

JUDGMENT AS BELIEF

BY

Thomas Albert Lewis

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE BOARD OF UNIVERSITY STUDIES OF THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY IN CONFORMITY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

BALTIMORE

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CONTENTS.

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CHAPTER I.

Introductory—The Problem and Method.

In a rather uncritical fashion, it may be said that present theories of judgment fall into three classes. *First,* there are those theories that put judgment safely beyond the change of experience, beyond the power of growth and readjustment to disturb; *secondly,* there are those theories that are emphatically averse to this exaltation of judgment upon a throne where it shall forever rule over experience willy-nilly, but are rather in favor of putting experience itself on the throne; and, *thirdly,* there are those theories that strike a middle ground, that want to keep reason on the throne so that experience will not run away with itself into anarchy, but desire reason to be responsive to evolving life.

The first sort of judgments are found in formal logic. It can be said, with more or less truth, that this logic transcends actual, growing experience, individual and social, and forms a closed system of thought that sustains itself on a priori principles. It attempts by the use of the syllogism to weave a fabric of truth out of propositions that are not real fibers of existence, drawn from this sphere or that, from the world of fact or fiction, or some other. This logic, certain critics say, represents an endeavor to think at large, to gain knowledge through sheer reasoning with propositions as propositions, and not with propositions as they openly assert or tacitly presuppose some world to which the knowledge can refer.

The second kind of logical theory, which is the antipode of the theory just considered, belongs to the pragmatists. This doctrine exactly reverses things—that is, it gives stumbling, striving experience the place of honor and appoints judgment to serve. The pragmatist withdraws allegiance from all logic that claims to know more about guiding human happenings and events, as together or in succession they join in creating a life of progress and well-being, than the thought that is born of the travail of

those very events and happenings which it guides; he cuts loose from all the moorings of universal and necessary thought and floats away on the "flux of things" with no fixed point, to the right or to the left, behind or before, with no sun or stars in the sky except when present experience is in danger of going upon the rocks, and then it has to be a particular kind of sun or star—one made to order for this very experience, no universal sun or star being of the right uniqueness. To the pragmatist judgment is a projected plan that has no virtue in harmony of parts, but only in the way it works out in practice, the way it mends experience.

The third style of theory, that held by theorists who aim to strike a balance between the universalist and the particularist, criticize the former for pretending to be universal and necessary without being universal and necessary anywhere, and the latter for not generalizing the facts sufficiently to be able to corral them anywhere. To state this criticism in terms of present-day politics, the universalist is a "stand-patter," who believes in tariff from its very innate reasonableness, and the particularist is a "free-trader," who believes in letting each individual case settle its own affairs, as the occasion gives wisdom. One group of theorists over-emphasizes the authority of abstract thinking, and under-emphasizes the authority of concrete, active life, while the other, reversing the emphasis, commits the opposite error; the one worships the certain past, the other worships the uncertain future. The universality and necessity of formal logic are not false categories in their nature, but only in their use, *i. e.,* in being lifted out of experience and deified; neither, on the other hand, is changing experience (fluctuating phenomena) false *per se,* but only when it refuses to take its place in some realm of existence. It is a selective union of the two contrasting theories that is the desideratum—experience must not be allowed to divorce itself from relations, or relations from experience; thinking and action must join to satisfy all the facts of life.

The problem of bridging the abyss between abstract thought and concrete fact and event has furnished the motive for the investigation undertaken in this paper. Belief more than anything else seems to give promise of accomplishing the feat of satisfying conservative intellect and radical action, and that was

consequently the direction the investigation took. In this study my presentation is largely re-presentation; any originality it may have will be found mainly in the sifting and correlating of earlier thoughts on the subject. The paper is, indeed, a sort of census of those minds that have originated the chief ideas on belief. The census form consists of but two questions, first: "What is belief?" This was put to historical and present writers on psychology; then second, "Is judgment the same as belief?" and this was put to writers on worth theory, epistomology, and logic. The answers received to these questions, and the criticism and interpretation of those answers will, accordingly, be found to constitute the body of this investigation.

As to the results of the census: The first question which was asked of Hume, James Mill, John Stuart Mill, Bain, and as many modern psychologists, met with replies which strongly indicated that belief—whatever other attributes it might have—has these two: namely, an objective reference to reality, and a subjective reference to self. The second question, which was asked of Baldwin, Meinong, Bradley, Brentano, Urban, the Pragmatist, and others, received answers that tended to show that judgment has the very characteristics found to be the characteristics of belief—the subjective and objective characters. Baldwin's Genetic Logic has the genesis of judgment and the genesis of belief coinciding; Brentano, looking at judgment from the psychological as Baldwin does from the epistomological, sees judgment to be belief; both these men and others hold that judgment has existential reference; and Urban, through his worth theory, and the pragmatist, through his theory of logic, vie with each other in giving emphasis to the subjective control in life and judgment. Further support of the idea that judgment embodies in overt expression the dual nature of belief appears in a short criticism made of bare negation, the emptiness of which is easily explained upon the theory that identifies belief and judgment, and in a longer criticism of pragmatism, which aims to show that pragmatism supports the view of this paper—for in failing to reach belief, the pragmatist likewise fails to reach judgment, thus stopping at what Meinong, Baldwin and Urban call assumption.

CHAPTER II.

Past Psychological Theory.

Section I: Belief As Vivacity of Idea.

What is meant by Hume's theory, that "belief is a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression," will be most quickly, as well as most clearly brought out if we begin by setting forth the author's point of view. Perhaps the leading characteristic of Hume's philosophy is his skepticism; at any rate, we may be certain that in his treatment of belief, this motive leads. Reason is declared to be impotent as soon as it presumes upon its reputed authority; it is then no longer able to produce conviction. Outside of demonstrative and intuitive propositions, there is no such thing as certain knowledge. As soon as we attempt to gain truth inductively we land in the bog of "matter of fact," where knowledge can find no footing, and belief goes down in doubt.[1] Reason is chained to skepticism, and in spite of herself, she must give aid to her rival. The relation between belief and reason, as Hume regarded it, is well put in the following passage: "When I reflect on the natural fallibility of my judgment, I have less confidence in my opinions than when I only consider the objects concerning which I reason; and when I proceed still further to turn the scrutiny against every successive estimate I make of my faculties, all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last, a total extinction of belief and evidence."[2]

This brief consideration of the fundamental assumption of Hume's system of philosophy brings us without surprise—in fact, pretty much as a matter of course—to the statement that belief is not demonstrable, is not a state of mind "grounded in evidence." The more thought strives after judgments that give conviction of truth, the less the conviction grows. For abstruse and tortuous thinking serves only to drain away assurance. "It is not in the peculiar nature of our ideas or in their order that we find belief." The imagination with all its resources is not able so to join ideas that the mind will be moved to assert the reality they pretend. Nothing but artificial emptiness can ever result from the vain abstractions of the dogmatist. If we have conviction about matters of fact, they are to be credited to the natural

[1] Hume: A Treatise on Human Nature; p. 477.

[2] Ibid.; p. 474.

working of experience; to habit. The author is quite explicit on this point. "All reasonings concerning causes and effects," he asserts, "are derived from nothing but custom, and belief is more an act of the sensitive than of the cognitive part of our nature."[1] And again: "If belief were a simple act of thought, without any peculiar manner of conception or the addition of a force and vivacity, it must infallibly destroy itself, and in every case terminate in a total suspense of judgment."[2] The feeling of conviction is, accordingly, "a sort of automatic governor," with which nature has provided the human mind to save it from the despair of utter doubt. The natural flow of life's happenings breeds in us unavoidably the lively concept of an unquestioning judgment.

We have thus far found the pioneer student of the "nature of that act of mind which persuades of the truth of what we conceive" to be quite consistent in his conclusions. Belief is simple and spontaneous like sensation, and it is no more to be had by a quest into the land of abstract thinking than is sensation. It is the "superior force of vivacity or solidity or firmness or steadiness" an idea has from being connected with the present impression; in fine, belief is for Hume a precipitate of custom.

When, however, Hume undertakes to discover the causes of belief, he seems forced to enlarge on his earlier conception of it. In this connection, Carveth Read observes that "Hume's next remark takes us deeper; an impression of the senses communicates its vivacity and force to all the ideas related to it. Hence, memory is distinguished from imagination by its greater vivacity and also by the fixity and order of its ideas, derived from the order of the original impressions. Further, the vigor and vivacity of mental processes, and therefore, of belief, is favored by the attention; by the associative principles of resemblance and contiguity; and more especially, by causation and by repetition and custom. Even an idea of which we have forgotten the correspondent impression may itself become the ground of belief and inference; because whatever firmness or vivacity it has it must be able to bestow on whatever is related to it. 'Of these impressions or ideas of memory, we form a kind of system, comprehending whatever we remember to have been present, either to our internal

[1] Hume: A Treatise on Human Nature; p. 475.
[2] Ibid.

perception or senses; and every particular of that system, joined to the present impressions, we are pleased to call *reality*. But the mind stops not here. For, finding that with this system of perceptions, there is another connected by custom, or if you will, by the relation of cause and effect, it proceeds to the consideration of their ideas; and as it feels that it is in a manner necessarily determined to view these particular ideas, and that the custom or relation by which it is determined, admits not of the least change, it forms them into a new system, which it likewise dignifies with the title of *realities*. The first of the systems is the object of memory and the senses; the second, of the judgment. 'Tis the latter principle which peoples the world, and brings us acquainted with such existences as, by their removal in time and place, lie beyond the reach of senses and memory. Hence, although the passions and excitement of poetry and oratory, by increasing the force and vivacity of ideas, influence our beliefs, yet, by reflection and general rules, the understanding corrects the appearances of the senses,' and determines the judgment 'even contrary to present observation and experience.' Thus, in reviewing the causes of belief, Hume, starting from sensation as its origin, has effected a transition to science as still more coercive."[1]

That Carveth Read is justified in this criticism of Hume, is quite manifest. Hume could not give a full exposition of belief without incorporating in it an element of cognition. And, moreover, there is yet further evidence that belief functions only in cognitive situations. We have reference to the way Hume accounts for the belief in the physical world. By a propensity of the imagination, he explains, perceptions that are constant and perceptions that are coherent are made a sufficient excuse for setting up extra-mental existence. We may turn our backs upon a tree or a house or the sun, but that does not destroy these objects, for, turning about, we find them still. They are constant. Or again, if our experience has to do with objects that suffer change in a short lapse of time, we find that such objects vary as we come back to them, as in the case of a fire burning in the grate; but that the change is coherent. From the constancy of the perceptions of the sun, and the coherence in the perceptions of the

