truth, and precisely in that part which is merely formal, and now grown obsolete. For example, the worship is a formal one, and the *forms* of it are quite *arbitrary*,¹ and regardless of any natural relation of things, as in respect to foods forbidden, or to an outer expiation or atonement quite disproportionate with the supposed *sin* (offense), and the sin itself may be a merely formal one. But this declares that the *Outer* form is wholly indifferent in itself, and that what is really commanded is the *act* of obedience—the inner act of the Spirit, from *repetition* of which it may grow into the *habit* of referring all things to God. In respect to this act of the spirit, there should, in fact, be no distinction made in outer acts or things; and the most indifferent to present use or proximate reasons should be selected as precisely the types to indicate the absolute universality of the Religious relation in

¹ The *material* is here again treated as mere *means*, wholly destitute of any significance in itself.

them—precisely the means to signify that it applies to *all*—so long as this Religious relation is to be recognized only by formal act of a mind as yet unconscious of its *inner* relations. It enforces the truth that the *Religious act* must be *both* inner and outer.

In like manner, the prescriptions for cleansing of uncleanness, which now seem abhorrent to delicacy, are but a *first* way of recognizing the distinction of the spiritual from the animal nature, and of declaring the soul to be tainted and undeveloped, so long as it stays willingly or *unwillingly* in this Outer Nature. Thus this also hints at another and immortal nature in the Man, which must be honored and kept ever cleansed, as though a day might come when it would be called forth from the body, and should then be able to appear in a spiritual purity. We should command these prescriptions, scientifically, as “good for the health”—to secure the “*sana mens in sano corpore.*” (For our Science has got so far as to recognize the “mind” at least as something to be *kept clean!*) And so we should prescribe to the Artist, “Keep your *mind* pure, if you would realize a Beautiful Creation!” Or we should say, philosophically, “Keep *both* mind and body pure, if you would attain to that ‘highest consciousness’ which is a consciousness of the Divine.” But this Mosaic law was given to men who had no Science, nor Art, nor Philosophy. And though they came to look for a “Shiloh,” to be born some day, in this manger of the body, yet they had no notion of what we mean by a birth of the Divine in the religious Consciousness, nor that this Shiloh was, above all, to be thus born as one who would recognize himself in *Spirit*, rather than in his body, as “son of God.” They must have regarded this typical cleansing of the spirit, therefore, in another light than as a perfecting of its consciousness, or a promise of Divine revelation in it when pure. For the Jew, all this was covered under the idea that the Divine eye saw *within* him—“searched his innermost thoughts, and that this pure eye alone was what must not be offended.” But this, again, is only a true reference of all to the Divine; for the *immortal* can, after all, have its being only in that; and to suppose, as does this formal ceremony, that not we, but it alone, can know what is fitting or necessary for its complete satisfaction, is a form of surrender to its will which is all the more perfect because it acts upon a possibility rather than on a *certainty*. And, when we

think of it closely, may we not say that *all* our acts of obedience to the Divine are thus really based, not upon a certainty as to the good character of the *outer* act, or *form* of the act, but only upon a certainty of the good *intent*, the inner act?¹ We may be sure of this *intent*, but the *outer* shape to give it may take so much the form of sheer contingency as to be like "casting bread upon the waters." So here, in this *formal* obedience in general, as merely *typical*, the *intent* is all, and is to be formalized only that it may be *explicitly taught* as intent, and made habit as such. To obey the Rule here, is to recognize the *last* Reason—that of a Divine in all *to be obeyed in every*, the *least* thing, as the very *act of living*. And this is true, albeit this Reason is *not*, and just *because* it is not, perceived *outwardly* as Reason, but only as Rule. For, as *Religious* act, it has only this inner *intent* as its Reason, and the Rule only as conventional outer form for practice. In a larger sense, of course, which is only hinted at, and not included in this merely formal practice, an act is Religious, as we have already seen, only because its Reason is the Infinite Reason, which is so precisely because it overrules all mere proximate reasonings and sensible perceptions.

But the deep wisdom of the Jewish Law, in these regards, is to be seen in the fact that for such *merely typical* purposes, suggestive purposes, it is precisely the indifferent things which are taken. There is no violation of any essential relation of Right or Justice in matters of practical use (otherwise, it would not be still in vogue, unchanged, according to the Rabbi's boast). This is a system of *Obedience only*, but one in which both the Practical and Theoretical are embodied in *Use*. It seeks to teach Religion as an *Art*, that the *Science* may come from the practice of it. It is sought to establish certain habits of mind which become a "second nature," a *spiritual* nature. For who can doubt that the practice of this law by the Jews, through all their persecutions, has made of this "second nature" a far more spiritual nature, and of the Worship a far more spiritual worship, than in the days of Moses? And the tenacity with which this system and its habits have clung to the Jewish race confirms the fundamental idea of

¹ Another form of rejecting this outer material as "*immaterial*"—not the spiritual material.

this, and of every true Religion, that *Obedience* is the *first* step, and also the *necessary* means, the *Way* to Religious Life. But its insufficiency is in not going beyond this first step; or, rather, in not developing it into the higher forms which obedience takes, when the human spirit has become, as a thinking-being, more thoroughly conscious of itself and of its relation to the Divine Reason.

2. The *second* phase of Religion, then, is the *Reflective* phase, which develops itself through Science, Art, and Philosophy, to attain to the Reason in the *Thought-form*. The *first* phase, just considered, is an *Art-form* of Religion, in which there is only a *sentiment* of the Divine, or *feeling* of the Reason as something *hidden*, and which is to be learned only by *practice*. The *second*, or Reflective stage, may be called an effort to *state* this *hidden* Reason—an Effort which culminates in Philosophy. This *Hidden* is at first only *felt* as a *Revealed* yet *unrevealable*, *unstatable*, a *known*, yet an *Unknowable*; and Reflection only confirms the intuition of Art that this Divine Reason is knowable only in the *practical Spiritual Act*. And the highest Philosophy is only a teaching of the *Art* of Religion, as a *method of thinking*, whereby one may attain to, and consciously abide in, the Divine Reason as the Universal thought. Thus, at all stages, Religion must be taught only as an *Art*, and its Reason is knowable only in the *practice* of this Art. In other words, it cannot be made a merely *theoretic* Science, even in the form of Philosophy.

(a.) But in that *first* stage, of *mere* Art, *mere formal* practice, it is really implied that the sentiment of the Divine, of the *Reason as such*, is quite dormant. (And, in fact, *when* is it not more or less so? Is it any *less* dormant with those who now claim to be "Agnostic," than it was with the Jews?) In this state of the mind, the necessity for practice is so *absolute* that it must be prescribed by penalty, and this of an *external* kind, because the *practice seems* to him to be only an external one. (For *any* practice of the spirit's activity, even an unconscious one, is better than none. And the *penalty* here¹ *still* is, that a man thus blind to the

¹ More generally, this indicates the primary necessity for *moulding* this arbitrary external material into a symbolic significance before it can *have* any meaning. In other words, it is like a *language* which has no other than a merely conventional meaning such as the mind comes to attribute to it. Such a *means* or *mediation* is mechanical Nature for the *knowing* Spirit.

Divine Reason *within* him shall *have* nothing except through the external act. This urges him on to find the Reason *without*.) The man is conscious only of the external; and his dealing with this is the only means by which to *react* upon his *inner* nature, and render him conscious of that as his real *life*. The being of his spirit is, as yet, a being "unknown" to him; and so, therefore, does the Divine seem to him an "unknowable" Being. The Art of Religion is, here, like the Useful Art; it promotes an external knowing of things, and leads to the *second* phase, where Science of the external has reacted, through Reflection, upon the inner man, and shown him the *indifference* of mere *forms* to an Infinite One and same Substance. And it is also like the *merely imitative*¹ Art, which educates the *Sentiment*, and shows it an *infinity* of outer means, from which it *must, necessarily, react into itself* as a choosing being, and thus, also, it leads to this second phase, where the mind recognizes itself as an *activity*, and must find its Reason in itself. In this way, Science becomes Inductive, to rise toward an "Unknown" *last* Reason; and Art becomes Deductive, *from* an "Unknown" *first* Reason. Science dissects, to find proximate reasons, and then seeks to further analyze these, till the *last* and One Reason is reached.² On the other hand, *Art* synthesizes, *creates*, rationally because successfully,³ yet knows not the ultimate or *first* Reason from which this Creation issues. Obviously, this *first* Reason of synthetic Creative Art and the *last* Reason of Analytic Science must be one and the same, though sought in different directions. Yet, though the one seeks without, through all the Outer Universe, and the other within, in the profoundest consciousness of the Inner World, neither finds it, because each is seeking *only* in *one* direction. The one would find it as *Object* only, the other as *Subject* only. But it is both, or, rather, it is neither, in the forms which are attributed to Sub-

¹ This is the "2nd act" or *react* of *Aquinas*. The finite spirit catches by *sympathy* the repulsion of the Infinite Spirit for this external material and thus learns how to interpret it as non-spiritual, *i. e.*, arbitrary, mechanical, and *merely* usable, and *meaning what you will*. This Repulsion is all that constitutes it in itself as attraction, and for the spirit as mere means, mere mediation.

² And since it can reach it only as *abstract*, this also shows this outer material to be an arbitrary and absolutely dependent one.

³ Art triumphs over the *material*—no hindrance in *that*; she can make it *mean* what she will.

ject and Object, the former as a nullity, the latter as a "thing." This *first* and last Reason is manifestly what is *Creative*, both in Nature and in Art, upon the *same* material. It is therefore the same *formative* activity, both without and within. Yet, in neither case can it be this apparent *material*, nor this *non*-apparent Creator. In itself, it must be spiritual, and self-sufficient for all.

(*b.*) Philosophy seeks to bring this Science-seeking and this Art-seeking to their aim—the Absolute Reason—by combining their Inductive and Deductive methods in its own more general and complete method. Thus it presents an *Art of Thinking*.

It presents this Art as, so to speak, an Art of *thinking* the self *out* of the Finite, so that one may rise to a point of view where the Finite shows itself as only a self-differentiation of the Absolute One. This is obviously an essentially religious elevation of the man as a thinking-being. It is wholly identical with Religion in the fact that it recognizes the man as existing only in and by the operation of the Divine being in him—as *born* of the Universal Spirit, and as finding his *absolute* relation to that in his consciousness or *recognition* of it, as the One Sole Objective Reality, which includes himself as well as all that really is.

Hence, it wholly discards as "principle" what a merely Inductive Science takes as an axiom, that there *is* a *Finite* (*e. g.*, an *atom*), which has an independent and exclusive existence of its own. It nullifies this by showing the obvious fact of the absolute dependence which every such supposed *finite* has upon another, and so on *ad infinitum*, so that there is a manifest *necessity* for finding the relations of all, in order to find the complete relations of any. In other words, each is in Universal, *infinite* relation—or this Universal Relation is *in* each, as its only *raison d'être*, its only possibility of being. This Infinite Relation centres itself at every point as the Infinite Reason—the necessary only source of all mere proximate reasons. It demonstrates this negatively, also, by showing the manifest absurdity of seeking for a *whole* by going outward for it without end; the whole must be where one starts, or not at all. When this "fact" strikes the scientist, he is precisely in the position of the Artist who finds himself driven in upon his inner invention by the very infinity and consequent essential *irrationality* or mere *outer* means. This, then, leads him necessarily to deduction, as an "instrument" at

least, for extending his knowledge, and he finds this *inner means* to have a wonderfully *expansive* power, forbidden though it be by *his* logic; and Philosophy follows him and the Artist to this deductive point of view.

The mere "reasoning" by *external* relation being thus shown to be necessarily a finding only of *proximate* reasons, and incapable of reaching the one and only Reason, Philosophy next turns to this Deductive Method of Art, and shows the insufficiency of that, so long as it regards the Reason *by* which it creates as an *Unknown*, although it demonstrates itself in its results. The human spirit can be thus rationally *creative*, only because it has the ultimate or first Reason as the very *form* of its activity. A creative activity is one which goes out of itself and *creates* what is *external*.¹ It is not that merely mechanical *going-on* from one external thing to another, of which Science vainly seeks to find an end; but it operates everywhere as an *inner* relation, simultaneous and infinite in respect to all. Thus the Outer Creation is self-centred—is equally a Whole—at any or every point. It *issues* from every point. Thus absolute in its relation, it can be ultimately related, as a *creation*, a *constant* creation, not to an *atom*, surely, nor even to a *Force*, but only to a Thought Divine. But, since this Thought Divine is *everywhere*, it is in man, as a thinking-being; and he is its spirit-form, its active form in distinction from these outer, spatial, mechanical, and passive forms. Hence it is that in Thought, when he attains to it in this absolute consciousness of it, the man has Universality—Infinite Relation—as a thinking-being. This Universal Thought is not *his* thought (just as this BEAUTY is not *his* Beauty), but is the Divine, substantial, and permanent thought, which is the same for every man, and unchangeable. And its operation in him, when he breaks loose from his merely finite and *linear* thinking in limited forms of Space and Time, and rests himself upon it in its eternal nature, is not an operation of his own, not an inductive forming, nor a deductive relating of this thought by himself; but it shows itself

¹ It is not *as creative*, a coming-together—a composition—but an unfolding, as in the Rose, or in any vital process; and that mechanical *coming* together only presents the *conditions*, the *outer* means for this new creative act. In the *chemical*, transformation seems to be the turning-point from the old to the *new*, from the mechanical as only *one* act to its change into a *higher* creation.

to him as an infinite self-transformation. He is a mere beholder of its process, yet sees it all as Necessary Relation, and therefore as Reason. And, in thus contemplating its self-evolution, he is oblivious of the temporal and spatial, oblivious of himself. Yet he is not *merged*; for he is conscious of this Divine Object as Supremely Beautiful, with a Beauty which does not excite, but calms the soul—gives not joy, but peace. Thus he has his highest inner or subjective Consciousness as a thinking-being, in this realization of his religious relations, as an *active form*, to the Divine Reason. He is in a communion with the Spirit Divine, under its *Thought-Form*; its *active form*—its *spirit-form*—as fully conscious of itself.

(c.) Now, this may be called Contemplative Religion—such a Religion as Plato realized. It is the ultimate product of Reflection as Philosophic Reason. It is not such a Religion of Beauty as that of the Greeks in general, who saw Beauty only as Infinite Proteus in outer forms of Nature, but is rather the resolution of this, in the form of Sentiment, by Socrates, into the worship of the Absolute Beauty as Divine. And this was further developed into the Philosophic, Contemplative Religion, by Plato, the first who saw *Use* and Beauty meet, and resolve themselves into the embrace of Eternal Reason. And as the question arose with him, and has been discussed down the ages since—whether Contemplation or Action be the higher form—so is the same essential question proposed when it is asked whether Philosophy or Religion be the higher form, or which is the one that includes the other. Now, it is obvious that, as *Theory*, Philosophy includes Religion; but, as *Practice*, Religion must also include Philosophy. And the relations in which we have considered this question, as between Contemplation and Action, may enable us to see clearly the *difference*, as well as the resemblance, between Philosophy and Religion.

Philosophy, as we have seen, is, after all, as *Religious*, only the teaching of an *Art*. It presents a method of attaining to the highest Religious thought. It takes the highest Art-form—the Love of Beauty—out of and beyond its semi-unconscious state, by teaching it to be conscious of the operation of the Reason in it. It abolishes the Artist's conceit that it is *his* Reason which is ultimate in this creative activity within him. Thus it makes his inner

Object a real and Absolute one, and renders him, as Subject, only a Spiritual beholder, and no longer of a merely finite nature. This is teaching the Art of beholding the Divine as the Absolute Beauty, which Socrates calls it, or as the Divine Reason of Plato.¹ And it teaches this no longer as something to be *judged* of by what is felt in the process as only *my* sentiment or artistic "taste," but as what is seen and known as an absolutely necessary relation, wholly independent of myself or *my* feelings, it is not merely *felt* by a sensibility above *sense*, but also *known* by a criterion which is universal, the Reason of it.

Now, it is obvious that, in this phase of it, as a finding of the Absolute Reason, Philosophy is religious; and as teaching a rational method of arriving at a consciousness of this inmost Reason, and of its relations to us in our thinking, it is a *teaching* of Religion. But a teaching is not a *doing*, nor is an Art the *practice* of the Art. Philosophy, then, may rank as the highest of Arts, as Method, just as it ranks as the highest of Sciences, as synthesis of all others. It is one of the Arts of Religion itself, one of its *ways* to its Object. But yet it must be *practised*, in order to even be religious. And since it can only thus become Religion by its *practice*, Religion must include it, and not it that. It enters into the sphere of Religion, in common with Useful Art and Beautiful Art, as what we may call the Thinking Art, or even the *Absolute* Art, since right thinking includes all the others. But this implies, of course, that it is, in fact, a perfected and absolute method.

Yet, even if this be so, still its practice will be deficient, will come short of Religion, if it be taken as merely an Art of Thinking. Man is not made for mere contemplation, however pleasing that may be to him. And to stay in that would be only to make an idol of himself in this higher, spiritual sensibility, just as the man who flies not so high makes an idol of his senses. Thus the

¹ This goes back (with a difference) to the Jewish point of view. That saw the Divine *without*, this *within*; yet, *so* far, this is rather a tendency only to *Fear* of it; and, though both imply *inspiration*, there is a disposition to look upon it as *mechanical*, and to *wait* for it. Thus no active Art-Creation would spring from either, thus taken as merely *theoretic*. All is regarded as *already ordered*; by the Jew (since he looks *without*) as arbitrarily ordered, and by the Idealist (since he looks *within*) as "Rationally" ordered. So there is no *use* in the former case, and no *occasion* in the latter case, for any *creative* activity—any effort to change what cannot be *changed* (says the Jew), or what cannot be *bettered*, since it is *already* perfect, says the Idealist.

effort defeats itself, becomes *unreasonable*, and finds no real Divine, as the experience of ascetics and pietists has amply shown. For, in fact, this Divine Reason is such that, as a man cannot abide in, so can he not even *reach* those serene heights of contemplation by any theoretic teaching, nor even by learning the *way*, but only by going over the *practice* of the Religious Art, in *all* its forms of Use, of Beauty, and of Reason. And of all these the Philosophic peak is practically the most difficult and most thorny height to climb. It is *above* the others only because they must be scaled *before* it, and are still necessary to it for its own practical realization. This is indeed affirmed and taught by the true Philosophy itself. The Reason, when found, proves itself to be essentially an *Activity*—a perpetual self-transformation into *Act*—so that it is never *complete* except in Act. Yet it completes itself in every, the least act. Hence this *Divine* "Object" cannot be taken as a mere Object of *interior* contemplation—as merely to be *thought* about. It is to be realized by us, as also an Outer Object *to be created* by us, in the *good act*. For it really exists as *Outer* only in so far as it is thus created by us. Thus Beauty exists for us in Nature only as we reach the capacity to *put* it there as Outer Object of Contemplation. And Beauty exists in Man's Art only as he has learned to project his idea of a Divine into these Outer forms. And, in general, Rationality exists, and will exist, in this Outer world for Man as *spiritual*, not as it exists for him there as merely a mechanical suitable for him as *body* merely, but only as he *reforms* and *recreates* this Outer by his spiritual energy into forms fit for the use, admirable as the Beauty, and sacred as the Reason, of the Spirit itself.

3. Not Contemplation, then, but Reciprocal *Creative* Activity is what characterizes the Divine Reason, as a *Religious* relation between God and Man. It may be called neither Theory, nor Practice, alone; but rather a Creative and *Recreative*, or *mutually-Creative*, Art *in act*. For let us note the sublime *reciprocity* of it as *Act*. Contemplation may indeed be called a Revelation of this Divine Reason *for* us, within as our Object beheld, and *its* Creation of us *for* that, as its adoring Subject. But so, also, *in* the good act, do we actively and with design *recreate* this Divine Reason *for* ourselves as Outer Object in *many* forms; and it stands there for us as a regarding and loving Subject contemplative of

the Divine *in* us, when this Object of our act is a spiritual one, as in the case of a fellow-man, for to him we thus reveal the truly Divine as Love in Act. Let us trace this Creative Religious Act briefly, *first*, as *merely* formal in the *Outer* (as it was in Fine Art); *second*, as formal in the *Inner*, as in Contemplation—the Thinking Art; and, lastly, as truly Divine and finished Art, in the *loving* Act.

(a.) It is sometimes said there is nothing *new*, if it is *true*, and nothing *true*, if it is *new*. As usual with maxims, this one holds as to the *Substance*, but is false as to the Form. The *Substance* is necessarily unchangeable, and hence always old: but the Form is just as necessarily changeable, and always new. It is true that the True can never be new in itself; for it is Eternal, and never to be created as THE TRUE. But it is equally certain that the True, the Beautiful—that Divine trinity of the Reason—is only a perpetual self-transformation through the finite Use and the infinite Beautiful into the Absolute Reason. In other words, as to Form, there is not only the fact, but also the necessity, of a perpetual change—perpetual renewing. The True, in itself, is only the Rationally Formal;¹ and, to be exhibited in the *Finite*, must take infinite variety of forms.

Now, in the *merely* Useful Form, just illustrated, as to the Divine Reason, in the Jewish Religion, the True is only reiterated, for the *memory*, mechanically (just as it is in Outer Nature), as the One, *only*, True, the Divine. This is the *simple* Truth, that the True is One in itself, and Eternal; and, as such, *creates* many Forms, but cannot *be* created. That is how the *True* appears, at *first*, and also at *last*, when only *abstractly* regarded. This is the “*first* Reason” of Art, and the “*last* Reason” of Science, considered as an “Unknowable,” though the basis of all Knowing.

But in the second, or Reflective Stage, just treated, there is perceived the infinite self-differentiation of this *Divinely* True,

¹ *The Idea*, first seemingly passive, but really active (*Being*), and in the *Beautiful* infinitely active and so seeming to be *only* active (*Essence*), and finally in the *Reason* (*Notion*), found to be necessarily an activity creative of an object which *recreates* it, through the means first posited, as *merely* objective Art, but remoulded from within by the essentially *eternal* activity of the *first* act (Aquinas) reacting upon itself and finding *subjective* centres.

this Necessarily *One*, till its Infinite and *essential* Form is recognized in the *Beautiful*, which we love to *contemplate* only, and hence project into Nature and into our own Art-Creation. And the highest Philosophy shows this Infinite and *Active* Form of Beauty to be the *first* and *last* Reason of every Truth—its beautiful harmony with itself. We are apt to attribute all our benefits to mere “*Useful*” Science. We do not realize our debt to Fine Art. Without that to make us perpetually *certain* of an *Infinite* Reason *in* us, we might easily fall under the sway of Materialism; in fact, if we never *created* Beauty for ourselves, we should never escape from the thrall of mere sense. And a merely Inductive Science is very far from including, among its “facts” to be investigated, this fact of *Beauty*, manifest though it is, shining brighter than the sun, more multiple than the stars. This “Useful Science” only glances askance at the Artist, and has no thought even of inquiring into this Infinite Reason of Beauty.

Hence, in this Reflective Stage, even in Religion, there is a long and painful process before this merely Useful Form issues out of all particular form and finds in Beautiful Form its Infinite Reason. At first, the Reason is here, also, only an inductive Reason as in Science, or a Critical Reason as in Art. Such is the dogmatic or doctrinal Reason in Theology, which thus leaves to Philosophy the task of harmonizing all three. For all of these, Science, Art, Theology as dogmatic, are only a seeking for the formal *outer statement*, which the operation of the inner spirit wishes to create for itself as useful object, or for a *form* of the True which may be a means of practice. Thus Science comes to find the Infinite Reason, proximately, as Outer Law, and at once strives to put this to Use. Art finds it as Inner Reason, and thus realized in its *own* act, which the Artist *uses* in order to divine its *method*, by watching its operation.¹ Theology seeks to express it in *doctrines* for the *mind* now, instead of in forms of practice for the Outer Worship. It is trying to give the *inner* man a direct and spiritual practice, in a *thinking* of the Reason. In other words, it seeks to realize the Divine Reason as *Truth*, in finite

¹ Thus Hegel got his method by accomplishing that most difficult of efforts, the watching of the mind's own operations, or rather the *spirit's* operation in it as a *law* to its right or necessary thinking. Thus Hegel like Plato finds he must be first pupil in Art before he can be Creative of the True as Outer Statement.

forms of it, *created by the man himself*. And these, as "Divine Truth," he sets before him as *sacred* objects, which he would fain make *unchangeable*, because what these seek to *express* is unchangeable. He has thus, in a formal way, *recreated* the Divine *for* himself and others, with a pious *intent*, but perhaps unmindful that, for the Divine, this *finite* form can be in itself only one of finite *Use*. And so the *real* intent of these creed-forms is only to be useful, and not to be the final, the Beautiful Form of the True. They are not the Heavenly dogma, such as Dante saw it reflected like glowing Light upon the uplifted face of Beatrice. They are only statements of certain relations of thought in which the Truth seems to reveal itself, or, by reflecting upon which, its operation in us may be felt.

(*b.*) All this inner Reflection is evidently only a study and use of Forms, made external in order to *be* used. But this *intentional creation* of them implies that they are also *internal*, and leads to a consciousness of that fact. The *practice* in this stage of Reflection has in fact become an *inner* practice of *thinking*, and hence grows more and more disposed to dispense wholly with the outer form, and even the outer practice, perhaps. For it does not yet clearly distinguish the difference between the relation which man has, as mere pupil, to those arbitrary forms necessary for him as iterative, in the *first* stage of Religion, and his relation to these forms which he creates for himself, and which reflect moral responsibility for their Beauty upon himself. He may come to dispense with the former, since they are only Art-Objects, separable from him. But he can never dispense with the latter, for they are his own Art-Creations, and to cease to thus project himself into *act* is to cease to be, *like* his Creator, Creative. This is the highest, the essential *imitation*, by which alone he can realize his being as spiritual.

But he finds to be evidently, at first, an *inner* creation, and he may foolishly say, that suffices, and so withdraw into mere contemplation. Or, more wisely, he may wish to understand this fact that he creates first inwardly in idea; and why it is that there, also, his forms are but clumsy idols when compared to the Beauty which is alone Divine. Thus he turns psychologist, if he be still "scientifically" inclined, and supposes that he can find a proximate reason for Beauty—a reason for Reason itself. Hence

Science, Art, and Philosophy are here dealing only with ideas, however unconsciously, and however much they may really suppose themselves to be wholly materialistic and even contemptuous of ideas.

These *ideas*, then, *as* such, must now be analyzed also, till the ultimate Idea is reached, and springs forth as the final Reason—the Alpha and Omega in this infinite process. But a merely critical and discursive method can have no end here, no result. It must be displaced, or resolved out of its insufficiency as method, and its inherent finitude as result. This can be done only by a true Philosophy, as has been sketched—a Philosophy which finds the True as Absolute in itself, and not abstract, and hence as infinitely Creative of Forms and Beautiful in their harmony. Then only does true creativeness begin for the Spirit when it finds itself free in the operation of an Absolute Thought. All other creation is mere patchwork or blind imitation. *This* discards at once that vain seeking to bring things as finite entities together from without, and glue them with an empty phrase. It works by inner and necessary relations, wherefrom the objective form develops, of itself—*grows* to its *Use* like a duty, or to its *Beauty* like a rose. For the REASON is *in* it; and this has *Use* for its Outer Form, and *Beauty* for its Inner Form—the one finite and temporal, the other separable therefrom and Eternal.

(c.) This Creative Art, therefore, in its Religious form, is threefold—because it must be in full *Act*, and not merely in outer form, nor in thought alone. The Spiritual Act is not complete, except as it realizes itself externally. Thus the Divine Creative Act is not complete, except in the realization of itself in the Spirit of Man, as *not* the Divine, yet conscious thereof. And so the Religious Act—the Divine Act in and through the Man's Spirit—is not complete as merely outer in form, nor as merely inner in contemplation, but as both of these united in an infinite variety.

His religious thought must realize itself, not, as Art does, in a dead object, but in a living one; not as mere *Beauty*, but also as *Use*; not merely as *Thought*, but as *Good-will*. Thus his Religious Creative Art is one which proceeds from a Divine Love that realizes itself in an objective good, as well as in a subjective good as reaction of the act done. In other words, the Love is not a self-love here, as in the mere Art Creation, but is a love of the

Divine *in others*, since this Divine Object is in all others, and, whatever is done to *them*, is done to *it*. This is the sublime unity which Love, as creative principle, gives to its results—that unity, already mentioned, of *reciprocal* creation; for it even inverts the relation of giver and receiver, as between God and man, and makes of the Divine itself a waiting pensioner upon man's bounty. "*It is in prison.*" and *we* visit it; it is *hungering*, and we *feed* it. Such is the tender solicitation of a Divine Creator, whereby He seeks both to dignify man and to make us know of His nature by *doing His will*. It is in doing such *acts* that we veritably feel and know the *reality* of a Divine *Being*, not merely as an *Idea*, nor as an Operating *Thought*, but as a Creative Love, which has *Use* for us, not merely as temporal and bodily, but as Spiritual and Immortal.¹

Hence this threefold form of Religious Art finally *unites* what at first were *apparently* severed, since they appear only successively to a growing consciousness.

(1.) The *first* act is that of Obedience: and, at first, to precept, to outer form and ceremony; then, to the inner form of *sensibility* which commends itself, or to some other proximate and "sufficient" reason; and, finally, to the Absolute Reason, to which, when known, Obedience is no longer felt as a duty nor a pleasure, but as a *peace*. As before intimated, the *merely* formal is indifferent in itself, and may therefore seem irksome. Its efficacy for *suggestion* may cease. Yet, after all, this view of it comes rather from a partial than a complete thinking of its use. Follow the *form, just because* it is indifferent and may be changed. The more indifferent it is, the more absolutely spiritual must be the act of obedience in it. "*This form,*" you will say, "*cannot contain the Religious relation.*" No, nor can any other outer form. Only the Spirit itself can contain it. But the Spirit itself can contain it only in act, and should do so in *all* its acts. Hence the very indifference of this or any other mere Art-form implies that the Obedience must be in *every* act of the Spirit, and can therefore show itself and practise itself in every act, even the most indifferent, the most formal, the most easy. Thus the *outer* form is essen-

¹ Here again the statement of the Swedish seer seems apt, thus: "The Divine Substance is *Love*, and its form is *Wisdom*"—in the Infinite and Beautiful Form of Reason as a perpetually Creative Activity. Such is the *Spiritual material*; hence the *mutuality* of its creativeness; *it cannot* but recreate itself.

tially eliminated, and the Spirit is thrown into the Reflective act, as the essential.

(2.) This *second* Religious act, the act of Reflection, of inner Worship, in so far as it is subjective only, obviously has its highest realization in the Thought-form; and, for reaching this, the highest Philosophy is a teaching of the Art. No mere proximate reasons can suffice to reach the sphere of pious Feeling, by the way of Reflection. Still less can they claim, but rather themselves *disclaim*, the ability to reach the serene heights of Contemplation. Yet this realization does not depend upon a philosophic knowing or training, any more than the capacity to behold the Infinite Beauty depends upon an Artistic training. It must, then, be attainable by another way. Happily, we are sometimes *most* conscious when we may seem to ourselves unconscious, and so it is in moments when this Infinite Reason reveals itself to us. Philosophy is, in fact, but the conclusion of an infinite progress towards a thinking of God, and is so only by *resolution* of this merely serial and linear thinking, into its essential wholeness at every step. It is thus only a beginning to find the Divine in this Reflective way. But it is not the *thinking* of God, but the doing of His Will to which the promise of knowing Him is attached. Here, therefore, also, there must be Obedience.

(3.) Hence the *third* Religious act is the act of Love. This is also an act of Thought, but very different from the contemplative philosophic act of Thinking. It is the Creative Act, which realizes itself, not merely inwardly as possession of its Object ideally, but also as an Art-impulse to outer creative activity. Its ideal Object is Divine; but so also is its *practical* object to realize the *good* externally and *infinitely*; for where *ends* the result of a good act? Thus it includes the three forms of Use, Beauty, and Reason; for to all of these must it give particular form; and it can operate only by Obedience to both the Outer and the Inner law, and hence also by the act of Reflection, which to it must be the thorny way, and the cross to be transformed into crown. Yet the *simplest* good act done in the spirit of Love contains the highest Philosophy, though its doer be wholly illiterate; and it reveals the Divine to him inwardly, and to others outwardly, far more than all doctrine can reveal or suggest.

MEPHISTOPHELES.

BY CAROLINE ELIOT LACKLAND.

Bayard Taylor says, with regard to his translation of Faust, that his work grew in clearness as he drew away from the cloudy atmosphere of interpreters, and that the study of commentators led him back to find that the author of Faust is his own best commentator!

As all religious creeds may be predicated upon the Scriptures, from the dogmas of the Church of Rome to the elaborated mysticism of Swedenborg, or the carnal teaching of Brigham Young, so is it also with this (as Starr King calls it) "bible of literature," Faust. From its depths and resources men have drawn inspiration or despair, purity or immorality. Yet Goethe simply placed his own truth there, and left others to discover this by the light they themselves cast upon it; it mattered not to him who became the prey of his devil of doubt or denial, so he himself got rid of him! Mephistopheles was not Goethe's truth-teller, but a bringer out of the truth. The exhaustive form of the great Author's showing forth of his idea required symbols to convey his highest divinations, which were often but the outward sign of their spiritual grace. Goethe, Faust, and Mephistopheles can never be thought singly; to name one is to indicate the others. Thus, given any note in the musical scale as Tonic, the chord resolves itself through mediant and dominant, the harmonious three in one, uttered, divided, and reunited in the first all-containing tone. The character of Mephistopheles has been called an exhausted subject, but those who thus assert only prove themselves to be the subjects exhausted! the theme is too vast even yet to have been adequately grappled with; it is the giant that escaped, in hugely outlined form, from the soul struggles of Goethe, and as in the Arabian tale the Afrite emerged from limited space and took tremendous shape, so arose the demon companion of Faust before the astonished eyes of men. Another, as mighty in intellectual strength as he who set the monster free, must arise to reduce to appreciable limits the power evoked by Goethe; and he must take to the sub-

ject sufficient light and thought fitly to reveal to himself the manifold bearings of that wondrous tragedy of which Bayard Taylor sings to Goethe:

“Und Deine Jünger sehn in Dir, verwundert,
Verkörpert schon, das werdende Jahrhundert.”

For the expression of Mephistopheles, Goethe reached from oldest Bible lore to Gospel history—from patient Job to agonizing Paul. From his own complex nature, from Herder's elevating or depressing influence, and from the cold, dissecting criticisms of Merck, he gleaned materials that should incorporate his *Liebling-Teufel*, aiming through this creation to escape himself from the body of that death which imprisoned him. Far back into the cold depths of Iceland he penetrated, bidding the giants of the Norse Mythology to do him service. From the fermentations of the philosophical agitations of his time he gathered what should subserve his purpose. Forward, towards the far-off indications of scientific discovery, he turned his keen prophetic thought, and from the travail of his restless brain and life experience grew Faust and Mephistopheles. Who and what is Mephistopheles? He is “not light loving,” he is the spirit of negation, of doubt, of scepticism, of destruction; “all is not known to him, but much”—he is the principle of the understanding—

“Part of that power not understood
Which always wills the bad, and works the good.”

