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# THE JOURNAL

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## SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

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### SOME ASPECTS OF RECENT GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.<sup>1</sup>

BY G. H. HOWISON.

In another publication<sup>2</sup> I have endeavored to present the above-named topic in its general bearings, showing the situation to be one of hesitancy and transition, with a remarkable tendency towards a high and even exaggerated estimation of the empirical methods that distinguish the philosophic school historic in England, the rallying-ery of "Back to Kant!" having been succeeded by a more adventurous one of "Beyond Kant!" and this "beyond," mainly under the dominating pressure of the current interest in the theories of evolution and natural selection, being construed as lying in the region of that empiricism of which these theories are the boasted victorious result. In the present article we come to the details and the *personnel* of the more prevalent and typical views. It will be of advantage to consider these under two leading points of view: first, as operating in German society at large; and, secondly, in the phases confined to the universities.

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<sup>1</sup> In substance, a lecture given at the Concord School of Philosophy, July 19, 1882.

<sup>2</sup> See the report of Professor Howison's remarks, in "The Concord Lectures." Cambridge: Moses King, 1883.

## PHILOSOPHY IN GERMAN SOCIETY GENERALLY.

In the total stream of present German thought there are discernible three main currents—the idealistic, the materialistic, and the agnostic, or “critical,” as its adherents prefer to name it. This division, however, is not distinctive of the present period, being merely the continuation of a world-old divergence in doctrine. But it is distinctive of the present situation, that, as already indicated, these several views are now all defended from standpoints more or less empirical. In the case of materialism, to be sure, this is natural and in no wise unexpected; but the occurrence of it in the case of idealism and of agnosticism, after Kant’s day and in his own land, and among thinkers long given to the study of his works, is a genuine surprise. That the very principles of the “Critique of Pure Reason,” the historic stronghold of the *a priori*, should suffer the complete transformation of being made to support empiricism, is a performance truly astonishing. Yet it has been managed, and constitutes the distinguishing feat of the so-called Neo-Kantians.

Each of these three main movements has a leading representative. There are thus three men who challenge our attention, as in their several ways typical of the dominant intellectual interests of their day—Eduard von Hartmann, Eugen Dühring, and Friedrich Albert Lange. The first stands for such idealism as is now in vogue, derived in a long line of degeneration from Hegel, through such self-styled adherents as Strauss and Arnold Ruge, Bruno Baur and Feuerbach, and from Kant through the distorting medium of Schopenhauer; the second represents materialism, with the singular trait of blending with the legitimate line of its empirical defences certain remarkable elements of a transcendental logic; the third represents agnosticism, with the additional and peculiar interest of being the Neo-Kantian *par excellence*.

Hartmann was born in Berlin, in 1842, the son of a general in the Prussian army, in which he held a commission himself till disease that left him a permanent cripple turned him aside into the career of letters. Dühring, also born in Berlin, in 1833, began his career in the Prussian department of justice, but was ere long compelled to abandon this, through disease that deprived him of his sight. In spite of his blindness, however, he has kept up the



most copious production and publication.<sup>1</sup> But, in contrast to Hartmann, who leads the quiet life of a man of letters well to do, he has tasted no little of the bitterness of the human lot. For many years he won some bread and much reputation as a *privat-docent* at the University of Berlin ; but, in 1877, he was dismissed from this office on account of his persistent and bitter attacks on some of the scientific and philosophical performances of certain of his colleagues, particularly Helmholtz ; and since then he has picked up a precarious subsistence in private life. Lange, born near Solingen, in 1828, made his university course chiefly at Bonn, where his principal interest seemed to be in philology and pedagogics, and then passed some years in practical life, partly as bookseller, partly as secretary of the Duisburg Chamber of Commerce. Later, he was made professor of philosophy at Zurich, where, in his case too, disease left its lasting marks in the effects of a surgical operation that nearly cost him his life. In 1872 he was called from Zurich to Marburg, but died there in 1875, after prolonged sufferings, in the bloom of his intellectual powers, to the unceasing regret of that large body of his younger countrymen who were beginning to see in him a philosophic force of far-reaching effect.

Though the three men were so considerably separated in years, they began to act upon the public almost simultaneously. Lange's "History of Materialism," so noted in its later form, first appeared in 1865 ; Dühring's first important work, the "Natural Dialectic," was published the same year ; while Hartmann's "Philosophy of the Unconscious" came first from the press in 1868. The main lines of their several theories we are now to trace, and endeavor to value.

In opening a study of HARTMANN and his large circle of readers, we come at once upon the sphere of an influence the vastness of whose reach in the present "Enlightened Public" of Germany it is impossible to overlook ; I refer, of course, to Schopenhauer. Hartmann is generally and justly recognized as the mental heir of Schopenhauer, in direct succession. His so-called system is, how-

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<sup>1</sup> His works already comprise no less than twenty octavo volumes, in the various departments of metaphysics, economics, sociology, mathematics, and criticism.

ever, far inferior in intellectual quality to that of his predecessor. He differs from Schopenhauer in giving to the empirical a great predominance over the *a priori* method,<sup>1</sup> and in his doctrine concerning the nature of the absolute. The former fact expresses his deference to the "stupendous achievements" of recent science; the latter, his ambition to frame a system that should blend in a single higher unity whatever of preceding theory he knew—Schopenhauer's pessimism and sundry idealistic fragments, no doubt also first suggested by Schopenhauer, but in detail borrowed largely from Schelling and the "left wing" distorters and mutilators of Hegel.

Schopenhauer, seizing upon Kant's doctrine of the *ex mente* origin of nature, and the consequently phenomenal character of the world, asked the question that cannot but rise upon Kant's results—What, then, *is* this "Thing-in-itself," assumed as the source of the sensations that our *a priori* reason co-ordinates into a universe? He felt the force of Kant's arguments for the limitation of knowledge to the realm of the subject's own experiences—of the contradictions into which reason was apparently shown to fall when attempting to apply its categories to a Thing-in-itself supposed to lie beyond that realm. But he also felt the necessity of the Thing-in-itself, of an absolute, in order to the relativity that, according to Kant, was an essential feature of knowledge; and seeing, too, the chasm that separated Kant's doctrine of the will from his view of the intellect, he proposed to remedy both defects of the Kantian theory at once by the doctrine that reason is *only* theoretical, and the will not phenomenal but noumenal: in short, that the absolute is Will—a darkling, dumb outstriving, in itself unconscious, whose impulsions, by a perpetual thwarting from some mysterious Check, give rise to what we call consciousness. The whole of being was thus reduced to terms of inner or subjective life. There was the dark undertow of the ever-heaving Desire, and, woven over it, the flashing image-world of Perception: the universe was Will and Representation. Of this Will we knew nothing, save that it was insatiable; the forms of consciousness were not its expression, but its repression—its negation. Ever the

<sup>1</sup> The reader will easily recall his significant motto, so taking in these times: "*Speculative results by the inductive method of the natural sciences.*"

higher these rose in the ascending evolution of nature, in reaction against its wilder and wilder throbbings, ever the more bitterly must their necessary finitude thwart the infinity of its blind desire. Universal life was thus, from its own conditions and essence, foredoomed to misery: its core was anguish, its outlook was despair. And all the facts of existence, from wheresoever taken in the ascending levels of consciousness, confirmed but too darkly this haggard prophecy of *a priori* thought: everywhere the overplus of pain, everywhere illusion dispelled in disappointment. There was, and could be, but one avenue of escape—death and oblivion. On this fact rose the whole structure of ethics; the “whole duty of man” was simply this: *Suppress the will to live*. All moral feeling was summed up in pity, and all moral action in ascetic living, that, the tone of life being thus perpetually lowered, the will might slowly sink into quiescence, and life itself at last fade out into the repose and silence of annihilation.

Such was the philosophy (which, if at bottom theoretically hollow, has still on its surface a certain tragic fascination) that stimulated Hartmann to attempt a composition of like tone on the ancient theme of Man. The philosophic problem, let it be noted in passing, takes for its leading question, in the minds of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, a phase of Kant’s “What may I hope for?” The all-dominating concern for them is, What is life all worth? They are both possessed with a profound sense of the misery of existence; but while, under Schopenhauer’s treatment, the pessimistic strain seems to sound forth only at the close, and to issue from conditions that originally bear solely on the origin of experience, there can hardly be any doubt that with Hartmann the pessimism was first, and the theory of the Unconscious an afterthought to explain it. His problem has the look of being this: Given misery as the sum of existence, what must be presupposed in order to account for it?

The method and the contents of his solution both show what a weight empirical evidence has with him in contrast with dialectical. He professes a certain allegiance to the latter, and he makes frequent resort also to *a priori* deduction of the most antiquated sort; but his general drift to fact, induction, and analogy is the patent and distinguishing feature of his book. He seizes upon a striking but occult class of facts in our psychological history, as

containing the explanation of his problem, and, indeed, of life itself. There is given in our very experience, he says, the manifest presence of an unconscious agency. He refers, in this, to the class of experiences nowadays commonly grouped under the term "reflex action"—facts of somnambulism, trance, clairvoyance, and instinctive knowledge; all those "unconscious modifications," in short, the emphasizing of which formed such a memorable dissonance in the thinking of Sir William Hamilton. The Unconscious is actually here *with us*, Hartmann holds; there is a something beneath our consciousness that performs for us, even when consciousness is suspended, all that is most characteristic of life, and that, too, with a swift and infallible surety and precision; what less, then, can we do than accept this Unconscious as the one and absolute reality? We accept; and so come by the *Philosophy of the Unconscious*.

Here, however, Hartmann is confronted by the warning of Kant, which, on grounds of a critical determination of the nature and limits of reason, forbids him to undertake the discussion of an object thus removed from possible experience. This warning, then, must first of all be silenced. Hartmann consequently addresses himself to the refutation of the Kantian thesis that knowledge is only of the phenomenal. Here he leaves his favorite basis of facts, and resorts necessarily to hypotheses purely *a priori*. He proceeds by showing the self-contradiction, as by Kant's own terms, of a *material* Thing-in-itself—a supposed background hid, as it were, *behind* the vision-world of experience, this phenomenon, this apparition, rising thus between the thing and the mind; and then proposes, as the remedy, the bringing of this absolute *within* the film of the apparition, and, so to speak, between it and the mind. In short, he makes his Unconscious, as the absolute, the common source of two parallel streams of appearance—the one objective, the sensible world itself; the other subjective, the stream of our conscious perceptions of the world.<sup>1</sup> These two streams, as both flowing from the one Unconscious, under identically corresponding conditions, are in incessant counterpart. Thus, knowledge, though not a copy of natural objects, is an exact counter-image to them, engendered from a common source. Con-

<sup>1</sup> A reminiscence, here, of Spinoza.



sciousness and nature are both pure show (*Schein*); the world is an "objective apparition" (*ein objectiver Schein*), and perception is a duplicate "subjective apparition" (*ein subjectiver Schein*), and both are exhaled mist-like from the depths of the Unconscious. Existence is thus doubled throughout; space, time, and the causal nexus are duplicated too, as well as the units they contain or connect.

The Kantian doctrine—that space, time, and causation are merely subjective—being considered thus disposed of, its corollary of the empirical limitation of knowledge likewise falls away, and Hartmann may proceed, he thinks, with his metaphysical programme. First, however, the method of philosophy must be more precisely accentuated. *How* can knowledge of the absolute, which lies (as the Unconscious) wholly beyond our consciousness, ever arise? By virtue of two facts, replies Hartmann: our "mystic sense of union with the Unconscious," and that uniformity of nature which forms the basis of induction. The organon of philosophy has thus two factors—Mystic and Induction. From the former come all the *clues* of knowledge, the mysterious "suggestions" of the Unconscious itself; from the latter, the *verification* of these, as followed out in the complicated system of experience. It is by the latter alone that philosophy distinguishes itself from religion: for both flow alike from the mystic of the "suggestions," while religion retains in the form of myth those mysterious whisperings which philosophy, following the self-revelation of nature in induction, lays bare in their clear and literal truth.

In the light of this method, now, the Unconscious so far reveals its real nature that we know it is something infallibly and infinitely intelligent. Strictly, it is not the *Unconscious*, but rather the *Subconscious*, the *Unbeknown* (*das Unbewusste*).<sup>1</sup> In its infallible infinite-swiftness of perception, however, as experience testifies of it, there is a transcendent type of the flashing inspirations of genius. It is thus not *self-conscious*; its intelligence is clairvoyant, and has no "large discourse of reason," that "sees the end in the beginning." But, as intelligent energy, it has the two constituents that we find present in all intelligent activity within experience—will and representation. And here is the point at which

<sup>1</sup> "Zekle crep' up quite *unbeknown*."—LOWELL: *The Courtin*'.

to correct and complete Schopenhauer's doctrine of the absolute. Not will is the absolute; for will as well as representation is part of conscious experience; will is itself phenomenal. Rather are will and representation the two co-ordinate primal manifestations of the one Unconscious. Here, too, is the truth of the famous *Neutrum*—the something neither subject nor object—that Schelling set up for the absolute; and no longer, thinks Hartmann, the target for a Hegel's "the absolute, popping up as if shot from a pistol," since it is now construed in terms vouched for by actual experience. Moreover, the conception is here found that will embosom the vast system of Hegel himself: the all-embracing "Logical Idea" (*das logische Idee*) falls as a mere constituent into the vaster being of the Unconscious; for what is the Unconscious, as revealed in experience, but that which works by the incessant interplay of representation and will? And just as will in its essence is mere blind struggle, so is representation in *its* essence nothing other than luminous idea—the all-embracing logical bond that grasps the vague of sensation into distinct terms, and these terms again into systems, and these systems at last into a single organic unity of thought.<sup>1</sup> The Unconscious, then, is primordially will and idea; and from the necessary interplay of these arose the twofold world of finitude, pouring forth from the Unconscious in the counterpart streams of object and subject, of sensible world and conscious perception.

Hartmann is now at length well ashore on the familiar coasts of Schopenhauerland. This world-child of clear-eyed virgin Idea and darkling brutal Will is no product of far-sighted love, endowed with an exhaustless future of joy: it is the offspring of chance, and its future carries in its very core the germs of ever-expanding misery. This gloomy theme Hartmann pursues over all the provinces of experience, seeking to prove that suffering everywhere outbalances happiness, that "he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow," the pitch of anguish rising ever higher and higher as nature ascends in the scale of consciousness, and especially as man enlarges and quickens that intelligence whose chief result must, from the nature of the case, be the keener apprehension of the deceitfulness of life. Nor, continues Hartmann,

<sup>1</sup> Note the one-sided and superficial construction here put upon Hegel's theory.

let any one hope to evade this conclusion by theories of possible compensation. Men, to be sure, usually live in one or another of three stages of illusion in regard to this essential misery of life: they either think that, even in this world, the sum of joy so far exceeds the sum of sorrow as to make existence here essentially good; or, if sobered out of this by inexorable experience, they take refuge in the hereafter, in the prospect of an endless opportunity beyond the grave—a refuge of lies, since the Unconscious is the sole subject of conscious life, there is no individual self, death is simply subsidence into the absolute vagueness, and immortality is therefore a delusion; or, finally, surrendering both of these dreams, they resort to the future, and indulge in the illusion of hope—the world can yet be made the abode of happiness, and let us make it so. But, admonishes Hartmann, all these fancies ignore the contradiction that lies in the very heart of existence; there is but one plain moral in the drama of experience, and that is the utter worthlessness of life. Ethics consequently sums itself up in the single precept, *Make an end of it!* The will being in its essence a wild unrest, both metaphysics and experience teach that the only way of escape from the misery inherent in the nature of life is to bring the will to quiescence; in short, to blot it out of being. Our sole intelligent desire, won in the bitter school of experience, is the longing for release from struggling, the wish to be delivered from this delusive Maya of consciousness and to pass into motionless Nirwāna. Hasten, then, the day when the pitch of misery shall have risen to the frenzy of despair, and mankind in united delirium shall execute a universal *auto da fé*, and, by final self-immolation, end the tragedy of existence forever.

Nevertheless, while this is the sum of its theory, ethics may have the important practical question to settle, How shall we make an end of things the surest and soonest? There is here indeed no *duty*; there is no such thing as duty: there is simply a possible satisfaction of the desire for release from misery; but to this end there may be an alternative of means. We may each promote the end by a negative or by a positive agency. By following the traditional standards of virtue, we may advance society in order, peace, prosperity, and apparent welfare, the real outcome of which, however, is but the profounder despair; or we may, by passion, fraud, and violence, heighten the rising flood of

misery directly. Which each will do is matter of temperament and circumstance. Pessimism thus does nothing actively to promote what traditional ethics would brand as immorality; it merely leaves the so-called morality or immorality to be dealt with by the fate inherent in existence. The interaction of both is the force that drives the universe assuredly to its desired dissolution.

Moreover, the negative side of pessimist ethics gives rise to problems of history, of politics, of religion; for one theory of these matters, put in practice, may promote the final catastrophe more surely and swiftly than another. Thus, pessimism has its philosophy of history, in which history appears as the evolution of the three stages of illusion mentioned above. The great scene of the first stage was the pagan world, typical in which was the Hellenic joy in sensuous life, and the Roman glory in conquest and organization. That of the second is Christendom, so far as it is untouched by decay of its essential dogma. That of the third is the modern world of "enlightenment," of "advanced" thinking, of political and economic reorganization in the interest of "the good time coming." Following all is the surely predestined disillusion that is to lead to the final dissolution. Pessimism has, too, its philosophy of politics. Its ideal polity is a "strong government," based on the theory of socialism and administered in its interest to the remotest detail. Pessimism has, finally, its philosophy of religion, according to which religion is the consecration in myth and mystery of the meaning that philosophy puts rationally. Religion, therefore, undergoes an evolution side by side with the development of philosophy. Accordingly, pessimism sees all religions arrayed in two successive groups—the religions of illusion and the religion of disillusion. The former break up again in accordance with the "three stages." Paganism is the religion of the first stage; Christianity, untainted by rationalism, that of the second; "free religion," "liberal Christianity," the "positive religion," "ethical culture," the "church of humanity"—all the manifold experiments at making a "religion" whose interest is to be centred in this world alone—constitute that of the third. Over against all these stands Hartmann's "religion of the future," whose priests are to celebrate the doctrine, solemnize the rites, and inspire the devotees of the great Nirwāna—the eternal silence and blank.



These are the main lines of the theory that engages the adherence of that throng of *blasés* sentimentalists who make up the body of Hartmann's admirers. In contrast with the Germany that responded to the sober and invigorating views of a Kant, a Fichte, or a Hegel, these people are a curious and disheartening study. Apart from the revolt that minds of any real moral vigor must feel at such results, the want of intellectual fibre betrayed in the acceptance of this mesh of contradictions is a telling evidence of decline in theoretical tone among the "cultivated classes." Limp as this "system" hangs, with its preposterous attempt to construe the absolute by mere pictorial thinking, by adjustments of components set side by side, by a temporal antecedence to the world of nature, in short, by means of categories strictly mechanical, flung on the screen of space and time—to say nothing of its bald ignoring of the chasm between consciousness and the Unconscious, of its absolute at once unconscious and conscious, of its deduction of the reality of knowledge from the assumed issuance of duplicate worlds from the Unconscious, and its then using this reality of knowledge to establish this very issuance—flimsy as all this is, there seems to be a sufficient multitude to whom it gives a satisfaction, and who are even willing to do battle, at least on field of paper and under fire of ink, for the high privilege of a general annihilation in the distant future. It is true, however, and fortunate for Germany, as indeed for the world, that this class of minds forms only a portion of the public; that authority goes by weight and not by numbers; and that Germans of the higher and more thorough order of culture have already discerned the bubble, and have pricked it without pity. It would be unjust, however, to take leave of Hartmann and Schopenhauer without emphatically acknowledging the service they have rendered by their complete unveiling of the pessimism necessarily inherent in every theory that makes the absolute impersonal.

When we turn now to DÜHRING, we find ourselves suddenly in the opposite extreme of the emotional climate. Dühring is materialist, but he is optimist still more. Indeed, it seems not unlikely that he is optimist before he is materialist, just as Hartmann is pessimist first and expounder of the Unconscious afterwards. In taking him as the representative of materialism, I have purposely

passed by names far more widely known—those of Moleschott, Büchner, and Carl Vogt, for instance—both because these are all men of popular rather than of severe methods, having far less weight in the scientific world than he, and because he is a man of far more scope, of really great and thorough attainments, of positive originality, and of a certain delicacy of intellectual perception essential to a great thinker.<sup>1</sup> Haeckel, who, by his extravagant ardor in advocating atheistic evolution, his vast knowledge of biological details, and his high reputation among his associates in science, fills so large a place in the minds of readers as a representative of materialism, must also here give way to Dühring, on the ground of not concerning himself seriously with the philosophic foundations of the theory, but only with such of its phenomenal details as belong more especially to organic existence.

Dühring names his system the *Philosophy of the Actual*. This title sounds almost like a direct challenge to Hartmann, as much as to say, “No mystical subconscious or incognizable Background *here!*” And to have this really so is Dühring’s first and last endeavor. The absolute for him is just this world of sense, taken literally as we find it: briefly and frankly, *matter*. As we perceive and think it, so it *is*—extended, figured, resistant, moving; a total of separate units collected into a figured whole and into a uniformity of processes by mechanical causation: in short, a *variable constant*. This conception of an indissoluble polar union between Permanence and Change is, according to Dühring, the vital nerve of the Actual, and the key to its entire philosophy.<sup>2</sup> But this polar coherence, he thinks, is only possible by the Actual’s consisting of certain primitive elements, definite in size, figure, and number, subject to definite laws of combination and change of combination. The permanent in the Actual is thus (1) Atoms,

<sup>1</sup> A writer more correctly to be compared with Dühring is Czolbe, of Königsberg, author of a naturalistic theory expounded in his “Limits of Human Knowledge on the Basis of the Mechanical Principle,” who died in 1873. But his views did not, like Dühring’s, develop themselves into a comprehensive philosophy, applied to all the provinces of life. He belonged, too, rather to the previous generation of thinkers than to this, and was known there as an opponent of Lotze. The latter I have likewise passed by later on, in the agnostic-idealist reference, in spite of his acknowledged bearing on the position of Lange, mainly for reasons similar to those that led me to disregard Czolbe.

<sup>2</sup> In this he undoubtedly presents a one-sided reflection from Hegel, with whom Identity and Difference are the elementary dynamic “moments” of the absolute Idea.

(2) Types, or the primitive Kinds of the atoms, the origin of species in nature, and (3) Laws, determining the possible combinations of the types and the order of succession in these combinations. The variable, on the other hand, is the series of changing combinations as they actually occur; these amount simply to a change in the *form* of the Actual, in its parts and in its whole. The evolution of this form moves towards a certain result, which, as necessarily evolved from the primitive conditions and therefore involved in them, may be regarded, though only in the sense of a mechanical destination, as the *Final Purpose of the World*. The Actual, then, taken in its entire career and being, presents the form of a self-completing system of relations. In other words, there is a *Logic of Nature*, inherent in the world itself. To reproduce this logic in the form of our knowledge is the aim and sum of science; to reproduce it not only so, but also in disposition and life, is the sum of philosophy. Philosophy being thus the aim and the distilled result of all the sciences, its method and organon must be identical with theirs. The method is hypothesis, verified by experimental induction and criticised by thought. The organon is the imagination checked by the understanding, and the understanding checked by dialectic: the former gives us the requisite hypotheses; the latter tests and settles their rival claims, the dialectic purging it from the illusory contradictions into which it naturally runs when facing the problems of ultimate reality. These problems all concern the notion of infinity, either in the form of the infinitely great or the infinitely small; and the contradictions, seemingly unavoidable, to which they give rise, are in truth, says Dühring, mere illusions, springing from the lack of a First Principle that has genuine reality. These contradictions, he continues, formed the basis of Kant's boasted dialectic, by which he is thought to have exposed the illusion hiding in our very faculties: he would have it that they issue from the inmost nature of the understanding when it presumes to grapple with things as they are; but their appearance in the form of his famous "Antinomies" was in fact owing to his imperfect conception of the origin of knowledge, and his consequent falsification of nature into a mere phenomenon. With this assertion, Dühring confronts Kant's standing challenge, "How can you make out that perceptions and thoughts are true of the Real, when from the nature of

the case they must be products of our human organization, and therefore shut in to the perpetual contemplation of—themselves?” By searching in the right place, he answers in effect, and finding that “*common root*” of sense and understanding of which you yourself, Kant, have more than rarely spoken, but the investigation of which you have found it so much easier to evade. What sort of “criticism of reason” is it that stops with thrusting experience into the limbo of an abstraction called the *a priori*, and never asking what the *Prius* thus implied must be? Man brings his perceptive and thinking organization into the world with him, doubtless; but from whence? Whence indeed, if not from the bosom of Nature? Let us but once think the Actual as the Actual—as a continuous whole, unfolding towards its Final Purpose—with man and his conscious organism veritably *in* it, and the reality of knowledge becomes intelligible enough. For consciousness is then no longer an imprinted *copy* of things, as the truth-cancelling and unthinkable theory of dualism makes it, but becomes instead a new *setting* of them, pushed forth from the same original stock; man thus inherits the contents and the logical system of nature by direct transmission, and consciousness, while remaining self-converse, becomes *self-converse in which the process of the world is re-enacted*.<sup>1</sup> And we reach in this way not only the reality of knowledge, but the ground for the occurrence of contradictions in it, and the principle of a dialectic that will solve them. This *Natural Dialectic*—proceeds Dühring, in his treatise under that title—moves in the following manner: Knowledge, though identical with the Actual in contents, differs from it in form; it is, in fact, just the translation of those contents from the form of object into that of subject—from the form of being into that of knowing. Now, a leading trait of this subjectivity is its sense of *possibility*—of the power to use the active synthesis that works in nature, and that now in mind works as the secret of its thinking, with an indefinite freedom. In short, it possesses *imagination*. As a consequence, it falls under the illusion of the false-infinite (Spinoza’s *infinitum imaginationis*), and assumes that the principles of its logical synthesis—space, time, and causation—are as infinite in the object-world as they appear

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<sup>1</sup> This reminiscence of Leibnitz’s monadology is extremely noteworthy.



to be in itself. But to suppose causation, time, and space to be really infinite would strip the Actual of the quality of an absolute, and thus annul reality altogether. For, first, causation cannot in fact run backwards infinitely, but must at some time or other have absolutely *begun*; and it must break off its retrograde in logic as well as in time—must cease in respect to “grounds” as well as in reference to “causes:” for real causation belongs only to events and change, not to Being and identity, and hence there must come a point where the questions *What caused it* and *Why* are finally silenced, else there would be nothing absolute; whereas *the unde-derived necessity of Being, and of its elements and laws, is the first condition for a rational view of the world*. Secondly, real time cannot be infinite: for real time is nothing but the total duration of causal changes; and *to suppose this infinite would, reckoning backwards, make the beginning of causation, just established, close an infinite duration*. Finally, real space is simply the extent of the sum-total of atoms: but this must be finite, because *the number of atoms is necessarily definite; for, if it were not, the Actual of perception, as a series of changes by definite combination, would be impossible*. Objective space, time, and causation are thus all finite; the persuasion that they are infinite, with all the consequent array of counterpart propositions contradicting the foregoing, is an illusion arising from neglect of the differences between object and subject. Subjective space, time, and causation have, to be sure, a *quasi* infinity; yet our authentic thought, even about them, dissolves this illusion and agrees with reality as soon as the understanding brings its dialectic to bear. Here, then, concludes Dühring, the whole Kantian fog-bank of Antinomies is explained and scattered: one series of Kant’s pairs of counter-judgments is entirely true; the other comes from the false-infinite, and is the work of the imagination, uncritically mistaken by Kant for the understanding.

From this point onward, then, the metaphysics of the Actual may freely proceed. The Actual as absolute—as to its veritable Being—is eternal: time and causation apply not to its inmost existence, but only to its processional changes. Nevertheless, this differentiation is just as necessarily involved in its nature as is its abiding identity. The system of changes called the sensible world must accordingly, at some instant or other, have strictly *begun*.

Thenceforward the Actual, poured in its entirety into these changes, moves in a gradually varying, many-branching Figure, whose elementary components are of constant dimensions and number, but whose shape is undergoing incessant alteration, giving rise, from epoch to epoch, to forms of existence constantly new. The series of element-combinations is not recurrent, and the world-whole moves not in a circuit, but in a continual advance. This movement is carried forward by the Logic of Nature; consequently, by the combined action of causation, space, and time, which are its only ultimate principles. Hence real causation is the transfer of motion by the impact of extended parts, and the evolution of the world proceeds by the single principle of *mechanism*. Strictly, then, universal logic is simply a *Mechanics of Nature*.<sup>1</sup> This cosmic principle unfolds itself, primarily, in two auxiliary ones—the *Law of Difference* and the *Law of Definite Number*. The logic of the universe, bearing onward in obedience to these, must of necessity move, however, to a definite result—the above-mentioned Final Purpose of existence; that logic must play the form inherent in it out to its completion: thus the universe moves to a self-predestined *close*, and is, therefore, under a third and final law—the *Law of the Whole*. These three laws, now, are the key to all philosophy, theoretical or practical. They are, for instance, the basis of that Natural Dialectic which is to purge our logic of its subjective illusions: thus, exactly as the Law of Sufficient Reason<sup>2</sup> must limit itself, as we just now saw, by the real and higher Law of Causation, so that the universe-process may strictly *begin*, so must the other subjective logical principle, the Law of Contradiction,<sup>3</sup> be construed not to exclude but to include the Law of Natural Antagonism; otherwise, the Mechanics of Nature would be impossible. They teach us, too, not only to recognize the presence of continuity throughout the whole of existence, but how to interpret it with precision, and not to obliterate difference in our anxiety to establish identity. The Law of Difference and the Law of Definite Number provide

<sup>1</sup> Dühring's earliest book of mark was a "Critical History of the General Principles of Mechanics," a work crowned with the first prize by the University of Göttingen, and held, generally, in the highest esteem. It passed to its second edition in 1877.

<sup>2</sup> That every occurrence must have a reason, and a reason sufficient to explain it.

<sup>3</sup> That no subject can have contradictory predicates.

not only for the movement of nature through the determinate steps of the inorganic and the organic, but also for the ascent *by a specifically new element* from the former to the latter, and, within this, from the plant to the animal, and finally from the animal to man, with his rational consciousness. The whole, to be sure, must be developed through the single principle of mechanism, but the now favorite doctrine of the "Persistence of Force" violates the essential principle that specific differences—primitive types—inhere in the primordial being of the Actual, and is therefore false. So, too, the Darwinian pseudo-law of the "Struggle for Life," with its unsocial corollary of the supreme right of the strongest, must be rejected, not simply as striking at the root of ethics, but as violating the Law of the Whole. Species can arise neither by the transfer of a dead identity of force, nor by any number of "survivals" of what merely *is* or *has been*, but must come from Kinds in the primitive constitution of the Actual.

At this juncture, however, Dühring feels called upon to reconcile the fact of ascending differences with his principle of mechanical continuity, and to explain, moreover, the *original* transit from identity to difference—from the primal repose of the Actual to its unresting career of causation. But, after manifold attempts, which all imply the unmechanical hypothesis of a conscious primal purpose in his absolute, he finally takes refuge in the "mechanics of the future," which, surely, is some day to unravel the mystery. But, at any rate, he goes on, our three laws lead us securely to the completing term in the theory of the world, by settling the supreme question of the character and value of life. This question he discusses in his work entitled "The Worth of Life." He solves the problem in the optimist sense, and by means of the principle of compensation: Existence is unquestionably marred by evil, by real evil; but its dominant tone, its resistless tendency, its net result, is genuinely good. And this solution does not rest on any merely subjective accidents of temperament, but directly on the objective principles of existence itself. It is found, in short, in the Law of Difference and the Law of the Whole, and in the essential necessity—the *inevitableness*—of the being of the Actual. Existence must be judged, not by the morbid cravings of sentimentalism, fed on fantasy, but by sound sentiment, which is founded on clear understanding: when we once see distinctly into the nature of

the world, and adjust our tone and conduct to that, we shall find a sufficient comfort in life; there is a bracing satisfaction in the discriminating insight into that which *must be*. Existence has, too, a *charm*—and in *itself*; and the secret of it lies in that very variety, or difference, which constitutes the principle of its movement. Moreover, life *mounts* in differentiation, and the increased objective good of the higher levels of consciousness outweighs the increase of subjective susceptibility to pain. Still further, contrast not only heightens pleasure, but is the source of it: the sense of resistance overcome is the very root of joy; evil is the necessary foil for the reaction essential to life. Still profounder elements of good are contributed by the Law of the Whole: not only does the ascent of life to higher and higher levels point clearly to the greater fulness of existence as part of the Final Purpose, and so give play to the “influence of the ideal” in the encouraging prospect of the future, but our inseparable union with the Whole, our direct descent from nature, and our reproduction of its life in ours, imparts to us a certain *Cosmic Impulse* (Dühring calls it *der universelle Affect*), which, pressing upon the foundations of our being, fills us with a dumb sense of the oneness of nature, and binds us by forces coming from beneath consciousness, nay, from the beginnings of the world, to the totality of existence with an attachment that no sum of ills can utterly destroy. It is from this “Cosmic Impulse” that the inborn love of life and the instinct of self-preservation arise. Our delight in the landscape comes from it; likewise our delight in art, our capacity for poetry, our bent to science and philosophy, with which we would figure to ourselves the form of this treasured All. It is, finally, the source and the reality of the set of feelings consecrated by the name of religion. To deny the worth of life is, therefore, to put ourselves in conflict with the elemental forces of our being, which will subdue us in spite of our struggles.

Nevertheless, Dühring continues, though life is essentially good, there is real evil in it, and one condition of its good is that we shall rise to higher good by the spring from overcoming the evil: the world makes itself better through us as channels. In this fact we pass from theory to practice, finding in it the basis of ethics. The first principle of ethics follows from the conception that contributes so much to the excellence of the Actual—the Law of the



Whole. The highest practical precept is, *Act with supreme reference to the Whole*. But inasmuch as we are members not only of the absolute Whole, but of the lesser whole called society, we can only act in and through that; accordingly, first in the order of practical theories comes now Dühring's sociology. His writings in this field are voluminous, especially in political economy, in which he adopts and develops the views of our countryman Carey. Carey, he thinks, has revolutionized this subject. The doctrines involved in the free-trade view, especially the principle of unrestricted competition, he considers a deification of mean self-interest. They strike at the foundation of rational ethics—the supreme moral authority of the Whole. Away with them, then, and substitute instead those of benignant co-operation. This sentiment is now carried out in a corresponding philosophy of politics, in which Dühring develops an extreme socialism. That the aforesaid Whole, however, is conceived in the sense of a dominant atomism, very presently appears: the “Whole” aimed at is simply a greater force to give effect to the caprices of that order of “enlightened individual” who so ignores the mighty Whole of history as to see in the organic institutions of reason—the family, the state, the church—nothing but barriers to the career of humanity. The end of government, Dühring holds, is “to enhance the charm of life;” and here, unfortunately, in settling the practical test of enhancement, he is betrayed into destroying the profound principle on which he rested his case for the worth of life—that we must be guided by objective values, and ignore the outcries of subjective caprice. It appears to him that, down to date, there has been no considerable political or social wisdom in the world. Social organization, as well as political, ought now to undergo a complete re-creation, and all in the interest of giving the greatest possible range for each individual to act according to his views of what regard for the Whole requires. Thus, all governments armed with force are to be done away. In their stead is to come voluntary association. Democratic Communes are everywhere to replace organic States. There is to be no centralization—no one great Commune, but numbers of little ones, to suit the convenience of individual preference. There is to be universal “equality,” and women—a redeeming stroke of justice—are to share in all the vocations, offices, emoluments (and the few burdens) of society

equally with men. Instead of compulsory wedlock, there is to come voluntary union from love, the bond to cease when the passion ceases. We are now at a long remove from that hostility to self-interest that erewhile would prohibit unrestricted competition, and revolted at the selfishness of free trade. Education is to be reorganized in behalf of these conceptions, which are further supported by an appropriate philosophy of history. History is simply a continuation of the drama of nature; it tends to life, the variation of life, and the enhancement of its charm. The test of historic progress is the heightening of self-consciousness; but this Dühring takes to mean the greater and greater accentuation of the individual's sense of his validity just as he stands at each instant. The career of history has, accordingly, three periods—that of the *ancien régime*, that of the transitional present, and that of the free and exhilarating future. This future, however, is to be conducted by tolerably dry logic: much sentiment and refinement are “aristocratic.” A suitable philosophy of religion closes the general view: religion is really nothing but the “Cosmic Impulse;” historic religions are only superstitious misconceptions of this profound pulse of the universe; they are all to disappear, as essentially worthless pseudo-philosophies. The “society of the future” will neither worship nor sublimely hope. The Philosophy of the Actual has dispensed with God, and likewise with immortality. For, to say nothing of the predestined catastrophe of the universe, the individual consciousness ceases at death. There is no common basis of consciousness, each person is a perfectly self-enclosed circuit; nor is there any individual basis of it, except the body. An individual consciousness is merely a definite “situation”—one specific combination—of the world-atoms; death is its dissolution, and is therefore final oblivion.

The system that opened with such a keen vigor of theoretic purpose, and which exhibits, as contrasted with Hartmann's, so many points of a higher, firmer-knit, and subtler intelligence, has ended in a moral atomism as it began in a physical—in utter social dissolution. It is, however, only paying the penalty of inadequacy in its theoretical principle. Its root of irrationality is identical with that of Hartmann's theory—the undertaking to construe the absolute with the categories of the relative, to think the eternal in relations of time and motion. It is a merit in Dühring that

he himself lays down with great force the principle here implied ; but his conception of the absolute forces him fatally to contradict it. He will have the chain of causation once on a time *begin* ; but a beginning is necessarily a point in time, and a point in time is necessarily related to a *before* as well as to an after. Dühring consequently finds it impossible even to state his beginning of change without referring it to a supposed rest preceding it ; in no other way can he make room for a continuous mechanical nexus in the whole of his Actual. The Actual is thus necessarily brought *wholly* under time ; time and causation *are* carried back, whether or no, into "Being and identity," and Dühring is asserting in one breath that the absolute is *not* subject to relative categories, and yet *is* so. After his scruples about time and causation, it is remarkable that he manifests no hesitancy in applying *space* to his absolute ; he proves real space to be finite, and thus annuls his absolute as before : for so, his total Actual has a limited extent ; an extent, however, like a beginning, must be defined by something other than itself—it is unthinkable, except in contrast to a *beyond* ; thus the absolute, as really extended, is undeniably relative. The ground-scheme of Dühring's system is hence a self-contradiction ; that is, it is essentially irrational. The insufficiency of his principle exposes itself still further when he comes to discuss the origin of consciousness and the reach of knowledge. He makes a fatal misstep when he seeks the "common root" of sense and understanding in a time-and-space *præ*, ignoring the fact that he has given no answer but bald denial to the Kantian doctrine of the ideality of space and time, and that, until the supports of this doctrine are removed, there can be no use of these elements to locate a *root* of consciousness : to search for the *præ* of something, in a region still presumably the creation of that something, is an industry not likely to be largely rewarded. Dühring's entire Dialectic, like his supposed refutation of the Kantian Antinomies, rests on the assumption, which he does not argue, that there is a space, a time, and a causal progression, distinct from the thoughts to which we give those names, an assumption which he may have hoped to warrant by establishing afterwards a mechanical transit from mere vitality to consciousness ; from any serious attempt at the latter, however, his clear insight into the limitation of the Persistence of Force prevented him from making. But it is in the

practical sphere that the self-contradiction in his principle shows at its worst. This principle compels him at the outset of his ethics to set up the supreme authority of the Whole; but its lack of ethical substance brings him at the end to bare individualism. At first we feel as if he had failed to draw from it the high consequences of which it seemed capable. Why, we say, should he sink from the stern ethics of devotion to the Whole into this wretched atomism of private caprice? But we have here the genuine drift of the system; for real morality is impossible on a pessimist basis, and Dühring's principle, in spite of his subtle and imaginative plea for it, is optimist only by illusion. The very "Whole" that is the ground and the sovereign object of our duty is in truth but a monstrous Power, whose self-centred "Purpose" is the burial of moral life, while yet only on its threshold, in a hopeless oblivion. The yearnings of her offspring, imparted to them by her "Cosmic Impulse," Nature does not share; she brings them forth, "to laugh and weep, to suffer and rejoice," for a season, then to pass to the Abyss, whereto she also, with her latest and highest, too surely is speeding. Life under such conditions is essentially worthless, let it be painted in what sounding terms it may. The resistless beat of such a theory is either to despair, as in the case of the frank pessimism of a Hartmann, or else to illusions of reconstructing the future in behalf of capricious desire. We cannot hope for the abiding; let us then turn to the satisfactions of the hour! In short, the professed hedonism of Dühring's theory is at bottom pure egoism. Covering the horror in the depths of life with a thin optimistic gloze, Actualism can have no final precept but the exhortation to cultivate the Whole so far, and only so far, as it may be means to the greatest sum of individual enjoyment: "therefore, whatsoever *thy* hand findeth to do, do *that* with thy might; for there is neither wisdom nor device nor knowledge in the grave—and thither thou goest."

In passing now to LANGE, it is not surprising to find him strongly actuated by the desire to lay a better foundation for ethics than materialism and pseudo-idealism have proved able to build. His "History of Materialism" is not properly a history, but a philosophy buttressed by history, in which, by exhibiting materialism in the utmost possibilities that ages of restatement



have been able to give it, he aims to expose its deficiencies exhaustively, and to assign the true weight which its principle and that of idealism should respectively have in a rational theory. The book has made a wide and deep impression on the younger men at the German universities, and it is perhaps not beyond the facts to say that his is at present the most decided influence at work among people of severe and technical training.

There must be sought, begins Lange, some higher stand-point than either materialism or current idealism affords; and this, he is convinced, is to be found in the doctrine of Kant, provided it be held to with rigid consistency. In his own words: "As a beaten army looks about for some strong position on which it may hope to rally, so now, for some time, has been heard on all sides the signal, *Fall back on Kant!* Still, not till recently has this retreat been really in earnest, and now it is found that his stand-point could never in strict justice be described as surmounted. To be sure, misconceptions of his meaning and the pressure of the impulse to metaphysical invention did for a while tempt his successors to endeavor the rupture of the strict limits he had drawn to speculation. But the sobering that has followed this metaphysical intoxication has compelled a return to the abandoned position; and all the more, that men see themselves again confronted by the materialism that once, on Kant's appearance, had fled and hardly left a trace." He is deeply sensible of the deficiencies of materialism, but, at the same time, appreciates the truth of a certain phase in it as against the pretences of what he takes for idealism. He says: "Materialism lacks for *rapports* with the highest functions of man's intelligence. Contenting itself with the mere actual, it is, aside from the question of its theoretic inadmissibility, sterile for art and science, indifferent, or else inclined to egoism, in the relations of man to man." And yet, on the other hand: "The whole principle of modern philosophy, outside of our German 'spell' of *romancing with notions*, involves, with scarce an exception worth naming, a strictly natural-scientific treatment of everything given us by sense. . . . Every falsification of fact is an assault upon the foundations of our intellectual life. As against metaphysical poetizing, then, that arrogates the power to penetrate to the essence of nature, and determine from mere conceptions that which experience alone can teach us, materialism as a

counterpoise is a real benefaction." But, on the further contrary, idealism met a certain want that mere empiricism cannot supply. "The endeavor," he adds, "is almost as universal to overcome the one-sidedness of the world-image arising from mere fact. . . . Man needs a supplementing of this by an ideal world created by himself, and in such free creations the highest and noblest functions of his mind unite."

In these words Lange's general position already reveals itself. If Hartmann calls his view the *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, and Dühring his the *Philosophy of the Actual*, Lange's might similarly be named the *Philosophy of the Ideal*. He prefers, however, to speak of the Ideal, not as a philosophy, but only as a stand-point, because he wishes to include in philosophy not only the means for satisfying the craving after ideality, but that for closing with the demand for certainty. The aim of philosophy, he holds, is not a doctrine, but a method; and it is itself, when precisely defined, simply the *critical determination of the limits of the main tendencies in our faculty of consciousness*. These tendencies are two—the investigation of phenomena, and speculation upon assumed realities beyond them. Philosophy has thus two functions: the one *negative*, resulting in the critical dissolution of *all* the synthetical principles of cognition, and the stripping them of all assumed competence to the absolute, leaving their outcome purely phenomenal; the other *positive*, affirming the right and the uses of the free exercise of the speculative bent, when taken no longer as knowledge, but only as poesy.

The supports of this "Stand-point of the Ideal" are sought in a critique of the "Critique of Pure Reason," or a sort of "New Critique of Reason," whose ambition is, to bring what Lange takes as the first principle of Kant's inquiries now for the first time to a rigorous completion. This principle (with, unfortunately, too much support from Kant's own declarations in the course of the discussion over his work) is assumed to be the absolute restriction of our knowledge to experience: we have *a priori* "forms" of cognition, but they become futile when applied beyond phenomena. That Kant himself regarded this as only the principle of his *theoretical* view is, to be sure, unquestionable; but his setting up the practical reason as in itself absolute was, Lange maintains, a direct violation of it, and, in fact, was rendered impossible by it.

Will, like cognition, is for us only *phenomenon*; we cannot, then, aver with Kant that we must *be* free, but only that we must *think* ourselves free. In this, though, there is an end to Kant's grounding of ethics, and we must seek to construct a complete system by the consistent carrying out of the only certainty with which we can begin. We must return to the problem of the source and limits of cognition, where, fortunately, we can assume an *a priori* organization as having been established by Kant. The elements, too, that Kant assigned to this organization—space, time, cause, and the rest—all belong there; but Kant's attempt to settle *a priori* the exact possible number of such "forms" was necessarily futile: there is no way to determine what the contents of our *a priori* endowment are except induction. And the gradual progress of the natural sciences, particularly the modern physiology of the senses (in which the primary sensations—light, color, heat, sound, taste, odor, etc.—have all been reduced to modes of motion), points clearly to the probable omission of an essential "form" from Kant's list: *motion* should take its place among the *a priori* "forms" of sense. Indeed, one great aim of our reconstruction of the "Critique of Reason" should be to bring its doctrine into thorough accord with the results of the latest natural science. This we shall do by insisting, first, on strict observance of the limits it assigned to knowledge, and, secondly, on defining these more exactly, in accordance with the mechanical nature of sensation. In fact, we here arrive at the true import and value of materialism: for that the Actual of *experience* is explicable on mechanical principles alone, is the clear outcome of the latest science, with which it only remains to set our theory of knowledge into agreement in order at one stroke to give materialism its due, and yet its *quietus* as a scheme of the absolute. The Actual of experience, extended, moving, interacting in all its parts, and transmitting energy from one part to another under the universal law of the Persistence of Force, is from beginning to end our mere representation (*Vorstellung*): the derivation of mind from *actual* matter is therefore impossible, as it would involve the absurdity of the object's producing the subject whose testimony is the sole evidence that there *is* any object; and as for a *hypothetical* matter—a conjectural substrate beneath the actual—that is shut out of the question by the nature of the limits of possible

knowledge. For, once we are certain that our objects are strictly *ours*—are but the framing of our sensations in our *a priori* “forms”—we are thenceforth confronted with the *limiting notion* called the Thing-in-itself. The doubt, thenceforward ineradicable, of our power to pass this limit turns into certainty of our impotence to do so, when we find, as Kant shows us, that the attempt must cast our reason into systematic contradictions. Our *knowledge*, then, is confined strictly to the field of phenomena—to knowing, not what *is*, but only what exists relatively to *us*—and within this field it is further restricted to the tracing of mechanical causation; for, again by Kant’s showing, its highest category is action and reaction, and all the terms of its synthesis must be extended objects of sense: hence Du Bois-Reymond’s “Limits of Knowledge in Natural Science” become the limits of all knowledge whatever. While, then, our philosophy thus falls into step with natural science, it vindicates to materialism the entire province of nature, but excludes it forever from explaining mind.

But the relativity of our knowledge, continues Lange, with especial emphasis, reaches wider than Kant suspected, and its contradictions are profounder. The limiting Thing-in-itself Kant assumed as a reality; or, at all events, he declined to doubt its existence; but, to carry the *a priori* principle to its proper conclusion, we must now recognize the phenomenal nature of this notion itself. Our all-encompassing distinction between *thing* and *representation*, between *noumenon* and *phenomenon*, is itself a judgment *a priori*; in fact, an *illusion* of that order. It arises from our constitutional tendency to put the positive pole of the category of relation—substance, cause, agent—as if it were something *additional* to the system of experience, instead of merely a term within it. It is thus itself a contradiction, one not simply functional, but *organic*, and provokes to endless other contradictions. It is an illusion; but one which, though we recognize, we can never dispel, any more than that of the moon’s enlargement on the horizon, of the bending of the stick when thrust into the water, or of the apparition of the rainbow. But, like these, it will mislead only him who persists in the stolidity of the peasant; and as these, when comprehended, not only do not disturb our science, but continue (and in heightened measure) to quicken the pleasure of existence by their variety or their beauty, so will this ground-



dissonance of our nature, with its whole array of derivative discords, serve, when once mastered, to enrich the monotone of life and raise it to orchestral fulness and harmony. The metaphysical passion, born of this illusion, is indeed worthless for *knowledge*, but it is precious for life. In its immature stages, it burns to transcend the limits of experience, in the vain hope of bringing back *knowledge* of that mysterious Beyond; and so long as it has continued in this delusion, it has been the bane of the world. But when once freed from it, it will become, with religion and poetry, the benign solvent of all the ills of living. It springs from the same fountain as they, and is, indeed, its strongest and most precious jet; for it is the work of *imagination*, its highest and noblest function; and imagination comes from the illusion of the noumenon, and without it would not exist. While, then, for knowledge we must hold fast by the actual, for all the inspiration of life we must take refuge in the Ideal. Phenomenal and noumenal, the actual and the Ideal, together, and only together, make up the total of experience—of our vital Whole. In not less than this Whole are we to live,—

“Im *Ganzen*, Guten, Treuen resolut zu leben,”—

and the Good and the True are to be sought for in the Ideal; in the Ideal, not only as vaguely rendered in the visions of poetry or the solemnities of religion, but far more as framed into organic epics of the mind, and turned with the force of systems upon action, by metaphysical invention. Nor let it be supposed that our knowledge of the purely poetic character of speculation will paralyze its power over conduct; though void of literal truth, its ethical truth is real; the conduct that it means is absolutely right. “A noble man,” to borrow Lange’s own words, “is not the least disturbed in his zeal for his ideals, though he be and must be told, and tells himself, that his ideal world, with all its settings of a God, immortal hopes and eternal truths, is a mere imagination and no reality: *these are all real because they are psychical images; they exist in the soul of man*, and woe to him who casts doubt upon their power!”

Having thus cleared up the “Stand-point of the Ideal,” Lange then turns to the view it affords of practical philosophy. He touches first the question of the worth of life, where his settlement

is this: Neither pessimism nor optimism is an absolute truth; the problem of evil, if we push for its radical solution, belongs to the transcendent world, of which we can know nothing. Applied, however, to the world of experience, the doctrine of the Ideal gives an optimist or pessimist result according as we consider life in its whole, with the Ideal in it, or only in its part—the part of actual, stubborn fact. The fact, in itself, must always seem *bad*; but it must be remembered that this very badness is the shock of contrast with the ever-present Ideal; and the optimist solution has, after all, to come from moral energy: play into fact with aspiration after the Ideal and enthusiasm for it, with the firm resolve to transform fact into a semblance of its pattern, and the reward will come in a gentler tolerance of defect and a calmer contentment: “the freer our career in the metaphysical region, the more is our world-image pervaded by sentiment, and the more optimistic; but the more ethical, also, is its reaction on our doings and bent. We are not only to reconstruct the actual after the Ideal, but to console ourselves for the perception of what actually is by contemplating what ought to be and might be.” The transition hence to ethics is natural, where the highest maxim is: *Serve the Whole*. But the Whole here intended is the entire complex of experience, with the active Ideal in it. “Work upon fact with recognition of its stubborn reality, but in the light of the Ideal,” is what the maxim means. We cannot *know* that we are free or immortal, but we cannot help assuming we are the one, and hoping we may be the other; and, on the other hand, we do know that in our relation with mechanical nature, in whose domain, after all, the larger part of our action lies, we are *not* free; that time is exceeding short, and enjoyment is hope deferred. The *lesson of life is chiefly fortitude and resignation*. Lange, however, has no personal drawings towards egoistic ethics, nor to hedonism, even in its most universal form. He announces himself here as the continuator of Kant: he desires to act, and have men act, from duty solely; to seek the Ideal, and serve it at all personal hazard, though with due regard to the imperfections of men and the obstinacy of fact. His sociology follows the lines we should now expect: his doctrine of the Whole leads him to a pronounced socialism, but he would have this socialism a real one, in which organized society is to correct the aberrations of the in-

dividual with vigor; he sees, too, like Dühring, the import of political economy in a comprehensive practical philosophy, and some of his earlier writings were devoted to vigorous discussions in it. Free trade and *Laissez-faire* can find no place, of course, in the practical theory of the moralist of the Whole. Spontaneous "harmony of private interests," and the talk of the Cobden school generally, is to him mere vagary, springing from a fatuous social optimism. In many essentials, however, he affiliates with Mill, while he derides Carey; whereby he fell into many an acrimonious dispute with Dühring, for the vitriol of whose sarcasm, too, he had but little relish. On the religious question, Lange aims at a purely ethical position: one religion is to him as good as another, provided it does the work of consecrating the Ideal and giving it practical influence with men. As for "rationalizing" religion, let it be done, if it must be done, in the interest of culture and taste, but beware of dreaming that in this way you are getting at truth! The Christian religion, for instance, we may retain in spirit, but in letter, No. Its entire ecclesiastical Symbol, in fact, whether cultus or creed, may freely stand as long as it can, *provided it be understood to mean nothing but a mode, strictly symbolic, of enshrining the Ideal in general.*

It is impossible not to recognize the seeming higher tone, both intellectual and moral, of Lange's general view as contrasted with that of either Hartmann or Dühring. The substitution of fortitude for despair on the one hand and for enjoyment on the other, unquestionably betokens a sounder moral feeling, while the standpoint of critical agnosticism is at least in so far more intellectual that it must be radically removed before any doctrinal procedure can be validly begun. The adroit preservation, too, of the play of the Ideal in the phenomenal whole is evidence of keen susceptibility to imagination, and to its necessity and value in the conduct of life. In this respect, Lange reminds us of Mill, though having far greater fervor of fancy, as the latter appears in his "Three Essays on Religion." Like Mill, too, he will prove in the end to have been a man of feeling rather than of intellect, determined in his judgments by the wants of his heart even more than by the lights of his head. We cannot long conceal it from ourselves, that his belief in the ethical energy of the Ideal is without foundation in his theoretic view; that to talk of *duty* based on what we

*know* to be pure fiction of the fantasy is a hollow mockery ; that the sole excuse that agnosticism can put forward for acting under the Ideal is the anodyne this offers for the otherwise insupportable pain of existence : nor are there wanting clear indications that Lange forebodes the spectral nature of even this excuse—that he divines the foregone failure of a remedy applied in defiance of our knowledge that its essence is illusion. Vaihinger, himself a positively *fey* agnostic, says truly enough :<sup>1</sup> “ There breathes through this view of Lange’s a strain of tragic resignation. . . . A lofty moral pathos speaks out in all that Lange teaches, and in his manner of teaching it.” Like Carlyle, when gazing upwards at the silent stars rolling through the solemn and trackless night, and seeing there the image and type of all existence, he can only ejaculate : “ Ech, it’s a *sad* sight, and we maun e’en mak’ the best o’t ! ” For him, life has reduced itself to the phenomenon of a phenomenon, to contradictions born of one fundamental contradiction, and that an illusion we can never dispel. The professed “ critique of reason ” has ended in representing reason as essentially irrational—the self-harmonious turns out to be a thoroughgoing discord, our “ organization ” is disorganization. Nor can all the seeming glow of the “ Ideal ” blind us to the outreaching of this contradiction into Lange’s doctrine of action. The Ideal is put forward as an end in itself ; but it is in reality only viewed, and by the agnostic *can* only be viewed, as a means to the suppression of disgust with life. Thus Lange proclaims duty, but his principle is actually pleasure ; he denounces egoism, but cannot surmount hedonism ; he declares for the autonomy of the will, but his doctrine forces a strict heteronomy. He stands professedly for a stern socialism, the sovereignty of the Whole as the organization of the Ideal ; but in his theory there lurks the uttermost atomism : so many individual fantasies, so many systems of the Ideal ; and, for each, the sacred “ duty ” of meeting the antagonism of the countless other illusions with becoming fortitude and resignation. And, truly, so long as existence is thus shut in to mere appearance, its ghostliness cannot but betray itself in all its movements. If, with Hart-

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Haus Vaihinger : “ Hartmann, Dübring, und Lange : ein kritischer Essay.” Iserlohn, 1876. A book full of interest and of acute criticism, though marred by diffuseness and extravagance. I have found it a valuable aid.



mann, the universe becomes a colossal and shadowy Blind Tom, endowed with a clairvoyance whose infallible "intelligence" displays itself in striking through æons with fatal precision at its own existence; and, with Dühring, a gigantic Automaton Chess-Player, matched against itself, and moving with balanced "charm" to the checkmating of its own game: with Lange, it fades into a phantom Panorama, in front of which sits Man, a forlorn imbecile maundering over a Perhaps behind it, and shaking the flimsy rattle of the "Ideal" in the fatuous persuasion that he is stilling the irrepressible sob in his heart. Let it do its best, agnostic philosophy cannot make of life anything but essential delirium—with the shapes of its phantasmagory distinct enough, to be sure, and with an all too fatal persistency in the recurrence of its wanderings—but delirium still. In the wan light of "critical" thinking,

"We are such stuff  
As dreams are made of, and our little life  
Is rounded with a sleep."

It is, however, no proper refutation of a theory to show its evil practical results. It is a just retort for all such reproaches, to say: "Yes, our fate is heavy and our prospects are desperate; but what does that do towards disproving the fact?" It is true enough that Lange's ethical structure breaks down, and that the gap between it and his theory is a discredit to his intellect, but his "critical" view is not to be displaced except by strictly theoretical means: his procedure must be forced to expose contradictions, or else both that and its results must be accepted. Should it, however, prove to be self-contradictory, it will annul itself and its presupposed principle. And such a contradiction it plainly involves. Its principle is that the *a priori* nature of our cognition prohibits us from assuming that we can know by means of it things as they are. This is but another way of saying that we are forbidden to assume that it is anything more than a peculiarity of man; it is an endowment of humanity, and whether its "forms" are those of possible other intelligences, or of intelligence universally, we can never know; and for the reason that we are shut in by the "limiting notion" of the Thing-in-itself. This principle, now, Lange will carry out with unflinching comprehensiveness: it must be extended to include even the fundamental distinction



between our phenomenal world of experience and the noumenal Thing.

This aim of Lange's comes from a genuine systemic insight; not only is it true in the general that a principle, to be such, must work in its sphere with unlimited universality, but in this particular case the omission of the contrast between consciousness and things from the compass of phenomenalism would be fatal to the claims of the latter as a principle. If the notion of Thing-in-itself be more than phenomenal, then there *is* a Thing-in-itself, and in cognizing the contrast in question, in putting the judgment *There are Things-in-themselves*, we put a judgment of absolute validity, and see by the light of intelligence *as such*—with the eye of all possible intelligences: which would force upon the agnostic the further perilous question, By which of our merely subjective categories, then, do we manage this astonishing achievement? The admission of this one noumenal judgment would open the entire agnostic mechanism of the *a priori* to the inroad of the absolute. In some way, then, it must be reduced to a mere conjecture: it will not do to dissipate it wholly, for then, not only would another absolute judgment arise in its place, namely, *There are no Things-in-themselves*, but the validity of this would put an end to phenomenalism forever: if there *is* no Thing-in-itself, then our cognition, call it by the name of "subjective" as long as we may, is the cognition of all that is—the objects that we represent to ourselves in our normal and in our potential activity are the only objects, and human intelligence has a universal quality, knowing its objects as all intelligences must know them.

With the instinct of self-preservation, then, Lange draws the mentioned distinction back within the sphere of consciousness; this, too, he will have us refrain from using as if applicable to the absolute; we must treat this also as phenomenal, and hence we cannot be sure that there is, or is not, a Thing-in-itself. But we now cannot silence the apprehension that there *may* be one. Hence, the distinction remains, and Thing-in-itself becomes a *limiting notion*—the antithetic formula of *Me and Not-me* becomes an all-encompassing category (in fact, our fundamental *a priori* principle) that necessarily causes all our cognition to *seem* merely subjective, whether it be so in reality or not, and thus compels us to limit our certainty to phenomena. Its agnostic force is, there-

fore, rather increased than diminished; we have now not a single cognition remaining that can pretend to belong to intelligence *as such*.

It cannot now longer be concealed, however, that, in setting out upon this path, Lange was moving to a goal that he little suspected and still less desired. He has decided that, to validate the phenomenal limitation of knowledge, he must make Thing-in-itself a "form" *a priori*. But he must be in earnest with this apriority, and a "form" *a priori* means a principle from and in consciousness organically and *solely*. To say that a notion is *a priori* is to say that the thought of it exhausts its existence, possibilities, and essence altogether; the entire being of it is in a native energy of consciousness, and this elemental *discharge* from consciousness is the whole meaning of the corresponding name; thus, for instance, the pure thoughts corresponding to the words *space*, *time*, *cause*, are exactly and utterly what space, time, and cause respectively *are*. Anything short of this view would render apriority null; for, if there were anything wholly *extra mentem* to which they, even possibly, corresponded, we could then never be certain that they *originated* in consciousness at all—we should remain in a quandary as to whether they did or did not—yet from consciousness they *must* originate in order to give them that absolute universality and necessity of application to their objects with which we incontestably think them: as a genuine Kantian, Lange must assent to this; and not simply assent, but proceed from it wholly and thoroughly. To make Thing-in-itself a "form" *a priori* is, therefore, to *exclude* its existence in any other sense. But this annuls the desired conjecture of its possible absolute existence; we have committed ourselves irretrievably, then, to the judgment, *There are no Things-in-themselves*; and therewith, as shown already, an act of absolute cognition enters, and phenomenalism falls to the ground. The "critical" procedure has annulled its own principle.

Lange is, however, equal to the emergency; he has that dogged and indomitable courage which cannot realize its own defeat. The rally on a new point explains his doctrine that this ground-form of consciousness, as he considers it—this contrast between consciousness and Thing-in-itself—is an organic contradiction. He would evade the force of the above conclusion by showing that

Thing-in-itself is not the real contents of that *a priori* notion which forms the "limiting term" in the relation in question. On the contrary, that term is an *hypostasis*—an imaginary "embodiment," a putting as beyond, independent of, or *plus* consciousness—of its own system of internal categories appertaining to phenomenal objects; in short, a putting of the notions of substance, cause, and interagent, as if they transcended conscious experience, and existed apart from it as its object and ground. The *a priori* category of substance and accident (subject and predicate), which properly only connects one composite phenomenon (called the "subject" of a judgment) with another phenomenon so as to compose a new and fuller unity, lends its term *substance* for this purpose; the category of cause and effect, which properly connects one phenomenon with another so as to condition and determine the latter's occurrence, lends similarly its term *cause*; and, in like manner, the category of agent and reagent, which properly connects phenomena into a system of mutual attraction and repulsion, lends its term *agent*. Thus, this triune hypostasis is, by some *a priori* impulse, *which Lange does not attempt to explain*, projected beyond the limits of remaining consciousness, and is thought as one term of the so-called noumenal relation, while consciousness as a whole constitutes the complementary term—its "organization" (as Lange calls it) being viewed as *reagent*, and its sum of phenomena as *effect* and *predicate*. By this spontaneous contradiction of the proper nature of its categorical system, our consciousness, confounding its own organic notions with the hypostatic notion of a Thing-in-itself, sets a bound to its own certainty by an illusion which, as *a priori*, it can never dispel.

The justness of this analysis, *so far as it goes*, is self-evident: we have doubtless here the correct partial genealogy of the remarkable notion Thing-in-itself, and the exact genesis of all "critical" agnosticism. There is wanting in it, however, the all-important fact that it is the co-agency of the other *a priori* elements, space and time, with those actually mentioned, that imparts to this notion its specific character and chief plausibility. The infinity of these two elements, in contrast with the necessary finitude of all sensuous representations and of the total of sensible experience, together with our natural tendency to ignore those *other elements* in consciousness—the strictly supersensible—and to take

our ease in the more familiar region where time and space render all things plain, makes the inadvertence of supposing an "*abundant room*" for "existence wholly out of consciousness" and, as we say, "independent" of it, an easy matter; an inadvertence stimulated by the incessant activity of the other categories, but engendered by a deeper principle, *which Lange's omission to investigate is the vital defect of his analysis*, leaving it a quite inadequate account of the nature and function of the notion Noumenon; of which, further presently. We thus think the Thing-in-itself as extended or at least as enduring, even when we view it as the soul or as God, and this is the source of all that mechanical psychology and viciously anthropomorphic theology which has been, and is now, the bane of religion, and the constant cause of scepticism and indifference. With the addition now made, we have the correct account of that travesty of the Noumenon which we call Thing-in-itself, and may now attend to the real meaning of Lange's result.

And this is striking enough. For he has, in fact, unwittingly completed the demonstration of the absolute quality of human knowledge; and, at the same time, that of the necessary falsehood of materialism—not simply the permanent impossibility of *proving* it (which, as we saw, he had already done from his agnostic stand-point), but its *absolute* impossibility; for he has removed the basis for even its hypothesis. He has shown now (1) that the Thing-in-itself does not exist; (2) that, as notion, it is a self-contradiction—something whose sphere is solely *within* consciousness putting itself as if it were *beyond* it; (3) that, in spite of this, we continue, and must continue, to accept this illusion, which compels us to limit our knowledge to experience, and renounce all claims to its being absolute.

That is to say, then, *the sole cause of our doubting the rigorous validity of our knowledge, and reducing our cognition to the mere idiosyncrasy of one species out of an unknown number of possible orders of intelligent beings, is an illusion whose genesis we know, a contradiction that we distinctly detect. Then, beyond all controversy, our discrediting and limitation of our cognitive faculty is an error, and we are to correct it by disregarding its cause.*

And it is idle to say that we cannot do this, because the illusion is organic, and will therefore continue to play upon us for-



ever. Now that it is once detected, it is *completely in our power*, so far as its affecting our judgment is concerned. The presence of organic and necessary illusions in the faculty of cognition, especially in its function as sense, is an unquestionable fact (the multi-form phenomena of refraction, for instance), but, from the moment we know them as organic and necessary, they cannot mislead us, because to know them as such we must trace their origin in the necessary laws of the function they affect; we thenceforward learn *to interpret them*—as signs, namely, of a complexity in our system of consciousness far richer and more various than we had at first suspected,—of a harmony of antagonisms far more manifold and overlapped one within another than we had dreamed of; and the more wide-embracing their recurrences become, each time detected and corrected, the more do we gradually rise to the conception of the self-sufficiency of our intelligence. And the power of detecting and allowing for them comes just from their being organic, and depends upon that. We are, therefore, now in the position, by the investigation through which Lange has led us, to assure ourselves of the reality—the absoluteness in *quality*—of our human intelligence. From the Kantian doctrine of the *a priori* carried to its genuine completion, as we have now seen it, we infer that the objects which present themselves in course of the normal and critical action of human consciousness are all that objects *as objects* can be; that beyond or beneath what completed human reason (moral, of course, as well as perceptive and reflective) finds—*finds*, I do not say *fathoms*—in objects and their relations, or *will find*, there is nothing to *be found*; that *our universe* is *the universe*, which exists, so far as we know it, precisely as we know it, and indeed *in and through* our knowing it, though not merely *by* that.

The process that has led us to this result, and which may properly be called a *Critique of all Scepticism*, yields, moreover, the final impossibility of materialism. We saw, some distance back, that the *actual* of sense could by no possibility be the source of consciousness, being, on the contrary, its mere phenomenon—its mere externalized presentation (picture-object) originated from within. But the hypothetical *potential* of sense, the assumed sub-sensible *substance* called matter, we have now seen to be precisely that self-contradiction called the Thing-in-itself, and it therefore



disappears from the real universe along with that illusion. We have also, then, a definitive *Critique of all Materialism*.

By the path into which Lange has led us, we therefore ascend from the agnostic-critical stand-point to the higher and invigorating one of thorough, all-sided, and affirmative *idealism*. A few words must suffice to outline its general conception. Our result, then, is this: Our normal consciousness has the trait of universality: it puts judgments that, in the same circumstances, every intelligence, and every order of intelligence, would put; and the objects it perceives, and *as* it perceives them, are the same that, under the same conditions, all intelligences would perceive; for objects are themselves but complexes of its judgments, and the mentioned circumstances and conditions are, indeed, *part* of the objects as perceived—not limitations imposed upon consciousness from without, but particularizations of its own primordial processes. Or, to put the case inversely: The potential reach of normal human consciousness is what we *mean* by universality: intelligence *as such* is simply the *fulfilment* of human intelligence. The attempt to take the universe as beyond or apart from or *plus* consciousness, has sublated itself into the bringing of the universe wholly within and conterminous with consciousness; and the ancient by-word, *Man the measure of all things*, comes round again, but with a new and pregnant meaning. Only, this universe-consciousness must be thought as it *is*, without omission or exaggeration of any of its contents, and, above all, by mastering the grounds of its existence and the method of its possibility. All that is, comes within consciousness, and lies open to it—the literal *All*, whether “starry heavens without” or “moral law within,” sensible system of nature with its bond of mechanical causation or intelligible system of moral agency with its bond of free allegiance constituting a “Kingdom of Ends”—a world of *spirits*, with the Father of Spirits omnipresent in all: consciousness means *that*. In being conscious, we are conscious of a *universe*—wherein each of us, to put the case in a metaphor (inadequate, of course), is a single focal point upon which the one ensphering Whole of light is poured in rays that are reflected back again to its utmost verge, and thence returned to be again reflected and returned, and so on without end, each added return bringing rays in greater fulness from remoter and remoter confines. Consciousness and universe

are in truth but two names for the same single, indissoluble and continuous Fact, named in the one case as if from within it, and in the other as if from without. Not that in every conscious focus all the contents of this universe are imaged with the same clearness, or reflected forth with the same energy, as in every other; only that, dim or bright, strong or feeble, confused or distinct, the same Whole is in some wise or other always there. And it is not to be overlooked that, to the fulfilment of this universe-consciousness, it is essential that it be not simply an individual, but a social, an historic, and, in fact, an immortal consciousness. The grounds for this conception it is not our place to enter upon here; it is enough to say that the interpretation of the facts of ordinary consciousness into the rigorous necessity of their implying this absolute Universal is the business and achievement of a genuine *Critique of Reason*. Of the method and result of this it need only be added that it proceeds to the adequate explanation both of the *a priori* categories, of which we have now heard so much, and of that residual *Noumenon* which we saw that Lange left unexamined; it finds the explanation of the former, and the reality of the latter, in a single Conscious Principle, of the absoluteness and all-transcending infinity of which the vague notion *Noumenon* is only our native confused feeling, while the categories are merely its modes of manifestation, which, though they seem so different to our natural view, turn out, on critical investigation, to be one and the same single Synthetical Energy—simply a *necessary* nexus between all possible separate terms of sense. This Principle, as blending into one, by its ascending retreat from the categories, the two activities of absolute Subject and absolute Cause, is the one Creative Unity. The universe-consciousness thus passes from an apparent mere Fact into a pure Act. And this Act, as determining itself through a system of conscious subjects—*loci* or *vortices* of the categories—into that uttermost particularity of consciousness which we name sensible perception, clasps together in its living process both Subject and Object, and is thus strictly *personal*—the Person of persons.

It is plain, of course, that the truth of all this hangs upon the validity of the doctrine of the *a priori*. It is a noteworthy fact, then, that Lange, as agnostic, sees that he must by no means admit the theory according to which alone the establishment of the

*a priori* is possible. To determine that its principles are veritably underived from its objects, consciousness must, of course, be capable of an act in which it extricates itself from its world of sensible objects, and contemplates its cognitive equipment strictly *per se*—an act which thus *transcends experience*, and was, consequently and fitly, named by Kant “transcendental reflection;” an act, moreover, whose execution presupposes the power not only of using the apparatus of judgment upon elements that are not sensible objects at all—in short, that the categories *can* be applied beyond sensuous experience—but also of making judgments of absolute validity, since the decision that anything is organic in us must be a decision upon our real nature, as it appears, say, to the mind of our Creator. This presupposition is radically at variance with Kant’s subsequent *finis* to his theoretical critique, and with Lange’s acceptance and development of it. It is in keeping with this, now, that Lange takes the astonishing ground that the contents of our *a priori* endowment can only be determined by induction—a manifest contradiction, as an induction, despite its formal generality, is always a *particular* judgment, while, to establish the apriority of an element, we must show it to be not only universal, but necessary. It is plain, then, that Lange has here finally abandoned the properly Kantian stand-point, and, without intending it, has really gone back to that of Locke, where he and his followers may be left, without further concern, to the thoroughgoing surgery of Hume.<sup>1</sup>

#### PHILOSOPHY IN THE GERMAN UNIVERSITIES.

As peculiar to the universities, because of the severe technical training requisite to the pursuit of the problems involved, the most novel, and, therefore, most immediately interesting phenomenon is that of the men who have frankly abandoned *a priori* ground altogether, and are, as they are persuaded, engaged in the task, patient and humble, but alone truly valuable, of laying in slow and careful experiments the foundation for a future empirical metaphysics that is to take away from that province of thought

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<sup>1</sup> Among the leading Neo-Kantians, after Lange, are Professors Cohen, of Marburg; Bona Meyer, of Bonn; Benno Erdmann, of Kiel; and Dr. Hans Vaihinger, of Strassburg.

its present reproach, and to give it the dignity of a science. They have thus, with full purpose, taken up the position that Lange has unintentionally prepared for his followers. Their object is stated in the same general terms as that of Spencer, and, particularly, as that of Mill and Bain, but their occupations and methods are materially different. The Englishmen rely, indeed, upon experience as the sole basis of evidence; but they have deemed it already possible to raise upon it vast and complicated theoretical superstructures, which have, as they acknowledge, only that "probable" evidence which induction affords. The German party, on the contrary, hold that results in the form of law and system are only to be the reward of their remote successors. They refer us to the fruitful but tedious and long unrewarded labors of the age before and around Galileo, which ushered in the career of modern science—labors in the patient and minute *measurement* of phenomena. The character of exact science can only begin in a body of knowledge when it has risen to the point of being computable; and formulas of computation are to be generalized only after long periods of measuring and remeasuring the phenomena involved. When varying phenomena can once be connected by some sufficiently simple law of quantitative interdependence, generalizations, on a great and unexpected scale, may be effected by the computational apparatus of the calculus.

It is singular, however, that this school really had its origin in one of the most intense metaphysical movements of the old-fashioned kind that Germany has known; I say *intense* purposely, for the number of its participants has always been small compared with that of the followers, or professed followers, of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. I refer to the philosophy of Herbart, who was Kant's successor at Königsberg, and who, seizing on Kant's notion of Things-in-themselves, worked out a metaphysical theory on the hypothesis that, behind all the phenomenal particulars and genera of experience, there lay a real world of corresponding distinctions in the Things-in-themselves—a singular new form of atomism, not strictly materialistic, however, but somewhat more akin to the monadology of Leibnitz, these units of reality (or *Reals*, as Herbart called them) being some spiritual and others material. Out of this metaphysics grew up a vigorous school of psychology, to which Fechner brought, together with fresh and



often quite mystical speculations, a remarkable body of researches, aiming to establish mathematical relations between inward sensation and its outward conditions. From these came the now noted formula, called Fechner's Law, in which the principle is stated that "the intensity of a sensation varies directly as the logarithm of its stimulus." These researches now have attracted all that class of minds with the requisite training in the exact sciences, and the requisite eye for broad generalizations, that would otherwise busy themselves with ordinary inquiries into nature, and whose bent is to an empirical logic. They are busy at laborious experiments upon all sorts of mental phenomena that can by any possibility be got into a sensible form capable of measurement, and their ingenuity of invention and method in these regions is truly astonishing. Their labors affiliate, of course, with those of the investigators in physiological psychology; indeed, the two investigations go usually hand in hand, though the measurement part belongs properly to what is called psychophysics. The aim here is suggested by the title—to establish a mechanics of mental experience. This is one day to do for psychology the analogue of what physics has done for natural philosophy—enable us to pass to the social, race, and historical laws of human action, as we have passed to the laws of matter not merely on the earth's surface, but in the distant celestial regions. When these psychophysical laws shall have one day reached a sufficient generality, they will afford, the new school predict, an accurate foundation for speculation and verifiable theorizing on the basis of probability, just as in the natural world physical principles have done for the correlation of forces, the conservation of energy, the wave theory of light, and the nebular hypothesis or its possible correction.

This account may not unfitly close with a brief reference to the philosophic situation at the University of Berlin, as it presented itself to my own observation in the winter semester of 1881-'82. It may be taken as typical of what is going on in the whole of Germany, Berlin being confessedly the German intellectual centre. All the phases of the present state of transition, as I have endeavored to describe them,<sup>1</sup> were reflected there. One notice-

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<sup>1</sup> See the remarks already referred to, in "The Concord Lectures."



able fact, especially in the light of Professor Wundt's statement of five years ago,<sup>1</sup> was that of two courses of lectures on Schopenhauer. The drift of these was unfavorable, to be sure, but both of them betrayed the fact that Schopenhauer's doctrine of the nature of the will, apart from his metaphysical and ethical uses of it, had made an effective impression on the lecturers. Wundt could say, in 1877, that to that date Schopenhauer had met with no consideration in the universities whatever. But it is now plain that his doings have taken some root even there, and in directions that must prolong the present inability to surmount the agnostic and empirical obstacles. For not only at Berlin did he have a good hearing, but in several of the other universities too. In fact, in the whole of Germany, there were some nine or ten courses then given upon him—a greater amount of attention than any other single thinker received, excepting only Kant, Plato, and Aristotle.

But, to resume, Berlin, in 1881-'82, was a fair reflection of the general conditions I have already depicted. From the venerable Michelet—in his eighty-second year, lecturing with astonishing vigor and admirable powers of exposition on "German Philosophy since Kant," and vindicating himself, in this course at least, from the charge so frequently in past days brought against him, of belonging to the "left wing" of the Hegelian school—to young Dr. Ebbinghaus, a representative of the psychophysical empiricists, pretty much all the phases of the present situation were at hand—the vanishing remembrance of the great spirits of the bygone generation, the transitional uncertainty evinced in the dominant attention to history, the vivid interest in the agnostic interpretations of Kant, the fresh and animated attachment to empirical views, the faith in the great future awaiting the new studies in psychophysics. Zeller, who began philosophical life as a Hegelian, and may be reckoned the latest, perhaps the last, illustrious product of that school, but who wearied of the "Dialectic," and now seems to find in Spinoza, construed in a Hegelian sense, better satisfaction than in any other modern thinker, was almost wholly occupied, of course, with historical instruction. In his auditorium the great throng of the *philosophie studiosi*—five or

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<sup>1</sup> See Wundt on "Philosophy in Germany," in *Mind* for July, 1877.

six hundred—was to be found; there he lectured daily, with speech fluent and gracious, and with an exhaustiveness and an ease of learning that were not less than overwhelming. Althaus, another of the elder generation, busied himself with psychology and Aristotle. Paulsen, who, from his vigor of early middle-age, his professorial rank, and his already extended reputation, is probably to be regarded as the rising man in philosophy at Berlin, and whose audience, next to Zeller's, was much the largest, defended, on grounds wholly empirical, a frank impersonal pantheism, making great use of a peculiar and interesting form of the argument from history—a striking enrichment and deepening of the old proof *de consensu gentium*; he put it that advancing social and historical experience is the tribunal of probable truth, that impersonal pantheism has grown with the growth of this experience, and thus exhibits all the probability that the approval of this tribunal can afford. His definition of philosophy, too, is in keeping with his empiricism; its essential identity with science is a favorite thesis of his, and he defines it accordingly as the inclusive whole (*Inbegriff*) of all sciences.<sup>1</sup> Of the *privat-docenten*, Dr. Lasson lectured on the philosophy of rights—a descendant of Hegel's school, but, like the rest of the younger men in Germany now, with no decided claim to a truly penetrating insight into the master's doctrine; he talked of Hegel as “a literary classic”—a symptom of questionable significance. Dr. Ebbinghaus expounded Kant in the agnostic and empiristic sense, lectured on Schopenhauer, and gave vigorous lessons in psychophysics. Dr. Deussen lectured on Hindoo philosophy, which had the look of further stirrings from Schopenhauer and further foundations for his influence. Finally, Dr. Gizycki, an empiricist, principally interested in the English moralists of the last century, gave courses on Shaftesbury and on ethics from the stand-point of the development hypothesis.

A mighty purgative for these agnostic and empirical tendencies would possibly be found, were the Germans to betake themselves

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<sup>1</sup> Professor Paulsen is the author of a very noticeable work on Kant—the “History of the Development of Kant's Theory of Knowledge”—on which his reputation mainly rests. This has been followed recently by another, with the title “What Kant may be for Us.” He holds that Kant attained no stand-point essentially higher than Hume's, and that Hume was not properly a sceptic, but only denied the capacity of reason to judge of truths of fact.

to a thorough study of Hume, not in the more literary and much abated form in which he appears in the "Essays," but in his unconstrained masterpiece, the "Treatise of Human Nature." So far as I could discover, this work is well-nigh unknown in Germany. Zeller, of course, was well acquainted with it, and, besides, had no need of its cure; but, excepting him, no one at Berlin seemed to have made any thorough study of it, nor does recent philosophical literature anywhere in Germany give any signs of such study. Yet, in the Fourth Part of its First Book, Hume has himself furnished the key to the destruction of the empirical position and its resulting agnosticism. There he is not content to stop with his ordinary doctrine, that experience can give no more than the sensation of the present moment; but goes on to show—whether of full purpose or not it seems impossible to decide—that, without presupposing the abiding unity of personal identity, even that fleeting presentation is impossible. But this permanence of personal identity he had, by the rigorous logic of empiricism, already done away with, and all perception—all experience, even to its simplest term, was thus reduced to illusion. The contradiction between this and the empirical principle, which derives its whole force from the assumed absoluteness of the single sensation, is obvious; and what Hume has really done, then, and quite irrefutably, is to remove that principle finally. True is it indeed, that, without the Abiding in us, the transitory and sensible is impossible. Or, as it has been most forcibly put in a saying that deserves to become classic, "Our unconditioned universality is the ground of our existence;"—its *ground*; that is, at once its necessary condition and its Sufficient Reason.

## FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF DR. H. K. H. DELFF BY A. E. KROEGER.

In all our knowledge there is something which is controlled not exclusively and pre-eminently by reflection, but by conditions belonging to our personality; and it is precisely this element which determines the peculiar direction of our thoughts. If everything in knowledge were absolutely and solely conditioned by reflections and arguments of the understanding, it would be possible to convince every person of his errors—at least to a certain degree, corresponding to the capacity of his understanding—and to gain him over to the more correct view. But as matters stand, it would be impossible to convince, for instance, a Darwinian or Materialist of the idea of life and of the rationality which pervades nature, by merely employing arguments, though they were the most profound and acute; just the same as the Darwinian's scholarship and power of combination would not be able to convince any one who feels himself powerfully penetrated by the living and rational character of nature. And how else can this fact be explained than by assuming that even in science we operate not merely with the understanding and our power of reflection, but also with personal sympathies? Doubtless it is a compact, and in itself connected web of arguments, which, taken from psychological and historical reflection, has been elaborated throughout centuries, and is put forward to prove that man is of divine and not animal origin; and yet nobody, who has more than superficially and carelessly considered the Darwinian hypothesis, will be induced thereby to approve another and utterly different view of the origin of man than that of the Darwinian theory. On the other hand, the Darwinian will be equally unsuccessful in his efforts to persuade any one who has received the highest or deepest conservations and initiations of philosophy and religion. The reason can only be this: that this or that person not only examines the proofs submitted to him with the eyes of the understanding, but also meets them with a certain vital force of the soul, which, by an essentially different quality, energetically repudiates the one or the other matter, and compels the understanding, which is its servant,



to oppose real or apparent proofs to those other proofs, in order to be able to maintain itself in its own Being under all circumstances. It can also be said—speaking from the stand-point of him who is convinced of the sufficiency of his proofs—that the other person does not take them to heart. But why not? Why, simply because the other's heart clings to quite another mode of thinking, which repels all heterogeneous processes.

There are certain matters in the scientific organization of every person which most decidedly belong to the category of moral convictions and only subsequently develop into logical insights; and even then always in such a way as to remain dependent upon their original source. It is through convictions of this kind, which are in their essence moral, that the peculiar culture of almost every individual is determined in its principles. Hence, it is idle work to dispute or argue, with reasons of reflection, with any one who does not share the presuppositions that move us—that is, our moral convictions, no matter whether such a dispute turns upon general or special matters. The only hope to gain over such an opponent rests on our success in shaking his moral convictions, which again cannot be done by the logical acuteness of the arguments employed, but only by the moral power of the soul, which expresses itself forcibly, whether with or without that logic. For, if those moral convictions are shaken, our opponent will be able to take our arguments to heart, as the phrase goes, and to consider them in the face of his conscience. If they are not so shaken, even the logical and empirical compulsory force of our arguments will not move him effectually; they will be to him mere empty and voiceless words.

The source of all important certainty and conviction is, therefore, to be found in the heart, or, as this word is liable to much abuse, let us rather say, the soul. If we consider man not according to the abstractions of school-learning, but according to concrete experience, it is generally known that man is a personality. But it is not well thinkable that any activity, hence also man's mental activity, can be excepted from being conditioned by the inner motive force of every human being, his personal motivation; as, indeed, every part, or manifestation, must always assume the character of its whole, or its subject. Representations, conceptions, judgments, conclusions, everything pertaining to the consciousness



conditioned by reflection, is a mediated production of the spirit, induced by a perception and connected with an objectivation. It is based essentially on a relation to the things, wherein only their external side, their appearance to the senses, as we say, is shown, and has been abstracted from this manifestation and placed before the objective contemplation of the mind. In this mediated activity, connected with the external, we see at work an immediate relation, which does not proceed from the periphery of things, but endeavors to grasp and represent the whole essence of the object immediately in its separate appearance, and which, proceeding from the inner central and total force of man, his soul, is a peculiar act thereof. This immediate relation, or act, is always composed with and made the basis of that mediated act, and is what we call faith:—excluding, of course, every determined—as, for instance, a religious—significance of the word. Thus I also form a judgment of a person's character, not in the first instance by reflecting on its utterances, but, above all, by the general impression his being as a whole makes upon me immediately. In the same way every scientific exposition of a peculiar nature is reducible to certain presuppositions, that remain and are left in part altogether unproven, and which are accepted in no other manner, and, in fact, cannot be accepted in any other manner than by faith. Thus, for instance, it would be clearly ridiculous to maintain that the truth of the mechanical view of the universe results from the mechanical construction of the separate phenomena, instead of saying the reverse—namely, that the truth of these constructions is dependent upon the truth of that fundamental view, since they are altogether impossible without such a presupposition, representing, as they do, only their individual application and development. Hence, also, Epicurus spoke of that *πρόληψις* or anticipation of a spiritual information of a matter, without which, as he says, nothing can be either understood, or investigated, or disputed.<sup>1</sup>

Well, these anticipations I have called faith; and this faith is accomplished by the soul, the fundamental power of man and of

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<sup>1</sup> "Cicero de Nat. Deor.," 1, 16. "Quae est gens, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam deorum, quam appellat *πρόληψιν* Epicurus, id est anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intelligi quidquam nec quaeri nec disputari potest?"

personality. This explains sufficiently what I mean when I say soul, not a chaos of blind feelings, but a living and free force, which gains its knowledge through sentiments and represents its acts in passions. Feeling is blind determinedness; sentiment, on the other hand, is an inner, free-cognizing, cherishing, and determining one's self in another, and another in one's self, and includes a living clearness and evidence — distinct from the mediated knowledge of reflection, which gathers and combines the separated—immediately and directly seizing and appropriating the whole. That which we call faith, therefore, is not blind, but seeing; not chained down, but free and choosing. For consciousness and freedom are not chained down to the system of reflection any more than man's whole being is absorbed in it. That consciousness is only a form of externalizing in regard to the true self and consciousness of man, and borrows the positive power of his seeing and choosing only from this substance, which is its basis. I should prefer, however, to call this knowledge of faith conscience, or, as the Greeks named it, *συνείδησις*, which implies a co-knowing. Conscience is generally taken as meaning a divine law, an *ἄγραφος νόμος*, engraven in the fleshy tablets of the heart. How little valid, or, rather, in what very limited sense this interpretation is valid, is evident among other things from this, that the communist, who aspires to overthrow all law and order, also appeals to his conscience. Hence, conscience signifies that individual stand-point on which every person rests, and by which he is moved.

All knowledge, therefore, demands faith, and faith lies at the basis of all knowledge. All proofs, that extend into the sphere of moral convictions, derive their convincing power from faith alone. Without faith all proofs of the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will, are only juggler's tricks, or a weak reed that breaks in your hand at the least pressure. This faith, which is postulated by every proof, is not directed upon the visible components of the proof and their composition, but on the invisible part of the matter. This faith is not darkness, but light; not a weakness, but a strength; not a passive subjection, but an act of the purest personality, and none the less conscious and free because it does not arise in consequence of a deliberation, reflection, and judgment of the understanding.

The judgment on which it is based is an immediate judgment, which does not unfold itself objectively, but enwraps itself in the inwardness of a sentiment.

Hence, when we speak of conviction in the true, significant sense of the word, it is this personal fundamental act of life from which everything of that conviction emanates; this act of life which involves a direct, living connection with the living concrete matter itself. Those persons, however, who accept something merely from hearsay, be they moved by whatever external grounds, or who leap across the chasm of uncertainty by a *salto mortale* with bandaged eyes, may boast neither of conviction nor of faith, but are to be accounted, in the truest sense of the word, *servum pecus imitatorum*, since they have renounced their personality as well as their self-thinking and self-willing, and committed suicide upon their dignity as men.

But faith is, as has already been suggested, and as, indeed, appears from the nature of the case, individually determined and different. Thus, for instance, the first immediate impression which I form and receive of any particular subject, is conditioned by the original relation of my personality, and the direction in which its tendencies and inclinations move. In the same way, the impression which I first conceive of another person, and in consequence whereof I form a judgment of him from his several doings and sayings, is altogether conditioned by my individuality and its natural relation to that of the other person. Hence there arises a danger of falling into a state of general indifference and scepticism, since we seem forced to declare every true personal conviction valid merely as such, and truth seems determined only by individuality. This would lead us to the doctrine of the Sophists: That is true which appears to each one as true. Nevertheless, there is precisely in the region of personality a sphere of the universally valid which has far greater motive power than anything in the sphere of mere conception. This is the sphere of the Moral. Some have tried to represent this as a delusion, by pointing out how different notions about the just and proper are to be found among different people, and how the just and proper seem, therefore, based only upon tradition and habit. Without dwelling upon the fact that, nevertheless, certain universal and common fundamental traits can be recognized amid these differ-

ences, and remain ineradicable, we shall merely observe that the true part of this argument is simply this: the moral categories of consciousness, or of the mind, are certainly dependent upon the history, or the historical development, of mankind, or of any particular people. The attainment of a higher degree of culture is essentially connected with the consciousness of an ideal and of its unconditioned right in regard to the lower stage, and the right of this consciousness in regard to morality surely no one will dispute, who examines at the same time the sphere of *Æsthetics*, and compares, for instance, the Hellenic ideal of beauty with that of the negro, or even of the Phœnician or Egyptian, and who considers, further, that the Beautiful and the Good belong necessarily to the same sphere. For surely no one will pretend that the Beautiful is based on an imitation of nature, and that, in order to create Beauty, nothing but a correct eye is necessary. Beauty and Morality—let me say it boldly—resolve themselves finally into an Unconditioned, and melt together, therefore, with a certain religiousness, if I may say so. Or, does morality consist in a naked heroism, a mere energy of the will, which knows how to carry out a boundless desire in spite of all obstacles, and which, even in succumbing, does not give up itself? Or, is morality that which we measure with the barometer of criminal statistics? Or, do we exhaust its conception by the predicates of honesty and respectability? Do not these belong rather also to the appearance, whereas morality relates to the motives, which prompt our acts, or which prompt the personality of those—who otherwise would be determined only by their education, habits, and temperament—in spite of themselves? Hence, morality is rather a filling of one's self with the contents of absolute life, a subjugation of the innermost source of personality to a certain universal, independent validity and obligation, which is the same for, and common to, all individual persons, in spite of their individuality; and which is, therefore, before and above them, within itself, and points to an independent source, to an Absolute, to an absolute Essence. Hence, in this quite general sense we must expressly maintain the identity of morality and religiousness, and we can say now that, when we expressly disregard every particular historical form of religion, and every single philosophically thinkable or historically factual development, and mediating form thereof,



the validity of a faith is altogether determined by its relation to the Moral—that is, to the universal Religious. But even taking the Moral by itself—and comprehending it less in its innermost essence—we have already a standard measure for the truth of any view of the world. And such a view, wherein the result may certainly be veiled, but which, if carried out actually, would end in moral indifference or positive immorality, is unquestionably condemned by that very fact, no matter how it may bribe by its probability.

I maintain, therefore, in this sense, that that science has the better right, and is entitled to claim it, which is in its spirit the most religious and can maintain itself in its results before the judgment of common morality. But when I say “the most religious,” I do not mean a repeating of everything that has been written of and is generally accepted or practiced as religion. On the contrary, I am of the opinion that the more certain we feel of a matter, the more free we are of its accidental appearance. Nor do I mean by it the worship of a supermundane God, but generally a disposition to think in the most sublime manner the ground as well as the becoming and the essence of the world. But if I perchance worship a supermundane God, I do so—let the other mediations through which I arrived at this worship be what they may—only through faith; that is, through the before-mentioned conscious and free life-act of my personality.

The whole natural position of cognition is moved out of place whenever we try to make reflective knowing the only source of all certainty and all peculiar cognition. The proof of reflection always presupposes and includes the inner certitude of faith. But this faith, this immediate taking hold by means of sensation, although it contains the subject-matter itself, contains it, after all, only in its undecided generality. Hence, if we desire to know it in its particularity and separate moments, we are necessarily driven into the path of common understanding, and must make use of it as a means for our purpose. And if we now follow further that immediate certitude in faith, nothing else will remain to us within that region to make us certain of the particular and separate moments in our cognition than the conclusive proof in independent thinking and the agreement of experience. For, as little as we ought to allow ourselves to be persuaded of the truth



of a subject by mere hearsay or authority, even so little is it proper for man—and can it result in peculiar and personal cognition—to accept as something external whatsoever develops itself particularly or connects itself with that subject in his knowledge—in his full conviction of the certitude of the subject. In truth, the essence of cognition is to be found only when we think out from one independent beginning the whole particular and separate contents of the subject to the end. Here, therefore, and here alone, the saying is true: *credo quia intelligo*; not *intelligo quia credo*. These maxims have both their full validity, each in its place. I must believe the subject in order to be able to comprehend it; but what particular and separate moments it may contain, of that I can believe only so much as I comprehend.

Let us consider the contradictory conditions that attach to knowledge, the one-sidedness of thought, which always sees at one time only one part of the whole, and is inclined to believe that part to be the whole, and the mere externality of things, which is all that the things really present to the examination of knowledge; let us consider how the certain results, of which the honest scientific investigator boasted at one time, became tottering again on the next occasion, or turn out to be only relatively valid and correct; let us consider the whole character of knowledge, which is that of progress, of approximation, and which—as well on account of the inexhaustible nature of experience as by reason of the subjective inclination of man, and, finally, also by reason of the mere mediateness to which knowledge is confined—permits it to arrive at the subject-matter itself only through a series of conclusions; let us consider, further, the infinite possibilities and thinkabilities which offer themselves as well in the way of an *a priori* reason as by the glittering character of the empirical material; and, finally, let us reflect on the feelings of the proud systematician himself, and ask him whether he does not secretly ask himself daily, upon reviewing his worshipped constructions: After all, are they really true? I say, let us consider all this, and we shall see the folly of endeavoring to make abstract or empirical knowledge the *only* basis of life. In these days of ours we run after an ideal, and persuade ourselves that we can surely attain it, although in truth it is purely utopian. By the division of labor, in the face of an

infinite amount of detail, men expect finally to gain that perfection and freedom from error which they have missed hitherto so sorely. But they forget that the detail is really infinite, and, above all, that it is a matter of subjective apprehension, of which the relativity of all things human can never get rid. And, after all, the essential, that is to say, everything, has already been decided, and what remains to be done is only to carry the matter out to an end in all directions; and, although this end appears as yet and for itself ever so far removed, nobody will dream of postponing his conviction in regard to the fundamental principles and their next essential consequences until that time—a clear proof of the correctness of our assertion that in all great matters it is not knowledge, but faith, which casts the decisive vote. But, apart from that, let no one persuade himself that the thinkability and probability of a view of life is decisive and determinative in regard to a man's mode of thought and general conduct. For, if such were the case, everything would become uncertain; all our supports would totter and break, and man's mind would become a play of the waves and winds. Even like a rudderless boat, since the honesty of conviction seems to command us to follow now this and now the other probability, and to sacrifice the happiest and most quieting faith for its sake. But life and history also have a right, and an older right. To us it seems folly and unnatural to make knowledge the only valid authority, as if only that were true which some *one* man thinks.

Even in science the occupying of a particular stand-point from principle cannot depend alone upon intellectual grounds (grounds of reflection), and, in point of fact, does not so depend. But let us look back from the events of to-day upon the course of history, and witness how the humane character of man has been developed and cultivated, and, if we shall then become convinced that we have really made progress, we shall no longer hesitate to adopt the moral and humane presuppositions, which are the basis of the consciousness of the cultured man in his present historical conditionedness, as measures and criteria of our convictions. My historical remarks have shown me even in Christianity a specific—and by no means the least—progress of human culture and morals. In whatever we are spiritually ahead of the ancients, we owe the advance altogether to Christianity. The humanism at the close

of the last and the beginning of the present century was a well-justified reaction; for the Hellenism, from which it started, is an essential and independent element of culture, which mankind must on no account relinquish, though it also surely does not make Christianity dispensable. But when that tendency of humanism turned in later times hostile against Christianity, it destroyed the roots of its own life. For, let folly and bad intentions in church-dogma and cultus have changed Christianity ever so much for the worse, we at least cannot refuse to recognize that it is also a lever of culture; and to oppose it as such must, therefore, necessarily influence the position which the opponent himself occupies in the sphere of culture. Nor should it be forgotten that this humanism owed Christianity that spicy taste which alone could make it palatable to our days.

When Herder hears the spirit of harmony, the world-spirit, sing his song of enchantment which "draws soul close to soul and heart to heart," and when he closes thus:

"Enchained within one feeling,  
We're one perennial All;  
In one chord gathered, pealing,  
God's echo we recall" —

he seems to speak pantheistically, Spinoza-like; but the Christian idea of love has given to abstract pantheism the living glow and active nerve. Even the opponents of Christianity stand under its influence and adorn themselves with its gems. Even a Julian had to adopt the policy of recommending the Christian love of neighbor to his pagan subjects; and who does not see that the Stoic Epictetus and the Neo-platonist Hierokles, in his translation of the golden sayings of Pythagoras, gathered the perfume of their morality from Christian education, or from the invisible influences of Christianity. But let it be well observed that we have here to deal, not with Christian church-dogmas, nor, indeed, with any fixed opinions or assertions, but with the religious, moral, and scientific by-taste, so to speak, which every person, who grows up in the charmed circle of a Christian-Hellenic world, sucks in with his mother's milk. This taste, this invisible tincture or fundamental tone, or rather this atmosphere of our higher culture, ought to have some, and, in fact, a predominant, influence on our

judgment, and point out to us the worth or worthlessness of scientific standpoints in a decisive and directory manner.

Some one has said : "*La conscience, n'est elle pas plus que la science ?*" Undoubtedly a moral-ideal sentiment—an ideal claim of the soul of universally valid significance and harmonizing with the nature of man and of humanity in an immediate manner—is always to be preferred to an hypothesis of the understanding, so far as credibility is concerned. And all certainty in matters of principle is, after all, reducible to an inner sympathetic feeling, which even the thinker must always rouse simultaneously with his deductions if he wants to be sure of the growth and prospering of his ideas on foreign soil. It requires more to believe in a proof than merely to find it correct, more to give it credibility than the *quod erat demonstrandum*. In the same way the acutest proofs, the most imposing collections of dates, and their most cunning combinations, are not able to shake hypotheses, which we assume *on principle*, and of the truth of which we have a permanent conviction in our mind, even though it should involve a modification of the special, logical demonstrations thereof. Hypotheses assumed on principle are independent of reasonings which belong to logical demonstrations ; such assumptions coincide most closely with our moral decisions. But they are on that account in no way blind and wanting motives. It is a very dangerous error to believe that only the reasoning of our understanding has universal validity, and that rationality and evidence are manifested only in logical proof.

Another remark of the profoundest significance which arises here is this : that it is not things or their outward perceptions which form the views men have of them, but that it is man with his universal and particular constitution who makes these views through the things or their outward perceptions. These are merely the substance, which receives its form—its specific significance—from man.

We do not know whether this view was the basis of Kant's "Critic of Pure Reason ;" at any rate, the consequences of Kant's work will prove to be too far-reaching and unjustified. For this view does not necessarily imply the necessity that, with the determining influence of subjectivity, this subjectivity should lack all *objectively*, universally valid measure. As we have already shown up for the



particular individual or personal constitution, such universality in the religious-moral foundations of consciousness, we shall also point out the same for the general and common understanding, or reflection, of man in the categories which condition all intellectual consciousness and all rational perception. On the other hand, we find that Kant, who does not touch the personal matter at all, and moves solely in the region of universality and abstraction, looks upon the categories only as subjective determinations, and thus repudiates an *objective* knowing, as not given to man. In doing this he takes these categories, it is true, not from the universally accessible nature of consciousness and thinking, but from the traditionary, artificial schematism of psychology and logic, and hence they can claim no universal validity in his super-artificial presentation. He goes no further than their historical existence, and does not consider at all their natural organization and life-movement. But this result cannot satisfy us at all; it is, on the contrary, as compared with empiricism, the other extreme; and this empiricism, which, in its lack of science and untruth, lifts up its head every day more boldly and prefers every day more tyrannical claims, can be considered truly beaten only when we shall be fortunate enough to find in the two extremes of criticism and empiricism the happy mean, and discover in the all-determining subjectivity, at the same time, the paths and transitions that lead to the objective being of things. Thus, true science must in the end show itself to be the higher and in itself existing unity of criticism and empiricism.

