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THE JOURNAL

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[No. 1.

DE MORGAN AS LOGICIAN.

BY GEORGE BRUCE HALSTED.

Augustus De Morgan was born, in 1806, in India, where his father was in the East India Company's service.

When sixteen years old he entered Trinity College, Cambridge, to pursue mathematics, gaining, in 1825, a Trinity scholarship, and coming out fourth wrangler in 1827. He was prevented from taking his M. A. degree, or from obtaining a Fellowship, by his conscientious objection to signing the theological tests then required at Cambridge. Jevons says: "A strong repugnance to any sectarian restraints upon the freedom of opinion was one of De Morgan's most marked characteristics throughout life."

At the age of twenty-two he became professor of mathematics in University College, London. As a teacher, De Morgan was particularly gifted. A voluminous writer on mathematics, he contributed essentially to those expansions of the fundamental conceptions which have rendered possible the new algebras, such as Quaternions and the Ausdehnungslehre, and have generalized the whole idea of a mathematical algorithm or calculus.

But it is his logical work that will give De Morgan his most lasting fame. Here he stands alongside of his immortal contem-

porary, Boole. The eternally memorable year in the history of Logic was 1847, in which George Boole issued "The Mathematical Analysis of Logic, being an Essay toward a Calculus of Deductive Reasoning," and De Morgan published his principal treatise, called "Formal Logic; or, the Calculus of Inference, Necessary and Probable."

It is much to be regretted that the great memoirs produced in 1850, 1858, 1860, 1863, by De Morgan, are so comparatively inaccessible in the "Cambridge Philosophical Transactions," for it seems impossible to adequately convey in short space their value to logicians. Certainly, his "Syllabus of a Proposed System of Logic," published in 1860, however important, cannot be taken to replace even the papers of 1850 and 1858, in which the same matters appear, and lacks altogether the charm of the memoirs.

De Morgan had met in his life an unusual amount of bad logic. His great combination of logical with mathematical learning, and his prominent position in London, the great metropolis, made him the man to whom resorted all Circle-Squarers, Angle-Trisectors, Perpetual-Motionists, etc. Adding this curious experience to his great bibliographical knowledge of what had been attempted in that way in the past, he formed a large book, called "A Budget of Paradoxes," which is one of the most interesting treatises ever written on what may be called extended fallacies.

From the broad field of his published writings it is our intention only to select, first, a few points for special mention, and then state some ideas on the general way in which he has influenced for good the world of thought.

De Morgan first gave that thorough treatment of contrary, negative, or contradictory terms which has since been so much praised. Bain says: "According to the true view of contrariety, as given by De Morgan, the negative is a remainder, gained by the subtraction of the positive from the universe; the negative of X is $U-X$, and may be symbolized by a distinct mark, x ; whence X and x are the opposites under a given universe; not- X is x , and not- x is X ." It is just in reference to this point as to the term or name that De Morgan says: "Next it is clear that a name excludes as well as includes: every object of thought is related to *man*, for instance, as either *in* the name or *out*. The logician has always excluded the privative name, *not-man*, for instance, as all but use-

less: a certain practice of his own really makes it so. For he will have no *universe*—or total sphere of thought—except the whole universe of possible existence; or, at narrowest, the whole universe of objective reality.

“He forgets that, more often than not, the universe of the existing topic of thought is limited. We are talking of animals, for example, and nothing else; then *not-man* becomes so definitively significative that we have a separate name for it, *brute*.

“Logic ought to give us that command of thought which will prevent our mental vision from being obstructed by the casual absence of a name.”

Of the separation of logic and mathematic our author says: “The effect has been unfortunate. . . . The sciences of which we speak may be considered either as disciplines of the mind, or as instruments in the investigation of nature and the advancement of the arts.

“In the former point of view their object is to strengthen the power of logical deduction by frequent examples; to give a view of the difference between reasoning on probable premises and on certain ones by the construction of a body of results which in no case involve any of the uncertainty arising from the previous introduction of that which may be false; to establish confidence in abstract reasoning by the exhibition of processes whose results may be verified in many ways; to help in enabling the student to acquire correct notions of generalization; to give caution in receiving that which at first sight appears good reasoning; to instil a correct estimate of the powers of the mind by pointing out the enormous extent of the consequences which may be developed out of a few of its most fundamental notions; and to give the luxury of pursuing a study in which self-interest cannot lay down premises nor deduce conclusions.

“As instruments in the investigation of nature and the advancement of the arts it is the object of these two sciences to find out truth in every matter in which nature is to be investigated, or her powers and those of the mind to be applied to the physical progress of the human race, or their advancement in the knowledge of the material creation.”

Though fond of laughing at metaphysics, De Morgan did not see that it could be entirely gotten rid of.

"Right or wrong," he says, "human beings are made to be metaphysicians, children most of all, uneducated persons more than educated. We know all about *can* and *cannot* from our cradles; we never feel the same assurance about *is* and *is not*. A philosopher, in a dark age, may determine to set out with a knowledge of the naturally possible and impossible; but not even a philosopher ever pretended to set out with a knowledge of the existent and non-existent."

In our author's system the order of the premises is changed, the Minor Premise being written first—*e. g.* :

Vinegar is an acid.

All acids contain hydrogen.

∴ Vinegar contains hydrogen.

Thus we see instantly what before was considered very wise in Lord Bacon to have observed, that the form of the syllogism resembles the mathematical axiom—things equal to the same thing are equal to each other—for by this arrangement we bring the middle terms right together, and see just how the extremes are brought into connection through their relation to the same middle term. And so we see immediately why every Syllogism must have three, and only three, Terms—the Minor, Major, and Middle. If there be four terms, either in form or in fact (from the ambiguity of either of them), the two terms of the conclusion will not have been compared with one Middle Term, and the regular conclusion does not follow.

We have in the same way the following canons for testing the validity of Syllogisms :

1. If the Minor and Major Terms, each being compared with the same third or Middle Term, both agree with it, they agree with each other.

This underlies all Affirmative Conclusions.

2. If the Minor and Major Terms, both being compared with the same third term, one agrees and the other disagrees with it, they disagree with each other. This is the foundation of negative conclusions.

Further, Aristotle and all the old logicians said that the whole of the middle term must be taken in at least one of the premises.

As they put it, the middle term must be distributed at least

once in the premises, otherwise the minor term may be compared with one part and the major with another part of it.

From

Some men are poets,
Some men are Indians,

nothing follows. But the Aristotelians were too broad in their generalization, as De Morgan clearly showed in his doctrine of Plurative Judgments.

For example, if we have given the premises,

Most men are uneducated,
Most men are superstitious,

according to Aristotle we are not warranted in drawing any conclusion; for the middle term is men, and in neither premise is anything said about all men. But, in point of fact, we can draw the perfectly valid conclusion,

Some uneducated men are superstitious.

Again, Aristotle is contradicted by numerically definite judgments. In these there is inference when the quantities of the middle term *in the two premises together* exceed the whole quantity of that term. Lambert first thought of this principle. De Morgan, without any knowledge of Lambert, reconceived it and extended its use.

Suppose we grant the premises,

Two thirds of all human beings are women. The number of married women is never greater than the *total* number of men.

It follows that half the entire number of women are single.

Still, easy and certain as such reasoning is, it looks very like an example of how difficult it is, to a logician trained only in the traditional logic, that in a Princeton "Manual of Logic" the only numerically definite syllogism given was erroneous, and stood so for years. I stated this to the author, and in the latest stereotyped edition it has been changed. The Syllogism he gave was as follows:

"60 out of every 100 are unreflecting.

"60 out of every 100 are restless.

"Therefore, 20 out of every 100 restless persons are unreflecting."

After pointing out to him the fault in what he had been teaching for years, the following has been substituted :

“ 60 out of this 100 are unreflecting.

“ 60 out of this 100 are restless.

“ \therefore 20 restless persons are unreflecting.”

Another point on which Aristotle and the old logicians laid great stress was what they termed the Figure of a syllogism. This they treated cumbrously and at indefinite length. De Morgan has given a much more concise, but at the same time much clearer, exposition of it. The Figure of a syllogism depends upon the situation of the middle term in the premises.

There are four figures. In the first figure the middle term is the subject of the major and predicate of the minor. In the second, the middle term is the predicate of both, and in the third the subject of both. The fourth occurs when the middle term is made the predicate of the major and subject of the minor premise.

De Morgan represents the subject of the conclusion—that is, the minor term—by x , the middle term by y , and the predicate of the conclusion—that is, the major term—by z , and says :

“ A Syllogism is the deduction of a relation between two terms from the relation of each term to a third. The first figure of the logicians is that of *direct transition*— x related to z through y related to y and y to z .

“ The fourth figure is that of *inverted transition*— x related to z through z to y and y to x .

“ The second figure is that of *reference to* (the middle term)— x related to z through x to y and z to y .

“ The third figure is that of *reference from* (the middle term)— x related to z through y to x and y to z . Thus, when the notion of figure is taken into account, its force and meaning are best seen by stating the combination of relation in the different figures.

“ So when we say

“ Kings are men,

“ All men are mortals,

“ Therefore, kings are mortals,

we are saying that kings being a species of men, men in turn being a species of mortal beings, therefore, kings are a species of mortals ; and we are speaking in the first figure, for when we say that a species of a species is a species of the genus, we

compare the minor with the major by the relation which the minor stands in to the middle, and the middle to the major.

“When we say

“Common salt contains no hydrogen,

“All acids contain hydrogen,

“ \therefore Common salt is not an acid,

we use the second figure, and compare both major and minor with the middle.

“This is equivalent to saying species and genus of the same are species and genus of one another.

“Again, if we say

“No tribes are without religion,

“Some tribes are cannibals,

“ \therefore Some cannibals are not without religion,

we use the third figure and compare the middle term with both major and minor.

“The fourth figure is simply the first with the concluding relation inverted.”

Here we see stress laid upon the consideration of relations, and, after all, we feel sure that De Morgan's greatest work was connected with his development of the Logic of Relatives, independently discovered by Leslie Ellis after reading Boole's "Laws of Thought." One of De Morgan's last memoirs, in the tenth volume of the "Cambridge Transactions" was on the Logic of Relations, which is, in the mathematical sense, a far-reaching generalization of the old logic. In our modern mathematics everything is generalized as far as possible. Thus the notion of imaginary magnitude in analysis, and of imaginary space in geometry, has become fundamental and all-embracing, including the real as a special case. Every study of a generalization or extension gives additional power over the particular. We need to go beyond and look back from an elevation.

Any first-rate mathematician working in logic would attempt to generalize, and, in fact, Boole generalized, the scholastic logic in a manner entirely different from De Morgan. In the "Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie," page 250, the celebrated critic, A. Riehl, says: "Das allgemeine, den aristotelischen Syllogismus als speciellen Fall einer speciellen Methode umfassende Problem des Schliessens hat Boole nicht nur gestellt,

sondern auch gelöst. Niemand, der sich gegenwärtig oder künftig mit Reform der Logik beschäftigt, darf an Werke Boole's vorbeigehen." Boole is obtaining world-wide homage. Herbert Spencer says: "In the work by Professor Boole, 'Investigation of the Laws of Thought,' the application to Logic of methods like those of mathematics constitutes another step far greater in originality and in importance than any taken since Aristotle."

But let us not forget that De Morgan's generalization, though different in kind and direction, has done, perhaps, as much toward breaking away the old incrustation that covered the logic germs.

In his view of the subject, the purely formal proposition with judgment, wholly void of matter, is seen in "There is the probability x that X is in the relation L to Y ." The syllogism is the determination of the relation which exists between two objects of thought by means of the relation in which each of them stands to some third object which is the middle term.

The pure form of the syllogism, when its premises are absolutely asserted, is as follows: X is in the relation L to Y , Y is in the relation M to Z ; therefore X is in the relation " L of M ," compounded of L and M , to Z . In ordinary logic, which admits only the relation of identity, the actual composition of the relation is made by our consciousness of its *transitive* character. The requisites of the copular relation, in the system of ordinary syllogism, are *convertibility* and *transitiveness*.

Any relation which possesses these qualities may take the place of "is" in the common syllogism without impeachment of its validity.

A relation is transitive when, being compounded with itself, it reproduces itself; that is, L is transitive when every L of L is L . For example, "brother." Thus, from the transitiveness of the connecting relation in ordinary syllogism, A is B and B is C gives A is C , since, from the *convertibility* of the terms, A is B gives B is A . Here at last we have broken away from that paltry narrowness which sickens us with the assertion that our minds in pure thinking can use nothing but the relation of identity—the Jevons sophism that thought cannot move because all thinking is the substitution of identicals.

So we see that in logic, as in mathematics, we may develop a

whole system of theorems about symbols which are to be used in a given manner; and then to make this whole system true of a desired relation we have only to show that the relation fulfils the one or two fundamental principles of the system. De Morgan treated of convertible and inconvertible relatives, repeating relatives, non-repeating relatives, transitive and intransitive relatives, and inaugurated a general system.

On three out of his four pairs of simple propositions three separate algebras of logic have been founded.

Resurrected and revived, Logic has joined the ranks of the on-marching sciences.

ON HEGEL'S IDEA OF THE NATURE AND SANCTION OF LAW.

BY WALTER B. WINES.

There can be no doubt as to the necessity for the acceptance of the inevitable. To accomplish the possible, and to refrain from attempting the impossible, are equally wise. From this admitted truth, as a major premise, with a minor premise supplied in each particular case, a practical age has constructed a prudential syllogism whose conclusion is that to avoid vain seeking after empty knowledge and useless inquiry after that which knowledge cannot compass is not less commendable than to know all things knowable. It should not, however, be forgotten that prudence, while often the soundest worldly wisdom, may sometimes be contemptible meanness. To the palace built by philosophy, prudence sustains the relation of a cellar to a house: fundamental, useful, even necessary, yet not forming a part of its symmetry, and far beneath the apartments above, illumined by the sunlight, and through which sweeps the pure upper air.

The maxim, "Seek not to know what you cannot know," commends itself in many respects. The proposition that it is possible to know only what is capable of knowledge calls for no argument. It is not its statement, but its application, that is deleterious. The

crucial test of knowledge is too often the subjective capacity of the enunciator of the maxim. "I do not know" may sometimes be a creditable admission, but does not the very admission disprove the possibility of such a subjective negation affording any ground for the predication of knowledge, or the lack of knowledge, in others?

A statement of these preliminary considerations is not unnecessary. It is common to ridicule what is called the "windy throes of metaphysicians," and to compare their speculations to the childish attempt to grasp the prismatic hues of the rainbow. Time's echo, however, will throw back such empty laughter on the heads of those who evoke it. The tree which grows upon the mountain-top may think itself much higher than the hill on which it grows, yet it is seen for only a mile, while the mountain towers into the sky—a monument of creation, and a mound and gravestone of some dead cataclysm.

The best way to meet an argument that you cannot answer is to call the man who advances it a fool. A shrug will often accomplish more than a demonstration. This appears to be the position of many at the present time; but truth will grow and fructify for ages after the shoulders have lost the power to come to the aid of the feeble reason.

The study of law, considered in its breadth and entirety, is closely connected with that of mental philosophy. To the layman, who perhaps attempts to measure the wisdom of its provisions by his own notions of what constitutes "common sense," this proposition may appear a paradox. And even many members of the legal profession may, at first blush, question its truth. Yet it is believed to be a fact beyond successful controversion that there is a philosophy of law; in other words, that there is some underlying principle which makes so-called justice just. A law which makes all law legal is apt to escape the memories or the notice of those who receive their law through long generations of precedent, and whose thoughts never go deeper in their search for precedent than the ordinary habits and customs of the mass of mankind. This philosophy is not a philosophy of makeshifts; its principle is not a principle of expediency; its higher law is really a law, and not a selfish maxim.

What is the reason of law? What makes law possible? What

makes property a fact? What makes property allowable? These are questions which we would find answers for. If we are told that "expediency" is the answer to each, we are still confronted with the question: What is the reason of expediency? It requires some sanction, and that can be given only by thought. It is, therefore, evident that no satisfactory answer to any of these questions can be given until, after an examination of certain preliminary points, we have reached some satisfactory conclusion which may serve as a basis for a reply.

All science may, with fairness, be called an explanation. When we associate certain phenomena with their causes, we explain. The relation of an event is only half perfect unless its reason be told. In like manner all science is, in no small degree, a sort of natural history of causes and effects. But scientific explanation is always an explanation within conditions; the facts to be explained are the conditions of the explanation. But these very conditions require explanation, and, in order to answer the final questions which, spectre-like, haunt humanity—whence? and why? and whither?—we must have an explanation of explanation. But, if what has been already said be true, all explanation is conditioned, and if we would have an ultimate explanation, it is evident that it must be self-conditioned. Any final explanation which will explain the existence of conditions, and therefore existence as existence, must bring its own reason for its own self, its own necessity, that it is and that it alone is. To put the same statement in another and more concise form: All explanation is a taking possession of by mind, the ultimate explanation is a taking possession of, by mind, of *all* explanations, or, in other words, the taking possession of *all* by mind. This is nothing but self-consciousness, to understand which is to understand *all*. Hegel found the constitutive process of self-consciousness through the *notion*. That process is the idealization of a particular through a universal into a singular.

This creative effort is, at first, not readily intelligible. It is easy to see that two and two make four, but what a void lies before the mind when one turns to the question, *WHY should two and two make four?* But, though at first it may be difficult to appreciate the notion, it will ultimately be seen to be the radical of thought. And it is by the march of this notion, by the continuation and

repetition of acts of self-consciousness, that the *ego* is developed into its categories, which, in their concreteness, are externalization. If this be true, not only do different differences exist between subject and object, but at the same time an absolute identity. Hence, the reduction of the object to the subject is entirely possible, since, in reality, it only reduces itself to itself. This being conceded, the transition from the *thinking* idea to the *acting* idea is not difficult. To theorize is to think about something external to ourselves. But theory, when complete, converts its object into itself; it has possessed itself of all that the object really is; it has reduced it from externality into subjectivity.

But what is will? Will is kinematic thought; and thought is potential will.

The great German metaphysicians, Hegel and Kant, sought to establish the truth of the freedom of the will. Their pride of reason was humiliated by the admission of the notion of necessity. To admit compulsion was, in their view, to admit that they were *things*, made after the image of a stone, rather than *men* made after the image of God. They could not rest under the imputation of being shuttlecocks between the battledoors of events. They were resolute in the search after better and truer means of escape than some so-called advanced thinkers of to-day, who seek a rescue from the Fate of knowledge through the Fetish of ignorance.¹

To-day, among certain schools, free-will is laughed at. As long ago as the time of Dr. Johnson, even that great man said, "We feel that we are free, and that is all about it." And we can imagine the laugh which accompanied such a statement. Yet Dr. Johnson's argument is, perhaps, as excellent as any that can be urged in favor of free-will, since any philosophy which would command respect must guard against being repugnant to common sense. The cry of the rabble is not to be accepted as the test of true philosophy; but if, when a truth has been demonstrated and brought under the cognizance of ordinary men, they fail to appre-

¹ Huxley finds satisfaction in the thought that there are things which we cannot know, such as cause, substance, and externality; and on the strength of this (negative) belief he claims to be considered orthodox. Herbert Spencer appears to find a remarkable source of joy in feeling that he cannot find any interpretation of the mystery of subject and object, and in his inability to understand the power manifested therein.

ciate it, or find it repugnant to all their conceptions, there is strong reason for suspecting the philosophy to be in the wrong. But an idea has found lodgment in the brains of a certain class of thinkers that "freedom" means "motivelessness." The argument is, that because a man cannot act without a motive, he is a slave. But what constitutes serfdom? Is it not true that he who acts from motive intelligible to himself acts freely, while all other action is the result of necessity? Surely freedom is to obey one's self rather than to yield submission to something external to one's self. If this be so, a man's motival action is free, because his motives are his own, so that there can be no incompatibility between moral necessity and mental (or moral) freedom.

In nature, the cause repeats itself in the effect; the spark is repeated in the explosion; the motion of the arm is repeated in the motion of the stick. But in the operation of the will the motive is not repeated in the act. It is the nature of the agent that is repeated in the performance—not the nature of the motive. Our language affords an incidental corroboration of the truth of this statement. With regard to physical nature, we use the word cause; in reference to the will, we employ the term motive. But it must not be forgotten that it is only moral necessity that is freedom. A man may be the slave of his appetites, and then he is not free. It may be argued that, just as a man's higher motives are his own, so are one's desires and appetites; and, if obedience to the one be freedom, it is folly to call submission to the other slavery. To understand this subject thoroughly, however, it is important to distinguish between the two meanings of the word "*mine*." In one sense, subjectivity belongs to the inner *me*; but is not objectivity doubly mine? Have I not acquired objectivity and reduced it to possession? Does it not, then, belong to the *inmost* me? Is it not of my very essence, even that essence realized? If an affirmative answer be given to these questions, it must follow that one is truer to one's self when one is true to the *universal* "mine" than to the *particular* "mine."

But the objection may be urged, with plausibility, that the very particulars which one obeys are externalized and realized. One's desires are the outcome of nature and spirit, and what is nature but the realized idea? Such an argument, while plausible, possesses no logical weight. We are dealing with free-will, and this

can exist only when will wills itself. One feels that one's sensuous motives have a kind of externality to one's self; but to be free one must obey one's own motives; will must will itself; just as the end of reason is reason, so the object of the will is will, and therefore it is free. Hence it is that the ordinary opinions of mankind, in reference to the freedom and slavery which a man may undergo in himself, have a deep foundation in actual fact. Each man feels that he is less a man when he is dragged at the heels of his senses, and more a man when he frees himself from that democracy and submits himself to the restraint of the monarch reason. Each man stands in graceful pride in the freedom of that restraint which is imposed by universal reason; each one lies in chains who yields to the natural motives which are the sole lights, the sole guides of animals and things. Such lights are like the stars, particular and sparse, while the light of reason is like the day, universal and wide. It is true freedom, therefore, for each man to conform his will to the universal; in this way only can he become in the true sense a man; in this way only can the evolution of nature from thinghood to manhood be effected.

Now, free-will is the root of law, although (as has been already said) at the present time many so-called philosophers scout the idea of free-will. Man, they say, is ruled by his organism. This organism is a thing, just as is a cabbage, and is influenced only by externals. There is nothing but a sequence of events, and men are causes only as is the cue that propels a billiard-ball; but the force is not to be found in the cue, nor in the arm, nor in the man, nor in the food, the sun—the conditions that caused his growth. "Before Abraham was," this force existed; it has undergone more curious exigencies in its long day than Cæsar's clay. About its beginning nothing is known; it and matter are the twin Melchisedees.

Does it ever occur to such people to consider what, then, is the meaning of law? Can it have any? If there is no free-will, what justification is there for legislative enactments? Why should there be a penalty for theft, or a right of civil action for breach of contract? Insane persons are held irresponsible for their acts and are allowed to escape punishment, because they are not free agents—in other words, because they are not under the *control* of reason. But, according to some modern thinkers, no

man so controlled (*i. e.*, no sane man) is free ; why, then, should the latter, under this hypothesis, be liable to punishment if the former are to be exempt ?

Men, however, will not believe such advanced thinkers, and Dr. Johnson's argument is as good as theirs. We are free ; otherwise law has no meaning, and to eliminate free-will is to overturn the very foundation of the temple of justice.

But free-will is, at first, isolated self-identity ; in other words, it is primarily abstract. If two components constitute a whole, either part, separated from the other and considered in itself, is abstract. Free-will, as it at first emerges, has the character of singleness or abstractness. It is like one leg of a pair of compasses. In its very singleness, however, and by its very oneness, it is constitutive of the person ; it is a person. But the person's personality must be realized ; for, because it is thinking will, it has in it, implicitly, the notion. The notion is the very concreteness of the universal, the particular and the singular. And as realization is always through something *other* than itself, and as free-will, as the person, is an abstract inner, and its immediate *other* must be an abstract outer, it follows that free-will can be realized only through an external thing. In this we have property. Here, then, we have the notions of person and of property, which Hegel calls the abstract self-internal and the abstract self-external.

It is beyond the scope of the present article to enter upon any discussion of the manifestation of the notional evolution into abstract right, morality, and observance ; in which we again find the universal, the particular, and the singular. For the will, which is universal in law, passes into a particular phase and becomes inner, as conscience, in morality, and finds its true concreteness in observance. We must confine our attention to the philosophy of law ; and, while these subjects are intimately associated with it, and their exposition would admirably illustrate the inner motions of the notion in the philosophy of abstract right, their consideration would require too much time and space to be profitable in this connection.

Legality, then, or abstract right, divides itself into property, contract, and penalty ; and here again we find the singular, the particular, and the universal. For in property we find the single will, in contract we find several, or particular, wills, and in penalty we find the will of the whole, or the universal will.

First, then, of property. We have already seen that will is realized through, or by means of, an abstract self-external, a thing without will; and, while will is realized only through this thing, it in its turn finds its meaning only in will. From this statement certain things evidently follow. A man, being in his nature singular, can be possessed only of the singular. That only would be his immediate *other*. The universal can be the other only to the universal, and hence cannot be the subject of private property. Property, therefore, has its sanction, its meaning, only in nature, in the spirit of the person. From the very statement of the nature of concreteness, it follows that it is a man's duty to possess, or be a proprietor, since it is only in this way that his abstract will can be realized. A man who possesses nothing still remains abstract implicitly. But let it not be understood from this statement that it is a man's duty to be rich. The notion does not dictate as to how much or how little a man shall own; all that it dictates is its own evolution into the idea, into the objective spirit. The man who makes life subservient to a bank account is not making humanity an end to itself, but a means to a wretchedly trivial end. Such an end, if made a ruler, will misrule. The man whose object and aim is a triviality will become trivial. A life with an external motive will become an external life, and, therefore (as a sequence from what has been said), will become deformed, one-sided. It is only by cherishing noble ends that man can do nobly. It was a sentiment of Milton, no less beautiful than true, that he who would write an heroic poem must make life an heroic poem. The proverb, "Like master, like man," holds true of the end (master), and of the means (man) chosen to attain it. The meaning of the obligation is not vulgarity, but a fuller life, a more complete being, and in this sense it is every man's duty to be an owner. But will, even when set in the object, requires enunciation, which can be effected only by an act. This is seizure, which term is here used as synonymous with occupation. The judgment determines that the object seized belongs to the party seizing; in other words, his will has predicated of it, "it is *mine*." The very immediacy of the body to the mind is sufficient enunciation of property in that; and any injury done to that in which I have set my will is an injury done to my will. Seizure, then, is the bringing of a more external into relation to that less

external property, my body. Of course, the mode of seizure, or occupation, varies. I may move into a house or hold a coin in my hand. Hegel treats the whole subject of possession under three heads, and divides seizure itself into bodily seizure, formation, and designation. Here, then, is a rise in generalization from individuality to universality. Designation Hegel considers the perfection of occupancy. Not only is possession shown by bodily seizure, but by formation. Instead of taking a thing into relation to his less external property, he can place his less external property in it. He who bestows labor upon a thing enunciates his possession by formation; and, lastly, by naming, labelling, or the employment of signs, he demonstrates appropriation, or that he has set his will in it.

But even bodily seizure demonstrates proprietorship roughly—that is, that one has set one's will in the object; and even this is a kind of designation, for that is only another name for a sign, and, as a corollary from what has been already said, all the forms of occupancy are only less general instances of the ultimate import, a less general demonstration of the fact that a thing is willed mine.

Possession itself may be considered under three heads. The first of these is, as we have seen, *seizure*; the second, *use*; the third, *alienation*. These are not stereotyped in their separateness; they are known in their transitions.

The evolution of *seizure* into *use* will illustrate what has been not unhappily termed the “life-flux” of the notion. All seizure is appropriation by will. Will makes the object its own. But in this process the will must be regarded as positive, and the thing determined as negative. The will, then, being particularly determined by the thing, is particular will in a desire, and the thing negative, being particularly determined, is only for the will, and, consequently, serves it. This is the whole meaning of use. Hegel defines use thus: “Use is the realization of my desire through the abstraction, destruction, consumption of the thing; the selfishness of my nature is thus manifested, which, accordingly, thus accomplishes its destiny.” According to the same authority, use is the real side of property, and is often employed as an argument by those who have wrongfully taken possession. Such persons argue, “The thing was of no use to the man from whom

I took it." Yet, as Hegel justly points out, such an argument is bad as against the actual assignment of will. If will be already in the object, use can give no title to another whose will is not in it; or, rather, whose seizure is secondary. How, then, originates prescription? From the fact that seizure may become an empty symbol, the will which made occupation or designation a force may have passed away, and the property is then really without an owner; and thus property may be acquired or lost, in lapse of time, by prescription. From the very necessity of enunciation through bodily seizure, formation, and designation, follows the necessity for continued manifestation, and it is in this way that prescription has a meaning and a right.

But, as will may in time lapse for want of enunciation, so it can be withdrawn by negation. If a thing become mine when I have willed it mine, it is evidently not mine when I have willed it not mine. In the latter act consists alienation. And when two individual wills meet, one willing alienation and the other proprietorship, we find what is technically termed in law "consent," and therefore what is designated a contract.

Thus we have arrived at the second moment of the notion of abstract right.

In this connection it may not be out of place to remark that, although much of this evolution may seem unfamiliar, much of it is sanctioned by man's ordinary experience, and the foregoing explanation of consent (although closely following Hegel) agrees with the definition in use among lawyers.¹ Philosophy collects the drift truth scattered through the world, and constructs, from the isolated fragments, a homogeneous whole.

It is in this unity of different wills that property reaches or appears in its highest manifestation; it is a unity in which difference is at the same time negated and affirmed. But the very essence of the notion is the identification of differences and the differentiation of identity. In this act we see a proprietor (whose will has met the will of another, and where "consent" has resulted) at once ceasing to be yet remaining and becoming a proprietor; and from this may be deduced the right of cancellation of the contract in case of a *laesio ultra dimidium vel enormis*.

¹ Grotius, "De Juro Belli et Pacis," lib. 2, ch. ii, s. 4; Story's "Eq. Jur.," sec. 222.

The historical progress of law, through many of its simplifications, through the extinction of many of its symbolism founded purely in sense, and through the actual changes in the signs of possession, is an object of interest to the lawyer. The conversion of subjectivity into objectivity, which we find in passing from property to possession, requires some formalities to effect itself; for possession is the expression of will, and expression is only a particular externalization. The history to which we have referred, then, must be studied in relation to expression, and its progress in time will be found to be regulated by the advance of the possibilities of expression, or the facility for the passage of the subjective into the objective.

But it will be clear, to any one who has followed us so far, that contract is not manifested as will. The act of contract, in that it is particular, is a manifestation of wills in community, but not of will in universality. How, then, does the element of universality attach to contract? We answer, Only through its sanction or prescription by the universal will. It is not possible, in this connection, to enter into a consideration of the remedies under contract. These remedies, as every one knows, fall into one of two classes, viz.: the right of civil action, and penalty.

This leads us to the consideration of the third head under our general division, *i. e.*—Penalty.

As contract is under the sanction of the universal will, it follows that any one who intentionally negates the community of wills negates by his act the absolute will, and affirms in its stead his own particular self-will. This, in its essence, is crime.

What is the remedy? If crime be a negation of the universal will, it can be corrected only by an affirmation of the universal will in the same regard, which affirmation must be a negation of the particular will. In this consists penalty. A realized negation of the absolute will is force; hence the criminal, in such negation, has resorted to force, and the reaffirmation must be by a negation of self-will. Every one knows the effect of a double negative, and that will illustrate in some degree the process of thought. The criminal must be subsumed under his own law—force. In other words, he must be compelled to undo his own compulsion, which is evidently to restore him to his own right. But this can be efficiently done only by a disinterested representative of right.

Mere individual counter-assertion would be interminable, hence the restoration of the true inmost will of the criminal can be effected only by means of a judge, who is the representative of the universal, because (his feelings being apart from the inquiry) he can decide in conformity with the objective standards of right. And, since the relation of justice can be made actual only through the knowable existent, punishment must relate to either the person or the property of the criminal. It must not be forgotten that punishment has its foundation in the very nature of will. A more thorough comprehension of the inexorable facts of thought would do much to bring about a better understanding of the true position of the criminal in relation to society. In one sense the office of the judge is only to sanction the criminal's conviction of himself. It is the universal that he has outraged; and, as has been shown, that universal is his own in a truer and a deeper sense than are the desires and appetites which he hoped to gratify by his crime. He has given his consent to the law which punishes him. It is his inner self that tries, convicts, and condemns his outer self.

Considered in the light of these reflections, all punishment may be regarded as educational. Training is the counteracting of the passive force of nature by wise restraint and discipline. It is this that constitutes true education of the child. We have got beyond the idea that education comprises only the instruction of the child in the "three R's." We have come to see that it is elaboration—the elaboration of nature (the chaos) into character (the cosmos). True education is the subjection of nature in man, the subordination of his senses and appetites. This is possible only through the negation of the mechanical necessities of nature and a super-position of the universal, from which, as we have seen, results freedom of the will. Thus, we find that all punishment is educational; the infliction of penalty is not, as some would have us think, a wrong, but a right, which conduces to the true freedom of the individual, to the welfare of the community, and to the ultimate attainment of justice.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUL AND ITS IMMORTALITY.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF CARL FRIEDRICH GOESCHEL BY SUSAN E. BLOW.

(CHAPTER II—*Concluded.*)

Personality, or the Immanent Development of the Soul and its Immortality.

50. Such is the concrete content into which the soul develops itself, attaining, through personality, freedom of the Spirit, and with this freedom gaining not only immortality, but also the resurrection and transfiguration of the body. We must, however, keep in mind that we reach this result only when recognizing the soul as a Self. We seek and find the ground and goal of self hood in the Absolute Self. The soul from which the process of development immediately moves is itself immediately given. We took the soul as we found it, immediately in time, and the Spirit into which the soul developed itself was finite, just because it developed itself from a *given* point. The whole course of development lacked ground and guarantee; the individual was without soul—consciousness without a subject; the personality of the finite spirit lacked origin and destiny—beginning and end—its Alpha and its Omega. We could find both only in a Being who should be the Absolute Realization of all the moments which we had discovered successively in finite and posited forms in the development of the Spirit. That which is given is explained only through a Giver who is *in* Himself and has developed out of Himself all that He gives: the GIVEN cannot be explained through emanation, for the unconscious activity presupposed in emanation cannot produce what it has not in itself; the *given* is, however, explained through Creation, and Creation presupposes the Creator. This Creator is the Absolute Spirit, who from eternity to eternity determines Himself from Himself; this self-determination reveals itself as the Trinity, in which the Absolute Spirit, apprehended as Absolute Personality, mediates itself—in which also the idea of Creation finds its truth, and the Created Spirit its interpretation and transfiguration.

In accordance with this view, the Trinity is the immanent condition of the absolute self-conditioned personality of God; the Absolute Personality of God is the condition of Creation, and hence, also, of the created personality of the finite spirit; the personality of the finite spirit (which herein proves itself the independent reflection of the Absolute) is the condition of the freedom of the finite spirit; the freedom of the finite spirit in the Absolute Spirit is the condition of its personal imperishability.

Notwithstanding this chain of connections and dependences, we are able to proceed immediately from the Soul: the Soul develops itself into Spirit and points of itself to God. This seeming paradox is solved by the insight that the Soul in its immediacy has in itself as its dowry the witness of the Absolute Spirit—that it exists in communion *with* this Spirit, draws its nourishment *from* this Spirit, and manifests the richness and fulness of this Spirit just in proportion as it develops itself. This realization or meditation is, therefore, itself a proof of the Divine Creation—more definitely of the continuously progressive Creation, *i. e.*, the penetrative participation of the Absolute with the finite spirit. In so far as this participation has been interrupted on the human side, the act of progressive Creation manifests itself as deliverance and reconciliation through the condescension of God to the finite spirit which is thus recalled to life in Him after becoming, through its fall, subject unto death. Creation has not once been, but it *is*; it is essentially continuous, progressive, personal, participative; hence it implies preservation, renewal, and communion.

The crucial insight of Philosophy is the identity of the immanent movement of the concept with experience. This is the stone of stumbling and rock of offence on which the many are wrecked, or before which they stand paralyzed. This identity grows clear only through apprehension of the Personality of Thought, *i. e.*, through the insight that Thought in all of its moments participates in the Absolute Spirit and in all Creation. Only through this insight can we explain how, from any given moment of Thought, there may develop the empty, accidental, arbitrary, intermediate phases of apostasy—for *each* moment, being penetrative and participative, is in continuous relation with all the moments of Being and Thought.

According to an old fancy—embodied most purely in the great

poem of Dante—what man does not yet know he shall learn in the vision and recognition of God. In the same sense it is true that all is determined in the *concursus Dei*, and this *concursus Dei*, in a fallen world, manifests itself in the Redemption.

We are now at the end of that process of development which has led us from immediate existence to Actuality or Individual Totality; from Being to Thought—from the Individual to the Person, and which, moving on from the Person, has borne us upward and backward to Absolute Personality. Everything, however, depends upon seizing that focal point from which flashes at once the inmost comprehension, and upon attaining that speculative insight in which the truth is perfectly mirrored. Nothing, therefore, is so imperative as adequate apprehension of the relationship between Being and Thought, and correct valuation and distinction of the categories which develop themselves in these different spheres. The main obstacle to Knowledge of God and of the Soul lies in the fact that even in Thought we are hampered by Being and the categories of Being. Thence it is that we inquire so anxiously if Existence necessarily belongs to the Absolute Thought which we call God, and doubt whether the *Existing Thought* or Thinking Soul is secure of this existence in the future. On the one hand, Existence as extended in space and time is so mighty and overwhelming that, in its infinite dispersion, it seems to threaten all consciousness, and, in its infinite expansion, to attack all individuality. On the other hand, it is so reliable and so real that, without it, it would seem Thought cannot be. This is the magic power wielded over us by Being as opposed to Thought. We are all like poor Lenette, who, after listening to the Astronomic discourses of her would-be philosophic husband, complained that he made the stars seem so large that she could not hold them in her little heart and head; and, when he held forth on Pneumatology, declared in her distress that he made souls seem so small that she had to stretch them all out of joint to have anything left of them. Such witchcraft does Being exert over Thought that, though the latter includes and concentrates within itself the whole expanse of Being, it is, nevertheless, on the one hand, startled and terrified by Being, and, on the other hand, feels itself dependent upon Being. Therefore, it is impera-

tive that we learn to know Thought as well as Being. We have already characterized it as the internality and truth of Being, and have recognized existence in its externality as only a single Moment of Thought, which, in its isolation, is negated in the totality of moments—*i. e.*, in Thought itself.

If only we were able to realize that Thought is the purest transfiguration and clearest self-explication of Being—that in it Being comes to itself by turning itself inside out, and reflecting itself in itself; if we could become conscious of Thought in its height and depth and fulness, we could never question whether to this inmost Thought belonged the outwardness of Being. Neither could we, after such a recognition, stumble over the critical doubt whether Thought as subjective and Being as objective could really coincide. Nor, again, could we ever deny to human thought the power to recognize truth, for we should know that Thought is One. Consequently, human thought is not simply human, but of and from God. And, through Personality or the power of participation, mediated in the individual man.

We have followed the Soul in its upward path; we have noted its immediate origin in Being; we have seen it rise out of Being into Consciousness or subjective thought; we have rejoiced in its culmination as Spirit in total Thought—how can we then still anxiously doubt and question whether Thought, in that future which it includes within itself, shall still have the existence out of whose externality it has ascended, and whose limits it has annulled? How, indeed, unless we resemble the worthy countryman, who, gazing thoughtfully at the ascending Pegasus, mourns the plough-horse now forever lost?

But not only is the objective validity of thought often made dependent upon its external existence instead of its immanent idea—but the withdrawal from thought of external existence is claimed to threaten its subjective validity, and to snatch away the thinking Subject. We reply, simply, He who has learned to think Thought as the coming to itself of Being (and what is thought if it be not this) can never doubt that the thinking subject belongs essentially to and is inseparable from Thought; without the thinking subject, Thought cannot be.

Yet, even with this insight, we frankly confess that the main difficulty is not overcome. This difficulty lies, as has been said,

not in Thought, but in the Crude Being which is blindly and involuntarily shoved under Thought. It is necessary that this difficulty, upon which really rests the whole doubt of personal immortality, be clearly set before the mind, in order that we may read its refutation in that progressive development of the Soul which has been already traced.

Herein lies the doubt. Being is and shall forever be; there will always be existence, and this existence will realize and reproduce itself in individuals. It is always the same Being, but that which exists is not the same; out of the infinite womb of Being are born forever fresh individuals; the river of Being flows on forever, but never for a moment are its waters the same. So too is it with thought. Thought thinks, and shall think forevermore; or, to put it in other words, just as Being develops itself ever explicitly in individuals, so does it ever return upon itself implicitly in Thought. With this Thought there shall be always a thinker; as the process of Being demands objective individuals, so with Thought is bound up the thinking subject. But, as there is change in the individual objects which are the bearers of Being, so there is change in the Subjects which are the bearers of Thought. True, the thinking subject is the *conditio sine qua non* of Thought, just as Being demands the object in order to become Existence; but these subjects which emerge from Thought just as objects emerge from Being are, no more than the latter, necessarily persistent.

What answer can we make to this objection? In how far is this doubt which distinguishes between Being and Thought, and acknowledges the distinction, open to the charge of being still clouded and hampered by the Externality of Being?

The whole doubt is based upon a supposed analogy between Being and Thought: its procedure appears reasonable and just. It will concede to Thought *just as much right as to Being, but not one whit more.*

Our first question, therefore, is whether this analogy is really carried out with the intended fairness and justice—whether as much has been conceded to Thought and the Thinker as to Being and the natural object.

In the transmutation of material object there is preservation of the species, but not of the individual. But what matters this to

an object which is an element merely and not a self; which in change changes only *for* the subject, and which itself is indifferent to change, as it belongs to and is dependent upon the externality which changes it. It becomes another for the subject; for itself it is essentially the same as before; it resembles its earlier form of being, as the body of the man resembles the body of the child.

If, however, a thinking subject changes into another, it loses its all in losing its Self. The nature of the thinking subject is to be subject—to be self—to be one and the same. The nature of the objects of being is, on the contrary, only to be object. If the subject is changed, it is destroyed, whereas the change of the object is the realization of its nature. To be just, therefore, the assumed analogy between Being and Thought must concede to the subject that in such process of change as accords with its nature it shall *remain itself*, just as the object in its own manner retains its essential identity under all changes of form. In every modification to which the external object is subjected it remains “thing;” before and after each change it is dependent upon external conditions; its nature is stamped upon it from without, and it is only a negative element in an inclusive totality. So, in every change experienced by the subject, the subject must remain *itself*; it may vary its manifestation, but its essence must be selfhood.

But doubt is not yet silenced, and with renewed energy it now directs its attack against the complaining subject. Dare the rich man complain of death because it takes from him his wealth, while from the miserable wretch who has nothing it takes nothing? The rich and happy man loses much in death which the man who is poor and miserable does not lose. Yet who would venture to arraign death for equalizing the inequalities of human life? In the beginning men were equal—in the grave they are equal again! The poor man loses less than the rich, but then during life the poor man *had* less than the rich. So death robs the subject of consciousness, but cannot take consciousness from the natural object which never had it. Its procedure is not, therefore, unjust, and Subject and Individual become equal as they sink back into universal Being.

In vain we reply to Doubt that the rich and the poor, being both men, are in their essence alike, while the subject and the

natural individual are essentially unlike; consequently, that the equalizing process which is just in the one case is unjust in the other. Boldly comes the startling answer that Being is the common mother of life and thought—the common source of all individuality and all subjectivity. As the rich and the poor, the happy and the wretched, are alike men, so nature and spirit, individuality and subjectivity, are alike the issue of Being. Being externalizes itself in Things which return again into Being as they proceeded from it; Being concentrates and comes to a consciousness of itself in subjects, which in like manner emerge from and sink back into Being!

Making this declaration, scepticism pleads guilty to and is convicted of the error of which we had accused it. Our accusation was that scepticism always implies Being as the infinite Substance and the ultimate source of all things; that to the sceptic Being is the fountain whence and the bottomless gulf whither all things flow—the womb and the grave of life. Thought is, in his apprehension, only a mode of universal Being; out of Being come both the natural individual and the conscious subject, and back into Being shall each return. This is the plague-spot of doubt—the cancer which eats away the life of thought. Its medicine and cure is Speculative Philosophy, which, as immanent Logic, recognizes, not in Being but in Thought, the ground of all natural objects and of all conscious subjects; which sees that it is Thought from whose fulness Being is projected as an isolated radius or single moment, and that this single moment comes to its actuality only in connection with all the other moments of the inclusive Totality. Thus Logic proves to be the Monism of Thought, and culminates in concrete Theology, wherein Thought reveals itself as Absolute Personality, which, adequately apprehended, is the Trinity.

Through this insight we strike at the very root of doubt; we storm scepticism in its last intrenchment. But though the sudden revolution by which Thought is posited as the ground of Being may paralyze the sceptic who has always instinctively posited Being as the ground of thought, the paralysis is only for a moment, and thus accepting as a fact the reproach hurled upon it, doubt hurls it back upon Speculative Philosophy. The reproach was that scepticism made of Being the Alpha and the Omega, or, to state it more concretely, that it deified nature as

ultimate source and final goal—that it gave no honor to the Triune God, into whose Absolute Consciousness finite consciousness returns, not only without loss, but accentuated and glorified, while this same human consciousness is stifled and drowned by return into Being. This is the accusation now hurled back upon Speculative Philosophy, with the claim that she herself in her Logic derived everything from Being, in her Physics derived everything from Nature, and thus herself thinks Thought as a Mode of Being. Paragraphs and pages are pointed out to convince her that she derives from Being, becoming, existence, being for self, essence and phenomenon, manifestation and reality, and, finally, the Idea itself in its subjectivity, objectivity, and absolute ness. The Idea which has thus slowly emerged from the depths of Universal Being she then salutes as Spirit, and claims for it eternal persistence. But if this Spirit has developed itself out of Nature, must it not return into Nature? Does not Philosophy itself demand this circular course in which the end meets the beginning? In the process of Philosophy does not everything rise out of and sink back into Being? Have we not ourselves seen the soul awake out of an individual existence which was sunk in the material—has it not arisen before our eyes out of the state of unconscious identity with the all into the freedom and conscious unity of the Spirit? Dare the soul, then, deny its origin? Is not this origin denied unless the soul returns into it as its goal?

Vainly we remind our antagonist that from our contingent and immediate beginning in Being we were led back to the true, Self-Mediated Origin, out of whose Absolute Personality was wrested the personality of the finite Spirit in its identity with freedom and immortality. Herein is the reply of scepticism; you abandon and deny the very logic and philosophy which you claim thus to further and expand; it is time that you should recognize that this difference between your principle and your result, your beginning and your end, is the culmination of a progress developed, not, as you assert, *out of* your principle, but in contradiction to it. This is the final word of doubt. It abandons its own principle, that everything is developed from Being; but it claims as result of the long conflict that it has also forced Speculative Philosophy to a surrender.

What shall we say? Has Speculative Philosophy done her

work in the world by bringing to light the Supremacy of Thought, and shall she now, blushing and speechless, surrender her assaulted principle, and, giving glory to the truth, admit the newly found answer to the old enigma to be indeed the Solvent Word? What concerns us all is that truth should prevail. Truth is saved when the Supremacy of Thought is vindicated; why, then, should we not rejoice in the new discovery as though it were our own? Why do we still cling to a form over which, in spite of variations, Being predominates in the beginning and at the end?

The question rises, Is this so? May not the attack upon that Logic which develops itself from Being rest upon a misapprehension?

The immediate starting-point and principle of Philosophy is Being. But, if Philosophy does not misunderstand herself, this means nothing else than that *to Thought its own being is first*, or Being is Thought in its first immediacy. Consequently, Thought is its own *prius* and its own principle, for it is Thought which recognizes in Being its own first crude determination. Being is that which is first thought by Thought. Consequently, Thought as implicit is its own principle. Being is only the first chaotic abstract object of Thought, and belongs itself to Thought. From Being, or rather from itself through Being, Thought develops its richer and fuller determinations until in the concrete self-realization of the Idea it concentrates in itself the determinations which it has successively developed. Thus Thought is the Identity and Totality of all its determinations, of which determinations the first and crudest is Being. Thought is not merely the Totality, but as such also the Identity of its determinations. Thought is consequently not the mechanical conglomeration of these separate moments, but it is the unity prismatically reflected in their various categories.

It may, indeed, be urged that in this sense all methods—that of Spinoza equally with that of Descartes—have presupposed Thought, for, no matter what may be posited as a first principle, it is always Thought which posits it. The emphatic difference between Philosophy of immanent thought and its predecessors lies in the fact that they were not conscious of their fundamental presupposition, whereas the Philosophy of Implicit Thought knows *itself* as its own fundamental principle. That the Logic which moves

from Being is conscious of Thought as its underlying pregnant principle, is proved by its culmination in the Monism of Thought, for Spirit is essentially this Being for the Spirit. The history of Philosophy is the external confirmation of the insight that all methods of philosophy—the crudest as well as the most complete—have the same ultimate ground. They fail, however, to recognize this ground, and therefore wreck themselves upon Being, which, as thus apprehended, is isolated in its own exclusiveness, whereas, seen in the light of the Idea, it reveals itself as a radius of the infinite circle of Thought.

Scepticism thinks all things under the form of time, hence it thinks them as isolated and successive. But, as only Thought really *is*, Being cannot be apprehended as isolated and sundered from Thought, but only as included in Thought. In the form of Representation, therefore, it may be said that Being will perish but Thought shall abide, and with Thought the threefoldness that is in Thought, viz. : Body, Soul, and Spirit—Individuality, Subjectivity, and Personality. In other words, Being shall come to itself; it shall not be simple externality, but shall prove itself to belong to the Internal. If, therefore, earlier in the process of development, we defined Thought as the coming to itself of Being, this did not imply, as the sceptic claims, that Being was the source of Thought, or that Thought *originated* in the withdrawal of Being from externality into the Internal. This were impossible, for the outward has no inward; on the contrary, it is the inward which has an outward. The process of development, therefore, demands that Thought as *prius* shall externalize itself in Being, thus making itself its own object, and, through this self-separation, returning into itself enriched.

Thus, by an apparently different path, we have attained again the same result. The Alpha and Omega is not Being, but Thought, more definitely the Absolute, personal consciousness of God. From this divine consciousness, as it is revealed to the finite consciousness, all thought proceeds, and into this divine consciousness shall all thought return. The process of the finite consciousness is to know itself first in identity with being—then to sunder itself in soul and body, self and its other—and, finally, as person participating in and penetrated by God and creation, to be conscious that it is saved and glorified in the divine life.

By the path which we have just traversed we have also attained to more adequate apprehension of Being—mere Being is only external. Positing it as first principle, we learn its dangers; searching for its hidden depths, we learn its emptiness.

It is henceforth clear that this external Being, to which we cling so desperately, as though without it we were nothing, is, in its abstraction, exactly the negation of the Ego, that which would destroy the Ego were it not transcended by the Ego. In this transcendence Being vanishes in Thought—*i. e.*, its particularity as such is cancelled in the Totality. Therefore, it is evident that all denial of immortality in its ultimate analysis is grounded in the assumption, consciously or unconsciously expressed or implied, that Being has the ascendancy over Thought, Nature the supremacy over Spirit. In a word, all denial of personal immortality is denial of Spirit in its essential idea, whether it be in the crude form of the famous “System of Nature and of the Natural Laws of the Physical and Moral Worlds,” or in the more subtle systems of thinkers who abhor Holbach, La Grange, and Mirabeau. Just as certain is it, on the contrary, that the guarantee of Immortality is the Supremacy of Thought, and that only from Thought could proceed the development of the Finite Spirit into its Essential Content.

It should not be ignored that the pantheistic-materialistic struggle against the persistence of individuality (in its ancient as well as in its modern and fashionable forms) rests solely upon the presupposed superiority of Being. To set up the empty Category of Being as the first principle of the world is necessarily to reduce consciousness to a vanishing mode of Being, to make it the transient expression of a blind activity into which it shall be reabsorbed. To follow step by step the pantheistic procedure is most instructive, as quite unconsciously it testifies to that very priority of Thought over Being which it assails. Its result is that in the very moment when the subject, in order to escape from the empty and evil Self, generously sinks itself in Abstract Being, it, nevertheless, thanks to its imperishable persistence, emerges again as the *conditio sine qua non* of the system.¹ For only Thought can be the object of Thought; to think Being abstracted from Thought is as impossible as to think Nothing.

¹ Cf. Schelling, *Phil. Schrift.*, I., 168, 169.

Hence follows a second result. As we cannot think Being without implying Thought, so we cannot think Nothing without implying Being—for to think nothing is not to be and not to think. Thence it follows that those who hold to personal immortality, whether with prophetic feeling, realized faith, or conscious insight, hold on also to Being. Thought rules Being, but Being insists upon being included in Thought. This Being is not, however, crude external Being, but that inward Being which belongs to Thought as the body belongs to the Soul, which finds in the Spirit its adequate form, and therein, glorified and transfigured, celebrates its realized unity with Thought.

Here rises before us another cliff upon which the thought of immortality is often wrecked. The first rock of danger was Being—Abstract Being, presupposed as Origin and End of All. Being, thus apprehended, is Nature, Body, the material and finite. The other rock is Abstract Thought—Thought empty and non-existent; that false infinitude which lacks the finite; which admits no Body and no Being, and herein, surrendering the consciousness which is bound up with the finite, destroys itself. Upon the first rock was wrecked Spinoza, though through the mighty working of the subject within him he was saved from entire destruction. Upon the second rock Schelling was nearly stranded, but with a final effort he called up all his strength and steered away to safer shores. His moment of danger was when claiming that consciousness could not be thought save in relation to the body and to finite conditions generally, and therefore belonged to the passing time. He gave his verdict against individual persistence, which he denounced as prolonged mortality, and apprehended eternity as pure timeless infinitude in God. True eternity is, however, the fulfilment and realization of the Infinite—the Unity of the Infinite and Finite, to which alone belongs Actuality. Eternity is not timeless, but the Unity of all the moments of time. This Eternity manifests itself in Thought: Thought includes and subordinates Being; the Spirit is neither soul nor body, neither infinite nor finite, but the Unity or Actuality of these in themselves false and untenable determinations.

Recently Schelling has recognized anew that the ultimate truth is the "subject which, triumphing over all, maintains itself," and proposes an empirical development from what is. This is exactly

what has been done by Philosophy, following the method of logical development and organization. What *is*, is Thought: this Thought begins with Being, and in its progressive development carries Being in and along with itself. As the categories unfold, Thought shines through them more and more clearly as "that all-encroaching subjectivity" which claims all that is external as its own, and therein conquers and cancels externality; its ultimate and adequate form is personality, which consciously includes Body and Soul in the Spirit, and realizes itself in a vital, transparent, participative Unity.

Thus Being belongs to Thought as the Body to the Soul. This is, however, not limited Being, but the full and complete Being which at once has been, is, and shall be. Being only *is* when it exists at once in all of its dimensions. Therefore even La Mettrie confesses: "In one sense I cease to be whenever I think that I shall not be." He should have added: "In one sense I cease to think whenever I think that I shall not think." For it is Thought which includes in itself the scattered dimensions of Being, and knows that each requires all the others. Hence thought contains within itself the witness of its imperishability; in its essence Thought is nothing but imperishability.

The Soul which thinks, *really thinks*, must also really *be*. The Actuality of Thought expressed in terms of Being is "the Totality of all its Moments," but, as realized in the highest category or form of Thought itself, it is Personality. Self-consciousness is not extinguished, but accentuated and transfigured in the Consciousness of God and of Creation. Being *personal*, the Soul is imperishable.

REMARK.

The soul develops itself out of itself into the finite Spirit, which only knows itself to be immortal as it realizes itself in Personality as this finite Personality is actual and immortal only through the Absolute Personality. The Absolute Personality of God is the Actuality of Absolute Thought; it is therefore not only the goal in which the finite Spirit, as though having at last found its element, comes to itself, but it is also the ground which preceded the development that begins with the human soul. Herein the genetic principle of Philosophy is indicated as Logic, which Principle, being absolute, must be identical with its Result. As this

principle is the focus of all true knowledge, any little cloud which darkens or obscures it will project long and heavy shadows over all the developments of Philosophy. Such spots and shadows have their sole source in the position usurped by Being relatively to Thought, for it is Being which clouds and obscures Thought until it is wholly penetrated by Thought. The philosophy of the day is widely obscured by these threatening shadows. Therefore it were well for us to linger yet awhile by the fundamental principle of Logic: this will also tend to a more complete illumination of the question with which we are immediately occupied.

Thought is the genetic principle, the *prius tempore et dignitate*; it is not only the goal, but also the origin of all that is. Being, on the contrary, is the starting-point of the undeveloped finite; consequently, the first phase of the secondary process of development; more definitely, the beginning of Creation, which itself is a result. Being, as such, includes its development which preceded Being as absolute in Absolute Thought. Thus, Being, with its implicit content, is *in creation* just as Thought is in Creation; but it has priority only relatively to the thought of the finite Spirit, which being its content unfolds from it; relatively to the Absolute Thought, Being is secondary, conditioned, created. Properly speaking, even in the first relationship Being, as posited by Thought, is itself Thought, though relatively to Realized Thought—*i. e.*, Thought in its crudest, most immediate form. Thus, Absolute Thought is the original creative power; as Absolute it is realized, consequently precedes the absolute realization of the undeveloped finite which first develops in creation. And as this Thought is the ultimate origin, so is it the ultimate goal, hence the all in all; therefore Creation, which, as externalization, begins with Being, develops itself in Man (who is the internality of Creation), into Thought, and therein unites and transfigures all its isolated moments.

This is the all-leavening, all-generative truth! Thought is the *Principle*—Being the beginning of the self-externalization of Thought, the *ground* that the Principle posits in Creation, and, conformably to its implicit content, develops into Thought. Without this truth there can be no absolute knowledge and no Christian consciousness. As absolute, Thought is also absolute in its development, or, from all Eternity, Realized Thought. In the

beginning, with Thought, was the Word or Realized Thought.—John, i, 1.

For us the presupposition of Spirit is Nature; yet Spirit is also the reality and outcome of Nature—Spirit is the only truth—the one reality. Spirit is the Absolute *Prius* of Nature. Thought is the actuality of Being.

Consequently, it is only in the sphere of time that Being-with-Self precedes Being-for-Self, and Being-for-Self precedes Being-with-and-for-Self. As the different moments of Being-with-Self and Being-for-Self in truth belong to and penetrate each other, and their apparently fixed isolation is attributable only to Nature in its exclusiveness or space in its discreteness, so the precedence and succession of the three essential moments of Thought is only the finite process in time. The *prius* of time is the Absolute in which the three already named categories do not follow each other, but interpenetrate each other. Each, in fact, belongs to the Other; or, more definitely, Each *is* the Other.

From this insight is developed the highest Idea as the Light of Absolute Personality in its realization, and this is the Trinity. According to this view, the Father is not merely Being-with-Self, but the Being-with-Self of God, or, in other words, the Being-with-Self of the Being-with-and-for-Self; *i. e.*, Absolute Being with Self. So the Son is not exclusively for himself the Being-for-Self, but *Absolute* Being-for-Self—the Being-for-Self of God; hence, the Being-for-Self of Being-with-and-for-Self: finally, the Spirit is not simply the realized Being-with-and-for-Self, but inasmuch as Being-with-and-for-Self being absolute and conditioned only by itself is from Eternity in God, it necessarily from Eternity belongs to the Being-with-Self of God in the Father and the Being-for-Self of God in the Son, just as in the Spirit it proceeds from the two above-named determinations, and this not in time, but from Eternity. It may, indeed, be said that the first and second persons of the Godhead are realized through the Third, but this is only stating that the Trinity is essential to the Absolute Idea of God without therein implying a *prius* and *posterius tempore*, or hinting of a privative separation.

The Absolute is, according to its idea, essentially Thought, and, as such, personal, penetrating, and penetrated; hence it is itself in each of its moments—*i. e.*, in each of its moments it is abso-

lute, personal, wholly itself, One ! This oneness is, however, when adequately apprehended, oneness with its other, and is therefore only explainable and realizable through the Idea of Personality. On the other hand, the Self-immanence of Absolute Personality is only realized in the Trinity, and without this absolute personality the idea of Creation, despite all artificial props, sinks inevitably into the Conception of Emanation, or an active process, wherein forms arise only to vanish. Again, in the idea of Creation, the Absolute Personality of God is revealed and confirmed, being grounded not in Creation, but in the presupposed Creator. From any other standpoint the idea of God is grounded in the created human Soul, and the human Soul is grounded in Natural Being. Complete this process with the insight that the attained independence of the human Soul can be perpetuated only in personality, and the connection is again restored, the circle again rounded to a whole.

It must, of course, be admitted that the finite (hence the human) is an essential moment in the immanent unity of the self-generation of God ; this immanent humanity of God is, however, to be distinguished from the created man ; it is, as eternally self-generated, distinguished from its own incarnation in time.

Likewise the body is an essential moment in the Unity of the created finite Spirit ; this essential body is, however, to be distinguished from its external, visible, and tangible manifestation, of which it, like its own immanent soul, is independent.

In the light of these results it grows ever clearer that all progress in philosophy depends upon insight into the nature of the true first Principle. If philosophy sets up Being, as Thales set up Water, as the origin and end of all, it swallows up in this empty universal all personality, absolute and finite, eternal and immortal ; it rises into self-conscious Individuality, which, as a mode of Being, is submerged in Universal Being, and it finds in Water its death. If, on the contrary, philosophy finds its Alpha and Omega in Thought, which is at once that which posits and that which is posited, the active principle of Being whose passivity is within itself, then Being subsides into a Moment of Thought, and Nature into a Moment of the Spirit. With Thought is set up as first Principle, instead of an Abstract Universal, the Individual more definitely—Personality, in which the Individual becomes Universal ; hence Abso-

lute Personality posited by itself. As ultimate Origin and end, Thought is Absolute Personality—*i. e.*, Thought thinks itself and posits itself in itself; it is, therefore, its own Subject and Substrate, its own image and object, and its own mirror; and it is all these three in one. Being is an immanent integral moment of Thought and of all the personified forms of Thought—a moment whose isolation is negated in the Totality wherein Being itself is organically preserved. Further, Thought proceeds out of this immanence, and brings forth its single moments in succession. This is the Creation whose successive phases are described by Moses. These moments are externalized that they may develop themselves in time, and thus not fall back into Thought as into a gloomy grave, but, transfigured and glorified, move forward in Thought as their illuminating element; Creation, which appears first as the Contradiction of God, being herein transformed into his image—*i. e.*, finite personality.

So much by way of general explanation and indication. We have rejected not only the fatal results of pantheism, but also its apparently harmless principle. To set this principle clearly in the light and exhibit its radical defects has been our main object. To this end an open avowal of our own philosophic faith was necessary. We have made it frankly, knowing that the more explicit the confession the more definite will be the expression of opposing views, and the more clearly differences are stated the sooner will the reconciling truth be found. Our antagonists can only gainsay our results by renouncing the principle of Thought, throwing themselves in the arms of Being and resting on her bosom until, in the fulness of time, they are delivered by the truth.

THE MATHEMATICAL ANTINOMIES AND THEIR SOLUTION.

BY GEORGE S. FULLERTON.

If we suppose two parallel straight lines, unlimited in extent, and intersected by perpendiculars drawn at equal distances from each other, since it is evident that each division upon the one line is equal to each division upon the other, and that any number of divisions upon the one will equal in extent a corresponding number upon the other, the question naturally arises whether the equation will not hold good when all the divisions are considered. Whether the lines may not be regarded as equal in extent, and whether the sum of the divisions upon both lines will not be equal to twice the sum of the divisions upon either line alone? That is, are we not forced to conclude that one infinite may be equal to, less, or greater than another?

In the correct answer to this question lies the solution of the mathematical antinomies, which have their origin in a false conception of the infinite, and are in no sense contradictions into which the reason, legitimately used, must fall. The fallacy contained in the above reasoning is palpable. It is true that we must consider each division on the one line equal to each division on the other, and, taking any number of divisions on the one and adding them to an equal number on the other, we obtain a sum equal to twice the number of given divisions on either. But when we say "*all* the divisions on the one are equal to *all* the divisions on the other," we speak of the lines as quantitative wholes, and introduce an error with the word *all*. To conceive of a thing as a whole, we must assign to it limits, and in saying "the whole" of any object we refer to those limits beyond which there is none of that object. In regarding any object as a quantitative whole, we necessarily think it as finite. When we compare one line with another and say that its extent is greater or less than that of the other, we mean that, when the one is applied to the other, its limits extend beyond or fall within those of the other. In other words, we give the difference between the distances included between their respective limits. Measuring is merely giving the distance between

limits. In the case of the two infinite lines we have no point to measure from, and no point to measure to, and no measurement—therefore no comparison is possible. It is a palpable contradiction to compare (*i. e.*, give relations of measurement between the respective limits of) two infinities (*i. e.*, things which cannot be measured as having no limits).

The terms longer, shorter, equal, can therefore have no meaning as applied to infinite lines, and are legitimately used only in speaking of the finite.

As a line can only be increased by adding to it at its extremities, it is manifestly absurd to speak of the sum of the two lines mentioned above as greater than either line alone; but there are cases in which the error of a wrong conclusion is not so immediately palpable—as, for example, the case of a line limited at but one point. May we not here add to the line at its extremity, and thus increase its total length? At first glance it would seem so, but when we recollect that the line is limited only at one point, and is not, therefore, as a line, defined (for two points are necessary to define a line), the impossibility of regarding it as a quantitative whole is evident, and the impossibility of increasing or diminishing its length *as a whole* necessarily follows. The word “all” cannot be applied to the line either in its original state or after it has been added to. The question, therefore, whether a line without any limits is not greater than one which is limited at one point, is rightly answered by saying that the very nature of the conceptions precludes the possibility of the words “greater” or “less” being applied to either; that neither of the lines can be regarded quantitatively, and that, consequently, the question is a meaningless one.

The reasoning here applied to lines will also apply to surfaces and solids. It is unnecessary to multiply instances, as the principle is in all cases the same. In general, wherever the limit is removed in any one direction, whether in the case of lines, surfaces, or solids, the object can no longer be regarded as finite, and, consequently, not as a quantitative whole.

If we use the word infinite in its strict etymological sense, as referring to a total absence of limits, that which has even one limit cannot, of course, be called infinite. We find such a use of the word in the writings of Sir William Hamilton, who asserts

that past time, since it is bounded by the present, cannot be infinite—"a bounded infinite is a contradiction."¹ But arguments drawn from the etymological signification of a word are valueless, unless that signification expresses the true and whole content of the word. That such is not the case here is evident. A line limited at but one point is certainly not finite, for it cannot be regarded as a whole, cannot be increased, diminished, or compared with other lines; in short, it is not subject to the conditions of the finite. If, then, for etymological reasons, we exclude it from the class of infinities, we have the infinite, the finite, and a *tertium quid*, which is between the two. There is, however, no difficulty in classing such a line with the infinite, for they are subject to the same conditions, and equally distinct from the finite.

It remains to consider a class of cases of an apparently different nature from those we have examined. It is argued that an infinite series of dollars will exceed in value an infinite series of cents—that, where the unit differs, the difference will extend to the series in its totality. The error of such an assumption may be easily shown by showing what the assertion necessarily involves.

Suppose that, instead of counting one cent in the one series to each dollar in the other, we vary our mode of procedure by counting one hundred cents in the one to each dollar in the other. It is true that the one series will be exhausted one hundred times as rapidly as the other; but, since they are both infinite (will never end), we may continue thus forever (to infinity). We may then regard the two series as of equal value. And, by successively changing the unit, we may make the one series greater than, equal to, or less than the other, the value depending merely on the mode of reckoning. If we have a right to make an estimate of the comparative values of the series in the first instance, we have the same right in the second, as the error in the two is identical, and consists in regarding an infinite series as a whole, capable as a whole of increase or diminution. An infinite cannot be made one member of an equation, for, having abstracted the quantitative, we have abstracted the condition under which alone an equation is valid, and the form becomes meaningless.

¹ "Metaph.," Boston, 1859, pp. 527 *et seq.*

The difficulties which will arise from overlooking this important fact are well instanced in that agnostic theory which Sir William Hamilton developed under the name of the Philosophy of the Conditioned, the fundamental principle of which is that "all which is conceivable in thought lies between two extremes, which, as contradictory of each other, cannot both be true, but of which, as mutual contradictories, one must."¹

Let us examine his application of this law to our conception of space:

"We are altogether unable to conceive space as bounded—as finite; that is, as a whole, beyond which there is no further space. Every one is conscious that this is impossible. . . . The one contradictory is thus found inconceivable; we cannot conceive space as absolutely limited.

"On the other hand, we are equally powerless to realize in thought the possibility of the opposite contradictory; we cannot conceive space as infinite, as without limits. You may launch out in thought beyond the solar walk, you may transcend in fancy even the universe of matter, and rise from sphere to sphere in the region of empty space, until imagination sinks exhausted; with all this what have you done? You have never gone beyond the finite, you have attained at best only to the indefinite, and the indefinite, however expanded, is still always the finite. . . ."

That the former of these contradictories is inconceivable we must admit; but the argument used to prove the latter inconceivable is plainly faulty. We may, indeed, "rise from sphere to sphere in the region of empty space" without transcending the finite; we cannot arrive at the unlimited while we carry our limits with us. Each successive stage simply places the limits farther apart, and in no respect tends to do away with them altogether. This attempt to arrive at the infinite forcibly reminds one of the tragical history of the amusing person in Chamisso's poem, who supposed that, by turning quickly around, he could cause his cue to hang in front.

"Er dreht sich links, er dreht sich rechts,
Es thut nichts Gut's, es thut nichts Schlecht's—
Der Zopf, der hängt ihm hinten."

¹ "Metaph.," Boston, 1859, pp. 527 *et seq.*

And how analogous would be the condition of one who would still seek to reach the infinite by endlessly continuing this hopeless journey to that of the hero as portrayed in the last verse !

“ Und seht, er dreht sich immer noch,
Und denkt: es hilft am Ende doch—
Der Zopf, der hängt ihm hinten.”

It is not by adding space to space that we arrive at the idea of infinite space. Imagination may well “sink exhausted” in the attempt to find the end of the limitless. This is an attempt to realize infinite space as a quantitative whole, and, so considered, it is manifestly inconceivable, as containing a contradiction. The antinomies arising from the consideration of the minimum of space, and those which have to do with our idea of time, are equally capable of solution by the substitution of the true (qualitative) idea of the infinite for the quantitative idea; the error is in all cases identical, and the contradiction a gratuitous one.

It is interesting to notice that that acutest of thinkers, Immanuel Kant, although he has based the proof of the thesis of his first antinomy on a false conception of the infinite, and although, after correctly criticising the false conception, he himself lapses into it, yet perceived, and in so many words gave expression to the fact, that the conception of the infinite is not a quantitative one.

The thesis of the first antinomy maintains that the world had a beginning in time, and is limited with regard to space—both of which are denied in the antithesis. The proofs offered in support of the antithesis may be passed over as extraneous to the subject; those in support of the thesis I will quote, not for the purpose of again pointing out their fallacious character, for they are identical with the arguments used by Sir William Hamilton, but in order that I may give the observations appended to them, which are significant in their contextual connection. The proof proceeds by assuming the truth of the antithesis, and then proving it to be impossible:

“Granted, that the world has no beginning in time; up to every given moment of time an eternity must have elapsed, and therewith passed away an infinite series of successive conditions or states of things in the world. Now, the infinity of a series consists in the fact that it never can be completed by means of a suc-

cessive synthesis. It follows that an infinite series already elapsed is impossible, and that, consequently, a beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its existence. And this was the first thing to be proved.

“As regards the second, let us take the opposite for granted. In this case the world must be an infinite given total of coexistent things. Now, we cannot cogitate the dimensions of a quantity, which is not given within certain limits of an intuition, in any other way than by means of a synthesis of its parts, and the total of such a quantity only by means of a completed synthesis, or the repeated addition of unity to itself. Accordingly, to cogitate the world, which fills all spaces, as a whole, the successive synthesis of the parts of an infinite world must be looked upon as completed—that is to say, an infinite time must be regarded as having elapsed in the enumeration of all coexisting things, which is impossible. For this reason an infinite aggregate of actual things cannot be considered as a given whole, consequently not as a contemporaneously given whole. The world is, consequently, as regards extension in space, *not infinite*, but enclosed in limits. And this was the second thing to be proved.”¹

It will be noticed that the word *completed* (vollendet) is used in the first part of the proof in a manner to which we may object as misleading. When we speak of a series as “completed by means of a successive synthesis,” we are apt to regard it as a whole, having a beginning as well as an end. The inconsequent nature of the reasoning in the latter part of the proof it is scarcely necessary to point out. The observations on the thesis are the following:

“In bringing forward these conflicting arguments, I have not been on the search for sophisms, for the purpose of availing myself of special pleading, which takes advantage of the carelessness of the opposite party, appeals to a misunderstood statute, and erects its unrighteous claims upon an unfair interpretation. Both proofs originate fairly from the nature of the case, and the advantage presented by the mistakes of the dogmatists of both parties has been completely set aside.

“The thesis might also have been unfairly demonstrated by the introduction of an erroneous conception of the infinity of a given quantity. A quantity is infinite if a greater than itself cannot

¹ “Critique.” Trans. by Meiklejohn. London, 1876, pp. 266

possibly exist. The quantity is measured by the number of given units—which are taken as a standard—contained in it. Now, no number can be the greatest, because one or more units can always be added. It follows that an infinite given quantity, consequently an infinite world (both as regards time and extension), is impossible. It is therefore limited in both respects. In this manner I might have conducted my proof; but the conception given in it does not agree with the true conception of an infinite whole. In this there is no representation of its quantity; it is not said how large it is; consequently, its conception is not the conception of a *maximum*. We cogitate in it merely its relation to an arbitrarily assumed unit, in relation to which it is greater than any number. Now, just as the unit which is taken is greater or smaller, the infinite will be greater or smaller; but the infinity, which consists merely in the relation to this given unit, must remain always the same, although the absolute quantity of the whole is not thereby cognized.

“The true (transcendental) conception of infinity is: that the successive synthesis of unity in the measurement of a given quantum can never be completed. Hence it follows, without possibility of mistake, that an eternity of actual successive states up to a given (the present) moment cannot have elapsed, and that the world must, therefore, have a beginning.

“In regard to the second part of the thesis, the difficulty as to an infinite and yet elapsed series disappears; for the manifold of a world infinite in extension is contemporaneously given. But, in order to cogitate the total of this manifold, as we cannot have the aid of limits constituting by themselves this total in intuition, we are obliged to give some account of our conception, which in this case cannot proceed from the whole to the determined quantity of the parts, but must demonstrate the possibility of a whole by means of a successive synthesis of the parts. But as this synthesis must constitute a series that cannot be completed, it is impossible for us to cogitate prior to it, and, consequently, not by means of it, a totality. For the conception of totality itself is, in the present case, the representation of a completed synthesis of the parts; and this completion, and, consequently, its conception, is impossible.”¹

¹ “Critique,” pp. 268 ff.

We here find a conception of the infinite brought forward as false; a declaration of wherein it differs from the true conception; and a statement of what, according to Kant, the true conception really is. "A quantity is infinite if a greater than itself cannot possibly exist." We can readily see that such a conception gives us, not an infinite, but a finite. Not only is the word *greater* inapplicable to infinities, but the very expression "a *quantity* is infinite" is absurd, as involving a contradiction. Kant was too clear a thinker not to see that that which admits of an addition of units, and consequently of increase as a whole, cannot be infinite. He declares that this does not agree with the true conception of the infinite, in which "there is no representation of its quantity, it is not said how large it is; consequently its conception is not the conception of a *maximum*." This is a clear recognition of the fact that the conception cannot be quantitative.

But it is evident that Kant did not see the full force and the logical consequences of this statement. In the sentence immediately preceding he uses the phrase "an infinite whole," and in the sentences immediately following he brings forward a conception faulty in precisely the same respect as the one criticised. "We cogitate in it merely its relation to an arbitrarily assumed unit, in relation to which it is greater than any number. Now, just as the unit which is taken is greater or smaller, the infinite will be greater or smaller; but the infinity, which consists merely in the relation to this given unit, must remain always the same, although the absolute quantity of the whole is not thereby cognized." That is, if we designate the infinite by a , the unit by b , and the infinity (the relation of a to b) by x , we find that a varies as b , but that x remains always the same (and this can only mean *numerically* the same).

The infinity is, in this case, simply an indefinite number, and the quantity of the whole can certainly be cognized. The error is identical with that in the case just cited, and both parts of the proof given in support of the thesis of the first antinomy will fall to the ground when this error is rectified.

It remains to consider a case which apparently militates against the theory that an infinite series can never be regarded as a whole. In the case of a point moving uniformly along a line, over the whole of which it will pass in a given time, we have a descending

series which we may assume to be represented by $\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{8}, \dots 0$. The point will have moved over one half of the line in half a minute, over one fourth more in a quarter of a minute, etc., until, when the minute is completed, the point will have arrived at zero. We find here, under a slightly different guise, the old problem of Achilles and the Tortoise. Must we not regard the whole series as contained between the two limits 1 and 0, and capable of completion by a successive synthesis?

A moment's consideration will reveal the fallacy of such a mode of reasoning. The series is not completed at all, but is truly infinite. It is limited at one point by the highest member, $\frac{1}{2}$; but is not limited at another by the zero, since this can only be assumed as a limit to the series by breaking the law of the series, which is that each term shall be half as great as the term preceding. We can never, by halving something, arrive at nothing; a division of substance will never give us that which is not substance. The 0, since it does not make one in the series, cannot limit the series. The error lies in regarding the series as capable of completion by passing through all degrees of the composite to the simple, and from that to 0 as a final term. Whether we hold to the Kantian conception of space, or to the Berkeleyan, which would deny to any given portion of space an infinite divisibility, our conclusions will be the same as to the impossibility of the completion of an infinite series. According to the former, space and time are composites. A space is made up of spaces, and never by subdividing it could we arrive at that which is not space. The point in question passes over the whole line, not by completing the descending series until it arrives at the simple, but by the successive addition of spaces, which are composites. A line is not made up of points, for a point is possible only as the limit of a line. If one point has no extension, a thousand will have no more. We cannot, by multiplying points, create in them a property which no single point can possess in the slightest degree. "As space is not a composite of substances (and not even of real accidents), if I abstract all composition therein, nothing—not even a point—remains; for a point is possible only as the limit of a space—consequently, of a composite. Space and time, therefore, do not consist of simple parts."¹

¹ "Critique," p. 274.

We cannot, therefore, consider any member of the series under consideration as the smallest possible, but must regard the series as truly endless. We have, then, an infinite series, limited at but one point, which cannot be regarded as a sum total, a quantitative whole, equal as a whole to the given line; and the apparent exception we find to be not incompatible with the general position we have assumed.

According to the Berkeleyan theory, which would hold that the subdivision of any given portion of space will result in the simple, we are compelled to assume that the point in question passes over the line by the successive addition of simple parts; but we may still hold the mathematical series to be infinite. The negation of an infinite divisibility to space does not imply the negation of the infinity of a mathematical series, but simply implies that mathematical reasonings can be applied to the determination of space only within certain limits—those of a possible perception. We find, then, that, on either theory, this antinomy, like all the others, depends upon a misconception, and is capable of an easy solution.

FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF J. G. FICHTE BY A. E. KROEGER.

PART THIRD.—*Concerning the Higher Faculty.*

CHAPTER III.

GENERAL REVIEW OF ALL THE PRECEDING.

Life, as One, is simply because it is; and in this its Being it is altogether not an object of contemplation, but an object of thinking; and, moreover, of pure thinking, or intellectualizing.

It cannot be contemplated, for contemplation is a being of immediate freedom. But life in its pure being is not free at all to tear itself loose from that being; it is absolutely tied down to that its formal being. It is, therefore, absolutely impossible that life should have an immediate contemplation of its being.

Nevertheless, it is thinkable. It has freedom to manifest itself

in its being, and in this manifestation it certainly contemplates itself; but in none of its manifestations is it altogether absorbed. Hence its fundamental manifestation is a double one; it can rise above them and comprehend itself as that which remains unchangeable in the change. This comprehension of itself is a going beyond the contemplation, and hence, according to the above established conception, a thinking generally. But it is, furthermore, as distinct from the thinking treated of here, a *pure* thinking. For, although the going *beyond* a form of contemplation (as in the above-mentioned external perception there is a going beyond the *inner* form of contemplation) is a thinking, the entering into another form of contemplation (the external form, in the above case) is not a pure but a sensuous thinking. Here we are face to face with the original manifestation of life, and, therefore, at the source of all contemplation. We go beyond it, and hence beyond all contemplation. This thinking is, therefore, a pure thinking, or an intellectualizing.

The fundamental manifestation of life is, as I have said, a double one. This it is necessarily; for if it were merely simple, and if life were thus absorbed in it, the thinking of a something, which remained unchangeable in every change, would be impossible. Hence there must be, at least, a change of forms, a duplicity of the form. The change itself is posited by that thinkability, and is, in its fundamental element, nothing else than that thinkability. Hence duplicity suffices for it; and hence nothing more than duplicity is needed for it.

It is of a double character. First, an absolute self-alienation, a general contemplation; as yet, however, not contemplating that power as power, but merely contemplating its object, the sensuous world. Second, an absolute return into itself through concentration into one point of that general contemplation, and a consequent assumption of individual form, and self-consciousness and free activity in that form.

It is well known, but does not concern us here, that while the first fundamental form remains always unchangeably one, life can represent itself in this second fundamental form of individuality in an infinite repetition of that form. But it always remains the same one fundamental form; and this formal unity alone is at present considered by us.

In the first form life generally (*vita*) is viewed as a permanent power; a view which certainly does not immediately follow from the contemplation, but which we comprehend here as following from the general connection.

In the second view the same life is contemplated as a real living (taking the word as a verb, *vivere*), and hence as an immediate moving and being active. We therefore have in both views an immediate contemplation of the living of the life. The whole is a contemplation of life, and nothing else.

Why this contemplation of life should dirempt into a duplicity of form we have already stated; the reason given being, that it is thinkable, as it must be, only in this manner. But it cannot be thinkable without being contemplated, since it is thinkable only under the condition of being an object of contemplation, the fact of thinking being merely a going beyond contemplation, and being, therefore, conditioned by it. Adding thinking to contemplation, the whole would be a revelation of life unto itself.

It can also be shown why the contemplation of life must have separated into that duplicity of form in the exact manner in which it did so separate. In the universal form, life is contemplated only as a possible living. This is as yet no true living; and hence the second form, in which the contemplation of actual living and moving becomes possible, must supply the deficiency of content of the first. In this second form, again, life is never contemplated in its totality and in its completed being, but only in beginnings, which point to an infinite further development. Hence the first form must supply the deficiency of extent of this second contemplation. Neither of the forms of contemplation by itself, but only both in their union, furnish an expressive contemplation of life.

The whole system of facts of consciousness, therefore, which we have hitherto established, has really been deduced from one ground, and comprehended as a necessary in itself connected totality. If there is life, and if life reveals itself to itself, then there must be precisely such a consciousness as we have described; for only in this form can life reveal itself to itself.

It is well known to us that the first form results in a permanent sensuous world with all the determinations pointed out in it; and also that the second form results in a system of individuals,

with necessary determinations; but we know at the same time that the whole is nothing but the necessary form of the self-contemplation of life. We know that this contemplation necessary separates into such images, and that, indeed, it dirempts originally in order to be able alone to think itself beyond all contemplation. Hence we are far from arresting our investigation at those images, as in themselves essences.

But how did we arrive at that result? Positively in no other way than by following the purely scientific principle to regard consciousness as a phenomenon existing for itself, and to explain it out of itself. What, then, is the hitherto described consciousness? It is an exhibition of free activity, and utterance of power, merely and solely for the purpose of making power manifest and cause freedom to be visible as freedom—an exhibition which has no other end than to make the freedom appearing in it to be really freedom.

I should not be at all annoyed if any one were to consider such a consciousness a very empty and insignificant exhibition; or if he were to suspect any description of it to be not very profound and thorough, and hence to be incorrect.

But we have often before hinted already that such a view is not to be our final result. Hitherto we have regarded life merely as life, as absolute freedom and self-activity, and from this presupposition we have correctly enough arrived at all our previous conclusions.

But supposing the presupposition of our immediately preceding paragraph should prove true, and that a new law should assign to absolute freedom a definite aim and end. Supposing that freedom should no longer exist for its own sake, but as the means and instrument of this higher law, of the moral law, which is to be realized through freedom in the sphere of external contemplation, and which, therefore, must be contemplated itself! What would be the result then?

Precisely as the whole system of consciousness, hitherto deduced, was a contemplation of life, so life itself, in its just discovered spiritual unity, would become a contemplation of the moral law. It would, therefore, be contemplated no longer merely for the sake of being contemplated, and for the sake of giving rise to an exhibition of freedom. The exhibition would obtain a unity, a sig

nificance, an end: morality. We should have to say that the one life of freedom is, in truth, nothing but the form of contemplating morality. It might be that, in our investigation of this moral law, it would turn out that here also we should be driven to ask: What is it? for what purpose? and whence its origin? and that then we should discover again that the moral law is also nothing but the form of contemplating a higher principle, arriving at which, no further questions could be asked. In this way absolutely everything would change into contemplations and forms of contemplation and nothing would remain as a true Being but the One absolute principle. Everything within the region of contemplation would change into conditioned and conditioning forms of contemplation except the absolute contemplation of the One absolute principle, which alone would remain as the absolute contemplation, having its being for its own sake.

Life must be contemplated in order that the moral law may be contemplated; and the moral law must be contemplated in order that the absolute may be contemplated: this will be the ascending series of our meditations.

CHAPTER IV.

THE MORAL LAW AS THE PRINCIPLE OF LIFE, AND THE LATTER AS
THE VISIBILITY OF THE FORMER.

A.

Life, it is true, is out of itself, of itself, and through itself in form—*i. e.*, in its activity. This is an immediate result of its conception, since otherwise it would not be life. But it is quite a different question whether its conceived existence, beyond all activity, is also based in itself and absolute. If this question is answered in the affirmative, then life and its manifestation, exist only for the purpose of existing, and for no other purpose.

We have already before, in the course of our investigation, met some facts of consciousness according to which this question can not be answered in the affirmative. Indeed, the natural aversion of every uncorrupted man to consider formal freedom as its own end and aim is the most general and telling fact of this kind.

We have gathered together these facts, and expressed them by the supposition that there exists some definite or final purpose,

which is to be attained by the activity of this life ; and that, consequently, life is not merely for its own sake, or for the sake of manifesting itself, but for the sake of that definite or final end ; in short, that it is merely a tool and means of realizing that end. Let us now further analyze that supposition.

If Life does not exist for its own sake, then it also does not exist *through* itself ; that is, the ground of its existence is not in itself, but in another, namely, in that final end. Life, indeed, is only *thought*, as we have seen. Now, if this thinking of life examines itself in order to discover whether it has its ground in itself or not, it most certainly finds that it cannot constitute a fact the ground of the thought life, since life is thought as in itself the ground of all facts, and the only ground of facts. If, therefore, life cannot be thought as being its own ground, a final end can and must be thought as such ground.

That final end, therefore, which also can only be thought, and which must be presupposed as existing—and for the present as, at least relatively, absolutely existing—is the ground of the formal existence of life as well as of its qualitative character. All this is involved in our presupposition.

How this final end can be thought by us as existing—for the present such a thinking is absolutely demanded, and we know that it is possible. Should any one say that such a thinking were impossible for him, we should simply have to decline his participating in our investigation ; and what an entirely different sphere of being it opens to us we shall mention afterward, and by that very means ascend higher. But, factually, within the sphere of appearances, that final end has not actual existence, but is to, *shall*, have actual existence through life. The final end is, where it is, only through life. Again : life itself, in its own existence, is only through the Being of the final end. It is evident that in these two propositions the word *is* must have a different meaning, since otherwise they would contradict and cancel each other.

The Being of life, therefore, is positively nothing absolute itself. We have discovered its ground : it is the final end which creates and determines it.

Why does the final end need to create a Life outside of itself ? Since our investigation doubtless seeks the Absolute, and since we have now discovered a higher somewhat, which, in comparison

with life, at least, is absolute—why should we now again proceed from this new discovered Absolute toward life? Does the conception of a final end itself, perhaps, involve such a going beyond itself again? Undoubtedly. It needs a somewhat of which it is the final end. It wants to be realized, and needs a means for that purpose; and this purpose it furnishes itself, so far as we can now perceive, in life.

It wants to be realized; but the real and actual can be contemplated. It is to be contemplated; and hence it needs life. Life, therefore, is, in its real essence, the contemplability or the appearance of the final end.

B.

Having obtained this new and higher view of life, it will now be our duty to further determine the hitherto final results of our investigation; and this further determination will henceforth be our business.

Firstly, the content of our previous absolute thinking was this: Life *is*. This content has now been changed into this expression: The visibility of an absolute final end *is*—which is the substantial part of the expression; and this visibility is absolutely active, pure, and altogether creative—which is its formal part. Every one will here perceive a duplicity. The absolute final end is altogether and throughout determined by itself. It is what it is simply through itself, and this is a determined Somewhat. It *is*; it does not grow to be; and nothing in it grows to be. Hence it is also beyond all life, and as the ground of the being of that life. Now, this final end assumes here, moreover, the form of an absolute life and of a freedom, which is an absolute creating out of nothingness, as we have described it heretofore.

Now, what can this life create out of nothingness? Its inner content and core, perhaps, and the inner content and core of its product? If we take up the former view, where we regarded it as purely formal life and freedom, unquestionably. But, according to the present view, which does not concede that it is an absolutely being and complete final end, in which there is no growth and becoming, we can no longer say so. Hence it could create only the form; that is, it creates the final end, which was previously merely in the spiritual and altogether invisible world, in the visible world, wherein that final end did not previously

have existence. It is, therefore, an absolute creator, but only of the form, and not of the content, of the final end. It no more creates the latter than it is created by it.

We furthermore came across the basis of all contemplation—namely: the utterance, or manifestation, of that life. And this we met in a double form: the universal form, which represents the one total life in its mere possibility; and the individual form, which represents it as actually active, but only from out of specific points. The duplicity of that form was necessary in order to make life something more than merely thinkable. The contemplation was contemplation of the life just as it is, as a mere free activity and nothing else. But at present we perceive that life is not to be contemplated merely for the sake of being contemplated, but in order that the final end may be contemplated in life. Previously we deduced contemplation from the conception of the contemplability of mere life. This, now, is no longer sufficient. Life is to be contemplated as at the same time the means and the tool of the final end. Thus the contemplability of the final end itself must enter through life at the same time in our *a priori* determination of the general system of contemplation. By means of this fundamental law we must now further determine the determination of contemplation so far as we have discovered it at present; and to do so will be our business now.

C.

The duplicity of the fundamental form was the condition of the thinkability of life; but this thinking itself is again, as has appeared in the course of our investigation, a condition of the thinkability of the final end, and hence of its appearance in the form of thinking. Hence this disjunction remains, as well in regard to the contemplability of the final end as of that of life. Presupposing it to be valid, we have, therefore, to determine only its two single fundamental forms.

I. The General Form. This is, firstly, contemplation of the Power of Life, which comprises an infinite manifold. Now, what must be, according to our previous view, the determining ground of this manifold—that is to say, as a manifold in its seeming inner content, in so far as this is a particular content? The activity, in its pure unity, is not contemplable, but only thinkable; if it

is to become contemplatable, it must dirempt itself; and, since it is to be infinitely contemplatable, it must dirempt itself infinitely. The ground of the seeming diversity of the particular is, therefore, contained altogether in the absolute contemplatability; and this is diverse, because otherwise it would not exist at all; but the true basis is the mere empty freedom, wherein there is nothing distinguishable. Thus, then, the manifoldness is a mere semblance; an appearance simply in order to be an appearance; and it is nothing else.

According to our present view, the Power exists not only in order to cause the appearance of activity, but also in order that it may appear as the tool of the final end. Through the command of this final end the free activity is limited, within general possibility, to a fixed sphere. Not all that is possible, but only a part of the possible, is to occur. Now let us ask: Does this part, which is to occur, occur merely for the sake of making freedom visible? By no means; but in order to make the final end visible. This final end, taken as real, would be this part of the power—of the real power, or of the power of the real. Now, how is that, which is not to occur, related to it? This opens to us a double view: the final end is to be made visible through life, and hence through freedom. But freedom in the individual form, which alone admits of acting, comprises self-limitation. Hence, the visibility of a command of a final end involves expressly that there shall be a play-ground, as it were, or a more extended sphere, wherein something prohibited can be found. So much, for the present, concerning the matter of the visibility of the command; its formal part we shall meet in proper time.

Hence, the visibility of the final end most certainly involves that, besides the sphere of the acts commanded, there shall also be another sphere of mere possibility; but the final end can involve no determination as to what are to be the contents of this other sphere, since it is fully exhausted by the sphere of the commanded. Thus that inner sphere of mere possibility falls under the rule of the above determining law—the law of the contemplatability of purely empty and nugatory freedom. All this is no power to create the Real, but merely the power to create an Appearance.

From this it follows, firstly, that it is possible to represent the final end through the means of life; that freedom can absolutely

do whatever it is bid to do, and that there is no possibility of a dispute about these matters. The original power of life is nothing else than the power to achieve the final end; nothing else than the original self-manifestation of this final end in freedom. The totality of the power expresses the final end wholly and completely; nay, it comprises far more; that is, also, the power not to obey; and the other expression of the final end comprises only the narrower sphere.

Let me add this: We know, from our investigation, that the general contemplation must be described as a contemplation of power; in immediate contemplation, we behold only the object of that power—nature. Now, just as life has thus lost its independence and absoluteness, so nature, the mere image of that life, also, and to a still greater degree, loses its independence and absoluteness by that result. Just as the power is in all its determinations only the product of the final end, so nature, the mere contemplability of that power, is such a product to a still greater degree. Nature is the image of our real power, and hence absolutely conformable to an end; we can achieve in and upon nature all that the final end commands us to achieve. The principle of nature is absolutely a moral principle, and by no means a natural principle; for, if it were the latter, nature would be absolute. Nature is heteronomous, and by no means autonomous. Nature is to be explained, partly from its ends, and partly from the visibility of those ends; from both, indeed, as we have shown in the case of the power, whose image nature is. If we forget the latter point, we shall fall into absurdities.

Morality, therefore, appears here as the absolute determining principle of nature. Nor ought this to surprise us, since it has appeared as the principle of life, which again is the principle of nature.

II. In the general unity form of life, as such, we discovered not only a contemplation, but also a real power—namely, the power to concentrate into a unity-point of the general power, and to create individual forms by that contraction.

Now, since life, in its truly real acting, is, without exception, the expression of the final end, the same applies to those *actibus individuationis*. Our previous assumption, that life were herein utterly free and lawless, now drops entirely to the ground. Life, in

this production of individual forms, is determined altogether by the final end. Each individual, therefore, who comes into existence does so come into existence through the final end, and solely for the sake of the final end. Nevertheless, he comes into existence as an individual; that is, just as individuation appeared formerly as the concentration into a unity-point of a possibility of acting, and a connection of a fixed series of possibilities of acting from this unity-point, so now it appears as the concentration to a unity-point of the *Shall*, and as the connection of a series of *Shalls* from this unity-point. Just as above the general sphere of a power of doing separated into several individual faculties, so here the general problem given to the one life separates into several problems; into parts, through the realization of all of which, if it were at all possible in time, the universal final end would be realized, each individual having, through his mere existence within the sphere of universal life, such a specific problem. Each one is to do that which he alone is called to do (or *shall* do), and which he alone *can* do—since the concentration upon the unity-point of the *Shall* is also a concentration upon the unity-point of the *Can*—which only he, and positively no one else, is called to do and can do, and which, if *he* does not do it, will be done by no one else, at least of this community of individuals. Precisely as we discovered above, that in a physical aspect the individual comes into existence without any action or consciousness of his own, and cannot change this his Being—this concentration upon or into a unity-point—although having the power to determine himself from that point with absolute freedom, so now, in the world of his moral destination, he is to find himself as he is, without any action or consciousness of his own, and without any power to change this his moral being. But neither must (shall) he, in this his moral world, even desire to change it, but must further voluntarily develop and determine himself in accordance with that found fundamental law of his moral determination. The individual does not assign to himself his moral task, for that is assigned to him simultaneously with his existence; but he does, at some time of his life, assign it to himself *consciously*. This, however, he can do only because it has been originally assigned to him, without his consciousness, through his mere existence. The coming into existence of an individual is a particular and altogether determined

decree of the moral law in general, which expresses itself in full only by its decrees to *all* individuals.

The one and universal life, in its assumption of individual form, is altogether determined through the final end. In what manner? It is true that life is activity, and, moreover, absolute, creative activity. But in this, its universal form, it is not conscious of itself, and hence it is not free in the strict sense of the word. That is to say, there is no impulse in it which it may follow or not follow. Hence, it is not determined through the final end, as the individual is determined through the command of the final end, with a freedom to obey or disobey. The final end operates upon life in its universal form as a law of nature, and life in this form is only the appearance in nature of the final end. In and through it such and such individuals must result, and they do result.

In this way, therefore, we have been led to a fixed and real nature, which, in so far as we ascribe reality to the final end alone, is not merely the visibility of another, but visibility for itself. What is this nature, firstly, in regard to its form? Not a substrate, or anything of that kind, but pure and absolute life and power, which creates the merely possible into an actual, the immediate fundamental principle of all actuality. The ground of its being, as well as the ground which irresistibly and, like a law of nature, determines the manifestation of its power, is the final end itself. Here we find the absolute union and the true connecting link of both worlds, the visible and the invisible.

Now, which are those original determinations, and the absolute creatures of nature? The world of individuals. The individuals, therefore, in consequence of their moral destinations, are the only true and actual in nature, and their creation completes nature in general.

Whatsoever exists otherwise, or appears as existing, is product of the particular life, or of particular life in individual form; as, for instance, contemplation of nature in the individual itself as also a part of nature, a further modification of nature, since in its unity-point it is a power of nature.

This removes all difficulties—which beset other systems, that assume an in itself absolute, hence immoral, nature—of explaining freedom and consciousness in the individual. The individual is

simply moral; and this morality posits absolutely consciousness and freedom, since morality is possible only on condition of *their* existence.

We add here the following: In the individual form, as such, the real power of life to create individuals is completed and exhausted. The individual, when once he exists, is absolutely an individual, and can neither annihilate himself nor change into other individuals, and thus create individuals outside of himself. If, therefore, universal life were to come to an end in the production of one or a certain fixed number of individuals, this coming to an end would exhaust and annihilate the real power of the one life, and life in its universal creative power would become invisible. This can never occur, for life must absolutely appear in its totality, because the final end must become visible in it. Hence, within the sphere of appearances, the world of individuals is never completed; new ones must always arise; and it is not only necessary that there should be many individuals—which we had not proved before—but that there should be a continuous, increasing, and, in the appearance, never-to-be-completed series of individuals.

We might say that, according to the above, the final end in its totality must be divided among the sum of individuals, and that hence, if the final end is a determined and complete Whole, the sum of individuals must also be a complete Whole; and this remark furnishes us opportunity for an additional statement, which opens a wide prospect. For, in so far as the final end is to become *visible*, it must be apportioned among a determined and fixed sum of individuals, since it is visible only in the form of individuals. And thus the just now demonstrated continuous creation of new moral individuals presupposes that a part of the final end is still invisible; namely, the part which is to be made visible by the new creation. In this regard, therefore, the appearance of every new-world citizen—and there is no other world than the moral world—is a revelation of the moral final end from a new and previously altogether invisible point of view. It is possible that this progressiveness of the manifestation of the final end may be conditioned by the fulfilment of the problem, which became visible previously; and that, until such fulfilment takes place, time will pass on void and empty, merely repeating the unfulfilled problem in other individuals. Thus, in the moral order of the final end,

one age of the world would be conditioned by another age, and the sequence of ages would be the gradual unfolding to greater clearness of the final end.