He is the troublous law that worketh in the members of the Saint:

“The whirlpool that, swirling to get above,
Is always shoved, imagining to shove!”

As universal spirit of finite nature, he first controls, then serves Faust. Like unpalatable yeast, his activity must leaven the inert mass into the wholesome bread of life. He is the impotent instrument that men call “Nature” in things material, “Evil” in things spiritual. He is the offence that must needs come; but to man is the woe if he is admitted into life as ruling force. Men once saw in Goethe's “Prologue in Heaven” only a daring blasphemy; now they recognize the broad, free stroke of the artist, who paints upon a huge canvas colossal outlines of some

masterful conception ; here the delineation presents the grandest theme, there the most lovely ! Again the grotesque and horrible obtain, but, in the final accomplishment of the whole, strength and harmony prevail. In this scene the words of the Lord are :

“ Man’s active nature flagging,
Seeks too soon the level—
Unqualified repose he learns to crave—
Whence willingly the comrade him I gave,
Who works, excites, and must create, as Devil.”

In the divine announcement “ I gave,” we hold the solution of the problem. Nature and evil seem active, and are wholly passive. They are finite, do not know themselves, are not self-determined, and, having served the divine purpose to carry on the divine plan, they *must* fall off, are therefore finite. Mephistopheles is too absurdly impotent to excite divine hatred ; he is an irresponsible agent, without will. Like powerful, pent-up, controlled steam, he forces the machinery of life, itself coerced and limited. And herein consists his awful comicality—his futile struggles against the “ something of this clumsy world ” who forces “ nothing ” to its self-destruction, negates negation, and to whom the wrath of man and death of worlds are “ infant frowns and bubbles bursted ! ” Just here the Devil must have his due, and Mephistopheles may teach a lesson, though unwittingly. In the “ Prologue in Heaven ” he finds himself in highest company ; he appreciates the fact, and is both elated and uncomfortable as he realizes the situation ; but after his departure he is never known to make capital (so to speak) of having appeared at court ; neither does he betray inferiority or weakness by unduly boasting of high acquaintance ! In his sublime audacity, on the contrary, he asserts :

“ Part of the part am I, once all, in primal night,
Part of the darkness which brought forth the light—
The haughty light, which now disputes the space,
And claims of Mother Night her ancient place.”

Goethe was himself an Aristocrat, “ to the manner born ; ” this may indeed be the underlying reason why even his familiar, Mephistopheles, omits to say, “ *My friend*, the Lord ! ” Goethe had pondered much on the oldest book of the Bible, Job. Herder had written upon it, and a fine translation of his article can be

found in the fourth volume of "The Journal of Speculative Philosophy." Herder ploughed the ground in Goethe's mind for the growth of Mephistopheles, and the critic Merck served as Model for the completed thought. As painters in Rome, who, while knowing what they wish to portray, still search the Scala di Spagna for their models, so Goethe held his idea in reserve until he could fitly set it forth by partial imitation. Merck indicated Mephistopheles, but fell far short of the Artist's further development. Grimm justly says: "Mephistopheles grew far beyond the seeming intention of Goethe." And this may well be, since the author placed himself outside of himself, and dealt out the cards of his game of life to silent partners whose hands he knew, and who moved for or against, as he willed and prompted. As he himself grew wise to combine subtly, their moves reflected his plan and purpose. Mephistopheles grows, through companionship with Faust, into a gentleman-like diplomatist and statesman. He first presents himself, however, to Faust's consciousness as a servile poodle. The presence of this animal has been interpreted to represent, or typify, a finite means to finite ends, evoked by the thought of Faust to appropriate all avenues to creature enjoyment, to the comprehension of which the Earth Spirit had limited Faust's mental and spiritual power, finite enjoyment being typified by an animal because it has a limited activity, a kind of knowing without insight, yet is without language, which is the form of Spirit; the streaming trail of fire that followed the dog is compared to the evanescent glories that worldly honors, wealth, and sensual delights confer.¹ In fact, the very achievements that Faust has already pictured to himself and ardently desired, and for the reception of which his mind is already prepared. Wagner, to whom the creature reveals no unusual seeming, regards the beast with indifference, but Faust, recognizing blindly within himself a reason for its appearance, falls into profound meditation, typified possibly by an entry into his study, where in solitude his troubled soul enters into conflict with itself, and love of God and man struggle against the unseen Evil at his side. The inventors of the old Faust legend, who made the frisky animal an unflinching attendant on their fire and brimstone fiend, might indeed have

¹ "Letters on Faust," "Journal of Speculative Philosophy," vol. i, p. 186.

exclaimed in bewilderment as to the appropriation made by Goethe of their favorite familiar, and would find it a more difficult problem to swallow the philosophical demon than did Goethe's mother, who gave herself no concern about his Satanic Majesty. Mephistopheles in some of his phases is absolutely delightful in his fine irony—as, for example, when, having revealed himself as the poodle's real core, he, soundly sweating and panting, emerges from huge mist proportions behind the stove as Faust's semblance, a scholar! he has suffered so intolerably in the atmosphere of St. John's light of revelation, he finds himself so hopelessly entrapped and barricaded by the "Drudenfuss," and yet this queer Son of Chaos, at such an instant, gathers his forces and perpetrates a practical joke. Faust might well say, "the *casus* is diverting!" Mephistopheles observes soon after, in expressing his rage at Creative force:

"And had I not the flame reserved, why, really,
There's nothing special of my own to show!"

Here he writes impotent destructiveness upon his own brow, and ignorantly admits himself a tool of higher power. But our demon reveals the diplomatic courtier when he says:

"Culture, which smooth the whole world licks,
And also unto the Devil sticks,"

and goes on to teach Faust the valuable lesson—

"When with externals thou art well endowed,
All will around thee flock and flatter."

It is truly difficult to realize that so irrepressible a fiend as the Spirit of Negation should have no chance at all! In the compact between Faust and Mephistopheles each holds something in reserve. The devil is checkmated at the first move, although neither player in the game of life then sees it! But if the sole aim and triumph of the fiend is to prove the worthlessness of all things finite as fast as he presents them, is not he himself insuring the impossibility of Faust's exclaiming, with regard to things perishable: "Ah, still delay, thou art so fair!" Mephistopheles subtly proves that the laws by which sin enters the soul and those by which sin leaves it differ. It is easier for evil to find entrance than exit.

“For devils and for spectres there is Law;
The first is free to us, we're governed by the second.”

Mephistopheles, in their varied wanderings, does not take his companion oftener than necessary to accomplish his evil purpose, to church; he pays the highest tribute to religion when he finds innocence (Margaret) at the door of the sanctuary, and even when he makes the sacred temple the theatre of his cruel scourgings of his trembling Victim with the lash of her own sins. He is ill at ease with Margaret. In the beginning he had “no power o'er souls so green.” And at the last he fears her, for her soul has never consented unto sin. She has no charm for him; her loveliness is not “la beauté du diable;” her simple goodness is witless in his eyes, but in her pure presence his gross speech is hushed; her happiness shall be Faust's first selfish sacrifice in his onward career to earthly enjoyment and ambition. The foundation step to Faust's ladder of fame shall be the crushed heart of the woman he loves, the only pure, true love of his life, the heart that never wronged him. But Mephistopheles blindly feels that Margaret's influence will yet rob him of his prey. He may bar his victims from the priestly benediction, but there is no putting asunder for Eternity of those whom God hath joined; finite interest may obtain the priestly benediction, but there is no eternal joining of that which God hath put asunder! These are the thoughts that Goethe has shadowed forth in the relations of Mephistopheles, Faust, and Margaret. Goethe loved to appear incognito; so also Mephistopheles. Evil from the days of Adam approaches in borrowed guise. St. Paul exclaims: “The evil that I would not, that I do!” Mephistopheles reverses the case: “The good I would not, that I do;” he is the “wrath” that “praises God.” Starr King says: “The Faust tragedy, taken altogether, first and second parts, is the greatest miracle of literature. It is the serpent ‘Thought’ trying to swallow the world, and, it must be conceded, nearly succeeding in the attempt.” True, much baneful venom fell from the jaws of the insatiate serpent, which, if a necessary accompaniment of such monstrous deglutition, may yet be deplored. Goethe, however, sought only relief for himself, and, rightly considered, the book of Faust is not immoral. The divine endures, Mephistopheles is put to confusion, the deed

of the individual returns upon himself. Yet Goethe had no wish to moralize, he was simply working out his own problem of life. Neither his mental nor spiritual digestion was disturbed by other men's deductions; and if people seized despair when he rejected it, that was their affair, not his; he cannot be held responsible for that which he did not intend. And if, in exorcising his own devil of doubt, the latter entered the herd, his personal relief was what concerned himself, and the herd of swine (the lesser minds) and their fate were not considered. It was an old-time opinion that crime is most nearly allied to the uneducated classes, that the man of letters and science stands on a plane that lifts him above all sensual enslavement. Mephistopheles, therefore, is the type of the progressive and modern Satan, inasmuch as he knew all that lay within the realm of the understanding. The letter of Scripture he could quote and teach, and could talk of deity, although he could never think the Absolute. Like many an inferior creature, he was made the vehicle to carry and disseminate principles of life, although he did it as unwittingly as the black flies of whom Herodotus wonderingly writes. He handed the cocoon of sensual life to Faust, ignorant that through pain and remorse it would turn into the Psyche of undying and redeeming love. Goethe and Shakespeare have been called plagiarists by those who partially discover the process but cannot appreciate the re-creative activity. Such persons ignore the sculptor's thought, and demand the manual chisel labor; they are never satisfied. To be consistent, they should accuse language of plagiarism, reconstructed as it ever is from the souls of dead words. Nature is in this sense a plagiarist, utilizing forever herself for herself! Creative power is thus a plagiarist, evolving life from death in its eternal circle of destruction and renewal. Appropriation, participation, are in this sense plagiarism, and so only are the Authors of Mephistopheles and Iago "plagiarists." In the first part of the Faust tragedy we cannot lose sight of the Author; the individual (as well as his ideas) is embodied, and forces himself upon us. When, later, Goethe (so to speak) outgrows himself, the procession of his emancipated thoughts moves on in a grand triumphal march; his style becomes so true that the detail of muscle and sinew is not needed in order to define his meaning. The Mephistophelian serpent that was coiled about his life falls at his feet,

and we see him at the last emancipated, standing erect, bold, and strong as Apollo. He holds the terrible *Ægis* turned from himself, and towards the world; he is master of the deadly weapon; it no longer paralyzes him, and men must learn to gaze upon it and not die! *Mephistopheles*, not a flesh-broiling, flesh-eating ogre, is the devil men must face and conquer henceforth. The Zeus of *Phidias* was a type of the divine to the Greeks. St. Paul revealed "the Unknown God," but to the Saint himself the problem of the origin and office of Evil was as a deadly thorn and a body of death. It is the office of *Mephistopheles* partially to reveal to mankind the principle of Evil, the shadow of the Divine, the companion of Light, the eternally negated! That in which we may not abide, past which we are constrained to press, into which we must enter, through which we arrive at last, from the depth unto the everlasting height.

We are to deal with Faust's Spirit of Evil in this paper principally as he appears in the first book of the tragedy. It would be profitable if we could follow his marvellous outcome in part second of the play, but one point only can be alluded to—viz., the crowning crime prompted by the demon, and the last temptation of Faust, from the horror and remorse of which the latter falls into the clutches of relentless Care. The unpardonable sin against humanity is committed—oppression, cruelty to the Aged. The innocent youth of Margaret was the demon's first sacrifice, but the destruction of the home of *Philemon* and *Baucis*, and their consequent desolation and death, have left no meaner, darker deed to be enacted, and, as Faust's outward vision is closed by *Nemesis* from beholding the sin-bought prospect, the eyes of his spirit are turned inwardly to read the problem of life aright. For the last time he has uttered his awful casuistry, "the end justifies the means," the alienation is completed, the return is sure. In spite of the demon's utmost skill to prevent it, Faust's soul must bear the fruit of an unselfish endeavor, and, in uniting with the divine, evil passes out of sight.

From Magic, from the Mystics, Goethe drew inspiration and material, as did *Thomas Aquinas* and *Emmanuel Swedenborg*. But with regard to *Mephistopheles*, Goethe seems to have borrowed much from Norse Mythology. *Mephistopheles* is *Asa-Loke*! *Utgard-Loke*, or hell-fiend, represents only lowest evil; but *Asa-*

Loke appears first in Asgard with the Gods. He assisted in the creation, giving the senses, passions, fire of the veins. In Nature he is the corrupting principle of the mighty four—Sylph, Undine, Salamander, Gnome. Like Odin (the divine), he pervades all.

Anderson says: "In no divinity is it more clear than this, that the idea, proceeding from the visible workings of Nature, enters into the human heart and mind, and there finds its moral and ethical reflection." In the beginning As-Loke was closely allied to Odin (Light), then united himself with Air, later becoming destructive fire, getting thus farther and farther away from the divine principle. Odin's union with mind and matter is creative and beneficent. Loke's is always destructive. In Nature, Loke brings about terrific throes and convulsions by land and sea. In man, he arouses all activities of lying; he is outwardly beautiful, but is of inconstant mind. Though of the Gods, he slanders and blasphemes them, and departs, Judas-like, from their midst, to work out his own destruction and their glory.

He is the ever-thwarting principle; he shortens the hammer of Thor, and bestows the ring of Andvari. Mephistopheles so closely resembles this old Norse demon that Goethe may have regarded and studied him with admiration, and taken him as Model.

Only a true philosophy—that which in itself includes, reconciles, and transcends all other systems—can solve the problem of Evil, and give to every man the power to eliminate its destructive element from his own being. Compared with this result of pure thinking, Science, which subjects steam to do her bidding and bridles and controls electricity, seems puerile. Philosophy, hand in hand with Religion, declares and defines to man the nature and limitation of Evil, and reveals to him how he shall erect a temple within his own soul before whose portal the monster serpent, Sin, shall lie prone in the dust, felled by the arrows of a light divine. A recognition of man's power of self-determination is the first stirring of the infant Hercules to conquer that which threatens true life. It is a promise and prophecy of strength that grows to giant proportions in the using, when man awakens from the cradle of purposeless inactivity. Into every human life comes the possible Eden, the possible Fall, the possible Victory. It is as **man** himself chooses, for in determining himself he destroys fate. **No**

need now to question "Who and what is Mephistopheles?" Philosophy and Religion have revealed him, and the means to his subjection. To lay hold on the divine-human as declared in the incarnate Word, to become self-determined, "to work out his own salvation" after this perfect plan and pattern, is man's heritage, his birthright. The appalling silence no longer endures when man is confronted with this problem of Evil, and when the Vala's awful question, "*Understand ye yet—or what?*" rings solemnly within his soul. For at length man overcomes the necessary thwartings, which only, as he negates them in his return from alienation less or greater, constitute him truly Man. And as he passes into the image of the Father, numbering himself with the children of Light, Evil has indeed become his good, for he has used it to his soul's discipline, and has conquered that mightiest of foes—himself! Himself, remaining Victor.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

A REPRINT OF "THE DIAL."

[We publish the following circular on account of its general interest to readers of Philosophy.—ED.]

We propose to reproduce "The Dial," page for page, without abridgment, and with the addition of an index to the whole work, containing a list of the contributions, with names of the contributors, so far as it is possible to procure them; to which will be appended a full historical account of "The Dial," with anecdotes, incidents or gossip, that will in any manner illustrate the influence of a work which marks an era in American literature. The additional matter, pagged separately, will be prepared by Rev. George Willis Cooke, author of "Ralph Waldo Emerson, his Life, Writings, and Philosophy."

For a long time it has been almost impossible to procure a complete copy of "The Dial," and the demand for it, coming largely from public libraries, has been so constant and growing that we feel warranted in issuing this proposal to reprint it, so soon as we can be assured of two hundred subscribers, at fifteen dollars each (to non-sub-

scribers the price will be twenty dollars). The work will be in four octavo volumes, substantially bound in cloth.

For the convenience of libraries already in possession of the original work, the new index, with additional matter, will be bound separately in pamphlet form and sold for one dollar.

We respectfully solicit your subscription, for which we annex a blank.

ROBERTS BROTHERS, Publishers,

299 Washington Street.

BOSTON, June 1, 1882.

[The following notice, from the pen of Mr. Curtis, is appended to the above circular.]

RALPH WALDO EMERSON AND "THE DIAL"

From "The Literary World."

To speak of *The Dial* is to recall one of those products of the "transcendental" epoch which seem to those who look back upon them like

golden exhalations of the dawn.

Brook Farm, *The Dial*, the active interest in German literature and philosophy and music, Theodore Parker's preaching, were all signs then, as they are traditions now, of the general moral and intellectual revival to which also the impetus of the Anti-Slavery crusade and of the Woman's Rights agitation belongs. *The Dial*, while not an organ of any particular movement, was the literary gazette of the "new spirit," and its natural editor was Mr. Emerson, whose serene genius and temperament, with his commanding and poetic public discourses, and the dignity, simplicity, and purity of his life, had made him the peculiar representative of "Transcendentalism." It was his only service as an editor, in the usual sense, and the labor was not exclusively his. It was understood that Mr. Emerson and Miss Margaret Fuller were the editorial council, and in the opening address of "The editors to the Reader" Mr. Emerson speaks modestly of "those who have immediately acted in editing the present number" in a tone which implies that it was wholly a labor of love.

The first number of *The Dial* was issued forty years ago, in July, 1840, and it is still a most interesting and remarkable publication. There had been nothing like it in this country, and if Schiller's *Horen* may have aimed as high, there were not the same favoring circumstances, so that *The Dial* remains unique in periodical literature. Its purpose was the most various expression of the best, the most cultivated, and the freest thought of the time, and was addressed to those only who were able to find "entertainment" in such literature. There were no baits for popularity. In the modern familiar phrase, each number was a symposium of the most accomplished minds in the country. But its circle both of contributors and of readers was local and small. The first number was made up of papers by Mr. Emerson and Miss Fuller, Theodore Parker, George Ripley, William H. Channing, John S. Dwight, A. Bronson Alcott, and Dr. Hedge—I believe—with passages from the journal of Charles Chauncey Emerson, to whose memory Dr. Holmes paid so beautiful a tribute in his *Metrical Essay*. The poetry of the number was supplied by Mr. Emerson, Mr. Cranch, Miss Fuller, Mr. Dwight, Edward Emerson, Henry Thoreau, and Mrs. Hooper. It was almost wholly a "Boston book," but it is a part of our literature. Among its memorable contributions was Mr. Emer-

son's poem "The Problem," with its line which is now, like Shakespeare's famous lines, a universal expression,

He builded better than he knew;

and his exquisite song,

Oh, fair and stately maid!

to which may be fitly applied his own words in the next number of *The Dial*, when speaking of Ellery Channing's poetry, that it "is of such extreme beauty that we do not remember anything more perfect of its kind. Had the poet been looking over a book of Raffaele's drawings, or perchance the villas and temples of Palladio, with the maiden to whom it was addressed?"

The Dial was published for four years, and it truly marked the transcendental time of day. It is the memorial of an intellectual impulse which the national life has never lost. "Many readers," as Mr. Emerson said in his preface to the first edition of Carlyle's collected essays, "will here find pages which in the scattered anonymous sheets of the ——— magazine spoke to their youthful mind with an emphasis that hindered them from sleep."

The influence of its editor has been noiseless but extraordinary. Many of the most popular and immediately effective American writers and orators seem to have been middlemen between Mr. Emerson and the great public. To the young men of the last generation he spoke with the same deep power with which Dr. Channing affected Mr. Emerson's own younger generation, and that power he has never lost because he has always revered the dreams of his youth. Those who have felt throughout their lives this purifying and elevating and liberalizing power, and who have seen in his inspiring career the perfect sanity of true genius, can never think without affectionate reverence of Ralph Waldo Emerson.

GEORGE WILLIAM CURTIS.

OBITUARY.—PROFESSOR T. H. GREEN.

[We reprint the following obituary notice from the London "Academy" of April 1, 1882. The reader will notice that it is written by the distinguished translator of "Hegel's Logic." It is a valuable estimate of a great man.—ED.]

The death of Professor T. H. Green, at Oxford, on March 26th, came as a sad surprise even to those who had noticed his evident ill-health. To many, there as elsewhere, it was the loss of a friend whom they had long looked up to, sympathized with, and counted upon. It closed the career of a citizen of Oxford devoted with singular candor to what he believed the highest interests of his adopted city; and for the intellectual world it brought to what seems a premature termination an inquiry, finely conceived and untiringly pursued, into the questions lying at the very foundation of theory and practice.

Thomas Hill Green was born in 1836; and, after his school-time at Rugby, came up to Balliol College, where, in due time, he was elected to a fellowship. A friend who used to meet him about this period seems to have been especially struck by the decided interest he showed in religious questions, particularly on the practical side. Then, as always, he was also a keen politician. He was one of the original members of a society known as the "Old Mortality," which included the names of Bywater, Dicey, Pater, Swinburne, and of Professors Bryce, Caird, Holland, Nettleship, Nichol, in its early and subsequent fraternity. Green's essays were remarkable alike for their power of

thought and their distinctive stamp of expression. At the Union Debating Society he was a weighty speaker. A contemporary tells of a speech in which, defending Republican institutions from the blame of a slave system, he laid the guilt on "a slave-holding, a slave-hunting, and slave-burning oligarchy, on whom the curse of God and humanity rests."

Shortly after taking his bachelor's degree (in 1859), he began to study Hegel, and gave a good deal of attention to the Tübingen school, especially Baur, some of whose works he had thoughts of translating. Among the fruits of these studies were two essays on the "Development of Dogma," read to the "Old Mortality." But theory and action were, in his case, never far apart. During this same period he was one of a small knot of young men who co-operated in writing on the subject of University Tests. The volume in which these essays were to appear was rendered unnecessary by the passing of the University Tests Act of 1871. His range of reading during the years of the Civil War in America was summarized by the late Professor Comington as varying between Hegel and the "Morning Star" (one of the few British newspapers which espoused the side of the North in that contest). He was then, as he always was, an earnest, active, and believing member of the party of progress; and while in later years he sometimes seemed more disposed to get the best out of existing institutions, such as the Established Church and the "College System," he was in the beginning of his thirties more distinctly anti-ecclasiastical and radical in his Liberalism. But in essentials the aim of his political convictions probably remained the same.

For a short time he was engaged in a special inspection of schools in connection with the Endowed Schools Act; but from 1866, as Ethical Lecturer, and subsequently as tutor at Balliol, his main function was that of a university teacher. In 1878 he was elected to the office of Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy, and shortly after resigned his tutorship. The last sixteen years of his life possess, therefore, a general uniformity. His lectures as tutor and as professor could not be styled popular, but they attracted, even from the first, many of the most thoughtful students in a way that few lectures now do. For those who could pass over a want of fluency in delivery, an occasional abstruseness of thought, and a certain unpracticality (as examinees must judge it) in his mode of treatment, there was a strong fascination in the compact reasoning, the high-toned ideas, and evident enthusiasm of the lecturer. At one time it almost seemed as if he might have formed a school of metaphysicians; but there is little risk of that in the present day. To those who, as college pupils, came into closer contact with him, he appealed even more memorably by the simplicity of his life, his unaffected kindness, and the deep and perfectly unforced religiousness which spoke from his heart.

During the latter years he was a member of the town council of Oxford. Some of us, perhaps too selfish or too cynical, sometimes thought he was wasting his energies on the petty disputes of local politics. His own argument for the step was that it enabled him more effectually to promote social amelioration—particularly in education. The Oxford High School for Boys was largely due to his untiring advocacy, and, it may be added, largely indebted to his liberal hand. It was from the same belief in the efficacy of political power as an organ of progress that he took a leading part in political struggles, and supported with all his might the party which might be expected to give speediest effect to schemes of social and economical reform.

To the world outside Oxford he was best known as a philosophical writer. If we except his essay on an "Estimate of the Value and Influence of Works of Fiction in

Modern Times," which gained the Chancellor's Prize in 1862, he first appeared as an author in two essays which were published about 1866 in the "North British Review," on the "Philosophy of Aristotle" and on "Popular Philosophy in its Relations to Life." His main work followed in 1871, as part of a new edition of Hume's works by Green and Grose, in four volumes. The first two volumes, including the "Treatise on Human Nature," were prefaced by lengthy introductory dissertations, one dealing with the theoretical philosophy of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume; the other with the ethical views of these writers and their contemporaries. The former is a probably unequalled piece of minute and at the same time comprehensive criticism of the origins of current English philosophy. In December, 1877, Professor Green began in the "Contemporary Review" a series of papers on "Mr. Herbert Spencer and Mr. C. H. Lewes: their Application of the Doctrine of Evolution to Thought." These papers did for the modern representatives of English psychological method what the Introduction to Hume did for Locke. In the present year two articles in successive numbers of "Mind" have entered upon the discussion of the problem, "Can there be a Natural Science of Man?" Nor must it be forgotten that in several short reviews published in the "Academy" he has made contributions of permanent value to the literature of philosophical criticism.

Green, as has been said, began his study of German philosophy with Hegel. To call him, in the obvious sense of words, a Hegelian would be a mistake. But he learned, as many others have learned, from Hegel the exceeding breadth and depth of the problem of philosophy in a way which makes it impossible, for any one who has learned it, ever again to return to the philosophic caves where psychology is kept clear of metaphysics, logic barricaded from theology, and faith forbidden any intercourse with morals. Such good Hegel has done to many who have scant sympathy with the rationality of the actual; so with the dialectical *rapprochement* between being and not being. But *il faut reculer pour mieux sauter*, and from Hegel Green went back to Kant. The return, almost always inevitable, has special uses for an Englishman. For Kant, while he takes up the disputes raised by Hume, supplies results which, when disguised, make up a considerable part of the assumptions of the empirical metaphysicians. To interpret and supplement Kant was, superficially described, the aim of Green's later teaching.

It would not be going far astray to say that from his essay on Aristotle to his latest words in "Mind" he was engaged with the same old question between what the schools call the sensible and the intelligible world. If in the earlier papers the discussion is more involved, it is also lighted up by characteristic gleams of picturesque phraseology; in the latter, if the style is more monotonous and subdued, the drift of the argument is more distinct. Not, indeed, that it is ever possible to master the meaning by glancing rapidly over his pages. His eye was fixed on the main and supreme questions; the details always retained their subserviency to, and coherence in, the mass; he did not break truth up into manageable fragments, but kept it whole and indivisible in its every part. His style, in short, was characteristic of the man. There was the same weight of centralized purpose in both.

With all his realism, or perhaps because of his honest and unembittered realism, he was an idealist—one of the few who, now as always, refuse to abandon the cause of what may, for want of a better name, be called metaphysics. He sought to set before those who ignore philosophy, or who identify it with one or more of the sciences, the consideration that there are a few presuppositions still unanswered and apparently unanswerable by scientific methods. No doubt empiricism does not much mind what is

said of its presuppositions, for prescription has given it such a hold on the mind that, with or without foundation, it manages to hold well together, and to rear its psychological towers into mid-air, and then asks if the magnificence of the superstructure need not excuse from further inquiry into the question of foundations.

In undertaking this discussion, Green started from Kant. But whereas the neo-Kantians usually develop the empirical side of Kant, he tried to emphasize the tendencies which come especially to the front in the Kantian ethics. He sought to complete the *disjecta membra* of the critical philosophy by reducing the separation between feeling and understanding to its proper amount in comparison with the more stupendous interval between phenomena and noumena. "Every object we perceive," as he says in his last published page, "is a congeries of related parts, of which the simplest component, no less than the composite whole, requires, in order to its presentation, the action of a principle of consciousness not itself subject to conditions of time." If this be true of nature in general, then, in reference to physiology of mind, it follows (to quote his earlier words) that "we cannot naturalize the 'human mind' without presupposing that which is neither nature nor natural, though apart from it nature would not be—that of which the designation as 'mind,' as 'human,' as 'personal,' is of secondary importance, but which is eternal, self-determined, and thinks." W. WALLACE.

OXFORD.

SENTENCES IN PROSE AND VERSE.

SELECTED BY WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING.

VI.

I dined with our English visitor [Cobden] at the Club. He spoke indirectly, and had the true English way of talking aside about his six per cents., and interrogatively. I asked him why he did not let them make an occasion for him to speak, but he said he came over "To keep his ears *open* and his mouth *shut*."—*Ibid*.

In our walks he takes out his note-book sometimes, and tries to write as I do, but all in vain. He soon puts it up again, or contents himself with scrawling some sketch of the landscape. Observing me still scribbling, he will say that he confines himself to the ideal, purely ideal remarks; he leaves the facts to me. Sometimes, too, he will say, a little petulantly, "I am universal, I have nothing to do with the particular and the definite." He is the moodiest person, perhaps, I ever saw. As naturally whimsical as a cow is brindled; both in his tenderness and in his roughness he belies himself. He can be incredibly selfish, and unexpectedly generous. He is conceited, and yet there is in him far more than usual to ground conceit upon.—*Thoreau [journal unpublished]*.

How many walks along the brooks I take in the spring! What shall I call them—lesser *riparial* excursions—prairial, rivular?—*Ibid*.

It looks as if it were the blood mantling in the cheeks of the youthful year, the rosy cheek of its health. Its rude June health!—*Ibid.*

Critchicrosses have been edible some time in some places. *Galls* suggest a union—a connivance of two kingdoms (the animal and vegetable) to produce.—*Ibid.*

The wonderful clearness of the water, enabling you to explore the river-bottom, and many of its secrets now, exactly as if the water had been clarified. This is our compensation for a *heaven concealed* [dog-days].—*Ibid.*

A child asked about the bobolink: "What makes he sing so sweet, mother? Do he eat flowers?"—*Ibid.*

What poor crack-brains we are! Easily upset and unable to take care of ourselves. If there was a precipice at our doors, some would be found jumping off to-day, for fear that if they survived they might jump off to-morrow.—*Ibid.*

A broad leech on a turtle's sternum, apparently going to winter with it. That peculiar drawling note of a hen, who has this peevish way of expressing her content at the sight of bare ground and mild weather.—*Ibid.*

It is strange they did not make us more intense and emphatic—that they do not goad us more into action. Generally, with all our desires and restlessness, we are no more likely to embark in any enterprise than a tree is to walk to a more favorable locality. You would say there is a high tariff on thinking and originality.—*Ibid.*

Here it is *standing night* [on the Allegash River], and every fir and spruce you cut down is a plume plucked from night's raven wing.—*Ibid.*

If my father had been a farmer and had an Indian for his hired man, how many aboriginal ways we children should have learned from him! How contagious are boys' games!—*Ibid.*

— at once hooks himself on to some immovable institution, as a family—the very rottenest of them all.—*Ibid.*

So do the seasons revolve, and every chink is filled. While the waves toss this bright day, the ducks, asleep, are drifting before it across the ponds.—*Ibid.*

Why, it is as much as the strongest man can do to decently bury his friends and relations without making a new world of it!—*Ibid.*

I hear this morning one *Cut-it-Potter* from a Golden Robin. Jacob Farmer says, they call the Cardinal-flower *slink-weed*, and that the eating of it will cause the cows to drop their calves.—*Ibid.*

The spotless edge of the drift which curves over sharp like the visor of a cap The heel of a bank [of snow]. . . . Who was it—what satyr—that invented this rustic beetle [made of one piece of wood]. . . . Thus detect the first approach of spring by finding here and there its scouts and vanguard, which have been slain by the rear-guard of retreating winter?—*Ibid.*

It is well if the writer does not become hardened. He learns how to bear contempt and to despise himself. He makes, as it were, *post-mortem* examinations of himself before he is dead. Such is art.—*Ibid.*

The fiddles made by the trees whose limbs cross one on another—played on by the wind. Orpheus and Apollo are certainly there, taking lessons.—*Ibid.*

How did these beautiful *rainbow* tints get into the shell of the fresh-water clam buried in the mud at the bottom of our dark river?—*Ibid.*

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[No. 4.

FATE AND FREEDOM.

BY WILLIAM H. KIMBALL ("Theron Gray").

Fundamental to all correct thought are certain ruling principles, that, either consciously or unconsciously, come to expression in efficient results. These principles are inherent to Creation, as laws of Absolute Being, and are threefold in form. This threefoldness may be termed the *static*, *genetic*, and *hypostatic* elements of Being, or Life. As a concept of thought, the first potentially embraces and holds, as a primary, indefinite Providence, all the possibilities of creation, and thus stands as the All-containing or *Eternal One*. The second, being essential to generative activity or creative outgoing from the *One*, involves the element of contrariety in the manifold, with all the sharp definitions inherent thereto. The third, being requisite to consummate creative order and harmony as a final satisfactory outcome to such activity, involves the element of all manifoldness in composite order—the *one in the many, and the many in the one*.

These are essential fundamentals of Being, because they are distinctly realized as fulfilling factors to creative experience, and nothing can be *evolved* to creaturely experience that is not first *involved* in creative Being. I mean by creative Being the involved Life or vital Providence that is primarily essential to all

appearance in material form and uses. Every form of use realized in our human arts and sciences is first an involved power, and thus a Providence in eternal Being.

Unity that indefinitely involves all, *Diversity* that contrariously evolves and displays all in immature conditions, and *Compound Unity* that harmoniously actualizes all in embodied or matured result, constitute the essential laws of creation.

In any work of art or artisanship there must first be given artist or artisan with genius or power equal to the form that is to appear finally and verify that form. The conception of the artist that holds the art-form *ideally* perfected, also holds in the thought, whether consciously or not, the material requisite to embody it. In idealizing the theme, he necessarily *thinks* material which alone can give sensible form thereto. But in this primary degree both supersensible and sensible form are so indefinite or obscure to all outward appearance that no sign of art is apparent in the *realm of existence*. Idea is buried in thought, and material, perhaps, in the chaotic depths of earthly indifference. Yet there is *being* to the theme in the potentiality of universal Providence, and more immediate being in the idea of the artist; but, as yet, no visible form. It thus essentially *is*, but does not existentially appear. Nor can it appear *as a form of art* during the labored processes of development. It thus appears in primary form—in immature conditions—but not in a way to reveal the conception of the artist and denote his real power and rank of genius. This final appearance occurs only when the material has been so wrought upon by that genius as to stand forth “the image and likeness thereof;” when material becomes glorified with the glory of the art-conception, and the conception *appears* in glory through material so exalted by genius.