[1] Carveth Read: Metaphysics of Nature; pp. 9 f.

fire, it is but a step to the positing of independent existence; and the imagination takes that step—the unauthorized step which gains a "soul, and self, and substance."[1] But this imagination, this galley which after the oars of constancy and coherence have ceased to ply, carries on its course without any new impulse—what is it but reason, making inference beyond what is directly experienced; and what is the result but belief that is a conviction of active thought, and not of passive sensation? T. H. Green at this point criticises Hume as follows: "What then is the impression and what the associated idea? 'As the propensity to feign the continued existence of sensible objects arises from some lively impressions of the memory, it bestows a vivacity on that fiction; or, in other words, makes us believe a continued existence of body.' Well and good, but this only answers the first part of our question; it tells us what are the impressions in the supposed cause of belief, but not what is the associated idea to which their liveliness is communicated. To say that it arises from a propensity to feign, strong in proportion to the liveliness of the supposed impressions of memory, does not tell us of what impression it is a copy. Such a propensity indeed would be an impression of reflection, but the fiction itself is neither the propensity nor a copy of it. The only possible supposition left for Hume would be that it is a 'compound idea;' but what combination of 'perceptions' can amount to the existence of perceptions when they are not perceived?"[2]

In explaining the cause of our belief in independent existence, Hume plainly resorts to mental processes that are more than mere sensations or feelings; the "propensity of the imagination" is not a passive inference, but an active one. Two "perceptions" in memory may resemble each other so closely that the second "fits with ease into the mold of the first;" or again, two perceptions may rest upon each other in a dependence that makes the second seem a continuation of the first; but nothing short of *thinking* can relate the single perceptions, and by processes of discrimination, comparison and associative integration, identify them as being of one object. When taken objectively, not as merely psychological process, belief is found really to have meant

[1] Hume: Human Nature; p. 484.

[2] T. H. Green: General Introduction to Hume's Treatise; p. 262.

for Hume, not simply a sentiment, but what Carveth Read calls "the subjective acceptance of reality."

Section II: Belief as an Inseparable Association of Ideas.

Association, which in Hume modestly suggested itself as merely one of the factors of belief, proclaims itself in James Mill the sole cause of all human convictions. Belief is reduced to mere mechanism, is ultra-rational, and besides, lacking attention, which alone gives an outlet for psychic control, is barren of all spontaneity of feeling, of emotion, or of action. This theory in the hands of Mill is made to explain with ease and admirable simplicity all cases of belief from that in sensation to that in judgment. For these phenomena are each a combination of parts. A sensation, indeed, is somewhere and for someone. A present sensation, of its very nature, makes the mind which has it say, "I have it; it's there; and it's one." Within this complex of elements (the ideas of position, of unity, and of myself) there obtain indissoluble relations, and therefore, *ex hypothesi,* belief. Thus, the author remarks, "when I say, 'I have a sensation,' and say, 'I believe that I have it,' I do not express two states of consciousness, but one and the same state." [1]

So much for simple cases, "where belief consists of sensation alone or ideas alone," but what of belief in the more complicated[2] cases, where "sensations, ideas, and associations are combined?" How, for example, is our belief in the existence of objects present to the senses, accounted for by the irresistible connection of ideas? Here, as we shall find, the theory of inseparable association completely expands itself. In going from belief in the isolated sensation or idea to belief in the object of this sensation or idea, consciousness finds the way long. But the distance is made less difficult by being broken up into parts. The first part of this course through experience serves to bring the different sense-activities together, and thus to make possible that coalescence which incorporates into one sensation (usually, that of sight) the consequence of the rest; and with the concrete result that in subsequent time, when the eye catches sight of a "rose," it is not merely a sensation of color that is had in consciousness, but also

[1] James Mill: Analysis of the Human Mind; vol. 1, p. 342.

[2] Ibid; p. 377.

an anticipation, by instantaneous inference, of the feel of the rose, of its distance away, of its smell or taste, etc., all these correlated experiences springing up with the color experience by association. In the language of the author, "we believe we should have these (other) sensations. That is, we have the idea of these sensations inseparably united one with the other, and inseparably united with ourselves as having them." [1]

At the end of our first advance toward the realization of a belief in the "existence of external objects present to the senses," we have the "conviction that, in such and such circumstances, we should have such and such sensations." But the mind does not stop here. The sensation that, under certain conditions, I believe I may have, is an effect that owes its existence to a still more fundamental existence acting as its cause. And by association which obtains irresistibly between cause and effect, we are carried beyond the sensations that fuse to make the rose of our ideas, to the corresponding qualities that cause these sensations, and that inhere in a single object or substratum which unites them as the mind did the several sensations, but with the result that we have a real objective rose. That this is the genesis and essence of a sense object, and a sufficient apology for our ardent belief in it, Mill stands ready to prove with the best of illustrations.

Belief in memory or testimony, in future events, and in a proposition, Mill bases likewise on a mechanical linking together of ideas.[2] And it may be said both of these phenomena and of those of the external sense, that the conviction they elicit is explained by this theory, not erroneously, but rather insufficiently. Muscular resistance and uncontrollableness are of course the chief factors in our belief in external reality. But Hume's "lively idea related to or associated with a present impression" explains better our belief in memory. Mill, in fact, begs the question, as Adamson charges, when he states that the idea of a past experience and of myself as having had the experience, gives memory its certainty; for that contains in itself the very element which is supposed to be got out of their conjunction. Of expectation, Adamson remarks that ideas irresistibly suggested by present experiences are not necessarily believed, and that many of our

[1] Mill: Analysis of the Human Mind; p. 349.
[2] Analysis of the Human Mind; pp. 382-9.

beliefs do not arise from such association.[1] Again, belief in testimony is in reality belief in an event which is inseparably associated as consequent to the testimony as antecedent. J. S. Mill takes issue with his father at this point, touching both testimony and proposition, the latter being for James Mill but the automatic coupling of two clusters of ideas that stand for the same thing; as for example, "man and rational animal." "Every assertion concerning things, whether in concrete or in abstract language," runs the criticism, "is an assertion that some fact, or group of facts, has been, is, or may be expected to be, found wherever a certain other fact, or group of facts, is found."[2]

In conclusion, it suffices to repeat that the "association theory" is too narrow for the facts; that belief in physical objects would scarcely come if there were only the intimate conjunction of ideas "in our heads," and no stubborn, involuntary, obstructing nature to bring it; that belief in past or future events scarcely derives its feeling-force from such a mechanical operation; and that to consider belief in an assertion as belief that two names are names of the same thing, is, as J. S. Mill protests, to give an inadequate explanation of the import of any assertion except those that are classed as merely verbal.[3] Though belief is, as we are endeavoring to establish, always cognitive, it is not to be considered as only cognitive; association is barren unless rooted in apperception or a causal activity on the part of the psychological subject.

Section III: Belief as Ultimate Assent.

What is John Stuart Mill's conception of the nature and cause of belief, is revealed in the following short bit of criticism which is substantially his: "We do not believe whatever comes into our heads."[4] The associationalists had laid down such principles as the following: "All cases of belief are simply cases of indissoluble association. There is no generic difference, but only a difference in the strength of the association, between a case of belief and a case of mere imagination. To believe a succession

[1] Encyclopedia Britannica; 9th edition; article on "Belief."
[2] J. S. Mill; Critical notes to James Mill's Analysis; vol. 1, p. 417.
[3] Ibid.; vol. 1, p. 417.
[4] Ibid.; p. 407.

or co-existence between two facts is only to have the ideas of the two facts so strongly and closely associated, that we cannot help having the one idea when we have the other.[1] And it was these claims of the "association psychology" which John Stuart Mill had to face when he came to consider the subject of belief, and to them it was that he opposed the pointed objection that we do not attach reality-significance to whatever ideas tend to stick together in our heads. "Assuredly, an association, however close, between two ideas, is not a sufficient ground of belief; is not evidence that the corresponding facts are united in external nature. The theory seems to annihilate all distinction between the belief of the wise, . . . and the belief of fools."[2]

In sense-experience "inseparable associations do not always generate belief, nor does belief always require as one of its conditions, an inseparable association; we can believe that to be true which we are capable of conceiving or representing to ourselves as false; and false, what we are capable of representing to ourselves as true."[3] To explain and at the same time to enforce this argument, the writer calls attention to the common observation, that when one railway train in motion is passing another at rest, we are able, by withholding our vision from any third object, to imagine the motion in either train. That of two contradictory associations, we may believe either, is also attested, Mill thinks, by the fact that astronomers and educated persons, though convinced that the earth moves about the sun, are able to see "sunset either as the earth tilting above ths sun, or the sun dipping below the earth." Again, men who have studied Berkeley do not believe they see the magnitude of an object.[4]

If association fails to prove its claim as being the source of our sense assurance, it is next a question of how it vindicates itself in memory and in judgment. That consciousness distinguishes between ideas of memory and the ideas of imagination, James Mill thinks to be explicable on two grounds. In the first place, he says it may be justly supposed that the distinction which is originally made between the sensation and the idea would carry

[1] Critical Notes to James Mill's Analysis; vol. I, p. 402.
[2] Ibid; p. 407.
[3] Ibid; p. 418.
[4] Ibid.; pp. 407-11.

on into memory; and in the second place, the idea of self, which in all memory forms part of the complex idea, sets in contrast the memory of sensation and the memory of a mere idea by entering into the former as a "sentient self;" and into the latter as a "conceptive self;" and "myself percipient and myself imagining or conceiving, are two very different states of consciousness." [1] J. S. Mill takes exception to this, and protests that he can form, by force of creative thought, as vivid an idea of himself on the field of Shrewsbury, listening to Falstaff in his characteristic soliloquy over the body of Hotspur, as he can of himself in the presence of General LaFayette, whom he once met. And as to memory and imagination being distinguished, so to speak, before they are born, *i. e.*, in their prototypal sensations and ideas, such a procedure but passes the difficulty to the other hand; there is no solution to be found in the distinction between the original sensation and the idea (mere fiction of the mind) unless it be that the distinction between memory and imagination is also primordial.[2] But such an explanation reduces association to a work of supererogation.

