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
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THE JOURNAL OF RACE DEVELOPMENT

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JULY, 1918

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE WAR By James L. Barham, LL.D., Foreign Secretary, American Board of Foreign Missions; formerly President of Euphrates College, Harpoot, Turkey.....	1
JEROMEAN ASPIRATIONS By Srećko Tadić, Late Lecturer at the University of London, (King's College).....	10
THE FUTURE OF ALSACE-LORRAINE By David Starr Jordan, LL.D., Chancellor of Leland Stanford University.....	40
CHINA'S PART IN THE WAR By C. W. Bishop, Assistant Curator, Oriental Section, University Museum, Philadelphia.....	56
KOREAN BUDDHISM By Frederick Starr.....	71
ALLIANCE WITH JAPAN By John Stuart Thomson, Author of "The Chinese," "China Revolutionized".....	85
THE INFLUENCE OF INDIA ON WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN MODERN TIMES By Benu Kumar Sarker, Professor, National Council of Education, Bengal.....	91
NOTES AND REVIEWS.....	105

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INDEX OF AUTHORS

BARNES, HARRY E. The Struggle of Races and Social Groups as a Factor in the Development of Political and Social Institutions....	394
BARRETT, JOHN. The Pan-American Outlook.....	114
BARTON, JAMES L. The Ottoman Empire and the War.....	1
BISHOP, C. W. China's Part in the War.....	56
BLAKESLEE, GEORGE H. The Monroe Doctrine and the Proposed Constitution of the League of Nations.....	420
BROWN, J. MACMILLAN. The Future of the Pacific.....	362
BY AN AMERICAN MANY YEARS RESIDENT IN JAPAN. The Strength of Japanese Officialdom, Particularly in Education.....	373
CALDERÓN, SENOR DON IGNACIO. Pan-American Ideals and the War.	109
CASSAVETY, N. J. Bulgaria's Case.....	145
The Question of Epirus.....	230
CHAMBERLAIN, W. I. Recent Developments in the State Educa- tional System of India.....	298
ELLIS, GEORGE W. Liberia in the New Partition of West Africa....	247
HODOUS, LEWIS. The Emergence of the Individual in China.....	168
JENKS, JEREMIAH W. New Cabinet Starts Party Responsibility in Japan.....	210
JORDAN, DAVID STARR. The Balkan Tragedy.....	120
The Future of Alsace-Lorraine.....	40
ION, THEODORE P. The Claims of Greece at the Peace Congress....	219
LOMBARD, FRANK A. Japan and the Present Crisis.....	213
MEANS, PHILIP AINSWORTH. Race Appreciation and Democracy....	180
REID, REV. GILBERT. Coöperation of Peoples of the Far East.....	189
Philippine Observations.....	283
SARKAR, BENOY KUMAR. The Influence of India on Western Civil- ization in Modern Times.....	91
The Reshaping of the Middle East.....	332
SHAMIS, THOMAS. Lithuanians.....	157
SHEPHERD, WILLIAM R. The Psychology of the Latin American....	268
STARR, FREDERICK. Korean Buddhism.....	71
STANOYEVICH, MILVOY S. What Serbia Wants.....	136
SUGAREFF, V. K. The Bulgarian Nationality of the Macedonians....	382
TALBOT, ELISHA HOLLINGSWORTH. Present Conditions and the Out- look in Mexico.....	344
THOMSON, JOHN STUART. Alliance with Japan.....	85
TREAT, PAYSON J. The Foundations of American Policy in the Far East.....	198
TUCIĆ, SRGJAN. Jugoslav Aspirations.....	16
YARROW, E. A. The Bolsheviki in Siberia.....	321

BASSETT, JOHN SPENCER. <i>The Lost Fruits of Waterloo</i>	319
COOLIDGE, ARCHIBALD CARY. <i>Origins of the Triple Alliance</i>	316
ELLIOTT, CHARLES BURKE. <i>The Philippines: To the End of the Com- mission Government</i>	106
FREEMAN, HILDA M. <i>An Australian Girl in Germany</i>	317
HERRON, GEORGE D. <i>The Menace of Peace</i>	107
HERRON, GEORGE D. <i>Woodrow Wilson and the World's Peace</i>	108
HILL, DAVID JAYNE. <i>The Rebuilding of Europe</i>	315
HUMPHREY, SETH K. <i>Mankind, Racial Values and the Racial Prospect</i>	105
LATANÉ, JOHN HOLLADAY. <i>From Isolation to Leadership. A Review of American Foreign Policy</i>	316
LEUTRUM, COUNTESS OLGA. <i>Court and Diplomacy in Austria and Germany. What I Know</i>	314
LEWINSKI-CORWIN, EDWARD H. <i>The Political History of Poland</i>	108
PONSONBY, ARTHUR. <i>Democracy and Diplomacy</i>	315
ROSS, EDWARD ALSWORTH. <i>Russia in Upheaval</i>	319
SAVIC, VLADISLAV R. <i>South-Eastern Europe; the Main Problem of the Present World Struggle</i>	107
VASSILI, COUNT PAUL. <i>Confessions of the Czarina</i>	318
WESTERGAARD, WALDEMAR. <i>The Danish West Indies Under Company Rule (1671-1754)</i>	106
WEYL, WALTER EDWARD. <i>The End of the War</i>	314

INDEX OF AUTHORS

BARNES, HARRY E. The Struggle of Races and Social Groups as a Factor in the Development of Political and Social Institutions....	394
BARRETT, JOHN. The Pan-American Outlook.....	114
BARTON, JAMES L. The Ottoman Empire and the War.....	1
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BROWN, J. MACMILLAN. The Future of the Pacific.....	362
BY AN AMERICAN MANY YEARS RESIDENT IN JAPAN. The Strength of Japanese Officialdom, Particularly in Education.....	373
CALDERÓN, SENOR DON IGÑACIO. Pan-American Ideals and the War.	109
CASSAVETY, N. J. Bulgaria's Case.....	145
The Question of Epirus.....	230
CHAMBERLAIN, W. I. Recent Developments in the State Educational System of India.....	298
ELLIS, GEORGE W. Liberia in the New Partition of West Africa....	247
HODOUS, LEWIS. The Emergence of the Individual in China.....	168
JENKS, JEREMIAH W. New Cabinet Starts Party Responsibility in Japan.....	210
JORDAN, DAVID STARR. The Balkan Tragedy.....	120
The Future of Alsace-Lorraine	40
ION, THEODORE P. The Claims of Greece at the Peace Congress....	219
LOMBARD, FRANK A. Japan and the Present Crisis.....	213
MEANS, PHILIP AINSWORTH. Race Appreciation and Democracy....	180
REID, REV. GILBERT. Coöperation of Peoples of the Far East.....	189
Philippine Observations.....	283
SARKAR, BENOY KUMAR. The Influence of India on Western Civilization in Modern Times.....	91
The Reshaping of the Middle East.....	332
SHAMIS, THOMAS. Lithuanians.....	157
SHEPHERD, WILLIAM R. The Psychology of the Latin American....	268
STARR, FREDERICK. Korean Buddhism.....	71
STANOYEVICH, MILIVOY S. What Serbia Wants.....	136
SUGAREFF, V. K. The Bulgarian Nationality of the Macedonians....	382
TALBOT, ELISHA HOLLINGSWORTH. Present Conditions and the Outlook in Mexico.....	344
THOMSON, JOHN STUART. Alliance with Japan.....	85
TREAT, PAYSON J. The Foundations of American Policy in the Far East.....	198
TUCIĆ, SRGJAN. Jugoslav Aspirations.....	16
YARROW, E. A. The Bolsheviki in Siberia.....	321

BASSETT, JOHN SPENCER. <i>The Lost Fruits of Waterloo</i>	319
COOLIDGE, ARCHIBALD CARY. <i>Origins of the Triple Alliance</i>	316
ELLIOTT, CHARLES BURKE. <i>The Philippines: To the End of the Com- mission Government</i>	106
FREEMAN, HILDA M. <i>An Australian Girl in Germany</i>	317
HERRON, GEORGE D. <i>The Menace of Peace</i>	107
HERRON, GEORGE D. <i>Woodrow Wilson and the World's Peace</i>	108
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HUMPHREY, SETH K. <i>Mankind, Racial Values and the Racial Prospect</i>	105
LATANÉ, JOHN HOLLADAY. <i>From Isolation to Leadership. A Review of American Foreign Policy</i>	316
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LEWINSKI-CORWIN, EDWARD H. <i>The Political History of Poland</i>	108
PONSONBY, ARTHUR. <i>Democracy and Diplomacy</i>	315
ROSS, EDWARD ALSWORTH. <i>Russia in Upheaval</i>	319
SAVIC, VLADISLAV R. <i>South-Eastern Europe; the Main Problem of the Present World Struggle</i>	107
VASSILI, COUNT PAUL. <i>Confessions of the Czarina</i>	318
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No. 1

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE WAR

By James L. Barton, LL.D., Foreign Secretary, American Board of Foreign Missions; formerly President of Euphrates College, Harpoot, Turkey

Nearly all of the articles and books written on the subject of the war have dealt with the western front. The Balkan situation and the relation of the Ottoman Empire to the conditions that precipitated this world conflict have been little discussed. On the other hand, there has apparently been a distinct endeavor upon the part of the Central Powers, and especially of Germany, to keep attention fixed upon the western front. The tentative peace propositions that have been issued from Berlin from time to time and the addresses in the Reichstag have dealt with Alsace and Lorraine, Belgium and Poland, with almost no reference to Armenia and Turkey. Even the peace suggestions of the Pope, sent out to the world, made the merest allusion to the eastern area of the conflict but spoke with repeated emphasis upon adjustments that might be made on the western European frontier.

The attention of the reading public has been so repeatedly turned to the western area of the war, and held there by newspaper correspondents and magazine articles, that few are aware of the fact that the real object of the conflict, if not its center, is in the East and not in the West. In saying this, no special emphasis is laid upon the Russian Empire, either at the outset of the war or in its present distracted condition. Though the Central Powers were not primarily attempting to gain control of Russia, they did however wish to reduce Russia in her military strength to such an extent that she would cease to be a menace to the carrying

out of the ambitious ideas of the Kaiser. It is also apparent from the history of the outbreak of the war that the strike of Germany against Belgium and France, and incidentally against England, was not primarily to conquer and annex those countries to Germany but was to remove them from the ranks of dangerous antagonists in order that Germany's hand might be free to push her deep-laid plan for securing supremacy in the Balkans and across Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf.

For many years Germany's military and political leaders and writers have dwelt upon the importance of Germany's having a field for expansion. Germany's African colonies have proven a disappointment in that they did not furnish an attractive field for German colonization. Even to the outbreak of the war, the number of Germans in her four African colonies was comparatively negligible, while those who had gone to Africa with a view to colonizing and developing German territory there were free to express their disappointment. There was little prospect that Africa would be inhabited by any considerable number of German emigrants eager to establish new homes and to build up a new business there. That being the case, it was evident that other areas suitable to German colonization and easy of approach should be discovered, since it had been accepted as inevitable that Germany must have a field for expansion in order to provide for her excess population and to afford adequate field for her increasing commerce.

In 1905, Prof. Joseph Ludwig Reimer, in *A Pan-German Germany*, said:

It is precisely our craving for expansion that drives us into the paths of conquest, and in view of which all chatter about peace and humanity can and must remain nothing but chatter.

Prof. Ernst Hasse, in the same year, in *The Colonization of the German Folk Territory*, said:

All the policy, internal and external, of the empire ought to be subordinated to this governing idea—the Germanization of all the remains of foreign populations within the empire and the procuring for the German people of new territories proportionate to its strength and its needs of expansion.

Baron v. Vietinghoff-Scheel, at a meeting of the Pan-German League in Erfurt, in September, 1912, said:

Our frontiers are too narrow. We must become land hungry, must acquire new regions for settlement; otherwise we will be a sinking people, a stranded race. True love for our people and its children commands us to think of their future, however much they may accuse us of quarrelsomeness and lust of war.

Paul de Lagarde, in 1913, in his German writings, said:

We must create a Central Europe which will guarantee the peace of the entire continent from the moment when it shall have driven the Russians from the Black Sea and the Slavs from the south, and shall have conquered large tracts to the east of our frontiers for German colonization.

Klaus Wagner, in his *War*, in 1906 writes:

Every great people needs new territory. It must expand over foreign soil; it must expel the foreigners by the power of the sword.

In 1906, Ernst Hasse, in his *World Politics, Imperialism, and Colonial Politics*, said:

The territory open to future German expansion must extend from the North Sea and the Baltic to the Persian Gulf, absorbing the Netherlands and Luxembourg, Switzerland, the whole basin of the Danube, the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor.

Amicus Patriae, Armenien und Kreta, eine Lebensfrage für Deutschland, 1896:

In this nineteenth century, when Germany has become the first power in the world, are we incapable of doing what our ancestors did? Germany must lay her mighty grasp upon Asia Minor. The Turk has lost his rights, not only from the moral but also from the strictly legal point of view. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878 he gave undertakings, not one of which he has kept. His claims are nullified.

F. List, *Sammliche Schriften*, 1850:

The right and left banks of the Danube from Presburg to its mouth, the northern provinces of Turkey, and the west coast of the Black Sea—do they not offer large tracts of land, naturally fertile and as yet unexploited, to the German emigrants?

Friedrich Naumann, *Asia*, 1899:

All weakening of German national energy by pacifist associations or analogous activities reinforces the formidably increasing power of those who rule today from Cape to Cairo, from Ceylon to the Polar Sea. No truce with England. Let our policy be a national policy. This must be the mainspring of our action in the Eastern question. This is the fundamental reason which necessitates our political indifference to the suffering of Christians in the Turkish Empire, painful as these must be to our private feelings. The truth here, as elsewhere, is that we must find out which is the greatest and morally the most important task. When the choice has been made there must be no tergiversation. William II has made his choice; he is the friend of the Padisha, because he believes in a greater Germany.

These quotations are sufficient to show the trend of thinking of German political, military and historical writers, as well as writers on economics. The eyes of Germany were turned toward the Balkan Peninsula and Ottoman Empire not only as providing a field into which excess German population could flow but as affording a basis for the increase of political and military power to Germany.

THE RESOURCES OF TURKEY

We of the West have been accustomed to think of Turkey as almost a barren and desolate waste, and so have not realized that within the bounds of Asiatic Turkey there was much to attract the colonizer and the European nation who would conquer for the sake of exploitation. There is no country of its size lying so near the centers of European civilization possessing, as does Turkey, untold, undeveloped resources. These resources have not only not been developed under the 500 years of Mohammedan rule but their very existence has not been discovered and published to the world except in small part. The policy of Turkey was to exclude the entrance of foreign capital for the development of internal resources, while the government that claimed ownership of all mineral products was not capable of developing these resources. The writer has known of silver and copper mines in the interior of Turkey, operated by the Turkish government, that not only produced no returns to the operating government, but were a constant liability, the product of the mines not meeting

the expense of production. One of the outstanding reasons for this, beyond the natural propensity of the Turkish official to graft, was the absence of transportation facilities. When lead and silver and copper must needs be transported hundreds of miles upon the backs of camels over foot-worn paths, through mountains and plains crossed by swollen streams at certain periods of the year, it is not difficult to conceive that the cost of production might easily exceed the value of the product. In the interior of Turkey there are apparently unlimited deposits of valuable minerals. It is widely known that there are mountains of high-grade copper ore which have hardly been drawn upon up to the present time. The writer has heard natives of the country speak of copper mines in the Vilayet of Mamouret-ul-Aziz and Diarbekir where the ore was of such pure quality that it was impossible for the natives with their black powder to break it up for transportation. With the best method of tamping known to them, the drill hole into which their black powder was inserted and tamped, instead of producing a shattering of the ore, fired the charge like a rifle. Copper of this purity the natives were unable to do anything with, but it awaits development under modern methods of mining.

The country is also blessed with many water powers of large value which might be utilized for all kinds of manufacturing purposes as well as for irrigation. Asiatic Turkey is by no means a desert but offers rich returns to the government that will develop the resources that lie upon the surface as well as those that are more concealed.

The climate is varied and suited to a great variety of grain and fruit products. By the introduction of commercial fertilizers and modern methods of agriculture, the agricultural products of the country which have been for generations sufficient to supply the needs of a fairly large population might be quadrupled in quantity and quality. German explorers have crossed the country during the last fifteen years in many directions and have taken careful note of their widely extended observations, and thus the leaders in Germany were aware of the rich resources of that country, which would not only provide for a surplus

population but which might be made to furnish an adequate base for military operations in the future.

What is true of the Ottoman Empire east of the Bosphorus is true in a large measure of the Balkan Peninsula extending from the Adriatic Sea across to the Black Sea. There is large mineral wealth in that country now undeveloped, with water power and other resources available for the uses of any stable, enterprising government that can be established. While the expansion of Germany to the northwest would give her an outlet to the North Sea, which she has so long desired, with the dense population of the Netherlands and of Belgium they would not afford the field for colonization of which Germany so greatly felt the need. But the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire offer every facility for an extensive colonization and are full also of promise of large commercial and industrial expansion and of a great increase in military power.

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY

The railway line connecting Berlin with Constantinople was open to traffic in 1888. The road was constructed by Baron Hirsch through the Balkan Peninsula and was a part of a plan, apparently then in process of development, to provide an overland route with direct railroad connection from the capital of Germany not only to Bagdad but to some point on the Persian Gulf below Bagdad, giving Germany the advantage over England in a short route to India. The only break in the all-rail route was at Constantinople, in crossing the Bosphorus, and the tunneling or bridging of this historic piece of water is not by any means an impossible engineering feat.

In 1888, when the all-rail route to Constantinople was completed there were only short railway lines anywhere within the Turkish Empire eastward and these were mostly in the hands of Germany, with kilometeric guarantees from the Ottoman Government. Little by little the Germans obtained from the Turkish government concessions to construct a railway toward the southeast from Constantinople.

In 1893 they were granted such a concession from Eski-shehir to Konia. This line was open to traffic in 1896.

There is no need of following out in detail the development of the Bagdad Railway, which was under construction throughout its lower length by German engineers at the outbreak of the war. This construction has been pushed until at the present time, so far as can be ascertained, there is direct railway connection between Constantinople and Nisibin, nearly 100 miles to the east of Oorfa. This line has afforded the only means of supplying the two Ottoman armies operating on the Palestine and the Mesopotamian fronts. The acquisition and construction of this railway by the Germans is another indication of Germany's purpose to occupy at least the southern section of Europe and to control a direct line of communication from Berlin to Constantinople and the Persian Gulf. Branch lines have been surveyed reaching into the productive regions north of this main line, but none of these lines are constructed up to the present time. It is reported that there were less than 150 miles of this line to be completed to make an unbroken connection from Constantinople to Bagdad. That section of the Bagdad Railway that was started from Bagdad is now of course in the hands of the Allies; the remaining section is still in the hands of the Turkish forces.

Little attention was given in the Western world to the concessions secured by Germany for this railway, and it seems to have aroused little suspicion in the minds of the European government that Germany was carrying out a deep-laid plan to gain control over the heart of Asiatic Turkey. This point became more apparent through the developments of the war, showing now completely Germany had mastered the situation from the beginning and made preparation for the military use of all this part of Turkey in case of a European outbreak. Had there been no war in Europe, Germany would have gone on quietly completing her plans, finishing the railway, and so making herself practically impregnable in Turkey. From the outbreak of the war until the present time she has been doing

everything in her power to gain a mastery over the Turkish forces, holding as she does the control of the same through Enver Pasha, the minister of war, and as the entire country is under military control, all Turkey being within the war zone, she has been able to hold unbroken sway to the present hour.

The disaffection of Arabia and its affiliation with the Allies, taken together with the success of the Allied forces on both the Palestine and Mesopotamian fronts, leading to the loss of Bagdad and Jerusalem, have introduced a decidedly new element into the plans of Germany for threatening India and Egypt from southeastern Turkey. Unless there is a marked change in the war situation in that region there is no hope in this direction. In order to offset the blocking of the contemplated pathway to the Persian Gulf and to India, the Germans have now made their treaty with Russia, throwing the entire Trans-Caucasus area ostensibly into the hands of Turkey but actually into the control of Germany. This will give Germany, through its vassal, Turkey, the control of the railway running from Batoum across the Trans-Caucasus to Baku on the Caspian Sea. This is an area rich in resources, and especially in oil; the oil wells being reckoned among the most productive in the world. The possession of this territory will give Germany a decided hold upon Persia, and through Persia will enable her to threaten the safety of northwestern India. If this accession can be maintained by Germany it will probably in the long run be fully as advantageous to her as the original plan by way of the Bagdad Railway and the Persian Gulf.

CONSTANTINOPLE AS A POLITICAL CENTER

The location of Constantinople at the point where Asia and Europe almost touch each other is of fundamental political importance. One can readily see by glancing at the map the commanding position that Constantinople holds not only in relation to the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles, but with reference to the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal. The harbor of Constantinople

is unsurpassed; the fleets of the world could lie there at anchor in perfect safety. The Dardanelles, as has been demonstrated by the present war, is capable of defence against the united attack of the navies of the world. The first-class naval and military power that holds Constantinople as its capital could dominate the Mediterranean and so the short passage from Europe to India and the Far East. It is no wonder therefore that Constantinople has always been a problem before the European nations. This fact, has more to do than almost any other with the maintenance upon the Bosphorus of Turkey as a government. It seemed to be essential for the protection of the Mediterranean and for the balance of power in Europe to have a second or third rate power hold Constantinople and dominate the Dardanelles.

It is also an interesting fact that the Greek nation went to pieces with Constantinople as its capital; and now there is evidence to lead to the conclusion that the Ottoman Empire is crumbling to its fall, with its capital at the same place, although it has held sway there for 400 years. It is well known, however, that it did not always dominate the situation because of its own power and military or naval strength, but by virtue of its weakness. The nations of Europe agreed to protect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire at Constantinople for their own protection and because they could not agree upon the occupancy of that important center by any other nation, European or Asiatic.

Early in the present world conflict Russia was assured by the Allies that if she faithfully did her part in the present conflict she should be given Constantinople and the Dardanelles as her reward. There were many leaders in Great Britain who reluctantly consented to this agreement, and there were many leaders in Russia who were very much puzzled to know whether Constantinople would be to Russia an asset or a grave liability. Sir Edwin Peers reports that in a conversation he had with the President of the Russian Duma a little over a year ago this question was discussed. Sir Edwin made the remark to the Russian, "You are unquestionably fighting for the mastery of Constantinople."

To which the Russian immediately replied, throwing up his hands, "What could we do with Constantinople! It is more than 300 miles from the nearest border of Russia. Unless we could control a large section of Roumania and Bulgaria and Thrace, so as to have a direct connection between Odessa and Constantinople, it would be a constant source of peril to Russia and always the vulnerable point at which the attack of any political enemy could be directed." He went on however to say, "What is Russia in this war for unless it be to gain Constantinople?" That is where the question stood until Russia's withdrawal from the Alliance when of course she sacrificed everything that had been promised her and is entirely out of the running at the present time.

This raises the serious question as to what will be done with Constantinople under the reconstruction. There is reason to believe that the European nations in considering the matter have practically decided that none of the first-class European powers shall hold Constantinople. The question therefore is as to what second-class or third-class power shall have that privilege—or, we may say—responsibility. If Bulgaria had remained true to the Allies she would have had a fair chance of being chosen for that responsibility, but she is now out of the question.

Lloyd George in a recent speech in Parliament practically promised Constantinople to the Turks. While this was not promised in the form of a written declaration it probably was made after some discussion at least with France, although probably not with the United States. The conclusion which Lloyd George's utterances naturally led to was that if Turkey should break her relations with Germany she would be permitted to hold Constantinople, her ancient capital, but would lose other areas of her territory occupied largely by non-Moslems, as Armenia, Syria and Palestine. It can probably be safely assumed that there has been no definite agreement as yet among the Allies as to what ultimate disposal will be made of Constantinople. It is well known in some circles that the suggestion has been broached that the United States assume that responsibility in the in-

terests of European peace. Such a step on the part of the United States would be contrary to tradition, but as we are doing so many things these days contrary to every tradition and to Washington's much-quoted farewell address in which America was warned not to form entangling alliances with European nations, another breach of this time-honored tradition would not necessarily shock the country or the world. It certainly goes without saying that the United States, for its own sake, does not want Constantinople, and if arguments can be brought forward to lead it to break over its well-known policy and assume the government of that important center of the Near East, it will be wholly on the benevolent argument and in the interests of maintaining the peace. No European nation would think that the United States was entering upon that responsibility with any political ambition to control the politics of the Near East or of the Mediterranean, and we can hardly imagine America's taking that responsibility, except temporarily, and until some better disposition can be made of that important area. In all of this discussion it is necessary to think of the area covered not simply as the city of Constantinople but all of the environments of the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles, including the whole valley of the Bosphorus. This would virtually be a small state, with a population of several million, which under proper management would assume large commercial importance. After the war is over and the arteries of communication in Asia Minor have been developed, Constantinople will be the natural outlet for the rich areas lying at the back side, across Asia Minor and Armenia as well as the Transcaucasus and Persia, to say nothing of the environs of the Black Sea on the north and east. The Peace Commission upon which will be laid the responsibility of settling this important question will not have an easy task.

ARMENIA

The problems of the eastern section of the Turkish Empire, including what has been known heretofore as Armenia, but whose boundary is not clearly defined, is still another

question of prime importance to the Armenian, and in which a great number of people in Europe and America are also keenly interested. For generations the Armenians have dreamed of an autonomous country of their own, under some stable and safe form of government. No race has suffered from the maladministration of the Ottoman Empire more severely than the Armenians. The persecution which they have endured at the hands of the Turkish government has extended over several generations, and culminated since the beginning of the war by the most vicious attack ever made upon them as a race and which was extended from them to the Greeks and Syrians. It would seem that the world has decreed that to put the Armenians and Armenia back under Turkish Moslem rule would be not only unwise but the rankest cruelty and injustice to a stricken people. The endeavor on the part of the Turkish government to eliminate the Armenians and the Armenian question from the Ottoman Empire has resulted in the destruction of probably not far from 800,000, possibly more, of the Armenian people. The lives of many were deliberately taken, under official orders, while still vastly greater numbers have suffered death through their deportation into the deserts of Northern Arabia and Syria. This has reduced the natural population of Armenia, although at its best the Armenians themselves did not constitute the majority of the population of the six vilayets commonly referred to as the Armenian vilayets of northeastern Turkey. At the same time it must be noted that the Turks did not constitute a majority. The population of that country is made up primarily of Armenians, Kurds and Turks, with some Circassians and representatives of other races. The Kurds are out of sympathy with the ruling Turk. If we eliminate the Turk as the possible future ruler of that area, as we are bound to do by every sentiment of righteous justice and in the interests of good government, the question at once rises as to whether the government of the country could be put into the hands of the Kurds. To ask the question is sufficient for its immediate reply—that the Kurds have no faculty or training for any kind of administrative government.

The next question is as to whether in that area an Armenia could be constituted to be controlled and governed by Armenians alone. This question would have been a much fairer question to ask and much easier to answer before this terrible blow, which has so reduced the strength of the Armenians. At the present time, after such severe losses, there are few indeed who would advocate the creation of an Armenia to be put under the control of Armenians alone. In fact, the Armenians themselves are not asking for this, but they are asking that that entire area, including an outlet on the Black Sea and also on the Mediterranean, extending somewhat beyond the so-called six Armenian provinces, shall be given a separate government, wholly independent of the Turk or of any possible Turkish government that may exist on the West, controlled by some European or Western nation that will guarantee to the country a measure of self-government and prepare the region for absolute self-government in the future. This request and desire is not unreasonable and is capable of realization if only the Western nation can be discovered with strength enough to command the respect and confidence of all the other nations of Europe and the world and with ability to organize a government that shall guarantee safety to all the people within its borders and that shall develop the resources of the country and train the people gradually in self-government.

The nation that assumes this responsibility must be one of sufficient size and strength to command confidence and with revealed ability to develop the resources of the country, industrial, as well as intellectual and moral. Among the large nations of Europe there is probably none that could be agreed upon because of the fear of political ambitions and that the territory would be governed in the interests of the governing nation. Under any condition, Russia is out of the question. She has more than she can do at home in organizing self-government. This leaves in Europe, England, France, Italy of the Allies, and Germany an enemy country. Unquestionably Germany must be eliminated as a possibility for either the control of Constantinople

or of Armenia. Whether or not France and England could agree that either one of them should hold that important position remains to be seen. The position if held by Great Britain would strengthen her hold upon India and give her a new basis for defence from any attack upon the north or west. Whether or not France would assume the responsibility for all of that area, including Northern Syria, remains to be seen.

As to whether any of the second-rate powers could be trusted with this responsibility is not so clear. Scandinavian countries have had little experience in colonization and in developing self-governing colonies. Spain has proven her inability by her government in the Philippines and in Porto Rico. Portugal has more than she can handle now in East and West Africa. Probably Holland would hardly wish to undertake more in this line than she has in the Congo District. Switzerland has never had experience in colonization and in the control of remote colonies and has probably not a sufficient military power to command the confidence of Europe. It is natural that again attention should turn to the United States as the country that has demonstrated its ability to give a good, safe local government to an Asiatic people and prepare them for self-government. The attention of Europe has been directed to America's achievements in this direction in the Philippine Islands and in Porto Rico, and this has given the United States a reputation for colonization possessed by no other country. There is a feeling in wide circles, including the Armenians, that if the United States should assume this responsibility she would perform it with credit to herself and with absolute justice to the people governed, and that in the course of years—perhaps a generation or more—a government could be established in the area above outlined which would be capable of administering its own affairs. Of course it would not be a government administered wholly by people of any one race, but all races would be drawn upon, as they had ability to contribute. There is no country that will be better able to develop the vast undeveloped internal resources of the country than the United States, and so put

the whole area upon a self-supporting basis at an early date. There is a probability that this question will be put to the United States for a decision as soon as matters in Turkey settle down and the world is ready to take up the subject of re-construction and re-organization in the interests of permanent peace. There are few who doubt that the United States could accomplish all that could be expected of it, and more, in this direction, if it should give itself to the task.

JUGOSLAV ASPIRATIONS

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Scarcely one outside Germany and Austria-Hungary knew before the war who the Jugoslavs were, where they live, and what were their struggles and aspirations. For the cabinets of Europe they were somewhere in the East, a troublesome, semi-barbaric race, disturbing Turkey and Austria-Hungary in their blessed work of "civilization," and complicating even more the Balkan tangle, so ingeniously inaugurated at the Congress of Berlin. The Jugoslav question was simply not existing, and that which the Jugoslavs themselves outlined as their problem, was left entirely to be settled by Berlin, Vienna and Budapest. The iron heel which is now oppressing almost the whole world, and against which the whole world rose in arms, was considered good enough and well deserved when it was applied only to the Jugoslavs. It is not exaggerated to say, that before the war the Jugoslavs had no friends in Europe, that every door on which they knocked remained shut for them, and that the voice of the few advocates they had in foreign countries remained a voice in the desert. Partitioned as they were, and subject to three rulers, they were considered only troublesome, but never dangerous for the intentions of either group of European powers, which based their policy on deceiving catch-words like that of "balance of power" and "peaceful penetration." And whereas the Teutonic powers very cleverly exploited all the advantages of a situation created by the blindness of their sentimental adversaries, the Entente powers not for a moment conceived that the Near-Eastern problem includes in itself all the threads of the Far-Eastern and Western problems. Things were left to go as they went, or far more as they were directed by Germany and Austria-Hungary, the only two

powers which never ceased to pursue their Eastern policy with the utmost rationality, energy and directness. Knowing only too well that war-preparedness is the strongest basis for the attainment of imperialistic aims, they prepared feverishly, without making a secret of it, inviting even the remainder of sleepy Europe to be onlooker of their rising military growth. The biggest lie in history, that German and Austrian armaments have the innocent intention to be the strongest guardian of peace, was accepted by European diplomacy as ready money, and except France, there was no European power which conceived, that if peace is to be guarded with armaments, German and Austrian armaments ought to be counterbalanced by equal armaments. German propaganda, one of the most wonderful organizations in the world, and being an integral part of the preparedness policy, succeeded marvelously in deceiving Europe even on this point, and whenever a suspicion rose or a protest made itself just a little more credible, the peace assurances were doubled, and Europe was assured that Germany must be strong for her mission as the world's saviour against the Pan-Slav monster. It did not matter that at the same time the Pan-Slav monster was cajoled and invited to join Germany and Austria-Hungary against the other powers. European diplomacy cared little to penetrate into the real and true facts, it sufficed to have whatever excuse to muddle away, whatever straw to catch at, and Germany was never too tired to spread all over the world whole trusses of straw for the convenient use of European diplomacy. And so those whose duty it was to hear everything, and to see everything, preferred to remain deaf and blind, and passive in face of all the events. But events have their own logic, which no diplomatic tricks can turn aside from its straight-on way, and this logic is proceeding mercilessly towards its goal. The moment was to come, when the logic of events in the Balkans and the logic of events in the remainder of Europe has to come to a tremendous clash at whatever cost on either side. Europe, that Europe which pretends to be democratic, human and civilized, but which not only allowed, but protected Turkish and

Austro-Hungarian oppression in the Balkans and in Yugoslav lands in Austria-Hungary, was by the logic of events destined to awake to a rude reality. It was destined to pay for its sleepiness and passivity with millions of lives and with a misery unsurpassed in history. And it was at last destined to side with those whose oppression it tolerated, and whose warnings it despised. And the logic of events, victorious like every truth, forced upon Europe, and consequently upon the whole world, the great and far-reaching importance of the Yugoslav problem.

The annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1908 was the first big event resulting from the policy of preparedness, and the first step in the realization of the Austro-German programme of Mitteleurope. It was accomplished boldly and with the Entente as an angry but powerless onlooker. The result was that Entente diplomacy opened one eye, only to faster shut the other one. The bite in the sour apple of Austro-German success was sweetened by the avoidance of world conflagration. The due logic of events was surely acknowledged, but the fact was again overlooked that events do not stop, that the first act of the Balkan drama must necessarily be followed by the second, third and so on, until the very ripe problem is either way settled. The second act was the Balkan war with its epochal internal and external results. Undertaken in defiance of the European concert it pronounced the determined judgment of the Balkan peoples that they have decided to settle their question among themselves, without outside interference. It was a hard blow to European diplomacy, but at the same time it was the first strong emphasising of the principle of self-determination. Diplomacy of course once more attempted to upset such an unheard of insolence, and the conference of London was designated to spoil the over-weeningness of the Balkan peoples. But it was doomed to failure, and the continuation of the war, and subsequently the peace of Bucharest sealed the fact, that peoples, even if small and weak, break with the foul tradition of being led and commanded by the big and strong ones. Germany and Austria-Hungary, who already during

the war succeeded to persuade Bulgaria to become a shameless traitor on the common cause, accepted the treaty of Bucharest with furious rage, whereas the Entente diplomacy preferred to show an artificial indifference. This indifference was so great that it failed even to note the Austro-German preparations for the tremendous third act.

The successes of the Balkan wars, especially the glorious resurrection of Serbia, were a deadly thorn in Austro-German eyes. There was not the least doubt that the strengthening of Serbia will provoke the utmost opposition of Austria-Hungary who suddenly saw all her Balkan plans endangered, and that nothing will be left unturned to bring about such a conflict, or such a pretended conflict, which will enable her to attack Serbia, before this country has recovered from the military exhaustion of the Balkan war, and before Russia and the Entente powers are adequately prepared to defend her. But besides endangering the Austro-German "Drang nach Osten," the resurrection of Serbia multiplied the long existing menace for Austria-Hungary, arising from the strong movement of her Yugoslav subjects towards liberty and unification with the victorious brothers across the Danube and Drina. This movement, suppressed with all the means, legal and illegal, by the governments of Vienna and Budapest, developed after the Balkan wars with such rapidity and force, that the foundations of the Hapsburg Empire, fraudulently cemented together, began seriously to totter. This was one means more to hasten preparations for the ruin of Serbia, and over her ruins the way to German world domination. Had European diplomacy at that time rightly understood the tremendous significance of the Balkan situation with all its hangings-on, and had it taken the only steps dictated by the situation, instead of again muddling away, the allies would have met the onslaught of the Central Powers better prepared, not only military, but politically which would have been of immense value in dealing with the mailed and oiled host of the Kaiser. But the logic of events was again overlooked, and the logic of events brought about the greatest and bloodiest war in history.

The outbreak of the war opened at last the eyes of the whole world, including the European diplomacy, and the grand conception of Berlin and Vienna became at last vivid to everybody. The innocent German lamb and the double-headed Austrian rooster, pained in fear of the Pan-Slav bear, were "forced" to draw the sword for their "protection," and to protect themselves by slaughtering millions and destroying the noblest values of humanity. The mighty fan of their aims and ambitions, which was so long clasped together, opened, and the stupefied world learned for the first time clearly the judgment the Kaiser pronounced over it. The unanimous reaction which followed, and which should have been less bloody if set at work long ago, pronounced its counter-judgment culminating in the proclamation of the principle of democracy and national self-determination. With that the whole immense reservoir of national problems all over the world, was at once opened. Subjugated nations and oppressed peoples got for the first time an acknowledged right, not only to raise their voice, but to be heard. There is no wonder if they availed themselves of this right with all the means of disposal. Subjugation and oppression are terrible whoever imposes them, but if the oppressors are Germans and Magyars, the oppressed are surely the most unfortunate beings on earth.

The Jugoslavs are one of the nations which through centuries had to suffer bitterly under Austro-Magyar domination, and which through centuries in vain tried to attain its liberty, independence and unity. In vain and in spite of the fact that to every student of national and political conditions in southeastern Europe the Yugoslav problem must present itself as one on which the whole structure of a peaceful Europe must be based. But the Yugoslav problem has attracted little consideration in the past, as far as the allies are concerned, and its significance has only begun to penetrate into the mind of the "few responsible" since the war has brought in an imperative form the Yugoslav problem on the order of the day. At present the truth cannot be any more concealed, that the Yugoslav question is one

of the most important, perhaps even the foremost question of the present war. It includes in itself not only a Yugoslav, but also an imminent European and world problem. It is the flesh and the bone of the whole Eastern Question. If all the problems of the war are settled, excluding only the Yugoslav problem, there is no doubt that the future peace will be a very strong Austro-German peace. It would mean to lay new, and even firmer foundations for the next terrible catastrophe of mankind. It would mean a full victory for the Kaiser and for the truly grand, and truly dangerous idea of Mittel-Europe. A right and just solution of the Yugoslav problem is equal to a right and just solution of the problem of German world domination, for by protecting the one and destroying the other, the basis can be established for a lasting peace. It must never be forgotten that German world domination can be attained only on an open road to Constantinople and the Persian Gulf, and conclusively to Egypt and India. On this road the Yugoslavs—if independent and united—can, will and must be the only barrier. If this barrier is made strong and firm, there is no power which will break through.

Since the Yugoslav problem made itself familiar with public opinion in Europe and America, there ensued much talk about the proper solution of it. But among many excellent ideas which less or more hit the mark, there were only too many aiming at a partial solution, very often in the interest of Austria-Hungary, or at least with the intention to satisfy both, Austria-Hungary and the Yugoslavs. Such ideas and proposals betray the highest grade of political dilettantism. If the Yugoslavs consented to have a partial solution of their question, they could have it at once, and the whole Yugoslav propaganda would be superfluous. Austria-Hungary would be only too glad to settle the whole question in a partial sense, and recent events in the dual monarchy fully confirm this fact. Therefore it cannot be strongly enough emphasized that a partial solution of the Yugoslav problem is no solution at all, and that no one of the 13,000,000 Yugoslavs will ever declare himself contented or will accept a partial solution. The Yugoslav problem is

thoroughly ripe, and must be solved in its entirety. It is the *sine qua non* of the future peace. And it must not be forgotten, that as determined as the Yugoslavs were in their struggle for deliverance, freedom and unity, as determined they will be in defending their standpoint, not only in their own interest, but also in the interest of democracy, humanity, and a better and juster Europe. In opening before the world all the aspects and prospects of their problem, they do not beg for alms, nor do they expect to gain anything from a charitable disposition of this or that statesman. With the utmost resolution they demand justice, nothing but justice. They are no beggars but a proud, capable nation, whose aspirations are indisputably just, and indisputably clean. There are only two aims by putting forward the Yugoslav question. First, to enlighten real democracies all over the world on the true facts and on the righteousness of Yugoslav aspirations, and second to destroy the misunderstandings and misrepresentations which were accumulated by Austro-German propaganda before the war, and which still are spread by Austro-German agents and pacifists of different patterns throughout the allied countries. In treating it this way the Yugoslav problem cannot fail to engage the genuine sympathy and the support of everyone to whom the principle of democracy and national self-determination is no mere phrase.

As already mentioned, the Yugoslav question went before the war almost unnoticed in Western Europe and in America. Only the Teutonic powers have realized its full importance and have treated it accordingly, of course from their own point of view. For Western Europe the complex of the Balkan question never included that part of the Yugoslav lands which was under Austro-Hungarian domination, although it was an indivisible and integral part of it. The average public, not excluded some "far-sighted" diplomats, got used to regard the Balkan question more from the point of back-stair stories, imagining the Balkan peoples as good minded ruffians, playing with sword and fire among themselves, but not endangering the lazy indifference of Europe. Only very few recognized that the Balkans were

not a stage, but a real weather-corner, where Germany and Austria-Hungary have stored an immense quantity of diplomatical, political and economic explosives, with the purpose of setting at a moment's notice the whole world in flames. From the Berlin Congress onward Austria-Hungary and Germany were supplied with a "laissez passé" in the Balkans, and it was their supreme task to divide the Balkan peoples and to make each of them a powerless tool in their hands. Turkey and Bulgaria readily consented, and even Rumania was for a considerable time an Austro-German vassal. With the acquirement of Turkish and Bulgarian support, easily fomented owing to Turkish impotence and Bulgarian greed, Germany and Austria-Hungary got almost free hands in political and economic matters in the Balkans, the more as they were, although unwillingly, supported by Rumania also. It must be owned that Turkey and Bulgaria were of immense value to the Teutonic powers, not only in peace time, but even more in siding with them in the present war. Turkey's and Bulgaria's capacity to subjugate themselves under the Teutonic will, and their exceptional position as proteges of certain European states was fully exploited by Germany. It is still inexplicable how could Turkey and Bulgaria, who were the arch-intriguers of the Balkans, ever gain all the sympathies of Europe whereas at the same time those, who sincerely and faithfully guarded the interests of humanity and civilization at the doors of the East, remained misunderstood and even despised. Much was of course done by Turkish and Bulgarian propaganda, the later prominent by its shamelessness and hypocrisy, but there are ample proofs that it ought in first line to be attributed to the very able machinations of Germany and Austria-Hungary, who know how to impose upon the world their own opinions, and how to mislead everybody concerning their designs.

But there was in the Balkans one state which never consented to be lead by Germany, and which equally refused to be honored with the "mighty" protection of the Apostolic Hapsburgs. A state which desperately struggled to make the world believe that the Austro-German "Drang nach

Osten" means its destruction and a tremendous menace for the whole world. That state was Serbia. Small and weak in comparison with its hereditary foes, but determined and strong in its will of self-preservation and its defence of Europe and humanity, she remained in all her struggles and sufferings faithful to right and democracy. Unfortunately only very few were there to appreciate it. Europe, and even America saw Serbia only in those colours with which she was painted by Austria-Hungary. No one was interested in the fact that Serbia represents a modern, truly democratic state, with a constitution equalled only in the United States, that her political, cultural and economic institutions can stand comparison with any of those in Western Europe, and that her art and literature deserve to be appreciated by all cultured nations. But she was throughout her national and cultural development the victim of perfidious Austro-German intrigues which paralysed all her progress. Not before Serbia's valiant stand in the Balkan wars has European opinion changed. And even then it was more the admiration for a nation of brave soldiers and gallant fighters than the right appreciation of her value as a member of the European communion. The fact was easily overlooked, that Serbia is called upon to play a tremendously important part in the development of world's affairs, and she was only too often left to fight alone her own and other's battles. Having Austria-Hungary continuously pressing her down like a nightmare, Serbia was unable to resist successfully, and she would have perished forever if Germany and Austria-Hungary had not prematurely disclosed their devilish plans for the destruction of the world. The greatest crime in history was necessary to convince Europe how right Serbia was in continuously warning the world of the Teuto-Magyar danger, and how more right in struggling mercilessly against subjugation under Austro-Magyar domination.

But the barring of the Eastern road was not the only reason for the destruction of Serbia as planned by the Teutonic powers. She was guilty of another crime, in that she tried and worked for the dismemberment and the parti-

tion of the dual monarchy. Yes, for that she worked, as far as her kinsmen in Austria-Hungary were concerned. But she did it in full agreement with the 9,000,000 of those enslaved kinsmen, who had and have the only and sole desire, the only and sole aim and longing, to be freed from Austro-Magyar yoke, and to be united with Serbia and Montenegro in one free and independent state. In this work Serbia acquitted herself only of her sacred duty as the only independent Yugoslav state. In her struggle against Teuto-Magyar penetration she was morally supported by all the Yugoslavs, who never ceased to gravitate towards Serbia as their liberator, and being chosen as the Yugoslav Piedmont, she naturally became the centre and the axle of the Yugoslav movement.

Now, who are the Yugoslavs, what are their aspirations, and what does their movement represent?

In the Serbo-Croat language Jug means South, and therefore Yugoslavs means Southern¹ Slavs, viz.: geographically the southern branch of the great Slav family. Historically the Yugoslavs bear three different names: Croats, Serbs and Slovenes. But ethnographically they are one and the same nation. They originate from the same stock, speak the same language, inhabit a continuous territory, their customs are identical, and from time immemorial their national aspirations aimed at restless unity. During the time between the fifth and seventh century the Yugoslavs migrated from the Trans-Carpathian regions into their present home, and in spite of living in different groups they never ceased to consider themselves one and the same nation.

At present the Yugoslavs number about 13,000,000. Five million live in Serbia and Montenegro, 7,500,000 in Austria-Hungary, and about half a million are living in America and the British colonies and dominions. Others are scattered in Northern Albania, in Greece and in Bulgaria. About 40,000 Yugoslavs dwell in the Kingdom of Italy. The western part of the Yugoslav territory in Austria-Hungary is occupied by the Slovenes, the centre by the Croats, the eastern part by the Serbs. But this is taken only in a general sense. As a matter of fact the Croat and Slovene elements

on the one hand, and the Serb and Croat on the other, are intermingled in the various countries.

The Slovenes were the first who succeeded in founding an independent state. The ninth century saw the birth of a Croatian and a Serbian state. The Slovenes were the first to lose their independence to Charlemagne, in 778. The Croats elected the King of Hungary to be their king after the extinction of their native dynasty in 1102. Serbia which reached its zenith under Tsar Dušan, was definitely conquered by the Turks in 1459. The Kingdom of Bosnia lost its independence to Turkey four years later. The Slovenes and Croats fell finally under the Austrian domination, the Serbs under the Turkish. The whole of Yugoslav history is full of struggles against Germans, Magyars, Turks and Venetians. These perpetual conflicts with their invaders and oppressors, have prevented the Yugoslavs from achieving their unification.

The French revolution at last awakened their national consciousness. It gave the impulse to the insurrection under Karagjorgje in 1804, and to the resurrection of Serbia. It inspired Napoleon with the idea of realising the partial unification of the Yugoslavs by uniting Dalmatia, Istria with Trieste, Carinthia, Carniola, Gorica-Gradiška and part of Croatia into an administrative unit under the name of Illyrian Provinces, a name derived from the ancient inhabitants of the Balkans, who were erroneously looked upon as the ancestors of the Yugoslavs. This unification, although temporary (1807-1815), represents one of the most precious pages in modern Yugoslav history. After centuries of oppression, the French introduced the native tongue in the schools and public life of the country. The Napoleonic experiment was followed in the thirties of the last century by another movement for Yugoslav unification, known as the Illyrian movement. It was in the end suppressed by the Austrian government, and Ljudevit Gaj, its originator, cast in prison.

The nearer we come to our own day, the stronger grows the national spirit, and the more ardent the desire for union. Already in 1869 the Croatian Parliament unanimously pro-

claimed the political identity and equality of the Serbs and Croats, and even passed a resolution whereby the Serbo-Croat language was in future to be officially styled the Yugoslav language. That same year a congress of the most notable Croatian, Serbian and Slovene patriots proclaimed in Ljubljana, the capital of the Slovene lands, with boundless enthusiasm the unity of all the Yugoslavs. Since then the whole national life of the Yugoslavs has been impregnated with the Yugoslav idea. But the more that idea progressed, the more it excited the persecuting fury of the Germans and Magyars, who—with right—looked upon it as highly dangerous for their hegemony. The last forty years of Yugoslav history are nothing but a fierce and unremitting fight on the part of the Austro-Hungarian authorities against the irresistible Yugoslav movement. But the idea of national and political unity was eternal in the soul of the Yugoslav nation. It was in the mind of the great rulers of their national empires before the Turkish invasion, it was the ideal of all the martyrs of their race during the Ottoman oppression, it inspired their national poetry and the works of the great thinkers and poets of Dubrovnik, it gave strength to the heroic resistance of the Montenegrins, and to the rising under Karagjorgje which gave birth to modern Serbia. It directed every action of the great Njegoš, inspired the policy of Prince Michael, and has been the goal of all the house of Karagjorgjevic. It accomplished the renaissance of the Croats and Slovenes, which bore such heroic fruit in the struggles of 1848, and irradiates the life-work of the great Bishop Strossmayer. It was the primary cause of the long struggles of the Croats for their independence and unity, and of all the national struggles in Dalmatia, Istria, Rijeka (Fiume), and South Hungary, in the Slovene lands and in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Political deliverance, the integrity of national territory, and the foundation of a united State has been the final aim of all Pan-Croat and Pan-Serbian aspirations, of every constitutional struggle and of every riot and insurrection throughout Yugoslav lands, whether in Austria-Hungary or in the Balkans.

To resist effectively the tendency towards unification, displayed by their Yugoslav subjects, the Hapsburgs have pursued a diabolical policy, based first upon the principle of "divide et impera," and then upon a ruthless and tyrannical persecution.

A mere glance at a map shows that the Yugoslav lands under the rule of the Hapsburgs, form one continuous, unbroken territorial block. But instead of representing one homogenous province, it is shared between the two halves of the monarchy, and incidentally sub-divided under eleven administrations and fourteen legislations. The eleven separate administrations are: Croatia-Slavonia, Rijeka (Fiume), Dalmatia, Istria, the city and district of Trieste, Gorica-Gradiška, Carniola, Carinthia, Styria, the Yugoslav districts of Hungary proper, and Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Every one of these provinces (except Fiume and the Yugoslav districts of Hungary proper) has its mock-diet for those matters which are autonomous. Fiume has but a municipal council and the Yugoslav districts in Hungary, being under direct Hungarian rule, share the legislation of the Budapest Parliament. All provinces belonging to Austria, must besides send deputies to the Vienna Reichstag, while Croatia-Slavonia has for her common affairs with Hungary a common legislative in the Parliament of Budapest. There are also the Austrian and Magyar delegations for the common of the whole monarchy. The Diet of Bosnia-Hercegovina has no legislative powers and was created only as a mockery with the intention to deceive Europe. The autocratic administration of these provinces is shared between the Germans and Magyars of the monarchy.

The educational, judicial and ecclesiastical partition, the maritime service, and the railway and tariff policy are even more complicated than the territorial and administrative division. There the muddle is such that any student of Austro-Hungarian affairs would be stupefied and at pains to which quality to attribute it, to ingenious perfidy or to utter stupidity.

Now, the object of this parcelling out was to divide the Yugoslavs by a series of watertight compartments, so as

to estrange each from the other, and to prevent their unification.

It would lead too far to record all the examples of Austro-Hungarian misrule in Yugoslav lands. They are so many that the space of an article does not suffice to record even the principal ones. Volumes have been written on this misrule. World known authors as H. W. Stead, R. W. Seton-Watson, Sir Arthur Evans, A. H. E. Taylor, Ernest Denis, Cheradame and others, have amply illustrated this misrule and that nonsense of a Hapsburg dominion which has the insolence to call itself a state. Leading statesmen of all the allied nations have openly denounced Austro-Hungarian misrule, and Lloyd-George was more than right when calling the dual monarchy a ramshackle empire. It is ramshackle to the core, it is perverse, unjust, cruel and vulgar, and among its Slav subjects it is boundlessly hated and despised. Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Ruthenians and Yugoslavs are unanimous in their hatred, for each of these nations has abundantly experienced Austrian perfidy and Magyar brutality. And each of these nations demands its liberation from Austro-Hungarian rule, and each will consider the day of redemption as the greatest and happiest event in its history. Could anyone imagine that such a fervent desire to get rid of Austro-Hungarian rule can possibly originate in all these peoples and nations being malcontent elements, unable to accommodate themselves in an orderly state? Or that all the root of it rests with that Pan-Slavism, which Germany and Austria-Hungary have served to the world as an evil spectre? The Austrian premier, Dr. Seydler, in answering to the Entente, concerning the liberation of small nations, especially of those of Austria-Hungary, declared in the Austrian parliament, that no one of the Austro-Hungarian nations or nationalities wants to be "liberated" or torn away from the monarchy, because all are contented with, and happy under the present rule. This content and this happiness deserve to be nailed down. Without entering into things which happened in other Slav provinces in Austria-Hungary before and during the war, and which were just as monstrous as those that happened in

Jugoslav lands, and without enlarging upon reflections, a few statistics will suffice to give a vivid illustration of the content and the happiness of the Yugoslavs.

The pre-war persecutions and the reign of terror in Yugoslav lands, marked by an almost continuous suspension of the Constitution, by continuous dissolutions of the Croatian parliament and the provincial diets, by the brutal reign of the Magyar satraps Khuen-Hedervary, Baron Rauch and von Cuvaj in Croatia, by so many insurrections in Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Dalmatia, and crowned by numerous trials for high treason, of which the Zagreb trial in 1908 and 1909, founded on documents which were forged in the Austro-Hungarian legation in Belgrade, was a European scandal, were only preludes for all that terrible ravaging which took place since the war began. With the mere advent of war, the "happy and contented" Yugoslavs had to give proof that they do not want to be liberated. All the prominent national leaders were at once cast in prison, many of them notwithstanding the fact that they were members of the parliament, and protected by their parliamentary immunity. The property of all suspected persons was by mere administrative order confiscated for the benefit of the state and sold at auction, mostly to German and Magyar Jews. During the war these confiscations have overreached the number of 100,000. In Srijem, the richest agricultural district in Yugoslav lands, more than a thousand peasant families were evicted and deprived of their property, because they were pro-Serbian. Immediately afterwards the evacuated parts, mostly model farms, were colonized with Magyar peasants, the object being twofold: to prevent the property being ever returned to the rightful owners, and to Magyarise a purely Yugoslav district. More than 200,000 persons whose sentiments for Yugoslav freedom and unity were known to the authorities, were interned in penal camps, and it was openly stated in the Austrian parliament, that more than half of them have died as a result of the terrible sufferings imposed upon them. Monster trials for high treason were held everywhere, and death sentences poured down on the un-

fortunate victims like rain. Although all the sentences were not made public, from those which were published, it can be seen, that in Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and in the Slovene lands, not less than 35,000 people were executed for high treason and for crimes against the military power of the state. At one single trial, in Banjaluka, in 1915, sixteen people, belonging to the best classes of society, were sentenced to death on the gallows, and eighty-two to penal servitude amounting altogether to 858 years.

To proceed with similar statistics would mean never to end. There is a continuous chain, black and bloody, showing to the utmost extent the "happiness" of the Jugoslavs and their "disgust" to be liberated from the "blessed and fatherly" rule of the Hapsburgs.

It is true, there were in the past periods when the Jugoslavs tried to come to terms with their oppressors and to induce them to establish such conditions as would give to the Jugoslavs the possibility for a free political, cultural and economic development. But all and everything was in vain. The two dominant races, the Germans and the Magyars, although a minority in the Monarchy, never consented to sacrifice even a bit of their hegemony in the interest of democratic principles or the rebuilding of the state in a better and truer sense. It is therefore only natural that the principle of liberation and unity became a national dogma for all the Jugoslavs wherever they live.

The prospect of settling the Yugoslav question within Austria-Hungary has become utterly impossible, and there remains only one possibility to settle it, viz.: the liberation of the Jugoslavs, and their unification with Servia and Montenegro in one single, free and independent state. This of course means the partition, and with the settlement of the Czech and Polish questions, the destruction of Austria-Hungary. But Austria-Hungary must be destroyed, because her destruction is a European and a world interest. To leave Austria-Hungary strong and in her present structure, means to leave the arch-enemy of humanity free to display all his evil abilities against democracy and civilization,

and simply to invite him to be yet more the limitless ally and supporter of German militarism and German devilish designs in the East.

Having in short lines exposed the birth and the development of the Yugoslav movement for unity and independence, with all the accompanying circumstances which have strengthened its determination, it is necessary to give some details and some explanation of the Yugoslav programme as regards liberation and the future Yugoslav state. The Yugoslav programme was not drawn up by a couple of politicians or learned men. Every single member of the Yugoslav nation, the nation as a whole, with all its longings and sufferings, the spirit which animated the public and private life of the Yugoslavs, which inspired their poets, artists and soldiers, all and everything which is theirs, collaborated to build up a national gospel on which Yugoslav future may be based. Therefore it can safely be said that the Yugoslav programme expresses and represents the true and genuine will of the entire Yugoslav nation. Framed in words, the Yugoslav programme finds its best expression in the momentous Declaration of Corfu, dated July 20, 1917, and signed by the prime minister of Serbia, M. Nikola Pašić, representing the government and the people of Serbia, and by Dr. Ante Trumbić, president of the Yugoslav Committee, representing all the unredeemed Yugoslavs of Austria-Hungary.

The declaration in ascertaining first, that the Yugoslav nation is absolutely unanimous in its will to be liberated and united, and declaring "anew and most categorically that our people constitutes but one nation, and that it is one in blood, one by the spoken and written language, by the continuity and unity of the territory in which it lives, and finally in virtue of the common and vital interests of its national existence and the general development of its moral and material life," proceeds to give a concise synopsis of Yugoslav struggles for independence in the past, which were unsuccessful as the Yugoslavs were numerically inferior to their enemies in the East and West, and it was impossible for them to safeguard their unity as a nation and a

state and their liberty and independence against the brutal maxim "might goes before right," militating against it both, East and West. But the moment has come, says the declaration, when the Yugoslav people is no more isolated. The war imposed by German militarism upon Russia, France, and England (and in the last instance upon America), for the defence of their honor as well as for the liberty and independence of small nations, has developed into a struggle for the Liberty of the World and the Triumph of Right over Might. All nations which love liberty and independence have allied themselves for their common defence, to save civilization and liberty at the cost of every sacrifice, to establish a new international order based upon justice and upon the right of every nation to dispose of itself and so organize its independent life, and finally to establish a durable peace, consecrated to the progress and development of humanity, securing the world against a catastrophe similar to that which the conquering lust of German Imperialism has provoked.

As to the future Yugoslav state which has to be established after this war, the declaration of Corfu gives the following main principles:

1. The state of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, who are also known by the name of Southern Slavs or Yugoslavs, will be a free and independent kingdom, with an indivisible territory and unity of power. This state will be a constitutional, democratic, and Parliamentary monarchy, with the Karageorgević-dynasty, which has always shared the ideals and feelings of the nation in placing above everything else the national liberty and will at its head.
2. The name of this state will be the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and the title of the sovereign will be King of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.
3. This state will only have one coat of arms, one flag, and one crown.
4. The four different flags of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes will have equal rights, and may be hoisted freely on all occasions. The same will obtain for the four different coats of arms.
5. The three national denominations, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, are equal before the law in all the territory of the kingdom, and each may freely use it on all occasions in public life and before all authorities.

6. The two Cyrillic and Latin alphabets also have the same rights and every one may freely use them in all the territory of the kingdom. The royal and local self-governing authorities have the right and ought to employ the two alphabets according to the desire of the citizens.

7. All religions are recognized, and may be free and publicly practiced. The Orthodox Roman Catholic and Mussulman religions, which are most professed in our country, will be equal, and will enjoy the same rights in relation to the state. In view of these principles the legislature will be careful to preserve the religious peace in conformity with the spirit and tradition of our entire nation.

8. The Gregorian calendar will be adopted as soon as possible.

9. The territory of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes will comprise all the territory where our nation lives in compact masses and without discontinuity, and where it could not be mutilated without injuring the vital interests of the community. Our nation does not ask for anything which belongs to others, and only claims that which belongs to it. It desires to free itself and establish its unity. That is why it conscientiously and firmly rejects every partial solution of the problem of its freedom from the Austro-Hungarian domination.

10. The Adriatic Sea, in the interests of liberty and equal rights of all nations, is to be free and open to all and each.

11. All citizens throughout the territory of the kingdom are equal and enjoy the same rights in regard to the state and the law.

12. The election of deputies to the national representation will take place under universal suffrage, which is to be equal, direct, and secret. The same will apply to the elections in the communes and other administrative institutions. A vote will be taken in each commune.

13. The constitution to be established after the conclusion of peace by the Constituent Assembly elected by universal, direct, and secret suffrage will serve as a basis for the life of the state. It will be the origin and ultimate end of all the powers and all rights by which the whole national life will be regulated. The constitution will give the people the opportunity of exercising its particular energies in local autonomies, regulated by natural, social, and economic conditions. The constitution must be adopted in its entirety by a numerical majority of the Constituent Assembly, and all other laws passed by the Constituent Assembly will not come into force until they have been sanctioned by the king.

Thus the united nation of Serbs, Croatians, and Slovenes will form a state of twelve million inhabitants. This state will be a guarantee of their national independence and of their general national progress and civilization, and a powerful rampart against the pressure of the Germans, and an inseparable ally of all civilized peoples and states. Having proclaimed the principle of right and liberty and of international justice, it will form a worthy part of the new society of nations.

The declaration of Corfu has been hailed with enthusiasm throughout Jugoslavdom, but nowhere more than in those Jugoslav lands which are under Austro-Hungarian domination. Following the so called May-declaration by the Jugoslav deputies in the Austrian Parliament, in which they declared that the minimum of Jugoslav demands consists in the "unification of all the Croats, Serbs and Slovenes in a state organism, independent and democratic, and free of any foreign domination," the various Jugoslav deputies emphasized in their speeches in Parliament and out of it, that the nation never shall renounce its rights and aims, and whatever may come, the Jugoslavs demand to be heard and to be given the right of self-determination. Austrian and Hungarian statesmen energetically repudiated these Jugoslav "insolences," calling them traitorous, and Count Czernin declared that the self-determination, which he and his German colleagues so promptly asked for Ukraine, Finland, Lithuania and other parts of Russia, cannot be applied to Austro-Hungarian nations and nationalities. But the Jugoslavs over there were grim and determined, and went their way forward. Today they openly proclaim their adherence to the declaration of Corfu. The results are grave disorders and collisions between police, army and civilians, and a rising revolutionary ferment throughout Jugoslav lands. In close collaboration with the Czechs who also demand their independent state, the Jugoslavs have brought the government to naught, and if the Allies could properly grasp the situation and exploit it in a right way, there would be instantly an open revolution in Austria-Hungary. The tempest is near, very near. There are too many signs for it. Continuous news arrives which indicates that great events are in store. The dissolution of the Austrian parliament is one sign, the conference between the Kaiser and the Austrian emperor the other. The further cementing of the alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary means a further extent of Prussian domination in the dual monarchy, and at the same time a further and more vigorous persecution of the non-German and non-Magyar nationalities. But whatever persecutions, what-

ever reign of terror, the oppressed nations stand prepared and ready for the last trial from which they hope to emerge as free peoples, strong enough to direct their own destinies.

As regards the territorial complex of Yugoslav aspiration there is little to explain. The declaration of Corfu points out that the territory of the new state has to include all the territory inhabited compactly and in territorial continuity by the Yugoslav nation. Geographically this includes the following provinces: (a) Serbia and Montenegro; (b) Bosnia-Hercegovina; (3) Dalmatia and the Dalmatian archipelago; (d) Croatia-Slavonia with Rijeka (Fiume), and the Megjmurje; (e) The country of the Drava in South Hungary, and the former Serbian Vojvodina, (Bačka and Banat); (f) Istria, the Istrian islands and Trieste; (g) Carniola and Gorica-Gradiška; (h) Southern Carinthia, Southern Styria, and the adjoining territory in South-Eastern Hungary.

In all these territories the Yugoslavs constitute a compact population of exceedingly pure race. The mixed population on the borders is due partly to natural contact with neighbouring races, and partly the artificial result of hostile policy, and cannot seriously affect the national character of the country.

All these lands form an ethnical unit, they are geographically contiguous, and economically interdependent.

Serbia and Montenegro with Bosnia and Hercegovina cannot attain their normal development without the possession of Dalmatia. Detached from its hinterland the Dalmatian coast would be valueless for commerce and navigation, and the safety of Dalmatia would be permanently jeopardized, were she deprived of her archipelago. One reason why Austria-Hungary occupied and annexed Bosnia-Hercegovina was, that she already possessed Dalmatia. Dalmatia and the Dalmatian archipelago must properly belong to the owner of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Moreover, in the Middle Ages Dalmatia formed an integrant part of the Yugoslav states—whether Serbian or Croatian—which arose during the course of history, and when she was incorporated with Austria, Dalmatia herself evinced the tendency towards

union with other Yugoslav countries. As the utmost that could at that time be aspired to, she asked to be united with Croatia-Slavonia, and the Diet of Zadar (Zara), and the Croatian Parliament in Zagreb never ceased to demand such a union.

For centuries Croatia-Slavonia sturdily defended her autonomy against Germanism and Austrian centralisation, no less than against magyarisation. In a union of all Yugoslav countries Croatia would at once take her proper place, first of all for ethnical reasons, secondly, because her national and political renaissance was accomplished under the banner of a great Yugoslav movement, and because the Croatian Parliament always demanded Yugoslav unity, territorial integrity and political independence. And finally because her three great waterways, the Save, the Drava and the Danube, as well as the railway that traverses the country and connects Belgrade with Rijeka, render Croatia the natural intermediate link between eastern and western Jugoslavia.

Rijeka is the only natural and practicable seaport for Croatia, and at present also for Serbia. The right of Croatia to Rijeka (Fiume) as an incontestable part of her territory was never called into question before the falsification of paragraph 66 of the Croato-Hungarian agreement of 1868. As a result of this crime Hungary deprived Croatia of the administration of the town and seaport of Rijeka, just as she had in 1861 deprived her of the administration of the Megjmurje, a purely Croatian district between the Drava and the Mur. As a port Rijeka is valueless without its hinterland, and this again cannot thrive without its natural seaport. A Yugoslav Rijeka is of vital necessity to Croatia-Slavonia, Serbia, and a large part of Istria and Carniola.

The possession of the Quarnero Islands and of Eastern Istria is inseparably bound up with Rijeka, just as Western Istria is bound with Trieste, the only seaport of the Slovene hinterland.

In the hands of the Yugoslavs, Trieste would prove, economically speaking, an important stronghold against Ger-

man economic pressure. If the Jugoslavs were deprived of Trieste and their communication with the sea, they would no longer be sufficiently strong to resist German southward pressure, which is continually encroaching on the Slovene territory in Carinthia and Styria. Only the possession of Trieste, Carinthia and Southern Styria can enable the Slovenes to block the advance of Germanism towards the Mediterranean, and so accomplish their mission as the Alpine Guard of the Adriatic and Jugoslavdom. In this capacity they would serve the interests of all the opponents of Pan-Germanism, and ensure the security of the allied powers as well, as the national existence of all the Yugoslav countries.

There are in Hungary 102,000 Slovenes, living between the Mur and the Raab, and 800,000 Serbo-Coats north of the Drava and the Danube. This entire population, which consists largely of wealthy landholders, can only be saved from forcible Magyarisation by union with the brothers of their race. If they are permitted to remain Jugoslavs, the fertile plains of the Bačka and Banat will be preserved to the nation and furnish the other Yugoslav countries with the granary they require.

Any partition of the national territory, and above all the cession of any part whatsoever to a foreign power, would not only seriously impede the development of Yugoslav unity and violate the principle of nationality, but would prove a mere repetition of the Austrian system, and a fresh source of endless conflicts and collisions.

When America decided to enter the war on the side of the Allies, the Jugoslavs at once felt that they won their greatest and mightiest supporter. Although little acquainted with the Yugoslav problem America's entry could not fail to include in its war aims the liberation of the Jugoslavs. President Wilson's momentous declaration concerning the self-determination of nations and peoples proved it. And today America is called upon, more than anyone else, to settle accounts with the Teuto-Magyar powers. This settlement cannot repeat past blunders, neither can it approve diplomatic tricks, intended to create a gloved barrier

around the European cancer, leaving the pestilential hearth untouched and breeding new catastrophes for mankind. America stands for right and democracy, and right and democracy must be the flag of the future peace. Germany and Austria-Hungary stand for autocracy and for oppression, and if they get a single button-hole through which to escape, they will remain a menace for peace and humanity. America's duty is to prevent this and to impose upon the world such a peace which will fully satisfy all those who have their life long fought and struggled for those principles which would make the world a decent place to live in. America's mighty will and her tremendous moral powers can achieve it.

The only thing the Jugoslavs ask, is justice. If justice conquers all the dark powers which have so long oppressed the world, then the Jugoslavs will at last get their own home in which they can devote all their abilities for the benefit of civilization and humanity. Their liberation and unification, so fervently desired by them, will be also a gain for the allied nations, respective for the world's democracy. With this war the Jugoslavs have entered the universal history, their problem being at last recognized as an integral link in the chain which extends from Hamburg to the Gulf of Persia. The Jugoslavs are one, and it can safely be said, the most important means to break this chain. Therefore democracy—true democracy—wherever it breathes, ought to help the Jugoslavs, to support their cause, and with that support to ennoble its own cause for which so much precious blood has been shed.

THE FUTURE OF ALSACE-LORRAINE

By David Starr Jordan, LL.D., Chancellor of Leland Stanford University

I

Of all the problems in political geography raised by the war, the one that seems most difficult to settle is that of Alsace-Lorraine. Torn from France, by what its deputies in 1871 rightly called "an odious abuse of force," misruled for forty-five years by dull-witted officials under orders to substitute discipline for freedom, and systematically robbed and abused in the present war, Alsace-Lorraine is under no obligations legal or moral to the German Empire. The claim of France although morally wholly genuine, is legally not much better than that of Germany. In the old dynastic fashion, Emperor Napoleon III, wagered his Rhine provinces against those of the Kaiser and duly lost. Under the rules of the game, the stake went to Germany. The republic which followed the Emperor's downfall perforce weakly abandoned it in the Treaty of Frankfort in order to avoid still greater calamities. The people concerned were not consulted. Under dynastic rule they had no right to be considered, and under absolutism they have acquired none since. Meanwhile the "Tragedy of Pride" as Ferrero calls it, prevents either nation from yielding even to its own advantage.

For fifty and more years the Germans have tried in vain to assimilate the Alsatians, the Danes in Flensburg, and the Poles in Posen. The reason for their failure is that the Prussian government has offered discipline instead of freedom. The fatal word "*Eroberung*" (conquest) has always stood in the way of understanding. No loyalty is possible under the lash.

To her "conquest" of "Elsass-Lothringen" Germany has said in effect: "I will not give you your freedom or equality

until I am sure of your love." Alsace responds: "I cannot love you until you set me free." Lorraine replies: "I am not of your family. I cannot understand your ways." Then Germany says to France: "We cannot be friends until you forget." And France answers: "You will not let me forget, and so I cannot."

Germans as a rule fail to understand the loyalty of South Africa to the British Empire after the unfortunate and unjustified Boer war of conquest. As a matter of fact, South Africa was treated humanly and thus bound by the cement of good-will. With a similar policy on the part of Germany after the war of 1870-1871, there would have been no "problem of Alsace-Lorraine." But statesmen of the type of Campbell-Bannerman rarely come to the front under the dynasty system.

In an article in the *Deutsche Politik*, Professor Martin Fassbinder is quoted as saying;

The French base their claims to Alsace on the fact that the Alsatians are attached in their hearts to France. This unfortunately is only too true. The reproach leveled at us, that we do not understand how to assimilate conquered territories is well founded, and it is a phenomenon which merits our best attention.

In 1659 Colbert wrote to his brother, the first administrator of Alsace, exhorting him to treat the Alsatians better than the inhabitants were treated by their rulers. At the same time he urged the clergy to use their influence to induce the Alsatians to become good Frenchmen. The consequence was that in 1675, when the German troops entered Alsace, they met not with complete indifference, but active hostility on the part of the inhabitants of that province.

With us Germans, an administration of such a nature is impossible. Ours is a régime which admits of no change. Hence, when the functionaries of such a régime treat the inhabitants badly, it is difficult to conciliate them and even more difficult to assimilate them.

II

There are two main fallacies in German discussions of this subject. Alsace, with her republic of Strassburg and her ten free cities, never "belonged to Germany" in a proprietary sense. Germany indeed was little more than a geographical expression when through its own House of

Hapsburg, Alsace became loosely attached to the ramshackle "Holy Roman Empire," of which Austria was finally the chief heir. Through history, Lorraine has been mostly attached to France.

It may be that Alsace-Lorraine now "belongs to Germany," having been held by force in serfdom for forty-seven years. It ought to "belong to the Alsatians." In any event, it is not "a part of Germany," except as a bond-slave is part of his master's household. The territory of "Elsass-Lothringen" is "Reichsland," or land owned by the Empire, inhabited by "Deutsche zweiter Klasse" (second-class Germans) who are legally little more than squatters on public domain.

The second fallacy maintains that the people are German because of their original Swabian origin and because seven-eighths both in Alsace and Lorraine speak in a Swabian dialect to children and servants while using French for other purposes. The question of language has no more importance in Alsace than in Switzerland. The essential to unity is community of experiences and aspirations, not of speech. Most educated Alsatians speak three languages. The leaders of opposition to Prussianism are not of French but German stock, largely from Upper Alsace, especially Colmar and Mülhausen. The names of Waltz ("Oncl Hansi"), Boll, Blumenthal, Wetterle, Helmer, Preiss, Zislin, Froelich, Weill, indicate this.

In the words of Napoleon; "they speak in German, but they saber in French." "Being German, they are more obstinately French than any Frenchmen could be." A wise administration would never have sought to wreak its discipline by force on a freedom-loving folk. It would have sought rather to promote the Alsatian ideal of international friendship. If Alsace-Lorraine had been given an equal stake in government and the right to rule itself and to maintain its own customs, the "question of Alsace-Lorraine" would long ago have been solved. As matters are, Imperial Germany has forfeited all claim by trying to crowd its own language and discipline on an independent people which has tasted freedom, with a specialized culture

of its own. A strange mentality that which finds honor and glory in holding a fine-spirited body of people against its will in political and social subjugation.

III

But Germany now has reasons other than sentimental for holding the district. Only in recent years has the value of the immense iron mines of Eastern Lorraine been appreciated. These furnish now some 80 per cent of all German iron. This ore, known as "Minette" contains,¹ 2 per cent of phosphorus which made the ore useless until two English chemists, Thomas and Gilchrist, invented (1878), a process by which the phosphorus was thrown into the slag, becoming of itself a valuable fertilizer while the iron was relieved of its presence. This process gave to a part of Lorraine a special value in the eye of Germany. With the fate of the iron of Lorraine or the potash of Alsace, the world has little concern. The advent of natural trade would render political ownership a secondary matter.

It has now been proposed, for the benefit of Prussia, to dismember the united province. This would of course weaken opposition to the severe but "necessary" process of "*Entwelschung*" (deforeignization) while making another substantial addition to the wealth and power of Prussia, to which Kingdom this plan would add Lorraine. Such an adjustment, it is urged, would be a great boon to Lorraine, while inflicting on refractory Alsace a just punishment. The latter would thus find herself permanently excluded from Prussia, "a great state alone capable of guaranteeing to the Alsatian people the free opportunity of public manifestation of their national sentiments." One German journal declared that a "Prussia enlarged by the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine could realize by her all-powerfulness the destinies of the empire." Meanwhile Prussia "never weary of trampling on men's souls," has neither in this case or any other regarded the will of the people concerned as a factor in determining their future.

¹ According to Prof. C. C. Eckhardt, *Scientific Monthly*, May, 1918.

IV

In this deadlock, many have suggested splitting the difference by dividing the territories. Some would make the division lengthwise, giving the French-speaking communes to France. Some would cut crosswise, giving Lorraine to France and Alsace to Germany.

Neither suggestion I think would be final, and certainly neither would be acceptable to the people concerned. Alsace and Lorraine, once very different in temper, have been welded into one by common misfortune. To divide the district would be simply to cripple it. As already indicated, its problem is not one of language, nor of race. There is, moreover, no natural frontier even between the Germanic and the French communes. The center of opposition to Germany lies by no means in the French areas nor in their now more than half-Germanized chief city of Metz, but in Upper Alsace and especially in the ten towns (The "Décapole") which were free cities under the old German empire. These are Mühlhausen, Colmar, Türkheim, Rösheim, Münster, Schlettstadt, Hagenau, Weissenburg, Kaysersburg and Oberehnheim. Later Landau entered the league while Mühlhausen left it to become a canton of Switzerland, afterwards voluntarily joining herself to France. Strassburg, meanwhile, was a republic, ruled by a bishop.

V

It is suggested that the question of Alsace-Lorraine should be settled by a plebiscite at the end of the war, under control of some neutral authority. But then there is at present no such authority and the difficulties in the way are considerable.

The plebiscite, or ballot, is a device for ascertaining the will of the people. It is not clear that this can ever be safe and effective in determining the fate of any disputed district of Europe. The process can have no value unless voting rests on intelligence and the ballot is fully guarded, with a secret vote and the absence of all duress, intimidation, or bribery. As some form of duress is a regular ac-

companionment of the suffrage in many parts of Europe, we can therefore hardly expect the stream to rise above its source. Even in the best-ordered districts a plebiscite as to national allegiance would be fraught with embarrassments. In case of any proposed change in boundaries, public feeling would run high in the states concerned, as well as in the strip of territory to which the plebiscite should be applied. This condition would encourage intrigue, with manipulation of public opinion. The struggle for ascendancy would affect the rest of the world, and sympathies racial, political, religious, would form a disturbing element far beyond the limits of the regions concerned. "I can imagine," says Professor Walter Rauschenbusch, "a plebiscite turning into an active volcano. . . . This provision would operate as an almost insuperable check against any change. It would give the population no initiative, only a vote."

The former bond of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany rested on her busy commerce across the Rhine, and on the large influx of German manufacturing interest in Strassburg and Metz. The persistent though mostly latent opposition was stronger in German Alsace than in French Lorraine, no doubt partly because the French population had been more thoroughly "skimmed" by emigration after the Franco-Prussian war.

Matters of language have assumed importance only through attempts to suppress the use of the French tongue. As before indicated, it is not vital to the unity of a nation that all its people should speak the same language. Stability is secured by equality before the law and the recognition by all that under a common government their individual rights are assured. In the words of Albert Oeri, "A compatriot who thinks our thoughts is nearer to us than one who merely speaks our tongue."

Most attempts to define nationalities by race lines are bound to fall. Language and race cross every border, sometimes producing inextricable mixtures of blood and tongues. Kinship in spirit is the vital essential. The requirement of a unified nation with one race, one speech and one religion

is the method of oriental despotism. It is the watchword of the infamous "Committee of Union and Progress" at Constantinople. Such a demand is out of place in modern international Europe.

VI

Finally, in any discussion of this particular problem must be weighed the claim of France that a plebiscite at the present epoch would be unwise and unfair, as a large part of the population has been banished and replaced by half a million German immigrants, these mostly located in Strassburg, Metz, and the iron district of Lorraine. Still more emphatically, it is urged that the will of the provinces for all time was indicated in the protest of the retiring Alsatian members of the French National Assembly at Bordeaux,—one of the noblest documents in history.

On March 1, 1871, in behalf of the "lost provinces," M. Grosjean uttered this valedictory:

Delivered in scorn of all justice and by the odious use of force, to foreign domination, we have our last duty to perform. We declare once for all as null and void an agreement which disposes of us without our consent. The vindication of our rights rest forever open to all and to each in the form and in the degree his conscience shall dictate. The moment we leave this hall, the supreme thought we find in the bottom of our hearts is a thought of unalterable attachment to the land from which we are torn. Our brothers of Alsace and of Lorraine, separated at this moment from the common family, will preserve to France, absent from their hearths, an affection faithful to the day when she shall return to take her place again.

In an address to Europe at large the delegates used these prophetic words:

Europe cannot permit or ratify the abandonment of Alsace and Lorraine. The civilized states as guardians of justice and national rights cannot remain indifferent to their neighbors under pain of becoming in their turn victims of the outrages they have tolerated. Modern Europe cannot allow a people to be seized like a herd of cattle. She cannot continue deaf to the repeated protests of threatened nationalities. She owes it to her instinct of self-preservation to forbid such uses of power. Peace concluded as the price of a cession of territory could be nothing but a costly truce, not a final peace. It would be for all a cause of internal unrest, a permanent and legitimate provocation of War.

Finally, on March 24, apostrophizing Germany, Frédéric Hartmann made his historic appeal:

By the fact that you have conquered us, you owe us a status in law, a civil and political constitution in harmony with our traditions and with our customs.

But Germany, enmeshed in the *Kultur* regimentation of Prussia could not grant to an *Eroberung* a freedom her own people had never known. "She looked for the reaping of fruit she did not know how to cultivate." For forty years she granted to "Elsass-Lothringen" no constitution at all, and then one "made in Prussia," bearing no relation to the customs and instincts of Alsace-Lorraine.

VII

There is but one fair basis of settlement.

The *land of Alsace-Lorraine belongs to the people of Alsace-Lorraine*, and to no one else. There should be no question as to this. As "men without a country" for half a century, they have made a country of their own, as characteristic and as freedom-loving as its neighbor, Switzerland. Alsace-Lorraine should be set free as an independent state with full right to determine her own future. From an article written by R. M. Bauer of Baden in Aargau favoring the independence of Alsace-Lorraine, now going the rounds of the Swiss papers, I translate the following:

Only an independent, free Alsace-Lorraine brings the guarantee of an epoch of peace in Europe. Both opponents would learn to meet again without hate, to the welfare of common humanity. Alsace-Lorraine would help both to reconciliation. They would themselves be a free people in the future free Europe.

The writer concludes with an appeal to Alsatians in the name of world-peace to work for independence.

But a guaranteed neutral state should remain unfortified. The strong citadels of Strassburg and Metz (France's key to Germany) should be dismantled. A state with guaranteed neutrality should have neither forts nor armies, and these two fortresses have been the main cause of the undoing of the provinces.