There is a certain delight and repose to the artist whose genius has projected and wrought *in the mind*, as a cherished ideal, an art-conception. But, inasmuch as genius is essentially social in its nature, craves sympathy and fellowship in its achievements, it will not allow its creations to rest in thought—to slumber in the brain of its possessor. So the *is* of thought yearns to become existent in form, and the artist devotes himself to the task of giving outward appearance to the creation that haunted his mind and impressed invisible form there.

Now, creation, *in its static degree*, holds and carries the principle of immutable law or method that amounts to *fate* or absolute certainty. There can be no deviation from the counsels of Eternal Wisdom. These counsels are manifestly all fixed and constant.

How, then, shall arise human freedom and responsibility?

If man were not invested with a sense of personality through rational discretion and moral freedom, he would be little more than stock or stone: at least, he would not arise above the animal plane of existence. Unless he could exercise rational discretion regarding the good, the true, and the beautiful, he would be no subject for an intelligent appreciation of "the blessed life" designed for him. Hence he *must* realize personality and freedom *to this extent*. And this freedom will seem to be without a countervailing power. So the experience of moral freedom delivers him, to this extent, from the grasp of fate, in order to endow him with spiritual personality by which alone he can come to the boundless freedom of Eternal Life. In this ultimate reality, law and liberty, fate and freedom, become one.

The constant truth is that all the providences of Creative Wisdom are in exact accordance with human needs; but, to become rightly related in use, they are not to be arbitrarily imposed as if man were a machine, but comprehended and appropriated by him as a free subject. In order to truly comprehend and appropriate, he must be trained, disciplined, educated into amplest manhood. During this educational process his freedom will be more or less misleading, involving rebuffs and pains. Fate, or the wise laws of Providence, will assert their rights against the freedom of ignorance, and thus bring distress; but it is all in order that subjective science may finally triumph in law and liberty fully accordant.

Fate, then, being understood to be the necessary rule of immutable law, and controversial freedom being the motions of human selfhood during its ignorant or uneducated experience, the placid reign of fate and the delightful reign of perfect freedom are sure to be realized by man when he becomes perfected in knowledge of the laws of Providence and heartily co-operates therewith, instead of mistakenly trying to controvert them. This co-operation and harmony are assured; for the truth that the Divine Providence is

ordered in exact accordance with every human need is to be realized in charming experience.

Let me try to make my thought duly impressive by analogy in science; for instance, the science of mathematics.

Given: Mathematics, and the pupil who needs to be master of its powers. While God's providence in mathematics is coeval with his own Being, the laws and principles that make that providence potential science are as fixed or immutable as God himself. They are decreed, fixed, *fated*. The law of relation between the theme and the pupil is not less august and stern. He must proceed to supplant his native ignorance or nescience with knowledge or science in order to become duly empowered and free. Meantime, he is free to choose whether he will stumble onward under the disabilities of ignorance, or intelligently conform to the rule of *fate* and partake of the wealth resident therein. He is thus free to choose; but one readily sees that this freedom is not absolutely real. For, unless it carries his choice in the right direction—leads him to pursue the subject as a devoted student, and thus empowers him in knowledge—he is hampered and goaded at every turn by the bonds and shafts of ignorance. Destined, by the good Providence, to be lord and master, he is not allowed to *rest* in a choice that leaves him in slavish ignorance. And this sufficiently illustrates the nature and extent of human freedom, under the immutable decrees of Creative Wisdom, in all respects. This *quasi* freedom is an essential endowment, for without it man would not be man. But it can determine no orderly issues in permanent results, except by leading to intelligent conformity to immutable law. Then fate and freedom become co-ordinate factors of life. Then Divine law and human freedom are perfectly reconciled, and act together as one. For all the providences of that law are exactly accordant with all human needs; as the air we breathe is fitted to the lungs, whose delightful play is responsive thereto. So the *master* in mathematics is free in his vocation, for in this special instance he has conformed his human power to the rule of fate, which is only another name for eternal law that rules mathematics. And the truth here is simply a brief outline of the whole truth of Divine and human relation, both during the educational discipline of Humanity and the consummated power of the Divine Humanity. Man is a free *agent*, but in no case is he absolutely or

independently free. He comes to perfect freedom in coming to perfect law. His activity here is charmingly free, because it is found that the rule of fate or law is full of Divinest providences, escape from which he would not if he could, and could not if he would.

Man is free to operate chemical forces. If, however, he tries to operate them without understanding them, he is stung and flayed for his temerity. His freedom cannot controvert the laws of chemical fate; yet, if he will only become a thorough chemist, thus bringing his action into accord with those laws, they will be found full of beneficence, assuring his freedom and supplying his wants at the same time. The earth, with all its stores and elements, is given to man to "cultivate and subdue." Earth without and earth within are equally placed thus at his disposal, and become surely tributary to his blessedness through intelligent mastery and scientific alliance.

This being the index of truth in broadest sense, it is seen that all seeming hindrances and afflictions under Providence are only friendly remonstrances and hints, designed to prompt us to cast off the trammels of ignorance and weakness, and become empowered and free in the knowledge of the Highest.

If fate were only a mockery to our freedom, instead of being an aid and educational stimulus, prayer and all human efforts would be foolish and vain; but, as it is, they are emphatically otherwise. Especially is true prayer potent in helpfulness, for it stimulates a correct sense of Divine and human relation. It helps to poise the creature in an attitude of real dependence, and thus to promote those receptive conditions that are essential to human attainment in true knowledge and power. Nothing can be more absurd than to propose specific aims as tests of the efficacy of prayer. While true prayer can never fail of being answered, the answer may not come in the way specifically desired. Let a test-aim be proposed, and the whole Christian world unite in petitions therefor, and failure as to such aim would in nowise prove the impotence of prayer. Indeed, any petition whose inspirations were a challenge of unbelief, and an ambition to confound such unbelief, could hardly pass as Christian prayer. It would seem more like a pious throwing of dice with a hope of winning the game. It were absurd to suppose that the infinite Wisdom would bestow its favors upon prayer-gambling!

There are doubtless conditions of human spirit under the sway of perfect faith when earnest prayer will literally win a response in a result that would not otherwise take place. But this would involve no controversion of distinct law. It will doubtless be found a tenet of eternal law that matter shall be subservient to mind or spirit rightly disposed or qualified. Divinely qualified, man is appointed to magisterial sway—to lordly dominion in natural realms—but he will then know and acknowledge the Source of his power, nor will he incline to misuse it. The result of prayer will correspond to the state of the one who utters it. Formal petition to the Highest is not necessarily prayer, while informal spiritual aspiration is, essentially, prayer.

There are those who regard the proposed "prayer gauge" as a shrewd test of spiritual realities, who look upon it as a pertinent way of determining the value of prayer, but they only thus expose their own puerile estimates concerning fundamental principles of creative law. They show how feebly they have touched the problem of Fate and Freedom, and how poorly they comprehend the real relation of Divine and Human in experience. It is the more singular that they thus mistake when, throughout the whole range of the special sciences, it is seen that man is conditionally free to pursue—must constantly strive, "knock," or ask, in order to achieve—and comes finally to achievement, and the positive freedom it confers, only by the recognition of law and conformity to its sway.

Unbelief here is not only confronted and refuted by "Moses and the Prophets," but by all the realities of Fate and Freedom as they stand in human experience to-day.

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE THIRD VOLUME OF HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION," BY F. LOUIS SOLDAN.

III.—*The Divine Idea in the Church as the Realm of the Holy Spirit.*

3. This [process], however, has also assumed phenomenal existence; it stands in relationship to the subject. It exists for the subject, and its relations to it are no less essential. The subject is to be a citizen of the kingdom of God.

This [postulate], that the subject is to become himself a child of God, implies that the reconciliation in and for itself has been consummated in the divine idea, and that it thereupon has also appeared [as an external phenomenon], and that truth has become a certainty to man. This certitude is the phenomenon: it is the idea as it presents itself to consciousness in the mode of phenomenality.

The relation of the subject to this truth is this: the subject arrives at this conscious unity, it renders itself worthy of it, it produces it in itself, and is [thus] filled with the divine spirit.

This is accomplished by self-mediation, and this mediation consists in the possession of this faith. For the faith is the truth, the presupposition that in and for itself the conciliation has surely been accomplished. Only through the belief that this conciliation has been accomplished in and for itself, surely, the subject becomes able to, and can, place itself within this unity. This mediation is absolutely necessary.

In the state of beatitude engendered by this thought, the difficulty is annulled which was immediately involved in the fact that the relation of the Church to this idea is a relation of single, particular subjects to the idea; but this difficulty is annulled in this truth itself.

To state it more explicitly: The difficulty is, that the subject is different from the divine spirit; in this appears the finitude of the subject. This is annulled, and it is annulled by the circumstance that God looks at the heart of man, at the substantial will,

at the innermost, all-comprehending subjectivity of man, at his internal, true, and earnest will.

Besides this internal will, and differing from this internal substantial reality, there is found in man his externality, his defect—the fact that he may commit errors, that he may exist in a manner which is not adequate to his internal substantial essence, to this substantial, essential internality.

Externality, however—alienation, finitude, or imperfection as it particularizes itself further—is reduced to an unessential element, and is cognized as such. For in the idea the alienation of the Son is not a true, essential, permanent, absolute, but a transitory, vanishing phase.

This is the concept of the Church in general. It is the idea which in this respect is the process of the subject in and for itself, since the subject has been received into the spirit, and is spiritual—whereby the spirit of God dwells in it. This, its pure self-consciousness, is at the same time the consciousness of truth, and this pure self-consciousness, which knows and wills the truth, is indeed the divine spirit inherent in it. This self-consciousness, moreover, expressed as faith that rests upon spirit—that is to say, upon a mediation which annuls all finite mediation—is the faith which is wrought by God.

(b) The Realization of the Communion [of Worshippers]. The realized communion [of worshippers] is what we call in general the Church. This is no longer the rise of the communion [of worshippers], but the existing communion which also sustains itself.

The existence of the communion consists in its perpetual, eternal Becoming, which is based on the fact that it is the nature of spirit to cognize itself eternally, to pour itself out in the finite spark of individual consciousness, and then to gather itself out of this finitude and comprehend itself again, since there arises in the finite consciousness the cognition of its essence, and with it the divine self-consciousness. Out of the fermentation of finitude, which wells up in foam and froth, spirit rises like a perfume.

In the existing communion the Church is the general instrumentality by means of which the subjects arrive at truth, by which they acquire the truth. By it the Holy Ghost becomes real and present, and finds its abode in them, and by it the truth is in

them. By it they are in the enjoyment and the realization of the truth, of spirit, since as subjects they are the realizing agents of spirit.

The universal of the Church is, that the truth is here presupposed, not as it was at the beginning, when the Holy Ghost had just been poured out or called forth, but rather that the truth appears as present and existing truth. This is for the subject a different mode of beginning.

1. This truth, which is thus presupposed and thus exists, is the doctrine or the dogma of the Church, the doctrine or dogma of faith, and this content we know; in one word, it is the dogma of reconciliation [of atonement]. The point is no longer that an individual person is elevated to absolute significance by the pouring out of the Holy Ghost and its proclamation, but rather that this significance is a known and acknowledged one.

It is the absolute capability of the subject to take part in the truth as well in himself as objectively, to arrive at truth, to be in the truth, to attain consciousness of the same. This consciousness of the dogma is here presupposed, it exists.

It is clear that a dogma is necessary, and also that in the existence of a communion of worshippers the dogma is already completed. It is this dogma which is represented in the form of an image-concept, and this is a content in which in and for itself there is consummated and exhibited what shall be produced in the individual as such.

Thus, as a presupposition which is complete in its elements only, the Church can find its growth and development in the communion of worshippers alone. The spirit which is poured out is but the beginning, is incipient, is the impulse. The communion [the Church] is the consciousness of this spirit, is the expression of what the spirit has found and of what it has been struck with, namely, of the truth that Christ exists for the spirit. Whether the communion of worshippers expresses its consciousness on the basis of a written document or record, or whether it links its self-determinations to tradition, is not an essential difference; the principal point is that, by the spirit inherently present in it, it is infinite power and authority for the continuation and promotion of its doctrine and dogma. This authorization proves itself in the two distinct cases to which allusion has just been made. The

expounding of a fundamental document or writ is in itself cognition, and develops into new determinations; and, although tradition begins with something given or presupposed, tradition is in its historical growth essentially an establishment [of dogmas]. Thus the dogma or doctrine is essentially produced and developed in the Church. It is at first a sense-perception, a feeling; it is an evidence of spirit that rouses our feelings like a flash of lightning. But that determination of producing or developing is in itself but a one-sided determination or predication, for truth has also existence in itself, and it is presupposed; the subject is already comprised in the content.

The doctrine or dogma has therefore been made essentially in the Church, and in this process the thinking power, the educated consciousness, asserts its claims, and all that it has elsewhere gained for the education of its thoughts and in regard to philosophy it uses for this thought and in behalf of the truth which is thus known. It forms the dogma or doctrine out of another content which is concrete, and still alloyed with impurities.

This existing doctrine must then be preserved in the Church, and what exists as a dogma must, of course, be taught. In order to remove it from the contingencies of opinion and [individual] judgment, and to preserve it as a truth which is in and for itself and fixed, it is laid down in the form of symbols. It *Is*, exists, is valid, is acknowledged, is immediate, but not in a sensuous mode, as if it were to be conceived through the senses as we conceive the world, for instance, which is a presupposition to which, as to a sensuous thing, we stand in an external relationship.

The spiritual truth exists only as a known truth; its mode of external appearance is that it is taught. The existence of a body of teachers whose office it is to teach and proclaim this doctrine is an essential institution of the Church.

The subject is born into this doctrine; its beginning is surrounded by this state of valid existing truth, and by the consciousness of the same. This is the subject's relation to this truth which exists, and is presupposed in and for itself.

2. The individual thus born into the Church is at the same time destined to take part—although unconsciously—in this truth, to be a sharer of its benefits; the subject is destined for this truth. The Church expresses this in the sacrament of baptism; man is

within the communion of the Church in which the evil is conquered in and for itself, and God is in and for himself reconciled.

Baptism indicates that the child is born in the communion of the Church, and not in lonely misery; that he will not find a hostile world, but that the Church is his world, and that he must grow up in harmony with the communion [of believers] wherein he is to find his place and condition.

Man must be born twice; once naturally, and, secondly, spiritually, like the Brahmin. Spirit has no immediate existence; it exists as it gives birth to itself out of itself; it exists only as the regenerated.

This regeneration is no longer the infinite sorrow which is the labor and pain at the birth of the communion of worshippers; the subject cannot be spared the infinite real pain, but it is alleviated. For there still exists the contest of particularity, of the special interests of passions and selfishness. The natural heart which still holds sway over man is the enemy against whom he must struggle, but this is no longer the real struggle out of which the communion of worshippers arose.

To the special individual the doctrine or dogma stands in the relation of something external. The child is as yet spirit in itself only; he is not yet realized spirit, he is not real as spirit; he has but the possibility or power to be spirit, or to realize himself as spirit. Thus, the truth approaches him first as something presupposed, as something recognized and valid; that is to say, truth approaches man first in the form of authority.

All truth—(including the sensuous, although it is not truth in the proper sense)—obtains with man first in that manner. In our sensuous perception the world thus approaches us in the form of Authority. It exists, we find it as such, we perceive it as an independently existing thing, and our attitude towards it is that towards an independent thing. It is what it is: and as it is, so is it valued.

The doctrine, or dogma, which is the spiritual element does not exist as such a sensuous authority, but must be taught as a valid truth. Morality, or the ethical element, has permanent validity; it is an existing conviction; but because it is of spiritual nature we do not say it exists, but it is valid, or is binding. But since it first appears to us as an Existence—it is—and because it appears to us

as something that is valid and has sway, we call this manner of existence Authority.

Man learns the presence of sensuous things by authority; since they are there, since they exist, he must submit to the fact. Thus, the sun is there, and, since it is there, I must submit to the fact. Thus [it is] also [with] the doctrine, with the truth; but the latter comes to our notice not through sensuous perception, through the activity of our senses, but we receive it by being taught its existence; we receive it through authority. Whatever is in the human spirit—that is to say, what is in his true spirit—appears in man's consciousness as an objective thing; or, what is in man's mind is developed, so that he knows it as the truth in which he lives. The important point in such education, practice, training, and acquisition, is the forming of a habitual attachment to the Good and the True. The object in this respect is here not the conquering of the Evil, for the Evil is already conquered in and for itself. The question here is simply that of contingent subjectivity. With that one proposition of faith, that the subject is not what it ought to be, there is connected at the same time the absolute possibility that it may fulfil its destination and may be received into the grace of God. This is a matter of faith. The individual must seize the potential unity of the divine and human natures, and this unity he seizes in the belief in Christ. God is then no longer [merely] an externality for them, and the seizing of this truth is the contradiction of that fundamental proposition—namely, that the subject is not as he ought to be. The child, since it is born within the pale of a church, is born in freedom and for freedom; there is no longer any absolute alienation for it, since this alienation is posited as overcome and conquered.

In this process of educational adaptation the aim is not to allow the Evil—for which there is generally a possibility in man—to arise in him; but, since the Evil arises when man does wrong, the latter exists thereby as something that is nugatory in itself, and over which spirit has power, in such a manner that spirit has power to undo the Evil [and cancel it].

The meaning of repentance, atonement, is, that by man's elevation to the truth crime is cognized as something conquered, which has no power in itself. The deed cannot be made undone in a

sensuous manner, but spiritually, internally. He is forgiven; men know him as one whom the Father has received.

This is the office of the Church, to so accustom man that the education of the spirit becomes more and more internal, and that the truth becomes more and more identical with his Self, with man's will, and that it may become his own will, his own spirit. The struggle is over, and the consciousness has arisen that it is no struggle like the one portrayed in the Persian religion, or in Kant's philosophy, where it is demanded that the Evil should be conquered, but where Evil abides eternally in and for itself opposed to the Good, and where an infinite progression is the highest principle.

Where no further progress is made than to reach a "categorical imperative," there the struggle and endeavor are infinite, the solution of the problem is infinitely deferred.

Here, on the contrary, the problem is solved in itself; the Evil is cognized in spirit as conquered in and for itself, and, on account of this conquest, the subject has but to make his will pure and good, and the Evil, the bad deed, has disappeared.

At this stage arises the consciousness that, when the natural will is given up, there is no sin which cannot be forgiven—except the sin against the Holy Ghost, the denial or negation of the spirit; for the latter alone is the power which can annul all [Evil].

There are many difficulties in this which arise out of the idea of Spirit and Freedom; there is on the one side spirit as universal spirit, and on the other the existence of independent individual men. This, then, must be said: it is the divine spirit which causes that man is born again; this is divinely free grace, for all that is divine is free; it is neither fate nor destiny. Then, again, the individual existence of the soul is a fixed fact, and in this connection some have tried to discover how much [of this attribute of freedom] belongs to man. They ascribe to him a *Velleitas*, a *Nisus*, but to look upon this relation as a fixed and final stage would be in itself unspiritual. The first being, the selfhood, is the idea potentially, the potential spirit; and what must be annulled is the form of its immediateness, or its isolated, particular independence. This self-annulment or return-movement of the idea is, however, unlimited, universal spirit. Action and life in the faith of a potential reconciliation is, on the one side, the

subject's doing; but, on the other side, it is the doing of the divine spirit. Faith itself is the divine spirit which is active in the subject. Not that the latter is a mere passive vessel; on the contrary, the Holy Spirit is also the subject's own spirit, inasmuch as the subject has faith. In this faith he acts against his naturalness, and strips it off and casts it away.

To explain the antinomy which lies in this path of the soul, reference may be made to the differences between the three conceptions that have arisen in regard to it.

(1) The first is the Moral View, which finds its contrast in the quite external relationship of our self-consciousness (a relation which, taken by itself, would occupy the fourth or first place), namely, in the Oriental and despotic relation of the annihilation of the individual's own thinking and volition. This Moral View places the absolute end and purpose of the spirit, or the essence of spirit, in a purpose of volition—namely, in volition as his own volition, so that this subjective side is the principal thing. The law, the universal, the rational, is my rationality within me. In the same way the willing and the realization, which make it my own and render it my subjective aim and end, are mine; and since there enters into this view the idea also of something higher, of the Highest, of God, and of the Divine, these themselves are but postulates of my reason; they are what I myself have posited. It is true, on the other hand, that these should be things that are not posited, that form the strictly independent power; in this predicate, "not posited," I do not forget that this "not posited" is posited by me. It makes no difference whether this is expressed in the form of a postulate, or whether we express it by saying, My feeling of dependence, of my need to be saved, is the first thing; in either form the objectivity proper to truth is annulled.

(2) From the stand-point of Piety this view is modified by adding, in regard to the determining volition and in regard to the universal or the law, that all these are [the emanations of] the divine will, and that the power of a good resolution is in itself something divine; and with this general relation it lets the matter rest.

(3) The mystic view, finally, or that of the Church, defines this connection of God with the subjective volition more closely, and

establishes a relation between them which is based on the nature of the Idea. The representations of this in the several churches are but diverse attempts to solve this antinomy. The Lutheran conception is, without doubt, the most ingenious, although it, as well as the others, does not fully attain the form of the idea.

3. The last [principle] in this sphere is the enjoyment of this assimilation [of the subjective will by the divine and] of the presence of God. We have arrived at the stand-point of the conscious presence of God, of unity with God, of the *unio mystica*, the feeling of the unity of the self with God.¹

This is the sacrament of the Eucharist, in which there is given to man, in a sensuous, immediate manner, the consciousness of his reconciliation with God, and of the entrance of the spirit into his soul, and of its abode there.

Inasmuch as this is a feeling—of which our Self is the object—it is also a movement; it presupposes the removal of differences in order to produce this negative unity. While, on the one hand, the constant preservation of the Church (which is at the same time the uninterrupted creation of the same) is the perpetual repetition of the life, sufferings, and resurrection of Christ in the members of the Church, this repetition is, on the other hand, explicitly performed in the sacrament of the Eucharist. The perpetual sacrifice in it is that the absolute content, the unity of the subject and of the absolute object, is offered to the individual for his immediate participation and enjoyment, and when the individual is reconciled, then this perfect reconciliation is the resurrection of Christ. For this reason the Eucharist is the central point of the doctrine of Christianity, and from this point all the differences in the Christian Church receive their color and distinguishing characteristic. There are three conceptions in regard to it.

1. According to the one concept, the host, this external object, this sensuous, unspiritual thing, becomes by consecration the present God—God [conceived] as a thing, in the manner of an empirical thing, and just as empirically participated in and taken by man. Thus is God known in the Lord's supper, in this central

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—The feeling of the connection of man's own deeds with the spirit in man, and through the latter with God.

point of the doctrine, as an external thing, and this externality is the basis of the whole of the Catholic religion. Thus the bondage in thought and action arises, [for] this externality affects all further developments, since the True is conceived as a fixed and external thing. Since it thus exists outside of the subject, it may be subjected to the power of others; the Church holds possession of it as well as of all the other means of grace. The subject is conceived in every respect as passive and recipient, as not knowing what is true, right, and good, and as bound, therefore, to receive and accept it from others.

2. The Lutheran conception is that the movement begins with something external, which is an ordinary, common thing; but that the participation in and the self-experience of the presence of God is brought about inasmuch and in so far only as this externality is consumed, not only physically, but in spirit and faith. In spirit and faith alone there is the present God. The sensuous presence, by itself, is nothing, and even the consecration does not render the host an object of worship; the object exists in the faith alone, and thus there is in the eating and the annihilation of the sensuous the union with God, and the consciousness of this union of the subject with God. Here the grand consciousness has arisen that outside of the participation and the faith the host is an ordinary, sensuous thing; in spirit alone the process has its truth.

There is no transubstantiation [in an external sense], yet there is a transubstantiation indeed [in another sense], but it is one by which the external is annulled and the presence of God is strictly a spiritual one, in such a way that the faith of the subject is its necessary condition.

3. There is [also] the conception that the present God exists in concept only, in the recollection, and that for this reason recollection alone can be said to have immediate subjective presence. This is the conception in the Reformed Church;¹ it is a non-spiritual, but simply vivid, recollection of the past; it is not divine presence, no real spirituality. Here the divine, the truth, has fallen down to the level of prosy rationalism (*Aufklaerung*) and of the one-sided Understanding; it is a merely moral relation.

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—The Reformed Church, "*Reformirte Kirche*," is the name given in Germany to the church which is based on the views of Calvin and Zwingli.

(c) The actualization of the spiritual into universal reality. This contains at the same time the transformation or the re-formation of the Church.

Religion is spiritual, and the Church exists first within, in spirit as such. This internal element, this subjectivity (which is present to itself and considered as internal, not developed in itself), is feeling, sentiment; the Church possesses essentially consciousness, conception, needs, impulses, worldly existence in general—but with these separation and differentiation appear: the divine, objective idea presents itself to consciousness as an Other, as something alien, which is partly given by authority, and partly is made man's own by pious worship. Or the phase of participation [of the Lord's supper] is but a single phase; that is to say, the divine idea, the divine content, is not viewed really, but is simply a matter of image-conception. The moment of communion loses itself in image-conception and flows over partly into a Beyond, a heaven beyond, partly in the past, and partly in the future. Spirit, however, is strictly present to itself, and demands a filled and complete presence; it demands more than simply love and misty image-conceptions; it demands that the content itself be present, or that the feeling, the sensation, be developed and expanded.

Thus, the Church, as kingdom of God, faces an objectivity in general. Objectivity, as the external, immediate world, is the heart; another objectivity is that of Reflection, or of abstract Thought or Understanding, and the third true objectivity is that of the idea; it now remains to be considered how spirit realizes itself in these three elements.

1. In religion in itself the heart is reconciled; reconciliation is thus in the heart, and is spiritual—the pure heart which attains this participation in and enjoyment of the presence of God in itself, and with it attains reconciliation, the enjoyment or satisfaction of being reconciled. This reconciliation, however, is abstract; since the Self, the subject, is at the same time that side of this spiritual presence in which there is a developed worldliness or externality, and the kingdom of God, the Church, has, therefore, a relation to worldliness.

In order that reconciliation be actual, it is necessary that reconciliation be known in, exist in, and be produced in this develop-

ment, in this totality. The principles for this worldliness exist in this spiritual element.

The Spiritual, to speak more particularly, is the truth [*i. e.*, its true purpose] of worldliness, because the subject as such, as the object of divine grace and mercy, and as a being reconciled with God, has infinite value; this is in accordance with its [ideal] destination, which finds fulfilment in the Church. According to this destination, the subject is known as the infinite self-certitude of spirit, as the eternity of spirit.

The nature of this subject, which is thus infinite in itself [it is determined as infinity, and that implies its freedom], is, that it is a free person, and it therefore stands related to the world and reality as subjectivity which is in itself, is reconciled within itself, and is permanent and infinite. This is what is substantial, and this, its determination, must be the basis of its relation to the world.

The rationality and freedom of the subject lie in the fact that it is the subject which has been liberated, which has attained freedom through religion, and that, according to its religious characteristic or determination, it is essentially free. It is necessary that this reconciliation should come to pass in the world itself.

(1). The first form of the reconciliation is the immediate, and for that reason not yet true, mode of reconciliation. The form in which this reconciliation primarily appears is, that, in the first place, the Church contains in itself the reconciliation, the spiritual, this reconciliation with God, as an abstraction from the world; [in this] the spiritual renounces worldliness, and places itself in a negative relation to the world, and thereby to itself also; for the world in the subject is the impulse towards the natural, towards social life, to art and science.

The concrete element in man's Self, the passions cannot be justified when confronted with religion by saying that they are natural; but the monkish abstraction holds this view: that the heart should not be developed into this concreteness, should remain an undeveloped thing; or, that spirituality, reconciliation, and life for this reconciliation, should be concentrated in itself and undeveloped, and remain so. But it is the essence of spirit to develop itself and to differentiate itself, even unto worldliness.

(2). The second form of this reconciliation is, that the world and

religion are to remain external to each other, and yet to assume a mutual relationship. The relationship in which the two stand to each other can therefore be but external, and of such a nature that the one rules over the other, and reconciliation does not exist. The religious element must be the ruling, the reconciled factor; the Church is to rule over the worldly element that remains unreconciled.

It is a union with worldliness which is unreconciled; it is worldliness crude [*i. e.*, "carnal," unspiritual] in itself, which, on account of being crude in itself, is ruled over; but that which is ruling absorbs this worldliness into itself. All inclinations, all the passions, and whatever unspiritual worldliness exists, appear in the Church on account of this dominion and rule, because the worldly element is not reconciled in and of itself.

This is, then, a dominion and rule posited on account of the unspiritual element, in which externality is the principle, and in which man is in his relationship outside of himself [*i. e.*, his true nature, reason, seems an external force constraining him]; it is the relation of dependence, of being unfree in general. Into whatever is human, into all impulses, into all relations to the family, into action and political life, this diremption is introduced, and the self-alienation or self-estrangement of man is the principle.

Man, in all these forms, is in general bondage, and all these forms are considered nugatory and unholy. Since man is encompassed by them, he is in respect to them essentially in the condition of finitude and diremption; that which has no abiding value surrounds him, and the truly valid is elsewhere.

This reconciliation with the world presents itself to the heart of man in such a manner that this reconciliation becomes the very opposite. The further examination of this diremption within reconciliation itself shows it to be that which appears as the corruption of the Church—the absolute contradiction of the spiritual within itself.

(3). The third consideration is, that this contradiction is dissolved in the idea of Morality, that the idea of freedom has found its way into reality, and, when the reality is formed according to the idea, according to reason, to truth, to eternal truth, it is Freedom grown concrete, it is rational will.

It is in the organization of the state that the divine forms the

woof to the warp of reality, where the one is interpenetrated by the other, and where the worldly element is justified in and for itself. For the principle of the organization of the state is the divine will, the law of justice and of freedom. True reconciliation, by which the divine actualizes itself in the sphere of reality, is found in the laws and the ethical life of the state; this is the truly transforming discipline [*subaction*] of worldliness.

The ethical institutions are divine and holy, not in the sense in which holy is opposed to the ethical, as celibacy, for instance, is represented as the holy state when compared with marriage and the love of family, or when voluntary poverty is contrasted with active self-interested thrift or lawful gain; in the same way blind obedience is considered a holy and sacred object. But the really and truly ethical is found in obedience, in freedom, rational will, obedience of the subject to the ethical. In ethical [life] the reconciliation of religion with reality or worldliness exists and is completed.

2. The second is, that the ideal side in this now becomes prominent by itself. In this reconciliation of the spirit with itself, the internal [nature of man] cognizes itself as self-contained, as being in itself; and this knowledge of being within one's self, or of being self-contained, is that Thinking which is reconciliation, self-contained being, being-in-peace-with one's self — but this peace is quite abstract and undeveloped. Thus, there arises the infinite behest [or postulate] that the content of religion should stand the test of thought also, and this necessity cannot be obviated.

Thinking is the universal; it is the activity of the universal, and stands in a contrast with the concrete in general as well as with the external. It is the freedom of reason which has been obtained in religion, and which now knows itself for itself in spirit. This freedom now turns against the merely spiritless externality, against bondage; for bondage is directly opposed to the idea of reconciliation or liberation, and thus the thinking makes its appearance which defies and destroys externality, no matter in what form it appears.

This is the negative and formal movement which has been called in its concrete shape Rationalism (*Aufklaerung*), and in which thinking turns against externality, and the freedom of the

spirit which lies in reconciliation is asserted. This thinking, when it first originates, arises as this abstractly Universal, and is directed against the concrete in general, and therewith, also, against the idea of God—against the view which holds that God is not a dead abstraction, but the Trinity; that he is self-related, that he is within himself and returns to himself. Abstract thinking through its principle of identity attacks this content of the Church: for that concrete content stands in contradiction to the principle of identity. In the concrete there are determinations and distinctions; since abstract thinking turns against externality in general, it turns against the difference as such, against the relation of God to man, against the unity of the two, against divine grace and human liberty—all these involve the unity of opposite categories. But the understanding, abstract thinking, takes abstract identity for its highest principle; this kind of thinking proceeds to dissolve all that is concrete, all determinations, all the content which is in God. Thus, reflection has for its last result nothing but the objectivity of identity itself [or, in other words], this [view]: that God is naught but the Supreme Being, without determination, and empty. For every determination renders a being concrete. He is for cognition a something transcendent [“unknowable”], because cognition [“the knowable”] means the knowledge of a concrete content [*i. e.*, a being with attributes]. This extreme result of reflection reaches a principle exactly opposite to that of the Christian Church; by it all that is concrete in God is cancelled. It may, perhaps, thus be expressed: It is impossible [to cognize God, for to cognize God means to know God in his determinations [*i. e.*, to limit him]; he should remain, however, according to the principle of Reflection, pure abstraction. In this formalism, it is true, the principle of freedom, of internality, of religion itself, has been conceived, but as yet only abstractly.

The other element through which, in this abstraction, determinateness enters into this universality is naught else but what lies in the natural inclinations and impulses of the subject. From this stand-point it is then asserted: Man is good by nature. Since this pure subjectivity or ideality is pure freedom, it adheres to the category or determination of the Good, but the Good itself must also remain here an abstraction.

The Good is determined here as Arbitrariness, as the general contingency of the subject; and thus the highest principle of this subjectivity, or freedom, which renounces the truth, and produces and knows within itself the development of truth, is, that what it acknowledges as valid are but its own determinations, and that it is master over that which is good and evil.

This is an inner moving and stirring, which may just as easily be hypocrisy or the merest vanity as it may be quiet, noble, and pious endeavors. It is the world of pious feelings to which Pietism¹ confines and limits itself. Pietism does not recognize any objective truth, and, although it retains a mediation, a relation to Christ, it makes this relation remain within the feeling, in the inner sentiment. There everybody has *his* God, *his* Christ, etc. It is true that [a certain] particularity, in which each person has his individual religion and view of the world, exists in man; but in religion, by the life of the Church, it is consumed, and has no longer any validity for the truly pious man, and is put aside.

Over against the empty essence of God there stands thus the finitude which is free for itself, and has become self-dependent, which in itself is considered absolute (as probity of the individuals, for instance). The further inference is that not only the objectivity of God is thus transcendent and inaccessible, and is thus negated, but that the other determinations also, which are valid in and for themselves, and which are posited in the world in the form of rights, etc., disappear and vanish. When the subject withdraws to the height of his infinity, the Good and the Just have existence only within himself; it reduces them all to his subjective determination; they are but *his* thought. The realization of this Good is then to result from natural arbitrariness, contingency, passion, etc. This subject is then the consciousness [which imagines] that objectivity is comprehended within the subject itself, and has no fixed existence; it considers nothing valid but the principle of identity alone. This subject is the abstract one; it can be filled with any content whatsoever; it is capable of subsuming any content which is thus planted in

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—Pietism is the name given in Germany to a religious view which began to manifest itself there during the latter part of the seventeenth century; it attached less importance to doctrinal differences, and more to fervid religious feelings and good works.

the heart of man. Subjectivity is thus arbitrariness itself, and the knowledge of its power is strictly that it produces Objectivity or the Good, and gives to it a content.