In the case of the judgment of belief in the validity of evidence, the younger Mill comes into close quarters with the elder by conveying his criticism of association through the very example which his father used to corroborate association; the example, namely, of the sailors shipwrecked on a remote island, trying to decide whether the footstep in the sand were that of a man or a monkey. Their decision would be made, said James Mill, only when the evidence was strong enough one way or the other to resist all contradictory evidence, and to clinch its complex of ideas in an indissoluble union. But this irresistible coalescence of ideas is not absolutely essential for a judgment, says J. S. Mill in reply, because, even after gaining conclusive evidence that the footprint was that of a monkey, it would be possible for the sailors to associate it with a man as having made it.[3] Accordingly, the question still remains, What is belief? "What is the difference to our minds between thinking of reality, and representing to ourselves an imaginary picture?" And this question John Stuart Mill does not attempt to answer, if to answer means to explain

[1] Critical Notes to James Mill's Analysis; p. 420.
[2] Ibid.; pp. 422 f.
[3] Ibid.; p. 434.

in terms of something else. He simply says: "I confess that I can perceive no escape from the opinion that the distinction is ultimate and primordial." [1]

Of John Stuart Mill we may conclude, as we began, by saying that belief (at least, of the educated) is not "baited" by every accidental union of ideas in the mind, however close that union may be. Not that we are never influenced in making up our convictions and giving our assent, by the mechanical linkings of our thought, but that the power of these associations is not absolute; belief is larger than association. We pin our faith, not to inseparable association, he would say, for it is not inseparable; but to the "underlying uniformity of nature;" [2] and to it we risk our all, believing that consequent will invariably follow antecedent.

Section IV: Belief as Action.

Whether it is that new facts are always coming above the horizon of human experience, and indeed, of reality, and confounding old theories; or simply that the facts existing are of too vast a number (even the representative ones) to be brought within the ken of a single life, is a question that is again in mind as we come to the study of Alexander Bain. Phenomena that ought to be classed under belief were running wild beyond the confines of "sentiment or feeling," or of "inseparable association," or even of "ultimate assent." It was Bain's ambition to project a theory that would be thoroughly comprehensive. He accordingly declared that at bottom, belief is action; "action is the basis and ultimate criterion of reality." [3]

To say with James Mill that conviction is an association of ideas is to reduce belief, Bain argued, to a mental state that is ultra-rational and static; it is to forget that belief is a motor phenomenon, and that it expresses itself in attitude or movement; it is to make the mistake of thinking to find a true resultant when one component, and that the main one, is left out. The correct view of the question is to be had from the side, not of antecedent, but of consequent. We have the clue to the real character of belief in the connection between faith and works. "The practical

[1] Critical Notes to James Mill's Analysis, p. 412.
[2] Ibid.; p. 436.
[3] Bain: The Emotions and the Will; 4th edition, p. 506.

test applied to a man's belief in a certain matter is his acting upon it."[1] This conception of the nature and origin of human assurance, explained as it is by the working of our own experience, had likewise no need for an *a priori* principle, whether that principle be a lively idea or an ultimate assent.

Bain's position means more than that a conviction tends to—or does—manifest itself in an outward action, if the exciting situation permits; it is no such tempered view as that; it means that there is no conviction but has its essence in an accompanying thought of possible or immediate action, however remote or indirect the latter may be. "If I am thirsty, I may say that I believe myself to be thirsty, because I act accordingly; I cannot assure myself or any other person that I am not under a dream, an imagination, or a hallucination, in any other way than by a course of voluntary exertion corresponding to the supposed sensation."[2] The author's determination to prove action indispensable to belief appears still more boldly in a second case. He believes that he yesterday ran up against a wall to keep out of the way of a carriage. There is no disposition to do anything in consequence of this memory, yet, it is a conviction. And this because, says Bain, "I feel that if there were any likelihood of being jammed up in that spot again, I should not go that way if I could help it."[3] It is a readiness to act that makes belief "something more than fancy." Even the conviction that obtains in the highest theoretical knowledge is amenable to the action-theory. The reason that such knowledge is seldom reduced to action is "not want of faith, but want of opportunity."[4]

Such stress as we have found Bain laying upon the action element in belief is almost enough to eclipse from view any other element (or elements) it may have; assurance attaches to voluntary activity; it attaches also to spontaneous activity. "Our natural state of mind; our primitive start, is tantamount to full confidence;" "in its essential character, belief is a phase of our active nature."[5] But we are luckily saved from such a mis-

[1] Bain: Emotions and the Will; 4th edition, p. 508.
[2] Ibid.; p. 508.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.; p. 507.
[5] Notes to Mill's Analysis; pp. 394 ff.

understanding of the author by coming upon statements that definitely disclaim place for experience in a primordial impulse; mere persistence in action that is bringing pleasure or alleviating pain, has no accompanying state of confidence. Activity that is itself its own end, gives no basis for the expectation of attaining something remote, by a certain means; and for Bain the only kind of confidence possible is confidence in means to an end.[1] It is "a fiction or a figure to speak of belief in a present reality."[2] The author accordingly remarks that "while, therefore, action is the basis and ultimate criterion of belief, there enters into it as a necessary element some cognizance of the order of nature, of the course of the world."[3]

By the cognitive constituents necessarily present in all belief is not meant, however, a reasoning state of mind; *i. e.,* not this alone. We do not wait for the reflections of experience and the consequent inseparable association before we launch our trust; "belief follows the absence of contradiction." "The natural mind has a predetermined bias to action," but let thought open ever so small an outlet, action breaks forth into belief! Belief at its maximum, too, for larger experience but sets up checks and indicates the direction of safe travel. Thus, although convictions function only where there is some knowledge, the amount required at the beginning is remarkably meager—just a mere observation of some sequence in nature, such as seen, for example, by a young child which, given sweetmeats at one time, expects the same again upon the second appearance of the donor. This nice balance for action, for motor response, seen in its simplicity in animals, children and savages, Bain considers the leading fact in belief; a fact which he terms "Primitive Credulity," or "an impotence of thought;" the latter, because, "without some positive interference from without, there is no other way of doing or thinking."[4]

There is no need for words concerning the importance of the "action theory." Its value is attested by the place it occupies, more or less modified, in the theories of today. This conception

[1] Emotions and Will; pp. 505 f.
[2] Notes to Mill's Analysis; p. 342.
[3] Emotions and Will; p. 506.
[4] Ibid.; p. 537.

of belief gives a just and needed emphasis to the practical aspect of human experience. It suggests the "passional nature" of James, and the "motor attitude or accommodation" of Baldwin. Moreover, the cognitive element which attaches to belief justifies the statement that for Bain belief was of reality. To have belief in water as being of a certain compound means, he says, that I believe I should, if I analyzed water, find those elements.

CHAPTER III.

Present Psychological Theory.

In this division, we shall pursue the same method as in the preceding one; the different writers to be treated will be presented both constructively and critically. But whereas in the foregoing chapter, we have been considering theory as attaching to a particular individual, we shall now consider the various theories of belief as represented by a number of individuals. This has its advantages, and can really be done in a general way; for present theories of belief can scarcely resist classification under feeling, intellection, or will. A second variation on the procedure of the first division will be the supplementing of the more general psychological treatment of belief with brief reports of the limited data which have been gathered in pathological and experimental investigations.

Section I: Descriptive.

(A) Belief with Feeling Paramount.

Walter Bagehot and Professor William James may be looked upon as continuing in a modified and developed form the theory of Hume, with the important difference, however, that they assign to the intellect and the active nature a share in the determination of belief, while giving the leading role to feeling.

Belief is recognized by Bagehot as having an intellectual as well as an emotional element;[1] but not having such a preponderating intellectual element as the "quiet, careful people who have written our treatises" give it. And it is to bring forward the emotional side of the subject that the writer expresses himself so emphatically in defining belief as "emotional conviction."

[1] Bagehot: The Emotion of Conviction; Literary Studies.

"Probably," he forecasts, "when the subject is thoroughly examined, 'conviction' will be proved to be one of the intensest of human emotions." Indeed, some such view of assurance seems necessary to explain the tenacity or burning certainty of those convictions that assert themselves after the intellectual incentive has gone, or that transcend that incentive. Only thus could the author himself account for the fact that he still remained susceptible to the conviction that he should be "member for Bridgewater," when years had passed since his defeat. And only thus can we account for such conduct as that of Calif Omar, who burnt the Alexandrian library upon the flimsy pretext that, "All books which contained what is not in the Koran are dangerous; all those which contain what is in the Koran are useless."

The writer thinks his position, that belief is not a "purely intellectual matter," further established by our experience in dreams "where we are always believing, but scarcely ever arguing;" and by the abnormal belief that the insane suffer as fixed illusions, a belief that has a degree of intensity never realized by the sane. But the argument he makes the most of in this connection is that by which he endeavors to show that certain ideas possess of themselves the power to generate assurance without the exercise of the intellectual process; the ideas, namely, that are clear, or intense, or constant, or interesting. These ideas are designated as tendencies to irrational conviction and adhesive states of consciousness.

These four groups of ideas, moreover, give Bagehot a basis of attack on Bain's sweeping assertion that belief is identical with our "activity or active disposition," and support his assumption that children are born believing, and become skeptical only with the checks and disappointments of hard, non-acquiescing experience. Doubt is defined as "hesitation in these ideas, produced by collision." This collision, however, never puts us fully on our guard against these insidious ideas, and thus, we retain even in our adult, hesitating stage, "vestiges of our primitive, all-believing state."

Miss Ettie Stettheimer, in a critical study entitled "The Will to Believe as a Basis for a Defense of Religious Faith," [1] quoting

[1] Archives of Philosophy; edited by Frederick J. E. Woodbridge; No. 2, December, 1907; p. 64.

from Hans Cornelius, says: "There are two possible methods for a research into the conditions of belief. One may start with a fixed definition of the real, and then deduce from it what marks our ideas must show in order to be characterized as real; or, one may proceed inductively, and search for the common qualities of those ideas which are generally believed, and thus determine the nature of reality." She then goes on to say that James attempts to carry through the second of these methods. And her observation is as serviceable as it is true. For to gain any comprehension of Professor James' treatment of belief without first placing one's self on the side of the Ego (the common-sense Ego), so one can see what ideas it chooses as real, would be a thing as impossible as undertaking to make the cart pull the horse; because the force that decides reality is not external, but internal.

