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
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
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Map
of the
Northern Coast of
PORTUGAL.



Map
of the
Western Coast
PORTUGAL.

THIRD EDITION, EDITED BY LIEUT.-COL. H. D. JONES, R.E.

JOURNALS OF SIEGES

CARRIED ON BY

THE ARMY UNDER THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

IN

S P A I N,

DURING THE YEARS 1811 TO 1814;

WITH NOTES AND ADDITIONS:

ALSO

MEMORANDA RELATIVE TO THE LINES THROWN UP
TO COVER LISBON IN 1810.

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JOHN T. JONES, BART., R.E.,
KNIGHT COMMANDER OF THE BATH.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

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MEMORANDA

RELATIVE TO

THE LINES THROWN UP TO COVER LISBON
IN 1810;

BLOWING UP BRIDGES

ON THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS AND OTHER
PLACES IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL;

AND

THE DESTRUCTION OF FORT CONCEPTION IN 1811.

P R E F A C E.

THE following Memoranda contain a portion of the ten sheets which the Author deemed it right to withdraw from the second edition of the 'Journals of Sieges,' in consequence of a military force being sent to Lisbon at the moment of their being printed.

These Memoranda were originally drawn up with the view of making known to those who had not the opportunity of personal inspection, the nature and extent of the defences created to cover Lisbon. They are now distributed with the same view; and if they prove useful to any brother officer seeking professional information, the writer will consider himself well repaid for the trouble of extracting them from his notes.

LONDON, 1829.

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OF

THE THIRD VOLUME.

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“ Il est des militaires qui demandent à quoi servent les places fortes, les camps retranchés l'art de l'ingénieur ; nous leurs demanderons à notre tour comment il est possible de manœuvrer avec des forces inférieures ou égales sans le secours des positions, des fortifications et de tous les moyens supplémentaires de l'art.”
—*Conversations de Napoleon, par Montholon.*

MEMORANDA

RELATIVE TO

THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS.

CHAPTER I.

DESCRIPTION OF THE COUNTRY IN FRONT OF LISBON,
WITH DETAILS OF THE MANNER IN WHICH IT WAS
OCCUPIED AS A MILITARY POSITION.

THE retrenched positions covering Lisbon, known under the denomination of the Lines of Torres Vedras, have gained so much celebrity, as having formed the barrier from which the tide of French conquest first receded, and moreover possess so many peculiarities of defence, and are so free from the objections usually urged against lines, that some observations on their nature, construction, and mode of occupation, can scarcely fail to be interesting to professional and other officers seeking military information; and happily, since the first edition of this work was penned, in 1813, the affairs of Europe have so changed as to admit of some degree of descriptive detail being without impropriety substituted for the former eulogium of the general merit of the lines.

The determination to commence these works may

Description of
the Country.

be dated from the battle of Talavera. The offensive movements which led to that action having put to the test the value of Spanish co-operation, and having fully demonstrated the utter inefficiency of their armies, from want of organization, want of discipline, and skilful officers, it became apparent to the Duke of Wellington that the contest would, in the next campaign, devolve on the small body of veteran British and newly raised Portuguese troops under his command, and a defensive system of warfare ensue. To prepare for a final struggle was thenceforward the great object of consideration ; and as the hope of successfully defending an extended and open frontier, like that of Portugal, against a very superior and highly skilful enemy, could scarcely be entertained, it was decided to seek out some position in the lower part of Estramadura, not liable to be turned or passed, and having an assured communication with the sea, which should command all the approaches to Lisbon, and which position, being retrenched in the strongest manner, would offer a point of concentration for the whole of the defensive forces of Portugal, army, militia, irregulars, &c., where they might, in conjunction with the British, be victualled and supplied with ammunition for any period of time, whilst occupying a most favourable field for deciding the fate of the capital and the kingdom in a general action.

With these views, whilst the army was cantoned on the Guadiana, Lord Wellington, in the month of October, 1809, attended by his quarter-master-

general, Colonel Murray, and his chief engineer, Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, made a personal reconnaissance of the country in front of Lisbon, and judging the scheme practicable by means of a chain of fortified posts to extend across the peninsula, directed the officers of engineers to examine and minutely delineate the various strong features of ground between the sea and the Tagus, on a breadth of several miles, in order to enable him to decide on the most eligible line of defence whenever he should deem the moment arrived for commencing the work. In the mean while, the defences of Fort St. Julian at the mouth of the Tagus were to be extended to cover and insure a communication with the fleet; and ground was to be occupied as retrenched posts or positions at Castanheira, Monte Agraça, and Torres Vedras, to support the manœuvres of the army while retiring on the meditated line, or place of embarkation. (1)

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These labours proceeded uninterruptedly till the commencement of February, 1810, when the preparations of the French for the conquest of Portugal having assumed a decided character, Lord Wellington, during the march of his army from the Guadiana to the Coa, revisited Lisbon to give final orders respecting the works to be erected for its protection. A few days were sufficient to ride over and decide on the ranges of hills convertible to his views; and having fixed the principal points and

(1) See Note at the end.

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the Country.

grand outline of his defensive system, he rejoined his army on the frontier, leaving the plan, trace, and execution of the works to Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, whose sound military knowledge and indefatigable zeal were pledges for the details being worthy of the design.

At this time it was presumed that the invading army would be nearly double the strength of the defensive force, and equal to manœuvre in two formidable bodies on the right and left of the Tagus, so as to throw back their opponents hastily on Lisbon ; or, if parried in strategy, likely to attempt wearing them out by a succession of sanguinary combats. Expectation of a successful resistance was therefore very doubtingly entertained, and the object of primary interest and attention was to secure places for re-embarking the army in case of disaster, or if the enemy should advance before the lines could be rendered of sufficient strength to make it prudent to occupy them. The next consideration was to establish such strong enclosed works to block up the passes as should enable indifferent troops to delay or check a hostile column, in its endeavours to interrupt the retrograde manœuvres of the regular army ; and these paramount objects being attained, every effort was to be used to strengthen the selected ranges of hills to the utmost that time would admit.

From the rocky nature of the coast of Portugal, there are very few spots favourable for maritime communication ; and in the space to be covered by

the projected lines, only one suitable point could be found, being a small bay, not two hundred yards in length, and very partially sheltered from the ocean by Fort St. Julian at the mouth of the Tagus ; and even at that spot, at intervals, such a sea rolls in for days together that no boat can with safety approach the shore.¹

The works to cover an embarkation were therefore to be traced of a threefold nature : first, to form a position of such extent that the whole army might sustain itself and protect its artillery and stores, during any period of bad weather which might retard the commencement of the embarkation ; secondly, with an enclosed work within the principal trace, of such size and strength as might admit of diminished numbers defending themselves, should a gale of wind come on after one portion of the troops had been embarked ; or should the army have met with such severe loss on its retreat, previously to reaching the point of embarkation, as to preclude the possibility of occupying the outer line ; and lastly, with a small post on the shore, sufficiently strong to

¹ Even in the advanced season, between the end of April and middle of June, 1810, at the large fishing town of Ericeira, such a surf prevailed that the boats could not be launched for a single morning.

In 1811, four jetties, to cover the place of embarkation at St. Julian, were constructed by Captain Holloway, at an expense of £15,000, which, notwithstanding every local and nautical opinion being unfavourable to their stability, resisted the most furious gales of wind throughout the war, and rendered an embarkation practicable in all seasons and weather.

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protect the rear guard and insure its safe embarkation.

The first object was obtained by means of a line of detached redoubts and intermediate defences, appuying its right on the Tagus, near Fort das Maias, and its left on the ocean behind the canal at the little fort or tower of Junquiera. The works of this exterior line commanded the town of Oeyras, and included within their trace, the contour of which measured 3000 yards, the whole promontory, at the extremity of which stands Fort St. Julian. The second was effected by the construction of a large irregular enclosed work, occupying the summit of the height immediately in front of Fort St. Julian. The last object was found in Fort St. Julian itself, which, from its extravagantly high scarps and deep ditches, can never be successfully assaulted against the slightest opposition. (2)

As a secondary point of embarkation, and looking to the probability of a series of operations terminating on the left of the Tagus, a line of works was to be thrown up at Setuval, to cover the right bank of that harbour, and keep open its communication with the sea. These works were to be formed partly of a connected trace and partly of detached redoubts, their right being closely supported by Fort St. Phillippe, and their left resting on a scarped cliff. The front of defence rather exceeded 1500 yards, and, besides occupying the ground most favourable for the erection of batteries to annoy the transports, formed, with Fort St. Phillippe, a strong

post, in which a division might maintain itself during the embarkation of the main body of the army, and ultimately effect its retreat by the sacrifice of a small rear guard in the fort.

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the Country.

The principal line of defence, denominated subsequently the second line, was formed on the knowledge that only four great paved roads lead to Lisbon, between the sea and the Tagus, below the point where that river, from its increased depth and breadth, becomes, in a military sense, impassable to an army ;—that three of those roads, at nearly parallel points, pass over or between heights of extraordinary strength, viz., at the passes of Mafra, Montachique, and Bucellas ; and that the fourth, bordering on the Tagus, where the ground is less bold, passes under a strong range of heights at Alhandra, nearly two leagues in advance of the right of the above-mentioned line of passes ;—and further, that the country between the paved roads being hilly and broken, could not, without the utmost delay and difficulty, be crossed at any part by an army with its artillery. It was proposed to block up the passes with formidable works, and to support their defence by forming the different ranges of heights between them into one uniformly strong line, so as to insure a connected barrier across the peninsula, which an invader must force through by a front attack before he could reach Lisbon.

Nature had done much in aid of this design : commencing on the left from the sea at the hamlet of Ribamar, in front of Ericeira, and following up

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the Country.

the course of the little river St. Lorenzo to Cacheca, adjoining the pass of Mafra, a distance of seven miles, a deep, rugged, and in many parts impracticable ravine leaves scarcely a favourable point for a battalion to advance in column. This flank therefore presents no inducement whatever for an invader to select it for his principal line of operations ; and it was considered that, in the first instance, the destruction of the peasants' tracks, and establishing artillery in secure enclosed works, 88 to 94, on the projecting points, to flank the most accessible part of the ascent, would be sufficient to enable a small corps of observation to secure this portion of the line till reinforced.

Plate XIX.

The pass of Mafra was strengthened with peculiar care and considerable labour ; for although the main ascent, viewed as an isolated feature, possesses great strength, there is much ground on its right enclosed with a wall as a royal park (tapada), the features of which are but very moderately bold ; and, moreover, two roads run nearly parallel to the northern and southern boundaries of the tapada, which offer great facilities to an enemy to manœuvre and carry the pass by a flank attack. The main ascent being rendered secure by means of redoubts and emplacements for artillery, so disposed as to enfilade the road and concentrate their fire upon points of it where deep and broad cuts, and other artificial obstructions, were marked out to be formed at the required moment, the principal labour was directed to secure the flanks of the pass. The wall of the

tapada, or royal park, had a banquette added to its interior, and efficient flanks were created along its front, either raised for field-pieces or loopholed for musketry; and a chain of redoubts, 74 to 77, was thrown up on the most commanding points within the enclosure, to sweep the ravines and interdict the passage along the road in its rear. Further, each feature of the ground overlooking the approach to the tapada was occupied by a redoubt, well furnished with a powerful and commanding artillery, 62, 63, 64. The strong heights above Gradil, called the Serra de Chypre, so situated on the road from Torres Vedras as equally to obstruct the march of a column by the main pass of Mafra and the collateral branches on the left of Morugueira, were also strengthened to the utmost, by redoubts 78 to 81.

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the Country.

Plate XIX.

A little in rear, and to the left of the village of Morugueira, works were established, 82, 83, and 84, for the defence of the minor pass by Cacheca, and as a communicating link of the chain between Mafra and the left extremity of the line.

Further, to guard against these important points being turned with artillery on their left, and that the security of the strong corps likely to be allotted for the defence of the main pass of Mafra should not be altogether dependent on a successful defence of the extensive line of the ravine between Morugueira and Ribamar, a retired post was established at Carvoiera, on the left of the Chilleros valley, 96 and 97, to command the only coast road from Ericeira to Cintra, St. Julian's, and Lisbon, in its

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the Country.

descent of the opposite bank of the valley ; and that road, where most under fire of the redoubts, was to be mined for destruction. No. 95, situated on a strong feature of ground on the right of the valley, co-operated in these objects.

Plate XIX.

Lastly, the town of Mafra itself was formed into a defensive post towards Ericeira, and was covered on that side by a chain of works, 85, 86, 87, blocking up the only lateral approaches practicable for artillery.

The next object of attention was the pass of Cabeça de Montachique. The heights forming the immediate flanks of that pass being naturally as strong and favourable for defence as can be desired, little labour was bestowed on them, and the principal consideration was to block up the road. For this purpose twenty-five pieces of artillery were secured in redoubts (No. 52 to 61 inclusive), situated on strong features, mostly in advance of the principal range of heights to the right and left of the great paved communication from Torres Vedras and from Sobral through Zibriera, which, completely enfilading a considerable length of the approach, were considered to render a direct attack along the road hazardous in the extreme. This disposition of the redoubts was caused by the advanced features of the ground intimately connecting with each other, and being deemed to form a chain of posts collectively stronger than the main features of the pass. It is, however, an example of fortifying to be followed with great caution, it being contrary to all

just principles of defence to extend a chain of small posts in advance of a main feature—that is, to court an action in detail, and is utterly inadmissible in the defence of a pass, wherever the approach is such that an enemy can act off the great road.

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the Country.

The defensive features of the country, from the pass of Mafra to that of Cabeça de Montachique, are less distinctly marked than along any other portion of the line; but the hills, though not continuous or precipitous, are high, steep and salient, affording the means of covering a parallel road which connects the two passes. These hills were occupied by isolated redoubts, 62 to 73, overlooking Plate XIX. the difficult country in their front, commanding every approach to the lateral road, and securing that communication to the defenders: they were consequently both outposts and guards to a chain of rather formidable heights in rear of the road, and which heights, thus covered, were considered to offer a favourable field of action, should an enemy think it worth while to attack a re-entering line, from whence only one indifferent road for artillery exists to facilitate his further movement, and against which artillery could only be brought by previously forcing the works near Gradil (Serra de Chypre), or the advanced defences of the pass of Montachique.

From Montachique to the pass of Bucellas the heights are of a nature to preclude the necessity of works, except for the purpose of blocking up a road for cavalry, and perhaps cars, over the ridge at

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the Country.

Freixal, which was effected by retrenchments, 49, 50, 51.

The pass of Bucellas is of the strongest description, the road running between two high and steep mountains, through an opening of only a few hundred yards: the defence of the pass consequently hinged on the troops maintaining possession of the flanks of the mountains; and all an engineer could do was to establish secure emplacements for artillery to enfilade the pass, to mine the bridge at its entrance for destruction, and create other obstructions on the road to detain the advancing columns under their fire. The approach was thus guarded by works, 43 to 47, and in case of disaster, 45 was intended to cover the retreat of the defenders.

Plate XIX.

From the pass of Bucellas towards the Tagus, the Serra de Serves, a high and extremely difficult ridge, with scarcely any break, occupies a front exceeding two miles to the road which crosses it from Villa de Rey. Its right flank then overlooks and gradually falls on the low ground bounding the Tagus. This space of two miles and a half between the right of the mountain and the river presented full scope for art and labour, and advantage was taken of every feature of the ground to give it strength. Works were multiplied along its centre, Nos. 34 to 39, in front of Via Longa, and also on the bluff extremity of the Serra de Serves, above Portella, 40, 41, and 42, forming its left flank. Its right flank, resting on the Tagus and closed by a strong redoubt, No. 33, it was proposed further to

secure by deep and broad cuts through the salt-pans in its front, made in a direction to be enfiladed by the fire of gun-boats ; but notwithstanding all the labour thus bestowed on this portion of the line, it was confessedly much the weakest, and great dependence was placed on the aid it would derive from a peculiar chain of strong heights, forming almost an isolated feature, about five miles in its front, at Alhandra. These heights it was proposed to dispute with an advanced corps, and works, 1 to 4, were established to enfilade the main road, flank the low ground, and equalize the strength of the front ; and redoubts, 5, 7, 8, were thrown up as im-
Description of
the Country.
Plate XIX.

The above-mentioned features of country (occupying 22 miles of front), thus connected and strengthened with 59 redoubts, mounting 232 pieces of artillery, and requiring 17,500 men for their garrisons, formed the principal line of defence across the peninsula, and fulfilled all the conditions sought for in a position to cover Lisbon. The works which, under the first view of the army retiring into Estramadura, had been thrown up on the heights of Torres Vedras and Monte Agraça, 14 to 17, and 20 to 27, served as valuable outposts to this defensive line, from 6 to 9 miles in its front, blocking up the principal approaches, and assuring the troops time to take up their ground and occupy the new defences before they could be attacked in force. These advanced works were completely isolated posts, except that the country on the left of Torres Vedras

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being open, and offering an inviting facility to an enemy to turn that defile and the works for its defence, the passage of the little river Zizandra was guarded or rather watched by three redoubts established on its left bank at St. Pedro de Cadeira, and in rear of Ponte de Rol, 30, 31, and 32; and with the same view, as respects Monte Agraça, redoubts, 9 to 13, were thrown up in the pass of Arruda.

Two strong isolated features of ground which command the main roads at the intermediate points of Ajuda and Enxara dos Cavalleiros were also retrenched, Nos. 18 and 19, 28 and 29, as additional impediments to the rapid advance of an enemy on the principal line.

Signal posts for the purpose of instant communication between these various detached works, and generally along the whole front of defence, were established on the points best uniting an extensive view with perfect security.

Lisbon, the prize to be disputed, situated 12 miles in rear of Via Longa, 15 miles in rear of the pass of Bucellas, 12 in rear of the pass of Montachique, and 23 in rear of the pass of Mafra, is of great size, and advantageously placed for defence and subsistence on the right bank of the Tagus. Its buildings are of such an incombustible nature as to render bombardment almost harmless; and the approaches being generally narrow and sunken, and flanked by stone houses having the doors and windows secured with iron gratings, and other defensive expedients, render the suburbs peculiarly

susceptible of an irregular defence. It was not therefore deemed necessary to fortify the enceinte, but the Portuguese were encouraged to erect barriers and traverses at the several entries, to create interior posts, to mount guns on the castle, the Peña convent, and other domineering and strong points ; and by their exertions the city was expected to be placed altogether beyond a coup-de-main when occupied by such forces as it was intended at the moment of danger to throw into it.

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the Country.

St. Julian, the point of embarkation in the event of defeat or discomfiture, is situated 24 miles in rear of Carvoiera, and 27 miles in rear of the pass of Mafra ; the high road to it from the other passes being through Lisbon, though it may be reached from either of them by tolerable cross-country communications without passing through that city. (3)

These extensive works were pressed forward by Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher and his officers with the greatest zeal and ardour, and they were liberally supplied with means. A detachment of infantry was selected to act as overseers, directors, and artificers ; two regiments of Portuguese militia were allotted as pioneers, the peasantry of the surrounding districts were put into requisition as labourers, and no petty cavils about official forms of expenditure were allowed to impede the supply of materials and stores. (4)

Napoleon had proclaimed early in the year, with more than his usual arrogance, that he was collecting a force of 110,000 invincibles on the frontiers

Description of
the Country.

of Portugal, to drive the English out of the Peninsula; and it was naturally concluded that he would act at least with his wonted celerity and enterprise—that he would push forward to the main object, regardless of isolated fortresses, and strike a final blow before means of resistance could be matured.

The several works of the lines were in consequence thrown up in haste, and of a construction requiring the least labour compatible with a certain degree of strength: the redoubts were generally made of a field profile of a size to require from 150 to 250 and 300 men for their defence, and were armed, according to the importance of their fire, with three, four, five, or six pieces of artillery.

The main works at Torres Vedras, Monte Agraça above Sobral, and Oeyras, being considered independent forts, or rather species of petty fortresses, were made larger and stronger than the works at other places; particularly those of Torres Vedras, which, blocking up the most direct road to the point of embarkation, and being moreover on the spot of former enterprises, were regarded with peculiar jealousy: they were of a trace to be tolerably flanked, and of a magnitude to require a garrison of 2200 men with 40 pieces of cannon, independently of the number required to guard the lines of communication with the convent of St. Joa, and the castle in the town, which latter were formed into good posts, Nos. 25 and 27, and mounted with seven pieces of artillery.

The main work on Monte Agraça, which was

made roomy and spacious, required a garrison of nearly 1000 men, and was armed with 25 pieces of ordnance ; it was, however, very imperfectly flanked, and the profile was almost the same as that of the small redoubts. In advance of this main work, at various points of the ridge, the dependent redoubts, 15, 16, 17, mounting 19 guns, and requiring above 1000 men for their defence, (the whole being considered to form only one post, occupying the summit of Monte Agraça,) were thrown up to flank and see the ascent. The enclosed work on the height between Oeyras and St. Julian's was sufficiently flanked, and of a magnitude to require a garrison of 1340 men, and on it and its dependent redoubts and batteries above 50 pieces of ordnance were mounted.

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the Country.

The above-mentioned three principal works were furnished with 160 rounds of ammunition per gun, 30 of which were grape, and 200 hand-grenades : the other redoubts were supplied with 60 rounds per gun, 8 of which were grape-shot, and from 12 to 16 hand-grenades each.

The artillery mounted in the several works were 12, 9, or 6-prs., with two or three $5\frac{1}{2}$ -inch field howitzers in the larger forts ; they were all Portuguese iron ordnance, on carriages of a most primitive construction, with such low trucks as to be perfectly immoveable over broken ground, and consequently not to be immediately rendered useful to an enemy on carrying a redoubt. The artillery of every work, being mounted with the view to guard some fixed object, fired through embrasures.

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the Country.

It has been stated that the works of St. Julian,² Monte Agraça,³ and Torres Vedras,⁴ were the first commenced in the autumn of 1809, as isolated points, with the view of having some defence prepared for the army, should the invaders instantly advance as they threatened. The works for the defence of the passes were next undertaken,⁵ and ultimately, in the spring of 1810, the whole were in progress. With the same feeling, the works at St. Julian's were originally confined to the heights between the fort and the town of Oeyras: in the spring, and early in the summer of 1810, the advanced line of redoubts, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108,⁶ was thrown up; and in the autumn, the exterior points were occupied, and the advanced defences completed.⁷

Such was the original plan and construction of the lines which, when nearly brought to the degree

² On the 3rd November, by Capt. Wedekind.

³ On the 4th ditto, by Capt. Williams.

⁴ On the 8th ditto, by Capt. Mulcaster.

⁵ Viz. Mafra, on the 17th Feb., by Capt. Ross;—Ericeira and Carvoiera, 19th Feb., by Lieut. R. Jones;—Montachique, do., Capt. Mulcaster;—Via Longa, 24th Feb., Lieut. Stanway;—Arruda, 17th March, Lieut. Forster;—Ponte do Rol, 26th March, Lieut. Thomson.

⁶ Principally by Capt. Squire.

⁷ It will be seen from the above dates, that, except at Monte Agraça, a point quite out of the beaten track, and almost unknown to the British, the works of Torres Vedras were undertaken three months before any other part of the lines, which accidental circumstance, added to the previous celebrity of the pass, caused their name to be given to the whole system of defence.

of perfection that the aspect of affairs seemed to admit, were given over to the charge of Captain John T. Jones, by Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher, on the 6th July, 1810; and the advance of the invaders being momentarily expected, himself hastened to the scene of active operations on the Coa.⁸

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It would appear that, soon after Colonel Fletcher's arrival at Lord Wellington's head-quarters, the proposed mode of occupying the lines underwent con-

⁸ "COMMANDING ROYAL ENGINEERS' ORDERS.

"Mafra, 6th July, 1810.

"As Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher, Captains Chapman, Squire, and Goldfinch, are about to join the army, Capt. Jones will be left in the immediate command and superintendence of all works and duties connected with the Engineer Department in this part of Portugal, and he is therefore to be obeyed accordingly.

(Signed)

"R. FLETCHER,

"Lieut.-Colonel, Commanding Engineer."

Memorandum of Officers left under Capt. Jones's orders.

Captain Holloway,
Williams,
Dickenson.

Lieut. Stanway,
Thomson,
Forster,
Trench,
Piper,
Tapp,
Reid,
Hulme.

Captain Wedekind, }
Lieut. Meinecke, } King's German Legion.

Lorenzo Homen, }
Sousa, } Portuguese Service.
Britto, }

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the Country.

sideration, and some change was contemplated, (probably in consequence of the invaders engaging in the siege of Almeida, which gave expectation of the rains commencing previously to the final struggle, which, as will be hereafter shown, would materially change the relative strength of some portions of the country;) for, on the 17th July, orders were issued to strengthen, as far as possible, the right flank of the advanced ground, on which the posts of Torres Vedras and Monte Agraça had been established, and to throw up additional works for the further security and strength of its left flank; also to add various exterior defences to the position, covering the place of embarkation on the right of the Tagus.

In consequence of these orders, renewed exertions were made on the lines, and as many workmen as could be advantageously employed were collected at each point to be strengthened. The young officers now, for the first time, placed in charge of extensive districts, exerted themselves with a zeal which knew no limits, and every where throughout the lines a spirit of honourable emulation proved highly advantageous to the progress of the work.

On the right, the musketry trench No. 1, across the marsh between the Tagus and the heights of Alhandra, and the trench No. 2, ascending from the marsh to the summit of the heights, were converted into strong lines; and the left of the former was so far thrown back as to admit of the ground in its front being generally and closely flanked by retired

batteries, which were excavated in the flank of the mountain. These batteries were of a very powerful nature, and being completely covered from all ground in their front, could not be cannonaded, or even seen by an enemy, till almost on the glacis of the defences across the low ground, and consequently rendered any effort to force that line utterly hopeless.

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From the right of the mountain of Alhandra, two miles of front were, as a field position, rendered strong to an excess, for along the face of the mountain, near its summit, a scarp almost perpendicular, from 15 to 18 feet in depth, was cut or blasted; every part of which was closely flanked by a covered musketry fire, and generally flanked by artillery, secured in enclosed works constructed on the salient points of the heights—all these flanking works being seen, and plunged into by larger and stronger redoubts, situated on commanding interior peaks of the mountain, 114 to 120.⁹

At this time, Alhandra being considered an advanced position to the line of Via Longa, in order to prevent its being turned on its left, the heights above Calhandrix, at a spot where they narrow to a rocky ridge, not exceeding 600 yards in breadth,

⁹ Could it have been foreseen in July, that time would have been allowed by the invaders for carrying the scarps and other defences of Alhandra to the degree of strength they ultimately attained before the army entered the lines, the flanking guns on the salient points of the scarped ridge would have been placed in open batteries instead of strong redoubts.

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were, on the representations of the executive officer, ordered to be occupied with a chain of redoubts supporting each other. Fifteen hundred men commenced these works, 121, 122, 123, and 124, on the 6th September, and miners being at the same time employed to scarp the flanks of the ridge, it soon formed a strong detached position across the only range of heights over which artillery could travel to turn Alhandra.

In order to block up the valley between the heights of Alhandra and Calhandrix, and to connect the defence of those positions, a strong abattis, with a covered communication in its rear, was formed across the valley, at a retired point between 121 and 6, where its front could be generally swept by the artillery of the works on the Alhandra heights, and could also be closely flanked by a fire of musketry from some stone buildings, situated on the sides of the valley, which were converted into fortified posts.

Ultimately, time being found, an additional post was established in rear of Mata Cruz, 125, which thoroughly connected the defence of Alhandra with that of the Serra de Serves, at its strongest point; and the front of that mountain, from the bluff extremity above Portella to the pass of Bucellas, wherever deemed most accessible, was commenced to be scarped near its summit, in imitation of Alhandra.¹⁰

¹⁰ These several works were superintended by Lieutenant Forster, having at different periods under his orders Lieutenants Trench, Piper, Tapp, and Reid.

On the left flank of the advanced defences, following up the course of the Zizandra (which in summer is an insignificant stream) to Torres Vedras, additional redoubts were thrown up to form a chain along the left bank of the river, and obstructions were created at points under their fire to the flow of the current, so that when the autumnal rains commenced, which happened the day that the advance of the army entered the lines, the river overflowed its banks, and in a short time more than half the valley became so complete a bog that no reward could induce any of the peasantry to attempt to pass over it; and that portion of the front which in summer had been the weakest, became, during the winter, in some degree secure from attack.

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These two advanced flanks being thus strengthened, attention was naturally directed to a communication with the centre, and the invaders granting time, an interior line of road, for infantry and cavalry, was traced to connect Alhandra and Monte Agraça. All unnecessary access from the front was blocked up, and several bridges and paths leading to this ground were destroyed, but no additional enclosed works were proposed. Indeed, from the left extremity of Alhandra, along the valley of Arruda to Monte Agraça above Sobral, the hills being naturally bold and precipitous, and the communications from more than two-thirds of the salient features of the ground converging to a point, and passing over a narrow interior ridge, give this space a contracted second defence, which admits of limited

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numbers guarding its extended circumference ; consequently the destruction of a few roads, blocking up the gorges of the ravines, and providing short lateral communications from the right and left to this interior line, were sufficient, in addition to the three or four redoubts previously established on the flanking points of the exterior ridge, to give great strength to this space, and insure an uninterrupted communication from the Tagus to the great work on Monte Agraça.

On intelligence reaching Lisbon at the end of August, of the premature fall of Almeida, and the consequent retrograde movements of the protecting army, when the prospect of invasion seemed immediate, and the danger imminent, the fears of the public authorities induced ready attention to the urgent requisitions of the engineers for additional labour, and generated a momentary spirit of emulation to aid in the completion of the lines, now become the last bulwarks of the national independence. The conscription for labour was extended to a distance of more than 50 miles around ; no excuse was admitted for withholding personal service—even women and boys took their share in the labour—and at one period, although the middle of harvest, the workmen on the lines were augmented to more than seven thousand. In consequence of such abundant labour, the months of August and September were most profitably occupied, besides erecting the new defences, in strengthening various points and works of the rear

line, necessarily left imperfect when time appeared so very limited in the early summer ; particularly at the position in front of Fort St. Julian, covering the place of embarkation, at Mafra and the pass of Morugueira, and along the ravine to the left of that pass ;¹¹ also on the position of Via Longa, and the low grounds bordering the Tagus.¹² At the former place, the eastern side of the valley in front of the quinta of the Marquis de Pombal was occupied by a detached work, No. 109, of strong profile, more than usually flanked, and the advanced heights were so shaped and scarped, as to bring nearly all their reverse under fire of the artillery on the flanks of the defences. In aid of this measure, and to equalize the strength of the eastern front, the advanced defences of the main position beyond the little rivulet called Foz-de-Oeyras were joined by a line, No. 110, to the Tagus, so as to rest on Fort das Mais, by which additions the town of Oeyras was covered, and included within the exterior line of defence. On the left, the redoubts 106, 107, 108, were connected by a covered road or musketry trench to shelter infantry from a cannonade ; but which, being without a ditch in its front, and its parapet unrevetted, admitted of a forward movement of the troops on any front, not exceeding the interval between two redoubts, or nearly 800 yards.¹³

¹¹ By Lieutenant Meinecke, King's German Legion, and Lieutenants Hulme and Reid.

¹² By Lieutenant Stanway.

¹³ By Captain Wedekind, King's German Legion.

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As the army fell back on the lines by the most leisurely movements, time was also found to complete various services, which, interfering with private establishments, or the public convenience, had been deferred to the latest moment; such as levelling obstructions to the fire of the works, felling the trees in their front, and forming substantial abattis with their stems and arms, breaking up roads, destroying bridges, preparing and charging mines, &c.; and on the 7th of October, every preparation for defence was as complete as any longer delay could have rendered it.

The disposition of the irregular troops and the arrangements of the commissariat were also perfected during the leisurely retrograde movements of the army. (5) The militia, ordenanza (national guards), and gunners, being assembled on the line of defence, and apportioned to the different works, were made to exercise the guns, and practise various defensive exercises; and dépôts of provisions, tents, and stores were formed at points named from head-quarters. The position and working of the signal stations were also perfected; and a party of seamen, supplied by the navy, now passed and received intelligence from one extremity of the line to the other in seven minutes, with undeviating accuracy; and as a further measure to insure the communication of orders, arm telegraphs, constructed at Lisbon, were placed at each post in readiness to be used in the event of any disaster occurring to the masts or yards.

At this time also, the whole of the country which had been strengthened by works was divided into six districts of nearly equal extent, and a regulating officer of engineers was appointed to each district, for the purpose of explaining the nature and intention of the several fortified posts, to enable the general officers to take up their allotted ground in the most expeditious manner. Mounted guides, perfectly acquainted with all the localities, were held in readiness at the most advanced points of each district, to meet the columns, and assist the regulating officers in pointing out the several villages, bivouacs, &c., and afford such information respecting the various roads and communications as should prevent either confusion or mistake, should the enemy be pressing the columns. Movements
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The army, consisting of 22,000 British infantry, and 3000 cavalry, with about a similar number of Portuguese infantry, entered the territory thus prepared for their reception and support, on the 8th of October, with the expectation of taking up the ground to dispute the principal passes of Mafra, Montachique, Bucellas, &c.; but their movements not being pressed by the invaders, (in consequence of the steady discipline preserved amongst the retiring troops, and the lesson they had given them at Busaco,) an embarrassment was felt about the points retrenched in advance, at Torres Vedras and Monte Agraça. To occupy them properly, would be to isolate and sacrifice a number of good troops without any object; whilst, to abandon, or leave

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them with inefficient garrisons to fall or capitulate, would be to furnish subject of triumph to the invaders, likely to produce the worst effects on the feelings of the troops and of the population. Lord Wellington, aware of the great strength which the heights of Alhandra, Calhandrix, &c., on the right flank of these posts had attained, and that the rains then pouring down with their accustomed autumnal violence must swell the Zizandra on their left flank, and soon render it a formidable defensive obstacle, when there would remain from the sea to the Tagus only a space of about seven miles on the south of the valley of Runa, between Torres Vedras and Monte Agraça, without artificial defence, decided to halt at Sobral. (6) The space last described presenting a most excellent field of battle for an army with an inferior cavalry, from having a strong and intersected front, and both flanks secure, he destined as the central point of his defensive manœuvres, placing the main body of his troops upon it, fixing his personal head-quarters at Pero Negro, immediately in its rear, and communicating with all parts of the line, from the telegraph on the elevated point of Monte Agraça forming its right flank. (7)

The redoubts and other defensive works being garrisoned with militia or ordenanzas, the troops composing the active army were thus distributed: General Hill's corps (two divisions) to guard the position of Alhandra; the light division, under General Craufurd, to occupy the front from the left of Alhandra, through Arruda, to the great work on

Monte Agraça; the third division, under General Picton, to occupy Torres Vedras, and watch the line of the Zizandra; the fifth division, under General Leith, to take post on the reverse of the heights of Monte Agraça, with General Pack's independent Portuguese brigade, in the great redoubt on the summit of that mountain; and the first, fourth, and sixth divisions, under Generals Spencer, Cole, and Campbell, to occupy Zibriera, Ribaldiera, Runa, &c., their left communicating with General Picton at Torres Vedras, and their right being in immediate contact with General Leith.

A corps of Spaniards under the Marquis de la Romana, about 6000 infantry, which it had been arranged should cross the Tagus from Badajos at the same time that the army entered the lines, were to be placed on the intermediate post of Enxara dos Cavallieros.

The main body of the cavalry, which scarcely amounted to 3000 men, were to be cantoned about the rear line, principally on the flanks, ready to act on the plains bordering the Tagus, or in the least broken tracts between the two lines, should a column of infantry have the temerity to penetrate into them by paths impracticable to cavalry and artillery.

The defence of Lisbon for some days, in the event of a total or partial discomfiture on the lines, was amply secured, without making any deduction from the effective force of the retiring army, by means of a powerful squadron collected in the Tagus, and a fine body of marines sent from England, which,

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in addition to the civic corps, the militia, and the ordenanza of the district, and the ordinary garrison, directed by the British General Peacocke, formed an efficient as well as imposing force.

The army, which, during the retreat from Coimbra, had fallen back on one road, separated into two bodies at Pombal; General Picton's division marching from thence directly on Torres Vedras, and the remainder by the roads of Rio-maior and Alemquer on Sobral, or Thomar and Santarem on Alhandra. On the 8th October, the advance under General Hill reached the latter place. The previous night the autumnal rains had begun to fall in torrents, and continuing throughout the two following days, the newly formed communications became heavy and deep with mud; nevertheless, in consequence of the good arrangements previously made, the succeeding divisions marched directly on their allotted points of occupation, and separated at the fixed turnings, into brigades and battalions, to their several villages and bivouacs, with as much celerity and order, as if re-entering their cantonments from a review.

On the 10th, the rear division, only distantly followed by the enemy, marched into Arruda, the preceding divisions took up ground on and beyond Monte Agraça, and a distribution of force was made for all the intermediate and rear defences.

During the succeeding night an unusually violent storm of wind and rain, thunder and lightning, prevailed, which almost overwhelmed the troops in

open bivouacs, and impeded the communication of orders ; still, at daylight, on intelligence of the approach of the French, all were under arms in good order at their respective points of assembly, the garrison of the works complete and on the alert, the field artillery horsed or in position, and every other arrangement made to repel an attack. It was, however, late in the afternoon before the enemy began to act : Marshal Massena then with a strong body of cavalry dislodged the English post at Sobral, and ascended the height above the town, from whence he had a full view of the works opposed to him ; and judging from their extent and formidable appearance that it was the intention seriously to dispute the ground, he withdrew his cavalry in the night, and Sobral was next morning re-occupied by strong British pickets.

The several divisions of the allies, as soon as posted on their ground, diligently employed themselves further to strengthen their respective fronts, particularly those forming the main body of the army between Monte Agraça and Runa, along which space no artificial defences had been previously established ; the support of the advanced works by troops not having been contemplated in the original project for the lines. Indeed, from this cause even the great paved communication from Sobral to Zibriera, and the road from Sobral to Ribaldiera, had not been blocked up by any work ; so that in the position occupied by the allies the two armies might have come into contact without the invaders

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being under the necessity of forcing any defensive post.¹⁴

On the 13th, the French infantry having closed up, Marshal Massena directed a great effort against Sobral, which town, not being within the line of defence, was abandoned to him without a struggle. He immediately filled it with troops, and closely supported them by other large bodies bivouacked in its immediate vicinity; these bodies communicating with the remainder of his army on the road of Alemquer. Having thus concentrated his whole force in readiness to act on the weakest point of the line, he pushed some strong patrols along the road of Zibriera and Ribaldiera to feel the allies, but which being quickly driven back, the advanced posts of the hostile armies arranged themselves almost in contact along the valley by Duas Portas towards Runa. The French cavalry pickets took post on the road between the town of Sobral and Monte Agraça, with their videttes on the lower knolls of the mountain immediately under the great redoubt; and the remainder of the French army formed their bivouacs in the tract of country from Sobral to the Tagus, so as equally to threaten every part of the line from Zibriera to Alhandra, and their right being actually in contact with the weakest portion of it.

¹⁴ To have placed the invaders under the necessity of storming, or otherwise reducing some work before they could bring forward their artillery, the height immediately in front of the town of Sobral de Monte Agraça should have been occupied.

To strengthen the heights on the left of Monte Agraça consequently became an object of primary interest, and large working parties of the troops, frequently relieved, were unceasingly employed to throw up strong redoubts on the commanding points above Ribaldiera and Runa, 128, 129, and 130. The valley in rear of Gosandiera and Zibriera was blocked up by a well-flanked abattis, field batteries of position were established on various flanking points of the same ground, and roads of communication formed to them, so that in a short time this open portion of the front quite changed its face, and appeared little less formidable than the other parts of the line.

Further, to parry this skilful disposition of the invading army, eight battalions from General Hill's corps were on the 14th formed in reserve on the second line, near the pass of Bucellas, in readiness to move at any moment to the support of Alhandra, or of the main body of the army by the roads of Zibriera and Sobral.

A redoubt, armed with 9-pounders, was also commenced on the ascent of Monte Agraça, on a lower level, and to the right of the main work, more effectually to enfilade and block up the great road from Sobral; and subsequently No. 149 was established above Matacaes, more completely to interdict the use of the road through the pass of Runa to the invaders, and the heights above Portella and Patameira were scarped, and strongly occupied by works 150 and 151. At the same time the defences

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behind the lower Zizandra were greatly augmented.

Every morning, two hours before daybreak, the troops stood to their arms at the point of assembly of their several cantonments, as did also the garrisons of the works; Lord Wellington, in person, being in the fort on Monte Agraça, in readiness to direct any general movement, according to the exigencies of the moment. The army thus remained under arms till a communication from every portion of the line, and ocular demonstration, had assured their commander that no change had taken place in the disposition of the hostile troops, nor any preparation been made for immediate attack; the several divisions and brigades were then ordered to resume their daily labours of strengthening their respective fronts, making lateral communications, improving the roads, sheltering and securing their outposts, &c. The weather was generally wet, and the duty irksome—still all supported it with cheerfulness, in the full confidence of annihilating their opponent, whenever the threatened attack should take place; but after a week had elapsed, expectation would no longer support itself, and the hope of an immediate and brilliant triumph subsided.

Marshal Massena made in person a very close reconnoissance of the right of the lines, and on the 16th, having remained an unusual time with a numerous staff examining the entry of the valley of Calhandrix, a shot was fired at the party from No. 120, which striking a wall whereon the Marshal

was resting his telescope, he acknowledged the warning by taking off his hat and moving on.¹⁵ This reconnoissance served to convince the French commander of the inadequacy of his means to attack an army so posted and supported; he therefore turned all his views to subsist his forces till he could be reinforced; and after remaining in his original bivouacs till he had exhausted the country, and his troops were becoming sickly, he retired on the night of the 14th November towards Santarem, and was next day closely followed by Lord Wellington.

Marshal Massena took up a defensive line behind the Rio - maior, intrenching a corps at Santarem, and the allies went into cantonments at Cartaxo (head-quarters), Alcoentre, Azambuja, Alemquer, Villa Franca, &c., one division being left at Torres Vedras, and the whole kept in readiness to fall back whenever the French should be greatly reinforced; under which expectation every exertion was ordered to be made to keep up and improve the works of the lines.

In aid of a protracted defence of the peninsula of Lisbon, Abrantes had been enclosed with works, and the fortifications of Peniche had been repaired

¹⁵ There was no wish to injure Marshal Massena, but merely to make him retire, or a dozen guns might as readily have been discharged at him as one. Napoleon, who always spoke and reasoned well on military subjects, has left recorded, in Count Las Casas' Journal, an excellent observation on the folly of firing a single piece of ordnance at an individual where injury is meditated.

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and augmented. The good effect of these measures now became apparent, as frequent sorties from Peniche kept the cantonments of the invaders in a state of watchfulness and alarm; whilst Abrantes, blocked to the French, and kept open to the allies, the best communication across the Tagus.

Peniche was in all respects a fortress; but there being no possibility of transporting heavy artillery across the Serra de Estrella, for the attack of Abrantes, its defences were limited to a resistance against a coup-de-main, or an attack with 12-pounders.¹⁶

The garrison of Abrantes was composed altogether of troops in the service of Portugal, commanded by a Portuguese governor. The only British in the place were the engineers, the senior of whom, Captain Patton, (the officer who had constructed the defences,) being a man of peculiar gallantry and firmness, was, by order of Lord Wellington, made one of a council of defence, and any proposition for surrender was forbidden to be tendered or received without his name being signed in approval of the measure.

Marshal Massena early saw the importance of Abrantes, to secure a communication with and enable him to draw supplies from the Alemtejo; and, previously to retiring from before the lines, caused the works to be closely reconnoitred, when

¹⁶ The armament of the place was limited to the calibre of a 12-pounder, to prevent the invaders forming a battering train in the event of their capturing it.

they were deemed too strong to be attempted by a coup-de-main. Movements
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To prevent the invaders communicating with the Alemtejo by any other point, the right corps of the allies, under Marshal Beresford, had, on the change of position of the hostile armies, been passed over the Tagus in boats, and cantoned at Barcos, Chamusca, &c.: floating bridges were now established on all the small rivers in its rear to the ferry opposite Alhandra, to insure its re-occupation of that point, should it become necessary.

In the beginning of December, some movements of the French troops in the south of Spain leading to the belief of a diversion being intended in the Alemtejo, in aid of renewed operation against the lines, the promontory of Almada, on the left of the Tagus, opposite to Lisbon, which commands the navigation of the river, and from whence shells will range over a great portion of the city,¹⁷ was retrenched under the superintendence of Captain Goldfinch.

The left of the position rested on the broad basin of the Tagus, on the heights immediately above Mutella; its centre was on Monte de Caparica, Lugar de Monte, and its right on the rocky cliff called the Altos da Raposeira, rising above the sea, the whole extent of its front being about 8000 yards. A chain of redoubts, 17 in number, flanking each other, and having flèches in their front, more com-

¹⁷ The Tagus, opposite the Castle of Almada, is only 2200 yards in width.

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pletely to see into the ravines, was established on the most prominent knolls of this line, their defence being united with, and supported by, several country-houses in their rear, which, being built of stone, with stone enclosures, might at any moment be rendered formidable posts. A sunken road, which extended nearly throughout the position, in rear of the redoubts, formed a secure communication between them, and was ingeniously made by the executive officer to add to their defence, by cutting a banquette, and dressing off the slope in its front so as to form it into a regular covered-way, with places of arms at points which gave the best flanks, and could best be supported from the stone buildings.¹⁸

The dilapidated castle of Almada was repaired and armed for defence, so as to form a species of interior citadel, which should preserve the communication with Lisbon till the latest moment ; and as a means of ready communication between the fleet and the several parts of the position, roads were carried up various parts of the cliff, forming its gorge.

It being proposed to entrust the defence of this position to the seamen and marines of the fleet, with the militia and civic corps of Lisbon, the redoubts were made of unusual magnitude, many being capable

¹⁸ After a certain portion of this road had been formed, the completion of the remainder was suspended, in consequence of the inconvenience it occasioned to the occupiers of private dwellings, and the knowledge that the road could, by due attention, be finished whenever required in less time than an invader could collect a force, and march through the Alemtejo.

of containing 400, 500, or 600 men, and from 6 to 10 pieces of artillery; the calculated garrisons for the whole when completed being 7500 men and 86 pieces of ordnance. Any attack of Almada at this time could only have been a secondary operation; for, even if successful, the Tagus would still have interposed an impassable obstacle between the victors and Lisbon, and their retention of the promontory must have been altogether contingent on success in front. Therefore any mode of occupation of Almada, which should have prejudiced the defence of the lines, could scarcely have been justified; but it was an object of the greatest value thus, by means of strong works and a force which could not otherwise have been rendered serviceable, to have done away the possibility of a small corps annoying the fleet, creating alarm and confusion in the capital, and perhaps spreading a panic throughout the country in rear of the army, at the moment of the lines being attacked.