It is however an open question whether any buffer state could maintain itself against the will of Imperial Germany and against its own people's love for France. For France as a nation is distinctly lovable, which Prussia is not and can never be. Surely a freed Alsace will drift towards France, and this without a regard to pledges or "guarantees."

While writing this article, I have heard from an Alsatian thoroughly acquainted with the present conditions in that country. He says:

No doubt the feeling among the people is now thoroughly and strongly in favor of France and everybody hopes the country will return to French citizenship. It is the only way of definitely putting an end to the German misgovernment which, especially since the war, has become more and more odious to everybody.

The country is too small to remain independent, the possibilities of developing industry, trade and agriculture would be too small. Besides the Germans would always try to regain their influence, their people would remain in the country, the intrigues would be perpetual as now in Flanders, and no hope left for internal and external peace.

In 1913, the people of Alsace and Lorraine were strongly opposed to war even for their own release, because they realized what war would mean, through most bitter experience. Even more than Belgium had their fields been "the cockpit of Europe." Their hope was to become an equal self-governing state within the German Empire, and through their double linguistics to form a bridge of friendship and understanding between two great nations. Let us be level headed ("têtes carrées") and patient, they urged, for some day Alsace would yet turn the scales in behalf of German liberty. This feeling prevalent before the war was thus expressed by a prominent Alastian:

It is for the people of these provinces to say loudly and clearly that the demand be made for the friendly bridge between two civilizations—not the glacis of a fort, nor yet the field of battle, we ask "No war; Franco-German reconciliation; self-government for Alsace-Lorraine."

All prospects of "bearable life" under German rule vanished with the attack on Belgium and France.

VIII

All this before August of 1914.

Since then Alsace-Lorraine has suffered acutely in all her interests. Prominent Alsatian leaders have been condemned to death, though fortunately each of them had already taken refuge in France or Switzerland. Even the most conservative of the well-to-do classes have found it necessary to banish themselves, while German officers have engaged in miscellaneous looting, the loot being sold at auction in Stockholm and Amsterdam.

Early in the war, an Alsatian wrote me as follows:

Many persons were imprisoned and exiled to interior Germany without any judgment. Nearly every denunciation, even anonymous ones, are taken as true, and people sent to prison for some weeks. Speaking French in the streets or shops is strictly prohibited. Some villages were burnt down by the army, others were shelled and destroyed. Jewels, furniture and so on were taken away by German officers in automobiles in the villages evacuated by their troops and especially in the castles, in their own land! I never had thought that war could be so cruel and lawless and lose every notion of morals and law.

Daniel Blumenthal, late mayor of Colmar, in a little book entitled *Alsace-Lorraine* tells the story of the reign of terror experienced in the last four years.

In the first place, persons inscribed on the black-list, that is to say, those most suspected, have been arrested and imprisoned. Those who have escaped the talons of the Germans, have been objects of persecution for so-called high treason, liable to capital punishment. They have had their property seized and (supreme misfortune) they have been declared to have forfeited their German nationality.

The Council of War was in permanent operation.

Blumenthal estimates that 30,000 Alsatian soldiers, mobilized in the German army, have gone over into the French. Many of these "have begged to be sent to the front, to fight the Germans, thus risking their lives twice in the service of France."

The mayor adds:

Alsace-Lorraine has suffered under the Prussian rule of Germany. This rule has weakened the strength of the country, but could not kill the spirit of the people. There is but one way in

which the two provinces can regain their health. They must again be united to France, their mother country, their rightful home.

It appears that Alsace-Lorraine has been officially treated as an "enemy country," the true meaning of which term to the Prussian has already been indicated in Belgium, France, Serbia and Armenia—examples which place the German military directorate outside the range of moral comprehension.

A special interest attaches therefore to a little book entitled *L'Épreuve d'Alsace, par un Alsacien* (*The Ordeal of Alsace, by an Alsatian*) which sets forth the conditions in that region for the first two years of the war. The volume is made up of unsigned articles from the *Journal de Genève* (1916). I am assured on unquestionable authority that it is truthful as to facts. Many of the incidents are described from German official sources or quoted from the Pangermanist newspaper the *Strassburger Post*, an exotic in Alsace.

The outbreak of war was presaged by the notorious preliminary skirmish at Saverne (Zabern) in which German civil authority was laid supine under the feet of the German General Staff. The events which succeeded this failure of civil justice were progressively alarming to the people of the provinces. Von Wedel, the "Statthalter," or viceroy of Alsace-Lorraine, and Mandel the Secretary, both of them men of character and ability, as generous as their superiors would permit, resigned their offices, the former being replaced by the reactionary von Dallwitz, a man of iron who would stand no nonsense.

The Alsatians tried to be law-abiding, though new "laws of exception" or "laws of protection" as the Prussians termed them were enacted day by day; statutes they had no part in making nor in enforcing. "Germany had become one vast barrack ruled by Prussian subalterns" and barrack law became the law of Alsace.

All French journals were promptly suppressed, all editors² who had not made their escape being sent to jail.

² A letter from the writer to Léon Boll, editor of the influential *Journal d'Alsace-Lorraine* was returned from Strassburg by the military authorities marked *flüchtig* (fugitive), and "fugitive" also were the members of the nationalist group whose names I have already mentioned.

Black lists of *Französlinge* (Frenchlings)* arose to meet the demand and the reign of persecution gave place to a reign of terror.

At first, I am informed, Alsace accepted the characteristic fiction that "war had been forced on Germany" and that she had no choice save to fight. Returning soldiers from the Belgian campaigns dispelled this illusion and the feeling against Prussia grew stronger and stronger as the opportunities for expression grew less.

At a banquet of German sympathizers at Gebweiler in Upper Alsace (April, 1915) the orator, Professor van der Pforten spoke in the following vein:

Germany is now completely united and providence has chosen the German people to subject all Europe to a radical cure which shall be to her a blessing of Heaven.

This cure was then rigorously applied in Alsace as well as in Belgium. "After the war," said the wife of another professor from the now Prussianized university of Strassburg "the Alsatians ought to lick our feet."

It was made clear that the "laws of exception," with their excessive limitations of personal freedom, would not end with the present conflict, but were "rather to be continued until the whole population had made a complete submission, that is, for an unlimited time."

The new Pangermanist governor, von Dallwitz, spoke of the liberal hopes of the Alsatians as "the extravagant and altogether grotesque fancies of a double culture" with "that other chimera of the rôle of mediator of the national frontier" "The Alsatians are called by the geographic situation and their past history to form an impassible rampart of culture and mentality purely German." This was a warning that all their ambitions of culture and liberalism must be given up and that they must henceforth become like the mass of Prussians, intellectual and spiritual slaves, "bricks in the wall of an edifice they could not see and need not understand." "A broom of iron," said the Pangermanist Lienhardt, "will clean up Alsace, if the young Alsatians do not take up this duty themselves."

* Called by the Alsatians "francillous."

Early in the war, the German authorities took possession of all properties belonging to French owners in Alsace-Lorraine, all employees suspected of French leanings being dismissed. Further it was intended to buy up all these properties at the end of the war, and to replace their owners and their personnel by Germans. Such a move, it was said, "would be a benefit to the provinces, as they had not realized the system of intense agriculture practiced in Germany." By this means also, old soldiers were to be colonized in Alsace "thus assuring the veterans a comfortable existence in the country with profit to the national cause."

In the same connection and at about the same time citizens of the German empire then abroad were ordered to return home at once on penalty of expatriation with loss of all rights as citizens.

This plan acutely affected Alsace-Lorraine, for on its rolls were undoubtedly thousands who were, as charged, "Germans only in name" many of whom had left for other countries as the war began. Thus were expatriated most of the intellectual leaders, including not only the avowed "nationalists" but also many conservatives, who had opposed the frenzied movements of Pan-Germanism.

The author of *L'Épreuve* cites many individual cases of punishment administered under the law of exception.

At the outset of the war, the French made a most ill-advised invasion of Alsace—unfortunate because the ground could not be held. All who gave the French army any sort of welcome were severely dealt with by the returning Germans. Here was a harvest for the informer.

At Gebweisler, a prominent manufacturer (M. de Bary), was sent to prison for pointing out to a French officer a bookstore where maps could be obtained. At Mühlhausen another manufacturer (Auguste Wagner) was imprisoned for three years on a wholly unproved charge of laying a map on the saddle of a French officer. A justice of the peace, Acker at Cernay, was similarly punished for opposing a German family from making up a black list for proscription.

A merchant of Mühlhausen (Meyer) was condemned to imprisonment for life for "high treason." The military

commandant set the verdict aside, summoning a new court to substitute a sentence of death. A woman of Colmar (Madame Blaise), was charged with warning the French commandant of a projected betrayal. She was acquitted for lack of evidence, but the German commandant (Gäede), annulled the decision, condemning her to ten years imprisonment because it was shown that whether guilty or not, "she was perfectly capable of committing the crime charged against her."

The usual brutalities were meted out for "seditious speech." Several journalists at Strassburg went to prison six months for the cry *Vive la France*. Others were similarly punished for *Vive la belle France*, and *Vive la République* as well as for singing the Marseillaise, itself an Alsatian protest against tyranny.

Similar punishments were given to some hundreds of people for leaving home without permission or for other infractions of military police regulations.

Punishments less severe, but equally insistent, were laid on those who wrote letters in French or who spoke it in public. All commercial letter-heads in French were destroyed. A citizen of Strassburg was sent to jail for eight days for writing his name Henri instead of Heinrich, and another for several months for calling himself Charles instead of Karl. In the prison at Strassburg, a newcomer was greeted in these words: "Do not weep, Madame, you will find here an excellent company, our house is the only one where one may speak French with impunity."

All these high-handed proceedings tend naturally to create counter-manifestations which led to still greater severity. A barber at Mühlhausen remarked, "No one dare speak in our country; we would better sew up our mouths." For this he went to jail for fifteen days. A milkman served a month for saying: "The Germans always speak of their victories, never of their defeats." A young woman spent a week in jail for waving her hand to French prisoners. Offenses of this kind led to the arrest and punishment of thousands of persons

A more important case was that of the Pastor Herzog of Waldersbach who declared that this was an "unjust war, provoked by Germany," omitting moreover to pray for the Emperor, in one of his services. For this he was imprisoned for a month.

Pastor Gerold of Strassburg, a man widely known and beloved, eighty years of age, was accused of giving money to wounded Frenchmen in the hospital. More than this, in a sermon he had uttered words "which wounded the German sentiments of a high functionary who was present." In substance, he had deplored the hard rule to which his people were subjected and prayed for the final triumph of justice. As punishment, he was imprisoned for a month.

In this connection, it may be well to remember that none of these acts are the work of lawless mobs, such as sometimes over-ride the law in more favored countries. The governmental machine in Germany reserves to itself all forms of tyranny, subject only to the still harsher rule of the military. The General Staff of the Army has always held civilian authority in contempt, and does not hesitate in the name of "military necessity" to set aside any manifestation of leniency of which civil authority may sometimes be guilty.

In spite of "necessary discipline," the "lost brothers" of Alsace, being German, are today farther than ever from being fully Germanized.

The author of *L'Épreuve* thus sums up the case:

When a people whose whole history is made up of struggles for political and intellectual independence sees at one stroke its traditions and all its liberties stricken down before a pitiless dictatorship, it reacts with all its vigor against the violence. Strong with the clear vision of men and things inherited from its fathers, it looks unflinching towards the new hope which rises on the horizon. (*L'Épreuve*, p. 69.)

IX

The question of Alsace-Lorraine is thus no longer a matter of the conflicting claims of two sovereign powers. It is a human problem, in which the people of Alsace and Lorraine on the one hand and the civilized world on the other

are primarily concerned. To *leave these people in the clutches of the absolutist Germany of to-day, would be to restore fugitive slaves to their masters.*

No such settlement can be made consistent with justice, and without justice Europe can have no lasting peace. The true aim of civilization is to secure freedom, order and justice, for with them peace will naturally follow, taking care of itself.

X

The Treaty of Frankfort in 1871 reduced 2,000,000 human beings to the status of a flock of sheep. The Treaty of Berlin in 1878, turned over 10,000,000 or more of Christianized people in Asia Minor and Macedonia to be hunted as vermin by a barbarian horde. By its consent to these achievements of monarchial order, Europe laid, broad and deep, the foundations for the world anarchy of today. "They enslave their children's children who make compromise with sin."

CHINA'S PART IN THE WAR

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It is not the purpose in this paper to enumerate the contributions, important as they are, which China has already made to the progress of civilization; nor is it to suggest how she can best aid in that reconstruction of the world's social, political, and economic fabric which will have to be taken in hand immediately after the close of the war. The sole aim is to consider how China may most speedily and effectively bring to bear her enormous but hitherto latent strength upon the accomplishment of the one object that concerns any of us at the present moment—the winning of the war.

Too much time has been lost already. It was evident from the first that China must pursue in connection with the war one of two courses; she must either maintain her neutrality, or she must enter the conflict on the side of the Entente nations. In either case her resources were available for use by those nations.

Now, China, as everyone knows, is capable of producing in vast quantities the very things, cereals, coal, iron, cotton, and wool, for want of which our civilization is suffering so keenly, while internal transportation problems present no insuperable difficulties. As a necessary preliminary step, however, to the utilization of this source of strength, a carefully worked out and well concerted plan of action was essential in order to avoid injustice to any individual nation, whether China herself or any other. Here again, as has happened so often at various crises in the course of the war, lack of foresight, of cohesion and coördination, of singleness of purpose, have stood in the way, and nothing has been accomplished.

It is probably too late now to make any effective use of China's vast material wealth in connection with the war,

since at least two years must elapse before it could begin to make its influence felt; and it is scarcely conceivable that the war will not have reached its turning point, one way or the other, before that time.

China has, however, one asset, and that her most important one, the utilization of which to any extent requires no joint action on the part of the allied nations, which so far from demanding extensive and costly development work before it becomes available, is ready for instant use, and which is capable of exerting an effect of the utmost importance upon the fortunes of the war. This asset is her labor.

China has endured for millenniums as a thoroughly integrated social complex which no shock of foreign conquest or domestic disturbance could destroy or even seriously modify. For ages in this region of southeastern Asia there has been going on a somewhat slow but none the less steady evolutionary process which has resulted in the development of a type of mankind, forming something like a quarter of the total population of the globe, whose most salient characters are courage, industry, patience, physical energy, sound morality, respect for law, and a cheerful, optimistic outlook upon life generally. These are the qualities which experience has shown to be those best fitted for achieving success in the struggle for existence. The enduring character of Chinese civilization is the proof of that. That these qualities are also just the ones needed for the successful prosecution of the war is equally clear.

It appears not to be generally known in this country that this tremendous reservoir of man power is already being drawn upon on a comparatively large scale. In both England and France Chinese labor of a very high and efficient type is being utilized in a great variety of ways. This is done not merely to effect the release of additional men for the combatant force, but also to increase the actual production and transportation capacity. Already the number recruited for this purpose is nearing the quarter-million mark, if it has not passed it, and still these men are being rushed across by the thousands. There can scarcely be too many of them. Fortunately the supply is inexhaustible.

These members of the Chinese Labor Corps, as it is called, are all picked men. As is well known, the population of China may be divided roughly into two distinct types. One, that occupying the southern half of the country, is of medium or short stature and is connected racially with the populations of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Japan. The other, taller and better developed physically, occupies the northern provinces and is related to that group of the human family of which the eastern Mongols, the Manchus, and the northern Koreans are representative members. There are also very fundamental differences between the cultures of northern and southern China, into which, however, it is not necessary to go here.¹

It is from the northern provinces that the men of the Labor Corps are recruited. Very high qualifications are insisted upon, mental, moral, and physical. The corps is under regular and rigid military discipline, the men being under the charge of regularly commissioned officers of the British service who, through familiarity with China or for some other special reason are better able to make themselves useful in this work than as members of the combatant forces.

The pay provided for the members of the corps is much better than anything that they could earn in China, while very liberal allowances are made for their families during their absence and in the event of death or disability. Naturally their physical well-being is most carefully looked after, provision is made to keep them amused and cheerful, and there is, finally, a strict stipulation regarding their repatriation after the close of the war. That these men have already proved their usefulness is evidenced by the efforts made to increase their numbers, and there is indeed scarcely any limit to the variety of ways in which they may be profitably employed, in the loading and unloading of ships and railway trains, in road-making and construction work of all kinds, and above all in agriculture—in the production of that food which, we are told, is to win the war.

¹ See the very valuable paper by Dr. Berthold Laufer, entitled "Some Fundamental Ideas of Chinese Culture," in *The Journal of Race Development*, Vol. V, No. 2, October, 1914.

Upon the steamer in which the present writer returned to America early in the present year there were about a thousand of these men, all passenger accommodation except that of the first class having been taken over for them. Each man was dressed in a neat uniform of dark blue modeled upon the garments to which the North Chinese laborer is accustomed, and bore upon his left arm a red brassard with his number in the corps. Each was also provided with a stout waterproof canvas dunnage-bag containing his kit and personal belongings. As a body these men left little to be desired. Almost all were young, and though full of fun and good natured horseplay they were docile, orderly, neat, and thoroughly amenable to discipline, while a well developed esprit de corps had already begun to show itself. To a man they appeared to be in robust health, strong, willing, and capable of working both hard and continuously. After the regular morning health inspection, deck sports were held, tugs-of-war and the like, and there was nothing at all perfunctory about the way in which they entered into these. Among the men were several with a particular gift for waggery and buffoonery, a sort of thing quite as much appreciated in China as it is elsewhere, and these individuals were constantly exercising their talents for the edification of their comrades. That they were well fed goes without saying; the rations were ample, and of much better quality than those to which the average Chinese laborer is accustomed at home.

These men were not simply mercenaries, enlisting in this enterprise and risking attacks by submarines on the voyage and aeroplane raids once in cantonments in England or France, merely for the sake of wages higher than they could hope to earn in their native villages. There was apparent among them, in spite of their rollicking, devil-may-care good nature, a genuine feeling of responsibility and seriousness, a very real desire to reflect credit upon themselves, upon their families, and upon the newly established Chinese Republic of which they were citizens. The reality and depth of this sentiment were shown in the clearest possible way by the contents of the letters which they wrote home during the

voyage across the Pacific. In these there was manifest almost without exception an astonishingly clear comprehension of the issues at stake in the war, and also a sincere anxiety on the part of each man to "do his bit" toward bringing about an Allied victory.

Another idea, quite widely prevalent among these men, was especially significant. It was that in time they would return to China, after learning a vast deal about the ways of the Occident and the factors which contribute to success under the conditions of modern civilized life, and that they would then be in a position to aid in the advancement of their own people.

There was nothing jingoistic in this, nothing of resentment for the humiliations inflicted upon China by the various European powers under the Manchu régime; nothing, in short, even remotely suggestive of any menace to the peace and welfare of mankind, once China attains that place among the nations of the world to which she is justly entitled. The Chinese philosophy of life is not an aggressive or a predatory one. It is, on the contrary, based more firmly probably than that of any other nation upon the principles of justice and democracy and fair play for all. The so-called "Yellow Peril" was in the main nothing but a very clever piece of camouflage on the part of H. I. M. the Kaiser, an attempt to divert the attention of the world from the true source of future peril. So far as it has ever had any real existence at all, it has been due to the nomadic nations of Central Asia, the barbarous Huns, Bulgars, Magyars, Mongols, and Turks, whose gigantic raids have from time to time overwhelmed large portions of the civilized world, and from whom civilized China has suffered in precisely the same way and to a far greater degree than have the nations of Europe. It can not be too often reiterated that it is not the color of a man's skin, but the mode of his life and the manner of his thinking, that render him a menace or a blessing to his fellows.

The question hitherto has been, "What can America do to help China?" It is perhaps not too much to say that but for the stand taken by this government during the

early years of the present century, China would now have been partitioned by the European powers, if not into actual dependencies, at least into protectorates and "spheres of influence," in which event the opportunity now presented to the Chinese people for the working out of their own salvation must have been postponed for many generations. Again, the return of a large part of the Boxer indemnity, so frequently adverted to as an example of American love of justice and bona fides, has probably exerted a greater influence than any other single episode in the entire course of China's relations with the western powers, in winning her to a willingness to give modern civilization a fair trial, and to adopt therefrom such elements as shall enable her to bring her own material culture abreast of the times. Few, probably, of the peasants and carriers and muleteers and boatmen with whom one comes in contact in traveling through the interior of China ever heard of the Boxer indemnity and its return, or of John Hay and the Open Door; but everywhere one finds prevalent a feeling that somehow Americans are particularly good friends of China, that they have no territorial aspirations endangering her integrity, and that both as a nation and as individuals they are actuated by those same motives of justice and logic and fair play which exert so powerful an influence upon the Chinese mind also.

It is fortunate from every point of view that this friendly feeling should exist. Especially is this true just now, because the time has arrived when, if the people of the United States choose to do so, they may, with China's friendly co-operation, remedy a deficiency fraught with as great peril to the cause of civilization as any that war conditions have revealed. This deficiency is in the supply of agricultural labor, regarding which complaints are constantly being voiced on every hand.

We hear it reiterated—and it can not be repeated too often—that food is going to win the war. The supplying of the necessary food was one of the responsibilities assumed by us upon our entry into the war, as a part liquidation of the debt we owe to those peoples who have been fighting

our battles for us across the Atlantic while we have been making up our minds that we were not too proud to do our own fighting. If then, for any reason whatsoever, the people of this country fail to increase the production of foodstuffs up to and even beyond the amount required to supply adequately all the peoples depending upon us, there will have occurred one of the most tragic and most inexcusable instances of national betrayal to be found in the history of the world. The failure of the North German princes to support Gustavus Adolphus against the Imperialists, the way in which Austria repaid Poland for rescuing her from the Turk in 1683, or the recent defection of Russia from the common cause, will appear meritorious acts by comparison.

Suppose we ask ourselves, "Are we providing an adequate supply of essential foodstuffs for our Allies and ourselves? Does there exist anywhere, either here or abroad, any shortage of food that can be traced to insufficient production in this country? Does there remain anywhere in the United States any land, suitable for agricultural uses and not otherwise employed, that is not being utilized to its maximum capacity?" The answers to all these questions are painfully clear. The situation then is this: that as long as any lack of food exists anywhere among the peoples of the Entente nations capable of being remedied by increased production here in America, just so far do we as a people fail in the performance of one of the most important parts of the responsibility which we voluntarily assumed a year and more ago. Further, the blame for every death from malnutrition among our Allies which might have been prevented by increased food production in this country may rightly be laid at our doors. There was no constraint upon the people of the United States in accepting a state of war with the Central Powers, save that laid upon us by the common foe. We took nearly three years in which to consider the advisability of such a step, and the responsibilities which it would entail. If, then, after pledging certain definite forms of assistance to our new Allies—forms among which the supply of provisions occupied a

prominent place—we violate our pledges, through apathy, indifference, or any cause whatsoever, we shall find, at the close of the war, that we have been fighting most effectively on the side of Prussianism and autocracy.

The reason constantly given for the failure to increase the output of food is of course that it is impossible to find farm workers. All sorts of makeshift expedients are resorted to, and heralded in the press as indications of the terrible earnestness and intensity of purpose with which we have undertaken the prosecution of the war; whereas, in point of fact, such expedients are simply additional proofs, if any were needed, of the well meaning diletantism and failure to utilize all available resources which have characterized the action of the United States in every war in which they have taken part. Instead of resorting to such pathetically inadequate makeshifts as the taking of our boys and girls out of school and putting them into the fields, it would be perfectly possible, if the people of this country so willed it, to supply ourselves with as many laborers as were needed; not immature or inexperienced children who should be at their books or their play, but grown men of fine physique, practical farmers, accustomed to grow on a given piece of ground two and three and even four times as much as the American farmer is able to produce.

That this could be done most easily and effectively, our trans-Atlantic Allies have already demonstrated. Nor would there follow any disturbance whatever in the equilibrium of our own somewhat delicately balanced body politic. The northern provinces of China are a reservoir, simply inexhaustible, of farm laborers of the best type, strong, intelligent, sober, law-abiding, and skilled to the last degree in the art of coaxing from the soil the utmost yield possible in the way of food for man and beast, and that, too, without at the same time impoverishing the soil itself. These men are accustomed to farming under all possible aspects, from practically desert conditions, where constant irrigation is essential, to those obtaining in the swampy regions bordering the coast and the great rivers, where drainage and flood control instead of irrigation are the determining factors.

The objection may be urged that the Chinese farmer is not accustomed to the growing of such crops as he would be called upon to raise over here. Nothing could be further from the truth than to assume that the Chinese farmer confines himself to the production of rice. Rice, particularly in the north, is eaten only by an infinitesimal part of the population. The standard cereals with the Chinese, except in the south, have been since prehistoric times wheat, barley, and millet, while within recent times the dietary has been enriched by the addition of maize and sweet and Irish potatoes from the New World.² There is not a single one of the more important products of our fields and gardens in the growing of which the northern Chinese farmer is not past master, while the list of valuable food plants which he is in the habit of raising includes very many varieties of which we in this country have not so much as heard.

Another objection which it is conceivable might be raised against the use of Chinese farm labor in this country is that the methods of agriculture as carried on in China are so hopelessly dissimilar to those practiced by our farmers as to render the plan utterly unfeasible from the start. The answer to this is simply, that it is not true; there is no dissimilarity worth mentioning, aside from the greater intensity and intelligence with which the Chinese farmer applies the methods common to both countries. The writer has repeatedly been impressed, in traveling through the country, by the resemblances between the farming processes actually in vogue in northern China and those to be seen in this country, particularly in those regions where the use of farm machinery has not yet attained great proportions. One sees the same ox-drawn carts, the same utensils—wooden pitchforks and rakes, clumsy mattocks and spades and hoes, rude scythes and cradles and sickles—which were used universally in the days of our grandfathers, and which

² May not the remarkable acceleration in the rate of increase of the population of China which has taken place in the past two centuries in spite of famines, plagues, and massacres on a scale of which the Occidental mind has no conception be ascribed in part, at least, to the addition of these three items to the food supply?

still survive in many localities. The sheaves of wheat and barley are tied in the same way, and the strawstacks about every farmstead look precisely like strawstacks everywhere. At most, the differences in method between Chinese and American agriculture are no greater than those to be witnessed in this country between the broad and level western farms with their large application of machinery, and the small rugged hillside farms of our eastern states, where primitive methods still to a great extent prevail.

Looking at the importation of Chinese labor in this country from still another point of view, the fear might, it is conceivable, be honestly entertained that where it was collected in large numbers the safety and peace of the countryside would be imperilled. Such a notion, to anyone at all acquainted with the ingrained orderliness and respect for law and authority of the Chinese agrarian population, would appear laughable. Unfortunately however the ideas prevalent in this country regarding the Chinese are inspired largely by recollections of the Boxer outburst; by sensational photoplays and melodramas staged in some impossible "Chinatown," with highbinders and opium smokers and slave girls as characters; and by the addresses of a few misguided exponents of the Gospel—exceptions, it is only just to say, to the great majority of their class—who feel it incumbent upon them to display in as lurid a light as possible the evil qualities of "the Chinaman at home" in order to swell the size of contributions to the cause of his conversion.

Bad characters exist in China, naturally, as they do in all countries; but it is the writer's conviction, based upon a somewhat extended experience with both types, that the American "bad man," be he native Anglo-Saxon, or half-breed Mexican outlaw, or New York gunman, is a very much more evil and treacherous and generally undesirable sort of person than is his Chinese confrère. And in both countries, it must be remembered, these types are the exception. Of the great mass of the population in China, and particularly of the rural population, it would be easy to multiply instances of the good qualities, drawn from the re-

ports of large numbers of properly qualified observers. For considerations of space, however, the writer will content himself with a statement of the conclusions at which he himself has arrived, after a residence of eighteen years in various parts of the Far East, and after travels which have taken him through twelve of the eighteen provinces into which China proper is divided.

Chinese ideals of right and wrong are practically the same as our own, and are probably on the whole somewhat better lived up to. Respect for the marriage tie and for the aged is carried considerably farther in China than is the case in this country. That there are certain practices which, though recognized as vicious, are carried on more or less openly in China is certainly true; whereas with us, though probably more generally prevalent, these practices are resorted to only in secret and furtively, being ignored or hushed up by all respectable people. The virtue of charity has also been cultivated in China to a very great extent, contrary ideas notwithstanding; the existence of beggars in such vast numbers is sufficient proof of that, if other were lacking. Repeatedly the writer has seen humble pedestrians, trudging along, pack on back and stick in hand, stop and drop a few cash into the outstretched bowl of some blind or crippled or leprous unfortunate, and upon inquiry the motive given has been the wish to "acquire merit in the next life." This motive will no doubt appear inadequate to people whose lives are governed by the yearning to "lay up treasure in Heaven;" but that it is efficacious in inducing acts of a charitable nature will have to be admitted.

Again, the writer has been repeatedly impressed by the apparently reckless way in which fruits, cooked foods, and sweetmeats, exposed for sale on stands along the road, were left entirely unwatched. Any fruit vendor in this country who left his applecart unguarded in a busy thoroughfare, whether in town or in country, would be apt, on his return, to find his stock depleted; but such appears not to be the case in China, in spite of the fact that more or less acute hunger is the constant and familiar companion of a great

majority of the poorer classes. That thieves of course exist in China is not to be disputed, although their number is probably nothing like what it would be in this country were a like condition of grinding poverty and insufficiency of the most elemental needs of life to occur. It can not be emphasized too strongly that the Chinese laboring class is as honest and law abiding and reliable as that of any country in the world, and far more so than that of many of the countries which have been permitted to dump upon our shores the dregs of their population without a demur upon the part of our statesmen at Washington or our patriots in the back blocks.

It is a commonplace that where large bodies of laborers of European or African race are gathered together in this country, as for instance in mining or railway construction camps, drunkenness, prostitution, and disorder occur, sometimes reaching proportions which render them a serious menace to the more permanent and orderly portion of the community. Such a state of affairs would be unthinkable in a camp of Chinese laborers in this country. They are not drunkards, prostitution would be out of the question for more reasons than one, and among them it is not customary to prosecute their personal vendettas with the aid of stiletto or razor or revolver; their quarrels, in fact, rarely get beyond the point of vigorous personal abuse, particularly since the abolition of the queue has deprived would-be combatants of a convenient point d'appui.

As regards the question of repatriation, that should present no difficulties whatever. The laborers, if organized under some plan similar to that already put into practice with such good results by our Allies, would be under what would amount to military control from the moment of their enlistment until they were discharged again in their native land. That any considerable number of them, or any of them at all for that matter, without European style clothing, without funds, without a knowledge of the language or of the country, should be able to escape from surveillance, conceal themselves until the hue and cry died down, and, finally, establish themselves over here in economic compe-

tition with our own people, is an idea which does more credit to its propounder's imagination than to his mental equipoise.

About the utility and practicability, then, of such an auxiliary force of farm laborers during the present crisis there can be no question, provided always that the plan is worked out and carried into operation by individuals familiar with the actual needs of the situation, with questions of transportation, and with the modes of thought and the manner of living of the peoples of the Far East. Such a plan, it is evident, would speedily supply the shortage which is universally admitted to exist in the supply of farm labor, and supply it, moreover, with a class of men more skilled than any in the world in the getting of food from the soil—"farmers of forty centuries," as the late Prof. F. H. King called them in his classical little book on the agriculture of the Far East. This class of labor would not come into competition with any in this country, first, because it would be under direct governmental supervision and not in the open labor market at all; and second, because the class of labor with which it might compete is practically nonexistent. If food is to win the war, it is surely more practical to enlist in its production a large force of experienced, industrious professional farmers, than to urge commuting business men to cultivate their backyards before and after office hours, or to set school children to work and expect them, with their lack of strength and experience, to make any effective contribution to the food supply of the allied nations.

There is, moreover, another advantage in the plan, only second in importance to the primary one that it enables us to increase the food supply more surely and speedily than in any other way. It is taken as a matter of course that such a force of laborers would be repatriated as soon as possible after the close of the war. Naturally, the signing of peace will not bring about by some miraculous means an instantaneous abundance of food and other material needs, and months will elapse before nations now organized for war

can transform themselves into communities organized for peace. Nevertheless sooner or later this force of Chinese farm laborers would return to its native land. Instead, however, of returning the same untraveled, ignorant, unsophisticated individuals who left it to go to the United States, they would have undergone a training in American ideals and material culture and standards of living which could in no other way be given so advantageously to such great numbers of men. These men, upon their return to China, would scatter far and wide through the country, returning each to his native village, as every Chinese hopes to do; and there they would become advance agents, as it were, for American ideas and ideals, American products of many kinds, American notions in regard to the standard of living, of material comfort, of political and social and economic and educational processes—of all that group of ideas and of material facts which taken together form that particular type of civilization, founded upon liberty and law, which we regard as peculiarly our own and for the right to perpetuate which we are now fighting on the battlefields of Europe. In no other way could America so quickly and effectively aid her sister republic to find herself and establish herself upon those solid foundations of democracy and constitutionalism upon which we ourselves have built.

We affect to look with pitying contempt upon the aims of those misguided Oriental nations which have until recently endeavored to keep themselves free of contact with the nations of the west by pursuing a strict policy of exclusion of all foreign persons, products, and ideas. The motive behind this policy was of course the desire to ward off danger to national independence, just as our motive in pursuing an Oriental exclusion policy, in so far as it is not based on ignorant race prejudice pure and simple, is the desire to ward off possible economic dangers. These dangers, however, are not to be permanently averted merely by building dams and dykes against them. The flow of a river is not to be stopped by building a dam across its bed. Sooner or later the current will overtop the dam, or burst it asunder, and the ensuing flood will be more destructive than the danger which the dam was built to avert.

It is no longer possible for nations to shield themselves behind "Chinese walls" of seclusion and isolation, as we have tried to do hitherto. The Orient tried it and failed, and the same result is bound sooner or later to overtake a like attempt on the part of the Occident. The only solution, then, is to overlook no opportunity to extend a helping hand to the Orient, to aid it in every possible way in its efforts to advance, to grasp the essentials of modern civilized life, and to assimilate its standards of living to our own. In this way, and only in this way, can the danger of future economic competition of a disastrous nature be avoided. The Oriental is quite as susceptible as is his Occidental brother to the pleasure to be derived from creature comforts and luxuries, and he is equally averse to having these taken away from him once he has become accustomed to them. The reason why our present standards of living do not exist in China is the same which explains their non-existence in the Europe and America of only a few generations ago; modern means of communication, of transportation, and of the application of machinery to the numberless processes of modern civilized life have not yet been introduced. The country is predominantly agricultural. Commerce, manufactures, mining, and transportation have yet to be developed to the point where they can begin to afford a livelihood to any very great part of the population. Political ideals will have to crystallize in the shape of definite, well thought out, generally accepted and consistently followed policies, both domestic and foreign. Until these changes take place standards of living and the crowding of population upon the limit of food supply will improve but slowly. The presence in China of a great army of men in the prime of life who have been in close personal contact with our American civilization in its manifold aspects would have an influence simply incalculable in aiding that country to accelerate its adjustment to modern world conditions with the least friction or waste of time and effort. The effect, too, upon the extension of American commerce after the war, through the foothold that would thus be gained in the Chinese markets, will at once suggest itself to every thinking man.

KOREAN BUDDHISM¹

By Frederick Starr

I am to speak to you this morning on the subject of Korean Buddhism. My reason for speaking on this subject is that little is known in regard to it anywhere. I therefore bring something that at least has the merit of being new to most of you.

Korea is always named as one of the Buddhistic countries of the world; it has been so for many, many years. We may divide the history of Korea into three very well marked periods of time. There is, first a period known as the era of the Three Kingdoms; it ended with the year 918, a date easy to remember because exactly one thousand years ago. The second period of Korean history is known as that of the Koryu dynasty. It began with the year 918 and came to an end in 1392, a year equally easy to remember because precisely a century before the discovery of America by Columbus. The third period of Korean history, commonly known as the period of the Yi dynasty, began with 1392 and continued until 1910, when the independent history of Korea ended with its absorption by Japan.

The history of Buddhism in Korea is divided into the same three periods because the things which led to these breaks in the national history were landmarks in the history of the national religion. The early period was called the era of the Three Kingdoms because at that time the peninsula was divided among three different nations. In the north was the kingdom of Koguryu, sometimes called Koma. It occupied more than half of the peninsula. Its capital city was P'yeng-Yang, still a city of importance. The second kingdom was small; in the southwest of the peninsula, known by the name of Pakche, it was also called

¹ An address delivered at All Souls Church, Chicago, March 10, 1918.

Kudara. The third kingdom occupied the southeastern section of the peninsula. It was larger than Pakche but smaller than Koguryu and was called Silla or Shiragi. Such, then, were the three kingdoms, which existed through a period of hundreds of years.

Buddhism first came to Koma. It was introduced in the year 369, and its introduction was the result of foreign missionary effort. In those days there was an empire of China, but there were also various small Chinese kingdoms on the northern border of the Korean peninsula. The first Buddhism that entered Korea came from one of those little Chinese kingdoms and it came naturally to the northernmost of the three kingdoms—to Koma. The king of that little Chinese kingdom sent the message by the hands of a priest named Sundo, who brought images and sacred texts. He was well received on his appearance in P'yeng-Yang. In fact, the king of the country put him in charge of the education of his son, the crown prince. In a few years the new religion made great headway, and, just as everywhere where Buddhism went, it carried with it education and art, and Koma became a center of culture and advancement.

Within a short time, Sundo was aided by a new priest sent from the same Chinese kingdom,—a man named Ado, who came in 374, when Sundo had been in the country about five years. The immediate effect of Ado's coming was that two great monasteries were built in P'yeng-Yang, over one of which Ado was placed, while Sundo was in charge of the other. These two monasteries were not only centers of religion; they were full-fledged universities, according to the idea of universities of those days. Buddhism spread rapidly, so that in 392 it became the recognized and official religion of the kingdom of Koma.

We are told that in the year 375, as the result of the coming of these foreign priests, the capital city of P'yeng-Yang was laid out as a great ship. That sounds strange to us,—that a city should be laid out as a great ship. Although it is not an integral part of Buddhism, this idea of laying out the city of P'yeng-Yang as a great ship came from the Chinese teaching, and I want to say something about

the strange attitude of mind represented in it. The city of P'yeng-Yang was really *regarded* as a great ship, and a mighty mast was erected in the city in order that the sails of prosperity might waft the city to good fortune and success.

Even today one may see great masts scattered over the Korean peninsula, some in the most out-of-the-way places. These masts rise to a great height. They are built of metal, with a center of timber. They still evidence that ancient notion that a city or a valley or an entire district was considered as a ship.

Still stranger ideas, however, affected the people of those times, and the evidence of them may still be seen in Korea. For instance, I recall clearly one spot near the great temple of Tsudoji, where the whole mass of country is a great cow. The different parts were pointed out to me. Here was the snout; here was an iron ring, to which the earth cow was supposed to be tied; here was a hollow in the rock, a foot or so in diameter, regarded as the nostril of the creature, which stretched out in the direction indicated to me, for many yards.

In another section, near Riri, I saw a mountain or hill which was thought to be a running horse; because there was danger from running horses in the older time, two pillars of rock had been raised (in accordance with the advice of the wise men of the day) in order to stop the horse from running into the fields and destroying the crops. Such notions seem to us extraordinary or strange, but they were part of the science of the day in P'yeng-Yang in those long ago times.

The little kingdom of Kudara received its Buddhism fifteen years later, in the year 384. Koma had been a center of missionary effort; the religion had been sent *there* from outside, unsolicited. But Kudara begged for the gospel and sent its messengers not to the little kingdoms on the north, but to the empire of China itself. They said: "Send us the great priest Marananda. We want Marananda to come and teach the people."

I forgot to tell you that Sundo was a Tibetan, born in the great mountain mass north of India; traveling from there eastward, first to China and afterwards to Korea, he carried his gospel. Marananda was a Hindu. He had great fame in the empire of the Chinese, and the people in Kudara wanted his ministry; Marananda came to the capital city of Kudara or Pakche, and the gospel was received with great willingness by the people.

He was himself housed in the king's palace; he was treated with great respect. Soon ten other priests came from China and the religion had no trouble in making headway throughout the kingdom of Kudara and it increased rapidly. It was from Kudara, in the year 552, that Buddhism was sent for the first time, by the king of that country, into Japan. And with it, he sent figures and texts and a letter telling the emperor of Japan, Kimmei, that it was a good religion and he hoped that the people would accept it.

The third of the three kingdoms, Shiragi, was the last to receive the Buddhist teaching, which came about 424. It came, I suppose, from the capital city of P'yeng-Yang, and they say that the priest who brought it was called Mukocha. They speak of him as "the black man,"—"the negro." Was this dark man truly a negro—or an Indian, or some other dark racial type? Mukocha went by boat; down the river Taidong to the sea and then around the peninsula and up to the east coast in order to reach the kingdom of Shiragi.

There seems to have been some mystery about his arrival. He hired himself out to a farmer and extraordinary things are told in regard to his life as a plowman, for he plowed for the farmer, who hid him in a cave. They said that when he was hidden in this cave, it frequently shone with glory. It is said that he was fond of art, and desired that his cave be carved with Buddhist carvings. He cured the daughter of the king, and because of that cure gained influence in the kingdom. The religion he brought was early Buddhism, called today Hinayana, or "the little vehicle."

This cave of Mukocha was a place of wonders. It is said that outside of it was a peach tree that blossomed with flowers of five different colors; in winter, when snow drifted around the cavern, plants of great beauty pushed their way up through the snow and blossomed and bore fruit. There are many strange and miraculous things told about this black monk, but there is no doubt about the beauty of the cave he left behind him. After he established the religion firmly in the country, he sent for artists to decorate that cave-temple. I have been in it; it is one of the fine things in art of the East. Situated near the summit of a hill, it looks down over the eastern sea; in the midst of the cavern-chapel is seated a stone Buddha of extraordinary beauty, carved from a single block of stone, some 11 or 12 feet in height. That figure has seen the sun rise through almost fifteen hundred years; beautiful in its silent, pensive attitude, it is surrounded by rock hewn figures, for the walls of the cave are decorated with carvings made by the artists who were sent to the black monk.

These figures represent the early disciples of Buddha; the faces are painted in different colors and the features represent different race types. The Buddha preached to all peoples of all races; and as his India swarmed with strangers, among his early disciples there may have been white men and brown men and black men.

I love to think of the old capital of Shiragi, Kyong Ju. It had its period of glory; among its ruins I have been deeply impressed. Here we may see the splendid grave of General Kim, 1200 years old. It is faced around its whole circumference with stone slabs set firmly in place; twelve of them are carved with the animals of the eastern zodiac. There is an ice-house among the ruins of old Kyong Ju, an ice-house perhaps 900 years old; cunningly built of stone, underground, with true arch-vaulting it sheltered ice for the chilling of food and the cooling of drink a thousand years ago. There is a stone observatory intended for celestial observation, still standing; it is perhaps 1250 years old and it is the oldest known structure of its kind remaining.

In those fine old days, Kyong Ju was a center of trade.

We are certain that Chinese and Koreans and Japanese were there; we are equally certain that Tibetans and Indians and Persians came thither and it is claimed that merchants from Arabia used to stand in its market place.

Of course, we always think of the country around the Mediterranean as being a site of culture long ago. We always think of movement there; that does not surprise us. But we are apt to think of the far east as being eternally stagnant, and it surprises us to think of Kyong Ju with Arabian merchants in its market place.

And it had its scholars. There was Ch'oc Chuen. He was a poet and essayist; he was a skilled calligrapher writing the beautiful Chinese characters famously; he was reckoned as one of the greatest sages and learned men of his day in China proper which was an honor not to be surpassed.

All that splendor, which is no more, goes back to 424 A.D., when Mukocha, the black monk, went there to teach. The religion which he introduced flourished and developed. It became in time the state religion, but it was no longer the simple religion that Mukocha brought; it was the developed Mahayana, northern Buddhism. Like all state religions, while it gained power, wealth, and ease, it became corrupt; toward the end it did much harm in Shiragi, as in the other two kingdoms. For instance, at one time, the king became so infatuated with Buddhism that he became himself a monk, divorced his wife and made her become a nun. Later, things became still worse. In 911 the king upon the throne was extremely devout. Kung-ye was his name. He was absolutely absorbed in Buddhism; he neglected his duties; he did frightful acts in the name of religion; there can be no question that he became insane. Then the crash came; the people rebelled against him; there was revolution and a leader, named Wangon arose. He was at first devoted to his master's cause, but finding the case hopeless, he listened to the demand of the people and joined in the revolution; in time he became king, and founder of a new dynasty, that of Koryu. In its later days Shiragi had become mistress of the whole peninsula and the kingdom over which Wangon ruled was a united Korea.

In 918 the second period in Korean history begins. Wangon realized that the chief trouble had been Buddhism. Still, he himself was Buddhist, and he continued to practice Buddhism, but on a more moderate scale. Having moved his capital to Songdo, he ended his first year, 918, with a famous festival of which we have a description.

There was an enormous lantern, hung about with hundreds of others under a tent made of a network of silken cords. Music was an important element. There were also representations of dragons, birds, elephants, horses, carts and boats. Dancing was prominent and there were in all a hundred forms of entertainment. Each official wore the long flowing sleeves, and each carried the ivory memorandum tablets. The king sat on a high platform and watched the entertainment.

You see, he was very far from cutting loose from Buddhism. We may say that Buddhism really flourished to an extraordinary degree over the whole peninsula. When Wangon died, in 942, he left a written message for his son and successor. It contained ten rules of conduct for his guidance as king. These rules were numbered from one to ten. Three had to do with religion and of course that religion was Buddhism. In the first rule he advised his son to continue to recognize Buddhism as the state religion of united Korea. The second rule was that he should build no more monasteries. While it was a good thing to continue Buddhism, it was a bad thing to build more monasteries, as too much money had already been spent upon them. The sixth of his rules was for the establishment of an annual Buddhist festival of the same nature as the one he had celebrated at the end of his first year. So Wangon did not destroy Buddhism, but continued it as the national religion.

In course of time the old religion regained its destructive influence. It gathered wealth and refinement and became corrupt beyond even what it had been before. There is not time to state the different points. I shall mention briefly a few instances and events from the history of the religion during this period. In 1026 there was an effort made to break its power; there had come in from China

a fuller development of Confucianism the official class became Confucianist; it organized and directed everything done in the government. Between the officials, Confucianists, and the priests, Buddhists, there grew up a deadly conflict.

In 1036 the king was devoutly Buddhist. "Those who could read the signs of the times surmised this when in 1036 the king decreed that if a man had four sons, one of them must become a monk. Because of the Buddhist canon against the spilling of blood, the death penalty was changed to banishment. Another great festival was added. The king also encouraged the custom of having boys go about the streets with Buddhist books on their backs from which the monks read aloud as they went along to secure blessings for the people." (Hulbert.)

In 1046 it is said the king fed and lodged 10,000 monks in his palace. In 1056 or thereabouts one son out of three was compelled to become a monk. In 1136 we are told that 30,000 monks were present at a single ceremony.

Under such circumstances, what would happen? When a religion had such a hold on the community—building splendid monasteries, developing great temples, making idols into whose construction gilt of pure gold entered in great quantity, making bells of metal that might have been used better for practical ends, draining the people of wealth by giving enormous properties eternally into the possession of the monasteries, a crash was bound to come. It came in Korea. The country had been drained; the people had been heavily burdened; the men who as monks and priests should have led the people in instruction and in good living, were corrupt beyond conception.

At last, in the year 1392, a man arose who fought against the king. The basis of his fighting was the fact that the government was completely given over to a corrupt religion. In 1392 the old kingdom of Korai disappeared and with it the dynasty of Koryu, and in their place came the modern Chosen and the Yi dynasty. Seoul became the new capital.

Just as before, it was the successful general who became the founder of the new dynasty; in this case also he had been

loyal at first to the deposed king. This man's name was Yi, and his title Ta-jo, and he is commonly known in Korea as Yi Ta-jo. He is revered as the founder of the dynasty which has just ended. Remember that it was Buddhism carried to excess against which the revolution had been directed. Just as Wangon was fairly gentle in his treatment of Buddhism, so Ta-jo did not at once wipe out the old religion. That remained to be done by a man considerably later, the king who ascended the throne in 1469. His name was Chasan. During the early part of his reign his mother ruled as regent. Three years later, in 1472, he abolished all monasteries and temples, not only in his capital city of Seoul, but in every city throughout the kingdom.

The priests, driven out of all the cities and large towns, had to take refuge in the mountains, and from that time down until these latter days there have been no Buddhist temples in Seoul or Songdo or P'yeng-Yang or the other cities of Korea. There have only been monasteries out in the mountains, often in inaccessible places.

Those were pretty drastic measures and under such drastic measures Korean Buddhism sank to its worst conditions. There were hard times in the mountain monasteries—400 years practically, of exile.

Several things happened. In the first place, each monastery became a thing of itself; there was no unity, no combination, no force in the movement of Buddhism as such over the kingdom. In the second place, not being permitted to enter the cities, the Buddhist priests gradually came to be looked upon with contempt by the people; they were, of course, beggars, vowed to poverty; they always had been that, but they had had respect; with their seclusion in mountain monasteries they lost the respect which had been paid them; they became ignorant, vicious and depraved. Buddhism could hardly sink lower than Korean Buddhism did after being driven to the mountains.

It would, however be a great mistake to think there were no good men among them; none who cared for education. Some incidents show redeeming features and show hope.

In 1592 (it is interesting how '92 runs through the his-

tory of Korean Buddhism—392, 1392, 1592) occurred the invasion of Hideyoshi. Hideyoshi, in Japan had become a great general, was actual ruler of the country; he had dreams of empire and wanted expansion. He sent a vast army to conquer Korea. This army was under two generals, one a Christian and the other a Buddhist. They wrought great destruction in the unfortunate peninsula. Even today, every man, woman, and child in Korea has heard the story of that time.

During Hideyoshi's invasion, there was a monk in one of the mountain monasteries named Hyu-Chung. I will read what Hulbert says:

Hyu-Chung, known throughout the eight provinces as the great teacher of Sosan, was a man of great natural ability as well as of great learning. His pupils were numbered by thousands, and were found in every province. He called together two thousand of them and appeared before the king at Euiju and said: "We are of the common people but we are all the king's servants, and two thousand of us have come to die for Your Majesty." The king was much pleased by this demonstration of loyalty and made Hyu-Chung a priest-general and told him to go into camp at Pop-heung monastery. He did so, and from that point sent out a call to all the monasteries in the land. In Chulla province was a warrior-monk, Choe-Yung, and at Diamond Mountain another named Yu-Chung. These came with over a thousand followers and went into camp a few miles to the east of P'yeng-Yang. They had no intention of engaging in actual battle, but they acted as spies, took charge of the commissariat, and made themselves generally useful. During battle they stood behind the troops and shouted encouragement. Yu-Chang, trusting to his priestly garb, went into P'yeng-Yang to see the Japanese generals.

So you see, notwithstanding the condition of poverty and ignorance and unimportance to which the Buddhist monks sank, there were still among them occasional teachers of great learning with thousands of students, who were ready to serve their king in his struggle against the invader.

In 1660 a curious condition had arisen. With these mountain monasteries open to any one who would come, they became a refuge for the disaffected generally. Suppose a man had trouble with his family; he would become religious and retire to a mountain monastery, becoming a monk; or if some man failed in business, he might find refuge as a

monk in a monastery; for one reason or another, it was easy for a man who was vicious or a failure or unhappy, to take refuge in the mountain monasteries. They flocked to them by thousands, until the government became disturbed and about 1660 the king issued an edict "that no more men with family ties should desert them in this way, and that all monks who had families living should doff their religious garb and come back to the world and support their families like honest men."

Such has been the history of Korean Buddhism. In 1902 an effort was made to revive it. In 1894 the Chinese-Japanese war took place. It was a war over Korea, and in 1895 it ended with the treaty of Shimonoseki. From 1895 on, Korea was a hot-bed of world intrigue. China, Russia, Japan, all were struggling on the peninsula for a continued foothold. Each was trying to gain advantage. Korea was a very important spot in the world. In 1904, came the great war between Japan and Russia, and in 1905 the treaty of Portsmouth. So you see, 1902 came right between those two great wars, both of which were fought on account of Korea. In 1902 the man who had been king—the last real representative of the Yi dynasty, had become emperor. One of the results of the war of 1894 was to make Korea an empire, and to make the king of Korea an emperor. In 1902 when the effort was made to reestablish and revive Buddhism in Korea, it was an empire with a new emperor. Hulbert, who never admired Korean Buddhism, says this:

In 1902, a very determined attempt to revive the Buddhist cult was made. The emperor consented to the establishment of a great central monastery for the whole country, in the vicinity of Seoul, and in it a Buddhist high priest who was to control the whole church in the land. It was a ludicrous attempt, because Buddhism in Korea is dead.

That was written by Dr. Hulbert in 1905. It referred to an attempt made in 1902, and it seemed to him that Buddhism was dead. Now, I visited Korea last year, and the bulk of my time while there was spent in the study of Korean Buddhism. I went to many of the monasteries. It was an interesting study, and I confess I should differ

strongly with Dr. Hulbert in saying that Korean Buddhism was dead.

It seems to me that, whatever was true in 1902, in 1917 and 1918 Korean Buddhism is very much alive. The monasteries of Korea are under the control of thirty head monasteries, each of which has from a handful to forty or more lesser monasteries and temples under its charge, looking to it for direction. These thirty head monasteries had come to be greatly reduced in property, membership, influence and splendor in 1902; that is true. It is true that they were separated from each other; there was no feeling of unity among them; each monastery was a thing by itself, and decay and corruption were evident everywhere.

But about five years ago the priests of the thirty head monasteries came together; they held a great meeting and discussed their common interests; they decided that union was necessary and a forward movement, a thing such as was tried in 1902 and which failed then. It was tried again and has not failed. They elected a President of their commission, and this President's term of office was for one year; now every year at their annual meeting they elect a President whose whole time is devoted to the interests of combined Korean Buddhism for that year. They bought property in the city of Seoul and erected a central building, partly temple, and partly office building. The expenses of the head office are borne by the thirty temples, in proportion to their importance and wealth; each contributes annually a set sum for the advancement of Buddhism in Korea.

While in Seoul this last year I visited a theological seminary of Buddhism. It has a good property in a desirable part of the city; it occupies a fine old Korean building; it has a corps of teachers of some ability; I found sixty-five students. The institution has been running about three years. The young men with whom I talked seemed to be earnestly interested in the work and looked forward to doing something in the way of advancement in the mountain monasteries. A definite course of three years' instruction is offered. The number of students has grown steadily, and I

imagine the time may come when there will be hundreds of students in this theological seminary.

And there is a magazine conducted today in the interests of Korean Buddhism. It has been under way for something like five years. The history of the young man who edits it is rather interesting. I met him and had quite a talk with him about his religious experience. His father is a pillar of the Presbyterian Church in Seoul, one of the most successful of the missionary churches of the city. The young man himself was educated in Catholic schools in the city of Seoul; his whole education came from foreigners, and he himself now has a double employment; he is official interpreter for the Belgian consul in the city of Seoul, but he finds his pleasure and devotion in his magazine for the advancement of Korean Buddhism. Son of a Presbyterian elder, trained in Catholic schools, speaking French, Korean, Chinese and Japanese, professionally engaged at a foreign consulate, he is the editor of a magazine whose object is to revive, strengthen and carry on Korean Buddhism. He is, moreover, the author of a history of Korean Buddhism, which is not yet in print. It is, I think, the only history of the kind that has been written covering the whole period of Korean Buddhism.

I went to Tsudoji on Buddha's birthday. It is one of the great mountain monasteries of the south. They knew I was coming and I therefore found a place to sleep. When we came near it—within three or four miles—we found the crowd going up; the nearest railway station is about ten miles away. Most of the people, however, had walked from their homes. It is a mountain district and a country district, not thickly populated; there are surely only two or three towns of any size within fifteen miles. When I reached Tsudoji I found one of the liveliest scenes I ever saw in Korea. The head priest told me that 10,000 people slept on the grounds of the temple that night. The majority of them were women. Of course, *that* would have been true, if it had been a Presbyterian gathering. I stayed there two nights. The full day I put in there, there was a wonderful crowd of people present; there were a few

Japanese,—a teacher and one or two officials,—but apart from those, the whole crowd was Korean. I have no doubt 15,000 people were on the grounds that day. I was interested to find that one of the events of that evening was a moving-picture show, on the grounds of the temple. The life of Buddha was to be represented in moving pictures before an audience of 10,000 Koreans. That didn't look much like death! I am told that at the other head monasteries there were proportionately equal crowds.

Korean Buddhism has perhaps a political part to play. When the Japanese took over Korea, Buddhists came into the country in great numbers. The Japanese are Buddhists and many Japanese priests and temples came with the settlers. The Japanese priests and temples, however, do not fit with the Koreans. There may be thousands of them but they will not make Korean converts,—not because the Japanese are not ready to do missionary work, but because the Koreans are not ready to accept it. The Korean Buddhism of today is Korean, not Japanese.

I can imagine nothing that would be more dangerous to Japanese control than a strong and vital Korean Buddhism that was hostile to Japan. On the other hand, I can think of nothing that would be a greater help to Japan than a Korean Buddhism developed among those people by their own priests and friendly to Japan. What Korean Buddhism is to be in the future depends upon its relation to the government now there. If Korean Buddhism accepts and coöperates with the Japanese control, it will become the mightiest factor that can be devised to make Japan's hold on the peninsula a success. If hostile to Japan, when the crisis comes, as it surely will come, when Japan will be tried out again and once for all on Korean soil, Korean Buddhism may be the decisive element in that moment of test.

ALLIANCE WITH JAPAN

By John Stuart Thomson, author of "The Chinese," "China Revolutionized"

From 1909 to 1914 I propagated in two of my books and in a number of magazines of Allied countries, a defensive Anglo-American-French naval alliance. I am now propagating the addition thereto of a Nipponese alliance, one purpose of which shall be the saving of all Asia (including the Philippines) from the German fist and submarine, whether the attack is made direct or by Bolsheviki or other agent.

From 1914, with Stephen Pichon, France's foreign minister, and Baron Sakatani, ex mayor of Tokio (now adviser to China at Peking) I have urged the prompt use of Nippon's armies on all fronts, so as to confine the war and win promptly. We had little difficulty in securing the approval of the Kensaikai (Opposition) party with 118 votes in the Diet.

I am tremendously impressed both with the value and with the warmth of this sympathy, led by Baron Kato, ex-Minister of Justice Ozaki, and ex-Premier Okuma. The latter even said that to save civilization from tyranny, Nippon would be willing to spend half a million lives on the western front or elsewhere. His exact words reported by Gregory Mason in the London *Outlook* are: "We should perhaps send half a million men or more, and be given 50 miles of the French front. We are willing to lose hundreds of thousands on the western front in order to strike Germany a blow of victory."

I of course urged that the Nipponese armies should have been used in 1914-1915 to strengthen the power and promptness of Brusiloff's drives for Vienna, to meet the Italian armies.

In September, 1917, we won the *Corriere della Sera* of Milan which said: "There will come a time when the missed

opportunity of the aid of the Nipponese armies will be considered the worst error of the Allies. Not a single statesman among the Allies has had the timely insight to urge a straightforward bid for Nippon's armies." Italy's Senator Ferraril said in the *Messagero* of Rome: "We want the Nipponese also in Macedonia." The *New York Times* of February 13 and February 27, 28, 1918 said tardily (America has been the slowest to appreciate the place and importance of Nipponese aid), "Use the Nipponese armies at once in Macedonia, Palestine, Siberia and all fronts." In foreign affairs we Americans are gifted with microscopic hindsight, instead of telescopic statesmanlike foresight. Why didn't the *Times* say this in 1914-1915 when Brusiloff was making his successful drives?

Economically of course it would not be right that Nippon should be enriched by the war through munition-making, and not spend some of the blood cost. That is why I want the Nipponese ships which bring Australian wool and beef and Javanese sugar to the western front, to bring also some of Nippon's soldiers. Via Canada and via Nipponese ships, we could soon land at least fifteen divisions on the western front. Of the effective countries (I do not include Pacifist China, though Baron Sakatani can gather up several hundred thousand soldiers there too) Nippon is richest in war-like youths.

We were profoundly grateful when in the fall of 1917 the powerful Tokio newspapers *Hochi* and *Nichi* admitted the theory that Nippon's armies might be needed and used even in Europe. We rejoiced when in January, 1918, the Kensaikai party (118 votes) read this declaration in the Diet: "Nippon has not been sufficiently positive in her support of the Allies to date."

Ex-Minister of Justice Ozaki (of Opposition) stood up in the Diet on January 28, 1918, and said impassionately: "I denounce the policy of the ministry to date. Nippon should more vigorously enter the war for democracy. I demand that Nippon increase the aid extended to the Allies."

Viscount Montono, foreign minister, told the Diet: "In order to secure lasting peace, we are firmly confident that,

Nippon must not recoil from any sacrifice she may be called upon to make."

Viscount Kato, president of the Kensaikai party, declared in an interview in the *Chugwai Shog-yo*: "Nippon should lend more aid to the Allies, in order that she should always maintain intimate relations with Britain, France and America."

Russia is and will be as disorganized as China for years to come, partly because her masses cannot read. She is the China of the white race (part Tartar indeed). Russia was Germany's chief aim all along. Lenine, Trotsky and the Bolsheviki are virtually Teuton agents, by the Brest-Litovsk record, and by the general belief throughout Poland. Our boys are now being killed on the Ypres and Amiens fronts by divisions, guns and ammunition released by the Bolsheviki for this purpose. Some of the guns being fired upon us, are Nipponese artillery that the Russians captured in Manchuria!

Nippon, America and the Allies must redeem Siberia and Russia by conscription for civilization; not by consent to the Bolsheviki's pacifist pro-Germanism. We must and will send Nippon in to rescue Siberia, and Baron Sakatani will see that China aids with her army. China owes us such a duty, and moreover she is one of our pledged Allies. Let us therefore recognize pro tem, under Generals Horvath and Semenof of Kharbin and Vladivostok, a rehabilitated Siberia under the aegis of Nippon, as our agent and ally.

I believe Barons Ishii and Shibusawa will, when the day of arrangement comes, agree to a fair protection and division of China's franchises, between Nippon and the Allies. "No Germans need apply." For one thing, Nippon will not consent to such a repetition of militarism in the Far East. She well knows that Germany intrigued the Korean, China and Russian wars against Nippon.

On November 2, 1917 America (and Britain inferentially—many of Britain's treaties being secret) officially recognized an indefinite phrase: "Nippon's special interests in the Far East." Of course this means two things: special duty to police the Far East against Germany, and proportionate

interests in China's franchises. I believe Baron Goto's party entertains this sense of financial compromise.

It is true that Nippon under Baron Hayashi's advice, once refused Secretary of State Knox's and E. H. Harriman's request for American participation in Manchurian railways, but Nippon explains that intriguing Germany had put China "up to" forcing on America a franchise from Kinchou on the Liao-tung Gulf, up through Mongolia and Siberia to Tsitsikar and Aigun, in competition with Nippon's Manchurian Railways, that were not paying overwell.

"What's the use of having cut-throat competition," said Nippon. This seems a reasonable explanation.

It is true that Professor Tsurutaro at one time was pro-Teuton academically, but almost everybody except the German is open to conversion and conviction! Editor Tokutomi has at times been anti-American in his journal the *Kokumin*, but doubtless Germany was lying to him about us!

M. Wakamiya has at times been anti-Caucasian, but so have some of us in our haste been anti-Nipponite! I possess my own share of vituperative vocabulary and sins of generalization! *Tempora mutantur et nos mutamur in illis!*

The Bourbon wing of the Terauchi party once demanded twenty-one monopolies from China, but if they thus outplayed German intrigue and meant to share with the Allies, it is all right; also providing that China received her due royalties, and would not waste the said receipts on purchases in Germany! Since the Chinese masses cannot read, China needs the supporting hand of both America and Nippon, America supplying the sentiment and Nippon supplying the police arm when necessary.

I. Nobutaro and the *Taivo* magazine at times were obstinate in objecting to Nippon giving maritime help to the Allies in the submarined zone, but deeds speak louder than words, and Nippon has sent many ships to help us, partially through a little economic pressure that America put upon the Obstructionists by delaying shipments of steel plates to

Nippon, till the ships were sent to do Nippon's share! This is what is known as "American shirt-sleeve diplomacy," and it has its uses with Obstructionists! I can recite three instances where ex-President Roosevelt, my esteemed friend, has used the same kind of diplomacy with Obstructionists in Germany, Nippon and even in Britain! Sometimes a son must speak "up and out," even to his father!

Baron Megata once objected to sending a Nipponese army to Europe, but other Nipponese more powerful have taken the other side,—for instance Baron Okuma! Kotaro Monchizuki once said in the Diet that "America should clear out of the Philippines," but responsible members of the Diet have told me that he is a humorist, and was only trying to force us to offer an alliance, which we now cordially do offer!

Katayama's, Nishakawa's, Kinoshita's, and Abé's Socialist party in Nippon is disorganized in war time and therefore does not come into this discussion.

Dr. Iyenaga, official spokesman in America for Nippon (East and West Advertising Bureau), at one time offered psychologic reasons why Nippon's armies should not be sent to Europe, and General Oshima, minister of war, at one time also opposed. Dr. Terao said: "Send no army." Dr. Senaga said: "Nippon's first aim should be commercial gain out of the war." Kinnosuke said practically the same thing, but then he is often facetious! Viscount Uchida thinks the Bolsheviki may infect Germany, and he waits and watches. But "watchful waiting" has been a success no where in this war; it lost Serbia and Rumania; it lost Bulgaria; it sacrificed Russia; it did all it could to lose Nippon.

But so have we all varied and fluttered in opinion, before we settled down to courageous and statesmanlike policies. Professor Ninagawa-Shin of Doshisha University, Kyoto, says in the *Nichon Nihonjin* magazine: "Nippon and the Allies should attack on the eastern front, even if Russia becomes a permanent foe, so as to prevent the Teutons withdrawing men for the western front." There speaks a real statesman of strategy and psychology, and with him I

dream a dream as follows, a dream which could have been effected in 1914-1915, if the Fiasco Cliques had acted courageously on the first diagnosis of the world war.

The final break must be made by a Nipponese army before Moscow, joining an Allied army finally at Vienna, and forcing and inducing and encouraging Bohemia, Turkey, Bulgaria, variable Ukraine, Hungary, Saxony whom Bismarck ravaged, Poland, Greece, Serbia, Rumania and Central Russia, to all work with us and choke off and ring round the mad north-German, Wodan-worshipping barbarian, thus ushering in a new type of civilization, based on the freedom and the league of race units, which (in a world-confederation) observe and fight for international law.

Like two samurai, Nippon and America face each other across the Pacific and on the other side of the Pacific (we are in the Philippines). May the crowd who look on, never shout out: "Abunaizo! Batto Shita" (look out! they are unsheathing their swords), unless those swords are unsheathed as partners against the common enemy.

THE INFLUENCE OF INDIA ON WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN MODERN TIMES¹

*By Benoy Kumar Sarkar, Professor, National Council of
Education, Bengal*

Modern civilization begins in 1776 with the publication of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*. Its formative period may be taken to have closed with 1815, when the fall of the Napoleonic empire, on the one hand, and the almost assured success of the "industrial revolution" on the other were laying the foundations of a new inter-political system and a new socio-economic order throughout the world. Ever since the year 1 of this new culture India has been in intimate touch with the West; for by the Regulating Act of 1772, the year of the partition of Poland, England took charge of the administration of the eastern provinces of the present British India.

It goes without saying that the achievements of the Occidental world in industry, science, philosophy and the fine arts during the nineteenth century have profoundly influenced the thoughts and activities of the people of India, as of other regions in Asia. But what is most likely to be missed by the student of culture-history is the fact that even the ancient and medieval civilization of the Hindus has been one of the feeders of this modern civilization itself; i.e., that the cultural movements in Europe and America since 1776 have been affected to an appreciable extent by the achievements of free India down to that period.

1. NAVAL ARCHITECTURE

In the days of the sailing ships and oaken vessels the naval engineering of the Hindus was efficient and advanced enough to be drawn upon with confidence for European

¹ Lecture delivered at Columbia University, New York, April, 1918.

shipping. At Madapollum, for example, on the Madras Coast, many English merchants used to have their vessels yearly built. The Hindu ship-architects could ingeniously perform all sorts of iron work, e.g., spikes, bolts, anchors, etc. "Very expert master-builders there are several here," says the English traveler, Thomas Bowrey in his *Geographical Account of Countries Round the Bay of Bengal (1669-1675)*; "they build very well, and launch with as much discretion as I have seen in any part of the world. They have an excellent way of making shrouds, stays, or any other riggings for ships" (p. 72, etc.).

Writing even so late as 1789, on the eve of the industrial revolution in Europe, Solvyns, the French traveler, could still recommend, in his *Les Hindous*, the Hindu method of uniting the planks as "not unworthy of the imitation of Europeans" (Vol. III, sixth number, ed. 1811). He says: "In ancient times the Hindus excelled in the art of constructing vessels, and the present Hindus can in this respect still offer models to Europe." (Ed. 1789, cited by Mookerji in his *History of Indian Shipping*, p. 250.)

In the building of a boat the Hindus began by choosing a large piece of timber which they bent as they pleased. To the two ends of this they attached another piece thicker than it, and covered this simple frame with planks; "but they have a particular manner of joining these planks to each other, by flat cramps with two points which enter the boards to be joined, and use common nails only to join the planks to the knee. For the sides of the boat they have pieces of wood which outpass the planks. This method is as solid as it is simple." (Solvyns, Vol. III, sixth number, ed. 1811.)

Some of the Hindu methods were actually assimilated by the Europeans. Thus, as the French writer observes: "The English, attentive to everything which relates to naval architecture, have borrowed from the Hindus many improvements which they have adopted with success to their own shipping." ((Mookerji, p. 251.) Further, the Portuguese "imitated" the pointed prow in their India-ships. This was a characteristic feature of the grab, a Hindu ship

with three masts. (Solvyns, Vol. III, fourth number, ed. 1811.)

The industrial and material culture of Old India was thus sufficiently vital to influence contemporary Europe at the threshold of the nineteenth century civilization.

2. THE SO-CALLED BELL-LANCASTERIAN PEDAGOGICS

During the formative period of the modern educational systems, also in Europe and America the pedagogy of the Hindus, especially on its elementary side, has played an important part.

It is well known that primary education was grossly neglected in America during the first half-century of her independence. In England even so late as 1843, 32 per cent of the men and 49 per cent of the women had to sign their names on the marriage register with a cross. Illiteracy was the rule in France also at the time of the Revolution, as Arthur Young observed. Guizot's educational commission (1833) found that "the ignorance was general" and that "all the teachers did not know how to write." (Compayrê, *History of Pedagogy*.)

In an age of paucity of "public schools" private educational efforts naturally elicited the people's admiration. And none drew more sympathy and support than Andrew Bell's (1753-1832) "mutual-tuition" or "pupil-teacher" or "monitorial" system of school management. His first school was founded in England in 1798, but in less than a dozen years 1000 schools were opened to teach 200,000 children. (Painter's *History of Education*, p. 305.) This "mutual instruction" was a craze in France also under the Restoration (Compayrê, p. 515). The same system known in America after Lancaster (1778-1838), the English rival of Dr. Bell in theology, was in vogue in the New England States during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. (Parker, *History of Modern Elementary Education*, 102, 241, 264, etc.) It could become so universal simply because of its cheapness as it did not involve the appointment of teachers. And as to its educational value, Bell was so en-

thusiastic as to declare, after visiting Pestalozzi's School at Yverdun in 1815, that in another twelve years mutual instruction would be adopted by the whole world and Pestalozzi's method would be forgotten. (Quick's *Educational Reformers*, p. 352.)

What, now, is the origin of this much-applauded mutual-instruction or monitorial system, the so-called Bell-Lancasterian "discovery" in Pedagogy? Historians of education are familiar with the fact that the plan of making one boy teach others has been indigenous to India for centuries. (Compayré, 6, 514; Painter, p. 305; Meiklejohn, *An Old Educational Reformer*, Dr. Andrew Bell, pp. 25-26.) Bell, himself, in his *Mutual Tuition* (Pt. I, ch. I, V) describes how in Madras he came into contact with a school conducted by a single master or superintendent through the medium of the scholars themselves. And, in fact, in England the monitorial system or the method of making every boy at once a master and a scholar is known as the "Madras system."

England's debt to India in pedagogics has been fitly acknowledged in the tablet in Westminster Abbey, which describes Andrew Bell as "The eminent founder of the Madras System of Education, which has been adopted within the British empire, as the national system of education for the children of the poor." (Narendra Law's *Promotion of Learning in India by Early European Settlers*, p. 49, 61.)

3. "SHAKOONTALA" AND THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT

The romantic movement in Germany and England, with its after-math, the English pre-Raphaelite movement, has been the greatest force in Europe's modern letters and art. The poetry of Old India has furnished an impetus to this current also of nineteenth century thought.

The "Shakoontala" of Kalidas, the Hindu dramatist of the fifth century A.D., was Englished by Jones in 1789. Forster's German rendering (1791) of it from the English version at once drew the notice of Herder (1744-1803), the

great champion of comparative methodology and "Welt-literatur." And Herder introduced it to Goethe, on whom the effect was as tremendous as that of the discovery of America on geographers, and of Neptune on students of astronomy. Goethe's ecstasy expressed itself in the ultra-enthusiastic lines:

Wilt thou the blossoms of the spring, the fruits of late autumn,
 Wilt thou what charms and enraptures,
 Wilt thou what satisfies and nourishes,
 Wilt thou in one name conceive heaven and earth,
 I name, Shakoontala, thee, and in that is everything said.

These are the words of a man who in 1771 had dramatized the narrative of Gotz, a medieval bandit. The sentiment in favor of the Rousseauesque "state of nature," the love of "ancient reliques," the Bolshevik revolt against the *status quo* of art, the subversion of classic restraint, the lyric abandon to the promptings of the imagination, the awakening of the sense of wonder, and the craving of the soul for the unknown, the mystery—a great deal of all that was later to be associated with Scott, Shelley, Schiller, and La-Martine had been anticipated and focused in that drama of "Storm and Stress." It is not strange, therefore, that the great "futurist" of the eighteenth century, the father of modernism in European literature, should have welcomed the Hindu Shakespeare as warmly as he did the Elizabethan. For in Goethe's eyes wistfully looking for more light, more spontaneity, more freedom, both shed the "light that never was on sea or land," the one as the star of the Middle Ages, the other as the sun of a hitherto unknown world.

"Shakoontala" left an indelible impression upon the literary activity of this pioneer of romanticism. It is the story of a woman with child deserted by her lover. The Gretchen-episode in the tragedy of Faust may thus have been inspired by the dramatist of India. At any rate, German critics have pointed out that the conversation between the poet, the manager and the Merry Andrew in the prelude to "Faust" is modelled upon that in Kalidasa's play, in which the manager and one of the actresses talk as to the kind of performance they are to give.

The "Shakoontala" *furore* has lasted till almost today. One of the noblest "overtures" in European music is the "Shakoontala overture" of the Hungarian composer Goldmark (1830-1915).

4. THE "GEETA" IN EUROPE AND AMERICA

Another force that Old India has contributed to the life and thought of the modern world is the profound optimism of the "Geeta" (ca. B.C. 600-200?), a section of the "Mahabharata" (the Great Epic). The "Geeta" was translated into English in 1785. It was popularized in Germany by Herder. Since then its *leit motif* has been absorbed by the sponge-like minds of the greatest thinkers of Europe and America. It may be said to be held in solution in almost every great "poetical philosophy" or "philosophical poetry" of our times down to Bergsonian "intuition."

In the first place, the "Geeta" is the philosophy of duty and *Niskama Karma* (work for its own sake), of the "categorical imperative." In the second place, it tries to solve the mystery of death, which is but an aspect of the larger and more comprehensive problem of the evil. The solution is reached in the conceptions of the immortality of the soul, the infinite goodness of God, the nothingness of death and the virtual denial of the existence of evil. Such postulates are of the deepest significance as much to the lover who seeks an "eternal" union of hearts, as to the warrior who must bid adieu to the body in order to save the soul. This Bible of Old India has therefore influenced not only the *Imitation of Christ* by Thomas à Kempis but also Tennyson's "In Memoriam" and Browning's "La Saisiaz," both inspired by the death of friends.

The "obstinate questionings" in Browning's poetry are the same as those of Arjuna in the "Geeta:"

Does the soul survive the body?
Is there God's self—no or yes?

The answer in both "La Saisiaz" and the "Geeta" is in the emphatic affirmative. It is a message of hope to suffer-

ing humanity. Men and women in distress can brace their hearts up if they are assured that somehow through God's mysterious dispensation the good persists in and through the evils that are apparent. This Hindu optimism is voiced also by Walt Whitman, the voracious student of world-thought, in the following words:

Roaming in thought over the universe
I saw the little that is Good steadily hastening towards immortality,
And the vast all that is called Evil
I saw hastening to merge itself and become lost and dead.

Tennyson had made only a tentative and halting statement to the same effect:

Oh, yet we trust that *somehow* good
Will be the final goal of ill.

But the paean of the Upanisadic *Ananda* (or bliss) and *Amrita* (or immortality) rises clearly forth in Browning:

Why rushed the discord in, but that harmony should be prized?

Further,

The evil is null, is nought; is silence, implying sound;
On the earth the broken arcs; in the heaven, a perfect round.

The syllogism of the "Geeta" leads, indeed, on such-like arguments, to the more drastic conclusion:

Up then! and conquer! in thy might arise!
Fear not to slay the soul, for the soul never dies.

Even militarism and man-killing are thus not evils in Hindu optimism. No wonder that the "Geeta" should have been a source of inspiration to the most diverse minds seeking comfort and strength. It could not fail to be a trumpet to the prophets of Duty, and such prophets were Carlyle, the sage of Chelsea, and Mazzini, the political mystic of the Italian regeneration.

With the memorable words, "Close thy Byron, Open thy Goethe," Carlyle sent forth his *Sartor Resartus* to the English people, as the manifesto of an all-round Germanism. This German *Kultur* was the idealism of Kant, Lessing,

Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, the nearest European ally of Hindu Monism. It opened the Anglo-Saxon mind to the sense of the infinite, of the majesty of the spiritual self, and electrified the soul to the recognition of the "duties that lie nearest thee." The gospel that taught people to "make thy numerator zero in order that the quotient may be infinite" converted the Bostonians of the trans-Atlantic world from Lockites into metaphysicians. This "new thought" of the day was worshipped by Parker and Emerson around the "Dial." The New England Transcendentalists thus became kinsmen of the Hindus.

5. HINDU TECHNIQUE IN POST-IMPRESSIONIST ART

"Modern" is the term that seems to have been monopolized by the artists who claim Cézanne as their inspirer. And yet in this modernism Old India's paintings and sculptures have been a stimulating force.

The plastic art-creations at Bharhut and the frescoes at Ajanta constitute in stone and colour the poetry of the whole gamut of human emotions from "the ape and tiger" to the "god-in-man." The encyclopaedic humanism of Hindu art is indeed comparable only to the comprehensive secularism in the painted *bas reliefs* of Egyptian hill-caves and the stately *Kakemonos* of the Chinese masters. While the message of the artists and craftsmen of India is thus universal as the man of flesh and blood, they developed certain peculiarities in the technique and mode of expression which "he that runs may read."

The most prominent characteristic of the Hindu sculptures and paintings is what may be called the "dance-form." We see the figures, e.g., Shiva, the prince of dancers, or Krisna, the flute-player, *in action*, doing something, in the supple movement of limbs. Lines in graceful motion, the play of geometric contours, the ripple of forms, the flowing rhythm of bends and joints in space would arrest the eye of every observer of the bronzes, water-colours and *gouache* works in India. Another characteristic that cannot fail to be noticed is the elimination of details, the suppression of

minuter individualities, on the one hand, and, on the other, the occasional elongation of limbs, the exaggeration of features, etc. All this is brought about by the conscious improvising of a new "artistic anatomy," out of the natural anatomy known to the exact science of Ayurveda (medicine). In the swollen breasts, narrowed waists, bulky hips, etc., of Late Minoan or Cretan (*ca.* 1500 B.C.) works which bridged the gulf between the Pharaonic and the primitive Hellenic arts we can see the analogues or replicas of some of the Hindu conventions.

Leaving aside other characteristics, e.g., the absence of perspective, the grouping of colour-masses, the free *laissez faire* treatment of sentiments, etc., one can easily pick up the Hindu elements from the Cézannesque paintings and Rodin's sculptures and drawings.

Let us listen first to Rodin lecturing on the beauties of Venus of Melos:

In the synthesis of the work of art the arms, the legs, count only when they meet in accordance with the planes that associate them in a same effect, and it is thus in nature who cares not for our analytical description. The great artists proceed as nature composes and not as anatomy decrees. They never sculpture any muscle, any nerve, any bone for itself; it is the whole at which they aim and which they express. (Dudley's transl., p. 15.)

It is this theorizing that virtually underlies Hindu art work.

Similarly Vincent Van Gogh (1853-1890), the Dutch painter, who, if not in execution like Cézanne, has at least, in ideal, pioneered the new art movement of today, seems almost to have given the theory of Hindu art from the side of painting. He says:

I should despair if my figures were correct; I think Michelangelo's figures magnificent, even though the legs are certainly too long and the hips and the pelvis bones a little too broad; It is my most fervent desire to know how one can achieve such deviations from reality, such inaccuracies and such transfigurations, that come about by chance. Well, yes, if you like, they are lies, but they are more valuable than the real values. (*The Letters of a Post-Impressionist*, translated from the German by A. M. Ludovici, p. 23.)



Rodin was charged with the crime of being an "innovator" in art for he introduced movement and action into statuary. His "St. Jean Baptiste" (1880) is a specimen in point, as also the interlaced figures like the "Hand of God" holding man and woman in embrace, "Cupid and Psyche," "Triton and Nereid," etc. With regard to this "new technique," the representation of activity, we are told by Van Gogh that the "ancients did not feel this need."

To render the peasant form at work is, I repeat, the peculiar feature, the very heart of modern art, and that is something which was done neither by the Renaissance painters, nor the Dutch masters, nor by the Greeks. (*The Letters*, 22, 24.)

It is thus clear why the theory and practice that seek movement in art-forms, appreciate an "incorrect" anatomy and look upon arbitrary proportions as not distortions but "restorations," should find an affinity with the work of the Hindu masters. And the psychology of this post-impressionist art-credo is perfectly natural, because like the previous pre-Raphaelitism and the still earlier romanticism, the new art movement is essentially a revolt. It is a reaction against the Academicians' rule of thumb. It is born of a discontent with the things that be, and of a desire to search for truth and beauty from far and old.

This latest revolution in art was brought about when Gauguin, the French master, conceived

the truth that the modern European and his like all over the globe, could not and *must not*, be the type of the future. Anything rather than that! Even black men and women were better than that—cannibals, idolators, savages, anything! (Ludovici's introduction to *The Letters*, etc., p. xii.)