But even with this suggestion to guide the reader through the chapter on the "Perception of Reality," [1] he yet meets with difficulties. One such perplexity is as to the way the experience of doubt could ever arise to vex the Ego, if the Ego decided the truth of things wholly by the postulate of its own inner nature. It is quite natural for the new-born mind to turn the hallucinatory candle into a reality, since there is no other object present in consciousness to protest. But it is quite different when the world has grown hard and stern, and squarely contradicts the child in his natural conceit; the tables are then turned. And it is in such and only such a situation that the congenital tendency to accept without question anything and everything, becomes tempered with curbing doubts. Having found the danger of a passive acquiescence in the lead of the emotions or active nature, the child no longer trusts everything; about some things he takes a second thought. Without recognizing stubborn controlling facts over against us, it is a mystery why the boy with his winged horse should ever meet with contradicting conditions. Indeed, Professor James, as Miss Stettheimer asserts, does seem almost forced to declare for space-reality, a world extra mentem, simply to have something for belief to go out upon. She refers to the passage in the Principles of Psychology where he speaks of the candle existing "over there.....in space, related to our reals." [2]

[1] James: Principles of Psychology; vol ii, p. 318.

[2] Archives of Philosophy; edited by Frederick J. E. Woodbridge; No. 2, December, 1907; p. 69.

And following this out logically, one could say of the illusory candle that it became unreal for the experience having it, only when it was found not to exist in real space alongside of other reals.

If, however, there are times when the author's presentation of belief as the "mental state, or function of reality."[1] tries comprehension even beyond its capacity, there are other times, many of them, when the understanding moves along with facility. The consideration of belief as an emotion furnishes an example of the latter. In this, James agrees with Bagehot, and says that "in its inner nature, belief, or the sense of reality, is a sort of feeling allied to the emotions more than to anything else."[2] But it is concerning the circumstances "in which we think things real," that Professor James carries on most of his investigation; for about all that can be said of belief as the "sense of reality," is that it is a state of consciousness *sui generis,* a feeling that feels like itself. How important a part is accorded the emotions in the matter of conviction may be seen from two or three quotations. "Every exciting thought in the natural man carries credence with it."[3] "The whole history of witchcraft and medicine is a commentary on the facility with which anything which chances to be conceived is believed the moment the belief chimes in with the emotional mood." "Belief consists in the emotional reaction of the entire man upon an object." Mere appearance, bare appeal to the intellect, is not enough to "sting" us with assurance. In order to move us to belief, an object must be interesting and important; it must come to the mind, as Hume said, as a lively and active idea. This is attested by our "everlasting partiality to the sense-world, or the world of our practical life."[4] How, at their height, emotions lead us to believe the first thing that comes to mind, is instanced by the unreasoned conviction of the mob.

In the first paragraph of this brief review of James' theory of belief, it was said that the only way to compass the author's meaning is by the way of the Ego. Let us then adopt that course.

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[1] James: Principles of Psychology; vol. ii, p. 283.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.; pp. 286 ff.
[4] Ibid.; p. 294 f.

We are immediately met with the assertion that the "*fons et origo* of all reality is the Self." While Stout and Baldwin posit two controls, inner activity and outer limitation, James would place the whole matter in the hands of one control—the Self. He might be considered as saying in Shakesperian style, "It is not in our objects but in ourselves that we are believers." "Certain postulates are given in our nature; and whatever satisfies those postulates is treated as if real."[1] This prerogative of the Ego reaches its climax at the end of the chapter on "Perception of Reality," and belief and will are said to be exactly the same states of mind. "Will and Belief, in short, meaning a certain relation between objects and the Self, are two names for one and the same psychological phenomenon."[2] The only difference between them is physiological; which seems to mean that in both these phenomena there is a "consent" to the existence of the object, a turning to it in an interested, active, emotional way, but that in Will there is added a new physiological element, that of effort.

Professor James summarizes his whole position in one short sentence, as folllows: "The most compendious possible formula, perhaps, would be that our belief and attention are the same fact."[3] He offers this definition with the hope of incorporating into a single view all the earlier views that persist each by virtue of a certain truth, but a partial truth; the view of James Mill, of Bain, and of Sully. "For the moment, what we attend to is reality; attention is a motor reaction, and we are so made that sensations force attention from us."

(B) Belief with Cognition as an Indispensable Element.

As representative of those who consider that belief can exist only on some kind of cognitive basis, we shall examine the views of Sully, Stout, and Baldwin. These writers, coming at the problem from two different directions, bringing evidence from both the analytic and the genetic sources, and finding in it all a unit-signification, are able to present argument of double weight. And for them, belief has emphatically a reference to an extra-mental reality, to a reality beyond the mere ideas that are in

[1] Principles of Psychology; vol. II, p. 317.
[2] Ibid.; p. 321.
[3] Ibid.; p. 322.

consciousness; belief for them has its roots, at least its main roots, in the representativeness of knowledge. They do not say, however, that belief is knowledge and nothing else; that it has no intrinsic nature of its own, but is merely a shadow or reflection; they contend only that belief and cognition operate always in conjunction. This view does not underrate conviction in its inner active nature; its impulse, its propelling spontaneity, its character as the focal expression of all that is creative in conscious life; it simply gives ground upon which conviction can support itself. If belief spun its object out of its own nature, then there would be neither object nor belief, for all would be an objectless immediacy.

Sully's point of view toward belief is best set forth in his work, "Sensation and Intuition," in the chapter, "Belief: Its Variations and Its Conditions." In this chapter he takes up the subject in an acute and exhaustive manner, working out, perhaps, the most complete psychological research yet made in this field. His primary assumption is that "every idea involves a mental impulse to realize the corresponding sensation," and that this psychic fact is the last "inaccessible stage" in the history of belief.[1] By notable skill in choosing pertinent illustrations, he is able to marshal an array of evidence sufficient to turn his assumption into a very credible theory. The experience of certainty has thus, even in its germ form, an objective mark or condition. Assurance when in its embryo state gives promise of that objective development expressed by the writer in these words: "To believe means to believe in something; and in order to do this, a definite idea of the thing believed in is necessary."[2] Or, again, by saying that "the reference of thought beyond itself to a real object is a part, and a very important part, of what is meant by belief."[3]

That the exercise of cognition is a prerequisite condition of any and every experience of conviction, becomes more and more manifest as belief, rising out of mere objective tendency, *i. e.*, unwitting acceptance, develops from simple expectation and reflective anticipation to logical conviction. As experience unfolds in growth, it defines, differentiates and magnifies itself; features that were at

[1] Sully: Sensation and Intuition; p. 81.
[2] Sensation and Intuition; p. 81.
[3] Human Mind, p. 87.

first vague and indistinct become marked and positive. If we trace briefly the genetic investigation Sully makes of belief in the chapter referred to, we shall meet results that show the relation between knowing and believing to be very intimate.

We remember an earlier statement of the author's assumption with respect to the origin of human certainty and confidence: "Every idea involves a mental impulse to realize the corresponding sensation." But it may be well to emphasize another: "Belief arises," we read, "from the inherent tendency of the idea to approximate in character and intensity to the sensation of which it is the offspring."[1] "In the instinctive transitions of mind from a recurring idea to the actual sensation typified by it, there seem to present themselves the first awkward, but necessary, trials of human faith."[2] A simple and unique mental force is here posited, but it is attached to the idea as a sort of craving for the "real" which the idea knows about, but confesses not to have. And that this is not a fancy but a fact is strikingly attested, as Sully points out, by the conduct of higher animals, of children, of uncultured men and of savage races. The young mind easily yields to illusion; it is constantly taking vivid ideas for impressions. And the savage cannot resist attributing personal life to stumps and rocks and logs of human form. Conditions of mind that in the mature life can be brought about only by artificial means, by some drug, such as an opiate, occur in early life quite naturally, and for the reason that sensation and idea are not far from each other in intensity. At this immature stage, we are told, consciousness has not yet really objectified its experiences, not divided space and time into segments or points of reference; not even made the grand divisions of known and unknown; past and present; actual and possible.

To this first level of belief, Bain objected, and criticised Sully for not taking account of the order and sequence in nature—facts which the former thinks essentials, and correlates of all assurance. It is true that to think of an experience having none of those large orienting categories, is to think of an experience set afloat, so to speak, without any bearings. But that may be for the reason that we are looking back from the high ground of

[1] Human Mind; p. 484.
[2] Ibid.; p. 83.

logical organization. At any rate, Sully maintained that these "bearings" take on definite character only with the further development of experience; only, that is, with the arrival of anticipation and its consequent disappointment. And certainly that argument is difficult of refutation which holds that disappointed expectation precedes and provokes reflection upon the past, upon the relation of antecedent to consequent. As long as the child is not deceived in his expectations, but always finds an orange the thing his idea pictured, just so long is he going to be ignorant of sequence in nature, and happy in his ignorance. It is only when the orange proves to be, not an orange, but a painted ball, which is not constituted of juicy bites that the child begins to scrutinize its shape, color, texture and other attributes. Nothing but the thwarting of credulous expectation will drive the young mind to consider the basis of his definite anticipation, and give him incentive to look into the deeper significance of antecedent and consequent, which Bain calls the correlate of assurance.[1] It alone will awaken this "conceptive faculty or imagination," which is the other grand influence (besides disappointment) in transforming our first overweening trust into deliberate conclusions of reason, and which transforms an indeterminate, formless world into a world having all the form and meaning given by the great categories of co-existence, sequence, and permanent existence.