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## KNOWLEDGE AND THE RELATIVITY OF FEELING.

BY JOHN DEWEY.

The doctrine of the Relativity of knowledge is one of the most characteristic theories of modern thought. To many, indeed, it seems the sum of all modern wisdom. That we cannot know Being, but must confine ourselves to sequences among phenomena—this appears to many the greatest achievement of thought: a discovery whose full meaning it was reserved for the Nineteenth



Century to penetrate, and one which, if mastered, will put an end to all the idle speculation which is supposed to have disgraced the philosophical thought of the past, and turn intellectual activity into the fruitful fields of real knowledge.

The doctrine has been reached in at least four different ways, and held by as many schools. There is the Positivist, who claims to have reached the doctrine as the result of history, and not from any system of Metaphysics, and who is among the loudest in proclaiming it the panacea for all ills which intellect is heir to. There is the school who profess to have reached it from a philosophical examination of thought itself, and to have found it involved in "imbecilities" at every attempt to overstep phenomena—the school whose chief representative is Hamilton, but more lately given to calling up the greater shade of Kant to conjure by. Then there is the Associationalist, who, after Hume had made wreck of Sensationalism by showing that its methods and presuppositions left no basis for any objective knowledge—no, nor for objective existence either—had before him the sorry task of keeping the method and yet avoiding the result. His instrument was the "association of ideas," and by it he attempted to reach results compatible with every-day thought and the established facts of physical science. But to whatever extent he succeeded (and we are not concerned with that question at present), he found himself confined within the limits of his subjective capacity for association, and he, too, took Relativity for his shibboleth.

But with the development of the theory of evolution arose a school that wielded a mightier weapon. Here was an established scientific theory which assumed objective existence, and also, in one of its highest generalizations, included man, and showed that he, and presumably his intellect and knowledge, had in the progress of the cycles been developed from these original existences and forces. Here, then, is a theory which, in a certain form, may deny all creating and constructive thought, and consequently be thoroughly sensationalistic. Furthermore, by extending indefinitely the sphere and time of operations, it bridged the gaps and strengthened the weak points of former sensationalism; and, above all, it postulated objective existence. Here, then, is a theory which may satisfy the demands of physical science and of "common-sense" as to existence independent of subjective feeling; pay

a compliment to the former by adopting its methods and results, and at the same time forever silence all who claim that we have absolute knowledge. For, notice how this theory is also compelled to assume the form of Relativity. According to it, in the form we are considering, all knowledge is, through a nervous organism, constructed through evolution from the lowest form of life, or from matter. Accordingly, it must be conditioned by the state and quality of the organism, and cannot represent or copy objective existence. It is therefore relative to the subject. But since, according to the realistic assumptions of the theory, there is objective existence, this must remain forever unknown and unknowable. To know it would be possible only through the contradiction of a feeling not relative to the subject. This, then, is the position of that form of the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge which is probably most widely influential at present. All knowledge is derived from feeling; feeling is conditioned upon the existence of external objects, and expresses the way in which the sentient subject is affected by them, and not what they are in themselves. All knowledge is through feeling, and all feeling is relative. Such are its dogmas.

What we intend in this paper is to examine into the theory of the Relativity of Knowledge in so far as it bases itself upon the fact of the relativity of feeling to a subject. Were we to examine it exhaustively in its relations to the theory of evolution, with which in its fourth form it is connected, it would be necessary to ask how the scientific theory of evolution, by hypothesis an exact and correct statement of a universal law, is compatible with any such supposed origin of knowledge. But we pass over this for the present, and will inquire simply into the mutual relations of the two parts of any sensationalistic theory of the relativity of knowledge.

That we may have the work thoroughly before us, it must be noticed, first, that Relative here signifies subjective as opposed to objective, phenomenal as opposed to ontological. It denotes an imperfection of thought, not its essence. Secondly, this theory in its present form is not a psychological theory. It does not simply state certain facts regarding the method in which we get to know the world, but claims to be a Philosophy, and so gives epistemological conclusions regarding the knowableness of Being,

and, therefore, ontological conclusions regarding the nature of Being, viz., that it is unrelated to Thought.

Plausible as the theory seems at first sight, by reason of its supposed basis in well-established scientific facts, it is impossible, upon further reflection, to suppress certain questionings. These formulate themselves as follows: How is it possible to assume at the same time the truth of the sensationalist hypothesis and that of the Relativity of Feeling? Are these two doctrines ultimately reconcilable? Does not the possibility of knowing the relativity of our feelings imply an element in knowledge besides these feelings? Could a merely feeling consciousness ever arrive at the knowledge that there were objects as referred to which its feelings were purely relative? In a word: Can a consciousness made up exclusively of feelings which are *ex hypothesi* relative ever transcend this relativity, and make assertions regarding an absolute object as referred to which alone they could be termed relative?

What I wish to present is some suggestions in answer of this question; and incidentally, if possible, to throw some light upon the ultimate ontological bearings of any theory of the relativity of feeling.

It is to be noticed, first, that this theory assumes that there is an absolute object or objects. There can be no relative except as referred to an Absolute. It is only by assuming that there is something Non-relative that we can know our feelings to be relative. Relative and absolute are correlate terms, and one without the other is meaningless, or rather impossible. Were it not postulated that there is a Non-relative existence as referred to which our present actual feelings *are* relative, it is evident that the feelings themselves would be the ultimate and absolute, thus contradicting the hypothesis. There is no need to occupy space in stating these truisms, for, besides their self-evident character, they are admitted, or rather claimed, by the chief modern representative of the doctrine we are examining. Says Mr. Spencer: "The proposition, that whatever we feel has an existence which is relative to ourselves only, cannot be proved, nay, cannot even be intelligibly expressed, without asserting directly, or by implication, an external existence which is not relative to ourselves." . . . The hypothesis "that the active antecedents of each primary feeling exist independently of consciousness is the only thinkable

one. It is the one implicitly asserted in the very proposition that feelings are relative to our own nature, and it is taken for granted in every step of every argument by which the proposition is proved" (Spencer, "Principles of Psychology," vol. i, pp. 209, 210). And, again: "More certain than the relativity of relations, as we conceive them, is the existence of non-relative forms to which they refer; since proof of the first involves perpetual assumption of the last" (Ibid., p. 227).

It being admitted, then, that knowledge of the relativity of feeling implies knowledge of a non-relative existence, the question arises as to the compatibility of this position with the theory it accompanies, viz., that all knowledge is derived from feeling. Is it logically possible to hold that all knowledge comes from feeling, and yet that there is knowledge of the existence of an Absolute? Rather, does not one position exclude the other? We will put the case in its simplest form. Either there is knowledge of something Non-relative or there is not. If the latter be the case, then, as we have already seen, the relativity of feeling could never be known, nay, the question as to its relativity could never have occurred to consciousness. The former alternative is the one adopted. We must admit that there is knowledge of the existence of an absolute object. But how is this knowledge obtained? Since all knowledge comes from feeling, this must also. In other words, since sensation-knowledge we must have sensation that there is an absolute existence. But on this theory (that every feeling is relative) an absolute sensation is a contradiction in terms. We may give up the sensationalist hypothesis, and, admitting that we have knowledge not derived from feeling (viz., that an Absolute exists), hold that feeling is relative. Or we may give up the Relativity theory and hold, so far at least as this point is concerned, that Sensationalism is true. But to attempt to hold them together is suicidal. If all our knowledge comes from feeling, since we can never have a feeling of the absolute object, we never can have knowledge of it; and we cannot have a feeling of it, since, by the theory, the absolute is precisely that which is *not* conditioned by feeling. Or, on the other hand, if we know that all feeling is relative, we do know that there is an absolute object, and hence have knowledge not derived from sensation. When these alternatives are once fairly faced, it will be seen that one or



the other must be definitely adopted. Both cannot be accepted. To attempt it is to show that neither position is understood.

Such is the fact. The reason for it is not far to seek. By the sensationalist hypothesis, we know only our feelings; according to the relativity theory, we must know the relation of our feelings to an object; this the feelings cannot give, except by transcending their relativity—except, in short, by ceasing to be feelings. Humes showed once for all that if the sensationalist presuppositions be adopted, the “perceptions” themselves were ultimate and final, and that any supposed reference of them to an object is a fiction to be accounted for as best may be.

An examination of the method by which Mr. Spencer attempts to unite with his sensationalism the position that the existence of an Absolute is known will confirm us in the conclusions just drawn, for we shall see that the best which he can offer is a virtual surrender. His argument was substantially given in the passages cited from him, and is similar to that given in the *First Principles* for the existence of an absolute object in general. Briefly, it is as follows: “The existence of a Non-relative is unavoidably asserted in every chain of reasoning by which relativity is proved.” This is apparently offered as a serious argument in proof of the existence of an absolute object; at least it is all that is offered. Its worth may be made evident by a parallel example. To prove A, we must assume B; by its assumption A is proved. But B is involved in the proof of A; therefore B is also proved. It is evident, or ought to be, that we have here no proof of the existence of either A or B, of the Relative or Non-relative, but simply that there can be no A without B, no Relative without an Absolute—an undoubted fact, but one which leaves the existence of either in as much doubt as before. In truth, it is not a solution of the difficulty, but a statement of it. It says that unless there be an absolute object, our feelings cannot be known as relative; while the question is precisely *how* is this absolute object known. Mr. Spencer’s legitimate conclusions from his argument are either that there is no absolute object, and hence the feelings are not relative, or we do know they are relative, and hence know that there is an absolute object, and have knowledge which is *not* relative. To attempt, as he does, to prove the existence of one from the assumed existence of the other is to reason in a circle. It can



not be that we know there is a Non-relative because we know that our feelings are relative, for the latter point is just the one in question, and cannot be proved, as Mr. Spencer himself shows, without assumption of the former. The knowledge of the existence of the Relative cannot be made to depend upon the assumption of a Non-relative, and knowledge of the existence of the Non-relative upon that of the Relative, at one and the same time. But it is only by this most illogical procedure that Mr. Spencer gets the Absolute, which, as he recognizes, is necessary to the proof of the relativity hypothesis.

We conclude, then, that we are justified in reasserting our original statement. To know that our sensations are relative, we must know that there is an Absolute. To know that there is an Absolute is, on the sensationalist hypothesis, to assert the *contradictio in adjecto* of an absolute feeling, or else to reason in the wholly illegitimate manner just examined. Hence, the two positions of Sensationalism and Relativity of sensations are wholly irreconcilable.

So far we have confined ourselves to the simplest assumption of these theories as conjoined—the assumption that there *is* an absolute object or objects. We have not concerned ourselves with the question, *What* is this absolute object? This, however, can no longer be kept in the background. Even admitting what we have seen it impossible to admit on the hypothesis that we have knowledge of the existence of a Non-relative, we have yet to decide whether the relativity of feeling can be proved without knowing *what* this Non-relative is. The sensationalist must hold, of course, that it can be. To hold that sensations can tell us what an absolute existence is, is a contradiction even greater (if there be degrees in contradiction) than the one we have just seen the theory involved in. And so we find that the absolute object is for Mr. Spencer beyond consciousness, independent of consciousness, unknowable. In fact, Absolute and non-relativeness to consciousness are synonymous terms with him and the Sensationalists generally. Our question, therefore, is: Can we prove the relativity of feelings on the hypothesis that they are relative to an unknown something by reference of them to something out of and independent of consciousness?

In reply, we ask the following questions: 1. Is it possible to

know *that* something is, if we have absolutely no knowledge *what* that something is? Can we know that an Absolute is, if we don't know what Absolute means? 2. Is it possible to know the existence of anything which is *ex hypothesi* out of relation to consciousness, and, further, know that this is the Absolute? 3. Is it possible to refer the whole content of consciousness to something which is beyond consciousness? Since the relative is so only as referred to an Absolute, can such a ratio between that which is in consciousness and that which is out of it be discovered as to demonstrate the relative character of the former? All these questions must, I conceive, be answered in the negative. As to the first, the predication of existence of an Unknowable seems to be a psychological impossibility. If there be any meaning in the assertion that X is, I confess I cannot see it. When it is said that something *is*, it is meant that *something* is. The predication must be of something; it cannot be of a pure Non-entity, like the Unknowable. The subject must *mean* something before it can be said either to be or not to be, or have any other intelligible proposition regarding it made. And so, as matter of fact, it is only as Mr. Spencer identifies his Unknowable with an Absolute, and thus takes advantage of the popular connotations of the word, that he is able to say that the Unknowable is; it is only as he smuggles some degree of qualification, however slight, into the subject that he can make it the subject of a proposition.

The question as to the possibility of knowledge of anything beyond consciousness, while presenting, since unknowable, the same difficulties to an affirmative answer as the question just considered, must, in addition, be answered negatively, on grounds of self-consistency. To say that something beyond consciousness is known to exist, is merely to say that the same thing is and is not in consciousness. Its special characteristic is to be *out* of consciousness; but, so far as it is known to exist, it is in and for consciousness. To suppose otherwise is to suppose that consciousness can in some way get outside of or "beyond" itself, and be conscious of that which is not in consciousness—a proposition as absurd as that a man can stand on his own shoulders, or outstrip his shadow.

If we go further and give to the Absolute any positive signification, if it becomes anything more than the blank negation of all determinate relations, the bare *is*, which nevertheless is a qualifi-

cation by thought, we are only adding further relations to consciousness; we are only qualifying it further by thought relations. Can the theory we are examining avoid such determinations? This brings us to our third question: Can a mere *x*, an absolutely unrelated object, afford us any ground for asserting the relativity of specific objects in consciousness as they actually exist? If the absolute object is entirely out of relation to consciousness, it certainly cannot be related to feelings, the supposed content of consciousness. Even were it granted that we could know the existence of an unknowable object and know that it was absolute, we should not be justified in saying that our actual feelings were relative; to effect this, the Absolute must be brought into specific relations with specific feelings. As long as its sole characteristic is unrelatedness to consciousness, it and the content of consciousness have nothing to do with each other; and to make one the ground of asserting anything regarding the real nature of the other is absurd. Indeed, not only *must* specific relations between the object and feelings be asserted, but we find as matter of fact at least one such implicitly posited, viz., that of cause and effect. The absolute object is the cause, the feeling is the effect. Now, remember that by this same theory all knowledge comes from feeling, and then ask how is it possible for the feeling consciousness to know this relation. At most, sensationalism can mean by causation regular succession of feelings; but the characteristics of the supposed cause in this case are precisely that it is *not* a feeling, and (since it is unknowable) that the succession has never been once observed, but it is only by making this self-destructive assumption that the theory can get the slightest footing.

We conclude on this point, therefore, that, to prove the Relativity of Feeling, it must be assumed that there is an absolute object; that this object must be in consciousness, and specifically related to the content of consciousness, and that these relations cannot be in the way of feeling. We must know *that* there is such an object; we must know *what* it is, and the what must consist in its relation to thought. Perhaps a method of stating this conclusion which would appear less formal, though not less expressive of the difficulty, would be to say that whatever is explained must be explained by reference to the known and not the unknown. Even were it admitted, *e. g.*, that the cause of our

feelings and that force have some transcendental existence entirely unrelated to ourselves and entirely unknown, it would not be by such unknowns that the relative character of our present feelings could be shown. To show or to explain is to bring the thing into relation with something known. Explanation of the unknown by the known, not of the known by the unknown, is the order of science.

An examination of the specific feelings which are said to be relative to the subject will both bring this point into clearer light, and reveal in what, positively, their relativity does consist. In a concrete case: Why is the feeling of color as given in immediate consciousness said to be relative? Is the knowledge that it is such obtained by reference to a known or an unknown object? The question thus put answers itself. The sensation of color is said to be relative to ourselves because it is known to be dependent upon vibrations of ether and the retinal structure of the eye. It is merely the relation between these two as given in consciousness. Unless I know that there is such a retinal structure and such waves, or something corresponding to them, it is absurd to speak of the feeling of color as relative. It is only because I may know what light is as objective that I may know that what it seems to be in feeling is relative and subjective. And so with sound and taste. The subjectivity of taste, *e. g.*, means that in the object unrelated to a nervous organism there is such and such a physical or chemical structure, and that the sensation of taste is the relation between that structure and a corresponding organic structure. Clearly, then, our knowledge of subjectivity or relativity depends upon knowledge of something objective. But it must be especially noticed that this something objective is not given in feeling, and, therefore, is not relative to sense. These objects—the waves of ether, the structure of the retina, etc.—are not themselves feelings, and never have been: were they feelings, there would be no reason to assert the relative character of the feelings following upon them. Consequently, if it should be said that these so-called objects, the vibrations, etc., although not themselves feelings, yet have meaning attached to them only in so far as they represent *possibilities* of feeling—and mean only that under certain conditions they would become feelings, and that even now they possess signification only as symbolized by actual sensations—the



answer is ready. But, before giving it, we will state the objection more fully. It may be said that the objects we have supposed, the vibrations, etc., are, as known, themselves conditioned by the affection of the nervous organism through some other object, and so on indefinitely, so that, after all, our knowledge of them is entirely relative.

But any such objection, to be of value, must hold that this process goes on *ad infinitum*, as otherwise there would be something known not through feeling, and, therefore, not relative. But if it does go on *ad infinitum*, it is clear that we fall into our original difficulty: nothing will ever be known except the immediate feelings, and to refer them to anything existing out of or beyond themselves will be impossible. The mere fact that one feeling is the antecedent of another could never give any reason for asserting that that feeling was relative in comparison with an unknown object. To suppose that it could, is to suppose that a feeling may transcend its own relativity. Therefore, on this theory of the infinite regress, it can never be known that there is an absolute object, and, therefore, immediately present feelings can never be referred to such an object; *i. e.*, can never be known to be relative. They become themselves absolute and absolutely known.

We conclude, therefore, that to prove the relativity of feeling is impossible without assuming that there are objects which are known not through feeling. In short, Sensationalism and the Relativity hypothesis again prove themselves utterly incompatible. The theory of the relativity of feeling, therefore, is so far from proving the subjectivity of our knowledge that it is impossible, except upon a theory which assumes that we do have objective knowledge.

The removal of a possible misapprehension and an objection are needed to complete the discussion of this point. It will perhaps be said that, since the relativity of feeling was known long before there was knowledge of what the objects really were, and that since now it is possible or probable, in some cases, that we do not really know the objective order, our account cannot be correct. But it must be noticed that this account does not depend for its correctness upon the question whether objects are really what we think they are, but simply upon the question whether the theory of the Relativity of Feeling does not assume and require that it is



*possible* to so know them. And this question is implicitly answered in the affirmative in this very objection; for, if our present knowledge is incorrect, this can be shown only by reference to an established objective order to which, by greater knowledge, it shall be shown that our present theories do not correspond.

Or, again, it may be said our account is incorrect, because the real reason for calling a feeling relative is not because we have any knowledge of the object as referred to which it is relative, but simply because under the same objective conditions different persons have different sensations, or even the same person at different times. But nothing is gained by this change in expression, since it assumes that there are permanent objective conditions, which must be known. For the two differing feelings are either known to refer to the same object or they are not. If not, all ground for calling them relative disappears. But, if they are, of course this object must be known. By any method of stating the theory, it will be found impossible to avoid reference to a known order objectively existing. In this connection it may not be without interest to quote Mr. Spencer's summary of the theory as admitting implicitly, though unconsciously, just this point. He says: "The quality and the quantity of the sensation produced by a given amount of a given external force vary not only with the structure of the organism, specific and individual, as well as the structure of the part affected, but also with the age, the constitutional state of the part as modified by temperature, circulation, and previous use, and even with the relative motion of subject and object." What we desire to call attention to are the two admissions or claims which he makes, all unconscious of their bearing upon his theory. (1) That there is objectively "*a given amount of a given force*;" and (2) that some nine objectively existing causes of the modification of this force as given in feeling can be shown. In short, it is assumed that there is an objective force, the kind and amount of which is known, and that the causes which produce the variations of this in immediate feeling can be shown, and, consequently, eliminated.

So far, our conclusions as to the relation of the theory of Relativity of Feeling to the theory of knowledge have been negative, and consisted in pointing out that it was not consistent with Sensationalism. But we are now prepared to draw a positive conclu-

sion and say that the real meaning of the theory of Relativity of Feeling is that a feeling is a specific determinate relation or reaction given in consciousness between two bodies, one a sensitive, the other a non-sensitive object. It is possible to hold it, therefore, only in conjunction with a theory which allows knowledge of these objects; furthermore, since we have knowledge of these objective conditions, the knowledge of their relation as given in feeling, though relative indeed to the subject, is not for that reason a detraction from our knowledge of objects, but rather an addition. One certainly cannot see *a priori* any reason why the knowledge of the reactions of, say gold, in the presence of an acid should be an interesting addition to our knowledge of these substances, while the knowledge of its relation to a sensitive organism as given in feeling should be a deprivation of real knowledge. Except upon the theory that the real nature of things is their nature out of relation to everything, knowledge of the mode of relation between an object and an organism is just as much genuine knowledge as knowledge of its physical and chemical properties, which in turn are only its relations.

Leaving the subject of feelings, we come to that of relations between feelings which it has also been attempted to demonstrate to be purely relative to the subject, giving no knowledge of objective relations. There is no reason to draw upon the patience of readers to examine this view. It is subject to all the difficulties which we have made out against the like theory regarding feelings, besides laboring under the additional difficulty of having to show that these relations are themselves naught but feelings. Since we have already shown that the relativity of feelings to the subject cannot be proved without assuming objective relations, the case stands, *a fortiori*, against any such attempt as the present. There is also a self-contradiction in the theory so glaring that it might well have made any one pause who was not so mastered by the presuppositions of his system as to be blind to the rules of ordinary logic. Sensationalism must and does hold that all relations are reducible to feelings; are themselves, indeed, but kinds of feeling. But the theory of relativity supposes a relation between the subjective feeling and the unknown object which is the absolute. But, according to Sensationalism, this relation must be a feeling. Hence nothing exists but feelings, and relativity is a myth! If there be

no real relations, there can be no relativity; and, conversely, to say that feelings are *really* relative is to say that a relation really and objectively is, and is known. But to say this is to abandon the position that relation is a kind of feeling, and thereby to abandon Sensationalism. The fact that the two positions are so often held in conjunction is only evidence of how slightly the real meaning of either is grasped.

We summarize our results as follows: The doctrine of the relativity of feeling is incompatible with Sensationalism, and is so for two reasons. First, Sensationalism can never give knowledge of the *sine qua non* of the Relativity theory: the existence of an absolute object. For the very reason that sensation *is* relative to the subject, it can never transcend that relativity and make assertions regarding something absolute. Secondly, even if the existence of the absolute object were assured, feeling *qua* feeling can never demonstrate its own relativity. The Absolute here as an unknown Universal can never be known to be the Absolute which constitutes the relativity of the present content of consciousness. The feelings must be definitely referred to that absolute object. For feeling itself to make any such reference assumes that it can transcend its relativity, and know not only an absolute object, but what it is and what relations subsist between the two.

But if this knowledge of the existence of an absolute object and of its determinate relations is not given by feeling, we are justified in saying that it is given by a consciousness which by its relations determines the object. For, as we have shown that these objects must be related to consciousness, and cannot be related in the way of feeling, what they can be except as determined and constituted by relations of this consciousness it is not easy to see. Since a feeling can be known as relative only when referred to an object, this object cannot be a feeling, nor constituted by a feeling. The object must, then, be relative to a thinking consciousness.

There are two points which every theory of the Relativity of Feeling must include and explain: (a) In what does the relative character of the feelings consist? (b) What is the nature of the correlate absolute? The sensationalist hypothesis breaks down, as we have seen, at both these points. But our present theory, that relativity consists in a specific ratio between a sensitive and a non-sensitive object, which are constituted by relations to self-con-

sciousness, proves itself, I think, amply adequate. Since relativity, according to it, consists not in relation to a nervous organism, but to consciousness, the possibility of knowledge is provided for. And, on the other hand, since this self-consciousness is the ground and source of relations, it cannot be subject to them. It is itself the true Absolute, then. This does not mean that it is the Unrelated, but that it is not conditioned by those conditions which determine its objects. Thus, we are saved the absurdity of believing in a relative which has no correlate absolute.

We have thus considered the theory of the Relativity of Knowledge in that form where it unites itself with and bases itself upon feeling. The reader may see for himself how large a portion of it would also apply to any theory of the Relativity of Knowledge. In closing, we must repeat the caution with which we began: that we are not dealing with the theory of relativity of feeling as a psychological theory. The correctness of the theory is undoubted. The philosophical interpretation of it is the point in question. Its conditions and implications need development, and we have attempted to show that when they are developed the theory is compatible neither with Sensationalism, nor with Subjectivism, nor with Agnosticism; that it is compatible only with a theory which admits the constitutive power of Thought, as itself ultimate Being, determining objects.

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## PRIMEVAL MAN.

BY ELIZABETH PALMER PEABODY.

This paper, the *résumé* of some thirty years of my own studies into Historical Origins, was written as long ago as 1854; before I had read Bunsen's "Antiquarian Researches," which I found, when I did read them, in 1860, confirmed with astronomical, philological, and physiological facts, and with the ornamentation of the most ancient monuments, as well as with collation and criticism of the oldest written documents, the theory of a primeval civilization, long antedating what had been considered, hitherto, the beginning of human history.

And, of course, it was written prior to the recent scientific theories of the "Origin of Species" and "Descent of Man." But the acceptance of the theory of the evolution of the human body out of star-dust, through all lower animal forms, till it reached the human shape (perhaps in the faun, which may have been historical!), does not at all invalidate the arguments on which is founded my theory of the Primeval Man. As a Spirit of Reason, communing fully with his kind in love, and comprehending nature by intuition, I submit that the "Image of God" is *not material*, and must be sought and found, not by physiological but by historical research. Of course, man could not appear on earth till an organization had been developed or evolved adequate to be a perfect instrumentality of the Spirit. J. J. Garth Wilkinson, in his work entitled "The Human Body in its Relation with Man," has illustrated by the physiology what I attempt to illustrate by the history of humanity. For, as Mr. Emerson has sung, even the fragmentary history that we have is sufficient to show to an earnest, reflective mind that

"Deep love lieth under  
The pictures of time,  
That fade in the light  
Of their meaning sublime."

The earliest traditions declare the unity of the human race, not merely by referring man, bodily, to one progenitor (of which there is reasonable dispute), but by referring civilization to one law-giver.

Considering the names of the primeval law-givers, to which each great race goes back (the Aryan *Mann*, the Indian *Menu*, the Egyptian *Menes*, the Lydian *Maeon*, the Etruscan *Manus*, the German *Man*, and the radical syllable *min*, found in declining the Latin *homo*, and in *Minerva*, the name of the Roman goddess of wisdom), we find the old root, *mn* (the liquid *m* expressing the meeting, and the *n* negating the limit, of phenomena). *Man*, etymologically, means the consciously meaning creature expressing himself by the symbolic organs of speech, the oldest and characteristic creation of man being significant articulate speech—and if the sensuous genius of the Aramæan language named man from his body (*Adam*—*Edom*—red earth), because, characteristically,



they considered the phenomenon first; yet his spiritual being was not left unrepresented in the Hebrew Genesis. For not only in Chapter First is he declared the conscious sovereign of the earth, and of all that there is therein, but in Chapter Second it is said that "the Lord God brought to Adam all creatures to be named, and the name that he gave them was the name thereof"—a statement which can symbolize nothing *less* than that man, having appeared on earth in full physical development, unhindered by inheritance of physical evil (which is always the consequence of moral disorder or negligence), not only received on his healthy sensorium perfect impressions of nature's particulars, but his unspoiled brain was in that perfect state for intuitive perception, classification, and all other mental action,<sup>1</sup> of which we have partial example in every great original genius, whose proper action is always to name correctly sensuous things, and their relations to *the whole*, of which he has mystic knowledge in his sense of personal identity; that the name the primeval man gave to everything brought before him "was the name *thereof*"—that is, it expressed its nature and attributes; in short, articulate, significant language was the first creation of man, and the special witness of his *intellectual* entity. Expression was coeval with Impression, or Speech followed hard on Perception.

That man did appear on earth, not only in physical and intellectual power, but *morally free* to good and evil, is patent, in that he was, as we have already said, and as all ancient tradition recognizes, primevally, the law-giver. And in justifying the assertion that the names of the most ancient law-givers *point* to, or imply the first social organism, rather than an individual, it may be in point to cite the fact that in ancient Egypt all the wisdom gathered in the ages, by whomsoever committed to writing, went to make one book, called the "Book of Hermes," whence, in process of time, came the conception of the Egyptian god Hermes, inspirer of all wisdom. For that "all scripture came by inspiration of God" was an ancient proverb, expressing not the faith of the Hebrews alone, though *their* characteristic conception of *Law*, as concrete in one Holy *persona personarum*, made *their* symbol

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<sup>1</sup> See Frances Power Cobbe's "Intuitive Morals," and F. D. Maurice's "Conscience," for the later recognition of this truth.

of the self-revelation of the Divine Spirit always to be human history.

The name of the Hebrews' God, *JEHOVAH*, was composed of the three tenses of the verb *to be*—"was," "is," "shall be"—which happily expresses the idea of Eternity, and, to the moral sense, means *THE PROMISER*. ("As it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be," is the grand intuition of Primeval Humanity, sealing it as the Eternal Son of God.) It is precisely because only the expression of Truth and Good, which is symbolized by man in his social unity, can touch the sensibilities of all men, from zenith to nadir, that the Hebrew scriptures interest the heart and command the imagination of more varieties of race than do the sacred books of any other nation.

For only the few of any race or age, by a process of introversion, *abstract the idea of Divinity*. The mass of men, whether barbarous or civilized, are interested by nothing less than a story of social interaction; and they are so quick to infer a Divine factor in history, because every man personally realizes the need of *Divine* to supply the shortcomings of *human* Causality and Ideality.

In short, it is because men, considered in solidarity, can alone become the image of God, that the adequate form of a Revelation of God must needs be the *total of human history*.

It matters not, indeed, whether we consider as an Idea expressed in apologue merely, or as historical fact, that old tradition which (whether it appears as the Eden of the Hebrews, the Egyptian kingdom of Osiris, the Persian kingdom of Ormuzd, the Golden Age of ancient Europe, or the long reign of gods before men, lying back of the Chinese and Indian histories) always symbolizes the one general truth—that the race began as one social organism; all variety of human individuality harmonized into Wisdom and Power, by the recognized rule of a supreme self-conscious being, infinitely good and wise, in parental relation with it, generating, and educating to regenerate it, forevermore.

The etymology of the words *just* and *right* (perfect participles of the Latin words for *to command* and *to reign over*), and the instinctive appropriation of them to the decisions of conscience, point back to the same original fact of pure Theism as the first religion of the human race, and the first principle of all govern-

ment. Every degree of remorse (which every individual feels more or less, from his earliest days of reflection) implies the same truth—namely, that man is “created upright,” and begins his career as the image and vicegerent of God.<sup>1</sup>

That all nature is instrumentality for man ; and, to make society a “communion of the just,” his recognized and appointed duty is, at once, the instinct of the heart, the ultimate truth of Reason, and the oldest statement of history. (Gen. x, 9–17.)

It is this primeval fact (or Idea) of the Incarnation of God in man which has had the effect, in Asia, to give any man, in whom the supreme power is formally vested, the *prestige of divinity*. Always, with Asiatics, the “powers that be” are revered as divine. The “Great Emperor” of China, “Grand Lama” of Thibet, “Indian Rajah,” or whatever the title of the Oriental ruler may be, is not the *servant*, but an *incarnation* of God (with the one exception of the kings of Israel).

The salutation of Brahmin to Brahmin, though it be from aged father to youthful son, still is, “to the divinity that is in you I do homage.” *Even in its ruins*, Asiatic society is thoroughly theocratic. Hence the persistence of those majestic forms of social and political life which lie like a ghastly mask on its shrunken skeleton.

And it is this not yet entirely dead mysticism, on the borders of Europe and Asia, upon which the demonic Czar Nicholas knew how to play, and which gave to his assumption of divine right by the Ukase a strange power over the Asiatic portion of his subjects ; while, on the other hand, it was simply ludicrous to the western mind, whose extreme peculiarity is expressed by the London “Punch” ; and it inextricably puzzled, or more or less heavily imposed upon those nations, whose culture lies half-way between these extremes, who talk of the divine right of kings and infallibility of popes.

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<sup>1</sup> Hence the great poet of the Ideal, in his Sphinx song :

“Ask on—thou clothed Eternity !  
Time is the false reply.”

And—

“Pride ruined the angels—  
Their shame them restores ;  
And the joy that is sweetest  
Lurks in stings of remorse.”

But there is another tradition of History, coeval with that of the incarnation of God in man, which testifies to a fact only logically second to it: this is the *Fall of Man* from Paradise; the death of Osiris, torn to pieces by the monster Typhoons; the invasion of the kingdom of Ormuzd by Ahriman; the silver, brazen, and iron ages of ancient Europe that followed the golden age of Saturn.

Whether these corresponding traditions point to Ideas constituting the mind of man, or to historical facts on the social and political plane of the primeval civilization, they equally, with that of the incarnation, symbolize the truth—that there is a Being of whom the human race is an intelligent creature, endowed with *freedom* to become, consciously, one with Him, no less than left at liberty to rebel against Him *within a certain sphere*. Otherwise the mind of man is a material slough, half conscious in despair.

But that it is not the last is symbolized by a third tradition, inextricably mixed up with the two others in all their forms. With the curse and banishment from Paradise is linked, indissolubly, the immortal hope of Redemption, which is found to be no less universal if more or less clear in different civilizations.

It is said to Adam, in Genesis iii, that Eve's seed shall crush the serpent of evil; and to Abraham, in Genesis x, "In thy seed shall all the families of the earth be blessed." Isis, the faithful wife of Osiris, never ceases to seek the divided body of her beloved husband—[which, the fable says, Typhoons buried all over the earth]—that, bringing the pieces together, a house of life may be made, to which he shall return to live and rule forevermore. The Persian prophecy is, that Ormuzd shall in the end overcome Ahriman; and, over Chaos, according to the theogony of Hesiod (which is really ill-remembered history), "Love, first born of Immortals, rose."

Indeed, the Greek myths of Redemption are multitudinous. Think of that wonderful story of Jupiter and Semele, where the finite is destroyed by its irreverent desire to know God *otherwise* than by worshipping him, humbly and gratefully—wherefore for earthly beauty is given ashes, by Jupiter's coming in his unveiled infinite majesty in answer to the incontinent human desire. But, according to this fable, the divine spark of life, which the Infinite

has fathered and the Finite mothered, is saved *in the thigh of Jupiter* (which seems to be the emblem of the activity of the spirit in time); and, in due season, the man-child appears—a fiery God, riding on the panther, and conquering India; the stroke of his thyrsos turning the earth beneath into the grape, whose form and streaming wine answer to the sun, with its streaming light—showing that the earth and the heavens are alike symbols of the one life, whose ineffable nature is VICTORY!

Also, think of Prometheus (mind foreseeing), who, “benevolent to man,” warns his brother, Epimetheus (mind passive), against receiving any gift whatever from Jupiter, who, *in that oldest mythology*, always stands for the *god of this world*, in opposition to a sublimer Divinity. But the warning was in vain, for forgetful Epimetheus “received” the consummate Pandora, who straightway opened on him her *casket*, whence, to his dismay, “flew human ills through earth and air.”<sup>1</sup> But here, also, is found the Promise; Hope was left prisoner of man by the quick-falling cover!

Again, to Prometheus, chained by Jupiter for bringing fire from heaven to man on earth, comes at last the deliverer, Hercules, the genius of Labor, born of the God-like Will, and the all-entrancing Beauty of the Grecian land, who brings to an end one old era, and begins another.

To those who may object to all this, that it is Poetry, and not History, we reply that we can afford to make the transference, though we submit that it is a *poetic form of History*, by which the Divine meaning of ages of human experimenting is distilled into a convenient form for transmission and moral use. With respect to the fact of man's first estate in physical and intellectual uprightness, the historic fall, and the growing redemption of the race (a symbolic trilogy which integrates the triplicity of human destiny), History is strong with her unquestionable monuments, and is growing stronger as they are daily explored.

To say nothing of *language*, in which the early history of the human mind is fossilized, and which at last is being studied scientifically, stones, no more than figures, will *lie*. When man builds his life into architectural masses like those of Egypt and

<sup>1</sup> See Flaxman's “Illustrations of Hesiod—Pandora opening her Box.”



India, or moulds it into sculpture, as in the allegoric figures of Persia and Assyria, the colossi of Egypt, and the gods and heroes of Greece and Rome, he makes that which he is—everlasting as the hills:

“Earth proudly wears the Parthenon  
As the best gem upon her zone;  
And morning opes with haste her lids  
To gaze upon the Pyramids.”

The monuments of the Elder World testify to what man has been, known, and done, as cannot be gainsaid. We need but slightly indicate what volume upon volume of antiquarian research tells, in details which cannot be too considerably explored. Even monumental architecture shows that, in early antiquity, men were organized to labor, and accomplished vast designs; and the laborers were not mere artisans, but creative artists, whose culture (again) implies organized society.

The sculptures of those monuments that Heeren explored in Egypt, Persia, and India, on which are brought together the inhabitants of remote regions, prove an immense commerce.<sup>1</sup> We see the nomads of Asia and Africa, reciprocally, on the architectures of Egypt and Assyria. They are walking in processions in Egypt, bearing tributes; they hold up, as caryatides, the thrones of the old kings of Persia and Assyria. Costumes and manners identify some of these figures *with the Scythians of the North*, and the Ethiopian and Egyptian nomads described by Herodotus; for it is plain, on comparing his descriptions with accounts modern travellers give of the Tartaric and African tribes, that nomads neither deteriorate nor improve in the lapse of ages. Their office seems to be to keep up the wild stock of the human race, with a protest against that subjection of one class of men to another which can only take place in any nation by some men's arrogating a divine right, which is, in fact, inherent in all, or in none.

On the temple- and palace-walls of Egypt and Assyria are represented triumphal marches of conquerors, bringing as prisoners, at their chariot-wheels, multitudes of nations who were linked together by religion, politics, or commerce. The tributes brought mingle the silks of China, the commodities of farther and hither

<sup>1</sup> Heeren's "Researches in Persia, Egypt, and India."

India, with gold and ivory borne on the hands of negroes from Guinea, even so long ago!

The investigations of Landseer into a species of monument, found among the ruins of Babylon, whose architectures and sculptures are destroyed, have poured unexpected light upon the history of the early ages. Cylinders of precious stone, carved with more or less artistic skill, are picked up, even to this day, among the ruins of Babylon, and are occasionally dug up in the Eastern Continent, in places as distant from each other as Ireland and China. They are small, but their great numbers can only be accounted for by recalling the remark of Herodotus—that “every Babylonian had a signet.” They are, in short, horoscopes, which were worn on the top of a staff, or on a string tied round the neck. The aspects of the heavens are represented on them by emblematic figures, which recall the astronomical science that, as astrological myth, gave form to the popular religion of old Babylon.

It is only the extensive commerce, which had one of its capitals on the banks of the Euphrates, and another on the Nile, and embraced the isles of the sea, east and west, that can account for the wide spread of many mythological stories, through which gleam the sciences of Nature, especially astronomy; but which often have a historic and metaphysical sense also, as if nations of different genius had successively symbolized their thought, and even history, by the same figures. For, in process of time, these signets, being used as seals and pledges of faith in commerce, were universally diffused in waxen semblances, each nation interpreting the graven images according to its own ideas and traditions.

If, as Landseer seems to prove, these cylinders are referred to in the Book of Job (xxxvii, 14), were legislated against by Moses as graven images,<sup>1</sup> and were the ground forms of many Grecian and Roman myths, the testimony they bear to the antiquity of a general commerce, supporting and supported by an affiliated Paganism, is remarkable.

The unity of Paganism in its principle (which is the worship of

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<sup>1</sup> It is noteworthy that Moses always says: “Thou shalt not have a graven image *unto thyself*,” which is a perfect description of a Babylonian signet, every horoscope being peculiar to its owner. Such idols it was easy for Rachel to conceal by sitting on them.

the Heavens and the Earth), and the interfusion of its rites and ceremonies with the activities of commerce, was a widely extended fact in antiquity; but many European monuments bear a different interpretation. They consist of fragmentary Epics and Lyrics, pointing to an action of man antagonistic to religion and union, which the monuments of southern Asia and northeastern Africa always presuppose; in short, they are redolent of a more lively religious sentiment, in the form of Hero-worship.

In Europe, as elsewhere, the first rulers of men are said to have been divine; and European divinities are always of the human form, which, instead of being disgraced, as in Asia, by allegoric monstrosities, such as a hundred breasts, or a multitude of arms or eyes, becomes, whenever it symbolizes the Divine, of Ideal beauty.

The worship of human form culminated in Greece, where the Titans, children of Heaven and Earth, seem to have had earliest sway. Benjamin Constant shows that the reign of the Titans represents a sacerdotal government, learned in the arts and sciences, and by these very means tyrannizing over conquered masses, foreclosing the freedom of new generations as they "came upon the shores of being."

Sir William Jones's Dissertation upon "the identity of the gods of India and Italy" affords a mass of evidence that the sacerdotal governments of Asia and Africa extended, at an early age, into Europe also; else the identity he discovers is only to be accounted for by supposing that vast emigrations went from some central point of Asia, carrying their traditions of glory with them to new localities, where they finally took root, and seemed, to their posterity, indigenous; so that the ancient Italy was really a reminiscence of India, and the golden reign of Saturn, perhaps, but another statement of the primeval organism of men in society. For does not Saturn obviously stand for the ancient Time? Think of his history: so Time devours all that it brings forth. Stupefied into custom, it may at last mistake a stone for a living child, let the stone only be cunningly swathed by the changeable Rhea (who personifies the flow of circumstance).

But the autocratic genius of political power, the Greek Zeus, the good father, Eupater, Jupiter, being child of that one of the Titans who had obtained sway over all the rest (for custom is

stronger than all other finite principles), when, like the rest of his brethren, he is condemned to be devoured, indicates his descent from Uranus (Heaven—this father's father), and under that protection, by his mother Rhea's aid (as Hesiod has told us), escapes to Crete, and gets educated by the priests of Cybele. (Everywhere we find religion, though often, as here, it has gone astray into the earth for its God.)

In the first force of his youthful genius, Jupiter declares war against the time-honored custom (political contends with sacerdotal power); Saturn is compelled to *disgorge*, first, the stone, then the brothers and sisters of the new autocrat, who, in the generous plenitude of conscious power, seeks the prison-house of his uncles, the Titans, to set them free also (autocratic power craves the prestige of the divine association).

What splendid symbolization is this of ages of human activity, distilled down into a poetic quintessence by the generalizing Intellect and creative Fancy! The Genius of Humanity, in some remarkable person, triumphs over Time; and, taking counsel of all the powers of Nature, especially of the forecasting wisdom of man, builds up, on the ruins of an outworn ancient dynasty (which in its own day had a not unlike history), the Olympian kingdom.

There is a subsequent war between the Titans and the Olympic gods, and a conquest of the former by the latter, with the help of the hundred-handed giants of the earth and sea. And this is followed by the battle of the giants with the victorious gods (for the conservative multitude, of course, when it has become conscious of its potency, always rebels against the autocratic power, although it did help restore it to new vigor!).

The whole story has been reproduced in Europe within fifteen hundred years.

Let Constantine's Empire stand for Saturn; let the principle of monarchy, encouraging the popular element till it has gained its own purposes, stand for Jupiter and his allied giants; let Hildebrand's struggle of the ecclesiastical against the civil power stand for the war of the Titans against the Olympic gods—and it will be seen that the whole fable of the war of the Titans was veritable history, which always has words of prophecy for the understanding heart. The myth holds good for history, even to the end; Jupiter conquers and keeps in bonds the rebel Titans. He

even nails the immortal Prometheus, his prime counsellor, to the rock of circumstance, by mechanical art and material Force, under the direction of Mercury (the brain in the hand). Why is not this a probable history of the elder world, since we know that, in the modern era, the Practical Intellect always has sacrificed to immediate ends the inspirations of its youth, without which it would never have risen to its place of power? <sup>1</sup>

The monarchical principle grew in Europe—first, by the Church, which anointed it; secondly, by the popular element, which gave it material force. No sooner was it established than it dealt with both as Jupiter did with the Titans on the one side and the giants on the other. But there is nothing which has lived that can entirely die. The mountains that are piled on the giants are not “firm set earth;” the buried ones turn, and shake the foundations of the cities built over them; occasionally their fiery life bursts forth overwhelming; there is secret, undated community with the Higher power, “benevolent to man,” who brought the fire to earth; <sup>2</sup> and the divine Titan bides his time, and outlives the vulture of circumstance. The self-regenerating liver may not be exhausted even through thirty thousand years. Idea foresees that, however persistent may be any beautiful form, every form is temporary. As out of the conjunction of the active genius of Greece, with its beautiful sensibility, sprang a force, personal, moral, instant; conditioned by political circumstance, and directed to specific ends; constantly renewed and cultivated by the very labors that were imposed upon it to keep it from the place of power—so it may be that the legitimate governments of modern Europe are educating the Hercules that shall unbind the genius of Humanity for a new Avatar!

Homer celebrated the past glories of the Olympian era. The fall of Troy is the last event that brought the will of the Pelasgic-Dodonæan Jupiter about. Apollo, the god of the Heracleidæ, took his place in Greece thereafter. If Jupiter survived as a name, it was *vox et prætereæ nihil*.

When, some ages after Homer and Hesiod, Herodotus took up

<sup>1</sup> See “Biography of Napoleon Bonaparte,” as given by Hazlitt.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Longfellow has embodied this idea in his “Enceladus.” But I deny any plagiarism. This essay was written (1853) long before his sonnet was published, if written.



the pen of History, which the epic poets had laid down, the Delphic oracle was the sole temple of Religion that held any sway over the people. But its sway was supreme. It is because we see the details of the Ionian revolt and Grecian resistance to Persia microscopically, that it does not appear to be Apollo's deed, as obviously as the destruction of the Pythian serpent, and the building of the temple of Crissa.

The triumph of the age of Pericles was the flowering out, in national act, of a Religion founded on the worship of Divine Intellect, in pure human form.

Karl Ottfried Müller has interpreted the Dorian conception of Apollo as "the moral harmony of the universe," broadened first by the toleration, and then by the absorption, of the tutelary gods of the other tribes, who severally personified the various human instincts and faculties which possibly characterized their heroic founders, and the systems of culture they severally established. But Müller's interpretation is not enough to explain the belief in his *personality*, which made Apollo the god of the people.

Modern researches have suggested, if they have not proved, that Apollo was an ancient leader of the Dorian colonization, a Hero Priest (perhaps the remembrance of one of the "fourteen lives of Buddha" long prior to Gotama), who led a colony of the atheistical sect (falsely so called, for its denial of any Divinity existent in the material universe opened up the way for an apprehension of God in man, the only known creature of which Love, Wisdom, and Spiritual power are in any degree attributes).

In the personality of a heroic man, then, is at last found adequate explanation of the effectiveness of the worship of Apollo over the masses of the Greeks. It is only *Personality* that will command a people's worship; never an abstraction.

The human Apollo must have combined the highest ideas of the Brahminical piety with the immeasurable self-respect of the protesting Buddha,<sup>1</sup> who probably united rare personal gifts with his complete culture.

Apollo inspires and commends his worshipper to his own Ideal Beauty.

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<sup>1</sup> The word *Buddha*, Intelligence, did not originate with Sakyamuni. It heads the most ancient genealogies of Asia. (See Tod's "History of Rajasthan.")

Except the Hebrew, this is the only worship that history speaks of which does not subject man to material nature; and, at the same time, does not despise, but respects, material nature in its due place.

Its supreme act is Imagination, which, descending from the calm heaven of Reason, expresses itself in Music, Dance, Science, and every beautiful art—the equilibrate motion, which is the rest not of death, but of the two poles of life in equipoise.

Its action in society was the inevitable result of a noble wisdom that saw the supreme end of a state<sup>1</sup> to be the unfolding of its constituent members to a perfect individual development, which, precisely because it was felt by each one to be his own moral creation, was his highest source and means of enjoyment.

Such a political state was measurably historical with the Dorians; and the only argument against their historian has been that “such culture is incredible in a wandering tribe of Nomads.”

But what justifies this ever-recurring preconception of primeval *barbarism*, when it is opposed by facts so stubborn as the Sanscrit, Zend, and other old tongues, teeming with words applied to intellectual and moral exercises not named in modern languages, proving a subtlety of intellect on the one hand, and a range of nature on the other, without parallel in modern civilization?

What is to be made of the fossilized science discovered among the superstitious practices of the Eastern nations? The idle legends, by which those among whom they are found explain these forms of custom, prove that the science originated with some more highly educated race who went before.<sup>2</sup>

It is immeasurably more absurd to suppose that the wonders of Grecian art and culture, described by Homer, and otherwise indicated in the first ages of Greece, were the imagination of the poets, than to believe them to be historical facts.

Layard has discovered, in Nineveh, that beneath the relics of the eighth century before Christ is found another, previously buried, Nineveh, whose works of art are of an altogether more

<sup>1</sup> K. O. Müller, vol. ii, “History of the Dorians.”

<sup>2</sup> See Bailly’s “History of Ancient Astronomy,” and “L’Origine des Sciences.”

exquisite character, showing the remoter age to have been more highly cultivated than the later one!<sup>1</sup>

Many of the cylinders of Babylon, referred to just now, specimens of which are scattered through the cabinets of Europe, exhibit the highest taste of art. The shawls of Cashmere, the steel and the silken webs of Damascus, are older than historical memory.

All these nations have the tradition that these inventions were introduced by divine personages. The "social compact" and the germination of arts and sciences among barbarians are romances of modern philosophers that have not a solitary historical verification. Joseph de Maistre's idea of savages being the degradation of the human race, not its germs,<sup>2</sup> is far better authenticated by facts than the opposite opinion; and it is no objection to this view that the nobleness of some savage nations testifies to the restorative power of an entire removal from the seats of concentrated corruption, from which the crimes or the caprices of their progenitors may originally have driven them; the promise of Redemption is as inherent in man as the Fall and the original sovereignty. The whole trilogy is perpetually reproduced, both in individuals and in History.

The Vedas of the Aryans, the Desatir of the Persians, the Puranas, and other sacred books of the Indians, equally show that the Fallen man was not at once bereft of all the glories of the sovereign.

In that day, when yet "the whole earth was of one lip," man, in comparison with later generations,

"above the rest

In shape and gesture proudly eminent,  
Stood like a tower."

"High in the midst, exalted as a God,  
Th' Apostate in his sun-bright chariot sat;  
Idol of majesty divine—  
His form not yet had lost  
All its original brightness,

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<sup>1</sup> Mariette's discoveries in the most ancient Egypt and the exploration of the Great Pyramid bring similar evidence.

<sup>2</sup> "Soirées de Ste. Petersbourg."

Nor appeared less than  
Archangel ruined,  
And the excess of glory obscured."

In short, men whose personal gifts and splendor of action are hardly exaggerated in the myths of the Grecian gods, whose forms (as Heeren says) Homer and Hesiod fixed forever in the human imagination by the characterizing strokes of their wonderful genius, might not unreasonably have been believed by ordinary men to have been wholly divine.

A late writer has traced from India, by the names of their settlements, which are found to be but a thinly disguised Sanscrit, the founders of every Grecian, as well as many Syrian and Egyptian states; and he promises to do the same with respect to Italy and other nations farther west.<sup>1</sup>

The earlier of the emigrants were sun-worshippers, who may naturally have succeeded to worshippers of the abstractions of the human mind (of which the Heavenly host and the forms of Earth are emblems), that at last brought about a worship of material nature, instead of the *Supreme Spirit, whose expression they are*; and this, in every instance, at last reduced men to barbarism. If there were various sectaries of this worship of nature (and how could it be otherwise?), and if they made various experiments of social life, the recollections of these persons by their descendants, and their histories, seen across the dark ages of Revolution and Barbarism, would account for the variety and contradictions of the myths, which present the greatest difficulties when it is insisted to harmonize them into one scheme, as Hesiod and others have tried to do.

But those antiquarians and critics are quite in the wrong who so earnestly set forth that it was not legitimate for the Grecian poets to have used these historical facts as the fanciful symbolization of their ideas. The truth is that the facts themselves grew out of the Ideas, which were their final cause of being.<sup>2</sup>

The genius of Humanity exercises its highest prerogative when

<sup>1</sup> See "India in Greece," by E. Pococke. He has promised it respecting the Kelts, who preserved the original Aryan organization of clans in the Scotch Highlands and Ireland (Aryaland?).

<sup>2</sup> See F. D. Maurice's "Apocalypse."

it extracts the Idea which a great social movement, or series of movements, has expressed, and casts aside the facts, as the gold-smelter does the ore in which he finds the precious metal embedded. This "mystic harvest" of Time, that the Poet "gathers in a song," is a corresponding verification of the argument derived from Philology, for the high condition of Primeval man, which the Philosopher of History cannot spare.

We know, indeed, by the Romancers and wandering Minstrels of the twelfth century, that these transcendental Reapers of the fields of Time make sad work with the dates and localities; but, on this account, we do not cease to be grateful that the middle age literatures have preserved the grand forms of Charlemagne and his Paladins, and of Arthur and his knights, who were really flesh and blood, and would never have been represented as the defenders of innocence, age, and chastity, but for the reality they shared in the Christian Life of Love.

That idea of pure Love made them imperishable; and, when they passed away personally, all in them that was derived from it survived as a *power*; and, re-embodied in chivalry, and the Christian poetry, not only educated Milton, as he has gratefully recorded, but Christian Europe, so far as it has been educated at all, which is indeed but partially.

The peculiarity of Greece was not derived from the emigration of the Solar Tribes, but from the leaders of the Pelasgian colonies of later date, called the Lunar Tribes. These, before they left Asia, had rejected the theology of the Brahmins, and their whole social organization, by denying the abstract principle out of which those doctrines grew, and propounding a theory in favor of the human will exactly opposite to the old Pantheism.

The first, as well as the last Buddh preached that God was the evolution of ages, and always came into form at last AS A MAN.

The signature of the developed divinity was the union of all gifts of genius and fortune which could make human opportunity. Having traversed all nature, from the lowest moss and animalcule up through all vegetable and animal organizations, he at last found himself the most beautiful, wise, and powerful of men, and the son of a king.

Choosing five hundred companions, most nearly gifted like himself, he exercised Saturnian sway; and, having organized the



whole race of men into a perfect society, and established peace, truth, and universal felicity, he and his five hundred passed into *nir-wana* (which has been strangely interpreted annihilation), for they had arrived at the consummate flower of Being!

Such is the oldest Buddhistic Tradition.<sup>1</sup>

We can plainly see what there was inspiring and commanding in this myth. What a spark of fire it must have been to kindle all the personality of genius slumbering in that old Brahminical world!

If it was a doctrine preached by a man whom fortune had placed on a pinnacle of political power by his birth, and he could give his thought *act*, nothing recorded of the triumphs of Buddhism is incredible. Even the last Buddha (Gotama) conquered Brahminical Sacerdocy for ages, in its old seats.

Alexander and Cæsar and the modern "Man of Destiny" came into similar relation with their respective times, and, with a gauge of much less depth, did a corresponding work on the political plane.

It is true that Brahmanism always recovered itself in its old place, when the living Buddha passed out of the flesh; but *this* in the end was an advantage to mankind, for it produced emigration *en masse* of those who had acknowledged him.<sup>2</sup>

Each leader could believe himself, and be believed by his followers, the coming Buddha, just in proportion to his gifts; and would work and inspire others accordingly. Hence the leaders of the earliest Pelasgian and Hellenic colonies.

The river Dor is one of the eastern sources of the Indus, coming from the mountains of the beautiful Cashmir, where even now travellers see working in the fields men with forms that recall the proportions of the Farnese Hercules and the Apollo Belvedere. From this river the leader of the Dorian emigration to Europe went, and was ever after idealized and worshipped as Apollo.

The first Buddhists are to be judged by their oldest books, and the uttermost purity and first energy of their doctrine; not by the present Buddhism, which dates from Gotama (the last man

<sup>1</sup> See "Revue Independante," article by Bournouf.

<sup>2</sup> It is noteworthy that the Pelasgian emigration dates from the victory of the Brahminical over the warrior-caste, in India. The warriors were not subdued, but emigrated.

who bore that name, in the fourth century before Christ), and which is now unquestionably corrupted from its first life.

The *caput mortuum* of both systems (Brahminism and Buddhism) is all that is left in modern India to-day.

The healthiest results of any doctrine are to be looked for among the Emigrants, who banish themselves from the opposite conservatisms, and whose activities and hardships in the colonization of new countries involve contests with nature, and with the older settlements of their opponents, which keep their intellect and energy alive for ages.

History has testified to no other Buddha who can compare with Apollo, who must have been the apotheosis of a rarely gifted man.

But even the divine Apollo recognizes a fallen humanity in his experience. The most remarkable rites in his worship consecrated the remembrance of his limitations by ceremonies of expiation and purification, necessitated by his violation of life—the mystery of mysteries—in his destruction of the Pythian serpent, which personified, perhaps, some savage fetichism, or the corruptions of the old Brahminism, but which could not be destroyed without violence.

The infernal deities at Phœæ, to whom the expiation was made, are the “clouds and darkness round about the throne” of the “Unknown God,” whom the Greeks “ignorantly worshipped.” But what is most remarkable and interesting in this myth is that the expiation Apollo makes is by menial service to man, which suggests an obscure apprehension of the characteristic doctrine of Christianity.

Karl Ottfried Müller says there is trace of a myth of the death of Apollo in the oldest mythology; and, also, it interchanges Apollo and Hercules, as if they symbolized the same facts of history. Both were names of the Sun-God. There was one form of the story of the restoration of Alcestis from the dead which made Apollo the Restorer, who, moved by the *love* he felt for the king, whom he had once humbled himself to serve, fought with Orcus. Does not this express the central depth of the Christian doctrine of redemption?

Were not Brahminism and Buddhism opposite errors? Brahminism despises the life that now is as *Maya*—Illusion. Buddhism

pities and *despairs of it*; Nirwana is absolute deliverance from it. Brahminism lacks the love, Buddhism lacks the dignity, of *human nature*, and both, therefore, allow *human life* to lapse, instead of glorifying it; but had they been, in their beginning, just what these theories are now, *and no more*, they had never founded social systems that it has taken so many ages to wear out. They are among the involuntary witnesses to the truth that man is created upright, which means in communion with God, whose Word is the *sum of things*, each one of which, and the order in which they are found, wake echoes in the human mind (*i. e., words*) which may be used for mutual understanding with our fellows—as God used the things themselves to converse with the primeval man before men were driven to *hiding* themselves in the trees of the garden, in conscious shame for having let their birthright lapse, by taking the law from below their proper sphere of life rather than from above, in that worshipful communion with the Father of Spirits which realizes the unity of all Life.

The animal as well as his material environment is good in its place, and it is all right that men should see, name, and enjoy it as “very good.” But let them not rest—but work—in it: “My Father worketh hitherto, and I work.” The world which science cognizes is the body which God has prepared for the human spirit to sojourn in, that men may commune with each other, tossing the echoes of its particulars from their tongues, to express that they know themselves as denizens of a heavenly kingdom, and heirs of its throne, on which they shall sit down, having overcome this world by knowing and using it in love.

*Absorption* and *nirwana* amount to the same thing, leaving God *minus* his Son, in whose face, as the old Schoolmen said, the Father beholds his own Glory. They grow *pale* before the Victory of Life Everlasting in Christ Risen. He left nothing in the grave, because every power constituting mind and body rises from the plane of nature, and *ascends into heaven*, by its own proper action and perfect use, singing “Hallelujah! the Lord God omnipotent reigneth (*in and by man*).” “So it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end.”

## NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

*OBJECT AND REFLECTION.*

## A NORMAL LESSON ON THE SIMPLICITY OF TRUTH.

All things pertaining to life and piety are of His divine power, which is given unto us through the knowledge of Him who hath called us by glory and virtue.—2 Pet., i, 3.

—PURVER'S TRANSLATION.

Since instructions are many, hold close to those whereon the rest depend. So may we have all in a few, and the law and the prophets in a rule.

—SIR THOMAS BROWNE.

Through all the diversities of human experience which necessarily ensue from the diverse limitations of circumstances and pursuits, and through all the ambiguities of human speech which may either inhere in the constitution of language, or spring from the variety of usage, there is an abiding unity of all truth, which is indicated and manifested to every enlightened intelligence, in a growing simplification of doctrine, or, so to speak, in a growing crystallization of law. The multiplicity of rules in all educational, as in all social and all individual life, so far as it is not ultimately capable of reduction to the central and comprehensive rule of "God-with-us," must be a form of practical polytheism, fraught with the distractions and dangers of a false faith. In the following more or less fragmentary suggestions the writer's desire is to inculcate the universal immanence of the supernatural in the natural, and to represent the work of education as being but one of the fields of exercise for that religious faith which moves, more or less directly, in the van of all living, progressive intelligence.

An "Object" may be simply defined as anything which is perceived or perceptible; that is, as anything "cast over against," or placed before, and so contrasted with, or distinguishable from, while subject to, our individual power of perceiving. As a secondary meaning, resulting from the desirability, real or imagined, of things perceptible as means of happiness, the term is also applied to the pursuit or desire of any such thing, and becomes nearly or quite synonymous with the terms "Design," "Purpose," "Motive." But it is so important, for the statement of first principles, to distinguish that primary meaning as a fact independent of all the variable moods of individual feeling, that the term "Object" may with advantage

be more explicitly defined as somewhat external to men, or to their individual consciousness, which somewhat, in the Divine ordering and illuminating of the perceiving being and the perceived thing, impresses the consciousness of men with a varied distinctness and fulness, according to their varied sensibility and capacity. Impressions thus received into consciousness, and there more or less definitely retained or secretly commingled, become, obviously, a sort of secondary objects, and furnish the materials of memory and "subjects" for reflection.

But while these comparatively internal facts, or subjects of reflection, are indeed subjects at will, or proper to us, as compared with those more impersonal facts which were their external occasion, they must obviously still be also regarded as external or objective in their relation and attitude to the secret individual consciousness, or the power of perceiving and reflecting, which inheres in the man proper, by virtue of his deeper relation to God.

The recorded creation of man in the image of God is the charter of his inherent superiority to the laws of inferior creatures, and even suggests the possible inference that the mention of his being created may be a figurative piece of condescension to that fallen and fragmentary condition in which he inevitably contemplates himself on the same plane with those creatures; and that his real origin in the essential and truly characteristic part of his constitution is that of an inevitable emanation of the Divine Substance in its collision with a hostile power, in that underlying conflict of the ages and the universe, which was presumably antecedent to the creation, and which is to be coeval, and coeval only, with the duration of time. But this suggestion it is unnecessary and inexpedient here to follow up further than to note that original diversity in human experience, of external fact and internal fact, which led even so profound and exhaustive an intelligence as that of Plato to regard matter as self-existent and eternal.

Without a deep appreciation of this fundamental contrast we cannot steadfastly do justice to the ever subtly shifting and seemingly evanescent, but ever stubbornly recurring, distinction between true Subject and true Object, and the consequent relativity and transitoriness of human knowledge; nor have any firm hold on the reflective power as the main element, or, indeed, as any element at all, in the development of that knowledge. But we must be led, by way of compromise, to designate the intermediate, transitional stages of a completed consciousness, as at best an indiscriminate mixture of the two elements, in which the priority of the internal is not maintained; and as the policy of concession thus accepted is consistently pursued or developed, to adopt a spiritless, materialistic faith and philosophy, barren alike of all deep principle and all lofty aspiration. But with



that appreciation, the philosophic ground may still be maintained for the universally obvious duality of Science, and the distinction between the internal or personal element and the external or impersonal may be rigidly observed through all the abounding and else inevitable confusion consequent upon the degree of profundity or insight in different observers, or in the same observer at different stages of intelligence. Indeed, despite all the inherent ambiguities of language, and all the perverse quibblings of scepticism of which those ambiguities are the stronghold, this "Subjective" and "Objective" duality of worldly and communicable experience and knowledge may be styled a direct intuition of the healthy soul, and a self-evident fact to a matured intelligence. But the ambiguities of language are themselves a result of this pervading duality of experience, and are to be mastered on the same principle of simplicity and subordination of the natural to the supernatural.

Howsoever the spiritual or substantial and the physical or phenomenal may be mediated by the intellectual or metaphysical—whatsoever division may be made of the various elements of truth, according to the stand-point and method of the observer, into subjective roots and objective branches of science, it must at least be obvious to all that there are root-sciences and branch-sciences, and that the science of language, which combines and connects them all, is justly to be regarded as the trunk of the tree. Although in itself neither a source of strength nor a seat of beauty, it must pre-eminently represent the principles, whatever they may be, which are common to all science. Indeed, the whole significance of Language, as a productive science rather than a wasteful art, consists in the fact that, as the mediator of the sciences, or the medium of their communicability and prospective fusion, it presents none other than those universal principles; and so, as it becomes indeed known to us, represents the essential and permanent conditions of all phenomena distinct from those accidental and transient ones which form so large a part of our transitional and probational experience. As the immediate omnipresence and practical omnipotence of God in nature, and a pervading harmony of nature, where not obscured without nor interrupted within by avoidable evil, are found to be the ultimate lessons of every department of knowledge, they are registered in the constitution of language, and so become the elementary materials of Grammar. The secret presence of Subjective power in Objective phenomena, which Subjective power, whether immediately consisting in the present Deity, or whether mediately represented by principles and men, maintains its own position and the subordination of nature by a continual process of creation, or expenditure of itself in new Objective forms, and so proves that subordination, and not self-preservation, is the universal law

of nature—this is the great mystery of grammar as of all science. Let the student of grammar, then, and of all science, begin his study with observing the ever-shifting distinction between internal and external experience, between power and phenomena, with a view to learning, in the first place, the qualities of spirit as distinguished from those of matter; and let him not dream to build except upon the foundation thus laid, if he would not have the image of his dream broken and crushed to powder before the Stone which is even now “cut out of the mountain without hands,” and which is destined to “fill the whole earth.”

As the Divine Subjective Power is antecedent to the universal Objective existence in the work of Creation, we may infer that the work of human investigation, subjective development, must be antecedent to objective intelligence. “First the root and then the fruit” must ever be the order of the truth that “springs out of the earth” under the beams of the righteousness that “shines down from heaven” (Ps. lxxxv, 2). Unconsciously, the soul of the earnest inquirer imbibes principles with facts, gaining by the process an increase of intellectual capacity which ensures their subsequent conscious discrimination and permanent possession. By the faithful observance of this just order of experience, man discovers and occupies his appointed place as lord of the outward creation. As his real life is “hid with Christ in God,” all facts furnish principles, which in turn become recognized as more important facts, and again suggest more important principles, according to the law of subjective development, until the scheme of the universe is consistently mirrored in his soul, so far as its details may be known to him, without diminishing, but, on the contrary, enlarging his appreciation of his relations towards God and his fellow-man. His very knowledge of God, the Supreme Subject, is plainly nothing more than a progress from earlier crude and contracted objective apprehensions to later refined and enlarged ones, with the extension of his own subjective capacity.

The mind of the individual and that of the race thus enlarging with the development of principles, the attainments of one age and stage become the starting-point of the next, and the primary law of education thus not only pervades all departments of knowledge, but endures through every period of progress. So far as the simplification and enlargement of language may keep pace with the same tokens of progress in general science, the teacher will be continually able to adapt his demonstrations of truth to the simple sense and craving capacity of the unsophisticated learner, never allowing his necessary practical devotion to the Objective or phenomenal to prevent that recognition of its immediate dependence on the Subjective or potential which, as an ever-shifting relationship, is that with which every learner must begin and end. Whether, therefore, it be regarded as

a unity or as a trinity, whether as the direct fusion of the subjective and objective, or as their distinct though harmonious coexistence in an otherwise "unknown God," the simplicity of Truth thus becomes the clew of grammar, and the law of education, so far as the work of education may deserve its name, by being at once elementary and progressive; and the broadest expression or illustration of that simplicity may yet appear in the profound but universal subordination of true Object to true Subject in the realm of ideas, and in the analogy, or philosophical identity of the relation existing between them, with those equally universal relationships of physical nature which are known as Polarity in the inorganic kingdom, and as Sex in the organic. The typical and far-reaching significance of these outward principles in the Divine allegory of God's creation, it may be, is only beginning to be broached.<sup>1</sup>

RICHARD RANDOLPH.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., *January, 1883.*

### THE BEAUTIFUL.

Beauty is not a local somewhat, nor is it an abstract quantity. It cannot be predicated of any scene or condition in itself, independently of human soul-condition. One's emotions may be aroused in admiration of some visible scene, and he may thence call upon a companion to observe and admire with him, but there is no certainty that the companion sees and admires *with him*—sees as he does. It is beautiful to the one, exciting delightful emotions, and is only coldly commonplace to the other. So beauty, in its merely sensory aspect even, is conditioned upon a unity or harmony between man and his relations in experience. The world of sense awakens throbs of delight and admiration only to one whose feelings are toned up to a becoming pitch of æsthetic sensibility. Mere animal relation with the sensible realms is void of such sensibility. Only human emotions can fitly respond to or record on life's tablet the *element* of beauty that is resident in the world of sense. Hence, there is sensory æsthetic experience only where there is a vital marriage of beauty of soul with outward conditions. And as the *human form* is composite in its nature, and fitted thus for delights—(1) through sensible relation with things; (2) through supersensible experience in the realm of ideas; and (3) through intimate unity and converse with the infinitely Good, True, and

<sup>1</sup> The reader, who may incline to pursue this analogy, is referred to the articles "Subject and Object, or Universal Polarity," *Journ. Spec. Phil.*, vol. viii, p. 97; and "Polarity in Character," vol. xi, pp. 320 and 417. The former article he is requested to correct at p. 104, l. 22, by inserting "presently" before "external"; and the latter at p. 324, l. 14, by reading "competition" instead of "completion."

Beautiful—the coronet of beauty that human form is authorized to wear may glow with the gems of highest heaven. So it is puerile and weak for one to relegate æsthetic experience mainly to sensory elements, and thereupon indulge oddities of dress and conduct as signs of superior æsthetic tone. The beautiful in human experience has all the breadth inherent to the human form. This form lives at once, or may live, in the delights of sense, the delights of reason, and the delights of wisdom. Come to its best powers and amplest inheritance, this form shall revel in the matchless beauty of regained Paradise, so full of the Highest that it shall carry all of the rational and sensory nature, tinged with the lustre of its divinest equipage.

The young English poet, Oscar Wilde, who is just now claiming some attention as, *par excellence*, the exponent of æstheticism, may be measurably touched with some sense of the beautiful—possibly in all of its degrees—but he is manifestly at fault in claiming familiarity with æsthetics *as a science*. One may have intimate emotional kinship with the beautiful in its whole scope, and actually be all aglow with poetic radiance or other flame of genius in the line of art, and yet his intellect may be so void of any measuring rules or defining laws thereof as to be wholly wanting in due scientific appreciation.

The distinctive boundaries of art and science are really very marked, though nothing is more common than a confused muddling of the two in thought and speech. Art may very forcibly play in human experience as intuitional perception and expression of some more or less vital reality, but science alone scribes the law, rule, or measure that constantly subtends all order, either of thought or thing. So the former is more akin to the emotional, and the latter to the intellectual, realm of human power.

In proportion as art and science are divorced in their operations is the product measurably partial and unsatisfactory. Art may inspire, but only science may duly order activities. But art impulsion is sure to carry with it a *degree* of knowledge or science, else it could not take even partial form. But when one not only cultivates “æsthetics,” like this young poet Wilde, but talks glibly of the theme as “science” that commands his constant adoration, we may rightly challenge him to justify his claims; and, unless he can formulate to the understanding the distinctive principles, laws, or rules that constitute æsthetics, call upon him to “step down and out.” At least should he merely show the measure of æsthetic activity and intelligence that speaks through his life, and leave such measure of art and science to impress others with its own character and value.

Art emotions are not raised simply in behalf of the *beautiful*, for there is also an animating spirit in man towards the *good* and the *true*. The art

element is the generative or vitalizing force, while the science element is the embodying or organizing force. The affections are motived or enlivened with some sense of the good, true, or beautiful, and the intellect is moved, in corresponding degree, to give appreciable form, as an *effect*, to such *affection*. In those human conditions that realize only the partial and fragmentary in experience, neither art nor science can exhibit perfect consistency or maturity of spirit and power; such as must animate and fortify human energy under the reign of the unitizing principles that shall finally prevail. Only the co-ordination of art and science, in creative order attained, will realize the invincible play of art in its supreme degree, as it goes forth robed in the symmetry and order of supreme science. Till then, very vital fragments may stimulate and direct humanity in its educational career, but fully comprehensive scientific definition may not be expected of every adventurer, especially upon a theme so illusive in its character as æsthetics.

It is reported of Mr. Wilde that, when affirming the universal prevalence of beauty, he was asked to name the beauty that was resident in an elevator close by, whereupon he could only beat a hasty retreat under cover of his hackman. He had not reflected that beauty and deformity are two requisite poles to experience, at least during the processes of human development, else he would not have affirmed the present universality of beauty.

But if he were duly schooled in that sense of human lordship that foretells the universal dominion of man in the supreme reign of art and science, duly conjugated, he could not fail to discern a measure of beauty in every form of human achievement that tends to such mastery, and in some degree illustrates it. Human freedom, realized from the mastery over and subjection in use of nature's forms and forces, is instinct with beauty, and the signs of such mastery must in some measure reflect the beauty.

W. H. KIMBALL.

CONCORD, N. H., *January*, 1883.

### SENTENCES IN PROSE AND VERSE.

SELECTED BY WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING.

[The first selection in the portion of these "Sentences in Prose and Verse" published in the July number (J. S. P., vol. xvi., p. 234), should have been credited to *R. W. E. (Conversations)*. The first sentence in the part published October (p. 444), should be credited to *Thoreau's Journal* (unpublished).—EDITOR.]

#### VII.

The pilgrim oft  
At dead of night, 'mid his oraison, hears,  
Aghast, the voice of time disparting towers.—*Dyer*.



There is no world to those who grieve and love.—*Landor*.

Where longs to fall yon rifted spire,

As weary of the insulting air;

The poet's thought, the warrior's fire,

The lover's sighs are sleeping there.—*Langhorne*.

O Death in Life, the days that are no more.—*Tennyson*.

While man doth ransack man,

And builds on blood, and rises by distress;

And this Inheritance of desolation leaves

To great expecting Hopes.—*Samuel Daniel*.

The grief that on my quiet preys—

That rends my heart—that checks my tongue—

I fear will last me all my days,

But feel it will not last me long.—*J. H. Moore* [*from Montreuil*].

Her voice was on the wind,

And the deaf ocean o'er Salurdad closed.—*Southey*.

Think of a country where there is but one opinion, where there is no minority. Fisher Ames was right when he said the best majority was that where there was but one over.—[*Conversations*] *Anon*.

Mrs. A. and Mrs. B. do really believe that they are very ill; and I have no doubt this is very true, for the moment. But let anything occur to tempt Mrs. A. or B. abroad, and she goes off like a shot.—*Ibid*.

Our modern Soerateses have not discovered, with that fabulous old one of Xenophon's, that "They know—they know nothing."—*Ibid*.

The perception, or idea of light, is not changed for that of darkness in so small a time as the twinkling of an eye. So that, in this case, the muscular motion of the eyelid is performed quicker than the perception of light can be changed for that of darkness.—*Erasmus Darwin*.

A proper rogue is indispensable in a play, in the cutting of whose throat the audience may take an unmingled interest.—*Coleridge*.

The common vineyard snail has 21,000 teeth [*Haeckel*]*—*a gnat's wing beats 8,000 times in a second, so fine are its muscles.—*G. H. Lewes*.

In order to sleep, the minute blood-vessels, or capillaries of the brain, contract, and extrude blood from the brain; if the vessels remain full, the nervous force continues to act and sleeplessness results.—*B. W. Richardson* [*quoted*].

It is a mercy your children have got over ye measles so well, but there is a real duty belongs to you to instruct them in the word of God.—*Mrs. Godwin* [*William Godwin's mother*].

Your brother Hally is going to send you a turkey. I am, thro' mercy, better.—*Ibid.*

A bare crying for mercy at last is a dangerous experiment. We trust providence, but it's in a wrong way, not in ye way of well doing. Seneca's morals he bostes of is not sufficient.—*Ibid.*

The tempers of seafaring men are generally like the boisterous Element.—*Ibid.*

Lay thy stones with fare coulars; I wish to be desolv'd and be with Christ, not my will but the will of my God in Xt be done.—*Ibid.* [*æt.* 78].

He seems to be poorer for the l. 44 I have given him than he was before he had it; he now can't neither board nor cloth Harriot.—*Ibid.*

For every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evil, and this he doth by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves downward.—*Hobbes.*

The organization at birth may greatly influence the motives which govern the series of our future acts of intelligence, and we may even possess moral habits acquired during the fœtal state.—*Nicholson* [1797].

Not able to walk ten yards without panting for breath, and continually falling; still he is able to ride ten miles every day, and eat and drink very hearty. His face is quite red, constantly convulsed by ill-humor, his hair gray and dirty, his beard long, and the clothes he wears not worth sixpence.—*Mrs. Bishop* [*sister of Mary Woolstonecraft, giving her an account of their father*].

Here is a strange medley, a farthing candle, or one as thick as my wrist. They have never been permitted to walk on account of wearing out shoes. Send me a few wax tapers, for a farthing one often falls to my share, and we go to bed very early.—*Ibid.*

My sentiments are French, and French they will be even in the grave, provided one has sentiments in the grave.—*Montcalm.*

"The prejudice I can't get rid of, that, in war, God supports the full regiments."—*Frederic the Great.*

Human nature is rarely uniform.—*Walter Scott.*

"As I crawled in" to the lost party in the snow, they cried: "They had expected me; they were sure I would come."—*Dr. Kane.*

She was a person, briefly, who was good and kind, but impossible to rely upon, and little adapted to social life.—*Madame Recamier* [*of Madame Chateaubriand*].

Wordsworth, well pleased with himself, cared little for modern or ancient. His was the moor and the tarn, the recess in the mountain, the woodland scattered with trees far and wide—trees never too solemn or lofty, Never entangled with plants overrunning the villagers' foot-path; Equable was he and plain, and tho' wandering a little in wisdom, Ever was English at heart. If his words were too many; if Fancy's Furniture lookt rather scant in a whitewashed apartment; If in his rural designs there is sameness and tameness; if often Feebleness is there for breadth; if his pencil wants rounding and pointing; Few of this age or the last stand out in like elevation. There is a sheepfold he raised which my memory loves to revisit— Sheepfold whose wall shall endure when there is not a stone of the palace.  
*Landor.*

History always begins not with the union, but with the disunion of a nation.—*Mommsen.*

Nay, till you have at least marked, on the top of each page, what Month and Year it actually is, the Book can not be read at all—except by an idle creature, doing worse than nothing under the name of reading.—*Carlyle* [*Walpole's George the Second*].

Algarotti—one of those half-remembered men, whose books seem to claim a reading, and do not repay it when given.—*Ibid.*

Nine had already struck by the old Roman clock, surrounded by ivy, which shares with the Church of St. Brelade, at Jersey, the peculiarity of having for its date four ones (1111), used to signify eleven hundred and eleven.—*Victor Hugo.*

Philosophy triumphs over past and future ills, but present ills triumph over her.—*La Rochefoucauld.*

I am sure a little reading in Seneca, the philosopher, would set you right in this pitiable wrong.—*Godwin* [to Parkinson; ten days later the latter destroyed himself].

Among the Marghi [West Africa], if a person in old age dies, his death is esteemed a cause of satisfaction and mirth, while that of a young one is lamented in tears.—*Barth.*

I never pluck the rose; the violet's head  
Hath shaken with my breath upon its bank,  
And not reproached me; the ever-sacred cup  
Of the pure lily hath, between my hands,  
Felt safe, unsoiled, nor lost one grain of gold.—*Landor.*

Amid the storms of fate, and throbs of pain,  
Wisdom is impotent, and virtue vain.—*Ibid.*

The imperial dummy—*Silentiarius imperialis*, the title of the chief of police, under Justinian.—*Victor Hugo.*

Like to the sent'nel stars, I watch all night.—*Lovelace.*

As I beheld a winter's evening air,  
Cur'd in her court false-locks of living hair.—*Ibid.*

Why shouldst thou swear I am foresworne,  
Since thine I vow'd to be?  
Lady, it is *already* morn,  
And 'twas last night I swore to thee  
That fond impossibility.  
But O! the nymph, did you e'er know  
Carnation mingled with snow?  
Or have you sene the lightning shrowd,  
And straight breake thro' th' opposing cloud?  
So ran her blood; such was its hue;  
So thro' her vayle her bright hair flew,  
And yet its glory did appeare  
But thinne, because her eyes were neare.—*Ibid.*

I am once more going through with the old experiment of planting potatoes, and do not yet find it convenient to give it up. [Conversations.]—*Anon.*

Yes, they [the farmers] were grubs, perchance, once; but grubs become butterflies. Insects go through three transformations. To-day they are in the larva, and to-morrow in the air. Professor T. is the butterfly; we need people in all stages.—*Ibid.*

"Give me the comfort of your society at dinner." [From a note.]—*Ibid.*

The English have an astonishing degree of productive force, which seems to be latent in Americans.—*Ibid.*

Never had I the least social *pleasure* with him, though often the best *conversation*.—*Ibid.*

The most poetry is in the ripples [on a pond].—*Ibid.*

He bears well the *vitriol of solitude*. [Said of Hawthorne].—*Ibid.*

I have that vanity of the ancient apostle, who used without fail to read his sermons over to the family *after church*. So I read again my old discourses up and down.—*Ibid.*

## BOOK NOTICES.

The Christian Philosophy Quarterly, October, 1881. Edited by Rev. Charles F. Deems, D.D. New York: Published for the American Institute of Christian Philosophy. Anson D. F. Randolph & Co., 900 Broadway. Two dollars a year; fifty cents a copy.

Contents: (1) Historical. (2) The Cry of the Conflict, by Charles F. Deems. (3) What we mean by Christian Philosophy, by Noah Porter. (4) Some Difficulties in Modern Materialism, by Borden P. Bowne. (5) The Religious Aspect of the American Scientific Association, by H. S. Trowbridge.

Most of the articles in this number were delivered, it seems, at the "Summer School of Christian Philosophy," held at Greenwood Lake. The articles of Dr. Porter and Professor Bowne, either or both, are of sufficient value to make the reputation of any journal of philosophy.

Kantian Ethics and the Ethics of Evolution; a Critical Study. By J. Gould Schurman, M. A. (Lond.), D. Sc. (Edinb.). Published by the Hibbert Trustees. London and Edinburgh: Williams & Norgate; New York: Scribner, 1881.

This book seems to me to be the best contribution to the critical study of the Ethics of Kant which has so far appeared in English. The discussion of Mr. Spencer's "Data of Ethics," which forms the second part of the work, also displays great vigor and independence of thought, but it is hardly equal to the first and larger part. Dr. Schurman writes with remarkable ease and grace, and his expositions and criticisms always exhibit that thorough command of the matter in hand which comes from knowledge and thought at first hand. I shall not attempt to follow the progress of his close and searching criticism in all its detail, but I shall rather make one or two remarks on points in the doctrine of Kant to which he does not, as I think, do perfect justice.

To derive from Kant all that is best in him, it is necessary to keep a watchful eye on the goal towards which his inquiry is leading, as well as to examine with care the actual statements he makes at any of the intermediate points in his progress towards that goal. In his examination of Kant's distinction of the "intelligible" and "empirical" character in man, which is one of the numerous logical distinctions drawn by Kant, Dr. Schurman has hardly borne this indispensable rule of fruitful Kantian criticism sufficiently in mind, and the result is that, valuable as his remarks are in bringing out the dualism of which Kant never quite got rid, they fail to indicate the actual advance made by him. "Kant maintains that, though human actions are unchangeably determined in the empirical character of each individual, they are nevertheless free; for that empirical character, whence they flow, is itself the freely originated product of the intelligible character." Of this doctrine "The Determinism of Schelling and Schopenhauer is the the logical outcome" (p. 6). "Empirical volitions, as following in time, constitute a succession, the members of which, according to Kant, are causally related to the other events in time. Everything that falls in time is caused by what has already happened in time; volitions occur in time, *ergo*, volitions are determined" (p. 12). "Kant sought to turn the edge of such objections, and doubtless succeeded, but only by involving himself in contradiction" (p. 13). He "relegates



both reality and freedom to a transcendental sphere, which has no conceivable connection with this actual world in which we believe they both exist, and which can enter into no connection with it without involving the whole system in hopeless contradiction" (p. 19). "Now, it would be vain to deny that Kant affords sufficient occasion for the charge which Dr. Schurman with such force brings against him, of simply limiting freedom to "the night in which all cows are black;" and from this point of view the reference to Schelling and Schopenhauer is felicitous, although I must protest against the half-formed resolution to make Hegel also a finger-post to warn off the unwary. But neither Schelling's mysticism nor Schopenhauer's pantheism is really the development of what is most characteristic in Kant's theory. In the section criticised by Dr. Schurman, Kant is engaged in suggesting, in a vague and tentative way, the means of transition from the mechanical view of dogmatism to the teleological view of idealism. (Cf. Hegel's *Logik*, iii, 213 ff.) The ordinary opposition of freedom and necessity, as formulated in the third antinomy, is, he seeks to show, no real opposition at all; or, rather, he points out that there is no absolute reason why we should maintain the mechanical and the teleological conceptions of nature to be mutually exclusive. For the alternative of "necessity or freedom" it is not impossible that we ought to substitute "necessity and freedom." Natural or necessary causation is certainly justified from the point of view of sensible experience—the point of view from which in our ordinary or unspeculative mood we contemplate all things; nay, it is justified absolutely so far as knowable reality is viewed only as a phenomenon in space and time. But we must remember that phenomena do not necessarily exhaust the universe, and, in particular, that the invariable sequence of one event on another—which is the sole content of the natural law of causation—still leaves unresolved the question as to the ultimate *ground* of the sequence. So far Kant speaks quite generally, and his reply has in view as much his future explanation of the world of nature as requiring to be contemplated teleologically when it is viewed in relation to God, as his ethical doctrine of reason as originating the moral law and introducing man to a purely intelligible realm. But he goes on to apply to man's actions the general view just indicated. His explanation of the compatibility of freedom and natural causation is, as I understand it, briefly this: In our perception of nature—including, of course, man's volitions as in time—there is no activity in any proper sense of the term, but simply an *invariable sequence*. To say that man's volitions come under the law of natural causation is not to say that they are compelled, but only that, so long as we look at them from the empirical point of view, we must find them conditioned like all other phenomena. It is therefore quite possible that the acts of man should proceed from his reason, and yet that they should come under the law of natural causation. All acts, whether free or not, must, as realized in the world of sense, conform to the law of that world. Hence it is that, for him who limits himself to the world of sense, even free acts, supposing that there are such, will seem necessitated; while again, for him who separates a free act from its manifestation, that act will seem independent of the natural law of causation altogether. But neither of these alternatives need be held if it is only recognized that phenomena are not absolute realities, but rather the manner in which Reason manifests itself. This, as it seems to me, is the drift of Kant's reasoning, although it is much obscured, as it must be admitted, by his use of language that is appropriate only in the mouth of the psychological idealist; as also by Kant's caution in refusing to admit that Reason in its theoretical use can possibly establish the reality of freedom. Dr. Schurman has missed the force of some of Kant's expressions from his prepos-

sion that Kant's "noumenon" must necessarily be a mere blank identity, similar to Schelling's "absolute indifference" or Spencer's Unknowable.

In the second section of his critique Dr. Schurman goes on to consider Kant's conception of Freedom. He will confine himself, he tells us, to an examination "into its validity as a theory of the facts of our moral consciousness," without dealing with "its compatibility or its incompatibility with any other part of the Kantian system"—a promise, however, which is very partially kept (see p. 37 ff.). After a lucid sketch of the whole ethical doctrine of Kant, our author proceeds to raise some objections against the Kantian doctrine of Will as practical Reason. He finds much ambiguity in Kant's own statements, but finally he comes to the conclusion that Reason and Will are for Kant identical—a conclusion which is undoubtedly correct. But this seems to him a very objectionable position. It takes away the *differentia* of Will, and makes human action merely an inexplicable fact. "Kant seems to have regarded it as entirely gratuitous to postulate a faculty standing between the action and the law of reason" (p. 32). Hence, like Hegel, he makes Will "a peculiar kind of thinking." Now, as "thought in the Kantian system cannot be peculiar to any individual (though Kant himself may have conceived it thus) but must be a transcendental self-consciousness, that makes the individual a universal," it follows that "the individual will has shrivelled into nothingness at the grasp of universal reason." This is an extraordinary leap. Does Dr. Schurman mean that, if thought were "peculiar to the individual," the will would *not* "shriveled into nothingness at the grasp of universal reason"? Surely the affirmation of the universalizing power of thought does not make the individual the mere medium of something-not-himself. On the contrary, a "thought" that should be "peculiar to any individual" would be no thought at all, but a mere play of impressions, of which the individual would be but the passive and unconscious bearer. Nor is it easy to see how the interpolation of a peculiar faculty called will, distinct at once from action and the law of reason, should improve the Kantian theory. What meaning does Dr. Schurman attach to the term "action"? If he does not mean by it mere organic movement, it must be a "peculiar kind of thinking," and this "thinking" cannot be separated from the "law of reason" without becoming pure caprice. It seems, therefore, to me, that, in objecting to Kant's identification of Will and Practical Reason, Dr. Schurman objects to that which constitutes one of Kant's especial claims on our gratitude. By this very identification Kant destroyed that mechanical conception of volition as a separate faculty or "thing" acted upon externally by another faculty or "thing," and at least prepared the way for the solution of the problem of human freedom. "Will," we are told, "is no more practical reason than it is practical imagination or practical sensation. It is the faculty of consciously choosing among motives, from whatever source they come, and of acting upon them." Now, as choice, and acting upon choice, cannot be two distinct things, and as the act of choice is only a "peculiar" determination of self-consciousness, the only difference between Kant and his critic, so far as I can see, is that the former makes Will the expression of a law of reason, while the latter makes it independent of reason, and therefore irrational.

In the third section Kant's moral Principle is considered, and the familiar objection to its empty formalism is stated with great force and clearness. Even this objection seems to me to be made too much of. No doubt the mere form of law will not yield any definite code of moral duties, but Kant was not wrong in fixing upon the pure idea of duty as the condition of freedom. Certainly that idea only presents itself in connection with the choice between alternative courses of conduct; but, on the other hand,

unless an act is willed, not because it is simply more pleasurable than another, but because it "ought" to be done, it has no moral character. In insisting upon the necessity of determining by reason which of several causes ought to be followed, or is consistent with the pure idea of duty, Kant has at least touched the central point of morality. It is true that, in separating absolutely between reason and desire, Kant has made it impossible to deduce specific laws of duty; but if we assume, as he virtually does, that the only problem of ethics is to explain the ground of moral obligation, we must place it where he does—in a universal law of reason. Dr. Schurman, however, is no doubt right in saying that morality "is not incompatible with a principle that differs from the formal law, in that it has a content, but agrees with it in that it is of universal extension" (p. 57); and that "when man no longer follows blindly his selfish appetites and desires, but acts rationally in accordance with the idea he has of his own worth and dignity as man, then his will is good, for it is the unhampered service of reason" (p. 62).

In the remarks just made, which have been directed mainly to points of difference, I am conscious of having conveyed a very inadequate idea of the suggestive character of Dr. Schurman's work; but enough has perhaps been said to show that his essay is well worthy of careful study. The second part, containing a searching criticism of Mr. Spencer's ethical theory, brings out, with great clearness, many of the imperfections which beset the evolutionist ethics of that philosopher.

JOHN WATSON.

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## BOOKS RECEIVED.

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The Platonist. Edited and published by Thomas M. Johnson, Osceola, St. Clair County, Missouri. A monthly periodical devoted to the dissemination of the Platonic Philosophy in all its phases. Pp. 33-48. Two dollars per annum.

*Contents of No. 3.*—(1) Pearls of Wisdom gathered from Platonic Sources; (2) General Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Platon, by Thomas Taylor; (3) Life of Platon (concluded); (4) Commentary of Proklos on the First Alkibiades of Platon, translated from the original Greek, Introduction; (5) The Last Words of Socrates, by Alexander Wilder; (6) On the Utility of the Mathematical and Metaphysical Sciences, by Thomas Taylor. Iamblichos: a Treatise on the Mysteries; a new translation by Alexander Wilder, Part I. (7) That Intelligibles are not External to Mind; and Concerning the Good (from Plotinus); (8) Hipparchos on Tranquillity.

*Contents of No. 4.*—(1) Pearls of Wisdom gathered from Platonic Sources; (2) The Best Translation of Platon; (3) On the Utility of the Mathematical and Metaphysical Sciences, by Thomas Taylor (reprinted from the Introduction to his Treatise on Theoretic Arithmetic); (4) General Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Platon, by Thomas Taylor; (5) A Discourse upon the Mysteries, by Iamblichos, translated by Alexander Wilder, Part I; (6) On the Necessity of Purification, and the Method by which it may be Obtained, by Porphyrios, translation by Thomas Taylor; (7) The Ele-

ments of Theology, by Proklos; (8) *The Life and Works of Thomas Taylor, the Platonist.*

*Contents of Nos. 5, 6, and 7.*—(1) *Pearls of Wisdom*; (2) *The Eternity of the Soul—its Pre-existence*, by Dr. H. K. Jones; (3) *Manuscripts of Thomas Taylor, the Platonist, a Letter from Thomas Wentworth Higginson*; (4) *On the Necessity of Purification, and the Method by which it may be Obtained*, by Porphyrios; (5) *On the Means and Grades of Ascent to Absolute Unity*, by Proklos; (6) *Life of Hai Ebn Yokdan, the Self-taught Philosopher*, by Abubacer Ibn Tophail, translated from the original Arabic by Simon Ockley, revised and modernized by W. H. Steele; (7) *The History of Hai Ebn Yokdan*; (8) *Entheasm*, by Alexander Wilder; (9) *Iamblichos: a Treatise on the Mysteries*, a new translation by Alexander Wilder; (10) *The Plato Club of Jacksonville, Illinois*; (11) *General Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Plato*, by Thomas Taylor (continued); (12) *The Elements of Theology*, by Proklos, translated from the original Greek (continued); (13) *Platonic Technology: a Glossary of Distinctive Terms used by Platon and other Philosophers in an Arcane and Peculiar Sense*, compiled by Alexander Wilder; (14) *The Life and Works of Thomas Taylor, the Platonist*; (15) *To the Rising Sun*, by Thomas Taylor (Poem); (16) *On Dialectic, or the Threefold Ascent of the Soul to Absolute Being*, translated from the original Greek of Plotinos.

*Contents of Nos. 8, 9, and 10.*—(1) *Pearls of Wisdom gathered from Platonic Sources*; (2) *On the Study of Platonic Philosophy*; (3) *Materialism of the Day*, by Walter Lewin; (4) *On Magic*, by Proklos, translated from the Latin of Ficinus; (5) *The Education and Discipline of Man—the Uses of the World we Live in—*by Dr. H. K. Jones, a Lecture delivered at the Concord School of Philosophy in the Summer of 1881; (6) *The Elements of Theology*, by Proklos, translated from the original Greek; (7) *Iamblichos: a Treatise on the Mysteries*, a new translation by Alexander Wilder, Part I (concluded); (8) *General Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Platon*, by Thomas Taylor; (9) *On the Necessity of Purification, and the Methods by which it may be Obtained*, by Porphyrios (concluded); (10) *The Life and Works of Thomas Taylor, the Platonist* (continued); (11) *On the Virtues*, translated from the original Greek of Plotinos; (12) *The Dream: an Imitation of the Beginning of the Eleventh Book of Apuleius*, by Thomas Taylor; (13) *The Celebration of the Natal Day of Platon* (selected); (14) *Platonic Technology* (continued), compiled by Alexander Wilder; (15) *Book Notices.*

*The Legend of St. Olaf's Kirk.* By George Houghton. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. The Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1881.

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*Strauss and Renan: An Essay.* By E. Zeller. Translated from the German, with Introductory Remarks by the Translator. London: Truebner & Co. 1866.

*Kantian Ethics and the Ethics of Evolution.* By J. Gould Schurman. Published by the Hibbert Trustees. Edinburgh: Williams & Norgate. 1881.

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No. 2, "They Have their Reward," impressively develops the familiar connection between sowing and reaping, and, while granting that the followers of the lower instincts "have their reward," such as it is, sets forth the Pauline doctrine of germinal evolution, and urges sowing to the spirit rather than to the flesh, as the surest beginning of a Christian manhood.

No. 3, "The Personal Influence of God," is a plea for soul-intercourse with Christ, as a means of coming under the direct living influence of the Deity—and this not a vague discourse of mysticism, but a practical instruction as to reproducing in one's self a spiritual likeness to the founder of Christianity, and making the human soul sensitive to the divine soul.

No. 4, "The Principle of Spiritual Growth," analyzes what Jesus called the "expediency" of his leaving his disciples, and the earth he had come to save, to their own efforts, in order that the very absence of the beloved One might develop faith and strength to "live as seeing Him who is invisible."

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SWEDENBORG AND HENRY JAMES.

BY WILLIAM H. KIMBALL ("THERON GRAY").

That the system of truth *involved* in the wonderful treatises of Emanuel Swedenborg covers a true doctrine of Creation, and is thus fundamental to all that can interest mortal man, is evident to me, and manifestly not less evident to certain others who have studied and rightly considered that system. Among those who have studied the great Seer with duly qualified affection and becoming intellectual force, the late Mr. Henry James may be counted foremost. Indeed, Mr. James has given such devoted zeal and royal vigor to the expositions he has made of Swedenborg, that others fall mostly into the shade, in comparison. And it is a question whether they do not, generally, more obscure than elucidate the master they wish to serve. Yet, the great purport of Swedenborg's thought as a comprehensive system, opening into all true *being*, *knowing*, and *doing*—opening into "the way, the truth, and the life" of Divine Mastery—remains almost uncomprehended and unsought, and earnest people run to and fro stretching their weary vision for more light. Why, in view of the broad insight of the master and the remarkable genius and power of the pupil, do those commanding truths to which both were so constantly pledged remain unimpressed upon the intellectual force of to-day,

thus leaving thought largely to surge and swelter, concerning most important problems at least, amid opinional distractions, when it should be anchored in scientific certitude? Why has Swedenborg so voluminously written, and James so vigorously explicated, principles and truths thus vital and necessary, and yet so few see and understand? Let us see if we can solve this problem in some measure, even though limited as we must be on this occasion.

Mr. James treats of these great problems of Creator and Created simply as a Christian philosopher. He is so devoted to philosophy as to deem it adequate for every emergency; hence he persistently excludes science from all participation in philosophic problems. To be sure, as a higher form of knowledge or *actual* science—actual knowing, to a certain extent—he proclaims truth with marked emphasis and certainty, even in this supreme realm. But it is the utterance of philosophy, that is to impress one according as the affections have first been qualified, and not a formulation by manifest science, which no intellect can gainsay nor reject when once understood.

It is the function of science to carry its own force, and compel assent or conviction per force of manifest knowing and doing. Science neither cherishes nor depends upon labored arguments. It is its own argument, in that it actually is and does. It forces conviction when it appears in its proper form.

Mr. James, with a heart all aglow with central life and an intellect readily responsive, saw and proclaimed truth as "Divine Philosophy"—most assuring to himself, and more or less impressive upon such of his readers as were spiritually related thereto. But it will hardly be supposed that he beheld it *incarnated*, or embodied as formal science. He could not have apprehended it as a measured and measuring system, that could be formulated and defined, and applied to test the value of thought concerning "the Highest." If he had done this, he would have claimed a province of *Divine Science* as well as that of "Divine Philosophy." Failing in this, and letting slip the principle of degrees wherein alone such science is rooted, we find him relegating science exclusively to the realms of rational knowledge, instead of carrying it to its ultimate as a manifest body—the incarnation of philosophy. This is emphatically an era of science. Whatever

the realm of human endeavor, conclusive and abiding results can only be attained through scientific certitude. And such certitude is no less needful and available as a ruling method of science in highest realms of thought than in the lower. Measured and measuring order of knowledge, *as universal science*, is as real and necessary as is such order necessary to the special sciences. Mr. James seems to have taken little account of Swedenborg's principle of degrees, which Swedenborg himself so fully elaborates. And Swedenborg failed to give efficient form and best application thereto, and thus left that principle standing without its true form and proper force in application. It is designed to make this appear, though a far more extended assay than we can here make is requisite to give extensive application and desired force.

"The knowledge of degrees," says Swedenborg, "is, as it were, the key to open the causes of things, and enter into them; without it, scarcely anything of cause can be known."—*D. L. & W.*, 184.

The ruling principle of discrete degrees is this: A *one* is to be rightly discriminated under threefold aspect, because every *one* is, intrinsically, threefold in its elements. Let us take *Society* as the *one* under view. In its first, involved or indefinite form or *degree* it is a *one* of primary elements; simplistic and vague enough as to any form becoming our present conceptions of society. In its second degree it is the same *one*—society—though it is in an entirely different form or order. It is here *known* as society—comes to definite form as such. It is here society in its partial, broken, fragmentary forms, because, whereas the elementary principle of the first degree was that of *indefinite involution*, that of the second degree expresses the element of *definite evolution*, wherein the utmost diffraction and distraction occur. But under the order of discrete degrees, as creative law, we shall find this *one*—society—emerging from its broken, conflicting, and superficial forms, and settling into a third and consummating form whose glory shall fitly illustrate the Divine triunity itself, and whose radiance shall "pale the light of sun, moon, and stars." For here the *one* becomes a reality in its perfect degree—the degree that composes, associates, Divinely orders all the elements under the rule of perfect, scientific consociation.

Thus the form of this universal law is *trinity-in-unity*; and the

elements involved are (1) the simplistic (involved), (2) the complex (evolutionary), (3) the composite (evolved).

Under this conception of scientific order, I find the grand Creative Series standing:

1st. God the Creator, necessarily indefinitely *involving* the natural and the Divine Humanity.

2d. God the Creator definitely *evolving* the creaturely form in the natural creation, wherein He wisely hides Himself till that form comes to due self-consciousness and self-assertion.

3d. God the Creator in creation clearly *evolved*, whereby Creator and creature become consciously one in Divine vitality, and all human conditions become truly responsive to the inspiring Presence.

So, primarily, the three creative degrees *cover the whole realm*, and all special applications and analyses must be derived thence and be kept true to that source in order to prove reliable and satisfactory in results.