During the winter the posts of the two armies remained as first arranged on either side of the Rio-maior, the advance of the French being retrenched at Santarem, and that of the allies occupying the village of Val; the hostile sentinels being only separated by the bridge at the south-western extremity of the long causeway across the marsh between the two places. Each stood unremittingly on the alert, the allies trusting to a mine, which they kept ready for explosion under the principal arch of the bridge, to prevent a sudden rush; and the French

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to the artillery of a redoubt, which they had constructed on a height enfilading the whole length of the communication. On the left flank the armies were not in such immediate contact, the allies being intrenched at Alcoentre with a picket of observation in the town of Rio-maior, and the principal force of the French being at Alcanhede; nevertheless the same vigilance was maintained as on the right. On the left of the Tagus, besides lining the bank of the river with pickets of observation, batteries were thrown up to command the mouth of the Zezere, where the French had collected many boats, and the ruined castle of Tancos was converted into a military post.

During this time unremitting care and attention was also paid to strengthen the several defences of the lines, add to the scarps, and perfect the lateral communications; for which latter object a paved road communicating with the rear by Pero Negro was ordered to be formed along the rear of the heights last retrenched on the left of Monte Agraça, and a communication for carriages was made from the left of Alhandra across the valley of Calhandrix by St. Romeo, and in rear of the pass of Matos, to Monte Agraça; and subsequently similarly ready and short communications were perfected throughout the whole tract of fortified country. As the spring advanced, additional works, mounted with 56 pieces of ordnance, were completed behind the Zizandra, Nos. 131 to 144, and the left bank of that river was scarped to compensate the fall of

the waters and preserve the equilibrium of defence. Movements
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The bridges on the great road from the rear of the cantonments of the army to the front of the lines were mined for destruction, those on the lateral communications destroyed, and all obstructions to the fire of gun-boats on the road or ground bordering the Tagus were levelled.

It is almost unnecessary to add, that no renewed effort against the lines was made to put the value of these labours to the test. The invaders, after remaining in their cantonments till the commencement of March, retired out of the country, closely pursued and harassed by the allies ; offering the first and only instance of a military enterprise planned and matured by Napoleon, whilst in the plenitude of his power, being defeated by the steady perseverance and superior foresight of an opponent. It is not, perhaps, too much to add, that this failure before Lisbon gave a fatal blow to the general belief of French invincibility, and taught oppressed Europe to resist and become free.

CHAPTER II.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE LINES COVERING LISBON.

FROM the foregoing description it will be seen that the lines covering Lisbon consisted of two distinct ranges of hills, or rather tracts of country, extending from the sea to the Tagus, modelled into strong fields of defensive action and defensive manœuvres; each line in some degree aiding the other, but their occupation and defence being perfectly distinct and independent.

On a comparison of the two lines, it must be admitted that, looking to operations during summer, the rear line appears to have been judiciously selected for the arena of defence, as it contains the greatest portion and most equal distribution of strength of front. Thus the greater part of the ravine from Ribamar to Mafra is very strong, whereas no portion of the banks of the Zizandra below Torres Vedras is otherwise than tame. In like manner the passes of Montachique and Bucellas are of the strongest nature of mountain-pass, whilst the corresponding inlets of Zibriera and Monte Agraça derived their strength chiefly from works. The rear defences have also the advantage over the advanced line of covering four or five miles less ground; the former, following

the principal features of defence, measuring 24 miles, and the latter 29 miles ; the distance in a direct line between their flanks being 22 and 25 miles respectively. Further, under the belief that the invaders would approach in sufficient force to act in two bodies, and the impression then general throughout Europe, that the French could not fail of success, it was an advantage of the rear line not to be despised, that its strongest flank was nearest the point of retreat and embarkation, and consequently that least likely to be forced.

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In any extremity arising from an overwhelming pursuit, and a harassed retrograde march, the rear defences would therefore in all probability have formed the field of proffered combat ; but, under the favourable circumstances of the young Portuguese troops having proved themselves trust-worthy, a triumphant retreat, and an advanced season, with an enemy acting only on one point, to have left the advanced works to their garrisons, and to have abandoned to the invaders 150 additional square miles of country contained in the space between the two lines, would have been a sacrifice of character, feeling, and confidence, far beyond what any increase of physical strength could have compensated ; and here, as ought to be in every case depending on judgment, previous arrangement was modified, and made to give way to circumstances.

From the distribution of the troops in the lines it appears that Lord Wellington, under the expectation of fighting a battle which should decide the fate of

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a kingdom, spread an army not amounting to 50,000 men along a front of 29 miles. This extended arrangement is so contrary to the spirit of modern warfare,¹ that to prevent any erroneous conclusions being drawn from it, it is deemed necessary to mention that the allotment of the force for the several portions of the line was calculated on a peculiarity of the features of the country, as well as on the extraordinary degree of strength which had been given to the flanks, rendering them rather fortresses of support than points to guard. The peculiarity alluded to is the projection of Monte Junto, which stretches out fifteen miles in front of the centre of the lines, and is of so rugged and precipitous a formation, as to preclude the march of an army with artillery over its summit; nor can the ridge of Barregudo, which nearly connects Monte Junto with the position, be crossed with artillery without a publicity and delay which would have deprived the movement of every advantage; and the ridge can only be avoided by passing along the road of Runa, which was included within the line of defence. These serras consequently divide the attack and defence of the front line into two portions, giving the assailants a very long and tedious march to move a corps from opposite Alhandra to the line of the Zizandra below Torres Vedras; whereas, from

¹ It is remarkable, that the most striking example of concentration also during the late wars should have been afforded by this same commander, who, at Waterloo, placed and manœuvred 60,000 men on a front little exceeding a mile and a half.

the position of the main body of the army between Torres Vedras and Monte Agraça, a very short march would enable the defenders to succour either the right or left, and compensate inferiority of numbers by superiority of movement.

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It may also be observed, in further justification of this unusual extension, that the celerity and accuracy with which, by means of the signal stations, orders could be sent and intelligence received from the most distant points of the lines, obliterated distance with respect to communication, and insured a well-timed combination of movement amongst the whole body of the defenders, enabling them to derive every advantage from partial success, and protecting them from overwhelming disaster in the event of partial discomfiture.

As a general character of the lines, formed from unprejudiced consideration of their merits and defects, it may be stated that they derived their strength and value primarily from their peninsular situation on the sea, which precluded the possibility of an enemy manœuvring on, or turning their flanks, and assured their rear being constantly open for the defenders to receive supplies and reinforcements ; secondly, from the unusual degree of natural strength of the ranges of hills and ravines forming their front ; and lastly, from the judgment with which the engineer connected the several strong features of the country into an equally defensive line. Art and labour were judiciously exerted to improve natural advantages, to strengthen and cover the weak points, to diminish

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the length of accessible front, to block up the approaches, to facilitate the movements of troops within, and to cramp and confine the movements of those without ; in short, to give such powers of defence and communication to every portion of the front that the army might remain concentrated in a body, keeping only detached corps of observation on its right and left, which, from the natural and artificial strength of their positions, might repel a weak or sustain a serious attack till succoured ; and that at no point should a corps engage, but under the favourable circumstances of a strong front, secure flanks, facility of movement, and an open, but inattackable rear.

The redoubts, generally speaking, were merely securities for artillery in those situations where a fire of that nature was demanded by some specific object, such as to interdict the free use of a road, delay the repair of a bridge, or sweep along the entry of a pass ; and in no instance were the guns considered as defensive weapons of the works in which they were placed, except at the position on the height of Calhandrix, where three redoubts in line were made to cross their fire with each other, and mutually support a fourth redoubt in advance. All the other redoubts were perfectly independent of each other, and were made of a strength of profile to resist an assault, and placed on points where artillery could with great difficulty be brought to cannonade them. Their number was justified by the peculiarity of the contest, which placed, on

the same position with a good army, half the same amount of militia, ill-organized peasantry and gunners, who, though totally unfit to act in the field, still being possessed of innate courage, were equal to defend a redoubt and work its artillery. Throughout the whole front there was not a continuity of artificial line necessitating a single efficient brigade to be kept out of column, and the works may be regarded as so much additional strength given to the army, without subtracting a man from its effective force. Indeed, the artificial defences of the lines altogether present a most favourable example of the just application of the engineer's art in furtherance of, but invariably subservient to tactics, creating pivots and supports, but never a tie or restraint on field movements.

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In appreciating the defensive power of the various portions of the lines against the efforts of an invader only moderately superior to the defenders, this consideration of the defensive army being a compact and manœuvring body totally independent of the works should have great weight; as, in consequence, it would not have sufficed for the ultimate triumph of the assailants that a column should manœuvre successfully so as to fall on some weakly guarded point, before the defenders could be reinforced. By such a movement the assaulting force would only have lent a flank and offered a most advantageous opportunity for the attack of an army, ready to engage with it; or even should the assailants by a rapid and powerful effort have broken through any

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point of the line, it would have served merely to place them between an efficient army and a city which, though not fortified, was assuredly far beyond a coup-de-main.²

Therefore, notwithstanding their many natural and professional merits, it must be acknowledged that the troops were to the lines as life and health to the body, giving them strength and efficiency in exact proportion to their own; and that a successful defence of the lines hinged altogether on the unremitting vigilance, able disposition, and rapid movement of the defenders. One single error of judgment, or one single miscalculation of time or distance, might have rendered the whole line of works useless; for field redoubts left to their own garrisons, even when thickly studded, can only be expected to impede, turn, or disorganize a column of march with its artillery, but never to oppose an impenetrable barrier to the advance of a powerful and determined army.

² In order that an army covering a capital should preserve due latitude of manœuvring, it is indispensable that the city should be rendered capable of several days' resistance when left to its own powers. A variety of instances might be adduced in proof of this statement; but two very recent and well-known examples will suffice:—In 1813, Napoleon, by his foresight and activity in throwing up works on the banks of the Elbe, preserved Dresden during one of his manœuvres, and in 1814 lost Paris during a similar manœuvre from having too tardily and insufficiently fortified it.

CHAPTER III.

OBSERVATIONS ON LINES AND RETRENCHED
POSITIONS GENERALLY.¹

“Ceux qui proscrivent les lignes et tous les secours que l’art de l’ingénieur peut donner se privent gratuitement d’une force et d’un moyen auxiliaires jamais nuisibles, presque toujours utiles et souvent indispensables.”

UNTIL recent experience, it was fast becoming an axiom, that an army receiving battle in position must be beaten, and that no skill in occupying and strengthening, nor firmness in disputing and maintaining ground, could balance the advantage of free and concentrated movement, and the moral confidence arising from being the assailant. The recorded sentiments and feelings of many celebrated commanders and tacticians are in unison with this opinion ; and with the solitary exception of the battle of Fontenoy, the page of history uniformly supports it, from the actions of Blenheim and Ramilies, through the operations of Frederick and Napoleon, to the campaigns in Egypt and the Peninsula. There the reverse was for the first time exemplified in a succession of brilliant triumphs on the defensive fields of Alexandria, Corunna, Talavera, Albuera, Fuentes d’Honor, the Pyrenees,—and in front of Lisbon, the exploded opinion, after the interval of a

¹ This chapter was composed as the vehicle for a series of notes illustrative of the principles of field fortification, and of the art of fortifying generally.

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century, was revived and happily exemplified, of lines being able to check and paralyse the efforts of a powerful invader.

Whether these successes should be ascribed to the ability with which the several positions were occupied or retrenched, to the superiority of the troops, or to the *impassible* nature of Englishmen as our opponents state; or whether there be advantages to be derived from defensive combat not understood by other armies, it is not deemed necessary to inquire. But as from the inadequate force with which we usually carry on continental operations, defensive warfare sustained in defensive positions must continue to be resorted to, some general observations on the subject of retrenching ground and positions have been thrown together, with the view of leading the young officer to form a correct judgment as to the value and proper application of field defences—that he may neither despise them as altogether useless to an army, nor trust to them as never-failing sources of strength.

On the first of these points it must be recollected that, although during the early part of the last war field-works fell into discredit, and almost into disuse, such aids were previously very highly estimated by those best able to judge of their utility. Frederick the Second, Marshal Saxe, Count Daun, and all the best generals of the last century, frequently and successfully availed themselves of redoubts and retrenchments to strengthen their positions or support their movements; and it is a well-established histo-

rical fact, that a few earthen redoubts at Pultawa marred the fortune of Charles XII., and fixed the wavering destinies of the great Muscovite empire.

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It is, however, unnecessary to revert to past history to show the value of field-works, as in the recent battle of Borodino, a few simple redans, hastily thrown up to cover the left flank of the Russian position, paralysed for hours two French corps d'armée, and had nearly proved equally fatal to the fortunes of Napoleon as the redoubts at Pultawa to those of his prototype Charles. Indeed the attack of Dresden, which failed in consequence of the assailants being opposed by a slight field retrenchment, and many other events of the recent campaigns, leave no doubt that field-works judiciously disposed may still be rendered valuable auxiliaries, even to the most numerous and most active armies.

To effect this, and apportion works justly to cover a country, or strengthen a proposed field of battle, is the most difficult application of the engineer's art, being subject to no fixed rule, but merely founded on general principles, requiring to be modified on each occasion from an innumerable variety of circumstances, both physical and moral.

A just idea of these principles can only be acquired through a knowledge of tactics, and of the powers of troops under different orders of formation and movement; which, well understood, can scarcely fail to produce a feeling that works ought in every situation to be accessories and aids to the manœuvres of troops, and never principals of any defensive field system.

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Posting troops to fight a general action, or strengthening the front of an army when so posted, are details founded on the foregoing principles, which for the same reasons scarcely admit of theoretic elucidation, and the knowledge of them can only be fully attained by long service with an active corps.

Considerable insight into such details may, however, be gained by studying the principles on which various fields of defensive combat have been occupied by skilful commanders.

In these it will be seen that a rocky height, a knoll, a wood, a village, and even a single house, have frequently formed the prominent flank or defensive posts; and instances might be adduced where each of the above obstacles have mainly contributed to the repulse of the assailants; and on the contrary, where such posts, injudiciously occupied or ill-supported, have led to discomfiture or the loss of entire divisions of the defensive force.

These extremes are found in the battles of Blenheim in 1704, and of Ligny, in 1815.

In the former action, the village of Blenheim, on the left flank of the defensive army, being well retrenched and occupied with twenty-four battalions and twelve squadrons, proved an insurmountable obstacle to the Duke of Marlborough's efforts in the early part of the action; but that commander skilfully transferring his attack to a point near the centre of the defensive line, which was beyond molestation from the troops in Blenheim, they, from principals in the action, became merely spec-

tators of the defeat of their friends, when they had no alternative but to surrender prisoners. At the battle of Ligny, on the contrary, the town and villages in front of the Prussian line on the heights of Sombref were so strongly occupied with men, and so closely supported each other, that Napoleon did not dare to leave them in his rear or on his flanks, but wasted his time and exhausted his strength during many hours in an attack of advanced posts, till too late to force the Prussian line, which retired without loss as soon as it became dark.

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But to leave these higher points, as also the best formation of troops, the situations of the artillery, and the dispositions of the reserve, which are usually settled in all their details by the general-in-chief, and confining ourselves to the consideration of the best means of strengthening troops already posted, we may adduce the battle of Waterloo as a happy exemplification of natural defences being turned to profit.

In that action, the line being formed along the crest of a range of easy heights, the country-house of Goumont was very strongly and the farm buildings of La Haye Sainte moderately occupied as posts in advance of the line; the former being in front of the right flank, at the distance of four hundred yards, and the latter nearly in front of the centre, at the distance of three hundred yards, the interval between them being thirteen hundred yards.

Napoleon did not think it prudent to pass through this space, or leave two such posts in rear of his attacking columns, and as a preliminary measure

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to advancing against the line, made a great effort to possess himself of Goumont.

The column for the attack was of a magnitude, and advanced with an intrepidity, which seemed to command success, as did a second and third, supported by a powerful fire of artillery; but the battalions of Guards which occupied the building, being experienced as well as brave troops, had most judiciously loopholed the garden walls to the front, and otherwise so opened their fire, that they maintained the post, and covered the right flank of the position throughout the day.

The Germans in La Haye Sainte behaved with similar firmness, and long disputed the passage of the chaussée; but their communications being cut off,² and their numbers too few to be formidable to the rear or flank of an advancing column, Napoleon concentrated on their left a most powerful body of troops, which advanced to attack the line with apparently matchless force; but a slight bank and hedge enabled a very inferior force to check their progress till troops came up from the second line, and utterly routed them.³

² Their communications and the post itself were ultimately lost from neglect of the simple precaution of blocking up the entrance gate at the side, and forming an opening through the rear enclosure wall; which would have admitted of the ammunition of the defenders being renewed, and their casualties replaced.

³ In order to prevent any misconception from the above observations, it is necessary to state that no artificial cover or retrenchments of any nature aided the firmness of the troops, and that the battle of Waterloo was fought on ground untouched by the spade.

The present appearance of the field, however, seems to con-

It is evident that on the field of Waterloo, or on any other field of defensive combat, with time, artificial defences might have been prepared on or near the sites of the buildings or hedges occupied by the troops in advance of the main line, which would have afforded an equal or better defence; and thus we discover at once the position in which works would positively have aided an army.

Other battles are equally illustrative of the use of strengthening the most prominent or marked features of defensive ground, either with the view of covering a weak front by an advanced or flanking fire, or preventing an assailant from establishing his artillery on points favourable for cannonading the defensive line previously to using his bayonet; and even where such marked features of the ground do not exist, their place may readily be supplied artificially by the erection of flanked works, or two or more, or a system of redoubts flanking each other,

tradict this fact, and will, after a few years, afford plausible arguments for historic doubts on the subject. The excavations recently made along the front of the position, to obtain soil to raise the artificial mountain on which the Belgic Lion now peers over the field, have the precise trace and appearance of a well-flanked retrenchment; and further, the artificial mountain itself forms a strong and commanding feature, which, if viewed as part of the position, takes away nearly all the merit of its defence.

Indeed it is truly to be regretted that the good citizens of Brussels should, in the gratification of civic vanity, have had the bad taste to destroy a lasting and indisputable memorial of the valour and firmness of their countrymen and their allies, merely to substitute a perishable trophy of their own loyalty, which will in all probability be thrown down on the first ephemeral success of a French army.

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in such situations and force as experience will soon teach an officer to be necessary.

There is, however, a very serious obstacle to the employment of the art of retrenching positions, which is, that after an army has taken up its ground, and a battle becomes inevitable, there is seldom time to throw up works of sufficient strength to be depended upon; and it is scarcely possible, in any moderately open country, to select a position to be fortified in advance for the protection of a frontier or a capital which an enemy will not find roads to turn and render useless. Thus, in allusion to the battle of Waterloo, had the ground been strongly retrenched during the spring, Napoleon would naturally have avoided it by marching on Brussels by the road of Hal, and therefore such preparatory labours seem only advisable in peninsular situations, or to block up the entry, or dispute the sortie of a mountain-pass, occupy the interval between two fortresses, or for some other specific and very limited object.⁴

Even in such favourable situations, attention should be directed rather to the improvement of natural obstacles than to the erection of artificial lines of defence; and where works cannot be dispensed with, they should, as far as practicable,

⁴ The Duke of Wellington, in his defensive campaigns, felt this so strongly, that on some occasions (near Campo-maior, in 1811, for instance) where he strengthened open ground with the intention of giving battle, he caused the parties to labour during the obscurity of night only, and the excavation to be covered at break of day with boughs, so as not to be recognized as works by the enemy from the neighbouring heights.

be enclosed, independent, and capable of defending themselves. Nothing can be more vicious than to cover an extensive tract of country with a regular system of bastions and redans, as recommended in most treatises on field fortification. Such long systematic lines of defensive works, besides the great expense, labour, and publicity attending their formation, have the serious defect of being of no strength, unless equally guarded throughout; and further, when attacked, the defenders have, in consequence of their flanked trace, to man an alignment of nearly double the length of the front to be defended, and are utterly incapacitated from making any instantaneous or powerful forward movement: they therefore necessitate the worst possible disposition of troops for offence or defence, and must be regarded as inadmissible under the present system of tactics. Indeed, such long defensive lines, even when most in repute, at the end of the seventeenth and commencement of the eighteenth century, were invariably forced as often as attacked, and it is difficult to conceive on what foundation their popularity so long sustained itself.

Field defences, however, are not to be indiscriminately condemned or rejected because they are continuous or systematic. In order to strengthen the front of an army with judgment, it is necessary to consider every feature and every portion of the ground separately, and arrange such mode of occupation as shall best combine its particular defence with the general defence of the position. Thus, in

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parts unfavourable for manœuvring, it may be advisable to form a continued line of considerable extent, covered with every nature of obstacle, and having none but the most confined outlets, on the principle that a range of difficult heights would be scarped, or low ground inundated, to lessen the number of men on those points, and leave a superabundance of force for other points favourable for offensive movements. Again, since the employment of artillery in masses has been introduced, and that an irresistible fire, sometimes of hours' duration, now invariably precedes the advance of the columns of attack, it will frequently prove a good measure, in situations where natural cover cannot be formed from a cannonade, to create it artificially between all the prominent defensive posts.⁵ Thus, each furlong of ground being duly considered, and the nature of defence best adapted to the locality being formed, the whole front of an army may occasionally be covered with lines of works, which, while they augment its defensive powers, leave its movements perfectly free.

Continuous lines, of the short extent of a mile or two, may frequently be resorted to with advantage, in situations where the flanks can be naturally or artificially secured, as on a river or a fortress.

⁵ This might be effected by means of a sunken trench, like a parallel at a siege, made to connect a whole chain of redoubts. Such an expedient would cover infantry from the fire of guns without impeding their forward movement in line, and openings might be left for the advance of the cavalry and artillery, or they might act in masses on the flanks.

Such lines, in communication with a fortified town, when composed of fronts of fortification or other flanked trace, and made of a profile not to be assaulted, are well suited to facilitate the defensive manœuvres of an inferior army, and also to augment the defensive powers of the fortress itself, by occupying important tracts of ground which could not be included within the permanent works. In such cases they are usually denominated retrenched camps, as at Setuval, Bayonne, Antwerp, &c., under which character they form a medium of defence between field-works and permanent fortifications, which can be resorted to on any pressing emergency arising from defeat, and may be generally recommended by an officer without hesitation; for if it be not convenient to man them fully, their evacuation, after a show of resistance, neither compromises the retreat of the defenders, nor detracts from the original strength of the fortress.

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Experience affords many proofs of positions of two or three miles length of front, which could not be turned when retrenched on a field profile, being capable of an excellent defence; and our own annals furnish a remarkable instance, in the attack by the Duke of Marlborough, of a small corps hastily and imperfectly retrenched at Donawert, in June, 1704, when an incomplete victory cost the Duke 8 general officers, 1500 men killed, and 4000 wounded,⁶ being a greater loss than he experienced

⁶ See Life of Marlborough, by Archdeacon Coxe, vol. i. p. 259.

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in the July following, in forcing Marshal Villeroy's extensive lines of Tirlemont, defended by 70,000 men: and on this point it should be recollected, that the most sanguinary and least complete victory of the same celebrated commander was over an army in a retrenched position of short front at Malplaquet.

It is apparent, however, that isolated and unsupported field positions of this nature, retrenched on a field profile, besides being liable to be turned, and the defenders shut up as in a trap, and made prisoners, partake of all the defects of longer continued lines in proportion to their extent, and are in the same proportion objectionable. They are, consequently, inadmissible whilst hostilities are carried on with the numerous and powerful armies of the present day, and would scarcely have demanded an observation had not the most prominent example of a retrenched field position ever formed in England been of such nature.

None of the objections to continuous lines, however, apply to retrenchments formed of enclosed and isolated works, each capable of a good resistance, as the intervals between them do not require a line of supporting troops, and after furnishing garrisons for the works, the army may remain in masses, sheltered from cannonade by some irregularity of the ground near the summit of the heights; or if such be not found, on their reverse, immediately below the crest, ready to move in compact and formidable bodies on any menaced point, or form into line or manœuvre on the posts taken up, so as best to parry

the efforts of the assailants ; a good specimen of which nature of position may be studied in the defences of Almada.

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Plate XX.

It seems to be an indispensable condition of such field-works in aid of an army, whether prepared at leisure or during active operations, that they be of a profile and capability of defence to resist an assault, that they be securely closed in the rear, placed sufficiently near to and so disposed as to flank each other, and armed with sufficient artillery to prevent heavy columns passing between them without being thrown into disorder from severe loss ; or else made of a size to contain a force likely to prove formidable to the rear of a column which should venture to pass them. In this case, indeed in all cases, the outlets from, and intervals between works, should give every freedom for the movement of troops compatible with security from assault or being passed.

On this point it may be as well to observe, that detached enclosed works, in front of an inferior army acting on the defensive, ought to be regarded as vital points, performing certain functions of themselves, and their garrisons be considered as integral parts of the works, destined to share their fate—to triumph or fall with their post, and not as portions of the army to be protected and withdrawn. Under this view, the defensive corps being left unshackled in their movements, and their part being confined to the discomfiture of the enemy, they will be prepared to seize the favourable moment, and advance to the attack when the redoubts shall be most warmly

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engaged, or their fire have thrown the assailants into confusion ; so that to derive full benefit from works, as much judgment is required in posting and manœuvring the force to be strengthened, as in placing the works themselves.

This leads to a consideration of the just proportion between the garrisons of detached works and the army they cover, and also of the length of front along which works may be allowed to extend for given numbers of men. On the first point it may be observed, that the better the troops composing the defensive army, the fewer should be the works, for it can seldom be advisable to confine any considerable body of a manœuvring and steady force in an enclosed work, unless it be the key or main support of a position ;⁷ but when an army is composed in great part of ill-disciplined and unsteady troops, artificial defences can scarcely be too numerous.

The extent of front which works may cover need in strictness only be limited by the power the army possesses of succouring, in sufficient time, any and every work that may be pressed, so that a ready or difficult communication will frequently decide the eligibility of occupying a distant point ; but as strength is invariably gained by concentration, no ground should be occupied that is not intimately connected with the main object of defence, even if invitingly convenient. On this head no better rule

⁷ Such, for instance, as the occupation of Goumont by the Guards at Waterloo.

can be followed than to inquire, previously to occupying any point, whether it be essential to the support or safety of the main body of the army; and on each occasion an officer must exercise his judgment to modify and turn local circumstances to advantage on the unchangeable basis of science. It cannot, however, be too strongly borne in mind by those planning defensive expedients, that troops are the principals, works the accessories of defence,—that the latter must invariably be dependent on and limited by the former, and consequently that every point superfluously retrenched is an unnecessary source of distraction and division of force. Field-works can never without hazard be left to their own garrisons; and reverting to the lines of Torres Vedras, which would seem to warrant the creation of an unlimited number of defences, it may be confidently predicted that any commander not possessing the utmost promptitude, decision, and skill in manœuvring troops, who, trusting to that example, shall attempt to defend against a superior, or even equal force, a tract of four-and-twenty miles of country as a fortified position, will infallibly be beaten; and that an engineer who should, on any ordinary occasion, copy the extended system of isolated redoubts and retrenchments practised in front of Lisbon, would, instead of adding to the strength, altogether cripple an army.

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But whenever, by the foresight and skill of the general and the exertion of the engineer, the arrangements of the troops and works shall be in happy

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unison, and a defensive army well posted shall have its front covered with works constructed on just principles, its force will be incalculably augmented, and its defeat rendered almost impracticable. Even a few works, thus judiciously disposed on the principal features of the ground, or to sweep the approaches, could not fail to add materially to the powers of movement and resistance of a defensive force ;⁸ as will frequently the most trifling efforts of labour, such as loopholing buildings, barricading streets, blocking up or opening communications, destroying bridges or roads, or the fords of a river, felling abattis, forming emplacements for field-guns, or the slightest cover from cannonade ; and an active and zealous engineer will generally find opportunity on the eve of a battle to strengthen, by some of these various labours, the fronts and flanks of a defensive force.

In making this statement, it is not forgotten that since the improved organization of armies has given them an increased facility of movement, and a consequent celerity and boldness of enterprise, placing legs almost on an equality with arms in war, time is rarely allowed to a defensive force for perfecting defensive expedients ; but this consideration, so far

⁸ Napoleon was so highly impressed with the value of these preliminary labours, even where armies are nearly balanced in strength, that on the morning of the battle of Austerlitz he went at the break of day to the retrenchment of Santon, and remained there for a considerable time on foot, encouraging and urging on the exertions of the working party.

from being deemed to excuse the attempt, should only stimulate an engineer to increased exertion. The country naturally expects some return for the liberal arrangements recently made to improve the engineer's service, and increase the engineer's means, and every officer is interested to show that the sappers and their field equipment, which now form an integral part of each division of an army, are available auxiliaries to its force. The most simple exercise of his art will occasionally prove their paramount utility; and as it not unfrequently occurs, even after hostile armies come into view, that days pass in reconnoitring or preparation for attack, who can say on such occasions to what extent activity and intelligence may not gain artificial strength for a field of defensive action, and consequent character and reputation for an officer? ^a

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^a In 1812, on the retreat from Burgos, and in 1813, after the battle of Vittoria, when the army under the Marquis Wellington advanced to the frontiers of and entered France, every position occupied by the troops, even if only for a few days, was strengthened by breast-works thrown up to cover the guns of the field brigades and pickets, and all the principal points were intrenched, and made as strong as time and circumstances permitted. Where necessary, the ground was levelled or fences thrown down, to make an easy communication along the position: the flanks were secured by redoubts, constructed on as strong a profile as time permitted. As soon as the general commanding a division had posted his troops, the engineer brigade, with intrenching tools, was brought forward, and working parties immediately told off for the above duty, under the directions of the engineer attached to that particular division.—ED.

Details of
Field-works on
the Lines.

CHAPTER IV.

MEMORANDA RELATING TO VARIOUS DETAILS OF FIELD-WORKS AS THROWN UP ON THESE LINES.

“Les principes des fortifications de campagne ont besoin d’être perfectonnés : cette partie de l’art de la guerre est susceptible de faire de grands progrès.

“Les fortifications de campagne sont toujours utiles—jamais nuisibles, lorsqu’elles sont bien entendues.”—*Conversations de Napoleon, par Montholon.*

Workmen.—The manual labour of the lines was performed by the peasantry of the country and two regiments of militia. The former were obtained by conscription, and were relieved weekly ; the latter worked as a permanent duty. The peasantry were paid six vintems¹ per day as labourers, and twelve vintems per day as mechanics, and the militia at one-third those rates. Subsequently, as the work increased and lengthened almost into a permanent occupation for the peasantry, their rate of wages was augmented to ten vintems per day for labourers, and sixteen for artificers, the militia continuing to be paid at the original rate. In August, 1810, when more than 2500 men were working in a body

¹ A vintem is 5·4 farthings.

at Alhandra, and the ordinary supply of the town would not furnish sufficient provisions for such augmented numbers, the officers of engineers took upon themselves to make requisitions on the neighbouring districts for bread sufficient to supply each workman with a pound per day, and saw that the value was regularly stopped from the men's wages at the end of the week. In the winter of 1810 and 1811, when the country was totally exhausted of provisions, this system was improved into a regular supply of a pound of biscuit per man issued by the British commissariat, for which three vintems per day were deducted from the wages of the peasantry.

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Superintendence.—The number of officers of engineers employed on the lines never exceeded seventeen at the same time, viz., eleven British, two Hanoverian, and four Portuguese, and the number of their own soldiers never exceeded eighteen rank and file; but they had the assistance of more than 150 soldiers of the line, principally artificers, selected from the regiments at Lisbon. The latter were under the charge of a captain stationed at Mafra, and a subaltern at Alhandra, but were divided into parties of two and three each throughout the whole extent of the country to be retrenched. In some of the districts a subaltern officer of engineers, with that small number of English soldiers, utterly ignorant of the language, directed and controlled the labours of a thousand or fifteen hundred peasantry, compelled to work, many at the distance

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of forty miles from their homes, whilst their own lands lay neglected, and no Portuguese ever attended of higher authority than a cabo, equal, according to military classification, to a serjeant; nevertheless, during a twelvemonth of this forced labour, not a single instance of insubordination or riot occurred, and the great quantity of work performed should, in justice to the Portuguese, be more ascribed to regular habits of persevering labour in those employed, than to the efficiency of the control exercised over them.

Mode of Payment.—On commencing the lines, the officers of engineers were made public accountants, contrary to the regulations of the Service, which strictly prohibit it, and they had, in consequence, to take charge of large sums of money (all in silver), and make the weekly payments of the labourers' wages.

Every moment of the engineers' time being devoted to the works, and no officer having a secure place to lodge the cash, nor any competent person to keep his accounts, many were considerable losers by this duty; and the active service of the senior officer of each district was altogether lost one day in the week whilst settling with the workmen, each of whom individually received and signed in triplicate for his 4s. 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ d., which useless formality rendered the payment of 1500 or 2000 men the labour of many hours.

After some months, the impolicy as well as in-

justice of making the engineers paymasters becoming apparent, an officer of the commissariat, with efficient clerks, was named for that duty, and made a regular round of the districts, paying the workmen on lists prepared and certified by the engineers. In a similar manner, during the latter periods of the war, in carrying on works in detached situations, the officer of engineers was relieved from the responsibility of being a public accountant, by the duty of paymaster being allotted to an ordnance clerk or conductor of stores, who received a sum of money to cover the intended service from the commissary-general, and disbursed it on the order of the engineer in charge of the work.

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Materials, Stores, &c., how obtained.—All materials, stores, implements, &c., were purchased by the commissary-general on requisition from the commanding engineer, and the officers in charge of the several districts only gave receipts for the quantities delivered to them, being in no way responsible for or consulted respecting the price.

Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher had a general authority from the commander of the forces to make these demands on the commissary-general, and when he gave over the charge of completing the lines to Captain John T. Jones, and made him responsible for the future expenditure, he also transferred his authority to order materials, &c.; which authority so delegated was found efficient. In like manner, Captain Goldfinch was subsequently invested with

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similar delegated powers and responsibility, whilst retrenching the position of Almada ; and generally speaking, each officer, when employed in charge of a distinct work, had authority to make demands on the nearest commissariat station.

The gunpowder used for blasting during the formation of the scarps of the lines, the quantity of which was very considerable, also that used for mining the bridges and roads, was obtained from the ordnance commissary at Lisbon as wanted, on requisition addressed to the commanding officer of artillery.

When mining was ordered in situations distant from any artillery dépôt, it was at first customary to draw cartridges from the nearest brigade of guns ; but as this was invariably found to be a source of vexation to the artillery officers, a supply of gunpowder was latterly transported with the engineers' stores, with cases ready prepared for given charges.

Plate XXIII.

Trace of the several Works.—The redoubts were made of every capacity, from that of fig. 7, limited by want of space on the ground it occupied to 50 men and 2 pieces of artillery, to that of fig. 10, for 500 men and 6 pieces of artillery, the importance of the object to be attained being the only guide in forming the dimensions. Many of the redoubts first thrown up, even some of the smallest, were shaped like stars (figs. 3 and 9), under the idea of procuring a flank defence for the ditches ; but this construction was latterly rejected, it being found to

cut up the interior space, and to be almost fallacious with respect to flank defence, the breadth of the exterior slopes being in some cases equal to the whole length of the flanks so obtained, as in fig. 9. Even when, from the greater size of the work, some flanking fire was thus gained, the angle formed by the faces was generally so obtuse, that it demanded more coolness in the defenders than ought reasonably to be expected, to aim along the ditch of the opposite face : and further, this construction prevented the fire of the work being more powerful in front than in rear.

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In order to decide on the proper trace of a work, it is necessary to consider whether its object be to prevent an enemy establishing himself on the ground on which it is to be placed, or whether it be to insure a heavy fire of artillery on some other point in its vicinity. In the first case, every consideration should be sacrificed to that of adding to its powers of self-defence, by flanks or other expedients. In the second, its powers of resistance are secondary to the establishment of a powerful offensive fire, and its trace cannot be too simple. Latterly, the shape of the redoubts was invariably that most fitted to the ground, (figs. 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,) or such as best parried the enfilade fire or musketry plunge of neighbouring heights, care being taken to present the front of fire deemed necessary towards the pass, or other object to be guarded ; and such will generally be found the best rule of proceeding.

Plates XXIII.
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This recommendation, however, is not intended

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to apply to isolated works of large dimensions, and more particularly to those considered the key of any position. No labour or expense should be spared to render such works capable of resisting the most furious assault, either by breaking the parapet into flanks, or forming a flank defence in the ditch ; for the experience gained in the Peninsula shows that an unflanked work of even more than an ordinary field profile, if skilfully and determinedly assaulted, will generally be carried—for instance, redoubt Renaud, forts Picurina and Napoleon, &c. Nor does the serious evil of curtailing the interior space, which renders any breaks in the outline to procure flanks so objectionable in small works, apply to works of large dimensions ; for it must be recollected, that in similar figures, whilst the length of the outline increases only in the simple ratio of the double, triple, or quadruple, the interior space or surface increases as the square of their like sides. Under this view, the great work on Monte Agraça (fig. 2) must be considered as very defective, the flank defence being confined to an occasional break of a few feet in the trace, caused by a change of direction in the contour of the height, whilst the interior space is more than doubly sufficient for the number of its allotted garrison to encamp.²

² It was understood at the moment, that General Junot strongly urged Marshal Massena to permit him to advance up the mountain with a division just before the dawn of day, and make a desperate effort to carry the large work by assault. This was good counsel abstractedly, and the assault would probably have been crowned

Interior and other Defences.—This work, however, had some of its most exposed salient points, or those most easy of access, or most likely to be assaulted, cut off by earthen lines of parapet, steeply revetted externally, and so traced as to serve for traverses to the interior. It had also three or four small enclosed posts formed within it; and the work at Torres Vedras (fig. 1) had each of its salient points formed into an independent post. These interior defences and retrenchments were intended to guard against a general panic amongst the garrison, which would necessarily be composed in part of indifferent troops, and also to prevent the loss of the work by the entry of the assailants at any weak or ill-defended point. Such interior lines to rally on are absolutely essential to the security of a large field-work. They serve as substitutes for a blockhouse or tower, placed in the interior of all well-constructed permanent earthen works, and merit far more attention than they generally receive.

The small circular wind-mills of stone, which were frequently found occupying salient knolls, selected for the site of advanced flèches, readily converted into admirable interior posts of that nature; and many mills situated on the elevated points of the main de-
with success, had the garrison been isolated; but there being a division of infantry bivouacked in rear of the heights, which was under arms every morning long before daybreak, and had a ready communication all round the counterscarp, they would have marched on the flank of the assailants on the first musket being fired, and have rendered the attempt abortive and highly destructive.

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Plate XXVI.

fences were made to add greatly to their security by similar conversion. (Figs. 24, 25, and 26.)

Redoubt No. 109, occupying a very important and very exposed point in advance of the position of Oeyras, was deemed of so much value, that being commanded by a height between 600 and 700 yards in its front, in order to insure some power of resistance after its parapet and scarps should have been destroyed, its artillery dismounted, and its interior ploughed up by a cannonade from the height, a gallery, loopholed for reverse flanking fire along the ditch, was formed behind the counterscarp at the salient angle of the front faces, and a communication made to it from the interior, under the bottom of the ditch. The soil being of a hard chalky substance, which stood without support, fixed the adoption of this means of defence in preference to the ordinary caponière, which requires so much less labour. (Figs. 11 and 23.)

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The parapet of No. 109 was also cut en crémail-
lière to throw a musketry fire on the salient angle
next the heights, and to screen the defenders of its
left face from the enfilade fire of the heights. This
mode of indenting the parapet, however, was not
thought a good measure generally, it being found to
add very much to the labour, and to abstract from
the direct fire of the work an equal quantity to that it
threw in a different direction ; besides making the
defence of the parapet rather complex for militia.
Therefore, latterly, in those redoubts where any par-
ticular trace was not imperious, it was always pre-

ferred to make an additional face to the work, than to leave a salient angle so acute as to necessitate such extra support; and at Almada, this principle was carried so far as to render the contour of some of the redoubts almost circular. (Figs. 14 and 15.)

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Plate XXIV.

Situations of the Works.—Many of the redoubts were placed on very elevated situations on the summit of steep hills, which gave them a most imposing appearance; but it was in reality a defect highly prejudicial to their efficiency and defence, for the fire of their artillery on the object to be guarded became so plunging as to lose half its powers; the musketry could not be made to scour the face of the hill sufficiently; and during the night both arms became of most uncertain effect.

The domineering situation of the redoubts, however, gave confidence to the young troops which composed their garrisons, protected them from a cannonade, and screened their interior from musketry, unless fired at a high angle, and consequently at random. These considerations perhaps justify the unusually elevated sites selected for most of the redoubts on the lines, though they cannot induce an approval of them as a general measure. Indeed, the ill consequences arising from height of situation was so strongly felt on the lines, that on very elevated points, particularly at Monte Agraça, in order to command the face of the mountain, flèches, or small redoubts, were established in front of the main work (fig. 2), on the projecting knolls, which afforded

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the best flanking points. These advanced batteries were made of the same strong profile in front as the redoubts, and their gorges were equally secured, except that the rear parapets were formed as mere screens, so as not to give cover against the fire of the main work ; and for the same object, the counterscarps of the rear ditches were sloped into the plane of the parapets of the commanding work. Even these flèches, though nearly doubling the garrison, saw the face of the hill less perfectly than the main work alone would have done, if placed on a height of a more moderate and more regular ascent, which shows that very elevated situations for works are seldom to be preferred.

At some points, where it was deemed likely that the troops would act in combination with redoubts occupying the summits of very elevated knolls, flèches, or field batteries, were prepared for the field brigades in the best flanking or enfilading situations, much lower down on the face of the hill. This seems the most judicious mode of occupying a height as a field position, when the artillery can be placed under the effectual musketry fire of the redoubt; but on these lines, it being impossible to foresee which part might or might not be occupied strongly by troops, it was made a rule to put no artillery in battery, except within works capable of defending themselves. At some points, where space could not be obtained within the redoubts, the guns were placed on a lower advanced level, connected on its flanks with the defences of the redoubt (fig. 8). Some of

the flank defences were limited to one or two guns, which could only be justified by the difficulty an enemy would find in passing the object they fired upon. It ought to be received as a general rule, that no flank can be formidable to infantry which does not contain at least three pieces of ordnance ; and even to render a flank of three pieces very destructive, it must be in a situation of tedious approach, or in a work which cannot be run into.

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Profiles.—The profile of the several works varied on every face and flank, according to its liability to be attacked or cannonaded ; the only general rule enforced being that all ditches should be at least 15 feet wide at top and 10 feet in depth, and the crest of the parapet have at least 5 feet command over the crest of the counterscarp.

No parapet exceeded 10 feet in thickness, unless exposed to be severely cannonaded, and few more than 6 or 8 feet ; and some, on high knolls, where artillery could not by any possibility be brought against them, were made of stone or rubble less than two feet in thickness, to gain more interior space, and allow full liberty for the use of the defenders' bayonets. Many of the rear enclosures, when supported on precipices, were merely screens ; and in some few cases, on the position near Ribaldiera, they were left to the precipice itself (fig. 5). The rear of advanced *fîèches* and other small works, situated within good musketry-fire of the main defences,

Plate XXIII.

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Plate XXVI.

were generally closed with a very open but strong stockade. (Figs. 24, 25, and 26.)

In elevated situations, many of the banquettes were raised within four feet of the crest of the parapet, it being the rule to fix the level along each face at such height as would admit of the musketry plunging down the face of the hill, or at least seeing some yards of the glacis.

The exterior slopes were made greater or less, according to the tenacity of the soil; but it was found after the first winter, that no slope cut through the natural ground had sustained itself at a greater angle than 45° , and in made ground the exterior slopes were washed away at that angle. Indeed, in consequence of the heavy rains in southern climates, it is almost essential to form some kind of revetment to works, to keep them defensible during winter; and in 1811, most of the exterior slopes of the works of the lines were retained with dry stone walls. To insure an efficient system of drainage should always be a principal consideration with an officer on commencing a work. Some redoubts deeply excavated, with the view to screen the defenders, particularly Nos. 101 and 102, at Oeyras, from neglect of this precaution, literally filled with water in September, 1810, and the labour of forming drains to keep their interior dry was little less than that of constructing the redoubt.

The interiors of the parapets were retained with fascines or sand-bags: the former stood perfectly well, except that those originally made, being com-

posed of the smaller branches and twigs, became, during the summer, so readily combustible as to be considered unsafe; and latterly, only the larger branches, completely divested of their leaves and twigs, were worked into fascines intended for interior revetments. The sand-bags rotted and burst after the first winter.

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A drawing is given of the profile of several of the works in different situations (figs. 16 to 23); that of the redoubts on the heights of Almada (fig. 20) deserves particular attention, as those works stand in situations open to be violently cannonaded, and the hills forming the position are such as are most frequently occupied with works, and the profile was fixed after the experience gained in making the lines: it was as follows:—

	Feet.	In.
Height of interior crest of parapet . . .	7	0
Height of parapet above banquette . . .	4	3
Thickness of parapet	14	0
Berm	2	0
Breadth of ditch at top	16	0
Depth below surface of ground	12	0
Crest of glacis below crest of parapet . .	5	6

In the profile of lines of flanked works, in low situations, where the interior space was not limited, the crest of the parapet was generally fixed at 10 feet above the level of the ground, for the purpose of a better command in front, and better covering the troops; and this height was thought to be the best adapted for attaining a good defence with moderate

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labour. Even with this elevation, no covered-way was formed to any line ; but the crest of the glacis was kept six feet or six feet and a half below that of the parapet.

The redoubts of the lines being mostly thrown up as secure emplacements for guns, and to procure an open field for the fire of their artillery being the principal object attended to in their construction, they were mostly placed on the summit of the heights they occupied, so that each face might have a full command of the ground in its front, or of the point it was intended to protect ; but, in other situations, where the object of a redoubt was merely to prevent an enemy occupying a particular spot, it was, wherever practicable, constructed on an inclined plane on the reverse of the height, so that only its most salient point, or perhaps, its front faces, rose over the crest of the hill. (Fig. 22.) This defilement gives the work considerable protection from cannonade, and causes the front parapet to cover the rear lines and the defenders far better than if constructed on a horizontal plane, and should generally be adopted in situations where an enemy cannot establish batteries in its rear ; and invariably in the construction of lunettes or *flèches* in advance of a fortress, as, beyond the advantages above mentioned, it causes the interior of the work to be completely seen from the place.