D.

Let us now proceed to determine the second fundamental form of the manifestation of life—the individual form—by applying the same principle.

I. The contemplation of the one and universal power exists in the individuals as such. The totality of the power, or nature, is contemplated through them as the focus of knowledge; and by each of them, of course, in the same manner, for in regard to the contents of that contemplation they are not individual, but are the one and universal life itself.

In order to remove all occasion for misapprehension or confusion, I will here add the following: The one universal life—or nature—has already, on a previous occasion, been separated into two main views: firstly, as real life, in its creation of individuals; and, secondly, as ideal life, in its self-contemplation. It can assume the latter form, as factical, only in the form of the individual, since it contemplates itself and becomes conscious of itself only in that form—though as one contemplation, and hence, as in all individual forms, the same one content. This contemplation must comprise all that is comprised in actuality. But actuality extends as far as individuation. Hence universal contemplation must comprise the contemplation of as many individuals as the one life has created; and the *immediate* universal contemplation must extend just so far: namely, to the universal contemplation of all individuals from the standpoint of every single individual.

And here let me make a remark, which I trust will remove many a misapprehension of previous propositions of the Science of Knowledge. No individual contemplates, or beholds, beings of his own kind *in himself* and in his self-contemplation, but in the immediate contemplation of the one life. Whatsoever else there is in nature—physical force, etc., down to coarse matter—is contemplated, of course, by each individual in himself, in the immediate contemplation of his universal power. But precisely because this is its universal and not its particularly limited power, it is compelled to transfer this contemplation to other

beings of its own kind, which have already appeared to it in the first contemplation.

Now, the one life, as nature, is absolutely determined by the final end in the production of individuals. It can produce no individuals, except with specific moral determinations. This, as an absolute determination of that life, must also appear in the universal contemplation thereof, and, moreover, in its immediate contemplation, wherein the individuals appear according to their existence, altogether independent of the reflection of the contemplating individual upon his own morality. It must appear in the same universality which it has in the one life. What is this universality, and where is its limit? It is this: that all individuals, without an exception, have a special moral destination of their own; and whatever this destination is for every particular individual, lies beyond the limit. The universal contemplation merely shows that all individuals have a moral destination, for the sake of which their being, and the products of their freedom, must not be treated like things of nature, but must be respected; in short, this contemplation involves all that we have previously established factually as the source of the conception of the relation of free beings to each other—the conception of Law. These conceptions we have found—and this is an important matter—to be independent of the morality of the individual himself who entertains them; nay, independent even of the fact of the reflection concerning his own morality. They are the real mediating and connecting link between the natural and the moral conceptions, as well as of their ground—the determination of the one life through the final end. The real central link is found between the two worlds.

This appears also in actual life. Even the man, who is himself unjust, and who cannot look upon his act in the form of that contemplation, being moved by passionate desire, will judge that act to be unjust when committed by another, because he is then calm and open to the impressions of his spiritual nature; just as we often find the very men demand most of others who are least inclined to help those others when necessary. In their lowest form we find these conceptions, not so much as things, which anybody is to *do*, as something, which ought to *be*.

We here obtain, therefore, a new determination of universal contemplation, the basis of the Legal Conception, whereby free-

dom is turned into nature, as it were, and called upon to operate and produce a fixed and permanent Being like an irresistible and compulsory law of nature.

II. The particular, moral determination of each individual, which is *his* in consequence of his origination from out the universal life, does not arise into consciousness in the described universal contemplation, but only in the separate and altogether internal self-contemplation of the individual as such, since this determination is his exclusively own Being. The question is, How and in what manner?

In order to answer this question thoroughly and clearly, let us investigate more closely the condition of moral freedom and its contemplability. We saw above that the mere sensuous individuality, even without any appearance of the moral law in consciousness, makes actual acting completely possible, and real freedom, the possibility of determining one's self to do a specific act, in every way perfectible. If the moral law is added, there arises a limitation of that determined possibility; at first, of course, merely in the conception. It is conceived that the possible freedom of acting must be limited to a determined, limited sphere. Now, in consequence of this conception, the free individual, confined to the described condition, is to limit himself by a free act, and this free act is to be visible as such, since the law, as determining the life, is to be visible. But the free act, according to a previously demonstrated proposition, is visible only when a resistance occurs; hence the visibility of the moral determination as such posits, first of all, a resistance. The resistance must, therefore, be manifested—just as the visibility manifests itself—absolutely. And since it is the one life, as nature, which is determined by the formal visibility of the moral law, it must be that one life which produces such a resistance.

But, again, where must this resistance appear? Evidently in physical freedom itself, for it is this freedom which is to be determined, and, moreover, in its individual form, since here we speak only of this kind of form. This resistance is not itself an acting. For freedom is to be limited in advance of this acting. Hence, it must be necessarily a principle, which, without the moral limitation, would be an acting. In other words, it must be an impulse, for by that word we have characterized such a principle before. It must be, moreover, a positive impulse, and by no

means a mere indifference to act without any moral determination; an impulse which, in resisting this determination, must be overcome by it, and in the very overcoming of which the moral free deed must become visible. It is a necessary consequence of individuation that such an impulse should appear in the individual; for it belongs to the individual form, as a form wherein the actual causality of the moral law is to become visible.

It is a positive impulse to act, for the present, *without* any moral law. But for that very reason it aspires to perfect its whole form, and thus to be absolute, even though it be against the moral law. It wants to abrogate the moral law altogether. In our consciousness it will thus appear as a natural *will*, given to us through our mere sensuous existence. Hence the law, against which it rebels, and which, on its account, rebels against it, as a *shall*, as the negation of the will in its function, as a ground of determination. Hence this peculiar form of the law, which for that very reason is valid also only for this opposition. In determining the one life, the final end has not at all the form of the *shall*, but only the form of the *must*. It rules as a law of nature. The impulse itself is its product in so far as it is a law of nature, and exists only for the sake of its visibility and in its mere form; the same impulse which, through the same law, as a determining law of freedom, is to be annihilated, not so far as its being is concerned, which would be a contradiction, but as a determining ground of acting.

REMARK.

This impulse is a natural impulse, and, if we follow it, it produces an acting according to the law of nature. Hence, in following the impulse, the individual is not at all free, but subservient to an irrevocable law; and in this region life, in its mere form as pure life, has no causality whatever.

But what, then, is the content of this acting in general, and generally, of the manyfold in its seeming manifestation of freedom? We have seen it before: the mere contemplability of life as such, without any real core; a mere picturing in order to be a picturing; a Nothing, forever to be further formed. The individual who acts in obedience to the impulse acts under the law of this further evolution of the Nothing.

Again, if, on the other hand, the individual determines himself

through the moral law, he also is not free, and life again has no causality; for this is what freedom means. Has he, then, no freedom at all? Yes, certainly: in the transition, in rising from the condition of nature to that of morality.

This enables us to offer a ready reply to the question propounded. Consciousness is the freedom of a Being; determined consciousness, freedom of a determined being. Whatsoever is to be the immediate consciousness of a subject must be immediately the actual being of that same subject. If the subject is absorbed by the natural impulse, his moral determinateness still remains, of course; his being; but only in the background, as it were. His immediate, actual being, is that impulse. Hence the impulse alone is manifested in consciousness, and it is absolutely impossible that the moral determinateness should manifest itself in consciousness—at least so far as its *contents* are concerned; for, in regard to the *form*, and in so far as that form is contained in the general conception of law, as a part of the universal contemplation, it may be otherwise. Now, what is the ground of this impossibility? The absorption by the impulse. Hence the individual must, first of all, get rid of the impulse. Can he do this? Or, in order to give another form to the question: Since such a self-ridding of the law of nature on the part of the individual, without having determined himself as yet by the moral law, would be the just described freedom, the causality of the life through itself, is the individual really and in point of fact free?

Since such a freedom conditions the determinability through the moral law, and hence its absolute visibility, does not this actual and real freedom belong to the absolute determinations of the individual, as such, which it receives immediately from nature under the determination of the final end?

Three things, therefore, constitute the essence of the individual: 1. The natural impulse; 2. The moral determination or destination; and 3. Absolute freedom as the mediating link between the two former.

Hence the individual must annihilate the impulse, as its immediately actual being, through this freedom. Does any Being, then, still adhere to it? Of course; that is, its moral destination; and this is now its immediate, actual Being. For the present, how-

ever, it is still free in regard to it, since it has not yet determined itself in accordance with the laws of that destination. Hence it now enters the emptied consciousness necessarily, in consequence of the law of consciousness.

Now, what sort of a consciousness is this? As the immediate expression of Being, it is necessarily an immediate contemplation, which forms itself under this condition precisely as it is, without any freedom on the part of the knowing—such as we meet in thinking, which is a going beyond contemplation—and accompanied, as all contemplation is, by immediate evidence. Its content has no external ground, and cannot be made a subject of argument, like a series of thinking. It simply is, and is what it is; that is, it is a consciousness that I am called upon to do this very particular thing.

Result.—The determinedness of moral consciousness is not produced by the freedom of thinking, but absolutely creates itself. It is true that freedom co-operates in the process, but somewhat differently. By killing the impulse, it puts itself into the condition wherein it can realize itself that determined contemplation propounds a problem, which the individual can freely make his own, and which he ought to and most certainly, according to the above, can solve. But the acting of the individual is an infinite line, and, by virtue of that infinity, stands under the moral law. Hence, after accomplishing the first problem, a second problem will arise for the individual—conditioned by the first one—and so on *ad infinitum*. The moral destination of the individual, which is altogether completed by his going beyond universal life, as a Being, can thus arise to consciousness only in an infinite, never-to-be-finished series of separate, determined contemplations, which series is connected and remains the same through the law of conditionedness; and the determined act, we are called upon and actually can do, is valid only for the determined time-moment.

The impulse, as an essential component part of the individual, remains eternal; hence freedom also remains eternal. If, therefore, the individual had determined himself to realize his determined moral problem, he nevertheless would be able to repeal, or cancel, this his moral task at any time; or, even if he did undertake the next task, he still might refuse obedience to the following, etc., etc. In this condition his infinite life would therefore re-

main an everlasting self-determination, a continuous creation of free resolves, which, however, might just as well be moral as immoral. But in that case the moral law would also not be a determinedness of *Being*, of the fixed, unchangeable unit of individual life, as it proposes to be; but it would exist merely accidentally, and as a determining ground of some manifestations of life without any rule or law whatever.

These accidental manifestations would be moral, to be sure, but the life itself, in its root and basis, would remain immoral.

That accomplished problem was in contemplation; hence life must be determined by contemplation. But it is to be determined by the absolutely invisible and eternal unity of the law. How can this determination, as the only true morality of the individual, manifest itself?

Evidently only by the absolute annihilation and canceling of the impulse as well as of freedom, since the described opposite condition is founded on the latter. Now, neither of them can be annihilated as faculties. They must, therefore, be annihilated as facts. The individual must have the power to determine himself for all eternity never to admit any more as a fact the freedom which nevertheless continues as a possibility forever.

Determination through freedom is called a *free* Willing—not the previously described *natural* Willing. That determination would, therefore, be a resolve henceforth and forever to obey—without flinching or considering, and without any separate resolve of freedom—the moral law, in whatever form it may present itself in our infinite contemplation.

Of course, freedom would remain as a faculty—a possibility; and hence such a will—for in its continuance we must call it will, and not, as in the moment of its origination, resolve—must uphold itself eternally through itself, which upholding is precisely the continuous annihilation of the always possible real freedom, and will manifest itself as such an upholding. But continuous self-determination, to be moral, is now no longer possible, since this self-determination has been achieved for all eternity. Now let the moral law develop itself internally hereafter in the infinitely continued series of contemplations, and you may be sure that its eternal life will develop itself precisely in the same manner, since the Will, as the mediating agency, is always present.

The act of the creation of an eternal and holy Will in itself is the act by which the individual creates itself into being, the immediate visibility of the final end, and by which it, therefore, completes its own peculiar internal life. Henceforth the individual no longer lives himself, but within him lives, as ought to live, the final end. The final end, I say, and not the command (Categorical Imperative), for only in relation to the impulse and freedom is the final end a *Shall* and a Command; not for the Will, since the will wills nothing but the final end, and is, in truth, the Will of that final end. If we therefore still choose to look upon that final end as a law, it must be as actually through the mediating Will, a law of nature for real life, since a law of nature can now, that we have presupposed the existence of the Will, be nothing else than a manifestation of the final end. After the annihilation of freedom, even individual life changes into nature, *i. e.*, the higher and supersensuous nature.

E.

Determination of the Universal and Individual Forms in their Union through the Final End.

I. The determination through the final end involves immediately, not the universal operating power of life, or the sensuous world, but only the sum of free individuals. It involves that power of life only in form; that is, in so far as there must be generally a play-ground, or a larger sphere, wherein to make visible moral freedom in its distinction from natural freedom.

But the final end itself marks out within that absolutely given sphere a narrower field—the field of the productions of morality—and this field is divided off among the several individuals. Now, whatever we may think in regard to that general world as to its infinity or finity, this, at least, is immediately clear: the moral problem within it, describing, as it does, a narrower circle, must be a finite problem, which can be realized, and will be realized at some time by the totality of all the individuals to whom the problem is allotted. But, whenever this problem is realized, the reason for the existence of the sensuous world, which reason alone keeps it in existence, disappears, and hence the sensuous world itself vanishes.

II. But in so far as the final end itself is not, as here, an accidental manifestation, but determined in its absolute Being, it is necessarily infinite, just as life itself is, in this respect, infinite. Hence, after the annihilation of this first world, it must produce through life itself as nature—*i. e.*, as universal and eternal nature—a second world, altogether in the same form, in which alone it can become visible; that is, in individuals with natural impulses, freedom, and moral determination.

Of this second world we would have to say the same that we said of the first world; namely: the problem assigned to it will be solved at some time; and thus the second world also will perish. But, in order to represent the infinity of the final end, the same absolute and fundamental law will necessitate the creation of a third world, etc., etc., *ad infinitum*. The final end can make itself visible in life only as an infinite series of consecutive worlds.

III. Nevertheless, there is in this infinite consecutiveness of worlds only one life and only one determining final end. But how does it remain a unity and connected, and how does it thus become visible as a unity? The product of the absolute immediate determination of life through the final end we have in the individuals. It is only within the individuals, and through the self-contemplation of their power, that sensuous worlds arise. Those individuals are created through life as absolutely one and the same eternal nature, and the sensuous worlds are created only by the transit through the principle of the visibility of life. Hence, the individuals, being produced by the final itself, and not by any special manifestation thereof, remain the same. Their individual unity extends beyond the infinite series of all worlds; of course, in so far as they have determined their existence in actuality by the final end, or in so far as they have engendered the *will* in themselves. By means of this will, which is the immediate Being of the final end in them, and which creates worlds only for them and for their eternal end, they survive the destruction of all worlds. For the real and last appearance of the final end occurs only in the form of the individual, and the will alone is the proper medium of this appearance, the worlds being merely the spheres for the visibility of the individual wills. Those individuals who have not engendered that will in themselves will discontinue to exist.

They are mere appearances in this first world, according to the laws thereof, and perish along with that world.

Hence, the unity of life reposes for all eternity in the unity of the self-consciousness of the individuals, which began in this world, and in the unity of its contemplations of all its worlds, which, on that account, must also remain connected.

IV. This is the fundamental unity. But how does it connect the different worlds and make their series appear as one series? The answer is ready at hand: In regard to its existence, every preceding series is the condition of the possibility of the following series. Life can progress only by means of its complete development from the first step to the second step, etc., etc. In regard to the internal connection, the ideal ground, the determination through the final end, each preceding step exists simply because the next step is to follow it. The second step, for instance, is the expression of the final end, determined in its particular way, because the final end is determined in its particular way; but this second step cannot be taken until the first step, as the means and condition of that expression, has been taken.

Now, what, then, is that world which is to exist absolutely, and which, therefore, is the absolute expression of the final end, and after the realization of which the final end will have been altogether achieved and made visible? Evidently that world which exists for its own sake, and not for the sake of another world. Hence the last or final world. But there is no such final world, seeing that the series is infinite. Hence the absolute final end itself never becomes visible; only conditions of it become everlastingly visible. We can, therefore, never achieve the final end in its absolute contents, and must abandon our endeavor to reach in this series an absolute, which will become visible as such.

REMARKS AND DEDUCTIONS.

1. The second world, and, to a still higher degree, the infinite series of subsequent worlds, give admittance only to those individuals who have in the first world cut themselves off from immoral nature and engendered a holy will within themselves. Whatsoever remains in this life a mere manifestation of nature, perishes with that nature. But as no individuals, even not the perishing ones, are without a moral destination, and as the moral

end of this world must be realized in its totality, nature, being governed by the determination of the final end, is bound to create other individuals in place of those who do not realize their destination, and to give to those new individuals the same task which the perished failed to achieve.

2. Only those individuals, in whom the will has become a fixed and unchangeable Being, progress into future worlds. Now, although the will will have to exert and uphold itself forever also in those future worlds, since in those worlds also freedom and impulse must continue to exist as their absolutely formal conditions, it nevertheless may be assumed that individuals, once admitted into that series of future worlds, will be able to uphold their will. Hence no further perishing of individuals is possible in those worlds, though the worlds themselves will perish after the lapse of their time, and bring forth new worlds.

3. Hence in those future worlds we shall always have tasks and labors as we have here ; but we shall always have a holy and good will ; never a sensuous will.

Let me add the following general remarks : All individual life is, at its beginning, immoral, not in regard to its destination and what it ought to achieve, but in actuality. Morality is the product simply of absolute freedom. No individual is engendered a moral being, but each must make himself a moral being.

Again : The sphere for this self making itself moral on the part of life is the present world ; it is the place for the culture of the will for all future worlds. Hence our present world is absolutely the first of the whole series of worlds ; and neither it, nor the individuals appearing on it, have ever existed before.

And, finally, in all the future worlds there will appear only old individuals, who have existed previously in this present world of ours, and in it have arisen to a holy will. Hence no future world will produce new individuals. (Not to mention that, being new individuals, they would necessarily be immoral.)

It is true that we have previously established the proposition that the one life must become visible in its unity as life ; that is, as causality, and that thus we have proved that life must produce individuals, at least in its primary determination. Now, has this our proposition—deduced, as it is, from the eternal law of visibility—validity for all eternity ? And if it has, must not the one life in

its causality become visible as a Unit in all future worlds? Unquestionably. But in that case it has made itself visible as the factual principle of the production of a new world, and, accordingly, of infinite new future worlds, in which character it is not at all visible here.

ROWLAND G. HAZARD'S WORKS.¹

In previous numbers of this journal we have quoted largely from the latest work of Dr. Hazard. To the Anglo-Saxon mind the question of self-determination, so important to the philosopher, takes the form of the possibility of the freedom of the will. That the ordinary reflection—the second stage of knowing, as we have called it in another place²—will be sure to deny the possibility of freedom in a given instance, we may be certain. This is certain, because it does not acknowledge the existence of freedom as a possibility in any shape, and, of course, it will not recognize any special example of the same. Give it the idea of Cause, and, though it will admit that one object is modified through another, and that the modified object is effect, it will refuse to think the cause as a first cause of motion, but will hold: “A given cause is made active by some other cause.” It thus avoids the issue of the problem, and declines to

¹ 1. “*Essay on Language, and other Papers.*” By Rowland G. Hazard. Edited by E. P. Peabody. Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1857.

2. “*Our Resources.*” New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1868.

3. “*Finance and Hours of Labor.*” New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1868.

4. “*Freedom of Mind in Willing; or, Every Being that wills, a Creative First Cause.*” New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1864.

5. “*Two Letters, on Causation, and Freedom in Willing, addressed to John Stuart Mill. With an Appendix on the Existence of Matter, and our Notions of Infinite Space.*” By Rowland G. Hazard. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1869.

6. “*Zwei Briefe ueber Verursachung und Freiheit im Willen.*” Gerichtet an John Stuart Mill. Mit einem Anhang ueber die Existence des Stoffes und unsere Begriffe des Unendlichen Raumes. Von Rowland G. Hazard. New York: B. Westermann & Co. Leipzig: Bernhard Hermann.

7. “*Animals not Automata.*” By Rowland G. Hazard, Esq. (Reprint from “*The Popular Science Monthly*,” vol. vi, p. 405.)

8. “*Man a Creative First Cause.*” Two Discourses delivered at Concord, Mass., July, 1882. By Rowland G. Hazard, LL. D. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1883.

² See October ('83) number “*Jour. Spec. Phil.*” “*Philosophy in Outline*,” Chapter ix, § 82.

acknowledge the necessity of a true cause as the origin of the influence which is separated from the cause by the cause itself, and produces successive modification on all the links until it reaches the object in question. The thought of self-activity as the necessary presupposition of any motion or activity is called "inconceivable" by a thinker of this grade.

Dr. Hazard is gifted with such clear insight that he has never regarded the question of free-will as insoluble by reason of the "inconceivability" of self-activity. His glance has taken in at once the fact of causal action and the necessary presupposition of self-activity as the essence of causality. We can predict that it will almost surprise him that many sensible, capable, "common-sense" persons will fail to be convinced by his argument because they do not consciously admit self-activity as a possible thought.¹ A candid writer of this class recently reviews² the last work above cited, and dissents from Dr. Hazard's conclusions quite confidently. He even goes so far as to grant self-activity, but it does not seem to occur to him that self-activity means the origination of movement; to him it is entirely reasonable to admit self-activity and assert that it is the "product of innumerable forces," etc. He says, for example:

¹ Dr. Hazard's idea is that activity is always stimulated by a want, and he says ("Letters to Mill," p. 126): "I have already remarked that the ability of the mind to start from a fixed condition of universal passivity into action is, at least, doubtful, and that such condition being wholly foreign to our experience, the problem is not practically important."

His idea, elsewhere stated, is that if the mind should ever itself become wholly passive and oblivious, it could be still, through its sensations (which are not dependent on its *own*, but may be excited by extrinsic agencies), aroused, and wants be induced in it through the same agencies; and that, in fact, in such case, such external agency would be required to save him from annihilation. In "Freedom of Mind in Willing," chap. xiii, p. 137, he says: "If we ever become quiescent, we cease to be cause, and this want must then become manifest by some change, effected by some active cause without us, the effect of which, from the constitution of our being, we may recognize without effort of our own; and the fact is, we can not always prevent such cognition. If our mental activity ever entirely ceases, it must then be as if we had no mind, and we must be re-minded before we can again become an active cause; and this, as before suggested, may be done by want in us, produced by causes to the action of which our own efforts are not essential."

In another passage (p. 171) he treats of the bountiful provision which has been made for the production and recurrence of these wants—spiritual and physical—which are thus essential to intelligent activity. He holds that the question of our ability to change, of ourselves, from a purely passive to an active condition, is never put to the test of actual experience, and that it does not concern the question of man's freedom—i. e., the question of his *being* free—but only the question of *how he became free*, as he is with his actual environment. The true question is, Taking man as he is, does he will freely? (See also "Letters to Mill," pp. 101–153.)

² In "The Index" for November 8, 1883, p. 221.

"The fact that a creature is self-active, that the impelling forces, called the will, are a part of its nature, and therefore *internal*, does not carry with it the implication that the creature is detached from that cosmic order in which all things are bound together by the law of causation.¹ And, unless it be so detached, how can the words 'independent' and 'free' have, in this case, any logical or philosophical meaning? It seems to us that the libertarian, to prove free agency, must show that a creature has the power of deciding and doing differently from what it does decide to do; not simply that the proximate cause of its movements is internal, not external, but that this cause is not a related, dependent link in the chain of causation; not simply that the creature can exercise choice and will and act in accordance therewith, but that its choice and will are not dependent upon and determined by the constitution of its being and the nature of its environment; that, in short, being independent and free, it cannot only do as it chooses, but that it can choose to do one thing as easily as another."

Self-determination, according to the fatalist, is not freedom. For it moves according to its nature, and is compelled by itself thus to move. True to his hampered mode of thinking, which always puts its object into the form of conditioned and conditioning, it conceives the self-active in the form of a conditioned-by-itself, but regards that as a form of fate. And if there is choice present, then it "must choose as it did choose, because it is clear that it could not both choose and not choose at the same time!" Thus the reviewer suggests:

"If an individual, under any given circumstances, could have done the opposite of what it did do, it follows that from the same causes opposite effects could have resulted, which is an absurdity, or that events may occur independently of causation, which is no less an absurdity.²

"The advocates of necessity,' says Mr. Hazard, often ask 'if a man could will contrary to what he does will. I would say that he could if he so decided; but it would be a contradictory and absurd idea of freedom which, for its realization, would require that one might try to do what he had determined not to do.'

"He 'could will the contrary of what he does will, . . . if he so decided,' undoubtedly. But this is saying only that he could will contrary to what he does will, if he so willed. The question is, *Could he so decide?* The old advocates of free-will would have answered, unhesitatingly, Yes. But Mr. Hazard sees that this answer involves a conception that is 'contradictory and absurd,' and endeavors to avoid it.

¹ As to "that cosmic order in which all things are bound together by the law of causation," Dr. Hazard holds that this cosmic order is but the composite result of every intelligent will, and that every conative being has the power by his own acts of will to vary that order; and that, in fact, every act of will is intended to change that order, and may do it—making the future different from what it would have been but for such act.

² As to our power to will or do the opposite, see "Letters to Mill," p. 131.

"The question he raises is not whether 'one might try to do what he had determined not to try to do,' but whether he could decide contrary to what he does decide, contrary to what his character, views, and circumstances compel him to decide. If he could, according to our view, he is a free agent. If he could not, he is not a free agent. It is clear from Mr. Hazard's reply that he believes he could not, for he sees that the opposite of this belief leads to contradiction and absurdity."¹

¹ Dr. Hazard's definition of freedom as applicable to willing must be borne in mind. He says ("Freedom of Mind in Willing," p. 19): "The question may arise whether that which controls itself is free, or whether the fact of its being controlled, even though by itself, renders it not free. This question, in our present inquiry, concerns the action of the mind in willing; but we may say, generally, that everything, in moving or in acting, in motion or in action, must be directed and controlled in its motion or in its action by itself, or by something other than itself; and that, of these two conditions of everything moving or acting, or in motion or in action, the term freedom applies to the former rather than to the latter; and, if the term freedom does not apply to that condition, it can have no application to the acting, or the action, of anything whatever. And hence self-control is but another expression for the freedom of that which acts, or of the active agent; and this is in conformity to the customary use and the popular idea of the term freedom."

He holds that every being with feeling, knowledge, and volition is in its constitution self-active. "An act of will, a volition, is but an effort of the being that wills. Freedom in willing or effort is self-control of the effort by the being that wills, as contradistinguished from the idea of an act of will contributed by some extrinsic power. Every act of will, every effort of every such being, is incited by its own want (a feeling or emotion), and is directed to the gratification of this want by means of its own knowledge, including its preconceptions of the future effect of its effort. The object of an effort is always to make the future different from what it would otherwise be. This, as the being can not change the past, is the only conceivable motive, and the being thus acts, and acts as it does, not from any propulsion in the past, but from its own present feeling of a want to be gratified, which is its own knowledge of a reason for acting. It directs this effort by means of its own perceptions—more or less reliable—of the future effect of its effort ("Freedom of Mind in Willing," p. 70).

"As a conception, poetic or logical, of the effects of any contemplated efforts upon the future, is thus essential to the effort, a being with only sensation and a knowledge of the past and present would not will. It is only by the God-like power of making the future present that intelligence, infinite or finite, in the exercise of its will, becomes creative. By means of this power of anticipating its effects, the mind, in willing, is influenced by the anticipated creations of its own action, while those creations are still in the future, making a very broad distinction between intelligent and any conceivable unintelligent cause.

"It is this fact, that intelligent cause is influenced by its preconceptions of its own effects, that fits it for First Cause; for that which is thus, as it were, drawn forward by the future, needs no propulsion from the past; that which is moved by inducements before it does not need a motive influence behind it; that which acts from its own internal perception of the effects of its own action upon its own internal, existing want, does not require to be first acted upon by extraneous external forces."

This reduces all motives to one; with the further result reached (in "Letters to Mill,"

The reviewer elaborates his idea of the fate involved in organism in the following language :

"A statement of two or three of Mr. Hazard's positions will give some idea of his views and reasonings. He claims that every being, having feeling, knowledge, and power, is 'a creative first cause, an independent power in the universe, commensurate with its knowledge, freely putting forth its efforts to change existing conditions.' Every such being, however high or low in the scale of life, within the limits of its power and knowledge, is in its action 'as free as if it were omniscient and omnipresent.' This is as true of the oyster as of man. To those who would limit free agency to man, this statement will seem strange; but it is consistent with the general theory of free agency, so far, at least, as free agency is consistent with itself. If the power of choosing and willing implies independence and freedom, then there is no escape from the conclusion that the worm, within the limits of its knowledge and power, is independent and free. With this view of the subject, the question of the evolutionist, Where, in the development of life and intelligence, does free agency begin? is deprived of its force and rendered irrelevant by a surrender to the necessitarian of what hitherto has been defended, and is now generally regarded as a stronghold of the doctrine of man's free agency, involving a denial, too, of what is commonly believed to be an essential distinction between man and all other living creatures on the globe.

"But when this concession is made, as it is by Mr. Hazard, another question immediately arises: If, in the evolution of life, the condition of every period has grown out of pre-existent conditions, how is it possible that in this invariable continuity of phenomena creatures appeared endowed with powers enabling them to sever connection with the converging forces and influences that produced them, and to escape reciprocal relationships with the environment in which they were formed, so that

p. 25), that effort is always to move our muscles or increase our knowledge. In all this, intelligent being will, of course, conform its action to the existing conditions, the succession of which he seeks by his effort to influence. His action will, under one set of circumstances, differ from what it would be under another; but, in view of these conditions, be they what they may, he must still judge and decide what his action shall be to make the future what he wants it to be. This is self-control of his act of will, and hence freedom in willing. The change of the condition makes no difference to this freedom; he acts as freely on one set of conditions as on any other, and change in the conditions affects him only as it changes the knowledge by which he determines and directs his efforts. If the power to move the being to action inhered in the conditions or circumstances extrinsic to it, there could be no need of their being known to the being that acts. That such power does not inhere in the circumstances, but in the mind's own view—its knowledge, its belief in regard to them—is evident from the fact that, when by mistake the belief differs from the actual facts, the action is conformed to the belief and not to the fact. That his action is so conformed to his own knowledge indicates that it is so conformed by himself, and hence is his free act. (For this influence of circumstances, see "Freedom of Mind in Willing," p. 80; also p. 327 *et seq.*; and "Letters to Mill," §§ 8 and 9 of Letter I, and §§ 10, 16, 17, 18 of Letter II.)

they could be 'independent' and 'free'? Organisms appeared possessing sensation and the will and power to move themselves. But was not sensation a condition local and circumscribed in its character, determined in its nature, its tendencies, its requirements, its expressions, by influences so universal, so multitudinous, so complex, so subtle, and extending so far back in the abyss of time as to defy all finite powers of calculation? The oyster wills to move its shell; but is not its willing, in this case, dependent upon the possession of a shell, dependent upon an organized structure within the shell with relations between its parts, dependent upon an environment with relations between its parts, dependent, too, upon the connection between these inner and these outer relations, giving rise to certain sensations and wants and the power of effort? Since every creature is a product of innumerable forces that have established its medium and formed and fashioned it, giving it position and character, is connected by myriad threads with the entire universe, and its modes of life and thought, its appetites and passions, the air it breathes, the food it eats, the earth on which it lives, are determined by the constitution of nature, how can we say in truth that it is 'independent' and 'free'?"

And so when Dr. Hazard defines the holy man, "who has eradicated his conflicting wants, and annihilated the conditions requisite to his willing what is unholy," as being above sin and as incapable of willing what is impure and ignoble, the reviewer asks:

"What is this but a statement of the doctrine of necessity? The holy man must will what he believes right, because his character and disposition constrain him so to do."

If a self-made character, as in the case of holiness, is simply the fixed habit of willing only what is in harmony with free-will, it insures persistence in freedom. But the fatalist is convinced that this is an example of fate!

There are two kinds of necessity—the logical and the fatalistic. The necessity involved in a definition is a logical necessity: "A self-determined must be free." A fatalistic necessity is involved where something is made to be what it is by the action of something else: "This thing is determined by the totality of conditions existing in its environment." By the fallacy known as *quaternio terminorum*, or *ambiguous middle*, the following refutation of the possibility of freedom may be made: (1) A self-determined being must be free; (2) but, if it must be free, it is necessitated, and (3) therefore is not free. (The refutation of this may be easily accomplished by continuing the argument thus:) (4) But, since it is not free, it is evident that it was not necessitated to be free, and, therefore, (5) in spite of (2) and (3), it is free. The necessity in (1) is a logical one, and in (2) and (3) a fatalistic necessity. The reasoning assumes the identity of the two because of the use of an ambiguous word. So, in the case of a saint who has, by the energy of his will, formed the habit of

choosing the pure and noble, or what conduces to self-determination, the incapability of sinning is a logical one, logically resulting from freedom.

The most important characteristic of Dr. Hazard's writings is his clearness and simplicity. He expresses his insights in the language of a business man, avoiding almost entirely the conventional technique of the schools. The consequence of this is the popularity of his works among thoughtful persons who are not large readers in the province of metaphysical literature. Almost every notice that has appeared mentions the remarkable clearness and conciseness of the work on "Man a Creative First Cause."

The critic that objects to Dr. Hazard's solution of the problem of free-will must do so, as we have suggested, on the ground of the general impossibility of self-activity or self-movement. It seems strange that a thinker can admit derived movement or activity and yet deny self-movement and self-activity. He admits derivation, but denies the existence of a source of derivation. There is something which is moved, and a chain of moved bodies which receive and transmit motion, but no energy that originates motion. This is, in fact, the denial of causality. For the cause must be regarded as an energy that acts on something else as a modifying influence, and therefore must separate from itself, by its own activity, a portion of its influence or energy in the act of transmitting it to another.

If the causal action is regarded as a series of links in which each link receives causal energy and again transmits it, then the modification which we call *effect* is a modification received by the entire series from beyond the series, and the movement of the entire series is effect without a cause, unless the cause exists beyond the series.

Or, if the series is a circular one, as in the case of correlation of forces, then each link may be regarded as the source of the modification which it transmits through the series of links round finally to itself, and producing a modification in itself as effect. Hence, each link is a self-activity, the originator and receiver of the modification transmitted through the other link of the series.

It is clear that the denial of self-activity as the presupposition of causal action ends in setting up the theory of the indestructibility of force or motion, as well as the theory of the correlation of forces, or of particular movements. But the logical conclusion should be that each link in the circle of effects is an originating cause of its own effect—each is *causa sui*.

This implication of self-activity or the origination of motion in the idea of cause, and, consequently, its presupposition in the idea of effect, is an immediate one, and perfectly self-evident to every clear thinker. It is, therefore, perfectly legitimate for Dr. Hazard to presuppose it. But it is

to be expected that those persons who have persuaded themselves that effects can be produced without the operation of self-active causes will refuse to admit such a thing as free will-power.

It will be seen by the dates of the works referred to that Dr. Hazard has been before the public as an author for many years. His work on the "Freedom of Mind in Willing," published in 1864, is, if we mistake not, used as a reference book in many of the universities of Europe, as the work of a specialist and an authority on his theme. Few who read the clear and vigorous paragraphs of the most recent work would credit what is the fact: that they were written by a business man in his eighty-second year, and at intervals snatched from an active management of very important and complex affairs.

"Of the earliest of his published writings, the 'Essay on Language,' Channing thus speaks in his lecture on Self-Culture: 'I have known a man of vigorous intellect, who had enjoyed few advantages of early education, and whose mind was almost engrossed by the details of an extensive business, who composed a book, of much original thought, in steam-boats and on horseback, while visiting distant customers.' His later writings, on topics of finance and philosophy, have elicited strong expressions of appreciation and respect from one of the most distinguished of living authors in the same departments of inquiry—John Stuart Mill."¹

The relation of our author to the celebrated Dr. Channing is told in a recent work:²

"His knowledge of Rowland G. Hazard dated from the anonymous publication of 'Language, by a Rhetorician,' which I read to him when it first appeared. He immediately recognized a rare metaphysical genius in its author, and said: 'I must find out this young man. He is evidently young and unpracticed in the literary art, but he thinks originally and profoundly; and I believe that he is the one to answer Edwards "On the Will," which has never been answered yet on its own logical ground.' The next summer he wrote me from Newport that he had found 'Rhetorician in a manufacturing firm in Rhode Island; quite occupied with practical business at present, but to be, as I think, a star in the intellectual firmament by and by.'"

¹ Quoted from a review of Dr. Hazard's writings in the "North American Review" for 1874, by G. P. Fisher, D. D., who speaks of Dr. Hazard as "an American author who, without the advantage of a college training, and engaged from early life in an extensive manufacturing and mercantile business, which has allowed but limited opportunities for reading, has nevertheless written with extraordinary ability upon the grave and often perplexing problems of economical and metaphysical science."

² "Reminiscences of William Ellery Channing," by Elizabeth P. Peabody, p. 351.

In a letter from Dr. Hazard in the appendix to Miss Peabody's "Reminiscences of Channing," the story of the origin of the "Freedom of Mind in Willing" is told :

"Once, and I believe only once during that visit, the subject usually spoken of as 'the freedom of the will' came up. Dr. Channing stated his own position in regard to it to be that, while upon the testimony of his own consciousness he fully believed in freedom—that is, in his own free agency—still, all the argument seemed to him to be in favor of necessity ; and he went on to state what he regarded as the strongest argument of the advocates for necessity ; namely, that, if the same circumstances should occur a thousand times over, and the conditions of the mind at each recurrence of them should be the same, then the action would be the same. And this, he said, seemed to him to argue necessity. I replied, at the moment, that this was a particular case of the general law that the same causes necessarily produce the same effects ; and I doubted the applicability of this law to the mind, which was itself a cause. Here, so far as I recollect, the discussion of that subject then ended.

"I met him again, not very long after, at his summer residence near Newport, when he recurred to this conversation and the remark I had then made touching the like cases ; and I then said to him : 'Admit, for the purpose of the argument, that the same causes do of necessity produce the same effects, and that this law does apply to mind. Now suppose the one thousand cases with all the circumstances the same, and the conditions of the mind at each recurrence of them also the same, and that one of those conditions is that of necessity ; then, the same causes of necessity producing the same effects, the same action follows. Again, suppose another one thousand cases all alike, but that one of these conditions, instead of that of necessity, is now that of freedom ; then, the same causes of necessity producing the same effects, the same action follows. Now, as we can change the element of necessity to that of freedom without changing the result, the result is no indication of which is in and which is out.'

"Dr. Channing, after a short pause, said : 'It looks as if you had thrown that argument entirely out of the question ; but I would not like to decide it upon so short consideration.'

"In one of my discussions with John Stuart Mill I narrated what I have just written ; and when I had stated Dr. Channing's view as to the strongest argument of the necessarians, Mill interrupted me to say : 'That is precisely what I rely upon.' When I repeated what I had said upon it, I thought he looked perplexed ; and, thinking I had not expressed myself clearly, I began to explain, but he held up his finger and said : 'I see

the point; I see it. But I will wait till I read that in your book.' I was struck with the similarity of the effect upon these two distinguished thinkers.

"I cannot now fix the date, but at one time, when I was about to leave for the winter, Dr. Channing wrote to me that he wished to see me before I left, but was not well enough to leave home. I, of course, went to see him, when he said to me in substance that he had recently re-read 'Language,' with a higher appreciation of it than before; that he very much desired that the argument of Edwards should be logically refuted, and that freedom should be logically established, and he wished I would undertake it. I was quite surprised, and expressed the doubt I felt as to my ability, and also mentioned the slight knowledge I had of the subject—not having even read the argument of Edwards, or given special thought to the question generally. But he replied that he thought I had advanced farther in it than any other one he knew. Thus encouraged, and at the same time very loath to refuse the request of one I so much revered, I consented to look farther into the subject and see what I could do.

"My progress in it was slow; perhaps the slower, because I soon concluded that all the advocates of freedom had virtually given up the philosophical argument and fallen back either on revelation or their own consciousness—which weighed nothing with those who questioned the supreme authority of the Bible, or asserted their consciousness was not that they acted freely, but the reverse. Hence I resolved not to read, lest I should get into these ruts of thought, which evidently did not lead to the point I wished to reach, but would first try to work out the problem in my own way. From Edwards I learned what the questions were, and began to think about them in my usual desultory way as I was travelling about, or in such leisure moments as I could spare from my regular business, and became more and more interested in the pursuit."

We conclude this notice by quoting what Dr. Fisher says of the second of the treatises named above, and by two extracts from the book addressed to John Stuart Mill:

"'Our Resources' is a collection of articles published by Mr. Hazard during our late war. Early in the struggle there was great apprehension that, with the destruction of our foreign credit, our resources would prove inadequate to the emergency. These essays were designed to establish the faith of the public, here and abroad, in the sufficiency of our means. They originally appeared in the newspapers, but were collected into a pamphlet, which passed through repeated editions in this country and England. Abbreviated translations of them were also circulated on the

Continent. They showed that the *spare* income of the nation prior to the war was \$1,000,000,000 (gold value), and that from the stimulus imparted to labor by the war itself, and from the improvement in agricultural machinery, there was no reason to fear a diminution of this surplus; further, that from the standard of living prevalent among all classes in this country \$500,000,000 might be saved without stretching economy to a point involving any real hardship. They showed also that, while the great expenditures in the war, the prostration of the credit of individuals and of banks, and the withdrawing of coin, required a considerable emission of paper currency, yet any expansion beyond the limit of this requirement would increase the cost of the war, and enhance the debt to be subsequently paid in gold, with no counterbalancing advantages, since the increase in the volume of paper money would add nothing to its aggregate value or purchasing-power. The warning which was given in these able papers it would have been well to heed. One of the essays, entitled 'Compensation to Slaveholders,' undertakes to demonstrate that the value of land alone in a free State is equal to the combined value of land and of the slaves required to cultivate it in a slave State. This argument yields a picture full of encouragement to the South, since facts already indicate that it will be verified by the practical test.

"The last article of this series appeared at a very critical epoch in the financial affairs of the country. The treasury was depleted; gold was at 280; money was scarce, and the bonds of the Government unsalable. The incoming Secretary of the Treasury was advised in advance by bankers and financiers that his only resource was to issue more currency, that there might be a plentiful supply of money wherewith to buy the bonds. Mr. Hazard in this paper asserted—what in the light of subsequent experience is now obvious—that the course recommended to the Secretary would lead directly and speedily to national bankruptcy, and that it would, if adopted, produce a depreciation of the currency which it would be impossible to arrest, and that our financial fate would be the same as that which befell the Southern Confederacy. This article of Mr. Hazard was entitled 'Expansion and Contraction.' It explained how the effect of expansion must be to make money scarce and prevent the sale of the bonds; while the policy of contraction, if avowed, and adhered to, would restore confidence, and release money from the uses of trade and the appliances of speculation, to be invested in Government securities, and at the same time increase its purchasing power. The proposition was generally regarded as preposterous, but the arguments by which it was supported were found, on examination, convincing, and the doctrines of this brief essay are now among the recognized truths of political economy

The Secretary of the Treasury was fortunately convinced that these positions were well taken ; and, if the policy of contraction, which the author advised, was not pursued, no further expansion was attempted. The public are not generally aware how near we were, at that time, to measures which would have inevitably brought upon us financial ruin."

THE DEFINITION OF CAUSE.¹

If the whole aggregate antecedents are the Cause of any effect, then, as at each instant, the whole antecedents are the same at every point of space, the effects should be everywhere the same. To this it may be plausibly replied that, the conditions acted upon being different at different places, different results may follow from the action of the same cause.

In the first place, however, it must be borne in mind that, as these various conditions must exist before they can be acted upon, they must themselves, in the view we are now considering, be a part of the antecedents which make up the Cause. You explicitly assert that all the conditions are included in the Cause. The whole past being thus combined in one Cause, acting upon a perfectly blank and void and therefore homogeneous future, the effect would be the same throughout the whole length and breadth of its action. Again, admitting that the same causes, acting upon different conditions, may produce different effects, it can hardly be asserted by the advocates of the rule that the same causes necessarily produce the same effects, that the action of the same cause can itself be different ; for, then, this different action upon the same conditions would produce different effects, thus disproving the rule. Now, the whole past, being embodied in one Cause, must have one certain specific action, and that action either (being sufficient) produces an effect, or (being insufficient) produces no effect. If it produces an effect, then this effect is added to the aggregate events of the past, so far changing the aggregate Cause ; and a past Cause, which has once acted, never can again act as the same Cause, for this additional effect or event must ever remain a part of the whole past ; and hence there can be no practical application of the rule that the same causes of necessity produce the same effect ; and, on the other hand, if the action of this one aggregate Cause (being insufficient) produces no effect, then, as there can be no change in the Cause (and none in the conditions upon which it acted), the Cause would, of course, remain the same Cause, and, its action being the same and upon the same conditions, the result must be the same—that is,

¹ From Dr. Rowland G. Hazard's "Two Letters to Mill on Causation," p. 56. The criticism on the idea of a totality of antecedents shows clearly that efficient cause must be an intelligent will.

no effect, and there would be an end of all change, and everything would remain quiescent in the state in which this insufficiency of Cause found it.

If it now be said that the failure of this cause to produce any effect by its action is such a new event or condition that it can, as a consequence of it, act in some other manner, then, there being no change external to it, and nothing to change itself except the negative fact of non-effect, which can have no influence upon anything not cognizant of it, it follows that the Cause must be intelligent, and, as such, capable of devising or selecting some new mode of action which will avoid the deficiency of that before tried, and found to be ineffective. The Cause already embracing the whole past, nothing could be added to it from what already existed: being ineffective, no new existence has been added to it; and if, under these conditions, it changes its action, it must be self-directing, accommodating its action to circumstances which must be known to itself as a prerequisite to such accommodation. It must be intelligent Cause.

The whole of the prior state never can occur again, for the present is already added to it; and if, like a circulating series of decimals, the consequent of this whole past should be to reproduce and continually repeat the same series, and even though the observation of this uniformity, in the successive order of events, should enable us to predict the whole future, still it would not prove that the producing power was in the past circumstances. It would only prove the uniformity upon which the prediction was founded, and not the cause of that uniformity which still might be the uniform action of some intelligent active agent, who, perceiving some reason for adhering to this order, and having the present power, continually repeated it. Much less could it prove that power not free. The mere observed order of succession, uniform or otherwise, would not include a knowledge of the power that produced this uniformity, nor the manner of its doing it. To find this we should need to compare the effects with those of some known power in action, as those of intelligent effort or of matter in motion. Nor would this supposed dependence of the present on the past be a case of the same causes producing the same effects; for at each repetition of the effect the whole prior state, which is assumed to be the Cause, is different, the effect of each "prior state" acting as Cause being continually added: and, if there comes a time when there is no effect, then there can be no difference in this "prior state" or Cause, and, of course, no variation in the consequent—no effect.

And if, as you say, "in the general uniformity . . . this collective order is made up of particular sequences obtaining invariably among the separate parts," then the foregoing positions apply to each of these separate parts or longitudinal sections of the whole.

ON OUR NOTION OF INFINITE SPACE.¹

Mr. Herbert Spencer, in the article referred to in the preceding paper (*"Mill vs. Hamilton: the Test of Truth"*), says: "Here, then, is the flaw in Sir William Hamilton's proposition: that space must be infinite or finite are alternatives of which we are not obliged to regard one as necessary, seeing that we have no state of consciousness answering to either of these words, as applied to the totality of space, and therefore no exclusion of two antagonistic states of consciousness by one another." But the obvious truth of the general proposition, that everything "must be infinite or finite," does not depend upon our having a state of consciousness answering to the particular thing to which it is applied.

We assert that all the angles of every plane triangle are equal to two right angles; but we have no state of consciousness corresponding to triangles in general, or to every plane triangle, and hence, if such consciousness of the thing to which the general proposition is applied is necessary, we could only assert this of the particular triangle in the mind's view at the time. But, in demonstrating this geometrical theorem, we perceive that we use no elements which do not pertain to every plane triangle, whatever its form or size, and hence assert its truth of every plane triangle. The only condition essential to the demonstration is, that the figure shall be bounded by three right lines. So, too, when we assert that a thing is infinite or finite—is or is not bounded—we perceive that the truth of this proposition does not depend upon any peculiar property whatever of the thing to which it is applied, but is as true of a thing with one property, or one combination of properties, as of a thing with other property, or other combination of properties; and hence, whether we do or do not know or conceive of the properties of the particular thing to which we apply the proposition, is not material to our faith in its universal application to all things whatever. The only ground upon which space could be excluded from its application would be to assert that space, in itself, is no thing—that it is but our conception of nothingness; but it has the property of, or is in itself, extension—the very property or conception to which the idea of being bounded or not bounded most palpably applies.

If I see only a portion of anything, I know that it either is or is not bounded. A telegraph wire, of which I cannot see any end, I know either has or has not an end in each direction. It may be infinite, and every portion of it present the same appearance as that which I now see

¹ From the "Two Letters on Causation," etc., p. 274.

It may make an entire circle, and thus, though finite, in a common sense of the word, have no end. Even in this sense, to deny one of the positions asserts the other, both in terms and in thought.

In regard to space, it is asserted that, in its entirety, we can neither comprehend or conceive it as bounded, nor yet as not bounded. The first seems to me certain, but I am by no means sure that we cannot and do not conceive of space as boundless. That we know it must be either bounded or not bounded, taken in connection with our inability to conceive of it as bounded, seems to indicate that we do, in thought, regard and conceive it as boundless.

The mental process by which we attempt to grasp the idea of infinite space is peculiar. We begin with the admitted fact that it can have no bound or limit, and yet the next thing we attempt is to find its bound or limit, and then, because we cannot find in it that which we know does not belong to it, and cannot possibly pertain to it, we conclude that we do not comprehend it. This is as if one who had never before seen any shot, except those made of lead, should, on looking at some made of silver, say these are pure silver shot; I cannot find any lead in them; therefore I do not comprehend them. That our conception of anything does not embrace in it a property or quality which does not, or cannot, pertain to it, is so far proof that our conception of it is not incorrect. As the fact that one does not and cannot find any lead in pure silver shot, is so far evidence that he has a correct conception of silver shot; so, too, that we do not and cannot find any limit or bound to infinite space, so far indicates that in this respect we properly conceive it.

The knowledge or conception of a thing in itself is impossible to us. We can only know it by its properties of producing change in ourselves, and, if an outward object, the only way in which this can be done is through our sensations. The same object may have the property of effecting a variety of sensations, and we have not a full conception of it till we know all these properties, or, rather, all the effects attributed to them, for the properties, as distinct from the effects, like the things in themselves, are unknowable, and are recognized only by their effects upon us. When we name these properties, we only name a cause, the existence of which is inferred from the effect. This object may also have the property of changing itself, or of changing other objects, and, maybe, of being changed by them. The knowledge of all these elements is necessary to that full comprehension which is possible.

We comprehend a thing in itself when we know all its component parts and properties, and all the relations of these parts and properties to each other. As an entirety, we comprehend a circle whose radius reaches to

the remotest star. We know that all its properties are the same as those of any other circle. We cannot readily divide it into, and particularly notice, each of such magnitudes as we have been accustomed to move over, or even to clearly apprehend by the eye, for to fix the attention on each of such portions would require centuries. These cannot all be the objects of real or imaginary sensations. We cannot thus make it up or construct a conception of it by the addition of the minor perceptions which our senses have supplied. But this does not imply that mentally we do not comprehend this vast circle, with all its intrinsic properties and conditions. One must at least have a clear conception of those parts, properties, and relations, which he can fully and accurately present, on a smaller scale, to the senses. Now, the idea or conception of infinite space, in itself, is the simplest which is possible. Its only property by which it is related to or distinguished from anything else is its capacity to contain extension or admit other existences into itself; and for these it is equally essential, whether we regard it, with these other existences, as distinct, self-subsisting entities, or as mere ideal creations, or imagery of the mind. Strictly speaking, perhaps, this capacity of space, to be a receptacle for things or for certain mental imagery, is rather a use than a property. Its component parts are perfectly homogeneous—nothing but space—and the relations of each portion to all the rest are the same, and there is nothing external to it to which different portions of it might have different relations.

The idea of a periphery of a circle, considered merely as an isolated line, has this same homogeneity: every portion of it is precisely like every other equal portion, and has the same geometrical relation to every other portion. So, too, of the surface of a sphere; every portion is like every other portion of like dimensions, and each of such portions has the same relation to all the rest of the surface. But, in the cases of the circle's periphery and the sphere's surface, we always have a difference in the relations of the different parts to what is extrinsic to them, as that one part is farther from the earth than another, or one part is farther to our right than another, which cannot occur in regard to infinite space, to which there is nothing without to compare.

Intelligent being, intrinsic to space, may regard one portion of it as to his right, and another as to his left; but change in his position does not change his relation to all the rest of space in this respect.

If, instead of periphery and surface, we consider the enclosed area of the circle, and the enclosed quantity or space in the sphere, then the portions in each vary in their intrinsic relations to each other; some are nearer the periphery or the surface than others, or some are nearer to the

centre than others ; but make this sphere infinite, and this variety in the intrinsic relations of its parts disappears, for there is then no circumference, consequently no centre, but every point in it is as much a centre and as much on or near the circumference as any other point.

The homogeneity of the isolated periphery of the circle or of the surface of the sphere is again attained, and the conception is not embarrassed or complicated by any difference in the relations of its component parts, and has the additional exemption from such embarrassment and complication that there is nothing without it with which it can have any relations whatever.

The idea of infinite space is thus simpler than that of a finite homogeneous sphere in which the different parts stand in different relations to each other, and also to surrounding objects. No conception of anything can be simpler than of that which is perfectly homogeneous in all its parts, and in which every part has the same relation to every other part, and nothing outside with which to have varying relations, and in which, having only one property, this can, of course, have no relations whatever, and, therefore, no diversity of relation to any other of its properties.

In regard to the surface of the finite sphere, we cannot, in our conception of it, take in separately each point and observe its relations to every other point, for the number of these points is infinite ; but, knowing that each of these points has the same relation to every other point, we are justified, after ascertaining this fact, and having observed the relation of one point to the rest of the surface, which includes all other points, in saying that we comprehend this relation of every point to the whole surface.

So, too, in the case of infinite space, though we cannot consider each of the infinity of like finite spaces, of which it is composed, yet, knowing that the relation of each one to the whole is the same as that of every other, we may in like manner assert that we conceive and know that every point or portion has the same relation to the whole which every other point or like portion has. It seems, then, that our conception of infinite space—which properly extrudes the element of limit or bound, which does not belong to it, and which embraces a knowledge of all its component parts, and of all the relations of those parts to each other, and of all its properties and their relations to each other, and of all its uses—is as full and perfect a conception as we have of anything whatever.

The idea of what is thus homogeneous in all its parts, and in their relations to each other, which has but one property or use, and nothing without it to which it can have varying relations, is the simplest possible conception of existence, having indeed so few elements of thought in it as,

in the last analysis, to raise a doubt as to whether the conception is that of existence or of its absence.

Perhaps the principal difficulty in the case is that of believing that an idea, so simple and so limited in its conditions, really fits an object which, in its vastness, is illimitable. Hence we seek to add to our conception of it, and find that in so doing we immediately come in contact with ideas that do not belong to it, showing that on all sides we have reached the limit of the conception we are exploring, and have already embraced in our survey all that pertains to it. If extension is regarded as its property, this does not generically distinguish it from other things; for all have this property, and the consideration that this is the only real property of space, and that space is necessary to all material existences, strengthens my previous suggestion that extension is the nearest approach to our notion of a substratum. Mere extension is unoccupied space, and is that which always remains when all the other properties of that which occupied it are abstracted; but the extension, in itself, is then reduced to a vacuum or nonentity.

The reduction of our notion of tangible space to an idea of the simplest character, and eventually to a mere extended vacuum, is not wholly an isolated fact, without parallel in other objects of thought. As the tangible quantities of an algebraic formula may sometimes be reduced in the aggregate to zero, and more especially as the combination of such formulas in an equation, sometimes, when reduced to their lowest terms, results only in $0=0$, so, too, in subjecting some of our abstract ideas to that last analysis, in which they elude further reduction, analysis, or comparison, we get glimpses of relations by which they seem to be neutralizing each other, and, in the aggregate, resolving into nothingness, suggesting as a corollary the converse possibility that from nothingness they may have been evolved, and brought into existence by the creative plastic power of an Intelligence of a higher order than that which thus by its action resolves them again into their original nonentity.

If, by a fuller knowledge—a clearer perception—of this resolving process, or otherwise, we shall ever come to be able to reverse it, then, in connection with the ideal philosophy, the creative power of the finite, as of the Infinite Intelligence, will no longer be veiled in a mystery which has thus far been impenetrable to mortal vision, and the origin of all existence, except that which creates, would be revealed to us.

We may, perhaps, even now anticipate, or venture the prediction, that the creative power of mind will be found to reside mainly in its poetic modes of thought, and its annihilative, mainly in its logical prosaic modes.

This would be in harmony with the suggestions I have heretofore made: that the representation of the thought and imagery of the mind of God in the creations of the material universe is the purest type we know of poetry; that the province of the poet is to create, and to make his creations palpable and tangible to others, and that the appliance of the logical modes to his productions immediately reduces his creations to mere abstractions, with a cessation or revulsion of all the poetic vision and emotion which they were fitted to produce. We may thus, by a resort to the logical modes, annihilate the creations of the most gifted in our own sphere of intelligence, or, at least, reduce them to intangible abstractions. We may further note in this connection that mathematics, the purest type of the logical processes which thus dissolve or reduce the creations of the poet, is only the science of quantity, of simple extension, or mere space; our idea of which, involving the fewest properties and relations, is the nearest approach to nothingness of which we have any conception.

But this power of annihilating is by no means the only characteristic of the logical faculty. It is not creative, but it discovers and analyzes what already exists, and, in its ability to reduce, to disintegrate, and to abstract, it is an important agent in the advancement of our knowledge of what already is, often harmoniously co-operating with the poetic modes to this end.

A STUDY OF THE ILIAD.*

BY D. J. SNIDER.

III.

Book Second stands out among the books of the "Iliad" in possessing certain qualities of its own. It has, on the whole, the subtlest procedure, the most elusive links of conjunction that can be found in the whole poem. The motives are so hard to catch, so fleet and riant in their evasiveness, that the drift of opinion has usually been to regard the book as patchwork or a caprice, with little outer or inner connection. But it has a plan, a profound plan, and it fits organically into what goes before and what comes after. It has, however, a spirit of sportfulness, of playful concealment, which must first be reached and sympathized with before its true harmony can be felt.

Regarding it apart from the Catalogue of Ships, we see that

* Articles I. and II. of this series appeared respectively in the April and the July numbers of this Journal for 1883.—EDITOR.

it has a fundamental comic strand; it is, indeed, a sort of divine comedy, yet looking forward to a great and serious end. A double plot we observe in it, or rather a plot within a plot; we behold the astute human stratagem enfolded and carried on in the universal divine stratagem; Zeus, the upper ruler, turns to a comedian of the skies, and Agamemnon, the lower ruler, is to have his own wily, deceptive game played upon himself by the supreme God. Yet this play above and below and between is all in furtherance of the deep providential plan of the poem. So it is a veritable piece out of real life. Providence cannot help being a humorist once in a while; for has he not to deal with mortals, who, in their self-importance, sometimes get to thinking themselves a Providence? It is a hint of the world's comedy, played by its two actors, the God above and the man below; the Aristophanes of Olympus, that greatest comedian of all, reveals the mighty terrestrial scheme merely as a piece of his colossal divine humor.

The first point to be noticed is the relation between this and the preceding book. Here the subtlety of the treatment must be felt and seen, else the connection is lost; for this connection is not so much an external event as an internal, almost unexpressed state of feeling. The great fact lying back of this book and joining it with the First Book is the wrath and withdrawal of Achilles. But this fact is hardly spoken of, and then, as it were, with a quick rebound from the subject. Yet it is the matter in the minds of all the Greeks, it is the hidden, fearful thing lurking in their hearts and causing a deep suppressed anxiety. It is not a subject which can be talked about openly; the deed is done, and the Leader is the guilty man. The situation is: Our Hero has left us; what are we to do now? It is the masterly skill of the Poet in such an emergency to leave the main fact unspoken, yet to make it most deeply felt; this self-suppression one may well consider as the most genuine flash of artistic instinct in the whole Book—a flash swift and penetrating to the heart of the army.

That the chief men have the fateful word in their thoughts, but are unwilling to speak it out, will be seen by examining their utterances. Agamemnon says to the Council of Elders that he will *try* the Greeks and counsel flight; but how this could be a trial of them he does not tell, and we at first do not see; still the Elders seem to have understood him perfectly; he touched the hid-

den chord in his faint allusion. Again, Ulysses says in his speech to the people that the Leader intends to *try* them ; he explains no further, deeming the expression intelligible to all. There is an appeal to something underneath, which we must feel out ; it is the state of public opinion, as we should call it, like a subterranean river flowing dark and voiceless, yet a very decided reality. Agamemnon is therefore in doubt concerning this speechless monster, and there results the trial, which is to answer this question : Will the Greeks fight without their Hero ? Such is the main theme of the present Book, such is its subtle connection with the preceding Book ; the withdrawal of Achilles has roused and transmitted this dark burden of uncertainty and anxiety, which now lies on the hearts of the people, and makes the spoken word an intrusion, a crushed, ill-omened sound, altogether to be avoided.

Still it is not wholly avoided. Twice allusions to the fatal quarrel break out, and we are to note both the circumstances and the speakers. The first allusion comes from the mouth of Thersites, the demagogue who tries to be the voice of public discontent ; he is the unbridled slanderer of public men, the coiner of calumny. Such a character naturally touches the sore spot of the situation in hope of popular favor, but he is suppressed by the applause of the people, who are in no mood to listen to abuse or to any discussion of the painful topic.

The second allusion is made by Agamemnon in his last speech, where he confesses the wrong he has done to Achilles, and manifests repentance. This confession, it is plain, is spoken in deference to the feeling which he knows to be in the people, and it puts him in harmony with them by coming over to their opinion. Doubtless he felt what he said ; but certainly he removed a great obstacle by his penitent words ; though they cannot restore the Hero, they do restore the Leader to their good-will. He has won his point ; the Greeks will fight for the cause without the Hero ; he can afford to be generous and confess his own mistake. Such are the two allusions in this Book to the quarrel between Hero and Leader, which we read in the previous Book ; both presuppose a deep though not loud spirit of dismay, if not of discontent, among the people, and form the strongest bond of connection between the two Books.

It will be remembered that the First Book leaves us with the

two supreme persons of authority, the one in the Lower World and the other in the Upper World, each of whom has his plan. In the Second Book we are to see each carrying out his plan, and to see how both plans—that of the man and that of the God—fit into and complement each other. Zeus, in sleepless anxiety, is turning over his scheme which will bring honor to the heroic Individual; this is now the universal principle, the decree of the Highest God, and must prevail. Moreover, it is one with the Greek consciousness, not on the surface so much as down in the depths thereof; the Greeks, too, believe primarily in the honor of the Hero, and are in agreement with Zeus, or soon will be. This divine plan will henceforth hover, like a Providence, over the entire movement of the poem till the reconciliation of the Hero with his people.

On the other hand, Agamemnon, the earthly Leader, has his scheme, which is to take Troy in the absence of Achilles. He imagines that he can do without the Heroic Man, yet he has a lurking doubt; this doubt is to be resolved by a second scheme, which seeks to find out whether the Greeks will fight without their Hero. He may well feel a secret questioning upon this matter; the purpose of this Second Book (apart from the Catalogue) is to give the answer of the Greeks, which answer is, We shall fight.

These are the two plans above and below, the providential and the human; they start in opposition, then they unite in bringing forth the same result, namely, to get the Greeks to fight without Achilles. But after this point of union they again separate; that the Greeks will be defeated Zeus knows, that Troy may be taken Agamemnon imagines. It is the lesson of the Providence who is over all, and sportfully employs even the delusions of men to fulfil its purpose.

We may now touch upon the organism of the Book. It has two parts: first, the Testing of the Greeks, which is to find out whether they will fight without Achilles, and, secondly, the Calling of the Muster Roll when it is ascertained that they will fight. The last is usually called the Catalogue, and for us is rather a dreary list of names, though it is appropriate where it stands.

I. We shall now take up the First Part, which is by all means the most significant, and is usually meant when the Second Book is spoken of. This Part has one essential sub-division which di-

vides it into two movements, the one toward disruption and abandonment of the Trojan enterprise, the other is the reaction toward harmony and a valiant continuance of the struggle. On the track of these two movements, each of which is strongly marked by the introduction of a divine appearance, we shall follow out the course of the action.

(a) Zeus, in pursuance of his plan of honoring Achilles, sends a false dream to Agamemnon, declaring that Troy is now to be taken. At once the question springs up, How can the supreme deity resort to a deception to accomplish his end? The moral feeling is shocked, and at once begins to exclaim about the low conception of God among the Greeks. The question is indeed fundamental, and must be seen in its true light to understand the poet and his age. We have already found the axiom of Homeric Theology to be that the Gods are in the man as well as outside of him, and we may apply our axiom to the present case.

Indeed, we must feel that this dream is Agamemnon's own; he dreams that he can take Troy himself, without the Hero. This touch has been already given in the First Book, in his character there portrayed; turn back and mark his pride, his vanity, his contempt of others. The foundation of his conduct is, he imagines that he is self-sufficient alone; he dreams that he can capture the city without the aid of Achilles. Thus we are justified in putting this dream inside of Agamemnon.

But it is outside of him; Zeus sends it; this is the difficulty. Yet we need but reflect that this self-delusion of the Leader is a part of the plan of Zeus; the God turns the vain scheme of mortal man to his own purpose. It is the way of Providence, who overrules the evil of the world to good, as the moralist declares. But the Homeric manner of expression is mythical; that is, the Poet makes Zeus the cause, the sender of the delusion. The genuine mythical spirit always puts the deity at the centre of every action, and the world moves from him and around him. Zeus sends the dream, because this dream fits into and is a part of the providential plan of Zeus. The divine impulse has now been given, which is to bring the Greeks to fight, and by defeat to show them how necessary is their Hero. Thus we must see this dream in its double significance, the human and the divine; what it is in the man and what it is outside of him.

Having attended to the Olympian part, we may now look after the terrestrial. The dream is working delusively upon Agamemnon, yet there lurks in him the suspicion that it is a dream. He calls the Council of Elders and tells them his vision; the wise Nestor faintly hints its unreality. Then the people assemble; he advises them to abandon the war and go home, in a spirit contrary to the promise of the dream. This is his trial of the Greeks, to find out whether they will fight without Achilles. He employs the following stratagem: I shall make a discouraging speech, tell them to go back to home and country, and see what they will do. So as Zeus employs a deception above, Agamemnon employs a deception below, unconsciously requiting the divine ruse by one of his own. Yet both have the same purpose—to bring the Greeks to battle.

The Greeks at once respond in the most startling manner to those feigned words of the Leader. They clean out the channels, they drag down the ships to the sea, and get ready to start for home. A comical yet affecting scene, it is the sudden strong impulse of Family, which has been suppressed for ten years in those enduring hearts, and which now, at the touch of a sympathetic word, breaks forth in a vast sea-swell of emotion. It is one deep throb of that voiceless popular heart longing to get home, yet speaking mute volumes of heroic endurance for their cause. It is but one throb, and then comes the reaction which is now to be outlined briefly.

(b) This reaction is begun from above—must begin there, since it is a recall of the Greeks to the spiritual principle of the war. Juno mentions for the first time the name of Helen; she is the very soul of the Greek cause. If the first divine impulse came from Zeus for the sake of Achilles, this second one comes from Juno and Minerva, the special guardians and partisans of the Greek side, for the sake of Helen. The plan of the Goddesses is not interfered with by Zeus, as it fits into his higher plan of honoring the Hero and of bringing the Greeks to battle. Juno and Minerva are partisans; Zeus is over them.

Again there is a divine interference, and again we must see this same divine purpose in the hearts of men. The Greeks can not go home till they have restored Helen. Such is their strongest aspiration, their profoundest principle. That movement to go

home was but a transitory outburst of feeling—a noble one too—yet they will recover from it and fight again if they be recalled to themselves. It looked for a moment as if the ruse of Agamemnon would upset the whole enterprise, and therewith the plan of Zeus for Achilles; but the frenzy could not last; they would not be Greeks if they could go home without Helen.

The resolution above having been shown, we can now look below and see its execution. The human instrument is Ulysses, altogether the wisest man of the Greeks, whom grief had already seized for the loss of the enterprise and prepared for the appearance of Pallas. When he is ready for her, the Goddess darts down in a flash and speaks to him. Why just to him? He is the man to behold her, the only man, just as Agamemnon was the man to see the delusive dream. She recalls to him the great object of the war, Argive Helen, and bids him restrain the present rush for home. It was, too, his own inner command, else he could hardly have heard the Goddess.

In every sense Ulysses proves himself to be the proper man for the emergency. He takes from Agamemnon the staff, the wonderful staff of authority, always imperishable; he restrains the multitude, employing argument upon the leaders and blows upon the populace. He touches the heart of the matter in his famous utterance: Let there be one ruler, the Many cannot all be Kings. Obedience to authority is his golden word; herein he shows himself the intellectual enemy of Achilles, who is insubordinate.

Moreover, a new phase of opposition develops itself, very different from that of Achilles. Here he comes with his speech; it is the fault-finder Thersites. He too is hostile to authority, not as beautiful Hero, but as ugly, cowardly calumniator. All the qualities of body and mind repugnant to the Homeric spirit are heaped upon him, till he is weighed down with diabolic adjectives. Yet he belongs to the Homeric world—is indeed a prophecy of the Athenian demagogue. His outer ugliness corresponds to his inner perversity, a truly Greek method of expression, which makes him a sort of plastic Greek devil. He is the man who picks flaws in all great deeds and enterprises, and vilifies the men of authority. The wise man suppresses him with violence; the wise man too utters the statement: The rule of the Many is not a good thing; a

voice from Heaven among those beautiful but ever-conflicting individualities.

Yet Thersites told truths; he gave in some respects a just criticism of the Greek leaders; he was the opposition newspaper in the Greek camp. Now comes the strange fact: the people in whose behalf he seems to be speaking applaud Ulysses for suppressing him. Is it a case of popular fickleness and ingratitude? No; the people saw in Thersites the image of their own present attitude, their own ugliness, and they at once shrunk back, and the beginning was made toward the reaction. Not a loose episode is this affair of Thersites, but the turning-point back to their rational purpose.

This return to the grand object of the expedition is made complete by the three speeches of the three chief men which now follow. Homeric oratory before the people is here a glorious anticipation of Attic eloquence; in this instance, and in many others, we trace all the germs of later Greek life in the old poet. Each of these speeches has its own character. That of Ulysses dwells upon the national end against the domestic impulse so powerfully wrought upon by Agamemnon, and then he recalls the religious promise at the beginning of the war; Nestor follows somewhat in the same vein, for the old man is the appreciative spirit, not the creative—a difference seized by Shakespeare in "*Troilus and Cressida*." Agamemnon, at first in a tone of penitence, then in a tone of triumph, shows that he thinks the Greeks will fight without their Hero. The reaction is complete; the people are arrayed for battle. Pallas with her ægis stalks among them; the war spirit is rampant. The supreme end, which we may call national, has suppressed the feeling for home, and once more the combat is to be renewed, now without Achilles.

The two supremacies, divine and human, Zeus and Agamemnon, have each attained their purpose. Zeus has brought about war through the delusive dream, by which means he intends to honor Achilles; Agamemnon has ascertained that the Greeks will fight, though the Hero be absent. In the mean time the chief object of the war has been stated—the restoration of Helen; it was necessary to recall this purpose to the mind of the Greeks in their discouragement after the withdrawal of Achilles. It is also shown how a Providence hovers over the poem, who employs human

agency, and even human delusion, for its end; the will of Zeus is being accomplished.

After all, the interest of this Book lies in the picture of the people, that uncertain, billowy Demus so famous in Greek history. Aristophanes caught the outlines of his portrait in Homer; a comic element plays around this dark, susceptible human mass, laughable and laughing. Yet the image is not unfavorable, as is sometimes declared; it is true, and sympathetically drawn. The people are capable of strong emotions, especially for their distant families, assuredly not an ignoble trait; still more, they are capable of being recalled to their great national end when it is for a moment lost in an ebullition of feeling for wife and children. The deep, unswerving purpose, the strong, underlying will, which continued the war for ten years through every manner of hardship, is revealed. This is not fickleness; it is the fundamental persistency through all fluctuations which the Poet brings out. Finally, though their Hero may abandon them, they will still fight for the principle of the war, at its call they will again take their place in the ranks—a true and sympathetic picture of the people, I think; it shows forth the eternal and substantial element of their character, as well as the temporary and fluctuating, which is their comic side. Granite there is here underlying all these foamy and dashing waves, and holding them in their limits. In the First Book we had the Princes and their quarrels, in which selfish or personal ends were the chief matter. But in this Second Book we see the people and their sacrifice for the supreme object of the war, and their devotion to the cause. The contrast is certainly not unfavorable to the people.

All of which is serious enough; yet the free Homeric sport cannot be omitted, this double deception, on the part of both man and God. It is the deep look of the Poet into the reality, whereof the outward play is this comic capriciousness; appearance takes on a thousand delusive shapes to reveal the eternal—such is the humor of existence. I do not find it to be a lie, or even degrading; it is a means of expression, somewhat strange to us, though we have, too, in the novel, a fictitious utterance of life.

One glance forward ought to be made in this connection. The stratagem of Agamemnon has succeeded; he may now chuckle over his good luck. But could he behold his scheme, as it lies in

the supreme plan of Zeus, he would see that his very success is defeat, that the wily deceiver is himself deceived in the deception which he has practiced. Thus Zeus plays with the most cunning of men in a sort of celestial comedy all to himself, and to the eye of the Poet, who must witness it too; he takes delight in turning earthly shrewdness back upon itself. Not out of hate, but out of love, the divine humorist must let cunning undo itself, mid the laughter of the Gods.

II. The Second Part of the Book begins with the strong address to the Muses. It is well to follow the Poet into his own processes where we can. This address is not a formal matter, but a faith; the impulse of song is to him a wonderful, a divine thing; he addresses that unreflective genius of his as some existence external to himself. He is not self-conscious, we say; he does not fully grasp his spiritual operations as his own; he has to employ these outer shapes to give utterance to his inner impulse. This process is *epification*—to deify the spiritual act of man; every mental movement, instead of falling into abstract prose as with us, in Homer seizes hold of a form and becomes a short poem. And with truth is it so; for the poetic process is a vision of the reality, and has the divine right to be placed out in the world, where the Muses are.

In the First Part of this Book we saw the principle of the war brought out; in the Second Part we have the so-called Catalogue which is the muster-roll of both sides, Greeks and Trojans. We mark the political organization of these peoples; towns more or less independent send leaders quite as independent; each town has its hero, and the culmination is the hero of heroes, Achilles. There is a lack of subordination, though a supreme commander be recognized; we see the case of Achilles might become universal. And Zeus, the final authority above, does not support the final authority below, but the hero; the stress is laid upon the individual even by the God, which fact reveals the essence of Greek consciousness.

(a) The Greek muster-roll is given not only by countries, but by ships, as if the armament might be sailing out of Aulis for Troy at the beginning of the war, and not after nearly ten years. Whereby conjecture has been much stirred up among the learned, but it need not stop us here. We see how every part of western

Greece was roused to share in the war; it was in the strongest sense a national enterprise, and brought about a national unity, such as was not seen afterward. Those jealous, discordant Greek towns all responded to the call for Helen's restoration; what could that have meant to them? Something deeper than their strifes, something stronger than even their ties of family; what was it?

(b) The Trojan muster-roll is introduced by the message of Iris. She announces the approaching battle, for which Hector marshals the Trojan forces. They have no ships; the marine element is left out. But they, too, will not restore the stolen women; what do they mean, all these Asiatic peoples, by keeping her?

The nations in conflict divide pretty nearly on a line between Europe and Asia, which fact suggests the spiritual struggle between the Orient and the West. Yet these various nations seem in the main to belong to the one Hellenic race; evidently it is a conflict of tendency—the Trojans are Hellenes with face turned toward the East, the Greeks are Hellenes with face turned toward the West. Thus we may catch the first faint image of meaning in this struggle for the possession of Helen, who is to appear in the next Book.

Book Third.

This, above all other Books of the "Iliad," may be called Helen's Book. It contains the essence of her antecedent history; it has a record of her situation and her sorrow; it shows her beauty, and the conflict which always seems to be linked with beauty. Already in the previous Book she had been mentioned as the grand object of the war; her restoration shone forth as the supreme purpose of the Greek expedition. The Greeks will fight without their Heroic Man for her sake; not to honor Achilles, but to bring back Helen, they have proclaimed in deepest heart-thrills. Now she is to be brought before us.

The organism of this Book, quite different from either of the two previous Books, is woven together of two threads running parallel and intertwining at two separate times. These threads are, first, the external combat between the husbands of Helen; secondly, the internal conflict in the soul of Helen. Mark the very intimate relation between these threads, though they be so distinct; that duel before the walls of Troy is for the possession of Helen, and is the image in real life of what is going on in her

spirit. She has a desperate struggle between two conflicting emotions: Shall I yield to or put down Aphrodite? Her aspiration is to be restored, which the Greeks are fighting to fulfil; still she seems not fully ready. In such manner she has her individual problem; but that individual problem is also the problem of the Greek world, and it is just now being settled at Troy on the boundary of two grand divisions of our globe. Helen bears in her the principle of the war, she is its embodiment; in this Book we are to see the inner struggle of heart which gives meaning to the outer struggle of battle.

I. Let us first consider the external thread, as it is the first one touched by the Poet. This is the course of the Duel, which has two phases, being dropped once and taken up again in the progress of the Book. This external thread we must regard as the side of reality, the real appearance in the world of a spiritual conflict. It naturally comes first, then it deepens to the soul of the contending elements.

(a) The muster-roll has been called on both sides; each is arrayed for combat in presence of the other. Who now leap forth? Menelaus and Paris, the two individuals of the two armies most directly concerned; they are the injured and injurer, who have their nations also drawn up on their respective sides. Now the feeling runs, if this grievance lies between two individuals, let them fight it out by themselves and not spill innocent blood. Both armies so incline at present; it is a personal matter; let the two persons settle it by arms, and let both sides enforce the contract. A personal conflict for the personal possession of the woman and her chattels; this is what both Trojans and Greeks seem just now to see in the war, so eager are they to have it brought to a close. They together ratify a contract which, the Poet hints, Zeus does not sanction, nor can we.

This duel very properly opens the fighting of the "Iliad." There will follow many other duels; indeed, the chief strategy of the poem consists in personal combat between two antagonists. But this first duel reveals the spirit of them all, it lies between the injured and the injurer; Helen stands in the background of all the individual prowess of the Heroes, and nerves their arms for the contest.

(b) The outcome of the duel is that Paris is defeated by Mene-

laus, but saved by Aphrodite. She breaks the strap of his helmet to foil his enemy, and then carries him off in a cloud. Such is the intervention of the Goddess, which we must not consider as an allegory in which each little incident has its separate meaning, but as the broad general image of a spiritual occurrence. Let us conceive of Paris quitting the battle-field stealthily, under a cloud, if you will. It is Aphrodite who leads him; his sensuous is far stronger than his warlike nature. She leads him out of the combat; when there is danger to his dear body, the grand instrument of pleasure, she makes him a coward; for this reason he, as the disciple of Aphrodite, receives such bitter reproaches from his warlike brother Hector.

Thus we see what Paris means, what he stands for to the mind of the Poet. He is the favorite of Aphrodite, his leading trait is that of sensual indulgence, which destroys the heroic character of man, and debauches the domestic character of woman. Moreover, we get a glimpse of what the Trojans think of him, and what his standing is in Troy, as in the entire Book we are introduced to the Trojan view of the world as distinct from the Grecian. One party, led by his own brother Hector, hates Paris, yet the latter has hitherto foiled their attempts to restore Helen. For in this Book we learn that she was demanded back by a Greek embassy before the war began, of which embassy Menelaus and Ulysses were members. Even the Graybeards of Troy, as they look at Helen, seem to be in doubt whether a woman so beautiful ought to be given up; they, the old men, say with unwillingness: Let her go for the sake of our Trojan land and families. It is clear that Paris has a strong party supporting him in the city; it is furthermore clear that he cannot be forced to surrender Helen, and Troy participates in his guilt. Paris may be said to be a truer representative of Trojan spirit than Hector—much truer; though in the pinch of war the Trojans now assent to the compact, yet we may mark the word: if it leads to the surrender of Helen, they will break the treaty; that deed is already foreshadowed in their character.

II. The second thread, that of Helen, may now be picked up and carried through the Book, of which it is the very essence and inner spirit. We have already had her name mentioned as the object of the Duel, and indeed as the object of the whole war; we

are thus prepared for her appearance—here she steps forth in her own person. She comes right out of the duel—is born of it, we may say ; for the question of it is, Shall Helen be restored or continue in alienation ? Shall the beautiful woman of the world be wife, or be lost to Family ? We feel that the soul of the theme is ethical ; back of the question stand the Greek and the Trojan armies to decide it. Upon that decision much depends—the whole Western world ; this subject, too, is the beginning of Western Literature. Let us scan Helen closely, then, as she appears here, for she is not only the object of the conflict, but bears it within her own bosom ; nay, she portrays it too.

She is in Troy, apart from her true husband, in a state of estrangement. The Poet introduces her twice in the course of this thread of the Book, each time under a different aspect. First, she is shown us in her acts and relations in the city without Paris ; this gives what may be called her artistic phases. Secondly, she is shown in her intense conflict with the Goddess Aphrodite and the mortal representative of the Goddess—namely, Paris. Both times, however, she reveals the one mighty struggle of her heart ; both times, too, she shows that she had repented, and was torn by perpetual self-reproach on account of her deeds, past and present. Deep and sorrowful in every way is this mental anguish of Helen ; she is not happy in Troy, estranged from her true life ; she longs to be restored, and it is this longing of her heart which corresponds to the outward attempt of the Greeks.

(a) Iris, the messenger of the Gods, comes to Helen in the palace under the form of Laodice, fairest of Priam's daughters. The occurrence which is thereby brought about is not a mere whim, but is divinely sent ; Laodice, the mortal shape, simply tells what is going on, but in this mortal shape is hidden Iris, who comes from the Gods. This message is a part of the divine plan, and the event which takes place in consequence is linked into the providence which rules over the poem. Who does not delight in the old Poet's recognition of a divine control of the world, into which the individual is jointed through his deed ? Moreover, Iris comes from the better Gods, not from Aphrodite, who will appear later ; this message tells her of the coming combat, and recalls the memory of her absent spouse and kindred, to whom she would now fain return. This desire for restoration is the strong emotion

al background of this first phase of Helen, and is the contrast to the resistless command of Aphrodite in the second.

But let us note what is Helen's occupation in Troy. She is making a garment wherein are woven the conflicts of the Greeks and Trojans for her sake—a wonderful garment, which, when completed, we may call the *Iliad* itself. For, if she truly represents this conflict in her marvellous web, we shall have to call her Poet, too, or at least Artist, who has experienced the mighty struggle, and then turns around and portrays it. It is a deep, perhaps the deepest, element of her character, this self-reflection of Helen in Art. In such manner she is busied inside of Troy, the weaver of the many woes which she has caused and endured, imaging beautifully the great conflict, and being herself at the same time the most beautiful image of it. In later ages Helen became the type of Art, or its Ideal; the suggestion thereof is found in old Homer, who makes Helen the self-imaging person, weaving a brilliant robe out of the combats for her own sake. The Artist has verily in him the struggle and the aspiration of his age, which he must weave out of himself into a beautiful garment, if he would make his *Iliad*, Greater or Lesser.

The divine messenger bids her to witness the duel which is to decide what she is to be in the future. What her desire is cannot be doubted for a moment; there comes at once that heart-burst of hers aglow with painful recollections of what she has left. It is manifest that she longs to pass out of her period of alienation to that of return to family; repentance is the word that cries from every line; heart's sorrow is indeed her companion. Yet coupled with the deep distress is her beauty; the old men of Troy confess the war for her possession to be worth the prize, and declare that her face is like an immortal Goddess to look upon. Assuredly a noble and true definition of beauty; the Eternal shines through her face—that face touched by struggle and contrition, yet looking up to restoration. Sorrow and beauty are the twin sisters, inseparable; under beauty lurks the passionate trial of the soul, till it rise up to reconciliation. Such is the face of Helen: not merely an outward symmetrical visage, but a living mirror, reflecting all her life; for a mask, though it have the Greek lines and be of human flesh, cannot be beautiful; the soul must be uttered in the features.

We may now pass with Helen to the city wall, and take a look with her from it. Here again we behold the artistic phase of Helen in a new way. To Priam, who addresses her very kindly, she gives a description of the leading Greek Heroes as they appear down in the plain; yet this is coupled with a strong description of herself, of her own internal condition. It is another word of sorrow bursting up with the wish for death. But behold Agamemnon, Ulysses, Ajax, but not Achilles; authority, wisdom, strength, but not heroism, are represented in that Greek host. Helen, we may well say, is in all this the Artist still, or the Poet; she depicts the essence of the Greek army in the characters of its great chieftains as she looks down into them from her high position on the watch-tower. This is a picture of hers too, woven now of words; it may be called the companion-piece to her garment woven of threads. Thus has the Poet brought her forward in these two passages as the Artist, at one time picturing the combats by means of visible forms, at another time showing the characters of Heroes by means of spoken words; the one hints of sculpture, the other of poetry, the two great Arts of Greece. Still more deeply she has pictured herself the imager and the imaged; her heart is the heart of the whole war, and its portraiture too; the scission in that heart is what we are next to witness when she comes before us.

(b) The second part of Helen's thread—this Book of Homer, in its structure, being woven out of threads like Helen's garment—shows the actual struggle about which she has previously so bitterly reproached herself. It is the struggle with the Goddess Aphrodite in person; these are now the two combatants, and a duel takes place far more intense and far more significant than the duel which has just taken place before the gates of Troy; in fact, this second duel is that which gives spirit and meaning to the first. Aphrodite has just come from Paris, who looks, she says to Helen's temptation, not like a returning warrior, but like a blooming dancer in the chorus. Helen recognizes the messenger, so different from Iris; indeed, she has become conscious of the presence of the Goddess in her own desire; but she turns ferociously upon Aphrodite and refuses to obey. We see the desperate effort of the woman, smitten by shame and remorse, to free herself of the chains which still hold her captive. It is the conflict in her own breast between

sensual love and self-control, one of the thousand inner conflicts which for many years Helen has watered with her tears, and then has given up again. It is the picture of them all; the Goddess is a Goddess, and responds, with wrath: Beware lest I shall hate thee and make Greek and Trojans hate thee, and thou shalt perish miserably! The Goddess threatens to take away Helen's beauty; then indeed will she be lost, being no longer the object of eager possession to both Greeks and Trojans—in fact, to the world. Helen without the gift of beauty is indeed not Helen; in awe of the Goddess she turns away, wrapped in a shining robe, and goes into the presence of Paris.

Here is her second struggle, not now with the Goddess, but with the man; yet both struggles at bottom are of the same kind. She turns upon him who has brought her so much woe and who has just shown himself such a coward. She knows his unworthiness, she knows too her own guiltiness; she casts upon him reproaches, very bitter and very true, and then yields again. Paris has his excuse, very convenient in Greek polytheism; he says that Pallas won the victory for Menelaus, but asserts that there is a God on his side too, and at once demonstrates the fact.

Such is Helen's double struggle with the Goddess and her mortal counterpart; an intense, furious combat, but ending in defeat. Both Paris and Helen are the victims; to Aphrodite they have sacrificed both manhood and womanhood. We are led back to the original wrong; the island Cranae is hinted; the history of Helen's fall is re-enacted in Troy. This Third Book brings out in vivid dramatic interest the beginning, which is repeated before our eyes, and thus is a poetic review of the origin and meaning of the war. Still Helen is repentant; Paris is not; he knows no contrition for his act, and thus there is between them a vast difference—the whole universe, we might say. He must perish; she must be restored; Paris, the city of Troy, all that comes between her and restoration, will be swept out of the way by the world-governing Powers.

Helen in this Book is seen to be the cause of the war, as the statement usually runs. She is certainly the image of it in herself; a deep reflection of it in its ethical purport. She has a great throe in her bosom, a massive heaving heart of sorrow and conflict; she longs for the return to home and country, but the Tro-

jans stand in the way. This is their guilt, their grand interruption of the divine order; they must be wiped out; those one hundred thousand Greeks are before their gates for that purpose. Thus her inner struggle is the outer struggle between Greek and Trojan; she is the soul of the war, its very soul put into a human soul. We may call her the ideal, whose life is to be the reality of that which is fought for on the Trojan plain. Her cause has taken possession of her nation and race; that cause arms them and drives them into the battle for her salvation, which is their own salvation too. She becomes a type which the Artist reveals, wherein he images the nation to itself in its strongest aspiration.

But Helen in this Book is that Artist too, or is employed in artistic work. She is not only the bearer of the struggle, but its painter—the image making its own image. Such is the artistic nature which has to image what it endures; the Eternal peers through the personal sorrow and transforms it into the expression of the Beautiful. In her fall she manifests the possibility of her rise, which will overcome her sensuous impulses and find restoration, even after many relapses. One such rise and relapse, the image of them all, we have seen in this Book; but we feel assured that redemption is coming and with it a new world. Such a hint there is in this fervid account; hope is here, and the future harmony and reconciliation. The germ of her recovery we touch everywhere; this fact is the most vital one of the story. It is a deep glance into the time to come on the part of the old bard; a genuine, prophetic glance which brings back the truest word of the ages—restoration of the fallen soul. A comparison with those old Greeks rises involuntarily: Would our social order restore Helen as readily as they did? Would her modern sister ever acknowledge her as restored? Would her cause call forth a thousand ships and a ten years' war? Hardly; but our excuse is at hand; those old Greeks had to settle this question before all others; it was then the question of the World's History, which it is not now. Thus, however, we may catch a glimpse of the greatness and reality of the theme of which this ancient poem treats.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

"THE PLATONIST," SECOND VOLUME.

["The Platonist," it seems by the following circular, was only temporarily suspended. It appears again with the beginning of 1884, and will continue its work of making accessible rare and valuable Platonic writings, together with new and original commentary. We shall notice its contents from time to time.—Ed.]

"THE PLATONIST," VOLUME II.—AN EXPONENT OF THE PHILOSOPHIC TRUTH.—ESOTERIC CHRISTIANITY IS IDENTICAL WITH TRUE PHILOSOPHY.

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THOMAS M. JOHNSON,
Osecola, St. Clair County, Missouri.

Eleven numbers of Vol. I. can be supplied at \$3.00 post-paid. The edition is limited, and early orders are suggested. Bound copies of the complete volume were sold at \$5.00; unbound, at \$4.00.

Also a valuable pamphlet entitled "Paul and Plato," by Prof. Alexander Wilder, at 25 cents per copy, post-paid.

INTELLECTUAL LIBERTY AMONG THE GREEKS.

Mr. F. M. Holland's "Rise of Intellectual Liberty," soon to be published by Henry Holt & Co., opens by relating how the Ionian philosophers and their pupils were persecuted by Athens, to her own destruction, and how Socrates, Plato, and their contemporaries awakened mental activity. Chapter II describes the conquest of Greek and Roman polytheism by the speculations of Pyrrho and Epicurus, aided by the science of Alexandria. The next two chapters are given to the reaction in favor of supernatural religion accomplished by unintentional co-operation of the Roman emperors and early Christians. A sketch may here be found of the process by which tyranny destroys itself. Western Europe is next seen, first in such subjection to the Church that persecution became almost unknown, and then in irrepressible agitation, produced partly by the Catharists and other popular preachers against the luxury of the clergy, and partly by those early rationalists, the Nominalists. Putting down these heretics necessitated not only atrocious cruelties, but such reckless reliance on the superiority of intuition to reason as stimulated a mighty growth of independent mysticism. This was the inspiration of Dolcino, Dante, and Rienzi, among whose contemporaries in the fourteenth century were those sovereigns of France and Germany who gave timely checks to papal arrogance. The eighth chapter shows how the authority of the Bible was set up by Wycliffe and Huss against the popes, whose supremacy was at the same time endangered by the attempts of three great councils to make the Church a limited monarchy. Then follows a chapter on the "Revival of Letters," when classic learning, oceanic discovery, printing, art, and

commerce united in developing new habits of thought. Thus, as related in Chapter X, it became possible, not only for German mysticism to liberate the northern nations from the Roman yoke, but for Paracelsus, Franck, Gruet, Servetus, and Copernicus to begin still more extensive innovations. The concluding chapter urges that mystics, skeptics, liberal Christians, and scientists, have all had their places among the champions of freedom, that this great cause has been peculiarly indebted to the labors of scholars, and that the interests of high culture, biblical criticism, female emancipation, tolerance, political liberty, free inquiry, and pure morality, have all been found to be identical.

TWO WAYS TO TEACH.

There are two ways to teach: the one of man—
By symbols nice that catch the ready ear,
Woven with neatest logic, so one can
Build up an argument of words, nor fear
His house will fall—till some revealer clear,
With insight sure, point to the hollow word,
Which, seeming solid, shuns the glance severe.
This way is man's, shifting and error-blurred,
Wrought of the intellect, not living, spirit-stirred.

The other is of God, a living way,
Careless of symbol, with the truth made strong,
Indifferent to the semblance of delay,
All-utilizing ills and seeming wrong,
Begetting martyrs; in the issue long
Accepting humble hearts to make them see
Their parts made certain, hear the mighty song
Sphere-sung, by ages helped and spirits free,
And e'en unconscious lisped by frail humanity.

B. R. BULKELEY.

CONCORD, MASS.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON.

There have been other suns, and still shall be,
Whose steady radiance draws
A host obedient to its golden laws,
Systems that shine and shade responsively.
This man was like the Earth,
Which feeds her strengthening juices everywhere,
And, dreading naught but dearth,

Lends to each life that asks of her at need
That food which swells the seed
To its especial dower.
Careless to shape, careful to feed the flower,
So broad souls drew their liberal life from thee,
And high souls learned how pure a man could be
Who worshipped Purity.

When Death shall bare
Our unaccustomed spirits of these hands,
Answering their hourly prayer,
These eyes and ears whose lordly influence
Binds thought itself to sense,
Shall we not walk awhile as in new lands
With old needs reaching for lost utterance ?
Thou, Seer, will not stand lonely on that shore
Where free men wander—thou wast free before.
The high transparent speech
That floated out of reach
Of our air-currents, though we felt its breath
And knew it knew not death,
Will find interpretation swift and fair
In that serener air ;
A brother's voice alike to old-time Sages,
And to the child which One set in the midst
To teach the ages.

Thy large, wise phrase fell grandly from the Greek,
And smoother singing has our ears beguiled ;
What matter ? We shall listen when you speak,
Our Plato when you sang—our Poet when you smiled !

FANNIE R. ROBINSON.

BOOK NOTICES.

THOUGHTS ON THEISM, with Suggestions toward a Public Religious Service in Harmony with Modern Sciences and Philosophy. London: Trübner. 1880.

Deanthropomorphization is the fashion of the day with churchmen who are anxiously aware of the need of setting their house in order, and perhaps nowhere has such a clean sweep been attempted as in this little book, which is an earnest plea for the establishment of a "New Catholic Church, dedicated to the worship of God and the service of Man." This god bears a strong family resemblance to "The Unknowable" of Mr. Spencer, and, indeed, his (?) genealogy is not left uncertain or disowned, for many quotations from that doctor of the new divinity and his school are allowed to witness to it. God is "the Formless Infinite," "That which Is," "Pure Ens," "Whom we do not *know*," and yet who is "an *intuitional* truth or immediate fact of *consciousness*!" He "is never known as possessing faculties or properties or qualities," and "This seems to be the groundwork of a true theology!" The authors join hands with the Rev. Canon Curteis in allowing us "to accept—if charity so requires—as the common basis for theological reunion the agnostic formula, '*Something Is*!'" Hitherto theology has been taken to be a kind of science, but now it is found to be nescience, and it would almost appear that Heine was more than half right when he jestingly claimed the last word of Theism to be Atheism. Between the finite and this Infinite, man and god, thus *per impossibile* conceived, "there is no ratio of likeness, no binding links can make them one; there is nothing common to both except the fact of existence," if, indeed, even "existence"—*pace* Hegel—can be affirmed of Pure Being; and, nevertheless, it seems good to our authors to make this the basis of a true Cult! "Thy will be done," will be the cry of future saints, calling on the name of the Nameless and addressing the characterless Void. This *reductio ad absurdum* may be recommended to any who are tempted to rationalize the historical religions. Religion is concrete, poetic, imaginative; the highest emotions, grouped and impersonated, are its ideals; its gods are all instinct and permeate with humanity; its nourishment and delight are *Aberglaube* of some kind or other, and such genial and naïve "superstition" has always abounded in the ages and lands of Faith; and wise reformers, like Comte, following the Catholic tradition, have known better than to prune these luxuriances to the quick. Religion refuses to live in an artificial vacuum, like the author's. To bring science and philosophy into her house is to introduce dynamite unawares to desecrate and destroy; and that they have a dumb feeling of this fact is shown by their book having another side, where we find "*Aberglaube* reinventing," symbolical ascription allowed, and so forth. But, best of all, their Religion is as thoroughly and literally anthropomorphic as their theology is without form and void; and we find them brought in the end to endorse the truly humanitarian creed of Principal Caird, that Religion's paramount aim is "to seek with all our might the highest welfare of the world we live in, and the realization of its ideal greatness and nobleness and blessedness." It would be ungenerous to expose the rather crude philosophemes—on subject and object, fate and free-will, etc.—of a book that ends so nobly and well. By way of amen, may I quote one favorite sentence: "God is for man the commonplace book where he registers his highest feelings and thoughts, the genealogical tree on which are entered the names that are dearest and most sacred to him."

J. BURNS-GIBSON.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Empirical and Rational Psychology. Embracing Cognitions, Feelings, and Volitions. By A. Schuyler, LL. D., President of Baldwin University, author of "Principles of Logic" and a series of mathematical works. Van Antwerp, Bragg & Co., Cincinnati and New York. 1883.

Economic Tracts. No. VIII. (No. 4 of series of 1882.) Caucus System. By Frederick W. Whitridge. An essay prepared for Vol. I of the "Cyclopædia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States." Edited by John J. Lalor. (Issued by permission of the publishers, Messrs. Rand, McNally & Co., Chicago.) New York: The Society for Political Education, 4 Morton Street. 1883. [Pamphlet of 27 pages.]

A Russian Social-Panslavist Programme, drawn up in London. By C. Tondini de Quarenghi. (Reprint from the "Contemporary Review," August, 1881.) London: Strahan & Co. (Limited), 34 Paternoster Row. 1881. [Pamphlet of 28 pages.]