Although handling this law of degrees with much effect, I do not find that Swedenborg clearly announced the elementary principles of the degrees, nor do I see that he carried them, in application, to best scientific issues.

The law of degrees furnishing, as claimed, a standing scientific clew, derived from fixed character, or distinctive form inherent to those degrees, a demand reasonably arises that we either exhibit its practical form and use, or dismiss the great claim made in its behalf.

Let us now try to formulate a *subordinate or primary analysis*, related to a *secondary analysis and definitions* that will illustrate the principle of Creative Triunity, and its method of application as practical science.

THEME: CREATION, UNDER THE LAW OF TRIUNITY.

I. CREATOR :	{ Involving (1) The Simplistic Element (the Indifferent).
	{ Involving (2) The Complex Element (the Differentiating).
	{ Involving (3) The Composite Element (the Associating or Unitary).
II. CREATING :	{ Evolving (1) The Simplistic Manhood (Common Human Force).
	{ Evolving (2) The Complex Manhood (Special Human Force).
	{ Evolving (3) The Composite Manhood (United Human Force).
III. CREATED :	{ Evolved (1) The Simplistic Manhood realized in Divine Order.
	{ Evolved (2) The Complex Manhood realized in Divine Form.
	{ Evolved (3) The Composite Manhood realized in Divine Order.



Here, accordingly, is an analysis of Creative Elements that comprehends the whole scope in distinct scientific form. True, it does not name the physics of creation, for a true conception and discussion of the great problems of God's true creation have no direct reference to crude physical constitution, any more than the art-conception of the artist has reference to, or involves, the constitution of the quarry whence his material is derived. The creative operation in Humanity is a process that, presupposing physical form, applies to the fashioning of Human Form to Divinest issues, wherein it becomes filled with the glory of the Lord. Hence, in a true doctrine of creation, the discussion of *physical constitution* has no sort of pertinence. Physical constitution is a primary necessity, to be sure, as crude matter is basic to art and artisanship that need material form as embodying instrument, or as the material elements are requisite to human corporeity.

God's true creation makes Natural Man the subjective term, and God-Man (Godly Man) the objective term, all things else being the various instrumentalities and furnishings, and, finally, the gorgeous livery of the Divine Humanity, or immaculate GOD-MAN realized as Creative End. So, let cheap natural science no more try to nourish the human intellect with protoplasmic pabulum, nor tickle its fancy with visions of "star-dust." Neither protoplasm, star-dust, nor other corporeal elements are of any *direct* account to science in its supreme degree—the degree of Creative Life, Activity, and Form; though all *become*, reflexly, a thousand times more luminous with the glory of the Highest than they can ever appear by the best lumen of mere natural science. Let us bear in mind, therefore, that the truths of creation, in any sense that can satisfy the yearning desires of the soul, are not truths of physics, excepting as physics are subsidiary or provisional to metaphysics. They are truths of God as creator and Man as creature, both subjectively and objectively. Hence any scientific (formally valid) estimate of the essential nature of the Creator, the essential order of the *creative operations in human nature*, and the essential order of the *Divine Natural Humanity in creative ultimate*, will effectually cover the whole theme in its amplest scope, and leave nothing to do but to conform human states, thoughts, and activities to the rule of these principles of eternal

law, thus making Divine and human authority one power in human affairs.

The case is similar, in very limited or special regards, when a teacher, professor, or master in his vocation—as, for instance, a Botanist—conforms his own conduct or authority strictly to the ruling principles of the science—is wholly one with its immutable commands—and thus is the powerful instrument to effect Botanic culture. “It is hard to kick against the pricks.” We may work easily *with* science, but only amid tumult and painful toils *against* it. And this is true in regard to that commanding science which, definitely comprehending human nature as societary force, is instrumentally available to qualify and order that force into perfect society. We come, accordingly, to an ampler rendering of the principles mainly in view, in order to find whether human knowledge may not become perfectly assured as to that which is of transcendent human interest. We proceed to a more thorough analysis and fuller definitions of the moments given under the head “Creating.” It is here that interest mainly centres, for this degree covers the spheres of human development under the generative operations of Creative Wisdom. When this realm becomes clearly explored, as to its pervading laws, by the objective light of the ultimate degree—the degree of composure in “the way, the truth, and the life”—and the ruling forces in human affairs are brought into strict conformity with such knowledge, human advance towards Divine order will become astonishingly rapid. For the Kingdom of God in the earth is an evolution in its procedure, as the Master so constantly taught; and, when men conform their ways to the manifest laws of that Kingdom, comparative peace will at once ensue, even before great progress is made in qualifying conditions. The designs of the Supreme Architect in human society are perfect. So long as we, the builders, ignorantly patch and bungle, putting up disorderly fenders to protect from heats and chills and storms, as they variously play upon us, so long do we obstruct and deform the structure. So long, too, heaven’s fierce fluids will play upon us to tear away the deformities we project. If a builder were to construct his edifice by piecemeal in temporary defences against the assaults of the elements, rather than in intelligent consistency with architectural designs, his structure would be a horror to sight and a peril to



life; yet we, the unwise builders of the great social structure God has designed, still boggle and botch, and distrust Divine Providence, who cannot consent to our blunders, and give us social security and quiet under them.

But we are not just now so intent upon *applying* principles, as laws of social conduct, as we are to exhibit the nature and scope of a commanding system, and thus to discover whatever shortcomings may appear in Swedenborg's rendering of a principle of matchless power and worth.

As already intimated, we hold that Swedenborg failed to give a practical definition of the distinctive nature of discrete degrees, and thus inevitably failed to carry them, in application, to their commanding issues. For such reasons, it is believed, he did not *fulfil the demands of science in its supreme realm*, however forcibly he may have promulgated its leading principle, and given a true base for philosophic estimates of the great problems of Life and Being.

Let us, then, turn to our full analysis of the secondary degree of the creative series ("Creating"), and try to find what our law of discrete degrees, as already defined, will do to exhibit the elements of human nature and the order of those elements in the scale of human development. We are surveying Human Nature as Divinely vitalized at its very core, and, therefore, one unbroken power that carries every individual of the race, in varied states of culture and utmost contrariety of personal experience. But from the very form of the individual mind as a threefold power, with *wisdom* as ground of Divine Revelation, or Logostic perception; *reason* as a ground of distinctive human appreciation, or analogic perception of the Highest by proper illumination; and the lower degree, of *sense*, as a ground of symbolologic perception of highest realities when duly reflected from above; the whole realm of the mind cannot be duly appealed to, excepting through methods that will *embody* eternal truth to lower and lowest human faculty; concrete it, as it were, into adamantine firmness. It is thus that lowest human powers, rightly disposed, may come to ready participation in sublimest realities. So we not only desire to make a logical statement of the primary factors of creative law, and, to some extent, a rational *exposé* analogically, but

also to symbolize to the eye by a formulation that will effectually embody the whole truth "*in ultimates.*" The formal embodi-





ment, and through that practical uses, is the "ultimate" as formal science of creative elements. The diagrams of Creative Order (illustrative symbol), presented on opposite page, were projected many years ago, in order to aid the author's own thought and hold it conclusively fixed upon the *creative elements* duly analyzed and synthetized, and it is thought that they cannot fail to aid others who may be interested in these matters, discussed by Swedenborg and Mr. James—matters so important to consider and so difficult to comprehend as science. The first one—with the light centre of four triangular forms and three shaded external hemispheres consisting of nine triangular forms—is presented as a symbol of the order of the *Creative Operations* ("Creating"). It is designed, in the first place, to represent the constant intimacy of the Divine and Human elements in creation, under all the varying states of the creaturely form as real to consciousness, and also in that indefinite form prior to *distinct human* consciousness. The light spaces in the centre (0, I, II, III) symbolize Creative Being as constantly the inmost life to creaturely form, and the dark external hemispheres (1-9) represent the threefold order of the human form in development—the order of creaturely development corresponding to the essential order of the human form as a triunity of character already defined. This diagram is designed, in the second place to represent the threefold order, in development, of the threefold elementary forms of creaturely constitution—the simplistic, complex, and composite, in human nature. And this analysis relates to the subject as a trine form of mind, a trine form of thought as the productive, versatile activity of mind, and to the trine order of visible activities and uses in the course of such development. The first shaded hemisphere (1, 2, 3:) stands for the developing states of consciousness in the general or common human nature: or, more truly, it is the degree of actual *human unconsciousness*. For, a creaturely state of life does not become an intelligent experience, real to consciousness, until it becomes woven into the consciousness through an educational process not comprehensible in itself. Creation is from highest to lowest—from God to Man—hence any distinctive form of creaturely life must be *Divinely given*, and thence *humanly appropriated* by a toilsome process of subjective energy, before the subject can become duly conscious thereof. God is not an *impostor*; He does not *impose* the goods



He confers upon the creaturely form as if that form were a dead machine, but makes it a living subject, freely receptive and appropriating the Divine providences, "as of self," as Swedenborg significantly phrases it. Both Swedenborg and Mr. James very distinctly emphasize this important truth.

Proceeding, then, in our definition, we come to say: the second shaded hemisphere (4, 5, 6:) stands for the *developing* states of consciousness in special or particular human personality realized in "selfhood;" and the third (7, 8, 9:) stands for the *developing* states of consciousness in the associate or unitary human form.

As already seen, these various forms are creatively real or Divinely implanted in human nature at the very initial of each degree. A form is *ingenerated* in Creative Life, is thence *generated* in natural form as seed-form or planting there, and thence *regenerated* in natural realms, where, at the *end* of the regenerative process, the matter becomes a full fruition to experience, and thus invested with full significance to the creaturely form. Whence it may clearly appear that Creative Fruition—Divine Man—must be an *initial* reality in creaturely realms—a Divine Incarnation—at the transition point from complex development to composite development—the transition point from ripest selfhood, as pharisaically illustrated, to societary "seed" given in Jesus Christ as a planting for societary fruition. And it may further appear that no proper understanding of the nature and significance of this Incarnation—this natural planting of a Divinest reality—could by any possibility be realized by natural man in his then immature states. The immediate disciple, instructed by the intimate Divine presence, must have had some vital *sense* of the reality, but he could have had no full knowledge. The husbandman, with faith in some promise of important results, might plant an unknown seed and have a tolerable sense of the seed itself, in its outward form, at least; but he must come to the harvest, and convert it in experience—in actual uses—in order to fully comprehend it. And, unless he had experienced the general order of development from fruit to fruit again duly multiplied, he would naturally get discouraged and distrust the promise, when he found the given form as a planting had totally disappeared, and only rank stock remained visible. So, the Divine

Seed, implanted in Human Nature at the initial point of that nature's fruitional degree of evolution, must have been, at best, only very partially comprehended at the time, and quite lost to those who, coming after, beheld only the obscuring *husks*—the external formal vesture of the inworking Spirit. And at last, when, like the ripening husk of the grain, old forms give token of departing life, and interior realities as a fruition to God's creating presence and power in human affairs are mostly unknown, as also unseen, the decline of faith becomes inevitable, and reckless human self-assertion, in manifold forms, comes largely to the front in experience.

But we must not permit extended diversion from leading designs. Discussion proper to a periodical publication forbids an extended explication of the numerous aspects of thought and activities naturally transpiring during the processes of the creative unfoldings of the human form or creaturely nature; yet there are points that must not be overlooked at this time. A commanding one is this: In all states of the distinctive human consciousness (1-9) the Divine and Human are in such constant intimacy in reality that the inmost human state is always vital with Divine Life. So, this human form has actually fully rounded dimensions, however one-sided it may seem. That is, it has a conscious hemisphere in the beclouded realm of the natural experience, and an unconscious hemisphere in the luminous realm of inmost Being. This is imaged by the diagram first in view, thus: When the creaturely form is naturally conscious in lowest hemisphere or extreme simplism (1, 2, 3:), his unconscious *being* is in Creative Being to the extent of the hemisphere of light represented by spaces 0, I, II. When, likewise, he is in the degree of natural consciousness represented by the shaded hemisphere 4, 5, 6:, his unconscious *being* is in God to the extent of the luminous hemisphere 0, II, III. And when he is self-conscious in the degree represented by hemisphere 7, 8, 9:, his unconscious *being* is in the lumen of the hemisphere 0, III, I. Whence is sensibly illustrated the important truth that "in God we live, move, and have a being"—that Creator and creature are vitally one in actual Being constantly, and only alienated to creaturely consciousness during the tumultuous states of existential development.

Another point that has already been measurably touched, but is

yet of such impressive import that it may well be urged anew, is this: the essential form of a degree or human state is not an intelligent reality or full experience to creaturely form during the unfolding process of that degree. It only becomes such during the operations of the next degree. Thus the common (simplex) human form, in development, has its root in the unal element (I) of eternal Being; germinates in "1" of the first developing hemisphere (as vegetable germ quickens to life in the seed buried in earth); mediately unfolds in "2" of that hemisphere (as in the germinal vegetable process the old seed-form tends to dissolution and the new form tends to subjective distinction); and grows to fruition of its form in "3" of that hemisphere (as vegetable germ comes to full germinal form and breaks its earthy barriers for a new career amid heavenly airs and sunshine). Thence the next degree, as shaded hemisphere 4, 5, 6; illustrating complex development—development in specific selfhood—is rooted in the dual element of Being (II), quickens in conscious human *selfhood* in "4," unfolds more forcibly in that selfhood in "5," and conclusively forms or matures in that *selfhood* in "6" of that hemisphere. This series corresponds with stock-growth in the plant.

The consuminating form of human development is illustrated by the shaded hemisphere 7, 8, 9; and is grounded in the composite element of Being (the trine) represented by Roman numerals, III. This form quickens in associate or fraternal vitality in "7," more definitely unfolds in composite power in "8," and thence ripens in that majestic order in "9." Here development ends in full composite power duly ordered, fitly symbolized by numeric "10," where, as a symbol of this numeric power, *the primary term* (0), previously unknown as embodying power, becomes an instrumental form equivalent to the whole power of the series 1-9: this ninefoldness being extended indefinitely in higher associations.

If we still hold the vegetable form as the corresponding symbol, this process—conclusion at "9" and transition into "10"—is forcibly illustrated by the ripened grain that throws off the husk (now dead), that before obscured the intrinsic treasures beneath imposing exterior, and displays "the golden grain" in all its objective glory. Thus it is that ear-blade, ear-growth, and ear-ripeness make a fit symbol, in the mouth of the Divinely Revealed

GOD-MAN, of the *initial, unfolding, and unfolded* order of God's Kingdom in the earth. And thus it is that the fully composite, associate, or unitary order planted in human nature, as the Divine Incarnation, works as Holy Spirit (spirit of wholeness) in the serene depths central to all our human jars and painful struggles, and points clearly to the glory of a new era of Creative Fruition, when it may be said: "The kingdoms of this world are become the kingdom of our Lord and his Christ."

It is seen<sup>1</sup> now, we trust, that a scientific formulation and explication of the great principle of creative law, announced and partially defined and elaborated by Swedenborg—even though our rendering is necessarily very brief—verifies the essential realities presented to the vision of that remarkable Seer, and, as we are persuaded, gives every earnest mind an infallible clew both to the Master and his most worthy expositor, Mr. James.

Swedenborg's system of thought, when logically constructed, works a complete revolution in current ideas of Creation. It explodes the old notion of an arbitrary creation wrought by God as an outside force and terminating in physics humanly animated in primitive or merely natural man. It maintains that the creature's vital substance is constantly the Creator, as his inmost *being*. And although it seems to affirm creative "ultimate" as occurring in the primitive or Adamic nature, thence making a *re-creation* necessary to carry the creature up to Divine conjunction in true felicity of life, yet a proper rendering of the law of discrete degrees, by a consistent unitary principle, will hold the matter firmly, (1) as Creative *Insistence in Absolute Being*; (2) Creative *Existence in human appearing*; (3) Creative *Subsistence in Divine Human appearing and being as one*—this being Creative End. Swedenborg variously formulates the order of the degrees, verbally, with a constancy becoming his supreme devotion to highest truth: though not, we are confident, in a way compatible with the full demands of science.

<sup>1</sup> "It is seen," we say, because our essay presupposes a knowledge, on the part of the reader, of Swedenborg's intellectual attitude concerning the principles under discussion. And, as it is not practicable to quote here sufficiently to give a systematic view of his thought, we can only recommend to the interested reader a perusal of his treatises, especially upon this subject of discrete degrees. His little work, known as "Divine Love and Wisdom," will be found sufficient for this purpose.



As a system of creative philosophy, somewhat involved, and also a system of science in form still more involved, his thought gets forcible and extended enunciation under his hand, and more specific elaboration as a philosophic system under the cogent handling of Mr. James. And it seemed only to need a more distinct showing of the elementary nature of the creative degrees, and strict scientific *thesis, analysis*, and *synthesis* accordingly, to make the whole as comprehensive and commanding, practically, as could be desired.

In order to see, by his own expression, how his thought bears upon the problem of Creation, let us briefly quote him :

"In the created universe, both in its greatest and in its least parts, these three—end, cause, and effect—exist, because they exist in God the Creator, who is the Lord from eternity."—*D. L. & W.*, 169.

" . . . the end is all in the cause and all in the effect ; hence it is that end, cause, and effect are called the first end, the middle end, and the ultimate end."—*Id.*, 168.

"The universal end, which is the end of all things in creation, is, that there may be an eternal conjunction of the Creator with the created universe ; and this is impossible unless there be subjects in which His Divine may be as in Himself, consequently in which it may dwell and remain, which subjects, in order that they may be His habitations and mansions, must be recipients of His love and wisdom as from themselves."—*Id.*, 170.

"That end, cause, and effect are in all and singular the things of creation, is evident when it is considered that all effects, or ultimate ends, become anew first ends, in a continual series from the Lord the Creator, who is the first, to the conjunction of man with Him, which is the last."—*Id.*, 172.

"It is to be observed that every degree is distinguished from another by its proper coverings, and all the degrees together are distinguished by their common covering ; and that the common covering communicates with the inner and inmost in their order."—*Id.*, 194.

" . . . the prior degrees are in their fulness in their ultimate."—*Id.*, 217.

These must suffice as hints of the order of his thought concerning the law of degrees as a principle of universal order. His con-



ception of the principles of "successive order" and "simultaneous order," as pertaining to these degrees, is quite equally important. In the diagrams already presented, these principles are very clearly illustrated. The first one, with shaded degrees illustrating the human form in order of creative development, very distinctly typifies "successive order." The other diagram, with its three circular forms firmly united in the *Centre*, thus representing the full-orbed and fully illumined consciousness in creative fruition realized, well depicts the principle of "simultaneous order." This symbol is easily understood by one who has understandingly followed our exposition of the laws of creative development. The threefold elements of human nature are never lost or dismissed in their successive operations. In "the ultimate" they are simply perfected, Divinely qualified, associated and actuated in ways ever new and fresh with new inspirations; like the opening day of the Springtime, or the movement of musical harmonies and the responsive bounds of young life in the orderly combinations and transitions of "the merry dance." Indeed, were it not for this great play of human life in the Divine-Human Order of the future, all these simple shadows, that so thrill our poor life of to-day with their flashy tinsel, would be without living soul, and speedily perish with the moving, natural personalities that operate them. The whole natural world would collapse for want of vital fibre.

This second diagram represents the threefold elements of human nature in triune order, in the full light and life of Creative End. In the Divine Natural Manhood, come to conscious experience in *mind*, *thought*, and *outward conditions* truly ordered, there is no darkness in any sphere. The previous darkened half-spheres of consciousness become here luminous whole spheres, all vital with immortal vigor and playing in Divine accordance, because all are duly conscious of the Eternal Centre wherein they are formed and united, and where they realize the great law of Harmony in the Life and Light of Creative Triunity. When, too, the external or natural mind becomes thus Divinely illumined and consciously one with its inspiring Centre, it is found that all forms of the external are firmly united *in each other*, and this unity is firmly fixed in the Central Life itself. "Each in all and all in each" is the law of full organic composition—every *one* in the *universal*

and *the universal in every one* as a constant living experience. This second diagram distinctly illustrates this perfected degree of consciousness: a state that *realizes to human form* what is ever true—namely, the constant presence of Creative Life in the creaturely nature.

In virtue of the Living Word inherent to the Human Form—the “Life that lighteth every man that cometh into the world”—there is a monition to the *common* sense which forbids that the natural life shall *rest* or remain in the grossness of its mere animal proclivities. The same monitor is a perpetual spur to the cultivated or *special* sense—the moral sense—forbidding that the individual life remain and *rest* in the antagonisms and conflicts native to the mere human selfhood. So, too, there is the same, as Divinest monition to the *aesthetic* sense, that forbids any rest to man—whether in individual or collective regards—short of full participation in infinite Goodness and Truth, with all the Divine Harmonies they involve. The rule of *physical force*, adapted to the lowest developing conditions; of *ethical force* proper to the higher conditions; and of *aesthetic force* as suited to highest conditions of culture—will all be found duly instrumental in effecting progress to desired results; and, when they are employed scientifically, the morning of the New Day will begin to dawn upon us.

There is no question but Mr. James is right in maintaining that Swedenborg's books form the base of a new intellectual system of immense importance, yet Mr. James himself seemed well aware that the great promise of the work, as a system, was not fulfilled by the labors so faithfully devoted thereto in the treatises of the great Seer. A system, to be clear and commanding as such, must be brought to its “ultimate.” It must attain embodiment—come to perfect form as positive science. In no other way can it be the ready instrument to cleave the fossilated ages of error and superstition, and give the human intellect the Divine Mastery to which it rightly aspires. There are occasionally men of exceptional genius, like Mr. James, who gather the truth from first principles, and dispense it thence in generous measure to the few who, with qualified philosophical insight, come to ready sympathy and fellowship in the treasures thus disclosed. But the majority of intellects, of a sturdy practical nature, cannot be reached by doctrines and

theories logically explicated, especially when those doctrines and theories concern problems of our human origin and destiny. There was probably never greater interest and more earnest quest concerning highest realities; but such interest and search need help that logic and philosophy cannot give till they culminate in science in its highest form. A large class of active intellects demand demonstration by positive methods, and scorn or deride what they regard as mere personal opinion or airy speculation. And these are not generally much impressed by Swedenborg's system; for, although he clearly sounded the key-note to science in its ultimate form, he did not fully delineate and define the elements, and formulate a tangible system as comprehensive creative law. He saw clear enough that "all things are in human form," and that "the laws of the human mind are the laws of the universe," yet it was one thing to see this and make it the base of a wonderful elaboration of most vital truths, and quite another thing to analyze and synthesize his theme, and give his logic the formal lineaments of exact science—a science that, clearly appearing in its own form, would thence steadily explore the problems of *mind*, *thought*, and *experience*, and leave no uncertain sounds to confuse and bewilder.

It is hoped that the outlines that have been here briefly traced may be found serviceable as an index to amplest scientific certitude. Surely the threefold elements, as defined, are so *necessary and sufficient* to Creative Order that there were no possible consistency short of the three, and nothing beyond imaginable to add to the fulness. As elements of Creative Being, without which actual creation could never occur, they are as indispensable as, in Geometry, are *point*, *line*, and *curve*; or as to comprehending thought are *thesis*, *antithesis*, and *synthesis*. But, beyond strict classification and definition, application in use as universal law is requisite to give the proper practical test of the real value and power inherent to the system. Manifestly a sufficient criterion of highest realities must be adduced in order to realize a *science* of the Highest. Swedenborg's and James's logic and philosophy, rightly rendered as science, assuredly furnish this criterion.

All scientific discrimination will constantly take strict account of the difference between developed and developing conditions. Developing process involves a career amid various complications

and appearances that more or less misrepresent or obscure developed results. Developed conditions reveal and explain all previous throes, however toilsome and distressing.

## FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.<sup>1</sup>

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF J. G. FICHTE BY A. E. KROEGER.

BOOK SECOND.—*Facts of Consciousness in Regard to the Practical Faculty.*

### CHAPTER V.

#### NATURE AND THE INDIVIDUAL.

At this insight, that the material world is merely absolute limitation of the productive power of the imagination, one question still remains in part unanswered, namely: What is that which limits in this limitation?

The question might be put: 1. What is the ground why life limits itself at all? To this the answer is, Because it represents itself in an image, and an image is always limited and determined.

Or, 2. Why is life limited in this particular manner? This question has already been answered, in part, as follows: Because the original and absolute power of imagination is limited; and hence originates extension, quality generally, and externality outside of the Ego, all of which constitute the mere empty form of external contemplation, which has no inner significance at all. But we have already shown that the real *Inner Essence* of the world,

<sup>1</sup> [Various reasons have compelled us to discontinue, for a time, the publication of Fichte's "Facts of Consciousness." We shall now take it up again and continue it to the end. The work deserves careful study, as the first part of it constitutes an admirable introduction to the Science of Knowledge, while the second part is a clear exposition of the religious aspect of the Science of Knowledge, as developed by Fichte in the later period of his life. For convenience of reference to the former portion of this book, the reader may note that the parts already published are to be found in the following places: Vol. v, "Jour. Spec. Phil.," pp. 53, 130, 226, 338; vol. vi, pp. 42, 120, 332; vol. vii, Jan., p. 36.—En.]



as a resistance to the power of free life, must be something quite different, must be, in fact, itself a *power*—a pure *noumenon*, which no external contemplation can reach. This power or force is indeed the world, and, as such, the world is posited and altogether determined.

Whence does this determination or limitation arise as the only genuine, true, and original limitation? Evidently through original thinking itself, and in the following way:

The world, even in its inner character, as a force, and as a resisting force, is to be object of the causality of the one *common* Ego; and the force or power of this world is to be overcome by the power of that one common life. In this subjugation a certain determined power of life, peculiarly and essentially belonging to it, will, no doubt, make itself visible to universal contemplation. Now, since by the law of our science we never start from a presumptive world in itself, but always from life alone, how would it be if that resistance, the real inner power or force of the world, were originally posited and thought only as pure resistance and as nothing else, hence as that wherein the power of life and in opposition to which the power of life made itself visible?

The matter now stands thus:

Life represents itself in its unity. Being life, it is a power—a determined, peculiar power; and, moreover—since we know it to be a principle—an infinite power within its determinedness. We did not say that life represented itself in its unity internally, in the thinking heretofore described—indeed, our whole previous internal representation was not one of unity, but merely a partial one—but that life represented itself externally and in external contemplation. Hence, it cannot represent its power—in its essence, of course, for its formal condition we have already discovered in an internal but individual contemplation—as something altogether internal in this form; and the power remains in the described thinking, precisely because it is a self-externalizing, utterly unseen and invisible. Hence, if this power must nevertheless be represented in such a thinking—and, since it is a life which is to be represented, it cannot well be represented otherwise—it can be represented only in a resisting object—that is, we must add and think together with it a somewhat, which would be fully annihilated if the power of life were completely



developed. Now, if such a somewhat is added and posited—and such a somewhat is, according to us, that very internal world, which we may now, having properly raised it to its rank as a noumenon, call *Nature*—the inner power of life, although kept invisible, would yet be its real determining master, since this nature would contain only that which the power of life itself contained, but in its very opposite. And if we called the thinking of such an opposite limited—*i. e.*, limited to precisely *such* a thinking, the invisible limiting part of this thinking—the hidden premise of its contents would be the very being of the power of life itself. Now, suppose that the power of life developed itself actually within this thinking, then this same power, which was at first and without this thinking of a resistance altogether invisible, would become visible in this its being developed through contact with the resistance for a form of contemplation, which contemplates only in opposition, and hence beholds everything only as limited by its opposite. The power, thus developing itself, would henceforth always appear as limited by the resistance posited in advance by thinking, and would be visible only in a form of contemplation, thus constituted.

*Remarks.*—The Science of Knowledge holds Nature to be nothing else than the opposite, which absolute thinking has formed, to the absolute power of free and spiritual life, and which that thinking has thus formed necessarily in order to make that power visible, it being in itself invisible.

Now, when you tell this to a “Natural Philosopher,” and say to him that Nature is merely a limit, merely a negative, and nothing positive at all, he gets angry, and cries out aloud about the outrage committed on Nature. But that is all he does. For to enter upon the arguments of the Science of Knowledge, and to refute them by proving the opposite of what has just been advanced, would require a faculty of acute and logical thinking, of following a very extensive series of thoughts, and of employing a more than usual degree of dialectical art.

But what dim feeling is it, really, which so excites their wrath, and which certainly must have some weighty ground? It is scarcely to be expected that we shall ever learn it from them; hence we must try to put speech into their mouths. The matter is this:

The conception of an Absolute Being, altogether of itself, through

itself and in itself, is ineradicably impressed upon consciousness; and just as ineradicably there is impressed upon consciousness the impossibility of transferring this conception to itself (to the Ego) and of positing itself in any way as the Absolute. Now, those philosophers, together with all their contemporaries, have believed the Science of Knowledge to make the Ego that Absolute, in violation of the ineradicable consciousness before mentioned. Believing this, they, of course, were forced to improve on such a system. But this improvement turned out to be an unhappy one, since they made Nature the Absolute, after it had resulted, of course, that the Ego could not well be the Absolute. They argued: Either the Ego or Nature; there is no third; for their range of vision reached only these two. Their wrath is excited, really, because they think that, since we will not let Nature pass for the Absolute, we must necessarily make the Ego the Absolute. But in this they are mistaken; we draw no such consequence; for our more extensive range of vision embraces something more than those two factors.

Nature remains for us a mere limit, subordinated to the Ego, its pure product, namely, as one life. An Absolute outside of the Ego and of Nature, extending to the former, and by its means also to the latter, their proper point of support, we shall learn to obtain in another way.

Let no one here hasten to put in the mediation of those ever-ready peacemakers, who would say that the whole matter is probably a mere word-dispute. True, we know, as cannot well be otherwise, and we are sorry for it, that, in thus making Nature the Absolute, they, at the same time, constitute Nature their God; and we know also very well that they do not really represent the separate objects of Nature as being such God, but transfer this their conception of God to a common World-soul or internal Force of Nature underlying all phenomena of Nature, which Force of Nature, indeed, if matters turn out well, and if a proper height of sublimity is attained, is said to project itself in some phenomena of Nature as self-consciousness. (If they were at all habituated to thinking closely whatever they think instead of indulging in superficial phantasies, they would comprehend, at this very place in their system, that there is no thinkable transition whatever from a force of Nature, simply manifesting itself, to a return of such force into itself in a duality and form of reflection!) But we

see clearly that every principle, which is to be *realiter* a principle of sensuous appearance, is itself sensuous, and cannot be at all thought as supersensuous and spiritual; not even as an Ego, much less as God; and that hence only two ways are open to them. Either they should confess that they lack insight into the unity and connection of the appearance, seizing it only separately and scattered about as it presents itself, and that hence they are no philosophers; or, if they will lay claim to this title, and thus admit a supersensuous and spiritual as real, they must utterly drop their reality of the sensuous, since it is absolutely impossible to connect the two; and they must learn to comprehend the whole sensuousness as mere form of contemplation of the supersensuous, even as the Science of Knowledge comprehends it.

According to all that we have said before, the sensuous world is no more an object of experience than the previously established parts of the self-representation of life in its unity, but is altogether a something *a priori*. It is not a foreign something, which enters into contemplation and thinking, but is necessarily grounded in them. Its universal, external form, materiality and quality in general, originates in the peculiar form of the power of imagination; hence it does not belong to itself, but to the latter, and is formed in opposition to it. As we said before: The limitation of the power of imagination makes an object visible—so now we may say: The object makes visible the power of imagination, and its internal determinedness—for instance, of infinity. Moreover, since consciousness must begin somewhere, and must begin precisely at this point, the power of imagination here becomes first partially visible; and this its form here first enters the range of vision. It is true that, in order to recognize this form as form of the power of imagination, and as an absolute form, we need something else—namely, free reflection, which itself, however, is possible only under the condition of that immediate contemplation of the object. Thus matters stand in regard to the external form. But the internal part of the sensuous world is, as we have described it just now, the expression of the real, final, and original power of life by its opposite. It is, therefore, formed through the real power, just as matter, etc., is formed through the power of imagination. This inner sensuous world is determined by that power of life, and nothing can arise in it except its opposite and annihilating

power be in that power of life. The sensuous world is thus nothing but an image by means of the opposite of the power of life according to the two chief forms of the latter, imaginative and real power; it is, therefore, absolutely determined *a priori*, and not accidental. (There is positively nothing in it but the component parts of this image; take them away, and nothing remains, no *residuum*, no unknown something = x.)

We have shown above that the sensuous world is not posited by the individual as such, but as one life; and this also appears from the mere analysis of the thinking of a sensuous object. That which is individual is perceived simply because the Ego in its inner contemplation perceives itself as the principle of that individual; hence, it is visible, and exists only as the result of that principle, as we have seen above in the instances of the freely produced conception of a purpose of reproduction, etc. But, as such, it ceases the moment that the Ego ceases to hold it fixed by immediate production. Hence, a fixed, independent existence, independent of free representation, does not pertain to it. Now, if we produced objects in this manner we should regard them as representations, which would drop away as soon as we should cease to represent them. (Idealism is often described as assuming this to be the case, but it is a complete misapprehension.) But we ascribe to them an independent being, as a sign that we give them an image of a being, which we, as individuals, cannot take away from them again, and which does not depend upon our inner contemplable freedom: namely, an image of the One. They are not representations; hence, they are things themselves immediately. We do not have and possess these things in our immediate contemplation through representatives, but we possess themselves in their immediate essence, since, in reality, they are, after all, nothing but appearances, and the appearances which we (the universal Ego) possess ourselves. This extremely important and altogether misapprehended point of our Idealism must be stringently insisted upon. There are systems, for instance, according to which things do not appear as they are in themselves, but are changed in a manifold manner by our representations. The fundamental error lies here, in the circumstance that another being than the being of their appearance is attributed to them. According to us, the things appear absolutely as they are, for they



are nothing else than their appearance. They are throughout and throughout appearance, to use an expression which was formed, as it seems, to terrify us, but which we quietly appropriate to our own advantage.

Besides—to prove our proposition by another side of the analysis—the objects of the sensuous world are posited immediately as absolutely valid for others as soon as we reflect upon such objects and gather them up in the act of objective thinking, a sure proof that all we have now described is a single synthetical thinking period, through which the whole external world arises for us.

## CHAPTER VI.

### GENERAL REMARKS.

We review all the preceding in order to attach to it some general remarks.

*Result of the Whole.*—The presupposed life of consciousness represents itself in its unity immediately through itself. The objective views of the world hitherto established are those representations. It is true that that life of consciousness is broken, which means that it is repeatable many times as the same life—for, as yet, we have not noticed any real inner distinctions of the individuals, but have considered them all as the same.

1. Now, how did we arrive at this result? Evidently without any argumentation and proof, and merely by the free maxim of our science to regard consciousness as a particular phenomenon of itself, without any foreign mixture; hence, by mere scientific form. In this, therefore, all philosophy, which claims to be a science for itself, ought to agree with us. But the philosophers opposed to us in this have not even allowed consciousness to pass for an appearance standing on its own feet. Our treatment finds its first discoverer in Kant. Such a treatment of consciousness is justly called Idealism, and all philosophy must, therefore, according to us, be Idealism from the first start and in its beginning. It might become something else by an exposition of the ground of consciousness. But this question is not raised until we have completed the list of facts, and meanwhile we explain the phenomenon out of itself, so long as we can do it at all.



2. We see here, clearly, the distinction of our system from that which assumes sensuous things existing in themselves and makes them the basis of consciousness—a system which we will not call by the ambiguous name dogmatism, but plainly materialism, to which name it can raise no objection if it is logical. This system says: In all hitherto established objective views of the world, the sensuous world represents itself; but our system says: It is the life of consciousness which represents itself in them. We agree, however, in this, that it represents itself in the same form of an altogether determined and necessary thinking. The difference between both expressions is apparent; the only question is, What is the real point of the dispute? It is this: Materialism posits the things as the ground of the life of consciousness. Now, this we contradict. At least, in the described consciousness it is life that represents, and life represents itself in it. Another and higher question is: Does it not also represent a something else, outside of itself, while it thus represents itself and in its self-representation? It is possible, and it will turn out to be so. This is the inquiry after the ground. But materialism makes use of this proposition from the very start, without any necessity, and in an altogether unsatisfactory manner. According to materialism, consciousness represents the sensuous world in itself. The materialist says: Things exist. This we also say, and say it as emphatically as he may desire. But he also says: Hence, the things are at the same time the *ground of our representations* of them. Here we perceive a whole tissue of fictions. Of course, they exist; but how do you know that they are at the same time such ground? You furthermore assert that we have only representations of them, which is in direct contradiction to an accurate observation of self-consciousness. Finally, you connect these two fictions by a relation, which is also purely fictitious, in making one of them the ground of the other—a fiction which is, moreover, completely unintelligible, for you have never yet uttered, nor will you ever be able to utter, a sensible word concerning the manner in which a thing can change into an image essentially different from the thing, and in another power separated from the thing and also essentially different.

3. We also remark the difference between our system and every kind of speculative Individualism, but especially idealistic Indi-

vidualism. Every philosophical system intends to explain consciousness; which is perfectly right. But all previous philosophical systems, without exception, rose no higher in this undertaking than to explain the consciousness of a single individual subject, which naturally meant the individual subject just then philosophizing. The consciousness that was to be explained has never been thought as the consciousness of one life, embracing and cancelling all individuality. The Science of Knowledge is the first system that has done this, and has done it in such a manner that no one has observed it, but imagined that Science to be also an individualism. One good result, however, was the consequence: people began to perceive that it ought not to be thus.

It is true that the materialist, by silently presupposing a number of Egos—for otherwise he cannot arrive at them—can explain the harmony in their representations of the sensuous world by basing himself on the thing in itself and the impressions which it makes in accordance with its being. But—apart from his inability to explain himself as a representing being—he can never explain the representation—his own, for instance—of other rational creatures outside of himself. For I should like to know what sort of an impression of a *sensuous object* that would be by means of which the image of an altogether supersensuous Ego would arise, and what sort of an activity that would be through which the image of an inactive and altogether in itself locked-up and separated principle would be produced.

Idealistic individualism, indeed, loses its deduction at the very first point. Space is the form of my contemplation; hence, whatever is in space will easily follow as being also my contemplation. But who, then, is this Ego? I do not desire the answer, which you would like to give me, impelled thereto by a dim feeling, but I want the answer, which you must give me logically. How do you know, then, that space is the form of contemplation? Surely, only through immediate inner self-contemplation, which is individual. Now, unless you have higher principles in your Speculation, this self-contemplation can have validity only for itself, for the individual. Space is form of your individual contemplation; this is what your self-contemplation states. But how are you now going to draw the consequence, in violation of all rules of reasoning, that space is also the form of contemplation of other indi-

viduals (if you, indeed, are able to posit them), since you ought rather to conclude the opposite?

*Remark.*—Kant, it is true, answers the problem just proposed in a different manner. He says: *For us men*, space is the form of contemplation. But let us ask, first, what is the word *men* to signify here, and what can it signify at all? If it signifies the opposite to irrationality, then it is equivalent to rational beings, and the expression ought always to have been so understood. But if it is intended to signify more, then an opposition between rational beings themselves ought to have been indicated; a classification in their general sphere between rational and irrational men. In which case I ask: So far as thinking is concerned, can you think other rational beings than those that are contained in the general form of reason of the Ego? The question is not merely whether you can think otherwise, but whether such another thinking would not be an absolute contradiction, and whether that form of reason is not the only possible one. Hence, on the field of thinking, no such opposition is possible. Or do you, perhaps, behold such other rational beings, in which case the opposition would be transferred to the sphere of contemplation? You will not be able to prove such contemplation, however much you may imagine other bodily forms of rational beings. But, on the field of contemplation, you are limited to the reality of contemplation, and your imaginations are phantasms which you would do wisely to avoid. I should like to know whether Kant would seriously state that any kind of rational beings might not have the contemplation of space, but something else in its place.

Kant, therefore, ought to have said, and intended to say, that Space is the form of contemplation for all rational beings. But where is there any trace of a proof of this in his system? He has not demonstrated that the evidence, which, in point of fact, emanates evidently from his own individuality, has universal validity for all subjects, although, in point of fact, he applies it, and does not even mention that he does so. But does he not speak of the validity of the categorical imperative for all men? True, but not otherwise than he has spoken already in the Introduction to the "Critique of Pure Reason" of Extension as the form of contemplation for us men. If it were his speculative system which spoke thus, he would have to show up this categorical imperative as the

determining ground of some particular consciousness (as we have pointed out, the power of life as the determining ground of the Internal of nature), and, moreover, of that consciousness through which many and all are posited. He would have to show up the many and the all as the form of contemplation of a categorical imperative, precisely as we have represented the sensuous world as the form of contemplation of the development of the living power, and as will probably, indeed, appear to be the fact. Hence, he has neither deduced that consciousness of the unity of life in the many—though we have, also, not done this as yet—nor has he expressly stated it to be a fact of consciousness—which we have done in the preceding—but he has simply presupposed it, quietly, driven thereto by common sense. Hence, if the tendency of his mind, his common sense, was not individualistic, his system was at any rate; but then common sense, from time to time, corrected his system.

4. This insight into the self-representation of the unity is also the only means by which to explain the validity of everything *a priori* for every rational subject, as well as the claim of each such being to this validity. The universal validity for the whole sphere of objects, of which we have spoken just now, and which must carefully be distinguished from the former, has already been explained. If I see that the object is produced through me, as the principle, and that I am limited by my faculty to produce it only in this particular manner, then I comprehend clearly that the object cannot be produced by me differently in all eternity, and that, hence, it also cannot be differently for me. The question is now, what this principle is. For if it is my Ego as individual, then that objective validity holds good only for me the individual, and we cannot understand how any one else can be presumed to acknowledge it. But if that principle is absolutely the one and universal life of reason, and if it is immediately posited as such unmistakable, then it becomes evident that the universal validity must hold good for this life of reason, and for every one in whom it manifests itself, and that each one who comprehends this is entitled to presume that every one else will admit it.

*Remark.*—But, in order that such a universally valid somewhat should be actually valid for a given individual, it is necessary, firstly, that the individual should give *attention*. This attention



is an act by which the individual makes itself the One Life, with abstraction from its own inner imaging and contemplating.

Now, since that universally valid somewhat is valid for the One Life, it is evident that every individual for whom it is to be valid must make himself that One Life. But this attention presupposes, secondly, that it should be possible in the way required by the character of that valid somewhat. For instance, to see a visible somewhat we must look—that is, attend; but this can be required only from those who have eyes. It is the same with the inner insight. For although we cannot presuppose absolute blindness on this field, the faculty of thinking, after all, develops itself only gradually and by exercise to its higher degrees, and thus it may well happen that a universally valid truth may not be valid for somebody, in spite of all his attempted attention and goodwill to comprehend it, simply because his faculty of thinking has not yet been developed in the region wherein that truth lies.

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## ON THE NATURE OF PROPERTY AND ITS DEVOLUTION.<sup>1</sup>

BY J. G. WOERNER.

*Analysis.*—I. Of the nature of property; its acquisition, use, and alienation. §§ 1–3.

II. Devolution of property on the death of its owner; rights of the family. §§ 4–8.

III. Administration; officers and courts having charge of the same. §§ 9–11.

### § 1. *The Acquisition of Property.*<sup>2</sup>

My property is that which is *mine*. That only is mine which I *acquire, hold, and dispose of* by my will. It is *my will* which de-

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<sup>1</sup> [This article forms the introductory chapter to a forthcoming work on Probate Law, by Judge Woerner.—Ed.]

<sup>2</sup> The definition of property has been attempted upon various theories. An able writer, Mr. U. M. Rose, has published, in the "Southern Law Review" (vol. ii, N. S.,



termines the acquisition of a thing by me, whether originally, by reducing to possession, and thus *making my property* that which

p. 1 *et seq.*), a series of articles, entitled "Controversies of Modern Continental Jurists," in which he comments upon the most celebrated theories concerning the derivation of rights, and dwells with approbation upon KANT's System, which he styles *the Possibility of Coexistence* (as to Kant's definition of property, see his *Rechtslehre*, published in the *Philosophische Bibliothek*, vol. xxix, Berlin, 1870), and ROSMINI's theory, from whose work (*Della Natura del Diritto*, Naples, 1837) he quotes to some extent, and, accepting him as a guide to Kant's profound study, condenses his theory as follows: "The sum of the property of a person may be regarded as a sphere, of which that person is the centre. Within this sphere the action of a person is free and independent, and is protected by the moral law against all aggression or restrictions. The person has the moral right to oppose force against any attempt to intrude into this sphere, or to usurp any part of it. The spheres of different personalities exclude each other reciprocally, and serve as mutual limitations to each other. For whatever remains outside of these spheres, each person preserves a complete liberty of action, and no one has a right to arrest its action and expansion within this free and unoccupied space; and in this free space there is a large room for rivalry and competition. Every one has the right of pursuit, but no one can have a right to any object until he has apprehended it, and has annexed it, as it were, to his person, in the manner already stated. A transfer or conveyance of property is an abandonment of it in favor of another determinate person, or a number of such. If the person to whom the transfer is made neglects or refuses to accept the property, it does not fall to the first occupant, as it would do if the abandonment were general; because the owner, having a right of complete disposal of it, may dispose of it conditionally if he sees fit; and in such case, on a failure of the condition of acceptance on which the right should be transmitted to another, the property will revert to him who had conditionally abandoned it. A contract which produces an obligation is only an abandonment in favor of another of a portion of one's personal activities. A man may barter his personal services, his skill, his future ability to control and dispose of a sum of money, and the manner of its disposal, just as he may sell and deliver—that is, abandon to another—a chattel, the only difference being that in the former case his obligation is active, while in the latter it is, or may be, only passive, the duty in the one case relating to acts, and in the other to forbearances. Rights may also be transmitted by general abandonment. Where property is unconditionally abandoned, it devolves on the first taker or occupant, who apprehends it physically, intending to make it his own, doing thereby no undeserved injury to any human being. Abandonment of whatever kind extinguishes, either conditionally or absolutely, the right of the owner or proprietor to the subject of the right, by causing the intellectual bond which binds it to him to disappear. Words are merely one class of symbols from which the intentions of men are inferred. In large cities people are to be found who earn a livelihood by collecting articles of small value, which are thrown in the streets. In such cases the abandonment is implied and not expressed. In the same way come titles by prescription or limitation. From long non-user an abandonment of a right is presumed; the intellectual bond is supposed to have been withdrawn; and therefore the right passes to the first taker. In the case of a contract importing an obligation, the abandonment

was no one's property before; or *by contract*, by which a thing becomes mine through the *concurrence* of my will with that of its former owner. Since I cannot rightfully acquire the property of another without his consent—that is, without his free will—it is obvious that the will of the original owner is a necessary element in my ownership, and in the ownership of any one who may lawfully acquire it after me, and remains operative until the property has lost its character as such by voluntary abandonment. By my own free will I may abandon my property, whereupon it ceases to be such, and relapses into the condition of *res nullius*—subject to become property by the sole will of any person who acquires it.

## § 2. *Tenure and Use of Property lost by Non-User.*

I *hold* or *use* a thing which is mine, at will. Matter is unfree—*i. e.*, it has no will, it does not belong to itself. Neither right nor duty can be predicated of a mere thing; its quality is to offer resistance; it is, therefore, negative to my will: my will, in realizing itself, overcomes this resistance and subjects the thing to its purposes—changing its form, destroying, consuming it. That which is *mine* is thus a part of *my personality*, of *me*, in so far as its end and purpose of existence is the satisfaction, the realization of my will, and to serve it for its purposes as my bodily limbs serve me. Will, then, is the essence of property; without it there is none. Hence, that from which I have withdrawn my will, which I have abandoned, ceases to be my property, and becomes, as we have seen, *res nullius*, the appropriation of which by another is no violation of my right, because it is no collision with my will. If, then, I wish to preserve my property, or, which is the same in effect, my right to it, I must indicate, in some way perceptible to

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necessarily inures to the benefit of the person on whom the obligation rested, and therefore amounts to a voluntary discharge of the obligation.”—*Southern L. R.*, vol. i, N. S., p. 17 *et seq.*

The reader will notice how near these views approach those given in the text, which follow the exposition of HEGEL in his *Philosophie des Rechts*, §§ 40–70. No translation into the English tongue of this truly exhaustive and masterly treatise on the law has, as yet, it is believed, appeared; but in *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* (vol. iv, p. 155) was published the “*Outlines of the Science of Rights, Morals, and Religion*,” which is a translation of Hegel’s *Philosophische Propædæutik*, enriched by explanatory notes elucidating Hegel’s terminology and abstruse reasoning, and which contains a full synopsis of his greater work.

others, that it is still subject to my will; otherwise I may be understood as having abandoned it. To avoid collisions arising out of a misinterpretation of my relation to a thing, a definite period is fixed by custom or law, within which my will is presumed to attach to it; if I permit this period to expire without using the thing, or indicating in some tangible way that it continues to be mine (keeping it in possession, laying it up, or in some way exercising ownership over it), its abandonment is presumed and my right to it is lost by *prescription*, my ownership barred by *limitation*.

### § 3. *Alienability of Property.*

In like manner I may *relinquish* my property to another, either by freely *giving* it, or *exchanging* it for other property. We have already seen that property acquired from another can become such only by the will of the former owner. My donee as well as my vendee holds the property given or sold by the concurrence of my will with his own; it must be my will that the donee shall take, and his that he will receive, the thing which he acquires from me by gift; and my will to relinquish and that the vendee shall hold the property I sell or barter, and his to relinquish and that I shall hold the property I get in exchange therefor. Property so relinquished does not cease to be property when it ceases to be mine, for it is *my will* that my donee or vendee shall hold it. The alienation of property constitutes one of the forms in which I use it, in which it serves my purposes, and in which I *realize my will*. This phase or quality of property constitutes the sphere of *contract*. Alienability is of the essence of property; an infringement of my right or power to alienate my property is therefore a limitation upon my free will, and to that extent a violation of my personal liberty, because my free will finds realization in property. The infringement of my personal freedom is precisely the same if a limitation is put upon my power to alienate property as if I were prevented from acquiring, or from holding or using it. The limitation would in either case deprive me of my power to contract, and thus destroy my liberty.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Intellectual or manual skill, sciences, arts, even religious functions (sermons, masses, prayers, etc.), as well as services to be rendered for another at or for a given period, are all included in the sphere of contract. It might appear, on a superficial view, that such

§ 4. *Will of Owner operative in Property after his Death.*

Property, then, is the realization of the free will of a person, the external sphere of his freedom. As such, it partakes of, and is clothed with, the dignity and inviolability of the person. The things which constitute property can have no rights, for they have no will; and will alone, or the person in which it has its *abode and vehicle*, can be the subject of right and of its correlative, duty. The law recognizes and deals with property only in so far as it recognizes and deals with the will of the owner, realized or externalized therein. For the sphere of the law is the Spiritual; it operates upon and through the will alone.<sup>1</sup> Thus the law recognizes in the property of a deceased person his free will; that is, his rational will, and enforces it. The failure of such recognition would destroy the property, which can be such only through the will of its owner. If this has been adequately expressed, the disposition of the property is enforced accordingly; if not, the law itself supplies the omission by imparting to the property the universal will, which is the free will of rational persons.

§ 5. *Free and Capricious Will. Caprice ignored by the Law.*

The distinction between truly free or rational will and caprice, unfree or irrational will, lies in the content which the will gives itself, or the object which it pursues. Universal will (as distinguished from personal, individual, or subjective will) is the

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skill, or functions, or services cannot be classed as *things*, and do not, therefore, constitute property, being themselves emanations of free will, and qualities or attributes of the mind. But it is within the province of my mind or will to *externalize* a limited share of my activity, to give to another an interest in it, and thus to reduce it to the condition of an external thing, which I may alienate for his use—not the whole of my labor, skill, or services—the totality of my activity or productions—for that would be to alienate my own personality, to destroy my free will, which are inalienable. The servant or laborer for hire *realizes his will* by exchanging his services or productions for his wages, and thus enters into a lawful contract; but the slave gives up or is deprived of his free will, to the *destruction of his personality*, which can neither be relinquished nor acquired as property by another.—HEGEL, *Phil. d. R.*, §§ 43, 66, 67, and *addenda*.

<sup>1</sup> The will is free; freedom is its substance and essential quality in like manner as the substance and essential quality of matter is gravity. Gravity is not an accidental predicate of matter, but matter itself; so with freedom and will: freedom is will. Will without freedom is a word void of meaning; freedom exists only as will.—HEGEL'S *Philosophie des Rechts*, § 4, and *addendum*.



will as embodied in the law, in morality, ethics, religion. Without universal will there could be no laws, nor anything obligatory upon us all. Each one would act according to his own caprice or pleasure, without respecting the caprice or pleasure of others. In so far, then, as the will of the individual has for its content or object the universal will, it is rational and free.<sup>1</sup> Caprice, arbitrary or limited will, has for its object or content the gratification of some impulse or appetite, which may or may not be rational, *i. e.*, in consonance with the universal or absolute will.<sup>2</sup> It follows that the law can recognize and enforce only true or rational will, and must ignore and cancel that which is capricious and arbitrary.

### § 6. *Property in Relation to the Family.*

The ethical relation between the sexes demands their union in matrimony, from which *the family* results as a spontaneous natural (social union) *society*, whose members are united by the bonds of mutual affection, implicit trust, and voluntary obedience (*pietas*). The family is an organic totality, whose constituent elements have their true existence not in their individuality, but in their relation to each other through the totality, lacking independence when separated from it; they have no separate interests to seek, but only one common interest for the whole. Hence, there dwells in the family but one will—namely, that of the head of the family, who represents it in its legal relations to others.<sup>3</sup> In

<sup>1</sup> "The absolute will has only itself for object, while the relative will has something limited."—HEGEL, *Propaedeutic*, § 20; *Jour. Sp. Ph.*, vol. iv, p. 57. See also HEGEL, *Encyclopaedic*, §§ 483–486.

<sup>2</sup> Caprice (arbitrariness) is *formal*, but not *true* freedom. Since I may elect to determine, or not to determine, this or that, I possess what is ordinarily called freedom. My choice consists in the faculty of the will to make this or the other thing *mine*. Being a particular content, this thing is not adequate to me—I am not identical with it; I am simply the potentiality to make it mine. Hence, the choice lies in the indeterminateness of the Ego and the determinateness of the content; being determined (limited) by this content, the will is not free—*i. e.*, has not itself (universal will) for its content. Whether the content (object) of the capricious will be rational (conforming to the universal will) or not, depends upon *accident*: my dependence upon the content constitutes the inconsistency of caprice. Men usually believe themselves free when allowed to act arbitrarily, but true freedom has no contingent content; it alone is not contingent.—HEGEL, *Phil. d. R.*, § 15; *Jour. Sp. Ph.*, iv., pp. 56–58.

<sup>3</sup> *Jour. Sp. Ph.*, p. 167, § 23.



recognizing the true nature and validity of the family, the law accords to it and secures it in the enjoyment of the necessary means to its existence—property; and this in a higher sense and in a more efficient degree than it secures the property of individuals. The existence of the family as an aggregate person requires a permanent estate, adequate not only to the capricious purposes and desires of an individual, but to the common collective wants of all its members.<sup>1</sup> In this estate or property no one member of the family has an exclusive interest or right of possession, but each his undivided interest in the common fund.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, the property is usually held by the head of the family, and in his name. It devolves chiefly upon him to provide for it the means of subsistence and of satisfying their various wants. He controls, manages, and disposes of the property or estate, limited in his absolute dominion over it, aside from his moral obligations, only by the affirmative provisions of the law. Upon the dissolution of the family, through the development of its ethical purpose—*i. e.*, upon the attainment of majority of the children—who then separate from it as persons *sui juris*, capable of holding property of their own and becoming founders of new families, their interest in the family estate is modified accordingly; the authority of the father, as well as his liability to support such children, is no longer recognized in law, but becomes of ethical or moral force only.<sup>3</sup>

### § 7. Testamentary Disposition of Property.

From the nature of property, in its relation to the individual as well as to the family, springs the principle of its devolution upon the death of the owner. The power to dispose of property by *last will* or *testament* results strictly from its essential *quality of alienability* by the owner,<sup>4</sup> and is, like gifts or contracts *inter vivos*, limited only by the policy of the law.<sup>5</sup> The restraint placed upon

<sup>1</sup> Hence the provisions in the statutes of the several States securing to the widow and orphans of a deceased person the homestead, year's support, etc., as against creditors; the homestead acts, liability of a father for the support and education of his minor children, the wife's right to dower, etc.

<sup>2</sup> HEGEL, *Phil. d. R.*, §§ 158, 170; *Encycl.*, § 520.

<sup>3</sup> HEGEL, *Phil. d. R.*, § 177.

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, § 3.

<sup>5</sup> But, from the stand-point of ethics and morality, the unlimited testatory power is not justifiable. If the testator die after his children have reached majority, there may

a testator is no greater than that which exists in cases of alienation of property *inter vivos*; the wife's dower, the provisions, clothing, year's support, household furniture, etc., of which a testator cannot deprive his family, are similarly protected against creditors, and, in many cases, against improvident alienation by the living head of the family. A fruitful source of litigation is found in the capricious and arbitrary dispositions often made in wills to the grievance and unjust deprivation of heirs-at-law; and the readiness with which juries seize upon slight pretexts, flimsy proof of "undue influence," etc., to set aside such unjust wills, is indicative of a deep-seated ethical aversion to the power of arbitrarily diverting the natural channel of the devolution of property.

### § 8. *Course of Descent at Law.*

Upon the natural dissolution of the family by the death of the parents, or more particularly of the husband or father, the property of the family *descends* to the heirs. It is quite apparent that, in the case of a family in the most restricted, natural sense (consisting of parents and children), there is in this process no substantial, but only a formal change of ownership: the property

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be some ground for voluntary discrimination between his natural heirs. Unless, however, this is resorted to in a very limited measure, and for valid reasons, it will be in violation of the logical and ethical basis of the family. Nor can the testatory power be deduced from the arbitrary will of the testator against the substantial rights of the family unless the kinship be remote. The arbitrary power of the father to disinherit his children is one of the immoral provisions of the Roman laws, according to which he might also kill or sell his son; and the wife (even if not in the relation of a slave to her husband, *in manum conveniret, in mancipio esset*, but as a matron) was a member, not of the family of which she was the mother, but of that of which she was a descendant, inheriting from the latter, and the latter inheriting from her.—HEGEL, *Phil. d. R.*, §§ 179, 180.

The power of testamentary disposition of property is nowhere so unlimited as under the modern statutes of England and the American States. The common law of England, at least the custom in particular places, did not allow a man to dispose of the whole of his personal estate by will unless he died without either wife or issue, but required him to leave one third to his wife and one third to his children, if he left both wife and children; or one half to his wife or children, if he left either (see 1 Perk. Williams on Excc., 1 *et seq.*). Under the codes of most of the continental countries of Europe the right to disinherit one's own children is allowed only for certain causes pointed out by the law, which are required to be recited in the instrument, the truth of which may be traversed and the will set aside if not sustained at the trial.

held by them in common, or by the head of the family for them,<sup>1</sup> now passes to them directly. In the absence of a testamentary division, the property vests by the law of descent, passing from the husband and father to the wife and children, that being the natural, substantial, and rational course; such, in the absence of a contrary disposition, is the rational, substantial will of the deceased to which the law gives effect. In default of wife and children, the parents, brothers, and sisters, or other more distant relatives, constitute the heirs; the family bond is looser as the kinship is more remote and the relatives belong to other families of their own. In the same ratio in which the reason demanding the heirship between members of the same family loses force with the remoteness of kinship, the propriety and justice of testamentary disposition of property becomes more apparent.<sup>2</sup> The disposition of property in anticipation of death (*donatio causa mortis*) is properly subsumable under the law of contracts.

§ 9. *The Law supplies the Will Element in the Property of Deceased Persons.*

It is self-evident that the claims of creditors of a deceased person constitute a title to the property left by him superior to that of heirs, whether testamentary or at law. A debt constitutes property of the creditor remaining in the possession of the debtor, which, by the concurrent will of both, is, at some period subsequent to the creation of the debt (arising out of an express or implied contract), to pass into the possession of the creditor. The debtor, then, has only a qualified property in the thing (usually the price for goods sold or services rendered) which constitutes

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, § 6.

<sup>2</sup> The institution of primogeniture is deducible from the political necessity of the State, which seeks to increase its stability by creating a class of persons independent alike of the favor of the government and of the public at large, and protected even against their own imprudence and caprice by the entail of their estates, relieving them from the distracting cares of obtaining the means of support and the vicissitudes of fortune, thus enabling them to devote their undivided energies to the service of the State. Primogeniture and entail are violative of the true principle of property, destroying both its alienability and natural course of descent; hence, they are utterly indefensible and immoral where no political necessity exists for them (HEOEL, *Phil. d. R.*, §§ 306, 180). In America they are generally inhibited by the constitutions or statutes of the several States.

the debt—namely, the right of *possession* for a period of time which may be definite, or depend upon the forbearance of the creditor. The substantial property—the right to the thing—with a present or future right to the possession also, is already in the creditor; for this reason it cannot go to the debtor's heirs, or it goes to them to the extent only in which he had an interest therein. To secure the rights of creditors in the estates of deceased persons against the heirs as well as against strangers, and to secure justice to and between the heirs themselves—in other words, to enforce the rational will of the decedent, which can be no other than that upon his death his property shall pass to his creditors and testamentary or legal heirs—the law itself performs the office of the deceased owner, substituting for, or supplying as, his will its own universal will.<sup>1</sup>

From this theory, it is apparent that the true reason of the law of descent, of the recognition of the validity of testaments, and of the authority assumed by the law over the estates of deceased persons, is to be found in the necessity of restoring the essential quality of property which has lost the will-element by the death of the owner. Some text-writers look upon the property left by deceased persons as *res nullius*, which might be seized and appropriated by the first comer or bystander, and hold that the laws of descent and of distribution are simply wise and necessary precautionary measures to prevent strife and violence at the death-bed. That such is the effect of these laws is evident enough, as also

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<sup>1</sup> "The character of *this estate*, together with the variety of individuals who may be interested in it, as creditors, legatees, or distributees, seems to demand that it also should be *vested by law* in some common agent, who shall preserve it from waste and dispose of it to those entitled to receive it, according to the provisions of that law which has undertaken to provide for the discharge of the duties omitted by the intestate. The creation of this *agent* the law wisely leaves to the discretion of the ancestor, if he chooses to exercise it; he may make his own will instead of leaving it to the *law* to make one for him, and he may appoint his own agent or executor instead of confiding this duty to the probate court under the authority of the law. If the ancestor, by will, appoint his own agent or executor, he thereby becomes vested with the *title* to the property in a fiduciary character. But, if, either designedly or otherwise, the ancestor die without executing his power of testamentary disposition, *the law*, as in case of real estate, assumes itself the duty of appointment, and vests this title and authority over the *personal estate* in a common agent for the parties in interest, who is called an *administrator*."—HARRIS, J., delivering the dissenting opinion in *Evans vs. Fisher*, 40 Miss., 643, 679 *et seq.*, citing from 1 TUCK. *Lect.*, pt. 2, pp. 397, 398.



their wisdom and validity; but to place the reason of their enactment on this ground is to ignore the true nature of the family as well as the true nature of property.<sup>1</sup>

§ 10. *Administration; Functions of Executors and Administrators.*

The purpose of the law in this respect is accomplished in a simple and efficient manner by its officers or ministers, vested with powers and duties commensurate with the exigencies requiring their intervention. The sum of their activity is called *administration*, which, in its narrowest legal sense, is the collection, management, and distribution, under legal authority, of the estate of an intestate by an officer known as *administrator*; or of the estate of a testator having no competent executor, by an *administrator with the will annexed*. The person charged with the management and disposition of the estate of a testator is an *executor*, and his office is called *executorship*, because he executes the testator's will, but his official acts are also called *administration*.<sup>2</sup> The functions of these officers are in many respects similar to those of trustees as known in chancery. Text-writers find it convenient to subsume them under the same class when discussing the powers, rights, duties, and liabilities of trustees. But there is an obvious and essential distinction between administrators and ordinary trustees: while the latter derive their powers from the voluntary creators of the trust, the authority of the former flows directly from the law itself. Their functions constitute an essential element of the law, and are exercised with entire independence of the personal views, desires, and intentions of the parties concerned. They are in the full sense officers of the law and of courts organized and having jurisdiction for the especial purpose of aiding and

<sup>1</sup> HEGEL, *Phil. d. R.*, § 178.

<sup>2</sup> The term *administration*, in its primary signification and general sense equivalent to *conduct, management, distribution, etc.* (Webster), is also applicable to the management of the estates of minors, persons of unsound mind, drunkards, spendthrifts, etc., by officers known as *guardians, curators, tutors, committees, etc.* Persons who are incompetent to manage their affairs have not free will, without which, as previously set forth in the text, there can be no property; hence, as in the case of deceased persons, the law vindicates its character as such by supplying it with the content of its own universal will, through the intervention of guardians, etc.



controlling them. They are clothed with authority to act in all matters connected with the disposition of the decedent's estate precisely as he himself would rationally have done, and it is the office of these courts to compel such action and to cancel all capricious, wilful acts inconsistent with justice and the legal rights of creditors and distributees.

### § 11. *Elements and Nature of Probate Courts.*

The organization of courts having exclusive jurisdiction over matters pertaining to the administration of the estates of deceased persons and of minors, and persons incapable of managing their affairs, has undoubtedly proved exceedingly useful and convenient to the public. But while to this circumstance may be ascribed their historical development and the modern growth and increased extent of their jurisdiction, yet the true distinction between them and the courts of ordinary plenary jurisdiction is not found in their usefulness or convenience, but is based upon the more profound principle underlying their origin, the logical diremption of the functions peculiar to the two classes of courts, which a brief examination of these functions will readily disclose.

The division of the powers of government into their constituent elements results, in all modern free states, in the three co-ordinate departments, confided to separate magistracies, known as the legislative, judicial, and executive. It is sufficient for the present purpose to bear in mind that it is the office of the judiciary to interpret and apply the law established by the legislative branch to cases arising out of collision, whether actual or imaginary, with the law, leaving it to the executive branch to carry out the judgments of the courts. Thus the judge is seen to act as the organ or mouth-piece of the law, announcing, in each case brought to his official knowledge, whether the alleged collision between the will of an individual, as objectified in an outward act (for will which is undetermined, not become external by accomplishment of its purpose, is beyond the realm of the law, which deals only with the actual<sup>1</sup>), is real or imaginary. In the exercise of this function, the judge, with a directness peculiar to this branch of sovereign power, accomplishes the great office and end of the state and of

<sup>1</sup> HEGEL, *Phil. d. R.*, §§ 113, 13.

all government, the accomplishment of justice, the realization of will ; securing to the rational will of the individual its legitimate fruition, and holding the irrational, capricious, or negative will to its own logical result (reparation and punishment for wrong and crime).

But we have seen that all property subject to administration is deficient in that element which alone can be the basis of a *collision* between the individual will and the law ; it is the province of the court having jurisdiction over executors and administrators *to supply the individual will* lacking in property, to fill the vacuum created by the death of the owner with the content of the universal will—that is, to secure the disposition of property under administration as the owner, acting rationally, would have disposed of it if living. The functions involved in this office<sup>1</sup> have a ministerial element superadded to their judicial quality, which, if they occurred in ordinary courts of law or equity, would require the intervention of adjuncts—commissioners, auditors, referees, etc.—involving, aside from the question of inconvenience, delay, and cost, an incongruity in the duties of the office.<sup>2</sup>

Such being the logical basis and scope of courts having control of executors and administrators, their historical development in England, but more particularly in the United States, has been a gradual but steady separation from the common law and chancery courts, and has resulted in a practical recognition of probate jurisdiction as a distinct and independent branch of the law, destined to achieve for itself a sphere *sui generis*, based upon and determined by its own inherent principles.

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<sup>1</sup> Such as the appointment of administrators, granting probate of wills in non-contentious cases, qualifying executors, fixing the amount and passing upon the sufficiency of bonds and sureties, receiving inventories, settlements, reports, etc., fixing the dividends to be paid to creditors, etc.

<sup>2</sup> JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURTS: *South. L. R.*, vol. iii, pp. 254–267.

## THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF CARL FRIEDRICH GOESCHEL BY SUSAN E. BLOW.

CHAPTER II.<sup>1</sup>*Personality, or the Immanent Development of the Soul and its Immortality.*

As the crowning result of the labor of all previous periods, philosophy has at last discovered its true method, and therein attained the one form adequate to its content. It is true that the critical philosophy arraigned the dogmatic procedure, and exposed its inadequacy, yet this same critical philosophy fell into the dogmatism it denounced, and the dogmatic method of demonstration (in part under the altered name of construction) prevailed until philosophy attained insight into the genetic development of the idea. Even now the speculative method is grossly misunderstood; it is still to many an insoluble enigma that the content should be developed from the concept—"from the concept" meaning to them just as much *as*, and not one whit more *than*, the old *a priori*. In the worst case of all, however, are those who, understanding the open secret quite as little as others, yet insist upon their own comprehension. The philosophy which has not only recognized the inadequacy of a method based upon the dualism between Being and Thought, but has also substituted for it the progressive development of the concept or notion growing out of and moving towards the identity of subject and object, is, by such as these, harangued and tutored, and condescendingly urged to consider the wonderful fact that a formal or subjective logic is not adequate to objective reality and true conviction, and that this subjective logic must, therefore, be supplemented by objective experience. Thereupon this experience is interpolated extempore instead of being included as method in the identity of Being and Thought, and developed and mediated in the development of the concept or notion. The object is not something

<sup>1</sup> [The introduction and first chapter of this work were translated by Mr. T. R. Vickroy, and published in volume xi (pages 65, 177, 372) of this journal.—Ed.]

different from its concept or notion, but one with it; hence, the object develops in and through itself, and through this development comes to its experience. Methodically pursuing and following the object, we experience it in ourselves. How this may be more definitely understood—how the self-developing, progressive movement from the concept identical with its object, or from the object identical with its concept, which the subject looks upon and follows, reveals itself as the most vital experience—we shall learn in the progress of the task which we have set ourselves, and we shall also see clearly how this movement differs in the sharpest manner from the dogmatic method of proof of which dualism is the root, and which (whether interposed *a priori* or *a posteriori*), being transcendental, is necessarily external.

Critical philosophy reproached dogmatism for presupposing without proof the agreement of thought and its object, and this reproach was deserved. It then sought to show that this agreement could not be proved; the attempt was, however, an utter failure, and the proposition that the unity of Thought and Being could not be demonstrated proved to be itself undemonstrable. It is most remarkable that this critical philosophy, while challenging and censuring the presupposition of the as yet unproved identity of Being and Thought, itself presupposes, without demonstrating, the duality of subject and object. With the recognition of this defect, progressive philosophy learns to presuppose nothing, neither to assume anything nor to accept anything as already settled, but to investigate and discover how everything given immediately develops and mediates itself. In this manner we see Being develop itself logically out of Nothing, through Becoming, to the Notion or Comprehension and the Absolute Idea, and then conversely find these several steps, moments, or categories outside of and beside each other in whatever is immediately given. This done, we are at home everywhere in general, for we have learned to complete the circle from any given point of its circumference. It may be objected that, in the Logic, Thought immediately presupposes and postulates itself; we answer that thought is immediate only in so far as it is its own mediation. Therefore, it is the beginning which realizes and confirms itself in its development, and in itself it both finds and surmounts being. That thought is its own mediation is no ground for rec-

ognizing something different from thought as prior to thought, but, on the contrary, this self-mediation forces us to recognize thought as the true beginning from which Being develops itself into Comprehension—herewith proving, also, that being pertains to Comprehension.

This general course of development once mastered, any special experience in any sphere of the real world will reveal itself as a necessary internal development of the thought of the given object, and with ever new astonishment we shall be confirmed in the recognition that in whatever is immediate may be found, though in manifold and varied forms, the same moments or categories which revealed themselves on the plane of pure thought.

The given object in our present investigation is the human soul. It is given as Thought, and can, therefore, still less than other given objects, withdraw itself from the categories of Thought. We shall, however, not make even this presupposition, but shall simply observe how the soul develops in itself. We shall take the soul as it is—abstracting nothing from it—imputing to it no foreign or external element. The command laid upon Philosophy, says a great master, is like the Saviour's command to the rich youth, who, hearing it, went away sorrowful. Pure philosophy thrives only under poverty and restraint; like the nun, it is bound by the three monastic vows.

If, then, the soul develops according to its own essential nature, and, in obedience to its own laws, moves forward to its immortality, it cannot be reproached with having borrowed help from something external whose accord with its nature must be demonstrated. The critical consideration whether the categories, as subjective forms, can be held valid in the object has certainly no validity in the psychological sphere, because here the subject is unquestionably its own object. The more rigorously, therefore, in this sphere must the demand be insisted upon that there shall be no transition as in a demonstration from *one* to the *other* in order to bind together in thought things which exist as separate; but that, on the contrary, the one shall produce in and out of itself its own determinations.

The question whether the soul persists presupposes the progressive development of the soul. For, if the soul does not progress neither can it perish; it remains *as* it is and *what* it is: having



permanence, can it lack continuance? If, on the contrary, the soul progresses, it does not remain *as* it is, and, therefore, it behooves us to see if it remains *what* it is—that is to say, whether, under changes in its modes of manifestation, its essence remains unchanged.

Evidently all turns upon the mediatorial question of *how* the soul develops or progresses. In the answer to this, the immediate questions of whether or not the soul progresses, and whether or not it persists, are also answered. Just on this account we must postpone these immediate questions which insist on fixing, in advance, the end of an untravelled road, and confine ourselves to the concrete question of how the soul develops and unfolds. We shall follow the soul in its own path; thus following, we shall learn whither the path tends.

Herewith we are directed into the path of experience. As we know the soul first under the form of its immediate existence, so we can follow its progressive development and note the various phases of its manifestation. There is no ground for presupposing a difference between Being and its experience; rather the experience develops itself out of Being as Being develops itself out of thought. We might, however, move from Thought as our starting-point, in order therein to recognize the same categories. No matter how we begin, whether we move from the accidental and immediate—*i. e.*, from a given object—or whether we start with the Universal—*i. e.*, with Thought—everywhere, in the most distinct and varied spheres, we shall find the same progressive movement. The universal particularizes itself in differences which then again mediate themselves in unity. The comprehension or concept dirempts itself in itself into subject and object in order to annul this separation in their identification. The subjective concept divides itself in judgments that it may reunite with itself in the syllogism. The first phase is the immediate unity and totality; the second, the self-diremption of this totality into being and essence, outward and inward; the third is the transfiguration of the difference into unity. Thus man, too, is first a single and undivided essence; but he dirempts himself into outward and inward, body and soul, and this diremption occurs not only in thought through reflection, but also in fact through death. The final phase would be the transfigured unity of soul and body; this is the res-

urrection in the Spirit. Upon this insight rests the trichotomy of the New Testament, which ascribes to man body, soul, and spirit, and to the Godhead ascribes three persons.

In our present inquiry, however, the starting-point is not *man*; he has served us only as the example of a universal law of development. Not man in his totality is our starting-point, but a part of man, itself first abstracted through reflection—namely, the soul of man—but the entire soul. Neither is resurrection our goal, for we must seek our goal, not assume it. Nevertheless, as resurrection is the ultimate truth and goal of the soul, it is obvious that from the beginning of our inquiry some kind of persistency conformable to the essence of the soul must be presupposed. It is obvious, also, that in the idea of resurrection there is implied, as a necessary condition, the perpetuity of the body in a manner corresponding to its conception or notion, which is that of externality or otherness. Thus much, therefore, may be presupposed; namely, that the immortality of the human soul has for its starting-point the soul itself, while the resurrection of the body, as well as its reunion with the soul, has for its starting-point the total man.

The human soul, then, is our initial point. Let us ask, first, whether in the soul, considered as a totality, may be discerned progress through the ever-recurring moments of unity, self-separation, and self-identification. As a totality, the soul, in its immediacy, is homogeneous and undivided, but just from this it follows that the soul sunders, distinguishes, separates itself from itself, in order to realize its unity. As *Thought*, the soul, in its immediacy, is blank, potential thought—thought without distinction and without reflection. In the second stage or moment, thought distinguishes itself from being; thought and being are opposed to each other until thought becomes conscious of being. As *Being*, the soul, in its immediacy, is Thought sunk in the Material, and the Material is Being in which thought lies concealed and undeveloped. In this immediacy, the soul has unity only because it is unconscious and undeveloped, and, in this indifference and unconsciousness, it contradicts its own essential nature. In the second phase, this unconscious *being* of the soul having, as individual, completed the spheres of being, develops itself into consciousness in that Being: since as individual it reflects itself after its self-separation both in

itself and in its other it falls into self-difference ; Consciousness is this difference itself, for self-consciousness necessarily implies consciousness of all that through self-separation is made other than self. The third phase demands that this divided consciousness annul its tension, therein realizing a mediated unity ; in so far as it recognizes itself not only in itself, but in its other, it attains unity with its other, and therein realizes itself as Spirit.

The progressive movement of the soul can, accordingly, be indicated in three words—Soul, Consciousness, and Spirit or Individual—Subject and Identity of the Subject with the Object. But the question arises, What have we thereby gained ? Can we abstract the meaning of our formulated statement ? Are we able to show how the content of these several moments is self-unfolding and self-revealing ?

Primarily, it may be mentioned that in this division the Aristotelian doctrine of three souls seems to be realized in its underlying truth. The first is the nutritive Soul (*ἡ θρεπτική ψυχή*), found in and identical with the life of the plant. The second is the life of the animal or the sensitive Soul (*ἡ αἰσθητική ψυχή*) ; this sensitive Soul in human life comes to consciousness through reflecting itself in itself, and thus finding the internal in itself. The third is the rational Soul (*ἡ νοητική ψυχή*), which rises out of human consciousness, and, identifying itself with its object realizes itself as Spirit. (Aristot., "De Anima," ii, 2, 3, 4 ; iii, 12, 13.)

As man develops himself in body, soul, and spirit, so the soul, abstracted from its sensible, tangible body, passes through phases of development corresponding to body, soul, and spirit. That is to say, the soul in its first phase is an immediate totality ; in its second phase it estranges itself from itself, making itself its own object ; in its third phase it penetrates to the identity of subject and object. Thus the soul is first its own body or its own foundation ; it serves itself without distinguishing itself from the body. With the act of distinguishing comes also synthesis ; this is the *soul* which, distinguishing and uniting, holds sway over body and spirit. The third is the actually mediated unity, which, rising above body and soul, includes and transfigures both.

To this trichotomy is related that into which Plato analyzed both the individual Soul and the State. First is the body—that which obeys and serves—the basis of all further development, τὸ

ἐπιθυμητικὸν ἢ χρηματιστικὸν; the second, or the mean *between* the first and last, is the *Soul*, or that which simultaneously sunders and reunites, called τὸ θυμικὸν ἢ θυμο-εἰδὲς and ἐπικουρικὸν; the third is the spirit, or the mean *above* the first and second, the unity of both, or Reason, τὸ λογιστικὸν, ὁ Νοῦς. In so far as the soul is thought as abstracted from its external body, its body subsists through its (soul's) individuality; its soul is its self-consciousness, with which are necessarily bound up the consciousness of its object and its own distinction, therefrom; the third is Reason, or the Spirit which takes up into itself and mediates both the preceding phases of development. The first is Hypothesis, the second Antithesis and Synthesis, the third Thesis: or, 1, Soul; 2, Consciousness as distinguishing and uniting; 3, Spirit or Reason.

The development of the soul into consciousness, and of consciousness into spirit, is experimentally confirmed: it is in general represented as an awakening. Even the rudest empirical theories of the soul teach something of this awakening; but the truth of this phenomenon, the content of this observation, is not brought to light. To us, however, this progress of the soul, through its own self-diremption into inner and outer and conscious mediation, has revealed and vindicated itself as the universal dialectic of immediacy.

That the soul in its progressive movement develops from itself, receiving into itself nothing foreign and external, is proved in the end by the fact that the soul, in its highest perfection as spirit, has no other content than before. The nature of the soul, after as before its development, consists in the identity of thought and the object of thought. The perfection of the soul is simply the mediation of this unity and its elevation into consciousness. The child longs for and tries to grasp the moon, because he feels it as his object, and dependent on himself; this is the soul's immediate unity with its other. The youth recognizes the difference from and the elevation above himself of what seemed before one with him and subject to him; finally, the man comprehends that the star which the child tried to seize with his hands is but a single moment in the totality of spirit.

Through this same organic process of estrangement, and its removal, the immediate unity of love comes to its rational mediation or idea. The realized idea of love is marriage. Parallels



and symbols of marriage are found throughout the spheres of spirit. Unity is followed by separation, separation by reunion, betrothal, marriage. We discern these organic moments in the tender and significant myth which closes the old world and opens the new; this myth belongs essentially to the history of the doctrine of immortality. In it we see how Psyche, the king's daughter, outgrows her origin and breaks loose from it; how, like Iphigenia, she is exposed by her own parents; how she is rescued and borne away by Zephyr, and transplanted immediately into immediate relation or spontaneous union with the all-unifying Spirit of love. She rests in love, in inmost oneness with the unseen and invisible God. But there comes a moment of temptation—temptation which she does not resist. She is enticed by the longing to know. She steps out of innocence and unconsciousness not only into knowledge, but into alienation. She feels the misery and degradation of estrangement; she knows the bitterness of slavery, and in the sweat of her face performs her cruel tasks. But she has also the hope of deliverance; she struggles to cancel difference and annul separation, thus reuniting herself with the alienated Spirit of love. He, in the distance, is still near her; in the supreme moments of trial, he sustains her. At last she is conscious of reconciliation and deliverance; the bridegroom comes; love realizes itself in marriage; the marriage is ratified in heaven, and the bride receives immortality, for immortality consists in this marriage of the mortal and the divine.

In this ancient myth, the development of the soul through its successive grades is embodied and illustrated: but the content of the soul is not disclosed; the determinations remain abstract; the result unmediated. For logical development, we have compounded with a poetic myth; immortality does not seem to develop itself, but to be bestowed from without. We have followed the course of development *in time*, and seen it attain its crowning result. The soul is at the goal of the race; and this may involve the destruction of the soul. As the soul has risen out of immediate unconscious unity, shall it not complete the circle of its life by return into the same? Is this final rest the reconciliation which follows the long and weary struggle?

So it appears: the soul's movement, which we have traced empirically, does not necessitate the immortality of the soul.



Completing itself in time, it needs no eternal continuance. This appearance will, however, at once negate itself, for it is based upon the outward course of development, and has taken no cognizance of the content of this development. The next step, therefore, is to consider the various stages of the soul's movement with reference to their content, and its unfolding, in order to determine if anything further follows from it.

To exhibit the nature of the soul involves, according to Plato, a long and divine investigation. This investigation is, however, nothing external, but consists in the immanent self-development of the soul into Spirit, which is the realized idea of the soul. The investigation is a *long* one, because it implies this internal realization; and, if the soul is immortal, its immortality consists in its development into spirit, in its exhibition of the idea of the soul through making explicit all that this idea implies. This development can only be called "*divine*" in so far as the Godhead is its beginning and its end. To experience its length, we must travel again, with slow and carefully considered steps, the road over which we have already rapidly passed. We often gain more by repeating a journey than in making it for the first time. With reference to our beginning, we must at first place it in the soul, for it belongs to the thought of immanent development that nothing shall be given from without; the initial question must, therefore, be what the soul can find in itself. The end of the course in which the soul moves we may name, in advance, the Spirit; but we must inquire, definitely what *is* the Spirit, and how, following the movement of the soul, we can find its beginning and its end in God.

## THE SOURCES AND FACULTIES OF COGNITION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE POLISH OF E. TRENTOWSKI<sup>1</sup> (FROM THE FIRST VOLUME OF HIS "LOGIC")  
BY I. PODBIELSKI.

(Continued from the October Number.)

We pass now to the regions of the complete selfhood, the very soul, that is, to the cognition, in which our selfhood measures itself with the core of all existence, with God's Word (Logos), in the creation with God himself, and also perceives itself, with its great and holy object, in the philosophical difference in indifference or in the union of harmonious compromise.

Attention (*attentio, die Aufmerksamkeit*) is the first power of our complete selfhood, of the very selfhood, of the true selfhood, or the soul. There is a correspondence between man's divine nature and the senses in the external man, or the imagination in man's internality; it corresponds also with the senses and imagination. Within it the senses and imagination come to their philosophical difference in indifference, or unity in compromise. And truly without the senses and imagination, attention is an utter impossibility. Concentrating our attention upon something, we concentrate also our senses, together with their common perception; besides, we let loose the reins of our imagination, that it may seize upon the object and change its multiplicity into a unity.

We can turn our attention towards the objects of the material

<sup>1</sup> "Next to Cieszkowski is Stanislaus Ferdinand Trentowski, who lived at Freiburg a long time in exile [banished in 1830, on occasion of revolution in Poland—he was born in 1808], and gave lectures there. His 'Grundlage der Universellen Philosophie' (Carlsruhe, 1837) and 'Wissenschaft der Natur' (1840) attempt to proceed beyond Hegel. He combines the Cartesian principle, 'cogito ergo sum,' with the sensualistic 'sentio ergo res est'—just as had been done before by all true and whole philosophers, although only in individual insights, and he crowns this work of combination with the principle, 'Therefore I perceive God is.' This concrete philosophy he divides into essential, formal, and essential-formal philosophy, and each of these again into three disciplines. The first contains the three disciplines: (a) Philosophy of Nature; (b) of Spirit; (c) of God manifesting Himself. The second includes (a) Grammar; (b) Logic and Mathesis; (c) Æsthetic. The third includes (a) Criticism of Experience; (b) Reason; (c) Perception. The pedagogical writings of Trentowski, written in the Polish language, are very much prized by his countrymen."—[Translated from Erdmann's "Grundriss der Geschichte der Phil.," § 346, 15.]

world as well as towards those of the immaterial world. All this proves that attention is quite as much of an empirical as of a speculative nature, or of a philosophical nature; therefore it is not the power of our body nor of our spirit, but of our very selfhood, our very soul.

Attention is the mother of scientific observation (*observationes*; *die Beobachtungen*). The child has the qualities of its mother. Because observations can be both physical and psychical, they belong especially to the objects of life; in this realm they are the creation of our complete selfhood. Although attention is already the power of the complete selfhood or the soul, still it is only the first degree and the lowest one. It seizes upon the essence of things, but in an external manner, only like a little child. It is the philosophical mind in its infancy.

Reflection (*deliberatio, animadversio intuitus, combinatio*, etc., *Anschauern, Schauen, Ueberlegen*, etc.) is the second power of our proper selfhood. It is the mature and cultivated attention, or it is the youthful stage of the comprehending mind. Reflection obtains mastery over the complete truth, but as yet only with regard to the form, and therefore it constitutes the source of mathematics. Its nature is to deliberate between the substance and the form, but to seize upon the form and to reject the substance. Yet the form which it gives us is quite as much of empirical as of speculative nature. And so, for instance, geometry proves its theorems *a priori*, but, drawing its figures on the blackboard, it can represent its thoughts *a posteriori*. Arithmetic also is a product of spirit, but the writing of numbers makes it visible. It is a proof that reflection unites sensuousness and rationality, and that it is of a philosophical nature. Taking the thing accurately, the memory and judgment find their philosophical difference in indifference, or their union in harmonious compromise, in the reflection. If you deliberate upon something, you must have in your memory all that preceded, and you must discern whether that which follows has any connection with the premises. It is the mathematical thinking. Therefore memory is a body, and judgment is a spirit; but reflection is the selfhood and soul of these two beings. Reflection, as the faculty of seizing the form, gives us axioms. The geometrical elements, for instance, are these axioms, or self-evident truths. The material and intellectual evi-

dence is their attribute. But reflection, as well as attention, is not yet the source of philosophical cognition, for while the latter touches its object externally, reflection seizes upon it only by the formal side. Neither of them penetrates into the very essence.

The comprehensive Mind (Myst, in Polish, having no corresponding word in any other language—not even in Greek, and in German only the approximate expression, *wahrnehmendes Gemüth*—is the foundation of the Polish-Slavonian philosophy) is the third and the last faculty of the recognizing selfhood, the Soul itself. It is reflection in its second potency, and attention in its third potency. The comprehensive mind does not touch truth and knowledge externally, like attention; nor does it seize upon them by the formal side, neglecting the substance, like reflection; but it forces itself into the depth of their essence. The understanding and reason attain in the comprehensive mind to their philosophical difference in indifference, or their eternal union, in the complete reconciliation and harmony. As the understanding is the highest empirical, and reason the highest metaphysical, so the comprehensive mind is the highest philosophical power of cognition. Since the comprehensive mind forces itself into the essence of truth and knowledge, it is the most certain source of cognition.

On this account it deserves our fuller consideration. The comprehensive mind is the father, principle, and source of the senses, as well as of reason. Sense is what is outside of our comprehensive mind, or what is found by our mind—its externality, its body; but reason is what is through mind, or what is in mind—the internality of mind, its spirit. Properly speaking, there are neither senses nor reason, but mind only, under one of its aspects external, under another internal, and under a third essential or proper. This constitution of the comprehensive mind makes it the chief source of cognition, which has the two first sources—to wit: the senses and reason—for its factors. The comprehensive mind, then, is our total selfhood in its philosophical fulness, and, opening itself towards the fulness of all existence, it is the fundamental truth and knowledge in us, or it is God's breath within us (*notio*) looking up to deity and God; it is the eye of our actuality, seeing around itself actuality. The comprehensive mind, as the senses and reason, and, secondly, as our passivity and activity, fused into



one, is energy; and, if developed sufficiently in its divine nature, it is spontaneity. Hence, it has all theoretical categories that belong to energy and spontaneity for its predicates, and it constitutes within us, and also perceives without us, these things, namely: totality, omnipresence, singleness, liberty, actuality, limitation, congruity, essence, majesty, independence, selfhood, and dignity. As living spontaneity, and possessed of the feeling of self and selfhood, it is the temporary focus of all spontaneity, of all feeling of self and selfhood in the creation. But as God alone is spontaneity, feeling of self and selfhood in the creation, therefore the comprehensive mind is the mirror in which God perceives Himself, and comes to his Word in time. Our full selfhood or the soul is on the one side, God on the other, the comprehensive mind constituting the nodus or bond of difference in indifference between these two polar axes. It is, if I may say so, the conductor between our selfhood and God. Over this conductor God flows into our breast, and our selfhood or the Soul to God. Without the comprehensive mind, we could not even meet with the thought that God exists; without it we should not be acquainted with our Father and Lord; without it we should not have self-respect, feeling of self; we should not believe in truth, beauty, and virtue; without it conscience would be impossibility, and godliness a chimera! It is the power of living deity within us; it assures us that liberty and immortality are qualities of our being; that even in prison we can deserve honors, because we have not succumbed to the evil around us, and have not stained our pure selfhood or the Soul. It breathes into us the omnipotence of God, which nothing can resist, and it clothes us with the purple robes of character. As the senses have sensuousness, and reason has rational things or ideas, so the comprehensive mind has the things of mind for its object. The comprehensive mind sees truly matter and spirit; the divine, however, is everywhere, the end of its search. As the expression of the self-conscious selfhood, it conquers self-consciousness. Its cognition lies within the difference in indifference expressed by self-consciousness = self-consciousness. Because the self-conscious is everywhere the object and subject in one fusion, the difference in indifference of mind's cognition may be expressed as follows: the object-subjectivity in us is equal to the object-subjectivity out of us. It is the true object-subjectivity



which is the foundation of the Polish-Slavonian philosophy. The Germans have sought for this a long time, but hitherto in vain.

The comprehensive mind, being the unity of the understanding and reason, comprehends all that belongs to these two faculties; it is, therefore, sense-perception, memory and understanding, imagination, judgment, and reason; besides, it is attention and reflection, for these are mind itself, but on a lower degree of development.

By this, all faculties of our full selfhood fuse together and make it the chief monarch in the region of cognition. It may be said that it is only one faculty of our selfhood, but assuming more and more a special form, because the senses—perception, memory, imagination, and attention—are only the expression of the comprehensive mind.

As the senses produce empiricism, and reason speculation, so the comprehensive mind produces philosophy. As mind is the common focus of the senses and reason, so philosophy is the common focus of empiricism and speculation. Not only God Himself, but every word of God, penetrates through our mind into our selfhood or the soul, and changes there into man's word. Therefore, man's word is the true word of divine wisdom, though this word expresses eternity in time only, and therefore is transient. The comprehensive mind, being the unity of the senses and reason, or that of the faculty of our existence and of our nothingness, is the faculty of our living in time and of our divine state, or of our biosophism and our theosophism. Hence, it is twofold—the temporal and the eternal. The temporal mind has for its object the temporal divine life, and prevails in the fields of political life; but the eternal mind is occupied with the eternal truth, and stands forth in philosophy. Mind creates comprehensions (*acroamata*).

As the comprehensive mind is the focus of all faculties of our selfhood, so within *acroamata* or comprehensions melt impressions, representations, recollections, conceptions; ideals, judgments, ideas; observations, and axioms or mathematical truths. Comprehension is the dome of the sky set around with all these stars. For the examples of comprehension provide for all total, perfect actualities which our logic has introduced, to wit: essence, existence, essence in existence; biosophism, theosophism, congruity, self-consciousness, being, God, selfhood, mind, etc.

The comprehensive mind is the last and highest power of our selfhood ; hence, this analysis of the sources and faculties of cognition finishes with it.

REMARK I.

The human soul, as selfhood, the true image of God, may be compared to the mathematical point, which expands into a globe ; or it is a totality within the totality ; it is the centrum of man and man himself. It is the perfect organism, from which no one link can be removed without a general injury. The same thing is true in regard to the faculties of cognition, being the qualities of our selfhood. On this account, the senses—perception, memory, and the understanding ; imagination, judgment, and reason ; attention, reflection, and the comprehensive mind—every faculty taken separately, is an empty abstraction ; and it is the true actuality only when it embraces in itself the full mind and the total selfhood.

On this account, pure sense-perception, pure reason, pure reflection, and even pure mind, are absurd impossibilities. As in the selfhood, so in the cognition ; totality lives in every point ; therefore, the entire man lives in the senses, in the reason, and in the mind. What is true of the sources of cognition, the same is true of the streams that flow therefrom. There is, accordingly, no pure empiricism, no pure speculation ; but in both is to be found the philosophy in which either reality or ideality prevails.

In the three sources of cognition we have the entire analysis of truth and knowledge. Sense is : existence, wholeness, substance, simultaneity, necessity, usefulness, etc. Reason, again, is : nothingness, negation, unity, causality, sequence, legality, nobleness, etc. Mind is : biosophism, theosophism, totality, harmony, liberty, goodness, etc. The sensuous cognition is called *a posteriori* ; the rational, *a priori* ; but that of the comprehensive mind is called *a posteriori* and *a priori* ; together, that is *a totali*. The first cognition is practical, the second is theoretical ; the third is practical and theoretical together—that is, synthetical. Analyzing truth, knowledge, and cognition according to our three different faculties, we could find more than two hundred thousand categorical principles of philosophy lying in the things and in our selfhood, and hence as many philosophical systems. We mention this in order to call attention to the fact that one general philosophy is an impossibility on the earth, and equally impossible is one

creed; and that it is the duty of every man to develop, by his own thinking, his individual conviction. This he will do if he knows how to appreciate sufficiently the deity within his breast.

One God, one philosophy, or one creed is to be found only in heaven; on the earth are millions of Selfhoods or Souls, and, hence, millions of spontaneous convictions. Some great aim—for example, the fighting for native land, or for virtue, liberty, light, and progress—happens to be, in this world, the common tie among them. In such cases, all men, truly cultivated and free, become as one man.

*(To be concluded in the next number.)*

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## OBJECTS AND THEIR INTERACTION.<sup>1</sup>

BY JAMES WARD.

We may come eventually to doubt the possibility of isolated simple objects as the psychical atoms, so to put it, of which our mature perceptions and intuitions are built up; still it will be best to let this conception pass unchallenged for the present. But in any case we can have no direct acquaintance with them. For the simple object is to be conceived without relations to other objects, either temporal, spatial, substantial or causal: it is presented to a subject and has Position in this sense, and that is all. Those definitions of it, therefore, which involve a reference to the body are psychologically manifestly faulty. And even when brought into relation with other objects, it does not admit of classification, for it has not qualities, but only a quality, whereas classification is only possible where there is both agreement and difference, or, in logical language, both genus and differentia. Thus, since quality implies classification, we ought, perhaps, when exact, to speak of the content rather than of the quality of a simple object. The conception of an object or sensation pure and simple is, in fact, a limit

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<sup>1</sup> [Discussed at the Moral Science Club, at the rooms of Mr. James Ward, M. A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge University, England. Printed in this journal by permission of the author.—Ed.]

we never reach, and never can reach, by real analysis. But we know directly—*i. e.*, by actual decomposition—that many, nay most, of the objects we ordinarily take to be homogeneous and single are really heterogeneous and compound;<sup>1</sup> and we have indirect evidence that such complexity exists even further than we can directly trace it.<sup>2</sup> Hence, though we cannot reach a demonstrably simple object, it is often assumed that there are such, and, in attempting to give a constructive or synthetic account of mind, psychologists, such as Spencer, Lewes, and others, start from this ideal limit.<sup>3</sup> And it is evident that in such a conception we have reached in one direction the “utmost verge” of psychology, if we have not even gone beyond it.

But whatever grounds we may have for regarding our ordinary sensations as complex, we are certainly not warranted in attributing this complexity to association as we know it. Between the complexity of the sensation of purple, and the complexity of the perception of an orange, there is a twofold difference: (1) the elements of the former, when separately presented, do not revive each other, whereas the sensations associated in the latter do; and (2) the complex in the latter case is, but in the former is not, the sum of its constituents and directly analyzable. It is quite possible both modes of composition have something in common at bottom; but however this may be, distinct terms are necessary to prevent them from being confused. Without attaching any importance to Mill’s conception of mental chemistry, we shall, I think, do well to speak of the complexity of our ordinary sensations as due to combination.

There is one fact about the relation of these ordinary sensations to each other which, though well known to physicists, is scarcely recognized by psychologists;<sup>4</sup> and that is that in several cases,

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<sup>1</sup> The clearest case is Helmholtz’s discovery of the composite character of musical notes, vowel sounds, etc.; next come mixed colors, the combination of taste and aroma, taste or smell, and pungency; the touch of a wet surface, etc., etc. Cf. on this point Helmholtz, “*Lehre von den Tonempfindungen*,” Abt. 1, § 4 fin.

<sup>2</sup> In the case, *e. g.*, of musical tones; in the variations of quality in colors, and even in sounds, as the intensity is varied; in similar variations depending upon the extent of surface stimulated, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. esp. Spencer’s chapter on the Substance of Mind, “*Psychology*,” vol. i.

<sup>4</sup> Wundt is the one conspicuous exception, and he apparently only because he treats of physiological optics, acoustics, etc.



perhaps in all, they constitute groups of *continua*. A musical tone or the color of the sky does not admit of classification any more than the position of London does; but as this belongs to that continuum we call the surface of the globe, so do they to a continuum of tones and colors respectively. But by a continuum here I mean a series of objects such that between any two a series of others may be, or may be conceived to be, interposed so as to differ the less the more they approximate in the series. We may represent the form of a continuum spatially so long as the kinds of difference do not exceed three. When one of these differences is intensity, we find very strikingly in some cases, but more or less in all, that continuous change of intensity involves continuous change of quality too.<sup>1</sup> Among motor objects we find groups of continua of two kinds—(1) what I have called motor objects proper, the feelings of innervation, effort or resistance of psychologists, and (2) auxilio-motor objects, *i. e.*, those muscular sensations by which we come to know the position of our limbs. Of the last there are, of course, several groups,<sup>2</sup> and the constituent objects are manifestly complex. Under normal circumstances motor objects are always accompanied by auxilio-motor, but in disease or passive movements they are separated, and their distinctness thus made manifest. In motor objects, qualitative differences are at a minimum, the continuum consisting almost wholly of gradations of intensity. We shall have to return to these in analyzing our space perception; at present I want to bring into one view still more elementary facts.

The first of these is as important as it is obvious: the fact, *viz.*, that there are some objects the presentation of which is an absolute bar to the simultaneous presentation of others. Now, we shall find that such inco-presentable objects are those which are members of the same class, or rather continuum. Any color may be presented with any sound, or taste, or temperature. But one color inhibits another: and one taste or touch another in like manner. Still, many things are parti-colored, and we may feel hot on one

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<sup>1</sup> The most striking case being that of color, all colors alike approximating to white or black as the illumination increases or decreases. Musical notes become harsh when too loud, though pure tones, I believe, do not. In these facts we have, as already mentioned, evidence of the complexity of color and notes. In temperature the chief variation is in intensity, the qualitative variation being small.



side and cold on the other. Thus, we have here a new complication, and one which it may be thought can only be explained by the help of space. But space is not the only *principium individuationis*, for several tones may be presented simultaneously, between which there is no spatial relation. But then they must all be different, whereas several colors or touches, apparently identical, can be presented together. We are thus brought to recognize a fact commonly overlooked—what Mr. Bain calls the mass or volume of a sensation. It is, however, worth while trying to give a more precise account of it than Mr. Bain does. The field of sight or the irritation of a mustard plaster are instances of a mass of sensation. Of such we cannot, I think, say that they consist of a number of objects identical in quality and intensity, but distinguished by difference of place. For, although this fact of massiveness as distinct from intensity is an essential element in our perception of space, it is evidently not the whole of it. In this experience of massive sensation alone it is impossible to find other elements which an analysis of spatial intuition yields. But we may say that the constituent objects in question are not really identical in quality, but that each is a combination of one of a number of qualitatively identical objects with one of a continuum. To such continuum we may, if we choose, give the name of “spatial qualia” or “local signs,”<sup>1</sup> provided we regard it as merely a continuum of objects, and not as a space. The simultaneous presentation of two different objects is a fact for which we do not feel bound to seek a reason, but for the simultaneous presentation of two apparently identical objects we do.

If we can justify this hypothesis of continua of local signs, we can give a more exact expression to the inco-presentability of certain objects. Thus, in any given continuum, we should say that the same local sign cannot at the same time be united with more than one object out of a series, all of which may be successively united with it, and any of which may be simultaneously united with other local signs in the same continuum. We may represent this symbolically. Thus, if  $A \dots B \dots C \dots D$  be the continuum of colors,  $r_1 r_2 r_3 r_4 \dots$  the continuum of local signs with which

<sup>1</sup> For an exposition of this brilliant speculation of Lotze's, see his “Metaphysik,” B. iii, ch. iv.

color is combined, then  $Ar_1 Ar_2 Ar_3$  or  $Ar_1 Br_2 Cr_3$  is possible simultaneously, but not  $ABr_1 BCr_2$ , though  $Ar_1 Br_2$  may be followed by  $Br_1 Cr_2$ , and so on.<sup>1</sup> But even this statement that  $Ar_1$  may be followed by  $Br_1$  is too general. That there is some law, even in the succession of sensations, is shown by the existence of complementary after-sensations, or after-images, as they are less exactly called.<sup>2</sup>

The intensity and extensity (*sit venia verbo*) of compound presentations of the same group are not independent. An increase of intensity in any given object involves the simultaneous presentation of others in the same continuum. To this corresponds Lewes's Law of Irradiation, though I fear there are no facts to justify the wide range he gives it. The conditions of irradiation are, however, very different in different senses, irradiation being least in the highest senses, *i.e.*, where voluntary attention is most excited. Again, an increase in the volume of a sensation is so far equivalent to an increase in intensity that objects which do not otherwise rise above "the threshold of consciousness" secure attention by such increased extensity. Thus, in determining the *minimum sensible*, both quantities have to be taken into account.