The other development of this stand-point is, that the subject, compared with the unity into which it has poured itself, has no independent existence, and does not retain its particularity, but that it gives to itself the determination of sinking itself into the unity of God. Thus, then, the subject has neither a particular nor an objective aim and end, except that of the honor of the One God. This form is religion; in it there is an affirmative relation to the subject's essence, which is this One, and the subject relinquishes itself therein. This religion has the same objective content as the Jewish religion, but man's relation is widened; he retains no particularity. The Jewish national privilege [as the chosen people] is here wanting which posits this relation to One; here there is no limitation; man is related to this One as pure abstract self-consciousness. This is the attitude of the Mohammedan religion. In it Christianity finds its opposite, because the Mohammedan stands in the same sphere [*i. e.*, as contraries belong to the same unity] with the Christian religion. Like the Jewish religion, it is spiritual; but this God exists for self-consciousness in the abstract, cognizing spirit only, and it stands in so far on the same level with the Christian religion as there is no particularity retained. Whoever fears God pleases him, and man has value in so far only as he places his truth in the cognition that He is the One, the Essence. No barrier of any kind between the believers and each other, or between them and God, is acknowledged. Before God, the determinations of the subject in regard to rank or position are annulled; the subjects may be of rank, or they may be slaves; but this is accidental only.

The contrast between Christianity and Mohammedanism is, that in Christ spirituality is concretely developed, and that it is known as triune, *i. e.*, as spirit, and that the history of man, the relation to the One, is concrete history; that it has its beginning in natural will, and this natural will is not as it ought to be [*i. e.*, it is fallen, corrupt]; the renunciation of this [natural will], or that by which it becomes its [real] self, takes place through the negation of itself for the sake of this its essence. The Moham-

medan hates and banishes everything concrete. God is the absolutely One, and this implies that man retains for himself no aim and end, no particularity, no peculiarity. Existing man indeed particularizes himself in his inclinations, his interests, and these are here all the more wild and unrestrained because they lack Reflection; but with this the complete contrast is posited as well, namely, the giving up of everything, indifference to every aim and end, absolute fatalism, indifference towards life; no practical aim has essential validity. But since man is also practical and active, the aim and end can solely be to produce in all men worship and reverence of the One; the Mohammedan religion is therefore essentially fanatic.

The reflection which we have considered stands on the same level with Mohammedanism, [since it asserts] that God has no content, that he is not concrete. God's manifestation in the flesh, the elevation of Christ as the Son of God, the transfiguration of the finitude of the world and of the self-consciousness into the infinite self-consciousness of God are all wanting here. Christianity is looked upon [by this abstract view] only as a doctrine or dogma, and Christ as a messenger of God, as a divine teacher—that is to say, as a teacher like Socrates, but of superior rank, since he was without sin. But this is only a superficial view. Either Christ was nothing but a man, or he was “the Son of Man.” Of the divine history nothing remains [if this superficial view is adopted], and, if Christ is spoken of in the style of the Koran, the whole difference between this stage and that of Mohammedanism is, that the latter—whose view bathes itself in the ether of the limitless—is the infinite independence which renounces all particularity, all pleasure, rank, all individual knowledge, and all vanity. The stand-point which rationalism, the view of the understanding, holds is, that God is considered as something distant, as something transcendent [“jenseits,” “beyond,” *i. e.*, beyond the limits of the knowable], and as having no affirmative relation to the subject. This view, therefore, considers man as being abstractly for himself, and as having recognized the affirmative Universal as far only as it is in him, but that he has it within himself abstractly only, and therefore bases the accomplishment and fulfilment of it on contingency and arbitrariness only.

But even in this last form we are able to recognize a reconciliation, and this last phenomenon is therefore equally a realization of faith. For, since all content, all truth, have been spoiled in this subjectivity (which, knowing itself infinite, is particular), the consciousness of the principle of subjective freedom arises therein. That which in the Church is called the Internal is now developed into completeness in itself; it is not only the internal or conscience, but it is subjectivity which makes itself subject and object, which distinguishes itself and is concrete; it exists as its [own] objectivity, which knows the universal to be in itself and which produces it out of itself. It is the subjectivity which is for itself and determined in itself; it is the completion by which the subjective extreme becomes the idea-in-itself. The defect therein is, that it is formal only, and lacks true objectivity; it is the last point of formal culture that still lacks necessity in itself. The true completion of the idea requires that the objectivity should be set free [made objectively independent], and that it be the totality of objectivity in itself!

The result of this objectivity, therefore, is, that in the subject everything is misty and distorted, without objectivity, without fixed determinateness, without the development of God. This last climax of the formal culture of our time is at the same time the extreme of coarseness [or crudeness of insight], since it possesses the form only of culture.

In the preceding we have considered scientifically these two elements in opposition to each other in the development of the Church. The one was the lack of freedom, bondage of the spirit [even] in the absolute region of freedom. The other was abstract subjectivity, subjective freedom without a content.

3. What remains to be considered is, that subjectivity develops out of itself the content (but in a manner which proceeds according to necessity), and knows and acknowledges the content as necessary, as objective, and as being in-and-for itself. This is the stand-point of philosophy, that the content takes refuge in the idea, and, through thinking, receives its rehabilitation and justification.

Thinking is not merely this act of abstracting and determining according to the law of identity; this mode of thinking is itself essentially concrete, and therefore it is comprehension; its

nature is, that conception determines itself to its totality, the idea.

It is self-existing free reason which develops and justifies in knowledge the content of truth, which acknowledges and cognizes a truth. The purely subjective stand-point, the evaporation of all content, the rationalism of the understanding, and [the doctrine of] Pietism, as well acknowledge no content, and, therefore, no truth.

The idea, however, produces the truth—that is, the subjective freedom—but it acknowledges, at the same time, this content to be not produced, but to be a truth which has existence in and for itself. This objective stand-point alone is able to pronounce and give the testimony of spirit in a cultured and thinking manner, and is contained in the better class of dogmatism of our times.

This stand-point is therefore that of the justification of religion, especially of the Christian and true religion. It cognizes the content according to its necessity, according to its reason, and, in the same way, it cognizes the forms in the development of this content. We have inspected these forms, namely: the phenomenal manifestation of God, this image-conception for the sensuous, spiritual consciousness which has attained universality or thought, this complete development of the spirit.

In justifying the content and cognizing the forms, the determinateness of the phenomenon, Thinking also recognizes the limits of the forms. Rationalism knows naught but the negation, the limit, the determination as such, and it therefore wrongs the strict content.

The form, the determination, is not merely finitude, it is not merely limit, but the form, as totality of form, is itself the idea, and these forms are necessary and essential.

Since reflection has broken into religion, thinking or reflection occupies a hostile position towards image-conception in religion, and towards the concrete content. Thinking, that has thus commenced, never rests; it persists and renders the heart, heaven, and the cognizing spirit empty and void, and the religious content then takes refuge in the idea. Here it must receive its justification, and thinking must conceive itself as concrete and free; it must hold the differences not simply as posited and given, but it must let them go free, and thereby recognize the content as objective.

Philosophy has for its function to establish the relation to the two preceding stages. Religion, or the pious impulse of our nature, may take refuge in emotion instead of in the idea, in the sentiment which resigns itself to the giving up of the truth, which renounces the knowledge of the content; so that the holy Church has thus no longer a communion, and collapses into atoms. For communion is found in the dogma or doctrine; but each individual has his own sentiment, own emotions, and a particular view of the world. This form does not answer to spirit, which wishes to know its position. Thus, philosophy has two contrasts or antitheses. On the one side it seems to be in contrast with the Church; it has this in common with culture, with reflection, that, when it is in the process of conceiving, it does not stop with the form of the image-concept, but must conceive in thought, and must cognize through this the form of image-conception as necessary. But the idea is the higher stage which comprehends the distinct forms and does justice to them. The second contrast is that with rationalism [*Aufklaerung*], with the indifference of content, with [the mere] opinion, with the despairing renunciation of truth. Philosophy has for its aim the cognition of truth, the cognition of God, for he is the absolute truth; in this respect nothing is worth while, compared with God and his explication. Philosophy cognizes God essentially as concrete, as spiritual and real universality, which is not envious, but communicates or imparts itself to others. Light itself communicates itself, and allows itself to be shared. Whoever says that God cannot be cognized, says that God is envious, and he is not in earnest in believing in God, no matter how much he talks about Him. Rationalism, this vanity of the understanding, is the most violent opponent of philosophy; it takes it amiss when philosophy demonstrates the presence of reason in Christian religion, when it shows that the testimony of spirit of truth is deposited in religion. In philosophy, which is theology, the whole object is to show reason in religion.

☞ In philosophy, religion finds its justification from the stand-point of thinking consciousness. Unsophisticated piety has no need of this; it receives truth as authority, and finds satisfaction and reconciliation by means of this truth.

○ In faith there is already the true content, but it still lacks the

form of thinking. All forms which we have examined hitherto—feeling, image-conception—may have the content of truth, but they themselves are not the true form which makes the true content necessary. Thinking is the absolute judge before whom the content must prove and justify itself.

Philosophy has been charged with placing itself above religion; but this is false according to the fact itself, for philosophy has only this and no other content, but it gives it in the form of thinking; in this manner it places itself above the form of faith, but the content is the same.

The form of the subject—as a feeling individual, etc.—concerns the subject as an individual; but feeling, as such, is not excluded from philosophy. The question is only whether the content of the feeling be the truth, whether it can prove itself as such before Thought. Philosophy thinks what the subject as such feels, and leaves it to arrive at an understanding with his feelings. Feeling is not rejected by philosophy, but the latter gives to it rather the true content.

But, since thinking begins to place itself in a contrast with the concrete, the process of thinking must go through this stage of opposition until it arrives at reconciliation. This reconciliation is philosophy; in this respect philosophy is theology; it represents the reconciliation of God with himself and with nature; it represents that nature, which is alienation, is in-itself divine, and that the nature of the finite spirit in-itself is, partly, to elevate itself to this reconciliation, and partly attains this reconciliation in the course of the history of the world.

This religious cognition through the idea is, in consequence of its nature, not general; it is again simply cognition within the Church, and thus in regard to the kingdom of the spirit three stages or classes are formed: The first class, that of immediate, unsophisticated religion and faith; the second, the class of the understanding—of the so-called cultured or educated people—that of reflection and rationalism; and, finally, the third class, the stage of philosophy.

When, after having considered its rise and existence, we see the realization of the Church in its spiritual actuality lapse into this internal conflict and division, this realization appears to us to be at the same time its decadence. But can we here speak of a

downfall when the realm of God is established forever, and the Holy Ghost, as such, lives eternally in its communion [of believers—the Church], and the gates of hell shall not prevail against the Church? To speak of decadence would mean to wind up with a discord.

But what does it avail? The discord exists in reality. As it was at the time of the Roman Empire—when (because the general unity of religion had disappeared and the Divine was profaned, and the general political life lacked counsel, action, and confidence) reason took refuge in the forms of civil rights, or, because that which has existence in and for itself had been given up, the individual weal was made a purpose and an aim—in the same way at the present time, when the merely moral view, the individual opinion and conviction without objective truth, has made itself the ruling power, the rage for private or individual rights and pleasure has become the order of the day. When the fulness of time is come, and the justification through the idea has become a want and a necessity, then the unity of the internal and the external no longer exists in immediate consciousness, and in reality, and then there is nothing in faith that is justified. The rigor of an objective order, external compulsion, the power of the state, are here of no avail; the decay has eaten its way too deep for that. When the Gospel is no longer preached to the poor, when the salt has lost its savor, and every fixed foundation has been tacitly removed, then the people—whose understanding always remains undeveloped, and for whom truth can exist in image-conception only—no longer know how to satisfy the impulse of their inner nature. They are least removed from the infinite pain; but since the love is perverted to a love or to pleasures which are free from all pain, the people see themselves forsaken by their teachers; the latter have helped themselves through reflection, and have found satisfaction in finitude, in subjectivity and its arts, and thereby in vanity; but that substantial mass of the people cannot find its own satisfaction in this.

This discord has been dissolved for us by philosophy, and the object of these lectures has been to reconcile reason with religion, to cognize the latter in its various shapes as necessary, and again to find in revealed religion the Truth and the Idea. But this reconciliation is itself but a partial one, without external univer-

salinity ; philosophy is in this respect a secluded sanctuary, and its servants form an isolated priesthood which cannot walk the paths of the world, and which must guard the treasure of truth. How the temporal, empirical present finds its way out of its dividing quandary, how it will shape itself, must be left to it, and is not the immediately practical cause and concern of philosophy.

[END OF THE WORK.]

A GENERAL ANALYSIS OF MIND.¹

BY JAMES WARD.

I.

Many admirable works have been written purporting to furnish analyses of mind ; but almost all of them, in common with other works on psychology, proceed at once to the examination of special facts, such as Sensations, their authors apparently considering it unnecessary to discuss at any length the relation of the several elements of mind to each other. While cognitions are under discussion, emotions are out of view, and volitions in their turn are treated regardless of both ; so that though the special analyses and descriptions are excellent, the *tout ensemble* of mind is never exhibited at all : we lose sight of the wood among the trees. The reason of this is not far to seek. First, in most states of mind as we know them some one aspect or element is prominent, the rest being obscure or of secondary interest. Hence, in common language, and very generally in psychology too, these obvious and obtrusive differences between one state and another have been regarded as concrete mental states, instead of being in reality only abstractions. "The mind can seldom operate exclusively in one of these three modes," says Mr. Bain, referring to his own "classification of mind." "A feeling is apt to be accompanied more or less by will and by thought."² Sir W. Hamilton is even more explicit : "In distinguishing the cognitions, feelings, and con-

¹ Discussed October 15, 1880, at the Moral Sciences Club, at the rooms of Mr. James Ward, M. A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge University, England.

² "Mental Science," p. 2.

tions," he says, "it is not to be supposed that these phenomena are possible independently of each other. In our philosophical systems, they may stand separately from each other in books and chapters; in nature they are ever interwoven."¹ But neither of these writers can be said to have given any orderly exposition of nature's weaving. Secondly, the reference of these apparently distinct facts to distinct faculties diverted attention still more from their common connections. And, lastly, the obscurity of the term consciousness rendered any attempt at a general analysis of mind almost hopeless. For consciousness seemed at one time something outside those obvious facts of mind which the psychologist could describe; at another those facts seemed themselves the sum total of consciousness. Thus, to Reid it was a special faculty, while according to James Mill it was but a "generical mark . . . under which all the names of the subordinate classes of the feelings of a sentient creature are included."² Neither signification was likely to turn psychologists from the accepted classifications of the salient facts of mind to a careful analysis of mind as a whole. Hamilton did indeed attempt an analysis of consciousness as "the universal phenomenon of mind;" and so far with good results that, whereas James Mill and Bain barely mention the important fact of attention, Hamilton devotes a couple of lectures to it. Still, such is the vague and equivocal character of that word Consciousness that Hamilton's venture was in the main a disastrous one. We shall do well, therefore, to profit by his misfortune, and avoid the term while essaying in like manner to make a general analysis of mind.

For the sake of clearness, it seems desirable to make as positive a statement as the case admits of at the outset of the results it is hoped may be established as our investigation proceeds. In every concrete "state of mind" (accepting this term for the present without question)³ there is the presentation of an object, or complex of objects, to a subject. Such presentation entails on the part of the subject (1) non-voluntary attention, and (2) a change of feeling—*i. e.*, pleasure or pain in some degree, the character and

¹ "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i, p. 188.

² "Analysis of the Human Mind," i, p. 225.

³ Professor Huxley's term *psychosis* might perhaps be used instead by those who like it.

intensity of this change being determined mainly by the intensity and quality of the object when simple, and also by certain relations among objects when a complex of these is presented. This feeling is followed by and determines a second form of attention, of which there are two varieties—the innervation of movements, and voluntary attention. Movements may be termed motor objects, to distinguish them from other simple objects, which may be called sensory objects. It behooves us now to take up all these points in turn, and to fix the signification of the terms used.

Wherever the word SUBJECT or its derivatives occur in psychology we might substitute the word Ego and analogous derivatives, did such exist. But Subject is almost always the preferable term; its impersonal form is an advantage, and it readily recalls its modern correlative Object. Moreover, Ego has two senses, distinguished by Kant as pure and empirical, the former of which is, of course, an object, while the latter is subject always. By pure Ego or Subject I should propose to denote the simple fact that everything mental is referred to a Self: it is not enough to speak of feeling, for we can only think of feeling as felt by some one, whether that some one knows itself as such or not. The attempt, however, has frequently been made, and especially by those who are adepts at what some one has called "psychogeny," to substitute for this conception of a Subject that of Consciousness or Sentience.¹ But consciousness implies a conscious subject as much as heaviness implies matter that is heavy; and none show this more clearly than these writers themselves, who, under one disguise or other, employ the obnoxious conception on almost every page.² The head and front of its offending are the ontological assumptions supposed to underlie it. But now, setting entirely aside any attempt at a metaphysical discussion of this point, is such an objection to the term one that can be entertained on the scientific platform? Even this mere question of method does not properly fall within the scope of psychology, or even of science at all: it is a philosophical question pertaining to the general doctrine of method. Still, inasmuch as its determination logically precedes the problem

¹ Cf., *e. g.*, Lewes's definition. "Study of Psychology."

² As in the following from Wundt, which is but a specimen of many like passages in his and others' writings: "Die Eigenschaft des Bewusstseins, sich bei allen Wechse seiner Zustände als das nämliche zu erkennen u. s. w." "Psychologie," S. 428.

of systematizing special facts, we are perhaps justified in considering it for a moment. We may distinguish three forms of assumption: (1) Valid hypotheses, such, that is, as admit of proof or disproof; (2) what Mill calls Hypothetical Descriptions, and Bain Representative Fictions, such, *e. g.*, as that of an electric fluid; and (3) the so-called Primitive Beliefs or assumptions of common sense. We may decline to adopt a hypothesis, and may employ a new representation to colligate our facts, but a biologist who rejected the Darwinian theory would not employ the terminology of natural selection, nor an opponent of the undulatory theory talk of waves of light. But from the time of Hume to the present the conception of a mind or conscious subject has been assailed and disowned by psychologists, though no one has been able to shake it off, still less to find a substitute for it. *Naturam expellas furca tamen usque recurrit*. But it must be allowed that the attempt to legitimate this conception as a constituent element of experience is as much beyond the range of psychology as the attempt to invalidate it even as a formal or regulative conception. If Hume is wrong on the one side, Reid is equally at fault on the other; in fact, we in England seem to be always confusing psychology and philosophy. It might be urged that as the Copernican astronomy corrects certain judgments founded on perception, so should psychology this conception of common sense. To this, I think, the fair and final reply would be that astronomy corrects the inference from one observation by means of others of the same kind, and so frees itself altogether from the Ptolemaic representation, while psychology cannot accomplish the parallel task.

The attempt has been made in two ways—the one by subordinating psychology to biology, and the other (already referred to) by the supposed disproof of the necessity of the conception of a subject, which has been based on the possibility of accounting for the origin of the conception. The former, so far from eliminating the conception of a subject, has made its necessity more evident than ever. For, even if the biological exposition should be finally the clearest, it must be preceded by a systematic treatment of the facts from a subjective stand-point, a confusion of the two points of view, of psychological fact and physiological interpretation—in any case difficult to avoid—being else inevitable. The second attempt also entails a violation of scientific method; it confuses

the stand-point from which the origin of the conception is *expounded* with the stand-point at which the conception is *acquired*. True, there was a time when X did not know himself, but Z, in thinking of that time, cannot think of it without conceiving X to exist. So far as X's knowledge went, the conception of Self resulted, it may be, from certain differentiations and associations among a chaotic aggregate of presentations, of which, of course, X was never one; but Z cannot think of this differentiation of the presentation except as presented to X—or to some other subject.¹ There also was a time when X had no idea of succession; but we do not on that account attempt to represent presentations without time-relations. Both these endeavors to escape the ontological assumptions of the conception of a subject by eliminating the conception itself are, then, fatally defective in point of method. They do not, as the astronomers did in the illustrative case, supersede the objectionable conception by the aid of cognate facts; but the one appeals from internal experience to external, and the other from the universal to the infantile stage of knowledge. The appeal in each case, instead of excluding the objectionable conception, only seems to make its necessity more manifest. The truth thus appears to be that the conception of a subject is one psychology cannot transcend nor escape, implicated as it is not in some only, but in all our conceptions of psychical facts. This being so, we are far more likely to reach the truth eventually if we make the relation to a subject as explicit as possible instead of resorting to all sorts of devious periphrases to hide it. Our psychology will in this way be more systematic, and our position, when we attempt the philosophical problems the science confessedly involves, will be the more hopeful on that account.

The dream of a system of knowledge without assumptions only results in assumptions which are disconnected, and, in all probability, opposed. Here we are *in mediis rebus*, and here we must begin whether we will or no; but without assumptions at the out-

¹ For I think we might for the present allow the possibility contemplated by Locke and Kant, that a series of subjects might replace each other without detriment to the idea of personal identity, since this depends upon a certain relation among the total of ideas which constitutes personal experience; as we see by the fact that, whether the subject changes or not, the idea of personal identity disappears when the other ideas are sufficiently "deranged." But so gratuitous a supposition is, of course, valueless, save as it helps us to see what is and what is not necessarily connoted by the term Subject.

set we cannot begin at all. The premises of one science may be established in another, but some assumptions must remain when the particular sciences are complete. To harmonize these, and, if possible, to find the final and all-conditioning assumption, is the problem of philosophy, whether soluble or not. It would be difficult, probably, to formulate neatly a criterion which should determine what assumptions concerning its subject-matter a science can investigate, and what it must receive unquestioned. In the former we may include hypotheses and hypothetical descriptions, which have this in common, that they are assumed for the sake of facts that can be represented without them; to the latter I should refer conceptions necessary to the representation of the fact, such, *e. g.*, as that of Substance in physics, and perhaps that of Design in biology. To this latter category belongs also, by general consent, the psychological conception of a subject, and it is to this category that we apply the term Common sense.

But, though contending for the explicit recognition of the conception of a subject or pure Ego in psychology, I am by no means prepared to maintain that this conception strictly connotes so much as is often supposed. Self and substance,¹ for instance, are not manifestly incompatible conceptions, but I think that common sense keeps the two ideas distinct, although by philosophers they are often confused. It is not till reflection begins upon the question, What am I? that the notion of a soul or spiritual substance is formed, whereas the conception of self not only obviously precedes such reflection, but remains distinct throughout it. And when the term Mind or Soul is understood, as is frequently the case, to imply that the objects presented to the subject are modifications of a substance with which the subject is identified, the distinction between the two terms becomes still more apparent. But it will, I have no doubt, be contended that this conception, however different from that of a subject, is equally a postulate of common sense, which psychology cannot refuse, and which, if examined at all, must be examined by the metaphysician. This is a question

¹ Taking substance in the Cartesian sense (cf. "Prin. Phil.," i, §§ 51, 52), not in the Kantian sense of noumenon, *i. e.*, a problematic something = *x*, of which we obtain a negative conception by abstracting from our notion of an object the fact of its presentation to a subject (cf. in the first edition of *Kritik* the section on the distinction of phenomena and noumena).

requiring special and careful discussion, but we cannot enter upon it with advantage at present.

OBJECTS, as I understand the term, in their simplest form, would be the "qualities" of what are commonly called sensations. For the best psychologies now distinguish between the quality or content, the intensity, and the tone or feeling, of a sensation. The two first admit of only ideal separation; or, to put it otherwise, an object may vary in intensity, but with an intensity = 0, ceases to be.¹ But the tone or feeling accompanying a sensation of given quality and intensity varies, from time to time, independently of these. Thus, we separate the blue of the sky from the pleasure its presentation occasions, and while we now, at all events, regard the former as an object, we still conceive the latter to be subjective. This, however, is a point we shall have to consider more closely later on. In those cases in which all agree to use the term object, we find, on analysis, a complex or manifold of simple objects in my sense of the term; that is, our intuition of a thing implies, besides present sensations, the reproduction of former sensations related to the present in certain ways, which may be called mental forms, whether we regard them as *a priori* forms or not. Thus, what is by universal consent an object, involves a twofold relation, first to a subject, and, secondly, to the several elements of which it is the synthesis. But although the first is the more fundamental relation, as on it the very essence of objectivity depends, and although the constituent elements of the complex presentation sustain this relation, yet they are almost always either explicitly or implicitly denied the title objects. This anomaly, for such, at least, it seems to me, is due, I think, partly to the indifference psychologists have commonly manifested to mere questions of method, and partly to the confusion which in consequence prevails as to the relations of psychology to the physical sciences on the one hand, and to metaphysics on the other. There is a certain wide class of psychical facts or "states of consciousness," to use for once an objectionable term, which possess in common the properties of reproduction and association. It will be an important problem by and by to determine more precisely the bounds and characteristics of this class; but it must surely be obvious, at the outset, that it requires a general class-name, in which no account, of

¹ Cf. Kant's "Anticipations of Perception."

course, shall be taken of specific differences. Such a class was recognized by Locke in his definition of idea as "whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks."¹ Kant,² again, and the Herbartians,³ use *Vorstellung* with the same generality. It is in this sense that, in my opinion, we ought to use the term Object. Locke's term *idea* is no longer suitable, since a narrower signification has been given to it by Wolf, Hume, and others; and the English rendering of *Vorstellung*, besides its liability to confusion with *Vorstellen*, must often be reserved to express the relation of the object to the subject, for we may, under all circumstances, call this *presentation*. Besides, Object is, I believe, the proper term; but to make this good there are, as already hinted, several objections to be met.

In the first place, it will be urged that sensations are states of the subject, and that this is a deliverance of common sense if anything is. Now, if by this be meant that sensations are *metaphysically* subjective modifications in an idealistic sense, I should not venture at this stage either to assert or deny it. But if the meaning be that sensations are *presented* as modes of the subject, then I think it will be easy to show that such a position is only possible so long as we neglect to distinguish between the subject proper or pure Ego and that complex presentation or object, the empirical, or, as we might almost call it, the biotic Ego. The relation of this complex presentation to other presentations is unquestionably one of the toughest problems psychology has to face, but we need not wait for its solution to admit the fact that the presentation of a sensation, as my sensation, involves the distinction of subject and object. But, again, the meaning may be that a subject whose presentations were all sensations would know nothing of the difference between subject and object. In this objection the confusion already referred to recurs between the stand-point of given experience and the stand-point of its exposition. The true way, surely, to represent the bare fact of sensation is not to attempt to reproduce an experience as yet confined to sensations, but to describe such experience as a scientific psychologist would do if we could imagine him a spectator of it. The infant who is delighted by a bright color does

¹ Essay I, i, 8. ² Kritik der reinen V, Elementarlehre II, ii, 1, § 1. Harts. p. 261.

³ Volkmann, "Lehrbuch," § 25, p. 171.

not, of course, conceive himself as face to face with an object, but neither does he conceive the color as a subjective affection. We are bound to describe his state of mind truthfully, but that is no reason for abandoning terms which have no counterpart in his consciousness, when these terms are only used to depict that consciousness to us.¹ As to the objection that, when all is said and done, sensations are *conceived* by common sense as modifications of self, whether so presented or not, I grant that it appears so at first blush, but not when common sense is more closely examined. The fact is, we are here upon what has been called "the margin of psychology," where our ordinary thinking brings into one view what science has to be at great pains to keep distinct. Though it is scientifically a long way round from a fact of mind to the corresponding fact of body, yet it is only on careful reflection that we can distinguish the two in those cases in which our practical interests have closely associated them. Such a case is that of sensation. The ordinary conception of a sensation coincides, no doubt, with the definition given by Mansel: "Sensation proper is the consciousness of certain affections of our body as an animated organism,"² and it is because in ordinary thinking we reckon the body as part of self that we come to think of sensations as subjective modifications. But when considerations of method³ compel us to eliminate the physiological implications in the ordinary conception of a sensation, we have no difficulty in distinguishing

¹ This source of error, which I have endeavored to describe as a confusion of standpoints, is one to which no other science is liable except psychology, and the sciences dependent upon it. In all other sciences the facts are distinctly conceived as presented not to this individual or that, but to a certain normal and universal subject, or, as Kant has expressed it, as "objective," because not referred to mine or to any other empirical consciousness, but to a general consciousness. ("Prolegomena," § 20.) Now, the standpoint of psychology is in this sense of the term equally "objective," or universal, and equally requires the use of conceptions having "objective" validity. If a science of physics is impossible with mere "judgments of perception," so, too, is a science of psychology impossible without the aid of conceptions which shall enable us to raise such judgments into "judgments of experience." And, had Kant by any chance learned to distrust the logic of his day more and its psychology less, he would, in all probability, have added the conceptions of subject and object to his categories of relation, and have shown that without them a science of mind is impossible.

² "Metaphysics," p. 68.

³ The confusion that results from ignoring such considerations is well seen in Hamilton's famous note. *Dissertations to Reid*, pp. 880 *b* and 881.

the conscious subject, and the "affections" of which it is conscious in this, as clearly as we can distinguish subject and object in other cases of presentation. On the whole, then, I conclude that there is nothing, either in the facts or in our necessary conceptions of them, to prevent us from representing whatever admits of psychical reproduction and association, no matter how simple it be, as an object presented to a subject.

A word as to the meaning of PRESENTATION. Since nothing but objects are presented, it is safe, and sometimes convenient, to speak of objects as presentations. But, strictly speaking, presentation is, I take it, the name for that relation between the object and its subject which is the indispensable condition of attention, or, as we usually say, of consciousness. To regard this subject activity as the only relation between subject and object there is to represent—which is substantially the case with Leibnitz's conception of "windowless monads"—is as much an error on what we may term the idealistic side as Locke's representation of the subject as a *tabula rasa* was an error on the side of realism. Intimately as the two facts are involved, I think we shall find reason not only analytically to distinguish them, but to regard them as really separate; in so far, *i. e.*, as what are usually, though not very happily, termed "the phenomena of unconsciousness" seem to show that, though presentation is indispensable to attention, the converse is not true.¹

I have here used ATTENTION as a generic term in a much wider sense than is usual. Even when a non-voluntary attention is recognized, it is supposed to imply a certain intensity of something which in its lower degrees would not be recognized as attention, much as height, *e. g.*, instead of being understood absolutely, is often taken to imply comparison. And this something I take to be that which is implicitly recognized even by such terms as receptivity and passivity, which in appearance deny it. Altogether passive the mind is not even in sensation, as Locke, though only very incidentally, remarks.² This activity is also recognized in the use of the word "conscious," but the treacherous uncertainty

¹ The early use of think and *penser*, and still more the German *vorstellen*, are on this account manifestly misleading.

² Essay II, ix, 1.

of this term makes it imperative to keep clear of it as much as possible.

In FEELING we have again one of those *πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα* which are the stumbling-blocks of psychology. We may recognize three distinct uses of the term, as when we talk (1) of a feeling of pleasure or pain; (2) of a feeling of roughness, chilliness, of feeling well or ill, and the like; and (3) of a feeling of hope, despair, indecision, etc. The last are instances of complete states of mind—states, *i. e.*, in which cognitive, æsthetic, and active elements all occur; in the second we recognize only attention to presentations or objects; the first is a distinct and unique psychical fact, to which, when not otherwise qualified, I would strictly confine the term. But, unfortunately, the second use of the word, together with a parallel ambiguity in the word Sensation, has helped to bring about a confusion between feeling and presentations even in writers who follow Kant in declaring them generically distinct. The immediate cause of this ambiguity, however, is to be found in the difficulty of distinguishing any definite quality in those "organic sensations" which yet, by their intensity, occasion us much pleasure or pain. But a distinction between the object, or, as Mr. Bain says, "the intellectual aspect," and the feeling or "emotive aspect," though difficult, is still possible, if we once disengage ourselves from the bad and ready-made psychology of ordinary language. Yet Mr. Bain goes so far as to say: "Some sensations are mere pleasure or pain—nothing else: such are the feelings of organic life, and the sweet and bitter tastes and odors."¹ But in this his very words belie him, as does his whole treatment of these sensations. Thus, in describing tastes, he says: "In the case of sweetness, for example, not only can we be affected with the pleasurable feeling or emotion belonging to it, but we can be distinctly affected by a great many substances possessing the quality; we can identify some, and feel a want of identity in others."² Surely there is "an intellectual aspect" here, else what indeed were the point of distinguishing "the pleasurable feeling *belonging to*" sweetness, if sweetness were "mere pleasure and nothing else"? Similarly it will be found that even organic pleasures and pains have an "intellectual aspect," *i. e.*, a quality

¹ "Emotions and Will," third ed., p. 558.

² "Sense and Intellect," second ed., p. 160.

distinct from the feeling, and admitting both of comparison and of association with other qualities. We are accustomed in familiar language to speak of pains or pleasures, but this can always be rendered the pain of gout, the pleasure of rest, and so on. Even when a word for the quality fails, the quality is still there. Though the two elements are certainly less distinct in such "organic sensations" than in sensations of sight or hearing, for example, yet this is not because of a closer fusion or even identity, but because the intellectual element itself is less distinct—*i. e.*, is never so presented as to form those connections with other presentations which make definite intuition possible. Pleasure and pain, then, it is contended, are not discrete quantities, admitting of a plural, but the polar extremes of a continuous quantity which varies in intensity and sign with the objects presented and attended to, but is never itself an object among these.

To say that feeling and attention are not presentations will seem to many an extravagant paradox. If all knowledge consists of presentations, it will be said, How come we to know anything of feeling and attention if they are not presented? We know of them indirectly through their effects, not directly in themselves. This is, perhaps, but a more concrete statement of what philosophers have very widely acknowledged in a more abstract form since the days of Kant—the impossibility of the subjective *quâ* subjective being presented. It is in the main clearly put in the following passage from Hamilton, who, however, has not had the strength of his convictions in all cases: "The peculiarity of Feeling, therefore, is that there is nothing but what is subjectively subjective; there is no object different from self—no objectification of any mode of self. We are, indeed, able to constitute our states of pain and pleasure into objects of reflection, but, in so far as they are objects of reflection, they are not feelings but only reflex cognitions of feelings."¹ But this last sentence is not, perhaps, altogether satisfactory. Sir W. Hamilton nowhere tells us what he understands by reflection beyond saying that it is "attention directed to the phenomena of the mind."² He cannot mean that pleasure and pain *are*, in fact, presented as objects, but only known by a special concentration of attention, which ensures

¹ "Metaphysics," ii, p. 432.

² "Ibid.," i, p. 236.

to them the requisite intensity.¹ His meaning must rather be that, as he has said elsewhere of the "phenomena of consciousness" generally, feeling "can only be studied through its reminiscence."² But this is a position hard to reconcile with the other, viz., that feeling and cognition are generally distinct. How can that which was not originally a cognition become such by being reproduced? To say that feeling is "subjectively subjective," that in it "there is no object different from self," is surely tantamount to saying that it is not presented; and what is not presented cannot, of course, be re-presented. Instead, therefore, of saying that feeling and attention are known by being made objects of reflection, it seems to me we can only say that we know *of* them by their effects, by the changes, *i. e.*, which they produce in the character and succession of our presentations. If this be what Hamilton means by "reflex cognition," I agree with him.