Plate XXV.

In this construction the rear enclosure, whether palisades or a wall, should be made of a strength to resist light howitzer shells pitched over the para-

pet, but not so strong as to afford cover against the heavy guns of the place.

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Stores and Provisions.—In each redoubt wholesome casks were provided and placed in security to contain four quarts of fresh water per man for the calculated garrison, besides the tubs with water for the use of the artillery ; and a dépôt of intrenching tools was also provided in the following proportions.

	Shovels.	Pick-axes.	Felling-axes.
Works for 400 men	10	6	3
300	8	4	2
200	7	4	2
Smaller	6	3	2
Monte Agraça, proportion for 1500 men.			

Magazines.—The magazines were formed of splinter-poor timbers, about 10 inches by 8, placed at an angle between 45° and 50° against a substantial traverse ; and wherever an efficient drain could be made around them, their floors were sunk one, two, three, and even four feet below the level of the interior of the work ; which excavation, and the relative height of the redoubt with respect to the ground in its vicinity, served to regulate the length of the timber, so as to have the top of the magazine sheltered from direct fire.

The magazines were lined internally with plank, and strengthened externally with two feet of earth in sand-bags, over which tarpaulins were spread ; and thus protected, these magazines were found sufficiently dry.

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Platforms.—The platforms, as originally laid down, consisted merely of a plank for each truck, but during the summer and autumn of 1810 they were all replaced by platforms of the ordinary construction. Many of the redoubts being on undulating heights, and the guns being mounted on extremely low carriages, it required undeviating attention to keep the front of the platform on a sufficiently high level to insure the guns clearing the intermediate swell of the height, so as to strike an object at the foot of the slope. In such situations the eye will frequently attain an object which the gun on its lower level will not.

Palisades.—The palisades in the ditches were mostly young fir-trees, from four to five inches in diameter, roughly pointed, and fixed three or four feet into the ground with a riband very low down; and when the ditches were broad, much nearer the counterscarp than the scarp.

In the last campaign the palisades of the redoubts thrown up near the Montagne de la Couronne in the Pyrenees, where wood was plentiful and cost nothing, were made of trunks of trees placed close together at the foot of the escarp, and were found almost equal to a masonry revetment.

The best disposition of the ordinary palisades in works with wide ditches was thought that adopted for the advanced redoubt, No. 109, at the position of Oeyras, (fig. 23,) where they were fixed as fraises along the counterscarp, about two feet below its

crest, with an inclination towards the bottom of the ditch. Fraises in that situation are little likely to be injured by a front fire of cannon or howitzers, and the manual operation of cutting them away is extremely difficult, besides the men, whilst so employed, being exposed to the fire from the parapet of the work. This mode of fixing fraises was also partially applied to some salient angles, on the approach to which little fire could be brought.

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It should be observed, however, that fraises being much more liable to be broken down by vertical fire than palisades, are more adapted for field than revetted redoubts, as vertical fire can seldom be brought against the former, and it ought to form the basis of attack of the latter.

Barriers.—Each redoubt was closed with a barrier-gate, and a bridge of joists and planks.

For these four last-mentioned services, more than 50,000 trees were received between the 7th July and 7th October, 1810; the greater part however being firs from the royal forests, no payment was made for them.

Abattis.—The abattis were formed solely of the stems and boughs of whole trees well pointed, all the smaller branches being cut off, so that the front of the abattis afforded neither cover nor concealment to an assailant, although it presented a barrier of spears, five, six, and seven feet in height. The abattis were usually placed from twenty to thirty

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yards in front of the work, each stem and large branch being firmly staked down into the ground, and when practicable, the trace was so disposed as to be flanked along its front by some of the defences.

Obstacles in this situation are undoubtedly the best means that can be devised for aiding the defence of works, and are seldom sufficiently attended to.

The great object of defence should be to contrive some expedient to check the assailants, and cause them to halt, if only for two or three minutes, under a close fire of musketry from the parapet. Such an advanced obstacle has ten times the effect of one of equal difficulty opposed to an assailant, when he has closed with the defenders of a work. He knows that in the latter case he has but to overcome one difficulty to obtain complete success, whereas in the former case the troops exhaust their ardour and lose their formation on a mere preliminary effort; and every one must have felt how extremely difficult it is to revive confident boldness, and restore order for a second effort after a check.

Fir-trees were found the least, and olive-trees the best adapted to form abattis.

Trous-de-Loup.—The trous-de-loups were at first made of the ordinary dimensions and numbers, but subsequently an increased number of rows (eight or ten) of pits, only two feet or two feet six inches in depth, well staked at bottom and in the intervening spaces, were considered preferable, as affording no

cover within them for men to fire on the work, before which they might be placed, and presenting great impediments to the advance of an assailant.

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During the occupation of the lines, trous-de-loups were formed in front of part of the position of Via Longa, consisting of a triple row of inverted cones, nine or ten feet in diameter at top, and of the same depth.³ These were found to be a most formidable obstacle, but were perhaps larger than absolutely required, as it is only necessary that trous-de-loups should be of a depth to prevent an assailant getting into them and firing over their tops, which 7 or 8 feet will effect.

Whenever practicable, from the height of the profile or the fall of the ground, the rows of trous-de-loups were concealed and protected from cannonade by forming an advanced glacis with the earth excavated from the pit.

Artillery.—The provision of artillery, ammunition, and artillery stores, was arranged by the Portuguese in the arsenal at Lisbon, on memoranda sent from time to time by the commanding engineer, and the guns were mounted by parties of Portuguese gunners detached from thence, as the works were prepared to receive them. It was gratifying to observe, on these occasions, by what persevering and patient labour the peasantry, with their rude means of transport, (merely the common cars of the country pushed forward by oxen,) succeeded in transporting 12-

³ By Captain Burgoyne.

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pounders into situations where wheels had never before rolled, and along the steep sides of mountains where horses would have been useless.

Although the armament of the lines ultimately amounted to nearly double the number of pieces of ordnance originally contemplated, the zeal of the Portuguese General Rosa smoothed all difficulties, and his activity and resource seemed to render the supply of guns, ammunition, and the means of transport, inexhaustible; and, highly to his credit, every thing supplied, though rude and inconvenient, proved efficient and substantially good. The Portuguese officers and gunners employed on this duty were also zealous and active, and took extremely good care of their stores and ammunition. Their numbers assembled on the lines amounted to 3208, regulars and irregulars.

Calculation of Garrisons.—As a general rule, the garrisons of the redoubts and the number of troops required to man the retrenchments were at the commencement calculated on an allotment of two men per yard running of parapet for all lines; but after some time, this calculation was deemed too considerable, and the numbers were fixed at two men per yard running for all front lines, and one man per yard for all rear lines, deducting for the spaces occupied by the artillery; an addition to or deduction from these numbers being made by the commanding engineer in all cases where deemed expedient from local causes.

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Admitting each man to require three feet to enable him to use his musket freely, this latter calculation will, (whatever be the figure of the work,) insure the parapet being sufficiently manned, and leave a reserve to supply the place of those killed, or in large works to charge the first of the assailants who may penetrate into the interior. It was, therefore, deemed preferable to the more scientific formula for allotting a man to a certain number of square feet of the interior space, which rule, though well calculated to apportion the garrison of every sized work in a similar ratio between its interior space and its length of parapet, seems too much the result of theory, which requires that each man of a garrison should have a certain space for his accommodation; whereas in practice such does not appear to be essentially necessary, for till the moment of being menaced with an attack, many of the garrison of each work will be kept on the watch on the face of the hill, and others be permitted to amuse themselves in its rear. All cooking, &c., is also performed outside of the work, so that it is only at night, or during the action which decides the fate of the position, that the garrisons are closely shut up, and then at least one-third should be kept constantly standing or sitting under arms on the banquette. Besides this, every figure from the triangle to the circle varies in the proportion the content bears to the periphery, and it is on the latter only that the defence hinges.

Scarps.—The scarps were formed by cutting the

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front slopes of ranges of heights near their summit as perpendicularly as the soil or rock of which they were composed could be made to stand, or on such irregularity of level as presented the greatest facility for making a perpendicular cut.

Plate XXVI.

The chief difficulty in tracing a line to be scarped was to find portions of the ascent sufficiently steep, that when cut to the required angle, the base should not form a road, which might serve as a breathing and rallying point, and unless flanked, a secure communication to an assailant. Fig. No. 27 is a section of a scarp of nearly two miles in length, formed along the summit of the front of the position of Alhandra, in August and September, 1810. Much of the upper twenty or thirty feet of that range of heights was found to be a ledge of precipitous rock, only covered with a few feet of earth; which covering being removed and thrown down the face of the hill, the rock behind it was readily made insurmountable to infantry by means of blasting. At other points a species of sandstone, which, when cut through, stood nearly perpendicular, afforded great facility to the formation of the scarps; indeed, without some such natural aid, scarping will seldom be found practicable.

It never was presumed that scarps could be trusted to without defenders; but it was considered a great point gained to have rendered portions of ground of such difficult access as to be safely left to the guard of a small corps, or to unsteady troops, such as the militia and ordenanza, on the lines. For

the purpose of better watching, and to insure the ready approach of troops and field artillery to all points of the front scarped, a line of interior road was formed nearly parallel to the scarps of Alhandra and Picanceira, at the shortest convenient distance from the front.

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Roads and Communications.—The military roads generally were traced along the rear of ranges of heights on the shortest line, concealed from the view of the ground in front; they were perfected during 1811, so as to form a ready communication along the front line from the sea to the Tagus, with direct communications from the rear line.

Several miles of the lateral road were entirely new, as also most of the direct communications from the lateral road to the works; but the intermediate communications between the advanced works and rear line were merely the original car roads of the country widened and rendered practicable for military purposes. Many of the communications along the valleys were of necessity paved to keep them in a state to be used; but generally the heights over which the main communication passed were rocky or abounded with loose stones and other materials which readily formed into firm roads. Fig. 21 is a section of the covered road commenced at Almada, and intended to be carried from the right to the left of that position.

Plates XX.
and XXV.

Telegraphs.—The telegraphs were composed of a

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mast and yard, from which latter balls were suspended ; the vocabulary used was that of the navy, many sentences and short expressions peculiar to the land service being added. These telegraphs readily communicated with each other, at the distance of seven and eight miles ; but in consequence of the ranges of hills interrupting the view, it required five principal stations to communicate along the front line, viz.—at Alhandra, Monte Agraça, N. S. de Socorra, Torres Vedras, and redoubt No. 30, in rear of Ponte de Rol.

The telegraphs were worked by a party of seamen under Lieutenant Leith, of the Royal Navy.

Ground, how obtained.—The ground required for the site of works, roads, abattis, scarps, &c., was taken possession of without a reference to or complaint from the owner or occupier, or any estimate being made of its value, which, however, was seldom considerable. Compensation was made to the proprietors for the olive-trees cut down ; also for trees felled in private woods, and for crops destroyed before the advance of the invaders. The owners of mills dismantled in consequence of being on knolls selected for the site of works had a monthly payment equivalent to their previous average gains, and also a sum of money for the restoration of the machinery ; but otherwise, the principal injury sustained by private property being inflicted when the lines became the seat of war, the loss fell on individuals.

Conduct of the Portuguese.—The British officers of engineers, spread singly over a space of 150 square miles of country, and billeting themselves in the best and most convenient houses, were everywhere treated with civility and kindness by the inhabitants; and a general readiness was shown by the upper classes to admit them to the familiar society of their families, which led to many sincere and disinterested friendships being contracted between individuals of the two nations. Indeed, it is but a tribute of justice to the Portuguese gentlemen and peasantry of Estramadura to state that, during many months of constant personal intercourse, both public and private, the latter ever showed themselves respectful, industrious, docile, and obedient, whilst the former in every public transaction evinced much intelligence, good sense, and probity, and appeared in their domestic relations, kind, liberal, and indulgent, both as masters and parents.

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Secrecy with respect to the extent and nature of works going forward was enjoined, and it is highly creditable to all concerned that scarcely a vague paragraph respecting the lines found its way into the public prints; and, notwithstanding the magnitude of the works, the invaders remained ignorant of the nature of the barrier raising against them, till they found the army arrayed on it to stop their further advance.

Total of Retrenchments and Garrisons.—The length of retrenchment completed at the period the

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army occupied the lines, including the periphery of 126 enclosed works, when calculated on the data before mentioned, required 29,751 men for its defence, and there were mounted on it 427 pieces of artillery, independently of the works to cover an embarkation at St. Julian's, which were calculated for 5350 men, and contained 94 pieces of artillery. It is, however, evident from the description of the lines that little more than a third part needed to be kept fully manned at the same period.

In 1812, when the lines were considered as perfect as they could be made, they consisted of 152 distinct works, armed with 534 pieces of ordnance, and required on the same calculation 34,125 men for their garrisons. The embarkation position remained as above described.

Expense of the Lines. — The disbursements on account of the lines, to the 6th July, 1810, were about £60,000; at the moment of the army occupying the ground the disbursements amounted to nearly £100,000: which sum was doubled before the conclusion of the war, by the outlay for the position of Almada, the repair and preservation of the various defences and communications, and by indemnities to some individuals for property wantonly destroyed or taken for the use of the troops during the occupation of the lines.

Public Mention made of the Lines. — “Having advanced from the positions in which I was enabled

to bring the enemy to a stand, and oblige them to retire without venturing upon any attack, it is but justice to Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher and the Officers of the Royal Engineers, to draw your lordship's attention to the ability and diligence with which they have executed the works by which these positions have been strengthened to such a degree as to render any attack upon that line occupied by the allied army very doubtful, if not entirely hopeless. We are indebted for these advantages to Lieut.-Col. Fletcher and the Officers of the Royal Engineers, among whom I must particularly mention Captain Chapman, who has given me great assistance upon various occasions." ⁴—*Dispatch from Viscount Wellington, dated Cartaxo, Nov. 21st, 1810.*

Details of
Field-works on
the Lines.

⁴ Captain Chapman was next in seniority to Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher from the commencement of the lines, and was thus deservedly particularized for the great zeal and activity he displayed in aiding to carry into effect the plans of his commanding officer.

WORKS COMPOSING THE LINES,
AS NUMBERED ON THE GROUND AND ON THE PLAN.

DISTRICT No. 1.

*From the Tagus at Alhandra to No. 11, above Arruda Road,
inclusive.*

Nos. of the Works.	Infantry required.	Artillery mounted.				Names of Places where situated.
		12-prs.	9-prs.	6-prs.	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ how.	
1	1000	4	3	6	..	Line across the low ground at Alhandra, resting on the Tagus.
2	800	2	Rising line to the left of do. do.
3	200	2	Redoubt, left extremity of rising line.
4	2	Right flank to the scarped face of the position.
114	100	..	2	1	..	Flanking redoubt to the scarped front of Alhandra.
115	100	..	2	Do. do.
116	100	..	5	Do. do.
117	150	Flèche Do. do.
118	400	8	Redoubt on the most commanding point of the Alhandra position.
119	350	6	Redoubt closing the left of the position.
6	..	2	Barbette battery retired on the extreme of the left.
120	130	2	Redoubt, extremity of left of front of the heights of Alhandra.
5	120	..	3	Do. do.
121	250	..	3	1	..	Heights of Calhandrix, advanced redoubt.
122	300	3	Do. right.
123	300	3	Do. centre.
124	350	3	1	Do. left.
125	250	4	Rear work, to connect the Calhandrix position with the rear line.
7	200	3	Redoubt on the heights in rear of Alhandra, looking up valley of Calhandrix.
			11	1	..	The valley of Calhandrix is closed at its mouth by a line of intrenchment and abattis, not numbered, thrown up whilst the army occupied the lines.
8	200	3	Heights in rear of Trancoso de Cima, to prevent Alhandra being turned with artillery.
9	280	..	3	St. Sebastian, right of pass of Matos.
10	400	2	1	Carvalhao, left of the pass of Matos.
11	300	4	Moinho do Ceo. Wind-mill above Arruda road.
	6280	51	36	9	..	

DISTRICT No. 2.

From No. 12, above Arruda Road, to the Left of Monte Agraça.

Nos. of the Works.	Infantry required.	Artillery mounted.				Names of Places where situated.
		12-prs.	9-prs.	6-prs.	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ how.	
12	120	..	3	Forte do Passo, rocky bluff above Arruda road.
13	120	2	Forte de Canara, paved road leading to Bucellas.
14	1590	14	6	4	1	Main work, Monte Agraça.
15	460	3	3	1	..	Advanced work on the same hill.
16	250	1	2	..	1	Do. do.
17	300	7	1	Do. do.
152	250	4	2	Advanced work, right of road leading to Sobral.
	3090	24	16	12	3	

DISTRICT No. 3.

From Zibriera to the Caduceira Heights, inclusive.

Nos. of the Works.	Infantry required.	Artillery mounted.				Names of Places where situated.
		12-prs.	9-prs.	6-prs.	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ how.	
151	300	Patameira, redoubt for field artillery. Scarped plateau between the Quinta de Anoteira and Ribaldiera prepared for field guns.
128	500	6	Large work, Serra de Caduceira.
129	350	6	Centre do. do.
130	200	..	5	Left do. do.
28	270	3	Enxara dos Cavalheiros, north redoubt.
29	280	..	4	Do. do. south redoubt.
	1900	15	9	

DISTRICT No. 4.

From No. 144, on the Left of the Pass of Runa, to the Sea.

	Nos. of the Works.	Infantry required.	Artillery mounted.				Names of Places where situated.
			12-prs.	9-prs.	6-prs.	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ how.	
Main work, Torres Vedras,	149	250	4	2	Height above Matacaes, to command the Runa road.
	26	300	..	3	Advanced mill near do., to block the Runa road.
	20	470	5	..	2	1	S. E. Bastion of the main work at Torres Vedras.
	21	270	..	2	6	1	S. W. do. do.
	22	380	5	..	3	1	N. W. do. do.
		600	South Curtain 150 men, W. Curtain 90, N. E. Curtain 360.
	23	180	..	4	3	..	West Redoubt, Torres Vedras.
	24	300	..	7	East Redoubt, Torres Vedras.
	25	200	..	2	Convent of St. Joa.
	27	500	5	Castle of Torres Vedras in the town.
	131	90	4	Enclosed Battery, left of Variatoja.
	132	150	6	Do. left of do.
	133	120	..	4	Do. behind white Quinta.
	134	110	4	Do. ridge of Casal de Serra, overlooking the village and heights of Bemfica.
	135	160	..	4	Do. do.
	136	150	4	Do. do.
	137	100	4	Do. do.
	147	Open Battery above Ponte do Rol.
	148	Do. do.
	138	100	2	..	Enclosed Battery in rear of No. 30.
	30	340	3	1	Redoubt above Ponte do Rol.
	139	160	4	Enclosed Battery between Nos. 30 & 31.
	140	120	4	Do. do.
	31	373	..	3	Redoubt at Alгатerra.
	141	180	4	Enclosed Battery between 31 & St. Pedro.
	142	150	4	Do. do.
	143	150	..	4	Do. do.
	144	130	4	Do. do.
	32	260	3	1	At St. Pedro de Cadeira.
	145	250	..	4	Quinta de Belmonte.
	111	250	5	Between St. Pedro and the sea, Quinta de Passo.
	146	250	..	6	Quinta de Bessuaria.
	112	220	4	Between Quinta de Bessuaria & the sea.
	113	50	2	Enclosed Barbette Battery at the sea.
	7413	78	47	16	3		

1720 men.

DISTRICT No. 5.

From the Tagus to the Pass of Bucellas, inclusive.

Nos. of the Works.	Infantry required.	Artillery mounted.				Names of Places where situated.
		12-prs.	9-prs.	6-prs.	5½ how.	
33	300	4	Banks of the Tagus, right of position of Via Longa.
34	200	..	3	Advanced Redoubt to enfilade Calçada, do.
35	120	..	4	Do. do.
36	370	9	Do. summit of advanced hill, do.
37	50	..	3	Garden, right of paved road, do.
38	340	..	5	Building, left of road, do.
39	340	5	3	Summit of highest hill, do.
126	188	2	Right work to close the valley of Cabo.
127	154	Left do. do.
40	150	Caza de Portella, ad- } These redoubts
						vanced redoubt. } close the left of
41	240	5	Do. right. } the position of
42	350	6	Do. left. } Via Longa.
43	..	4	Right of Pass of Bucellas, open battery.
44	2	Do. front emplacement.
45	..	3	Do. rear do.
46	2	Left of Pass of Bucellas, front do.
47	..	3	Do. rear do.
48	200	2	In rear of the Pass enfilading the Calçada.
18	300	4	Right work, Serra de Santa Ajuda.
19	200	..	3	Left do. do.
	3502	47	25	

DISTRICT No. 6.

*From the Pass of Freixal to the Park of Mafra, including the
Pass of Montachique.*

Nos. of the Works.	Infantry required.	Artillery mounted.				Names of Places where situated.
		12-prs.	9-prs.	6-prs.	5½ how.	
49	..	2	Pass of Freixal, emplacement right.
50	160	..	2	Do. right redoubt.
51	300	4	Do. left redoubt.
52	190	..	3	Right of the Pass of Montachique, entrance of Pass.
53	230	..	2	Do. near the village of Prezenhiro.
54	210	Do. mill on Euxara road.
55	150	3	Do. rocky bluff.
56	150	2	Do. pine-wood.
57	270	3	Do. rocky height covering the right.
58	310	..	3	Left of Pass of Montachique, entrance of Pass.
59	260	4	Do. mill on Mafra road.
60	150	..	2	Do. flèche covering the left flank.
61	190	..	2	Do. covering the left flank.
62	390	3	In front of the road from Mafra to Montachique, covering the great road, Alto de Cheixa.
63	280	..	3	Do. Casal de Serra.
64	210	..	3	Do. corner of park wall.
65	270	3	Mafra road, Oiteira de Sta. Maria.
66	350	4	Do. Malveira.
67	120	..	2	Do. right of 66.
68	260	4	Do. Monte de Zinho.
69	240	4	Do. Pinhal de Fidalgo.
70	240	4	2	Do. Quinta de Estrangeiro.
71	240	..	4	Do. do.
72	130	..	2	Do. Astadieros.
73	340	3	Do. Casal de Conto.
	5640	43	30	

DISTRICT No. 7.

From the Park at Mafra, inclusive, to the Sea.

Nos. of the Works.	Infantry required.	Artillery mounted.				Names of Places where situated.
		12-prs.	9-prs.	6-prs.	5½ how.	
74	190	..	2	Pass of Mafra, Cazal de Pedra, right of Park, within the entrance.
75	70	..	2	Within walls of Park, advance Milharica.
76	390	4	Cabeça de Sincout.
77	380	4	Juncal.
78	110	2	1	Serra de Chypre, advanced work.
79	270	3	Do. redoubt, advanced mill.
80	310	3	Do. second mill.
81	280	..	3	Do. lower work.
82	210	2	2	Left of the village of Morugueira, right.
83	240	..	3	Do. centre.
84	290	3	Do. left.
85	290	3	Ereceira road to Mafra, Alto de Arriero.
86	280	3	Do. Alto de Paz.
87	340	3	Mill, south of Ereceira road, Pinheiro.
88	200	3	To command the road from Sobral des Alarves to Mafra.
89	310	3	Defence of Picanceira road.
90	230	3	Peneyaixo, to command the roads leading from Picanceira and Encarnaçoa.
91	200	3	Lagoa, to command three roads leading from Encarnaçoa.
92	180	3	Defence of the road to Morvao.
93	330	3	Ribarmar, right.
94	320	2	Do. left.
95	250	2	Rear line, right, Monte Gordo.
96	280	3	Do. centre, Carvoiera.
97	350	2	Do. left, St. Julian's.
	6300	57	13	

} Right of Pass of Mafra.

DISTRICT OF OEYRAS.

Nos. of the Works.	Infantry required.	Artillery mounted.					Names of Places where situated.
		24-prs.	12-prs.	9-prs.	6-prs.	5½ how.	
98	1340	20	6	..	Main work.
99	70	..	6	Right Battery to flank the valley and beach of Oeyras.
100	50	..	6	Left Battery to flank the valley of Oeyras.
101	250	..	10	Advanced to great work, right.
102	260	..	8	Do. left.
103	130	3	Advanced in front of Oeyras, front.
104	100	2	Do. south mill.
105	170	4	Do. north mill.
106	320	..	6	Vineyard, left of 98.
107	800	..	6	Quinta Nova, building and redoubt.
108	360	..	6	Left flank of Position.
109	500	7	..	1	Advanced on a hill to the N. E. of Oeyras.
110	1000	3	Line extending on the right from No. 104 to Fort das Mais.
	5350	20	48	19	6	1	

1st May, 1812.

Detail of the Number of Works, Troops, and Ordnance, as proposed originally for the Occupation of the Position of Almada. This project was subsequently reduced, as described in page 39.

Works.	Guns.	Men.	Works.	Guns.	Men.
Redoubt No. 1 . . .	4	150	Brought up . . .	100	5490
Redoubt No. 2 . . .	4	150	Redoubt No. 18 . . .	5	200
Flèches and Outposts . . .	2	100	Adjacent Buildings . . .		60
Village of Morfacem . . .	8	600	Redoubt No. 19 . . .	4	200
Redoubt No. 3 . . .	4	200	Flèche and Buildings . . .	2	100
Quinta de Geddos . . .		50	Redoubt No. 20 . . .	6	300
Redoubt No. 4 . . .	3	150	Redoubt No. 21 . . .	5	200
Redoubt No. 5 . . .	5	250	Adjacent Buildings . . .		100
Adjacent Village and Buildings		100	Redoubt No. 22 . . .	3	150
Redoubt No. 6 . . .	12	600	Adjacent Buildings . . .		40
Redoubt No. 7 . . .	4	150	Redoubt No. 23 . . .	5	200
Adjacent Buildings . . .		50	Flèche . . .		40
Redoubt No. 8 . . .	5	150	Redoubt No. 24 . . .	4	150
Adjacent Village and Buildings		100	Adjacent Buildings . . .		80
Redoubt No. 9 . . .	5	200	Redoubt No. 25 . . .	4	150
Flèche and Village . . .		100	Redoubt No. 26 . . .	4	150
Redoubt No. 10 . . .	5	200	Flèche . . .		40
Adjacent Village . . .		80	Village of Pregal . . .	4	300
Redoubt No. 11 . . .	5	250	Redoubt No. 27 . . .	5	200
Adjacent Roads and Buildings		100	Redoubt No. 28 . . .	4	150
Redoubt No. 12 . . .	4	150	Redoubt No. 29 . . .	6	300
Flèche . . .		50	Redoubt No. 30 . . .	5	200
Redoubt No. 13 . . .	6	300	Street and Buildings . . .		150
Adjacent Buildings . . .		50	Redoubt No. 31 . . .	6	200
Redoubt No. 14 . . .	4	150	Redoubt No. 32 . . .	4	150
Redoubt No. 15 . . .	3	150	Redoubt No. 33 . . .	3	150
Flèche . . .	2	50	Redoubt No. 34 . . .	3	200
Vill. N. Senora de Monte	6	400	Redoubt No. 35 . . .	3	150
Redoubt No. 16 . . .	4	200	Village of Cazilhas . . .		150
Redoubt No. 17 . . .	5	200	Town & Castle of Almada	12	800
Adjacent Buildings . . .		60			
Carried up . . .	100	5490	Total . . .	197	10,750
			Reserve . . .		4,000

MEMORANDA
RESPECTING
BLOWING UP BRIDGES ON THE LINES OF
TORRES VEDRAS
AND OTHER PLACES IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

It is necessary to preface these memoranda by observing, that a bridge or other piece of masonry in the climates of Spain and Portugal obtains a degree of consistency and adhesion perfectly unknown in the north of Europe, except in some few remains of Roman buildings; and that the charges of mines of destruction being calculated for that increased resistance, are perhaps larger than would be necessary in these regions.¹

It cannot, however, be too strongly impressed on an officer's mind charged with these undertakings, that the larger charge he uses the more likely he is to succeed, and that where powder can be procured, the value of a few pounds should never be allowed

¹ In blowing up old works built of small rough stones bedded in large masses of mortar or cement, and well grouted, which it may be remarked, *en passant*, are, after a few years, the best possible walls to resist battering, it is frequently found more easy by the miners to bore into the solid stones than into the cement.

to weigh against certainty of success : at the same time, the greatest merit an officer can possess is to know how duly to apportion the means to the object.

Destruction of
Bridges.

BRIDGES.

The following were the most usual modes pursued in destroying bridges :

First, a small shaft, commenced generally a few feet to the right or left of the centre of the bridge, being sunk from the road-way to the haunch of the arch, a chamber was excavated laterally for the charge of powder under the solid part of the road, so as to bring the centre of the chamber to the centre of the bridge, and the powder in a case duly prepared to resist damp was deposited in it ; a hose fixed to the box of powder was then brought to the surface of the road-way through the shaft, which was solidly filled in ; a piece of portfire was attached to the end of the hose, and where means admitted of due preparation, the hose was guarded by a square tube, to prevent its being crushed or injured ; earth or rubbish was then placed over the powder till the line of least resistance was through the haunch of the arch, and when that was the case, one barrel of 90 lbs. never failed to destroy the arch.

When, however, the bridge continued in use during the operation of mining it, or the mine was to be exploded at the moment after a corps or division had filed over the bridge, then the hose being brought up to within a foot of the surface of the road-

Destruction of
Bridges.

way, a groove was cut from the shaft to the side of the bridge, along which the hose was laid, the end with the portfire attached to the top of the battlement; after which, being firmly covered over without being squeezed down, the passage of the bridge remained free throughout its whole breadth.

In this case, as no mound could be raised over the charge in the centre of the bridge, the line of least resistance depended on the form of the arch, and therefore, to insure its destruction, an additional half-barrel or barrel of powder was added to the charge.

The bridge between Kal and Santarem was prepared for destruction on the above principles.

The bottom of the chamber of the mine was sunken 6 feet 9 inches below the surface of the road-way; the charge was $2\frac{3}{4}$ barrels of powder, of 90 lbs., put into a case 6 feet long by 1 foot broad, and 10 inches deep.

The shaft being filled to the surface, the paving stones displaced were laid over it.

The order to mine this bridge was given at Cartaxo, at 7 P.M., on the 25th December. A working party, one serjeant and 12 men of the 95th regiment, were procured, and commenced working about midnight; and although there was a French picket and sentinel within twenty yards of the spot, the mine was completed and charged in seven hours. There was some delay occasioned at the commencement of the work by the French advanced posts getting under arms, till they had, by various patrols,

pushed close to the workmen, and ascertained the cause of the noise. Destruction of
Bridges.

The following night two other bridges in the same neighbourhood were mined: one was loaded with ninety 6-pounder cartridges, taken from a field brigade of guns, and the other with sixty 6-pounder cartridges; and the work at both was concluded before daylight.

The bridge at Val dos Penos, of a single semicircular arch, 30 feet span and only 2 feet thick, the piers of which being supported by the solid rock on either side, was prepared for destruction by means of a horizontal shaft formed in the masonry of the side of the bridge, between the pier and the rock.

The level of this opening was about one foot above the springing of the arch, and its lateral distance from the stones forming the arch 5 feet. When the gallery had reached the centre of the bridge (which was 14 feet wide), a return of about 3 feet was made towards the arch, leaving 2 feet of backing between the arch-stone and the chamber. Four boxes, each containing half a barrel of powder, were placed at this extremity of the chamber, and the saucisson being led to the side of the bridge, the gallery was filled up.

Several bridges over the Alva and Ceira were prepared in a similar manner for destruction, but not exploded, in consequence of Marshal Massena advancing by the line of Viseu and Busaco.

The French, however, on their retreat out of Portugal, made use of the chambers thus prepared,

Destruction of
Bridges.

and blew up the bridges effectually with charges of only 45 lbs. of powder.

The arches of the bridge over the Rio Gingo being of small span, it was prepared for destruction by means of a gallery driven into one of the piers itself at the level of the springing of the arches, with the view of destroying two arches : the charge inserted was 135 lbs.

The labour of thus forming the entry and chamber in the solid masonry was performed by one serjeant and eight men of the Guards, and occupied 36 hours. It was, however, more expeditious, and thought equally efficacious for the purpose of destroying two arches, to sink down in the usual manner to the haunch of each arch, and make two chambers to be exploded by the same saucisson. But where only one arch is to be destroyed, the powder should never be divided, as it is very difficult to insure the simultaneous explosion of two or more charges, and the momentary precedence of either might totally destroy the effect of a second, when acting against the same resisting power.

From the experience of more than twenty bridges, of dimensions varying from 15 to 48 feet span, and from 1 to 2 feet 6 inches thickness of arch, prepared for destruction on one or other of the above principles, and exploded in Portugal and Spain, from four to six hours may be stated as the average of time necessary to complete the operation ; and there was no instance of a charge thus placed failing of its object.

Every one knows that the usual practice is to load over the powder of a mine a quantity of earth one and a half times the line of least resistance. Mouzé's experiments seem to decide, that by augmenting the charge of powder one-fourth beyond the ordinary calculation, the thickness of earth may be reduced to two-thirds of the height it would otherwise be required; that by adding one-half to the ordinary calculated charge, the loading may be reduced to one-third of what it is now made, and that by doubling the ordinary calculated charge, the loading over the powder may be omitted altogether.

Destruction of
Bridges.

This theory seems to hold good in mining bridges for destruction, for it happened more than once, under pressing circumstances, that the whole substance of a bridge has been found of solid masonry to the surface of the road-way between the arches, and so hard, that days would have been required to pick it out; and more than once it occurred that the destruction of a bridge was ordered at the moment when necessary to be performed. In these cases two or three barrels of powder, of 90 lbs., were placed on the centre of the crown of the arch, in a hole scraped out as quickly as possible, and as much rubbish thrown over as time would admit, and usually this increased charge had a due effect.

At Dueñas, in October, 1812, the bridge being of solid masonry from the arch to the road-way, and the rear-guard of the army being pressed by the enemy at the moment the miners were set to work, nothing more could be effected than stripping off

Destruction of
Bridges.

some of the pavement, and placing two barrels of powder over the crown of the arch, and slightly covering them with the rubbish. The explosion of the powder thus placed made a gap in the centre of the arch of 15 feet, nearly half its diameter, through its whole breadth; and in the Lines an arch of a bridge was completely destroyed by the same quantity of powder being placed on the surface over the crown of the arch, without any loading whatever.

The cases to contain charges likely to remain long under ground were prepared with great care, to prevent the powder becoming damp; the wood was well saturated with tar, and then covered with canvass thickly payed over with pitch, and a square tube, similarly protected, was prepared for the hose or saucisson: powder thus secured will remain for months uninjured.

On Christmas night, 1810, two bridges over the Rio-maior, between the two armies, were thus prepared for destruction, and remained so till the 16th February, when the charges were taken up for examination, and, notwithstanding a deluge of rain had fallen, in the interior the powder was found most perfectly dry.

In one or two instances, where the powder was likely to remain buried for an indefinite time, the charge was enclosed in a second case, prepared similarly to the interior.

From the effect observed of different explosions, it was considered to be advantageous to deposit the powder in cases of an oblong shape, rather than in

square boxes, with a view to insure the explosion affecting the whole breadth of the arch, which it frequently will not do when confined to a point, but blow down only a portion of the arch.

Destruction of
Bridges.

A particular instance of this partial effect occurred at Pont St. Maxence, by the French, in 1814, where one-half the breadth of the arch remained perfect after the explosion, and afforded a free passage across to the allies. A model of the bridge, in that state, was to be seen in the *école d'artillerie à Paris*, in 1815; and, most probably, a similar result attended a mine sprung by the French, in the bridge of Ruivaes, in the north of Portugal, one-half the breadth of which remained passable.

It is highly desirable to ascertain how far the effect of the explosion is changed or diminished in force by spreading out the charge in proportion to its bulk.

The efficacy of long tubes, filled with powder, used to blow gaps in roads, ascending the sides of hills on the Lines, leads to the belief that the field of concussion might be greatly extended by such means, and still be sufficient to shake down an arch.

DESTRUCTION OF FORT CONCEPTION, IN 1810.

FORT CONCEPTION is situated on the road from Almeida to Ciudad Rodrigo, about 5 miles from the former, and 15 from the latter place.

The French, when they abandoned it in 1808, made breaches in the two faces of the bastions, and in the two flanks and one face of the ravelin of the front, above the Spanish village of Alameda (A B).

Plate XXI.

At the commencement of June, 1810, the invading army of Marshal Massena being engaged in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, with apparently balanced success, Lord Wellington kept the light division, under General Craufurd, in advance of Almeida, and the 9th Portuguese regiment in the fort; and being desirous of maintaining this advanced position as long as possible, directed the breaches to be repaired, and the fort to be put in a state of defence. A few days subsequently, his lordship further directed that, as circumstances might make it desirable to destroy the fort, mines should be prepared for that purpose, at the same time that the measures for defence were proceeding; so that the fort might be ready for either object.

This duty was confided to Captain Burgoyne, Fort Conception, 1810. having under his orders a lieutenant of Portuguese engineers.

The workmen were such as could be furnished from the 9th Portuguese regiment, and consisted in artificers, of carpenters and masons only, there not being a miner in the regiment.

The frame-work, materials, &c., were ordered to be supplied from Almeida ; but that garrison being fully occupied with preparations for its own defence, little could be obtained from thence.

In the spirit of the orders received, the breaches were, in the first instance, stockaded with palisading, taken from the covered-way of the most defensible sides of the fort ; they were then cleared and built up with the squared stones of the original construction, found among the rubbish in the ditch ; and the gates and bridges were made serviceable, &c. ; but, as time passed, the probabilities of the fort being occupied and defended decreased, and the principal exertion was turned to prepare it for destruction.

Fort Conception was a regular square, with bastions at the angles, having very long faces and flanks.

The curtains were covered with small ravelins, and on the line of the capital of one of the bastions were two advanced casemated redoubts.

The bastions were full, the curtains all casemated, and in each flank was a very small casemate, nearly on a level with the bottom of the ditch, for two or three loopholes.

Fort Concep-
tion, 1810.

The project for mining the bastions (commenced under the idea that the fort might, perhaps, be required to be defended and not blown up,) was as follows :—

A shaft was to be sunk on the line of the capital, nearly to the level of the bottom of the ditch, and a gallery carried from the bottom of the shaft, near to the escarp wall of each face ; and then a return to be made for two chambers, the effects of which were calculated so as nearly to meet.

Some alterations were necessarily made during the progress of the work, in consequence of finding, in excavating, that the fort had been built on the ruins of an old castle, or other very substantial building : large irregular masses of masonry were constantly met with, and they were either worked round, (or as in one case) worked under, or a new shaft was opened.

A few instructed miners would have very soon prepared the whole of the fort and outworks for demolition ; but with the Portuguese regiment, not a man of whom had ever seen any thing like such operations, the progress was slow and difficult : the soil was loose and unfavourable, but showing a little apparent tenacity when first cut out. It was only by the experience of occasionally nearly burying themselves, by the gallery breaking in upon them, that these men could be induced to take the necessary precautions with their frames. The galleries were 5 feet high, and two and a half wide, and the frames 2 feet square. The latter were

made by a party of 20 carpenters, from the 9th Fort Concep-
tion, 1810. regiment.

On account of the impediments in driving the galleries, it was decided to take advantage of the casemates as much as possible, for lodging the powder: the casemates in the flanks were therefore used for that purpose; they were about 12 feet cube, and with nearly a foot of water in them. Large stones were laid on the floors till a perfectly dry support for the position of the powder was obtained, which was secured in a box, with a tarpaulin over it, and the casemates were subsequently filled, or nearly so, with stones and rubbish.

The ravelins were casemated, and 5760 lbs. of powder, in barrels, were lodged in each, in four portions (of 1440 lbs.); that is, one in each face and flank.

At the detached works, that nearest the fort was in the shape of a lozenge, and full of casemates, in two stories: the floors of the lower casemates, which formed a range of stabling, were below the level of the ditch, as shown in section.

Plate XXI.

It was proposed to mine the three angles (AAA); but from finding the soil to be rock, and from want of means, with the probability of every succeeding day being that on which it would be necessary to destroy the work, the whole powder applicable to the three mines (3840 lbs.) was lodged in one of the angles at D, in the manner shown in the profile, and was eventually exploded there, the regular mines not having been completed.

Fort Concep-
tion, 1810.

The outer detached work had two small circular casemates in the two angles towards the country, enclosed in the solid mass of masonry ; these were used as chambers (EE), each loaded with 2800 lbs. of powder.

In all cases where the explosions might affect another mine, the hoses, in equal lengths, were brought to a common train, and portfires were attached at the ends ready to be lighted.

On the 4th July, the garrison of the fort was withdrawn, and orders were received to explode the mines on the approach of the enemy in force. Waiting this event, the advanced pickets of the defensive army still occupied the covered-way, having the cavalry videttes a short distance in their front.

On the 10th July, Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered ; and on the 21st, the French army passed the fort. On their approach the mines were fired, and exploded with full effect. Good breaches were effected in the faces of the bastions, and small ones in the flanks ; of the ravelins nothing remained standing but a small part of the salient angles : the first detached work (that in a lozenge form) was as if cut in two diagonally, the half where the powder was lodged being entirely blown down ; of the outer detached work, the whole of the front face, and great part of the flanking faces, were destroyed.

NOTES.

NOTE 1, p. 3.

THE following paper of memoranda or instructions, given to Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher for his guidance in proposing the mode of strengthening the ground in front of Lisbon, is extremely interesting, as showing the first conceptions of a system of defence subsequently perfected into the Lines of Torres Vedras.

MEMORANDUM.

Lisbon, October 20, 1809.

In considering the relative state of the strength and efficiency of the allied and French armies in the Peninsula, it does not appear probable that the enemy have it in their power to make an immediate attack upon Portugal. They must wait for their reinforcements; and as the arrival of them may be expected, it remains to be considered what plan of defence shall be adopted for this country.

The great object in Portugal is the possession of Lisbon and the Tagus, and all our measures must be directed to that object. There is another also connected with that first object, to which we must likewise attend, viz., the embarkation of the British troops in case of a reverse.

In whatever season the enemy may enter Portugal, he will probably make his attack by two distinct lines, the one north, the other south of the Tagus, and the system of defence to be adopted must be founded on this general basis.

In the winter season the river Tagus will be full, and will be a barrier to the enemy's enterprises with his left attack, not very difficult to be secured. In the summer season, however, the Tagus being fordable in many places between Abrantes and Salvatierra, and even lower than Salvatierra, care must be taken that

the enemy does not, by his attack directed from the south of the Tagus, and by the passage of that river, cut off from Lisbon the British army engaged in operations to the northward of the Tagus. The object of the allies should be, to oblige the enemy, as much as possible, to make his attack with concentrated corps. They should stand in every position which the country could afford such a length of time as would enable the people of the country to evacuate the towns and villages, carrying with them or destroying all articles of provisions and carriages not necessary for the allied army; each corps taking care to preserve its communication with the others, and its relative distance from the point of junction.

In whatever season the enemy's attack may be made, the whole allied army, after providing for the garrisons of Elvas, Almeida, Abrantes, and Valença, should be divided into three corps, to be posted as follows: one corps to be in the Beira; one to be in the Alemtejo; and the third, consisting of the Lusitanian legion, eight battalions of chasseurs and one of militia, in the mountains of Castello Branco.

In the winter, the corps in the Beira should consist of two-thirds of the whole numbers of the operating army. In the summer, the corps in the Beira and in Alemtejo should be nearly of equal numbers. I will point out in another memorandum the plan of operations to be adopted by the corps north and south of the Tagus in the winter months.

In the summer, it is probable, as I have before stated, that he will make his attacks in two principal corps, and that he will also push on through the mountains between Castello Branco and Abrantes. His object will be by means of his corps south of the Tagus to turn the positions which might be taken in his front on the north of that river; to cut off from Lisbon the corps opposed to him; and to destroy it by an attack in front and rear at the same time. This can be avoided only by the retreat of the right, centre, and left of the allies, and their junction at a point at which, from the state of the river, they cannot be turned by the passage of the Tagus by the enemy's left.

The first point of defence which presents itself below that at which the Tagus ceases to be fordable is the river of Castenheira, and here the army should be posted as follows:

Ten thousand able men, including all the cavalry, in the plain between the Tagus and the hills; 5000 infantry on the hill to the

left of the plain ; and the remainder of the army, with the exception of the following detachments, on the height in front and on the right of Cadafoes.

In order to prevent the enemy from turning by their left the positions which the allies may take up for the defence of the high road to Lisbon by the Tagus, Torres Vedras should be occupied by a corps of 5000 men, the heights in the rear of Sobral de Monte Agraça by 4000 men, and Arruda by 2000.

There should be a small corps on the height east-by-south of the heights of Sobral, to prevent the enemy from marching from Sobral to Arruda ; and there should be another small corps on the heights of Ajuda, between Sobral and Bucellas.

In case the enemy should succeed in forcing the corps at Torres Vedras, or Sobral de Monte Agraça, or Arruda. If at the first, it must fall back gradually to Cabeça de Montachique, occupying any defensible point on the road. If the second, it must fall back upon Bucellas, destroying the road over the height of If the third, it must fall back upon Alhandra, disputing the road, particularly at a point one league in front of that town.

In case any one of these three positions should be forced, the army must fall back from its position as before pointed out, and must occupy one as follows :—

Five thousand men, principally light infantry, on the hill behind Alhandra ; the main body of the army on the Serra of Serves, with its right on that part of the Serra which is near the Casal de Portella, and is immediately above the road which crosses the Serra from Bucellas to Alverca ; and its left extending to the pass of Bucellas. The entrance of the pass of Bucellas to be occupied by the troops retired from Sobral de Monte Agraça, &c.; and the Cabeça de Montachique by the corps retired from Torres Vedras.

In order to strengthen the several positions, it is necessary that different works should be constructed immediately, and that arrangements and preparations should be made for the construction of others. Accordingly I beg Colonel Fletcher as soon as possible to review the several positions.

1. He will examine particularly the effect of damming up the mouth of the Castenheira river, how far it will render the river a barrier, and what extent it will fill.

2: He will calculate the labour required for that work, and the

time it will take, as well as the means of destroying the bridge over the river, and of constructing such redoubts as might be necessary on the plain, and on the hill on the left of the road, effectually to defend the plain. He will state particularly what means should be prepared for these works. He will also consider of the means and time required, and the effect which might be produced by scarping the banks of the river.

3. He will make the same calculations for the works to be executed on the hill in front, and on the right of Cadafoes; particularly on the left of that hill, to shut the entry of the valley of Cadafoes.

4. He will examine and report upon the means of making a good road of communication from the plain across the hills with the valley of the Cadafoes and the left of the proposed position, and calculate the time and labour it will take.