Philosophy and Christianity. A Series of Lectures delivered in New York in 1883 on the Ely Foundation of the Union Theological Seminary. By George S. Morris, Ph. D., Professor of Ethics, History of Philosophy, and Logic in the University of Michigan, and Lecturer on Ethics and the History of Philosophy in the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1883.

Hegel. By Edward Caird, LL. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Glasgow. (A volume of "Philosophical Classics for English Readers," edited by William Knight, LL. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of St. Andrews.) Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons. 1883.

Ueber das Richtige. Eine Eroerterung der ethischen Grundfragen von Dr. Julius Bergmann, ord. Prof. der Philosophie an der Universitaet zu Marburg. Berlin, 1883: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn. Koenigliche Hof Buchhandlung.

An Examination of the Doctrine of the Natural Evolution of Mind; or, the Distinctive Features of Scientific and Spiritual Knowledge. An Address delivered in Manchester New College, London, at the Opening of its Ninety-eighth Session, on Tuesday, October 2, 1883. By Charles B. Upton, B. A., B. Sc., Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy. Williams & Norgate, 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, and 20 South Frederick Street, Edinburgh. 1883.

The Oriental Christ. By P. C. Mozoomdar. Boston: George H. Ellis, 141 Franklin Street. 1883.

Die Entstehung der Neuhoehdeutschen Sprache. Martin Luther. Von Prof. Wm. H. Rosenstengel. Madison, Wis. (Separat-Abdruck aus dem "Herold" von Milwaukee vom 5. bis 9. November, 1883.) [Pamphlet of 23 pages, double column.]

The Mounds of the Mississippi Valley, Historically Considered. By Lucien Carr, Assistant Curator of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Cambridge, Mass. (From Vol. II of the "Memoirs of the Kentucky Geological Survey." N. S. Shaler, Director.)

Report of the Commissioner of Education for the Year 1881. Washington: Government Printing-Office. 1883.

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[No. 2.]

ON SPACE OF FOUR DIMENSIONS.

BY GEORGE S. FULLERTON.

In the "Quarterly Journal of Science"¹ for April, 1878, appeared an article, by J. C. Friedrich Zöllner, Professor of Physical Astronomy in the University of Leipsic, "On Space of Four Dimensions." The facts which the author thinks prove the actual existence of such a space, or at least make its assumption a reasonable hypothesis, are given in the first volume of his "Scientific Treatises,"² and, after presenting in his article the general argument to prove that the *possibility* of a four-dimensional space is not inconceivable, he cites one of these facts to prove it an actuality.

From the fact that Zöllner's treatises have excited considerable interest and some discussion in Germany, and that a leaning to the belief in a space of four or more dimensions is by no means uncommon, and seems to present a special attraction to those accustomed to mathematical reasonings; and from the additional

¹ Vierteljahrsschrift.

² "Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen," von Joh. Carl Friedrich Zöllner, Professor der Astrophysik an der Universität zu Leipzig. Erster Band. Leipzig: L. Staackmann, 1878.

fact that the peculiar misconception which underlies the argument presented by Zöllner is specious and oft-recurring—an error into which many have fallen before him, and many more are likely to fall in the future—an analysis of his argument, and a notice of the misconceptions upon which it is based, will not be without interest. Omitting certain sections which are unnecessary to an understanding of the positions taken, his argument, as it stands in the “Quarterly Journal,” is as follows:

“In accordance with Kant, Schopenhauer, and Helmholtz, the author regards the application of the law of causality as a function of the human intellect given to man *a priori*—*i. e.*, before all experience. The totality of all empirical experience is communicated to the intellect by the senses—*i. e.*, by organs which communicate to the mind all the sensual impressions which are received at the *surface* of our bodies. These impressions are a reality to us, and their sphere is two-dimensional, acting not in our body, but only on its *surface*.

“We have only attained the conception of a world of objects with three dimensions by an intellectual process. What circumstances, we may ask, have compelled our intellect to come to this result? If a child contemplates its hand, it is conscious of its existence in a double manner: in the first place by its tangibility, in the second by its image on the retina of the eye. By repeated groping about and touching, the child knows by experience that his hand retains the same form and extension through all the variations of distance and positions under which it is observed, notwithstanding that the form and extension of the image on the retina constantly change with the different position and distance of the hand in respect to the eye. The problem is thus set to the child’s understanding, How to reconcile to its comprehension the apparently contradictory facts of the *invariableness* of the object, and the *variableness* of its appearance. This is only possible within space of three dimensions, in which, owing to perspective distortions and changes, these variations of projection can be reconciled with the constancy of the form of a body.


“The moment we observe in three-dimensioned space contradictory facts—*i. e.*, facts which would force us to ascribe to a body two attributes or qualities which hitherto we thought could not exist together—the moment, I say, in which we should observe

such contradictory facts in a three-dimensioned body, our reason would at once be forced to reconcile these contradictions.

"I now proceed to apply the higher conception of space to the theory of twisting a perfectly flexible cord. Let us consider such a cord to be represented by $a b$, showing us, when stretched, a development of space in *one* dimension—

(a ————— b).

If the cord is bent so that during this action its parts always remain in the same plane, a development of space in *two* dimensions will be required for this operation. The following figure may be given to the cord :



and all its parts, if conceived of infinite thinness, may be considered as lying in the same plane—*i. e.*, in a development of space in two dimensions. If the flexible cord, without being broken, has to be brought back into the former figure of a straight line in such a manner that during this operation all its parts remain in the same plane, this can only be effected by describing with one end of the cord a circle of 360° .

"For beings with only *two*-dimensional perceptions these operations with the cord would correspond to what we, with our three-dimensional perception, call a knot in the cord. Now, if a being, limited, on account of its bodily organization, to the conception of only *two* dimensions of space, possessed, nevertheless, the ability of executing, by his will, operations with this cord which are only possible in the space of *three* dimensions, such a being would be able to undo this two-dimensional knot in a much simpler way. Merely the turning over of part of the cord would be required, so that after the operation, when all parts again lie in the same plane, the cord would have passed through the following positions :



"If this consideration, by way of analogy, is transferred to a knot in space of *three* dimensions, it will easily be seen that the tying as well as the untying of such a knot can only be effected

by operations, during which the parts of the cord describe a line of *double curvature*, as shown by this figure :



We three-dimensional beings can only tie or untie such a knot by moving one end of the cord through 360° in a plane which is *inclined* toward that other plane containing the two-dimensional part of the knot. But if there were beings among us who were able to produce by their will four-dimensional movements of material substances, they could tie and untie such knots in a much simpler manner by an operation analogous to that described in relation to a two-dimensional knot."

It will be noticed that the argument here presented by Professor Zöllner is purely analogical. From the supposed experience of a *two-dimensional* being, the objects of whose perception are acted upon by a *three-dimensional* being, he draws an inference to our experience should a being inhabiting space of *four* dimensions act upon the objects which we perceive. Finding, as he thinks, such effects,¹ as one might expect to see under those circumstances, produced in the presence of Dr. Henry Slade, a spiritualistic medium, he infers the existence of four-dimensional beings as agents in their production.

Before taking up the fundamental error in his reasonings, we may take exception to his founding an analogical argument upon a single term. If we, by acting in space of three dimensions, can untie a knot of a certain kind in a manner impossible to one moving but on a surface, it does not follow that a knot of a different kind may be untied in a manner impossible to us acting in space of three dimensions by allowing motion in still another—a fourth dimension. If one knot (*a*), which one man can only untie in one way, may be untied in still another way by another man, it does not follow that another and a different knot (*b*), which the second man can untie in only one way, can also be solved in a new way by a third person. For all we know to the contrary, the second knot may admit of but one solution.

If it be proved, however, that we, acting in *three-dimensional*

¹ *E. g.*, the production of true knots in an endless cord.

space, can untie knots which are not to be untied in a space of *two* dimensions, and if it be also proved that in actual experience knots are tied or untied, which seem to us incapable of solution in a space of *three* dimensions, we *may* suppose that it was done by action in the direction of a fourth dimension, though there also remains open to us as alternative the supposition that it was done by a hitherto undiscovered mode of manipulation in space of three dimensions, or by action in a space of five, six, or any other number of dimensions.

The whole argument lapses, however, when it is shown that the supposed experience of two-dimensional beings—the only *datum* for inference to another term—is a supposition without basis, and arising out of a misconception. The manner in which we acquire our conception of space, according to Zöllner, is this: “The totality of all empirical experience is communicated to the intellect by the senses, *i. e.*, by organs which communicate to the mind all the sensual impressions which are received at the *surface* of our bodies. These impressions are a reality to us, and their sphere is two-dimensional, acting not in our body, but only on its *surface*.” This gives us the idea of a surface. In explaining how we arrive at the idea of the third dimension, or distance, Zöllner follows a similar method to Berkeley, in his “New Theory of Vision,” and refers the idea to the experienced connection of the variable visual appearance with the constant tangible object.

Although Zöllner has followed Berkeley (to whose essays he refers in his article), it is evident that he has not understood the force of his reasonings. The statement that the impressions of sense “act at the surface of our bodies,” and that through them we gain the idea of a surface (two-dimensional space) before we know space in a third dimension, is a double misunderstanding. The impressions of sense, if by this phrase sensations are designated, are not felt primarily at the surface of our bodies, and are only localized after a long visual and tactual experience of the organism—an experience which implies as its outcome a knowledge of space in its three dimensions.

The sensations given us by contact with objects would not at first have *position* or *coexistence* in *space*, but only *succession*, or *coexistence* in *time*, until after the fixing of the relations of visual and tactual sensations—they could be localized. After that they

would, of course, suggest the space-idea on being themselves awakened—which would be a going back, however, from conclusion to premises. There is no necessary connection between any particular sensation and the part of the body to which we relegate it. It is not felt *in* the part, and all localization of sensation is a result of experience and observation. Before the idea of the organism, as extended, no sensation could be regarded as spatially *out of* another.

Again. The idea that we know a surface before we know the third dimension is untenable. A surface, as we know it, implies the idea of distance—it presupposes the knowledge of a third dimension. In the latter part of his essay on "Vision" (§§ 155–158) Berkeley speaks of this. In the inquiry concerning what knowledge a spirit endowed with the power of vision, but without the sense of touch, would have of geometry, after denying that he would have any knowledge of a solid, or quantity of three dimensions, he continues: "and, perhaps, upon a nice inquiry, it will be found he cannot even have an idea of plane figures any more than he can of solids, since some idea of distance is necessary to form the idea of a geometrical plane, as will appear to whoever shall reflect a little on it." "I must confess it seems to be the opinion of some very ingenious men that flat or plane figures are immediate objects of sight, though they acknowledge solids are not; and this opinion of theirs is grounded on what is observed in painting, wherein (say they) the ideas immediately imprinted in the mind are only of planes variously colored, which, by a sudden act of the judgment, are changed into solids; but, with a little attention, we shall find the planes here mentioned as the immediate objects of sight are not visible, but tangible planes. For when we say that pictures are planes, we mean thereby that they appear to the touch smooth and uniform. But then this smoothness and uniformity, or, in other words, this planeness of the picture, is not perceived immediately by vision; for it appeareth to the eye various and multiform." A similar error to Zöllner's was that made by Sir William Hamilton in his lecture on the relations of sight and touch to extension. In inquiring whether extension is the object of sight, he argues as follows:¹ "All parties are, of course, at one in regard to the fact

¹ "Metaphysics," New York, 1880, p. 385.

that we see color. Those who hold that we see extension admit that we see it only as colored; and those who deny us any vision of extension make color the exclusive object of sight. In regard to the first position, all are, therefore, agreed. Nor are they less harmonious in reference to the second—that the power of perceiving color involves the power of perceiving the differences of colors. By sight we, therefore, perceive color, and discriminate one color—that is, one colored body—one sensation of color from another. This is admitted. A third position will also be denied by none—that the colors discriminated in vision are, or may be, placed side by side in immediate juxtaposition; or, one may limit another by being superinduced partially over it. A fourth position is equally indisputable—that the contrasted colors, thus bounding each other, will form by their meeting a visible line, and that, if the superinduced color be surrounded by the other, this line will return upon itself, and thus constitute the outline of a visible figure.”

It is evident that, in saying that the colors discriminated in vision may be “placed side by side in immediate juxtaposition,” Sir William is using language which implies a knowledge of distance. The planes to which he refers are not purely visual. To vision alone we must allow some discrimination between the colors, that they may become representative of tactual differences, but what that discrimination would be to one who had never enjoyed the sense of touch we have no means of knowing. It certainly would not be like our present knowledge of the differently colored planes. In his “Review of Sir W. Hamilton’s Philosophy,” Mr. Mill has pointed out with clearness the misconceptions in this supposed argument of Sir William’s, and has justly complained that the position, line, and figure of which it treats are not the objects of pure vision.

Our idea of space is not derived from visual sensation alone, nor from tactual impressions alone, but is, so to speak, the nearly simultaneous representation, by a few visual symbols, of a multitude of successive tactual impressions. The visual symbols, before they are interpreted in tactual impressions, can give no true idea of space any more than a sight of the letters and words can give the ideas contained in a book to one who has not learned to read. But the sign and the thing signified may become so closely

connected by long experience that one may easily fall into error as to the share of the whole impression to be attributed to the one element and to the other.

Our knowledge of a surface, or space of two dimensions, therefore, implies a knowledge of distance, which is necessary to the interpretation of the visual symbols, and without which they would be meaningless. And we have, consequently, no idea what would be the conception of space of a "two-dimensional" being, nor how he would be affected by a manipulation of the twisted cords. Reasoning from our experience of a surface, and the movements of cords on a surface, to that of such a being, is unwarrantable. We do not know what would be his idea of a line, a surface, or a knot—in short, any analogical argument based upon his experience is based upon something to us totally unknown and inconceivable.

If it be objected that all this relates to a visual knowledge of extension and not to a tactual, and that, though the idea of distance, or extension in a third dimension, be necessary to the former, it may not be to the latter; I answer that our idea of space is a complex of the two, the interpretation by a general formula of many particulars, whereby, if we may accept the results of the observations of Platner on the blind,¹ the idea of simultaneity or coexistence is substituted for that of succession.

The idea, therefore, of spatial extension must be very different in one who has never enjoyed the sense of sight from what it is in one who has, and we could not argue from the experience of such to our own.

Moreover, it is evident that Zöllner does not refer at least a knowledge of tri-dimensional space to tactual experience alone, but refers it to an attempt to reconcile our apparently contradictory visual and tactual experience, so that our knowledge of the third dimension at least would have reference to vision. And if it be denied that we can gain any idea of a surface from tactual impressions before a localization of sensations, it is incumbent upon Zöllner to show how they would ever give rise, taken alone, to the idea of a surface.

But, even granting that we consider a purely tactual knowledge

¹ Quoted by Hamilton, "Metaphysics," New York, 1880, p. 389.

of space, we have no reason to believe that there could be knowledge of a surface prior to a solid, or independently of knowledge of extension in a third direction; though here we are reasoning largely in the dark, as we cannot tell what may be the notion of *direction* in the mind of a blind person, or how it compares with our own, which has always reference to visual experience. We have no idea whatever what would be the conception of space in the mind of a blind "two-dimensional" being; but we may at least assume that, whatever might be the nature of his conception, it would have little or nothing in common with our idea of a surface.

Consequently, the argument from the twisted cords is wide of the mark, and the whole analogical argument from the experience to two-dimensional beings, the objects of whose perception are acted upon by us from the direction of a third dimension, to that of three-dimensional beings in their relation to four-dimensional, is an analogy drawn in fact from *our* knowledge of a surface, and *our* knowledge of a solid, to something inconceivable, and shows a misconception of the force of the reasoning contained in the "New Theory of Vision."

DANTE'S "INFERNO."

BY SUSAN E. BLOW.

To know how hard the wind is blowing one must sail against the wind. To measure the force of a stream one must swim against its current. That the tendencies of any given age may be comprehended, they must be surveyed from the standpoint of an age different in its habits of thought. Drifting with his generation, the individual cannot gauge its strength, and sees neither the direction in which it moves nor the goal towards which it tends.

We live in an age which is rapidly losing the consciousness of sin. Equally alien to our feeling are the physical self-scourings of the mediæval saint and the spiritual agony of the Puritan.

The burden which bore so heavily upon Christian sits very lightly upon us. We hear much of the soul of goodness in things evil, and, reversing the disguise of Satan as an angel of light, we are learning to look on sin as an angel veiled in darkness. The doctrine of the fall of man is interpreted to mean ascent to a more conscious plane of existence. "Paradise is a park where only brutes, not men, can remain," and it is a rise and not a fall which is symbolized in the myths of the woman, the serpent, and the tree. Out of the depth of Donatello's sin is born the conscience which converts the faun into the man. Faust fearlessly allies himself with the Devil, and makes him the instrument of his salvation. The poets with one voice teach that "by ministry of evil good is clear," that "evil will bless and ice will burn," and that we "rise on stepping-stones of our dead selves to higher things." The scientist assures us that "men end by going right after trying every imaginable way of going wrong," and the history of the world is shown to be a course of practical logic, through which man is gradually learning wisdom from his mistakes. Thus sin is no more sin, and, instead of groaning with the Apostle, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" we plume ourselves on the secrets wrested from conquered wrong, and cheerfully condone the wrong that is yet unconquered.

The thought upon which this view of sin ultimately rests is, that man can only learn what he is by finding out what he is not, and that the violation of his ideal nature in its reaction reveals him to himself. So long as he acted in accord with his nature, there could be neither self-consciousness nor spiritual freedom. There must be contrast before there can be comprehension, and, as we know light through darkness, we can realize good only through the ministry of evil.

Whatever else this theory may or may not be, it is distinctly anti-Christian. There can be no sympathy between a philosophy which sees in sin the condition of a realized self-consciousness and a religion which heralds its founder as "the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world." The Christian consciousness has always defined sin as rebellion against God, "the act of a traitor who aims at the death and overthrow of his sovereign." Sin, according to the Christian Church, is that which, had it power

so to do, would drag God from his throne, and would rejoice could He cease to be. It brings forth no good but only evil, and evil continually, and, far from rising through it to the heights of vision and attainment, man sinks through it to a condition worse than that of the unconscious brute.

To realize how totally the thought of to-day contradicts the Christian theory of sin, one needs but to study that theory as expounded by the great poet of the Church in his "*Divina Commedia*." Nowhere shall we find such vital grappling with the universal problem of man as in the utterances of this sternest and tenderest of poets. "Behold, therefore, the goodness and the severity of God," exclaims the inspired writer. "Behold the infinite love and the infinite rigor of the man taught of God," our hearts exclaim as, following Dante, we penetrate to the ultimate depths of sin and misery, and learn at last the genesis, the development, and the outcome of evil.

Dante has been called the voice of ten silent centuries, and certain it is that the truths to which he gave immortal expression had, during these ages, been slowly crystallizing in the consciousness of the Christian world. His poem is not individual but universal; he utters not his own thought, but the unformulated creed of Christendom. Nay, he reaches beyond Christianity and speaks to the universal conscience of humanity—that inward witness which is always calling upon man to rejoice in his freedom and tremble before the responsibility bound up with it.

The "*Divina Commedia*" is the outcome of a profound and exhaustive reflection upon the facts of the moral world. Reflection, in all of its forms, involves the reduction of the infinitude of particular things to a finitude of classes, and culminates in that philosophic insight which reduces this finitude of classes to the unity of an inclusive process. Adequate reflection upon the moral world should therefore result in the classification of its complicated phenomena, and in the ultimate discovery of the genesis and development both of good and evil.

It is because Dante has traced this genetic development that the "*Divina Commedia*" is an organic whole vitalized throughout by one all-penetrating thought. This fundamental insight is that, as man is a derivative being, the condition of a true development must be an uninterrupted connection and communion with his

source. As right relationship to the sun solves the secret of the planetary system, so right relationship to God solves the secrets of life and thought. As a stream cut off from its fountain-head must inevitably dry up, so the soul which separates itself from God destroys itself. It is a dying soul, which can be restored to life only by the renewal of its relationship to God. In the substitution of self for God lies the germ of all sin. "Because thy heart is lifted up, and thou hast said I am God and I sit in the chair of God (whereas thou art a man and not God), and hast set thy heart as if it were the heart of God, therefore I will bring thee to nothing, and thou shalt not be, and if thou be sought for thou shalt not be found any more forever."

Conformably to this theory, the "*Divina Commedia*," in its three main divisions, treats of the corruption of the will, the purification of the will, and the perfection of the will. The "*Inferno*" traces the history of the soul, as, emptied of God, it becomes progressively filled with self; the "*Purgatorio*" shows us the gradual emptying of self, and the "*Paradiso*" the filling of the soul with God. The poem culminates with the rapture of the beatific vision—the steadfast, immovable, attentive gaze of the soul upon that Light, "in whose presence one such becomes

"That to withdraw therefrom for other prospect
It is impossible he e'er consent."

It is a truth which is too generally ignored, that all duties arise out of relationships. It is because there are fathers, mothers, children, sisters and brothers, that there are paternal, filial, and fraternal duties; it is because a man has a country that he should be a patriot; it is through friends that we learn the sweet obligations of friendship; and it is because the world is full of the aged, the poor, the sinful, and the sorrowing, that we are called on to exercise reverence, pity, charity, and sympathy. Finally, it is because our souls are bound up with a material frame that we struggle for the conquest of the flesh by the spirit, and it is because there is an infinite God that our souls yearn towards him with aspiration, and bow before him with awe. Particular relationships are the conditions of particular duties, and all particular relationships are grounded in the fundamental relationship which makes them possible.

Keeping before us this central thought of the poem, let us now study in detail the problem of sin and punishment as dealt with by Dante in the "*Inferno*." Omitting the first two Cantos, which relate how the poet came to undertake his arduous pilgrimage, we find ourselves at the beginning of the Third Canto standing before the gate of Hell. Over the gate is this inscription :

"Through me is the way into the doleful city ; through me the way into the eternal pain ; through me the way among the people lost. Justice moved my high Maker ; Divine Power made me, Wisdom Supreme and Primal Love."

The sense of this inscription is so alien to the sentiment of to-day, that it is hard for our minds to grasp. Its implicit argument is this : If man is free he is responsible. If he is responsible, justice requires the return of his deed upon him. To spare him the result of his own activity is to insult his ideal nature by denying his freedom. Hell is the Creator's final tribute of respect to the being he made in his own image ; and, as both Wisdom and Love imply recognition of the essential nature of their object, they concur with Justice in demanding the punishment of the sinner.

It is easy to find fault with this view of man's nature and responsibilities, but it is hard to substitute for it one which is not open to more vital objection. The practical denial of human freedom would be the dissolution of organized society, for our whole intercourse with each other is based upon a recognition of that responsibility which current theories so lightly set aside. It is to me a most significant fact that the false philosophy which denies man's responsibility culminates in denial of his immortality ; and, if it emancipates the sinner from the fear of Hell, it destroys for the struggling saint the hope of Heaven. In its outcome it is more cruel far than the faith it condemns, for that, at least, had eternal happiness as a set-off to everlasting pains, while this makes all our hopes a lie, and sinks the evil and the good in the same blank annihilation.

What mainly interferes with our acceptance of the Dantean theory of punishment is the unconscious materialism of our thought. By the average mind penalty is conceived as something external to, and distinct from, the spiritual result of sin. It is something done to the sinner, not something which he

through his sin does to himself. Dante's view (it would seem to me) is that through repeated sinful acts the soul attains a grade of permanence in sin. The long conflict between good and evil comes at last to an end, and the sin in which we have indulged is stamped upon the soul as its eternal form. And, as sin is dominant within, it is universalized without us. The glutton is immersed in his gluttony, and surrounded by other gluttons; the carnal sinners are driven about in the total darkness of their souls by the fierce winds of their passions, and are cut off by their own limitation from comprehension of any other type of character than their own. By our own acts we determine ourselves, and only what we are can we recognize in others. Our punishment is what we ultimately become mirrored to consciousness through our surroundings.

Throughout the "Inferno" the varying punishments are simply the external symbols of varying phases of sinful consciousness. The wrathful are immersed in boiling mud; the violent in a river of blood. The hypocrites, "a painted people," wearing cloaks all gilt without, all lead within, are moving round with steps exceeding slow, and in their looks are "tired and overcome." The thieves, whose deed universalized would make it impossible to know "whose was whose or what was what," are seen in an eternal process of transformation into the serpents, who aptly symbolize their creeping stealth. Flatterers are immersed in filth, "for those things which proceed out of the mouth come forth from the heart, and they defile a man." Schismatics, who have made division where there should be unity, are eternally cleft by a sword-bearing devil, and the consuming flame of conscience swathes the evil counsellors who have employed God's great gift of wisdom to deceive their fellow-men.

Man is free! This is the first truth emphasized by our mediæval poet. Pass now with him through the gate of hell, and learn how free man makes himself the slave of sin. "Our wills are ours to make them thine;" rational freedom is the soul's voluntary choice of the good. We have said that we should trace through the "Inferno" the progressive filling of the soul with self, and lo! the first spirits we meet, as we step upon the starless plain, are those who illustrate selfishness in its emptiest and most abstract form. Dante's description of them is a most seathing one.

"They lived without blame and without praise; to God they were neither faithful nor rebellious. Heaven chased them forth, and the deep hell refused to receive them. Mercy and judgment disdain them, and report of them the world permits not to exist. They have no hope of death, and their blind life is so mean that they are envious of every other lot." The description concentrates in the twofold statement that "they were for self, and that they never were alive." They did not deny the truth, they simply never thought about it; they did not rebel against God, they *only* ignored Him; they did not consciously assert themselves, they merely indulged each passing caprice. They are the representatives of that frivolous class who live only in the moment, and in the moment think only of themselves. Petty passions sting them like wasps and hornets, and, goaded by the capricious love of change, they forever chase a whirling ensign which scorns all pause. In the stage of immediate impulse they have substituted self for God, and indulgence for obligation; the house is empty, swept, and garnished, all too ready for the evil spirits who will soon rush in. Is it significant that of these souls there is such a long train that scarcely could the poet believe death had undone so many?

As the return of man's deed upon him is the Creator's recognition of the creature's dignity, so the fruit of sin in the soul is the denial of personal accountability. The victim of caprice is always a fatalist; he is the slave of his own unconscious self, and he projects this inward necessity as external limit. The souls who assemble on the joyless strand of Acheron "blaspheme God, and their progenitors, the human kind, the place, the time and origin of their seed and of their birth." Everything and every person in the universe is to blame for their condition except themselves.

Summing up this introductory Canto, we have, first, recognition of the source of punishment in the divine justice; second, recognition of the first phase of sin in the blank form of selfishness; third, recognition of the outcome of sin in the repudiation of personal freedom and responsibility. In the remaining Cantos selfishness will realize itself in an infinitude of particular manifestations, and culminate in the concrete unity of selfish form and content in the person of Lucifer.

We have seen that duties arise out of relationships, and that all secondary relationships are grounded in the fundamental relationship to God. Man draws from God the power to realize himself. It follows that the progressive realization of his own ideal nature is a progressive approximation to the divine type, and that the complete indwelling of God is the perfection of man. Truth and goodness are not abstractions—they are the eternal thought and will of God. What God thinks is the true; what God wills is the good—or, rather, as in Him knowing and willing are one, truth and goodness are but distinctions in the unity of His Eternal Act.

Some degree of insight into the nature of God is therefore the necessary condition of any understanding of what is right or wrong, good or evil. If to be good is to be like God, and to be wicked is to be unlike Him, it is of infinite importance that we know who and what He is. Parallel with the vanishing consciousness of sin has been the disappearance of all definiteness in the conception of the first principle of the world, and the theory that God is unknowable has kept even pace with the theory that man is irresponsible. The restoration of a divine ideal would be also the restoration of our guilty sense of alienation from it. "I have heard of Thee," exclaims Job, "by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth Thee, *wherefore* I abhor myself and repent in dust and ashes."

If we try to think the creative principle of the world, we come at once face to face with the idea of self-activity. By self-activity is meant an activity that acts upon itself: as a creative principle logically antedates all creation, it must be self-active, for the obvious reason that there is nothing but itself for it to act upon. Its activity, therefore, begins from and comes back to itself. It is a circular process, and therefore necessarily an eternal process. It has been complete from all eternity, and yet repeats itself in every moment of time.

Rightly apprehended, a process of self-activity is seen to be necessarily a process of thought, for thought alone has the power of acting upon itself. All natural objects and forces are results of an activity external to themselves. But thought creates itself, embodies itself, realizes itself, and defines itself. There can be nothing higher, or wider, or deeper than thought, for "it is the

form of an infinite content"; there can be nothing back of thought, for, whatever we may set up as prior to thought, thought gets back of it through thinking it. In a word, that which exists in thought cannot antedate or include thought.

The realized form of thought is self-consciousness, and this involves the distinction of the self from the self, and the persistent identification with self of the self thus distinguished. The eternal distinction of the self is the begetting of an eternal object, the eternal identification of this object with self is eternal recognition, communion, or love. This is the truth revealed to faith in the doctrine of the Trinity, and which inspired the rapt utterance of Dante when he exclaimed :

" O Light eterne, sole in thyself that dwellest,
Sole knowest thyself and known unto thyself,
And knowing lovest and smilest on thyself."

Self-activity and communion, or spiritual interpenetration, are therefore the marks of the divine nature. Hence man, made in the image of God, develops through active combination with his fellows. Through organization the individual man avails himself of the strength, the experience, and the insight of total humanity. Whatever nullifies activity, or strikes at participation, is evil, and the final outcome of evil must be stagnation absolute and isolation complete.

This insight enables us to understand the grading of sins in the "*Inferno*." All sin strikes either indirectly or directly at organized society. The less heinous sins are those which attack society indirectly, by destroying in the individual man the qualities through which combination is possible. These are the sins punished in the circles of Incontinence ; the next degree of sin is that in which there is the attack of man upon individual men, as shown in the circle of Violence, and its final phase is that in which the sinner, first by fraud and then by treachery, attacks the social whole. That fraud made universal would cause a relapse into savagism is symbolized in the primeval giants who stand as sentinels over the region of the fraudulent, while the self-exclusion and self-destruction brought about by treachery are strikingly imaged in Lucifer frozen in the bottom of the pit.

Having defined sin, and indicated its increasing degrees, our
XVIII—9

next object must be to seek its origin, and trace its gradual development and expansion within the soul. This can best be done by a careful analysis and comparison of the sins punished in the different circles of the "Inferno." If we can discover in them a principle of evolution, and can show that in the process of sin man's essential nature is progressively destroyed, we shall have settled the question as to whether sin is the instrumentality through which man rises out of the condition of unconscious unity into that of spiritual fellowship with God.

Limbo, the outermost circle of the "Inferno," is peopled by souls who have perished through defect. Virgil, who is one of them, describes himself as "by not doing, not by doing, lost." Among these souls some have attained to heroic virtue and some to philosophic insight. They have realized the fullness of purely human thought, of human love, and of earthly fame. The great poets have pleasure in each other, and Aristotle, "father of those that know," sits amid a philosophic family, who all regard and do him honor. But no finite good can satisfy an infinite craving, and if even the highest purely human life be placed under "the form of eternity" its honors will show themselves empty and its joys declare themselves vain." "Naught but God can satisfy the soul He maketh great." Hence the great souls in Limbo, without torment, suffer sadness, and without hope live on in desire.

Following Limbo are four circles in which are punished the souls "who subjected reason to lust," the Gluttons, the Avaricious and Prodigal, and the Wrathful and Gloomy. The carnal sinners are borne ever onwards in the sweep of a hellish storm; the gluttons are lying prostrate on the ground; Cerberus, "emblem of their blind voracity," eternally barks at them, and rends them, and down upon them pours unceasing a storm of hail, foul water, and snow. The avaricious and prodigal, "those who placed their happiness in gold, and those who placed their happiness in what gold could buy," roll heavy weights and smite them against each other. The prodigal cries to the avaricious: "Why holdest thou," and the avaricious retorts, "Why throwest thou away?" Intrinsically their sin is one. Make avarice universal and trade and commerce are impossible, the movement of practical life ceases, and the social order is destroyed. Universalize prodigality, and the result is the same. In the one case no man can get anything,

and in the other no man has anything. And as this two-fold crime is essentially against society, and society rests upon the principle of recognition, both miser and spendthrift are made unrecognizable.

"Their undiscerning life which made them vile
Now makes them unto all discernment dim."

Sunk in the marshy Styx, naked and muddy, the souls of those whom anger overcame stand smiting each other, not with hands only, but with head and with chest and with feet, and beneath the water and fixed in the slime are the gloomy souls forever gurgling in their throats, "Sullen were we in the sweet air that is gladdened by the sun, carrying lazy smoke within our hearts: now lie we sullen here in the black mire." Profound insight of the poet, to mete one punishment to the wrath which makes man his neighbor's enemy, and the melancholy which makes him an enemy to himself; and subtle the analysis implied in the *lazy* smoke carried by the gloomy within their breasts. God is Self-Activity; man is made in his image: hence, all that is active rejoices the soul, and all that is passive palls upon it. Sloth is man's denial of himself; its next phase must be sullen gloom, and its final outcome suicide, corresponding to the final outcome of anger, which is murder.

In the Eleventh Canto of the "*Inferno*," the four classes of sins just described are grouped together under the general head of Incontinence, and this Incontinence is said to less offend God, and to receive less blame, than the malice and mad bestiality met with in the lower circles of the "*Inferno*." As contrasted with these deeper sins, the sins of Incontinence are less conscious and deliberate, and indicate a less extended corruption of man's moral nature. They are sins of feeling rather than sins of thought or will. Their common root is that the man seeks self-gratification. Carnal sin, gluttony, and avarice arise from the excessive indulgence of natural appetites, and anger manifests the exaggerated self-love of those

"Whom injury seems to chafe
So that it makes them greedy for revenge."

If it be true that duties arise out of relationships, each special duty may be defined as expression of the feeling which should be

stimulated by the relationship. The only knowledge presupposed is knowledge of the relationship itself. Thus a young child understands little of the distinctions between right and wrong, but from the very dawn of his conscious life has known himself as guarded by a mother's tireless care, and blessed by a mother's overflowing love. He should meet this love with love expressed in sympathetic obedience. Through obedience to wise commands he will himself become wise, for, as goodness is truth in act, doing the good must culminate in vision of the true. With comprehension the child becomes self-directing, following the good of his own independent choice. Indeed, we may say there has been choice from the beginning, but, whereas he first chose the right through faith in his mother, he now chooses it because he has come to know it as the substantial truth of his own ideal nature. The final stage of development is attained when, through repeated activity, he has so determined himself in the image of the good that he rises above choice, and by a sweet necessity of nature is constrained to the right.

Just as the child shapes himself into goodness through love for his mother, so man shapes himself into goodness through love for God. In tracing backward the history of man, we may arrive at a point when his mind is empty of all knowledge except the knowledge that he is and that God is. Consciousness of his own existence and consciousness of his primal relationship are the conditions of his normal development. And as love should be awakened in the heart of the child by the love of the mother, so love in the heart of man should respond to the love which called him into being. We love Him because He first loved us, says the Apostle, and no student of Christ's method of training can have failed to observe that he grounds all spiritual graces in a personal relationship to himself.

I repeat, therefore, that goodness in man is progressively generated from the love of God. In its first phase empty and abstract, but concreting and defining itself through particular acts of obedience, this love creates in man the image of God. To know God we must be like God, for to comprehend a spiritual Being is to be in substantial identity with Him. Hence, Christ recognizes the attained fellowship of his disciples, by declaring that he will call them no more servants but friends, and the yearning soul of

the Psalmist refuses to be satisfied until it shall awake in the likeness of God.

Generalizing our statement, we may say that the starting-point of human development lies in feeling. Feeling rushes into act and act defines man to himself. By making an external image of himself, and looking at what he has made, man learns what he is. Thus through feeling he rises into thought, and finally expresses the concrete unity of thought and feeling in the acts of the conscious will.

It follows that any interruption or perversion of the course of man's normal development must necessarily originate within the sphere of feeling. This perverted feeling, rushing into expression, makes for man a false image of himself. Thus his thought is corrupted, and he sees what is *not* instead of what is, and this results in an activity of the will, which is in supreme contradiction of his ideal nature, and in supreme violation of all his fundamental relationships. There can be no perversion of the intellect and will which does not imply a logically prior perversion of the feelings—no stage of conscious and deliberate sin without an antecedent stage in which the sympathies have become alienated from God.

It is therefore with profound intention that Dante places in the outermost circles of the "*Inferno*" sinners in the unconscious stage of alienated love. This alienation of feeling is discerned by him as the logical condition of the deeper degrees of sin to be punished in the lower hell. Nor does the poet leave us to abstract his theory from the content of the poem, but, in the Seventeenth Canto of the "*Purgatorio*," he himself traces all sin to "the excess, defect, or perversion of love." Man has an infinite power of loving. Infinite love demands an infinite object. If man loves God supremely, he will love all other objects in right degree. If he is slack in his love of God, he will love unduly self and finite objects. The excessive love of finite objects giving birth to struggle for their possession, changes into hate the love man should bear to his fellow. Such is the genesis of the seven capital sins. Sloth is the slack love of God; lust, gluttony, and covetousness, are the excessive love of finite objects; pride is the distorted love of self; and envy and anger are distortions of the love which should exist between man and man. Viewed from the standpoint

that duties arise out of relationships, lust is rebellion against the ideal of man in his relationship to the family; gluttony is perversion of the relationship between soul and body; covetousness, envy, and anger, are practical denials of the relationship of the individual to the social whole; and pride is the supreme negation of man's relationship to God. Conceived as a developing process, sin begins in the slackening of love to God, and culminates in the supreme love of self. Hence, sloth is the first sin found within the "Inferno," and spiritual pride is punished in its lowest depth. Conversely, pride is the first sin expiated in Purgatory, because, until the self ceases to be supreme, there can be no return of the soul unto God.

The first blessing of the Saviour of men is bestowed upon the poor in spirit. Humble receptivity is the condition of spiritual growth. The first mark of humility is, that it mourns its own defect; the second is the meekness which bears lovingly defect in others. Out of the recognition of lack is born that hunger and thirst after righteousness which is the panting of the soul for its God, and mercy is the living sign of the indwelling life of God. To have God's life dwelling within us is to be like God, and hence able to see God; and as God is Love, and Love is recognition and reconciliation, the vision of God makes the pure in heart the peacemakers of the world.

The atmosphere in the circles of Incontinence is one of simple darkness, apt emblem of the soul whose light is darkened and at last extinguished by passion. The total darkening of the powers of the soul is the signal for the lighting of the flames of hell—symbols of a consciousness which through its own act has fixed itself in a state of permanent self-contradiction.

Dante's description of the transition from the circle of the angry to the sixth circle, which is that of the heresiarchs, is most vivid. "In my ears a lamentation smote me, whereat I bent my eyes intently forward. And the kind master said: 'Now, son, the city that is named of Dis draweth nigh, with the heavy citizens, with the great company—'

"And I: 'Master, already I discern its mosques, distinctly there within the valley, red as if they had come out of a fire.'

"And to me he said: 'The eternal fire that inward burns them shows them red as thou seest in this low hell.'

"And I: 'Master, what are those people who, buried within those chests, make themselves heard by their painful sighs?'

"And he to me: 'These are the arch-heretics with their followers of every sect; and much more than thou thinkest the tombs are laden. Like with like is buried here; and the monuments are more and less hot.'"

If the sins in the circles of Incontinence may be traced to the supremacy of self in the emotions, heresy may be defined as the manifestation of self-love in the intellect. Without an undue love of self a man cannot become a heretic. The perversion of thought is a direct outcome of a perverted state of feeling. It is the recognition and assertion by the intellect of the distorted universe created out of sinful emotion. The man who persistently yields to his fleshly appetites must ultimately lose faith in his own higher powers. The man who lives only for the moment practically denies his immortality, and from the practical to the theoretic denial there is but a step. The man who acts as though God were not is travelling the high-road towards Atheism.

The important point to be noticed in this connection is, that because heresy is an outcome of sinful feeling it has in itself a sinful character. It is impossible to divorce what a man thinks from what he is, and it is because we have illogically asserted this separation that we have become as careless and inert in our own thought as we are lazily tolerant of the thought of others. Starting with the assumption that it makes no difference what we believe, we have come to believe in nothing. Ignoring our responsibilities, we have drifted into doubt of our power. The saddest sight in a sad world is this universal spectacle, of minds enslaved by their own ignorance and paralyzed by their own inactivity. The one thing in life which to the aroused soul seems worth doing is, to waken other souls from their death-like sleep; and the wail of prophet and poet, of saint and Saviour is, that the eyes of mankind are blind, and their ears are waxed deaf.

The circle of the heresiarchs is the transition from the sins of feeling to the sins of conscious will. To love self more than God is the sin of feeling. To see self instead of God is the sin of intellect. To create a world like the false self thus seen is the sin of the conscious will. Throughout all the spheres of sin, the common element is the abstraction of the individual from his relationships.

Lust is this abstraction in the region of feeling; Pride is this abstraction in the sphere of intelligence. Therefore the theologians teach that lust is the pride of the body, and pride is the lust of the soul; and Dante stigmatizes the rebellion of Lucifer as a "proud adultery." Finally, covetousness is abstract individualism in its relationship to material things; man wanting all for himself refuses to recognize the equal claim of others to the good things of the earth. In the very first canto of the "*Inferno*," Dante is confronted by these sins in the forms of the leopard, the lion, and the she-wolf; and the other so-called cardinal sins, as well as the deeper wrongs which arise from their combination, are by him always traced directly to these fruitful germs.

In the circle of the violent is shown man's conscious attempt to realize his abstract individualism as against his neighbor, against himself, and against his God.

The violent against man are divided into two classes: those who attack life, and those who attack property; and these two forms of violence are traced to their roots in anger and covetousness. "Fix thy eyes upon the valley," cries Virgil to his follower, "for the river of blood draweth nigh, in which boils every one who by violence injures others. O blind *cupidity*! O foolish *anger*, which so incites us in the short life, and then in the eternal, steep us so bitterly."

In the second division of the circle of the violent are found sinners who have done to themselves what those in the first division did to their neighbors, i. e., they have wasted their own substance and taken their own lives. That prodigality is covetousness turned against self has been already shown, and that suicide is the outcome of that pride whose first degree is spiritual sloth grows evident as we read the graphic recital of the fierce soul which, in its disdainful mood, thought to escape disdain by death.

The sins punished in the third division of the circle of the violent are even more obviously traceable to Pride, Lust, and Covetousness. Supine upon the burning sand, Capaneus shows us that his pride is still unquenched; while Jacopo Rusticucci and the unrecognizable usurers reveal to us, without need of comment, the genesis of their respective sins.

In order that we may rightly apprehend the nature of the sins of violence as well as those of treachery and fraud, we must have

a clear idea of the relationship of will to feeling and thought. Will is that phase of the mind which objectifies—it is the concrete unity of feeling and thought—that which at once creates and recognizes its image. The corruption of the will is the corruption of man's total nature, and its result must be negative to that activity and communion which we have throughout recognized as the marks of the divine. Relatively to society, it is the reduction of man to the abstract savagism of the Cyclops, "who neither planted nor ploughed, who had no laws and met in no councils, who dwelt alone in vaulted caves on mountain heights, and each man, holding no converse with others, devised apart his wicked deeds. Relatively to the individual, it is his reduction to the condition of Lucifer, a condition of ignorance, impotence, and absolute loneliness. He may flap his bat-like wings, but the only result of this vain activity is to fix him more firmly in his ice.

In external correspondence to the total corruption of the souls in the circle of fraud, pestilence is added to darkness and flame. Here all the senses are assailed; the sight by murky air; the ear by lamentations "that have arrows shod with pity;" the smell by stench of putrid limbs; the touch by hideous scurf; and the taste by thirst that craves one little drop of water. And as we are repelled by these symbols of sin, so our souls are repelled from the panders and flatterers—the simonists, sorcerers, and peculators—the hypocrites, thieves, evil counsellors, schismatics, and falsifiers, who inhabit Malebolge. We find it hard to analyze their consciousness, for where corruption has become universal the distinctions of sin are lost. The root of theft, for instance, is certainly covetousness, but before covetousness issues in theft it has allied itself with all the other cardinal sins. The poison of sin has so spread within the soul that there can be left in it no power of normal action. Hence Virgil blames Dante when he weeps over the sorcerers, exclaiming, "Art thou too like the other fools?—Who more impious than he that sorrows at God's judgment."

The imagery of the last circle of the "Inferno" forcibly suggests the self-destruction which is the final outcome of selfishness. Lust has conceived and brought forth sin, and sin being finished brings forth death. Out of the sphere of darkness into the sphere of fire—out of the region of fire into a region of fire and blood—out of this into the loathsome pit of fraud, where pestilence is added to

the darkness and the flame, and finally down from the pit of fraud towards frozen Coeytus, wherein are fixed the spirits of those who have committed the supreme sin of treachery.

Formed by the union of all the rivers of hell, Coeytus stagnates because there is no lower depth towards which it can flow. Upon its frozen surface stand the giants. Ninrod, a dull and confused spirit, speaks a language no man can understand, and all other languages are incomprehensible to him. Ephialtes "has his right arm pinioned down behind and the other before, and a chain holds him clasped from the neck downwards." The sinners, immovable in the ice, have power only to weep, and as the tears gush from their lids they freeze, and this closes their eyes. The only other activities mentioned are butting, champing of the teeth, and the flapping of Lucifer's wings, which makes the winds that freeze Coeytus.

Sin has done its work ! Made for combination with his fellows, each man through sin has isolated himself from all others. Made for activity, he has lost all power to act. The indulgence, the assertion, and the corruption of self, have issued in self-destruction. "Lo Dis, and lo the place where it behooves us arm ourselves with fortitude."

It may be asked, if this view of sin be true, what hope can there be for sinful man ? If the logical movement of sin is not towards good but towards greater evil, how can the effect of even a single sin be undone ? The answer to this question we shall find in the study of the "Purgatorio." Meanwhile let us carry from the "Inferno" the assurance that not until the Ethiopian changes his skin and the leopard his spots can *he* do good that is accustomed to do evil.

THE MORAL CREATIVENESS OF MAN.

BY FRANCIS ELLINGWOOD ABBOT.

It is a well-recognized principle, since Kant, that the human mind energizes in three fundamentally distinct ways: namely, thinking, feeling, and willing. No analysis has yet succeeded in reducing these three modes of consciousness to one, or in discov-

ering a more primitive mode of which they are derivatives in common. But it by no means follows that they can exist separately. On the contrary, it is more than probable that they can only exist in inseparable combination. A "state of consciousness," instead of being (as is sometimes strangely imagined) a simple or ultimate phenomenon, is complex to the last degree—a compound of psychical elements so numerous as to baffle all attempts at exhaustive specification, a resultant of forces so numerous and so subtle as to extinguish even the hope of exact or complete comprehension. It would take the whole past of the whole universe to explain fully the most insignificant fact of the present, even in the physical order of things—much more to explain fully a fact of the psychical order, involving, as it must, a world of phenomena beyond the range of physical investigation. So far is a "state of consciousness" from being a simple fact, that the entirety of human knowledge, by the confession of every competent student, is insufficient to explain it. Only the dogmatic sciolist will for a moment imagine the contrary.

Nevertheless, all the innumerable currents, counter-currents, and under-currents, which constitute at any given moment what is called the "stream of consciousness," are made up of three great classes of elements which, like the so-called elements of chemistry, must be regarded as, at least provisionally, and for us, ultimate. Every "state of consciousness" is composed, in constantly varying proportions, of thoughts, feelings, and volitions; thought may predominate, feeling may predominate, volition may predominate, but each of the other two can always be detected by close observation and analysis as concurrently active. Each is a permanent and constitutive element of human consciousness, and the coexistence of the three elements is as essential to consciousness as the coexistence of three sides is essential to a triangle.

To a greater or less degree, therefore, volition enters into every conscious state; and it is owing to this fact that man is, by the primal necessities of his nature, a moral being. The provinces of volition and of morality are identical, or, at least, coterminous. A being purely intelligent, or purely sentient, or intelligent and sentient without being also volitional, would be a non-moral being; and if man could, at any moment or for any period, be purely intelligent, or purely sentient, or intelligent and sentient

without being also volitional, he, too, would be, for that moment or period, a non-moral being. It is precisely because man's volitional or moral activity never absolutely ceases or slumbers, so long as his consciousness continues, that he can never escape from the domain of moral law—that his most secret thoughts and feelings are accompanied by a volitional activity which stamps upon them all a definite moral character. And it is precisely because the fact of morality is thus indissolubly bound up with the fact of volition, as a permanent part of human nature, and a permanent factor of human consciousness, that philosophy has never escaped, and never will escape, the necessity of arriving at some solution of the ancient problem of "fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute."

Deeply imbedded in this fact of the indissoluble connection of morality and volition lies the reason why mankind never have been, nor can be, long satisfied with a purely mechanical philosophy of human nature. It is the very essence of man to be a volitional and moral being; it is the very essence of a machine to be non-volitional and non-moral. The two concepts are absolutely incompatible, and cannot possibly be united in a seeming synthesis without a lurking self-contradiction, which inevitably, and soon, develops a distinct protest in the philosophical consciousness. No amount of ingenuity, subtility, or genius can long succeed in rendering such a synthesis plausible. Precisely in proportion to the depth and strength of the moral consciousness in any epoch, and precisely in proportion to the degree in which the philosophical consciousness is suffused and permeated by it, will be the strength of the ultimate philosophical reaction against mechanical psychology in all its forms. It avails nothing to misrepresent this reaction as rooted in, or animated by, the spirit of an obsolete theology; its real root is the fact that mechanical psychology is vitiated at the very core by this unscientific and irreconcilable contradiction in its fundamental concepts. It is a proof neither of bigotry, nor of superstition, nor of "animism," but rather of genuine philosophical acumen, to maintain the utter repugnance of two such notions as those of humanity and mechanism; it is a proof of scientific incapacity and obtuseness not to discern the necessity of founding psychology on concepts which shall at least forbear to devour each other.

True it is that the speculative tendency of which La Mettrie's

"L'Homme Machine" is perhaps the boldest exponent has asserted itself in recent times with great energy, and may to many seem to be acquiring a permanent ascendancy. Such a view of the case, however, appears superficial to all who can distinguish between the spirit of the age and the spirit of the ages. The mechanical psychology is the natural product of a period of which the most striking characteristic is the almost miraculous growth of the mechanical and physical sciences; it marks the first attempts of scientific method, inevitably crude as they must be, to assert its rightful dominion in studies from which it had been jealously and arbitrarily excluded by the spirit of ecclesiasticism, and in which these first crude attempts should be regarded as the somewhat noisy precursors of soberer and more valuable investigations in the future. Science, in any large or full meaning of the term, is still in its infancy. It is scarcely too severe to describe it, so far as psychology, sociology, and ethics are concerned, as still being in the immature or chaotic stage of its career. The corrective of the crudities which now make many otherwise able scientific men incline to a mechanical view of man's entire nature must and will come, not at all from external opposition on the part of theological or other non-scientific antagonists, but rather from the further development of science itself—from a thoroughly scientific discrimination between those facts of human nature that can be mechanically explained and those facts of human nature that do not admit of mechanical explanation.

Darwin has permanently changed the whole course of human thought in these matters. That the theory of evolution has come to stay, and to constitute the foundation of all future theories of the universe, can be doubted by no one who knows the irresistible strength of the facts and arguments by which it is established. But whether evolution itself is to receive finally a mechanical or teleological interpretation is an issue not yet decided. Herbert Spencer, and Ernst Hæckel, with a boldness, cogency, and consistency far superior to Spencer's, advocate the mechanical view of evolution; but multitudes of keen and thoughtful minds are coming to see that this view overlooks numerous facts of the highest importance that refuse to be ignored or crowded out of sight. Unquestionably the ancient teleology, as represented by Paley, is

outgrown by the modern mind, largely for the very reason that it exhibits so fragmentary, artificial, and mechanical a character, and rests wholly on the old dualism of natural and supernatural; while the monistic teleology, latent in the very concept of evolution itself, has not as yet been anywhere adequately developed. Meanwhile the necessity of a deeper philosophical reading of the facts which pertain to man's moral nature is slowly but surely becoming felt more profoundly every year. The spirit of the age may possibly, as is claimed, be satisfied with mechanical psychology; but the spirit of the ages, which is both older and younger, is certain to assert its supremacy once more in the effort to bring all human experience into order, correlation, and harmony with this boundless cosmos. The ethical interest survives, undestroyed and indestructible; and every attempt to construct a science of ethics out of mechanical—that is, essentially non-ethical—elements is from its very inception foredoomed to failure.

It is a noteworthy fact that the only two Americans who have thus far greatly distinguished themselves by a powerful originality in the field of speculative philosophy—Jonathan Edwards and Rowland G. Hazard—have both busied themselves in the main with the same great problem of necessity or freedom in volition.¹ It is another fact, less patent but equally noteworthy, that this problem is the speculative side of the great practical struggle which has given to America its special significance in the history of mankind—the struggle to realize the ideal of constitutional liberty in political institutions, to reconcile individual freedom with national unity in a great political society founded on the legal recognition of equal individual rights. This is essentially an ethical conception, and one of the highest order. Edwards defended the doctrine of necessity in ethics, out of devotion to the theological doctrine of the unlimited Divine sovereignty, which from time immemorial has been the foundation of political absolutism “by the grace of God”; Dr. Hazard defends the doctrine of freedom

¹ Ralph Waldo Emerson, confessedly the greatest name in American literature, is not here included, because, though he is often popularly and loosely styled a “philosopher,” that is exactly what he was not. He was *littérateur*, essayist, moralist, seer, preacher, poet, prophet—anything but “philosopher,” to whom logical concatenation, systematic construction, and comprehensive unity of form, are the very law of his being. Unsurpassed as Emerson's writings are in other respects, those are the very qualities which are most conspicuously absent in them.

in ethics, out of devotion to the modern doctrine of the limited self-sovereignty of man, which is the only possible foundation of instituted political freedom. Freedom in ethics is the thought-side of freedom in politics; the latter logically presupposes the former. It is apparent, then, that Dr. Hazard's philosophy is rooted in the soil, and interprets his country to the world; while that of Edwards was rooted in Calvinism, and, if politically realized, would have made his country an impossibility.

The connection of ethics and politics, so curiously illustrated in this instance, is no fanciful analogy, but a truth abundantly recognized in philosophy and exemplified in history. Ethics may be defined as the science of self-government by man as an individual, and politics as the science of self-government by man as a society of individuals; they are but two subdivisions of one and the same future science of human self-government, or *anthroponomy*, founded throughout on the same principle of individual moral freedom under universal moral law. The popular conception and practice of politics as the empirical administration of states in the interest of partisan or even personal self-aggrandizement reveal clearly the small progress yet made in the moral education of the race. In the present state of opinion, ethical law and political action have little, if anything, to do with each other; but, if the evolution of human society is to continue in the future as it has done in the past, the time must yet come when man, as a free moral being, will govern himself both individually and politically by the ethical idea, and recognize the binding force of justice in the action of nations no less than in that of persons. In fact, the moral creativeness of man, which Dr. Hazard has so ably vindicated with reference to the formation of personal character, is just as forcibly illustrated in the institutions, laws, and customs of communities as in the characters of individuals. No treatment of ethics can be thorough or complete which omits to consider the action of the individual as a member of the politico-moral community, or which fails to emphasize the oneness of the law that should govern man's conduct both as an individual and as a social being, or which is so narrowed in scope by the spirit of individualism as not to teach that customs, laws, and institutions incorporate the aggregate conscience of the community, just as indisputably as words and deeds incorporate the personal conscience of the indi-

vidnal. In brief, man is by nature a social being, and politics ought to mean the *ethics of society*.¹

It is from this consideration of the profound identity of ethics and politics, and from the entire confluence of his ethical speculations with the deepest currents of American thought, feeling, and life, that we regard Dr. Hazard, notwithstanding the eminence of his great Puritan predecessor, as having laid the first foundations of a distinctively American philosophy. The venerable octogenarian thinker himself makes no such pretension and entertains no such ambition; but the "extraordinary ability" and "philosophical talents of a very high order" which were recognized in his works by the "North American Review" of October, 1869, in an elaborate review of them by no less competent a critic than Professor George P. Fisher, have not escaped the admiring recognition of others, and can scarcely fail to command in time the attention, the wide-spread study, and the ultimate influence they deserve. Dr. Channing, in his lecture on "Self-Culture," thus alludes to Dr. Hazard's earliest published paper, the "Essay on Language," published in 1835, and republished and edited with other papers in 1857, by Miss Elizabeth P. Peabody: "I have known a man of vigorous intellect, who had enjoyed few advantages of early education, and whose mind was almost engrossed by the details of an extensive business, who composed a book of much original thought, in steam-boats and on horseback, while visiting distant customers." It was, in fact, in large measure owing to the urgency of Dr. Channing, who greatly desired to see an adequate reply to Edwards's arguments against freedom, that Dr. Hazard undertook the composition of his "Freedom of Mind in Willing," though the completed work (D. Appleton & Co., 1864) was not published till many years after Dr. Channing's death. The speculations of John Stuart Mill, who, though dissenting from his metaphysical views, expressed great respect for Dr. Hazard's financial and metaphysical writings, occasioned the publication of a later book (Lee & Shepard, 1869), entitled "Two Letters on Causation and Freedom in Willing, addressed to John Stuart Mill." These two books contain the fullest and most elaborate statement of Dr. Hazard's

¹ How profoundly Dr. Hazard has always recognized this great truth appears conspicuously in his noble lecture on the "Causes of the Decline of Political Morality," as contained in his "Essay on Language, and other Papers." Boston, 1857.

system. But he has just published a new book entitled, "Man a Creative First Cause" (Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1883), which contains two lectures recently delivered, and presents a general summary of his thought in a beautiful, interesting, and winning manner.

It is not our present object either to epitomize, analyze, or criticise these various writings, but simply to call attention to them, in the hope that thoughtful readers may procure and study them for themselves, as the most original and remarkable contribution to philosophy yet made in this country. Dr. Hazard's want of familiarity with the history of philosophy is in many respects a disadvantage; yet it is a great advantage, also, in so far as it has protected him from the danger of allowing his rare genius to be suffocated under a mass of mere erudition, or to be diverted into the channel of mere criticism or reproduction. Too much study of what other men have written, no less than too little study of it, has its own peculiar peril; excess of discipleship and defect of that self-reliance which is the inexorable condition of profound original insight have thus far made America a follower, not a leader, in philosophy. Equally removed from servile imitation and conceited self-assertion, the shining merit of Dr. Hazard's thinking is, that he has serenely trusted his own soul—wrestled indomitably at first hand with one of the most difficult problems of philosophy—meditated, pondered, and mused, with eye fixed steadily on his subject rather than on what men have written about it; and finally wrought out results which only flippant incapacity will despise. It is not necessary to accept all these results in order to appreciate their value; we certainly do not accept them all: it is enough to recognize the freshness of his point of view, the delicacy and subtilty of his analysis, the force and acuteness of his reasoning, the general purity and beauty of his style, and, above all, the moral dignity and elevation of his spirit. The one central purpose of his thought is the vindication of *freedom*, as the essential condition and necessary logical presupposition of all morality, whether in theory or in practice; and it is safe to say that mechanical psychology will never permanently establish itself as scientifically true until it has first reckoned with Dr. Hazard—first understood, and then on the same high plane satisfactorily offset, the weighty moral considerations adduced in support of his

position. It is in our opinion highly probable that even his qualified *Berkeleyanism* will fail to receive the sanction of the philosophy of the future; but this is unnecessary to his main argument, as he himself explicitly admits, and we cannot regard it as otherwise than an excrescence upon the ethical theory with which it is associated. Waiving this point, however, as unsuitable for discussion at present, we quote the following terse summary of his doctrine from "Man a Creative First Cause" (pp. 92 *et seq.*):

"We have now endeavored to show that the only efficient cause, of which we have any real knowledge, is mind in action, and that there cannot be any unintelligent cause whatever.

"That every being endowed with knowledge, feeling, and volition is, in virtue of these attributes, a self-active, independent power, and, in a sphere which is commensurate with its knowledge, a creative first cause therein, freely exerting its powers to modify the future, and make it different from what it would otherwise be; and that the future is always the composite result of the action of all such intelligent creative beings.

"That in this process of creating the future, every such conative being, from the highest to the lowest, acts with equal and perfect freedom, though each one, by its power to change the conditions to be acted upon, or rather, by such change of the conditions or otherwise, to change the *knowledge* of all others, may influence the free action of any or all of them, and thus cause such free action of others to be different from what, but for his own action, it would have been.

"That every such being has innately the ability to will, i. e., make effort, which is self-acting; and also the knowledge that by effort it can put in action the powers by which it produces change within or without itself.

"That the only conceivable inducement or *motive* of such being to effort is, a desire—a want—to modify the future; for the gratification of which it directs its effort by means of its knowledge.

"That when such being so directs its effort by means of its *innate* knowledge, it is what is called an *instinctive* effort, but is still a self-directed and consequently a *free* effort.

"That when the mode or plan of action is devised by itself, by its own preliminary effort, it is a *rational* action.

"That when, instead of devising a plan for the occasion, we through memory adopt one which we have previously formed, we have the distinguishing characteristic of *habitual* action.

"In the instinctive and habitual we act promptly from a plan ready-

formed in the mind, requiring no premeditation as to the mode or plan of action. But in all cases our effort is incited by our want, and directed by means of our knowledge, to the desired end, which, whatever the particular exciting want, is always in some way to affect the future. In our efforts to do this in the sphere external to us, which is the common arena of all intelligent activity, we are liable to be more or less counteracted or frustrated by the efforts of others. In it man is a coworker with God and with all other conative beings, and in it can influence the actual flow of events only in a degree somewhat proportioned to his limited power and knowledge.

"But that in the sphere of man's own moral nature the effort is itself the consummation of his creative conceptions, and hence in this sphere man is a *supreme* creative first cause, limited in the effects he may there produce only by that *limit* of his knowledge by which his creative pre-conceptions are circumscribed.

"And further that, as a man directs his act by means of his knowledge, and can morally err only by *knowingly willing* what is wrong, his *knowledge* as to this is infallible; and, as his *willing* is his own free act, an act which no other being or power can do for him, he is in the sphere of his moral nature a sole creative cause, solely responsible for his action in it.

"His only possible wrong is in his freely willing counter to his knowledge of right. He must have known the wrong at the time he willed, or it would not be a moral wrong. Hence the knowledge by which he directs his acts of will is here as infallible as that of omniscience; and, his power to will within the limits of his knowledge being unlimited, he cannot excuse himself on the ground of his own fallible nature, but is fully and solely responsible for all the wrong he intended, or which he foresaw and might by right action have prevented. Conversely, a rightful action indicates no virtue beyond the knowledge and intent of the actor. The failure to make an effort demanded by his convictions of right is in itself a wrong. That, in the domain of his own moral nature, man is thus supreme, indicates it as his especial sphere of activity. Ages of successful effort in the material has been the preparation for its successful occupation, and we may reasonably expect that the advance into the more ethereal realm of the spiritual will be marked by the sublimest efforts of pure and lofty thoughts, and that the results of it will be the crowning glory of all utility."

Dr. Hazard's central position is thus: that freedom is the essential prerequisite of man's moral creativeness. Whatever opinion may be held on subordinate points, this central position must remain impregnable so long as man's moral consciousness survives;

that is, so long as he is conscious of being in any degree the *creator* of his own moral character and action. The theory of evolution cannot possibly expunge this fact from his consciousness, or destroy the indestructible connection between morality and freedom. Neither mechanical philosophy, nor mechanical psychology, can ever become scientifically established, as true to all the facts of Nature, until it has succeeded in reconciling the two irreconcilable concepts of morality and mechanism. Be the prevalent opinion of the day what it may, far-seeing philosophers will continue to regard it as a mere ephemeral fashion of the time, until it shall have effected a genuine rational synthesis of all known facts, moral no less than mechanical; and there is no fact more certain than the fact that man is, in no merely mechanical sense, the real author of his own action. That man's whole being has been derived, in an orderly and natural manner, from the universe as a whole, it is the great achievement of the evolution theory to have established beyond a reasonable doubt; but that, in the course of this orderly and natural evolution, he has at last attained to a genuine moral freedom, and won the high dignity and prerogative of a genuine moral creativeness—this is the older insight which Dr. Hazard has vindicated afresh in an age that was in danger of forgetting it.

In the last analysis, every denial of moral freedom is found to rest on a misstatement of the law of cause and effect. Necessarianism plays many variations, but the theme is ever the same. "Every event has a cause; every volition is an event: therefore every volition has a cause." Admitted; but does it follow that volition is also not free? There are events and events: the question is whether a volition is an event of the same order as the motion of a billiard-ball, and has a cause of the same order. The unwarranted assumption that volition and motion are events of the same order, and must have causes of the same order, has led to the invention of that "question-begging epithet" *motive*. The metaphor confounds fundamentally unlike and incongruous things. Instead of saying, "Every event has a cause," it should rather be said, "Every motion has an efficient cause, and every volition has a final cause." * To assume that volition has an efficient cause is

* This idea that volition has only a final cause, though expressed in different terms, pervades all Dr. Hazard's works upon the subject. It is implied in the title of his first

at once to put it into the category of motion, and to solve the gravest problem of anthropology, after the Gordian-knot fashion, by begging the question. It is not science that makes this assumption. Every competent physiologist admits that, be the correlation of physical and psychical events never so close and constant, the real relation of physical motion and psychical change has not yet been discovered, and that it is mere dogmatism to treat one as the efficient cause of the other. Against such a procedure there is one objection, grounded on the very correlation of physical forces, which has never yet been satisfactorily answered. In every event of the physical order, the entirety of antecedent motion is converted into subsequent motion; none of it is lost as motion; it must all be accounted for physically as motion; no infinitesimal fraction of it can be shown to have been converted into psychical change. The chain of molar or molecular motions is complete in itself and infrangible; no conversion of motion into volition is even conceivable, much less demonstrable; and it cannot be assumed, without also assuming that that part of the motion which has been converted into volition, being subtracted from the total antecedent motion, and therefore not appearing in the total subsequent motion, has altogether vanished out of the physical order *in transitu*, and destroyed that quantitative equation of the two motions which the theory itself requires. Such an assumption as this, therefore, can only be made by violating the principle on which it professes to rest. The term *motive* has, in fact, no proper place in the discussion of freedom, being irremediably a "question-begging epithet"; it does not denote a true cause of volition in any other sense than that of final cause, purpose, or end; and

work, "Freedom of Mind in Willing, or Every Being that Wills a Creative First Cause," and also in his last, "Man a Creative First Cause"—"First Cause" being used by him as "a cause which can act without being previously acted upon."

He holds that intelligence in action is the only efficient cause; that the mind is not moved to action by any propulsion in the past, but by its own perception of a reason for making an effort to gratify a recognized existing want. And that it directs its effort to this end by means of its own knowledge, including as an essential element its perception of the future effect of its effort; and as we cannot change the past nor make the present different from what it already is, the only conceivable object of effort—the only motive—is to make the future different from what it otherwise would be. ("Freedom of Willing," pp. 69, 239, 246, 256, 357; "Letters to John Stuart Mill on Causation," etc., pp. 22, 56, §7, p. 99, 122; "Man a Creative First Cause," §§5 and 6.)

the law of causation should be so construed as to correspond with the facts.

Since, then, motion and volition constitute two mutually irreducible phenomena, two phenomena which are fundamentally unlike in kind, it is plainly the worst possible reasoning to confound them under a common term, *event*, and by the use of it, as an "undistributed middle," to infer that volition, no less than motion, must have an efficient cause. So put, the law of causation is a mere bugbear, a scientific blunder, a half-truth that is the worst of falsities. "But must not every event have a cause?" Assuredly; but not in the same sense. Every motion has an efficient cause, and every volition has a final cause—that is the law of causation so stated as not to lose sight of an ineradicable distinction between things that differ, and not to deny a fact as certain as the revolution of the earth round the sun—namely, that fact in the world of human experience which Emerson aptly named the "sovereignty of ethics." Volition, to be volition, must be free from efficient causation; it can have no cause but a final cause. Such freedom as that is the foundation of all ethical distinctions. A volition is the act, or effort to act, of the being that wills—an original activity without which he would cease to be a moral being and become a thing. If it is conceived as the necessary effect of a chain of antecedent causes stretching backwards into an illimitable past (and it must be so conceived if it is efficiently caused), it is then conceived, not as an act of the being that wills, but as an act of the universe itself in all its infinitude. Under such a conception of volition, there is no place for that of personality as given in human experience, above all, in social experience. A person is a being that, within certain limits, freely governs its own activity by final causes, purposes, or ends, and that is not governed by efficient causes; the free formation and free execution of purposes is the essential characteristic of personality. Society is but a community of persons, whose aggregate activity is but the resultant of their mutually co-operative or mutually neutralizing individual activities. Ethics, politics, political economy, jurisprudence, sociology—these all are sciences, every whit as genuine as, though relatively less developed than, the various physical sciences; yet they all depend unconditionally on the existence of persons, as volitional or moral beings. And

the condition of all moral personality is freedom from efficient causation.

Notice that it is in the name of science, not in the name of any actual or ideal religious system, that the postulate of moral freedom is here treated as established by human experience itself. In all its forms, whether permanent, obsolescent, or nascent, religion is here left out of the account ; the claim now made is that natural science, in its higher (though relatively immature) departments, is impossible without that postulate. Every science necessarily starts with certain necessary presuppositions ; and, just as geometry starts with the given existence of points, lines, surfaces, and solids, ethics must start with the given existence of persons with free volitions. No appeal is here made to the alleged direct testimony of individual consciousness to the existence of freedom ; the whole case is now rested on the moral creativeness of individual and generic man, as an observed objective fact of which no scientific explanation can be given unless the fact of free volition is conceded. That is no scientific explanation which begins by denying the fact to be explained ; and no ethical system has any claim to be considered scientific, if it begins by denying or ignoring the only ethical quality in human action. It is precisely here that the future battle-field between the mechanical and ethical theories of evolution is unmistakably discernible. Freedom, personality, personal responsibility, moral creativeness—these are not only the fundamental concepts of ethics, but also the most incontestable facts of human life, whether in its individual or social aspect. The problem of the evolution philosophy is to show how, out of elements which apparently comprised only the impersonal, the non-moral, the unfree, personality and morality and freedom have gradually arisen. The mechanical theory of evolution virtually argues that this evolution has not taken place at all, and that, since the original elements manifest only mechanical or efficient causes, the ultimate product also must be mechanical only ; while the ethical theory of evolution argues that, since personality and morality and freedom are patent in the ultimate product, they must have been latent in the original elements, as immanent cosmical purpose, end, or final cause. This is the issue yet to be decided, now that evolution in some form has become a foregone conclusion among all who have followed the course of modern

thought. Of course, if the mechanical theory is true, it will override all opposition in the end; but among the logical and ultimately historical results of its victory will be the gradual extinction of all moral ideals based on belief in human freedom, the gradual cessation of all efforts to realize them, the gradual decay of all sentiments which they have created, and the gradual formation of a habit of mind which will contemplate all human actions as intrinsically equal in point of ethical quality, since they are all alike inevitable effects of irresistible causes. Such a result would be the reversal, not the continuation, of the process of moral evolution exhibited by history; and for that reason it throws suspicion, to say the least, on the mechanical theory itself. Only that theory of evolution can finally prevail which shall faithfully follow out the line of evolution already marked out in the history of the past; and this, we believe, will be the theory which fully recognizes and explains the supreme fact of all history—the moral creativeness of man.

FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.¹

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF J. G. FICHTE BY A. E. KROEGER.

CHAPTER V.

THE CONTEMPLATION OF GOD AS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE MORAL LAW, OR OF THE FINAL END.

We have seen that life, in its form, as a mere inner self-determination and self-activity, is by no means absolute, but exists for the sake of something else, namely, in order that the final end may be contemplated. In its essence it is not life in this its mere form, but visibility of the final end. As such it appears in

¹ This article completes the translation of Fichte's "Facts of Consciousness," long since begun in this Journal. It includes the lectures given by Fichte at the University of Berlin during the winter semester of 1810-11. The entire work is now to be found in the "Journal of Speculative Philosophy": Vol. V, pp. 53, 130, 226, 338; Vol. VI, pp. 42, 120, 332; Vol. VII, January, p. 36; Vol. XVII, pp. 130, 263; Vol. XVIII, p. 172.

two simultaneously existing and mutually each-other-conditioning forms: in the general form as a nature determined by the final end, which as an eternal nature creates by virtue of that same determination an infinite series of worlds; and second, in the individual form as absolute freedom determined by the same final end. Hence we find in each individual natural impulses, moral determinateness, and—floating between both—absolute freedom, which can arise by its own actual annihilation into a Holy Will, through means of which Will the individual form in its determinateness—that is, the sum of all individuals—survives the destruction of all possible worlds.

Now, we have above expressed a doubt which very readily assails any attentive thinking, that this final end itself, which we have constituted our supreme principle for the present, may also not be absolute. Should this suspicion be confirmed, we should have to consider factical Being also—in analogy with the previous—as being itself only the visibility of another and higher Being, of which Being formal life would now also become the visibility, namely, mediately and through it as the connecting link.

Let us, therefore, proceed to investigate whether the final end is absolute, or, if it is not absolute, what may be its ground, and what may become visible through it. I am inclined to think that it will be found to be the Being of formal life itself, and shall first explain here the conception of Being as taken here for the first time in all its strictness. I call being that which never becomes and never has become, and of which one can absolutely say nothing else than, It is.

Now, I speak here of the Being of Life, that is, of an absolute Becoming, a Being which in its formal essence is only a Becoming, and never real Being. To connect real Being with such an absolute Becoming signifies: this Being itself is in all this infinite Becoming. It is, and does not become; it takes no part at all in the change. It is, therefore, that which remains one and the same throughout all the change. This unity and immovable permanence is not its characteristic, in point of fact, as Being, but only as the opposite of Change.

Let it be well noted: I do not say that as Being it carries within itself non-permanence and Change, which would be nonsense, but simply that without this opposite of a Change the predi-

ates of permanent being and non-change would not at all be possible—an infinite and on no account a negative proposition. It is not Being which follows from the unity, but the unity follows, in opposition to the Becoming as a Change, from Being.

Let us examine this relation of contemplation quite closely. Formal life, we have said, is an absolute Becoming. Now, if you try to think such an absolute Becoming, you must give to this Becoming a certain time of duration, however short, in order to give to contemplation its absolutely necessary fixity; for otherwise the Becoming will dissolve before you into nothingness, and you will have thought nothing.

But this is already against our agreement and a contradiction; for you were called upon to think an absolute Becoming. But duration is a stopping of the Becoming, and hence its negation. Let us, however, release you from this task, since otherwise the thought required would never be reached.

Now, this Becoming, to which you, in violation of our agreement, have allowed a moment's duration, is pushed aside and annihilated by a new absolute Becoming, emerging altogether out of nothingness, and hence having no connection with the former Becoming. Under these conditions, however, there is no internal unity at all in the presupposed life, and we do not think *the* Life, but infinitely different lives. That which alone brings unity and duration into Being is its life; and it appears clearly how, without this presupposition, life cannot be contemplated at all, either in general or as *the* Life.

Result: The presupposition of an absolute Being in Life, as we have just now described this Being, is condition of the contemplability of life.

Now, this just described Being is the same which we have heretofore called the final end.

All Becoming, all manifestation of life, has the duration necessary for its mere contemplability only in so far as it is a Becoming of the Being, whether immediately, or through mediation, and hence, whether in the moral or in the mere sensuous form, makes no difference here. This Being is, therefore, the real substance of the Becoming, or of the deed in the Acting. But now life is in its form an absolute Becoming. Hence this Being in its manifestation exists for all eternity only in the Becoming, and never in

factical Being. In factical Being it could appear only at the end of all life. But life desires to manifest its Being in every one of its manifestations. The fact that this becomes no actual Being is explained by the infinitely continuing Becoming, which is required by the form of actuality. Being, therefore, as a real being, is the purpose and intention of the appearance, and the only, unconditioned, and infinite purpose: hence the final end.

Result: The Being of Life, which must be posited as its ground, becomes the final end only in its synthesis with the Becoming, as the form of life. Outside of this synthesis and beyond that form, we cannot even speak of a final end, but only of a Being. The final end is, therefore, the manifestation of Being in the Becoming—in order to make that Being visible; hence it is mediately visibility of the Being of Life—precisely what we supposed it to be.

REMARK: Being of Freedom and Morality are altogether one and the same. (We may also say: Being of Life, provided we take the word in its most pregnant sense, as signifying absolute Being, beyond all Becoming, and provided we do not make it signify the mere factical being of the appearance.)

But the further question is: What is this Being of life, and can it be further determined? I say: Yes! and in the following manner: The formal part of life is the mere self-determination to be a Becoming. This self-determination, therefore, adds nothing more to Being than that which follows from this form: the perishability of the particular, and the infinite progress. But that which really is permanent in the manifestation, and remains permanent throughout the whole infinite series, is based not on it, but on Being itself. Now, it is the faculty of contemplation which remains permanent in every manifestation, makes it enduring and actually endures throughout the whole infinite series. Hence this contemplation, in its absolute form, does not become, but is; and by its form it keeps up the infinite becoming. The fundamental Being of life, therefore, is, in its form, a contemplation, which has not become, but which is, eternally and unchangeably, the same. All activity, which belongs after all only to formal life, is to be eliminated from it in thought. The word contemplation seems to involve this activity in itself. Let us, therefore, substitute for it the other expression: the Being of Life is a permanent, fixed image, or appearance, an in itself completed Being, which, on that

account, is not again immediately contemplated. This, I say, is the absolute Being of Life; hence Life is completed by that Being, and is nothing but that Being.

Absolutely united with this contemplation we discover formal life; or, the contemplation has formal life, is formal life, etc. Through this formal life it manifests itself, when it manifests itself in the eternal form of the Becoming.

That which we have hitherto regarded as Life is, in its absolute Being, Contemplation, Image, Appearance. But, Contemplation is freedom in regard to a Being; is related to a Being, which is contemplated in contemplation; Imaged in the Image, and which appears in the Appearance.

What sort of a Being is this? Not the Being of Life itself, for life is merely an image, and ends with being an image; and, moreover, it is the image of another, of an opposite. Evidently it is, therefore, a being beyond all Becoming as the image itself is. But now the contemplation is its contemplation, and is therefore dependent upon it as well in regard to its Being as in regard to its contents. Hence that Being must be the ground as well of the formal as of the qualitative existence of the contemplation. Hence, although the contemplation is absolutely and does not *become*, it is not of itself, out of itself, and through itself, but *is* through that being. It is, therefore, absolute only as a fact, a fact of that Being. But that Being is absolutely out of itself, of itself, and through itself. It is God.

Now, nothing else can be said of this Being in this its mere conception—this God—than that it is the absolute, and that it is not contemplation, or anything else involved in contemplation. But this is the mere form of its Being, and merely in opposition to the Being of the Appearance. That which God is really and in Himself appears in the contemplation. That contemplation expresses Him wholly, and He is in it the same as He is internally in Himself. But this contemplation is not again contemplated; but manifests itself only by the freedom connected with it. Hence, this essence, as it is in Himself, manifests itself throughout all eternity primarily and immediately in the contemplation of the eternal final end. Hence Life in its real Being is the image of God, as He is absolutely in Himself. But as formal life, as really living and active, it is the infinite desire actually to become this image of God; a

desire, however, which for the very reason of its being infinite it can never achieve. In real activity, if it is at all true and does not merely seem to be, this formal life is always the primary condition of the Becoming of this image at a certain time moment.

And thus we have obtained the final and complete solution of the problem of our investigation: Life or Knowledge. (We shall see directly how perfectly synonymous those two expressions are.) Knowledge is most certainly not a knowledge of itself—in which case it would dissolve into nothingness, having no stay or support—but it is a knowledge of a *Being*; that is, of the only true Being, God. On no account, however, of a Being outside of God—the like of which, apart from the Being of Knowledge itself or of the contemplation of God, is not at all possible, and the assumption of which is sheer nonsense. But that only possible object of knowledge does never arise in actual knowledge in its purity; it is always broken by the necessary forms of knowledge, which can be shown to be thus necessary. It is the showing up of these forms of knowledge which constitutes philosophy, or the Science of Knowledge.

CHAPTER VI.

CONCLUSION.

RÉSUMÉ.—I. Whatsoever is outside of God dissolves itself into mere contemplation, image or knowledge—as, indeed, being outside of God signifies contemplating God and can signify nothing else. There is in this contemplation not a trace or spark of the real formal Being, which remains altogether in God. Hence the theory of the Comprehensible—God being incomprehensible—can be only the theory of Knowledge, or the Science of Knowledge; for outside of God nothing exists but knowledge.

II. It is true that this Knowledge (this appearance) is not a dead but an absolutely in itself living Knowledge. As such a Life it again has no Being, no Materiality, no Quality, but is simply a Principle. A Principle not of the contemplation (knowledge) or of its object, God, for that contemplation is originally, but simply of a further determination of that contemplation, and thereby of its entrance into the form of Becoming.

III. Now, this life or principle of the contemplation is an abso-

lute faculty to image or schematize everything that constitutes its essence. Originally it is the image of God. Place the principle first on this stand-point. Evidently two cases are possible, which exclude each other. Either the principle, in being such principle, remains what it is, the image, and then its product becomes an infinite series of contemplation. I say, contemplation. Contemplation is everywhere, where the principle, in being a principle, involves a Being, that is, a Being which has not been dissolved into a scheme by freedom, an unconscious Being.

Or, take the second case. The principle remains not this Being a principle, but changes it also into a conception, which here is a conception of God; a conception which, if the principle has proceeded systematically, as we do here, becomes the conception of God as the absolute object of contemplation. This is the genealogy of all conceptions, and here, especially, of the conception of God: Religion, which completes the life of knowledge and is its highest summit.

IV. Let us now return to the contemplation, in which the principle is unconsciously the image of God. Here again there are two possible cases. Either freedom is presupposed in the contemplation, and the product of contemplation is viewed in its transit through it as the second Unconscious element of the principle; and then there arises the infinite contemplation of the final end. This is the view of the moral world.

Or, freedom is not presupposed in the contemplation, and hence the product of contemplation is not determined by a transit through that contemplation; and then there arises the contemplation of infinite nature, which nature here itself dissolves into contemplation and appears as a form thereof.

V. Finally, freedom itself, the principle as such, which in the former fundamental contemplation remained concealed—may be schematized through freedom itself and elevated into consciousness; and then there arises the contemplation of the Ego, as free, and free, moreover, in regard to the final end which now becomes its law. This results in a double view of the Ego: first, as the principle of a moral world; and, second, as the principle in a not moral and hence purely sensuous world.

VI. These five fundamental forms exhaust all possible forms of consciousness for all eternity. The Science of Knowledge treats

of the necessary forms of consciousness, and hence what we have just now said is the fundamental scheme of that science, as the necessary conclusion of a complete representation of the Facts of Consciousness.

FINAL REMARKS.—It would be beneficial to every scientific representation, if it were once in a while compelled to strip off the terminology wherein it wraps itself—perhaps necessarily—and were requested to speak for once in the words of common language and of common sense, whatever new things it has to say. We now propose to extend this service to our own representation.

Speaking in the ordinary language of life we maintain, and have maintained in all soberness, the following :

1. A knowledge exists actually, in fact, and independent ; for this knowledge is a free and independent life.

This must be conceded to us and accepted by all who desire to occupy the same stand-point with us of a philosophy which proceeds from knowledge as a phenomenon in itself. At the same time it is necessary that they must have developed already that thinking, and their own faculty of thinking, sufficiently to be able to think that knowledge, were it only problematically. Thus, no one thinks at all our problem if he thinks, for instance, that knowledge is a quality, say, of a presupposed substantial human being. We never have said, man *possesses* knowledge ; and whoever cannot bring himself to think something else than this in listening to our words loses altogether their sense and meaning, and excludes himself from the sphere wherein alone they have a meaning. We need no bearer of knowledge. Knowledge must be considered, at least for the present, as bearing itself. How we are going to dispose of man, who certainly does not on any account possess knowledge, but whom, with the help of God, knowledge is going to possess, will appear in due time. For the present, the abstraction of our science requires us to forget him, just as the geometrieian requires us to forget matter.

2. This life begins in a certain confinedness of its freedom.

3. Its progress or course of life consists in this, that it must liberate itself from this confinedness, probably thereby dropping into another, but minor, confinedness, from which again it must liberate itself, etc. In short, its course of life is a perpetual elevation of its life into a higher freedom.

4. This continuous development of life is likely enough governed by fixed and determined laws. An exposition of the Fact of Consciousness would therefore be, as it were, a natural history of the development of life.

5. Such a history, being a history of the development of life, must begin from the lowest point; from that point wherein life is given to itself without any previous development. This point, the *terminus a quo* of that history, is external perception.

I have said, Knowledge is simply because it is; it has an independent existence, and the only independent existence known to us. But that knowledge, in its essence being freedom, it must really be freedom, which is independent. I have said further, that you must think, at any rate, this, just as I think, and have expressed it—though you think it is so merely problematically for the present—since such a thinking is the stand-point of philosophy; and that any one, who cannot by any means think knowledge otherwise than as a mere accident of the substrate, man, is quite as incapable of forming a philosophical thought as a man would be to form a geometrical thought who could not arise above the notion of matter.

But it is furthermore clear that such a presupposition of a bearer, or substrate, of knowledge, is in itself an absolute contradiction. We are investigating here the totality of consciousness. Now, such a bearer of consciousness can surely not be brought near to us except through some consciousness, and his credentials will be received only upon the affirmation of that consciousness. Hence, if we presuppose him simply, we exclude the consciousness which introduces him from our investigation, which thus remains imperfect, lacking one of the most essential elements.

Indeed, it has been already sufficiently established how philosophy is absolutely annihilated by this impotency of thinking. Kant, it is true, has not expressed this truth so concisely and unconditionally as we have expressed it; but without a presupposition of this truth he has, in fact, said nothing at all, and his writings remain a mass of contradictions. The philosophizing public generally has not made this presupposition, and hence has really found nothing, or else only a mass of contradictions in his writings.

(How, nevertheless, some of them—with their thinking faculty

in such a condition—can find wisdom in that doctrine, and make themselves its exponents and apostles, is, of course, a riddle.)

It is true that the printed Science of Knowledge has told it to them, but they never believed that it was meant seriously; and this is the sole reason why that science has remained a closed book to them. In attempting now to lead you to an understanding of the Science of Knowledge, I must pray you above all, and as the condition of all my other prayers, that you will believe me when I say that I am quite serious in making that assertion in the very words in which it is couched; and that you will dare to think that thought along with me, though it be only problematically. Surely the attempt can do no harm. If in the course of our investigation you are not convinced by the grounds adduced of the truth of that presupposition, why, you can continue to think just as you have been accustomed to think before. And without that presupposition you cannot, indeed, understand what I have said to you in the course of these lectures, and would give it an utterly false meaning.

I have asserted that that life of knowledge changes itself. In my view it, being itself thoroughly in earnest, produces a Being, which is also actual and remains in fact, and which, after being, cannot be cancelled again; a Being in itself, since Life is in itself. Now this Being expresses itself immediately in a knowledge, since such a Being is itself knowledge. How can any one, who entertains such a view seriously, have a doubt as to the reality of such a knowledge, which is, after all, nothing but that Being itself? True, if, whenever the word knowledge is spoken, we can think of nothing but our idle dreams, and if we can think no other reality but that which we can grasp with our hands, then such a doubt might be in place. Those who misunderstood the Science of Knowledge fell into this error.

[THE END.]

KANT AND PHILOSOPHIC METHOD.

BY JOHN DEWEY.

On its subjective side, so far as individuals are concerned, philosophy comes into existence when men are confronted with problems and contradictions which common sense and the special sciences are able neither to solve nor resolve. There is felt the need of going deeper into things, of not being content with haphazard views or opinions derived from this or that science, but of having some principle which, true on its account, may also serve to judge the truth of all besides. It is no matter of accident that modern philosophy begins, in Descartes, with a method which doubts all, that it may find that wherewith to judge all; nor is it meaningless that Kant, the founder of modernest philosophy, commences his first great work with a similar demand, and "calls upon Reason to undertake the most difficult of tasks, self-knowledge, and establish a tribunal to decide all questions according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws."¹ This self-knowledge of Reason, then, is the Method and criterion which Kant offers.

Before we may see what is involved in this, it is necessary to see what in gist the previous methods had been, and why they had failed. The method of "intellectualism" begun by Descartes and presented to Kant through Wolff was (in one word): Analysis of conceptions, with the law of identity or non-contradiction for criterion. To discover truth is to analyze the problem down to those simple elements which cannot be thought away, and reach a judgment whose predicate may be clearly and distinctly seen to be identical with its subject. Analytic thought, proceeding by the law of identity, gives the method for philosophic procedure. Now, Kant in his pre-critical period² had become convinced that analysis does not explain such a conception as that which we have of causation: "How one thing should arise out of another, when it is not connected with it, according to the law of identity, this is a

¹ See Kant's *Werke*, Rosenkranz's ed., vol. ii, p. 7.

² See especially his essay on attempt to introduce the idea of negative quantity into philosophy. *Werke*, vol. i.

thing which I should much like to have explained.”¹ Nor again, while it may be, and undoubtedly is, the method for pure thought, does it give any means for passing from thought to existence. This, he would say, is no predicate of anything; it is part of no conception, and can be got by no analysis. Reality is added to our notions from without, not evolved from them. But, if logical thought is not adequate to such notions as cause, nor able to reach existence, it can be no method for discovering Absolute truth.

So Kant finds himself thrown into the arms of the Empiricists. It is experience which shows us the origin of an effect in a cause, and experience which adds reality or existence to our thoughts. What, then, is the method of “Empiricism”? Beginning with Bacon, at first it merely asserted that the mind must be freed from all subjective elements, and become a mirror, to reflect the world of reality. But this, as criterion, is purely negative, and required the positive complement of Locke. This method in a word is, *Analysis of perceptions with agreement as criterion*. In contrast with the intellectual school, which began with conceptions supposed to be found ready-made in the human mind, it begins with the perceptions impressed upon that blank tablet, the Mind, by external objects, and finds “knowledge to consist in the perception of the connection or agreement or disagreement of these ideas.” But two questions arise: If truth or knowledge consists in perceptions, how, any more than from conceptions, shall we get to an external world? This question was answered by Berkeley in showing that, if knowledge were what this theory made it to be, the external world was just that whose *esse* is *percipi*. The second question is: What is agreement of perception? Agreement certainly means, as Locke said, “connexion,” that is, mutual reference, or Synthesis. But how can this synthesis occur? The mind is a blank, a wax tablet, a *tabula rasa*, whose sole nature is receptivity, and certainly it can furnish no synthesis. Locke had avoided the difficulty by assuming that ideas come to us or are “given” more or less conjoined—that one has naturally some bond of union with another. But this, of course, cannot be. Simple impressions or perceptions are, as Hume stated, such as admit of no distinction or separation, and these are the ultimate

¹ Ibid., p. 157.

sensations. These have no connection with each other, except perhaps the accidental one of following or occurring together in time, and so it is that "every distinct perception is a separate existence." Necessary connection among them, therefore, there can be none. Sensations are purely contingent, accidental, and external in their relations to each other, with no bonds of union. Any agreement is the result of chance or blind custom. Knowledge as the necessary connection of perceptions does not exist.

Kant consequently discovers, by a more thorough study of empiricism, that it too betrays him. It, no more than his former guides, can furnish him with a way of getting to an external world nor to knowledge at all. Nay, even self, some ghost of which was left him by the other method, has disappeared too.

What has been the difficulty? Descartes did not come to a stand-still at once, for he had tacitly presupposed the synthetic power of thought in itself—had even laid the ground for a theory of it in his reference to the Ego, or self-consciousness. But his successors, neglecting this, and developing only the analytic aspect of thought, had produced a vacuum, where no step to existence or actual relations, being synthetic, could be taken. "Conceptions are empty." Nor had Locke been estopped immediately, for he presupposed some synthesis in the objective world; but it turns out that he had no right to it, and world, self, and all actual relations, being synthetic, have gone. "Perceptions are blind." The problem, then, is clearly before Kant, as is the key to its solution. Synthesis is the *sine qua non*. Knowledge is synthesis, and the explanation of knowledge or truth must be found in the explanation of synthesis. Hence the question of Method is now the question: How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible? *A priori* means simply belonging to Reason in its own nature, so the question is, How and to what extent is Reason the source of synthesis?

The case stands thus: Pure thought is purely analytic; experience *per se* gives only a blind rhapsody of particulars, without meaning or connection—actual experience, or knowledge involves, *is* synthesis. How shall it be got? One path remains open. We may suppose that while thought *in itself* is analytic, it is synthetic when applied to a material given it, and that from this material, by its functions, it forms the objects which it knows. And such, in its lowest terms, is the contribution Kant makes. The material,

the manifold, the particulars, are furnished by Sense in perception; the conceptions, the synthetic functions from Reason itself, and the union of these two elements are required, as well for the formation of the object known, as for its knowing.

To characterize Kant's contribution to Method, it remains to briefly examine these two sides of his theory: First, for the part played by the synthetic functions or the categories. These, in first intention, are so many conceptions of the understanding, and, as such, subject to analysis according to the law of identity, and thus furnish the subject-matter of Logic. But they also have relation to objects, and, as such, are synthetic and furnish the subject-matter of Transcendental Logic, whose work is to demonstrate and explain their objective validity. This is done by showing that "the categories make experience and its objects for the first time possible." That is to say, Kant, after showing that the principles of identity and contradiction, though the highest criteria of logical thought, can give no aid in determining the truths of actual experience, inquires what is the criterion of truth for the latter, or what comes to the same thing, of the synthetic use of the categories as Transcendental Logic—and the answer he finds to be "possible experience" itself. In other words, the categories have objective validity or synthetic use because without them no experience would be possible. If Hume, for example, asks how we can have assurance that the notion of causality has any worth when applied to objects, he is answered by showing that without this notion experience as an intelligible connected system would not exist. By the categories the objects of experience are constituted, and hence their objective validity.

It follows, accordingly, that the system of experience may be determined, as to its form, by a completely made out system of categories. In them, as synthetic functions, constituting experience, we find the criterion of truth. But they themselves have a higher condition. As synthetic functions, they must all be functions of a higher unity which is subject to none of them. And this Kant calls the synthetic *unity* of Apperception or, in brief, self-consciousness. This is the highest condition of experience, and in the developed notion of self-consciousness we find the criterion of truth. The theory of self-consciousness is Method.

But this abstract statement must be farther developed. It

comes to saying, on the one hand, that the criterion of the categories is possible experience, and on the other, that the criterion of possible experience is the categories and their supreme condition. This is evidently a circle, yet a circle which, Kant would say, exists in the case itself, which expresses the very nature of knowledge. It but states that in knowledge there is naught but knowledge which knows or is known—the only judge of knowledge, of experience, is experience itself. And experience is a system, a real whole made up of real parts. It as a whole is necessarily implied in every fact of experience, while it is constituted in and through these facts. In other terms, the relation of categories to experience is the relation of members of an organism to a whole. The criterion of knowledge is neither anything outside of knowledge, nor a particular conception within the sphere of knowledge which is not subject to the system as a whole; it is just this system which is constituted, so far as its form is concerned, by the categories.

Philosophic Method, or the discovering of the criterion of truth, will consist, then, in no setting up of a transcendent object as the empiricists did, or of an abstract principle after the manner of the intellectual school. Since the categories, in and through self-consciousness, constitute experience, Method will consist in making out a complete table of these categories in all their mutual relations, giving each its proper placing, with the full confidence that when so placed each will have its proper place in experience, *i. e.*, its capacity for expressing reality determined.

But we have now strayed far from Kant. While having said nothing which is not deducible from his Transcendental Logic, we have abstracted from the fact that this holds only of the *form* of our knowledge; that there is also an *aesthetic*, and that thought is synthetic, not in itself, but only upon a material supplied to it from without. Turning to this, we find the aspect of affairs changed. Though the categories make experience, they make it out of a foreign material to which they bear a purely external relation. They constitute objects, but these objects are not such in universal reference, but only to beings of like capacities of receptivity as ourselves. They respect not existence in itself, but ourselves as *affected* by that existence. The system of categories furnishes the criterion for all the knowledge we have, but this

turns out to be no real knowledge. It is, Hegel says, as if one ascribed correct insight to a person, and then added that he could see only into the untruth, not the truth. Nor does the deficiency of our method end here. We had previously assumed that the categories as a system, or in their organic relation to self-consciousness, could be known. But it now turns out that nothing can be known except that to which this feeling of external matter through sensibility is given. To know this subject, or self-consciousness, is to make an object of it, and every object is sensible, that is, has a feeling which tells us how we are affected. But such a knowledge is evidently no knowledge of self-consciousness in its own nature. Thus, so far as knowledge is concerned, it must remain a bare form of self-identity, of "I = I," into definite organic relations with which the categories can never be brought. Hence, it appears that our picture of a method was doubly false—false in that after all it could not reach truth; false in that after all no such method was in itself possible. Our organic system of categories cannot constitute absolute truth—and no such organic system is itself knowable. Criterion and method we are still without. The golden prize, which seemed just within our hands as long as we confined ourselves to the Transcendental Logic, turns out to be a tinsel superfluity.

Yet, none the less, there was the suggestion of a method there, which is exactly what we wish. The only question is: Is its reference to the *Æsthetic* necessary? Is the latter a necessary part of Kant's theory, or, so far as it concerns the reception of external matter, an excrecence? The question is just here: Previous methods failed because they made no allowance for synthesis—Kant's because the synthesis can occur only upon matter foreign to it. Thought in the previous theories was *purely* analytic; in Kant's it is *purely* synthetic, in that it is synthesis of foreign material. Were thought at once synthetic *and* analytic, differentiating and integrating in its own nature, both affirmative and negative, relating to self at the same time that it related to other—indeed, through this relation to other—the difficulty would not have arisen.

Is the state of the case as Kant supposes? Must we say that Reason is synthetic only upon condition that material be given it to act upon, or, may it be, that while we must say that for the in-

dividual the material, nay, the form as indissolubly connected with the material, is given, yet, to Reason itself, nothing is given in the sense of being foreign to it?

A slight examination will show us that, at least as far as Kant is concerned, the former supposition is but an arbitrary limitation or assumption, which Kant imposed upon himself, or received without question from previous philosophy. On one side, he had learned that pure thought is analytic; on the other, that the individual is affected with sensations impressed upon it by external objects. At the same time that he corrects both of these doctrines with his own deduction of the categories, he formally retains both errors.

So we have him asking at the very outset, as a matter of course: "In what other way is it to be conceived that the knowing power can be excited to activity, except by objects which affect our senses?" That is to say, he assumes at the outset that there is something external to Reason by which it must be excited. He perceives, what all admit, that an individual organized in a certain specific way with certain senses, and external things acting upon these senses, are conditions to our knowledge, and then proceeds to identify respectively this individual with the subject, and these things with the object, in the process of knowledge. But here it is that we ask with what right does he make this identification. If it is made, then surely the case stands with Reason as he says it does—it acts only upon a material foreign to it. Yet this individual and these things are but known objects already constituted by the categories, and existing only for the synthetic unity of apperception or self-consciousness. This, then, is the real subject, and the so-called subject and object are but the forms in which it expresses its own activity. In short, the relation of subject and object is not a "transcendent" one, but an "immanent," and is but the first form in which Reason manifests that it is both synthetic and analytic; that it separates itself from itself, that it may thereby reach higher unity with itself. It is the highest type of the law which Reason follows everywhere. The material which was supposed to confront Reason as foreign to it is but the manifestation of Reason itself. Such, at least, are the results which we reach in the Transcendental Deduction, and such are the results we consider ourselves justified to keep in opposition to Kant's pure assumptions.