Our study of James Sully thus far may be summarized by saying that belief demands as the necessary condition of its advent into life, some rudimentary experience, "more especially some sensation,"[2] and that this meager experience becomes in mature belief, definite, objective fact, existing for presentation as permanent, independent objects. This in psychological belief is the same as in logical. "Belief in a proposition," he says, "is a belief in its truth; that is, in its correspondence with the actual relation of things."[3] But the question we want to raise now is, What of inseparable associations, emotion, action—does Sully count them as conditions of belief. The answer is short—he does, but not as indispensable conditions. He accepts J. S. Mill's criticism of

[1] Human Mind; p. 93.
[2] Ibid.; p. 81.
[3] Outlines of Psychology; p. 398.

inseparable association (it does not account for our choosing between memory and imagination) against identifying belief with emotion. He reasons thus: "The mode of its (belief's) origin, the impartial range of its objects, and the fact that it holds common relation to all the emotions properly so called, renders it very desirable to classify them together."[1] With respect to the claim of the action-theory to account for all human conviction, he remonstrates that there are in our experience beliefs that cannot possibly be explained on the basis of action; as for example, the case when the expectation of coming harm becomes paralyzing terror. The raw material of belief is not to be found in feeling, emotion, or action; belief is ultimate. Feeling and action, however, have an effect on assurances, but not directly; only mediately, through ideas, which alone have a direct bearing upon conviction. Comprehensively and compactly put, belief at its full includes for this author intellectual representation, feeling and active impulse, and if it be of the ideal kind, also a certain amount of restraining will.

Stout undertakes an explanation of belief from an analytical point of view, and works out a theory of much breadth. This theory is sufficiently comprehensive to include both the action-theory of Bain and the association theory of James Mill. Bain held that the "relation of belief to activity is expressed by saying that what we believe, we act upon." This Stout approves. There is no question that a confident state of mind tends to express itself in action; conviction and activity are really correlated to each other. Bain's mistake was not that he made his theory too sweeping, but that he did not make it sweeping enough. Limiting action to phenomena extrinsic to the mind was where he made his mistake. "He considers only trains of muscular movements, producing a corresponding train of effects in the material environment. But even where such trains exist, the mental action with which belief is connected, does not consist in these overt movements, but in the prior process of framing a plan. But there is no essential difference between this inward process and that by which we work out a theoretical result without reference to external action."[2] And so, whether the experience be theoretical or

[1] Sensation and Intuition; p. 100.

[2] Stout; Analytical Psychology; vol II, p. 237.

practical, it makes no difference; the same principle applies in one case as well as in the other; confidence and action are correlates. In either case, we act only because we are thus trusting the means to the end. The action-theory, made thus thoroughgoing, becomes immune to a large part of the criticism that proved the position of Bain vulnerable; such criticism, for example, as that "psychical activity seems physiologically to consist in muscular activity," and "that it will rain tomorrow seems almost the same as buying an umbrella today."[1] In the opinion of Stout, "it is needless to say that the theoretical series must be through and through constituted by beliefs; and that our confidence in the result depends on our confidence in the antecedent steps. . . .The whole body of beliefs forms a system of interdependent parts; it is the coherence of the system which constitutes the possibility of its component elements."[2]

It is, of course, plainly to be seen that this active aspect of belief is in intimate relation with the author's "Conative and Cognitive Synthesis." We see it in the following statements: "A practical need is one which demands for its ultimate satisfaction an actual change produced in the environment, or in the relation of the organism to the environment; or at least, in the consciousness of the power to produce such change. Theoretical needs, on the contrary, require for their ultimate satisfaction only an extension of knowledge and removal of doubt without alteration in the things known." And again: "In the beginning of mental life, practical needs are paramount. Purely intellectual curiosity disengages itself from these by a process of gradual evolution."[3] The fact that "the growth of our intellectual nature consists in the growing definiteness and determinateness of our 'active' nature,"[4] is a presupposition of all belief, is quite manifest from the criticism which Stout prefers against Bain when he, perhaps in an attempt to take account of positive convictions, modifies his original theory of the nature of belief, and declares the correct view to be "that belief is a primitive disposition to follow out any sequence that has once been experienced, and to

[1] Bradley: Logic; pp. 18 ff.
[2] Stout: Analytical Psychology; vol II, p. 237.
[3] Analytical Psychology; vol. II, pp. 93 f.
[4] Ibid.; p. 237.

expect results."[1] Stout's objection is that "this statement implies a theoretical interest which has no existence in the rudimentary stages of mental life." The basic fact that we have to remember as we cross over to the "passive aspect" of the theory in hand, is that both the practical and theoretical activity is directed to an end, and depends upon the condition of confidence in the intervening steps or means; that as practical conation is solely directed to the effecting of an unobstructed course for trains of extrinsic changes, mediating a desired object, just so theoretical conation is solely directed to the attainment of an unobstructed course for trains of thought, likewise mediating a desired end.

Belief as limitation of activity, and belief as a condition of activity, are maintained by Stout to be co-extensive and interdependent. They are the two sides of the same shield. Indeed, confidence would be an impossibility but for the restraining circumstances set up by nature, requiring definite means to reach a definite end. It is as much a truth that we cannot experience conviction without the force of limiting conditions as it is that we cannot walk without walking upon something. "The steps of a process, issuing in a given result, are fixed independently of us. In devising means to an end, therefore, we are not free to make what mental combinations we will."[2]

Limitation of subjective activity, then, as we are distinctly told, is an indispensable factor in assurance. But what does this imply? How belief leads to action, we know, but here the situation is reversed, and belief follows action. The answer, however, is not difficult. By the limitative, or passive aspect of truth, is meant simply the recognition of an objective control. The control by which we lay hold of the means, and bring ourselves to a desired end is an inner control; but the control which makes us consider means, bringing us up with a tug when we neglect such consideration, and which early convinces credulous natures that "wishing is not having," that control is outer. But outer does not mean something that is foreign to our subjective experience; on the contrary, it is a very present fact which asserts its rights both in presentation and representation, directly, as sense objects, or indirectly as determining ideas.

[1] Analytical Psychology; vol. II, p. 238.

[2] Ibid.; p. 239.

"The limitation of subjective activity," the author writes, "may take two distinct forms. We find ourselves forced to think in a given manner, in spite of an attempt to think otherwise. In this case, the limitation is an actual opposition or obstruction. This happens whenever the mind entertains the possibility of an alternative which it is ultimately driven to reject. On the other hand, there may be no attempt to think otherwise.[1] As a typical example of the latter, we may think of a man feeling the noon-day sun beating upon his head. The mind here entertains no possibility of an alternative. "There is no question that the Sun is shining." The former type of limitation—that of opposition or obstruction to subjective activity, is instanced by the child sucking at an empty bottle, or by the inability of the schoolboy to "think '5 plus 6 equals 12' if he separates the '6' into its units and adds them one by one to '5'."[2] In broad outline the fields represented by these three illustrations (which show the significance of the passive side of belief) are as follows: "Impressional Experience," "Physical Resistance," "Inseparable Association," and indirectly, "Desire" and "Imagination."

A striking feature of Baldwin's treatment of belief, is his endeavor to give the phenomenon full cognitive standing by eliminating its undeveloped or germ-forms, and segregating them under a separate name: "Reality-Feeling." This represents a distinction in belief phenomena that for a long time has been coming. And the distinction is an important one. For, as long as the term Belief was allowed to continue its old significance, and to include a range and diversity of meaning that no single word could compass, there was no hope of keeping any fences in the field; destructive criticism had too much license.

Definite treatment of the "Reality-Feeling" is deferred to a later chapter, where it will be taken up more specifically. The treatment here will be general, only so much as it required to make the author's theory clear in its other parts. There is a similarity between the import of reality-feeling and the import of an earlier expression we came upon in Bain—that of "Primitive Credulity." In Sully, also, we found belief-phenomena of a nature resembling this; it is the phenomena that appear in the

[1] Analytical Psychology; vol. II, p. 239.
[2] Ibid.; p. 243.

mental life of the child before he has become, through disappointed anticipations, skeptical and reflective; it might be called the phenomena of the pre-belief period; the stage of natural trust and of unthinking confidence. But reality-feeling, though it has prototypes, is not without variation upon these prototypes. The phrases, "primitive start," "over-weening confidence," "pristine assurance," used as synonyms for "primitive credulity," are scarcely synonymous with the sense of the following: "The phrase, reality-feeling, denotes the fundamental modification of consciousness which attaches to the presentative side of sensational states; the feeling which means, as the child afterwards learns, that an object is really there. . . . the idea which has the reality feeling may be said to have its own guarantee of its reality; it is a 'given' and my feeling of it is direct acquaintance with it."[1] There is here something besides Bain's restless impulse toward the real; there is also a passive consciousness of the real. "Reality-feeling at this early stage is simply the fact of feeling. . . . Existence is simply Presence; but Presence is Existence, and whatever is in consciousness is real."[2] Physiologically explained, reality-feeling (and also, unreality-feeling, or absence-feeling, which is the negative pole) means that "any sensory process has its feeling of reality element; and any tendency to movement has its unreality-feeling in the sensory process which satisfies it."[3]

A second salient characteristic, perhaps the most fundamental in Baldwin's system, is his "Co-efficient of Reality." The meaning, taken in its general significance, denotes any objective stimulus, in whatever realm, that, coming in conjunction with some impulse or desire or expectation, gives to consciousness a feeling of satisfaction and conviction of reality; while, in particular application, it means a real, sensory object, and not a phantom; an honest act, and not a hypocritical one; a picture that proves to be beautiful, as anticipated, and not unattractive; or, it means that mark by which I recognize an image as representing a former state of consciousness, or belief, in a thought which has "consistency, or the absence of presentational or conceptional contradiction."

[1] Baldwin: Feeling and Will; p. 149.
[2] Ibid.; p. 150.
[3] Ibid.; p. 153.