5. He will examine the road from Otta Abringola, Labougeira to Merciana, and thences to Torres Vedras; and also from Merciana to Sobral de Monte Agraça. He will also examine and report upon the road from Alemquer to Sobral de Monte Agraça.

6. He will intrench a post at Torres Vedras for 5000 men. He will examine the road from Torres Vedras to Cabeça de Montachique, and fix upon the spots at which to break it up might stop or delay the enemy; and if there should be advantageous ground at such spots, &c., will intrench a position for 4000 men, to cover the retreat of the corps from Torres Vedras.

7. He will examine the position of Cabeça de Montachique, and determine upon its line of defence, and upon the works to be constructed for its defence by a corps of 5000, of which he will estimate the time and labour.

8. He will intrench a position for 4000 on the two heights which command the road from Sobral de Monte Agraça to Bucellas. He will intrench a position for 400 men on the height of St. Ajuda, between Sobral and Bucellas, to cover the retreat of the corps from Sobral to Bucellas; and he will calculate the means and the time it will take to destroy the road at that spot.

9. He will construct a redoubt for 200 men and three guns at the wind-mill on the height bearing east-by-south and east-south-east from the height of Sobral de Monte Agraça; which guns will bear upon the road from Sobral to Arruda.

10. He will ascertain the points at which and the means by which the road from Sobral to Arruda can be destroyed.

11. He will ascertain the time and labour required to intrench a position which he will fix upon for 2000 men, to defend the road coming out of Arruda towards Villa Franca and Alhandra.

12. He will fix upon the spots at which the road from Arruda to Alhandra can be destroyed with advantage.

13. He will construct a redoubt on the hill which commands the road from Arruda, about one league in front of Alhandra.

14. He will examine the little rivers at Alhandra, and see whether, by damming them up at the mouths, he could increase the difficulties of a passage by that place; and he will ascertain the time, labour, and means which this work will require.

15. He will fix upon the spots and ascertain the time and labour required to construct redoubts upon the hill of Alhandra on the right, and prevent the passage of the enemy by the high road, and on the left, and in the rear, to prevent by their fire the occupation of the mountains towards Alverca.

16. He will determine upon the works to be constructed on the right of the position upon the Serra de Serves, as above pointed out, to prevent the enemy from forcing that point; and he will calculate the means and the time required to execute them. He will likewise examine the pass of Bucellas, and fix upon the works to be constructed for its defence, and calculate the means, time, and labour required for their execution.

17. He will calculate the means, time, and labour required to construct a work upon the hill on which a wind-mill stands, at the southern entrance of the pass of Bucellas.

18. He will fix upon the spots on which signal-posts can be erected upon these hills to communicate from one of these positions to the other.

19. It is very desirable that we should have an accurate plan of this ground.

20. Examine the island in the river opposite Alhandra, and fix upon the spot and calculate the means and time required to construct batteries upon it, and play upon the approach to Alhandra.

21. Examine the effect of damming up the river which runs by Loures, and calculate the time and means required to break the bridge at Loures.

WELLINGTON.

[Upon the letter of these instructions the position of Castenheira,

thirty-two miles in front of Lisbon, was commenced to be retrenched on the 8th January, 1810; but Lord Wellington, on a second personal reconnoissance of the ground on the 10th February following, perceiving that it was a line open to be turned, ordered the works to be filled in.]

NOTE 2, p. 6.

To Vice-Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

“ Sir,

“ Lisbon, 26th October, 1809.

“ I have the honour to enclose an extract of a letter which I have received from the Secretary of State, relative to the defence of this country, in the event of the enemies’ armies in Spain being reinforced to such a degree as to render the possession of Portugal doubtful.

“ In case the enemy should make a serious attack upon Portugal, his object, as well as that of the allies, would be the possession of the city of Lisbon. The British army would necessarily have another object, viz., a secure embarkation after the possession of the city of Lisbon should be evidently lost.

“ The line of frontier of Portugal is so long in proportion to the extent and means of the country, and the Tagus and the mountains separate the parts of it so effectually from each other, and it is so open in many parts, that it would be impossible for an army, acting upon the defensive, to carry on its operations upon the frontier without being cut off from the capital.

“ The scene of the operations of the army would, therefore, most probably be considerably within the frontier, whether their attack be made in winter or in summer; but if it should be made in summer, when the Tagus is fordable in many places, at least as low down as Salvatierra, the scene of the operations of the army would necessarily be lower down than that point.

“ It is probable, also, that in the event of the enemy being enabled to invade this country in force, he will make his principal attack by the right of the Tagus; but he will employ one corps upon the left of that river, with the immediate object of embar-

raising, if not of preventing, the embarkation of the British army, and of precluding the use of its navigation by the allies.

“ I should wish, then, to be assisted with your opinion respecting the possibility of embarking the army in its transports, and bringing them away from the following places, in the event of a defeat by the enemy in the field, which should oblige the British army to evacuate the country, and which of course supposes that they would be pressed by the enemy.

“ 1st, Peniche.—I conceive that I should be able to hold this place during any length of time that might be necessary for an embarkation; but, from what I have above stated, you will observe that in the event of the attack being made between the months of June and November, when the Tagus is fordable, the operations of the army would be carried on in a part of the country which would be cut off from Peniche, and the retreat to that place would be impracticable.

“ 2ndly, Paço d’Arcos on the Tagus.—I could not pretend to hold the high ground which commands Paço d’Arcos without occupying it with at least 20,000 men, which, in the circumstances stated, would possibly be the total amount to be embarked.

“ 3rdly. The two bays to the eastward of St. Julian.—I could hold St. Julian and the Bugio for at least eight days, and could cover an embarkation to be made in these bays, particularly in that immediately under St. Julian, and protect the passage of the fleet out of the river.

“ In deciding upon all projects of embarkation in the Tagus, I beg of you to advert to the probability that the enemy, if in sufficient force, may and will occupy the ground on the left of the river from Almada to Trafaria; and that you will consider how far it will be practicable, if it should be necessary under these circumstances, to remain in the Tagus with the fleet of transports.

“ 4thly, Setuval.—I could hold the ground which would cover the embarkation and protect the passage of the fleet out of Setuval for eight days: but it must be observed respecting this place of embarkation, that an enemy’s corps on the left of the Tagus might, if in sufficient strength, render it impracticable to reach it with a beaten army.

“ It is also to be observed, that if the army, after its defeat, should be able to embark in boats and cross the Tagus, to go to Setuval, it might equally embark in boats to go to the trans-

ports in the Tagus, and a long and fatiguing march would be avoided.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ WELLINGTON.”

“ Vice-Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.”

Extract from Dispatch.—Lord Wellington to Vice-Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

“ Viseu, 23rd March, 1810.

“ It appears to me that we are all agreed that, although it is desirable, it is not essentially necessary, to hold the left bank of the Tagus; and indeed the great inconvenience which will result from the enemy having possession of that point is that stated in Dom Miguel Forjaz’s letter to me, viz., the facility which it will give them to excite, and the probability that they will succeed in exciting, disturbances in Lisbon.

“ I acknowledge that I had not before contemplated this danger, to which I have given a good deal of thought since he drew my attention to it, and I hope that I shall find means of getting the better of it. It is desirable, however, that we should hold the left bank of the Tagus, and certainly, if possible, the communication between Lisbon and Setuval.

“ You appear to agree in the statement contained in my letter to Dom Miguel Forjaz, that I have not the means of occupying that part of the country with regular troops; and that it is not expedient to ask, and that it is probable we should not receive, the assistance of more troops from England. But you think that this ground affords advantages, which, if properly improved, might enable the militia, and other irregular force, to hold it against any attack which might probably be made upon it.

“ As far as I know of that ground, there are three positions upon it: one has its left behind the swamp which is in front of Aldea Galega, and its right at Palmella; or the left might be thrown further back, probably to Coima. The other is that upon which Colonel Fletcher lately reported, and you have his report; and the third is with the right at Trafaria, and the left at Almada. Of these, the first only keeps the communication open with Setuval. There is, I understand, a space of between four and five miles of plain ground to be occupied in each of these positions, which ground affords no natural means of defence, such as rivers,

swamps, mountains, &c.; and these deficiencies must be made good by the resources of art.

“These are the facts as they relate to the ground; and I will now inform you of those which affect the means by which these positions are to be defended.

“In the first place, Dom Miguel Forjaz has misinformed you respecting their description. He has no disposable militia in that quarter; and, in order to hold Palmella and S. Filippe at Setuval, we are obliged to detach a part of the militia from the north side of the river.

“In the next place, he has misinformed you of the numbers of the ordenanza in that part of Portuguese Estramadura. I doubt if there are 1000 instead of 10,000 armed. But if there were 10,000, even with the assistance of two or three corps of militia, they could not hold the ground, as it has been reported to me to be, even if strengthened by all the resources of art.

“The consequence of attempting it would be, that they would be driven in confusion to the river, where there must be means prepared to give them a retreat across the river, a part of which means would inevitably fall into the hands of the enemy.

“These considerations, and particularly the last, have created a conviction in my mind, that, if it were necessary (whereas it is only desirable) to occupy the left bank of the Tagus, the best mode of occupying it would be on the heights from Trafaria to Almada. The loss of one part of this line would not necessarily occasion the immediate loss of the whole. The people employed to defend it would be more immediately under the eye of those capable of directing them, and timely measures might be adopted to withdraw those whose retreat might be necessary, without the risk that any of the boats would fall into the hands of the enemy. But even this measure is impracticable, on account of the want of men to occupy the ground.

“That which I proposed for this part of the country was to occupy Forts S. Filippe and Palmella, and Outaõ, and to make the country between these forts the retreat for the ordenanza, means of transport, &c., &c., of Portuguese Estramadura, which should be ordered thither. They would then be in the rear of the enemy's corps, which should occupy the ground from Almada to Trafaria; and, at all events, this corps would lose its communications, and would find no subsistence in the country,

and could not be able to maintain its position for any length of time.

"I wish I could do more; but, upon a fair calculation of circumstances, probable events and means, I do not think I can, with propriety, undertake, or do otherwise than give my opinion against undertaking, more."

NOTE 3, p. 15.

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Colonel Peacocke.

"Sir,

"Gouveia, 9th September, 1810.

"I beg that two companies of the 2nd battalion 88th regiment may be posted at St. Julian, to take charge of the new works there, and of that fort, with such a detachment of the Royal Artillery as can be spared from the duties at Lisbon.

"You will give directions to the officer who will command at St. Julian, to attend to the orders heretofore given respecting the works, and to allow no person whatever to go into or to inspect them, excepting the officers of the engineers or artillery, and persons employed under their directions, or persons having orders in writing from Marshal Beresford or me, to be admitted to view them.

"I request that the fort at Paço d'Arcos may be occupied by the troops from St. Julian, by an officer's guard of twenty men.

"I beg you to arrange with the Portuguese Secretary of State, by the permission of the King's Minister at Lisbon, to carry these orders into execution, and you will give the directions which may be necessary for cleaning out the barracks, &c. The post at St. Julian is still to continue under your orders.

"I have the honour to be, &c.

"Colonel Peacocke."

"WELLINGTON."

NOTE 4, p. 15.

"Sir,

"Viseu, February 18, 1810.

"As the works carrying on under Lieutenant-Colonel

Fletcher may require the employment of persons in the country, and the use of materials, without waiting for the employment of those persons, or the purchase of those materials by an Officer of the Commissariat, I have to request that all orders for workmanship, labour, or materials, drawn by Colonel Fletcher upon the Deputy Commissary-General at Lisbon, may be paid; Colonel Fletcher being held accountable for the money.

"I have also to request that the Deputy Commissary-General at Lisbon may be directed to supply Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher with such numbers of fascines, palisades, and pickets as he may require at such stations as he may point out, without waiting for further orders from me.

(Signed)

" WELLINGTON."

"The Commissary-General, &c."

NOTE 5, p. 26.

Memorandum sent to Lisbon during the Retreat of the Army.

With a view to occupation of the works in the lines in the front of Lisbon, they must be divided into certain districts, and an officer must be appointed to command or regulate the troops in each. The troops (that is to say, the militia, the British and Portuguese artillery, and the ordenanza artillery) must be assembled in the district; and the officer commanding, or the regulating officer, must make the arrangement and distribution of them, to be carried into execution when it will be necessary by the advance of the enemy.

The Commissary-General of the British army must supply all the troops in these positions under the arrangement of June, 1809; and there must be a Commissary in each district.

No. 1.	. .	Tents for 2,500 men.
No. 2.	. .	Ditto 2,000 men.
No. 3.	. .	Ditto 5,000 men.
No. 4.	. .	Ditto 5,000 men.
No. 5.	. .	Ditto 10,000 men.
No. 6.	. .	Ditto 10,000 men.

No. 1 District.—Troops to be assembled at the head-quarters forthwith.

2470 Militia Infantry,
250 Ordenanza Artillery,
140 Regular Portuguese Artillery,
70 British Artillery.

No. 2 District.—Troops to be assembled at the head-quarters forthwith.

1300 Militia Infantry,
300 Artillery of Ordenanzas,
140 Portuguese Artillery of the Line,
40 British Artillery.

No. 3 District.—Troops to be assembled at the head-quarters forthwith.

400 Militia Infantry,
60 Artillery of Ordenanzas,
60 British Artillery.

No. 4 District.—Troops to be assembled at the head-quarters forthwith.

1100 Militia Infantry,
500 Ordenanza Artillery,
80 Portuguese Artillery of the Line.

No. 5 District.—To be assembled immediately.

2400 Militia Infantry,
480 Ordenanza Artillery,
120 Portuguese Artillery,
50 British Artillery.

No. 6 District.—Troops to be assembled at the head-quarters immediately.

700 Militia Infantry,
350 Ordenanza Artillery,
230 Artillery of the Line,
40 British Artillery.

The Districts are to be as follows :

No. 1. From Torres Vedras to the sea. Head-quarters, Torres Vedras.

No. 2. From Sobral de Monte Agraça to the valley of Calhandrix. Head-quarters, Sobral de Monte Agraça.

No. 3. From Alhandra to the valley of Calhandrix. Head-quarters, Alhandra.

No. 4. From the banks of the Tagus, near Alverca, to the Pass of Bucellas inclusive. Head-quarters, Bucellas.

No. 5. From the Pass of Freixal, inclusive, to the right of the Pass of Mafra. Head-quarters, Montachique.

No. 6. From the Pass of Mafra to the sea. Head-quarters, Mafra.

W.

NOTE 6, p. 28.

In appreciating this distance of seven miles, it should be recollected that the number of men required to guard a position depends less on the extent of its front than on the facility of access to the several portions of it. Large armies with their numerous trains of artillery cannot engage across a country, particularly when the defensive force is strongly posted or retrenched; but their principal columns of attack must march by the great roads or open spaces. To insure a victory over good troops, it is not sufficient to push up their position bodies of light and unsupported troops, or even strong columns with bayonets only, as Marshal Massena did at Busaco; but a superiority of force of all arms must be brought to act conjointly on the point destined to be overwhelmed.

Being so, it is evident that the nature and number of the lateral communications within, and of the direct and lateral communications without a position, are main points on which the force necessary for its occupation depend. In front of the range of heights extending from Monte Agraça to Torres Vedras, the only exterior road parallel to its front (that of Runa) was blocked to an offensive force till after the capture of several strong redoubts; and only two direct roads, and those little distant from each other, lead over the range. This ground consequently possessed defensive capabilities which far more than counterbalanced its extent of front.

NOTE 7, p. 28.

The following is a copy of the letter of instructions under which the officers of Engineers acted as regulating officers in the several districts.

“ Head-Quarters, Rio-maior, 6th October, 1810.

“ Sir,

“ I enclose a memorandum, by which you will see the manner in which I have divided into districts the country which has been fortified between the Tagus and the sea, the objects for which this division has been made, and that you are appointed regulating officer of the district No. —.

“ I likewise enclose a list of the redoubts and works in that district, stating the number with which each is marked, the number of guns it contains, and the number of infantry deemed necessary for the defence of each.

“ The business of your situation as regulating officer of district No. —, is to arrange the troops in their several stations when they will be sent into the district to occupy the redoubts; to take charge of the mines intended to blow up the roads and bridges; and to carry my orders in the district into execution till an officer to command the troops within it will be appointed: you are then to assist him in making his arrangements as one of his staff, and in the defence of his post, with your professional abilities.

(Signed)

“ WELLINGTON.”

“ Captain —, Royal Engineers.”

APPENDIX A.

A selection has been made from the Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington, and from French Official Documents, which appeared to be not only interesting but highly instructive, as placing before the reader the state of the two armies, and also showing the opinions of the Generals commanding them during the occupation of the Lines.—EDITOR.

EXTRACTS
FROM THE
DISPATCHES OF LORD WELLINGTON,
HAVING REFERENCE TO THE OCCUPATION AND
DEFENCE OF THE LINES.

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K.B., to Major-General Sontag.

“ Sir,

“ Rio-maior, 6th October, 1810.

“ Lieut.-Colonel Bathurst will have apprised you of my wish to employ you, and will have conveyed to you my request that you should proceed to Torres Vedras, where you will receive further orders from me.

“ The object for which I have requested you to go there is to take the command of the troops destined for the defence of the redoubts constructed at and in the neighbourhood of Torres Vedras, and extending from thence along the river to the sea. The redoubts and works at Torres Vedras are numbered from No. 20 to 27 inclusive, and have 48 pieces of cannon, and require 3800 men for their defence. The redoubts on the left of Torres Vedras are No. 30, at Ponte de Rol; 31, Alгатena; 32, S. Pedro de Codiera; 111, 112, and 113, between 32 and the sea. These require 1500 men, and have 33 pieces of cannon.

“ I enclose a note of the number of men deemed by the chief Engineer necessary for the defence of each redoubt, and of the number of guns in each, and a memorandum from the chief Engineer of the object in view in constructing these works.

“ My intention is to occupy these works partly with British infantry, partly with Portuguese infantry of the line, and partly with Portuguese militia.

“I have ordered to Torres Vedras immediately the 58th regiment, consisting of 300 rank and file, and two regiments of militia, consisting of 1700 men. To these I shall add another British regiment, a Portuguese regiment of the line, and another regiment of militia, if I should find that the enemy manifest any intention of moving in that direction.

“I have also ordered to Torres Vedras, 60 British artillery; 140 Portuguese artillery of the line, and 250 artillery of the ordnanza: so that the garrisons for the redoubts will be complete in artillery, and will be wanting only in their complement of infantry.

“I enclose a memorandum, by which you will see the mode in which I have divided the district of country between the Tagus and the sea; and that I have appointed a regulating officer for each district. These regulating officers are the Engineers who constructed the works; and, in the case of an appointment of a General Officer to command in any district, would only assist him as part of his staff. Captain Mulcaster and Lieut. Thompson are appointed to the station at Torres Vedras. I have also sent Lieut. Dundas to Torres Vedras to act as Brigade-Major under your orders.

“There are provisions at Torres Vedras for the troops destined to defend that post. There is musket ammunition, and 60 rounds for each gun in the redoubts. There are likewise tents there for 2500 men.

“I recommend that you should immediately distribute the artillerymen in the several redoubts according to the number required for each gun; that you should likewise station a proportionate number of the infantry intended for the defence of each redoubt in it immediately, so that the officers and men may become accustomed to their station.

“The 58th had better be kept, five companies at Torres Vedras, the other five companies in the six redoubts between Torres Vedras and the sea.

“I have the honour to be, &c.

“Major-General Sontag.”

“WELLINGTON.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Lieut.-General Hill.

“ Sir,

“ Arruda, 8th October, 1810.

“ The Quarter-Master-General sends orders to Major-General Fane to withdraw the cavalry under his command to Tojal and Loures to-morrow morning, with the exception of one squadron of British cavalry, and two squadrons of Portuguese cavalry, which are to continue to observe the ground in front of the right of the army, as long as it may be practicable for them.

“ I request you also, to-morrow morning, to send a brigade of Portuguese 6-pounders, (which you were to have sent to General Leith in exchange for the 9-pounders,) and two 6-pounders belonging to the brigade with Major-General Leith, which you brought from Nostra Senhora del Monte, from Villa Franca, through Alhandra and Arruda, to Sobral de Monte Agraça, where the 6-pounder brigade is to join the 6th division of infantry; and the two 6-pounders are to be sent on to Ribaldiera, to join the 3rd division of infantry.

“ I also request you to send from Villa Franca, through Alhandra and St. Antonio de Tojal to Cabeça de Montachique, the Portuguese 9-pounders brigade which has been with your corps; where it is to remain in reserve, and in readiness to move at a short notice.

“ The other Portuguese 6-pounders brigade with your corps, and the 3-pounders brigade with Colonel Le Cor, must be brought to Alhandra.

“ It is my intention that the troops under your command should (as they have hitherto) be the right of the army, and occupy the position of Alhandra, &c.

“ There must be a brigade of British infantry for the occupation of the line on the right, extending from the high road to the Tagus; and adverting to the strength of the remainder of the ground, it is my opinion that, as the whole of the mountain is scarped, one brigade of Portuguese infantry of General Hamilton's division, and the 12th regiment, and the three battalions of militia under the command of Colonel Le Cor, will occupy this ground, and the other ground which I am about to describe, very sufficiently; unless the enemy should make his great attack on the right flank, in which case further measures will be necessary.

“ There are six batteries on the line from the Tagus to the left

of the mountain, containing thirteen 12-pounders, and seven 6-pounders, numbered from No. 1 to 6 inclusive; and six redoubts, No. 114, for 100 men, with two 9-pounders; No. 115, for 100 men, with two 9-pounders; No. 116, for 100 men, with five 9-pounders; No. 118, for 400 men, with eight 12-pounders; No. 119, for 350 men, with six 12-pounders; No. 120, for 130 men, with two 12-pounders, and a flèche; No. 117, for 150 men.

“You will find the batteries and redoubts on the hill so placed, as not only to defend the faces of the hill itself, but to command different parts of the road from Arruda to Alhandra.

“No. 6 commands the valley upon the left of the position, through which a road leads to Calhandrix.

“In order more effectually to stop any body of troops attempting to turn the left of the position by the valley of Calhandrix, Nos. 7 and 8 have been constructed, each calculated to contain 200 men, and having in each of them three 12-pounders; and further, upon a hill on the left of the valley, No. 121, for 250 men, and three 9-pounders; No. 122, for 300 men, and three 12-pounders; No. 123, for 300 men, and three 12-pounders, and one 9-pounder.

“I conceive that the infantry above mentioned will be sufficient for the occupation of all these works and ground in the first instance; and I shall hereafter send you directions for the disposal of the remainder under your command. In the mean time, I request you to allot the brigades and troops for the occupation of this ground; but they need not move into their position till the enemy be rather nearer.

“In order to provide artillerymen for all these works, 300 artillery of the ordenanza, 140 Portuguese artillery, and 40 British artillery, have been ordered immediately to Alhandra. Captain Squire, of the Engineers, has been appointed the regulating officer of this district, in order to assist whoever may be appointed to command the troops in it; and he can give you every information, and will assist you in making the arrangements for the distribution of the troops, &c.

“I recommend that the artillery, at least, should be posted in the redoubts and batteries as soon as they shall arrive. Tents have been ordered to Alhandra for 5000 men, and some should be sent into the works for their accommodation. A double set for

the usual number of men will probably keep them dry. The Portuguese artillery and ordenanza in the works must receive their provisions from the British Commissary at Alhandra; and some of them must come down from the works for them daily.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ Lieut.-General Hill.”

“ WELLINGTON.”

*Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Vice-Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

“ Sir,

“ Alemquer, 8th October, 1810, 5 A.M.

“ I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 7th instant. The forts of Cascaes and St. Antonio have never been considered as at all affecting the place of embarkation of the army, if embarkation should become necessary, nor the passage of the transports from the Tagus.

“ In the event, however, of the army occupying the works at St. Julian, the ordnance in Cascaes and St. Antonio might be used by the enemy against the former; and it would therefore be desirable that the ordnance and stores should be removed from these forts to St. Julian, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will have this done. Indeed, I understood that it had been done long ago, under the general directions given to remove the ordnance and stores from all the forts not within the line of our own works.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ WELLINGTON.”

“ Vice-Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.”

*Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Vice-Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

“ Sir,

“ Alemquer, 8th October, 1810, 5 P.M.

“ I shall be much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to order the armed transport and the flat boats which you mention,

up the river, to anchor off Alhandra. I have directed the bank of the river to be cut down, so as to enable the guns of the latter to bear upon the enemy.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ WELLINGTON.”

“ Vice-Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K.B., to Brigadier-General R. Craufurd.

“ Sta. Quintina, near Sobral, 11th October, 1810,

“ My dear General, half-past 11 A.M.

“ I hope that your men are well put up in Arruda in this terrible weather. I do not think the enemy’s plan is quite decided yet. He has still some troops at Alemquer, and there is a body of cavalry and infantry (I saw of the latter about 300 men) on this side of Alemquer. I mean, however, to hold the town of Sobral as long as I can.

“ The peasants say that they were marching this morning upon Villa Franca, which is to attack our right, where Hill is. They can make no impression upon the right, positively ; and they must therefore endeavour to turn Hill’s position upon the Serra of Alhandra by its left. This is a tough job also, defended as the entrances of the valleys are by redoubts, and the villages by abattis, &c. However, that is what they must try.

“ The paved road which leads through Arruda passes on to Alhandra, in front and under the fire of the Serra of Alhandra : there are roads of communication with this road, on its left, going to Alhandra, with Villa Franca, and I believe Castenheira, but these are at present impracticable ; and on its right with Loureiro and Calhandrix, in the valley of Calhandrix, by which Hill’s position on the Serra of Alhandra may be turned. These roads, are, however, not paved, and are, of course, now impracticable, and there are redoubts upon the heights on both sides of the valley of Calhandrix, and the village itself is prepared.

“ In the present state of the weather the enemy may certainly get light troops upon the paved road from Arruda to Alhandra, without passing through Arruda, but they positively cannot get

guns there; and as the only paved or at all practicable road to Arruda, from this side of the river of Arruda, passes through Sobral, I hope that that point is, for the present at least, pretty secure.

“ From this statement, however, you will see how important the situation of Arruda and the possession of the pass of Matos (which, by the by, itself turns Hill's position) are to our operations. Arruda itself, I do not think, could be held for any great length of time against a superior force, but the pass of Matos can, defended as it is by the two redoubts.

“ I understand from Fletcher also that the redoubts command the road going out of Arruda towards Alhandra. So that if you should find it most advantageous to give up Arruda, the enemy could not make much use of that road, at least by daylight.

“ I need say nothing to you about the defence of the pass of Matos. I think it would be desirable, however, that you should occupy, with the 52nd or 43rd, the high ground which continues from the right of the right-hand redoubt, looking from Matos towards Arruda.

“ As soon as the attack upon Hill shall be absolutely decided, I shall move Sir B. Spencer's division upon St. Jago dos Velhos, about two or three miles to the south of Matos, on the road from Matos to Bucellas. He will then occupy the heights of St. Romão on your right, bringing his right to the redoubts which protect the left of the valley of Calhandrix. I do not like to move him yet however, because I still think it possible that the enemy may turn himself this way; and if he does I have another arrangement prepared for him, upon which I shall write to you hereafter. I wish you, however, with a view to this arrangement, to look out for the roads of communication from Matos to the high road from Sobral to Bucellas.

“ Believe me, &c.

“ Brig.-Gen. R. Craufurd.”

“ WELLINGTON.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K.B., to Lieut.-General Hill.

“Sta. Quintina, 11th October, 1810,

“My dear Hill,

8 A.M.

“I received your letter of yesterday in the night from Mr. Sodré. That which the enemy has got on the road between Carregado and Alhandra is only his advanced guard; and I recommend to you to hold the town of Alhandra, keeping a few guns at the church, and barricading the streets. The enemy can bring no guns to the heights on the left of the high road, as long as this weather lasts; and this measure will preclude the necessity of your throwing your people into the position prematurely, where they would be exposed to the bad weather.

“I recommend to you, however, to occupy immediately the three villages on the left of the Serra, called Calhandrix, A dos Mellos, and Loureiro. The first is loopholed, and there is an abattis in its front; and it commands the passage by the valley of Calhandrix, which the redoubts on the left of the heights, and the corresponding redoubts on the other heights, are calculated to defend. There are roads to these villages from Alhandra, at the back of the Serra, and from Alverca.

“Sixty British artillery were ordered to you yesterday, and all the Portuguese artillery of the line, remaining at Lisbon, were ordered to Alverca. I have now sent to order 200 volunteer artillerymen from Bucellas to Alverca, and they will bring you a note from Captain Burgoyne.

“Believe me, &c.

“Lieut.-General Hill.”

“WELLINGTON.”

“They swear that the tents have been sent from Lisbon. Make inquiries about them at Alhandra and Alverca. When the gun-boats arrive, make some of them take their stations above the town, so as to assist in enabling you to hold it.”

Memorandum for Lieut.-General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

“11th October, 1810.

“I believe that the force which appeared yesterday at Alem-

quer is the same advanced guard, and it afterwards proceeded by Carregado towards Villa Franca.

“Colonel Hawker, however, should receive orders to patrol well forward towards Alemquer, so as to ascertain whether there is any force of the enemy in Alemquer, and of what strength.

“If the enemy should move from Alemquer upon Sobral de Monte Agraça in superior strength, I should wish the following arrangements to be made.

“General Sir Brent Spencer’s division to move to Zibriera, and canton in that village and Gozondeiza. Head-quarters to Pata-meira. Major-General Cole and Major-General Campbell to retire when necessary from Duas Portas and Ribaldiera, and occupy the heights immediately behind those villages, extending their line across the high road from Ribaldiera to Enxara dos Cavalleiros.

“General Pack’s brigade is in that case to occupy for the present the redoubts on the heights above Sobral de Monte Agraça, with his light infantry in the redoubts on the points of the rocks above the road leading to Arruda, marked Nos. 11, 12, and 13. The largest number should be in No. 11. Nos. 12 and 13 require each about one-third of No. 11.

“Captain Williams, of the Engineers, will communicate to General Pack all the details of the information respecting these redoubts.

“WELLINGTON.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K.B., to C. Stuart, Esq.

“My dear Sir,

“Ajuda, 12th October, 1810.

“I received this morning your letter of the 10th. No tents arrived yet.

“The troops are suffering every where for want of them; and General Hill was obliged to draw in from Villa Franca.

“I do not know that the enemy has more than an advanced guard in Alemquer. He reconnoitred us last night at Sobral with a large body of cavalry and little infantry; and, by mistake, our troops left the place, and I believe neither party were in it during the night. We were in it, however, this morning.

“ I believe the floating battery went off up the river this morning, and is off Villa Franca.

“ I must write to England on the Admiral's desire to have an allowance for carrying home prisoners of war. It is a new question, on which I cannot decide.

“ C. Stuart, Esq.”

“ Believe me, &c.

“ WELLINGTON.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K.B., to Brigadier-General Pack.

“ Ajuda, 12th October, 1810, 2 P.M.

“ My dear General,

“ Captain Chapman has delivered your message to me ; and first, I beg to assure you that there is no chance that the communication between your troops in the redoubt and the army will be interrupted ; but if such a chance existed, I had provisions prepared for the troops in the redoubts, which were consumed by the troops that first arrived at Sobral. In this supply wood was included, and forage for horses and mules. Wood and forage are still in large quantities in Sobral ; and I have again desired the Commissary-General to send some more provisions to the redoubts, and to send there also some of the wood at Sobral : and if you will be so kind as to send your mules to Sobral, with a note from yourself to the Commissary there, they may bring away with them as much forage as they can carry.

“ In respect to tents, the Portuguese Government were to supply them ; but they have failed in this, as they have in every thing else. You must only keep your troops in the neighbouring villages and houses till it shall be necessary to occupy the redoubts in force, with pickets only in the redoubts ; and before it may be necessary to go into the redoubts, I still hope that you will have the tents.

“ I beg that you will communicate with the commanding officers of the two regiments of Lisbon volunteers, who are to go to the redoubts likewise.

“ I beg you to send an officer round to the three redoubts occupied by the Caçadores, and see that they are either in their sta-

tions, or near them ; and that the artillerymen are there likewise ; and that these people are supplied with provisions.

“ Believe me, &c.

“ Brigadier-General Pack.”

“ WELLINGTON.”

“ I shall be obliged to you if you will see whether a communication exists, or can be made, from the left and rear of the redoubts to Zibriera.”

Memorandum for Colonel Murray, Quarter-Master-General.

“ 13th October, 1810.

“ When the army shall be ordered to occupy the position of Zibriera and Patameira, the troops will be formed as follows from the right :

“ Lieut.-General Sir Brent Spencer’s division, with its right at the two wind-mills between Zibriera, and the redoubts of Sobral, will occupy a line extending to an old mill on the right of Zibriera ; and thence to another old mill on the left of the church of Zibriera, bringing their left to the ravine. This line extends about 1000 yards.

“ The remainder of the troops of the division to be in reserve in the rear of this line, with the exception of the battalions of light infantry attached to the brigades which are to occupy Zibriera.

“ Major-General Picton’s division is to form with its right in a line with the left of the 1st division, and is to extend to the village of Patameira, about 800 yards.

“ The remainder of this division to be in reserve in rear of the right of General Cole’s division, throwing its light infantry along the ravine in its front, and occupying the houses and Patameira.

“ Major-General Cole’s right is to rest on the ravine in a line with Patameira. His centre on the lower of the two mills on the hill on which there are two ; and his left on the high road from Ribaldiera to Enxara dos Cavalleiros, where that road passes through the Portella.

“ This line extends 1700 yards, and the remainder of the troops

of this division will be in reserve in the rear of its left, throwing the light infantry battalions of the brigades of Portuguese and British infantry out in its front.

“ The 6th division are to place their right at the point where Major-General Cole’s left will stand, and occupy the mountain on the left of the Portella, looking to Ribaldiera, placing the Lusitanian Legion on the mountain still further upon the left, on the left of a road leading from Runa into the high road from Ribaldiera to Enxara dos Cavalleiros.

“ Major-General Leith’s division will be in reserve in rear of the right.

“ Brigadier-General Campbell’s and Brigadier-General Coleman’s brigades in reserve in rear of the left on the high road from Ribaldiera to Enxara dos Cavalleiros.

“ The artillery to be placed as follows :

“ The British 9-pounders, and the 6-pounders attached to General Hill’s division, at Zibriera.

“ The 6-pounder brigade attached to the 1st division at the mills on the right of that division.

“ Major Arentschildt’s 9-pounders and 6-pounder Portuguese brigades, at an old mill on the right of Patameira.

“ Major Dickson’s 9-pounder Portuguese brigade, and the brigade of Portuguese 6-pounders attached to Major-General Leith’s division, on the left of the village of Patameira, and on the right of General Cole’s division.

“ The brigade of artillery attached to General Cole’s division at the mill, where his centre will stand.

“ Three of the 6-pounders attached to the 6th division in the Portella, on the high road from Ribaldiera to Enxara dos Cavalleiros, and three on the road from Runa to Enxara dos Cavalleiros.

“ The 3-pounders attached to Brigadier-General Campbell’s brigade to be in reserve, as well as Captain Ross’s troop of horse artillery.

“ The officers commanding divisions will reconnoitre the situation of their several posts.

“ The communications are from the great redoubt of Sobral by the wind-mills to Zibriera ; thence to the rear, and across the ravine by a concealed road to Patameira : thence, in the rear of Patameira to the right of General Cole’s post ; thence behind the

mountain on which his centre will stand, to the high road leading from Ribaldiera to Enxara dos Cavalleiros.

“As soon as possible, cover should be made for the guns at Zibriera, and on the right and left of Patameira, masking this from the view of the enemy.

“WELLINGTON.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Brigadier-General R. Craufurd.

“Ajuda, 15th October, 1810, 5 A.M.

“My dear General,

“The enemy have now got a good large body in front of General Spencer, at Sobral, and he withdraws this morning to Zibriera. A squadron of the 14th Dragoons will be sent to you, as likewise the axes. Fletcher will give orders respecting the bridge which you mention to Runa.

“We shall want you upon our right, if the enemy collect their whole force in the centre, which, at present, appears probable, though not quite clear. Pray examine all the roads leading from your rear to the great redoubt of Sobral.

“I move my head-quarters this morning from hence to Enxara dos Cavalleiros, but I shall either be at the great redoubt all day, or they will know there where to find me.

“Believe me, &c.

“Brig.-Gen. R. Craufurd.”

“WELLINGTON.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Lieut.-General Hill.

“My dear Hill, “Ajuda, 15th October, 1810, 5 A.M.

“I do not think the enemy's designs are yet quite clear, but they rather point to our centre, where they have assembled a large corps, and the prisoners say that the whole are thereabouts.

“ Sir Brent Spencer withdrew this morning from the front of Sobral, where he could not stay longer without engaging on terms of disadvantage. Pack is in the great redoubt, and this road is completely blocked. I move my head-quarters, however, this day to Enxara dos Cavalleiros, in order to be nearer what appears at present to be the probable scene of action.

“ I moved your troops to Bucellas the day before yesterday, partly in order to be able to close them to the centre, if that should be the active scene; partly because that I think at Bucellas, and from thence in the villages, along the foot of the Serra de Serves, as far as the Casa de Portella, some of them would be better situated to give support to the troops in the redoubts at Trancoso, and to those which defend the left of the valley of Calhandrix, than they would be further to the right. I wish you would look over this ground, and the communications with its rear, and see how it could be best supported.

“ These troops, however, should still remain at Bucellas, &c.; for the present, and I beg that the other British and Portuguese brigade may be in readiness to march at a short notice to join the centre of the army.

“ Keep an officer at the signal-post, and I will send you the orders by signal as well as by message.

“ Le Cor shall occupy the lines of Alhandra while you will be away; and the 2nd battalion 88th shall be ordered up from Lisbon to support him.

“ Believe me, &c.

“ Lieut.-General Hill.”

“ WELLINGTON.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K.B., to Charles Stuart, Esq.

“ Head-Quarters, 16th October, 1810,

“ My dear Sir,

11 A.M.

“ The Admiral has just now apprised me of the loss of forty boats at Santarem, which is a serious misfortune, to be attributed solely to the Government. I have written to him upon the arrangements to be adopted in consequence of it, which go

principally to our own defence, but there are others which require the early attention of the Government.

“First; the island of Lyceria, which is at present at the enemy’s command, is full of corn and cattle. There is a safe communication now with the south end of it, and all the supplies should be drawn away immediately to Lisbon. If the Admiral can station a flotilla at the N.E. extremity of this island, so as to prevent the enemy from bringing their boats lower down the river, if not already brought down, this island may yet be safe. But, at all events, the corn, cattle, straw, &c., should be brought away from it.

“Secondly; the province of Alemtejo being now open to the enemy, the people should be directed to remove under the cover of Palmella, and Fort S. Filippe, at Setuval, which are both garrisoned; and the ordenanza should be collected there. It is probable, however, that Fort S. Filippe and Palmella are not provisioned, as was the case with Obidos, which was therefore abandoned, and is the case with other Portuguese forts, notwithstanding repeated applications and remonstrances.

“Thirdly; care should be taken of the other boats on the river, that they do not fall into the hands of the enemy. Positive orders ought to be given that all boats of every description should anchor on this side, on every night, between Alhandra and Lisbon. As soon as the Marquis de la Romana’s corps shall be across the Tagus, there will be no occasion for fleets of boats going over; and when they do go for provisions or other purposes, they should be under the charge of some officer of the police, who should force them to return.

“The enemy have made no movement of importance this day. They have certainly one, probably two corps d’armée on this front, near Sobral, but not a shot has been fired since the day before yesterday, excepting from the lines at Alhandra on a reconnoitring party yesterday.

“Believe me, &c.

“C. Stuart, Esq.”

“WELLINGTON.”

“If there should be no provisions in Fort S. Filippe or Palmella, some ought to be sent by sea.”

*Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Vice-Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

“ Pero Negro, 16th October, 1810.

“ My dear Sir,

11 A. M.

“ I enclose an order for Colonel Fisher to deliver to your directions the 12-pounders belonging to the British army; and I likewise enclose an order for the brass 12-pounders, Portuguese. I would recommend the former, as the French have with them French 12-pounders, which are heavier than the Portuguese brass 12-pounders.

“ I consider the loss of the boats at Santarem to be the greatest misfortune that could happen to us, and it may oblige us to change our position, and take up our second line. The French will either arm these boats, and operate upon Hill’s right flank, in which case the strength of your flotilla, and the support to be given to it by larger vessels, will become an object for your consideration; or they will use them to form a bridge, and establish themselves upon the island in the Tagus, across Hill’s right flank; or they will use them for a bridge or other communication with Mortier, whom they will have it in their power to draw to their support either on this side or on the other side of the river.

“ In whichever way the boats may be used, their loss is a serious misfortune, and at all events the whole of the Alemtejo lies at the mercy of the enemy!!

“ The Government may congratulate themselves upon this notable arrangement. They would not adopt in time any one measure to remove what might be useful or necessary to the enemy; they neglected their peculiar business to occupy themselves with what did not concern them; and there is not an arrangement of any description which depended upon them, or their officers, which has not failed.

“ At this moment the enemy are living upon grain found close to the lines; and they grind it into flour with the mills in our sight, which the Government were repeatedly pressed to order the people to render useless, and which could have been rendered useless only by taking away the sails.

“ Then the boats are left at Santarem in order to give the enemy an opportunity of acting upon our flank, and thus dislodging us!

"The first object to attend to is to prevent the enemy from establishing himself on the island of Alhandra; your gun-boats, by occupying the river at the north-east end of it, and on both sides, will probably prevent that, if supported by something stronger in the main channel.

"Another object well deserving of attention is the great island Lyceria, which is, I understand, full of corn and cattle. If you could get a flotilla of gun-boats up the eastern channel of the river to the point of separation, where the two channels form this island, this object might be effected; otherwise, I fear it will not.

"I have not heard from General Hill that he was in want of seamen to work his guns. He has a great number of artillerymen, both British and Portuguese, as well as of the ordenanza, and I am convinced that the seamen would give us more efficient assistance in the gun-boats on the river.

"Believe me, &c.

"WELLINGTON."

"Vice-Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley."

"If you cannot get gun-boats to the north-east end of Lyceria by the eastern channel, it will be necessary to have some naval strength off the south-west end of it, lest the enemy should endeavour to pass a force down that way.

"The enemy have made no movement of importance yesterday or this day. They appear to be fortifying themselves at Sobral; but their delay is probably connected with the acquisition of the boats at Santarem.

"I have directed that a heavy battery may be constructed on the right flank of the lines at Alhandra, which will tend to support the gun-boats there."

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Lieut.-General Hill.

"16th October, 1810, $\frac{1}{4}$ before 1 A. M.

"My dear Hill,

"I conclude that you will have heard that the people of Santarem allowed forty large boats to fall into the hands of the enemy!!!

"I have written to the Admiral upon the measures to be adopted for the security of your right flank; and Colonel Fletcher writes to Captain Squire to desire him to construct a work in the rear of the right of your line for four heavy guns, to command the navigation of the river, and give protection to the gun-boats. In the mean time, the officer commanding the gun-boats should be informed of these circumstances, and should be desired to watch the river above Alhandra closely at night, so that nothing may pass down.

"I hope that you received my letter of yesterday morning.

"Take care that, if the enemy should make a serious attack upon your post at the church of Alhandra, you shall have it in your power to draw away your guns in time. If you should find that they are advancing upon you seriously to attack you in the lines of Alhandra, which I can hardly believe, you had better bring one of your British brigades from Bucellas to Alverca to give support to the other. It appears to me, however, most likely that, if they wish to carry the lines of Alhandra, they will try your left flank rather than your right, and if so, your troops are better stationed at Bucellas and Villa de Rey than at Alverca. Probably one brigade might occupy an intermediate position at the Casa de Portella with advantage. If you should think so, move them.

"The 8th corps, and I believe the 6th, are near Sobral. They have made no movement, and not a shot has been fired for these two days, excepting one this morning from one of the redoubts between this and Arruda.

"Believe me, &c.

"Lieut.-General Hill."

"WELLINGTON."

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K.B., to Brigadier-General R. Craufurd.

"At the Great Redoubt of Sobral,

"My dear General,

"17th October, 1810.

"I received last night your letter of the 16th. I could see

the reconnoissance of yesterday on our right from hence ; but I am much obliged to you for the information which your letter contains.

“ The roads are not yet fit for the march of your guns, and I therefore still keep them here ; but I have ordered six Portuguese three-pounders to S. Ajuda this day, and I beg you to send a person to that place to bring them to you. They are narrower in the axle-tree, and lighter than our carriages, and will probably answer your purpose equally well with the six-pounders, but you shall have the latter as soon as the roads will bear them.

“ The positions which the enemy have taken up in our front, and the measures which they are adopting to fortify themselves on their right, induce me to believe that their attack will be principally directed upon our right.

“ I see that they have troops encamped on the heights above Villa Franca ; and Hill tells me, in a letter of last night, that there were large fires on the heights near Alhandra, from which his pickets were obliged to withdraw in the evening.

“ I have brought General Leith's division to the rear of this fort, where part of it is encamped. General Spry's Portuguese brigade will be cantoned this night in a village in the rear of the redoubts Nos. 12 and 13. The Hanoverian legion are in the villages behind No. 11 ; to all of which the British brigades in General Leith's division will be a reserve.

“ If the enemy should make his attack between this and Arruda, I think these arrangements will make us tolerably secure, and will give time to make a further movement of troops to the right. On the other hand, if he should make his attack upon the centre or left wing of the army, with all the troops in front of this place, I shall be able to transfer General Leith's division to be the reserve of the right of the centre, for which I originally intended him.

“ The disposition which I have above described will show you what line I wish you to take. If the enemy attack Hill's right, and our line to the left of this redoubt, my wish and intention is to employ you in an offensive movement. If they attack Hill's left, by Trancoso or the valley of Calhandrix, and at the same time the ground on the right of this redoubt, I should prefer that you should look to Hill, rather than to the redoubts Nos. 11, 12,

and 13. It would be necessary, however, for you to observe the ground between Nos. 10 and 11. All is quiet this morning in the front.

“ Believe me, &c.

“ Brig.-Gen. R. Craufurd.”

“ WELLINGTON.”

*Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Vice-Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

“ Pero Negro, 17th October, 1810, 8 A. M.

“ My dear Sir,

“ I have just received your letter of the 14th, and two of the 16th.

“ As for the prisoners taken from the enemy, whether by Portuguese or English troops, I have hitherto always considered them as English. * * * * *

“ The way in which the matter is managed here is, that all prisoners taken are sent to the Provost-Marshal at head-quarters, and are forwarded by him to his assistant at Lisbon. He draws their provisions from the Commissary for them from time to time, and application is then made to you for a passage for them to England, when they are in sufficient numbers to render it worth while to send a ship home with them.