The above are some out of a number of facts which have been supposed to lie outside the pale of psychology. Let us now pass to those interactions of objects commonly allowed to be psychological, where these discarded facts may be found to help us. A preliminary question meets us here, *viz.*, as it is ordinarily worded, whether we can be conscious of, or attend to, more than one thing at a time. Unless an affirmative answer can be given to this question, psychologists who discuss the interaction of objects must be much deluded men. But, in fact, the whole

<sup>1</sup> The sense of hearing, however—so far, at least, as tones go—seems an exception, or rather a special case. For it is doubtful, I think, whether volume of sound, as distinct from intensity, is possible. If so, we cannot have  $Ar_1 Ar_2 Ar_3 \dots$ , but only  $Ar_1 Br_2 Cr_3 \dots$ .

<sup>2</sup> Of these, the most striking instances are furnished by sight. If we stare at a bright spot on a dark ground, and then look away, we see a dark spot on bright ground. If we dip a hand into warm quicksilver, the hand feels cold on withdrawing it; if into cold, it feels warm on being withdrawn. After carrying a weight, and experiencing the effect of gravitation, we come for a while to believe in "levitation." There exists at present no general investigation of this subject, though Hering's speculations make it one of great interest.

question is due to a confusion between voluntary concentration of attention and that non-voluntary attention which mere presentation determines. It is true that attention cannot have two foci, but it is not all focus. As in the special case of sight, we see much more than we look at, so we must admit, in the general case, a field as well as a focus of attention.<sup>1</sup> Subject then only to the law of incopresentability objects of every sort and kind may be presented together, and, being so presented, become "associated." Of this association we have not, I think, any evidence at the time it may be supposed to have taken place: it is not till some one or more of the objects is presented again that the association becomes manifest. We find that the association is more complete the more intense and the more frequent the presentation. But what *is* the fact itself, our ignorance of which we cover by this simile of association? Do objects really stick or fuse together when they are simultaneously presented often enough and at the requisite intensity, as Mr. Bain's "adhesion by contiguity" might seem to imply? Or are they bound by hidden links, by which they drag each other on and off the stage of consciousness in accordance with Herbart's psycho-dynamics? Lotze is of opinion that any investigation into the nature of association must be fruitless.<sup>2</sup> But, if so, association should be a first principle, and ought to admit of such a statement as shall remove the need for inquiry. So long, however, as we are asked to conceive presentations, originally distinct and isolated, becoming eventually linked together, we shall, I think, feel the need of some explanation of the process. For neither the isolation nor the links are clear. Not the isolation, for we can only conceive two presentations separated by other presentations intervening in a continuum or a series of presentations; nor the links, unless these also are objects, and then the difficulty recurs. But if for contiguity we substitute continuity, and suppose the "associated" objects to be parts, not isolated wholes, we shall have to ask first, not how the distinct and originally disconnected objects, *A B C*, are converted into a unity, *A B C*, but how an originally undifferentiated presentation, or mass of presentations (*A B C*), a *totum objectivum*,

<sup>1</sup> Wundt's "Blickfeld und Blickpunkt des Bewusstseins."

<sup>2</sup> "Metaphysik," s. 526.

as it were, becomes separated into partially distinct objects. Against this view it cannot be urged that such differentiation involves, at bottom, the same inconceivability as the commonly assumed process of integration. We cannot conceive the homogeneous becoming heterogeneous, it is true, but we can suppose differences, which were obscure before, to become distinct through changes in the intensity of presentation or attention. And we are by no means without evidence in support of this supposition. The question has been canvassed in part already in discussions concerning the *primum cognitum*:<sup>1</sup> that attention proceeds in the main analytically, is first extensive and general, then concentrated and intensive, there can be no doubt. The increased sensibility of sight, touch, hearing, and even of taste and smell, consequent on practice, can be represented as due to a restriction of intensity to a particular object in a continuum over which the intensity was irradiated before. It is quite impossible now to imagine the effects of years of experience removed, and to picture the character of our infantile presentations before our own movements had enabled us to localize or project them, and before our interest had led us, habitually, to concentrate attention on some and to ignore others, whose intensity thus diminished as that of the former increased. In place of the many things we can now see and hear there would then be not merely a confused presentation of the whole field of vision and of a mass of indistinguishable sounds, but even the continua of sounds and sights themselves would be without their present distinctness. Thus, the farther we go back the nearer we approach to a total presentation which had the character of one general continuum in which differences were latent. Even if there were no other grounds for assuming the existence of such a continuum, the facts of association would almost justify it; for in what other way can we represent to ourselves the connection between one presentation and another? And, after all, what else do psychologists mean by the unity of consciousness at any moment?

But, even if we see grounds for rejecting the current conception of isolated objects, we shall find, I think, yet other difficulties in the conceptions of Re-Presentation commonly received. We shall,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Hamilton, "Metaphysics," ii, pp. 327 ff.



I presume, agree at once to reject as extra-psychological every attempt to explain this fact by the properties of nerve-substance. From the days of Descartes onwards such explanations have been in vogue, and yet it is evident at once that they involve terms that are psychologically unmeaning. It may be that re-presentation is psychologically inexplicable, although its physiological counterpart is known and admits of explanation; but we cannot make this explanation do duty for a psychological one any more than we can tie a knot in a ring with our fingers, because the problem is analytically feasible in space of higher dimensions. But what do we mean by Re-presentation? Postponing for a while the inquiry into the differences between presentations and re-presentations in the sense of impressions and images, let us consider simply what we understand by the re-presentation after an interval of some particular image. To this end, we must take a case in which there is not merely re-presentation, but memory. A certain idea ( $m_2$ ) occurs to us, and we say we recognize it as identical with ( $m_1$ ), which occurred some time ago. But now there cannot be two images here, or we could not, with any exactness, speak of identity or re presentation, and yet there must be something to justify the distinction of "now" and "then." In other words, there can be no classification of  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  as two images identical in kind; there can only be a single presentation ( $m$ ) complicated<sup>1</sup> with certain other presentations, making the total to be  $m_{1,2}$ . Actual observation will, I feel confident, show this to be in fact the case. What, then, is true, when only we can *know* that we are dealing with re-presentation, forms, or ought to form, part of our conception of re-presentation. Wherever we talk of re-presentation there is so far one identical image as the kernel complicated with certain others; and these may, on occasion, constitute the whole into a memory-image. If so, there is something distinctly misleading in Mr. Spencer's exposition of what he calls "the Associability of Feelings." The following is what he gives as the "most general statement" of it: "Be there, or be there not, any other kind of association, the primary and essential association is between each feeling and the class, order, genus, species,

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<sup>1</sup> This is a term that calls for explanation, which, I trust, will be forthcoming by and by.



and variety of preceding feelings like itself.”<sup>1</sup> Not to quarrel just now with this unusual use of the term Association—though it is singular that a form of association to which Mr. Spencer devotes two long chapters, recognizing no other, is set aside by Professor Bain, in a single sentence, as unimportant<sup>2</sup>—what I wish to call in question at this point is simply the idea of a series of images,  $a_1, a_2, a_3 \dots$  which sort themselves, and are ever accumulating, like spirits on the banks of the Styx. If I see a certain color or a certain thing a hundred times, I have not a hundred images, but one image: each succeeding presentation adds certain environing complications, some of which may be more intensified at one time, some at another.

What, now, do we know concerning this central image in the intervals when it is not consciously presented? Manifestly our knowledge in this case can only be inferential at the best. But there are two facts, the importance of which Herbart was the first to see, from which we may learn something: I refer to what he calls the rising and falling of presentations. All presentations having more than a liminal intensity rise gradually to a maximum and gradually decline; and when they have fallen below the threshold of consciousness altogether, the process seems to continue, for the longer the time that elapses before their “revival,” the fainter they appear when revived, and the more slowly they rise. This evanescence is most rapid at first, becoming less as the intensity of the presentation diminishes. It is too much to say that this holds with mathematical accuracy, although Herbart has gone this length. Still, it is true enough to suggest the notion that an object, even when it is no longer able to influence attention, continues to be presented, though with ever less and less absolute intensity, till at length its intensity declines to an almost dead level just above zero. So far as the rising or sinking of an object is due to attention or to the interaction of other objects, we may attempt a psychological explanation of it; but where it is due directly to the object itself, no psychological account of the fact seems possible.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> “Psychology,” i, § 115, p. 256.

<sup>2</sup> “Mental Science,” II, ii, 2, p. 128.

<sup>3</sup> So far from agreeing with Hamilton and his obscure German, Schmid (Hamilton, “Lectures,” ii, pp. 211–216), that this fact is incapable of physiological interpretation, I

To sum up, then, as to Re-presentation: the account I would give of this conception is as follows: In the first place, regarding only the single object—such an object is presented. This primary presentation (or impression) is psychologically an ultimate fact, if it is not indeed an hypothesis to which our facts drive us. We have no experience of such a beginning, and yet must postulate one somewhere. Such presentation, once begun, continues indefinitely long. It may have an end as it had a beginning: oblivion is possible, but obliviscence seems the rule. What we call re-presentation is due to an increase in the intensity of such a persisting object, whereby it is sufficiently raised above the level of the general obscurity to form part of “the field of consciousness.” But then, secondly, such object is only partially single; at the first it is actually part of a continuum of objects in such way connected with it that its further rise above the threshold of consciousness entails the rise of the adjacent parts of the continuum. When represented, however, it is found to be thus complicated with parts of other elementary continua to form a new continuum. We must be able to give some account of this new continuum if we are to explain the Association of Ideas.

The only association that can properly be called such is, so far as I can see, the so-called Association by Contiguity. At all events, it is with this only that I propose to deal now. Under contiguous association are included both the association of objects simultaneously presented, and that of objects presented in immediate succession. The last is, I think, the simpler; let us take it first. And here again the facts are clearest in the case of those objects over whose intensity the subject has most complete control—*i. e.*, in the case of movements. In such a series of associated objects, A B C D E, etc., we find that each member recalls its successor, but not its predecessor. Familiar as this fact is, it is not very easy to see any reason for it. Since C is associated both with B and

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would rather say that it is incapable of any other. These writers first regard the image as “an energy of the self-active power of a subject, one and indivisible,” and then maintain that it cannot “be abolished without a laceration of the vital unity of the mind as a subject one and indivisible.” The evanescence they explain by the finiteness of attention. But if this were the sole cause, why in reminiscence do we not find the object resume its former vividness? I know nothing more transparently feeble than this metaphysical psychology which Hamilton has contrived to appropriate.

D, and apparently as intimately associated with the one as with the other, why does it revive the latter only and not the former? B recalls C, why does not C recall B? If we consider the intensities of B C and D at the moment when attention is about to be fixed upon D, it is evident that the intensity of B will be less than that of C, and waning, while the intensity of D will be as great or greater, and waxing. Thus, association in this case appears to depend upon comparative intensity. The same will, I think, be found true of sensory objects, though here the complication is much greater. Interest apart, attention—*i. e.*, to say non-voluntary attention—passes from the less to the more intense objects. And where interest or expectation is great, objects presented in one order are often attended to in another. In both cases, I think, it will be found that the order of representation is the order of attention—the order, *i. e.*, in which the objects occupied “the focus of consciousness.”

The next question is whether the association of objects simultaneously presented can be resolved into an association of objects successively attended to. When we try to recall a room we saw but for a moment, there are always a few things that recur distinctly, the rest being blurred and vague, instead of the whole being revived in equal distinctness or indistinctness. In a second presentation, our attention is apt to be secured primarily by the things unnoticed before, as these have the advantage of novelty, and so on till we have “lived ourselves into” the whole, when the whole admits of simultaneous recall. In such a case we have substantially what Herbart would have called *eine Verwebung von Reihen*. Professor Bain takes the trouble to admit something very like this in a single sentence, but not the least trouble to square his exposition with it.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> “Mental Science” (on Successions), p. 112.

## HOMER'S "ILIAD."

BY D. J. SNIDER.

It will be denied by few that the first great literary product of the world is the poems of Homer. They are the beginning of what we call Letters: a fact of the very highest import to those who look to that branch of human endeavor, not for entertainment merely, but for a guiding light of life. Homer is the creative book of Literature; all books of that sort look back to him as parent, particularly the poetical books, which are the best. It may be said that every age, as its literary effect deepens, will find a deeper significance in him, and must have a new comment upon his works. So it is and must continue to be not only with Homer but with every great book; the new time will reveal in it the new meaning; it unfolds with the ages.

The important question, therefore, must come up to the earnest student, What is it to know truly the Homeric Poems? Their variety of suggestion is great and fascinating, and has called forth many special departments of learning; erudition has burrowed into them, and constructed vast underground labyrinths, in which one is always in danger of getting lost. These labyrinthine passages have, in the first place, no end: a lifetime will not suffice to explore them; in the next place, they have no light, being always in caverns out of the path of the sun. Every new spiritual time must avoid them and reveal the old poems afresh for its own behoof; not in the darkness of erudition, but in the sunlight of the poet must the true seeker take up his abode.

Assuredly the matter of first import is comprehension of the thing in hand; one must penetrate to the spiritual principle of the work, reach down into the very soul of its maker and commune with the same. We have not grasped any product till we become a sharer in the creative activity which made it, and so pass with it into its being. This deep intimacy with the Poet is his revelation to us; before our eyes we must behold his world rise up from the deep and take on form. Let us enter his workshop and follow the generative thought as it bursts into reality, and thrills and throbs into harmonious utterance. In such man-

ner we seek to realize this old song, to make it our own, till it becomes an instructive part of our nature, singing through us into our own daily life. Then we may be said to recognize the soul of Homer, being transformed into some image of him ourselves; we have entered into kinship with him; we fraternize joyfully with his strangest shapes, and look through his remotest glimpses.

Doubtless the rarest kind of knowledge always is to know what true knowledge is. It is so often mistaken for Opinion, Conjecture, Information, Learning, and other uncertain and impure forms of human brain-work, that one is inclined to turn away from every new word, particularly if it be on an old theme. Only too frequently is such distrust justified. A mountain of commentary has been heaped around all the great works of Literature, till their light seems to go out in the darkness of illustration. We often know so much about the thing that we do not know the thing itself, cannot know it; erudition has swathed it in such dense, obscure folds that ignorance seems a blessing—indeed, a veritable illumination. Around and about the matter, never directly to the heart of it, do our learned guides keep us straying so long that we have at last to dismiss them and go on by ourselves as best we can. Knowledge, if this be such, is certainly getting into great straits, so encompassed with uncertain phantasms that she scarce knows herself, being in deep doubt whether she be not a phantasm too.

Thus we often hear men speak in wrath and desperation, thus we may sometimes speak ourselves; still, wrath is hasty, and complaint is weakness. With all his shortcomings, we cannot do without our Interpreter; he is truly a priest in that mighty Literary Hierarchy which arose with the first great book of Letters, this Homer, and has extended its spiritual sway down to our present age with an ever-increasing power and blessing. The Interpreter has a function, too, in this time of ours, indispensable; it may be very humble, or very elevated; he may be erudite merely, which is something; but his highest destiny is to be a spiritual guide, leading us back to those perennial well-heads of human culture called Literary Bibles, and teaching us to be again what their authors, the best and deepest souls of our race, have been, and thus to be truly ourselves the heirs of Time. The Interpreter, then, has his parish, if not his church; a word, weighty, even



beautiful, is given him to speak—the word of connection between what is disconnected; the word of light where there is darkness; the word of harmony where, on the surface at least, are seen only inconsistency, contradiction, confusion. A golden word, uniting ever where otherwise is separation, it makes head, heart, and even voice into an instrument upon which the old Poet seems to be playing again, yet attuned to a modern key-note.

Such is a hint of the ideal Interpreter, from whom the real one is likely to be quite different. If we now turn to the *Iliad*, we must first seek for its creative thought, and thought can be attained in one way only, by thinking. We shall have to wrestle with an idea, and, furthermore, witness that idea unfolding into the members of the poem. This brings us to the organism, the work, which is to be carefully analyzed, and then re-combined into unity. Thus we get its structure, or architectonic relations, which is the framework upon which its life hangs and moves to its end. This life of the poem comes through individuals whose characters are to be penetrated and brought into harmonious relation with one another, and with the entire work. Thought, organization, characters, must be first separated by reflection, then re-united into the Whole, which is thereafter to sink into our feelings, into our life, and become a part of our instinct. Thus the Homeric world is ours, not through the head alone, but through the heart, and we have passed into our complete Greek inheritance.

I. The *Iliad* is a series of dualisms, beginning with that deepest one of all, the dualism between the human and divine. But it is also a series of reconciliations: it masters its conflicts, and transforms them to harmony. Mark the Gods; they are infinite, yet forever dropping down into the finite, which is the image of the poem, and of the entire Greek consciousness. But, on the other hand, through this finite side of the Gods we get a glance into their infinite nature; this glance is the all-important gift in the student which he is to bring with him if he is to look into the old poet's world. It peeps through the divine limitations into the illimitable; it sees beyond the quarrels and struggles of Olympus, and beholds the reconciling element of the divinities; the poetic glance it is which the Homeric man must have had by nature as the birthright of his age, but which requires some train-

ing to recover on our part. To it the Gods become transparent; their strife, passions, jealousies, shortcomings, are but the outer shell, through which the divine image must be seen; this glance is the flash which spans with a bridge of light the chasm of Homer's dualisms.

The first and most important of these dualisms is that between Men and Gods. There is an Upper World, the realm of divinity; there is a Lower World, the home of human action. Everywhere in Homer these two worlds are seen moving alongside of each other, intermingling, separating; through every Greek soul a terrestrial and a heavenly stream is pouring, often in conflict and rage, but finally in placidity and peace.

The main insight is that both these worlds, though distinct to the outer eye, are one to true vision, to that poetic glance which beholds harmonies. The Gods must be seen to be in man, otherwise he is a mere puppet in the hands of external powers, whereby he loses his freedom. But the Gods must be seen to be outside of man just as well, otherwise they lose their divinity, being merely some thought or caprice of an individual. The poem is a poem of freedom, such has been the faith of the genuine reader in all ages; yet it is also a poem of providence, which providence perpetually hovers over it, and directs it. But its providence fits into freedom, such is its deepest harmony; the Gods are both in the man and in the world; they are the true essence of the human soul on the one hand, and the true reality of existence on the other. Thus the mighty dualism between Men and Gods vanishes; the two opposing sides of it pass into one supreme harmony in this grand Homeric Hymn of the Universe.

It may be truly affirmed that the highest test of the appreciation of Homer is to see this unity of the Upper and Lower Worlds as they stand in his books. Still further, it is necessary to see out of the finite manifestations of the Gods, out of their follies and weaknesses, into their universal significance. Nor must this be grasped as an esoteric doctrine in Homer, as some learned men have done; it is simply the natural meaning which, however, requires the poetic vision in order to be truly beheld. Without the connecting glimpse, Homer remains a dualism—indeed, a chaos of Gods and Men capriciously tumbling amid one another.

II. We may now pass to consider this Lower World, in which

there is transpiring a conflict of prodigious significance—the conflict between the Greeks and Trojans. These two peoples are much alike, with the same customs mainly, with the same religion and language; it is clear that they belong to the same stock: both are Hellenic. Yet, in this unity of the two, a decided difference has set in; their tendencies are, in fact, quite opposite; the Greeks are Hellenes with face turned towards the West, the Trojans are Hellenes with face turned towards the East. We behold the primitive differentiation of the Hellenic race, and the struggle of the two sides; it is the first record of that struggle which is the soul of the Greek world: Occident *versus* Orient. The spiritual separation of Hellas from the East, passing into complete opposition, is the key-note which Homer strikes in the *Iliad*; it is the great fountain of Greek legend, and the inspiring principle of Greek history. Nay, this conflict is, perhaps, the chief epoch of the World's History, exhibiting the transition out of the East to the West; and the old poem is the earliest bugle-call of war to the peoples of Europe for the preservation of the European heritage.

But what is the principle at stake in this long, desperate contest? An adequate answer to this question involves much: indeed, a new translation of Homer; not, however, of the Greek tongue into English, but of the Greek soul into English. The Poet has often stated the object of the war to be the recovery of Helen, who was the most beautiful of Greek women, also the wife of a Greek king, Menelaus. She has been taken from country and home by a Trojan, who will not give her back to Hellas. The entire Greek world of the West at once arms itself for her restoration, which, after ten years' struggle, they accomplish. Nor is it to be forgotten that they were more united upon the Trojan War than upon the Persian War, or any other deed of their history. In their own judgment, as revealed by this act, their very destiny depended upon the recovery of Helen.

So different is the Greek view from our way of regarding such a woman that we are forced to ask, What does it all mean? What does Helen stand for to the Greeks? That she represents something deep within them, the very deepest, is indicated by the great sacrifice which they made for her sake. She must be their principle, their very heart; her story is the story, already hinted,

of the Occident against the Orient. The fight before Troy for her possession is the fight of the Greeks for the very soul of their existence; indeed, the matter goes much deeper, as we here can see who look back over the tract of Time; it is the fight for the future inheritance of the race, the question therein propounded being, Which of these two contestants, Greek or Asiatic, shall be the bearer of civilization to that new European world now being born? The Greek claimed it, and won it, both in legend and in history, valiantly defending it both at Troy and at Marathon.

It is true that there is a much easier way of looking at this affair of Helen. We may regard it merely as a story which Homer employed to amuse his listeners, and to get his bread; he intended it as a pretty tale and nothing more, and we must not go beyond his consciousness. All of which simply destroys the poet, as the maker of a Literary Bible, who must also be a seer, and build wiser than he knows. Again, the fact of the abduction of Helen may be taken as literal; women were often stolen in early times, as we gather from other testimony than Homer; in mythical ages it was a common event, often celebrated in legend and song. But the difficulty remains. How is it that this story has lived, and still lives, after millions of more entertaining stories have sunk out of sight? Nay, how is it that this story still puts forth new flowers and bears new fruit, like the tree of Time itself? But yesterday a new book, a new poem, came out upon Helen of Troy; to-morrow there will be another. There can only be one reason: it has the most permanent, universal theme; it has within it not merely the heart of Greece throbbing itself into deepest seductive harmonies, but of Europe, of the whole West. This universality of its theme must be grasped if we are to understand the poem.

Some men of learning and insight have thought that the story of Helen may be confined to the Greek cities of Asia Minor, which stood, as it were, on the battle-line, and were always engaged in a struggle with Oriental powers. There was a vast settlement of Greek colonies along the eastern shore of the Archipelago, which had this question perpetually before them: Shall we remain Hellenic or become Oriental? Shall our Helen be Greek or Trojan? Throughout the history of Greece this same problem runs, with deep, heroic heart-beats: How shall we free



Greeks restore to liberty our enslaved brothers in Asia? This enfranchisement of the Asiatic Greek was the object of the Athenian League, the ambition of Agesilaus, the pretext of Alexander. Well may it be said that the first thing in Greek legend, the last thing in Greek history, is this story of Helen.

Much, indeed, she meant to the Greek cities of Asia Minor, where the Trojan battle was perpetually fought over anew; still she has a far wider, in fact, a universal meaning. The great sacred word connected with her name is restoration; she must be restored to country and family—that is, to a true, institutional life out of that ambiguous Trojan condition. One may well see in this fact a hint of the redemption of the woman from her Oriental state, and of her elevation into a worthy life in the family, which belongs to the West. Nor is the hint of morality left out, which is the subjection of the sensuous nature of man to the rational; wherein Helen's career shows both the error and the correction. Paris must perish, Troy must be destroyed; both have violated the great moral injunction. Finally, after the Trojan struggle, Helen became the image of the new world, which sprang from it, in which the senses are filled with the spiritual life of Greece, and represent the same; it is the realm of beauty in which Helen is the ideal of Art, which embodies the preceding principles and conflicts of Greek existence to the vision. This new European world of Institutions, Morals, and Art is the deep-hidden foundation of Helen's story, which foundation we must excavate in thought and bring to sunlight, like the buried walls of Troy and Mycenæ, if we are truly to comprehend the matter.

Assuredly it would be the greatest absurdity to sacrifice thousands of human beings for one merely, unless that one in some way represented what was truest and best in the thousands. Many wives, we may suppose, lost their all for that one wife Helen. But she is what they all are; the loss of her is the loss of every Greek woman, and man too. Her restoration is their restoration: so the Greeks feel throughout this poem; they must take Troy and restore Helen, else they are not Greeks. Prosaic modern peoples fight for their flag; thus they too have their symbol for which they die. But the Greek flag was Helen, most beautiful of symbols—indeed, just the symbol of beauty. We also



stake thousands of lives for the life of one citizen who has been wronged by a foreign nation. In the one we have to see the all; if not see, then feel it in the most practical sort of manner.

Helen, therefore, is the image of Hellenic spirit, of all that Greece means to mankind and to itself. She is the soul of the Greek world, and the form of it too; both in her are blended into one supreme beautiful vision of the ideal. Her restoration is, consequently, the most important of terrestrial matters; it means civilization, freedom, the home; it means, too, Art, which now springs into existence in every direction—in sculpture, painting, poetry; springs just out of this *Iliad*, and the return of Helen which is the theme of it. But we must turn to the *Odyssey* for the outcome; there we see Helen restored; hence in this, as well as in many other respects, it is the complement of the *Iliad*. Most deeply we must make this feeling ours; if Helen had not been restored, there could have been no Homer, no Homeric theme of song, no Homeric soul to sing; indeed, no Greek world.

So our Aryan race upon the plain of Troy has split again as it once split in the highlands of Armenia, long antecedent to History, upon this same question, Orient or Occident, in its earliest germ. The one party stayed behind in the Orient, became Oriental, and there they are yet; the other party set their face toward the West, advanced slowly to the boundary of the seas, doubtless with many wanderings, dissensions, and separations. But this Western party, or a fragment of it, has a second great separation, far more important than the first, and far more decisive; at the crossing into Europe it is our Hellenic branch which appears and divides within itself; it too has to settle anew that primeval question, Orient or Occident, right on the line of the transition into the West. This transition is a physical one, but also a spiritual one, which is the chief fact of it; it has, moreover, got a voice now, most wonderful, melodious, sounding down to this day. That first struggle in the heart of Asia remained inarticulate, or at most a wild, confused murmur of dim vocables; but this second struggle on the borderland bursts into splendid articulation of heroic song, as the separation is made forever from the Asiatic world. Listen to the *Iliad* singing the first and clearest note of the conflict which lasted while Greece lasted,

lasts to this day. Paris of legend, Xerxes of history, came against the West; Agamemnon of legend, Alexander of history, went against the East; it is all one theme, making a world-epos, one in Universal History, one in the human heart. Here, as elsewhere, the heart-beat and the world-beat make one music, heard still in all true poetry, heard most distinctly, if not most profoundly, in this earliest Book of Literature.

III. Such is the great external conflict, as we may call it, the parties to which are the Greeks and Trojans. But this outer struggle strikes into the heart of each contending host, and there becomes an internal conflict; each side thus finds within itself a separation into two parties. In Troy we catch repeated glimpses of the two sides, in wrangling and bitter opposition; in the Greek camp the strife within stands quite on a par with the fighting without. Both are alike; in both there is the same source of trouble; the grand external conflict is transformed to an internal one, as is certain to happen in a time of war; passing into each of the opposing sides, it becomes the moving principle of all their factions and partisanship. Thus the great struggle, which is the soul of the war, renews itself in each of the opposing forces, imaging itself in inner dissension as well as in outer war. This double scission we may trace a little in detail.

First, let us consider the Trojans. At once we see them to be divided into two parties, vehement, even rancorous, which may be called the peace party and the war party. They meet repeatedly and deliberate; the vital question is: Shall Helen be restored? The Trojans are by no means a unit upon the matter; the one side will keep the beautiful woman, will sunder wife from husband, will defy the Greeks and their principle; this is the war party, headed by Paris, connived at, if not supported by Priam, the king; it is clearly the controlling influence in Troy. They are opposed by the peace party, led by Hector and Antenor, who favor the surrender of Helen to the Greeks, and thus hope to get rid of the war. But this party does not, and cannot prevail; it is the Greek element in Troy, really maintaining a Greek view against the oriental tendency of the Trojans. Thus we behold an inner reflection of the great external conflict within the walls, in fact, within the hearts of the hostile people; each Trojan man, to whichever party he belongs, must have some dim struggle in him-

self, whereof the outer real picture is the combat of heroes before the gates of the city. The wrong of Helen has gone within, and there makes a war also—a war in every Trojan heart.

We may next turn to the internal troubles of the Greeks, who are also divided into two parties. They are all agreed that Helen must be restored by ten years' war if need be; but a new difference has arisen peculiar to the Hellenic character. The Heroic Individual, Achilles, has been dishonored by the man in power, the supreme commander, Agamemnon; heroism is distained by authority. What can heroism do but retire in anger from all participation in combat, and let the Greeks see what they are without their hero? This scission gives the theme of the *Iliad*, which is the wrath of Achilles; out of such material the poem can be made, out of the wrath of the best man, which, indeed, must be overcome before Troy or any other city can be taken. That is, the Hero, the Great Man, must be conciliated and restored to his place of supreme honor; he is altogether the stoutest link in the whole chain of the Greek enterprise; indeed, his is always the first place in the World's History. So, in this earliest literary book, there must spring up the question about the significance of the Hero; with him dishonored it is not worth while to restore Helen, not worth while for Greece to be. Such is the decree of Zeus the Highest, written in red letters of battle: first, give back honor due to the heroic man, then you can recover the beautiful woman through his heroism; but what is the value of possessing her with him degraded?

The cause of Achilles is, therefore, at bottom, the cause of Helen; he, the first of Greek men, striving to restore the first of Greek women, is injured in his honor by a wanton act of authority; the wrong done by the Trojans to the woman now finds its parallel in the wrong done by the Greeks to the man. Indeed, this injury goes to the very heart of the conflict; the special form of the wrong, the taking of Briseis, is like in character to the taking of Helen; the Greek commander is thus seen to commit the very offence for which he and his Greek armament are seeking to punish the Trojans. In his own deed must be read his penalty; the Greek cause, too, is now at war with itself, which is just the ground of this internal strife; the Captain makes all the Greeks sharers to a degree in the wrong which they have come to avenge.

Such is the inner contradiction which has arisen in the Greek camp, and which Zeus must eliminate before Helen can be saved, being at complete variance with her restoration. This dissonance, which lies deep in the Greek soul, must be brought back to harmony; the instrumentality is the wrath of Achilles, the theme of the poem; this wrath, also, is a dissonance which must be got rid of, when the discordant Greeks, made harmonious once more, will have victory.

In such manner we behold that first great dualism repeating itself, perpetuating itself in deeds on both sides, imaging itself in all hearts, Greek and Trojan. The Rape of Helen was that which originated the external war between Greeks and Trojans; it divided the Trojans into two hostile parties; it was the same cause essentially which produced the quarrel in the Greek camp between Achilles and Agamemnon. The conflict is, indeed, in every soul on both sides; it is the mighty dissonance of the age, which it is just the duty of these valiant Greek warriors to harmonize, internally as well as externally. It is the problem of the whole Hellenic people; the story of Helen is the representation of it; each Greek before Troy is, in reality, fighting this dualism in himself, in his own side, in his race. A double, indeed a triple conflict, therefore; all phases of which we see come out with intense glow in the grand embodiment of the nation, the Hero Achilles.

IV. The inner Greek scission has been mentioned: namely, the quarrel between the two leading men; it is this which produces the *Iliad* with its special theme and its special line of events as distinguished from the entire Trojan War, whereof the poem occupies but a few days. This inner scission must be healed, then the external conflict will end in the fall of Troy; the Greek Hero will lay aside his wrath and be reconciled with his own people; then he will slay the Trojan Hero, after which there will follow a second reconciliation, now with the enemy. But ere all these things transpire there is to be a grand experience, which the world may well ponder. The Greek people are to wrestle with this problem: Can we do without our Hero and take Troy? No, we cannot, is the thousandfold answer echoing from many fierce battles on the Trojan plain; we cannot do without our Achilles; there can be no real conquest of Troy unless he be present and in honor. Such is the one side of this experience, bitter, sanguinary,



spelling out in blood its deep lesson to mortal men. But the other side is not wanting; the Hero is to find out somewhat too. Can he do without his people, without his cause in which he can be heroic? By no means; he is Hero only as he takes his place and fights in the desperate front rank of battle; out of his place, sulking in his tent, he is not Hero, in fact is a nobody; much less than a mediocre man who still fights, though in mediocre fashion. Thus even the Hero reduces himself with great celerity to zero.

But he is the person upon whom the eye rests; the central figure of the poem is this Heroic Man, who is to teach so much and to be taught so much. The problem of Individuality it may be called; each human being may see himself in this portraiture; he too must find out that only as he takes his place in the ranks and fights is he anything in the world; for, if he persists in getting along without the world, the world will persist in getting along without him. It is better to be reconciled, far better; take the example of Achilles, the toughest, most unyielding granitic character that was ever portrayed; still he yielded, yielded twice, to the astonishment, perhaps, but certainly to the deep edification of all mankind. This, then, is the theme which calls the *Iliad* into being: the Heroic Individual in his double Wrath and double Reconciliation.

Therewith the entire organism of the poem is suggested, to which we may now give a little study. The first Wrath and Reconciliation embraces what was above called the internal conflict of the Greek army, the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles, till the two are reconciled (Books 1-19). The Hero is dishonored by having his prize in war taken from him, his beloved prize, the maid Briseis, whom he intended to make his wedded wife, equal in rank with Helen. In such manner is his heroic personality disgraced; wrath is his response to the insult, and not till he sees that his wrath destroys his heroship, and that he, the Great Man, is no longer reflected in the deeds of the Greeks, does he cease from anger, changing internally, and restoring his broken relations with his people. Such is the first grand division of the *Iliad*, of which we must clearly make two subdivisions if we would see the whole poem in its organic structure. These subdivisions we may call Achilles in the Right (Books 1-9) and Achilles in the



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In such manner we behold that first great dualism repeating itself, perpetuating itself in deeds on both sides, imaging itself in all hearts, Greek and Trojan. The Rape of Helen was that which originated the external war between Greeks and Trojans; it divided the Trojans into two hostile parties; it was the same cause essentially which produced the quarrel in the Greek camp between Achilles and Agamemnon. The conflict is, indeed, in every soul on both sides; it is the mighty dissonance of the age, which it is just the duty of these valiant Greek warriors to harmonize, internally as well as externally. It is the problem of the whole Hellenic people; the story of Helen is the representation of it; each Greek before Troy is, in reality, fighting this dualism in himself, in his own side, in his race. A double, indeed a triple conflict, therefore; all phases of which we see come out with intense glow in the grand embodiment of the nation, the Hero Achilles.

IV. The inner Greek scission has been mentioned: namely, the quarrel between the two leading men; it is this which produces the *Iliad* with its special theme and its special line of events as distinguished from the entire Trojan War, whereof the poem occupies but a few days. This inner scission must be healed, then the external conflict will end in the fall of Troy; the Greek Hero will lay aside his wrath and be reconciled with his own people; then he will slay the Trojan Hero, after which there will follow a second reconciliation, now with the enemy. But ere all these things transpire there is to be a grand experience, which the world may well ponder. The Greek people are to wrestle with this problem: Can we do without our Hero and take Troy? No, we cannot, is the thousandfold answer echoing from many fierce battles on the Trojan plain; we cannot do without our Achilles; there can be no real conquest of Troy unless he be present and in honor. Such is the one side of this experience, bitter, sanguinary,

spelling out in blood its deep lesson to mortal men. But the other side is not wanting; the Hero is to find out somewhat too. Can he do without his people, without his cause in which he can be heroic? By no means; he is Hero only as he takes his place and fights in the desperate front rank of battle; out of his place, sulking in his tent, he is not Hero, in fact is a nobody; much less than a mediocre man who still fights, though in mediocre fashion. Thus even the Hero reduces himself with great celerity to zero.

But he is the person upon whom the eye rests; the central figure of the poem is this Heroic Man, who is to teach so much and to be taught so much. The problem of Individuality it may be called; each human being may see himself in this portraiture; he too must find out that only as he takes his place in the ranks and fights is he anything in the world; for, if he persists in getting along without the world, the world will persist in getting along without him. It is better to be reconciled, far better; take the example of Achilles, the toughest, most unyielding granitic character that was ever portrayed; still he yielded, yielded twice, to the astonishment, perhaps, but certainly to the deep edification of all mankind. This, then, is the theme which calls the *Iliad* into being: the Heroic Individual in his double Wrath and double Reconciliation.

Therewith the entire organism of the poem is suggested, to which we may now give a little study. The first Wrath and Reconciliation embraces what was above called the internal conflict of the Greek army, the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles, till the two are reconciled (Books 1-19). The Hero is dishonored by having his prize in war taken from him, his beloved prize, the maid Briseis, whom he intended to make his wedded wife, equal in rank with Helen. In such manner is his heroic personality disgraced; wrath is his response to the insult, and not till he sees that his wrath destroys his heroship, and that he, the Great Man, is no longer reflected in the deeds of the Greeks, does he cease from anger, changing internally, and restoring his broken relations with his people. Such is the first grand division of the *Iliad*, of which we must clearly make two subdivisions if we would see the whole poem in its organic structure. These subdivisions we may call Achilles in the Right (Books 1-9) and Achilles in the

Wrong (Books 10–19), designating them from the attitude of the Hero towards his people.

The first subdivision shows Achilles as the injured one, and the attempt of the Greeks to get along without him, their best man. They begin the battle afresh; they bring forward all the lesser men, who are the valiant warriors after Achilles; they speak boldly and fight bravely. But it is of no avail; their very soul has gone out of them in the absence of their Hero; him they must bring back at all hazards. Accordingly, the embassy is sent to the wrathful chieftain, ample restitution is offered, and the grand apology; he is fully acknowledged Hero. Thus honor is satisfied, but, in spite of everything, there remains the wrath, the heroic wrath, but now empty, devoid of all just ground. Henceforward he is the implacable sore-head; he refuses to fit himself into the order of the world by being reconciled with authority, for even the Gods, as Phoenix says, are placable.

Here our second subdivision of this First Part begins, showing Achilles in the wrong, for his right is now turned to a wrong. He permits the great Hellenic cause, of which he is the Hero, to be defeated; he, the grand protector of his friends, allows those friends to perish, whereof the culmination is reached in the death of Patroclus, his dearest friend. It is clear that thus he is no longer the Hero; his honor has turned to dishonor; wrath, seeking to vindicate the worth of the individual, has destroyed it. Then comes his insight into the bitter truth of his conduct, followed by passionate repentance; he is now ready for reconciliation with the Greeks and Agamemnon. Such is the mighty change in the Hero; an internal change it is, and means a transformation of the man, indicating what true heroism is; there is an enemy within more defiant than any enemy without, and there is here a conquest greater than that of Troy—the conquest of himself. Hector was easily vanquished by Achilles, but Achilles vanquished by Achilles is the grandest spectacle of the *Iliad*; it is the turning-point of the poem; henceforth we may pronounce him a new man. Yet not complete; another Wrath rises within him, which must also be reconciled; it now turns against the Trojans, passing from the internal to the external enemy.

This introduces us to the Second Wrath and Reconciliation of the Hero, constituting the second grand division of the *Iliad*. It

is the Trojans who have brought disgrace and sorrow upon him through the loss of his friends. He used Hector and Troy as the instruments of his First Wrath; but his new insight is that such a course ends in undoing himself. Achilles brought calamity upon the Greeks for the sake of honor, but just this calamity has in a deeper sense come home to him also as the chief Greek man, and has dishonored him with a new dishonor. This second dishonor calls forth a second wrath; not yet has he risen above anger into the realm of harmony. So he has learned much, but is now to learn more still; true to his character, he will march forth against the foe, as he previously withdrew to his tent. Again, too, he carries his just wrath against an external enemy into the realms of wrong; he may kill Hector, but not maltreat his dead body; thus he violates the ordinance of the Gods, at least of Zeus the Highest, who is ultimately over both Greeks and Trojans. This he is to see; it is his second great insight and conquest of implacable wrath.

So we have the Second Reconciliation, not with the Greek, but with the Trojan; a deeper note seems touched therein than in the First Reconciliation. Achilles must destroy the destroyer of his friend and of his people; then his honor is satisfied, and he is again the supreme Hero when Hector is slain. He has now reached the culmination of his fighting; he has brought Hector to lie in death with Patroclus, the friend. Still he rages; it is, however, an empty rage, being against a corpse, which can be no longer a foe; it is a wrath without reason, like that continued wrath after the Embassy, whereby honor turned to dishonor. But he changes a second time within, and is placable towards the foe; it is his highest harmony to place himself in accord with the Gods, who decree the restoration of Hector's body. It is the last and supreme deed of the Hero, a new self-conquest, wherewith the *Iliad* ends.

But the war is not ended, nor can it end at such a point. Achilles cannot take Troy; the principle of the great conflict is not his so much as his own heroic individuality. He can bring matters to the highest point of heroism, he can destroy the heroic man of the enemy, but those walls before him he cannot scale; the Trojan War, involving the principle of Orient against Occident, he cannot end. Such is the limit of the Hero. But that



V. The characters of the *Iliad* constitute a living gallery of human beings, whose existence we never question, whose identity we recognize as distinctly as that of our next neighbor. We may say that the poem gives the first great lesson in characterization; it is not an abstraction, but a living deed—the whole of it, from beginning to end. To image men afresh, not in outward shape, but in their inward soul, is a great idea, the greatest in Literature, perhaps; it is a new creation of man to a degree, showing him spiritually transparent to all eyes that can see. Such a feat performed successfully makes the essence of a Literary Book, revealing the inner springs of human conduct as they break forth into action. The idea of character in its true development seems to have been given to us by Homer; from this *Iliad* we may build a world, and fill it with typical men, such as must always be in every phase of society. In this, as in other mentionable cases, Literature has followed in the ancient Homeric path; indeed, it must remain in the same, to be at all.

The Poet has clearly the fundamental distinction into men of thought and men of action; those best in the council, and those best in the field. Indeed, according to his conception, the complete man unites the two qualities, wisdom and the deed. He has thus seen and drawn that deepest line of the human soul between Intelligence and Will, on one side or other of which all character fluctuates. In the Trojan as well as Greek camp we notice both kinds of men, carefully classified; the wise man is distinct from the man of deeds, yet not wholly distinct; each shares in the gift of the other, though one trait predominates; Homer produces living realities of men, not abstract phantasms.

Our first question is, Can we find any common principle upon which to string these characters so that we may behold the spiritual bond which unites them? For some such unity we must search, as being that which holds Trojans or Greeks together, and makes a common cause possible. We shall find this fundamental ground of character in the principle about which the two parties collide, and for which they offer their lives. The conflict enters every soul and forms the basis of its action. In each human breast is a picture of the universal struggle, with fainter or intenser colors; the relation of the man to that struggle makes him what he is in such trying periods.



If we first turn to the Trojans we find them dividing upon the restoration of Helen, the source of the war; their characters may be ranged according to the ethical principle involved in that act. We may select three typical persons. Hector may be called the Greek in Troy; he favors the return of Helen, and his character corresponds to such a view. He is the domestic man first, true to one wife, with the deepest instinct of the Family; he appears as father and husband in the most tender of human relations. Very beautiful is this phase of Hector, winning for him all hearts; he clearly ranges himself on the side of the Greeks in regard to the justice of their claim; he is the ethical man in Troy. But his country is assailed; he, the Hero, must defend it, though he believes it to be in the wrong, and has the gloomiest forebodings for its fate in consequence. Such is the dissonance in Hector; still he remains loyal, in every way noble, faithfully subordinating family to country. Paris, on the other hand, is the Oriental man in Troy, the favorite of Venus, the abductor of Helen; sensual, unheroic, the man who cannot sacrifice his passion for the true life either of the family or the country. He is thus made the contrast to his brother Hector. Priam, the ruler, father of the two differentiated sons, is a sort of compromise between them; he will not restore Helen, nor does he exactly refuse; on the whole, his leaning seems to be to the side of Paris. His domestic relation, too, is a sort of barbarous compromise between East and West, between polygamy and monogamy, with a tendency to the former. He has a family, yet it borders upon a harem; not based upon violence, yet consistent with Oriental notions.

Troy has not the internal Greek problem which springs from the Heroic Individual, nor could it well have, with its face turned towards the East. In the person of Hector, both hero and authority are combined, which fact gives him his prominence in the poem, since he does more fighting than Achilles. Still, he is not its hero by any means, as some have said; he has not the grand problem of Achilles which makes the poem. The Heroic Individual must be seen wrestling with authority, the outcome of such a struggle must be shown for both sides, then the poem means something for the Greek, for the world. Hector has no such difficulty, because he has no such towering strength in him, no such unbending heart of oak; his pattern is evidently too

small for such a conflict. In comparison, he is a sweet, amiable man whom we admire, and we regret that inner dissonance which comes from having to defend a country whose cause he believes to be wrong.

We may now glance at the Greek characters; in like manner we shall find them dividing upon the line of their essential principle: heroship in conflict with authority. Such is the internal problem for all the Greeks, not for the one merely, being ingrown into their whole spiritual existence. For upon the Trojan problem, the restoration of Helen, they are a unit; just that is the object of their expedition against Troy, and is the unquestioned ground of their character. Hence domestic life does not need to appear in the Greek camp, being wholly presupposed by the purpose of the enterprise. Even the captive woman Briseis is to be elevated into an ethical life in the family by the Greek Hero who captured her, thus showing the destiny of the captive woman also is to become the wife. We have already spoken sufficiently of Achilles, as one side of this inner Greek conflict. Ajax and Diomed seem to have his possibilities of character; they are the heroes next to him, great warriors, men of action, with strong individualities. They still cling to authority, though we see that they too might fall off; the germ of the same trouble is in them. On the other hand, the wise men of the Greeks, Ulysses and Nestor, stand by Agamemnon, the leader, without faltering, though they reprove his rash act; he must be sustained against the Hero, for the sake of the all-governing principle at stake in the war; such is the true mark of wisdom: if they must choose, they prefer the victory of their cause to the honor of the individual.

Such are the main lines of distinction among the men on both sides; but the poem has a very strong feminine element, which must also be considered. Troy alone can have female characters of any significance; in it they can be at home, and in it is their problem. Troy retains Helen, and thus disrupts domestic life, the deepest principle of woman; just this is the conflict, or one phase of it, between Trojans and Greeks, for the latter are seeking her restoration, while the former are divided upon the matter. Three female characters will be found in the city who express the various shades of the domestic relation of woman as it plays into

the great conflict between East and West. Andromache, spouse of Hector, corresponds to her husband; she is the Greek wife in Troy—the faithful, devoted Greek wife; she is quite absorbed in her family ties; country lies beyond her vision. Hecuba is the Oriental wife and mother, or indicates that tendency; certainly she seems in no protest with her polygamous household. The favorite wife of the harem, perhaps the only one in the old age of Priam, we may see in her a hint of what the Trojan War meant for the redemption of woman as well as of man. Thirdly, there is Helen, the alienated Greek wife, most interesting of all of her sex; deeply fallen, but now repentant, full of self-reproach, longing to return out of her Trojan condition to her Greek domestic life. This longing of their most beautiful woman the Greeks must make real, such is their greatest enterprise; indeed, with a little deeper glance, we can see it to be their whole destiny, the grand sum of their spiritual endeavor. In Troy we behold her now, in a state of scission, inner and outer; separated physically and morally from her own, yet sighing for restoration. It has been seen how she represents the entire struggle; the grand external war between Greek and Trojan is a war within her, burnt into her very soul, tearing her life into bleeding shreds. Yet her strongest aspiration is, to be redeemed from her fallen lot, which redemption the Greeks must accomplish, for it is just that which makes them Greeks.

VI. But there must be not merely the return of the woman, but also of the man, from Troy and from the Trojan alienation. This brings us to the last grand scission of our Homeric theme, the scission into two poems, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. There are, then, two books upon the Trojan occurrence; this dual fact and its import are to be noted and studied. Troy is not taken at the end of the *Iliad*, which sings of the wrath of the Hero; the wrong which caused the war remains; Helen is not restored, though her restoration is everywhere implied. In the second poem, the *Odyssey*, she appears in her old Spartan home, the reinstated wife and queen. But her life and return cannot be made the theme of this second poem, which must take up a new theme, yet in a harmonious completeness with the first; our new, yet accordant theme, is the restoration of the man to family and country. It is the story of the wise Ulysses, of his many wanderings, physical and spiritual,

till he returns to peace and to his home. The whole book is one of the deepest looks into the abysses of human existence and its tireless movement; struggle, desperate, long-continued, ending in victory which brings forth a new struggle which ends again in victory. The question is: How can the man who takes Troy, or performs other great action through his intelligence, be restored through intelligence from the alienation which is born of his very deed? This present alienation is of the profoundest; the Trojan War has caused the Greek Heroes to live separated from family and state for so many years; it is not an easy matter to get back, the separation having gone so deeply into their lives and their souls.

But the work must be done, and that, too, by the wisest Greek, wherein he is to give the last and highest manifestation of wisdom, the final, fairest bloom of the Homeric world. Ulysses is the man whose skill is the chief instrumentality in taking Troy and restoring Helen; now he has the same problem of restoration for himself—which he proceeds to solve, must solve, in his spiritual strength. No army will help him, no thousand ships, no one hundred thousand heroes; nought can help him but his own mighty, much-enduring heart. He is, therefore, the ethical hero, and the intellectual one too; greater than even Achilles, who could not take Troy and release the beautiful woman, whose mission ends with killing Hector, who has not the gift of wisdom, nor the ethical purpose of the whole war so much as the idea of personal honor. We shall not disparage Achilles, but put him in his place; it is Ulysses who first enters the Trojan walls, through intelligence, and then returns to his wife, prudent Penelope. Both are the deeds of wisdom; the capture of the hostile city is a great action, but the second conquest, which implies self-restoration, is a far greater.

It will be further observed that the primitive dualism of the human mind, its diremption into Will and Intelligence, is now seen to have taken on an outward form in two poems, and in their two heroes. The one of the poems is action, the other wisdom. The one sings of the Wrath of the Heroic Man and his reconciliation through honor, the other sings of the Wise Man, returning to an institutional life and mental harmony after the great Trojan separation. This last is a sea-voyage, boisterous, full of tempests and hostility of the Gods; a soul-voyage, too, we must never forget through our absorption in the external incidents. Both poems



end in reconciliation, as they must, but they are in other respects different, if not opposite. The reconciliation of Wrath in personal honor is personal, but the reconciliation of man with institutions after his lapse is the highest harmony of life, is universal. Still, we must not leave out of mind that last act of Achilles, placing himself in unity with Zeus, the supreme ruler; yet even thus his personal feelings must be touched through the prayers of the aged Priam. But Ulysses is the Achilles who finds his honor in the ethical world, whose whole aspiration and endeavor are for a return to it, who has seen beyond the limits of the individual life into the universal one. The first is the young Hero, the second is the older one. Achilles is fated to die early with work undone, Ulysses lives to the end and completes his work; in fact, he is the completion of Achilles's life.

VII. From this Lower World we now pass to the Upper World, that of the Gods, which is the primal principle controlling Homer's Universe; the Divine is perennially over it and starts it into being. Homer has faith in the Gods, a joyous, buoyant faith, yet deeply genuine; he insists upon the overruling providence in the world, but he does not therein destroy the freedom of the individual, if he be read aright. The deities are in the man as well as outside of the man. Let it never be forgotten that these two sides, so strongly antagonistic in the upper currents of human action, are at bottom in unity; the Homeric poems rest upon this ultimate foundation, and the poetic vision is that which beholds the two streams, terrestrial and celestial, flowing harmoniously together. The Divine is the deepest, strongest instinct of the Poet; he dwells often on this lower earth, but he seems to dwell here unwillingly; he is never so happy, so free, so transcendently poetic as when he rises in one grand flight to Olympus, and tells what is going on there. In the company of the Gods he is always at his best; he often gets dull when he has to describe the combats of mortals; soon he throws off his mundane chains and mounts to the society of his deities, whereby his song seems to flow at once into a new life and vigor. In this upper realm he sees that all human action is governed by divine action; yet he sees, too, that man must be free and in harmony with the Gods.

We shall notice in the Upper World quite the same manifesta-



tions as in the Lower ; there is the same separation, the same unity—indeed, the same social and political organization. For the terrestrial is but the adumbration of the divine, the reflection of the clear heavens above in the earthly waters below. Homer feels in every throb of his heart, he shows in every line of his work, that this real world of ours, this appearance of things to our senses, is but the bearer of a divine impress ; without such impress it has no significance, would indeed fall into chaos. The Divine stamps its image upon the waxen material of Time ; this is what he is forever recalling to us by his interventions of the Gods in temporal matters, as if he were saying : Only in so far as thou makest thyself the agent of divinity, and becomest godlike thyself, hast thou, O Hero ! truly significance in the Trojan or any war.

In the Upper World we shall find, therefore, quite the same scissions as in the Lower ; we have already observed that this Lower World gets its division and organization from above, from the hands of the Gods. The first division here is into the upper God, Zeus the Highest, who has supreme authority, as against the lower Gods, who have to be subordinated. So we see in Olympus a phase of that same disruption which we noticed below on Earth. Still further these inferior Gods are divided among themselves into two parties, just upon the merits of the Trojan conflict, as the people in the Lower World are divided into Greeks and Trojans upon the same issue. Thus our grand theme, the struggle between Orient and Occident, is truly Olympian, divine ; each side of the conflict finds its representatives among the Gods ; the dualism of the time is found both on earth and in heaven.

Zeus is the supreme God, and the divine movement of the *Iliad* turns upon his three chief attitudes towards the struggle. First, he is for the Hero against the Greeks, who, according to his decree, must reconcile their Great Man before they can win. Secondly, he is for the Greeks, when the Hero is reconciled, against the Trojans ; he is the highest embodiment of the Greek principle in its conflict with the East. Thirdly, he is for the unity of the Greeks and the Trojans against the Hero when the latter collides with the Providence of the poem by insulting the fallen enemy, and must be subordinated. Achilles yields, the Hero and the God are then in accord ; this is the final and highest reconciliation. Thus, we see that there is a movement in Zeus, from his

favoring the Heroic Individual at first, till his final subordination of the latter. He is the grand movement of the world in its relation to the activity of the man; the movement of history, or of its idea, in contrast with individual development seen in Achilles.

It was said that Zeus is the supreme divinity, but in one phase this statement has been at times questioned. The issue may be put in this form: Does the Zeus of the *Iliad* control, or is he controlled by Fate? We cannot now enter upon the discussion of this subject, which seems to have divided the students of the poet from the beginning. As in all such questions, there is the superficial view, which sees the dualism, hears the discord; it may persist in dwelling upon these dissonances, of which no one doubts the existence. But there is the deeper view, which sees the reconciliation; our object is to attain this, if it be attainable. The emphatic answer may be given; there is always in Homer, as the central, moving principle, a personal God—Zeus; on the surface of the events, and on the surface of the language, Fate introduces sometimes a contradiction more or less grave, which, however, is swallowed up in the general harmony. Assuredly an impersonal Destiny does not rule the Homeric poems; consciously or unconsciously in the mind of the poet, a self-active personality is always behind them. The doubtful expressions upon this point, quite frequent if torn from their connection, must be interpreted, in view of the total conception of the movement of the poem; thus, Fate will be seen not only to vanish as the supreme Homeric principle, but in reality to confirm divine as well as human freedom as the spiritual foundation of Homer's work.

The character of Zeus has given great difficulty in its moral aspects. How could he, the supreme God, bearer of all that is highest in the Greek world, be endowed with such monstrous passions? How could such a being find worship among men? But we must consider that the Greek conceived of his divinity as human; to him the God was not the abstraction of some virtue or power, but an actual man in flesh and blood; moreover, a total man, with the sensuous as well as the spiritual element. The mightier the God, the mightier the passions; indeed, Zeus was magnified in his lower nature in proportion to his higher nature; if he had supreme power and intelligence, he had supreme senses

to correspond. He had to be a colossal lover, and hater too, just as he was the God of colossal might and mind. Mentally and physically there must be a correspondence; so he is a reality, not a shadowy ideal simply. Thus, the Divine was manifested in a sensuous form, which is the Greek standpoint.

VIII. We may now turn to the Inferior Gods, who are divided among themselves, and take sides in this Trojan conflict. Thus, they become finite, struggling persons, such as we saw below in the plains of Troy among mortals. We ask, Why this doubling of the strife? why thrust it into the Upper World when there is a Lower World given over to it entirely? This is the grand peculiarity of Homer; he furnishes a double reflection of the struggle. The Gods, too, make war; they stand for the ideal forms of the principles in collision; they signify that the conflict below on earth is a spiritual conflict; it is not a mere test of brawn, not a wild, barbarous rage of fighting mortals, seeking to devour one another like beasts of the forest. Driving the arms of the heroes is an unseen principle; it, too, must have its representation apart from the visible world of combat before Troy; it is the higher, stronger; without it the heroes would be little or nothing. This spiritual realm Homer makes the abode of the Gods, above the mortal contestants yet controlling them; he always insists upon this divine element in human affairs, which he organizes as a distinct world.

But there is a spiritual principle on both sides: there is the Greek and the Trojan principle; hence the Gods, the representatives and executors of the spiritual world, divide into two contending parties on Olympus. Troy has its right, so has Greece; the dualism is reflected in divine partisans. In the earlier portions of the *Iliad* they confine themselves to deliberating with one another, and to aiding their favorite mortals; but in the latter parts of the poem they enter the conflict and fight one another. Thus the poet never lets us forget that there is a spiritual principle at work in this Trojan struggle, always hovering above it and determining it. What that principle is, has already been unfolded; ours is the modern prosaic way of stating what Homer reveals in a poetic way by means of his divinities. We, too, demand that a war have its principle, and that the historian declare it; Homer introduces an Upper World, just to show the ideal side in the

grand conflict between Orient and Occident. This is his enduring glory, and it is this chiefly which makes his books to be bibles in the Literary Hierarchy; he shows that the worthy human deed is not a capricious, but a divine thing.

The Greek partisans are Juno, Minerva, Neptune, standing in most intimate relation to Zeus, but often in opposition to him. The Trojan partisans are Venus, Mars, Apollo, who manifestly represent the Oriental side of Olympus. Through such strife, through such limitations placed upon one another, the Gods are finite, though at the same time supposed to be infinite. Thus a contradiction arises in the conception of the Gods, of which Homer himself seems to be partially conscious. The finitude of the Divine—that is, the finitude of the Infinite—is a self-contradicting statement which in a naïve way suggests humor; the Gods, so divine, yet so human, have always a tendency to be humorous. They are a blessed company, happy, joyful, loving the laugh; still the poet is a believer, sincere, even pious. The humor of his divinities belongs in the heart of his religion; it is not the laugh of indifference, still less the sneer of skepticism. Nothing gloomy clings to his faith; he can sport with his Gods; the happy man can worship earnestly and at the same time smile at his deities. To us it seems an almost impossible state of mind; but the poet venerates the beings with whom he plays; his is a loving devotion, not by any means the sarcasm of the scoffer. The limitations of the Gods, their foibles, weaknesses, he takes as belonging to them; he can throw a touch of humor into his deepest faith, so free he is in his treatment of his Gods, yet so sincere and full of love; indeed, all true humor rests upon love—love of the object about which one is humorous. The unconscious humor of Homer rests upon his love of the Gods; he loves them because they are finite, and become humorous. Like some children, they must not be too perfect; otherwise they cease to be children, or cease to be Gods.

IX. But above all the differences of the Gods is their unity in Zeus, which is the chief fact of Olympus or the Upper World. Zeus is the providence of the poem; he stands over and bridges the two parties among men, the two parties among Gods also; he unifies the Upper and Lower Worlds. All dualism ends at last in him, the Highest; through him the great thought of a



controlling Power, of a world-moving Intelligence, breaks everywhere out of these poems. Between the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* there is no difference in this respect; the one supreme deity is above and rules. Yet in another respect we see an important difference. The *Odyssey* has essentially but one grand interference of Zeus, which starts the poem and propels it to the end; he is the beginning; the action of the poem rolls from one fillip of his finger, and keeps rolling. But in the *Iliad* this interference is oft-repeated; it continues to drop into the action from the heavens above all the time. The deeds of this Lower World must be shown to depend directly upon the Upper World and its decrees, which can never be allowed to sink out of view. This distinction between the two poems is almost the distinction between the universal and the special Providence.

This unity in Zeus, lying back of Greek polytheism, has given rise to no little speculation. It has been supposed to be a remnant of the true faith, which, monotheistic at first, was corrupted into a multitudinous idolatry. Thus the Greek religion is considered a faint reflection of that true revelation originally given by God to man, from which the latter has fallen off. A theory quite the reverse has also been given—a theory, not of a fall, but of a rise of man. This takes the Greek polytheism as an intermediate step in the move out of a pantheistic worship of Nature toward monotheism, of which the supremacy of Zeus is the first early appearance.

But these theories need trouble us no further at present; it is sufficient to know that the Poet brings us to a realm above all conflict, where there reigns the divine harmony of the Universe; he is seen to rise out of all dualism on Earth and on Olympus to the oneness of Zeus. Yet not without conflict; the price of Olympian repose is the terrestrial struggle. This supreme unity above is to be brought down into the world below, where it is to abide and take on form in visible things; thus it becomes reality, indeed, the great reality in all earthly matters. What is discordant, it harmonizes; what is wrathful, it reconciles. The world, with all its vast goings and comings, is transformed into an eternally tuneful sphere, into one great piece of music which starts into song of its own accord, and sings itself finally into an *Iliad* whose whole movement is out of dissonance into reconciliation.



Our poem takes as its theme the profoundest conflict of History, that between the East and the West ; it touches the deepest struggle of the human soul, the problem of the Individual ; the world without and the man within are attuned to one note ; both find their ultimate harmony in the common God. In such a strain have the multiplex scissions come to an end.

Homer has, therefore, bridged, in his way, that profoundest of all chasms—the chasm between the Beyond and the Here, between Earth and Olympus ; it seems to be his chief striving to make some path across the enormous gap which separates the Lower and Upper Worlds. It is no easy task for us to-day ; indeed, the sum total of our whole effort runs parallel to Homer in a certain manner. We also seek an unseen Upper World in some form. Can we reach the invisible soul of our time, and make ourselves at home therewith ? Can we stand face to face with that spiritual power which uses Time as its material, and man as its instrument ? No modern book, not even religious book, recognizes more deeply than Homer that this outer world is but wax for the seal stamped by the Gods. Earth and Olympus are indeed twain, but, in the truer meaning, they are one—each is the image of the other, reflecting the discord, yet beneath all discord reflecting the reconciliation.

It was said that this harmony, springing from the conquest of fierce strife and dissonance, becomes a song ; now the man appears who vibrates to this deep attunement of things, and who can make human speech vibrate in accord with the same, giving to words the rapture and the rhythmical swell of an ocean flowing out of tempest to tranquillity. The Poet steps forth with his strains, singing this unity in Zeus as the key-note of his song : a most marvellous, adorable man. His utterance thrills with the secret harmony of the God, harmony now revealed ; all men thrill with him, being transmuted into the movement of his song. Olympus, with its scissions, moves into unity, and we see rise up an organized society of the Gods ; we behold, too, the poem which utters and images the same. The bard is truly the voice of Zeus, the Highest, whose daughters, the Muses, tell him the true word, which he again tells to man. But it is the bard alone who can hear the voice of the Muses, not every man ; indeed, that is just his gift, his genius—to be able to hear the voice of the Muses.

Critics have, indeed, denied the unity of the *Iliad* in manifold

argumentation; they have pointed out its discords, its disagreements, its uncertainties. It has this side; whoever wishes to dwell in it can do so and find much confusion, war, and rumors of war; in fact, he can pertinaciously affirm that nothing else exists in it, except to the eye of the visionary. But the true Homeric faith is in the unity of the poem, its harmony; without such qualities it could never have been a Literary Bible. Reconciliation is its divine word, the word of a Bible; most deep and true is its unity, that of Olympus itself. We must reach up into this one soul of the *Iliad* for its inspiring draughts; much disordered material floats on the surface of it as on the surface of the sun; still, these refractory masses are smelted into one brilliant flowing stream when we once see them touched by the central fires underneath. The genuine Homeric scholar has his creed, which he will repeat, after reading some hostile book, with tenfold emphasis: I believe in the unity of Homer, in the unity of the Upper World, in the unity of the Lower World, in the unity of the two together, and supremely in the unity of the poem which images all these unities.

Thus it will be seen and felt that the poem is one and in accord—its men as well as its Gods; these are harmonious parts of a Whole representing the concord of the divine and the terrestrial; man is transformed to a musical being after all his struggles, since he is in perfect agreement with his divinities. Woe be unto him when he falls out with his Gods, as Hesiod does, deeming providential Zeus to be a jealous tyrant over mankind. Then the happy Homeric unity will be rent asunder, and human life will become tragic; the Upper and the Lower Worlds will be two discordant notes, whose dissonance tears mankind to pieces. The Gods are our enemies; what, then, are we? Such is the Hesiodic man, evidently a fallen soul, in torture; but the Homeric man feels the divine powers to be in tune with himself, nay, to be in truth himself, his own spiritual essence; therefore he utters their harmony.

The poem must consequently have a musical end, not merely in verse, but in spirit. It refuses to conclude in the destruction of the city; that would be a disastrous, discordant end; in reconciliation only can the song cease worthily, although conflict may arise again afterwards. It cannot terminate in the wrath of the Hero, but in his external and internal harmony, in that lull of his soul

when he has reached up and participated in the unity of Zeus, fitting himself into the supreme, world-governing plan. This is the finality and true completion of the hero; his mission is concluded, not in wrath, but in atonement; no further height is by him attainable.

A short synoptical table may aid in keeping before the memory what has been said above, as well as in showing the organism of the poem.

I. Scission into the two worlds, Lower and Upper.

A.—THE LOWER WORLD.

II. Scission of the Lower World into two conflicting nations, Greeks and Trojans.

III. Internal scission in both Greeks and Trojans; each side has two opposing parties.

IV. The internal Greek scission producing the *Iliad*, with its double Wrath and double Reconciliation.

V. Scission of the character of the poem into two sets.

VI. Scission of the Trojan theme into two poems.

B.—THE UPPER WORLD.

VII. Scission of the Upper World into Zeus and the Inferior Gods.

VIII. Scission of the Inferior Gods into two parties, one favoring the Trojans, the other the Greeks.

IX. The unity of all these scissions, both of men and Gods, in Zeus.

## NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

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*THE MODERN LOGIC.*

The Johns Hopkins University, that prolific young mother of science, has lately put forth a little book called "Studies in Logic." It is the newest fruit of that wonderful Symbolic Logic which, though at times curiously anticipated, really sprang into lasting life only in 1847, created by George Boole.

Perhaps the most interesting essay in the present volume, "On the Algebra of Logic," by Miss Christine Ladd, makes use of the two simple relations which I think most naturally suggest themselves to any one who exhaustively examines the whole question of syllogistic inference from the modern point of view. This mode of dealing with deduction was stated by Leibnitz, and, as a specimen of Boole's Logical Method, I contributed to the "Journal of Speculative Philosophy" for October, 1878, a paper called "Statement and Reduction of Syllogism," which, strictly following Boole, and the suggestion in a two-page note by Cayley on Boole, by means of a relation of total exclusion, and a relation of partial inclusion, reduced all syllogism to one form, and gave perfectly general criteria for inference from any two premises.

As Miss Ladd uses the same two relations to do this same thing, I have thought it might most easily familiarize your readers with her notation to state it side by side with the older.

For the relation of partial inclusion, some  $x$ 's are  $y$ 's, or some  $y$ 's are  $x$ 's, Venn writes  $xy = v$ ; Cayley suggested  $xy > 0$ ; Miss Ladd writes  $xy \vee$ . For the relation of total exclusion, no  $x$ 's are  $y$ 's, or no  $y$ 's are  $x$ 's, Boole and his followers have written  $xy = 0$ ; Miss Ladd writes  $xy \bar{v}$ , using Boole's negative sign, a minus written over the thing to be negatived.

Now, noting symmetry, using the complementary classes, and observing that, whether we have  $x$  or  $\bar{x}$ , the symmetry of relation is not altered, it is easy to see that all logical propositions can be brought under these two forms.

Thus, all  $x$  is  $y$ , becomes  $x\bar{y} \bar{v}$ , while  $x\bar{y} \bar{v}$  means some  $x$  is not  $y$ .

Propositions with a universal subject or predicate take the first form; the remaining propositions fall under the second form. Syllogisms are inferences with elimination, the ordinary object being to eliminate a single term which occurs in two premises. The premises of every syllogism are two propositions having a common term. Taking  $x$  and  $z$  for the extremes, and  $y$  for the mid-term, writing all propositions in the above two forms, and going over all the possible combinations of premises, there are only two which give rise to a conclusion or relation between the extreme terms. These were written in the old notation

$$\begin{aligned} xy = 0, z\bar{y} = 0 \therefore xz = 0, \text{ and} \\ xy = 0, zy > 0 \therefore \bar{x}z > 0. \end{aligned}$$

In the new notation they are

$$\begin{aligned} xy \bar{v}, z\bar{y} \bar{v} \therefore xz \bar{v}, \text{ and} \\ xy \bar{v}, zy v \therefore \bar{x}z v. \end{aligned}$$

Boole's equation,  $x + \bar{x} = 1$ , meaning everything is either  $x$  or non- $x$ , gave a general symbolic proof of the validity of these conclusions.

For, whatever  $xz$  may be, we know  $xz = xzy + xz\bar{y}$ ; but in the first syllogism above a factor of  $xyz$ , namely,  $xy$ , is equal to nought, and a factor of  $x\bar{y}z$ , namely,  $z\bar{y}$ , is equal to nought; therefore,  $xz = 0 + 0 = 0$ .

Again,  $y = xy + \bar{x}y$  always; but in the other syllogism above, since  $xy = 0 \therefore y = \bar{x}y$ . But also we are given  $zy > 0$ , therefore substituting, we have  $\bar{x}zy > 0 \therefore \bar{x}z > 0$ . This may illustrate what is meant by working with an algebra which assigns the expression of the quantity of propositions to the copula, and so has two copulas.

Miss Ladd proves the first of the above as follows: "The premises are

$$x(z + \bar{z})y\bar{v}; (x + \bar{x})\bar{y}z\bar{v};$$

and together they affirm that

$$\begin{aligned} xz(y + \bar{y}) + x\bar{z}y + \bar{x}\bar{y}z\bar{v}, \text{ or} \\ xz + xy\bar{z} + \bar{x}\bar{y}z\bar{v}. \end{aligned}$$

Dropping the information concerning  $y$ , there remains  $xz\bar{v}$ ."

For the second she says: "The second premise is

$$zy(xy + \bar{x}\bar{y})v,$$

which becomes, since there is no  $xy$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} zy(\bar{x} + \bar{y})v, \text{ or} \\ zy\bar{x}v. \end{aligned}$$

Dropping the information concerning  $y$ , there remains  $z\bar{x}v$ ." This last use of  $+$ , which puts  $\bar{x}\bar{y} = \bar{x} + \bar{y}$ , is the extension of Boole's  $+$ , used by Jevons in 1864, and since by nearly all workers in modern logic.

It is evident that this reduction enables us to give very clear and compendious rules for the validity of syllogism; and for the case last proved—namely, the universal-particular syllogism—the test, adapted to Boole's



way of writing  $xy = 0$  as  $y = v\bar{x}$ , was stated on page 426 of the journal as follows :

"When but one of the four terms is universal, a conclusion can be reached in all cases (*and in those only*) where the universal term is the middle term in one of the premises, and the middle term in the other premise is of the same quality."

Adapted directly to the new notation, this is given on page 39 of the "Studies in Logic" thus :

"All the rules for the validity of the universal-particular syllogism are contained in these :

"(1) The middle term must have the same sign in both premises.

"(2) The other term of the universal premise only has its sign changed in the conclusion."

A convention that the universal proposition is taken as not implying the existence of its terms excludes syllogisms in which a particular conclusion is drawn from two universal premises. Apart from this we may say that if, when expressed in Boole's affirmative notation, two or more of the four terms contained in the two premises are universal, a conclusion can always be reached. When referring directly to the new notation for the doubly universal syllogism—

"(1) The middle term must have unlike signs in the two premises.

"(2) The other terms have the same sign in the conclusion as in the premises."

Still further, these two forms, to which all valid syllogisms may be reduced, coalesce into one, which the simple consideration, that two premises are inconsistent with the contradictory of their valid conclusion, will throw into the form

$$(a \ b \ \bar{v}) (\bar{b} \ c \ \bar{v}) (c \ a \ v) \ \bar{v}$$

given by Miss Ladd, which itself is only a special case of a still more general theorem given by Leibnitz (*specimen demonstrandi*, Erdmann, p. 99).

Perhaps the fundamental point in the system is the choice of two copulas both perfectly symmetrical, as against the old copula of inclusion, which is an unsymmetric relation. As bearing on the naturalness of the choice, I may call attention to the fact that these two symmetric relations are the ones chosen for the algebraic notation used by Dr. Royce, of Harvard, in his excellent work on "Logical Analysis" (San Francisco, 1881), which was designed as the simplest presentation of the subject for his own scholars.

The person who has made the most telling advances in logic since Boole is Schröder, some of whose marvellous simplifications Mr. Venn does not seem to have fully appreciated.

That the system under consideration has assimilated Schröder's results gives it a delightful facility in the solution of the most complicated questions, and lends it additional value to any American not reading German.

Now that the syllogism may be so readily disposed of, why should not every college teach some modern method of power commensurate with that here found under the head of Resolution of Problems?

GEORGE BRUCE HALSTED.

PRINCETON, N. J.

### THE CONCORD SUMMER SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY.

The Concord Summer School will open for a fifth term on Wednesday, July 18, 1883, at 9 A. M., and will continue four weeks. The lectures in each week will be ten; they will be given morning and evening, except Saturdays, on the secular days (in the morning at 9 o'clock, and in the evening at 7.30), at the *Hillside Chapel*, near the Orchard House.

The terms will be \$4 for each full week; for the course, \$15. Board may be obtained in the village at from \$7 to \$12 a week, so that students may estimate their *necessary* expenses for the whole term at \$45. Single tickets, at 50 cents each, will be issued for the convenience of visitors, and these may be bought at the shop of H. L. Whitcomb, in Concord, after July 10, 1883. Any to whom this circular is sent can now engage course tickets by making application, and sending \$5 as a guarantee. For those who make this deposit, tickets will be reserved till the tenth day of July, 1883, and can then be obtained by payment of the balance due. They entitle the holder to reserved seats.

All students should be registered on or before July 10, 1883, at the office of the Secretary, in Concord. No preliminary examinations are required, and no limitation of age, sex, or residence in Concord will be prescribed; but it is recommended that persons under eighteen years should not present themselves as students, and that those who take all the courses should reside in the town during the term. The Concord Public Library of 17,500 volumes will be open every day for the use of residents. Students coming and going daily during the term may reach Concord from Boston by the Fitchburg Railroad, or the Middlesex Central:<sup>1</sup> from Lowell, Andover, etc., by the Lowell and Framingham Railroad; from Southern Middlesex and Worcester Counties by the same road. The Orchard House stands on the Lexington road, east of Concord village, adjoining the Wayside estate, formerly the residence of Mr. Hawthorne. For fuller information concerning the town and the school, we would refer applicants and visitors to the "Concord Guide Book" of Mr. George B. Bartlett.

Lodgings with board may be obtained at the following houses in Concord village:

Miss E. BARRETT, Monument Street.

Mrs. KENT, Main Street.

Mrs. O'BRIEN, Monument Square.

Mrs. GOODNOW, Main Street.

Mrs. CUTTIE, Sudbury Street.

Mrs. N. DERBY, Walden Street.

Mrs. B. F. WHEELER, Belknap Street.

Mrs. HOW, Hubbard Street.

<sup>1</sup> Express train from Boston leaves Fitchburg depot at 8 A. M., and arrives at Concord in time for the morning session. On Thursdays, train for Boston by Fitchburg Railroad leaves Concord at 9.40 P. M.; and on Wednesdays, train for Boston by Middlesex Central leaves at 9.38 P. M., giving opportunity to attend the evening session and return to Boston after the lecture.

Lodgings without board can be obtained in the neighborhood of each of the above-named houses. Students and visitors will make their own arrangements without consulting the undersigned.

A. BRONSON ALCOTT, *Dean.*

S. H. EMERY, JR., *Director.*

F. B. SANBORN, *Secretary.*

CONCORD, April 30, 1883.

#### LECTURERS AND SUBJECTS.

MR. A. BRONSON ALCOTT, Dean of the Faculty, is not expected to deliver the Salutatory or to converse on special subjects, but it is hoped he can be present.

DR. JONES will not lecture this year.

The Courses will be as follows :

PROF. W. T. HARRIS.—Four Lectures on *Man's Immortality in the Light of Philosophy and Religion*; and Four Lectures constituting a Course of Elementary Lessons in Philosophy.

The latter will be

1. JULY 18th, 9 A. M.—*Space and Time Considered; Basis of Kantian Philosophy, Ground of Certainty deeper than Scepticism or Agnosticism.*
2. JULY 20th, 7.30 P. M.—*Causality and Self-cause; Force Transient and Persistent; Self-existent Energy underlying all Change.*
3. AUGUST 1st, 9 A. M.—*Fate and Freedom; Individuality; Distinction of Reality and Potentiality from True Actuality, of Phenomenon from Substance.*
4. AUGUST 3d, 7.30 P. M.—*Laws of Thought, the Principles of Identity, Contradiction and Excluded Middle; Categories of Being, Essence, Cause, and Personality.*

Prof. Harris's special subjects will be:

1. JULY 25th.—*The Absolute a Personal Reason. Discussion of Plato's insight (Tenth Book of the Laws) and Aristotle's (the Eighth Book of his Physics and the Eleventh Book of his Metaphysics)*
2. JULY 27th.—*Triune Nature of God.—St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Anselm—Justice and Grace in the Divine Nature.*
3. AUGUST 6th.—*The World as Revelation of the Divine First Cause—Nature and Man; the Doctrine of Evolution; the Orders of Being as Progressive Revelation of the Divine.*
4. AUGUST 8th.—*Immortality of the Individual Man in the Light of Psychology—in the Light of the Christian Religion; the Vocation of Man in the Future Life.*

PROF. GEORGE H. HOWISON, LL.D.—Four Lectures on *Hume and Kant and the Merits of the Issue between them.*

Prof. Howison's subjects will be:

1. *Hume's Aim and Method; the Problem, as handed over to Kant.*
2. *Kant's Mode of Dealing with this Problem.*
3. *The Strength and Weakness of Kant's Methods and Results.*
4. *Attempts by Subsequent Thinkers to supply Kant's Defects; the Desiderata still remaining.*

PROF. WILLIAM JAMES, of Harvard University.—Three Lectures on *Psychology.*

MR. DENTON J. SNIDER.—Four Lectures on *Homer and the Greek Religion.*

1. *Literary Bibles—Homer.*
2. *The Iliad.*
3. *The Odyssey.*
4. *The Gods.*

REV. R. A. HOLLAND, S. T. D., will not lecture this year. In place of his lectures, as advertised

PROF. HARRIS will give four Lectures on *Elementary Insights in Philosophy.*

REV. J. S. KEDNEY, D. D.—Two Lectures on *Art Appreciation and the Higher Criticism.*

MR. F. B. SANBORN.—Four Lectures on *The History of Philosophy in America.*

1. *The Puritanic Philosophy; Jonathan Edwards.*
2. *The Philanthropic Philosophy; Benjamin Franklin.*
3. *The Negation of Philosophy.*
4. *The Ideal and Vital Philosophy; R. W. Emerson.*

MR. JOHN ALBEE.—Two Lectures. *The Norman Influences in English Language and Literature*  
 REV. DR. BARTOL.—A Lecture on *Optimism and Pessimism—a Personal Equation*.

MRS. E. P. PEABODY.—A Lecture on *Milton's Paradise Lost*.

MRS. E. D. CHENEY.—A Lecture. *A Study of Nirvana*.

PRESIDENT PORTER.—A Lecture on *Kant's Categorical Imperative*.

MRS. J. W. HOWE.—A Conversation.

MR. JULIAN HAWTHORNE.—A Lecture on *Novels*.

MR. DAVID A. WASSON.—A Lecture. *Herbert Spencer's Causal Law of Evolution*.

MR. LEWIS J. BLOCK. A Lecture on *Platonism and its Relation to Modern Thought*.

Readings from the Thoreau Manuscripts will occupy one evening, as usual.

### PROGRAMME OF LECTURES.

#### JULY, 1883.

18th, 9	A. M.	Prof. Harris.
	7.30 P. M.	Prof. James.
19th, 9	A. M.	Dr. Kedney.
	7.30 P. M.	Prof. Howison.
20th, 9	A. M.	Prof. James.
	7.30 P. M.	Prof. Harris.
23d, 9	A. M.	Prof. James.
	7.30 P. M.	Prof. Howison.
24th, 9	A. M.	Dr. Kedney.
	7.30 P. M.	Dr. Bartol.
25th, 9	A. M.	Prof. Harris.
	7.30 P. M.	Mr. Snider.
26th, 9	A. M.	Mr. Sanborn.
	7.30 P. M.	Prof. Howison.
27th, 9	A. M.	Prof. Harris.
	7.30 P. M.	Mr. Sanborn.
30th, 9	A. M.	Mr. Wasson.
	7.30 P. M.	Prof. Howison.
31st, 9	A. M.	Mr. Hawthorne.
	7.30 P. M.	Mr. Snider.

#### AUGUST, 1883.

1st, 9	A. M.	Prof. Harris.
	7.30 P. M.	Mrs. Howe.
2d, 9	A. M.	Miss Peabody.
	7.30 P. M.	Mr. Snider.
3d, 9	A. M.	Mr. Sanborn.
	7.30 P. M.	Prof. Harris.
6th, 9	A. M.	Mr. Albee.
	7.30 P. M.	Prof. Harris.
7th, 9	A. M.	Mrs. Cheney.
	7.30 P. M.	Mr. Albee.
8th, 9	A. M.	Prof. Harris.
	7.30 P. M.	Mr. Snider.
9th, 9	A. M.	Pres. Porter.
	7.30 P. M.	Mr. Block.
10th, 9	A. M.	Mr. Sanborn.
	7.30 P. M.	Readings from Thoreau.

Slight changes in the above programme may hereafter be made, and other names may be added to the list of lecturers.

### PROFESSOR MORRIS'S LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIANITY.

[The following Syllabus of a Course of Eight Lectures, delivered at the Union Theological Seminary, in New York City, on the "Ely Foundation," in January, 1883 (every Thursday and Friday evening, beginning January 4th), by George S. Morris, Ph. D., Professor of Ethics, History of Philosophy, and Logic, in the University of Michigan, and Lecturer at the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, contains an analysis of the subject so suggestive and thorough that we print it entire.—ED.]

#### PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIANITY.

##### LECTURE I.

##### *Religion and Intelligence.*

The main object of this course of lectures, to show that intelligence, as such, is the true bulwark, and not the enemy, of religion.

Religion cannot—even if it would—withdraw itself from the liability of being made a subject of scientific or philosophic inquiry.

First, the phenomena of religion, without any reference to their absolute significance, may be made the subject of a comparative, inductive study, and the result is the "Science of Religions."

Or, secondly, inquiry may be directed to the absolute significance and justification of the phenomena in question, and the result is the Philosophy of Religion.

Importance of this latter inquiry for religion.

Modern "Agnosticism," which results from a misapplication and misinterpretation of the method and conclusions of purely physical science, has the form of knowledge, without its substance; from it religion has nothing to fear before the forum of absolute intelligence.

The history of English Deism as partially illustrating the truth of the last statement.

Against Agnosticism, philosophy and religion have a common cause. In this negative sense the two certainly agree.

The more important question is, whether philosophy—which is, properly, nothing but the unbiassed recognition and comprehension of experience on all its sides—confirms or invalidates the positive, theoretical presuppositions of religion.

For religion—and above all, Christianity—is, in form and substance, of and for intelligence. It presupposes and requires knowledge of the Absolute. And philosophy aims to achieve the same knowledge by the way of experimental demonstration.

Philosophy and Christianity alike imply (1) a process of intelligence (Theory of Knowledge), by which (2) the absolute object of intelligence is reached (Theory or Science of Being).

## LECTURE II.

### *The Philosophic Theory of Knowledge.*

The philosophic theory of knowledge is, in ideal, nothing but the science of intelligence as such, or of experience in the fullest sense of this term.

This science not contained in Formal Logic. Nor is it contained in Empirical Psychology: witness, the results of British psychological speculation.

The "science of intelligence as such" is the necessary correlate and condition of the science of being as such; in other words, it is an organic part of Philosophy, and is found, in more or less completely developed form, wherever philosophy is found.

Intelligence comparable to a light.

Intelligence is an activity, *versus* the old sensational theory that the mind in knowledge is passive, and like a "piece of white paper."

The activity of intelligence is not a mode of motion. The relation of subject and object in knowledge is not purely mechanical, or sensible.

The activity in question is synthetic. (Incidental discussion of space and time as forms of synthesis for intelligence.)

It is living and organic. It involves, in particular, the ideal continuity and unity of subject and object, *within* the sphere of knowledge, and not (as sensational agnosticism assumes) their mechanical separation and opposition *outside* the realm of all knowledge.

Hence, (1) the forms of the "subject" are the forms of the "object," and *vice versa*.

(2) Knowledge is a unifying process. It finds unity in the midst of apparent multiplicity. It sees the universal in the particular. Its object is thus the concrete universal, or the universal which subsists through and by very means of the particular, and



not the abstract universal, which excludes the particular and is never an object of real knowledge at all, but only of a supposititious imagination.

Intelligence is itself a concrete universal, for it is an organism. Every natural organism is a direct illustration of the one subsisting only in and through the many, the one life in and through the many members. The "members" of intelligence are the forms or fundamental categories of knowledge, the framework of all our conscious intelligence. The "one life" stands self-revealed in self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness is the "light" of intelligence. It is a pure, ideal, and spontaneous activity.

Self-consciousness is the active and relatively independent condition of objective consciousness.

But objective consciousness, on the other hand, is also the (relatively passive) condition of self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness in man, while it is the organic head, or the "light" of all human consciousness whatsoever, turns out, upon examination, to be a borrowed light, and itself dependent on an Absolute Self-consciousness.

The philosophic science of knowledge confirms St. Paul's denial "that we are sufficient of ourselves to *think* anything as of our [purely individual] selves," and finds, in further agreement with the Apostle, that, in the absolute and final sense, "our sufficiency is of God."

### LECTURE III.

#### *The Absolute Object of Intelligence; or, the Philosophic Theory of Reality.*

The question as to "what being really is," not a "tyro's question." Its practical importance.

The unity of Being is expressly or implicitly presupposed by all science.

Physical science seeks, not an absolute unity, but only a relative one.

The "universal," to which physical science leads us, is consequently abstract, not concrete. Its picture of the universe is monochromatic. And pantheism, in the odious sense of this term, consists, essentially, in adopting the highest generalizations of mathematico-physical inquiry as the final results of philosophic science, and interpreting the unity of being, accordingly, as abstract, dead and mechanical, rather than as concrete, living, and organic.

The terms being (or reality) and intelligence are correlative. The predicate being is applied to the object of intelligence. That most truly is which is most truly known or knowable. The real is the intelligible.

The sensible, *as such* (or as sensible), is not intelligible. It is "phenomenal."

The science of knowledge demonstrates the organic unity of "subject" and "object," or of intelligence and being.

Hence (1) the distinction made between intelligence and being is a purely formal or "logical" one, not real. Being, in other words, includes intelligence.

(2) The nature of being, therefore, is not made known to intelligence by revelation from without, but from within, or from the inner depths of the nature of intelligence itself.

(3) The revelation of being in intelligence necessarily takes the form of self-intelligence, self-knowledge, or self-consciousness. Being is thus primarily revealed as *spiritual*.

(4) "Substance is Action" (Leibnitz). Or, Being is Activity, is Doing. It is activity of spirit. But the activity of spirit is Life (Aristotle). Absolute being, as such, is therefore absolutely living. No being whatsoever without "potency of life."

Space, time, and matter are dependent modes of absolute spiritual existence. Materialism, in holding the contrary, errs, among other things, against the first principles of thought and of being (Unity of Being and Unity of Knowledge). The proximate root of matter is found in force; and force is a purely spiritual category. The law of the motions of matter is identical in kind with the law of the activity of intelligence.

Man, as man, is spirit.

The philosophic doctrine that the unity of being is the unity of Absolute Spirit, is the doctrine of Theism.

The unity of Absolute Spirit rests on a unity of self-consciousness, of personality.

Groundlessness of the common objections raised against the conception of God as personal.

#### LECTURE IV.

##### *The Biblical Theory of Knowledge.*

Peculiar reasons why the theological student is obliged to inquire after the final results of philosophic science.

He is entitled to have these results correctly reported to him.

Specific difference of philosophy and religion.

Christianity is a spiritual life, which the Scriptures represent as conditioned upon the knowledge of God.

According to the Scriptures, (1) knowledge that, in form and substance, is purely individual, is relatively empty, and, when carried to its final issues, "cometh to nought." The scriptural estimate of sensible knowledge.

(2) Knowledge proper is a spiritual process. This truth, which philosophic science expresses by saying that science is of and through the universal, is more concretely expressed—but without change of sense—by the Christian scriptures in the declaration that our sufficiency to think is of God, or that true understanding is due to the inspiration of the Almighty.

"Perfect freedom" the attribute only of that "thought" which is "begun, continued, and ended" in God.

The Christian theory of knowledge implies a God "near at hand."

All knowledge is, in a sense, of the nature of "revelation."

No merely mechanical revelation possible.

Revelation, as a process of knowledge, is a spiritual process. Its essential form is that of self-revelation, or of the Spirit to the spirit, and it is rendered possible only through the organic oneness of the recipient with the divine Spirit.

The content of revelation cannot be out of essential relation to intelligence.

#### LECTURE V.

##### *Biblical Ontology—The Absolute.*

The Absolute omnipresent in the relative, and yet distinct from the latter.

The Absolute for religion, as for philosophy, is Spirit, and is God.

God as the creative condition of space and time, and of "force."

The Infinite as known, or knowable, in and by the finite.

The Scriptures find in the personality of a transcendent Man the true revelation and perfect exemplification of the nature of the absolute and everlasting God.

The true understanding of Christ is a "spiritual understanding."

Absolute Being, or Spirit, exhibited in the Scriptures under the attributes of intelligence, life, and love.

The triune God.

Importance of the doctrine of the Trinity.

"Trinity" does not simply mean "threeness." The conception of trinity not a sensible, or phenomenal, but a spiritual conception. It is, accordingly, incapable of being sensibly illustrated.

Trinity is concrete unity.

Intelligence, Life, and Love—each a triune process.

This process, in finite beings, subject to temporal limitations, from which, in God, the Absolute, it is free.

The Son and, through him, the world, as the object of the divine intelligence.

The Holy Spirit, as at once name of the third person in the divine Trinity and also the concrete and perfect name of the Absolute, or of God.

Brief defence of the expression, "Three *persons* in one God."

#### LECTURE VI.

##### *Biblical Ontology—the World.*

Philosophy of Nature and "Pure Physical Science" distinguished.

Philosophic Agnosticism and Mechanism as perversions of pure physical science.

Religion presupposes, not a system of pure physical science, but a philosophy of nature.

Brief *résumé* of the philosophy of nature.

Biblical conceptions:

(a) The world dependent for its existence on divine power.

(b) Creation not the result of a casual impulse or of an arbitrary determination on the part of the Creator.

(c) God the everlasting worker. His relation to the world active and incessant.

(d) The world full of divine riches.

(e) Knowledge of the world to be "sought out."

(f) Vanity and corruptibility of the world apart from God.

(g) Christ the creator of the world, and

(h) Also its redeemer. Redemption included in the definition or conception of creation.

(i) The *rationale* of creation founded in the doctrine of the Trinity. The Second person of the Trinity as the "first-born of every creature."

(j) Christ the "image of the invisible God" only as he is creator and redeemer of the world.

(k) No limits of time placed on the divine work.

The foregoing conceptions opposed to pantheism.

False antithesis of "nature" and "the supernatural."

#### LECTURE VII.

##### *Biblical Ontology—Man.*

The Christian conception of man, on the two sides of his identity with nature, and of his distinction from and above nature.

Christian ethics is the theory of the "perfect man."

The experimental character of this theory; together with comments on a modern demand that "morals" should be "secularized" and "humanized."

Christian conceptions:

(a) The world and the natural man (or "the flesh") regarded as, respectively, the place and the instrumental condition of the realization of the perfect man.

(b) The birth of the spirit is the birth of the true man.

(c) The actual realization of the true man depends on a spiritual activity, on the part of man.

(d) This activity is conditioned upon knowledge.

(e) The object of this knowledge is "the will of God," which itself is nothing other than the law of absolute or perfected being, or of the most perfect realization of the spiritual nature.

(f) Man's activity supported by the activity of God himself; man, therefore, a co-laborer with God.

(g) Man finds the "dwelling-place" of his true self in God.

(h) That will alone is free which wills the true self, or which wills itself in God.

(i) Man is "saved," or made "perfect man," "in Christ Jesus," and not merely by him. His redemption is a spiritual, and not a merely mechanical process. Christian ethics not quietistic.

#### LECTURE VIII.

##### *Comparative Philosophic Content of Christianity.*

Religion "of and for intelligence."

In what sense the like is true in regard to the works of artistic and political genius.

Religion as the living apprehension of that which philosophy aims to comprehend.

Faith as "abbreviated knowledge."

Indispensable value, for philosophy, of the data contained in the "Christian consciousness;" together with remarks on the question whether philosophy can exist without the data which religion furnishes.

"Self-consciousness" as the principle or standard of measurement for the "philosophic content" of all "religions."

Christianity as the absolute religion.

##### *DR. McCOSH'S PROGRAMME OF A PHILOSOPHIC SERIES.*

[The following circular, issued by Messrs. Scribner's Sons, of New York, announces a series of valuable contributions to Philosophy. Their scope is defined by Dr. McCosh in what follows.—ED.]

For the last thirty years I have been taking my part in the philosophic discussions of the age. I have a few things yet to say before I willingly leave the arena. These have long occupied my thoughts, and they relate to thrilling topics of the day on which many are anxious to have light thrown. In order to bring my views before the thinking public, I start *A Philosophic Series*, to consist of small volumes of about sixty pages each, in stout paper, at fifty cents per volume, and issued quarterly, and each embracing an exposition complete in itself of one theme. I begin with

I. *The Criteria of Diverse Kinds of Truth as opposed to Agnosticism, being a Treatise of Applied Logic.*—This will confront me with the leading philosophic heresy of the day, which is working secretly where it does not appear above ground, and undermining some of our most precious faiths. It has been shown again and again that Agnosticism is suicidal. It is an evident contradiction to affirm that we know that we can know

nothing. But when we have done all this we have only strengthened the position of Agnosticism which holds that all truth is contradictory. Without entering into a wrestling-match with a spectre, I have set before the mind the truth which is seen in its own light. It has again and again been shown that we have no one absolute criterion of all truth. I have allowed this and approached the subject in a different way, and I show that we have now satisfactory criteria of the diverse kinds of truth which we are required to believe. The little treatise, which can be read in a few hours, is intended to give assurance to thinking minds, especially young men, in this age of unsettled opinion. It may also be used as a text-book in our upper schools. It may be followed by

II. *On the Nature of Causation in Relation to the lately discovered Doctrine of the Conservation of Energy or the Persistence of Force.*—It is a fact that most scientific men now acknowledge that they do not know what to make of the doctrine of Causation. The old doctrine is as true as ever that every effect implies a cause, but it requires to be modified and explained anew in conformity with recent science.

III. *On what Development can do and what it cannot do.*—Religious people in the present day do not very well know what to make of Development. Irreligious people are turning it to the worst of purposes, making it supersede the power of God. Surely some good may be done by explaining what is meant by Development, which is just a form of causation, which can do much, but cannot do everything.

IV. *A Criticism of the Philosophy of Kant, specifying its Truths and its Errors.*—Kantism is the most influential philosophy of the day both in Europe and America. Kant has established a body of most important philosophic truth, but, without meaning it, he has allowed principles which are fitted to undermine our knowledge and the reality of things.

V. *A Criticism of Herbert Spencer's Philosophy as culminated in his Ethics.*—Mr. Spencer is the most powerful speculative thinker of our day, and we now see the full philosophic and practical issue of the principles which he has been developing for many years in eight or ten volumes. It is surely desirable to have these principles thoroughly sifted.

But I have proposed enough till such time as I find that my project is to be countenanced by the friends of a sober philosophy.

JAMES MCCOSH.

\* \* NOTICE.—Orders for *THE CRITERIA OF DIVERSE KINDS OF TRUTH* (ready Oct. 12, 1882), and subscriptions for the entire series, will be received by

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS,

743 and 745 BROADWAY, NEW YORK.



*PRESENT STATE AND PROSPECTS OF PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY.*

A LETTER FROM PROFESSOR C. L. MICHELET.

[The following very interesting letter on the above topic, from the hand of Professor Michelet, of Berlin—who, though now in his eighty-third year, exhibits the animation of a seemingly quenchless youth—has recently been received by Professor Howison, in acknowledgment of the printed report of the latter's two lectures on the same subject at the Concord School of Philosophy in July, 1882. We print the translation by permission.—ED.]

[TRANSLATION.]

BERLIN, *April 25, 1883.*

"HONORED FRIEND: You have very accurately, and in burning colors, depicted the doleful decline into which the mass of our philosophic thinkers have fallen. Young Germany, you say, has, with great precipitancy, thrown away not only the results, but the method, of its past, to plunge headlong into the English School. You hold a mirror up before us, to show us with reproach to what a pass we have come. And your 'Present Aspects of Philosophy in Germany' bears witness to the exceeding thoroughness of the brush with which you paint.

"In it you rightly set out from Kant's critical system, as the germ of the entire development—the system which, 'waxing rather than waning,' would to-day, in Neo-Kantianism, be glad to dominate Germany once more, and carry it back to that unintelligible Negation, the Thing-in-itself—the system which has started no end of misgoings, and which affects to disdain Kant's three great successors as dreamers. Still, you do not doubt of the final victory of true philosophy in a people which, now that it has ceased to be the Scrub of Europe—now that it has so gloriously wrestled to its political regeneration—you hold is in the future to bring the Science of Reason to its finished consummation, in continuance of the affirmative systems of those Heroes of philosophy.

"This trust I share completely, and hope to live to see its fulfilment yet, in the frail decline of my life. And now permit me to add to your exposition a few particulars, which may be regarded as supports of this hope.

"Many of the German philosophers who are now throwing themselves into the arms of empiricism do not adhere to the simple, pure empiricism of Locke; but what they call experience is always more or less permeated by apriorist elements. In like manner, Kant's 'Experience,' in

his demanding *how* synthetic judgments are possible *a priori*, has already taken up a metaphysical element into itself, through the Categories, and through Space and Time. For after Hume, with 'the besom of Nemesis,' as you very well express it, had thoroughly swept away Locke's naked empiricism, which fancied it could soar out of itself into universality and necessity, there could not well be any return to that. The universality and necessity which Hume abjured for experience, Kant transferred to the *a priori* conceptions and perceptions of his idealism. And if the Germans have gone to school to the English, the English have also come over the channel to us. At any rate, Spencer is desirous of a combination of induction and deduction, of the *a posteriori* and the *a priori*, makes manifold use of dialectic, and, even in systematic results, is in harmony, through his evolutionary theory of the universe, with the Hegelian world-process, albeit he still ostensibly adheres to the Canon of Kant.

"Hegel himself, while praising Aristotle for a thorough experimentalist as well as a profound thinker, adds: Experience in its totality is Speculation itself. Zeller, however, with all his polemics against the Hegelian dialectic, cannot, even with the best intentions, keep up the stand by bare experience. If, in his speech on 'The Present Position and Problem of German Philosophy' (in the weekly *Im neuen Deutschen Reiche*, No. 50, pp. 921-928, 1872), he begins with: 'We need to return to experience,' he yet concludes with the words: 'But experience only furnishes us with phenomena; the essence of things, philosophic truths, can only be found by active thought.' And therefore I too, in my 'System of Philosophy,' in five volumes, have only been able to see 'Exact Science' in the combination of both methods.

"In view of the existing philosophic situation in Germany, the Berlin Philosophical Society, which originally consisted exclusively of Hegelians, but which, in the course of events, has admitted many members inclining to empiricism, has, in the Third Head of its Prize Problem, set for the competitors the question: 'Does Hegel's dialectic method fulfil the requirements that must be made of philosophic method, or not?'

"With best greetings from household to household,

"In sincere friendship,

"Wholly yours,

"MICHELET.

"PROFESSOR G. H. HOWISON."

## BOOKS RECEIVED.

Notes on Matter, Force, and Motion. By Andrew Leslie. St. Louis, Mo., 1882.

Sketch of the Life of Professor Chester Dewey, D. D., LL. D., late Professor of Chemistry and Natural History in the University of Rochester. By M. B. Anderson, LL. D., President of the University of Rochester.

The Moral Lack of Higher Education of To-day: An Oration delivered at the Forty-seventh Annual Convention of the Delta Upsilon Fraternity, at Providence, Rhode Island, October 20, 1881. By Professor E. B. Andrews.

The New Ethics: An Essay on the Moral Law of Use. By Frank Sewall. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1881.

Three Phases of Modern Theology: Calvinism, Unitarianism, Liberalism. By Joseph Henry Allen, A. M. Boston: George H. Ellis. 1880.

Joh. Friedr. Herbart's Saemmtliche Werke. In Chronologischer Reihenfolge Herausgegeben von Karl Kehrbach. Erster Band. Mit einer Lithographirten Tafel. Leipzig: Verlag von Veit und Comp. 1882.

Life Beyond the Ocean: Sketches of Religious, Social, and Political Life in the United States of America. By A. P. Lopuchin, St. Petersburg. 1882.