[We see the same thing in Kant's theory of phenomenon. Just as, concerning the process of knowledge, he assumes that subject and object are in external relation to each other, and hence Reason in contact with a foreign material, so here he assumes that the character of phenomenality consists in relation to an unknowable noumenon. The phenomenon is referred to something outside of experience, instead of being defined by its relation within experience—in which case it would be seen to be a phenomenon in its own nature, in that the categories which constitute it as such are not adequate to truth.

We have but to turn to Kant's derivation of the categories, to be again assured that Kant's theory of Reason as synthetic only in reference to foreign material is one purely assumed. As is notorious, these he took from the Logic of the School, which he held to give a complete table of all the forms of pure thought. When we turn to this table we find the highest point reached in it to be reciprocity. Now, reciprocity is precisely that external relation of two things to each other that we have already found existing, in Kant's theory, between subject and object in Knowledge—the relations of things that are independent of each other but mutually act upon each other. So, too, it is but another way of stating that Thought, analytic in itself, is synthetic when applied to an external material, or that this material, blind and haphazard in itself, is formed by something acting upon it. When Kant tells us, therefore, that the categories are not limited in their own nature, but become so when applied, as they must be, to determine space and time, we have in our hands the means of correcting him. They are limited, and express just the limitation of Kant himself. And Kant confesses their insufficiency as soon as he takes up the questions of moral and æsthetic experience and of life itself. Here we find the categories of freedom determined by ends, free production, organism to be everywhere present, while all through his "*Critiques*" is woven in the notion of an intuitive understanding which is the ultimate criterion of all truth, and this understanding is just what we have already met as the organic system of experience or self-consciousness.

Whether we consider the relations of subject and object, or the nature of the categories, we find ourselves forced into the presence of the notion of organic relation. The relation between subject

and object is not an external one; it is one in a higher unity which is itself constituted by this relation. The only conception adequate to experience as a whole is organism. What is involved in the notion of organism? Why, precisely the Idea which we had formerly reached of a Reason which is both analytic and synthetic, a Reason which differentiates itself that it may integrate itself into fuller riches, a Reason that denies itself that it may become itself. Such a Reason, and neither an analytic Thought, nor an analytic Experience, nor a Reason which is analytic in itself, and synthetic for something else, is the ultimate criterion of truth, and the theory of this Reason is the Philosophic Method.

The two defects which we found before in Kant's theory now vanish. The method is no longer one which can reach untruth only, nor is it a method which cannot be made out. The track which we were upon in following the course of the Transcendental Deduction was the right one. The criterion of experience is the system of categories in their organic unity in self-consciousness, and the method consists in determining this system and the part each plays in constituting it. The method takes the totality of experience to pieces, and brings before us its conditions in their entirety. The relations of its content, through which alone this content has character and meaning, whereby it becomes an intelligible, connected whole, must be made to appear.

It was the suggestion of this method, it was the suggestion of so many means for its execution, it was the actual carrying of it out in so many points that makes Kant's "Philosophy" the *critical* philosophy, and his work the *crisis*, the separating, dividing, turning-point of modern philosophy, and this hurried sketch would not be complete if we did not briefly point out what steps have been taken toward the fulfilling of the Ideal. This is found chiefly in Hegel and his "Logic." We can only discuss in the light of what has already been said why Hegel begins with Logic; why the negative plays so important a part in his philosophy, and what is the meaning of Dialectic. (1.) Logic. One of Hegel's repeated charges against Kant is, that he examines the categories with reference to their *objective* character, and not to determine their own meaning and worth. At first it might seem as if this were the best way to determine their worth, but it ought now to be evident that such a procedure is both to presuppose that they are subject-

ive in themselves, and that we have a ready-made conception of object by which to judge them—in short, it amounts to saying that these conceptions are purely analytic, and have meaning only in relation to an external material. Hence the method must examine the categories without any reference to subjective or objective existences; or, to speak properly, since we now see that there are no purely subjective or objective existences, without any relation to things and thoughts as two distinct spheres. The antithesis between them is not to be blinked out of sight, but it must be treated as one which exists within Reason, and not one with one term in and the other out. The categories which, for the individual, determine the nature of the object, and those which state how the object is brought into the subjective form of cognition, must be deduced from Reason alone. A theory performing this task is what Hegel calls *Logic*, and is needed not only to overcome Kant's defects, but is immediately suggested by his positive accomplishments. In our account of the Transcendental Deduction we saw that self-consciousness was the supreme condition of all the categories, and hence can be subject in itself to none of them. When it is made subject we have no longer the absolute self-consciousness, but the empirical ego, the object of the inner sense. In short, the categories constitute the individuals as an object of experience, just as much as they do the material known. Hence they are no more subjective than objective. We may call them indifferently neither or both. The truth is, they belong to a sphere where the antithesis between subject and object is still potential, or *an sich*. It is evident, therefore, that logic, in the Hegelian use, is just that criterion of truth which we thought at first to find in Kant's transcendental *Logic*—it is an account of the conceptions or categories of Reason which constitute experience, internal and external, subjective and objective, and an account of them as a system, an organic unity in which each has its own place fixed. It is the completed Method of Philosophy.

(2.) The Negative in Hegel. It ought now to be evident that any Philosophy which can pretend to be a Method of Truth must show Reason as both Analytic and Synthetic. If History can demonstrate anything, it has demonstrated this, both by its successes and its failures. Reason must be that which separates itself, which differentiates, goes forth into differences, that it

may then grasp these differences into a unity of its own. It cannot unite unless there be difference; there can be no synthesis where there is not analysis. On the other hand, the differences must remain forever foreign to Reason unless it brings them together; there can be no analysis where there is not synthesis, or a unity to be dirempted. If there be no synthesis in Reason, we end in the impotence of the former school of intellectualism, or in the helpless scepticism of Hume; if Reason be synthetic only upon a foreign material, we end in the contradictions of Kant. If there is to be *knowledge*, Reason must include both elements within herself. It is Hegel's thorough recognition of this fact that causes him to lay such emphasis on the negative. Pure affirmation or identity reaches its summit in Spinoza, where all is lost in the infinite substance of infinite attributes, as waves in the sea. Yet even Spinoza was obliged to introduce the negative, the determinations, the modes, though he never could succeed in getting them by any means from his pure affirmation. In Hume we find pure difference or negation, the manifold particularization of sensations, but even he is obliged to introduce synthetic principles in the laws of association, though he never succeeds in legitimately deriving them from sensations, for a "consistent sensationalism is speechless." Kant had tried a compromise of the principle, synthesis from within, difference from without. That, too, failed to give us knowledge or a criterion of Truth. Hegel comprehends the problem, and offers us Reason affirmative *and* negative, and affirmative only in and through its own negations, as the solution.

(3.) Dialectic. We have now the notion of Dialectic before us in its essential features. We have seen that the desired object is a theory of the Conceptions of Reason in an organic system, and that Reason is itself both integrating and differentiating. Dialectic is the construction by Reason, through its successive differentiations and resumptions of these differences into higher unities, of just this system. If we take any single category of Reason—that is to say, some conception which we find involved in the system of experience—this is one specific form into which Reason has unified or "synthesized" itself. Reason itself is immanent in this category; but, since Reason is also differentiating or analytic, Reason must reveal itself as such in this category, which accordingly passes, or is reflected, or develops into its opposite, while the

two conceptions are then resumed into the higher unity of a more concrete conception.

Since the system of knowledge is implicit in each of its members, each category must judge itself, or rather, Reason, in its successive forms, passes judgment on its own inadequacy until the adequate is reached—and this can be nothing but Reason no longer implicit, but developed into its completed system. Reason must everywhere, and in all its forms, propose itself as what it is, viz., absolute or adequate to the entire truth of experience; but, since at first its *form* is still inadequate, it must show what is absolutely implicit in it, viz., the entire system. That at first it does, by doing what it is the nature of the Reason which it manifests to do, by differencing itself, or passing into its opposite, its other; but, since Reason is also synthetic, grasping together, these differences must resolve themselves into a higher unity. Thus, Reason continues until it has developed itself into the conception which is in form equal to what itself is in content, or, until it has manifested all that it is implicitly. A twofold process has occurred. On the one hand, each special form of Reason or Category has been placed; that is, its degree of ability to state absolute truth fixed by its place in the whole organic system. On the other, the system itself has been developed; that is to say, as Reason goes on manifesting its own nature through successive differences and unities, each lower category is not destroyed, but retained—but retained at its proper value. Each, since it is Reason, has its relative *truth*; but each, since Reason is not yet adequately manifested, has only a *relative* truth. The Idea is the completed category, and this has for its meaning or content Reason made explicit or manifested; that is, all the stages or types of Reason employed in reaching it. “The categories are not errors, which one goes through on the way to the truth, but phases of truth. Their completed system in its organic wholeness is *the Truth*.” And such a system is at once philosophic Method and Criterion; method, because it shows us not only the way to reach truth, but truth itself in construction; criterion, because it gives us the form of experience to which all the facts of experience as organic members must conform.

It will be seen, I hope, that we have not left our subject, “Kant’s Relation to Philosophic Method;” for a crisis is nothing in itself. It is a crisis only as it is the turning point; and a turning point is

the old passing into the new, and can be understood only as the old and the new are understood. The criterion of Kant is just this turning point; it is the transition of the old abstract thought, the old meaningless conception of experience, into the new concrete thought, the ever growing, ever rich experience.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

TRANSLATED FROM HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHIE DER RELIGION," [BY F. LOUIS SOLDAN.

I have deemed it necessary to make religion in itself the object of philosophical contemplation, and to contribute this inquiry as a special part to the system of philosophy. In order to introduce the subject I shall precede it by an exposition of (A) the diremption of [or antithesis in] consciousness, which awakens that desire whose satisfaction is the task of our science [of religion]; and I shall describe the relation in which this science stands to philosophy and religion in general, and also to the principles of religious consciousness in our own time. Then, after touching upon (B) some preliminary questions which result from these relations of the science, I shall, finally, give (C) a classification of the latter.

We must make clear to ourselves, in the first place, what the object is which presents itself to us in the philosophy of religion, and what our conception of religion is. We know that religion removes us from the limits of time, and that it forms for our consciousness a realm where all the enigmatical problems of the world appear solved, where all contradictions found by musing, pondering thought appear cleared, and all pangs of feeling stilled; it is the realm of eternal truth, rest, and peace. Generally speaking, man is man on account of thought, of concrete thought, or, more particularly, on account of being spirit; from man as spirit proceed the manifold forms of the sciences and arts, the interests of his political life, the relations connected with his Freedom and Will. But all these manifold forms, the whole warp and woof of human relations, activities, joys, everything that man values and esteems, and wherein he seeks his happiness, his glory, and his pride,—all find in the end their centre in religion, in the thought,

consciousness, and feeling of God. God is therefore the beginning of everything, and the end of everything. From this point whatever exists emanates, and it returns into it. He is the centre which animates and inspires everything, and which, while sustaining all these forms in their existence fills them with life. By means of religion man places himself in relation to this centre, in which all his other relations converge, and he elevates himself thereby to the highest level of consciousness, namely, to the realm which is free from relation to [and dependence on] other things, which is absolutely self-sufficient, unconditioned, free, and which is its own end and aim.

Religion, being the occupation with this final end and aim, is therefore absolutely free, and has its aim in itself. To this final aim all other aims lead back, and, although otherwise independent, they vanish before it. No other aims can maintain themselves in contrast to this final aim; in it alone they find their realization. When the spirit has attained the realm [of religious thought] where it occupies itself with this aim and end, it becomes freed and unburdened from all that is finite, and obtains its final satisfaction and liberation. For here spirit is no longer related to something other than itself, to something limited, but to the unlimited and infinite, which is an infinite relation, a relation of Freedom, and no longer one of dependence. Here the spirit's consciousness is absolutely free, and is true consciousness indeed, for it is consciousness of absolute truth. This relation of freedom, on the side of feeling, is the joy which we call beatitude; on the side of activity its sole office is to manifest the honor and to reveal the glory of God, so that man in this relation is no longer chiefly concerned in himself, in his interests, his vanity, but rather in the absolute end and aim. All the nations know that it is in their religious consciousness that they possess truth, and they have always looked upon religion as their pride and worth, and as the "Sunday" [or Sabbath] of their lives. Whatever causes us doubt and anxiety, all our sorrows and cares, all the narrow interests of finite existence, we leave behind us upon the sands of time, and as, when we are standing upon the highest point of a mountain, removed from the narrowness of terrestrial sights, we may view quietly all the limits of the landscape, and the world, so man, lifted above this rigid reality, looks upon it as a semblance, an

image only, which this region of purity mirrors, and its shades, contrasts, and lights are softened into eternal rest by the ray of the spiritual sun. In these regions flow the streams of oblivion, out of which Psyche drinks, into which she sinks all pain. Here the dark shades of life are softened into the image of a dream, and are transfigured into the darker outline within which the splendor of the eternal appears.

This image of the absolute may offer to religious devotion either a more or less present animation, assurance, and enjoyment, or it may be represented as something to be longed and hoped for, as something appertaining to the distant and to the beyond; but it remains a certainty in every case, and, since it is a divine object, it illumines the times with its rays and engenders the consciousness that truth is strong and will prevail, although sorrows may torment the soul in the realm of time. Faith recognizes the divine as the truth and substance of existing things, and this content of devotion is the animating principle of the present world; it makes its activity felt in the life of the individual and rules him in his will and deeds. This is the general view of religion, religious sentiment, consciousness, or whatever we may call it. It is the object of these lectures to contemplate, examine, and understand its nature.

As regards our aim, we must understand distinctly that it is not the task of philosophy to plant religion in a person's mind, for it is supposed that it is found in everybody [to whom these lectures are addressed]. It is not proposed to put something substantially new into man; this would be just as foolish as to attempt to put mind into a dog by making him chew a book. He whose heart has not outgrown the world of the finite, he who in the longing for the eternal and in feeling anticipation of it has not attained his own elevation, he who has never looked into the pure ether of the soul, does not possess within himself the material whose contemplation and cognition is our present task.

It may, nevertheless, happen to be the case that religion is engendered in the mind by philosophical cognition, but such is not a necessary consequence; it is not the intention of philosophy to edify, nor is it required from it as a test that it should engender religion in this or that person. It is undoubtedly the purpose of philosophy to [demonstrate and] develop the necessity of religion in

and for itself, and to conceive that the spirit must proceed from all other modes of its own volition, conception, and feeling to this absolute mode; but therein philosophy completes the same process which is the universal fate of spirit; but this is quite different from elevating an individual being to that height. The caprice, perversity and indifference of the individuals may interfere with the necessity of universal spiritual nature, may depart from it and attempt to establish a peculiar stand-point of their own and to maintain themselves upon it. This possibility of stepping indolently upon the stand-point of untruth, or, of remaining upon it knowingly and willingly, arises from the freedom of the individual, while planets, plants, animals, by the necessities of their natures, cannot deviate from their truth, and they *become* what they shall be and *must* be. But in human liberty *is* and *shall be* are different things; it contains the element of caprice; it has the power of separating itself from its necessity, from its own law, and of working against its own destination. Therefore, even if cognition should see the necessity of the religious stand-point, even if volition should learn from reality the futility of its separation from it, all this might not prevent a person from persisting in his obstinacy, and he might still turn away from his necessity and truth.

The saying that "such or such a person possesses a cognition of God and yet keeps away from religion, and has not become religious," has been used in the customary shallow manner as an argument against [philosophical] cognition. It has never been asserted that cognition will lead or ought to lead to religion, but rather that it should cognize that religion which is already in the mind; it is not the task of [philosophical] cognition to dispense religion to this or that person, or to bring about a religious reform in the single, empirical individual, if he does not possess any religion in himself already, or does not want to possess any.

But in reality there is no man so corrupt, so lost, so bad—and we cannot look upon anybody as being so miserable—that he has absolutely nothing pertaining to religion in his soul; he will be found to have at least some fear of it, some longing for or hatred of it; even if the latter should be true, his soul has been engaged with religion and is entangled in its threads. Since he is a human being, religion is essential to him, and not an alien sensation. But much depends here on the relation in which religion stands to a

man's general views of the world and of life ; to them philosophic cognition and its influence principally relate. In this relation lies the source of the diremption and separation from the original impulse of spirit in the direction of religion ; out of this relation have grown the most manifold forms of consciousness ; the most various relations between these forms and the interest of religion have sprung from it. Before the philosophy of religion can gather itself into its own concept, it is compelled to work its way through the whole labyrinth of those interests of the times which have at present concentrated themselves in the wide sphere of religion. At first the movement of the principles of the time proceeds outside of philosophical cognition ; but their own movement brings them into contact and conflict with and antithesis to philosophy, and this antithesis and its solution we shall have to consider after having examined the first antithesis which as yet lies outside of philosophy, and after tracing the confirmation of its development to the point where it draws toward itself philosophical cognition.

A.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION AS RELATED TO ITS PRESUPPOSITIONS
AND TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE TIMES.

1. *The Separation (Entzweiung) of Religion from Free, Worldly Consciousness.*

a. The relation which religion has in itself, in its immediateness to the other consciousness of man, contains the germs of diremption, since both sides are in the process of separation. Even in their naïve relation they constitute two different occupations, two realms of consciousness, between which transitions take place alternately. Thus man in his actual, worldly pursuits has the days of the week to busy himself with his worldly affairs, and with providing the necessities of life ; and then he has his Sunday when he lays all these aside, when he concentrates his thoughts on himself, and, freed from the absorbing influence of finite pursuits, lives for himself and the higher elements which he has within, and which is his true being. In this separation of the two sides there enters, however, at once a double modification.

a. Let us first look at the religion of a pious man, that is to say,

of one who truly deserves this name. Belief or faith is here as yet artless and *naïve*, it is not mingled with reflection, and is without antithesis. Belief in God in its simplest form is one thing, but it is quite a different matter when, as the result of reflection, and with the consciousness that there is something opposed to this belief, we say, I believe in God; in the latter there appears already the need of justification, of argument, of polemics. The other religion, that of the unsophisticated, pious man, is not treated by him as a special matter, distinct by itself, which has nothing in common with his general life and existence, but it penetrates with its breath and flavor all his feelings and actions; his consciousness relates every aim and object of his worldly life to God, as its infinite and last source. Every phase of his finite existence and course, his sorrows and joys, he raises above his narrow sphere, and produces in this elevation the idea and feeling of his eternal essence. All the rest of his life forms modes of confidence, of ethical conduct, of obedience, of habit; he is what circumstances and nature have made him, and he takes his life, his conditions, and his rights, as he has received everything, as an uncomprehended fate: "Such is it!" Or, in relation to God, he may take gratefully, as a gift of free grace, what is his, and in turn is ready to offer it to Him as a free sacrifice. His other consciousness is thus freely and naturally subjected to this higher realm.

β. On the side of the world, the difference appearing in this relation develops into a contrast. It might seem as if the development of this side involved no detriment to religion, and as if encroachment were avoided, since, according to the expressed profession, religion is acknowledged to be supreme.

In fact, however, it is otherwise, and from the side of the world vitiation and diremption creep into religion. The development of this difference may be designated in general as the rise of the Understanding and of human interests. As the Understanding awakens in the life of mankind, and in science, and as reflection becomes independent, the human Will sets up absolute aims, as, for instance, legal institutions and the state, both of which are to have existence in and for themselves. The inquiring mind cognizes the laws, the qualities, the order and characteristics of natural things and of the activities and creations of spirit. This experience and knowledge, as well as the willing of these aims and

their realization, are the work of man, of his understanding and volition. In all of them he sees his property his own. Although his starting-point is that which *is*, that which he finds in existence already, he is no longer one who merely possesses the attribute of knowing, one who enjoys rights which he has not created himself. What he has wrought through his intelligence and will out of the materials found, is his own, his work, and he has the consciousness that he has produced it. These productions therefore, constitute his honor and his pride, and they constitute a vast and infinite wealth; his world of knowledge, of judgment, of external possessions, of rights and deeds.

Thus spirit forms within itself this contrast—as yet naïvely, without knowing it at the beginning. But it soon becomes a conscious one; for spirit now moves between its two sides, whose contrasts have developed into reality. One side is that wherein it knows itself as its own, wherein it is in the midst of its own aims and interests, and where it determines itself free and independently from within. The other side is that in which spirit recognizes a higher power and absolute duties—duties without corresponding rights—and where whatever he receives for the fulfillment of his duties remains a gift of grace. In the former, the self-dependence of spirit is the basis. In the latter it possesses the attributes of humility and dependence, and its religion differs from the religion of independence in the circumstance that spirit confines cognition or science to the worldly side, and assigns the sphere of religion to feeling and faith.

γ. But conditionality is involved even in the side of self-dependence, and Cognition and Will must experience it. Man will at any rate demand his right; whether it will be conceded, does not depend on him, and in this respect therefore he depends on something else. In matters of cognition he proceeds from the conditions and the order of nature as a starting-point; these data are given to him. The content of his science and knowledge is matter extraneous to him. Thus the two sides, that of self-dependence and of conditionality, enter into a relationship to each other, and this relation leads man to the confession that everything is made by God, not only the things which constitute the content of his knowledge, of which he takes possession, which he uses as a means for his ends, but also he himself and the spirit and the intel-

lectual faculties, which, as he says, he employs to attain to that cognition.

But this concession is dead and cold, because in it that conception and knowledge are wanting which constitute the life of consciousness, and in which the latter is by itself and is self-consciousness. Whatever is limited [*alles bestimmte*] belongs to the sphere of cognition and of human, self-created aims and interests, and in these there is nothing but the activity of self-consciousness. This concession is therefore void, because it stops with what is abstractly universal, namely, [with the assertion] that everything is a work of God; with the most diverse things (the course of the stars and its laws, ant, man) this relation does not advance beyond one and the same thing, namely, that God has made it. Since this religious relation of the several objects is always expressed in the same monotonous statement, it would become wearisome if it were to be repeated in every individual case. The whole matter is therefore considered settled with the one admission that God has made all things; the religious side is thus satisfied once for all, and in the development of cognition, and the pursuit of interest and aims, no further thought is given to it. It looks almost as if that admission were only made to get rid of the matter, or, as it were to be safe from attacks from without as far as this point is concerned; in short, one may be in earnest or not in earnest with this assertion.

Piety, whatever it may undertake or experience, never tires of lifting its glance to God, although it does this every hour of the day in the same way. And yet, as long as piety means [simply] pious feeling, it is still in [the phase of] singularity. It is in every moment that which it is [without reserve, undivided], entire, because it is without reflection and comparing [relation-seeing] consciousness. Here [on the other stand-point], however, where cognition and self-determination are the rule, this comparison and the consciousness of this uniform sameness are essential, and a universal proposition is here asserted once for all. On one side the understanding holds sway, and on the other it has the religious feeling of dependence.

b. Nor does piety escape the fate of diremption. Diremption exists in it potentially in the fact already that its real content is but a manifold and contingent one. The two relations, that of piety

and of the comparing understanding, no matter how much they seem to differ, have this in common, that God's relation to the other side of consciousness is indefinite and general. The second of these relations finds direct expression in the quoted saying: "God has created all things."

a. The mode of contemplation which is peculiar to piety and through which it lends greater explicitness to its reflection, is that it looks upon circumstances and institutions [as if they were to subserve some aim or end, that is to say] in the light of a teleological relation, and that it considers all the events of the individual life, as well as the great events of history, as proceeding from divine purposes, or as tending and turning towards them. This view no longer confines itself to an acknowledgment of a general divine relation, but it makes the latter become a definite relation. [Through this] a more explicit content appears, the most diverse matters are placed in relation to each other, and God is then looked upon as the efficient cause of these relations. The animals and their surroundings are thus or thus constituted in order to find their food, to nourish their offspring, to be protected against injury, to resist the winter, to be able to defend themselves against their enemies. It is discovered how in human life, through what appears accident or chance—such as some misfortune—man is led to happiness either in a worldly or an eternal sense. In short, the doing and the will of God are here contemplated in particular actions, natural phenomena, events and the like.

But this content itself, these aims, this finite content, are contingent, are projected for the moment, and lose themselves in inconsistency at once. If, for instance, God's wisdom in regard to nature is admired in the weapons which the animals have, either to gain their food or to defend themselves against their enemies, experience will show at once that these weapons are of no avail, and that the creatures, considered as aims in themselves [as existing for their own sake], are used by others as means.

It is owing to progressive knowledge that this external teleological view has been reduced and superseded. For higher knowledge demands, in the first place, consistency at least, and discovers that those aims and ends which were considered divine purposes are subordinate and finite ends; they are things which

prove themselves to the same experience and observation to be void and erroneous, and not objects of the divine will.

Were this view adopted, and its inconsistency ignored, this in itself would prove it to be indefinite and superficial, because any and every content—no matter what its nature—might be put into it. For nothing could be found, no portion of the order of nature, no event, of which a useful trait in some direction or other could not be pointed out. Piety, if this view be taken, exists no longer as a *naïve* feeling, but is based on the general idea of an aim and end, on the idea of the good; and it argues by subsuming the existing things under this general thought. But this argument places piety in the embarrassing position of having pointed out to it, in this immediate appearance of natural things—no matter how much of purpose and use it has previously shown to exist in them—just as many indications of absence of purpose and defects. What is beneficial to one is harmful to another, and consequently lacks purpose. If the protection of life and of the interests connected with existence is furthered in one case, it is just as much endangered or destroyed in the other. Thus there is a diremption in itself implied in elevating, contrary to God's eternal mode of activity, finite things to the dignity of essential ends and aims. This inconsistency contradicts the idea which we have of God, namely, that He and His mode of action are universal and necessary.

Since piety thus considers the external end and aim, or the externality of the thing, by which the latter is useful for something else, the natural determination of the object which has formed the starting-point seems to be, that it exists for something else. But upon closer examination this appears the object's own relation, its nature the immanent nature and necessity of that which is related. Thus arises for piety the real transition to the other side, which has been designated before as the phase of Selfhood [*das Moment des Selbstischen*].

β. Piety is therefore thrown out of its argument, and, after a beginning has once been made with thinking and with the relations of thought, thinking must seek and demand above all things that which is peculiarly its own [*characteristic*], namely, consistency and necessity, and oppose them to that stand-point of contingency. With this step, the principle of selfhood develops com-

pletely. Since the Ego as Thought is simple and universal, it is relation in general; and since I exist for myself, as self-consciousness, the relations also should exist for myself. To the thoughts and ideas which I make my own, I lend the determination which I am myself. I am this simple point, and that which exists for myself I will cognize in this unity.

In this respect cognition deals with that which *is*, and with its necessity; it conceives this necessity in the relations of cause and effect, reason and inference, force and manifestation, the universal, the genus and the individuals, which belong to the sphere of the contingent. Cognition and science thus place the most diverse matter in reciprocal relationship; they deprive it of the contingency which it owes to its immediateness; and, considering the relations which the exuberance of finite phenomena possesses, they grasp the world of finitude within themselves, and comprehend it in a system of the universe. Cognition, therefore, needs for this system no presupposition which is extraneous to the same. For the knowledge of what an object is, what its essential determinations are, results from inspection and observation of it. After the qualities of objects have been observed, one proceeds to the relations in which they stand to other objects, not the contingent, but the determinate [and necessary] relations, which point towards the original thing from which they take their origin. In this manner we inquire into the ground and cause of a thing, and this inquiry has here the meaning that the special causes are sought. It is no longer sufficient to designate God as the cause of the lightning, or the downfall of the republican constitution of Rome, or of the French Republic; for it is soon discovered that such an explanation is altogether general, and does not give the desired explanation. When we want to know the cause of a natural phenomenon, or of some law as effect or consequence, we want to know the cause of just this phenomenon; we do not ask for the cause which would apply to everything, but for the one which fits this special case and no other. And, therefore, it must be the cause of such special phenomena, and must be an immediate one; it must be sought in the finite, and must be finite itself. This mode of cognition can, therefore, not progress beyond what is finite, and does not want to go beyond it, because it knows everything, and can do justice to everything in its finite sphere. [Such

a] Science forms a universe of cognition, which for itself does not require God, [since] it lies outside of religion, and has no connection with it. Cognition enlarges within these limits upon its relations and connections, and in this it has all the determinate material and content on its side, while there is nothing left for the other side—the side of the infinite and eternal.

γ. Thus the two sides have completely unfolded themselves in their contrast. The feeling mind is, on the side of religion, filled with the divine, but it is without freedom, self-consciousness, and without consistency in regard to its determinations which have the form of contingency. The consistent connection of the determinations is peculiar to the side of cognition, which, while it is at home in what is finite, and moves freely in the logical determination of the most diverse connections, is unable to construct anything better than a system without absolute trustworthiness, without God. The absolute content, purpose or aim belongs to the side of religion, but is found there as something abstractly positive only. Cognition has taken possession of all the finite content and drawn it within its sphere; the entire determinate content has become its share. Yet, even if it should give to the same a necessary connection, it cannot lend absolute connection to it. Since science has taken possession of cognition, and is the consciousness of the necessity of the finite, religion has been deprived of cognition, and has shrunk into the simple feeling, into a content-lacking elevation of the spiritual to the eternal, but it knows nothing that it could predicate of the eternal; for whatever would involve cognition would be a lowering of the eternal to the level and connection of the finite.

When the two sides have thus developed and enter into a reciprocal relationship they are mutually distrustful. Religions feeling distrusts the finitude which cognition involves, and charges science with vanity and conceit, because in science the subject is self-related and self-contained, and because in it the Ego, as the cognizing principle, in its relation to the external, remains for itself. On the other side Cognition is distrustful of the Totality to which the Feeling confines itself, and in whose unity it sinks all explication and development. Cognition is afraid of losing its freedom if it should yield to the demands of the Feeling by acknowledging a truth which it does not see clearly and distinctly. And when the religious feel-

ing steps forth from its universality, and projects aims and ends for itself, and thus makes a transition to determination, Cognition can see in this undertaking nought but arbitrary caprice, and it would become the play of chance, if it too were to pass into determinateness in the same way. When developed reflection, therefore, is obliged to betake itself to religion, it finds it unendurable there and becomes impatient of all those determinations.

c. When the development has reached this stage, in which each side, at the approach of the other, repels it as its enemy, there arises the need of a harmonization through which the infinite may appear in the finite, and the finite in the infinite, so that neither shall form henceforth a realm by itself. This would result in a conciliation of the religious, pure feeling with cognition and intelligence. In such a conciliation, full satisfaction must be given to the highest demands of cognition and of the idea, for these can make no concession which would sacrifice aught of their dignity and worth. But neither can the absolute content be allowed to suffer detraction and to be dragged down into finitude; when opposed to it, the finite form of cognition must yield.

In the Christian religion the need of this conciliation must necessarily become more apparent than in the other religions, for the reason that—

a. It itself arises out of absolute diremption and begins with the pain, in which it severs the natural unity of the spirit and destroys the inner peace. In it man appears naturally bad, and therefore bears in his deepest soul a negative relation to himself; the spirit being forced back upon itself, finds itself severed from the infinite and absolute being.

β. Conciliation, the need of which here reaches its culmination, becomes apparent to faith in the first place, but not in such a way that the latter can remain in its *naïve* state. For spirit which turns within towards its immediate naturalness is sinful, and therefore alienated, removed and estranged from truth. When my Ego is placed in this state of separation, I am no longer Truth; the latter is in this case given to conception as an independent content, and truth is conceived on the basis of authority.

γ. But although I am put thereby into a world of intelligence, in which the nature of God, the determinations and modes of His actions, are placed within the reach of cognition, and the question

of the truth of all this rests on the observation and testimony of others, I am nevertheless thrown back upon myself at the same time, because thinking, cognition, reason, are processes within my own self, and because my freedom is placed before my eyes in the existence of sin, and in my reflections, in regard to the same. Cognition is, therefore, an inherent element of the Christian religion itself.

The Christian religion secures to me the maintenance of my freedom, or rather its achievement. In the Christian religion, not merely the genus, but the individual, the welfare of the soul, the salvation of the individual as such, are the essential ends and aims. This subjectivity, this selfhood (not selfishness) is in itself the principle of cognition.

Since the Christian religion stands on the principle of cognition, it gives development to its content; for the ideas about the general subject are either immediately or in themselves thoughts, and as such they must unfold themselves. But since the content is on the other side essential to the idea, it is separated from immediate opinion and perception, and passes through such separation. In short, subjectivity looks upon it as an absolute, self-existent content. The Christian religion itself arrives at the contrast of feeling, of immediate perception and of reflection and cognition. It contains within it cognition as an essential element, and has caused it to develop itself in its whole consistency, as form, and as a world of form, and to present thus a contrast to that [other] form which contains that content as a given truth. On this rest the discords of our time.

So far we have considered the growth of the contrasts in that form in which they have not yet developed into philosophy in the proper sense, or where they are still removed from it. The next question is: 1. What is the relation of philosophy to religion in general? 2. In what relation does the philosophy of religion stand to philosophy? and, 3. What is the relation of the philosophical inquiry into religion to positive religion itself?

(To be continued.)

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.¹

BY A. D'ORELLI.

At a time when evil grows luxuriantly, it may be interesting to become acquainted with an investigation from the pen of a well-known scientific man, particularly if in the end it should appear that strict science is capable of calming the religious-moral consciousness even in regard to the fact of evil. The author, however, departs from the traditional necessity of evil, long since taught by the philosophy of Hegel.

The problem of evil, the author rightly declares, is not unimportant, and is of such a character that it leads us into the centre of the system, and can only be made clear from the fundamental principles of the same.

The treatise begins with the question as to the origin of evil, its universality and, as it seems, its necessity, as well as its position towards God. The greatest difficulty of the problem is in the answer to the two last questions. As regards the origin of evil, it lies in a perverted disposition and volition, not in sensibility, nor in the understanding, nor in imperfection, nor in limitation. Not in sensibility: the desires, it is true, can influence the direction of the ideas, and by that means become determining motives, but the human soul, being free, decides independently.

The individuality, augmented in the passions, being restrained and conquered by the moral law, becomes the most powerful organ of this latter, and produces first good with its utmost energy. The body itself exists in order that the human soul may exercise and verify its moral power over its appetites.

The source of evil does not lie in the understanding either. It is true that in evil reflection co-operates; evil increases in intensity in proportion to the education of the intelligence which is at its command.

Nevertheless its root lies in disposition. We do not sin with our understanding, which at most produces error, but with our dis-

¹ A metaphysical investigation by A. L. Kym, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Zürich. (Munich, Th. Ackermann, 1878).

position. We must, therefore, avoid evil more with our heart than with our head. As regards limitation, from which Leibnitz derived evil, Kym justly maintains that it lies *below* the line of morality, because the finite was given at the same time as nature. Out of limitation, as such, one could understand that weakness arose, but by no means evil.

Evil in the moral world runs parallel with pain in nature. The latter comes in contact with the former, in so far as in the latter too an idea can be violated or stunted in its execution. Therefore, in all cases where an idea reigns, a moral imperative meets us; already in nature, by no means first in the moral world, although it certainly attains in this latter its perfection and receives its specific stamp.

Therefore the systems which reject the final causes, e. g., that of Spinoza, recognize neither pain nor evil. Spinoza, therefore, true to his stand-point, changes the ethical into the physical, throughout.

All moral conduct presupposes a knowledge of the moral law. But—this is the real question—in what relation does it stand to this latter? How do we acquire it? Does it arise entirely from experience, or is it *a priori* inherent in the mind? Can sensualism or rationalism conclusively decide here, and decide for itself alone? Has not rather the insight into the origin of the moral rule to adapt itself at the same time to both? We consider, says the author, this third possibility the only true one. An accommodation between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* must produce also in the province of ethics true knowledge.

The moral law enters the consciousness of the actor directly by the action, but the soul creates and completes the idea of the universal moral rule out of its own nature. External circumstances can, it is true, contribute to the development of the moral law, but the root thereof lies nevertheless in the soul itself.

Here in ethics therefore the limitation of pure empiricism or pure induction appears clearly. According to pure empiricism alone, ethic knowledge also would have to be obtained through the senses. But the moral idea never originates from the senses, and is as little to be obtained by simple induction as the idea of the absolute. It can only be explained by the nature of the human soul itself.

If, now, the moral rule is to manifest itself, this appears only

possible by its exerting itself synchronously in the contrast between good and evil, so that one of these antitheses may be as necessary and justifiable, and therefore as good, as the other. Is, then, evil a necessary factor in moral-human development?

The author rejects this supposition, which has been made by the pantheistic school, e. g., by Hegel.

The view that evil is necessary is opposed to the healthy moral-religious consciousness. It is *quite* contrary to the nature of morality that the moral rule should thus arise, and that man should become conscious that he stands towards it in a perverted relation.

It can also be revealed to him by a circumstance in harmony with itself, therefore by a good action.

Only error is unavoidable. Being finite I shall err, but being free I can preserve a pure disposition. At the same time evil must be sharply defined, and be strictly kept in its specific difference, it must be separated from everything crude and undeveloped if it is to become clear to us that it is not necessary.

The further difficult question is, then, this: In what relation does God stand to evil, and how can the fact of evil be reconciled with the goodness and almightiness of God?

In answering this question the author directs our attention to the different systems of philosophy, to theism and its relation to pantheism. Considered as a principle, the ethical interests only find their inner possibility and explanation in "monistic theism," under which the author understands essentially the organic-theistic system.

For only in this case has man an individual existence, without which freedom is impossible. The supposition of independent and free beings is not at all in opposition to the absolute. On the contrary this latter, fundamentally considered, i. e., from the ethical point of view, demands beings relatively independent of itself. In the idea of the absolute lies, not the destruction, but the preservation of the individual. Only in monistic theism does the almightiness of God not exclude the independence of the creature, but the absolute perfection of God reveals itself precisely in the fact of his having created beings who are capable of moral good.

His revelation can have no other meaning than to be known as the absolute good. In human freedom is included, it is true, the

possibility of an unmoral exercise of the same, but in no case is evil executed by God, but by the free decision of men.

Freedom is in itself good ; its wrong exercise is man's affair.

Thus evil as regards God is *utterly* excluded and is by no means consonant with His being.

Only in the organic-theistic system, therefore, is evil possible and a reality, without any joint origin of the absolute being connected with it. Only in it can God be kept apart from every contact with evil, and, because this arises from the free creature, only thus can it be justified in regard to Him.

Evil itself draws its power from good ; it reverses the principles of the moral process and makes out of the means an end. For this reason it is not original but only secondary, i. e., all positivism which it has in its power it only received from its relation to good and out of this latter. Good, therefore, is *in the abstract first and before* evil, because the latter can only arise in opposition to it by the assistance of the power which it has taken from good. As it borrows the strength by which it acts from good, though it employs it in a perverted manner, it possesses, when considered from this point of view, in spite of all the reality and fearful power with which it at times appears, no existence *of its own*. Hence its ephemeral duration in some cases is explained.

For on the one hand evil is continually at war with other evil, while on the other hand it has a constant enemy in good. One would, then, imagine that the absolute, with its power of conforming to the end in view, would forthwith create perfection in the world. This is so far impossible as in this case we should have a completely tranquil existence without any development or genesis. All moral good must be self-gained, not given and passively received. Without development, therefore, not only would the finite be altogether abolished, but the moral also would be fettered in its inmost energy.

Where there is development there is also imperfection ; it is bestowed with the former, and is unavoidable in the sphere of the finite. Nor can conformity to the end in view gain the upper hand at once, but only by degrees ; for the design (final cause) and the idea are much checked by the matter which they have to master. Thus misery and imperfection in nature are explained. Nevertheless, neither imperfection nor misery annuls final cause

in the world. And from the existence of deformity we must not infer that the world is without design; for even deformity is relatively conformable to the end in view, otherwise it could not appear at all. For what is entirely without design is not capable of existing.

Since, then, the nature of development is inseparable from imperfection, which consists in the non-realization of design, it is evident that God could not have arranged the world better than He has done. For the sake of development and gradual progress, imperfection, as well as pain in the physical world, had to be admitted as a factor in the conformity of the absolute to the end in view, as it is carried out in the world. The welfare of the individual must be considered in relation to the whole.

The design or final cause lies more in the whole than in the individual creature. In consideration of the design inherent in the whole, the individual creature must relatively sacrifice his welfare. Welfare, therefore, is not the exclusive object of the creature.

We must, therefore, not designate the struggle, which the creatures carry on among themselves, as an evil, for then we should have to blame the Creator for having, e. g., created carnivora. But this would be as much as blaming the order of gradation in nature, and would lead to the suppression and rejection of all individuality.

In what relation, then, does that struggle, which is carried on in nature and in human life, stand to the moral system of the world? It is compatible with it and does not by any means exclude it.

One could, it is true, say with reference to man, that with his liberty the possibility is given that the ethical design in the world might not be realized, and it seems, indeed, as if the moral system of the world were placed entirely in the hands of man.

For God cannot extort morality from man, as that would violate its inmost essence and annul it. Nevertheless God could place such laws in the organism of nature and the ethical world that human liberty might be allowed a certain latitude. He even had to do this from the organic and ethical point of view. Both provinces involve this latitude. Thus the laws of nature which can never be broken necessitate the exercise of human liberty. Man is only free in decision. If this decision has passed into action, and become connected with the laws of the phenomenal world, it

can only produce what these laws permit. So far human liberty is limited, and no action, however bad, can annul the design of the whole, which itself is good.

Evil breaks itself against the order of the whole, and it cannot conquer necessity, which exists in the whole because it is good. Evil, therefore, can never obtain universal existence.

Will evil ever be completely conquered in the ethical evolution through which mankind passes?

It is not impossible that mankind might reach a state from which evil would be entirely excluded, but this is only conceivable in some remote period of time; namely, when not merely the individual but the whole race would have fought its way up to perfect morality. This would, then, prove that evil existed neither at the beginning nor at the end, but only in the middle, of the historic-ethical process of mankind.

The final cause of the world's development as it pervades the province of morality is, it is true, the abolition of evil. By the moral act above all, the world's development, in its culmination, mankind, returns to God.

The ethical is, namely, in all entity by far the highest. It stands above the theoretic and the æsthetic because in it the specific nature of man is the most included. Gradually, even if amid manifold error, mankind will, by its moral union with God, expel evil. The annihilation of evil by the victory of good is the ideal which the history of humanity strives for and seeks to realize.

This work, whose contents we have here summarized, is certainly one of the most able treatises ever composed on this difficult subject. It is, besides, most intimately connected with the "*Metaphysical Investigations*"¹ published by Professor Kym in the year 1875 (Munich, Th. Ackermann). In this latter work our author has especially produced a very exhaustive dissertation on God and His relation to the world (pages 320–383). Pantheism and theism, the immanence and transcendence of God, are subjected to a searching examination. At the same time the author endeavors in each of these stand-points to preserve the authorized balance—momentum—and thus to obtain a philosophical system which may reconcile the two opposite views. This reconciliation between pantheism and

¹ See our notice of this work, *Jour. Spec. Phil.*, vol. xi., p. 219 (April, 1877).—Ed.

theism is, above all, effected in such a manner that the religious-moral interests are secured in their full significance, and herein precisely we see the principal advantage of this work. It contains, besides, other careful investigations on space and time, motion and matter, and especially on human liberty (pages 282-320). The treatise on evil is so far connected with the investigations on the absolute and on human liberty, as without liberty the ethical estimation of the act disappears; with the investigation on the absolute as the theology of the author is intended to be examined anew in the light of the problem of evil and to be confirmed in its accuracy.

According to the author's view, only monistic theism (i. e., the organic stand-point) explains on the one hand evil as a positive power, and yet on the other hand protects God from every contact with it.

Successful as this investigation of the position of God in regard to evil appears to us, we yet should like to begin our criticism just at this point. The author, namely, undertakes almost too boldly to fix in an abstract manner what after all belongs to the frontier territories of human knowledge.

In these, according to our view, is included evil.

Certain it is that evil has its chief source in human liberty. But is this its only source? We doubt it. Evil appears to us rather a general power, which pervades the whole universe and culminates in man alone. At the same time we do not at all conceal from ourselves that this view also presents great difficulties; for it easily leads to dualism, as is to be seen in Schelling.

The author has endeavored to avoid this dualism. Whether he has entirely succeeded we do not venture to decide. But, whatever position one may take up with regard to the origin of evil, so much is certain, that in the treatise in question, on the problem of evil, the difficulties have not been avoided, but disclosed and for the most part solved.

Being, therefore, perfectly convinced of its excellence, we recommend all deeper thinkers to study it.

THE DIALECTIC UNITY IN EMERSON'S PROSE.

BY W. T. HARRIS.

It has often been said that there is no unity in Emerson's prose essays, and, that they consist of a vast number of brilliant statements, loosely connected and bound into paragraphs, with only such unity as is given by the lids of the volume. We hear it said that the experiment has been tried of reading an entire essay, sentence by sentence, backward from the end, without injury to the sense. This lack of order and connection has even been praised as giving variety of form and freshness of style.

While it is true that there is no parading of syllogistic reasoning in Emerson's essays, and no ratiocination, there is quite sufficient unity of a higher kind if one will but once comprehend the thoughts with any degree of clearness.

In a work of literary art, such as a drama or a novel, we expect organic unity as well as logical unity. There must be a beginning, in which we form our acquaintance with the persons, their surroundings, and the peculiarities of character and situation; then a middle, in which character and situation develop into collisions as a natural result; then a solution of the collision by one mode or another, restoring the equilibrium in the social whole.

In the prose essay we cannot expect organic unity, but we may expect rhetorical unity and logical unity.

There need be no formal syllogisms; the closest unity of the logical kind is the dialectic unity that begins with the simplest and most obvious phase of the subject, and discovers by investigation the next phase that naturally follows. It is an unfolding of the subject according to its natural growth in experience. Starting with this view, we shall discover this and that defect, this and that necessary correction, and in the end we shall reach a better insight, which, of course, will be the second step in our treatise, and must be followed out in the same way as before. Such development of a theme exhibits and expounds the genesis of conviction, and is the farthest removed from mere dogmatism. We pass through all shades of opinion, adopting and rejecting them in succession, on our way to the true final conclusion.

There is no logical method equal to this dialectic one that expounds the genesis of the subject. When we have reached the conclusion we have exhausted the subject, and seen the necessity of our result. Such is the method that Plato describes and indorses in the seventh book of his "Republic." To be sure, the untrained intellect will often get confused amid the labyrinth of conflicting opinions, just as the callow young men did when Socrates applied his method to their theories. The reader is apt to expect a consistency of opinion from the beginning to the end. Difference of views bewilders him.

Emerson has furnished us many very wonderful examples of dialectic treatment of his subject. But he has been very careful to avoid the show of ratiocination and the parade of proof-making. The object of his writing was to present truth, and to produce insight, and not to make proselytes.

The student of literature who wishes to learn the dialectic art, and, at the same time, to become acquainted with the genesis of Emerson's view of the world, should study the essay on "Experience" in the second series of essays. In this wonderful piece of writing we have a compend of his insights into life and nature arranged in dialectic order. Master his treatment of the topics, and you will discover what constitute real steps of progress in experience, and at the same time you will learn how the first grows into the second and that into the next, and so on to the highest view of the world that he has attained, or to the final view reached by men of deepest insight, called seers. He names these steps or stadia in experience, (1) illusion, (2) temperament, (3) succession, (4) surface, (5) surprise, (6) reality, and (7) subjectiveness.

(1) The first phase of experience, according to him, brings us to the consciousness of illusion. This is a great step. The *naïve* man without culture of any sort has not reflected enough to reach this point. He rests in the conviction that all about him is really just what he sees it. He does not perceive the relativity of things. But at the first start in culture, long since begun even among the lowest savages, there appears the conviction that there is more in things than appears at first sight. Things are fragments of larger things; facts are fragments of larger facts. Change of the totality of conditions changes the thing or fact that is before us. Things escape us, and thus "dream delivers us to dream, and there is no

end to illusion. Life is a train of moods like a string of beads, and, as we pass through them, they prove to be many-colored lenses which paint the world their own hue, and each shows only what lies in its focus."

What experience comes next after this one of illusion? Evidently the perception of conditioning circumstance, the perception of fate or external influence, which may be called temperament. (2) Structure or temperament "prevails over everything of time, place, and condition, and is inconsumable in the flames of religion." When experience has exhausted the view of temperament it finds that it has learned the necessity of succession in objects. For there is a process underlying things, and we see that what made us explain illusion by temperament was the discovery that things changed through external influences. Now we see a little better, and understand that there is succession—one phase giving way to another, and thus exhibiting a series of influences instead of one final result. Temperament therefore, is no finality, for it produces no ultimate state or condition, but succeeds only in making a transitory impression.

(3) We pass out of this stadium of experience and enter on the theory of the world that sees change and succession according to some law or other. We look now for that law. When we see the law we shall understand the order of sequence, and can map out the orbit of life and of things. We shall see the true order of genesis.

This view of the necessary order of sequence is no longer a view of mere change, but a view of the whole, and hence a view of the fixed and stable. The orbit remains though the planet wanders perpetually.

(4) Emerson calls the view of the law of change "surface," as if the seeing of a line as a whole were the seeing of a surface. Various tadia of opinion there might be on this plane of experience. As very narrow orbit or a very wide one might be computed for the cycle of succession. The progress of experience will correct the narrow view. We think to-day that we have taken in all the metamorphoses of the object of investigation, but to-morrow we discover new ones and have to enlarge our description. "Surface" expands and we make new theories of the law. We are, however, dealing with the law of cause and effect, and cannot for-

mulate the whole under it, for the whole cannot be cause of something else or the effect of some other being.

(5) Emerson calls the next form of experience "surprise," because it begins with the insight made in some high moment of life, when for the first time one gets a glimpse of the form of the whole. What must be the form of the whole, you ask? The whole does not admit of such predicates as we apply to the part or fragment. The dependent has one law, and the independent has another. The dependent presupposes something, it is a relative existence and its being is in another. The independent is self-contained, self-active, self-determined, *causa sui*. The first insight is a "surprise," and so is the second insight; all of the high moments of experience admit us to "surprises," for we see the fountain of pure energy and self-determination, in place of the limitations of things, and the derivative quality of objects which receive only their allotted measures of being. The soul opens into the sea of creative energy, inexhaustible and ever-imparting.

By these moments of "surprise," therefore, we ascend to a new place of experience, no longer haunted by these dismal spectres of illusion, temperament, change, and surface or mechanic fixed laws. Things are not fragments of a vast machine, nor are men links in a cosmic process that first develops and then crushes them. Things do not exist in succession, as it before seemed to us, but the true, real existence that we have found is always the same.

(6) We enter through the moments of surprise into the realm of insight into reality, hence *reality* is Emerson's sixth category of experience. "By persisting to read or think, this region gives further sign of itself, as it were, in flashes of light, in sudden discoveries of its profound beauty and repose, as if the clouds that covered it parted at intervals and showed the approaching traveller the inland mountains, with the tranquil eternal meadows spread at their base, whereon flocks graze and shepherds pipe and dance."

(7) One more step experience takes—it identifies the deepest reality as of one nature with itself. The absolute is mind. Emerson names this step of insight subjectiveness, because in it we arrive at the conviction that the absolute is subject and not merely unconscious law or power. At this highest point of experience

we reach the station of the seer, the culmination of human experience. The seer as philosopher sees the highest principle to be reason; the poet sees the world to be the expression of reason; the prophet and law-giver sees reason as the authoritative, regulative principle of life; the hero sees reason as a concrete guiding force in society.

In a certain sense all of Emerson's writings are expansions and confirmations of some one of these phases of experience. The essay on the "Over-Soul" treats of surprise and reality; that on Circles treats of succession, surface, and reality, under other names; that on Spiritual Laws on reality and subjectiveness; that on Fate treats of temperament and succession; those on Worship, History, Gifts, Heroism, Love and such titles, treat of subjectiveness. His treatises on concrete themes use these insights perpetually as solvent principles—but always with fresh statement and new resources of poetic expression.

There is nowhere in all literature such sustained flight toward the sun—"a flight," as Plotinus calls it, "of the alone to the alone"—as that in the essay on Over-Soul, wherein Emerson, at great length, unfolds the insights, briefly but inadequately explained under the topic of "surprise" in the essay on experience. It would seem as if each paragraph stated the idea of the whole, and then again that each sentence in each paragraph reflected entire the same idea.

Where there is no genesis there can be no dialectic unity. The absolute is not a becoming but a self-identical activity. In those essays in which Emerson has celebrated this doctrine of the highest reality, and its subjectivity or rational nature, and its revelation to us, he writes in a style elevated above dialectic unity. These essays do not have dialectic unity only because they have a higher form of unity—that of absolute identity. Each is in all and all is in each.

To give one specimen of this I offer a very short analysis of the contents of the essay on "The Over-Soul." He says in substance that man has some moments in his life when he sees deeply into reality; what he sees then has authority over the other parts of his life. He sees principles of justice, love, freedom, and power—attributes of God. This seeing is the common element in all minds, and transcendent of the limitations of particular in-

dividuals. Just as events flow down from a hidden source, so these ideas and insights descend into the mind. He calls this the "over-soul," "a unity within which every man's being is contained and made one with every other. Although we live in division and succession, and see the world piece by piece, yet the soul is the whole, and this is the highest law." These glimpses of the eternal verity come on occasions of conversation, reverie, remorse, dreams, and times of passion. We learn that the soul is not an organ, but that which animates all organs; not a faculty, but a light, and the master of the intellect and will. Individual man is only the organ of the soul. These depths of the spiritual nature are accessible to all men at some time. The sovereignty of the over-soul is shown by its independence of all limitation. Time, space, and circumstance do not change its attributes. Its presence does not make a progress measurable by time, but it produces metamorphoses causing us to ascend from one plane of experience to the next—as great a change as from egg to worm, or from worm to fly. Society and institutions reveal this common nature or the higher person, or impersonal one—for, in order to prevent the confusion of attributing to the over-soul the passions and imperfections of human personality, Emerson sometimes speaks of Him as impersonal (using Cousin's expression). This revelation of the divine is a disclosure of what is universal, and not the telling of fortunes. There is no concealment when in the presence of its light; the reality appears through all its disguises. The growth of the intellect as well as of the character obeys the same law. The emotion of the sublime accompanies the influx of its light. Its presence distinguishes genius and talent. Faith, worthy of the name, is faith in these transcendent affirmations of the soul. Thus revering the soul, man "will calmly front the morrow in the negligency of that trust which carries God with it, and so hath already the whole future in the bottom of the heart."

In his book on "Nature," his first published work, Emerson developed substantially the same views, with a system of classification much like that in the essay on experience, and showing a genesis in the same dialectic form. (1) Nature for use or "commodity," as he calls it, is the first aspect recognized. After food, clothing, and shelter comes next nature's service to man in satisfying the spiritual want of the (2) beautiful. Then through this

comes the symbolic expression of human nature through its correspondence with material nature, and thus arises (3) language. Fourthly, nature is a (4) discipline, educating understanding and the reason, and also the will and conscience. Then the transition to (5) idealism is easy. Nature is for the education of man, and this lesson is taught us in five distinct ways. Sixthly, we arrive at the knowledge of the (6) one spirit that originates both nature and man, and reveals its nature in the ethical and intellectual constitution of the mind and its correspondences in nature. Thus from nature we come to the over-soul, or what was called reality and subjectivity in the essay on experience. The eighth and final chapter of *Nature* draws practical conclusions, making application of the doctrine to life: "The problem of restoring to the world original and eternal beauty is solved by the redemption of the soul. The ruin or blank that we see when we look at nature is in our own eye. The axis of vision is not coincident with the axis of things, and so they appear not transparent, but opaque. Build, then, your own world. As fast as you conform your life to the pure idea in your mind, the world will unfold its great proportions."

Emerson looks on the world of nature and man as the revelation that the over-soul makes to him, and accordingly looks reverently toward it, and through it, to the great soul of souls, and always sees, under whatever guise, some good. He finds help in everything. He helps every one, too, most by teaching to them the significance of the world as he has found it.

This thought of the revelation of the soul in man and nature is the idea that forms the unity of all that he has written, whether it be in essays like the "Over-Soul," or in historical and critical studies like "English Traits and Representative Men," or in poems of nature like "Monadnoc." One will find everywhere, though under slightly differing names, the elements of experience described in this sublime poem prefixed to the essay on Experience:

"The lords of life, the lords of life,
I saw them pass
In their own guise,
Like and unlike,
Portly and grim,
Use and surprise,

Surface and dream,
 Succession swift and spectral wrong
 Temperament without a tongue,
 And the inventor of the game,
 Omnipresent without name ;
 Some to see, some to be guessed,
 They marched from east to west :
 Little man, least of all,
 Among the legs of his guardians tall,
 Walked about with puzzled look.
 Him by the hand dear nature took,
 Dearest nature, strong and kind,
 Whispered ' Darling, never mind !
 To-morrow they will wear another face,
 The founder thou ; these are thy race ! '

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

SELECTIONS IN PROSE AND VERSE.

BY WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING.

[From the *Gulshan I Raz*, the Mystic Rose-Garden of Sa'd ud din Mahmud Shabistari, born, in the year 1250, near Tabriz,—a *résumé* of Mr. Whinfield's rendering.]

(Concluded from October Number, 1883.)

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE.

In the name of him who taught the soul to think,
 And kindled the heart's lamp with the light of soul,
 By Whose light the two worlds were illumined,
 By Whose grace the dust of Adam bloomed with roses,
 That Almighty one who, in the twinkling of an eye,
 From *Raf* and *Nan* brought forth the two worlds.¹
 What time the *Raf* of his power breathed on the pen,²
 It cast thousands of pictures on the page of Not-being,
 From that breath proceeded the soul of Adam ;

¹ *Raf*, the material, and *Nan*, the spiritual, or "world of command."

² *Raf*, power, force ; *pen*, universal reason.

When he beheld him a specific person,
He thought within himself "What am I?"

The world of command and creatures proceeded from one breath,
And the moment they come forth, they go away again.
Albeit, here there is no real going and coming,—
Going, when you consider it, is nought but coming!
One becomes many and many few.
It is but one circular line from first to last,
Whereon the creatures of the world are journeying.

From proper arrangement of known conceptions,
The unknown proposition becomes unfolded,
The major premise is a father, the minor a mother,
And the conclusion a son or brother.
But to learn of what kind this arrangement is,
Reference must be made to books of logic;
Moreover, unless divine guidance aids it,
Verily, logic is mere bondage to forms.
He that knows "the Truth," and to whom Unity is revealed,
Sees at the first glance the light of very Being;
He sees God first, in every thing that he sees.
To him, whom God guides not into the road,
It will not be disclosed by use of logic.
All things are manifested thro' their likes,
But "the Truth" has neither rival nor like.
How can any man know it, tell me how?
Fool that he is! for he seeks the blazing sun
By the dim light of a torch in the desert!
Know, that the whole world is a beam of light of "the Truth."
From blindness arose the doctrine of "Assimilation,"
From one-eyedness that of God's remoteness,
From the same cause arose false and vain Metempsychosis.
Since it had its origin from defective sight,
He is like one born blind, cut off from perfection,
The man who follows the pathway of schism!
The theologian who has no perception of Unitarianism,¹
Is in utter darkness, in clouds and bondage of dogmas.
Whatever each says about Unity, more or less,
Affords a specimen of his own power of insight.
When the object seen is very near the eye,
The eye is darkened so that it cannot see it.
This blackness, if you knew it, is the light of very Being,
In that land of darkness is the well-spring of life.
Blackness, in both worlds, is poverty;
Blackness is most precious, neither more nor less.
You are asleep, and this vision of yours is a dream,
All that you see hereby is an illusion.

¹ Unitarianism, *tauhid*, to be one with the One, to see all things in God.

When this illusion of seeing double is removed,
 Earth and heaven will become transfigured.
 When the true Sun displays his face to you,
 There remains not the light of Venus, moon, or sun.
 Falls one beam of his on the hard rock,
 It is torn to pieces like wool of divers colors.
 The world is yours and yet you remain indigent.
 Look up! and see how the vault of highest heaven
 Is stretched round about both worlds.
 Wherefore do they name it "throne of the Merciful"?
 What connection has it with the heart of man?
 Wherefore are these two continually in motion?
 Peradventure, the heart is the centre of that heaven:
 Heart the central point, and heaven the circumference;
 Moved by this, the other heavenly spheres are circling.
 Each day and night this highest sphere
 Makes a complete revolution round the world.
 If there were no mount of "youness" where were the road?¹
 Come forth from the dwelling of Umhâni,
 Say only, "*Whoso hath seen me has seen the truth.*"
 Consider the structure of the heavens,
 Mark well how they move in one direction,
 From east to west, like a water-wheel,—
 They are ever hastening without food or sleep.
 It is disclosed in man's own self,
 Each creature that goes before you has a soul,
 And from that soul is bound a cord to you;
 Therefore are they all subject to your dominion;
 For that the soul of each is hidden in you,
 Know yourself that you are the world's soul.
 The north quarter of the world is your dwelling-place,
 Because the heart is on the left side of your body.
 The world of reason and mind is your stock in trade,
 Earth and heavens are your vesture.
 Power and Knowledge and Will are shown forth
 In you, O slave of the Lord of bliss.
 You are the Hearing, Seeking, Living, Speaking,
 Yet you endure not of yourself, but of Him!
 O first! who art also the essence of the last,—
 O inward! who art also the essence of the Outward.

"I" and "you" are the accidents of Very Being,
 The lattices of the niches of the lamp of Necessary Being.
 Of whom shall I say that he is the perfect man?
 It is he who is acquainted with his own origin.
 He is a traveller who passes on with haste,
 And becomes pure from self, as fire from smoke.

¹ *You-ness*, phenomenal existence. *Italics* denote renderings from the Arabic.

He makes the law his upper garment,
 He makes the mystic path his inner garment,
 The very truth is the station of his nature.
 That man attains to the secret of unity
 Who is not detained at the stages on the road.
 In addition to reason, man has a certain faculty
 Whereby he perceives hidden mysteries.
 Every man whose heart is pure from doubt
 Knows for a surety that there is no being but One.
 In that glory is no "I," or "We," or "Thou,"
 For in Unity is no distinction of persons.
 The soul becomes child, youth, adult, and aged man;
 It acquires wisdom, knowledge, reason, counsel;
 Then comes his appointed time, from the pure presence.
 All the parts of the world are like plants,
 Every one of them tends towards its Centre,
 Its nature forsakes not its centripetal character.
 He is "near" on whom light is shed,
 "Far" is that not-being which is distant from Being.
 Fear remains not when you have started on your journey,
 The Arab racer needs not the whip.
 Let pure gold be burnt in the fire,
 If it contains no alloy,—what is there to burn?
 The phenomena of the world overpower you,
 Thence, like Satan, you cry, "Who is like unto me?"
 Thence you say, "I, myself, have free will."
 In "the All," you will obtain deliverance from self,
 In "the Truth," you will become rich, O Dervish.
 Go, Soul of your father, yield yourself to God's will,
 Resign yourself to the Divine foreordination.
 If knower and known are both the One pure essence,
 What are the aspirations in this handful of dust.
 Call to mind the state and circumstance of your creation,
 From thence you will fathom the root of your thought.
 To whom said God, "*Am not I your Lord?*"
 On that hour when he "*Kneaded the clay,*"
 He wrote by grace the faith on the heart.
 If you will read forthwith that writing,
 You will understand whatever you desire.
 In this place, behold his attributes to-day,
 That you may behold his attributes to-morrow.
 Reason cannot see the state of the world to come,
 As a man born blind cannot see things in this world.

I have heard that, in the month Nysan,
 The pearl-oysters rise to the surface of the sea of Uman,
 And rest on the mirror with opened mouths.
 The mist is lifted up from the sea,
 And each drop of rain becomes a pearl.

The diver goes down to the depth of the sea,
 The shore is your body, the sea is Being,
 The mist, Grace; the rain, Knowledge of the Name;
 The diver of this mighty sea is human reason.
 Mark! what a difference there runs between body and soul,
 You may take one as the east, the other as the west.
 Knowledge is not that which loves the world,
 Which has the form but is void of reality.
 Knowledge of faith springs from angelic virtues,
 Goodness is made manifest in equity,
 Equipose in a body is its climax of perfection.

Tho' the sun abides in the fourth heaven,
 Yet his rays are the light which rule the earth.
 The elementary temperaments exist not in the sun,
 The stars are neither hot nor cold, dry nor moist.
 The world is the dowry given to man by the Universal Soul,
 Of this marriage the issue is eloquence,
 Knowledge, language, virtue, earthly beauty.
 Set not foot beyond your own limits!
 Every actual being is manifested thro' plurality.
 Tho' this whole is to the outward aspect many,
 It is smaller in quantity than its own part.¹
 This whole has not real, absolute being;
 Its existence is both plural and single.
 The world is this whole, and in every "twinkling of an eye"
 It becomes non-existent, and endures not "two moments."
 Every moment a new heaven and a new earth,
 Every moment it is a youth and an old man.
 Continually is creation born again in a new creation,
 On this side the world is renewed and perfected,
 On that side it is every instant annihilated.
 But, while the fashion of this world passeth away,
 All will be everlasting in the world to come.
 Just as in this world, from the potentialities of the elements,
 The three kingdoms of nature are evolved,
 So, all your dispositions in the world of spirits
 Will be made manifest, now as lights, now as fires.
 The death of the body will abide not in "*the house of life*."
 Duality by the side of unity is pure illusion,
 Not-being is single like being.
 All plurality proceeds from attribution.
 The manifestation of differences and plurality 'mid things
 Proceeds from the chameleon-like contingent.

Altho' perfect analogies are unattainable,
 Continue steadfast in searching them.
 As the "*twinkling of an eye*" comes the last day.

¹ Because Absolute Being is the summum genus holding all actual being beneath it.

By a breath the spirit of Adam was created.
 Tho' the mirror of the heart be polished,
 What profit is it when only self is seen on its face ?
 I have sought and found the origins of all things,
 And the wise man finds no trustworthy information
 As to anything, save from its original environment.
 For this duty did God create you man,
 Albeit, he created many beings besides yourself.
 Cast away vain talks and mystic states and visions,
 Dreams of lights and marvels of miracles.
 If you strive to be a faithful servant abandon form,
 Form accords not with perfect obedience.
 If you hope to take wing as a bird,
 Cast this carrion world amid vultures.

What matters relationship, seek your true friend,
 Then, what are your paternal or maternal uncles ?
 What proceeds from them save pains and wrinkles ?
 All relations are like some fairy-tale—a spell, a bond.
 I know not, verily, the religious hope you enjoy,—
 Cast out your adversary, the flesh, that you may escape,
 Purge yourself of affirmations and negations,
 Give your mind wholly to the Young Christian.

By cursed Iblis, who witnesses not verity,
 Are wrought thousands of miracles.
 Now, he appears from the wall, now from the roof ;
 Now he dwells in your heart, now in your body ;
 Iblis is the Imam, and ye his followers.
 All men have fallen upon evil days.
 See the one-eyed Dajjal, in what way
 He is sent into the world as an ensample,
 Know him for the ass whose name is *Jassis*,¹
 See all these asses in the toils of that one ass !
 When our lord told the story of the latter days,
 In several places he signified this matter.
 He said to me, " O Pharisee and hypocrite,
 Thy life has been spent in seeking name and fame,
 Behold this knowledge, devotion, self-seeking, illusion,
 From what have they kept thee back, O laggard ? "
 The face of my soul was blackened with shame,
 To think of my life lost and my wasted days.
 He filled a goblet and gave it me to sip,—
 " Drink," said he, " with this wine, tasteless and odorless,
 Wash from thee the writing on the tablets of Being."
 Neither now do I exist in myself, nor do not exist,
 I am not sober, not sick, not drunken,
 Sometime like his eye I am joyful,

¹ Antichrist, or the spy—a mighty beast !

Sometime like his curls I am fluttered,
 Sometime, by force of nature, I am lying on ashes,
 Sometime, at a look from him, I am in the rose-garden.

What know you of form, or of substance?
 What is the next world, and what is this world?
 What heaven and hell, and Hades is what?
 Have you not heard the text, "What ye see not?"
 Come! show me what is Jabulea,
 What that city, whose name is Jabulsa,¹
 Come, and hear the meaning of "like unto them."
 Hear it from Ibn Abbas, and then know yourself;
 What profit is there in knowing, when you are powerless?
 How shall I tell the tale of "states of heart,"
 To you, O man! with head downcast and foot in the mire?
 You sit like women in the street of ill-fortune;
 You take no shame to yourself for your ignorance.
 Whereas "women" are wanting in intelligence and faith,
 Why should men choose their fellowship?
 Tarry not day or night at the halting-places,
 Linger not behind your fellow-travellers and the camels.
 Like Moses, son of Amram, press onward in this path,
 'Till you list the words, "Verily, I am God!"

To him whose soul attains the beatific vision,
 The universe is the book of the "Truth most High."
 Accidents are its vowels, and substance its consonants,
 And grades of creatures its verses and pauses.
 Of this book, the first verse is, "Universal Reason,"
 Second, comes "Universal Soul," the verse of light,—
 The third verse thereof is "Highest heaven."
 Look up and see the vault of "highest heaven,"
 Wherefore do they name it the "throne of the Merciful?"
 What connection has it with the heart of man?
 Wherefore are these twain continually in motion?
 The fixed stars are one thousand and twenty-four,
 Who have their stations round about the "throne."
 You may say these heavens are revolving,
 In the rotation of day and night, like a potter's wheel,
 And thereby every moment the wisdom of the Master
 Fashions a new vessel out of water and clay.
 The elements,—water, air, fire, and earth,—
 Have taken their stations below the heavens,
 Inimical are they to each other in essence and in form,
 Yet united into single bodies, at first of necessity.
 Ponder well once for all on your own origin;
 Your first mother had a father, who was also her mother.²

¹ The world of ideals.

² Universal reason evolved Universal Soul, like Eve out of Adam's rib.

Behold the world entirely comprised in yourself,
 That which was made last was the first of thought.
 There is no other final cause beyond man;
 It is disclosed in man's own self.
 When the back of the mirror is blackened,
 It must reflect a man's face from its face;
 And the rays of the sun in the fourth heaven
 Are not reflected till they strike upon the dust of earth.
 Behold this Not-being which is the evidence of Being,
 See this height, how it is the very essence of depth!
 Your natural powers are as ten thousand,
 His limit and portions are appointed to each by "the Truth,"
 Each arises from, and returns to, one Name,
 In that name each creature has its being,
 To that name it is ever giving praise,—
 By the door whereat each enters it departs,
 Tho' in its lifetime each wanders from door to door.
 Thus you learn all the names of God,
 For that you are an image reflected from "the Named."
 It is most meet that you should think no more on self,
 The word "I" is not limited to man.
 Necessary Being is as Heaven, and Hell as contingent:
 "I" and "you" are the Hades' veil between them.¹
 When this veil is lifted up from before you,
 There remains not the bond of creeds or sects.
 Phenomenal being is as the dot on *ayn*,²
 When *ayn* is clear, *ghayn* becomes 'ayn.
 One step is the passing out from the "II" of "He."
 Hail, O Light of God! O shadow of Divinity!
 The existence of creatures and plurality is but a semblance,
 And not everything that seems to be really is.
 Set a mirror over against yourself,
 Look on it, and mark that other person,—
 It is not this nor that, what, then, is the reflection?
 Separate imaginary appearances from "True Being,"
 Make not yourself a stranger but a friend.
 What profit to you is there in this non-existent existence?
 Knowledge is not that which loves the world,
 Which has the form but is void of the reality.

Heavenly being descends from the unseen world,
 Descends like some licentious reveller,
 Sets up its flag in the strong city of earthly beauty,
 Throws into confusion all the world's array,
 Now riding royally on the steed of comeliness,
 Now brandishing the keen sword-blade of eloquence,—
 When beheld in a person, it is called loveliness.

¹ Good and evil in the personal, or a medium for their reflection.

² *Ayn*, eye or essence; *ghayn*, cloud or darkness.

Death occurs to a man in three sorts,—
 The one every moment, is that due to his nature,
 Of the other two, know one is the death of his will,
 The third death is that compulsory on him.
 The world has not this death of the Will,
 For you alone of all creatures have this death.
 But every moment the world is changed,
 And its last state becomes like unto its first.
 On the day of your death your body, with contrition,
 Will tremble like the earth on the day of doom.
 Brain will be confounded and soul darkened,
 Your pores will run with sweat like rivers,
 In your death-agony, O wretched man!
 Your bones will become "*soft as dyed wool*,"
 Leg will be twisted with leg,
 Every friend will be separated from his fellow,
 Your land will be a level plain,—without hills or valleys.
 When you are stript of the garment of this body,
 All your virtues and vices will at once be shown.
 A body you will have, but free from stain,
 In it will be reflected forms as in pure water.
 Phenomenal limitations will be removed from Being,
 Nor height nor depth will remain to view,
 Your head and foot and eye will become as a heart,
 Pure of the stains of earthy form.
 Consider what wines "their Lord gives them to drink."
 Whatsoever is seen in this visible world
 Is as a reflection from the sun of that world.
 The world is as curl, down, mole and brow,
 For everything in its own place is beautiful,
 As objects of sense are as shadows of that world.
 Annihilation, intoxication, and the fever of love,
 These mystic "states" are not mere illusions,
 To know these states requires either revelation or faith.
 You are an infant, and your Father is the Father on high,
 For this cause said Jesus, at the time of his Ascension,
 "I go unto my Father who is on high."

One who is accursed and banned and hated
 Is now Shaikh of the ages because his father was Lord.
 O ass! now have you chosen for your Shaikh
 An ass who is more ass-like than yourselves.
 If the son be of good judgment and fortune
 He is as fruit, the cream and perfectness of the tree.
 Discipleship is learning the knowledge of the faith,
 Kindling with light the lamp of the heart.
 Again an inspiration came to me from "the Truth,"
 "Cavil not at wisdom, because of a fool,"—
 If there were no sweeper in the world,

The world would be buried in dust.
 So goes the world, *Allah is all-wise*.
 Begin to till your field for the next world's harvest.
 The courageous man is pure from abjectness as from boasting,
 His nature is exempt from cowardice and rashness,
 Equity is as the garment of his nature.
 Actual existence is the vassal of Necessary Being,
 This whole has not real absolute being,
 For it is a contingent accident of Reality,
 But this is not the great resurrection day ;—
 This is the day of works,—that, the day of faith.

The blessed portal of Unity is the sanctuary of the soul,
 Which is the rest of the Everlasting, the Simurg.
 His entrancing state is the union of union,
 His heart-ravishing beauty the light of light ;
 He went before and all souls follow after,
 Grasping the skirts of his garment.
 I say not what your father and mother are,
 For it behooves you to regard them with reverence.
 The deficient in sense is called a sister,
 The envious is named brother,
 Your own enemy is called your son,
 And a stranger your kinsman.
 In childhood opens out perception of the world,
 And the temptations of the world act upon him.
 When all the particular parts are ordered in him,
 He makes his way from these sources to general notions.
 Of actions there is an endless plurality,
 Evil dispositions come into operation.

When the light of the sun is divided from the night,
 You see its dawn and up-rising and full ascension ;
 Again, from the circling of the revolving heavens,
 Declension, and afternoon, and sunset are seen.
 The light of the prophet is a mighty sun,
 Now shining in Moses, now in Adam,—
 From this sun every moment is cast a shadow,
 Which is one degree in the ascension of faith ;
 The time of our lord is the meridian line,
 For he is purified from all shadow of darkness,
 Since he stands on the narrow way of "the Truth."
 The kernel of an almond is utterly spoiled
 If you pluck it from its husk while it is unripe,
 But when it grows ripe in its husk it is good.
 If you pluck out its kernel, you break the husk ;
 The law is the husk, and the truth is the kernel,
 The mystic path lies between this and that,—
 When the kernel is ripe, it is good without the husk.

Union with "the Truth" is separation from the creature state,
 For with "Him" is estrangement from self.
 The sun's rays are shed down from the fourth heaven,
 And are mingled with the water,
 Then the heat strives to ascend on high,
 And the water of the sea clings to it,
 And when with these are joined earth and air,
 Then comes forth the green and pleasant plant.
 This becomes the food of man and is transmuted into animals,
 Who are eaten by and transmuted into man.
 It becomes seed and passes thro' divers states,
 And then there is born of it another man.
 Unity is like a sea, albeit a sea of blood,
 Whereout rise thousands of mad waves.
 Thence you say, "I myself have free will,
 My body is like the horse and my soul the rider ;
 The reins of the body are in the hands of the soul ;
 The entire direction thereof is given to me."
 Know you not that all this is the road of the magians ?
 All these lies and deceptions come from illusive existence.
 Dignities are permitted, but men of dignity
 Are subject to the sway of "the Truth." Allah is over all !
 Recognize the working of the Truth in every place,
 Set not foot beyond your own proper limits.
 Ask of your own state what this free will is,
 Like as the Guebers speak of Yezdan and Aherman,
 So these ignorant fools say, I, and He.
 You existed not when your actions were originated,
 You were appointed to fulfil a certain purpose.
 Godship consists entirely in sovereignty,
Causation is inapplicable to the acts of God.
 He has imposed upon you the law for this cause,
 That he has imparted to you of his essence.
 The head is to knowledge as a vessel,
 The shells of the knowledge of the heart are voice and letter ;
 The soul is darting as a lightning flash,
 It bears these letters to the listening ear.—
 Then, break open the shell, take out the royal pearl,
 Cast away the husk, carry off the rich kernel.
 Without a husk the kernel ripens not,—
 From outward knowledge grows the sweet vintage of faith.

CHORUS FROM THE HERAKLES OF EURIPIDES.

(An experiment at translation according to the plan of Dr. J. H. Heinrich Schmidt in his work on Rhythm.)

Strophe I.

Ever is Youth dear to me ! Old Age, our foe, will alway,
 More heavy than crags Ætna uprears,

Our heads emburden,
 Our eyelids down weigh,
 Shutting out fair sunlight.
 Ne'er let Asian wealth of broad dominion be my heart's choice,
 Nor golden palaces well-stored,
 When set 'gainst youth in its prime,
 Mid wealth most beauteous treasure,
 Most beauteous treasure mid want.
 Thou drear murderous Age, I hate thee; may billows engulf thee deep!
 Boon bestow nevermore on man, come to palace or town no more,
 Far away into æther alway may pinions waft thee!

Antistrophe I.

Ah! were there wisdom, were there right shown by the Gods to mortals!
 To some were allowed a twofold youth
 For a shining sign-mark
 Unto them of virtue;
 Having reached their life's goal.
 Backward turned, they may run their double course in the rays of sunshine,
 While souls ignoble were granted
 One only measure of life,
 So all could clearly the bad know,
 Could clearly honor the good
 As they shine forth from the clouds in number as stars for the sailors' night.
 Now no way by the Gods established all evil and good makes plain
 Round our circle of years may roll, riches only have increase.

Strophe II.

Though youth depart, ne'er will I cease
 Graces mingling with Muses,
 That union loveliest known.
 Ne'er live I 'mong the Muse-bereft!
 Find me ever amid the garlands!
 I'll chant, an aged minstrel,
 Unto thee, Mnemosyne,
 Herakles, thee will I sing
 Gloriously triumphant!
 Follow with Bromius, Giver of wine,
 Follow with dance, and the seven-toned shell
 Blent with Libyan reed-notes—
 Let end not the Muses' work
 Who called me forth to the chorus!

Antistrophe II.

They pæans sing, Delian girls,
 Weaving beautiful dances
 Around the fires of the God,
 Sing Latona's son well born.
 Pæans I, though an aged minstrel,
 O'er domes aloft will swan-like

Pour forth, hoary of cheek,
 Singing praise unto my king.
 Strikes up well in my music,
 "Child of the God!" Yet sooth his fame
 Soareth beyond that glorious birth!
 He, endurer of labors,
 Made calm-flowing life for man,
 Slew the terrible monsters!

C. E. S.

N. B., *January 6, 1883.*

CREATOR AND CREATURE.

There is a marked effort, in philosophic thought, to discriminate and state the proper distinction between Creator and Creature. Both are manifestly requisite terms in any valid conception of Creation; and it is thought the following statement may present useful hints regarding this quest.

God is the Universal, Uncreated Life; Man is a specializing or instrumental form of that Life, in which form the Life is not a full, subjectively conscious reality until man becomes wholly fashioned and actuated by the power of the Life. Man is thus the creaturely instrument, form, measure, and expression of the Creative Life, which, in itself, is immeasurable and exhaustless. Man, made consciously full and free by the indwelling Life of God, is still man and not God; for he is a specializing expression of a Universal—a liminary or particular realization of the Unlimited. He is a human continent of a Life that, *in itself*, is uncontained and immeasurable; as to human sense, bounded space is a continent of the immeasurable space; or, as a master in musical art and science, personally realizes, in his own genius and power, the glories of the immeasurable or exhaustless fountain of tonal and harmonial power, and yet is only a subject fitted to express or give ever-varying forms to the issues of that fountain. The human form, as the creaturely subject of the Creator, is designed to become perfectly fashioned to receive and express the immeasurable glories of the Creative Fountain without power to abate or exhaust the treasures thence flowing, any more than the musician or other master in special science has power to exhaust, by use, the providences of such science—the exhaustless potentialities of such science.

As a fitted receptacle and instrument of Creative Life (a "perfect man in Christ Jesus"), the creature must feel all the fulness and glory of that Life; must feel it as if it were his own, when the truth is, it is only God's Life in him and not his own. The musician, duly empowered and inspired by the entrancing powers of tonal rhythm and harmony, feels their

inspirations in him as his own veriest self; yet he is not music, *in esse*, but only a human form qualified to receive *from the exhaustless fountain*, and manifest its glories outwardly. He is a spiritual form, fashioned to experience and reveal the glories of music without being *it*. So man, truly created or fashioned to the Divine purpose, is fitted to experience and reveal God in his human activities—fitted to feel and act divinely—and yet is not God. God is in the immeasurable Providence of all power of *being, knowing, and doing*. All the providences real to thought and outward experience have their sole root in eternal Being. They come into outward form and activity by the power of the Living Word or Wisdom from that Being; and finally into proper subjectivity—into human appreciation and use—through man, the creature, become divinely fashioned to God's ultimate designs—become consciously one with his Source, and one with all his surroundings.

Creatureship is a form of human consciousness. And this form is experienced by degrees. It is first indefinitely conscious in a common human nature—a nature that buries all human kind in communal indifference. It is next definitely or distinctly conscious in a special nature—a nature that differentiates or separates man from man, and *apparently* man from God. It is finally associately or unitarily conscious in a composite nature that reconciles and divinely orders all relations, both human and Divine. As to consciousness, the creature is naturally man in the first estate; he is spiritually man in the second; and divinely man in the third, this third embracing and reconciling all previous contrarieties.

WILLIAM H. KIMBALL.

CONCORD, N. H.

MAGIC OR MIRACLE, WHICH?

It is the plausible claim of a recent French critic, that the breadth of the scepticism of a given period, certainly as applied to the scepticism within the Church itself, and especially in so far as that scepticism is both humble and reverent, is in itself an indication of the extent of the new additions which are about to be made to the faith of the Church, when that scepticism has been overcome, and the new questions have received a satisfactory, if only approximate, solution.

If I were, in a single word, to attempt to indicate that defect in the conceptions of God's relation to the universe which has been the real cause of most of the scepticism in regard to the supernatural which has accompanied them, and the true method by which they have been and are being overcome, I should say that it all culminates in this: the substitu-

tion in the place of Magic (which was a violation and defiance, not only of law and of reason, but of all other divine qualities, such as love of beauty) of such a conception of the divine relations to nature, and control over nature, as is harmonious with them all.

I fear that at least the popular conception of God, in his wonder-working in the world, has made of Him simply a great Magician, and the miracles mainly feats of magic; and I am equally convinced that the only safety on the part of the Church is in abandoning this whole ground—this whole class of impossible and unthinkable conceptions, which have come to cluster about the miracles, and to put in their place ideas which are consonant with all that we know, through science, of the nature of the universe, of the nature of man, and at one and the same time ideas far more consonant with the highest moral conceptions of the infinite character of God. I cannot indicate better the nature of the intent of what is here to be accomplished, than by saying that what has already been so largely accomplished in Christian thought, as applied to the first chapter of Genesis, must now be applied not only to the miracles of the Old Testament and of the New Testament, but to that whole field which is embraced by prayer, by conversion, and the facts of the spiritual life or of the dependence of the human soul upon the life of God. How vast is the revolution in popular thought here involved will best be realized for many of us by simply recalling what carries us back, not more than a single generation, to a time when the creation of a world was described as being as easy to God as the creating an atom, and in which the present earth, with all its marks and results of geological eras, and its natural history of millions of years, was conceived as a trick of legerdemain, to which even a period of a few hours or a few days was conceded, rather out of deference to what might be considered the exigencies of the historical narrative, but which might as readily have been compressed into a moment of time.

But, if thus created, then equally might it thus be destroyed, with a word, and so it was said that He who had called the innumerable worlds, filling the infinite spaces of the universe, forth from nothing, might in like manner thus dismiss them back to nothing again.

It is unquestionable that the changes which have been wrought in all our methods of thinking are immense; equally certain that they necessitate a new way of looking at such ultimate ideas as those of creation and of Providence—fields into which it can hardly be said that Christian thought or Christian philosophy has yet entered with any definite conceptions capable of being used in a system; but I think it is equally certain that Christian thinking, as a whole, has already been immeasurably uplifted in

character, dignity, and every attribute of the highest power. From this point of view, the presence of magical elements in Biblical records is so far from being a matter of surprise that their entire absence, on the other hand, would be in itself a miracle. To the opening eyes and imagination of the race, as of the child, there is no criterion of the difficult or the easy, of the possible or the impossible. It is this latest generalization of reason, guided by experience, that finds everywhere reason and law, love and beauty, where, to the primitive exercise of the faculties, all is fairy-land, or a realm of magic. What is thus the central idea of magic, if idea can be predicated of that whose essence is unreasonable? It is that anything of which the thought or the conception in the imagination is possible is also possible in reality. But, while the tendency toward the acceptance of the magical is thus universal to the human mind in the earlier stages of its development, it is the distinguishing characteristic of the Biblical records that this language, alone of all human documents, is not necessarily confined by the conceptions of the age in which it found its first utterance, but that thus far it has, for the most part, yielded a higher meaning to each stage of the intellectual development of the race, and, by a kind of natural or prophetic transfiguration, risen with it as an ever attendant, ever increasingly commensurate expression of its increasing knowledge.

Notably is this the case with the first chapter of Genesis, in which, with no greater accommodation of language than would be natural and almost inevitable in such a case, the narrative might very well be employed by a disciple of Tyndall or Huxley in describing to his own children the progress of these wonderful world events. It is possible that, as was believed by Swedenborg, this wonderful adaptation has been secured in the description of the Creation by a guiding and controlling inspiration which does not belong in a like degree to all of the subsequent history.

What most concerns us, however, is this: Do the gospels present us with accounts of magic which we must reject and the accompanying facts, or do they give us proper miracles, and therefore events, which are consonant with, as well as expressions of, the highest measure of benevolence and excellence or glory of God?

For here, we repeat again, is the real antagonism of thought, which has precipitated the conflict in the thought of the best minds of the present century. It is not at all the antagonism between miracle and law. This is capable of resolution, and greatly to the dignity and elevation of both of its terms. The real antagonism is between magic and miracle, or between childish and impossible conceptions of the universe, and things which are required both by the necessities of thought and by the infinite

perfections we are also compelled or led to attribute to the author of that universe.

To that naïve faith or ignorant apprehension, for which the annihilation of such a planet as ours, with all its contents of life, and calling it again into complete being and activity as it exists to-day, is as thinkable as the appearance or disappearance of an atom, the New Testament miracles may seem at first sight to wear also some of the features of the magical, and yet, with the single exception of the multiplication of the loaves or perhaps the finding of the piece of silver, there is not one of them which presents any necessary contradiction to our thought.

So again of another class or type of manifestations truly and rightly termed miraculous; in lifting again into functional activity human bodies, from which the warmth and glow of what we call vitality have to all human tests apparently forever fled, we have a fact which also, to outward human appearance, has in other connections and in other circumstances occurred hundreds of times, and the frequency of whose possible recurrence has often been made the object of precautioning care even of legislation. What becomes of the living soul while the body lies stark and cold and breathless; who can tell? How easy or how difficult the summons which is followed by its resumption of control over vital functions we cannot tell, but in either case, in that restoration there is no contradiction of any ascertained law, either of the mind or of science, which should prevent us from admitting, so far as credibly attested, the facts.

Now, last of all, in approaching the scene of the ascension, a third type of miraculous accounts, I do so at once with more diffidence and with more reverence as well; but if we can show that even this one transcendent fact of the planet may be so conceived of as to free it from any considerable part of the magical features which encumber it, as usually represented to our imagination, we shall have taken one step at least toward that reconciliation with the thought of our age, which is the indispensable condition of the restoration of religious and with it of spiritual faith.

The difficulties which will necessarily still remain will be great enough, and I confess too great, to compel intellectual acceptance at this one point, and the faith of the Christian will still be left to rest upon the personal acceptance by a penitent loving soul of a fact which it cannot understand, on authority which it dare not dispute.

But such as it is, that partial relief of our difficulties must be found, I think, in the conception that the body of our Lord, during the forty days which elapsed subsequent to the crucifixion, had already passed through some of the stages of that complete transformation, from the natural to the spiritual—from the terrestrial to the celestial—from the earthly to

the heavenly—which, in the faith of the Christian, is one day to be part of the experience of every redeemed soul.

According to this hypothesis, it is at least not the body of flesh and blood, as it appeared during the earthly life of our Lord, which now rose, overcoming the ordinary working of the law of gravitation with all the difficulties which its subsequent disappearance must involve.

But, while thus considering, even with this varying degree of satisfaction, these three, which I will call the major miracles, we may, I am sure, now proceed to claim joyfully all the rest as no longer obstacles in the way of the gospel first to be overcome, but as manifesting in their form and intellectual adaptation, as well as in their inmost ethical nature and significance, the most exalted features of the gospel which they all illustrate.

They are, indeed, glimpses and foretastes of a higher spiritual order of things, in which the soul is to rule the body, and in which, by a divine process of recuperation, the new life in Christ is itself to possess a creative power, by which its stains and rents and imperfections are even in this earthly life in a large measure to be removed. These once considered in their true light, and the great body of the miracles, with both an inner and an outer force, become parts of the very highest wisdom of Christianity.

H. LOOMIS.

POUGHKEEPSIE, N. Y., *February 13, 1883.*

R. W. E.

[SONNET READ AT THE FUNERAL OF R. W. EMERSON.]

His harp is silent : shall successors rise,
Touching with venturous hand the trembling string,
Kindle glad raptures, visions of surprise,
And wake to ecstasy each slumbering thing ?
Shall life and thought flash new in wondering eyes
As when the Seer transcendent, sweet and wise,
World-wide his native melodies did sing,
Flushed with fair hopes and ancient memories ?
Ah, no ! That matchless harp shall silent lie ;
None hath the vanished minstrel's wondrous skill
To touch that instrument with art and will :
With him winged Poesy doth droop and die ;—
While our dull age, left voiceless, must lament
The bard high Heaven had for its service sent.

A. BRONSON ALCOTT.

CONCORD, MASS, *April 27, 1882.*

BOOK NOTICES.

LA REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L'ÉTRANGER. Paraissant tous les mois ; dirigée par TH. RIBOT.

[The contents of the numbers of Vols. XIII and XIV were noticed in our July number, 1883. The contents of Vols. I to VII will be found in *Jour. Spec. Phil.*, x, p. 109, and xiii, p. 44.—Ed.]

"La Revue Philosophique," for July, 1879 (Vol. VIII), contains "The Philosophy of Idea-Forces" (idécs-forces) by A. Fouillée, Part I. A somewhat satirical view is taken of philosophers, and their methods are discussed in a lively manner, in the above article, which aims to be logical, and is certainly spirited and full of illustration.

"The Critical History of Jules César Vanini," by A. Baudouin. A personal history, sketched in an artless, entertaining style, precedes this critique. As a philosopher, we are told Vanini had strange opinions, hardly to be called theories, and did not pretend to be an original genius. He closely studied nature, and an eventful life did not disturb the simplicity of his order of thought.

"Error and Selection," Part I, by F. Paulhan. "The importance of the rôle performed by the unconscious operations of the brain is the great obstacle which is opposed to the complete separation of psychology and physiology." The article defines the exactness of impressions received under various conditions, and how to measure what is positive and true, and absolute consciousness.

"Whewell's Theory of Science and Induction," by L. Liard, is treated with evident scientific knowledge.

The books examined are: "Observations and Reflections on the Development of Intelligence and Language with Children," by E. Egger (Fr.); "Education as a Science," Bain (Eng.); "History of Philosophy," Fr. Harms; "Consciousness considered as a Limit of Natural Knowledge," Hermann Siebeck; "Musical Pleasure," H. Berg; "Study on Cerebral Operations and on the Isolated Rôle of each Hemisphere in the Phenomena of Mental Pathology," by Dr. J. Luys.

"La Revue Philosophique" for August, 1879, contains:

1. "The Masters of Kant—II. Newton," by D. Nolen. The article opens with a sketch of Kant from the time he left Königsberg, in the vicinity of which he was a preceptor for ten years, consecrating his efforts almost wholly upon the problems of mechanical physics. Kant felt the necessity of a philosophic revolution, and made a vow to wholly devote himself to it, and the earnestness with which he insisted on following a good method proves that of Newton, his master. He began by being the interpreter and advocate of Newton's physics, against the opposition of the Cartesians and the disciples of Leibnitz. M. Nolen here explains the principles of Newton, their effect upon Kant, and the opposition of other believers whose beliefs he examines. From the method of Newton Kant created one truer and more comprehensive, outlined by M. Nolen, who asserts that it was not enough for Kant to maintain his master's principles, but he also wished to strengthen and extend them by new applications; he also states that, of all the works of Kant, that entitled "The General History of Nature and the Theory of the Heavens, or an Essay on the Structure and Mechanical Origin of the System of the Universe, after the

Principles of Newton, 1755," best shows the power and originality of his mathematical genius, and the inspiration of Newton. Newton explained the actual state and preservation of our planetary system; he did not dare scrutinize the origin of our world or extend his theory to the universe. The system of Newton is not fully explained in this article, other than to compare him with Kant, or to show the development of the latter through a study of Newton.

2. "The Dualism of Stuart Mill," by L. Carrau. If it were necessary to prove that the human mind cannot wholly lose its interest in problems relative to the existence of a first cause or creative principle, it would suffice to invoke the example of Stuart Mill. No one adhered more than he to the experimental method; he was a strict positivist, refusing to follow August Comte in his chimerical mysticism, and yet the question of God was his last thought; he was not on account of this an unbeliever, but he believed that the religious problem could be put scientifically. In analyzing Stuart Mill's dualism, M. Carrau undertakes to question if some of the proofs rejected by the English thinker have not more value than he attributes to them, and if, without disregarding the conditions of scientific induction, we cannot learn more about divinity than he affirms about it. He refers to the influence of Bentham, and states that the effort of Stuart Mill to establish his dualism bears on the argument called cosmologic, which shows that every phenomenon has a cause, since it is a change determined by an antecedent. In M. Carrau's discussion on the existence of God as a cause of the universe, he brings up the atomistic theory of Thomson, and questions the existence of ether as eternal and uncreated, believing that Mill's dualism would gain nothing by proving this, since the fluidity of ether could not resist an all-powerful finger in tracing the harmonious plan of the Cosmos. After analyzing the various points of Stuart Mill's theories, and comparing them with other arguments on the same subjects, M. Carrau concludes that Stuart Mill's criticisms do not seriously compromise the cosmologic argument, and that they have not shaken the philosophic foundation of the belief in a sovereign thought, the first cause of the world, and the human mind.

"The Conclusion of the Critical History of Jules César Vanini," by A. Baudouin, sketches Vanini after his arrival in Paris. "Error and Selection," by F. Paulhan, is continued.

The books examined are: "Studies in Theology and Philosophy," by J. F. Astié (Fr.). The analysis of the works of Professor Hausrath, of Heidelberg, on "The Century of Jesus Christ," is especially commended among these studies. M. Astié best deserves the title of "Independent" of all this class of theologians, says his critic Maurice Vernes. "History of Modern Philosophy," Windelband (Ger.). The first volume treats of the Renaissance to the time of Kant. "On the Theory of Judgment," by Goetz Martius, a possible disciple of Herbert Spencer, according to the critic A. Burdeau. "The Antitheses between the Middle and Modern Ages in the History of Philosophy," by Sebastiano Turbiglio (Ital.), a work reviewed in a critical spirit by A. Espinas.

"La Revue Philosophique" for September, 1879, contains:

1. "Religious Philosophy and Neo-Hegelianism," by E. de Hartmann. A treatise chiefly on Liberal Protestantism, which, if it wishes to seek a more positive basis, says the author, must sacrifice a part of its critical radicalism, or seek to approach orthodoxy at the expense of its own principles, or it should remain faithful to these, and try to give a more solid basis to the religious doctrine, while obeying the exigencies of the critical conscience. The author pursues a very interesting discussion on the various forms of religion, and speaks of the doctrines of Pfleiderer in particular. "Speculative Protestantism," says

Hartmann, "as a Christian sect now belongs to a dead past; as a religious speculative philosophy, on the contrary, it is the germ of a new pantheistic religion of the future, utilizing the results of speculative philosophy to satisfy, as far as possible, the religious want." "The Critical History of Vanini," by A. Baudouin, is continued, and "Error and Selection," by F. Paulhan, concluded.

Books examined are: "Metaphysics considered as a Science," by Alaux; "The Genesis of Bayle's 'Erudit' Scepticism," by A. Deschamps; "Studies on the Theory of Evolution," by L. Carrau.

The October number of "*La Revue Philosophique*," 1879, contains: "Sleep and Dreams," by J. Delbœuf. This article is a critique on several works on the above subject. The author prefaces his criticism by specifying the various kinds of dreams, and remarks that the moral nature often lies dormant in the dreamer, the most refined person often being a subject to the basest passions in his dream-existence. He studies the subject from a medical, philosophical, and psychological standpoint, and, besides numerous interesting examples of the peculiarity of dreams, makes a very interesting study and points out its usefulness.

2. "On the Rôle and Legitimacy of Geometric Intuition," by Boussinesq. The author treats this subject under the following heads: I. The defiance which geometric intuition inspires among some partisans of the non-Euclid doctrines. II. This defiance is not justified, for the evidence or geometric intuition cannot, as they suppose, be a product of external observation. III. Whatever opinion one may have about its origin, geometric intuition none the less remains the most perfect of our intellectual faculties, and the best defined in its object. IV. Without intuition all reasoning would become impossible in geometry, and probably even in the other branches of mathematics. V. Reflections on the idea of space. VI. Of the distinction of absolute and relative movements.

3. "Movements and their Psychological Importance," by Th. Ribot. The author, after stating that not until within twenty years has the rôle of movements in the formation of states of consciousness begun to seriously attract attention, describes the psychical life as the ensemble of nervous phenomena with which it is united, and forming a circuit which parts from the exterior world to return to it. This circuit comprises, in the whole, three periods: one of transmission from the outside to the center, one of elaboration in the centers, and one of transmission from the center to the outside. This last phase, that of reaction, has been ignored by ancient psychologists. In the organism, they have considered only the sensitive side and have neglected that of motion. According to them, the body, in motion, is to the soul a stranger or servant. An inadmissible thesis: facts prove, on the contrary, that it is an indispensable co-operator. The subject is treated in a practical, interesting manner, and with great breadth.

The critique on Vanini, by Baudouin, is concluded.

The books examined are:

"Contemporary English Morals," by Guyau; "Philosophical Works," by Sophie Germain; "J. J. Rousseau judged by the Genevese of To-day" (Fr.); "Psychical Motion and Consciousness," by Herzen (Ital.).