With such an article of faith the present-day artists have been seized by "Wanderlust." Today they draw their inspiration from the Mexicans and American-Indians, from the Negro art of the Congo regions, from Karnak and Nineveh, from the Tanagras of Greece and the "primitives" of Italy. And they roll their eyes from "China to Peru." The Buddhist, Shaiva, Vaisnava, Moghul and Rajput arts of India have but enlarged the list of the new Ossians

and Percy's "Reliques" as whetters of the "futurist" imagination.

6. MANU AS THE INSPIRER OF NIETZSCHE

Nietzsche's Dionysian cult is one of the latest great forces in world-culture. The web of recent Eur-American life is being supremely invigorated by the warp of the Nietzschean *Will to Power*. It is interesting to observe that almost the whole of this new cult is reared on Hindu humanism and energism. Old India has contributed its hoary Manu as the master-builder in order to boss the super-men who are to architecture the Occident of the twentieth century.

Nietzsche, like the "futurists" of all ages, believes that the world is in need of a thorough-going "transvaluation of values." How is that to be effected? The means to the re-humanizing of humanity have been devised, says he, by the Hindus. "Close thy Bible, open thy Code of Manu" is his prescription. And why? Because Manu is the proponent of an "affirmative" religion—the religion of the "deification of power," whereas Christianity is the creed of the slave, the pariah, the chandala. (*The Will to Power*, Vol. I, Bk. II, p. 126.)

One breathes more freely, after stepping out of the Christian atmosphere of hospitals and poisons into this more salubrious, loftier and more spacious world. What a wretched thing the New Testament is beside Manu, what an evil odour hangs around it! (*The Twilight of Idols*, p. 46.)

In Nietzsche's estimation Manu is a better because more frank teacher of political science, also, than the insincere philosophers of the Western world. Thus, "Manu's words again are simple and dignified; 'Virtue could hardly rely on her own strength alone. Really it is only the fear of punishment that keeps men in their limits and leaves every one in peaceful possession of his own.'" (*The Will*, Vol. II, Book IV, p. 184.)

In international politics Hindu theory since the days of Kautilya (fourth century B.C.), the Bismarck of the first

Hindu empire, has been candidly Machiavellian. Nietzsche finds greater truth in the mercilessly correct view of inter-statal relations given by the Hindus than in the hypocritical statements of Occidental statesmen whose actions belie their words.

Rather what Manu says is probably truer: we must conceive of all the states on our own frontier, and their allies, as being hostile, and for the same reason, we must consider all of their neighbors as being friendly to us. (*The Will*, Vol. II, Book IV, p. 183.)

This is the celebrated doctrine of *Mandala* (circle of states) fully described in Kautilya's *Artha-shastra* and Kamandaka's *Neeti*, both treatises on politics.

The fundamental reason for Nietzsche's sympathy with, and advocacy of, Hindu culture is to be found in the fact that the Hindus were keenly alive to the animality in human life and interests, and that their "Weltanschauung" embodied the joy of living in its entirety. As Nietzsche observes, Manu has "organized the highest possible means of making life flourish."

The fact that, in Christianity, "holy" ends are entirely absent, constitutes my objection to the means it employs . . . My feelings are quite the reverse when I read the Lawbook of Manu, . . . an incomparably intellectual and superior work . . . It is replete with noble values, it is filled with a feeling of perfection, with a saying of yea to life, and a triumphant sense of well-being in regard to itself and to life, the sun shines upon the whole book. All those things which Christianity smothered with its bottomless vulgarity, procreation, woman, marriage, are here treated with earnestness, with reverence, with love and confidence." (*The Antichrist*, p. 214-215.)

It is this secular outlook, this positive standpoint, this humanism that has given a sanctity to life in Hindu thought. "I know of no book in which so many delicate and kindly things are said to woman, as in the Lawbook of Manu; these old graybeards and saints have a manner of being gallant to women which perhaps cannot be surpassed." "The breath of a woman," says Manu, on one occasion, "the breast of a maiden, the prayer of a child, and the smoke of the sacrifice are always pure." Elsewhere he says; "There is nothing purer than the light of the sun, the shadow

cast by the cow, air, water, fire, and the breath of a maiden.”
(*The Antichrist*, 215.)

7. SANSKRITIC CULTURE AND THE “COMPARATIVE” SCIENCES

The greatest *differentium* between the modern civilization and all that the world witnessed between the Chaldaean ages and the eve of the industrial revolution is the phenomenal expansion of the human mind. This has brought in its train a catholicity of interests and toleration of divergent views. In this emancipation of the intellect from the thralldom of parochial and racial outlook, Old India's contribution has probably been the most helpful and significant. The reason is not far to seek. The “discovery of Sanskrit” by the European scholars of the eighteenth century opened the portals to the series of sciences called “comparative.” And it is this that has rendered possible the recognition, though not complete yet, of the fundamental uniformity in the reactions of man to the stimuli of the universe.

The first fruit of the discovery was “comparative philology.” Jones founded the Asiatic Society of Bengal at Calcutta in 1784, and in 1786 hit upon the hypothesis of a common source of Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Gothic, Celtic and Persian. The linguistic survey was pursued more systematically by the poet Schlegel, who, in his *Die Weisheit der Indier* (1808, *The Language and Wisdom of the Indians*) announced that the languages of India, Persia, Greece, Italy, Germany, and Slavonia were the daughters of the same mother and heirs of the same wealth of words and flections. Comparative philology was scientifically established by Bopp's *Das Conjugationssystem* (1816) and “*Comparative Grammar*” (completed in parts between 1833 and 1852).

Once the unity of the Indo-Aryan or Indo-Germanic languages was realized, the road was opened to the interpretation of ideas, ideals, rituals, customs, superstitions, folk-lore, etc., on a more or less universal basis. This has ushered in the sciences of comparative mythology and com-

parative religion, for which Max Müller's *Sacred Books of the East* series is chiefly responsible. The investigation has not stopped at this point. Secular, economic, political, and juristic institutions and theories have been attacked by the methodology of comparative science, and the result has been works like Maine's *Village Communities* (1871), *Ancient Law*, and *Early History of Institutions* (1876). More "intensive" studies have indeed compelled a modification of the conclusions of the pioneers; but, on the whole, in the field of social science Sanskritic culture has been demanding a gradually enlarging space.

The trend of latter-day scholarship is to detect, through the ages of history, the close parallelism and *pragmatic* identity between Hindustan and Europe not only in theology and god-lore, but in rationalism, positive science, civic life, legal sense, democratic ideals, militarism, morals, manners, and what not. The evidences from the Hindu angle are being supplemented in recent years by the findings of Egyptology, Assyriology, and Sinology, i.e., the sciences dealing with extra-Aryan culture-zones. The establishment of a comparative psychology of the races, past and present, Oriental and Occidental, is thus being looked for as the greatest work of anthropological researches in the twentieth century.

NOTES AND REVIEWS

Mankind, Racial Values and the Racial Prospect. By SETH K. HUMPHREY. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917. 223 pp.

In the early chapters of the book, Humphrey tries to show that in the long ages that man has been on the earth his physical characteristics have remained practically the same, and that his brain capacity, as seen by his works, has shown little progress. In fact civilization imposes upon man conditions which effectually block—indeed reverse evolution. The only way in which we can hope to improve the race is by applying the principles of racial progress,—what the race needs is brains.

Society must not only discourage the multiplication of the unfit, but must also encourage the increase of the "fit." The author does not oppose humane methods for the care of defectives, but pleads that philanthropy should not encourage the increase of the "unfit."

The Aryan race, he claims, is superior to any other, but that it must be kept pure in order to retain its position. Each nationality represents its own characteristics, and these will either remain distinct or be finally mixed with some other and cease to be. In considering the nations at war, he concludes that France and England are both past the zenith of their racial evolution; that Russia never will equal other great nations; that the strength of Germany has come through years of isolation and internal growth. The future world will be in the hands of either—English speaking people or Germans. In the light of facts and prophetic vision the author claims the English speaking peoples, America, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, on account of their youth and racial purity will finally put down the Germans. America, however, is warned concerning her "Melting Pot" idea regarding the Negro and immigrants of inferior racial stock.

The book closes with a chapter on "Eugenics," and a discussion on the propagation of only the best after the "War."

C. E. S.

The Philippines: To the End of the Commission Government. By CHARLES BURKE ELLIOTT. Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1917. 541 pp.

This book is a continuation of a volume entitled, *The Philippines: To the End of the Military Régime*. It gives an account of the instituting, by the United States, of a commission form of government in the Philippine Islands. The author, by drawing comparisons with the conditions which existed under Spanish control, endeavors to show the value of the work done since the American occupation: the introduction of new principles and ideals of life together with new methods of government. He shows that though the whole country has been changed as to law, order, education, rights of the people, and improved environment, the Filipinos are not Americanized; their fundamental character is not changed in the large. This is partly due to their isolation. Our policy in the Philippines is based on faith in the inherent capacity of the natives to govern themselves. Although the government is carried on as economically as possible we have tried to accomplish our end through the education of the natives and by introducing sanitary conditions and scientific methods of trade and agriculture, thus raising the standard of their civilization. Whether the United States has allowed itself to be hurried in its dealings with the Filipinos is a matter of diverse opinion among the officials working in the islands. Time alone can decide this question. The Jones Bill, the history of which is traced in detail, is the new law that organizes and regulates the relations between the United States and the Philippine Islands. By it, a new, although not different, form of government has been provided in which the Filipinos have a majority of members on the Commission Board and the local government is almost entirely in the hands of the natives. M. T. M.

The Danish West Indies Under Company Rule (1671-1754). By WALDEMAR WESTERGAARD. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1917. 359 pp.

The author, in this volume, gives a critical and elaborate history of the Danish West India Islands during the period from the time the Danish West India Company was organized in 1671 to 1754 when the islands were taken under the direct control of the King of Denmark. The work is based on the Danish royal archives, material which Dr. Westergaard is especially fitted to handle in an efficient manner. Besides being the son of Danish

parents to whom the Danish language is familiar, he is a trained student in history.

We are given an authoritative history of the colonization and the development of trade and agriculture in St. Thomas, St. Croix and St. John, the only islands of this group of about fifty large enough to have official names. A vivid picture is drawn of the slave trade, and of slave insurrections; of emancipation; and of the control of labor by legislation.

A supplementary chapter which is simply a brief outline of the history of the islands from 1755 to 1917 is added. It is to be hoped that this will be enlarged by the author in a later volume. A bibliography of twenty pages, an appendix, several illustrations, and maps, add to the value of this book.

M. T. M.

South-Eastern Europe; the Main Problem of the Present World Struggle. By VLADISLAV R. SAVIC. Introduction by Nicholas Murray Butler. New York, F. H. Revell Co. 1918. 276 pp. \$1.50.

This volume is important to those who wish to understand the point of view of the educated leaders of Serbia. The particular aim of the author, who was formerly Head of the Press Bureau in the Servian Foreign Office, is to convince the American public of the justice of the claims of a greater Serbia. According to the Declaration of Corfu, signed July 20, 1917, by representatives of Serbia and of Committees of Serb provinces in Austria-Hungary, the greater Serbia, to be created after the war, is to comprise Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slovenia, a federal state with a total population of some 13,000,000 people. It is obviously impossible to satisfy these territorial demands of Serbia as well as those of Italy and of Bulgaria. The author is on firm ground when he argues that the new Jugo Slav state has better claims to Dalmatia and the islands of the Adriatic than has Italy; but his chapter on "The Serbo-Bulgarian Relations" should be supplemented by reading "Bulgaria's Case," by Professor Tsanoff, which was published in the January, 1918, issue of the JOURNAL OF RACE DEVELOPMENT.

The Menace of Peace. By GEORGE D. HERRON. New York, Mitchell Kennerly. 1917. 110 pp.

The purpose of this collection of short essays is well expressed by the following quotation: "a peace that leaves Germany unde-

feated is essentially a German victory, and straightway leads to the Germanization of the world. A peace based upon a drawn battle between the Germanic Powers and the Allies is nothing else than the capitulation of the world to Prussian might and mastery."

Woodrow Wilson and the World's Peace. By GEORGE D. HERRON.
New York, Mitchell Kennerley. 1917. 173 pp.

A collection of newspaper and magazine articles written in 1916 and the early part of 1917 for European publications. They are interesting as interpretations of the foreign policy of the United States. The author is a consistent admirer of President Wilson's statesmanship.

The Political History of Poland. By EDWARD H. LEWINSKI-CORWIN, Ph.D. New York, The Polish Book Importing Co. 1917. 628 pp.

A book which should be read by all those interested in the territorial problems which must be solved at the close of the war. An Allied victory over the Central Empires will mean a recreation of the Polish State, but the delimitation of the boundaries of this new state will be difficult. A knowledge of Polish history and of the present Polish point of view are essential for those who wish to understand the Polish Problem. The volume is profusely illustrated, and has a valuable series of maps showing the area of Poland at different periods in its long history.

THE JOURNAL OF RACE DEVELOPMENT

OCTOBER, 1918

PAN-AMERICAN IDEALS AND THE WAR By Senor Don Ignacio Calderón, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from Bolivia	103
THE PAN-AMERICAN OUTLOOK By John Harrett, Director General of the Pan American Union, and formerly United States Minister to Argentina, Peru and Colombia	114
THE BALKAN TRAGEDY By David Starr Jordan	120
WHAT SERBIA WANTS By Mihailo S. Staniyevich, M.A., M.L., Late Assistant Pro- fessor in Zajevar College, Serbia	136
BULGARIA'S CASE: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR R. A. TRIMOFF By N. J. Cassavety, General Secretary of the Pan-Epicurean Union in America	147
LETHUANIANISM By Thomas Shainis	157
THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN CHINA By Lewis Hodous, Head of the Chinese Department, Hartford Seminary Foundation	168
HAVE APPRECIATION AND DEMOCRACY By Philip Ainsworth Means	180
COOPERATION OF PEOPLES OF THE FAR EAST By Roy Gilbert Reid, D.D., of Shanghai, China	189
THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN POLICY IN THE FAR EAST By Payson J. Treat, Professor of History in Leland Stanford Junior University	198
NEW CABINET STARTS PARTY RESPONSIBILITY IN JAPAN By Jeremiah W. Jank, Ph.D., LL.D., Research Professor of Government and Public Administration, New York Univer- sity; Chairman, Alexander Hamilton Institute; and Director, The Far Eastern Bureau	210

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or population, the sovereignty of each of them is and must be equally respected. We owe allegiance to the same flag; the flag of democracy and liberty. While consecrating all our devotion to our own country, we are at the same time members of one great commonwealth, working together for the progress and welfare of mankind. Inspired by the same ideals of equality, freedom and justice we advance with one common faith and spirit of charity towards the immortal culmination of our destiny. When we look back into the history of the world, we cannot but feel proud for having eliminated from the New World all kingly privileges and class distinctions and established instead the people's self government.

The invasion by northern hordes of barbaric tribes in the early centuries of the Christian era brought about the final disruption of the once great Roman Empire. Then as it is happening now, devastation and ruin followed their track. Civilization perished by the sword, and during many centuries Europe was the field of marauding feudal lords. Knowledge, science and culture disappeared and took refuge in the consecrated precincts of the monasteries. But in the fifteenth century, after the fall of Constantinople under the Turkish power, a great reaction took place in Western Europe, and a notable revival of learning followed: important inventions came into use, such as the printing press, the perfecting of the compass and the use of gun powder. The greatest event of all was the discovery of America by Columbus. It opened a new era in the history of the world.

Although the feudal period passed away, and with the formation of kingdoms a greater order and security came about, the fate of the people was very little improved. The kings considered their subjects as mere instruments for the satisfaction of the ambitious expanding of their dominion and power, and kept the countries of Europe in a constant state of unrest and war.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century a great political upheaval took place; the French people started a new and transcendental revolution for the recovery of human rights.

On May 5, 1789, the States General of France met and were inaugurated with the old pomp and solemnity. The king, the nobility, the clergy and the commons all took their places, and when the king sat down, the clergy and the nobility put their hats on; the commons against all precedent did the same thing. By that simple act they asserted the right of the people to an equal share in the government. The majesty of the Crown was to give place henceforth to the majesty of the Nation.

The great French Revolution marks a distinct epoch in the history of human liberty. Contemporaneously in the New World another revolution, less tragic and with no less far-reaching results took place. The English colonies of America refused to be taxed without their consent, and after a long and glorious struggle the United States of America became an independent nation. About the early part of the nineteenth century, inspired by the ideals of the French Revolution, and the example of the North American republic, the Spanish colonies of the New World proclaimed their independence, and finally democracy was established in all of them.

In this manner and by successive revolutions the right of self-government by the people and for the people became the recognized basis of authority.

It is to the lasting credit of the United States, the progress that is being made in the proper understanding of the meaning of democracy. The marvelous development in every branch of industry, the accumulation of wealth and the ceaseless activity of the American people have awakened the admiration of all the world, but these achievements represent, I would say, only the material side of the power of this country; there is another aspect to my mind of far more significance, and that is the growing consciousness amongst all classes, the press and public opinion,—which after all is the conscience of a democracy,—that the true greatness of a nation that aspires to the leadership of other nations, and has attained a commanding position such as the United States occupies, lies in the policy of invariable respect of right and the practice of justice, in all its dealings.

It seems to me that the number of people who wish to base the foreign policy of this country on the profits to be obtained,—sacrificing to that end the rights and the respect due to other countries, is becoming confined to a small number of unscrupulous speculators who, under the guise of national convenience, are willing to take advantage of any excuse whatsoever to use the power of the nation in a criminal policy of domineering over smaller nations. The reiterated declarations of President Wilson that the United States has no designs of conquest or aggrandisement at the expense of any nation, no matter how weak, has been received by the American public and the press as the true expression of the nation's policy.

The attitude of the United States in the actual world's conflict, confirms the high ideals which now inspire this Republic. In his admirable message asking Congress to declare war against Prussian militarism, President Wilson voiced in the following words the noble and generous sentiments of the American democracy:

Right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have carried nearest our hearts, for democracy, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for universal dominion of right by such concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we have with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured.

This, ladies and gentlemen, is a fine epitome of the ideals that make this nation worthy to lead the world and be an example to all the republics of America to whom these declarations mean not only an assurance but an inspiration for justice and right.

Some time before the declaration of war by the United States, my country, answering the German notification of an unrestricted submarine warfare, declared that it could not and would not acquiesce in a policy so contrary to all the accepted principles of international law, and broke relations with Germany, stating at the same time that Bolivia made its policy one with the United States in this emergency.

When military autocracy challenges all accepted rights, tramples down the sacredness of treaties and by its incredible atrocities turns back to the practices of times when Christianity was unknown and fills full the measure of sorrow and misery of the inhabitants of the invaded territories, no neutrality, no peace is possible. The triumph of militarism would mean the end of all free nations. The revival of the dark night of medievalism in its most oppressive form: military force.

We must fight to the end trusting that this is the last fight for freedom and democracy; but we cannot lose sight of the new problems that are looming up for the readjustment of the economic conditions of the world. Let us hope that the same generous principles of justice, right and a proper regard for the welfare of mankind in general, will be the guiding light that will redress any wrongs and make the world a more attractive place to prepare ourselves for our higher and everlasting happiness.

THE PAN AMERICAN OUTLOOK

By John Barrett, Director General of the Pan American Union, and formerly United States Minister to Argentina, Panama and Colombia

These are days of great import in Pan American relations. The world war is having a most direct bearing upon Pan American solidarity. It is doing more than any other influence since the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine to weld together the American Republics in common purpose, in common interest and common achievement. The Pan American development of the hour is a disappointment to every enemy of those ideals for which the advocates of true Pan Americanism have stood in the past and will stand for long years in the future. What is happening now confirms the wisdom of the persistent endeavors which the friends of Pan Americanism have made during a long period of trial and tribulation.

It is interesting to look back ten or fifteen years and remember the pessimism of those who opposed the movement for practical Pan Americanism which was initiated by the Pan American Conference held at Rio Janeiro in 1906. It is easy now to remember how the pioneer advocates of this movement were scoffed at, how their articles, addresses and efforts were ridiculed. Where there were a few men who honestly believed that the results were possible which now are before us, there were thousands who regarded such possibilities as pure dreams.

The records of the Pan American Union, the international organization of all the American Republics, with which the writer has had the honor to be connected for nearly twelve years, prove conclusively the growth of Pan American sentiment during the last ten or twelve years. A decade ago it was difficult to find any group of men in the political or business life of the United States who took a

real interest in practical Pan Americanism. The efforts of the Latin American diplomatic and consular representatives in the United States, of the United States diplomatic and consular representatives in Latin America, and the unceasing labor of the staff of the Pan American Union seemed to make little impression. There might have been discouragement were it not for the absolute confidence of these diplomats and the officers of this organization in the justice of their cause and what the future would bring forth. Fortunately the Department of State, headed by a great Secretary of State, Elihu Root, coöperated with the Pan American diplomats and the Pan American Union, and presently the Department of Commerce, which heretofore had thought little of Pan American Trade followed its example; then gradually the magazines and newspapers, chambers of commerce, boards of trade, universities and colleges, began to awaken to the potentialities of Pan Americanism. In due time the cause developed a real stride of progress. As each year passed by the interest grew more and more widespread until at the outbreak of the world war Pan Americanism was an accepted principle and fact throughout the world.

When, however, in April, 1917, the United States entered the struggle, many of the old pessimists and an army of skeptical persons again expressed their views to the effect that the structure of Pan Americanism which had been built up so rapidly during the previous decade would now prove itself to be only a paper castle. It is actually sad to call attention to the fact that the writer received numerous letters and listened to many statements to the effect that all which he and others had done in favor of Pan Americanism in past years would not now stand the test of a great trial. There were too many men who said:

What now of your vaunted Pan Americanism; what now of all the speeches, addresses, articles, predictions, etc., of the past; what now of the value of Pan American coöperation, Pan American unity and Pan American commerce; what now of the real Pan Americanism that is supposed to have its deep foundations based on the Monroe Doctrine and the early struggle of all the American Republics for liberty and independence; will not, in face of all your efforts, it be proved that the ties that bind the

American Republics together are of wax and will melt away under the fire of this world struggle?

The day after the United States declared war on Germany I was asked in almost a patronizing way by a prominent editor; "what will the other American Republics do now that one of their sister nations has entered the field of war; will any of them break relations; will any of them by chance declare war?" He asked as if he had no confidence in such developments. Without the slightest hesitation but with the confidence born of a little knowledge of the history and the record of the other American Republics and of the characteristics of the Latin American press and peoples, the reply was made that I believed that within fourteen months from that time, that is, by July 1, 1918, over one-half of the Latin American governments would have broken relations with the enemies of the United States and that over one-third of them would have entered the war. It was also stated that, although a small group of governments might remain neutral, there was little question but that their attitude of neutrality would be a sincere one, not intended as lack of respect for or sympathy with the United States, but inspired by a conscientious belief of the statesmen of such countries that they were doing what was best in international relationship.

Without expressing any opinion whatever as to the wisdom of the action of the various American Republics, and without commenting upon whether such action is praiseworthy or not, it is permitted to make a summarized statement of just how these governments stand according to official records. These figures and facts will confound the enemies of Pan American solidarity and demonstrate that the attitude of the Western Hemisphere taken as a whole is undoubtedly favorable to the triumph of the just principles of democracy.

Of the twenty Latin American Republics which reach from Mexico and Cuba on the north to Argentina and Chile on the south, thirteen have officially broken relations with the Central Allies. Given alphabetically they are: Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,

Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay. Of the thirteen which have broken relations, nine have declared war. These include Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. Two other countries, namely, Uruguay and Peru, have taken steps equivalent to a declaration of war, but as their attitude has not been thus officially treated by Germany, they still are to be classed technically as only having broken relations. Were they considered as having declared war, eleven of the Latin American countries could be described as actually being in the midst of the conflict.

Seven countries remain officially neutral: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Salvador and Venezuela. Some regard the action of Paraguay as classing her among those which have broken relations, but this is not accurate according to strict official interpretation.

Summed up it therefore can be said that technically speaking a good majority of the Latin American countries have broken relations with the Central Allies; morally speaking a majority have declared war, while barely one-third remain neutral. There should be fairness, moreover in judging the neutral countries. It is, in the opinion of high authorities, unjust to say that any of them are favorable to the enemies of the United States or are against this country and the Allies. It is the opinion of many of those familiar with the situation that the administrative officers of all the neutral countries, in determining the policies of their governments, are doing what they honestly believe to be right. They contend that there has been no actual official cause for their governments declaring war, and therefore their present attitude is justified. None of them, however, denies the right of each country to act as it sees best in the premises. It must be borne in mind also that the neutral countries of Latin America are placing their vast material resources at the disposal of the United States and the Allies, and are aiding in this way almost as much as if they were actually in the conflict.

Careful scrutiny of the leading newspapers in the neutral countries shows that a large majority of them are friendly to the United States and the European Allies. Only a small minority can be classed as anti-American and anti-Allies. Consideration of the editorial comment in the representative papers in all parts of Latin America, the special articles which are appearing in its press, the expressions of opinion which are being made in the various congresses, special addresses that are being delivered, and pamphlets and books that are being distributed, would lead to the inevitable conclusion that the war has justified beyond all expectations the best principle of Pan Americanism and proved the actual solidarity of the western hemisphere.

It now behooves every American, whether he comes from the northern or southern continent, to be studying more than ever before how the American Republics can work together in harmony, in sympathy, in mutual respect and in the preservation of the world peace which must follow this mighty struggle. It is a remarkable fact that since the Pan American Union, whose constituency includes all the American Republics, was reorganized in 1906-1907 there has been no war between any two American Republics, and the sentiment has grown stronger each year that no two shall engage in a conflict against the sentiment and will of the other nineteen. Around the governing board table of the Pan American Union there assembles on the first Wednesday of each month, except those of the summer, the high diplomatic representatives of all the American Republics. There they sit, shoulder to shoulder, elbow to elbow, each having equal authority with the other and all actuated by a common purpose which means the coöperation of all the American nations for the development of friendship, good understanding, better acquaintance, commerce and peace among them. While this board has not actual authority to settle Pan American political problems, such as the prevention of wars, its moral influence is undoubtedly a mighty factor in this direction. A great European statesman recently entering the Pan American Building at Washington, noting the practical work which the Pan American

Union is doing for Pan American solidarity, and then finally seeing its governing board room, its great council table and the chairs arranged about it carrying each of them the name and coat of arms of a particular country, and finally looking at a photograph which showed the Secretary of State of the United States and the diplomatic representatives of the other American Republics seated there, remarked that he believed that if there had existed in London or Berlin, in Paris or Vienna a Pan European Union organized on the basis of the Pan American Union in Washington, and having a similar council chamber and council, this world war would never have taken place. Possibly this is an optimistic view point, but it carries a suggestion of immeasurable significance. May it not be true that the American Republics, through their Pan American Union and through the example of their council which forms its governing board, are showing the way to the world for international coöperation and a league of nations which shall preserve forever that peace which all men and all nations now hope will be inaugurated at the conclusion of this war.

THE BALKAN TRAGEDY

By David Starr Jordan

I

After the Turkish Janizaries who served as the guard of the Greek Empire in the fifteenth century broke loose and seized Constantinople, they also encountered and subdued the "grim, raw races" of the districts, mostly south of the Danube, known collectively as "The Balkans."

Over the Balkan peoples, as over all others included in the Ottoman Empire, the Turks have ruled by force and fear alone—about four million Turks (all the men actual or potential soldiers) against twenty million or more subject Bulgarians, Serbians, Albanians, Roumanians, Vlacks, Armenians, Mesopotamians, Macedonians, Kurds, Syrians, Egyptians, Moors, Arabs, Jews and Greeks. The conquerors forming chiefly an army of occupation, these subject multitudes have lived continuously under martial law. This at the best is not law at all; in the hands of the Turk it has taken the form of utter neglect alternating with savage slaughter. Extermination of heretics has always been proclaimed as a religious duty of the Moslem, though through inertia and sometimes through humanity he has often fallen far short of his theoretical obligations.

Under such conditions it is evident that any degree of self-government or even of ordinary tolerance would mean the dissolution of the Turkish Empire. For if the people themselves were allowed to rule, they would insist upon the "bearable life" which no race under Turkish control has ever attained. The average high-class Turk to be met with in Constantinople is, to be sure, a soft-spoken, leisurely gentleman, but hard and cold nevertheless under the surface, and quite impervious to the feelings of others. Now, as in Byron's time, he is likely to prove as "mild-mannered a man

as ever scuttled a ship or cut a throat." On the other hand, the typical Turkish peasant is a simple-hearted farmer, said to be a brave soldier and a clean fighter.

Turkish officials insist that recurrent massacres are absolutely necessary if Ottoman rule is to be maintained. Only by violence, they say, can the varying elements be held in check. "To concede absolute equality would be to commit suicide." "In our reconstruction of the Ottoman Empire," declared Riza Bey, "administrative conformity must be absolute; autonomy is treason; it means separation. Our Christian compatriots shall be Ottomanized citizens. We shall be no longer conquerors and slaves but a nation of freemen." To this end, it was found necessary to insist on one language, one religion and one code of laws throughout the Empire, that being the program of the "Committee of Union and Progress" organized by the young Turks. Only terrorization and massacre could bring it about. A familiar proverb in Constantinople asserts: "Old Turk, young Turk—old dog, new collar."

In the light of these things one comes to understand the motive of the several massacres and the animus of the several revolts which have marked the last century of Turkish history. Revolutions successively freed Greece, Serbia, Rumania, Bulgaria and East Rumelia (the latter becoming part of Bulgaria) and later permitted the detachment by Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The war of 1912 further set free Albania and Macedonia with the ill-defined districts of Thessaly and Thrace. Montenegro, a little circle of limestone crags, with arable land only in sinkholes formed by the breaking of the crust over underground streams and caves, had held out against the Turks from the first. Settled by unconquered refugees from Serbia, this little state, very poor and very proud, had, until 1916, kept its land and freedom inviolate through the centuries. Only an attack on the eastern rear could have subdued their rocky fastnesses.

The woes of repressed nationalities spring mainly from wars of conquest. Unrest is usually the result of some past effort to bring about order by force. Old political wrongs

can be remedied in either of two ways, by restitution or by conciliation,—the one looking back to causes, the other forward to effects. The first is not always possible, the second not customary. But one or both are necessary to permanent peace. If ancient wounds cannot be healed, they may perhaps be soothed in new tolerance and justice.

Balkan folk have suffered from every conceivable wrong. Slaves to the Turk, "small change of the Tsar," objects of intrigue by Austria, Russia and Germany—merciless towards one another, mismanaged and misunderstood by the Great Powers—they and their affairs are today in the most hopeless tangle. The only final way out is through federation, notwithstanding the fact that every tendency toward union is opposed by a multitude of conflicting interests.

Federation, with equality before the law, would settle race problems almost at one stroke, because in removing racial domination, racial subservience would be wholly obliterated. For if all races came to have an equal stake in the common government, questions of nationality, language and religion would cease to be of first importance and would pass into the background, as in Switzerland and the United States. With the inextricable racial tangle in Macedonia and Thrace, no right of nationality, except equal right, can be made to apply.

The tragic history of the Balkans has been conditioned on five main elements: (1) emancipation long drawn out—the various districts which gained their freedom from time to time forming separate centers of population and rapidly developing national rivalries; (2) the placing over most of these states of German or Germanized princes, trained in the poisonous dynastic atmosphere; (3) the infesting of the new courts at all times by the secret agents of three unscrupulous dynasties; (4) the weakening of respect for human life by servitude through long generations, and finally (5) a confusions of tongues. As a matter of fact, the Balkan peoples speak at least seven distinct languages, five of them (Slavic, Rumanian, Greek, Hebrew and Turkish) using different alphabets and having scarcely a linguistic root in common. Furthermore, along the borders, in the courts and marts,

six world-tongues (French, German, English, Russian, Italian and Spanish) also crowd for recognition. Under these conditions, racial identity is confused, a man being known by the language he speaks.

Adding to the general complication, two further elements have had their part in creating dissension. First, there are four state hierarchies, or churches, each a political organization, three of them, at least, according to a prominent Bulgarian, being "unconcerned with either religion or morals." Second, under Turkish control, all ancient boundaries were obliterated and promiscuous migrations resulted in inextricable entanglement, especially along the sea-boards. Moreover, the absence of coherent law, with universal social subservience, reduced all races and all social ranks to a common level—at the bottom,¹ a condition obliterating, for the most part, feudal nobilities, which might otherwise have led in racial self-assertion.

II

During the last twenty years, dynastic rivalries had turned Europe into a vast armed camp. Thanks mainly to the German emperor and his military caste, war was in the air. Meanwhile, however, other nations had carried the torch hither and thither throughout the still exploitable world. War was indeed becoming respectable, for almost every great nation had eventually engaged in it.

It seemed therefore a favorable moment to get rid of the Turk by setting fire to the Balkans. Accordingly in 1912, Hartwig, Russian Minister at Belgrade, "the evil genius of the Balkans," lined up the states in an effort to expel the Turk from Europe, even as France, Italy and Britain had driven him from Africa. Nevertheless, it was not understood among the allies that actual war should be the method of expulsion. A Bulgarian university official assured the writer that the premier, Gueschof, regarded the league as a "simulacrum" (to use his, Gueschof's own words) that is, as a

¹ This fact has made for ultimate democracy particularly in Bulgaria and Serbia where hereditary orders of nobility were never revived.

kind of "bluff." Its supposed purpose was to exercise some sort of joint pressure which would move the Turk progressively from Albania and Macedonia. But the alliance once made, King Nicola of Montenegro took it seriously. With his whole army, about 50,000 strong, he came down from the mountains, crossed Lake Scutari and stormed the citadel of Scutari, largest and northernmost town of Albania. By this assault, he set the land in flames,² and opened the first Balkan War, by which the Turks were finally expelled from Albania, Macedonia, Thessaly, and most of Thrace and of the islands of the Aegean. The fall of Adrianople brought the contest practically to a close, and in London, soon after, was held a Conference which, under diplomatic pressure from Europe, ended in the unsatisfactory Treaty of London.

In this treaty, the western boundary of Turkey was fixed by a straight line drawn from Enos on the Aegean north-easterly to Midia on the Black Sea. As to the disposal of the lands won from Turkey, many embarrassments arose, due mainly to the conflicting interests of some of the Great Powers. By a special Serbo-Bulgarian treaty previously made, Bulgaria was to have that part of western Macedonia lying south of the ancient Serbian capital of Uskub, while Serbia was to receive, besides the Novi-Bazar, the greater part of Albania, including Durazzo, her coveted "window to the sea," of which, in default of customs agreements, she was really in sore need. Indeed, Serbia had long been grossly oppressed because of the prohibitive tariffs levied on all imports and exports by the greedy states which surrounded her, a fact affecting notably her special product of pork. Other agreements at this time seem to have been mainly informal. By them, it was understood, that Montenegro was to have Scutari itself, and certain barren crags to the southeast known locally as the "Accursed Mountains,"

²Nicola's motives have been questioned. A statesman in a position to know assured me that the king had been selling stocks short on the Vienna Bourse, and therefore it was to his interest that prices should fall. If so, the royal purpose was accomplished, for it is said that stock-values in Europe fell \$200,000,000 at once under this master-stroke. Moreover, most of them have been falling ever since.

together with the whole of the big lake, on the commerce of which Scutari and the Montenegrin villages of Virpazar and Rjeka mainly depend. Greece was apparently to have Epirus, Thessaly and the Islands of the Aegean, though this arrangement also seems to have been left undefined in the written agreements. The Greek premier, Venizelos (a resolute and resourceful statesman), did not ask in behalf of Greece (it is said) for anything east of the Struma River, as the strip along the sea from Demir-Hissar to Kavala "would have no backbone."

By the Concert of Powers in London which reviewed these adjustments, little heed was given to Balkan agreements.* Albania was the chief "stone of stumbling and rock of offense." Both Austria and Italy had designs upon it, as well as Serbia and Greece. The town of Avlona, key to the Straits of Otranto, a potential "Gibraltar" was especially claimed by Italy in order to "convert the Adriatic into an Italian Lake." For this demand there was, of course, no racial excuse, though reason enough in a military way, if the European anarchy of the past were to continue.

In view of the general deadlock concerning Albania, the Concert decided to make a separate kingdom of it, under a German princeling.

A word in regard to Albania. This strange, wild, roadless region is inhabited by an untamed people, broken into primitive clans, ruled by their own traditions, and subject to no common authority. Omitting the Greek-speaking Albanians of Epirus, the others constitute four main groups, known at sight by their headwear. The Arnauti wear a low white fez, the Meredites a high one, the Albaneser a low red fez, the Marisols a high one with a long black tassel. The Albane-

* As to Greek claims, no decision at all seems to have been made by the Concert of Powers. Several of the islands desired by Greece were also coveted by Italy. Montenegro got a rather worthless extension of territory (largely of barren, "accursed" mountains) but was debarred from the city of Scutari, though the writer was informed in Cettinje of the existence of a special promise to lower the bed of the outlet to Lake Scutari by fifteen feet or so, thus redeeming some thousands of acres of land now submerged in shallow water.

ser are Catholics, the others Moslems. Lately it was estimated on good authority⁴ (no census has been possible) that Albania now has 1,300,000 inhabitants. Of these 1,000,000 are Moslems, 240,000 Orthodox Greeks, mostly in Epirus, and 90,000 Roman Catholics; but regardless of divergencies or agreements, all scorn every edict to compel the use of Turkish and persist in the employment of their own dialects. In view, therefore, of Moslem preponderance in Albania, it was suggested in 1912 to the "Committee of Union and Progress" to commence a series of "necessary" massacres in that district where every one refused to use the "National" tongue. For against Moslems, it was said, such severity would not attract the attention and sympathy of Europe—so annoying and even perilous to the Turks in their work of enforcing discipline. Then if the measures succeeded in Albania, they could be later extended to Macedonia, where "union and progress," through extermination of heretics and malcontents, was greatly needed.

The history of the impossible Kingdom of Albania need not be related here. It will, however, be recalled that this political farce lasted only a few months, the King and his court never having dared to emerge beyond the frog-ponds which bounded the tiny "capital," Durazzo.

Matters having been amicably settled at London, the Balkans themselves were next heard from. Serbia at once gave notice to Bulgaria that, being herself debarred from Durazzo, the agreement between them as to Macedonia no longer held, and that she (Serbia) would therefore take as her rightful share of the territory won the northwestern part of that district (Macedonia). Greece in turn demanded Salonica and its hinterland. Bulgarian feeling now ran high, for the people fancied all Macedonia to be racially theirs. As one of their leaders said to me, they "felt like the woman in the Bible story whose child was about to be divided." In brief, they could endure no thought of a division of Macedonia. Under the circumstances, however, Serbia can hardly be blamed for not thinking herself bound

⁴ N. J. Cassavety, *Greek-American Review*, April, 1918.

by a treaty already virtually nullified by the Great Powers. Access to the sea, as we have seen, was almost a vital necessity to her national existence. This could be attained in one of three ways only—(1) access to Durazzo through the Novi-Bazar, as agreed on in a treaty, (2) annexation of Herzegovina with the ports of Gravosa, Ragusa and Cattaro in southern Dalmatia, or (3) the annexation of Monastir with the valley of the Vardar River down to the Gulf of Salonica. Failing to secure the first, as previously promised, she insisted on the third.⁵

Meanwhile, peace being apparently established, some of the Bulgarian regiments had begun to disband of their own accord, and to leave for home, thrusting their officers aside. They had had enough of fighting.⁶ If, therefore, a stand was to be made by Bulgaria against the pretensions of Serbia and Greece, immediate action seemed to be demanded. The almost inevitable crash came within about two weeks, even while Western Europe was congratulating itself on the happy outcome of affairs. So far as Bulgaria was concerned, she was forced to make a move of some sort at once, or else to relinquish without a struggle all the important gains of the war. Moreover, Bulgarian feeling had been much inflated because of glories in the field and the schemes of her ambi-

⁵A better adjustment than any of the above, because it would serve to bind the nations together, would be to establish a free port on the Gulf of Salonica, with privileges of shipment across the intervening country from Serbia, and from Hungary as well. In time, a canal should be built from Belgrade through Nish and down the Vardar River to the Gulf. The importance of such a waterway, already surveyed the writer understands, has been strongly urged by Serbian economists. In a rational world, it might also be possible to make Gravosa on the Adriatic a free port to be reached from Serbia through Herzegovina. A Balkan customs union would solve these several problems at one stroke. Before the war, the common use of the Danube, under control of the joint Danube Commission, afforded a model of coöperative national action.

⁶The average Bulgarian is a sturdy, independent person, a bit morose and set in his ways, a freeholder at home and a democrat at heart, with a touch of the American spirit which radiates from Robert College throughout the Near East and most distinctly through Bulgaria. It is a common saying that "Robert College is the very heart of Bulgaria." It speaks volumes for the work of the devoted men who have sustained and maintained this great center of education on the Bosphorus.

tious ruler. To be the Prussia of the Balkans was a very flattering prospect, and Tsar Ferdinand, self-willed and audacious, could not let the opportunity slip.

He proceeded then to do the worst thing possible under the circumstances, which was to make war without warning on both Serbia and Greece. The dispute as to who was primarily responsible has brought many facts to light. To me it seems clear that the blame should fall on Ferdinand. His cabinet knew nothing of his intentions; his General, Savoff, executed the orders. The populace, ill-informed and optimistic, applauded this and every other aggressive action.

The hostile move was of course a criminal blunder. In this connection, intelligent Bulgarians have admitted to the writer that their county has committed at one time or another all the diplomatic errors she has found possible. This particular one (as well as the recent joining of fortunes with Germany) had tragic results, as will be seen.

To begin with, Ferdinand's plan to make surprise attacks on Serbia and Greece found the Serbian army already warned, and in the encounter with them the Bulgarians were badly worsted. The simultaneous descent on the Greeks in Macedonia, however, was at first successful.

Meanwhile, Rumania, under the claim that she had received no part of the Balkan spoils a share of which was due her for remaining neutral, invaded the Dobruja in northern Bulgaria. At this, the Bulgarian soldiers in Macedonia, knowing their own homes to be imperilled and careless of military discipline, hastily abandoned the field and turned to the defense of their own ravaged lands.

Moving northward up the Struma River, they were pursued by the Greeks as far as the borders of old Bulgaria, though they made two or three vigorous stands near Dzu-maia on the way. While these events were taking place, Turkey, repudiating the Enos-Midia line drawn as her north-western boundary in Europe, also entered the lists and soon recaptured Adrianople and Kirk-Kilissy. Thus attacked on every side, Bulgaria capitulated and the second Balkan war was brought to an end by the Treaty of Bucharest. "We were compelled to accept whatever terms were offered,"

said a Bulgarian official. "If they had asked us to shoot our King, we should have had to do it."

In accord with this treaty, Rumania⁷ received the southern Dobruja, a stretch of rich meadows on the lower Danube, which includes the city of Silistria. Serbia acquired Ochrida and Monastir with most of northwestern Macedonia. Greece took a broad strip with the seaboard from Thessaly eastward to beyond Kavala.⁸ By these readjustments Bulgarian acquisitions were reduced to the Rhodope mountain region, north of the River Bistritza, and much of Thrace, including the Thracian Coast with the marshy Porto Lago and its shallow bay and the open roadstead of Dedeagatsch.

Thus was completed the humiliation of Bulgaria. In brief, the allies had determined to crush her once for all. By this means was created on her every side a new Alsace-Lorraine, a "wound in flanks" of Balkan unity. But in the events leading up to this consummation, Bulgaria, as we have already seen, had been far from sinless.

III

Macedonia, a historic district of indefinite boundaries varying through the ages, shades off into Thrace on the east and Thessaly and Albania on the west. In the days of Turkish rule, as already noted, the various Balkan races had spread far and wide with no recognized group boundaries. Since classic times, therefore, Macedonia has never had a definite national status, but had supported a medley of many races attracted by its fertile valleys and long seaboard.

⁷Rumania's avowed claims to this territory were two-fold. First, she had remained neutral during the war against Turkey, in which all the states concerned had received extension of territory and she was therefore entitled to compensation. On this she had insisted from the first, of which fact Bulgaria had been fully warned. Second, it was a political necessity to humble Bulgaria, eager to make herself "the Prussia of the Balkans." As to these reasons I was told in Bulgaria that "Rumania's act was very wrong, but any other Balkan state would have done the same thing under like conditions."

⁸Kavala, the only valuable seaport Bulgaria could hope to obtain, the Kaiser insisted should be made "a present to his sister, the Queen of Greece." Venizelos, obeying orders, secured it.

By most competent authorities it is agreed that the interior and especially the mountainous parts were, before the evictions—to be discussed later on—inhabited mainly by Bulgarians. In the west were thousands of Serbians, with everywhere scattering settlements of Rumanians known as Vlachs. For the rest, the seaboard was preëempted by Greeks. Salonica had also an extensive population of Jews, descendants of refugees from ancient persecutions in Barcelona, and still speaking the Spanish language. Turks meanwhile abounded in the towns and villages everywhere. In these regions, however as again already indicated, "race" is determined mainly by language. For example, the people about Castouria in Thessaly, though largely Bulgarian in stock, speak the Greek language and are therefore rightly counted as Greeks. For the same reason, the Albanians of Epirus are also regarded as Greeks.

Nevertheless, despite all considerations of language and race, the Bulgarians have from the first stubbornly regarded Macedonia as almost wholly Bulgarian, the Greeks, knowing the seaboard, think it mainly Greek, while the claims of Serbia to the western part of the district are scarcely less insistent. With the advent of the wars, all three nations were surprised at the variety among the Macedonian peoples, still more at their resentment at being disturbed.

The Bulgarian people expected a united Europe promptly to reverse the injustices of the Treaty of Bucharest. Especially was it believed that Great Britain, the advocate of fair play, would intercede in their behalf, even to the extent of reclaiming Adrianople. For in the first Balkan war, the populace had come to believe Bulgaria to be a child of fortune, admired of the Great Powers. But no serious protest arose in any quarter, only mild deprecations, and those from Austria and Russia.⁹

⁹That Great Britain made no show of opposition at Bucharest is now regarded as a grave diplomatic error. An expression of interest in Bulgaria's fate in 1913, might perhaps have brought her into the Entente, in spite of her German ruler. In the present conflict, the Bulgarian people had avowedly no interest save to recover the Dobruja and to liberate Macedonia.

Following the Treaty of Bucharest, the Balkans gave no farther heed to the opinions or wishes of the Powers. "Europe exists no longer" was a common saying in Sofia, to express Bulgarian disillusionment. The other states proceeded to clinch their victory. In Rumania, Turkey and Greece, general eviction was the order of the day. From the Dobruja, the Rumanians expelled all Bulgarians whose land-tenure did not accord with Rumanian law, the number of those thus affected having been estimated at upwards of 100,000. From Greek Macedonia a still larger number of Bulgarians were promptly ejected. Out of Thrace the Turks sent upwards of 300,000 Greeks and perhaps 100,000 Bulgarians, each family being given only from two hours' to four days' notice. Furthermore, they were allowed to sell nothing and to take away only what they could carry on their backs, while their farms (in general) were turned over to Albanians previously ejected by Serbia from the Novi-Bazar. This adjustment later provoked resentment among the Turkish farmers about Adrianople. They accordingly protested, charging that "the Albanians were more expert with the Mäuser than with the plow," and that "their chief accomplishment was cattle-stealing." The authorities were therefore asked to "bring back the Bulgarians who are now our friends."

In the winter and spring of 1914, 267,000 Turks left Salonica by steerage for Constantinople, while upwards of 30,000 Jews sailed for New York. When the writer went through Macedonia in May, 1914, probably more than a million people were homeless wanderers in the Balkans, living in shacks, army-tents or box-cars, often four or five families together, the Bulgarians subsisting on the four cents a day per person allowed by the government, the Greeks mainly on an equivalent in rice.

The lot of refugees from Macedonia in 1914 was wretched beyond description, many dying daily of cold and privation, all being without homes, property, schools, and everything else, including hope. An American teacher resident in Bulgaria gave the writer an interesting version of the mutual

attitude of the Bulgarian people and the Macedonian refugees who swarmed all along the Struma road from Petrich to Sofia. Said the first: "We went down to Macedonia to set you free. Why don't you stay at home instead of coming up here to take our jobs, to die in our houses, to make us all sorts of trouble. My brother died in Macedonia. O, go home!"

And the Macedonian answers: "Who asked you to come down to trample our vines, destroy our herds and bring down the Greeks upon us? I don't care if your brother did die in Macedonia. Mine is dead, too."

After certain ugly incidents, Bulgaria, being influenced more or less by outside opinion, ceased to evict either Turks or Greeks. From Serbia but few were sent out. Those who remained, however, were harshly treated by the military and forced to adopt the Serbian language and Serbian names. In fairness it must be said that this severe policy was not approved by Paschich, Serbia's wise and humane premier.

It is no part of the purpose of this article to discuss in detail these-called atrocities of the Balkans. Nevertheless, the Report of the Carnegie Commission in 1913, a sincere and impartial document, contains much which also came to the writer's notice in going over a part of the same ground. It is clear that soldiers of each nation participated in these crimes, and also that in many or in most cases, irregular bands or hangers-on—the Bulgarian Comatiji, the Greek Andartes and the Turkish Bashi-bazouks—were the chief culprits. In very few cases only does any high officer seem to have been implicated.

IV

The adhesion of Bulgaria to the cause of the Central Powers in the present war, was, in the writer's judgment, one of the worst of her long series of blunders. For this Tsar Ferdinand is mainly responsible. "We must go with the winner," said Ferdinand's mouthpiece, Radoslavoff. But it was too hastily assumed that the nation most lavish of promises would come out ahead.

It should be noted that Ferdinand has never had a strong following in Bulgaria. The government's slight majority in the Parliament in 1914 consisted of a dozen or so tractable Turkish delegates from Thrace. These sat at the extreme right, voting together and at the dictation of the Tsar. It is evident that bargaining with the Turk in Thrace was considered more profitable than eviction, as well as more humane. At this time (March, 1914) the writer was told that the "Left" in the Bulgarian parliament, then led by Malinoff, the present premier, was almost ripe for a republic. But the fact that Bulgaria was overburdened by dynastic neighbors served to hold this movement in check.

In the general tangle of conflicting ambitions, the relations of Bulgaria with Serbia have been peculiarly unfortunate, for the two countries must continue to be neighbors throughout history. Their inhabitants have very much in common, more in fact, than either is willing to concede. Both peoples are essentially brave, honest, self-restrained, and apart from battle-lust, humane. Their only hope for the future lies in friendship and toleration. Accusations of treachery and plans of retaliation harm both sides alike. Retaliation recognizes no limits; above all, it poisons the future.

In the restoration of the Balkans, it will be impossible to return to any previous adjustment. There is no *status quo* to fall back on, nor is any decision by plebiscite practicable. To people banished far and wide, no act can restore their lost homes, already occupied by other exiles fled from like tyrannies. The only settlement which can endure will be one raised above all military and political questions, and dictated solely by the common welfare. As has been emphasized, a permanent adjustment of the whole Balkan problem will not rest on boundaries or on questions of race or language, but on equality before the law, a customs union and some degree of federation. The most vital point, therefore, is the formation of a Balkan Confederation with free trade among members, and arbitral treaties to protect the people from injustice of all sorts. For as trade quarrels lead toward war, so customs unions lead toward conciliation, and

every move towards elimination of interstate barriers should receive the sympathy and help of all lovers of peace. Unfortunately, however, what is and what ought to be have never yet been made to coincide in the Balkans. But that fact need not darken the future. Sooner or later the United States of the Balkans is bound to arise, to the unbounded advantage of all alike.

It has been justly said that any one who makes himself acquainted with the life in any Balkan state is sure to become a partisan of the people he knows. To a large extent this is true, a fact abundantly illustrated. The individuals in each country are better than their politics, and all of them show a sturdiness of character and a capacity for education that promises much for the future. Rumania and Macedonia are unhappily still burdened with the absentee landlord. In Bulgaria and Serbia, as already indicated, there are no great landholders and no recognition of titles of nobility, a fact which lays a solid basis for democracy. All the Balkan races are bound by strong ties to America, the most enduring being those forged by Robert College and its sister institution, the Woman's College of Constantinople. The intellectual group, especially in Bulgaria, are largely graduates of Robert College, of which the University of Sofia, under the rector, Stephan Kyroff, may be regarded as a daughter institution.

In this general connection, the writer recalls a charming spring day spent on the farm of Stoyan Vatralsky, the recognized poet of Bulgaria, a Harvard man on whose library table he found magazines like the *Atlantic Monthly*, *The Nation*, and others typical of American idealism. With the acquaintances he made in Sofia and elsewhere, he could not think ill of the Bulgarians as a people, however execrable some of their war methods may be. And I can understand how others must feel equally drawn to the enthusiastic and optimistic Greeks, the clear-headed and devoted Serbians, the grave and proud Montenegrins. All of these races, the Rumanians as well, are capable of heroic acts. There is also a large hope in the unspoiled wildness of the aboriginal Albanian.

The American people as a whole will wish well to all the Balkan folk, including Bulgaria, for the time being sadly alienated from civilization. But particularly must we insist that Serbia which, with Armenia, has suffered most in these terrible days, be restored to all her just rights. At the same time, it has to be recognized that no rights at all accrue to any nation from the ill-starred Treaty of Bucharest.

WHAT SERBIA WANTS

By Milivoy S. Stanoyevich, M.A., M.L., Late Assistant Professor in Zajecar College, Serbia

We fear the Americans do not yet understand the life-and-death character of the struggle waged by a self-reliant and energetic people, who are coming forward at this great moment in history, convinced of the justice and integrity of their cause. Ordinarily a politician or a journalist will say that the Serbians are in general battling for the realization of their national ambition and for the readjustment of the "Balkan equilibrium." But these hackneyed phrases do not convey any well defined idea to an average American citizen. He does not quite understand why hundreds of thousands of precious lives and millions of dollars should be expended for the assertion of abstract principles.

It is desirable therefore to explain why the balance of political forces in the Balkans must be maintained even at the detriment of Serbia or her great Allies, the Entente powers, and to expose also what the Serbians want in regard to recognition of their national state. It is indispensable to explain the questions which follow, and formally to develop the trend of ideas which deeply affect the restoration of a tortured state. The first act consists in the raising up of Serbia out of the ruins, moral and material, under which she now lies, gasping and starving. But the repatriation of her exiles, and the resuscitation of her villages and towns, is not the only task incumbent upon this victimized nation. In the future she will also have to reconstruct of her own strength her political and educational tools, in order to prepare herself for the high cultural mission which will be thrust upon her as a member in the renewed Balkan or Yugoslav confederation. From her extreme suffering will come supreme wisdom, provided she knows how to avail herself of the promises made by the

Allied powers to sanction the creation of a new Adriatic state, namely Yugoslavia of which so much is written and discussed in recent times.

I

In 1914 at the outbreak of European War the population of Serbia together with Montenegro might have been estimated at 5,500,000 souls. The army comprised rather more than 350,000 men, including all three "bans" and the volunteers. Two million persons left the country at the time of the Austro-German and Bulgarian invasion of 1915. But there can be today hardly more than half a million refugees beyond the frontiers in Italy, Russia, Greece, France, England, Switzerland and America. The population now in Serbia must amount, therefore, to rather less than 3,000,000, of whom 1,500,000 have already become the charges of public or private philanthropy.

Almost all of the inhabitants of Serbia and Montenegro speak Serbian, and in vast majority belong to the Greek-Orthodox Church. There were in Serbia prior to the war 1450 churches and 90 monasteries. The property of the churches was valued at 50,700,000 dinars (\$10,000,000) and the monasteries 30,000,000 dinars. In addition to this there were 2600 elementary schools, 75 secondary schools, 2 theological seminaries, 2 military academies, 5 normal schools, 20 colleges, 1 university (at Belgrade), and 1 academy of science and art.

By her geographical situation Serbia is an agricultural country, where almost every peasant cultivates his own freehold. The holdings vary in size from 30 to 500 acres. The country produces wheat, barley, oats, maize, rye and beetroots. In the beginning of the war there were 252,000 horses, 1,645,000 head of cattle, 6408 sheep, 2,340,000 swine, and 1,790,000 goats. The forests have an area of 3,650,000 acres. The mineral resources are considerable, including coal, gold, copper, cement, silver and lead. The output of the mines was valued at 65,810,000 dinars. Flour milling is one of the most important of Serbian in-

dustries. In 1914 there were 32 large flour mills in the country. Brewing and distilling are extensively carried on. Other industries worth mentioning are carpet weaving, meat packing, sugar refining, and the preparation of wines.

When the invaders succeeded in occupying Serbia, they devastated or pillaged all mines, churches and monasteries. They burned houses and destroyed villages. It is difficult to calculate the number of dwellings reduced to ashes and ruins. According to information received from the districts of Kraina and Timok, and adding to that the reports obtained from the cities: Belgrade, Nish, Kragujevac, Skoplje, Prizren and Cetinje, we reckon more than 15,000 houses destroyed or rendered uninhabitable. No precise information prevails as to the number of churches demolished or damaged, or as to the workshops, factories, schools and farms which have been pilfered. The pillaging of the monasteries and the carrying off of the gold ornaments, vessels, books, old manuscripts, and archives, have especially caught the attention of the public, but it ought also be realized that numbers of buildings valuable to the state have likewise been subjected to terrible outrages. All libraries and precious documents have been removed and sent to Austria and Bulgaria. Domestic animals: cattle, pigs, sheep, horses and goats, as well as the reserves of crops have been requisitioned by the invaders, or consumed by the famished population. A large portion of the railroad lines was also destroyed, and nearly all the vehicles, carriages, carts and motor cars have disappeared from the country.

Estimates made as to the losses suffered by Serbia amount to about \$1,000,000,000. Who is going to pay this immense sum after the war? Austria, Bulgaria, or Turkey? There is no doubt that the war expenditure and refunding of the requisitions will be laid upon the conquered enemy after the conclusion of peace. But it is certain that so large an indemnity will not be paid off in a few weeks or months, although Serbia will be in immediate need of considerable resources. One must remember that she will not be alone in claiming compensation, and that

the devastation made in Italy, Bohemia, and Poland, has also reached enormous proportions.

II

Certain statesmen and politicians have suggested that an increase of territory at the expense of Bulgaria might to some extent compensate the losses sustained and add something to the prestige of Serbia. No one in Serbia takes this proposition seriously. It would be a betrayal of Serbia's past if she could dream of accepting such an offer. Europe has toward her a higher obligation than this. For centuries she has sacrificed herself to divert the invasion of Turkish hordes from Western Europe. The Entente Allies, now fighting for the same principle against unscrupulous military autocracies, will understand the Serbian national claims and will go so far as to admit them. For the last one hundred years Serbia has shown her vitality, her energy for work, her economic and her moral value. She has lived her life worthily. She would never for her own profit exact a right of conquest over Bulgaria. The calculations of benevolent friends who have thought to confer on Serbia the perilous mission of assimilating hostile populations in western Bulgaria are fallacious. Such annexed districts would probably be in a state of permanent revolt and intrigue, and they would have to be kept under the yoke at the cost of a burdensome military occupation. These provinces would augment the resources of the national budget, but they would impose an expenditure which would be as great as the receipts coming from them. Serbia does not want that. She believes that in Bulgaria there is still a sane and honest element opposing the imperialist motives of "Tsar" Ferdinand. With these democratic elements and real leaders of the Bulgarian people, the Serbians may be able to come to an understanding. But first of all it is essential that the Bulgarians must restore the Serbian territory they have seized. Furthermore, they must dissociate themselves from their Ferdinands and their jingo-imperialists, who inspire and gal-

vanize with Austrian ducats the policy of treachery and greed. They should turn from the imperialistic dreams of Tsar Simeon and Tsar Samuel to the democratic tradition of 1876. If they do not yield to this policy they will after all bow to a *force majeure*, and reënter a new quadruple Balkan confederation founded on the very principles of the Balkan League of 1912. The possible quadruple alliance of four Balkan states, Serbia, Greece, Rumania and Bulgaria is not a mirage. This idea was many times advocated by both foreign and Balkan politicians. In the second half of the nineteenth century its ardent sponsors in Serbia were Jovan Ristich and in Greece Spyridion Tricoupis. At the present time its strong supporters are the prominent statesmen, Bratiano, Pashich, Venizelos and Andria Radovich.

However, the final solution of the Balkan problem is infeasible for the present time. If Bulgaria remains persistent in her desire to keep her territorial acquisitions in Macedonia and Dobrudja, the question will inevitably meet the cognate problems of Greece and Rumania. If the Entente powers in opposition to this fact hold that some satisfaction should be conceded to Bulgaria, they will only be able to persuade Greece of her national claims in Asia Minor, and Rumania of her claims in Transylvania. Similarly with Serbia, the Macedonian question can be reopened in favor of Bulgaria, provided Serbian national aspirations are achieved by the unification of the Southern Slavs (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes). But here one may see the justification of the far-seeing prophecy of Albert Sorel in 1876, "When the Balkan Question appears to have been solved, Europe will inevitably be confronted by the Austrian Question." Those who refuse to speak of dismemberment of Austria-Hungary should not press the subject of Serbo-Bulgarian reconciliation. When, in the first Balkan war, Serb and Bulgar joined hands, they did so in open defiance of Vienna; and today more than ever is it impossible to be at the same time the advocate of Serbia, of Bulgaria, and of Austria-Hungary.

III.

The elimination of the Austrian empire from the European concert is imminent. For the last fifty years events have notoriously proved that Austria-Hungary was the stumbling-block in the solution of the Eastern Question and the creation of a Balkan confederation. She pursued there a policy of envy, malice and cunning. Profiting from the misery of Bulgaria, she offered her in 1915 a loan of \$100,000,000 from the *Disconto Gesellschaft* syndicate. Half of this sum was paid in cash and the remainder of \$50,000,000 applied to outstanding obligations, giving the syndicate a two years' option on Bulgaria's 5 per cent government securities. Of course, all this bargain was made at the expense of Serbia and her territory in Macedonia and in the Morava valley. Bulgaria sold to Austria the bear's skin even before the bear was killed!

Nobody can deny that in the Balkan Peninsula Austria-Hungary has great political and economic interests. Of \$500,000,000 of export and import per year made by the Balkan states, one-fifth, i.e., \$100,000,000 is in connection with Austria-Hungary. Serbia, as an inland country having no outlet on the Aegean or the Adriatic Sea, is entirely dependent on her powerful northern neighbor. Dalmatia and Istria, which geographically form the seaboard of Serbia, and which are besides inhabited by Jugoslavs, rest in the control of alien hands. Unsuccessful in finding new markets, the Serbian peasants feel the pinch of a permanent struggle with Austrian and Magyar capitalists. Lying between the Bulgarian anvil and the Austrian hammer, Serbia will continue this struggle to the end. But the issues involved in the rivalry between Austria-Hungary and the young Balkan states rest upon other than economic motives. The unity of a race of twelve millions is at stake; the future of all the wide lands that lie between Pirot and Ljubljana, between Cetinje and Temišvar is concerned.

The Southern Slavs, sharing the same racial characteristics and forming a single national family, want to be united into one state. As immortal Jefferson said,

When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to separation.

The causes which impel the Jugoslavs to separation from the Austrian empire are manifold. Austria-Hungary is not a state in a strict constitutional or international sense of the term, but simply a geographical expression. Most modern states are organized and practically homogeneous nations. They are inhabited by men of the same race, who speak the same language, who cherish the same ideals, and who are united by a great common heritage, by the bonds of a common literature, history and tradition. In Austria-Hungary nationalities are *forcibly* held together, and hate each other with a fierce hatred. Next to that, Austria-Hungary suffers from very dangerous social fissures. Whilst the body politic of the country is ruled by race privileges, the body social is dominated by caste privileges. In the Dual Monarchy the aristocracy and gentry still exercise mediaeval rights. In social and economic relations the characteristics are arrogance and brutality from above and humility and servility from below. The agricultural laborers, small farmers, and factory workers are treated almost like serfs. Austria-Hungary, as a purely artificial and preposterous state is united not by the unity of the people, but by a common bondage. The racial, national, religious and social antagonisms within the country are so great that they can only be described in the terms of Thomas Hobbes: *Bellum omnium contra omnes*.

IV

Far from being happy, the people in the Habsburg Monarchy live a miserable life. Plato once said that a state would be happy where philosophers were kings, or kings philosophers. As ill luck would have it, the Austrian philosophers have never been kings, nor the Habsburgs

philosophers. The various nationalities in Austria-Hungary are oppressed and subjected to one of the grossest tyrannies which the modern world knows. The Jugoslavs: Serbians, Croatians and Slovenes, do not want to be constituent parts of such a "state" which is in its entity a greater political, geographical and ethnical anomaly than ever was the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century. The Southern Slavs are nowadays straining every nerve to form their own state, which will be independent from Austria-Hungary. In this new state they purport to be bound together, not only by a common racial origin, common language and historic tradition, but by the strong consciousness of the advantage and necessity of being united into one autonomous political unit. This future state, which was officially proclaimed by the Yugoslav Committee of London and the Serbian Government at Corfu, July 20, 1917, will have a homogeneous population of about 12,000,000 inhabitants, and will include the following states and provinces: Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria, Carniola, Bačka and Banat. The new state, in itself, will constitute a young and wholesome force, as a dam in the defense of Europe against the German *Drang nach Süden*. The whole history of Serbia's struggle for liberty and independence, her unlimited courage, her religious and political tolerance, her democratic instincts and dispositional moderation—are the guarantees for fulfilment of this great task.

Small in territory, but great in spirit and valor, Serbia has shown the world an example of epic virtue and in no less degree a capacity for endurance in adversity. The Serbian people believe religiously in the justice and final triumph of the Yugoslav ideal, and while fighting for it they have given examples of lofty heroism and martyrdom. A better future is the rightful heritage of such a nation. Liberated and unified Serbia will become the focus and center of the whole Yugoslav race. Here is not a question of allotting to Serbia certain provinces inhabited by other branches of her race and tongue as "compensation."

Nothing can "compensate" heroism so magnificent, and sufferings so terrible as those of Serbia, save the unification of all the Yugoslav nation. The point in question lies in giving practical application of the working out of the Southern Slav race idea, and securing for Serbia that seaboard of which her traditional enemy, Austria, has long deprived her. It is further a question of conciliating the requirements of Italian national security with the requirements of Yugoslav unity. Without Yugoslav unity, formed in agreement with Italy, Italian national security cannot be obtained. The Italians and Yugoslavs have in the Adriatic identical interests. The Italians are a free and generous nation whose liberation in the time of Cavour, Mazzini, and Garibaldi, passed the same phase through which is today painfully laboring the liberation and unification of the Southern Slavs.

Reaching a friendly understanding in regard to the Dalmatian coast, the Italians and Yugoslavs will be linked by a fraternity of arms, of aims, and of interests, and will constitute a magnificent field of economic and cultural activity to the mutual benefit of both. When they come to this understanding there will be no longer any cleft in the Italo-Yugoslav Block into which Austria will be able to pour the corrosive acid of her inveterate intrigues. A permanent solution of the Southern Slav Question, in cooperation with Italy, will be the best guaranty and counterbalance athwart the Austro-German road to the Adriatic and the Balkan Peninsula.

If the future is to be devoted to correcting violations of the principle of nationality from the Habsburg Monarchy, considerable sacrifices are unavoidable. Truth has only one standard and the last word for the creation of the Yugoslav state with its natural ethnographical and economic boundaries will rest with political wisdom. Then, and only then, the people of the Balkan Peninsula will be able to unfold their rich resources for the welfare of human progress and for the establishment of justice and peace among the nations of southeastern Europe.

BULGARIA'S CASE

A REPLY TO PROFESSOR R. A. TSANOFF¹

By N. J. Cassavety, General Secretary of the Pan-Epirotic Union in America

In the May issue of the *New Europe*, Mr. Mavrocordato, in commenting upon an article written by Mr. Sideris, socialist Greek deputy from Salonica, on Macedonia, makes a remarkable statement. He declares that the Balkan nations are extreme in their nationalistic aspirations, and uncompromising to exasperation. He also says that the writers on the Balkan question, as a rule, have shown as strong a fanaticism for or against this or that Balkan race, as the Balkan peoples themselves.

Any one who has read the literature written on the Balkans during the last fifty years will agree that with very few exceptions the Philhellenes are hopelessly irreconcilable to the Bulgars, and the Philobulgars are unreasonably antagonistic to the Greeks.

The only explanation we venture to give of this warm championship of the one side or the other is the violence of the propaganda which is carried on by both Bulgars and Greeks to influence foreigners in favor of their respective views on Macedonia.

Thus, a foreigner who first visits Greece, is so thoroughly catechized in the Greek version of Macedonia, and in the Greek conception of the "terrible, savage, and brutal Bulgars," that he becomes from there on impermeable by any arguments which tend to alter his Greek opinion of the Bulgars. And likewise, the foreigner who visits Bulgaria first, is so convinced of the total worthlessness of the Greek claims on Macedonia, and of "the brutality, perfidy, barbarity" of the Greeks, that he cannot even bear to listen to the arguments on the other side.

¹ See article, "Bulgaria's Case," by Professor Tsanoff, *JOUR. OF RACE DEVELOPMENT*, Jan., 1918, p. 296.

Of the intensity of the national feeling that races in the veins of the Balkan peoples, and which gives birth to narrow views on their best interests, we cannot help mentioning the article of Professor Tsanoff. The professor has allowed himself to be carried away by his patriotic sentiments and has been unfair to Bulgaria's neighbors, Serbia and Greece.

Of the extreme exposition of the views of Bulgaria and of Greece by Philobulgars or Philhellenes, respectively, we should limit ourselves in citing works which are, strange to say, almost invariably consulted as authorities by most American writers on the Balkans—namely—Professor Monroe's *Bulgaria and Her People* and Mr. Noel H. Brailsford's *Macedonia* on the Bulgarian side, and French articles such as appeared in the *Review des Deux Mondes* in May, 1918, on the Greek side.

To any student of the Balkan question, who is unwilling to choose the course of least resistance by accepting the conflicting statistics, theories, and histories of either the one or the other side of the Balkan disputes, such treatises cannot be of use as a guide in the just appreciation of the respective rights of the claimants of Macedonia.

Professor Monroe's treatise,¹ for instance, will at the very outset warn the fair minded student against acquiescing in his views.

His authorities are Professor Tsanoff, Mr. Kutuktchieff and a number of other Bulgarians. And the keynote to his view of the Macedonian question is given in the singular statement, "Bulgaria was betrayed, attacked, and traduced by her treacherous allies." (Introduction, p. VIII.) This statement is made in reference to the war of 1913. So far as we know, only Professor Monroe has advanced this novel version as to the culprits of the second Balkan war. This view, of course, was the initial contention of the Bulgars, until a year later, on the anniversary of the second Balkan war, General Vasoff wrote the following indictment against the Bulgarians for having precipitated the war, which indictment has forced the Bulgarians to admit that they betrayed their allies.

¹ *Bulgaria and Her People.*

The catastrophe of June 29 is the work of a Camarilla which has its network of activities spread through every Bulgar institution. It is our old plague in our governmental organism. It is accustomed to govern without check and without responsibility. It has committed a crime of aberration on June 29, only in order to avoid the arbitration of Russia. Thus has the Balkan Alliance been broken, and Austria escaped the four-headed hydra, by the offering of Bulgaria as an holocaust. God only knows when our people will escape the disgrace to which men without conscience and without honor have condemned it.²

We can thus realize how widely mistaken Professor Monroe is, and how a fair minded judge will be misled in taking such a writer as a reliable authority. Professor Monroe calls all the Greeks "perfidious, and thieves."

Mr. Brailsford, in a less passionate probulgarian style, sees in the Bulgarians the future race of the Balkans, the progressive and amiable, the deserving race; and in the Greeks, a race of degenerates, unfit to hold any equal sway with the Bulgars.

Mr. Domergue, in his extreme Philhellenism, pictures the Bulgars as "barbarians, brutes, ruffians, deprived of the sense of honor and morality." "Only the Greeks are intelligent, honorable, amiable, etc."³

Space, of course, does not permit us to multiply examples of writers who, owing to their fiery attachment to one or the other nationality in the Balkans, are unsafe guides.

When I read Professor Tsanoff's treatise in the *JOURNAL OF RACE DEVELOPMENT* I was not taken by surprise by the intensity of the writer's conviction. The Balkan peoples, unfortunately, seldom see any other point of view except their own, and the Bulgarians, despite their many good qualities, are more perfectly Balkan in respect to this weakness, than any other of the Balkan races. What filled me with astonishment, however, was the attempt of Professor Tsanoff to exonerate, and even to justify Bulgaria for her partnership with Prussia and Turkey, against the democratic nations of the world.

If the Balkan regions claimed by Bulgaria and held by Bulgar troops today are regions inhabited by Bulgarians; if the cultural

² *Mir*, June 29, 1914.

³ *Echo de Paris*, May 1, 1915.

ideals inspiring Bulgaria and her political and economic system are genuinely democratic; if the ethnic unification and the strengthening of Bulgaria are in no sense a triumph of *Drang nach Osten* diplomacy—then America should realize and should openly declare, not only that she has no possible quarrel with Bulgaria, but that the active support of Bulgaria's demands is a logical part of her own war-program.

If Professor Tsanoff can point the truth of these three suppositions, he expects us to believe that,

1. Bulgaria entered the war as an ally of Germany, not because she sympathized with Prussianism, but because German strategy apparently did admit the demands of Bulgaria's own liberating mission.
2. Bulgaria is not a Hohenzollern pawn, nor one with Germany in spirit, nor an outpost of Germany in fact.
3. Bulgaria's war is a Bulgarian war pure and simple, a distinctively Balkan undertaking, aiming to complete the liberation and the unification of the Bulgarian folk.
4. Bulgaria has achieved already in the heart of the Balkans what America is now undertaking to achieve for all Europe: The vindication of the principles of nationality and democracy.

While we challenge the correctness of the evidence adduced by Professor Tsanoff to substantiate the truth of his three suppositions, we feel that our work can be as easily accomplished by relegating the testing of the evidence to a secondary consideration, and by assuming that he has proved the truth of his suppositions to examine whether Bulgaria can be absolved from the sin of having declared war against Humanity and Democracy.

"Bulgaria," pleads Professor Tsanoff, "had claims upon Macedonia. In order to make good those claims she went into alliance with Germany."

There are two alternatives suggested by this contention. Either that Germany is more liberal, more democratic, and more just, and recognized the justice of Bulgaria's claims, while the Allies refused to do so, "apparently;" or, that the Allies have not found her claims just and could not justly yield to her, while unscrupulous Germany consented to sacrifice the rights of other races in order to invite Bulgaria's participation in the struggle.

If the Bulgarian cause was just, if Bulgaria's claims were just, then, the allied Germans are the real champions of liberty and justice, and the Allies and America are on the opposite side of democracy, and freedom of small nationalities.

But, it may be argued that in all other cases the cause of the Allies is just, the cause of Germany unjust; while in the case of Bulgaria, the Allies are unjust, and the Germans just.

Had Bulgaria the faintest love of world liberty and world democracy, it will be readily admitted that she could not have sacrificed the cause of world-democracy, in order to "liberate" a few hundred thousand Bulgar-Macedonians.

It is impossible to conceive of the logic of Professor Tsanoff who insists that Bulgaria is democratic, animated by similar principles as those by which America is animated, and that although she knew that Germany was aiming at the ruin of France, England, Italy and America, she deemed the "liberation" of Macedonia of a more serious concern than the salvation of the democratic countries of the world.

Had Bulgaria been animated solely by a burning desire for the "liberation" of Bulgar folk, we are decidedly certain that she would have trusted in the justice and the fairness of the Allies, and now in the fairness of America to adjudicate to Bulgaria what really belongs to her.

If Bulgaria were animated by the same unselfish motives which made America enter the struggle on the side of the Allies, she would have preferred to suffer at the unfairness of the Allies and of America, rather than assist the most barbarous autocracy to crush the democratic peoples of the earth.

Having shown that Professor Tsanoff's argument attempting to justify Bulgaria's alliance with Prussia will not stand, I shall now endeavor to point out that the three conclusions arrived at by Professor Tsanoff from his three suppositions, are altogether contrary to indisputable facts.

1. "Bulgaria," concludes Professor Tsanoff, "is not a Hohenzollern pawn, nor one with Germany in spirit—nor an outpost of Germany in fact."

Professor Tsanoff finds great pleasure in the enumeration of antiquated lists of references. We will quote not the obscure volumes which are said to be found mostly on the dusty shelves of German libraries, but living, contemporary authorities to prove that Bulgaria is a Hohenzollern pawn, "one with Germany in spirit, an outpost of Germany, in fact;" that Bulgaria did not enter the war as an ally of Germany because Germany admitted Bulgaria's liberating mission, but because Bulgaria is craving after "Balkan hegemony," because she longs to become the Prussia of the Near East, because she was growing mad with the lust of conquest; that Bulgaria did not enter to fight this war as a mere Balkan war, but as a war to crush democracy, and to destroy French culture, British sea power, and Serbian expansion; that Bulgaria has not "liberated" Macedonia, but has massacred the Macedonian inhabitants, annihilated Serbian civil population, and perpetrated acts of extreme violence upon Roumanians and Greeks.

And to prove our points we will refer to the irrefutable testimony of Bulgaria's officials and publicists, as well as to German and Austrian opinions.

We want Macedonia—that is, we don't want it, because we already have it. Our troops are in Macedonia, and we will never again get out of it.⁴

At all costs we must be neighbors with Austria-Hungary. Our friendship has grown during the war, and has become an alliance as solid as rock. Now we can give hands across the Morava Valley. This neighborhood was very necessary for us. Some day we should have to have it. I ask myself how much have the Austro-Bulgar relations suffered by the unfortunate fact that Serbia has come in between us! The way which leads from Bulgaria to Europe is now open. This passage has been secured without the violation of the principle of nationality (?) which the Allies have so insistently put forward. We have been accused by the Allies that we have conscripted from the conquered countries. The conquered lands are Bulgarian. If we have shed our blood to conquer them, it is not in order to leave them alone.⁵

Of course, it is unnecessary to mention here that the lands of which Mr. Radoslavoff speaks as Bulgarian are the

⁴ *Viene Freie Presse*, June 11, 1917, Premier Radoslavoff

⁵ *Viene Freie Presse*, June 11, 1917, Premier Radoslavoff.

eastern portion of the Old Kingdom of Serbia, which separated Bulgaria from Austria-Hungary. "These lands are Bulgarian." And so, entire Serbia is Bulgarian. Almost all of the Serbian population has been exterminated, as we shall be told by the Bulgarians themselves.

Commenting on these declarations of Premier Radoslavoff, the official organ of Sofia, *The Echo of Bulgaria* wrote:

The neighborhood of the two countries secured by a common effort against most formidable enemies is a new factor of friendship between the Monarchy and Bulgaria. *Even if the latter had no right over the Valley of Morava, the need of having a free line of communication with the Central Powers would be for her a sufficient reason to claim its possession.*⁶

In Vienna, where the interests of the monarchy in the Balkans have always been well judged, the need of having on the Danube a friendly nation, and consequently, a direct communication with Bulgaria, are the thoughts unanimously agreed upon. *Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria*, subject to most trying privations, hold fast against an ever growing coalition, and it is their adversaries that waste themselves in a struggle as sanguinary as it is vain. Russia is from now on incapable of any serious effort, and there is room to believe that, if the Allies succeed in persuading her to try again, she will experience a fatal disappointment. At any rate, without Russia, the war on the continent is virtually ended.⁷

On July, 1915, General Angeloff issued a pamphlet, *The Hour of Bulgaria*. We quote:

Besides the signal services which Germany renders to us by the destruction of France and Russia, she shows us also the unincalculable way whereby we can realize the *hegemony in the Balkans*. The nation which aspires to hegemony must prepare to fight against all her neighbors. *The German example shows us that we cannot attain to hegemony except by violence. If we do not obtain it, we cannot be the Prussians of the Balkans.*

Here is the greatest ambition of Bulgaria—to become the Prussians of the Balkans. Yet, Mr. Tsanoff very naively insists that Bulgaria's ideals are absolutely like those of America!

On April 11, 1917, the *Bulgarian Press* announced the change of the Bulgarian civil code.

⁶ *The Echo of Bulgaria*, June 14, 1917.

⁷ *The Echo of Bulgaria*, June 14, 1917.

"The necessity of this modification," declared the Bulgarian Minister of Justice, "may be explained by the fact that our existing civil code is a sort of a copy of the French civil code, which is absolutely worthless. We propose to replace it by the German civil code, which is absolutely perfect. This transformation will have the advantage of drawing us nearer to the Central Powers."⁸

What Bulgaria longs for is a thorough Prussianisation of her institutions.

P. Oswald, a German publicist writes:

The rôle of Bulgaria in this war has consisted in joining Turkey to Germany. As the word from Hamburg to Bagdad goes through Sofia, and as Bulgaria forms the link between Orient and Occident, she can now profit by her geographical position, and fulfill her destiny in the world.

We have attempted to disprove Professor Tsanoff's contention that Bulgaria entered the war in pursuance of the principle of nationality. We should feel contented with the evidence adduced, and forego the annoyance to our readers of inviting them to go over the three suppositions of Professor Tsanoff.

We have already proved that Bulgaria's institutions are not democratic, and that she is a German tool for the furtherance of the Prussian policy of *Drang Nach Osten*. It remains for us now to examine whether Macedonia occupied now by the Bulgarians is Bulgarian in nationality.

In the first place, it should be necessary for us to define the term *nationality*. What constitutes a *nationality*? And Lord Cromer, in reviewing the excellent work of Arnold Toynbee, *The New Europe*, agrees with Mr. Toynbee's definition: "It is the will to coöperate" and "It is irrespective of language or religion."⁹

A few years ago Mr. Clemenceau issued a pamphlet in which he discussed the question of nationality. He brought forth the same conception as Mr. Toynbee. "No matter what language I speak, if I choose to be a Frenchman, so

⁸ *Mir*, April 11, 1917.

⁹ *The New Europe*, Preface, p. 1.

then, I am a Frenchman," wrote Mr. Clemenceau.¹⁰ This definition found acceptance among the most learned circles of Europe and America. Only Germany and Bulgaria objected to it. Germany could not admit this solution, for, she considers the Flemings, the Dutch, the northern Swiss, the Alsatians and the Lorraineans as Germans, because they speak German,—a quasi-German language. The fact that the Dutch hate the Germans, the fact that the Flemings, the northern Swiss, and the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine object to a union with Germany is of little moment to the Germans. "They are Germans, and if they do not understand that, we will force them to accept our opinion," is the reply of Germany.

Having then, invited our readers' attention to the definitions of nationality as accepted by the democratic nations of the world on the one side, and by Germany and Bulgaria on the other side, we can the more easily perceive the error of the Bulgarophiles who maintain that the largest portion of Macedonia is Bulgarian.