Through the memory co-efficient of reality (also, that of thought, as we shall see later), Baldwin has been able to free himself from the sense-world, which has always lorded it over those who would not forsake the particular. Contrary to Stout, he holds that it is through memory, and not through the direct impression of the senses, that we obtain our knowledge of more than the mere resistance of an object; that is to say, of its independent persistence. "To a creature without memory, reality would be simply successive resistances; but with memory as recognition, comes also persistence."[1] Baldwin would include in his "co-efficient of externality," more than Stout's sensational test, and more also than the possibility (memory) test of J. S. Mill. Either of these positions taken alone is inadequate. He writes: "An adequate formula, to do justice to both, would have to run something like this: belief in external reality is a feeling of the necessary character of sensations of resistance, and of my ability to get such sensations again at any time."[2] Baldwin thus obtains two kinds of present reality: "Present external reality, guaranteed by its independence of my will; and present memory reality, guaranteed by subjection to my will."[3]

For the theory now before us, belief properly so called, is preceded by disappointment and doubt. It corresponds to those "later modes of conviction" which Sully found to come into consciousness only with chagrined expectation, and with the development of the conceptive faculty or imagination. To say that belief follows doubt—follows, that is, upon its resolution—is to say that the "feeling of belief is a feeling that attaches to the representative faculty primarily."[4] The naive faith that once trusted everything and everybody, having been deceived once too often, has turned skeptical, and mere impressions and ideas are no longer straightway accepted as having sufficient credentials in their own immediate presence; they must support their claim by a reliable escort, or by directly convincing the senses. And if they can satisfy the requirements, consciousness at once consents, and the new candidate enters the world of reality. To represent exactly

[1] Feeling and Will; p. 166.
[2] Mind. O. S., vol. XVI.
[3] Feeling and Will; p. 165.
[4] Ibid.; p. 155.

what goes on in experience in the interval between the arising of doubt and its solution, this figure would have to be extended. We should have to consider consciousness, not only as passing upon the eligibility of impressions and ideas, but as being in want of just such "real" as these gave promise of supplying. How near such a figure comes to giving the meaning of Dr. Baldwin's theory may be seen by comparison with his most complete definition of belief: "Belief in anything. . . .is the consciousness of the prescience of that thing as fit to satisfy a need." [1]

Section II: Pathological.

It seems fair to say of the pathological investigation of belief or of the "feeling of reality," that it has not advanced far enough in experiment and observation to find a basis sufficiently broad to support a theory. The acquisition of facts has not reached that degree of accumulation where the chief demand is for a theory to interpret their significance. For this reason, Janet is found urging that most stress be laid, not on hypotheses, but on the observation of facts.[2] But though the results arrived at in pathological study of the nature and cause of human certainty fall short of the amount necessary to justify more than tentative conclusions, these conclusions are, nevertheless, not to be disregarded; and for the old reason that a mental function which resists comprehension when in normal condition, may when in an abnormal state become amenable to the understanding.

To the question as to what new fact the pathological investigation has discovered, the only safe reply would seem to be that pathology has discovered no new fact, but only emphasized an old one; namely, that belief is intimately connected with the activity-sources in our nature. The feeling of certainty, as also the feeling of reality, has no *a priori* guarantee to fall back upon, but like health or disease, must depend upon biological conditions. Confidence springs from all parts of the self. It is not something which has its origin in a corner of our nature; say, the intellectual corner. As Professor James says, "the mere fact of appearing as an object at all is not enough to constitute reality." [3]

[1] Feeling and Will; p. 171.

[2] From Dr. Hoch's paper, cited below.

[3] James: Principles of Psychology; vol. II, p. 293.

What those who have studied the pathology of belief, or of the feeling of reality, think about the two subjects, is briefly but representatively given in two articles: one, a review, and the other, a carefully argued theory. The former is by Dr. August Hoch ("A review of some recent papers upon the loss of the feeling of reality, and kindred symptoms").[1] The latter is by C. Bos ("Pathologie de la Croyance").[2] Dr. Hoch reports that the loss of the feeling of reality is commonly found in one or another of three spheres of existence; that relating to the individual's own activities or thoughts or that relating to the outside world or to the body. A patient will say that vision is cut off; that the eyes do not reach out; that food has no taste; that hearing is not clear; or complain of inability to feel the various parts of the body; or say that he has "no thoughts," asserting that the mind is without content, except as it comes from the conversation of another. In attempting an explanation of the loss of the sense of value or appreciation of the facts of experience it has been found that these symptoms are present when it is impossible to demonstrate objectively any sensory disorders, except, perhaps, fleeting changes which may obtain in "grave cases, where the somatopsychic alterations are most marked." Dr. Hoch thinks more studies are needed to decide this point. Janet is inclined to oppose the idea that the loss of the feeling of reality has any connection with disorders of organic sensation, and to regard the common factors in these cases as being a peculiar sense of incompleteness in regard to perceptions, emotions and actions. "The mind does not carry out its processes to their normal completion." He therefore ventures to relate the "unreality" experience to a "lowering of cerebral activity."[3] Storch and his followers, however, hold to a theory of explanation which contrasts with that of Janet. It is based upon the claim that the "feeling of the reality of external objects, and the projection into space, depend upon the association of muscle sensations with space perceptions."[4] This view asserts that the change which causes the feeling of unreality is to be found "primarily in a disorder of the conscious-

[1] Psychological Bulletin, 1905.
[2] Revue Philosophie, lxviii.
[3] Loc. cit.; p. 237.
[4] Psychological Bulletin, 1905; p. 237.

ness of the body, and insufficient valuation of organic sensations; and secondarily, in a disorder of the consciousness of the external world." The question as to the unreality of ideas is explained by the fact that they consist of memories of sense-impressions and organic sensations. This theory agrees with that of Janet in not making unreality-feeling depend upon disorders of organic sensations; its changes may be regarded like the agnosis, as association-disorders, and not as anæsthesia.[1] But it is also to be noted that in his review Dr. Hoch mentions the fact that the symptoms attending the loss of the feeling of reality present a close relation to emotional changes, which may both succeed and precede them. And the fact that these changes are of the depressive kind, suggests the fact that even in the "association-explanation," mental weakness may have a part.

C. Bos in his paper, "Pathologie de la Croyance," traces every irregularity of belief to a common cause. Whether, he says, the alteration be hallucination, credulity, incredulity or doubt, the cause is the same: a powerlessness or weakness of the mental activity. Hallucination, "the simplest kind of illusory belief," is for Bos a case where the weakness of the mind is over-run by the image. And credulity, which parallels hallucination, differs from it only in the fact that the illusion is brought about, not by an image, but by an idea; the credulous welcome an idea as the one suffering hallucination welcomes an image. These two illusory states of consciousness, however, fall prey to deception from the same incapacity; they lack what the writer calls "the second moment." When the image or idea first comes into the range of attention ("the first moment") the attitude toward it is the same in the mind subject to hallucination or credulity, as in the normal or mature mind; at this stage, the presentation is before the mind simply as a certain content. But this period of agreement is of short duration. The "second moment" comes quickly, and in that the sane and tempered individual considers (unconsciously, most often) the escort of the presented image or idea—the time and place associates, etc., and later, comes to a conclusion. But into the mind open to hallucination or credulity, this scrutinizing, saving, "second moment" does not enter. It is this inability to overhaul his ideas that makes the credulous person believe such unreasonable things as that the President (of

[1] Psychological Bulletin, 1905; p. 238.

France) is to be present at a village fete, or that a certain neighbor is four hundred years old. The mind of such an individual is able only to suggest the bare idea; for the rest, all is passiveness and psychic poverty. There is no energy left from the "first moment" to give to the "second moment."

With the incredulous or negative-minded, there is the same falling off of mental activity; the same lack or insufficient buoyancy of thought. In the case of the "negator," there is, though, more effort required than in the case of the credulous, for only in the second moment can there be denial. But this denial is forced by fixed ideas that play the role of Cerebus, and repulse before examination any ideas not like themselves. This fact explains such conduct as that displayed by a person who refuses to go to bed because there is no night, or by the sick person who refuses to believe that there is cannonading in the city, because he thinks it a pretext to keep him shut up. Incredibility, or negativity of mind, is plainly an obstinacy, a contradiction, an arrest from cramp or immobility.

Doubt is also a result of diminished mental activity. The illusions of hallucination and credulity are traced only indirectly to mental weakness, but doubt is traced directly. Though there is a blind automatism in credulity, and in doubt great intellectual development, yet there is ultimately no difference in the two forms of illusion. The doubter cannot triumph over his distrust and inhibit the impulse to disbelieve, any more than the individual at the play of credulity or hallucination can master his overweening trust, and inhibit the impulse to believe. Belief and will are both troubled by doubt. This fact is seen in cases where hesitation reaches the stage of delirium, as for example in the case that would not eat, for trying to decide whether one "eats to live," and who died with the question unsolved. The will cannot cut the Gordian knot. Since, therefore, will and belief are identified even in doubt, C. Bos is permitted to draw the general conclusion that all alterations of belief have a common character, "which is a powerlessness or weakness of the mental activity under its higher form."

Section III: Experimental.

Professor Titchener, in his recent book of lectures on "Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes," remarks that "the experimental technique for the study of judgment in particu-

lar, has not yet been perfected."[1] And of the feeling of reality, he says that he has "not yet carried the question into the laboratory."[2] Nor does he in his criticism of the different explanations of this feeling mention anyone who has made any laboratory investigation directly bearing on the subject. Indeed, this field of research seems to await the coming of the experimentalist; and accordingly, any insight into the nature or origin of belief or kindred phenomena that comes from this source may be expected to come only indirectly, that is to say, by a study of the laboratory work on judgment, which is at present being carried on by the "method of examination" (Ausfrage-experimente), and particularly that done by the experimentalists of the Wurzburg school.

The question for the psychologists to decide in the matter of belief is what particular mental content the individual has at the time he is experiencing the feeling of certainty. Or, to state the same thing from a point of view strictly judgmental, the question is as to the nature of "Bewusstseinlage," which Professor Titchener translates as "meaning something like posture, or attitude of consciousness."[3] The latter question is the one dealt with in the experimentation on the thought-processes. To find what interpretation the experimentalists give the "attitude" (Bewusstseinlage) shall accordingly be the object of this section. But before we turn ourselves to that question, it will be necessary to give attention to another which naturally takes precedence: the question of the problem *or Aufgabe.*

By *Aufgabe* is meant an influence that determines the course of conscious experience. Titchener is speaking of the *Aufgabe* (in its general signification) when he says that "this notion of the external and precedent determination of consciousness, comes into experimental psychology by hints and partial recognitions in the late '80's of the last century.")[4] And also, when he says that "experimental results in general are seen to be functions of the

[1] Titchener: Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes; p. 51.

[2] Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes; p. 255.

[3] Ibid.; p. 100.