“ This arrangement answers very well for the present; but if their numbers should increase much, we must appoint an officer or officers to take charge of them, who will perform that duty which is now performed by the Provost-Marshal.

“ I hope that the accounts which you have received of the enemy's having found forty boats at Santarem are not well founded,* as Hill tells me that when he wanted boats there on the 7th he could find only five; and Beresford had armed parties in all the upper parts of the river, burning all the boats they could find. They went so far as to burn the spare boats belonging to the bridge of Abrantes.

“ From what I see of the Tagus from hence, I should imagine

* The accounts were not well founded.

that no part of it can now be fordable; and, at all events, if the river was fordable, I have no apprehension whatever that any part of the army now in Portugal (excepting parties to get provisions or plunder) will cross the Tagus to carry on an operation on that side. And there is nothing to be apprehended from Mortier's corps, which by letters from Estramadura of the 11th, received last night, I find had withdrawn towards Seville.

"I am concerned to find, however, from your letter of the 16th, that if the enemy should take possession of the ground on the left of the Tagus, extending from Almada to Trafaria, our fleet has increased in size to such a degree, that a great number of the transports would be compelled to put to sea. As I do not think it probable that the enemy has it at all in his power to undertake such an operation at present, this circumstance does not now much signify, but it is one of serious consideration for the British Government, in case of any other invasion of Portugal by a larger force, which should be capable of making an attack upon both sides of the Tagus.

"It is quite clear to me that Portugal and England cannot afford a force to do more than defend one side of the river; and if the transports cannot remain in safety, the enemy being in possession of the left bank, the defence of the country ought not to be attempted.

"All my measures and arrangements upon this subject have been founded upon your opinions conveyed in your official letter of the 26th of October, in answer to certain queries from me directed to this point; and if you have seen any reason to alter your opinion, I recommend that you should revise it, and state it again in the same form.

"I am perfectly aware of the strength of the ground on the left of the Tagus, but unfortunately it would not answer our purpose of saving Lisbon and the Tagus from the enemy. I have reports and plans for fortifying and occupying it, but I have never thought of carrying the plans into execution for the reasons I have above stated, and it is now too late to think of them.

"If the enemy, now in our front, should cross the Tagus with his whole army, which is hardly practicable, I must only do the same with mine; and I agree with you in thinking not only that I shall be before them, but shall have the best position in the country, although not fortified.

" I do not wish the sick men (now ordered to be embarked) to be sent to England. I am firmly of opinion that the enemy cannot succeed; but as I know that their situation is desperate, we must expect that there is no risk they will not incur to attain their object, and I know enough of operations of this kind to be aware that nobody can be certain of their result. My wish, therefore, is to have embarked in the ships every body who cannot walk down to the beach, because, in case any accident should happen, I know well that, even under the best arrangements, those who must be carried will have but a bad chance of being removed.

" Believe me, &c.

" WELLINGTON."

" Vice-Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley."

" The name of the French General killed by the gun-boats was St. Croix. He was an excellent officer, and much respected."

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K.B., to Vice-Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

" Pero Negro, 19th October, 1810.

" My dear Sir,

" I am glad to find your opinion continues the same respecting the anchorage in the Tagus. If it should be necessary to occupy that anchorage, which does not appear very probable, I should think that many vessels might be sent out of the river, such as victuallers, store-ships, &c., retaining none excepting those necessary to receive the troops, &c.

" Brigadier Rosa's conduct certainly appears extraordinary.

" The position of the gun-boats is very satisfactory. I learn that the marine battalion attached to the French army has been ordered to the Tagus, it is supposed to construct a bridge. It is possible, however, that it may be to man gun-boats. The only improvement which I could suggest in your distribution is that the advanced flotilla near Salvatierra should be strengthened.

There would be no risk in this arrangement if the southern channel should be navigable, and it would effectually protect the island of Lyceria.

“ Believe me, &c.

“ WELLINGTON.”

“ Vice-Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K.B., to the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

“ My Lord,

“ Pero Negro, 20th Oct. 1810.

“ The difficulties which the enemy experience in procuring subsistence, owing to their having invaded this country without magazines, and having adopted no measures for the security of their rear, or of their communication with Spain, has rendered it necessary for the soldiers to straggle in search of food, and not a day passes that prisoners and deserters are not sent in.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ The Earl of Liverpool.”

“ WELLINGTON.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K.B., to Charles Stuart, Esq.

“ Sir,

“ Pero Negro, 23rd October, 1810.

“ All the accounts which I have received of the proceedings of the enemy lead to a belief that they are collecting and making materials to construct a bridge to cross the Tagus.

“ It is impossible for me to say positively whether they will perform this operation, having first endeavoured to carry the positions occupied by the army, or without making such an attempt ; but, adverting to the numbers with which they entered this country, and to their probable existing force, and to the character and reputation of the General commanding the army, and to the importance of the object to be gained by their forcing our position ;

and the certain loss of character, of time, and of all the objects of the campaign, by their retreat without attempting to carry it,—I cannot believe that the attempt will not be made as soon as the means of passing the Tagus, in a retreat in case of failure, shall have been prepared.

“Whether the attempt to carry our positions will be made or not, it is obvious that the enemy is constructing this bridge solely with the view to pass into the Alemtejo, to which point I beg you to call the serious attention of the Portuguese Government.

“First; I recommend to them, without loss of time, to adopt the measures for the removal of persons, valuable property, cattle and grain, which they ought to have adopted at an earlier period, in the provinces of Beira and Estramadura.

“They might move either towards Elvas, towards Lisbon, or towards Setuval, in all of which places they will be secure; or behind the river Alcacer do Sal, or towards the province of Algarve.

“Secondly; I recommend that the mills should be rendered useless for the moment, by carrying off the sails and some of the iron pins of the wheels.

“Thirdly; It is necessary that the Government should adopt early measures to enable the army to follow the enemy into the province of Alemtejo.

“The orders should be prepared, directed to the owners of large boats, to attend where they might be required, with boatmen, &c., and measures adopted to insure obedience to these orders. We shall want to re-establish immediately the three bridges, at Punhete over the Zezere, at Abrantes, and at Villa Vella over the Tagus (for I believe the bridge at Abrantes has been taken up). The Government should therefore immediately prepare the boats and the means of laying three bridges; which might be laid down and used on the lower part of the Tagus, for the passage of the army, if that mode of passage should be found preferable to that by boats. It is useless for the Government to point out to me, that it would be desirable to endeavour to prevent the enemy from passing into Alemtejo. I am aware of that; but unless I weaken the position on this side of the Tagus, upon which every thing depends, I cannot effect that object. Indeed, I doubt whether I should be able to effect it at all under any circumstances.

“ I cannot conclude this letter without requesting you to point out to the Government the inexpediency of giving to the ordenanza of Alemtejo the arms which were sent by the British Government, to arm the organized corps of militia ; and the folly of sending into the Alemtejo two pieces of cannon.

“ The ordenanza are very capable, if they choose it, of preventing plunderers and marauders from crossing the river, or from plundering if they should get across ; but it must not be expected that they will make any resistance of the description which ought to be made by troops to whom 500 stands of new arms are delivered, or to whom two pieces of artillery are attached ; and these arms will be thrown away and be lost to the service, and the cannon will fall into the hands of the enemy, to the disgrace of the Portuguese army. I would observe also, that if it were right to give these arms and cannon to the ordenanza, the military officers of the Government ought to have been consulted upon the subject ; but, unfortunately, the existing Regency cannot avoid interfering with military affairs, with which they have no concern.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ C. Stuart, Esq.”

“ WELLINGTON.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Brigadier-General R. Craufurd.

“ Redoubt of Sobral, 23rd October, 1810.

“ My dear General,

7 A. M.

“ I should be happy to make your division stronger, and I have had in contemplation various modes of effecting that object ; but you must see the difficulty which is created by the arrival of General Officers of rank superior to yours. However, I hope that I shall be able, in some manner, to increase your force.

“ My intention, in bringing up a brigade to St. Jago dos Velhos, was not to limit the space which I wished you to attend to, but to have a body of troops in readiness to throw in upon the ground about Trancoso, and extending from No. 8 to the mills (marked A in your plan), in case the enemy should make a push at the valley of Calhandrix. The guns from the point (B in your plan) in front of Trancoso will be with you probably this day ;

and I should wish to have them placed in the proper situation, and to have the general charge between General Hill's left, which extends to No. 8, and the right of General Leith.

“ Believe me, &c.

“ Brig.-Gen. R. Craufurd.”

“ WELLINGTON.”

“ I enclose a memorandum, of which a copy will be sent to General Hill, and another to General Lumley.”

Memorandum for Lieut.-General Hill, and Brig.-General R. Craufurd, to be also communicated to Major-General the Hon. W. Lumley.

“ Sobral, 23rd October, 1810.

“ Lieut.-General Hill will adopt such measures as he shall think necessary for securing the entry of the valley of Calhandrix, by the Quinta de Belhaco, upon which he will communicate with Brigadier-General Craufurd, who will have a battery placed at the point of the ground extending from the redoubt No. 9, to fire upon the road from Arruda to Alhandra, and to defend the left of the entrance of the valley of Calhandrix.

“ Major-General Lumley's brigade of infantry is stationed at St. Jago dos Velhos, as a reserve and point of support to the left of General Hill's corps, and the right of Brigadier-General R. Craufurd's division.

“ Major-General the Hon. W. Lumley will examine all the roads leading from his cantonments to the redoubt No. 8, and to the wind-mill about 800 yards on the right of that redoubt, in the rear of the Quinta de Belhaco ; to the Quinta de Belhaco by those wind-mills, as well as by Trancoso ; to the redoubt No. 9, and the ground extending from the right of No. 9 to the point on which Brigadier-General R. Craufurd will have the battery constructed ; to the village of Matos.

“ Major-General the Hon. W. Lumley will attend to any requisitions he may receive from Brigadier-General R. Craufurd for any assistance, if that point of the position should be attacked which extends from Matos to the Quinta de Belhaco.

“ WELLINGTON.”

Memorandum for Marshal Beresford.

“ Pero Negro, 26th October, 1810.

“ In the existing situation of affairs, it is desirable that Colonel Wilson’s detachment should be brought down towards Thomar and Torres Novas, so as to confine the enemy’s detachments on that side. It will still be necessary, however, that Colonel Wilson, Brigadier-General Millar, and Colonel Trant, should advert to the necessity of their keeping up their communication with, and their rear open to, the lower Douro. Accordingly, when Colonel Wilson shall establish himself at Thomar, if he should find that the enemy move upon him in force there, or endeavour to retire by that road, he will send off his infantry by Espinhal and Foz d’Arouce, and across the Mondego, at the Barca de Peña Cova, to the convent of Busaco, and thence by any road he pleases towards the north. If the enemy should not press him at Thomar by the road of Torres Novas, the infantry might retire from Thomar by the road of Ourem and Leyria, or, if the season should be favourable, direct from Thomar upon Coimbra. His cavalry and any light detachment of infantry might move from Foz d’Arouce upon Ponte da Murcella upon the Alva, and carry into execution the objects of your former instructions. A sketch of the country from Thomar towards the Mondego and Alva will be sent to you for Colonel Wilson’s use.

“ Marshal Beresford.”

“ WELLINGTON.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

“ My Lord,

“ Pero Negro, 27th October, 1810.

“ The reports which I have received from the prisoners and deserters who have been brought in, concur in the accounts of the distress felt by the enemy for the want of provisions of all descriptions. They state that they are collecting and preparing materials to construct a bridge over the Tagus; but although we have a good view of that river from different parts of the ground occupied by the army, and have officers and others employed on

the left of the Tagus to observe the motions of the enemy, I have not been able to discover either where this work is carrying on, or where the bridge is to be placed on the river, if it should be constructed. The enemy appear very anxious to collect boats, and on the 24th endeavoured to drive a party of the ordenanza from Chamusca by the fire of their artillery, in order to obtain possession of some which were under that place.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ The Earl of Liverpool.”

“ WELLINGTON.”

*Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to the Earl of
Liverpool, Secretary of State.*

“ My dear Lord, “ Pero Negro, 27th October, 1810.

“ My dispatches of this date will give you an idea of our situation, which I hope will be satisfactory to you. In my opinion the enemy ought to retire, for he has no chance of annoying our position; and delay will only aggravate his distress, and make his retreat more difficult.

“ I calculate that a reinforcement of 15,000 men would not give him so good an army as he had at Busaco. He had 2000 men killed there: Trant took 5000 prisoners at Coimbra: above 1000 prisoners have gone through this army: many men have been killed by the peasantry, and in the skirmishes with our different detachments: and they had 200 or 300 men wounded in the affair with our outposts about Sobral. They cannot have less than 4000 sick, after the march they have made, the distress they have suffered, and the weather to which they were exposed. Indeed, the deserters and prisoners tell us that almost every body is sick.

“ From this statement you will judge of the diminution of their numbers, and you will see that I have not much reason to apprehend any thing from the ‘*quinze beaux bataillons*’ which fought at Essling, and which cannot be here before the middle of November. I do not think I have much to apprehend, even if Mortier should be added to them. However, we shall see how that will be.

“ We have an excellent position, which we are improving every day; and the army is in good order and spirits, and not sickly.

By the last returns, we had 4200 in hospital, and no serious disorder. We had 8500 sick in the military returns, but these include convalescents at Belem, of whom, I hope, under better regulations, not to have quite so many.

"I am not quite certain that I ought not to attack the French, particularly as they have detached Loison, either to look for provisions, or to open the road for their retreat; but I think the sure game, and that in which I am likely to lose fewest men, the most consistent with my instructions and the intentions of the King's Government; and I therefore prefer to wait the attack. Besides, although I have the advantage of numbers, the enemy are in a very good position, which I could not turn with any large force, without laying open my own rear, and the road to the sea. This is the worst of all these strong countries, that they afford equally good positions to both sides.

"Believe me, &c.

"The Earl of Liverpool."

"WELLINGTON."

Instructions for Captain Wedekind, Royal Engineers.

"Pero Negro, 29th October, 1810.

"Upon the receipt of this letter, you will wait upon his Excellency Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley, and inform him that you are appointed by me to communicate with the officer employed by him to have the boats and other materials, viz., balks, planks, anchors and cables, cordage, &c., prepared for three bridges, one over the Zezere at Punhete, one over the Tagus at Villa Velha, and one over the Tagus at Abrantes.

"You will receive the Admiral's commands respecting the officer with whom you are to communicate; and you will immediately wait upon him, and inquire from him what arrangements have been made, and in what state of preparation are these several bridges; what quantities of materials he has in readiness, and what quantities wanting; and what steps have been taken to procure the materials wanting; and you will report the result of your inquiries for my information.

"WELLINGTON."

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Vice-Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

“ My dear Sir,

“ Pero Negro, 29th October, 1810.

“ I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 28th instant, and I am very apprehensive that you will have much trouble with our bridge concerns, which the Government ought not to have imposed upon you. As two of our bridges have been destroyed, and I conceived that that of Abrantes was so likewise, I wished that the Government should make their arrangements through the bridge-master (who has always managed these concerns for us), to supply us with boats, &c., for three others ; and I proposed to use these to pass the lower Tagus with the British army, when the enemy's operations should render that measure desirable.

“ I have now sent instructions to an officer of Engineers to wait on you upon the subject of these bridges, and I recommend to you to refer him to Colonel Fisher, and to leave to these two officers all the detail of the preparations for these bridges, supplying them from the naval stores with such articles of beams, planks, cordage, anchors, &c., as they may require, and assisting them with your influence over the owners of boats.

“ From the enclosed extract of my letter to Mr. Stuart on this subject, you will observe that I requested the Government would make all the arrangements for having boats at command to ferry the army over the Tagus, if it should be necessary, as well as boats to be formed into bridges eventually.

“ The place at which I should fix these bridges in the lower Tagus, if I should ever fix them in this part of the river, and that in which I shall cross the river, if I should ever cross it, must depend upon the enemy's operations. I think it probable, however, that there is no road across the island of Lyceria from the proposed landing-place opposite Alhandra, and that I should not place any large proportion of the army there.

“ In respect to the island of Lyceria, and the left bank of the Tagus, I am apprehensive that we shall get into some little confusion in that quarter, as both the Government and the Governor of Setuval, &c., have made that part of the country the object of their peculiar attention, and I know nothing that is going on there, what troops they have, or what enemy they have to

oppose. I heard cannon in that quarter the day before yesterday ; and, excepting the two brass three pounders sent over by the Government, I was not aware that they had a gun.

“ Believe me, &c.

“ WELLINGTON.”

“ Vice-Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Major-General Fane.

“ My dear Fane, “ Pero Negro, 1st November, 1810.

“ You will receive directions from Colonel Murray to march to Lisbon with one brigade of Portuguese cavalry and a battalion of Caçadores from General Hill’s corps, and to cross the Tagus by boats, which will be prepared for you.

“ Our wish is, if possible, that you should go up with the tide as far as Zamora, from whence there is a road of three leagues to Salvatierra ; but you had better communicate with the naval people upon this subject, and go to the place to which the troops can certainly be conveyed in one tide, and at which the horses can certainly land.

“ The objects in sending you across the Tagus are as follows :

“ First ; to observe the enemy’s movements on the right of the river, and convey to us some certain information of what they are about.

“ Secondly ; to prevent them from crossing it, if possible.

This, of course, must depend upon the means they have of making a first establishment on the left bank of the river compared with those you will have to resist them.

“ Thirdly ; to endeavour to destroy their establishments of boats, timber, rope, casks, &c., which they have formed, as it is said, at Santarem and Barquinha.

“ In respect to the first point, we have at present the following intelligence : that the enemy have spread themselves from Santarem to Pumbete, along the river. They have some cannon and about three or four battalions of infantry. The troops they have are, in general, cavalry. Till you would get to Salvatierra, you

would not have a view of the main branch of the river ; and you should proceed on to Chamusca.

“ In respect to the second object, it is impossible for me to form any opinion of the means of passing the river which the enemy possesses, from the contradictory accounts I have received. They talk of their having completed two boats which were on the stocks at Santarem, and of their having three or four more ; but I am not sure what they have.

“ Besides the Caçadores, you ought to find all the ordenanza of those districts collected under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel —, whom you will take under your orders. He has with him two 3-pounders. If you should find that the enemy has means of passing a large body over the river at a time, of which I shall hear from you, I must increase the force there, and adopt other measures.

“ In respect to the third object, I have to inform you that Brigadier-General Rosa has orders to send over the Tagus with you two 12-pounders on travelling carriages and artillerymen. The Governor of Setuval has orders to send to Zamora to meet you some 6-pounders, which he had lately brought from Setuval for a warfare which he was carrying on upon the left of the Tagus.

“ If you should find that the means of drawing the 6-pounders are sufficient to draw the 12-pounders, you had better take the latter with you. If they are not, you had better take the 6-pounders. In that case you will send the 12-pounders back to Lisbon in the boats ; but if you should take with you the 12-pounders, you will either send the 6-pounders to Setuval if you can find bullocks to draw them there, or if not, you will send them over to Lisbon in the boats.

“ Besides this, I have requested Admiral Berkeley to send with you some of Congreve's rockets, and some officers and seamen who are acquainted with the mode of using them. You will communicate with the Admiral upon this point, and with Brigadier Rosa, the commanding officer of Portuguese artillery, respecting the 12-pounders.

“ I should hope that between the 12-pounders and the rockets, we shall be able to destroy all their little establishments at Barquinha and Santarem.

“ The next thing upon which I must instruct is your retreat, in case the enemy should cross the Tagus in superior strength.

“ It is not very probable, according to all accounts, that he will attempt it below Sautarem. If he should cross above the situation in which you will be, you will retire gradually upon Salvatierra, and from thence to Aldea Galega, giving the Assistant Quarter-Master-General and me the earliest information of your movements, in order that boats may be prepared to transport you. You will find a good post at Alcochete, about a league in front of Aldea Galega.

“ If the enemy should cross below you in force, you must in that case retire direct from the river till you shall come upon the great road leading from Monte Mor to Aldea Galega, and thence to that town.

“ If by any accident you should be cut off from Aldea Galega, which is not very likely, you will retire upon Palmella and Setuval.

“ Believe me, &c.

“ Major-General Fane.”

“ WELLINGTON.”

*Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Vice-Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

“ Sir,

“ Pero Negro, 3rd November, 1810.

“ I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 2nd instant, and I am much obliged to you for embarking Major-General Fane's detachment.

“ It is not necessary that I should enter into any discussion of the comparative merits of Congreve's rockets and carcasses ; or that I should enter into any defence of the former, of the merits or demerits of which I have no experience, never having seen them used.

“ I should hope, however, that the Master-General of the Ordnance would have urged his Majesty's Government not to send any to this country, if they are what you describe. Captain Beresford, however, mentioned to me that he had some of them on board the *Poictiers* ; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will allow some of them, with some seamen of the *Poictiers*, to be sent over to Major-General Fane, in order that they may, at least, be tried against the collection of the enemy's materials for their bridge at Santarem and Barquinha, as I fear that he will

have no opportunity of trying the 24-pound carcasses which you have been so kind as to offer him, since the gun-boats, in which the 24-pound guns are, cannot go higher up than Salvatierra; and there are no means on the left of the river of moving the 24-pounders, even if mounted upon travelling carriages, by land, from Salvatierra to the station at which Major-General Fane would have to use them.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ WELLINGTON.”

“ Vice-Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.”

*Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to the Earl of
Liverpool, Secretary of State.*

“ My Lord,

“ Pero Negro, 3rd November, 1810.

“ I wish it was in my power to give your Lordship an opinion of the probable course of the enemy’s operations, founded upon the existing state of affairs here, considered in a military point of view; but from what I am about to state to your Lordship, you will observe that it is impossible to form such an opinion.

“ The expedition into Portugal was, in my opinion, founded originally upon political and financial, rather than military considerations. It is true that, with a view to the conquest of Spain, there were advantages purely military to be derived from the removal of the British army from Portugal; but I think I could show that it was not essentially necessary to effect that object, particularly after the door into Castille had been closed upon us, by the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida.

“ The political object, therefore, in removing us from Portugal, which was the effect that our evacuation of the Peninsula would have had upon the inhabitants of Spain in general, and upon those of Cadiz in particular; and the financial object, which was the possession and plunder of Lisbon and Oporto, were the principal motives for the perseverance in the expedition into Portugal. I believe the latter to have been more pressing even than the former.

“ It is impossible to describe to your Lordship the pecuniary and other distresses of the French armies in the Peninsula.

All the troops are months in arrears of pay ; they are in general very badly clothed ; their armies want horses, carriages, and equipments of every description ; their troops subsist solely upon plunder, whether required individually, or more regularly by the way of requisition and contribution ; they receive no money, or scarcely any, from France ; and they realize but little from their pecuniary contributions in Spain. Indeed, I have lately discovered that the expense of the pay and the hospitals alone of the French army in the Peninsula amounts to more than the sum stated in the financial *exposé* as the whole expense of the entire French army.

“ This state of things has very much weakened, and in some instances destroyed, the discipline of the army ; and all the intercepted letters advert to acts of malversation and corruption, and misapplication of stores, &c., by all the persons attached to the army.

“ I have no doubt, therefore, that the desire to relieve this state of distress, and to remove the consequent evils occasioned by it, by the plunder of Lisbon and Oporto, was the first motive for the expedition into Portugal.

“ The expedition, not having been founded upon any military necessity, has been carried on and persevered in against every military principle. We know that Massena could expect no immediate reinforcements ; and without adverting to the various errors which I believe he would acknowledge he had committed in the course of the service, he has persevered in it, after he found that he was unable to force the troops opposed to him when posted in a strong position, and when he knew that they had one still stronger in their rear, to which they were about to retire ; and that they were likely to be reinforced, while his army would be still further weakened by sickness, and by the privations to which he knew they must be liable on their march. He knew that the whole country was against him ; that a considerable corps was formed upon the Douro, which would immediately operate upon his rear ; that at the time of the battle of Busaco he had no longer any communication with Spain ; and that every step he took further in advance was a step towards additional difficulty and inconvenience, from which the retreat would be almost impossible.

“ If the expedition into Portugal had been founded upon mili-

tary principle only, it would have ended at Busaco ; and I do not hesitate to acknowledge that I expected that Massena would retire from thence, or at all events would not advance beyond the Mondego. But he has continued to advance, contrary to every military principle ; and I therefore conclude that the pressure of financial distresses, which was the original motive for the expedition, was that for persevering in it, and may operate upon the measures of the present moment.

“ In this view of the case, it is probable that Massena may endeavour to maintain his position as long as he can keep alive any proportion of his troops, being certain that the same difficulties which induced the Emperor to undertake the expedition without any military necessity, would induce him to make every effort to reinforce him at the earliest possible period of time, and therefore that he will remain some time longer where he is.

“ Your Lordship is already acquainted with the means of reinforcing him. There is no doubt that, by raising the siege of Cadiz, and abandoning other unattainable objects, Massena may be reinforced to a very considerable extent.

“ Under these circumstances, I have frequently turned over in my mind the expediency of attacking the French army now in my front, before it should be joined by its reinforcements ; and upon the whole, I am inclined to be of opinion that I ought not to do so.

“ I enclose your Lordship an account of the number of battalions, squadrons, &c., which entered Portugal with Massena, and I cannot believe that they composed an army of less than 70,000 men at the battle of Busaco. I calculate their loss, including sick, since that time, at 15,000 men, which would leave them with 55,000 men, of which 6000 or 7000 are cavalry, at the present moment.

“ The effective strength of the British army, according to the last returns, was 29,000 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and one regiment at Lisbon, and one at Torres Vedras, which in the view of the contest ought not to be taken into the account ; and I enclose a statement of the Portuguese force, according to the last returns.

“ Besides this force, the Marquis de la Romana's corps consists of about 5000 men ; making a total of 58,615, of which I could command the services, in case I should act offensively against the enemy, of which about — would be cavalry.

“ Besides these troops, there are different bodies of militia, infantry, and artillery, in our positions ; but I should deceive myself if I could expect, and your Lordship if I should state, that any advantage would be derived from their assistance in an offensive operation against the enemy.

“ Although the enemy’s position is not so strong as that which we occupy, there is no doubt but that it has its advantages ; one of which is, that in attacking it we could hardly use our artillery. I would also observe, that in every operation of this description by the British army in Portugal, no attempt can be made to manœuvre upon the enemy’s flank or rear ; first, because the enemy show they are indifferent about their flanks or rear, or their communications ; and secondly, because the inevitable consequence of attempting such a manœuvre would be to open some one or other road to Lisbon, and to our shipping, of which the enemy would take immediate advantage to attain his object.

“ We must carry their positions, therefore, by main force, and consequently with loss ; and in the course of the operations I must draw the army out of their cantonments ; I must expose the troops and horses to the inclemencies of the weather at this season of the year, and must look to all the consequences of that measure in increased sickness of the men, and in loss of efficiency and condition in horses.

“ I observe that, notwithstanding the length of time which has elapsed since the greatest and most efficient part of the French army has been employed against us, there is yet no other military body in the Peninsula which is capable of taking, much less of keeping, the field : and the relief of Cadiz, which appears to me to be a probable consequence of the state of affairs here, would not give us the assistance of an army from that quarter, either in the way of co-operation or of diversion ; nor would the removal of Sebastiani from Grenada, which would be the consequence of the relief of Cadiz, enable Blake to make any progress beyond the Sierra Morena towards Madrid. We should still stand alone in the Peninsula as an army ; and if I should succeed in forcing Massena’s positions, it would become a question whether I should be able to maintain my own, in case the enemy should march another army into this country. But, when I observe how small the superiority of numbers is in my favour, and know that the position will be in favour of the enemy, I can-

not but be of opinion that I act in conformity with the instructions and intentions of his Majesty's Government, in waiting for the result of what is going on, and in incurring no extraordinary risk.

"Every day's delay, at this season of the year, narrows our line of defence, and consequently strengthens it; and when the winter shall have set in, no number, however formidable, can venture to attack it; and the increase of the enemy's numbers at that period will only add to their distress, and increase the difficulties of their retreat.

"I have thought it proper to make your Lordship acquainted with the course of my reflections upon this subject, and my present determination, which I hope will be consistent with the wishes of his Majesty's Government. Circumstances may change; the enemy's distresses for provisions, and the operations of our detachments in his rear, may induce him to detach to such a degree as to render a general attack upon him a measure of positive advantage, in which case I shall alter my determination. But, adverting to the necessity of placing the troops in the field in this season if I should make any attack, the advantage must be very obvious before I adopt a measure which must be attended by the consequence of losing the services of my men by sickness.

"I have the honour to be, &c.

"The Earl of Liverpool."

"WELLINGTON."

*Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K.B., to Vice-Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

"My dear Sir,

"Pero Negro, 6th November, 1810.

"I have received your letter of 11 A.M., the 5th instant. I assure you that I am no partisan of Congreve's rockets, of which I entertain but a bad opinion, from what I recollect of the rockets in the East Indies, of which I believe those of Congreve are an imitation.

"It is but fair, however, to give every thing a trial, more particularly as I have received the orders of Government to try these machines. I do not think it would answer any purpose to try

them here ; but I understand that the enemy have seven boats on the square at Villa Franca, which possibly might be reached by the rockets fired from Hill's advanced picket, and they might be tried there.

“ Believe me, &c.

“ WELLINGTON.”

“ Vice-Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K.B., to Major-General Fane.

“ My dear Fane, “ Pero Negro, 8th November, 1810.

“ I have received your letter of the 6th in the evening. I find that the only draught they had for the guns on the left of the Tagus was oxen ; and Beresford has repeated his orders that you should be plentifully supplied with these animals. They will be slow, but very sure.

“ I have desired General Howorth to send over to you a party of British artillery, with a rocket-carriage drawn by horses, and some rockets, the whole lately come from England ; so that you will be able to try these machines very effectually. I also desired Rosa to send you a 5½-inch howitzer, that you might also use the 24-pound carcasses. All this and the Caçadores will have arrived some time ago.

“ The enemy's movements look like an intention to attack Abrantes, where Colonel Lobo commands, who is doing remarkably well ; and I shall be obliged to you if you will let him know how well I am satisfied with him.

“ On the left of the Tagus is Don Carlos de España with about 1200 Spanish troops, with whom I wish you to communicate by your right, and to keep all matters straight between him and Lobo. Don Carlos I believe to be a very good kind of man, and a good officer.

“ Lobo has at Abrantes not only the boats of the bridge there, but I believe those of the bridge of Punhete ; and he ought to have those of the bridge of Villa Velha. He has very prudently taken up the bridge of Abrantes ; and since the enemy have appeared in force on the left of the Zézere he has sent the boats

over to the left of the Tagus, and has given charge of them to Don Carlos de España.

“The orders which Lobo has respecting these boats is to have combustibles in each, and every thing prepared to burn them at a short notice, but not to burn them till the last extremity, and till it shall be certain that they will otherwise fall into the hands of the enemy.

“I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate with Don Carlos on this point particularly, and see that he understands exactly what he is to do, and is prepared to do it.

“The boats at Abrantes are now more important than ever. First, it is very important that the enemy should not get them; and secondly, it is very important that we should not lose the use of them, unless absolutely necessary to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy: for if Lobo is to be attacked at Abrantes, I must and will support him from the left of the Tagus, and so I beg you to tell him, and we shall want the boats there.

“Our guns were removed from the neighbourhood of the Zezere, and I believe throughout Lower Beira; but of this last, although ordered, I am not certain.

“Let me hear from you if the Caçadores have their clothing.

“Believe me, &c.

“Major-General Fane.”

“WELLINGTON.”

*Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Vice-Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

“Sir,

“Pero Negro, 10th November, 1810.

“The assistance which I have uniformly received from you, not only in those objects to which I have drawn your attention from time to time, but in others to which you have adverted yourself, induces me to suggest a mode in which the navy might most materially contribute to the success of his Majesty’s arms, and to the salvation of this country.

“I have long considered that, after occupying the most important points in the position of the army, it was most desirable that I should have a disposable force capable of moving to any point

which might be attacked, or of acting offensively against the enemy, if circumstances should render that measure advisable.

“The strength which I have added to the several positions of the troops has already increased my disposable force, but it would be increased if we could have the assistance of a brigade of seamen, and of a battalion composed of the marines of the squadron, in a proportion still greater than their numbers would add to the numerical strength of the army.

“If you should see no objection to the plan,* I would propose to you to land the seamen and marines whom you should think proper to employ in this manner, and to place them in barracks or cantonments in the first instance, in the neighbourhood of St. Julian, Cascaes, &c., where they might be arranged in companies and battalions, and the officers and petty officers posted to each, where they might be properly equipped for a further advance towards the positions occupied by the army, and might learn some of the most simple and necessary evolutions of the troops, in order that they might execute them with facility, at the moment their services would be required. I would propose to leave them in this situation, till circumstances should render it necessary or desirable to draw some of the troops out of the positions they now occupy, to be disposable for other parts; and I would then move the battalion of marines and the brigade of seamen to occupy the fortified positions from which the troops would have been withdrawn.

“When the brigade of seamen and battalion of marines would move into these positions, the Commissary-General of the Army would, of course, provide for their subsistence; in the mean time it might be more convenient that they should be subsisted by the pursers of the ships to which they severally belong. I should wish you, however, to decide upon these points as you may think best; and if you should prefer that the Commissary-General should provide for them, a commissary shall be attached to them immediately, in the same manner as to the other brigades.

“If you should approve of this plan, I will send an officer of the Adjutant-General's, and one of the Quarter-Master General's department, to Lisbon, to place themselves under the orders of the officer whom you shall appoint to command the brigade.

* On reference of this proposition to the Admiralty, the Board would not approve of landing the seamen of the fleet.

And I will have all the arrangements made for quartering them, as I have above proposed for your consideration.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ WELLINGTON.”

“ Vice-Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.”

*Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Vice-Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

“ Pero Negro, 11th November, 1810,

“ My dear Sir,

10 A. M.

“ I have received your letter of the 9th at night.

“ The bridge at Villa Velha is burnt. The boats of the bridge of Abrantes, and all the materials belonging to it, still exist; the bridge of Punhete was taken up, and I believe the boats were taken up to Abrantes, where they now are.

“ The orders which I have given to Abrantes are at all events to prevent the boats from falling into the hands of the enemy, but not to destroy them till it shall be certain that the enemy must obtain possession of them.

“ As you say very truly, the anchors of the boats that are burnt must still remain, and will answer for other boats and bridges. Whether the boats of the bridges are destroyed or not, or whatever may become of the anchors now down, it is absolutely necessary that the boats used in bridges, in these torrents, should each have an anchor; and, as an additional security, a rope must be passed across the river, to which each boat should be fastened. The rope alone would be sufficient in the summer season; but when the torrents come down in the winter, not only are the anchors required to hold them, but great attention must be paid to the whole machine, otherwise, not only the bridge would become impassable, but the boats unserviceable.

“ I enclose an extract of my letter to Mr. Stuart upon this subject, likewise a copy of my instructions to Captain Wedekind, of the engineers.

“ All that I wish in respect to the boats for the new bridges is, that we may know where to lay our hands upon them when we shall require them.

"In respect to the other materials for the bridges, I wish to have them prepared, and in readiness to be sent up the river when we shall want to use them; and I have employed Captain Wedekind upon this business, in order that I may know exactly what is prepared, and what is not, when the time shall come when I may have to cross the Tagus.

"Believe me, &c.

"WELLINGTON."

"Vice-Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley."

"P.S. I observe that I sent you on the 29th October, the extract of my letter to Mr. Stuart of the 23rd, on the subject of the bridges; and I therefore do not now trouble you with it again."

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Vice-Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

"Sir,

"Pero Negro, 12th November, 1810.

"I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 11th, and I assure you that I shall always be happy to acknowledge the cordial assistance which I have received from you, and from the naval force under your command, since I have had the honour of commanding his Majesty's troops in this country, of which your immediate attention to the suggestion contained in my letter of the 10th is only an additional instance.

"Major Marston is the officer of the Quarter-Master-General's department directed to conduct the details of quartering the brigade of marines and seamen, and to put himself under the orders of the officer whom you will appoint to command the brigade. He will wait upon you to receive your commands, and to be placed under the orders of that officer. He has likewise been directed to make requisitions for canteens and camp kettles for the men, which will be supplied as to the other troops.

"I am inclined to be of opinion that the seamen will be of most service if armed with firelocks. As they will be in positions, some time would elapse before they could close with their enemy, and they would be awkwardly situated if they had no fire-arms in their

reach. It is to be observed, also, that the musket and bayonet may be used equally well with the pike, if an opportunity should offer of closing with the enemy.

"I concur entirely with you that, in case it should be necessary to embark the army, these men must be the first sent to their vessels; and, indeed, the possibility of their services being required in their ships before it should be requisite for me to call for their services on shore, was one of the reasons for which I proposed Fort St. Julian, &c., as the first place of their assembly.

"I have the honour to be, &c.

"WELLINGTON."

"Vice-Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley."

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K.B., to Major-General Fane.

"Pero Negro, 12th November, 1810.

"My dear Fane,

"I enclose a report I have received from Captain Goldfinch, on the line of country from Palmella to the Tagus, in front of Aldea Galega. You will see that the right of the position at Rilvas is not very good; but at the same time it might be advisable to oblige the enemy to go round by the open country between Palmella and the right of the morass, and you might gain time by it: and as it is as well always to be prepared with a measure from which advantage may be derived, I would recommend you to have mines prepared in the bridges and causeways, stated to cross the rivers and morass, the destruction of which would impede the passage. The bridges and causeways will not be the worse for these mines if we should never blow them.

"I rather believe there is some camp equipage belonging to the British army at Abrantes, and I shall be obliged to you if you will desire Lobo to issue some tents to Don Carlos de España, in order to cover his people from the rain in this terrible weather.

"Believe me, &c.

"Major-General Fane."

"WELLINGTON."

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K.B., to Major-General Fane.

“ Pero Negro, 14th November, 1810.

“ My dear Fane,

“ I received in the night your letter, giving an account of your cannonade upon the boats at Santarem, which I hope will have had a much better effect than you suppose. There is more ammunition at Zamora. I have spoken to Beresford respecting an officer of artillery, and another howitzer for you.

“ In respect to the dépôt of materials at Santarem, I am anxious that an attempt should be made to destroy it, whatever may be the consequence to the town, if you believe it really exists there.

“ I should be very sorry to destroy the town, or any part of it; but I should never forgive myself if, having it in my power to destroy the means of passing the Tagus, I omitted to make use of it; and the enemy were afterwards to be able, by this dépôt, to have a communication with a body of troops, which we must expect they will employ on the left of the river.

“ I beg you, therefore, to let Lieut. Lindsay make the attempt, if you think the dépôt of materials is really there, which I believe there is no reason to doubt.

“ Believe me, &c.

“ Major-General Fane.”

“ WELLINGTON.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Brigadier-General R. Craufurd.

“ On the Hill in front of Sobral,
15th November, 1810, 20 m. past 10 A.M.

“ My dear General,

“ You will have observed that the enemy have retired from the ground they occupied with their right about Sobral, and I think it most probable that they will have retired their whole army towards Santarem.

“ Sir B. Spencer's division is now feeling its way on towards

Alemquer, and a patrol of our cavalry is just gone to the wood in front of No. 11.

“ If you should find that the enemy have retired their left as well as their right, I beg you to cross the river at Arruda, and feel your way on towards Alemquer, by the direct road leading from Arruda.

“ Send this note on to General Hill, by the direct communication from Arruda to Alhandra. I wish him to feel his way on by the high road of Villa Franca and Castenheira, to Carregado, with the advanced guard of his corps.

“ I shall soon have some British cavalry at Sobral and Alemquer, and General Hill had better get some of the 13th Light Dragoons from St. Antonio de Tojal, to observe in his front.

“ We must make our first movements with caution, as I heard last night that the enemy had a reinforcement on the frontier of Upper Beira on the 9th.

“ Believe me, &c.

“ Brig.-Gen. R. Craufurd.”

“ WELLINGTON.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K.B., to Vice-Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

“ On the Heights in front of Sobral,
15th November, 1810, $\frac{1}{2}$ past 10 A.M.

“ My dear Sir,

“ The enemy retired their right in the course of last night, and have probably retired their left from the high road of Villa Franca.

“ I have sent to Lieut.-General Hill to move on, and I think it would be desirable to have some of the boats sent up the river immediately, in case we should have to send more troops across. They might come as far as Alhandra, to which place I shall send them further directions.

“ I conclude that Lieut. Berkeley will move up the river on General Hill's flanks.

“ Believe me, &c.

“ WELLINGTON.”

“ Vice-Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Brigadier-General R. Craufurd.

“ Heights above Alemquer,
“ 15th November, 1810, $\frac{1}{4}$ past 3 P. M.

“ My dear General,

“ I enclose a letter in triplicate, which I wrote you this morning, and I hope that somebody at Arruda will have opened it, and will have acted upon it in your absence. You see the enemy at Villa Nova, I conclude, and I request you to communicate with the officer in command of General Hill's outposts, who will, I hope, be this night at Carregado. In the morning I wish you to feel your way cautiously to Villa Nova, and thence on the road to Santarem.

“ I shall move General Spencer's division in the morning to Alemquer, and General Hill's corps I shall close up on the high road along the Tagus. I shall be up here very early in the morning.

“ Believe me, &c.

“ Brig.-Gen. R. Craufurd.”

“ WELLINGTON.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Major-General Fane.

“ My dear Fane, “ Pero Negro, 15th November, 1810.

“ The enemy retreated last night, and their outposts were this evening at Villa Nova. They have all gone to Santarem.

“ Our advanced guard is this night at Alemquer, they will tomorrow be well on towards Santarem. General Hill will be at Villa Nova, and Sir Brent Spencer at Alemquer.

“ The enemy intend either to retire across the Zezere into Spain, or across the Tagus into Spain, or across the Zezere, to attack Abrantes. The last is possible, as I last night received an account, that on the 9th they had a considerable reinforcement on the frontier of Beira Alta.

“ I have requested the Admiral to have boats brought up the Tagus, and I propose to pass over General Hill's corps to Salva-

tierra, or at least to be in readiness for that movement as soon as possible. This will enable me to prevent the success of an attack upon Abrantes, at all events, and possibly the movement of retreat across the Tagus; and if they retreat across the Zezere, I shall be able to annoy them by passing the river at or above Abrantes.

“ You must, in the first instance, rocket Santarem, if you believe that the boats and materials are still there; in the next, you must encourage Lobo at Abrantes to hold out, whatever may be the attack made upon him. If the French should pass the Tagus between you and him, desire him to get his boats over to the right of the Tagus, and let Don Carlos de España pass over to Abrantes, and tell him that, in this case, Abrantes cannot be attacked. You will in that case take care of yourself by withdrawing down the river.

“ If you find that they are using their materials in constructing a bridge over the Zezere, move your cavalry opposite to Abrantes; make a great show there; throw the bridge over the Tagus, with the exception of three or four boats on the other side (the right), and have every thing in readiness for a complete bridge for you and Hill to cross, either to pursue the enemy through Beira Alta, or to oppose the enemy in his attack upon Abrantes. In this case (of their using their materials to make a bridge over the Zezere), I think it probable that you will have your Caçadores and rockets and artillery still opposite Santarem; but if you should have reason to believe that the whole have been taken from Santarem, or that the design to cross the Zezere is manifest, move your whole force opposite to Abrantes, and encourage Lobo and the garrison by all the means in your power.

“ There is still a chance that the enemy may take up and try to keep a position at Santarem, endeavouring to keep his rear open, and his communication with Ciudad Rodrigo across the Zezere. However, this ought not to alter your measures. As soon as you are certain that they are using their materials to cross the Zezere instead of the Tagus, make the communication with Lobo your object, still holding your communication with the right of the army, and rocketing Santarem, if you should think there is any thing there to be destroyed.

“ Believe me, &c.

“ Major-General Fane.”

“ WELLINGTON.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Lieut.-General Hill.

“ My dear Hill, “ Cartaxo, 18th November, 1810.

“ The enemy are still too strong for us this day at Santarem, and I have delayed the attack upon them until to-morrow morning, in order to have the assistance of the 1st division. If they stay we shall then attack them.

“ I enclose my letter of the 15th to Fane, which I believe you have already seen. I beg that you will instruct him to cross the Tagus to Abrantes immediately, with his cavalry, light infantry, and Don Carlos de España's brigade, if he should find that the enemy are retiring from the Zézere through Lower Beira, and to annoy them as much as he can, still keeping his communication with Abrantes. He may take some troops from Abrantes if he wants them.

“ Let your troops move on by the usual stages on the left of the Tagus, as soon as they shall have crossed the river. When you will arrive opposite to Abrantes, you will follow the instructions above given to Fane, with this difference, that you may be able to cut off the rear of the enemy entirely, when your corps shall be up; or if the whole rear should have passed Abrantes before you shall have arrived there, you will push it as hard as you can with safety till you arrive yourself upon the Ponsul.

“ I shall follow the enemy to the Zézere, where I shall endeavour to get the light division over the river to join you.

“ Believe me, &c.

“ Lieut.-General Hill.”

“ WELLINGTON.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Lieut.-General Hill.

“ Cartaxo, 19th November, 1810, 5 P. M.

“ My dear Hill,

“ I have received Fane's letter of last night from Abrantes, which almost induces me to believe that I have made a mistake in sending you over the Tagus at all; and I am certain that you should proceed no further up the river than Chamusca at present

with the head of your corps; that General Lumley's brigade should remain at Almeirim, and the Portuguese troops at Salvatierra. The cavalry might go up to Chamusca. You should not go any further till you shall find that the enemy have decidedly passed, or are passing, the Zézere.

"In order to be in time for Major-General Lumley, I send him orders to halt at Almeirim, and the Portuguese to halt at Salvatierra, but for the cavalry to go to Chamusca.

"I did not attack Santarem this morning, as the artillery intended for the left missed its way; and I am rather glad that I did not make the attack, as the enemy have there undoubtedly a very strong post, which we must endeavour to turn; or, if they have not retired across the Zézere, or towards the Alva, they must be too strong for us here. I believe, however, I shall attack them to-morrow.

"Pray let the river be watched at Chamusca as well as at Almeirim, and let me know every thing that passes on this side.

"Believe me, &c.

"Lieut.-General Hill."

"WELLINGTON."

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to Major-General the Hon. W. Lumley.

"My dear Sir,

"Cartaxo, 21st November, 1810.

"I received this morning your letter of the 20th, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will continue to observe the enemy's movements on the right of the Tagus, and keep me informed of them. The officer who will take this to you will point out the place at which the boat of communication is stationed.