Contents: I. *On the Way to America*. (1) From St. Petersburg to Vienna; (2) Zurich; (3) Geneva; (4) Paris; (5) London; (6) Ten Days on the Ocean.

II. *Beyond the Ocean*. (1) New York City; (2) The Merry Christmas; (3) Carnival and Lent; (4) Easter in America; (5) Religion in the United States; (6) The Land of Positive Science; (7) The Bible in America; (8) The Kingdom of the Mighty Dollar and Preaching; (9) A Camp-meeting; (10) The Knights of Mystery (Masons).

III. *Russian Echocs*. (1) A Russian Festival beyond the Ocean; (2) A Russian Sorrow (Death of the Czar); (3) The Russian Chapel in New York; (4) Americans at the Russian Chapel.

IV. *Social and Political Notes*. (1) Our Transatlantic Friends; (2) Immigration; (3) The Land of Milk and Honey; (4) American Husbandry; (5) A Fasting Doctor; (6) Mania for Competitive Trials; (7) On the Sea-shore.

V. *The Presidential Campaign of 1880*. (1) Opening of the Campaign; (2) The Democrats; (3) The Greenbackers and Woman's Rights; (4) On the Battle-field; (5) In the Democratic Camp; (6) Curiosities of the Presidential Campaign; (7) Decision of the People.

VI. *Return from America*. (1) Across the Ocean; (2) From Bremen to St. Petersburg; (3) Home Again. [Title and contents are here translated from the original Russian.]

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### THE CENTENNIAL OF THE "CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON."

BY KUNO FISCHER.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY BENJAMIN RAND.

#### I.

The appearance of Kant's "Critique of the Reason" marks the turning-point which separates the first from the second period in the history of modern philosophy, the former of which had its beginning in England and France, and came to its close in Germany, while the latter is of German origin, and issued from Prussia. The birth of such works dates from the time when they are first published—that is, when they have emerged from the obscurity of the workshop into the full light of the world. The "Critique of Pure Reason" was published in midsummer of the year 1781, simultaneously with Schiller's first tragedy. Kant dedicated his work to the Prussian Minister Von Zedlitz, who had proved himself favorably disposed toward him and his work. He signed the dedication on March 29, 1781, and probably wrote also at the same time the (not dated) Introduction. The larger portion only of the work was then printed, and some months elapsed before the entire publication was completed. It is there-

fore wrong to regard, as is repeatedly done, the date of the dedication as the birthday of the "Critique of the Reason," since this work was written previously, but had not yet been published. It appears from the letters which were written at this time by J. G. Hamann, of Königsberg, to Hartknoch and to Herder, that Hamann, to whom (simultaneously with Kant) the proof-sheets were forwarded, could not finish reading the text before the last week in June, and not until four weeks later did he receive a complete copy, sent from the hand of the author. He wrote a notice of the work on July 1, 1781, for the Königsberg "Times," but which for certain reasons he left unpublished. Its concluding words read as follows: "The fortune of an author consists in being praised by some and known by all—and what the reviewer regards still as the acme of genuine authorship and criticism—to be understood by a very few." Events verified this saying. The first public criticism came from the philosopher Chr. Garve, of Breslau, and made on Kant the worst possible impression. It appeared in an extra of the Göttingen "Literary Advertiser" on January 19, 1782. The publication of the "Critique of Pure Reason" falls, therefore, in the middle, and its first distribution in the second half of the year 1781.

## II.

Before we attempt to realize the importance of this epoch-making work we will direct a hasty glance at its origin, so far as knowledge of this has come to us from the study of the philosopher. Kant, after fifteen years waiting as *privat docent*, was made a professor when forty-six years of age. It was necessary for him to make the customary defence of a printed discourse before entering upon his professorship of Logic and Metaphysics. This took place on August 21, 1770. The theme of the Latin inaugural dissertation was, "The Forms and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World." His respondent was Marcus Herz, a young physician of Jewish descent, with whom Kant had intercourse as teacher and friend, and whom he assured that his ideas had been searched by him (Herz) to their very depths. M. Herz went to Berlin immediately after the disputation, and was there daily a welcomed guest in the house of Mendelssohn. He acquired in time a very creditable position both as physician and



philosopher, and became, through his conversations, and later by lectures before a mixed audience, the first expounder of the Kantian philosophy in the Prussian capital. After his marriage with the daughter of a Portuguese Jewish physician, who was famed for her beauty, intellect, and grace of manners, it was the attractive power of Henrietta Herz which made his house between 1779 and 1803 one of the most frequented literary centres in Berlin. The letters of Kant to M. Herz are most interesting, and are likewise the only letters which give us an accurate insight into the origin of the "Critique of the Reason."

The problems of the Critique, and, indeed, the first of its fundamental discoveries—the new doctrine of Space and Time—were contained in the inaugural dissertation. It is easy to see that the question as to the "Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World" coincides with the question as to the fundamental forms and limits of the faculties of Sense and Intellect; for the Sense-world comprises the objects as they affect our faculty of Sense (*Sinnlichkeit*), while the intelligible world comprises the Presentations (*Vorstellungen*) as they are in themselves independently of the corresponding sensible phenomena and of the nature of our faculty of Sense, and as they can be grasped only by the intellect. The philosopher, therefore, must at once undertake the task of setting forth in a large work "The Limits of the Sense and Reason." But the domain of the reason in its whole extent embraced the principles of Natural Science, of Morals, and of *Æsthetics*, or, otherwise expressed, "The Metaphysics of Nature, the Metaphysics of Morals, and *Æsthetics*." Kant intended at this time to present as soon as possible the entire content of the critical philosophy in one complete work. The tasks, however, divided themselves, and a succession of fundamental critical questions arose, each of which demanded for itself a separate work. Twenty years (1770-'90) elapsed before the plan was realized which Kant had marked out in a letter of June 7, 1771, to Herz as his project.

One of these tasks pressed immediately to the foreground the metaphysical problem, or the question concerning the knowledge of things both theoretical and practical. The solution of this problem the philosopher called a "Critique of the Pure Reason." Its plan and limits were yet much too widely applied. The cri-

tique of the pure reason must be limited to the theoretical science of cognition, the establishment of our knowledge of things through the Sense and Reason. Kant hoped to publish such a work within three months; so he wrote on February 21, 1772. The three months grew into nine years. Again and again during this long period he sees the end nearer at hand than it is, again and again it removes to a distance; in vain he hopes to be able to reach it in the summer of 1777; the next winter, the following summer pass by, and still his hopes, like unfulfilled promises, abide; and even at Christmas of 1779 this hoped-for end is not yet reached. After the difficulties of the research are conquered, the presentation and explanation follow, far greater difficulties than Kant had imagined. "What I call the 'Critique of the Reason,'" he writes on the 20th of August, 1777, "lies like a rock in the way. What retards me is nothing more than the endeavor to make everything appearing therein perfectly intelligible." Genuine clearness demands that one unite amplification and perspicuity with brevity. Brevity at the expense of clearness costs the reader a useless sacrifice of time, and it is also time for which the author is responsible. Kant has taken well to heart the striking words of the Abbé Terrasson: "Many a book would be far shorter if it were not so short." But there exists also a breadth of amplification at the expense of perspicuity if thereby the whole is to us only obscured. "Many a book," Kant has said in order to complete the saying of Terrasson in a no less striking way, "would have been much clearer if it had not been intended to be so very clear." To give an exemplary style of clearness to the most difficult of all books was the mark which was before the eye of the philosopher in his "Critique of the Reason," but which he was unable to reach to perfection at the first throw.

The work had finally so far prospered that Kant, after having first deeply meditated on the whole, then having sketched the single portions in writing, and arranged them in their connection, could now put his hand for the last time to the task and attend to the composition and copy for the press. This occupied between four and five months of the year 1780. In October, Hartknoch, of Riga, offered to publish the work, and before the end of the year the printing began. The three months were nine years, and the promised "little work of a few pages" had become a corpulent

work, the number of whose sheets exceeded two alphabets, and of which Hamann jestingly said : "It does not correspond with the stature of the author."

On the 1st of May, 1781, Kant wrote to his pupil and friend in Berlin : "A book will be published by me during the Easter fair under the title 'Critique of Pure Reason.' It will be printed for Hartknoch's Publication by Grunert in Halle." "This book contains the result of all the manifold researches which began with the ideas over which we disputed under the title of *mundi sensibilis et intelligibilis*. It is to me an important matter to submit the entire result of my efforts to the review of the man who possessed such insight as to deem my ideas worthy of consideration, and who was so sagacious as to search them to their depths."

### III.

A century has passed since the birth of this work, one of the most difficult and most mature which has ever appeared, and to-day the sense of the Kantian teaching is under discussion as if it were of yesterday, and as if the succession of systems which proceeded from it belonged not to the fruit by which the tree is known ; as if only now a "philological" interpretation of his phrases could lead to an understanding of the philosopher, which a century moved and filled by the ideas of Kant failed to obtain. The single portions, however, of the work of a great thinker can only rightly be understood when the problem and innermost thought of the whole are evident to us. We will therefore attempt to render the fundamental ideas so clear that our readers shall be spared those difficulties which obscurity in expression and fulness of detail occasion. Wherein lay the necessity of a new epoch in philosophy, the task which Kant undertook, and in the original comprehension of which he perceived the newness, as likewise the distinguishing characteristics, of his work ?

All the speculation before his time pretended to be an explanation of the *thing*. Each one strove in his own way after a system of the universe, and made a more or less perfected scheme which embraced the all-of-things. So long as there yet existed by the side of such a universal knowledge no special science which branched into the particular domain of things, philosophy reigned without a powerful opposition, and had undisputed possession

of a large kingdom. But as soon as the special sciences appeared, and these provinces were cultivated, opponents arose in an ever-increasing number, who disputed the authority and even the right to existence of philosophy. In antiquity, metaphysics, and, in the middle ages, that which took its place, theology, had easy reception, for the experimental sciences were as yet immature and infant children. They grew up through the discoveries which made the modern epoch and changed our views of the world in all departments; special research increased, and, in the same proportion as the territorial dominion of human knowledge enlarged, the imperial authority of philosophy declined. Were the kingdom not to perish, as of old the Roman-Germanic empire, it must take possession of a new and permanent position, which would be recognized and uncontested on the part of the experimental sciences.

It was *superfluous* if it only repeated what the experimental sciences had discovered and announced; it was of *evil* if it should search into the same objects independent of all experience and oppose trustworthy results with uncertain or false speculations. It must avoid experience, and yet never dared lose sight of it. It must, in the first place, leave the field of empirical facts, the domain of the knowledge of things, and take for its problem the possibility of experience itself, the possibility of a cognition of things in general, the solution of which was to give a new view of the world. This was the only possible expedient which remained for philosophy; it was likewise a necessary task, demanded by the adaptation of the intellect to the acquisition of knowledge.

The fundamental question was not now, How are things and their phenomena possible, the data, whose sum we call nature or reality? but it was, How is the fact of experience and the cognition of things themselves possible? It is evident that this question cannot be solved by experience, for this is not and cannot be its own object.

*A scientific research is therefore demanded which will be distinct from and yet persistently directed upon experience.* The position must be found from which one can behold for himself the entire domain of experience, or the knowledge of things in general. Kant placed philosophy upon this point and made the egg easily



enough stand on its end, although so many hands had attempted this before his time, but unsuccessfully.

The question concerning the possibility of knowledge was as such not new, for there had been very many theories of knowledge in the history of philosophy. The problem had often enough been asked and investigated in the ancient as well as in the modern period before Kant, but had always been answered in this way : that, viewed strictly, the conditions upon which the fact of cognition depends *are themselves, indeed, the entire fact of knowledge*, although in its simplest form. Thus, the fact in question was not explained, but presupposed, no matter whether these presuppositions consisted in the affirmation of innate ideas or in the sensuously given and united impressions, whether this connection was called causal connection or succession in time. The philosophers before Kant explained cognition by a kind of knowledge-substance, just as once the physieists explained the phenomena of heat by a heat-substance, or combustion by the phlogiston. Thus the fact of human knowledge remained unexplained ; and since the assumptions made were not accidental, but followed necessarily from the nature and trend of their systems, it also remained *inexplicable* : it was regarded as a dogma, which seepitics themselves, in spite of every denial, allowed to continue and even employed.

Kant probed this dogmatic position of all the philosophy which preceded him, and brought it to an end with the very simple and obvious claim, that the conditions of knowledge and experience could not themselves indeed be knowledge or experience, but must precede them, as the factors the product, and the cause the effect. There is a great difference between that which goes beyond or surpasses (transcends) our knowledge and that which *precedes* it, and by Kant is designated with the word *a priori*, or "transcendental." The former lies beyond the horizon of our knowledge, the latter on this side. It was to these latter *a priori* conditions of our knowledge and experience that Kant directed his inquiry. His research is in this respect *new*, and distinct from all previous philosophy : it deals with the conditions of human knowledge, not presupposing, but investigating, testing, sifting—that is, it is not dogmatic, but *critical*. The objects of the critical examination are the factors of knowledge, *i. e.*, our faculties of reason ; hence the name "*Critique of the Reason*" for the Kantian investigation. But



it asks how the reason originates experience, and not how it comes forth from the latter filled with manifold empirical intuitions: it treats, to speak Kantian, about the reason *a priori*—the pure reason as the sum-total of the transcendental faculties; hence Kant called his work the “Critique of Pure Reason.” The word “transcendental” signifies with him both the conditions which precede experience and the inquiry directed into these; it is, in the first case, equivalent to *a priori*, and in the second synonymous with “critical”; hence the critical philosophy is called also the “Transcendental Philosophy”; and the “Critique of the Reason” heads each of its divisions and each of its inquiries with the title of a “transcendental.” It is well to explain the sense of this term, since it is customary to present all sorts of mists and reveries under this word, which is either misunderstood or not understood at all.

Kant’s epoch-making achievement lies in the *critical* direction which he has allotted to and pioneered for philosophy.

#### IV.

In order correctly to estimate the importance and extent of this epoch, we must make clear *what is called critical thinking*.

Objects can be held either dogmatically or critically: dogmatically, if one takes the objects as given and perceives only their attributes; critically, if one searches into the conditions from which they and their attributes proceed—that is, investigates their origin and follows the circumstances of their evolution. The origin and development of objects are the problems of the critical thinking; the presentation of the historical development of things is its labor and result. If we accept a system of the universe as given and completed, and seek to discover the laws of its present organization, we treat it dogmatically; on the contrary, critically, when we ask the question, How has the universe originated, and by what changes has its present state gradually arisen? It is precisely the same with the contemplation of the earth and all terrestrial life in the entire diversity of its forms and kinds, with the contemplation of mankind and its races, people, and languages, religions and religious records, poetry and the fine arts; in a word, with the whole world of nature and art. I need only mention the names Kant and Laplace, Lamarck and Darwin, Fr. A. Wolff and G. Niebuhr, D. Fr. Strauss and F. Chr. Baur, in order to evoke

the record of a century which, upon all sides, seeks for its view of the world's historical development by means of *critical* research. I do not speak of this or that product of investigation, but of the critical tendency of mind in which even opponents must share in order to combat those conclusions to which they are averse. Any one of our great literary men, since the days of Lessing, could be brought forward as an example to show the position one occupies in the critical knowledge of things; but above them all stands Kant, *because he applied the critical method to knowledge itself*, and thereby became the founder of a period which has, with good reason, been styled the *critical*. The last century is called the period of Clearing-up (*Aufklaerung*); ours is the period of Criticism. It is in this fact that we discover the bearing and significance of the Kantian epoch.

From a conception of the Kantian problem we obtain at once an idea of its extent, which is found to far exceed that of all previous theories of knowledge. It is the neglect or ignorance of this fact which prevents an insight into the spirit of the Kantian teaching. The factors of knowledge must be discovered, and from these the possibility of experience must be explained. This was the task to be accomplished. Now, it is evident that, without the possibility of experience, there exist no objects of *possible* experience, no objects of the same, no sum-total of the same, which latter is called in German the "*Sinnenwelt*" (Sense-world). The question, therefore, concerning the possibility of experience, concerning the origin of knowledge, must coincide in a certain sense with the question concerning the origin of the Sense-world. The Kantian philosophy, from the way in which it has conceived its task, must demand and lay hold of a point of view in which the Sense-world appears no longer as something given, but as something which issued forth by virtue of the reason; a point of view in which there is made evident the origin of the Sense-world from out of the conditions of reason and its activity.

Here the whole chasm between the dogmatical and critical way of thinking opens up, and we perceive the extraordinary effort of mind which is necessary both in the discoveries of the Critique and in its understanding. The difficulties which have to be overcome in new conditions of life and of knowledge are always as great as the interval between these and the accustomed course of

life and consciousness, and they appear in their most obstinate strength when we are compelled to give up the natural, and, as it were, the rooted point of view of our presentations. Thus it is with the critical way of thinking as opposed to the dogmatical. I will endeavor to explain the difficulties with which it deals by a comparison which has a deeper than a mere figurative relationship to the subject in hand. From the natural point of view which we here occupy, the universe appears to us as an actually given object, as a sphere in whose centre rests the earth, around which sky and sun, moon and planets describe their orbits in various periods of time. The ancient astronomy was founded on the view which required an artificial apparatus for the explication of the given phenomena of the common and special revolutions of celestial bodies, and a Ptolemaic assumption of epicycles for the explanation of the apparently confused courses of the planets. Copernicus saw that the position of the ancient astronomy was untenable, and that the root of its error lay in the geocentric view. In order to understand the planetary universe, the natural view arising from the first immediate sensuous beholding must be abandoned, and the heliocentric view must be adopted, in which the human spirit conceives of the earth as in its horizon, discovers it among the planets, and looks down upon its terrestrial habitat. Now, it is evident that the dweller upon the earth does not observe the rotation of its axis or the central movement of his own world; and that from this lack of observation, this ignorance of his own movement, proceeds that necessary illusion which causes us to perceive a daily rotation of the firmament, a yearly movement of the sun around the earth, and the anomalies in the movements of the planets which revolve around the same centre as the earth. The Copernican system refutes and destroys the Ptolemaic. It recognizes the fundamental error of the latter, and explains, from the geocentric standpoint, all those apparent movements which this considers and must consider as incontestable facts; it substitutes the simplest of solutions, and one most in conformity to nature, for an artificial and insufficient hypothesis. Just as the Copernican system is related to the Ptolemaic in Astronomy, and as the heliocentric standpoint is related to the geocentric in the view of the planetary world, so in general is the critical way of contemplation related to the dogmatical and the transcendental point of view to the natural.

The example and teaching of Copernicus give us involuntarily an important guide. As it is with our view of the material world in general, and of the planetary system in particular, so likewise it may be and is with the Sense-world. It is to be anticipated that similar fundamental errors will produce similar results; that we, unconscious of our own intellectual activity in the formation of our entire world of sensuous presentations, will regard this latter as a given object, and take our own doing for the state and properties of things external to us; just as in the universe we perceive the movements and the conditions of movements of heavenly bodies other than the earth, because we do not observe the motion of our own world. A self-deception similar to that which the geocentric standpoint causes controls our entire idea of the world, and requires, in order to be made evident, and its power destroyed, reflection and knowledge on our part; except that here the basis is far more extensive and much more concealed, and for that reason more difficult to discover than the source of the geocentric error which pertains to our cosmical abode. In order to perceive the order of the planetary world, and in it the movement of the earth, Copernicus must introduce into Astronomy the heliocentric point of view. In order to discern the order of the Sense-world, and in it the activity of our reason, the philosopher must rise to the critical (transcendental) point of view, from which the world of phenomena is seen in Space and Time. The heliocentric view stands in the same relation to the human abode as the critical view to the human reason: the horizon of knowledge of the one extends as far as the region of the heavenly bodies, that of the other as far as Space and Time, or as the Reason and its boundaries. *Kant became the Copernicus of philosophy, and would be it.* Our comparison is one after Kant's own heart, and was employed by him, for he has willingly and repeatedly compared his work to that of Copernicus, as Bacon has his to that of Columbus.

V.

We have just expressed the difference between the dogmatical and critical way of thinking by saying that in the former the objects are assumed to be given, while, on the contrary, in the latter it is asked, How have they originated? Now, it is evident that no object can appear or be realized in our reason without the aid of



our own creating activity. The view according to which things are given us from without is therefore only possible when one does not perceive, or does not know, or forgets the activity of his own mind. This state of unconsciousness or self-forgetfulness characterizes the dogmatic way of thinking. *Not to know what one does*, and for that reason to regard our own work as an alien product, is the very substance and explanation of the dogmatic state. If this activity has its source deeper than our consciousness, or, what amounts to the same, if it precedes the latter, then it acts unconsciously, and the dogmatic view of objects becomes the most natural thing in the world ; it is the first and immediate way of Presentation, the refutation of which is possible only when the unconscious production is revealed and raised into consciousness. In this consists one of the most difficult tasks of the critical thinking. If the creating activity is a conscious one, it can only fall into oblivion through entire lack of reflection on our part ; but the result will be the same, since in such a state of forgetfulness we would regard our own work as a foreign product, only that here the folly of the dogmatic notion comes immediately into view. No one thinks the geocentric view of the world foolish until its falsity has been perceived, but every one laughs at the man who was greatly astonished that it had been discovered what the stars were named ! And yet the first error is just as dogmatic as the second ; for they both follow necessarily from ignorance of our own doings, only we cannot perceive the movement of the earth, but are well aware that all nomenclature is a work of human invention. To one who does not know or forgets the latter fact, the names of the heavenly bodies must appear like labels placed upon them from without, which belong to them as signs to public houses, and then it is certainly right to wonder at their telescopic discovery.

Ignorance of one's own action is the innermost source of all dogmatic bearing, of all the self-deception, blindness, and folly exhibited in the choice of our aim and opinions in life. Knowledge of our own action, or self-knowledge and self-reflection as applied to the aims of a true science and to a philosophy of life, is throughout the task of the critical thought. Kant has justly been compared with Socrates. The point of agreement lies in the last-mentioned characteristics. Self-knowledge, knowledge of one's



own action as applied to the true human purposes of life, was the theme by which Socrates in the ancient and Kant in the modern period made epochs in philosophy. They agreed in the manner of statement of the problem, but entirely disagreed in the method of its solution.

Our idea of the world has arisen unconsciously, and is therefore by birth dogmatic. The natural consciousness continues to hold firmly to the dogmatic position. The dogmatic philosophy rests upon this fundamental view, and must have developed and exhausted its systems in all possible directions before the critical revolution could take place. It is therefore not surprising that the epoch of the latter was not realized until more than 2,000 years had elapsed in the succession of human ideas. The dogmatic philosophy is the historically developed presupposition of the critical, as the Ptolemaic system is of the Copernican.

There exists in the course of development of every man, and even of those who are called to the highest scientific discoveries, a state of mind in which the dogmatic bearing is alone in conformity to nature, and the critical is utterly impossible. One must have knowledge of a multitude of objects, and have acquired a wealth of presentations, before one can take an interest in their production, and can ask the question, How have these objects originated? One must possess Presentations before one can ask, Whence do they come?

When a story is related to a child, and he listens with eagerness and the closest attention in order to satisfy the wants of his imagination, it never occurs to him to inquire, Where did this story have its origin? Who is its authority and voucher? He asks, indeed, whether the story is true, but not from any desire for knowledge, but because he *wishes* it to be true, since an actual occurrence makes an entirely different and far stronger impression upon the fancy of a child than an invented story.

Hence, he is easily and readily contented if he is assured the account is true. For the same reasons, the simple popular belief demands in religious things the actuality of the entire sacred history, and receives any diminution of the historic reality, or any mythologic method of explanation, as a weakening of the sublime impression and an unsettling of belief.

When pictures are shown to a child, his attention is entirely

taken up with the objects presented. He breaks forth in exclamations over the picture, and wants to know what is represented, but does not ask by whom? If we tell him the woman in this painting is Mary with the Child Jesus upon her arm, he is fully contented. That the painter is named Raphael signifies nothing to him. He will not ask, Is it genuine or spurious? Copy or original? Such questions cannot enter his mind, for they presuppose Presentations which the child has not and cannot have. One sees how necessary and indispensable is the dogmatic way in the enlargement of our world of presentations, and how inconsistent and ridiculous would be the demand to think critically from the commencement. Just as the dogmatic philosophy is necessary and indispensable in the progress of human ideas, so likewise is the critical philosophy impossible in the beginning of a philosophic contemplation of the world.

Not merely the presupposition but the *object* of the Critique is our knowledge of things in their inborn dogmatic condition. Clearly, the fact of knowledge must exist before; and, in order that its possibility and legitimacy can be investigated, it must be given, or originated, in uncritical ways apart from reflection, in order to call forth the question, How is it given? The critical philosophy stands, therefore, to our natural (dogmatic) knowledge of things (the latter being taken in its widest signification, which includes also the dogmatic philosophy) as physiology to life, optics to seeing, acoustics to hearing, grammar to speech. By a false reversal of this relation one can easily ascribe to the critical philosophy a folly which would be as nonsensical as if it meant or must mean that a knowledge of things must be delayed until we have grounded it by explanation and proof; that one must first fathom how one knows before one can venture with the faculties of cognition into the stream of things. Truly, Kant would then, as Hegel has sarcastically suggested, be like that man who would not go into the water until he had learned how to swim. To hold to our comparison of the natural knowing with the swimming, Kant is to the one what Archimedes, who discovered the laws of swimming, is to the other. When we heed well the succession of our perceptions and cognitions, they are obvious enough: first the natural seeing, then the optics, then the disciplined, tested, critical seeing whereby we are made conscious of

all the unavoidable optical illusions, and of all the phantoms of appearance. The natural seeing is the subject of optics, the critical is the result. Entirely similar is the succession of stages in the development of philosophy: first the natural knowing and the dogmatic systems, then the critique of the reason, and from this proceeds a trained, instructed, and regulated knowledge, which pierces the self-illusions of the reason or the dogmatic phantoms, and avoids all systems and artifices of knowledge founded upon them. When Kant, in this sense, cried Halt to the continued working and experimenting of a certain metaphysics, he would not, to use once more the foregoing figure, warn against the swimming in the water, but against a neck-breaking flight through the air.

## VI.

The problems of the "Critique of the Reason" must have conformed to the age from which it proceeded, and it is, therefore, befitting for us at its Centennial to realize its historic character and the course of the inquiry which this has determined. For this purpose, let us inquire into the state of philosophic knowledge which Kant saw before him. I refer to the dogmatic systems, which the modern era since the beginning of the seventeenth century had produced. They are founded entirely upon the requirements of the natural knowledge, and are understood through the latter without a learned prolixity.

The natural reason, with confidence in its powers, demands a cognition of things by one's own impartial and unprejudiced research. This point of departure is true for the whole of modern philosophy. That it goes courageously to work with good faith in the natural light of reason, gives it its dogmatic and naturalistic character. But in this way a controversy arises which necessitates a separation into opposing directions in the course of development of philosophy. The only way of knowledge as viewed by the one is a sensuous and rightly guided experience and observation, and, by the other, clear and distinct thought independent of the sensuous perception. We name the first kind of philosophy Empiricism, the second Rationalism. The legitimacy of empiricism is self-evident; that of rationalism is, that through sensuous perception we perceive things only as they appear in our organs of sense, and not as they are in reality, or in

themselves independent of these organs. The clear and distinct—that is, self-evident—thought consists in a constantly progressing series of proofs and deductions after the example of mathematics, and must therefore be based upon immediate and certain axioms or principles, from which all the rest follow. Such a teaching of principles is called Metaphysics; and hence Rationalism is developed in a series of metaphysical systems. The entire controversy of modern philosophy, accordingly, oscillates between Metaphysics and Experience, and Kant would be the judge that investigates and settles this suit in his “Critique of the Reason.”

Bacon had founded Empiricism in two epoch-making works—“*De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum*” (1605), and his “*Novum Organum*” (1620). He described the way of experience, the inductive method, which leads from the perception of facts to the knowledge of causes, but did not investigate the elements in which experience itself consists. This problem Locke solved in one of the weightiest and most potent works in modern philosophy, his “*Essay concerning the Human Understanding*” (1690). He established the position of Sensualism, which is, that all experience is perception, external and internal (sensation and reflection), and all objects of perception are ideas or impressions of the outer and inner sense. But, it will be asked, What are impressions? Here arises a new contrast within Sensualism; impressions are either only perceptions (presentations), and then all our objects of cognition are ideas, and there are, in reality, only the perceiving and perceived existence, only spirits and ideas; or they have a purely material nature, are changes in matter, and then there exist, in fact, only matter and movement. The first view is called Idealism, and the word ought, in the first place, to designate only this standpoint, which Berkeley established (1710-’13); the second view is called Materialism, which the French Philosophy worked out in the last century, and completed in the “*Système de la nature*” (1770). There is still a third inference. If all the objects of conception are only impressions, they are composed of *single* phenomena, without a universal and necessary bond; then every sort of connection is made by ourselves and strengthened by habit, and thus without the objective and valid worth of knowledge. There exists, then, after all, no true knowledge. This is the standpoint of Scepticism, which David Hume, one



of the most sagacious of the men who sprang from the philosophy of experience, set forth in his "Treatise on Human Nature" (1739), and his "Enquiry concerning Human Understanding" (1748). Of all the earlier investigations, these have exercised upon Kant the greatest influence. Hume proved that a true knowledge of things was unexplained, inexplicable, and impossible, by all the previously made presuppositions of philosophy, and thus he caused the question to be more profoundly and searchingly made than heretofore: How is the fact of knowledge possible? First the scepticism, then the criticism; first the great sophists of antiquity, then Socrates! "Without Berkeley, no Hume; without Hume, no Kant," said Hamann; and Kant has himself affirmed that Hume was one of the weightiest of his predecessors, if not the weightiest. The first reviewer of the "Critique of the Reason" did not know how to discriminate correctly between Berkeley and Kant. When Kant wrote the "Prolegomena," for the explanation and defence of his "Critique of Pure Reason," he wrote in the Introduction: "I freely acknowledge that it was a suggestion made by David Hume which many years ago first awoke me from the dogmatic slumber, and gave to my researches in the field of speculative philosophy an entirely different direction."

If, then, the philosophy of experience has led, in the way here described, to scepticism, whither has rationalism tended on the opposite side? I will answer briefly, and allow the different metaphysical systems which have here been set up to so come under the natural light of reason that their theme will immediately be made evident. There are three principal systems, each ruled by a fundamental view, which the state of the world forces upon the unprejudiced mind with all the strength of natural truths. These truths are: 1. The *opposition* between conscious and unconscious being, between spirit and matter; 2. The necessary and universal *connection* of all things, in spite of that opposition; 3. The *continuous gradation* which suffers no break in the nature of things, and adjusts all dissimilarities by gradual transitions. The first idea filled and controlled the teaching of *Descartes*; the second, the system of *Spinoza*; the third, that of *Leibnitz*. These are, as it were, the three words of the naturalistically conceived metaphysics before Kant. There exists no fourth. Now,



since each of these primitive truths comes to the natural understanding, it will strive involuntarily to unite all three, and to avoid only those conclusions which are in opposition to it and its experience; it affirms, with Descartes, the absolute distinction of soul and body, but without reasoning that then all bodies must be powerless, and all beasts sensationless; it affirms, with Spinoza, the universal causal connection of things, but without disavowing the value of aims and powers that conform to purposes in the world; it affirms, with Leibnitz, the continuity of things, but the principle upon which his teaching rests—that all existence consists of representative units of power (monads)—appears to it paradoxical and contrary to experience.

The outcome of all this is evident. A combination of metaphysical systems will be striven after, which will harmonize with and stand the test of experience—a universal system which satisfies the requirements of cognition and settles all controversies, not barely the strife between the metaphysicians, but also that between rationalism and empiricism, between metaphysics and experience. This system of the demanded eclectic kind, matured with the amplest clearness, composed methodically, and set forth in pure German, is the undeniable and weighty service which Christian Wolff has performed for the philosophy and culture of his time as of his people. He founded the school from which the German professors of philosophy of the last century went forth, among them the first teachers of Kant.

The effect of the Wolfian teaching, however, extended farther than school and chair. What lay at its foundation and formed the peculiar active force of this system, which was methodically set forth, was by no means a philosophic profoundness, that discovers concealed truths and works them out regardless of consequences, and unconcerned as to what experience and the common consciousness say thereto; but it was this very common consciousness with its experience, the so called “common sense,” which feels itself secure in the possession of its natural truths, and does not sacrifice any one of these, for the sake of consistency, for a philosophic fancy of the school, or for any artificial system of thought. Nothing was, therefore, more natural than that the eclectic mind, together with that of the “common sense,” should seize the rudder of philosophy, should strip off the chains of

the Wolfian system, which the master had worn with so much *grandézza*, and should now appear as a popular philosophy, as a philosophy for the world, in opposition to the school. Such was the character of the German "Clearing-up," which was in sympathy with Rousseau and the Scotch school, and which belonged to the second half of the last century, thus immediately preceding the critical epoch. Kant has always taken this popular philosophy into consideration.

The outcome of the philosophy of experience was the Scepticism of Hume. This called forth, in opposition to itself, the Scottish school, in the philosophy of "common sense" introduced by Thomas Reid (1764). The outcome of Rationalism and of Metaphysics was Eclecticism. This made and dissolved the system of Wolff. From it also proceeded the German Clearing-up, which harmonized in spirit with the Scotch school. This kinship of spirit was made known by the noble Christian Garve, one of the most influential thinkers and authors of the German *Aufklaerung*, in his translation and exposition of "Ferguson's Moral Philosophy" (1772), and also of the celebrated standard work of Adam Smith. His "Ferguson" was highly stimulating to Schiller, then a pupil in the ducal military academy, and exercised a remarkable influence on the formation of his early philosophical ideas. The representatives of the German Clearing-up held all opposition to the sound common sense as absurd, and all discord between head and heart as a sign of mental wandering. The elucidation of natural truths is their theme, the diffusion of this light is their mission, the popularizing and beauty of instructive speech is their task. It must be acknowledged that men like Moses Mendelssohn, who was, in his time, the most celebrated among the philosophers of the German "Aufklaerung"; like the gifted but early deceased Thomas Abbt, who began to employ, with great success, the style of the essayist, after the example of the French and English, and in conformity to the taste of the age; and like John Jacob Engel, who was the contemporary and friend of Garve, and the polite literary leader of the common sense—have recognized and fulfilled these functions. Over against the extremes of philosophy, these contrasts between Dogmatism and Scepticism, between Rationalism and Empiricism, between Idealism and Materialism, stands the German Clearing-up, in the same relation as in Engel's

"Philosoph für die Welt" Mr. Tobias Witt stands to the extremists in his neighborhood, who ruined their cause every time, in that they always, by their method of speech and action, became extravagant in opposite directions. "I, who have always lived midway between two modes of speech," says Tobias Witt, "I have taken notice of both modes, and now I speak, according to the time and occasion, sometimes as Mr. Grell, and at other times as Mr. Tomm."

## VII.

There is no doubt but that the so-called common sense, with its natural truths, has an actual influence, and rules the world in spite of all systems and doubts of philosophers. The full importance and recognition of this fact can no longer be doubted. But certainly the question upon the decision of which the advance of philosophy depends is, whether, in the recognition of common sense, its own establishing is precluded, or is not, rather, demanded? Whether our common consciousness ought to be the last of all foundations, or not, rather, the first of all problems in philosophy? The men of the Scottish school, as of the German Clearing-up, took "common sense" for a basis, and asserted its truths to be the fundamental facts and the guide in all philosophizing. They desired to return to the point which preceded, in the origin of modern philosophy, the schism between Empiricism and Rationalism. Such a retrogression of things is, however, always impossible, and, when striven after, appears only as a forced and unsuccessful attempt. The next advance of philosophy demands that the common sense, with its so-called natural knowledge, this presupposition of dogmatic cognition, cease to be regarded as the basis of philosophy, and be made into the first of its problems—into the object of its investigation.

This Kant has done. How is the fact of our common or natural consciousness possible? The fundamental *fact* of the dogmatic becomes the fundamental *question* of the critical philosophy. An advance more simple or more in accordance with the law of intellectual development could not be conceived. The dogmatic philosophy with all its marked contrasts and the eclectically conducted Clearing-up with its labored adjustments indicate, in the clearest manner possible, the task of the "Critique of the Reason" and the aim of its research. The systems of knowledge independent of

and in conflict with experience having failed, the cognition of things in full harmony with experience is the end sought, the problem to be solved, and the thing to be explained. If those conditions in the organization of our reason are discovered and pointed out which create experience in its universal and scientific validity, but which cannot produce any other kind of knowledge, then the aim is attained, and the problem is solved which Kant saw before him. The general theme of the "*Critique of the Reason*" lies, therefore, in the question, How and under what conditions is knowledge in conformity with experience? how is experience as science, methodically arranged experience, possible? Since, now, all experience consists in the uniting of the objects of our perception or of phenomena, the theme of the "*Critique of Pure Reason*" divides itself into three main problems: 1. How can sensations give rise to Phenomena? 2. How can phenomena give rise to Experience? 3. How can the truths of experience give rise to Science or a methodically arranged knowledge of the phenomenal world which unceasingly progresses, ever widens its sphere, and constantly strives after the unity of a totality, although it never attains to the perfection of the finished whole? These originations are the creation or work of the reason, and are produced, in the first instance, through the intuitive, in the second through the thinking; in the third through the ideal-giving faculty. Manifestly these powers and doings are so related to one another that they together gradually produce knowledge in conformity with experience. The intuitive reason (Space and Time) transforms our impressions into phenomena, and thus furnishes the material which the understanding (through its power of uniting concepts) changes into truths of experience, which latter again offers the material for the reason to transform into Science or to systematically employ in its strivings after an arranged and perfected unity. This is not the place to discuss at length the solution of these three problems, the second of which proved the most difficult; but we have plainly enough before us, as in the whole issue of the "*Critique of the Reason*," the *development* of the Reason, or the unfolding and intensifying of our faculties of cognition as impelled by the desire for knowledge.



## THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUL AND ITS IMMORTALITY.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF CARL FRIEDRICH GOESCHEL'S "PROOFS OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL," BY SUSAN E. BLOW.

### CHAPTER II—(*Continued*).

#### *Personality, or the Immanent Development of the Soul and its Immortality.*

1. At the very first the soul is seized as fortuitous, ungrounded unity, placed in the outward world, immersed in its own outer body; consciousness is apprehended as the distinction or diremption into inward and outward, the Ego and the non-Ego, the knowing of self and its other; *spirit* is seized as the mediated necessary unity of the Ego and the non-Ego developed out of the double consciousness and grounded in itself. The task to which we now address ourselves is to learn more definitely the content of these different stages, and simultaneously to search out, step by step, *what* occurs in the progressive unfolding of the soul, and *how* in this unfolding the content of the soul is revealed.

2. It is not a brilliant paradox, but the simple truth, that the immortality of the soul demands the death of the soul. The soul, *as soul*—*i. e.*, the soul in its immediate undeveloped phase—must die like the body; *as soul*, the soul cannot persist. The soul must not love its life, but give up its life, in order to win it again as thought in Reason. Its life is the *naivete* of immediate unity, which, having no consciousness of otherness, neither knows nor fears anything external to itself. Its death is the resurrection of consciousness; henceforth it is burdened with its other; unity is shattered, opposition is given with object; upon the one side is the Ego, upon the other the non-Ego; thus consciousness is itself double and contradictory; consciousness of itself and consciousness of its other. Herewith, however, consciousness transfigures itself. For in *knowing* the other it cancels its separation from the other; the other of which it is conscious belongs to it quite as well as the self of which it is conscious. Through insight into the Identity or Continuity of subject and object the conflict of



consciousness is overcome, and the death of consciousness is the birth of the spirit. Spirit is the transfiguration of consciousness; the reconciliation of subject and object. In the spirit, soul and consciousness are born again, and this new birth is a transformation in which the self-consciousness in consciousness is both positively and negatively cancelled.

3. In exact accord with this double-dying is the famous, but grossly misunderstood, distinction of Aristotle between the mortal  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  and the immortal  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ ; for the  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  is realized only as the external existence of the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  is annulled. Its reality is thought; this reality is immortality, for death lies not before it, but behind it.

4. It is worthy of remark that the oldest Greek fathers, Justin Martyr, Tatianus, and Theophilus, in accord with the scriptural trichotomy of body, soul, and spirit, promulgated the identical doctrine of the soul which we have been defending, and recognized the same categories, though they seized them under the form of sensuous representation. They taught *mortalem est animam*; notwithstanding, they rightly opposed the heathen, who, seeming to propound the same doctrine, meant the annihilation of the spirit and denied the persistence of self-consciousness. Therefore the fathers added, "but the soul ( $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ ) shall rise again with a mortal body, for the spirit is imperishable and gives life" ( $\pi\upsilon\epsilon\delta\mu\alpha$   $\acute{\alpha}\phi\theta\alpha\rho\tau\omicron\nu$   $\zeta\omega\omicron\pi\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\nu$ ).

5. Throughout it is the spirit which, first in the phase of existence, and then in that of consciousness, invisibly rules the soul until finally it realizes itself and manifests itself in its own proper image. First it appears as *soul* in and with the body, hence as individual: this is the anthropological sphere. In the second sphere, that of phenomenology, it appears as subject, hence as consciousness. The subject is distinguished from the simple individual in that the latter only reproduces the species, while the former is subject only in so far as it is a self. But is not the subject, like the individual, subordinate to the otherness to which it opposes itself? We behold it die as the soul enters its third phase; the only question is, what elements of the previous phases does this third phase take up into itself? At first we recognize in the soul's progress and transition only this much, that in the third or psychological sphere the spirit appears in its own proper

image, for it has transcended the external, which stood opposed to it, and has reconciled and taken up its object into itself. Therefore it can have lost nothing of its essential nature; it must have saved out of its first period its individuality, out of the second period its self-consciousness; it has mediated both individuality and self-consciousness, and added to them all that they lacked. Thus as Spirit it is all in all; the realized form of the Universal, it is conscious at last of the wealth it has always possessed.

6. We have now attained a point of view from which, in accord with the content of the Spirit, we can pursue our inquiry into the further destiny of the Spirit. Its beginning was immediate; that is to say, it came to the knowledge of itself and of its other without knowing *how* it came; *whence* it came it knows not even yet. Although it has found a beginning in itself as individual, yet this very beginning, through its contingency and immediacy, points to an origin outside of itself. As this contingent beginning led to thought, it must have come out of thought. Consciousness cannot rise out of the unconscious. Because the spirit is thinking activity, it is able to trace itself back to its immediate origin. And conversely this immediate origin points necessarily to an ultimate origin in thought. It is worthy of remark also that the Individual does not *make* his beginning; he only *finds* it in himself; this beginning points, therefore, to a higher origin. But this is as yet not found, nay, rather, it is found in the Result.

7. As realized in spirit, the soul has cancelled the opposition of subject and object. It has mediated itself through its other—taken up its other into itself. The end it has thus attained is, however, only a relative, and corresponding to the relative beginning from which it moved. Its final end and ultimate origin must lie in this other through which it has mediated itself. For obviously this other, considered relatively to the spirit, is either subordinate to it or equal with it (in both of which cases opposition cannot be cancelled in identity and the beginning remains unfound); or finally it is that in which the spirit (which up to this point has progressively developed itself before us), moving backward, finds its origin—moving forward, finds its goal.

8. If the spirit is a mediated somewhat, and has become conscious of this mediation, it must recognize itself more definitely as *finite* spirit, and its other, through which it is mediated, as Abso-

lute Spirit. It cannot really recognize itself as spirit without recognizing itself as finite spirit: as finite spirit its nature is its relationship to Absolute Spirit, in which it finds its condition and its truth—that without which it could not be and that toward which it endlessly strives.

9. The soul is now spirit, *i. e.*, it has developed itself into Conscious Unity with God and the World; it is, however, finite spirit, for it finds its beginning as something given, and has its beginning in time. The Absolute Spirit posits itself from eternity; the finite spirit is through the Absolute Spirit.

10. We took the soul as we found it for our initial point. We found that the soul had a beginning in its own nature and developed itself out of itself. This nature of the soul was, however, something given; thus really we plunged at once *in medias res*; we had not the ultimate or primitive origin of the soul: this ultimate origin can only be the final result, which, moving from our given starting point, we shall attain. Beholding the soul determine itself successively as Individual, as Subject, and as Spirit, we are led to the ultimate Ground or Origin which we presupposed in the earlier stage of our inquiry.

11. Just because the ultimate ground of finite being is Absolute Being, we must, from any given starting-point, reach Absolute Being. The soul does not develop arbitrarily into something different from itself, but moves from its finite beginning toward the Absolute Beginning, which is also its origin and goal. The implicit idea of the finite spirit is Mediation, *i. e.*, identity with and through the Absolute Spirit; to make this implicit idea explicit is the soul's development. The finite spirit is *in* the Absolute Spirit, and the Absolute Spirit in the finite.

12. The ground of the finite spirit is the Absolute Spirit, and the Absolute Spirit is the spirit which has its ground in itself. That which is its own ground must be also the ground of the finite or dependent, whence it follows that the finite spirit partakes of the Infinite Spirit.

13. The recognition of God as Absolute Spirit, or *Causa Sui*, is not simply a formal postulate—*i. e.*, it is not a postulate which lacks reality and with which we try to satisfy ourselves merely because we can go no farther. It is not a fiction of the mind set up as a tranquillizing conclusion to the endless, restless series of

Thought. Rather has our inquiry yielded the result that in the finite spirit God realized himself, for the development of finite spirit ends with the recognition of God as the Absolute Spirit, whose presupposition is necessary to its own being *as* spirit.

14. The spirit is that which is *Causa Sui*—*i. e.*, the spirit can have its presupposition only in spirit. The presupposition of finite spirit is therefore necessarily Absolute Spirit. It follows that the Absolute Spirit produces itself in itself in the same manner in which the spirit made in its image develops itself.

15. The deeper insight is this, that from eternity to eternity God produces himself in Himself, in that out of the Universal through the Particular he becomes Individual. The Individual is so entirely the truth of the Universal and the Particular that they both become Individual through an individualizing or determining process. For both Universal and Particular are limited, determined, or individualized by the limit which separates them from the Individual, or rather from eternity to eternity they determine themselves through this limit as individual. Secondly, the individual is Spirit by means of union with subjectivity from everlasting to everlasting: for Spirit is the truth of individuality and subjectivity in the sense that these latter are complete only in their union as Spirit. Thirdly, Spirit as such is not only a Totality complete in itself, but it is reflected as a totality in each of the Moments of its Self-determining activity. Each of the Moments of the Total is therefore itself a totality penetrated by and mirroring the whole. Through this reflection the spirit realizes itself or determines itself as personality. To recapitulate: The finite depends upon and implies the Infinite. The Infinite has the form of self-relation or Universality. The Universal is the true Individual. The Individual has the form of self-conscious Spirit. The realization of self-conscious spirit is Absolute Personality. Personality is inclusiveness—transparency—that which penetrates all and is penetrated by all.

16. Thus the ternary process of life develops itself three times within the essence of God, therein cancelling numerical difference. In its first phase it appears as Universal, Particular, and Individual; in its second phase, as Individual, Subject, and Person; in the third and final phase, as that which determines itself in itself—as that which is determined by itself, and as self-com-



municating person proceeding again out of this determination. Herein God realizes himself as Absolute Spirit, which is its own object, and which realizes this object through itself.

17. Consequently the Absolute Spirit not only engenders himself within himself, but also creates outside of himself his complete image. This image, through the force of his absolute personality, he penetrates and concretely realizes. This perfect image is the finite spirit.

18. The finite spirit is also spirit; it is essentially spirit; consequently it proceeds from spirit—*i. e.*, from the Absolute Spirit. It is the created image of God. The finite spirit, as spirit, partakes of the Absolute Spirit; it differs from the latter in that it is created and finite. Like the Creator, it is a self—but a created self. This implies that its destiny is to realize itself through a progressive self-unfolding. To this end the first requisite is personality, or the flowing union of the finite with the Infinite Spirit. This personality is seized as the Unity of Thought or Spirit—Spirit is *one*; that is to say, *first*. Spirit is the only reality; outside of it there is nothing real. *Second*. Spirit itself is Unity; for, as there is nothing outside of spirit, spirit cannot be outside of itself. Spirit is not a number, to be distinguished from a preceding or following number; so it is contradictory to speak of a plurality of spirits coexistent or successive. As *personal*, spirit is always emphatically one and the same. Upon this insight rests the philosophy of Aristotle, and upon the gross misapprehension of this insight rests the absurd accusation brought against him, that he attributed to the whole of humanity a single soul, conceived as existing external to all men, and yet the common property of all.

19. As, in accordance with the foregoing, the finite spirit is progressively united with the Absolute Spirit, which is its ground, it necessarily ascribes to itself pre-existence, or, rather, an essence prior to existence. Through this essence it must have developed out of the Universal, through the particular into the Individual, before beginning the individual development which up to this point we have considered.

20. Held under the form of sensuous representation, pre-existence involves the contradiction of existing before existence. The speculative content of the doctrine, however, is, that pre-existence



refers to the essence back of manifestation, the pure being back of existence—the existence which underlies self-recognizing Being. The truth of pre-existence is therefore essence, or rather potentiality in God. Hence a procession out of God, which *as* procession is existence, or the eternally spoken Word. This procession may be indicated as follows: Moving from God it manifests itself first as Universal or the undetermined unity of Being and Naught—thence it passes through the particular, which is Becoming, into Existence. God thinks it, and it is done! The next step is, that Existence should become Conscious Being, or, in other words, that phenomenal existence should move forward into actuality.

21. Creation is essentially that which is brought forth out of what is not, or pure being; more adequately grasped, Creation is seen to be divine in its origin. Creation must, however, not be identified with God; it is rather the negation of the divine essence, the contradiction of himself which God produces out of himself. Just on this account, however, it is not the abstract contradiction *of*, but the immanent contradiction *in* God. Inasmuch as Creation is essentially the externalization of God, his revelation of himself outside of himself, it follows that, as existence, it is not eternal, for only God is eternal in his existence. Consequently, the contradiction of the divine essence must exist under the form of time, although this contradiction as immanent essence is itself eternal. It is therefore as essential to creation to have a beginning in time as it is essential to God to have realized himself from all eternity.

22. From this it follows that the soul of man, being *finite* spirit, and belonging to creation, has as phenomenon its beginning in time. As essence, however, before its Manifestation in time it was inherent potentiality in God.

23. From this insight follows still another result. If the soul, as phenomenon, had its beginning in time, it must, as phenomenal and external, have its end in time. So much follows logically from our premise (and nothing more); and, though this result was limited in a former stage of our inquiry, it is our duty to re-state it here in the light of the deeper insight and more adequate determination to which we have now attained. Only the phenomenal existence of the soul has an end, and it has this end only in time, for only time ends; as the *beginning* of this existence in time finds

its origin backward in eternity, so its *end* in time flows forward and melts into eternity. Its origin in eternity was pure being and essence; the end of the soul as phenomenal existence must, on the contrary, be the *content* which it has developed out of its essence and existence.

24. All turns, therefore, upon the question whether the developed content of the soul is identical with the pure being in which, before existence, it originated. Pure being is, however, nothing but undeveloped being: therefore, the end of the soul is the negation of this beginning, for Soul realized is being developed into Self-conscious Spirit. We must therefore say that what the soul receives *from* eternity undeveloped it takes back developed into eternity. Time, which lies between, is the developing process, and this development follows necessarily from the idea of created being—which has defined itself as being externalized or projected in time.

25. It has now become more glaringly evident that the immortality of the soul depends upon the content it develops and reveals in time. This renews the question, In what does this content consist? The eageny of this question is now definitely apprehended: we must therefore study it more closely, and we are able to do this because we have found in God's self-revealing process the same categories through which the content of the soul develops itself.

26. The implicit being of the soul first realizes and reveals itself as Individuality. To us, therefore, the soul appears first under the form of Individuality; we recognize it first as Being which is for itself. The content of this first determination is as follows: As being for self, the soul, like every other object, is an individual; as soul it is *the* individual, the principle or essence of all individuality, the germ of individualization or determination, the indivisible itself, simplicity and unity. This is the first relationship of the soul—its relationship to the world. The soul is to the world as unity to the manifold—rather it is the unity which includes this manifold in itself.

27. Through this reflection of the individual by the world is tested whether the soul has its own true being in itself; *i. e.*, whether it also reflects itself in itself. The soul meets the test by developing itself into consciousness: the Individual becomes Subject. As subject, it is conscious not only of itself, but of its other;

it knows this other as other, and therefore knows the difference between itself and the other. As result of this first contradiction, it becomes conscious of contradiction in each of the moments of the contradiction, separating itself first into body and soul, and secondly distinguishing in its other subject and object. Thus consciousness finds itself in its other, and its other in itself. The subject not only finds the object in itself, but also finds the subject outside of itself, and the truth or outcome of this subject in the highest or Absolute Subject. Thus self-consciousness culminates in the consciousness of God; herewith the soul enters into its relationship to God. But this relationship is still burdened with alien elements; consciousness is still divided against itself and the contradiction unsolved.

28. Inasmuch as consciousness holds in itself not only *self* but the *other* of self, herein uniting the contradictory, inasmuch as it finds the other in itself, and itself in the other, thus identifying the opposites, inasmuch as finally it finds the Source and the outcome of itself in the other, viz., in the Absolute Consciousness thus transcending the contradiction, its process is one in which the contradiction posited is progressively annulled. The subject itself is finally penetrated by the Absolute Spirit to which originally it opposed itself; thus it rises into personality which must verify itself as penetrability. Thus the subject as person attains to participation with that which was formerly opposed it; thus the soul develops itself through consciousness into spirit which is essentially *to be for the Spirit*. Spirit as such is subject and object; it has no subject and no object but itself. There remains, therefore, nothing but Spirit. What is not Spirit is not actual, but only a moment of actuality, a vanishing element in the total self-manifestation of Spirit. Herein lies the distinction between Nature and the Spirit. Nature manifests in isolation and fragmentariness that which Spirit holds in indivisible Unity. Spirit is one; it grasps even Nature as a totality, which Nature itself can never do.

29. Through this identity of the human Spirit, the original identity within the Absolute Spirit is realized or brought to consciousness. On the other hand, the difference out of which spirit proceeded is both negatively and positively cancelled. Both these results are mediated through Personality, which, sounding forth from God, rings through the Universe, and, resounding from the

finite Spirit, penetrated by the Spirit of God, echoes through all the Spheres of Creation.

30. The soul is created by God; that is, it is externalized—posited as existence. This is its first phase. It is, however, created to be Spirit, or, in other words, determined to be self-determining. Therefore, it develops itself out of the conditions of creature, out of the passive determination of existence, more exactly out of being for self, or individuality, to consciousness; out of consciousness into Spirit, or Being in and for itself. This path which moves from creation, which in its turn moves from God, leads necessarily back to God, for, as God is Spirit, the goal of Creation must be also Spirit. Herein this path of the soul's development is seized as a *Regressus* or return into God. It is, however, also, so far as its content is concerned, a progress, for the soul does not return into the essence under the form of which it was from eternity in God, neither does it return to the form of its own immediate existence in time, but it returns to God as the complete realization of what it was created to be, in that, through this return into God, it comprehends its own idea, and progressively unfolds it without losing, in any phase of its development, a single element of its realization.

31. The development of the soul is therefore not concluded with its return as Spirit into God; rather, it is essential to the idea of Spirit that, through its individuality, it is and remains distinct from God and from all creation; that, through its subjectivity, it is and remains conscious of itself, of God, and of all being; finally, through its personality it annuls its limitations, and, without detriment to its finitude, persists and progresses into the infinite. The persistence of individuality and subjectivity is also demanded by the very idea of personality, which, as inclusiveness, implies, not only the negative cancelling of finitude, but the taking up of finitude into itself.

32. In the light of our attained insight we are now able to define more adequately the difference between the *immediate unity* of the soul in its first appearance, and the *mediated unity* which the finite spirit in its complete development proves itself to be. The immediate unity of the Soul is not pure immediateness, for the former implies at least the soul, while the latter is utterly devoid of any determination. Pure immediateness is the uncon-



scious abstraction from all distinction or determination ; it is the undetermined void. When, however, the soul is seized in its immediate unity, this unity may be more adequately defined as the *simplicity* attributed to the soul, in so far as the soul remains after all manifoldness recognized as externality has been consciously abstracted. To this simplicity we are led by the abstraction from otherness, which necessarily grows out of the recognition of otherness. For, when otherness emerges, we can at first transcend it only by abstracting from it, thus conquering a footing outside of it through which we secure ourselves against it.' Simplicity, therefore, is attributed to the soul in consequence of a previous abstraction from otherness based upon an antecedent recognition of otherness. Hence it is a mediated immediateness, and we understand by simplicity that final inwardness which remains after all that is outward has been abstracted, the last retreat into which the soul as essence retires. Mediated unity, on the contrary, does not abstract from otherness in order to preserve itself, but it penetrates and includes its other as it is itself penetrated and included. The immediate unity of the soul is itself still something external, for it is that contradiction of the external which still feels the pressure of externality ; the mediated unity, on the contrary, is immanent, for the outward belongs to it.

33. Thus far, in speaking of the other with which the individual spirit identifies itself, we have referred to essential being as manifested in Nature, in the world of spirits and in God. We must, however, also include otherness in the individual spirit itself. This other, which belongs immediately to the individual spirit, is the body. Spirit, in this aspect, is the identity of body and soul.

34. In speaking of the body of the soul we must again distinguish between the external body, from which the soul can separate itself, and the internal body, from which the soul, being simple, cannot separate itself, because it is immanent in the soul. It is through this body that the soul is *for itself*, and distinguishes itself from others. This body is also the soul's mediation, for without an individuality of its own it could not ascend through consciousness to that identity of subject and object in which it completes and reveals itself as spirit.

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<sup>1</sup> Δὸς μοι ποῦ στῶ.

35. Through the abstraction of all that was bodily we attributed to the soul, in the first moment of its movement, individuality, or rather the principle of all individuality. This individuality is, as it were, the protection of the soul's identity throughout the different phases of the soul's self-externalization. As mentioned, we seized individuality first by abstracting the body. In the final phase of development, on the contrary, it is the body which realizes and protects individuality and distinguishes one essential being from another. For the body is otherness<sup>1</sup> or negation, and, as result of the identity of the inward and outward negation, is shown to be implicit in the soul.

36. We have now a more adequate knowledge of the content which has developed itself in and from the soul. It is the spirit. And spirit consists, on the one hand, in the identity of the soul with its body, and, on the other, in the identity of the spirit itself with its object. It is through the identity of the soul with its body that the soul preserves its individuality and its subjectivity in its personality. It is through the identity of the spirit with its object that the spirit preserves its personality in its freedom.

This result must be comprehended word by word, and in the exact definition of each particular word; only thus will it be recognized not as a formal result, but as the organic content both of that original development whose course we have retraced, and of the new development whose goal we have anticipated in introducing the element of freedom into the idea of Spirit. For the moment, however, we must concentrate our attention on the difference between the identity of the soul with its negation and the identity of the spirit with its negation. The former is the Spirit in itself, the latter the Spirit outside of itself. In itself and out of itself it is, however, always the same spirit.

37. It has been said that from the personality of the finite spirit follows its freedom. To distinguish personality from the individuality and subjectivity included in it, we have defined it as penetrability. Penetrability is that quality through which the finite spirit enters into inward union and vital interaction with the

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<sup>1</sup> The German word *Andersseyn* has been rendered "otherness" in this translation. The reader will gather the import of the term from the context. The object in consciousness is the otherness or other-being of the subject; Nature is otherness to God.

Absolute Spirit, and through this Absolute Spirit into union and interaction with the whole created universe. Thus, nothing remains external, or rather alien, to the spirit. Through personality, matter itself is penetrated by the spirit, which in the *disjecta membra* of the material world recognizes itself. By virtue of this personality, therefore, the finite spirit is seized as the totality of all its moments which in Nature lie outside of each other, and are united only in spirit. The spirit recognizes in its object itself as other, herein cancelling alienation and revealing the nature of the object. The spirit penetrates all because it is itself penetrated by the Absolute Spirit. Personality is, therefore, the outcome of continuity or stability, the transfiguration of identity, and the cancelling of contradiction in both a negative and positive sense.

38. The essence of freedom is, therefore, identical with personality; freedom is included in and conditioned by the *person*. Freedom of the spirit may be defined negatively as the negation of any limiting or determining power alien to the spirit; positively conceived, it is the power of self-determination. Through personality freedom is mediated in the finite spirit. For, though the finite spirit is determined by the Highest Spirit, which herein manifests itself *as* highest, yet this determining spirit relatively to the determined spirit is not an external, objective, alien force, but, only through its personality, Absolute Spirit. Personality belongs to the Absolute Spirit and to the finite Spirit. In the former it is immediately active, in the latter, in its first phase, it is passive. Hence, conformably to the essence of personality, there follow reciprocal action and reaction. Consequently, it is no alien force which acts upon the finite spirit.

39. The possession of freedom is the guarantee of immortality; this is the logical result of the process of development. The individuality of the *soul* and the consciousness of the *subject* are preserved in the *personality* of the finite spirit through the freedom demanded by personality. On the negative side, freedom implies the disappearance of the negative power which threatened persistence; on the positive side, it implies that the soul, as finite spirit, is self-determining, because determined by spirit. The continuous action of the Absolute Spirit upon the finite spirit must make the latter increasingly self-determining. The complete

penetration of the finite spirit by the Absolute Spirit would be the finite spirit's complete self-determination.

40. While, therefore, personality is secure from destruction and certain of persistence through the freedom which belongs to its idea, it also guards and maintains within itself individuality, or indivisibility, and consciousness. For it is implied in personality that the moments out of which it emerges (Individuality and Consciousness) shall each be included in their essence, though transfigured in their form, just as the idea of spirit includes essentially these same moments apprehended as soul and subject. The indivisible has become penetrable, the individual has become person, but that which penetrates through and through is not something alien and inimical to the individual; consequently, it is not destructive of individuality. In other words, individuality could only be submerged in its abstract opposite; but this enemy has disappeared, for what *is* is individual. So consciousness could lose itself only in *its* opposite, abstract being, but consciousness has emerged from being; it is developed being—the truth or outcome of being; it is penetrated by being; it has coalesced indissolubly *with* being; therefore, consciousness can go over only into universal consciousness, and in this it becomes clearer and purer, like color in the light.

41. The persistence of the human soul has proved itself to be essentially personal persistence—*i. e.*, the finite spirit, as penetrating and penetrated, is in both active and passive union with its other or the Absolute Spirit. The activity of the finite spirit is, therefore, one of *Erinnerung*.<sup>1</sup> Recollection is twofold: it looks backward and moves forward; it presupposes a source which it remembers and demands—a goal toward which all its activity shall tend. It is, therefore, both the internal principle of the developing soul and the ultimate result of this development, *viz.*, immortality itself. There is no point of time in which the soul cannot remember a preceding point; hereupon rests the Platonic psychology. There is, likewise, no point of time in which the soul attains to perfect and complete recollection. Such a point would be the temporal end of the soul; this temporal end would,

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<sup>1</sup> *Erinnerung* means recollection, and in this place also a deepening of the soul in self-knowledge—it is a sort of *descent* into one's self.



however, be eternity, *i. e.*, the totality of all moments as actuality. The reason that much seems accidental to the understanding is one and the same with the reason that so much slips out of the memory. Contingency is negated only through the apprehension of continuity, and things forgotten come again to the recollection only when all things are seen in connection, as moments in an inclusive process. From time to time there seems to float before us, out of a primeval past, vague visions of things known and unknown; try as we may, we cannot make the vision definite. Much of the past, which once was near and vivid, melts into unconsciousness; much of the future, which tried to come to us and could not, recedes into the invisible distance; but if we have forever lost the one, shall we never grasp the other?

42. It is worthy of remark, for it will aid us to orient ourselves, that freedom, immortality, and *Erinnerung* are the more exact determinations of personality which develop themselves out of its contents and exhibit the relations of the finite spirit with itself, and to all that is other than itself. Thus, too, the prophetic longing of feeling to meet its loved ones beyond the grave, the hope guaranteed by faith of conscious reunion before the throne of God, determines itself in personality as a mediated concept. As faith is not ashamed of the Gospel, so philosophy is not ashamed of the childish representation of this reunion, but, in face of the sneer and jeer of pantheism, seeks its ideal development. This childish representation is one stage of the development, though a low stage. The spirit transcends it as it learns to distinguish the false from the true selfhood.

43. But in mortality there is not complete penetration, for the body unpenetrated by spirit decays. This is one side of death; the other is, that penetration becomes complete in the resurrection, which is nothing else than the penetration of the body, the final cancelling of contingency, and the transition to an eternally progressive reflection and reciprocal penetration.

44. The resurrection is the consummation of the soul's beatitude, for it leaves nothing foreign and impenetrable to the soul standing over against the soul. The last enemy has been destroyed. Herein, however, blessedness is only negatively defined. Positively defined, blessedness is not the pure light, but the fulness of colors in the light and their reciprocal interpenetration; in

other words, the transfiguration of the body with the soul in the spirit. There shall come a time, and it shall be for all time, when one person shall, literally, be within another; when each one of us shall read in the other the hidden secret which, as yet, we know not even in ourselves. All shall be transparent. Now, the soul is clearer than the body—*mens notior corpore*; the soul is transparent, the body opaque. But the time shall come when the body shall be completely penetrated, and one with the Soul in the Spirit.

45. As the spirit, in the process of self-development and self-realization, moves through three spheres, and only in the third sphere attains its adequate form, so in each sphere it moves through three phases, the third of which always includes the other two, and therein develops (though always within the limits of the special sphere) the enduring germ of immortality.

That what has been said may grow clearer, we must now again (as demanded by the spirally progressive movement of the idea) circle around our course from its remote beginning, thus developing a fresh content and a further completeness.

46. In the Anthropological Sphere the soul moves through its natural existence or corporeality, and through its yet dreaming internality, to its actuality which is attained when internality comes to itself in the body. This Actuality is the unity and individuality of the soul, manifested as *feeling*. Feeling is, therefore, the imperishable basis of "being in and by self."

In the sphere of phenomenology, the subjectivity which results from feeling dirempts itself into the double consciousness, whose unity is the Reason of the Subject. Reason is thus the persistence of being *for* self.

In the psychological sphere, the Spirit, which is the Concrete realization of Reason, moves through its theoretical sphere in which the object acts upon it, and through its practical sphere in which it acts upon the object, to its truth or actuality, which proves itself to be Personality. Personality consists in the active and passive participation of the soul *with* the body *in* the Spirit, and also in the communion of the finite Spirit with the Absolute Spirit, and with all other Spirits.

47. With Personality is bound up, on the one side, *Erinnerung*, as the outcome of Feeling, and, on the other side, Freedom, as the

outcome of Reason. The outcome of feeling is the unity of the soul with its body in the Spirit, whence follows Immortality; the outcome of Reason is the participation of the Spirit in the corporeal externality of Creation in which consists the Resurrection. Both presuppose the Absolute Personality, and, consequently, imply the beatitude of the soul as the corporeality of the Spirit in the service of God.

48. The destiny of man, conformably to the idea of Creation and its preservation, is essentially *personal*—*i. e.*, man is called to communion with God and with Creation. In so far as he, being created, is not yet thoroughly participative, he is, nevertheless, capable of participation or Person in the process of becoming. He loses the power of participation only in so far as he, in virtue of the indwelling freedom of the Person, opposes himself *to* it, falls away *from* it, and obdurately persists in this fallen condition.

49. Obdurate persistence in isolation is evil; it is the opposite of participation, which is good. It is defined more accurately as “the flesh”—*i. e.*, the relationship of the body to the soul has been reversed; the body rules instead of serving; it hardens and obscures the soul, instead of allowing itself to be penetrated by the soul.

It has been stated that in Personality the unity of the soul *with* the body *in* the Spirit is bound up as *Erinnerung*, and the unity of the spirit *with* creation *in* the Creator is bound up as freedom, whence flow the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body. Conversely, there is bound up with obdurate isolation, on the one side, the rejection or expulsion of the soul from participation, or, in other words, conflict between the soul and body in the flesh; and, on the other side, slavery and disobedience, or conflict between the flesh and the spirit. From the enduring discord between body and soul follow the progressive mortality and impenetrability of the soul; from persistent alienation or isolation results an endless future, already begun, of damnation in slavery and disobedience. It is the “flesh” or the rebellious and obdurate body which, reversing the relationship between soul and body, darkens and degrades both; the servant, to his own shame, makes himself master; the master falls into disgraceful slavery, until the Redeeming Personality, descending in the form of grace, ultimately lightens even this darkness and penetrates

even this impenetrability, and restores to the soul blessedness, to the body true corporeality, *i. e.*, the freedom of obedience. For corporeality *is* obedience, and, when the body has become one with the soul in personality, obedience is converted, through participation with God and creation, into freedom.

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## FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF J. G. FICHTE BY A. E. KROEGER.

### PART SECOND.—*Concerning the Practical Faculty.*

#### CHAPTER VII.

##### COMMUNICATION BETWEEN FREE INDIVIDUALS AS SUCH.—THE MORAL LAW.

We have elaborated three main parts of the objective representation of the world: a system of Egos, a system of organized bodies of these Egos, and a sensuous world. But our previous assertions involved still another, fourth, point. We have stated that not only the body of a rational being, but also the product of its activity, must be perceivable, and perceivable *as such*, by all other rational beings; and this absolute perception of the products of free beings, as such, belongs to the objective representations of the world. This perceptibility of the products, etc., we have established as a mere naked fact of consciousness.

We have, thus, the problem left us: to explain the possibility of this fact from the totality of consciousness, and thereby to make it a part of the system of that consciousness, since we do not conceive consciousness as a mere collection of separate phenomena, but as one in itself connected phenomenon.

1. Let us first determine the fact still closer.

The individual does not, in point of fact, act as an individual, but as the one life; his self-determination to act is, as we have seen, a renunciation of his individuality, which rests upon the mere free conception, and a self-abandonment to the objective external power, which is the power of the one Life. Hence it is not the individual, but the one life, which acts.



If this activity, or one of its products, is to be perceived, the *attention* of the perceiving individual is requisite. But this attention is also a renunciation of the individual as such and a surrendering of itself to the objective thinking, as the one life. Hence, it is also not the individual, but the one life, which perceives.

In the above established fact, therefore, the one life acts upon itself; and thus it seems fully explained and made comprehensible how it, as the life of consciousness, not only can but must be conscious of itself in its activity; precisely as individual life becomes conscious of its individual freedom. The problem seems solved.

2. Strict as this argumentation appears to be, and although not every one might be able to point out its defect, I still hope that no one will be satisfied with it. Indeed, I have made use of it only to make the real point in issue more prominent. The defect in it is this: It is quite true that the individuality is altogether pushed back into the inner sphere of contemplation, and that it does not occur at all on the field of objective world-contemplation, where only the unity occurs. But what sort of a unity is this? It is simply *Sameness*, but by no means a numerical unity. It is true that the many are altogether the same, without any qualitative distinction; but they are not one in point of number. On the contrary, rather, that Sameness is repeated many times, and this manifoldness rather constitutes a separation. From this it follows that the established fact involves the following assertion: One of those many individuals is to suspend the original Sameness by absolute freedom; it is to determine itself by actual activity beyond that Sameness, which inner further determination will probably image itself also upon a material product. But this change is not only to effect the one individual, which actually acts, but likewise at the same time all the repetitions of that individual, separated as they are by numbers. That change, since it is to be perceived by them all, is to alter the world-contemplation of them all in the same manner as it has changed that of the free originator of the change, in whom the change might be explained from the contemplation of his inner freedom. The matter to be made clear, therefore, is, how the inner absolute freedom of one individual can change and bind the contemplation of all. It

appears at once that the question is important; and it can be seen why the question can be solved only by showing up a connecting link here, through which the numerical separation would be suspended in the same way as the objective self-representation of life suspended the qualitative separation, and by means of which the life would be comprehended as numerically one, precisely as it has been comprehended previously as qualitatively one. Not until that link has been shown up can we justly say what we prematurely attempted to say before—namely: that it is the one life of consciousness, which acts upon itself, and that hence it must necessarily be conscious of itself in this its activity. It is therefore our next task to find that link, since it alone can solve the problem placed before us in the established fact.

This link will, of course, show itself to be a new fact of consciousness, to which we must assign its place in the comprehension of the totality of our phenomenon.

3. In order to fix the real point in dispute still more concisely, and thereby, of course, to bring the clearness of the solution nearer to us, we shall compare it with the preceding point as follows: We cannot proceed here as we did previously, nor can we hope to deduce the link required here from the foregoing. Previously thinking represented the reposing and dead power of life; the mere fixed being of that power; and the image of that power in contemplation was nature. Hence, nature is as unchangeable as its prototype; and not only is it not involved in, but it is downright contradictory to, the conception of nature to think in it a change, a deviation from its eternal law, a new creation. Anything like this is altogether excluded by that thinking of a nature, and is impossible. If, nevertheless, it should occur, it would be possible only through a completely new principle of thinking, utterly opposed to all previous thinking.

But this is precisely what our fact involves. Absolute freedom of life is to make something real even down in the sensuous world. Hence, something utterly new is certainly to be created in that world. This follows neither from nature itself, nor from its contemplation; indeed, it is downright contradictory to nature. Hence, the contemplation of this new creature must also be a new creature by an absolute *hiatus*, without any gradual transition of the fixed contemplation of nature; not only not corresponding to

and not explainable from the development of this contemplation of nature, but in direct contradiction to it.

Still, in so far as this product is nevertheless to be visible within the sphere of sensuous contemplation, this sphere itself will dirempt into an *unchangeable* sphere, as the expression of the first thinking, and into a sphere *changeable* through freedom.

(This, though in itself important and to be well pondered, is for our present investigation merely collateral.)

4. Now, where do we propose to connect this altogether new contemplation?

We are well aware that we cannot proceed here as the materialist does, who is ready with the reply: "Why, these products of freedom are simply in themselves"—how difficult he would find it to defend this if he considered what he were saying!—"and make impressions upon us, therefore, according to what they are!" The way of the materialist proceeds from the outward to the inward; ours proceeds from the inward. We must show up an inward, which is contemplated in those products. Now, this inward does not lie concealed, as we have seen just now, in the thinking of the power, but in a new and higher, though perhaps not really actual thinking, which enters consciousness. We shall call it for the present X. This X is, in this series, the absolute first, and it is, like the previously pointed out thinking of the power in general, represented in a sensuous world, and in contemplation represented in a product of this sensuous world, as a new creation within it.

5. What kind of a thinking is this? This product of the rational being outside of us is to appear as one of absolute origin, as a new creation within fixed and established nature. Hence the thinking which lies at its basis is also to appear as a new thinking, not proceeding from the series of preceding thinking, as the sequence proceeds from the ground, but as a thinking which is absolute in comparison with all previous thinking. Furthermore, that product is not to appear as product of *my* freedom—of mine, the thinking individual. But now there is no immediate object of inner contemplation at all except freedom; hence it must be freedom, which is determined by that required thinking = X. And, since it is not my own determination of freedom, it must be a foreign determination; hence a *limitation* of freedom.

Thus far we are clear; the only question is, What kind of a

limitation of freedom is this? The power in general is altogether determined; it is One; it is altogether a totality, and the same in every repetition; and as such it is posited as existing already through the previous thinking, and engrafted upon unchangeable nature. But so far as that power extends, so far the freedom of every repetition extends. The new thinking = X cannot be in contradiction to this thinking; it cannot cancel a freedom posited by the latter, *in so far as it is thus posited through the latter*. Hence the thinking X is certainly not a limitation of freedom, in so far as it *can* do something—in which respect alone freedom is posited through the first thinking. Each repetition *can* do everything involved in the power by virtue of the first thinking. Hence there remains for the thinking X only a limitation of freedom through freedom itself; X must renounce that freedom. The thinking X would thus be a law addressed to freedom to limit itself through itself. Although freedom *can* do something by virtue of the first thinking, it *shall* not (must not, ought not to) do what it can. X is a prohibition of the use of a certain, undoubtedly existing, freedom. This absolute prohibition, as an inwardness—and made manifest in the external contemplation precisely as the one power of life was manifested previously—would produce in that contemplation a product of the freedom of a rational being outside of me, just as that power of life produced in contemplation a nature without any freedom at all.

6. Let us first express clearly the new discovery we have made. Previously we said: Life, as one, has its determined power, and *can* develop that power altogether and without any drawback in every numerical repetition of itself. Now, however, we say: That is true; but, nevertheless, there occur in the absolute thinking of that life prohibitions to make use of that freedom *in certain cases*. I add these words purposely, since I do not speak at all, as yet, of the law in its unity, but merely of its single, transitory, and, as it were, psychological utterances.

This prohibition occurs in the one life, and hence in all its numerical repetitions.

We said above that the explanation of the fact under discussion would force upon us the assumption of another fact. This new fact has just been found. It is the appearance of a moral law—though for the present manifested only in the form of prohibitions



of certain utterances of freedom. This at the same time leads us at once into a new chief division of our whole subject. We may properly characterize the contents of that division as a *higher faculty*, in relation to which the faculty treated of in our two first divisions, both in its theoretical and in its practical form, is a lower faculty.

### PART THIRD.—*Concerning the Higher Faculty.*

#### CHAPTER I.

##### THE MORAL TIE BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS.

We have asserted this thinking of being able to do something—which yet we are prohibited from doing—precisely as we have previously asserted the thinking of the power represented in external contemplation; and as we posited the latter as a fixed world of nature, so we posited the former as the product of the freedom of free beings outside of the contemplating individual. We have shown how that thinking of a prohibition occurs internally, and how, precisely on that account, the appearance of such a product of freedom occurs externally. We have further shown how that limitation of freedom through the law does not need to enter into clear consciousness, and that it does not enter consciousness in original construction any more than the power of life did in the original construction of nature, being merely the invisible ground of determination of such a limitation of the productive power of imagination, through which there arises for us the appearance of a product of freedom of a free being.

But I say still more. We have actually deduced fixed nature from an inner and higher principle; the existing power of life is the ground of its existence and its determination. Have we deduced in the same way the system of Egos and their organized bodies? As a fact, we have established it also; and we have, furthermore, added the general deduction that, in this representation of life, its unity, which was broken off in the individuality, is restored. After that we closed with the general reflection that this sum of Egos is infinite in its possibility, but ended and determined in actuality. This last expression shows us what is lacking: the determining ground of this objective contemplation of a system of

Egos outside of us, and the principle, which limits the infinity of such an image, have not yet been pointed out. The just discovered thinking of a prohibition has furnished us this lacking principle. Whenever a prohibition makes itself felt within us—or would make itself felt if we were to make the feeling clear to our consciousness—not to act, because an expression of freedom outside of us is to be expected, there we posit a free being; and wherever, together with the prohibition, that expression itself appears to us, we posit a product of that free being.

We have discovered that the use of freedom (the actual development of the existing power of life) is subordinated to a higher law addressed to inner freedom itself, in consequence of which the latter is to determine itself through itself. Whether this law appears in that unity and universality in which we have announced it just at present, or whether it is, perhaps, in this its formal unity, merely a conception produced by ourselves, does not concern us here at all. We speak here merely of its single, factically occurring utterances of the single, determined prohibitions.

Concerning these we have found the following: The one life, which is qualitatively one and the same, is separated into many numerically different repetitions, each of which is possessed of the entire One power of life. Let us assume that one of these repetitions should exercise a part of that one common power of life; then there arises—immediately, absolutely, and as a new creation—a prohibition, within all the other numerical repetitions, to work against that exercise of power; a prohibition which, although it does not necessarily enter consciousness, can, nevertheless, be always raised into consciousness by reflection, and which, moreover, at any rate, exists in the inwardness of life and manifests itself as principle in an external contemplation (of course, only for him who attends, who transplants himself from out of his own individuality into the sphere of unity). I say it is a prohibition, not impotence. The individual *can* well enough, but he *shall* not, *must* not do it. He can do it physically, but he cannot do it morally. Hence we certainly do maintain that the freedom of the one individual does determine and form immediately the freedom of all; not immediately in a physical way, however, but mediately, through the uprising prohibition, in a moral way. Thus, then, the numerical separation has been cau-

celled, as was required, and the gulf, which remained between the many sensuously, has been filled up morally, not by a physical, but by a moral connection.

Nevertheless, it is necessary, in order to throw full clearness on the preceding, that we should first definitely establish the distinction between the physical and the moral *nexus*.

A physical *nexus* exists where a cause, immediately through its effect upon itself, is also effect upon another, where self-determination, therefore, is at the same time determination of another, and where this effect upon self, or self-determination, and effect upon another, or determination of another, are in their nature one and the same. A material body, for instance, moving in space, moves itself, of course, first of all; and is, in so far, only self-determination. But immediately through that self-movement it propels everything, which resists it with less power, out of that space, which it enters. Its self-movement and its movement of another are absolutely one and the same, and there is no mediating link. (In the same manner we regard our own free action upon the material world. Our hand, for instance, propels something immediately in accordance with a law, by moving itself according to a law.)

A moral *nexus*, however, is one where another middle link enters between the self-determination of the cause and the determination of another, which middle link, since it cannot be a Being—whereby all *nexus* would be cancelled—must be a consciousness; an immediate consciousness of that self-determination of the cause in the other. Now, this consciousness of the self-determination, and by no means the self-determination immediately, as in the physical *nexus*, is to determine and limit the other. How can this be possible? Is not consciousness freedom, and determined consciousness freedom from that of which we are conscious? As sure, therefore, as the other is conscious of the self-determination of the cause, he himself must soar freely and indifferently above it. He is limited by it must mean, therefore, that he is called upon, on account of that consciousness, to limit his undoubtedly existing freedom by his own freedom.

Now, such a moral *nexus* is the one which we have asserted—one individual act which is a self-determination and remains as such altogether and wholly in him. But immediately united with

this self-determination there arises an altogether general consciousness for all individuals, which is accompanied immediately by a limiting prohibition; and thus, then, as we intended, moral connection has been established between them all. Although their separation in the physical world remains, nay, is rather only now really confirmed, they are nevertheless all within the moral One, and encircled by the law, which prohibits to all the same exercise of freedom.

To speak popularly, this is the *nexus*—evident to all, and manifesting itself in the lowest consciousness—between free and rational beings. In their physical *nexus* they are not to tread on each other, treat each other as matter by pushing, knocking, or beating each other. They are not to place themselves in immediate continuity, but to put consciousness and thought between them and thus act upon each other. As representatives of this reciprocal action we point out in the sensuous world *light* and *air*,<sup>1</sup> which separate the immediate continuity, and make possible mutual visibility and communication of thoughts through words. Both are half-spiritual elements in comparison with solid matter, which our body has not at all for other individuals, but solely for the solid matter outside of us.

I said that the multiplicity of individuals are one through the moral *nexus*, however separate they may remain in the sensuous world. Nevertheless, an important question remains unanswered here which we shall by no means conceal. Our statement was, that when one of the numerical repetitions of the one life acts free, there arises absolutely a consciousness for all others, which prohibits them to use their freedom adversely to that act. If this transition is admitted, everything else that we have said follows of itself according to our previous principles. But how is it with the transition itself? How can the free self-determination of the one effect and cause a consciousness in all the others? This surely is the real point of the question. The present standpoint of our investigation, therefore, is this: It is true that we have taken life from out of the sensuous into the moral world, and we have also indicated the characteristic point of distinction between both; but we still lack their connecting link.

<sup>1</sup> Compare FICHTE'S "Science of Rights" with this and all the preceding deduction of individuality.



## CHAPTER II.

## FULLER EXPOSITION OF INDIVIDUALITY.

1. Let us posit in advance of all possible utterance of freedom an objective contemplation of the power of life generally, as a manifestation in the contemplation of the world. That objective contemplation must be in all regards one. There is no subject in it at all, for that contemplation does not reflect itself, but is a mere objective existence of such a contemplation, a mere pouring out and a pure externality, without any inner essence.

Let us assume that an actual utterance of the power thus expressed in contemplation is to be arrived at; how would this be possible? Contemplation is scattered over the manifold and opposite; its very essence consists in this. But the actual activity of freedom is conditioned, according to what we said above, by beginning in a simple point and moving onward from it, according to the law of particular conditionedness. If an activity is to be attained, therefore, the one life must first contract itself from out that universality and scatteredness into a single point; and this it must do, of course, with absolute freedom.

Now, if such a contraction were to take place, what would be the contracting factor? Evidently the one life; for nothing exists outside of it. But what would be the result of the contraction? It would be a limitation to the one point in the universal, with abstraction from all other points; it would be that which contracts itself precisely in this point; which did not exist in the general contemplation, but first arose into being through the absolute act of contraction, and which is thus enabled to become a subject of reflection. It would be the possibility to reflect upon the point thus given through the contraction, and to calculate, according to the law of conditionedness, the causality which may now emanate from it. In short, the result of such a contraction would be that it would only make possible another contemplation, based upon the first original *fact* of freedom, which contemplation is the same we described above as internal, and as the property of the individual. Hence, it originates the individual itself, and the self-contraction of the One is the original *actus individuationis*.

What is it, then, which makes and produces the individual? Evidently the one life, by the contraction of itself. And what is it, really, in the contemplation conditioned by and presupposing the determined contraction, which contemplates and is contemplated; or, what is the Ego which occurs in it? It is the one life, now entered into this form, however, and abandoning the general form of externally gazing contemplation. Can the one life return immediately from out of this form of contraction to the general one of scatteredness? Undoubtedly. The individual, therefore, is not at all a special Being of Life, but a mere form of it—and a form, moreover, of its absolute freedom. The forms exclude each other mutually; the life cannot be in one form and in the same undivided act in another form; but it can pass from one into the other with the same one freedom, and remain one and the same by means of that freedom. The one absolute life changes itself into an individual without thereby losing its freedom.

The individual is not a particular being, but an accidental form. Hence the main proposition which we are trying to solve—that the individuals, either as such, or, at least, as in their form of existence separate numerical repetitions of the one life, represent just so many separated worlds, and that thus there is a gulf between them which we must try to fill up; this proposition is now done away with altogether, and hence the whole difficulty is removed. The immediate tie between individuality and universality is absolute, and remains always in the freedom of the life to form itself either into the one or the other.

I add here, at once, the highly important general proposition, that it is conditionally necessary that the life should assume individual form, the condition being—*if* it is to act. No acting except in the individual form, since only thus does life concentrate itself into the point of unity, from which all acting must proceed. It is only in the individual form that the life is a practical principle. But it is never necessary—I mean physically necessary—that it should act, since it always acts with absolute freedom; and hence I say that the necessity is conditioned. It may be different under the moral legislation, and it may there become necessary to attribute to the individual form another than the merely conditioned necessity.

2. We have hitherto described the life in the individual form as limited to the one point only *in contemplation*, and as sketching an image of its acting from out of this point. Let us assume, now, that it determines itself to act, and acts really; in virtue of which of its two forms does it do this? The life has power only in its unity; hence, as we have already remarked in the proper place, it acts only as unity and only in this form. Again, a real exercise of the power occurs only from out of a point of unity, and by passing through a series of conditions. Life can comprehend both only in its form of individuality. Life, therefore, acts in virtue of both of its forms, both being intimately united. The universal form furnishes the power in general; the individual form furnishes its determinateness, without which a factical utterance of the power could never take place. The individual form is, in reality, only the power of the conception and of a contemplation in accordance with the conception; in itself, it is not at all *really active*. But since the spiritual life can be active only in accordance with a conception—for this is involved in the contraction into the one point, as the last decisive proof—the individual form is that form through which it must necessarily pass in order to arrive from the all-encircling contemplation at a real act. The one which is not absorbed in the various and opposite forms of itself, but remains the same in all changes, is the really, for itself, existing element of life. Whether it is, on that account, absolute, I do not propose to say. For us it is at present only the absolute element of Life, in opposition to life's mere appearances.

It itself is unchangeable in this its being; for itself is absorbed in none of these changes. These, its changes, certainly exclude each other mutually in time, and time itself is nothing but the form of contemplation of those changes themselves as nevertheless belonging to One. But the unchangeable itself is absolutely beyond all time; for, although it changes in time, these changes do not affect its real being. If these modifications are, furthermore, put into a fixed and permanent form, which form they have, of course, only for the connecting contemplation, then this occurs in the form of contemplation of space. Since life itself thus soars over its modifications, it soars all the more over the fixed determining contemplation of them; it is even less in space than it is in time. It is a mere power—a pure power without

substrate, a power which does not at all appear immediately, and hence is not contemplated, and which, therefore, is also not contemplated in any of the possible forms of contemplation. Here, therefore, we hit upon a thinking, which by its very content excludes all contemplability, and hence every form of possible contemplation. Its thought involves positively no appearance but that which is at the basis of all possible appearance. Wherever an appearance is, there itself is no longer; but there it is one of its appearances. I say only one, for it is not totally absorbed in any of its appearances; and, in order to substantiate this, it appears in many forms, remaining one and the same in the transition. That which is altogether no object of contemplation is called, not sensuous, supersensuous, spiritual, all of these terms being negative modes of determination taken from our contemplation. Spiritual, however, signifies that, the content itself of which precludes sensuous interference, as is the case here.

It is easier to comprehend in a certain case—as, for instance, in the present one—that we ought to act in accordance with this insight, than do so really, and to keep sensuous interference actually aloof. This happens, because all of us have first developed our consciousness within the sphere of sensuous contemplation, and have passed a good part of our life in it, and because sensuous contemplation has thus become, through habit, almost a second nature with us. Even if any one succeeds so far as to be able to keep that sensuous admixture aloof so long as he is attentive to himself, he still is, nevertheless, very easily surprised by the old habit whenever he has to reason, and when he can, therefore, no longer keep his attention fixed upon himself. Without being conscious of it, his reasoning assumes a sensuous form. It is thus in our case. We have said, that it is the one life, which assumes the form of individuality, because it can appear as a practical faculty only in that form; in all individual forms the same one life, and in all those forms in its totality. Now, if somebody were to find it difficult to comprehend this, what could possibly be the reason? Perhaps, without being quite conscious of it, he argues as follows: The one life is, therefore, in me in all its totality; at the same time, it is in my neighbor; at the same time, perhaps, also in America; perhaps even in Sirius; but how can it be at the same time in so many places? Such a man would,



therefore, have conceived the spiritual life in the form of external contemplation, and tied it to conditions of space—which is precisely what he should not have done.

According to the above, the self-determination of the one life to engage in real activity—which determination can never occur otherwise than in individual form—results necessarily in a consciousness of this its activity on the part of life, which consciousness is universal, and hence must occur in the same manner in each individual form, which life has assumed. What kind of consciousness is this? The general contemplation of the power, simply as such power, remains; for it is an unchangeable, fundamental form of life; the view of the fixed and unchangeable nature, which is expressed in that contemplation, remains also, and life can always resume its place therein, through an exercise of its freedom. But the individual form gives rise to a consciousness of a determined activity, which no longer exists as a merely pure and formal power, but is used up as such, and which must therefore be subtracted from the sum of the original power given in general contemplation; which subtraction, and by its means the whole required consciousness, would not be possible if the first fixed contemplation did not remain unaltered. The former is the contemplation of an unchangeable; but this contemplation views a sphere perpetually changeable by new creations, and in no manner following fixed laws in its changes. The former deals with a world, which, being unchangeable, obeys a law; the latter deals with facts as such, facts that have no connection at all, at least none through a physical law. It is evident that the latter is conditioned by the former, that freedom can be regarded only as a further modification of the universal power and of its opposite image, nature; and that it can be measured only by the degree in which it modifies nature. We comprehend a product of freedom only as the cancellation of a development of nature, and we measure it only by ascertaining how far the power of nature has been annihilated by it; consequently, by restoring nature in thought to its previous condition. We must, therefore, be able to restore it, and hence possess it in our universal contemplation. The contemplation of freedom is, therefore, conditioned by the contemplation of fixed nature, and is possible only by presupposing the latter.

Thus far in regard to the external form of this consciousness; and now let us consider its inner content. By acting in individual form the one life has used up and cancelled a certain portion of its power as mere power. Hence, after the act there arises the physical impossibility of a certain manifestation of freedom, which was quite possible before the act. This is the first, immediate effect of that manifestation of freedom upon the one and universal life. It must, consequently, enter all the individual forms of that life, since they all have the same consciousness. Each individual form must become conscious that it absolutely cannot do now what it could well have done before that act: namely, that it cannot put to use the power which has been already used up and cancelled in the universal life. Whatever is done is done, and cannot again be made undone, either by its author or by anybody else; for, if it were possible to undo it, nature would have to be restored to its previous condition, which, however, has been absolutely cancelled by the manifestation of freedom. We can destroy; but that does not cancel the deed or act, since we do not restore the life of nature to its former condition, but produce dead ruins.

Hence this immediate consciousness of not having the power to do something because a certain factual manifestation of freedom has gone before, this necessary recognition of factual Being, is the link in consciousness, with which the contemplation of the products of all freedom, whether our own or that of others, connects; and only now our problem has been completely solved.

3. We have seen that, if the one life is to realize actually a manifestation of its power, it must concentrate itself from out of the general contemplation into a single point of that power. This concentration gives rise to the individual form, and must itself be thought as *actus individuationis primariæ et originariæ*. This is, as I believe, evident; but it remains useless for application, unless we view and accompany the further determination of the individual form by this *actus primarius*.

That concentration within a point of unity—although we regard it at present merely as ideal, just as we established it at first—has caused something to occur in life, which cannot be made undone. That point has appeared in the conception, and has given rise to an infinitely continuable line of freedom and action, which was not possible before the occurrence of the concentration. The life

has been changed in its original condition, and an altogether new and permanent faculty—namely, of continuing that line of freedom—has entered it.

Now, it is true, that the life can drop and need not reassume that form, by means of the absolute freedom, with which it soars between the two fundamental forms of general contemplation and individuality; in which case that individual form, which was once one of the series of life's appearances, disappears altogether. But by means of that same form it can also connect again with that point, since the point is a fixed determination of life itself, and can further determine its determinedness in that individual form which it first assumed.

Let us suppose, now, that it does this, and continues the individuality once begun; in what manner will it proceed to do so? Let me explain here, in order to increase intelligibility by opposition, that in the original *actus concentrationis*, which is precisely the *actus individuationis*, there is absolutely no self-consciousness, neither of the universal life—which, although it concentrates itself, does not reflect upon its concentration, as it would have to do in order to think itself as the cause thereof—nor still less of the individual, for by this act individuality comes to exist.

(In immediate facticity this is manifested by the circumstance that we all are brought into life without knowing about it, not finding ourselves till we are in the middle of it.)

But I say, further, that, in the continuance of the individual form, self-consciousness arises necessarily. For a new point of unity = B has been taken hold of by the conception, and the problem now is to find, how its realization from out of A is possible, and possible under the condition, that A has been realized. Hence, in the conception of B, according to this rule, A is presupposed as already conceived, as conceived in the same life, which immediately contemplates itself and remains accessible to itself; hence by the same one principle, the Ego. The necessary union and relation of these two conceptions to each other necessarily produce self-consciousness.

What is this Ego? It is a comprehending principle, the unity of different acts of comprehension; hence, it bears the individual form, and is the individual as such. And what is the final and the true element in this comprehending? Evidently the one life itself.

Can we, therefore, say strictly that the individual becomes conscious of itself? By no means, for the individual is not at all; how, then, can it become anything? We must say, rather: life becomes conscious of itself in the individual form, and as individual. I say *as* an individual, for the consciousness deduced by us expresses nothing further. To make this individual conscious of itself, and at the same time, in this individual form, conscious of itself as one life, is precisely what we endeavor to accomplish by our philosophy, and it costs some exertion to bring this about; a sure proof that it is not involved in the original fact of consciousness, which, on the contrary, leads every individual to consider himself an absolute in itself.

We append here a consequence. Life, in the form of universal contemplation, is not at all capable of self-consciousness. It is only in the individual form, and, let it be observed, only in the continuation of that form, that it can become self-conscious; just as, according to the above, it can be a practical principle only in this form. Hence, it is natural that life, in so far as it is self-consciousness and practical principle, represents itself not at all in its unity, but as a world of individuals.

This explains also why those persons who, when they hear knowledge spoken of as independent life, cannot understand it otherwise than as self-consciousness and can never penetrate, owing to the necessary laws of thinking itself, beyond individuality to the thinking of life in its unity. From the concentration of life in one point onward, which itself is an absolute fact, everything is factual. But the natural man is merely a historical intelligence, who can very well take hold of facts, re-image them in his reproductive power of imagination, substitute and exchange one for the other, but has also in this the limit of his range of vision. Whenever the problem is no longer merely to exchange facts for facts, but to rise beyond all facticity in its absolute form to its absolute ground by pure thinking, the faculty of the natural man is at an end; he must die, and a new one must be born in his place. This limit is here, where the problem is to rise beyond individuality as the absolute seat of facticity, and to comprehend the one spiritual life as merely appearing in it.

Now, such an individual form can be continued infinitely by the life, but must always be so continued according to the same rule,



so that in the new unity-conception C the conception B is already presupposed, the one individual Ego always remaining as the last basis of consciousness. Hence, the one life can either remain in its universality and undeterminedness, or form new individuals, or continue individual series already begun. The latter are determined in it by the previous, with which the connection must be made; hence there is no fear that life might make a mistake some time in this business.

Now, if life in this way continues an individual series, where does it take the new point from? Evidently from the universal as yet untouched power; it is something new, never yet manifested in life, for otherwise it would not be included in the universal power. By what rule, then, does it choose the point, or what law determines it in making its choice? So far as we know, as yet no law at all; it takes that point with absolute freedom from out of the universal, absolutely creating it into the sphere of actuality. It is only at its realization that Life becomes subject to conditionedness through the former; this, however, does not in any way limit the purpose, but merely indicates the manner of its execution.

Hence, the continuation of the individual series is just like the absolute *actus individuationis*, an absolute creation from out of the one life. The life creates the individual anew in every point, or—if we will speak somewhat loosely of the permanent form of the life in this individual as a logical subject—the individual creates itself anew with absolute freedom at every moment. It is true that its former being, now deposited in the region of facts, determines its accomplishment of a purpose, but by no means the purpose itself, which it determines with absolute freedom. Since this purpose is necessarily within the sphere of the universal power, it is attainable. Again, since this universal power is an absolutely connected whole, wherein there is a line of conditions from each point to every other, that purpose is also attainable by every individual—provided, let it be understood, that the individual takes time enough to pass through the middle links of the conditions. Whatever is possible, or whatever lies within the power of the universal power, is also absolutely possible for every individual. The series of conditions are, of course, very different for different individuals.

4. Life has power, and develops it through concentration into an individual form and by virtue of that form. For what purpose? According to the preceding, we cannot answer otherwise than thus: For no purpose except to manifest that power: the end of the development of the power is that development itself.

Now let us suppose, which is at present an arbitrary assumption, that life did not develop its power generally, merely for the sake of developing it, but that it developed it for a definite end, in order to realize by the development a purpose assigned to life; then it is clear, firstly, that, as it can be a practical principle generally only in the individual form, it can also be a practical principle acting for a specific purpose only in that form.

All the factors hitherto considered, the concentration into the unity of the point, the formation of a conception of the activity, and the self-determination, according to the rule of that conception, made activity completely possible. Freedom of action was realized complete and wholly. Now, if that freedom, which had no purpose outside of itself, is to have a further determination to effect a specific end, then this would be clearly a limitation of freedom, *as such*—of physical ability, which here is able to do everything that is contained in the conception of a purpose—to the more limited sphere of that part of it which lies within the conception of the externally assigned purpose. It would, therefore, be a purpose of the kind which we have called above *moral*, and the requirement addressed to the free activity to realize that end would be a moral law, and in this instance a positive law—a commandment, namely, to realize the end. This is the second point.

The commandment is, therefore, accepted as part of the end to be attained, with absolute freedom, and, furthermore, of the higher freedom, of freedom within and above freedom. Hence consciousness of its having been accepted is possible only within the immediate contemplation of freedom itself, which is the inner contemplation. The external, universal contemplation of all life receives, according to the above, the product of such a conception of an end to be attained immediately through the consciousness of an inability to do something; but on no account does the mere inner consciousness of freedom itself receive it. The question, therefore, is, whether that product shows in any way, and whether

that immediate consciousness involves any determination to indicate that the moral law has or has not been accepted and influenced by it. In a general way the question cannot be properly answered as yet; but we can indicate here already a particular instance in which the product does not show it: namely, in cases where this product itself is only a conditioning middle link to arrive at the moral purpose, which as yet is merely *thought* in the consciousness of its originator. In this case the product certainly does not immediately express anything moral, since the moral conception has not been immediately influenced by it. It remains possible, of course, that the product has not been even thought as a means for a moral purpose, but is the result of a blind and purposeless outbreak of the mere power as such. The mere external consciousness does not indicate which of these is true, but remains dubious until perhaps some future and continued manifestations of that individual form occur.

The fact, therefore, whether the moral law has determined the conception of an end or not, appears immediately and categorically only in the immediate, inner contemplation, and hence only in the individual form of life, in which alone, indeed, the moral law can be gathered up in the conception of an end, so as to influence it; but it never appears immediately in external contemplation.

5. I have inserted this proposition, which will not find its general application till hereafter, in this place in order to explain thereby a former link and to connect with it.

A *moral* consciousness of *not being permitted to do something*—namely, to destroy the product of freedom—connects immediately, and is synthetically united with the consciousness through which an utterance of freedom, that has occurred in any individual form of life, arises in the consciousness of all other individual forms—a consciousness of *physical* inability to do something which is absolutely universal for the originator as well as for all others. The question arises whether that moral consciousness is just as much the same for all individuals as the former was found to be? I say it is the same for all individuals except the originator. We meet here the distinction in the relation, which was pointed out in the previous links of the contemplation of the world.

For the originator the following cases are possible:

1. He may not have reflected at all upon the moral law in rela-

tion to his act, and may not reflect upon it in this relation hereafter, in which case a commandment of the moral law concerning the product of that act does not occur for him at all; and whether he will create that product or not depends altogether upon his arbitrariness—that is, upon his blind and aimless utterance of power.

2. He may not have reflected upon the moral law in advance of the act, but may reflect upon it in that relation afterward, and discover that the product of his act is a hindrance to and contradictory of the moral purposes commanded of him; in which case he not only may, but is bound to destroy it.

3. He may really have allowed the moral law to influence his conception of a purpose, and the product may be a link on his path to a moral end; in which case the same prohibition, not to destroy it, is addressed to him that is addressed to all the others, but from a different reason.

Whence, now, this distinction? The originator can know whether he acts morally or not; the others cannot know it. Hence the prohibition addressed to the others presupposes that the moral end is the end of all development of freedom, and that for the sake of this end no development of freedom must be disturbed, of which it may be presupposed that that end has inspired it.

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## MAN A CREATIVE FIRST CAUSE.

(A NEW WORK<sup>1</sup> BY DR. ROWLAND G. HAZARD.)