"Mind," a quarterly review, July, 1879, and "The Journal of Speculative Philosophy," January, April, July, receive full and favorable notices of an able list of articles.

"*La Revue Philosophique*" for November, 1879, contains "The Pretended Scepticism of Hume," by G. Compayré. According to this author, the philosophic influence of Hume is increasing; it is beginning to be recognized that his philosophy is not made of negations only, but contains a particular and original dogmatism which must not be con-

founded with vulgar scepticism; it is not only an accident and a curiosity in the history of thought, but an essential element. This author specifies the various works of Hume, and regards his "Treatise on Human Nature" as the most dogmatic; while Hume himself thought "An Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals" his best work, which opinion neither posterity nor his contemporaries held; and, with all its good sense and wisdom, his work on morals too closely resembles that of Professor Hutcheson and Bishop Butler to possess genuine originality, says M. Compayré, whose critique is concise as it is comprehensive, and written in a spirit of fairness.

2. "A Theory of Mathematical Knowledge," by M. O. Schmitz-Dumont, reviewed by P. Tannery, is concluded, with further demonstrations of a sound, clear character.

3. "Sleep and Dreams—II. Their Relations with the Theory of Certainty"—by J. Delbœuf, gives many interesting facts, and the author's theories are convincing. He has also treated this popular subject in a manner comprehensible to all.

Books examined are:

"Greek and Contemporary Sophists," by Funck Brentano; "The Revolutions of Justice," by H. Brocher de la Fléchère; "Lessons of Positive Politics," by Lastarria (Fr.); "History of Philosophical Terminology," Eucken (Germ.); "The Morals of Positivists," Ardigò (Ital.), Mélusine, Gaidoz and Rolland.

The contents of "La Revue Philosophique" for December, 1879, are: "The Origin of Religions," by Guyau; a discussion of a work by Max Müller, whose doctrine differs from that of Herbert Spencer. The subject of Max Müller's work is the development of religious thought with the Hindoos. His pages are filled with beautiful passages, and show the spirit of Matthew Arnold, Strauss, and Renan.

2. "On the Education of the Esthetic Sense in the Little Child," by B. Perez. Children very early show an eye for the beautiful equal to the musical sense; the taste for play and the dramatic sense manifesting itself later. The author states the various ages in which certain objects attract the attention of children, and explains the causes of their preference; in his belief, the esthetic taste of the child can also receive a happy influence if his attempts at imitation or artistic creation are wisely guided. The extent of the poetic faculties in a child are sufficiently great to regard him as a precocious artist, provided he is early taught by imitation, when he is already capable of following a course in painting and architecture. The musical instinct, he believes, is innate in the young; a child is born a musician, or will become one if he hears music at an impressionable age. No one, he says, is unmusical for lack of ear, but lack of practice. In the spoken voice there is a true or false timbre, a harmony of sounds with the thoughts and sentiments, a music of the soul, which is one of the great secrets of eloquence. This very interesting article analyzes the love of play, the dramatic instinct, and love of the marvelous, and, through a keen knowledge of a child's capacity, inherited tendencies, and disposition, affords the best instruction as to the education of children.

3. "On the Influence and Elements of Ideas," by Dr. Ch. Richet. "All is not said," observes this author, "when the influence of the nerves and nervous centres upon movement has been explained, for the muscles have sensitive nerves, so that each contraction provokes a nervous excitement which reaches the centres and produces either a reflex movement, a conscious or unconscious sensation." He further discusses voluntary and involuntary movement, and how the course of our ideas and sentiments is affected by them.

4. "Double Personality in Dreams," by J. Delbœuf, describes the consciousness of self in dreams, witnessing as it were the part which imagination makes self play.

5. The Manuscripts of Sophie Germain—New Documents—by C. Henry. A collection interesting to geometers, containing a number of letters.

Books examined are:

"The Study of Psychology," by G. H. Lewes; "Spiritualism," by Wundt; "So-called Spiritualism," Ulrici; "History of Materialism," by Lange, vol. ii.

VIRGINIA CHAMPLIN.

LIBRARY OF ABORIGINAL AMERICAN LITERATURE. In 1882 Dr. Brinton, editor of the "Medical and Surgical Reporter" of Philadelphia, and for a long time well known here and abroad for his valuable contributions to the ethnology of the aborigines of America, and especially for his books, "The Myths of the New World" and "The Religious Sentiment," issued a circular announcing the publication of a series of works under the general title here given. We quote from the circular:

"Each of these works will be printed in the original tongue, with an English translation and notes. Every work admitted to the series will be the production of a native, and each will have some intrinsic importance, either historical or ethnological, in addition to its value as a linguistic monument. Most of them will be from unpublished manuscripts, and every effort will be made to secure purity of text and competent editorship.

"The works contemplated in the series are such as will be indispensable to the future student of American archaeology, ethnology, or linguistics. A provisional list is added to this circular. They will be printed from type, in medium octavo, on heavy paper, and but *very few copies will be struck off beyond the number subscribed for.*"

The following are some of the works which it was proposed to issue in this series. Four, including the first and fourth with two others, have already appeared (1884):

No. I. "The Chronicles of the Mayas," edited by D. G. Brinton, M. D. This volume will contain five brief chronicles in the Maya language of Yucatan, written shortly after the conquest, and carrying the history of that people back many centuries. Four of these have never been published, nor even translated into any European tongue. Each will be given in the original, with a literal translation and grammatical and historical notes. To these will be added a history of the conquest, written in his native tongue by a Maya chief, in 1562. This also is from an unpublished manuscript. The texts will be preceded by an introduction on the history of the Mayas; their language, calendar, numeral system, etc.; and a vocabulary will be added at the close.

No. II. "Central American Calendars." A number of native calendars and "wheels," used by the Mayas, Kiches, Cakchiquels, and neighboring tribes, in reckoning time and forecasting the future, will be published for the first time, with explanations. From lack of sufficient material, this important point in American archaeology has remained extremely obscure. The collection which it is intended to embrace in this volume is unquestionably unique of its kind.

No. III. "The Annals of Quauhhtlan." The original Aztec text, with a new translation. This is also known as the "Codex Chimalpopoca." It is one of the most curious and valuable documents in Mexican archaeology.

No. IV. "The National Legend of the Creeks," edited by Albert S. Gatschet. Mr. Gatschet will present: (1) The original German account, written in 1735, by which this legend has been transmitted; (2) Its English translation; (3) Its retranslation into the Creek language, in which it was originally delivered, by an educated native; (4) Its translation into the Hitchiti, a dialect cognate to the Creek; (5) Glossaries and ethnographic notes.

No. V. "The Chronicles of the Cakchiquels." These chronicles are the celebrated "Memorial de Tecpan Atitlan" so often quoted by the late Abbé Brasseur de Bourbourg. They are invaluable for the ancient history and mythology of Guatemalan nations, and are of undoubted authenticity and antiquity.

Other works of equal interest will be added, if the series proves acceptable to scholars. The above order of issue is uncertain.

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A VIEW OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES.

BY E. H. RHODES.

It needs no deep acquaintance with the history of philosophy to discern that the philosophic temper is distinguished by an ardent desire not merely to know, in their isolation, as many facts or theories as idle curiosity or other motives might prompt men to accumulate, but to discover principles that shall give harmony and unity to knowledge. Some germs of this philosophic spirit are probably implanted in the breasts of all men who are capable of allowing their thoughts to rise above the level of mere animal needs, and, as mental culture spreads and deepens, the movements of this spirit are, of course, more widely and deeply felt. It is, however, to Philosophers and Men of Science that we must look for the most eminent examples of it. Though in speaking of Philosophers and Men of Science as if they were distinct classes, it must be borne in mind that, until quite modern times, the philosopher and man of science was almost always found combined in the same person; and if, owing to the vast extension of the domain of science in recent times, it has become necessary for the scientific man to devote himself to some special department, and that, consequently, a distinction is now drawn between him and

the philosopher, it is not the temper of mind, but only the extent of the sphere within which that temper seeks its satisfaction, that justifies the distinction. The scientific man takes some circumscribed portion of the great Universe of Mind and Matter wherein to philosophize, of which to discover the unifying principles—the principles which bind his facts together and give them their highest interest and character of intellectual grandeur; the philosopher is content with nothing less than the Universe itself. *Its* unifying principles, *its* rationale, is the great object of *his* aims and desires. Eminent as was Descartes, the illustrious subject for our consideration on this occasion, as a man of science, it is because he aimed at nothing less than a Rationale of the Universe that he has justly earned the title of Philosopher. He was fortunate in the epoch in which it was his lot to publish his philosophical system. The hundred years that preceded its appearance had been distinguished by some of the most remarkable scientific discoveries ever made—discoveries which could not but largely modify the cosmological conceptions that had been handed down by the Greek and scholastic philosophers. The labors of Copernicus had established the heliocentric theory of our planetary system; Galileo's invention of the telescope had revealed the inequalities of the moon's surface, the phases of Venus, the satellites of Jupiter, and the ring of Saturn; the same philosopher, by his experiments on falling bodies, had taken the first steps toward the construction of a sound science of dynamics. The investigation of the laws of the reflection and refraction of light by Maurolyeus, Descartes himself, and others, left but little for their successors to discover in an important department of the science of optics. The researches of the professors of the great Paduan school in Italy and Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood had revolutionized men's ideas of physiology and anatomy. Queen Elizabeth's physician, Dr. Gilbert, may be said to have constituted a new science by the publication of his great work on the magnet, in which almost all the fundamental facts of magnetism were first made known. The profound impression which these and other marvellous discoveries must have made upon the thoughtful and philosophic minds of the time it would be difficult for us, familiar as we have grown with them, to estimate or even to imagine, had we not witnessed in our own day the depth of the impression and the stimulus to thought produced

by Mr. Darwin's speculations on the origin of species. These vast and important additions to knowledge had rendered needful, if not the construction of an entirely new system of philosophy, at least such an extensive modification of the old as would render it consistent with the new discoveries of science. To this necessary task Descartes devoted the chief efforts of his life—a task which his rare intellectual endowments and the variety and extent of his acquirements in philosophy and science rendered him eminently fitted to discharge. The depth and penetration of a profound philosopher were in him united with the keen logical understanding, the lucid style and method, which have distinguished so many of his countrymen. He was familiar with Greek and scholastic philosophy, was one of the most eminent mathematicians of his time, to which science he contributed one of the most valuable, because one of the most fertile and universal, of its methods. He was a scientific investigator himself, besides knowing all the science of his time, the leading facts and principles of which, with a remarkable exception, which will be noticed later on, are to be found embodied in his philosophical writings. Such were the natural gifts and such the acquirements of the philosopher whose system was destined to supersede the old Greek and scholastic systems and form the point of departure for subsequent philosophic speculations.

Let us, then, now inquire what were the new features in Descartes' system of philosophy which distinguish it from the systems of his predecessors, and which enabled his successors to take it as the starting-point of their own speculations. Now, if any one imagines that Descartes made some new and important contribution to the positive solution of the great problems of metaphysics, a careful study of his works, combined with a knowledge of the History of Philosophy, will convince him of his error. By the great problems of metaphysics are meant such problems as, for example, are implied when the questions are asked, Does the soul or mind exist? What is its nature? What its relation to thought and feeling? What is the nature of the material universe, and what its relation to thought? Does God exist? How do we know of His existence, and what is His relation to us? What is reality? What is truth? What the criterion for distinguishing between it and falsehood? On these and the like great questions did Des-

cartes' powerful intellect exercise itself to the end of his life ; and the answers he gave to them, the conclusions he reached, had already been given, had already been arrived at by one or other of the philosophers that had preceded him. What, then, did Descartes do to earn the position he holds in philosophy ? He did three things. He taught men how to doubt in a rigorous and systematic manner. He brought into clear and distinct view the subjective method in philosophy, made it the foundation of his system, and professed to deduce his theory of the Universe from a self-evident proposition furnished by that method. And, thirdly, taking the widest view of Philosophy, and considering its object to be to furnish a Rationale of the genesis and nature of the Universe, he brought within the circle of his own system almost all the great scientific discoveries of his epoch, whether in the realm of organic or of inorganic nature. In the first place, then, Descartes taught mankind that, ere they can hope to arrive at certainty, they must first learn how to doubt. By precept and example he enforced this difficult, but necessary, lesson upon them. Before his time men had at most merely played at doubting, when they doubted or pretended to doubt at all. He first set them the example of rigorous and systematic doubt, first impressed upon them the necessity of searching out from the inmost recesses of the mind, and submitting to a cautious and vigilant criticism, every belief they had imbibed, whether, almost unconsciously, through the impressions of their senses as they grew up from infancy to manhood—the "*præjudicia ineuntis ætatis*" he so often warns us against—or from the teachings of authority and from the vast mass of unsifted materials stored up in the writings of all ages. It is difficult for us, who have so long and so thoroughly learned this lesson, who are accustomed to submit every proposition in history, philosophy, or science to the rigorous tests suggested by the accumulated experience of the last two centuries of scientific activity—it is difficult for us to realize how little men understood, or rather how entirely they failed to conceive, what thorough and systematic doubt was. Some idea of the depth of their dogmatic slumbers we may form by inspecting the philosophical writings of Descartes' great predecessor, Bacon, one of the most unprejudiced and open-minded of men. What a mass of unexamined dogmatic beliefs does the "*Novum Organon*" reveal in its writer ! what a host of

pre-suppositions as to mind, body, the world, forms, essences, and the like, derived from all kinds of sources Greek and scholastic, concerning which the writer seems quite unconscious that all need a rigorous re-examination !

Descartes would, however, have considered that he had conferred on philosophy a boon of little value if the result of his lesson in systematic doubting were to be a barren skepticism. He was himself no skeptic ; he believed that there was such a thing as truth ; he doubted not the reality of mind and matter ; so far was he removed from doubt that, comparing himself to Archimedes, he needed but to find as a fulcrum one fundamental, one indubitable truth, and he would raise into our view the whole system of the Universe. This fulcrum, this irrefragable truth, he believed he had found in his celebrated axiom "*cogito, ergo sum*"—"I think, therefore I am." However doubtful might be the existence, as real objects, of what he saw and felt and heard, he could not doubt their existence as mere sensations ; whether his thoughts were true or false, he could not doubt that he had thoughts, and so long as his thoughts, sensations, emotions, volitions, feelings continued their course, so long as the stream of consciousness continued its flow, he could not doubt the continuance of his own existence. Of the existence of his feelings, taken as mere feeling, it was impossible for him to doubt, and, so long as his feelings existed, it was equally impossible to doubt his own existence. "*Cogito, ergo sum*" was, then, the fundamental self-evident proposition furnished by his subjective method. The thought involved in this sentence, implicit in previous philosophical systems, he rendered explicit, he disentangled it from other ideas, clearly and forcibly explained his method of arriving at it and wherein lay its certainty, and his labors in this matter constitute his second title to the position he holds in the history of philosophy. Now, this truth, *cogito, ergo sum*, not only served as an irrefragable first principle from which his system of philosophy was to start, but, from the exceeding clearness and distinctness with which he apprehended it, it guided him to the discovery of what was equally indispensable with itself—of a criterion or test for distinguishing between truth and falsehood. This criterion is, that whatever is apprehended with the same clearness and distinctness as this primary truth is true likewise. Thus with the discovery of this

first truth he had found not only his fulcrum, but his lever too. But, thought Descartes, though my fulcrum needs no guarantee—guarantees itself, in fact—my lever possesses not this perfection; its excellence must be guaranteed by another. Reflecting, therefore, once more on his fundamental truth, *cogito, ergo sum*, and observing that he inferred the existence of himself as a thinking substance from the existence of his thoughts, he saw involved in this first principle the further principle, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, or, everything has a cause. The first use he made of this new principle was to prove the existence of God. Among the ideas existing in his mind, he found the idea of a Being infinite, independent, supremely intelligent and supremely powerful—the idea of an all-perfect God. Now, such an idea must have an adequate cause. His own imperfect nature could not possibly be the adequate cause. The only adequate cause could be the actually existing Deity. Moreover, in the idea of God alone was contained necessary and eternal existence; hence there could be no doubt of the existence of this all-perfect Being. God, then, the Creator and Upholder of all things, having been proved to exist, it is from Him we derive our faculty of knowledge; and, as he is a God of perfect truth, it is impossible that he could have given us a faculty that should lead us astray. Whatever, therefore, we perceive clearly and distinctly, must be true. If our ideas are false, it is only when there are obscurity and confusion in them, and then they proceed not from God, but *a nihilo*. In our own breasts, then, we have a criterion for distinguishing between the true and the false—a criterion whose validity is guaranteed by God himself. But though every man possesses this criterion in himself, it depends entirely on his own Will, which Descartes held to be free, whether he make use of this criterion or not. Belief or assent is an act of the Will; it is, therefore, entirely our own fault if we fall into error, since we can always avoid doing so by being careful to give our assent to nothing except to what we clearly and distinctly perceive, and to what can be deduced therefrom by clear and distinct principles of reasoning. So strict is Descartes on this point that he will not allow men to plead the greater imperfection of their intellects as an excuse for falling into greater errors than their fellows. He will not allow of greater or less imperfection of mind. Indeed, he begins his celebrated treatise, “*De Methodo*,”

with the words “*Nulla res æquabilius inter homines est distributa quam bona mens.*” Clearness and distinctness of perception, then, are essential to truth, and the difference between clearness and distinctness he explains when he says: “A clear perception I call that which is present and open to the attentive mind, just as we are said to see those objects clearly which are present to the observant eye and move it with sufficient strength and openness. But that perception is distinct which, at the same time that it is clear, is so separated and marked off from everything else that it contains within itself absolutely nothing but what is clear.” According to Descartes, the Universe, as created by God, is composed of two substances, Mind and Body. By substance he means anything whose existence is absolute and independent, or at any rate only dependent on the concurrence of God. Bodies and Minds exist, therefore, whether they are present to our consciousness or not, whether they or their properties are perceived by us or not. Each of the two substances has an especial property which constitutes its nature and essence. Extension in length, breadth, and depth constitutes the essence of bodily substance, and it is from our perception of this property that we infer the existence of the substance body. Thought constitutes the nature of the thinking substance or mind, and it is from the existence of his own thoughts that a man infers the existence of his own mind or thinking substance. The other properties of bodies—as figure, motion, position, divisibility—are but modes of the essential property, extension. The other properties of mind—as imagination, sensation, will—are but modes of its essential property, thought. In the case of Man, mind and body are found intimately united; and it is their intimate union that gives rise to many of the feelings we experience: the various appetites, as hunger, thirst, etc.; the passions, as anger, joy, sadness, love, etc.; sensations, as light, color, sounds, smells, tastes, heat, hardness, and other tactile qualities.

To explain how this intimate union of Mind and Body gives rise to these various mental affections was the aim of what justly deserves to be considered his greatest work, his “*Passiones sive Affectus Animæ.*”

He begins this Treatise with a statement of the distinction Philosophers have drawn between Action and Passion. Every occurrence, every fresh event, is called Passion in respect of the

subject to which it happens, and Action in respect of the subject which is the cause of its happening. So that, although Agent and Patient are very frequently quite different things, Action and Passion remain one and the same thing, which has these two names on account of the two different subjects to which it can be referred. Now, no subject acts more immediately on the soul than does the body to which it is joined; and, consequently, what is Passion in the soul is commonly Action in the body. There is, then, no safer way of arriving at a knowledge of the Passions than by first carefully considering what is the difference between body and soul, to the end that we may know to which of the two ought to be assigned each one of the various functions that exist in us. For this purpose he lays down the rule that whatever affections and properties are common to ourselves and inanimate bodies ought to be attributed to the body only, as, for instance, figure, motion, heat; all species of thoughts, on the other hand, pertain to the soul. The functions of the body, then—its movements, its heat, the action of its muscles, nerves, brain, and organs of sense—are quite independent of the soul; and it is a vulgar error to suppose that the activities of the body are due to the soul's presence, and that they cease, in other words, that the body dies, because and in consequence of the soul's quitting the body. On the contrary, the soul leaves the body, which is just as much an automatic piece of machinery as a clock, because the bodily machinery gets out of order, gets spoilt, as do the works of a clock. The nature of this machinery he illustrates by an account of the way in which affections of the sensory nerves are converted into muscular movements through the action of the brain and motor nerves, quite independently of the mind—an account which wants but little change to bring it up to the level of the explanation of what is called reflex action, to be found in our text-books of physiology. Indeed, Descartes' conception of the nature of all organized bodies, whether of men or beasts, very much amounts to this: that they are automatic pieces of machinery, so adjusted to their external environment that, when acted upon by this environment, the bodily machinery reacts in a manner conducive to the preservation of its own vigor and efficiency, and, he might have added, to the continuance of the race, co-operating with changes in the environment which are favorable to these

ends, and resisting changes that tend to the injury of the bodily machinery or to the extinction of the race; that this action and reaction go on whether the body is endowed with consciousness or not; that beasts of all kinds are probably altogether unconscious automata, and that man is very largely so. But, whatever may be the case with beasts, and Descartes is not quite sure that even they are altogether destitute of consciousness, though certainly they are of reason—*ratione carent et forte omni cogitatione*—man is endowed with a mind to whose action upon the body some of the movements of the latter are due, and whose passions and affections are due to the action of the body upon it.

Cogitationes, thoughts, which are the sole functions of our Soul, are of two kinds. The actions of the Soul, and its Passions or Affections. The actions of the Soul are the activities of our Will; they come from the Soul, and depend upon it entirely. Our Passions are, in general, all kinds of perceptions or thoughts which are found in us (*omnes species perceptionum sive cogitationum quæ in nobis reperiuntur*). The actions of the Will are twofold. They either terminate in the Soul itself, as when we will to think of some intelligible or immaterial object; or they terminate in our body, as when we will to move our limbs and they move. Of our Perceptions, some have the Soul for their cause, others the body. The first class of perceptions are the perceptions of the activity of Will and the perceptions of intelligible as opposed to imaginable things. The perceptions due to the action of our body—that is, the activity of our brains and nervous system—are: 1. Dreams and phantasies due to the brain working in certain tracks left by previous impressions. The phenomena of memory are due to the same cause, except that the Will generally takes an active part in directing the activity of the brain into these traces of ancient impressions left in the brain-substance. 2. The perceptions due to external objects. These objects, affecting our sense-organs, awaken our nerves into activity, and they in their turn awaken the brain into activity, and it is to this activity of the brain that the perceptions of external objects in the mind are due. 3. The perceptions we refer to our body, as heat, cold, pain, etc. Like the last, these perceptions are owing to the affected part of the body setting up activity in the nerves and brain. 4. The perceptions which are commonly referred only to the Soul. The effects of these per-

ceptions are felt as if in the Soul itself, and no immediate cause (*causa proxima*) to which they can be referred is commonly recognized. Such perceptions are the feelings of Joy, Anger, and the like, which are sometimes aroused in us by objects which awaken the activity of our nerves (*e. g.*, external objects or feelings of bodily pain, etc.), and sometimes by other causes. It is to this last class of perceptions to which the word Passions is generally restricted, and it is this class which, under the name of Affections or Passions of the Soul, Descartes undertakes to explain in this Treatise. He shows how these Passions, Affections, or Emotions, like the second and third class of perceptions above, really have their cause in the physical activities of the nerves and brain. Let us take an example, as it will serve most briefly to explain Descartes's ideas on this subject. Suppose an unarmed man to come suddenly across a tiger in a forest. The external object, the tiger, has its image impressed point for point on the retina of the eye, the optic nerve sends to a particular part of the brain impressions each of which corresponds with a particular point of the retinal image. There is thus formed on the brain a physical image or figure corresponding point by point with the tiger, or, at any rate, so much of the tiger as affected the field of vision. Now, this physical image has three effects. First, it produces in the man the same effect as it would in an unconscious automaton, like the antelope. In such an automaton the physical image would affect the nerves leading to the muscles of the legs, and the animal would automatically take to flight, without the intervention of any consciousness or mind in the matter. The second effect of the physical image is the mental image of the tiger which presents itself in the man's soul and makes him believe he sees an actual tiger. The third effect of this physical image is to awaken in the substance of the brain, in ways explained at large by Descartes in his treatise, certain physical activities, the mental aspect of which activities is the Passion or Emotion of Fear. And Descartes explains how the object of these Passions and Emotions is the preservation of the individual, and of the race he might have added. And the way they effect this object is by evoking the activity of the Will and causing it effectually to second the merely automatic efforts of the reflex machinery. Thus, in the example we have chosen, the Emotion of Fear having been roused in the man's mind, he wills

to fly. Now, it is only through the Will that the Soul can act upon the body, or rather that portion called the brain. The Will then sets up an action in the brain which, through the mediation of the nerves, sets up an action in the muscles of the legs, or, at any rate, makes them act more vigorously than they would have done automatically. We see, then, that, according to Descartes, all states of consciousness, except those that originate in the Will, have their conditions, origin, or causes in the physical actions of the body, and more immediately of the brain. Either external objects act upon the nerves, or some of the internal organs of the body do so, and this action of the nerves rouses the brain to activity, or in some cases the activity even begins in the brain; well, this Action of the brain, which at the present day we should be inclined to represent by some kind of vibration of its molecules—this aspect of the whole event is the cause of, or has another aspect in, some phase of consciousness, whether perception, emotion, imagination, or what not. In the words of Descartes, what is Action in respect of the Brain substance is Passion in respect of the Mind. “*Ita ut quamvis Agens et Patiens sint valde diversa Actio et Passio tamen maneant una eademque res, quæ hæc duo habeat nomina ratione duorum diversorum subjectorum ad quæ referri potest.*” So that although Agent and Patient—*i. e.*, Body and Mind—in this case are very different, Action and Passion, nevertheless, remain one and the same thing, which has these two names on account of the two different subjects (body and mind again) to which it can be referred. But if, in the cases of consciousness we have been considering, the Actio is in the body and brain, and the Passio is in the Mind, there is another class of cases in which the Actio is in the Mind and the Passio in the brain and body. In this class of cases the Action arises in the Will and terminates in the body, or passes on from it to external matter, whereas in the former class the Action originated in the body, or, if in external matter, it then passed on to the body, and terminated in the Mind. Our Volitions are by Descartes referred to the Mind itself, have the Mind itself and not the body as their cause and origin. Such, in brief, is Descartes’ account of the affections of the mind that arise from its intimate union with the body.

The various sensations of color, sound, taste, smell, hardness,

softness, and the like—sensations which exist only in our minds, and arise in them owing to the action of external bodies on our bodies and the intimate union of the latter with our minds—are generally considered to be exactly like corresponding properties in the bodies themselves, and are thus placed in the same class with magnitude, figure, motion, and position, properties which exist in bodies independently of our perception, and to which our perceptions accurately correspond. But this is an error, originating in what Descartes considers the prime and especial fountain of all errors—the wrong and hasty judgments we form about things in our earliest infancy, the *præjudicia infantie*. At the commencement of life our mind had been so closely bound up with the body that it had no leisure for any thoughts except those only through which it felt the things that affected its body, and even these feelings it did not refer to any external object. It merely had sensations of pain or pleasure according as the body suffered any inconvenience or the reverse; or if the inconvenience or advantage that befell the body was trifling, our mind experienced, according to the diversity of the parts or moods of the bodily affection, the various sensations of tastes, smells, sounds, heat, cold, light, color, and the like—sensations which represent nothing external to thought. At the same time our mind also had perceptions of magnitude, figure, motion, and the like, which were displayed to it as things or modes of things existing external to thought, or, at any rate, capable of so doing, although the infant mind did not yet observe the difference between these two classes of perceptions and sensations. By and by, when the bodily machine, which has been so framed by nature that it can move itself about by its own efforts in various ways, began in a random fashion to twist itself about on this side and that, and in so doing accidentally obtained some advantage or escaped from some inconvenience, the mind adherent to it began to observe that what it so obtained or shunned was external to itself; and not only did it attribute to the external object magnitude, figure, motion, and whatever it perceived as things or modes of things, but also tastes, smells, and the various other sensations which it perceived were caused in it by the external object. And taking account of things only so far as they were of use to the body, the mind considered that the reality of an object was proportional to the degree in which it affected the mind. Hence

it thought there was much more substance or corporeity in stones and metals than in water or air, because in the one it felt more hardness and weight than in the other. Nay, so long as it felt neither wind nor cold nor heat in the air, it accounted the air as nothing at all. And, receiving from the stars no more light than from the flames of small candles, the mind imagined the stars not to be larger than those flames. And, not perceiving the rotation and globular shape of the earth, it was inclined to think it motionless and a plane. With a thousand like prejudices was our mind imbned in infancy; and afterward, not remembering that these opinions had never been submitted to a strict examination, it admitted them as most true and most evident.

We have seen that Descartes held that Creation contained only two classes of things, minds and bodies; in other words, that the created Universe was composed of the two substances, Mind and Matter. When, then, in the course of his philosophical system he comes to treat of the material Universe, he has to explain what is the essential nature of the Matter of which it is framed, and how the vast variety of its phenomena are but the consequences of this essential nature. That material objects external to our minds and independent of them really exist, is a truth grounded upon the most certain reasons. Whatever sensation we experience undoubtedly comes to us from something different from our mind; for it does not lie in our power to feel one thing rather than another. This depends entirely on the thing which affects our senses. Now, we have a clear and distinct perception that this thing is a kind of matter extended in length, breadth, and depth, whose various parts are endowed with various shapes and motions, and cause in us a variety of sensations of color, smell, pain, etc. And as we can not believe that God is a deceiver, and causes us to have clear and distinct perceptions of what is false, we are bound to believe that extended objects really exist, possessed of all those properties which we clearly perceive are congruent with extended things. It is this extended thing which is called body or matter. Extension, then, constitutes the nature or essence of any body; not its hardness or softness, or weight, or color, or any other sensible quality. Its nature depends on none of these.

But, if extension is all that constitutes the nature of matter, how is to be explained the phenomenon of rarefaction and condensa-

tion, whereby bodies seem to be of different volumes at different times. And, again, where nothing but extension is perceived, it is not usual to speak of body, but to call it empty space, and mere space is believed to be nothing. As to condensation and rarefaction, it is, observes Descartes, a mere change of figure in the condensed or rarefied body, resulting from the nearer approach of its constituent parts to each other, or their removal to a greater distance from each other. If a body of air or water becomes rarefied its quantity remains unaltered, the particles merely move to a greater distance from each other; in other words, the intervening pores become larger, and, as wherever there is extension there is the extended substance called matter or body, Descartes, with perfect consistency, maintains that the increase in the size of the intervals between the parts of the rarefied body is due to the accession of new bodies, although those bodies may be quite imperceptible to our senses. To take his own illustration: when a dry sponge is squeezed, pieces of extension are squeezed out of it, and when the grasp upon it is relaxed, the sponge recovers its shape through pieces of extension making their way into it again. As to the objection to his definition of matter, advanced by those who distinguish between matter and empty space, he observes that it is easy to see that the extension which constitutes the nature of space is the same as that which constitutes the nature of body, if we are careful to attend to the idea we have of any particular body—a stone, for example—and separate everything from it which is not required for its corporeal nature. Its hardness may be rejected, because if the stone is fused or ground into powder it will lose its hardness and yet not cease to be a body. Its color may be rejected, for some bodies are so transparent as to be colorless. Its weight is immaterial; fire, which is exceedingly light, is none the less a body. Its heat or cold or other qualities may also be rejected, because, though they may suffer change, the stone still remains a body. Now, after all these rejections, nothing remains of our idea of the stone except its extension in length, breadth, and depth; the only thing which is contained in our idea of space, whether that space is full of bodies or, as it is called, empty. It follows that there can be no such thing as a true vacuum; wheresoever there is extension there must substance be. *Nihili nulla potest esse extensio.* Hence no vessel filled with any kind of matter can be emptied of

that matter without new matter entering as fast as the old matter is got rid of. And should any one ask the question, What would happen if God were to remove the contents of the vessel and allow nothing else to take their place? the answer must be that the sides of the vessel would thereby become contiguous. When nothing interposes between two bodies they must of necessity touch. It is a clear contradiction to suppose there can be distance between them and yet that distance be nothing, since all distance is a mode of extension and therefore cannot exist without extended substance—that is, matter. Hence it follows that a hollow vessel cannot contain more matter at one time than at another, and that, when it is filled with lead or gold or any other heavy or hard body, it contains no more matter or corporeal substance than when it is filled with air or than when it is considered empty. The quantity of matter does not depend on weight or hardness, but on extension only, and this in the same vessel is always the same. From this conception of the nature of matter, Descartes deduces several important consequences. There can be no such things as atoms or portions of matter in their very nature indivisible, since extension itself is divisible without limits. The Universe can have no limits, since we cannot conceive extension as limited. The substance of the earth is the same as that of the heavens, and, however many worlds there may be, they are all made of the same extended substance. Thus in the whole Universe there exists one and the same matter, known by the sole attribute of extension; and all the properties we perceive in it are reducible to the fact that it is divisible and its parts able to move among each other. Hence matter has capacity for all those affections which are perceived to be consequences of the motion of its parts. Every variation in matter, all the diversity of its forms, are due to motion.

According to Descartes, then, not only is all Matter extended, but all extension is Matter. Space is a Plenum; such a thing as a Vacuum is an impossibility. The quantity of Matter contained within any closed surface is the same as the volume of that closed surface. All physical phenomena are to be interpreted in terms of matter and motion; in other words, in terms of extension conceived as capable of division without limits, and with parts capable of motion among themselves.

Let us now examine what Descartes understood by the term

Motion. He is dissatisfied with the common account which takes motion to be the *action* whereby a body migrates from one place into another, as it fails to explain how the same body can be said to be at the same time both in motion and at rest. Thus a man sitting on board a ship sailing out of harbor is in motion with reference to the shore, but at rest with reference to the ship. According to the common notion which places motion in action and rest in the cessation of action, the man ought to be said to be at rest, inasmuch as he feels no action in himself. Descartes therefore gives as a definition of Motion that it is *translatio unius partis materiae, sive unius corporis, ex vicinia eorum corporum, quæ illud immediatè contingunt, et tanquam quiescentia spectantur, in viciniam aliorum*—Motion is a transference of one portion of matter, or of one body, from the neighborhood of those bodies which are in close and immediate contact with it, and are regarded as at rest, into the neighborhood of other bodies. Now, bearing in mind the fundamental conception that lies at the bottom of Descartes' whole system of physics—namely, that matter and extension are convertible terms, and space consequently a Plenum—we see that the bounding surface of any body must at every point be in immediate contact with some point or points of the bounding surfaces of other bodies, and, according to Descartes' definition, the body is in motion when its bounding surface passes continuously into contact with the bounding surfaces of an ever-changing succession of fresh bodies.

We may form a picture of his idea by observing the motion of a fish as it swims through water. The surface of its body is always in contact with the water, but as it swims along it is continuously passing into contact with fresh watery surfaces. As a moving body can only be in contact with one set of bodies at the same moment, it cannot correctly be said to have several motions at the same time, though, *in thought*, this motion may be considered to be the resultant of any number of motions in different directions. In all cases of motion the difficulty arises of settling which are to be considered the moving bodies and which the bodies at rest, a problem to be solved by considering the circumstances and history of each case as it arises.

But though a body can have only one proper motion of its own, it may share in innumerable other motions. For it may form

part of some larger aggregate of matter, having a motion of its own, and that aggregate be but a portion of some still larger body with its own motion, a case we may illustrate by the example of the movements of the wheels of a watch carried in the pocket of a man pacing the deck of a ship sailing upon the surface of our globe as it moves round the sun.

We are now in a position to understand the very important principle which, according to Descartes, governs all actual motions of bodies in the Universe—the principle which forms the foundation of his celebrated theory of Vortices. This principle is that, in every case of motion, a complete circle of bodies moves simultaneously. Since space is a *Pienum*, a body can only move by expelling some other body from the place into which it enters, and this latter body must expel a third body, and so on, till we come round to a last body, which enters the place left by the first at the moment the first body left it. We can form a mental image of this kind of circular motion by imagining a water-pipe quite full of water, bent round till both ends meet and form a closed ring, within which the water circulates round and round. If, furthermore, we imagine the section of the pipe not to be uniform, it is clear that the smaller the section of any portion of the pipe is, the quicker the water must flow along that part. The same, too, will be the case with Descartes' rings of moving matter. His matter, too, must be capable of indefinite subdivision to be able to accommodate itself to the innumerable varying grades of section of his rings.

When he comes to speak of the cause of Motion, the general cause thereof he makes to be God himself, who in the beginning created matter with motion and rest, and still by his ordinary concurrence preserves in that totality of matter exactly the same quantity of motion and of rest as he then placed in it. For, although in the separate parts of matter the quantity of motion changes, yet is the sum total the same fixed and determinate quantity. Proceeding to discuss particular laws of motion, he succeeds in giving a clear statement of what is called by Newton the first law of motion; but the erroneous and confused account he gives of other cases of motion are of interest only as showing that the human mind had not yet attained the kinematical and dynamical conceptions that the labors of his great

successor, Newton, were destined to develop into full clearness and precision.

According to Descartes, the distinction between fluid bodies and hard bodies is that the particles of fluid bodies are moving about in every direction, whereas the particles of hard bodies are at rest. It is because the particles of fluid bodies are in motion that they offer no resistance to pressure, while hard bodies offer resistance to subdivision simply because their particles are at rest. For, he argues, assuredly we can imagine no kind of glue which could hold more firmly together the particles of hard bodies than their own rest. For what could that glue be? Not a substance, because, since the particles are themselves substances, there is no reason they should be joined together by another substance rather than by themselves. There is also no mode different from rest, for no other mode can more oppose the motion which would separate the particles than their own rest. And, besides substances and their modes, we know of no other kind of things. He then, on his own principles, discusses the nature of fluid pressures and motions, and ends the second part of his principles by declaring that the principles laid down in it are sufficient to explain all natural phenomena, as will appear in the following books.

Having laid down the general principles of matter and motion—principles derived from the light of reason, not from the prejudices of the senses—he proceeds to apply them to the explanation of the phenomena of nature. But first he warns his readers against supposing that such finite beings as they are can understand the purposes of God in creation—an error they fall into whenever they say that all things were made by God on our account. In his description of the positions and relative sizes of the bodies that compose our system he places the Sun, which is far the largest, in a fixed position at the centre, where it shines by its own light, while the Moon and other planets, one of which and not by any means the largest is our earth, shine by light borrowed from him. Just as the Sun occupies the centre of a vast sphere in which are the planets only and no fixed stars, so the fixed stars, which are at an immeasurable distance from us, are, each of them, suns shining by their own light and occupying each the centre of a vast sphere of its own. As to the constitution of the Sun, it is a flame of fire

made of a highly mobile and fluid matter, that needs no aliment, because its material is not dissipated by the circumjacent matter, as are flames on this earth. Not only do the Sun and fixed stars consist of fluid matter, but all the heavens—he uses the word in the plural because each fixed star is the centre of its own heaven—all the heavens consist of fluid or liquid matter, are plena of fluid or liquid matter, each of which in its motion carries along with it all the bodies, however hard and solid, contained in it. Seeing, then, that our Earth is upheld by no pillars nor suspended by any ropes, but merely surrounded by the highly fluid material of the heaven in which it lies, we ought to think that it is at rest, and has no tendency to motion; nevertheless, we must not think that this fact is any obstacle to its being carried along by that heaven, and, while immovable itself, obeying its movements; even as a ship, impelled by no oars nor winds and bound by no anchors, is at rest in the midst of the sea, although, perchance, some vast body of its waters, gliding along in an unobserved current, may be carrying the ship along with it. In like manner all the other planets are at rest, each in its own region of the heaven, and all the variation of position which is observed in them is merely due to the fact that all the material of the heaven which contains them is in motion. And here Descartes reminds the reader that what he has just said about the earth and planets being at rest is entirely in accordance with, and follows from, his own definition of motion—namely, that it is the transference of one body from the neighborhood of the bodies which are in immediate contact with it and are regarded as at rest into the neighborhood of other bodies. With such a definition of motion it is easy to see how Descartes could uphold the earth's immobility.

Descartes' reasons for considering the Earth at rest are highly interesting. They show us how he succeeded in reconciling his science and his orthodoxy. Well may he pride himself when he compares his own skill in avoiding Copernicus's error of attributing motion to the earth with the clumsiness of Tycho Brahe, who verbally denied the earth's motion, but really attributed more movement to it than Copernicus himself. Had poor Galileo known of Descartes' definition of motion, he might have evaded the censures of the Church, defied the Inquisition, and yet held to his own views of the Solar System. Having thus removed every

scruple on the subject of the earth's motion, Descartes tells us that we should think that the whole material of the heaven wherein the planets abide is perpetually whirling round after the fashion of a vortex, with the Sun in the centre, and that the parts of the heavenly material nearer to the Sun move more rapidly than the more remote, and that all the Planets (one of which is the Earth) always abide within the same portion of the celestial material. In this way, without the aid of any machinery, may all their phenomena be most easily understood. For, just as when straws float on the surface of an eddy or whirlpool in a river, we see that they are carried along by it, and some even turn round their own centre, and that the nearer they are to the centre of the eddy, the quicker they complete a whole gyration, and that although their motions are always circular, yet they scarcely ever describe absolutely perfect circles, but deviate a little therefrom in length and breadth, so can we, without any difficulty, imagine all the same things concerning the Planets. And by this one thing are all their phenomena explained. Those planets that have satellites revolving round them he considers to occupy the centre of minor vortices contained in the greater vortex, whose centre is the Sun. Thus the Earth is the centre of a subordinate Vortex, which not only serves to carry the Moon round in her monthly course, but also carries round with it the earth in every twenty-four hours; and thus we see that, as in the case of the Earth's annual motion round the Sun, Descartes could maintain that the Earth was at rest, so, in spite of its daily revolution round its own axis, he can once more uphold the doctrine of its immobility.

As regards the Matter that fills the Universe, Descartes supposes that as originally created by God it consisted not of spherical parts, as with such a shape they could not have constituted a Plenum, but of parts with angles or corners. These parts, being in motion, were gradually ground into a spherical shape, and the corners thus rubbed off (like filings) form an exceedingly fine and subtle matter—Descartes' first element—which fills the interstices between the spherical portions, which are likewise very minute, and constitute his second element. There is besides a third kind of matter of parts more coarse and less fitted for motion. This is his third element. Of the first element are made the sun and the fixed

stars; of the second, the transparent substance of the skies; and the third is the material of opaque bodies, as the earth, planets, and comets. As the material Plenum gradually shapes itself into vortices, the first element collected at the centre of each vortex forming the sun and stars, the second element formed the great body of each vortex, surrounding the central element on every side, and, by the pressure caused by its centrifugal effort as it whirls round and round, it constitutes light. The planets are carried round the sun by the motion of his vortex, each planet being at such a distance from the sun as to be in a part of the vortex suitable to its solidity and mobility. The motions are prevented from being quite circular and regular by various causes; a vortex, for instance, may be pressed into an oval shape by contiguous vortices. Comets are free to glide out of one vortex into the next contiguous one, and thus to travel, in a winding course, from system to system, through the universe. Such is a brief sketch of Descartes' system of the Heavens. It is worked out in all its details in the third book of his "*Principia*," and it is impossible not to be struck by his extraordinary ingenuity in making it account for the very large number of phenomena to which he applies it in that book. Three phenomena, however, three laws of planetary motion, well known in Descartes' time, he does not account for, passes over in total silence, as though they were facts of no moment; and it was his neglect to account for these three laws that caused his "*Principia*" to be superseded by the "*Principia*" of his great successor Newton, who did account for them. The laws referred to are, of course, the celebrated ones discovered by Kepler: that the planetary orbits are ellipses with the Sun in a focus; that the areas described or swept out by lines drawn from the Sun to the planet are proportional to the times of describing them, and that the squares of the periodic times of the planetary revolutions round the Sun are as the cubes of their mean distances from him. These laws Descartes passes over in silence. It is impossible to suppose he had no knowledge of them. Kepler had published his discoveries as early as 1609. Descartes, moreover, shows his familiarity with the works of Tycho Brahe, who was Kepler's fellow-laborer at Prague. Whatever the cause of his neglecting to take these laws into account, that neglect ensured the rejection of his theory of the solar system, when Newton advanced his theory accounting

for them. Should, however, the law of gravitation ever be successfully explained by a system of stresses in an all-pervading fluid, Descartes' theory, though in a form much modified and altered, might again reign within the realm of Science.

A POPULAR STATEMENT OF IDEALISM.

BY WILLIAM M. SALTER.

I.

The object of this paper is not so much to prove idealism as to state it with a measure of clearness and consistency. If there is at times an undue positiveness of statement, let it not be charged to an intention of lording it over the reader, but simply to a desire to thoroughly enter into and speak from the intellectual standpoint under discussion. Further, the sciences of physics and physiology, ordinarily regarded as having a more or less materialistic tendency, are in truth, at the present time, rather inclining to play into the hands of the idealist.¹ We shall not, however, presuppose a technical knowledge of these sciences on the part of the reader, as we lay claim to no such knowledge for ourselves, and hence shall, from necessity as well as choice, abstain from any extended use of their technical phraseology. Without further preface, then, we may begin.

When the thorns of a rose-bush prick our finger, we have as a result a pretty recognizable feeling, called pain. It is a real sensation, and we may localize it in the finger, yet we do not attribute it to the thorns and say that it exists in them. We know very well that as our sensation it cannot exist apart from ourselves, and so we call it a subjective reality. Suppose, now, that we bend over to smell one of the roses on the bush; we are greeted with a new experience of a more agreeable character, viz., perfume. Is this perfume a reality outside of us, or a sensation of our own?

¹ W. K. Clifford even says that the "doctrine of Berkeley's has now been so far confirmed by the physiology of the senses that it is no longer a metaphysical speculation but a scientifically established fact." ("Right and Wrong.")

The idealist regards it as a sensation, and we may sometimes, especially in the case of strong odors, whether agreeable or disagreeable, feel quite distinctly that this is the case. If so, it exists just as the pain, and, though we may locate it in our nostrils, we may feel as little inclined to attribute it to the flower as the pain to the thorns. The rose produces in us this sensation, as the thorns that of pain. Professor Huxley, remarking upon the odor of the musk-plant, even says that "it is as absurd to suppose that muskiness is a quality inherent in one plant as it would be to imagine that pain is a quality inherent in another, because we feel pain when a thorn pricks the finger."¹ This is strong language, though it is possible to become so distinctly conscious that odors are our sensations or feelings as to have no hesitancy in subscribing to it. All depends here on each one's own consciousness, and this is not a thing to be created or changed by the mere assertion of another. Physiology, however, comes to the side of the idealist in the matter, not only by saying that the odor does not exist outside of us, but by attempting to show how it arises within us. It teaches not only that our nostrils are necessary that the sensation may arise, but that these nostrils, being lined with a delicate membrane, in which terminate very small nerve-fibres, having their other endings in the brain, the sensation of smell is ordinarily the result of the working of this entire apparatus. Some infinitesimal particles, being thrown off from the odorous substance, touch the membrane, the vibrations produced therein are communicated by the nerve-fibres to the brain, and there in some mysterious way the sensation of odor arises. The odor does not, strictly speaking, belong to our nostrils, or any part of the olfactory apparatus, any more than to the external object, but first comes to be in our mind. A sensation of odor may even arise without the presence or action of any external object whatever. If the appropriate changes take place in the nerve-fibres, and are communicated to the brain, the odor results as truly as if an external object were the cause of it. And we should be mistaken, not in saying that the odor exists, but only in supposing that it comes from without. For the localizing of the odor, as of the pain before spoken of, is an act of the mind. The pain is not *in* the finger, nor the odor now in the nos-

¹ "Science and Culture," p. 259

trils, but we *place* them in these parts of the body. Of themselves they have no position, and, indeed, if we had only such simple sensations, it is doubtful if we should have any notion of space whatever. But we may assign them their places so many times that the act of localizing becomes at last almost instantaneous, unconscious, or, what is the same, mechanical.

It does not require much imagination to suppose that bitter and sweet, and all kinds of tastes, may be similarly sensations, which are given to us by external objects, but, strictly speaking, are not their own properties, but their effects upon ourselves. On slight reflection, we may realize the same of heat and cold—viz., that they are our own feelings, linked indeed with various objects, but not intrinsic qualities of them. Heat is, according to the teaching of physics, a mode of motion; by this is not meant that heat *is* motion, but that, when motion is communicated to our own organism, it gives rise to the sensation of heat.

That sound may similarly be a sensation within us rather than a reality without, is probably harder for most of us to realize. The thunder rolls, we believe, whether we hear it or not. Yet physics teaches, and most educated men at the present time are trying to accustom themselves to the conception, that the only external things in this relation are the air and its vibrations, and that these, when reaching the ear, produce sound, but are themselves soundless. On occasion of a loud report of a cannon, we may be distinctly conscious of the vibrations of the air as such; indeed, the very house, or, if we are in the open air, the ground may shake with them. And after such an experience it cannot be difficult to distinguish between the vibrations and the sound, and to entertain the idea that the sound is only an effect upon ourselves. A person who becomes deaf may be aware of the vibrations in certain cases and yet *realize to himself* that, owing to certain physical defects, their ordinary results cannot follow in him.

Color, doubtless, seems like a still more inviolable possession of the outer world. Physics, however, treats it as it does sound. The waves of the supposed ethereal medium are, according to its teaching, the real objective counterparts of color, color itself being a sensation, which we transfer to the particular object from which the wave-motions are supposed to be reflected. We may indeed

conveniently speak of color and light, as of sound and heat, as existing outside of us in this or that portion of space, and there can be no objection to our doing so as long as we do not assume that our language is strictly accurate and scientific. But, in strictness, we can only say that color and light are our sensations, produced indeed by a combination of physical and physiological causes, but not themselves inhering in the external world. Physiology assures us of an optical apparatus, similar in the essential manner of its construction to the olfactory apparatus already described. Each mode of sensation is, in fact, similarly provided for. And color, being the result of the action of the apparatus, is no more in the retina, or the nerve, or the brain, than in the object itself. It arises on the completion of these mechanical processes in a manner that physiology confesses to be beyond its power of comprehension. And colors, as odors, may arise without the action of external objects if but the appropriate changes take place in the optical apparatus. Many of us have perhaps some time had that unfortunate experience known as "seeing stars," and yet this imaginary light, as we may term it, was as truly and really light as that of the actual stars in heaven. We should be mistaken only in supposing that the "imaginary" light came from heaven—that is, in localizing the sensation, not in recognizing its existence. This localizing is a matter of the judgment. Even if we say that color and light must exist somewhere (that is, that they necessarily imply the idea of space), their determinate place is not their own property, but is given them by the mind, though of this mental act we may cease to be distinctly conscious. And color-blindness, it may be added, does not mean that the color-blind individual sees what does not exist, but simply that the sensations of others, who make the majority, are not like his own. The practical uses of life lead us to call him mistaken in consequence, but, if the majority of human sensations should shift and become like his, those of us keeping our present sensations, and in the minority, would have to allow ourselves "mistaken." In itself, the light of a switch-lantern is neither green nor red; what it is in itself no one knows. But green and red are names for its effects on individuals, and may differ as individuals differ.

But most difficult of all to realize, or even, as it may at first seem, to think, is the notion that hardness and pressure are our

sensations rather than qualities of bodies in themselves. Is not the ground hard, we ask, when we stamp upon it, and the dictionary heavy when we try to lift it? Why, if solidity was but a sensation of his, could not the forlorn Hamlet have caused his "too, too solid flesh" to melt? But the real question with the idealist is simply, What is *meant* by hardness, pressure, and solidity? Color, no more than pain, is denied to exist, because its manner of existence is found to be subjective; nor is color any more than pain changeable at our will. That hardness, etc., exist, is beyond dispute; but what are we to understand by their existence? The only answer any one can make is that on stamping the ground the foot is resisted, and, on attempting to lift the dictionary, its pressure is experienced. That Hamlet's flesh was solid he knew by touching one part of it by means of another and experiencing their mutual resistance. And the idealist only conceives that he is making a more accurate statement of all this when he says that the ground and the dictionary and the flesh produce in us these feelings. In a word, hardness, etc., are sensations produced by objects, even as sound and color, and as such exist in us, though their causes may well be external to and independent of us. If the ground does not give me the feeling of hardness when I strike it, it boots little to call it hard;¹ if it should some time give me no such feeling, it would thereby cease not only to be hard, but to be the ground in any intelligible sense. Instances might be multiplied, only conspiring to show that hardness, etc., in objects really mean their capacity to produce such experiences in us—and yet I doubt not that, unless the reader already agrees with me, he will have to question himself and analyze his experience for some time

¹ It may be asked, when any object—*e. g.*, a ball—falls upon the ground, Does it not experience the hardness of the latter, and so may not hardness exist independently of ourselves? The answer is, Yes, if the ball is supposed to be a sentient thing. But, if not, our attributing to it an experience of hardness rests upon a harmless anthropomorphism, and, while allowable enough to popular speech, is destitute of any real warrant. Does not the ground resist the ball, then? All we can say is that, if we were in the place of the ball, *we* should experience resistance. Our sensible knowledge in the case amounts to simply this: that the ball ceases its downward motion (or, if you will, that its mass motion is to a certain extent turned into a motion of its molecules, which latter is again convertible into heat—all of which are assertions, it hardly needs be said, respecting actual or possible sensations). The hardness or resistance of any object means simply that, if we (sentient beings) touch it, we experience such sensations.

before he can agree. Proof is not only out of place, it is impossible in a matter where all depends upon immediate knowledge—that is, experience. The idealist can only say to another, This is my experience, and, if I cannot lead you by your own reflection to a similar understanding of your own, I will at least spare you “arguments” and “proofs,” which can be to no purpose.

Use may be made, however, of one further illustration, which may possibly be helpful: What do we mean by distinguishing between a ghost or phantom and a real body? The former may sometimes seem to have a shape and features, and even, as in the case of Protesiláus in Wordsworth’s noble poem of Laodamía, “roseate lips.” And how do we know it to be a phantom, as how did Laodamía know her blooming hero to be, after all, but a vain shadow, save by essaying to clasp it, and finding that it eludes our grasp; that, instead of real and unmistakable sensations of resistance, it gives us none at all.¹ Hence the poet calls Protesiláus an “unsubstantial² form.” A thing that resists us is *ipso facto* real. Even things that we cannot see, or smell, or taste, or have any sensible proof whatever of save of this single kind, viz., capacity to resist us, we know thereby to exist—for example, the air. Resistance is ordinarily called a primary quality of bodies, and, though our previous analysis will not allow us to make the ordinary distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of body (as if the former were in the object, the latter only in ourselves), yet there is a difference—viz., that resistance is a universal and unchanging quality of bodies (even the molecules and atoms being supposed to have this power, however inappreciable

¹ “Forth sprang the impassioned Queen her Lord to clasp;
Again that consummation she essayed;
But unsubstantial Form eludes her grasp
As often as that eager grasp was made.
The Phantom parts—but parts to reunite,
And reassume his place before her sight.”

Virgil’s lines are similarly suggestive:

“Frustra comprehensa manus effugit imago,
Par levibus ventis, volucrique simillima somno.”

² Substance has this primary sensible meaning, viz., that an object is not a mere empty form, but one that resists us when we attempt to pass through it. It would be well for those philosophers who make such an ambitious use of the term at least to remember this its primary significance. From what is demonstrable it has come to mean sometimes just what is indemonstrable.

to the senses), while color and other sensible qualities may change before our very eyes. A colorless body may at least with an effort be conceived, but a body that gave no resistance, and would give none even if our power of noting the same were increased *ad infinitum*, would not be a body at all, this term having no other intelligible meaning than that which gives resistance. Yet sensations, by being permanent and universal, do not lose their character as sensations and become separate realities. Another reason for calling resistance a primary quality is perhaps that resistance is a sensation of more vital importance for us to note than any other. For, if we experience it in too emphatic a manner, we are in danger of losing, for a time or permanently, the power of further sensation, while odors, sounds, or colors rarely bring after them so serious a consequence. It is, then, rational to give a higher rank to resistances than to other kinds of sensations, and the latter acquire serious import chiefly when from past association they lead us to suspect that resistances will follow after them, as when, for example, we hear at the foot of a mountain a rumbling and crackling noise and know that an avalanche is coming. It would be an interesting general inquiry how far such motives of practical convenience or necessity enter into the formation of not a few distinctions and conceptions in common use; yet the interest would be chiefly psychological, since distinctions and conceptions so formed can hardly be regarded as having real or philosophical validity.

But, to return, What is the residue of the external world left after the foregoing analysis? Apparently very little that we may properly call an external world. The common sense of men regards the fragrance of a flower as external in the same sense that its color and shape are. But our ungracious analysis has not only divested the flower of its fragrance, it has stripped it of its color and of every sensible quality it possesses.¹ What is left, then? Is

¹ Cf. Dr. William James: "To the naïve consciousness all these attributes [color, taste, smell, sonority, as well as hardness and pressure] are equally objective. To the critical, all are equally subjective." ("The Feeling of Effort.") A similar view is elaborated by Professor Huxley, in papers on Descartes and Bishop Berkeley. ("Lay-Sermons," p. 320 ff.; "Critiques and Addresses," p. 287 ff.) Herbert Spencer says: "Thus we are brought to the conclusion that what we are conscious of as properties of matter, even down to its weight and resistance, are but subjective affections produced by objective agencies that are unknown and unknowable." ("Psychology," vol. i, p. 206.)

it the form or shape? Now, the form is not indeed a sensation, but a boundary or limit of sensations (of color or resistance), discerned and marked out by the intellect. But what is a limit when that which is limited is taken away? If a form changes when its content changes—for example, in shifting clouds—does it not cease to be when the content ceases to be—for example, when the clouds vanish and leave a clear sky? Now, in the idealist's view, the material of the world does not indeed cease to be, but its manner of existence is found to be subjective. Plainly, then, the form cannot remain objective. Our common sense indeed asserts that a form which has no content is not a real form, but only an idea of our mind. A similar line of remark applies to the change and motion observed in and among sensible objects. If these objects are really resolvable into groups of sensations, their changes and the motion among them must be equally matters of sensation. For, apart from the objects of which they are predicable, what are change and motion but abstractions of the mind? Professor Huxley says: "All that we know about motion is that it is a name for certain changes in the relations of our visual, tactile, and muscular sensations."¹ Quite as little can the molecules and atoms, out of which the sensible world is supposed to be composed, serve as a truly objective residuum. For, though they may not be thought of as having the secondary qualities of matter, they are as having the primary ones of extension and resistance in however infinitesimal a degree. And even the conception (now gaining some currency) of the atom as a point without extension considers the point as a centre of force or resistance, and, if these are recognized as subjective sensations, the same difficulties present themselves in attempting to regard the point as something real and objective that we met with in trying to think of an empty form. In any case, the supposed molecules and atoms are not the causes of the sensible world, but this world itself stated in the simplest possible terms.² They would be discovered, if ever they could be, not in

¹ "Science and Culture," p. 279.

² Lange regards the atoms as phenomenal, the only difference from ordinary sensations being that the latter are immediate, the former vermittelte and gedachte. ("Gesch. des Materialismus," ii, 165.) Contrast Büchner, who regards the modern doctrine of atoms as an "Entdeckung der Naturforschung," while the ancient was a "willkürlich speculativa Vorstellung." (Lange, ii, 181.)

connection with efforts to verify an inference to somewhat out of the circle of our sensations, but by successively dividing and subdividing the contents of the sensations themselves, and reaching at last their irreducible elements.¹

Is there nothing real and objective left? So far as sensible phenomena are concerned, we must answer, Yes; the whole sensible (material) world is but an effect upon ourselves. But, because nothing sensible is left, it would be a hasty inference to say that nothing whatever is left. If we are asked, What?—we answer, All that causes the sensations. We have allowed and posited a cause for each species of sensation we have considered, and the only trouble has been that each conception of the cause, provisionally allowed, has turned out, on examination, to be itself an effect—*i. e.*, a sensation in us. We have, for example, regarded odor and other secondary qualities as coming from an extended body external to ourselves. But, on turning our attention to the extended body, we found that the element which makes it a body, *viz.*, its resistance, is a sensible experience of our own. Yet, apart from the resistance, there is but the empty extension or form, and this can hardly be called a cause, if indeed it can be said to exist, in any real and objective sense. Our search, then, for causes was unsuccessful. But, though we *know* of no causes, we have an inextinguishable faith that there *are* such causes, there being, in fact, no particular thing we are more sure of than that for every event (and every sensible phenomenon is an event, *viz.*, in ourselves) there is some kind of explanation or cause. It remains for us, then, in the absence of knowledge, only to think, or conjecture, or speculate, by which we mean, to form some kind of hypothesis, which we cannot hope to verify. An hypothesis as to the nature and order of sensible phenomena need not remain an hypothesis, since we can experience the phenomena with which it has to do, and test the hypothesis by its conformity to the same. But we have no experience of the causes themselves, and can have none, and so, though one opinion may seem to us more probable than another, and may even be practically settled and acted upon, it can never in the present state of human faculties take the rank of scientific knowledge. To recount the opinions of men on this subject would be

¹ Atom = particle of (vibrating) matter. Tyndall, "Frag. of Sc.," p. 431. So ether is matter, dense, elastic, etc. Ibid.

to write the history of metaphysics; and to examine them, with the aim of fixing upon some one as an opinion for ourselves, would be venturing on a solution of the metaphysical problem. The theist has one solution and the speculative materialist has another;¹ the agnostic, in the Kantian and Spencerian sense, is content simply with acknowledging the problem and asserting it to be beyond human power of solution. But it is no part of our present purpose to discuss these varying views. We wish in what follows simply to become a little more at home in the position respecting sensible phenomena, which has already been reached.²

The first difficulty which naturally arises in one's mind may seem to be a very radical one. It is, that to be consistent we must acknowledge our own body to be but a tissue of sensations, like any external object. Hence the various organs of sense, the nose, ear, eye, etc., the nerves connecting them with the brain, and the brain itself, are but groups of sensations, and as such exist only in our mind. And consistency does demand this. For though our attention was directed primarily to the external world, the same line of thought, a little more closely followed, manifestly conducts to the same conclusions respecting the nature of our own body. If the yellow of a pair of gloves I am wearing is my sensation, surely the simple flesh-color of my hands is no less my sensation. If the sound of the piano does not strictly inhere in the piano, but in myself, the same must be said of the sound of my own voice—viz., that it is not properly in my vocal organs, but in my mind. If the weight of the dictionary is really a sensation I experience, equally so is the weight of my own arm when I hold

¹ The question may be raised, Has there ever been such a materialist? For ordinary materialism does not hold to some supersensible matter and motion as an explanation of things, but to matter and motion as we know them and are in constant contact with them, though, it may be, reduced to their lowest terms, *e. g.*, molecules and atoms. If idealism is true, ordinary materialism is simply confusion of thought. Professor Huxley, however, suggests a genuine speculative materialism (*vide* his "Hume," p. 79); whether involving self-contradictions or not, we do not now undertake to say.

² The position might be called sensible or physical idealism, and is nowise inconsistent with, but rather implies, a supersensible or metaphysical realism. And such a union of idealism and realism is the view of Spencer, and was of Kant, and even Berkeley, absolute idealism taking a step farther and involving the causes of sensible phenomena in the same subjective relationships (whether in a human or an absolute subject) wherein we have found sensible phenomena themselves to be involved. The statement of absolute idealism, however, is made under correction.

it at right angles from my body. The hardness and resistance of my skull or of any bone in my body are sensations just as much as the hardness and resistance of the table or of the floor under my feet. And there is no reason why we should except the sensible qualities of the nose, eye, or ear, or of the nerves connecting them with the brain, or of the brain itself. The gray color of the matter of the brain can no more have existence outside some one's mind than any other color. The weight, texture, and outlines of the nerves are matters of sensation as much as those of the blades of grass out in the field. And of themselves, and out of relation to our mind, they are all equally mysterious. So considered, they are no longer nerves or blades of grass, but simply the unknown causes of these groups of sensible phenomena in us. But, in so saying, does not the idealist, it may be asked, cut the ground from under his own feet, since, in the previous analysis, he has been treating, after the manner of ordinary physiological teaching, the various organs of sense, the nerves and brain, as the very means by which we get sensations? The question is fair, and must be fairly met. And the idealist has a choice of only two alternatives: either to deny that we have any real sensations, the superstructure disappearing, as every superstructure must, with its groundwork; or to allow that the organs of sense, nerves, and brain are not such a means and groundwork, that the origin of sensations is not merely partially but totally inexplicable, and that all explanatory language, such as has been used, and physiologists generally are using, is but provisional, and, when assuming to give an anywise strict and scientific account of the matter, must be reprobated.

It is not possible to deny with any soberness that we have sensations, and so the latter alternative must be taken. The organs of sense and the nervous system cannot in any strictness be said to produce sensations, because they only exist as sensations. The mind cannot be really dependent on the bodily organization, because the bodily organization has no meaning save as a group of phenomena in and to the mind. All sensible phenomena, things as near as the beating of our hearts or the movement of the particles of our brain, and things as far as the shining of a star or the sweep of a system, are equally phenomena to us and in us, and have no meaning apart from us. However venturesome the ex-

pression may seem, idealism demands that we say that, instead of the world's containing us, we ourselves contain the world; that, however much meaning the word "outside" may have in reference to the body, it has none to the mind of man.

The idealist is aware that this seems to involve an altogether mysterious, if not unthinkable, notion of the mind. Ordinarily, the mind is regarded as existing within us, and the mind of another we not only connect with that assemblage of sensible qualities we call his body, but more definitely with the nervous system that is hid in it and has its head and centre in the brain. According to idealism, however, brain as well as body exists *in* the mind. What in the name of common sense, then, it may be asked, *is* this mind, and *where* is it? First let it be said, relapsing for the moment into ordinary habits of speech, that the assertion of the existence of the mind *in* the body or the brain is destitute of all experimental support. We do not find the mind, however diligently and minutely we may examine the body or the brain. The supposed existence of the brain itself at times when we do not see it, and all that physiology may tell us of its structure, may be verified; but no one has ever found a sensation or thought¹ in the brain, or has the slightest ground for hope that he ever will. The alternatives are, then, to deny or ignore the mind, or to allow that we are altogether off the track in making this kind of a search for it. The idealist takes the latter. What the significance of the ordinary view is, that the mind is connected with the brain, will be considered later; it suffices now to say that the idealist cannot allow that the mind is *in* or anywise *spatially* connected with the brain. But as to the question, *what* the mind is, the answer may be given, it is that which experiences sensations and thoughts; and to the other, *where* the mind is, it may be said, not that the question is unanswerable (as we might say in reply to a question as

¹ It is, perhaps, superfluous to remark that the "sensation or thought" of another than the one making the search is meant. Of course, the brain and its movements are the latter's sensations. The sensations of the other are, however, there only to his imagination. Conceivably, indeed, we may examine our own brain, and try to find the sensations that we may think are hidden somewhere in it. And lucky are we if, after some fruitless searching, the thought suddenly strikes us that we are *experiencing* the only sensations we can ever find, and that, being essentially subjective, it is vain and meaningless to seek for them where they do not exist. An explanation of the double use of sensation will be given later on.

to the origin of a mysterious noise in the night), nor that the mind is nowhere, but that the question has no meaning, or just as much meaning as one would have as to what the color of a certain pleasure is, or what the weight in pounds avoirdupois of a pang of regret. The conception of the mind, which Idealism necessitates, is indeed mysterious, but only as we try to range the mind along with the sensible phenomena which it takes cognizance of, and forget that it is not itself one of them, but that to which they all exist.

At least, however, it may be urged, the idealist must allow that his conception of the world makes *it* altogether illusory. If he saves the mind, he does so at the expense of all the objects to which the mind can direct itself. Now, the present writer cannot answer for all the theories that have passed under the name of Idealism. Some are doubtless hastily conceived, and, in truth, not so much interpretations of experience as departures from it and attempted flights in the air. The idealism here considered, however (which, but for the seeming presumption of the title, would be called "scientific idealism"), results simply from an analysis of what experience is. The very head and front of its offending, to the mind of the dogmatic realist, is that it so resolutely holds to the ground of experience, and refuses to give the name of reality to anything apart from experience (save, of course, the transcendental and unknown ground or cause of all experience). What is the meaning, then, in an assertion that such a world of experience is illusory? Illusory, in common speech, is something which does not correspond to real facts. But in this case what are the real facts with which we can contrast the world of experience? In the sense of facts separate from the mind, the idealist does not allow that we know of any such facts (the transcendental cause being left out of the account since we know nothing of it). All facts in his view *are* facts of mind, or mental experience, and he does not leave us so much reality in the separate sense as to constitute the possibility of an illusion. The semi-idealism somewhat current at the present day, which—while holding to the subjective nature of odors, sounds, colors, and other secondary qualities of bodies—asserts that matter, in its essential or primary qualities of extension, resistance, figure, motion, etc., exists quite apart from the mind, does make the secondary qualities illu-

sory, since we all suppose that these qualities belong to the external world as truly as any others. But a thorough-going idealism finds the primary or essential qualities of matter to be subjective in just the same sense that the secondary are. The whole material world is but an effect upon us; hence illusory is a word inapplicable to it. If we had no waking hours we should not call our dreams illusory; and it is but an affectation of knowledge to give the name of dreams to our daylight experiences. For who knows, or has reason for believing, that there *is* anything more real than these daylight experiences?

But if the world of the idealist may not properly be called illusory, does not another difficulty arise—viz., that all objects of consciousness are made equally real, and no possibility is left by which there can be any illusory objects at all? Yet that many objects of (supposed) human knowledge are fanciful, or imaginary, or illusory, is beyond question. How will the idealist explain this duality in consciousness, according to which there are real and unreal objects, save on the hypothesis of two orders of existence, one in the mind and the other out of the mind? The question is not really difficult to answer. The idealist cannot deny the duality or the existence of illusions; but, he says, it is not that we contrast our sensations with realities existing apart from the sensations, but our *thoughts or judgments* with our sensations. Illusoriness simply means, according to the idealist, that one state of mind does not correspond with another. Let us take an example. Suppose that I entertain the idea that I can suspend myself in the air, or at any rate that, like Darius Green, by attaching something like wings to my body, I can fly. Here is plainly one state of mind. And now, having mustered my courage and arrayed myself with the requisite paraphernalia, I make the experiment; but, owing to a lingering doubt of the result, not from a very great height. The consequence is that, after perhaps a flutter or two, I find myself on the ground, and, retaining my power of sensation, that I feel bruised, lame, and certainly well undeceived. This all makes up another state of mind, and plainly it does not correspond with the first. Why not, then, call the first an illusion? Indeed, the idealist may say that only in accordance with the requirements of his theory can any ideas or beliefs be proved to be illusory; for the only way is to experience some

sensation, or succession of sensations that contradict these ideas or beliefs.

The revealer and real enemy of illusions is not any objective reality outside and independent of us, but sensible experience itself. The distinctions of truth and error, fact and fiction, reality and illusion, have as much validity to the idealist as to any one; for we have not only sensations, but thoughts of them—thoughts of what they may be; and thoughts thus acquiring a kind of independence of the sensations, their truth and worth can only be tested by discovering whether they correspond to our sensations or are convertible into sensations. Illusoriness can, then, be only in our thoughts. It is meaningless to say that a pain I experience is illusory, and just as meaningless that any color, or sound, or resistance is illusory. Mistakes are always mistakes of the judgment in locating or interpreting the data of the senses, not in these data themselves. All sensations are subjective, yet they are all real. No one would care to know of anything much more real than an acute pain under which he is suffering. It is slight consolation to tell him his pain is *only* a sensation. So the idealist does not see why his world should be slightly spoken of as made up *only* of sensations; why the heat, light, color, beauty, movement of nature, should be ranked less highly because they are what we experience, and not something existing apart from our experience. But the notion of reality will engage us in what follows.

[Part II, on the Notion of Reality, will be given in the next number.]

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT.

BY T. B. VEBLEN.

The place of the Critique of Judgment in Kant's system of Philosophy is that of a mean between the two Critiques of the Pure and of the Practical Reason. A feeling of the lack of coherence between the other two critiques prompted him to the elaboration of this one, and the Doctrine of Method at the close of the

work is mainly a sketch of the way in which he conceived that the results of this Critique were to be made useful in the system of Philosophy to which he regarded all his critical work as preliminary. The outcome of the Critique of the Practical Reason is the notion of freedom in the person; the outcome of the Critique of Pure Reason is the notion of strict determinism, according to natural law, in the world. It will hardly do to say that the two are contradictory, for they are so thoroughly disparate that, taken by themselves only and placed in juxtaposition, they do not even contradict each other. It is well known that it was on account of this disparity of the two notions that Kant was able to hold to the reality of personal freedom at the same time that he held to the doctrine of unavoidable determination according to natural law. But while he found the disparity of the two indispensable in order to the reality of freedom, he also found that, in order to free activity, a mediation between the two was likewise indispensable.

The idea of freedom of moral action contains the requirement that the concepts of morality are to be actualized in the sphere of natural law. Without the possibility of realizing the concepts of morality in the realm of nature—without ability to affect events in the course of nature—morality would be only a fiction. The free person must be able to exert a causality on things, or else his freedom would be only an absurdity; but, even if it be granted that the person can and does come into the course of events as an efficient cause, that is not enough. Thus far the conclusions of the Critique of Practical Reason reach, but Kant was not satisfied with that. The action of the person must be capable of falling in with the line of activity of the causes among which it comes; otherwise it will act blindly and to no purpose. The agent must know what will be the effect of this or that action, if his activity is not to be nugatory, or worse than nugatory. And, in order to such a knowledge of the results of a contemplated action, the knowledge furnished by simple experience is not sufficient. Simple experience, whether we accept Kant's doctrine concerning the knowledge given by experience, as he has developed it in the Critique of Pure Reason, or not, cannot forecast the future. Experience can, at the best, give what is or what has been, but cannot say what is to be. It gives data only, and data never go into the

future unaided and of their own accord. Data do not tell what the effect of action will be, except as we are able to judge the future by the help of the data given. Judgment must come in, if experience is to be of any use, and morality anything more than a dream. The power of judgment, or of reasoning, must mediate between theoretical knowledge and moral action; and the kind of judgment that is required is inductive reasoning. All this is simple enough. It is so simple and is so obvious that it is difficult to see it until it has been pointed out, and after it has been pointed out it seems to have been unnecessary to speak of it. Though Kant, in giving his reasons for undertaking the Critique of Judgment, speaks mainly of the indispensableness of this power of inductive reasoning for the purposes of morality, it is evident that it is no less indispensable in every other part of practical life. To-day any attempt, in any science, which does not furnish us an induction, is counted good for nothing, and it is with this power of inductive reasoning that the most important part of the Critique of Judgment has to do.

In Kant's trichotomous scheme of the faculties and capacities of the intellect, the Power of Judgment lies in the middle, between the Understanding and the Reason, just as the faculty of pleasure and pain lies between the faculties of cognition and of desire, and affords a connection and mediation between the two. The Understanding has to do with cognition, and is *a priori* legislative for empirical knowledge; the pure Reason has to do with desire, and is *a priori* legislative for action; by analogy we should be able to say, at least provisionally, that the Power of Judgment has to do with the capacity of pleasure and pain, and legislates *a priori* concerning the adequate or subservient, the commensurate, appropriate, or adapted (*das Zweckmässige*).

The Power of Judgment is, in general, the power of thinking the particular under the universal. "If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then the judgment which subsumes the particular under it is *determinative* [Deductive reasoning]. But if only the particular is given, for which the judgment is to find a universal, then the judgment is only *reflective*" [Inductive reasoning]. (*Kr. d. Urtheilskraft*, ed. K. Kehrbach, 1878; *Einl.*, IV.) Inasmuch as this Critique is a critique of the *pure* Power of Judgment only—*i. e.*, of the Power of Judgment in so

far as none of the principles of its action are borrowed from elsewhere—it has to do only with the reflective judgment; for, in order that the judgment be determinative, the universal which is to serve it as a rule in the work of subsumption must be *given*, and so must be present as a premise, and will condition the action of the judgment working under it. The determinative judgment is simply the activity of the intellect in general in applying the laws given by Understanding and Reason, and, as such, its action has been analyzed in the two critiques which treat of those faculties. The determinative judgment, subsuming particular data under general laws which are also data, is nothing but the activity of the Understanding in combining simple experience into a synthetic whole, under those laws of the understanding which are a necessary condition of experience. Therefore the discussion of the determinative judgment belongs in the critique of the theoretical Reason. The reflective judgment passes beyond the simple data of experience and seeks a universal which is not given in empirical cognition; therefore it must proceed according to a principle not given to it from without. It has a power of self-direction, and therefore calls for a critique of its own.

This is the starting-point of the Critique of Judgment, and, if this had been borne in mind, it might have saved many of Kant's critics a good deal of mistaken criticism. As a rule, the criticisms offered on his doctrine of Teleology have gone to work as though his starting-point had been from the developed principle of Final Cause, and as though he had proceeded from that principle to the notion of adaptation, and thence to that of æsthetic appropriateness, which is precisely reversing the truth. They have taken up the Critique wrong end foremost, and it is no wonder that they have found fault with it. Kant's doctrine of Final Cause is arrived at from a consideration of the way in which the reflective judgment works; the nature of the reflective judgment is not deduced from a preconceived notion about finality.

The office of the reflective judgment is to find unity in multiplicity, or to give unity to multiplicity. Its action is not only synthetic, but it is to make a synthesis which shall reach beyond, and include more than what is given in simple experience. The problem of this Critique, as of the other two, is: How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible? but, while the faculties under con-

sideration in the other two Critiques have to do with laws unavoidably given and unavoidably applied to given data, the reflective judgment has to find the laws to be applied to given data. The reflective judgment is the faculty of search. It is the faculty of adding to our knowledge something which is not and cannot be given in experience. It is to reduce the manifold of nature, the various concepts we have of the things in the world, to a synthetic totality. It has to bring the facts given in experience under laws and principles, and to bring empirical concepts under higher concepts. Whatever is ascertained, and so becomes an item of knowledge, becomes therewith a point of departure for the reflective judgment. The reflective judgment is continually reaching over beyond the known, and grasping at that which cannot come within experience. Its object is a synthesis, a systematization of whatever is known; and, in order to the attainment of a system, its procedure must be governed by some principle. As the result aimed at lies beyond experience, the principle according to which it is to proceed cannot be given by experience. The principle is not taken from outside the power of judgment, for, if such were the case, the judgment working under that principle would be determinative and not reflective; therefore the principle according to which the reflective judgment proceeds must originate with the reflective judgment itself; or, in other words, it must be an *a priori* principle of the intellect, and must hold its place as a principle only in relation to the reflective judgment. It cannot be the same principle, in the same form, as any of the principles governing the other faculties.

The nature of this principle is to be found from a consideration of the work it is to do. The reflective judgment is to generalize, to reduce our knowledge to a system under more general laws than any given by experience. Its office is to systematize, and to systematize is but another expression for reducing things to intelligent order; that is, to think things as though they had been made according to the laws of an understanding, to think them as though made by an intelligent cause. But to think things in a system *as though* they were made by an intelligent cause is not the same as to think that they are made by such a cause. So much is not required by the principle. All that is required is that the things be thought as falling under a system of law accord

ing to which they adapt themselves to the laws of our understanding—that they are such in the manner of their being as they would be if they were made with a view to the exigencies of our capacity of knowing. The principle of the reflective judgment is, therefore, primarily the requirement of adaptation on the part of the object to the laws of the activity of our faculties of knowledge, or, briefly, adaptation to our faculties.

Now, whenever the intellect finds the objects of its knowledge to be such as to admit of the unhampered activity of the faculties employed about them, there results a gratification such as is always felt on the attainment of an end striven for. The more nearly the concept of the object known approaches to what such a concept might have been if it had been constructed simply under the guidance of the laws of the mind's own activity and without being in any way hindered or modified by external reality—that is, the more nearly the activity of the mind in thinking a given thought coincides with what would be the mind's activity if that activity were guided by its own intrinsic laws alone and were not influenced or hampered by the environment—the more fully will the requirements of the mind's activity be realized, and the more intense will be the gratification felt in contemplating the object of thought which so employs the mind. A feeling of gratification, or the contrary, accordingly, goes along with the activity of the reflective judgment as a sanction and a test of its normality.

What this feeling of gratification testifies to is, that the play of the faculties of the intellect is free, or but little hampered by the empirical element in its knowledge. It therefore indicates that the objects contemplated are, in the form in which they are present in thought, adapted to the faculties. This adaptation of knowledge to our faculties may take place in two different ways, or rather it may take place at two different stages in the elaboration of the material gained by experience. A simple datum may be given to the apprehension such as to conform to the normal action of our faculty of knowledge, and, by its so conforming, it shows adaptation to the faculties that are employed about it. In such a case, the concept which is contemplated and found adapted is not thereby an item of knowledge which goes to make up our conception of the world-system, or to make a part of any systematic or organized whole. As a datum of the apprehension, it is consid-

ered singly by itself only in relation to the apprehending subject, no thought being given to its making or not making an integral part of our knowledge of reality. In so far as concerns the adaptation conceived to belong to the concept, it is no matter whether any external reality corresponds to the concept or not; and, therefore, it makes no difference, as to the adaptation, whether the concept is derived from experience or is a pure figment. The adaptation belonging to such a concept, which is only a datum of the apprehension, is, therefore, subjective only. It is only a question of the conformation or nonconformation of a simple concept (*Vorstellung*) to the norms of the apprehension. The question is, how far the concept given is suited to the normal activity of the faculty of cognition; whatever may be the objective validity of the concept, that does not enter into consideration at all. This being the case, the only way to judge of the adaptation of such a concept is to take cognizance of the way in which the faculties act on occasion of it, and the test can only be whether the faculties act unhampered and satisfactorily; and the only indication of the normal activity of the faculties, again, is the resulting feeling of gratification or dissatisfaction. If the concept, simply as such, pleases, it is normal or adapted; if it displeases, it is not. The object corresponding to such a concept, which pleases in its simple apprehension, is said to be beautiful, and the reflective judgment, in so far as it proceeds on the simple adaptation of the data of apprehension to the faculties of cognition, is æsthetic judgment. It is of a purely subjective character, and its action is not based on logical, but wholly on pathological grounds. The decision of the æsthetic judgment is made on the ground of the feeling called forth by the apprehension of the concept, and the feeling is, therefore, in this case, the only authority that has a voice in the matter.

From these considerations it follows that there can be no objective principle of æsthetic judgment. The principle which governs taste must accordingly exert its authority, not through the means of logical argument and proof, but by an appeal to the nature of men in respect to reflective judgment in general. "The principle of taste is the subjective principle of the judgment in general" (*Kr. d. U.*, p. 148). The universal validity which a judgment in a matter of taste bespeaks can, therefore, rest only

on the assumption of an essential similarity of all men in respect to the feeling involved in such a judgment.

On the other hand, the data of cognition may also be contemplated, with reference to their adaptation, at the stage at which they are no longer simple data of apprehension, but constitute a part of our knowledge of reality. That is, they (the concepts) may be considered as making a part of our knowledge of nature, and, consequently, as entering into a system in which they must stand in relation to other data. Their adaptation will consequently here be found, if at all, in the logical relations of concepts—items of empirical knowledge or laws of nature—to one another, and the conformity of these relations to the normal activity of the faculties; not in the immediate adaptation of particular items or data of experience to be taken up by the faculties, as was the case in the æsthetic judgment. And since the faculties, in dealing with the relations of concepts as making up our knowledge of reality, have to do with the relations of real objects as known to us, the relations of the concepts, in which the adaptation is supposed to lie, are here conceived to be real relations of objects; the adaptation of these concepts, as standing in logical relations to one another, to the normal activity of the mind, therefore comes to be looked on as a quality of the objects contemplated. The objects are conceived to stand in such relations of dependence and interaction as correspond to the logical relations of the concepts we have of them. Now, as a matter of fact, the connection or relation of our concepts which will be found adapted to our faculties, and which answers the requirements of their normal action, is one according to which they make a systematic, connected whole. The relations of objects which shall correspond in the world of reality to this logical relation of our concepts are such relations of interaction and interdependence as will bind the particular things in the world of reality together into a whole, in which the existence of one thing is dependent on that of another, and in which no one thing can exist without mutually conditioning and being conditioned by every other. That is, the adaptation found, or sought to be found, in concepts when contemplated in their logical aspect, is conceived to be an adaptation of things to one another in such a way that each is at the same time the means and the end of the existence of every other.

Such a conception of the world of reality, in which things are united into an organized whole, can proceed only on the assumption that the particular things which go to make up the organic whole are subject to laws of a character similar to that of the logical laws according to which our mind subsumes the particular under the general, and holds together all the material gained by our cognition in a systematic totality of knowledge ; which is the same as saying that in such a conception is contained the idea that the world is made according to laws similar to the laws of our understanding, and therefore that it is made by an intelligent cause, and made with intention and purpose. To put the same thing in another way : To conceive the world in the way required by the reflective judgment is to conceive it as being made so as to harmonize with the laws of our understanding ; that is, in being made, it is adapted to our faculties, and therefore made by a cause working according to laws like those of our understanding, and with a view to the exigencies of our understanding in comprehending the world. The cause producing the world must therefore be conceived to have worked it out according to a preconceived notion of what it was to be, and the realization of the form in which the world so created actually exists, accordingly, has its ground in an idea conceived by the cause which created it. The idea of what the world was to be precedes and conditions the world as it actually comes into existence—which is precisely what we mean when we say that the world was created by final cause.

All this argument for a final cause in the world rests on the action of the reflective judgment, and its validity therefore extends only so far as the principle of the reflective judgment reaches. That principle is the requirement of adaptation, on the part of our knowledge, to the normal action of our faculties of knowing ; it is therefore of subjective validity only, and can say nothing as to the nature of external reality. The finality which is attributed to external reality, on the ground of the adaptation found by the reflective judgment, is simply and only an imputed finality, and the imputation of it to reality is based on the same ground of feeling as every other act of the reflective judgment. Our imputation of finality to the things of the world, and our teleological arguments for an intelligent cause of the world, proceed on subjective grounds entirely, and give no knowledge of objective fact, and furnish no

proof that is available for establishing even a probability in favor of what is claimed.

What is proved by the tenacity with which we cling to our teleological conception of the world is, that the constitution of our intellect demands this conception—that our faculties, in their normal action, must arrive at this before they can find any halting-place. The mind is not satisfied with its knowledge of a thing, or of any event or fact, until it is able to say, not only how the thing is, or how it came about, but also why it is as it is, and what was the purpose of its coming to pass. At least it must be able to assert, before it will rest from its search, that the thing or event has a purpose; the proposition may be put into this general form, and we may be obliged, oftentimes, to leave the matter in this state of generality; but we cannot believe, concerning anything, that there is no reason why it is, or why it is as it is. It is, of course, possible to give our attention to any item of knowledge—to employ ourselves about any object or any process or law in nature—without bringing in the notion of purpose; but our knowledge of it cannot be regarded as complete until we have asked the question why it is.

But though this question of teleology is of extreme importance, yet a knowledge of the teleological end of a given thing, or the purpose of an action or event as considered from the standpoint of the economy of the universe, is not absolutely necessary in order to human life, nor even in order to a high degree of development in moral life. In truth, a knowledge of ultimate particular ends and purposes is of no use whatever in the affairs of everyday life; and, therefore, the principle of teleology, as being the principle of conscious purpose in the world, is not indispensable in order to such knowledge of things as is required by the exigencies of life. The knowledge we need and use can be got, and got in sufficient completeness for all purposes of utility, without any appeal to, or any aid from, the developed principle of finality; and, if the exercise of the reflective judgment, in its logical application, consisted in the decision of teleological questions alone, its value would be small enough. Such, however, is not the case.

The principle of the logical use of the reflective judgment was found to be the general principle of adaptation; and since, in its logical use, the judgment has to do with reality, the principle

which shall govern the reflective judgment here will be that of objective adaptation; that is, adaptation which is *conceived* to belong to things objectively. The motive which leads to the application of this principle to our knowledge of things was found to be a feeling of dissatisfaction with our knowledge so long as it consists only in a chaotic manifold of concepts. We are dissatisfied with a conception of reality which makes it only a congeries of things, without connection, system, or order, beyond juxtaposition in space and succession and duration in time. Yet such a congeries is all that unaided experience can give; and the determinative (deductive) judgment can do little to bring further order into this chaos. It is true, we have the general law of cause and effect given, and it looks as though we ought to be able to establish some system by the aid of it, when experience gives us the data to which the law applies; but further thought will show that we should be as helpless with that law as without it if no further principle came in to guide us in the application of it. We should have the law which says: "Every change has a cause and an effect"; and all that the data of experience would enable us to say further would be, that this law in general applies to these data. The abstract law and the data, simply under the action of the determinative judgment, could never get so far as to afford us ground for asserting that a given effect has a given cause; still less, that a given cause will produce a given effect. The truth of this is shown by the nature of our knowledge of particular causes. We can never designate, with that certainty which belongs to every deliverance of the deductive judgment, what is the cause of any given effect. We may have no doubt as to what is the cause of a given effect; but still, if it should turn out that the effect under consideration has some other cause than the one we counted on, we should not, therefore, conclude that the world is out of joint. It is possible that we may be mistaken in our opinion as to particular cases of cause and effect—even the most certain of them—which would not be the case if we arrived at our knowledge of them by simple deductive reasoning from data of experience and an *a priori* law. There is always an element of probability, however slight, in our knowledge of particular causes; but simple experience—cognition—never has anything to say about probability; it only says what *is*, and leaves no room for doubt or probability.

In order to find what is the cause of a given effect, and, still more, what *will be* the effect of a given cause, we need a guiding principle beyond anything that experience gives. We have to go beyond what is given us, and so we need a principle of search. That is what is afforded by this principle of adaptation. The mind is unsatisfied with things until it can see how they belong together. The principle of adaptation says that the particular things do belong together, and sets the mind hunting to find out how. The principle of adaptation says that, in order to the normal action of the faculties, things must be conceived as adapted to one another so as to form a systematic totality—that things must be conceived to be so co-ordinated in their action as to make up an organized whole—and the mind goes to work to make its knowledge of reality conform to its own normal activity; or, in other words, to find what particular cases of interaction under the law of cause and effect will stand the test of the principle of adaptation. What the principle of adaptation does for us is, therefore, in the first place, that it makes us guess, and that it guides our guessing. If it were not that we are dissatisfied with our knowledge so long as it remains in the shape of a mere manifold, we should never seek to get beyond a congeries of things in time and space; and, if it were not that the principle of adaptation shows us what we are to seek further, we should never find anything further in our knowledge.

But the principle of adaptation cannot give us any new data, nor can it tell us anything new about the data we have. All it can do is to guide us in guessing about the given data, and then leave it to experience to credit or discredit our guesses. That is, it is a regulative, not a constitutive principle of knowledge, according to the distinction which Kant makes in his classification of *a priori* principles of the mind. Now, as has already been pointed out, the direction in which this principle will lead us is that of generalization, since no such principle is needed in order to deductive reasoning. In order to analyze the content of our empirical knowledge, there is no guessing necessary; all that is then required is that we take a more complete inventory of what we already know. The guessing, under the principle of adaptation, is in the direction of a higher systematization of what we know. The principle suggests that, in order to conform to the norms of

our faculties, things should fall into a system under laws of such or such a character; that they should stand in such or such relations of interaction and co-ordination; and that the laws which are given *a priori* as applying to things should apply to them in such or such a way; and so it leads to an hypothesis as to the nature of particular things and the laws of their connection. The principle guides us to an hypothesis, but it has nothing to say as to the validity of the hypothesis in the world of reality. It proceeds on the basis of a feeling, and so it can decide whether the hypothesis suits the mind, but not at all whether it applies to reality. Experience alone can say whether the hypothesis fits the things it is intended for; or, rather, it can say whether it appears to fit them, since, inasmuch as an hypothesis never can become an object of experience in the same sense as things are objects of experience, it can also not have that empirical certainty which belongs to our knowledge of individual things. The testimony of experience as to the validity of the hypothesis can only be of a cumulative character, and all it can do is to give it a greater or less degree of probability. It is of the nature of circumstantial evidence.

The principle of adaptation, in its logical use, is accordingly the principle of inductive reasoning. The need felt by the mind of bringing order and systematic coherence into the knowledge it acquires, and therefore of conceiving the things about which it is engaged as adapted to one another, affords, at the same time, the motive and the guiding principle for induction. The unrest felt on account of the inharmonious and forced activity of the faculties, when engaged about a mere manifold or a discordant miscellany, drives the mind to seek a concord for its own activities, and, consequently, a reconciliation of the conflicting elements of its knowledge. The reason for the unrest felt in contemplating external things simply as individual and unconnected things lies in the fact that the mind is adapted to conceive the subject-matter of its knowledge in the form of a connected whole. If the mind had not an inherent capacity for thinking things as connected into a totality, or at least as being connected in a systematic way and under definite laws, it could not feel the lack of totality in contemplating things under the mere form of juxtaposition in time and space. It would not be dissatisfied with things as mere data if it knew of nothing better; and it would not seek for anything

different if the conception of things, as a mere congeries, satisfied the requirements of its normal activity. But, the requirement of totality, of adaptation of part to part, being present, the mind has no alternative but to reflect and reflect on the material given it, and make the most it can out of it in the way of a systematic whole; and the requirement of adaptation points out the direction which its search must take. One consequence of this is that the search is never ended, as, from the nature of the case, the requirement can never be fulfilled. As soon as a result is obtained by the process of induction, that result becomes, for the purposes of the question in hand, a fact of empirical knowledge, and therefore acquires the character, not of a completed whole, but of an isolated and disconnected datum. As fast as one step of induction is completed it becomes a means to another step, which must inevitably follow it.

According to what has just been said, the motive and guiding principle of inductive reasoning, and, with it, of the teleological judgment, is the requirement of adaptation or totality in our knowledge. When we find this requirement answered, in greater or less degree, the consequence is more or less of a feeling of gratification, just as there is always a feeling of gratification on the successful completion of an undertaking, or the attainment of a desired end. This feeling of gratification may therefore be regarded as a sanction to the principle of the reflective judgment, and, in the last resort, it is this feeling of gratification alone which can decide whether the principle has been applied successfully in any given case.

Therefore, so far as concerns the distinctive characteristics of the reflective judgment—and, therefore, of inductive reasoning—it proceeds on subjective ground entirely. Its motive is subjective, and, though the evidence by which it seeks to establish the results aimed at is of empirical origin, yet the criterion, to which the result must conform in order to answer the purposes for which it is sought to be established, is subjective. The consequence of this subjectivity of the principle of induction is that the results it arrives at are only more or less probable. Yet, singular as it might seem, hardly any part of our knowledge except that got by induction is of any immediate use for practical purposes. For by induction alone can we reduce things to system and connection,

and so bring particular things and events under definite laws of interaction; therefore by induction alone can we get such knowledge as will enable us to forecast the future; and knowledge which shall help us to forecast the future—to tell what will take place under given circumstances and as the result of given actions—is the only knowledge which can serve as a guide in practical life, whether moral or otherwise.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

TRANSLATED FROM HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHIE DER RELIGION," BY F. L. SOLDAN.

II.

The Position of the Philosophy of Religion in regard to Philosophy and in regard to Religion.

1. THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION IN GENERAL.

From what we said above, namely, that philosophy makes religion the object of its contemplation, and from the further apparent fact that contemplation and the object of contemplation are two different things, it would seem as if our inquiry were still dealing with that relation in which the two sides are independent of each other and remain in separation. If this were the true relation, our contemplation would necessarily step out of the field of piety and enjoyment which religion forms, and contemplation, which is the movement of thought, would become as different [from religion] as, for instance, the diagram and figures in pure mathematics are from the spirit which contemplates them. But this is in its first appearance only of such relation, when cognition is still in a state of diremption with the religious side, and is finite cognition. If we examine this question more closely, we see that, as a matter of fact, philosophy has content, needs, and interests in common with religion.

The subject of religion as well as philosophy is the eternal truth in its objectivity, or God, nothing else but God, and God's explanation. Philosophy is not the wisdom of [this] world, but the

cognition of what is not of this world ; not the cognition of the external universe, of empirical existence and life, but the cognition of what is eternal, of God and whatever flows from his nature. For this nature must reveal and develop itself. The explication of philosophy involves, therefore, the explication of religion, and its own explication is also that of Religion. Philosophy, in its occupation with this eternal truth which is in and for itself, is the occupation of thinking spirit and not of caprice or of a special interest in this subject, and it is therefore identical in its activity with that of religion. The spirit, in its philosophical reasoning, enters upon this subject with as much energy, and renounces its particularity as fully, when it penetrates its object, as religious consciousness does, which will give up all particularity and forget itself in this content.

Thus religion and philosophy coalesce ; philosophy is really in itself a cult, or religion, for it is the renunciation of subjective notions and opinions in the occupation with God. Philosophy, therefore, is identical with religion, but with the distinction that it is so in a peculiar mode, different from that which we are accustomed to call religion proper. Their common characteristic is that each is religion, but they differ in regard to their mode and manner of being religion. They differ from each other in the mode of their occupation with God, and in this are found the difficulties which seem so insuperable that it is considered impossible to identify philosophy and religion. Hence the apprehensions of theology in regard to philosophy, and the hostile position of religion and philosophy. This Theology assumes that such a hostile position exists, and, when it looks upon it from the standpoint thus assumed, philosophy seems to have a corrupting, destructive, and desecrating influence on the content of religion, and its occupation with God seems to be altogether different from religion. This is the old contrast and contradiction, which we find first among the Greeks ; with the Athenians, this free democratic people, writings were burned and Socrates condemned to death. In our times such contrast is generally admitted to exist, and finds more credence than the Unity of religion and philosophy which we have just asserted.

And yet, old as this contrast is, the connection between philosophy and religion is just as old. Even to the Neo-Pythagoreans

and Neo-Platonists, standing as they do within the pagan world, the Gods of the people were no longer the Gods of phantasy, but they had become to them Gods of thought. Such connection is found also with the principal Fathers of the Church, who were essentially philosophical in their religious attitude, for their fundamental principle was that theology is religion as it appears to thinking, philosophical consciousness. To their philosophical culture the Church owes the first beginnings of a content of Christian doctrine.

This union of religion and philosophy was still more thoroughly carried out during the middle ages. There was so little fear that any injury could come to faith through philosophical cognition, that the latter was considered essential for the development of faith itself. Those great men, Anselmus and Abelard, worked at the further development of the determinations of faith from the standpoint of philosophy.

Cognition, when it reared its own world, distinct from that of religion, had mastered the finite content only; but, when it developed into true philosophy, its content became the same as that of religion.