"Endeavour to see the road from Santarem to Torres Novas, as well as that to Golegão. Possibly it may be seen from the steeple of the church, or some other high building at Almeirim.

"Tell General Hill that the rain has destroyed the roads, and filled the rivulets to such a degree that I am obliged to delay the movements on the enemy's right, which I had intended to make yesterday with a view to dislodge him.

"Believe me, &c.

"WELLINGTON."

"Major-General the Hon. W. Lumley."

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K.B., to C. Stuart, Esq.

“ My dear Sir,

“ Cartaxo, 21st November, 1810.

“ I enclose my dispatch to Government, which I beg you to send home, and to let the packet sail. The enemy have a position stronger than Busaco or Sobral, and the rain, which is destroying them, enables them to maintain it. One of our brigades could not march two miles yesterday in less time than three hours. It did not get in till two o'clock. This day we are at a stand still; and if the weather shall clear up, I hope to be able to dislodge them by movement.

“ Let the Government do what they please with the deputies arrived, or expected to arrive, from France.

“ I think that Austin's quarantine ought to be stopped, as the yellow fever is disappearing at Cadiz.

“ Believe me, &c.

“ C. Stuart, Esq.”

“ WELLINGTON.”

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K.B., to the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

“ My Lord,

“ Cartaxo, 21st November, 1810.

“ The enemy retired from the position which they had held for the last month, with their right at Sobral, and their left resting upon the Tagus, in the night of the 14th instant, and went by the road of Alemquer, towards Alcoentre with their right, and Villa Nova with their left. They continued their retreat towards Santarem on the following days.

“ The allied army broke up from their position on the morning of the 15th, and followed the march of the enemy, and the advanced guard was at Alemquer, and the British cavalry and the advanced guard at Azambuja and Alcoentre on the 16th, and at this place on the 17th. In these movements they have made about 400 prisoners.

“ These troops have been followed in their march by Sir Brent Spencer's and the 5th division of infantry under Major-General Leith.

“ On the 17th I received accounts from Major-General Fane, from the left of the Tagus, that the enemy had constructed another bridge on the Zezere ; that which had been first thrown over that river having been carried away by the floods ; and that they had on that day marched a large body of troops from Santarem towards Golegaõ, and I immediately passed Lieut.-General Hill’s corps across the Tagus, at Valada, in boats, which Admiral Berkeley had been so kind as to send up the river to aid and facilitate the operations of the army. The object of this movement was that Lieut.-General Hill might give countenance and assistance to Abrantes, in case the enemy should attack that place ; or, that, if they should retire from Portugal through Lower Beira, he might annoy them on their retreat.

“ On the 18th, the British cavalry and the advanced guard found the enemy’s rear guard so strongly posted in front of Santarem, that it was impossible to attack them with any prospect of success ; and although my posts on the left of the Tagus have informed me that the enemy continue to send troops and baggage along the road on the right bank towards the Zezere, their rear guard have still maintained their post ; and they have evidently in that post and in Santarem a sufficient body of troops to enable them to hold the strong position of Santarem against any attack which I might make on its front.

“ At the same time the rain, which has been so very heavy since the 15th, has so completely destroyed the roads and filled the rivulets, that I have hitherto found it impossible to dislodge the enemy from his position at Santarem, by movements through the hills on his right flank. The bad state of the roads has also possibly been the cause of the enemy remaining at Santarem so long.

“ Although the enemy have moved large bodies of troops to the eastward from Santarem, I have not yet heard that any large numbers have crossed the Zezere. I cannot be certain, therefore, that their intention is to retire from Portugal entirely. Their army being collected between Santarem and the Zezere, they are in a situation to be able, and they may endeavour to maintain themselves in that strong position till the reinforcements, which I know are on the frontier, can join them ; and for this reason, and because I was unwilling to expose to the inclemencies of the weather a larger body of troops than it was absolutely necessary

to employ to press upon the enemy's rear, and to support the advanced guard, I have kept in reserve a considerable proportion of the allied army, some of them still in the cantonments in the line of our fortified positions.

“ I have also ordered General Hill to halt the head of his corps at Chamusca, on the left of the Tagus, till the enemy's movement shall have been decided.

“ I have not heard from General Silveira, who is on the frontier of Upper Beira, since the 9th instant, and he then informed me of the movements of different bodies of troops, which I suppose to be 20,000 men in Castile, apparently levying contributions of provisions, &c., for the army in Portugal. These accounts have been confirmed by others of a later date, the 13th instant, from Salamanca.

“ Having advanced from the positions in which I was enabled to bring the enemy to a stand, and to oblige them to retire without venturing upon any attack, it is but justice to Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher, and the officers of the Royal Engineers, to draw your Lordship's attention to the ability and diligence with which they have executed the works by which these positions have been strengthened, to such a degree as to render any attack upon that line occupied by the allied army very doubtful, if not entirely hopeless. The enemy's army may be reinforced, and they may again induce me to think it expedient, in the existing state of affairs in the Peninsula, to resume these positions ; but I do not believe they have it in their power to bring such a force against us as to render the contest a matter of doubt. We are indebted for these advantages to Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher and the officers of the Royal Engineers, among whom I must particularly mention Captain Chapman, who has given me great assistance upon various occasions.

“ Your Lordship will have observed how much the effective strength of the army in proportion to its total numbers has increased lately. There is no sickness in the army of any importance ; and above one-half of those returned as sick in the military returns are convalescents, who are retained at Belem till they shall have gained sufficient strength to bear the fatigues of marching, and of their duty in the field.

“ Besides the allied army, I enclose the copies of a correspondence which I have had with Admiral Berkeley, from which your

Lordship will observe that an additional force had been provided from the fleet; and I take this occasion of informing your Lordship, that in every instance I have received the most cordial and friendly assistance from Admiral Berkeley and the officers and men of the squadron under his command. Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Williams has even done me the favour to come up the Tagus to superintend the passage of General Hill's corps over the river.

“ In my dispatch of the 20th October, I informed your Lordship that the Marquis de la Romana had joined the allied army in their positions in front of Lisbon, with a considerable detachment of the Spanish army under his command. He still continues with us; and I receive from him much valuable advice and assistance.

“ Throughout the period during which we occupied those positions, every thing went on with the utmost regularity, and to my satisfaction, notwithstanding that the force was composed of troops of various descriptions and of different nations; and I attribute these advantages entirely to the zeal for the cause in which we are engaged, and the conciliatory disposition of the chiefs and general officers of the armies of the different nations; and I have no doubt that the same cordiality will prevail as long as it may be expedient that the armies should continue united.

“ Lieut.-General Sir Brent Spencer, and Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, and the officers of the General Staff of the army, have continued to give me every assistance in their power.

“ My last dispatches from Cadiz are dated the 9th instant.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ The Earl of Liverpool.”

“ WELLINGTON.”

EXTRACTS

FROM

FRENCH OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Rapport de l'intendant Général Lambert au Prince Berthier, Major-Général, sur la situation de l'armée de Portugal,

Viseu, le 23 Septembre, 1810.

Monseigneur,

L'armée de Portugal a fait son mouvement le 15 de ce mois par les défilés de Guarda, Celorico et Pinhel, regardés toujours comme impraticables pour les voitures. La dernière de ces communications, indiquée comme la seule où il fût possible de risquer des voitures d'artillerie et de vivres, s'est trouvée la plus longue et la plus mauvaise.

Le quartier général a couché le 16 à Freixadas, le 17 à Celorico, le 18 à Mangalde, le 19 à Viseu, où il attend encore l'arrivée de l'artillerie du grand parc et de la réserve.

Les points occupés aujourd'hui par l'armée entre Viseu et Coïmbre sont Saint-Combo-Daon et Pont de Criz par le deuxième corps; Sanbugossa, Tondella et Casal de Maria par le sixième corps; Viseu et son rayon par le huitième corps; la réserve de cavalerie, le grand parc et tous les équipages sont à deux lieues en arrière, mais hors de danger, après avoir causé de véritables inquiétudes et retardé les opérations.

Les routes ne pouvaient être plus détériorées ni plus obstruées. Les ponts de la Coa, du Mondégo et de leurs affluents étaient intacts; ce qui est d'une grande importance dans un pays où les rivières sont profondément encaissées, et où le moindre ruisseau devient au premier orage un torrent formidable.

Villes, villages, hameaux, tout était déserté, au point que le prince n'a jamais eu un seul guide. Partout, les habitants avaient

fui dans des lieux d'un accès difficile, chassant devant eux leurs bestiaux et emportant de leurs maisons ce qui pouvait nous être de quelque utilité. Cependant l'extrême fertilité du pays, l'abondance des vins, celle des fruits et des plantes potagères, ont offert beaucoup de facilité d'existence au soldat, qui d'ailleurs avait du biscuit et du riz dans son sac, et ses parcs de bœufs à sa suite.

Le Beira produit peu de blé ; mais ses vallées sont couvertes de maïs ; ses coteaux, de vignes ; ses bois, plantés d'oliviers, de châtaigniers et d'une espèce de chêne dont le gland offre un aliment agréable. Toutes ces productions seront utilisées lorsque leur maturité aura permis de les recueillir.

Viseu était sans habitants comme tous les lieux où nous avons passé. On y a vainement cherché des magasins ; tout avait été évacué par l'armée ennemie. Les maisons des particuliers étaient cependant approvisionnées, ce qui a tourné au profit des soldats, sans qu'on ait pu en faire de distribution régulière, la nécessité de forcer les portes pour se loger, ayant livré la plupart des maisons à des dégâts inévitables.

L'hôpital de Viseu avait trois cents fournitures en bon état ; mais le prince n'ayant pas considéré cette ville comme située dans sa ligne future de communications, j'ai dû renoncer à l'idée d'y établir le petit nombre de malades que les corps ont à leur suite.

C'est à présent, Monseigneur, que j'apprécie l'extrême utilité des brigades de mulets, qui, sans perte aucune, ont exactement suivi nos mouvements, tandis que les équipages, qui les ont retardés, arrivent dans un état déplorable.

Quatorze caissons du premier bataillon provisoire et cinq caissons du dixième ont été délabrés et brûlés ; le premier bataillon a perdu quinze chevaux, et le dixième, quatre mulets. Vingt-neuf mille rations de biscuit contenues dans ces caissons, et dans quelques autres qu'il a fallu alléger, ont été distribuées à différents régiments qui suivaient cette route, et n'ont pu parvenir au sixième corps, auquel elles appartenaient.

J'ai acquis l'expérience que quatre mulets de bât, portant huit quintaux, marchent aussi vite que les colonnes ; tandis qu'un caisson chargé à huit cents, ne peut franchir aucun des obstacles des montagnes. Aussi désiré-je organiser de cette manière nos attelages de relais, parce qu'il serait désavantageux au gouvernement de faire construire de nouveaux caissons à Lisbonne, y trouvât-on le moyen de le faire économiquement.

Je dois désirer que les deux nouvelles brigades formées à Bayonne, malheureusement trois mois après la demande que j'en avais faite, puissent atteindre le grand quartier général, et que six autres brigades puissent y être formées en toute hâte, ce seul genre de transport étant le seul propre aux routes de ce pays.

Telle est, Monseigneur, la situation de l'armée, qui reprendra bientôt son mouvement sur Coïmbre.

Signé : LAMBERT.

Rapport de l'intendant Général Lambert au Prince Berthier, Major-Général, sur la situation de l'armée de Portugal.

Alenquer, le 20 Octobre, 1810.

Monseigneur,

La campagne de l'armée de Portugal ; la singularité qu'elle présente, en traversant un royaume sans apercevoir un habitant ; les marches pénibles qu'elle a dû faire dans un pays entrecoupé de montagnes, et privée de guides qui suppléent à l'imperfection des cartes ; l'épuisement total de ses moyens d'habillement, d'équipement et de transport ; les sommes énormes qui lui sont dues, et le vide absolu de la caisse de l'armée ; l'impossibilité de recourir à la voie des contributions dans des villes absolument désertes ; l'insuffisance des ressources que les contributions offriraient, même dans les chances les plus favorables à l'expédition ; tout me fait un devoir d'appeler de la manière la plus sérieuse, l'attention et la sollicitude de V. A. sur l'armée de Portugal. Dans le rapport que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui adresser le 27 Août dernier, j'avais porté à 5,396,000 francs ce qui était dû à l'armée jusqu'au 1^{er} Septembre dernier. Cette somme se composait, tant de ce qui était dû sur la solde, que d'autres dépenses d'argent détaillées dans mon rapport. Depuis cette époque, les paiements faits ont d'une part diminué la dette, mais de l'autre elle s'est accrue de deux mois de solde, qui seront dus à la fin de ce mois, et de diverses autres dépenses, de manière qu'on peut les porter à 7,000,000 de francs environ. Lorsque l'armée occupait l'Espagne, on pouvait encore trouver dans les contributions extraordinaires, frappées par les Ducs d'Abrantès et d'Elchingen, des ressources qui, quoique

médiocres et péniblement arrachées, satisfaisaient à une partie de ses besoins ; mais notre entrée en Portugal nous ferme, du moins pour le moment, la voie de ces ressources ; et, quand même les communications seraient rétablies, V. A. doit sentir que les fonds provenant de ces contributions seront plutôt réservés par les gouverneurs des provinces aux troupes cantonnées dans leur arrondissement, qu'à une armée placée à une si grande distance, et dont l'éloignement même ne permettra pas de bien juger les besoins. Avant de quitter l'Espagne, j'ai chargé l'ordonnateur Clapiers de tous les détails relatifs au recouvrement de ces contributions, que l'intention de S. A. le Prince d'Essling est de maintenir pour la solde de l'armée ; mais, depuis plus d'un mois, privé de communications avec l'Espagne, je ne puis connaître le résultat de ses démarches et la quotité des versements qui ont eu lieu. Dans la situation actuelle des choses, l'armée de Portugal se trouve réduite à ses propres moyens, au sein d'un pays désert, dont les approvisionnements ont été dévorés par les troupes ennemies. La caisse de l'armée ne renferme que 4800 fr., savoir : 4000 fr. en bons à vue sur le trésor public, et 800 fr. en numéraire. Voilà ses seules richesses, qu'on tenterait en vain d'augmenter par la voie des contributions, puisque la grande étendue de pays que nous avons parcourue est vide d'habitants, qu'on n'y rencontre que des maisons abandonnées, et qu'on n'y voit que les traces d'un fanatisme si violent, que les proclamations les plus encourageantes, les promesses les plus flatteuses n'ont pu vaincre la résistance des malheureux Portugais et les ramener dans leurs foyers. Je ne crains pas même de le dire à Votre Altesse : la chance la plus favorable à l'expédition, c'est-à-dire la prise de Lisbonne, serait insuffisante pour l'acquittement de nos dettes et des dépenses courantes ; elle ouvrirait sans doute à l'armée un champ plus vaste pour les approvisionnements ; elle nous permettrait d'en tirer des pays environnants ; en étendant le cercle de nos communications, elle nous procurerait une richesse momentanée, qu'on pourrait même rendre assez durable à l'aide d'une sage économie et d'une administration bien combinée. Mais cette chance, tout avantageuse qu'elle soit réellement, enrichira peu la caisse de l'armée. Elle doit s'attendre à voir se reproduire à Lisbonne l'image de ce qu'elle a vu sur la route : il est plus que probable que les riches habitants de la capitale se sont déjà retirés avec ce qu'ils ont de plus précieux, et qu'en entrant dans la ville, nous n'y trouverons,

comme dans celles que nous avons traversées, que des palais démeublés et tous les signes de l'abandon. Or, sur quelle portion d'habitants pourraient se porter les contributions ? La classe moyenne me paraît celle qui en supportera plus facilement les charges ; mais, outre que la politique exige une très-grande modération dans l'imposition des contributions, les rentrées de Lisbonne ne pourront jamais, quelque fortes qu'on les suppose, mettre l'armée en état de se passer des secours du gouvernement. La ligne resserrée qu'elle occupera, pour se garantir de toute surprise et de toute attaque, ne lui permettra pas d'étendre bien loin le système des contributions ; elle sera bornée, par la nature des choses et des circonstances, à l'exploitation des ressources qui sont sous sa main, en attendant que les secours qu'elle pourrait recevoir lui facilitent les moyens d'étendre ses conquêtes et d'accroître en proportion la masse de ses ressources en tout genre.

Il est inutile d'ajouter que la présence de trois armées dans un pays peu riche par lui-même a dû l'appauvrir encore, et que les dépenses considérables qu'ont dû entraîner l'armement et l'équipement des milices nationales, ont nécessité, de la part des habitants, des sacrifices pécuniaires qui ne doivent pas tourner à notre avantage.

Il résulte de cet aperçu, Monseigneur, que l'armée de Portugal, en lui supposant tous les succès qu'elle doit attendre de l'expérience du chef qui la commande et de la valeur qui caractérise les troupes impériales, doit recevoir du gouvernement les plus prompts secours, et qu'en différer l'envoi, c'est exposer les corps à des plaintes qu'il est plus utile de prévenir que facile de réprimer. Votre Altesse jugera qu'il est convenable de diriger ces fonds de l'Espagne, et de les tirer des caisses particulières établies dans les six gouvernements. L'armée de Portugal a d'autant plus de droits sur ces fonds, qu'en quittant l'Espagne, elle s'est privée du recouvrement, du moins jusqu'à ce moment, des quatre millions qui lui appartiennent et qui sont affectés au paiement de la solde, sur le restant des contributions extraordinaires frappées par les Ducs d'Abrantès et d'Elchingen. Votre Altesse voudrait bien, après avoir déterminé la somme qu'elle doit envoyer, et que je ne crois pas devoir être au-dessous de sept millions, en supposant que de nouvelles troupes ne viennent pas ajouter à la dette, recommander aux gouverneurs des provinces d'en faire protéger l'arrivée au grand quartier général. La situation de la caisse de l'armée ne

permet plus de retard. La solde, les gratifications de campagne, les indemnités pour pertes de chevaux, les frais de poste, les travaux instantés de l'artillerie et du génie, les dépenses d'administration, le service si important des hôpitaux, la détérioration de presque tous nos moyens dans une campagne pénible faite au milieu des pluies et par des chemins presque impraticables, tout réclame impérieusement les fonds que je demande à V. A., et que je lui demande de la manière la plus pressante, parce que les embarras de notre position m'en font un devoir.

De mon côté, Monseigneur, j'ai fait tout ce que j'ai pu pour assurer les approvisionnements de l'armée pendant sa marche, pour la faire vivre dans un pays peu riche, peu abondant par sa nature, pour justifier enfin la confiance dont S. M. l'Empereur a bien voulu m'honorer. J'ai même la douce satisfaction d'apprendre à V. A. que les approvisionnements ne sont pas encore consommés, et que l'armée, malgré la proximité des troupes Anglaises et Portugaises, et les ravages qu'elles ont exercés, n'éprouvera pas encore de privations d'ici à quelque temps; mais j'isole de ce rapport tout ce qui m'est personnel, pour ne rattacher les idées de V. A. qu'à la nécessité de nous envoyer des fonds et de prévenir de nouvelles plaintes.

Je vous prie, Monseigneur, d'agréer l'hommage de mon profond respect et de mon dévouement sans bornes.

Signé: LAMBERT.

Lettre du Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Commandant en Chef de l'armée de Portugal, au Prince Berthier, Major-Général.

Alenquer, le 29 Octobre, 1810.

Monseigneur,

J'envoie le Général Foy à Paris, pour vous rendre compte de la position de l'armée.

Depuis douze jours je suis devant les ouvrages de l'armée Anglo-Portugaise: elle est derrière trois lignes de retranchements auxquels elle a fait travailler depuis dix-huit mois. Le croquis ci-joint vous indiquera ses positions et les nôtres.

Je n'ai pas cru devoir attaquer des retranchements garnis d'une

artillerie formidable et un ennemi deux fois plus nombreux que nous : ç'aurait été lui donner trop d'avantages, et j'aurais compromis l'armée de Sa Majesté l'Empereur. Je n'aurais pas balancé à livrer bataille en rase campagne ; mais dans l'état actuel des choses, je me borne à l'observer sur tous ses débouchés, et, dans le cas où il voudrait me la donner lui-même, je me replierais sur une ligne que j'ai reconnu nous être la plus avantageuse sur les coteaux d'Aveiras, ligne ayant sa gauche à Villanova, et sa droite à Minho de Cubo, dans la direction d'Alcoentre, et couvrant les deux grandes routes de Leiria et de Thomar.

J'ai fait à Santarem mes principaux établissements ; on y a formé un grand hôpital. J'y ai fait construire des fours, rétablir les moulins, réunir tous les grains qui sont assez abondants, et rassembler tous les matériaux que le pays peut offrir pour y jeter un pont de bateaux, et, à défaut, un pont de radeaux ; mais l'ennemi a tellement détruit tous les moyens quelconques, que je ne sais si je pourrai parvenir à le faire construire. Nous n'avons aucun des outils dont on aurait besoin pour cet objet ; je suis obligé d'en faire fabriquer. J'ai réuni tous les ouvriers de l'armée pour y travailler. Les Généraux E'blé et Lazowski président à tous les ouvrages avec la plus grande activité ; mais quelque grands que soient nos efforts, j'espère et je n'ose rien assurer.

L'armée trouve encore assez de vivres dans les positions qu'elle occupe : tous les moulins du pays travaillent pour elle ; on ne peut pas dire jusqu'à présent que l'armée ait éprouvé de besoins. Le beau temps a succédé à dix jours de pluies abondantes et continues. Les officiers Portugais que j'ai avec moi, nous assurent qu'il pourra bien continuer pendant tout Novembre.

L'armée, depuis notre départ d'Almeida, a un déficit de sept à huit mille hommes, tant blessés, morts, et prisonniers, qu'égarés, dont on ignore le sort ; les malades ne pouvant faire le service sont aussi compris dans ce déficit, qui, pour cette raison, se trouve aussi considérable. Ci-joint l'état de situation.

Nous n'avons pas trouvé un seul habitant dans tout le pays que l'armée a parcouru ; et ce qu'on aura de la peine à croire, pas même dans les grandes villes, comme Coïmbre, d'une population ordinairement de vingt mille âmes. Depuis que je suis devant Lisbonne, je n'ai pas pu y envoyer un seul homme. La classe moins aisée du peuple s'est réfugiée dans les bois ; les riches ont suivi l'armée Anglaise à Lisbonne. Ce n'est absolument qu'un

désert, où les officiers Portugais que j'ai avec moi n'ont pu être d'aucune utilité à l'armée.

Les pluies nous ont considérablement avarié de cartouches ; nous n'en avons pas beaucoup en partant d'Almeida, comme j'ai eu l'honneur d'en rendre compte à Votre Altesse, de manière que je suis obligé d'y apporter la plus grande économie, et de ne réprimer qu'avec la plus grande circonspection l'insolence des postes Anglais.

Je me tiens dans mes positions, dans l'espérance que les Portugais réfugiés à Lisbonne feront peut-être un mouvement contre les Anglais, qui les ont réduits à la plus affreuse misère, ou bien que Lord Wellington quittera ses retranchements pour venir recevoir ou me donner bataille. Si mes efforts pour l'établissement d'un pont sur le Tage ont un heureux succès, je pourrai alors manœuvrer sur les deux rives, et vivre avec les ressources de l'Alentejo, pays abondant en blé, et le plus riche du Portugal. Je puis aussi, dans la position où je me trouve, attendre la réserve que Sa Majesté n'aura pas manqué de m'envoyer, suivant ce qui est dit dans les instructions de Votre Altesse. Je dois cependant la prévenir que je pars aujourd'hui pour aller visiter tout le cours du Tage jusqu'à Santarem, et même jusqu'au confluent du Zezere. Si l'établissement d'un pont de bateaux ou de radeaux était absolument impraticable, et qu'il me fût impossible de passer le fleuve, je me déciderais à faire un mouvement rétrograde avant les grandes pluies ; mais ce ne serait qu'après m'être bien convaincu qu'il n'y aurait pas d'autre parti à prendre. Je me dirigerais par la route de Ponte de Murcella et de Guarda, pour ne pas suivre le chemin que j'ai déjà fait, et pour trouver quelques ressources.

Ma position est difficile : mais, je le répète, attaquer trois lignes de retranchements, et un ennemi qui a deux fois autant de forces que moi, et, derrière lui, tous les moyens nécessaires pour se rembarquer, ne m'a pas paru convenable pour le bien du service de Sa Majesté. J'ai donc pris le parti de me mettre sur la défensive, en attendant les ordres de Sa Majesté, et le résultat des dispositions que je fais.

Au reste, le Général Foy donnera à Sa Majesté et à Votre Altesse tous les détails qu'elle pourra désirer. Ils la convaincront qu'en résumé nous avons besoin ici d'un renfort de troupes, de munitions, de souliers et d'argent.

J'ai cherché tous les moyens possibles pour donner de mes nouvelles à Votre Altesse, je ne sais si elles lui seront parvenues. Je lui en ai envoyé de Viseu, de Coïmbre, par un officier Portugais (M. Mascarillas), de Leiria, et d'Alenquer. Je me suis enfin décidé à faire partir le Général Foy, avec un détachement.

Je suis avec un respectueux dévouement, etc.

Signé : MASSE'NA.

Lettre du Prince Berthier, Major-Général, au Maréchal Soult, Duc de Dalmatie.

Paris, le 4 Décembre, 1810.

J'ai mis sous les yeux de l'Empereur, M. le Duc, vos différentes dépêches. S. M. a été mécontente que lorsqu'il s'agit de dispositions aussi importantes que celles qui tiennent à la sûreté de son armée en Portugal, vous ayez laissé le Général la Romana se porter sur le Tage, sans le faire suivre l'épée dans les reins. Si l'armée du Prince d'Essling était battue, M. le Duc, vous devez sentir de quelle importance cela serait pour les armées de l'Empereur en Andalousie, et combien elles seraient compromises. Le mouvement même de la Romana prouve que ce qui se passe en Portugal est la chose la plus importante pour les affaires d'Espagne.

La position des Anglais est toujours à Torres-Vedras, et en arrière de Villafranca. Le Prince d'Essling est en position vis-à-vis de la ligne des Anglais. Ces derniers ont environ trente mille hommes de leurs troupes, dix mille Espagnols et trente mille Portugais. Le Prince d'Essling a environ cinquante mille hommes ; mais, ayant jugé la position de l'ennemi trop forte, il n'a pas jugé à propos de l'attaquer, et s'est lui-même retranché. Le Prince d'Essling a isolé Abrantès du Tage, et a commencé le siège de cette place, défendue par deux mille hommes de milices Portugaises.

Le Comte d'Erlon, M. le Duc, était le 18 Novembre à Guarda, avec un corps de vingt mille hommes, et il aura vraisemblablement battu tous les corps de milices Portugaises qui interceptaient les communications de l'armée du Prince d'Essling.

Le Prince d'Essling, avec ses forces et dans sa position, ne

craint aucune attaque de la part des Anglais. Il compte garder sa position, et il s'occupe d'organiser ses moyens de subsistances dans la vallée du Tage. Il a fait faire un pont sur le Zezere, couvert par de bonnes têtes de pont, et par des ouvrages avancés considérables. Cette rivière, par sa nature, est le véritable obstacle qui rend difficile une entreprise par Castelbranco; de sorte que si des circonstances imprévues obligeaient le Prince d'Essling à évacuer sa position, il garderait toujours son pont sur le Zezere, ainsi que les ouvrages qui le défendent.

L'Empereur, M. le Duc, me charge de vous faire connaître qu'il est indispensable qu'un corps de dix mille hommes, tiré de l'armée d'Andalousie, et composé d'infanterie, de cavalerie et d'artillerie, se porte, soit sur Montalvao, soit sur les hauteurs de Villa Velha, pour se mettre en communication avec le Prince d'Essling et avec le Général Drouet, et puisse concourir et servir à forcer les Anglais de se rembarquer. Toutes considérations, M. le Duc, doivent disparaître devant le mouvement que je vous prescris. Il importe peu que le quatrième corps occupe beaucoup de terrain. S. M. pense que le siège de Cadix ne peut être disputé par les misérables troupes qui se trouvent enfermées dans cette place.

Par mes lettres des 30 Septembre, 26 Octobre, 14, 21, et 28 Novembre, je vous ai réitéré la volonté de l'Empereur, et S. M. ne doute pas que déjà un corps, tiré de l'armée d'Andalousie, égal à la force de la Romana, ne soit en ce moment sur le Tage, en communication avec le Prince d'Essling; car, je vous le répète, aucune opération en Andalousie ne peut avoir de résultat, si l'armée du Prince d'Essling avait du désavantage, ce qui a été si bien senti par la Romana. S. M. vous ordonne donc, M. le Duc, de faire marcher un corps sur le Tage, pour concourir à l'opération principale, qui est la destruction des Anglais.

Vous trouverez ci-joints plusieurs *Moniteurs*, qui vous feront connaître les nouvelles de Portugal du 12 Novembre, parvenues par la voie de l'Angleterre.

Signé : ALEXANDRE.

*Lettre du Prince Berthier, Major-Général, au Maréchal Masséna,
Prince d'Essling.*

Paris, le 4 Décembre, 1810.

Monsieur le Prince d'Essling, le Général Foy, que vous avez expédié, est arrivé à Paris le 22 Novembre ; il a fait connaître à Sa Majesté, et dans le plus grand détail, ce qui s'est passé et votre position.

Dès le 4 Novembre le Général Gardanne était en avant d'Almeida, avec un corps de six mille hommes. Le Comte d'Erlon, avec les divisions Claparède, Conroux, et la cavalerie du Général Fournier, a dû se trouver à Guarda vers le 20 Novembre.

L'Empereur, Prince, a vu par les journaux Anglais, que vous aviez établi des ponts sur le Tage, et que vous en avez un sur le Zezere, défendu sur les deux rives par de fortes têtes de pont. Sa Majesté pense que vous devez vous retrancher dans la position que vous occupez devant l'ennemi ; qu'Abrantès se trouvant à huit cents toises du Tage, vous l'aurez isolé de son pont, et bloqué pour en faire le siège. L'Empereur vous recommande d'établir deux ponts sur le Zezere ; de défendre ces ponts par des ouvrages considérables, comme ceux de Spitz devant Vienne. Votre ligne d'opérations et de communications devant être établie par la route de Guarda, partant du Zezere, passant par Cardigos, suivant la crête des montagnes par Campinha et Belmonte, vous aurez toujours la route de Castelbranco et Salvateria, pour faire des vivres.

Je viens de donner de nouveau, au Duc de Dalmatie, l'ordre, déjà réitéré plusieurs fois, d'envoyer le cinquième corps sur le Tage, entre Montalvao et Villafior, pour faire sa jonction avec vous. L'Empereur croit qu'il serait nécessaire de s'emparer d'Alcantara, de fortifier et de consolider tous les ponts sur le Zezere et sur le Tage, d'assurer toutes vos communications en saisissant les points favorables que peuvent offrir les localités, pour fortifier de petites positions, des châteaux ou maisons, qui, occupés par peu de troupes, soient à l'abri des incursions des milices.

Vous sentirez, M. le Prince d'Essling, l'avantage de régulariser ainsi la guerre, ce qui vous mettra à même de profiter de la réunion de tous les corps qui vont vous renforcer, pour marcher sur Lord Wellington, et attaquer la gauche de sa position, soit pour

l'obliger à se rembarquer, en marchant sur la rive gauche du Tage ; ou enfin, si tous ces moyens ne réussissaient pas, vous serez en mesure de rester en position pendant les mois de Décembre et de Janvier, en vous occupant d'organiser vos vivres, et de bien établir vos communications avec Madrid et Almeida.

L'armée du centre, qui est à Madrid, ayant des détachements sur Plasencia, vos communications avec cette capitale ne sont pas difficiles.

Deux millions 500 mille francs, destinés à la solde de votre armée, sont déjà à Valladolid ; deux autres millions partent en ce moment de Bayonne ; ainsi votre armée sera dans une bonne situation.

Votre position deviendra très-embarrassante pour les Anglais ; qui, indépendamment d'une consommation énorme d'hommes et d'argent, se trouveront engagés dans une guerre de système, et ayant toujours une immensité de bâtiments à la mer pour leur rembarquement. Il faut donc, Prince, travailler sans cesse à vous fortifier vis-à-vis de la position des ennemis, et pouvoir garder la vôtre avec moins de monde, ce qui rendra une partie de votre armée mobile, et vous mettra à même de faire des incursions dans le pays.

Vous trouverez ci-joints des *Moniteurs* qui donnent des nouvelles de Portugal, parvenues par la voie de l'Angleterre, datées du 12 Novembre.

Signe : ALEXANDRE.

Rapport du Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, au Prince Berthier, Major-Général.

Torres-Novas, le 6 Mars, 1811.

Ainsi que j'ai eu l'honneur de l'annoncer à Votre Altesse, dans une dépêche du 20 Janvier, j'employai les derniers jours de ce mois et les premiers de Février à terminer les préparatifs nécessaires pour mon passage du Tage. Je faisais élever des ouvrages sur les deux rives du confluent du Zezere, pour me préparer une triple tête de pont à Punhête ; et je portais à cent vingt, le nombre de bateaux et pontons, afin de pouvoir établir trois ponts, dont l'un sur le Zczere, et les deux autres sur le Tage au-dessus et au-des-

sous du confluent. Comme l'ennemi avait en quelque sorte barré le débouché du Zezere par les batteries formidables et les retranchements qu'il avait construits en face, je faisais faire cinquante haquets pour transporter une partie de mon équipage de pont au-dessus de Punhète, dans le seul endroit favorable à l'établissement d'un pont. On travaillait en même temps à un chemin à rampe douce au travers de la montagne, pour faciliter le passage des haquets. Mais ces dispositions n'ont pu être tellement cachées à l'ennemi qu'il n'en ait eu bientôt connaissance ; et, dès lors, il a construit vis-à-vis du point choisi pour le nouvel établissement, d'autres ouvrages qu'il a liés à ceux qui se trouvaient déjà vis-à-vis du Zezere. Pendant qu'il bordait d'épaulements la rive du Tage, il couronnait par des retranchements et des batteries les hauteurs peu éloignées dont nous devions nous emparer pour protéger le passage.

Il poussait avec une égale activité ses travaux sur le Rio-Mayor ; il renforçait ses troupes sur la rive gauche du fleuve, et les concentrait en face de Punhète. Il établissait des postes très-rapprochés, et divers signaux de correspondance. Enfin, il travaillait sans relâche à améliorer les communications sur sa ligne. Toute la population qu'il a emmenée des provinces que nous occupons, lui donnait la faculté de pousser tous ces travaux à la fois, avec une grande célérité. Le passage du Tage devenait de jour en jour plus difficile ; il était même jugé très-hasardeux par une partie des officiers généraux de l'armée. J'étais cependant au moment de l'entreprendre, soit au-dessus de Punhète, au moyen des haquets, soit à Santarem, en faisant descendre mon équipage de pont sur le Tage, pour opérer contre le corps de Hill, qui était réuni vis-à-vis de Punhète, soit enfin en me servant de l'un de ces points pour une diversion, et de l'autre pour le véritable établissement. Mais plusieurs reconnaissances faites sur les rives du Tage, et sur ce fleuve même, m'ont fait connaître l'extrême difficulté d'une grande opération sur Santarem ; et les débordements fréquents en face de cette ville la rendaient très-dangereuse.

Monseigneur, les choses étaient dans cet état, lorsque le Général Foy est arrivé le 5 Février, et m'a apporté la dépêche de Votre Altesse, en date du 22 Décembre. D'après son contenu, et d'après ce que m'a dit le Général Foy de la part de Sa Majesté, j'ai compté sur la prompte co-opération du cinquième corps, que vous m'annonciez devoir se porter sur la rive gauche du Tage à

Villafior. Ne recevant aucun ordre direct pour le passage de ce fleuve, et n'apercevant rien qui pût me faire juger qu'il fût commandé par les intentions de Sa Majesté, j'ai jugé convenable de suspendre cette opération, afin de ne pas exposer inutilement l'armée à une attaque de vive force, et à toutes les chances du hasard, lorsque je pouvais espérer d'obtenir les mêmes avantages par l'arrivée du cinquième corps. Le Général Foy ayant dépêché, le 27 Janvier, de Ciudad-Rodrigo, un courrier à M. le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie, pour lui annoncer que l'armée de Portugal était en mesure de passer le Tage, mais que la co-opération de son armée, ordonnée par Sa Majesté, devenait absolument nécessaire, il semblait qu'un fort détachement devait être au moment d'arriver sur le fleuve. Ainsi, j'ai dû attendre que le cinquième corps se présentât à Villafior, qu'il me donnât des renseignements exacts sur les ressources de l'Alentejo, et qu'il nous amenât quelques pièces de gros calibre, qui nous sont très nécessaires, et que je n'ai pu conduire à travers les montagnes du Beira.

Ces espérances ont été vaines. Pendant que les rapports m'assuraient qu'il existait dans le haut Alentejo un corps Français, ni mes reconnaissances fréquentes, ni les espions, ni les mouvements de l'ennemi, rien ne m'a fait connaître que ce corps se soit approché du Tage. On a entendu pendant quelque temps des salves d'artillerie dans la direction de Badajoz ; mais la cessation totale de ce bruit, depuis plus de 20 jours, me prouve que le siège a cessé ou que la place est prise depuis lors ; que par conséquent je n'ai plus de co-opération à attendre, et qu'en résultat, au lieu que l'armée de Portugal ait été secourue par celle du midi, elle a au contraire servi à protéger et couvrir les opérations sur la Guadiana.

J'ai employé le mois de Février à perfectionner et compléter nos moyens de passage et nos travaux. Depuis cette époque comme auparavant, je n'ai cessé de tourmenter l'ennemi par des démonstrations, des reconnaissances fréquentes, des expéditions sur le Tage et dans ses îles, et des opérations contre les rassemblements de paysans qui se formaient vers Pombal, Espinhal, Castelbranco, Pedrogao, etc., dans lesquelles l'avantage nous est toujours resté, et qui procuraient quelques ressources en vivres et en bestiaux aux corps qui en étaient chargés. Nos courses étaient surtout dirigées vers Villafior ou Montalvao, et plus haut sur le Tage, pour avoir des nouvelles du cinquième corps, et nos démon-

strations étaient multipliées sur le fleuve, pour empêcher l'ennemi de faire des détachements sur Badajoz. Enfin, pendant que sur la ligne et sur le Tage nous avons tenu dans des mouvements ou des bivouacs continuels l'armée Anglaise, nos troupes n'ont cessé de battre tout le pays situé entre Castelbranco, Ponte Murcella, les faubourgs de Coïmbre sur la rive gauche du Mondégo, et la mer, par des détachements ou des maraudes organisées. C'est dans une de ces reconnaissances principales sur le Rio-Mayor que M. le Duc d'Abrantès a reçu à la joue une balle, qui lui a fait une blessure peu profonde et dont il est parfaitement guéri. Dans cette petite campagne d'hiver, nos soldats, parfaitement aguerris, n'ont éprouvé d'autres pertes qu'une plus grande consommation d'effets, tandis que l'ennemi, peu accoutumé à tenir campagne, surtout dans cette saison, a ses hôpitaux remplis de malades.

Pendant que nous ne cessons de travailler à Punhète et sur les autres parties de la ligne, l'ennemi n'a pas perdu son temps : il s'est constamment occupé d'augmenter ses défenses. Il a réuni entre Punhète et Chamusca tout le corps de Hill et de Beresford ; et, profitant des ouvrages qu'il a élevés vis-à-vis de Santarem, il a pu faire passer sur la rive gauche du Tage une partie de la division Picton vers Alpiarça et Almeyrim. Toutes ces troupes peuvent se réunir sur le point menacé en peu d'heures, au moyen des signaux. Ainsi l'opération du passage, qui était déjà très difficile par rapport aux rives escarpées du Tage, à la largeur de son lit, à la rapidité de son cours, à ses terribles débordements et à la lenteur des débarquements, est devenue très-hasardeuse, puisqu'il faudrait enlever avec des forces inférieures des retranchements bien garnis de troupes, ou établir le pont sous le feu de l'ennemi, pour attaquer ensuite ses lignes. Veuillez observer aussi, Monseigneur, qu'afin de ne pas compromettre l'armée pendant l'opération, elle doit être placée sur la rive gauche du Zézere. Si le passage du Tage ne réussit pas, en outre des pertes de troupes, de l'effet moral produit sur les soldats des deux puissances, l'armée perd sa ligne d'opérations sur Coïmbre, elle est rejetée de suite sur l'Espagne, et n'ayant pour retraite qu'un pays stérile et affreux, des chemins à travers les rochers, les précipices et les torrents, elle doit perdre une partie de son artillerie ; elle se trouve de plus hors d'état d'emporter les blessés, et réduite à les abandonner, ainsi que les traînards, ses malades, etc. Si l'opération réussit, l'armée aura perdu dans cette affaire une bonne partie

de ses munitions qui sont déjà infiniment réduites ; il lui en coûtera aussi beaucoup pour défendre ses têtes de pont ; et à quoi se réduisent les avantages d'un tel succès, si on ne peut pas se tenir à cheval sur le Tage ? A gagner quelques lieues de pays peu fertile et entièrement dévasté, dans lequel un petit corps de troupes ne trouverait pas des vivres pour quinze jours.

Votre Altesse n'aura pas oublié qu'en m'occupant du passage du Tage, j'avais toujours pensé que les embarras des subsistances rendraient très-difficile l'occupation des deux rives, même avec des têtes de pont. Car un établissement permanent ne peut avoir lieu à Santarem, à cause de l'étendue de la position et de l'abaissement de la rive gauche, qui est si souvent couverte d'eau sur une lieue de largeur ; et, en face de Punhête, le pays où devaient s'établir les ponts, n'offre aucune ressource, même à une grande distance. Outre ces inconvénients, il s'en présentait de très grands dans les dangers de la rupture des ponts par les débordements furieux qui ont eu lieu au printemps, ou par les machines que l'ennemi jetterait dans le Tage à Abrantès, et dans les suites de l'isolement des têtes de pont, où les troupes pourraient être enlevées ou affamées. En effet, trop de faiblesse les exposerait aux tentatives de l'ennemi ; et si les garnisons étaient trop considérables, l'armée, dont la force numérique est déjà moindre de moitié que celle qui lui est opposée, se trouverait coupée en deux et très compromise sur les deux rives. De tels inconvénients s'augmenteraient beaucoup à mesure que le grand corps de l'armée, placé sur la rive gauche du Tage, se verrait forcé à s'étendre pour faire des vivres et à s'éloigner davantage de ses ponts. Bientôt viendrait le moment où on serait forcé de se jeter sur l'une ou l'autre rive ; et, alors, on pourrait trouver les têtes de pont entourées par une contrevallation de l'ennemi, ou bien l'armée se verrait forcée à recevoir bataille avec un fleuve à dos, en voulant se porter sur la rive droite du Tage. La nécessité de se tenir en même temps à cheval sur le Zézere accroît encore ces difficultés ; car, si on n'a pas un débouché sur la rive droite de cette rivière, il faudra en faire le passage devant l'ennemi pour marcher sur Coïmbre ou sur Santarem ; et si on n'occupe pas de têtes sur la rive gauche, on ne peut ni entreprendre des opérations contre Abrantès, ni avoir des communications avec Almeida.

J'ai eu à décider, Monseigneur, une nouvelle question d'après ce que le Général Foy m'a rapporté des intentions de Sa Majesté

pour traîner la guerre en longueur, régulariser son système, tenir cependant l'ennemi toujours en échec. Est-il préférable que l'armée se porte tout entière dans l'Alentejo ou entre Pombal et Coïmbre ?

J'ai pensé qu'en nous jetant dans l'Alentejo, et en mettant entre nous et l'ennemi un fleuve comme le Tage, sans pouvoir conserver notre équipage de pont, qu'il est impossible de transporter faute de chevaux, l'armée combinée ne serait plus en échec ; qu'à l'abri de cette barrière et des retranchements de Sétubal et d'Almada, Lord Wellington mettrait les Anglais dans des cantonnements pour les refaire, et enverrait en même temps quelques détachements Portugais et des milices, afin de contenir le neuvième corps, d'empêcher ses progrès au delà de la frontière, de rassurer et de réorganiser les provinces du nord du Portugal. D'ailleurs la destruction de vivres opérée dernièrement par les Anglais, et l'état malsain de la partie basse de l'Alentejo forceraient bientôt notre armée à remonter vers Portalègre ou à se jeter sur la Guadiana, pays destinés probablement à être occupés un jour ou l'autre par le cinquième corps. L'armée, qui éprouve une multitude de besoins, s'éloignerait encore des ressources que le Général Foy m'annonce avoir été accumulées à Cuidad-Rodrigo et à Almeida, et de ses véritables lignes d'opérations ou de communication ; de nouveau, elle se trouverait pendant longtemps sans correspondance avec la France. Enfin, Monseigneur, les raisons pour lesquelles j'avais fait le projet de passer dans l'Alentejo n'existent plus, puisque l'armée du midi paraît devoir faire le siège des places.

J'ai cru reconnaître, au contraire, tous les avantages et une conformité entière aux intentions de Sa Majesté dans le changement de positions que l'armée va opérer en pivotant sur Pombal pour se mettre en ligne entre la mer et le Zezere. Elle sera en face de l'ennemi, et n'aura plus ni ouvrages ni Tage à surmonter. Elle pourra sans cesse agir contre ses postes, contre ses détachements, contre les points faibles, si toutefois l'ennemi se rapproche de nous ; ce qui n'est pas supposable, à cause de la dévastation du pays, de la difficulté des vivres et du système d'inertie qu'il a adopté. Si les Anglais restaient près de Lisbonne, je continuerais à agir par des détachements sur le Tage et sur le Zezere ; et, au moyen du pont de Pedrogao ou de tout autre que j'établirais, on épuiserait la rive gauche de cette dernière rivière.

Quand l'armée sera un peu organisée, qu'elle aura reçu quelques remplacements et quelques munitions, elle pourra, si Sa Majesté l'ordonne, faire encore quelque pointe en avant. Et si pendant la saison des gués sur le Tage, il entrerait dans les intentions de Sa Majesté de pousser ces pointes au delà du fleuve, l'armée trouverait des ressources pour quelque temps dans l'Alentejo après les récoltes.

J'espère pouvoir faire vivre l'armée cinquante ou soixante jours sur le Mondégo, pour attendre l'organisation des secours en vivres que l'Espagne peut nous faire passer. En plaçant une division du neuvième corps à Trancoso et Guarda, une autre vers Pinhancos sur le Mondégo, et à Viseu, de doubles communications avec la France et l'Espagne seront solidement et régulièrement établies ; ce corps d'armée gardera les débouchés de la tête de la vallée du Zezere, surveillera les partis ennemis qui pourraient menacer l'Elja, et trouvera de quoi vivre pendant quelque temps dans les vallons fertiles de la Cova de Beira. Enfin, si le cinquième corps occupe les frontières de l'Alentejo ou fait les sièges des places, l'ennemi se trouvera inquiété sur les deux rives du Tage, obligé de se diviser ou d'abandonner totalement une des rives ; alors, au moyen d'un corps séparé qu'il serait, dans tous les cas, bien nécessaire d'établir à Alcantara, l'armée du midi et celle du Portugal pourraient concerter leurs mouvements, et celle-ci se trouverait encore en mesure de couvrir et de protéger les opérations de la première.