[In this small volume we have a concise statement of Dr. Hazard's now famous arguments on the freedom of the will which have been considered, in this country and in Europe, as a complete answer to the fatalistic positions of Jonathan Edwards and others. The two papers which form the bulk of this volume were read at the Concord School of Philosophy in the summer of 1882.

What in our view gives the greatest value to the book is the deep in-

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<sup>1</sup> "Man a Creative First Cause." By Rowland G. Hazard, LL. D., Author of "Freedom of Mind in Willing," two letters on Causation to John Stuart Mill, etc. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1883.



sight which its author evinces into the necessity of self-determined being as the pre-condition of finite or dependent being, and his recognition of self-determination in the conscious will of man. Writers who start out with the assumption that all conceivable manifestation of force or energy is only the manifestation of derived energy, refuse to admit self-determination or self-activity as a necessary principle. "Everything is determined and made what it is by the totality of conditions," is their principle. Inasmuch as a dependent or fated being cannot be a totality, it follows that, if consistent, they refuse to think any totality.

We quote the following passages from the first essay to illustrate the author's clear and logical style of setting forth this insight.—Ed.]

[*The Will the Ground of our Knowledge of Matter.*]

Through its only active faculty of will—its effort—the intelligent being strives to produce *change*, of which, when effected, it is the *cause*.

Our own individual effort is the only cause of which we are directly conscious, but we are directly conscious of changes in our own sensations, for some of which we have, and others we have not, made effort. From some of these sensations we infer objective material changes, some of which we have, and others we have not, caused. From some of these we also infer the existence of other intelligent beings, like ourselves, to whose action we attribute many of these changes in our sensational, or in objective phenomena, which we have not ourselves produced. But, as some of these changes require a power beyond any indicated in ourselves or in our fellow-beings, we infer the existence of a superior intelligent power adequate to their production. We thus come to know ourselves, our fellow-beings, and God as cause.

Of the existence of matter or of its properties we are not directly conscious. We know nothing of it except by the sensations which we impute to its agency, and as these sensations can exist in the mind in the absence of the external material forms or forces to which we impute them—*e. g.*, in dreams—the sensations are not conclusive evidence of any such external existence. All our sensations which we attribute to matter are as fully accounted for by the hypothesis that they are the thought, the imagery of the mind of God directly imparted or made palpable to our finite minds, as by that of a distinct external substance in which He has embodied this thought and imagery.

In either case it is but the expression of his thoughts and conceptions. In either case, too, it is to us equally *real*, the sensations by which alone we apprehend these, to us external phenomena, being the same.

In either case, too, matter and spirit are still antithetically distin-

guished, the one having the properties of knowledge, feeling, and volition, while the other is unintelligent, senseless, and inert.

[*The Hypothesis of Idealism.*]

The hypothesis that the material phenomena are but the thought and imagery of the mind of God *immediately* impressed upon us is the more simple of the two, and makes creative attributes more nearly accord with powers which we are ourselves conscious of exercising.

We can ourselves by effort create such imagery, and, to some extent, make it durable and palpable to others.

We, however, find no rudiment of force or causative energy in these creations of our own. We can no more attribute inherent power to them than we can to an image in a mirror, and there seems no reason to suppose that any increase of power in the creator of such imagery could imbue it with causative energy.

On the other hand, if the existence of matter, as a distinct, independent, objective entity, is conceded, it may still be urged that it can, within itself, have no causative power. If wholly quiescent, it could exert no power to change itself, for all change in matter is by its motion in masses or in atoms; and matter cannot move itself.

Even if it could be imbued with motive power, it could have no inducement, no tendency, or means to determine its motion in one direction rather than another; and a tendency or power of self-movement which is equal in all directions is a nullity.

Its quiescent existence might be a fact perceived by intelligent beings as among the conditions for them to act upon, but any change thus wrought in such being is the result of its own perception, or its own action on the quiescent matter. Clay may be moulded, it cannot mould.

But it does not appear to be claimed that matter, except when in motion, can be regarded as a power. It is inert, and has no self-active power by which it can begin motion in itself without being first acted upon, nor can it determine the direction of its own motion. This beginning and determination must, therefore, be by the only other possible cause—by intelligent being—and that which thus begins and directs the motion is properly the cause of all the effects which follow, and matter is only an inert instrument which intelligence uses to produce these effects.

[*The Untenability of Mill's Theory of Causation.*]

Another and a very popular notion of cause, adopted by many eminent philosophers, is that all events or successive phenomena are connected in

a chain of which each successive link is the effect of all that preceded it. These also hold, as an essential adjunct to their theory, that the same causes necessarily produce the same effects, and hence that each of these successive events is necessitated by those which precede it. J. Stuart Mill, one of the able advocates of these views, says ("System of Logic," Book 3d, Chap. v, § 3): "The real cause is the whole of these antecedents;" and again: "The cause . . . is the sum total of the conditions positive and negative taken together; the whole of the contingencies, which being realized, the consequent invariably follows."

On these and other similar positions of Mill, and the materialistic school generally, I will remark that they do not distinguish between those antecedents which are merely passive conditions to be acted upon and changed, and those which act upon and change them; do not distinguish what *produces* from what merely *precedes* change. Life is a prerequisite to death, but cannot properly be regarded as a cause of it.

Again, if the cause is the *whole of the antecedents*, then as at each instant the whole of the antecedents is *everywhere* the same, the *effect* would everywhere be the same; and throughout the universe there could be only one and the same effect at the same time.

It is also obvious that on this theory of the "whole antecedents" there can be no possible application of the law of uniformity that "the same causes produce the same effects," for the moment the cause—the whole of the antecedents—has once acted, its action and its effect are added to and permanently change it, and the same cause can never act a second time. The advocates of this theory—that "the whole antecedents are the cause," and of the asserted law that "the same causes must produce the same effects"—also very generally hold that we get all our knowledge from experience. But it is clear that, if the theory is true, there can be no experience as to the law, and hence no knowledge to justify them in asserting it.

[*No Way of avoiding the Hypothesis of a Free Will or Creative Energy as the Origin of Change.*]

However difficult the conception, there seems to be no way to avoid the necessity of this constant exercise of creative energy to begin change, and produce uniformity in the results, or to escape the conclusion that every particle that floats in the breeze or undulates in the wave, every atom that changes its position in the uniform modes of electrical attraction and repulsion, or of chemical affinities, is moved, not by the energizing, but by the energetic will of an Omnipresent Intelligence.

[Definition of the Will.]

In the first place, the will has sometimes been treated as a distinct entity. This finds expression in the phrase "freedom of the will," and opens the way for the argument that, if this distinct entity can be controlled by some power extraneous to it, even though by the being of which it is an attribute, then the *will* is not free.

Such reasoning is wholly precluded when we regard the will as simply the faculty or ability of the mind to make effort, and an act of will as simply an effort of the mind to do, and, in accord with this view, speak of the freedom of the *mind* in willing, instead of the freedom of the *will*. Edwards, in his celebrated argument for necessity, defines WILL to be "*that by which the mind chooses anything*," and says "*an act of the will is the same as an act of choosing or choice*."

In my view, the will is that by which the mind *does* any and every thing that it does at all, or in the accomplishing of which it has any active agency. Limiting its function to the phenomena of choice seems to me peculiarly unfortunate. Our choice is merely the *knowledge* that one of two or more things suits us best: and, as we have just shown, knowledge cannot be determined by the will. We may, as in other cases, by effort—by comparing the respective advantages of the several objects of choice—bring about the conditions essential to our knowing which suits us best. The object of the comparative act is to get this knowledge; but the knowledge as to what suits us best—the choice—is itself a fact found, not made or done by us. It is an immediate perception to which the previous efforts, comparative or otherwise, may have been necessary.

[Definition of Freedom.]

Edwards also says: "The obvious meaning of the word FREEDOM, in common speech, is *power or opportunity of doing as one wills*." But as applied to willing—the *willing* being then the *doing*—this is merely saying that freedom is the power to do as one does, or to will as one wills, or, if the doing (as we will) applies to the realization of the object of our effort, then it makes our freedom in making the effort depend on the subsequent event, which is absurd. It makes our freedom to *try* to do dependent on our *power* to do. But we may freely make effort—try—to do what the event proves we have not power to do.

In this popular use of the word freedom, it applies only to the *doing*, which comes after the *willing*, and is but a synonym for power. Freedom, in its more comprehensive sense, and as applied to intelligent being, is simply SELF-CONTROL. Freedom in willing does not imply that the mind's



effort is not controlled and directed, but that it is controlled and directed by the being that makes the effort, and is not controlled or coerced by extraneous power.

The consequences of these defective definitions of will and freedom upon the argument are obvious—*e. g.*, Edwards makes choice and preference identical, and also says “to *will* and to *choose* are the same thing.” He will have no difficulty in proving that our choice or preference is not a matter which we can control, that we cannot, *per se*, prefer pain to pleasure, and hence are not free in choosing, and then, if choosing is the same as willing, logically infer that we are not free in willing.

If we may properly define will as but a faculty to make effort, and an act of will as simply an effort, and discard the assumption that will and choice are the same, these arguments for necessity are eliminated. Leaving for the present the consideration of other arguments for necessity, we will turn to some of the sequences of the foregoing premises.

And, first, it is evident that no power can change the past, and that the object of every intelligent effort must be to make the future different from what but for such effort it would be.

This is the only conceivable *motive* to effort. Now, intelligent being, constituted as before stated, has through its feelings an inducement to make efforts to so mould the future as to obtain an increase of those feelings which are pleasurable and avoid or lessen those which are painful; and by means of its knowledge it can distinguish and judge, more or less wisely, between these feelings, and also determine by what efforts it will seek to thus mould the future.

Such a being is in itself self-active, requiring no extrinsic agency to put it in action, or to sustain or direct its activity.

#### [*The Relation of Knowledge to Will.*]

In conformity with these views we find the fact to be, that whenever we would influence the willing of another, we always try to do it by changing his knowledge. We may seek to do this by simple presentation of existing facts, or by argument upon them; or we may exert ourselves to change the facts—the conditions upon which he is to act—*e. g.*, we may interpose insuperable obstacles to his intended action, or we may directly produce or change the feelings which prompt his action. But, as any such actual change of the conditions is wholly ineffective till it makes a part of his knowledge, these apparently two modes are really only one, and it comes to this, that our only mode of influencing the willing of another is to change the knowledge by which he controls and directs his own willing, and it is evident that this mode is effective only upon the

condition that this other does direct and control his own willing and conforms it to his own knowledge.

It would be absurd to suppose that the conforming of the act of will to the knowledge of the being that wills is by an extrinsic power.

It comes, then, to this, that the only conceivable mode of influencing the will of another is by changing his knowledge, and that this mode is wholly unavailing if this other does not direct his own action by means of his own knowledge—*i. e.*, if he does not will freely.

From these premises it follows that our willing not only may be, but must be, free. From these, too, it follows that every being that wills is a creative first cause, an independent power in the universe, freely exerting its individual energies to make the future different from what it otherwise would be.

[*The Divine Foreknowledge does not impair Human Freedom.*]

This equal and perfect freedom of all does not impair the sovereignty of the Supreme Intelligence.

Edwards argues that, if the Supreme Intelligence did not foreknow human volitions, he would be continually liable to be frustrated in his plans. But Omniscience could at once perceive what action was most wise, or, even if prevision was essential, could search out and be prepared for every possible contingency. It is *conceivable* that a man could do this in the game of chess, and there are games which, though inexplicable to the uninitiated, may practically be so investigated that the best move in every possible contingency will be ascertained, and with the advantage as to the first move success will be certain to one having this superior knowledge, though he may not foreknow a single move of his opponent.

[*Instinct not Incompatible with Free-Will.*]

The phenomena of instinct have been very generally deemed exceptional. Our own conscious agency in them is so slight that it escapes ordinary observation.

The well-ascertained fact that animals at their birth perform instinctive actions without previous instruction or experience, furnishes a clew to the solution which brings these phenomena into harmony with all other *voluntary* actions. It indicates not that the *will*, the voluntary effort, is absent, but that the *knowledge* by which we direct it is *innate*.

In every intelligent conative being the knowledge that by *effort* it can move its muscles must be innate. There is no conceivable way in which the being could itself acquire this knowledge. No movement of its own muscles, without self-effort, could suggest the idea, and it would never

discover any connection between the movement of the muscles of another with effort. No such experience or observation of the phenomena of muscular movement has any tendency to elicit or suggest the idea of effort.

But, so far as our observation goes, every animal, man included, is born with this and some additional knowledge which is essential to the preservation of its life. The kid, the moment it is born, can rise upon its feet and go directly to the source of food which its mother supplies, and it or the human infant would die of hunger before it could empirically learn the complicated muscular movements and the order of their succession which are required to avail itself of its food.

If there is any *self-activity* prior to birth, it still more strongly indicates that the knowledge of some of the modes by which we subsequently act is innate. . . .

The instinctive actions are of the same character in all grades of being; and in regard to rational actions I see no distinction in kind, but only in degree, between those of man and the lower animals. Descending in the scale of intelligence, we will probably reach a grade of beings which do not seek to add to their innate knowledge, nor invent or form new plans to meet new occasions for effort.

The actions of such must be wholly instinctive; but I have seen dogs and horses draw inferences and work out ingenious plans of action adapted to conditions so unnatural and improbable to them as to preclude the assumption that they had been specially provided by nature, through hereditary transmission or otherwise, with the knowledge of the plan they adopted for such exigency.

[*Like Causes, like Effects, do not preclude the Existence of Free Causes.*]

But the argument from cause and effect seems to be most relied upon by necessarians.

I adopt a statement of it which has the assent of one of its most distinguished advocates, viz.: If all the circumstances in a thousand cases are alike, and the conditions of the mind also the same, then the willing will be the same, and this uniformity indicates necessity.

This assumes as the basis of the argument that the same causes must produce the same effects.

In the first place, I would remark that an intelligent self-active cause is under no necessity upon a recurrence of the same circumstances to repeat its action, but having in the first case increased its knowledge, it may act differently in the second.

It may with reason be said that with this increase of knowledge the conditions of the mind are different, but, if this difference is not tacitly

excepted, the hypothesis of a thousand like cases is inconceivable—there would not even be two such.

But, giving the argument all that is intended by those who urge it, and granting their assumption, that the same causes do of necessity produce the same effects, let us suppose the circumstances in one thousand cases to be alike, and the conditions of the mind at each recurrence of them to be the same, and that one of these conditions of the mind is that of *necessity*, then, the same causes of necessity producing the same effects, *the same action follows*.

Again, suppose the circumstances in another one thousand cases to be alike, and the conditions of the mind again the same in each case, but that in these one of the conditions of the mind, instead of being *necessity*, is *freedom*, then, the same causes of necessity producing the same effects, *the same action follows*.

Now, the result, being in both cases the same, cannot possibly indicate whether it is necessity or freedom that is among the conditions, and proves nothing. One phase of this argument from cause and effect is that all the present events, including volitions, are necessary consequences of their antecedents. I have already treated of this asserted dependence of the present on the past, and will now only add that intelligent action is always wholly upon the present conditions, and has reference solely to an effect in the future, and it is not material to such action how or when either the active being, as he is, or the conditions for him to act upon, came to be, or how connected with the past, nor whether they had any past. If, however, by the force of past events themselves, or by any causes whatever, there is established a certain flow of events having a tendency to extend into the future, such flow in its effect upon our freedom in willing does not differ from that flow which is the composite result of conative efforts, which I have already considered. Our individual action is always to interrupt or modify such flow. We decide as to our own actions by our preconceptions, our prescience—more or less reliable—of what the future will be with, and what without, our own efforts.

The influence of present external conditions is also much relied upon by the advocates of necessity, but I trust it is already obvious that we may vary our free action with the circumstances, that we act as freely upon one set of them as upon any other, and that such action, being self-conformed, is perfectly free.

The influence of internal phenomena, as the moral character, knowledge, disposition, inclination, desires, wants, habits, etc., which make up the attributes and conditions of the mind that wills, is also much relied



upon, and necessarians have been at much pains to show that the willing is always in conformity to these. But in view of the fact that freedom, in the act of willing, consists in the action being self-controlled and directed, it would have served the purposes of their argument much better to have proved that the action was counter to or diverse from the character. They seem to have been especially unfortunate in making successful efforts to prove that our actions are always in agreement with our prevailing choice, or, which is very nearly the same thing, with our strongest motive. The moral character of the being is indicated and represented by its efforts, but this manifestation through the efforts does not effect its freedom in making them. A demon is as free as an angel.

[*Conformity to Character does not destroy Freedom.*]

The advocates of necessity often ask if a man could will the contrary of what he does will. I would say that he could if he so decided; but it would be a contradictory and absurd idea of freedom, which for its realization would require that one might try to do what he had determined not to try to do. In short, all these arguments of the necessarians, that our acts of will are not free because they must conform to our own character, our own views and decisions, virtually assert that one is not free because he must be free; or, in other words, being of necessity free, he is constrained to be free, and hence is not free.

[*Foreknowledge based on Two Conditions.*]

Edwards and other theologians agreeing with him have regarded the argument from prescience of volitions, which they hold to be perfect in deity, as very conclusive. They assume not only that a volition which is infallibly foreknown must of necessity happen, but that it must happen by restraint or coercion of the willing agent. This is not a logical inference. Whether a free volition ever can be infallibly foreknown may be doubted. I think I have already shown that such foreknowledge is not requisite to the supreme sovereignty of the universe. But some philosophers, who in their inquiries exclude theology and revelation, also argue that the imperfect prescience, which must be an element in the decision of all our efforts to influence the future, also indicates necessity. Both hold that the possibility of prediction involves necessity as to the volition. But if, as I hope to demonstrate, a free act is as easily foreknown and predicted as one that is not free, this argument is wholly unavailing. If some being by its power *controls* a future event, it of course can foreknow and predict it, but such control of the volition of another, for reasons already stated, I hold to be impossible, involving a contradiction which

power cannot reconcile. Aside from this conclusion, the difference between a volition which is free and one which is not free is that the former is controlled and directed by the being in which it is manifested, and the latter by some extrinsic power. Our principal means of foreknowing what the self-directed, the free, act of an intelligent being will be is its conformity to the known character, habits, etc., of the actor; and if it is admitted that the external power which controls and directs the action which is not self-directed always conforms the act to the character of the being in which the action is manifested, then the probabilities of forming a correct judgment of what the action or effort will be are in this respect just equal. But the admission that this conforming of the action to the character of the actor is by an extrinsic power and not by the actor himself is an unwarrantable, I might perhaps say an absurd, assumption. In stating it, one can hardly avoid a solecism, for the character which is thus presented to us by the actions is not that of the being apparently acting, but of the power or powers which determine the actions. The actions in such case might represent as consistent character, for to the outside observer the actions make the character; but it would be the character, not of the being apparently acting, which we perceive or know, but of the being or power extrinsic to it which we do not know. All our knowledge of beings as individuals, and even of species, would thus be annihilated. The hypothesis of such extrinsic agency in conforming the action to the character of the actor is, in various aspects of it, a gratuitous and inadmissible assumption.

If it still be urged that the act may be controlled by an extrinsic power that does not conform the action to the character of the apparent actor, then, if we do not know this extrinsic power, we wholly lose our principal means of predicting what the action will be; and if we do it, and know it without any effort, we still have to meet the same difficulties, somewhat more complicated by this extrinsic agency, to ascertain what this extrinsic power would determine this unfree act of another to be, as we would to solve the question as to what the more direct and simple, self-determined free act of this other would be; so that on any admissible hypothesis the free act of will is more easily foreknown and predicted than one that is not free; and, if this argument from the susceptibility to prediction has any weight, it is in favor of freedom, and not of necessity.

*[Idealistic or Materialistic Theories of Knowledge do not affect the Question of Freedom of Will.]*

We have already alluded to the two different hypotheses—the one regarding material phenomena as forms of a distinct entity, called matter;

the other regarding it as but the thought and imagery of the mind of God immediately impressed upon and made palpable to our finite minds, without any intermediate vehicle in the process.

In either case the sensations, by which alone we know, or which, perhaps, are all there is, of the phenomena, are equally real, and are, in fact, identically the same on the one hypothesis as upon the other. If as a result or corollary of our arguments in regard to cause, or otherwise, the material universe is regarded as the work of an intelligent Creator, working with design to produce a certain effect, then, upon either of these hypotheses, it is the presentation and expression of a conception existing as thought and imagery in his mind before he gave it palpable tangible existence in ours, and the only question as between the two hypotheses is whether, in making it palpable to us, he transfers this thought and imagery *directly* to our minds, or does this by painting, carving, or moulding, in a distinct material substance.

I have already intimated my leaning to the ideal hypothesis as being more simple and equally competent to embrace and explain all material phenomena.

I will here remark that the adopting of one or the other of these two hypotheses has very little, if any, bearing upon the views which I am presenting: whether the Supreme Intelligence found the matter, in which he expresses and makes his thoughts permanent and tangible, ready-made, or made it himself, either as a distinct entity, or as mere imagery of his mind, has in most respects no more significance than the question whether Milton and Shakespeare and Bacon found existing materials for expressing and making their thoughts palpable and permanent, or contrived and made the pen, ink, and paper which they used for this purpose. In either case we get the thoughts of the author, and can use the same means to express our own, including even, in some measure, the visible creations in which the Author of all has communicated his thoughts.

Another consideration in favor of the ideal hypothesis is, that under it creating becomes more conceivable to us: we can any of us conceive or imagine a landscape and vary its features at will; this is an incipient creation, which by effort we make more or less perfect.

Such creations of our own we for the time being locate outside of ourselves, and, while we are wholly absorbed in contemplating them, they are to us perfect external material creations.

To make them such to *others* requires that we should in some way impress our conceptions upon their minds and make the imagery of our own palpable to theirs. Though our faculty of doing this, as compared with that of creating the imagery, seems to be very limited, we are none

of us wholly devoid of it. Landscape gardeners, architects, sculptors, painters, and more especially poets, have it in marked degree. In all these it is effected by slow, tentative processes, though in the latter it often appears as a genuine spontaneity, a fiat of creative genius.

We, then, already have, and habitually exercise, all the faculties essential to material creation, and, with the requisite increase in that of impressing others, we could design and give palpable persistent existence to a universe varying to any extent from that which now environs us, which would be objectively as real and material to the vision, even, of others, as the heavens and the earth they now look out upon.

Though these creations of our own are mostly evanescent, and the persistent reality which, with great labor and pains, we give to some of them is very limited, and the presentation even of these very imperfect, still they show that we have within us the rudiments of all the faculties which, on the ideal hypothesis, are essential to creating. This hypothesis is further commended to us by the consideration that man, having in a finite degree all the other powers usually attributed to the Supreme Intelligence, lacks under the material theory that of creating matter. Corresponding to his omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence, man has finite power and finite knowledge, and can make all the ideas and objects of his knowledge palpably present, which is equivalent to, and, under the ideal hypothesis, is identical with, a finite prescience, limited, like our other attributes, to the sphere of our knowledge. The ideal hypothesis then rounds out our ideas of creative intelligence, relieving us of the anomaly of the creation of matter as a distinct entity, for which we have in ourselves no conscious rudiment of power and cannot conceive, and finding little if any relief in the alternative of its having always existed without having been created.

A legitimate inference from the foregoing premises seems to be that, if from any cause one's own incipient creation of objective phenomena should become so fixed in his mind that *he could not change it at will*, it would become to him a permanent external reality, and this inference is empirically confirmed by the fact that this sometimes happens in abnormal conditions of the mind.

However conscious we may be of our own agency in the formative process as to the formations themselves, this subjection to our own will seems to be the only element by which we distinguish our own ideal creations from objective phenomena.

This strongly suggests that the difference between the creative powers of man and those of the Supreme Intelligence is mainly, if not wholly, in degree and not in kind, and that even in this the disparity,



vast as it is, is still not so incomprehensible as has been generally supposed. This gives warrant to the logic in which, by short steps, we attribute all creations and all changes which we regard as beyond our own power and beyond that of other embodied intelligences known to us, to a superior intelligence with the same powers which we possess and use to create and change, increased, we need not say infinitely, but to a degree corresponding to the effects which we cognize and ascribe to them.

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## PHILOSOPHY IN OUTLINE.

BY W. T. HARRIS.

"Philosophy can bake no bread; but she can procure for us God, freedom, and immortality."—*Carlyle's translation from Novalis.*

### CHAPTER I.

#### *Introduction.*

*Philosophy is not a science of things in general, but a science that investigates the pre-suppositions of experience and discovers the nature of the first principle.*

§ 1. Philosophy does not set up the extravagant pretension to know all things. It does not "take all knowledge for its province" any more than geology, or astronomy, or logic does. Geology aspires to know the entire structure of this globe; astronomy, to know all the stars; logic, to know the structure of the reasoning process. Philosophy attempts to find the necessary *a priori* elements or factors in experience, and arrange them into a system by deducing them from a first principle. Not the forms of reasoning alone, but the forms of sense-perception, of reflection, of speculative knowing, and the very forms which condition being or existence itself, are to be investigated.

§ 2. The science of necessary forms is a very special science, because it does not concern itself with collecting and arranging the infinite multitude of particular objects in the world and identifying their species and genera, as the particular sciences do. It investigates the presupposed conditions and ascends to the one supreme condition. It therefore turns its back on the multitude

of particular things and seizes them in the unity of their "ascent and cause," as George Herbert names it. The particular sciences and departments of knowledge collect and classify and explain phenomena. Philosophy collects and classifies and explains their explanations. Its province is much more narrow and special than theirs. If to explain meant to find the many, the different, the particular examples or specimens, philosophy would have to take all knowledge for its province if it aspired to explain the explanations offered in the several sciences. But that is not its meaning—to explain means to find the common, the generic principle in the particular. This is just the opposite of that other process which would take all knowledge in its infinite details for its province. To explain all knowledge is not to know all things.

§ 3. To illustrate Philosophic Knowing, and at the same time to enter its province and begin philosophizing, we shall take up at once a consideration of three ideas—Space, Time, and Cause. Space and Time—as the conditions of nature or the world, as the necessary presuppositions of extension and multitude—will furnish us occasion to consider the infinite and the possibility of knowing it. The idea of Cause will lead us to the fundamental insight on which true philosophy rests.

## CHAPTER II.

### *Space and Time as Presuppositions of Experience.*

§ 4. In all experience we deal with sensible objects and their changes. The universal condition of the existence of sensible objects is Space. Each object is limited or finite, but the universal condition of the existence of objects is self-limited or infinite. An object of the senses possesses extension and limits, and, consequently, has an environment. We find ourselves necessitated to think an environment in order to think the object as a limited object.

§ 5. Here we have, first the object, and secondly the environment as mutually limiting and excluding, and as correlatives. But the ground or condition of both the object and its environment is Space. Space makes both possible.

§ 6. Space is a necessary idea. We may think this particular object or not—it may exist or it may not. So, too, this particular

environment may exist or not, although *some* environment is necessary. But Space must exist, whether this particular object or environment exists or not. Here we have three steps toward absolute necessity: (1) The object which is not necessary, but may or may not exist—may exist now, but cease after an interval; (2) the environment which must exist in some form if the object exists—a hypothetical necessity; (3) the logical condition of the object and its environment, which must, as Space, exist, whether the object exist or not.

§ 7. Again, note the fact that the object ceases where the environment begins. But space does not cease with the object nor with the environment; it is continued or affirmed by each. The space in which the object exists is continued by the space in which its environment exists. Space is infinite.

Let us consider how we know the infinitude of space, for this is a very important concern in philosophy. The doctrine is current that we cannot know the infinite, that we can form no conception of it. Hence the word infinite would be to us without any meaning except a negative one.<sup>1</sup>

§ 8. Space is both divisible (discrete) and continuous. It is composed of parts, each part being again composed of parts. But each part of space is not limited by something else; it is limited only by space. The environment of any finite portion of space is and must be necessarily other portions of space.

§ 9. But if any limited space has space for its environment, it is not limited by it, but continued by it. Any possible limited or finite space is continued by an environment of space, and the whole of space is infinite.

§ 10. This insight into the constitution of Space is a positive knowledge of and an adequate conception of its infinitude, but it is not a mental image or picture of infinite space. Conception in that sense would contradict the infinitude of space, for an image or picture necessarily has limits or environment. But the conception of the infinitude of space is adequate and exhaustive, because it enables us to answer questions relative to the conditions of

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<sup>1</sup> The argument here given I used in 1860 to refute Sir William Hamilton's "Law of the Conditioned." I printed it first as part of a series of philosophical articles in the "Boston Commonwealth" for December 18, 1863. See, also, "Jour. Spec. Phil.," vol. iv, p. 279.

existence in space—as the science of mathematics shows. A finite object could not exist were it not for this ground or condition which is its own environment. Self-environment is the characteristic of the infinite. The idea of infinite space is therefore the condition of the mental image or picture.

§ 11. That which is continued by its environment might be still finite if it could ever arrive at an environment of a different kind, and which, therefore, did not continue it. So Space might be finite were it to encounter an environment that was not space. But such is clearly seen to be impossible by the direct insight which we have into the nature of Space. There can be no object or finite space which does not imply space as the condition of the existence of what is beyond it.

§ 12. As a condition of all change, motion, development, and manifestation, Time is likewise necessary. The object in time is called an event. The event is limited or finite, and has its environment in the form of antecedent and subsequent. The event begins or ends in some other event. But a limited time begins in a time and ends in a time, so that Time is its own environment, and consequently infinite. It is not made finite, but continued by its limits because it is self-limited.

§ 13. Whatever we find to belong to the nature of Time and Space we shall find to have correspondences and correlatives in the laws of things and events in the world, because things and events are conditioned by Space and Time. Hence mathematics, based on this insight into Time and Space, gives us, *a priori*, certain principles which govern things and events.

§ 14. Experience is thus a complex affair, made up of two elements—one element being that furnished by the senses, and the other by the mind itself. Time and Space, as conditions of all existence in the world, and of all experience, cannot be learned from experience. We cannot obtain a knowledge of what is universal and necessary from experience, because experience can inform us only that something is, but not that it must be. We actually know Time and Space as infinites, and this knowledge is positive or affirmative, and not negative. Just as surely as an object is made finite by its limit, just so surely is there a ground or condition underlying the object and its limit, and making both possible; this ground is infinite.



§ 15. The scepticism in vogue, called "Agnosticism," rests on the denial of the capacity of the mind to conceive the infinite; and, strange to say, this very example of the infinite which we find in Space and Time is brought forward to support the doctrine. "I can conceive only finite spaces and times, but not space or time as a whole, because as wholes they contain all finite spaces and times." But agnosticism bases its very doctrine on a true knowledge of the infinity of time and space. For, unless it knew that the environing space was necessarily a repetition of the same space over and over again forever, how could it affirm the impossibility of completing it by successive additions of the environment to the limited space? It says in effect: "We cannot know Space, because (we know that) its nature implies infinite extent, and cannot be reached by successive syntheses."

### CHAPTER III.

#### *Three Stages of Knowing.*

§ 16. Space and Time have been considered as the presuppositions or preconditions in all experience. Three grades of Knowing have been found by analyzing experience. First, there was knowledge of the object; secondly, of the environment; and, thirdly, of the ground or logical condition which rendered the object and its environment possible. There was the thing in space; secondly, its relation to an environment of things in space; and, thirdly, there was space. There was likewise the event; and its environment of antecedent and subsequent events, and then the underlying logical condition of time.

§ 17. The first stage of Knowing concentrates its attention upon the object, the second upon its relations, and the third on the necessary and infinite conditions of its existence. The first stage of knowing belongs to the surface of experience, and is very shallow. It regards things as isolated and independent of each other. The second stage of experience is much deeper, and takes note of the essential dependence of things. They are seen to exist only in relation to others upon which they depend. This second stage of experience discovers unity and unities in discovering dependence of one upon another. The third stage of experience discovers independence and self-relation underlying all dependence and

relativity. The infinite, or the self-related, underlies the finite and relative or dependent.

§ 18. These three stages of Knowing found in considering the relation of experience to Time and Space—object, environment, and logical condition—these elements are in every act of experience, although the environment is not a very clear and distinct element in the least cultured knowing, and space and time are still more obscure. But philosophy, as a higher, special form of reflection, investigates the presuppositions or logical conditions of the objects and environments of our experience, and makes the third stage of experience clear and distinct—far more clear and distinct than the first or second stages, because they relate to contingent and changeable objects, while the insight into the unchanging nature of Time and Space sees the necessary and universal conditions of the existence of all phenomena. The third element of experience which furnishes these logical conditions is the basis of universal, necessary, and exhaustive cognitions.

§ 19. The most rudimentary form of human experience, as it is to be found in the case of the child or the savage, contains these logical presuppositions, although not as a distinct object of attention. Even the lowest human consciousness contains all the elements which the philosopher, by special attention, develops and systematizes into a body of absolute truth.

§ 20. Every act of experience contains within it not only a knowledge of what is limited and definite, but also a cognition of the total possible, or the exhaustive conditions implied or presupposed by the finite object. Hence those vast ideas which we name World, Nature, Universe, Eternity, and the like, instead of being mere artificial ideas, or "factitious" ideas, as they have been called,<sup>1</sup> are positive and adequate ideas in so far as they relate to the general structure of the whole. We know, or may know, the logical conditions of the existence of the world far better than we know its details.

All our general ideas, all our concepts, with which we group together the multitude of phenomena and cognize them, arise from this third stage of experience. It is the partial consciousness of the logical conditions of phenomena which enter as condi-

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<sup>1</sup> See "*Jour. Spec. Phil.*," vol. xvi, p. 386.

tions of our experience that enables us to rise out of the details of the world and grasp them together, and preserve them in bundles or unities, which we know as classes, species, genera, processes, and relations. These classes and processes we name by words. Language is impossible to an animal that cannot analyze the complex of his experience so far as to become to some degree conscious of the third element in his experience, the *a priori* element of logical conditions.

§ 21. Another most important point to notice is that these *a priori* conditions of experience are both subjective and objective, both conditions of experience, and likewise conditions of the existence of phenomena. The due consideration of this astonishing fact leads us to see that, whatever be the things and processes of the world, we know that mind as revealed in its *a priori* nature is related to the world as the condition of its existence. All conscious beings in the possession of the conditions of experience—in being rational, in short—participate in the principle that gives existence to the world, and that principle is reason. Time and space condition the existence of the world; time and space we find *a priori* in the constitution of mind or reason. This surprising insight which comes upon us as we consider time and space is confirmed by all our subsequent philosophical studies. We shall find a new confirmation of it in the next chapter, in our study of Causality.

#### CHAPTER IV.

##### *Cause and Self-Cause.*

§ 22. Let us return to our study of experience and take account of another presupposition which is necessary to make experience possible, and which is an element far subtler and more potent than Space and Time, because it is their logical condition also. This deeper principle is Causality.

(1.) We regard a thing or object as related to its environment as an external existing limit, in which case the ground or logical condition is Space; or (2) we regard the object as an event or process which consists of a series of successive moments with an environment of antecedent and subsequent moments; its ground or presupposition is Time; or (3) we may look upon an object as the recipi-

ent of influences from its environment, or as itself imparting influences to its environment. This is Causality.

§ 23. The environment and the object relate to each other as effect or cause. The environment causes some change in the object, which change is its effect; or the object as cause reacts on the environment and produces some modification in that as its effect. The effect is a joint product of this interaction between the so-called active and passive factors or coefficients. For both are active, although one is relatively passive to the other.

§ 24. The principle of causality implies both Time and Space. In order that a cause shall send a stream of influence toward an effect, there must be time for the influence to pass from the one to the other. Also the idea of effect implies the existence of an object external to the cause, or the utterance of influence, and in this space is presupposed. Space and time are in a certain sense included in causality as a higher unity.

§ 25. This principle of causality is so deep a logical condition of experience that it conditions even space and time themselves. For the externality of the parts of space or the moments of time are conditioned upon mutual exclusion. Each now excludes all other nows, and is excluded by them. Each part of space excludes all other parts of space, and is excluded by them. Any portion of space is composed of parts of space, and it is the mutual exclusion of these parts that produces and measures the including whole. Suppose, for instance, that one of the parts of space allowed another part to become identical with it, penetrate it, and did not exclude it; then, at once, the portion of space to which these two parts belonged would shrink by just that amount of space which had admitted the other. The portion of space and all portions of space are what they are through this exclusion, and this exclusion is a pure form of causality, or an utterance of influence upon an environment. (This seemingly strange conclusion will become more intelligible when the presupposition of cause and effect is investigated.) Time itself is another example of the same exclusion. The present excludes the past, and is excluded by it. Both present and past exclude the future, and are excluded by it. Suppose one of these to include the other, then time is destroyed; but, as time is the condition of all manifestation and expression, the thought of such mutual inclusion of moments of



time is impossible. The same implication of causality is found in time as in space.

§ 26. Now, if we examine Causality, we shall see that it again presupposes a ground deeper than itself—deeper than itself as realized in a cause and an effect separated into independent objects. This is the most essential insight to obtain in all philosophy.

(1.) In order that a cause shall send a stream of influence over to an effect, it must first separate that portion of influence from itself.

(2.) Self-separation is, then, the fundamental presupposition of the action of causality. Unless the cause is a self-separating energy, it cannot be conceived as acting on another. The action of causality is based on self-activity.

(3.) Self-activity is called *Causa sui* to express the fact of its relation to causality. It is the infinite form of causality in which the cause is its own environment—just as space is the infinite condition underlying extended things, and time the infinite condition underlying events. Self-activity as *Causa sui* has the form of self-relation, and it is self-relation that characterizes the affirmative form of the infinite. Self-relation is independence, while relation-to-others is dependence.

§ 27. *Causa sui*, or self-cause, is, properly speaking, the principle, *par excellence*, of philosophy. It is the principle of life, of thought, of mind—the idea of a creative activity, and hence also the basis of theology as well as of philosophy.

*Causa sui*, spontaneous origination of activity, or spontaneous energy, is the ultimate presupposition underlying all objects, and each object of experience.

§ 28. We have now before us three of the logical conditions or presuppositions of existence and experience.

I. Object—Environment—Space.

II. Event—Environment—Time.

III. Effect—Cause—*Causa sui*.

## CHAPTER V.

### *The Absolute a Personal Reason.*

§ 29. Having defined philosophy as the science of the *a priori* factors or elements of experience, which are necessary conditions of

existence as well as of experience ; having discussed Space, Time, and Causality, and thereby proved and illustrated the reality of this kind of knowledge, whose special object is the logical presuppositions to be found in all other kinds of knowing, no matter how elementary and crude they may be, it is necessary now to consider the bearing of these *a priori* ideas upon the question of the existence of God.

We must ask whether it is not possible to have a world in time and space without a Creator ; whether we cannot conceive the Creator, if there is one, as a blind force.

§ 30. To experience, the objects of the world are endlessly diverse. Particularity reigns. Each existence is in some way different from all else. But to philosophy, looking at the *a priori* conditions of experience, there is unity underlying all this diversity. Space conditions the existence of matter, and every physical body must rigidly comply with the geometric laws of space. So, too, all movement and all activity of force must conform to the laws of time. Here we have unity of fundamental condition. In causality there is absolute unity—self-cause being the source of both matter and form in the world. Self-activity is an *a priori* condition, not only of all changes, but also of time and space themselves. The very conception of externality and mutual exclusion involves the act of repulsion or of self-separation such as forms the ultimate element of the idea of cause.

§ 31. The unity of space as the logical condition of matter, and of time as the logical condition of all change and manifestation, prove the unity of the world. The mathematical laws which formulate the nature of space and time condition the existence of all the phenomena in the world, and make them all parts of one system, and thus give us the right to speak of the aggregate of existence under such names as “world” or “universe.”

This question of the existence of an absolute as Creator or as Ruler of the universe hinges on the question of the validity of such comprehensive unities as “world” and “universe.” If such ideas are derived from experience, it is argued that they are fictitious unities,<sup>1</sup> and do not express positive knowledge, but only our ignorance, “our failure to discover, invent, or conceive.” For

<sup>1</sup> “Jour. Spec. Phil.,” vol. xvi, p. 386.

we certainly have not made any complete inventory that we may call "the universe."

§ 32. Only because we are able to know the logical conditions of experience are we able to speak of the totality of all possible experience, and to name it "world" and "universe." Finding unity in these logical conditions, we predicate it of all particular existence, being perfectly assured that nothing will ever exist which does not conform to these logical conditions. No extended objects will exist or change except according to the conditions of space and time. No relations between phenomena will arise except through causality, and all causality will originate in *Causa sui*, or self-activity.

All co-ordination is based on identity of species, or genera. The Homogeneity of space and time rests on this sort of identity, and ultimately all identity of species is based on the identity involved in *Causa sui*, or self-cause.

§ 33. Self-cause, or eternal energy, is the ultimate presupposition of all things and events. Here is the necessary ground of the idea of God. It is the presupposition of all experience and of all possible existence. By the study of the presuppositions of experience one becomes certain of the existence of One eternal Energy which creates and governs the world.

How does one know that things are not self-existent already, and therefore in no need of a creator? If this question still remains in the mind, it must be answered again and again by referring to the necessary unity in the nature of the conditions of existence—space, time, and causal influence, based on self-cause. The unity of space and the dependence of all matter upon it preclude the self-existence of any material body. Each is a part, and depends on all the rest. Presuppositions of experience can only be seen by reflection upon the conditions of experience. The feeble-minded, who cannot analyze their experience nor give careful attention to its factors, cannot see this necessity. Indeed, few strong minds can see these necessary presuppositions at first. But all, even the most feeble in intellect, have these presuppositions as an element of their experience, whether able to abstract them and see them as special objects or not.

§ 34. Let us vary the mode and manner of expressing this insight for the sake of additional clearness. First, let us ask what is

the nature of self-existent being—of independent beings, whether there be one or more.

(1.) It is clear that all beings are dependent or independent, or else have, in some way, phases to which both predicates may apply.

(2.) The dependent being is clearly not a whole or totality; it implies something else—some other being on which it depends. It cannot depend on a dependent being, although it may stand in relation to another dependent being as another link of its dependence. All dependence implies the independent being as the source of support. Take away the independent being, and you remove the logical condition of the dependent being; because without something to depend upon there can be no dependent being. If one suggests a mutual relation of dependent beings, then still the whole is independent, and this independence furnishes the ground of the dependent parts.

(3.) The dependent being, or links of being, no matter how numerous they are, make up one being with the being on which they depend and belong to it.

(4.) All being is, therefore, either independent, or forms a part of an independent being. Dependent being can be explained only by the independent being from which it receives its nature.

(5.) The nature or determinations of any being, its marks, properties, qualities, or attributes, arise through its own activity, or through the activity of another being.

(6.) If its nature is derived from another, it is a dependent being. The independent being is therefore determined only through its own activity—it is self-determined.

(7.) The nature of self-existent beings, whether one or many, is therefore self-determination. This result we see is identical with that which we found in our investigation of the underlying pre-supposition of influence or causal relation. There must be self-separation, or else no influence can pass over to another object. The cause must first act in itself before its energy causes an effect in something else. It must therefore be essentially cause and effect in itself, or *Causa sui*, meaning self-cause or self-effect.

§ 35. (8.) Our conviction, at this stage of the investigation, is, therefore, that each and every existence is a self-determined being, or else some phase or phenomenon dependent on self-determined being. Here we have our principle with which to examine the



world and judge concerning its beings. Whatever depends on space and time, and possesses external existence, in the form of an object conditioned by environment, has not the form of self-existence, but is necessarily a phase or manifestation of the self-determination of some other being. If we are able to discover beings in the world that manifest self-activity, we shall know that they are in possession of independence, at least in degree; or, in other words, that they manifest self-existence. When we have found the entire compass of any being in the world, we are certain that we have within it the form of self-activity as its essence.

§ 36. (9.) We should note particularly that self-activity, or self-determination, which we have found as the original form of all beings, is not a simple, empty form of existence, devoid of all particularity, but that it involves three important distinctions: Self-antithesis of determiner and determined, or of self-active and self-passive, or of self as subject of activity and self as object of activity. These distinctions may be otherwise expressed: (a) As the primordial form of all particularity; (b) the subject, or self-active, or determiner, regarded by itself, is the possibility of any and all determination, and is thus the generic or universal and the primordial form of all that is general or universal; hence the presupposition of all classification; (c) the unity of these two phases of universality and particularity constitutes individuality, and is the primordial form of all individuality.

§ 37. (10.) There is here an error of reflection very prevalent in our time, which does not identify these distinctions of universal, particular, and individual in the absolute existence, but calls this absolute or self-existent being "the unconditioned." It thinks it as entirely devoid of conditions, as simply the negation of the finite. Hence, it regards the absolute as entirely devoid of distinctions. Since there is nothing to think in that which has no distinctions, such an absolute is pronounced "unthinkable," inconceivable, or unknowable. The error in this form of reflection lies in the confusion which it makes between the environment and the underlying presupposition. It thinks the antithesis of object and environment, of object and cause, but fails to ascend to self-limit and *Causa sui* as the ultimate presupposition and logical condition of object and environment.

§ 38. (11.) Plato, in the tenth book of his "Laws," asks, in view

of this self-activity which he calls "self-movement": "If we were to see this power (self-movement) existing in any earthly, watery, or fiery substance—simple or compound—what should we call it?" and answers: "I should call the self-moving power Life." Life is the name which we give to such manifestations of self-determination. Aristotle, who is careful not to call this energy "self-movement," but considers it to be "that which moves others, but is unmoved itself," defines it likewise as the principle of life. The tenth book of Plato's "Laws" has, perhaps, been the suggestive source of most of the thinking on the necessity of the divine as the presupposition of the things of the world. Aristotle has treated the thought again and again; but the seventh and eighth books of his "Physics" and the celebrated seventh chapter of the eleventh book of his "Metaphysics" have furnished theology the most logical form of the intellectual view of this necessity. Aristotle in the latter passage gives his grounds for recognizing in this pure activity of self-determination God "as an eternal and the best living Being." "He possesses the activity of Reason, of pure thinking and of eternal life, and is always his own object."

§ 39. The ground of Aristotle's identification of self-determination, or of energy which moves but is not moved, with Reason or thinking being, becomes clear when we consider that this self-distinction which constitutes the nature of self-determination or *Causa-sui* is subject and its own object, and this in its perfect form must be self-consciousness, while any lower manifestation of self-activity will be recognized as life—that of the plant or of the animal. In the plant there is manifestation of life wherein the individual seed develops out of itself into a plant and arrives again at seeds, but not at the same seed—only at seeds of the same species. So the individual plant does not include self-determination, but only manifests it as the moving principle of the entire process. The mere animal as brute animal manifests self-determination more adequately than the plant, for he has feeling and locomotion, besides nutrition and reproduction. But as mere animal he does not make himself his own object, and hence the *Causa sui* which is manifested in him is not included within his consciousness, but is manifested only as species. Man can make his feeling in its entirety his object by becoming conscious, not only of time, space, and the other presuppositions, but especially

of self-activity or original first cause, and in this he arrives at the knowledge of the Ego and becomes self-conscious. The presupposition of man as a developing individuality is the perfect individuality of the Absolute Reason, or God.

## CHAPTER VI.

### *Philosophy, Theology, and Religion.*

§ 40. Philosophy is not religion, nor a substitute for religion, any more than it is art, or a substitute for art. There is a distinction, also, between philosophy and theology, although philosophy is a necessary constituent of theology. While theology must necessarily contain a historical and biographical element, and endeavor to find in that element the manifestation of necessary and universal principles, philosophy, on the other hand, devotes itself exclusively to the consideration of those universal and necessary conditions of existence which are found to exist in experience, not as furnished by experience, but as logical, *a priori* conditions of experience itself.

§ 41. Philosophy finds Time, Space, Causality, Self-activity, and it arrives, in the consideration of self-activity as the only possible basis of time, space, and dynamic influence, at the idea of God as a necessary being. The ideas of time and space, which all conscious beings find as *a priori* factors of experience, justify such general ideas as are expressed by the words "World," "Universe," "Nature," "History," "Society," etc., which are regarded as factitious or artificial by those who have not noticed that all experience possesses, in addition to finite, sensuously present objects, also the universal and logical conditions of that experience. The idea of self-activity is the deepest of these presuppositions which make experience possible, and which make the existence of the world possible.

§ 42. The idea of self-activity is the source of our thought of God. If one lacked this idea of self-activity and could not attain it, all attempts to teach him theology, or even to reveal to him divine truth, would be futile. He could not form in his mind, if he could be said to have a mind, the essential characteristic idea of God; he could not think God as a Creator of the world, or as Self-Existent apart from the world. If the doctrine were revealed

and taught to him, and he learned to repeat the words in which it is expressed, yet in his consciousness he would conceive only a limited effect, a dead result, and no living God. But the hypothesis of a consciousness without the idea of self-activity implicit in it as the presupposition of all its knowing, and especially of its self-consciousness, is a mere hypothesis, without possibility of being a fact.

§ 43. A pre-condition of divine revelation is the creation of beings who can think the idea of self-activity. The idea must be involved in knowing as logical condition, although it need not become explicit without special reflection. Philosophy is a special investigation directed to theological conditions of existence and experience, and so likewise theology and religion are special occupations of the soul. The soul must find within itself the idea of the divine before it can recognize the divine in any manifestation in the external world.

§ 44. In discovering and defining the *a priori* ideas in the mind, philosophy renders essential service to religion, because it brings about certain conviction in regard to the objects which religion holds as divine, and conceives as transcending the world although it has not yet learned their logical necessity. It imagines, perhaps, that the mind can have experience without presupposing in its constitution the divine doctrines which it has received through tradition. But philosophy may arrive at certainty in regard to the first principle, and the origin and destiny of the world and man, without making man religious. He must receive the doctrine into his heart—that is the special function of religion. To know the doctrine is necessary—that is philosophy and theology; to receive it into the heart and make it one's life is religion.

§ 45. Philosophy has suffered under the imputation of being too ambitious—aspiring to “take all knowledge for its province,” or to usurp the place of religion and destroy the Church. We have seen that the mind possesses *a priori* logical conditions which enter experience and render it possible; we have seen, likewise, that the mind, in its first stages of consciousness, does not separate these from experience and reflect on them as special objects. It does not perceive their regal aspect, nor recognize them as fundamental conditions of existence. Nevertheless, it sees what it sees by their means, and may, by special reflection, become conscious



of their essential relation. But this higher form of reflection is preceded by many stages of spiritual education, in which partial insight into these *a priori* ideas is attained. Special phases, particular aspects of them, are perceived. In the acquirement and use of language, in the formation of ethical habits, in the creation and appreciation of poetry and art, in the pursuit of science, and especially in the experience of the religious life, these *a priori* presuppositions appear again and again as essential objects under various guises—a sort of masquerade, in which these “Lords of Life,” as Emerson<sup>1</sup> calls them, pass before the soul.

§ 46. The knowledge of these *a priori* elements in experience, although a special one, is the most difficult of acquirement. It is not a field that can be exhausted any more than the field of mathematics, or the field of natural science, or that of social science. New acquisitions are new tools for greater and greater acquisition. We must expect, therefore, that the idea of Self-activity, which we have found as the first principle, will yield us new insights into the being and destiny of nature and man, so long as we devote ourselves to its contemplation.

## CHAPTER VII.

### *The Triune Nature of God.*

§ 47. The conclusion reached in our time, that the theological doctrine of the Trinity is a useless subtlety, may be found altogether rash, and unwarranted by philosophy. It is true that, while it makes distinctions in the divine essence, Theology has often disclaimed the ability to conceive or think them, but it has never proved that they were unthinkable. Theology has tried to find all of its dogmas in the intellect, and to base them on the nature of Reason. Some have been thoroughly demonstrated, others have been only partially expounded. In the history of the development of Christian dogmas one will find all the phases and aspects of the speculation by which the intellectual insight into the Triune nature of God has become a possession of the Church.

§ 48. In philosophy we shall find that this distinction forms the

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<sup>1</sup> See Emerson's sublime essay on “Experience,” in which he describes the soul's ascent through five stages of insight.

basis of the true theory of the existence of the world, and of man's freedom and immortality. Without independence of persons, and oneness of the persons of God, there could not be finite temporary existence nor immortal individuals.

Leaving this dogmatic statement of results and relations, let us consider the necessary inferences involved in the thought of self-activity.

§ 49. Self-activity has been distinguished into determining and determined, or active and passive, subject and object of activity. We identified the subject as universal, the antithesis between subject and object as the particular or special, and the total as individual. These were seen as the primordial forms of the categories of Reason—the *universal*, the *particular*, and the *individual*.

§ 50. (1.) The self-determined as self is pure active. The self-active is vital and living and thinking, and essentially self-knowing.

§ 51. (2.) It is not adequately expressed as self-active or self-knowing, because this involves an activity that makes itself passive, and a knowing that knows itself not as subject, but as object.

§ 52. (3.) To act simply to produce passivity within itself is the act of self-annihilation, or of self-contradiction. To know one's self as object and not as subject, is also not to know one's self truly, but to know what one's self is not. We see, therefore, that the explication of self-activity, or self-knowledge, or pure, absolute self-consciousness, demands that the self-active shall determine itself as self-active, or that the self-conscious shall know itself as self-conscious, and that the free shall know itself as a free being.

§ 53. (4.) It follows, therefore, that independence of persons arises in the primordial self-active one. In order to be self-active and self-knowing, it is creative, and creates another which is the same as itself. In our finite knowing, our thoughts and fancies exist for us, but only subjectively. In the Absolute, their existence as thoughts is absolute existence. Hence, knowing and willing are one in God. This, indeed, is the ground of explanation used again and again in Christian Theology in treating the Trinity.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, i, q. xxvii, art. iii.: "In Deo sit idem voluntas et intellectus." Also, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, lib. iv, cap. xix.: "Una res sint in Deo intellectus et voluntas." This is treated fully and explicitly by St. Thomas Aquinas, inasmuch as

§ 54. (5.) A first absolute self-activity begets a second independent, free, perfect self-activity. The second, too, is creative—his will and knowing are one. In knowing himself, he creates a third equal in all respects to himself.

§ 55. But the second is begotten, while the first person is unbegotten. In knowing himself, therefore, the second person makes an object of himself not only as he is, but he makes an object also of his relation to the first, which is that of being begotten, or derived from the first.

§ 56. In the idea of derivation and begetting there is the idea of passivity. If the second were only derived and begotten, he were only passive. But he has made himself self-active from all eternity. The passivity which is implied in derivation has been eternally annulled, but it is, nevertheless, an element in the self-knowledge of the Son, and as an object known comes to exist as created, because his knowing is creating.

§ 57. In thinking his relation to the first person, he therefore creates a world of finite beings, extending from the most passive up to the most active. It is a world in which all is process or evolution—no finite existing absolutely, but only relatively to the development of a higher being. All below man pass away and do not retain individuality. Man is self-determining as individual, and hence includes his own development within himself as individual, and hence is immortal and free.

§ 58. (6.) It is the thought of a becoming from passivity to perfect activity that is involved in the recognition of the derivation of the second from the first person, and this thought is the basis of the creation of the world. All stages of finitude are passed through on the way to the creation of man.

§ 59. The thought of what is merely object—the thought of the mere passivity—is the thought of simple externality or Space. Space is the thought of one point outside of every other—no participation—simple exclusion—mere objects outside the subject. Space is the first thought of the creation, the lowest thought in the self-knowing of the divine second person. (The mechanical,

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Christian Theology rests on it. There could be no creation unless intellect and will were one in God. Self-knowledge is the origin, first, of the eternally begotten Word, and, secondly, of the Holy Spirit.

chemical, and organic phases of nature we shall discuss in another chapter.)

§ 60. (7.) The Second Person knows himself as eternally elevated above all finitude and passivity, although his derivation implies passivity as a logically prior condition. And as he knows his perfection as having this logical prior condition, he knows his perfect self as existing as the consummation and summit of Creation. Theology calls this a procession, or a double procession. If the Second Person could not know the evolution or process out of the passive into the active—out of the finite and imperfect into the infinite and perfect—then he could not know his derivation from the First Person. Then, too, there could be no such elevation of the world, no salvation of any of its creatures.

§ 61. Because the First Person knows the Second Person as self-knowing, he knows the self-knowing of the Second, and recognizes in the perfection of the Second his own perfection; also, in the creation of the Third perfect person by the self-knowing of the Second Person, the First Person recognizes his own perfection, so that the Third Person proceeds not only from the Second Person, but also from the First Person.

§ 62. The Third perfect Personality is the Holy Spirit that lives in the Invisible Church. It is the archetype of all institutions. We recognize a sort of personality in institutions. The State, for example, has deliberative, executive, and administrative functions—an intellect and a will. What is imperfectly realized in historical institutions is perfectly realized in the Eternal and Invisible Church, which is composed of innumerable souls, collected from innumerable worlds, and all united, not by temporary devices of written compacts, or immemorial usages and formalities, but by the bond of love or the spirit of Divine Charity and self-sacrifice, for the true good of others. The Spirit of this infinite and Eternal Church is the Holy Spirit—"a procession but not a begotten," because it arises or is an eternal involution from the manifold of Creation through the Self-Knowledge of the First and Second Persons.

§ 63. Man as individual progresses or develops by social combination with his fellow-men, and thence arise institutions of Civilization—the family, civil society, the State, the Church. Historical institutions, being finite and having limitations incident to



organization, are perishable, but their archetype is the invisible Church, into which go, or may go, all souls after death. The principle of social combination or co-operation is altruism, Charity, or Love, the principle which sacrifices self for one's fellow-men. In that principle alone can perfect organization exist. The Spirit of the Invisible Church, the archetype of the Visible Church, and of all other institutions of Civilization, is the Third Person of the Divine Being, the Spirit of Love and Co-operation organized into the greatest reality of the universe. For it includes all souls that have lived in the universe from the timeless beginning of the consciousness of the Eternal Word. From this view we find the world to be the process of evolution of souls, so that this is the present, past, or future purpose of each and all stellar bodies.

§ 64. (9) The first self-active being in its self-knowledge knows no passivity, no imperfection, and hence no finite being. The world is not to be explained from his self-knowledge except by mediation of the Second Person, called the Eternal Word. The relation of the First Person is, or may be, expressed, therefore, by Justice. Justice returns the deed upon the individual and gives each its due. The due of a finite or negative being, whose individuality exists through separation and exclusion and negation of others, is therefore self-annihilation, and such is the fate of all finitude in the thought of pure self-activity, except it is saved through the intervention of the thought of the Second Person, who thinks his relation to the first as derivation or sonship. But the Eternal Word thinks his origination from God eternally as an annulment of passivity and isolated material existence, and a rising into the perfect unity of the Church. Here we have the form of perfect Grace. A perfect being, whose entire activity brings up from nothing finite beings and gives them existence and progression in order to culminate in man, who can carry out this development by uniting with his fellow-men in social union and ascend into the Invisible Church.

## NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

*REPORTS OF THE LECTURES AT THE CONCORD SCHOOL.*

[WE reprint the following notice of the volume of "Concord Lectures" published last fall by Moses King, Cambridge, Mass., of whom copies may still be obtained at the prices named.—Ed.]

"The Concord Lectures on Philosophy" will be issued in a short time from the publishing house of Moses King, at Harvard Square, in Cambridge. In way of co-operation of the faculty and lecturers of the Concord School of Philosophy, the book will have the benefit of all that could be desired. Every lecturer has revised the abstracts of his own lectures, and the statements of doctrine and argument are made briefly and clearly, so that the reader can grasp readily, without reading the full lectures, the peculiarities of any lecturer or of the school which he represents. One lecture will be printed in full—that of Professor Garman, of Amherst College, who is President Seelye's assistant in the department of mental and moral philosophy. This is a concise review of the reasoning by which Dr. L. P. Hickok meets the materialistic agnostics on their own ground, and has been approved by that veteran metaphysician. A special feature is made of the Emerson commemoration; abstracts of all the papers and addresses will be given. All the poems read at the school—including Mr. Alcott's monody on Mr. Emerson, entitled "Ion," and Mr. Sanborn's opening poem—will be published in full. The volume will also contain a brief historical sketch of the school, with complete programmes of the first three years of its existence. As foot-notes to the names of the lecturers will be given brief biographical notices, in which the chief facts of the life and the writings of each one will be mentioned. Whatever may be the history of philosophy in this country, however much the Concord school may be outdone hereafter, the fact of the attempt will compel it to be recognized in all faithful histories in coming years, and in this fact will lie a part of the value of this first authorized publication of the proceedings. Among the lecturers whose lectures are given in this volume are Dr. W. T. Harris, Dr. H. K. Jones, Mr. F. B. Sanborn, Mr. A. Bronson Alcott, Professor John Watson, Mr. George P. Lathrop.

Mrs. Julia Ward Howe, Professor Charles E. Garman, Miss Elizabeth P. Peabody, the Rev. Dr. C. A. Bartol, the Rev. R. A. Holland, Mrs. Ednah D. Cheney, Mr. Rowland G. Hazard, Professor George H. Howison, and Mr. John Albee.

The volume will contain nearly 200 pages, royal octavo. It will be printed from large-faced, new type, on fine quality of calendered paper. It will be bound in two styles, cloth and paper. The price per copy, post-paid, will be \$1.75 for cloth binding, and \$1.25 for paper binding.

A good part of the edition is already subscribed for. A limited edition of only one thousand copies will be printed. No plates are made, and the type is distributed as soon as the forms are printed, so that, to make, certain of obtaining a copy, the order should be sent to the publisher without delay.

#### MR. WASSON ON EVOLUTION.

[We reprint the following very able letter by Mr. Wasson from the columns of "The Index" (for November 9, 1882). It is a part of a discussion between Mr. Wasson and Mr. B. F. Underwood.—ED.]

MY DEAR SIR: You say with good warrant that I am an evolutionist. I had said as much to you, and should have said it in "The Index," in order to correct some misapprehensions, had I found occasion to do so without coming forward for that express purpose. You have now spoken for me, and I am glad of it. But, so much being said, I am under obligation to say more. For I believe in evolution without accepting as sufficient any philosophical explanation of the fact hitherto offered—an evolutionist holding out for more adequate explanations; and I shrewdly suspect that the case is not much otherwise with Colonel Higginson, little as he may be satisfied with the system and methods of Herbert Spencer. But to some of your readers, with whom the fact of evolution and Mr. Spencer's explanation of it are one and the same, and no more to be separated than the fact of gravitation and the law of gravitation as discovered by Newton, such a declaration of position will not be intelligible. I must therefore try to render it intelligible, and beg leave to do so in the form of a letter to yourself, as if in continuance of a conversation which passed between us one evening, and of which I retain a pleasant recollection.

Evolution means continuity in the process of nature, or of the known universe. The contrary notion is that of a natural process interrupted at times by obtrusions or injections of power from without, which power may thereafter either run in the channels of nature to give them a new content, or run side by side with them as a distinct supernatural current, or it may but briefly suspend the effect of natural law, and then be with-

drawn, leaving all to go on as before. Now, the former conception was that of the new school of thought in New England, commonly known as the transcendental school, before Herbert Spencer was heard of. Emerson had announced it as indubitable truth in "Nature," his earliest work. Parker had applied it to one great province or principle of human history in his "Discourse of Religion." Higginson and Johnson, the two adherents of the school whom I first encountered upon coming to Massachusetts in 1851, were younger men, and not in the same way before the public, nor do I recall any express private declaration from either of them upon the point; but they were certainly on the same line of thought. So extended indeed was this manner of thinking that it had reached me in eastern Maine, and in a general way determined finally my point of view, while I was yet a student there in an orthodox theological seminary, therefore between the years 1848 and 1851. "Development" was the word then, and quite as good a word as evolution, save that the latter is in some respects more convenient. This term came into vogue, displacing the older one, along with a particular explanation of the world-process, as being but the blind movement of forces purely physical or physico-chemical; and now it is the persuasion of many that the idea of continuous universal development was born into the world from the womb of this particular theory; and that one can be an evolutionist in no other form. But the idea has been abroad for a century or more. During no less a period it has been generating theories and hypotheses designed to cover some part of the great world-process, if not the whole. And familiar to American transcendentalism, though in a sense not very precisely defined, it was taken up by Hegel and worked out methodically with a thoroughness and in a way that excited the vast admiration of one age, and now excites the half-contemptuous astonishment of another.

Hegel was an evolutionist of the strictest sort. I hazard nothing in saying this, though far from being an Hegelian scholar, for a slight acquaintance with his manner of thinking makes the fact obvious. Take, for example, his "Philosophy of History," his most exoteric work. He there represents history as a logically ordered succession of steps, whose result is a freedom self-contained and self-governed. The whole process is presumed in the first step, and in the last all the preceding ones are subsumed. But here we are to make a distinction of much importance; we are to distinguish between two very different conceptions of evolution. The first step in Hegel's historical evolution is represented by China, the second by India, another by Greece, and so on. Now, according to one style of thought, the phenomenal fact, China, should have evolved itself to become India; the phenomenal fact, India, have evolved itself to become



Greece; and so to the end. This would imply that what had actually come to the surface in China was sufficient to produce, and of necessity must produce, the whole course and result of history. It would imply, not simply that the actual morals, institutions, laws, and manners of China sprang from productive principles in the human spirit which would elsewhere go further and give themselves a higher manifestation, but that these morals, institutions, laws, and manners would transform themselves into others of a more advanced type, and these again into others; thus, that the first phenomenal result, considered as quite cut off from any unapparent resource, is in and of itself the source and principle of all subsequent evolution. Hegel thought quite differently. What he speaks of is the self-evolution of spirit, or of the human spirit. This, following an order inherent in itself, unfolds its content, and gives itself an outward representation in doing so; China representing the primary degree of this unfolding, India the next, and so on. Here the evolution and the continuity are spiritual, and spiritual only. In the outward representation we observe indeed an order of succession, but no outward line of production running from one degree to the next, say from China to India. The succession is like that of the steps in a stairway, where there is indeed an ascending order, but no production of one step by the next lower.

But it will now be prudent for me to get away from Hegel, and make a safe retreat. I really do not know how far the evolution of existence, as traced in his "Logic" should be understood as a movement taking place in time; I am only sure that the thought-process, which according to him is the veritable world-process, is evolutionary, and in the most vigorous sense. But what is here said of him is simply preparatory to a statement which might have been made without reference to him, though the preparation is not superfluous. The statement is that evolution may be, and has been, conceived of in two quite opposite ways. On the one hand, it is conceived of as proceeding from within outward, from unapparent reality to apparent form significant and representative of the reality; which representation is in and of itself, or apart from its producing principle, nothing. This, I suppose, was—approximately at least—the earlier thought of Emerson and of the American transcendentalists generally. Take for illustration some well-known lines from "The Problem."

"These temples grew as grows the grass;  
Art might obey, but not surpass;  
The passive master lent his hand  
To the vast soul that o'er him planned."

The master is passive, and it is the vast soul which plans in the growth of grass and temples, dewdrops and worlds. Art is true art only when inspired and guided by conceiving Nature, the supreme and eternal artist. Spiritual Nature imagines, and the world-picture lies before us, we ourselves a part of it; she thinks, and her thoughts are the laws of structure and motion in the universe. She is not, meanwhile, apart from her manifestation, but ever present in it and one with it. Instinct with her life, the stone is "conscious;" instinct with her purpose, the worm is "striving to be man." Now, one may represent the fact to himself in this way, and yet be no evolutionist, even though he admit an ascending course of phenomenal manifestation. To illustrate, let us suppose that a Phidias or Michel Angelo has come to the perfect maturity of his genius, and is fully qualified to plan a Parthenon or St. Peter's, but that he chooses, one cannot say why, to begin with a hut, then to build something a little finer, and so through a succession of approximations, to bring forth at last the glorious structure which was in his mind from the first. This were not evolution. On the other hand, suppose a great artistic genius in course of development; it is Turner, for example, that we are thinking of. In principle and promise the genius is fully there at the beginning of his career, but, as realized and productive power, it is daily arriving, and it goes on increasing during a period of some five-and-thirty years. Meantime, it is of the nature of this genius to be productive, to give itself an outward and visible expression. Always it brings forth its best, but its best of to-day will be bettered another day, for its power grows. Reviewing Turner's works, we can trace the stages of his artistic growth; from point to point we can see that his apprehension becomes more alive, his insight more delicate and penetrating, his imagination freer, larger, and more subtle. Here is a real development, but, though represented outwardly, it takes place only in the *genius* of the artist. The productive principle is there, and there too is the principle of continuity. Between the picture of one year and that of another there is a connection, but they are connected only through the producing genius. Now, universal evolution has been conceived of in a manner somewhat similar, though not strictly the same. The productive power and the principle of continuity are in Nature with the capital initial—Nature as spiritual, self-active, formative, and not in the outward representation, though she is not apart from her product, like the painter from the picture. This, I should say, was Emerson's way of thinking. He is indeed a hard man to corner, for he not only spoke but thought poetically, and can never be bound to a theory strictly defined. But I should say that his thought ran in the direction indicated.

Let us now turn to the opposite conception. Here physical force, as apparent in the forms and motions of material things, is the be-all and end-all. It is purely phenomenal in the sense of existing only relatively to us, as we only relatively to it. Behind it is a nondescript somewhat which exists absolutely, but of which nothing can be known, since it is in no mode of relation either with ourselves or with the world around us. Quite independently of this, in which there is no evolution, and out of which there is none, the phenomenal or physical evolves itself, passing ever from simpler to more complex forms. Its principle of continuity is the law, newly discovered, of the conservation of physical energy, or persistence of force. Its productive principle is perhaps gravitation, since this seems to be indicated as the one primordial mode of force, out of which all other modes may or must have come; though on this head a degree of reserve is maintained. The whole movement is from without inward. At the outset there is but a gas or nebulous matter, uniform in character, uniformly diffused through the infinitude of space, and drawn equally in every direction. This matter is all and only surface; it has no *within*, but is extension without intension. But it concentrates itself in masses, rounds itself into globes, and now has an inner and an outer, though only in the spatial sense. But again it proceeds, and, in the complexities of chemical differentiation and affinity, acquires a positive interior content. Then it develops life, and in this arrives at a far intenser mode of relation; then through the ever-deepening subtleties and mysteries of vital being increases incessantly the proportion of content to surface. At length, though itself mindless, it evolves conscious mind or spirit, which has no surface, but is intension without extension. And while, according to the former conception, the physical world is in and of itself nothing, but might be called a function of spirit, so here we have the precise contrary; spirit is evolved, but it is only a function of matter, and has in itself no being.

Such are the opposed conceptions, as rapidly and roughly sketched. My own persuasion is that a true and entire theory of evolution, should it one day come, will comprise both and conform to neither. I believe that the real evolution is polaric, spiritual-physical; that on both sides there is a line of continuity, and productive power in their unity. An analogy will render it fairly clear what these words mean; but this letter is already too long, and I must crave leave to continue the subject and conclude the present statement in another.

Yours very truly,

D. A. WASSON.

## TRANSLATIONS FROM SCHOPENHAUER AND VON HARTMANN.

[The following announcement from Messrs. Trübner & Co., of London, conveys the welcome intelligence that the long-expected translations of "The World as Will and Idea" ("Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung"), by Arthur Schopenhauer, and "The Philosophy of the Unconscious" ("Die Philosophie des Unbewussten"), by Edward von Hartmann, will appear at an early date. There are no works on philosophy which have attained to greater popularity in this generation than the two works here offered to the public.—ED.]

"The World as Will and Idea," by Arthur Schopenhauer. Translated from the German. (In October, 1883.) In Three Volumes, post 8vo.

It is now fully sixty years since Schopenhauer's "Opus Magnum"—destined to work a revolution in the philosophical speculation of the century—made its first appearance. Still, such was the indifference exhibited towards this work by the author's contemporaries occupying the chairs of philosophy at the different German universities, that, a few years after its appearance, the greater part of the edition found its way into the paper-maker's tub. It was only towards the close of the first half of the present century that a reaction set in, and that the work, hitherto unaccountably neglected, commenced to assert its claims to the attention of the public. Since then, edition has followed edition in rapid succession.

It must be said, to the credit of an Englishman (John Oxenford), that to an article of his in the "Westminster Review," which created quite a sensation at the time, and which reacted powerfully on German opinion, the tardy recognition of the great philosopher is in some measure due. A translation of the work has long been needed, but the difficulties were great, and several efforts in that direction were killed in the bud.

The present translation has been undertaken by two gentlemen, trained in German philosophical thought at German universities, and prepared for the task by an intimate acquaintance with the principles of Schopenhauer's philosophy.

"The Philosophy of the Unconscious," by Edward von Hartmann. Translated from the German by W. C. Coupland. (In December, 1883.) In Three Volumes, post 8vo.

There must necessarily be a close alliance between true merit and success—else the unexampled success of Hartmann's "Philosophy of the Unconscious" would baffle all reasonable explanation. But its cause is, perhaps, not far to seek; the author of the work is one of the most gifted, yet independent, disciples of Schopenhauer, whose system of philosophy he exhibits in a masterly way, attempting at the same time to harmonize it with those of Hegel and Schelling. As he is, moreover, master of a lucid and elegant style, a larger number of general readers has been attracted by and fascinated with the work than is, as a rule, the case with works on metaphysical subjects. The outcome has been the sale of ten editions of the German original since its first appearance. It could not be otherwise than that a lively desire should have arisen in England, as well as in the United States, for the appearance of a faithful translation; and it is surprising that it has not been attempted before. Probably the extraordinary difficulties of the task have hitherto deterred intending translators. But however that



may be, it is believed that the present translator—an ardent student of German philosophy—has successfully coped with the difficulties of the task, and that his translation will satisfy all reasonable expectations.

London: Trübner & Co., 57 and 59 Ludgate Hill.

*PRAYER OF MARY, QUEEN OF SCOTS.*

[FOUND IN HER BOOK OF DEVOTIONS. PROBABLY WRITTEN A SHORT TIME BEFORE HER EXECUTION.]

O Domine Deus! speravi in te;  
O care mi Jesu! nunc libera me:  
In dura catena, in misera poena,  
Desidero te.  
Languendo, gemendo, et genuflectendo,  
Adoro, imploro, ut liberes me.

TRANSLATION.

O Blessed Redeemer! my hope lies in thee;  
O Jesus, Beloved! now liberate me:  
In fetters I languish, and in my soul's anguish,  
I supplicate thee.  
Heart-rending sighs sending, on knee lowly bending,  
I adore, and implore thee to liberate me.

THEODORE HARRIS.

CONCORD, MASS.

BOOK NOTICES.

LA REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L'ÉTRANGER. Edited by TH. RIBOT.

[The contents of Volumes VIII to XII of this valuable philosophical journal will be published in a future number of this journal. The contents of Vols. I to VII will be found in *Jour. Spec. Phil.*, x, p. 109, and xiii, p. 44.—ED.]

January, 1882:

This number is devoted to: (1) "Musical Æsthetics in France. I. Psychology of Vocal Music," by Ch. Lévêque. The author states that "the philosophy of the beautiful and of art, or general æsthetics, has developed more slowly, and produced fewer works, in France than in Germany. France has not lacked eminent critics on these subjects, but they have not gone deeply into the philosophy of the art. This is especially true of music. Those uncultured in it are not tempted to write of it psychologically. J. J. Rousseau, and a few other noted writers, advanced the study of music by method, but not until within twenty years has a complete treatise been met with." M. Lévêque analyzes "The Philosophy of Music," by M. Charles Beauquier, as a sam-

ple of the progress of musical æsthetics, and acknowledges it to be a truly philosophical work.

(2) "The Principle of Morals," by Ch. Secrétan. First article. "Each spring delights our eyes with flowers like those of the year before, and each generation of men agitates the problems that their fathers flattered themselves they had solved. Incontestable in the domain of mathematics, of sensible experience and industry, the law of progress does not seem to extend its empire to the study of the deepest causes—those of our origin and destiny. Men for centuries have universally questioned themselves on the law of their activity without having found an answer sufficiently evident to unite them in the same conviction." M. Secrétan pursues his subject at length under the heads of: 1. *Obligation*. Herein he maintains that all moral doctrine revolves upon duty and supposes liberty. The question, "What ought I to do?" would have no meaning if there were not several courses possible to follow, of which only one is that of duty. Thus, free-will and the sentiment of obligation form the conditions of moral thought, because they are the very conditions of practical activity. 2. *Liberty*. M. Secrétan argues that the conception of obligation includes a conception of liberty, and that one cannot be obliged by duty to follow one course, and be rigorously determined by nature to follow another; the fatality which sometimes draws one to recognize evil is relative and secondary. 3. *Duty in Empiricism*. The highest logic is found only in morals. Reciprocally, morals are founded on logic, the indispensable preliminaries of which are obligation and liberty. A consistent empiricism will never venture to formulate a moral, for this act implies an ideal universally required of thought—or, in other words, an obligation. A logical mind does not regard obligation as other than the feeling of being obliged. 4. *Duty in Rationalism*. However rationalists may identify themselves with science, they have not obtained philosophy unless they can explain what knowledge is in itself. The pre-eminence of practical reason, the superiority of virtue over science, of the will over the understanding, demonstrate themselves to whoever asks, "What am I?" The superiority of virtue over science is defined within its just limits to him who asks, "What ought I to do?" The question confesses that study is a duty, and that science is a virtue necessary to all others. Kant and Fichte so understood it. 5. *Experience and the a priori in Morals*. This argument is based on the relations of morals to metaphysics, in which the author continues to define the idea of duty and the conception of the ideal. The subject of morals is exhaustively treated by him under the divisions herein mentioned, and the nature and beliefs of man are minutely defined, and his relations to spiritual influence argued with earnestness and faith.

(3) "Monism in Germany." First article, by D. Nolen. The writer says that the systems that have sprung up in Germany from the awakening of philosophic speculation within fifteen years seem to have united to avenge the name and defend the principles of monism. The word is ascribed to the invention of Wolff. "The monists of the present," this article affirms, "place science before metaphysics, and the problems heretofore belonging to the latter are now solved by science, in which truth alone can be found. M. Nolen considers monism from the scientific standpoint, and outlines its history.

(4) The Book Notices in this number include:

(a) "Discourses on the History of Religions," by A. Réville. Paris: G. Fischbacher, 1881. This volume contains the course of lectures given by M. Réville on the history of religions, and are, according to his critic, James Darmesteter, a model of

philosophic impartiality. Several chapters are devoted to the discussion of the old theories on primitive revelation and primitive tradition, worship, and symbols, and many interesting questions, and the author is proclaimed a master in the art of fine writing. (b) "An Historical Study on the Philosophy of the Renaissance in Italy" (Cesare Crémonini), by Mabillean. Paris: Hachette. This history is a kind of unique monograph of a condensed memoir on the school of Padua. Crémonini was great in the eyes of his contemporaries, and is unknown to-day. M. Mabillean, with designed impartiality in exposing his deficiencies, leads the reader to be partial through charity, the critic, M. Georges Lyon, states. In his opinion, the most interesting portion of the work is that which relates to the relations of the Paduan to the Jesuits and the Inquisition. (c) "Our Duties and our Rights," by M. Ferraz (Paris: Didier), comprises a course delivered before the Faculty of Letters at Lyons, recommended by the critic, F. B., to masters and pupils, as very instructive and clearly written. (d) "The History of Psychology," by Dr. Herm. Siebeck. Gotha: Perthes, 1880. This history differs from others, says the critic, Edmond Colsenet, in giving the beginning and development of the sciences particularly relating to man, physiology, and medicine. The first part treats of the beginning of psychology before Socrates and the sophists. The second part, "The Constitution of Psychology as a Philosophic Science," by Socrates and Plato, in the sense of dualism. (e) "Literary Polemics in the Fourth Century before Jesus Christ," by Gustav Teichmüller. Breslau: William Koebner, 1881. Paul Tannery analyzes this work. In his opinion, no more important one on philosophy has been issued for a long while. The author throws new light on the dialogues of Plato. Under Bibliographical Notices, Henri Marion reviews a work on Bacon by Thomas Fowler. London: Sampson & Low. "A strong and substantial work." "Hartley and James Mill," by G. Spencer Bower. London: Sampson & Low. The first part is devoted to biographies, the second to philosophic opinions and systems, and the third examines the value and influence of their doctrines. According to Th. Ribot, this volume is the best *résumé* of the doctrines of Hartley and Mill.

(5) Review of Foreign Italian Periodicals.

(a) "Rivista di Filosofia Scientifica" for July; (b) "La Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane" for April, June, and August.

*February Number:*

(1) "The System of Spinoza in France," by P. Janet. "The history of Spinoza's system in France may be divided into three periods. In the seventeenth century Spinoza was an object of curiosity to some strong minds, and of execration and horror to believers who saw in him only a 'monster.' In the eighteenth century, with some few exceptions, he was scorned and neglected as obscure, barbarous, indecipherable. In the nineteenth century, owing chiefly to the German influence, he is restored to honor, finds new disciples, and is treated with respect even by his adversaries." These three phases the author of this article chooses for the basis of a very exact study, both critical and biographical, with a synopsis of the estimates of the various adversaries of Spinoza. In Paul Janet's belief, the noble and superior qualities of Spinoza's system are such as might be appropriated by Spiritualism, leaving the lesser ones to its opponents. Spinoza could be divided into halves, one being claimed by the followers of Descartes, the other by those of Diderot.

(2) "The Faculties of the Child at the Period of Birth," by B. Perez, is a semi-physical, semi-psychological treatise, which evinces an excellent understanding of the mental power of infants.

(3) "Monism in Germany," by Nolen, is concluded in a lengthy analysis of Hartmann, and has varied and interesting philosophical features.

(4) "The Seven Enigmas of the World" is the title of a speech delivered before the Academy of Berlin, July 8, 1880, in honor of its founder, Leibnitz, by M. Dubois-Reymond. "The seven enigmas" are: 1. The intimate nature of matter and force; 2. The origin of movement; 3. The origin of life; 4. The apparent finality in nature; 5. The origin of sensation; 6. The origin of reflected thought and language; 7. Free-will. If M. Reymond has not solved these enigmas, he seems to have compared and studied them with profound insight, if we may judge by the presentation of "C. S.," who offers little comment.

(5) The Book Notices are:

(a) "Positivism and Experimental Science," by the Abbé De Broglie. Paris: Victor Palmé. According to his critic, Ch. Secrétan, De Broglie is a clear, fertile, exact writer, agreeable and eloquent, and courageous in his opinions. His work is destined to arrest the progress of error, and is "thoroughly polemic." (b) "On the Circulation of the Blood in the Brain of Man," by Angelo Mosso, Salviucci, Rome, 1880. The important question considered in this work is the circulation in the brain during mental work and during sleep, and what are the physical conditions of Conscience. The subject is ably treated, and an excellent idea of the work is given by "E. G." (c) "Berkeley," by A. Campbell Fraser, LL.D. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London. The biographical portion of this book contains a correspondence between Berkeley and Sir John Percival, reviewed by A. Penjon. (d) "Studies on the History of Primitive Institutions," by Sir Henry Sumner Maine, translated from English into French by M. Leyritz. Paris: Thorin. All Europe has saluted the author as a master in the science of origins, and any work by him, says his critic, Henri Marion, should be called to the attention of the thinking public. (e) "Habit, and its Influence on Education," by Dr. Paul Radestock, A Psychological-Pedagogical Study. Berlin, 1882, R. Appelius. (f) "The Analysis," by H. Schmidt, proves this work to be of great merit in mental development and education. (g) "The Geometric Number of Plato," a new interpretation, by J. Dupuis. Paris: Hachette, 1881. The critic, Paul Tannery, does not always agree with the writer in numericals, but thinks his interpretation the most "plausible" of any that has appeared or will appear. (h) "History of the Sciences in Belgium," by Ch. Lagrange, E. Lagrange, A. Gilkinet. Four volumes comprise this history, and present the intellectual development of Belgium since 1830.

(6) Review of Foreign Periodicals.

(a) "Experimental Review of Freniatria and Legal Medicine." (b) "Archivio de Psichiatria, and Criminal Anthropology."

### *March Number:*

(1) "The Stages of the Religious Idea in Humanity," based on a new book by Eduard von Hartmann, by M. Vernes. "Whoever regards religion as an illusion," says M. Hartmann, "must also regard as illusion the apparent development (progression) to which this illusion gives place; but he who has the conviction that there is a real development in religious matters cannot maintain that the object of this development is a pure illusion." This thesis is discussed on every point by M. Vernes. M. Hartmann attempts to trace religion to the animal origin of man, questioning if animals have or have had a religion. He adopts the term used by the famous Max Müller, a savant in matters relating to India—henotheism—which M. Vernes defines as the common origin of abstract monism, polytheism, or monotheism. Henotheism is based upon a con-



tradition. Man seeks divinity and finds gods; he addresses each of these gods in turn as if they were the divinity, and confers upon each predicates which bring into question the divinity of other gods, and, by addressing different demands to each, he unconsciously denies their natural divinity. M. Vernes does not think that the fact that the premises of M. Hartmann are approved by the eminent Max Müller renders them less open to discussion. In this belief he considers religion in all its forms and to remote ages, and tests M. Hartmann's arguments by comparison with historical facts, the result of which is an instructive and interesting view of religious origin and division.

(2) "Musical Æsthetics in France," second article. "The Psychology of Instruments," by Ch. Lévêque. M. Lévêque compares the various musical instruments in their physical effect upon the voice. Stringed instruments, being capable of producing sustained notes, harmonize with the voice, and the piano changes the natural tones of the voice, since the latter is in subjection to it. The more musical an instrument, the more it is the voice, which is the greatest of all instruments, and upon which musical thought, the expression of the soul, can be impressed and conveyed in musical language to others, as if this unlimited natural instrument, the voice, were passive material. With this statement the author discusses the expressive power of various instruments, and the capability as well as the usual misunderstanding of the voice.

(3) "The Principle of Morals," second article, by Ch. Secrétan. The continuance of this subject is a wider examination of the principles given in the beginning of the argument previously published. The divisions under which it is herein presented are:

The *a priori* element of principle.

The *a priori* in the conception of the world.

The empiric element of principle in nature.

*Moral Unity—Discussion of the Objections to Unity.*

(4) Under Book Reviews are mentioned:

(a) "Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy," by F. Pollock. London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1880. Reviewed by Jules Lagneau, who pronounces the work to be produced in leisure with great thought and a conscientious care amounting to piety, and with a patience and candid reasoning with which Spinoza would have his works studied. The synopsis of M. Lagneau forms a clear and connected *résumé* of Spinoza's principles as understood by M. Pollock, and his enthusiasm for the latter is easily allowed when considering the interesting matter he has found for approval. (b) "History of the New Philosophy," second volume, by Windelband. Reviewed by Henri Marion. This history treats of philosophy before Kant, Kantian philosophy, and philosophy after Kant. The second volume treats exclusively of Kant and his German successors. The author treats the subject with ardor, and his views are very comprehensive; but there are defects in the arrangement of matter, and a lack of titles where needed, according to the estimate of his critic. (c) "Inductive Knowledge," by Th. Jacob. Unger, Berlin, 1881. Reviewed by A. Debon. Three interesting questions form the object of what this critic calls a "curious study": 1. How is the understanding of conception to be defined—that is to say, its signification and scientific value? 2. In what consists the demonstrating link of the attributes of conception in all kinds of reasoning, either mathematical or experimental deduction? 3. On what is based induction itself, understood in the common sense of the word, that is, the extension of right or law demonstrated, in all time and in all places in the same conditions. (d) "Saint Catherine of Sienna; Psycho-pathological Observations," by Alfonso Asturaro. Naples: Morano, 1881. This brochure is a sketch, and not a complete life. The author speaks respectfully of Catherine, but re-

gards her as influenced by hysteria springing from physical causes, and from this condition arose her visions and ecstasies.

(5) Review of Foreign Periodicals.

*April Number :*

(1) "Psychological Methods and Experimental Psychology," from the recent works of M. Wundt, by G. Séailles. An account of the personal labors of M. Wundt and his pupils in the laboratory of the university at Leipzig.

(2) "Psychology of Great Men," first article, by H. Joly. The author says that it is more difficult to study the superior than the degenerate forms of human intelligence. The man of genius, in the accredited opinion, is more occupied in doing than in asking how he does; he bears with him, it is generally asserted, the secret of his creation. As for ordinary minds, it is, unfortunately, easier for them to grasp what they are themselves, and to understand the weaknesses of every nature against which they daily defend themselves, than to penetrate the conditions of existence and to measure the heights of those sublime faculties whose development has been so quickly arrested in themselves. Works on madness and crime abound, but those which treat of genius are not only rare, but are almost always devoted to depreciating their subject, to bringing out the vices or weaknesses of great characters, and discovering in them the germs of physical or mental maladies, which so often form the greater part of the inheritance on which their posterity can count. A genius M. Joly defines as having had his head higher than the majority of men, and his feet, perhaps, as low as the smallest child, or even beast. He may be a genius in some attributes only. In this first article he analyzes intuition, inspiration, and inheritance, and presents many striking thoughts.

(3) M. Secrétan concludes his subject, "The Principles of Morals," discussing it further under the heads: "*Résumé* of the Deduction. Impossibility of Subjective Morals: Religious Morals—Personal Interest—Individual Perfection—Charity—Justice."

(4) Book Notices:

(a) "Inward Speech," an essay on Descriptive Psychology, by Victor Egger. Paris: Germer Baillière, 1881. "Inward speech," says the author, "is something well known but greatly ignored, especially by philosophers." The analysis which Victor Brochard gives of this book fills several pages. He pronounces M. Egger a pure psychologist, presenting his subject without reference to physiology. His style is remarkably finished, his thoughts carefully elaborated, and his work one of great distinction. (b) "Probity and Moral Law: Ethical and Teleological," by Mme. Clémence Royer. Paris: Guillaumin & Co., 1881. This author has written many important philosophical works, and this one her critic pronounces the boldest expression of evolutionism in morals, even going beyond the conclusions of H. Spencer in his "Data of Ethics"; for it embraces in a vast synthesis the totality of beings, organic and inorganic. "A work of serious merit, always suggestive and frequently profound." (c) "J. Salvador, His Life, Works, and Criticisms," by Colonel Gabriel Salvador. Paris: Calmann Lévy. Joseph Salvador was one of the first and boldest initiators of religious criticism in the nineteenth century. Since 1822 he has, as M. Renan avers, thrown a new and "audacious" light upon the origin of religion. (d) "The Power of Sound," by Edmund Gurney. London: Smith, Elder & Co. A fine treatise on musical æsthetics.

(5) Foreign Periodicals.

*May Number:*

(1) "Determinism and Liberty," "Liberty demonstrated by Mechanics," by J. Delbœuf. "If there is a problem which inspires, and at the same time leads to despair,"

says this author, "it is that of liberty. Since the day that man began to reflect on his own nature he has not ceased to put this question to himself, 'Am I free?' The answer varies according to his stand-point. If a legislator or judge, free-will is to him a dogma; if a priest or believer, he lays it as a sacrifice at the feet of divinity; if a philosophical moralist, he finds in his inmost being the irrefragable proof of the independence of his conscious thought; if a philosopher in natural philosophy, the laws of nature, universal and immutable, prevent him from granting to any being whatsoever the privilege of escaping from it." The author, under the first division of his subject—I. "Ordinary arguments for and against free-will"—continues: "If an inexorable fatalism rules our thoughts and actions, there is no longer truth or science; error is legitimate, and there is no longer error; the wise man and fool are both in the right, and there are no longer fools or wise men. All opinions, even those qualified as absurd, are only what they must be; the determinist who torments himself to defend his cause is only a puppet in the hands of destiny, which at a given moment draws him from behind the scenes and makes him speak and gesticulate on the stage before other puppets, his spectators.

"Here the adversaries of fatalism triumph, but it is a mere victory of words. These unassailable consequences the determinist accepts without the least repugnance. It must be thus," he says. "We can do nothing about it. Each plays the part assigned to him for all eternity, and plays it conscientiously, with the persuasion, more or less profound, that he is the author of it."

## II. "Can free-will be an illusion?"

The determinists answer the moralists that the idea of freedom and faith in free-will is an illusion. The author examines the premises of both believers. The determinists confess that they believe themselves free, although science assures them they are not. The author studies the opposition between faith and science.

III. Can there exist forces capable of modifying their intensity, their direction, or their point of application?

IV. "Of the pretended necessity of a directing principle to regulate cases of indeterminate movement."

This subject M. Delbœuf acknowledges to belong to geometricians rather than to philosophers, but he gives the views of noted mathematicians.

V. "To determine a movement, can a force that is null suffice in certain cases?"

VI. "If there are free actions, they cannot imply a creation of force."

Whatever the opinion in regard to the origin of human activity, man stands towards nature as a master to a slave.

(2) "The Renaissance of Materialism," by F. Paulhan. This article is a brief history of the conditions giving rise in France to materialism, and an account of its growth. One of the most obscure points of materialism M. Paulhan declares to be the conception of matter itself, and the materialists cannot answer what matter is. Materialism and positivism he asserts are enemies. The prevailing opinion is that experimental philosophy is a genus of which positivism and materialism are two species.

(3) "Anaximander of Miletus; The Infinite, and Evolution and Revolution (Entropie)," by P. Tannery.

This article is a kind of critical synopsis of historical information given by Gustav Teichmüller regarding Anaximander. M. Tannery states that, in the grave question of the origin and destiny of the world, philosophy, since its birth, has been hovering between the thesis of Anaximander and the antithesis of Xenophanes.

*June Number :*

(1) "Sociologic Studies in France. I. Animal Colonies," by A. Espinas.

The history of individuality begins for M. Perrier, according to the statement of M. Espinas, with that of organization and life; something like an announcement of this is found in what is poetically called the personality of the atom. The character of the atom and evolution occupy a great portion of this analysis by M. Espinas.

(2) "Determinism and Liberty," by M. Delbœuf, continued from the May number of "La Revue." "Determinism, as a doctrine, is as ancient as human thought." The continuance of this subject is divided into: Proof of the Existence of Liberty.

I. *Exposé* of mechanism.

II. Law of the fixation of force. Neither this force nor that of the conservation of energy is in contradiction to free-will.

III. Free beings might dispense with time. Distinction between real and abstract uniform time.

IV. There exist discontinued movements.

V. Discontinued movements are explained only by liberty.

(3) "The Variations of Personality in the Normal State," by F. Paulhan.

"1. The variations of personality, analogous to those revealed by the morbid conditions described by various authors, are very frequent in the normal state. 2. If man can be said to have a certain unity, this unity has its basis in the body, and not in the soul, and in the lower rather than the higher functions of the brain. 3. Man has not a completed unity; it seems to be only in progress of formation." From this thesis the author gives at length views of pathological phenomena.

*July Number :*

(1) "The Sense of Locality and its Organs in Animals and Man," by C. Viguier.

In the words of an unknown writer, from whom M. Viguier quotes, "Natural history has been haunted by a phantom known by the name of *instinct*, which is invoked in all difficult cases, as was the term phlogistic by the chemists of the last century. Lewes regards instinct only as degenerated intelligence. The wonderful faculty that animals possess of returning to places from which they have been taken, shut up in boxes from which they saw nothing, M. Viguier attributes to the sense of smell. The animal perceives a succession of odors along his route, and by them traces his way back, no matter how many turns there may be. With man the hand is closely connected with the power of vision; an animal, not having this member, has a keener scent to act with vision. Animals have hereditary aversions and fears, and their object becomes known to them by their sense of smell. The chief facts of this article are presented to prove a distinct sense of locality in man analogous to the sense of smell in animals.

(2) "The Psychology of Great Men," by H. Joly. The continuation of this subject by M. Joly treats of Heredity in Families, and its effect in the perpetuation of talent.

(3) "Will as Power of Judgment, and Adaptation," by Th. Ribot. In this study the author proposes to study anomalies, and to draw conclusions upon the normal state. The fundamental principle which dominates the psychology of the will, in the healthy as in the morbid state, is that every state of consciousness has a tendency to express itself by a movement or act. Activity in the animal is not a beginning, but an end; not a cause, but a result. This is the essential point which should not be lost sight of, and alone explains the physiology and pathology of will.

*August Number :*

(1) "The Philosophy of F. Glisson," by H. Marion. This author states that philosophers have questioned whether Leibnitz has not been influenced by the English physi-



cian, Francis Glisson. Little is known of the life of Glisson excepting facts relating to his ancestry. The object of M. Marion's study is a work of Glisson's, entitled, "The Energetic Nature of Substance, or of the Life of Nature," which was published in Glisson's seventy-fifth year, and which he spent ten years in writing. This work had little reputation when produced, and is now very rare. M. Marion compares Leibnitz and Glisson, and undertakes to prove how much his works were studied by Leibnitz.

(2) "Determinism and Liberty," by Delbœuf, is concluded.

I. Liberty demonstrated by mechanics. Mechanical evaluation of the motive power of will.

II. Psychical origin of the free nexus of forces.

III. The action of free nexi of forces.

IV. The future of free beings.

(3) "The Psychology of Great Men," by H. Joly. "The Great Man and Contemporaries." The author quotes at length the views of the "distinguished American philosopher," Mr. William James, as published in "The Atlantic." M. Marion devotes several pages to the consideration of Mr. James's beliefs, but does not agree with him in attributing genius more or less to chance.

*September Number :*

(1) "The Right and Action," by Ch. Secrétan. M. Secrétan suggests *goodness* as the word to express moral activity. He discusses: 1. The problems of evil. 2. Pure and applied morals. 3. Theodicy.

(2) "The Common Features of Nature and History," by G. Tarde. The writer asks why social science is still to be born, or why it is born so late among its adult and vigorous sisters. He enters upon the study of history to aid him in his examination of the question. One thesis that he maintains is that all similarities are due to repetitions. 1. All similarities observed in the chemical, physical, and astronomical world have for their only explanation and possible cause periodical and principally vibratory movements. 2. All similarities of the world result from hereditary transmission. 3. All similarities that are remarked in the social world are the direct or indirect fruit of imitation in all its forms.

(3) "Syllogism and Knowledge," by E. Pannier. Between the classic thesis of syllogism, "which engenders science," and the modern system, which contests the reality of syllogism, there is less difference than there seems to be. In both, the fundamental idea is the same; syllogism ought to be demonstrative; it is or is not a method of acquiring knowledge. The error common to the two schools consists in a false appreciation of the function of reasoning. The conclusions which M. Pannier arrives at in his study are that "reasoning is not an instrument of knowledge, but an operation of analysis and classification, effected by the means of verbal substitutions, and which, having nothing to reveal to us outside of the premises given, reposes neither on a categorical form of the mind, nor on an axiomatic truth, nor on any principle of transcendence whatsoever. We conclude because we define, and our definitions have no other object than to create the whole substance of our reasoning."

*October Number :*

(1) "Sociologic Studies in France. II. Social Contemporary Science," by A. Espinas. "If the individual is the product of an association, the logical result is that every association can be individualized. It would indeed be strange if Nature, so faithful to herself in the development of her works, nature which is one like mind, because mind

is either a nameless monstrosity or a part of nature—that nature, we repeat, after having, by a persevering process, constructed all living beings on one plan, should renounce this plan and adopt wholly new principles, when it was a question of constructing societies with these same individuals as elements." M. Espinas further considers his subject from the stand points of art and science.

(2) "A Precursor of Maine de Biran," by Paul Janet, of the Institute. Maine de Biran in his writings has quoted a work that is little known, and which was written by a physician of Montpellier, named Rey Régis. The title is "Natural History of the Soul," which should not be confounded with one of the same name by Dr. Charp, of London. From this work Maine de Biran extracts a curious physiological fact, which has become classic in psychology. It refers to a paralytic who had lost movement without the sense of feeling, but who, when touched beneath a coverlet, without seeing the spot, was incapable of locating it. He had lost the faculty of localization in losing a sense of movement, a remarkable fact which supported a theory dear to Maine de Biran, that movement or voluntary will is the true cause of the localization of perceptions. This work Rey of Régis, M. Janet thinks, has never been quoted or used by any philosopher, and Biran quoted it only for the above passage. Nevertheless, he, in M. Janet's belief, was more or less influenced in his ideas by this work. Rey Régis defends against the Cartesians, and especially against Malebranche, the direct and ruling power of the soul upon the body; the indication of original and investigating thought. M. Janet gives somewhat of a history of the Cartesians, and a full analysis of Rey Régis. The second portion of the work relates to the union of the soul and the body, and he thinks is less original than the first part.

(3) "The Weaknesses of Will," by Th. Ribot. Irresolution, which is a beginning of a morbid state, has inward causes which pathology will make clear to us; it comes from the weakness of incitations or their ephemeral action. Among irresolute characters, a few—the number is small—are so through a wealth of ideas. The comparison of motives, reasoning, calculation of consequences, constitute an extremely complex cerebral state, in which tendencies to action impede each other. But this wealth of ideas is not in itself a sufficient cause for irresolution; it is only an assisting cause. The true cause here, as everywhere, is in the character. Among the irresolute who lack ideas it is more evident. If they act, it is always where there is less action or less resistance required. Deliberation with difficulty ends in choice, and choice with more difficulty in action. The author discusses and compares morbid conditions as results and causes.

#### *November Number:*

(1) "Psychology of Great Men," by H. Joly. "Genius and Inspiration" is the concluding article of the interesting series of M. Joly. He questions whether it was chance, as popularly believed, that led Columbus to discover America; and in treating of the great geniuses of the world he discusses the conditions outside of themselves which brought into action natural tendencies awaiting such causes. The reasoning of the writer and the many points which he considers invest his subject with unusual interest, heightened by a charming style.

(2) "Sociologic Studies in France. II. Social Contemporary Science" (the conclusion), by A. Espinas. The writer begins his concluding article boldly by stating that if a liberal should venture to declare, in any political assembly whatsoever in France, that the declaration of the rights of men, the whole "revolutionary religion," is only an immense postulate, he would rouse the general indignation and be regarded as a renegade.

To distinguish between faith and science, practice and speculation form the starting-points in the discussion of M. Espinas, which is earnest, instructive, and spirited.

*December Number:*

(1) "The New Expedients in Favor of Free-Will," by A. Fouillée. "Among the moralists," says the writer, "those particularly attached to spiritualism or criticism, a kind of anti-scientific reaction in the interests of morals has been observed for some time." The arguments of MM. Secrétan and Renouvier and others, who have devoted themselves to the subject of free-will, are minutely analyzed by M. Fouillée.

(2) "History of the Conception of the Infinite in the Sixth Century before Jesus Christ," by P. Tannery. This is an article of rare historical value to which no synopsis could do justice, as it is replete with facts in point of history and philosophy, which are considered very carefully from many stand-points by the writer. As in a preceding article, he studies the premises of Gustav Teichmüller.

(3) "The Conditions of Happiness and Human Evolution," by F. Paulhan. "Pessimism is a fashionable problem. People are greatly occupied with it, either in the way of defence or attack." The author asserts that he shall examine only a few points: 1. What gives value to life? Generally speaking, happiness. 2. Do the blessings of life exceed the ills? Pessimism often comes from the indignation we feel when deprived of happiness—our supposed right. The adaptation of an organization to its surroundings constitutes the conditions of happiness. Evolution, development, and the education of the people the writer discusses as causes of happiness. He concludes by saying that if pessimism were perfectly established, and it were proved that life is and will be an evil, then general suicide would be the best practical good, and a duty, man ending his own suffering and sparing future generations.