If we inquire into the difference between religion and philosophy, as it shows itself in this unity of content, we find it to be as follows:

a. Speculative philosophy is the consciousness of the idea [German: *Idee*], so that everything is conceived as idea; the idea, however, is the True in [the form of] thought, and not as mere precept or image-concept (*Vorstellung*). The True in [the form of] thought may be explained, more particularly speaking, as that which is concrete, which is posited as dirempted in itself in such a mode that the two sides of the diremption are contrasting categories of thinking (*Denkbestimmungen*), whose unity the idea is conceived to be. To think speculatively means to analyze a reality so that the differences, as determinations or categories of thought, are contrasts, and that the object is conceived as the unity of the two. Our perception looks upon the object as a whole, our reflection distinguishes and conceives [the existence of] various sides; it cognizes manifold elements in them, and severs them. Reflection, in considering these differences, does not bear in mind their unity; at one time it forgets the whole, at another the differences [or

parts], and when it has both in mind it separates the object from its qualities, and represents both in such a way that that in which the two coalesce becomes a third something, which is different from the object and its qualities. Such a relation may exist in mechanical objects which belong to externality altogether, for with them the object is but the dead substratum of the differences, and the quality of being One is the collection of external aggregates. In the true object, however, which is not an aggregate, not a merely externally joined plurality, the object is one with the distinguished determinations, and it is speculation alone which conceives unity in the contrast itself as such. It is the general business of speculation ever to grasp all the objects of pure thought, of nature, and of spirit in the form of thought, and thus to conceive them as the unity of the difference.

b. Religion itself is the standpoint of the consciousness of the True which is in and for itself; it is therefore that phase of spirit in which consciousness has for its subject the speculative content in general. Religion is not the consciousness of this or that truth in individual objects, but of the absolutely true, of the True as Universal, as All-comprehending truth beyond which nothing else exists. The content of its consciousness is, in the next place, the universally true which is in and for itself, which is self-determined, and not determined from the outside. While the finite depends on something else for its determinations, the True has its determination, its limit, its aim, within itself; it is not limited by another, but the other lies within it. This is the speculative principle of which we become conscious in religion. There is, indeed, truth in every other sphere as well, but not the highest, absolute truth, for this exists only in perfect universality of determination and in that which is determined in and for itself. To be determined in and for itself is not simple determinateness, which exists in regard to another thing, but that which contains the other, the difference, within itself.

c. Religion contains this speculative principle as a state of consciousness, as it were, whose sides are not simple determinations [or categories] of thinking, but are filled with concrete content. These phases can be no other than the phase of thinking, active universality, activity of thinking, and reality as immediate, particular self-consciousness. While in philosophy, on the one hand, the

rigidity of these two sides vanishes through a conciliation by thinking—for both sides are thoughts, and it is not true that one only is pure universal thinking and the other empirical, individual [in] character,—religion, on the other hand, can attain the enjoyment of unity only through lifting these two hard extremes out of their diremption, and by elaborating and uniting them. For the reason that religion divests its extremes of the form of diremption, dissolving the contrast through the element of universality, it remains akin to thought in form and movement even, and philosophy, as the ever active thinking through which contrasts are united, stands in the closest relation to it.

The thinking contemplation of religion has transformed its particular phases into thought, and the question arises, as to the general relation in which this thinking contemplation of religion holds as a department of the system of philosophy.

2. RELATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION TO THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

a. In philosophy the highest [principle] is called the absolute, the idea; it is superfluous to trace this [doctrine] back, and to show how in the Wolfian philosophy this highest [principle] was called *ENS*, Thing; for the latter term proclaims itself as an abstraction which is not sufficiently adequate to our idea of God. The absolute in more recent philosophy is not an abstraction to the same extent, but, for all that, it has not yet the same signification as our term, God. In order to show the difference fully, we must first consider what “Signification” itself signifies. When we ask what is the signification of this or that [expression], we ask for two, and, moreover, two opposite things.

In the first place, we ask for what we call the meaning, the purpose, the general thought of such or such an expression, or work of art, etc. [In this sense] we ask for the inherent [meaning], and what we try to conceive is the thought. If we ask in this sense: What is God? what signifies the expression, “God”? we want the thought—although we may, possibly, already possess an image-concept (*Vorstellung*). It means, therefore, that the logical idea is to be stated, and the logical idea is therefore the signification. What we want is the absolute, God’s nature expressed in thought, a logical knowledge of him. This is one signification of the

“signification,” and in this respect that which we call the absolute signifies the same as the expression, God.

b. But the question is asked, also, in a second sense, which calls for the opposite. If we begin with the pure logical definitions and not with the image-concept (*Vorstellung*), it may happen that the spirit neither finds satisfaction in it, nor feels at home there, and will ask for the signification of this purely logical definition. Thus we have, for instance, the definition of [God, as] the unity of the subjective and the objective, or the unity of the real and ideal. One might understand every part of this definition by itself, and know very well what unity, subjective, objective, etc., mean, but, nevertheless, confess that he does not understand this definition. When we ask the question in this sense, the signification is the opposite from that mentioned before. What is asked for now is an image-concept corresponding to the logical definition, an example of the content which was given in the form of thought only. If we find the content of a thought difficult, the difficulty lies in the circumstance that we possess no image-conception of it. Through an example the signification is explained, and thus alone the spirit sees itself in this content.

In case we begin with the image-concept of God, the philosophy of religion must consider the signification of this concept, namely, that God is the Idea, the Absolute, the Being comprehended in thought and idea, and philosophy of religion has this in common with logical philosophy. The logical idea is God as he is in himself [or *in potentia*]. But it is God's essence that he is not merely *in* himself [or potentially]; he is just as essentially *for* himself [or actually]. He is the absolute spirit who does not contain himself in thought, but gives to himself phenomenality and objectivity.

c. In thus considering in the philosophy of religion the Idea of God, the mode, also, of his image-conception is placed before us: he is conceived by himself only. This is the absolute on the side of its existence in time and space [*Dasein*]. In the philosophy of religion we have thus the absolute for our subject, but not merely in the form of thought, but also in the form of its manifestations. The universal idea is, therefore, to be understood in the purely and simply concrete signification of being on one side, essence in general (*Wesentlichkeit überhaupt*), and, on the other, in its activity of positing itself externally, of becoming a phenomenon, of

revealing itself. It is a common saying that God is the Lord of the world of nature and of spirits; that he is the absolute harmony of the two, and that which produces and sustains this harmony. In these expressions neither the thought, nor the concept, nor its existence in time and space (*Dasein*), its manifestation, is wanting. But, since this is a philosophical inquiry, the side of existence in time and space (*Dasein*) itself must be comprehended in the form of thought.

Thus, philosophy considers the absolute, in the first place, as the logical idea, as the idea as it exists in thought, whose content is formed by the determinations and definitions of thought. Philosophy shows the absolute in its activity also, in its creations; this is the process of the absolute itself, namely, to become Being for itself, to become spirit. God is thus the result of philosophy, but a result known not simply as result, but as producing itself and being its own presupposition. The one-sidedness of the result is annulled in the result itself.

Nature, finite spirit, the world of consciousness, of intelligence and will, are incarnations of the divine idea, but they are distinct forms or special modes in which the idea appears, forms which are not yet so permeated with the idea, that the idea is in itself in being in them, and exists as absolute spirit.

In the philosophy of religion we consider the potential (*die an sich seyende*) logical idea not merely as determined as pure thought, nor simply in its finite determinations where it is in some finite mode of its phenomenality, but rather as it is in itself [or potentially] in thought, and also how it becomes a phenomenon, how it manifests itself. Such phenomenality or manifestation, however, is an infinite one, for it is that of spirit reflecting itself within itself. Spirit which does not become manifest, or phenomenal, does not exist. In this determination of phenomenality there is contained the finite phenomenon also—that is, the world of nature and the world of finite spirit—but spirit is the [creative] force underlying the latter, which produces them from itself, and itself from them.

This is the position which the philosophy of religion occupies in regard to the other departments of philosophy. God, in the other departments, is a result, but here this end is made the beginning, and forms our special subject. It is considered as the purely and simply concrete idea with its infinite phenomenality—

and this determination concerns the *content* of the philosophy of religion. This content we consider with thinking reason; this regards the *form*, and leads us to [the consideration of] the position of the philosophy of religion in regard to positive religion.

3. RELATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION TO POSITIVE
RELIGION.

It is a well-known fact that the faith of the Church, and more particularly of the Protestant Church, has been fixed in the form of a dogma. This content has generally passed for truth, and, as a definition of the nature of God and of man's relation to God, it has been called a creed, which means, in a subjective sense, that which is believed, and, in an objective sense, that which should be recognized in the Christian Church as the content [of religion], and which is the mode in which God has revealed himself. As a common, definite dogma, this content is embodied partly in the apostolic symbol, and partly in the later symbolic books. In the Protestant Church the custom prevails to regard the Bible as the essential basis of the Dogma.

a. In the cognition and definition of the doctrinal content, reason forms an element of the argument. At the beginning of this course the doctrinal content of the Bible was still made the positive basis of the argument, and thinking was to be merely the exegesis which collects the thoughts of the Bible. But, as a matter of fact, the understanding had previously and independently fixed its views and thoughts before it began to inquire how the words of the Scripture might be explained in accordance therewith. The words of the Bible form a presentation which is not systematic. They are Christianity as it appeared at the beginning; spirit alone comprehends the content and explains it. Through the fact that the exegesis calls in Reason as adviser, it has come to pass that the so-called rationalistic theology has sprung up, which has put itself in contrast to that Dogma of the Church, or that the latter places itself in contrast with it. In this process the exegesis takes the written Word, interprets it, and pretends to aim at nothing but to bring to light the true spirit of the word and to adhere to it faithfully.

But, no matter whether the Bible is adopted for the basis merely as a matter of courtesy, or whether it is so adopted in good faith,

the nature of all interpreting explanation requires that thought must have its share in it. Thought contains inherent in it definitions, principles, and presuppositions, which come into play in the work of interpretation. If interpretation is not merely verbal explanation, but an explanation of the meaning, it must carry its own thoughts into the word which is its basis. Mere word-interpretation can do no more than to substitute one word for another of the same scope. In an explanation, however, further logical reflections [Gedankenbestimmungen] are connected with it; for explication means the evolution of further thoughts. Apparently we still adhere to the meaning, but, in fact, we develop further thoughts. The commentaries on the Bible are not simply guides which introduce us to a knowledge of the content of the Scriptures, but rather present to us the mode of thought of their own time. The intention is, to state the meaning of the word; but a statement of the meaning implies that the latter be drawn forth into consciousness, into conception, and [therefore] the conception, which has categories of its own, becomes a factor in the exposition of thought, which is represented as being simply the meaning. Even in the exposition of such fully developed philosophic systems, as, for instance, that of Plato or Aristotle, the various presentations and expositions differ according to the peculiarly constituted conception of every expounder that undertakes it. Theology has proved exegetically the most contrary opinions out of Scripture, and thus this so-called Sacred Writ has been treated like a nose of wax. There is no heresy which has not appealed to Scripture in the same way as the Church itself.

b. Rationalistic theology, which thus originated, did not confine itself to exegesis on the basis of the Bible, but, proceeding to free cognition, it assumed a certain relation to religion and its content. In this more general relation the process and the result can be no other than that cognition takes possession of whatever is fixed and given in religion. The doctrine of God thus branches out into definitions, qualities, and actions of God. Cognition seizes this definite content and claims it as its own. In its finite mode it conceives, on the one hand, the infinite as something which possesses limitations (als ein Bestimmtes) as abstract infinity, and thereupon, on the other hand, it finds that all special qualities are inadequate to the infinite. Thus by its own mode it annihilates the religious

content and completely impoverishes the absolute object. This mode of cognition knows very well that the finitude of limitation which it has drawn into its circle points toward a world beyond, but it conceives the latter in a finite manner as an abstract highest being to which no character whatever is attributed. Rationalism (*Aufklärung*)—for so is the system of cognition just described called—imagines that it places God very high when it calls him the infinite for which all predicates are inadequate and unjustifiable anthropomorphisms, but, in reality, while conceiving God as the highest being, it has made this idea hollow, void, and poor.

c. If it should seem as if the philosophy of religion stood on the same basis with the theology of rationalism, and is therefore in the same contrast with the content of religion, this is a delusion which will disappear soon, from the following considerations :

1. By that rationalistic consideration of religion (which is identical with the abstract metaphysics of the understanding) God was conceived as an abstraction which is empty ideality and to which finitude forms an external contrast. From this standpoint morality, as a special science, is the doctrine of what belongs to the side of the real subject in regard to action and conduct. The other side, that of the relation of man to God, was distinct and separate by itself. Thinking reason, however, which does not stand in the attitude of abstraction, but starts from man's belief in the dignity of his spirit, and, deriving its impulse from the courage which truth and freedom give it, conceives truth as something concrete, as fulness of content, as ideality in which limitation or finitude is contained as a phase. God, according to this view, is not empty [abstraction], but spirit, and this definition of spirit not a mere word, but it sees the development of the nature of spirit in its cognition of God as triune. Thus God is conceived as making himself his own object—in which distinction the object remains identical with God, and God loves himself in the object. Without this definition of the trinity, God could not be spirit, and spirit would be an empty word. But when God is conceived as spirit, this conception includes the subjective side, or it itself develops into it, and the philosophy of religion [therefore] is a thinking contemplation of religion which encompasses the whole definite content of religion.

2. As far as that form of contemplation is concerned which

confines itself to the words of the Holy Writ, and maintains that it explains the same through reason, it, too, occupies apparently only the same basis as the philosophy of religion. For that mode of contemplation makes its own arguments arbitrarily the basis of Christian doctrine, and, while it allows the words of the Bible to stand, it makes its own particular opinion the principle to which the presupposed biblical truth must subordinate itself. This mode of reasoning retains thus its own presupposition, and moves within the limits of reflecting understanding without subjecting the latter to criticism. The philosophy of religion, as cognition through reason, forms a contrast to the arbitrariness of this mode of reasoning; it is the reason of the universal, striving for unity.

Philosophy is so far from walking on the common high-road of thought of that rationalistic theology, and from this exegetical mode of reasoning, that it finds itself most exposed to their warfare and calumnies. They protest against philosophy for the sole purpose of reserving for themselves the right of their own arbitrary reasoning. They call philosophy a specialty (*etwas particulars*), whereas it is naught but rational and truly universal thinking. To them philosophy appears like a ghost, a spook, of which no one knows exactly what it is—something alarming; but in this estimate [of philosophy] they only show that they find it more convenient to remain on the standpoint of their own fantastic, arbitrary reflections, which philosophy cannot look upon as theology. Those theologians whose arguments move within the limits of the exegesis and who appeal to the Bible for every one of their wild notions, and who deny to philosophy the possibility of cognition, have carried things so far, and have lowered the respect for the Bible so much, that, if their views were correct, and no cognition of the nature of God were possible from a proper explanation of the Bible, spirit would be compelled to look for another source to gain full truth.

3. Philosophy cannot stand in a contrast to positive religion and to the doctrine of the Church, which has preserved its positive content, in the manner in which this is done by the metaphysics of the understanding and rationalizing exegesis. It will be shown, on the contrary, that its kinship to the positive doctrine is infinitely greater than appears at a first glance, and that the rehabilitation of the dogma of the Church, after it had been reduced

by the understanding to a minimum, is so largely the work of philosophy that, for this very reason—which is its true content—it has been decried as an obscuration of spirit¹ by a rationalistic theology which does not rise above the limits of the understanding.

The fears of the understanding and its hatred against philosophy originate in the apprehension with which it sees philosophy reducing the reflections of the understanding to their [true] basis; that is to say, to an affirmative principle on which the understanding becomes shipwrecked, while philosophy finds [there] a content and a cognition of the nature of God after all content had seemed cancelled and annulled. A content of any kind appears to that negative view an adumbration or obscuration of spirit, although its very object is to remain in the night which it calls rationalism, and to which indeed every ray of the light of cognition must appear hostile.

It may suffice here to say, in regard to the supposed contrast of the philosophy of religion with positive religion, that there cannot be two kinds of reason and two kinds of spirit, not a divine reason and a human reason, not a divine spirit and a human one, absolutely different from each other. Human reason, or the consciousness of its essence, is reason in general; it is the divine principle in man. Spirit, in so far as it is the spirit of God, is not a spirit beyond the stars, beyond the world; God is present, is omnipresent, and, as spirit, he is in every spirit. God is a living God, and is all energy and action. Religion is a creation of divine spirit, not an invention of man, but the work of the divine activity and creativeness in him. The expression that God as reason rules the world would be senseless if we did not assume that it refers to religion, and that the divine spirit is active in the determination and formation of it. The perfection of reason through thinking does not stand in any contrast to this spirit, and, therefore, it cannot absolutely differ from the work which spirit has produced in religion. The more man, in his rational thinking, allows the object itself to fill his mind

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—Hegel's argument is based on the relative position which he assigns to understanding and reason, the former being the faculty which conceives the finite and its relations, while the latter conceives the infinite. Any attempt, therefore, to apply to the infinite and divine the reasoning process of the methods of the understanding, Hegel considers futile and fraught with inevitable error. Hegel's view reminds us of Dante's "Reason, when following the footsteps of the senses, has short wings."

freely, the more he renounces his particularity and tries to reason from the standpoint of universal consciousness; and the more his reason refrains from seeking its own in the sense of a particular, the less will it be liable to descend to that contrast. For the object is reason itself, spirit, divine spirit.

The Church or the theologians may refuse this succor or take offence at seeing their doctrine stated in terms of reason; they may even reject with haughty irony the endeavors of philosophy—although these are not only not hostile to religion, but rather aim at fathoming its truth—and make merry about the “fabricated” truth. But this disdain is to no avail, and becomes idle vanity after the need of cognition and its contrast to religion has once arisen. Judgment has its rights which cannot be withheld in any manner, and the triumph of cognition is the reconciliation of the contrast.

Although philosophy, as philosophy of religion, is so very different from the rationalistic views—which in their heart are hostile to religion—and is by no means the spectre which it has been represented usually, we see, nevertheless, even to-day, that the most rigid contrast between philosophy and religion is made the shibboleth of the times. All the principles of religious consciousness which have sprung up in the present time—no matter how their forms differ among themselves—agree in this one point: that they wage war against philosophy, and that they try to make it refrain at any rate from concerning itself with religion. It therefore becomes our business to consider the relation in which philosophy stands to these principles of our times. Such an investigation seems all the more auspicious, as we shall see that, in spite of that hostility to philosophy, in spite of enemies in many directions or in each and every direction of the consciousness of the present day, the time has come when philosophy may take religion for the subject of its investigation without prejudice or favor, and in a happy and profitable manner. For its opponents are those forms of divided consciousness which we have considered above. These rest either on the standpoint of the metaphysics of the understanding—for which God is [an] empty [idea] of which the content has disappeared—or on the standpoint of feeling which, after the loss of the absolute content, has retired into its empty inwardness, but which agrees with that metaphysics in the result, that every definition or predication is inadequate to the eternal content

—which they treat as an abstraction. We shall even see that there is nothing in the assertions of the opponents of philosophy but what philosophy itself contains as its principle and as the basis of its principle. This contradiction—that the opponents of philosophy are also the opponents of religion whom philosophy has conquered, and that they nevertheless possess in their reflections the principle of philosophic cognition—finds its explanation in the fact that they are the historical element out of which the perfect philosophical thinking has developed itself.

BRADLEY'S "PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC."¹

BY S. W. DYDE.

The question as to whether Logic has anything to do with Metaphysic, at one time either wholly or partially ignored, admits now of only one answer. It has come to be understood that Metaphysic bears a relation to Logic similar to the relation between the trunk of a tree and some of the branches. Not only in Logic, but also in Ethics, is this relation now admitted to hold good. Because of this, Green, in his latest work, "*Prolegomena to Ethics*," saw the necessity of making plain, first of all, his metaphysical basis. Those who discuss logical or ethical questions, either explicitly or implicitly, make use of metaphysical principles. Inasmuch as, however, one may attempt to ignore the fact that his ethical or logical system depends upon a metaphysical position, it is better to preface any announcement of such a system by stating, as clearly as possible, the principles intended to be used. Those who have not done so have been prevented by different motives. Some have a horror for the seeming endlessness of Metaphysic, and so think the best course to pursue is to have nothing whatever to do with it. Some may have thought that their principles would of themselves become apparent in the progress of their work. But the main reason, no doubt, is that this

¹ "*The Principles of Logic*." By F. H. Bradley, LL. D., Glasgow, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. London: Kegan Paul, French & Co., 1 Paternoster Square, 1883.

method, which is plainly the most intelligible, is at the same time the most difficult. It must presuppose that the writer has thought out satisfactorily to himself the vital connection between Logic and its principles, and that he can show what in Logic has been a natural growth, and what an unnatural excrescence, what is native and what foreign. The difficulty of this plan is that it is directly contrary to the method in vogue. Logic and Metaphysic have been until lately almost diametrically opposed. At times, however, one writer has shown one point of connection, and another another. It seems a much easier course in consequence, following in the well-worn ruts, first to state the connections already proved, and then, by a critical examination of the rest, to discover negatively what should be set aside as useless, and positively what further connections may thus have been established. But that still leaves, as it must in any case, the whole question at the mercy of the author's own philosophical opinions. So that, whatever plan may be followed, a concise account of first principles is loudly demanded, and the demand is undoubtedly rational.

Bradley, though not expressly setting aside one portion of his work as a prolegomena, has nevertheless been at considerable pains to state what philosophy seems indispensable to a proper understanding of the subject. He is driven by the mere press of the discussion to declare his views regarding the relation between intelligence and nature, mind and matter. But his statements are far from satisfactory. Not, indeed, until he has, to use his own language, almost accomplished his voyage does he lay bare his inmost thought. The consequence is that his readers feel that he should have begun just where he ended. His foundation so ill accords with much of his superstructure that he impresses us with the conviction that he has labored in vain. He takes too much the attitude of one who has built a castle, and, after leading the spectators to believe it is made of marble, reveals that it is but a house of cards. Apart from that, much that he has written is exceedingly suggestive, and will prove, even when he is considered to be in error, a stimulant to thought. His work will repay a careful examination.

Before proceeding to take up in detail "The Principles of Logic," I will endeavor to state the principles which should guide us in our criticism. These principles will serve at once for a po-

sition by which to test the correctness or otherwise of a particular theory, and also, because of that, for a basis upon which must be built any system that will endure. In order to accomplish this purpose, a discussion of that proposition which Bradley announces last will be our point of departure.

First of all it must be made particularly prominent that no treatment of the principles of Logic is worthy of consideration that does not attempt to explain the connection between consciousness on the one hand and the world on the other. The failure to recognize the urgency of this need has led to the tremendous amount of almost useless writing commonly known as Formal Logic. This science, divorcing at the outset mind and nature, has proceeded in all seriousness to give an account of the laws, rules, regulations, methods, etc., which govern an abstraction; the mass of rules that have been heaped up are worth little more than waste paper. Only so far as they have ignored their first position, and considered thought not as unrelated but as in essential relation to reality, have they produced lasting results. Only so far as they have been untrue to their principles have they realized truth.

But Bradley's is not a mere Formal Logic. He has seen that some connection between intelligence and nature must be made. So far, then, he is much beyond the formal logicians. Yet it is one thing to see that a solution of a difficulty is necessary, and another thing to offer the correct solution. Many have recognized that as there is a world, and as there is reason, and as the world so far as we know is rational, there must be a connection between the two. But fewer have stated a valid connection. Of course, it is always an easier task to destroy than to build. There are more who are willing to pull to pieces the theories of others than to construct a theory of their own. These maintain a merely negative attitude, and always have this advantage—that while they themselves are attacking they do not present any front to the enemy. It is always open to the skeptic to say, if any one ventures to dispute his standpoint, "Oh, you have mistaken my position." Such will-o'-the-wisp philosophers are extremely hard to catch. It is doubtful, indeed, if they are worth catching. But they are at least so far useful, and even necessary, that they enable a constructive metaphysician, if he is open to persuasion, to

correct his errors; and, besides, as no position can be absolutely negative, the skeptic, if he has been sound in his attack upon a received system, has so far pointed the way toward a better solution of the problem.

In a treatise on Logic the main trouble with a writer, who sees that it is necessary to state his view with regard to the relations of mind and matter, is not so much what to say as what not to say. For in one aspect of it the discussion of the relation between mind and matter involves the whole of Metaphysic. When once the subject is introduced, it is harder to stop than it is to continue. But we must attempt to outline what appears to us the basis of a true system of philosophy. We shall, perhaps, best accomplish our object by quoting, first of all, Balfour's objection to Green's Metaphysic. It will be presently shown that Bradley's position is substantially the same as Balfour's. The latter says: "If the world of experience consists solely of relations, what are these relations between? Let it be conceded, for the sake of argument, that, however far we carry back the analysis of what constitutes an object, we still find ourselves dealing with relations; are we not still compelled to believe that there cannot be relations unless something other than relations exists to be related, even though this 'something' (apart from its relations) is 'nothing for us as thinking beings'? And if this be so, does the transcendental theory, in Green's hands, save us, after all, from the philosophic dualism of which he is so much afraid?" ("Mind," No. 33, pp. 76, 77.) This is an objection which occurs to almost every student of philosophy, and which, in spite of the evident contradiction involved in its very statement, seems to persist. The contradiction is that while something to be related has no meaning for Balfour except as independent of consciousness, the truth is that it can have no meaning if it is independent of consciousness. For that which is by definition beyond consciousness cannot be known to exist. However, this high-handed criticism has proved unable to bring conviction home to those who hold such a theory. The reason is, that while no one will dare to deny the truth of this criticism, they believe that, although their theory must in its general aspect be false, there is an element concealed beneath its wording which is not so much false as unexplained.

Let us take an illustration—*e. g.*, iron. To start with, it may

be said that iron exists for us only as we know it. What, then, do you know of iron? An ordinary individual will answer that question by stating some of the common properties of iron, but he will give you to understand at the same time that his knowledge is not complete. A chemist, besides telling you that iron is an elementary substance, will proceed to give additional properties, concluding, perhaps, by saying that much still remains to be discovered about this metal. Now, both will admit, without question, that a certain property of iron which I know is related to me as knowing—*i. e.*, that a certain property is a relation between the thinking subject and the thought object. And the same is true of all the known properties. Indeed, most will agree as well that substance itself has no signification apart from relation to the self and means the permanent possibility of sensation. We have, so far, then, explained the knowledge of iron by relations. But what is yet to be explained is this, that both the ordinary individual and the chemist declare that their knowledge is not absolutely complete—that more may still be known after further tests or experiments have been made. Indeed, most will be prepared to assert that, no matter what analysis may be made and chemical experiments performed, it will still be possible to know more, and that we can never say authoritatively that nothing more can possibly be known of iron. This something more or residue, which, as just now said, cannot possibly be known, vigorously maintains its existence and refuses to be considered a nonentity. Different philosophers have given different names to this "something" which cannot be known. One will maintain that it is a substratum in which the known relations inhere. Spencer has called it the Unknowable. If once we can find the key to unlock the mystery of this residue, we shall have laid bare one of the secrets of philosophy.

First of all, this "something more" cannot be real and at the same time unknowable. By real is not meant materially existing, but simply existing for consciousness. If we hold by the view that there is "something more," we must let go the idea that it is unknowable, for it is not unknowable if it is known to exist. It cannot be argued that while we do not know that it exists we cannot help believing that it exists, and therefore, although it exists, it is still unknowable. For whether it exists for us as a fact

or only as a belief, it still exists as a fact or as a belief for our consciousness, and therefore is so far known. But, again, the very statement of those who we supposed were answering our queries was that, while they had announced all they knew, they still believed it possible to know more. In other words, they declared the residue knowable. Consequently, there is nothing left but to predicate reality of this "something." Reality is not equivalent to materiality, but to that which exists for consciousness. That much may be considered settled.

In the second place, this residue is not a substratum which underlies the properties, but is not itself a property. The only meaning that can be given to such a substratum is that it exists, although it cannot be known; so that "Unknowable" and "Substratum" are so far convertible terms. As a result, the reason already given for condemning the applicability to the residue of the term "Unknowable" equally condemns the applicability of the term "Substrate." But there is a second reason: The residue is knowable. Consequently, from one point of view (it is not said it is the only point of view) it is a diminishing quantity. What is brought to light is always seen to add to the existing relations. While we persist in our avowal that what we know of iron is not completed knowledge, we cannot fail to notice that all that has yet been discovered of iron is just properties of iron, *i. e.*, new relations for consciousness. Naturally, then, we might infer that, as everything that has yet been found is a property, what remains to be found will also be properties—that, as all we know of iron is relations, all we can know will be relations. Therefore the residue cannot be a substratum.

It might be objected to the argument just advanced, that it has failed to realize the full meaning of substratum. The objector might very naturally urge that substrate was considered not simply as not a relation, but as what from its very nature could never be a relation. It was looked upon as that in which the properties inhered, and therefore to reduce it to a mere property was to make the object vanish. While one might talk away forever about relations and properties, there is something in the nature of an object—of substances in general—which is, by that method, wholly overlooked. While all would be willing to admit that what was not known of iron and yet was capable of being

known must, when known, be resolved into relations, still there seems to underlie not any more what is not known than what is already known, that without which the properties would be disconnected tatters. Indeed, the conviction cannot be erased that, even were there only one property known, there would exist something, not that nor any property, without whose existence it would be impossible for the property to exist. That something is not an object, for an object implies properties. But it is that element of an object which, while not a property, is essential to there being an object at all. That is what is meant by "substrate." Or again, to put the objection in popular language. The chemist says iron is an elementary substance, and he also says iron has a peculiar lustre. Now, it may be true that each of these facts is a relation to consciousness, but any one can see that they are not upon the same level. There is more in calling iron an elementary substance than in saying it has a metallic lustre. The difference between the two seems to be that, while the latter is content with making prominent the manner of existence, the former makes prominent the existence itself. Everything, it is true, has an indefinite number of ways of existing, which may be called its properties or relations, but the ways of *existing* presuppose in their very terminology the existence of an object. An object has properties which are, so to speak, accidents, *e. g.*, it may be round at one time and square at another. Properties change, but that which does not change but remains the same throughout every change of properties—that cannot itself be a property or a relation. That is what is meant by "substrate."

From the above objection we may be able to limit the discussion by noticing what underneath its negative character is essentially positive. It is agreed upon that in the idea of a substrate there is some truth. That is asserted both by the advocates as well as by the opponents of an underlying something. It may be discovered, also, that those who hold that there is a substratum underlying the properties of an object must maintain, to be consistent with their own views, that that substratum underlies not the properties in a bunch, but every single property. Were that not the case, then the retort could be made that, if one property could exist without a substratum, could two not? And that would lead finally to the conclusion that the substratum was a phantom.

Our inquiry, therefore, presents this aspect: What is there accompanying a single property that is not that property? When, for example, we touch something and say, "It is hard," what have we done? The property of the thing is hardness—but we do not mean that hardness *per se* has any existence. A relation cannot possibly exist unless it relates the subject feeling to the object felt. But we do not assert the independent existence of a relation when we say "It is hard"; we refer the hardness to the thing, and of that thing is already predicated existence. "It is hard" means "It (whatever it is) exists as hard," so that the single property is discovered to be not single but complex, for with the property "hardness" has come, in spite of ourselves, the *existence* of something not yet known except as hard. Now, if we assert about the same thing, "It is blue," the same process is gone through. But, while in this case the property is different, we still predicate the existence of the object.

The above analysis goes to show that a sensation simple and immediate is impossible. It is impossible to say "hard" or "blue" without including in that statement, in the first place, the result of previous impressions; in the one case hard or not hard, in the other case blue or not blue. These relations of agreement and discrimination are so necessary that no knowledge can be obtained without their aid. If, then, a sensation pure, simple, and immediate is an impossibility, and if we still have sensations of some kind, of what nature are our sensations? We may answer complex and mediate. But in saying "hard" or "blue" we have not only implied the union of the present impression with others both like and unlike itself formerly experienced, but also its permanence. That characteristic of our sensation which is especially significant in the present discussion is its permanence. Sensations which come and go without leaving any trace, like flashes of light in a looking-glass, can have no existence for us as conscious beings. Immediately upon a color being brought within our range of vision, we consciously or unconsciously (according as the color is well or only slightly known) contrast it with other colors; but before that is done we have referred it to the self as permanent. Referring the sensation as a sensation *for me*, or as *my* sensation to the self, we give it that character of permanence which it cannot have except for conscious beings. Now, that

permanence is what we have hitherto called existence; and all that it means at this stage of our knowledge is the capacity of causing again the sensation in me which I have already felt. Existence is, then, the permanent possibility of sensation. We cannot help ascribing this permanence to a sensation. The idea of permanence, so long as we continue at the stage of existence, only means from one *point* of view that, no matter how often the sensation is present to sense, its capability of continuing so to be presented will never be exhausted. That is the whole meaning of simple existence (*i. e.*, material existence). From another point of view the compulsion to ascribe permanence to an impression arises from the refusal of consciousness to be exhausted by a momentary impression. Answering, then, to the capacity of the object to be seen or felt is the capacity of consciousness to see and feel. It is plain that this compulsion cannot be produced by something independent of consciousness, for something independent of my consciousness can have no effect upon my consciousness. As soon as it affects my consciousness it ceases to be independent; of course, this does not mean that what *I* do not know is not known, but only that what I do not know is not known *by me*.

From all this we can now say that this "something more" which was announced to underlie the property is the existence of the object of which it is a property, but that this existence is not only not independent of consciousness, but is a result of consciousness itself. We have learned, moreover, that the "something more" is from the point of view of the sensation the permanent capacity to be again what it has been, and, from the point of view of the subject, the permanent capacity of knowledge.

The relation of the sensation to consciousness has occupied our attention so completely that we have ignored the full import of the sensation. We have been tempted to overlook the vital truth that a sensation *per se*, no matter how permanent, cannot exist. When we say, "It is blue," besides referring the blue object to the self, we have in thought related this blue object to other objects both blue and not blue. The relation of this object to others which are blue is a potential infinity; so also is the relation of this object to other objects which are not blue. Consequently this "something more" will assume a new phase, *viz.*, the permanent

capacity of this object as blue to be related not only to itself repeated, but to others which are blue, as well as to others which are not blue. This is a relation from the point of view of the object or of the perception, and corresponds, as does the relation from the point of view of sensation, to the permanent capacity of knowledge.

The net gain of our research has been principally of a negative kind. It has been shown that the residue which persists in consciousness is not and cannot be something alien to consciousness as the "Unknowable" or the "Substrate," but springs from the essence of consciousness itself. But it is not wholly negative; for, while engaged in the criticism of other theories, we have in a measure exposed our own. A broad hint was given that this residue was a potential infinity, which had its origin in the fact that consciousness not only rose above any sensation or any perception, but testified to its ability to rise above any number of sensations and perceptions. Accordingly, the more we bring to light concerning the nature of matter in general, or of any particular object, we are only in one sense revealing the nature of self-consciousness. But that part of the work was only glanced at. If it were attempted here to construct a system of Metaphysic or Ethics, this "something more" would require to be not simply mentioned but explained. But for the purposes of Logic nothing more is required than a glance. Logic is concerned mainly with the negative value of this residue. Having firmly secured the position that it is not a thing-in-itself, whatever that thing-in-itself may be called it is ready to uphold its own fundamental dictum that nature, or matter, or reality, by whatever names it may be known, is not in any sense independent of consciousness, though it may in large measure be independent of my consciousness. Out of the struggle and turmoil of the foregoing discussion is precipitated this result—that matter is thought matter, that reality is thought reality, that nature is the world as known; or, to put the principle in a light a little more favorable to the universality of consciousness, matter and reality are only thinkable matter and thinkable reality, and the world is a knowable world.

One remark more may be added. It will be observed that nothing has as yet been said of space and time. The omission of them was intentional. Although space and time must enter

into the constitution of anything as an object, it would be apart from the aim of Logic to engage in any protracted debate concerning their nature. That well may be left to metaphysicians. But there is one aspect of these categories (for I think we may call them categories) that bears directly upon the question now at issue. Every one is willing to admit that it is impossible to think an absolute limit to space or time. He will admit, further, that if a limit, *i. e.*, a relative limit, is thought, and if thought seeks to go outside that limit, it will find the space or time on the other side of exactly the same nature as the space or time upon this side of the imaginary line. Now, while from its very nature it is impossible to know space—if to know space means to know it as an object—yet we assert that space is intrinsically knowable. It would be thought an outrage upon consciousness if the idea were for a moment entertained that, should we prosecute our journey through space sufficiently far, we should come upon space quite different from the space we know. Such a proposition is self-contradictory. We should immediately say that whatever that something was, it was certainly not space. And so with time. Now, the world we know is in space and time. So far, then, as these two categories are concerned, we are prepared to say that, no matter what in the world is yet unknown, it, when known, will be placed under space and time. It will conform to the conditions of intelligence. No one ever thinks of inserting underneath the particular spaces we know or the particular times we know a substratum, and then declaring that, while we can know particular spaces and times, we cannot know this substratum. That would be equivalent to maintaining that we can at once be conscious and step outside of consciousness. We can no more leap outside of our own consciousness than we can jump out of our own skins. If we could leap out of our own consciousness we should be irrational in the very act. Simple Simon, when he jumped into the bramble-bush and scratched out his eyes, did not then see what, when he had his eyes, was invisible. He saw nothing. The consequence was that he concluded he would get his eyes again. In the same way, if it were possible for us to get beyond consciousness, we should not then know the unknowable or the substrate. We should know nothing. It is well for us that consciousness cannot commit suicide. The nature of space and time, therefore,

lends its aid in support of the theory that the "something more" is the same as that which is already known, and that the world is a knowable world.

Having thus cleared the way, we may now advance without fear of stumbling over philosophical obstacles at every turn. The remainder of our work will fall easily into two divisions: 1. An examination into the "Principles of Logic," in order to discover how far Bradley conforms to the principle laid down in the introduction. Apparently, at least, this will be chiefly negative. 2. A tabulation of the results which Bradley has himself obtained, not so much in conformity with the principle into which he was unwillingly pressed as in conformity with the true principle above adduced. Inasmuch as these results are scattered at random through Bradley's book, it will be some gain, at least, to have them set forth apart from the mass of detail and criticism in which they are almost completely hidden. This method will prepare the way for an intelligent appreciation of the real value of the positive portion of the "Principles of Logic," and will demonstrate how far Bradley has gone in determining a true system.

This, it must be remarked, overlooks an interesting portion of the book—*i. e.*, the chapters devoted to the criticism of the Association School. But while from them we may receive useful hints concerning Bradley's own theory (and that is the objective point in this essay), it will not come within the limits of our undertaking to present any detailed review of these parts. This course may be the means of causing me to appear in the *rôle* of a fault-finder. And it is true that many seemingly unimportant points will thereby be brought into prominence. But Bradley has himself in a measure, at least, been my excuse. He has separated in part between his own view and his criticisms of others. It would have been better if he had made the separation still more absolute, for the criticism or destructive portion of his work and the constructive portion are essentially different. As this is so, we propose, after stating that the criticism is able and valuable, to confine ourselves to the positive portion of the book.

With this end in view we may, so to speak, diagnose the "Principles of Logic" in order to find its exact metaphysical condition. The difficulty that at once confronts us is, as was already mentioned, that the philosophical theory underlying the Logic is

fragmentary ; besides that, when led at times by the argument into abstract discussion, he frequently breaks off abruptly before reaching the crisis. The bunch of grapes and the water are tantalizingly kept just beyond our reach. I am among those readers of the book who, as he states in the preface, think that he has given too little philosophy, and what little he has given he has given too often. If, like the child and the medicine, he had made a wry face and said, "Now, and be done with it," and had written a concise statement of his ideas, it would have proved more tangible as well as more satisfactory. The scattered and incomplete nature of the statements made has driven us to adopt a rather unusual mode of procedure. By examining them as they occur we may see in what respects they are alike, and thus lay bare the thread of connection. Here and there is given a glimpse of the regions that lie beyond, and it will be as good a plan as any other to take these glimpses up in turn ; this will presuppose in the reader some knowledge of the work in question. In their order the phases or the questions to be examined are as follows :

a. The nature of Judgment.

b. The distinction of Singular Judgments of Sense, as Analytic and Synthetic.

c. The ultimate nature of the Real, as involving the distinction of "Thisness" and "This."

d. The Relations of the Negative and the Affirmative Judgment.

e. The Category of Subject and Attribute as the basis of Inference.

These may be analyzed in turn, and thus their signification and tendency will be made clear. "Tendency" is added, because it may be nowhere explicitly acknowledged by Bradley that what is attributed to him is in reality his ; indeed, it is quite probable that he might feel inclined to make some demur at the interpretations given. But questions must be pushed home, and no arbitrary barrier can shut off investigation.

(To be continued in the next number.)

A STUDY OF THE ILIAD.¹

BY DENTON J. SNIDER.

IV.

Book Fourth.

The connection between this and the preceding Book is most intimate, not simply in incidents, but specially in thought. This connecting thought it is our main concern to see and unfold; that is the thread which holds the poem together, and has held it together against all the attacks of time and of criticism. The previous Book showed the personal conflict for the possession of Helen, and the treaty based upon it; the present Book shows that no such treaty can ever be carried out, being contrary to the divine government; that this conflict at Troy is not a personal matter between husband and seducer, but a national struggle; indeed, we may add, looking back at it, a world-historical struggle, which has to be fought out between the contending elements before any peace is possible. Such Olympian emphasis we must hear in this Book.

We have just seen placed before us in living reality the central conflict of the war, of the entire Trojan war, in the person of Helen, whom we may therefore call a type or character, which embraces the essence of all characters of this time and of this struggle; she has in her the whole Trojan war, both sides of it, fighting there as well as outside of her. Around her and for her the two contending peoples fight, must fight, since she denotes their very essence; the Greeks are not Greeks unless they rescue Helen; the Trojans are not Trojans unless they keep her in her alienation.

Such is the image of the great general war; but into this general war a special occurrence is playing, the wrath of Achilles. We now begin to see what that wrath really means; the withdrawal of Achilles from battle signifies his withdrawal from the

¹ Articles I, II, and III of this series appeared respectively in the April and the July numbers of this Journal for 1883, and in the January number for this year.—
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Greek cause, which is the restoration of Helen. These books are necessary to show what the Hero abandons through his wrath; they portray the world in which he is a chief factor; now he quits that world in anger, and is ready to let it be destroyed. But, separated from it, he is no longer a Greek, no longer himself truly; the deep scission in his soul, growing deeper with every Trojan victory, is to be pushed to the last limit, till he quit his wrath and be restored to harmony with his world and with himself.

But we are far from that point yet, though visibly going thitherward; at present we must return to the general phase of the conflict, which is in the process of unfolding. Let us look at that treaty again; by it, apparently, the whole war has been brought to an end; Menelaus is now to have Helen and her treasures in reward for his personal victory over Paris, and the Greeks are to sail off home, leaving Troy undestroyed. Impossible; the treaty was not ratified by Zeus; the Poet says it cannot be. The supreme Governor cannot let the matter be settled thus, for the simple reason that it is no settlement. Here it is that we have of necessity an intervention of Zeus, the mighty overruling hand which has to descend and seize the rudder when mortal men are running the world into chaos.

Yet he interferes in his own way; that way is humorous. Zeus is again the humorist; indeed, must be so, having to deal with mortals and immortals who must have their own will, and yet must be made to fit into the divine order, even when willing the very opposite thereof. Can Zeus, our Greek Providence, help laughing, and even breaking his jest, when he sees the little man or the little God working busily all the while to thwart his purpose, and just by that means forwarding it, and indeed making it possible? In this world-embracing humor of Zeus I cannot see hate or even contempt; on the contrary, its root is love, as is the case with all true humor; when Zeus hates, he grasps for his thunderbolts, which are always at hand, and in good order. Love, I say, is at the bottom of his rugged heart, still to be unfolded somewhat, it is true; love is that which overrules the hostile deed of man for man's own good, and gives him, besides, out of pure grace, his own sweet will even in opposition. But not man now, as we said in the case of Agamemnon at the beginning of the

Second Book, but deities, Herē and Pallas, are the object, the Olympian humor of Zeus.

This war, then, is no personal quarrel between Paris and Menelaus; it cannot be settled by a duel between two individuals, though they be the injured and the injurer. Paris is all Troy, Menelaus is all Greece, the peoples are the real participators in the conflict; that is, this Trojan struggle is not personal, but national, and is to be fought out to its true result by the nations involved in it. The Trojans cannot give up Helen without becoming Greeks, without acknowledging the triumph of the Greek principle. A few men of this kind are in Troy—Hector and Antenor, for example; but most of its people side with Paris, and sustain him, even though they hate him personally for having brought on the issue, or for other untold reasons. One thing is certain: they never compelled him to restore Helen, though they must have had the power. We must see that their spirit is to keep her in estrangement, and that Zeus, the Hellenic God, is determined to crush this spirit out of the Hellenic race. Her forcible surrender would, therefore, be no solution of the great question for either side, especially for the Trojans; they must break the treaty; Zeus will have them break it, since he is bent upon putting them and their principle down in the end. The Supreme Deity will overrule this work of man, whereby he would shun his task, making a peace where there is no peace.

This treaty, then, through which the war is to be brought to an end by a personal duel, is a violation of the great purpose of Zeus in the entire Trojan struggle. But specially it is a violation of the promise to Thetis, of the promise that her son Achilles should have honor. Thus the Heroic Individual would not get his meed which is the very theme of the poem. He must be harmonized with his people, they honoring him, he sustaining them, ere the conflict can be brought to a close. So we see that the whole Providence of the poem in its two phases—namely, that Troy shall be destroyed as the outcome of the entire war, and that Achilles shall be reconciled as the outcome of the Iliad episode of the war—is contradicted by this treaty and its result. Zeus, therefore, appears and sets it aside, turning the human course of action back into the divine plan.

Why, then, does the Poet introduce the duel at all? It is, in-

deed, necessary to teach the providential thought and discipline; the Greeks, and we, too, might otherwise imagine the affair to be a merely personal matter between husband and seducer, and no concern of theirs or ours; a fight over a beautiful but dubious woman, such as many fights have been and will continue to be without causing a national war. But this Book raps us over the head, saying, Awake, O indolent brain! and think; my Helen is not simply one little woman and nothing more, but the supreme object of two great peoples, yea, of two continents; not merely a runaway wife of a Greek chieftain, but the very heart of the two struggling tendencies of the Hellenic race. This Book has an interpretation of Helen, we may say, as well as a prophetic outlook upon the result of the great war.

The structure of the Fourth Book is simple, yet reveals the thought at its essential points of juncture. Two chief parts we behold, which may be named the Breaking of the Treaty and the Renewal of the War. They are seen to carry us at once beyond the individual grievances involved in the rape of Helen, and to bring us to the universal import of the struggle.

I. It has already been indicated that there must take place at this conjuncture an interference of Zeus as the supreme world-governor, for the purpose of asserting the Providence of the poem. The treaty is to be annulled; the Gods order it, and then find the human instrument to bring about the annulment. For the Gods work through human instruments, but do not thereby destroy free agency; they rather confirm it; the intention must be in the man as well as in the God. Hence we shall have two phases of this First Part, the divine and human, each of which is unfolded in sequence.

a. The deep underlying fact in this divine utterance is the doom of Troy. It is to be destroyed; there can be no treaty, no compromise which would leave it standing; its attitude toward Helen is its character, and that character must be wiped out of the Hellenic world of which Troy is the oriental tendency. Thus Zeus decrees unwillingly, for it is not a personal matter with him; indeed, if he were to follow his own wishes, he would spare the Trojans and their city, which he has honored above all cities "under the sun and starry heaven," and which has always given to him due sacrifice. But he also, the supreme deity, must put aside personal con-

siderations, and look at the eternal reason in all things; so Troy must perish. Zeus, too, has his struggle with himself in a momentary pang of finitude; then it is over. Such is the deep feeling of penalty in the universal order, as it bursts up everywhere out of the "Iliad"—the feeling of the justice of the world, and the world's deed.

It may be asked, Why do the Gods punish the Trojans for what the Gods compelled the Trojans to do, as, for example, to violate this treaty? Such violation was decreed by Zeus; is that justice, to punish men for wrong which they are forced to commit? The answer lies in that axiom of Homeric interpretation which the reader must always have present to the mind: Homer's Gods and their decrees are in the man as well as outside of him; they are his own character, his own free-will, his very essence indeed. Zeus through Pallas moved the Trojans to break the treaty, it is said; but already the Poet has indicated that the general feeling at Troy was that Helen should not be restored; she was refused to an embassy demanding her back before the war. Indeed, she cannot be restored if Troy is to remain Troy; that there was no serious and abiding purpose of fulfilling the treaty we see by the readiness with which the Trojans renew the fight when it is broken.

Here we may make a note on the character of the Gods in Homer, especially of Zeus. The highest as well as the lowest traits Zeus has in him; if he had not, he would not be all. He is the Whole, both centre and circumference, both divine and human. His divine side surpasses all the Gods in its divine greatness; his human side surpasses all mortals in the magnitude of human frailties. Human, terribly human he is, just in proportion as he is transcendently divine; the one conditions the other. Zeus is the product of Greek plastic imagination which figures the God as man universalized; not the spiritual man simply, but the sensuous man also, the total man, magnified into a colossal image. Zeus is not an abstraction, not a virtue or a dry catalogue of virtues, or entities; he is a person, and has caprice, for personality without caprice cannot be conceived by the Homeric Greek. But under that capricious, humorous play we shall always find the eternal element.

In accord with this character of him we notice that in his very first words he is teasing Pallas and Herē, the strongest Greek partisans among the Gods. He also propounds to them the question

whether Troy shall be left standing and Menelaus lead his Helen home, or not. Yet we see that he is not serious in this, but it is his sport, his humor. In his next speech, however, we see in a gentle way the iron hand; the side of necessity appears, which decrees, at present in the mild form of permission, that Troy must perish, though his caprice contemplates the opposite and plays with the thought for a moment. Sportfulness he has, yet is capable of exploding into sudden wrath which is usually very evanescent, and more often feigned than real. The froth of existence he shows, too, in his seething moods, but the granite is always peering forth above and around; we know, too, it is at the bottom of the surges and holds them, though we do not see it. So he plays with the Goddesses; fun or anger, it is still play, and takes the form of teasing which has always a rude love under it; he teases them now just because it is their heart's desire which he is about to accomplish. After teasing them well, he tells them that he is going to do just what they wish.

Mighty truth we may well feel in this portraiture of Zeus, a genuine image of the Time-spirit which delights in sporting with chance, which reveals itself under the thousand forms of contingency called events, which seems to take pleasure in teasing the struggling sons of men with false visions of hostility and defeat just at the moment of victory. "Yet the will of Zeus was accomplished" is the grand Homeric refrain through all this bustle and tumult of cross-purposes among men and Gods. It is the humor of existence, this colossal humor of Zeus, who, in appearance, is foiling while in reality carrying out the plan of the individual; or, on the other hand, he is, in appearance, carrying it out while foiling it, or turning it into his own plan.

The cry is always heard: "A very unworthy conception of deity." It is imperfect, we may well believe, but not base. It will do good to every son of every century to take to heart and make real to himself that Greek standpoint which put a God at the centre in all things, a person, and endowed him with all the traits of personality, the lowest as well as the highest. A shadow of the complete humanity, all of it, hovers therein, and the voice of it speaks the word of hope. We must see, too, that Zeus is playing only on the surface with time-bubbles. Underneath is the one great earnest end; that end is universal—the end of the race. Who will

deny that the cause of the Greeks is the cause of humanity, and Zeus putting down Troy and its oriental tendency is the mighty image of the World's Reason surmounting its obstacles in Time, and unfolding into its own pure reality? Zeus is a mythus assuredly, but mythus is truer than history—the essence, indeed, of all history concentrated into a single colossal visage.

He is also figured in the domestic relation, in the broadest sense, as father of Gods and men, for religion always conceives the world as one family, whose bond is love. In the more narrow Olympian household he is husband and parent; so he sports with, in fact teases, wife and child. He has the character of the Greek who, under the form of play, of artistic spontaneity and sportfulness, worshipped the Gods seriously and was pious. But listen to that divine wife Herē in response. While acknowledging the supremacy of the husband, she strongly asserts her place and prerogative not only in the family, but in the world-government, being equal both in birth and rank to the highest God; the first and grandest assertion of woman's rights, one may think, and prefiguring much that has followed in that line. Truly everything is in Homer, to the eye of the student who has faith in his heart. But Herē has no humor; she is bitterly in earnest, divinely indignant, yet she can be sarcastic, with a woman's sting in her tongue. Still, she has no humor, and cannot stand teasing. Zeus, master of all limitation, alone can possess the true Olympian humor; no lesser beings, mortal or immortal, can manage it any more than they can handle his thunderbolts. So Zeus permits his wife, the strong partisan, to bring about that which he had already resolved upon as world-judge.

Such is this divine intervention, which we must grasp in its double phase: first, as a necessity in the supreme order; secondly, as a caprice of the Gods. Nor can we pass by that descent of Pallas from Olympus in the form of a blazing meteor, a wonderful sign to Greeks and Trojans. Sign of what—peace or war? Alas, poor mortals! both sides interpret the sign both ways. It is but an appearance to them, without any certain divine stamp—a touch of sympathetic humor in the old bard, which some unfeeling critics would cut out, being as ignorant of the meaning of the sign as were the Greeks and Trojans. But the Goddess is seeking her human instrument for breaking the

treaty, for such is her way. She has found him ; behold, he steps forth.

b. This human instrument is Pandar, the archer. It is instructive at this point to watch the procedure of the poet, and see how he links the divine decree into the deed of the man. Observe how he gives to Pandar an ample internal motive, "Thanks and praise from all the men of Troy and gifts from Paris." Well did Pandar read the Trojan spirit in regard to the treaty. Glory and cupidity move him within ; thus he is a free agent with his own mainspring of action." Yet it is a Goddess who suggests and inspires these motives, the Goddess Pallas, who knows her man and finds the character ready for her promptings. Why bring in the Goddess ? Because it is she who adjusts these individual motives into the universal course of events. Ordinarily they would be of no significance ; but now the war turns on them, and they have a place in the divine order. From Zeus the Highest comes this act of Pandar ; yet it is Pandar's own. He is the instrument of the Supreme Ruler ; yet he none the less proceeds of his own accord. Man has his will, and just therein is realizing the will of the Gods ; but to connect the two is the work of a deity, of Pallas, Goddess of Wisdom, beheld in the poetic vision of Homer.

Thus the "Iliad" is a poem of freedom, having the true glance, which joins into one harmony the divine and human relations. Providence is here, free-will is here. Neither side is left out or blurred ; yet they work together, fit into one another, nay, the one could not be without the other. The Gods are in the man as well as in the world ; thought is not merely subjective, but also objective ; the individual is not simply free in himself, but through his freedom he links himself into the universal order of the world. One may put his finger upon this point and say : This is the chief greatness of Homer, this is the reason why mankind will not let him die. He has spoken the reconciling word, has given both sides of this existence of ours—the human and divine—working in concord. He tells of the decrees of the Gods, then of the doings of men ; these are the two threads of the poem, of life, of the universe.

The arrow speeds, Menelaus is wounded, the treaty is broken. The Trojans at once move into array of battle without disowning the act of Pandar ; they, indeed, make it their own. All along

we have seen that this was their secret spirit ; the treaty was but a momentary fit of weariness of war. They would not, in fact could not, give up Helen. Hector, leader in war, is manifestly not the political leader. In this respect Paris is stronger than he, and represents more truly the character of the Trojans.

We have already had the divine utterance concerning the doom of Troy. Agamemnon now gives the human utterance in regard to this violation and in regard to the Trojan character, of which this violation is but one outburst. Troy will perish. Not in vain has the treaty been made and the sacred pledges given. The Trojans with their heads, with their wives and children, will pay for this wrong. Again breaks up that strong feeling of penalty so frequent in the "Iliad." Agamemnon sees the great fact of the Trojan action in its complete circle ; he, the mortal, spies the plan of the world-ordering Zeus in this incident. It is the human vision beholding the divine purpose ; the Leader is the man chosen to take a glimpse into the all-governing principle above him. In the very wantonness of the Trojans he beholds them as victims of supreme justice. The man now speaks what the God has already decreed, Helen is not to be restored except through the destruction of the city. If Troy were not doomed it would have allowed Helen to return. Zeus will punish them, says he. The mortal sees in Zeus only the punisher and not the originator of the violation. The poetic eye takes in the complete Zeus, and beholds the free act of the Trojans working into the purpose of the Highest.

This vaticination of Agamemnon is in many things remarkable, particularly so in style. A prophetic rapture and earnestness lie in it, an elevation of the look into what is everlasting, like some Old Testament writ. The Greek bard seems suddenly changed into the Hebrew prophet, and the Hellenic song is transfigured into a strain of Israel. That Olympian humor of Zeus is gone, swallowed up in a sublime seriousness ; that serene life is clouded with wrestling, with agony. It is the mortal in contrast with the immortal ; particularly it is that mortal Agamemnon whom this speech fits. He has fallen out with the Hero Achilles, and is on his road to repentance, which we shall witness in the Ninth Book, a very sober business and inclined to make men see the justice of the Gods. Of this penitential journey the present speech may be

taken as an important landmark, lying about half way toward the destination.

II. It has already been seen how the Trojans at Pandar's shot move into battle array without any warning to the Greeks, without even the command of their own chieftains; they make his breach of the treaty theirs. The result is the renewal of the war, which forms the Second Part of this Book. Fighting now mainly fills the Homeric canvas, the painful struggles of mortals below on earth. This part it is not necessary to follow in much detail, being easily comprehensible in itself, and having had its significance already unfolded on Olympus. For this Lower World, with all its tumult and conflict, is but the finite material on which the will of the Gods is impressed; that will in its pure form Homer brings before us in his Upper World. This Second Part falls into two divisions: the personal tour of Agamemnon, and the general battle which follows.

a. The King hastens on foot around the army, rousing the people in general and the chieftains in particular; the thought which propels him is what he has just seen and uttered in his prophecy; now again he declares that "Zeus will never aid the false." He seeks to carry out the will of the supreme God, and to make the Greeks the instrument thereof. It is a true mission, and the Leader shows its inspiration; he does his work with a demoniac power. He is dexterous with praise and rebuke, softening rebuke when it has stung too deep. The Greek chieftains are again brought before us in order, as we beheld them in the view from the wall of the previous Book, but in a different manner. Subtle touches of character we get from them all; particularly we mark the proud-spirited Diomed, disdaining to reply to the unjust reproof from the King, and restraining his companion from angry words in answer thereto; he will rather suffer wrong than quarrel with the shepherd of the people, as Achilles has done. One takes delight in thinking these noble words as the prelude and the prerequisite of the noble deeds of Diomed to be recorded in the very next Book. No sulking from him. "Come, now, let us, too, think of the furious charge."

b. Therewith the general battle opens; the personal round of Agamemnon has come to an end. Certain differences between the two armies the Poet has marked: the noise which the Trojans

make in contrast to the silence of the Greeks, which implies, apparently, a better discipline; the confusion of many tongues among the Trojans in contrast to the unity of speech among the Greeks, a curious philological fact, which hints the mixed Asiatic non-Hellenic tendency of Troy in contrast with the pure Hellenic tendency of the Greeks; then, too, the ever-recurring differentiation of the Gods into the two hostile sides is the final mark of the great conflict.

Personal encounter is the marrow of the Homeric battle; every kind of situation is introduced, every difference of weapon, of wound. Finally, the whole line begins to retreat; this time it is Hector and the Trojans. The Gods now come in for a moment; Apollo calls to the Trojans down from their holy citadel; to fight for that is, indeed, a prodigious inspiration, and every man can look up there and hear, if not see, the God who is also telling him, as the chief encouragement, that Achilles has retired in wrath from the side of the foe. But Pallas fights among the ranks of her people, just before their eyes, or rather souls, having no citadel to call down from. So the Gods cannot keep out of the terrestrial conflict.

But we are now to see a new phase of the struggle—the combat of the mortal with the immortal, the Hero grappling with the God, and, what is stranger, putting him down. That Hero is Diomed, whom we have already heard with so much favor, and thought him, of all Greeks present, best prepared to meet and vanquish the Gods of Troy. As this Fourth Book is in the nature of a descent from Olympus to Earth, the highest God having his judgment brought down to the mortal, so the Fifth Book is in the nature of an ascent from Earth to Olympus, the mortal having his deed brought for judgment up to the highest God.

ROSMINI'S INNATE IDEA, A PRIORI IDEAS, AND
SUBJECT-OBJECT IDEAS.

BY CONDÉ B. PALLEN.

To investigate a subject involving so many intricate difficulties as the one about to be discussed offers, may seem to many a futile undertaking, and wherein little harvest can be expected from much labor. All that may be said in the present paper as regards the origin of ideas, I am aware, will be forestalled by the usual objection that, as no solution has as yet been arrived at by the most acute intellects who have given it consideration, it is not likely, indeed of the highest improbability, that a satisfactory answer can ever be given. Admitting the full force of the objection, it may, however, be replied that, although no satisfactory solution can, perhaps, be expected, yet there is hope that it may be approximated; and, at least, that all speculations which stamp themselves with error in their contradiction of plain facts may be refuted and shown to be an intellectual seduction from even a true approximate reply. If this can be done, we are getting just so much nearer the truth as we recede from the path of error.

It may be laid down as axiomatic that any theory—built up for the explication of attested facts, which in its conclusion contradicts any single fact, whose solution it purports to give—that such theory is essentially false, and, so far from elucidating the subject, only involves it in greater difficulties. In, therefore, explaining the origin of ideas in the Human Intellect, if the explanation given obviously stands in contravention to any single known fact, we must rigorously conclude that the given solution is not true. It should be carefully noted, however, that the contradiction be real and not merely apparent; for it often happens that what seems a contradiction is only so in appearance. It will, therefore, require a careful analysis of the fact in question before we can with safety conclude against the explanation given.

All the various theories proposed by philosophers as solutions of this problem resolve themselves under three general heads, with certain specific distinctions—viz., firstly, that theory which declares

that all primitive ideas come solely from the thinking subject; secondly, that which holds that they come wholly from the object without, and a third theory, advocating their origin, as rising both from the object without and the activity of the thinking subject within. The first divides itself into two specifically distinct systems, the one holding that at least the most primitive of all ideas, that of Being, is *innate* to the subject, getting nothing either from the object without or from the activity of the subject within; the other postulates that certain primitive ideas are produced by the sole activity of the thinking principle, independent of the object without. In considering these two divisions, we shall, by way of implication, though not explicitly, touch on the validity of the second general division enumerated, which makes all ideas the product of the object alone. The third general division, which holds an intermediate position, we shall consider independently.

Taking these systems in the order given, let us first consider the theory of the *innate* idea of Being. If it be shown that this most primitive and first of all ideas in the *human* intellect cannot be innate, it will follow *a priori* that no other idea can. The theory of the innate idea is warmly espoused and vigorously championed by Rosmini. In a little pamphlet, translated and edited by the Rev. Father Lockhart, and published last year, we have a clear and succinct statement of Rosmini's position, as well as a preface, from the pen of the editor, giving a short exposition of its contents. On page 43, in what may be called the ninth article of Rosmini's pamphlet, we find his solution of the "Origin of the one indeterminate idea," the idea of Being. In his first allegation Rosmini states that "the idea of Being in general precedes all other ideas. In fact, all other ideas are only the idea of Being determined in one way or another, and to determine a thing supposes that we already possess the thing to be determined."

The first statement that the idea of Being precedes all other ideas cannot be denied, but the second statement, that all other ideas are but determinations of the indeterminate idea of Being, must be more carefully considered. In one sense this latter may be readily admitted, if by it is understood, that contained in all determinate ideas is the idea of Being as determined; in this sense there is no objection. But if it is meant that in any determinate idea whatsoever is *formally* contained the indeterminate idea of

Being, *qua* indeterminate, it is to be denied. For instance, the idea of substance is not the indeterminate idea of Being, but the determinate idea of Being as substance; otherwise we should have to exclude accidents from the periphery of Being. Likewise the Infinite is Being, and so is the Finite, but neither is Being indeterminate, since one is Being essentially imperfect and the other essentially all perfect. Being in its formal signification absolutely prescind from all determinations whatsoever, and equally disregards all modes.

But the crucial point of the statement lies in the assertion that, in order to determine a thing, we must already possess the thing to be determined. This means that we must first have the indeterminate idea of Being before we can get any determinate idea of determined Being. It is true that the indeterminate idea of Being precedes all other ideas; but the question is, How do we get this indeterminate idea? The fact that it precedes all other determinate ideas does not establish as a fact that it is innate to the soul, but only shows that it has precedence in the order of cognition. That it is *first* idea will not be denied; the question is, How do we *first* get this idea? Rosmini, in his second statement, affirms that "this idea cannot come from sensation or from our feelings," and this may be readily granted; but it may be added that not only can this indeterminate idea not come from sensation, but that no idea, *qua* idea, can come from sensation, even the most determinate. But his reason for this statement is not valid, for he goes on to say that "the sensations and the feelings do not furnish the spirit anything except determinations of the idea of Being by which it is limited and restricted." This position cannot hold, for the reason that the sensations do not furnish to the spirit the limitations for the *ideal* determinations of Being, since the idea of determined Being is not the particular contingent and concrete restriction of the *Idea*, but the ideal determination of an ideal indeterminate. Sensation furnishes the intellect nothing ideal at all; but, if the determination of Being is a determination in the *Idea*, that determination cannot be furnished by the concrete restriction which exists in the sensation.

This determination must, therefore, come from the intellect, for the reason that it is an ideal limitation. And this leads

us to the consideration of the third Rosminian canon, that the indeterminate idea of Being "cannot come from the operations of the human spirit, such as universalization and abstraction; because these operations do nothing more than either add determinations to this same idea *Being*, or take them away when they have been added, and this *on occasion* of feelings experienced." It may at once be asked, Where is the proof for this canon? It is not sufficient to affirm that the operations of the human intellect, such as universalization or abstraction, cannot evolve the indeterminate idea of Being, but it must be shown why the human intellect is incapable of any such process. If we examine carefully into the reason alleged to uphold this incapability, we shall find an admission which virtually denies the assumption. Rosmini admits that the human spirit *can take away* certain determinations from its determinate ideas; in other words, that it has the power of abstracting certain determinations from its ideas, so that one determinate idea can, by the lifting of certain ideal restrictions, be evolved into a less determinate idea; for instance, in the idea Man, by taking away the determining note Rational, we arrive at the less determinate note Animal; thence by abstracting the note Sensitive we arrive at the still more indeterminate idea of Living Thing, and, in continuing the process by lifting the note Living, we reach a still greater indetermination, that of Body; thence we can prescind from the note Corporeal and hold as a remainder Substance. What, then, is to prevent us from abstracting once more and arriving at the transcendental notion Being? When Rosmini admits the power of abstraction to be possessed at all by the human intellect, where is he to draw the line? At what point of the process will he set the limit?

If the intellect can go at all from the more determinate to the less determinate, what is to prevent it from reaching the least determinate or the indeterminate? In the face of this it may be held that it is not necessary for the idea of indeterminate Being to be innate, for, if the power of abstraction be at all conceded to the human intellect, and this Rosmini admits, it can arrive at this indeterminate idea by the active exercise of its abstractive power. Moreover, although the idea of Being in general is indeterminate *as regards all determinate modes of Being*, yet in its *formal* concept it is determinate in so far as its formal indetermination

marks it off from restrictive determinations, and constitutes it as most universal of all concepts. In its formality it is neither Substance nor Accident, neither Finite nor Infinite. Considered, therefore, in its own formal nature, it is determinate for the reason that it cannot be confounded with any determinate being whatever. What, therefore, is to determine it if, as Rosmini holds, all ideal determinations are furnished by sensation? He surely could not hold that sensation furnishes the determination of the indeterminate! To admit this would make even the general idea of Being partake of the nature of the concrete, for Being must be formally determined in some way—that is, it must be marked off from all other concepts as that which suffers no determination at all. But if Being in general is innate to the human intellect and suffers determination through sensitive restriction, it descends to particularity, and its universal nature is destroyed.

The *necessity*, therefore, of any *innate* idea is not established in the assertion that the abstractive power of the human intellect is incapable of reaching the indeterminate by lifting the limitations of the determinate. For if it be at all admitted that the human intellect can abstract from any determination, it follows that it can abstract from all determinations. But, since the chief argument upon which Rosmini bases his theory lies in this so-called necessity, the foundation of his system falls with the doing away with this presumed necessity. It may be admitted that there is a necessity to the human intellect of possessing first the idea of Being indeterminate before it can cognize any determinate beings, but may be altogether denied that there is, for this reason, any necessity that this first idea must be innate, or *given* to the soul at its creation. Rosmini's averment that this first idea is innate is only an arbitrary assumption, and lacks all confirmation in fact.

Outside of all that has been said, the postulating of such a theory involves us in complications which seriously affect well-established conclusions from other departments of Philosophy. In the first place, what does this idea of Being represent? In other words, what is the formal object which this concept covers? If it be an idea at all, it must have an object. What is this object? If this idea be co-created with the human spirit, the object of this idea must have been cognized by the human spirit from the first

moment of its existence, or it lies latent therein until sensation, as Rosmini affirms, furnishes the occasion for its production. In whichever way we consider the matter, there must be an object corresponding to the idea as soon as it becomes active in the human intellect. That object, it will be answered, is simply Being. But it is a verified metaphysical fact that Being, *qua* indetermined, has no objective existence. All Being objectively existing is determined Being, Infinite or Finite, Substance or Accident. Before, therefore, the human intellect can possess this indeterminate idea, there must be some object present to it objectively; but, as all objects in the order of nature are determined beings, unless first a determined being be present objectively to the intellect, it can conceive no idea at all, much less the most indeterminate of all ideas.

It cannot get its first idea from any indeterminate object, for no such object exists. The object which, therefore, presents itself first to the intellect must be the object whence it gets its first idea; but that object must be objectively a determined being. Now, as every idea must have its object, the first of all ideas must also have its object; and, since the first object present to the intellect is that object which gives the human intellect its first idea, and this first idea is that of indeterminate Being, it follows that the human intellect must get this first idea of indeterminate Being from the first determined being objectively present to it. But the only way in which the human intellect can get its idea of indeterminate Being from determined being is by apprehending it apart from all its determinations—that is, by abstracting from determined Being all its determinations and considering it as Being *simply* under the transcendental concept *Some Thing*.

It may be stated, on the validity of the foregoing argumentation, that the indeterminate idea of Being must necessarily follow by way of abstraction from the presence of the determined object, and cannot, therefore, be innate to the human soul, for the reason that it must be the resultant of the combined operation of the intellect and the determined being which is its object. To give to the intellect the idea of indeterminate being without an object being present to the intellect, to which that idea in some way corresponds, is, *de potentia ordinatu*, impossible. There can be no object in the objective order of things which is not determined being,

and there can be no idea in the intellect which has not an object fundamentally corresponding to it in that order, whether that object be an actual entity or only a possible entity ; and this object must have its own definite essence or quiddity, which determines it to its own nature and marks it off from all other objects, possible or actual. It must, therefore, follow that the intellect finds the foundation for its indeterminate concept of being in the determined objective order, and hence can only arrive at its transcendental concept by abstracting from the determined object present to it all determinations. If this be not held, we must assume the radically false position that there is nothing in the objective order, even fundamentally, which corresponds to our indeterminate concept of being ; and, therefore, when we predicate being of anything, we are not attributing to it any reality, but only an intellectual figment. Than this there is no broader road to Idealism, and thence, as a logical sequence, to Pantheism.

Furthermore, this determined object whence the intellect abstracts its indeterminate idea is either infinite or finite, either God or creature. If it be infinite, either this infinite object is immediately apprehended by the intellect or mediately ; if immediately, then the first object of human cognition is the Divine Essence directly ; if mediate, then the first object is not the infinite at all, but the medium through which the infinite is apprehended secondarily or as a sequence from the first. But on this last supposition we are forced to the conclusion that it is the finite, after all, which the intellect first apprehends. On the supposition that the intellect first and directly apprehends the Divine Essence we are thrown upon the theory which Gioberti champions—viz., that our first idea is God. Indeed, Gioberti advanced this last objection against Rosmini, who admitted that there must be a distinction between indeterminate Being and God ; but we think with little success, for, on his premises, that the idea of being is innate, it seems to us he must be forced to Gioberti's position.

Gioberti argued that " this idea must be God, because everything is either God or a creature, but the idea of Being is not a creature ; seeing it has divine characters, therefore it must be God." The Divine characters to which Gioberti referred are its Eternity, Immutability, and Necessity. To this Rosmini replied that " Every *real* being must be God or creature, but not so every *ideal* being.

The *Idea* of being abstracted from God's reality is neither God nor creature; it is something *sui generis*, an *appurtenance of God*." This reply seems to us but a distinction in words, and involves some very fatal falsities. In the first place, Rosmini explicitly declares that an idea is not a *real* Being. But this is false on the face of the assertion, for an idea is as *real* in its own order as its object is in the ontological order. Its reality is not, of course, the same reality as its object, for the one is a *real* ideal and the other a *real* objective determined essence. What is more, this *real* idea is a *real* modification of the thinking subject, and as such has a real existence in the physical order. Not only, therefore, is it a creature, but an accidental modification of a creature, a *Being of Being*. To hold, therefore, that it is neither God nor creature is to contradict the logic of facts. Furthermore, to affirm that it is something *sui generis*, and yet is an *appurtenance* of God, is also a manifest contradiction; for, if it be something of its own kind, it must be by that much distinct from God, and what is not God is infinitely distinguished from him; if it be an *appurtenance* of God, it cannot be any other than God Himself, for in the Divine Being there is no real distinction. He can have no appurtenances, for everything which belongs to him is essentially Himself.

Here we find Rosmini running adverse to certain indisputable philosophical dicta. Ideas are realities, which he denies; they are not God, which he implicitly affirms, although he attempts to evade the difficulty; God can have no appurtenances, for all that belongs to Him must be of His own Essence, and this Rosmini seems to dispute when he affirms that there are *appurtenances* of God which are not God. In brief, therefore, the idea of Being cannot be innate, because there is no necessity which demands that we hold to the opinion that it is innate, although there is a necessity that we should hold to the undeniable fact that it is the first idea of the human intellect. The fact, however, that it has precedence to all other ideas in the order of cognition does not establish the fact that this first idea has been *given* to the human intellect. In the second place, the human intellect could never get its first idea of indeterminate being save by abstraction from some determined being which presents itself objectively to the intellect, for all objective being is determined being, and so it is

only determined being which can become the object of intellectual cognition, and alone can serve as the objective foundation of the concept of indeterminate Being. The intellect, therefore, can only get its indeterminate idea by abstracting from that determined object. In the third place, this determined object must either be infinite or finite; it cannot be infinite, for then our first idea, which is indeterminate, would be God, and this leads us to many serious complications and contradictions to established truths in Metaphysics.

Let us now examine into the position held by the advocates of *a priori* ideas.¹ In this theory it is affirmed that the human intellect produces its first idea or ideas by its own activity without the aid of any extraneous object. It is asserted that the intellect determines itself to the act of cognition, and hence is self-determined; that the intellect has the power of making its own idea in this act of self-determination. This determination is not the act of determining its own entity or creating itself in the order of being, but is the self-determination, its own operation in the act of knowing. It must be admitted, therefore, that the intellect is in its first act of entity, or in the act of existence, before it arrives at its second act of operation, or that act by which it knows. If, however, it be held that the act of knowing creates the intellect entitatively, or makes it to be something in the order of being by virtue of that cognoscitive act, we fall into the following contradiction: antecedent to this act of knowing the intellect does not exist, for it is only made to be by the cognoscitive act; but on the hypothesis this cognoscitive act itself is not being, or does not exist; hence we have a *Non-Entity* determining another *Non-Entity*, the as yet non-existent intellect, and, by virtue of its determining act, creat-

¹ That there may be no misapprehension in this matter, it will be well to state our ontological standpoint. In the present paper the word *a priori* is used with reference to the order of cognition in the finite intellect. It is here held that no idea in our intellect is *a priori* to the cognition of its object. When, therefore, we deny any *a priori* idea to the finite intellect, it is not to be understood that we mean the same of the Divine Intellect. All created objects, which are intelligible because they possess the nature of Being, are posterior to their prototypal idea in the Divine Mind; and hence the divine idea is *a priori* to all objects in the created world. Moreover, all objects are intelligible—*i. e.*, can be known to the finite intellect, because they are true being through their conformity to the prototypal idea after which they were fashioned. It must, therefore, be remembered that our argument applies to finite and not to Divine cognition.

ing Being ; in other words, we shall have a non-existent, non-determined something acting upon a non-existent something, and thereby determining it ; but as this supposed first has no determination of its own, how can it give determination to this second, the supposed subject of its act ? *Nemo dat quod non habet*—the first has no determination of its own. How, therefore, can it give any determination to the second, seeing that it has nothing to give ? *Operatio sequitur esse*—operation follows being ; that is, the second act, which is operation, follows the first act, which is that of existence. The first act of existence, therefore, cannot be determined by the second act, but, on the contrary, must necessarily antecede it. For before any being can perform any operative action it must already be. It follows, therefore, that the existence of the Intellect as entity must precede its operation, the act of thinking. Hence the act of thinking cannot make the intellect to be entitatively.

Since, then, the intellect as entity antecedes its act of thought, the question remains, Can the intellect determine its own act of thought ; in other words, create its own idea ? It will be admitted that, prior to its act of thought, the intellect holds itself only *potentially* to that act ; that is to say, it does not yet actually think, but *can* think—*i. e.*, it is *possible* for it to think. As yet it is not determined to think, but has the power of such determination ? Whence comes the determination which will give it the actuality of thinking ? From itself will be the answer of the *a priori* advocate. Let us see if such can be the case. If the intellect can determine itself into the actuality of thinking, it must already possess that actual determination, which it will give to itself ; in other words, it must already be in the act of thinking, for it cannot give anything to itself unless it already have that something to give. But the very hypothesis involves a contradiction, that the intellect is only potential to the act of thought, and yet already is in the state of actuality which the act of thinking connotes ! What is potential can never be actual, and what is actual can never be potential under the same aspect. The potential and the actual mutually exclude each other, for what can be, now is not, and what now is, has ceased to be any longer possible, for the reason that it is now actual. It may be answered to this that the fact of the intellect's possessing entity at all is sufficient for its cognition of itself, and hence for its knowing the nature of entity or being.

By this means it will arrive at its idea of being, and may, therefore, be said to determine itself to its second act.

It seems that this process is compatible upon the basis that it has the power of reflection, and may thereby turn in upon itself, and hence know itself as Being. In reply to this difficulty, if we examine into it carefully, it will be found that it is nothing more than a restatement of the assumption that an entity holding itself potentially to its operation can determine itself to that second act without already possessing this second actuality; for the act of reflection is a second act, to which the intellect in its first act of entity holds itself potentially, and, in so far as it is potential to the intellect, requires a determination from something already in act; but reflection is as yet potential, and for that reason not actually possessed by the intellect. In order to determine itself to the act of reflection, the intellect should already hold the actuality of reflection before it can give to itself this actual operation. This involves us in the same contradiction that the intellect reflects before it performs the act of reflection. It may be furthermore urged that the intellect only reflects upon its own essence, through its own acts. It must, therefore, be already in its second act before it can reflect upon its essence through this act. Once given its second act, it can readily return upon that act, for the reason that this second act then becomes an object of which it may think by a third act, whereby it cognizes its own thought, and so gets an idea of its idea. It follows from this that the intellect cannot determine itself to its second act by holding its own entity up to itself as object of cognition. Whence, then, does the Intellect get its first idea, that of Being? We have seen that this idea cannot be innate to the soul—that is, *given* to it. On the other hand, it cannot come from the *sole* activity of the intellect itself, for the reason that the intellect primarily possesses only the first activity of existence and not the second activity of thought.

So far we have taken into consideration the solution propounded by those systems advocating *a priori* ideas, either innate or otherwise; under the test of analysis they fail to give the desired answer. We will now turn our attention to that third system, which affirms that the first idea is the combined product of both the extraneous object and the intrinsic activity of the thinking subject. We have

already seen that there can be no idea without an object ; we have also argued that every object in the universe of being exists as a determined something—this or that something. In the first place, then, it may be asserted that the first object of intellectual cognition must be a determined object—that is, as an entity objective to the intellect, it must have a determined form. But we also know that the first idea in the intellect is not of the object as determined, but as undetermined—that is, of the object apart from its determinations, whatsoever they may be. Granting, then, that the first idea is that of undetermined being, and also that there is no undetermined object existing in the ontological order, it follows that the intellect can only get this first indeterminate idea from a determined object by cognizing that object not as a determined object, this or that, but by conceiving this or that object, prescinding from its determinations, as merely *something* ; in other words, by an immediate abstraction of all determinations, or, to speak more precisely, by first cognizing the object as simple being before conceiving it as any determined being. It may be safely laid down at the start that the first idea in the human intellect, indeterminate being, is in some way the combined resultant of both the object and the thinking subject. This is exactly what the system under immediate consideration postulates. So far we are forced to an admission of this much as a logical sequence from our argumentation against the two foregoing systems.

The question now remains, *How* do the object and the intellect combine to the production of the idea ? In the first place, it must be carefully noted that when we speak of the idea as the resultant of the combination of object and intellect, it is not meant that there is a coalescing into one after the manner of a synthesis of object and intellect, so that the idea may be considered entitatively to be made up of object and subject as the composite elements of a physical whole. On the contrary, we mean that the idea is a resultant of both intellect and object, as causes which go toward the production of the idea, inasmuch as it is an effect of their joint action. Again we must distinguish what aspect of causality each holds to the effect—that is, what sort of cause the object is in relation to the idea, and what sort the intellect. This we will take into consideration in its proper place during the course of our investigation.

Since the human soul does not exist as a pure spirituality, but is conjoined to a material body as that which gives the determining form to the human nature, making a composite unity in conjunction with the material part, we may start out with the evident premise that the first idea of the human intellect is drawn in some way from the concrete object outside, through the medium of the senses. The intellect may be called an interior faculty which does not come into immediate contact with the material objective world, from which it is hedged in by the integument of sense. It must therefore come to or reach the intelligibility of the object *mediately* or through a medium. This medium must be, firstly, the external senses, for it is the external senses which first and immediately apprehend the sensible object as such. Again, as the intellect does not apprehend or cognize the material concrete singularity of the object, but comprehends it as universal essence, it follows that the intellect, in its cognition of the object under its universal nature, must, in some way, rid it of its material and sensible qualities; in other words, there must be an active abstraction on the part of the intellect, whereby it strips the object of its sensible properties. So much, then, for the facts which are patent to any accurate observer. To state the matter explicitly, we have this: the object outside, the intellect within; the object material, concrete, and singular; the concept within, immaterial and universal. Furthermore, the intellect can only draw its universal concept from the singular object, and through the medium of the senses.

The question now remaining for solution is, How the intellect acquires its universal abstract idea from the particular concrete object? Human cognition, it has been said, begins with the senses; let us therefore regulate our method of investigation by following the natural order of cognition; we shall therefore start out with sensitive knowing as the first step in the process. An object presents itself to the senses; the eye sees that it has firstly many varieties of color; secondly, that it has certain dimensions; the ear apprehends certain sounds which it emits; the touch, exercised in whatsoever organ it resides, feels the qualities of hardness or softness, etc. Such are the general sense cognitions, and consequent upon these may follow others, such as odor, moving, rest, and modifications of various kinds.

Let us now suppose that all the sensible qualities first apparent to the senses have been separately apprehended by each sense—the eye, color; the ear, sound; the touch, hardness, etc.—and the various senses each its special object of cognition. In order to an intact and complete sensitive cognition of the object, there must be a sensitive synthesis of all the various parts as apprehended by the senses. This synthesis cannot be brought about by any one special sense, for the eye, as an instance, cannot apprehend the sound from the hardness, softness, etc., and likewise each sense can only apprehend its own special object of cognition. Therefore, that there may be a complete sensitive cognition of the whole object in synthesis, there must be some sensitive faculty which sensitively apprehends all the properties of the object in its totality. Furthermore, there must be some sensitive faculty by means of which each special cognition by particular senses are distinguished one from another. Otherwise, how is the feeling or sensitive subject to distinguish between each particular sensation or apprehension?

How will the subject know the difference between the color of the object and its property of hardness, unless there be some sensitive means of comparison? The eye, for instance, cannot distinguish between the color and the hardness of the object, for the reason that it only apprehends color and not hardness, and so no more knows hardness from sound or any other property which does not fall under its own special act of cognition. As a consequence, not knowing any other property than that which falls under its special cognition, it can institute no comparison between its own object and another. There must therefore be a sense organ which can make the comparison and distinction between the special objects of each sense, and so synthesize all into one complete sense perception. This sense faculty is called the Common Sense, because it has in common as its object all sensible properties. It is an organ on which are registered all sense perceptions coming from the external senses, and on which is expressed the complete image of all sensible properties in the object according to the extent in which they have been apprehended by the external senses. Wheresoever this organ may be located in the sensitive subject is a matter of indifference to the present discussion, but it is commonly supposed that it is situate in the brain. In philosophical terminology it is also called the Imagination.

On the Imagination it may therefore be said that the complete picture of the object is expressed analogously to the way in which the picture of the individual is received and expressed on the plate in the camera of the photographer. This picture, or phantasma, as it is called in philosophical speech, is, however, only sensible, being but an image of the sensible properties and qualities of the object.

So far we have had but sensitive cognition, the apprehension of material properties, as such. There is as yet no apprehension of the Universal, but simply of this particular concrete object. Let us suppose that the object which we have instanced is a man. All that the sensitive subject knows is this particular concrete individual, offering itself for cognition under material determinations. There is no knowledge, as yet, of man in his essence, or under the abstraction Rational Animality, which is equally applicable to each and every individual of the species. It is the intellect, we have said, which apprehends the universal nature or essence.

How, now, does the intellect acquire its concept from this concrete phantasma expressed by the faculty of Imagination? It is evidently from this phantasma that the intellect draws its concept, but how? Here we stand in face of the difficulty. Just as the phantasma stands, it cannot be taken up into the intellect, for it is concrete and particular, while we know that the concept is abstract and universal. It may therefore be safely stated that the intellect does not grasp and take up into itself the phantasma as such. The phantasma must undergo a purifying process before the intellect can abstract from it its idea; that is to say, the phantasma must be stripped of its concreteness and all its particularity before the intellect can apprehend the essence of the object which it (the phantasma) presents.¹ Now, this concreteness and particularity consist in those very material qualities and properties which are pictured in the imagination by

¹ The Phantasma or picture in the Imagination is not to be regarded as a barrier standing between the Intellect and its object, but as a medium by means of which the intellect reaches its object. On the retina of the eye is formed an image of the sensible object by means of which the organ sees its object. The eye does not see the image on the retina, but the object by means of its image. Analogous to this sensitive process is the intellectual cognition by means of the image.

means of the phantasma, such as this color, this hardness, this sound, this size, etc. It must here be remembered that the phantasma is but the means through which the intellect apprehends the object, which is presented to it through the sensible representation of itself in the phantasma.

The intellect, therefore, in order to reach the essence of the object, must thrust aside the sensible properties expressed in the phantasma; that is, it must strip the object of all its sensible properties and apprehend its bare essence free from all its concreteness. By what means does this process take place? Plainly the imagination cannot strip the phantasma of its concreteness and particularity, for its only function is to apprehend and express these sensible properties in a synthetical image; in other words, its function is to make the phantasma, and not unmake it. It remains, therefore, that the intellect itself should perform this operation, and this it does by its abstractive power, which is nothing more nor less than the power of stripping off the particular and concrete in any material object presented to it for cognition. But this is not all; so far the intellect has only taken the concrete and the individual properties from the object as present in the phantasma, and thereby rendered it ready for cognition; upon this there follows another act by which the image now made intelligible is received into the intellect and then expressed or *conceived* into the idea or concept.

Hence the intellect, in its intellecting operation, is to be regarded according to a threefold act: the first, that of making the phantasma intelligible by purifying it from its concreteness through abstraction; the second, of receiving the purified or intelligible image into itself, and the third, that of expressing or giving birth to its concept, which is the idea or image representing the object under the form of universal essence or nature.

To return to the example we have already given, we will suppose an individual man to be presented to the feeling and thinking subject. First comes the sensitive cognition, according to particular and concrete properties and qualities affecting the external senses, then the transference of these to the imagination, forming an image in synthesis of the whole; so far, it is all sensitive cognition; the next step is that of intellectual cognition, wherein not this particular color, shape, size, etc., is the

object of cognition, but the universal nature of man, viz., rational animal, which can be predicated univocally of each and every individual man that does now or ever can exist. The phantasma cannot be predicated of each and every actual man or possible man, for the phantasma is only the concrete image of this particular individual, with his individual qualities and accidents. As an instance, suppose the individual in question has red hair, blue eyes, short stature, and is stout; if I were to predicate the phantasma of any other individual, I should be simply saying that he has the assemblage of all these qualities and accidents I saw in the first individual, viz., red hair, blue eyes, short stature, and stoutness. I should not be in this case predicating any nature or essence, but only an assemblage of accidents which this second person may not have, for he may have black hair, black eyes, etc. But, when I predicate of this second the nature of rational animal, I am declaring of him an essence which altogether prescind from all qualities and accidents whatsoever, and may be equally said of both.

We see, therefore, that there is an essential difference between the concept in the intellect and the phantasma in the imagination, the latter being but a concrete and particular image of a particular and concrete object, whereas the former is a universal and abstract image of this same object, stripped of all its individualizing notes.

Now that we have stated the method of intellectual operation in its act of cognition, let us examine with more precision into the nature of its act. It will be remembered that in advancing our objections to the *a priori* system of ideas we held that the intellect by its own unassisted activity could not produce its second act or that of cognition. We then said that the intellect, before its act of thought, held itself potentially to this second act, and since no power could generate its act save by a determination to that through some actuality other than itself, and that since the intellect did not possess the actuality of thought before thinking, it followed that it could not give this actuality to itself for the reason that it had no such actuality to give. We argued upon this ground that, therefore, there must be an object present to the intellect which alone could determine the intellect to think.

It is now incumbent upon us to define what we mean by the act of thinking. Firstly, it may be stated that the act of thinking is that operation whereby the intellect grasps and conceives its object; in other words, it is that act of the intellect whereby it forms within itself an image of the object under the nature of abstraction and universality. Its concept is the term of its act—that is, the concept is that in which the act terminates or results. The intellect holds itself potentially to the exercise of its thinking activity, until there be some object present to it *upon which it can exercise its activity*. Until, therefore, there be something present to it upon which it can act, it will not and cannot act. An object, therefore, must needs be present to it in order to determine the intellect to act upon it. An act cannot be exercised upon nothing, and inasmuch as an active power requires a something to determine it to the exercise of its activity, before there is present to it some object, which can serve in its operation as that factor necessary to call forth its potential activity into active exercise, before this factor is present there can be no action.

Now, the intellect, from its very constitution, has the power of thinking; but, since to think means to conceive a universal and abstract image of an object, there can manifestly be no thought until the object is present to be thought of. In this sense, then, the object determines the intellect to think, namely, inasmuch as it moves the intellect to become active in the exercise of its second act, and, moreover, is an essential factor in the act of cognition, for the reason that the intellect could not think without something to think of, and that something must be an object. The object, therefore, is that actuality which determines the intellect to its second act in the way we have stated. The actuality of this second act is nothing more than the grasping of the object and conceiving its image; and so all that is requisite for the production of this second activity is, on the one hand, the power in the intellect, and on the other the actual object to be grasped; the act is the medium which has for one term the object, and for the other the concept.

And here we have adequate and proportionate causes for the production of the act. The material efficient cause is the object, offering the material to the intellect for cognition; the formal efficient cause is the intellectual power of conception. Let us

look upon the intellect as a sun, with the power of illuminating any object which is presented to it. In order that it may actually exercise its illuminative power there must be some object for it to illuminate. Until, therefore, some object is present to it to suffer illumination, the intellectual sun cannot be said to illuminate, but simply has the power of illumination; but as soon as an object comes within the radius of its light, then it can be said to be actually illuminating. This illustration is, of course, inadequate to express the complete intellectual action, but it is good in so far as it goes. For not only does the intellect illuminate its object, but also takes it up into itself and conceives it by giving birth to it in a new order, by making the object participate, as it were, in its own nature, clothing it with immortality, and lifting it up into the immaterial world.

As far as we have proceeded in our investigation, we have ascertained that the concept is the mutual production of the object, on the one hand, and the active power of the intellect, as determined to act through the object, on the other. In other words, ideas originate in the intellect, not through the unassisted power of the intellect alone, nor are they the sole product of the object, but are the resultant of both combined as causes to their production. It now remains for us to inquire how it is that the intellect abstracts from the object, firstly, the indeterminate idea of Being, which, it will be remembered, was said to be its primary idea. It might be said, immediately, that there is no question as regards the fact that such is the case. An argument conclusive enough might be built upon the ground that, since the intellect must get its ideas from the object without, and that since the first idea is that of indeterminate Being, this first idea must come from the object. But the question now is not that such is the case, but, rather, How does this fact come about? the fact is undeniable, but we wish to account for it rather than dispute it.

It would seem that the first concept in the intellect should be that of some determined Being, and not that of indeterminate Being, for the reason that no object can be presented to it except a determined object; and, therefore, it would follow that its first idea, being drawn from a determined object, should be the idea of the determined essence of this object. Upon this hypothesis it would also seem that the very last idea the intel-

lect arrived at is the indeterminate idea of Being through a process of abstraction. We should then have the idea of Being in general, the last and not the first concept of all. In sensitive cognition it must be admitted that the first apprehension is that of the first particular concrete object which becomes present to the sense. The first, as well as all phantasmata, in the imagination is that of the particular concrete thing, whatsoever it may be.

Let us suppose the first image formed in the imagination is that of this man, John. We have present to the intellect the sensible image of John, whence it is to draw its first idea of indeterminate Being. This idea will not be that of the essence of John as a rational animal, but the indeterminate notion of Being or essence in general, prescinding from the determined essence rational animal. But how does the intellect grasp the most indeterminate of all ideas, firstly and immediately, without going through the process of abstraction by lifting, one after the other, the various determinations to be found in the determinate essence rational animal? To solve this difficulty will require a word by way of premiss to what has already been stated, and that word refers to what may be the nature of the object of intellectual cognition in general.

The proper object of the intellect is essence in general; that is to say, the intellect holds itself indifferently to the cognition of any essence that may be presented to it, and is only determined to the cognition of a particular essence when it cognizes this essence as such. The primary object of intellectual cognition is, therefore, essence, in so far as it prescinds from all determinations. Hence, when a determined essence presents itself to the intellect, it first apprehends such essence, not as this essence, but simply as an essence, without regarding the determinations which actually limit it in its existence. Its first act of apprehension, therefore, in seizing upon the essence offered to it, is to grasp it under its highest generality, viz., simply as a something having essence; in other words, to simply apprehend it as an essence prescinding from all consideration of its determinations which make it to be this essence. This is to do nothing more than to apprehend the object as Being, and in so doing the intellect conceives its first and most indeterminate concept, that of Being.

To put the matter clearer, we will have recourse to an analogy

drawn from the physical order. An object comes within the vision of the eye, though at a great distance. What definite object it is, whether horse, man, or locomotive, is not seen. All that can be seen is that it is an object, a something. It might be only a vapor, yet it is a something, an object. The intellect first apprehends its object in a like way, viz., as a something, though not this something. In this first apprehension we have its most indeterminate concept formed, that of Being. What is more, intellectual cognition could not take place unless the intellect first apprehended its object as something simply, for not to apprehend it as something would be to apprehend it as nothing—that is, not apprehend it at all. Furthermore, this apprehension of the object simply as something or Being must precede its cognition as *this* something, for the reason that the intellect could not apprehend the object under its determination at all unless it also apprehended these determinations as something, and, hence, must first apprehend them under the nature of indeterminate Being.

It follows, therefore, that the intellect must have its idea of something in general before it can cognize something in its determinations. When, therefore, the phantasma is presented to the intellect, the first act of the intellect is to apprehend the object presented through the phantasma as an essence, and an essence, simply, under the transcendental notion of Being. It is in the way just explained that we see how the intellect gets the idea of Being as its first idea. But whether the idea of Being is first or last idea, is a matter of indifference as regards the theory of the origin of ideas, which we have advanced as the only one in keeping with the facts known in intellectual cognition. For, in either case, whether the idea of Being is first or last, the theory holds good that ideas are the conjoint production of the object and the intellect.

The theory which holds that the idea in the intellect is but a sensible image impressed on the brain organ by the object reduces all concepts to mere phantasmata, and, as a consequence, denies all universality to them. But this is simply to destroy intellectual cognition, and is a patent contradiction to the evident *fact* that ideas do possess a universal nature. For this reason we have refrained from seriously considering the empirical theory. It is such an overt contradiction to what we have the very clearest evidence

is a necessary truth, that the statement of this theory is a refutation of its position. Its absurdity lies on the face of it, declaring, without comment, its inutility and impossibility.

In conclusion to our investigation of this intricate subject, it may be said that, even if the theory we have advocated does not satisfactorily conclude its truth to the reader's mind, at least it must be admitted that it is the nearest approximation to the truth that the human intellect has reached. It may also with safety be affirmed that the true and full explication of the question, if any is ever to be attained, will be arrived at by a further development of the system we have endeavored to elucidate, rather than by any theory opposed to it.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

*ROSMINI'S SKETCH OF MODERN PHILOSOPHIES.*¹

Through the efforts of the brotherhood at Saint Ethelreda's (Ely Place, Holborn), London, English readers are furnished with the means of access to the writings of the great Italian philosopher. Mr. Thomas Davidson (well known to the readers of this journal) has given efficient aid to this movement by numerous magazine articles, and by translations and original expositions.² Mr. Davidson has just now in press a translation of Rosmini's "Psychology." The first and second volumes of the English translation of Rosmini's "New Essay on the Origin of Ideas"³ have

¹ "A Short Sketch of Modern Philosophies and of his own System." By Antonio Rosmini-Serbati. With a few words of Introduction by Father Lockhart. London: Burns & Oates, Orchard Street, W., 1882.

² "The Philosophical System of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati." Translated, with a sketch of the Author's Life, Bibliography, Introduction, and Notes, by Thomas Davidson. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1882.

³ "The Origin of Ideas." By Antonio Rosmini-Serbati. Translated from the fifth Italian edition of the "Nuovo Saggio sull' Origine delle Idee." Vols. I and II. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1 Paternoster Square, 1883.

appeared from the hands of the brotherhood named, and the third and concluding volume may be expected.

We have reserved full notices of these works for a future number of this journal. If the study of Rosmini shall serve to introduce thoughtful readers to the rich mine of ideas called "Scholastic Philosophy," a great event will be achieved. Rosmini himself must be regarded as a genuine son of the school, and a worthy continuer of the famous line.

In this number we print a criticism on Rosmini's theory of Innate Ideas as found briefly stated in the little volume whose title is given above. It is only fair to quote the following passages relative to the general subject from Father Lockhart's Introduction, and refer our readers to Professor Davidson's account of the system, and to the translations of the "Origin of Ideas" and the "Psychology" for the complete discussion of the subtle and profound views of the author on these questions.

Rosmini undertakes to account for Ideas.

"Now, the preliminary difficulty in understanding the Rosminian philosophy is that it goes deeper than what are *popularly* assumed to be the first principles of human thought. It undertakes to *account for* ideas. But to many people it has never occurred that there is any difficulty in this matter requiring explanation. They have been used to assume with Locke and others, more or less of the same school, that the formation of ideas is so simple that it does not require to be accounted for. It is assumed to be a simple fact like sensation. They say: 'We *have* sensations, and we *have* ideas; the sensations come first, and they are transformed into ideas by the faculty of reflection.'"

Ideas enable us to know Facts of Experience.

"The fundamental principle of Rosmini's philosophy concerns, as I have said, the origin of ideas—how the *ideas or thoughts of things* arise in our mind. For it is certain that, whenever that modification of our sensitivity which we term a sensation takes place, we immediately and necessarily think, not of the sensation *within* us, but of a something outside of us to which we attribute *existence*, call it a *thing*, and credit it with being the *cause* of our sensations; so that we actually attribute to it the qualities of heat or cold, blackness, whiteness, or the like, which, when we reflect or think again, we know exist within our own sensitivity only.

"This mental process is obviously a *judgment*, in which we predicate the *existence* of a *cause* of our sensation. To say nothing at present of the idea of *cause*, it is clear that we could not apply the predicate of *existence* unless we knew what *existence* is—that is to say, unless we had the idea of existence already in our mind. We have thus two modes of knowledge to be carefully distinguished from each other—knowledge by judgment, whereby we affirm the reality of individual things; knowledge by *intuition*, whereby we intellectually think pure ideas."