But then comes the objection, How can we know the effects to be *their* effects if we do not know *them*? This is an objection the force of which I fully admit, but which, none the less, can hardly be profitably discussed till we are in a position to deal with the whole subject of "self-consciousness."³

¹ Cf. "Metaphysics," i, p. 237 fin., 238.

² "Ibid.," i, p. 379.

³ Still, the barest possible indication of the answer that might be given may be interpolated here. Granted that attention and feeling do modify the intensity and order of our presentation, it may be possible to show how we come not only to attend and feel, but to know of our feeling and attention. As the result of such modification we have first the perception, and finally the conception of self. If we can imagine psychological life at all without feeling, we can see how the body would at length be differentiated from other bodies, if it escaped destruction long enough; and how it would become associated with that "flow of ideas" we call the internal life. But without the "instinct of self-preservation," leading to certain movements of aversion or the opposite, to the repression of certain ideas and efforts for the realization of others, this complex object would not become the centre of those peculiar associations we may call self-interests. But this instinct being continuously operative, there would at length, on the occasion of any given change of feeling—say pain—be presented both a certain change in the field of objects immediately consequent upon it, and along with this change the re-presentation of "the generic images" due to thousands of similar changes, with which the new one would at once associate itself. To this spontaneous classification it would be possible to attend the moment attention was sufficiently under control, at least after the habit of such reflective attention was formed. What would then be presented would be the identity of the change just experienced with a class of changes characterized by their relation to the perception of self. *Mutatis mutandis*, a similar account might be given of our knowledge of attention, the attainment of which, however, supposes a still higher mental development.

We ought, however, to note that the antithesis in this case is not really between knowledge and ignorance, but between objects and attention, or feeling. It is not a fair statement of it to say, We know the effects but do not know the causes, instead of saying, We attend and may know the effects of our attention; we feel and may know the effects of our feeling. I said advisedly "*may know*," for feeling and attention are possible without the subject of both knowing either. A mouse feels, but who will say that he knows that he feels? Our English psychologies are masterpieces of muddling on this point, and largely in consequence of the continual interchange of the ideas of Consciousness and Self-consciousness. To feel, and to know that I feel, say Hamilton and the Mills, are "the same thing considered in different aspects."¹ But different aspects of the same thing are *not* the same thing for psychology, at all events, any more than the obverse and reverse of a farthing are the same thing in a picture or the produce of the same die. Not only is it not the same thing to feel and to know that you feel, but it is a different thing still to know that you feel and to know that you know that you feel; there is between the two, in fact, all the difference there is between self-consciousness and psychological introspection.² The difficulty of apprehending these facts and keeping them distinct is due, obviously, to the invariable concomitance of the earlier with the later; for we never know that we feel without feeling. And so, like savages who believe that if they were to lose sight of their shadow they would lose sight of themselves, we come to identify consciousness and self-consciousness—presentation, and the presentation of the effects of presentation. This, perhaps, is one of the many points in which human psychology will be helped by the advance of comparative psychology.

We ought also to bear in mind that the effects of attention and feeling cannot be known without attention and feeling; to whatever stage we advance, we have thus always, in any given "state of mind," attention and feeling on the one side; on the other, a presentation of objects. I have on this ground said above that the attention and feeling which are elements in such a state can-

¹ Hamilton, i, pp. 192, ff.; Mill's "Examination," pp. 138-141.

² Should any one suggest that at this rate the series may extend indefinitely, I refer him to those who contend about space of n dimensions.

not be re-presented in a reminiscence of the state because in the state itself they were not presented. But it may be well to discuss this possibility of representation independently. In the current psychological language we speak of an act of attention, or a feeling of pleasure or pain, as states of consciousness,¹ just as we speak of sense-impressions or their ideas as states of consciousness. And from this it seems to have been assumed, almost as a matter of course, that we have ideas of acts of attention, and ideas of states of pleasure or pain, which are the residua of the original states just as the idea of snow-white is the residuum of the impression produced by snow. But now in this last case, about which we are all agreed, there is a certain individuality: the impression was preceded, accompanied, and followed by other impressions qualitatively different from itself; there was a beginning and an end to its conscious presentation. Otherwise it would surely be a contradiction in terms to speak of its reproduction or of its association with some objects and not with others. But now, when we turn to our so-called *acts* of attention and *states* of feeling, we find, I think—as I have already contended in the case of feeling—that all the individuality there is pertains to the objects attended to and which are the occasions of a change of feeling. Attention and feeling seem thus to be ever present, and not to admit of a continuous segregation into parts which, having each a definite position in the past, could be revived along with their contemporaries.

Mr. Bain has an important chapter on this subject under the title of "Ideal Emotion," but, unhappily, he has not thought it necessary, here or elsewhere, to distinguish with any exactness between Feeling and Emotion. "Certain it is," he says, "that Revivability follows delicacy of discrimination,"² and in this way he accounts for the high degree of revivability characteristic of "the Emotions proper—as Love, Anger, Power, Fine Art." But an ambiguity lurks in this word Revivability as a psychological

¹ In an interesting note by Professor Flint ("Mind," vol. ii, p. 113) this language is the basis of an objection which loses all its force, once we recognize that there is no state of consciousness which consists wholly of feeling. Feeling is a form of consciousness, says Professor Flint; consciousness involves a dualism, therefore feeling is an object.

² "Emotion and Will," third ed., p. 90.

term. Thus, in speaking of the presentation of objects, we have to distinguish a second presentation of an object (A_2) like one formerly presented (A_1), and the re-presentation or revival of the last (a_1). Now, if we study Mr. Bain's revived emotions, I think we should find that the only re-presentation there is in them is of "intellectual states," *i. e.*, of the objects, whose relations determine the feeling and emotion. In this sense the old feeling is not revived, but felt anew, and the emotional manifestation is not ideal, but real. Mr. Bain goes on to say: "Feelings as such—pleasures, pains, and mental excitement—are always incorporated with intellectual states, and, by that means, are differentiated, held, sustained, and revived."¹ Even of the emotions—notwithstanding that he has already, at the beginning of the chapter, placed them highest in a scale of sensibilities, arranged according to revivability—he says later on: "In their strict character of emotion proper they have the minimum of revivability, but, being always incorporated with the sensations of the higher senses, they share in the superior revivability of sights and sounds."² In the chapter "Of Feeling in General" there is a still stronger statement: "It is never to be forgotten that an emotion in its pure and perfect character as feeling is, properly speaking, not revivable at all."³ What, now, are we to understand by this "incorporation" whereby what is not properly revivable at all comes to head the list of revivables? It can hardly be association. Owing to his fondness for details, Mr. Bain nowhere discusses association in general, but his treatment of the subject implies that discrimination is necessary to association, and, therefore, necessary to revivability. Feeling, "as such," in "its pure and perfect character," then, cannot be associated; for it is not discriminated; nay, is in its very nature opposed to discrimination. When, therefore, Mr. Bain talks of "Associates with pleasure and pain,"⁴ we must suppose him to refer not to the association of feeling proper with objects, but to the association of pleasurable or painful objects with other objects. And the invariable incorporation would appear to amount only to this: that the presentation under like circumstances of intensity and combination is accompanied by a like change of feeling, which is not strictly a revival of a former state of feeling, even

¹ P. 91.² P. 92.³ P. 16.⁴ "Mental Science," p. 102.

when the objects presented are a revival of objects presented before.

As to the difficulty of explaining choice or preference, if feelings are not revived, which might, perhaps, be urged, I do not think there is anything special in it. The decision, so far as we are at present concerned with it, depends on the ideal persistence of objective circumstances such as we have just discussed.

Postponing the further discussion of terms, we may now proceed to consider the several elements of a state of mind in their relation to each other, beginning with the CONNECTION OF ATTENTION AND OBJECTS, more especially sensory objects.

We are aware in ordinary life that the intensity of any given sensation depends upon certain physical quantities, varying directly in some proportion as these vary. Hence, since our habitual stand-point is the physical, not the psychological,¹ we conceive sensory objects as having an intensity *per se* apart from the attention their presentation secures. From the physical stand-point, indeed, it is manifest that no other conception is compatible with a scientific treatment of phenomena. Subjective sources of variation are supposed to be eliminated: the general mind or subject implied in the physicist's conception of a phenomenon is a subject in whom there is no feeling to produce variations of attention, or to favor æsthetic combinations of objects. Attention is thus assumed constant, and all variations in intensity regarded as objectively determined. But, psychologically, we cannot assume this. There are *a priori* three possibilities—intensity may depend on the object alone, on the subject alone, or on both jointly. The so-called sensational school of psychologists tacitly adopt the first, while the second seems to be a logical consequence of idealism. In any given presentation there is, it must be admitted, no immediate evidence that the intensity of the object is a function of two variables, (1) what we may, perhaps, call physical or absolute intensity, and (2) the intensity of attention. Still, there are facts which justify this conclusion. That the intensity of the presenta-

¹ Our philosophical terminology is here again wofully at fault. Since psychology occupies an objective point of view in the Kantian sense quite as truly as physics does, we cannot without confusion use "objective" to discriminate the two. Moreover, as we frequently require "objective" as a psychological term, it might, I think, be an advantage to drop it altogether in its epistemological sense and use "scientific" instead.

tion varies with the absolute intensity of the object, attention remaining constant, is a proposition not likely to be challenged. What we are bound to prove is that the intensity of presentations varies with the attention, the objective intensity remaining constant.

Assuming that voluntary and non-voluntary attention are fundamentally the same, this proof amounts to showing (1) that concentration of attention upon some objects diminishes the intensity of presentation of others in the same field, whether the concentration be voluntary or non-voluntary, *i. e.*, due to a shock; and (2) that, though only within narrow limits, increasing attention voluntarily has the same effect on the presentation as increasing the objective intensity. The narrowness of these limits—practically an all-important fact—is theoretically no objection. It would not be difficult psychologically to account for our inability to concentrate attention indefinitely; that we can concentrate it at all is enough to show that there is a subjective as well as an objective factor in the intensity of a presentation. The further consideration of the connection between attention and objects must be deferred till we come to treat of the relation of objects to each other.

As to the CONNECTION OF ATTENTION AND FEELING, it seems clear that non-voluntary attention precedes the feeling due to any given presentation, while voluntary attention follows it. As a rule, the more intense the non-voluntary attention the more intense the feeling, and the more intense, too, the voluntary reaction which follows upon it. Feeling is thus the link between sensation and movement, or more generally between the receptive and active states of mind. Perhaps each of these ought to be regarded as a concrete mental state; for in each there is an object—attention, and feeling.¹ But still, since the first is regularly followed by the second, it seems better to regard them as only ideally separate.

In studying MOVEMENT, we must, in the first instance, go where there is most light and observe things as they are now. Two things are clear: (1) Movements are objects, that is to say, have a certain quality and individuality, can be associated with other movements as well as with sensations, and can be revived in idea. (2) The presentation of these motor objects is—at all events under

¹ It is from this point of view that we see what truth there is in the old bi-partite division of mind.

normal circumstances—due to feeling. This is a fact of quite first-rate importance, which has, so far as I know, been almost entirely overlooked. But now movements are related to feeling in two ways: they may be purposive movements, or merely emotional or expressional movements. In the expression of the emotions proper there are certain movements, different for different emotions, which clearly are, or have been, purposive in their character. Over and above these, which present no difficulty, there remains the common fact of “diffusion” and certain characteristics distinguishing the expression of pain from that of pleasure. The problem is to give any tolerable psychological account of these most elementary facts. In any clear case of voluntary movement we have (1) the presentation of the movement in idea; (2) innervation, of which more anon; and (3) the presentation of the movement in reality. The presentation of the idea here involves no difficulty; association with the pleasurable or painful object will account for this. The only point to note is that this idea implies a previous presentation of the reality; so that voluntary movement, it would seem, cannot have been the first thing. By Innervation I mean the “fiat” on which voluntary movement depends. The term is not perfect, but is already in use, and enables one to avoid the confusing associations of “Will,” which is, moreover, a wider term. But I do not propose to include under Innervation the feelings of effort (*Innervations-gefühle*) so easily and generally confounded with it; such “feelings” are, in fact, but motor objects. Under normal circumstances the consequence of innervation is the presentation of the object innervated in greater intensity, and accompanied by the peculiar marks which distinguish impression from ideas.

When we turn to emotional movements we find no preliminary idea of the movements, and no direct evidence of innervation. Are we to regard them, then, as so far only sensory objects presented without any subjective intervention or initiation, for this is what Mr. Bain’s doctrine of “Spontaneous Activity” seems to come to?³

³ There is a plausible *double entendre* in this phrase, especially in connection with a theory of volition. But, on reflection, we see that there need be no psychological activity involved in the physical discharges of over-nourished centres, and that, if there is, we cannot conceive it as a bare *fiat* without any *faciendum*.

We can hardly do this, inasmuch as we can voluntarily repress or sustain these manifestations,¹ though we are not conscious of voluntarily initiating them; whereas over "automatic movements," such as convulsions, reflex winking, sneezing, etc., we have no control at all. This quasi-voluntary character of emotional expression may be taken, I think, as indirect evidence of innervation. But, if so, where is the idea or presentation innervated? Of this, "internal observation" tells us nothing, though we are not without materials for at least a conjecture. In the first place, there is a striking, and, as I think, instructive resemblance between certain of the obscurer organic sensations, and many of the movements, expressive of pain or pleasure; and it is a fairly probable supposition that as the former are always presented as a vague and massive background of sensory objects, so the latter form in like manner a continual background of motor objects. Or, in other words, that what is often called the common sensibility or *sensus vagus* consists partly of sensory, partly of motor objects, the variations of the former being determined apart from those of the latter directly through a subjective initiative. Such motor presentations, though impressional and not ideal, would yet admit of intensification, and in this sense would constitute *facienda*, which, through innervation, would become *facta*.² But even when we thus conjecturally extend the range of voluntary or purposive action to the utmost, we are forced to admit, at some point or other, of motor impressions not preceded by innervation, and therefore tantamount to sensory impressions, the subject being in such case receptive instead of initiating, passive instead of acting. But at such point there is, it seems to me, a clear breach of continuity which, therefore, we shall do well to keep outside the facts we attempt to deal with and explain.

¹ The readiest way to do this, I am aware, is to repress the pleasurable or painful object, but it is by no means the only way.

² I am by no means sure that we ought not, on theoretical grounds, to go much further. An absolutely new presentation, whether sensory or motor, impression without idea—will be found, I think, harder to conceive the longer we reflect upon it. Psychology, it seems to me, is at present drifting rapidly to a theory of innate ideas that would have made even Leibnitz protest.

ON SOME IDOLS OR FACTITIOUS UNITIES.

BY J. BURNS-GIBSON.

Do such words as "Social Organism," "Humanity," and even "Universe" and "Deity," in a monotheistic or pantheistic sense, stand for realities or real unities, or are they merely concept terms, and some of them, perhaps, words for which it is impossible even to frame a corresponding concept? If they are not real unities, but conceptual, ideal, or merely verbal, then it is a sort of idolatry to take them for such, and let them command us, and impose on us a kind of worship and reverence; and that is what is meant by calling them idols.

One often hears talk about a "Humanity," of which, as one may suppose of a living animal body, we are the members, and about a great human organism or "great human organic whole," in which we are said to live and move and have our being, like its molecules and corpuscles, and to which we owe the most unmitigated respect and duty. This sort of talk is fashionable just now in educated society.

Every day our ears are assailed by these grand words and phrases, till we are inclined to stop them with our fingers and turn away into some private garden of Epicurus, if any could be found in these days of solidarity and publicity. It is in vain, however, that you seek refuge from these terrible forms. They meet you at the very fireside. The other day I took up one of that charming series of little books, "English Men of Letters," to pass a leisure hour pleasantly, but had not read far when there confronted me this appalling formula: "Society is an organism, living and growing like other organisms, according to special laws of its own." The author blamed Gibbon for not knowing that! It was a good thing for his peace of mind that he did not. But how are we, who have the misfortune to live in this century, when these demoniac forms are stalking abroad and threatening to take possession of us, to exorcise them? Perhaps the question does not appear of much consequence. Yet to some it is becoming more and more evident that "Humanity"—the formidable apparition just defined—would sooner or later swallow up men and

women, and make of no account *individual* liberty and happiness ; and that a single-block " Universe " would render impossible the very thought of freedom or spontaneity on our part.

The source of these fetiches or factitious unities lies in human nature. Their motive or emotional source, at least, is indicated in the " *Novum Organum*," where Bacon says : " The human understanding, from its peculiar nature, easily supposes a greater degree of order and equality in things than it really finds ; and, although many things in nature be *sui generis* and most irregular, will yet invent parallels and conjugates and relatives where no such thing is." These idols of ours are, in fact, " idols of the Tribe." They arise from the desire for unity and simplicity. We unavoidably seek to accommodate the immense variety of things to our narrow comprehension. We love our ease, and so our minds tend to follow the lines of least resistance, and to make the shortest circuits round their objects. The infinite multiplicity oppresses us. We accordingly discharge multiplicity, discreteness, difference, from our view, and confine our attention to similarities and agreements and seeming continuity. But even in these we do not rest, for the current of desire that tends to unity is so strong that it carries us on to confound similarity with identity, and harmony or community with single-oneness.

Thus, by judicious neglect, we get things, as we think, within our grasp ; and that was our instinctive aim from the first. Neglecting exceptions, we get laws ; and we think we have eliminated what we call chance when we have simply refused to look at irregularities and give them due place and weight.

Yet it may be that there are everywhere, both in men and in nature, hidden springs and fountains of activities essentially and absolutely incalculable ; that, in fact, there is such a thing as real freedom or spontaneity—real, and not merely " phenomenal." (The " phenomenal freedom " that is offered us, like a stone for bread, is only the ignorance of impotence and slavery.)

It may be very perplexing ; it may even sometimes seem fit to put us to utter intellectual confusion, but we must put up with the uncertainty, for how can we establish that most desirable doctrine of the Uniformity of the Course of Nature without omniscience ? Yet without an unquestionable doctrine of uniformity and thoroughgoing determinism you cannot have a grand unitary

Being, "Humanity," nor a "social organism," nor a universe perfectly continuous and all of a piece; and without such a universe or all-inclusive *objective* unity, how can we have any single and sole, embracing and intimate *subjective* unity, like the deity of pantheism or monotheism?

Besides the emotional source of these factitious unities, there appears to be a reason for them in our intellectual constitution. Whatever the "I" may really be, in "I think, I feel, I know," for us it appears a single simple something, which resists any attempt of reflection to break it up. So far as human thought and philosophy have as yet carried their disintegrating and disillusioning operations, they have not, except for a very few subtle minds, and for these only in occasional metaphysical moods, dispossessed the "me," that feels, thinks and knows, of its permanent appearance of unity. It remains, to all intents and purposes, a real unit; and to it, as to a focus, all things converge and refer themselves in order to be known. The result is, that this subjective unity of knowledge tends, when we are off our guard, to throw a false reflection or glamour of unity over its manifold objects. But, though the many strings are tied in one knot and held in one hand, they are not one string.

Again, we can only see or envisage things in what is apparently one and the same continuous Time and Space; and this also gives a spurious kind of objective unity to the several things seen or imaged together. But community is not unity; and because all things for us share alike in time and space, and perhaps have some other common property or ground, it does not follow that they may not be essentially and in themselves disparate and separate.

Leaving these very general, and perhaps very elementary, considerations, let us take a few samples of spurious unity. Take "the social organism" first—and along with it that milder and vaguer god, "Humanity."

The phrase "social organism" covers an attempt to picture society, or the assemblage of men and women, as one gigantic man or animal, which has its own laws of growth, goes its own way, and lives its own life. It is further supposed to be under rigid law, so that all it has done might be accounted for, and all it will do might be calculated on. And, if any one declares himself

unable to get beyond the notion of society as a collection of individuals, or simply men and women living together, giving and taking and interchanging offices, he is told by one sect of philosophers, who are very prominent just now, that he is resting in what is a mere mechanical conception, and must raise himself to the level of "the category of organic unity!" Granting for the moment that such a conception of society is possible, it has still to be remembered that it is no reality, and, as a concept, has no real unity corresponding to it. It is objective, conceptual, ideal only, and the subjective realities remain as real and as many as ever. The many men and women cannot be transmuted by a figure of speech into one huge single organism. But even as a metaphorical conception, is it just and helpful to speak of the social organism, that lives and grows, like other organisms, according to special laws of its own—is it founded on any essential and vital resemblance between an animal, or even a plant, and a society of men? It may very well be contended that it is not. There is at least one fatal flaw in the analogy, and that is enough to make it useless and misleading. It is this: that, whereas in an animal or real organism of any kind the parts or members are there for the whole, in society, on the other hand, the so-called whole is for the so-called parts or members severally. Men are not for society, but society is for men. It is constituted by them and for themselves—each of them counting for one. Any assertion of proper individuality or freedom on the part of any member of an animal, if persisted in, means, in the long run, disease, death, corruption; while any failure to assert individuality and freedom on the part of a member of society means, to that extent, an imperfection in the society. Aristotle appears to have felt that the analogy embodied in the modern phrase "social organism" had not even three legs to go on when he expressed a preference for the metaphor "ship of state" over that of "the body politic." In society we are sailing on a joint venture, but each for his own good. Is it possible to think of any conscious being doing anything else? What every one always and only seeks is to go on living, and living more and more happily. Would not any other tendency in a living thing be simply suicidal? Altruism, unbalanced and unmitigated, is *felo-de-se*. On the contrary, self-preservation and self-fulfilment is the law for

each and every one. The common good that we are told each of us ought to pursue is for each one of us reflected back to its focus in himself, and we cannot conceive ourselves pursuing it, except as indirectly our own highest good. It is a roundabout way of getting at our own happiness. Utilitarianism is, to use a phrase of the schools, Egoistic Eudæmonism in sublime disguise. Round both the lesser circles of egotism and altruism there can always be drawn a wider and enclosing circle of *Egoism*. When altruism has been so included, the sting of calumny is withdrawn, and there is no more occasion for the fine hypocrisy of disinterestedness and self-forgetfulness and self-sacrifice; though, happily, these are impossibilities, except in pretence.

But, if we must give up this fascinating and highly scientific conception of society as an organism, the loss is not without its consolations. For it is evident that the organism-notion lends itself much less readily to free, equal, friendly, and brotherly life, than to despotisms, whether of the Bismarckian kind, or of the many-headed sort, where the greatest number for its greatest happiness claims to use us up one by one. When it has been settled that society or the state is a great animal, it will not be difficult for such members or molecules as find themselves happily situated in the head, or even it may be in the pineal gland, to justify their claim as monarchs and statesmen to rule and use the body politic, and every one of its members, according to the pleasure of their own will, and that without remedy or appeal. The Leviathan, whether of Cæsar or of the Caucus, might then eat up any one of us any day, and it is difficult to see what right the victim would have to complain if it were done scientifically and philosophically in the name of the social organism that lives and grows and devours and assimilates, like other organisms, according to special laws of its own.

The same kind of criticism may be applied to that milder-eyed idol, "Humanity." It is a grand conception, without doubt—even surpassing every other in grandeur—but let it never be forgotten that it is a mere conception. It is either an abstract noun or a noun of multitude—either an abstraction or a collection—and in no sense a real unity. It is not a reality, but an ideal. Taken as an ideal, which the real individual men and women consent to dream of and hope for—the perfect vision infinitely removed of

a harmonious, fully developed, and equipped society—as such it is good and eminently helpful; a very valuable and effective kind of dream.

But as somewhat already realized in any sense, and now here as a real unitary existent, and more real than the individuals, “Humanity” is almost, if not quite, as hurtful a delusion as the social organism.

Though it does not suggest so plainly the same grinding inexorable mechanism, it would easily lend itself to the establishment of a new kind of Papacy or hierarchy, which, in the sacred name of the god “Humanity,” would arrange our lives for us, settle what we might do and study, and what we might not, and insist on contentment with our lot and caste. But we, on the other hand, want to live our own lives and go our own ways. We want to grow freely. We would be free—“anarchical,” if you will have it so; and we desire to go on freely experimenting. We resent the prospect of being clamped together, parcelled, and pigeon-holed in this *doctrinaire* fashion. For those who feel like this, there will be some comfort in the discovery that the august and “great being” Humanity is only another idol of our own invention and erection, another tyrannical unity of our own imposition.

“The Universe,” again, is not even an idol that we have invented and set up. We only fancy we have. It is only *fatus vocis*, a name or sound which stands for nothing either real or ideal. It merely marks our *failure* to discover, or invent, or conceive. To talk of it as already found or conceived is to assume omniscience, to claim that we know all that is to be known, or at least all the kinds of things knowable, that we have summed up all the infinite many ones, and discovered them to be all alike in origin, path, and goal; that there is one principle, one order, necessity, or fate, and one end; and that so the mighty whole is really one, the “phenomenal” many are “noumenally” one, and, in fact, our single-block universe.

Now, the uniformity of nature, and of the course of nature, is a very good hypothesis for all working purposes—for life and science; but any attempt to make more of it than a maxim of prudence or habit of expectation, that sums up and gives effect to our past experience, has always issued in failure. Any attempt

to ground it on absolute certainty, or find a theoretical justification for it, begs the whole question. Here is one of these sophistical attempts from a recent number of a philosophical journal. The uniformity of nature and of the course of nature means, that "the same that has happened will happen again under the same conditions; *i. e.*, A is A, the sum of the conditions is the sum of the conditions, the universe is the universe, whether taken in *stasis* or in flow, and whatever its content, known and unknown, and at whatever point of time, past or future, we suppose the instant of attention and conceptual arrest to occur."

This is the most palpable begging of the question at issue. To find the uniformity of nature and its course, in the conclusion, the writer has put the universe in the premise. But the universe is just the totality of uniform nature; or, more precisely, it is an impossible attempt at naming concretely and in a kind of statuesque way the abstract formula, that it is put forward to prove or justify; and it presupposes the possibility of summing up the innumerable individual variants, and of afterwards resolving them into one single whole.

A double impossibility! Again, it is a resolution of difference into identity, and so, Hegelianwise, contradicts the very principle of identity and non-contradiction ("A is A") which the demonstration claims to found on.

And, further, what has been summed up is therefore finished and finite; and if the metaphysician has got something *totum teres atque rotundum*, then, just because it is what it is, and absolute, it is not infinite, and the endless multifariousness of things is left outside it. There is no way out of these impassable straits for absolutists, whether Spencerian, Hegelian, or openly and honestly materialist.

Therefore, in practice and science, men must be content to be empirical and tentative, feeling their way, and, as Professor Bain wisely and modestly says, risking the future. In theory and philosophy, again, they must be content, with Hume and Mill, to be critical and sceptical, and prepared for surprises and variations.

Variations are, as Darwin has taught us, a necessary presupposition of development; and to eliminate them, or, what is the same thing, to explain them away by referring them to the sum

of conditions, is to stay evolution and introduce stagnation in the place of movement, growth, and change.

Casualty and incalculable spontaneity appear to be of the very essence of variations; and that Darwin declined to refer them for explanation to "the sum of the conditions" or a universal principle or unknowable single-block force, is a wise reserve and suspense that has the stamp of genius on it. He left it to others of less cautious, and perhaps of less penetrative, intellect, to attribute their occurrence to an anthropomorphic creator, or to a pantheism that moves and progresses by turning itself inside out.

It is unnecessary to dwell long on the last example of factitious and idolatrous unity—namely, the deity of monotheism or pantheism—as it is obviously nothing but the universe turned outside in. If there is no single objective unity, then there can be no single and sole or supreme subjective unity. No universe, no deity—that is plain enough.

About monotheism, in particular, it may be fairly said that whenever it attempts to make itself consistent and seat itself securely, it merges in pantheism, and pantheism is simply the outside-in of the inside-out.

But if, on the other hand, the monotheist seeks to avoid this absorption of his deity in an absolutely fatalistic spirit, which is merely the inner side of its own outside the universe, both equally under necessity and absolutely determined; and if to avoid doing so he is content to rest in popular and poetical anthropomorphism, claiming for his supreme entity freedom and spontaneity, after the fashion of a man—then the opponents of monotheism are at least quite as much entitled to exercise their constructive imagination, and poetically postulate, to account for what they find in man and nature, millions on millions, beyond numbering, of free entities, springs of spontaneity, or incalculable activity.

Nor would this conception be exposed to the edge of Occam's razor. It would not be a case of entities multiplied beyond necessity, for we have the experience of separateness, difference, contrariety, and irregularity; and each of us may with equal right claim individuality, freedom, and spontaneity for himself and for his fellows with the same right that the monotheist claims it for his ideal, and with better right, for how else is his god framed

than by projection of what he finds in himself against a screen of indefinitely great space and time?

Polytheism is quite as reasonable a supposition or fancy, and more satisfactory, if you must have a theism. Indeed, the monotheisms, that have succeeded, have made shift to get along by means of some kind of subordinate polytheism.

Much more satisfactory—because you then have many unseen companions and comforters instead of one; you have stable society instead of the continual dread of absorption; you have what is evident and unmistakable poetry instead of pseudo-science; and, best of all, you have removed the bane of theism when you have made the gods many, because you have destroyed monarchy in the unseen world, which is the mainstay of absolute monarchy and all sorts of despotism in this; and so you have made it possible to realize the idea of the republic. Monotheism and monarchy are for children. If we have grown up, we do not want paternal government and tutelage, either in the seen or the unseen world. We want brothers. And no form of unbrotherliness is more heartless and mischievous, whether so intended or no, than that which throws us over, in self-excuse for indolence or indifference, upon the loving kindness of a very problematical unseen father or providence.

There is not space to enlarge on the advantages of rejecting once for all such fetiches as “social organism,” “humanity,” “universe,” and “deity.” They are endless, and very practical.

Let us get rid of all these false gods, and try, if we must have poetry, to conceive of what we find in and around us to-day as the provisional result of the endless, infinitely varied experimentation of countless free units of being.

And, whether we choose to make this imaginative synthesis or no, we shall at least be rid of the main obstacles to our advance towards the far-removed ideal harmony and confraternity—that country which all wayfarers, under various disguises and names, really seek—the commonwealth and brotherhood of men.

This, one may be permitted to hope, is that far-off event towards which we and all other beings are moving.

It may be an ideal goal that is never to be reached. A final harmony and friendly community of all beings, wherein all discords are resolved, is perhaps inconceivable.

It may be even a contradiction in terms when taken as perfect, final, and attained. But attainment does not much matter. We may even console ourselves that, if it could be accomplished, it would be stagnation.

Continual progress and approach is enough, and best. Meliorism is the only possible optimism. Lessing never said anything more permanently and impressively true than that familiar and often-quoted saying of his about Truth. And what he said about truth, one might venture to say about Good and all conceivable ends; that they are better unended and unachieved; that the flight is always better for us than the perch, on which we might fall asleep forever. In endless seeking and finding of better and better consist our life, our happiness, our highest good. Perfectness would paralyze us. Finality would kill us. Attained unity and equilibrium of any kind would undo us into nothingness. The half is always more than the whole.

ANTHROPOLOGY OF IMMANUEL KANT.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY A. E. KROEGER.

PART FIRST.—ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIDACTIC.

Concerning the Manner in which to cognize the Internal as well as the External of Man.

BOOK FIRST.—CONCERNING THE POWER OF COGNITION.

(Continued from January number.)

(c) CONCERNING THE DISEASES OF THE MIND.

§ 48. The foremost division is, as has been already observed, that into *crotchiness* (*crickets*), or hypochondria, and a *perturbed mind*, or mania. The German word for the former disease—*Grillen*, crickets—is derived from the analogy in listening to the chirping sound of a cricket in the stillness of the night, which disturbs that repose of the mind necessary to induce sleep. (The English “crotchet” does exactly the same mischief.—*Translator*.) Now, the disease of the hypochondriac consists in this: that certain bodily sensations do not so much indicate a really existing

disease in the body as rather merely excite apprehensions of its existence ; and human nature is so constituted—a trait which the animal lacks—that it is able to strengthen or make permanent local *impressions* simply by paying attention to them, whereas an *abstraction*—whether produced on purpose or by other diverting occupations—lessens those impressions, or even effaces them altogether.¹ In this manner hypochondria becomes the cause of our imagining ourselves inflicted by certain bodily diseases ; and though the patient knows that they are merely imaginary, he yet cannot refrain from regarding them at times as something real. And, *vice versa*, a real bodily ailment (such as oppressiveness after having partaken of distending food) produces often imaginations of divers external events and business cares, that vanish immediately when completed digestion has dispersed the distention. The hypochondriac is a cricket-catcher—a *phantast*—of the most miserable description. He is obstinate in opposing all attempts to disprove his imaginary ailments, and always clings to the doctor, who has a wretched time with him, and cannot quiet him otherwise than as a child—by giving him bread-crumble pills instead of medicines. And if such a patient, who, from being everlastingly sickly, can never become really sick, looks to medical works for advice, he grows altogether insupportable, believing, as he does, that all the diseases of which he reads in the books are to be found in his body. One of the symptoms of this disease of the imagination is the uncommon jollity, the lively wit, and the cheerful laughter to which the patient has often to give way, being thus the ever-changing play of his whims. A childishly anxious fear of the thought of *death* feeds this disease. Whoever cannot look beyond that death-thought with manly courage will never truly enjoy life.

A condition of mind still on this side of a perturbed mind is the *sudden change of moods (raptus)*. An unexpected transition from one theme to another entirely different theme, which no one looked for. Sometimes it precedes that perturbation, which it announces ; but often the mind is already so awry that these seiz-

¹ I have noted in another work of mine that, by turning away our attention from certain painful sensations, and directing it upon any other object arbitrarily taken hold of by our thoughts, we can defend ourselves against them so far that they cannot break out into disease.

ures of rulelessness become its rule. Suicide is often merely the effect of a *raptus*. For the man who cuts his throat in the violence of his excitement allows the doctor very patiently to sew it together again.

Profound pondering (melancholia) may also be a mere imagination of misery, which the *darkly pondering* self-tormentor creates for himself. Though in itself it is not mental perturbation, it can easily become such. It is, however, a very misplaced, though often used, expression, to speak of a *profoundly pondering mathematician*—for instance, Professor HAUSEN—when the idea desired to be conveyed is that of one profoundly *thinking*.