Mr. Ami Boue, one of the authorities cited by Professor Tsanoff, writes that the purely Greek population in Macedonia is more than 300,000 (p. 21, vol. II). He considers that there are over 200,000 Vlacks, and about as many Slav-speaking Greeks.¹¹

Now, not even the most extreme Philobulgars dare deny the existence of a large population in Macedonia which speaks Slav but feels Greek and speaks and prays for Greece.

Nor is there a discrepancy in the works of the writers on the Balkans that the Vlacks, whatever their origin, are strongly attached to the Greek cause. Greece, accepting the principle of nationality as defined by Mr. Clemenceau, Lord Cromer and Mr. Toynbee, considers the Vlacks and the Slavophone Macedonians as Greeks, because they love Greece, and pray for her, and wish to be united to her.

¹⁰ H. N. Brailsford, *Macedonia*, p. 19 and Prof. Spenser Wilkinson, "Types of Political Frontiers," *Royal Geographic Journal*, February, 1915.

¹¹ *Ami Boue La Turquie d'Europe*, p. 21, vol. II.; p. 23, vol. II.

Greece, then, claims that the Greek nationality in Macedonia is 800,000 strong.

Now, according to the best authorities, the total population of Macedonia does not exceed 2,250,000 people. Of these there are Mohammedans 800,000; Greeks (according to the Greek opinion) 800,000, the remainder 650,000 are distributed among the Bulgarians, Serbians, and Jews.

Bulgaria, however, accepts the German definition of *Nationality*. "Those who speak Bulgarian are Bulgarians" maintain the Bulgars. The Macedonians, therefore, who speak Slav, although they are attached to Greece, are Bulgarians. And if they do not understand it, it is the business of the propagandist to tell the Macedonians that they are Bulgarians.

With these antagonistic definitions of nationality, it is not to be wondered that the Bulgar and Greek statistics are at variance, and that the exponents of Bulgarophilism and those of Philhellenism are at odds.

The question resolves itself into the consideration of whether we should accept the German-Bulgarian definition of nationality or the Franco-British one.

If we accept the Bulgar definition, then the Bulgars have the preponderance in Macedonia; then the Flemings, the Dutch, the northern Swiss, and the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are Germans. If we accept the French opinion, the Slav Macedonians, who love Greece and hate Bulgaria and Serbia, are Greeks, the Flemings are Belgians, the Dutch are not Germans, and the northern Swiss are Swiss, pure and simple, and the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine French.

It is indeed necessary to show where we have derived our figures for the population of Macedonia.

As we have mentioned, we have consulted every authority adduced by Professor Tsanoff such as Brancoff, Brailsford, Boué, Lejean, Pouqueville, and as many as were to be found in our libraries, and our astonishment was most singular at the extraordinary disagreement of these authorities with the statements made by Professor Tsanoff.

Mr. Brailsford, for instance, answers the question of Professor Tsanoff, "What are the Macedonian Slavs, Serbians or Bulgars?" as follows:

"They cannot be said to be Serbians, because they cannot possibly be of pure Slav blood. On the other hand, they cannot be said to be Bulgars, their language is neither Serbian, nor Bulgarian, but Slav." And again, "The Macedonian Slavs have become Bulgars through Bulgar propaganda which was vigorously initiated thirty years in advance of the Serbian or Greek propagandas." "The Macedonians will become as easily Serbians or Greeks as they have become Bulgars." And he mentions that at Monastir he met a wealthy villager, and asked him, "Is your village Greek or Bulgarian?" "It was Greek last year, but now it is Bulgarian," replied the villager. "How is that miracle?" he asked. "Well, we needed a priest. We asked the Greek bishop to give us one. He refused us. The Bulgarians learned about it, and came to us and said that they would give us not only a priest, but also a teacher free of charge. So we became Bulgarians." And Mr. Brailsford says this was a Greek-speaking village:¹²

Mr. Boué, to whom Professor Tsanoff refers us as to his authority, writes:

The Macedonians in northern Macedonia pray for Prince Michael, and look up to Serbia, the Bulgars in Bulgaria to the Emperor of Russia, and the Macedonians in southern Macedonia and Thessaly pray for King Otto of Greece.¹³

And what does Professor Tsanoff answer to that question? "No! absolutely no!" Serbians in Macedonia! Evidently Professor Tsanoff has not gone over his authorities carefully.

But in concluding our reply we would ask Professor Tsanoff if he knows the statistics of the Bulgarian schools in Macedonia, of the Bulgarian bishoprics, and of the Bulgarian representatives to the Turkish parliament in 1908.

The school statistics for Bulgaria were published at Plovdiv, Bulgaria, in 1895, under the supervision of the Bulgarian exarchate.

¹² H. N. Brailsford, *Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future*, p. 101, 102.

¹³ *Ami Boué, La Turquie d'Europe*, vol. IV, p. 104.

Space does not admit of a detailed table of comparative numbers of schools, teachers, and pupils. We state only that the Greek pupils are some 34,000 more than the Bulgarian pupils in Macedonia. Out of five Christian deputies to the Turkish parliament in 1908, four were Greeks and one Bulgarian.

Out of thirty metropolitan bishoprics in Macedonia, seventeen were Greek in 1908, and only seven Bulgarian.

In fine, it all depends on the point of view one takes of the Macedonian question. Nationality must, after all, be judged according to the will of the people. What matter if I speak Greek, or Bulgarian better than English. So long as I have chosen to join my future with America, to adopt her traditions, to be imbued with her culture, to dream her dreams, to live for her and to die for her, what reasonable man will deny that I am American on the ground that I speak Bulgarian or Greek or Serbian?

In lieu of insisting upon a policy of "all-or-nothing" and of forced Hellenization, Serbization or Bulgarization, we should let the Macedonians choose with whom they wish to find their future. And we, former Bulgars and former Greeks, who have learned the newer meaning of nationality in America, should be freed of that unfortunate jingoism which has so long torn Macedonia with interracial hatreds. We should seek to teach tolerance, understanding, and brotherhood, and help to bring back the Balkan Federation which was so unluckily for humanity dissolved through a mere lust of conquest and a vain and mad longing after hegemony.

LITHUANIANS

By Thomas Shamis

Lithuania, having a loyal character, must be preserved; for her tongue possesses the key which opens all the enigmas not only of philology, but also of history.—Preface to *Grammatik der Litauischen Sprache*, by Emmanuel Kant, Königsberg, 1800.

Lithuania was once a world power. Its boundaries extended from the Baltic to the Black sea. Besides Lithuania proper, within its confines were the provinces of Vitebsk, Polotsk, Smolensk, Kiev, Lutsk, Chernogov.

Lithuania, like many another nation, fell prey to political tricksters and in 1772 was finally divided between Russia and Prussia. But Lithuanian patriotism survived; and the period immediately following the partition was a trying one for Lithuanians. They were oppressed and killed for their love of the Lithuanian language, and of their native rights and customs. But the scaffold, the prison and the Siberian exile were of no avail to make the Lithuanian give up what was so dear, the Lithuanian language.

Lithuania is situated on the Eastern shore of the Baltic sea, and forms an oblong, being 300 miles long and 200 miles wide. The date when the Lithuanians first settled in their native country is not known exactly, but from ancient times the Lithuanians occupied the swamps and level lands covered with endless forests extending from the Baltic sea to the East and South. In Bain's *Slavonic Europe* we read:

Lithuanians first emerged into the light of history at the time of the settlement of the Teutonic Order in the North. Rumors of the war of extermination, waged by the Knights against their near kinsfolk, the Prussians, first evoked the Lithuanians to a sense of their danger. They immediately abandoned their loose communal system for a monarchical form of government, and under a series of exceptionally capable Princes, notably, Mindovg (1240–1263), and Gedymis (1316–1341), began an astonishing career of conquest, mainly at the expense of Russia, so that at the death of Gedymis, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania extended from Courland to the Carpathians, and from the Bug to the Deans;

including the old Russian principalities of Plock, Kiev and Chernigov. Indeed, at one time, it seemed as if this new, non-Slavonic State was about to eclipse and absorb all the Slavonic states to the East and West.

The Lithuanian language, as many prominent linguists prove, is most beautiful, and older than the Greek or Latin. Anthropology has shown that the Lithuanian language differs from the language of the Slav, as has been heretofore believed, but belongs to the Indo-European group and is nearer the Sanskrit than any other language. Since anthropology has revealed the fact that the Lithuanian language is older than the Greek, Latin and German, the Lithuanians can truly say that without doubt theirs is the oldest language spoken today.

The Contemporary Review, of August, 1917, writes:

Harmonious, richer in affectionate and cajoling diminutives than any other of the languages of Europe, Lithuanian possesses the sonority of Latin and Greek; the primitive qualities of Sanskrit; and the softness and musicality of Italian. So well have some of the primitive characteristics of this beautiful language been preserved in the undisturbed backwaters of Lithuania, that, if it were possible for the Romans and the Greeks to rise from their graves, they would have little difficulty in understanding whole sentences as spoken by the Lithuanian today, whilst these could just as easily understand some of the phrases of the Sanskrit.

"Vyrai, traukite jungan," uttered the Lithuanian refugee sadly, as he shouldered his pack and fled before the German invader (1915). "Viri trahite jugum"—"Men, drag the yoke"—echoed the Roman. "Dziews (Dievs) dave dantis, duos ir duonos"—"God has given us teeth, he will give us bread"—continued the refugee resignedly, though his farm was in flames and all hope of return to his ravaged fields seemed gone forever. And from ancient Greece came the encouraging response: "Dzeus doe odontas dosei sitos."

It is undeniable that Lithuanian is the most ancient of all the living languages, and as such is of invaluable service to philology. This opinion was confirmed scientifically by Schleicher, who showed, by his work on the Lithuanian language, its great value to philology. And the work of Elisee Reclus testifies to its striking beauty:

Of all European languages, the Lithuanian has the greatest number of endearing and caressing diminutives. It has more of

them than Spanish or Italian, and even more than Russian, and they can be multiplied almost indefinitely by applying them to verbs and adverbs, as well as to adjectives and nouns. If the value of a nation in the whole of humanity were to be measured by the beauty of its language, the Lithuanians should rank first among the inhabitants of Europe.

Lithuanians in early days were noted for their production of amber, precious stones and other minerals. They traded chiefly with the Greeks and the Romans. Greek historians wrote about the second century that the Lithuanians were a quiet race of people and never fought unless attacked. Tischler and other archeologists write of the highly developed Lithuanian culture.

From the beginning of the thirteenth century Lithuania started her historical life. Until that century the Lithuanians lived in clans in their forests; when the Germans, discovering a new field for their commerce, prompted the Lithuanians by their spirit of independence to gather around their chiefs and to select a single head chief. The first to be selected was Rimgaudas who had gained several victories over the Mongolians, and stopped their march on Occidental Europe. Later he established his dominion over the Russians. He extended the boundaries of Lithuania as far as Polotsk and Vitebsk.

Mindaugis, who succeeded Rimgaudas, had to fight against the Russians, the Poles and the Teutonic Knights: The Knights of the Cross and the Knights of the Sword. The *Dublin University Magazine*, November, 1869, writes:

The Knights felt that if Lithuania was Christian, there would be no more "pagan hordes" for them to make head against, and so they were not at all anxious that the pure faith should make way across the Niemen. They were always ready, however, to foment disorders in the country.

In 1260 at the battle of Lake Durbes, Mindaugis inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Teutonic Knights. In 1263 he was assassinated. His sons taking revenge upon the murderers of their father brought Lithuania into anarchy which lasted nearly a score of years, until Vitenas finally brought order out of chaos.

Gediminas, Vitenas' younger brother, head of the Jagellon dynasty, was the founder of Lithuania's power. The Russians feared him and withdrew leaving Volhynia and he advanced as far as Kiev. About this time the Mongolians threatened to ruin the Western civilization. Lithuania at her height formed an obstacle which opposed the invasion, and the Lithuanians saved Europe from this disaster.

Gediminas realizing that Lithuania could not stand alone formed alliances with various nations in Europe, and ruled the country in an orderly manner. He even made arrangements with the Pope to establish Christianity in Lithuania, but the Germans with their Teutonic Knights succeeded in preventing this. A few friars were allowed to preach the gospel in Lithuania. F. Boldt in his review tells of the character of the Knights in the following words:

The Teutonic Knights were slowly preparing to annex Lithuania; they did not hurry themselves, for they liked to keep, as long as possible, a miniature crusading ground, where all the enthusiasts of Europe might carry on the war against the infidels, with a minimum of danger and a maximum of profit.

Gediminas' two sons, Algirdas and Keistutis, ruled together. This was a period of war for the Lithuanians. Algirdas, who fought the Russians forced them to give up much of their land and marched three times up to Moscow, and his gallant army invaded Crimea. When he died he left Lithuania with her dominions extending from the Baltic to the Black sea, and from the Bug to the Donetz. Keistutis was at the same time fiercely fighting with the Germans, who wished to conquer Lithuania. Keistutis' gentle character is ably told in the following which appeared in *Dublin University Magazine*, November, 1869:

Keystutt, was a prince in an age when, according to the German Minnesingers, the Christian Knights were losing all title to the name, yea, were spoiling the trade of the Jew usurers. Often taken prisoner by the Teutonic Knights, he usually owed his escape to the admiration which he inspired in his gaolers. Once, after eight months captivity he got away in the dress of the order, the well known white cloak with black cross, and on the horse of the Grand Master himself; but he took care to send back the horse

as soon as he crossed the frontier. He was as magnanimous in victory, as he was intrepid in defeat. Here is an instance of this crude heathen's conduct:

Johannisburg has just been taken by a night attack; the "white cloaks" have surrendered; they are packed in the courtyard of the castle while round them streams a crowd of people clad in sheepskins, brandishing their bows and arrows, and calling for vengeance and for wholesale sacrifice to Zinicz (the sanctuary of the highest God, Perun). Although the commander of the Knights steps forward, "Son of Gedimin," he says, "I am ready to die, but spare my comrades!" "Chose the four of them, whom you love best, and ride freely off; as for the rest, they shall all have their lives; Keystutt hath said it."

He always duly warned the Grand Master before he made any inroads on the Knights; and, when he said he was coming, he always came.

Jagello, the son of Algirdas, by his marriage with Hedwig, the Queen of Poland, united Lithuania with Poland on a dynastic union; the Poles, basing their claims on this mere bond exacted a prepondering power in Lithuania. Jagello was compelled to leave the Grand Ducal throne to his cousin, Vytautas, who did all he could to keep the independence of Lithuania, which at that time was three times larger than Poland. He attempted to Christianize the country and had a measure of success; the Lithuanians were baptized and thus were the last of the present Christian nations of Europe to become converted. Polish missionaries then began to travel through Lithuania and preach, but they made an unforgiveable mistake in disregarding the language (*lingua vernacula*) of the Lithuanians and in forcing the Polish language upon them. As a result of this Christianity did not obtain a strong foothold in Lithuania, so that still in the seventeenth century more than half of the Lithuanians were pagans. After this union with Poland, Lithuania retained its own power, princes and government, so that all that remained in common to the two nations was the union between them. Vytautas seeing the Teutonic Knights threatening to crush all in their way, gathered his forces, being aided by the Poles and Russians, and dealt the Knights a decisive blow which ended in a complete victory at Grunvald (1410). Unfortunately, however, Poland did not remain loyal and when in 1447 Casimer Jagello was

crowned King of Poland, disputes arose as to whether Lithuania should be considered a kingdom as it was before the union with Poland, or merely as a province of Poland. In order to settle this matter, conventions were held at Lublin and other places, in 1448, 1451, 1453, which ended in bloody riots between the Poles and Lithuanians. According to Lithuanian chronicles, the Lithuanians became so exasperated at the intrigues of the Poles that they wished to return the marks of heraldry bestowed upon them by the Poles. The Kingdom of Lithuania thus remained legally in the same condition in which it existed before the union. The situation is explained in Bain's *Slavonic Europe*:

In Poland itself, men were of one mind as to the desirability of a complete and absolute union; but the Lithuanian magnates obstinately opposed it. Only the fear of the Moscovite with whom they were always more or less at war, induced the Lithuanians to entertain the proposal at all. The project of a closer union was first debated at the Diet of Warsaw (November, 1563; June, 1564), to which the Lithuanians sent delegates. The discussions were warm on both sides and ultimately came to nothing; but the King judiciously prepared the way for future negotiations by voluntarily relinquishing his hereditary title to the throne of Lithuania.

However, from this time on this union began to weaken and in order to prevent disruption the Poles called a convention at Lublin in 1569. After this, these sharp disputes between the Poles and the Lithuanians partly disappeared, which in all probability was due to the fact that the Lithuanian princes and aristocrats began to mix more freely with the Poles and Gudai (inhabitants of White Russia) and also to assimilate their habits and customs. On the other hand the common people, up to the middle of the nineteenth century, were victims of a hard feudal system that existed at that time. To these common people credit must be given that the Lithuanian language and customs have survived. Secretly they practiced their old pagan religion so that almost half returned to the worship of their ancient Perun, a relapse due directly to the manner in which the Polish missionaries labored, namely, in

the Polish language instead of the Lithuanian. As time passed this union between the Poles and Lithuanians suffered severely from the exaggerated individualism of the Poles, which manifested itself in all departments of their government, and finally led Poland to anarchy. This condition also affected the Lithuanians whose princes and aristocrats had assimilated Polish habits and customs and had become Polonized. The hyphenated state became a kind of a confederated kingdom without any central administration and whose joint executive was a king whose power was paralyzed by diets, by government officers appointed for life, or by confederations organized in different provinces. This union did more evil than good to both states. The nobility of both thought of nothing but laying taxes on the people. Russia, Germany and Austria seeing the corrupt state of affairs determined to dismember Poland and Lithuania. The first partition took place on July 25, 1772, the second in 1792, and the third in 1795. By these three successive divisions, the greatest part of Lithuania was annexed to Russia, and the smaller part to Germany.

The nineteenth century brought many changes to the Lithuanians, now under the Russian government. In 1831 the Poles made an effort to regain their lost political liberty, which resulted in bloody and useless revolution. The Russian Ukase of 1849 forbade the use of the name of Lithuania which was to be replaced by that of north western country. Again in 1863 the Poles made a last and final political revolt, but as in 1831 their efforts were fruitless. The Lithuanian common folk were enticed to take part in these revolutions by empty promises, and as a result the seat of government at Vilna was occupied by the Russian Governor-General Mouravief (the Hanger); and the University at Vilna was removed to Kiev. Mouravief, in 1863, forbade the use of Lithuanian characters in all printed matter, from prayer-books to newspapers; and, in the following year, made such printing a crime. He also decreed that all books should be printed with Russian characters in order to accustom the people to adopt the Russian language and forget their own. This régime lasted forty years. The

Lithuanian literature was not allowed to live in Russia, so it sought a new home in Tilsit, (Lithuanian Germany), from whence books printed in Lithuanian characters were smuggled into Lithuania.

In 1904 a great revolution broke out in Russia. Fearing that the Lithuanians might join the revolution, Russia, in order to gain their good will, granted them the freedom of the press. Previous to this not only was the liberty of the press denied them, but all national movements, which tended to keep alive the national spirit and language, were forbidden and punished by banishment to Siberia. This severity had the most telling effect upon the Lithuanian people. Their sturdy sons left their birthplace for all corners of the globe; about a million coming to the United States of America. During the short period of ten years, (1904-1914), there was a remarkable growth of Lithuanian literature of permanent value, among which should be mentioned *Blunder*, by Dobilas, depicting the dawn of the new era; *Klaida*, (*Wrong*) by Lazdinu Peleda; *Sharunas*, by Vincent Kreve, authority on ancient heroes; and *Dainavos Salies Senu Zmoniu Padavimai*, by Vincent Kreve, Lithuanian life ably told. Among scientific works are, *Prakalba prie Lietuviu Kryziaus Albumo*, by Dr. Basanavichus and *Aisciu Studijos* (*The Studies of Aestii*), by Buga. Besides there were organized many societies of education, as well as a scientific society to conduct searches of ancient tombs and burial places for the purpose of discovering the nature of ancient Lithuanian culture. Mention must be made of the Society of Fine Arts and the Prohibition Society, the former for developing the Lithuanian national style and the latter for saving the poor people from squandering their possessions to obtain vodka. The Lithuanians in America are keeping abreast of the intellectual movement, since at the present there are thirty-two Lithuanian publications published in the States, not to mention those in England, Canada, and South America.

Can old historic Poland be reunited? This is the question asked by everyone. To answer it requires the considering of the following three points:

Will the people of Poland favor it?

Will the people of Ukrainia favor it?

Will the people of Lithuania favor it?

1. The people of Poland proper care little about the dream of the older Polish propagandist: "morza do morza," meaning, "from sea to sea." Can any nation or Peace Conference grant Poland the right to extend from sea to sea and thus to step over other nations without due consideration?

2. The people of Ukrainia were hard pressed by the old Russian rule while the tyranny of the Pole is still fresh in their minds. The leading Ukrainians with one accord say that they are ready to govern themselves and will not unite with Poland.

3. The people of Lithuania know well the efforts of the Poles to rob them of their language. It seems absurd, still it is a fact, that they were told by their Polish Christian messengers that a pagan language is only understood by a pagan god and that the Lithuanians must have a language other than Lithuanian in order to please the Christian God. The Pole tells the world that Lithuania is but a province of Poland, and that there are no Lithuanians. The Pole can say what he likes, but there never has been a time when the Lithuanians as a race fell into oblivion, much less were swallowed by Poland. And as for the language, he can at any time hear plain Lithuanian spoken. Professor Meillet of the College de France, says:

If you wish to hear from human lips some echo of what the language originally common to the Indo-European may have been, go and listen to the Lithuanian peasants talking.

To the question whether the Lithuanians can govern themselves, we need only point to a dispatch from Japan of March last:

In Lithuania there has been formed a provisional government consisting of the following: A. Smetona, premier; P. Dovydailis, minister of education; J. Shaulys, minister of foreign affairs; M. Smilgevichus, minister of finances; M. Birzhishka, minister of justice; J. Vileisha, minister of public works; D. Malinauskas, minister of public safety. Dr. J. Szlupas, well known among the American Lithuanians, has been appointed envoy plenipotentiary

to the United States; J. Aukshtuolis, president of the Lithuanian committee in Stockholm, is made ambassador to the Scandinavian countries; M. Ychas, member of the last Russian Duma, ambassador to England and France; J. Gabrys, manager of the Lithuanian Information Bureau in Switzerland, Ambassador to the Central Powers. A national army is being organized. Lithuania's absolute neutrality was proclaimed. A political and economic treaty with Sweden was drafted.

And a further proof that the Lithuanians can govern themselves is the convention of 1800 Lithuanian delegates from all parts of the United States, comprising representative men of the nationality in this country, which was held in New York, March 13-14, 1918. Resolutions were adopted repeating the demand for absolute independence for Lithuania "as a sovereign and independent state within its own ethnographic boundaries."

And the following reasons for this action were urged:

(a) The Lithuanians are the aborigines of the territory they occupy.

(b) The Lithuanians rendered a service to Humanity by rescuing Civilization.

(c) There was no real union between Lithuania and Poland. At Lublin, a confederation was formed, against the will of the Lithuanian people. The King of Poland had no right to act at this conference as the Duke of Lithuania, because a year previous to this conference he had left the throne of Lithuania. The dismembering of Poland and Lithuania dissolved all ties, if any had existed.

(d) Russia never conquered Lithuania, but the Russian Czar used the title of Grand Duke of Lithuania, transferring it to others at coronation. The fall of Czar Nicholas II frees Lithuania. Lithuania's declaration of its independence by the State Council, and, later, the recognition of the independence by the German Government, although unsatisfactory, makes the question of Lithuania an international one, to be settled at the termination of the war.

(e) The Lithuanian active participation in this war by contributing about a million of her sturdy sons to the Allied Armies, and having a self-government, entitles her to a representation at the Peace Conference.

(f) The Lithuanians enduring severe oppressions and persecutions have established educational, political and economic institutions and are fully prepared for self-government.

In concluding Emmanuel Kant says:

Without taking into consideration the importance and the usefulness which the conservation of a nation possessing such good qualities can have on the country, one must again remark, that the antiquity and purity of the language of the Lithuanian people, at the present oppressed and encircled in a narrow space, almost isolated from other races, has a great importance for science (linguistic) and especially for the ancient history of the migration of races. This is therefore another reason why this race and their language should be preserved.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN CHINA

*By Lewis Hodous, Head of the Chinese Department, Hartford
Seminary Foundation*

The last few decades have been remarkable for many changes in China, but one of the most significant and far-reaching is the emergence of the individual. The old culture of China was an impersonal culture. The group, the organization was dominant. The individual was a mere atom finding his life in the great whole. Before the law he did not exist except to be punished. Private life in our sense of the term did not exist. Organizations like the guilds, the secret societies multiplied and grew in power. Superficial observers have compared these to the organizations of the West. There is a difference, however. In the West these organizations are formed by free individuals. In China the individuals are not free. Still, we must not regard the compulsion of these organizations as outward. The compulsion was from within. The personality of each individual was so penetrated by the will of the crowd that free discussion and free action was impossible. In fact the individual was so dominated by the will of the crowd that no other action seemed reasonable.

This characteristic of Chinese culture is inherent in the language. The ideographs do not undergo changes to express person, gender, number, or case. They have idea content only and the situation determines the form which that idea content takes. The same character may be a noun, verb, adjective, or adverb. This produces an indefiniteness in the Chinese language which is sometimes troublesome. This absence of inflection is in contrast to the highly inflected Greek which was developed by a people with a rich personality.

The forms of address and social intercourse are impersonal. There is an atmosphere of selflessness in social

relations. The self and whatever is connected with it is depreciated. The first person is always referred to as my humble self. The wife is spoken of as the "inner man." The children are called my "dirty puppies." To be sure language always lags behind the spirit of the age, and so these forms speak of a culture of a day already past.

The Chinese state did not concern itself with individuals. The central government dealt with the provinces, the provincial government dealt with the prefectures and districts, and the minor officials dealt with the clan and the family. This impersonal government explains to a certain extent the difficulty of the transition to a republic which presupposes individuals. The whole family and often the whole clan or an entire village was punished for the crime of the individual. When the Trans-Siberian railway was torn up by the Hunghutze the Russian government razed every village within a certain distance of the break. In this they followed Chinese law. Under the old system banishment was a favorite form of punishment. The culprit was sent to some distant part of the empire and there allowed to live a free life. He simply reported periodically to the magistrate of the district. As a rule few ran away. They had nowhere to run and they knew that their action would bring punishment upon the whole family. This domination of the group made ostracism from the family the most severe punishment. It practically meant that a man was banished from society.

The adoption of the western legal system, which deals with individuals, is not without its difficulties. A learned Chinese warned his countrymen against the adoption of the western system. He pointed out that a wealthy murderer would find it possible for a few hundred dollars to purchase a substitute who would acknowledge the crime and suffer the penalty of the law. The money thus obtained he would leave to his family whose condition would be improved and who would worship him as a renowned ancestor.

The same impersonal atmosphere dominates the family. Marriage, which among us is regarded as a personal relationship, is in China simply the means of propagating the

family. The young people have no choice in the matter. The mates are chosen by the parents and their compatibility is decided not by their affection, but by the harmony of the astral influences presiding at their birth. Likewise divorce is not decided by the law of the State or Church, nor by the husband, but by the parents of the man.

Child training is quite different from that in the West. In the West the child is limited in his freedom at first, but as he grows he is given larger opportunities to express his individuality. In China the young child is given license to make the whole household uncomfortable by his outbursts. As he grows older the bands of tradition are woven about him. The little girl was allowed to roam about freely till about five years of age and then her feet were bound and likewise her whole life.

The family is controlled by the oldest member and yet his authority is not his own. He is simply the mouth-piece of tradition.

The individual in China is subject to pressure from three directions. There is the pressure from those above him in the state and family. This demands absolute obedience to authority. Then there is the pressure of those on the same level as he is. This pressure deprives him of freedom of competition and self-expression. He is also subject to pressure from those below him. If he would rule he must conform to tradition. Woe betide him who changes traditional rules.

The heart of this impersonal character of Chinese civilization is religious. The conscience, which has been the concrete expression of the self-determination of the westerner, is not in the keeping of the individual, but is in the keeping of the clan and its ancestors. Tradition decides whether a man's action is good or evil. His own personal opinion is of little value. Ancestral worship with all its ramifications holds the individual in his place.

It is not surprising that Buddhism has spread so widely in China and the East. Its doctrine of the annihilation of the ego by merging it with the whole is quite natural in this impersonal atmosphere.

Such a culture has certain advantages which should not be overlooked. The group control keeps the individual moral. The Chinese have been able to govern their country for several thousand years without a police system. In their large cities with a million or more inhabitants no police patrolled the streets. Personal life and property were as safe as in our cities. The prison population of China was very small. Even at present the prison population in China is small compared with the whole population. In Peking, a city of over a million people, the inmates of the Municipal Prison number about 500. The Chinese had few eleemosynary institutions. The family looked after the individual.

Another advantage is the spirit of self-sacrifice for the family which this system produced. Nowhere is there more sacrifice of self for the sake of the family than in China. When this same sacrifice is transferred to the country and humanity we shall enter a new world.

Such a system works well in ordinary times. When drought or flood afflict the land large numbers of helpless individuals are loosened from their ancestral place and wander over the land. They lack initiative and energy to shift for themselves.

The Chinese act together readily especially when excited by fear. The strikes in the schools, the boycotts, the panics which sweep over whole cities and districts show the weakness of the system. There is not a sufficient number of individuals strong enough to stem the tide.

The question has been raised whether this impersonal culture is racial or is due to the social system. The fact that we have passed through a similar stage of culture and that there are evidences of a personal culture among the Chinese is sufficient proof that this is not a racial trait.

The impact of the West upon China has broken up this impersonal system and loosened the individual from his social moorings. The old system yielded slowly but surely to the hard blows of western individualism. The Chinese moral and religious system rested upon the dogma that China was elected by Heaven to rule the world. The Chi-

nese called their country T'ien-hsia, all under heaven. The rulers of China believed in the election of other nations, but they were elected to be ruled by the Chinese. This belief of the Chinese was little appreciated by the early traders, diplomats and missionaries. In 1792 the Chinese government permitted trade with Russia. This trade had been prohibited by the Chinese. The communication of the Chinese Emperor on this occasion reveals the high position which he assumes. He said:

Inasmuch as the great Emperor loves all men alike he cannot endure to have the subjects of your realm suffer because of the closing of the trade with China. You have earnestly prayed that this trade may be reopened. Such request is hereby granted. If, however, further trouble should arise then all hope of reopening the trade will be in vain.

In 1793 as Macartney, the British Ambassador, sailed up the Pei Ho to Peking the Chinese put a flag on his boat which had the words "A messenger from the vassal country England bearing tribute to China." Even as late as 1873 when the ambassadors were received in imperial audience without the *kowtow*, the Chinese authorities explained that this privilege was granted by the Son of Heaven in view of the fact that these barbarians did not have opportunity of learning the proper etiquette.

The ruthless blows of the West shattered this dogma which was supporting not only the political system, but was also at the basis of the religious system. The early wars, the disastrous war with Japan, the Boxer Uprising, the Russo-Japanese War and lastly the revolution, knocked away the last support of this dogma.

Chinese civilization rested on another pillar which bolstered up this impersonal culture and tied the individual to the past. This was the position of the Emperor. The Emperor was called the Son of Heaven. The country was called the Kuo-chia, or family state. The Emperor was the mediator between Heaven and men. The revolution broke up this ancient idea. The ghost of the empire still lingers and looms up occasionally, but its ancient sway is departed. The system has been shattered, the fragments

still remain. Some of them will be built into the new social and political order which is now rising in China.

While these forces were breaking up the old system of China, there were others that were slowly making preparation for the new day. These constructive forces were preparing the individual for the new world. One of the most persistent of these forces is the missionary propaganda. The early missionaries came to China with an exalted idea of the worth of the individual. They were borne upon the great wave which produced the American and French revolutions with their mottoes of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. These men valued men because they had immortal souls, and taught them and inspired them. They had the poorest material to work on, but they did wonders making pillars of the Church out of pirates, and martyrs out of common clay.

They not only loosened the individual from his ancient moorings, but they were providing him with a compass and rules of the road on the uncharted sea of life. The missionary propaganda may be regarded as the training of personality, the latest flower of our Christian civilization. The work has scarcely begun. The task is large and difficult. The first materials were from the poor and insignificant and their influence was not large. Still a great work has been done. About 200,000 boys and girls are being trained in Christian schools. The Protestant Christian constituency has not yet passed the million mark, yet this small body of individuals has had an influence in China quite out of proportion to its numbers and its social standing. The missions and the Church have been the pioneers in all sorts of eleemosynary work, anti-footbinding, anti-opium, social improvement and modern education. All these movements are directed toward the welfare of the individual.

Another great factor in this development has been the returned student. He came back with a vision and many of them have remained true to their vision though they had to suffer for it. They have been able to translate the ideas of the West into the ideas of the East. They have been concrete examples and exponents of the new individual.

One of the most potent agencies in developing the new individual was the anti-opium movement. This great struggle enlisted the best men of China who gave themselves unreservedly to it. They came into contact with all sorts of people, diplomats, merchants and missionaries. I well remember a scene in China when the authorities of Foochow reduced the shops selling opium by retail. A subject of a foreign power decided to take advantage of the situation and under the protection of extra-territoriality opened a retail shop and was doing a rushing business. The gentry called a conference of those interested. They set the case before this conference and then made suggestions as to how the case might be handled. In a week the man was out of the business and no one else was tempted to follow his example. The anti-opium movement was one of the best means for the preparation of the revolution. It trained the gentry in resourcefulness, devotion to high ideals, developed initiative and coöperation.

The various agencies at work for the overthrow of the Manchus were all the product of the new individualism on one side and on the other were training schools for the rising individual. The outbreak of the revolution manifested a spirit of the finest sort. Men were touched by patriotism and for the time being transformed into new beings. As far as the fighting went, the revolutionaries made a glorious failure. They were outclassed by the well-trained northern army. Their spirit, however, was invincible. They were composed of a mixed crowd of coolies, students and soldiers. They were untrained and inexperienced. But they fought like heroes. A few companies came to Hankow without weapons. Rather than wait for their weapons they attacked the railway station, drove out the Manchu regulars and took over the arms and ammunition. Many of the wounded ran away from the hospital and entered the fighting lines.

This description by an eye witness of the battle about Hankow reveals the mettle of the new individual.

The battle at Kilometer Ten was a splendid exhibition of gameness and pluck on the part of the rebels. Although they were

outnumbered by the trained forces of the Imperialists in front of them and were subjected from the flank to a racking fire from Admiral Sah's war-ships, they held their ground until nearly five hundred had been killed and fifteen hundred wounded. At last they were compelled to retire. Their ranks were broken, but there was no panic. The advance of the Imperialists was a splendid justification of the training which the Northern troops have received under European instructors. Ten thousand strong, they crossed into the rebel territory during the night and attacked the entrenched rebels at daybreak Friday morning. These were behind well-planned fortifications and had little to fear from the attack. It was the guns of Admiral Sah's fleet that finally decided the day against them. . . . The range was short and the guns mercilessly poured in shells upon the rear of the rebels' position. The slaughter was appalling. The rebels replied ineffectively and were finally silenced. Gunboats drew nearer and the revolutionists were compelled to retire. The Loyalists, whose losses were slight, advanced on the abandoned trenches in splendid order under cover of the ships, capturing fifteen field guns and taking many Republicans prisoners.

But the rebels were not yet satisfied. They returned to the fray in the afternoon, bringing reinforcements, fresh field guns, and Maxims. They advanced at double-quick, cheering like schoolboys. They attacked the Royalists, but the fight was one-sided. The trained Imperialist soldiers raked the armed rebels in front of them with their rapid firing guns and modern rifles, but the rebels held their ground gamely but were ultimately compelled to withdraw. They saved their field guns and carried off their wounded.

This spirit has not departed. It is the spirit which is moving many ardent patriots today. It is the spirit which is making for progress among the people. While the governments are changing in Peking with kaleidoscopic rapidity, while one faction ousts another, the people awakened are plodding along making China a better country.

The government does not yet represent the people. It will be some time before China will have a sufficient number of awakened individuals who will coöperate together and make themselves felt in the government. There are at present two governments, one functioning at Peking and the other in Canton, each pretending to represent the republic. As a matter of fact there is little to choose between them from the point of view of the patriotic citizen.

The fear of encroachments by Japan and the inroads of the western powers have revealed the power of the individ-

ual in China. Just after the Japanese war it was said that certain officials in China did not know that a war had been fought and lost. What was worse, some of them did not care. In 1915, after the notorious twenty-one demands of Japan were made on China, the people were thoroughly aroused. A resident of the City of Hankow, for example, says:

On the day following the ninth of May, a day not to be forgotten, the people were mad with rage. Seeing nothing could be done, some suggested they should in some way demonstrate the people's profound sorrow. It was proposed that there should be no lights in the whole city that evening. During the day the proposal passed from mouth to mouth and when the sunlight had disappeared, bustling Hankow was pitch dark and dead silent. All doors were shut, no business, no traffic. Several of my friends gathered in my home. We talked about the danger to China. We sighed and shed tears, upon which my two little boys did the same.

And just recently as a result of the secret understanding between China and Japan which seemed to endanger China's independence, the Chinese students have left Japan in large numbers.

The press has been an important factor in the awakening of the individual. At present there are about three hundred newspapers in China. The number varies in direct proportion to the republican character of the government. When Yuan Shih Kai was planning to found a new dynasty with himself as the first emperor, the newspapers which resisted him were sealed. Some of them transferred their offices to the foreign concessions and kept up their agitation for a Chinese Republic. While the circulation of papers in China is not very large their influence extends beyond the actual readers. They are broadening the interests of the new individual.

The greatest development of the individual has taken place among the women. The woman movement has burst out suddenly in all parts of China. Even before the revolution the women were preparing for the new age. Some of them gave their lives for their country. One of the pioneers in the revolutionary movement was Ch'iu Chin, of

the Province of Chekiang, who gave her life for the republic as early as 1907. She was a woman of great ability. A prefect once presented her with two scrolls which expressed her characteristics: "Taking an active part in the battle of life, she shows a masculine superiority to the whole world."

During the revolution the women of China revealed that their narrow life could not quench the human spirit. Many girls ran away from school and joined dare-to-die bands. They served with the Red Cross on the battle front. They were frequently under fire and some of them were wounded. After the revolution the women entered a larger life. Foot-binding is disappearing in the larger centers. The women move about more freely. The girls are becoming athletic. Some of them can drive automobiles. They are giving their attention to schools and reform work of various kinds.

The individuality of the girls in well-to-do families has been recognized in arranging a marriage. They are consulted. In some instances the young people have been given an opportunity to meet each other before marriage. Still the struggle against the old impersonal system has not been won. The tragedy of life comes when the new faces the old. The young people want to choose their own calling in life, they want to select their life companion, they long to establish a home of their own, they want to be true to the awakened conscience within them and they find the past dominating their life and forcing it into the ancient moulds. Still the stars are fighting with the new individual and the victory is assured.

This new personality is not merely an ebullition on the surface of life in China. It has been recognized in the political, educational and religious aims and enactments. The constitution of the Chinese Republic has not been adopted yet, but the draft completed in 1917 recognizes the Chinese citizen. It makes all men equal before the law. It recognizes his personal responsibility before the law. It gives him a voice in the government. It secures those rights and privileges which are the common heritage of the West. While these rights and privileges are more or less theoretical, still they have been recognized and will be attained in due time.

Perhaps more radical and more far-reaching has been the change of attitude in the educational aims of China. The Manchu dynasty abolished the old educational system and adopted modern education. Although it adopted western methods, it did not adopt western ideals. The aim of education was to insure the stability and wellbeing of the Manchu government. The individual did not come within its horizon. Under the Manchus the aim of modern education was to develop the following virtues: loyalty to the Emperor, reverence for Confucius, devotion to public welfare, admiration for the martial spirit and respect for industrial pursuits. The new education followed the aims of the old. Under the Republic a new theory is slowly evolving according to which the aim of education is conceived as the cultivation of a moral and virtuous character. This moral education is to be supplemented by an industrial and military education rounded by aesthetic culture. Tsai Yüan Pei, the first minister of education defined moral education as imparting to the people the right knowledge of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. The focus of attention is shifting from the group to the individual. Still the individual is not isolated. His position is improved in order that he might have a share in establishing a new republic.

Perhaps the most significant recognition of the new individual has come from the religious side. The religious nexus binds the individual with the past and the severing of this tie has done a great deal to start the individual on the road to freedom.

Article XIX of the draft of the permanent constitution originally made Confucianism the basis of moral instruction. This article was dropped and Article XI was changed to read as follows:

The citizens of the Republic of China shall have liberty to honor Confucius and shall enjoy freedom of religious worship, which shall be unrestricted except in accordance with law.

This article was not achieved without struggle, but that it was achieved reveals how far the Chinese have departed from the idea of moral and religious unity of the Manchu dynasty.

The rise of the individual in politics, education and religion marks a new era in China. As we face the problem of making the world safe for democracy China faces the problem of making the individual fit for democracy. This is one of the great tasks in the renovation of this ancient country. It is a task in which the United States will have a large share. As we have stood for the open door, as we have led China to declare war on the side of the allies, so by our example and by the various impacts of our rich life we shall help China to enter this era after the war with a citizenship coöperating together in a new China and making her contribution to a world democracy.



RACE APPRECIATION AND DEMOCRACY

By Philip Ainsworth Means

I. DEFINITION AND CONTENT OF RACE APPRECIATION

After the war the world will find itself faced with a multitude of problems, some of which will be economic, some of which will be political and some of which will be religious. But the vast majority of the problems will be racial and cultural, not only purely so, but also by implication and by association. That is, so many economic, so many political and so many religious problems are, in part at least, racial and cultural that that category of problems will, in its widest sense, attain tremendous extent. It therefore behooves sociologists, politicians, psychologists, geographers, anthropologists and the rulers of various lands to begin now to gather the theoretical and practical knowledge which they will so sorely need directly the war is terminated. They must learn what material and intellectual characteristics of the various races and cultures of the world are potentially capable of being woven into the fabric of future world-civilization.

This is precisely the knowledge which race appreciation seeks to impart, for the best definition of race appreciation may be given in these words. Race appreciation endeavours first to determine the cultural characteristics of each racial group present in a given state and then strives to blend the best in each cultural category with the best in every other so that society will take on a character at once synthetic and eclectic. Only in this way can a nation comprising diverse racial and cultural elements build up for itself a social structure which will be fair to all and sympathetic to all. Only thus can democracy be made real in those countries which aspire to democracy, and only thus can the greater world-democracy of the future hope

to realize its declared ambition of giving a "square deal" to all men.

Race appreciation draws its materials from an enormously variegated list of sources. Perhaps the prime ones are anthropology and history, but psychology, sociology, political economy, commercial economy, geography and other branches of science all contribute their quota.

II. RACE APPRECIATION IN THE PAST

Until very recent years race appreciation has been mostly unconscious, or at least unformulated. Nevertheless it has been a very vigorous factor in the growth of civilizations. From the very earliest days of human or semi-human existence man has invented things to meet his needs in his unceasing combat with his environment, and, if the invention was found good, it was speedily copied or improved upon by men other than its inventor. This process has continued, with ever increasing complexity, throughout the history of mankind, and to it is due the highly synthetic character of most great civilizations, notably of our own West European civilization and of Chinese civilization. The growth of civilizations, then, may truthfully be said to have been caused by an unconscious race appreciation. That is, various societies have discovered from time to time, or have had it forcibly brought to their attention, that other societies possess admirable material and social institutions which well merit emulation. Thus the best in outside cultures has been made a part of societies alien to them, and the latter have, thereby, gained in excellence and strength by means of a process of race appreciation. One has but to dip back a little into the history of Egypt or of Rome or of Scandinavia to see how the process works. Indeed, an analytical examination of modern West European civilization as a whole reveals the process mentioned developed far toward its logical conclusion.

The process of unconscious race appreciation, however, has been by no means universal in its operation. As millenia and centuries have rolled by some societies have

shown greater aptitude for it than have others. Sometimes this disparity may be accounted for by geographical considerations. In ancient America, for example, complete isolation from all contactual influences derived from other cultures and societies brought about a curious semi-stagnation after a certain point had been reached. Again, other peoples, such as the early Australians and the Andamanese, seem to have made no progress at all, doubtless on account of the fact that their country offered few inducements to outsiders of high culture to come thither. Then too, one can find a number of cases where race appreciation of the unconscious variety has operated up to a certain point and then, for one reason or another, suddenly ceased. Examples of this type of society may be found in the Philippines (where Chinese influence was able to advance native culture up to a certain point), in the Canary Islands (where there are traces of North African influences), and in Rhodesia (where it is clear the Arabian or other traders were important in this way).

Owing to this irregularity in the aptitude or opportunities for race appreciation among different peoples there has come into being with the passage of time a wide divergency between the cultural advancement of various peoples and races. As some have, for a variety of reasons, less actively participated in the unconscious process of race appreciation than others, so have they now less developed cultures and less developed mental powers. The mentality of the West Europeans or of the Chinese and Japanese as contrasted with that of the Bushmen or of the Arawaks of central Brazil shows exactly the degree of disparity which has thus been created.

So much, then, for the entirely unconscious race appreciation of the past. In more recent times, especially since the beginning of the period of explorations by Europeans in the fifteenth century, race appreciation has been gaining in practical and political importance for the reason that West European culture (elaborated by the processes already outlined) has been brought into intimate contact with less elaborated cultures or with civilizations which, being very

different in their elaboration, have seemed to the Europeans to be inferior to their own because they were different. In some cases, as, for example, in Hispanic America, various societies of by no means despicable native attainments have, as it were, been knocked on the head and forced into a cultural straight-jacket, to the great detriment not only of themselves but also of those who did the knocking and the forcing. Again, other high cultures have had other fates in connection with their relations to West European civilization.

III. RACE APPRECIATION IN THE WORLD OF TODAY

This brings us to a point whence we can survey the present status of race appreciation. As I said before, race appreciation has been mostly unconscious or at least unformulated in the past. I have sketched the significance of entirely unconscious race appreciation, and I now purpose to outline the unformulated variety of it.

In my opinion, the British and the French have been the best exponents of unformulated race appreciation. In their colonizing activities they have usually displayed a lively appreciation of the good qualities of the natives of their colonies. The British in India, in Burma, in Egypt, in Sarawak, in the Pacific Island possessions and elsewhere have consistently manifested a desire to mould the political and social institutions created by themselves upon models furnished by the native institutions of the country. The use of headmen in Burma and the whole fabric of Indian colonial government are eloquent of this. The French, in Morocco, in Annam, in Madagascar, have done likewise. As a result, the English and the French are the best colonizers in the world. One can, of course, only conjecture what would have been the course of events in Mexico and in South America had the British or the French, and not the Spanish, conquered those regions. But the indications are that the native institutions would have been preserved and would have been adapted to modern needs, just as analogous ones in regions already mentioned

have been. British failure to do anything of this sort in North America is explained by the fact the native culture there was too lowly to command respect, the population being scanty into the bargain. The French in Canada did what they could along these lines among the more highly developed Iroquois.

The United States, in the Hawaiian Islands and Philippines, has likewise shown a desire to follow out the unformulated principles of race appreciation. Perhaps the worst colonists have been the Dutch and the Spanish. The latter, especially, used native institutions, when they used them at all, only as a means of oppression.

The perfectly natural outcome of the situation outlined here is that in the British and French colonies the population is wholesome, sturdy and contented; it is likewise loyal to its European instructors and is aiding them magnificently in this war. On the other hand, in Mexico, in the Andean countries and in other lands formerly under the rule of Spain, the bulk of the population is in a state which is profoundly deplorable on account of the fact that its native good qualities have long been ignored and neglected, being supplanted by alien and unsuitable institutions arbitrarily erected over a mixed population of which only a very slight proportion is fitted to receive and use such institutions.

IV. RACE APPRECIATION MUST BE CONSCIOUSLY APPLIED

Everything bearing on such matters in contemporary life indicates that race appreciation must be consciously applied to the needs of world civilization. Just as many lands will always have a population made up of a number of ethnic elements, so also will the world. And just as the civilization of each of those lands will, to be fair and salutary, have to comprise institutions derived from those of each racial element, so will the future world civilization be built up of many stones brought from many and widely separated quarries.

To go from the lesser to the greater, I will first discuss the importance of race appreciation in national affairs, then I will take up the matter of its application to world affairs.

Lands which have a population consisting of two or more distinct races and their blends fall into two groups. The larger is that in which the races involved are the native race with its culture and the West European race with its culture. (Morocco, Annam, Burma, India, Madagascar, Mexico, Peru and Egypt are all examples of this group.) The smaller group is that represented by the United States where the small and humbly cultured native population has been well nigh exterminated and where it has been replaced by two or more intrusive elements (the West Europeans and the Negroes and the Orientals). The race problem here concerns races all of which are alien to the soil, and only one of which is capable of sounding the correct cultural note. The problem here is that of making the others approximate as closely as possible to the culture of the West Europeans. There is here no question of preserving native institutions for the benefit of natives, for the institutions are unimportant, and the natives (i.e., Indians) are very rapidly merging themselves, both by blood and culturally, with the West European element.

In Mexico and the Andean countries, on the other hand, a good native stock, with great potentialities still, has long been crushed down and dwarfed by a total lack of race appreciation on the part of the ruling class. The political institutions of those countries have always been manufactured in Europe ever since the Spanish conquest. No account of the native characteristics of the people for whom they were designed has been taken, nor has any effort ever been made to discover what possibilities of a governmental nature might be latent in the native institutions of the country. Once a course of systematic and intelligently conducted race appreciation is instituted in those countries, we may expect to see a general and rapid improvement in the very nature and temper of those nations. From the point of view of the Mexican govern-

ment and of the Andean governments such a course is urgently necessary. After the war the other countries of the world, especially those which like England, France, Japan, Argentina, and China have no or few race problems, will make tremendous strides in material and intellectual development. Unless countries which have complex populations (and here I refer especially to lands like Mexico and the Andean countries) wish to be left hopelessly behind the times, they simply must bring their populations up to modern standards. It can be done, and it must be done. But the beginning must be made now. And race appreciation is the only road to the goal.

Luckily one government at least (that of Mexico) realizes this. Under the direction of Dr. Manuel Gamio the Mexican department of the interior is laying the foundations of a profound and very necessary study of the social characteristics of the various native groups in the country. That study will teach the government exactly what sort of institutions is needed by the various groups to bring them to the highest possible development and bring to an end the prevailing chaos. In the Andes the movement is not as yet so definitely formulated, but even there a few men and women are studying the problem of race appreciation.

The importance of race appreciation in the world as a whole can hardly be overemphasized. World civilization is, as I have said, bound to be synthetic and eclectic. To be successfully so it must intensify the present somewhat lazy tendency toward borrowing and copying the neighbours' good things into a vigorous but unhasty campaign which shall aim to make all peoples understand all others and to make all governments consciously seek for institutions in other lands which might, perchance, better fill their needs than their own analogous institutions. A feeling of good-fellowship and of wise tolerance between peoples must be encouraged. The beginnings of all this are already plainly visible. Every issue of every daily newspaper has at least one indication of it. The other day one read that the Siamese had sent five hundred aviators to fight in France. Today one is told that the Japanese are preparing to aid the Czecho-Slovaks to break down the

Bolshevik rule. A while ago a company of American Indians were decorated for gallantry by a French general. The princes of India are preparing to establish representative government in their country with the aid of the British authorities. All these items, and countless others, attest the truth of what I say. But the process must be carried further. It is conceivable, for example, that West European art (and of course American, Australian and so on) might be galvanized into new life if, instead of either drawing its inspiration from the long since worked out arts of Greece and Rome or of trying to be weird, freakish and original (like the Cubists and their ilk), it should begin to study the marvelous sculptures of Angkor, of Boro-budur, of Palenque and of the Tigris-Euphrates civilizations. European religion could gain new spiritual beauties by studying those of Buddhism and Confucianism. Administrators would be able to gain much valuable knowledge from the social systems of ancient India, China, Mexico and Peru. Agriculturists would gain many hints from some of the inhabitants of the Philippines and from the Quechuas of the Andes and from the Chinese rice-growers. So it goes. Each race and each culture contains at least some good which could be made to serve as a thread to be woven into the fabric of future civilization. Perhaps West European culture, on account of its mechanical and practical superiority will furnish the greatest number of threads, but even West European civilization has its lacks, most of them political and intellectual or spiritual, and these can only be compensated for and obliterated by race appreciation and thoughtful adaptations from other civilizations.

V. WORLD DEMOCRACY AND RACE APPRECIATION

Many people in these days, when told, as they constantly are, that democracy is the only form of government worth having, swallow the statement whole, accepting it on its own valuation, and immediately demand democracy and more democracy. They do not pause to think what they mean by democracy, nor do they really know what

they mean by it. Still less are they aware of the inherent weaknesses and fallibilities latent in democracy. Nevertheless, after some generations of experiment and of race-improvement, it will probably transpire that *some* sort of democracy is the best sort of government for peoples of West European blood, and perhaps also for some non West European peoples. Meanwhile, there are many peoples who are totally unfitted for democracy, who do not want it, and who would (and do) abuse it if it is forced on them. The Russians, the Chinese, the peoples of India and those of Mexico are all cases in point. Each of these peoples has or will have its own institutions, suitable to it because created by it. Those institutions may not themselves be democratic institutions, yet surely it would be undemocratic for the rest of the world to destroy them. The foundations of real democracy are tolerance and fair dealing. There is no democracy in taking away from a people that which is its own and which it wants, forcing it to have instead something which it regards with dislike. Yet that is precisely what some would like to see happen in Russia and in China.

World democracy will only be achieved when all sorts of peoples, all sorts of cultures and all sorts of societies dwell together in gracious good-fellowship and in a spirit of generosity. When we learn not to condemn all those who are different from ourselves in various respects, we shall begin to approach the democratic ideal.

COÖPERATION OF PEOPLES OF THE FAR EAST¹

By Rev. Gilbert Reid, D.D., of Shanghai, China

American people at the present time are specially interested in three peoples of the Far East, the Japanese, Chinese and Filipinos. Having spent five months in touring the islands of the Philippines, as well as having lived nearly thirty-six years in China, I take the opportunity of giving my views on these three Far Eastern peoples, particularly of the need for their larger coöperation. The people of Siberia also interest the nations at war, as do the peoples of India, Burmah, Siam, the Strait Settlements, French Indo-China, and the Dutch colonies of the East Indies; but the first circle of investigation is the more narrow one of the three neighbors of China, Japan and the Philippine Islands. When the war is over, we may safely discuss what is to be done with the other peoples of Asia.

In the *Manila Times* Mr. Maximo M. Kalaw has lately discussed these same problems. Perhaps he is prejudiced in favor of the Filipinos. As for myself I must be regarded as prejudiced, in favor of the Chinese, if interest in a special people is to be called prejudice. The one thought I have had in mind all these thirty-six years is to place at the front the interests of the Chinese nation and people. If a missionary, or educationist or reformer or adviser in China ceases to have such an aim, the sooner he returns to his own country the better it will be. The danger of having a special point of view may be illustrated by a conversation between a father and a son. The son asked: "Father, what is a man who leaves your party for another?" "He is a traitor, my son." "Well, what is he if he leaves another party and joins yours?" "Oh, then he is a convert, a man of character and a man of brains."

¹Much of this article was given in an address by Doctor Reid at University Hall, Manila, P. I., May 29, before the Sociedad Orientalista de Philipinas.

In this brief discussion, I will consider first coöperation between Chinese and Japanese peoples; then between the Japanese and Filipino peoples; and, finally, between the Chinese and Filipino peoples. I will then, according to the historical and scientific method, deduce certain principles applicable to these three peoples and also to the whole world. I will refer briefly to the dangers of any formal alliance by the governments of these peoples and then show how plans even for coöperation among the peoples of a few nations is not equal to a larger human brotherhood and a League of Peace among all nations.

I have noticed among Americans that as a rule they do not like Orientals as well as they like Occidentals; that they do not like Teutons as well as they do Anglo-Saxons; that they do not like other peoples as well as they like themselves. This, however, is not an American characteristic, it is human nature.

Likewise, I have noticed that some Filipinos do not like to be classed as Orientals. But it is no shame to have come from the Orient. Here great civilizations have arisen and are not yet extinct.

I have also noticed that some Japanese do not like to be classed as Asiatics. But most of the world's greatest religious teachers have been born in Asia, and have lived and taught there.

I have also noticed that some Chinese do not like to be classed as of the Yellow Race, or to be called Chinos, and much more hate being called "Chinks." They prefer in the Philippines to take on a Spanish name and so hide their identity. But the Chinese language, so I have been told, is to be the language of Heaven. The Chinese people, moreover, do not seem to be dying out. All nations have cast their eyes on China.

First, then, the relations of the peoples of Japan and China, two near neighbors of the same race, religion and culture. Naturally, and by every law of reason, they ought to be friends and to help each other; they ought not cut each other's throats or suspect each other's motives or cast ridicule on each other's habits and capabilities. As between

a Japanese on one side and a European or American on the other, the Japanese, as I take it, has a prior position in reference to China. But as between the Chinese and Japanese, the Japanese ought to have prior rights and interests in Japan, and the Chinese prior rights and interests in China. I do not believe in any policy or agreement among outsiders as to which of them is to have priority in China, with China left out of the bargain. Much of the trouble existing between Chinese and Japanese is due to this misconception, this injustice, into which all have fallen. Japan, for instance, has, in past years, made agreements or exchanged notes with Great Britain, Russia, France and the United States—as to their duty to preserve the sovereignty, integrity or independence of China; but all the time China has never been consulted in the matter at all. It is this procedure that offends all intelligent Chinese. When the Japanese armies drove the Russian armies northward through Manchuria, the fighting always taking place on the soil of neutral China, the Japanese at once became extremely popular with the Chinese people. The hatred that had existed in a mild form after the Chino-Japanese war vanished and suspicion did not yet arise to take its place. It was supposed that Manchuria was to be saved for China. Japanese instructors, drill-masters and advisers were sought for everywhere in China. Japanese were leaders in China because they were looked upon as helpers. Those were days of real coöperation, coöperation along legitimate lines. Through some cause or another—I regard it as a political one, rather than as proceeding from the people—since the war in Europe began in August, 1914, Japan has reversed her policies in regard to China. During these years I have offered criticism on Japan's treatment of China, and I must say, my criticisms have been taken in good part by most of the intelligent Japanese. Just lately, there has been more hue and cry in the English, American and Chinese papers, concerning further secret negotiations between certain military men of both countries, arising out of a possible necessity of sending troops to Siberia, or to northern Manchuria, to fight a common enemy. We must here, as elsewhere, dis-

tinguish facts from rumors, actuality from suspicion, truth from lies. I would remind my Chinese friends that even if the arrangement made should include military, naval, financial and administrative department of the Chinese government, this would not necessarily mean the ruination of China. Everybody knows that reforms must be made in these departments under the leadership of some one. For the Japanese to show the path of reform to China, is no more an outrage than for a Russian or a German, a Britisher or an American, to do it.

But let the Japanese statesmen, financiers and business men be on their guard. Let them not be puffed up with pride, go too far, or go beyond the limits of reason and justice. If they can coöperate with the Chinese on a plane of equality, China will be saved and the two countries and the two peoples will become the best of friends, with mutual esteem and to their mutual benefit.

The second relationship to be considered is that between Filipinos and Japanese. It is only lately that Japanese merchants, farmers and laborers have begun to come in any large number into these islands, particularly into the charming, the rich and the undeveloped island of Mindanao, the second largest of the group. If all ideas of political encroachment can be eliminated from Japanese ambition and a spirit of mistrust from Filipino thinking, it will be possible for the two peoples to coöperate without detriment to either side. The need for the Japanese to have a field for expansion can be as well met in these tropic regions as in the colder regions of Manchuria, Mongolia and Siberia, and on the other hand the investment of Japanese capital and the output of Japanese energy and skill will revert to the advantage of the Philippine Islands. The great steamship companies of Japan can afford much-needed means of transportation, her large business houses like those of the Mitsuis and of the Yokohama Specie Bank can afford facilities for the growth of trade, and the many plantations being started around the Davao Gulf will help in the laudable task of developing the undeveloped and so increasing the export wealth of the Islands. As to Davao alone I have learned that the Japanese

already have some 70 plantations, great and small, with over 50,000 hectares of land.

I now take up more fully the relations between the Filipinos and the Chinese. Here coöperation is most practicable and desirable. There is no danger of territorial aggrandizement from either side. The Chinese can greatly help the Filipinos and the Filipinos the Chinese. These Islands can help China, and China can help the Philippines. The Chinese have already been in the Islands for several hundred years. The best element of the Chinese population, the commercial element, has gone there and laid a substantial foundation for trade. The blood of the Chinese flows in the veins of the Filipinos. The two races mingle well together. The Chinese have even succeeded in adapting themselves to the Moros and the mountain tribes. Eight-tenths of the insular trade is reckoned as being in Chinese hands. As a general rule the Chinese business man, has a high reputation for trustworthiness, thrift and industry.

When these Islands shall secure full independence, if not before, there will be two things needed for bettering the relations of the two peoples and races. One is that Chinese, who desire to remain permanently, may become naturalized Filipinos, just as they become British subjects in British possessions. The other is that a limited number of Chinese farmers and laborers shall be allowed to go to such of the Islands as may desire them. To my mind, it would be better for the Islands if these Chinese were not contract laborers. The place where they are much needed is the island of Mindanao.

In this connection, I would recommend that leading Filipinos and Chinese form joint-stock companies, and that they be the first to introduce Chinese farming labor.

The Filipinos can also be of service to China in future reforms. While it will take some time for the Filipino merchant to match the Chinese, there are other directions in which the Chinese can learn from the Filipinos, as the Filipinos have already learned from the Spanish and Americans. The health department as it has been carried on for nearly

twenty years, and the sanitary and architectural improvement of Manila, Cebu and other towns, provides for the Filipinos a valuable schooling for similar work in China. The splendid roads of these Islands and the bridge-making can be a pattern to China. The normal training, the trade schools, and domestic science, also need to be imitated in Chinese schools. The school of agriculture and forestry can not only train Chinese lads, but also Filipinos who can go to China as teachers. If large salaries can be paid to European, American and Japanese teachers in China, I see no reason why a few Filipino experts—real experts, not superficial students—may not also be employed by the national, provincial and local governments of China.

In any case the faults and vices of the Filipinos do not need to be taught the Chinese any more than the vices of the West. Let the best in China—and in Japan, too—come to the Philippines, and let the best of the Philippines come to China. If there is to be any law of restriction, let it be the restriction of vice.

Now for a few principles to be deduced from a study of this triple relationship.

1. Each people in the Far East, as in the rest of the world, should be allowed full self-determination and self-development. Least of all should either of these three peoples, whom we have been considering, do anything to injure or destroy this right of all peoples.

2. National independence is a right. It only remains to consider whether it is prudent, safe and feasible. As a matter of fact, China as a nation has less independence than the people of the Philippine Islands, i.e., independence of outside interference and dictation.

3. Allied with these two principles is the great moral issue that Chinese, Japanese and Filipinos should do nothing at any time to weaken or take away the sovereign rights of each other. It might be a good beginning in this laudable task if the Japanese took the lead in freeing China from extra-territorial jurisdiction and the rule of so-called foreign settlements and concessions.

4. Let coöperation—something other than spoliation, occupation, domination—go beyond the stage of mere talking; let it be carried out into practical achievement. This is a task, a worthy task, a generous task, an advantageous task, for Japan, for China, for the Philippines.

5. Coöperation must be by any outsider with those who are native to the soil, not by one outsider with some other outsider in another's domains. The latter is a form of spoliation; the former is one of national development. Coöperation of Americans and Japanese in China is a very different proposition from coöperation between Japanese and Chinese, or Americans and Chinese, in China. So coöperation between Chinese and Filipinos would mean Chinese trade in the Philippines in conjunction with Filipinos—and Philippine trade in China in conjunction with Chinese.

6. In seeking for the development of either of these three countries, the interests of the people of the country affected must be placed first. This is especially true of the laboring class. Thus Japanese labor or Chinese labor should not hinder or destroy Filipino labor in the Philippines; Filipino labor as well as Japanese and Chinese should not drive out or starve out, but utilize and encourage, the labor of the Moros and other mountain tribes in the department of Mindanao and Sulu.

7. Coöperation is only possible, if there is mutual respect, and the quality of respect for others requires *cultivation*. The good points in another, not the bad points, should have all the emphasis.

8. "The abominations of lies" should give place to loyalty to the truth—truth without bias or prejudice. In the inter-relations of these three peoples, we need to know the facts and not idle rumor. The truth-lover should be anxious to know the exact situation in this part of the world.

9. While secrecy may be necessary in preliminary negotiation there should be no secret treaties, compacts or conventions. If there is anything kept in the dark at the present time between China and Japan, we may be sure it is nothing good.

10. None of us should be too suspicious, but it is well to keep our eyes open. To treat another as a suspect (a common habit these days) is too often a form of persecution, out-and-out injustice. These three peoples would get along better with each other and waste less energy, if they spoke straight to each other, face to face, and abandoned all sly insinuations and wild upbraidings.

11. Arrangement should be made whereby each of these three peoples could become the citizens or subjects of the other two nations, if it should be so desired.

12. These three peoples should meet each other more often in a social way. They are all Orientals: they should break down their social barriers.

Having stated these principles of Oriental inter-relationship, I now add that I do not recommend any Alliances: they have been the bane of Europe. Rival alliances brought on the "inevitable war." Alliance between these three states would probably lead to the inclusion of other aspiring peoples in Asia, and result in widespread complications with European Powers. Even this Triple Alliance of the Far East might endanger the peace of the Far East, and lead to a clash with the nations of the West. Better far a cultural, educational, commercial cooperation of the peoples of these nations of the Far East.

I go still further and say that any Alliance among Oriental nations or cooperation among Oriental peoples is not equal to the larger idea of all nations living together in peace, with commercial opportunities for all peoples in every land. No foreign nation should be eliminated from China, Japan or the Philippines, and Chinese, Japanese and Filipinos should have free scope to trade in all parts of the world, being guaranteed full and fair protection.

For twenty-five of the years I have been in China I have been at work on this cosmopolitan idea. I have established with sanction of the Chinese government, which has again and again given me every favor and encouragement, an International Institute of China, wherein all nations and all creeds could meet on an equal basis. In the summer of 1914 a plan for an international museum, with a committee of

twenty persons, one each from twenty countries, was approved by President Yuan Shih-Kai with the promise of 30,000 taels. The world war has upset these fine ideals, but when the war is ended, men everywhere will again see the sense, the necessity and the duty to come together in the bonds of peace, in an international human brotherhood, in the Kingdom of God throughout all the earth, in a real holy Catholic Church, in a renewed Hague Convention for Universal Peace, in a Federation of the World, in a Parliament of Man. The better day is coming; let us not lose heart. Meanwhile let us put forth every effort for coöperation of the peoples of the Far East, Chinese, Japanese and Filipinos.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN POLICY IN THE FAR EAST¹

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The aims and methods of American diplomacy have rarely been unworthy of the high ideals of American democracy. The diplomats may at times have been lacking in experience or in capacity; they have rarely been wanting in worthy motives. In no part of the world, down to the present cataclysm, has American diplomacy played a more commendable rôle or a more successful one than in the Far East. A generation ago this statement might have called for some defence; but time has demonstrated the fundamental wisdom of America's foreign policy, and it may safely be said that she has conquered with ideas where others have failed with the sword.

For a hundred and thirty years the United States has had interests in the Far East: First, the commerce of her adventurous merchants, then the pious work of her missionary bodies, and, finally, territorial possessions off the coast of Asia.

The American seamen and merchants who took part in the old China trade were stout democrats, who believed in the saving grace of business competition, who asked for nothing but fair play in the East and sought no special advantages for their country or themselves. Imperialism was undreamed of by the Americans of those days. Interference in the domestic affairs of foreign nations seemed a negation of the principles of the American revolution. Respect for the law of the land, even for Chinese law, seemed to them a self-evident duty, and, after the first war

¹An address delivered at the Bi-centenary of the University of California, March 18, 1918.

between Britain and China, a governor at Canton testified that the American merchants had been "respectfully observant of the laws." And because of their good conduct they won favor.

The first treaty negotiated by the United States in the Far East was with the kingdom of Siam, in 1833. The second was with China, in 1844. Although the trade of the United States at Canton stood second only to Great Britain, yet the Americans had not joined Britain in the so-called "Opium War." But every commercial concession which was granted to Great Britain was freely granted to us, and the crude extraterritorial provision in the British supplementary treaty was well defined by Caleb Cushing in the American document. In the sixteen years of friction between the first and second European wars, although at times the American representatives were sore tried and believed that only through war could foreign rights be maintained, yet the government at Washington counseled moderation, and thus America again was spared participation in a war, by no means wholly justifiable, against China.

Within this period came the opening of Japan to foreign intercourse after more than two centuries of seclusion. Because American interest in Japan was greater than that of any other power, America made the well-considered attempt to convince the Japanese of the error of their seclusive policy in the days when steam was shortening the girdle of the globe. To Commodore Perry, for the wise and sympathetic manner in which he conducted the negotiations, and to a handful of forward-looking Japanese in the Shogun's castle should be ascribed the credit for this epoch-making expedition. The gates were, however, but slightly opened, although British, Russians and Dutch were granted privileges like our own. It was the American consul-general, Townsend Harris, who, unsupported by battleships, won from the Shogun a liberal treaty of commerce. This was a personal triumph. Harris had convinced the Japanese, during a year's residence at Shimoda, of his unquestioned honesty and good-will. When they realized that they could believe in him, then they followed

his advice implicitly. And be it remembered to his credit, he took no advantage of their ignorance, but framed a treaty which protected as well as might be the interests both of his own country and of Japan. For almost three years after the treaty went into effect Harris remained at his post trying to harmonize the conflicting views of his European colleagues and of the Japanese ministers. There is good reason to believe that if Harris had not stood alone at one of these crises, two of the European powers would have become involved in measures which might easily have led to war with Japan.

If there is one word which runs as a golden thread through the dispatches between our representatives in the Far East and our State Department, it is the word "moderation." Sometimes it is coupled with "forbearance," and again with "justice." But over against the advocates of strong measures and the "gun-boat policy" American diplomacy stood for moderation, forbearance, justice, for, as we call it today, the "self-determination of peoples," the right of Asiatic peoples to work out their destiny without foreign interference.

In China, Anson Burlingame, at a time when American influence was at its lowest ebb during our Civil War, succeeded in introducing a policy of coöperation among the foreign ministers to take the place of individual force. He also became the first envoy of China to the western powers, and in the treaty negotiated by him in Washington, in 1868, appeared this summary of American policy:

The United States, always disclaiming and discouraging all practices of unnecessary dictation and intervention by one nation in the affairs or domestic administration of another, do hereby freely disclaim and disavow any intention or right to interfere in the domestic administration of China in regard to the construction of railroads, telegraphs, or other material improvements.

If such a clause had been accepted by all the great powers, and honestly observed, how different would have been the recent history of the Far East? How much more honorable the story of European diplomacy? How many

lives offered up on Manchurian battlefields would have been spared!

In a few years Japan entered upon her long struggle for the revision of the commercial treaties. These compacts contained two features which were repugnant to the national consciousness of Japan—the extraterritorial privileges of foreigners and the low conventional tariff. The former was first written in a Russian treaty of 1855, while the latter was framed in 1866 and replaced the very fair tariff in the Townsend Harris treaty. In his treaty Harris had apparently provided for the revision of its terms after July 4, 1872. The wording of his text was followed in the treaties negotiated by other nations, but for historical reasons the British treaty substituted July 1 for July 4. But when the Japanese sought the expected revision they found that the alterations depended upon the consent of both parties, and that unless all the treaty powers were willing to agree to the proposed changes, Japan would be bound by the onerous provisions. In other words, Harris should have written what he really had in mind, that the treaties would expire in 1872, and then new negotiations would take place.

The struggle of the Japanese for the revision of the treaties makes a long story and one that is not very pleasant reading in these days of high idealism. The depression is relieved only by a consideration of the record of the United States. When the powers refused any measure of revision, and Japan realized that she would have to remodel her codes and courts before she could gain jurisdiction over the persons and property of foreigners, she then tried to secure tariff autonomy, believing, in her innocence, that the powers surely could have no objection to allowing her to control her own tariff. But in this respect she was soon undeceived, for the United States was the only nation that would sign such a treaty. At every stage of the negotiations, which were carried on over a period of twenty years, the United States, acting on the principles of moderation and justice, sought to further the claims of Japan. But American influence was small in the world at large

before 1898, and it was not until Great Britain finally yielded, in 1894, that revision could be effected.

An interesting event in this period was the visit of General Grant to the Orient in 1879. In China and in Japan, in conversation with statesmen and officials and with the Mikado himself, he enunciated the American policy that she had no interests inconsistent with the complete independence and well-being of all Oriental nations. And he urged the two states to settle their differences and unite in strengthening themselves against European aggressions in Eastern Asia. Not only did he give pertinent advice in regard to the Loochoo Islands controversy between China and Japan, but he also urged them to unite in a joint political control of Korea, to quiet their own disputes in that country and to close the door to unfriendly European interference. Japan acted on this advice, and a treaty with China was drafted in 1880, but Li Hung-chang prevented its approval by the throne. And thus were sown the seeds of the Chino-Japanese War.

And, finally, General Grant gave this advice to the Mikado:

American statesmen have long since perceived the danger of European interference in the political affairs of North and South America. So guard against this danger. And, as a measure of self-protection, it has become the settled policy of the United States that no European power shall be permitted to enlarge its dominions or extend its influence by any interference in American affairs. It is likewise the policy of America in the Orient, I may say it is the law of our empire in the Pacific, that the integrity and independence of China and Japan should be preserved and maintained.

This counsel was given twenty-one years before John Hay sent out his integrity of China notes. Unlike the Americas, Asia possessed no state then strong enough to enunciate a Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine. Later, Japan alone had to repel the Russian advance into Manchuria and Korea, and since the outbreak of the Great War she has let the world know that she would tolerate no further European aggressions upon China.

A striking manifestation of the high place American diplomacy had won for itself came with the outbreak of the Chino-Japanese War in 1894, when both belligerents turned over the protection of their nationals in the enemy country to the United States. Never before, to my knowledge, had such a tribute been paid to a nation's honesty and fairness. And it was the more marked because in the eyes of the world at large American influence was but little esteemed.

It was the successful issue of the Spanish-American War which gave the United States the influence in world politics which her strength deserved. With the acquisition of territories in the Caribbean and the Pacific—Porto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines—the nation seemed to have emerged from her old self-centered provincialism to play a part upon the world stage. The growth of American influence in the Far East may be at once noted after the close of the war. A good understanding with Great Britain was developed in those days, and as Japan gained in strength she threw in her lot with the English-speaking peoples.

Before 1898, therefore, American influence in the Far East was based upon men and ideas, rather than upon power. American diplomats were, with rare exceptions, worthy exponents of American diplomacy. It is of interest to note the use which was made of men of missionary training in our diplomatic service, especially in China, where Dr. Peter Parker, a pioneer medical missionary, served as secretary of legation, *chargé d'affaires*, and commissioner between 1844 and 1857, and Dr. S. Wells Williams acted as secretary between 1855 and 1877. And the part played by American advisers in shaping the diplomatic policies of eastern countries should be remembered. From the early seventies until 1914, the adviser of the Japanese Foreign Office was always an American. E. Peshine Smith, Eli T. Sheppard, and Henry W. Denison, held this post, the latter for thirty-four years; and if Durham W. Stevens had not been assassinated by Korean fanatics in San Francisco, he would no doubt have been Denison's successor. If, throughout this long period

Japanese diplomacy has stood out in contrast with that of some of the western states, no little credit must be given to the Americans who carried the ideals of American diplomacy over to their alien posts. Another missionary, Dr. McCartee, was foreign adviser at the most important Chinese legation, that at Tokyo, from 1877 to 1879, and at a later period, when China needed all the wise advice possible to extricate her from the abyss after her unhappy war with Japan, it was the late John W. Foster who accompanied Li Hung-chang on his mission to the peace conference at Shimonoseki.

In this period another principle, based upon moderation and justice, was established. Unearned or undeserved indemnities were twice returned to eastern nations. In 1883, the total amount received from Japan as our share of the Shimonoseki indemnity was returned, and in 1885 the balance of the Canton indemnity was returned to China. This principle has not yet been generally recognized by other powers, although with the return of over ten million dollars of the Boxer indemnity in 1908, the United States again affirmed it.

The principles of American diplomacy in the Far East had been formulated before 1898, but the prestige gained in the Spanish War increased the force of American influence. After nine months of indecision the United States, with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, took possession of the Philippine Islands. This gave her a hostage to fortune in the Far East. The Islands were demanded by the United States primarily because it was our duty to the inhabitants, whom the fortunes of war had thrown into our hands. I question the accuracy of those who would assert that political and commercial interests dominated the policy of President McKinley. One test I would apply is this: if the Philippine Islands had been a part of Spain, inhabited by Spaniards and loyal to the mother-land, would the United States have taken them from her in 1898? Yet it must be remembered that, although our motives were high, the Islands were demanded as part of an indemnity, which included Porto Rico and Guam.

It was easy for a certain type of publicist to discount our pretensions, and to assert that America, which had carried her conquering eagles from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean, had now swept on to the conquest of Asia. To us this sounded absurd; to an Asiatic it sounded reasonable enough.

It was the international rivalry in China, after the Chino-Japanese war, which gave American diplomacy a larger field in the Far East. In the exploitation of China, from 1896 to 1899, the United States had taken no part nor had she been able to exercise any influence upon the eager participants in what was considered to be the "Break-Up of China." But after the Spanish War the voice of America was at least listened to, and her influence for good was felt. The so-called "Open Door" notes, sent to the great powers by John Hay on September 6, 1899, were designed to secure their assent to the maintenance of the "Open Door" for commerce in the leased territories and spheres of interest held by them in China. The principle was by no means new. Great Britain and the United States had long stood for open commerce, without discrimination. The importance of these notes lies in the public promise of five European powers, and Japan, that they would continue to respect this principle. It should be remembered that Italy and Japan had no leaseholds at this period.

From that time on the United States has followed Far Eastern developments with hitherto unknown interest, and she has played a part of increasing importance. During the Boxer Uprising in 1900, the United States coöperated with the powers in the relief expedition, and during the long months of diplomatic negotiations at Peking, she stood out consistently for moderate measures of punishment and for a low indemnity. As Mr. Rockhill reported at the time:

Throughout the negotiations our object was to use the influence of our Government in the interest of justice and moderation and in a spirit of equal friendship to the powers negotiating jointly with us and the Chinese nation.

It was while the international relief expedition was assembling at Tientsin, and while the West echoed with the cries for vengeance upon China that the United States again moved to save that unhappy country. The "Integrity of China" notes of July 3, 1900, sent out by John Hay, serve to round out the "Open Door" notes of the preceding September: they asserted the purpose of the United States to be the rescue of the legations, the protection of American life, property and interests, and the suppression of the existing anarchy in North China. And they announced her policy to be that of seeking

a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.

When favorable replies to these notes had been received from the powers, the moral victory of the United States had been achieved. Any power that would then encroach upon Chinese territory or independence would break faith with all the others. This was a triumph of ideas; it was based upon no treaty; it was supported by no armed force. Its real strength lay in "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind."

With the part played by the United States in the Far East since 1900 we are not concerned. The foundations of American policy were laid during the period of limited influence before 1899. There were times in those days when American principles, worthy in themselves, received scant attention from the other powers. But after 1899 these same principles received a hearing. And the so-called "Hay Doctrine" was but a flowering, under favorable conditions, of the seed sown by Cushing and Perry, Harris and Burlingame, Bingham and Low.

Within the last few years a small group of journalists has repeatedly charged our government and state department with ignorance or cowardice, or both, in dealing with Far Eastern affairs. The charge is made that the "Hay Doctrine" of the "Open Door" and the "Integrity of China"

is as vital an American policy as the Monroe Doctrine, and that it should be defended and maintained. Japan, they assert, has violated both parts of the "Hay Doctrine," and some have demanded that the United States proceed to war with Japan before it is too late.

If the premises of these gentlemen are correct, that the "Hay Doctrine" has equal force with the Monroe Doctrine, and that the Japanese have flouted the "Hay Doctrine," then the conclusion which they reach seems irresistible.

But, for myself, I have never been able to follow their line of reasoning. In the first place, there is really little comparison between the Monroe Doctrine and the "Hay Doctrine." The former is a doctrine which has received the approval not merely of the United States, but of the two Americas. And whereas in the days of weakness of the Latin American republics the United States was the only power able, if need be, to defend this continental doctrine, yet today most if not all the twenty-one republics would unite in its defence.

The "Hay Doctrine" was the formulation of a principle, recognized by all the world. But, at best, it represents officially only the views of the executive department of our government. The United States has signed no treaty guaranteeing the integrity of China and the principle of the "Open Door." It is very doubtful if any administration or any Senate would negotiate or ratify such a treaty, because of our national dislike for overseas entanglements.

On the other hand, all the powers which might have violated the principles laid down by Mr. Hay have signed solemn treaties to observe them. Japan, Russia, France, Germany and England have, in different compacts, agreed among themselves to respect the territorial integrity of China and the "Open Door." If any one of these powers violates these principles, the first nation to protest should be that whose treaty has been broken. In other words, all the interested powers have pledged themselves, in treaties, far more solemnly than in their exchanges of notes with us.

The real difficulty, I believe, lies in the loose way in which the "Hay Doctrine" is sometimes treated. I look

upon it as a logical development of the principles of American diplomacy already laid down in the Far East: It was the statement of a policy, based upon moderation and justice, designed to preserve the integrity of China and the equal participation of all the world in her commerce. The part of America lay in formulating and securing recognition of such a self-evident truth, but a truth which cut across the plans of certain powers. So long as America played fair, respected the principles which she had avowed, and reaffirmed them whenever they seemed to be forgotten, she fulfilled her full duty. And this affirmation has been made each time the principles seemed endangered: during the Russo-Japanese War in 1905; in the Root-Takahira notes of 1908, when the conduct of Japan in South Manchuria was being scrutinized, and in these notes the use of "pacific means" is expressly stipulated; during the Chinese Revolution in 1911; and, finally, in 1917 in the Lansing-Ishii notes, "in order to silence mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated." To do more, to wave the big stick whenever a charge was laid against a friendly power, would be unworthy of the dignity of a people who believed in the assured triumph of moderation and justice.