*January (1883) Number:*

(1) "Musical Aesthetics in France. III. Psychology of the Orchestra and Symphony," by Ch. Lévêque. The author discusses rhythm, the expression of various instruments, and states many interesting facts relating to music in general.

(2) "Contemporary Philosophers: M. J. Lachelier," by G. Séailles. "M. Lachelier," the writer affirms, "has taken great pains not to make himself known. Like Descartes, he did not like notoriety. He has, nevertheless, exerted a great influence upon French philosophy. He taught in the Normal School, and did not write much, but his teachings were very powerful."

(3) "The Criminal Statistics of the Last Half-Century," by G. Tarde. "What are properly called crimes have diminished nearly one half within the last half-century, and simple offences have more than trebled. Some say it is owing to increased education and refinement, or equalizing society. The small offences arise from the increased wants of the people, excited by their intellectual development. The writer throws a great deal of light upon his subject, and his statistics are of an interesting nature.

VIRGINIA CHAMPLIN.

## BOOKS RECEIVED.

The Platonist, St. Louis, Mo. Contents of 11 and 12, December-January, 1882: 1. Pearls of Wisdom (Gathered from Platonic Sources). 2. Special Notice. 3. Life of Hai Ebn Yokdan, the Self-taught Philosopher. By Abubacer, Ibn Tophail. (Translated from the original Arabic by Simon Ockley. Revised and modernized by W. H. Steele.) (Continued.) 4. On the Beautiful. Lib. VI, Enn. I. (Translated from the original Greek of Plotinos. Taylor's Version Revised.) 5. Iamblichos: a Treatise on the Mysteries. A New Translation, by Alexander Wilder. Part II.—6. On the Virtues. Enn. I, Lib. II. (Translated from the original Greek of Plotinos.) (Concluded.) 7. Selections from Ibn-Badja. (Translated for The Platonist by Alexander Wilder and Mlle. A. Peonié.) 8. The Life and Works of Thomas Taylor, the Platonist. (Concluded.) 9. The Elements of Theology. By Proklos. (Translated from the original Greek.) 10. Platonic Technology: A Glossary of Distinctive Terms used by Platon and other Philosophers in an Arcane and Peculiar Sense. Compiled by Alexander Wilder. 11. Book Reviews.

[The reader will be very sorry to learn that this unique and serviceable journal is in danger of being discontinued. In the last number of the first volume the following special notice appears.]

## "SPECIAL NOTICE.

"The 'Platonist' having failed to pay the expenses of publication, will be discontinued as a monthly with this issue, which completes volume first.

"In this connection we desire to return our sincere thanks to the kind friends who have aided us in our arduous work by subscriptions or otherwise. The many generous words of encouragement and appreciation sent us have been, we trust, fully valued.

"The 'Platonist' will be continued as a quarterly publication of fifty pages a number, at the price of \$5 per annum, provided that subscriptions to an amount sufficient to pay the expenses of publication for one year are received within three months from date. In case an adequate sum is not received within the specified time, the money that may have been sent will be returned.

"The 'Platonist' can be continued only in the manner indicated. It is absolutely necessary that the expenses of publication be guaranteed."

Prospectus of the Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science. H. B. Adams, Editor.

These Studies relate almost exclusively to the growth of institutions in the various American settlements and colonies, and are indispensable to the student of the history of our country. They are either ready for the press or in active preparation. Some of them will be published in the first instance by the University. Others will be reprints from the proceedings of learned societies, magazines, etc., where they appear in some cases under titles slightly different from those here adopted. The Studies will be pub-



lished at convenient intervals, and will bring together, in numbered monographs, kindred contributions to Historical and Political Science.

All business communications and questions touching exchanges should be addressed to Publication Agency (N. Murray), Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.; all scientific communications to the Editor.

Proceedings of the Canadian Institute. Vol. I, Fasciculus No. 3. Toronto: Copp, Clark & Co. 1882.

A Short Sketch of Modern Philosophies and of his own System, by Antonio Rosmini-Serbati. With a few words of Introduction by Father Lockhart. London: Burns & Oates, Orchard Street, W. 1882.

Thomas Jefferson as a Philologist. II. E. Shepherd. (Reprint from the "American Journal of Philology," Vol. III, No. 10.)

An Address on the Temperance Cause, and the best methods of its Advancement, by W. G. Eliot, Chancellor of Washington University.

The Philosophy of Kant in Extracts. Selected by John Watson, LL. D., Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in Queen's University, Kingston, Canada. Kingston: William Baille, Printer. 1882.

The Logos. By Thomas Hill. (Reprinted from the New York "Independent" of August 3, 1882.)

Proceedings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Session 1880-'81.

The Tides. A paper read before the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters, at December meeting of 1879, at Madison, Wis., by John Nader, C. E.

Evolution, Objective and Subjective; No Supersensible Matter; Scientific Philosophy. By William I. Gill. (Reprinted from the "Index.")

Science. Vol. I, No. 2. Moses King, Cambridge, Mass.

A Year's Legislation. Opening Address by Henry Hitchcock, Esq., the President of the Missouri Bar Association at its Second Annual Meeting, December 27, 1882. (Reprinted from the Proceedings of the Association.) St. Louis: Nixon-Jones Printing Co. 1883.

The Christian Religion. Mistakes of Robert G. Ingersoll and his Reviewers. By Dr. N. J. Cogswell.

Ueber den Weg, zum Wissen und zur Gewissheit zu gelangen. Eine Confession von Hugo Delff. Leipzig: Verlag von Fr. W. Grunow. 1882.

Revision der Hauptpunkte der Psychophysik von Gustav Theodor Fechner. Leipzig: Druck und Verlag von Breitkopf und Hartel. 1882.

Die Grundprobleme der Logik. Von Dr. Jul. Bergmann. Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn. 1882.

Mind. A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy. Contents for April, 1883: I. Psychological Principles, I., by James Ward; II. Reaction-time and Attention in the Hypnotic State, by Prof. G. Stanley Hall; III. On Some Fundamental Problems in Logic, by M. Martin; IV. "Natural Religion," by Edmund Gurney; V. Ethics and Sociology, by Prof. W. Wallace; VI. Notes and Discussions; VII. Critical Notices; VIII. New Books; IX. Miscellaneous. London: Williams & Norgate.

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## PHILOSOPHY IN OUTLINE.

BY W. T. HARRIS.

### CHAPTER VIII.

#### *The True Infinite is Free Energy.*

§ 65. We have already discussed many of the aspects of Experience, and have found three distinctions prevailing: (1) object, (2) environment, and (3) ground. Experience may be infinite as regards the multiplicity of objects which it may learn, or as regards the continuance of its observations, but there never can be an experience of any object that will contradict the logical conditions of experience. Whatever we may know in regard to the ground or logical conditions is necessarily true of all existence.

§ 66. This threefold distinction may be found in the categories of thought. The first of these is Being. Of course, it is impossible to seize upon words, in any language, which have always the same consistent definition to all minds. Only technical terms or special symbols can be kept true to one definition. Any general word in the language will have one meaning to minds in the first stage of consciousness which considers only objects without relations; another meaning to the second stage of consciousness which

considers objects only in an environment of relations and dependence; a third meaning to the stage of consciousness that considers the logical conditions underlying both object and environment.

§ 67. Being thus has three distinct aspects, according to the stage of consciousness which thinks it. But common to all the meanings or senses in which it is used it has the acceptation of a category of the greatest extent and least content of experience; it applies to all objects of experience, but expresses none of the distinctions of one object from another. Technically, therefore, in philosophy, it may be employed to denote the category of the first stage of consciousness. The shallowest thinking is least able to discriminate distinctions and differences. The most immature mind thinks all objects as having being. All objects to it are co-ordinate and of equal validity in this respect. The moment we begin to observe relations, this co-ordination vanishes and we make the terms of experience unequal. This object depends upon that object in some respect, and therefore is not co-ordinate, but subordinate to it. This belongs to that, and is only a manifestation of that object's energy or sphere of influence. Here we come to the categories of Essence and Cause.

§ 68. Essence and Cause imply the second stage of consciousness, in that they express a dualism of object and environment. Essence is technically used to express the being on which another being depends. Cause expresses still more clearly the same thought of dependence. When we regard an object as modified through its environment, we think the energy which imparts the impulse as the essence and the modification effected by it as the manifestation or phenomenon.

§ 69. But, underlying the idea of Cause, as origination of influence, there is the idea of self-activity, *Causa sui*, or personality, as the presupposition of all. These categories—being, essence, and personality—reveal to us again, therefore, the three stages of the development of consciousness.

§ 70. Modern Natural Science sets up the doctrine of the correlation of forces and the "persistence of force." In the case of individual forces—heat, light, electricity, magnetism, attraction of gravitation, and cohesion—there is finitude, each force manifesting itself only when in process of transition into another form of force. But there is a ground to all these forces, which is an energy.

The "persistent force" is the energy of each force without the particular quality of each force. But it is that which originates each special force, and that which likewise causes it to lose its individuality and pass over into another force. The "persistent force" is not a special force, like light, heat, etc., for the special forces are in a state of tension against each other, or are merely names for different stages of the same energy. The "persistent force" is an energy that acts, not on another, but only on itself. In all changes and loss of individuality on the part of particular forces the "persistent force" abides the same, continually emerging from its successive disguises under the mask of particular forces.

§ 71. Persistent force can not, like a special force, act on something else, because it is the totality of all forces. All things are mere equilibria of forces, and hence things, too, are manifestations of the self-activity of "persistent force." Thus natural science does not find itself able to avoid thinking self-activity as the ground of things and forces. Pure self-activity is mind or conscious being. Any form of Knowing or consciousness differs from the relation that particular forces or particular things have to each other in the fact that Knowing is an activity which forms within itself its other by its own energy. A self-active has duality—the self as subject and the self as object. The self as subject is out of time and space. The Ego as Ego likewise transcends time and space. If it were in time it would change, and could not be the unity of the manifold in consciousness. So, too, were it in space it would be a multiplicity of points, each external to the rest, and hence without unity. The Ego, like the subject of self-activity, transcends time and space, and is therefore no mere object of nature.

§ 72. The science of formal Logic states three laws of thought which correspond to these three stages of consciousness, although they may be looked upon as three statements of the same principle. These are the so-called principles of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle. *A is A*, or *an object is self-identical*, is the formula for the principle of identity, and it is very clear that it expresses the point of view of the category of Being, or of the first stage of consciousness. It ignores all distinction, all relation, and hence all environment.



§ 73. The principle of contradiction states the environment explicitly. Its formula is, *Not-A is not identical with A*, or it is impossible that the same thing can at once be and not be, or what is contradictory is unthinkable. Here we add in thought to the concept of A its contradictory, not-A. We distinguish them, but make one of them the limit of the other. We, moreover, assert mutual exclusion, and hence the finitude of both. Not-A is the formula for the relative or dependent, because it is expressed only in terms of something else—something else limited or negated. Change A, and you change the extent or compass of not-A. In the principle of identity the finitude of the object is not expressed, but in the principle of contradiction two mutually limiting spheres of being are defined.

§ 74. The formula for the principle of Excluded Middle tells us that A either is or is not, or that of two mutual contradictories we can affirm existence of only one. This principle adds the concept of totality to that of identity and contradiction, and therefore relates to the idea of Ground or Logical condition, the third stage of consciousness. Looking upon the total sphere, we can reason from the existence or non-existence of a part to the existence or non-existence of the other parts. It is the principle of the disjunctive judgment.

§ 75. The principle of sufficient reason, which is added as a fourth law of thought to the three already named, if admitted to this rank of laws of thought, expresses not only a ground of knowledge, but also a ground of being. It means not only that we must have a ground for affirming the existence of any being, but that there must be a real ground or reason for the existence of any being. Understood in this sense, it is the positive statement of the principle by which we cognize the logical condition underlying object and environment. "Excluded Middle" is the *negative* statement of this principle, while "Sufficient Reason" is the positive statement of it. The former states that "either, or" is true, while the latter states that the one is through the other, or that the totality is one unity. By it we perceive the necessity of *Causa sui*, or self-activity, as the sufficient reason for any causal action whatever. By it we affirm the truth that all being is grounded in energy, or that dynamic existence is the basis of static existence.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> C. C. Everett's "Science of Thought," p. 236.

§ 76. We observe in these principles the importance of the idea of the negative as the basis of the idea of relation. We can call the second stage of consciousness the negative stage, because it makes so much of the relative. The environment is the negative of the object, and its formula is not- $\Delta$ . It is of the utmost importance in philosophy to recognize the negative in all forms that it assumes. It is the principle of limit, of specialty and particularity, hence of all distinction and difference; it is likewise the principle of all contrariety, and hence of essence, force, cause, potentiality, and substance. What is most wonderful is that it is the principle of life and thinking, only that in these realms it appears as self-related. It sounds absurd, or at least pedantic, to hear one speak of self-negativity as the principle of mind. But really there is no insight possible into self-activity, and the logical conditions of experience, without some recognition of the self-negative. Self-distinction, as self-negation, is also affirmative, because it is identity as well as distinction.

§ 77. We must see that the categories of experience and the world are not based on Being, or even on Essence, but that being and essence are based on this negative process of self-relation which we recognize as pure energy, *Causa sui*, or personality. This alone is the root of individuality, independence, and freedom. The idea of God is the unfolding of its complete, positive import.

§ 78. The true Infinite is Freedom. An infinite is defined as that which is its own other or environment. But if this separation of self from environment is static or passive, the unity is imperfect, and must be supplemented by another. Space is supplemented by Time, because its unity is imperfect, a unity in kind, or species, of all parts of space, but not a unity of energy in which each part is the whole.

§ 79. In Freedom the self is its own other or environment, infinitely continued or affirmed by itself. Its other, too, is activity or energy, and is free, and hence infinite. Therefore it exists for itself. But a part of space, although continued by its environment, exists not for itself, but for the unity of all space, which alone is infinite. Space is infinite, but it does not consist of parts that are also self-existent and infinite. Hence the unity of all space is not perfect, as before stated.

## CHAPTER IX.

*Freedom, Fate, Individuality.*

§ 80. The problems of philosophy are perennial. Each individual must solve them for himself when he comes to the age of reflection. No number of philosophers can ever "settle" philosophic questions so that it will not be necessary for each individual to think out solutions for himself. Questions of mere fact in nature can be "settled" by investigation, so that a mere statement suffices to convey the result to a schoolboy. But it is not possible to "settle" matters of insight just as we settle matters of fact. A truth that requires for its comprehension a certain degree of cultured power of thought cannot by any possibility be taught as a matter of fact to a youth who has not yet arrived at the necessary stage of thinking.

§ 81. We recognize this quite readily in the acquirement of mathematical truth. Such truth cannot be conveyed to minds that will not or cannot grasp the elementary conceptions and make the combinations necessary. Only by intellectual energy can those truths be seen, and even mathematics has not "settled" anything for people who have no insight into its demonstrations. Philosophic knowing is knowing of presuppositions of existence—a knowing of logical conditions of being and experience. It is therefore a special kind of knowing that arises from reflection. These logical conditions of existence are invisible to the one who does not specially reflect upon them. When one sees them at all he sees that they are necessary elements of experience. It is a third stage of knowing, this knowing of logical presuppositions, and its insights cannot be seen from the first or second stage of knowing. Truths that are "settled" in philosophy may yet seem to be impossibilities to the one whose intellectual view is on the second stage of knowing.

§ 82. The truth of freedom or free-will cannot be seen from the second stage of knowing, which gets no farther in its consciousness than the thought of environment. To it, therefore, Fate is the highest principle. Again, to the first stage of knowing, what seems very clear to the second stage may be a dark enigma. The idea of fate is to it inconceivable, because it does not think objects

as in a state of relativity to their environment. Although all experience contains the three elements already pointed out—object, environment, and logical presupposition—yet the first stage of knowing is distinctly conscious only of the object; the second stage notes chiefly the environment, and thinks things as conditioned by necessary relations of dependence, while the third stage of knowing looks especially to the logical presupposition.

§ 83. Notwithstanding these radically different views of the world and its existences, it is not difficult to pass from a lower stage to a higher. Any one, whose point of view is so elementary as to include the immediate object as the most essential item, may be led up to the insight that the environment is most essential by calling his attention, step by step, to the essential relations which condition the existence of the object. He will soon come to see that the object depends on the environment, and will concede that the totality of conditions makes that object to be what it is, and prevents it from being anything else. This is the standpoint of fate: External constraint in the form of the “totality of conditions” environs all objects in the world, and makes them to be what they are. Any one habituated to observe the essential relations or environment of an object will adopt this as a final principle until he gets the third point of view—that of totality. The underlying logical condition, which is presupposed both by the object and its environment, is not a dependent being, nor a mere correlative of dependence. It is a totality, and self-determined.

§ 84. The conviction held by those in the first stage of knowing is that objects all possess self-existence in their immediateness, and that all relations are accidental and not essential. The conviction of those in the second stage is the relativity of all existence, and the omnipotence of fate. The third stage of knowing is the contemplation of the form of totality, which, being self-determined, is free. Its utterance therefore is: All beings are free beings, or else parts or products of free being.

§ 85. In the previous chapters of this outline we have considered Time and Space as grounds of existence of material things. We have considered the principle of Causality as the form in which all experience is rendered possible. Looking at its presupposition, we have seen that self-activity, or *Causa sui*, alone makes



possible any and all influence of one thing upon another. There must be self-separation of energy or influence as a condition of its transference from the environment to the object, or from any one object to another. This self-separation, or self-activity, is the basis of causality, and hence the basis of all things and phenomena in the world.

§ 86. Self-activity is freedom. Dependence on another and passive reciprocity of influences from without signify fate and necessity. There can be no real individuality except in the form of self-activity or self-determination. That which belongs to something else, and exists through the activity of that other being, is only a manifestation or phenomenon. All that it is reveals the nature of the energy of that other. With only the idea of fate or external constraint, and no consciousness of self-activity as the ultimate presupposition, the mind is obliged to deny individuality even to human beings, and to regard all beings as phenomena. Phenomena are syntheses of effects, manifestations of energy, or influence, that has originated in some source lying beyond the sphere of manifestation. But just as the thought of influence or causality involves self-separation or self-activity, so, as a matter of course, every special instance of it has the same implication. A phenomenon as a manifestation posits or presupposes the existence of the pure energy or self-activity whose manifestation it is. Dependence, or any form of essential relation, presupposes self-existence as that on which the object depends and as that whose energy it manifests.

§ 87. It is impossible, therefore, to think fate or external necessity as a finality, or, in fact, as existing, except as a result of freedom. "All things are necessitated by the totality of conditions" is the principle of fate; but its logical condition or presupposition is that the totality of conditions is self-conditioned. If the totality of conditions contains energy, that energy must be self-determining or free.

§ 88. Necessity or fate presupposes freedom as its ground or condition. Hence, if there is anything there is individuality. But whether we shall find many individuals in the world, or whether the world as a totality forms only one individual, is not evident from this principle alone. Being assured of the necessary existence of individuality or free self-determination as the form of

all totalities,<sup>1</sup> we may now look for individualities that shall correspond to its definition. But with the principle of fate as a finality we should be obliged to deny freedom to all individualities, and explain persons as somehow products of fate.<sup>2</sup>

§ 89. The fundamental truth is that the first principle is free, and that whatever is a totality<sup>3</sup> is free. It is clear that the first principle can reveal or manifest itself only in free beings. It would follow, too, that creation exists for the development or evolution of free beings, and that free beings can exist in a state of development.

§ 90. There is change; change implies that what is real does not cover all the possibilities of being. Water, for example, is liquid at this moment; at another moment it may be solid, as ice; or an elastic fluid, as steam. It is only one of these states at a time; one state is real and the other two are potential. Were it possible to regard the total existence of water as exhausted in these three states, we might say that water is only one third real at any given instant of time. Were all possibilities or potentialities real at the same instant, there could be no change. Here we arrive at the conception of actuality or total being, including all potentialities, whether real or otherwise.<sup>4</sup>

One can get but little ways into the discussion of the great question of individuality without making this distinction between beings which are part real and part potential and those whose potentialities are all real. Self-activities are those which are all real; they are self-realizing beings. Their real side exists through their will. But it seems strange at first that there should be two kinds of self-activity—the one a perfect Creator, God, and the

<sup>1</sup> Totality as here used does not mean quantitative totality, but *qualitative*—i. e., independent being.

<sup>2</sup> Rowland G. Hazard, in his book on "The Freedom of the Mind in Willing," concludes that "every being that wills is a creative first cause." He shows that self-activity is an essential presupposition of a conscious being possessing will. He has very acutely perceived that it is spontaneity or automatism that is denied by the fatalists, and that they ignore a most obvious fact of consciousness and observation.

<sup>3</sup> Totality, or independent whole.

<sup>4</sup> It is important to get this thought, but it is not essential to describe it in the words I use. Aristotle uses for the idea here called "actuality" the words *energy* and *entelechy*, and sometimes other expressions. Plato used the word *idea*, and Hegel used the words *Wirklichkeit* and *Begriff*.

other an imperfect self-realizing being. Actuality is individual, while reality may be only a phenomenal manifestation of an individuality. The individuality, as self-active, exists as wholly real, and gives existence to a product of his will which forms a second sphere of reality. This second sphere of reality may be a progressive realization, and it is here that we have the distinction between God and Man, God being perfect also in the second sphere of realization, while man is only progressively so. It is man's vocation to make himself objective in a second sphere of reality—the external world. When he has accomplished this, then he is both subject and object the same.

§ 91. To this distinction of reality from actuality we may give other names, as, for example, *phenomenon* and *substance*. Phenomenon is the reality which is subject to change through the activity of the totality of the process. The phenomenon manifests the nature of the energy which makes the process, that energy being always a self-activity. Substance is another name given to self-activity to express the phase of abiding and continuance that it has.

§ 92. Freedom is the essential form of the total or self-activity because it is independent. But in its self-realization it makes a second sphere of reality, the products of its acts.<sup>1</sup> In what we call the actual there is the entire potency which is manifested in the fragmentary realities not only in their creation, but also in their destruction. Hence it has been said, "What is actual is rational," because the actual is a process that annuls all partial realities. The more potentialities that are real the nearer is the existence to a true individuality. A being in which the entire circle of possibilities is realized is an actuality or energy and a

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<sup>1</sup> It has been asserted by those who insist on thinking all under the form of a thing conditioned by its environment that the will is constrained by the strongest motive—that motives render freedom impossible. These fatalists, however, fail to notice the distinction between reality and potentiality, and do not consider that motives are potentialities and not realities. Only the mind can see a potentiality; it creates the idea of it in itself. A reality is not a motive—a motive is the conception of a desirable possibility. After creating the conception, the will may realize it by destroying some phase of reality by changing it into the conceived possibility. Here the mind creates the motive, and then creates its correspondent reality, and is thus doubly creative instead of a mere agent or transmitter of the causality of the motive to the deed. Were a motive to constrain the will, it would be a case of something that acted before it existed.

complete individuality. When but few of its potentialities are real, it possesses little individuality; for when new potentialities are realized the being is changed so much that it becomes another. A being with one of its potentialities real would be as unstable of individuality as a pyramid on its apex is unstable of position; a being with all real would be immortal, though it were ever so undeveloped and lacking in education and culture. Before actuality a being progresses through evolution in which its individualities are continually lost. After actuality, permanent individuality is attained, and it can progress only through self-determination, which shall make for itself a sphere of externality identical with its own actuality. In one sense we speak of the uncultured man (child or savage) as having unrealized potentialities. These potentialities belong to his sphere of second reality, which he must create for himself.

## CHAPTER X.

### *The World of Nature and Evolution.*

§ 93. We will now consider the orders of being in nature in the light of the idea of creation already developed. Science in our time interprets the phases of nature in the light of the principle of Evolution. In the "struggle for existence" one order develops into another. When we have seen how a species has arisen from a lower one, and how a higher has ascended from it in this struggle, we have explained it in the spirit of science in our day. Let us notice that this "struggle for existence" is a manifestation of self-determination. The adoption of this point of view marks the arrival at an epoch in which the orders of being will be seen as a progressive revelation of the divine.<sup>1</sup> How does this idea of Evolution agree with the idea of creation as we have found it in considering what follows from Self-activity as the First Principle?

§ 94. The self-active is self-determining and self-knowing, sub-

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<sup>1</sup> "A subtle chain of countless rings  
The next unto the farthest brings;  
And striving to be man, the worm  
Mounts through all the spires of form."

This is Emerson's statement of the doctrine in 1836.



ject and object. But as object it is also self-knowing and self-determining. In this we can find as yet no necessity for creation of finite beings. The All-perfect knows Himself as all-perfect, and His knowing is creating, because will and knowing are one in the Absolute, and knowing Himself he creates what is self-knowing, self-willing, and hence pure self-activity like Himself a Creator. But the second self-activity, in knowing itself, knows its relation to the first—a relation of derivation, and, in knowing it, creates it. (See §§ 56 and 57.)

§ 95. It is in this contemplation by the Second of His derivation from the First that we find the ground of creation of a world of finite beings. The Second knows himself as pure self-activity, but as having made Himself such from a state of mere passivity implied in derivation. The state of passivity has been transcended, must have been transcended, ever since the First came to self-knowledge. But as absolute self-knowledge is necessary in the first principle, the same has been attained by the second from all eternity.

§ 96. Hence the passivity involved in a derivation from the First is only a logical presupposition, and not chronological. It being necessary that this logically prior state of passivity should be known by the Second Person in recognizing his derivation from the First, it follows that He creates a Third, not simply like Himself, but as eternally proceeding from the depths of passivity.

§ 97. The perfect, which is a procession, is eternally perfect, but the passive is an ascending series of orders of being in a state of becoming—an evolution from passivity to self-activity. The becoming or evolution has necessarily the form of time, because there are change and decay. It has the form of Space, because passivity involves externality or exclusion; for it (passivity) arises only in what is self-active, but is its opposite, and hence excludes it. But as this Evolution is as eternal as the self-knowledge of the Second Person, the world in time and space is eternal, although of necessity its individuals exist only in a state of transition and loss of individuality.

§ 98. Suns and planets have their youth and old age just as animals and plants. But just as sure as there is a realm of perishable individuals the end of whose existence is evolution, just so sure there must be a realm of immortal individuals ascending out

of the lower realm of evolution and belonging to a realm wherein self-evolution or Education prevails.<sup>1</sup>

§ 99. Vanishing beings, such as belong to the realm of evolution, form together what may be called an "Appearance," or manifestation of a process. The theory of Evolution interprets the history of the individuals by the law of the process which is that of the struggle for existence or the struggle for freedom and self-determination. This struggle is the school of development of individuality. There is no individuality where there is no self-activity. Individuality rises higher in the scale as it approaches the form of knowledge and will.

§ 100. A compendious survey shows us three orders of being: (a) inorganic nature, (b) life realized in plant and animal, (c) self-conscious intelligence realized in Man.

§ 101. There are three principles in the first of these realms, progressively realized. The first is *Mechanism*, or externality which is void of an internal bond of unity—space and time, mere materiality, mere exclusion and impenetrability in so far as they appear in nature, characterize this realm of mechanism.

§ 102. In so far as there appears dependence of one being on another we have a principle which attains its typical form in chemical unity. Each manifests another. Gravitation, even, is such a manifestation. One body attracted toward another attracts that other body in turn. Hence it gains weight and gives weight in turn. But in the chemical aspect of being each being shows some special relation to complementary beings with which it enters into combination in order to realize an ideal unity. An acid or a base, for example, has an ideal unity in a salt, and its combination with its opposite realizes this ideal unity. In so far as one being makes another the means by which it realizes itself there is a manifestation of teleology.

§ 103. Teleology is the third phase of the inorganic, and points toward life as its presupposition. Life is that in which every part is alike the means and the end for all the other parts—such is Kant's definition. Life manifests the phases of universal, particular, and individual—in a process in which there are species

<sup>1</sup> Says Emerson: "It is a sufficient account of that appearance we call the world that God will teach a human mind."

and individual, and self-determination is manifested. In the plant the species, only, manifests self-determination, each step being the evolution of a new individual out of the old one. But in animal life there come feeling and locomotion. On the scale of feeling there develops sense-perception as well as representation in its two phases of recollection and fancy.

When the animal progresses beyond recollection and fancy to generalization, he becomes immortal as an individual.

§ 104. Evolution prevails in nature, but it is not evolution of the lower to the higher through the unaided might of the lower. There is no such unaided might of the lower. The lower order of being exists only in the process of evolution into the higher. It exists only *in transitu*, and its individuality is fleeting. The Divine Thought of eternal derivation and eternal annulment of derivation creates a world of finite beings existing not absolutely, but only in a process of evolution. Hence each thing has phenomenal existence, and not absolute existence; it is relative and dependent, and manifests its dependence by change.

§ 105. If one conceives evolution even as growth of a living being, or, still higher, as the process of education of a conscious being, still the development does not take place unaided. Only the perfect or completely developed can exist in perfect independence. All growing individuals and all finite things exist because created and sustained by a Perfect Being. The question that has seemed insoluble is, How can a Perfect Being create an imperfect one, and for what purpose would he create and sustain such a being? It is answered by showing that the second Divine Principle recognizes his relation to the First as a begotten, a derivation which, in so far as it involves passivity, He has eternally annulled, so that He is equal to the First by his own Might of Self-activity.

§ 106. Creation is a free act, though necessary. It is not compelled by any external necessity. It is only a logical necessity, and not an external necessity. It is a logical necessity that the first principle should be Self-active or Self-determining, and hence free intelligence. But such logical necessity does not imply or involve fate or external constraint. This is a dialectic circle: (1) The First is necessarily free, (2) but is therefore necessitated and is not free; (3) hence not being free, it is not *necessitated* to be free, (4) and hence *is* free in spite of (2). (*Logical necessity*

is spoken of in (1); fatalistic necessity in (2) and (3); (2) and (3) cancel each other and leave (1) or (4.)

## CHAPTER XI.

### *The World of Man and Immortality.*

§ 107. We come now to consider the question of the individual immortality of man in the light of the principles which we have discussed in the previous chapters. Our subject has two phases: First, we must inquire what are the conditions of immortality, and what beings in the world, if any, possess such conditions. Secondly, we must consider the question in the light of the first principle of the world, as we have found it revealed as the supreme condition of existence and experience.

§ 108. How is it possible that in this world of perishable beings there can exist an immortal and ever-progressing being? Without the personality of God it would be impossible, because an unconscious first principle would be incapable of producing conscious beings, or, if they were produced, it would overcome them as incongruous and inharmonious elements in its world. It would finally draw all back into its image and reduce conscious individuality to unconsciousness. In our investigation of the presuppositions of experience, we have found *Causa sui*, or self-activity, as the ultimate principle, and we find in the human intellect and will what is harmonious with that principle. Let us note that Science, in teaching the doctrine of evolution and that of the struggle for existence, favors the doctrine that intelligence and will are the surviving and permanent substance. For intelligence and will triumph in the struggle for existence, and prove themselves the goal to which the creation moves.

§ 109. Space and time and inorganic matter are pervaded by the principles of mechanism and chemism. Organic being, whether plant or animal, manifests self-activity in various degrees.

§ 110. The plant possesses assimilation, or the nutritive process. It reacts on its environment. It is a real manifestation of individuality. Perhaps one would say that the rock, or the waves, or the wind has individuality and reacts on its environment. Certainly the plant possesses individuality in a less questionable form. The action of water, air, and mineral does not avail to assimilate



other substances into its own form. The plant takes up some portion of its environment into itself and stamps on it its own form, making it a vegetable cell, and adding it to its own structure. It strives to become infinite by absorbing its environment into itself. But it cannot conquer *all* of its environment in this way; it would have to become some world-tree (Yggdrasil) to succeed in conquering all of its environment. The infinite, the absolute, the self-active, must be its own environment.

§ 111. The plant form of existence cannot realize self-activity except to a limited degree. The portions of its environment which it takes up and assimilates, moreover, produce growth or expansion in space. This expansion implies separation of parts. The individuality of plants is rather of the species than of the particular plant. The individuality is in transition, being manifested by the growth of new limbs, twigs, leaves, or fruit, sprouting out from the old as the first did from the earth. Because the plant is a constant transition from one individual to another it cannot manifest identity except in the species.

§ 112. In the animal we have feeling and locomotion, and the unity is found in the particular animal as well as in the species. Feeling implies self-activity, not only in reaction on the environment as in the case of nutrition, but in reproducing the impression made by the environment within the soul of the animal. Unless the animal reproduces for himself the limitation caused by the environment there is no perception. The reproduction is accompanied by an unconscious judgment or inference that transfers the occasion of the feeling to an external world. Thus, time, space, and causality, function in feeling or sense-perception, but the subject is unconscious of them. The animal sees, hears, tastes, smells, or touches the objects of his environment, unconscious that he does this by reproducing within himself the shocks made upon his senses by them.

§ 113. This activity of reproduction (sense-perception) is only in the presence of the objects. But there is a higher order of reproduction which is free from the presence of impressions on the senses; this is called *representation*, and is in two forms—(a) recollection of former perceptions, and (b) free fancy, in which the soul causes to arise within itself by limitation new combinations of perceptions recalled, or entirely new objects. Although the ac-

tivity of representation is a higher form of manifestation of individuality, and seems to be quite free from time and place, because any former perception may be recalled at pleasure, yet it is still inadequate, because the object is a particular image, just as much as the perception of any particular object in the world.

§ 114. The being which perceives or feels is a self-activity in a higher sense than is manifested in plant life, but it is not its own object in the forms of mere feeling, or sense-perception, or recollection, or fancy. Individuality is persistence under change, self-preservation in the presence of alien forces, and self-objectivity. It is self-determination, or free causal energy, *Causa sui*. To have as object a particular thing, therefore, is not to be conscious of individuality, either of one's own or of another's. An individuality that does not exist for itself has no personal identity, and hence is indifferent to immortality. When the self-activity in reproducing an impression perceives at the same time its own freedom or causal energy, then it becomes conscious of self. This takes place in the recognition of objects as belonging to classes or species. Here begins the immortality of the individual. Not before this, because the individual is and can be only a self-activity, and cannot know himself except as generic. An individual that does not recognize individuality is not for itself, and its continuance of existence is only for the species and not for its particular self. But with the recognition of species and genera there is the recognition of self as persistent, although, at first, only in the form of recognizing the objects of the world as being specimens of classes and genera.

§ 115. Here begins immortality of the individual, with the recognition of individuality in the form of species, and directly it manifests itself in the formation of language or the adoption of conventional signs to represent classes, processes, and species. If any of the higher animals shall be discovered to accompany the act of sense-perception by recognition of the objects as examples of classes, and to possess conventional means of expressing, not particular objects, but general processes and species, then it will become necessary to admit the immortality of such individual animals.

§ 116. Above this first form of recognition of species the conscious mind rises to the stage of reflection and the stage of in-

sight. We have already discussed these stadia as (a) the perception of objects, (b) their environment, and (c) their underlying presuppositions. It is only in this latter species of knowing that the soul comes to recognize itself in its true nature, and it celebrates this fact first in religion as a knowledge of God as Creator and Redeemer of the world.

§ 117. In our study of the idea of self-activity as the highest principle we found the explanation of the world and its destiny, and this explanation is the necessary complement to the psychological investigation of the question of immortality. The Divine Self-activity in whom knowing and willing are identical, so that His knowing is at the same time a creating of His object, knows Himself, but this knowing does not create directly a world of finite beings. He knows only Himself and creates or begets His own likeness, a perfect being equal to himself, the Second Self-activity or Person.

§ 118. The Second Person, equal in knowing and willing to the First, creates a Third equal to Himself, but also creates a world of finite creatures in a process of evolution. Because the Second knows his own derivation from the First, which is only a logical precondition and not an event in time antedating his perfection (for He is eternally-begotten), in knowing it he creates it, and it appears as a stream of creation rising in a scale of beings from pure passivity up to pure activity.

§ 119. The inorganic nature, the plant, and the animal do not attain true individuality, but man does. Man makes his environment into the image of his true self when he puts on the form of the divine Second Person, as the One who gives Himself freely to lift up imperfect beings. As that form is the elevation of the finite into participation with Himself, so man's spiritual function is the realization of higher selves through institutions—the Invisible Church, which is formed of all the intelligent beings collected from all worlds in the universe. The social combination of man with man is thus the means of realizing the divine.

§ 120. The principle of the absolute institution which we call the Invisible Church is called divine charity or love. It is the missionary spirit, or the spirit of self-sacrifice for the good of others. This is the realization in man of the occupation of the Creator, and is, therefore, the eternal vocation of man.

§ 121. If man were not immortal there would be a break in the chain of beings that reaches from the pure external and passive up to the pure active, and hence the eternal elevation of the Second Person into equality with the First Person would be impossible, and, therefore, the First Person would not know Himself in the Second, and hence there would be no self-activity at all, and consequently, also, there would be no derivative or finite being. But this is impossible. The immortality of man and the necessity of intelligent beings on all worlds at some stage of their process is manifest from this.

§ 122. The First divine knowing creates or begets the Second, and sees in it the world of evolution and also the Third divine unity of blessed spirits in the Invisible Church as the Holy Spirit. The creation of the world is the result of the knowing of the relation of the Second to the First Person; and as all this is within the self-knowing of the First, its origin is called a "double procession." It is not a genesis like that of the Second which is that of one person from another; but a procession inasmuch as it proceeds from the free union of infinitely numerous blessed spirits assuming the form of the divine life of the Second Person.

§ 123. Let one remember that even our finite temporal institutions possess in some sort a Personality—deliberative and executive functions. It could be said that the State possesses a higher personality than the individual citizen, for it is not subject to his vicissitudes of sleeping and waking, youth and old age, sex, etc. But the Invisible Church is the Perfect Archetype of Institutions, eternal in duration and infinite in extent, and complete and absolute in its personality. Space and matter exist only that worlds may become theatres for the birth and probation of souls.

§ 124. The social life of man as it is realized in institutions—family, civil society, State, and especially in the Church—is his higher spiritual life. Were not human souls immortal as individuals, however, there could be no perfection resulting from the creation of the World, and hence the Second Divine Person could not contemplate in creation his own logical precondition of rising from passivity to pure activity; or, what is the same thing, He could not recognize His own derivation from the First; and this would involve also the impossibility of His own ascent to equality with the First; and this, too, the impossibility of the perfect self-



knowledge or self-determination of the First; and this the denial of independent being, and of any being whatsoever. Again, if we apply the principle of creation—self-knowing of the Absolute is creating—we may say that a world of imperfect beings implies the self-recognition of passivity or derivation on the part of the Creator. If there were actual present passivity and derivation, He could not be a Creator by reason of imperfection which would appear as a separation of Will from Intellect, as in Man. But His logical precondition of derivation and passivity would imply a First Person. Again, these two would imply a perfect final cause or end for the creation of imperfect beings which could only be reached by the tuition and education of these into a perfect institution possessing perfect personality, and through immortal life.

## THE SOURCES AND FACULTIES OF COGNITION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE POLISH OF E. TRENTOWSKI (FROM THE FIRST VOLUME OF HIS  
"LOGIC") BY I. PODBIELSKI.

(Concluded.)

### REMARK II.

We will devote here some space to the certitude of cognition and its immediateness.

Truth and knowledge are the essence of God in Heaven, and likewise of the universe; so, too, they are the essence of man, the highest being on the earth. They unite in God and stand forth as the living God's idea (*notio*). They unite also in man, and manifest themselves as cognition. Truth and knowledge in God is one, the same as truth and knowledge in man, because there can be neither two different truths nor two different knowledges.

God's living idea and man's cognition in potentia are identically the same, because cognition is both the divine breath within us and God's living idea (*notio*). Since, then, man manifests his own truth and knowledge in his cognition, he makes all truth and knowledge a temporal expression in the word. When he expresses his own idea (*notio*) in his cognition, he gives utterance to the living idea (*notio*) of God himself.

When a man has learned to know himself, he knows God, he knows all the creation, because truth, knowledge, and God's idea (*notio*) are everywhere the same. Cognition, therefore, this voice of truth, knowledge, and the living God's idea (*notio*), this voice of God himself in time, are immediately one. We, too, receive it from no external source; we draw it out with buckets, from no miraculous well; but developing what is innate within us—what lies in us and constitutes our being—we draw it out of ourselves, by our own activity. The true cognition, and such only is the free cognition, is not, if you wish for a precise expression, an acquired thing, but derived from ourselves.

Potentia—that is, our ability, God's breath in us—becomes actuality in the true cognition; our cognition in potentia becomes our cognition in actu. Cognition is essence, the very self hood unfolding itself into its own verbum, expressing its perception, its consciousness, and its selfhood. It is, if I may say so, the self-uttering immediateness of our God's breath (*notio*) within us. If our cognition in general is immediate, then much more so must be the three sources of our cognition—the senses, reason, and mind.

Some one will say here, perhaps: "I concede what you have said, if restricted to the case in which man recognizes himself. But if he make God, nature, or anything in general his object, does he recognize immediately? Certainly, the object here is not in him, but out of him, and through this his cognition becomes mediate. Without the aid of an object, man would not attain to its cognition." Even then we answer, man gets cognition immediately. Because truth, knowledge, and God's idea (*notio*), or God's word realized in an object, are not only different, but also identical with truth, knowledge, and God's idea (*notio*), or God's word in man. God has breathed into us His living idea (*notio*), and thus all truth and knowledge. Whatsoever is in God, in nature and spirit, in the past, the present, and the future world, is in us already, before our birth. All our art consists in drawing out of ourselves, or in acquiring this great living idea of God (*notio*). In acquiring the cognition of the object, which lies outside us, in acquiring the cognition of God, nature, of all things, we get the cognition of ourselves too. As the cognition of ourselves is the cognition of all existence, so, reciprocally, the cognition of all existence is the cognition of ourselves. Besides, who could enter

into immediate contact with the external object if the selfhood could not? To look around anything, would it stead us to borrow the eyes of an angel or a devil? Could we think through the head of another?

If, then, all cognition is immediate, so much more immediate are its sources.

Sense-perception lies dormant already in universal matter. It develops gradually, and comes into bloom finally in the animal, and more especially in the human senses. Sensuous contact with the thing of the external world is the same as contact with our own body. Sense is not merely our sense, but also the sense of the touched thing. Had it (potential sense) not been in this thing we could not touch it. If the sun had not been potentially in the pupil of our eye, we could not see the sun. If the sun were not outside us, it also would not be in us. In such cases the senses could not be the bond between the difference and indifference—between the empirical selfhood and the thing. This is God's law, and the holy dogma: What is within us, that is also outside us, and *vice versa*.

What we said of the senses is true of the comprehensive reason and of the comprehensive mind. Reason sleeps in the spirit of nature and awakes in man's spirit; mind dreams in every verbum of God and comes to the manifestation in the human selfhood. This philosophical difference in indifference, or the union of our being with the beings of the universe and with God himself, is the cause why our cognition is immediateness, and can be only that.

We are composed of body, spirit, and the soul, as St. Paul says also (I Thess., v, 23); or we are senses, reason, and mind. Body and spirit, senses and reason, are abstractions, but the soul or selfhood and the comprehensive mind are actuality. Therefore we obtain cognition, not by the body or the spirit, not by sense or reason, but always by our selfhood and comprehensive mind, and hence by our personality or immediately. The senses do not see, do not touch, but the selfhood, their substratum; likewise reason does not think, but our selfhood thinks. Moreover, we do not say our body, or our senses touch; nor our spirit or our reason thinks; but I touch, I think! And is it not the most manifest immediateness? We repeat, then, once more: if every cognition

is immediate, so much more its sources are immediate. For the reason that our selfhood acquires cognition neither by any miraculous rod, nor by any magic spectacles; nor by the divining wand discovering riches buried under the earth, but by itself or immediately; therefore it is entirely certain that it possesses immediate cognition; hence the infallibility or certitude of our cognition. The three sources of cognition are our inheritance; each of them has immediate certitude for itself, and rests upon the sure principal judgment, impossible to be denied. Hence, there are three immediate certitudes of cognition. To enter upon our subject more in detail:

The immediate certitude of sensuous cognition, upon which are based all experience and empiricism rich in useful sciences, is the immediate certitude of cognition first affirmed. The empirical selfhood takes a thing in its hand, and is sure of it immediately, and knows that this thing is, and that it holds it on the palm of its hand; and it knows that it is itself also, reality. By reality it means material, sensuous, tangible being.

It knows that itself is reality, for the reason that matter alone can touch matter, and enter into contact with it. The thing before me is, if I may say so, the southern pole, the empirical selfhood, the northern pole in the needle of real cognition, and the sense is the point of their difference in indifference; all three create the one whole, coming to its consciousness and to its verbum. The empirical selfhood says, therefore: *Sentio, ergo, res est, atque res sum!* Behold the first axiom, the empirical certitude, upon which experience builds up its palaces and temples. The empirical selfhood and the thing which it holds in its hand constitute the absolute unity in the moment of cognition, and the selfhood knows it immediately, or it is absolutely certain that it touches the thing. No assurance from any one else is needed to certify it of this perception; it knows this by itself. If any one dares deny this immediate certitude, it will resent the denial. It is mere sophistry to deny the objects touched with one's fingers, and to treat one's fingers as though they were dead sticks. Whosoever lives and is not a stick has senses with which to perceive objects and to know them immediately. My selfhood cannot touch and feel with the fingers of another. Its contact with external objects is immediate. Mediation is here an utter impos-



sibility. The infallible certitude of empirical cognition follows from its immediateness.

But not everything can be taken in the hand and touched. Therefore, the empirical selfhood has other senses. It tastes, smells, hears, and sees things. By these modes it gets cognition on various sides, and nearer, but always immediately. Certainly I convince myself, not with the tongue of another, but with my own, that pepper is hot, honey sweet, and vinegar sour. The eye is the farthest reaching sense, and perceives, in some sort, the infiniteness of nature. Where its power stops, it may be assisted with telescopes and microscopes. Yet these instruments have their limits, though nature is without limits. We come to this result, transferring ourselves, for instance, to another part of the world, and observing the stars; or, by the aid of the microscope, looking into small objects.

Therefore, the empirical selfhood expresses: *Sentio, ergo natura est, atque natura sum!*

It is the same certitude which we have known above, but applied to the generality of things. On this standpoint of cognition man is the sensuous or empirical selfhood, and comes to the physical feeling of himself and that of things.

The congruence of perception here makes its appearance. Man dissolves himself into sensation, he becomes sensation, and matter alone exists for him. Behold the source of Realism. The empirical selfhood, being a passive body, can have nothing else for its object than the corporeal. Whoever denies the immediateness of this cognition, whoever asserts that this immediateness is not the complete certitude, that we do not know whether we touch or not when we touch—in a word, who on this field plays the sceptic is weak and foolish. Diogenes cured one of these crazy men by beating him with a stick, and crying out, "Do you not feel?" And there is no better medicine for this disease. Whoever says that on touching a thing he does not feel this touching, must be convinced of his error by making him feel pain.

Every immediate certitude, therefore, and that which denotes sensuous cognition, cannot be proved. Every proof contains a certain mediation; and immediateness, by its very nature, does not know nor require mediation. Whoever wishes for mediation in immediateness does not himself know what he wishes for. To

prove to him who has shut his eyes that he holds in his hand a green, red, or white paper, let him open his eyes, and, if he be not blind, he will convince himself. The cognition of the senses has infallible certitude, and its axiom is the strongest pillar in the regions of cognition. For the general cognition rests upon it—*vox populi, consensus gentium*.

The immediate certitude of cognition which reason is possessed of is the second and negative, immediate cognition. The human spirit is the activity, internal movement or energy of our being; it is the invisible world, which enkindles itself in the body and moves it with its rays; it is spirit, thinking. The thinking selfhood knows by itself alone, and is immediately certain that it thinks; therefore it says: *Cogito, ergo mens sum, atque mens est*. It is the second axiom or certitude of cognition. The thinking selfhood is as certain that it thinks as the sensuous selfhood is certain that it touches. It is one and the same infallible certitude of the selfhood, but regarded at one time from the external, and at another from the internal side. *Mens* means not only thought, but also spirit and the spiritual selfhood, or Soul. The thinking selfhood, then, comes to the supernatural, speculative, self-feeling, or to the consciousness, and that in every moment of thinking. It dissolves itself here entirely into the rational; it is reason within itself and out of itself; an idea, a pure thought alone exists for it. Thought can have thought alone for its object, because it is impossible to touch the sensuous things with a thought. Spirit can enter into contact with spirit alone, and constitutes the speculative difference in indifference of cognition. The immediate certitude of rational cognition has been known to the world for centuries. The school of the Eleatics in ancient Greece built their system upon it. Descartes expressed it in the well-known sentence: *Cogito, ergo sum*. No German metaphysician, nor any thinking man, ever denied it. The sceptic who renounces thinking and doubts the same is found in contradiction with himself, and does not know what he says. To think and to deny thinking, is to be and not to be at the same time. It is an obvious logical contradiction. It is impossible, also, to prove to anybody the rational certitude of cognition, because it possesses immediateness. How to prove to him, who does not think and is an automaton, an artificial machine, that he

thinks? As you alone know that you think, so he alone can know that he thinks. Whoever does not know that he thinks, or that he has God's thought in himself, is not a human selfhood, but a mere thing. Metaphysics and speculation rest upon the rational certitude of thinking. It is quite as strong, however, as the empirical certitude. The particular science builds itself upon it: *vox uniuscujusque scientifici vatis*.

The immediate certitude of cognition being the inheritance of the philosophical mind is the third, and the last, or the limiting certitude of cognition. It is the proper and fullest and most important certitude of cognition, superior to the two which preceded. As the senses and reason unite in mind, so the sensuous and rational certitudes of cognition unite in that of the philosophical mind, forming the organic and living completeness or totality. The immediate sensuous certitude of cognition is affirmation; the rational one is negation; that of the comprehensive mind is limitation; all three form the one great infallible certitude which must be trusted; the full dogma placed in our selfhood or the soul; the holy book given us directly by God.

For the reason that in every third degree of truth the first two are contained as reality and ideality are contained in actuality, or as necessity and legality in liberty, as the useful and noble in the good, so also the immediate certitude of the comprehensive mind contains in itself both the sensuous and the rational certitude. Hence this full certitude is called the entire immediate certitude of cognition. The certitude of cognition of the comprehensive mind is the most immediate and the most infallible. For in the sensuous certitude of cognition our selfhood offers itself as sensuousness only; in the rational certitude of cognition it presents itself as rationalism alone, but in that of the comprehensive mind it is both together, or the total and full mind. It is manifest that in the last the entire Selfhood or soul acts, therefore its cognition stamps itself with the greatest immediateness and infallibility.

The full selfhood or soul, having developed its mind adequately, arrives at its own self-feeling, self-sense, or selfhood, and knows immediately that it is divine. Then it says: *Sum numen, ergo Deus est*. It is the third axiom or certitude of cognition, being the most precious gift, that we have obtained from heaven. Be-

cause in the divine all qualities are implicitly contained, and may be immediately deduced from it, the just mentioned axiom of cognition of the comprehensive mind leads to the secondary ones: namely, *sum libertas, ergo est libertas; sum eternus, ergo est vita eterna; sum verum, pulchrum et honestum, est igitur verum, pulchrum et honestum; est in me conscientia, est igitur virtus.*

The full self hood or soul is in its basis a deity, and stands with God in absolute unity, and is able to enter into close communion with him; it can then say of itself as God himself: *Sum qui sum.* And this *sum qui sum*, creative and created, opens and closes each of the philosophical investigations. The axiom, or certitude of the comprehensive mind, attaining cognition, is as immediate and infallible as the sensuous and rational certitude, but the former is richer and fuller than both these latter. That I am I know immediately and certainly, as much as I know that I touch something, and that I think. I know immediately and certainly that I have conscience, that I love truth, beauty, virtue; that I am free and immortal. I know, then, equally, immediately, and certainly, that there are conscience, truth, beauty, virtue, liberty, and immortality. These immediate truths cannot be proved to anybody who does not find them in his own breast. Whoever remains here a sceptic is not a man, but a brute. I know immediately that I am a spark of God, a deity, and hence that God exists. The existence of God cannot be proved to him who has expelled God from his soul or selfhood. Whoever denies God denies also himself, and says in effect: "I am a skull without brain, and a breast without a heart. I am nought, the greatest cipher, the cipher of ciphers. Evil is the negation of good." Therefore, whoever loses God has torn asunder his own mind, and has sunk either into sensuousness or rationalism. Hence it follows that no philosopher, but only an empiric or a metaphysician, can be an atheist. We know that the comprehensive mind is twofold—the temporal and the eternal. In both cases it says: *Sum numen!* The temporal mind, however, develops the divine nature of man in the age in which we live, and places some genius on a throne, or in earthly power, in office, in splendor. It is, for instance, the mind of Hildebrand, of Voltaire, Talleyrand, Napoleon, etc.

But the eternal mind calls all that Mammon, and, leading us



before the throne of the goddess of wisdom, anoints us with the balsam of philosophy, and makes us philosophers. In philosophy lies the highest form of sacrifice and the most honorable form of priesthood. It is necessary at first to be born a philosopher, and afterward to be made the priest of philosophy by one's own efforts.

This doctrine of immediateness of cognition, and its axioms or certitudes, will certainly astonish many a thinker, especially those who know German speculation. For German speculation teaches here entirely the contrary, and Hegel's system has proclaimed aloud hitherto as follows: "The cognition having the most mediation is the most perfect, the most certain." What brought Hegel and German philosophy to such a conviction? It is the subjectivity falsely seized, and the lack of insight into the nature of the true selfhood. We know that the selfhood acquiring cognition is what the Germans conceive as subject, and the thing that is the aim of cognition is the German object, and the internal speculative selfhood or thinking, pure thought alone is the total German selfhood or Soul. This being the case, it was natural that the thing that is the aim of cognition must find its immediateness in thinking, or the object must be mediated in the subject till the cognition takes place; therefore every cognition needs mediation.

We have a different theory of this relation between the selfhood acquiring cognition and the thing that is to be known, hence we have another, and, as we hope, better conviction.

Our selfhood and its object constitute the difference in indifference, or unity  $A=A$ . The faculty of cognition is here the connecting link belonging equally to both sides and leading to the immediate contact with each other. Hegel is the most obstinate enemy of immediateness in cognition, and it is for this reason that he did not understand it thoroughly. He says: "If immediate knowledge is to be the criterion of truth, it will follow that it is necessary to defend every superstition and idolatry for truth, also to recognize as holy the most immoral and foolish substance of will, for instance the caprice that worships a cow or a monkey. Brahma and the Lama are deities to the Hindoo or Buddhist, not by knowledge, as the consequence of mediation—that is, not by the understanding or reason—but merely because he believes it immediately." This is surprising. Do we not understand, and

do we not reason by our head only—that is, immediately? Does not every belief depend upon a mediation and even a miraculous one? What, then, Hegel says against the immediateness of cognition can avail only against his mediateness.

But the mediate cognition is an equally important truth, often even more important than the immediate one. Such is the mediate cognition that we obtain through the intermediation of other men or other books. Our entire learning in schools, in universities, and in after-life—the entire wisdom to which we come by a diligent reading—all that is the sweet fruit of mediate cognition. In truth, immediate cognition created our sciences, and even to-day by immediate cognition we acquire new observations and progress, and we learn new philosophical systems, and all that is original and carries us forward. But, in order to learn what men know already, what genius has discovered and described, to master the substance of our libraries, mediate cognition is absolutely necessary to us. To-day sciences stand in great repute and diffuse themselves everywhere. How can one become a physician, a lawyer, a clergyman, a chemist, a politician, and even a philosopher, without studying these for these objects, in universities, or without mediate cognition?

A young man, before entering cultivated society, must study much and long, in order that he may learn what is required of one of its members. The more he studies the more positively he will be able to stand independently. To-day, then, mediate cognition goes before immediate, and is its chief foundation. Not in vain does religion preach to us of the God-man and his absolute immediateness! We ought, however, to understand this thing quite otherwise than in the monkish spirit.

Nevertheless, it is the destiny of every mediate cognition to serve in our youth for the nourishment of spirit, to enlighten us, to make us spontaneous, and to carry us on to the immediate cognition! The mediate cognition is only the mother's breast, or education in the school to prepare us for the immediate one. We acquire the former as passive beings, and we derive the latter from ourselves, as God drew from himself the whole world, and as every divine being is obliged to do. The first cognition makes us learned, the second makes us inventive, both together make us cultivated and accomplished men. Although mediate cognition has an im-

mense value, although it is true that without it it is impossible to-day for the greatest man—even for a person of genius—to acquit himself in science worthily of himself and of his century yet without mediate cognition, one can be only a semi-rude and ridiculous “self-made” man, a shallow “natural talent.” Yet mediate knowing is not the end of our learning, but only the means to the end.

The learned man who has nothing but learning remains always in the state of spiritual childhood. His spontaneous selfhood has never been awakened, and, having been fed continually upon meditation, has been unable to assimilate it and convert it into immediate cognition. Not mediate, but immediate cognition is the golden fleece after which the Argonauts of learning have made their voyages for centuries! Mediate cognition makes us students, followers, parrots of the words of others, school-boys; immediate cognition makes us masters, idols of the world, worthy brethren of Socrates, Plato, Leibnitz, Hegel, and even of the Saviour himself! He only can be a son of God, and a God-man, who has come to immediate cognition, and who, in his character, principles, and actions, represents God himself. Not mediate, but immediate cognition is holy, is the manifestation of God’s word. The mediate gives us wisdom, revealed by men, and the immediate cognition gives the wisdom which God himself breathed into our being; the former is human wisdom, the latter is God’s wisdom. The immediate cognition is the criterion of the mediate one. “If I investigate myself only and know truth immediately, I may be convinced how much is right in this or that philosophy, in this or that religion; in a word, in any given theory, and, besides, how much it is worthy of my esteem. The mediate cognition is the earth upon which I am to build the temple for the immediate one; it is the food of my spirit, it is the medium, but not the end of my exertions.” So reasons every selfhood which is possessed of its own self-feeling and sense, and which is conscious of its divine nature. It is not here our purpose to underrate the mediate cognition, the high value and necessity of which we recognize; we wish only to represent its subordination, and also its relation, to the immediate cognition. The axiom or certitude of cognition of the comprehensive mind relies upon the word *I am*. From this word the logical Analysis begins, and ends at the same *I am*.

I am that I am = *Sum qui sum!*

## A STUDY OF THE "ILIAD."

BY D. J. SNIDER.

First of all, let it be declared that there is no intention of saying much about the Homeric controversy. Probably the most ardent disputant on either side would not affirm that the Wolfian theory, in all its redactions and modifications, had brought out the really vital questions of the Homeric poems. It has generated an innumerable offspring of probabilities, conjectures, disputations; of doubts chiefly it has been prolific, but seems to be unable to unfold any deep inner necessity of that marvellous song. It fails, somehow, to reach down to the soul of the poet, but is occupied with external matters, interesting enough, but quite dispensable in presence of weightier things. Certainly the question of authorship is not the supreme fact in those works called the poems of Homer; for do they not remain the same, and offer us their problem, whatever be the way we spell the author's name? Indeed, ought not this dispute to be forever settled in the answer once given by the puzzled pupil to his professor? "The poems of Homer were not written by Homer himself, but by another man of the same name." More important, yet not all-important, is the question of Homeric writing. Still, if this matter were settled beyond a doubt, it could not induct us into any true comprehension of Homer.

Let us, then, relegate such a disension to the halls of learned leisure, and take up another question which must always remain the leading one with the true-hearted student. Here before me are two books which the world always has declared, and does still declare, to be of its very greatest. Do I know them, and do I know why they are so great? Some phases of the Homeric dispute have sought to make us believe that we have no Homer; but we turn away, and see indubitably his twin books lying before us upon our table; so we take them up, assured once more of their reality, and begin anew to find out what they contain that lasts so long, so fresh, and so beautiful. With boldness we may advance to a new attack through long shelves of commentaries extending back to ancient Alexandria and Athens, provided we hold continu-



ally before us this question, What vitally true thing do these old poems tell us, even at this late day? An answer to such a question the sincere reader will seek in them, and will, in time, find. A little conference with another person engaged in the same pursuit may help him; hence, O reader! I give thee here my notes; perchance hereafter I may get some of thine. For a genuine attempt of a modern human soul struggling to make Homer and Homer's world profound reality unto itself is not only interesting, but teaches much. But if I find thee working merely in some ramification of the Wolfian argument with possible additions of thine own, cutting up the poems into ballads large or small, according to some new scheme, with fresh hypotheses as to their authors, defending or refuting a long string of conjectures from the beginning down, mere bubbles which have long since exploded of themselves, displaying thy erudition by citations from German sources or other vast mole-fields of learning, or in any manner reducing back to gold-dust and dirt the gathered and minted treasures of Homer, without manifesting the least appreciation of them, as they rest in sun-like radiance before thine eyes—I warn thee, I shall burn thy document without further reading.

Other kinds of notes—such as philological, textual, historical, ethnological—we shall, in the main, eschew; very necessary in their place, they belong not here. Even literary notes, in the common acceptance of the term, whereby beautiful passages are pointed out, fine comparisons are dwelt upon, offences against taste are duly scored, must not be expected. But, in the higher meaning of literature as the very portrait of the human soul and as the very visage of human history, there is much to be found in Homer which has hardly yet been said, or, if so, can well be said again. What is the significance of these poems to man—what do they mean, interpreted into the language and methods of thought of our day? An interpretative criticism, which takes these poems as mighty facts thrown up by our race in its development, and seeks to grasp the import of them in their relation to all culture, must be employed; such a criticism will regard Homer as the great revealer of his epoch, and will unfold, as its foundation, the poet's conception of the government of the world. The Gods, their interference in human affairs, their strange characters; the many

myths, and their many forms; the Homeric man, too—are all phases of that period long passed away, which demand some translation into our own life and expression whereby we may connect them with ourselves, and thus make them into a link of our own inner as well as of our race's outer history.

Another question will also come up for an answer: How does Homer build his materials into a poem? The structure of these Homeric books is their chief wonder, though not their chief greatness, perhaps; everywhere is seen the profound instinct of the builder who puts his work together, not only in the most beautiful, but in the most lasting way. This architectonic soul is what has preserved them so long, and has helped to make them the creative principle of literature; most succeeding poetic books have been built after their structural type. One may well say that as detached fragments, however excellent in themselves, they had long since perished; but, wrought into a temple, they attain their perfect beauty and duration.

Homer is, therefore, the builder; according to one derivation of his name, he is the man who fits together. Many materials were given him to work into his structure; one asks, In what condition did he find them? In a disjointed, floating mass, doubtless, just as they were thrown off by the people and handed down in tradition; they were fragments of a national life, and of its expression, impure, uncertain, but genuine, and coming from the hearts of men. The Poet takes them, fuses them, and makes them into a complete expression. From time immemorial there had been a great conflict with the East—a long series of conflicts, which culminated in one grand struggle; all the essence of this deep wrestle of nations was gathered into a song.

Many such fragments of antecedent conflicts we can discern in the "*Iliad*," where they take the form of some ancient tale or legend; there are hints of migrations; there are mythical notices of great revolutions, national and religious; such as the story of Dionysus's flight, the fable of Briareus, the tale of Bellerophon. A great poem resumes the whole Past into itself; the "*Iliad*" has united into one brilliant legend the legendary stores of the Greek race, and smelted them into one pure-flowing strain. Still more plainly has the Poet gathered the local legends of the Trojan War; each little community had its hero and its lay in his honor, which

recounted what he did and suffered at Troy in the great national enterprise. All these lays are not merely to be collected, but to be fused together into the national song; for is not each town a part of the nation? Such is the work of the Poet, such the materials out of which he is to build his edifice.

So much was furnished to Homer by his people, so much must be furnished to every great book. The mythus is made and given him by his nation or race; faint and disjointed it lies, but has the germ, the deep hint of their destiny, which the Poet seizes and unfolds to light. It is but the crude material of song, the scattered nuggets which he must gather and fling into his poetic furnace, melting them and casting away the dross, and stamping the pure gold with his seal, whereby it becomes current ever afterward, the literary coin of mankind. Hidden deep in mother earth, even nuggets are valueless, though they be gold, being unmerchutable, and, indeed, unrecognizable to most eyes.

So much, then, is given to the Poet from without by his people, yet it must not be forgotten that he too is one of the people—indeed, one of their typical men. He is also a myth-maker—he not only receives, but gives; these legendary treasures are his in the deepest sense. Moreover, he, of all men, feels most profoundly what lies in his people; he shares most strongly in their struggle, in their suffering, in their victory. Not simply, then, has the material been given him, but his heart has helped to make it; indeed, he is the sensitive throbbing heart of his whole people, and their voice too.

Even to-day Greece shows certain phases of the pre-Homeric epos. There has been a long conflict with the Turk, extending over hundreds of years; it is still a struggle with the Oriental man, as it was upon the plains of Troy and of Marathon. Every village has taken part in the conflict, has had its hero, and still celebrates him in song. The fragments of a great national poem are floating scattered through the villages, but there is now no Homer to throw them into the crucible and refine them, and work them into a great organic Whole. Nought do we see there now but the compiler; collections of these single melodious heart-beats we may find, but they are merely a fitful breath of music here and there, and then dying away to a wail or momentary joy. Perhaps the time is not come for the second Homer; when

the second Troy is taken and destroyed, he may be called forth by the shout of triumph.

But it is time to return to our task; we shall now attempt to contemplate these ancient poems in their true place at the fountain-head of Universal Literature. It is not too much to say that such is their relation to other Great Books; they are the beginning of the literary stream, and still give to it form and scope. This is quite the most significant fact about them; they belong not to a nation simply, though they be national in the highest degree; they rise and participate in that spiritual current running above nations, which hang therefrom as from their mother's breast. In that universal life they share, and image it, too; we must reach to the very highest consideration of them, which is to regard them among the Great Books of our race, to be called Literary Bibles, several of which our European peoples have created as they dropped down the stream of Time.

In examining the structure of the "*Iliad*" in the previous essay upon the poem ("*Jour. Spec. Phil.*," April, 1883), it was seen to divide into two very distinct Parts, each of which contained a Wrath and Reconciliation of the Hero, first with the Greeks, secondly with the Trojans—this division being most emphatically marked in the Nineteenth Book. Each of these two Parts was further subdivided, by the attitude of the Hero, into a justifiable and an unjustifiable Wrath, the latter continuing till he beheld his error and was appeased. Somehow thus the entire organism of the "*Iliad*" will rest in the mind:

I. First Wrath and Reconciliation (with the Greeks).

a. Achilles in the Right.

b. Achilles in the Wrong.

II. Second Wrath and Reconciliation (with the Trojans).

a. Achilles in the Right.

b. Achilles in the Wrong.

Such is the general structure of the poem as a Whole, as it rises out of its thought into one great edifice. To this view we are now to add the special structure of each Book, as it too rises out of its thought and joints itself into the total work.

A word upon the Invocation (the first seven lines), which, though short, is deserving of a long thought. This little preface is clearly intended for the whole "*Iliad*"; here we find stated the



essence of the poem in its twofold nature, in its primitive dualism. Both points are to be carefully noted as showing the ultimate thought of the Poet. The first point is the wrath of the Hero and its consequences; the Greeks suffer woes unnumbered, and many souls are sent to Hades; such is the result to the people when their Great Man is dishonored. But the second point is the other great fact of the poem: the will of Zeus was accomplished from the beginning. He is the Highest, and it is by such collisions as this Greek one that he brings forth the world's divine movement. A conception of Universal History lurks therein, and the course of the poem unfolds it. Reconciliation, which plays so important a part in the action, is not otherwise spoken of in this short passage, but here is the hint of it and its realm; Providence is over all conflict, fulfilling his purpose, and bringing forth harmony. The antithesis of the "Iliad," in fact of the Universe, is just this one here indicated: an Upper and a Lower World; an Individual on one side, the Deity or the Universal on the other; the question being, How shall this mighty man, as independent, even as wrathful, recalcitrant, free-agent, be made to fit harmoniously into the world's order, and to contribute his share thereto? Such is the problem of the "Iliad"; it is yours too, and mine; wherefore both of us may study the old Poet's solution of it with profit. Such a meaning looms out of this Invocation when seen, not by the first glance, but by the last glance, sent backward from the end of the poem.

One other thing the reader will delight to dwell upon: the Muse is invoked to sing this song; she is to the singer a veritable reality, not a juggle, or at most a fanciful play, as at present. The Poet, though he be called the Maker, knows that not he alone has made this wonderful lay; much has been given him, among other gifts a voice; it is indeed the Muse who sings through him. Thus he figures to himself his poetic process—a figure which has remained to this day, though too often merely as a figure, not as a soul with a divinity in it.

### *Book First.*

The First Book of the "Iliad" is worthy of careful study as a typical book of the poem. It has its own distinct organism, yet it fits most exactly into the organism of the entire work. Two

questions we are to ask concerning the formation of all these Books; What is their separate structure, taking each Book as a poem with its own architecture? and What is the relation of each Book to the entire "*Iliad*"? We shall, therefore, look at the First Book as a whole by itself first, then as a part of the total epical movement.

It divides naturally into two portions: the Conflict in the Lower World before Troy, and the Conflict in the Upper World on Olympus. This division introduces as the organic ground-work of the Book the grand Homeric dualism, the human and divine realms. In each, too, we notice a disturbance—in fact, essentially the same disturbance; the Olympian household is the image of what is taking place on earth, but it shows in addition the solution of the trouble, which is its divine function. Thus we behold at once an adumbration of the whole poem in this First Book.

I. We may now proceed to take up the Conflict in the Lower World, the first part of the Book, and seek the purport of the same. At once the Poet introduces us to the heart of the matter; we behold two men in strife, each of whom is the grand personal embodiment of a principle. These two principles at war we may state as Authority against Heroship. Agamemnon is commander, and has the right of authority; but he dishonors and wrongs Achilles, the Heroic Man, who retires in wrath from the combat and stays in his tent. It will be seen that Authority on the one hand and Heroship on the other are disjoined; they exist in different individuals who now are hostile. Thus the two strongest and deepest forces of the State, which ought to work in harmony, have become antagonistic, and we are to witness the consequences. Such is the famous quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon, the essence indeed of many quarrels that since have been and are hereafter to be.

Which is right, and which wrong? The quarrel has its origin in a violation done by Agamemnon—he refuses to ransom the captive daughter of Chryses, the priest. It is manifest that he ought to have permitted the ransom according to the Greek ethical instinct of the time; all the Greeks applauded the demand and said: Revere the priest and receive the ransom. But the leader refuses with passion; the result is a divine transgression, which is punished by the plague in the Greek camp. Moreover,

the act of Agamemnon cuts deeper; the restoration of Helen, also a stolen woman, is the matter for which the Greeks are fighting before Troy; the commander is thus violating the very principle for whose infringement he is seeking to punish the Trojans. And yet deeper does his action cut: he goes and commits a second deed of violence; he takes from Achilles Briseis, the Hero's prize in war and intended spouse; steals, as it were, another Helen. Thus Agamemnon substantially plays the part of Paris in the Greek camp, and contradicts the whole purpose of the expedition. He, the man of supreme authority in that expedition, does so; the Poet places him emphatically in the wrong, for he has denied in his deed his own cause, the cause of the whole Hellenic world.

It was true that Briseis was also a captive woman in the tent of Achilles. But she had never been demanded back, as was the case with Chryseis, and Helen too; nay, we learn that the Hero intended to elevate her from captive to wife. The Greek consciousness in this matter seems to have been: Women may be stolen, but must be restored when demanded back with ransom. Achilles therefore is seen to be in harmony with the Greek ethical feeling; he is here the patriot who seeks the cause of divine wrath, and then tries to remove it when found. Whereby he collides with the man in authority, Agamemnon.

The character of Agamemnon as revealed in these outlines has in it two striking traits: insolence toward the Gods, and arbitrariness toward man. Both are indeed the same trait, at one time directed to those above, at another to those below. Note how he abuses Calchas, the priest, for telling the source of the Greek trouble. The leader quarrels with the eternal fact—the very worst trait in a leader. Yet it is the disease of all authority, whose danger is to regard its own caprice as one with the reality, and to punish the honest speaker of the truth as an enemy of the cause. Listen to that first line addressed to the priest, and mark what lurks therein: “Never yet hast thou told me the thing that is pleasant.” Clearly the head of the army, who ought always to keep his eye fixed upon the great general purpose, has lost sight of the same in his individual whim and passion. The vice of his station it appears to be, which he must get rid of or destroy his own expedition.

A third trait here peeps forth, which will help him out in the

end. Agamemnon is flexible, and can be reconciled; he yields to a better view when his ire is calmed. At once he gives up his insolence toward the God, and restores the maid with due penance; but his arbitrariness to the Hero he at present persists in; he drives off his Best Man, for which conduct hereafter he will experience bitter repentance. Thus we must place to his account a redeeming trait: he is placable; the man in authority can be appeased, and made to recall his deed. Herein, again, he is in strong contrast with the Hero.

The fundamental lines of the character of Achilles also are brought out in these sharp disputes. He supports the Greek cause with body and mind; just now he is seeking to find and to get rid of the divine obstacle. But, when his honor is touched, he withdraws from the conflict and lets the cause go to ruin; he will not subsume his personality under a commander. He, too, has a disease—the disease of Heroism; he feels that he is not sufficiently honored by the Greek leader and the Greek army. We observe in his few first words that he is in a strained mood toward Agamemnon, which the latter reciprocates; it has long been a smouldering fire, for the whole ten years perchance, which now breaks forth in consuming flames. Indeed, he rather invites Agamemnon to come and take Briseis, that he may have a good pretext for sulking. The feeling of greatness unappreciated, long pent up in the brooding soul, bursts out of his speech everywhere; the Hero is present and in action, but is not recognized; he will bring both leader and people to a comprehension of his place in the world. Thus the disease of Authority on the one hand and the disease of Heroism on the other are the two maladies in the Hellenic camp and in the Hellenic soul; the twin principles, which must work together to produce a great harmonious national action, have fallen into strife and profoundest discord. That pestilence of Apollo, God of Light, which first struck the Greek camp and shrivelled the bodies of beasts and men, has now gone within; this is the real pestilence.

Such is the scission in the Greek enterprise—a scission which produces the First Part of the whole "*Iliad*," extending to the reconciliation of the two men in the Nineteenth Book. But here upon the spot we have two attempts at reconciliation, a divine and human attempt. The first, that of Pallas, is merely to prevent



bloodshed, and succeeds thus far; the second, that of Nestor, is to harmonize the strife, and does not and cannot succeed; this matter is too deep-seated without an appeal to the final judgment over mortal men—the judgment uttered by the consequences of a deed.

Let us scan this first divine appearance found in the “*Iliad*,” and see what it means; for just these connecting points between the Upper and Lower Worlds are the pillars of the Homeric temple. The heart of Achilles “within his shaggy breast was divided in counsel whether to draw the keen blade from his side and slay Atrides, or assuage his anger and curb his soul.” This is a plain statement of his internal condition. But while he was doubting, and even laid his hand upon his weapon, Pallas came from heaven, to him alone visible, and caught him by his golden hair and forbade him to draw his sword. Such is this striking passage in which the human internal state directly fuses with the divine external interference, a rise, as it were, from earth to heaven; also there is seen the transition from plain common speech—prosaic, we might say, for the contrast—into the mythologic tongue of Homer. While Achilles deliberates, though in passion, Pallas, the Goddess of Wisdom, appears to him only, and reveals to him his second sober thought. But if this be his own internal act, why introduce the God to declare it to him? Because it is the voice of the situation, too, of the Greek cause; it is not merely his inner suggestion, but that of the outer reality as well. He must rise out of himself, out of his own passion, and hear the whisper of Pallas; she and her commands exist not simply in the man, but outside of him as well; she is a voice coming from the world, which speaks in his own soul. Therefore is she divine, because a reality and not a subjective thought alone. A double error must herein be avoided: Do not interpret the God into a mere internal state of a man, thus the distinctively divine element is lost; do not, on the other hand, interpret the God into a mere external power driving the man from without, thus the human element of freedom is lost. Achilles is about to ruin the great enterprise against Troy by slaying the man of authority; so Pallas interferes, sent by Juno, who is the supreme guardian of the Greek cause, next to the throne of Zeus. But Pallas does not try to heal the breach; she rather urges the Hero to continue his railing at the Leader. Before Helen can be restored by the capture of Troy, it is clear that another question

must be settled—the honor of the Hero. In such manner, all through Homer, the two worlds, the Upper and Lower, or the Inner and Outer, touch and kiss in a divine rapture, then separate—the Gods flying off to their home on Olympus, the men resuming the bloody conflict before Troy.

Such is the divine mediation; now comes the human mediation. An aged man appears, respected by both parties, with far more experience of life and war than either, with a tongue dropping words sweeter than honey to smooth over the difficulties of heroes: it is the wise Nestor. He sees the conflict, and decides it aright; he is the voice of justice heard amid those tumultuous passions; indeed, we may take Nestor's speech to be the voice of the Poet himself regarding the merits of the quarrel. Listen to his word, for it speaks the reason of the situation: Thou, Agamemnon, take not the maid, the prize of him, Goddess-born, and Best Man of all the Greeks; and thou, Achilles, strive not with the King, the sceptred Man, to whom Zeus has granted rule. The wise old man, with that clear understanding of his, probes the difficulty to the core, and gives the best advice; indeed, he quite states the collision as it has been hitherto unfolded—individual heroism versus institutional authority.

But the word of reconciliation is now fruitless; each side charges the other with transgression against its right; each side does a wrong: the Leader violates the Hero's honor, the Hero refuses obedience to the Leader. The twin principles, whose perfect interfusion and agreement make the very soul of the Greek enterprise, have separated and turned with violence upon each other. What is to be the outcome? For one thing, this "*Iliad*" before us, whose whole course is now to show us through what disasters and punishments the two discordant principles must work back to unity and harmony, for together they must live according to the World's order, the voice of which we are now to hear—it is the voice of Zeus.

II. We are now to be borne to the Upper World, to the very highest pinnacle of the Upper World, whence we are given a glance over the future sweep of the poem. The appeal must be made to the final divine authority to settle this question of human authority. Mark again, it is a matter upon which the highest earthly powers, the Hero and the Leader, are at variance;

what will the supreme power of the world say to it? Hence the introduction of the world-governing power, the Highest God; the solution of the conflict is out of the reach of man below on the plains of Troy. This brings us to the Second Part of the First Book, which is ushered in by the prayer of Achilles to his mother Thetis, wherein the mortal Hero, in affliction and dishonor, rises up and communes with his immortal portion.

For Achilles has a mortal and an immortal parent; both have given him their endowment. A mortal and immortal strand runs through him; both are interwoven into his being and make him the Hero. He, the mortal part, prays to his mother who is a Goddess and immortal, but who is in himself too. As mortal, he is fated to die early; but as immortal he will obtain everlasting glory. Now that glory is stained by Agamemnon the Leader, who dishonors him. So he calls upon his divine mother to intercede with Zeus that the latter may grant victory to the Trojan enemy till the Greek restore him to his honor; that is, till he be recognized fully for his heroic worth, and thus get his immortal meed. In such manner this question is brought before the highest tribunal, and the grievance of Achilles is elevated from a personal matter into a universal question, in whose decision Hellas and all mankind have an interest.

What does Zeus decree, what must he decree in such an emergency? For the necessity of his judgment is the main insight; it is the Reason of the World uttering itself upon this question of Hero-ship. Zeus as the supreme divinity is above both Greeks and Trojans, and above the other Gods; in him we must see the highest movement of the poem, its true and final thought. This thought which now comes before the divine judgment-seat is that the Heroic Individual must be restored to his place in the Greek host and in the Greek mind; not till then can the Greeks conquer, or ought they to conquer. They are to be scourged into their own true destiny by the God; the Trojans must, therefore, be victorious till Achilles be restored to honor. We see it to be not an arbitrary command of some external power, but truly a divine decree resting upon the very essence of the conflict. So Zeus grants the prayer of Thetis, must grant it in order to be Zeus; the Greeks must perish till they be brought to understand what the Hero is, and take him up anew into their hearts.

All these things the Poet expresses not in our way, but his own way, which we must comprehend. He has a poetic form introducing a varied play of the Gods, who often seem capricious enough; yet in this very play he is deeply in earnest; in fact, it is his genuine and only manner of expression. He is seeking to give utterance to his profoundest thought; it is not a conscious employment of mythologic shapes which are blown into the air like soap-bubbles for their momentary iridescence, but it is his final sincerest expression of what he deems truth. Homer's age was not a time of abstract thought, but of poetic thought; the latter was the only way of thinking. So completely has this naive manner been educated out of us that we have to educate ourselves back into it; the Poet's images we have to translate into our abstractions in order to understand them. But with him it is the first spontaneous expression of a view of the World and its government; this primitive, unworn look out upon the Universe is his charm and his value for us. Through comprehending in our way what he means, we get back into his way; nature and life bloom again with their original freshness, seen through the eyes of the old Poet.

Thus we must reach down to the heart of this sportive play of the Gods. They have a personal, capricious side; but we must see through this side as a transparent outer covering and behold the rational necessity lying underneath. Zeus is Zeus, not because of his whimsicalities, but because he is the voice of the divine order of the world. So it is with the Gods generally; their finite human element is but a transparent body revealing the divine soul or some phase thereof; our vision, in reading Homer, must be trained to look through this external hull; such is the poetic glance which beholds in the image the reality.

We have now placed before us the first attitude of Zeus in the poem, with whom we cast a long look over what is to be. The question left unsettled below is answered above; the people and the Leader are to learn to honor the Hero. But Zeus must not be considered as hostile to the Greek cause; only a strong partisan like Juno can thus regard him. His present attitude is, in the long run, for the good of the Greeks; as other peoples known in history, they must be defeated in order to win. When they have learned their lesson this first attitude of Zeus will change, whereupon we shall enter a new phase of the poem.



But the matter is not yet fully settled upon Olympus; even against this supreme decree of Zeus there rises the protest. For the Gods are many, and they take sides in the struggle on earth below between Greeks and Trojans. The opposition is voiced by Juno, the zealous partisan of the Greeks; in favor of her people she proposes to interfere with the world-ordering plan of Zeus. The two are man and wife, heads of the Olympian family; hence the division between them assumes the form of domestic jealousy. It is natural; against the complete outlook which takes in all things is always the view of the partisan who sees but a part. Indeed, there has from time immemorial been this scission on Olympus between Zeus and the Lower Gods, who have conspired against supreme power; witness the ancient story of Briareus the Hundred-Handed, who was called to Olympus once to maintain the divine authority of Zeus. So Thetis tells the legend to him now, reminding him of his former deed, with a hint to assert his supremacy in regard to the Hero. And Zeus does it, must do it; the result is that there is wrath among the Gods too at their leader; as the earth below was disturbed, so is the divine harmony of Olympus stirred up to discord. It is all on account of mortals and their conflict between Hero and Leader; indeed, we behold quite the same conflict among the Gods—authority in a struggle with insubordination. Thus the earthly scission images itself above; yet it lasts but a moment; against divine authority there can be no real struggle.

Such is the difficulty, now we must have the mediation on Olympus, corresponding with the earthly movement of the poem. As Nestor sought to reconcile the two conflicting Greeks, so Vulcan undertakes to restore good feeling between his conflicting father and mother among the Gods. His solution is doubtless the true one: "Mother, be patient and submit, lest I may behold thee beaten with stripes." Which, though not an act of conjugal tenderness, is what happens to those who strive against the world-order; they are scourged and ground till they submit. Vulcan knows by his own experience; once before he interfered against the will of the supreme parent; the result is, he is now lame, and a blacksmith among Gods. In the Olympian economy he is what the Greek artist was in mundane society—indispensable, partaking of divinity by his genius, but socially in disesteem.

Vulcan effects his purpose and restores the happy mood; even inextinguishable laughter arises among the blessed Gods at his divine interference. He is a comic figure, and his solution of the difficulty is comic, for the situation admits of no other solution. He is a little Part putting himself above the great Whole, and trying to reconcile the same; Zeus as supreme God can have no genuine collision; it is a mere feint or show of seriousness, which vanishes suddenly in laughter, as here. Such is the true outcome of opposition to the highest movement of the spiritual world—a comedy. Looked at through the honest vision of the Poet, this scene is not degrading to Gods or Men, but is a simple though light-hearted representation of the fact.

So we have reached concord again, even merriment upon Olympus; a fresh festival begins with harp and song of the Muses, who evidently are to sing just this conflict and its reconciliation. Herein we have another ideal reflection of Greek life, full of music and joy, yet not without struggle. In honor of whom do the Gods feast? In honor of themselves. In honor of whom do men feast? In honor of the Gods—that is, ultimately in honor of themselves, imaged in their ideal world. Olympus is now concordant; the conflict there is harmonized, being in fact but a passing shadow over the Olympian heights. Zeus is supreme, such is the trumpet-voiced announcement from above; we may henceforth expect that his will, with some protest, and possible counter-plotting on the part of certain Gods, will be triumphant.

This First Book now lies before us in its organism and idea; an important Book we shall say—a sort of image of the entire poem held up in advance, an Introduction to the "*Iliad*," yet an integral part of it. We shall note its beautiful symmetry; it naturally divides into the two Worlds of Homer, Upper and Lower; then we behold the same conflict in each of these Worlds, with the mediation in each. Both Parts of this Book fit together harmoniously—fit, as it were, one upon the other. The thought builds the structure, from the structure shines forth the thought; both thought and structure are one process, which must be separated in an analytic criticism, but are always to be reunited in the poetic vision. Yet the great difference between the two Worlds is not to be passed over; in the Lower is the grand conflict, but unreconciled; in the Upper, the decision of the problem is stated,

which decision, from the lips of supreme authority, runs: Honor your Heroic Man, for I, the Highest, am the avenger of his wrong. A decree which holds good to-day, and will hold good forever; not an arbitrary caprice of Zeus, but the voice of the World-Spirit uttering one of its laws. Thus the potentate above decides against the potentate below because of the latter's violation; the first duty of the Leader is to reconcile himself to the Hero, else he is nought; both are nought.

In such manner we have a second portraiture of the conflict which is thrown up among the Gods. Such is Homer's way; he does not rest content with giving us a simple terrestrial account of wars and combats, but he draws over the earth an Olympian world which is the divine image of the struggle, together with its solution. This is the most glorious fact of Homeric song—this Olympian light breaking in upon it from above and revealing the reality in the appearance of things. Two portraitures run through the Poet's book: the one below, ambiguous, a struggle of brawn apparently, often tiresome; the other above, determinate, a struggle of spirit, never drooping in interest. We in these days say, too, that a war has its principle which drives the arm of the combatants, and often we state the principle abstractly; but Homer creates a distinct world to indicate this very matter, and thus makes it the emphatic part of the war.

Our modern substitute for the ancient Epos, the Novel, has no such Upper World whereby to give the spiritual side of its conflict. It could portray the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon, the struggle between heroship and authority in the present phase of such a problem, but it would have no divine interference. The conflict would have to work of its own energy through to the end; the characters would unfold and change by the experience of their own deeds, without the express oversight of Zeus. Homer has this internal development of character too, as we shall see; but he has, in addition, an external world-movement into which his personages fit, and which is the true reality of all their heroic actions.

GOETHE'S *DAS MÄRCHEN*.

BY GERTRUDE GARRIGUES.

"The German Emigrants," of which the tale ("*Das Märchen*") is a part, describes the adventures and entertainments of a family of distinction which has been forced, by the encroachments of the French, to leave its estates and seek safety beyond the Rhine. Its members reach the right side of that river without further injury, and settle themselves, for the time, upon a small property, there to await, with such patience as they may, the return of more peaceful times.

The first part of the novel is occupied with a description of the different personages; their adventures, and the disputes—growing out of the distracted state of the times—in which they engage. They find their chief pleasure, the author tells us, in describing the follies of two great nations, in finding the Germans as absurd as the French, and in representing, first one and then the other, as Jacobins and Radicals. This diversion finally leads to a fracas which results in several of the party separating themselves from the others. This is regarded, by those who remain, as so great a calamity that they resolve henceforth to banish politics, and all other subjects not likely to prove generally interesting, from their conversation when together. It is further agreed that, as nearly as possible, each one of the fugitives shall return to the interests and occupations which engaged him before his flight, and seek, at all times, so far as his powers permit him, to afford his part to the common entertainment in a courteous and ingenuous way.

The Clergyman—a typical Goethean character, by the way—offers, on his part, as dessert, a series of narratives which he does not promise shall be strictly authentic, yet which he, at the same time, insists no one shall have the privilege of doubting. He keeps his word, and each day the party is amused and instructed by one or more of his anecdotes. The first evening is devoted to the study of the connection between what is commonly called the natural and the supernatural, and of the difficulty of judging of events which are called marvellous, yet which, if properly considered, may be found to admit of a natural explanation. The other



tales teach the lessons of renunciation, of self-sacrifice, of self-restraint—that “man possesses within himself the same power to subdue his inclinations which may be called out by the persuasions of another.”

Finally Karl, the young man whose precipitation had caused the dismemberment of the party, inquires of the clergyman whether he knows a fairy tale. “The Imagination,” he observes, “is a fine faculty, yet I like not when she works on what has actually happened. The airy forms she creates are welcome as things of their own kind; but, uniting with Truth, she produces oftenest nothing but monsters, and seems to me, in such cases, to fly into direct variance with reason and common sense. She ought, you might say, to hang upon no object, to force no object on us; she must, if she is to produce works of art, play like a sort of music upon us; move us within ourselves, and this in such a way that we forget there is anything without us producing the movement.”

“Proceed no farther,” said the old man, “with your conditionings! To enjoy a product of imagination, this also is a condition, that we enjoy it unconditionally, for Imagination herself cannot condition and bargain; she must wait what shall be given her. She forms no plans, prescribes for herself no path, but is borne and guided by her own pinions; and, hovering hither and thither, marks out the strangest courses, which in their direction are ever altering. Let me but on my evening walk call up again to life within me some wondrous figures I was wont to play with in earlier years. This night I promise you a tale which shall remind you of nothing and of all.”

Then follows the tale which, at first sight, appears to be something entirely apart from the rest of the narrative, having no connection with or dependence upon anything that precedes it. A more careful scrutiny, however, convinces us that all the other matters considered are mere preparations for and indexes to this most marvellous work of all—mere points for its argument. What Goethe himself said of another production of his (*Novelle*) may be fitly quoted in this connection: “To find a simile for this novel, imagine a green plant shooting up from its root, thrusting forth strong green leaves from the sides of its sturdy stem, and at last terminating in a flower. The flower is unexpected and start-

ling, but come it must—nay, the whole foliage has existed only for the sake of the flower, and would be worthless without it."

To be able, even in the smallest measure, to seize the import of the work, it is needful to bear in mind the fact that all of Goethe's productions are biographical—parts of his life, as it were, and expressions of the various experiences he underwent. It was written in the years between 1793 and 1795, while Goethe was still at work upon "*Meister's Apprenticeship*," shortly after the publication of the "*Theory of Colors*"; and when, after his return from Italy, he was again passionately pursuing his scientific studies at Weimar. He had passed through the wild, stormful, but fervid and high-aspiring Werther period, and had attained a mature serenity without losing anything of his youthful enthusiasm. His religious doubts were all solved, his views of art matured, his aim in life defined. All the anarchy and unrest of his early life had broadened and deepened into a calm, self-sufficing, self-decisive manhood, of the height and depth, the strength and power of which he was at last fully conscious.

Having reached this point, with a mind like his, the first desire was to crystallize the impression, to give it form, "to execute some poetical task wherein all that he had thought, felt, and dreamed on this weighty business might be spoken forth." Such a task we believe he found in the tale. It is the shell of the chrysalis; it epitomizes the stage of development which he had himself reached, and to which, in the enthusiasm of production, he believed the world had also attained.

From the full, beautifully free, abundant nature-life of the classic world, man, during the middle ages, had gone over to the intense spiritual existence of Christianity. The mediæval Christian despised the body, and looked upon Nature herself as something hateful and impure. This world was regarded as the domain of the senses, and whatever was of it pronounced worthless. This life was considered as having value solely as a preparation for the life to come, and all spiritual things had their place in a beyond which was only to be approached by a renunciation of existence—by death.

The ideal of the classic world was the perfect identification of idea and form of a spiritual individuality with a natural form; the Christian ideal tore these two elements asunder and placed

them in irreconcilable enmity. In the classic world it was in the natural that spirit sought an Absolute, and hence it conceived the natural as in itself divine. The faith of the middle ages for the first time enabled spirit to penetrate into its own internality, in the process of which it at first esteemed the flesh—Nature and the natural in general—as something false or nugatory, notwithstanding the spiritual and absolute had been able to make its appearance only in this element. But the spiritual tendency, however strong, was, of course, incapable, even when most dominant, of overruling entirely the realism which made men cling fast to nature and to sensuous pleasures, as is evidenced by the pomp and parade, the rich animal life, which grew more and more a characteristic of the middle ages as the first faith slowly weakened.

The fact that this, his dearest, was, at the same time, his deadliest sin, was calculated to make man restless and miserable. He found it impossible to live in the mere hope of a beyond, and his faith taught him that to grasp this impossibility was his only salvation. Glad to escape by any means, if only for a moment, from the consideration of this direful dilemma, he willingly turned his attention to whatever new was offered. The Renaissance brought into Europe revelations of the matchless art of antiquity, and, for the time, all Europe turned Pagan. The Reformation, though apparently opposite in its tendency, through its appeal to the natural judgment of man's soul, was another move in the same direction. The eighteenth century—with its protest against all authority and its steady cry for a return to nature, though unlicensed, and, through its bloody agent, the French Revolution, by which it carried the war from religion into politics, thus translating freedom of thought into liberty of act, forever to be shuddered at—was the grand culmination in which the external and secular learned how more and more to secure recognition, until, at last, the modern world proclaims as its ideal—the *Human*. "The depth and height of the human soul as such, the universally Human in its joys and sorrows, its struggles, its deeds, and its destinies."

In a novel that openly takes for its scene localities made desolate by the French Revolution it is natural, perhaps, that men should look for some expression of political opinion from its author; but those who have done so here—as in his other works

dealing with that time—have met only with disappointment. This, no doubt, has led to the assertion, made as often almost by his friends as his foes, that Goethe had no political faith. "He was utterly without interest in political matters. He disliked the Revolution as he disliked the Reformation, because they both thwarted the peaceful progress of development. In it (the French Revolution) Goethe only saw the temporal aspect; his want of historical philosophy prevented him from seeing the eternal aspect." (G. H. Lewes.)

It would be hardly possible to draw a lazier conclusion or make a more erroneous statement than this. No man ever possessed a wider view, a quicker or surer power of generalization, or a truer, deeper sympathy for anything and everything which could, even in the smallest degree, affect humanity. It is true, he left to others the discussion of the purely political problem, while he gave his time to the purely human and individual interest. His whole life was spent in calling upon men to be free, to make themselves so against all odds; but by freedom he meant "the complete healthy development of their own natures," not a change of political constitutions. The French Revolution was to him then what it has grown now to be to most: only one of the crises—a great and fearful one, we must admit—in that grand movement by which the negativity of the middle ages was being forced to give way before the more positive element of the modern time. Another turn in the spiral through which the liberation of spirit is to be accomplished.

Goethe animated the universe with God; he saw in Nature the incarnation of Spirit. Morality was to him the high and harmonious action of all human tendencies, and art the highest representation of life. In his own words: "To discuss God apart from Nature is both difficult and perilous; it is as if we separated the soul from the body. We know the soul only through the medium of the body, and God only through Nature." Hence the problem of the tale, as we take it, is one with the problem of his century and ours—the reconciliation of spirit and matter, soul and body.

After the first shock received at the hands of the Reformation, the mediæval Church, foreseeing its final downfall, but unwilling or unable to submit at once to the omnipotent process of Spirit, drew its coils more firmly about its adherents, remorselessly seek-



ing to crush out all further progress. It was at this moment, "the middle of the night," when the darkness of the middle ages seemed intensified by the fact that men's minds had been, for a time, illuminated—if never so slightly—by the rising beam of Freedom, of which the Reformation was the morning star, only to be darkened again by the sable pall which the Church had hastened to let down over all things, that the so-called French Philosophy (Will-o'-wisps) arose. This Philosophy, although almost wholly sceptical, contained the positive element of a strong desire to impart information (Gold), to spread abroad a knowledge of things as they were, and so let light in upon old abuses.

The Church, at first, as foster-mother of all learning, received the new workers kindly, and, as nothing could come into the material from the spiritual world without her assistance, or, in other words, as this was the most direct avenue to their public, the French Philosophers gladly accepted the good offices of the priesthood (the Ferryman) to ferry them into notice. They repaid the service in the only coin they possessed—information upon various matters, both simple and abstruse, a variety of knowledge for whose jingle the priesthood had always had an abhorrence. The minds of men (the River), it had always felt convinced, would rise up in horror at the daring scrutiny that such as Diderot, Voltaire, D'Alembert, and their fellows, threw upon all things, sacred as well as profane.

The priesthood, therefore, when it came really to understand their bent, refused to accept their gold, and demanded of them instead a recognition of its authority. They must repay the Church, or its representative, not in glittering generalities or sparkling speech, but by the practice of meek and lowly virtues, by humility, obedience, patience, prudence, moderation, silence, and the like (Fruits of the earth). These, naturally enough, considering their characters, and the epoch of which they were the product, they did not have at their instant command; but were ready enough to promise all things in regard to them. The story tells us that the Ferryman gathered up the gold very carefully, and hastened to place it where he thought it could do no further mischief. Few of the French Philosophers but were advertised, as well as complimented, now and then, in those days, by a solemn clerico-legal burning of their works.

"Now, in this chasm," where the gold was thrown, "lay the fair, green Snake, who was roused from her sleep by the gold coming clinking down." When Goethe went to Weimar, Science, as we understand the word, in its many-sided manifoldness, did not exist; but at the time the tale was written it was already growing into a great and powerful engine of progress—to the prophetic, love-inspired eye of Goethe, the greatest and most powerful. In nothing was the eighteenth century more remarkable than in the impetus which it gave to scientific investigation, and it is to the encyclopedists that this was largely due. It was the information in regard to things—simple and minor largely, but often great, and vastly important—gathered from all quarters and on every side by its contributors, and then flung carelessly and at random into the voluminous pages of *L'Encyclopédie*, which did more than anything else to arouse Science (Snake) from her long sleep of the middle ages, to fill her with new energy, and with glad hopes of the future.

The Snake and the Will-o'-wisp expect much of each other. Their relationship is clear, their difference Goethe makes even clearer. The Will-o'-wisps are "gentlemen of the vertical line." "Since ever was a Jack-o'-lantern in the world, no one of them has either sat or lain." The encyclopedists were full enough of theory, of suggestion; they had plenty of these to give, and they gave freely and generously; but they would never have been contented to dig and delve laboriously, pile fact upon fact, experiment upon experiment, as she "of the horizontal line" is compelled to do.

What the Snake wants of the Will-o'-wisps is their gold; they wish to know of her where the fair Lily dwells. She knows, she can tell them, she can even carry them over the River herself—but it must be at high noon. It has been only at high noon—at illuminated periods of the world's history—that science, correct thinking or knowing, could so dominate the minds of men as to span the distance between, and bring in close contact the sensuous and the supersensuous, the seen and the unseen. True to its creed, the Church, through its priesthood, could admit no possibility of the natural holding converse with the spiritual; but Superstition (the Giant's shadow)—what Goethe calls the "dark Extraordinary"—could with his dark shadow measure the space, and lay like an

incubus over the River, which swept shudderingly and fearsomely beneath, as it held fast the two countries together.

The Snake is not sorry to lose sight of her relatives for a space. Having fed so well, she requires time for assimilation and investigation. This investigation is conducted in a different direction from the one we should have supposed; but Goethe's idea of science was, that it was all-embracing, all-pervading. It was not merely an investigation of physical phenomena—although there he gave it its full meed—but it led also to the understanding of all of the phenomena of existence, intellectual and spiritual, as well as the merely natural. "Without my attempts in natural science," he says, "I should never have learned to know mankind such as it is. In nothing else can we so clearly approach pure contemplation and thought, so clearly observe the errors of the senses and of the understanding, the weak and the strong points of character."

In the dark chasm where she had lain so long, the Snake had found small opportunity for investigation into other than the simplest natural substances. Alchemy and its earliest offspring, Chemistry, had represented all that there was of physical science; and of history, political economy, the science of government, all that owes its genesis to "the shaping hand of man," there was only the merest inkling in the minds of a few of the more illuminated. Goethe, through his kings—which may also be considered as symbolizing different epochs—for instance, the gold king might represent the genius of biblical or Hebrew supremacy; the silver king, the classic period; the brazen, the power (especially the secular-feudal) of the middle ages—shows us that the world has at all times been governed by one of three forces—wisdom, appearance, strength; but for a just and true balance of power all three should hold equal sway, and reign each in his own unmixed purity.

The three kings greet gladly the light which the Snake throws upon them, and the golden one inquires, immediately upon seeing her, "Whence comest thou?" and when answered, "From the chasms where the gold dwells," inquires again, "What is grander than gold" (knowledge)? "Light" (insight, the power to combine and arrange, to perceive the universal in the particular). "What is more refreshing than light?" "Speech" (the power to make use of this insight—to apply it).

Things are growing clearer; science has opened the way a little, and now poetical activity, with its still but strong insight (the Man with the Lamp), appears. "Why comest thou, since we have light?" asks the golden king. "You know I may not enlighten what is dark." Poetry is never found among the savage and rude; but the moment the cloud lifts a little, the moment there is the slightest striving toward knowledge or civilization, she is there. "Will my kingdom end?" asks the silver king. It was the question, no doubt, which he had intended asking of the Snake when he was interrupted by the coming of the Man with the Lamp. Now he asks it, more properly, of poetical insight. "Late or never," is the answer. Appearance, beauty, art and its accompaniments, will hold sway over man, we must believe, so long as life lasts. The brazen king now makes himself heard: "When shall I arise?" "Soon." "With whom shall I combine?" (Here is Goethe's idea of combination: "in himself, the individual is little or nothing; combined with his fellow-men, he is all.") "With thy elder brothers." "What will the youngest do?" "He will sit down?" "I am not tired," cried the fourth, with a rough, faltering voice. This is the first mention we have had of the composite king. It will be observed that he has taken no part in the above conversation, and is only aroused to interest when he hears himself mentioned. We may suppose him to represent the era at which the tale opens, and of which Goethe wrote: "Our present time is retrograde, for it is subjective. All eras in a state of decline are subjective; on the other hand, all progressive eras have an objective tendency."