The Idea precedes the Judgment and is the Source of Objective Knowledge.

"We are said to know a thing when we apply to it the *idea* of *existence* or judge that it is an *existing thing*.

"That which is *no thing* is unthinkable, for the object of thought—the idea of existence—is gone. And this shows that the idea of existence is the necessary object of thought, as S. Thomas says, '*Objectum intellectus est ens vel verum commune*' (S. Thom., S. I., 55, l. c.). It is the first idea, without which we can form no judgment and know nothing. It is plain, therefore, that the idea of existence must be self-known (*per se nota*), otherwise we should be incapable of knowing it or of knowing anything. And this is the same as to say that it must be the *first idea* and the *one innate idea* in the human mind.

"But how does this idea of existence make its appearance in the mind? Not as a product of the senses, for we are obliged to apply this idea on occasion of each sensation in order to form that *idea* of the *thing* which necessarily arises in our mind on occasion of each sensation.

"It does not account for the origin of the idea of *existence* in our minds to say we have in us a *faculty* endowed with the virtue of acquiring the idea of existence on occasion of the sensations. The question is, What is the nature of this faculty? For, in order that this faculty may be able to operate, must it not be itself *in act*? Surely that which is not *in act* does not exist, and therefore can not operate. For a faculty is nothing but a 'first act' (*actus primus*), whence 'second acts' (*actus secundī*), or what we commonly call '*acts*,' may proceed. Now, the *first act* of the *intellectual faculty*—the *act* by which this faculty exists—must in the very nature of things be an *intellectual act*, else the faculty would not be *intellectual*; and if the act is intellectual it must consist in the *vision* or *intuition* of an *object*, because this is what is meant by an *intellectual act*. The very etymology of *intellectus* (derived from *intus legere*, to read within) shows this clearly. The act of *reading* necessarily implies the act of *seeing*; and there can be no *seeing* without something which *sees* and something which is *seen*; in other words, without the intelligent *subject*

and the *object* which this *subject* looks at and thus *understands*. The thing seen—the object present *ab initio* to the intelligent subject—the constitutive *form* of the human understanding (*vis intellectiva*), is *existence*, *being*, and this is the *light of reason*.”

Ideas are Divine in their Source.

“Now, the idea of a thing is the same as the logical possibility of the thing. That which is possible was always possible, and is therefore eternal, and that which is eternal is divine; therefore Rosmini teaches that ideas are in a certain sense divine, *i. e.*, because they have divine characteristics.

“The idea, therefore, is so totally distinct from the sensations, so immensely elevated above them, that it is absurd to suppose it to be the *product* of sensations, because no effect can rise higher than its source; although it is, at the same time, an obvious fact that ideas are made known to us on *occasion* of the sensations. In a word, the sensations furnish the *material* element; the innate idea of existence [furnishes] the *formal* element of all the ideas we form by aid of the senses.

“If, then, the *idea of existence* is not a product of sensation, yet if on occasion of the sensations we always find it in our mind, it is clear that we find there what was there before, which was never *formed*, but which was *given from without* by means of another faculty, that of intelligence, which, as Rosmini teaches, is endowed with the intuition of the idea of existence by God, in Whose Mind the idea of existence, and of all existences, was from all eternity. This is expressed by S. Thomas when he says: ‘*Deus cognoscendo se cognoscit naturam universalis entis*’ (C. G., I, 50).”

Ideas are Divine Archetypes.

“These ideas of possible being in the mind of God are the types according to which He created all things, by an act of His free will, selecting out of all possible things such as He saw it was for the best to create. Thus an architect forms in his own mind the design which he intends to draw or to build, selecting also, for good reasons, not always the thing most perfect in itself, but that which is best, all the circumstances being considered.”

The Human and the Divine Ideas of Existence the same.

“S. Thomas says: ‘*Esse in quantum est esse non potest esse diversum*’ (C. G., I, 52). The idea, therefore, of existence or of possible being in the mind of God is the same essence of being as the idea of existence in

the mind of man. It must, therefore, be a communication to man of something that considered in itself is Divine, since the ideas in God are His Divine substance. In God they are God."

The Idea of Existence the Light of the Mind.

"The idea of existence is the *light* of the mind, according to the analogy with the material light, so that the light of reason is the name given universally to the informing, constitutive principle of the intellectual faculty. For as it is by the material light that our eye is enlightened so as to receive the impressions of form and color which aid us to distinguish one thing from another (and without this light the whole universe would remain for us perfectly dark), so the idea of existence is the *light of our mind*, by which we actually distinguish objects and know existences, on occasion of our eye being enlightened by the material light, or on receiving other sensitive impressions.

"This light of reason is, according to Rosmini, what Philosophy, following the lines traced out by Aristotle, defines as the *lumen intellectus agentis*, and of which S. Thomas says that it is *participatio Luminis in nobis impressa, seu participatio Lucis aeternae*.

"S. John tells us: *Deus erat Verbum . . . erat Lux vera quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum*—'The Word of God is the light that enlighteneth every man coming into the world.'"

Idea the Objectivity of Truth.

"It is this 'idea of existence' or 'light of being' given to man which constitutes the *objectivity* of truth, as seen by the human mind. For truth is that which *is*, as falsehood is that which *is not*. It is this which makes man intelligent, and gives him a moral law by which he sees the *beingness* or essence of things, and recognizes the duty of his own being, to act toward each being, whether finite or infinite, creature or God, according to the beingness or essence of being which he beholds in the light of the truth of being."

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THE PROBLEM OF ANTHROPOLOGY.¹

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF LUDWIG NOIRÉ BY M. B. BONNER.

The German word for *Art*, "*Kunst*" is derived from "können" (to be able to do something). It signifies everything that an animate being can work or accomplish with *consciousness* and at *any time*—consequently not by chance, not by a happy coincidence of outward circumstances, nor under constraint of a foreign superior judgment, nor a foreign overpowering will. The breaking in of animals and the training of laborers and slaves to (to them) unintelligible tasks—even if the former appear ever so artistic, and the latter produce beautiful works of art—are for this reason excluded from the idea of *Art*.

Accordingly, the idea of Art involves in its inmost essence—and this even in its very lowest manifestations in the animal world—the idea of *Liberty* (*Freiheit*—freedom); indeed, the latter is in reality built on the former, for a being has only as much liberty as it can gain and maintain for itself; and with Goethe we may call it the final conclusion of wisdom, that only he, who daily conquers them, deserves life and liberty.

¹ "Das Problem der Anthropologie: Die menschliche Kunst und ihre Bedingungen."
Von Prof. Dr. Ludwig Noiré.

For this reason Kant's¹ saying concerning human art is so true and to the point: "that only the productions of LIBERTY—*i. e.*, of a Volition that founds its actions on reason—ought properly to be called Art." If we generalize this clear and luminous definition, so that it may also include the Art of the animal world, there remain as the two most important attributes Volition and Consciousness of action. By virtue of this definition large fields of animal activity must be excluded from the idea of Art. Foremost the organic functions, as breathing, digestion, change of matter, the circulation of the blood, etc. Firstly, the attribute of Volition is wanting in them. Though all these vital functions certainly originate in some activity of the will, this latter is confined in such narrow bounds that the expression to be used in speaking of them is: "The animal *must* do all this"; not, it is *able* to ("*can*") do it—it is function, not art. Secondly, the degree of consciousness of action is so obscure that these activities appear to us as *inner* processes, not illumined by any coincidence with the external world, but, as it were, unconscious, going on with mechanical exactness and continuity; accordingly we can in these cases only speak of unity of will and effect, but not of consciousness. What there is wanting is the imaginative faculty, the soul of all true consciousness, of which the external senses are the principal media.

Nevertheless, we are obliged to exclude the activity of these senses from the precincts of art. We must not say that seeing, tasting, smelling—astonishing activities as they are, and bound to certain organs or implements—belong to animal art. What are wanting are liberty and volition, and especially an effect on the outer world.

The cause of this lies in the fundamental relation in which each individual—*i. e.*, "limited" being—stands to the rest of the world. This fundamental relation is that of subject and object. As the result of this relation, we have the fundamental distinction between *feeling* and *volition*, both only subjective qualities, but both only possible through relation to something external, an object. There can neither be a feeling which is not caused by some change in external relations, nor a volition that has not a goal, an external object on which it tries to "realize" itself.

¹"Kritik der Urtheilskraft," p. 171, edition Rosenkranz.

Though volition is the real fundamental instinct and the true essence of all things, still in itself it is only a dim impulse, a blind instinct, which only grows enlightened in the measure that sensation conveys to it more and more knowledge of the external world, and thereby effects a constantly increasing relation between the two. The will remains unaltered, but the motives on which it reacts increase. There is then, even in the lowest species of animals—among which one can hardly speak of higher perceptions than those conveyed by the sense of touch and instincts for sustenance—nevertheless, a consciousness of a constant change in an objective outer world which is intimately connected with the animal's interests in life. This change of sensations forms the real substance of its life; as it were, the matter of the total consciousness of the animal, for its entire attention and all exertions of its will are directed toward it.¹

As, according to this, all knowledge of the external world can only enter consciousness as an effect on the external senses; as, furthermore, every effect on the external world, especially among the higher animals, is controlled by the senses, and in every case is *felt* as counter-action or reflex—it is easy to understand why feeling is clearly separated from the real acts of volition, and, in spite of its eminent importance for the accomplishment of all consciousness, is yet regarded as *purely passive*.

Only on attaining the very highest step, viz., human science and art—where the external world is observed for the knowledge it brings; where one sees only for the sake of seeing; where one hears only for the sake of hearing; where even smelling and tasting are performed for the sake of smelling and tasting—only there it becomes plain and obvious that a specific art dwells in the senses, that we have to learn to see and hear as well as to speak and write, and that, in consequence of higher talents and cultivation, the sight and hearing of one is quite different, much more perfect than that of another. But all this will be treated of more fully on some other opportunity.

Here only this much: In all conscious and feeling beings we must unconditionally separate *Activity*, or action of the will on the outer world, and *Receptivity*, or the capacity of receiving or

¹ Partout l'intelligence se montre unie à l'instinct; pas d'instinct possible sans une intelligence pour le diriger et dominer.—BLANCHARD.

suffering impressions from the same source ; we must consider them as final opposites. Still we must never forget that everywhere in nature there is inseparable unity, and that it is only our objective thinking which makes these distinctions and divisions, to gain thereby as comprehensive, clear, and intelligent a view as possible. Let us therefore constantly keep in mind the unity and incessant reciprocal action of these two separated poles. All expressions of will and dexterity, all performances of strength and adroitness, that we admire in animals, are only possible under the presupposition of their external senses—that is, their sensations and their constant co-operation. And the converse of this is true—the senses must grow finer, more sensitive, and therefore more perfect, the more they are practiced, the more they assist and control the outward manifestations of the animal's organs ; they, too, have a school and are learning an art. But both the mechanical perfection of the organization and the perceptions of the senses must act with unity, which, considered from one point of view, is *Volition*, from the other *Consciousness*. Both harmonize in another point : that a living being can never have a broader sphere of consciousness than that which is in accord with the purposes of its existence, and is of service to them. For instance : Consciousness of danger, a wider survey, a higher perception, without the power to make them available by a corresponding activity, and of use to its life, would make the existence of an animal insupportable and a torture.

Those external faculties which show themselves through the assistance of its senses, and through the power of which the animal (as a vital mechanism, perfectly adapted to the conditions of the element in which it moves) is able to carry out all the functions which are of use to its subsistence, as well as to the propagation and preservation of its kind, we may justly call, in the most general sense of the word, its *Art*.

What elements are there inherent in this idea, are inseparable from it, and therefore constitute its real essence ? They are the following :

1. The idea of "*Können*" (power) or "*Vermögen*" (to be able to do) includes the idea that the being can at all times, according to its free inclination, therefore with consciousness, control this activity ; as Horace says : "*Ut quamvis tacet Hermogenes, cantor tamen atque optimus est modulator.*" This idea rests in its last

grounds on the contrast between "*actu*" and "*potentia*" (*δυνάμει καὶ ἐνέργειᾳ*), a conception the immeasurable significance and extent of which Aristotle's philosophical penetration first perceived, and it has been reserved for the present day, which has learned to consider the universe as an unalterable sum of living and elastic forces, to make its entire immensity apparent.

2. Inseparable from the idea of Art is that of *Interest*, which is, as it were, the unity-idea (*Einheits-Idee*) of all life, and nearly identical with volition, only that it contains rather the objective side of the latter, the sum total of everything toward which its efforts and strivings are directed. From this follows, that for the same reason and as little as there can exist a perception or sensation that does not serve the ends of existence of the being, and therefore is in perfect accord with its whole activity (as we remarked above), just as little is an activity or a mechanical liberty (freedom) in a living being conceivable which does not concur with the unity of the life interests, and is attached to it by most indissoluble ties. This is just the organic unity, the unerring certainty, with which nature fits out all living beings for the maintenance of their existence with all powers and organs that most perfectly correspond with their ideas and conditions of life. Every organism is, according to its degree, perfectly teleological (or in perfect conformity to an inward design or purpose). "*Natura sibi ubique consentanea est.*"

3. This latter idea, conformity to an end or aim, can only appear after presupposing the two just-named ideas—viz.: a central-will, permeating and governing all parts of life and its functions, and its external interest. But nothing but the latter, and that only, gives to the idea of art meaning and perspicuity. And it is a fact that this idea was first formed and developed in the human mind by that branch of man's activity where conformity to the end in view appeared clearly and objectively. The creation of whatever answered to human needs and necessities—the work of artisans—was the first phenomenon and consideration from which the idea of art could spring and become generally current.

The infinite adaptability, laughing all human art to scorn, which we meet in the construction of the animal organism, and which is the cause of all those activities and dexterities which are in the

highest degree adapted to the preservation of its existence, has led, in consequence of the analogy from which proceeded a similar contemplation and comparison of these artistic organizations with human works, to a twofold, equally near, but equally precipitate, conclusion.

1. Either these organisms have been completely identified with human works of art, and therefore one has equally assumed an active creative intellect acting from without, through whose influence the whole wonderful structure has been accomplished (for to regard it as the effect of a chance meeting of unorganized matter is a resort which cannot satisfy any thinking being), and has not tired to this day of adducing this infinite adaptability to ends as the surest proof of the existence of a Creator, and of varying this so-called physico-theological proof in all possible keys.

2. Or one has, in incomprehensible blindness, identified all activities of the animal that proceed from design, especially those by which it creates external works, like the ant its hill, the bird its nest, etc., with human activity to such a degree that one has ascribed them to the reason, the thought of the animal! This absurdity—hatched by the most recent materialistic school, the gallant defenders of which did not even seem to see that in lifting the animals to such a height they were becoming apostates from their own doctrine, and were giving it its death-blow—is not worthy of serious refutation.¹

What is it, then, that distinguishes human art in its deepest reason so much from animal art, as just characterized, and makes it at the same time belong so intimately to the special nature of man that it has been truly said, "*L'art est la nature même de l'homme*"? and as Longinus said: "Human art is not perfect till it seems to be Nature."²

¹ Any one wishing to investigate these things may compare the following excellent works: Reimarus's "Allgemeine Betrachtungen über die Triebe der Thiere, hauptsächlich über ihre Kunsttriebe"; Le Roy, "Lettres philosophiques sur l'intelligence et la perfectibilité des animaux"; Flourens, "Résumé analytique des observations de Fréd. Cuvier sur l'instinct et l'intelligence des animaux"; as also Schopenhauer in the second book of his "*Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*," vol. i, § 28; vol. ii, chaps. 26, 27.

² *Περὶ ὕψους*, § 22. Τότε ἡ τέχνη τέλειος, ἥνικ' ἂν φύσις εἶναι δοκῇ. Similarly Herder, "*Kalligone*," p. 172: "Man, according to his kind, is an Art-Creature. The Being and the Well-being of his race are built on the use of active reason, working through the organs of sense; only through Art has he become what he is. *Art is to him, as Man, natural.*"

Let us say it in one word: Human art is activity, directed, elevated, perfected, multiplied, and made effective by *Reason*. Everything will depend, therefore, on apprehending clearly and correctly the definition of Reason.

In the foregoing it has already been pointed out that there can be no animal instinct that is not led by a certain degree of intelligence, comprehending the latter to mean conscious notice of casual external circumstances. A passage of Flourens, often quoted, will illustrate this best. "Everybody," says he, "knows the garden-spider, whose web is a perfect model of radii springing from a centre. I have often seen this spider, after it had just left its egg, spin its web; then instinct alone was acting; but when I tear its web, it repairs the damage, and will do it as often as I tear its work. Consequently there is in the spider, besides the purely mechanical instinct which creates the net, also a kind of intelligence which informs it of the places damaged, and in what part its instinct has to be active."

This faint light—which is burning in every animal, even in those of lowest forms, and which lights the path for its actions and will in the narrow bounds in which, according to its nature, it is confined, and, as it were, closed in—is developed in man to the radiant light of reason, which endows him with a plenitude of power, self-consciousness, and internal and external liberty, which sharply and without exception separates his entire activity—as one thoroughly conscious of its object—and frees it from everything which could be placed by its side from the animal world.

What, then, is the essence of this reason? How does it operate? How has it become a possibility? How came it first to a realization? And what connection does it hold with human art? Did it proceed from the latter, or, *vice versa*, did reason spring from art?

It is a notable fact that in our day nearly everybody acknowledges that art had a beginning—first, rude beginnings, hardly worthy of the name of Art—but is reluctant to admit the same of human Reason, being unable to divest himself of the idea that reason was inborn in primitive man, as if it were a power bequeathed to him in full perfection. How is this contradiction to be explained? Manifestly by the disinclination most people have for submitting to any but the most palpable arguments, and such

arguments can be brought forward for *Art* in the crudest and most primitive tools and art-effects, whereas the intimate connection of these with *Reason*—which is in itself a necessary preliminary condition for the origination of these art-objects, and as the oldest and petrified manifestation of which such antediluvian treasures ought to be regarded—is overlooked, or not heeded, as being insignificant and unessential. Only serious and conscientious thinkers are penetrated by the conviction that both are indissolubly connected, that such primitive art-objects point at the same time to a very primitive state of reason, that no progress of art is conceivable which does not at the same time involve a progress of reason, that is to say, has it as well as a consequence, as a presupposition. The latter seems paradoxical, but is easily explained by the infinitely small degrees in which all progress, and especially that of primeval times, advances, and the uninterrupted chain of reciprocal action between intuition and activity or skill.

But if there is to be any question of priority, it must be admitted that art always precedes reason by a step, and that, as is the case to this day, the productions of the former always increase the power of expression, and with it the insight and force of the latter. For instance, that an organism is nothing but a machine, and can only operate mechanically, could not penetrate the general understanding before the age of steam-engines; just in the same way, in primitive times, the idea of cutting, boring, etc., could not be thought of before the existence of the primitive stone-knife, borer, etc. The words of Aristotle, “One can only understand what one can make,” are simple truth.

This assertion receives another clear and unanswerable argument through the fact, as shown us in the animal world, that there is an art without reason, whereas reason without art—that is, without a heightened, multiplied activity of practical functions in the service of life—can nowhere and never be found.

The enormous transformation which human existence underwent, and which became possible and necessary through the gradual development of reason—and the result of it, a conscious stepping out of the sphere of the animal world—can best be summed up in the following simple formula: Animal is a living mechanism, and its intelligence only serves to make this mechanism move in its own proper way, in conformity with external cir-

cumstances. Man, on the other hand, creates, by virtue of his reason, the mechanism, which he makes subservient to his purposes.

Whereas in Animal the intellect reaches only far enough to be able to accommodate itself within certain bounds to external circumstances, human reason subjects to itself the external world and dictates laws to nature. A universal art confined by nothing, and therefore capable of any and every development, takes the place of individual art, as the living embodiments of which the separate kinds of animals might be regarded. Then there awakens in man a desire for knowledge, which is in its most primitive form curiosity—a sort of intellectual craving for mental food, as hunger is a physical one.

I have treated this subject in detail in my work, “*Das Werkzeug und seine Bedeutung für die Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschheit*,” which discusses the outward active life of humanity extricating itself from the bonds of the animal world, consequently treats of the beginnings of human art, and must therefore be considered as a necessary complement, as the objective counterpart, to my “*Origin of Language*” (“*Ursprung der Sprache*”), the significance of which is really the origin of reason. Both works combined contain the solution of the question of the origin of man.

But here we wish to show the necessity of the connection between reason and art, to show the common root from which both have sprung, and make their true essence—that is, the truly *human* in them palpable.

The most important principle through which this can and must be done is *Tradition* or *Continuous-Life* (*Folgeleben*) [or participation in the life of the social whole].

The causal efficiency of the animal terminates with its individual existence. All experiences which it might gain in the narrow sphere which encloses its existence are lost again, as it has neither a possibility nor an interest to impart them to a being of its own kind. All its capacities are, therefore, only transmitted to its descendants directly through *Generation*. How? is even to the present day a great secret. But the fact is firmly established. The bird sings its natural song and builds its artistic nest without having learnt how to do it; the young beaver constructs its lodge, the young badger burrows its nest without the least instruction,

without ever having seen anything like it. That in the course of long periods of time modifications take place in this natural activity no sensible person will deny; that some bird must have built a nest for the first time, some beaver a lodge and dam, is an inference of logic; but it is certain and without doubt that all these abilities are only transmitted by birth and inheritance.

How entirely different in Man! Here we find a conscious transmission of intellect and skill in art, an interest in imparting and instructing tradition and imitation, a connection between succeeding generations which in no way can be traced back to what is innate to nature; the proof of which can be found in observing that all human activities proper, belonging here, would never develop without the pale of this association [social combination], so they can only become the property of the individual by *learning*.

In the first place, it is easy to understand, if it were not known to every one of us by experience, that such a collection and transmission of the knowledge and skill of succeeding generations could not but lead to astonishing results in the course of time; so that human culture and development of power would pour down through the thousands of years like a strong, constantly increasing river, forming at last a mighty ocean, which at this present day has become able itself to feed and preserve all its springs and tributaries, just as the enormous expanse of water which surrounds the continent feeds and keeps in never-ending circulation all the rivers flowing through and fructifying the country.

We, therefore, readily understand that it is solely this "continuous life" which can explain the grand miracle of the immeasurable power and glory of man, and we feel an ardent desire awaken in us to know how this continuous life originated, how it became possible, and how a reality. Let us therefore, with our whole mind and fervent zeal, strive to find an answer to this question—a question of loftier interest to human reason than any other, for it treats of its own origin.

The only safe way in all highest and most important questions is to conduct the inquiry according to the supreme principles of reason (as Kant calls them). We shall therefore proceed according to the three Analogies of Experience (Permanence, Consequence, and Reciprocal Action).

We shall therefore ask :

1. What was the most important *cause* of the setting in of the "continuous life" [solidarity of life, participation of each in the life of the whole], or (which means the same) of its becoming permanent?

2. What was its most important *effect*?

3. What was the most important *medium* which, joining cause to effect, produced a continuous reciprocal action, and, in unison with it, a chain of reciprocal actions, each effect becoming in its turn a cause, so that, through the extent and number of its effects and their interlacings, a constantly increasing progress, tending to infinitude, became possible?

To the first question I respond: It was, is, and will remain, the interparticipation of wills, or sympathy. This reason, which unites a large number of individual wills into a single one, is *ethical*. It is the indispensable condition and presupposition of all community of life. Take Sympathy away, and all life in communion—consequently, also, its most important product, reason—becomes impossible. That life in communion continues can only be explained through this ethical factor as ultimate root. In deducing, as many do (even Kant among others), ethics and social life from reason, they confound the cause with the means—Volition, which is primordial, with the consciousness of Volition, which is secondary. Reason is cold and calm; it has regard only for end and means; it does not act in us, it only helps us to act; it does not glow for the whole; it does not subordinate egotistical will to higher aims; it does not sacrifice; it does not renounce, nor hope, nor suffer, for it knows nothing of love; it is nothing but the faithful mirror that reflects everything, the external world as well as our inner emotions; but all those emotions, whether noble or ignoble, good or bad, spring from quite another source—from the heart, the will. This will, which in the single individual we call character, is what endures, never changes—the tree that bears fruit according to its kind. And so the common or ethical will (sympathy) is the true and only reason for the permanence of social life, *i. e.*, continuous life.

The second question I answer by saying: The most important effect of this community of the will of individual beings is communion of action, which, as I have shown in another place,¹ falls

¹ "Die Lehre Kant's und der Ursprung der Vernunft," p. 379.

still within the bounds of the animal world—for which examples can easily be cited, as when wolves or dogs hunt their prey in packs, buffaloes or monkeys defend themselves in herds. The province of humanity begins with the community of productive activity, and in it lies the true source of this higher continuous life which is directed and supported by reason. In it lie also the beginnings—that is, the first manifestations—of those ideas of right, property, and value which are inseparable from the idea of man, which, if permitted, I shall treat of fully in a separate work; here our concern lies with human art and skill. Let us then show how, through this social life, the natural and unconscious could, and had to, pass under the rule of art and consciousness.

It is certain that the creations of primitive man were little different from what we find analogous among higher animals; indeed, I believe that the constructions of the beaver far excel them in ingenuity. But there was one thing which promised them a great future—they were social affairs. The mound of earth, or the nest made of the branches of trees, was not for the single individual, to use it for himself and his young—as is the case everywhere, and without exception, in the animal world (for the constructions made in common by birds or beavers and others are only *aggregates*); they were, on the contrary, created through the joint will and combined activity of many. It would be well here to observe and weigh the first sign of reciprocal action; how union, in *giving permanence, obtains permanence!* For the work jointly finished, the dwelling becomes a tie; it unites all the members of the flock, and does it by the equal interest which each one has in the whole. So it is not love alone that is acting, but also egotistical interest; the two most potent powers unite, and in their unity become invincible. And so it has remained to this day; human beings who bear each other deadly hatred are kept together by interest; the largest part of the marriages that occur show only an extinct and chilly heap of ashes on the altar of home, but the walls of the house surround the unwilling parties, and the unity of interest makes an escape impossible. Not less important nor powerful is another effect of this reciprocal relation—that between the *whole* and the *single individuals*; the former consists of nothing but the latter, but, nevertheless, exercises an unlimited power over the individual. For the strong and mighty carry the weak

and timid along with them, supplying them with self-confidence, which everybody feels who knows himself to be a member of a larger body, and the want of which often tortures the one excluded into self-destruction; no plague, no leprosy, was feared as much as the excommunications of the Druids or of the Christian Church. The most important product of this reciprocal relation is *Discipline* in the twofold sense of the word—to wit, training and instruction. All instruction is a training of the will, and only by these means is man's skill in art trained or developed. The important point here is that this is not done by a foreign will, but by that of their own totality, which in this wise alone maintains and develops itself. Therefore, what the present day calls art tradition—and the reverse of which is considered to be objective dabbling, or subjective vagaries—has been the oldest human tradition; indeed, the very germ which enclosed the whole of human continuous life, its ethical (preceding) side as well as its reason, or intellectual side. The instruction of the young generation was at first a natural, but soon became a conscious, task of the community, for by instruction consciousness is first awakened. All skill in art, simple as it was in primitive times, had to be developed, learned, and to become a conscious exercise in this way. It would have remained unconscious if the individuals had always separated themselves from the community and made use of their inborn skill—*i. e.*, animal art—for the maintenance of their own lives as separate individuals. The twofold reciprocal action here explained between the *Creator* and the *Creation*, and between the *Community* and the *Individual*, leads up to the answer of the third question: What was the most important medium in the care and preservation of this life of community and continuity?

Without hesitation I answer: "Language, for she is the mother of reason, even reason herself."

In the foregoing I stated that animal organism was distinguished from pure mechanism by *consciousness*; that all animal art and mechanical skill must be subservient to the central will of the animal by a certain degree of consciousness. This consciousness increases by aid of the external senses, and the intellect of the animal reaches as far as it is internally conscious of its own power of action, and exercises it appropriately under the control of its external senses.

The distinguishing feature of human art—an art that constantly renews itself in the continuous life of generations, and thereby aspires and grows higher and higher—lies evidently in the consciousness of *Community*, which has its two bases or double roots in community of *Volition* and community of *Action*. Without this consciousness of community—the preliminary step to human reason, which, since then, has carefully guarded this characteristic—a solicitude for tradition, and therefore the training and instruction of the growing generations in art, could not be imagined.

Nobody will now be surprised if I here say that this consciousness of community was forced from within to seek a means of *Expression*, and that it found it, finally, in language.

Those that have read my former writings will know what I am aiming at, and will rejoice with me at the perfect agreement of the result, obtained on this, another road, with my theory of the origin of language in other works.

Consciousness of community and the desire to communicate are so closely and nearly related ideas that it is hard to conceive how one can exist without the other. The desire to communicate is an urgent impulse; from it sound is born, as we can daily observe in deaf-mutes, infants, even in dogs, for their barking is an attempt to speak, and only acquired by living with man. But sound is no language; it has no meaning; it is only the expression of the inner subjective emotion, which cannot be an object of rational thinking, but only of sympathetic feeling of congenial beings. To become a vehicle of communication, it must take to itself a means of comprehension, an object—which, intimately united with it, becomes capable of *reminding* every one of the same idea.

What else could this object be than the only thing understood in those primeval times, of mere dawning reason, the only thing all understood—for what can we understand but that which we can make?—the product of the common activity, the common *Work*?

I need not here stop to repeat the numerous proofs brought forward on the same subject and reached by different roads, laid down in my writings. It is hard to preach to deaf ears, and, I am grateful to say, the disagreeable task of forcibly removing the morbid matter which clogs these ears is not for me.

So it was art that bore human thought in her lap, and from which it came forth a weak, helpless, lisping child; and then a tremor went through the world, for the moment had come when mind tore itself free from obtuse matter, and commenced on angel's wings its flight toward pure ethereal heights.

All language is poetry. All power of expression was given to her by Art, all that enriches her to this day, and always comes to her in no other way. But only those that are called to it can truly enrich her. "Chemistry," says Jacob Grimm, "jabbers Greek and Latin; in Liebig's mouth, it becomes a powerful language."

Art gives to thought externality, and, in doing this, it *creates* it first. Thought gives to art inwardness. Its body, language, is the all-powerful medium of keeping, upholding, communicating, and propagating—in other words, is the real continuous life of all human knowledge, power, and volition. Banish these delicate aërial forms, and all that is human will become rigid, and die like the life of the individual when his breath forsakes him.

The river of tradition flows solely through the river-bed of language. The word is the imperishable seal of the human mind, the clearest mirror of the thought and spirit of each succeeding period of time. Whatever was *known* was *named*, and, if anything had no name, it is the surest sign that it was not known.

We have shown how word as a connecting link stepped in, a real *medium* between volition and power, between creator and creation; how it took hold of both in their *reciprocal action* and laid them down as thought in the consciousness of man, and with it reciprocal action began its never-ending play.

For the word binds together minds, and, in going forth from the mouth of one man and entering the ear of another, it awakens in him the same thought, which is yet as another, and, therefore, returns enriched in meaning to him who sent it; in this way, in increasing reciprocal speech and reciprocal action, growing ever clearer, more perfect, more conscious, it travels through generations of man, uniting the living with the dead, and already now preparing future perspicuity for unborn generations.

But mightier still, and inexhaustible in plenitude and multiformity, is the reciprocal action which is consummated between things. Drawn into the realm of human action are the eternal stars, which

from their unattainable heights proclaim their harmonies to the calculation of the sages, and through them trace the safest path for the mariner on the lonely depths of the oceans. Foreknown is the shadow which after thousands of years shall veil the light of the sun, and which formerly filled the souls of men with dreadful fears. All the zones of the earth exchange their products, all that is accomplished in the world becomes mutual property of knowledge, and nothing important happens that does not speed on wings of thought from one end of the world to the other. The will of man, who joins countries and continents by boring through the everlasting mountains, and bridges over the immeasurable oceans by the fine line of thought laid low in the depths of its waters, accomplishes all these miracles by nothing but the winged messenger, the faint breath of his mouth, which flies hither and thither in restless haste and joins the most distant things to each other, no less than the minds that are separated by immense spaces of thousands of years. Immortal companion of mortal man, how grand and amazing is thy power! Through thee humanity is formed into one consciousness, into one single experienced mind, the blessings of which every single individual enjoys, and has only to acquire, retain, and continue a small part of this consciousness.

This is not the place to present in detail the incomparable importance and significance of language in the accomplishment of an intellectual continuous life. This task may be left to him who in future days will venture on the bold enterprise of writing a "History of Reason." I bid him welcome to-day. From this logograph they will—and with better reason than from the old ones—date the commencement of the real history of the world. In the meanwhile, flow on, ye tears of youth, tortured by names, dates, battles, and treaties; and bloom yet awhile in your obscurity, ye dust-born pedants of driest philology, who by your senseless logomachy and word-catching have succeeded in imbuing the majority of thinking people with thorough disgust for the most glorious thing that the world holds—language!

I must here call attention to a very important difference between *Instruction* and *Intellectual Tradition*. This difference corresponds, on a higher plane, to the difference already stated between the inborn skill of the animal and its intellect. Intel-

lectual tradition, carried on continually through the organ of language, improves the intellect of the young human individuals, and makes them participants of reason; it is the all-embracing means of every instruction. But is such a purely intellectual tradition sufficient? Is it sufficient to have a thing in one's mind and be able to say it in words? Certainly not. As the young painter must to this day educate his arm and hand as well as his eye by constantly practicing and contemplating the models of present and former masters, as every art is only preserved and developed by such practical tradition—*i. e.*, instruction—just so, in primitive times, growing generations had to practice incessantly the very primitive skill in art of the first founders of human power and grandeur, and they had to do it under direction and by imitation of their elders, who already knew how to manufacture the rough stone implements, how to use them, to cut the tree, or weave the branches. Even the organ of intellectual tradition, language—regarding it as an art, *i. e.*, the movement of the organs of voice—could not then, and cannot to this day, be imparted to the child in any other way. Therefore language, regarded from this point of view, is also nothing but a skill acquired by imitation (repeating what is said), and therefore an object of instruction. But its *contents*, that which is *thought* in making the sounds, form the object of tradition. And this embraces all the rest, but as *Knowledge*, not as *Power*. “Doctus,” among the Romans, referred to both, but the “*Viri Docti*” speak of tactics, strategy, agriculture, etc., according to books!

We have now drawn a distinct boundary-line between animal and human art, which, by reason of its origin, must be thoroughly clear and intelligible to everybody. As we insisted that the most important character of the former was its being inborn, *not* learned, and must absolutely serve only the interest of the purpose of existence of the individual being, and no other interests—just as definitely do we characterize human art by saying it is not inborn; it has to be developed in each single individual, consequently learned, and from this follows just as certainly that it does not exclusively serve individual, but also other purposes.

This truth sheds a distinct light on the former confused attempts to make an absolute distinction between animal instinct and human understanding or reason, without anybody being able

to state just what he wished to be understood by the former or the latter. "Words, mere words," as in so many human disputes! A nearer approach toward truth was made when Kant¹ and Reimarus first framed the definition that the idea of instinct embraced everything which, *without being learned*, was done unconsciously and suitable to the end in view. The reason for this definition they were unable to give; they simply stated the fact.

We know now what this negative definition "without being learned" means. With the animal (excepting the exceedingly trifling sum of what in its life it may learn for itself) all learning is training (breaking in) in the service of man, not its own nature. The ox yoked to the plough, the horse docile to its rider, have experienced a "capitis diminutio," a degradation, since "Jove took their day of Liberty and with it the half of their strength."

In the human being, on the other hand, a miracle has been enacted; what he learns is his own nature, as to subdue the primitive savage instinct of nature is the principal task of all education. The whole man and everything human must be formed, developed, and educated.

And how did this miracle become possible? Only by the educator and the educated, the teacher and the taught being one and the same being. This seeming paradox has lost all incongruity; by our treatment it has become clear and comprehensible. The newly-formed organism, the social community, with the interest of the individual and of the whole inseparably united, creates a never-dying, continuous life, the products of which—language, reason, rights and morals, sciences and arts—are carried and perfected from generation to generation, and insure to humanity an ever-increasing power and internal perfection.

And with this we have also drawn the boundary-line between *Nature* and *Culture* in their general opposition. Culture is everything which humanity—since it has been humanity, *i. e.*, a social organism—has acquired of ability, knowledge, and skill in the community, and which it preserves to the community with never-tiring zeal; indeed, with a stern solemnity which proves its principles of life are at stake. The organic powers spring from nature; the intellectual are the special property of man.

¹ Muthmasslicher, Anfang, etc., p. 367, Rosenkranz. I mention this because latterly Darwin has always been called the originator of this definition.

Whether, according to this view, language, the essentially and exclusively human, must be reckoned nature or culture, every one may answer for himself.

THE ARGUMENT FROM EXPERIENCE AGAINST IDEALISM.

BY GEORGE S. FULLERTON.

"Poor philosopher Berkeley," wrote Doctor Arbuthnot to Swift, in 1714, "has now the *idea* of health, which was very hard to produce in him; for he had an *idea* of a strange fever upon him, so strong that it was very hard to destroy it by introducing a contrary one."

Arbuthnot's jest is the first on record of that innumerable host of jests, criticisms, and condemnations of the Berkeleyan Idealism which have repeated themselves in each succeeding age, and each successive harvest of which has sprung from the same old root of misconception and misinterpretation. Swift, to whom the above letter was directed, is said to have left Berkeley standing at the door in the rain, on the ground that, if his philosophy were true, he could enter as well with the door shut as open. Dr. Johnson confuted the system by kicking a large stone—"striking his foot with mighty force against it." "Pray, sir, don't leave us," said he on another occasion, as a gentleman who had been defending Berkeley's views was about to take his departure, "for we may perhaps forget to think of you, and then you will cease to exist." "According to this doctrine," said Voltaire in his "Philosophical Dictionary," "ten thousand men killed by ten thousand cannon-shots are in reality nothing more than ten thousand apprehensions of our understanding." Beattie, in his "Essay on Truth," speaks of "Berkeley's pretended proof of the non-existence of matter at which common sense stood aghast," and declares that on the basis of this philosophy one can have no evidence that any being exists in nature but himself.

Everywhere we find it accepted as a notorious fact that there

is an incompatibility between Idealism and the experience of daily life—that every hour will furnish facts as to the existence of a world independent of and external to the percipient mind, which will sweep away these speculative cobwebs, spun in secluded closets, and too frail to bear the touch of the investigator. It is supposed that to become an Idealist is to doubt the evidence of one's senses, and to declare human life a dream void of reality. In speaking of the violent motion of a table under spiritual influence, Mr. R. Dale Owen, in his "Debatable Land," says: "It would need a disciple of Berkeley to witness these phenomena, and still remain a skeptic in the reality of such manifestations"—intimating that a disciple of Berkeley is not bound to receive the evidence of his senses as are other men. And this sentence of Mr. Owen's well represents the general opinion as to the nature of Idealism.

Such a misconception we might expect from persons of merely general knowledge; but from specialists, those who have given time and attention to reasonings of this nature, they are not a little surprising. In Mr. Fitzgerald's "Essay on the Philosophy of Self-Consciousness," published in 1883—a book written from a Hegelian standpoint, which makes it the more surprising—we find it stated that the Idealism of Berkeley has become untenable since the advance of Physiological science has demonstrated the intimate connection and interdependence of mind and body, as if the discovery of new relations between phenomena within the sphere of consciousness could either prove or disprove the existence of that noumenal something which was the object of the keen Irish Bishop's brilliant polemic.

And in the notes appended to the German translation of Berkeley's "Principles," which appeared in von Kirchmann's "Philosophische Bibliothek"—both translation and notes from the hand of so ripe a scholar as the late Dr. Frederick Ueberweg—we find that the criticism constantly made against the system is, that upon a basis of Idealism laws of nature may be *maintained*, but none can be actually *demonstrated*. Here, evidently, the argument against Idealism is, as in the former cases, an argument from experience, and the criticism is, in some instances, supported by the authority of the lamented Dr. Charles P. Krauth, to whom we owe an American edition of the "Principles," enriched with the results of his wide and varied reading and mature reflection.

In all these objections it is assumed that experience, rightly interpreted, refutes the Idealist, and that Nature and the Laws of Nature are not to him what they are to the Realist—a misconception which arises from confounding two very different things, Idealism and Unrealism. And to show that such objections are really founded on a misunderstanding, there is, perhaps, no better way than to exhibit the true process by which a knowledge of nature and her laws is built up in the mind of the Realist, which will make evident the fact that that in which he differs from the Idealist cannot at all affect the process or the result, but lies entirely outside of the sphere of immediate knowledge, and can never modify in the slightest degree what lies within the field of experience.

One of the most common objections to Idealism is that it annihilates the external world and reduces waking life to a dream. "Bishop Berkeley," said Sydney Smith, "destroyed the world in one volume octavo, and nothing remained after his time but mind, which experienced a similar fate from the hand of Mr. Hume in 1737." But to any one who will consider what it is by which the Realist distinguishes between dreams or the pictures of memory, or imagination and waking life, it will be apparent that precisely the same distinction may be made by the Idealist. We know dreams from waking life partly from the fact that they are ordinarily not so clear and vivid, but principally (and this is the only satisfactory criterion) from the fact that the continuity of our conscious experience is broken into, the natural laws of succession and co-ordination, which we call laws of nature, not being followed.

No matter how clear or connected has been my dream of leading a storming party at Teb, if I wake to find myself lying in a bed in my own house, and take up again the thread of a regular existence, with which the life of which I have dreamed is incompatible, I conclude that the warlike experiences through which I have just passed are unreal. But my decision is based purely upon what is immediately known, the character and connection of the phenomena, and not at all upon any reasonings from a substratum external to mind, which might be perceived to add reality to the phenomena. In no case does this come into the judgment formed; it is not itself perceived, but merely inferred; and, after a comparison of the phenomena themselves has decided us to call one

class real and the other imaginary, we then, and then only, assume a substance underlying the real. The substance is not the determining cause of our judgment, but the determined effect.

If, after having the dream above mentioned, I should wake to find myself in circumstances compatible with the experiences of my dream; if I should have no sensations of waking; if the thread carried on in the dream should be continued in waking life without a break, there would be no means of knowing that my experiences had not been *real* throughout. So with the pictures presented by the imagination. It is from the fact that they are dependent upon the will of the individual, and come and go, not according to the laws of the appearance and disappearance of what we call *real* things, but according to laws of their own, that we can distinguish them from things in nature; and not at all from the fact that we can discover, by ocular or tactual demonstration, that the one class have a foundation in *substance* while the other have not. The tree that I saw yesterday looks just as much extended, now that I call it up as a picture in imagination, as the tree which I see from my window at this moment. The tree, I imagine, is not so clearly seen; but, apart from the liveliness of the image, it does not differ in any respect from the tree before my eyes. If I assume that the one is real and the other not, it is not from a difference in the pictures themselves, but from their connection with the sum total of my conscious experience.

It may be here *apropos* to remark the inconsistency in the reasoning of that large class of philosophers to whom Sir William Hamilton gives the name of Hypothetical Realists—those who claim that we know matter and mind only through their phenomena, but that we rightly infer two different substances to account for the two classes of qualities—in assuming a non-extended substance to account for certain phenomena, and among these placing the pictures furnished by memory and imagination. Now, the dome of St. Paul's does not look one whit less extended when called up as a reminiscence of European travel than it did while it was the immediate object of vision. If I think of my study-table while taking my morning walk, it looks just four feet long, and does not expand an inch when I re-enter my study and fix my eyes upon it. In apparent extent there is no difference between an imaginary and a real thing. We do not assume the picture of

imagination to be a modification of a non-extended substance because it looks non-extended, but we infer that, however it may look, it cannot really be extended, or it could not be attributed to the indivisible substance assumed by our theory. If, however, we have a right to infer in this fashion that things are not what they seem, surely it would simplify matters to attribute the real extension of the real table likewise to a non-extended substance, since there can be no necessary relation of similarity between a substance and its qualities.

This is, however, to some degree, a digression. The point to be kept well in mind is, that it is not by any reference to substance, as something underlying phenomena, that one decides whether a given experience is to be set down as real or unreal; and, if the substratum has nothing to do with the distinction made, surely the difference is just as broad a one to the Idealist as to the Realist.

The existence of real things, as distinguished from unreal or imaginary, being thus allowed by both sides, the question which next arises is: Whether there is in nature (which the Idealist might call the system of sense-ideas) anything, at least anything which can in any way touch actual experience, which is not the same to the Idealist as to the Realist? And to this question we may confidently answer, No!

Investigation of the laws of nature proceeds upon a basis of observation and experiment, and observation and experiment have to do with the immediate object of knowledge, and in no case with the "substratum" or "thing in itself." Apart from the interpretation of nature through the conception of Final Cause, a knowledge of objects consists, not in any fancied insight into their "nature," as a something underlying the qualities of the things, but in a knowledge of those qualities, their co-ordinations and sequences, and their relations to other objects (themselves immediate objects) past, present, and future.

The five experimental methods admit of precisely the same use in the hands of the Idealist as in the hands of the Realist. In no case are they applied to a "thing in itself," but to real things as we are made cognizant of them by the senses, or infer a possible future experience from actual experience in the present. The view of the world as a world independent of perception, and of phenomena as supported by a substance, it is claimed, is neces-

sary to a demonstration of the laws of nature; but, in point of fact, no instance can be shown in which natural science makes the slightest use of this assumed substratum. Though it is kept on hand as a safeguard, as one might put on a life-preserver to give himself a feeling of safety where he could by no possibility fall into the water, in experimentation it is always utterly disregarded.

When Baron Liebig instituted his series of experiments to ascertain the immediate cause of the death produced by metallic poisons, he sought the cause just where an Idealist would have sought it—in those phenomena which were found to be an invariable, unconditional antecedent of the phenomenon to be explained; and his whole process could have been performed just as well, with results in no respect different, had he been a follower of Berkeley and repudiated the “thing-in-itself,” to which he never once refers in explanation of anything. That fine specimen, too, of inductive experimental inquiry, Dr. Wells’s theory of dew, might well have been produced by an Idealist.

Had Dr. Wells lived earlier, he might have explained the phenomenon by a reference to “occult qualities,” or to the “nature” of the objects concerned; but, as it is, he nowhere passes beyond the sphere of the immediate objects of knowledge, or trespasses upon the realm in which the Realist and Idealist disagree.

The explanation of any particular phenomenon by reference to an “essence” or “substratum” is a relic of the past. It being generally admitted that we know, primarily at least, only the phenomena, all that we know of the substratum must be derived from this; and the using this derivative knowledge again to explain the qualities, although so palpably a case of reasoning in a circle, and now universally abandoned in any special investigation, is still held as an explanation of the possibility of sense-experience as a whole. Molière, in his *Malade Imaginaire*, makes one of his absurd physicians say:

Mihi a docto doctore,
Demandatur causam et rationem quare
Opium facit dormire.
A quoi respondeo,
Quia est in eo
Virtus dormitiva,
Cujus est natura
Sensus assoupire.

Such explanation, now abandoned by natural science, has been a fruitful source of error in the past, and it being accepted, though in a modified form, in philosophy, may we not expect from it evil results?

Should it be said that, in making such assumptions as those of atoms and molecules, science really makes use of that which is not a possible perception, and yet must be considered as really existent, it may be answered that no Idealist would deny the right, reasoning from analogies founded upon past experience of the connection of phenomena, to assume a possible future experience in some degree different from what we have at present; and should it be claimed that the things assumed to exist could *never* become objects of experience, it may be answered that there are symbols used in algebra which, though they cannot themselves be regarded as representing real being, are yet useful as formulæ to express the relations to be maintained between real beings—*i. e.*, they have a formal, though not a real, significance.

It is, therefore, most clear and evident that the “substratum” or “thing-in-itself” does not at all enter into the question, and in all reasonings from nature, or about natural objects, it is totally disregarded. We may safely affirm that the only difference in the views of nature taken by the ordinary scientific Realist and the consistent Idealist is, that the one regards objects as actually existing between the intervals of his perception, while the other attributes to them a merely potential existence. That this difference is not one which can be settled by an appeal to experience, or in any way touches experience, “jumps at the eyes”; but Ueberweg, in the seventy-eighth note appended to his translation of the “Principles,” criticises from this standpoint the illustration used by Berkeley to show that laws of nature, regular and unvarying methods of the production of the objects of perception, are *ust* as necessary to his system as to that of the Realist. Let us look first at the passage in Berkeley, and then at the note of his critic.

“That there is a great and conspicuous use in these regular constant methods of working, observed by the Supreme Agent, hath been shewn. . . . And it is no less visible that a particular size, figure, motion, and disposition of parts are necessary, though not absolutely to the producing any effect, yet to the producing it according to the standing mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for in-

stance, it cannot be denied that God, or the Intelligence that sustains and rules the ordinary course of things, might, if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all the motions on the dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made the movements and put them in it; but yet, if He will act agreeably to the rules of mechanism, by Him for wise ends established and maintained in the creation, it is necessary that those actions of the watch-maker, whereby he makes the movements and rightly adjusts them, precede the production of the aforesaid motions; as also that any disorder in them be attended with the perception of some corresponding disorder in the movements, which, being once corrected, all is right again."

"According to this," is the comment, "the irregularity we perceive in the movement of the hands seems to be the prior and conditioning thing; and the derangement in the interior of the watch, which, on Berkeley's principles, does not exist until it is perceived, is the subsequent and conditional thing; the natural mechanical connection, however, is exactly the reverse. By what antecedent perceptions or 'signs' is the irregularity of the whole conditioned? If, for example, a little dust, which no one has perceived, has got into the watch and put it out of order, the result is linked with something unperceived in the interior of the watch. This thoroughly unperceived something, of which not even a dim suspicion exists, is, according to Berkeley, a nothing, and out of the nothing comes the change in the running of the watch. But that this, as a thing self-contradictory, is not possible, must, to adopt Berkeley's way of speaking, be clear to any one who will reflect even a little. The recognition of the fact, therefore, that nature is regulated by law, draws with it irresistibly the inference that material objects exist without the mind."

It is here objected, in the first place, that, since we perceive the irregularity in the movement of the hands before perceiving the derangement in the interior of the watch, we must regard this movement as the conditioning thing, and thus reverse the natural order of cause and effect; and, in the second place, that the unperceived speck of dust is nothing, and out of this nothing cannot come the change in the running of the watch.

That these points are not well taken will be evident to any one who considers for a moment the process by which an investigator,

whether Realist or Idealist, discovers the cause of the disorder in his watch. Having noticed the disorder in the movement of the hands, he looks further—never once referring to anything which cannot become an immediate object of vision—for some phenomenon, perhaps a speck of dust, which may be regarded as abnormal; and which, whether Realist or Idealist, he will call the cause of the derangement. If no such phenomenon be found, both Realist and Idealist would declare the cause unknown, and would, upon the very same ground, assume that, could the investigation be made sufficiently thorough, some such cause would be found. Whether the as yet unperceived cause be actually existing out of mind, or only potentially exist, could not in the least affect the question; for, when perceived, both would acknowledge its actuality and true causality, and, while unperceived, both would have the same expectation of a possible perception. The actual existence of the cause, while still unperceived, is manifestly capable of no proof by an appeal to experience, as such proof must depend upon observation; and it is a truism to say that objects can only be observed during the intervals of direct perception, or while *actually* existent. The objection, too, that, since the irregularity of the movement of the hands is first observed, it must be the cause and the internal derangement the effect, is by no means just. The method by which the cause is distinguished from the effect is just the same to the Realist as to the Idealist. Were an adherent of Reid and a disciple of Berkeley both to look at the watch at the same time, they would both see first what, from a reference to a broad general experience, they would call an effect, placing as logically prior what is chronologically subsequent in order of knowledge. The appeal to general experience—which aids us in determining, in the case of any two interdependent phenomena, which is logically the antecedent and which the consequent—is open to a Berkeleyan as to any one else. It is evident, therefore, that, whether we regard objects as existing unperceived or not, we can draw no proof for the statement from an analysis of such cases as the one selected by Dr. Ueberweg, nor indeed from the whole field of experience, which is accepted in its entirety by both of the opposing parties. We are driven for our proof to an *a priori* law, and with this argument I have here nothing to do.

There is still an objection, and to many minds it seems to be

a strong one, urged against Idealism. On the hypothesis of the Idealist, it is said, even if it should be acknowledged that experience is left intact, that we lose nothing of which we have heretofore been possessed, yet we must regard experience, the whole objective system of nature, as well as the subjective succession of ideas, as a mere play of phenomena—regular and orderly it is true, but not fixed by the very nature of substance, liable to change at some time in the future. How can we on this hypothesis demonstrate, for example, any necessary causal connection between objects? Must we not be content with a mere observed succession?

Now, there is no reason why the law of Causation—to take a representative instance—should be one whit less certain and invariable for the Idealist than for another. We may regard the law of Causation as either gathered from observation or an *a priori* deliverance of intelligence. If we hold that it is gathered from observation, we base it, in any case, on the immediate object of knowledge, and not in the least on the connection of “things-in-themselves,” which have never been observed. Here we cannot differ from the Idealist, who accepts the same facts and follows the same methods. The certainty arrived at is the same for both. If, on the other hand, we hold the law to be a deliverance of intelligence, we have the highest reason to accept it as certain, and a reason quite independent of the “thing-in-itself.” Since it is not drawn from this last, it cannot depend upon it for its validity; and, if upon this basis the law is to be regarded as less certain to the Idealist than to the Realist, it can only be so because of another deliverance of intelligence which informs us that the law is only valid as applied to “substances.” This assumption—considering the existing usage of natural science, which applies it only to phenomena—seems rather absurd. The fact of one’s being a Realist or an Idealist will not determine for him the confidence to be placed in the law of Causation, or in any other law of Reason, as these laws have their scope and application exclusively within the field of immediate knowledge.

The Idealist accepts, therefore, if he be consistent, the whole field of experience; and this is to him just what it is to the Realist, containing all the distinctions marked by science or by common observation between real and unreal, dream-life and waking-life.

And in saying that he accepts experience, this must be understood as comprehending experience in its totality, future as well as present. The arguments for the existence of other minds, both Divine and human, and for the Immortality of the Soul, are not drawn (at least those of them which have really exerted an influence upon the belief of mankind) from that in which the Realist and Idealist disagree. They are as forcible to the one as to the other. The Realist, when he argues from the beauty and harmony which obtain in the world, from the evidences of wisdom and goodness, from the needs of his own moral nature, to a wise and good Spirit as the reasonable cause, argues from the world which he sees and touches, the world of experience, which is equally accepted by the Idealist. What is to prevent their arriving at the same conclusion?

Berkeley's system has of late been criticised as leading to skepticism and dangerous in its moral influence. Although Berkeley himself looked upon his philosophy as a strong bulwark of Theism, in the historical development of Idealism, it is claimed, we can see its unfortunate tendency. Now, some Idealists have undoubtedly been atheists and agnostics. But the danger which threatens thoughtful youth at the present time comes from a very different quarter; and it would hardly be just to hold all Realists responsible for the views of that by no means insignificant subdivision of their party who are adherents of perhaps the most inconsistent and unphilosophical of modern doctrines, modern materialism. There are those who find no place in their creed for a Deity, both among the ranks of the Realists and of the Idealists; and their difference of opinion as to the existence of "things-in-themselves" has little to do with determining their decision upon this point. Most criticisms directed against the moral influence of Idealism arise out of a misconception—a confounding of Idealism with Unrealism, which certainly reflects no credit on the former. But the subject of morals is a practical one, which finds its whole scope and application within the limits of a possible experience, and consequently remains just the same to the Idealist as to the Realist.

The interest of the controversy between them is, therefore, a purely theoretic one, or at least has only that practical importance which we are compelled to grant to all knowledge, however little

it may appear to touch human life and practice; and, indeed, when we come to practice, may we not call every one an Idealist? for thought, desire, volition, are exercised in every-day life solely upon the immediate objects of experience, the things we see and touch, and never have the slightest reference to the much-debated "thing-in-itself."

That Berkeley's Idealism is the final philosophy, no one who really understands Berkeley can for a moment admit. In his "Siris" we find gleams of a coming light, which Berkeley himself was not prepared for. But the weakness of Berkeleianism does not lie in the direction of the objections cited in the foregoing pages; and all objections, made from such a stand point, are powerless, as directed against the truth and not the error of Berkeley's system.

A NEW THEORY OF GENERAL IDEAS.

BY PAYTON SPENCE.

It is not my intention to revive that hopeless discussion of Realism, Conceptualism, and Nominalism, which centuries of speculation and disputation have transmitted to us in so confused and unsettled a state. Nevertheless, I propose, in this article, to discuss the subject of general ideas and the significance of general terms; and I feel justified in doing so by the fact that there is an explanation of those perplexing subjects which has, thus far, escaped the attention of investigators—an explanation which is more satisfactory to my mind than any other with which I am acquainted, not excepting that of Kant, which can hardly be classed with either Realism, Conceptualism, or Nominalism.

Of all the theories of general ideas with which I am familiar, I cannot regard any one as true. Realism seems to be abandoned in modern times; and while Conceptualism and Nominalism both have their champions at the present day, yet the very fact that there are defenders of both, after so many centuries of investigation and disputation, raises a presumption that there is something radically defective in both; and this presumption is favored by

the fact that nobody is entirely satisfied with either of those theories, even as presented by its ablest advocates.

If Nominalism still has its defenders, it is because they do not clearly set before their minds what it is they are required to ascertain. They are required to find out what mental phenomena general terms stand for; or into what we must translate them if we wish to ascertain their real significance. For instance, when we say *man*, what do we mean? *Man*, as a word, is, of course, merely a sign, a representative of some mental fact, movement, or process; and, hence, when I wish to point out its meaning—to translate it into its real significance—I must not substitute another sign for it. That would be like giving the Latin name for the English one, and saying that *man* means *homo*; or it would be like giving a verbal definition of the word, *man*. Now, this is what the Nominalists do, some in a less obvious way, perhaps, than others; and this is the hidden reason why neither themselves nor anybody else is satisfied with their work. The following, for instance, is Hamilton's defence of Nominalism, and it is substantially that of Berkeley and Hume: "We cannot represent to ourselves the class *man* by any equivalent notion or idea. All that we can do is to call up some individual image, and consider it as representing, though inadequately representing, the generality."¹ Now, if we merely use that "image" as the representative of something else, we virtually make it, like the word *man* itself, merely a sign; and hence we are no nearer the solution of the difficulty than when we started. That something—that "generality"—is just the thing that we are in search of; and, when we find it, we get the real significance of the word *man*—we get the mental fact, movement, or process of which the word *man* and the Nominalist's "individual image" of a man are merely representatives.

On the other hand, if Conceptualism has its defenders, it is because they do not use the word *conception* in its ordinary acceptance, or in any sharply defined sense. A conception, as ordinarily understood, "is a notion of past sensations, or of objects of sense that we have formerly perceived."² It is a reproduction in imagination of sensations or perceptions. This ordinary understanding of the word carries with it the idea that a conception is something

¹ Hamilton's "Lectures," p. 477.

² Stewart.

definite and determinate, and that therefore, whenever an effort to conceive a thing fails to attain this determinateness, it fails to become a real conception—the labor is an abortion; yet the effort—the mental movement or process—while valueless as a conception, may still, as we shall hereafter see, be as easily handled by the mind as a conception, and may be of equal value as an element of thought. The following quotation is given by Hamilton as evidence of Locke's Conceptualism. In the above understanding of the word conception, however, Locke's "general idea" is not a conception, whatever else it may be. "Does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult), for it must be neither oblique or rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon; but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist; an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together."¹

It does not in the least help us out of the difficulty with general terms to say, as some have done, that they are only abbreviated definitions; for this only shifts the difficulty from the former to the latter, and we find ourselves just as much embarrassed in our endeavors to ascertain the real significance of the definitions as of the general terms. If the definition of a general term is made as general as the term itself, it is necessarily as inconceivable as the latter.

We must not pass unnoticed Kant's interpretation of general ideas, particularly as his and the one that I shall presently give trench somewhat upon each other in one respect, although, in another, they are diametrically the opposite of each other. The first of the following extracts is taken from Dr. Stirling's translation of the "Critique"; the second is from his reproduction of the "Critique"; and the third is from a note in the reproduction, in which Dr. Stirling evidently adopts Kant's explanation of general ideas.

"I set down five points one after the other, thus,; what I have is a picture or representation (figure, image) of the number five. But if I think just *a* number, any number at all—let it be five, or let it be a hundred—then this thinking is rather the con-

¹ Hamilton's "Lectures," pp. 479, 480.

ception of a method toward the picture of some sum under a certain notion than this picture itself, which picture, in this latter case, it would hardly be possible to realize and compare with the notion. This idea, now, of a general process of the imagination for providing a notion with its corresponding picture or image, I call the schema of the notion."¹

"The general notion triangle is simply a conceived formula whereby you can construct a type, but it is itself a schema, for it is no single form—rather it is an infinitude of forms. . . . So with the general notions, dog, horse, man, etc.: these are not types, but schemata. The type is a single image or figure set up by the empirical imagination, whereas the schema is an absolutely general formula for the production of a whole family of types."²

"Kant is here seen to make an easy end of our modern nominalistic quibbling. . . . Surely it is common sense to see that a general idea involves in imagination only a schema, and that a schema there is not a type, but a general receipt for a whole family of types."³

The slight resemblance and the vast difference between Kant's interpretation of the subject and my own will be more intelligible to the reader when my own shall have been presented. This much, however, I will say here, that, while a general term is a sign or symbol of a mental *process*—a *formula*, if you choose—yet it is not a process "for providing a notion with a corresponding picture or image," nor is it a "formula whereby you can construct a type," nor a "formula for the production of a whole family of types," nor a "receipt for a whole family of types;" but it is a procedure, a *process*, the essential feature of which is the *destruction* (not the *construction* or *production*) of all types, figures, images, perceptions, and conceptions—the *reduction* of the *determinate* to the *indeterminate*—the conceivable thought to one of its inconceivable elements; it is a process of making *forms* (pictures, images, figures, types, perceptions, and conceptions) *formless*—of taking out the *particular* and special and *leaving* the *general*—of removing the positive and leaving the negative element of thought. It is, in brief, a process of *analysis*, not one of *synthesis*.

There can be no better evidence that the truth has not been

¹ Stirling's "Text-book to Kant," pp. 250, 251.

² *Ibid.*, p. 89.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 89, 90.

reached in reference to general terms and their significance than the vagueness and confusion with which they have been treated even by those who are regarded as among our most profound thinkers. When a writer of ordinary ability understands a subject, he usually finds no difficulty in making his understanding of it intelligible to others; and certainly it is an easy matter for him to explain his own views so clearly that others of equal ability with himself shall not put diametrically opposite interpretations upon what he has written. Yet we find Hamilton accusing Locke of maintaining "the doctrine of Conceptualism in its most revolting absurdity,"¹ while Bain says that "Locke is substantially a Nominalist."² Again, Hamilton, on one page, classes Reid with the Conceptualists Locke and Brown,³ on another he inclines to put him with the Nominalist Berkeley,⁴ and on a third he passes him over as extremely "wavering and ambiguous;"⁵ but Bain says that Reid's position coincides very nearly with Conceptualism.⁶ Again, Bain says of Hamilton, that "in some parts of his writings he expresses the nominalistic view with great exactness, while in others, and in his Logical system generally, he admits a form of Conceptualism."⁷

One cause, perhaps, of the confusion of thought on the subject of general terms and their significance is our symbolical thinking, or the habit which the mind gradually acquires of thinking by signs, or by fragments of images or conceptions, instead of those images or conceptions themselves. For instance, the words *a horse* signify, or are the signs of, a conception of a horse—a full and complete image of a particular horse. But the tendency of the mind is to drop all unnecessary encumbrances, and to take the easiest and shortest road to the end aimed at; and hence we drop first one and then another of the special characteristics of that conception of a horse, until, finally, when we say *a horse*, there flashes into the mind merely a very small fragment of that conception, such as the head, or even a part only of the head, as a representative of the whole image; and so, when we say *a cow*, or *a pig*, only a pair of horns, or a twisted tail, may come before the mind as a representative of the whole animal. But this is not all;

¹ Hamilton's "Lectures," p. 479.

² Bain's "Mental Science," Append., p. 27.

³ "Lectures," 476.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 479.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 480.

⁶ Bain's "Mental Science," Append., p. 29.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 31.

in the rapidity of the mind's action, even these small fragments of full conceptions are encumbrances. It is too much trouble and loss of time to be obliged to translate the words even into the fragments—the smallest representatives of their mental significance; so these fragments themselves are finally dropped, at times, and perhaps most of the time, leaving nothing but the words themselves, the skeleton machinery of thought, and our thinking becomes wholly symbolical. Now, I venture the assertion that there is as much symbolical thinking outside of arithmetic and algebra as there is in them. From my own observations, I am of the opinion that ninety-nine hundredths of our thinking is symbolical; that, in ordinary conversation or oral discourse and reading, we see, and hear, and conceive of nothing but the words themselves, with only here and there a real conception, or fragment of a conception, into which some particular word is translated, or partly translated. You say: How is this possible? Easily enough; for everybody does it. Passing through the stages which we have described above (and sometimes without this gradual transition through intervening stages), the process ultimates in our transferring to the words themselves the relations which exist among the things that the words are merely the signs of; and what is, if possible, even more remarkable, the words so far take the places of the things they represent that they awaken in us emotions (more or less distinct) similar to those produced by the things themselves, or our conceptions of them. There is no difficulty, then, in understanding how we may read a whole page without having a single conception, picture, or image, in whole or in part, enter our imagination. The words themselves awaken the same or similar emotions, and carry with themselves the same relations to each other as the things which they stand for, and, therefore, our thinking is just as complete as it would be did we use the things themselves, or the fullest and most complete conceptions or images of them. This, so far as I know, is almost an unexplored, though a vast, department of mental science.¹ We do not pretend to do full justice to it here; but we have, perhaps, said enough to enable the reader to understand how this symbolical thinking may delude the Nominalist into the belief that the general idea is noth-

¹ Campbell's "Phil. of Rhetoric," B. 2, c. 1, s. 1.

ing but a name, a word, or at most a fragment of itself; and also how the Conceptualist may lay hold of a conceivable part of a process (a part which, unconsciously to himself, his mind has substituted for the whole process in the manner just described), and, mistaking that part for the whole, conclude that a general idea is conceivable.

Another cause, or perhaps we should say indication, of the indefiniteness and confusion of thought that prevail in reference to general terms and their real significance, is the fact that writers on this subject do not recognize the difference that exists between the process of classification and that of generalization, but seem to have a vague notion that the two are substantially one and the same thing, a general idea being to them nothing more than a class. The confusion of language, as a matter of course, corresponds with the confusion of thought on this subject, the same name being generally given to both the class and the general idea. Now, what does the process of classification consist of? We make a class by resemblances, of course. Here is a plain figure having three right sides, and there is another one having three right sides. I put the two together, and I have a class called triangle, to which I add every other plain figure having three right sides. I have thus made the class triangle, but I have never once had occasion to use the general idea, triangle, in the process; for I have only dealt with particular triangles, each one having its own determinate sides, its own determinate size, its own determinate angles, and its own determinate form, color, and relation of sides to angles; and yet all these determinate figures I put together—and this is classification. Now, what is the real significance of the word triangle, as applied to the class thus formed? It means *a collection of determinate, perceivable, and conceivable triangles*. But what does the process of generalization consist in? We will begin as we did before. Here is a plain figure having three right sides; it is right-angled, isosceles, six inches long, and is drawn with red chalk upon a white surface. I mentally strike out—disregard—negate the redness of its sides, its right angle, the equality of two of its sides, its six inches of length, and, in fact, everything special and peculiar about that triangle; and now I need go no further; I need no more examples, for I already have my general idea, which is also called triangle. But see what

a different thing it is from the class triangle. It is something that is *formless, indeterminate, non-perceivable, and inconceivable*; and yet, in that confusion of thought to which I am trying to call attention, this general idea and the class are both called triangle. Triangularity would be a better term for the general idea; but the bare suggestion terrifies us with the possibility that it might open the gates to the entrance of "horseality," "dogality," "house-ality," and an innumerable troupe of similar uncouth and intolerable names claiming admission on the score of kinship to triangularity by similarity of genesis.

Another indication of the indefiniteness and confusion of thought that prevail in reference to general terms and general ideas is the confounding of the process of abstraction and that of generalization. To this point we shall return in its proper place, where we expect to show that a *general* abstraction is, in one sense, an impossibility except on the supposition that the general idea has already been attained, and, of course, attained by some other process (which can only be that of generalization); and therefore, the general idea being already in hand, it would be a work of supererogation to make a further effort to get by abstraction what we already have by generalization.

What I have thus far written as introductory is intended simply to show that the whole subject of general terms and their real significance, lies, at the present time, in a very helpless, hopeless, confused, unsettled, and indefinite state; and that we should, therefore, welcome any attempt to reduce it to an intelligible principle, and to determinate form and order.

In an article entitled "Time and Space considered as Negations," published in the "Journal of Speculative Philosophy" for October, 1879, I reached the following conclusion: "The principles of Affirmation and Negation are co-extensive with consciousness, and are the essential elements of all mental phenomena. All the phenomena of mind, from the simplest sensation up to the most complex intellectual operation, are but states of consciousness, simple and complex. Now, we have already seen that the simplest state of consciousness, if perpetual, would be no better than a state of perpetual unconsciousness. The latter would be tantamount to annihilation, and the former would be the same. Hence, the simplest form of consciousness or mental life must con-

sist in an alternation of a state of consciousness with a state of unconsciousness—a regular rhythmical revelation of the affirmation, consciousness, by its negation, unconsciousness, and *vice versa*. We might call it a pulsation or an undulation of the constituent of the mind, provided such an expression did not fasten upon us a premature theory as to the nature of that constituent. . . . The simplest state of consciousness, therefore, has its dual elements—its affirmation and its negation; and as all other states of consciousness, even the highest and most complex, are aggregates of such simple states, and as the complex must retain the dual character of the simple, and, like the simple, must have its affirmative and negative elements, therefore affirmation and negation are the dual foundations of mental life, and the essential elements of all thought, feeling, emotion, and volition.”

My “New Theory of Consciousness,” which was published in the “Journal of Speculative Philosophy,” July, 1880, was not an outgrowth from the article just quoted from; but it was suggested by, and was based upon, the current theory of atomic and molecular vibrations, their inevitable collisions and non-collisions constituting the conscious and the unconscious states of the atoms. Nevertheless, the conclusion reached in the first article, as quoted above, is also the necessary outcome of the second article, my “New Theory of Consciousness,” although its appearance in the latter was wholly independent of its appearance in the former. In other words, the principle that all mental life consists in a regular rhythmical alternation of conscious and unconscious states, while it is the inevitable conclusion of the first article, and is also the necessary outcome of the second, was reached in the two cases by processes of reasoning and considerations wholly independent of each other. To this extent, therefore, the two articles sustain each other, and I cannot help having more confidence in the principle which is thus an outcome of two independent processes of reasoning than if it had been reached by either one alone.

The principle which we reached in the two articles above referred to, the importance of which we wish now to illustrate, thereby still more firmly establishing its truth, is contained in the following words of our article on “Time and Space considered as Negations”: “Affirmation and Negation are the dual foundations of

mental life, and the essential elements of all thought, feeling, emotion, and volition."

Here is a plain figure, six inches long, drawn in red chalk upon a white surface; it has three right sides, one right angle, and two acute angles, and two of its sides are equal. It is *a* triangle. There is another plain figure ten inches long, drawn in white chalk upon a black surface; it has three unequal right sides and three acute angles. It also is *a* triangle. All such particular three-sided plain figures are called triangles. Then *a* triangle is a plain figure, bounded by three right sides.

Now, what is *triangle*? Shall we define it in the same terms as *a* triangle? Let us see. Triangle is a plain figure—we are balked at the very outset, for triangle is not a figure at all, and, of course, it is not bounded by three sides. Could we define triangle and *a* triangle in the same terms, there would, of course, be no difference between them—no difference, in other words, between the universal-particular and the universal—between, as we might say, water and one of its constituents, oxygen. How, then, shall we define triangle? We must first find out what it is. I now show you again that three sided, right-angled, isosceles triangle, six inches long and drawn in red chalk upon a white surface; and I ask you whether that is triangle. You say, "No, that is *a* triangle, not triangle." I next show you the ten-inch triangle, drawn in white chalk upon a black surface, and having three unequal sides and three acute angles; and to my question, "Is that triangle?" you again say, "No, that is *a* triangle, not triangle." I show you another of a different size, color, and shape; and I show you a great number of three-sided figures, all of different colors, sizes, and relations of sides and angles; and in every case you say, "That is *a* triangle, not triangle." Then *I can never show you triangle*. It is something that can never be present to the sight, the touch, or any of the senses. It is a thing that cannot be perceived, and hence it cannot be conceived. But this only tells us what triangle is not, not what it is—that, whatever it may be, it is inconceivable, because non-perceivable.

When I showed you that right-angled triangle, and to my question, "Is that triangle?" you said "No," yet back of that "No" was a secret, scarcely suppressed "Yes," as much as to say, "Well, you crowded me to say 'No' when I half meant 'Yes,' and, if trian-

gle is not that right-angled triangle, it is, perhaps, some other triangle, for it surely is to be found somewhere." But when I showed you acute- and obtuse-angled triangles, isosceles, and equilateral triangles, large and small triangles, and triangles of different relations of sides and angles, in numbers infinite, you still kept pace with me with your "no, no, no" *ad infinitum*, and back of each "no" was the suppressed "yes," indicating your belief that it must be something pertaining to them—their shadow, perhaps, if not their substance. Then what have you done with all my infinity of triangles? To each one you have said, "Triangle is not that, yet it is something pertaining to that." You have negated all my particular triangles, and would have negated as many millions more as I chose to show you, saying of each, "Triangle is not—not that—not any particular triangle. It is the negation of your right-angled triangle, of your obtuse- and acute-angled triangles, of your isosceles and your equilateral triangles, of your large and your small triangles—the negation of everything that is special, peculiar, and characteristic about each and every possible, perceivable, or conceivable triangle."

How totally different, then, are the two definitions, that, namely, of *a* triangle and that of triangle! *A* triangle is a plain figure bounded by three sides; but *triangle* is the negation of everything that is special, peculiar, and characteristic about each and every possible, perceivable, or conceivable triangle. In brief, *triangle is the negation of a triangle*. We now understand why what is called the general idea, triangle, is a thing that cannot be seen or felt—why it cannot be perceived, and hence why it is inconceivable. It is because it is a mental process for the destruction of all that is perceivable or conceivable about any particular triangle—for the reduction of any particular triangle to one of its indeterminate, inconceivable elements. The process is the same, and brings the same result in all cases; hence triangle, the negation, is necessarily singular and universal. Now, although the negation, triangle, is inconceivable, yet, because it is always the same without variation and is always singular, it has a monistic simplicity and universality which are the foundation of all mathematical certainty in the demonstration of the relations of the various parts of a triangle, as we shall presently endeavor to show.

- But are we sure that triangle (triangularity) is really a negation.

Some of my readers may still have doubts upon this point, believing that, in order to get a negation, we ought to negate more than we have done—that, in leaving triangularity, we leave a positive element, which cannot be called a negation. Let us go back to our red-sided, right-angled triangle, six inches long, and having two of its sides equal. I negate the redness of its sides, I negate its right angle, I negate the acuteness of its two other angles, I negate its length, and I negate the equality of two of its sides. Have I not negated everything that it is possible to negate? If I have omitted anything, let the reader negate that also; and what residue will be left in consciousness but triangularity? But why not now negate that also? Simply because if I negate that, or banish that from consciousness, the residuum in consciousness will not be the negation of that triangle nor of any triangle. It will be simply nothing, or the negation of everything. Now, negations are as different from each other as affirmations are from each other; but, if, in negating a particular triangle, I must banish triangularity from consciousness, then, in negating a circle, I must banish roundness, and, in negating a square, I must banish squareness from consciousness; then there would be no difference between the negations of a triangle, a circle, and a square; there would not be, in either case, any mental element left to relate the negation to its proper affirmation—nothing to indicate which is the negation of the triangle, which that of the circle, and which that of the square. Such is not the case with the undisputed negations. We never confound silence as a negation with darkness; and there is no danger of our calling silence the negation of light, or darkness the negation of sound. Every negation, to be a negation, must have an import which relates it to its proper affirmation. Such is triangularity as the negation of a triangle; and, without that, a triangle would have no negation.

Then the general idea, triangle, is a negation; and, of course, what is true of triangle is true of all general ideas; they are negations.

The sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles. This is a proposition to be demonstrated. I draw a triangle, and prove that the three angles of that particular triangle are equal to two right angles. I draw another, and show that the same is true of that also; and I may draw an infinite number of

particular triangles of different sizes and of different relations of sides and angles, and of each one I may prove the truth of the given proposition; but, as I can never exhaust the infinitude of possible triangles, all differing from each other, I may continue applying my demonstration to particular triangles forever without reaching that universality which must be reached before the mathematical demonstration is completed. Now, the particular demonstration is made universal by transferring it to the only thing which is, or can be, universal—namely, the negation of the particular triangle. This last step in the demonstration is regarded as so easy and simple that it is usually omitted from all demonstrations, it being either taken for granted or stated once for all. If expressed, however, it would be something like this: “We have now shown that in this triangle the sum of the three angles is equal to two right angles; but that is nothing peculiar or characteristic of the triangle before us, and it is therefore true of all triangles.” Now, while the geometrician makes this last step in the process as easily and as surely as he would say that the whole is greater than a part, yet the *explanation* of the ease and surety of the step, and of the apodictic certainty and universality of the conclusion, can only be given when we have solved that puzzling question of the centuries, “What are general ideas?” That explanation is this: when the proposition is proved to be true in the particular triangle used, that triangle is negated, *and the proposition abides with the negation*—the triangularity. Now, the negation of all triangles is the same one thing—triangularity; and hence all propositions that are true of it, or, we should say, that abide in it, are universally true.

From what has been said, it is evident that the universality of all geometrical propositions is dependent upon negations. It is, moreover, hardly necessary to remind the reader of the fact that the absolute certainty, even of particular geometrical demonstrations, is also dependent upon negations; for, without the negations, point and line, with which all geometrical figures and diagrams are theoretically constructed, there could be no absolute certainty in any particular demonstration.

The whole science of arithmetic rests upon that element of thought of which the word *one* and the figure 1 are our signs. When I say of any particular object that it is one house, one tree,

one pound, one dollar, it is, of course, not the house, the tree, the pound, or the dollar that is one, any more than *a* triangle is triangle. *One*, like triangle, is something which cannot be seen or felt, or in any way perceived or conceived. The negation of any and every particular object, considered as a single object, leaves, as a residue in consciousness, simply the numerical value of the single object, or, in other words, leaves the negation, one. The arithmetical one, therefore, being a negation, has that monistic simplicity and invariableness which characterize all negations as compared with the endless variety and changeableness of affirmations. All ones, then (if we may use the plural), are absolutely, necessarily, and universally equal; or, more correctly (since there can be but one *one* as a negation), the negation, one, is absolutely, necessarily, and universally equal to itself, or identical with itself.

Now, the whole of arithmetic proceeds from this negation, one; and without it there could be no arithmetic as a mathematical science. The import of *one* being determined, and its symbol agreed upon, the next step in arithmetic is the defining and symbolizing the other numbers—thus: $1 + 1 = 2$; $1 + 1 + 1 = 3$, and so on. Then come the propositions, which may be stated either in the form of problems, as, for instance, “to find the value of $3 + 2$ ”; or of theorems, as, for instance, “ $3 + 2 = 5$,” the demonstration of which is as follows: $3 + 2 = 3 + 1 + 1$; but $3 + 1 = 4$ by definition, therefore $3 + 1 + 1 = 4 + 1$; but $4 + 1 = 5$ by definition, therefore $3 + 2 = 5$.

Similarly the whole science of algebra rests upon a negation with its several symbols, *x*, *y*, *z*, etc.

Therefore, the certainty and universality of all mathematical propositions rest upon negations.

It is said that “notions without perceptions are void, and perceptions without notions are blind.” Such metaphorical forms of expression are excusable when, as heretofore in this case, the subject treated of has not been reduced to a principle that can be clearly and distinctly formulated in scientific language. In such cases, the best that can be done in discussing the subject, is to illustrate it, and talk at it, and around it, and about it, and thus give as clear an understanding of it as can be done in the absence of a knowledge of the principle to which it may be reduced. If, instead of the above illustrative, figurative form of expression, we

substitute the following law, there is certainly an immense gain in clearness and precision of thought and language. *Perceptions and notions determine each other.* From this it follows that the one without the other is indeterminate, and, because indeterminate, non-perceivable and inconceivable. Now, if we reduce this law of the subject to some general principle or principles, the whole matter is then put into scientific form. That general principle is the principle of Affirmation and Negation, namely: *Affirmations and Negations determine each other*; and this is brought under the still more general principle that *Consciousness and Unconsciousness determine each other.*

Now, is our law true? Is it true that perceptions and notions (general ideas) determine each other? We have endeavored to show that general ideas are negations, and, as such, are indeterminate. We shall now endeavor to show that perceptions, considered by themselves, are also indeterminate; and that these two indeterminates determine each other. Should we succeed in showing that general ideas (notions) and perceptions do thus conform to the law of Affirmation and Negation, it will be confirmatory evidence of the truth of our theory that general ideas are Negations.

Something lies before me in the field of my vision—but that is already saying too much; for, in saying that something lies *before me*, or *in the field of my vision*, I have already defined or determined, partially at least, that which in its real nature is, as we shall see, indefinite and indeterminate. If I have already recognized that it is *before me*, or *in the field of my vision*, I have already taken the initiatory steps toward making it a thing perceived and to that extent determined, and hence an object, instead of that element of an object which we wish to get at—that chaos of unrelated sensations which, as *sensations*, are wholly subjective, and therefore have no *before* or *behind* to them, and are never *in a field of vision*. With this check upon our thoughts, we will change our illustration.

You and I are looking in the same direction. You see upon the blackboard a right-angled isosceles triangle, six inches long, two of its sides being drawn with white chalk, and the third one with red. I, having as good eyesight as yourself, and looking in precisely the same direction, do not perceive that triangle at all.

With my eyes turned toward the blackboard, I sit gazing thoughtlessly into vacaney, and the colors, lights, and shades from that triangle, pouring continuously into my eye, fall upon the retina, and cause a great variety of sensations or impressions. I am just conscious enough, or unconscious enough, to realize a dim blur of impressions made by the different colors, lights, and shades; but it would be saying too much to say that I am conscious of the colors, lights, and shades as differing from each other, or as at all related to each other into lines or forms; in short, I have simply a great number of unrelated sensations, or of detached units of consciousness. That triangle is so plain to you; yet whatever of it lies upon my consciousness is but an indefinite, indeterminate something, non-perceivable, and hence inconceivable, until I add to it that which is not an essential part of its constitution. I cannot perceive it without making it a unit; but to make it a unit is to put its parts into relation with each other, whereas the very essence of its present nature to me is the non-relation of its parts; and so it must continue to be to me until I put into it, or find in it, or conjoin with it, another element which shall define and determine it, and thus make it perceivable and conceivable. That other element is triangularity—that negation which, as we have already seen, is also indeterminate, non-perceivable, and inconceivable. The general idea, then, conforms to the law of affirmation and negation, and thus gives us an additional assurance that it is itself a negation.

It will, perhaps, be said that my negation is simply an abstraction, and that I have, therefore, merely given a new name to an old thing. There is, however, something more than a mere name involved in this matter. All real abstractions are abstractions of particulars, that is, of determinate things—an abstraction of an indeterminate thing such as a general idea, in the first instance, being an impossibility. An abstraction presupposes that we already have in hand the thing to be abstracted. Then to abstract a general idea we must already have the general idea before the mind; in other words, the mind must already be in possession of the very thing that it is trying to attain—must use the *end* as a *means* to attain the *end*. This is an impossibility. The general idea, therefore, before it can be abstracted, must be attained by some other process besides that of abstraction. Now,

the only other process possible is that of negation—the rejecting of the particular determinate things until nothing more can be rejected, leaving the general idea, the negation, as the only residuum in consciousness.

An *ultimate* is that which has not proceeded from anything else—that which has no *genesis*. *Things* are procedures from ultimates. *Science* is the ascertained relations of things. Philosophy is the ascertained relations of ultimates; or, we may say, *philosophy is the science of ultimates*.

Only a *monistic* cosmical theory can give us a genesis of things, and thus enable us to escape the insuperable difficulties which attend any theory of two or more different cosmical ultimates which must be supposed to have been, in the outset, dovetailed and fitted into each other either by an amazing accident or by an equally amazing design—a pre-established harmony. And this, it seems to me, is a fatal objection to Kant's Time, Space, and Categories. If they are procedures, or, in other words, if they have a genesis, they are not *a priori*; if, on the other hand, they have no genesis, if they have not proceeded from some common source, then they are different ultimates, and, as such, have no relation to each other, and can never by any possibility be brought into relation to each other. This is the hidden weakness of Kant—this complex system of implied pre-established harmonies between things which can only be *a priori* by being unrelated and unrelatable.

If, as we have said, only a monistic cosmical theory can give us a genesis of things, and thus enable us to escape the insuperable difficulties that must attend any theory of two or more different cosmical ultimates, yet even a monistic theory, which takes in only one half of nature—the positive side—and neglects the equally important negative side—the realm of negations—must soon become entangled in difficulties equally insuperable. Negations have an equal claim with affirmations upon the attention of the philosopher. The moment he crosses the threshold of the great temple of nature, as a philosopher, while he may be dazzled by that brilliant trail of the light, and the life, and the beauty, and the harmony of realities infinite, in processions and procedures interminable upon his right, he is appalled at the sight of those awful shadows upon his left—Unconsciousness, Time, Space, Cause, Universals—those spectral forms that will neither “down” nor

“out”—those ghosts of realities that have been the terror of philosophers in all ages, standing forever there, dumb, silent, stolid as the sphinx, a perpetual defiance to the most royal heads that have ever entered the temple; but which, when approached more closely, are found to be naught but harmless ghosts and shadows—mere skeleton negations of the living realities.

A POPULAR STATEMENT OF IDEALISM.

BY WILLIAM M. SALTER.

II.

In Goethe's tragedy, after Faust has pronounced his successive curses on ambition, mammon, hope, faith, and patience, the chorus of spirits laments:

“Woe! woe!
Thou hast it destroyed,
The beautiful world.”

They will not, however, give him over to despair, and turn upon him with divine cheer:

“Mightier
For the children of men,
Brightlier
Build it again
In thine own bosom, build it anew!”

It would be straining a comparison to say that we shall now attempt to do for the sensible world what Faust was summoned to do for the world of human aims and passions, which he had so rudely destroyed. For, in truth, the idealist has not destroyed the sensible world, nor sought to, but only the notion, so sedulously cherished by many, of its separateness from ourselves. And, if he had destroyed it, it would be quite beyond his power to build it again. For we do not create our sensations, nor can we. We do not think of color, and then by an act of will make it stand before our eyes. We cannot conjure up harmonies of sound and then

actually hear them. Our sensations come, we know not how nor whence; our sole knowledge is that they are, in a very limited way, subject to our control. They come in order: but I, save within certain limits, do not determine that order, and cannot determine it; I have simply to recognize and accept it, as I do the sensations themselves. In proposing a work of reconstruction, then, the idealist has no notion of evolving the world out of his own thought, or inner consciousness, so called. He wishes simply to show that his demolition of the external world has been only a demolition of a wrong opinion of it, and that a *real external world* is just as truly his property as any one's; that the words "real" and "external" are as significant to him as to any one, and this without forgetting for a moment the result of his first analysis, that the whole sensible world is nothing and means nothing outside of human (or other sentient) consciousness. Let us proceed to this task:

In a way that we have acknowledged to be altogether mysterious, we experience certain sensations. These sensations do not suggest the notion of reality, they do not lead us to *infer* something behind them that we may call by this name; they *are* reality.¹ A color as such, a resistance as such, is real, just as a pain is; there is nothing to us human beings that can be more real; and, in fact, our very notions of reality are not prior to, but are based upon, these simple and direct sensible experiences. Where these sensations are to be located, how they are to be connected, what is their place in a final system of thought—these are other questions; the sensations themselves are nowise problematical or derived, but the data and material, with the immediate and unquestioning acceptance of which every process of reasoning must begin. Moreover, these sensations do not come at hap-hazard. As we have already said, they do not (save within limits) obey our direction, either in the time and place of their arising, nor in their manner of succeeding one another. Though *our* experiences, they

¹ Professor Huxley says this of odor: "To say that I am aware of this phenomenon, or that I have it, or that it exists, are simply different modes of affirming the same facts. If I am asked how I know that it exists, I can only reply that its existence and my knowledge of it are one and the same thing; in short, that my knowledge is immediate or intuitive, and, as such, possessed of the highest conceivable degree of certainty." ("Science and Culture," p. 258.) The idealist simply conceives that this is the manner of existence of all sensible phenomena.

are in another sense independent of us—that is, independent of our wishes or will. We have to *learn* of them, as truly as if they were alien existences having no kind of relation to ourselves. And we do soon learn that they are associated with or succeed one another in regular or fixed ways; and hence a world, a cosmos as opposed to a chaos, evolves itself out of our experiences. The groups of associated sensations we call objects, the difficulty of distinguishing the same being simply that of discovering which out of the numberless sensations thronging upon us are really associated. The uniformities of succession among sensations or phenomena we call laws, the exact marking of which is a still more intricate and difficult task. It may perhaps be unfortunate that we have no other word than law to designate a uniformity of succession, since in politics and ethics (not to say religion), where the word was perhaps first used, it has quite a different meaning.¹ But if the scientific use of it is defined, as it ordinarily is by physical investigators, there is no need of our being confused by it, though the inferences not infrequently made from the laws of nature to a law-giver show that this confusion often exists.

One of these groups of sensations is our own body. It is true that all phenomena are our own according to the idealistic hypothesis—a stone, or a tree, or a star equally with the body. But there are reasons for calling the latter specially our own. *First*, we have a double set of sensations in connection with our body. When I strike my face with my hand, I experience not only a sensation of resistance in my hand, but also one in my face. When, however, I strike the stone, I have but a single sensation, viz., in my hand. The assertion may be ventured that if the stone, on being struck, gave us a sensation as our own face does when struck, we should, though quite perplexed and mystified, feel that in some way it was a part of us. It may be questioned, indeed, whether our own body does not *mean* so much of the sensible

¹ A law in politics or ethics, it hardly needs saying, prescribes what men are to do or ought to do; a law in physics, and natural science generally, is simply a statement of actual facts. The laws of the State and of morality are frequently disobeyed; those of physics can never be in the slightest degree, though one may modify the action of another. In fact, obedience and disobedience are misleading terms in the physical sphere. Bodies do not fall *because* of the law of gravitation, but the law of gravitation is simply a statement of the general fact that they do fall. See a clear statement in Professor Huxley's "Introductory Primer," p. 13.

world as yields these double sensations. A *second reason* is that, with these sensations we call our body, is connected our general power of sensation. We are not so dependent on the stone, or tree, or star; if any particular one of these were removed or destroyed, we could see and feel quite as well as before. But if the minor group of sensations I call my ear is removed, I no longer hear; if my eyes are plucked out, I no longer see. Yes, though the external organs remain uninjured, if but those delicate fibres connecting them with the brain be destroyed or only severed, I no longer hear or see; and if that group of sensations we call the brain exists no longer, not only hearing and sight vanish, but all power of thought (so far as we know) vanishes too. The light of a candle may be snuffed out and the candle be lit again. The snuffed-out-light of human life and thought is, humanly speaking, incapable of restoration. As Othello says, in the last fateful scene with the sleeping Desdemona:

“Put out the light—and then put out thy light:
 If I quench thee, thou flaming minister,
 I can thy former light restore,
 Should I repent me:—but once put out thy light,
 Thou cunning'st pattern of excelling nature,
 I know not where is that Promethean heat
 That can thy light relume.”

In this way is it possible for the idealist to do ample justice to those common-sense notions of the dependence of the mind upon the body, which he may seem to make light of. The mind *is* dependent on the body in the sense that our general power of sensation and thought is connected with those sensations we call our body. Why this should be so is quite mysterious. Neither physics, nor physiology, nor psychology explains it, though either may give us a most careful and detailed statement of the facts to be explained. Why my power of perceiving colors should be linked with the particular group of sensations I call my eye, I utterly fail to understand. Why it should not be equally well linked with some other group or with no group at all, and I thus be but mind with no bodily organism whatever, I cannot in any way see. But it is enough for the practical uses of life, and enough for science, that does not concern itself about ultimate

questions, to recognize that there is this connection. And, further, it must be stated that we have no proof that any other connection—not to say the absence of all connection—is or ever has been actual, so that the notion of pure mind or spirit may be, for all we know, an entirely vain one, though it must be recognized as abstractly possible.

It would, however, be a totally unwarranted leap to infer from all this that the organs of sense are anywise causally related to sensations, or that the body in general is to the mind. It would be, indeed, forgetting that the organs of sense, as so many groups of sensible phenomena themselves, only exist in the mind, and that the body is simply a part of our mental experience. My body is not a cause, but a sign of my mental existence—a sign, that is, to some one else, or to myself, if I could need one. If I should become blind, the condition of my visual organs would not be properly explanatory, but simply *indicatory* to another of the fact, and it would be indicatory to me if I could need any proof of that which I already know. So death as a physical fact cannot be seriously called an explanation of the cessation of mental activity, though the two, for all we know, may be inseparably connected. Death as a series of sensible phenomena can only exist in some one's mental apprehension; when my own time comes, for example, it will be simply a *sign* to some one else of the cessation of my mental life, and might be an equally significant sign to myself if I could die and observe my dying at the same time. For, if no one is present or observes me, there would be no physical death, properly speaking, but simply the inexplicable fact of my ceasing to feel and think. And fundamentally mysterious is, in the same manner, man's birth, and, indeed, all the stages of his earthly existence. Explanation is there for none of them; the fancied explanations and causes of which men speak in the sphere of sensible phenomena are but man's own experiences, and, so far from their explaining man, man is necessary to explain them. What in turn explains man is the world-riddle.

Nor is science anywise inconsistent with such a view. The results of physical science, of physiology, and even of physiological psychology, are the same on any theory. They all have to do with mental experiences, according to the idealist. He will not care to interpose a word, save when the physical or physiological

investigator talks of objects literally ¹ outside the mind, or uses such objects to explain the mind, or considers laws to signify more than matter-of-fact connections, or uses necessity in a sense which Professor Huxley emphatically repudiates.² Idealism is not a question of any special science, but relates to a general understanding of all the sciences. And, as here considered, it must not be identified with *a priori* systems of thought, with transcendentalism or intuitionism, as those words are frequently understood. It is nowise inconsistent with the view that all our knowledge of the sensible world is gained by experience, that is, with pure empiricism. In fact, idealism may claim to have a special affinity with the spirit and methods of modern science, since science, too, calls for experience and does not concern itself about matters that lie beyond experience. If any object cannot actually or conceivably be brought within the range of sensible experience, it is as good as non-existent to the scientific investigator. And this may be said without implying that the scientific investigator may not forget his special, and, after all, rather limited rôle, and, as a human being, conjecture and speculate and hope and believe like the rest of mankind.

Let us now consider briefly the meaning of the externality of the world. The externality of one's own body means very little, unless the thought is that one's body is not a mere idea, but a real group of sensations. For that our body is literally external to ourselves has meaning, only if "ourselves" has some position, relatively to which the body is external. But, as we have seen, there is no warrant for such an assertion, "ourselves" being simply that to which the body and all sensible objects exist and have meaning. But few are concerned about so awkward and doubtful a conception as the externality of our own body, and that about which we are concerned—the reality of the world *external to our body*—the idealist may assert as unhesitatingly as the most vigorous common sense. And this is the interpretation he puts upon the common-sense assertions of a world *outside of ourselves*: viz., it is *outside our body*. The ellipsis is easily explicable, since our body is "ourselves" in a sense that

¹ Properly the language is perfectly allowable, as will be explained farther on.

² "Lay Sermons," p. 144.

no other group of phenomena is, as before explained. And why should we not as immediately know a world external to the body as the body itself? The hardness of the ground I may know just as immediately as that of my cranium. The color of another's eye I can note even more easily than that of my own. The external world is not to be called an inference. Such a way of speaking rests on misconceptions which it has been the endeavor of this essay to clear up. Neither common sense nor genuine philosophy countenances it. It is half-enlightenment. The whole sensible world, the ground as well as the human body that stands upon it, the air as well as the lungs, and the heavens as well as the earth—all is equally real and known with equal immediateness; that is, it is real, viewed as the real experience of some sentient subject, and unreal, and the whole equally unreal, if regarded as a self-subsisting thing, apart from some sentient subject. Hence the renewed necessity for asserting the purely provisional character of the language used in the earlier part of this essay. The external world is not, in any strictness, simply certain mysterious entities in the brain, at the other end of complicated nerve processes. If so pitiable a reduction were made of this vast and splendid spectacle about us, the idealist could hardly receive or merit the serious attention of his fellow-men. The world is as great—yes, possibly as infinite—in extent and duration to the idealist as to any one; for it is not merely what we experience, but all we can experience and all that we can conceive that we might experience, if there were no limits to our powers. In fact, a limitless experience would be but another name for a limitless world. And the so-called “mysterious entities” in the brain, it had better be acknowledged, are a fiction. Physiology can get along well enough without them, and the true office of physiology is not to discover for us the causes of sensations, but to investigate a certain group of sensations—viz., those that make up what we call our bodily organisms. Indeed, in the idealistic theory, all the sciences become, in some sense, branches of *psychology*, and it may be questioned whether there can be any separate science bearing that name. If there is to be, it must be either an account of each individual's own mental experiences (or world), or of general human powers of sensation and thought, as opposed to the *content* or *objects* with which they are concerned. For the distinc-

tion between subject and object is valid to the idealist, as it must be to every one who thinks.

A color is not, strictly speaking, ourselves, nor is an odor or a resistance. They are what we experience, and the full statements would be, we perceive the color, and scent the odor, and feel the resistance. It is even possible to realize at times that the pain which we may experience is not strictly ourselves, but that under which we suffer, though pains and pleasures are not shapeable into definite objects as other sensations are. The idealist only insists that the object shall not be separated from the subject and treated as if it were a thing in itself. We are all aware of how the moonbeams seem to follow us as we go along a stream of water on a bright moonlit night. According to the idealist—and here according to the ordinary teaching of the physicist as well—they *do* follow us, and, as rays of light have no existence apart from us, the idealist simply adding that this is true in respect to all material existence. But, for all this, the moonbeams are not ourselves, and sensible phenomena in general (nor the whole sum of them) are not ourselves, though it may be, for all we know, that we can have no existence apart from them any more than they from us. *Sensibile* is perhaps a good, if a rather scholastic word, for a sensation viewed on its objective side; for meaning, as it does, *that which may be perceived or felt*, it immediately suggests *that which perceives or feels*—viz., the subject, which alone is *sentiens*. Subject and object so taken are evidently not inferences from sensation, but analytical statements of what sensation implies. Neither is substance, or some unknowable entity behind the sensation, the one being simply that which knows and the other that which is known. For the sake of the utmost clearness, it might have been better to use the word *sensibilia* in this discussion wherever sensations have been conceived in the objective sense; since sound, color, weight, etc., are not sensations in the sense of being themselves sentient or of implying a sentient subject behind them, save in the case of those groups of *sensations* we call other human beings (or animals of the lower sentient creation generally); more accurately speaking, they are the content or object of sensations. Hence, it could be said, as it was (in effect) earlier in this paper, that our own sensations never reveal to us sensations in another. Our own sensations

have for their content or object simply material qualities. The sensations of others are not a matter of observation, but of inference, and exist only to our imagination or thought. The different meanings of words have in general to be intrusted to the intelligence of the reader, unless a scholastic precision of statement is attempted. And, moreover, the purpose of this paper has not been to build up a complete theory of existence, but simply to bring out the subjective references of phenomena, of which we are ordinarily unmindful. *Sensibilia* excellently combines both the objective and subjective meanings of material phenomena—objective in that they are objects to the mind, and not the mind itself, subjective in that they imply the mind to which they exist.