At this dark hour of the Great War, when a ruthless military autocracy, intoxicated by fleeting successes, has ground under its iron heel five of the nations of Europe, it seems almost fatuous to speak of the ultimate triumph of moderation and justice. But I would be blind to the teachings of history if I did not affirm it. Truth is not forever on the scaffold, nor is wrong forever on the throne. Mankind has struggled on from dark days to bright ones, through the morass to the firm ground and the high ground. Wrongs are righted, even though generations may intervene, and the eternal principle of justice abides long after man-made treaties are thrown to the winds. And just as I believe that the Allies will win in this Great War, and that the principles set forth by the chosen representative of the American people will be the determining factors in the final settlement, so I believe that in the days of recon-

struction in the Far East the principles laid down by American diplomats in the past, which reflected so well the spirit of their democracy, will have an increasing influence in molding not only the international relations but the continental policy of all Asia. Nothing is settled until it is settled right, and the American policies of moderation and justice and self-determination are founded in righteousness itself.

NEW CABINET STARTS PARTY RESPONSIBILITY IN JAPAN

By Jeremiah W. Jenks, Ph.D., L.L.D., Research Professor of Government and Public Administration, New York University; Chairman, Alexander Hamilton Institute; and Director, The Far Eastern Bureau

President Wilson early characterized the great war as a war for democracy, and English and French statesmen have since re-echoed the expression. With that fact in mind, the question was early raised whether the spirit of harmony could last among the Allies, with democratic states on the one hand, and on the other Russia in the early days a despotism and Japan at best a very strongly centralized, imperialistic constitutional monarchy. Would not the differing ideals of government bring about a lack of harmony that would be fatal? Germany doubtless counted on such a conflict. Her intrigues with Mexico and Japan made clear her belief regarding the latter country. Her intrigues in Russia were, first, to weaken Russia's military power, and second, by force and treachery and bribery to disintegrate the new republic, then to dominate it herself.

Most Americans believe that at the end of the war it will be possible for Russia to have her steps guided safely in the direction of popular self-government. Japan has been and still is a problem that has raised serious question in the minds of many.

Japanese statesmen have claimed throughout that their aims were those of the Allies, and nobody has questioned, for the last two years at any rate, the sincerity and effectiveness of Japan's support of the war. Now, in the appointment of this new cabinet, we see Japan taking a real, important forward step toward democracy. In the new Hara cabinet we have for the first time in Japanese history a strictly party cabinet, that of the Seiyukai, for though the Ministers of War and Navy are not party men, the civilian members are, and it was organized as a party cabinet with the expressed purpose of holding the party responsible for results.

It is fair to say that Japan has been squinting in this direction for many years; it would hardly be accurate to say that one

could detect a steadily progressive movement in that direction. As long ago as 1900, Ito, Japan's great, possibly her greatest statesman, recognized that in the course of time popular self-government was bound to rule the world, and that Japan must take her place eventually by the side of the other nations. The writer recalls a personal conversation with one of Ito's trusted lieutenants at the time of the formation of the party, in which it was said almost with bated breath that the ultimate aim of the new party would be to introduce the principle of party responsibility as exemplified in Great Britain, with the intention that gradually, as time and opportunity would permit, full party responsibility reflecting the people's will would be attained. This same spokesman had accompanied Ito in that first great foreign tour made preliminary to the formation of the Japanese constitution when, with characteristic thoroughness, the constitutions and methods of administration of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany—all the leading nations of the world—were studied in order that Japan might find the system best suited to her needs.

As we all know, just emerging from a form of government that was practically a personal despotism, the Japanese statesmen felt that the model best suited for them at that time was the German, the Prussian form of government; and the new imperial constitution, embodying those principles, was finally promulgated in 1889. From a date even preceding the adoption of the constitution by several years, however, there have always been in Japan leading thinkers who advocated the establishment of popular assemblies, the expression of the people's will, and the gradual assumption of responsibility by the people's representatives. The organization of the party which has now finally succeeded in taking the responsibility came in 1900; but until the present time, though parties have made their wishes felt in government, though the leaders in different governments have represented certain party views, no cabinet as a whole has been appointed to carry out a party policy with public recognition of its sole party responsibility.

We shall not be able to judge the full significance of this step until we see how successful it may be in carrying through any line of policy that it may undertake. As yet the party is responsible to the Emperor in all formal ways, and this first step may not lead to other progressive steps in the same direction without certain setbacks; but there is perhaps in the history of the war no

single event that signalizes better the progressive advance of the spirit of democracy than this establishment of the party cabinet in Japan.

The immediate cause of its formation may have been the rice riots, as has been suggested, in part; in part the conflict of opinions over the government's policy in Siberia; in part the determination to make Japan's policy toward China less political and more economic. Many factors probably contribute to the result, but underlying all of them there seems to have been the surging impulse of the democratic spirit, which is worldwide in its expression. It is hoped that the result will be permanent and beneficial.

The cabinet promises well in its personnel. Mr. Takashi Hara, the Prime Minister and Minister of Justice, is a statesman of wide experience in public life. He was "one of the right-hand men of Prince Ito when he raised the banner of the Seiyukai in 1900;" and from that time to this he has been a consistent advocate of this forward policy. He is not the only strong, progressive man in the cabinet. Baron Takahashi, the Minister of Finance, has long been known as one of the ablest, most progressive men of his country. With him in experience and ability is Viscount Uchida, the Minister for Foreign Affairs; and throughout, the cabinet is one that will command respect. The outlook is promising.

The list of the cabinet members follows: Prime Minister and Minister of Justice, Mr. Takashi Hara; Home Affairs, Mr. Takejiro Tokonami; Foreign Affairs, Viscount Yasuya Uchida; War, General Giichi Tanaka; Navy, Admiral Tomosaburo Kato; Finance, Baron Korekiyo Takahashi; Education, Mr. Tokygoro Nakahashi; Communications, Mr. Utaro Noda; Agriculture and Commerce, Mr. Tatsuo Yamamoto.

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JAPAN AND THE PRESENT CRISIS By FRANK A. LEONARD, Professor in Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan.	213
THE CULTURE OF GREECE AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE By Theodor P. Ion, J.D., D.C.L.	216
THE QUESTION OF EPISCOPY By N. J. CANNON, General Secretary of the Pan Episcopal Union in America	220
LABORS IN THE NEW PROTECTION OF WHITE AFRICA By Dr. GEORGE W. LILLIE, B.C., F.R.G.S., Assistant Sec- retary of the Council of Africa	227
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE LATIN AMERICAN By WILLIAM H. SHEPHERD, Professor of History, Columbia University; Temporary Professor, University of Chile	230
PHYSICAL OBSERVATIONS By Rev. LUDWIG BOLD, D.D., of Shanghai, China	233
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT OF JAPAN By W. J. CHAMBERLAIN, Ph.D.	239
NOTES AND REVIEWS	244

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Furthermore, in her administration of Taiwan, her acquisition of Chosen, and her pressure upon China, there has not been lacking evidence of selfish territorial greed. These facts: Japan's admiration for Germany, her Prussianism, her bureaucracy and her territorial greed, form a foundation four-square for a superstructure of surmise to the effect that Japan will, upon the slightest opportunity, unite herself with Germany or at least develop along Prussian lines in the East, thus becoming inevitably an enemy of the United States whose ideals of democracy and state-brotherhood are clearly defined.

All these facts were known to Germany; and she was not slow to create therefrom an atmosphere of suspicion against Japan throughout the world, especially in the United States whom she hoped to involve in an Oriental war. Japan's alliance against Germany indeed seemed incongruous, especially when it was remembered that, at the outbreak of the war, she had not the slightest personal cause for hostility. Nothing but her loyalty to an alliance with England, nothing but her respect for a *piece of paper*, led her to enter the war; and nothing but that same loyalty held her there during the early years of the struggle.

If the United States of America had to wait, and wait, and wait for a very material personal injury before she could see her duty in the great conflict, it is not strange that she fell an easy victim to German plots and harbored marked suspicion of Japan and her motives. Recent revelations of German intrigue and treachery have removed from thinking minds the cruder forms of that suspicion; but the natural uncertainty remains, and we still need to remember that he who in word or thought deepens our doubt of Japan or weakens our union with her, is, though perhaps unknowingly, a tool of Prussian intrigue.

In this propaganda, based upon the facts already mentioned, certain other facts have been intentionally ignored. They have been over-looked also by those of us who should have known better. *Noblesse oblige*—the sense of what is demanded by personal honor—is of compelling strength in Japan. Whatever slurs may be cast upon the business

integrity of Japanese merchants, whatever charge of secret diplomacy may be brought against her statesmen, Japan is, above every other nation, susceptible to the influence of expectation, and would deem it an eternal disgrace to be found untrustworthy in a matter of trust. No country, not excepting the United States, holds a higher record than is evidenced in the scrupulous care with which Japan has kept her Gentlemen's Agreement with the United States, even under the smart of racial discrimination. Our government knows and our people should understand that Japan may safely be trusted in all matters where honor is called into play. If she seems in any case to have failed, it is because of what she had been led to believe the rules of the game.

In the second place, a unique feature of Japanese statesmanship is the marked ability to foresee the inevitable, and a sure instinct to reserve for itself the right of initiative in leading the nation along that inevitable path. For example, Japan boasts herself to be the only nation possessing a constitution not forced but freely given by a gracious sovereign. It is true that her constitution is the free gift of the Emperor; but it is also true that for twenty years the demand for such a constitution had been growing throughout the nation until the government foresaw the inevitable, declared that a constitution would be granted at the end of ten years, and kept its promise in 1890 amid the rejoicings of an absolutely united people. Although Japan's constitutionalism was in 1890 merely an ideal upon paper, although the realization of that ideal has been slow and not unattended by reverses, yet the quarter of a century has seen real progress; and Japan today, in spite of her lingering bureaucracy, is in the process of true democratization.

Here a third fact must be emphasized: in Japan the highest morality, supreme duty, demands of the individual and the class complete self-abnegation for the good of the state. Her concept of the state is not Prussian; it is distinctively Japanese. It contemplates not a ruler, nor yet a ruling class, but a family, a racial brotherhood, under an Imperial Father. For the good of this brotherhood, the

law of self-abnegation applies not to the individual alone but to each and every class; and repeatedly in history individuals and classes have bowed in willing obedience to that supreme duty, as when after the Restoration the wealthy and powerful Samurai surrendered all—wealth and power—to the throne that their country might be strongly united in her new endeavor.

What is Japan's situation today? She finds herself a party to a great democratic alliance struggling for international justice and brotherhood. Her high sense of honor, of noblesse oblige, holds her to that alliance in which she has contributed far more than we realize, or can realize, until we awake to a deeper appreciation of what Great Britain and her Allies have accomplished in their guardianship of the high seas. United in this alliance, Japan is caught in the folds of an accelerated evolution. Her leaders to day foresee the inevitable assured in an allied victory: the democratization of the world. At heart some are deeply troubled; others rejoice; but the veriest bureaucrat in all Japan will, figuratively speaking, commit harakira before he will stand in the way of his country's progress; nay more, he will lead his country on that path of progress though it mean the downfall of every personal ambition.

I do not idealize the leaders of Japan, nor do I say that they all rejoice at the vision of the future which they behold; but I do say with full confidence, based upon the psychology of their race, that what they have done they will do: sacrifice all that their country may not lose the fruit of victory—a place in the fellowship of the forward-moving nations of the world.

Our eyes are upon Europe, and we watch with eager gaze the brightening promise of victory for justice and humanity, for democracy among the nations there; but the results of the war in Europe will be insignificant in comparison with its results in Asia. The outcome of this struggle changes by two thousand years the course of Oriental evolution. Yes, if Germany were victorious it would mean Prussianism in Japan and throughout the East, even as it would mean by necessity the exaltation of force, in the

United States of America. But Germany is not victorious. Her efficiency and Kultur, idolized by all, have been found wanting. There is a surer road to a place in the Sun; and none but a fool will follow her now in the pathway that leads to death.

The Japanese by nature and instinct are idealists and hero-worshippers. Only through the necessity and training of the last fifty years have they become materialistic and worshippers of efficiency. When Europe and Great Britain went to war with Germany, it seemed to Japan largely a struggle for material advantage. When the United States held to neutrality and harvested enormous wealth, that also seemed good economic policy. When the United States at last entered the war it was only after having suffered material loss, and her policy still seemed consistent. But when the people of the United States carried successive Liberty Loans over the top, when they gave their millions in an increasing stream to the Red Cross and for the work of the Y. M. C. A., Japan looked on in wonder. Here was something other than that selfish materialism which she had come to feel characterized the United States in its worship of the almighty dollar. She wondered and questioned: can it really be that the United States is in the war from disinterested, humanitarian motives! She began to realize the meaning of the war.

When Japan is fully confident of America's sincerity, when the war shall have ceased, in victory for the principles of justice and humanity, Japan, touched by the exhibit of practical idealism will be ready to follow America through thick and thin, in a devotion to what is also her own native instinct. Somewhat over two decades ago, before clouds of suspicion had begun to prejudice Japan against the United States, in one of her larger cities the children of the primary schools, in which no white men taught, were asked to state in writing what character in history they most admired and most desired to emulate. In the thousands of answers appeared the names of ancient Japanese heroes and of Chinese sages, but the name of Abraham Lincoln led all the rest.

The duty of the United States is clear today. We no longer believe the crude stories of Japanese treachery upon our shores. We must forever banish from our minds the suspicion that militates against the most cordial coöperation and makes it difficult for Japan to move freely in the current of her new evolution. More than that, in the councils that conclude the war we must seek such an alliance with Japan as will make future misunderstandings impossible and cause her to feel the constant inspiration of a trusted, trusting friend in the working out of her hard problem of oriental democracy.

THE CLAIMS OF GREECE AT THE PEACE CONGRESS

By Theodore P. Ion, J.D., D.C.L.

Greece entered into the world conflict without laying down any conditions. She proclaimed that she was carrying on a war of liberation, and this requires that the claims of Hellenism should be examined in this light, to know whether these have really to do with countries inhabited by Greeks.

It is certain that the basin of the Eastern Mediterranean was both in ancient times and under the Byzantine Empire entirely Hellenic.

The Greek race (by an intricate network of influences), gained possession of the greater part of this basin and completely Hellenized it. Macedonia, Thrace, Asia Minor, including Pontus, were inhabited by peoples that were either Hellenes or completely Hellenized. A strong Greek national feeling existed in Smyrna, Egypt and Palestine where the Greek language had taken the first place, even crowding back the local languages.

The Greek Empire had to endure waves of invasion on all its frontiers. From the North, from the East, and the South the attacks came in succession. The last assault, made by that tribe which was the best organized militarily, destroyed the Empire.

The Turkish conqueror by massacres and by forced conversion to Mohammedanism, considerably reduced the number of the Greek population of these regions. A great part of them were, however, saved. The Turk, busied in waging war, needed people to work and support him. He therefore tolerated the Greek Christians who worked in order to enrich the Mussulmans.

The resistance of the race, and its faith in a happier future made it possible for it to endure its long martyrdom

and to maintain itself in this *inferno*. It was in vain that, as tradition goes, the Turks had the tongues of hundreds of thousands of Greeks cut out, in order to root out their language. It was in vain that the Greek boys, at an early age, were forcibly taken away from their families to make janissaries of them. The race showed an extraordinary vitality; it survived, and what is more, it ended by imposing its intellectual superiority upon the Turks.

Greece claims today the countries which formerly were Greek and which ethnologically justify this claim.

These countries are Thrace, Asia Minor and the Greek Islands.

THRACE

Taking as a basis the statistics of the Turkish Government of the year 1912, the ethnological composition of this province is as follows:

1. Vilayet of Constantinople

Turks.....	449,114
Greeks.....	364,459
Armenians.....	159,193
Bulgarians.....	4,331
Jews.....	46,521
Foreigners.....	149,825

2. Vilayet of Adrianople

Turks.....	508,363
Greeks.....	366,363
Armenians.....	24,060
Bulgarians.....	107,843
Jews.....	19,300

We have, then, 957,477 Turks, 730,822 Greeks and 112,174 Bulgarians.

In regard to education the number of schools and pupils is as follows:

1. Vilayet of Constantinople

Greek	
Schools.....	237
Teachers.....	832
Pupils.....	29,929
Bulgarian	
Schools.....	3
Teachers.....	15
Pupils.....	300

2. Vilayet of Adrianople

Greek	
Schools.....	416
Teachers.....	651
Pupils.....	32,369
Bulgarian	
Schools.....	123
Teachers.....	210
Pupils.....	6,881

We have, then, 653 Greek schools, 1483 teachers and 62,298 pupils as against 126 Bulgarian schools, 225 teachers and 7181 pupils.

Here we have the Turkish statistics as to the number and the intellectual activities of the various peoples of this province. The proportion of the Bulgarians to the Greeks is 1:7; the proportion of Bulgarian to Greek pupils is 1:9, and yet, the proposal has been made to give this province to Bulgaria. That is what some fanatics understand by the liberation of peoples.

The Bulgarians, more adroit than those who defend their claims, have discovered a new device, the system of "compensations." Greece, they say, should enlarge its territory by annexing parts of Asia Minor and the Islands, while they should acquire territorial compensation in Macedonia and Thrace.

If the Greek state is to be enlarged by territorial acquisitions in Asia Minor and the Islands, it is simply because the Greek element is there predominant. The old theory of the balance of power between states has been entirely discredited and abandoned. The Bulgarians and their supporters, therefore, can justify their claims only by proving that the populations of these provinces have a Bulgarian national consciousness.

The Bulgarians have in the past attempted, on the basis of statistics prepared by them, to show that all Macedonia and Thrace are inhabited by Bulgarians or at least that the great majority of their peoples are Bulgarians.

We shall prove by a Bulgarian propagandist that this affirmation is false. In a work which has just appeared at Lausanne, the author, Dr. N. Mikhoff, on the basis of the

observations made by P. Sergeon in a book which may be regarded as the exponent of Bulgarism, asserts that the total number of Bulgarians, the world over, is 5,500,000 souls. In 1910, before the Balkan Wars, the kingdom of Bulgaria had a population of 4,329,108. Granted that there were in foreign lands 250,000 Bulgarians (although in America and Australia, apart from the other countries in the world, the number of Bulgarian immigrants is very considerable), we obtain a total of 4,579,108 inhabitants. It needed therefore, only 920,892 to complete the 5,500,000 of which the Bulgarian race consisted, according to their well-known propagandist Dr. Mikhoff.

If we deduct from this number 279,684, which is the Bulgarian population of that part of Macedonia, annexed to Bulgaria in 1913, it will lack only 641,208 of satisfying the assertions of the Bulgarian propagandist.

The population of Thrace amounts to 2,000,000; that of the Greek and Serbian part of Macedonia, claimed by the Bulgarians, is about 1,500,000. So Bulgaria wishes to annex 3,500,000 people, while on the basis of the assertions of Dr. Mikhoff Bulgaria would only have needed 650,000 souls in order to have all the Bulgarians in the whole world free.

We have here the proof that Bulgaria, in demanding the annexations of Macedonia and Thrace, is really trying to subjugate populations whose national consciousness is by no means Bulgarian.

The proof that the populations of Macedonia and Thrace have not the Bulgarian national consciousness, a fact which is evidenced today by the popular manifestations of loyalty to Greece of a nature that it is unnecessary to recall, is found in the complaints of Professor Tsanoff, who, in his article which appeared in July, 1918 thunders against the Greek priests and teachers who are supposed to have altered the national consciousness of the Macedonians.

We find this proof, too, in the treatment meted out to the Greek and Serbian inhabitants of Macedonia by the Bulgarians, during the recent occupation of these regions by the Bulgarian army.

After their recent defeat by the Allied armies they evacu-

ated these regions and left behind them populations decimated by ill-treatment, starvation, exposure, deportation and massacre. Property had been destroyed, pillaged and burned, the people had been stripped of all their belongings. A delegation of the International Red Cross of Geneva, and certain officers of the Allied Armies in Macedonia who visited the country, described the situation as truly appalling.

The Germans acted in this way against the Belgian and French populations only because they were not German. The Bulgarians, by applying the same methods to the populations of Macedonia, showed that these peoples were strangers to them.

The only just solution of the question of Thrace, just, because based on historical and ethnological grounds, is its restoration to Hellenism, for to Hellenism it incontestably belongs.

ASIA MINOR

What is the Greek population of Asia Minor?

It is difficult to answer this question.

The Greeks represent it as being more than 2,000,000. Dr. Karl Dieterich, in a study which appeared at Leipzig in 1915, and which has recently been published in English by the American-Hellenic Society, estimates the population at more than a million.

The Greek estimate is probably nearer the truth, or, according to accurate school statistics, the Greeks of Asia Minor maintain 1444 schools for boys and 360 for girls, with 143,849 pupils and 46,916 pupils respectively.

If we take into account the fact that these schools have been established solely in important Greek centers, which are the only ones that can maintain them; that these schools are, with rare exceptions, elementary schools, attended by children from 7 to 14 years, one is forced to the conclusion that the population which furnishes 182,000 pupils must certainly surpass the estimate of the German writer,¹ who, by reason

¹ The number of the Greek pupils is in fact 280,000, for the girls who attend these schools are only 47,000 as against 143,844 boys. The girls in a given population are usually, numerically, almost equal to the boys, so that we must regard this number (280,000) as representing more accurately the number of Greek children in Asia Minor.

of the alliance of his country with Turkey, would naturally try to minimize the importance of the Greek element in order to do away with the claims of Greece on Asia Minor, upon which Germany had cast her eye.

Dr. Dieterich examines the Greek element from the point of view of its intellectual, economic and social strength. He demonstrates their influence in order to draw the conclusion that the Germans must reckon with this, for it is through coöperation with this element that the German expansion in Asia Minor can obtain certain and solid results. His essay is interesting, for it proves that science, commerce and industry, are in the hands of the Anatolian Greeks, and further that the Greeks of the country regions are most industrious agriculturists.

We might multiply statements of this sort, and give extracts from works dealing with the character of the Greeks of the west coast of Asia Minor, in the Vilayets of Broussa and Aïdin (Smyrna) and of the coast of the Black Sea.²

All this demonstrates the existence of a numerous, strong and industrious Greek element, concentrated chiefly in the western part of Asia Minor, and the Hellenic claims on Asia Minor are thus completely justified.

Various opinions have been advanced as to the fate of this country. Many are of the opinion that the Ottoman Empire should be preserved, only guaranteeing, for the future, an administration which will safeguard the beliefs and well-being of the populations that live there.

It is the fate of the Mussulmans, mingled with the Christians, which is advanced as an argument to justify the opinion of those who favor the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire.

Such a conception does not in the least correspond to the object aimed at, which is to settle finally the pending questions in such a way as to avoid in the future any causes for international conflicts. The subject nations have received formal assurances of freedom, and will be grievously disappointed if they do not receive this great boon, for the sake of which they have suffered for so many centuries.

² Compare, in the work above cited, the writer's preface to the study of Dr. Dieterich in which several quotations are given on this point.

The injustice which would thus be committed against the Christians of Asia Minor would be all the more glaring, for the same arguments have not prevented the recognition of the independence or the union of the peoples of Austria-Hungary to other sister states.

There, too, time and might have done their work. The populations have mingled; along with densely concentrated populations, the neighboring races have invaded the territories occupied by a given people; they have mingled with the natives, and a mixture in language and national policy has resulted. This is disregarded and rightly so. These intruders must accept the dictates of justice or must depart. For what reason or motive should the indigenous populations of Asia Minor be treated differently? For Greeks and Armenians have lived in Asia Minor from ancient times. The Mohammedan Turk or Kurd is a foreigner who has conquered and destroyed the Greek and Armenian civilization.

The vitality of these peoples has been shown by their resistance. During these long centuries of subjection, it was in vain that the conqueror used every means to Mohammedanize them, to destroy their language and their national consciousness.

They suffered all, they endured all, but they maintained their nationality, as such, and they preserved their national consciousness intact. By what right can they now be compelled to come once more under the domination, even though this shall have been modified for the better, of him who has tortured them for centuries? Is such a dwelling together possible? Some of the noblest souls think of it as being so. They make much of the fraternization of peoples, of forgiveness of wrong-doing; ideas that are all very fine, but under the given premises incapable of application. Those who advocated them have not had to suffer the long moral and material tortures that the Greeks and Armenians have had to endure. They have not had their sisters massacred, their daughters outraged and their property pillaged, and destroyed. With the Greeks, as with the Armenians, the hatred of the Turk is a very powerful feeling

and this sentiment has been recently intensified by the crimes that the Turks have committed in the process of exterminating these peoples, an extermination that has been marked by a cruelty that surpasses all imagination.

Besides, the Turks cannot change. Mussulman lands have only been able to enjoy law, order and prosperity when under Christian government. The lands along the northern coast of Africa have only enjoyed order and tranquillity when under foreign rule. Morocco, Algiers, Tunis and Egypt were in a chaotic state until the Christians from foreign lands brought order, and with order, prosperity to these lands.

But the Christian administration has been able to succeed in these countries because it administered peoples belonging to the same race, with the same tendencies and the same beliefs. The disorder that existed before the appearance of the foreign administration was all due to the arbitrariness of leaders who made war for the sake of rapine. By imposing a respect for order, the foreigner has restored tranquillity.

In Asia Minor, however, we have profound reasons for disagreement. The Greek and the Armenian are separated from the Turk by religion, by civilization, by differences in aims and ideals. These are peoples that are civilized, while the Turk still remains barbarous, fanatical and obstinately opposed to all progress, because his religion, utterly lacking elasticity, prevents him from assimilating new ideas. It will require great efforts, demanding an indefinitely long time, to inculcate the rules which form the basis of civilized society. The Hindoo and the Arab Mussulman belong to races with a great civilization behind them and influencing them. But the Turk has never had any culture or civilization. What elementary notions of organization he has, have been borrowed from the conquered races. He will, therefore, resist all reform that the civilized nations may endeavor to impose upon him. All similar attempts that have been made in the past have utterly failed for these very reasons. Can anyone maintain that the Armenian and Greek peoples of Asia Minor have drunk so lightly

from their cup of woe that they must still be exposed to the hateful recoil of the barbarous Turk?

Historically and ethnologically the Greek and Armenian spheres of influence are clearly defined. It is only necessary to free these territories and to leave to the Turks what remains of the country,—a vast expanse—as the regions where they may gather and live. These freed lands will draw to them the Greeks and Armenians and will form centers which will assure their free development. Exchanges in population will take place, partly by the natural law of attraction and partly by more formal agreements. Dense national agglomerations will thus be formed which will permit these peoples to give free scope to their national activity and to their individual civilizations. This re-partition will, moreover, permit an attempt to organize the territories that will be left to the Turks, without imposing upon the Greek and Armenian that promiscuous intermingling, which is so repugnant to them and which is bound to delay, if not totally to prevent, the establishment of order, which is absolutely necessary to all progress.

Such a settlement corresponds furthermore to the general and common weal. It is founded on the experience of the past, for it is by the total independence and the absolute separation of the Christians that progress has been made. The Balkan States form a striking example. As soon as a given Turkish territory obtained its complete liberation, the Mussulman populations, who could not bring themselves to submit to the new conditions of law and order, departed and the Christian element set to work at tasks in which, within very short periods of time, palpable progress was made. When one has before him the experience of the past, why should one wish to continue a system which has never resulted in anything but deception and disappointment? When have the efforts at reform in Turkey ever had any results? These lands have need of considerable amounts of capital in order to provide the means of development. This capital will never be forthcoming unless order is definitely established by a state of affairs that is certain and definitive, that excludes the element of chance.

This final settlement is made requisite, too, by the ambitious aims that have arisen with regard to these countries. Imperialistic covetousness, in spite of the principles proclaimed, has not yet been abandoned. Keeping the Sick Man alive, in order to try new experiments on him, will result in feeding these ambitions. They will make an effort by intrigues to produce a miscarriage of these reforms and new causes of conflict will be created. By a definite and final settlement which shall give to Greece what is historically and ethnologically Greek, and which shall create an Armenian State, these ambitions will disappear. The Turks will only have to become civilized and to raise themselves to the scale of their neighbors in order to assure the conservation of their independence, and to gain the respect of foreign peoples. This result would be greatly facilitated by the example that the Turks would have before their very eyes, for the results which will be obtained by the Greeks and Armenians cannot fail to have a good influence upon the better Turkish elements, who, realizing what they will gain by the establishment of a regular administration will work hard to secure for their country the machinery necessary for its development. The Greek and Armenian influence to which the Turks have learned in several centuries of experience to accommodate themselves, will be exerted more easily and naturally than any other, and will serve to make the Turks understand the necessity of a total abandonment of their present-day conceptions which form a shocking anachronism in this 20th century.

THE ISLANDS

The population of the islands occupied by the Italians is almost exclusively Greek, for the Greek element, numbering 143,000 souls, is offset by only 4500 Turks, resident in Rhodes and Cos and 2500 Jews, who are all settled in Rhodes. These Greeks of the islands have preserved, throughout the ages, more clearly than elsewhere, their Greek nature and character, for their little islands were so insignificant and the people so poor that they have remained

free from all foreign influence. In physique they call to mind the ideals of a Polyclitus or a Phidias.

The Italians hold them by virtue of the Treaty of Lausanne, in order thus to secure the execution of the clause which obliged Turkey to withdraw her troops from Tripoli. These troops have long since disappeared so that the reason which justified the Italian occupation no longer exists.

Italy, which has formally accepted the principles laid down by the United States, will surely respect the principle of nationality which requires the annexation of these islands to Greece.

THE QUESTION OF EPIRUS

By N. J. Cassavety, General Secretary of the Pan-Epirotic Union in America

Among the many thorny questions which will pay their unwelcome visit to the delegates of the nations seated around the Peace Table, the question of Epirus will be a distinguished one, for it will involve not only the necessity of reconciling the two small nations immediately interested in it—namely, Greece and Albania, but also the need of satisfying a great power—Italy.

In 1913, the ambassadors of the great powers at London, yielding to the pressing demands of Italy and Austria, created the principality of Albaniano, and awarded to that principality the district bearing the name of Northern Epirus, or Southern Albania, which was occupied by the Greek army.

Under pressure, and with bleeding heart, Mr. Venizelos ordered the evacuation of Northern Epirus. But the Greek nation never renounced her claims. The Christian population of the district, almost wholly Greek, resented their subjugation to Albanian domination, and opposed Prince William of Wied by force of arms.

The Albanians divided themselves against one another; Essad Pasha plotted against his prince; Colonel Thompson, of the Dutch gendarmerie, was assassinated in front of the palace; the Prince of Wied fled; and Albania fell into its customary and inevitable condition of anarchy.

Mr. Venizelos fearing for the fate of the Epirotes at the hands of the wild bands of Guegues who had been mustered by the Prince of Wied, beseeched the great powers to allow the Greek troops to reoccupy Northern Epirus. Italy was propitiated by a simultaneous permission granted to her by the powers to occupy the valuable port of Avlona.

Thus matters stood at the outbreak of the European War. At Athens, and in fact, everywhere, it was believed that one thorny question had finally been given a happy solution. It was maintained that Greece would hold Northern Epirus permanently, that Italy would establish herself at Avlona, and that Albania would be put under the tutelage of the Great Powers of the Entente. It seemed as if Italy acquiesced to this solution of the Epirotic question, when suddenly, those deplorable events took place in Greece, the expulsion of Mr. Venizelos from power and the unfriendly attitude of Constantine toward the Allies.

The Greek forces were ordered demobilized and transferred to Peloponnesus. Italy, immediately thereon, extended her forces to the South from Valona and occupied Epirus as far down as Jannina.

It was not until after the return of Mr. Venizelos to power in 1917, that Italy withdrew her troops to the north of Jannina, occupying to this day that portion of Epirus which had been awarded to Albania in 1913, and which the troops of Mr. Venizelos had re-occupied in 1914.

Every sign tends to strengthen the conviction of the Greeks, and the Epirots, that the Epirotic question is not definitely settled. Italy indicates her determination to have Northern Epirus included in the state of Albania. And the Epirots are determined that no such attempt shall ever be crowned with success. Hence, we are led to believe that the question of Epirus is not a question to be relegated to a secondary place in the consideration of the American people who will be called upon to assist in the happy solution of all intricate racial problems.

We have reviewed briefly the history of the Epirotic question. In fact, the history of this question begins with the year 1913, when Greece and Serbia, by the defeat of Turkey, were coming to the right shores of the Adriatic. Until 1913 the Epirotic question was not in existence. The Albanians satisfied with their privileged position they held under the Turkish Empire, did not seek independence. They did not desire to be separated from the Ottoman Empire. Occasionally only did they rise to arms to prevent the Turks from

subjecting them to taxation and to compulsory military service. Nor have the Albanians as a whole a conception of national unity. Mr. Reginald Wyon wrote in the *Blackwoods Magazine* in April, 1903:

As to the people themselves, spoken of collectively as Albanians or sometimes as Arnauts, the idea gained thereby of a united nation is quite erroneous. They must first be divided into three, according to the three religions, namely, Mohammedans, Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic Christians. These three religious factions constitute three entirely different peoples, each animated by fanatical hatred of the other; and they can be subdivided into clans and factions ad lib. As each clan can be reckoned as a miniature autocratic kingdom, ready at any moment to go to war with its next door neighbor, the anarchy existing all over Albania can be faintly imagined.

And Mr. Caillard wrote in *The Fortnightly Review*, of April, 1885:

In spite of their close blood-relationship, they are bitterly hostile towards one another. The Ghuëgs look down upon and despise the Tosks, who, in their turn, view the Ghuëgs with jealousy and dislike. It is acknowledged unreservedly by both that they cannot live together. They are continually quarreling, and often civil wars result.

Dr. E. J. Dillon wrote in the *Contemporary* of April, 1903:

Each tribe hates the other with religious rancour, although the line of cleavage does not always run parallel with religious tenets.

And again, Mr. Wyon wrote in the *Blackwoods* in April, 1913, "Roman Catholic Albania:"

The numerous clans live absolutely independent of each other, some in blood-feud, where they shoot each other at sight whenever they meet. Sometimes the slaughter is great: at others, they are content with half a dozen killed on each side.

We might adduce innumerable expert testimonies, had our space permitted, to impress the fact that Albania was not created because the Albanians wanted a kingdom. In fact, the Albanians did not care for a united Albanian kingdom, and as we saw they did not long delay to cause its dissolution.

Who, then, created the Albanian kingdom? We take from the *Literary Digest* of May 6, 1915, the following quotation translated for the *Digest* from the publication *L'Italie* published in Rome. Pieter Kakaviqui, secretary of the marshalship at the court of Wied wrote:

Albania being, in fact, the creation of the Triple Alliance, it is on the lot of the Austro-Hungarian and German armies that its future political existence depends. Not only the head of the State, but every Albanian citizen, without distinction of religion, should feel compelled to fight on their side, in recognition of the liberators of Albania.

Mr. Wyon wrote in April, 1913, in the *Blackwoods Magazine*:

It is to be remembered that a ceaseless agitation is in progress, chiefly on the part of Austria (through the priests) and of Italy (by means of the schools) to gain influence.

And again, in the same publication Mr. Wyon wrote:

The time will come when at least two of the Great Powers will have to seriously consider the Albanian problem, who are both vitally interested in its solution.

In the *Literary Digest* of February 21, 1914, we read:

Austria-Hungary and Italy may regard the new kingdom as a chess-board for playing their game of rivalry in the Adriatic.

In the *Spectator* of May 23, 1914, we read:

Perhaps, the chief obstacle to a working arrangement in the Epirote lines is that Italy does not approve of it, and so we come back to the fact that Italy's presence in Albania is a very significant thing. It is useless to prophesy. There is a mess; Austria and Italy may try to use that mess to their own profits.

We hardly think it is necessary to say more on this point. Albania was created by Austria-Hungary and Italy, in spite of the Albanians.

There is no doubt that after 1913, the appetite of a few Albanian nationalists has been whetted to demand Epirus for the imaginary Albanian state.

But the Epirots, although abandoned by the unwilling government of Mr. Venizelos, resolved upon resistance to

the end, irrespective of whether they should meet Albanians or the Triple Alliance as their opponents.

The Ambassadors at London submitted to the inexorable insistence of Italy and Austria to include the Northern Epirots in the New Albania. The public in France, England, and America recognized the injustice done to the Epirots, and the injury to the new Albanian state, for, the revolution of the Epirots precipitated the downfall of the New Kingdom. The *Spectator* wrote in April 11, 1914:

Northern Epirus has been spoken of as the Ulster of Greece. When the powers decided to create an independent principality of Albania, they did not include Northern Epirus within its boundaries without any reason. It was because they could not agree on any other solution, and merely accepted the place that divided them least. But, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that as Northern Epirus is largely Greek, the Epirots object to the decision of the powers.

And again:

The rising which is now embarrassing Prince of Wied, and causing him to contemplate taking the field at the head of an Albanian Army, was only to be expected.

It is true that men of Greek race, and speech in Northern Epirus are cut off from their natural affinities.

We have so far adduced the testimonies of eminent authorities to establish the truth of our contention that the Albanians have no national feeling, that Italy and Austria-Hungary were the instrumentalities for the creation of the Albanian kingdom, and that their motives were, as Mr. René Puaux says in his introduction of the *La Malheureuse Epire* "to make Albania as large as possible in order that they may divide it up between themselves later on;" or as Mr. André Chéradame writes in his *Douze ans de Propagande en Faveur des Pays Balkaniques* in order to embarrass Greece and Serbia, and to embroil the Balkan Allies into a civil strife."

We have, also, produced testimony as to the ethnological character of Northern Epirus, but, seeing that every dispute of an ethnological character will be solved as far as it is consistent with fair justice and feasibility, on the principle of

nationality, we deem it our duty to utilize the remainder of our paper in bringing additional authorities as to the ethnology, numbers, culture, traditions and the national aspirations of the people of North Epirus.

“The oracle of Jupiter was established in Epirus before the deluge of Deucalion by the Pelasgians who built him a temple. The Selles were his priests” (Herod. II, 54).

Achilles, the Thessalian addresses Zeus as follows: “Jupiter, King of the Pelasgian Dodona, in the vast abodes, God who presidest at Dodona, where the cold winters reign; around your altar live the Selles, your interpreters, who never wash their feet, and sleep on the ground.” (2 III. Book XVI, 233 and following.)

It would have been strange, indeed had the Epirots remained unaffected by the Hellenic culture, with thousands of Athenians visiting the oracle of Dodona. If the Epirots were not originally Hellenes, as in fact they were, they surely were Hellenized.

Pyrrhus was completely Greek, as Plutarch tells us. The coins of Pyrrhus bear Greek inscriptions.

When Paulus Aemilius defeated Perseus, Epirus fell to the Romans, and Duruy says, “Two thousand carriages loaded with statues from Macedonia and Epirus passed through the streets of Rome.” Had Epirus been barbarian, she could not have possessed the art treasures which the Romans brought to the Imperial City.

Never before the arrival of the Turks had Epirus, as far North as Durazzo (Dyrrachion) formed one country with Illyria, modern Albania. Turkey joined Northern Epirus to Albania in the fifteenth century, and the Southern in the year 1800.

In 1806 Ali Pasha Tebelen became the first Albanian Pasha in Epirus. His proverbial villainy and cruelty are known. To him Epirus owes the Islamization of its inhabitants to the North. His aim was to Albanicize Epirus, but he did not succeed. The patriotism of the Epirots was more violent than the violent measures of Ali to extinguish it.

In 1885, V. H. Caillard who visited all Epirus, wrote in the April issue of the *Fortnightly Review*:

As for the Epirots they may be considered *purely Greeks*. Their language is Greek, their names are Greek, they are thoroughly Greek in thought and feeling, habits and religion.

We were met all along the road by deputations of villagers from far and near who prayed that at least they might be included in Greece.

The whole country seemed to ring from end to end "Viva Gladstone!" Mr. Gladstone was looked upon as the saviour of their country, the man in whom they trusted for coming prosperity and happiness, for reunion with their real fatherland.

We asked the inhabitants if they were satisfied with the existing régime. "No!" was the reply. "Our only remedy is to be joined to our mother—Greece. We have nothing in common with Albania. Taxes may be heavy in Greece. Yet, we should have improvements!"

"Our names are Greek, all names are Greek here, because in ancient times Epirus and Greece were one, and they should be so now. But it cannot be forever—our hope is in Mr. Gladstone."

If these are not considered sufficient proofs of the popular yearning to be united to Greece, we might go back into not remote history and remember that the Souliotes, a chiefly Greek-speaking tribe of Epirus, were not only continually at war with the Albanians, but were among the first to commence the Greek War of Independence, and that Bozzaris, of their numbers, was the greatest of heroes who fell in the early part of the terrible struggle. Epirus has, in fact, been Greek in all essential points from time immemorial, except only in name; it is to be hoped that, one of the most essential points to her, may be ceded to her soon.

Leake, Pouqueville, Hobhouse, who travelled through Epirus, are teeming with testimonies of the Hellenic character, and Hellenic aspirations of the Epirots from Avlona to Preveza.

But the Albanophiles object to such statements. They say that Northern Epirus must be considered Albanian because a large portion of the population speaks Albanian.

To these objections we consider our duty to oppose without acrimony the disinterested opinions of men like Dr. E. J. Dillon. In the *Contemporary Review* of April, 1903, he wrote:

For the past ten years or more the Albanians have been slowly extending their territory, and without serious opposition. The

Christians who occupied their own land were either killed off or driven away in large numbers from the Villayets or Provinces of Kossovo, Monastir and Salonica.

Thus the chivalrous brigands have succeeded in forming the majority of the population, and where they are in minority they are predominant, seeing that they carry weapons and know how to use them, while Christians, Serbs, Greeks, and Bulgars are by law unarmed.

The land-owners dwell in fortified houses, their retainers are armed to the teeth, and the wherewithal to live is furnished by the Christians—Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars, who wise in their generation, lay in corn, fruits and money, which the enemies enjoy. The Malsia tribe, for instance, is supported, almost exclusively by the proceeds of organized depredations on the Christians who try to live and work in their neighborhood.

In the *Fortnightly Review*, in 1885, F. P. Caillard wrote:

In 1806, Ali Pasha Tebelen became the governor of Epirus. It is hardly necessary to say that misrule and oppression soon began. In a short while Ali had confiscated most of the property worth having, and had transferred it to some of "My Albanians." The Epirots protested to the Porte. On failing to obtain redress, emigrated en masse to Zante.

Ali was bitterly reprimanded, and recalled the Epirots, but soon he reconfiscated their lands and gave them over to his "Albanians." Nevertheless, Ali's attempt to Albanicize violently the Christian Epirots had no practical success.

From the foregone quotations it is easily understood that the Christian Epirots who were of Greek race, and of Greek sentiment, under the savage oppression of Turkey, and of the Albanians, were reduced to the condition of slavery. The educated Greeks fled the country; the wealthier went to live in the Heptanese, at Athens, or in the Peloponesus; and the paysants, in order to mitigate the fury of their oppressors tried by all means to hide their national feelings, and to learn the language of the Albanians in order that they might the easier beguile them. Thus the language, as it has recently happened in Alsace-Lorraine, under persecution has been altered. The Greek Epirots were forced to learn to speak Albanian and to forget their mother tongue, as the younger generation in Alsace-Lorraine is forced to learn German and to forget the mother tongue—the French. Other such examples of oppressed nationalities, which have altered their languages but not their national feelings are

the Armenians, who, for the most part, speak Turkish; the Greeks in Brussa, who likewise speak only Turkish, and the Danes in Schleswig-Holstein. Language, therefore, is not the test whereby we should judge the nationality of the Northern Epirots, although almost all of the Northern Epirots today speak Greek.

So much for the national aspirations of the Northern Epirots. We shall conclude this article by producing statistics about that portion of Epirus claimed by Greece as rightfully belonging to the Hellenic patrimony.

The frontier proposed by Greece in Epirus would leave to her the Vilayet of Jannina, the sandjacks of Jannina, Prevesa and Goumenitza (or Rechadié) in full, the larger portion of the sandjack of Argyrocastron, and, in the sandjack of Korytsa, the cazas of Korytsa and of Colonia in full, and about half of the caza of Starovo.

These territories contain a population of 477,383 souls of whom the two-thirds are Greeks and the other third Mussulmans, or to be more accurate, 316,651 Greeks and 154,413 Mussulmans, without taking into account 5,104 Jews.

Upon an analysis of these proportions, it is evident that in the most important districts, the majority of the Greek element reaches in the caza of Pogoni 96.4 per cent, in the sandjack of Prevesa 91.7 per cent, in the sandjack of Jannina 88.6 per cent, in the caza of Delvino 75.2 per cent. Elsewhere the majority of the Greek element falls below this proportion of 2 to 1; in certain districts the two elements are about equally balanced; in a very few others, finally, the majority passes over to the Mussulman element.

The table given here below shows the detail of this distribution in the different districts.

These numbers are drawn from the statistics compiled in 1908 by the Ottoman Government in view of the parliamentary elections, in order to determine the number of the electors and that of the deputies to be elected. Such statistics, if they do not always conform to the real proportions between the two elements, cannot be construed as biased in favor of the Greek element. The truth is that they have been compiled in the same anti-hellenic and gre-

cophobe spirit which ruled all the dealings of the Young Turks during the preparations for the first elections. It is, therefore, probable that the numbers compiled do not exaggerate the preponderance of the Greek element.

Further explanation should be made. The table appended below shows as Greeks, not only those who speak Greek, but also the Orthodox Christians who, while speaking the Albanian or the Coutzo-Vlach, are, and call themselves, and wish to be Greeks. They represent about one-third of the total element indicated as Greek.

As we have dealt a little earlier in this article with the linguistic question, we will only add that language is not a safe criterion for the distinction of ethnic elements. Albanophone Greeks speak Greek as well, and can read, write and transact business only in Greek. The same holds true of the Coutzo-Vlachs. Nobody denies today that the only safe test of nationality is conscience and the will of the individual.

Greece, confident that the Northern Epirotes desired union with her, proposed to the International Epirotic Committee to have a popular referendum applied, in order to determine the will of the majority. "But Austria-Hungary and Italy rejected this plan. They feared that Greece would win" writes Mr. Rene Puaux in *La Malheureuse Epire*.

In the comparison which will be made in the table below as regards the ethnic elements, it is not sufficient to note that the Greek element represents two-thirds of the population, although that fact in itself is adequate to confirm the rights of Greece to claim the regions where her sons preponderate. It is also necessary to add that if Greece will be forced to annex some few thousands of people of non-Greek character, it must not be forgotten that the frontiers are so drawn as to leave within Albania considerable numbers of her children.

The boundaries proposed by Greece take in 154,413 Mussulmans, but at the same time leave out 44,119 Greeks.

The territories claimed by Greece are Greek, not only on account of the inhabitants; they are Greek also on account

of the Hellenic civilization, which has already joined them to Greece by the ties of thought and sentiment.

Table of population of the vilayet of Jannina

DISTRICT	GREEKS			TOTAL GREEKS	MUSSULMANS	TOTAL POPULATION
	Greco-phones	Albano-phones	Vlacho-phones			
Jannina.....	72,674	1,400	10,800	84,874	5,032	89,906
Metsovon.....	5,882			5,882		5,882
Liascovikion.....	6,100	2,624		8,724	4,584	13,308
Prevesa.....	12,542			12,542	1,854	14,396
Louros.....	20,162	1,100		21,262	882	22,144
Margariti.....	1,400	8,812		10,212	18,426	28,638
Philates.....	17,340	250	100	17,690	11,276	28,966
Paramythia.....	9,936	2,600		12,536	4,704	17,240
Argyrocastron.....	13,178	7,916		21,094	21,032	42,126
Delvinon.....	12,231	4,155		16,386	5,450	21,836
Cheimarra.....	3,865	3,383		7,248	4,750	11,998
Tepelen.....		5,846		5,846	15,566	21,412
Premeti.....		9,500	2,128	11,628	18,530	30,158
Pogonion.....	18,615		2,381	20,996	810	21,806
Total.....	193,925	47,586	15,409	256,920	112,896	369,816
Corytsa.....		43,800	1,214	45,014	53,919	98,933
Total.....	193,925	91,386	16,623	301,934	166,815	468,749

* Ottoman government statistics by Amadori Virgili, 1908.

We now come to the culture of Epirus:

Table of statistics of schools in Epirus

NAMES OF SAND JACKS	NAMES OF KAZAS	NUMBER OF SCHOOLS			NUMBER OF TEACHERS			NUMBER OF PUPILS		
		Greek	Roumanian	Italian	Greek	Roumanian	Italian	Greek	Roumanian	Italian
Jannina	City of Jannina.....	(8)	(1)		(60)	(2)		(1,467)	(35)	
	Jannina (incl. City of Jannina).....	258	2		334	8		9,417	63	
	Metsovo.....	8			20	1		482		
	Konitza.....	31			36	3		1,089	22	
	Leskoviki.....	34			36			1,118		
	Filiatai.....	34			33			1,302		
	Paramythia.....	32						732		
	Total in the Sand Jacks..	397	2		459	12		14,140	85	

Table of statistics of schools in Epirus—Continued

NAMES OF SAND JACKS	NAMES ON KAZAS	NUMBER OF SCHOOLS			NUMBER OF TEACHERS			NUMBER OF PUPILS		
		Greek	Roumanian	Italian	Greek	Roumanian	Italian	Greek	Roumanian	Italian
Argyrocastro	Argyrocastro..	50			59			1,916		
	Delvino.....	24			33			1,063		
	Premeti.....	35	1		39	1		1,118	18	
	Tepelen.....	18			22			589		
	Himaza.....	8			14			507		
	Pogoni.....	42			57			2,061		
	Total in the Sand Jacks..	177	1		224	1		7,254	18	
Preveza	Preveza.....	32			40			1,254		
	Louros.....	36			36			1,180		
	Margariti....	30			31			681		
	Total.....	98			107			3,115		
Berat	Berat.....	18			28			769		
	Scraperi.....	1			1			24		
	Lousina.....	25			29			623		
	Valona.....	10		2	16		5	435		40
	Total.....	54		2	74		5	1,851		40
Total in the vilayet.....		726	3	2	864	13	5	26,360	103	40

School and church maps and statistics by Amadori Virgili, 1908. "La Questione Rumeliota."

From the preceding table we see that Greece has 726 schools for boys and girls. Three of these are colleges for boys (Jannina, Konitsa, Korytsa) and one is a college for girls at Jannina. We see that Greece has 900 teachers, male and female, and pupils attending schools to the number of 27,000, which represents 9.2 per cent of the entire population. If we take into consideration the fact that the Mussulmans dislike schooling and they never send their children to school, we should compute the percentage not on the total population, but on the Greek population only, or on the 270,000 which would give us 10 per cent. Very few countries among the most civilized can show a nobler educational effort. And this effort acquires a more striking

significance when we know that the Ottoman Government had been ever so suspicious of the Greeks as to check the educational ardor of the Epirots. Yet what has Roumania accomplished with all the lavish expenditures to detach the Coutzo-Vlachs from their allegiance to the Hellenic ideals? In twenty-five years she has succeeded to establish only three schools in Epirus, with 13 teachers and 103 pupils over a total population of 22,000 Vlachs. Over an equal period of time, Italy has only 2 schools, 5 teachers, and 40 pupils. *As to Albanian schools, there are none at all.*

On the other hand, Greek culture without any subsidies from the Kingdom of Greece, spread itself in full vigor enlightening not only the Greeks, but also the Turks and the Jews. At Jannina, Konitza and Koritza the Turks and the Jews attend the Greek schools, Essad Pasha is a graduate of the Greek College of Jannina.

But even more strikingly Greek is the work of the Church. There is not in Epirus one village, no matter how small, but it has one or more churches, and one or more priests. This moral education prepares, completes and prolongs the instruction received at the schools. And along side with the churches have sprung up the monasteries, which served as a refuge for the persecuted, and as a school which perpetuated the Greek language, and the Greek traditions. There are 49 monasteries in the sandjack of Jannina, 12 in that of Preveza, as many in Himara and others in other sandjacks, or 189 in all.

There are in Epirus eight metropolitan episcopates, as follows: Preveza, Paramythia, Jannina, Argyrocastron, Conitza, Corytsa, Berat, Durazzo.¹

These episcopates are also the supervisors of all the charitable institutions in Epirus.

But it is private initiative that has distinguished itself in the works of charity, which have made the Epirots famous all over Europe. The Epirots, oppressed by the Turks and the Albanians, left their homes early in their boyhood and went to Russia, Roumania, Egypt, Austria, England and

¹ Oecomenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, Episcopates in European Turkey (Map).

Marseilles, where they amassed large fortunes. Their first thoughts as soon as they became rich, were to donate to Greece, or to their native towns their large fortunes for the erection of schools, hospitals, orphan asylums, museums, and churches. At Jannina the largest hospital is due to the generosity of a patriotic Epirote. Likewise the orphan asylum at Jannina is the gift of an Epirot from the contested portion of Northern Epirus. The Greek College for Boys is due to the Yannote Zossima, and the College for Girls to Naxios. At Prevesa, Argyrocastro, Paramythia, Delvino, Metsovo, Lambovo, Konitza, and other cities of Epirus, one will see the princely gifts of Averof, Zappas, Zographos, Bancas and Anagnostopoulos (a Boston citizen).

Everywhere the traveller in Epirus will see the fruits of culture, and will feel the force of Hellenic civilization. The inhabitants who are proud to call themselves Greeks, are Greeks not only by blood, and sentiments; they are Greeks also by mentality, by civilization and by the love they cherish for Hellas.

We have only given a few testimonies of writers of well recognized ability, and of unassailable veracity to prove that the Northern Epirots are Greeks, not Albanians.

But the Albanian organizations in America and England insist that the decision of the ambassadors at London in 1913 shall be respected. According to that decision the greater part of Epirus is to go to Albania, and the Greek districts of Argyrocastron, Korytza, Chinara, Premeti, Pogonion, Tepeleni are to be sacrificed to the Albanians.

The Albanians as a whole are not responsible for such an imperialistic attitude. The very large mass of the Albanian people do not care for an Albanian state. They would welcome the Turkish rule which left them to their tribal independence.

The so-called Albanian movement is the work of a few Albanian chieftains who have fled their own country, pursued by antagonists.

These self-styled Albanian leaders have created a circle of sympathizers in England and in America, whom they deceive by false representations.

These Albanian "leaders" have special stories of Greek and Epirotic atrocities in order to rouse the sympathy of England and America for Albania.

We quote from the *Manchester Guardian*, October 2, 1914, the following by its Balkan correspondent, C. S. Butler:

I have read in the *Guardian* of July 22, of shocking atrocities alleged to have been committed against Albanians by Epirotes. Having served as a British war-correspondent both in Macedonia and Epirus in 1912 and 1913, I feel constrained in the interests of truth to rebut these charges, which are either wholly untrue or grossly exaggerated. Mr. Aubrey Herbert is a brave and honorable man, and I quite believe that he and that plucky English lady, Miss Edith Durham, spread these tales in perfect good faith, on the strength of the testimony of Albanian refugees and residents at Valona and Durazzo. But they make a very great mistake in launching these horrors in the British press without having verified them by a visit to the locality itself. I happen to know that Mr. Herbert has repeatedly been invited to visit the Epirote borderland, in which these atrocities are alleged to have been committed, but he has not gone. Miss Durham has apparently only made one hurried visit to Koritza since the journey, which forms the subject of her well-known little book and on which, to judge from that same book, she succeeded in travelling the northern fringe of Epirus without coming in contact with a single Greek inhabitant. Is it fair, then, to condemn the Epirotes unheard, when nothing would have been easier than to verify the truth of the astounding tales related in the *Manchester Guardian* and brought up in the House of Lords on July 28?

We shall adduce two more witnesses of international repute as scholars and as men of honor and impartiality; Hon. W. P. Reeves, Ex-Governor of New Zealand, and Z. D. Ferriman, author and journalist.

Mr. Ferriman wrote to the *Daily Chronicle*, April 3, 1914, from Jannina:

When Athens sat in darkness, the appanage of a eunuch in the Seraglio at Stamboul, Jannina was a focus of Greek learning, and the travellers in the early nineteenth century tell us of scholars like Athanasius Psalida. Byron met one of his pupils at Athens in 1811, and wrote of him that he was "better educated than the fellow commoners of most colleges." I had heard of Lucas Via, of John Valeras, and other natives of Jannina who brought to it the culture of the West, of the Schools of Psalida and the Zozimas, of Sakellarios and Coletti and Metaxa, but Dr. Georgitsis told me much more, among other things of the school founded by the brothers, Philanthropinos in 1650 which flourished for more than a century.

This does not sound extraordinary as it is put down here, but if we try to realize the barbarous environment amid which these things were accomplished, and the savage tyranny which essayed to thwart them, the achievement is little short of marvellous. It is a matter of wonder that Epirus has had to wait so long for her emancipation whilst regions which deserved it less have long enjoyed it. But not all Epirus is free. Districts as Greek and as cultured as Jannina, Argyrocastro and Moschopolis, where a printing-press was established nearly 200 years ago, are excluded because a company of gentlemen seated around a green table in London have drawn a line on a map and decreed otherwise.

I am writing this in the house of Dr. Georgitsis. His fourteen year old son, Sophocles, is seated opposite to me doing his lessons. He is at the Gymnasium, the high school, which has existed for well-nigh a century amid incredible difficulties. His schoolfellows of the senior class are not here. They have gone to join the hierolochitai, the sacred bands, to fight, if need be, for unredeemed Epirus. So has the Doctor's nephew, who was residing lately at West Norwood. So has the best young blood of the country.

I shall meet some of them, for I leave today in order to try and give some account of the land which has been handed over to a factitious State created to satisfy the covetous aspirations of two European powers.

The Honorable Pember Reeves, in a letter to the *Daily Chronicle* of April 11, 1914, defends the Epirotes who rose and fought the Albanians, declaring their independence.

The honorable writer asks "What are the Epirotes fighting for?" And answers:

They are not asking for justice; that of course, would be union with Greece. They ask for the guarantee of a tolerable existence.

The Great Powers are supposed to be deciding what they will do. Already certain European papers are clamoring that international forces be used in Epirus—in other words, that the Greek Epirotes should be shot down.

Before the "Shoot 'em down!" policy is considered, much less adopted by the Great Powers, I would appeal to you and to your readers to scan these terms put forward by the unfortunate Epirotes. I would ask them to consider whether the demands are excessive, coming as they do, from an educated, civilized, Christian people who, to please Italy and Austria, and for no other reason, are being forced under the rule of Moslem savages, whose chief industry is professional brigandage. It is usual to compare the case of the Epirotes with that of the Ulster Protestants, but the analogy, though by no means fanciful, is anything but exact.

Nobody proposes—at the dictation of Austria and Italy—to expel the Ulster Protestants from the British Empire, or to put

them under a foreign flag. Ulster has not been proclaimed a part of some savage country, say Morocco. No one has suggested that her people should call themselves Arabs or Abyssinians, that they should lose the protection of the British Army, of fleet, or be regarded as aliens by the British Parliament. They are not to be ruled by a German prince or deprived of votes and parliamentary institutions. The Irish Nationalists may have their faults, but they are civilized Christians. The roughest of them are not brutal bandits, whose hands during the past eighteen months have been red with the blood of Ulster peasants. Mr. John Redmond has many critics, but his bitterest enemies have never likened him to Essad Pasha. I would invite you and any fair-minded reader of yours interested in the matter to inquire into Essad Pasha's record. When they have ascertained it they will, I am convinced, agree that in refusing to place themselves, their wives, children and property, under the despotic rule of such a person, the Epirotes are only striving for the primary rights of man. For Essad Pasha is just now the virtual ruler of Albania, in so far as Albania has a ruler at all.

Such are the Epirotes whom the Central Powers had resolved to place under the rule of New Albania.

Whatever may happen to Albania, and we hope that she will be reorganized, and made into an independent nation, we are certain that at least America will not permit a thoroughly Greek population "more Greek than the Greeks themselves," Rene Puaux, *La Malheureuse Epire*, to pass under the dominion of a foreign nationality—much less under the dominion of the Mohamedan Albanians, who hate the Epirotes and who, in their turn, hate the Albanians as heartily.

Epirus, as far as had been occupied by the Greek armies in 1913, is in preponderance Greek. Whatever certain interested powers may have decided in 1914, the United States will do justice to the brave and long-trying people of Northern Epirus, who ask nothing more than to be allowed to be united to their mother country—Greece.

"Truly, few countries of Greek character merit as much as Northern Epirus, to be called, and to be Greek." Rene Puaux, *La Malheureuse Epire*.

LIBERIA IN THE NEW PARTITION OF WEST AFRICA

By Dr. George W. Ellis, K.C., F.R.G.S., Assistant Corporation Counsel of Chicago

West Africa is an indefinite geographic term employed in a general way to designate the territories comprised in the Republic of Liberia and the colonies of the different European powers on the West Coast of Africa.

What Lady Lugard calls the African Black Belt comprises a broad stretch of territory, extending across the African continent from the Senegal on the west to the Red Sea on the east and from the Sahara on the north to the equator on the south. Laced with numerous rivers embowered with trees, studded with luxuriant and silvan forests, inhabited by a wealth and variety of animals and birds, enriched with gold and diamonds and peopled in unnumbered millions by the finest black races of the globe, in natural wealth, wonder and magnitude, this is, perhaps, the most remarkable section of our globe. In mountain, lake and forest, in flower, landscape and scenery, and in bird, beast and man, this is one of the unrivalled and most picturesque portions of our earth.

This fascinating stretch of territory includes West Africa where its western limits are washed by the white crested billows of the Atlantic Ocean. With the exception of Liberia on the west coast and Abyssinia on the east, not only West Africa but all Africa, has been taken and partitioned and the African races against their wishes have been compelled to submit to the indeterminate control and subjection of alien powers.

Because of its great natural wealth West Africa has been of increasing political and commercial importance. From Great Britain, Germany, France, Spain and other European nations, rapid transportation facilities and cable communi-

cations have brought the ports and marts of West Africa within easy reach of those of Europe and the world. So that today West Africa is a growing factor in the economic production and consumption of international trade products. Europe says she is engaged in the philanthropic work of redeeming West Africa and in the glorious process millions of dollars are secured through West African commerce. It was partly to protect this growing trade,—though in its infancy,—and African discoveries, that West African colony holding powers decided to partition Africa some thirty odd years ago and to exercise the political sovereignty and jurisdiction thereof.

THE NEW PARTITION OF WEST AFRICA

Notwithstanding West Africa was divided among European powers, this world war has had its West African consequences. Now that the war has practically closed we are looking backward as well as forward to see how far the people of West Africa have been driven from their former course.

Rich in mines and with an area of 33,700 square miles, Togoland, just below Liberia on the Gold Coast, was the first German West African colony to fall into the grasp of the Allies, in their determined policy to force Germany from the continent of Africa.

The second Germany colony taken was Kamerun, a fertile district south of Togoland and covering an area of 190,600 square miles.

The third was German Southwest Africa, lying adjacent to the British possessions in South Africa, the second largest German possessions in Africa and containing an area of 317,953 square miles.

The largest and most imposing of German holdings in Africa was German East Africa, containing some 365,644 square miles. This was the last German colony to fall in Africa, and whose prolonged and protracted resistance to allied subjection gave rise in the German mind to the vision of "Middle Africa," which with "Middle Europe" completed

the dream and picture of German mastery and dominion in the political and economic conquest of the world.

With their mammoth wealth of billions of dollars, the acquisition of these German colonies by the Allies pre-supposes some kind of a division among the conquering powers, and presents to us the question of The New Partition of West Africa.

As interested as we are in The New Partition of West Africa, because of its ultimate influence upon the relations between the lighter and darker worlds, we are particularly concerned here in how far this new partition will effect the great mission and destiny of the Liberian Republic, which holds out to the millions of the African races the high hopes of self-discipline, self-government and Christian civilization.

The importance and significance of this question is disclosed in a glance at the ideals for which the Liberian nation stands and the hitherto European colonial attitude not only toward Liberia, but toward American and democratic principles for West Africa.

WEST AFRICAN COLONIAL GOVERNMENT

The form of political machinery for social control employed by the different European powers in their various West African colonies, in a general way, is very similar. The colonial government is administered by a governor and his council. Each colony is divided up into what are called commissioner-districts and are presided over by a district commissioner. The authority of the governor is enforced by the usual civil officers and courts, with a reserve force of soldiers thought to be sufficiently numerous to suppress any uprising among the Native Africans. The district commissioners are distributed through the hinterlands and each usually has at his command a detachment from the colonial frontier force and in many instances exercises judicial functions with certain Native chiefs when not sitting alone. The governor and council make the laws and are clothed with great political power. In some of the colonies the Native races have representation on the Council and in others none.

EARLY COLONIAL ATTITUDE TOWARD NATIVE RACES

Early West African colonial governments seem to have been based upon the principle that the Native races had little or no rights other than to obey. The Africans were given little or no participation in the governments. They were taxed to maintain a political system of high salaried and in many instances overpaid officials from Europe who believe religiously in the right of the few to govern the many in the interest of the former. African institutions were regarded as mere superstitions to be inconsiderately and ruthlessly destroyed.

The West African colonial governments were not only characterized by the race prejudice which too often attends and marks the political and social intercourse between the white and darker races; but they were charged in addition with the class feeling which pervades the political institutions and social structure of European governments and society. Europeans resident temporarily in West Africa seemed possessed by an absorbing passion to make their fortunes and return to Europe as soon as possible. It was very evident that the white races were in West Africa, braving the dangers of the climate only for the supreme purpose of wealth making in trade or in fortune finding. The colonial governments gave them such ardent assistance as to make the shameful neglect of the interest of the great masses of Native peoples stand out in the boldest relief.

One of the results was that the colonial governments and administrations were attended with all kinds of friction with Native tribes, which were not adjusted to their sudden subjection to the arbitrary political authority of alien races, who were not hesitating to abrogate African laws and customs; violate the African's rights; destroy without understanding them African political and social institutions; and were compelling Africans in their own native land to submit to taxation without representation or consent, and obey a government whose officials and administrators were too largely saturated with the double prejudice of race and class, while the wealth of African forests, fields and mountains were being transported in millions to Europe.

In the various African colonies the tribes at different times made such resistance as they could against the encroachments of European colonial governments, but to no avail; and one punitive expedition after another was sent against them. Tribe after tribe was convulsed, butchered and dismembered; African towns one after another were burned and destroyed; African women and children by the thousands were subjected to all the horrors and cruelties of punitive and exterminating wars. And although all West Africans were completely suppressed and many of their chiefs and kings deported, exiled or executed; yet, in the process white officials and colonial governments were thrown under the psychological influence of a fear of Native uprisings which lingers with many of them still. The fear was so great in Sierra Leone that West Indian soldiers under white officers are to this day stationed at Freetown, the chief center of this British colony. The bravery and heroism displayed by many of the African leaders and people in defense of their liberties and their lands, as in Ashanti, contain materials for the most thrilling stories in romance and in fiction.

REFORM IN WEST AFRICAN COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

But there came a better era in West African colonial administration. The wholesale slaughter of Africans, attending the subjection of West Africans and the administration of so many of the colonial governments, touched the heart of humanity and met with increasing disfavor in Europe. The nature and character of African institutions, from a scientific standpoint, aroused the interest of scholars and competent African resident students, and gradually the African began to be disclosed to the world in his intellectual, religious, moral and social conditions, in aspects something like he really is.

It was during this time that the immortal Mary H. Kingsley travelled in West Africa, studied the African in his own home and the varied phases of his tropic life, and through her works entitled, *Travels in West Africa* and *Studies in West Africa*, not only profoundly influenced all colonial governments on the West Coast, but changed and

altered fundamentally the attitude of all Europe toward Africa and its races.

Dealing with the aspects and conditions of different tribes there followed many valuable contributions in the classic works of Sir Harry H. Johnston, John Sarbah, Sir A. B. Ellis, Casley Hayford, and other noted writers; but above the influence of them all was the voice and pen of West Africa's most noted and distinguished writer and scholar, Dr. Edward W. Blyden, lately deceased, pleading before the bar of Europe for political and social justice for Africa and for Africans.

In honor and memory of Mary H. Kingsley,—who truly gave her life to redeem Africans from the injustice and tyranny of European colonial governments,—the African Society of London was founded and organised for the purpose of studying African Native institutions and conditions in the interest of the truth, for the guidance and information of Europe and colonial administration in Africa. Elsewhere other societies with similar purposes came into existence. Mr. E. D. Morel, author of *Affairs of West Africa*, editor of *The West African Mail*, a weekly publication, and other notable works, threw himself with remarkable zeal and ability into this new movement toward the African races and their control. There flourished for a time a noted publication in London entitled *West Africa*, which with *The West African Mail* were in daily and sympathetic communion with the different sections of West Africa and which set forth weekly the truth in the interest of justice and a square deal to all West Africans.

In Germany, France, Great Britain, and even in Belgium, some of the most prominent names in Europe are now identified with the much needed work of reform in European colonial administration in Africa. So that the colonial administrations in West Africa have been compelled to modify and change their attitude toward the Native races, still they are far from what they should be. In German West Africa the local government is still very rigid and prejudiced toward the Native Africans. In the vast territories controlled by Great Britain more consideration is given to the rights and

institutions of Africans than in former times, but "the man on the spot," like the white man of the Southern American states, is pleading to the higher home government to be let alone on the ground that he has special knowledge on the Native situation, and therefore knows best what to do. The attitude of the colonial government in the Congo toward the Natives remains, after the most searching international exposure, a sad reflection upon the government of the advance nations of the backward ones. And unfortunately "the man on the spot" is permitted still to exercise too much authority and power over the Native Africans.

M. Du Ponty, governor general of French West Africa at Dakar, informed the writer at different times of the very agreeable manner in which the French colonial governments are now getting along with their Native subjects and of the number that were being educated in the colonies and in France, and of the increasing extent to which the Natives were permitted to participate in the colonial government.

DEVELOPMENT OF RESOURCES TO NEGLECT OF NATIVE RACES

While the colonial governments in West Africa from an American standpoint are open to some criticism in the broad human interest of the Native races and future general welfare, still too much praise cannot be bestowed upon the courage and industry of Europeans in all the West African colonies, in blotting out the slave traffic with all its cruelty and degradation, in abolishing barbarous practices among certain tribes, in assistance and education given in individual cases to Native Africans, in establishing improved methods of sanitation, in railroad construction, in facilities for telegraphic and wireless communication, and in the exploration and development of all material interests of the continent, to enable Europeans to live longer in Africa and to enable Europe to secure more wealth from the commerce and resources of the African races.

The thought above all others to be emphasized is that in this great process of African material development, there is

too little effort devoted to the advancement and development of the great masses of the Native peoples on the one hand, and on the other among too many Europeans resident in West Africa, official and otherwise, the feeling and belief are too strong that the darker races have a special and inferior place to other races, and that it is among the great aims of life for which the functions of government should be employed and all social pressure invoked, to keep these darker races on this inferior plane.

WEST AFRICAN COLONIAL ATTITUDE TOWARD AMERICANS

The great majority of Europeans and officials in West Africa do not seem to be of the best class. Service in Africa has always been considered very hazardous for the white man on account of the African fevers, etc. And with the exception of the highest officials and some of the heads of large commercial firms and corporations persons are selected who are unable to secure service in more favored fields. Some of the governors are evidently from the highest European classes, but the greater number of European subordinate officials give evidences that they are taken from the under classes; and when they enter upon their duties in West Africa, with large interest, responsibilities and trusts committed to their care, they too often become arrogant, conceited and oppressive, in their endeavors to impress the public that they belong to the upper European classes. They appear in too many instances in West Africa to devote more thought and effort in aping European nobility in petty snobbery than in the serious solution of the many political and social problems with which they must constantly contend as administrators.

It is natural anyway for the colonial governments in West Africa to be prejudiced toward democratic institutions because of European prejudice toward them. The white American for this reason will find much prejudice against him in West Africa. European officials like and demand more professed and formal courtesy than Americans show officials. The freedom, conversation and conduct of the white Ameri-

can keeps colonial officialdom very uneasy less American democratic manners and ideas spread to colonial subjects and thus interfere with European policies of political and social control. Europeans readily recognize the value of Americans along many industrial lines and so long as the latter confine themselves to purely industrial pursuits in the development of the natural resources of the country, there seems to be little or no objection to a few white Americans.

In South Africa where American steam engines and agricultural implements are meeting with increasing demands and where the white population is much larger in proportion to the Native, still there the prejudice against and the fear of American democratic manners and political ideas are very marked and manifest, largely on account, however, of the missionary activities of American Negroes. The anti-American feeling has not been so pronounced in West Africa because of the paucity of resident Americans, aside from the missionaries, notwithstanding the white population is exceedingly small in comparison to the Native. Nevertheless there is the same feeling as in South Africa because the Natives are restive under the government of an aristocratic political system, imperial in rigor, form and feature. And because of the presence of Liberia and a few Americans there has appeared from time to time what were considered well founded reasons for the political psychology of some of the West African colonial governments.

White American missionaries at different times sought release through the American Legation at Monrovia from oppressive and needless official restrictions on the southwest coast against their locomotion and freedom, some of which went so far as to prohibit them from leaving the colony. But in some of the colonies where the administrators are certainly of a high order, where Native problems are seriously and ably considered as in Northern Nigeria, where prejudice is not so patent and where the hand of authority is neither so heavy nor so oppressive, while white Americans will find little or no signs of outward unwelcome, still they need not flatter themselves with the thought that they are the objects of particular love and affection.

PURPOSE AND NATURE OF THE LIBERIAN DEMOCRACY

In establishing the Liberian Republic, its founders had in mind the creation of a democracy for black men from every section of the world, after much the same fashion that the United States of America was considered an asylum for the oppressed of every land. In so far as the United States had failed in its ideal of a free democracy to all men and races upon the principles of justice and equality, and had been limited to a free democracy for white men only, Liberia was settled with the view and hope that on the West Coast of Africa the black man could govern himself and work out his own destiny and civilization under the institutions of a free and black democracy. As the owners of the soil, the rulers of the state, and the teachers of the people, here the black man was to take his place in the family, of nations not simply as a black man, but as a man, endowed as other men and susceptible to the same culture, dignity and refinement.

LIBERIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD NATIVE RACES

And while the Liberians were founding a government where black men, exiled from Africa, might return and be free to enjoy all the opportunities and privileges of other men in an independent sovereignty of their own with all the inducements and inspiration of a self-governing democracy, yet in their Declaration of Independence, Bill of Rights, and Constitution, they took care to provide for the liberty of all men amply regulated and protected by law.

They not only held before the whole West African world the dazzling spectacle of a Negro nationality fashioned after the most modern and improved methods in government and statecraft, but they unified their political interest with that of the Native races by a constitutional provision that made the latter, like other persons of African descent, eligible for the citizenship of this new state. They identified themselves further with the aborigines by linking with the establishment of the Liberian government the purpose of bearing the light not only of Christianity and western civilization to the pagan Africans, but they sought the agricultural

and industrial uplift of the Native peoples as well, as is partly disclosed in a miscellaneous provision of the Liberian constitution.¹

And before the Liberian colony had entered the Family of Nations she had more than justified her existence by her services to humanity and civilization in the abolition of the traffic in slaves, and in her appeal to all Christendom she set forth few declarations more significant than when she said:

The Native African bowing down with us before the altar of the living God, declares that from us, feeble as we are, the light of Christianity has gone forth; while upon that curse of curses, the slave trade, a deadly blight has fallen as far as our influence extends.²

And since the birth of the Republic thousands of Natives have been incorporated into the Liberian body politic and many are today occupying leading places in the educational, religious, and political life of the state, with finally a representative in the Cabinet as Minister of Education and with an enrollment of more than one-half of the children attending the Liberian public and denominational schools.³

DIFFICULTIES OF LIBERIAN POLITICAL IDEAL

The Liberian ideal is an inspiring one and it appeals to the admiration of the Negro peoples in every section of the civilized globe. At the time it was launched upon the West African coast the political and economic subjection of black men in certain countries were such as to guarantee great promise for the success of the Liberian venture. To find an asylum in Liberia then attracted the best Negro minds and characters under oppression in other countries. The

¹ Section 13 of Miscellaneous Provisions of the Constitution, and Declaration of Independence.

² Declaration of Independence & Dynamic Factors in the Liberian Situation, *Journal of Race Development*, at Clark University, Worcester, Mass. by George W. Ellis.

³ Education in Liberia, Report of Education, 1907.

great continent of Africa with its amazing wealth and interesting stalwart races, living for the most part under their tribal institutions in their own lands, afforded an opportunity for Negro leadership especially from the United States to be found in no other quarter of our earth. At the most strategic point on the West Coast—at the head of the famous Gulf of Guinea—Liberians and their friends pictured in their minds the future of the West African republic as a powerful and dominating Negro nationality, melting for miles the Native tribes across the rolling plains of the Sudan into a solid and unified democracy, that would not only command all West Africa but exercise a tremendous influence in international thought and affairs.

Often spoken of as "Little America" by the aborigines, the influence of the Liberian republic was carried along the trade routes to the finer tribes of the plains and plateaux of the far interior. The kings and princes of Musahdu exchanged greetings and messages with the presidents of Liberia at Monrovia.

But the lustre of this Liberian ideal was dimmed by the occurrence of two great events: The liberation of the colored peoples in North America and the West Indies and the partition of Africa by the European powers. The physical emancipation of the blacks in the New World has held from Liberia the vast majority of the Negro peoples with their leaders, by holding out to them the hope of complete freedom and equality in the lands of their exile; and the partition of Africa has not only limited the physical and social fields of Liberian activity, but has forced those who have cast their destiny there into a hard struggle to keep the sovereignty of the nation intact in an ever decreasing geographic domain.

So that the 60,000 or 70,000 Americanized Liberians have been forced to witness the painful and distressing experience of seeing the reduction of their original territorial limits, by one neighbor and then another, to about 60,000 square miles, with a present Native population of not more than 2,500,000. And but for the good offices and assistance of the American government in the Liberian crisis of 1908, the chances are



that Liberia would have been completely absorbed by the European colony-holding powers.⁴

The purpose of the Liberian government, the democratic principles of its Bill of Rights and Constitution, the doctrine that black people have a right to rule, and the message of equality, liberty and self-respect, which the Liberian people bear not only to the Native races but to the Negroes of the world, calling them through self-government to a dignified and enlightened manhood, are inconsistent with the temper and spirit of the colonial government of subject races in the interest of the governed and with the doctrine of permanent subordination and natural inferiority of the black peoples to the white, for which most of the European colonial governments stand in Africa.

EUROPEAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS LIBERIA

Before the partition of Africa Great Britain and France gave many and signal proofs of their friendship and good will toward Liberia and there seems little or no doubt that the governments at Paris and London were sincere in their expressed good wishes for the future good fortune of the Liberian state. But subsequent events indicate that this friendly attitude of these two governments has been considerably modified. A complete knowledge of all the facts forces the conviction that the local government at Sierra Leone has been, perhaps, the largest single factor in this change. The colony of Sierra Leone was established by British philanthropists—among them Clarkson and Wilberforce—as an asylum for oppressed Negroes in the British colonies of the West Indies, during the latter part of the 18th century. And it was from this experiment that American philanthropists obtained the idea of the Liberian colony for American freedmen.

It is important here to recall that in founding the Liberian colony in 1820, the government of Sierra Leone refused to

⁴ Dynamic Factors in the Liberian Situation, *Journal of Race Development*, Clark University, Worcester, Mass., January, 1911, George W. Ellis.

Political Importance of the International Loan in Liberia, *Journal of Race Development*, Clark University, July, 1912, George W. Ellis.

permit the American emigrants to even land at Freetown, and they were forced to locate on the fever-stricken Island of Sherbro, south of Sierra Leone, where most of the Americans died before they secured the more suitable site at Monrovia.

Beginning with this act of unfriendliness the Sierra Leone government supported and encouraged British subjects in their meddling with tribal and intertribal matters and in their resistance to the enforcement of Liberian customs revenue laws, which resulted in the first great so-called Anglo-Liberian boundary dispute, starting about 1856 and ending in 1883, when over the diplomatic activity of the United States government, extending earnestly through many years, the Liberian northwest territory between the Sherbro and Mano rivers was added to the colony of Sierra Leone.

The triumph of the Sierra Leone government for its part in the working up of the complications of this first boundary dispute and so reporting the situation as to bring the London government to the unchangeable determination of settling the difficulties only by taking this northwest territory, over the opposition of both Liberia and the United States, has had, perhaps, more influence upon the course of Liberian destiny than any other single fact since the declaration of Liberian independence.

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century the development of African exploration and the pressure of European population suddenly changed the attitude of practically all Europe toward Africa. European governments acquired almost the whole of the continent, during which expansion was excited and encouraged by rewarding explorers and administrators, responsible for territorial expansion, with promotions and titles of rank and nobility. During the height of this European fever for African territory, the first successful attack upon the territorial integrity of Liberia was made, and the London government was at last prepared to follow, after a long and tireless effort on the part of the colonial government of Sierra Leone, religiously and with firmness the advice of what is now so often called "the man on the spot." Great Britain had no more right to take this Liberian northwest territory in 1883 than in 1856, but the

passion for African territory had become so strong among European nations, that it seemed unable to permit Liberia to escape, even from so great and just a nation as Great Britain.

Heretofore, Liberia had been largely protected because of European respect for the known American origin and interest in Liberian welfare. But the final British attitude in this northwest difficulty showed that the time had arrived when something more than American diplomacy was necessary to save Liberia from the European desire for African territory. This was regarded as a test case and it was believed that in it in a way, America disclosed the extent to which she would go to protect Liberia. The bad effects of this case have continued to the present time.

To maintain her political parity with Great Britain in West Africa, France soon followed the bad example set by Great Britain and in 1892, after a few preliminaries, added the Liberian territory from the Cavala to the San Pedro River to the French West African possessions.

Since then other valuable territories in the Liberian hinterlands have been taken by France, touching both the Saint Paul and Kavala basins. And only a few years ago Great Britain succeeded in getting the district of Kaure Lahun, which the American commissioners to Liberia reported in 1909 was being wrongfully occupied by British authorities. In this forced process of territorial contraction, under the circumstances, Liberia has been exceedingly fortunate in maintaining her sovereignty and this was done only with the greatest difficulty.⁵

PRE-WAR OUTLOOK IN WEST AFRICA

Notwithstanding the frequent loss of territory and the difficulties which thus far have attended the history and efforts of the Liberian people to establish a self-governing democracy for black men on the border of the greatest Black

⁵ Dynamic Factors in the Liberian Situation, *Journal of Race Development*, January, 1911, Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts, George W. Ellis.

Belt of the world, there is still a great future dawning before the nation. Like other portions of West Africa, Liberia is rich in the wealth and wonder of mine, field and forest.

By the terms of an international agreement between the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany Liberian sovereignty has been preserved, and with her territorial limits defined the Republic now enters upon an era of industrial and political progress which will make the Liberian ideal an ever increasing factor in West African development.⁶

While Liberia settles down to her high mission, West Africa continues in beneficial changes in the policy of the colonial governments toward the Native races. More and more the truth is gaining ground that Africa is the black man's land and that he is entitled to an increasing participation in the government of himself and his country. More and more Native institutions are being respected, and instead of trying to make a European out of an African in Africa, more attention is given to the development of the Native along his own lines and institutions, for a high and glorious destiny in his tropical environments.