Meanwhile, the golden king—wisdom, the natural spokesman of the other two—is asking of the man: "How many secrets knowest thou?" "Three," replied the man. "Which is the most important?" said the silver king. "The *open one*"—that "the Universe is full of goodness, and whatever has being has soul"—replied the other. "Wilt thou open it to us also?" asks the brass king. "When I know the fourth," replied the man. "*What care I?*" grumbled the composite king in an undertone. "I know the fourth"—renunciation, man must leave hold of the particular in order to grasp the universal—hissed the Snake. And well she knows it, and will hereafter prove her knowledge of it. "The time is at hand"—when nature and spirit should no longer be es-



tranged—cries the old man, in a strong voice. It is enough ; he hurries away in one direction, the Snake in another. As he passes, the light which he carries—pure poetical insight—changes everything which it falls upon into something brighter, purer, greater, lovelier, holier.

The scene now shifts to the cottage of the old man. He enters, and finds his wife—practical activity—in tears. Our old friends, the Will-o'-wisp, have been there before him. They have been playing off upon her some of their usual pranks, and she is now almost in despair. This is another view of the estimation in which Goethe held the encyclopedists. Though recognizing and gladly proclaiming the services they had rendered the arts and sciences, he deprecated the evil influence they had exercised by their continual vociferations in favor of a false and pernicious freedom—a freedom which, as they taught it, really amounted to unlimited license. “Whatever frees the intellect, without at the same time giving us command over ourselves, is pernicious. Only within the circle of Law can there be true freedom ; we are not free when we acknowledge no higher power, but when we acknowledge it, and in reverence raise ourselves by proving that a Higher lives within us.”

The method which the Will-o'-wisps used toward the old woman was rude, but it was probably the only one suited to the time. They first licked away the old poetical ceremonials and rites, which were all that had made beautiful the rough stones which sheltered her, and then, with the new gold shaken from themselves, dealt death to the Faith (Mops) which had been alike her plaything, her sorrow, and her joy. Poetical insight can clothe again the bare walls with new lustre and beauty, and change this dead Faith into something more enduring ; but unless his help-mate, practical activity—the people, humanity at large—in her own person (the Basket) carries this Faith, as well as the homelier virtues for which the Will-o'-wisps have made her responsible, thus freeing themselves, it can never be restored to a true spiritual existence.

The old woman departs upon her errand. The basket weighs heavily upon her, but it is not the onyx : it is the vegetables that burden her. It is easy to carry a high faith, a noble purpose ; an inspired feeling exalts, it hovers above our heads and we can

scarcely hold it to us; it is the exercise of the simple, lowly virtues of daily life that weary and distract.

Walking along and musing in sullen fashion, she suddenly finds herself confronted with the Giant's shadow (Superstition). He soon robs her of part of her burden. Not of the onyx, which she could not rid herself of if she would and would not if she could, but of part of the debt due to the Ferryman. He, when she presents herself before him, is enraged to find only a part where he had looked for the whole; and is ready at once with the plea which had been used by his Church since ever it was established. It is not he, it is not the Church, it is the minds of men that must first be satisfied and assuaged. She must bind herself to the time-river, to public opinion, for the further payment of her debt. She finds this a heavy business. Her hand, the very soul of labor, is blackened and shrivelled, if not rendered useless; the activity of labor remains, but its influence, its power, ends when it ceases to be other than for itself.

There is one hope left, however: she will repay her debt and so rescue the noble member. She hurries away with eagerness and speed. And now her basket is no longer a burden; it hovers free above her in the air.

One of the delicately fine points of the tale is now to appear. Thinking of Goethe in the light in which we love him best, as poet and seer, we should have supposed, probably, that it would have been to poetical activity, inspiration, that he would have confided the task of first introducing the Prince to the fair Lily—of bringing the natural side of man face to face with the spiritual. But no, he has given us a subtler touch. It is to practical activity that the task of leading him across the River is intrusted. Goethe believed firmly in the dignity of labor; but it must be labor with an object, an ideal, not dull, lifeless toil. "Godlike energy is seen only in action; what we can *do* we *are*; our strength is measured by our plastic power."

And now, behold! on the other side of the River—over which one of the party has made of her body a bridge, by means of which the others have crossed—are assembled the Snake, the two Will-o'-wispes, the Old Woman, and the Prince. All bound upon the same quest, all seeking to gaze upon the beautiful face of the fair Lily. Merely to gaze, they will not dare to touch; the very glance

of her eye carries with it a heavy penalty. And yet they must seek her. All thought, all effort, all desire, all being must find its centre in spirit. The middle ages, we have said, had placed her in a beyond where she might be gazed upon but never touched; the problem of the modern time is to carry her over the River, a willing captive, and make her to reign a sweet household goddess—*here*.

The old woman, laden with the basket containing the memorial sent by her husband to the fair Lily, approaches her first. She finds her seated in a beautiful grove and singing sweetly to the music of her harp, but she is not happy. If the material side of man wanders about restless, useless, and unhappy, because separated from the spiritual, that spiritual part itself suffers no less from the estrangement, and probably suffers more; for it is only through the material that it can find existence and a field of action. The first result of the strong desire of man (Hawk) to attain spiritual insight and communion is to rouse the soul to consciousness, and to kill the happy ignorance (Canary) with which it has hitherto found solace. But there is no affliction possible to man which his divine side is not capable of elevating itself above, and the fair Lily, though bemoaning her favorite, recognizes in his death one of the signs which combine to teach her hope.

She enlivens the onyx and rouses him into a half-life, with which she finds some small pleasure. Still she knows that he can never be a living, real presence again until he returns to a life upon earth—until the individual is able to realize a religion apart from its forms. "Each has his own religion; must have it as an individual possession; let each see that he be true to it, which is far more efficacious than trying to accommodate himself to another's!"

The Snake now arrives, full of eagerness and hope. "The prophecy of the bridge is fulfilled." Lily is doubtful: "The lofty arch of your bridge can still but admit foot-passengers; and it is promised us that horses and carriages, and travellers of every sort, shall, at the same moment, cross this bridge in both directions"—for science to reach its full development, to accomplish its full mission, it must cease to be the speculation of a few and become the minister of the many. "Is there not something said, too, about pillars, which are to arise of themselves from the waters of

the river?" it is not enough that public opinion shall grow indifferent to the so-called "conflict" between religion and science; it must proclaim that there is no conflict. The Snake is determined to be hopeful. "However it may be," she says, "the temple"—of the future, in which wisdom, beauty, and heroic strength shall hold equal sway—"is built."

When Lily hears, for the second time that day, the blessed tidings, "the time is at hand," she is almost ready to believe; and her attendant virtues—hope, faith, and charity, or love—are aroused.

Now is the time for her Prince to appear. He is weary and despondent, his desire is shrunk and drooping. He has reached his "darkest hour."

That soul and body may become one, that the material part of man may be filled and permeated by the breath of God, true spiritual existence, it may not be necessary—as the faith of the middle ages taught—that man should die, physically: but it is necessary, it must always be necessary, that he shall make a renunciation of his *merely* natural existence. Spirit will not come down to lead a merely sensuous life with matter; but matter must raise itself—through the destruction of its sensuousness—to a spiritual life with her. It is only in the "regenerated man" that soul and body can be one. Goethe understood this well, and it was only when he had experienced this truth, when he had passed through the "Mystic Bath" himself, and had come out pure "Gold," that he could have written the tale, which symbolizes that process.

To most men at some moment of their career—alas, and forever alas, for him to whom it never comes!—there comes a time when they are confronted by their limitations. The intellect, in her search after knowledge, may be defeated; the affections may be broken and prostrated by the loss of objects dear to them; the conscience may be violated, the will may be thrown back upon itself. It matters not how the conflict begins, it must *end* by a recognition of the utter inability and insufficiency of man in his own unaided person to reinstate peace in his own soul. This is the crucial test for all mankind. Every human soul must cry: "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me;" but only the elect can say: "Nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt." These accept their limitations as a divine appointment, and bow in total



and absolute submission to the power of God—not conceived as blind force, but as divine intelligence—and, in so doing, pass, by that fact, into a higher state.

In some form or other, the birth of the soul involves the death of the body; that is, the birth of the higher grows out of the negation or denial of the lower principles. So the Prince, in the act of casting himself up on the bosom of Lily, instantly expires. The fair Lily herself is overcome with grief and horror; the higher principles themselves for a moment are shaken, for the whole man must share in this passionate conflict.

The Snake at once bestirs herself, and places this process under the form of eternity, thus typifying its universal truth. The fair Lily rouses herself, and faith shows her in a mirror the reflection of herself—what she is to hope for in the future. But now there is need of action. The Snake calls faintly for the Man with the Lamp; the sensuousness of man once abandoned, the understanding can not support him long unless assisted by reason or divine inspiration. To attain this, practical activity is necessary. “No grief of the soul that can be conquered except through action.” The Woman with the basket is wild with fear for herself; but the Snake bids her forget her own care and do what she can to help the Prince; she may find it the best way to help herself. “Man lives for man, and only in so far as he is working for Humanity can his efforts bring permanent happiness.”

All effort to obtain the Man with the Lamp is useless until the Prince’s Hawk is seen soaring again into the air. When the desire of man for the higher life rouses itself again to action, reason needs no bridge on which to cross to him. Insight impels, and man’s own desire is conductor.

The old man has already announced to the fair Lily that “her greatest misfortune she may look upon as her greatest happiness,” and he now sets about, in the true spirit of poetic activity, to make of his prophecy a surety. Lily’s little canary, too, under the genial influence of his lamp, is to share in the general rehabilitation—the happy innocence, or ignorance, of spirit is to be born anew as virtue. The Flames, also, are to play their part; scepticism is a necessary factor in all development. They enter and devote themselves to Lily, thus diverting her mind from what would otherwise have been a too heavy burden.

Midnight has now arrived, and the old man, looking at the stars, begins speaking: "We are assembled at the propitious hour; let each perform his task, let each do his duty: and a universal happiness will swallow up our individual sorrows, as a universal grief consumes individual joys." Each is willing to do his duty, and has a duty to perform, excepting the three attendants, who at this supreme moment are fast asleep; but they, too, are to be awakened and informed with new power from the reflection which the Prince's Hawk will throw upon them. The procession forms and moves slowly toward the River; the truths which are known to a few are now to be laid open to all. Each person, and every object, now emits a mild light of his own, even the basket—the body itself—and Lily's veil. "All things have power to teach him who has the power to learn." Most marvellous of all, when they reach the River they find it spanned by a strong and noble bridge—the Snake at *midnight*! Well might the Ferryman gaze with astonishment at the gleaming arch, and the many lights which were passing over it.

When they have all reached the other side, the Snake resumes her old form for the last time, and once more surrounds the basket with her circle. The old man asks her: "What hast thou resolved on?" "To sacrifice myself rather than to be sacrificed; promise me thou wilt leave no stone on shore." "*Wir entsagen müssen*," we must learn to limit ourselves to the Possible. In this first restraint lies the germ of self-sacrifice; in the giving up of claims too high for attainment, we learn to give up claims for the sake of others. Science may not pierce the clouds and light up the awful mystery of the Absolute; but she may, and does, make life valuable and the rolling years endurable.

At the old man's command, Lily touches the Snake with one hand, her lover with the other. The Prince is at once aroused, and, assisted by the old man, stands erect, the canary fluttering upon his shoulder. There is life in both, but the spirit has not yet returned. The conflict is over, but it has left the man weak and nerveless. Some work must be found for him to do—a field which his "activity may fill." The sphere of individual effort for the Snake is now exhausted, and she yields herself up a willing sacrifice for man. To the first touch of practical activity—the first call from the many—she shows herself willing to respond.

and lies a heap of glittering jewels ready to be thrown into the stream of time.

The old man now addresses himself to the Will-o'-wisps, and his tone, we are told, is respectful—to the inspired eye of reason the work of the Literati of the eighteenth century seemed worthy of all respect—and tells them of a service which none but they can accomplish. The procession is again formed, and proceeds slowly forward until it reaches a large brazen door, bolted with a massive golden lock—the old *régime*, cemented and held fast by long usage—which he requests the Lights to eat away. They require small entreaty, and make short work of the business. This was their mission: to open, tear down, and destroy; it was for others to rebuild.

The clanging doors open and introduce our friends into the sanctuary—the temple of the future, guarded by the Kings. The Lights fall upon each king in turn, and, finding nothing to satisfy them in either of the others, attach themselves to the composite one. For the third time the old man announces: “The time is at hand!” Lily throws herself upon him in thankfulness, and clasps him still closer as the temple begins to move. The old woman and the Prince hold by each other also.

Strange to say, the temple makes its way straight up through the Hut of the Ferryman, which falls through, covering the old man and the youth with its *débris*. This occurrence causes the temple to rock fearfully, and fills Lily and the old woman with alarm. But they need not have suffered any concern. Wandering around it in the dawn, they find that insight—the virtue of the Lamp—has recognized its necessity as an institution, and has converted it, from the inside to the outside, into solid silver. The Ferryman, too, is not forgotten, but comes out of this new temple within a temple in the guise of a Pilot or Helmsman.

The old woman is in despair. “Among so many miracles, can there be nothing done to save my hand?” Her husband bids her bathe in the River, and, on her demurring, continues: “Go and do as I advise thee; all debts are now paid.” In this new, happy reign of reason, even labor will be exonerated from the burden laid upon her by others.

As the rising sun appeared upon the rim of the dome, the old man stepped between Lily and the Prince, and cried, with a loud

voice: "There are three which rule on earth: Wisdom, Appearance, and Strength." At the first word the gold king arose; at the second, the silver; and at the third, the brazen, while the mixed king "very awkwardly plumped down;" in the new temple of the future sham and fraud shall find no place; they will have no power to exercise fear, but will excite only amusement or disgust. The Man with the Lamp leads the youth to each of the three kings in turn. The first girds him with his sword; the second hands him his sceptre; the third presses an oaken garland upon his brow, with the words: "Understand what is highest." At this his features kindle, his eyes gleam, and his first word is—"Lily!" At last the true meaning of life lies open before him, and body and soul are one.

"Oh, my friend," he says, turning to the old man, "glorious and secure is the kingdom of our fathers; but thou hast forgotten the fourth power, which rules the world earlier, more universally, more certainly—the power of love." The old man answers, with a smile: "Love does not rule; but it trains, and that is more"—it is the spirit of love, of grace, the feminine element in humanity, that aids the individual to progress and development, and it is the same principle that actuates modern society and tends to local self-government.

The new-birth of the individual accomplished, the attention is naturally directed outward, and it is seen at once that the process may also be a general one. The prophecy of the bridge has been fulfilled, and a stately structure, upon which people of every station and under every variety of circumstances are seen to be safely and pleasantly employed, appears. "Remember the Snake in honor," said the Man with the Lamp; "thou owest her thy life; thy people owe her the bridge, by which those neighboring banks are now animated and combined into one land. Those swimming and shining jewels, the remains of her sacrificed body, are the piers of this royal bridge; upon these she has built and will maintain herself."

Four lovely maidens now enter the temple. Three of them we recognize as Lily's attendants, who have now returned to her; in her moments of activity, spirit needs no adjuncts, but in her quiescent state they serve as indexes to her. The fourth hastens to the Man with the Lamp, who greets her as his wife, but tells her



she is free to choose another husband, if she desires. She will not hear of any other, but tells him that he too is grown younger. And so poetical and practical activity—Reason and Endeavor—are joined again in the truest of all marriages.

The final catastrophe draws near. The Giant is seen stumbling and blundering over the bridge. His presence does not harm, but his shadow causes deadly mischief. The new king involuntarily grasps his sword; but a moment's reflection convinces him of its powerlessness, and he looks calmly at his sceptre, then at the lamp and rudder of his attendants. "I guess thy thought," said the Man with the Lamp, "but we and our gifts are powerless against this powerful monster." Superstition is only to be cured by natural means, and, fortunately, those means are near at hand. "The natural sciences," says Goethe, "are so human, so true, that I wish every one luck who occupies himself with them. They teach us that the greatest, the most mysterious phenomena, take place openly, orderly, and simply, unmagically; they must finally quench the thirst of poor ignorant man for the dark Extraordinary by showing him that the Extraordinary lies so near, so clear, so familiar, and so determinately true."

Now the Hawk, with the mirror, soaring aloft above the dome, catches the light of the sun and reflects it upon the group which is standing on the altar; through the knowledge gained of the Highest, which his own desire has reflected upon him, man, surrounded as he is now, and ever should be, by all the good and gracious influences which he has drawn to himself, finds his best life in a life lived for others. This life may often, must often, be lived in solitude—the king and his followers proceed by secret passages into his palace—but its beneficence shall none the less be spread abroad and serve to illuminate all mankind.

The retiring Flames, wishing to have a little sport before they leave, scatter a few gold pieces upon the marble flags as they pass, and the people press eagerly forward to catch them. There are still those who find food for thought in the scriptures of the last century, but the time of their greatest usefulness is past.

"Behold the prophecy!" There have always been individuals for whom it was true; for the race—? "The bridge is swarming with travellers, and the temple is the most frequented of the whole earth."

## THE PURITANIC PHILOSOPHY AND JONATHAN EDWARDS.<sup>1</sup>

BY F. B. SANBORN.

In speaking of philosophy in America, I should hardly be called on to present any "History of Philosophy" at all, since there is nothing that can be distinctively recognized from the intellectual side as American philosophy—using the term as we do when we speak of the Indian, the Greek, the German, or the English philosophy. Our countrymen have been the followers of many systems, the inventors of none; for not even the transcendentalism of New England can be considered as a distinct American philosophy, though it comes nearer to that designation than any other.

Nevertheless, I find it convenient, and even, in a high sense, very appropriate, to speak of philosophy in America as passing through certain unique and varied historical phases; only I use the broad and noble term Philosophy as indicating the guide of life, the exponent and directress of national existence, rather than a certain metaphysical insight, fruitful of speculation even when barren of results; such as was censured of old in the Athenians, later in the Schoolmen, and, less than a hundred years ago, in the Germans. There was a time when Wordsworth could say, and with a melancholy portion of truth—

Alas! what boots the long laborious quest  
Of moral prudence sought through good and ill?

What is it but a vain and curious skill,  
If sapient Germany must lie deprest  
Beneath the brutal sword? Her haughty Schools  
Shall blush; and may not we with sorrow say,  
A few strong instincts and a few plain rules  
Among the herdsmen of the Alps have wrought  
More for mankind at this unhappy day  
Than all the pride of intellect and thought?

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<sup>1</sup> A lecture read at the Concord School of Philosophy, July 24, 1883.

Germany has done something to justify her sapient and haughty schools since the time of Wordsworth and Napoleon; and so America, without such schools, but with a manifest philosophic destiny, has gone forward, ever since the landing of our Pilgrim Fathers in 1620, to make significant, by practical illustration, certain phases of speculative thought and ethical purpose.

These phases, roughly stated, are: (1) The Puritanic Philosophy in history from 1620 to 1760, culminating in Edwards; (2) The Philanthropic Philosophy in history, from 1760 to 1820, with Franklin as its type; (3) The Negation of Philosophy, from 1820 to 1850; (4) The Ideal or Vital Philosophy, from 1850 onward, with Emerson as its best representative.

These periods, of course, interlock and pass into each other, so that it is hard to say when one ends and the next begins; but, to illustrate them, three persons are taken of eminent fame in America and throughout the world: Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758), as the type of Puritanic thought; Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790), as the type of Philanthropic Realism; and Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882), as the type of Idealism. For the intermediate period—between Franklin's and Jefferson's establishment of real prosperity and theoretic freedom and Emerson's epoch of ideal excellence—I could find no sufficient personal representative; but any successful politician or popular favorite would serve—one as well as the other. This period, like the age immediately following adolescence in men, was a vigorous, ungoverned, risky time, from which we emerged into the tumult of civil war, and thence, with sinews hardened and egotism abated, into the calmer atmosphere of assured national life.

When Canning said of those nascent futilities in the world's history—the South American republics—"I called into existence a New World to redress the balance of the Old," he used a grandiose phrase to describe what had been done two centuries before by a little band of heretics seceding from England and landing on Plymouth Rock. It was Bradford and Winthrop, John Smith and John Robinson, and not George IV's eloquent premier, who redressed the balance of Europe with the rising orb of America. And these men, the true planters of our nation, were humble Christians and resolute Calvinists, who in their philosophy put God first, and made their religion a thing of daily life. The Puri-

tan movement in England meant much, but it signified far more in America, where it shaped the permanent foundations of national greatness. Its reign there was short—scarcely more than twenty years—while here it held sway for more than a century, and strongly influenced colonies like New York, Virginia, and New Hampshire, where it did not ostensibly prevail, as it did in Massachusetts and Connecticut. Puritanism—which was Calvinism with English modifications—did in fact what Tacitus said was very difficult—it reconciled empire and liberty—the sovereignty of God and the freedom—even the political freedom—of man. It exalted the omnipotence of the Deity till men looked in its eyes, as Cromwell called them, “like poor creeping worms upon the earth,” and then it raised these depraved and lost creatures to be heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ, and the equals of whatever boastful or splendid walked the world. Thus Calvinism gave birth to democracy, while Arminianism, the professed creed of liberty, favored inequality and every kind of privilege. “What do the Arminians hold?” asked an inquirer in Archbishop Laud’s time. “The best bishoprics and deaneries in England,” answered Dr. Morley, who soon became a bishop himself. Time passed by, and in a few years those bishoprics and deaneries had all fallen before the sword of Cromwell, that soldier of Calvinism—the leader of that army of the Lord which was mighty in England for the pulling down of strongholds. “Calvinism,” says Fronde, “was the spirit that rises in revolt against untruth—the spirit which has appeared and reappeared, and in due time will appear again, unless God be a delusion and man be as the beasts that perish; for it is but the inflashing upon the conscience of the nature and origin of the laws by which mankind are governed.” The Puritanic philosophy, then, like the stoical, was both ethic and religious; it declared the chief end of man to be the love and service of God, and that this service must be in purity of heart and practical morality. I say nothing here of the traditional theology which the Puritans held to, and which had lost some of its noblest limbs in the wrench that tore it from the trunk of the parent church; but in the grand simplicity of its philosophic principle—the immediate dependence of the universe on a conscious, wise, loving, and just First Cause—Puritanism yields to none of the more attractive systems of philosophy. It was in expanding these elements of Cal-



vinism—the foreordination, justice, and omnipotence of a personal God—into the detail of an ecclesiastical system, that Puritanism broke down and lost its hold on the world. And that most acute and inflexible of all the Puritans, Jonathan Edwards, coming upon the world's stage just as the Puritanic was yielding to the philanthropic spirit, was, of course, thrown into the most pronounced contrast with the tendency of his times, and thus became the clearest manifestation, at least for America, of the Puritanic philosophy—in which God was everything, man nothing. In the philanthropic philosophy, on the other hand, man's welfare became everything, and God's glory little or nothing. Edwards was devout and ascetic—Franklin humane and genial, not to say godless.

Treating of the religious affections and of their influence on the soul, Edwards said, at the age of fourteen, when speaking of the comparative excellence of the higher qualities:

One of the highest excellencies is love. As nothing else has a proper being but spirits, and as bodies are but the shadow of being, therefore the consent of bodies one to another, and the harmony that is among them is but the shadow of excellency. The highest excellency, therefore, must be the consent of spirits one to another. And the sweet harmony between the various parts of the universe is only an image of mutual love.

A few years later he wrote:

I walked abroad alone in a solitary place in my father's pasture, for contemplation. And as I was walking there and looking upon the sky and clouds there came into my mind so sweet a sense of the glorious majesty and grace of God as I know not how to express. . . . After this my sense of divine things gradually increased, and became more and more lively, and had more of that inward sweetness. The appearance of everything was altered; there seemed to be, as it were, a calm, sweet cast or appearance of divine glory on almost everything. God's excellency, his wisdom, his purity and love seemed to appear in everything: in the sun, moon, and stars; in the clouds and blue sky; in the grass, flowers, trees; in the water and all nature, which used greatly to fix my mind. I used often to sit and view the moon for a long time, and in the days spent much time in viewing the clouds and sky, to behold the sweet glory of God in these things; in the mean time singing forth with a low voice my contemplation of the Creator and Redeemer. . . . I found, from time to time, an inward sweetness that would carry me away in my contemplations.

This I know not how to express otherwise than by a calm, sweet abstraction of soul from all the concerns of this world; and sometimes a kind of vision, or fixed ideas and imaginations, of being alone in the mountains or some solitary wilderness, far from all mankind, sweetly conversing with Christ, and wrapt and swallowed up in God.

From this religious intoxication the step was but a short one to that view of God which has been made the chief reproach against Edwards and his school of Calvinists—men at variance on some points with the accepted creed of Calvinism, and more in harmony with the earlier Calvinism of St. Augustine, if so Hibernian a distinction may be allowed. In describing his religious experiences of youth, as he looked back on them from mature life, Edwards once said :

From my childhood up my mind had been full of objections against the doctrine of God's sovereignty, in choosing whom he would to eternal life, and rejecting whom he pleased, leaving *them* eternally to perish, and so be everlastingly tormented in hell. It used to appear like a horrible doctrine to me. But I remember the time very well, when I seemed to be convinced, and fully satisfied as to this sovereignty of God, and his justice in thus eternally disposing of man according to his sovereign pleasure; but never could I give an account how or by what means I was thus convinced. And there has been a wonderful alteration in my mind with respect to the doctrine of God's sovereignty from that day to this; so that I scarce ever have found so much as the rising of an objection against it in the most absolute sense—in God showing mercy to whom he will, and hardening whom he will. God's absolute sovereignty and justice, with respect to salvation and damnation, is what my mind seems to rest assured of. This doctrine has very often appeared exceedingly pleasant, bright, and sweet; absolute sovereignty is what I love to ascribe to God.

If Edwards had been willing to exercise his acute and refining intellect in reasoning upon this question, as the greatest of the Latin fathers, St. Augustine, did, perhaps he would, by inward argument, have reached that conclusion which Augustine so often and so painfully reasons out, as in the seventh book of his "Confessions" :

Whatever is good; that evil, whose origin I questioned, has no substantial existence—since if it were substance it would be good. For either it would be substance incorruptible, and hence a great good, or else

a substance corruptible, which could not be corrupted unless it were good originally. Therefore I saw, and it was revealed unto me, O God! that Thou hast made all things good; and that there are really no substantial existences which Thou hast not made; and to Thee evil exists not at all; nor does it exist in thy creation as a whole, since there is nothing outside of that creation to invade and corrupt the order which Thou hast established. In some parts of that creation there are, to be sure, some things which appear evil, because they are out of place; but these same apparent evils are in place elsewhere, and there they are good; and in themselves they are good.

This remarkable passage, the thought of which is found in many philosophers, may have been in Emerson's mind when he wrote his hazardous poem of "Uriel"—these verses especially:

One, with low tones that decide,  
Doubt and reverend use defied;  
With a look that solved the sphere  
And stirred the devils everywhere,  
He gave his sentiment divine  
Against the being of a line.  
Line in nature is not found,  
Unit and universe are round;  
In vain produced, all rays return,  
Evil will bless and ice will burn.

I would not say that this abstruse and perilous thought of the universe was in the mind of Edwards—the range of whose vision was so far within that of Augustine and Emerson—thus giving the most favorable interpretation that can be put on the shocking and damnatory parts of his theology. In defending the doctrine of original sin, Edwards, in fact, maintained that God is not directly the author of sin and evil, but only disposes things in his universe in such a manner that sin will certainly ensue. Indirectly, therefore, through his foreknowledge, God is the author of evil, to which both Edwards and Augustine at times seem to ascribe an eternity of continuance, not quite in harmony with the reasoning of both as to the goodness of God and the origin of evil. In truth, the early dualism of Augustine never seems to have been in all respects shaken off, though he contended so stoutly again and again to refute that Manichean heresy. By refusing to give a place, as Origen did, to a general "restoration" of fallen

angels and lost human souls, Augustine seems to have allowed in practice the heresy he condemned in words—that evil is eternal, and therefore practically self-existent and a check on God's goodness—not merely the antiphonic refrain to the loveliest of songs—as he declares it to be in his "City of God" (Lib. xi, cap. xviii).

Dr. Kirkland had been a student of theology with Dr. West in Edwards's former home at Stockbridge. Dr. West was the author in 1772 of an able defence of the great work of Edwards on the "Freedom of the Will," which had appeared in 1754. Edwards died in 1758, and this anecdote by Dr. Kirkland relates to a period more than thirty years later. "My father," says Kirkland, "sent me to Dr. West's house to study theology. He placed in my hand such books as Edwards's powerful work on 'Original Sin,' and Hopkins's treatise on 'Holiness,' books which, if I could have read them with any belief, would have sent rottenness into my bones. They were written with such prodigious power that they made me melancholy. I used to go out into the doctor's orchard upon that beautiful side-hill, and there I would pick up a ripe and blushing apple and look at it; then I would pluck a flower, and observe its beauty and inhale its odor, and say to myself, 'These are beautiful types of the loveliness of God; I know God is benevolent, and I will return to my studies cheered by these impressions.'"

But Dr. Kirkland added: "These tremendous doctrines seemed to awaken the deepest emotions of piety in the mind of Dr. West, and to impart light and gladness and thankfulness to his inmost spirit." For Puritanism had the secret of extracting the sweetest honey from the sourest and strongest substances. "Scarcely anything," says Edwards, speaking of his early religious life, "scarcely anything was so sweet to me as thunder and lightning; formerly nothing had been so terrible to me."

It was indeed the noble error of Edwards, as of Augustine—his master in the spirit, if not in fact—to approach philosophy too exclusively from the side of the received Christian theology. The famous book on the "Freedom of the Will" was not so much a philosophic treatise as a theological polemic aimed at the Arminians. Edwards wrote to the Scotch minister, Erskine, in 1749, that he "had been endeavoring to bring the late great objections and outcries against Calvinistic divinity to the test of the strictest



reasoning; and particularly that grand objection that the Calvinistic notions of God's moral government are contrary to the common sense of mankind." A philosophical work entered upon in a spirit so controversial would need to be carried forward magnanimously, and to draw from the deepest fountains of speculative truth in order to merit the praise that has been given to Edwards on the Will. In truth, these fountains were hardly accessible to Edwards, who knew Plato but partially, and Aristotle hardly at all; who could not read French; who was ignorant of the great labors of the Schoolmen and the Catholic theologians since Augustine, and would have, perhaps, despised them had he better known them, as Cotton Mather and the Calvinists in general did. "It is indeed amazing," wrote Mather, while Edwards was in college, "to see the fate of the writings that go under the name of Aristotle. First falling into the hands of those who could not read them, and yet, for the sake of the famous author, were willing to keep them, they were for a long time hid under ground, where many of them deserved a lodging; and from this place of darkness the torn or worn manuscripts were anon fetched out, and imperfectly and unfaithfully enough transcribed, and conveyed from Athens to Rome. The Saracens by and by got them, and they spoke Arabic—the concise and broken style a little suiting them; and even in Africa there were many Aristotelian schools erected. When learning revived under Charlemagne, all Europe turned Aristotelian; yea, in some universities they swore allegiance to him; and, oh, monstrous! if I am not misinformed, they do in some universities at this day. No mortal else ever had such a prerogative to govern mankind as this philosopher, who, after the prodigious cart-loads of stuff that has been written to explain him, yet remains in many other things besides his 'Entelechia' sufficiently unintelligible, and forever, in almost all things, unprofitable. Avicenn, after he had read his 'Metaphysics' forty times over, and had them all by heart, was forced, after all, to lay them aside in despair of ever understanding them."

This Philistinism of Mather toward Aristotle (which reminds one of the mutterings of Mr. Adams the other day against the whole study of Greek) was not peculiar to the wilful, witch-hunting divine of Boston, but was a common Puritan trait, from which Edwards could not escape. The author of an elaborate system of

theology for Calvinistic schools—Bernard Pictet, of Geneva—writing in 1696, seven years before Edwards was born, thus speaks in his preface, after ridiculing the middle-age Schoolmen :

Cause enough, then, why our well-instructed Reformers of the Church should banish from the reformed churches the whole scholastic theology, with its curious, futile, and even blasphemous questions, and give themselves wholly to exegesis of the Word of God ; drawing that theology which they taught, not from Lombard's "Sentences," not from Aristotle nor Plato, but from the well of Scripture undefiled. I too have abstained as much as possible from the barbarous jargon of the Schoolmen.

The work of Edwards was not "drawn from the well of Scripture undefiled," nor yet, as are the works of Augustine, continually fortified by Scripture texts ; but almost wholly made up of the links in a chain of close metaphysical argument, which we must admire even when we disown its conclusions. These were in some respects but another form of that destructive negative criticism first initiated by Locke and Hobbes in England, which, in the hands of Hume, had been so effective in unsettling the basis of philosophy in the eighteenth century, and which, a few years later, when Hume's writings became widely known, was to prepare the way, in Kant's mind, for the new speculative philosophy of the nineteenth century. To this philosophy Edwards would have been logically opposed ; but there was in him a vein of mystical and transcendental thought, at variance with his own logic, which might have led him, had he lived to the age of Mr. Alcott, to welcome the work of Kant as opening the way to something better than the logical faculty or the gatherings of experience could prescribe as an ultimate philosophy.

The Puritans denounced Aristotle and the Schoolmen—but what does our Puritan Schoolman, our Father Jonathan of Connecticut, proceed to do at once, in the absence of Plato and Aristotle and the subtle doctors of middle-age Europe ? What but set up a school of his own, with a subtle metaphysical treatise or two, which his followers have been expounding for more than a hundred years ? Edwards's "Careful and Strict Inquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notion of that Freedom of the Will which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame," was published in

1754. In this book Edwards did not for an instant disown the metaphysical method, but boldly praised it and called it indispensable, as the Catholic Schoolmen had. I do not purpose to enter upon the strict chain of metaphysical arguments by which Edwards maintains his chief proposition—that the human will is not free; nor shall I attempt either to uphold or refute that proposition. It is doubtful if more cogent reasoning was ever marshalled to prove a point against which the nature of man instinctively rebels—namely, that we are constrained by necessity to do what we feel that we are free to avoid doing. But take notice that he displays an activity and subtlety of mind such as no American philosopher had before shown, and that Edwards was very much in the line of the intellectual effort of his day—that is, the first half of the eighteenth century. It was upon such reasoning, as well as upon their numberless virtues, that the renown of the English Berkeley and the French Malebranche was founded; and it was by arguments still more subtle that the Scotchman Hume, contemporary with Edwards, threw half the civilized world into a maze of scepticism until Kant came to their rescue, a few years after the death of Edwards. The surprising fact is, that, with these remarkable powers of analysis and reasoning, which would have made Edwards a match for Hume on his own ground, and with this demand of his age to be fed on that sort of food, the Puritan minister yet stood resolutely by his chosen task of preaching Christianity as he understood it to the poor Indians of Stockbridge, and the anxious saints and sinners of New England, wherever he encountered them. His mission was to save souls, by helping men to repent of their sins and be converted; and to this he devoted himself rather than to the calm and leisurely study of philosophy, such as in after-years occupied the thoughts of Kant at Königsberg. It was his zeal, as a preacher, in fact, that led Edwards to compose his great work on the Will—as appears by his letters to his Scotch correspondent, Erskine, to whom, in 1757, he thus explained the connection between the Puritan means of salvation and the doctrine of necessity as applied to the will of man:

The doctrine of a self-determining will, as the ground of all moral good and evil, tends to prevent any proper exercise of faith in God and Christ in the affair of our salvation, as it tends to prevent all dependence upon them. For, instead of this, it teaches a kind of absolute independence

on all those things that are of chief importance in this affair, our righteousness depending originally on our own acts, as self-determined. And truly in this scheme man is not dependent on God, but God is rather dependent on man in this affair. Yea, these notions tend effectually to prevent men's ever seeking after conversion with any earnestness, and indeed they destroy the very nature of conversion itself.

Of Edwards in the pulpit we have this account from one who heard him :

He carried his notes with him into his desk, and read most that he wrote. Still, he was not confined to them, and, if some thoughts were suggested to him while he was preaching which did not occur to him when writing, and appeared pertinent, he would deliver them with as great propriety and fluency, and often with greater pathos, and attended with a more sensibly good effect on his hearers than what he had written. While preaching, he customarily stood holding his small manuscript volume in his left hand, his elbow resting on the cushion or the Bible, his right arm rarely raised but to turn the leaves, and his person almost motionless. His success was not owing to the pictures of fancy or to any ostentation of learning or of talents. In his preaching, usually, all was plain, familiar, sententious, and practical.

It was to preaching in the hope of promoting the conversion of men that Edwards devoted himself; but his youthful observations in natural history show that he might have been another Linnaeus, or a naturalist of distinction in some other field, if he had cultivated his talents for observation and scientific discovery. These, like all the intellectual powers of Edwards, were very marked in his childhood—and it is rather a pity that he did not take the same line of development which Swedenborg did—the eager pursuit of science first, and the promotion of spiritual knowledge afterward. In his childhood, perhaps at the age of twelve years, Edwards addressed this letter to some person of distinction in this country or in England—to whom is not known—but about the year 1716, before Linnæus was sent from his father's parsonage to a Swedish academy :

*May it please Your Honor :*

There are some things that I have happily seen of the wondrous way of the working of the spider. Although everything belonging to this insect is admirable, there are some phenomena relating to them more particularly wonderful. Everybody that is used to the country knows their



marching in the air from one tree to another, sometimes at the distance of five or six rods. Nor can one go out in a dewy morning, at the latter end of August and the beginning of September, but he shall see multitudes of webs, made visible by the dew that hangs on them, reaching from one tree, branch, and shrub, to another, which webs are commonly thought to be made in the night because they appear only in the morning; whereas none of them are made in the night, for these spiders never come out in the night when it is dark, as the dew is then falling. But these webs may be seen well enough in the daytime, by an observing eye, by their reflection in the sunbeams. Especially late in the afternoon may these webs, that are between the eye and that part of the horizon that is under the sun, be seen very plainly, being advantageously posited to reflect the rays. And the spiders themselves may be very often seen travelling in the air, from one stage to another among the trees, in a very unaccountable manner. But I have often seen that which is much more astonishing. In very calm and serene days in the forementioned time of the year, standing at some distance behind the end of a house or some other opake body, so as just to hide the disk of the sun and keep off his dazzling rays, and looking along close by the side of it, I have seen a vast multitude of little shining webs and glistening strings brightly reflecting the sunbeams, and some of them of great length, and of such a height, that one would think they were tacked to the vault of the heavens, and would be burned like tow in the sun, and make a very beautiful, pleasing, as well as surprising appearance. It is wonderful at what a distance these webs may plainly be seen. Some that are at a great distance appear (it cannot be less than) several thousand times as big as they ought. I believe they appear under as great an angle as a body of a foot diameter ought to do at such a distance, so greatly doth brightness increase the apparent bigness of bodies at a distance, as is observed of the fixed stars.

But that which is most astonishing is, that very often appear at the end of these webs spiders sailing in the air with them, which I have often beheld with wonderment and pleasure, and showed to others. And since I have seen these things I have been very conversant with spiders, resolving, if possible, to find out the mysteries of these their astonishing works. And I have been so happy as very frequently to see their manner of working: that when a spider would go from one tree to another, or would fly in the air, he first lets himself down a little way from the twig he stands on by a web; and then, laying hold of it by his fore-feet, and bearing himself by that, puts out a web, which is drawn out of his tail with infinite ease in the gently moving air, to what length the spider pleases; and, if

the farther end happens to catch by a shrub or the branch of a tree, the spider immediately feels it and fixes the broken end of it to the web by which he lets himself down and goes over by that end which he puts out of his tail. And this my eyes have innumerable times made me sure of. Now, sir, it is certain that these webs, when they first proceed from the spider, are so rare a substance that they are lighter than the air, because they will ascend in it (as they will immediately in the calm air), and never descend, except driven by a wind; wherefore 'tis certain. And 'tis as certain that what swims and ascends in the air is lighter than the air, as that what ascends and swims in water is lighter than water. So that if we should suppose at any such time, where the air is perfectly calm, this web is so easily drawn out of the spider's tail that if the end of it be once out, barely the levity of it is sufficient to draw it out to any length; wherefore if it don't happen that the end of this web catches by a tree, or some other body, till there is so long a web drawn out that its levity shall be so great as more than to counterbalance the gravity of the spider, or so that the web and the spider, taken together, shall be lighter than such a quantity of air as takes up equal space—then, according to the universally acknowledged laws of nature, the web and the spider together will ascend, and not descend, in the air; as when a man is at the bottom of the water, if he has hold of a piece of timber so great that the wood's tendency upward is greater than the man's tendency downward, he, together with the wood, will ascend to the surface of the water. And, therefore, when the spider perceives that the web is long enough to bear him up by its ascending force, he lets go his hold of the fixed web and ascends in the air with the floating web. If there be not web more than enough just to counterbalance the gravity of the spider, the spider, together with the web, will hang *in equilibrio*, neither ascending nor descending, otherwise than as the air moves. But if there is so much web that its greater levity shall more than equal the greater density of the spider, they will ascend till the air is so thin that the spider and web together are just of an equal weight with so much air. And in this way, sir, I have multitudes of times seen spiders mount away into the air from a stick in my hands, with a vast train of this silver web before them; for, if the spider be disturbed upon the stick by the shaking of it, he will presently in this manner leave it. And their way of working may very distinctly be seen if they are held up in the sun or against a dark door, or anything that is black.

And this, sir, is the way of spiders' going from one tree to another at a great distance; and this is their way of flying in the air. And, although I say I am certain of it, I don't desire that the truth of it shall be

received upon my word, though I could bring others to testify to it, to whom I have shown it, and who have looked on with admiration to see their manner of working. But every one's eyes, that will take the pains to observe, will make them as sure of it. Only those that would make the experiment must take notice that it is not every sort of a spider that is a flying spider; for those spiders that keep in houses are a quite different sort, as also those that keep in the ground, and those that keep in swamps, in hollow trees, and rotten logs; but those spiders that keep on branches of trees and shrubs are flying spiders. They delight most in walnut-trees, and are that sort of spider that make those curious net-work polygonal webs that are so frequent to be seen in the latter end of the year. There are more of this sort of spiders by far than of any other.

But yet, sir, I am assured that the chief end of this faculty that is given them is not their recreation, but their destruction, because their destruction is unavoidably the effect of it; and we shall find nothing that is the continual effect of nature but what is of the means by which it is brought to pass. But it is impossible but that the greatest part of the spiders upon the land should every year be swept into the ocean. For these spiders never fly except the weather is fair and the atmosphere is dry; but the atmosphere is never clear, neither in this nor in any other continent, only when the wind blows from the midland parts, and, consequently, toward the sea. As here in New England the fair weather is only when the wind is westerly, the land being on that side and the ocean on the easterly. And I have never seen any of these spiders flying but when they have been hastening directly toward the sea. And the time of their flying being so long, even from about the middle of August every sunshiny day until about the end of October (though their chief time, as I observed before, is the latter end of August and beginning of September), and they never flying from the sea, but always toward it, must needs get there at last, for it is unreasonable to suppose that they have sense enough to stop themselves when they come near the sea, for then they would have hundreds of times as many spiders upon the sea-shore as anywhere else. The reason of their flying at that time of year I take to be because then the ground and the trees, the places of their residence in summer, begin to be chilly and uncomfortable. Therefore, when the sun shines pretty warm they leave them and mount up in the air, and expand their webs to the sun, and, flying for nothing but their own ease and comfort, they suffer themselves to go that way that they find they can go with the greatest ease and where the wind pleases; and, it being warmth they fly for, they find it cold and laborious flying against the wind. They, therefore, seem to use their wings, but just so much as to bear

them up, and suffer them to go with the wind. So that, without doubt, almost all ærial insects, and also spiders which live upon trees, are, at the end of the year, swept away into the sea and buried in the ocean, and leave nothing behind them but their eggs for a new stock the next year.

There is in this account of what Parson Edwards's boy had seen at his father's manse in East Windsor a happy mixture of fact and theory—the latter foreshadowing the deductive metaphysical turn of mind which afterward found its highest result in theological treatises. A few years later he began to speculate on the facts of consciousness and the laws of thought, and wrote his thoughts down.

To show the singularly precocious and active mind of Edwards in its earliest manifestations of speculative thought, let me cite a few of his youthful, even childish, speculations on Being and Nothing, and the other metaphysical abstractions that occupied, without filling, his capacious spirit from the age of thirteen to that of thirty. He discourses thus of Being:

That there should be absolutely Nothing at all is utterly impossible. The mind, let it stretch its conceptions ever so far, can never so much as bring itself to conceive of a state of perfect Nothing. It puts the mind into mere convulsion and confusion to think of such a state; and it contradicts the very nature of the soul to think that such a state should be. It is the greatest of all contradictions to say that *thing* should not be. It is true, we cannot so distinctly show the contradiction in words, because we cannot talk about it without speaking nonsense, and contradicting ourselves at every word; and because Nothing is that whereby we distinctly show other particular contradictions. But here we are to run up to our first principle, and have no other to explain the nothingness, or not being of Nothing, by. Indeed, we can mean nothing else by Nothing but a state of absolute contradiction; and, if any man thinks that he can conceive well enough how there should be Nothing, I will engage that what he means by Nothing is as much Something as anything he ever thought of in his life; and I believe that, if he knew what Nothing was, it would be intuitively evident to him that it could not be. Thus we see that it is necessary that some being should eternally be. And it is a more palpable contradiction still to say that there must be being somewhere and not other where, for the words *Absolute Nothing* and *Where* contradict each other. And, besides, it gives as great a shock to the mind to think of pure Nothing being in any one place as it does to think



of it in all places; and it is self-evident that there can be Nothing in one place as well as another; and, if there can be in one, there can be in all. So that we see that this Necessary, Eternal Being must be Infinite and Omnipresent.

This Infinite and Omnipresent Being cannot be solid. Let us see how contradictory it is to say that an Infinite Being is solid; for solidity surely is nothing but resistance to other solidities. Space is this necessary, eternal, infinite, and omnipresent being. We find that we can, with ease, conceive how all other beings should not be. We can remove them out of our mind and place some other in the room of them; but Space is the very thing that we can never remove, and conceive of its not being. If a man would imagine Space anywhere to be divided, so as there should be nothing between the divided parts, there remains Space between, and so the man contradicts himself. And it is self-evident, I believe, to every man, that Space is necessary, eternal, infinite, and omnipresent. But I had as good speak plain: I have already said as much as that Space is God. And it is, indeed, clear to me that all the Space there is, not proper to body, all the Space there was before the Creation, is God himself; and nobody would in the least pick at it if it were not because of the gross conceptions that we have of Space.

A state of absolute nothing is a state of absolute contradiction. Absolute nothing is the aggregate of all the contradictions in the world—a state wherein there is neither body, nor spirit, nor space, neither empty space nor full space, neither little nor great, narrow nor broad, neither infinite space nor finite space, not even a mathematical point, neither up nor down, neither north nor south (I do not mean as it is with respect to the body of the earth, or some other great body), but no contrary points, positions, or directions, no such thing as here or there, this way or that way, or any way. When we go about to form an idea of perfect Nothing, we must shut out all these things; we must shut out of our minds both space that has something in it and space that has nothing in it. We must not allow ourselves to think of the least part of Space, be it ever so small. Nor must we suffer our thoughts to take sanctuary in a mathematical point. When we go to expel Being out of our thoughts, we must be careful not to leave empty space in the room of it; and, when we go to expel emptiness from our thoughts, we must not think to squeeze it out by anything close, hard, and solid; but we must think of the same that the sleeping rocks do dream of, and not till then shall we get a complete idea of Nothing.

When we go to inquire whether or no there can be absolutely Nothing, we utter nonsense in so inquiring. The stating of the question is.

nonsense; because we make a disjunction where there is none. Either Being, or Absolute Nothing, is no disjunction; no more than whether a triangle is a triangle, or not a triangle. There is no other way but only for there to be existence; there is no such thing as Absolute Nothing. There is such a thing as Nothing with respect to this ink and paper; there is such a thing as Nothing with respect to you and me; there is such a thing as Nothing with respect to this globe of earth, and with respect to this Universe. There is another way besides these things having existence, but there is no such thing as Nothing with respect to Entity or Being, absolutely considered. We do not know what we say if we say that we think it possible in itself that there should not be Entity.

And how doth it grate upon the mind to think that Something should be from all eternity, and yet Nothing all the while be conscious of it? To illustrate this: Let us suppose that the World had a being from all eternity, and had many great changes and wonderful revolutions, and all the while Nothing knew it, there was no knowledge in the Universe of any such thing. How is it possible to bring the mind to imagine this? Yea, it is really impossible it should be that anything should exist, and Nothing know it. Then you will say, If it be so, it is because Nothing has any existence but in consciousness. No, certainly, nowhere else but either in created or uncreated consciousness.

There are passages here which foreshadow the course of German thought a hundred years later, while this next passage on "The Place of Mind" might almost have been written by a transcendentalist of Concord:

PLACE OF MIND.—Our common way of conceiving of what is Spiritual is very gross and shadowy and corporeal, with dimensions and figure, etc., though it be supposed to be very clear, so that we can see through it. If we would get a right notion of what is Spiritual, we must think of Thought, or Inclination, or Delight. How large is that thing in the Mind which they call Thought? Is Love square or round? Is the surface of Hatred rough or smooth? Is Joy an inch or a foot in diameter? These are Spiritual things, and why should we then form such a ridiculous idea of Spirits as to think them so long, so thick, or so wide; or to think there is a necessity of their being square, or round, or some other certain figure? Therefore Spirits cannot be *in place* in such a sense that all, within the given limits, shall be where the Spirit is, and all without such a circumscription whether he is or not; but in this sense only, that all created Spirits have clearer and more strongly impressed ideas of things in one place than in another, or can produce effects here, and not

there; and as this place alters, so Spirits move. In Spirits united to bodies, the Spirit more strongly perceives things where the body is, and can there immediately produce effects; and in this sense the soul can be said to be *in the same place* where the body is. And this law is that we call *the Union between soul and body*. So the soul may be said to be *in the brain*; because ideas, that come by the body immediately, ensue only on alterations that are made there, and the soul immediately produces effects nowhere else.

No doubt that all Finite Spirits, united to bodies or not, are thus *in place*; that is, that they perceive, or passively receive, ideas only of created things, that are in some particular place at a given time. At least, a Finite Spirit cannot thus be in all places at a given time equally. And doubtless the change of the place, where they perceive most strongly and produce effect immediately, is regular and successive; which is the motion of Spirits.

From what is said above, we learn that the seat of the Soul is *not in the Brain* any otherwise than as to its immediate operations, and the immediate operation of things on it. The Soul may also be said to be *in the Heart*, or the Affections, for its immediate operations are there also. Hence, we learn the propriety of the Scriptures calling the soul *the Heart*, when considered with respect to the Will and the Affections.

We seem to think in our heads, because most of the ideas of which our thoughts are constituted, or about which they are conversant, come by the sensories that are in the head, especially the sight and hearing, or those ideas of Reflexion that arise from hence; and partly because we feel the effects of thought and study in our head.

Seeing the Brain exists only mentally, I therefore acknowledge that I speak improperly when I say *the Soul is in the Brain only as to its operations*. For, to speak yet more strictly and abstractedly, 'tis nothing but the connection of the Soul with these and those modes of its own ideas, or those mental acts of the Deity, seeing the Brain exists only in idea. But we have got so far beyond those things for which language was chiefly contrived that, unless we use extreme caution, we cannot speak, except we speak exceedingly unintelligibly, without literally contradicting ourselves. No wonder, therefore, that the high and abstract mysteries of the Deity, the prime and most abstract of all beings, imply so many seeming contradictions.

"Indeed" [says Edwards in the same high strain of thought, but in another connection, amid these speculative meditations], "indeed, the secret lies here: that which truly is the Substance of all Bodies is the *infinitely exact and precise and perfectly stable Idea, in God's mind, together with*

*his stable Will, that the same shall gradually be communicated to us, and to other minds according to certain fixed and established Methods and Laws ; or, in somewhat different language, the infinitely exact and precise Divine Idea, together with an answerable, perfectly exact, precise, and stable Will, with respect to correspondent communications to Created Minds, and effects on these minds."*

Here, then, we have the purely Platonic doctrine of Ideas, with a modification suited to the needs of the New England theology ; and it is therefore no wonder to find Edwards citing amid these entries in his commonplace book what Dr. Cudworth, the English Platonist, says in his "Intellectual System," published in 1678, some thirty years only before Edwards wrote these pages :

"Plato, in his 'Subterranean Cave,' so famously known, and so elegantly described by him, supposes men tied with their backs toward the Light, placed at a great distance from them, so they could not turn about their heads to it neither, and therefore could see nothing but the shadows of certain substances behind them projected from it, which shadows they concluded to be the only substances and realities. And when they heard the sound made by those bodies that were betwixt the Light and them, or their reverberated echoes, they imputed them to those shadows which they saw. All this is a description of the state of those men who take the Body to be the only Real and Substantial Thing in the world, and to do all that is done in it ; and, therefore, often impute Sense, Reason, and Understanding to nothing but Blood and Brains in us."

Upon this materialistic view of the mind (that thought is a function of matter), so common of late years, Edwards says :

"It has been a question with some whether or no it was not possible with God to the other properties or powers of Matter to add that of Thought ; whether he could not, if he had pleased, have added Thinking and the power of Perception to those other properties of Solidity, Mobility, and Gravitation. The question is not here, Whether the Matter that now is, without the addition of any new primary property, could not be so contrived and modelled, so attenuated, wrought, and moved, as to produce thought ; but whether any Lump of Matter—a solid Atom, for instance—is not capable of receiving, by the Almighty Power of God, in addition to the rest of its powers, a new power of thought.

"That seems to me quite a different thing from the question, Whether Matter can think. For if Thought be in the same place where Matter is,



yet if there be no manner of communication or dependence between that and anything that is material—that is, any of that collection of properties that we call Matter; if none of those properties of Solidity, Extension, etc., wherein Materiality consists, which are Matter, or at least whereby Matter is Matter, have any manner of influence toward the exerting of thought; and if that thought be no way dependent on Solidity or Mobility, and they no way help the matter, but Thought could be as well without those properties—then Thought is not properly *in* Matter, though it be in the same place. All the properties that are properly said to be in Matter depend on the other properties of Matter, so that they cannot be without them. Thus Figure is in Matter: it depends on Solidity and Extension; and so do Motion; so doth Gravity; and Extension itself depends upon Solidity, for nothing can be solid except it be extended. These ideas have a dependence on one another; but there is no manner of connection between the ideas of Perception and Solidity, or Motion, or Gravity. Nor can there be any dependence, for the ideas in their own Nature are independent and alien one to another. And except the property of Thought be included in the properties of Matter, I think it cannot properly be said that Matter has Thought.”

Enough, you will cry, of these metaphysical reasonings of the New England Puritan—and I will give you no more of them. But take notice that they display an activity and subtlety of mind such as no American philosopher had before shown, and that they were very much in the line of intellectual effort in his day—that is, in the first half of the eighteenth century.

I wish to point out, in closing, what the practical philosophy or politico-ethical work of Puritanism was in America, and how closely Edwards coincided in time with the vanishing period of Puritanic sway. He died in 1758, just as the twenty years' contest between New and Old England was about to commence; and at that time Puritanism, having done its special work, was passing away. It had been a stern and rough nurse about the cradle of our infant nation; but the spirited child, not forsaken of Heaven—*non sine dis animosus infans*—had thriven by contact with the harsh conditions of life around him, and most of all by the useful austerity of the Puritan philosophy. In that scheme of the world the cardinal points were God and Duty; the State was a divine institution, like the Church, and its functions were to be sacredly upheld, and undertaken in the fear of God. The advantages of such a discipline to a raw people, cast upon these

shores amid the freedom-breathing but barbarizing influences of a new colony, can scarcely be over-estimated. Puritanism to such men was a girdle, not a fetter; it held them together and made them march forward in line, instead of straggling along without aim or purpose. But in time the girdle became a chain; the people began to fret under it and threw it off; and this was the very period at which Edwards and Franklin appeared. The one contended stoutly for the old faith, in all its strictness and with all its alarming penalties for sin; the other, with genial and prudent good nature, sought to introduce a milder sway, more friendly to the general development of mankind. Both were powerful forces, and had other forces more powerful behind them; but the time had come for Puritanism to withdraw from the scene, and the controversial writings of Edwards furnished the salvo of theological artillery under cover of which the army of the Puritans fell back in good order, leaving the field to Democracy and the philanthropists.

## MAN'S FREEDOM IN HIS MORAL NATURE.

BY ROWLAND G. HAZARD.

[In the July number we quoted largely from the first part of Dr. Hazard's new book on "Man a Creative First Cause." The following extracts are from the second part and the notes of the same work, under the general title of "Man in the Sphere of his own Moral Nature a Supreme Creative First Cause."—Ed.]

### *[A Cognitive Sense includes a Moral Sense.]*

The phenomena of the external are brought within range of our immediate mental perceptions by means of the external organs of sense. For the internal cognitive spontaneity, the main, if not the only, immediate instrumentalities seem to be the attributes (senses?) of memory and association, singly and in combination; but its genesis is often, perhaps always, by suggestion from the bodily organs, through the senses or the appetites, which much resemble and are closely allied to the senses. The sound of a cannon may call up our knowledge of the battle of Waterloo. The continual flow of ideas through the mind, singly or in trains or

groups, is to it an exhaustless source of knowledge. If the mind ever became wholly inactive and oblivious, it could only be aroused and rescued from annihilation by some extrinsic agency. Our spontaneous cognitions of external objects and contemporaneous changes may be presented by the bodily organs of sense in any possible order or combination, and the internal phenomena may come into notice in a like manner, though in the latter the combinations and the order of succession seem to be more subordinated to the associations of experience.

The cognitive sense seems then to be, as it were, the common terminus of the arrangement, organism, or means by which both objective and subjective phenomena are immediately presented to the mind. These presentations become the subjects of our judgments, which may also be with or without preliminary effort: *e. g.*, we perceive at once the difference in the size of a pea and an orange, but do not thus perceive the equality of the sum of the angle of a triangle to two right angles.

To illustrate these processes, suppose the four letters *f, t, i, a*, are put before me to form into a word. It may so happen that I will see them at first glance in the order *fiat*, and the thing is done, or I may have to proceed tentatively through few or many of the combinations which the letters admit of. So, too, the internal may accidentally come into view in such order that some new relation is immediately apparent and seems like a sudden flash illuminating the mind from without, without any agency of its own.

We distinguish the various perceptions of the one cognitive sense, first as objective and subjective, and then classify the former as senses of seeing, hearing, etc.; and, in regard to the latter, we speak of the sense of beauty, of order, of justice, honor, shame, etc. When the subject of these cognitions, and of the judgments upon them, spontaneous or otherwise, is that of moral right and wrong, they constitute the genetic elements of the *moral sense*. But the mere perception or judgment as to right and wrong has of itself no more effect upon the sensibilities than the cognition that twice five are ten has. It is not till we regard it as practically applied in action that it produces any emotion. Such action in others, when it is right, elicits our approval or admiration, and, when wrong, our censure or indignation; and in ourselves the triumph of the right inspires us with the pleasurable and elevating emotion of victory, while the yielding to the temptation to wrong brings with the painful feelings of debility self-debasement and dishonor. It is in these emotions of glory and of shame thus excited that we find the manifestation or development of conscience, which is properly the *moral sense*, to the sensations of which the cognition of right and wrong is only a prerequisite. Nor is it

material to the quality of our action whether these cognitions are true or false, for the moral virtue of our action all lies in our conforming them to our *convictions* of duty; and hence, though false convictions may ~~cause~~ our actions to be unwise, they do not affect their morality.

[*The Poetic and the Prosaic Mode of discovering and expounding Truth.*]

For the acquisition of knowledge by effort, mind has two distinct modes—observation and reflection. By the former we note the phenomena which are cognized by the senses, and by the latter we trace out the relations among the ideas—the knowledge—we already have in store, and thus obtain new perceptions, new ideas. A large portion of our perceptions, however acquired, are primarily but imagery of the mind—pictures, as it were, of what we have perceived or imagined. In this form we will, for convenience, designate them as *primitive perceptions* or *ideals*. By these terms I especially seek to distinguish these perceptions from those which we have associated with words or other signs or representatives of things and ideas.

There is a somewhat prevalent notion that we can think only in words; but it is obvious that we can cognize things for which we have no name, and can also perceive their relations before we have found any words to describe them; and, in fact, such knowledge or perception generally precedes our attempts to describe them.

These primitive perceptions, or *ideals*, are thus independent of the words which we use to represent them, and to which they may have a separate and prior existence. Even when in a strictly logical verbal process we reach a result in words, it is not fully available till, by a reflex action, we get a mental perception of that which those words signify or stand in place of.

Much of our acquired knowledge is of the relations in and between our primitive perceptions.

In the pursuit of truth by reflective effort we have two modes. In the first place we may, through our immediate primitive perceptions of things which are present, or the mental imagery of things remembered, directly note the existing relations among them or their parts without the use of words in the process; or we may substitute words as signs or definitions of these primitive perceptions, and then investigate the relations among the words so substituted.

In the difference of these two modes we find the fundamental distinction between poetry and prose, the former being the *ideal* or poetic, and the latter the logical or prosaic, method. The poet uses words to present his thoughts, but his charm lies in so using them that the primitive



perceptions—the imagery of his mind—shall be so transferred and pictured in that of the recipient as to absorb his attention to the exclusion of the verbal medium. We see the painting without thinking of the pigments and the shading by which it is impressed upon us. Every reader may experimentally test this distinction.

If it is well founded, he will find that when any portion of a poem, instead of thus picturing the thought on his mind, requires him to get at it by means of the *relations of the terms* in which it is presented, there is a cessation or revulsion of all poetic emotion.

The material universe, which, upon either the ideal or materialistic hypothesis, is the thought and imagery of the mind of God directly impressed on our minds, is the perfect, and perhaps the only perfect, type of the poetic mode.

Poetry, thus depending on this prominence of the primitive perceptions, is the nearest possible approach which language can make to the reality which it represents. Assuming that simple observation is common to both, these two modes of investigation—the one carried on by means of a direct examination of the realities themselves, or mental images of them, the other by means of words or other signs substituted for them—also present the fundamental and most important, if not the only, distinction in our methods of philosophic research and discovery.

[*In the Will, a Persistent Effort to actualize its Ideals is the Consummation of Freedom.*]

It follows from these positions that, as regards the moral nature, there can be no failure except the failure to will, or to make the proper effort. The human mind, with its want, knowledge, and faculty of effort, having the power within and from itself to form its creative preconceptions, and to will their actual realization independently of any other cause or power, up to the *point of willing*, is, in its own sphere, an independent creative first cause. Exterior to itself it may not have the power to execute what it wills, it may be frustrated by other external forces, and hence, in the *external*, the ideal incipient creation may not be consummated by finite effort. But as in our *moral nature* the willing, the persevering effort is itself the consummation, there can in it be no such failure; and the mind in it is therefore not only a creative, but a SUPREME CREATIVE FIRST CAUSE.

We have, then, between effort in the sphere of the moral nature and in that sphere which is external to it this marked difference: that while in the external there must be something beyond the effort—*i. e.*, there must be that subsequent change which is the object of the effort before the

creation is consummated—in the sphere of the moral nature the effort for the time being is itself the consummation, and thus, if by repetition, ideal or actual, made *habitual*, becomes a permanent constituent of the character which through habitual *action* will be obvious to others; will be a *permanent palpable* creation.

In his internal sphere, then, man has, to the fullest extent, the powers in which he is so deficient in the external. In it he can make his incipient creations palpable and permanent constituents of his own moral character.

In this permanent incorporation of them with his moral nature, habit has a very important agency. This may be cultivated and its efficiency increased by intelligent attention, and through it the ideals, the scenic representations which are continually being acted in the theatre within us, may be made available in advance of actual experience, for which, as already suggested, they serve as a substitute, and with some decided advantages in their favor.

In the *sphere of its own moral nature*, then, whatever the finite mind really wills is as immediately and as certainly executed as is the will of Omnipotence in its sphere of action, for the willing in such case is itself the final accomplishment, the terminal effect, of the creative effort.

We must here be careful to distinguish between that mere abstract judgment, or knowledge, of what is *desirable* in our moral nature, and the want and the effort to attain it. A man may know that it is best for him to be pure and noble, and yet, in view of some expected or habitual gratification, not only not want to be *now* pure and noble, but be absolutely opposed to being made so, even if some external power could and would effect it for him. We may, however, remark that, as the moral quality of the action lies wholly in the will, and no other being can will for him, to be morally good without his own effort is an impossibility; all that any other being can do for him in this respect is to increase his knowledge and excite his wants, and thus induce him to put forth his own efforts. Even Omnipotence can do no more than this, for making a man virtuous without his own voluntary co-operation involves a contradiction. The increase of virtuous efforts indicates an improvement in the character of the cultivated wants and an increase of the knowledge by which right action is incited and directed. The influence of such knowledge and wants, becoming persistent and fixed by habit, forms, as it were, the substance of virtuous character.

In the sphere of the internal as well as in the external, the last we know of our agency in producing change is our effort. But in our moral nature the effort is itself the consummation. The effort of a man to be pure and noble is actually being pure and noble. The virtue in the time

of that effort all lies in or in and within the effort, and not in its *success or failure*. It is for the time being just as perfect if no external or no permanent results follow the effort. If the good efforts are transitory, the moral goodness will be equally so, and may be as mere flashes of light upon the gloom of a settled moral depravity.

Nor does the nature of the actual resulting effect make any difference to the moral quality of the effort. A man's intentions may be most virtuous, and yet the actual consequences of his efforts be most pernicious. On the other hand, a man may be as selfish in doing acts in themselves beneficent—may do good to others with as narrow calculations of personal benefit—as in doing those acts which he knows will be most injurious to his fellow-men; and doing such good for selfish ends manifests no virtue, whether that end be making money or reaching heaven, and brings with it neither the self-approval nor the elevating influences of generous self-forgetting or self-sacrificing action.

A man who is honest only because it is the more gainful would be dishonest if the gains thereby were sufficiently increased. Such honesty may indicate that he is intelligent and discreet, but virtue is not reached till he acts not from sordid and selfish calculations, but from a sense of right and duty. And it is not consummated and established in him till he feels the wrong doing as a wound, leaving a blemish on the beauty and a stain on the purity of the moral character, the preservation and improvement of which have become his high absorbing interest, and its construction and ideal contemplation of which he has come to appreciate and to value above all other possessions and all possible acquisitions.

The consequences of a volition may prove that it was unwise, but can not affect its moral status. If at the time of the effort one neither did nor omitted to do anything in violation of his own perceptions or sense of duty, he did no moral wrong, and any subsequent consequences can not change the moral nature of the past action. No blame or wrong can be imputed to one who did the best he knew.

*[Man's Supremacy in the Domain of his own Moral Nature indicates it as his Especial Sphere of Action.]*

We have now endeavored to show that the only efficient cause of which we have any real knowledge is mind in action, and that there can not be any unintelligent cause whatever.

That every being endowed with knowledge, feeling, and volition is, in virtue of these attributes, a self-active independent power, and in a sphere which is commensurate with its knowledge a creative first cause therein, freely exerting its powers to modify the future and make it dif-

ferent from what it otherwise would be; and that the future is always the composite result of the action of all such intelligent creative beings.

That in this process of creating the future every such conative being, from the highest to the lowest, acts with equal and perfect freedom, though each one—by its power to change the conditions to be acted upon, or, rather, by such change of the conditions, or otherwise, to change the *knowledge* of all others—may influence the free action of any or all of them, and thus cause such free action of others to be different from what but for his own action it would have been.

That every such being has *innately* the ability to will, *i. e.*, make effort which is self-acting; and also the knowledge that by effort it can put in action the powers by which it produces changes within or without itself.

That the only conceivable inducement or *motive* of such being to effort is a desire—a want—to modify the future for the gratification of which it directs its effort, by means of its knowledge.

That when such being so directs its effort by means of its *innate* knowledge, it is what is called an *instinctive* effort, but is still a self-directed and, consequently, a *free* effort.

That when the mode or plan of action is devised by itself, by its own preliminary effort, it is a *rational* action.

That when, instead of devising a plan for the occasion, we through memory adopt one which we have previously formed, we have the distinguishing characteristic of *habitual* action.

In the instinctive and habitual we act promptly from a plan ready formed in the mind, requiring no premeditation as to the mode or plan of action.

But in all cases our effort is incited by our want, and directed by means of our knowledge to the desired end, which, whatever the particular exciting want, is always to in some way affect the future. In our efforts to do this in the sphere external to us, which is the common arena of all intelligent activity, we are liable to be more or less counteracted or frustrated by the efforts of others. In it man is a co-worker with God and with all other conative beings, and in it can influence the actual flow of events only in a degree somewhat proportioned to his limited power and knowledge.

But that in the sphere of man's own moral nature the effort is itself the consummation of his creative conceptions, and hence in this sphere man is a *supreme* creative first cause limited in the effects he may thus produce only by that *limit* of his knowledge by which his creative pre-conceptions are circumscribed.

And further, that as a man directs his act by means of his knowledge, and can morally err only by *knowingly willing* what is wrong, his knowl-



edge as to this is infallible, and as his *willing* is his own free act, an act which no other being or power can do for him, he is in the sphere of his moral nature a sole creative cause, solely responsible for his action in it.

[*The Materialistic Hypothesis not sufficient to account for the Genesis of Action or Change.*]

The advocates of materialistic causation in the outset, as might have been anticipated, encounter serious difficulty as to the genesis of action or change. For the inauguration of change, a self-active power, or cause, is essential. We do not differ materially as to the problem presented for solution. Bain, one of the most able and thorough exponents of the materialistic doctrine, says: "*The link between action and feeling for the end of promoting the pleasure of exercise is the precise link that must exist from the commencement; the pleasure results from the movement, and responds by sustaining and increasing it. The delight thus feeds itself.*" ("The Emotions and the Will," chap. ii, p. 315.) Passing over some of the many assumptions of this statement, I would inquire how began, or whence came, this "*commencement*" of this "*movement*," from which *results the pleasure of exercise which responds by sustaining and increasing it, and thus feeds itself?* In the same paragraph, in connection with such muscular exercise, he speaks of "*spontaneous movements being commenced*," and after it says, "We must suppose the rise of an *accidental movement*," and again of "*the random tentatives arising through spontaneity.*" From all this the legitimate inference seems to be that he regards these movements as commencing without any cause or reason whatever. The materialistic theory could reach no farther than this, and here stops far short of the generalization by which I have identified these genetic instinctive movements with our subsequent voluntary, rational actions, with no generic difference in the actions themselves, but only distinguished by the different manner in which we become possessed of the knowledge by means of which we direct our efforts to produce such movements.

The advocates of material causation rely much upon physiology to support their views, and think they find empirical confirmation of them in the phenomena of the nervous system—its material structure of brain, spinal column, ganglions, and nerve-centres, with its connecting and permeating nerve-fibres, with nerve currents, similar to the electric, flowing through them. This is a very interesting and a very useful branch of physiological research, but I fail to see its bearing upon the question as to what is the efficient cause, and what its nature and properties.

Suppose a man is looking at the machinery in a mill, the propelling

power of which is, as is common, in a separate room. The observer, in tracing the source of motion, finds first the main shaft or axis coming through the division wall which limits his sight, and upon it a very large main or driving wheel, or pulley. This main shaft extending through a large portion of the room and having upon it other lesser pulleys, from which other motion is communicated by belts to other shafts on either side, and from these, and in some cases directly from the main shaft, the motion is communicated by smaller belts to the various machines, and in some of these by small cords to each portion of them. In this arrangement, with its large driving wheel at the head of the main shaft with other pulleys on the same, with the belts leading from them and putting other shafts on each side in motion, and the smaller belts and cords giving motion to each separate machine, and finally, in some, to each minute individual part—each particular spindle—we have an apparatus very analogous to that of the brain, spinal axis, ganglia, or nervous centres, and connecting and permeating fibres of the nervous system; but no one, by any examination of the phenomena, would, in this application and distribution of the power to the machinery, learn anything as to the *nature* or kind of power in the adjoining room. He could only learn what it could *do*. He could not even tell whether it was a steam-engine or a water-wheel. In view of the results of physical science, its votaries would not hesitate to assert that, be it what it may, the *solar heat* is one of the intermediate agencies of its efficacy, and, if my views are correct, it is at least equally certain that in regard to both the mill and the nervous system the genesis of the power is *intelligence in action*.

Many of Bain's statements as to the spinal axis, the ganglia, the nerves with their nerve-currents and counter-currents passing to and fro in the transmission and distribution of power, would require very little change in the phraseology to make them pertinent to the shafts, pulleys, and belts which constitute the motor apparatus of the mill.

He says: "When the mind is in exercise of its functions, the physical accompaniment is the passing and repassing of innumerable streams of nervous influence;" and, as an inference from this, says: "*It seems as if we might say, no currents, no mind.*" ("The Senses and the Intellect," 2d edition, p. 66.)

So, too, when the steam-engine, or other motive power, of the mill is performing its functions, there is a constant passing and repassing of the belts through which its power or influence is distributed and communicated to the machinery; but the logical inference in both cases seems to be, not that in the absence of these movements there would be no power or cause, but simply that when there is no *action of the power or cause*

*there is no effect.* If the apparatus ceased to move, we could not thence conclude that the *unseen power* had ceased to exist. It might be merely detached, and, with undiminished vigor, still be performing its functions, and even with its activity increased, by being rid of the attachments which had encumbered and retarded it.

The conclusion of Bain assumes that the "passing and repassing"—the movement—is itself the genetic cause to which there is no antecedent cause. He thus consistently puts it in the same category with those "accidental movements" and "random tentatives" of which he has before spoken.

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## NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

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### BERTRANDO SPAVENTA.

[The following interesting account of the Italian philosopher is translated from the columns of the "*Corriere Calabrese*," of March 2, 1883, by Miss Virginia Champlin for this journal.—ED.]

Bertrando Spaventa, whose loss we are now deploring, was born of parents in moderate circumstances, in 1817, in Bomba, a small town in Abruzzo Chietino. His early education was acquired in the seminary of Chieti, where he soon displayed great intelligence, and where, when quite young, he became a professor of mathematics and philosophy. He then went to teach in the convent of Montecasino, and, after a year or so, went to the Cava dei Tirreni, where he taught a long while in the college of the Benedictine monks. With his brother Silvio he joined those who worked for the political restoration of Italy, and, when they dispersed after the deeds of '48, he removed to Turin, where he lived until 1860, teaching philosophy. In this year he was made Professor of Philosophy in the University of Bologna, where he remained one year, and since 1862 he has taught theoretical philosophy in the University of Naples.

Having an eminently comprehensive intellect, he soon saw that a profound study of philosophy is impossible without a study of the history of philosophy, and, in order to be able to understand the greatest philosophers in their own idiom, he mastered not only Greek, but modern literatures—French, English, and especially German. Together with his brother

Silvio, who was also endowed with a great philosophical mind, he was enabled, before 1847, to make a long and serious study in Naples of German philosophy, and soon became aware that an extraordinary genius had appeared in Germany in the beginning of this century—one of those geniuses who, like Plato and Aristotle, are seen at long intervals of centuries. We refer to Hegel, who—through having systematized and simplified all branches of knowledge, through having understood by his own thought that of the greatest philosophers prior to him, showing them to be like planets more or less elevated, with an especial evidence of positive thought—had given the most concrete manifestation of philosophic thought and the most inclined to reality and the system of things. Thus Spaventa became a follower of Hegel, and remained such to the last moments of his life.

Although wholly devoted to Hegel, he did not neglect the study of Italian philosophers, those in the time of the restoration as well as his contemporaries, Galuppi, Rosmini, and Gioberti, and he expended a great part of his activity in demonstrating that the Italian philosophy of the Restoration, which was believed to be extinguished on the funeral pyres of our inquirers, changed place and was continued under a freer heaven in the history of German philosophy, and that Giordano Bruno, Giulio Vanini, Tommaso Campanella, Giambattista Vico were the precursors of Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. This was the scope of his studies of Italian philosophy in the sixteenth century, his essays upon Bruno and Campanella, his preludes made in Bologna and Naples, the introduction to the lessons of philosophy, his studies on Kant and the philosophy of Hegel, on the philosophy of Mamiani, and many other essays published from the years 1850 to 1860 in different reviews in Turin. Thus, by expounding the doctrines of our greatest men and comparing them with the German doctrines, he recovered the thread of our philosophic tradition in the sixteenth century, and, rather than outwardly accept the importation of German philosophy, he proposed to recover the tradition lost for a while with us, keeping informed of philosophic progress in other countries. Continuing his studies upon Vico, Galuppi, Rosmini, and Gioberti, he saw in the first the precursor of transcendental psychology, and therefore the founder of the philosophy of history and criticism, or transcendental anthropology; he saw in Galuppi the duality of the Ego and non-Ego, like an immediate perception, a unity distinct in itself which is knowledge, and from it, from its synthetical unity, originally came the ideas, categories, and synthetical judgments *a priori*. In Rosmini he saw transcendental knowledge as an original synthetical unity, and the indeterminate being as the most abstract thought and



first possibility of all categories. In Gioberti he saw intuition as the infinite power of knowledge, and hence the unity of the spirit.

Spaventa, however, did not wish to maintain that the contemporary Italian philosophical movement was identical with the German, but only showed a few points of resemblance and noted the great difference between them, concluding that the true historical progress was lacking in Italy, its thought leaping forward irregularly rather than gradually and logically; and, while German thought is critical and conscious of self, the Italian is dogmatic. This he maintained in his first volume on the philosophy of Gioberti, published in 1863, and in the other essays on Vico, on Galuppi, and Rosmini.

Besides this, another argument which kept his mind active for many years was the problem of knowledge. *We know everything*, but is that which we know true, or is it merely a suggestive representation, an illusion or hallucination? As will be seen, it is the most formidable and at the same time the most fundamental problem of science; it is even the problem of science itself, and on its solving or non-solving depends whether science shall be or not be. This problem, and the way in which it has been put and solved by all philosophers in all times, and the way in which contemporary psychologists put and solve it, with the criticism which Spaventa made upon it, formed, if we may so express it, his field of battle.

Besides other writings which we have mentioned, and another book entitled "Principles of Philosophy," published in 1867, in which are expounded the theory of knowledge and the first part of logic, the doctrine of being, and other memorials published by the Royal Academy of Naples, Bertrando Spaventa left no other books, but, judging by his always active, stirring mind, we are led to suppose that he was ready to publish other works of great value. We believe that his brother Silvio will publish the manuscripts of the lamented professor, which will contribute toward giving him immortal life in the temple of science.

N. D. ALFONSO.

SANTA SEVERINA DI CALABRIA, *February 25, 1883*

### SELECTIONS IN PROSE AND VERSE.

BY WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING.

[From the *Gulshan I Raz*, the Mystic Rose-Garden of Sa' d ud-din Mahmud Shabistari, born, in the year 1250, near Tabriz.]

When Absolute Being has to be indicated,  
Men use the word "I" to express it.

Behold! how this drop of water from that sea  
Has associated so many names and forms!  
Mist, cloud, rain, dew, clay,  
Plant and animal, and perfect man.

Hear of me a discourse without "more" or "less";  
It is by nearness that you become far from yourself.  
A Being is manifested in Not-being;  
There is no obstacle in your way but yourself.  
But reflect well on your own illusory existence;  
While you are cloaked in this self of yours,  
The world is always as a veil before your eyes;  
Thence you say, like Satan, "Who is like unto me?"  
Thence you say, "I myself have free Will."  
All these lies and deceptions come from illusive existence.  
How, O foolish man! can free Will appertain  
To a person whose essence is nothingness?  
Seeing that your being is one with not-being,  
Say, whence comes this free Will of yours?  
A man, whose real existence is not of himself,  
Is neither good nor evil in his own essence.  
Whom have you seen, in the whole world,  
Who ever once acquired pleasure without pain—  
Who, in fine, ever attained all his desires,  
Who continued ever at his pitch of perfection?  
Every man, whose faith is other than predestination,  
Is, according to the Prophet, even as a Gueber. . . .  
The attribution of actions, to *us*, is imaginary;  
The attribution itself is but a play and a farce.  
*You* existed not when your actions were originated;  
You were appointed to fulfil a certain purpose—  
In *existence*, there is none who works but God.

How came it, O foolish soul! that from eternity  
This man was to be Muhammad and that Abu Jahl?  
It becomes Him to ask how and why;  
Causation is inapplicable to works of God;  
The honor of Man lies in his being under compulsion  
Not in having a share in free Will.  
Man has nothing whatever of himself,  
Yet God asks him concerning good and evil.  
By the uncaused sovereign will of the Truth,<sup>1</sup>  
By his foreknowledge giving absolute command,  
There was predestined, before soul and body were,  
For every man his appointed work.  
One was obedient for 700,000 years,  
Yet afterward bore the collar of curses on his neck.

<sup>1</sup> This Truth equals God, in western phrase.

Another, after his transgression, beheld the pure light;  
 When he repented he obtained the name "chosen";  
 And, more marvellous still, it was by Satan's disobedience  
 That Adam received mercy and pardon from the Truth,  
 Whilst thro' Adam's sin Satan was cursed.

*O wondrous actions of Thine, without how or why!*

Man has no free Will, but is under compulsion.

Ah, poor creature! *seeming* to be free and a slave.

This is no injustice, but true foreknowledge and justice—

This is no opposition, but pure mercy and grace.

He has imprest on you, the law for this cause,

That he has imparted to you of his essence.

Since you are impotent in the hands of the truth,

Abandon and forsake this Self of yours.

In "the All," you will obtain deliverance from Self;

In "Truth," you will become rich, O Durvesh!

Go, O soul of your Father! yield yourself to God's will,

Resign your Self to the divine *forccordinance*!

What is that sea whose shore is speech,

What is that pearl which is found in its depths?

Being is the sea, speech is the shore;

The shells are letters; the pearls knowledge of the heart.

Every moment a thousand waves rise out of it,

Yet it never becomes less by one drop,

For every object which you see, of necessity,

Contains two worlds—form and reality.

The union of the first is true separation;

The other is what endures forever, in Allah.

And what is pure wine? It is purification from self!

*O happy moment! when we shall quit our Selves.*

Without faith or reason, or piety or perception,

Bowed down in the dust, drunken and beside ourselves.

How are eternal and temporal separate?

The one is the world, and the other God.

The whole world is merely an *imaginary* thing;

It is like one point whirled in a circle.

Know the world is a mirror, from head to foot;

In every atom are a hundred blazing suns.

If you cleave the heart of one drop of water,

A hundred pure oceans emerge from it;

If you examine closely each grain of dust,

A thousand Adams may be seen in it.

In its members, a gnat is like an elephant;

In its qualities, a drop of water like the Nile!

The heart of a barleycorn equals a hundred harvests.

In the wing of a gnat is the ocean of life—

In the pupil of the eye is heaven.

Together are gathered, in the point of the present,  
 All cycles and seasons—day, month, and year.  
 World without beginning is world without end.  
 The mission of Jesus falls with the creation of Adam.  
 Each is ever being clothed and unclothed upon,  
 Each is always in motion, yet ever at rest,  
 Never beginning and never ending;  
 All the parts of the world are like plants:  
 They are single drops of the ocean of life.  
 When a wave strikes it the world vanishes away.

If the sun tarried always in one position,  
 And if his shining were all after one manner,  
 None would know that these beams are from him.  
 Men of externals have ophthalmia in both eyes,—  
 Thinking,—is passing from the false to the true,  
 And seeing the Absolute Whole in the past.  
 When a conception is formed in the mind,  
 It is, first of all, named Reminiscence.  
 Mystery cannot be compact into letters,  
 The Red Sea is not contained in a jug. . . .  
 I take no reproach to myself for my poor poetry,  
 For no poet like Attar is born in a hundred centuries.  
 But all this have I written of my experience,  
 And not plagiarized, as a demon, from angels.  
 The master of ecstasy alone knows what is ecstasy.  
 Abstraction is a condition of good thinking;  
 It will not be closed by force of logic.  
 Moreover, unless divine guidance aids it,  
 Verily logic is a mere bondage to forms.  
 Like Moses for a season, cast away that staff,  
 Come for a season into the "Valley of Peace."  
 Hear with faith the call, "Verily, I am God."  
 Forasmuch as the philosopher is bewildered,  
 He sees in things nothing but the contingent—  
 From the contingent he seeks to prove the necessary;  
 While his reason goes deep into phenomenal existence,  
 His feet are caught in the chain of proofs.  
 All *things* are manifested thro' their likes,  
 But the Truth has neither rival nor like.  
 A man who relies on far-sighted reason  
 Has much bewilderment before him.  
 The Divine Essence is freed from where, how, and why.  
 Thinking on the essence of the Truth is vain—  
 His essence is not manifested thro' His works,  
 The whole universe is exposed to view by His light.  
 But how is He, exposed to view, in the universe?  
 In that place where God's light is our guide,



What room is there for the message of Gabriel?  
 Like as his light burns up the Angelo,  
 So it burns up reason from head to foot.  
 What connection has the dust with the pure world?  
 Its perception is impotence to perceive perception.  
 What shall I say? since this saying is fine,  
 "A light night that shineth in a dark day."  
 Not-being is the mirror of Absolute Being;  
 Therein is reflected the shining of the Truth.  
 That Unity is exposed to view in this Plurality—  
 Like as when you count one it becomes many.  
 Tho' all numbers have one for their starting-point,  
 Nevertheless, you never come to the end of them.  
 Not-being is the mirror—the world the reflection, and man  
 Is as the reflected eye of the Unseen Person.  
 You are that reflected eye, and He the light of the eye;  
 In that eye His eye sees His own eye.  
 The world is a man, and man is a world.  
 What if the corn-grain of the heart be small,  
 It is a station for the Lord of both worlds to dwell therein.  
 From every point of this concatenated circle  
 A thousand forms are drawn;  
 Every point as it revolves in a circle  
 Is now a circle, now a circling circumference—  
 Phenomenal bondage holding each one in despair,  
 Each is in despair at its particularization from the Whole.

What is the next world, and what is this world?  
 Say, what is Siwurg, and what mount Kaf?  
 You are asleep, and this vision of yours is a dream;  
 All that you see thereby is an illusion—  
 The world is yours, and yet you remain indigent!  
*Rest not in bondage, in the prisons of nature!*  
 Come forth, and behold the divine handiwork.  
 The moon passes thro' eight-and-twenty mansions,  
 And next she returns opposite to the sun;  
 Then she becomes like to a crooked palm-branch.  
 The stars—who are of the people of perfection,  
 Wherefore, are they always undergoing the defect of setting?  
 Wherefore again is the heart of Heaven fretted with fire?  
 What does it desire, that it is always in a whirl?

What meaning attaches to wine, torch, and beauty?  
 What is assumed in being a haunter of taverns?  
 Wine, torch, and beauty are epiphanies of Verity.  
 Drink wine that it may set you free from yourself,  
 Drink wine, and rid yourself of coldness of heart,  
 For a drunkard is better than the Self-righteous.

The whole universe is as his wine-house,  
 The heart of every atom as his wine-cup.  
 Reason is drunken, angels drunken, soul drunken !  
 I and you are higher than body or soul.  
 Straightway lift yourself above time and space—  
 Quit the world, and be yourself a world for yourself.  
 The prophet as a sun, the saint as a moon,  
 Is set over against him, in that point, "I am with God."  
 He is a perfect man who in all perfection  
 Does the work of a slave, in spite of his "lordliness."  
 He finds eternal life after dying to self,  
 He makes the law his upper garment.  
 He comprehends both infidelity and faith,  
 Overshadowed beneath the canopy of Divine Epiphanies !  
 Until you utterly gamble away yourself,  
 How can your prayer be true prayer ?  
 It is not strange that the motes of dust have hope,  
 And desire for the sun's light and heat. . . .  
 He that is born blind believes not what you say of colors.  
 Reason cannot see the state of the world to come.  
 Your self is a copy made in the image of God ;  
 Seek in yourself all that you desire to know.  
 You say the word "I," in every connection,  
 Indicates the reasonable soul of man ;  
 Go, O master ! and know well your "self,"  
 For fatness does not resemble an empty tumor. . . .  
 By the imaginary line of the *I* of the "*He*"  
 Are produced two eyes at the time he looks forth.

Know now how the perfect man is produced  
 From the time he is first engendered.  
 He is produced at first as inanimate matter ;  
 Next, by the added spirit, he is made sentient,  
 And accepts the motive powers from the Almighty ;  
 Next, he is made lord of will by "the truth" ;  
 The knower is he that knows Very Being,  
 He that witnesses Absolute Being.  
 And being such as his own, he gambles clean away.  
 Your being is nought but thorns and weeds ;  
 Cast it all clean away from you.  
 Go, sweep out the chamber of your heart ;  
 Make it ready to be the dwelling-place of the Beloved.  
 When you have carded "self" as cotton,  
 Take out the cotton of your illusion from your ears,  
 Harken to the call of the *One*, the *Almighty*.  
 Why are you tarrying for the last day ?  
 Come into "the Valley of Peace," for, straightway,  
 The bush will say to you, "Verily, I am Allah."

Every man whose heart is free from doubt  
 Knows for a surety there is no being but One.  
 Saying "I am" belongs only to "the Truth."

Since I am limited to my own proper self,  
 I know not what is this shadow of me;  
 In fine, how can not-being be joined with being;  
 The two, light and darkness, cannot be united.  
 Like the past, the future month and year exist not;  
 What is there but this one point of the present?  
 Time is one imaginary point, and that ever passing away;  
 You have named it the fleeting river.  
 There is none other in this desert but only I—  
 Tell me, what is this echo and noise?  
 Accidents are fleeting, substance is composed of them;  
 Say, how does it exist, or where is this compound?  
 When the contingent wipes off the dust of contingency,  
 Nothing remains save Necessary Being.  
 What connection has the dust with the Lord of Lords?  
 What, then, is matter but absolute nonentity,  
 Wherein is demonstrated form?  
 Phenomenal objects are mere imaginary things—  
 The mist is raised up out of the sea,  
 Pure spirit returns to spirit, dust to dust;  
 In a moment this world passes away.  
 When the reasonable soul, as a light, enters the body,  
 There is produced a fair and brilliant form.  
 While you are cloaked in this self of yours,  
 The world is always as a veil before your eyes.  
 O soul of my brother! hearken to my counsel!  
 With heart and thought strive for the knowledge of the faith;  
 If you desire the angel, cast out the dog;  
 Go, cleanse the face of the tablets of thy heart,  
 That an angel may make his abode with you.  
 All the virtues lie in the mean,  
 Which is alike removed from excess and defect;  
 The mean is as the narrow way:  
 On either side yawns Hell's bottomless pit.  
 The knotted girdle is the emblem of obedience;  
 With the horse of knowledge, and the bat of obedience,  
 Bear off from the field the ball of good fortune.  
 Your Self is a copy made in the image of God;  
 Seek in your Self all that you desire to find.  
 The principles of a good character are equity;  
 And, thereafter, wisdom, temperance, and courage.  
 Beneath each number is hidden a mystery;  
 For this cause has hell *seven* gates.  
 The world is the dowry given to man by the Universal Soul

What is this beauty, in the charm of a fair face?  
It is not merely earthly beauty. Say, what is it?

Of everything in the world, above and below,  
An exemplar is set forth in your soul and body!  
Like you, the world is a specific person;  
You are to it a soul, and it is a body to you. . .  
Your body is as earth, your soul is as heaven,  
Your senses as stars, your mind as the sun,  
Your bones are as the mountains, for they are hard,  
Your hair as plants, and your limbs as trees.  
Contingency is creation born again, in a new creation,  
Tho' the duration of its life seems long.  
Whatever action once proceeds from you,  
If you repeat it several times you become master of it.  
All man's ingrained actions and sayings  
Will be made manifest at the last day.  
Everything in its own truth is beautiful.  
How can the mysteries beheld in ecstatic vision  
Be interpreted by spoken words?  
When mystics treat of these mysteries,  
They interpret them by types,  
For objects of sense are as shadows of that world—  
*The wise man has regard to analogy.*  
Ask not of me the story of the knotted curl;  
It is a chain leading mad lovers captive.  
I know not if His mole is the reflection of my heart.  
I have looked and seen the origin of everything.  
Knowledge is as a father, practice as a mother. . . .  
If you consort with the base, you become an animal;  
All men have fallen on evil days,  
The whole condition of the world is upset.  
Did ever one learn knowledge from the dead?  
Was ever the lamp lighted from ashes?  
If you strive to be a true nature, abandon form.  
In Christianity, the end I see is purification from *self*.  
Set your face toward the Truth, forsake relations.  
From gold and woman comes naught save store of pain;  
Abandon them, as Jesus abandoned Mary.

From that rose-garden I have plucked this posy,  
Which I have named the "mystic Rose-garden."  
Therein the tongues of the lilies are all vocal,  
The eyes of the narcissus are all far-seeing.  
Seek not with captious heart to find blemishes,  
For then the roses will turn to thorns in your eyes.  
Abandon study, to be seen and heard of men;  
Cast off the Dervish cloak, bind on the Magian girdle.  
If you are a man, give your heart to manliness.



What a minstrel is he who by one sweet melody  
 Burns up the garner of a thousand devotees !  
 That fair idol entered my door at early morn ;  
 By his look, the secret chamber of my soul was illumined.

The One (Ahad) was made manifest in the *mim*<sup>1</sup> of Ahmad.  
 In this circuit, the first emanation became the last ;  
 A single *mim* divides *Ahad* from *Ahmad* ;  
*The world is immersed in that one mim.*  
 In Adam were manifested reason and discernment,  
 Whereby he perceived the principle of all things.  
 When he beheld himself a specific person,  
 He thought within himself, "What am I ?"  
 From part to whole, he made a transit,  
 And thence returned again to the world.  
 He saw that the world is an imaginary thing,  
 Like as *one*, diffused thro' *many* numbers—  
 What am I ? tell me what "*I*" means—  
 What is the meaning of travel into yourself ?

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## BOOK NOTICES.

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A FRAGMENT ON POLITICAL EDUCATION. By GEORGE WHALE. London, 1882.  
 CONVERSATIONS ON PHILOSOPHY. By MISS HANDLEY. London, 1883.

These two little books may be taken as a sort of first fruits of the London Aristotelean Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy, of which the authors are members. Mr. Whale chiefly occupies his pages with an earnest recommendation of the study of History and Political Economy as a main part of the "closet" discipline and furniture of the citizen, "slowly learning to look at public questions without party animosity." To these he would add the practice of discussion and local government, and as much wider culture of the humanities as possible. In such training of the individual elements he finds the safeguard of the democratic organism. In his treatment of History, he rises to the philosophical conception of its continuity and organic wholeness, finding a biography for the race, which is not merely the mechanical and external combination of individual biographies. As to Political Economy, his mind is open to the fact that it is, after all, but an artificial kind of science, like heraldry, dealing with conventions and arrangements that are passing away before our eyes, yet possessing a provisional use as "preparing the way for the sociologist of the future."

Miss Handley's "First Lessons on Philosophy" offers itself as an introduction to

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<sup>1</sup> *Mim*, the forty grades of emanation, from universal reason down to man.

metaphysic and logic for beginners, and may be characterized almost in one word as a very cordial and naïve glance at Dr. Shadworth H. Hodgson's "Ideology." The treatment of the Master's doctrines by his disciples is thoroughly genial and simple, and has the distinction of great earnestness. If sometimes the zeal displayed is not entirely according to knowledge, yet, on the whole, the book may be recommended to those who only want a bird's-eye view of the Hodgsonian system, and do not look for any criticism or reconstruction. The author is content with a "metaphysic" which merely analyzes the phenomena of the empirical ego, and, while seeking affiliations in some uncertain way with Kant, repudiates the *transcendental* method. The "pure" or productive Universal Reason appears to be quite unknown to her. "The *Ego*, or subject, is only a *remote object* of consciousness, just as a house or a tree is!" Philosophy has nothing to do with "genesis" in any sense. Its problem is not the construction of Nature or experience, but simply the analysis and reconstruction of experience by individual minds. This is very much like ordinary English empirical psychology baptized into the name of metaphysic. So far as it goes, it is subtle and excellent in many ways, but it is not Philosophy, as this has been understood by Kant and his successors. J. B. G.

NATURE AND THOUGHT: AN INTRODUCTION TO A NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. By ST. GEORGE MIVART. London, 1882.

A Natural Theology would be a better title for the book, which leaves on one's mind the general impression that he has been perusing an interesting and ingenious survival of the apologies of the eighteenth century with a slight *nuance* of nineteenth-century difference, but not quite enough to remove the appearance of anachronism.

At one time the able author presents to the reader the picture of a distinguished modern man of science unhappily laboring to do marvels for ecclesiastical Christianity, or Catholic theology, in the heavy mediæval mail armor of scholastic realism, while at another, when he is reviving ante-Kantian positions and ignoring rather than meeting Kantian criticism, he cleverly assumes the *rôle* of a metaphysical Rip-van-Winkleism that has been asleep for a hundred years and more, and has only just had time since awaking to glance through a short history of modern philosophy and take a cursory view of the Darwinian and evolutionary movement in science. His attitude toward Darwinians and Agnostics is frequently that of a special pleader who, having little or no case, resorts to virtuous indignation verging on abuse. Take, for example, this little bit of the dialogue between "F"—the man of straw set up to be converted, a mild youth with a genius for making tremendous admissions and naïvely misrepresenting his own positions, who, on the eve of marriage, is in haste to find a theology befitting a husband and father—and "M," the Hotspur of church-philosophy, his guide and friend. "I have no patience with the wilful folly of such perverse sophists." "F. You seem to be quite warm on this subject!" "M. The indignation of any man who values human reason may well be excited by sophists who make use of exceptional mental gifts for the purpose of disparaging and virtually denying the assistance of that wonderful and admirable human intellect which they insult and blaspheme." "F. I thought it was rather the Darwinian belief about man about which you were indignant?" "M. And with good reason, seeing the consequences which will sooner or later inevitably flow from it, and which are as pernicious as irrational." As one consequence, truth, justice, and religion are to cease to claim the sympathy and obedience of the emancipated followers of reason (p. 175). "Consequence" is the refrain of the book, whose main feature is, perhaps, that it aims much more at edification than at

enlightenment—a characteristic which finds its explanation in the fact that Mr. Mivart has been deeply impressed by reading Mr. Balfour's "Defence of Philosophic Doubt," and similar recent works, with concern for the chaos of opinion and speculation in England, and is bent on resolving the discords and leading the way to satisfaction, rest, and *resolute activity*. This ardor for resolution is rather alarming. We see the Church, in the person of her champion, falling back and intrenching herself in what positions remain tenable, and yet, evidently, only retiring the better to spring forward again, as may be seen in the author's delicately insinuated approval of asceticism and recommendation of strenuous and absorbing worship and service of a preter-human object, which would either be an inhuman distraction and interruption, or simply a wrongly named concentration by wrong methods on an ideal of humanity, to be better served by a harmonious infinity of detailed acts of brotherliness and human loving kindness, and by the social organized pursuit of every natural perfection of man, in which the religion of the body will have a just place.

J. B.-G.

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### BOOKS RECEIVED.

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The Faith of Immortality. A Discourse delivered by Rev. J. C. Learned, at the Church of the Unity, St. Louis, March 4, 1883. St. Louis: Nixon-Jones Printing Co. 1883.

Ethics and Sociology. Inaugural Lecture delivered at Oxford, December 7, 1882, by William Wallace, M. A., LL. D.

The Journal of Christian Philosophy for January. Vol. II, No. 2. Contents: I. The Arguments for the Being of God, by Prof. George P. Fisher; II. Christianity and Social Science, by Washington Gladden; III. Revelation, by Prof. George T. Ladd; IV. The Incarnation and Modern Thought, by A. J. F. Behrends; V. Mind and Matter, Their Immediate Relation, by Pres. John Bascom; VI. The Spiritual Life, a Fact and a Testimony, by Giles H. Mandeville; VII. Proceedings of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy. New York: Published by the Editor, No. 4 Winthrop Place.

Science. Vol. I, Nos. 4 and 5. Published by Moses King, Cambridge, Mass.

Ueber die Genesis der Menschheit und deren Geistige Entwicklung in Religion, Sittlichkeit und Sprache, von J. Frohschammer. Muenchen, 1883. Adolf Ackermann.

Why did the Pilgrim Fathers come to New England? By Edwin D. Mead. (Reprinted from the "New Englander" for November, 1882.)

Ueber die wissenschaftliche und nichtwissenschaftliche Philosophie. Eine akademische Antrittsrede. Von Dr. Alois Riehl. J. C. B. Mohr, Freiburg und Tübingen. 1883.

A Chapter in Psychological Science. By Alexander Wilder, M. D., F. A. S. (A reprint from the "Medical Tribune.") New York: Nickles Publishing Co.

Corriere Calabrese. Catanzaro, 2 Marzo, 1883. (Containing a biographical article by Prof. Nicolo D'Alfonso on the late lamented Prof. Bertrando Spaventa, of the University of Naples.)

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The Freedom of Faith. By Theodore T. Munger. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1883.

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Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle. Compiled by Edwin Wallace. Cambridge: University Press. London: C. J. Clay & Son. 1883.

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. A Critical Exposition. By George S. Morris, Ph. D. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co. 1882.

The Principle of Continuity. Read before the Literary Section of Vassar Brothers' Institute, February 13, 1883, by John Thompson.

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God and Creation. By Robert Reid Howison. Richmond: West, Johnston & Co. 1883.

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Poems. By John Albee. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1883.

ΠΑΡΝΑΣΣΟΣ. ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑ ΠΕΡΙΟΔΙΚΟΝ. ΚΑΤΑ ΜΗΝΑ ΕΚΔΙΔΟΜΕΝΟΝ ΤΟΜΟΣ Ζ΄.—ΤΕΤΥΧΟΣ Β΄ ΚΑΙ Γ΄ ΕΝ ΑΘΗΝΑΙΣ. ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΤΥΠΟΓΡΑΦΕΙΟΥ ΠΑΡΝΑΣΣΟΥ, 1883.

L'Évolution Religieuse Contemporaine chez les Anglais, les Américains et les Hindous. Par le Comte Goblet d'Alviella, membre de la chambre des représentants de Belgique. Bruxelles: Librairie Européenne, C. Muquardt. Merzbach et Falk, éditeurs. New York: F. W. Christern. 1884.

The World as Will and Idea. By Arthur Schopenhauer. Translated from the German by R. B. Haldane, M. A., and J. Kemp, M. A. Volume I, containing four books. London: Truebner & Co., Ludgate Hill. 1883.

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An Inquiry into the Origin of Invention. A paper read before the Anthropological Society of Washington, February 20, 1883, by Franklin A. Seely, Examiner United States Patent Office, and Secretary to the Council of the Society. Washington, D. C.: Judd & Detweiler, Printers and Publishers. 1883.

Aids to Family Government; or, From the Cradle to the School according to Froebel. By Bertha Meyer. Translated from the second German edition by M. L. Holbrook, M. D. To which has been added an essay on the Rights of Children and the True Principles of Family Government, by Herbert Spencer. New York: M. L. Holbrook & Co. 1879.

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