Monseigneur, je résume les observations que je viens d'avoir l'honneur de présenter à Votre Altesse. Le passage du Tage étant une opération très-hasardeuse dans ce moment ; la coopération du cinquième corps n'ayant pas eu lieu depuis trois mois qu'elle m'est annoncée ; l'occupation des deux rives étant impossible, et la position de l'armée moins offensive au delà du Tage que sur sa rive droite ; la situation de l'Alentejo se trouvant changée par la dévastation des Anglais, et par les opérations de l'armée du midi ; je crois maintenant qu'il est plus conforme à ce que le Général Foy m'a rapporté des intentions et de la politique de Sa Majesté, et aux intérêts de l'armée, de marcher sur Pombal, d'y prendre position, et de maintenir les troupes le plus longtemps possible sur les rives du Mondégo. C'est le parti que je vais prendre, car il est impossible d'attendre plus longtemps dans nos positions. L'armée a tenu autant qu'il était physiquement

possible de tenir ; elle a vécu pendant près de six mois, à force d'industrie, de soins et de privations, dans un pays où l'on ne croyait pas qu'elle pût vivre quinze jours, et sur lequel l'ennemi avait organisé la dévastation que la rapidité de nos marches n'a pas permis de porter à son comble. Maintenant le pays où nous sommes, et celui qui l'entoure à cinq ou six marches, sont totalement épuisés. Le peu d'habitants qui reste, est réduit à vivre de racines, de glands et d'herbages. Les corvées ne trouvent plus à de grandes distances le maïs qui fait depuis longtemps la nourriture de l'officier comme du soldat. La viande est épuisée, la paille entièrement consommée, et les chevaux sont au vert depuis plus d'un mois, dans cette saison où l'herbe est extrêmement courte ; aussi en perd-on tous les jours un certain nombre dans l'artillerie et la cavalerie. L'habillement est en mauvais état, et il est devenu si difficile de réparer ou remplacer les souliers, que beaucoup de soldats ont des chaussures faites avec des peaux fraîches. Les cartouches et la réserve de biscuits se détériorent journellement par le mauvais temps. Les munitions sont en petite quantité. Les voitures d'artillerie ont souffert des réductions considérables par les consommations journalières. Il a fallu les augmenter encore à cause des pertes de chevaux. Les transports, qui étaient déjà en petite quantité, ont dû être encore excessivement réduits par les diverses consommations, et par les secours qu'ils ont prêtés à l'artillerie. Enfin, tout s'use en raison du service, des corvées et de la fatigue continuelle, et tout est bien difficile à réparer ou à remplacer. Je ne dois pas laisser ignorer à Sa Majesté que dans cet état de réduction et d'appauvrissement des armes et moyens accessoires de l'armée, j'ai cru devoir éviter tout ce qui pourrait tendre à compromettre la conservation d'aussi bonnes troupes.

Je dois de grands éloges à toute l'armée, pour sa persévérance et pour l'extrême dévouement qu'elle a montré. Les pluies qui sont tombées pendant les derniers mois ont augmenté ses souffrances, et je n'aurais pas exigé d'elle autant de sacrifices, si je n'avais pressenti, en quelque sorte, les intentions de Sa Majesté, et jugé que cette campagne n'ayant pu être terminée par un coup d'éclat, devait être une lutte de ténacité contre l'armée Anglaise et contre le Portugal entier, surtout dans la crise politique où se trouvait l'Angleterre. Mon équipage de pont et les travaux de Punhète n'ont pas peu favorisé mes dispositions. Ils m'ont valu

un nouveau corps d'armée, en tenant devant eux un détachement considérable de l'ennemi, et m'ont mis à même de couvrir de mes troupes une partie du Beira et de l'Estramadure, et d'en retirer les subsistances que nous avons consommées sur le Tage. J'ai tenu par là le corps du Général Hill et du Maréchal Beresford sur une défensive perpétuelle, en les obligeant à de continuels mouvements par les moindres démonstrations ; et ces démonstrations ont puissamment secondé les opérations de l'armée de M. le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie, puisqu'elles ont retenu constamment l'ennemi sur le Tage.

Le 6 Mars, l'armée exécutera son mouvement pour changer de positions. Les équipages, bagages et réserves d'artillerie seront dirigés d'avance sur les points où doivent se rendre les corps d'armée. Les deuxième et huitième corps prendront position le lendemain sur les hauteurs de Golgaô et Torres-Novas. L'artillerie faisant des dispositions démonstratives de passage à Punhête, et des préparatifs pour jeter comme pour détruire le pont, l'ennemi restera pendant deux jours dans l'incertitude sur le véritable objet du mouvement jusqu'à la destruction de l'équipage de pont. Leyria est le pivot de la conversion et le centre de résistance. J'y réunirai, sous le commandement de M. le Maréchal Duc d'Elchingen, la première division du neuvième corps, deux divisions du sixième, et la cavalerie de l'armée. Le troisième jour, avant que l'ennemi ait pu démêler mes intentions, l'armée se trouvera en ligne de Leyria à Thomar, et se mettra en marche : le deuxième corps, de Thomar vers Espinhal ; la troisième division du sixième corps, de Chaô de Maçans sur Anciaô ; le huitième corps, du même village sur Pombal et Redinha ; les sixième et neuvième corps formeront l'arrière-garde, de Leyria sur Pombal. L'armée s'arrêtera dans ses nouvelles positions, s'occupera du passage du Mondégo, et le neuvième corps marchera sur Celorico. D'après ces dispositions, l'ennemi ne peut rien entreprendre contre les diverses colonnes de l'armée, et il reste dans l'indécision jusqu'au moment où le changement de position est terminé. Cijoint un croquis et copie des instructions pour ce mouvement.

J'attendrai dans ces nouvelles positions les ordres de Sa Majesté, pour savoir si je dois me borner à inquiéter l'ennemi, en faisant vivre l'armée le plus longtemps possible entre le Mondégo et le Douro, ou si je dois porter la guerre au delà de ce dernier fleuve, opération assez difficile par la nature de ces pays mon-

tagneux. Il serait peut-être préférable, lorsque le pays entre le Douro et le Mondégo sera épuisé, de revenir sur le Tage, vers le Beira bas et le haut Alentejo, en occupant Alcantara, de profiter de son pont de pierre et de quelques autres qu'on pourrait établir plus bas avec des bateaux, pour se tenir à cheval sur le fleuve, maîtriser son cours, menacer l'ennemi sur ses deux rives, parcourir et manger celle de ces deux provinces qui serait moins gardée. Alors, au moyen de quelques vivres qu'on tirerait de l'Espagne, on pourrait régulariser cette guerre, et réorganiser l'armée, dont l'esprit a un peu souffert dans les maraudes et les corvées auxquelles elle a été réduite pour pouvoir subsister.

Monseigneur, je dois encore observer à Votre Altesse que pendant mon séjour sur les bords du Tage, je n'ai pu entreprendre rien de sérieux contre Abrantès, et que j'ai dû me borner à bloquer cette place ou plutôt à resserrer ses postes, et à empêcher ses communications avec les pays de la rive droit du Tage. Sa garnison a toujours été cinq régiments, dont deux de ligne et trois de milices. Son armement était considérable, et on le portait à cent pièces. Mais quel qu'en soit le nombre, je n'avais ni canons ni munitions pour diriger la moindre attaque contre cette place, car je n'ai pu conduire avec moi que du huit, à travers les montagnes du Beira. J'attendais, pour attaquer Abrantès, d'être maître des deux rives du Tage, pour pouvoir bloquer régulièrement cette place, et d'avoir reçu par l'Alentejo quelques pièces capables d'ouvrir ses murailles. Il est bon d'observer d'ailleurs qu'Abrantès est loin d'être un poste aussi important qu'on le dit, à cause de la distance où il se trouve du Tage, de son éloignement du Zezere, et des deux routes de Castelbranco et Guarda. Le pont de bateaux a été replié sur la rive gauche depuis notre arrivée.

Je vois s'approcher avec beaucoup de satisfaction, Monseigneur, le moment où il me sera permis de reprendre avec Votre Altesse une correspondance réglée. L'éloignement dans lequel je me suis trouvé, les difficultés du pays qui était derrière moi, l'insurrection des paysans organisés au loin, l'inconvénient d'affaiblir par des détachements trop fréquents une armée déjà faible en raison de celle qui lui est opposée, des opérations qu'elle devait entreprendre, et des corvées qu'elle envoyait journellement pour les vivres : telles sont les raisons qui m'avaient porté à préférer la voie des émissaires secrets, pour donner des nouvelles de la position de l'armée ; mais

il paraît que sur un grand nombre que j'ai expédiés, il en est arrivé bien peu à Almeida et Ciudad-Rodrigo.

Monseigneur, je ne finirai pas sans prier Votre Altesse d'observer que l'armée du Portugal manque de chevaux d'artillerie, de transports, d'habillements et de chaussures, et qu'elle a besoin d'être recrutée; enfin qu'il serait utile qu'elle fût placée pendant quelque temps dans un pays où l'on pût réunir les divisions pour y rétablir l'ordre et la discipline que les circonstances ont dû nécessairement affaiblir. M. le Général Foy entrera avec Votre Altesse dans beaucoup de détails que je ne peux écrire. Ma tâche a été et est difficile. Mon dévouement absolu au service de Sa Majesté m'a fait surmonter bien des obstacles.

J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-joints différents états qui indiqueront à Votre Altesse la situation de l'armée du Portugal.

J'attendrai avec impatience des instructions que je prie Votre Altesse de m'adresser bientôt, puisque, comme je l'ai dit, nous ne pourrons vivre que cinquante jours dans nos nouvelles positions, à partir du jour où le mouvement commencera à se faire, et puisqu'il importe qu'avant l'expiration de ce terme, je connaisse les ordres de Sa Majesté, afin que je puisse m'occuper en temps utile des moyens d'exécution qui exigent des dispositions préparatoires.

Je suis avec un respectueux dévouement, etc.

Signé : MASSE'NA.

P.S. Le Général Foy devait me quitter le 7. Je l'ai retenu jusqu'au 8.—Il a été témoin de la partie la plus difficile du mouvement. Tout s'est passé pour le mieux, ainsi qu'il en rendra compte à Votre Altesse.

Chão-Maçans, le 8 Mars, 1811.

Signé : MASSE'NA.

Lettre du Prince Berthier, Major-Général, au Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling.

Paris, le 29 Mars, 1811.

Mon cher Prince d'Essling, je vous écris particulièrement : l'Empereur aurait désiré que la campagne de Portugal eût mieux tourné. Vous avez mis trop d'audace à attaquer la position de

Busaco, qui était défendue par de bonnes troupes. Si vous aviez réussi, il est à croire que les Anglais eussent été culbutés dans leurs lignes, sans avoir le temps de s'y défendre; mais la force de la position de l'ennemi vous ayant fait perdre la bataille, l'Empereur, dans une pareille position, se serait arrêté à Coïmbre, s'y serait fortifié, y aurait fait des magasins, aurait remonté le moral des troupes, qui diminue toujours après un non-succès.

Votre tâche était difficile. Elle le sera encore; mais aussi il y a plus de gloire pour vous. C'est dans votre situation actuelle qu'il est très-important de déployer une grande énergie. Des affaires continuelles avec les Anglais les affaiblissent, les tiennent en alarme, et surtout les empêchent de faire des détachements dans l'Andalousie. Nous pensons que Badajoz est pris. L'intention bien formelle de l'Empereur est, au mois de Septembre, après la récolte, de combiner un mouvement avec l'armée du midi, un corps de l'armée du centre et votre armée, pour culbuter les Anglais; et c'est jusqu'à cette époque que vous devez agir de manière à ce qu'aucun corps ennemi ne puisse tenir la campagne, soit pour se porter en Andalousie, soit pour s'éloigner de plus d'une marche ou deux de Lisbonne. Nous sommes parfaitement instruits par les Anglais, et beaucoup mieux que vous ne l'êtes. L'Empereur lit les journaux de Londres, et chaque jour un grand nombre de lettres de l'opposition, dont quelques-unes accusent Lord Wellington et parlent en détail de vos opérations. L'Angleterre tremble pour son armée d'Espagne, et Lord Wellington a toujours été en grande crainte de vos opérations. La gloire de la France, la vôtre, mon cher Prince, sont dans vos mains. Si l'issue d'une grande bataille donnée sagement nous était contraire, ce qui ne paraît pas probable, en faisant de bonnes reconnaissances et en attaquant dans les règles, le résultat d'un grand nombre d'hommes tués à l'ennemi serait énorme pour l'Angleterre, et équivaldrait pour elle à une défaite. Car, certes, après une grande bataille dont le succès ne serait pas tout entier à notre avantage, les Anglais auraient un tiers de leur monde tué ou blessé. Je vous dis cela, mon cher Prince, pour vous faire sentir combien les Anglais tiennent à la conservation de leur armée. Je vous écrirai tous les jours. Quand je vous envoie quelques-uns de mes aides-de-camp, gardez-les un mois près de vous; faites-leur faire la guerre. C'est me rendre service que de les tenir en haleine et de les garder à votre école.

Dans quelques jours, il vous sera envoyé un million en petites traites, pour donner aux officiers la facilité de faire passer de l'argent en France.

Signé : ALEXANDRE.

Rapport du Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, au Prince Berthier, Major-Général.

Maccira, le 19 Mars, 1811.

Monseigneur,

Dans les dépêches dont était porteur le Général Foy, j'ai eu l'honneur de rendre compte dernièrement à Votre Altesse du changement de position auquel je me trouvais forcé par l'épuisement du pays que j'occupais, par le manque total des vivres et des fourrages, et par les réductions considérables que l'armée avait souffertes dans ses moyens et armements accessoires. J'avais fait pour ce mouvement des dispositions telles qu'il s'est exécuté fort tranquillement pendant les premières journées en présence de l'ennemi, que j'ai tenu dans une entière incertitude sur le but de mes opérations. L'armée s'est trouvée réunie à Pombal, Anciao et Espinhal ; mais l'ennemi, qui avait un trajet bien moins considérable à parcourir pour se porter sur notre ligne d'opérations, à cause du détour auquel nous obligeait la chaîne des montagnes d'Ourem, a pu nous présenter des forces supérieures, le 10 Mars, devant Pombal, où se trouvait le sixième corps formant notre arrière-garde. Il a attaqué les troupes légères placées en avant, les a repoussées et a pénétré dans le milieu de la ville. La première brigade de la première division chassa bientôt les Anglais à la baïonnette et en tua un grand nombre dans les rues ou dans les maisons ; ils furent poussés dans un grand désordre, et laissèrent la ville pleine de morts ou de blessés, qui ont été brûlés par l'incendie qui s'est manifesté peu après. L'arrière-garde est restée devant Pombal, et l'armée se trouvait sur Redinha. Déjà, pendant cette journée, la majeure partie de l'armée combinée était devant nous, et Lord Wellington s'y trouvait en personne. Le deuxième corps et la division Loison n'avaient à leur suite que quelques régiments ennemis.

Le 11 Mars, l'arrière-garde a pris position sur les hauteurs en avant de Redinha. L'ennemi a déployé dans l'après-midi vingt-

cinq mille Anglais sous le feu de notre artillerie, qui n'a cessé de tirer sur leurs masses avec le plus grand avantage, sans être contre-battue, Lord Wellington n'ayant montré de l'artillerie qu'après avoir terminé son déploiement. Alors, il a fait marcher une forte colonne vers la gauche par la vallée de Redinha. Aussitôt que la tête de cette infanterie s'est mise à tirer, elle a été chargée et culbutée à la baïonnette; l'officier Anglais qui la commandait a été tué. Le Colonel Laferrière a été blessé en chargeant à la tête du troisième régiment de hussards. Lord Wellington continuait à faire filer des troupes sur la montagne à gauche de la ville; l'arrière-garde, qui avait contenu l'ennemi au delà de toute espérance et lui avait fait éprouver une perte considérable, s'est retirée, dans le plus grand ordre et sans être poursuivie, sur le revers de la vallée où elle a pris position. L'armée s'est trouvée en partie échelonnée entre Redinha et Condeixa; le reste était en position en avant de ce dernier village: le deuxième corps occupait Espinhal et Corvo. La colonne du Général Cole, qui avait suivi jusqu'à ce moment le Général Regnier, était venue rejoindre Lord Wellington: celui-ci avait dans cette journée cinq divisions Anglaises avec lui et les troupes Portugaises montant ensemble à cinquante ou soixante mille hommes, sans compter les milices qui se trouvaient sur la rive droite du Mondégo et les paysans armés. D'après les rapports, le Général Hill se portait avec sa division et un gros détachement de Portugais à travers les montagnes du haut Zézere, se dirigeant sur la rive gauche du Mondégo. Dès ce moment, j'ai abandonné l'espoir de garder cette rive sans risquer une bataille, et j'ai tourné toutes mes attentions sur la rive droite de ce fleuve et sur l'Alva. D'ailleurs l'ennemi a exécuté dans ce malheureux pays son système de dévastation avec une telle rigueur qu'on n'y trouvait plus un grain de maïs.

J'avais envoyé le Général Montbrun avec une partie de sa cavalerie et le Colonel du Génie Valazé, pour reconnaître l'état du Mondégo et les dispositions de l'ennemi devant Coïmbre. Ils me firent le rapport que ce fleuve était prodigieusement enflé par la pluie qui ne cessait de tomber depuis notre départ; que le pont de Coïmbre avait deux arches ruinées et quelques-unes minées; enfin, que la rive droite était garnie par les troupes de Trant et de Silveyra, et défendue par du canon. Il fallait plusieurs jours pour raccommoder le pont du Mondégo, et une attaque de vive force

pour emporter Coïmbre ; les bateaux me manquaient pour effectuer un passage, parce que je ne pouvais amener aucun équipage de pontons, et que l'ennemi avait détruit tous les bateaux qui se trouvaient sur le Mondégo. A ces difficultés se joignaient la voisinage de l'armée combinée et la certitude d'être attaqué pendant qu'une partie de nos troupes serait employée à ce passage. J'ai dû alors renoncer à une opération devenue si difficile, et pendant quelques moments j'ai voulu arrêter l'ennemi par une bataille dans les belles positions de Condeixa. Mais mon entier dévouement pour Sa Majesté et la considération des intérêts de l'armée m'ont détourné de ce projet, et m'ont déterminé à bien peser les raisons majeures que devaient m'y faire renoncer. Voici, Monseigneur, les raisons qui me paraissent propres à convaincre entièrement Votre Altesse : la force de l'armée qui se trouve réduite à près de la moitié de celle qui m'est opposée ; le départ de la division Conroux du neuvième corps ; l'épuisement de l'armée par de longues privations et la réduction de ses vivres ; la quantité considérable de malades, d'équipages, bagages, dont une partie est traînée par des bœufs ; le peu de munitions qui nous restent ; l'état de l'artillerie dont les attelages sont excessivement réduits et dans le plus mauvais état ; enfin, le désir que les chefs ont manifesté depuis longtemps de quitter le Portugal et de rentrer en France, et qui ne contribue pas peu au défaut d'harmonie qui devrait régner à l'armée. A ces considérations se réunissaient encore l'éloignement de nos moyens, que nous ne pouvions trouver que dans nos places, tandis que l'ennemi avait ses derrières assurés par Peniche et par les lignes, et les dangers de perdre l'artillerie, les équipages, les traînards, les blessés, etc., si l'armée était repoussée ; car nous sommes au milieu de toute une population armée contre nous et exaspérée par les pertes que lui ont fait éprouver la disette dans laquelle nous nous trouvons, et la nature de cette guerre. Ces puissantes raisons, dont j'avais eu l'honneur de présenter une partie à Votre Altesse dans ma dépêche précédente, m'ont déterminé alors et depuis à éviter soigneusement toute affaire générale, qui d'ailleurs ne pourrait avoir aucune suite avantageuse pour nous, puisque nous nous trouvons forcés d'abandonner un pays entièrement dévasté, et où il est impossible de vivre. Je me suis décidé à ne combattre qu'autant qu'il le fallait pour l'honneur et pour la sûreté de l'armée, en disputant le terrain pas à pas à l'ennemi. Ainsi, j'ai dû renoncer au passage du Mondégo, et j'ai dû me

déterminer à rapprocher peu à peu l'armée de la frontière, où elle doit se ravitailler de tout ce qui lui manque.

Lord Wellington manœuvrant le 12 sur la gauche de Condeixa vers Fonte-Cuberta où était la division Loison, j'ai renforcé ce poste, qui couvrait tous nos mouvements, avec la division Clausel, et je m'y suis porté. Pendant ce temps, l'ennemi ayant montré quelques troupes sur les flancs de l'arrière-garde, M. le Maréchal Duc d'Elchingen, qui la commandait, abandonna la position de Condeixa plutôt que je ne le croyais, et se porta au delà de la division Loison. Le poste de Fonte-Cuberta était découvert, et l'artillerie qui s'y trouvait compromise; j'ai gagné avec elle la grande route par une marche de flanc à portée de canon de la ligne ennemie et par un beau clair de lune. Les deux armées n'ont exécuté que de grandes manœuvres dans cette journée, il n'y a pas eu un coup de fusil de tiré.

L'armée était réunie en avant de Miranda de Corvo, et l'arrière-garde se trouvait à Lamas: elle a été attaquée dans l'après-midi par l'armée Anglaise, qui continuait ses mêmes manœuvres sur les flancs. Après avoir défendu vivement sa position par de grands feux d'artillerie et de mousqueterie, l'arrière-garde est venue se placer en avant de Miranda de Corvo, et l'armée, par une marche de nuit, s'est portée sur Foz d'Arunce où elle a pris position sur les hauteurs de la rive droite de la Ceira. Le deuxième corps, qui se trouvait la veille à Corvo, tenait la tête de la colonne, et s'est établi à la gauche de la nouvelle position; le huitième à la droite; le sixième et l'arrière-garde devaient occuper le centre. Pendant ce temps, nos équipages et nos malades ne cessaient de filer, et rien absolument n'est resté en arrière. Cependant une partie de ces équipages et même quelques voitures d'artillerie étaient traînées par des bœufs, et les malades ou blessés portés sur des ânes. Dans l'attaque de Lamas, mon aide-de-camp, le chef d'escadron Marcelin Marbot, a été blessé de plusieurs coups de sabre.

La position sur la rive droite de la Ceira était forte et respectable; mais une partie du sixième corps était restée sur la rive gauche. Le 15 de ce mois au soir, elle a été attaquée vivement par plusieurs colonnes d'infanterie Anglaise, tandis que d'autres colonnes manœuvraient selon leur coutume sur nos flancs. Le village de Foz d'Arunce a été pris et repris. L'infanterie de l'armée combinée a encore beaucoup souffert du feu de toute

l'artillerie de la rive droite qui la dominait et la foudroyait, tandis que cinq pièces que l'ennemi a montrées, étaient tenues hors de portée par la domination de nos batteries. Le Colonel Lamour a été tué à la tête du trente-neuvième régiment, ce qui a occasionné quelque confusion dans nos troupes ; mais elles ont été réunies par une vigoureuse charge du soixante-neuvième régiment, et par quelques compagnies de voltigeurs qui s'étaient lancées sur l'extrême droite. Les Anglais qui attaquaient le village ont été mis dans le plus grand désordre, et ce désordre s'est communiqué sur toute la ligne ennemie. Dans ce combat très-opiniâtre, où nos troupes ont lutté contre un ennemi supérieur et contre les défauts de leur position sur la rive gauche, notre perte ne s'élève pas à deux cents hommes ; celle de l'ennemi, qui a eu un officier général de tué, est infiniment plus forte. On a remarqué le même avantage dans tous les combats où les Anglais ont presque toujours reçu un feu supérieur et où ils ont été vivement attaqués à la baïonnette.

Cependant le pont de Murcella, où se trouvait la seule communication de l'armée, était détruit, et il fallait plusieurs jours de travaux pour le raccommoder ; le neuvième corps, qui avait quitté l'armée à Pombal, le 16, faisait rétablir ce pont. Je l'ai fait terminer, et il l'a été totalement dans la journée du 19. Pour contenir l'ennemi, les deuxième et huitième corps avaient été mis en position sur les hauteurs de la rive gauche de l'Alva, tandis que le sixième corps était échelonné entre cette position et la Ceira dont le pont avait été complètement ruiné ; la division Marchand formait la tête vers l'ennemi, sur la belle position de la Ceira, et conservait au milieu des bois la ligne des feux de l'armée. L'ennemi est resté toute la journée en position, et n'a pas fait vers le soir son attaque ordinaire. Les bagages et l'artillerie, dont une partie avait filé à travers les gués de l'Alva, sont passés en totalité au delà de cette rivière, et, le 17, l'armée se trouva réunie dans les positions de la rive droite de l'Alva, avec une avant-garde sur les hauteurs de la rive gauche. L'ennemi a dégarni sa ligne au milieu de la nuit, et a fait un mouvement sur un de nos flancs ; mes reconnaissances n'ont pu m'indiquer encore le point sur lequel il s'est porté : elles ne peuvent s'étendre un peu loin qu'en très-grande force, parce que tous les habitants sans exception sont sous les armes, ainsi que j'ai eu l'honneur de le dire déjà à Votre Altesse. Je pense que l'ennemi a fait un détachement sur la rive

droite du Mondégo, afin de nous en disputer le passage, attendu que les eaux de cette rivière sont écoulées en partie par le retour du beau temps, et que d'ailleurs, dans ces pays élevés, elle a beaucoup moins d'eau que vers Coïmbre.

Je crois que, dans l'état actuel des choses, et d'après les mouvements que l'ennemi peut faire sur mes flancs, par le Mondégo ou par les montagnes de Guarda, où s'est dirigé le corps du Général Hill, il est nécessaire pour les intérêts de Sa Majesté de rapprocher encore l'armée de notre base d'opération sur nos places, afin de la remettre un peu de ses fatigues et de ses longues privations, de la réorganiser et de pourvoir au remplacement de tant d'objets qui lui manquent totalement. Il me paraît d'ailleurs impossible de faire vivre nos troupes dans des pays resserrés et montagneux qui ont été épuisés par les deux armées, et dernièrement ravagés avec la plus grande barbarie par les Anglais, qui punissaient tous ceux qui conservaient quelques grains, et n'abandonnaient pas leurs foyers à notre approche. Nous trouvons tout détruit : usines, moulins, maisons, et beaucoup de villages brûlés. Ci-joint une des dernières proclamations de l'ennemi à ce sujet. Je marcherai le plus lentement possible ; je disputerai encore à l'ennemi le terrain pas à pas, en évitant cependant, autant que possible, ces combats qui nous coûtent des braves, mais dans lesquels la perte est toujours du côté de l'ennemi par le nombre réel, et surtout par le rapport des forces des deux puissances. Aussitôt que j'aurai trouvé une position convenable à portée de ces places, je l'occuperai et j'y attendrai, s'il le faut, l'armée combinée ; j'y attendrai également les ordres que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous demander par ma dépêche du 6 de ce mois.

Notre mouvement de retraite s'est fait avec le plus grand ordre ; nous n'avons pas laissé en arrière un malade, un blessé, ni la moindre voiture d'artillerie ou de bagages ; l'ennemi a été repoussé toutes les fois qu'il a attaqué, et toujours avec perte. Enfin, depuis que l'armée a été réunie à Pombal, elle n'a fait que deux lieues par jour, et n'a jamais été poussée par les Anglais.

Je m'estimerai très-heureux, Monseigneur, qu'après avoir mis en usage tout le dévouement dont je suis capable, je puisse apprendre que Sa Majesté est bien persuadée qu'aucun genre d'efforts n'est ménagé de ma part pour répondre à la confiance dont elle a daigné m'honorer. J'ai déjà rendu compte à Votre Altesse que MM. les officiers généraux montraient le plus grand zèle pour le

bien du service. Comme j'ai lieu de remarquer plus particulièrement celui du Général de Division Fririon, que ses fonctions de chef d'état-major tiennent en rapport continuels avec moi, je lui dois la justice de vous témoigner aussi, Monseigneur, que, par son habileté, ses talents et son activité, il a acquis de nouveaux droits aux bontés de Sa Majesté dans le cours de cette campagne.

J'aurai l'honneur de vous présenter bientôt un rapport plus détaillé des opérations et de l'état de l'armée. Je n'avais pas pu trouver encore un moment pour présenter à Votre Altesse ce rapport sommaire.

Je suis avec un respectueux dévouement, etc.

Signé : MASSE'NA.

Lettre du Maréchal Ney, Duc d'Elchingen, au Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling.

Cortizo, le 22 Mars, 1811, à quatre heures après midi.

Prince,

Je reçois à l'instant la lettre que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire en date de ce jour, par laquelle elle me fait part du plan qu'elle a arrêté de diriger l'armée de Portugal sur Coria et Plasencia. Quoique ce matin je ne connusse qu'indirectement ses intentions à cet égard, je suis entré en matière contre cette manœuvre dans la lettre que je lui ai adressée il y a quelques heures : actuellement qu'elles me sont connues d'une manière positive, je proteste formellement contre, et je déclare à Votre Excellence qu'à moins que l'Empereur lui ait fait parvenir de nouvelles instructions relatives à un mouvement à opérer vers le Tage, ce que je ne puis croire dans les circonstances actuelles, le sixième corps n'exécutera point celui dont elle me parle dans sa lettre de ce jour. L'armée a besoin de se reposer en arrière des places d'Almeida et de Ciudad-Rodrigo, de faire arriver ses effets d'habillement, et de chaussure, dont elle manque absolument, et qui se trouvent entassés dans les magasins de Valladolid. Il faut que Votre Excellence se désabuse si elle pense trouver des vivres en abondance à Coria et à Plasencia. J'ai parcouru ce pays, et rien n'approche de sa stérilité ni du mauvais état de ses communications. Votre Excellence ne conduira jamais une pièce de canon jusque-là, avec les attelages que nous venons de ramener de Portugal. D'ailleurs cette manœuvre, si singulière dans ce moment,

découvrirait entièrement la vieille Castille, et pourrait, ainsi que je l'ai dit ce matin à Votre Excellence, compromettre toutes nos opérations en Espagne. Je sais qu'en m'opposant aussi formellement à vos intentions, je me charge d'une grande responsabilité ; mais dussé-je être destitué ou y perdre ma tête, je ne suivrai pas le mouvement dont Votre Excellence me parle sur Coria et Plasencia, à moins, je le répète, qu'il ne soit ordonné par l'Empereur.

Recevez, Prince, l'assurance de ma haute considération, etc.

Signé : Maréchal Duc D'ELCHINGEN.

Lettre du Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, au Prince Berthier, Major-Général.

Celorico, le 22 Mars, 1811, à onze heures du soir.

Monseigneur,

Je me suis vu réduit à une extrémité que j'ai constamment cherché à éviter. Monsieur le Maréchal Duc d'Elchingen a mis le comble à ses désobéissances, ainsi que Votre Altesse le verra par la copie des lettres ci-jointes. Comme elles pouvaient avoir des suites fâcheuses pour la sûreté des armées de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, j'ai ordonné aux généraux de division de son corps d'armée de ne plus obéir qu'à mes ordres directs, et j'ai donné le commandement du sixième corps à M. le Comte Loison, comme au plus ancien général de division.

Monseigneur, il est bien douloureux pour un vieux militaire qui commande les armées depuis longtemps, et qui a été honoré de la confiance de Sa Majesté, d'en venir à une telle extrémité vis-à-vis de l'un de ses camarades. M. le Maréchal Duc d'Elchingen, depuis mon arrivée à l'armée, n'a cessé de me contrarier dans mes opérations militaires. J'y ai peut-être mis trop de patience ; mais j'étais loin de m'attendre qu'il en abuserait au point de porter le scandale aussi loin. Le caractère du Duc d'Elchingen est connu : je n'en dirai pas davantage. Je lui ai ordonné de se rendre en Espagne, et d'y attendre les ordres de Sa Majesté. Mon premier aide-de-camp, qui aura l'honneur de vous remettre la présente, entrera avec vous dans de plus grands détails, et il rendra compte à Votre Altesse des mouvements rétrogrades et de la position de l'armée. Je compte aller prendre position entre Guarda, Belmonte

et Alfayatès. L'armée n'a pas perdu une seule pièce de canon, ni un seul bagage. Certes, ce n'est pas par les Anglais, mais par la disette que l'armée a été forcée à se retirer dans les positions actuelles, qu'elle ne sera forcée de quitter que par les mêmes raisons.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec un respectueux dévouement, etc.

Signé: MASSE'NA.

Lettre du Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, au Prince Berthier, Major-Général.

Alfayatès, le 31 Mars, 1811.

Monseigneur,

Dans ma dernière lettre, je disais à Votre Altesse que je ferais reconnaître Coria, Plasencia et Alcantara, pour m'assurer si le pays offrait quelques ressources et pouvait nourrir l'armée. Je n'ai pas eu le temps de recueillir ces renseignements. L'ennemi ayant fait des mouvements sur Guarda, l'armée a pris position à Sabugal, Alfayatès, Ponte de Sequeiros et Rapula de la Coa. La réserve de cavalerie est placée aux environs d'Alfayatès.

Monseigneur, je vous dois la vérité : l'armée a besoin de quelques mois de repos ; les officiers généraux et autres en ont parlé trop souvent aux soldats, et cette opinion est prédominante à l'armée. Je tiendrai tant que je pourrai mes nouvelles positions. Il est vrai de dire qu'elles offrent bien peu de ressources ; mais on pourrait y tenir quelques jours, si je ne suis pas contrarié comme je l'ai été jusqu'à présent. Il suffit que l'ennemi montre quelques têtes de colonne, pour intimider les officiers, et leur faire dire hautement que c'est toute l'armée de Wellington qui se présente. Il faut quelque temps à l'armée de Portugal pour se refaire, et pour profiter des effets d'habillement appartenant aux corps, et qui sont à Valladolid et à Salamanque. Je crois que quand l'armée aura pris du repos, et qu'elle se sera un peu habillée, Sa Majesté pourra la faire agir.

Il y a vingt-sept jours aujourd'hui que nous sommes en marche : tout est usé, et on a besoin de beaucoup de choses. Comme je l'ai déjà dit à Votre Altesse, nous n'avons perdu ni artillerie, ni caissons ; et nos chevaux sont obsolument exténués. Les équipages militaires n'existent plus ; nous n'avons donc aucun transport.

Tout le matériel des équipages militaires et de l'artillerie est à recréer.

J'ai prescrit au Général Comte d'Erlon de se placer, avec ses deux divisions, à Val de la Mula, Aldea de l'Obispo et environs, pour protéger l'évacuation d'Almeida, et pour se porter, au besoin, au secours des deux places, si l'ennemi les menaçait. Si je suis obligé de passer l'Agueda, j'échelonnerai l'armée entre San Felices de Chico, Ledesma, Zamora, Toro et environs, de manière à pouvoir la réunir en peu de temps, pour marcher, s'il le fallait, sur Almeida ou Ciudad-Rodrigo.

Je ne crois pas que l'ennemi puisse tenter rien de sérieux contre ces deux places, les ponts sur la Coa étant détruits et les abords de la première étant difficiles. Si je passe l'Agueda, que Votre Altesse soit bien convaincue que je n'ai pas laissé de développer la plus grande résistance, et que ce n'a été qu'à la dernière extrémité que ce mouvement aura été exécuté. Le désir que l'armée a manifesté depuis longtemps d'aller se reposer, ne me laisse aucun doute qu'il serait dangereux d'attendre l'ennemi pour recevoir bataille ou pour la lui donner. Les troupes sont bonnes, mais elles ont besoin de repos. Les maraudes, quoique organisées, et qu'on a été obligé d'y permettre, n'ont pas peu contribué à atténuer la discipline, qui a le plus grand besoin d'être rétablie.

J'aurai soin de rendre compte à Votre Altesse, tous les deux jours, de ce qui se sera passé.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec un respectueux dévouement, etc.

Signé : MASSE'NA.

Lettre du Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, au Prince Berthier, Major-Général.

Salamanque, le 17 Avril, 1811.

Monseigneur,

Dans ma dernière dépêche, j'ai eu l'honneur de mettre sous les yeux de Votre Altesse les motifs qui avaient fait rentrer en Espagne l'armée dont Sa Majesté m'a confié le commandement. Je vous ai fait connaître les positions qu'elle avait occupées depuis lors ; que, pour couvrir les deux places, une division du sixième corps était placée à Ciudad-Rodrigo, communiquant avec Salamanque par une autre division échelonnée sur la route, et que le

neuvième corps était placé à San Felicès el Grande et Vitigudino, où il était appuyé par le deuxième, occupant Ledesma. La même dépêche vous a informé, en outre, que le huitième corps était à Toro et la réserve de cavalerie à Benavente.

Aujourd'hui, Monseigneur, je dois vous exposer avec la même exactitude la situation dans laquelle l'armée se trouve, et les difficultés qu'elle a rencontrées depuis qu'elle est revenue sur la frontière.

Lorsqu'en arrivant à Guarda et Belmonte, j'eus reconnu les faibles ressources que le pays nous offrait pour vivre, je vis que nous ne pouvions pas nous dispenser de repasser la Coa et l'Agueda. J'écrivis le 25 Mars à M. le Maréchal Duc d'Istrie, pour le prévenir que dans huit jours nous serions en Espagne, et pour le prier de nous faire préparer un approvisionnement de cinq à six cent mille rations de biscuit à Salamanque. Le 31, je lui fis apercevoir combien il serait avantageux qu'on pût déjà en trouver trois à quatre cent mille à Ciudad-Rodrigo, pour donner un premier secours à des troupes qui n'avaient pas eu de pain depuis quinze jours, et les mettre à même d'y rester pour faire face aux Anglais qui paraîtraient entre les deux places.

A mon arrivée à Ciudad-Rodrigo, je ne trouvai que l'approvisionnement de siège, consistant en deux cent cinquante mille rations de biscuit et en farines suffisantes pour cent soixante mille rations : j'appris que celui d'Almeida ne pouvait nourrir la garnison de cette place que pendant trente-cinq jours, à partir du 4 Avril. La circonstance dans laquelle nous nous trouvions me fit beaucoup regretter que les approvisionnements considérables versés dans les deux places, par suite des dispositions que nous avions faites avant notre entrée en Portugal, eussent été consommés avec peu d'économie par le neuvième corps, et sans qu'il eût pris des mesures pour pourvoir à leur remplacement. Mais ce n'est pas le cas d'examiner ici ni ce que fit le neuvième corps, ni les dispositions de l'administration qui nous a succédé. Je sentis qu'il fallait cependant tenir, au moins quelques jours, entre les deux places, pour voir quels seraient les projets de l'ennemi, afin d'empêcher que, par une prompte apparition sur ce point, il ne portât la terreur dans le nord de l'Espagne, et de donner le temps d'arriver aux approvisionnements que j'avais demandés. Je fis donc prendre sur ceux de Ciudad-Rodrigo une double ration de biscuit par homme, pour trois jours ; mais, au lieu de secours réels que j'espé-

rais, ne recevant qu'un avis de M. le Maréchal Duc d'Istrie, que plus de dix mille fanègues de blé existaient à Salamanque, que six mille allaient encore y être envoyées, que deux mille fanègues partaient pour Ciudad-Rodrigo, où il devait diriger aussi deux cent mille rations de biscuit, pour remplacer ce que j'avais emprunté des magasins, je dus m'éloigner de cette place, en me bornant à représenter à M. le Maréchal, qu'il serait convenable aux intérêts de Sa Majesté qu'il y envoyât un corps d'observation pourvu de vivres, pendant que les troupes de l'armée de Portugal iraient en chercher dans les cantons qui présentaient des ressources. Votre Altesse peut juger, par ce que je lui ai déjà dit, combien il était à désirer que les assurances de M. le Maréchal et mes représentations eussent été suivies de quelque effet. J'arrivai cependant avec le sixième corps à Salamanque, et, loin d'y trouver ce qui m'avait été annoncé, je ne pus compter que sur six mille fanègues et trente-neuf mille rations de biscuit, sur lesquelles il nous a fallu prendre ensuite pour remplacer ce que nous avons consommé des approvisionnements de Ciudad-Rodrigo, ou vingt mille rations seulement avaient été envoyées par M. le Maréchal, sans qu'un convoi de cent mille, qu'il avait dit expédier pour la même destination, soit plus arrivé que les deux autres convois annoncés, l'un de six mille fanègues, et l'autre de deux mille. Ne voyant venir à notre secours ni corps d'observation de l'armée du nord, ni les moyens de subsistances qu'on nous avait promis, et l'importance de couvrir les places étant toujours aussi grande, j'ai ordonné à deux divisions du sixième corps et au neuvième d'emmener une partie des six mille fanègues trouvées ici, et d'aller s'établir dans les positions que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous désigner au commencement de ma lettre.

Si je n'ai pas vu arriver ce qui m'avait été annoncé, du moins j'espérais que les marchés pour lesquels un million de francs des fonds destinés à la solde a été retenu à Valladolid, ainsi qu'une de mes dépêches du 12 en a informé Votre Altesse, produiraient des versements considérables pour l'époque du 15, qui m'avait été indiquée. Mais nous sommes au 17, et rien n'a paru. Hier, j'ai exposé de nouveau à M. le Maréchal l'état pénible dans lequel nous nous trouvions, et que, si des secours efficaces ne nous parvenaient pas incessamment, nous serions contraints de renoncer à couvrir les places. Ce que je lui disais hier, Monseigneur, je ne puis que le dire à Votre Altesse, pour vous faire connaître le véri-

table état des choses. Les sixième et neuvième corps vont se trouver sans vivres : le deuxième se plaint déjà de sa position, et il n'y a que le huitième qui puisse tenir où il est. La cavalerie, quoique cantonnée, perd journellement un grand nombre de chevaux qui ont été épuisés par le manque de nourriture et leurs fatigues en Portugal. Les trains d'équipages et d'artillerie sont, par les mêmes motifs, dans un état de nullité aussi absolu. Le pays n'a plus de moyens de transport. La plus grande apathie règne dans toutes les autorités, dont le zèle devrait se développer dans la position où nous nous trouvons.

Le résumé de ma lettre est que, de toutes les promesses que M. le Duc de d'Istrie m'a faites, aucune ne s'est effectuée ; que je ne vois qu'un avenir extrêmement fâcheux ; que j'ai fait et que je fais tout ce qui est en mon pouvoir ; que je ne puis que faire des représentations, écrire, et exposer la véritable situation des choses, sans en être jusqu'à présent plus avancé. Etant sans autorité dans le pays, je désespère de pouvoir faire vivre plus longtemps les troupes que j'ai à San Felices el Grande et Vitigudino, ainsi que les deux divisions, dont une est à Ciudad-Rodrigo, et l'autre placée en échelons. C'est la vérité que je vous sou mets, Monseigneur ; il est vraiment instant qu'on prenne d'autres mesures, qu'on réponde à mes lettres et qu'on y fasse droit.

Je suis avec un respectueux dévouement, etc.

Signé : MASSE'NA.

APPENDIX B.

The following Letters and Extracts of Letters, which passed between Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher and Captain Jones during the period the latter Officer was charged with completing the Lines, are added to show the feelings and proceedings of the moment, and to elucidate some portions of the text. They are also added from a wish to bear honourable tribute to the character of the late Sir R. Fletcher, whose correspondence evinces knowledge blended with diffidence, and command exercised through kind and friendly communication.

INSTRUCTIONS
FROM
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL FLETCHER
TO
CAPTAIN JOHN T. JONES.

“ Mafra, 6th July, 1810.

“ Sir,

“ As you will be left in the immediate charge of the engineer department in this part of Portugal,* I beg to call your attention to the following objects. As you find the works completed, and as you think the officers can be spared, I request you will employ them in making accurate surveys of the different positions.

“ You will, I imagine, soon find it practicable to part with a proportion of the men of the line now employed in the department, and they will then be sent to Lisbon; but I think some of the men should be kept to destroy bridges and roads at the last moment. I conceive you will shortly have it in your power to dispense with the services of the Figueras and Torres Vedras regiments of militia, and I request you will report when you can do so.

“ I beg you will also let me know when you think the services of the Portuguese engineers are no longer required. You will also please to report to me when all the artillery and ammunition for our different works are complete. From the description of the carriages it is desirable you should improve the platforms as

* This letter accompanied a copy of the corps orders of the same date, printed as a note to page 19.

materials can be procured for them ; and as magazines not lined with boards are said to be less dry than those boarded, I request you will, as far as possible, have them completed with linings.

“ I wish to leave the mode of conducting the service generally entirely to your judgment. You are, I believe, perfectly aware of what is intended in the different districts, and the officers are severally acquainted with the details. I request you will report to me from time to time, and that you will make such observations as may appear necessary for the good of the service.

(Signed)

“ R. FLETCHER.”

“ Peniche, 7th July, 1810.

“ I observe by a letter from Captain Burgoyne that engineers are much wanted at Fort Conception, and I therefore request you will order Lieut. Thomson to join the army, and let some other officer take charge of his works at Poute de Rol.”

“ Alverca da Beira, 14th July, 1810.

“ Sir,

“ The Commander of the Forces has directed that the work on the hill above Oeyras, of which we have already spoken, should be thrown up. I think it should be for 400 or 500 men, and not less than six 12-pounders, and that it should be in every way respectable, and of a description not to be carried by assault. I request, therefore, that you will have the goodness to demand an additional number of workmen, and that you will commence it as soon as possible. The ammunition for the different works may continue in the nearest dépôts for the present.

“ I am, &c.”

“ Alverca da Beira, 17th July, 1810.

“ Sir,

“ The Commander of the Forces has expressed a wish that the position of Alhandra should be strengthened as far as

possible, whether by scarping or works, and I have therefore to request that you will examine that ground, and that you will cause redoubts to be commenced on such parts as may afford good flanking points, and as may appear to be at the same time favourable for the construction of enclosed works. They should, I conceive, have a ditch not less than 10 feet deep and 15 feet wide, and if the scarp will stand it, a slope that will render the work secure from assault. The bottom of the ditch should be palisaded. Should you find parts of the height that are favourable for scarping, you will employ a body of workmen upon them to render those places impracticable. His Lordship is also desirous that two or three good redoubts should be established between the work at St. Pedro da Cadeira and the sea. I think you will find one good situation at a hill about half-way between No. 32 and the sea, one near the sea, and a third at a point at which there was to have been a dam made. They should not, I conceive, be for less than 200 men, and three or four pieces of artillery each. You will probably find it convenient to keep the militia some time longer in consequence of these new works, but I will leave such arrangements entirely to you.