When Dr. Blyden, one of the best informed if not the greatest authority on West Africa, was retiring from the Directorship of Mohamman Education in Sierra Leone, January 24, 1907, he described the net results of European control upon the African under the old and new régimés and then added:

“Africa may congratulate herself, thank God, and take courage.”⁷

Aside from the many authoritative works which in recent years have poured a torrent of compelling facts upon the European world concerning the true condition and value of the African and his continent, in *The Making of Northern Nigeria*, and *Nigeria: Its Peoples and its Problems*, Capt. C. W. J. Orr, R.A., and Editor E. D. Morel have made two

⁶ Political Importance of the International Loan in Liberia, *Journal of Race Development*, July, 1912, Clark University, Worcester, Mass., George W. Ellis.

⁷ *Journal of the African Society*, No. 43, Vol. 11, p. 364, April, 1912.

more very valuable contributions to the serious discussion of African problems and peoples.⁸

With a wealth of facts these two writers, though from different points of view, are most convincing witnesses in a remarkable field for the industry and service of the Natives and for those later policies which preserve the Africans from demoralization and decay. With such splendid and able administrators as M. Du Ponty, governor general of French West Africa, and with the announcement that Sir Frederick Lugard was returned to West Africa to amalgamate the two Nigerias as the governor of both Northern and Southern Nigeria, West African colonial policies, in the two greatest West African fields, were most hopefully turned before the war toward the dawn of a better day for the African and for those who had assumed control of these affairs.

LIBERIA THREATENED BY THE WAR

Notwithstanding the growing new attitude of Europeans toward the government and development of West Africans in the interest of the African races, and the influence of such a social and political environment upon the ultimate mission and destiny of Liberia, yet, at the very beginning of the war the Liberian domain was seriously threatened to be divided between Great Britain and France, neighbors on the north, east and south.

It was contended by Great Britain and France that Liberia had permitted Germany to use Liberian territory as a base of operation and for this reason the state should be overthrown and its domain and peoples divided, as early as December, 1914, according to La Marquise de Fontenoy.

In an editorial on "Liberia and the Philippines," December 25, 1914, the *Chicago Tribune* substantially committed the United States to this program of Anglo-French absorption of Liberia.⁹

⁸ The making of Northern Nigeria, Capt. C. W. J. Orr, R.A. Macmillan & Co., London.

Nigeria: Its Peoples and its Problems, E. D. Marel, Smith, Elder & Co., London.

⁹ Economic and Political Factors in Liberian Development, *Journal of Race Development*, 1915, George W. Ellis.

That the situation was actually critical for Liberia and important to the people of the United States is further described by Dr. Frederick Starr, of the University of Chicago, in his address on this point at McCormick Theological Seminary, February 12, 1915, soon after the announcement of the Marquise and the editorial of the *Tribune*.¹⁰

That Dr. Starr did not overstate the gravity of the situation is further emphasized by the facts that in 1885 Great Britain concluded the taking of Liberian northwest territory from Shebro to the Mano River. To even up with Great Britain France in 1892 forced from Liberia the Ivory Coast territory from San Pedro to the Cavalla River. And since, both nations at divers times were so biting off Liberian lands as to make inevitable the ultimate absorption of the Liberian Republic. In 1908 such an attempt to overthrow Liberia was about to be consummated when the government of the United States intervened upon the request of the Liberian people and undertook with England, France and Germany the refunding of Liberian international debts and the administration of Liberian customs service. In January, 1915, the American Colonization Society at Washington decided and resolved to exhaust every resource and power, not only to save the independence of Liberia, but to regain the lands wrested from the republic through either force, fraud or duress, the title to every alternate lot or section of which lands is still owned and claimed by the American Colonization Society.¹¹

PRESENT SITUATION AND OUTLOOK

As the European war continued the United States was drawn into the contest against the triumph of autocracy. Following the example of the United States, Liberia joined the Allies, added new angles to the West African situation, and sent her sons and spent her money to save France from

¹⁰ Economic and Political Factors in Liberian Development, *Journal of Race Development*, 1915, George W. Ellis

¹¹ Sociological Appraisal of Liberian Resources, *Journal of Race Development*, 1915, George W. Ellis.

the complete destruction of the Hun and to help to preserve civilization for the safety and freedom of the world.

One of the factors which tended toward the preservation of Liberia was the jealousy and competition of European powers, typified by the keen rivalry and aggressive activity of Germany on the West Coast. But Germany now has been eliminated from the West African situation.

While Liberia has lost the influence of German rivalry on the West African Coast, on the one hand, on the other she has gained what is much more positive and valuable: The increased friendship and good will of Great Britain and France, by joining the allied cause at a time when military fortune was adverse; and the renewed and marked interest of the United States, evidenced by the United States loan to Liberia of \$5,000,000, through the good offices of Dr. Emmett J. Scott, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, Dr. Ernest Lyon, Liberian Consul General, Dr. Robert R. Moten, Principal of Tuskegee Institute, and other prominent Americans.

Under the sway of these powers and new developments it would seem that the future of Liberia is both bright and secure.

In the thought that three-quarters of a million of Native Africans from French Africa helped to win the battle of the Marne, to stop the invading Germans at Verdun, and to save France and Great Britain from unchecked and ruthless desolation; when we remember that the Natives from West Africa by the hundreds of thousands fought and died in France and elsewhere under the British and Belgian colors for the continued sway and political dominion of European powers, it is not unreasonable to expect and demand that in the future European control will do something tangible to educate and develop the African and hasten the time when Africa shall be ruled by Africans.

The idea that the ultimate rule of the European, in its final analysis, must be for the African, must now be stressed more and more until it dominates alike those who rule in Europe and administer in Africa.

By this service to civilization and the world the African is entitled to have all the forces of modern science and education utilized to develop him along African requirements, through the gradual processes of evolution and social progress.

The Negro Africans from the United States, Haiti, the West Indies, Liberia, North, West and South Africa have demonstrated by casting their fortunes with the Allies, not only equal capacity to comprehend the great and vital aims and ends of life and civilization, but by their love and loyalty to the right, the highest test, and by their courage and blood in the greatest and most destructive of all wars, they have proven their right beyond further question to equal opportunity to develop the best in them and to enjoy beside other races the advantages and rewards, offered by the economic, social and political life of the world, to which they have made so rich and unselfish contribution.

This war has not been in vain, if the white nations have learned, even at so great a price, the natural and potential equality of all men and races, the lack of knowing which constitutes the first great and invisible cause of the war.

When this great lesson has been learned the present race troubles and conflicts will be regarded as but human problems to be solved and worked out in the historic way.

Then, the world will be safe for democracy, Liberia will be safe in West Africa, and the Negro will be safe in the United States.

Then, the dignity of an enlightened manhood for the black man in Africa through representation and self-government will be among the great functions of European colonial administration of all subject peoples and groups.

The real conflict and antagonism once existing between the principles of the Liberian State and European colonial policies in West Africa will have entirely disappeared.

Liberia will no longer be regarded as striking a discordant note in West African affairs, but will be truly appreciated as a co-worker in something like her true light,—a pioneer in the interest of humanity though black, so poetically ex-

pressed by Mr. Justice Stewart in one of the recently adopted Liberian anthems:

Liberia the gem of West Africa,
The land where the Negro is free,
From race prejudice and proscription,
We lift our hearts unto thee,
May thy life be ever and ever,
We'll work with all our might through thee
To proclaim by actual practice
Equality and fraternity.¹²

¹² Liberian Acts, 1912, page 42.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE LATIN AMERICAN

By William R. Shepherd, Professor of History, Columbia University; Honorary Professor, University of Chile

“What has the United States in common with the countries of Latin America? Very little: the incidental fact of its geographical location in the same hemisphere, and the external circumstance that it became independent at almost the same time. . . . What, then, does it offer by way of unlikeness? Nearly everything, and in terms so disparate that they are but little less than diametrically the opposite of one another. Details and secondary matters apart, the contrasts, in which those countries never hold the place of vantage, are the following: populousness and uninhabitedness; wealth and misery; deeds and words; activity and atrophy; education and inculture; industry and politicalism; commerce and militarism; order and impulsiveness; legality and defiance of law; free will and arbitrariness; morality and egotism; truth and falsehood; principles and men; railways and mules; civilization and stagnation and even barbarism; liberty and slavery,” etc.

These are the words of an Argentine sociologist in a recent work¹ that elaborates on the theme until it covers upwards of 650 pages. So utterly dissimilar are the United States and its southern neighbors that, in his judgment, until education in the Anglo-Saxon sense has been made to permeate the Latin-American republics, “Pan-Americanism” will remain merely an expression, a concept void of real significance.²

An excursion into the realm of the cardinal points of difference between this country and its fellow nations in the

¹ Alfredo Colmo, *Los países de la América latina*, 8-9. Madrid, 1915.

² *Ibid.*, 651.

New World, which serve to render "Pan-Americanism" in fact and in practice as illusory as it is pleasing in theory and sentiment, might reveal many a sober verity to those who dream and talk and write about this particular sort of international solidarity—unless, of course, they believe that the principle that unlikes attract will prove omnipotent for overcoming divergence. Numerous are the angles of vision from which the points might be examined; but if any one of them can be singled out to special advantage, it would be the psychology of the Latin American, his way of looking at things, as contrasted with our own.

Although the topic affords a ready temptation to explain why the Latin American views matters so dissimilarly from ourselves, and how the divergence may be adjusted sufficiently to assure the virtual approximation of ideas, sympathies and interests requisite for international understanding and coöperation, it will be employed here with the sole object of setting forth what are possibly the most conspicuous of his traits that do not square with ours. Remembering that the allusion throughout is to the general and not to the exceptional, to the characteristic and not to the individual, one may discuss the situation frankly and without the remotest intention of assuming either a captious or a pharisaical attitude toward conditions with which we—as a people—are unfamiliar in our ordinary dealings. On the contrary, a spirit of genuine friendliness would suggest that the differences be indicated, in order that, once known and appreciated by us, they may be borne in mind when working upon some plan for an effective realization of what "Pan-Americanism" is presumed to represent. Even if criticism or condemnation seems implicit in treating the subject, an expression of either of them belongs properly to Latin-American writers,³ who have surveyed the conditions prevalent in their countries, and would come with poor grace

³ E.g., in addition to Colmo: J. Abasolo N., *La personalidad política y la América del porvenir*; A. Arguédas, *Pueblo enfermo—Contribución a la psicología de los pueblos hispano-americanos*; M. Bomfim, *A. América latina*; C. O. Bunge, *Nuestra América*; F. García Calderón, *La creación de un continente and Latin America, its rise and progress*; S. Mendieta, *La enfermedad*

from a foreigner. Their opinions, indeed, are the chief source of the statements that follow. In the light of his personal relations with our southern neighbors and acquaintance with them in their home-lands, the present writer is loth to admit the absolute truth of the characterization. Allowance must be made for the evidence it contains of certain of the very qualities to be mentioned; and yet, Latin Americans, assuredly, know one another better than an outsider can.

The main respects, perhaps, in which the psychology of the Latin American differs from our own may be summed up in the words "egoism," "impulsiveness" and "unmorality." None of these is to be taken in the sense in which we would ordinarily understand it. Defined in its relation to the Latin American, "egoism" is a disposition to regard the individual for what he is, rather than for what he can do. It is individualism conscious of self, but devoid of genuine initiative. "Impulsiveness," similarly, includes the usual concept of acting without forethought and contains another ingredient as well. This is a tendency to perform such action with a view to producing immediate effects or impressions, rather than to accomplish ultimate results. It is a blend of opportunism and arrested determination. "Unmorality," in its turn, finds inadequate representation in the dictionary rendering of "non-morality." The Latin American is not altogether an amoral person. His is a state of mind, simply, which recognizes ethical obligations in theory, but is apt to abstain from applying them.

The egoism of the Latin American commonly appears in a threefold cult: of the person, of formality and of exclusiveness. He is wont to attribute to himself an innate superiority, of which pride, vanity and arrogance are not the only, if indeed the principal, manifestations. It is the person that figures, that counts for most, the contemplation of

de Centro-América; F. Ortiz, La reconquista de América; A. Rodríguez del Busto, Peligros americanos; S. Romero, A América latina; M. Ugarte, El porvenir de la América latina; C. Zumeta, El continente enfermo; also articles in Cuba Contemporanea; La Reforma Social; Revista de Filosofía; Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras, etc.

self and the centering of all things in it. Personal honor the Latin American transmutes into a personalism of law, which makes courage for its own sake a virtue to be cultivated, regardless of conventional restraints. A martial sentiment, if not altogether an attitude of bellicosity, scornful of mere legal enactments or constitutional provisions, is the natural outcome.

Another phase of the egoism in question appears in an ultra-acute sense of personal dignity, which demands due recognition without allowance for circumstances. The story told of the Latin-American station-master is aptly illustrative. It seems that he had been telegraphed that two trains were coming in opposite directions on the same track, and had been ordered to throw the switch in time. The switch was not thrown and a frightful collision resulted. When asked why he had been so negligent, he answered: "The switchman was sick abed, and no one else was around." "Why didn't you throw the switch yourself?" "I told somebody to tell the switchman about it, and he didn't do it." "But when you knew that the switchman was ill, and you had no one else, why didn't you do it yourself, with your own hands?" "I!" was the astonished response, "I am the station-master! How should I be expected to do it? Everybody has got his dignity!"⁴ The more the story is thought over, the clearer will become its exemplification, not only of several of the characteristics already described, but of some of those bound up in the impulsiveness and unmorality of the Latin American, to be observed later.

As in olden days in Spain and Portugal, one strove to be an "hidalgo" or "fidalgo" (literally, a "son of something"), so the Latin American wants to be the head of something, or at least to make sure that his name shall be mentioned prominently in connection with a given undertaking. This striving for place and position is shown in his eagerness for office-holding, which amounts to a sort of mania or malady—"office-holderitis," so to speak. In consequence, he has not learned three maxims. These are: how to be a good loser

⁴ Bunge, *Nuestra América*, 220-221.

at elections; how to be happy without a public office, and how not to regard a public office as a private sinecure. If, therefore, he does enter into any arrangement with his fellows for common action, it is with the object primarily of enhancing his personal influence and prestige. This is the well-spring of the system of partisan leaders in politics and the blind adherence of their followers who call themselves after his name. Here, however, it is the egoism of the mass, ready to die for a man without thinking about the principles he is supposed to represent. Should conflict break out, the followers will wound, kill and destroy without any clear idea of the causes of the antagonism between the parties concerned.

Egoism displays itself, furthermore, in an excessive formality, in the rigor with which prescribed rules of conduct, official and social, must be observed. Artificiality is its keynote. From it proceed, not only pronounced decorum and etiquette, but a certain fixity of convention, a stiffness of propriety, a punctilious ceremoniousness, that seem incongruous in republican countries whence monarchs and courts, nobility and aristocracy, were banished a hundred years ago. The retention, also, of highly laudatory titles for officials and institutions, of tinsel uniforms for diplomats, of elaborate equipages and military escorts for presidents, and even the silken sash emblazoned with the particular country's colors and coat-of-arms which forms part of the presidential garb, on state occasions, appear inconsistent with democratic simplicity. Almost as inconsistent, also, seems the custom of wearing evening dress in the daytime for attendance on official functions.

Apart from the sartorial features of the matter, formality pervades many a procedure of government. It stiffens administrative, legislative and judicial activities, and ties them hard and fast with the tape that is red. The written document, along with the confirmatory signatures and paraphs attached thereto, constitutes its book of rules, and bureaucracy is the agent that enforces them. True to its concepts and traditions, officialdom exacts endless preliminary requirements, demands proofs and witnesses and other forms

of testimony galore, delays, postpones, tergiversates and—eventually—does something that common sense would have settled in a few minutes.

Within the social world meticulous correctness is that which gives tone, insures propriety and forbids deviation. The “*día de moda*,” or “fashionable day” is a sort of calendar-code. According to its prescriptions of date, places of amusement are to be visited or other social functions performed. Not to heed the calendar, and thus to do all this on the wrong day, is altogether unbecoming. Nor would an account of who were there, or what had occurred on such occasions, be either complete, befitting or credible, unless photographs thereof were taken and descriptions made of the clothing worn, for subsequent publication.

So buckram-like is this conventionalism of social conduct, that it renders adaptability to any special condition that may arise virtually impossible. It would be an exaggeration, doubtless, to assert, that, whereas the American knows how to be serious and dignified at the right time, the Latin American apparently is prone to select the wrong time. An example of this misplacement, at all events, is the way in which he views the association of older people and children, notably in public. Instead of entering with zest and real enjoyment into the sports and games of the young folk, he stands aloof. To participate would not comport with his estimate of the proper relationship that other people ought to see existing between youth and its elders. An American at a picnic would have a good time; a Latin American would be bored. Even at a banquet, or other more or less festive meal, when the moment for speech-making comes, the joviality that preceded must yield to an appropriate seriousness; for the flow of oratory to follow brooks no joking. A foreigner may tell amusing stories that will be endured and rewarded with laughter—more, perhaps, than they merit—but the Latin American perforce must color his remarks with eloquence alone.

Yet another aspect of egoism calls for mention. This is the spirit of exclusiveness that makes real coöperation extremely difficult, if not impossible. Resident foreigners

will form associations for gymnastics, sport, education or some kind of mutual aid. The Latin American flocks by himself. He has clubs, of course, and goes frequently to them; but it is not companionship that he seeks there, so much as it is the satisfaction of his craving for the self-excitement that will come from gambling. Conversation, reading, a bit of athletic exercise, participation in a game of skill rather than of chance, offers scant attraction to him, even if the requisite persons or apparatus happen to be available.

Rendered intensely partisan by his personal centripetence, and correspondingly jealous and distrustful of potential rivals, the Latin American balks at the thought of coöperation. On the other hand, such a thing as good-natured competition for the attainment of a common welfare is equally alien to his mentality. Association with others, he fears, might afford some advantage to a rival; and a contest with them, carried on in the best of humor and with the utmost friendliness, for the accomplishment of an object not directly beneficial to himself, would shock his sense of the eternal fitness of matters personal.

Rather than join his fellows in any project of mutual action, he prefers to belittle what they do. Criticism that always destroys and never constructs is his forte. What other folk say or write or do, he must attenuate: otherwise he might seem to be giving aid, thus elevating them and depressing him. Instead of encouraging their aspirations, he must oppose and nullify them. On the theory, perhaps, that association produces harmony, and hence a chance for all to rise—whereas apartness brings discord, and hence a chance for all to fall, except himself—he elects the latter course. It may fill him with a sense of vindictive pleasure if they go down, but not of forgiving happiness if they go up. So rooted is this inclination to belittle, that it creates a paradox. Let a Latin American visit New York, and he will be hypercritical of everything American. Once he returns to his own country, he disparages it just as heartily in comparison with all things American!

Fair play, therefore, respect for the opinions of others, the tolerance that means willingness to allow for a divergence in details that makes for unity in essentials, the Latin American is indisposed to admit or practice. Altruism, being the opposite of egoism, has no place in the sun of his approval. Regard for the rights of others might signify disregard for his own.

The net result of all this is that the Latin American suffers from a lack of real social solidarity. His "pronouncements," or appeals to self-interest over against organized society at large, and the absence of cohesiveness in his political parties, show it. The fact that he has no appreciation at home of the kind of private philanthropy that endows scientific, educational or humanitarian establishments or enterprises, makes it quite as plain. These are so many undertakings for the general good during this life, and convey no advantage to a particular individual. Hence, if the Latin American has any money to bequeath to an institution or society, he provides for himself again—eschatologically at least—by leaving it to the church. Patriotic in a sense he is, and yet he is not possessed of a genuine civic consciousness, of that sort of singlehearted devotion to country and community which subordinates the advancement of self to the welfare of the people as a body and of the nation as a whole.

Among the characteristics of the psychology of the Latin American which spring from impulse, one is hypersensitiveness. Quick in passions and bitter in enmity, he is easily offended or insulted. He is disposed to make a fetich of the melodramatic features of life, and to cherish prepossessions of medieval notions of heroism. Though his vivacity of temperament may incline him to look lightly upon serious things, he lacks a sense of irony. Excitable, irritable, he does not possess that saving grace of humor which smoothes a situation over. Satire, when he employs it, is apt to assume an aggressively personal form. Rather than seek out the causes of misunderstanding and remove them by a "heart-to-heart talk," by explanation, compromise or apology, he resorts to the "weapons of a gentleman"—to duel-

ling. Single combat alone will furnish the requisite atonement or reparation for an injury, real or fancied. To forget and forgive might be construed as cowardice.

These traits the Latin American carries over into the arena of political discussion. In public gatherings he is wont to ventilate pet theories and expatiate upon personal grievances until temperaments naturally mercurial overflow, and national susceptibilities have been ruffled sufficiently to emit sparks of fury. Unacquainted with the precise standing of his country in the world at large, and imperfectly informed about its actual relation to its immediate neighbors, or unwilling to recognize either of these circumstances, he converts patriotism only too readily into jingoism—"patriotismo" into "patriotería." Restless, nervous, suspicious, morbidly sensitive, untrained in habits of forbearance and self-restraint, he does not wish to hear the truth, however kindly, honestly and tactfully conveyed. Much less is he disposed to appreciate or profit by it. To him it is nothing other than outrageously malevolent criticism, which conceals either a sinister design to inflict material injury, or else a deliberate intention to insult.

Such a state of mind would seem to render an absolutely free and frank discussion of international affairs, as related to Latin America, and particularly as they may happen to bear upon the attitude of one country toward another, practically impossible, and a really fair solution of a specific problem, out of the question. Should anyone who, like the popular definition of a professor as "a person who thinks otherwise," venture to dissent or put forth a wholly innocent remark, he is apt to be misquoted, misinterpreted and morally lynched on the spot. Then come highly metaphorical and pyrotechnical harangues, perfervid displays of ardor, shouting of "vivas" ("hurrahs for") and "muera" ("down withs"), occasionally followed by the finishing touch of a direct insult to the flag or coat-of-arms of the foreign nation whose alleged misbehavior is under consideration—all this in time of actual peace. The result may be the precipitation of an armed conflict without anything like an adequate reason for it.

Even in the literary feature of political polemics the Latin American is prone to regard the productions of partisan pens—provided, of course, that they favor his side—as altogether infallible, and resents intimations to the contrary. Somewhat inconsistent, perhaps, with his disposition to belittle the achievements of others, he holds that the assertions such works contain are utterly beyond the shafts of criticism. To him they are “indiscutable,” a species of law and gospel unsusceptible of contradiction either by an adversary at home or by a dissenter abroad.

Another phase of the Latin American’s impulsiveness is presented by his verbosity. At home, on the street, in business and in the halls of congress, talkativeness reigns wellnigh supreme. Speech-making on every occasion and on slight provocation is the order of the day. If the speech can be, as it usually is, read, so much the better, because its length is thereby assured, and not only its length, but its potentiality for digression. The latter displays itself, either in an anxiety lest everything be not included, or in the faculty that Latin Americans call so expressively “mariposear,” i.e., to flit about like a butterfly from topic to topic, without ever settling long upon, or sinking deeply into, any particular theme. This mode of treatment may apply to the entire subject or to its component parts. If he happens to know the subject too well, rather than well enough, the speaker will bring out so insistently one detail after another that he fails to see the woods for the trees. In either case, extensiveness, and not intensiveness, is the object sought. The net result, however, would seem to reveal an abundance of words in the place of ideas, and an inclination to mistake talking a great deal for talking well and to the point. It is not an illustration of the art of concealing one’s thoughts by conversation so much, as of drowning reason in billows of emotion and imagination.

Eloquent the Latin American is, but his eloquence often takes the form of an efflorescent rhetoric, of a lavishness of flowery verbiage which is likely to mark an absence of originality. Both his oratory and his literature appear to lack genuine spontaneity, naturalness, simplicity, directness.

They reflect more sentimentality than sentiment. Thought is hidden, or the poverty of it excused, amid linguistic extravagance and exaggeration, and real creativeness is missing.

Closely akin to these aspects of the matter is the aptitude of the Latin American for verbal manipulation. Whether he makes speeches or writes books, he delights in versatility of expression. So as to insure that what he has to say shall be thoroughly representative of what other distinguished people have written and said, he ransacks dictionaries, lexicons, grammars and collections of synonyms for all sorts of choice or exotic words, phrases, archaisms and neologisms. If he cannot find just what he wants to reproduce, he will improvise it. To the same end, he will quote also from languages and authors, dead and living, anything imposing in the shape of classical terms, aphorisms, conventional utterances and the like; and, if desirable, will eke them out by reciting a list of more or less eminent names, drawn from as wide a geographical and chronological area as possible. The greater the range of the selection and the more redundant the expression, the more cogent, presumably, the effect produced, regardless of the pedantry that so much of it implies.

If inclined to juggle with words and phrases, the Latin American is no less disposed to indulge in agile theorizing, rather than quick thinking. He jumps easily to conclusions and proffers hasty generalizations. When troubles arise he has a ready-made panacea for them, and wants to administer it at once. He knows that something ought to be done, and believes that he knows how it ought to be done, even if he does not know how to do it. The improvidence, moreover, which he shows in his disinclination to save money or time, is matched by the lack of foresight and precision which leads him to talk about the ends without discussing the means. Hence, while the talk goes on, the particular thing that calls for action may languish, or else be done in such a hurry that it must speedily be undone and started all over again. Not infrequently it dies while the doctors are still prescribing.

Instead of slowly, patiently, industriously, systematically, examining in advance the practicability of a given measure, and studying its probable results, the Latin American wants to have his own particular nostrum tried out on the spot. Failing this, he will urge that what he has read in books on the subject, or has heard that other countries have done, be adopted forthwith. Whether the lore of the printed word or the local experience of another people is really adaptable to the environment of his own land, has little significance for him. If anything has succeeded elsewhere, it must succeed in his country too.

The Latin American, therefore, craves innovation, and is prone to confound experiment with achievement. Not the durability that affords a chance for something to mature and become really systematic, but the changeability that insures a plenitude of projects and a poverty of accomplished facts, seems to be his goal. If, under such circumstances, his constitutions are apt to be so much paper, instead of the fundamentals of government in application, his institutions are quite as likely to be so many scaffoldings, within which no solid edifice has been reared.

On a par with all this is the quixotism of the Latin American—the absence of that sober second-thought which restrains one from “flying off the handle.” To attempt the impossible, to ignore the disproportion between what one pretends to do and what one can do, seems alluring to him. It is not the realization of a practical, though extremely difficult, enterprise at which he aims, but an attainment of the impracticable and visionary.

Since impulsiveness drives one forward too suddenly, the effort it entails is as quickly exhausted, and indifference, if not positive inertia, is likely to ensue. The eager enthusiasm with which the Latin American starts off on something wears off all too soon. He will form societies, associations, leagues, institutes and what not, and formulate the needful resolutions; but once the names and portraits of the organizers have been published, and the indispensable, though laborious and obscure, committee work starts, the “big men” lose interest and the small men likewise until the whole

affair drops into the limbo of the forgotten. Indisposed, it would seem, to long, hard, regular and continuous toil, the Latin American then falls back upon the government to do what ought to have been done by private initiative.

A moral consciousness, finally, a feeling of personal responsibility, a clear-cut sense of distinction in practice between the right and the wrong of things, rather than between the correct and incorrect, a vigorously concrete appreciation of the qualities most essential to the daily task of social and individual improvement, seem lacking somehow in the Latin American. Tenacity of purpose, an indomitable will-power, directness, incisiveness and precision in statement and accomplishment, and the force of character which finds its great expression in conscientiousness, appear either insufficiently developed or almost non-existent, on the ethical side of his psychology. The moral sense as such is apt to assume an artistic or aesthetic form. The Latin American will look preferentially for the easiest and prettiest road to a given end, and not so much for the most effective one.

There is something about his psychology, moreover, which savors of a cult of externals. One form of it is an outward regard for what one inwardly must disbelieve. It appears in the guise of the fulsome compliment, in the assurance that if one admires anything, it is "at his disposal," and in the dilatoriness of "mañana"—the inclination to postpone the performance of anything, either for no particular reason, or because a promise already made to do something at a certain time involves a sort of courteous obligation periodically to defer its fulfilment by a resort to excuses. In the same category belong the fondness for display, the excessive lavishness in expenditure which is its accompaniment, and the passion for diversion and entertainment which gives point to the saying that a "Latin American dearly loves a 'fiesta.'"

Another form of this cult of externals is the discrepancy that seems to exist between what has been assimilated by imitation and the spirit that ought to animate it. Humanity the world over, of course, is prone to show the best and hide the worst: the Latin American, however, to exhibit,

not the eminently characteristic, but the evidence of patterning after other people. For this reason the foreign visitor will have pointed out to him those phases of orderly civilized life which elsewhere are taken for granted, and not what he would like to observe, namely, the things that are really distinctive.

More serious manifestations of the unmorality under consideration reveal themselves in the disposition of the Latin American to condone misbehavior. Too frequently will he look upon an individual who has done something wrong as a "desgraciado," a poor fellow, simply, who has committed an offence and who, because of his bad luck in being found out, deserves a measure of commiseration. The Latin American, furthermore, will lament eloquently a given evil after it has been discovered, but fail to take the practical steps necessary to abolish it. Instead, he prefers to "investigate." If he holds a position and learns of the perpetration of some act hurtful to the welfare of the establishment, he is apt to keep silent about it, and if one of his associates, more courageous than himself, exposes the wrongdoing, he will decline to lend him support. Self-respect, thus, would appear to be, not a matter of moral interest, on behalf either of the community or of one's own inner consciousness of rectitude, but rather something related to personal dignity. An example of the same attitude is visible along official lines, in the disinclination adequately to protect foreign patents, trademarks and copyright, the apparent excuse being that, since the foreigners concerned belong to countries more advanced, they ought to be willing to allow their less fortunate fellows in other lands to benefit by their knowledge and experience. Under such circumstances reproduction might well be considered a suitable form of appreciation, and this, together with the consciousness of virtue as its own reward, an ample compensation.

All the foregoing is designed to present certain cardinal points of difference between the psychology of the Latin American and our own. For their statement no claim of exhaustiveness or infallibility is advanced—nothing more in fact than an honest effort to indicate them as objectively and

dispassionately as the personal sentiment of the writer predisposes and the nature of the sources will allow. Error and injustice are bound to lurk in generalization, and the likelihood of their appearance here must be freely admitted. Whether the several traits constitute actual faults, whether the Latin American has an abundance of virtues to offset them, whether we ourselves have as many, or more, defects of another order, are matters quite irrelevant to the purpose in mind. It is not a question of superiority or inferiority on his part or on ours, but merely one of difference. If, therefore, a friendly and tolerant spirit is evinced by both the Latin Americans and ourselves toward the aspects of our mutual divergence, and if both of us refrain from wounding the sensibilities which such divergence engenders, respecting them instead, the clearer will become the prospects for that genuine, hearty, wholesome understanding and coöperation among the nations of the New World, which will make "Pan-Americanism" a reality.

PHILIPPINE OBSERVATIONS

By Rev. Gilbert Reid, D.D., of Shanghai, China

For many years, during my residence in China, I have desired to visit the Philippine Islands, that I might study the American administration, and form an opinion as to the capability of the Filipino people to govern themselves and form a new and independent Philippine republic. This desire was met at the end of last year. My five months stay in the islands allowed me to gain knowledge of events, conditions and people from a viewpoint different from that of others.

I approached the study of the Philippines from a Chinese angle. First of all I came in contact with the Chinese in Manila. I was asked to give several lectures before different Chinese clubs and the students and faculty of a Chinese school in Manila. Outside of Manila I visited thirteen places on different islands, where I was entertained by the Chinese at their clubs or private homes and where meetings were arranged for me to address. In this respect I had the advantage over other sightseers, globe-trotters and investigation commissions.

The Chinese form a small part of the population of the Philippines, though more than the number of other nationals, as American, Spanish, British, German or Japanese. And yet four-fifths of the trade is in Chinese hands. Many of these merchants came in days of Spanish occupation, and are now more familiar with the Spanish language than with English or American. Most of the small shops in the little villages or barrios are kept by Chinese rather than Filipinos. Much of the large business of the large cities is also managed by Chinese. Next come the British and then the Americans. The Chinese business man there as everywhere has a good reputation for industry, thrift and trustworthiness.

No provision is made for the full-grown Chinese to become naturalized. This is on the basis of American legislation. When Filipinos get a country of their own, these laws will probably be changed. Chinese laborers and farmers are not allowed in the Philippines, though every ship coming from Japan at present carries scores of Japanese laborers. The Philippine legislators are expected to pass a law this autumn allowing Chinese labor, and they expect that if the law is passed by Filipinos, it will be granted by the United States Congress. Chinese labor is needed, if for no other reason that it may counterbalance Japanese labor.

My first and quite natural interest, while in the Philippines, was in the Chinese, who reciprocated every kindness shown and sympathized with every trial endured for the good of their own country. Through them, in different places which I visited, a friendly approach was found to the hearts and homes, the struggles and hopes, of the original Philippine inhabitants, the rightful possessors of the soil.

In general, the Filipinos divide themselves into two classes, Christian Filipinos and non-Christian or pagan Filipinos. The former class is the larger and is becoming the ruling element in the country. Both classes are of Malay stock, having come from the Malay peninsula. Those who were Christianized under Spanish rule by the Catholic missionaries were later immigrants from the main land and had already been elevated by the high civilization of India and Cambodia, of China and the faith of Buddha.

During my five months in the Philippines I met men of both houses of the legislature, judges of the insular courts, governors of the provinces and officers of the constabulary. The men I met were the personification of courtesy, as are the Filipinos taken as a whole. The first impression of the Filipinos is always an agreeable one. They may lack the energy of the Chinese, but they have their own traits of character.

While my main contact in the Philippines was with the Chinese and Filipinos, I also had the chance to meet persons of other nationalities. Of these the chief were Americans.

The Americans I met were in the government civil service, in the army and navy, in the constabulary, on plantations, in education, in business and missions. As I mingled among Americans I found most of them were not altogether pleased at the way things are being run in the islands. Resignations were being presented all the time to different parts of the government. The dissatisfaction came from the rapid way in which Filipinos are superseding Americans in the government.

Wherever I went in the islands I was impressed with the remarkable skill and good sense, efficiency and generosity of American rule in the Philippines, unsurpassed by any other colonizing nation. There have been cases of cruel treatment of the natives, of unjust decisions, of immoral conduct, but the exceptions can not destroy the general record of honor and faithfulness.

I met prosperous Americans on hemp, cocoanut and sugar plantations. The hemp planters have their biggest rivals in the Japanese.

As to the Japanese I must testify to their energy, far-sightedness and innate sense of politeness. Around the Davao Gulf on the eastern side of Mindinao Island, they have bought up within the last few years as many as seventy hemp plantations.

Some of the largest and oldest business houses are British. Americans have more shops, but not as many large wholesale firms. British influence is still strong among the Filipinos. When Americans began to colonize, the British resident on the islands was rather supercilious, but today he is compelled to bow to American worth.

Another old firm is Dutch, whose former head joined a Netherlands committee of my institute when I was in Rotterdam in 1898.

Naturally there are many Spanish, or persons of Spanish extraction, or Spanish who have become American citizens. They are in trade, in education, in religious work, on plantations, and in literary employments. They form a desirable element in the community. Those whom I met were charming and cultured.

In my tour of the islands, I also made a study of the religious work done by Roman Catholics and Protestants.

Protestant clergy have been in the Philippines only since the American occupation, a short period of only some twenty years. Protestant Christians have had the advantage of teaching a people already taught the main dogmas of Christianity by Roman Catholic Christians.

The progress made is surprising. Owing to the presence of American authorities, no opposition could lead to acts of persecution. The Philippine Islands have received from our American institutions the great benefit of religious liberty, as great a boon as that of general education or sanitary regulation.

Fortunately the Protestant missionaries have all come from one country; they are all Americans, or at least connected with American organizations.

Good missionary comity has been followed by Protestants; the work of one denomination does not overlap that of another. The islands are pretty well divided among Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, Congregationalists (American Board), United Brethren, the Disciples (Campbellites), and in one city a family of the Christian and Missionary Alliance. Most of these bodies have united in one common organization for the Philippines, called Iglesia Evangelical Union. The Y. M. C. A. in Manila is also of this union kind in religion, but not in race. I have not mentioned the work of the American Episcopal Church, or as it is called in all the Far East, the American Church, for its policy has been different from that of other sects. Its distinguished bishop has been Bishop Brent, lately transferred to the diocese of Buffalo. He has not favored work among Roman Catholics or any form of proselyting.

Its work is among non-Christians—among the mountain tribes called Igorots and Negritos in the Island of Luzon, and the Moros (or Moslems), in the Islands of Mindinao and Jolo. Even the work among Moros is not yet of the proselyting kind.

I visited Silliman Institute in one of the southern Islands, called Negros. This institute or college was started by a

gift of Dr. Horace B. Silliman of Cohoes and for many years a trustee of Hamilton College. Twenty-four years ago I had urged him to help me to start an institute in China, as a light in all the Far East. He became so imbued with the idea that he started the institute in the Philippine Islands. The school was meant to be an industrial one, but at present, while giving instruction in industrial pursuits and in farming, it affords a complete training for entrance to the University of the Philippines. There are upwards of 800 students, some forty of whom are Chinese.

I made a study of Catholic work first in Manila and then in the provincial towns. I met the archbishop, an Irish-American, who had previously been a bishop in the island of Mindinao; also the superior of the Dominican order, the wealthiest of all the orders in the Philippines. I also met the Paulist Brothers, Spanish, who are the leaders of the educational work for training to the priesthood.

In Manila the chief feature of the work of the Roman Catholic Church, besides that of worship as indicated in the number of large churches, is educational. The Jesuits are at the head of the Manila Observatory, as they are of the Observatory in Shanghai, China. Through the meteorological observations those who travel by sea along the Asiatic coast are warned of coming storms.

The Jesuits also started one of the earliest colleges of Western learning in all the Far East, that of the College of San José, licensed in 1601 and made a "royal" college of Spain in 1722. The Jesuits were expelled from the Philippines in 1768 and allowed to return in 1859. The college became a branch of the University of Santo Tomas, named after Thomas Aquinas and frequently spoken of as the University of Manila, and distinguished from the University of the Philippines, established by the American government.

This Catholic university is under the Dominican order and was established in 1611. It comprises faculties of theology, canon law, civil law, philosophy and belles lettres, civil engineering and architecture, medicine, pharmacy and dentistry. It has a large hospital, and the best museum of natural history found in the Far East.

The Jesuits on their return to the Philippines started the Ateneo Municipal de Manila, a school of secondary instruction. The Dominicans have also a school of secondary instruction called San Juan de Letran, started in 1640. It has one of the finest school buildings in the islands.

Prior to American rule the Spanish government and the Catholic Church started two normal schools, one for male teachers and the other for female. The former was started in 1865 and was in charge of the Jesuits. The latter was started in 1868 (at Nueva Caceres) and was in charge of the Sisters of Charity. Another normal school for young ladies was started in Manila in 1892 and is in the charge of the Augustinian nuns of the Assumption.

The Catholic Church has many seminars for religious instruction, both in Manila and the provinces.

In many ways the work of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines has progressed since American occupation, and the presence of a competitive Protestant organization.

In place of Spanish priests there are now many priests from other countries, especially from the United States. This interest taken by Catholics of this country in the church work carried on in the countries of Asia is something new. It reacts on the home churches in a stimulating manner.

In the old days of Spanish rule the regular clergy connected with the orders, and generally called friars, outnumbered the secular clergy. The friars, moreover, obeyed the heads of the great monastic orders, rather than the bishops. At present the commands of bishop and of father superior seldom conflict. At the time of American occupation two-thirds of the friars left the islands, but since then many have returned or others connected with the orders in other countries have taken their place. There are today more Filipino priests, not friars, than under Spanish rule.

The orders were great land owners, and the purchase of friar lands (410,000 acres) became one of the most delicate of American tasks. Some estates were left to the orders. The chief land possessing orders have been the Dominicans, Augustinians and Recolletos, a branch of Augustinians.

The Franciscans by their rules cannot own land. Besides these four orders there are today four other orders, Jesuits, Capuchins, Benedictans and Paulists, a branch of the Lazarist order, named from Saint Vincent de Paul.

There are nine dioceses in the islands, three being established in 1910. Most of the bishops are Americans.

Outside of the non-Christian or Moslem tribes the whole population is Christian, and of these nearly all are Roman Catholics.

Since American victory over Spain, the larger educational work in the Philippines has been carried on by the United States government and the Filipino insular government. This work deserves special consideration.

There has first been a contrast between the American and the Spanish systems of education among conquered peoples. With the Spanish the system of education was religious as much as it was secular; there was a union of church and state. The American system of education introduced among the peoples of the Philippines has been the public school system existing in most of the states of the Union. It has been secular, not religious; church and state are separated.

How completely separated is governmental education in the Philippines from everything pertaining to religion is seen in the following law:

No teacher or other person shall teach or criticise the doctrines of any church, religious sect or denomination, or shall attempt to influence the pupils for or against any church or religious sect in any public school established under this act. If any teacher shall intentionally violate this section, he or she shall, after due hearing, be dismissed from public service.

This law seemed necessary to the men at Washington in the War Department or a clash at the very beginning would have taken place with the Church of Rome, unless all the teachers had been Roman Catholics able to teach the doctrines of their church. This alternative would have offended the Protestant element in this country more than the secularity of the public school system.

The American school system introduced into the Philippines has been democratic in kind, while the Spanish or Roman Catholic system in the old days was aristocratic. Americans have aimed at general education as the basis of a democratic system of government; the Spanish sought only for the select training of the choice few, as fitting to an aristocratic system of government. In Spanish days there was no middle class, but a few aristocratic families, Spanish, *Mestizos*, or Filipino, all nicely educated, polished, polite and dominating, and the many poorer illiterate subservient to their masters.

The American idea is contrary to the grain of most peoples who are cultured, in all lands, and especially in their colonizing attempts. Americans have been the first to democratize colonial and subject races. All other nations, Spanish, British, French, Dutch, German, have been slow to educate the masses and so give them a place in self-government. A man who is better off than others rather likes to stay so. Thus Lord Milner writing of education in Egypt, once said:

Egypt has yet to create a native professional class (it was then alien, not native). She has yet to educate the men who are destined to fill the government service. When these urgent needs have been supplied, it will be time enough to think of general public instruction.

It seems to me that the struggle everywhere is not so much between democracy and autocracy as between democracy and aristocracy. The aristocrats are always more than the autocrats. It is this larger number in every country that stands in the way of general education or the uplift of the masses.

A third distinction between Spanish and American education in the Philippines is in the use of languages. The Spanish taught the Spanish language; Americans have taught the English, or, more exactly, the American language. Moreover, Americans in occupying the Philippines compelled the subject Filipinos to learn and use the language of the conquerors, the language of the schools already existing was Spanish. This was to give place to American books

and American talk. But this is the rule everywhere, only the Filipinos have for some reason clung to the Spanish language. More grown-up Chinese in the islands speak Spanish than English. When I was in the Philippines early this year a bill was presented in the Legislature to require Spanish in the public schools. This was amended so as to make it an elective study.

Charles B. Elliott says:

The opposition to the English language has always been much more active than is popularly supposed, and under strong pressure the time when it should become the official language of the courts was extended until 1912. The proceedings (in the Assembly) have always been in Spanish, and the elaborate *Diario de Sesiones*, which corresponds to the *Congressional Record*, is printed in the Spanish language. One result of the creation of the new legislature under the 1916 law, with a membership solely Filipino, will be that the laws will be Spanish in form and substance as well as language, and that the English language will be ignored by the legislative department of the government.

Mr. Elliott points out that when Americans first took rule in the Philippines not more than 10 per cent of the inhabitants were able to speak and write Spanish; also, no vernacular language was sufficiently current. Thus "the adoption of English as the medium of instruction in the schools met with general approval," and then in a footnote he adds: "The future of the English language in the Philippines is still uncertain."

During my first days in Manila I was conducted through the great University of the Philippines by one of the American professors still remaining on the faculty of the university. Here I saw no ancient seat of learning gradually developing through the centuries, as are the Catholic institutions. The University of the Philippines is only eight years old. Nothing like it is found anywhere in the world. This great government hall of learning is a marvel of American energy and enterprise, vivified by a spirit of generosity also unparalleled in colonizing undertakings. This university had its beginnings in 1911. It is the proud peak of the hill of learning. It has separate courses or colleges of liberal arts, engineering, medicine and surgery, dentistry, veterinary

science, pharmacy, fine arts, education, law, agriculture and forestry.

The College of Medicine and Surgery (started before the university) needs to keep a larger body of experts than the other departments of the university. The experts are to be versed in tropical diseases. It is likely that American experts will now turn to China to be connected with the four medical colleges of the Rockefeller Foundation.

Connected with this medical training is the Philippine General Hospital, whose physicians are now all Filipinos, and with this hospital there is conducted a Philippine nurses' training school, directly under the supervision of the public service, an important branch of the government. The hospital has been erected at government expense and the nurses, over 100, are supported also by the government. The hospital buildings are of reinforced concrete, and as cold weather is unknown, the patients have plenty of fresh air and do not fear a bath.

Charles B. Elliott says:

The Filipino young women seem to possess in a high degree the qualities which fit them for professional nurses and they have won the unqualified approval of their instructors and the gratitude and appreciation of the patients for whom they have rendered such faithful and skillful service.

The Bureau of Science is the center of expert scientific training with suitable apparatus and laboratories.

The library is a vast collection of literature in many languages drawn from all parts of the world. One is amazed that such a collection, properly indexed, could have been brought together in so few years.

The College of Agriculture and Forestry is located at Los Banos in the region of earthquakes and volcanoes, to the south of Manila. Some Chinese students studying there conducted the Chinese consul general, his family and myself to inspect the work done. Most of the professors are Americans. More would be given instruction if the university and the government gave it better support. Through this failure several very competent men have gone elsewhere; two have entered British service in the Straits Settlements.

The work done is of supreme importance, along with the more general enlightenment given by the Bureau of Agriculture.

Other agricultural experimental stations have been started in Luzon Island, all under American management.

In Manila there is a trade school, distinct from the university, established in 1901. This is the head of industrial training in the school system of the archipelago.

In Manila there is also a fine normal school established in the same year as the trade school. This is distinct from the normal schools of the Jesuit order, started in Spanish days. Here teachers are being taught to do their work in the provincial schools.

The Philippine school system consists of primary, intermediate and secondary or high schools, beyond which is the great university of the Philippines. This system was introduced by Americans as more adaptable to American ideas of government than to more restricted system of Spanish church agents. Necessarily all the teachers at first were Americans, but of late years, and more and more so under the Wilson administration, the teachers are predominantly Filipino. Where Americans are still retained is as superintendents of schools in the provinces, and as supervising teachers in high schools.

In 1916 there were 4,400 schools, all but 350 or more being of primary grade. The number of teachers was 10,250 of whom 500 were Americans, these being in the higher grade. The number of pupils was 625,000, this out of a population of 9,000,000, and where the children of school age may be about 1,200,000.

It is in the thought, the audacity, the resolve to start such a system of schools that the United States government stands apart from all colonizing nations. The rapidity with which the work has been carried forward, as well as the suddenness in which it was begun, surprises even the American "hustler." Had it not been for this school system Filipinos would have seen only from afar the glory-dawn of national independence.

For efficiency in the school system of the Philippines, particularly in the university and for general supervision, it depends, it seems to me, on retaining the most capable of Americans. Even if the Philippines became an independent republic, there is no reason for excluding men of science and scholarship who are Americans. In fact, the more experts, the better. It may be that when the Filipinos are their own masters they may open the door to science, as to goodness, from all the world.

The great question for the peoples of the Philippine Islands, as for all peoples, is that of national independence and autonomous government. My acquaintance with these peoples, and with strangers dwelling within their doors or aliens exercising authority, is too brief to deserve much consideration.

Certainly most of the leading Filipinos have for many years desired independence, a most laudable ambition. They fought to secure it at the hands of the Spanish during Spanish rule. They again fought for it at the hands of Americans, when Spanish rule gave place to American rule. In both cases the warring Filipinos were called insurgents or insurrectos. Their war for independence has been spoken of as a reform, as a revolt, as insurrection, as revolution, as rebellion. The fighting done was not only for independence, but for democracy, to establish a Philippine republic.

When Filipinos failed in their fighting in both cases, the method pursued to secure the same end has been a political, diplomatic and peaceful one—the use of reason rather than that of force. The end has not been reached, but has been approached. Filipinos have not yet a republic or a nation of their own, but they have a large measure of self-government, of independent action, which perhaps is just as good as a professed autonomy, unless the world war is to usher in a world millenium.

American rule, which has stood in the way of Philippine aspirations for independence, has been of an evolutionary kind. First, there came the military régime from 1898 to 1901, a period of military governors. Next there came the commission government from 1901 to 1916, a period of civil

governors or governors-general. This period is divided into two parts, that down to 1907, when there was a Philippine legislature as well as a small select commission. Finally in 1916 there came two legislative bodies of Filipinos alone, a senate and a house of representatives.

In the last period the Filipino aspiration for greater autonomous government has been met, but not the aspiration for complete independence. The fact, however, that Filipinos have a legislature of their own is looked upon as the dawning glow of an independence day, and the credit has been given to the Democratic administration, which began in the United States in 1913, and in the Philippines by the selection of Francis Burton Harrison as governor-general.

The policy of the United States government in dealing with the independence of the Philippine Islands has been one of benevolence, and this just as much under Presidents McKinley, Roosevelt and Taft as under President Wilson.

The Jones bill of 1916 did not declare for Philippine independence any more clearly than had McKinley or Roosevelt, Taft or Root. Independence is still of the future.

Mr. Kalaw, in a series of articles in the *Manila Times* says:

While the act did not grant what all the Filipinos asked for it did grant the fundamental principle for which the Filipinos have struggled since Admiral Dewey's arrival—the principle of constitutional government and the recognition of their right to independence.

Mr. Taft, when governor in 1903, used this language:

Whether an autonomy or independence or quasi independence shall ultimately follow in these islands ought to depend solely upon the question, "Is it best for the Filipino people and their welfare?"

There is no doubt of the prevailing wish of Filipinos of the educated classes being that of complete independence. Perhaps I should say the wish as expressed in public. Privately I met several who felt that perhaps it would be for their welfare if they remained content with the self-government already granted and retained the paternal protection of the United States.

As to the Moros who predominate in the Department of Sulu and Mindinao, I was told that probably so far as they have any opinion at all they would prefer to remain under American control than under that of Filipinos.

The majority of Americans living in the islands think that the American government has already gone too far and that the Philippines would go to pieces or disappear if all American oversight should be removed. At the same time, many Americans who are engaged in the moral and religious uplift of the Philippines sympathize with the aspirations of Filipinos but doubt the expediency of complete independence.

The Chinese with whom I talked have of course no great admiration for American legislation as directed to Chinese both in the United States and in the Philippines, but are clever enough to see that further elimination of American control might work disaster to all interested.

As soon as Filipinos gain complete independence they must have diplomatic relations with most of the nations of the world. There will be many a diplomatic battle and perhaps even a military battle, unless wars hereafter are to be prohibited from the planet earth.

It might as well be stated that since the Japanese began to go into the Mindinao Island and buy up the rich hemp plantations around Davao and bring in one load after another of Japanese laborers, there are Filipinos as well as Americans and Chinese, who wonder what would happen if the American government withdrew and a few Japanese down there in Davao should accidentally get killed by some Moros or wild mountaineers. This does not mean that sensible Japanese plot a war with the United States in order to get possession of the Philippines, but only that the withdrawal of Americans would be a source of delight to many Japanese.

I only quote one Japanese, Dr. Nitobe, who headed an investigating commission to the Philippines in 1916. He said:

So long as the Philippines are held by the United States, Japan is not worrying much about the islands. At the same

time it would rather have the islands than not, but, so long as they are held by the United States, Japan will not go to war in the hope of thus acquiring them, holding that they are not worth the blood sacrifice that would be entailed, apart from the incidental financial expense. Nevertheless, should the United States withdraw, Japan would expect to exercise a controlling interest in the islands and should they be in danger of passing into the hands of some other power, Japan would not stand idly by.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STATE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM OF INDIA

By W. I. Chamberlain, Ph.D.

Education in India as conducted by the state is brought under review periodically through elaborate and detailed official reports issued annually in the presidencies or provinces by the directors of public instruction in those areas and quinquennially for the whole of India by the Director General of public instruction.

State education in India may be said to have commenced formally in 1854. During the Vice-royalty of Lord Curzon, which terminated somewhat unexpectedly in 1906, owing to a serious difference of policy which developed between him and Lord Kitchener, a careful study of the educational system and its results during the fifty years that had passed was made by a universities commission and by other educational agencies. As a result, the Indian Universities Act of 1904 was passed and the government issued a resolution in the same year upon Indian educational policy. This so-called resolution was published as a green book of fifty-one pages and contains a brief history of the preceding fifty years of state education and a statement of the policy determined upon for the future. Ten years later, February, 1913, the government issued another resolution on Indian educational policy which was published in 1914 in a green book of forty-seven pages. Since this statement of educational policy was made immediately before the commencement of the war, in which India has been involved from the beginning and government has naturally been preoccupied with national affairs since then, no further significant developments in educational policy have taken place.

These two resolutions of 1904 and 1913 form the basis for the following statement as to recent developments in the state educational system of India:

I

The resolution of 1904 commences with a brief historical résumé of the preceding fifty years. Education in India, in the modern sense of the word, may be said to date from the year 1854 when the Court of Directors of the East India Company in a memorable dispatch definitely accepted the systematic promotion of general education as one of the duties of the state and emphatically declared that the type of education which they desired to see extended in India was that which had for its object the diffusion of the arts and sciences, philosophy and literature of Europe, in short of European knowledge.

The acceptance of this duty was an important departure in policy. The advent of British rule found in India systems of education of great antiquity existing among both Hindus and Muhammadans, in each case closely bound up with their religious institutions. The first instinct of British rulers was to leave the traditional modes of instruction undisturbed and to continue the support which they had been accustomed to receive from Indian rulers, but the presence of the British in India brought about profound changes in the social and administrative conditions of the country and these in their turn reacted on the educational policy of government. The impulse toward reform came from two sources—the need for public servants with a knowledge of the English language, and the influence in favor both of English and of vernacular education which was answered by the missionaries in the early days of the nineteenth century. The well known minute written in 1835 by Lord Macaulay (at that time legal member of council and chairman of the committee of public instruction) marks the point at which official recognition was given to the necessity of public support for western education.

In their dispatch of 1854, the Court of Directors announced their decision that the government should actively assist in the more extended and systematic promotion of general education in India. They regarded it as a sacred duty to confer upon the natives of India those vast moral and ma-

SECONDARY EDUCATION

The growth of secondary instruction is one of the marked features in the history of education in India. The number of such schools rose during the last two decades of the previous century from 4000 to 5500 and the pupils from 214,000 to 558,000. The purely literary courses qualifying both for the university and for government employ attracted a great majority of pupils, and more practical subjects were but little in request. In the opinion of government, it appears essential to promote diversified types of secondary education corresponding with the varying needs of practical life.

UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

In founding the universities, the government of India of that day took as their model the type of institution then believed to be best suited to the educational conditions of India; namely, the examining university of London. Since then it is recognized that the best educational thought of Europe has shown an increasing tendency to realize the inevitable shortcomings of a purely examining university, and the London University itself has taken steps to enlarge the scope of its operations by assuming tutorial functions. The model, in fact, has parted with its most characteristic features and has set an example of expansion which did not fail to react upon the corresponding institutions in India. The Indian experience of fifty years proved that a system which provides merely for examining students in those subjects to which their aptitudes direct them, and does not at the same time compel them to study those subjects systematically under first-rate instruction, tends inevitably to accentuate certain characteristic defects of the Indian intellect: the development of the memory out of all proportion to the other faculties of the mind, the incapacity to observe and appreciate facts, and the taste for metaphysical and technical distinctions. Holding it to be the duty of a government which has made itself responsible for education in India to do everything in its power to correct

these shortcomings, the government came to the conclusion that certain reforms in the constitution and management of the universities were necessary and proceeded to make provision for them in the Indian Universities Act of 1904.

TECHNICAL EDUCATION

Technical education in India had hitherto been mainly directed to the higher forms of instruction required to train men for government service as engineers, mechanics, electricians, revenue officers, teachers in schools, etc. The call for fresh effort was recognized to be towards the development of Indian industries, and especially of those in which native capital can be invested. Technical instruction directed to this object must rest upon the basis of a preliminary general education of a simple and practical kind, which should be clearly distinguished from the special teaching that is based upon it, and should as a rule be imparted in schools of the ordinary type. As a step toward providing men equipped to take a leading part in the improvement of Indian industries, the government determined to give assistance in the form of scholarships to selected students to enable them to pursue courses of technical education under supervision in Europe and America. The experience which had been gained in Japan of the results of sending young men abroad for study justified the belief that the system will also be beneficial to Indian trade.

TRAINING SCHOOLS

If the teaching in secondary schools is to be raised to a higher level; if the pupils are to be cured of their tendency to rely upon learning notes and text books by heart; if, in a word, European knowledge is to be diffused by the methods proper to it, then it is most necessary that the teachers should themselves be trained in the art of teaching. The general principles upon which the government determined to see the training institutions developed were these. An adequate staff of men of ability and experience in the work of higher training. The period of training for stu-

dents to be at least two years, except in the case of graduates, for whom one year's training may suffice. The training in the theory of teaching should be closely associated with its practice and for this purpose good practising schools should be attached to each training college and the practice school should be well equipped with well trained teachers.

HOSTELS

Great importance was attached by government to the provision of hostels or boarding houses, under proper supervision, in connection with colleges and secondary schools. These institutions protect the students who live in them from the moral dangers of life in large towns; they provide common interests and create a spirit of healthy companionship. Missionary bodies have joined with alacrity in the extension of this movement. The credit for the first hostel established in India is claimed by the Madras Christian College, which still continues to add others.

ETHICS IN EDUCATION

The remark has often been made that the extension in India of an education modelled upon European principles, and, so far as government institutions are concerned, purely secular in its character, has stimulated tendencies unfavorable to discipline, and has encouraged the growth of a spirit of irreverence in the rising generation. It is the settled policy of government to abstain from interfering with the religious instruction given in the aided schools. In government institutions the instruction is, and must continue to be, exclusively secular. In such cases the remedy for the evil tendencies is to be sought, not so much in any formal methods of teaching conduct by means of moral text books, as in the influence of carefully selected and trained teachers, the maintenance of a high standard of discipline, the institution of well managed hostels, and the proper selection of text books, such as biographies, which teach by example.

LANGUAGE IN SCHOOLS

Except in certain of the larger towns, English has no place, and should have no place, in the scheme of primary education. It has never been part of the policy of government to substitute the English language for the vernacular dialects of the country. It is true that the commercial value which a knowledge of English commands, and the fact that the final examinations of the high schools are conducted in English, cause the secondary schools to be subjected to a certain pressure to introduce, prematurely, both the teaching of English as a language and its use as the medium of instruction. This tendency, however, requires to be corrected in the interests of sound education. The line of division between the use of the vernacular and of English as a medium of instruction should, broadly speaking, be drawn at a minimum age of thirteen. If the educated classes neglect the cultivation of their own languages, no progress would be possible in giving effect to the principle, affirmed in the dispatch of 1854, that European knowledge should gradually be brought, by means of the Indian vernaculars, within the reach of all classes of people.

CONCLUSION

In reviewing the progress of education after these fifty years, the government concludes its important minute as follows:

It rests with the people themselves to make a wise use of the opportunities that are offered to them to realize that education, in the true sense, means something more than an acquisition of so much positive knowledge, something higher than the mere passing of examinations, that it aims at the progressive and orderly development of all the faculties of the mind, that it should form character and teach right conduct—that it is, in fact, a preparation for the business of life. If this essential truth is overlooked or imperfectly appreciated, the labors of the Government of India to elevate the standard of education in this country and to inspire it with higher ideals will assuredly fail to produce substantial and enduring results. These labors have been undertaken in the hope that they will command the hearty support of the leaders of native thought and of the great body of workers

in the field of Indian education. On them the Governor General in council relies to carry on and complete a task which the government can do no more than begin.

II

The most recent pronouncement of the government of India in regard to its educational policy was made in February, 1913, being a resolution issued by the Governor General in council, and published in 1914. Practically a decade had passed since the issue of the resolution of 1904 upon the educational policy of the state. Furthermore, this resolution of 1913 followed almost immediately upon the state visit in 1912 to his great empire in Asia of the King of England for the purpose of proclaiming his accession as Emperor of India at the great Delhi Durbar of January, 1912. By reason of these facts and associations this resolution of the government of India has peculiar significance. It opens with the statement, made by the king-emperor in replying to the address of Calcutta University on January 6, 1912.

It is my wish that there may be spread over the land a network of schools and colleges, from which will go forth loyal and manly and useful citizens, able to hold their own in industries and agriculture, and all the vocations in life. And it is my wish too, that the homes of my Indian subjects may be brightened, and their labor sweetened by the spread of knowledge with all that follows in its train, a higher level of thought, of comfort, and of health. It is through education that my wish will be fulfilled, and the cause of education in India will ever be very close to my heart.

This is followed by a declaration of the resulting policy of the government of India, in which it is declared that it has been decided to assist local governments, by means of large grants from imperial revenues as funds become available, to extend comprehensive systems of education in the several provinces.

In the opening paragraphs of this resolution it is natural that this fitting opportunity should be taken to bring into review the progress of the last decade, more particularly in the direction of reforms resolved upon in 1904. Attention is called to the fact that of late years there has been real

progress in removing the defects of the educational systems in India, as recognized in the resolution of 1904. In the last decade the total expenditure from all sources on education had arisen from Rs. 40,000,000 to nearly double that amount. It is pointed out that this progress has been especially great since Lord Curzon's government introduced large measures of educational reform. The former crushing weight of examinations has been appreciably lightened; a commencement has been made in the reform of university and college organization; and the grants from public funds to private institutions have almost doubled in the past decade. The government maintains that it is not just to compare Indian systems, still for the most part in their infancy, with the matured systems of the modern western world, or to disregard influences of social organization and mentality. It asserts that the common charge that the higher education of India has been built up on a slender foundation of popular education is one that might have been levelled against every country of Europe at some period of its history. India is now passing through stages taken by other countries in their time.

RELIGIOUS AND MORAL INSTRUCTION

The question of religious and moral instruction has emerged with peculiar emphasis during this decade. This question was formerly discussed at an imperial conference, held in 1911. Grave differences of opinion emerged as to the possibility or advantage of introducing direct religious instruction into schools generally, and apprehensions of difficulty in the working of any definite system were put forward. Doubts were also expressed as to the efficacy of direct moral instruction when divorced from religious sanctions. In the matter of moral teaching, however, the difficulties are undoubtedly less than in the case of religious teaching. The government of India, while bound to maintain a position of complete neutrality in matters of religion, observe that the most thoughtful minds in India lament the tendency of existing systems of education to develop

the intellectual at the expense of the moral and religious faculties. For the present the government must be content to watch experiments and keep the matter prominently in view. Enlightened opinion and accumulated experience will, it is hoped, provide a practical solution to what is unquestionably the most important educational problem of the time.

PRIMARY EDUCATION: COMPULSORY AND FREE

The proposition that illiteracy must be broken down and that primary education had, in the present circumstances of India, a predominant claim upon the public funds, represent accepted policy no longer open to discussion. For financial and administrative reasons of decisive weight, the government of India has refused to recognize the principle of compulsory education; but it desires the widest possible extension of primary education on a voluntary basis. As regards free elementary education the time has not yet arrived when it is practicable to dispense wholly with fees without injustice to the many villages, which are waiting for the provision of schools.

The government laid down the following, among other principles, in regard to primary education:

1. There should be a large expansion of lower primary schools, teaching the three R's with drawing, knowledge of the village map, nature-study and physical exercises. Simultaneously upper primary schools should be established at suitable centers.

2. Expansion should be secured by means of board schools, except where this is financially impossible when aided schools, under recognized management, should be encouraged.

3. Teachers should be drawn from the class of boys whom they will teach; and should have undergone a year's training.

4. Schools should be housed in sanitary and commodious but inexpensive buildings.

PRIMARY EDUCATION: PROPOSED EXPANSION

It is the desire and hope of the government of India to see in the not distant future some 91,000 primary public schools added to the 100,000 which already exist for boys and to double the 4,125,000 pupils who now receive instruction in them. For purposes of present calculation a sum of Rs. 375 (\$125) per annum may be taken as a rough approximation of the probable average cost of maintenance of a Primary Board School. This figure provides for two teachers, for the purchase of books and stationery, and for other sundry expenses.

EDUCATION OF GIRLS

The government frankly acknowledges that the education of girls remains to be organized. In the resolution of 1904, it was remarked that, as a far greater proportional impulse is imparted to the educational and moral tone of the people by the education of women than by the education of men, liberal treatment had been accorded for girls in respect of scholarships and fees, with the result that the number of girls under instruction has arisen from 444,470 in 1901 to 865,000 in 1910. But the total number still remains insignificant in proportion to the female population. The immediate problem is one of social development. The existing customs and ideas opposed to the education of girls will require different handling in different parts of India, but the government commends the following principles for general consideration:

1. The education of girls should be practical with reference to the position which they will fill in social life.
2. It should not seek to imitate the education suitable for boys nor should it be dominated by examinations.
3. The service of women should be more freely enlisted for instruction and inspection.

SECONDARY EDUCATION

The importance of secondary, and in particular of high school education is far-reaching. Since secondary education of one grade or another is the basis of all professional or industrial training in India in the last decade, the number of secondary schools has increased from nearly 5500 to 6500, and the number of scholars from 622,000 to 900,000. The policy of government is to rely so far as possible on private enterprise in secondary education. To this policy the government adhere. It is dictated not by any belief in the inherent superiority of private over state management, but by the preference for an established system and, above all, by the necessity of concentrating the direct energies of the state and the bulk of its available resources upon the improvement and expansion of elementary education. The policy may be summarized as the encouragement of privately managed schools under suitable bodies, maintained in efficiency by government inspection, recognition and control, and by the aid of government funds.

Subject to the necessities of variation in deference to local conditions the policy of the government in regard to secondary English schools is:

1. To improve the few existing government schools by,
 - (a) Employing only graduates or trained teachers.
 - (b) Introducing a graded service for teachers.
 - (c) Providing proper hostel accommodation.
 - (d) Introducing a school course complete in itself with a sufficient staff to teach what may be called the modern side.
 - (e) Introducing manual training.
2. To increase largely the grants-in-aid, in order that aided institutions may keep pace with the improvements in government schools.
3. To multiply and improve training colleges.

TECHNICAL AND INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION

No branch of education at present evokes greater public interest than technical and industrial instruction. Con-

siderable progress has been made since 1904. Scholarships, tenable in Europe and America have been established. A well-endowed and equipped Indian institute of science has been established. The number of technical and industrial schools has arisen since 1904 from 88 to 218, and the number of pupils from 5,000 to 10,500.

The question has arisen as to how far educational instruction should develop on commercial lines, and it has been decided that, while educational instruction should in no case trade on commercial lines, in certain cases instruction in industrial schools may be supplemented by practical training in workshops where the application of new processes needs to be demonstrated.

AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION

For a country where two-thirds of the population are dependent for their livelihood on the produce of the soil, it must be admitted that the provision for agricultural education in India is at present meager and in serious need of expansion and reorganization. The present scheme, originated under Lord Curzon's government, is only seven years old. In the year 1905 a comprehensive scheme was evolved, under which arrangements were made both for the practical development of agriculture by government assistance, and also for teaching and research in agriculture by subjects connected with it. A central institution has been established. The existing schools and colleges have been reconstituted and improved. Farms for experiments and demonstration have been started. The present scheme of agricultural education has three main features:

1. The provision of first class opportunities for the higher forms of teaching and research.
2. Collegiate education.
3. The improvement of secondary and primary education.

UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

By common consent the Universities Act of 1904 has had beneficial results, but the condition of university edu-

education is still far from satisfactory, in regard to residential arrangements, control, the courses of study, and the system of examination. It is important to distinguish clearly on the one hand the Federal university in the strict sense, in which several colleges of approximately equal standing separated by no excessive distance or marked local individuality are grouped together as a university as in England, and on the other hand; the affiliating university of the Indian type, which in its inception was merely an examining body, and has not been able to insist upon an identity of standard in the various institutions conjoined to it. At present there are five Indian universities for 185 arts and professional colleges in British India. The day is probably far distant when India will be able to dispense with the affiliating university, but it is necessary to restrict the area over which the affiliating universities have control by securing in the first instance a separate university for each of the leading provinces in India, and secondly, to create new local teaching and residential universities within each of the provinces in harmony with the best modern opinion as to the right road to educational efficiency.

The government of India has decided, therefore, to found additional teaching and residential universities (at present six have been determined upon) in various centers of India. It may be possible hereafter to sanction the conversion into local teaching universities, with power to confer degrees upon their own students, of those colleges which have shown the capacity to attract students from a distance and have attained the requisite standard of efficiency. Only by experiment will it be found out what type or types of universities are best suited to the different parts of India.

TRAINING OF TEACHERS

Few reforms are more urgently needed than the extension and improvement of the training of teachers, for both primary and secondary schools. The object must steadily be kept in view that eventually under modern systems of edu-

cation no teacher should be allowed to teach without a certificate that he is qualified to do so. The government of India desire that provincial governments examine their schemes for training teachers of all grades and enlarge them so as to provide for the great expansion which may be expected especially in primary education.

ORIENTAL STUDIES

Great importance is attached to the cultivation and improvement of oriental studies. There is an increasing interest throughout India in her ancient civilization, and it is necessary to investigate that civilization with the help of the medium of western methods of research and in relation to modern ideas. The predominating opinion is that it would be difficult to create the appropriate atmosphere of oriental study in universities as at present constituted, and that, therefore, it is desirable to have in one institution scholars working on different branches of the kindred subjects which comprise Orientalia, and that for reasons of economy it is preferable to start with one institute well equipped and possessing a first class library. This central institute should not be isolated, and should be opened to students from all parts of India. The object of the institute, apart from research is to provide Indians highly trained in original work who will enable schools of Indian history and archaeology to be founded hereafter, develop museums, and build up research in universities and colleges in the different provinces.

CONCLUSION

The resolution which we have passed under review concludes with this paragraph of practical suggestions:

Such in broad outline are the present outlook and general policy for the near future of the government of India. The Governor General in council trusts that the growing section of the Indian public which is interested in education will join in establishing, under the guidance and with the help of Government, those quickening systems of education on which the best minds

in India are now converging and on which the prospects of the rising generation depend. He appeals with confidence to wealthy citizens throughout India to give of their abundance to the cause of education; in the foundation of scholarships; the building of hostels, schools, colleges, laboratories, gymnasia, swimming baths; the provision of playgrounds and other structural improvements; in furthering the cause of modern scientific studies and specially of technical education; in gifts of prizes and equipment; the endowment of chairs and fellowships; and the provision for research of every kind. There is a wide field and a noble opportunity for the exercise on modern lines of that charity and benevolence for which India has been renowned from ancient times.

NOTES AND REVIEWS

The End of the War. By WALTER EDWARD WEYL. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1918. 323 pages.

The book is an appeal to America to assume leadership in diplomacy, to eliminate imperialistic elements from the demands of our Allies, and to attempt a settlement based on internationalism.

Mr. Weyl reviews our spirit of pacifism in the early days of the war; the conversion of America; the real spirit of our war against militarism; the attitude of French, English, Italian imperialists for spoiling the enemy; the sacred egoism of Italy in her hopes of expansion and conquest; the position of America as the great arbiter among the nations; the need of unification and crystallization of a mass of diverse elements in the various countries; the war beneath the war in Russia; the identity of the German people and the German Government as opponents of democracy; the impossibility of a return to the status quo; the failure of most of the "guaranties" entered into by diplomats before the war; the formation of a Grand Alliance based upon the principles of internationalism with special reference to economic and trade relations after the war. Among the obstacles to internationalism Mr. Weyl mentions the State Idea, which would suppress nationalities and the Nationality Idea which would dissolve states.

The book closes with a chapter relating to the Peace Conference and the conditions following it. After this war all nations must avoid becoming imperialistic again. All great industries must be nationalized. "The final war for democracy will begin after the war. It will be a wider conflict than that which now rages and the alignment will be by classes and interests rather than by nations. It will be a war which will be waged until separate interests within each nation are completely extinguished;" only then will the world have been made safe for democracy.

C. E. S.

Court and Diplomacy in Austria and Germany. What I Know.
By COUNTESS OLGA LEUTRUM. Fisher Unwin, London, Adelphi Terrace, 1918. 287 pp.

The book is addressed especially to the Russians for whom Countess Leutrum had inherited from her mother a deep admiration. She also thinks that of all the Allies "Russia most needs

enlightenment as to the true and intimate causes of this war and the long treacherous preparations of Germany and Austria-Hungary."

Her father was a Hungarian and in the diplomatic service, so she grew up in an atmosphere saturated with international politics. She accompanied her father, who was Austro-Hungarian Minister to Holland, to the first Peace Conference at the Hague. Here she came in close contact with the political movements of the great European countries and she convinced herself that the Central Powers were opposed to the principles of durable peace which the Entente nations were so anxious to see established.

Upon the death of her father she spent some time within the German Empire. Here she was held in the greatest suspicion for her pro-Russian and anti-German sentiments. Later she took up her residence in Russia. She closes her volume with a final appeal to Russia to throw off the German yoke and to rise better and greater than before.

C. E. S.

The Rebuilding of Europe. By DAVID JAYNE HILL. New York, The Century Company, 1917. 289 pp.

David Jayne Hill, a diplomat of experience and a historian, is unusually well qualified to discuss *The Rebuilding of Europe*. After a historic survey, he sets forth the conditions existing in the different states in order to show that nations in their "economic imperialism," the real cause of the Great War, are tribal not international in thought. This fact must be taken into account when discussing reconstruction plans. A purely political organization, such as a superstate which armed force implies, would be resisted by all nations, since no state is willing to give up any of its "inherent rights." Modern nations, before forming an international organization, must rid themselves of their "heritage of evil," the traditional belief that the sovereignty of a state is synonymous with supreme power. When the states, which are really business corporations, are willing to accept the principles of universal justice which are extended to individuals within democracies, the details for a league of peace will be easily formulated.

M. T. M.

Democracy and Diplomacy. By ARTHUR PONSONBY, M.P. London, Methuen and Company. 1915. 194 pp.

A study of the question of democratic control in England. The writer, a member of Parliament, voices his protest against

the methods used in the field of foreign politics and makes a strong plea for the adoption of the same methods in the management of foreign affairs as home affairs. The House of Commons and the people are, he thinks, to blame for having submitted so long to a system by which they are deprived of control over international relations, "the most important branch of public affairs." He maintains that it is absurd for Foreign Office debates to be "the low-water mark of Parliamentary interest." The book contains opinions of many authorities which serve to show there has long been recognition of the defect in the present constitutional practice with regard to the management of foreign affairs.

Origins of the Triple Alliance. By ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. 1917. 236 pp.

A brief but excellent survey of the origins and work of the Triple Alliance. Especially valuable for teachers and students of the present war. The book is a revision of a group of lectures delivered by Dr. Coolidge in 1916. It makes clear the importance of the Triple Alliance as the great political and military factor in world affairs since the Franco-Prussian war. Bismark's policies and diplomatic triumphs are sketched with keen insight, and regard for his prescience is increased.

From Isolation to Leadership. A Review of American Foreign Policy. By JOHN HOLLADAY LATANÉ, Doubleday, Page and Company, Garden City, N. Y. 1918. 215 pages.

In a brief, concise manner Dr. Latané has reviewed the foreign policy of the United States from the days of the "warning of Washington against permanent alliance and the warnings of Jefferson against entangling alliances" to the time when the aims upon which the United States entered into the World War were definitely stated.

The Monroe Doctrine is discussed at length. The author believes that in its modern interpretation it has developed in us certain imperialistic tendencies which closely resemble the European imperialism which the United States has hoped to check.

The United States gradually departed from its place of isolation through its participation in various international conferences, such as the Berlin Conference, the Hague Peace Conferences, and the Algeiras Conference. It was instrumental in securing

the "Open-Door Policy" in the Orient and in forming a closer union among the several Pan-American States. The relations between England and the United States had so changed by 1897 that many writers have concluded that a secret treaty of alliance between the two countries must have been made.

The new Pan-Americanism is carefully outlined and the formation and policy of the American Institute of International Law are quite fully explained.

The United States has always remained neutral in times of European Wars, but in the present conflict where the security and safety of the entire world were threatened we could no longer be merely a silent observer. Through two years of experience we recognized the failure of neutrality, and this recognition and "the abandonment of isolation mark a radical, though inevitable, change in our attitude toward world politics." The war aims of the United States as contained in the several speeches of President Wilson are discussed in the closing chapter of the book. In conclusion the author shows that to America has fallen a great opportunity to serve mankind if she remains true to her best ideals. The United States has it in her power to shape the destinies of the world because as President Wilson has said, "We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of the nation can make them."

The book is well worth a careful study by all those interested in American Foreign Policy.

CLARA E. SCHIEBER.

An Australian Girl in Germany. (Through Peace to War, January-October, 1914.) By HILDA M. FREEMAN. Melbourne: The Specialty Press Pty. Ltd. 189-191 Little Collins Street, 1916. 372 pages.

The content of the book is founded upon the diary kept by Miss Freeman while she was in Germany, and she claims to have the originals—newspapers, pamphlets or magazines from which her many quotations have been literally translated. The book has not been colored by after-thought and reflection since the outbreak of the war.

Miss Freeman went to Germany to become governess in a German family. This was in January, 1914. She was received with much friendliness and consideration. When the war broke out the family still treated her with the greatest kindness and did all they could to protect her, and in every way assisted her in leaving the country, which she was able to do in October, 1914.

The way in which she describes the response of the German people when war actually came is very vivid. She places above all else the hatred of everything English as the real cause of the war. The goal ever before them was the destruction of England. In the early days of the war the people were urged to take care of the Americans. The Germans feared for the outcome if we united with England.

Public opinion was absolutely moulded by the newspapers and the newspapers were inspired from head-quarters. Every one went mad with joy because they were going to have war, but once war was declared they were filled with a desire to blame some one else for causing it.

The book gives us a splendid insight into a typical German family, with all its hospitality and kindness, yet shows the power and the influence of the German war lords and the German war spirit. Altogether the volume may be recommended as giving one of the most accurate descriptions yet written of the real Germany during the early weeks of the war. C. E. S.

Confessions of the Czarina. By COUNT PAUL VASSILI. Harper and Brothers, Publishers, New York and London, 1918. 298 pages.

Count Vassili knew the Czarina personally and gives a vivid account of the life of the Empress of all the Russias from the time she came to the throne, a bride, until she was sent into Siberian exile. The author hopes in this way to give us a better understanding of the social conditions which caused the Russian Revolution. The Czarina was a German princess and neglected no opportunity to show sympathy for her native land. She took little or no interest in Russian politics until after the arrival of the Czarevitch.

The manner in which Rasputin worked upon the emotions of the Czarina and her son is described at great length.

However, Count Vassili begs his readers to keep always in mind the fact "that the Consort of Nicholas II was not a normal

woman; that madness was hereditary in the Hesse-Darmstadt family to which she belonged, twenty-two members of which had, during the last hundred years or so, been confined in lunatic asylums; that consequently a different standard of criticism must be applied to Alexandra Feodorowna than to an ordinary person in full possession of all her intellectual faculties."

The Czarina doubtless lived a most unhappy life but she was so tactless that she estranged those who would have befriended her. She kept up continuous, secret communications with her cousin, Kaiser Wilhelm II and was very anxious to have Russia make a separate peace with Germany.

C. E. S.

Russia in Upheaval. By EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS, Ph.D., LL.D.
New York, The Century Company, 1918. 354 pages.

The aim of the author is to show the social changes which have taken place in Russia up to the close of 1917. In order to do this successfully, a careful review is made of the early Russian customs and practices. The chapters dealing with the psychology of the peasant, his soil hunger and the land question, and a discussion of the roots of the revolution are good. Dr. Ross draws a new picture of the part woman has played in the great upheaval of Russia. The question of labor and capital as interpreted by the Sovyet is discussed at great length. The author also shows how the Orthodox Church has been affected by the Revolution.

As a solution for the Russian problem, the author suggests a great federated state, "The United States of Russia," using our own country as a model. The break-up of the great Empire into many independent states would mean continual strife among them so that Russians would "look back with regret on the vanished peace of the Czar!"

In the closing chapter the author points out how costly is social revolution, costly in life, in good-will, and in organization.

C. E. S.

The Lost Fruits of Waterloo. By JOHN SPENCER BASSETT. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918. 289 pages.

One hundred years ago the world rejoiced at the overthrow of a great military autocrat. It was expected that universal peace would immediately follow. But the nations had forgotten that it was a principle and not merely a man that they had been contending against. That principle has lived on and has shown it-

self with renewed strength during the past few years. "To conquer the world and win a place in the sun" must be defeated or it will recur to distress future generations unless it is bound down by bonds that cannot be broken. *The Lost Fruits of Waterloo* has been written to show that "when Germany is beaten, as she must be beaten, steps should be taken, not only to insure that she shall not again disturb the earth, but that no other power coming after her shall lay the foundations and form the ambition which will put the world to the necessity of fighting the present war over again."

The object of the author is to set before the reader the idea of a permanent peace through federated action. After the defeat of Napoleon Europe tried various alliances and the idea of the Balance of Power in the hope of establishing permanent peace. In fact the failure of the Concert of Europe and the Balance of Power, although they met certain emergencies, doubtless brought on the recent world crisis.

In the past, Germany has stood for efficiency, but her state morality has been corrupted by the influence of Bismarck and Treitschke who taught that wrong may be done that good may result. This is a false doctrine and leads ultimately to wars. Germany must be taught that nations are under the same obligations to do right as individuals.

Among the obstacles to enduring peace the author mentions: economic rivalry, false sense of patriotism, sense of nationality, autocratic classes in society, the powerful influence of munition makers and professional warriors.

The world has been gradually uniting into larger and larger political units, and ultimately all nations must either bow to one conquering state, or else all nations must unite and form a great federation of nations if enduring peace is to be realized.

The "fruits of Waterloo" were lost a century ago. The world should have learned through the bitter disappointment of years and the ravages of war to take greater care in arriving at a just peace which alone can have any hope of endurance.