[4] Ibid.; p. 163.

instructions given."[1] The employment of hypnotism in the psychological laboratory is a case of the "problem" at its maximum.[2] On this subject Watt is quoted as follows: "What transforms into judgments the mere sequence of experiences that we discover when we analyze the processes of judgment, and what distinguishes a judgment from a mere sequence of experiences, is the problem."[3] It is a further opinion of Watt that the problem need not always be in consciousness, but may sometimes have what Messer calls "the character of the obvious." The adjustments of the body to a stimulus, though at first consciously made, may, as the reacting mind becomes more accustomed to the conditions, lapse into an unconscious procedure; paralleling in the sphere of thought what we find in the sphere of action, in the case of the skilled pianist who plays automatically notes that he once played calculatingly. A problem of this kind is that of the "cognition of real things—that is, of giving such a form to our perception, thought, and speech that they are adequate to real things, whether we are concerned with the persistence, properties, states, changes, relations or value of the real.[4] With this last remark in explanation of the Aufgabe, we come naturally to the question of the attitude (Bewusstseinlage) and the feelng of realness, or belief.

The "problem" may be considered the drive-wheel, which starts consciousness off, and the attitude or postures, the accompanying phenomena or meaning. In Messer's thought, as Titchener states him, "the observer is given a certain problem. The problem finds representation in consciousness, verbal or other; the observer understands it, has the attitude or Bewusstseinlage, of meaning; and has the good will to follow instructions."[5] It will save going into useless detail if we quote again at this point from Titchener. He says that "Messer's intellectual attitudes correspond to Ach's awareness of meaning; and Messer's emotional attitudes, to Ach's awareness of relation; and thus, to the original Bewusstseinlagen of Marbe and Orth."[6] Now, Messer's intellectual attitudes and Ach's awareness of meaning are "matters

[1] Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes; p. 162.
[2] Ibid.; p. 120.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.; p. 124
[5] Ibid.; p. 140.
[6] Ibid.; p. 109.

of the understanding, pure and simple,"[1] and so, need not detain us. It is the others with which we are concerned. They bring into experience affective and volitional elements which are reported by the subjects most frequently as surprise, perplexity, hesitation, uncertainty, doubt; or their opposites, satisfaction, certainty, relief, assent, conviction. It is significant that the Bewusstseinlage is found by Titchener to resemble James' "fringes," Hoffding's "quality of familiarity," and many of Wundt's feelings, especially, that "feeling which is the pioneer of knowledge."[2] This takes us back to belief as we saw it in James, who said that the "real" is a "fringe." We remember the criticism against this position; it was declared to lack the objective factor of outer control; to have the active principle of belief, but not its counterpart; and to be incomprehensible, how the fringe could be the objective meaning of the psychic object of which it is the fringe.

The question of attitude (Bewusstseinlage) thus narrowing itself down to a matter of how one idea (fringe) can be the meaning of another, presents us our problem in bold simplicity. Titchener, limiting the mental elements to two—sensation and feeling—finds that one idea (like James' fringe) may give meaning to another idea; the former idea being the context of the latter. Of the context he writes: "I understand by context simply the mental process or complex, or mental processes, which accrues to the original idea through the situation in which the organism finds itself."[3] And by "situation" he means "any form of Aufgabe that is normal to the particular organism" and not "a task or problem which may be set to any organism prepared or unprepared." We may now comprehend the cause and meaning of his opinion on the subject of belief, or the feeling of certainty: "The feelings of reality seem to be always of an emotive character, implying affective process in connection with kinæsthetic or other organic sensations, and running their course under the influence of an Aufgabe, or Einstellung (predisposition)."[4] We have these feelings of reality, Titchener indicates, "when we find that the

[1] Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes; p. 108.
[2] Ibid.; pp. 102 f.
[3] Ibid.; p. 175.
[4] Ibid.; p. 255.

brooch we have picked up is real gold, and that the table we have spied in the second-hand store, real mahogany; or when, after plowing through the introductory pages, we come to the real point in a scientific paper."[1] Likewise, an unexpected meeting with a friend is said to give us the same feeling. That the feeling of reality does come into our experience just as Titchener portrays it, our "flesh and blood" stand ready to witness; we are having just such feelings every day. It is a question, however, whether his conception of the nature of belief is sufficiently comprehensive; whether his feelings of reality, though having marks of belief, have all the marks. For Miss Calkins, Belief is "an idea distinguished both by the feeling of realness and by the 'relational' feeling of congruence."[2] The Wurbzurg school (as we have already seen) mean more by their Bewusstseinlage (attitudes, including certainty and conviction) than just sensation and feeling. Messer, in fact, goes the length of maintaining for judgment (belief) the "objective reference of the Austrian school." "In the everyday life of mind," he asserts, "our experience is intentional, directed upon objects." And "the psychologist who should suppose that perception and thought may be adequately characterized by the simple ascertainment of the sensations and ideas present in consciousness would be like a man who should seek to apprehend the real nature of money, by simply investigating the materials out of which money is made."[3]

Without further review of the matter, it is clear that the center round which discussion gathers is that of deciding what are the component parts of the meaning that constitutes a belief-situation. Is this meaning exhausted by reading off an "emotive character," "affective processes," "kinæsthetic and other organic sensations," and an "Aufgabe" to give direction and motive?[4] Or will it be found that belief is represented in consciousness primarily by a relational character; the relation between idea and object?[5] With these questions holding the field, there is not much chance for positive conclusions. This much, however, may be

[1] Experimental Psychology of the Thought Process; p. 254.

[2] Calkins: Introduction to Psychology; p. 124.

[3] Titchener: Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes; p. 133.

[4] Ibid.; p. 255.

[5] Ibid.; p. 253.

said: the experimentalists consider the existence of feelings of reality, or belief, to be beyond question; and also consider it a possibility that they may "include some unanalyzable core or residuum, a non-sensational and non-affective elementary process; and that this core or residuum may be their essential as reality-feelings." [1] Finally, we may say that, though undecided about the nature of belief, experimental psychology is not without cues for an epistemological study of the subject, and may be found to give support to the view maintained later in this paper.

CHAPTER IV.

Criticism.

Looking back upon the sinuous path we have made in trying to find a way through the diverse interpretations of belief, we cannot doubt that interpretation often misled us; that it was frequently misinterpretation. And yet, the light of theory which we chose as guide in our search for the meaning of belief was not a will-o'-the wisp; it always brought us—in time—to some fruitful end. Of the theories of belief that have passed before us in review, none was wholly without significance; each of them had at least one of those features we have seen standing out boldly and recurring in following theories. That is to say, we found no theory but related belief to feeling, or to cognition (with reference to reality), or to action; and sometimes belief was related to all three phenomena.

Belief seems both to be and to be influenced by feeling; it appears to be dependent continually upon the cognition of reality; and it has intimate relation to our active disposition. The earliest explanation of belief was, as has been emphasized, an attempt to identify conviction with feeling; with the vivacity of ideas. Hume considered that, in the last analysis, the only quality of mind essentially necessary to constitute human confidence, is feeling; just that feeling which is intrinsic to belief, and not any extraneous feeling. Bain later identified belief with the active phase of our nature, and Sully, with the cognitive. Baldwin and Stout have so far corroborated Sully as to assert that belief necessarily implies the cognition of reality; and pathology has taken its stand with Bain, holding that belief has its roots in the activity-sources

[1] Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes; p. 256.

of our being. Hume at the same time has his supporters. Bagehot and James have strongly advocated the view that conviction is a feeling or emotion. Belief, they say, is more like a feeling than anything else. Finally, we have the witness of experimental psychology as given in the thought processes. The evidence here is rather incomplete, but what there is favors the view that belief requires over and above its inherent feeling-nature a certain attitude or relation, perhaps including that between idea and its object.

Manifestly, belief as thus defined has meaning to confusion; it means everything; it includes in some way the whole of consciousness. But how can belief be feeling, cognition and action, all three? This question presents an insurmountable difficulty if we turn the way of the psychology which reduces all to content. For, considered mainly as content, how represented in consciousness, whether with a quality that is simple, or one that is complex, belief refuses to comprehend the entire mind; it prefers to be thought of as a feeling that feels like itself; that must be felt to be known; or as a feeling that combines two qualities; that of realness and that of congruity, or yet, as a feeling having an emotive character, and implying affective processes in connection with certain organic sensations. If, however, we approach belief by another way, looking upon it as the mental state or function of cognizing reality, or as being the consciousness of the personal indorsement of reality; that is, looking upon it as a phenomenon arising out of the accommodation of the Self to its environment, then the difficulty is no longer insurmountable. For from this point of view, belief is not embarrassed by its manifold interpretation; feeling, cognition of reality, action—all may be considered as influences in bringing belief about; they furnish, indeed, the necessary and only conditions of its generation.

In speaking of feeling and cognition (or representative knowledge) and action as the only factors that will produce human confidence, it was not said that each factor was indispensable to the product. The majority of the leading theories of belief regard it as inseparably related to representative knowledge; certainty is certainty only with regard to the truth of some object or event that has been, is, or may be in experience as a fact. It was held against Hume that he was unable to carry his theory

through until he had set up (by a "propensity of the imagination" —that is, by reflection) an objective world for belief to believe in. Bagehot and James as successors of Hume, in advocating the view that conviction is of the feelings (emotions) enlarge upon Hume at this point. Bagehot is positively of the opinion that primitive, naive trust is transformed by the hardships of experience into a trust that waits upon deliberation, and that is anchored in objective reality. Professor James is less positive, but he does seem to say, certainly at times, that assurance is of an object that exists as "real" and that is represented to us as an idea. That conviction depends upon thought to bring it to its object, and thus, for its being, is so manifestly the view of James Mill, his son J. S. Mill, Sully, Stout and Baldwin that merely to mention the fact is enough. And as for Bain, we remember that he declared belief to be an incident of cognition. With this array of evidence we can scarcely restrain ourselves from joining Sully in his statement that the "primal source of belief lies in the relation of representative ideation to actual presentation."

We may now turn to the question whether feeling or action is a necessary condition for the experience of conviction. It has been said already that belief in itself is perhaps of the essence of feeling, but to the other sorts of feeling—such as emotional excitement, it is generally agreed to have no vital relevance. When Bain advanced the idea that action is the basis and ultimate criterion of belief, it was argued against him that in many cases, as, for example, that of the highest theoretical knowledge, there is no active disposition aroused. But Stout disarms this criticism by counting action in thought as a condition of belief in theoretical ends. That there is activity of some kind, physical or mental, present in appreciation of reality or of truth, is attested by the pathologists when they talk of mental weakness causing hallucination, credulity, incredulity and doubt; and of the loss of reality-feeling depending upon the lowering of cerebral activity. We find the same meaning expressed by Royce: "Definite belief in external reality is possible," he writes, "only through this active, modifying, and constructing addition of something of our own to the impressions that are actually given to us."[1] There is no question that within us is an activity, a sort of motor-consciousness,

[1] Royce: Religious Aspects of Philosophy, p. 321.

that takes a hand in shaping the world of experience, and by virtue of that act feels that world to be real. This fact will receive emphasis in the chapter on Assumption.