§ 49. The *delirious raving (delirium)* of a waking person, in a *feverish* condition, is a bodily disease, and needs medical treatment. Only those persons on whom the physician perceives no such symptoms of disease are called *insane*, the word *perturbed* being but a milder expression. Hence, if some one has purposely caused a disaster, and it is questionable whether he is at all, or in what degree he is to be, blamed for it, and whether or not he was insane at the time of the commission of the deed, the court should not refer him to the medical faculty—the court itself being incompetent to decide upon such a case—but to the philosophical faculty. On this ground¹ the question whether the accused, in the commission of his deed, was in possession of all the faculties of his understanding and judgment, is altogether of a psychological nature; and, although bodily crankiness of the soul-organs may be occasionally the cause of an unnatural violation of the sense of duty, which inhabits every man, still doctors and physiologists are not yet so far advanced as to be able to look so deeply into the machinery of man's bodily organization that they can explain from it its application to so cruel an act, or—without an anatomy of the body—foresee it. Hence, *medical jurisprudence (medicina forensis)*—when the question arises whether the act of the accused was one of insanity, or committed in sound mind and upon deliberate intention—is an interference with matters foreign to the science of law, matters of which the judge understands nothing,

¹ TRANSLATOR'S REMARK.—There is an immense amount of meaning in this somewhat cumbersome sentence, which on that very account I have translated in all its cumbersome-ness.

and which, at any rate, he should, as not belonging to his own *forum*, turn over to another faculty.¹

§ 50. It is difficult to apply a systematic division of subjects into that which is essentially and incurably disorder. Besides, there is little use in spending one's time on it, since the strength of the person cannot assist in the cure, as it can in the cure of bodily diseases. It is only the use of the person's own mental powers that can accomplish the object desired, and all curative methods must necessarily be fruitless. Nevertheless, the science of anthropology—though, in this respect, it can be pragmatical only in an indirect way, that is to say, can only insist on negatives—demands that we should attempt, at least, a general sketch of this deepest, though in its own nature founded, degradation of mankind. We can divide insanity, in general, into *tumultuous*, *methodic*, and *systematic* insanity.

1. *Craziness (amentia)* is the incapacity to put our representations even into that connection which is necessary for the mere possibility of experience. In the insane asylums the female sex is, by reason of its talkativeness, especially subject to this disease; that is, to intersperse with their narration so many productions of their lively imaginations that nobody can understand what they really wish to say. This first class of insanity is *tumultuous*.

2. *Madness (dementia)* is that perturbation or disorder of the mind wherein everything which the mad person says—though it be conformable to the formal laws of thinking necessary for the possibility of experience—is, nevertheless, the product of purely self-made representations; but, by a falsely poetizing power of imagination, considers the latter to be actual perceptions. To this class of mad people belong those who imagine that they have everywhere enemies; who watch the features, words, and other

¹ Thus, for instance, a certain judge, having on trial a woman who had been condemned to prison, and on that account had in sheer despair killed her child, declared her insane, and hence exempt from death punishment. "For," argued he, "a person who draws true conclusions from false premises is insane. Now, that woman has made it her principle of action that penitentiary punishment is an ineradicable dishonor, worse than death" (which principle is surely wrong). "And from this premise she concluded that she would do something to deserve the death penalty. Hence she was insane, and, consequently, exempt from the death penalty." But on the basis of such an argument it would be easy to declare all criminals insane—persons whom we might properly enough pity and cure, but should never punish.

indifferent actions of others, and believe them to be intended for themselves, and to be traps set for themselves.

Often these persons, in their unfortunate craze, are so sharp-witted in the interpretation of that which other people do unconcernedly, that we would be forced to pay all possible honor to their mental acuteness if we could only trust to the truth of their data.

I have never seen an instance of a cure effected on a person so diseased, for the disease is a peculiar disposition to rave rationally. Nevertheless, they must not be counted as belonging to the Hospital-Insane; for, being anxious only for their own safety, without putting others into danger, they need not be locked up for the sake of public security.

This second class of insanity is *methodical*.

3. *Insanity (insania)* is a disordered, or perturbed, *power of judgment*, whereby the mind is kept in suspense by analogies, which are confounded with the conceptions of things similar to each other, and whereby the power of imagination causes a play of the connection of dissimilar things, like unto that of the understanding, as the real universal under which the latter representations were subsumed. The thus mentally diseased are usually very jolly, rave absurdly, and please themselves in the enjoyment of so extensive a relation of conceptions which, in their opinion, rhyme together. An insane person of this description is beyond cure, since he, like poesy in general, is creative, and, by reason of manifoldness, entertaining. This third class of insanity, though methodical, is only *fragmentary*.

4. *Crankiness (vesania)* is the disease of a perturbed *reason*. The mentally diseased patient flies beyond the whole ladder of experience, and searches after principles which may be utterly beyond the test of experience, and believes that thus he comprehends the Incomprehensible. He is able to grasp the invention of how to square a circle; he has full hold of the *perpetuum mobile*; he can lay open the supernatural forces of nature, and realize the mystery of the trinity. He is the quietest of all hospital patients, and is, by reason of his in itself secluded speculation, farthest removed from madness, seeing that, in his complete self-sufficiency, he overlooks all the difficulties of investigation. This fourth class of insanity might be called *systematical*.

For this reason: There is in this latter class of mental aberration not only disorder and divergence from the rule of the use of reason, but also *positive unreason*—that is, another rule, an entirely different stand-point, which the mind is called to occupy, and from which it looks upon all things differently, finds itself carried away from the *sensorium commune*, which is requisite for the unity of the *life* (of the animal) into a far remote place. Hence the word *Verrueckung* (craziness), which signifies to be pushed out of one place into another entirely different place. Even as a hilly landscape, when sketched from a bird's point of view, occasions a judgment quite different from that which you would pass when viewing it from the level. True, the soul does not find or see itself in another place—for the soul cannot perceive itself in its place in space, since otherwise it would be able to contemplate itself as an object of its external sense, whereas it can be to itself an object only of the internal sense—but we thus explain, as well as we can, the so-called craziness. But it is remarkable that the forces of a disordered mind thus frame themselves into systematic order, and that nature tries to bring a connecting link even into unreason, in order that the thinking faculty may not remain unoccupied, if not objectively for a true cognition of things, at least subjectively for the purposes of animal life.

On the other hand, an attempt to observe one's self in a condition—produced voluntarily by physical means—which approaches that of insanity, in order thereby to arrive at a better understanding of the involuntary, evidences reason enough to investigate the causes of the phenomenon. But it is dangerous to make experiments with the mind, and to cause it to become diseased to a certain degree in order to observe it and investigate its nature by the phenomena which may there be found.

Thus, HELMONT says, that, after having taken a certain dose of "napell"—a poisonous root—he felt as if he *thought in his stomach*. Another physician gradually increased his doses of camphor until it seemed to him as if all things on the street were in a state of great confusion. Many people have experimented with opium to such an extent that they finally felt their minds weaken whenever they neglected to use this stimulant of their brain. An artificially produced state of insanity may very easily become a true one.

DESULTORY REMARKS.

§ 51. Together with the development of the germs of propagation we find the germ of insanity, which also is inheritable. It is dangerous to marry into families where even one person has been so affected. For, no matter how many children a married couple may have had who have not had this taint—because, for instance, they took after their father, grandfather, or other paternal ancestors—still, if the mother has had only one insanely tainted child (no matter how free she is herself from the taint), she will at one time give birth to a child which, taking after the mother, as one can see by the bodily resemblance, will show this *inherited* trace of insanity.

Often people pretend that they can point out the accidental cause of this disease, and hence view it not as inherited, but as acquired. “*Love* made him crazy,” they say of one person; “*Pride* made him insane,” they say of another; and of a third they will even say, “*He studied too much.*”

Now, to fall in love with a person of high rank, whom it is the greatest absurdity to ask in marriage, is not the *cause* but the *effect* of insanity; and, so far as pride is concerned, the presumption of an insignificant person to require others to bow down to him and to assume haughty airs towards those others, *presupposes* an insanity without which he would never have exhibited such conduct.

So far as *too much studying*¹ is concerned, finally, I think there is little need of apprehension and of warning young men. In that matter youth needs spurs rather than reins. Even the most violent and protracted exertion in this respect—though it may *tire out the mind* so as even to make a man detest science—cannot *put the mind out* unless, indeed, it was previously disordered by finding, for instance, an attraction in mystical books and revelations that pass common understanding. This applies also to an inclination to devote one’s self entirely to the reading of books that have received a certain holy consecration simply on that account, and

¹ The *overtrading* of merchants, which leads them to branch off into extravagant plans beyond their powers, is a common phenomenon. But anxious parents need have no fear that the diligence of their children may be over-exerted if their head is otherwise in a healthy condition. Nature itself has provided against such overstocking of knowledge by causing students to feel a disgust at things over which they have brooded to excess, and at the same time in vain.

without paying attention to their moral teachings; a tendency for which a certain author has invented the expression: "He is scripture mad."

Whether there is any distinction between general insanity (*delirium generale*) and the insanity which sticks to a specific object (*delirium circa objectum*), I doubt. *Irrationality*—which is something positive, and not mere absence of reason—is just like *Rationality*—a simple *Form* into which objects can be fitted, and both have, therefore, a character of generality. But when this insane tendency at last *breaks out*, which generally occurs suddenly, then the insane person thereafter raves especially on whatever first chances to strike the mind, since the newness of the impression takes a firmer hold than do the impressions of subsequent occurrences.

People also say of a man whose head has gone astray: "He has passed the *line!*" just as if a person who for the first time passes the equator were in danger of losing his senses. But this is a misunderstanding. What those people wish to say is this: "That snob, who expected to fish gold without much exertion simply by a voyage to India, sketches out his plans, as a real fool, even on this side of the line; but during the execution of his plan the incipient craziness increases, and on his return shows itself in its full development, even though fortune may have been kind to him."

Suspicious that there is something the matter with the mind fall even upon those who *talk aloud* to themselves, or who are caught *gesticulating* when alone in their rooms. This is still more the case when such persons believe themselves specially favored or haunted, or admitted into converse with higher beings; but does not apply when they, perhaps, hold other saintly men open to these supernatural contemplations, but except themselves, and perhaps even do not entertain a desire to participate in such a gift.

The only general mark of insanity is the loss of *common sense* (*sensus communis*), and the *logical obstinacy* (*sensus privatus*) which supplants it—as when, for instance, a person sees in broad daylight a burning candle on his table which no one else sees, or hears a voice which no one else hears. For it is a subjective, necessary test of the correctness of our judgments in general, and hence of the health of our understanding, that we should apply

the same test to the *understanding of others*, and that we should therefore not *isolate* our judgment, and yet at the same time pass it for public judgment. This is the reason why the prohibiting of books that are based merely on theoretical opinions (and especially if they have no influence at all on legal doing or not-doing) offends humanity. For by such prohibition government takes away from us, if not the only, at least the most extensive and effective means to correct our *own* thoughts, which we do promulgate publicly, in order to see whether they agree with the thoughts of others; since otherwise something purely subjective—for instance, habit or inclination—might be very easily taken for objective, which really constitutes the appearance, of which men say that it cheats, or rather which induces men to cheat themselves in the application of a rule.

A man who does not bother himself at all in this respect, but has made up his mind to follow his own private bent of mind without acknowledging the common sense as valid—even though it should be altogether in an opposite direction—is given over to a play of thoughts, wherein he acts and judges, not as in a world common with others, but (as in a dream) in a world of his own.

Sometimes this may appear only in the expressions, wherewith an otherwise clear-minded head tries to communicate his external impressions to others in a manner that they do not conform to the common sense, but retain his individual notion. For instance, the talented author of the "Oceana," Mr. Harrington, had the notion that his exhalations (*effluvia*) burst from his skin in the shape of flies. Now, this may well have originated in electric effects upon a body so surcharged, of which phenomenon, indeed, people claim to have had some practical experience; and he may, therefore, have intended merely to indicate thereby a similarity between his feeling and that origin, but on no account a perception of those flies.

Insanity accompanied with *raving*—(*rabies*) which is an affection of anger against a true or imaginary object that makes one insusceptible against all external impressions—is simply a cross-breed of a disturbance, which oftener looks more terrible than it really is in its consequences, and which is not rooted as the paroxysm in a feverish sickness, but rather excited by material causes,

and can often be alleviated by the physician through means of a single dose of medicine.

Concerning the Talents Belonging to the Faculty of Cognition.

§ 52. TALENT—a natural gift—signifies that pre-eminence of the Faculty of cognition which does not depend upon teaching, but upon the natural disposition of the subject. Those talents are *productive wit* (*ingenium strictius sc. materialiter dictum*), *sagacity*, and *originality* in thinking, or genius.

Wit is either of a *comparing* character (*ingenium comparans*) or *argumentative* (*ingenium argutans*). Wit pairs or assimilates heterogeneous conceptions, which often lie far apart, according to the law of the power of imagination (of association). It is a peculiar faculty of assimilating which belongs to the understanding, as the faculty of cognizing things in general, in so far as it gives us the objects of our generalizations. Afterwards wit needs the faculty of judgment in order to subsume the particular under the general, and to apply the faculty of thinking for the purpose of *cognition*. We cannot learn to be witty, whether in speech or in writing, by the mechanism and forcing of schools; but wit, as a special talent, belongs to the *liberality* of our disposition in the interchange of thoughts (*veniam damus petimusque vicissim*), a quality of the understanding which it is difficult to explain. It is a sort of *affability* on the part of the understanding, which contrasts with the *severity* of the faculty of judgment (*judicium discretivum*) in the application of the general to the particular—the conception of the kind to that of the species—which faculty of judgment *retrenches* the faculty of assimilation as well as the disposition to exercise it.

Concerning the Specific Distinction between Comparing and Argumentative Wit.

(a) CONCERNING PRODUCTIVE WIT.

§ 53. It is pleasant, popular, and exhilarating to discover similarities between dissimilar subjects and to create subject-matter for the understanding in order to make its conceptions general, which is precisely what wit does. The faculty of judgment, on the contrary, which limits the sphere of conceptions and helps rather to correct than to extend them, is, to be sure, mentioned

and recommended with great respect ; but then it is serious, severe, and restrictive in regard to the freedom of thought. Consequently it is unpopular. The doing or not-doing of comparing wit is rather play ; but the doing or not-doing of the power of judgment is business. The former is a flower of youth ; the latter a mature fruit of age. A person who combines both in one mental product, and in a rather higher degree, is called an *ingenious man* (*perspicax*).

Wit runs after *conceits* ; judgment works to obtain *insights*. Considerateness (watchful care) is a *burgomaster-virtue* (a disposition to protect and govern a city in accordance with law, under the supreme command of the castle). But the great author of the "System of Nature," Buffon, was by his countrymen accredited with *boldness* (*hardi*), regardless of the objections that might be raised by the faculty of judgment, although his daring venture looks somewhat like immodesty or frivolity. Wit is more in search after the *froth* ; judgment after the *nutriment* beneath. To institute a chase after witty sayings—*bons mots*—such as the Abbot Trublet promulgated in great number, and thereby put wit on the rack—gives rise to empty minds, but disgusts, in course of time, the more cultured persons. Such minds are inventive in *fashions* ; that is, in accepted rules of conduct, which please only by their newness ; and before they are brought into general *use* must be changed for other forms that are just as transitory.

Wit using puns is *shallow* ; and mere broodingness (*micrology*) of the faculty of judgment is *pedantic*. *Humorous wit** signifies a wit which arises from a tendency of the mind towards the *paradoxical*. In this case the mien and tone are altogether serious, and yet you see lurking behind them the roguish intent, whose only ambition is to make some one—or, mayhap, his own opinion—subject to laughter. This is done by giving undue laudation to the opposite of what ought to meet approval (*Persiflage*). Let me instance Swift's "Art to Crawl in Poetry" or Butler's "Hudibras." This sort of wit, which endeavors to make the contemptible still more contemptible by sheer force of contrast, is very exhilarating by the surprise of the unexpected ; but it is, after all, simply *play* and shallow witticism, like that of Voltaire ; whereas that kind of wit which clothes true and important prin-

* Launigkeit.

ciples in the garb of a disguise, as YOUNG does in his Satires, may be called a sledge-hammer wit, since it means business, and excites more admiration than enjoyment.

A proverb (*proverbium*) is not a really witty saying (*bon mot*), for it is a *formula* which has become general, and expresses a thought that is perpetuated by imitation, and *may have been* witty enough in the mouth of the first one who uttered it. Hence, the speaking by means of proverbs is the language of the common people, and shows a thorough lack of wit in the intercourse of the more polite world.

It is very true that profundity is not a matter of wit; but in so far as wit may be a vehicle, or hull, for reason, or for the handling of the morally practical ideas of reason, we may well distinguish between profound and shallow wit. For instance, in WALLER's "Life" we find a specimen of the, as they are called, *remarkable* sayings of SAMUEL JOHNSON concerning women: "Undoubtedly he praised many whom he would have hesitated to marry, and probably married one whom he would have been ashamed to praise." The only thing to be admired here is the playfulness of the antithesis; but reason gains nothing thereby. But, whenever the problem touched questions of reason, his friend, BOSWELL, could not coax even a single one of those oracular sayings out of him—of which he was in constant search—which might have betrayed the least sign of wit. On the contrary, everything that he uttered concerning sceptics in point of religion, or the powers of a government, or human freedom in general, turned out—as was to be expected, in view of his naturally inherent and constantly fostered despotism—to be a clownish brutality, which his admirers prefer to call gruffness,¹ but which really proved his great lack of uniting, in one and the same thought, wit with profundity. It also seems, indeed, as if the men of influence, who paid no heed to his friends when they pushed him for Parliament as an exceptionally fitted person, were likewise lacking in appreciating his talents. For that sort

¹ BOSWELL tells that, when a certain lord, in his presence, expressed his regret that JOHNSON had not had a better education, BARETTI said: "No, no, my lord; no matter what you had done with him, he would always have remained a bear." "Ah, well, a dancing bear!" said the other. And a third one, JOHNSON's friend, who wished to soften the dictum, said: "*He has nothing of the bear about him but the skin.*"

of wit which suffices for the composition of the dictionary of a language does not, on that account, suffice to awaken and revive those ideas of reason that are necessary for an insight into important matters of business.

Modesty enters of itself into the soul of any one who feels himself qualified for such business matters; and distrust in his own talents, with a conviction that he ought not to decide for himself, but also take into consideration the judgment of others—this was a quality which JOHNSON never possessed.¹

(b) CONCERNING SAGACITY, OR THE GIFT OF INVESTIGATION.

§ 54. In order to discover or detect something which lies concealed either in ourselves or elsewhere, we need often a special talent, which tells us how to investigate properly. It is a natural gift to *judge off-hand* (*judicii prævi*) as to where truth might possibly be found; to get at the trace of things, and to make use of the slightest signs of relationship to discover or invent that of which we have been in search. The logic of the schools teaches us nothing on this point. But *Bacon of Verulam* gave us, in his *Organon*, a magnificent example of the method by which we might discover, through experiments, the concealed quality of the things of nature. But even this example does not suffice, does not give us the needed advice, as to how we ought to proceed according to fixed laws, and how we ought to manage so as to investigate luckily; for we must always in these cases presuppose something, must commence with an hypothesis, from which we have determined to begin our excursion; and this must be done, according to certain indications, in accordance with certain principles. Now, the great trouble is to find how those principles are to be scented out. For it is a very bad way of indicating the proper mode of investigation by giving advice to "go it blind," and trusting to good luck to expect to find a mineral mine wherever sporadic mineral indications are found. And yet there are people who have a talent of tracing the treasures of knowledge without having learned how to do so, and just as if they had a

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—Nearly all German writers of KANT'S time express pretty nearly the same view of Dr. JOHNSON, holding him to be a very shallow, dictatorially minded man, with no claim to the reverence of his fellow *littérateurs* which English writers generally seem to pay him.

divining rod in their hands. Hence, of course, they cannot teach the mode to others. They can only show how they themselves do it; it being a natural gift.

(c) CONCERNING THE ORIGINALITY OF THE FACULTY OF COGNITION,
OR OF GENIUS.

§ 55. To *invent* something is a matter quite different from *discovering* something. For the thing that we *discover* is supposed to have had previous existence, only that it was not known—as when Columbus discovered America. But that which some one *invents*—as, for instance, gunpowder—was not at all known before the artist who made the invention.¹ Either may be a merit. Again, we may *find* something which we do not seek at all, and then there is no merit whatever.

Now, this talent of invention is called *genius*. Hence, this name always pertains only to an *artist*—that is, to one who knows how to *make* something, and not to one who merely *knows* much. Moreover, it must be an artist who does not merely imitate, but who produces his works *originally*. Finally, it must be an artist whose products are *models*—that is, deserve to be imitated.

Hence, the genius of a man is the “exemplary originality of his talents” in regard to this or the other kind of products of art. Hence, also, we sometimes call a mind, which evinces such a disposition, *a* genius, in which case this latter word does not stand merely for the natural gift of a person, but also for the person itself.

To be a genius in many branches of art constitutes a *vast* genius—for instance, *Leonardo da Vinci*.

The real field for genius is that of the Power of Imagination; for this power is creative, and stands, less than any of our other faculties, under the compulsion of rule, and is on that very account the more susceptible to originality.

It is true that the mechanism of instruction is harmful to the growth of a genius—that is, so far as its originality is concerned—

¹ Gunpowder was known long before the time of the monk Schwarz, and was used already in the siege of Algeziras. Its invention seems to belong to the Chinese. Thus it may be that the German monk, getting hold of some of that powder, sought to analyze it by extracting the saltpetre, etc., and that he hence merely *discovered*, but did not invent it.

since that instruction compels the student to imitate. But each art needs, after all, certain mechanical fundamental rules, namely, such as shall make the work of art interpretative of the idea which it is to express. In other words, art demands *truth* in the representation of the object which the artist has in mind. Now, this must be acquired by studying with all the strictness of a school, and is certainly an effect of imitation; and to relieve the artist's power of imagination also from this compulsion, and to allow him to let his peculiar talent work even in violation of nature and against all rules, this may, perchance, result in an original madness; but it certainly cannot be held up as a model, and can, therefore, not be classified with genius.

Mind (Geist) is the *animating* principle in man. In the French language *Mind* and *Wit* bear the same name—*Esprit*. In the German language it is different. We say: a speech, a book, or a lady in society, etc., is beautiful, but shows no intellect. In such a case, the possession of *Wit* does not come into consideration; for one may get sick of wit, because its effect leaves behind nothing that is permanent. If any of the above-named subjects or persons are to be called *intellectual*, they must excite *interest*, and this they must excite by means of *ideas*. For ideas put the power of imagination in motion, which perceives a vast sphere for the exercise of such conceptions. How would it do, then, to substitute for the French word *génie* the German words *original intellect*? for at present our nation allows itself to be persuaded that the French have a peculiar word for this special intellectual gift, which we have not in our own language, but are obliged to borrow of them, although the French themselves have had to borrow it from the Latin language (*genius*), which really signifies nothing else than original intellect.¹

But the reason why this exemplary originality of talent is endowed with that mystical name of genius is that the man, whose gift it is, cannot explain its outbreaks to himself, nor account to himself how he came in possession of an art which he had no opportunity to acquire. For *invisibility* (of cause to an effect) is a necessary adjunct of the conception of a spirit, or intellect (a

¹ This paragraph can be of interest and understood only by those who are acquainted with the German language. I thought it best, however, not to strike it out.—*Translator*.

genius, which was adjoined to the so-gifted man even at his birth), whose inspiration he merely follows, as it were. But in such cases the mental powers must be moved harmoniously by means of the power of imagination, since otherwise they would not animate, but merely cross each other; and this can be achieved only by the *natural* disposition of the so-gifted man. Hence, genius may also be called the talent "by means of which nature prescribes to art its rules."

§ 56. We need not stop here to discuss whether the world is specially benefited by men of great genius, because they often point out new paths and open new views; or whether mechanical minds—though having created no new epochs—have not, after all, with their every-day common sense, always progressing slowly by means of the walking-stick and measurement of experience, done more in behalf of the growth of arts and sciences; especially as they never created disturbances, though they never called forth admiration. But one class of them, called *men of genius* (though better named monkeys of genius), have recently crept in under that advertising sign which uses the language of minds extraordinarily favored by nature, declares all laborious learning and investigating to be bungling work, and believes it has grasped the essence of all science by one stretch of its hands, though it pretends to deal it out concentrated in small but powerful doses.¹ This class, like the class of quacks and advertising doctors, is very injurious to progress in scientific and moral culture whenever its members decide on matters of religion, politics, and morals in an unappealable tone from the heights of their throne of wisdom, and thus try to cover up the poverty of their intellect. How else can they be answered than by our laughing at them, and patiently pursuing our path with industry, order, and clearness, without paying attention to their jugglery?

§ 57. Genius also seems—according to the differences of national dispositions, and of the soil on which it is born—to have various different germs in itself, and to develop them differently. With the Germans, it strikes out more in the *root*; with the Italians, in

¹ This refers more especially to the SCHELLING manner of ignoring all exact sciences and knowledge, substituting in place of it a very cheap method of arbitrary generalizing.—*Translator.*

the crown; with the French, in the blossoms; and with the English, in the fruit.

Again, the *universal* mind, which understands all sciences of whatever kind, must be distinguished from genius, which is inventive. The former may be inventive in regard to what still may be learned; that is, a person of such a mind must have an historical knowledge of all that has been heretofore done on the fields of all sciences. He must be a *polyhistor*, like *Julius Cæs. Scaliger*, for instance. But the man of genius has a mind not so much of *extensive* as of *intensive* greatness, making an epoch in whatsoever he undertakes. Thus *Newton* and *Leibnitz*. The *architectonic* mind, which has a methodical insight into the connection of all sciences, and how they support each other, is only a subaltern, and yet not a common genius.

But there is also a *gigantic* learnedness, which, however, is at the same time often *cycloplan*—namely, lacking one eye. This is the learning of true philosophy, which endeavors to utilize this mass of historical knowledge—the freight of a hundred camels—for the purposes of pure reason.

The mere “nature-taught” men (*élèves de la nature—autodidacti*) may also, it is true, in some instances, pass as men of genius, because they have thought out by themselves things that, to be sure, had been thought out before by others, and who are men of genius in matters that in themselves are not matters of genius. Thus, for instance, in Switzerland, there are many inventors in the branch of mechanical arts. But a precocious, marvellous child (*ingenium præcox*) like *HEINECKE*, of Lubeck, or *BARATIER*, of Halle, is of an ephemeral existence, a departure of nature from her rules, a rarity for the cabinet of a naturalist. Their premature ripeness we may, perhaps, admire; but it also often causes those who helped to advance them to repent from the bottom of their hearts.

Since, after all, the whole use of our faculty of cognition, even in its theoretical branch, stands for its advancement in need of reason, as furnishing the rule, in accordance with which alone such an advancement can take place, we may sum up the claim which reason makes upon that faculty in the following three questions, which are framed in correspondence with the three faculties :

The Understanding asks: *What do I want?*¹

Judgment asks: *What is the object?*

Reason asks: *What is the result?*

The minds of men are very different in their ability to reply to these three questions. The first question requires only a clear mind, which understands itself; and this natural gift is pretty common where there is any kind of culture, especially when attention is called to it. It is much more rare to have the second question answered properly, for there are many ways of determining its conception, and, seemingly, to solve its problem; and the question arises, therefore: Which is the answer that alone is exactly fitting? (For instance, in conducting court trials, or in resolving upon certain plans of action.) There is here a certain talent of choosing the exactly right course (*judicium discretivum*), which is very desirable, but also very rare. The lawyer, who comes into court with *many* arguments in favor of his point, makes it very difficult for the judge to decide, since he himself is only groping around; but if, after having explained what he wants, he knows how to hit *the* point—for there is only one—then the matter is quickly settled, and the decision follows, as a matter of course.

The understanding is positive, and scatters the darkness of ignorance; the power of judgment is more negative, to avoid errors that arise from the gloam which surrounds objects. Reason stops the source of errors (prejudices), and thus makes understanding secure, by establishing the universality of principles. Book-learning increases knowledge, it is true, but does not extend the conception and insight unless reason is added. Reason, however, must be still further distinguished from *arguing*, which is a mere play with experiments in the use of reason, without following the laws of reason. Thus, if the question is put, whether I ought to believe in ghosts? I may, in many ways, *argue* on the possibility of ghosts; but reason prohibits me from assuming their possibility superstitiously—that is, without any principle of explaining the phenomenon according to the laws of experience.

Through the great diversity of minds; through the manner in

¹ This is here to be understood only theoretically, as signifying: What do I want to assert as true?

which they view the same objects, and even each other, differently; through their rubbing against each other, and, finally, through their combination, as well as their separation—nature produces a marvellous spectacle of an infinite diversity upon the stage of the observers and thinkers worth their closest attention. The following maxims, which have already been mentioned as leading to wisdom, may be put forth as unchangeable commands for the class of thinkers :

1. *Self*-thinking.

2. In communicating with other men, always to think (put) one's self in place of the *other*.

3. Always to think *in harmony with one's self*.

The first principle is negative (*nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri*), a mode of thinking which is *free from all compulsion*; the second is positive, a *liberal* mode of thinking, which conforms itself to the modes of thinking of others; the third, finally, is a *consequent* (logical) mode of thinking. Of each of these modes Anthropology can furnish examples—more, however, of their opposites.

The most important revolution in the inner heart of man is "his exit from his self-incurred minority [or subjection]." For, while up to that time others thought *for* him, he merely imitating or following a leading-string, he now dares to advance on the pathway of experience with his own feet, though at first only in a tottering sort of way.

[*End of First Book.*]

THE SOURCES AND FACULTIES OF COGNITION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE POLISH OF E. TRENTOWSKI (FROM FIRST VOLUME OF HIS "LOGIC")
BY I. PODBIELSKI.

(*Continued.*)

Between our empirical selfhood and the empirical universal truth and knowledge stand the senses. They belong both to us and to nature; therefore they strike their roots in us [*i. e.*, in the spiritual], but turn towards nature all their power, and seize upon

externality only. Without them, man would not become the consciousness of nature; without them, nature would not have its consciousness in time. The senses are the magical window through which our selfhood looks out of its dwelling upon all the universe, and loses itself in its infinitude; through which, again, all nature, looking back into our selfhood, contracts its infinitude into one focus, and comes to its consciousness, to its Word.

Our body is one and the same with matter, matter being the body of all existence. But our body is the most perfectly developed matter—the flower of matter. It is no wonder, then, that it became the dwelling of a divine individuality, and came to be endowed with senses capable of being the mirror of all matter. Seeing something, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching it, we bring the object to our consciousness, and we know at once it and ourselves. An object, forcing itself into our selfhood through the senses, makes upon us an impression. This impression is our consciousness and its consciousness, it is an empirical cognition. God's empiricism, diffused throughout nature, and our empiricism, whether we regard them as self-evident, or as a result of inference, become here the same knowledge. Yet it is not the subject-objectivity [*i. e.*, consciousness in which subject is also object] of cognition, because in this neither our spirit nor its object plays the least part. In this is found only the equation between the empirical selfhood and matter, or between an object in us and an object without; therefore the object-objectivity. The empirical cognition expresses this: object = object. Sense is a multiplicity in itself, because it is seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching; therefore it is the entrance to the multiplicity of all existence—that is, the gate standing open to divisible matter and space. There are as many separate mirrors for the universe as separate senses; from that number of sides the external truth and knowledge look through these senses into us. Every impression received by a sense is the mirrored picture of an object, and, in the same sense, it is object itself, dissolved in its own consciousness and becoming a word. The impressions (*sensationes, Eindrücke*) which the object stamps on our selfhood are called sensations, from *sensus*, in Latin. Perception (*sensus internus, die Vorstellungskraft*) is the inward focus of all the senses in the empirical selfhood, and representations (*percepta, representationes, Vorstellungen*) are the

work of this perception. Perception is the inward sense. What this or that sense seizes upon, instantly conveys it to the perception, in which impressions change into representations. Perception is the forge of representations, and it is entirely an empirical faculty. We can perceive only what is the object of our senses, what has become an impression on our senses. Perception and the senses are the same, at least essentially. As impressions, so are representations; on the one side is their object, and on the other are the senses, and perception in the middle, which receives their difference and converts it into indifference.

Impression, representation, and object are the same. The sensuous object in impression and representation attains to the seeing of its own being—that is, to its consciousness. Impressions and representations constitute the entire immeasurable nature [repeated] in the human selfhood. The senses and perception are the bridge binding the empirical selfhood with nature. Over this bridge goes the selfhood into nature, and nature into the selfhood. If we have sound senses and sufficiently trained perception, we shall receive into us external truth and knowledge, as a holy communion, worthily—that is, without error and falsehood. Neither the senses nor perception can err, because they are the mirror of the external world, perfectly formed by God himself. Illusions happen here, therefore, only when the obscure and unscientific thought explains the true phenomena of nature falsely. The sun rises and sets for the senses. It is an empirical truth. But the conception of this truth—that is, the cause of this phenomenon—already transcends the limits of the senses. Each sense, together with perception, perceives nothing more than the being itself. It has the right to say: “This or that is here or now.” It recognizes the form, the attributes, and the qualities of a thing, for all that is in the thing. But what this thing is in its essence it never will investigate, for it does not see either its inwardness or its actual value. Coexistence or simultaneity is its field. Pursuing continually this or that, it does not know, and is not able to seize upon, the speculative unity of objects. It is the hunter for whom a certain something, or a separate thing, but not an organic wholeness, is a hare.

Sense in man manifesting his life is exposed continually to the object like a camera obscura towards objectivity, and conveys to

our selfhood the multifarious images, which are the true representations of a thing, and arise and disappear, on its ground-work, every moment. Our selfhood, for instance, looking from a certain high mountain upon the multiform environs, becomes itself these environs, and is, if I may say so, a large city inhabited by representations—the gallery of pictures. Time flows, the selfhood passes from one place to another; it may be seen what a play of representations is here! Our eyes are certainly the most excellent kaleidoscope! The same is true of the ears when they are pleased by the harmony of some delightful orchestra; the same is true also of the other senses. But all these impressions and representations are momentary; they arise and vanish in the twinkling of an eye. Therefore they belong only to the temporal selfhood. The selfhood, however, is not only temporal, but also eternal. The eternal selfhood, or the soul, retains, then, in itself, such impressions and representations as have charmed it most; hence proceeds memory. Memory (*memoria—das Gedächtniss*) is the sense and perception of a higher power; it is the faculty of congealing liquid representations in our selfhood, forcing on this field, if I may say so, a volatile word into the standing and immovable written letter. If perception has a likeness to the illuminated ground filled with the splendor of objects, in the camera obscura, then memory is like the manufacturer of enduring photographs. Memory is the storehouse of the impressed and perceived, or of the external as transferred into our selfhood and enchanted here; that is, destined to immutability. Memory is the eternal perception, but perception is the temporary memory; both are the daughters of the senses, and possess sensuousness. Perception is the temporal, and memory is the eternal sensuousness. The representations of temporal sensuousness transform themselves faithfully into the representations of eternal sensuousness, and then are called recollections (*recordationes, Erinnerungen*). Recollection is in memory what representation is in perception; both recollection and representation rely upon impression, and impression relies upon the external thing. Recollection and its object constitute empirical difference in indifference, of which memory is the logical conjunction, the algebraical sign of equality. As the senses say: “This or that is here or now; to wit, in general it is;” so memory replies: “This or that was there or here some

time ago ; to wit, in general it was." Sense and memory relate, then, equally to existence only, and differ from each other as this world from the post-mundane world, the present from the past. That memory does not belong to reasonings nor to spirit, but to sensuousness, to body, its passivity proves. This passivity augments or weakens as the body augments or weakens. Growing youth have strong memory, but old men lose it gradually, and finally entirely. The animals have no reason, but they have memory as well as perception and the senses. Impressions and representations only can be the object of memory. Because ideas cannot be inscribed on the enchanting tablets of memory, they must be thought ; that is, digested, changed into the nourishment and essence of spirit. Who learns ideas by heart, treats them as school-boys treat the representations given them.