And yet a consequence of idealism must now be more distinctly considered, which may seem almost to cancel the merit of the reconstructive efforts we have been making. Reality, save in the transcendental sense, being placed in our experience and not in something apart from experience, what can be said of objects when we do not experience them? A rather awkward phrase has already been used now and then—possible sensation. It can hardly be defined save by showing how the idealist is led, and even compelled, to use it. An odor that we scent is real, it is real in our sensation of it; what, then, is it when we do not scent it? Plainly, we can only answer, a possible sensation or reality. And we may accustom ourselves to this view of odors, and, perhaps, sounds, without much difficulty, but it seems almost impossible to realize it in connection with colors and resistances. Can it be, we ask, that the grass is only green when we look at it, and the ground only hard when we tread upon it? Look at the grass as often as we like, and turn upon it as stealthy glances as we can, it always has this color. But, in this very simple illustration, is it not possible that we can discover our real meaning in calling it always green? How do we know it to be so, when we do not look at it? Surely, we do not. But this we know, that, look at it as often as we like, we find it so; it was so this morning, and is this afternoon, and will be, we are sure, to-morrow and next day, and so on, as long as the summer lasts, and we may run back with equal confidence in the past. How, then, can we better express our confidence that these sensations are so continuously possible than by saying the grass is always green, and, since

it is so independently of our will, it is so quite apart from ourselves? This is simply popular language, by no means misleading or untrue. It is only when put to exact philosophical uses and made to mean that color is independent of our sensations that the idealist cares to interpose; and here let us renew a statement already in substance made, that it is not his object to deny any of the common convictions of men so much as to show what they really are—that is, how they arose and what they mean. “The ground is always hard” means, also, that we have always found it so, and believe we always shall find it so, and, as we can easily in thought go beyond the limits of our own lives, that this will be the experience of men in the future, whether after fifty or five hundred years. Similarly, we may go out in space and say that distant objects are hard, having the same confidence as to the moon’s surface that we have as to the top brick of a neighboring chimney—meaning in both cases not that they are so irrespective of ourselves or any sentient being, but simply that, if we go near enough, we shall find them so. The world thus means an order of possible (rather than actual) sensations, stretching out in space and backward and forward in time.¹

Does, then, the world, as more than the limited number of our actual sensations, exist only to our imagination or thought? Yes, though with a decided difference from many of our imaginations and thoughts, which cannot be confirmed by real experience. The scientific imagination is no more an arbitrary thing than sensation. I can indeed fancy what I like, can think of trees with their roots in the air, of horses with ten legs, etc., but scientific imagination is that which limits itself, viz., to real possibilities of sensation, and simply presents to us a large and flowing picture of these possibilities. And imagination may present us with sensations that were possible at a time when no sentient being actually existed, and hence never were actual sensations; for example, the appearance of the earth in the earliest geological epochs. Yes, the steps antecedent to the separate existence of the earth, passing along which the scientific imagination rises to the thought of an original fiery mist or nebula, are but the stages of a possible ex-

¹ No realistic view of space or time is here necessarily implied. Space and time may be simply abstractions from our sensible experience, so far as the necessities of idealism are concerned. Whether they are so is a question that does not now concern us.

perience, which we might think of ourselves as having, though in fact no sentient beings, of the kind that we know, could possibly have existed then. And the conversion of the nebular hypothesis into an assured knowledge (if that were possible) would not be due to a leap from ourselves out into "reality," so called, but to an ascertaining that what we before *conjectured* as a possible experience we now somehow *know* to have been a possible experience, and the only possible one. Once with the notion of fixedness in my present possibilities of experience, I can, as I do, unhesitatingly extend it to all past time as well as to the most distant space. Idealism introduces not one particle of uncertainty or variability into the whole realm with which science deals.¹ So imagination may present us with the supposed waves of the ethereal medium, with the molecules and atoms out of which the world is believed to be constructed, and with the particles of our own brains, which could indeed become actual sensations (to ourselves or any one else) only at the risk of all further power of sensation on our part.

Are, then, all these objects that exist to our imagination not *real* objects? Is the brain of each one of us but a thought? and was the earth, antecedent to the appearance of sentient beings upon it, but a possibility and not a reality? An inquiry might indeed be made as to the final meaning of reality. But, adhering to the ordinary notion of it as something possessed of sensible qualities, there is no way of escape for the idealist; he must give an affirmative answer. The brain has a gray color only when some one sees it, and its varied texture means nothing save in some one's experience. The earth, as a combination of sensible qualities and objects, began with the first sentient existence upon it. The brains of all of us living men exist only to our imagination, and so does the presentient globe. Flowers have no sweetness to waste on the desert air. The violets I may find on a lonely ramble in the woods, and which I am sure no one saw be-

¹ Though, of course, knowledge attaches only to the experience of the moment, and memory, like expectation, is a kind of belief, there is a clear line of distinction between beliefs with regard to what were (or might have been, or may become) matters of experience and those relating to matters of which there can be, in the present state of our faculties, no possible experience—*e. g.*, the whole sphere of the supersensible. The former are scientific, the latter speculative beliefs.

fore me, did not exist as violets till I found them. What gives them to me I know not, though they are gifts, and imply a giver, as well as a receiver. I do not create them by my coming upon them, and I could not, if I would, change them at will, turning them into daisies or roses. And I might have found them an hour, or a day, or perhaps a week before. And this continual possibility of experience I picture under the form of their actual existence all this time. And so may I picture my own brain, or the earth long before man or any sentient creature appeared on it. These are all true pictures, for they are pictures of what we might have experienced; but they are only pictures, and have no meaning apart from those who sketch or contemplate them. Still, if there is or was no actual experience, there is or was no reality, (save in the transcendental sense of that word).

The reader, who, whether a philosopher or not, is sure that he is not at least lacking in common sense, will perhaps turn from such a conclusion in disgust. And though the idealist is very loth to part company with common sense, since he conceives it his duty to interpret and not to contradict the common opinions of mankind—and knows that he has no other instrument for his conclusions than men in general have for theirs, namely, human reason, and that a real contradiction would logically necessitate scepticism;—yet, as simple matter of psychological fact, he may admit for himself that it is no easy thing to bear his theory always in mind. Idealism is not what he naturally and habitually thinks; it is the result of analysis and reflection, and implies an open-mindedness and a patience and a determination to think that are not with us as a gift of nature, and are rarely used by us save to reach some tangible or practical goal. Philosophy may be acknowledged to be not unlike ethics in that it holds before us not so much what is (in our thoughts), as what ought to be. We know in our moments of moral seriousness what we ought to do, yet in the stress and struggle of life we may often forget the moral ideal, and even seek to excuse and justify our conduct, whatever it be. So in an hour of philosophical reflection we may clearly see that the world about us, “all the choir of heaven and the furniture of the earth” (to quote from Bishop Berkeley), are but our sensations, and no more separate from us than our triumphs or our pains; that the world is our world, and that its greatness, instead of belittling us,

is in one sense our own greatness ; and yet in our ordinary work-a-day existence forget the philosophical truth, become unaware of the significance of our intellectual being, divide ourselves into mind and body, contrast the world within with the world without, sensation and reality, and become hardened and stiffened in all the customary abstractions, which, no doubt, serve a purpose, else they would not be made, but are, after all, but a kind of working armor for this earthly life, and have no fixedness or finality to the mind within. It is the mind that has made these abstractions, and the mind can unmake them, or, what is the same, transcend them. It can, in times not of aberration or affectation of transcendental insights, but of simply genuine thinking, throw off the armor and breathe free. And philosophy is injured no more than ethics by allowing that we do not always heed its demands. It is enough that when we think we know it to be true, as it is enough that, when our moral nature rises from its sleep, we know that the good and the just are intrinsically binding upon us.

And yet there is such a thing as intellectual seriousness. A genuine moral seriousness will not allow us to think of the good as simply a fair ideal which we may now and then recall only for the sake of a kind of æsthetic satisfaction ; it makes us set our hearts upon the ideal, and turn life into a prolonged endeavor to realize its requirements. So intellectual seriousness is not consistent with a recognition of truth at one moment and the next forgetting it, not to say contradicting it ; an effort must at least be made to bring the truth of philosophy into our habitual thoughts. And the objection cannot be allowed to be valid, that idealism will do as a theory for the closet, but not for the street and practical life. Because a headache is a sensation, I need become no less wary in guarding against it by proper exercise and diet. Because a resistance is only a sensation, it is none the less real, and I may be none the less on the lookout that I do not experience it too forcibly ; for there are signs which tell me of its approach as truly as there are symptoms of a headache. What difference can it make to me whether the pavement *is* always hard or not, so long as I always *find* it so, and am sure I always shall ? Expectation may be so vivid and confident as to amount to knowledge. Are we indeed practically concerned with the qualities of bodies save as we believe we may experience them ?

Why should I fear a falling stone more than a falling feather, save as I know that a very recognizable sensation will come from the one that will not come from the other? And even if this were otherwise, the true and philosophical way to meet idealism would not be by exposing the practical absurdity of it, nor by finding fault with any of its remote general conclusions, but by turning back upon its premises and testing the truth of its fundamental assumptions. And these assumptions are, in the language of Herbert Spencer,¹ that "what we are conscious of as properties of matter, even down to its weight and resistance, are but subjective affections produced by objective agencies which are unknown and unknowable" ("Psychology," vol. i, p. 206)—a sentence which contains in brief the whole of this article. If any one of the properties of matter is not such a "subjective affection," but a reality, apart from all subjective affections, idealism is overthrown, and the sensible world to this extent exists as truly when we do not experience it as when we do.

It may be well, in closing, to formally enumerate some of the implications and consequences of the idealistic theory:

I. Reality is not to be opposed to sensation, but is sensation, actual or possible. Truth means not the correspondence of sensation to some reality apart from it, but of thought to sensation.

II. Matter is not the cause of our sensations, not a metaphysical substratum behind them, but a general name for the sensations, viewed on their objective side (pleasure and pain excepted). And

¹ This language may be quoted without implying that Mr. Spencer always speaks in consistency with it. Elsewhere ("Psychology," vol. ii, p. 484) he speaks of ideas as depending on pre-existent nervous plexuses and waves of molecular motion much in the manner of the ordinary uncritical realist. But what are these nervous plexuses and waves of molecular motion? Are they not material, and as such possessed of at least the essential properties of matter? And does not Mr. Spencer teach that the properties of matter are "subjective affections"? How, then, can these affections be treated as if they were independent of the subject, capable of producing effects in it?

Professor Huxley has distinctly attempted to harmonize whatever inconsistency may seem to lie in his own assertions, now of idealism and now of materialism, and idealism is always with him the ultimate truth, though not so much by contradicting as by furnishing a solvent for materialism. (See his "Hume," pp. 78, 79, and "Science and Culture," p. 280.) From Professor Huxley the present writer wishes to acknowledge that he received his first lessons in idealism, though, but for some seeming incompleteness in the teacher's mental assimilation of the theory, the pupil would not have been led to the trains of reflection that are presented, at perhaps unnecessary length, in these articles.

force, it may be added, as science can deal with it, is not a mystical entity behind material phenomena, but material phenomena themselves viewed in certain relations to one another. A stone as such, an arm as such, a head of water, as so much weight in such position, are forces, actual or potential; that is, they can produce (or, what is the same, be followed by) changes in the state of other objects.¹ If we use force in another sense, we venture into a metaphysical region with which science is not concerned.

III. Phenomena, which are sensations, are not to be classed, in philosophical strictness, as physical and mental, since all phenomena as such are mental. But we may either experience phenomena or think of them; that is, we may have sensations or thoughts, and the latter may be called, *par eminence*, mental or psychical phenomena. Noumena are the unknown causes of sensations, necessarily posited if we regard sensations as effects in us. If matter is regarded as an independent reality, it is difficult to see why the term "phenomenon" should be applied to it; and, if it is applied, what other than verbal reason there can be for supposing the existence of noumena. Matter becomes thus itself noumenal.

IV. Object is a group of sensible qualities (or sensations), and law is a statement of a constant relation obtaining between objects. Mind is not a mysterious somewhat lying back of thoughts and sensations, but simply that which thinks and feels; not a substance, but a subject. Substance is a conception liable to lead us astray in other than material connections, and, if used, should at least be carefully defined. Substance and attribute, or subject and predicate, are purely logical categories, when applied to non-sentient objects (*e. g.*, a stone is hard), though, perhaps, containing the harmless illusion that the qualities of objects have some such centre of unity as we call subject or ego in ourselves.

V. The causative instinct does not find an answer to its questionings in the sphere of sensible phenomena. Sensible phenomena are but so many effects, though so orderly in their connections that from any one we may infer, with well-nigh unlimited practical certainty, to any other. Science studies these phenomena and their connections; and, if it speaks of cause and effect, it means antecedent and consequent; if it speaks of necessary connection,

¹ For light on this point, the writer is indebted to Dr. William James, in the remarkable critical paper already referred to, "The Feeling of Effort."

it means no more than matter-of-fact invariability of connection. The causative instinct impels, then, to metaphysical speculation. Metaphysics, in the idealistic theory, is not concerned with the last elements of the sensible world, but with the causes of this world, its elements included. Whether metaphysics can ever become more than a problem remains undetermined; it cannot, however, become science—*i. e.*, verified speculation—in the present state of human faculties.

VI. Idealism in no wise affects any truth of science, and, for all that it asserts, pure empiricism may be the true philosophy. It simply holds that all the truths of science are truths of mental experience (actual or possible); but none of the mind's objects (which are its experiences) can explain the mind itself. They have no existence, save in their unknown causes, outside the mind, and hence assertions, as that mind is a function of the brain, are, however popularly allowable, in philosophical strictness, either tautology or illusion. The general significance of idealism is simply that mind (that is, sentient existence of some sort) is made essential to the system of sensible things. It is no longer an incident, a by-play, a result of organization, comparable to the perfume of a rose or the music of a piano, but the indispensable prerequisite of any sensible existence. The world-problem is thereby simplified. It is no longer to account for mind and matter (in the separate sense), but for mind and its experiences. Idealism is not, however, itself any solution, being only a clear statement of what the problem is; and, for all that idealism says, the problem may be insoluble.

VII. Materialism is not to be met by direct attack any more than common sense, from which it is not essentially different. It is not so much an untrue as an approximate way of thinking. Its only weakness is that it does not understand the meaning of its own terms. The doctrine of the indestructibility of matter, for example, is perfectly true. But what does it mean? To uncritical minds, it seems to assert a brute datum existing outside of us, surviving our coming and going, a kind of material deity. But, scientifically speaking, the indestructibility of matter means the unchangeability of the weight of its elements. Weight, however, means pressure, and pressure is what a sentient being feels or might feel, and has in consequence no meaning apart from such

a sentient being. The indestructibility of matter is really a statement of the constancy of certain sensations. Materialism thus needs simply to be led to reflect. It does not stand to idealism as a rival philosophy, but is simply a *naïve*, uncritical way of thinking, while idealism, if true, *is* philosophy—philosophy being (as I use it now) no more than thought cleared of obscurity and assumption.¹ The only charge against materialism is, that it cannot be finally stated save in terms of idealism; and hence it may itself become idealism if it will but abandon the school-boy "cocksureness"² which is too apt to characterize it, and proceed to the not always welcome task of self-examination.

BRADLEY'S "PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC."*

BY S. W. DYDE.

(Continued.)

α. Bradley states (p. 10) that "judgment proper is the act which refers an ideal content (*recognized as such*) to a reality beyond the act"; again (p. 2): "Not only are we unable to judge before we use ideas, but, strictly speaking, *we cannot judge till we use them as ideas*. We must have become aware that they are not realities, that they are mere ideas, signs of an existence other than themselves"; and again (p. 40): "*The consciousness of objectivity* or necessary connection, in which the essence of judgment is sometimes taken to lie, will be found in the end to derive its meaning from a reference to the real." These three remarks all emphasize the same thought. To recognize an ideal content as such is the affirmative way of saying to be aware that it is not a reality; while again, when it is said that the consciousness of objectivity is the essence of judgment, it is meant that judgment in its essence does not consist so much in the mere relation of ideal content to

¹ I do not presume to give this as a definition of philosophy.

² Professor Huxley.

³ "The Principles of Logic." By F. H. Bradley, LL. D., Glasgow, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. London: Kegan Paul & Co., Paternoster Square.

reality as in the knowledge that the relation so made is an act of judgment.

In order fully to comprehend the above statements, we must discover the exact significance of "ideal content," the exact meaning of "reality," and also what is implied in the assertion that such reality exists independent of the act. First of all, What is the ideal content? In everything which we know exists we can distinguish at least two sides—(1) existence, (2) content. Even in the most simple proposition, "This is," for example, is already implied more than mere existence; for in our saying *This* is, we have given it, whatever it is, a position in space. Also when we fail to discover the content of a presentation and ask, "What is that?" there is already implied that it is, and that it is there. The content may be simple or it may be complex, but all that is has a content of some kind. A flower exists and has its peculiar qualities. These qualities, which form the content of the flower, can be discovered on examination. It is of a particular color, has a particular smell, has a certain number of petals, etc., belongs to such and such an order of plant. But we shall examine in vain if we expect to discover anything which will not come under the head of content. And yet some flowers stand for their own kind and some have attached to them a meaning. This meaning is not in the flower but in our heads. What is in the flower is real. What is in our heads is ideal. Thus we have two different aspects of everything: (*a*) The aspect of perception or presentation, which gives us the object as unique or individual, and (*b*) the aspect of thought, which gives us the object in its meaning or in its idea as a universal or a representative.

We may discover the exact significance of "ideal content" in another way, by an attention to the different senses of "idea." We may take, as an instance, any common perception, *e. g.*, that of a horse, of a particular horse which I had once seen and known. When my mind is turned toward this object, in all likelihood I recall in imagination some particular scene in which the animal played a prominent part. A picture is before me. I fancy I see the whole surroundings as well as the arch of his neck, the color of his hair, his prancing to and fro and round and round. This is a mental image, and it is particular. Such an image holds good of only one horse in the universe and of one particular occasion.

That picture will suit no other animal. Such is an idea, when idea means my psychical state. But now I abstract from this living, substantial scene all such attributes as we know are necessary to describe a horse. This particular horse vanishes. No position, no color, no special size or shape now appear. What is left is an idea—my idea of horse, idea now in the sense of meaning or logical idea. This idea (of a horse) never finds a counterpart in the actual world, but is a wandering adjective, having an existence only in our heads. The meaning of reality will be discussed hereafter.

The main question now to be asked is, What is the meaning of the phrase in parenthesis, "recognized as such"? Already we have given Bradley's own explanation. He further says (p. 10): "The ideal content is recognized as such when we know that by itself it is not a fact but a wandering adjective." I conceive that the writer means, primarily, by all these phrases, that judgment implies consciousness, *i. e.*, you cannot judge unless your mind is at work. It further calls attention to the truth that in judgment is a distinction between subject and object. If there were no such distinction there would be neither judgment nor idea. Only when we recognize that we are not the objects we see and touch are we able to judge. It may be that our knowledge of self is little, and that little of a negative character, yet it is, so far, a true knowledge of self. The child only becomes self-conscious when it distinguishes itself from the things which surround it. Until that is done, the child is only one object among others. When that is done, the pulse of thought begins to beat and the child judges. But while this is true, and will be admitted by every one, yet Bradley has put the position so strongly that it looks suspicious. There seems to underlie the phrase "recognized as such" a meaning which, when expounded, will prove the opposite of true. It is stated that we positively cannot judge unless we explicitly recognize that the ideal content is a *mere* idea and is not reality; *i. e.*, we contrast sharply ideal content and reality. When that has been done we are in a position to judge. In Chapter II, Bradley states that exclamations are nearly always judgments. "Fire!" "Wolf!" etc., are judgments. Nay, more, the pointing of the finger, the wink of the eye, are likewise judgments. But many who cry "Fire!" many who wink the eye, are so far from recog-

nizing explicitly the separation of ideal content and reality that they could not for the life of them tell if there were such a thing in existence as ideal content. But it may be answered that these have the capacity to understand that the ideal content is not reality when the matter is set before them. The answer is, But there you desert your own post. It was your theory that the ideal content must be *recognized as such*, that one could not judge unless he were able to say, "I am now about to refer an ideal content to a reality." If this were true, finally, what a comprehension a dog must possess when he judges, "What is smells"! But we may maintain, in opposition to the above, that all thinking, however vague, however indefinite, just so far as it is thinking, is also judging. The only difference between thinking and judging is, that judging is the expressing or stating of the thought, clothing it in words, thinking aloud. When a child places its hand upon a book and cries "Book," in its broken English, it as truly judges as the man who says "This is Volume I. of Macaulay's 'History of England,'" or as the philosopher who has written a book on ideal contents. It is only by analysis that we come to discover what judgment truly is—or would Bradley say that all philosophers who had not a true theory of judgment were unable to judge at all? Further, in order to know reality, to know ideal content, and to know a distinction between the two, we must have made many judgments, inasmuch as all this is knowledge, and to know is to judge. So that, if we still maintain that we *cannot* judge before we recognize the ideal content as such, and reality as such, we would conclude that we have judged before we could judge, or that, inasmuch as we could not know ideal content or reality without judging, we were wholly unable to recognize any distinction between them, or, in fact, were wholly unable to know anything at all. In the judgment is the synthesis of ideal content and reality, and this is discovered only after elaborate analysis.

Bradley, it may now be seen, has in the above failed to distinguish accurately between two very different things—viz.: the explicit and implicit presence of a logical principle. No one will accuse him of not seeing at all the difference between these two, for his own words would be a sufficient answer to such an accusation. When a street urchin cries "Fire!" he has judged, and it is just as true a judgment in one sense, Bradley would admit, as if

uttered by a logician who was aware of what was implied in the interjection. Yet, if this were taken without qualification, the reason for the insertion of the phrase "recognized as such" would have disappeared. He would think that, while the exclamation of the street urchin was, equally with that of the logician, a judgment, yet something radical was wanting in the former that was supplied in the latter. All that is absent in the one and present in the other is the consciousness of the logical significance of the phrase. This would seem to indicate that it would be possible for the consciousness of the logical significance to be so far wanting that the words would cease to be a judgment.

The difficulty may be put in another form. There is before us an elementary judgment. He who has judged, it may be, was ignorant that it was a judgment. The logician takes this judgment, and, analyzing, finds an ideal content, and a reality, and a referring to the reality of the ideal content. He is apt, therefore, to consider the judgment enriched by that process, and to think that, because the full meaning of the assertion was not before understood, the assertion itself has undergone a change. It is tempting to transfer the process of an analysis (which must from its very nature be a conscious one) to the assertion analyzed, and then to maintain that after the analysis something is to be found in the assertion that was not there before the analysis. It is the cropping up of the insidious belief that our thinking is one with universal thought. If it were true that our analyzing absolutely added to the idea, the conclusion would be forced upon us that, could we go back sufficiently far, we should come upon the foundation on which our process was primarily built, and that this foundation could not possibly be analyzed, and was, therefore, unknowable. Of course, Bradley nowhere states that such a conclusion is held by him; but this is manifestly the tendency of the theory.

b. The next point to be considered is the division of the Singular Judgments into (1) Analytic Judgments of Sense in which the given is alone analyzed. (2) Synthetic Judgments of Sense which transcend the given. (3) Those which have to do with a reality which is never an event in time (p. 48). It will be necessary, first of all, to understand what Bradley means by these terms.

1. Analytic Judgments of Sense. As judgment is the reference

of an ideal content to reality, then wherever that reference is found, if this theory adequately describes judgment, there is also judgment. In the first class of analytic judgments the reference is not expressly stated, but is yet certainly there. The subject, here unexpressed, may be (*a*) the whole sensible reality, or (*b*) a portion of it only. An example of (*a*) is "Wolf." Now, what have we in the assertion "Wolf"? Every one will admit that its meaning is that present to sight, or it may be to hearing, is the animal in question. Therefore we may say that we qualify the sensible present, the external, visible prospect by the adjective "wolf." Some have objected that, as single words are often interjections, no judgment is implied in them. We can only answer that, as single words can all be resolved into their meaning—and not only can be, but as a matter of fact are, for the very reason that they must be possessed of a meaning—they must also contain a judgment. An example of (*b*) is found when bending over a couch we should say of its occupant, "Asleep." In that case we do not refer to the bed or couch, or the covering, although all these may be present, but only to the person—*i. e.*, to a portion only of the sensible reality. In the second class of analytic judgments a subject is expressed. The ideal content is referred to the reality through an idea. The ideal content may be referred (*a*) to the whole or (*b*) to a part of what appears. Examples of (*a*) are: "Now is the time" and "The present is dark"; and of (*b*): "This is a bird" and "Here is a fish."

The analytic judgment has for its logical subject the external present, or a portion of the external present expressed or understood. The "external present" has no reference, when we say "external," to a reality beyond consciousness, nor any reference, when we say "present," to something which is not in time. "External present" takes its real significance from a reference to the spatial and temporal position of the speaker, and means that which is visibly or tangibly before me while I am in such and such a place or time, or such and such a condition. When the place, time, or condition in which I am is changed, the external present changes with it. "The present is dark," *e. g.*, is only true while I am in a dark place. "Now is the time" is only true of the particular time in which I am. And, again, though I exclaim "Miserable" as I look upon a picture of squalor and wretchedness, that is only

true for me while I am above that state myself, or am in my present condition.

A synthetic judgment, on the other hand, makes an assertion about something that we do not perceive, touch, etc.—*i. e.*, about something which does appear in our space and time, as was hinted at above. *Our* space and time is not fixed and invariable. It may be an hour, it may be a day; that altogether depends upon the character of the judgment. But whatever the space, how large or how small, and whatever the time, how long or how short, so long as it is not *our* space and time, it is not analytic. *E. g.*, the judgment, "The cow which is now being milked by the milkmaid is standing to the right of the hawthorn-tree yonder," would be analytic though the cow, milkmaid, and tree were half a mile off—or, indeed, so long as we could behold the operation of milking—while on the other hand the judgment, "There is a garden on the other side of the wall," would be still synthetic though I could touch the wall with my finger; and so with the others. This is the main distinction. The distinction of Analytic and Synthetic will not hold true on examination if the words really mean analytic and synthetic. Bradley says: "In 'John is asleep' the ultimate subject cannot be real as it is now given, for 'John' implies a continuous existence, not got by mere analysis." We might with equal truth say the same of the subject of any judgment. Nothing is got by mere analysis at all. With the analysis there must be also synthesis. So that every judgment is both analytic and synthetic. Consequently, as has already been stated, the main distinction must be that the analytic judgment has to do with *my* space, *my* time, *my* condition—as I now am—which "now" may be longer or shorter, as the case may be, while the synthetic judgment has to do with what is not *my* space, *my* time, *my* condition—as I now am—but with what might be or has been *my* space, *my* time, or *my* condition under other circumstances.

It now devolves upon us to discover the reasons Bradley has for drawing the above distinctions between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments. In the first place, it cannot be that the former refers the ideal content to the sensible present and the latter to an idea, for Bradley has himself said that synthetic judgments likewise refer to the external present, but in this case through an idea.

But, again, it cannot be that the latter refers indirectly to the external present while the former refers to it directly. No doubt, when I cry "Wolf!" I surely qualify the present by the adjective "wolf." Yet when I use the cry, if I have eyesight, I will not gaze up into the clouds, or on the ground at my feet, but will at least look toward the animal, if not point eagerly in its direction. Now that fact, though unexpressed, is surely present in the exclamation "Wolf!" If so, what results? This, at least: that the present to which the adjective is referred is not a vague, undefined present like a desert waste. We are, in fact, referring to a particular portion of it. No judgment, not even the most elementary, refers any ideal content to a sensible present, if we mean by "sensible present" a present that cannot be further defined. In every judgment is implied particularity as to time and space. Accordingly, as particularity with regard to time and space involves many references, the sensible present has already many references implicit in it, and is therefore, to all intents and purposes, an idea. We have already shown that when we cry "Wolf!" we do not mean "in the heavens above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth," but a wolf right there. That is implied by some gesture or other which is properly embraced within the meaning of the judgment. The gesture stands for words. We can see, too, that when we cry "Wolf!" we mean the wolf that I now see, or it may be now hear. We have, then, reference to a particular time. All this is fairly and legitimately implied in the expression. Therefore, it follows that what seems a "visible external present" is much more than what it seems—and is in reality a complicated idea.

It seems evident, then, that the difference between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments does not consist in the one's referring to a sensation and the other to an idea, for both refer to the external present. Nor was it, again, in one's referring directly and the other indirectly to the external present, since both refer indirectly, for, even in the case where no grammatical subject is expressed, one is implied, which is not adequately described as a part of the external present, but is only understood when seen to be an idea. The only valid distinction seems to be with regard to the degree of expressed or implied complexity. The Analytic Judgment is satisfied with the space included within the range of vision and

with the present time; the Synthetic Judgment deals with a space not now within our range of vision and a time not now present. This is certainly a distinction. But it is hard to discover why that distinction should make judgments of higher and lower grades. There is no faculty called into play by the Synthetic Judgment that has not been previously called into play by the Analytic. To connect a space not seen with the space seen is no doubt a synthesis. But to know the space seen equally requires synthesis. It is the same with time. To connect to-day with yesterday is a work of synthesis. But there is a synthesis necessary in order to know the smallest moment of time. An atomic here or there is as unknowable as an atomic now or then. But the whole question of the separation between Analysis and Synthesis (if these terms are employed by Bradley now in the same sense as they are employed afterward) must rest for its support upon the validity of an atomic here and an atomic now. If there is no such thing, then everything that implies Analysis at once implies Synthesis. When it is seen that the external present, to which the ideal content is referred in the Analytic Judgments, consists of temporal and spatial relations, then the Analytic Judgment becomes Synthetic. Every judgment is both or else neither. We need no magnifying-glass to see the tendency of the theory. The atomic then and now are inscrutable, and so unknowable, and we are landed where we were before.

It may be objected that Bradley would agree with all this, and has already expressed himself against the fiction of an atomic moment of time and portion of space. This is, no doubt, true. It only shows that he would hardly take arms against his own theory, and that he has not pushed his own views to their logical issue. Again, it may be answered that Bradley does not mean by analytic and synthetic what is ordinarily understood by these words. The reply is that, no matter how little he may mean by them, even if they are looked upon only as convenient names, yet it shows (apart from the fact that names should be appropriate) that he had not quite liberated himself from the thralldom of terms.

There is abundance of room for discussion in Bradley's introduction of the word "inference" into the explanation of the Analytic and Synthetic Judgments. He says of the latter (p. 48):

"They are synthetic because they extend the given through an ideal construction, and they all, as we shall see, involve an inference"; and again (p. 61): "In synthetic judgments there is always an inference, for an ideal content is connected with the sensible qualities that are given us. In other words, we have always a construction which depends on ideas, and which only indirectly is based on perception." These remarks reveal Bradley's theory of inference; but that is not the point of interest at present. What is now of concern is that he seems to imply that there is no inference in the analytic judgment. He, that is, reasserts that in these latter judgments the ideal content is referred directly to the reality without any ideal construction. We have already been at pains to show that even in the most elementary analytic judgment an ideal construction was to be found. It was seen that in the cry "Wolf!" the ideal content was not in any sense hurled into or at the sensible reality, with an utter disregard of everything. Bradley saw but only dimly that "external present" could not remain empty if it were an external present for consciousness. But, if that truth had been quite apparent to him, he would have at once admitted inference into the analytic judgment. That he did not do so will be a sufficient reason for imagining, at least, that he fancied the external present of the analytic judgment to be something without form and void; and that is, after all, only the unknowable or the substrate in another form.

c. Admittedly, the most difficult portion of the first book is the consideration of the definition of judgment, in connection with which Bradley introduces his distinction between "Thisness" and "This." Fairly to appreciate his theory and properly to comprehend the meaning of the above terms, it will be necessary to go some little way about. (1.) An inquiry may first of all be instituted with regard to the meaning of these terms. When it is said judgment is the referring of an ideal content to reality, it is meant by "reality" or the "real" that which is presented, given, or that which is unique or singular—guarding, however, against the fallacy that "presented," or "given," or "unique" is exhausted in the word "Sensation." We will perceive the true signification of unique by gradually closing ourselves in. (a) The unique is not an idea. Ideas are always universals, and dealing with them we never touch ground. (b) The unique is not exhausted when it is

said to occupy a particular space or a particular time. It is not its position either in space or time that constitutes its uniqueness. A particular space or time has meaning only in relation to other spaces and times, and such a relation that, when we say "particular," we, at least, indirectly include all the others. (e) The unique is just what is left when you abstract the idea, and when you abstract the spatial and temporal position. "It is unique not because it has a certain character, but because it *is given*. It is by *reference* of our series to the real as it appears directly within this point of contact, or indirectly in the element, continuous with this point, that these series *become exclusive*." We have in the above explanation the meaning of the terms "thisness" and "this." That which is in the presentation, but, although in the presentation (*e. g.*, spatial and temporal position), does not constitute it as unique, may be called "thisness." That which, in the presentation, on the other hand, does constitute uniqueness, may be called "this." So that every possible phenomenon is in its essence "this," and has "thisness."

(2.) The object of this theory is to overthrow, finally, the belief that judgment is the synthesis of ideas, for if it can be established that every presentation has "thisness," and is "this," and the "this" is different from ideas of the ordinary kind, then judgment does, in its essence, reach reality.

(3.) A brief outline of this theory may now be given. Let us repeat, "Every possible phenomenon that can be present both is 'this' and has 'thisness.'" A black coat is a possible phenomenon. This coat has a particular shape, and so occupies a particular space. As it is a particular space, it is related to other spaces, not, it may be, directly, but indirectly through other things (coats, or not coats, it makes no difference). It also has its place in time. But, again, the coat has parts: sleeves, collar, cuffs, pockets, etc., all of which occupy spaces. These are all related to one another and to the coat, and may be called its internal relations in space and time. Again, in the way of intensity, the color "black" has degrees; and other relations are established from this aspect. All these relations combined would constitute the "thisness" of the coat. But all these relations exist, though I do not perceive the article of clothing at all. In other words, we may and do have ideas of objects without their being presented to sense. But

should the coat be present to sense, then something more than we have already mentioned would be necessary in order to fix it as presented. This something more is just that which conducts us out of the realm of the ideal or the imaginative, as the case may be, and places us in contact with reality. "It is the *sign* of my immediate relation, my direct encounter in sensible presentation with the real world." It is the "this," that other aspect of the thing presented, which makes it unique.

But an objection may now be urged, Bradley continues, against this position. The objector might argue in some such way as this: "I am willing to admit all you have said, but I want to bring into prominence one portion of your exposition, upon which you but slightly touched. Granted, let it be that your account of 'thisness' is correct. I wish to notice that you say with reference to the other aspect, that this something more, this 'this,' is but the sign of your direct encounter with the sensible world. You have already admitted that 'thisness' is but an idea; and now, when you call the 'this' a *sign*, it makes no difference of what, you have made the second aspect an idea too. For what is the idea but a sign? or what is a sign but an idea?" Bradley at once sees the force of the objection, and acknowledges that, if such be the case, we have not as yet reached reality, and our labor has been in vain. But just when it seems as if there were no way out of the difficulty, an opening is discovered in the peculiar character of the idea which is the sign of our direct encounter with the real world. This idea is such that it cannot be transferred away from itself to anything else without at the same time destroying itself. The idea "this," together with the ideas "my," "thy," etc., are peculiar and unlike any other idea whatsoever. Let us take any feeling at all, *e. g.*, the sensation of whiteness. We will overlook altogether its position in space and time (if sensation can have such position); we will also overlook the fact that it is whiteness, and attend only to the fact of its immediate presence. We have, then, the idea of immediate contact with the real world *at this particular point*. This idea of immediate contact is so an adjective—*i. e.*, an idea. Can we, now having the idea, transfer it to any other presentation? If so, then (*a*) either the given is gone, and a new given takes its place, in which case there is no transfer, for the idea of the first given has disappeared, or (*b*) the given was not the

given, for there cannot possibly be two different givens—*i. e.*, we mistook a part for the whole. In other words, again, no transfer is made, for, on the appearance of the new and larger given, the idea of the old one as unique is gone. Accordingly, *the idea* of immediate contact and immediate contact cannot be separated. To separate one from the other is to destroy both. Therefore we find that though we have "thisness" along with the idea of direct encounter with the real world, yet this latter idea is in such union with the real world that the bond is indissoluble. To put the matter in another light—we have the sign of a direct encounter with the real world in the idea "this." This constitutes the uniqueness of the idea, fancy, feeling, sensation, or whatever it happens to be. If it could be referred to another substantive, then there would be two unique presentations, which is plainly impossible; for, if there are two, they cannot both be unique. Further, if there are two, it would seem that neither could be unique. If either could be unique, then the first or the second would require to vanish. If one vanished, there would remain but a single substantive, and the attempt to enlarge our knowledge would result in endless failure. Paragraphs 25 and 26 are very hard to understand, but, if I understand them, the above is an analysis of their content. The whole theory concerning judgment, indeed it may be the whole book, stands or falls by the soundness or unsoundness of this portion of it. Accordingly, it will have to be well and carefully examined before we proceed further.

(1.) Bradley says that "this" is unique not because it has a certain character, but because it is given, or presented; because I directly encounter it in the real world. Now, we should be precise. Either we mean this, or we do not mean it. Bradley evidently means it here. But he does not seem to see the full force of what he says, for he contradicts this statement in other places. For notice: I have before me now a book. It is presented to sense, to sight, and touch. It is thus given. Now, you ask me to describe the book, and I begin to tell you its shape, size, color, contents, etc. This is, we may say, the character of the book. This, therefore, falls within its content, and is the "thisness" of the book. But we are still in the region of ideas. We have not yet got to the reality of the book, and you bid me go on. I look at it again. I feel it. I taste it. I smell it. I try in every possible way to get further

nformation concerning it, but I am told at every turn that I have not as yet got to the "this" of the book. I give up. I know nothing more. When lo! I am told that its reality consists in its being present to sense. The magic medium is the sense. Now, what does this mean? Plainly that, if I am unable to touch reality through any description and examination, the reality is indescribable and inscrutable. Surely the conclusion is plain. No other course is open. We find, in truth, that there is no reality at all.

(2.) Again, there is no need to enter into the discussion of what is given to thought and what is given by thought. We need not stay to show the great mistake in Kant's philosophy here. But surely we must take a rational meaning of words, and when Bradley says that reality is reached in the given and presented, although he is careful likewise to say that this given is not immediate momentary presentation, yet that is really all that can be taken out of them. He would have us believe, if he could, that there are two kinds of sensation—one a momentary, one a lasting sensation. The momentary sensation *per se* plays no part in judgment. The lasting sensation is reality. We would at once subscribe to this view. But then Bradley goes on to say that from the lasting sensation must be stripped all that makes it lasting, for that which makes a lasting sensation lasting falls under the head of content—*i. e.*, of "thisness"—and then the remainder is the reality. In this he abandons his own position. For the lasting sensation, so stripped and denuded, is and can be nothing else but the old momentary sensation in a new dress. Thus it appears that in this account of "thisness" and "this" Bradley has made sensation the touchstone of reality. Bradley has himself at considerable length refuted this theory, and we can do nothing better than refer him to his own self.

(3.) It seems that the fundamental mistake of Bradley lies in his talking of what are merely aspects of one thing, as if they were each and all separate and independent. For example: No one will disagree with our author when he says every possible phenomenon is this and has thisness. We think he is announcing an important truth—this truth, *viz.*: that every thing in consciousness is that thing for and because of consciousness. We mean by that, that when we say *every thing* in consciousness is *that thing*, we

emphasize the truth that that thing is a *particular thing*. When we say that it is that thing for and *through consciousness*, we mean that, while it is that particular thing, it is not, and cannot be, *only* that particular thing—*i. e.*, an independent thing without relations; or, in other words, every idea, every fancy, every sensation even, has the particular and universal aspect. The idea and the sensation are *my* idea and *my* sensation; again, they are my *idea*, my *sensation*. By which we show that they are related to the self (and so are within the consciousness of that self) and to each other. In so far as the sensation exists for my *consciousness* it is universal; in so far as it exists for *my* consciousness it is particular. Every sensation that exists for *us* is referred to the self, and is so a thought sensation. In so far as it is a *thought* sensation it is universal; in so far as it is a thought *sensation* it is particular. Thus we see the two aspects in everything that is, the particular and the universal element. One element due to the thought—the other to the sensation. We might also say, though not required for the present purpose, that it must have both elements. Either element apart is of no avail. While, however, insisting upon the universal and particular aspects in every object of knowledge, we would be careful to guard ourselves against making either aspect an independent existence. Now, Bradley says every possible phenomenon is "this" and has "thisness." If he means that in every possible object of knowledge we have the universal and particular aspects, good and well. But whether or no he means this, he either departs from it, or is exceeding loose and inaccurate in his statements. For we find him talking of the universal aspect (*i. e.*, thisness) as if it were itself an idea; and we find him talking of the particular aspect (*i. e.*, this) as if it also were an independent idea—forgetting that "thisness" *per se* or "this" *per se* is equally nothing. It is one thing to have a correct and full *idea of* a universal or a particular aspect of an idea, and quite another thing to make either the universal or particular aspect of an idea itself *an idea*. Bradley, it would seem, confounds these two, and seems to think that, because we have *an idea of* a universal aspect, that aspect is *itself an idea*. Therefore we find him wondering, when he discovers that "thisness" is an idea merely, where on earth or in the principles of logic he can get at reality. Therefore, also, we find him, when he calls "this" also an idea, saving himself from

the enemy, in the shape of judgment being a synthesis of ideas, by declaring that the idea "this" is strangely peculiar, and has in some wonderful way reality wrapped up in itself. That also was the loop-hole out of which he escaped from the fallacy of an infinite series.

(4.) But following his theory to its logical conclusion, it is just this infinite series that stares us in the face. In the idea "this," or in every possible phenomenon (sensation included), we have two aspects—"thisness" and "this." Presently these aspects become ideas. Therefore, in every possible phenomenon (sensation included), we have two ideas. One of these, "thisness," we need not touch. The other is interesting. "This" = idea of immediate contact. So here in this other we have immediate contact and the idea of immediate contact. These in turn become two, etc., etc. They multiply faster than the heads of the Hydra.

(5.) We may see Bradley's difficulty in another light. He had got possession of the theory that the idea "this" (*i. e.*, of immediate encounter with the sensible world) was, in some sense, along with a few other ideas, different from all the rest. These few ideas had this peculiarity, that they could not be separated from reality. To attempt to separate the idea from the reality was to destroy the idea or the reality, or both together. Therefore, inasmuch as we know we have the idea (we could not well deny the fact without making use of the idea), we consequently know equally well that we have the reality. This, I think, is a mistake, *i. e.*, it is a mistake to suppose that reality is indissolubly bound up with only a few ideas. Bradley uses the argument we have already stated of the given being altered or else totally disappearing if we attempt to apply the idea of immediate contact to any other given than given No. I. What does this mean in plain language? I have a pencil here upon the table. I may touch it or I may not, as I call it this pencil. A book is also beside me. I may call it this book. But if I call it this book, then the idea "this" which I used in the case of the pencil (the idea this = idea of immediate contact) is either destroyed or else the given (*i. e.*, the pencil) disappears, or is submerged in a larger given, which includes pencil and book. Underneath all this is the fallacy not only that the real is the presented (which with care might be shown to be true enough, or rather that the presented is real), but

that the real is real only while it is presented. I cannot understand Bradley when he talks of the idea "this" being destroyed when I look from the pencil to the book. I say "this pencil," I say "this book." The idea (if you like to call it an idea) of immediate contact is present in both cases, and is destroyed by neither. This fallacy that the real is only real while it is presented has grown out of the false meaning which he has attached to "unique." If "unique" mean out of relation altogether, perfectly simple and immediate, it is easily seen how that, having looked at "this pencil" and having turned to "this book," I have destroyed the unique. If, indeed, the given is unique in this sense, then all will agree with Bradley. But many will wish to go further and say that even before they turn from the pencil to the book—with even looking at the pencil—the unique was destroyed, for the unique *per se* is nothing whatsoever. Is the idea "this," when placed equal to idea of direct encounter with the sensible world, unique? Far from it. Is there not implied in direct *encounter* (granted that it is an idea, although we fail to understand how it is) something to encounter (Bradley would have to admit some *one* to encounter) and something to be encountered? There must also be present the "ego" to comprehend them both. In the idea of direct encounter is there not also implied the time-filling which is the characteristic of sensation? Sensation, no matter how short, how direct, how simple, must fill some moment of time. This, then, is the pretended uniqueness of direct encounter. And we will discover that this true uniqueness which is sameness in diversity, permanence in change, is the real, the real real (if we may so speak), and that this real is not destroyed when I say "this book" (*i. e.* supposing the real, in the first place, to have been "this pencil").

(6.) Again, we shall see that Bradley is laboring under a false understanding of uniqueness when he says that, having attained to the truth that the idea "this" is inseparably united with reality, analytic judgments seem thus secured. Here, again, he is confusing the true and false notions of uniqueness. What Bradley means is, that having attained to this simplicity of direct encounter, from which has been taken all that belongs to character or content, you can pronounce an analytic judgment, because the subject is simple. We would reply, that were it possible for the

subject to be unique, in Bradley's sense of that term, any judgment would be impossible. The subject is nothing, and you can *say* nothing of nothing. But, in truth, if the subject is unique, in the real sense of unique, then, indeed, you can judge, and you may call the judgment analytic only because, be it noticed, the subject is not simple, but complex—*i. e.*, because there has been a previous synthesis. We are inclined to think, in conclusion, that Bradley has fallen into his own snare; that while he has been vigorously combating the theory that the real is momentary presentation, he has himself given way to the same theory. His mistake seems to have been in not recognizing that the reality to which the ideal content is referred—to be a reality at all for us—must be a reality for our *consciousness*, *i. e.*, a thought reality. This thought reality has nothing much to do with that endless discussion about sensation, or direct encounter, or immediate contact, concerning which so much is continually said and written. It is a thought reality because it is the real for us as conscious beings. This would have been secured if Bradley had been willing to admit that everything that *exists* for us exists for us through and because of our consciousness; and therefore sensation is sensation because we are conscious beings.

Only one other thing remains to be considered. That is, the nature of the connection between analytic and synthetic judgments. Reality we now understand to be a thought reality—and presentation is now not fleeting sensation, but a *thought* feeling. The object is no longer independent of, but within and dependent on, consciousness. The object, we may say, is "this." "This," we now know, has two aspects—viz.: "thisness," the universal aspect, and "this," the particular aspect. These are mutually complementary and reciprocal. They are correlative. The universal, taken by itself, is perfectly empty, and the particular, taken by itself, vanishes. Both are abstractions: the former like a geometrical surface, only length and breadth without thickness; the latter like a geometrical point, without parts or magnitude. These aspects are not found existing as separate entities in the real world, but are only discovered by an analysis of the real. "This," then, is the real. How do we pass from the real "this," which is now presented, to the real "that," not now presented? How do analytic judgments become synthetic? Here again we are dealing

only with abstractions. The analytic judgment, taken *per se*, is absolutely nothing, and the synthetic judgment, taken by itself, is likewise nothing. When we say "this" (if we mean what we say) we also say "that." We are unable to mean "it" unless we at the same time mean "others," which are not "it." The real object, apart from other real objects, is a phantom. The real is not simply related. Indeed, we are bordering upon a fatal theory if we say the real is related, for we may mean that the real exists apart from relations, and may or may not be related according to the will of the subject. The real is not then related, but relative—*i. e.*, apart from its relations it does not exist at all. "Others" are as essential to the "it" as the "it" is to the others. When we look upon the "it" as independent, we may produce what we call an analytic judgment. But in reality both judgments are at once both analytic and synthetic. The relation, further, of "others" to the "it" is perfectly on a level with the relation of the "it" to the others. Both relations are out of time. One does not precede or follow the other. As a consequence, a synthetic judgment refers as directly to the real as an analytic judgment. When Bradley, therefore, distinguishes between them by saying that the latter refers to a reality directly, but the former indirectly, he makes the mistake of supposing that the relation of "others" to "it" follows, somehow, the relation of "it" to the "others"; for he says that what is not presented must be, first of all, related to the presented, and then judgment follows. In some strange way, he gives us to understand every judgment is at first, for no matter how small a moment, analytic merely, and then afterward it may become anything. Finally, we may say that all these distinctions rest upon the fallacy that reality rests mainly for its reality not upon thought, but upon presentation. Bradley does not, it is probable, and would not, it is certain, ignore thought entirely; but, at any rate, many of his expressions and distinctions tend to place it in a subordinate position.

We might also say that § 32 (ii) might fairly be interpreted as follows: We transcend the given when we pass from analytic to synthetic judgments (given equals sensible present only). But this transcending the given is based upon an inference—some such inference as that the not-given is the same in essence as the given. Inference is nothing but assumption, and inference, finally, as a

result, takes us away from reality. Surely it has that tendency at least which is nothing but the same old fallacy that the "given" is the main thing. If the "given" is anything more than mere sense presentation, if the given is within consciousness, then it is no vast assumption to assert that if the not-given were given it would be the same essentially as the given, *i. e.*, it would only be for and in consciousness. Such an assumption turns out to be no assumption at all. It is, in fact, only asserting that self-consciousness is and always will be self-consciousness. If the "given" is, *e. g.*, red, that does not make self-consciousness in its essence red, and if the not-given should turn out green when, wonderful catastrophe! we expected *it* also to be red, that will not make self-consciousness green and thereby destroy it *in toto*; *that* would not be making self-consciousness two entirely different things. Yet it seems to me, when Bradley talks of inferences and enormous assumptions, his words tend just to such absurdities as we have been describing, and all this, we repeat, rests upon the fact that while the "given" (properly understood) is worthy of consideration, yet, when magnified, it becomes improperly understood, and gives rise to absolute fallacies.

d. We now come to the fourth topic for consideration, viz., Negative Judgments. Bradley's theory is stated in the opening section of Chapter III. "In the end the negative judgment consists in the declared refusal of the subject to accept an ideal content. The suggestion of the real as qualified and determined in a certain way and the exclusion of that suggestion by its application to actual reality are the proper essence of the negative judgment." It would seem from this that Bradley had failed to distinguish between "negation" and "denial" or "refusal." Our subject is the negative judgment, but Bradley talks as if every negative judgment must be an "explicit denial," a "declared refusal." If "negation" and "denial" are synonymous terms, then Bradley is correct, for, in order to there being a denial, there must have been something previously asserted. To deny is to say "No" to something to which the answer "Yes" had previously been given. If there has been no assertion expressed or understood, there cannot possibly be a denial—there would be nothing to deny. Therefore Bradley is correct. But "denial" and simple "negation" are two very different things. Denial must of necessity be ex-

plicit. Negation, on the other hand, is only the opposite of affirmation—the complement of it, if we may so speak, *i. e.*, when you affirm, you likewise deny. The very fact that Bradley, it may be inadvertently, calls a negation a denial, shows that he sets out with the preconception that denial is equal to affirmation and a succeeding negation, while, in truth, the denial is but the expression of the negation implicit in all judgment—implicit in the affirmation. Bradley, to put the mistake in one way, confuses implicit negation with explicit denial. To put the mistake in another way, he would say that while affirmation was not in time, negation was in time. Denial *followed* as a *consequence* upon "affirmation," or "suggestion," or "suggested relation," or "failure to relate," for all these expressions are used by Bradley. This last manner of putting his mistake may show us the bottom of the difficulty. Affirmation is not in time, but denial is. This means, when expanded, the old error, that the ultimately real is the inexpressible, *i. e.*, the ultimately real is beyond relations—it has no diversity within itself, but is all one. The real is simple and self-complete. If the real has no relations, it has, of course, no temporal relations. We have already shown the fallacy of this theory. Sameness without difference is nothing. For an object to be the same, it must be the same in contrast with the changing. If there is no change, then also there is no sameness. One by itself kills the other by itself. Only in their conjunction is there life. Mere sameness is, however, just the phantom which, for no matter how short or how long a time, Bradley would tell us, lives alone. Difference follows, and from this springs the negation. But we may go into some of the particulars of the theory, and in so doing fall in line, as far as possible, with Bradley's expressions.

I see a green tree = the fact x . I have the idea "greenness" = $a-b$. I may at once attribute $a-b$ to x . So far Bradley is correct. Again you cannot deny $a-b$ of x so long as you have merely $a-b$ and x . Bradley is still correct. But here he does not go quite far enough. We could not deny $a-b$ of x under any circumstances. Bradley says you can deny $a-b$ of x when you have x ($a-b$). This is not so. Even if you had all the letters of the alphabet multiplied together, you could not deny $a-b$ of x . For, be it noted, x = the green tree, and $a-b$ = the idea of "greenness"; so that to deny "greenness" of the green tree is to speak

falsely, and one needs no idea coupled with any fact to do that. Bradley makes this mistake. He fails to see that in affirming $a-b$ of x we have already denied $c-d$ of x (which $c-d$ may be any other color, but is not defined except as that which is not green). But "not-green" is clearly a negative, and therefore we have a negation in our affirmation. But Bradley answers (and he would seem to rest his case upon the argument he here makes), "When we point to a tree and apply the word 'green,' it may be urged that the subject is just as ideal as when the same object rejects the offered suggestion 'yellow.' But this would ignore an important difference. The tree, in its presented unity with reality, can accept at once the suggested quality. I am not always forced to suspend my decision, to wait and consider the whole as ideal, to ask, in the first place, Is the tree green? and then decide that the tree is a green tree. But, in the negative judgment where 'yellow' is denied, the positive relation of 'yellow' to the tree must precede the exclusion of that relation. The judgment can never anticipate the question. I must always be placed at that stage of reflection which sometimes I avoid in affirmative judgment" (p. 110). What Bradley means by the above is that "the tree is not yellow" involves the previous judgment, "The tree is green." "Surely," he might say, "no one would argue that the judgment 'The tree is not yellow' is involved in and coincident with the judgment 'The tree is green.' No one will say that when I know that the tree is green I at the same time must of necessity know that the tree is not yellow. It is barely possible that I may not know that yellow is a color." And Bradley is assuredly correct. But he has not touched the point at issue. We do not say that calling a tree green is only another way of denying that it is yellow. Far from it. What we do say is, that affirming "greenness" of the tree is precisely the same as denying what is not-green of the same tree. But denying the not-green of the tree is not the same with denying the yellow. This is the difference. Not-green is not equivalent to yellow: not-green includes yellow thus (to put it into the form of a syllogism):

The tree is not not-green;
 Not-green is yellow, black, red, etc.;
 The tree is not yellow, black, red, etc.;

so that Bradley is right when he says that denying yellow of a green tree rests upon an affirmation. But this affirmation (Not-green is yellow, black, etc.) is a result of further reflection. We do not deny yellow of the tree when we say "The tree is green"; we simply deny that the colors which are not green are to be found in the tree. Bradley might once more object that not-green is not a negative but an affirmative. It is true that in one of its aspects it is undoubtedly an affirmative, but in another aspect it is indisputably negative. More than that, it is true that the negative aspect is the most prominent. Looked at in relation to itself alone, it is positive. Looked at in relation to green, and it is decidedly negative. It is just this double aspect which Bradley refuses to see, and this refusal vitiates his theory.

The above seems a sufficient reply to all the objections which Bradley raises to the theory that affirmation and negation are but two aspects of the one whole. Affirmation and negation are not the same thing; they are not identical. Taken separately, they are directly opposed. But, taken *per se*, each is an abstraction which has no existence in reality. Pure affirmation and pure negation would in a measure correspond to Aristotle's matter and form, which are correlative terms. Already we have shown that Bradley, in his account of "thisness" and "this," laid himself open to the objection that the real was that which excluded all differences—a sort of unformed chaos. The expression of this real, if that were possible, would be pure affirmation. But this theory cannot be upheld.

But, again, it may be seen that Bradley is himself not clear concerning the exact nature of the positive relation which, he maintains, temporarily precedes the denial. He says: "But, in the negative judgment where 'yellow' is denied, *the positive relation of yellow to the tree* must precede the exclusion of that relation." What does this mean? Just this: that a relation excludes itself. First of all you relate "yellow" to the tree, and then, *after doing so*, you find it will not relate, or else that you cannot relate it. After relating, you discover that relation is impossible. When you say "The tree is green," what is done? This: the ideal content "greenness" is affirmed of the reality "tree." But Bradley maintains that before you can say "The tree is not yellow" you have already related the ideal content "yellowness" to the tree. If,

then, relating an ideal content to reality is the essence of judgment, we have, before we can judge "The tree is not yellow," plainly judged, "The tree is yellow." Granting that this is correct, although it would at once occur to any one that it was certainly a round-about process to reach a negative judgment, when finally you do say "The tree is not yellow," why do you do so? The answer is plain, "Yellow is not green; the relation 'green' excludes the relation 'yellow.'" Bradley himself almost admits as much when he says "The basis of negation is really the assertion of a quality that excludes." Here he has somewhat abandoned his former position. Now he would say that the basis of the judgment, "The tree is yellow," is not the assertion "The tree is yellow," as was said above, but "The tree is green." This admission takes Bradley a considerable way toward a more correct theory. It is equivalent to asserting that only the following steps are necessary to be taken in order to reach a negative judgment :

The tree is green ;
 Yellow is not green ;
 The tree is not yellow.

This can only mean that an explicit denial rests on both affirmation and negation, and on both equally. It cannot mean that a negative judgment rests upon an affirmative judgment. The negative judgment (the conclusion) rests on both a positive and a negative assertion (both the premisses). But to say that a negative judgment, notice, rests on a negative judgment, as Bradley finally does, is absurd, for that statement at once commits him to the fallacy of an infinite series. Besides all this, when he writes that "The basis of negation is really the *assertion of a quality that excludes*," he has made a statement that is tantamount to admitting the theory against which he has been contending. Here it is admitted that "green" is not simply a quality, but it is a *quality that excludes*. This means that while green has a positive aspect (it is a quality) it has also a negative aspect (it excludes). If green has a positive and negative aspect, the judgment, "The tree is green," is at once a positive and negative judgment. When that is seen, with it is likewise seen the folly of splitting judgments into positive and negative, when every judgment must be at once positive and negative. The truth is that Bradley saw, but would not ac-

knowledge that he saw, that negation is implied in any affirmation. This accounts for the long dispute which he found it necessary to have with the "logical negation." He admits that the "logical negation" is on a level with affirmation, but maintains that logical negation is not denial. If denial means articulating the word "not" or "no," then Bradley is right, but he protests against being drawn into metaphysical subtleties. However poor and meagre a logical negation is, it is still a negation, and as such is, when expressed, a negative judgment.

To conclude the argument with a simple illustration. I see a book and pronounce it red. Now, red is the only color explicitly noticed. When I say "The book is red," I at once exclude the relation of all other colors to the book. If "the book is red" is a true judgment, then the book is no other color. Some one now asks, "Is the book yellow?" We answer, "No; yellow is already excluded; it was said that red excluded all other colors, of which yellow is one." Surely if I am asked whether a red book is yellow, I do not refer yellow to the book, and then deny the reference. Any child would answer, "No, it is not yellow because it is red," and that answer certainly implies the truth that in the judgment "The book is red" we have both affirmation and negation. Expanded, the answer would read:

It is red, *i. e.*, it is no other color;

Yellow is another color;

It is not yellow.

This shows that the conclusion "It is not yellow" rests upon the first premise, with one foot upon its positive aspect, "It is red," and with the other foot upon its negative aspect, "It is no other color."

There are several interesting points in the foregoing discussion which might be dwelt upon with profit, but they will be only indicated here. First, Bradley is quite unsettled as to what is exactly the basis of a negative judgment. "We pronounce a certain quality as not belonging to a certain object," he says, first of all, "after the *positive relation* of the quality to the object" (p. 110). In another place he seems to think that the above language was a little strong, and so says: "It is only true that, as a condition of denial, we must have already a *suggested synthesis*." Suggestion has here taken the place of positive relation. Again: "The basis

of our first denial is to be found in the *failure to refer* an idea to a perception. Here we have neither a positive relation nor a suggestion, but a failure to refer—*i. e.*, merely an attempted relation or suggestion. It is not required to reopen the argument. Suffice it to say that there is a marked difference of meaning in these three expressions. They serve to show that for Bradley the basis of the negation was being shifted. The weakness to which this fluctuation points has already been noticed.

In the second place, the last expression—*i. e.*, “failure to refer”—affords an opportunity of learning Bradley’s estimate of the value of a negative judgment. It would seem from this that he accords it but a very secondary position. A negative judgment is only used when you fail to make a positive judgment, or at least it is in some sense a failure. This intimates that there is in the affirmation something of superiority. It is true, without doubt, that a positive statement is, as a rule, more definite than a negative statement. If A could only be C or D, then the negative judgment, “A is not D,” would be equally instructive with the positive judgment “A is C.” Commonly, however, we have many more possible predicates than two. But value as regards information and logical value are very different matters. From a logical point of view there is no difference in value between an affirmative and a negative statement, for each implies the other. Bradley’s view, as has been already shown, leaves the way open to the theory that nature has a ground-plan of pure positiveness. If so, we have again fallen in with the unknowable or substrate.

While Bradley, in dealing with negative judgments, had left the nature of the connection between positive and negative almost wholly undefined, he reveals his true theory more fully when he speaks of Negative Reasoning. There he holds that while in affirmative assertions you may make use of all the categories, in the negative assertions you can only make use of the category of Subject and Attribute. That is as much as saying that things are essentially positive, and that only into one portion of the positive can the negative be introduced. When we bear in mind that when we define we likewise limit, the conclusion is forced upon us that the positive sphere is for Bradley the undefinable and inexpressible. If so, it should have been utterly banished, but Bradley still holds stubbornly to its existence.

A STUDY OF THE ILIAD.

BY DENTON J. SNIDER.

Book Fifth.

This Book is a poem in itself with its own organism, yet it fits into the entire plan of the "Iliad"; as one beautiful God, complete in character, fits into the divine order of Olympus. The individual perfection stands not in the way of the universal harmony; indeed, the latter reaches its highest pitch only through the former. We must see and enjoy this book by itself, in its own nice adjustments, and then hear it as one grand note in the entire song of the epics.

In the previous Book the great fact has been settled that this Trojan contest is not a personal one, the grievance of Menelaus, but a national one, the grievance of all the Greeks, who are now in battle array and fighting for their cause. It has also been settled that they will wage the war without their great Hero, Achilles; though he withdraw, they will not. The conflict, then, is to go on; but who is now the heroic man? Behold him; he steps forth, Diomed, the son of Tydeus, on the whole the greatest warrior after Achilles. Yet the course of the poem will show, and must show, that he is not an Achilles by any means; in the end he will be wounded and compelled to retire from the war. But now he fills the eye, the hope of the cause turns to him, and in our present Book he is to pass through the struggles and triumphs of the Greek Hero.

In the very first lines we hear a note which sings through the Book to the end in a sort of undertone; it is the recognition of a demoniac force which takes hold of the Hero and compels him to be more than common men, more than himself in common mood. Pallas causes a flame to play round his helm and shield like to the autumnal star, as she sends him into the thickest of the fight. It is a divine appearance indeed; the lustre given by supreme courage, the shining energy which possesses the man when he is possessed, the exultant spirit of him who holds victory in his hands, knowing the reality as his own; it is that mighty spell of the

Great Man when he performs a great deed greatly. More words we cannot spend in trying to name it; let the reader feel it heaving and struggling beneath the poetic flow, and see it when it breaks up and bears before it everything.

Sometimes this power is represented as Pallas Athena, sometimes as his own spirit; both are necessary and must co-operate. Diomed is Hero because Pallas can thus work upon him; only as he makes himself the vessel of divine influence is he great. The Goddess and the Man must be made one and revealed in the deed; the highest activity of both united is the supreme excellence of both. Such is Homer's method of work at his best, though sometimes he drops from his altitude and makes his deities merely external and conventional; these Homeric nods are not to be mistaken for the genuine waking Homer. Even the enemy recognize Diomed when he is under the divine spell; Pandar sees one of the immortals at his side, so madly does he fight. But, when the spell is gone, he is but an ordinary man and flees before Hector, till again Pallas inspires him. The warrior, too, must have divine inspiration, as well as the poet or the prophet; this Fifth Book is full of the recognition of it.

As the conflict is national, and not personal merely, we have a general battle alongside the exploits of the individual Hero. But this general battle has a tendency to divide up into so many personal combats; just as authority, indeed, the whole Greek world, is always on the point of dissolving into its individual units. Zeus, the supreme God, is now planning honor for the individual hero; these poems of Homer bring out everywhere the side of individuality in prowess, strength, intellect. The faint and fleeting shadow of a general battle soon gathers and solidifies round an individual centre; that centre is now Diomed, about whom for the moment the Trojan war turns.

One takes delight in the thought that the old poet paid a visit to the home of Diomed long after the war and gathered these legends from the lips of his people, and wove them in the grand total poem of the Hellenic race. They have a local aspect; they are legendary treasures of Argos; the little community never forgot its Hero in the great struggle with the Orient, but swathed his name in rich folds of myth and song. They are local, and just for this reason they belong to the whole of Hellas and to its whole

poem ; they are a genuine growth, not an artificial product of the Hellenic soil. The united work of Greece was at Troy, in the contest against the East ; the united song of Greece is also of Troy, in which song Diomed is to have his due place. He was a local hero whose exploits were celebrated by his townsmen ; but he likewise belonged to all Hellas, by virtue of belonging to a Greek locality. The Poet's function is to make a national poem, in which every local hero participates ; which fact does not destroy, but confirms the unity of the poem.

Indeed, the unity of the "*Iliad*" rests upon the solidest fact : this is the unity of the Greek race in the war against Troy. The theme which unites the entire Hellenic people is the theme which unites the poem. The "*Iliad*" could not have been composed except as the image of that mighty common effort stirring the heart of the bard. But that effort binds together the Greek race, and with the same spiritual links it binds together the "*Iliad*." As the Greeks always showed beneath their one great purpose a tendency to drop back into individual ingredients, so the various books and songs of this poem have their own special unity, while over them is the great general unity. So this Fifth Book, so Diomed himself ; each with its strong individuality fits into the universal order. The true appreciation of Homer takes in and harmonizes both sides ; it will not permit the one poem to be torn asunder into separate and unconnected ballads, or suffer a crystallized unity which destroys the beautiful Greek freedom in a poetic centralization.

This Book, then, rests upon the one fundamental fact, the conflict between Greece and Troy, such as we have already seen on the Trojan plain, and in the soul of Helen. But a new phase is introduced. The Hero is now shown fighting the God ; the mortal on the side of Greece is brought to contend with an immortal on the side of Troy. It is no longer an affray between Greek and Trojan men, but between a Greek man and Trojan deities. Thus Diomed, the daring warrior, grapples with the divine representative, the spiritual embodiment of the Trojan cause. It is one of the deepest glances of the old bard, and makes the grand peculiarity of this Book, which is organized just from this point of view, and reveals one of the noblest of Homer's constructive methods—the rise of the Hero out of his struggle with men to his struggle with Gods. This organism we may now behold in detail.

There are two parts in this Book of almost equal length. The first Part shows Diomed beginning his contest with Trojan men, rising to a direct conflict with the Trojan Goddess Aphrodite, who, being wounded by him, brings her appeal to Olympus, which appeal Zeus, the last authority, sets aside. The second Part runs quite parallel to the first: it shows the mortal struggle raging around Diomed till he is brought into conflict with the Trojan God Mars, who, being likewise wounded by him, carries his appeal at once to Zeus, the supreme deity, and receives a sharp rebuke. Such are the two parts moving in beautiful symmetry from earth through opposition of Gods to the final favorable decree on Olympus. Deep inspiring hope lies therein. Diomed, mortal man, is victor not only over the Trojans, but over their Gods, their spiritual essence, his victory being confirmed by the decision of the ultimate divine judge. Thus we feel in the whole a double sweep upward to the Highest.

I. The first Part we shall now follow out in its main particulars, observing in its movement the three significant phases which are inherent stages of its unfolding thought. These phases are: the mortal in struggle with mortals, the mortal in struggle with the divine, the ultimate decision in favor of the mortal.

a. There is a general battle on the plain of Troy between Greeks and Trojans; Diomed is the main, though not the only, participant. But this battle cannot go forward, according to the Homeric conception, without a divine interference which is to shadow forth the spiritual principle at stake. The mere bloody combat is naught without the God in it. The first important interference is Pallas leading Ares out of the battle and setting him down "beside grassy Scamander." The Goddess of Wisdom can control the God of mere violence; she does it now, and the Greeks, her people, are victorious. Such is the divine hint; it is enough.

Again Pallas appears in answer to the fervent prayer of Diomed, who has been wounded by Pandar's arrow. That wound rouses the Heroic in him to the highest pitch; we note that he is ready for the Goddess inwardly, when she stands at once outwardly beside him. She takes that mortal cloud from his eyes which before hung upon them; now he can distinguish easily man and God. A most wonderful vision indeed, given by Pallas only; hereafter, in

this Book, Diomed will fight by it and win his victory. But mark, he must be careful not to assail any immortal but Aphrodite, that Trojan Goddess who deluded Helen, against whose divinity indeed the Greeks are chiefly fighting. With such an equipment we can easily believe that "a triple strength possessed him" to slaughter the sons of Troy.

Now we must turn to the Trojan side, where Æneas, who is the son of Aphrodite, is organizing resistance to the Greek Hero. Æneas takes as his companion Pandar, who caused the violation of the treaty in the previous Book. Pandar quits, in a fit of disgust, his true weapon, the bow, for the spear, whereby the way is prepared for his death. But the deeper motive is his great wrong; now comes the penalty. It is true that the Poet does not directly state that Pandar's death is the consequence of his guilty act, nor need he; the connection is felt all the time; Pandar violates the truce, then perishes.

Æneas, too, is about to perish, when he is picked up and carried off by his mother, Aphrodite. Another divine intervention; what does it mean? His mother, as Zeus says, is not warlike; she, who may be considered to have imparted her character to her son, rescues him. Æneas, though hurt, got out of that fight in Aphrodite's fashion; the strong contrast is with Diomed, who, though now wounded, is performing deeds of valor, and has just vanquished Æneas. So the weak Goddess rescued her favorite, Paris, in his duel with Menelaus; now her own son, in a closer kinship than Paris, is borne by her from the battle. Such is the shadowy suggestion, which cannot be pushed out into clear daylight.

Perhaps, however, the interference is purely external. Æneas had nothing to do with his flight; he was simply carried off by his mother in a swoon of pain. Such is not Homer's usual way, we feel certain; his poem is a poem of freedom. Still, he has his conventional, even mechanical passages, and he sometimes nods. In this Book, Vulcan rescues his priest's son from Diomed in a purely external way; Pallas loves the Trojan builder of the ships in which Paris took Helen; Menelaus is dear to Trojan Ares. Homer has his artificialities—nay, his soulless ritual; but this is when he nods. When he is awake, he beholds the divine and human in one, and portrays both in the form of God

and man ; the Upper and Lower Worlds become confluent to his vision.

b. But Diomed is not satisfied with wounding the mortal son ; he proposes to vanquish the immortal mother herself. He overtakes her, and draws her divine blood, the ichor ; we may think of it as the pure principle of herself, not derived from the physical elements, "the wheaten loaf and the dark wine." It is that which led Helen astray, that which all the Greeks are fighting, and chiefly this Greek Hero. Diomed tries to crush this principle, to make it cease its conflict with the Greeks. If he can drive it permanently from the field, he may well think that the war is ended.

Thus the old poet seeks to show this Trojan conflict in its essence, to indicate what every true Greek must meet and put down. It is not a contest of muscle simply ; in the brawny arm is a God who drives it ; that God must at times appear, lest men forget that it is he, and not themselves, directing the battle. The hostile deity, too, must step forth in person and be conquered ; Aphrodite cannot even rescue her own son in the pinch of danger. Brave Diomed, we can see, has pierced the heart of this whole Trojan difficulty ; for himself, at least, he has settled the question ; he will not be fascinated by that sensuous Goddess of beauty.

c. But Aphrodite is a Goddess, and is now to have her case brought before the highest tribunal. She passes from below to Olympus ; the means of her transition thither introduces two divinities. Iris, the messenger, whose rainbow arch spans heaven and earth, and makes a road up to the skies on which Gods can travel home, leads her forth. Horses and chariots she borrows of Ares, who has no use for them now, being still kept at a distance from the battle by the skill of Pallas. Aphrodite arrives on Olympus, falls at the knees of her sympathetic mother, Dione, and prefers her bitter complaint : "Not between Greeks and Trojans is now the strife, but the Greeks are fighting the Immortals." It is, indeed, a heavy charge, but it is what the Greeks must do, and it is just this contest which makes the soul of the Book.

But let us listen to the response of that mother : "Endure, my child, and hold thyself up, though in pain." It is, indeed, noble advice, divinely worthy ; it hints that Gods, too, must suffer—yea, suffer for the sake of mortals. In times past they have often thus suffered ; men have assailed divinity ; such seems to be the world's

order. She cites from mythical lore three cases ; into her speech bursts up this ancient faith of peoples, wrapped in dim legends, yet very real. Thrice she repeats that magic word "suffer," deeply intoning the note which palpitates through her whole speech. It is a most motherly, tender discourse, voicing an ancient religion of suffering, and in its sympathy giving strong consolation by its sweet counsel, "endure, endure." Alas! that wild daughter, Aphrodite, is, one thinks, the last person to endure.

Still further, the Gods have brought miseries upon one another on account of men, and have had to struggle and suffer. Assuredly, the conflicts of mortals are taken up to Olympus, and there divide the Gods ; this Trojan conflict has separated the deities into two hostile parties, as seen in the whole "*Iliad*," as well as in this Book of the "*Iliad*." For the earthly struggle has its spiritual meaning in the souls of the contestants, whereof the image is reflected in the Olympian struggle. The Upper World is the spiritual counterpart of the Lower World ; Homer never fails to give both. Such is the fate of Gods, and Dione bids her daughter submit.

Yet there is danger for a mortal to strive with an immortal ; death is not far off when he sets himself up against a divine reality. Thus Dione utters a gloomy prophecy over Diomed ; but he has another deity on his side. By the authority of Pallas he has assaulted the Goddess ; he is but the human instrument of a divine mover. He will not, then, perish so soon, and Dione finds her limit in another deity. In her plaintive tone lies a tragic depth ; she feels that the Gods too are tragic, only they are divinely tragic.

Such is the sympathetic, motherly utterance to Aphrodite on Olympus ; a second utterance is that of bitter hostility from Pallas. This takes the form of the most acrid sarcasm : the wound of Aphrodite comes from an attempt to lead astray some Greek dame to Troy ; the Goddess, caressing her, was pricked by the golden buckle of her garment. A biting allusion to the story of Helen ; the Goddess is indeed pricked severely by her own deed in its consequences ; the truth poisons the sarcasm. The wound of Diomed is the prick of Helen's pin.

Now comes the third utterance to Aphrodite—not that of love or of hate, but the decision of the world-judge arranging the divine order. "Warlike deeds have not been assigned thee, my

child, but the desireful deeds of marriage." She was out of her sphere in war; the world-regent remands her back into her proper function. Zeus sets his seal upon the victory of Diomed; the first grand appeal from mortal to immortal is settled; the further hint is flashed through to the end, that the Greek is to put down Aphrodite, the Trojan Goddess, by decree of the Highest.

II. We may now take up the second Part and behold it moving in a certain harmony of development with the first Part; both Parts we must see to be built upon the same plan, yet in symmetrical counterpart to each other. The three phases again appear; first is the struggle of mortal with mortal, organized, however, and directed by a God; the second is the struggle of mortal with divine; the third is the final decision on Olympus in favor of the mortal.

a. In the multifarious tumult of conflicts which follow is seen the hand of the divine organizer, Apollo, who is to bring back order and temporary victory to the Trojans, as the advantage in the first Part was with the Greeks. The position of Apollo in this Book is remarkable; he is a sort of divine guardian of Troy, standing dimly in the background everywhere, and setting in motion his instruments for his work. He has his divine counterpart in Pallas on the Greek side, who seems, however, the stronger. Apollo is now a Trojan God; hereafter he will step out of his obscure Oriental background and become a Greek divinity, the God of Light itself. Homer speaks of rocky Pytho and its treasures; but the rise of Apollo's sun upon Hellas does not take place in Homer's day.

Apollo first gives a strong warning to the Hero Diomed, who, forgetful of the advice of Pallas, has assaulted him as if he were an Aphrodite. There is, then, an element in Troy which is not to be put down or destroyed by the Greek; it is Phæbus Apollo, whose voice now speaks forth in terrible rebuke to the audacious warrior: "Dare not, O mortal! deem thyself the equal of a God." That voice quite cows the demoniac spirit of Diomed, and he retires; the central Hero of the Greeks has for a time the divine energy taken out of him, to the great advantage of the Trojans.

Now Apollo can rouse Ares, "blood-besprent, mortal-destroying, wall-smiting," the God of pure violence, as the influence of Pallas and her agent, Diomed, is paralyzed for the time. This

God of violence always, it seems, needs a God of wisdom to direct him ; he takes the form of Acamas, and exhorts the Trojans ; Sarpedon, too, is his indirect instrument in stirring up Hector, the greatest of the Trojans, to fresh combat. But Ares must beware of Pallas, and wait till he has seen her go away ; if she, with her strength and wisdom, remains with the Greek host, he can do but little.

Furthermore, Apollo makes important use of Æneas, whom he, stepping out of the air, had rescued when dropped by the wounded Aphrodite. Still Æneas, as the very son of the Trojan divine conception, must be present somehow in the battle ; so Apollo makes an image of him, round which the Trojans fight ; that is the Poet's way of saying they imagined him to be present—indeed, must have some image of some such being in their souls. But, next, Apollo brings the veritable Æneas into the battle, fully cured, for that wound of his was not a very serious one bodily, and the God of wisdom has cured the spirit's wound of that stroke of terror by a short delay in his temple.

Such is Apollo's organization of the Trojan forces which advance to meet the Greeks, who are now worsted. Æneas, true to his mother's spirit, retires and vanishes from the conflict ; two lesser Greeks can put him down. But the Greek heroes in the main are driven back ; even Diomed, the central figure, now withdraws before Hector. We mark the cowed spirit, though a good excuse is given ; Diomed sees Ares beside Hector and declines to fight with a God. But to put down the Trojan deities is the supreme function of the Greek Hero ; he will yet do so, with another draught of inspiration from Pallas in his body.

The Poet has not failed to give us a single picture of the whole present situation in the duel between Sarpedon and Tlepolemus, which follows at this point. The one, son of Zeus, aids Troy ; the other, grandson of Zeus, aids Greece. The children of the supreme Hellenic God are on both sides ; it is a struggle in the Hellenic race. But in this momentary phase of it the Greek is slain, and the Trojan severely wounded ; the contest is nearly equal, the balance now leaning to the side of Troy. The struggle of mortal with mortal thus culminates in this little episode ; those critics who would cut it out would make the whole poem bleed.

One of the many strands which weave this Book into the entire
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"Iliad" is Hector. He is at present the bold warrior mainly; Ares fights at his side to the vision of Diomed. But he is now seen to be very different from Æneas, son of Aphrodite; in the next Book the ethical element in his character will unfold into supreme radiance, so that he will stand in perfect contrast to Paris also. Hector is the Greek in Troy, condemning as a moral man, but defending as a patriot, his country. At present he is the companion of the God of War, which trait is his too; a possible hint of his future unfolding may also be gathered.

b. Now the Greek principle, embodied in Herē and Pallas, is to be seen rising up against this Trojan success and taking possession of Diomed, that he fight again a Trojan God. The scene is truly Olympian in grandeur; the description of the two Goddesses getting ready to assert their sovereignty is not only sublime, but full of the deepest poetic suggestion. Herē prepares the divine chariot and steeds, by which both are borne; Pallas lays aside her celestial garment and puts on the terrible dress of war, the very mail of Zeus. Then that wonderful gate of the skies, guarded by the Hours, "to whom have been intrusted Olympus and high Heaven, to open and close the thick cloud thereof"; that gate, watched over by Time, through which the lower deities must pass in their divine conveyance in order to reach Zeus, "sitting apart from other Gods on the highest Olympian peak"; that gate we too must see through, behind the cloud, to the seat of the son of Cronus. Out of Time, out of the finite world, it leads to the Infinite, who is now consulted upon this Trojan question, and gives his decree that Ares, God of mere senseless violence, be driven from the field. The voice of the last necessity we must hear in that; let us then look below to Troy.

The mortal instrument must be found; it is again Diomed, can be none other, for he has in him the most capacity for the divine energy. Herē, of course, finds the Greeks, and calls to them, with Stentor's voice, like that of fifty men. One comparison she makes which must be noted: "while Achilles went to war, the Trojans never passed their gates." Achilles is then missed; he is far greater than the next best man, Diomed, who cannot be the Hero of the whole "Iliad," but of one of its Books only, which Book implies as its setting the mightier Hero, now absent from battle. A small, tender fibre, to be sure, is this, easily disposed of by an excision;

but hundreds of such delicate fibres, almost invisibly woven through the organic body, are cut asunder by any theory which breaks up the unity of the poem.

Diomed is found by Pallas; he recognizes the Goddess, as he has before recognized Ares, a most important trait in a Hero; then he states her former command as his excuse for withdrawing. But she now gives him a tenfold draught of inspiration: "Fear not Ares, nor any other God, for I shall be thine aid." Zeus is indeed behind this strong assurance, which descends into the mortal Hero, the recognizer of Gods, and in his breast finds the strong response. Pallas must be inside of him as well as outside of him.

Again Diomed engages in combat with a Trojan God; to be sure, he is under the guidance of Pallas, who is greater than Ares, the deity of mere violence; she is Goddess of war and wisdom united. Such, too, is the inner trait of Diomed now; the Goddess can employ him, because her character is within him. That skill of Pallas in catching and turning aside the spear of Ares belongs to Diomed also, we may well think; and likewise her skill in guiding the spear to wound the God, who thereat goes off bellowing with the cry of nine or ten thousand men—a comic mark both of his strength and of his divine lack of self-command, violence broke loose in pain. So the other God of the Trojans, passionate blind havoc, is foiled at his own game and by his own means, being wounded and driven from the field by a mortal Greek.

c. He too carries his appeal to Zeus, his father, the highest God, without the intercession of the mother, as in the case of Aphrodite. His complaint is quite like hers—she is his wife according to some legends, his paramour according to others, but in this Book she calls him brother—"the Gods suffer fearfully from one another, doing favors to men." Chiefly he complains of his rival on Olympus, Pallas, "thy mad, mischievous daughter," who has now twice incited a mortal to take up arms against a God. Such, however, is just the highest function of Pallas; she must first give men wisdom, and then the courage to maintain wisdom by force, if necessary. The complaint of Ares is humorous; a God complaining must always have in him a touch of humor, though it be unconscious—an infinite being complaining of defeat, of his own finitude, above which he was supposed to be sublime. Particularly

is Ares humorous in this speech, complaining of the very thing he is guilty of, violence earnestly blaming violence.

The decision of Zeus is most severe; the God of Strife has his character set before himself from the mouth of the last arbiter of the world. Zeus proclaims him the most hateful of deities, forever disturbing the divine harmony of earth and Olympus; moreover, he shifts from side to side, like the fortune of war, a very turn coat of a God. Again the Supreme Power declares that a deity has suffered justly at the hands of a mortal. Still it is not well for an Olympian to suffer too much, so Zeus in his paternal character relents to the extent of putting his wounded son in charge of Pæon, surgeon of the Gods. The two Trojan spiritual principles Diomed has vanquished; he is equally strong against blandishment or violence. Such is the Greek Hero presented in this Book with wonderful life and color, with all the charm of poetry and spiritual faith. Hope, too, it images, the deepest hope of the race, wherein the man is shown fighting and overcoming Gods hostile and mighty, that he place himself in accord with the Highest.

We cannot help asking ourselves what are the two principles which are represented by Aphrodite and Ares, whom Diomed has put down? We have already learned about Aphrodite in connection with Helen. She is love in its sensual manifestation, love divorced from its purpose and soul, the Family; she is in consequence the effeminate, unwarlike, luxurious. The Greek woman Helen has been made the victim of such a love, and is held in its bondage by Paris and the Trojans. But the Greek Hero meets and wounds the Goddess, and all that she represents; also the Olympian household, the divine Family of the Greeks, shows itself hostile to Aphrodite. This is essentially the decision of Helen's case by the last authority; moreover, Zeus is shown to be emphatically a Greek and not a Trojan deity; he is now such as he appears in the outcome of the struggle. Aphrodite cannot defend herself, much less her own people; the world-judgment is against her and them. Ares is not the effeminate, but the violent principle; senseless cruelty, rage, the lover of strife and blood, changing without principle from side to side, a divine *condottiere*. We must mark his corresponding opposite on the Greek side, Pallas, who combines war and intelligence, while Ares is the irrational violence of war

Both Ares and Aphrodite have the Oriental tendency in their characters: love without its ethical or rational purpose, war without its ethical or rational purpose; both these Trojan deities are suppressed by Diomed below and by Zeus above—the Greek man and the Greek God in their highest potency. Wherein we mark a significant hint of the outcome of the whole poem, and a thought harmonious only with the unity of the “*Iliad*.”

This thought can be truly seen in one sole way—that is, through an insight into the structure of the Book. The idea is at once suggested by the organism; this organism we have seen moving on two symmetrical lines which show the same general purport, namely, the reference of the combat below on earth to the supreme arbiter of this great Hellenic conflict, to Zeus. There is an ascent from the terrestrial to the Olympian world twice, and twice the same decision is heard from above. That decision against the two most prominent Trojan deities is really a decision against Troy and the Trojan principle. One cannot help thinking that this Book touches the very heart of the struggle, and is prophetic of the whole “*Iliad*,” springing, indeed, from its inmost soul. It bears the decree of the Highest that the mortal Greek may meet and conquer the Trojan divinities; what a profound and world-embracing glance is that! Supreme poetic vision we feel it to be, a look of the old bard into the bottom of the Universe.

Still we must not suppose that the Trojan conflict is ended with the suppression of Ares and Aphrodite. Among mortals in Troy we have beheld, besides Paris and his tendency, Hector, who is now to shine forth not in his warlike, but in his ethical glory; to put him down will be a far harder task. But among the deities at Troy have we not seen with wonder Phœbus Apollo, at one time stepping forth out of this Trojan background with his word and his deed, and then dropping back into it, like a gleam of light vanishing into darkness? Who is he? A certain undevelopment he has, a lack of distinct outline, yet a mighty reality we feel him to be; in him this Orient has something permanent which will not be lost in the flames of Troy. Two of its Gods, those of sensuality and of violence, may well be suppressed; but Phœbus cannot be spared; his home will yet be transferred to Hellas, where he will become the chief Greek oracle, though in Homer he

looks out of a dim Oriental setting, not yet advanced to his true being.

Such is our Fifth Book, in its own unity and in its place in the unity of the "Iliad," though it has been torn all to pieces by German comment, as well as torn out of its place in the poem. Undoubtedly there are some loose threads hanging from the garment, but this does not show that it is not woven, nay, carefully cut and made, into a well-fitting robe. Loose threads can always be found, particularly if we pick them out with a sharp-pointed instrument; not the garment, but the picker is the thing deficient in unity. This microscopic criticism, if not corrected by healthy natural eyesight, will destroy every organic Whole; the microscope will exaggerate the almost invisible fly-speck to a monstrous heap of dung which fills the whole field of vision. No wonder that Goethe, the man who saw totalities in science as well as in poetry, hated the microscope.

For the sake of comparison, we shall add the structure of this Book as given in Hentze's edition of *Ameis's Anhang*.

I. Superiority of the Greeks through Pallas, who keeps Ares at a distance, and gives fame to Diomed. (Lines 1-453.)

1. Deeds of Diomed till wounded by Pandar. (1-113.)

2. Combat of Diomed with Æneas and Pandar, and the wounding of Aphrodite. (113-453.)

II. Superiority of the Trojans under lead of Ares in the absence of Pallas. (Lines 454-710.)

1. Restoration of the battle by Ares and Hector, before whom Diomed retires. (454-626.)

2. Combat between Sarpedon and Tlepolemus, and the further exploits of Hector. (627-710.)

III. Intervention of Here and Pallas in favor of the Greeks, and the wounding of Ares. (Lines 711-908.)

This is a purely external division, with no organic soul in it; the inner movement and essence of the Book are not only not brought out, but not even suspected. With such a view of its organism the Book falls to pieces, and one is not surprised to find the commentator cutting out first the myths of the Gods, then the myths of mortals, and leaving—what? The central fact is to see the double movement up from earth to Olympus; this is the thought, this is the structure on which all details are borne; both

thought and structure become one to the poetic vision, though they be separated for a moment by a critical analysis, in order that they be the better comprehended. Thus, the vision of the bard is justified and fulfilled in the reason of the critic, not by tearing the poem to peices, but by uniting it in a new bond of harmony.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

SENTENCES IN PROSE AND VERSE.

SELECTION BY W. E. CHANNING.

Child of a day, thou knowest not
 The tears that overflow thine urn,
 The gushing eyes that read thy lot ;
 Nor, if thou knewest, couldst return !
 And why the wish ? the pure and blest
 Watch like thy mother o'er thy sleep.
 O peaceful night ! O envied rest !
Thou wilt not ever see her weep.—Landor.

I am more
 A man than others, therefore I dare more
 And suffer more. Such is humanity ;
 I cannot halve it. Superficial men
 Have no absorbing passions ; shallow seas
 Are void of whirlpools.—*I bid.*

Ask me not, a voice severe
 Tells me, for it gives me pain ;
 Peace ! the hour, too sure, is near
 When I cannot ask again.—*I bid.*

Here, where precipitate Spring, with one light bound,
 Into hot Summer's lusty arms expires.—*I bid.*

Dull falls the mallet with long labor fringed.—*I bid.*

On festal days,
 When lay the dry and outcast arbutus
 On the fane-step, and the first privet-flowers
 Threw their white light upon the vernal shrine.—*Ibid.*

Ascribing absolute perfection to the author and ruler of so clumsily made and capriciously governed a planet as this.—*J. S. Mill.*

The author of the sermon on the mount is assuredly a far more benignant being than the author of nature.—*Ibid.*

It is no doubt possible to worship with the intensest devotion either deity—that of nature, or of the gospel—without any perversion of the moral sentiments. This simple and innocent faith can only, as I have said, co-exist with a torpid and inactive state of the speculative faculties.—*Ibid.*

After a time, they would have had enough of existence, and would gladly lie down and take their eternal rest. In a happier condition of human life, not annihilation but immortality must be the burdensome idea.—*Ibid.*

She [Lady Jersey] has a retentive memory and a restless mind, together with a *sort of intellectual arrangement*, with which she appears to have been gifted by nature.—*Greville.*

The Speaker said, “the only *lucid interval* Witherell had was between his waistcoat and his breeches.” When he speaks he unbuttons his braces, and in his vehement action his breeches fall down and his waistcoat runs up, so that there is a great interregnum.—*Ibid.*

I had hardly any acquaintance with Lord Londonderry, and am therefore not in the slightest degree affected by his death.—*Ibid.*

She [Lady Jersey] is deficient in passion and softness, which constitute the great charm in women.—*Ibid.*

There were five hundred pocket-books, and in every one money. He [George Fourth] had *never given away nor parted with anything*; prodigious quantity of hair, women’s hair, of all colors and lengths, some locks with the powder and pomatum still sticking to them; heaps of women’s gloves, *gages d’amour* he had got at balls.—*Ibid.*

Went to Oatlands [Duke of York’s] on Saturday; we played at whist till four in the morning! On Sunday we amused ourselves with shooting at a mark with pistols, and playing with the monkeys. There are a great many servants, and nobody waits on you; a vast number of horses, and none to ride or drive. The Duchess seldom goes to bed, or only for an hour or two; she sleeps dressed upon a couch. She walks out very late

at night, or rather early in the morning, and she always sleeps with open windows. She dresses and breakfasts at three o'clock P. M., afterward walks out with all her dogs [forty in number], and seldom appears before dinner-time [8 P. M.].—*Ibid.*

The Grecian mound, the Roman urn,
Are silent when we call,
Yet still the purple grapes return
And cluster on the wall.

Mild monastic faces in quiet collegiate cloisters.—*Clough.*

Tivoli beautiful is, and musical, O Teverone,
Dashing from mountain to plain, thy parted impetuous waters.—*Ibid.*

"You have read a great deal, you have thought very little, and you know—nothing."—*Dr. Parr [to Barker].*

"Yes, Jamie, he [O'Coigly] was a bad man, but he might have been worse; he was an Irishman, but he might have been a Scotchman; he was a priest, but he might have been a lawyer; he was a republican, but he might have been an apostate."—*Ibid. [to Mackintosh].*

The second-best remedy is better than the best, if the patient likes it best.—*Hippocrates.*

Some connivances are secured before they are sought for. Cowardice is the old fawner upon felony. The blood of the law is quickly wiped up. Behind the assassin who holds the poniard comes the trembling wretch who holds the sponge.—*Victor Hugo.*

Ce n'est que le premier pas qui conte in quarrels, as in all else. Dispute once, you are very sure to dispute again, whether with the man you hate or the woman you love.—*Ouida.*

In thy holiday of life,
Use occasion, work and climb;
The sepulchre has overmuch
Unprofitable time.—*Emerson.*

There is nothing like patience on a bad road in a dark and stormy night. No morning's sun lasts a whole day.—*Atkinson.*

The smile on an infant's cheek, seen oftenest when asleep, is a consequence of some nervous excitement. One observes the same thing on the face of a dying person, the passing effect of some internal irritation that has survived the conscious state, and which is left as a smile on the features of the corpse after death.—*Maudsley.*

A method of nutrition in which the acting parts are, at certain periods, raised, with a time-regulated progress, to a state of instability of compo-

sition, from which they then decline, and in doing this discharge nerve-force.—*Sir James Paget* [*rhythmical organic movement*].

See how the sun, here clouded, afar off
Pours down the golden radiance of his light
Upon the enridged sea; where the black ship
Sails on the phosphor-seeming waves.—*Crowe* [*Lewesdon Hill*].

The day returns, my natal day,
Borne on the storm and pale with snow,
And seems to ask me why I stay,
Stricken by Time, and bowed by Woe.—*Landor*.

More mutable than wind-worn leaves are we;
Yea, lower are we than the dust's estate;
The very dust is as it was before.—*Ibid*.

I loved thee by the streams of yore,
By distant streams I love thee more;
For never is the heart so true,
As bidding what we love adieu.—*Ibid*.

We promise according to hope, and we keep our promises according to fear.—*Roche foucauld*.

Self-interest, if it makes some men blind, affords a light to others.—*Ibid*.

We are neither so happy nor so wretched as we imagine.—*Ibid*.

Every one praises his heart, and no one his head.—*Ibid*.

There are excellent marriages, but no delicious ones.—*Ibid*.

If we can resist our passions, it is due to their weakness, not to our strength.—*Ibid*.

We are sometimes as unlike ourselves as we are commonly to others.—*Ibid*.

Nothing is more in the way of acting naturally than the wish to appear so.—*Ibid*.

The most glutinously indefinite minds inclose some hard grains of habit.—*George Eliot* [*Mrs. Lewes*].

That controlled self-consciousness of manner which is the expensive substitute for simplicity.—*Ibid*.

Manners must be very marked indeed before they cease to be interpreted by preconceptions, either confident or distrustful.—*Ibid*.

A kind Providence furnishes the limpest personality with a little gum or starch in the form of tradition.—*Ibid*.

A man's mind—what there is of it—has always the advantage of being masculine.—*Ibid.*

What a voice! It was like the voice of a soul that had once lived in an Æolian harp.—*Ibid.*

These severe classical nudities and smirking Renaissance-Corregiosities were painfully inexplicable, staring into the midst of her Puritanic conceptions.—*Ibid.*

She filled up all blanks with unmanifested perfections, interpreting him as she interpreted the works of Providence.—*Ibid.*

"You clever young men must guard against indolence. I was too indolent, you know; else I might have been anywhere at one time."—*Ibid.*

What effective shapes may be disguised in helpless embryos! In fact, the world is full of hopeful analogies and handsome, dubious eggs, called possibilities.—*Ibid.*

Plain women he regarded as he did the other severe facts of life, to be faced with philosophy and investigated by science.—*Ibid.*

A piece of tapestry over a door showed a blue-green wold with a pale stag in it. The tables and chairs were thin-legged and easy to upset. It was a room where one might fancy the ghost of a tight-laced lady visiting the scene of her embroidery.—*Ibid.*

Pride only helps to be generous; it never makes us so, any more than vanity will force us to be witty.—*Ibid.*

I have not the art of putting my impressions about books into words. I can not give my reasons for like or dislike.—*Hawthorne.*

The downy buds,
Those fairy cradles of the flowers.—*Street.*
The quail's quick whistle echoed clear,
From the red buckwheat's stubble near.—*Ibid.*

The butterfly,
Fluttering within and resting on some flower,
Fans his rich velvet-form.—*Ibid.*

Misty shade
Films the deep hollows, misty sunshine glows
On the round hills. Across the far-off wood
The atmosphere is shaded like thin smoke,
Until we fancy a dim swarm of motes
Is glimmering there and dancing. We approach,
And tread the dark recesses; withered leaves
Spread a thick, crackling mantle; countless trunks

Lead on the eye in labyrinths, till lost

Within a dizzy maze, and overhead

A vast and interlacing roof of green.—*Ibid.*

The quick flicker like a checkered speck.—*Ibid.*

The slow locust opens to the sun

Its pea-bloom shapes of blossoms.—*Ibid.*

HEGEL'S DIALECTIC METHOD—A PRIZE ESSAY.

[We print the revised programme of the prize essay on Hegel's Method offered by the Berlin Philosophical Society. (The former announcement will be found in our issue for January, 1882.) It will be seen that the time for receiving the essays is extended until 1887, and the prize nearly doubled.—Ed.]

The Berlin Philosophical Society, founded in 1843, by the disciples of Hegel, but now numbering among its members men of the most various philosophical creeds, has applied the surplus of funds recently collected for a monument in memory of Hegel to the foundation of a Hegel Institute, the object of which is the furtherance of philosophical research. The society has just issued the following prize theme: "A critical and historical account of the dialectical method of Hegel."

No. 1. The development of Hegel's Method, as shown in his writings. How his dialectic is related to his logic and metaphysics.

No. 2. Comparison of Hegel's Method with the methods of his predecessors. Is his method derived from them?

No. 3. The significance and value of Hegel's Method. Does it fulfil the requirements of a philosophical method or not?

The treatises may be in German, French, English, or Italian. They must be sent in by December 31, 1886, either to Professor Dr. Lasson (Friedenau bei Berlin, Saarstr. 3), or to Stadtgerichtsrath a. D. Meineke (Kurfuersten Strasse, 56, W. Berlin).

Each essay must be headed by a motto and accompanied with a sealed envelope containing the motto and the name of the writer and his address. The manuscript of the successful essay will remain the property of the society, the right of publication remaining with the author.

The prize of 750 "Reichsmark" (about 180 dollars in our money) will be paid on the first of July, 1887.

A copy of the programme can be obtained, on application, from the librarian of the University of Berlin, Dr. F. Ascherson.

(Dated) Berlin, June 28, 1881. (Signed by the two secretaries above mentioned.)

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