C. E. S.

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THE BOLSHEVIKI IN SIBERIA

By E. A. Yarrow¹

Siberia is so much in the public eye these days that I thought you might be interested in my observations on the situation. It is very difficult to give an orderly impression of conditions which are disorderly. If I might put the Siberian situation into one word I should say, *disorganization*, absolute disorganization, no matter from what angle one looks at it; political, social, economic, transportation, financial, and religious. Of course all these categories intermingle and overlap each other until their boundaries are lost but it may make for definiteness if I take each one up separately, and the one which is most apparent everywhere and which the people feel most keenly is the

ECONOMIC DISORGANIZATION

I noticed in Siberia the same condition that I found in the Caucasus, the almost total absence of manufacturies; and I suppose the causes are the same, the insecurity of capital invested in the provinces and the difficulty of getting protection for these industries from the Petrograd government. There seems to have been an influence emanating from such centers as Moscow which kept in definite centers the raw materials needed in industry. While the transportation facilities were in working order this did not do any great harm except in adding to the cost of manufactured

¹ Mr. E. A. Yarrow has just returned from two months in Siberia. After spending two weeks in Vladivostok, he was placed in charge of a Sanitary Train on the Trans-Siberian Railroad which took Red Cross and Medical Units with medical supplies to the front. Mr. Yarrow has had an excellent opportunity of studying Siberian conditions all the way from Vladivostok to Omsk.

articles, but when transportation ceased the result was tragic as the raw materials were left on the hands of the manufacturers and they could neither sell them nor use them themselves. During the first years of the war Siberia was the least troubled section of Russia, since it produced great supplies of foodstuffs and there were still stocks of manufactured articles for which they could exchange them; but as time went on these stocks were depleted with the result that prices went higher and higher and with them rose, of course, the prices of the necessaries of life. At present it is almost impossible to buy shoes, clothing, implements, or medicines. Shoes cost from \$30 to \$100 and a suit of clothes from \$100 up. It is not difficult to figure out how much a farmer must sell his butter and eggs for in order to cope with these prices. But the farmer class is not the one which is hardest hit. The general report is that they have more money than they know what to do with and tie it up in bundles and weigh it out. This of course is an exaggeration but there is some truth at the bottom of it. The class that is hard hit is the wage earner. The raise in his pay is nothing commensurate with the soaring of the prices of what he eats and what he wears, and the crippling of trade makes his services less indispensable. There is possibly enough food in Siberia to feed the population but there is nothing to buy it with and no way of distributing it. Some sections have plenty and at fairly reasonable rates while a town one or two hundred miles away will be nearly starving. Apart from agriculture, the principle source of the wealth of Siberia is its mines, and here again it has been very badly disabled. Before the Czecho-Slavaks took control, Bolshevism was as rampant in Siberia as in any other part of Russia and the mines were taken over by the workers and the owners were lucky if they got off with a whole skin. At present I believe the owners have regained control but owing to the demand for high wages, the high cost of material, and the lack of transportation, the mines have ceased to be paying investments.

In short, the present economic situation is bad enough to account for much of the trouble in Siberia but unfortunately there are many other knots in the tangle.

FINANCIAL DISORGANIZATION

One could hardly realize the tremendous importance which a stable currency holds in the life of a people, until one sees the confusion into which the lack of it has thrown the Russians. One is bewildered with the different kinds of money one has to handle in any ordinary transaction. There is the old Nikolaeff or "good" money which is worth about 20 per cent of its original value; then comes the Kerensky or "bottle label" variety which gets its value from no one knows where; next the money issued by different provinces or cities with no backing whatever. While I was in Omsk, the Omsk Government issued some millions also without any backing, and a day or two after the issue was made the Government fell. Postage stamps have been converted into currency by the simple process of stating the fact on their backs; coupons from much depreciated war bonds are another prolific source for ready cash; and the final and most astonishing forms are the individual issues by banks, restaurants, commercial houses and private individuals! Metal currency in the form of gold, silver, or copper has simply ceased to exist. The effect of this confusion is to paralyze all forms of trade. Even if a producer has an article which he could sell he would rather hold it than convert it into paper, concerning the value of which he rightly entertains the gravest of doubts. One of the very greatest needs of Siberia today and the one in which it can be helped only by outside nations, is that of *goods*. It has money, of the variety mentioned above but no sane merchant will agree to furnish materials in exchange for such trash.

The banks remain open but the only individuals darkening their doors are those who made deposits years ago and are now using every art of persuasion and threat to get them back again.

TRANSPORTATION DISORGANIZATION

There is only one railway line through Siberia, including the military loop to the North along the Amur river; and previous to the war this road, although run on antiquated

methods, still met the needs of the country very well. Considering the tremendous distances, it will at once be seen that the very life of the whole region depends on the efficient upkeep of this means of communication. The thing that most astonishes the student of Siberian affairs is the fact that in spite of all the changes that have taken place, most of them for the worst, the road is still running. This is a tribute either to a splendid organization of former times or to the loyalty of the men employed. Too much cannot be said in praise of the engineers and trainmen who have stood by their jobs in spite of all sorts of dangers, inadequate and unpaid wages, and the constant influence of Bolshevik propaganda. When I came through the latter part of November the men beyond Irkutsk had not had any pay for three months, and about 3,000,000 roubles were due them. This neglect was beginning to tell on their morale and there was grave danger of the whole road being tied up by a strike. The head of our train was very anxious to get back to Vladivostok at the earliest date possible and he had to frequently "jolly" the station master with presents of cigars, money or other commodities. It took us about twenty-four days from Omsk to Vladivostok although in ordinary times it would have taken nine or ten days or possibly less.

The rolling stock is in the worst possible condition as very few repairs have been made since the war began. There are between two and three hundred American engineers located on the Manchurian line from Vladivostok to Manchuria station. They were invited over by the Kerensky Government, I understand, but the Government changed before they were able to take control, and although they have been there for about two years they have never been able to do anything officially. They are now acting in an advisory capacity but the officials of the road use their own judgment in accepting any suggestions they make. One great difficulty as everywhere in Siberia is the grafting by high officials. If the Americans suggest improvements whereby economies may be practiced they run up against some high official who has some interest in keeping things as they are.

The most serious problem is the falling off of revenue. No general freight is being carried and the passenger service is all but abandoned. Thousands of box cars are being kept out of commission by the fact that they are being occupied by refugees who live in them for weeks and weeks, and no one seems to have the initiative or authority to put them out. Practically all of the activity of the road consists of hauling troops, supply trains for the Red Cross and Y. M. C. A., and all sorts of so-called "Missions" of investigation. As far as I know none of these organizations pay a cent for their transportation. A great number of trains are being used to carry Czech soldiers, Japanese, French, British, Italian, and Chinese. I have understood that the Americans pay when they ship troops, but this very rarely happens as they stick pretty close to Vladivostok which is about 4000 miles from the front. The principal activity of the Allies seems to be "investigating." Train after train of some special Commission goes by and when they have gone the length of the road and back their information is so stale and the situation is so changed that another "Mission" has to be sent out. It seems as if anyone can get a special car or a special train if he is insistent enough. At Irkutsk we found an old Scotchman who had worked his way through from Petrograd. He had commandeered a box car and raised the British flag over it and chalked in large letters on the sides, "British war mission," and he was getting away with it! We hitched him onto our train and brought him to Vladivostok with us. The Red Cross and Y. M. C. A. would each have three or four special trains going at one time on different sections of the road. One can imagine the attitude of the trainmen working these trains! When I left the Red Cross was considering seriously the question of supplying these men at least with clothing but as yet, as far as I know, this has not been done.

POLITICAL DISORGANIZATION

One has only to review the progress of events in order to be persuaded how absolute is this disorganization. *After* the Allies had occupied Vladivostok the citizens of that town

elected a Bolshevik mayor; and when the Czech General Gaida was made a sort of military dictator General Horvath, a Russian, refused to accept his authority in the Harbin district. With the formation of the Omsk Government it was thought that a stable Government had been established, but before the Powers had time to recognize it, this authority also was superceded by the Dictatorship of Kolchak, and at the present writing, Semenoff, operating in the Cheta region, withholds his allegiance and it is only the restraining influence of the Allies that keeps them from going at each others throats!

The great difficulty seems to be that there are no disinterested politicians in Siberia. Each individual seems to be out for something personal. Under the old system there was a considerable leeway left for the play of "legitimate graft" whereby each official supplemented his salary by some sort of "rakeoff." This system was so ingrained into the people that it has been impossible for the present officials to free themselves from it, with the result that whatever the new governments do they are always subject to the charge of dishonesty.

Since the Bolsheviks have been driven out the conditions have been getting steadily worse economically; couple to this the fact that a large portion of the people are Bolshevik at heart, it is not to be wondered at that a minority at least sigh for the good old Bolshevik days. There have been many signs of Bolshevik reaction but they are always put down with a heavy hand, but the spirit is here nevertheless.

The absence of any settled Allied policy further complicates the situation. They do not seem to have gotten together on any settled principle and some of the nationalities are working at cross purposes. Dozens of times the railroad has been on the point of being turned over to the American Engineers, but then someone held up the arrangement. The Japanese are the ones whose purposes are the most open to suspicion; there seems to be no doubt that they have designs on the northern part of Manchuria, and consequently do all they can to keep the Americans from getting control

of the railroad. There is any amount of secret diplomacy being carried on but as yet no one has called for an open "show down."

SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION

The social life of Siberia bears no resemblance to what it was before the war. Hundreds and thousands have fled from Russia proper to take refuge here, and naturally they are not of the Bolshevik turn of mind, but rather lean to the bureaucratic type. They are made up of old Government employees, army officers, owners of estates, university professors, and wealthy merchants. The sad thing is that they do not seem to have learned anything from the cataclysm that has overwhelmed their land. Instead of studying the underlying causes for the tremendous hold Bolshevism has taken on the masses, they simply look at its present manifestations, which are horrible enough in all conscience, and then their souls are filled with the one desire for revenge. Bolshevism has been discredited on account of its evil minded and dishonest leaders, who have led the movement into all forms of foolishness, cruelty and excess, but the man is very shortsighted and unwise who maintains that there is nothing higher behind it. In its essence and as the common Russian peasant or worker sees it, it is a tremendous protest against the real injustice and cruelty which he has suffered for ages at the hand of the capital classes. This is the fundamental reason why this movement has held on so long and been so tenacious of life; and the individual, or group, or government which refuses to take this point into consideration will have a hard time of it.

There is quite a strong tendency in Siberia today toward the reestablishment of the monarchy and there are many indications that if it is established things will be run very much on the old lines. When I was in Tomsk I was told on good authority that a threatened uprising of the peasants had been subdued in the good old fashioned way; by the use of the knout and indiscriminate executions. Society is divided into many factions each bitter against the other, none wishing to learn where his own philosophy could be changed

for the better or his methods of life modified, and each one filled with hatred of the other, only waiting for an opportunity to do some violence to the one who disagrees with him.

RELIGIOUS DISORGANIZATION

In normal times the Orthodox Church was second in influence only to the Government itself; in fact it was an integral part of the Government, and as is almost certainly to be the case of such establishments it was controlled by the influences which closely coincided with those dominating the old bureaucracy. It is needless to say that the Church is anti-Bolshevik, but it probably would have been opposed to any democratic movement on the part of the common people even if such a movement took a moderate course and did not manifest itself under such hideous forms as the present uprising. The Russian people are essentially religious by nature and while all other organizations have been attacked, there does not seem to have been any definite menace to the Church itself except that it has been disestablished. While there has been no concerted assault on the Church yet in numberless individual cases pillage, intimidation, and personal violence have been committed. Be the cause what it may, the Church which has been one of the great steadying forces in Russia, has lost its hold on the people. They claim that it has always stood for reaction and has been and is today more sympathetic toward the upper classes than toward the lower.

Wherever the Jewish influence dominates the Bolsheviks, the Church of course cannot expect sympathy or good will. This problem of the Jewish influence among the Bolsheviks should be mentioned. Undoubtedly many of the leaders are Jews gathered since the revolution from all over the world; rightly or wrongly the classes of Russians who are now suffering, attribute a large portion of their misfortune to Jewish intrigue. The Jew was never loved by the Russian but this hatred has become greatly intensified lately and if ever the upper classes get control again, there will be absolutely no place left for the Jew in Russia.

THE CZECHO-SLOVAKS

The history of the Czecho-Slovak intervention is so well known that there is no need of going into details, except to recall the fact that they were going through Siberia on their way to the French front when they were held up by the Bolsheviks and compelled to fight. They were then held in Siberia by the Allies who made them all sorts of promises which they haven't kept. They are at present in a very dissatisfied mood. They feel that the war is over and they are very anxious to get home to their families and to the great task of rehabilitating their country. They cannot leave without the consent of the Allies as this would endanger their whole future national aspirations. Their military accomplishments have been simply marvelous but they themselves acknowledge that the morale of their men is weakening. If they should withdraw there would be simply pandemonium let loose. Probably a considerable portion of the population would be murdered by the Bolsheviks who would immediately overrun this region. The forces the Allies have in Siberia today are insignificant and their position would be untenable were it not for the presence of the Czecho-Slovaks, but these have lost a considerable number of their men from sickness and fatalities in battle. When the spring opens—taking for granted that the Bolsheviks will still keep up their organization—they will need more aid from the Allies than they have received up to the present if they are to hold out.

CONCLUSION

When conditions are so very bad, and the issues at stake are so very serious as they are in Siberia today, it is very difficult to suggest a remedy, but it seems self-evident that the two alternatives open are for the Allies either to withdraw or stay on.

It would seem practically impossible for them to withdraw, as their doing so would simply turn the country over to a terrible orgy of destruction and bloodshed. There are some who claim that the purpose of the intervention has

been accomplished, viz. the saving of the Czechs, the protection of the large military stores from falling into the hands of the Bolsheviks, and the holding up of the large forces of German-Austrian prisoners who were being organized to form a new German Eastern front. They ignore the fact that although all these objects have been accomplished, yet by their very accomplishment the Allies have been compelled to take upon themselves new and almost more important duties, namely, the protection of the people who have taken refuge within their lines, and the establishment of some secure protecting government for both these refugees and the original inhabitants.

All my observations and the result of all my conversations with individuals who know the situation thoroughly, make me feel most strongly that the only thing to be done is for the Allies actually to intervene, not as they have done in the past, but with an intervention that will be effective.

The first thing necessary is for the Allies to adopt some settled policy. At present no one seems to know what they are doing or what they wish to do. There is an endless stream of ludicrous "Missions" of investigation going up and down the line and no one with power to act on the information which has been gained! It is quite evident on the surface that the different powers have not the same goal toward which their various activities are carrying them.

The second demand is for political stability and this cannot be secured until Siberia is really occupied by sufficient military forces to guarantee this stability. It seems useless to expect this power to originate with the Russians. Since I have been writing this letter a report has come from Omsk, the seat of the Siberian Government, that a Bolshevik uprising has taken place in which certain troops of the newly organized Siberian Russian army participated. The report states that they released the prisoners, the larger portion of whom were Bolsheviks, and that the uprising was put down "with severity" thereby no doubt adding to the already bitter class feeling.

The third demand is for a stable currency. Nothing on a very extensive scale can be done for the economic regen-

eration of Siberia until a medium of exchange is established which will have a real and permanent value, which will not depend, as does all the money now in circulation, on some lucky turn of the wheel of fortune or some beneficent arrangement of the Allies which will take place some time in the indefinite future. The Allies will either have to stand back of this issue or else take over some public utility which will be able immediately to at least carry the interest on the loan and eventually pay up the principal.

And this leads to the fourth demand: actual control of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The country cannot steady down until this vital travel artery is restored to normal activity and it cannot be restored by any local physician. The Road must be renovated from one end to the other. There must be authoritative control so that it will be made a source of revenue as well as the feeder for the people and industries of this vast region. At present it accomplishes neither purpose. And without the military occupation it would be useless to make the attempt.

Siberia is a wonderful country and has a splendid future before it but unless the Powers intervene with some drastic measures, its progress will be delayed years if not for decades.

THE RESHAPING OF THE MIDDLE EAST

By Benoy Kumar Sarkar

While the heat of the armageddon has forged new peoples of Europe into self-conscious statehood, the swan-song of national existence is being sung by one of the oldest peoples of the world. The slow but steady passing of Persia is probably the greatest though the most unobserved and the least talked-of event of world politics during the Great War. The imagination of mankind has indeed been fired by the emergence of Ukrainians, Czecho-Slovaks, and so forth, as more or less sovereign units in the international family. Democracy also has acquired a new lease and a new sanction for humanity through the theory of self-determination promulgated by the radicals of Bolshevist Russia and popularized by the President of the United States. But, as if to demonstrate the Rembrandtesque chiaroscuro in social evolutions, the world is silently witnessing the shades of annihilation that are fast enveloping the nearly fifteen million Shiahite (heterodox) Moslems of the Middle East.

The tragedy of Persia is not, however, an unknown phenomenon, not at any rate to the people of America. For it was an American citizen who, not long ago in 1912, exposed to the world at large the fact of the "strangling" of Persia. This honest disclosure elicited from Asia at that time a profound admiration for the American character, which was only equalled by another almost synchronous incident consisting in the official declaration of the United States that it would not participate in the Six-Power-Loan to the nascent Chinese republic on the ground that the action might necessitate intervention in the internal administration of China. But since then Persia seems to have dropped out of the consciousness of politicians in Asia and Eur-America. They are probably waiting to be startled

one day by the news that "Baytud Din," or the Home of Religion, as the land is known to its people, has formally passed into a dependency.

I. RECONSTRUCTION IN THE PERSIAN GULF

And yet, paradoxically enough, it is true that all through the war period Persia actively engaged the brains of the diplomatists and war-chiefs of the belligerents. It could not be otherwise. For it is the Persian Gulf that has ever remained the objective of all railway enterprises for connecting Asia with Europe and bringing the undeveloped regions of the East under the domination of the advanced Western races.

The war has no doubt given an undue prominence and notoriety to the almost completed Berlin-Bagdad Railway, the artery of a might-have-been Eur-Asian Empire for Germany. In reality, however, in this as in other adventures of colonial exploitation the Germans have been but the last in the field. For it was only in 1903 that the Anatolian Railway Company (German) obtained the concession for extending the Constantinople-Konia line (1872, 1888) to Bagdad, whereas England and France have been enjoying railway concessions in Asia Minor ever since the Crimean War (1857). Besides, in 1895 the thousand mile line from Cairo-Port Said to Kuwait (at the head of the Persian Gulf in Turkey) was almost on the point of being negotiated between the powers that be for an all-British route from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian and Australasian Zones. Even more important in world-politics was the Russian project of penetrating northern Persia as far as Teheran, or Hamadan (the ancient Ecbatana, the capital of the Median Empire, not far from the historic rock of Behistun which bears the inscriptions of Darius), or Yezd in Central Persia. This was to have been effected by extending the trans-Caspian line from Merv or Kushk and the trans-Caucasian railroad from Tabriz, the terminus that has been reached during the war time in 1915. The Russian scheme also contemplated reaching the warm waters of the South

Asian Seas at Bushire, or Bunder Abbas or Chahbar or Gwadur.

A rather curious fact in connection with this trans-Perian railway project of Russia is that she has had the active coöperation of England definitely since January, 1912. This seems to be inconsistent with the traditional Russophobia of the British. But it is not strange because, as is well known, Russia had recognized the "special interests" of Great Britain in the Gulf and had declared that it lay outside the scope of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of August 31, 1907.

England had also been relieved of another thorn in her side. Because the Anglo-French Entente of 1906 put a stop to France's pin-prick and obstructionist policy with regard to England, her enemy of Egyptian and Fashoda memories, in the Persian Gulf as in other spheres. Finally, in 1914 the French firmly cemented the new British friendship by surrendering, in consideration of financial compensation and new rights in Gambia (West Africa), the privileges and immunities of the traffic in arms with Maskat in the Gulf of Oman, which the Anglo-French treaty of 1862 accorded to France.

By the time, therefore, that the war began in Europe the two old competitors of the British Empire had been eliminated from the Middle East. The Persian Gulf was then a British lake. It is superfluous to add that it became necessarily a most powerful challenge to the military and naval might of the Germans, the latest of the empire-seekers. The magnitude of Germany's ambition in this direction and the depth of her disappointment at failure can be intelligible only if the world fully realizes that Britannia did not rule the waves of the Irish Sea and the Bay of Bengal more securely than she did the sheet of water about 500 miles long and 200 miles wide between Arabia and Persia. The western littoral, i.e., the seacoast of Turkey in Asia was for over a quarter of a century as British-dominated as the eastern, i.e., the Persian shore, and further on, the Mekran Coast.

At the northwest head lies Kuwait which under British influence virtually declared its independence of the Ottoman Empire in 1899. In 1914 it occupied the same status in international politics as Mongolia and Tibet with regard to China and the Powers since 1907. Contiguous to this region which was covetously looked for by the Germans as the possible sea-terminus of the Bagdad Railway lies Mohammerah in the northeast corner of the Gulf, at the mouth of the Karun River, within the jurisdiction of the Shah of Persia. This area also has long ceased to acknowledge Persian suzerainty and has been a *de facto* British protectorate. It is in fact the base of the British Oilfields in Persia. When the war broke out, therefore, the Shatt-el-Arab from its mouth as far inland as Basra, about sixty miles in Turkish territory, was a thoroughly British river.

Coming down the Arabian littoral, we have the Bahrein archipelago noted for the pearl fishery. Here since 1861, as in Cyprus since 1878 and in Egypt since 1882, the British rather than the Ottoman flag has been in the ascendant. Further down, the so-called Pirate Coast with the important port of Debai has been under the control of the British Resident at Bushire since 1853. This brings us to Cape Musandin, the tip of the Arabian Coast which juts into the Persian side at Bunder Abbas. Here indeed we have the Gibraltar of the Middle East commanding the Straits of Ormuz, the narrow entrance to this Asian Mediterranean. For, the province of Oman which is the hinterland of the Pirate Coast, as well as the island of Maskat came to recognize British guardianship during the Napoleonic wars, while Bunder Abbas is the terminus of the "British sphere" in Persia as delimited by the Anglo-Russian Agreement.

Now, on the eastern side, the littoral from Bunder Abbas to Mohammerah, i.e., the entire Persian shore of the Gulf, lies within what is technically known as the "neutral sphere" according to the same document. But actually the fine port of ingah, as one proceeds up, is under British domination, and Bushire, further up, has long been the Shanghai of this Zone, where the British Resident's will is law.

Only once was this hegemony of England in the Persian Gulf liable to be seriously threatened. In 1901 during the dark days of Great Britain while she was preoccupied with South African affairs the Russian papers were rabid in their open avowals for the seizure of Bunder Abbas as counterpoise to British Kuwait. In fact Russia did not hesitate to declare her intention of Russifying entire Persia. But the balance of power in the Middle East turned in favor of England as soon as the close of the Boer War left her energies free to attend to the situation. As against the Russian manifesto for monopolizing Persia Lord Lansdowne pronounced the British article of faith in 1903 in the following terms: "We should regard the establishment of a fortified post in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests which we should certainly resist with all the means at our disposal." Thus was enunciated the English Monroe Doctrine for the Persian Gulf. And this *status quo* was accepted by Russia in 1907 as a solution of the question.

It is not astonishing therefore that since the Anglo-Russian agreement the Turks should have automatically looked upon Germany as their natural ally, and that the Persians should have been pro-German or rather anti-ally in sympathy during the war. But the war found Germany and Turkey absolutely without any footing on the entire Ottoman littoral. For long before the war the British had succeeded in frustrating German overtures at Kuwait and at Shargarh on the Pirate Coast. Similarly Turkey's attempts to restore her suzerainty in Kuwait, Bahrein, Oman and Maskat had failed through British backing of the local Sheikhs, Sultans, Chiefs or Governors. And of course it could not take long to quell the few pro-German (Turk) upheavals in the Gulf region. The disturbances at Maskat were put down by a British Indian Army in 1915; and in 1916 a British force was posted at Bahrein to meet eventualities. On the Persian shore likewise the few Anti-British risings were sharply suppressed in 1915 and 1916. On the other hand, the tables were turned by the fall of Bagdad and the conquest of Mesopotamia in March 1917. The Turco-Ger-

mans had to be systematically on the defensive since then. Thus came to end the chances of Germany's ever questioning England's position in the Gulf.

The only Powers that could compete with England are England's allies and comrades in arms. But, as noted above France had renounced her claims in the Gulf in 1906 and 1914. She is not likely to reopen the question in future, for the French interests involved are too trivial. Russia also had indeed been friendly, but her desire to have a Port Arthur on the South Asian Seas would surely have needed England's watchful attention. With the revolution of March 1917, however, and especially the total collapse under Bolshevik régime since November of the same year Russia had ceased to be a controlling factor in world politics. Consequently at the beginning of 1918 England found herself the undisputed ruler of the Gulf. This towering predominance has finally been sealed by the unconditional surrender of Turkey in October 1918, and the ignominious failure of Germany on all fronts in Africa, Asia, and Europe.

II. THE NEW PERSIA IN REALPOLITIK

Persia is one of those few countries which like the seven Latin American states, Mexico, Salvador, Colombia, Venezuela, Paraguay, Argentina, and Chile, remained technically neutral during the hemispheroidal armageddon. It is in fact the only country in Asia excepting its neighbour Afghanistan and the Dutch Indies that did not declare itself formally against Germany's challenge of the British world-empire by a counter Eur-Asian combination. But in spite of its official neutrality Persia was a theatre of military operations not less active than German Shantung and British Egypt. And of course it was constantly disturbed by such intrigues and secret manoeuvres of the belligerents as are inevitable among neutral peoples when practically whole mankind is in arms.

In the summer of 1914 when the war broke out in Europe Persian politics were in a very unsettled condition. The Third Majlis (National Council or Parliament) had just

been elected, and the young Shah Ahmad Mirza ceremonially crowned (July 21). But since the abolition of the Second Majlis which was perpetrated in December 1911 in order to placate Russia and Great Britain in their demands relating to the appointment of foreigners in Persian public service, the constitutional or nationalist party had been left without any controlling hand in the administration. It is notorious, further, that throughout the *risorgimento* or revolutionary period since August 1906, the royalist, arbitrary and reactionary elements in Persia have had the systematic backing of the two interested Powers. This circumstance had the inevitable result of throwing the liberals, democrats and advocates of reform, like the Young Turk party in the western Moslem state, into the arms of Germany, and of compelling them to seek in her the only possible deliverer of the Middle East. The war, therefore, found Persia sharply divided in sentiment, the Shah and the Court party pro-ally, and the people or Young Persia pro-German (-Turk).

It was certainly easy enough to bring about the severance of official Persia's relation with the Central Powers, as in the cases of Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay, and Ecuador. In 1915 German, Austrian and Turkish ministers left Teheran. But during the first two years of the war anti-British risings of the people occurred frequently in Southern and Eastern Persia. Specially affected were the areas about Isfahan and Shiraz. Intensely serious was the situation in the port of Bushire which, therefore, had to be kept under British occupation from August to October. Seistan also on the Afghan frontier, the ever-debatable ground between England and Russia, came virtually into British hands. Finally in 1916 Kerman was occupied.

In the meantime Northern and Western Persia had the European war brought home to it through the Russian advance from Azarbaijan, the British advance towards Kut, and the Turkish resistance to both from the Bagdad Zone. By 1916 the failure of the British in Mesopotamia enabled Turkey to occupy Kirmanshah and Hamadan in Persia and thus cut off the Russian army from the contemplated coöperation with the British on the Tigris.

But in March, 1917, the fall of Bagdad and the disappearance of Turkey from the Mesopotamian region placed western Persia and Kurdistan within the sphere of British influence. The sway of the British power was further extended northwards through the dislocation in the Russian army because of the revolution (March 16), and especially through its total collapse under the Bolshevik régime (November 7). In 1918, therefore, England may be said to have automatically stepped into the vacuum, in the Urumiah basin and Azarbaijan, created by the retirement of Russia from the war. It is clear therefore that from the military standpoint Persia was thoroughly exploited; and yet the violation of Persia seems to be the least known event of the Great War.

How is it that such a thing could happen in Asia without any comment or even notice on the part of the students of international law or of the humanitarian democrats of the world, while it is precisely the violation of an European Persia that was ostensibly the *casus belli* of this war of all nations? The explanation is to be sought in the fact, not candidly and avowedly recognized, that Persia had ceased to be a Persian state long before the war broke out.

In a sense Persia's *status de jure* was indeed that of Belgium, as England and Russia had agreed in 1907 not to permit each other to intervene in the affairs of the land. But in actuality Young Persia's efforts at reconstruction on the lines of constitutional monarchy were thwarted by the Powers at every step. Shah Mohammed Ali (1907-1909) used to be aided and abetted by them so that he might curb the parliamentary endeavours of the people. Early in 1908 the First Majlis had even to encounter Russo-British demands to the effect that it must obey and submit to the Shah. In June it was totally overthrown and demolished by the Shah with the "Cossack Brigade" commanded by a Russian colonel. The Persian revolution could not, however, be thus nipped in the bud. The people mustered strength in the provincial cities, marched from Tabriz and Isfahan on Teheran the capital, deposed the Shah (July 16, 1909) and restored the parliament. The way



before this Second Majlis also was beset with difficulties by the Powers. Taking advantage of the revolutionary unrest, Russia quartered troops at Tabriz and other cities in Northern Persia, and England issued an ultimatum demanding the surrender of the roads in Southern Persia to be policed by the British Indian army at the cost of the Persian Customs Department (October 16, 1910).

Nor was this all. The ex-Shah's intrigues with the royalists in Persia were winked over by England and Russia in spite of the terms of the protocol by which he had been pensioned off. In fact, the Powers violated international law by allowing him to organize the invasion of Persia from Russian territory in July 1911. To make the situation still more difficult for the people, Russia, assured of England's connivance in Persia because of the Morocco crisis in Europe for which England needed Russian help against Germany, sent a fresh ultimatum. Young Persia was stung to the quick thereby, declared a general boycott of Russian and British goods (December 11), and together with the Moslems of Turkey appealed to Germany for sympathy in distress. The Persian boycott, however, proved abortive like the Chinese boycott of America in 1905, because it was an instance of measuring one's strength with a giant. The constitutionalists were completely humiliated, for in a fortnight the Second Majlis fell before a *coup d'état* of the Cabinet (December 24) which considered it impossible and useless to oppose the joint overtures of Russia and England. The understanding was then formally forced from Young Persia that it must not engage the services of foreigners without first obtaining the consent of the two Powers. Azarbaijan became practically a province of Russian Trans-Caucasia, and in 1913 the British despatched an Indian regiment to police Shiraz against the raids of Bakhtiyari and other tribes. Since 1907 Persia had thus been drifting between the Scylla of complete foreign subjection and the Charybdis of the Imperial autocracy encouraged by the Powers.

The violation of Persian neutrality was therefore a normal fact of Middle Eastern politics in pre-war times. And this was a natural consequence of the fact that for purposes

of international politics there were three Persias to be reckoned with. The partition of Persia had been consummated by England and Russia through a mutual agreement on August 31, 1907, just a year after the constitutional triumph of Young Persia (August 5, 1906). The Majlis was not consulted by the Powers prior to the act, nor has that body ever recognized the tripartite division of the country in its administrative or financial measures. But so far as the larger world is concerned, the territorial reconstruction in Persia was a *fait accompli* contrary to the now universally acknowledged postulate of self-determination for peoples. The juristic aspect of the Persian situation has been paralleled in November 1917 by the American-Japanese Agreement (Ishii-Lansing pact) about China without consulting that country at all.

The three divisions are:

1. The Russian sphere, or Northern Persia covering as far interior as the outskirts of Isfahan (the ancient capital, e.g. under Shah Abbas the Great, the contemporary of Elizabeth) and Yezd, the last stand of Zoroastrianism in its homeland. It includes the richest Persian province of Azarbaijan, the once flourishing tract known as Khorasan, and Teheran, the modern capital.

2. The British sphere, or Southern Persia, with Bunder Abbas as its western terminus, which commands the straits of Ormuz leading to the Persian Gulf as the Gibraltar of the Middle East.

3. The "neutral" sphere, or Central Persia, having for its base the entire Persian Gulf littoral and the Karun River, with the apex at Zulfikar, the point where the Russian Empire, Afghanistan and Persia meet. Its boundaries skirt such cities as Khanikin on the Turkish frontier, Isfahan and Yezd on the north, and Kerman on the south. Shiraz, the home of Saadi and Hafiz, lies within this sphere. It includes the historic province of Fars from which the country derives its name of Persia.

What, now, is the meaning of these three spheres? It was clearly explained by the Agreement itself. Thus, for instance, in regard to Southern Persia, Russia undertook to

guarantee England's monopoly of rights and opportunities by agreeing not to seek any political or commercial concessions for herself or any of her citizens or for the citizens of other countries. She assured, further, that she would not oppose the British Government or its subjects in the acquisition of such concessions. The concessions are of very wide scope embracing railway, banking, telegraph, roads, transport and insurance. Southern Persia was thus to be a preserve for Great Britain unmolested by anybody and positively supported by Russia. Similarly Northern Persia was to be Russia's unchallenged preserve insured and guaranteed by the British Empire.

In Central Persia or the so-called neutral Zone neither Power was to have exclusive rights or privileges. It was, technically speaking, a buffer whereon the back-door influences and intrigues, that are as a rule manipulated secretly in such areas, could have a free play. But to all intents and purposes it was in reality a British sphere, because all important interests within the area were in British hands. British concessionaires had been navigating the Karun River since 1888. Mohammerah at the northeastern head of the Gulf, though nominally a province of Persia, was as noticed above a *de facto* dependency of England like Hyderabad, Egypt and Tibet. The whole Gulf coast was dominated by the British navy from Bushire and Bunder Abbas. Besides, the Maidan i-Naphthun Oilfields which lie within 140 miles N. N. E. of Mohammerah in the neutral sphere were exclusively British according to the terms of the oil concession wrung from the Shah in 1901.

Along with these facts is to be taken into consideration the treaty between Russia and Persia negotiated in 1901 by which the "most favored nation" treatment in commercial matters was to be reserved for the countries already enjoying it. In view of all these conditions the preamble to the document of 1907 in which the solicitude of England and Russia is expressed as to respecting the "integrity and independence of Persia" would at once appear to be a camouflage that deceives nobody. And only the third-rate nations would tolerate the chimerical sham in the loudly proclaimed

“open door” alleged to be obtaining in Persia. No self-respecting Power could be lured by this *ignis fatuus*.

The truth about the Persian situation was certainly not hidden from Germany, just as the United States can not be hoodwinked by mere scraps of paper into believing that there is an “open” door in China in spite of the “special” interests of England, Russia, France and Japan, or that the integrity and sovereignty of the Chinese republic are consistent with the extra-territorial, judicial, customs and other concessions enjoyed by the Powers. It was Germany’s interest, therefore, to restore the independence and annul the partition of Persia. As a new-comer she naturally questioned the *status quo* of the Middle Eastern politics established by the first interlopers. But the miserable failure of German navy, army and diplomacy, and the utter pulverization of the Ottoman Empire, together with the unlooked-for dismemberment of the Russian Colossus, have brought about a most marvelous reconstruction in the map of Asia. The British empire has thus been left not only with the monopoly control over the destiny of entire Persia but also with undisputed suzerainty over every inch of the sea-front from the Suez to Singapore and over the entire land mass south of the great series of Asian water-partings, the Caucasus, the Karakum Desert, the Hindu Kush and the Tian Shan, as well as with opportunities for steady advance from this solid base into the Volga basin and the basins of the Obi and the Yenisei. The complete subjugation of Asia (with the solitary exception of Japan which happens to maintain her independence at home and dispute British advance in China and on the Pacific) by Great Britain appears thus to be the final solution of the Eastern question, that was opened with the Crimean War of 1856–57 and was almost closed by the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 in regard to Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia.

PRESENT CONDITIONS AND THE OUTLOOK IN MEXICO

By Elisha Hollingsworth Talbot, Honorary Member National Geographical and Statistical Society of Mexico

If we were to shape our estimate of the Mexican people of today by the law of biology which reads: "The most widely diversified types produce the finest offspring," we would not lack concrete evidence to verify this statement. There is ample proof of the cosmopolitan character of the Mexican people, who are as truly agglomerate nationally as are the Austro-Hungarians or Italians. While the development of these races, their blending and consequent attainment of cohesive national well-being, their strength in maintaining the latter (in spite of internal wars), and the preservation of their status among nations through all manner of vicissitudes attest the truth of this natural law.

It has been said that

The Mexican of today has the blood of more races in his veins than has any other American. Iberian, Semite, Hamite, Goth and Vandal, Roman and Celt, mingled their blood in that stream of brave and adventurous men who first set eyes on Yucatan in 1517, and who conquered Mexico in 1522. Like Spain from the remotest time, Mexico soon became the meeting ground of races, of peoples, of languages and of religions. Within the area of its original territory there were more families of native languages than in all the western hemisphere besides; and, to complete the chain, there were more kinds and grades of culture there. The Seri Indians of Sonora are as abject as the Fuegians, while the Nahuatl and Maya-speaking tribes of the Valley of Mexico and of Yucatan occupied the most elevated position for culture in the New World.

The origin of the Mexican aborigines is involved in that of the American Indians, since within the present boundaries of the Republic are gathered representatives of every zone from the Apache,—an Athapascan, whose principal home is in Alaska,—to the tribes of Oaxaca and Chiapas, who are the children of a torrid clime. There are now in Mexico perhaps ten times more Indians than were ever at any time within the United States domain.

T. Philip Terry, author of a hand book for travelers in Mexico, gives the linguistic families in the republic and their numerical standing, as follows:

Nahuatlan.....	1,750,000
Otoman.....	709,734
Zapotecan.....	580,000
Mayan.....	400,000
Tarascan.....	250,000
Totomacan.....	90,000
Piman.....	85,000
Zoquean.....	60,000
Tequistlatecan.....	31,000
Athapascan (Apaches).....	8,000
Huavan.....	5,000
Yuman.....	2,500
Serian.....	200

Prof. John Hubert Cornyn, long a resident of Mexico, founder of the American College of that city and an authority of high repute, says of the native rulers of the Indian races

Their whole tendency was exercised for the exaltation of the classes, and for the maintenance of the masses in political and social subjugation; [and that] these conditions having obtained, with some unimportant modifications, for close upon 2000 years in Mexico, they may safely be considered as normal. And here is where the would-be meddlers in Mexican affairs have fallen down. They have treated conditions existing there as abnormal, and have proposed to remedy them off-hand, as a tinker mends a leaky pan, forgetting that what is the growth of centuries can be eradicated only by patient endeavor intelligently directed over a long space of time.

When we realize fully the lack of education and its long line of benefits as applied to the great mass of Mexico's population, we may well marvel at the proven possibilities in that direction, for we naturally assume that centuries of ignorance must dwarf the capacity and desire to learn. Many exceptions to this rule have come under my observation in Mexico.

Thirty years ago I was present at commencement exercises at a young ladies' seminary in Morelia, the capital city of the fine state of Michoacan when there occurred one of the most inspiring incidents I have ever witnessed. Med-

als for superiority in various studies were awarded by the governor, in behalf of the state. Many students were in attendance, the great majority of whom were of white blood and belonged to the elite of the nation. But a young Indian girl, dressed in the simple garb of her race and station was, in the course of the evening, awarded three medals. Not a student belonging to the "superior" race received more than one medal. Yet this poor Indian who had never known the advantages of wealth or elevating surroundings dared not hope for other treatment through life than that of an inferior.

The principal of a high school in the city of Puebla once stated in reply to my question regarding the comparative scholarship efficiency of the Spanish or aristocratic student and the Indian, that, although the average proficiency of the former was considerably greater than of the latter, in all cases of which he had personal knowledge where a student far outstripped all his fellows and won first honors in his studies, the successful competitor was an Indian.

These and innumerable other instances of like nature certainly justify all that has been claimed for the Indian or peon of Mexico regarding his native intelligence and capacity for acquiring at least a practical education, and for the ordinary requirements and responsibilities of citizenship, including also the creditable performance of any official duties that he may, under the new "order of things" in his country be called upon to perform.

First and foremost among the purposes of the present or constitutional government of Mexico is the upbuilding of this great moral force and its direction into the right channels. This fact was evidenced in a most practical manner by President Carranza when, very shortly after entering upon the duties of his high office he sent a delegation of teachers to the educational centers of this country to study our school system with a view to the adoption of such of our methods as might be suited to Mexican conditions and needs.

A further proof of the intellectual possibilities of the Mexican Indian in the great problem of race development is

supplied by the splendid record these people have made in the realms of art and art craft, music, architecture, oratory, medicine, the sciences and in the broad field of literature. So potent are these characteristics of this interesting and misunderstood race that a modicum of its blood, introduced into the veins of the volatile and emotional Latin, becomes a wonderful balance by virtue of its steadfast, taciturn, virile, far-seeing and poetic qualities.

The conglomerate character of this aggregation of races and tongues and characteristics affords vast wealth of material for study by ethnologists. Baron von Humboldt, who was probably the most thorough of the many students of Mexico might have appropriately included its races as well as its minerals when he declared it to be the "Treasure House of the World."

AMERICAN INVESTMENTS IN MEXICO

It is both interesting and instructive to give here a somewhat detailed account of American investments in Mexico up to 1912, when the revolution had gotten well under way and had practically stopped the establishing of new enterprises and the operation of many old ones, both foreign and Mexican owned. These investments had reached a grand total of \$1,057,770,000 according to one of our consuls, while England had only invested \$321,302,800; France, \$143,446,000, and all other countries—Mexico included—only \$1,376,471,422. The American investments consisted of:

Railway stocks.....	\$235,464,000
Railway bonds.....	408,926,000
Bank stocks.....	7,850,000
Bank deposits.....	22,700,000
Mines.....	223,000,000
Smelters.....	26,500,000
National bonds.....	52,000,000
Timber lands.....	8,100,000
Ranches.....	3,150,000
Farms.....	960,000
Live stock.....	9,000,000
Houses and personal property.....	4,500,000
Soap factories, etc.....	1,200,000

Breweries.....	\$600,000
Factories, miscellaneous.....	9,600,000
Tramways, power and electric light plants.....	760,000
Stores—	
Wholesale.....	2,700,000
Retail.....	1,680,000
Oil business.....	15,000,000
Rubber industry.....	15,000,000
Professional outfits.....	3,600,000
Insurance.....	4,000,000
Theatres.....	25,000
Hotels.....	260,000
Institutions, public and semipublic.....	1,200,000

These figures are exceedingly illuminating. They not only give the reader an authentic basis on which to estimate the importance of the part played by the United States in the development of Mexico's natural resources, but show our confidence in her good faith and emphasize the magnitude of our opportunity and our duty as a commercial and financial nation, not only to deserve and hold the vantage ground already gained, but to extend and strengthen it in every proper and legitimate way. The door is wide open, and the extended hand of welcome bids us enter. Ours is the advantage of contiguity, reciprocal possibilities, neighborly obligations and mutual interest in the broadest sense of these words which are so full of meaning. But we must rightly understand and be understood if we hope to reap the possible fruits of this opportunity and these advantages in full measure.

And herein is the most important necessity at present devolving upon both Mexico and the United States in their relations to each other and to their common interest. It has been too long neglected. If, in recent years, one-half the money and organized effort had been devoted to disseminating the truth with reference to Mexican-American relations and mutual interests that have been devoted to a propaganda of falsehood conducted by designing political adventurers, much bad feeling, a vast sum of money, many lives and incalculable injury to future trade and industrial interests of both countries would have been saved.

It would seem that neighboring nations are no less addicted to the gossip habit regarding each other's affairs than are individual neighbors next door or across the street. The only difference lies in the degree of resultant injury.

AREA AND POPULATION

Mexico, the land of infinite possibilities, has a superficial area of 765,525 square miles exclusive of a number of small islands which, according to official statements aggregate 20,356 square miles. This enormous area is divided as follows:

	<i>Square Kilometers</i>
Adapted to dry farming.....	900,000
Mountain land.....	600,000
Irrigable land.....	190,000
Non-irrigable land.....	190,000
Occupied by cities, towns, roads, lakes and rivers.....	100,000
In actual cultivation.....	20,000

This area is occupied by twenty-eight states, two territories and a federal district. The superficial area of these is given officially as follows:

	<i>Kilometers</i>
Aguascalientes.....	7,692
Campeche.....	46,855
Chiapas.....	71,302
Chihuahua.....	233,215
Coahuila.....	165,219
Colima.....	5,887
Durango.....	109,495
Guanajuato.....	28,363
Guerrero.....	65,840
Hidalgo.....	22,373
Jalisco.....	86,752
Mexico.....	23,908
Michoacan.....	58,594
Morelos.....	7,082
Nayarit.....	28,371
Nuevo Leon.....	64,838
Oaxaca.....	92,442
Puebla.....	33,653
Queretaro.....	11,638
San Luis Potosi.....	62,177
Sinaloa.....	71,380
Sonora.....	198,496

Tabasco.....	28,871
Tamaulipas.....	83,597
Tlaxcala.....	4,132
Veracruz.....	75,863
Yucatan.....	42,600
Zacatecas.....	63,386
Federal District.....	1,499
Territory of Lower California.....	151,109
Territory of Quintana Roo.....	49,914

The population of the several states in 1910, in which year the last government census was taken, was as follows:

Aguascalientes.....	118,978
Campeche.....	86,500
Chiapas.....	438,843
Chihuahua.....	405,705
Coahuila.....	367,652
Colima.....	77,704
Durango.....	483,175
Guanajuato.....	1,081,651
Guerrero.....	605,437
Hidalgo.....	646,551
Jalisco.....	1,208,855
Mexico.....	989,510
Michoacan.....	991,880
Morelos.....	179,814
Nayarit.....	171,837
Nuevo Leon.....	368,929
Oaxaca.....	1,041,035
Puebla.....	1,101,600
Queretaro.....	244,663
San Luis Potosi.....	627,800
Sinaloa.....	323,642
Sonora.....	265,383
Tabasco.....	187,574
Tamaulipas.....	249,641
Tlaxcala.....	184,171
Veracruz.....	1,124,368
Yucatan.....	339,613
Zacatecas.....	477,556
Federal District.....	720,753
Territory of Lower California.....	52,272
Territory of Quintana Roo.....	9,109

To census Mexico fully has always been a difficult, if not impossible task. What with its vast mountain fastnesses so difficult to penetrate, its lack of transportation facilities and a prevailing prejudice, amounting often to absolute

superstition and even to actual fear, the enumerator has been met with disfavor always, and not infrequently with hostile demonstrations.

Add to these elements an ever present percentage of inefficiency, and you have at least reasonable justification for concluding that the total population was very considerably more in 1910 than was shown in the above table. For many years it has been generally stated to be in round numbers 15,000,000 in the entire republic; whereas, if we consider the natural increase since that year, together with the above and other elements which should be included in forming a fair estimate, 20,000,000 would, I am convinced, be nearer the truth.

It is particularly interesting to note the inconsiderable foreign population in 1910, as shown by the census reports (116,527) and divided as follows:

Spanish.....	29,541
Americans.....	28,639
Guatemalans.....	21,334
Chinese.....	13,203
British.....	5,264
French.....	4,604
Germans.....	3,827
Cubans.....	3,478
Italians.....	2,595
Japanese.....	2,276
Turks.....	2,907
Arabs.....	1,546
All others.....	5,433

There is food for reflection, both serious and amusing, in this brief and innocent statistical statement, if one takes the trouble to analyze it even in the most casual manner.

Ever since the political demise of President Diaz and the "cientificos," and particularly since the inauguration of the world war, the German colony in Mexico has been persistently used as a bogey, a counter-irritant and a reason for keeping a large military force on the north bank of the Rio Grande which otherwise would be dispatched to France and be employed in the work of helping to conquer the real German danger "over there." At no time has this bogey deserved a fraction of the attention it has received;

but at all times it has been practically without justification, and has been a serious reflection upon the American colony in Mexico which has throughout recent years been more than seven times as great in numbers as its German competitor, and certainly not its inferior in intelligence.

A close Mexican observer has asserted that in creating and maintaining this man of straw the few German propagandists in Mexico have succeeded in multiplying themselves and magnifying their importance, in the public mind, by many appearances and much loud talk in clubs, bar rooms and other rendezvous where their presence has been tolerated.

Surely the American, English, French and Italian colonies with a combined numerical strength in the proportion of 41,102 to 3827, according to the 1910 census, have been quite able to cope successfully with the Germans in Mexico, even if we include the "terrible Turk," and his 2907 compatriots who were domiciled under the green, white and red flag.

To the credit of Mexico be it said that of her own people only a small element of the Indian or peon population and those consisting of mixed German and native families, and of unscrupulous manipulators of ignorance, superstition and prejudice has ever yielded to the temptation of German gold or German argument in creating or perpetuating an unfriendly attitude toward the United States. The educated or intellectual elements, with comparatively few exceptions, have sympathized with the Allies, and especially with the United States, from the day we joined in the fight for world democracy. For Mexico has not forgotten her own fight against the encroachments of autocracy when she met and defeated the forces of Maximilian on the plains of Queretaro. Nor has she forgotten that the American government stood firmly by her throughout her supreme ordeal in advocacy and defense of the principles for which she fought. It was more than a revolution—it was a rebellion, not only against autocracy but against outside dictation in her own affairs.

In Mexico, life has been more or less of a discouraging

struggle for the protection of human rights, the establishment of high ideals, and the permanent maintenance of democratic principles through a republican form of government since long before the Cortez gold hunters set foot on the sands of Vera Cruz. The country seems to have inherited more than her share of peace disturbing ills. She has not merited them. They have been forced upon her for the gratification of selfish ends, or worse.

In the long years of autocratic rule in Mexico, which did not end with the beginning of a democratic form of government, there grew up a political and social system which gained strength as the years passed. The idle few, whose wealth had been inherited from idle ancestors, occupied the choicest seats at the nation's table, framed and administered the laws for the government of the many who for centuries were not permitted to have any part either in creating public sentiment or in acquiring the simplest rudiments of mental or moral advancements. Employment meant peonage, and peonage meant slavery. The favored few were awarded immense tracts of the richest land, and the down-trodden many were compelled to cultivate it in return for the miserable privilege of an existence that had neither the stimulus of ambition nor the comfort of hope. And what the greedy employer did not withhold, the ruling church exacted.

I have in my library a volume published some years ago by the Mexican government, containing tables showing that of the total number of children born in the country, more than one-half are "illegitimate." Investigate the occasion for this statement and you will find the answer in the fact that the Indian has been kept in such abject poverty that he has not as a rule been able to accumulate enough money to pay the priest for performing the marriage ceremony.

FINANCIAL CONDITIONS

It does not require the mind of a great financier to appreciate the magnitude of the financial problem which unavoidably demands a very large part of official Mexico's attention at this time.

The latest official statement places the total debt of the country, June 30, 1917, at a little above \$311,000,000 gold. This includes not only the revolutionary period but the pre-revolutionary, and excludes the debts contracted by Huerta and Villa, except \$5,000,000 which the latter was authorized to incur. This amount, it has officially been asserted was without authority increased by him to several hundred million dollars, a considerable portion of which the arch traitor and notorious bandit no doubt appropriated to himself and a few of his favorite partners in crime.

The extent of damage obligations incurred through the revolution has not yet been ascertained, but will be, in due course; and when ascertained will be adjusted and settled fairly and to the satisfaction of all concerned. I am assured from entirely reliable sources that every consideration will be extended to all legitimate claimants and their claims, and that no thought of shirking responsibility has ever been entertained by the present government.

Since 1910 the finances of Mexico have constantly experienced the disturbing influence of revolution, to which cause was added in 1914, the great war in Europe; and lately, the entrance of the United States into the conflict between the contesting forces of democracy and autocracy. Yet throughout this entire period the government has been able, without borrowing a single dollar from outside sources, to pay promptly all current obligations and keep the wheels of government running smoothly, and to maintain her financial and commercial standing.

In 1881 the total national revenue (Mexican money), was \$6,155,356, and the expenditures were \$5,757,547, and in 1909 the revenue was \$24,443,830 and the expenditures were \$23,752,887. In the fiscal year 1912-1913, which saw the triumph of the revolution initiated by Venustiano Carranza, the revenue amounted to \$120,958,902, and the expenditures \$110,781,871.

The Diaz régime surrendered the reins of government in May, 1911, and the period between that date and the accession to power of the Carranza or Constitutional party included the brief reigns of Madero and Huerta.

Since the adoption of the general plan of the Constitutional party and its orderly enforcement, there has been a marked increase of Federal revenue. To illustrate, I take the months of May, June, July and August, 1917, in which the treasury receipts were \$26,707,674.

The most rigid economy is being practiced in all departments of the government.

In the two years beginning with the spring of 1916 Dr. Alfredo Caturegli, Mexico's financial agent in this country, disbursed at his office in New York City over \$40,000,000, gold, in connection with many and varied financial and industrial transactions. And this incident is only one link in the endless chain of reasons why closer and ever closer relations between Mexico and the United States should be earnestly and unceasingly and by every proper means encouraged. To neglect this reciprocal duty is to close the door against golden opportunity.

Mexico needs money with which to develop more rapidly her manifold and incomparable natural resources, and incidentally, render more valuable the opportunity which she offers to American capital and enterprise. A hundred million dollars loaned her would not only be absolutely without risk, but would open wider the door of opportunity to American capital and enterprise, and narrow it in corresponding ratio, to our competitors. The suggestion is both natural and practical; and if not within the province of our government at this time, should appeal to our great bankers and capitalists.

Germany covets the Mexican market and is already planning to recapture at least a big slice of it. Not very long ago her merchants practically controlled the larger part of it, and more recently have fought hard to regain lost advantage and declining prestige. They have hoped to accomplish this purpose by a sickly and disreputable propaganda through the German colony in Mexico. The last prop on which rested this hope was knocked from under it when the German army surrendered to the Allies and the Kaiser dissolved his assumed partnership with God.

EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

How important it is to the commerce of this country to deserve and cultivate the favor and friendship of the Mexican government and the Mexican people can be best understood by a study of recent export and import tables with respect to a few of the articles of commerce which enter most extensively into Mexican-American trade. Although the less important articles are in themselves sufficient to illustrate my contention and to point out many avenues leading to possible profit, lack of space bids me omit them from this necessarily incomplete presentation of a very big subject.

For present consideration I confine myself to these articles which were exported from Mexico in the fiscal year 1912-13. Their value is given in gold:

Gold ore, dust, bullion, cyanides and sulphides.....	\$19,361,435
Silver ore, bar, cyanides and sulphides.....	99,939,500
Copper and copper ore.....	18,262,205
Sisal hemp*.....	15,066,877
Sugar Cane.....	5,631,850
Charcoal.....	4,188,175
Garbanzos (chick peas).....	2,465,181
Lead.....	2,453,285
Chicle (chewing gum).....	2,170,936
Ixtle.....	1,823,220
Hard and cabinet woods.....	1,682,565
Vanilla.....	1,657,735
Cattle hides.....	4,124,200
Cattle.....	3,459,253
Goat hides.....	1,225,118
Deer hides.....	189,362
Horses.....	117,861
Grass root.....	980,166
Antimony.....	798,250
Beans.....	580,322
Fruits.....	509,349
Raw tobacco.....	501,305

* In the year 1917, when the high prices of sisal hemp exacted by the Comision Reguladora de Henequen prevailed, the cash receipts from the product amounted to \$52,220,000, gold.

Of the leading industries of Mexico in which the United States is especially interested the group which may be ap-

propriately designated as the Big Three are: Mining, Oil, and Agriculture.

The individual articles which enter most extensively into Mexico's export commerce and of which we are the buyer and consumer are: silver, gold, copper, sisal hemp, oils, coffee, hides and skins, cattle, chick peas, sugar, chicle, rubber, hard and cabinet woods, and charcoal. Her imports cover a wider range of articles. The leading ones, in value, are: cotton goods, iron pipe, woolen goods, lumber, shoes, canned meats, railway supplies, cyanides, drugs, alcohol, fire arms, tools, musical instruments, copper, brass and bronze goods, furniture, leather, agricultural implements, iron goods, structural steel, wood manufactures, glass ware, hats, wine in barrels and bottles, printed paper goods, automobiles, dried and preserved fruits and explosives.

To prepare a complete list of articles entering into the reciprocal commerce possible between Mexico and the United States would be a difficult task. It would be equally difficult to estimate the value in dollars of the immense trade possibilities encompassed within this ever broadening opportunity for mutually profitable commercial and industrial enterprises. The only present barriers against its speedy and limitless development are artificial and can be forever obliterated by a persistent propaganda of truth, which shall not cease until falsehood and prejudice and misunderstanding have been permanently conquered.

The marvelous growth of the oil industry in Mexico in the few years that have passed since the first well was sunk renders every authentic statement relating to the subject surprising to all students of economics. Human credulity finds it difficult to realize that between 1905 and 1917 the wells of Mexico increased their output of oil from 300,000 barrels in the former year, to 55,292,770 barrels in the latter.

The principal oil fields of Mexico occupy a triangle of an 18,000 square mile zone extending from the seashore to the Sierra Madre mountains, the three districts of greatest production being Tantoyuca, Tuxpan and Papantla. Over 72

per cent of the oil lands within this zone are controlled by "groups," in these proportions:

	<i>Hectares</i>
Pearson group.....	564,095
La Corona group.....	408,385
Doheny group.....	227,477
French-Spanish group.....	145,666
Mestros group.....	76,222
Penn. Mex. group.....	67,110
Explotadoro Petrolifera group.....	63,913

The output in 1917, wonderful though it was, would probably have been increased to over a hundred million barrels if the necessary means for transporting it to the seaboard and thence to the consumer had been provided. And still the story is not complete. Thus far it has stated actualities only. If we include the potential or possible output of all the wells of Mexico the sum total, according to a recognized authority would now reach 488,000,000 barrels annually. Add to this last estimate the new wells which may reasonably be expected to enter the producing arena each year, and the result is staggering.

The exportation of manufactured articles from Mexico has been so insignificant since the beginning of the revolution, and especially since the United States entered into the world war, as hardly to justify tabulation. Only five articles, drugs, sugar, cotton seed flour, cigars and cigarettes and bran exceeded \$100,000 gold each, in value. This drop was chiefly due to disorganized labor and other internal troubles, and to restrictions upon international trade incident to the war, all of which will soon be removed.

It would be difficult to estimate the benefit to commerce directly and to the human race indirectly, and especially to the cause of world democracy in the war now so happily ended, for which credit must be given to the great oil fields, and to the unwavering action of the Mexican government not only in preventing threatened German inspired interference with the production of oil but with its delivery to the allied war fleets and to the innumerable industries co-operating in this greatest work of human mind and human brawn.

At no time in the progress of the conflict was it impossible

for the Mexican government to stop the flow of its oil into the reservoirs of Germany's enemies. But it never contemplated such action for a moment. And at no time has that government or any considerable element of its intelligent following entertained other than the most friendly sentiment toward the United States and actual sympathy with the cause of the Allies. This would have been expressed in no uncertain tones and with inspiring promptness if occasion for the abandonment of the policy of neutrality had at any period in the great conflict arisen. They who for a moment give ear to the contrary belief do Mexico great injustice.

To the writer, Mexico's ambassador at Washington has more than once stated his country's policy with reference to the war on the other side as one of beneficent neutrality. Would any other policy, in view of the facts that she had no navy, no surplus cash in her treasury, a small and indifferently equipped army, no real excuse for injecting herself into the conflict and no need of supplies which were not already going to the Allies, have been wise? But a more potent reason than any of these was the fact that she had troubles and problems of her own quite sufficient to tax her resources and test her brain power and physical possibilities.

Mexico is on trial before the high court of public sentiment, and her case should not be prejudiced by false testimony, religious intolerance, political schemers, sordid motives or other improper influence. From these sources she has already suffered almost to the limit of human endurance, and to the discredit of our own country must the admission be made that within our borders have these wrongs originated and been chiefly exploited.

When it is recalled that the original area of Mexico was 1,650,000 square miles, or a little more than twice its present dimensions, and that the enormous extent of territory which she lost to the United States was wrongfully taken can the reasonable mind wonder if there still remains in the Mexican heart a remnant of resentment toward the greater nation which despoiled her of this heritage of inestimable value? Rather wonder that in the brief space of half a cen-

tury so much has been forgiven and forgotten. It is asking a great deal to expect that our neighbor across the border can so soon—for fifty years is only an insignificant span in the world's great bridge of centuries—with absolute composure glance northward and with one sweep of his mental vision encompass the splendid states of Texas, California, Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Colorado, Utah, Nevada and a part of Kansas—a territory eight times as large as Great Britain—and realize without at least a slight feeling of resentment that only a short time ago every acre of this enormous empire belonged to him.

A misunderstanding of facts and policies is responsible for most of the charges brought against the Mexico of today, in print, on the platform and in private circles. Unreliable sources of information, a deliberately planned and far-reaching propaganda of falsehood, and inadequate efforts to counteract the effects of this propaganda are responsible for this unfortunate condition.

One of the most serious of these charges relates to the rights of aliens to hold property, engage in business and to assert and defend their legal rights. The impression has quite generally prevailed in the United States that no alien can hold property in Mexico without first becoming a citizen of the country, which would of course mean the renunciation of citizenship elsewhere, as one cannot serve two masters at the same time. On the contrary, the new constitution provides that any foreign corporation or individual may acquire and enjoy the use and profits of lands, concessions to work mines or to exploit waters or mineral fuel the same as natives, provided they make a declaration at the Department of State agreeing to be considered as Mexicans in all matters relating to such property, and to submit all legal questions to the courts of Mexico. And they are not permitted to meddle in Mexico's political affairs. Can reasonable objection be made to these requirements?

A semi-official pamphlet recently printed in English for distribution by the Mexican government asserts that "conditions of life for foreigners in Mexico are almost privileged.

They are treated as guests of honor, and the Mexican hospitality is proverbially generous and courteous. They enjoy all the guarantees and rights accorded to Mexicans, and are exempt from the duties and obligations of citizenship."

Race development in Mexico is advancing more rapidly under present influences than in any period of the past, not even excepting the most affluent and wonderful reigns of the Mayan and Toltec and Aztec kings, which represented a civilization in many respects unsurpassed in the world's history.

These influences are represented in the practical measures being inaugurated by the present government which may be briefly summed up as:

The transfer of power from a privileged autocratic few to the developing masses.

The providing of universal education in the fullest sense of the term.

The diverting of hundreds of millions of uncultivated acres from land barons who have kept them from producing either food for man and beast, or taxes for the government, to the peon class by which they will be industriously cultivated.

The discontinuance of special privileges.

The creation of a great middle class.

The elevation of the laboring classes to their proper position.

The introduction of modern farm methods and implements.

The abolition of the last vestige of peonage.

The prohibition of monopoly or trade limitation.

The advancement of Woman to her proper status as a citizen.

The prohibiting of bull-fighting and gambling and the restricting of the traffic in intoxicating liquors.

The freedom of the press.

THE FUTURE OF THE PACIFIC

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University of New Zealand*

1. THE PAST FORESHADOWS THE FUTURE

The only sound method of prediction is study of the past: Not that history exactly repeats itself; but that similar antecedents and conditions produce similar results. The lightning success of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic campaigns inevitably led to the aspiration for world-dominion and as inevitably led to the persistence of a sea power as nucleus of an opposition that could not but end in the downfall of the aspirant. The Potsdam magnates had studied the history of a century ago and thought that they would avoid Napoleon's mistakes. What they could not evade was the law of causation and every new outrage they have committed for the purpose of making sure of their goal has made their defeat more certain. These too successful wars made dynastic and national intoxication inevitable; and nature teaches us daily as well as all through history the destiny that lies in wait for the inebriate who runs amuck. The Potsdamers did not study history widely enough or human nature deeply enough.

2. THE ISOLATION OF THE PACIFIC

It may seem irrelevant to apply this to the Pacific Ocean and futile to judge of its future by its past, for it has been the most isolated of all seas and seems to be the last arena of human history. It has been side tracked from human power and ambition, and is only now about to come into its own, as the greatest expanse of water on the face of the globe. Its shores were occupied by peoples who were afraid to sail far from the coasts or coastal islands and never mastered the art of oceanic navigation till Europeans taught them.

And it is scarcely four centuries since even these were bold enough to venture into "that untravelled world, whose margin" seemed to "fade for ever and for ever as they moved."

3. IMPERIALISM WAS NOT UNKNOWN IN THE PACIFIC

But it is a mistake to think that imperialistic ambition never dared the perils of this great ocean, before European commerce gave it form and aim. Even in the Polynesian groups there is evidence enough that this is untrue. Hawaii does not stand alone as the arena of conquest and empire. The work of Kamehameha is a commonplace, but centuries before him kings like Umi consolidated royal power in the larger islands. It was the same story in the Society group, the Samoan, and the Tongan. Even in the smaller groups and islands of Polynesia, as, for example, in the Austral Islands and Easter Island we hear of monarchies. While in the extensive areas of New Zealand there was a growing tendency towards kingship which almost came to achievement early in the nineteenth century in the southward raids of Te Rauparaha. It was the great distances dividing not only the groups but the islands in each group that made a wider imperialism impossible, in spite of the marvellous command of oceanic navigation that the Polynesians had early acquired. But the strict law of interchange of consonants in the various dialects, some of them now separated by four or five thousand miles of ocean, postulates a development of their interrelated peculiarities in a confined area over which constant peaceful intercourse was made possible by the concentration of organised government in the hands of a monarch; this was doubtless in their vanished fatherland, Hawaiki, now the spirit land of many of the groups. That it lay in the east of the central Pacific seems to be indicated by the routes of the various migrations.

4. VANISHED EMPIRES IN MICRONESIA

There are other signs of submerged empires in the Pacific Ocean. These are to be found in Micronesia between Polynesia and Japan. On the southeast coast of Ponape one of the most easterly of the Carolines there exist the ruins of a megalithic Venice, Metalanim, that could not have come into existence without an organized government with the absolute command of a population of at least twenty times as great as the islands within a radius of 1500 miles could support; the blocks that compose the walls are so huge and some of the walls so high that it would need the muscle of hundreds, if not thousands, of workmen to haul them into position, and the work of tens of thousands more to supply these with the necessaries of life; its artificial islands and water-streets cover an area of eleven square miles.

Away to the west in the little island of Uleai I found a script still in use among the chiefs, as far ahead of the Chinese ideographs as the latter are ahead of mere picture-writing. It consists of a syllabary of between fifty and sixty characters and is also in use in another little island a hundred miles to the northeast of it called Faraulep. Such a method of record and communication could not have come into existence, much less persisted, unless an organized empire required it. Again on the east coast of Yap, a much larger island some four hundred miles to the northwest of it, there is a coastal village called Gatespar, to whose chief, one of the least powerful in the island, there come yearly canoes over hundreds of miles of stormy ocean with tribute; the tributers, when asked why they pay such homage to so obscure a chief, declare that he would raise hurricanes and earthquakes to destroy them if they did not. This too looks like the relics of a great imperial power in these islands.

5. THEIR FOUNDERS MUST HAVE COME OUT OF THE WINTRY NORTH

Now if there is one thing clearer than another in human history it is that no imperial stimulus has ever come out of the tropics and no empire has ever been organised in the

zone whose organisers have not come from outside the tropics. It is in the temperate zone alone have existed the climatic conditions that could make organising power an instinct of man. The long winters compel intense energy in the seasons fit for the raising of food and the keenest foresight in providing for the foodless times; and without organisation these might still land a community in famine and annihilation. The organiser is a necessity of life in the long-wintered zone; he is a luxury in the tropics where nature is so generous. And periodical famines, in spite of hard work and foresight, drive the more warlike organisers into descents upon the fuller supplies in and close to the tropics.

We will not be far wrong, then, in assuming that the empires whose relics are to be found in the Pacific Ocean were founded by migrants from the north temperate zone. We may also assume that they did not need to remain too many generations in tropical climates before they founded them. Tropical light blunts the nerve-ends and tropical heat relaxes the tissues. And before long the imperialistic impulse fades away and the faculty of imperial organisation grows feebler, unless some new goad of nature that will not be evaded, such as the sinking of an insular fatherland, stirs them to new energy and enterprise.

6. TOO LONG RESIDENCE WOULD HAVE QUENCHED THE IMPERIALISTIC FIRES

If the conquering, imperialistic migrants had had to come all the thousands of miles from India or the Malay Archipelago, right in the teeth of the trade winds, that would make the migration cover many generations, if not centuries; they would have left relics of their empire-making tendencies on the way. But there are none; not even the trace of a kingship, along the coasts of New Guinea and through the widely-ranged groups of Melanesia. There every village fights against its neighbour; there is nothing but village or minute local organisation, the very antipodes of empire. And such long saturation in the tropics would have left the monarchic capacity a mere shadow of itself

before it reached the central Pacific. If we are to explain the continued stimulus towards monarchical organisation that showed itself up till our own times in Polynesia, we must assume wave on wave of migration out of the north temperate zone.

7. THE ORGANISERS OF THE PACIFIC MUST BE FROM THE TEMPERATE ZONE AND MARITIME

And this is the postulate of healthy organisation of the islands of the Pacific Ocean in the future. The blood of the organisers must be renewed periodically from the cooler zones to the north or to the south. The era of European oceanic migration has at last brought the southern temperate zone into the sphere of human organising impetus. Belonging as it did to the oceanic hemisphere, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and the Argentine had to await the coming of oceanic man, before they could bring their influence to bear on human progress.

There is another feature of the past of the Pacific that must belong also to its future. It is that its organisers must be maritime. No race was ever so maritime as the Polynesian. He would undertake a voyage of thousands of miles of ocean without misgiving; he ventured out in directions he had never taken before, following the flight of birds and guided by the stars. Had it depended on the Papuan or Melanesian to bring the central groups of the Pacific within the human sphere, they would have been left to the seabirds till the Europeans came; even the Malays, daring coastal sailors though they were, never launched out into the unknown. Whatsoever race or races organise the Pacific Ocean must have a large supply of natural sailors, that is to say, sailors who have been accustomed from childhood to adapt themselves to the moods of the sea.

8. THE NATURAL NURSERIES OF SAILORS

It is quite true that many fine sailors come from inland; and the great lakes of America will always supply considerable numbers of hardy and skilled mariners for the oceanic

fleets of the United States and Canada. But for the bulk of crews that are to man the far voyaging ships, a nation must have natural breeding-grounds of oceanic sailors; these are the fiords and protected waters that tempt the boys into boats from early childhood; when manhood is reached all fear of the sea is gone; it is their plaything and comrade. The nation that has unbroken coast line like Peru and Chili can never be maritime in the true sense of the word; nor can the nation with ironbound precipitous coasts, unless it is insular and must find its way to other nations over the sea.

9. WHY AMERICA LEFT THE SEA FOR A TIME

The New England coasts, if not the whole Atlantic seaboard, formed the natural breeding-ground for the marine of the United States, they are broken into so many coves and bays. And in the early part of the nineteenth century it was one of the foremost maritime nations of the world. But the westward movement called the Americans away from the sea; the peopling of the great plains and other states beyond the Rockies absorbed their whole energies and ambitions for three-quarters of a century. Even the coastal growth of enterprise looked inland and not seaward for a career, especially after the Civil War, when the flocking of European immigrants gave every inland career an enormous unearned increment. It was this, along with the navigation laws passed by inland navigators, that brought the maritime enterprise of the United States to its nadir. The descent is about to be stopped; and the sounds of northern Oregon and the isles that stretch down the coast from Alaska will supply the sailors of her Pacific Ocean fleets. And in this new enterprise Canada will share to the full extent of her broken coastline and protected waters on the Pacific.

10. WHY BRITANNIA HAS RULED THE WAVES

But after all is said, it is the insular nations, provided they have plenty of protected waters, and are sufficiently large that have the best chance of making most of the sea.

Their people cannot move anywhere in the world without voyaging. They must have ships if they are to prosper; and one of the most important sections of them must be sailors; the natural career of a large proportion of their coastal growth must be on the sea; if they have much broken coastline and many protected waters, the boys take to it as a duck takes to the water.

We see this fully illustrated in the history of Great Britain. As soon as the center of commerce shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, she could not help becoming the greatest seapower; and her isles and firths bred fishermen and sailors by the myriad. Had Germany only reflected more correctly on these facts of nature, she would have hesitated to enter on her great and now disastrous enterprise. She has but a small coastal line on the North Sea fit to be the nursery of sailors, while her Baltic Coast has little that approaches to this in suitability for maritime capacity. And a little study of Admiral Mahan's books would have shown her that in a world war the ultimate decision lies with seapower; the strongest navy holds the gate of the arena of combat and ultimately strangles the continental combatant. But she was mad enough to think that though Britannia rules the waves, she could counterbalance the advantage by "waiving the rules."

There are other advantages that Britain has as an island; she lies off a great and populous continent and always finds a ready market. Another is that she lies across the latitudes; her zones of climate produce each its own variety of character and talent; and being under one government and organisation, the peoples of the different zones mingle, and nature secures in this that infinite variety of type which is one of her essentials for developing a great people. The lack of this latter advantage is apparent in the history of ancient Crete; she lay in the very eye of ancient trade, and thrice she flourished and thrice she fell. For maritime though her people were, there was not sufficient variety of type out of which nature might evolve a permanently great nation; she lay along the latitudes, her people were all set in the same mould.

11. JAPAN AND NEW ZEALAND IN THE PACIFIC ARE ANALOGUES OF BRITAIN IN THE ATLANTIC

There are only two other insular domains with all the advantages that made Britain so great on the sea; and these are both in the Pacific Ocean. One is in the northern hemisphere, the other in the southern; but both are like Britain in the temperate zone with a moderately severe winter. The one is Japan, and the other New Zealand. One, though an ancient nation, is just about to arrive. The other, though still in its infancy has all the potentialities that may in the future make her a great nation. But Japan has everything in her favour for immediate achievement in the Pacific Ocean; she has an overflowing population with a high birthrate; she has the singular advantage of entering upon a new career in the wide world with the heredity and faculties and sinews of a vigorous past career; in this she is like a tree that has been kept pot-bound till its roots have absorbed most of its vitality and is then transferred to an unlimited range of soil in the open; it is bound to luxuriate in its new sphere. Japan is both old and young; she has her roots far into a distinguished past and she is stretching out in all directions, as capable of development and as full of ambitions as a youth just entering on the world. Still more, she has a great continent beside her to exploit; a great market for her goods and a great quarry of labour. But perhaps the most striking feature of reborn Japan is her passion for education and especially for Western education; if only China and she would abandon their impossible script, they would surpass all other nations in the rapid development of their intelligence. For the thousands of characters that an educated man must become familiar with handicap the majority of their people. The substitution of an alphabetic script would send Oriental education deep and far. This must occur before China can become a true republic, or Japan become saturated with that love of liberty which has been the source and inspiration of all true progress in the West.

12. THE DANGERS OF AN AUTOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

Were Japan to jettison that Prussian model of government which she deliberately adopted at her revolution not much more than a generation ago, she would go far to remove all suspicion of her designs in the Pacific and all fear of her following in the footsteps of her model. A divine autocracy is never without the risk of developing a Kaiser Wilhelm and abandoning all sanity in its ambitions and international policy. The fate of Napoleon did not ensure the world against the repetition of his attempt at world-domination. We are suffering the result of the autocratic monomania that, counting itself partner with omniscience, if not omniscience itself, is unteachable. If it commands an armed nation that has acquired sufficient wealth, nothing can prevent it dragging mankind into the Golgotha Europe has suffered every century since modern kingdoms consolidated into overpowering centres of strength. Democracies are not wholly innocent of warlike passions; but their preparations for conquest can never be prolonged or secret. It is sane and high-principled democracy, democracy capable of self-control and incapable of mob-rule that alone can make a league of nations and the practical cessation of devastating wars practicable. And it is quite possible that Japan may by her widening foreign commerce, and the contact of her far-migrating citizens follow the course that has led Britain, as an island the pioneer in all seas, towards what is practically democracy and that a sane democracy. No community in the Pacific would be afraid or suspicious of such a nation, a nation inspired by the passion for liberty and respect for the rights of other nations and peoples.

13. THE OUTLOOK OF THE ORIENT

If it were asked what nation or race was most likely to dominate the Pacific in industry, commerce and finance, nature answers; it is the race that by instinct works hardest and that at the same time by its passion for education develops its intelligence and its faculties to the utmost, it is the nation that places intellectual and ethical progress

and the mastery of the secrets of nature above all other pleasures in life. The Orient has by a long series of periodical famines developed a race that surpasses all others in industry and submission to discipline. It is such a race too that is the most prolific. It was only the fitful moods of nature producing as they did those very intermittent periods of starvation that saved the world from being overrun by those Orientals that live outside the tropics; within the tropics there was added the inertia of tropical heat and light to prevent the swarming forth of hundreds of millions. They also set a limit to wealth, as well as to population. But now that Western methods of hygiene, industry, organisation and commerce are finding their way into the East famines will recur less frequently and with less devastating effect and the limit to increase of population and of wealth will vanish; while the spread of education will saturate industry and organisation with a more preserving intelligence.

14. NATURE'S PROVISION AGAINST THE COMBINATION OF SUPERWEALTH AND SUPERPOPULATION

What then is to prevent the Pacific Ocean, if not the world, being deluged with extra tropical Oriental humanity and dominated by its wealth and by its unwearied industry once it is transformed by better organisation and the infusion of educated intelligence? It will be another sequence of nature; where wealth accumulates fertility decreases, and the pursuit of leisure and pleasure interferes with the constancy and the efficiency of labour. "The wealth of Armerz and of Ind" not merely in poetry, but in reality, will bring the same results as it has done in the West, a check to the birthrate and the appearance and growth of labour difficulties. China will take centuries to realise unity and efficiency of organisation. Japan has the unity that an insular position gives a nation. But she is rapidly becoming wealthy and wealth will bring all its natural sequences. The prediction that she will have a hundred million of a population not long after the middle of this century will not

be fulfilled. Germany had through her accumulation of wealth entered upon a period of Sodom-and-Gomorrah licentiousness; the birth-debacle had begun in her cities and the country districts would soon have been unable to make up the deficit in population. A wealthy Orient will have the same experience and the same results.

15. THE LOVE OF LIBERTY THE GUARANTEE OF PEACE

But it is far yet from the stage in which that natural sequence begins to work, as it is far yet from that love of liberty which has been at the basis of all democratic developments. The leaven is working even in Japan whose natural unity makes discipline dominant. For not only is education favourable to it but the thousands of Japanese who have gone abroad and are coming into contact with occidental peoples and occidental institutions are drinking in the spirit of liberty at every pore. Even more do the Chinese abroad appreciate the advantages of Western freedom; it was from the migrants that there came the stimulus to revolution in China; and it was returned migrants who gave body and form to the republic. It is difficult for those who know the old East from contact with it to realise how strong the reflux of contact with the West outside the borders of the Orient is going to be. When its full effect manifests itself and the love of liberty becomes as deep in the East as it is in the West, we of the West in the Pacific will feel safe. For "we must be free or die, who speak the tongue that Shakespeare spake. The faith and morals hold that Milton held."

THE STRENGTH OF JAPANESE OFFICIALDOM, PARTICULARLY IN EDUCATION

By an American many years resident in Japan

Japan is one of the Allies and not the least among the number; she is doing more than simply fulfilling the obligations of her treaty with Britain. She is acting, and apparently with sincerity and heartiness, the part of a true ally. So far as appears, the government and the governing classes are taking the part of their allies with more than the conviction that it is the winning side; they also feel that it is the *right* side—the side of righteousness and honor. The fact that Japan's acts and attitude are what they are makes us pause anew to investigate Japan's position as to government. She takes the side of the democratic governments as against Germany, the exponent of autocracy and a militaristic bureaucracy; to which party should we expect to see her lean, arguing from her form of government and her governmental tendency?

When one compares Japan and Germany, and Japan and her three principal allies in this war, one cannot fail to be impressed with the very many more points of resemblance between Japan and Germany. In the first place the government and the people are not the same—which, of course, is tantamount to saying that Japan and Germany are neither of them true democracies. The common people have as yet little concern with the government. They are still too close to the more fundamental realities of obtaining a living in the face of many obstacles and much competition to take much interest in anything else. Their precedents, their education and attainments, their very religion, make no provision for anything but accepting the state of affairs as they find it. Of course some of the people, notably the new but rapidly growing class of factory operatives, which is so easily organized, are beginning to connect their own unsat-

isfactory condition with the government in a vague sort of way. But in general what is said above holds good: the people and the government are absolutely different bodies, and there is little interest taken in the matters of government by the rank and file.

Secondly, the feeling of the people with regard to the imperial institution, while absolutely different in origin, and in the way in which it is fostered, is nevertheless in its effects very similar. In the one case it is of very recent growth and is fostered by the imperial institution itself; in the other the history runs into millennia, and though there is, as described afterwards, a definite propaganda for fostering it, yet it is concurred in, and even intellectually assented to, by the whole nation with remarkable unanimity. But while the history and method may be different, the results are very similar in the two countries. In both the emperor is the seat of authority and neither is a constitutional government in our sense of the term. Whereas in Germany in very recent times the imperial institution has usurped the function once held by the people, in Japan from time immemorial the ruler has been the sole source of power, and the granting of the Constitution by the emperor of Japan was a piece of quasi-divine clemency—granted, the theory is, out of his love for his people entirely, and not because of any inherent right of theirs to have a constitution. So in neither country is there constitutionalism based on the divine rights of man as the Allies know constitutionalism.

On the other hand there is very little to be found in Japan of the definitely militaristic spirit—though it is difficult to see why it might not be legitimately expected from a country which the western nations refused to treat as an equal until they were compelled to do so by her military defeat of China. It certainly might be argued by the Japanese that the ways of war rather than the ways of peace have been the successful ones in their own experience, and that therefore the way to obtain their object was by force. In the face of this severe lesson by her western neighbors Japan's scarcity of real militarists is surprising. But if her militaristic spirit is far less developed than that of Germany, so

also is that offsetting factor, a socialistically inclined proletariat. This however is rapidly developing. Japan will not consent forever to cling to the leading-strings of her governing classes.

Lastly in this brief summary of a few of the outstanding similarities between Japan and Germany is the fact that there exists in the hands of officialdom in Japan today the selfsame weapon which has proved so powerful in the hands of Germany's bureaucracy—the system of education. The whole nation is not only educatable, but is already educated, according to the ideas of the ruling caste. The educational system in Japan is absolutely in the hands of the officials; given any line under the sun along which they wish to educate the people, there is no reason why it can not be done. Up to the present the chief use to which this power has been put is the fostering of the patriotic cult, the peculiar official Shinto with the Emperor and the imperial institution as the immediate object of reverence. There are in this, of course, grave possibilities of danger to good understanding with other peoples; but so far these elements do not seem to have come to the surface in any international relations. How very praiseworthy this is on the part of official Japan can be appreciated when one considers what its exact counterpart in Germany has done for the world.