The empirical selfhood compares its recollections with the fresh representations, or its former representations with the new impressions, and perceives that they are similar or not. If they are similar, it places them under the same class ; but, if not, it separates them carefully, and marks these differences with certain signs. The empirical selfhood of this kind is called the understanding, or intellect (*intellectus, Verstand*). Understanding is a good word, because it names what *stands under* recollections, representations, and impressions. The understanding occupied only with recollections and representations is the memory of the second, the perception of the third, or the sensuousness of the third and highest power. It is the king of all the senses, perception and memory, in the same focus. Passivity is also its nature. Sense is the most visible, crude, sleeping, or dreaming passivity of our selfhood ; perception is a passivity awakening for a moment, but soon falling asleep again ; in memory passivity sleeps a profound sleep, and in the understanding it awakes and comes to a degree of movement. This movement is not activity, but agitated passivity preparing itself to pass into activity. The senses and perception say, "It is so ;" the memory says, "It was so ;" the understanding finally cries, "It was so, it is so, and it will be so, or it is so always." Thus, the understanding comes to certain rules, and even draws conclusions. Still, it is only thinking empiricism, in which this and that stand forth as generality, as necessity. The understanding never goes out beyond the limits of generality and necessity—that is,

beyond the limits of common people's cognition. It reigns in kitchen, stable, barn, and on all the fields of reality, but no further. As the senses enable our selfhood to receive impressions, as perception makes it capable of representations, and memory of recollections, so the understanding makes conceptions out of all these materials.

Conception (*conceptus—der Begriff*) is recollection, representation, and impression, all in one; it depends always upon experience, and it means here nearly what intuition (*Anschauung*) means in Hegel's speculation. It is still our seeing of nature, indeed, but already ennobled in the highest degree—that is, spiritualized, changed into empirical thought. Impression, representation, recollection, and conception present, under different aspects, one and the same external thing transferred into our selfhood, and coming by degrees to its ever fuller consciousness. Yet, even in conception, it does not get its true consciousness, because that transcends the power of the understanding. The conception and its corresponding thing are the poles of the axis, and the understanding constitutes the central point in this difference in indifference. The conception is the highest, if I may say so, spiritualization of the material thing in the empirical selfhood.

Yet it is not Idea. So the region of nature travels slowly to the region of spirit; and it is natural. Matter is attracted by spirit, or thought, as the one magnetic pole by the other.

The senses—ennobling themselves in perception, memory, and understanding—make a pilgrimage to the Holy Land; that is, to the Reason, because between sensuousness and reasoning there is also polar opposition. The keen understanding is called sagacity (*acumen—Scharfsinn*), and the playful and quick sagacity is called wit, humor (*argutatio—Witz*). Sagacity and wit are phases of the understanding, therefore they are the empirical faculties, and, in reality, are the senses. The understanding following its nature finds its chief category in Use, divides and analyzes, seeks the universal—that is, the common elements, the rules; what is common and forms for itself abstractions. These functions prove that the understanding holds sway in the realm of sensuousness, and not in that of reason. The understanding or intellect develops, also, in animals; but here, because the sun of reason does not enlighten them at all, it bears the name of instinct. The senses—

perception, memory, and the understanding—are the roads to the consciousness of nature developing itself gradually in the selfhood of man. They are the children of the same mother, sensuousness; they are the inlets of the same ocean of externality, expanding itself, between our selfhood and nature; they are the phases of positing—that is, knowledge through experience.

Now we enter the regions of spirit, and learn to know the powers of our speculative selfhood.

Imagination (*imaginatio, die Phantasie die Einbildungskraft*) is in our internal selfhood what the senses are in the empirical, to wit: it is the first and lowest power. Imagination corresponds to the senses, and still more closely to perception; but imagination is not perception. Perception corresponds to imagination, as body to spirit; the former is passivity, the latter already activity.

Imagination is incipient reasoning, the reason in its cradle. It desires to look into the internal and indivisible world, but its inexperienced eye, not yet delivered from sensuousness, sees, instead of pure spirit, certain genii of nature, certain sylphs, gnomes, and goblins, certain angels and demons, certain phantoms, shadows, dreams. It does not arrive yet at ideas and pure thoughts, but it possesses ideals. An ideal is a thought *a priori*, but clothed by fancy with a body. A disagreeable ideal is called phantasm (*phantasma—das kopfgespenst*). Creative power, originality, activity, are the qualities of imagination. In a word, it is a poet dwelling in our internal selfhood, and, in the common people's language, it is called a liar. This liar, however, is worthy of love, as he does not interfere with science. Imagination belongs to the internal selfhood, but does not furnish cognition, because its eyes are still covered with the thick veil of empirical sensuousness.

Judgment, called *vis judicandi (Urtheilskraft)*, is imagination in its second potency [*i. e.*, its second stage of development], imagination purified from sensuousness and mental pictures. Therefore, it is the second faculty of the internal selfhood, much more perfect than the first. If imagination be a poet, then the judgment is the critic of this poet; if the former creates poetry, then the latter creates the rules for this poetry. Imagination created Jupiter and Juno, Venus, etc.; the judgment recognizes correctly in these the forces of nature apotheosized, as, for example, the influence of the sun and moon, etc. Judgment cor-

responds to memory, as body to spirit. If imagination is the boyhood of reason, then judgment is already its youth. Its insight into the regions of invisibility is already more assured, yet judgment is too much occupied with the works of imagination, and with the labor of purifying them from sensuousness, to be capable of conceiving ideas and pure thoughts.

Besides this, the judgment occupies itself, not only with the objects of the rational, but also with those of the sensuous world. It, for instance, judges which lady is more beautiful, which horse or greyhound is better, which meat is more palatable. Judgment is the faculty of deciding, as an arbitrator—of judging; and it creates verdicts—that is, sentences (*judicia, Urtheile*). Judgment is the activity and creative power of a higher degree, for it is easier to create delightful fancies than true propositions; easier to dream of beautiful things than to search after truth. Judgment is a highly prized faculty of our internal selfhood, notwithstanding it is not yet the source of its cognition.

Why? Because its eye turns willingly towards externality.

Reason (*ratio, die Vernunft*), finally, is the judgment of the second, and the imagination of the third potency, and thereby, as the king of all thinking activities, it is the highest force of the internal, or speculative selfhood. It is imagination grown old, changing its ideals into ideas; it is also the mature judgment expressing its decisions in ideas; then it is imagination and judgment united. Imagination, judgment, and reason are properly one and the same faculty of spirit, being but various degrees of its development; it is our directive activity, ever above us, and our creative power, our *a priori* activity perfecting itself, or our pure thought. Reason corresponds to the understanding, and is its opposite. The understanding in relation to reason is as body to spirit. Reason creates ideas. An idea is an ideal and a judgment in unity. Reason perceives the true invisible world with the eye of its ideality, and thereby becomes the second source of cognition, and is also the farthest extreme of opposition to the senses. On this account it deserves a fuller consideration.

Reason is our total selfhood standing forth in its metaphysical internality and opening itself to the internal universe; it is our selfhood transforming itself into spirit, and enkindling therein the heavenly light which may expand its rays into infinitude, and

may unite itself also with the heavenly light which God's spirit has spread out into the infinitude of creation; it is the spiritual truth and knowledge of our being entering into contact with the spiritual universal truth and knowledge; it is our ideal knowing (*notio*) seeking after the ideal cognition. Reason is the activity whose substance includes all categories of cognition; hence, it is unity, eternity, particularity, conformity to law, ideality, negativity, causality, formality, subjectivity, personality, independence, and consciousness; it is all that, and it aspires after all that, above itself. Therefore reason, in its speculation, exists by itself, and recognizes for truth only what it has established itself. Reason has reason, and reasonings alone, for its object; that is, it attributes being only to ideas, to pure thought. It disdains material existence as a sensuous illusion, and puts in its place immaterial existence—that is, spirit; therefore [what is to sense-perception], nothingness. As the living activity possessing consciousness, it is the mirror in which the universal spirit contemplates itself, and finds its focus and its Word. The reasoning selfhood is on the one side, and the truth and metaphysical knowledge which constitute the spirit of all existence are on the other.

They are two poles of one invisible, and, if I may say so, magnetic needle. Reason is the difference in indifference of these poles, the central point of this needle, the act of compromise; the wedding-ring of our spirit, with the spirit of all existence, and that of God. It leads to absolute unity with our Creator and Father, and permits us to read the revelation of his spirit.

Truth and internal knowledge within us without reason would not be able to unite with truth and internal knowledge without; these two forms of truth and knowledge would not be able to know each other as of one kin; they would not be able to come to consciousness. Reason belongs to us, and, from this individual focus expanding itself into infinitude, through God's ideas revealed in nature, finds itself again in the focus of infinitude—that is, in the spirit of God, and perceives itself in the reason of the Omnipotent. The internal selfhood, then, and reason, stand under the absolute selfhood, or the soul, as under their higher unity.

Hence, reason is subject. But as reason sees reason alone, its cognition is the expression of subjectivity, lying outside of us. Reason does not know the real object. Its object is a subject, and

its difference in indifference of cognition is absolute unity—that is, subject = subject. Here the recognizing selfhood and the recognized object form only one thing—to wit: idea, spirit, reasoning. As material are opposed to spiritual objects—that is, as the empirical are opposed to the metaphysical regions—so the senses are opposed to the reason, and their contrast is the completest of all. The senses see the grossest reality, and reason sees the purest ideality. As, then, the senses are the source of cognition for the visible world, so the reason is the source of cognition for the opposite invisible, spiritual world. Reason, as the source of cognition, places itself on the opposite scale of universal science, and makes an equilibrium, with the senses. As the senses are the parent of empiricism, so the reason is that of speculation. The Universal Spirit, particularizing itself within our individual spirit, and coming to its temporal consciousness, expresses itself through us, since we have developed our reason and given it utterance. Our reason, then, utters not only our own thoughts, but also the thoughts of the universe.

Two opposite poles are found to each and every being in the world. Therefore, as the senses discover by degrees the principle of subjectivity, *i. e.*, reason, so reason looks again for objectivity *i. e.*, the senses. But their exertions are in vain, because although matter and spirit—the senses and reason—constitute the absolute unity, yet the relative difference also has here its rights. As imagination is a poet, and judgment is a critic, so reason is the born metaphysician, and cannot be otherwise. Notwithstanding all that, it is the great gift which we have received from heaven. It is the gigantic eye of spirit piercing through the earth with its sight, and seeing spirit at the bottom of the world—the eye which looks into the true internality, into the invisible world! The senses keep us near the earth; the reason transports us into the very heavens.

(To be continued.)

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

DR. J. HUTCHISON STIRLING.

[We copy the following interesting sketch of the man and philosopher from a series of articles on "The Fathers of the City" (Edinburgh), published in "The Express" for July 20, 1882.—EDITOR.]

Deep-rooted in the rugged Scottish nature is the love of philosophy. From the years when Duns Scotus preached his gospel of thought down to the more brilliant ebullitions of a Hamilton or a Ferrier, the philosophic influence seems to have leavened every class and every mind. An essential feature of the national character, the movement has gone on through the centuries until it culminated at the finish of last century in the magnificent pyrotechnic display of Reid, Hume, and Smith, at whose rainbow-colors the whole of the speculative world was at once delighted and astonished. These were but the ruddy streaks of dawn that betokened the rise of the life-giving sun of Scottish philosophy, and in the warmth of the rays of Sir William Hamilton a host of aspiring students gave to the world the fruits of their lonely hours. The Scottish Aristotle, however, waned in the course of mortal existence, and, several years after his death, when least expected, a star gleamed across the firmament of human thought. Imbued with the thousand teachings of the French and German schools, and a deep drinker at the fountain of his own native philosophy, Dr. Hutchison Stirling at once, by the publication of his "Secret of Hegel," leaped from the obscurity of his study into the fierce light which beats around the throne of intellect. The mazes of thought into which Hegel's seeming perspicuity had led his readers were now laid bare before the latter-day student, and the intensely practical teachings of the German philosopher glow in all their beauty through the glass-like medium of his translator and disciple. "It is a popular error"—Stirling adjures his reader in the introduction to his Hegel, and he gives utterance to the sentiment with the pardonable pride of a master—"it is a popular error that Kant and Hegel are difficult because they soar so high, because they have so much of the 'fervid' in them, and especially because they are so *mystic*." It is only the haze which clings to the summer sunshine; it disappears soon before the all-absorbing light of the luminary itself. "The difficulties of Hegel are simply technical, and his logic is to be read only by such means as will enable us to read the 'Principia' of Newton—industry, tenacity, perseverance." What a life-drama these words conjure up before the biographer of any philosopher—of long days spent in research, and longer nights passed in evolving from the depths of consciousness the doctrines with which the student would fain rear his temple of thought! They have been the watchwords of Dr. Stirling's life. Industry in cultivating literature and science, tenacity in his beloved pursuit of philosophy, perseverance in climbing the arduous precipice of thought—have been engraved in golden letters on his brow in years past and present, and whether we

recognize in him the critic of Douglas Jerrold, Macaulay, and Tennyson, or the acute and skilful expounder of Hegel, Dr. Stirling stands forth among the authors of the present day by the originality and piquancy of his style and reasoning.

It is now sixty-two years ago since James Hutchison Stirling was born, on the 22d of June, within the murky confines of Glasgow. From his earliest years grave unto thoughtfulness, and with a certain philosophic method entering into his youthful studies, he passed from childhood to boyhood, flooding his mind with a stream of literature and romance. His father, an eminent Glasgow merchant, was a profound mathematician, and thus the child received very early an incentive to thought. He was but a lad entering upon his fourteenth year when the rich world of university life opened its vista before him, and forthwith we find young Stirling in the academic shades of Glasgow, crystallizing and acquiring as each new experience and study brought its influence to bear upon his rapidly developing mental faculties. First the milk and honey of classical lore, administered by the brilliant Sandford and Ramsay, intoxicated the young student, but soon the sterner mathematics and logic recalled him to what he was now fond of recognizing as his path in life. Even at this early period philosophy was alike his passion and despair. Its intricate problems and its halo of mysticism at once charmed and repelled; he frequently dreamed, as many young philosophers do, who have caught a glimpse by means of a winter's study of the wondrous and perplexing world revealed to them; but from his dreamings, as in similar cases, rugged reality brought its sudden awakening. That his career in Arts brought many palms of victory to Stirling we are well convinced, and it must have been with regret, if not with something akin to pain, that he deserted his congenial speculations for the somewhat more prosy, but more philanthropic, life of medicine. For four years he toiled in harness, until 1842, when he passed the Royal College of Surgeons, of which he has now been long a Fellow, thus gaining his release from what had been a long and colorless apprenticeship. During these sessions of student life Mr. Stirling had been devoting the rare moments of idleness in which he indulged, to the perusal and acquisition of what literature and philosophy might be for the day attracting attention or provoking criticism. When he left the kindly arms of his University to open with his surgeon's knife the oyster of the world, we thus see with what mental endowments he went forth to conquer. Medical men, as a class, are rarely *littérateurs*, but here we have a notable exception, and it must have been with unspeakable joy that he was received, both as an able surgeon and as a man of refinement and culture, by the small circle into which his first appointment led him.

The Hirwain Ironworks, in Wales, where Mr. Crawshay held sway during these years, was the new world into which his professional skill had called Mr. Stirling. There he found wide enough scope for the execution of long-cherished plans. His patients demanded his first attention, and into their cares and sorrows he threw all the sympathies of his heart, making himself beloved at every hearth to which he brought the sunshine of his presence. He had now somewhat more leisure time to pursue his favorite literary studies than when a medical student at Glasgow, and his fancy soon commenced urging him to use his pen to more advantageous purpose than formerly. The scenery and life around him were suggestive of ideas that soon took shape in the crucible of his mind, and Douglas Jerrold's "Shilling Magazine," the "Truth-Seeker," and Leigh Hunt's "London Journal" soon found in their young Welsh correspondent a contributor of such sketches as not only rendered their pages fascinating, but also attracted attention wherever they were read. His home he depicted in the fourth volume of Douglas Jerrold's

"Magazine" under the title, "A Peep into the Welsh Iron Valley," in which he gives, with characteristic piquancy, his impressions of life among rough and uncouth miners and workmen. Nor did his busy brain confine itself to the production of magazine articles. He still yearned after the love of his student days, and the ponderous tomes of philosophy, with which his every library shelf was stored, speak eloquently of the manner in which he was wont to spend his studious leisure. Every school of ancient and modern thought was scanned with the keen soul-reading that is synonymous with the only "true method." Volume after volume disappeared into the chaos of his ever-changing mind, building up for the future a safe foundation and order.

During the year 1851 a great sorrow gloomed over the heart of our young philosopher. His father died, and Mr. Stirling required all his philosophy to fortify himself against his grief. Yielding up the cares of his medical practice to a successor, he parted from what had become to him a dearly beloved home. He had newly married, and, on his father's death, inheriting something more than the traditional competency of the philosopher, he found himself well able to gratify the close-hugged desires of his youth. France, with its learning, science, and sunshine, was the first country to which he directed his steps, and here, in an out-of-the-way corner, he devoted all his liveliest energies to the studies which were absorbing his every attention and care. Now the germ was taking root which was destined in after years to produce the "Secret of Hegel," with its revelation of mysteries. Fichte, Schelling, and Kant poured all their rich treasures at his feet, and, inspired with an ambition which was now becoming to him a stern reality, Mr. Stirling left France to find in the libraries of Germany the necessary material for the accomplishment of his design. Whether the idea of writing his work arose while roaming amid the old university towns of the Fatherland, or immediately after his return in 1857 to England, it is impossible for us to say. The two volumes of the "Secret" burst upon the world in 1865, and that they were the fruition of what had been years of thought is amply proved by his modest introductory words:

"This is the last fruit, though first published, of a long and earnest labor devoted, in the main, to two men only, Kant and Hegel, and more closely, in the main, to the three principal works of the one, and the two principal works of the other. This study has been the writer's chief—not just to say sole—occupation during a greater number of years, and for a greater number of hours in each day of these years, than it is perhaps prudent to avow at present. The reader, then, has a good right to expect something mature from so long, uninterrupted, and concentrated an endeavor; it is to be feared, however, that the irregularity of the very first look of the thing will lead him to believe, on the contrary, that he is only deceived. . . . The importance of the matter might, in such a case, obtain excuse for a certain extemporaneousness that lay in the form—that, in short, the matter of years might compensate the manner of months."

The rich, exuberant style with which he attacks the intricacies of his subject throws a charm round Hegel and his work that proves fascinating, and which we would recommend to all philosophic writers. It is rarely we find in the absurdly pedantic and dry-as-dust ebullitions of Scotch or German thought such brilliance of metaphor as we have here:

"One approaches Hegel for the first time—such is the voice of rumor and such the subjects he involves—as one might approach some enchanted palace of the Arabian stories. New powers—imagination is assured (were but the entrance gained)—await one there—secrets—as it were the ring of Solomon and the pass-keys of the universe. But, very truly, if thus magical is the promise, no less magical is the difficulty; and one

wanders round the book—as Aboulfaouaris round the palace—*irrito*, without success, but not without a sufficiency of vexation. Book—palace, is absolutely inaccessible, for the known can show no bridge to it: or, if accessible, then it is absolutely impenetrable, for it begins *not*, it enters *not*; what seems the doorway receives but to reject, and every attempt at a window is baffled by a fall.”

The beauty of the language equals the beauty of his thoughts. Stirling seems to revel in an abundance of metaphor that lends the dry husks of logic a sweetness and flavor hitherto unknown. The book was published, and that it was received with fervor goes without saying. Ferrier, years before, had pointed to Hegel as an alpine summit, unattainable and wreathed forever in perennial snows. The valleys of thought seemed veritable “seas of darkness,” which alike allured and destroyed. But to the aid of the timid explorer now hastened a trustworthy guide who had already surmounted what had appeared the impassable, and at the sound of his voice the gloom and terrors faded like clouds before the sunshine.

Since his return from the Continent, Dr. Stirling’s life has been that of the student. His love of literature and philosophy has increased with every year, and the series of books that has issued from the press with his name on their title-pages tells of the ardent spirit with which his mind is imbued. Honors commenced to shower their laurels upon his head immediately after the publication of his “Secret of Hegel,” and Edinburgh University was not slow to award him the meed of praise when she conferred upon him the degree of LL. D. in 1867. Dr. Stirling had already devoted his heartiest energies to the study of her great philosopher, his “Sir William Hamilton on the Philosophy of Perception” appearing two years previously. Immense interest was excited in the philosophic world by the announcement, a few months afterwards, that the already famous Hegelian scholar was busy preparing an annotated translation of “Schwegler’s History of Philosophy,” and when, during the year, it was given to the world, it was eagerly conned and criticised. That it has met with wide-spread success is amply shown by the eloquent facts that in 1877 a sixth edition was published, and that each student finds in it a key to the wondrous intricacies of philosophic lore. A volume of critical literary essays appeared in 1868, under the title of “Jerrold, Tennyson, and Macaulay, and other Critical Essays,” which went far to prove his wide acquaintance with the classics of the English language. His other works are: “Address on Materialism,” 1868; “As Regards Protoplasm,” 1869, of which a second edition was issued in 1872; “Lectures on the Philosophy of Law, etc.,” 1873; “Burns in Drama, together with Saved Leaves,” 1878. His latest volume on philosophy, “The Text-book of Kant,” which was published a few months ago, showed with what fervor he has pursued his favorite study since his return from the Continent, where he drank so deeply at the fountain-head of German thought.

THE GOSPEL OF PAIN.

Pain as an element in the world’s development is a subject of powerful interest to historian, philosopher, and artist, since it marks the limit between the active and passive condition of mind. The Hindoos are the first among the ancient and pagan nations of history to recognize pain as a means. With them the otherwise impassable relation of caste, which birth decides, could be transcended through this means only. They could attain the highest or Brahm through physical suffering and by reducing

themselves to spiritual unconsciousness. The Persians, on the contrary, did not seek pain, but knew it as something negative. The Greek mind is expressed by the great hero Achilles when he says—

“ I would be
A laborer on earth and serve for hire
Some man of mean estate, who makes scant cheer,
Rather than reign o'er all who have gone down
To Death.”

The element of pain is found in the art of Greece only after it begins its decline. Then it is to be subordinated and overcome through the human will. The “Niobe” is a fine representation of endurance accompanied with intellectual recognition of cause and effect, while the “Laocoon” presents the distinction between the mature man in his comprehension of the inevitable and the apprehension of the unknown which belongs to youth. There is a close analogy between the ancient Roman and the modern in the place given to pain, that is, in its absolute subordination to human will. This is seen most clearly in the growth of the many organizations of civilized and institutional life. The individual has but slight recognition in comparison with the institution. This necessarily gives rise to an educated and rational will as opposed to the natural or purely emotional nature. Hence, the ancient Roman laid great stress upon the nation.

“ For Romans in Rome's quarrel
Spared neither land nor gold,
Nor son, nor wife, nor limb, nor life,
In the brave days of old.”

The Greek development of individual life is in marked contrast to this, and, consequently, the Greek's pleasure of living was the highest his mind could conceive. With the coming of Christ an entirely new phase of the element of pain is introduced into the world's history. The strongest emphasis is placed upon the purified spirit. How shall the spirit become pure? Through pain, since by this means unconsciousness ends, and all the faculties are aroused to their utmost activity, and the will asserts its power and frees the soul from its limitations. The self-active spirit becomes an art-element of the Romantic School in a different sense from that realized in the absolute calmness of the Classic School.

The ideal of Romantic art is the purified spirit at one with its creative spirit, the divinity of humanity, while the ideal of Classic art was the humanity of the divinity. The one gives us all the variations of aspiration—its ecstasy, its intensity, its endurance, and noble resignation. The other gives the intellectual subordination of all these to the will. The

five Great Masters—as Da Vinci, Correggio, Raphael, Michael Angelo, and Titian are generally called—reached the sublime in subjects representing the human form and character in its ecstacy of achievement. To be and to do have their highest possibilities realized in such works as the “Last Supper,” “Last Judgment,” and “Transfiguration.” What follows? To suffer!

The most artistic presentation of this subject known is the “Communion of St. Jerome,” by Domenichino. This artist has risen above all contemporary artists, and has succeeded in embodying the ideas of his own time; and, reaching backwards and forwards, shows the influence of pain as a physical means to a spiritual end. The picture represents the Saint, an emaciated figure and with fast-ebbing strength, as having been carried into the church to receive the sacrament of Communion. He seems unable to maintain the reverent position of kneeling, and would fall prostrate but for the prompt and loving assistance of friends. The poor relaxed and feeble body is in strong contrast to the intense look which is fixed upon the priest holding the consecrated Host. It is a startling presentation of the conflict between spirit and flesh.

The group of six persons surrounding St. Jerome seem actuated by three separate motives dividing them into pairs. A young priest, with clear-cut, intellectual features, kneeling at the right of the dying Saint, and a mature man, somewhat in the background, manifest the most intense interest in the sacramental distribution. They are an interesting contrast to each other and with Jerome, and may be taken as presenting the threefold expression of faith. The Saint, with that spiritual prescience which belongs to those who stand upon the threshold of the two worlds of the seen and the unseen, yearns with a great human yearning for the substance of the spiritual, thus making both the physical and spiritual nature maintain their struggle unto the end. The ecstacy of love for the Divine Being with whom he will soon be united is so great that all other things are as naught. The young priest, kneeling by his side, seems to behold the mystery of the light, and knows that God is there. He has not the emotional nature of the Saint, and there is much for him yet to do ere saintliness finds its expression in his features. We are distinctly commanded to know God and to love him. The mature man in the background, with the turban encircling his head, is as one who lives by faith alone, and it is a question if he sees the circle of light surrounding the consecrated wafer. He may be taken as a type of the class for whom the word is the law, and, resting upon it, he is free from the delight as well as the disquiet that belongs to those who must know consciously.

In the second pair is the young man standing immediately behind and supporting Jerome, physically, while with earnest look he gives a spiritual support to a serious-faced young woman, who, evidently, has not yet understood the great mystery of life through death, but is startled at the near approach of the latter. These two represent the plane of human interest and sympathy, and are entirely unconscious of the higher spiritual conditions that belong to the first pair. The third division is formed by the two who loved the *man* most—namely, the woman,¹ kissing the hand of the dying friend, and an elder man, who, from his resemblance, might be a brother of the Saint. The whole group finely illustrates the mental conditions surrounding every death where friends are called upon to witness that mysterious yielding to the summons of the spirit that which takes unto itself that which it had sent out of itself.

The group on the right of the picture is composed of three persons, and forms a contrast to the opposite group of six who have borne Saint Jerome into the church. The priest, holding the sacred Host, which appears as a circle of light in his hand, bends towards the sinking figure of Jerome. He is not looking at the plate, but at the dying man. He seems not to comprehend either of the two great mysteries taking place before his eyes, but to be absorbed in the human interest of administering to Jerome the sacrament by which both believe eternal life may be secured. The ecstasy of spirit, intellectually comprehended, is not seen in his face or manner so much as the expression of the faithful follower of the Word, and the human tenderness that gives to the Saint the substance of that for which he longs with a great longing. The Deacon holds the chalice, but also has his eyes upon the Saint, while the acolyte kneels in front with the closed book, entirely absorbed in looking upon the sufferer. He holds firmly but unconsciously the book, thus showing the power of habit and duty for him, as the moving the Bible from one side of the altar to the other is one of his duties as acolyte. He has the tender heart of youth, and death means pain and sorrow. It is not the spiritual but the physical condition that impresses him; yet there must come to every young soul some query as to what is death, and where are the dead? In the case of such a saintly character as the one before him, faith answers and there is no doubt. He and the woman kissing the hand of the Saint, with the middle-aged man who so closely resembles Jerome, are of the same

¹ Santa Paula, "a noble Roman matron, a descendant of the Scipios and the Gracchi, the most celebrated female convert of St. Jerome."—MRS. JAMESON ("Sac. and Leg. Art.," sub. "St. Jerome.")

type of character—namely, of those who can live by faith, and blessed are they.

The whole scene is represented at the foot of an altar, but all appearance of crowd or confusion is destroyed by the aid of the perspective, produced by giving a landscape seen through an open window. The lion is always associated with St. Jerome, and in this picture suggests the purely mortal view of death. He can suffer, but he cannot hope. He bows his head upon his paws and weeps. There is no solution for him of the problem of pain. With human beings, on the contrary, there is a solution, and that is the seeing of God. "Blessed are the pure in spirit for they shall see God." The angels seem to be the least expressive and pleasing part of this picture. They await the deliverance of the soul to welcome it to the divine world.

The historical interest associated with this picture lies in the fact that it is regarded as second only to the "Transfiguration" by Raphael. In the gallery of the Vatican a room is given to these two pictures and the beautiful "Madonna della Sedia." In the great cathedral of St. Peter, at Rome, the "Transfiguration" and "Communion of St. Jerome" are placed opposite each other. Here they are reproduced in mosaic, as are all the pictures of the World's Cathedral. This picture presents an entirely original conception of pain, and far excels all contemporary illustrations of the same subject. Martyrdoms, flagellations, and crucifixions have in their nature so much of the passive element that they have only the quality of endurance, which may or may not be an art quality. The "Communion of St. Jerome" gives the purely active phase of spirit, and thus fulfils the leading condition of the Romantic, or Modern phase of art: namely, the freeing one's self from the environment of the flesh and rising to the ideal conception of the spirit.

SUE V. BEESON.

St. Louis, September, 1882.

PHILOSOPHY AT JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

[We find the following interesting programmes of courses of lectures on philosophy for the current scholastic year in the circular of the Johns Hopkins University.—Ed.]

PHILOSOPHY, ETHICS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LOGIC.

PROGRAMMES FOR THE YEAR BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 19, 1882.

I. History of Philosophy, Ethics, etc.

PROFESSOR GEORGE S. MORRIS.

1. History of Philosophy in Great Britain.

Three lectures weekly, first half-year.

2. Philosophical Seminary.

For the study of selected texts, ancient and modern, relating to the science of knowledge. *Twice weekly, first half-year.*

3. Ethics, or the Science of Man.

A study of selected texts, with especial reference to F. H. Bradley's *Ethica Studies*. *Four times weekly, first half-year.*

4. Hegel's Philosophy of History.

(Sibree's Translation.) *Weekly, first half-year.*

5. The Philosophy of Religion in its relation to Christianity.

Eight public lectures, to be delivered in January, 1883.

II. Psychology, etc.

PROFESSOR G. STANLEY HALL.

6. Psychology.

Wundt's *Physiologische Psychologie*, and Max Müller's translation of *Kant*, will be used as a text-book basis. *Four lectures weekly, second half-year.*

7. Philosophy and Ethics.

The chief themes and problems in Philosophy (including Ethics) since Locke will be considered by lectures, with limited selections from Bowen's *Modern Philosophy* and Porter's *Human Intellect* for text-book work. *Four times weekly, second half-year.*

8. Pedagogy.

One public lecture weekly for eight or ten weeks.

9. Practical Work in Experimental and Observational Methods of Psychological Research.

Hours to be later determined.

NOTE.—Courses 1, 2, 6, and 9 are intended only for advanced students, or for undergraduates, whose preliminary study of the sciences introductory to philosophy may have prepared them to enter upon advanced work.

Courses 3, 4, and 7 are intended primarily for undergraduates.

Students who intend to pursue these courses are advised to read in advance one or more of the following works, with :

Course 1. Kuno Fischer, *Bacon und seine Nachfolger* ; Ch. de Rémusat, *Histoire de la Philosophie en Angleterre* ; T. H. Green, Introduction to his edition of *Hume's Treatise on Human Nature* ; G. S. Morris, *British Thought and Thinkers* ; major works of the leading British inquirers, such as Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid, Hamilton, the two Mills, Bain, Spencer, Lewes.

Course 2. Plato, *Theætetus* ; Aristotle, *De Anima* ; Berkeley, *Principles* ; Hume, *Treatise* ; Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* ; Fichte, *Science of Knowledge* ; Hegel, *Logic*.

Course 3. Plato, *Republic* ; Aristotle, *Ethics* ; Calderwood, *Moral Philosophy* ; Spencer, *Data of Ethics* ; Kant, *Ethics*.

Course 4. Flint, *Philosophy of History* ; R. Mayer, *Die philosophische Geschichtsauffassung der Neuzeit*.

Course 5. John Caird, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* ; E. Mulford, *The Republic of God*.

Course 6. Lotze, *Grundzüge der Psychologie* ; Taine, *On Intelligence* ; Ribot, *English Psychology* ; Ribot, *La Psychologie Allemande Contemporaine* ; Monck, *Introduction to the Critical Philosophy*.

Course 7 (for undergraduates). Ryland, *Handbook of Psychology and Ethics* ; Mayor, *Sketch of Ancient Philosophy*.

Course 8. Quick, *Educational Reformers* ; Farrar, *Essays on a Liberal Education* ; Fitch, *Lectures on Teaching* ; Latham, *The Action of Examinations* ; either Diesterweg's, Beneke's, or Schrader's *Pedagogik*.

III. Logic.

MR. C. S. PEIRCE.

Mr. Peirce will lecture four times a week throughout the year. The course will embrace the following topics:

The Psychological and Metaphysical facts upon which the possibility of Logic rests.—Text: Mr. Peirce's papers, *The fixation of belief*; *How to make our ideas clear*; *Questions concerning certain faculties claimed for man*; *Further consequences of your incapacities*; *The validity of the laws of logic*. Here, as everywhere throughout the course, the doctrine of the text will receive improvements, and the subject will be further illustrated by the aid of other works.

Modern Formal Logic.—Text: De Morgan's *Syllabus of Logic*.

Boole's Logical Algebra.—Not merely the principles, but also the practice of this algebra will be rendered familiar by the solution of numerous examples drawn from Boole, McColl, Miss Ladd, etc. Text: Schröder's *Operationalkreis des Logikcalculus*.