“I am, Sir, &c., &c.”

(Confidential Note enclosed in the above.)

“My dear Sir,

“In consequence of the new works you will probably hardly find it convenient to part with Captain Williams, but on this you will do as you please. With respect to the position at Alhandra, of course nothing more can be expected than that some of the most prominent points should be taken to *assist* the defence, but Lord Wellington is anxious that as much as possible should be done there. The point at the mill, and that near the sea, are two striking features on the left of St. Pedro da Cadeira, and I think there is a third, though, probably, it may be as well to take up the two last first; but this you will decide on the spot. There was a difficulty about powder for blasting, and Lord Wellington will order General Howorth to issue whatever we may want, to my order; you had, therefore, better use my name in drawing it.”

“Alverca da Beira, 23rd July, 1810.

“My dear Sir,

“I this morning received your three letters of the 18th. I am sorry to learn so bad an account of the signal-posts; we thought that from any one of them to the next nearest the balls would be very visible, and I am inclined to believe the principal fault lies in the telescopes, and I feel confident there will be no objection to your purchasing others of a better description, if you can find them. I am very glad to hear so good an account of works 86, 90, and 91. In consequence of the new works, about which I wrote to you on the 18th instant, I shall not report to head-quarters that the services of the Figueras regiment of militia can be dispensed with till I hear further from you.”

“Alverca da Beira, 26th July, 1810.

“P.S. I think it will be advisable to improve the trenches on the right of the Alhandra position; at least, those on the left of the road sloping up the hill. I am very glad that you found an expedient to avoid interfering with the salt-pans near Via Longa.”

(*Confidential.*)

“Head-Quarters, Celorico, 29th July, 1810.

“My dear Sir,

“As we seem now to have commenced our march towards your part of Portugal, I think it right to apprise you of it, that every thing on our different works may be in a state for immediate service. With respect to those lately commenced, you will naturally put them into such a state as at least to afford cover against musketry, and if the ditches are not of themselves sufficient impediments to an enemy, I think the bottom of them should, if possible, be palisaded; and you will, I am sure, generally have recourse to such obstructions as may occur to you on the spot. You can, I think, prepare these works for immediate service without interrupting their progressive improvement. You can close the entrances with a double row of our own chevaux-de-frize, unless any better method which you have the means of

effecting should strike you. You will naturally prepare the magazines for the reception of the ammunition. The Commander of the Forces does not think it necessary that the abattis on the right of the Serra de Serves, or in any other places in which they may be ultimately useful, should be felled. I would, however, recommend your examining your dépôts of felling axes, and the state of those tools. Lieut. Stanway can explain to you that the embankment in front of the redoubt on the Tagus (or the right of the Serra de Serves) and another on the bank of the river, were finally to be levelled, but not at this moment. It seems, I think, now desirable that Lieut. Leith should be in possession of the signal-books.

“Yours, &c.”

“Celorico, 31st July, 1810.

“Sir,

“I have this morning received your letter of the 25th, relative to the position at Alhandra.

“I am very glad to find you can strengthen its front so materially by scarping, and I think the two redoubts for the further protection of the left very desirable. I therefore request that you will proceed upon these works with all possible dispatch, and I am of opinion that it would be even advisable to begin the redoubts by withdrawing a part of the men employed in scarping, unless you can assemble a sufficient body to render such a step unnecessary.

“Yours, &c.”

“Celorico, 3rd August, 1810.

“By a letter from Marshal Beresford, I learn that the Portuguese have been ordered to prepare a large quantity of hand-grenades, which will be issued to your order. You are aware of the distribution for our works generally and for those lately undertaken; I beg you will decide.

“Lord Wellington seems desirous that Captain Williams should join General Leith’s corps as soon as the work on Monte Agraça is sufficiently advanced to admit of your sparing him with tolerable convenience.”

“Celorico, 10th August, 1810.

“I feel truly obliged and gratified by your satisfactory communication of the 3rd instant; it eased my mind of much anxiety. I should think the works covering Setuval must be nearly completed; in that case, do you consider Captain Dickinson as disposable for any other service, or would it be more desirable to employ him on the works at St. Julian?

“I request that when you think Captain Williams can be conveniently spared, you will order him to join Major-General Leith.”

“Celorico, 12th August, 1810.

“Lord Wellington is very anxious to have the Figueras regiment disposable, and he desired me to write to you to say if they could with tolerable convenience be spared, he wished they might be allowed to go home: you will judge of this, and if you think they can be parted with, I will trouble you to say so to their immediate commanding officer.”

“Celorico, 14th August, 1810.

“I have received a letter from Mr. Pickering, wishing to know how I would dispose of the Assistant-Commissary Clerk of Stores and two conductors, expected from England, to be attached exclusively to the engineer department. I have said, that, for the present, I wish them to be placed at your disposal, and you will employ them as the service demands.

“I will trouble you to ascertain whether the whole quantity of ammunition demanded for our different works has been supplied by General Rosa; a great deal remained to be sent forward when I left Lisbon.

“On considering our works near Fort St. Julian, it at one time struck me that it would, if practicable, be desirable to connect the redoubts on the left by a common trench, in which bodies of troops might be placed in security from a cannonade, who could support the intervals and communicate with facility with any particular point that might be pressed. I will trouble you at your next visit to consider how far such a thing would be desirable, and

whether the ground will conveniently admit of it, and, further, if the same sort of course could be introduced to advantage between the southern of the three mill redoubts (on the right) and the Tagus."

" Celorico, 19th August, 1810.

" Sir,

" I this morning received your letter of the 14th, and have to acquaint you that the Commander of the Forces approves of the allowance of a dollar per diem being granted to Lieut. Jeronimo José Ferreira and Captain Manoel Marquis de Cintra, as proposed by you.

" I am, Sir."

" Alverca da Beira, 24th August, 1810.

" My dear Sir,

" I have been favoured with your letter of the 17th, on the subject of the ground commanding the new redoubt above Oeyras. I cannot express how much I feel obliged by all your suggestions to promote the service. I would wish, however, before I speak to Lord Wellington on the immediate subject of your last letter, to be enabled to answer any questions he might put to me, as far as circumstances may admit.

" Perhaps you will be able to give me some rough idea of the quantity of powder that might be required for the operation you propose.

" With respect to the ground on the left of the Alhandra position, I have often been uneasy in considering it. I was anxious, whilst our time seemed very limited, not to propose more works than there seemed to be an immediate probability of executing, and I have lately been much occupied in thinking at what point fortifications ought to stop, should we remain here through the winter. The redoubt near Trancosa was thrown up under a hope that it might prevent an enemy from turning the position of Alhandra with artillery—infantry would, I believe, undoubtedly, do it. If, on a minute examination of the ground, you think that 1500 men might be so intrenched as to prevent the last-men-

tioned species of force from penetrating, the object is, I conceive, highly important, and I shall be truly obliged by your ideas at large on this matter.

“ I would not draw any of the tools from the places at which they are now in use to form the dépôt at Coimbra.”

“ Alverca da Beira, 27th August, 1810.

“ My dear Sir,

“ I received your letter of the 22nd instant, on the subject of our works near St. Julian's, yesterday morning.

“ I am glad to find the ground near the redoubts on the left of the position favourable for forming covered communications between them.

“ With respect to the interval between the cliff and the most southern of the mill redoubts, I had thought that some sort of line there would have a much better command of the ground in front than a work situated at the stone quarry in the rear, which would see but a short distance before it, and would itself be much better commanded by guns, or even musketry, that would be shouldered against the fire of the mill redoubts, by the shape of the ground.

“ I dare say, however, you will be able to manage the defilement of the work, so as to correct the evil of command, and I wish to abide entirely by what you think best on the spot. I think my general authority from Lord Wellington on this head sufficient for the execution of either. For the sake of dispatch, I think I would not have the capacity of the works exceed what would be necessary for about 300 men. The guns you can best decide. I am glad to find you have actually set about shaping the hill opposed to our last-erected work, so that it may be rendered of little service to an enemy.

“ I am, &c.”

(*Extract.*)

“ Celorico, 29th August, 1810.

“ Almeida is taken, owing, it is said, to their principal magazine having exploded. . . . It is impossible to see

very far at present, but as things are, I am anxious to have whatever you think best done at St. Julian's (the place of embarkation) as soon as possible."

(*Confidential.*)

" Celorico, 31st August, 1810.

" My dear Sir,

" I have this moment been with Lord Wellington, to ask him to what extent he would have our position put into an immediate state of defence. Whether the abattis should be felled, embankments on the Tagus levelled, &c. His Lordship says, that the former he would have undertaken directly, the latter he would not begin to throw down as yet. You will recollect there is one running along the river, in front of redoubt No. 33, on the right of the position of the Serra de Serves, and another in front of that work; these it was intended ultimately to remove. There are a great many olive-trees between No. 39 and the road, which were intended to be felled into separate rows of abattis. You will find, I think, many parts of the line between Morugueira, (in the pass of Mafra and Ribarmar,) in which trees may be felled to advantage. The same thing will, I think, also apply in other situations. I need not say that all the roads intended to be mined should be in a perfect state of readiness. Is the bridge in rear of Bucellas mined? I do not know that its destruction would do much good; but we have mined bridges in this neighbourhood that will not perhaps do more. There is an arch across a gully between Alverca and our works on the right of the Serra da Serves: does it seem worth while to mine this? There is a bridge in the rear of Euxara dos Cavalleiros which might be considered. Lord Wellington wishes the ammunition to be put into the different works as soon as possible. I would have you complete the communication between the redoubts on the left of the St. Julian's position as soon as you can. You will, I am sure, do your best on the right of this position. I am quite satisfied that you will quickly do what is most advantageous on the whole, with the time and means in your power. Are all the redoubts numbered?

" Yours very truly."

“ Celorico, 2nd September, 1810.

“ Sir,

“ I am this morning favoured with your letter of the 29th ultimo, relative to the position of Alhandra, your report on its present state, and your proposals to prevent its being turned. I immediately submitted the whole to Lord Wellington for his consideration. He thinks that, on the whole, it is desirable to strengthen the ground on the immediate left of the valley, and he would have you begin without loss of time.

“ I think I would, in the first instance, begin the lower work in front, unless if, being unsupported, it would be too liable to be carried by musketry. As to the others, I would recommend your immediately providing a dépôt of palisades, that should the occasion press, you may be in some state of defence against assault. In short, to progressively strengthen the ground in whatever way you think best.”

“ Gouvea, 7th September, 1810.

“ Lord Wellington has just now told me, that the artillery officer ordered to inspect the state of the ammunition has reported, that the numbers of our different works are not correct.

“ If from any cause the works are not all marked by their numbers on a board, you will oblige me by having it done as soon as possible. I before wrote to you as to distinguishing the works undertaken since I quitted Lisbon by letters. Do you think it would be worth while to mark any of the new flanking points taken up on the position of Alhandra? Since I wrote the above I have seen Lord Wellington, and he prefers numbers for the new works, though they may not be in regular succession. I would, therefore, propose that you mark the left of the new works behind the Zizandra 110, and go on regularly with the numbers to the right of Alhandra.

“ As it is the intention of the Admiral to withdraw the navy from our signal-posts, Lord Wellington requests you will make an arrangement that the ordenanzas may take charge of them for the present. You can use his name as your authority for any step you may take in that way. Do you think it would be prac-

ticable to find a set of men whom one could trust to work them, or who could be made to understand them? “ R. F.”

“ P.S. Lord Wellington says, at all events cut the trenches through the salt-pans.”

(*Extract.*)

“ Gouvea, 9th September, 1810.

“ I wish I may not in my zeal have got into a scrape about the water-casks. Lord Wellington seems to think the undertaking too great, and desires to have a list of the numbers that will be required. Can you therefore stop your hand for the present? Should they still be allowed, could not the Commissary-General supply a part of them?”

“ Gouvea, 11th September, 1810.

“ In consequence of the Admiral having decided to withdraw the navy from our signal-posts, Lord Wellington thinks we had better use the simple Portuguese telegraph, and I request you will have the goodness to get one made for each post, and carried to the spot. I should think it will not be difficult for you to procure a sufficient number of old seamen at Lisbon to work them.

“ Lord Wellington has consented that the water-casks should be supplied, and will order the Commissary-General to furnish and pay for them.”

“ Cortiça, 20th September, 1810.

“ Lord Wellington requests you will inform Mr. Dunmore that you think you can press the water-casks. He will write to Col. Peacocke relative to the captain and two privates for each signal-post.”

“ Coimbra, 30th September, 1810.

“ Sir,

“ I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd instant, recommending that a redoubt should be thrown up

for 300 men, somewhere about the centre of the line extending from the heights of Callhandrix to the Serra de Serves, and that the latter should be scarped where necessary.

“ His Lordship, the Commander of the Forces, is pleased to approve these proposals, and to direct that they shall be carried into effect as soon as possible.”

(Confidential, enclosed in the above, same date.)

“ Dear Sir,

“ Present circumstances seem to render it necessary that every precaution should be taken at and near our works for their being immediately occupied and defended, should such a measure become expedient. I would therefore recommend your making every arrangement as to mining roads, felling abattis, clearing away obstacles, dressing off slopes, &c., &c., with the various other necessary precautions, not any of which, I well know, will escape your observation. I would not actually load the mines until the last extremity.”

“ Head-Quarters, Leiria, 2nd October, 1810.

“ My dear Sir,

“ The following services have occurred to me as being necessary, under present circumstances, to be performed immediately:—viz., making the distributions of the hand-grenades to the different works; getting the water-casks into them; making a banquette to the walls which defend the left of the valley in front of Via Longa; making a good trench for musketry across this valley, I should think in the road leading to the height on the right, or rather on one side of this road where there is now a bank with some aloes, connecting by some kind of musketry defence with the village of Boca de Lapa. As there must be a number of guns placed on the high point on the right of this valley, I think it might be desirable to throw up a redoubt on this spot, having six embrasures towards the low ground. I think there should also be an emplacement for guns at the mill

at the end of the wall on the left, and to stockade or enclose it. In general, whatever you can do with the time and means in your power for defence at this ground, I think should be undertaken. The line-wall on the Tagus in front of the right of No. 33 to be levelled. The line immediately parallel to its front to be levelled. The bridge at Torres Vedras on the road to Sobral to be mined, in case it should become advisable to destroy it, and if any impediment would be occasioned by its destruction. These are all the additions that occur to me at present. Should you observe that I have omitted any thing in my several letters, I beg you will have the goodness to do whatever you think necessary towards the defence of our positions. Lord Wellington will write to the Admiral relative to gun-boats for our right flank. Are our new telegraphs completed?

“ Yours, &c.”

“ Alcobaca, 5th October, 1810.

“ Dear Sir,

“ Lord Wellington has directed me to write to you on the subject of guides for the different districts of our works. His Lordship has divided the districts as follows :

“ No. 1. From the sea to Torres Vedras ; head-quarters, Torres Vedras.

“ No. 2. From Sobral de Monte Agraça to the valley of Calhandrix ; head-quarters, Sobral de Monte Agraça.

“ No. 3. From the valley of Calhandrix to the Tagus, on the right of Alhandra ; head-quarters, Alhandra.

“ No. 4. From the banks of the Tagus, near Alverca, to the pass of Bucellas inclusive ; head-quarters, Bucellas.

“ No. 5. From the pass of Freixal inclusive to the right of the pass of Mafra, including Enxara dos Cavalleiros ; head-quarters, Montachique.

“ No. 6. From the pass of Mafra inclusive to the sea ; head-quarters, Mafra.

“ Lord Wellington wishes that an officer of the ordenanzas, or any other respectable person well qualified from local knowledge, should be appointed, with about four men under him, also well qualified, to show the roads from the works along the positions, and those leading to them from the front, connecting with the

next district by the flanks, and to the rear, in case of necessity. The officers and a part of the men must be mounted, and a letter will be written to Mr. Dunmore to supply good mules for them; let us say for the officers and two of the men for each district, if possible. I am sure you will make every arrangement for this service immediately. Lord Wellington wishes that the officer of each district should be in readiness to meet the quarter-master-general when we retire, and that the men should all be on the spot.

"I would recommend that the men should be constantly practised in acquiring every information about the roads of and bordering on the several districts. Every possible preparation is now of course necessary towards the defence of our works.

"The officers of guides will have cavalry pay, and the men 1*s.* 6*d.* per diem.

"I am very anxious about our signal-posts.

"I am, dear Sir."

"Head-Quarters, Rio-maior, 6th October, 1810.

"My dear Sir,

"I have named the officers to the several districts as follows :

- No. 1. Captain Mulcaster, Lieut. Thomson.
2. Captain Goldfinch, Lieut. Forster.
3. Captain Squire, Lieut. Piper.
4. Captain Burgoyne, Lieut. Stanway.
5. Captain Dickinson, Lieut. Trench.
6. Captain Ross, Lieut. Hulme.

"I have not named you for a district, as I think you will be much more useful to act generally in the first instance. I will trouble you to order all the above officers with you to join at the head-quarters of the different districts as soon as possible.

"Lord Wellington says he will not part with the seamen now, if they are not gone. I think you had better meet us as soon as you can. I believe head-quarters will be at Sobral on the 9th, where I shall be happy to meet you."

“ Arruda, 10th October, 1810.

“ My dear Sir,

“ I am very anxious to have the pleasure of seeing you. Can you come to head-quarters this evening? we will take the best care we can of you. Would it not be well to take Lieut. Reid's men from the redoubt he is now throwing up, and send them to those in front of Cabo? I am not quite easy about that village; you will oblige me by giving directions to put all the strength possible towards strengthening it, in any way as far as trenches, banquetting, walls, and any thing else that may occur to you can be done.

“ R. FLETCHER.”

“ Captain Jones, R. E.”

LETTERS AND REPORTS

FROM

CAPTAIN J. T. JONES

TO

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL FLETCHER.

“Lisbon, 18th July, 1810.

“I am sorry I cannot give you a favourable account of the signal stations; the sailors say, that the distance between the stations is too great, and that the masts are all too light for the yards; on Sunday evening two were sprung: they also complain of the telescopes. I have ordered stronger masts and yards to be prepared for each post, and if better telescopes can be procured in Lisbon, I shall not hesitate to authorize the purchase of them. To render the Ponte de Rol signals visible, we are cutting down the pine-wood, which at present forms its back-ground.

“The new works, Nos. 88, 90, and 91, are pushing forward with the utmost exertion by Lieut. Hulme; the guns for them are on the spot.”

“Alhandra, 25th July, 1810.

“Sir,

“I have the honour to report, that, in obedience to your orders of the 17th from Alverca da Beira, the front of this position has been carefully examined, and such parts of it have been marked for scarping as appear eligible; and various flanks and redoubts have been traced out in situations favourable for sweeping the face of the hill. A body of peasantry has been demanded of the Government, and will commence these operations to-morrow;

and I feel I may venture to assure you, that with six weeks or two months' labour, the whole of the front of the position shall be made as strong as can reasonably be desired."

(*Extract.*)

"Via Longa, 3rd August, 1810.

"Your letter of the 31st from Celorico has been a great relief to me, as I think it insures us the time necessary to complete the works begun since your departure, except, of course, the position of Alhandra, and even that will be in a forward state. The new work at Oeyras will be very shortly in a fair state of defence. Nos. 88, 90, and 91, are already in such a forward state, that I yesterday took all the workmen, (except 50 each,) and sent them to St. Pedro to push on those works. I have directed Captain Williams to confine his exertions at Monte Agraça solely to making the work defensible, such as clearing out the ditches, filling up the openings through the counterscarps, &c.

"The rains last week did much damage to the works, and we have parties every where employed to put them into order."

(*Extract.*)

"I passed a message from Alhandra to Mafra by our chain of posts in — minutes, so that there is now no fear of their answering when the weather is tolerably clear.

"How far might it be expedient to provide water-casks, with three days' water for the garrison of each redoubt? The men may bring with them three days' provisions, but they cannot bring three days' water, and it is scarcely possible to exist for six hours under fatigue in summer without liquid. A redoubt may not be attacked, and still for many days no man dare go half a league distant in search of water, and there is none nearer to some of the works.

"Water-tubs for the batteries are in preparation."

(*Private.*)

"5th August, 1810.

"Pray have the kindness to ask Lord Wellington to write to

Don Miguel Forjaz on the subject of furnishing us every man the country can supply ; it would incline the Portuguese Government to pay more attention to our representations generally. I have complained to Don Miguel and to Don Antonio Souares de Noronha, the Captain-General of the province, on this subject, and they have severely reprehended the several capitaõs-mor, particularly those I had reported by name ; but they every one protest, that all the ordenanzas of a middle age have been taken from them for the militia, and that none are left but boys and old men."

" 9th August.

" I have sent an order to Captain Williams to join General Leith's corps without the smallest delay, and have ordered Lieut. Trench to take charge of and complete the Sobral works.

" I regret exceedingly not being able to get forward with a general plan of the lines ; but by the subjoined distribution of the officers you will see it is impossible, at present, to withdraw any one from his particular duty.

Captain Holloway,	.	.	.	Peniche.
Wedekind	.	.	.	Sick.
Dickinson,	.	.	.	Setuval.
Lieut. Meinecke,	.	.	.	Oeyras.
Forster,	.	.	.	Alhandra.
Trench,	.	.	.	Sobral.
Piper,	Alhandra.
Tapp,	Lisbon Duty.
Reid,	St. Pedro da Cadeira.
Hulme,	Mafra and Ereceira.

In all of which districts there are very considerable working parties employed ; but I hope after next week to make some arrangement for the plan."

" Mafra, 14th August, 1810.

" Sir,

" I visited Setuval on the 7th of this month, and in con-

sequence of the then state of affairs, as communicated in your letter of the 29th ult., I abridged considerably the work which had been planned there. I likewise exerted myself to the utmost, and with some success, to procure more workmen and enforce more attention from the officers of ordenanzas; notwithstanding which I do not think those works will be completed before the middle of the ensuing month. Capt. Dickinson seems to think a fortnight more will suffice for their completion, and I send you an extract from his last Report to me on the subject."

(*Extract.*)

"Setuval, 9th August, 1810.

"The last orders received by the governor here had so good an effect, that he informed me yesterday, on his return from Lisbon, that six hundred workmen would be furnished me next week, attended by officers of ordenanzas and by a guard of twenty soldiers, for the purpose of taking all unruly subjects into custody: they will be distributed between the large redoubt, the lines, the two small redoubts in front, and the old pentagon. I am in immediate want of two barrels of gunpowder, for nothing but rock presents itself where I am excavating. I am in great hopes of having all completed here in a fortnight.

"S. DICKINSON."

"Captain Jones, Comm^{rs}. Engineer."

"18th August, 1810.

"Sir,

"On the subject of the Figueras regiment of militia, again mentioned in your letter of the 12th, I beg to say, that I am no longer desirous of retaining them, having failed in my best endeavours to move them from Mafra, in which district we now procure peasantry sufficient for the work.

"On the 1st August I wrote to Don Miguel Forjaz, the Secretary at War, requesting he would issue orders for their march from Mafra to Alhandra, to be employed on the new defences. On the 4th Don Miguel replied, that the regiment having been stationed at Mafra by order of Marshal Beresford, it was necessary

to have the Marshal's order for their removal. I wrote to Marshal Beresford's head-quarters that same day, to request their removal to Alhandra, but have not yet had any reply.

"Immediately upon the receipt of your letter yesterday I wrote to the commanding officer of the regiment to say, that his men are no longer required for service of the works, and that, as far as the engineer department is concerned, he is at full liberty to dispose of his men as he may think proper. I conceive, however, that some further order to the colonel will be necessary for their removal."

(*Private.*)

"August, 1810.

"Of Alhandra I hope we shall form a very strong position. I consider it now a strong position for 10,000 men, a fortnight hence I hope it will be thought the same for 7000 men, and in a month I doubt whether more than 5000 will be required for its defence.

"Alhandra, however, does not altogether satisfy me as a position; I should fear that an enemy acting with a very superior force would penetrate by the hills on the left, and get possession of the serra in the rear of it—a movement which would not only turn all our defences, but might perhaps lead to the capture of the whole force in the position, as it would then find itself surrounded, and its retreat cut off.

"On riding over the ground above A dos Matos, it appeared to me, that a post for 1500 men might be established there, which would effectually prevent such an enterprise. I feel diffident, however, in making the proposal; but, although no advocate for multiplying works, the necessity for creating some obstruction to the march of an enemy along the heights on the other side of the valley which bounds the left of the Alhandra position, is so thoroughly impressed on my mind, that I believe I shall suppress all other feelings and write to you officially on the subject; perhaps a strong work for a battalion on the rear serra itself might answer every end. When the mind is deeply engaged on any object, various thoughts and ideas occur which appear reasonable to the person forming them, and yet are in themselves absurd, and will not bear investigation. Such, perhaps, is my case now, but

I cannot avoid thinking that Alhandra should not be left an isolated position, but be joined to the Ajuda works, and that 2000 men strongly intrenched on its left would serve to connect the country into one defensive line from the Tagus to the Ajuda valley."

"Lisbon, 29th August, 1810.

"Sir,

"In consequence of your wishes I have now the honour to enter into some detail respecting the position at Alhandra and of the means to prevent its being turned. I enclose a paper of memoranda which I drew up yesterday when on the spot—it must be read as relating to the state of the work on Saturday next, and will I hope prove a satisfactory account of that strong position.

"The ground on the opposite side of the valley on the left is a range of strong hills of a much superior elevation to any other ground near them, and connected by a regular descent with the hills in rear of the position.

"At a point about a mile retired from the front of the Alhandra position this ridge terminates to its left with a bluff point, which overlooks all the country to the Ajuda works, at the distance perhaps in a straight line between them of less than three miles: at this spot it appears to me that a post might be formed for 1500 men, extending completely across the ridge, one flank of which shall appuy on the bluff point, and consequently overlook the country in that direction, and the other flank rest on the valley which forms the left of the Alhandra position, and its fire co-operate with the Alhandra redoubts in preventing the passage of an enemy through the valley.

"This post would so thoroughly occupy these hills as to prevent the march of infantry to the rear otherwise than by the space of two or three miles between it and the Ajuda works, and it would leave the whole army at liberty to act in that difficult country, whilst the enemy would have the garrisons of Sobral and Alhandra in their rear, and I should conceive it too hazardous an enterprise for them to attempt: if that be admitted, it follows that it would secure Alhandra from being turned by an enemy with or without artillery. I have one feeling of doubt on my

mind, which it is my duty to state, and that is, the possibility of an enemy forcing the valley between the two works. I will here state what has been done to secure it, and if not judged sufficient, orders may be sent for further obstacles being created: at its entrance, eight 12-pounders, in inattackable situations, can shower down grape-shot upon the enemy, and during a passage of half a mile they will always be under the fire of at least six pieces of that nature of ordnance, and for some part of the way under ten: the work now proposed will give an additional cross fire, and will prevent an entry into the valley by a collateral branch which exists about midway, and which is a most serious disadvantage: it is, however, to be recollected, that the fire of the artillery is from a very great height, and that much cover is created in the valley by hollow ways and steep rising grounds, and that in the night the fire of artillery will of course be uncertain: when an attack is expected, it will be proper to cut down the trees and place them as an additional obstacle across the valley, and also to level the houses, walls, &c. The works I propose to construct are three redoubts for 400 men each, mutually flanking each other, with a smaller work in advance to look down the valley in front, which the three forming the position cannot do: it is proposed to make them to resist cannon, and they being nearly a mile retired from the front of the Alhandra position, I do not think any enemy dare to bring up artillery for their reduction without having first forced Alhandra; for as the rear of that post will be open to our army and hid from him, he can never tell whether there be 4000 or 14,000 men in it.

“ I have sent a hasty sketch from memory of the ground, but which, I trust, will be sufficient to point out the situation of the proposed works. The soil is very unfavourable for their construction; it will therefore require nearly two months to complete them from the day of their commencement.”

(Memoranda referred to in the foregoing Letter.)

“ The position of Alhandra, as now taken up, is formed of an isolated range of heights; its right bounded by the Tagus, its front, left, and part of the rear, by a deep and difficult valley.

“ It may be viewed under the divisions of its front, left flank, and rear.

“ The front naturally subdivides into two parts : 1st. An extent of upwards of 2000 yards on the left, which has been so cut and blasted along its summit as to give it a continued scarp every where exceeding 10 feet in height, flanked in its whole length by musketry and cannon, and the approach to the scarp lying under a fire of grape-shot. Large general flanks have been established for that purpose, and redoubts have been erected on the summit for the security of the guns and troops, should any part of the position be forced. The second division of the front is an extent of 700 yards, more than half of it the low flat ground bounding the Tagus ; the remainder is the slope of a hill of easy ascent, gradually rising from the low ground till it meets the artificial scarp. This whole length has been retrenched by a continued flanked line of a strong profile ; across the low ground an advanced ditch has been added, flanked from the line ascending the hill, and which has likewise been made to answer as a powerful flank to the low ground generally. At the left extremity of this line, and at the point where the nearly inaccessible part of the front ceases, a redoubt has been thrown up.

“ The left of the position may be considered as having a front of half a mile. The ground is very high and steep, but not inaccessible. Two redoubts have been established there ; the one on the most commanding point of the whole position, for 400 men and eight 12-pounders ; the other on the left, for 350 men and six 12-pounders. A species of redoubt or *flèche* has been thrown up where the nearly inaccessible part of the front finishes on the left, for which, perhaps, 150 men should be apportioned, as in case of necessity they can support the front or flank as either may be pressed. Scarping and other impediments of that nature have also been attempted with success, so that the left flank may be considered only less strong than the front.

“ The rear of the position is above two and a half miles in extent. It is very open and of easy ascent, and one part of it is commanded by a range of hills, the occupation of which by an enemy would turn all our defences, and most probably cut off the retreat of the troops.

“ There are but three ways by which an enemy can get in the rear, or obtain possession of the above-mentioned ridge of hills.

1st. By forcing his way through the valley on the left. 2nd. By marching a column along the opposite heights of Calhandrix parallel to the left flank. 3rd. By making a detour to his right of several miles. To guard against the first, a height detached in advance of the position on the left has been occupied by a work for 250 men and five 12-pounders, and which, from its situation and construction, is so strong that it ought never to be forced: the fire from this work and from the redoubts, with an abattis, may perhaps be deemed sufficient to prevent an enemy from passing along the valley. The second passage might be impeded by the construction of a post for 1500 men upon the hills parallel to the left flank: at present, to carry artillery by that route, it would be only requisite for the enemy to force the redoubt above Trancosa. The third method can only be properly opposed by the manœuvres of the general commanding the army; but its bad effects might probably be counteracted by the erection of a strong work on the rear range of hills, where it would be the object of an enemy to establish himself.

“ J. T. J.”

[The above Reports on Alhandra are printed in full, with the view of giving some insight into the details of the labours of 1810.]

“ Lisbon, 3rd September, 1810.

“This morning I marked out a line to the right of the mill redoubts at Oeyras (agreeably with your letter of the 27th ult.), and which I hope in ten days’ time to render an obstacle to an enemy attempting to penetrate by that flank.

“ Your confidential letter of the 31st has just been received. I am happy to have it in my power to say that every thing at Oeyras is in a proper state, and, I trust, whenever the army falls back, every thing will be found as it ought to be.”

“ Lisbon, 5th Sept. 1810.

“ Dear Sir,

“ Your letters of the 1st and 2nd instant have been this day received. We will to-morrow commence strengthening the

ground to the left of Alhandra. I cannot say from recollection whether the narrow part in front of the proposed redoubts can be cut through, but I think, with plenty of time, much might be done by scarping. You may depend upon every exertion being used to do the utmost our means will allow at that spot. As you did not before notice my suggestion for water-casks being provided for the different redoubts, I concluded it had not been approved of. I have this morning set about endeavouring to collect casks sufficient to hold 10,000 gallons of water: water-tubs I have been collecting for some time past.

“With respect to the salt-pans on the right of Via Longa, we have made a cut through the low ground, or rather, we have widened and deepened a ditch which already existed there. We did it as a substitute for the cut ordered by you, in consequence of the opposition our proceedings met with, and from the damage which they would occasion to private property. I mentioned in a former letter that the Marchioness of Abrantes, who derives a great revenue from the salt-works, had made a representation to our Minister to stop the work, and that Mr. Stuart had written to me on the subject. I should, however, much like authority to proceed again with the original cut, as it is in every way better than its substitute; at all events, the salt-pans shall be filled the moment it appears necessary. Lieutenant Stanway is forming the abattis at that position. We are likewise mining the bridge at Bucellas and near Enxara — of course it is all done as quietly as possible. As to the magazines being damp, as far as my observation goes I have never seen any of the same nature less so: they have all been lined with boards since your departure, and every other precaution has been taken to keep them dry: whoever made the statement can have had but very little experience of the nature of field magazines, or must have made the observation from a wish to find fault: that the magazines will be damp when the rains set in is beyond a doubt, but that they are damp now I deny. The platforms of every work have been relaid since your departure. The work on the right of Freixal is raising, but with very little advantage or effect. We are going on with the line on the right of the mill redoubts at Oeyras, and I hope to make it something respectable in ten days’ time; the ground is extremely rocky and otherwise unfavourable for excavating. As to the trench to join the redoubts, we have not workmen sufficient to

undertake it in toto. We will put them upon it as far as they will extend, and the remainder of the trench being marked out, in case of emergency, a couple of thousand soldiers can complete it in twenty-four hours. For these operations we have been obliged to withdraw 100 men from sloping the hill."

(*Extract.*)

"Lisbon, 8th Sept. 1810.

"On the subject of a general system of drainage for the works before the rains set in, I conceive it to be absolutely necessary for their preservation during the winter: we have had a few showers lately, the effects of which have been to bring down the fascine-work and to deface the slopes, and, in some parts, to bring down the scarps. Parties have been constantly employed repairing these damages. I will take the earliest opportunity to examine the different works with this view, and to give more plunge to the superior slopes which may require it. Lieut. Hulme having made great progress with the several mines which we consider necessary under the roads and bridges on the left, I have ordered him for this duty, and for improving the defence of Freixal, and we were to have started together this morning, but the subjoined letter from Lieut. Reid renders it necessary that I should go to Mafra to see to the abattis at Morugueira, and to perfecting the defences of the valley on its left."

"St. Pedro da Cadeira, 6th Sept. 1810.

"Dear Sir,

"After I sent off my letter to you last night, I received a letter from Lieutenant Hulme to say that he had received your orders, through Lieutenant Stanway, to show me the mines and every thing to be done in that district, and then that he was to go immediately to Lisbon; I therefore went over the Ereceira works with him to day. You had desired him to form an abattis from Morugueira to Ribarmar: this I shall begin immediately, though I must say I have not all the confidence I could wish. If you have time, I would be much obliged to you for some further instructions; however, as I conceive that there is no time at present

for delay, I shall go over the Morugueira ground to-morrow, and the instant I can collect cars and men I shall begin at that place, and form a connected line from one redoubt to the other, breaking it in such places as will give me the most advantageous flank in front of my trees. I shall most anxiously look out for a note from you to say if this is what you wish.

“I remain, &c.

“WILLIAM REID, Lieut. R. E.”

“Capt. Jones, Comm^d. Eng^r.”

“P.S. The two redoubts of Lieut. Thomson, near this, I expect are this night completed with plank platform.”

“11th Sept. 1810.—Evening.

“Redoubts 88, 90 and 91, on the Picanceira line, are completely finished, and we are doing our utmost to strengthen the face of the ravine by scarping and laying it open to the fire of the work.

“With respect to Oeyras, as I could not visit it this week from being so much occupied with the Morugueira abattis, the Picanceira line, and the various new works on the right, I beg to enclose a report I have this instant received from Captain Wedekind.”

“Oeyras, 11th Sept. 1810.

“Sir,

“I should have reported to you before this on the progress of the new lines lately began, had I not been in the hopes of your weekly inspection of this district. With the means I have at present I calculate to have the flèche near the sea-side in some state of defence by the end of next week or the 21st of this month, that is, the ditch 15 feet wide at top and 9 feet deep, and the parapet 7 feet 6 inches high and 10 feet thick at top, and the lines between it and the mill redoubts, the ditches 12 feet wide and 4 feet deep.

“The soil where the flèche is, is as bad as possible; that of the

lines is more favourable: the ditches are opened at a distance of 170 yards, 6 feet deep and 4 feet high parapet: there are about 400 more yards of ditch to be opened.

"No. 109 redoubt is palisaded, and I shall leave there to-morrow only 100 men to improve the glacis and counterscarp on the west side: the masons are about laying the three last platforms of stone: the magazine is complete.

"I propose to begin the opening of the trench between 106 and 107 on Monday, if you can send me the 500 tools specified in the accompanying requisition: the distance between these works is nearly 800 yards.

"I shall be much obliged if you will have the goodness to hasten at the commissary-general's the delivery of the remaining palisades, since my last demand approved by you on the 10th August, to complete which near 3000 are as yet wanting.

"I shall continue my utmost exertions to make the best of the means I have to forward the works.

"CHARLES WEDEKIND,

"Capt. Eng. K. G. L."

"Captain Jones, Comm^g. Engineer."

"Lisbon, 12th Sept. 1810.

"Dear Sir,

"I have stopped collecting the water-casks; none had been absolutely purchased—only bespoke. Whenever occasion requires it, I can, at two days' notice, seize casks enough in the cellars of the vineyards around to supply all the works with water, and I think such would be the most eligible plan.

"I do not believe that any of the redoubts have wrong numbers affixed to them; at least, we carry on our duty by numbers and not by names, and I have never yet found any mistake to arise. I will, however, have them all examined.

"Taking away the seamen from the signal-posts will be a misfortune, as they have just become thoroughly expert at passing the signals. I think that a non-commissioned officer and two privates might be selected from Lisbon for each post, whom we could trust to pass the signals; but I do not think we could ever teach Portuguese, and even with soldiers I am not very sanguine in my expectations of rendering them very expert.

“The abattis near Via Longa are very forward, and to-morrow the cut through the salt-pans shall be recommenced.

“I have not yet been able to discover one magazine in the slightest degree damp.”

“Lisbon, 18th September, 1810.

“I have applied for and am promised Portuguese guards for all the signal stations, and as soon as it is reported to me that they have mounted, I will write to the Admiral according to your directions.

“Artificers are employed constructing the portable telegraphs to be fixed up near the site of the present signal-staffs. The post was removed from the Picanceira redoubt to Marvoa, and now answers very well.”

(*Private.*)

“I am happy to say the arrangement I made with Don Miguel Forjaz, that the governors of Mafra and Sacavem shall receive our orders for men for the right and left respectively, and see that the several capitaõs-mor furnish their full contingents, has done wonders for us. I expect we shall have 2000 additional this week, including women and boys, whom I pay at one-half and one-fourth the price of men. At Allhandra our numbers are so great that Forster has been obliged to turn commissary, and procure bread and serve it out as rations, in order to enable them to subsist.”

“Sir,

“22nd Sept.

“Not feeling myself authorized to sanction the appointment which Captain Holloway reports to me on the other side to have made at Peniche, I have written to him to say so, and that I shall forward his letter to you for a decision thereupon, which I now do.”

(Signed)

“J. T. J.”

“The side-arms, &c., are all complete, with the guns, &c., in all the new flanks and new works; indeed, General Rosa and his Portuguese artillerymen have shown the greatest zeal and activity in complying with our demands.”

“ 5th October, 1810.

“ I ordered the hand-grenades to be put into the magazines at the same time with the ammunition, and the water-casks into the several works.

“ Three of the new telegraphs were not quite complete last evening, but I expect in the course of to-morrow to fix those for the advanced line of signals in their places.

“ I begun the new redoubt between Alhandra and the Serra de Serves on the 3rd, the day I received the authority, and yesterday we began in earnest to scarp the Serra de Serves. From this moment every thing shall give way to the position of Via Longa.

“ I trust you will find every thing to your wishes. I spare no exertion to have all the works, &c., in the most creditable order, and I find the utmost attention and exertion in all the officers.”

“ Alhandra, 6th October, 1810.

“ I duly received your letter from Leiria, and I can now venture to assure you that every preparation for an instant defence of the lines is complete, and you need be under no apprehension for our credit, even if the enemy attack as the rear division enters the works.

“ The moment I knew of the army having commenced its retrograde movements, I commenced our final preparations; and we have neither spared houses, gardens, vineyards, olive-trees, woods, or private property of any description. The only blind to the fire of the works now standing is that beautiful avenue of old trees in the pass of Torres Vedras. The Juez da Fora and inhabitants pleaded to me so hard for the latest moment, lest they might be unnecessarily cut down, that I have consented to defer it till the day before the troops march in, and as I have trustworthy men with axes, in readiness on the spot, there is no doubt of their being felled in time. The pine woods on the Torres heights are down, and formed into abattis.

“ The abattis at Via Longa is also complete, the openings for communications being stopped up; the cut and salt-pans are full of water, and Lieut. Stanway will finish levelling the banks, &c., to-night. The water-casks and hand-grenades are furnished to

every redoubt. The powder is in the cases to load the mines, and the officers, each in his own district, is prepared to meet the divisions. The telegraphs for the front line of posts were forwarded from Lisbon yesterday.

“ It is lucky we commenced dressing off so soon, for now every thing is in confusion : the people are all running away ; and a string of men, women, and children, in cars, on animals, and on foot, are crowding every road to Lisbon. No one will believe that the army will halt till it reaches St. Julian’s, and all authority and order is beginning to be lost. Besides, the forerunners of the army seize every thing, and

“ I flatter myself you will be altogether surprised at the formidable appearance of our scarps here, and much pleased with the quantity of work of every nature done since your departure. When I heard of the Busaco business, I began to be alarmed for the consequences of having done so much ; for if the lines had not come into play, the expense would most likely have been cavilled at as unnecessary ; but now, of course, only the benefit derived from the strength of the works will be considered.

(Signed)

“ JOHN T. JONES.”

“ Lieut.-Col. Fletcher.”

FINIS.

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
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(1)
 (Attacks)
 OF
 (BADAJOS.)
in May & June
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


Attack
OF
Ciudad Rodrigo.
By
Genl. Sir Charles Wallis.
Jan. 1812.

Scale of Feet
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Great Road to Talavera

The Siege of
BADAJOS,
Genl. the Earl of Wellington,
between the
17. March to 6. April
1812.
 Scale of Feet

See Sections.
 Fig. 5, 6, & 7, Plate N^o 3.



Section

Fort

11' 9"



Fig.

b

*Crinoid
interior*

Bread





Sections OF BADAJOS.

Fig. 3

Section on the Line A.B.C.D. see Fig. 1.




Fig. 4



Fig. 5




Fig. 6



Fig. 7





Attack of the
French Fortified Posts
at
SALAMANCA
June 1812.

Section taken on the Line. DE







Fig. 1.
Plan of the Great Branch
of *Ciudad Rodrigo*



Section on the Line *M.T.* Fig. 1.



Fig. 2.

Plan of *Redoubt Renaud*.



Section on the line *a.b.*

Fig. 3.



Fig. 4.

Position of the French Works
Covering the Bridge at *Almaraz*



Fort Napoleon

Fig. 5.

Section of Fort Napoleon.




Fig. 6.

Plan of the *Retiro* Entrenchment



Section of the *Retiro* Entrenchment.

Fig. 7.




Section on the Line *H.K.L.* Fig. 1.

Summit of the main Branch.



Figure 9.





Scale of Yards
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100



CITY OF BURGOS.


See Antiquary Plate 9



Attack of the
CASTLE OF BURGOS,

between the 10th Sept. & 22 October
1812.

Scale of Fards




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


Sections of Castle of Burgos on Plate VIII.


Fig^r 1




Fig^r 2



Fig^r 3






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






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


1 Front destroyed.
2 Bastion partially destroyed.

ALMEIDA
French Attack.



Attack
OF
SEBASTIAN,
on 11th July & 9th Sept:
1813.



MONTE OLIA

Nº 11

Nº 12

Nº 13

Nº 17


Nº 16

Right of the Attack





Artillery Depot

Passages del Calzada





*to explain the
on the left bank,*






Sections taken through the Breach at
ST SEBASTIAN referring to Plate XI.

Fig^r 1.

Section on the Line M.B.



Fig^r 2.

Section on the Line M. A.




Fig^r 3.

Section on the Line M.L.




Fig^r 6




Figures 6 & 7 are a plan & section to explain the
mode of drawing the cables taught on the left bank.

Fig^r 7




Fig^r 8



Plan & Section of the bridge
thrown over the Adour for
the siege of Bayonne in 1834.

Fig^r 4



High tide
Low tide

High tide
Low tide

Fig. 5













Fig 2.

*Plan of the Sluice Gates
FLUSHING*



*The darker shades show the parts of the walls
cracked or blown down.*

Section thro' a.d.





Fig. 2.

Plan of the Sluice Gates
FLUSHING

The darker shade show the parts of the walls
cracked or blown down.

Section thro' a.d.





Nº 6

Road

Cut into

L. o. n.

S. C.



Attack
OF
FLUSHING
Between the 3^d & 15th of August
1809.



Plan of
BERGEN OP ZOOM
assaulted by the Troops

UNDER THE COMMAND OF

Lieut. Genl. Thos. Graham G.C.B.

1814.













R

Tagarro

A

U

G

A

T



GROUND in front of LISBON
(converted into Lines by
LORD WELLINGTON
in 1810

Good road

Military communication

Side of field works

Scale of British Statute Miles


Expressed for Major-General John Joseph R. D. et the Corps of Royal Engineers






achius





Plan
of
CONCEPTION
up in July 1810.
the orders of
Viscount Wellington.




600 feet





(Plan)
 of
 FORT CONCEPTION

drawn up in July 1841.

by the orders of
 Sir General Vincent Wellington.



Section on line a b












Fig. 5




Fig. 10




Fig. 4




Fig. 7



Fig. 9




Fig. 3



Fig. 6



Fig. 8





J. Neale & Co. 352 Strand

John Smith & Co. Royal Engineers




Fig. 11

Fig. 12









Fig. 13

Fig. 15



1/2 inch



J. Neale on 552 Strand.

George, William Lane, Royal Engineers.

Fig. 13



Fig. 21



Fig. 23




Fig. 16



Fig. 19



Fig. 22






Fig. 10



Fig. 21



Fig. 25



Fig. 17



Fig. 20



Fig. 22



Fig. 16




Fig. 19





Fig. 24

30 feet
20
10
5

Fig. 25



Fig. 24




Fig. 25




Fig. 26