There are undoubtedly many other points which might be mentioned in this connection, but I will confine myself to the above. I wish to say again that right through the list there is a difference in degree; it is, for instance, far easier to break into the official class in Japan than in Germany. But the fact seems to be that Japan, feeling instinctively the similarity between the two nations (whether temperamental or accidental we will not now discuss), when she was selecting models for herself along all lines after her reconstruction, deliberately chose Germany as her pattern in many things, especially in the matter of education. It is especially this item of education considered in the light of what has already been said as to Japan's officialism, of which I wish to speak a little more at length.

The educational system is official, first and last, from top

to bottom. From the Department of Education whose minister is head of the system, down through all the grades, 4 years university; 3 years college; 5 years secondary school; 6 years primary school; and 3 years kindergarten (where it exists) through it all it is official, almost inconceivably different from the spirit of education which we know in America. It is frequently remarked that the German system is calculated to reduce all students to one type. Certainly nothing could be more conducive to that end—highly desirable from the official point of view—than the educational system of Japan. It has been stated to be the ideal, albeit known to be unattainable, of the Department of Education officials to be able at any given hour of any day to say by looking at a schedule what any pupil in the empire in any given grade is doing. That is, of course, impossible; but they are able to inform you that if a certain pupil has reached a certain grade in any school he has therefore studied certain subjects as far as a given page in the text-book. The whole scheme is formulated by the Department and absolute adhesion to it is compulsory. No provision whatever is made for the “optionals” and “electives” which our colleges so elaborately furnish.

Private schools also have been very distinctly frowned upon; and although there are some indications that hereafter such absolute rigidity will not be exacted, yet it is still very difficult for the private schools to obtain “government recognition.” This last term means (1) that so long as a student remains in the school he is exempt from military conscription; and (2) that a graduate is permitted to compete with graduates of regular government institutions in the examinations of higher government schools. This last makes it hardly necessary to remark that a graduate of a mission school without “government recognition,” for instance, is not permitted to attend government colleges and universities; which is tremendously penalizing the private school students and handicapping the schools themselves.

Every prefecture has its department of education, whose head is one of the governor’s staff and is, like the other members of the staff, designated by the central government.

By the way, the shifting about of these heads of prefectural departments by the national Department of Home Affairs is one of the features of official life. After my years of residence in this little prefectural town there is not one of these officials who has not been changed; and in some cases there have been three and even four incumbents. When this can be done without tremendous detriment to the work it shows the absolute uniformity of the government in all the prefectures.

The principals of the schools are appointed officially; the primary and secondary school heads by the prefectural officials, and those above that by the national Department. These principals of the prefectural schools are really government officials. They rank as such and are so considered in social and official functions. These schools are: Middle School, feeding the colleges and afterward the universities, with a course of 5 years; the corresponding Higher Girls School, with 4 years; Normal with 4 years for both sexes; Agricultural with 3 years; Commercial with 4 years; all of these take pupils after an examination upon finishing at least the required 6 years of primary work. For the Normal it requires 7 or 8 years of primary work. For the less ambitious there is a higher primary course of 2 years.

It should be noted that there is very severe competition in the entrance examinations for the higher schools. In some of these there are several contestants for every place. A young friend of mine recently was one of a successful class of 50 out of 200 examinees. And we hear of 2000 young men competing in the entrance examinations when only 100 can be admitted. And it must be borne in mind that these men are all eligible and would be admitted without examination if there were places for them. But as there are so comparatively few schools the entrance is necessarily by competitive examination. One reason for the fierceness of the competition is that the successful graduate of the college and university has his position in life, financially and socially, assured to him. There is a great difference between graduates of government and private schools in the line of prestige and social standing, and in the probability of get-

ting a good situation. And this is true of the girls perhaps equally with the young men.

Recently I attended a series of graduations of the secondary schools: Middle School, Higher Girls School, Normal School, Agricultural School; the difference between the spirit—the feeling—of these graduations and those of secondary schools at home is so great that in spite of many years of such attendance the shock is always acute. They are so absolutely official.

Let me describe one of them; being official, describing one is describing the whole series for this year and for every year.

First, however, let me say that Japanese officials are not officious or impolite. They are gentlemen; kind, courteous, and thoughtful for the stranger in their midst. We who live in the prefectural towns are almost always on friendly, sometimes even on intimate terms with the officials from the governor down through the school principals. I have some very pleasant acquaintances and even some real friends among the official class. We hear of the bane of officialdom in Germany, especially its effect upon the officials in their rudeness and haughtiness to all below them in rank. I am very happy to say that while there is necessarily an official bearing among Japanese officials I have never seen anything even approaching the hauteur so common among Germans of this class. And especially is this true of the military officers; generally there is to be seen little swagger and no brutality among them. In view of these considerations it is easy to understand that there is little of the offensive about this class in Japan.

The graduation ceremonies—that is the right word—are conducted as follows: at the end of the school hall there are large panelled doors before the alcove in which are the imperial portraits. These doors are kept shut except on such occasions as New Year's Day and the Emperor's Birthday when they are opened for the school ceremony of bowing before the pictures. In front of the doors is the platform, highest in the middle and lower at the sides. First, the school takes its place in the main body of the room in the

middle, the graduating class in front; then the "fathers and elder brothers," some few of whom come to the graduation, take their seats around the edge of the room (in the case of a girls' school it is the "parents and elder brothers and sisters;" practically no women attend the graduation at boys' schools); then the "invited guests;" and lastly the "chief official," usually the governor, but in his absence, or in the case of an unimportant school, the prefectural education secretary or even some other official. The "invited guests" and officials sit on the right wing of the platform and the teachers on the left. At the command of the gymnastic and military training teacher, an ex-army officer of inferior rank, or it may be at the chords struck on the piano, all bow profoundly. Then the principal stands before the "invited guests," thanks them, especially the governor, for gracing the occasion with their presence ("in spite of great pressure of business you have come out this morning at great trouble to yourself," etc.), and declares the proceedings open. The national anthem is then sung, the guests usually not singing, with heads lowered in reverence. Next comes the reading of the Imperial Rescript on Education. This, promulgated October 30, 1887, which is a message from the Emperor himself urging his people to be diligent, obedient, and faithful in the discharge of all their obligations, has been in a special box on the table in front of the closed doors behind the platform. The principal goes from his seat at the left side of the platform to a place about twenty feet from the doors, bows before them, and then goes up, and (though not de rigueur, usually with gloved hands) with great care takes out the rolled Rescript, unrolls the silken cover, and lifts it to his forehead in reverence; this is the signal for all to bow, and bowed heads and lowered eyes are the rule during the reading. Then the roll is reverently replaced and the box closed and tied with its silken cord.

Next comes the distribution of diplomas: the principal takes his stand behind the desk and the head teacher brings the diplomas in a great lacquer tray and places them before him. Then a teacher, usually the former army officer, in his uniform, reads the names of the graduates who rise,

saying "present" as they do so. The one chosen for it, usually the best scholar in the class, goes out in front, bows while the rest simultaneously bow, advances to within three steps of the desk, bows again, receives the bunch of diplomas, raises it to his head and bows, retires the three steps, bows, turns about and goes to his seat. Sometimes the school has several courses in which case each course has the same order of procedure; and the same order is followed in the distribution of prizes which follows—prizes for general excellence, for excelling in some one branch, and for attendance. I have seen prizes awarded students who have not been absent for ten or twelve years; but I strongly suspect that this means *officially* absent, which means "without excuse."

After this the principal says a few words of congratulation and of exhortation to the graduates. Then the governor is handed by his attendant, an official in the education department, a beautifully written and classically worded letter of congratulation which he receives, reads from the desk, and afterwards deposits on the same to go later into the school archives. Then the lists are thrown open to the "invited guests" of whom one to three have been beforehand requested by the principal to say something, always congratulatory, sometimes also hortatory in tone, to the graduates.

The next item on the program is the reading by a member of the graduating class of a beautifully written and worded document expressing gratitude to all for their presence on the occasion, their thanks to the teachers, and their regret at leaving the school. A representative of the under classes reads a letter similar in style, expressive of their sorrow at losing their big brothers. These two documents go into the school archives, as do also the congratulatory addresses from the "invited guests" when these are read instead of being a speech without notes. After this a representative of the "fathers and elder brothers" addresses a speech of gratitude to the teachers for what they have done for the graduating class. Then if there is music on the curriculum of the school, as in the Normal and Girls Schools, the graduates sing a song expressing their feelings; and this is re-

sponded to by the under classes who sing the sentiments of Bobby Burns, and sometimes to the selfsame tune, indeed. After this the principal declares the proceedings over, thanks the guests again, and leads out the governor; the guests, and fathers and elder brothers follow in order.

Upon arriving and before leaving the three grades of guests are shown into three separate rooms where they are served tea and cake. Also after the proceedings there is usually an exhibit of penmanship, drawing and painting, and in the case of girls, of sewing, that is very attractive.

Little comment on this graduation program is needed to show how absolutely official it is in tone. I do not know any better way to show how the whole educational system of Japan runs in that direction than describing this one point of that system.

THE BULGARIAN NATIONALITY OF THE MACEDONIANS

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One of the most difficult problems, which the Peace Conference in Paris, would have to solve, is to decide the future status of Macedonia—the apple of contention among the Balkan States. No one, who is acquainted with Balkan politics at all, will dispute the fact that the crux of the Balkan problem is the Macedonian Question. Therefore, an equitable solution of it will provide the surest basis for a lasting peace in the Balkans. The present occupation of Macedonia by the Greek and the Serbian forces does not alter the difficulties involved in the question. It constitutes merely a holding in suspense of the final settlement of this intricate problem. There are, however, several obstructions which may lead to misunderstanding and cause a consequent dissatisfaction in deciding the nationality of the Macedonians.

The question of races in Macedonia is an important factor in the solution of the Macedonian question, but it is not beyond any hope of settlement. Macedonia does present a babel of races, creeds and tongues, which, in a way, baffles the ingenuity of the ethnographer, theologian, and the philologist, but these fragments of peoples represent a small minority in all the districts where either Greek, Serbian or Bulgarian population predominates. The regions west of Schar Mountain are inhabited mostly by Serbians. The western, central and the eastern parts of Macedonia are preeminently Bulgarian. The territory along the littoral of the Aegean Sea and southwest of the cazas of Vodena and Castoria is decidedly Greek. A valid

guarantee for the rights of the minority will put the racial question in the background.

A confusion may result from the consummate authority and finality with which the Greeks and the Serbians speak in discussing the Macedonian Question. Thus the Greeks employ the geographical term, Macedonia, as if the whole of Macedonia were Greek, by race, language and customs. The Serbians speak of it in the same sense when they refer to "old Serbia." and Macedonia. The Bulgarians only have used that term in referring to Macedonian territory in which the Bulgarian element is in the majority of the population. This vague use of the geographical name of Macedonia has created many conflicting opinions concerning the nationality of the Macedonians.

The Greeks have also invoked the assistance of religion in their claims on Macedonia. Their reasoning in this respect bristles with inconsistency. No contemporary political thinker will consider religion as an essential attribute of nationality, but the Greeks still persist to use religion as a synonym of nationality. Thus if a man were of the Greek orthodox faith, and if he were under the jurisdiction of the Greek patriarch of Constantinople he was *ipso facto* Greek regardless of his race or language. The Greek patriarchate of Constantinople has had the monopoly in matters of religion and education of all the Christians in European Turkey for centuries. The Patriarchs have used their authority to impose the Greek nationality on the Bulgarians. The native schools were abandoned, the native literature was destroyed, and the Greek language was forced upon the people. In fact, they were registered in the Church books as *Roume Millet*—Greek people. Nothing could have been more advantageous than the lapse of centuries during which they could have Hellenized the Macedonian Bulgar, but they have failed. Their crude and oriental methods were the means by which the national consciousness of the Bulgarians was awakened and led to the establishment of their independent church—an evidence that being under the jurisdiction of the Greek patriarch does not make a man Greek any more than an

American Catholic would be considered an Italian because the Pope of Rome is the head of the Catholic Church. But the Greeks have gone one step further. They have compiled statistics to prove on paper, at least, that the Macedonians are Greeks. We shall waive any refutation on this point because statistics, valuable though they may be, are always opened to the imputation of bias.

The opinion of foreign authorities, some of whom know intimately the people of Macedonia, has been sought by all the contending parties in order to influence American public opinion but we shall not rely much upon it because it has been exploited enough. How then is the nationality of the Macedonians to be determined?

This question can be properly answered in the words of President Wilson who said that the Balkan problem should be settled "along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality."¹ It is along such lines that the nationality of the Macedonian Bulgars has been indisputably established. The governments of Europe have confirmed on several occasions the Bulgarian nationality of the Macedonian peasants. The population itself has dared to assert its Bulgarian nationality in the face of Turkish, Greek and Serbian opposition.

Let us first consider how official Europe has created the map of Bulgaria in the Balkan Peninsula. The ecclesiastical oppression which the Bulgarian peasants had to endure was degrading enough, but it was at the same time, the only vehicle by which they could asseverate their national consciousness. In the early decades of the last century a campaign was inaugurated for an independent Bulgarian church. It was fundamentally a political movement conducted under the guise of religion. The Greek bishops condemned it on the ground that it was against the tenets of the Eastern church, which does not recognize racial distinction. The Bulgarian patriots, however, had calculated that it was the least expensive way from every point of view for the Bulgarian people to

¹ President Wilson's message to Congress, January 8, 1918.

establish their nationality and also strike a fatal blow at Pan-Hellerism—a herculian undertaking for a people against whom no political or intellectual obstruction had been spared to stifle the buoyancy of its national enthusiasm. For nearly forty years it had to be pounded into the heads of the Greek patriarchs and the Sultans of Turkey that the Bulgar was not going to relinquish what he had started to accomplish and that resistance was merely fanning the national fire into blaze. And thus on March 11, 1870 the Porte, disgusted with the Patriarch's dilatory methods in settling the church question issued the famous Firman, establishing the separate Bulgarian church.² This official act of the Turkish government was the most important event in the history of the Bulgarian renaissance. It was the foundation upon which the political structure of contemporary Bulgaria was built. Needless to say, the Porte was following its time honored policy of *divide et impera* in establishing the Bulgarian church, but it was not conscious that the Firman was creating a new nation within the Ottoman Empire. The tenth article of the Firman roughly demarcated the boundaries of the Bulgarian church. It included the dioceses of Nish, Pirot (both annexed to Serbia in 1878), Vodena and several other in eastern Macedonia.³ This article contained also the following provision: if the inhabitants of a locality (other than those above mentioned) express a desire, unanimously or at least three-fourths of the population, to come under the jurisdiction of the exarchate, and if their wish is well established, it will be granted to them.⁴ This provision was the bulwark of the Bulgarian regeneration in Macedonia, for four years had not passed when the inhabitants of Skopie (Uskup) and the Ochrida dioceses demanded Bulgarian bishops. In order to ascertain whether the majority of the population was Bulgarian, a plebescite was taken, the result of which was that three-fourths of the people accepted the exarchate.

² Richard Von Mach, *The Bulgarian Exarchate*, pp. 11-23.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

⁴ Prince Gregoire Troubetzkoi, "La Politique Russe en Orient," in *Revue d'histoire Diplomatique*, Vol. 21 (1907), p. 396.

And by the end of the year 1874, the representatives of the powers recognized the predominance of the Bulgarian element in the districts of Bulgarian Morava, Skopie, Monastri, and Castoria.⁵ The significance of the Church question was that through the many years of struggle for a free church the European powers recognized the existence of the Bulgarian people in the Turkish Empire; that it indicated, in a general way, where the Bulgarians constituted the majority of the population in Macedonia; and that it established a precedent for the Constantinople Conference to follow in formulating the map of Bulgaria.

The Constantinople Conference, which was held in the year 1876 at Constantinople, established the political map of Bulgaria along ethnographical lines. According to the project, which was written by Prince Tzerteleff, Secretary of the Russian Embassy, and Mr. Eugene Schuyler, the American Consul General at Constantinople, Bulgaria was to be divided into two administrative provinces—the eastern and the western. The latter province with which we are concerned was composed of the districts of Sofia, Vidin, Nish, Uskup, Monastir, Castoria, Veles, Tickvesh, Doiran, Strumitza, Melink, and Nevrokop.⁶ After he had put the government of Bulgaria on paper, Mr. Schuyler, who knew thoroughly the Balkans wrote: “The Bulgarian constitution is done and has been accepted by Salisbury as a basis of discussion. I think it will get through without a great many modifications, and what I am chiefly interested in is that Bulgaria be left as a unity instead of being divided into several separate provinces.”⁷ Sefat Pasha, the president of the Conference, admitted that the Bulgarian constitution aimed to include all the Bulgarians of European Turkey into two provinces in which the Bulgarian element would predominate, but he doubted the wisdom of the plan because it will create distinct racial divisions within the empire.⁸ Marquise of Salisbury, the

⁵ A. Ischirkov, *Les Confins Occidentaux des Terres Bulgares*, p. 86.

⁶ *Blue Book, Turkey No. 2*, p. 52 (1878).

⁷ Eugen Schuyler, *Selected Essays*, pp. 91–92.

⁸ *Blue Book, Turkey No. 2*, pp. 334–335 (1878).

special delegate from England, said: "The word 'Bulgaria' did not indicate a district of which the geographical limits have been confined. To give it a practical meaning the plenipotentiaries have been obliged to take into consideration the origin of the word itself, and the sense in which it is at present employed."⁹ The delegates of the Conference were endeavoring to apply the constitution to the two provinces in which the majority of the population was Bulgarian. Though they adopted the constitution with minor changes, yet it was doomed to be a failure. For the Turkish government to counteract the interference of foreign powers in the internal affairs of the empire, proclaimed a new constitution by which it guaranteed practically all national rights to the people. It was merely a throwing dust in the eyes of Europe. The constitution became a dead letter immediately after its proclamation. Thus the conference did not succeed in reforming Turkey, but it definitely described the western frontiers of Bulgarian Macedonia.¹⁰

But Russia, the self appointed defender of the Christians in Turkey, was not satisfied with the result of the Conference. If the concert of Europe failed to accomplish what it proposed to Turkey, her mighty army was to execute the will of the powers. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 was terminated by the treaty of San Stefano. The sixth article of this treaty stipulated the so-called "United Bulgaria." This was the realization of the long cherished hope when all the Bulgarian territory in the Balkan Peninsula was united under one flag. It embraced the whole of Bulgarian Macedonia without the city of Salonica, and a part of Thrace.¹¹ But it was an ephemeral union. Europe was then suffering from a Russophobic nightmare. Her leading statesmen argued that "United Bulgaria" would be the vanguard of Russian diplomacy in her slow but sure march towards Constantinople and the Aegean Sea. England, then the spokesman of Europe, formally de-

⁹ *Blue Book, Turkey No. 2*, p. 340 (1878).

¹⁰ *Ibid*, No. 13, map (1878).

¹¹ *Blue Book, Turkey, No. 23* (1878). See map.

manded that the San Stefano Treaty should be submitted for consideration before a European Congress. Russia was bound to yield to the collective will of Europe. And the Berlin Congress was convened on June 13, 1878. The result of the Congress was a national tragedy for Bulgaria. The Berlin Treaty completely abrogated that of San Stefano. For Bulgaria, like Gaul, was divided into three parts, the principality of Bulgaria, the autonomous eastern Roumalia, and Macedonia, which was left to the mercy of the Turks. Crushing as this blow was at their national aspirations, yet it did not dishearten the patient and calculating Bulgars.

From the time of the Berlin Congress until the year 1912, the Bulgarian statesmen have never ceased to work for the annexation of Bulgarian Macedonia. That was well nigh impossible without an understanding among the Balkan States for an equitable partition of Macedonia. The *Ante Bellum* Treaty which was concluded between Bulgaria and Serbia provided the nucleus for the Balkan League. The Serbian government pledged its honor that Bulgarian Macedonia should be annexed to Bulgaria. A small section of it was designated as the "disputed zone," for which the Czar of Russia was to act as an arbitrator in case the Allies could not agree upon a settlement. A succession of diplomatic blunders led to the disruption of the Balkan League and the consequent occupation of Macedonia by the Greeks and the Serbians became a fatal reality.

There is no need to explain these official facts. They clearly point out that official Europe has incontrovertibly confirmed the Bulgarian nationality of the Macedonian peasants. The foreign traveler may be irreconcilably influenced by one of the contending parties, but it is impossible to think that the representatives of the European powers could be deceived to favor the Bulgarians. These official decisions were based not only upon the ethnographical knowledge of the people, but also upon the indefatigable efforts of the Macedonian Bulgars to unite with Bulgaria. Lack of space impels us to state only few of the many out-

standing manifestations of national enthusiasm among the Macedonians.

Here again we find ourselves in conflict with the Greek pretention that the Macedonians are Greeks by sentiment and that they pray and hope for Greece. It follows, then, that they are Greeks by choice regardless of their nationality and language. This is a liberal attitude towards nationalism with which the writer is in sympathy. It has worked here in the United States where there is no friction between national ideals and aspirations. And the foreigner has been unconsciously assimilated under the influence of one flag, one language and one ideal. But can this be said of Europe which is checkered by small nations? The nationalistic movement, which during the nineteenth century resulted in the formation of the German Empire, the Italian kingdom, and the liberation of the several Balkan States militates against its practicability so far as Europe is concerned. In fact, it is not in accord with the political principles which the Paris Peace Conference has accepted as the only basis to settle international disputes—"along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality." Let us grant that the Macedonians are Greeks by sentiment, but historical evidence proves that the Greek pretention is merely an academic assumption. There is an abundance of facts which dispel any doubt that the Macedonian Bulgars are not sentimentally Bulgarian. For the sake of clearness repetition, here, becomes necessity, but only so far as it bears upon the point of issue.

Dr. Danev, formerly premier of Bulgaria, is the authority for the statement that Macedonia is the mother of Bulgarian civilization. This sentence fully expresses the evolution of Bulgaria as an independent state,—that evolution had its foundations in Macedonia. While religion does not determine one's nationality, yet it was through the channel of religion that the Macedonian Bulgar has asserted his national consciousness. The religious movement was formulated at Skopie and Veles in the year 1833 and 1834 respectively.¹² Here in "Old Serbia" the leaders

¹² Von Mach, *The Bulgarian Exarchate*, p. 11.

of the movement demanded that the Bulgarian dioceses should have a native bishop or one who can conduct church services and preach in their native language; that the dioceses should have the right to recommend their own bishops; and that the Greek language should not be used in their churches and schools.¹³ In the later stage of the movement the inhabitants of the dioceses of Ochrida, Prilep, Monastir, Veles, Uskup, Dibra, Strumitza and Nevrokop addressed a petition to the Porte requesting that the Bulgarian nation be authorized to organize a separate church.¹⁴ A committee of six, three of whom were Greeks and three Bulgarians, was appointed to work out a plan by which the church dispute between Bulgars and Greeks could be settled. This committee included, besides the above-mentioned dioceses, those of Melnik, Prishtina, Prezpa, and Moglenitza.¹⁵ This persistent desire for a national church could have been prompted only by the self-consciousness of a people, who could no longer endure the imposition of the Greek nationality upon them.

When the news from the Berlin Congress reached Bulgaria, the Macedonians, who hoped that Russia would prevail upon the Congress to keep Bulgaria united, were the first to protest against the decision of the powers. Several districts revolted. The insurgents were so desperately determined to defy the Turkish troops that an international commission was sent to promise a speedy enforcement of the reforms which were guaranteed to them by the Berlin Treaty.¹⁶ A more important incident at this time was the supposed intention of the Bulgarian exarch to move his residence to Philippopolis, Bulgaria. This would have been a serious blow to the national movement. The Bulgarian dioceses of Macedonia would be forced to pass under the

¹³ Cf. Prince G. Troubetzkoi, *Russia and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Viesnik Evropii*, Vol. 3 (1902), p. 19 (Russian). Also Historicus, *Bulgaria and Her Neighbors*, pp. 52-53.

¹⁴ T. St. Boormoff, *The Bulgaro-Greek Church Question, Zbornik za Narodni Oomotvorenia*, Vol. 15 (1898), p. 153 (Bulgarian).

¹⁵ T. St. Boormoff, *The Bulgaro-Greek Church Question, Zbornik za Narodni Oomotvorenia*, Vol. 15 (1898), p. 211.

¹⁶ *Blue Book, Turkey No. 44* (1878). p. 20.

jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarch and the peasants would again become the unwilling slaves of Hellenism. Far from it. Patriotic meetings were held in the principal towns and cities and resolutions were adopted imploring His Beatitude to return to Constantinople. The people went so far in their patriotic rage, as to address an ultimatum to the Exarch and demanded that he either resume his duty at Constantinople as the head of the united Bulgarian Church or the Macedonian Bulgar would accept the spiritual jurisdiction of the Pope of Rome as the only alternative for the preservation of their nationality.¹⁷ The Exarch yielded to the demands of the people and under the church influence the Bulgarians remained nominally united until the Balkan Wars.

Though it pleased the European diplomacy to subject Macedonian Bulgars to a further suffering under the Turkish misrule, yet their national enthusiasm could not be quenched. After 1878 the leaders of the national movement inaugurated an educational campaign in Macedonia from which evolved one of the most highly organized revolutionary movements which the Balkans have ever seen. The educational programme was later abandoned and vigorous military preparations were undertaken with the hope of making a final demonstration against the will of the powers. And on August 2nd, 1903, a revolt broke out in the province of Monastir. The revolution was a hopeless struggle against tremendous odds but it was a vindication that the native Bulgarian population of Macedonia was ready to sacrifice everything for its national freedom.

Add to this evidence of national enthusiasm the Bulgarian revolt of 1841 at Nish, Serbia, the several Macedonian regiments of volunteers, who fought against Serbia in 1885, and the army of Macedonian volunteers, several thousands of whom went from the United States, in the Bulgarian forces during the Balkan Wars, and the answer to the question, whether the Macedonians are Greek or Bulgarian by sentiment, is obvious. Mr. H. N. Brailsford

¹⁷ Simeon Radeff, *The Builders of Contemporary Bulgaria* (Bulgarian), pp. 96-106.

in his competent work, *Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future*, says: "My impression is that the more democratic Bulgarian movement really has the sympathy of the large number of the peasants who are 'Greeks' from fear or calculation. . . . I fancy that a plebescite would show that even in the districts of Vodena, Morichovo, and Serres, where Greek influence is still strong among the Slavs, the vast majority of the peasants would prefer to enrol themselves as Bulgarians rather than as Greeks."¹⁸ Mr. Brailford's fancy has been substantiated here in the United States. The Macedonian Bulgars, enjoying the freedom of speech and the right to assemble, have convened two congresses. The first Congress was held in the year 1913 at Chicago, Ill. The delegates representing every district of Bulgarian Macedonia appealed to the civilized governments of the world for the right to use their language in their churches and schools of their native land, which had been recently subjected to Greek and Serbian oppression. The second Congress was held in the year 1918 at Chicago, Ill. The delegates unanimously adopted President Wilson's fourteen points. They also strongly endorsed a union with Bulgaria, or, if that were impossible, an autonomous Macedonia should be established under a European protection.

These Congresses forcibly convey the conviction that the Macedonian Bulgars desire a union with Bulgaria and what they would choose to be if there were created such liberal conditions in Macedonia as exist in the United States.

It is hardly necessary to explain the evidence which these points bring out. They show that the Bulgarians from Macedonia and Bulgaria have a common history. They have both worked and fought for their national unity. They are one race, speak the same language, and have the same future aspiration. If ever the Macedonian peasants prayed and hoped for Greece, one will have to admit the painful truth that they have done it through the Greek priests and teachers who are the political and spiritual agents of Pan-Hellenism in Macedonia.

¹⁸ H. N. Brailsford, *Macedonia*, p. 198.

The basis of Bulgaria's foreign policy has been the incorporation of all the Bulgars in the Balkan Peninsula within one independent state as demarcated by the Constantinople Conference and the Treaty of San Stefano. The Berlin Congress divided Bulgaria in order to satisfy England and Austria. Bulgaria was outraged at Bucharest in 1913 under the pretence that she was aiming at a Balkan hegemony and disturbing the "Balance of Power" in the Balkans. But the situation is widely different to-day. Europe is not trembling from Russian aggression. The Paris Peace Conference has decided upon Greater Greece and Greater Rumania. The united Jugoslavia is a realized dream. Consequently, the legend of Balkan hegemony has vanished, the "Balance of Power" Theory has been toppled, and what is more encouraging is that Austrian intrigues have disappeared. The Balkan States have never been freer from foreign machinations. It is the most opportune time to lay down the foundations for a Balkan confederation—a confederation which will at once guarantee the future intellectual and economic development of the Balkans and become a strong barrier against the encroaching tide of Germanism in the Near East. That will largely depend upon how much the Peace Conference at Versailles would do to remedy the evils of Berlin and Bucharest and by a generous application of President Wilson's fourth fundamental principle for a lasting peace which provides "that all well defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world."¹⁹

¹⁹ President Wilson's address to Congress, February 11, 1918.

THE STRUGGLE OF RACES AND SOCIAL GROUPS
AS A FACTOR IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
INSTITUTIONS

AN EXPOSITION AND CRITIQUE OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL SYSTEM OF LUDWIG GUMFLOWICZ

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I. INTRODUCTORY REVIEW OF THE ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT
OF THE STRUGGLE OF GROUPS AS A PRIME FACTOR
IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION

The general notion that conflict and struggle have played a vital part in both cosmic and social evolution is an old one. As early as the close of the sixth century B.C., Heraclitus of Ephesus is reputed to have remarked in a strain quite Bernhardian that "War is common to all and strife is justice, and all things come into being and pass away through strife."¹ The concept of "war as determiner," then, dates back almost to the dawn of human reflection upon the problems of development and progress, and its persistence through the centuries is but a reflection and an indication of the undoubted validity of the doctrine when not pushed to an extreme or regarded as absolute and eternal in its application. Herodotus (c. 484-424 B.C.) considered the Persian War as the collision of two fundamentally opposed civilizations, and had no doubt that the victory of the Greeks was an unmistakable proof that the gods had expressed their approval of Hellenic "Kultur."² While he was compelled to witness the actual expansion of the Macedonian Empire, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) opposed the policy of ter-

¹ A. W. Benn, *Ancient Philosophy*, p. 20; cf. E. Zeller, *Greek Philosophy to the Time of Socrates*.

² Cf. J. B. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians*, pp. 44-45.

ritorial expansion, set forth the patriarchal theory of political origins, regarded the small city-state as the ideal political unit, and held that stability was the chief criterion for judging of the excellence of the administration of particular states.³ Polybius (203–121 B.C.), one of the greatest historians, sociologists, and political scientists of antiquity, may properly be considered the originator of the historical theory of the origin of the state through the application of force. Drawing his conclusions from his detailed study of the development of the Roman Republic through military expansion, he contended that political evolution was a social process which was initiated by war and conflict, but which was progressively tempered by the introduction of the elements of reason, reflection and consent.⁴ The Epicureans among the Greeks, as well as their Roman followers, such as Lucretius and Horace, took from Heracleitus the doctrine of the origin of all things in conflict and strife, but held that the inconveniences of warfare and anarchy in society led to the establishment of a stable political order and the introduction of the “reign of law.”⁵ The epic poet, Virgil, and the epic historian, Livy, both sang the praises of the ruthless Roman expansion, the swallowing up of smaller states by the Roman octopus, and the “peaceful blessings” of the rule of the autocratic Roman minority.⁶

Though the Christian theologians expanded the Stoic doctrines emphasizing the essential brotherhood of mankind, historical conditions made it inevitable that the Dark Ages, the first centuries of the Christian domination of the Western world, should witness a prevalence of warfare unparalleled since the conquests of early Rome. This political environment reacted upon the writers of the period, who represented the development of political institutions as a perpetual struggle to substitute law and stability for strife

³ *Politics*, Jowett's translation, Book I, 1–2; VII, 4–15.

⁴ *History of Rome*, trans. by Schuckburgh, Book VI, 5–6.

⁵ E. Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*, pp. 490–498; L. Stein, *Die Sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie*, pp. 228–230.

⁶ Cf. H. Peter, *Wahrheit und Kunst*.

and disorder.⁷ With the development of Scholasticism in the thirteenth century and its revival of Aristotelian political theory, the patriarchal theory of political origins again became popular and persisted until the disintegration of the scholastic philosophy with the new intellectual impulses which came from the "Commercial Revolution."⁸

In the latter part of the fifteenth century there began that process of exploration and commercial expansion which marks the dawn of modern history and has now come to be known as the *Commercial Revolution*. It brought with it the general suppression of the feudal system and the rise of the modern dynastic national states through the struggle of the kings against the feudal lords—an environment admirably suited to the production of theories of social conflict.⁹ As Italy was first affected by the development of commerce in the later medieval period, it is not surprising that the earliest modern exponent of *Machtpolitik* was an Italian, Nicolo Machiavelli (1469–1527), whose philosophy reflected the continual inter-urban strife of the Italy of his day. Being a great admirer of Polybius, he adopted the latter's theory of political origins, but was not willing to stop at this point. He insisted that the state not only originated in force, but that it must continue to expand or perish. He not only rejected the Aristotelian notion of the virtue of political stability, but also departed from classical and Christian precedents by ejecting ethics from the domain of political philosophy, and maintained that considerations of individual morality have no relation to the acts of a state, thus revealing himself as an expositor of *Realpolitik* as well as of *Machtpolitik*.¹⁰ The French publicist, Jean Bodin (1530–1596), mirrored the process of national unification

⁷ A. J. Carlyle, *A History of Medieval Political Theory*, vol. I, pp. 211–212; vol. II, pp. 56–74, 143–144; J. M. Littlejohn, *The Political Theory of the Schoolmen and Grotius*, pp. 26–33.

⁸ Aquinas, *De regimine principum*, Book I, 1; F. W. Coker, *Readings in Political Philosophy*, pp. 129ff.

⁹ W. Cunningham, *Western Civilization*, vol. II, Book V; C. J. H. Hayes, *Political and Social History of Modern Europe*, vol. I, pp. 27–72; W. C. Abbott, *The Expansion of Europe*, vol. I.

¹⁰ *Discourses*, trans. by Detmold, Book I, Chap. vi.

in France through the civil wars of the sixteenth century, which culminated in the coronation of Henry IV. He viewed society and the state as an aggregate of lesser social groups, and held that the state was produced by the forcible amalgamation of these smaller social entities.¹¹ Bodin's theory of the group composition of the state was carried to an extreme by the German jurist, Johannes Althusius (1557-1638), who legally recognized the individual citizen only as a member of one of the series of lesser constituent groups which went to make up the federal and contractual state which Althusius created in the realm of political theory.¹² The English absolutist, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), was another forerunner of the modern conflict school. To discredit the revolutionary tendencies and theories of his day in England, he emphasized the great value of political authority by dwelling at length upon the evils of the incessant warfare which must always be a concomitant of anarchy and the absence of authoritative political control. While he is conventionally regarded as a great exponent of the contractual theory of political origins, Hobbes argued that this contract need not be voluntary, but might be forced by a conquering group upon a conquered people.¹³

Important and interesting as the above anticipations of the "conflict school" may be, there can be no doubt that the real founder of the modern version of the historical theory of political origins was David Hume (1711-1776). In his destructive criticism of the social contract theory, Hume offered as a substitute the doctrine which had been foreshadowed by Polybius and Bodin, namely, that the state and government originate in force, but come to rest more and more upon consent, as the subject citizens begin to appreciate the value of political control and institutions.¹⁴

¹¹ *The Six Bookes of a Commonweale*, trans. by R. Knolles (London, 1606), pp. 47ff.; 262ff.

¹² *Politica methodice digesta*, Chaps, i, vi-ix, xix; cf. O. Gierke, *Johannes Althusius und die Entwicklung der naturrechtlichen Staatstheorien*, chaps. i-iii.

¹³ *Leviathan*, chap. xvi.

¹⁴ *A Treatise of Human Nature*, vol. II, pp. 111, 114, 140, 259-265; *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, vol. I, pp. 113-117; 447ff., vol. II, pp. 197ff.

But Hume was a philosopher and a psychologist rather than a historian and his doctrines were expressed only in a fragmentary manner. It remained for his disciple, Adam Ferguson (1723-1816), the first real historical sociologist, to present the earliest systematic elaboration of the historical theory of political evolution.¹⁵ So greatly did he stress the importance of conflict and competition that Gumpłowicz has correctly maintained that he was the first great exponent of the theory of social and political development, viewed as the product of the struggle of social groups.¹⁶ Hegel's conception of the development of society and civilization as a process of conflict was an important contribution to this type of doctrine, though Hegel's emphasis was upon the psychic rather than the physical aspect of strife.¹⁷

The founders of modern sociology, Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, while accepting the historical theory of political origins in the promordial struggle and amalgamation of social groups, did not push this doctrine to an extreme. Comte held that not only force, but also the Aristotelian doctrines of the inherent sociability of man and the social division of labor, must be assumed as necessary to explain the origin and growth of the state.¹⁸ Spencer, in drawing his famous contrast between militant and industrial society, contended that while society, the state and government originated in the primeval warfare that produced the amalgamation and integration of primitive social groups, there was an inevitable tendency to substitute an industrial for a military basis of social life and political activity, and to replace warfare by industrial competition.¹⁹

The great impulse to an elaboration of schemes of social evolution based upon the idea of conflict, however, came from the new Darwinian dynamic biology, with its basic premise of organic evolution proceeding from a struggle for

¹⁵ *The History of Civil Society*, passim.

¹⁶ *Die sociologische Staatsidee*, pp. 77-80.

¹⁷ Robert Flint, *The Philosophy of History in France and Germany*, pp. 496-541.

¹⁸ *The Principles of a Positive Polity*, vol. II, pp. 247ff.

¹⁹ *The Principles of Sociology*, vol. II, pp. 241ff.; 265ff.; 331ff.; 568ff.; 603ff.; 646ff.

existence and the survival of the fittest. Just as the social philosophers of the eighteenth century hastened to interpret society in terms of the Newtonian laws of dynamics, so impetuous sociologists and political scientists, in spite of Darwin's warning, lost no time in attempting to carry this new biological formula directly over into the field of sociology and politics without making any allowance for the radical differences in the data with which they were dealing. Even this rash departure would not have been so disastrous had not the evolutionary hypothesis been perverted to support the particular policies of ambitious and unscrupulous political groups and parties. Bagehot's brilliant contribution to this field in his *Physics and Politics* showed how valuable the new doctrines might be when used with caution wholly in the interests of candid and impartial political science. The great evil which has resulted from the perverted application of the Darwinian biology to the interpretation of history and social processes appeared when the biological theories were exaggerated and exalted in the service of the exponents of *Machtpolitik*, militarism, autocracy and racial egoism. In view of the well established fact that political and social theories invariably take root where they are politically serviceable or where the social and political environment seems to make them plausible, it is not strange that the earliest extensive development of this pseudo-Darwinian sociology was in that land of incessant racial and national conflicts—Austria-Hungary—and that it has been received with the greatest éclat and the widest general acceptance by that nation which has been the most congenial home of racial egoism, *Machtpolitik*, and militarism, the German Empire, founded and shaped by Otto von Bismarck.

The other phase of the general doctrine of social conflict, namely, the proposition that social and political processes within the state are fundamentally a struggle between classes and groups organized about definite special interests, has an equally venerable past. It was recognized by Aristotle in his analysis of parties, and Polybius went so far as to hold that a stable government must accord definite representation to at least the larger types of class interests in a state.

This view persisted in the medieval practice of representation of estates, and was elaborated by the great theorists of the Conciliar period and by Althusius. This rational conception of party organization and political representation was temporarily submerged by the doctrine of personal representation—one of the many disastrous absurdities which were introduced into political theory and practice through the neurotic sublimations in the political philosophy of Rousseau. In spite of the attempts of Marx in Europe and Calhoun in America to bring back the more rational view of party organization and political representation, it has been only in recent years that the doctrine of political activity as a process of conflict and adjustment between opposed interest-groups has begun steadily to gain ground in theory and must ultimately be restored in practice.

II. GENERAL NATURE OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL SYSTEM OF GUMFLOWICZ

One of the pioneers in the development of sociological theory and the leader of the so-called "conflict school" was the Austrian publicist and sociologist, Ludwig Gumplowicz (1838–1909).²⁰ Possessed of wide, if not wholly critical, learning, and a voluminous writer, no sociologist, with the possible exception of L. F. Ward, has been more impressed with the finality of his own doctrines, and one cannot escape the conviction that many, if not most, of the propositions which he advanced as being supported by "blind natural law" or as manifestations of "inevitable tendencies of the cosmic process" were merely the opinions of Gumplowicz upon the particular problem under consideration. Yet, in spite of his dogmatism, Gumplowicz must be accorded the credit of having first intensively explored one of the most fertile fields of sociological investigation. His thorough analysis of the social process, viewed as the interaction of conflicting groups, is one of the most fundamental notions

²⁰ Professor in the University of Graz after 1882. Brief sketches of Gumplowicz's life and sociological writings are to be found in the *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1909, pp. 405–413.

which has yet been brought forward by sociology and constitutes a contribution of the greatest permanent value. In addition to his specific interpretation of the nature of the social process, Gumplowicz was, perhaps, the first avowed sociologist to emphasize the importance of the general sociological concept of society and socialization as a developmental *process*—a line of sociological thought which has been greatly expanded by Gumplowicz's fellow-countryman, General Gustav Ratzenhofer, and by Prof. Albion W. Small, a leading disciple of the latter.

Sociology, according to Gumplowicz, is the science of the interrelation of social groups.²¹ It is the function of sociology to demonstrate that social phenomena are amenable to measurement and can be reduced to verifiable laws:

The function of sociology consists in showing that universal laws apply to social phenomena; in pointing out the peculiar effects produced by them in the social domain; and finally in formulating the special social laws.²²

Gumplowicz gives a narrow interpretation to the nature of social phenomena, describing them as those which appear "through the operation of groups and aggregates of men on one another."²³ Accordingly, the social process throughout history has simply consisted in the relations and reciprocal actions between heterogeneous social groups and elements.²⁴ Social laws, in turn, become merely the laws of the interaction and development of syngenetic social groups. Gumplowicz's whole system of sociology was thus narrowed and somewhat distorted by his presuppositions, but it cannot be denied that he fearlessly developed his deductions from the assumed premises with Hobbesian logic and clarity.

Gumplowicz's sociological system has long been regarded as the classic example of the influence of a writer's social

²¹ *The Outlines of Sociology*, translated by F. W. Moore, Philadelphia, 1899, pp. 83ff.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 82-3. One can give assent to this proposition without accepting as valid the ten "universal laws" formulated by Gumplowicz. cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 74ff.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 101f, 121, 123; *La Lutte des races* (French translation of *Der Rassenkampf*, by Chas. Baye, Paris, 1893), pp. 167-168, 261.

and political environment upon his theory.²⁵ The almost unique ethnic and cultural diversity and the continual struggle of national groups and social classes in Austria-Hungary as well as the control of political authority by a minority in both states of the Dual Monarchy, have unquestionably colored, if not entirely determined, the main lines of his whole sociological system, based as it is upon the premises of ethnic diversity, group and class conflict, the political sovereignty of a ruling minority, and the problems of political and national emancipation, cultural assimilation, and ethnic amalgamation. It is highly important that this should be kept in mind in estimating the validity of generalizing Gumplowicz's propositions as sociological laws of universal applicability.²⁶

Aside from his excessive emphasis upon social groups and their conflict as the unit of sociological investigation, the two most noteworthy propositions in the sociological system of Gumplowicz were his denial of the importance of the individual and his refusal to admit the existence of verifiable human progress for humanity as a whole. No other sociologist, not even Tarde, Durkheim, Sighele, LeBon, or Trotter went to such an extreme as Gumplowicz did in minimizing the importance of the individual and in magnifying the degree of coercion and determination exerted by the group upon the individual. In a passage which has become threadbare through citation he said:—

The individual simply plays the part of the prism which receives the rays dissolves them according to fixed laws, and lets them pass out again in a predetermined direction and with a predetermined color.²⁷

²⁵ Cf. E. A. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 276-277.

²⁶ Cf. A. W. Small, *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1898, pp. 105-106.

²⁷ *Outlines*, p. 157. Cf. also the following: "The greatest error of the individualistic psychology is the supposition that man thinks . . . This is an error. He is not self-made mentally any more than he is physically. His mind and thoughts are the product of his social medium, of the social element whence he arose, in which he lives." *Ibid.*, pp. 156, 760. Or again, "On the altar of her method of study, sociology sacrifices man. He, the lord of creation, the author of historical events as the historians think, he who as monarch or as minister guides according to his will the destiny of peoples . . . sinks away, in sociology, to a meaningless

Even further from general acceptance among sociologists is Gumplowicz's denial of the historical progress of humanity as a totality. While recognizing improvement in particular periods or in specific societies, he questioned the existence of any progressive development of human society as a whole, and held that the historic process is but the record of the rise and fall of countless successive civilizations following a cyclical course of growth and decline.²⁸ Gumplowicz thus, not only rejected the doctrine of Turgot, Condorcet, Godwin and Ward regarding the possibility of indefinite progress, but also even refused to accept the rather timid contention of Vico that progress took the course of a spiral. With Machiavelli and LeBon, he fell back upon the theory of the cyclical nature of the movement of history, which was common in classical times and was then best expressed by Polybius.²⁹

Gumplowicz's general sociological theories lead directly to his analysis of social and political institutions. He applied his doctrine of group conflict to an interpretation of

cipher. In complete contradiction to the portrayals of the historians, even the mightiest statesman is for the point of view of the sociologist only a blind tool in the invisible but all-powerful hand of his social group, which itself in turn only follows an irresistible law of nature." *Sociologie und Politik*, p. 54. Cited and translated by Prof. G. L. Burr, *American Historical Review*, January, 1917, p. 269 and note. The selection of Gumplowicz by historians and political scientists as an illustration of the sociological view of human individuality and freedom is entirely analagous to a choice of Froude or Lamartine by sociologists as samples of historical methodology and accuracy. Sociologists, such as Spencer, Novicow and W. G. Sumner, have not been lacking who have defended the extreme individualistic point of view and those alarmed by the exaggerations of Gumplowicz can gain a great deal of satisfaction and reassurance from a study of the works of Prof. C. H. Cooley, who has undoubtedly given the world one of the best interpretations of the interrelation of the individual and society that has been presented by any writer, sociological or psychological. Even the extreme doctrine of Gumplowicz, however, is probably as near to the truth as the opposite views of Fichte, whose spirit inspired, in part, the founders of modern scientific historiography.

²⁸ Somme toute, dans l'ensemble du processus naturel de l'histoire, il n'y a ni progrès ni recul; il n'y a progrès que çà, et là, dans certaines périodes de cet éternel cycle, dans certains pays où le progrès social recommence toujours. *La Lutte des races*, pp. 348-349; cf. *Outlines*, p. 207.

²⁹ Cf. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians*, pp. 248, 256.

the nature, development, and functioning of the state and regarded it as adequate to explain every phase of political action and theory.³⁰

III. THE STRUGGLE OF GROUPS AS THE BASIS OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PROCESSES

1. THE RELATION OF SOCIOLOGY TO POLITICAL SCIENCE

Gumplowicz's conception of the relation of sociology to the special social sciences is clear and logical: "Being the science of human society and social laws, sociology is obviously the basis of all the special social sciences treating parts of human society, or of particular manifestations of associated life."³¹ Sociological investigations have first made possible a scientific study of political institutions, since only by being based upon the laws of political development and processes, which have been revealed by sociology, can the analysis of political phenomena assume a scientific character.³²

³⁰ Gumplowicz's writings on sociology and political theory are voluminous. No other sociologist has contributed as extensively to political theory. His fundamental theories, centering about the conflict of groups and classes, are brought out in a dozen volumes and many essays published between 1875 and 1910, and they form the specific content of no less than seven separate books. As he added nothing except in the way of amplification to the doctrines expressed in his earliest works, the rather monotonous repetition and reiteration of the same principles tend more to weary than to convince the reader. The earliest statement of his "group-conflict" theory appeared in his *Race und Staat*, 1875. This doctrine received its first systematic presentation in *Der Rassenkampf*, 1883. The theory was further amplified and systematized and made a part of a coherent body of sociological theory in the *Grundriss der Sociologie*, 1885, which work constitutes the best statement of his sociological doctrines. His sociological theory was applied to political institutions, but without any important changes or additions, in *Sociologie und Politik*, 1892, and *Die sociologische Staatsidee*, 1892. His whole sociological system was summed up conveniently in *Sozialphilosophie im Umriss*, published posthumously in 1910. Aside from the works mentioned, Gumplowicz's chief publications were *Philosophisches Staatsrecht*, 1877; *Verwaltungslehre*, 1882; *Das Österreichische Staatsrecht*, 1891, *Rechtstaat und Socialismus*, 1881; *Soziologische Essays*, 1899; *Geschichte der Staatstheorien*, 1905; *Das allgemeine Staatsrecht*, 3rd. ed. 1907.

³¹ *Outlines*, p. 90.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 89.

2. THE NATURE OF THE STATE

Gumplowicz's theory of the nature of the state is strictly in accord with his general sociological doctrines and is distinctively a sociological conception of the state. "The state," he holds, "is a social phenomenon consisting of social elements behaving according to social laws."³³ At the same time, the state must be carefully differentiated from society. The term *society* may be applied to the ensemble of conflicting interest-groups within any organized unit of mankind, but the term *folk* is better suited to the description of such a cultural unity. In a more accurate sense, a society is a "group centering about some one or more common interests."³⁴ The *state* on the other hand, is a portion of mankind organized and controlled by a sovereign minority:

If nothing but the universal and essential characteristics of every state were incorporated in the definition, an agreement could easily be reached for there are but two. First, there are certain institutions directed to securing the sovereignty of some over others: secondly, the sovereignty is always exercised by a minority. *A state, therefore, is the organized control of the minority over the majority.* This is the only true and universal definition; it is apt in every case.³⁵

The state, according to the conception held by Gumplowicz, is far from an "ethical being." It has never been founded to preserve justice or improve the general welfare. The sole motive in the formation of all states has been the desire of establishing sovereignty for the purpose of exploitation. The concern of the highly developed states with justice and welfare is but incidental to their original and fundamental motive and purpose, namely, exploitation.³⁶ Again, questions of morality cannot be intelligently considered in a discussion of the nature and actions of states. The state is an inevitable product of "blind natural laws" operating upon heterogeneous social groups. Hence, it is a natural phenomenon. It is not "above morality," but,

³³ *Outlines*, p. 116.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 136-138.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 118; italics are mine; cf. *Lutte des races*, pp. 218, 222-223.

³⁶ *Outlines*, p. 119.

rather, has no more relation to ethical considerations than an earthquake or a tornado.³⁷

3. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF STATES, VIEWED AS THE PRODUCT OF THE CONFLICT OF GROUPS AND THEIR PROGRESSIVE AMALGAMATION

It is through his theory of the origin and development of the state that Gumplowicz has made his most important and permanent contribution to political theory. While few would agree with the details of his doctrine, or with his sweeping generalizations regarding the universality of the origin of states wholly through conquest and conflict, it is generally admitted that the account of political origins which he sets forth with great vigor and clarity is the most satisfactory and fundamental explanation of the origin of the state which has yet been produced. It probably goes further towards clearing up the problem of political origins than any other single theory, and it has gained such general acceptance among sociologists that it may almost be designated as *the* sociological theory of the origin of the state.³⁸

For the sake of orientation in further analysis, the theory of Gumplowicz regarding political origins may be briefly summarized as follows: mankind must be assumed to have had a polygenetic origin, resulting in the existence of many different or heterogeneous social groups. These groups were led into conflict with one another through the natural and inevitable tendency of all individuals and groups to improve their economic status and to increase the means of satisfying their desires. The first conquests of one group by another normally resulted in the extermination of the conquered, but sooner or later slaughter was commuted into

³⁷ *Outlines*, pp. 146-148, 151-152.

³⁸ An enthusiastic defence of this theory by Lester F. Ward is to be found in *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1902, p. 762. Its limitations are pointed out by Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 316; and by Hayes, *An Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, pp. 538ff. It is bitterly criticized and entirely rejected by Novicow in *La Guerre et ses pretendus bienfaits* and *La Critique du darwinism social*. Most sociologists and historians, however, reject his deductions rather than the essentials of his theory of political origins.

physical and political subjection and there arose the institutions of political sovereignty and the state. The first crude and elementary political society was soon complicated by the origin of various social, economic, and religious classes, each called into existence to supply some definite need in society. The process of conflict, which originally took the shape of inter-group conquest, accordingly became transformed into a conflict between the different classes within the state. This process led to a general amalgamation and assimilation of the diverse elements within the state and the gradual political emancipation of the masses. When carried to completion a folk-state or nation—the highest product of social evolution—was fully created. Attention may now be turned to a brief analysis of the main stages and processes involved in this interpretation of the origin and development of the state.³⁹

Quite in contrast with the procedure of Ward who boldly analyzes the conditions existing in the period before the "chaos," Gumplowicz maintains that the sociologist cannot discover the ultimate origin of society but must content himself with assuming the existence of the social groups required to originate the social process.⁴⁰ He does not consistently hold to this position, however, but attempts to defend so extreme a view of polygenism that he practically succeeds in constructing a *reductio ad absurdum* of the polygenist position.⁴¹ In short, he holds that the prehistoric period was characterized by the origin and differentiation of heter-

³⁹ The analysis which follows is based upon Gumplowicz's most extensive treatment of the origin of the state as found in Book IV of *Der Rassenkampf* and Part III of the *Grundriss*. Somewhat condensed versions of the same theory are to be found in *Sociologie und Politik*, pp. 72-78, *Die soziologische Staatsidee*, pp. 88-134; and *Sozialphilosophie im Umriss*, pp. 58-68.

⁴⁰ *Outlines*, p. 86.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 92ff.; *La Lutte des races*, pp. 41ff., 182ff., 353ff. Gumplowicz's method of handling ethnographic data in support of his theories is that of the uncritical comparative school of anthropologists which held the field thirty years ago, and his arguments from ethnography are, therefore, not entirely convincing. Fortunately, his theory of political and social origins does not depend for its validity upon the now generally discredited polygenist doctrine of human origins.

ogeneous social groups, while the historic era has witnessed their integration, amalgamation, and assimilation.⁴²

Throughout the period of associated human life there have been certain forces making for group unity and solidarity, which, as a totality, can be described by the general term *syngenisism*. This he defines as "That phenomenon which consists in the fact that invariably in associated modes of life, definite groups of men, feeling themselves closely bound together by common interests, endeavor to function as a single element in the struggle for domination."⁴³ It is a complex of physical, economic, moral, and cultural forces combined in different proportions in various periods and in diverse social groups. In the earliest groups consanguinity was the strongest bond, but, as society develops, the economic and psychic forces become increasingly important.⁴⁴

Gumplowicz, then, assumes at the outset of the historical process of social and political development a large number of small social groups or hordes, each united by consanguinity and identity of economic interests, and living in sexual promiscuity and equality of social position. The origin of the matriarchate, and later the patriarchate, provided a crude type of organization for these groups.⁴⁵ This preliminary period of social evolution was broken down by the origin of war and inter-group conflict and thus there was initiated that eternal process of social struggle which can never have an end. In external relations the groups have continually attempted to effect further conquests, and within each expanding group there has been a ceaseless contest going on between an ever increasing number of competing social groups or classes.⁴⁶ The fundamental motive of group conquest throughout history has been the desire for an improvement of economic well-being:

⁴² *La Lutte des races*, p. 182.

⁴³ "Le phénomène consistant en ce que toujours, dans la vie sociale, certains groupes d'hommes, sentant qu'ils sont étroitement reliés entre eux, cherchent à agir comme un seul facteur dans la lutte pour la domination." *La Lutte des races*, pp. 241-242.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 245; *Outlines*, pp. 139, 142-143.

⁴⁵ *Outlines*, pp. 110-113; 139.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 166ff., 125; *La Lutte des races*, pp. 167-168, 210ff., 217.

The motive force in the establishment of primitive political relations was economic, as has been seen; higher material welfare was sought. But this force never fails; the innermost nature of man keeps it in ceaseless operation, promoting the development of the state as it laid its foundation. Investigate the cause of any political revolution and the result will prove that social progress is always produced by economic causes. Indeed, it cannot be otherwise since man's material need is the prime motive of his conduct.⁴⁷

In the earliest type of group conflict the conquered were exterminated, but in the course of time there was instituted that fundamental transformation in social evolution whereby a general massacre was commuted into slavery and economic exploitation.⁴⁸ In this process of the superimposition of one social group upon another, and the subjection and exploitation of the weaker, is to be found the origin of sovereignty and the state.⁴⁹ No state, Gumplowicz contends, has ever arisen except through the conquest of one group and ethnic stock by another. The state is invariably a composite of heterogeneous racial and social elements. "No state has arisen without original ethnical heterogeneity; its unity is the product of social development."⁵⁰ Political relations in the early states depended upon the economic foundations of the new compound society. The sovereign minority exploited the conquered majority and the first states were, thus, a two-fold organization, on the one hand of sovereignty, and on the other of enforced labor:

Thus nature laid the foundations of ethnically composite states in human necessities and sentiments. Human labor being necessary, sympathy with kindred and tribe and deadly hatred of strangers led to foreign wars. So conquest and the satisfaction

⁴⁷ *Outlines*, p. 123. Though an ardent supporter of the Marxian doctrine of the economic interpretation of history, Gumplowicz rejected the socialistic dogma of state activity as the chief factor in social reform.

⁴⁸ *La Lutte des races*, pp. 161-162; *Outlines*, pp. 117-119.

⁴⁹ *Outlines*, pp. 116-121; *La Lutte des races*, pp. 218ff.

⁵⁰ *Outlines*, p. 119. In another part of his work Gumplowicz rather grudgingly admits that it is conceivable that a state may, in extremely rare instances, have originated through the peaceful division of labor and the differentiation of classes, but maintains that even in such cases its later history as a conflict of divergent interests would be the same as though it had originated in group conflict. *Ibid.*, p. 136.

of needs through the labor of the conquered, essentially the same though differing in form, is the great theme of human history from prehistoric times to the latest plan for a Congo state.⁵¹

The minority of conquerors was able in the first instance to overcome, and later to exploit, the conquered majority because of superior unity and discipline, for unity and discipline are the chief source of the strength of all social groups.⁵²

As soon as the first political relations were established through group conquest, resulting in the exploitation of a subject majority by a sovereign minority, the process of social conflict became transformed from external strife between groups or states into a struggle between classes within the state. This intra-group conflict, in addition to its fundamental economic motive, was also stimulated by the "necessity for satisfying ambition, love of glory, the interests of a dynasty, and various other ideals; and the life and death struggle between hordes anthropologically different becomes a contest between social groups, classes, estates, and political parties."⁵³ The earliest class conflict was the struggle for adjustment between the sovereign and subject classes. This relatively simple process was soon interrupted, however, by the development of a class of foreign merchants whose appearance marked the beginning of that extremely important element in every population, the middle class or the *bourgeoisie*.⁵⁴ In response to the growing needs of the developing state there were differentiated from these primary or original classes of rulers, merchants, and exploited masses such secondary or derived classes as the priesthood, professional classes, and artisans:

The phenomenon of class-building can be referred to a universal law: each want produces its own means of satisfaction. In so far as a class is able to satisfy a social want it is indispensable.⁵⁵

⁵¹ *Outlines*, p. 121.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 143-144.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 123-124.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 117, 127-129.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

The social process, in so far as it was confined to the internal affairs of the state, now became a complex and involved struggle between the various classes for participation in the control of the policy of the state in order to advance their respective interests:

The struggle between social groups, the component parts of the state, is as inexorable as that between hordes or states. The only motive is self-interest The social struggle consists in establishing appropriate institutions for increasing the power of one social group at the expense of others.⁵⁶

To carry on this conflict of classes within the state appropriate organs were necessary. Participation in legislation was found to be the most effective mode of social and political conflict. This explains the long struggle of the third and fourth estates to secure the right of participating in the legislative function of the state, and the tenacity of the ruling classes in the attempt to exclude them from this privilege.⁵⁷ In all cases the basis and measure of political power has been the ability to control human labor and its products. The ruling caste, composed of the original conquerors, kept its control over the labor of the masses through the aid of the habit of obedience and allegiance. The middle class obtained its political power from its control over material goods for which it could demand labor or its equivalent. The priestly class was able to secure political authority through its control over the minds of men and hence over their services. The exploited masses, whose services constituted the basis of all political power, were excluded from exercising any civic rights until after a long and difficult struggle for political emancipation.⁵⁸

The first concessions granted by the ruling caste gave rise to the notion of rights among the lower classes. The middle class was the first to make the appeal to "universal human rights, to freedom and equality." It pretended to be interested in advancing the interests of the masses and thus gained their support. While the masses were not re-

⁵⁶ *Outlines*, p. 145, cf. pp. 125, 132, 144-146.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 145-146.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 129-132.

warded to the extent of the promises made by the middle class, they gained experience in the methods of carrying on the struggle for political emancipation, and sooner or later they have succeeded in securing admission to the exercise of political functions and to a share in political authority. The process of political emancipation was greatly hastened and facilitated when the ruling caste was threatened by enemies from without and needed to conciliate its subjects in order to secure loyalty and unity.⁵⁹ Political rights are not metaphysical entities, says Gumplowicz, but are merely the "regulations built up for the existence of unlike elements side by side and reduced by practice to rules and principles."⁶⁰ They are but the legal statement of the actual relations which exist in any political society at any time. Hence there can be no basis for any doctrine of inherent or metaphysical "natural rights:"

"The premise of 'inalienable human rights' rests upon the most unreasonable self-deification of man and overestimation of the value of human life, and upon complete misconception of the only possible basis of the existence of the state."⁶¹ Rights are not founded upon justice. On the contrary, justice is "created only by the actual rights as they exist in the state. . . . It is the simple abstraction of political rights and it stands and falls with them."⁶²

Parallel with this process of political and economic development and continually interacting with and upon it, is the psychic and physical process of social unification. Assimilation or the psychic process proceeds most rapidly. The first step is the adoption of the language of the conquerors. Next follows the acceptance of their religion, manners and customs, and a cultural unity is formed. Finally, there comes the physical process of intermarriage or amalgamation and an ethnic unity is produced.⁶³ This uni-

⁵⁹ *Outlines*, pp. 148-150; *La Lutte des races*, 259-260. Gumplowicz surveys human history to gather evidence for the support of his theory of political origins and development and concludes that all the evidence tends overwhelmingly to substantiate his thesis. *La Lutte des races*, pp. 265-345.

⁶⁰ *Outlines*, p. 178.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 181.

⁶³ *La Lutte des races*, pp. 258-259.

fied and homogeneous social group constitutes a "folk-state" or nation—the highest product of social and political evolution.⁶⁴

The generalized account of political and social evolution which has been summarized above is in reality over simplified, for a large and highly developed state is rarely or never the product of a single conquest, but is normally the compound result of many processes of conquest and partial or complete assimilation and amalgamation.⁶⁵ A unified folk-state seldom remains such for any considerable period of time, for, as Gumplowicz contends in common with Machiavelli, Treitschke, and the German militarists, a state has an inevitable tendency to expand or decline. New conquests bring in another set of heterogeneous elements and the process outlined above must begin anew. No limit can be set to the extent of the possible or desirable expansion of a state. The natural tendency is for a state to increase until its strength fails from external resistance or internal disruption.⁶⁶ As was pointed out above, Gumplowicz maintains that ethical considerations have no relation to the conduct of states in a process of expansion. The state is a product of nature and is ruled and guided by the laws of nature and, thus, is not amenable to ethical judgment.⁶⁷ This is, of course, but the reappearance of the old Machiavellian doctrine, slightly embellished with a dash of pseudo-Darwinian sociology.

4. STATE ACTIVITY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

Gumplowicz's pessimistic denial of social progress has already been analyzed. It is obvious that such a conception leaves no possibility for any such thing as social initiative, and though Gumplowicz adopted most of the Marxian premises, he accepted none of the socialistic deductions regarding the possibility of a transformation of society and the state by collective action.⁶⁸ The state and society are products of

⁶⁴ *Outlines*, pp. 153-154.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 150ff.; *La Lutte des races*, pp. 343ff.

⁶⁶ *Outlines*, pp. 150-153.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 146-148, 151-152.

⁶⁸ Cf. *Die sociologische Staatsidee*, pp. 36-39; *Rechtstaat und Socialismus*, pp. 487-505.

natural forces which are independent of all social activity. They develop through the action of "blind natural laws" that mankind is powerless to alter. Further, his conception of the cyclical nature of "progress" rules out any such notion as the indefinite perfectability of man and society through an increase in knowledge and a development of "collective telesis."⁶⁹ Both society and the individual must be resigned to their fate for they are powerless to avert it.⁷⁰ In fact, Gumpłowicz maintains that the chief practical value of his sociology is that it will prevent the waste of human energy in useless utopian schemes of social reform.⁷¹

IV. THE INFLUENCE AND HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF GUMPŁOWICZ'S INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

In estimating the significance of Gumpłowicz for the history of sociology and political science and for the development of militarism and racial egoism in recent European history, it is necessary to differentiate those elements in his system which are of permanent value from those which have now been rejected, even by writers belonging to his particular group among sociologists.

While no authoritative student of anthropology would today accept Gumpłowicz's extreme doctrine of the polygenetic origin of the several branches of the human race, it is generally agreed that his chief contribution to sociology has consisted in his systematic elaboration of what has come to be accepted as the historical theory of the origin of the state and political sovereignty, though all would grant that he underestimated the pacific and coöperative factors which played at least some part in that process. His other significant and enduring contribution was his analysis of politi-

⁶⁹ Cf. L. F. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, vol. II, pp. 249-250, 545; *Pure Sociology*, pp. 573-575.

⁷⁰ Cf. *Sozialphilosophie im Umriss*, pp. 77-90.

⁷¹ *La Lutte des races*, pp. 350-352. See *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1905, pp. 647-651. for an interesting account of a conversation between Gumpłowicz and Ward, in which the former apparently made some concessions to the latter's conception of social progress and "collective telesis."

cal activity within the state as a process of ceaseless struggle and continuous adjustment and readjustment between groups and classes which have their constituent principle in a common interest or policy. His revival and elucidation of the concept of the political party as an *interest-group* was a significant phase in the analysis of what has probably been the most fertile notion elaborated by political science in the last fifty years. When properly recognized and embodied in law and parliamentary practice, it will probably do more than anything else to give intelligence, rationale, and directness to party government. This notion has been accepted and expanded by French publicists, such as Duguit, Durkheim and Benoist, and especially by the Austrian sociologist, Ratzenhofer. Ratzenhofer's system has been interpreted to American readers through its critical exposition and analysis by Professor Small, and has been applied to the analysis of the operation of the American government by A. F. Bentley in what is undoubtedly the most valuable contribution made by an American writer to the analysis of the deeper processes of government since Calhoun published his *Disquisition on Government*.⁷²

Unfortunately, the disastrous aspects of the doctrines of Gumplowicz are no less numerous and apparent. He was the most eminent and productive sociologist who has written in the German tongue and his complicity in producing the military obsession in the Germany of 1914 cannot be doubted. He was the most extreme advocate, among sociologists of any recognized standing, of the unqualified applicability of a misconstrued and perverted Darwinian biology to the interpretation of social processes, and was an equally ardent supporter of political fatalism, or the futility of human legislative activity in the face of the operation of the "blind natural laws" that set at naught the deeds of man. His representation of war as the sole agency in political development and the only reliable arbiter of the superiority of national *Kultur* was eagerly pounced upon by militarists, even less scientific and objective than Gumplowicz, such as

⁷² A. F. Bentley, *The Process of Government*.

Loria, Vaccaro and Oppenheimer have emphasized the tendency of the primordial physical struggle between groups to become transformed into an economic conflict.⁷⁴ Novicow has held that a study of social evolution reveals the fact that the primitive physical contest is progressively commuted through the alliance and federation of groups, and the substitution of intellectual competition.⁷⁵ This field of psychic struggles and adjustments has been explored with the greatest acumen by Tarde and Sighele.⁷⁶ According to De Greef, social evolution is a process of gradual substitution of contract and consent for the brute force of more primitive times.⁷⁷ Spencer and Tarde, but more especially, Vaccaro, have built up systems of sociology based upon the thesis that conflict ultimately terminates in an equilibrium or in adaptation.⁷⁸ Finally, Ratzenhofer and Small have insisted that conflict is continually tempered by socialization and transformed into coöperation, and that the "conquest-state" of early days is superseded by the "culture-state" of the modern age.⁷⁹

Therefore, even the adherents to the "conflict" theory are generally agreed that the transformation of conflict into alliance and coöperation seems to be a function of social evolution and they would apparently support the notion that war must be followed by an ultimate international adjustment which will forever exclude the recrudescence of the crude process of physical warfare. But all this lies in the realm of the abstract. It may readily be conceded that these the-

⁷⁴ A. Loria, *The Economic Foundations of Society*; M. A. Vaccaro, *Les Bases sociologiques du droit et de l'état*; F. Oppenheimer, *The State*.

⁷⁵ J. Novicow, *Les Luittes entre sociétés humaines; La Fédération de l'Europe*.

⁷⁶ G. Tarde, *L'Opposition universelle; Social Laws*; Sighele, S., *Psychologie des sectes*.

⁷⁷ G. De Greef, *Introduction à la sociologie*.

⁷⁸ H. Spencer, *First Principles*, Part II; G. Tarde, *La Logique sociale*; Vaccaro, op. cit., especially Introduction, pp. v-vii, 78ff.; 188ff. It is to be regretted that Dr. Bristol, in his helpful book on *Social Adaptation*, failed to include a discussion of Vaccaro, who has done more than any other sociologist to develop the notion of "adaptation" as a sociological process.

⁷⁹ G. Ratzenhofer, *Wesen und Zweck der Politik; Die sociologische Erkenntnis*; A. W. Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 190ff.

ories are valid, but it may legitimately be asked if we must wait for the tardy and expensive method of allowing this final era of alliance and coöperation to be brought about by the automatic processes of social evolution. Cannot man anticipate this development and by legislation secure the benefits of peace in advance? The doctrine that man may anticipate the normal course of social evolution by well-considered legislation was one of the few sound doctrines contained in the fantastic social philosophy of the French utopian socialist, Fourier.⁸⁰ It was revived and made the cornerstone of the sociological system of America's earliest and most voluminous writer on sociological matters, Lester F. Ward, and has been regarded as the chief theoretical contribution of sociology to social legislation.⁸¹ The bearing of this important thesis upon the present problem of the creation of a league of nations, which will furnish that all-important organ for the peaceful adjustment of international conflict, for which man has been striving through the ages, is obvious. Few students of history, politics or sociology will doubt the scientific justification or the desirability of the establishment of such an organization or the possibility of its erection, if its organizers comprehend and provide for the control of those fundamental sociological causes of rivalry and strife which have existed from the dawn of history and are not likely to be self-eliminated for centuries to come.⁸² If, on the other hand, the statesmen at the peace conference ignore the lessons and teachings of history and sociology and act upon the eighteenth century premise that social and political relations can be directly transformed and adjusted by the application of a few simple and self-

⁸⁰ Cf. Gide, *Selections from the Works of Fourier*, O. D. Skelton, *Socialism: a Critical Analysis*, pp. 69-70.

⁸¹ See the references given above, note 69.

⁸² For a summary presentation of some of the more important of these sociological obstacles to "perpetual peace," see the article by Dr. F. H. Hankins, "Is a Permanent Peace Possible?" in *The Journal of Race Development*, April, 1918; for a sociological argument supporting the immediate creation of a "league of democratic nations" to enforce peace, see the article by Professor Giddings, "The Bases of an Enduring Peace," *Bulletin of the American Association for International Conciliation*, April, 1917.

evident "dictates of pure reason," their organization will break up on the rocks of practical application, as did that of 1815, which failed, not only on account of weakness of central organization, but even more because it deliberately set itself directly across the path of the chief historical and sociological forces of the nineteenth century—nationality, democracy and the expansion of the Industrial Revolution.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS¹

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The opponents of a League of Nations insist that the Monroe Doctrine would be violated if the proposed constitution of the League should be adopted. In fact it is the supposed danger to the Monroe Doctrine which occasions the bitterest attacks against the League. It is apparent, however, to even a casual reader that many of these critics are giving to the Monroe Doctrine an extremely vague and all-inclusive meaning. The Doctrine would seem, according to certain recent senatorial addresses, to reserve to the United States the privilege to monopolize the commerce, seize the territory, and supervise the internal affairs of the other American republics; to be in fact guardian and unquestioned overlord on this hemisphere.

But is this the true meaning of the Monroe Doctrine? Before it is possible to state whether the Doctrine is violated by the constitution of the League, it is necessary to keep clearly in mind what the Monroe Doctrine really is and what it is not.

The original Monroe Doctrine was, in substance, a statement to the world that the United States would not permit the autocratic Holy Alliance,—Austria, Prussia and Russia—to conquer for Spain the newly independent Latin-American republics. President Monroe announced this Doctrine in his annual message to Congress, December 2, 1823, and took occasion to state in addition that the American continents were no longer “subjects for future colonization by any European powers.” The most important sentence in the message reads: “We owe it, therefore,, to candor

¹ This article was written shortly after the publication of the original draft of the proposed Constitution for the League of Nations.

and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers (Austria, Prussia and Russia), to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."

Since the Monroe Doctrine is believed to have developed and changed during the past century, it is important to quote what is probably the last official definition, one made by President Roosevelt in his annual message to Congress, December 3, 1901. This reads: "The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American soil." The same interpretation was given by Elihu Root, the acknowledged master of American foreign policy, in a carefully prepared address, April 14, 1914. He defined the substance of the Monroe Doctrine to be "that the safety of the United States demands that American territory shall remain American."

"American territory shall remain American,"—this is all there is to the genuine Monroe Doctrine. This policy does not even prevent a European power from waging war against an American state, provided that the result of the war, in President Roosevelt's words, "does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power."

In these recent official and semi-official definitions of the Monroe Doctrine, nothing is said of the supposed obligation of the United States to avoid participation in European affairs. President Monroe, to be sure, said: "In the wars of the European powers relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do." But this was not the great fact which he wished to announce to the world; it was not "the Doctrine." It was merely the statement of a well-known, existing policy of the United States, which might tend to make "the Doctrine" itself more acceptable to the European powers. This old policy of isolation the United States has been forced to drop. Whether we enter a League of Nations or not, we must continue to take our part in world

affairs. Neither is it to this isolation policy which the opponents of the League of Nations refer when they state that the Monroe Doctrine is in danger. They refer to the Monroe Doctrine in its relation to the American hemisphere.

Although the real Monroe Doctrine means, "American territory shall remain American," other and illegitimate interpretations, often selfish and imperialistic, have frequently been given to it. As Mr. Root said in his much-quoted address upon the Monroe Doctrine: "Grandiose schemes of national expansion invoke the Monroe Doctrine. . . . Clamors for national glory from minds too shallow to grasp at the same time a sense of national duty invoke the Monroe Doctrine. . . . Thoughtless people who see no difference between lawful right and physical power assume that the Monroe Doctrine is warrant for interference in the internal affairs of all weaker nations in the New World."

Is the genuine Monroe Doctrine endangered by the constitution of the League of Nations? This question may best be answered by considering two or three different ways in which, it is assumed, the Monroe Doctrine may be violated under the League compact.

I. THE ATTEMPT BY A NON-AMERICAN POWER TO SECURE AMERICAN TERRITORY BY FORCE

It was to prevent any such attempt, especially by the Holy Alliance, that the Monroe Doctrine was first announced; and it was against such an attempt, that of Napoleon III in Mexico during our Civil War, that the Monroe Doctrine was most signally enforced. But during the past century this Doctrine has been no stronger than the American navy. In 1902, for example, President Roosevelt sent an ultimatum to the Kaiser, threatening to send Admiral Dewey's squadron to prevent the German naval forces from seizing the harbors and custom-houses of Venezuela. The United States at that time was nearly involved in a war, single-handed, in defense of the Monroe Doctrine against the most powerful military nation in the world.

Under the constitution of the League, however, an attempt to seize by force the territory of Venezuela, or of any other American state in the League, would be resisted not alone by the forces of the United States, but by all the power of all the members of the League. One of the strongest and most notable provisions of the entire League constitution is the positive guarantee of independence and territorial integrity given in Article X: "The high contracting parties shall undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all states members of the League."

The Monroe Doctrine in so far as it protects American territory against seizure by force, is ratified and strengthened by the League constitution. The compact gives not merely the added power of the League to the Monroe Doctrine on this hemisphere; but it extends the principle of the Doctrine to the other states of the World League.

II. THE ATTEMPT BY A NON-AMERICAN POWER TO SECURE AMERICAN TERRITORY BY CESSION OR PURCHASE

Although President Monroe made no reference to the possibility that a European power might secure American territory by peaceful means, President Polk and President Grant both definitely announced that the United States would not allow any American territory to be ceded to a European power, or any of the existing colonies on this hemisphere to be transferred to a European power. The present Monroe Doctrine is thus admitted to mean that no non-American power may secure any American territory by any means whatsoever. The United States has often asserted that it would not permit the transfer of any of the Caribbean islands to a stronger European state, while during the present war our Government bought the Virgin Islands from Denmark to prevent Germany from securing them by purchase.

Under the actual operation of the proposed constitution of the League, there is no real danger that any non-American power would be permitted to secure any American territory,

members of the Council other than the parties to the dispute." Probably not one of the great powers would agree to the principle that a rival power must be permitted to establish a naval or military base in dangerous proximity to the territory of another. Great Britain is especially sensitive on this point, for it would never willingly permit a rival power to establish itself on its route to India. Great Britain has a Monroe Doctrine even for the Persian Gulf, announced in 1903 in these words: "We should regard the establishment of a fortified post in the Persian Gulf by any other power as a very grave menace to British interests which we should certainly resist with all the means at our disposal." The British commonwealths in the Pacific, Australia and New Zealand, have a Monroe Doctrine of their own, which forbids a foreign power to acquire land in any way in their part of the South Pacific. To preserve her own Monroe Doctrine, and that of her dependencies, Great Britain simply could not vote to compel the United States to permit a non-American power to acquire land on this hemisphere.

There is a possibility that the dispute might be transferred to the full body of delegates of the League; but this would not greatly alter the situation, for in that body Australia would have a vote, as well as all of the Latin American states in the League. It would be impossible to secure a unanimous recommendation in favor of a European or Asiatic power which wished to acquire American territory.

It should be emphasized that unless the recommendation of the Executive Council is unanimous (except for the two parties concerned) the United States is not bound by it; and the members of the League are under no obligation to attempt to carry it out. If the recommendation is not unanimous, the United States is as much at liberty to enforce this aspect of the Monroe Doctrine as it is at the present moment.

So far then as the practical working of the League constitution is concerned, there is no real danger that the Monroe Doctrine would be violated, even by peaceful purchase of

American territory. But if it would win support for the League to make this point absolutely positive, the other powers would probably agree to an amendment of the present draft, or, at least, would be willing to accept a statement by the Senate, in giving its consent to the ratification of the treaty containing the League constitution, that nothing therein should be interpreted to interfere with the well-known policy of the United States that American territory must remain American.

III. ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES BETWEEN AMERICAN STATES BY NON-AMERICAN ARBITRATORS

The Monroe Doctrine has nothing to do with the method of arbitrating disputes between American states; but certain opponents of the League have recently insisted that the Doctrine would be violated if international differences on this hemisphere were ever referred to a court of arbitration or council of conciliation on which Europeans should be in the majority.

But so far as arbitration is concerned, the United States has been referring American disputes for years to courts in which the majority were Europeans; and no one has claimed that the Monroe Doctrine was violated or endangered. During the past fourteen years the United States has had four cases before the Hague Court; in each instance Europeans have been in control of the Court. It was President Roosevelt, the great exponent of Americanism, who persuaded Mexico, in 1902, to refer to the Hague Court the first dispute ever submitted to it. In this Pious Fund case, as it was called, President Roosevelt, or his Secretary of State, selected two Europeans as our two judges; Mexico selected two other Europeans, and these four chose a fifth European. Every single member of this famous court was a European, and our Government and our people were entirely satisfied with the proceedings and with the results. The following year, President Roosevelt persuaded the nations which had differences with Venezuela to submit their case to the Hague. The three judges



selected were all Europeans. In the extremely important North Atlantic Fisheries Case, in 1910, between the United States and Great Britain, the majority of the five judges (aside from the British and American representatives) were also Europeans. Finally, the same year, in the case between the United States and Venezuela over the claims of the Orinoco Steamship Company, two of the three judges were Europeans.

As for the Latin-American international disputes, probably the most important one in the last two or three decades, that between Argentina and Chile over the Southern Andes boundary, was referred to the decision of the sovereign of Great Britain, and the proceedings were held in London.

Neither is the United States afraid of submitting disputes to a council of conciliation in which Europeans may be in the majority. In fact, by the so-called Bryan treaties, we stand bound today with twenty states, many of them Latin-American republics, not to go to war before we have submitted every dispute, of whatever character it may be, to a council of conciliation, provided we are unable to settle it by diplomacy. The method of selecting the judges makes it possible, as in the Hague Court, that the larger number of the council may be Europeans.

Whether we ratify the League constitution or not, the United States will continue in the future, as in the past, to refer disputes to courts and councils of conciliation, in many of which the European members are in the majority.

The League constitution then does not violate the Monroe Doctrine. It strengthens it in its most important aim—the protection of American territory against seizure by force. And more than that, the League constitution will for the first time place the Monroe Doctrine, in whole or in part, in the body of international law. Up to the present this Doctrine has been merely a policy of this country. If the League compact is adopted, the clause which guarantees the territory of every member of the League will give the Monroe Doctrine, in its essential feature, the legal backing and the pledged support of all states of the World League.

NOTES AND REVIEWS

By GOLDSWORTHY LOWES DICKINSON. *The Choice before Us*.
London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., Ruskin House,
40 Museum Street, W. C. 1917. 274 pages.

The book has two main themes; militarism and internationalism. In the opening chapter the author pictures for his readers the future of mankind if wars and preparation for wars are to continue. Unless there is a deliberate and conscious change in the ideas of men wars of increasing brutality and destruction will continue, universal military training will be introduced into every country, and the whole world will become an armed camp. The author shows that many of the supposed reasons for war, such as the need for expansion, and the growth of population are inadequate explanations. Armaments, fear and suspicion are the great factors in producing war, and if the armaments were scrapped the fear and suspicion would disappear.

Internationalism, or the spirit of coöperation, is the only salvation for the world from war and ruin. In order to secure permanent peace armaments must be abolished and disputes must be settled by a process of law and arbitration.

The aim of the author is to have a League of Nations with an International Court and a Council of Conciliation. The Council of Conciliation could also exercise the function of a Legislative body dealing particularly with regulations of trade and commerce. The "open door" policy should become universal and free trade routes granted across independent States. All nations should discuss questions of State openly and the people should have as much right to determining foreign as domestic policies. "Wars have been made by intrigues of the few, arrived at in the dark."

CLARA E. SCHIEBER.

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