The Logic of Relatives.—This subject will be treated in an elementary manner, so as to bring it within the capacity of the ordinary student. An entirely new general method of treating problems that involve relative terms will be developed. Text: Mr. Peirce's *Logic of Relatives*, *Algebra of Logic*, *Algebra of Relatives*, and a new paper.

Mathematical Reasoning.—The general nature of mathematical demonstration will be explained; the different varieties will be classified, and the particular use to which each can be put will be shown. The methods of mathematical research will be studied in the *history of multiple algebra*.

Theory of Probabilities.—The fundamental rules of the calculus will be discussed. Its practice will be illustrated by the solution of select problems, beginning with the simplest and proceeding to some of the most difficult. The theory of linear difference equations will be given. The method of least squares will be theoretically and practically treated. Text: Liagre's *Calcul des Probabilités*, Boole's *Calculus of Finite Differences*, Ferrero's *Metodo dei Minimi Quadrati*.

Inductive Reasoning.—A large part of the course will be devoted to this subject. Inductive and hypothetic inference will be considered as inverse forms of statistical deduction. The rules of these modes of inference will be deduced from the theory and set forth with great particularity, with many illustrations drawn from the history of the physical sciences. No effort will be spared to make this part of the course practically useful to the student. Text: Mr. Peirce, *On probable inference*.

The Nature of Scientific Reasoning, illustrated by the reading of Kepler's *De motibus stellarum Martis*.

Inquiry into the validity of Modern Conceptions of the Constitution of Matter.—Text: Meyer's *Kinetische Theorie der Gase*.

Relation of the New Theory of Logic to Philosophical questions.

Besides the lectures, Mr. Peirce will give private instruction in the different branches of logic to those who may desire to receive it.

The libraries of the University and of the Peabody Institute are well supplied with books for the study of philosophy.

The Metaphysical Club, for the study of logical, psychological, and philosophical matters, will continue to hold monthly meetings.

The first volume of *Logical Contributions*, by members of the Johns Hopkins University, will be published early in the autumn.

Contents: The logic of the Epicureans, by Allan Marquand; On the algebra of logic, by Miss Ladd; On the algebra of logic, by O. H. Mitchell; On relative numbers, by B. I. Gilman; On probable inference, by C. S. Peirce.

For further information, during the summer vacation, letters should be addressed to the "Johns Hopkins University," Baltimore, Md., and not to the individual professors, who are likely to be absent from the city.

BALTIMORE, June 12, 1882.

ADOLPH E. KROEGER.—OBITUARY.

On March 8, 1882, our esteemed contributor, Mr. Kroeger, died at his residence in St. Louis. From the beginning, Mr. Kroeger has constantly furnished translations for this journal, chiefly from Fichte and Kant, although occasionally from Leibnitz and others. A considerable portion of his translation of Fichte's "Facts of Consciousness" remains in our hands to publish in this journal. His translation of Kant's "Anthropology" is completed in this number through the first book. The second book, "On the Feeling of Pleasure and Pain," and the third book, "On the Appetitive Faculties," as well as the second part on "The Anthropological Signs of Character," were not translated by Mr. Kroeger, so far as we know, and their publication, consequently, will not be continued in this journal at present. The part that we have published is almost exactly one half of the entire work.

His chief works were the translations of Fichte's "Science of Knowledge" and Fichte's "Science of Rights," published, in 1868 and 1869, by Messrs. Lippincott & Co., of Philadelphia, after Mr. Kroeger had been at the considerable expense of stereotyping those works. The third great work of Fichte, "The Science of Morals," was translated by Mr. Kroeger, but remains still in manuscript. In 1879 we purchased of Mr. Kroeger the plates of the above-mentioned works, and also the manuscript of the "Science of Morals," hoping to be able to publish the latter, and to keep these valuable works accessible to students of philosophy. Mr. Kroeger's "Minnesingers of Germany," published in 1873, by Messrs. Hurd & Houghton, is out of print, but ought to appear in a new edition, enlarged by numerous translations of poems from the same source, which Mr. Kroeger published in the newspapers from time to time.

From a long and friendly article in "Der Deutscher Pionier" (October, 1882), published in Cincinnati, on the subject of this notice, we translate the following interesting particulars:

“Adolph E. Kroeger was born December 28, 1837, in the village of Schwabstedt, on the river Treene [a small river flowing into the Eider], in the province of Husum, Duchy of Schleswig. His father, Jacob Kroeger, the Lutheran clergyman of the place, having become involved in the political complications of the year 1848, was prosecuted by the Danish government and obliged to migrate to America in that year. He removed at once to a farm in the neighborhood of Davenport, Iowa, intending to devote himself to agriculture. As is generally the case, a farmer's life to one unaccustomed to it did not at first please him, and the following year Jacob Kroeger removed to Wheeling, Virginia, to occupy a vacant pulpit in a German-Protestant church in that city. Here he was less fortunate in his experience than before. American habits were not to his liking. The position of pastor over a German church in America was anything but agreeable. Every grocer or saloon-keeper had more to say in the management of the church than the preacher, and the relation of pastor to his people was in the highest degree abnormal, according to European standards. The shepherd did not lead his flock, but the flock compelled the shepherd to move with them wherever they chose to roam. Jacob Kroeger, after a bitter experience, returned sorrowfully to his farm near Davenport and devoted himself to agriculture, and especially to the education of his son Adolph. After his eleventh year young Kroeger received no school education except from his father, but soon entered upon a business life.

“In 1852, at the age of fifteen, he obtained a position as assistant book-keeper in the banking-house of Cook & Sargent, in Davenport, and occupied this office for six years, until the failure of the bank in 1858. His father died in 1857.

“During the time of his employment in the bank, young Kroeger used all his spare time in self-education, devoting himself especially to the study of literature and philosophy. He began at that time to write small paragraphs for the German and English newspapers, and acquired the style of journalistic writing. When his connection with the bank ceased (1858) he went to New York and found employment on the New York ‘Times.’ In the following year he was sent as correspondent by this paper to St. Louis, a post which he held until the outbreak of the civil war. Now began his proper literary career. In his writings on the political events of the day he treated his themes with so much ability as to excite much interest. . . . In the summer of 1861 he received a position as adjutant, with the rank of lieutenant, on the staff of General Fremont. After the recall of Fremont he resumed his correspondence for the New York ‘Times’ until appointed assistant treasurer, in 1863, by the newly elected treasurer of St. Louis, Mr. Bach. Mr. Bach died before the expiration of his term

of office, and Mr. Kroeger received the nomination as his successor. He was re-elected treasurer of the city in 1865, and filled the office until the expiration of his term in 1867. . . . His successor, Susisky, embezzled moneys belonging to the treasury, and, in order to shield himself, endeavored to shift the responsibility to Kroeger's shoulders."

The author of the article states that Susisky was convicted, but that "Kroeger was pardoned by the Governor on account of the interposition of the most distinguished jurists of the country, among whom was Judge Stallo (of Cincinnati). The latter gave an opinion upon the case, after reading a statement of the facts developed in it, that led to the action of the Governor. It seems that Kroeger was without blame in this transaction."¹

¹ The particulars of this tragical event in Mr. Kroeger's life have not been correctly told in the articles which have come under our notice. The event is tragical because it was the consciousness of unmerited punishment and disgrace that caused the premature death of this gifted man. Mr. Kroeger, who transacted some business as a broker in company with Mr. Susisky, the city treasurer, had been left in charge of the city treasury by Mr. Susisky on the occasion of his absence from the city, and, on one occasion for the convenience of a payee, in the course of business at the treasury, he, Mr. Kroeger, had given a check for six thousand dollars on his personal bank account in payment of a bill drawn on the treasury, and reimbursed himself by depositing the treasurer's check for the same amount to his own credit. The treasurer had left checks on the treasury signed in blank, and authorized Mr. Kroeger to fill them out. The testimony of Mr. Susisky and of the employees of the treasury agreed at the trial in establishing the fact that Mr. Kroeger had not misappropriated any money, but that for all checks drawn there were vouchers of equal amount showing the cancelling of lawful claims on the city treasury. The case was decided, however, not on these facts, which came out incidentally, but solely on the technical ground that Mr. Kroeger committed forgery in filling out the check signed in blank with the words "six thousand dollars to cash or bearer," even though done with the express authority of the treasurer, as appeared by his sworn testimony at the trial. An application for a new hearing of the case on its merits was refused, and Mr. Kroeger was sentenced. Mr. Susisky was subsequently tried and sentenced also. Susisky had unlawfully used the funds of the city to speculate with, and had lost his investments and had become a defaulter. Mr. Kroeger had not used any of the funds of the treasury. He was a victim sacrificed to public excitement and indignation, public opinion thinking the court had caught, by straining a technical point, a person who had done mischief but concealed it adroitly. It is justice to say that Mr. Susisky did not try "to shift the responsibility to Mr. Kroeger's shoulders," but his testimony entirely exonerated Mr. Kroeger of actual misuse of funds, although it did not acquit him, because the case was not tried on its merits. The text of the petition on which Mr. Kroeger was pardoned is as follows :

To his Excellency B. Gratz Brown, Governor of the State of Missouri.

The petition of the undersigned citizens of the State of Missouri respectfully sets forth—

(1) That Adolph E. Kroeger, convicted of forgery in the third degree before the criminal court of the county of St. Louis, in the State of Missouri, on the 27th day of

Next follows a lengthy account of Mr. Kroeger's literary and philosophical labors. "He wrote a history of the times of Frederic Barbarossa

October of 1870, and sentenced to five years in the penitentiary, was thus convicted and sentenced on the technical ground that the act of depositing another's check to his own account constituted forgery in the intent and meaning of the law.

(2) That, in consequence of his confident belief that the charge made in the indictment did not constitute forgery, said Kroeger offered no defence on the merits of the case, but rested it solely on this technical point.

(3) That the undersigned petitioners believe that the verdict rendered in this case, if technically correct, was a new and unusual application of the law on the subject of forgery.

(4) That, by the principle of free government which forbids *ex post facto* laws, a man ought not to be made to suffer for doing what, according to general usage and the previous construction of the law, had not been considered to be a crime.

(5) That the first one condemned under a new construction of a law has for this reason peculiar claims on executive clemency.

(6) That said Kroeger had borne hitherto an unblemished reputation, and had filled acceptably many positions of trust and responsibility, and had so impressed his friends and associates with his uprightness and integrity that they believed and still believe him to be incapable of the act of intentional misappropriation of money.

Wherefore, your petitioners respectfully pray that you will take into earnest consideration the circumstances of the case, and, if the grounds herein mentioned should seem insufficient, you will consider the two years sufferings and weigh this against the crime charged in the indictment, and that your Excellency will be pleased to extend to the said Adolph E. Kroeger your gracious clemency, and to grant him immediate pardon. And for this your petitioners will ever pray.

[Signed by the following lawyers—most of whom were or at some time had been judges:] Henry C. Brockmeyer ("I do not believe Mr. Kroeger guilty of any crime either in law or in fact, and I have examined the case closely and thoroughly."—H. C. B.); Henry M. Bryan, Lucien Eaton, George B. Kellogg ("I fully indorse the opinion of the Hon. H. C. Brockmeyer as above expressed."—G. B. K.); ("I recommend the pardon."—H. A. Clover); Enos Clarke, William R. Walker ("I fully agree with Mr. Brockmeyer in the opinion above expressed by him."—W. R. W.); James J. Lindley, J. G. Woerner, Horatio M. Jones, S. M. Breckenridge, and others.

Judge Samuel Treat, of the United States District Court, wrote the following letter to accompany the petition:

Hon. B. Gratz Brown, Governor of the State of Missouri.

SIR: From the facts and circumstances connected with the conviction and sentence of A. E. Kroeger, as the same have been made known to me, and I am satisfied correctly made known, I am clearly of the opinion that a grant of pardon would subserve the interests of justice. When a citizen has been deprived, by technical rules, of his personal liberty without a full and fair trial of his case on its merits by a jury of his countrymen, it better accords with the principles of constitutional liberty that he should be pardoned than that he should continue to be incarcerated, especially when great doubts exist as to guilty intent. So viewing the case in question, I join in recommending his pardon. Respectfully yours,

SAMUEL TREAT.

St. Louis, September 16, 1872.

and Frederick II of Hohenstauffen, which appeared in the St. Louis magazine 'The Western' (1878-1880). He published, in 1877, in pamphlet form, a translation of Frauenlob's (Heinrich von Meissen) 'Cantica Canticorum.' Specimens of Kroeger's translations from the Minnesingers are to be found in the last edition of Longfellow's 'The Poets and Poetry of Europe.' His history of the civil war in Missouri remains in manuscript; also a romance remains unpublished."

Mr. Kroeger's contributions to the "Journal of Speculative Philosophy" have been very numerous, as will appear from the following complete list published in the index to the fifteenth volume. Although Mr. Kroeger was never associated in the editorship of the journal, nor pecuniarily interested in its publication, he was always ready to furnish contributions for it:

- Fichte's Introduction to the Science of Knowledge (tr.), i, 23.
 Fichte's Criticism of Philosophical Systems, i, 80, 137.
 Fichte's Sun-clear Statement, ii, 3, 65, 129.
 New Exposition of the Science of Knowledge, by Fichte (tr.), iii, 1, 97, 193, 289.
 Kant's System of Transcendentalism, iii, 133, 241.
 Book of Job considered as a Work of Art (tr.), iv, 284.
 Cherubic Wanderer (tr.), iv, 31.
 Settlement for all Philosophical Disputes, iv, 111.
 A. B. Marx on Beethoven's F Minor Sonata (tr.), iv, 274.
 Fichte's Facts of Consciousness (tr.), v, 33, 130, 226, 338; vi, 42, 120, 332; vii, Jan., 36.
 Leibnitz on the Doctrine of a Universal Spirit (tr.), v, 118.
 New System of Nature, by Leibnitz (tr.), v, 209.
 Difference between the Dialectic and Synthetic Methods, vi, 184.
 Concerning a Pretended Right to Lie from Motives of Humanity (tr.), from Kant, vii, Apr., 14.
 Letter on the Proofs of Immortality, vii, July, 90.
 Leibnitz, Abridgment of his Theodicy (tr.), vii, Oct., 30.
 Can Matter produce Mind? viii, 283.
 Immortality, viii, 374.
 Anthropology by Immanuel Kant (tr.), ix, 16, 239, 406; x, 319; xi, 310, 353; xiii, 281; xiv, 154; xv, 62; xvi, 47, 395.
 Krause's Philosophy, ix, 103.
 Spinoza, ix, 263.
 What is Truth? ix, 437.
 Fichte's Criticism of Schelling (tr.), xii, 160, 316; xiii, 225.
 Obituary of I. H. von Fichte, xiii, 403.
 Kant's Critic of Pure Reason, Criticised and Explained by Himself (tr.), xiv, 1.
 H. K. Hugo Delff on Dante's Epochs of Culture (tr.), xvi, 142.

Besides these articles, he furnished a few book notices for the sixth, seventh, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth volumes, of which the following is a complete list:

- Notice of H. K. Hugo Delff's Works, vi, 93.
 Notice of Delff's Welt und Weltzeiten, vii, Jan., 88; and of the Die Neue Zeit, vii, Jan., 90.
 Notice of Castelar's Republican Movement in Europe, vii, Oct., 88.
 Notices of Von Hartmann's Writings, x, 220, 221.
 Notice of Von Hartmann's Aphorisms concerning the Drama, etc., xi, 446.

Book Notices, xii, 108-111.

Critique of Adolf Lasson on Teleology, xii, 112.

Notices of Books, xii, 217-221.

Of Mr. Kroeger's gifts at translating it is unnecessary to speak in this journal. He had a rare faculty for making clear English statements out of long, involved German sentences.

His contributions to periodical literature were very numerous.

In the "National Quarterly Review," published in New York, Mr. Kroeger printed an article on the life and writings of Fichte, and many other articles of which we have not the titles. In No. 108 of the "North American Review" he published a similar article on Leibnitz. In the "Southern Magazine," published in Baltimore, he printed other contributions. In "The Western" articles have appeared on the German Emperors.

The following is a list of contributions to newspapers from 1864 to 1879, so far as we can collect the titles from our scrap-books. The articles appeared in the "St. Louis Republican" for the most part, but many of the translations from the Minnesingers appeared in the "Boston Commonwealth." We shall be glad to publish additions to this list as a tribute to the memory of a brave, industrious, pure-minded, unjustly treated man.

1. Herbert Spencer's "First Principles."
2. "Our Republic." (Translated from the "German Monthly.")
3. The Music of the Future.
4. Beethoven.
5. The Sixteenth Canto from Tristan and Isolde. (Tr. from Gottfried von Strassburg.)
6. The Right of Suffrage.
- 7 to 14. A Series of Articles describing a Tour through the Eastern States.
15. Goethe's Prose Works.
16. Goethe's Dramas.
17. The Prologue to Tristan and Isolde. (Tr. from Gottfried von Strassburg.)
18. Shall we be a Nation or a Free People?
19. The Apollo of Belvedere. (Tr. from Winckelmann.)
20. Hymn to the Virgin Mary. (Tr. from Gottfried von Strassburg.)
21. Tristan and Isolde: The Loves of Rivalin and Blancheleur. (Tr. from Gottfried von Strassburg.)
22. "I would Depart." (Tr. from George Herwegh.)
23. Swedenborg's Ontology.
24. Sunday Dialogue on Philosophy.
25. Authority Worship.
26. Education.
27. Attacks on Christianity.
28. The Supernatural.
29. Philosophy and the Empirical Sciences.
30. The Dignity of Man. (Tr. from Fichte.)
31. Universal Suffrage in Missouri.
32. The Dream of Love.
33. Beethoven's F Minor Sonata. (Tr. from A. B. Marx.)
34. Crusade Song. (Tr. from Von Rubin.)
35. Praise of Virtue. (Tr. from Walther von der Vogelweide.)

36. A Talk with Mistress Love. (Tr. from Frauenlob.)
37. German Sermons of the Past Centuries.
38. The Fisher and the Fishlet. (Tr. from Alexander S. Pushkin.)
39. A Christmas Dance-Song. (Tr. from Tannhuser.)
40. A Day Song. (Tr. from Wolfram von Eschenbach.)
41. Crusader's Song. (Tr. from Albrecht von Johannsdorf.)
42. Hope of Love. (Tr. from Walther von der Vogelweide.)
43. Stanzas from Gottfried von Strassburg's Great Hymn.
44. Origin of Philosophical Disputes.
45. Praise of Night. (Tr. from the Old German of an Anonymous Minstrel.)
46. The Parable of the Pelican. (Tr. from Meissner.)
47. Prayer translated from an Anonymous Poet of the Thirteenth Century.
48. "Praise of Woman." (Translated from Conrad von Wuerzburg.)
49. A Song. (Tr. from Count Frederic von Liningen.)
50. "To the Loved One." (Tr. from Walther von der Vogelweide.)
51. Mine and Thine, The Glassy Fortune. (Tr. from G. von Strassburg.)
52. Love Song. (Tr. from the German of Duchring.)
53. Crusader's Song. (Tr. from Hartman von der Rue.)
54. Her Red Mouth. (Tr. from Gottfried von Nefen.)
55. The Lady's Message to her Crusader. (Tr. from Reimar the Old.)
56. Parting for the Crusade. (Tr. from Count von Botenlauben.)
57. Minnesong. (Tr. from Emperor Henry VI.)
58. Woman and Spring. (Tr. from Conrad von Wuerzburg.)
59. The Piece of Straw. (Tr. from Walther von der Vogelweide.)
60. The Lover's Complaint. (Tr. from Frauenlob.)
61. The Meadow. (Tr. from Christian von Hamle.)
62. The Two Lovers. (Tr. from Henry von Morungen.)
63. Minnesong. (Tr. from the German of Gottfried von Strassburg.)
64. Rhymed Sayings of the Cherubic Wanderer. (Tr. from [Angelus Silesius] Johann Scheffler.) [Two Articles.]
65. Charles Baudelere.
66. Technics and Esthetics in Philosophical Dress (reviewing a book by Dr. Ernst Kapp).
67. A Lyric. (Tr. from Theodore Sturm.)
68. Frederic Barbarossa and the Crusades. [Two Articles.]
69. Epilogue to the Franco-German War. (Tr. from George Herwegh.)
70. Hymn to the Virgin Mary. (Tr. from Gottfried von Strassburg.)
71. The Rule of the Incas.

[THE EDITOR.]

A. VERA.

[The following notice of Professor Vera, equally distinguished for his translations of numerous works of Hegel into French, and for his commentaries and original contributions to philosophy, we find in an old copy of the "Naples Observer."—Ed.]

We find in the "Rivista Settimanale" of the 21st October last, which is published in Milan, an interesting biography of Professor Vera, and we think that we are doing a kindness to our readers in reproducing it in this paper; first, because we believe that great thinkers do not belong to any country in particular, but to all countries; and, secondly, in regard to M. Vera, it may be said that he is not less an Englishman than an Italian or a Frenchman, as he has spent a great part of his life in England, and in some respects his name and works belong to the English philosophical world and intellectual life.

AUGUSTUS VERA.

Here is a commentator who shows the power of an original thinker; here is a *Gentile* who, having entered the Hegelian church, was proclaimed an apostle; an exalted favorite

among the French Eclecticists, who broke from their ties to assert the freedom of thought, and turned from the interests of the world and its honors to vindicate the rights of truth. Here is a man driven by fortune to foreign shores, who received the highest marks of respect in the metropolis of modern civilization, but who has retained a simplicity of manners which reminds us of Kant, who, like a clever swimmer, comes out of the ocean of idealism, and shows himself to be affable, kind, and without a shade of the affectation or pedantry of the philosopher and *savant*.

Augustus Vera, the great interpreter and successor of Hegel, not, indeed, in the chair of Berlin, but in the universal teaching, was born in Amelia, a small town in the province of Umbria, on the 4th of May, 1817, of Sante Vera and Giovanna Altieri.

The Veras, an ancient burgher's family, came from Città di Castello, and were originally called Della Vera. Sante Vera was considered the cleverest advocate not only of his own place, but of the province, and, having accepted the ideas of the French revolution, was first Commissary under the republic, then Imperial Procurator under the Napoleonic government. Giuseppe Vera, his brother, was also a celebrated Roman lawyer, and although he too received with enthusiasm the new French ideas, and professed himself publicly to be a Republican, both in prose and verse, as he was an *improvisatore* (extemporary poet), yet he was at the same time held in such a high esteem for his learning, eloquence, and honesty, that at the pontifical restoration Cardinal Consalvi took him with him to the Congress of Vienna, where he was intrusted with the defence of the interests of the Prince of Piombino and of his claims on the isle of Elba.

Sante Vera was well versed in Latin literature, and sufficiently in the French, and he was the first instructor of his son. Both by words and example he instilled in him from his earliest infancy the love of science, and gave him the best education which the domestic conditions and the times afforded. And Augustus acknowledges that he owes in a great measure to his father what he is now.

Professor Vera commenced his studies in the seminary of Amelia, but after having been there a little more than a year he left it. There the first indications of his genius began to show themselves; vivacious, quick, and *inquisitive*, his questions and discussions on abstruse philosophical and theological points caused a priest, his instructor, to prognosticate—"This boy will be a Voltaire or a Saint Austin." From the seminary he went to the college at Spello, a small town between Foligno and Spoleto, and from thence to that of Todi, because these institutes had the reputation of being the best in those places.

While in the midst of his classic studies a singular accident sent him from Umbria into Tuscany. He had in Siena an uncle named Philip, the intimate friend of an Englishman, Mr. Gould Francis Leckie, who lived near Siena at a place called San Chimento. This gentleman, having no children, thought of adopting one, and, confiding his intentions to his friend, the latter proposed to him his nephew. The proposal was agreed to, and Augustus was sent for to be adopted. At first, all things went well. Mr. Leckie, himself a finished Greek scholar, finding that the boy had already some knowledge of the rudiments of the language, which he had acquired from one of his cousins, heartily assisted him to improve himself. But, in a few months, on account partly of the exacting and rather singular disposition of Leckie, and partly of the inexperience and the proud and independent character of the youth, the connection between them was broken, and he left San Chimento carrying with him, if nothing else, the advantage of a first initiation into the English language and manner of living. In French he had

already had sufficient practice from the instruction which he had received from his father, and especially from an Augustinian monk of the name of Guerri, who had spent most of his life in France.

From San Chimento his father sent him to Rome to study law, but he did not pay much attention to it; what pleased him most was archæology, and during the year which he spent at Rome he principally attended the lectures of Nibby, the celebrated illustrator of the eternal city, so that at the annual concourse he gained the second prize.

About this time there returned from France a distant relation of his, Melchiade Fossati, a distinguished archæologist, known for his excavations at Canino, Grosseto, and other parts of the *Roman Campagna*, who was killed by a French shot at the siege of Rome. In his conversations with the youth, he convinced him that at that time neither in Rome nor indeed in Italy was there scope for talent, and that the best field for it was France. These words inspired him with a desire to go there, and after having spent a winter at Chiusi, making excavations with Fossati, he went to Paris.

Fossati had been long intimate with Ballanche, that gentle philosopher and harmonious writer, who joined the classic simplicity and imagination of the ancients with the advanced aspirations of modern progress. To him he introduced Vera, who, pleasing him at first sight, was welcomed by him as a son, so great was the kindness, so affectionate the care, so benevolent the advice, and so efficacious the support which he received from him. Vera cannot recall his venerable aspect and kind words without emotion.

He had been about a year in Paris, studying and working, when he was offered the position of professor in the Institute of Hofwyl, near Berne, which was famous at that time, and which had been founded and was conducted by Fellenberg, the disciple of Pestalozzi. It was proposed to him by Julien of Paris, founder of the "Revue Encyclopédique" (1819), and celebrated for the part which he had taken in his youth in the atrocities of Carrière at Bordeaux and Nantes, although he energetically denied the fact, and asserted that, on the contrary, he had prevented many proscriptions and had saved many from death. He did not, however, remain more than a few months at Hofwyl, where he taught the French literature, neither the place nor the somewhat monastic and Puritan habits of the place suiting him.

From there he went to Geneva, where he was soon appointed a professor in the Institute of Champel, so called from being situated in Champel on the heights overlooking the Arve and the Rhône, and which is the place where Servetus was burned. Here he taught the Greek and Latin letters, and the rudiments of philosophy. In Switzerland he first commenced the study of the German language and philosophy, but, after remaining a certain time at this school, he felt the want of a wider field for his studies and activity, and returned to Paris.

It was then that Ballanche introduced him to Cousin, whom he often met afterwards at the house of Mme. Colet. In the first and long conversation which he had with Cousin, this last proposed to him a professorship of philosophy in these precise words: "Voulez vous enrôler sous ma bannière?" He accepted. He was not a Frenchman, nor had he taken any university degree, not even that of M. A. (bachelier); nevertheless, he was appointed and sent to Mont-de-Marsan, the chief town in the department of the Landes, with the obligation of taking the degree of bachelier within six months. He took it at Pau, where the professor of philosophy who examined him, M. de Mézière, said to him: "Je regrette de devoir vous examiner, car vous devriez examiner et

pas être examiné." He had then published nothing, and had been in the university only a few months, yet he was already numbered among the young professors of the greatest promise.

From Mont-de-Marsan he was sent successively to Toulon, Lille, and Paris, as "agrégé volant," that is to say, to supply the place of the professors absent, from sickness or other causes, in the lycées at Paris. He then went as professor to Limoges, but was called anew to Paris to supply the place of Franck, at the Lyceum of Charle-Magne. From there he went to Rouen, and finally to Strasbourg.

He took the degree of "bachelier ès lettres" at Pau, that of "bachelier ès sciences" and the *licence* at Lyons, that of *agrégé de philosophie* in 1844, and that of doctor in 1845, at Paris.

His papers for the degree of doctor were the "Problème de la Certitude," and "De Platonis, Aristotelis et Hegelii de medio termino doctrina." The examiners pronounced them to be the most remarkable which had been presented for a long time, and he was complimented on them by the Minister Salvandy. Besides these papers he did not publish much during his residence in France. At Lille he wrote especially for the literary part of the "Echo du Nord," a journal somewhat radical and almost republican in its tendencies, edited by Leleux. He published two or three articles (one on the logic of Hegel, in 1840) in the "Revue de Lyon," and several in the "Liberté de penser," a review founded in Paris by a society of professors.

He had pupils of illustrious families, Jules Durville, son of the admiral, a youth of high promise, who was burned alive with his father and mother in the railway accident at Versailles in 1842, one of the sons of Admiral Baudin, and the celebrated writer and novelist, Edmond About. He knew the two admirals, and it was at Lille that he became acquainted with M. Thiers, who used to spend at that time every year some months in that town, and with the General Magnan who was afterwards made a Marschal. Illustrious, also, were his acquaintances and connections among the philosophers and men of science. The first and dearest among them was Rémusat, the historian of Abelard, St. Anselm, and Bacon—"qui a des idées sur tout," as Tocqueville said of him. He knew Saint-Marc-Girardin, the elegant annalist of the drama; the erudite Victor Leclere, lately dead, the renowned illustrator of the French literature of the Middle Ages; Vacherot; Ozanam; Garnier, the Cartesian; Damion, the biographer of the contemporary philosophers and thinkers of the eighteenth century, the micrologist of whom Cousin said, "il voit tout par le trou de l'aiguille"; Jules Simon; Guignault, the translator of Creuzer; Saisset, the translator of the Spinoza, who died not long ago; and Frank, the author of the "Cabale," and the editor of the "Dictionnaire des sciences philosophiques."

In 1851, dissatisfied with the state of affairs in France, and feeling that no freedom was allowed to philosophical teaching, he went to England, where he remained until his return to Italy, in 1860. Twice was he invited to resume his position in France, but thought it best to decline the offer.

In England he gave public lectures and private lessons. Here he had also distinguished pupils, and, among others, a nephew of the Earl Russell, Arthur Russell, the present member for Tavistock, and brother of Odo, the representative of England at Rome; and he was acquainted with many illustrious personages, such as Richard Monckton Milnes, who has been raised to the peerage under the title of Lord Houghton, one of the wits of English society; Macaulay; Millman, Dean of St. Paul's, the editor of Gibbon and the historian of Christianity; Vandeweyer, the Belgian ambassa-

dor; Oxenford, the witty critic; and Hepworth Dixon, the author of a book on Bacon, and of another on the Holy Land.

The results of his long studies and profound meditations in France bore their fruit during his stay in England. Laying aside his connection with the "Athenæum," the "Emporio Italiano," and other journals, we will only mention his capital book, the "Introduction à la Philosophie de Hegel" (1855). It was a true revelation. Hegel had been both well and ill spoken of. People felt towards him the attraction which the forbidden fruit inspires, but he was known out of Germany about as much as the Egyptian hieroglyphics before Champollion, or the cuneiform inscriptions before Rawlinson; nay, even in his country, the thought of the modern Aristotle remained, as it were, enveloped in clouds. To some he appeared a prophet, to others an impostor. There were, it is true, those who had endeavored, with a superstructure of philosophical and common phrases, and furious attempts at French and Anglo-Italian parallelisms, mingled with German formulæ, to make him understood, but they were like—

. . . il poeta Cujo
Che con di molti lumi faceva buio.

(The poet Cujo, who out of many lights made darkness.)

And behold! Vera, without using a word of German, in a French as pure and lucid as that of Malebranche, expounds the immense system of Hegel and unveils it to the admiration of the world. Two of Hegel's disciples, the depositaries of his doctrine, his Peter and Paul, Michelet (of Berlin) and Rosenkranz, thought they saw their master risen from the dead, and publicly honored the revealer, and the latter went so far as to say that the Germans could derive no small benefit from reading a book in which a great intellect, availing itself of a language at once transparent and precise, had made more luminous the conception of their master.

Prince Albert, whose mind was so highly cultivated, was struck with it, and spoke of it in the highest terms to the ministers and learned men, and even to his courtiers. His enthusiasm descended to his daughter, who was found by him one day at Berlin reading the book with her husband, the Crown Prince of Prussia. It was said that he would have intrusted Professor Vera with the philosophical instruction of the Prince of Wales had he not been prevented by the exigencies of his position and of the English society.

Count Mamiani, whose impartiality and distinguished mind are well known, invited Vera to return to Italy as professor of philosophy in the Scientific and Literary Academy at Milan. Here Vera taught only one year, lecturing also on the philosophy of history. We have read and admired his fine introductory lectures printed in French by Germer Baillièrè, but of his teachings his disciples can give an idea; but we expect more than an idea from his talented pupil, Raffaele Mariano, who has collected his lectures in Naples, where Vera has been transferred and has been teaching these last five years. Born in a province where the language is correctly spoken, and educated at Tuscany and Rome, notwithstanding his long residence in France and England, and his long intercourse with Hegel, Professor Vera, besides the fine and clear Roman pronunciation, has retained the pure and idiomatic character of his native language; but, finding this latter somewhat unsuited for the explanation of the new philosophy, or perhaps overpowered by the intuition of the absolute truth, he speaks slowly, and without connecting his thoughts with the artificial thread of the rhetoricians. But so great is the beauty of his ideas and so admirable his views, that the minds of his hearers remain

fixed in admiration, and he forms not disciples, but believers, capable of the free and absolute use of their own intellect.

We will speak another time of his translation of the "Logic" and of the "Philosophy of Nature" of Hegel, illustrated with introductions and commentaries, which make them original works of the highest order. The last especially is a very bold undertaking, being that part of the doctrine of Hegel most neglected by his own German disciples, and requiring to be explained not only a knowledge of the present state of physical sciences, but a superior mind, capable of overruling the system of truth now held in veneration.

We will speak another time also of his philosophical eloquence as well as of his critical and debating power, which are so well exemplified in his book, "L'Hégélianisme et la philosophie." To-day our object was only to render homage to a great thinker, great for his gigantic labors as well as for the ceaseless workings of his lofty mind.

GIULIO ANTIMACO.

SENTENCES IN PROSE AND VERSE.

SELECTED BY WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING.

VI.

No tarts that ever I tasted at any table possessed such a refreshing, cheering, encouraging acid, that literally put the heart in you and set you on edge for this world's experiences, bracing the spirit—as the cranberries I have plucked in the meadows in the spring. They cut the winter's phlegm, and now I can swallow another year of this world without other sauce.—*Ibid.*

How rich and autumnal the haze which blues the distant hill and fills the valleys!—*Ibid.*

I saw to-day a double reflection, in the pond, of the cars passing, one beneath the other, occasioned by a bright rippled streak on the surface of the water, from which a second reflection sprang.—*Ibid.*


For things that *pass are past*, and in this field
The indeficient spring no winter flaws.—*Giles Fletcher.*


And what's a life? The flourishing array
Of the proud summer meadow, which to-day
Wears her green plush, and is to-morrow hay.—*Quarles.*

The earth, the air, and seas I know, and all
The joys and horrors of their peace and wars;
And now will view the God's state and the stars.—*George Chapman.*

Knowledge is proud that he has learned so much.
Wisdom is humble that he knows no more.—*Cowper.*







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P
Philos

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