CHAPTER V.

Reality-Feeling and Presumption.

It was noted on page 35 that the meaning implied by the term reality-feeling has more or less prevalence in most theories of belief. The references given there were few, and they were given with the promise of more when we should come to this chapter. This promise we shall now endeavor to fulfill, and for a double reason: namely, to impress the fact that this embryo type of belief is recognized by authorities, and to explain its meaning.

From Bain, who blazed the way into this new territory, we have the following: "The belief in testimony is derived from the primary credulity of the mind in certain instances left intact under the wear and tear of adverse experience. . . .It never occurs to the child to question any statement made to it until some positive force on the side of skepticism has been developed." This statement by Bain is followed up by Bagehot, who gives it yet more emphatic form. He writes: "But though it is certain that a child believes all assertions made to it, it is not certain that the child so believes in consequence of a special intuitive disposition, restricted to such assertions; it may be that this indiscriminate belief in all sayings is but a relic of an omnivorous acquiescence in all states of consciousness, which is only just extinct when childhood is plain enough to be understood, or old enough to be remembered." Bagehot in another place in his essay expresses the view that we are born believing and would continue responding to the "strong rush of confidence" (his emotional belief) just as we do in dreams, if we were not thereby brought into contention with the world. Sully does not say that we are born believing; in fact, he says we are not; and that a certain amount of experience must precede confidence; but he reckons low the length of time that elapses before a sufficient experience has come to set up the earliest form of belief: "the transition from sensation to idea."[1] Of this early confidence he speaks as

[1] Sully: Sensation and Intuition; p. 82.

follows: "When the infant mind, in dream-like thought, had not yet learned to mark off the present and the past, it might not improbably even then have vaguely felt the strange likeness and unlikeness between the faint fugitive idea and the intense absorbing sensation. Now, in this curious mental event, the partial reproduction of the past sensation by the medium of a present idea felt to be one like it, one seems to find the origin of the oldest and most simple form of belief."[1] "If the infant could fully describe to us its state of mind, it would do so by saying, 'there is something in my mind that carries thought away to another thing brighter and better than itself, which thing is not exactly in my mind now, but seems ready to enter it.'" As to this early or germ-form of belief or reality-feeling, James expresses himself through the illustration of the child and the hallucinatory candle. To the onlooking psychologist, this candle exists only in the individual mind; has no status among other facts, etc. But the new-born mind, entirely blank, and waiting for experience to begin, reacts differently to it. "It can spin no such consideration as these (the above) about it; for of other facts actual or possible it has no inkling whatever. The candle is its all—its Absolute. Its entire faculty of attention is absorbed by it; it is; it is that; it is there. No other possible candle or quality of this candle; no other place or possible object in this place; no alternative, in short, suggests itself as even conceivable; so, how can the mind help believing the candle real?" Professor James has the feeling of reality excited by the very first object that enters the mind, while Sully considers that a sensation and its idea must have passed through the mind often enough to be noticeably distinguished before there can be any reality-feeling. This contradiction, however, is but a question of when primitive trusts starts; each writer equally corroborating such an embryo faith, or undifferentiated substance of belief. As further evidence for this unreasoning natural confidence, we may turn to Stout, who speaks of it in these words: "A pre-formed anticipation may be destroyed by collision with facts. It is through such experiences that the unquestioning credence of primitive belief gradually gives place to a comparatively tentative and skeptical habit of mind."

This series of quotations, though representing a variety of points of view, reveals a marked unity of signification. They are

[1] Sully: Sensation and Intuition; p. 82.

all of one accord in recognizing that childhood begins without skepticism, and with utmost confidence; without doubt, and with perfect certainty; without distrust, and with simple reliance. The first feeling is not of unreality, but of reality. We have by instinct enough confidence in things to start us off on the long road of accommodation to the environment, without the least uncertainty or misgiving. This wholesale way the young life has of conferring reality upon everything that touches it, has suggested a motor explanation. Baldwin relates the reality-feeling to gross attention; the attention with the large open maw ready to devour whatever comes in reach. According to this conception, we appreciate as real whatever, either by force of external conditions or by force of inner organic wants, we take into our experience by accommodation. It is not a case of recognitive belief, but of assimilative incorporation; we live here by faith, and not by sight.

Reality-feeling may be further designated as that stage in the genetic progression of consciousness that precedes disappointment and doubt; it is the stage of presumption or the taking of things as being what they first appear to be. It is well represented by dreams, for in them we go along, accepting one thing after another, in whatever order the things come and however disparate and disconnected they are, and never experience a single lapse in our sense that all is real. This undisturbed flow of simple credulity that runs through our dreams with never a rift in its course, does so, doubtless, because neither external facts nor internal associations are there to contradict. We presume on the reality of what we dream, just as the child presumes upon what it experiences. In both cases there is the primary, undisturbed presumption of reality that Urban speaks of as giving a reality in which the more specific existence-meaning[1] has not yet been differentiated, and as meaning the mere act of acceptance, taking for granted, prior to the explicit taking up of the object into a predetermined sphere of reality through the existence predicate. "In contrast with any meaning of reality later to arise and attach to an object," writes Baldwin, "we may saw that it is here simply presumed, taken for granted, that the object is real. There is a presumption of the dependableness of the thing."[2]

[1] Urban: Valuation; Its Nature and Laws; p. 43.

[2] Baldwin: Genetic Logic; vol. II, p. 22.

CHAPTER VI.

Quasi-Belief and Assumption.

In that period of childhood which we have designated by the term "reality-feeling," consciousness proceeds on its way of certainty and confidence with an ever tenor. "Pure experience," or immediacy of feeling or simple expectation, had not as yet been so seriously disturbed that it sought support in memory, and thus transformed itself into reflective anticipation. "Collision with fact" (collision with the physical and social tables that for Bagehot gives doubt) had not occurred, or at least had not produced a jar sufficient to awaken childhood out of its comatose condition of immediate assurance. But disturbing circumstances were destined sooner or later to break down this original equilibrium, and to provoke unwary confidence into doubt and alert inquiry. That this second stage in the progression of belief-consciousness does arise, and is a real fact in the growth of experience, is clearly the opinion of many writers. Bagehot refers to this period as a time in which "born-beliefs" crosses over to the belief of deliberation and evidence.[1] Bain is evidently speaking of it when he says that "many of our primitive expectations suffer shipwreck in the contradictions that they encounter."[2] Sully refers to this period in the life of consciousness as that in which the mind looks back upon the past before it acts; that is, looks into memory to see what basis anticipation has. It is distinctly the subject of the following passage from Stout: "A pre-formed anticipation may be destroyed by collison with facts. It is through such experience that the unquestioned credence of primitive belief gradually gives place to a comparatively tentative and skeptical habit of mind."[3] Baldwin recognizes such a stage and accounts for it by the failure of the "co-efficients of reality" to satisfy. "I doubt an image, a statement, a law, because it does not meet the demand that I have a right to make of it, if its claim be true."[4]

Further references are not needed to show that there is strong support for the view that the naive faith of earliest experience

[1] Emotion and Will; p. 516.
[2] Analytical Psychology; vol. II, p. 240.
[3] Stout: Analytical Psychology; vol. II, p. 240.
[4] Feeling and Will, p. 156.

is turned to disappointment and doubt. The problem that chiefly concerns us is not whether the individual comes into this stage of embarrassment and skepticism, but rather as to the way he gets out of it; it being admitted that he does—if of normal energy, somehow get out of his particular doubts, and does not accept his lot in careless unconcern. This problem leads us into epistemology—into a study of the "development of knowledge as controlled by facts."[1] Having lost its first grasp on reality, how now does the mind regain its hold? This is the question which most of all lay claim to our attention. But it has a solution, suggested by the term Assumption, as that term is employed in current discussion of the theory of knowledge and belief.

Assumption denotes active disposition, participation, on the part of the inner; it denotes subjective control; by assumption the psychic experience functions as a selective agency, and, equally with objective fact, sets up certain requirements for the acceptance of the new materials into experience. The individual, whatever interest impels him, whether practical, theoretical or æsthetic, is ever striving to enlarge upon the present; at one time he is unknotting a practical predicament; at another time, in a sort of spontaneous striving, he is making conquest of the future by weaving images of fancy or by action in play or art; and at yet another time, he is striving to encompass external fact, to find the truth that is hidden in things; to penetrate into objective existence as a seeker for the worthful, the fulfilling, the real.

Baldwin's own view of assumption is given in the statement that by assumption, "an established recognitive context, accepted for what it is, *is also read for what it may become.*"[2] Assumption is for him the only way the mind has of making any advance upon its present status, of gaining any new truth, of enlarging the world of reality. This schematism furnishes the moving principle that enables cognition to go in and possess the land.[3] It is this principle that gives unity to the whole of his genetic logic. Urban corroborates the position of Baldwin, and says "in the making of assumption, the act is determined by a subjective

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[1] Genetic Logic; vol. II, p. 381.

[2] Ibid.; p. 11.

[3] Ibid.; p. 44

factor, a demand arising from already existing dispositions and interests."[1] Royce also regards assumption as the inner asserting its rights as a joint owner in the world of experience. That the mind thus actively takes a hand in the weaving of life and its objects, is strongly argued in his book, "The Religious Aspects of Philosophy." In the chapter on "Postulates" (which, as we shall see later, are a species of assumption) Professor Royce says that "Postulates are voluntary assumptions of a risk, for the sake of a higher end. . . .They are deliberate and courageous volitions." "The postulate says: 'I dare be responsible for assuming'." We all postulate that our lives are worth the trouble, yet we all know perfectly well that many just such postulates must in the nature of things be blunders, but they imply not blind faith, but active faith. Blind faith is the ostrich behind the bush; the postulate stands like the lion against the hunters. The wise shall live by postulates."[2] The pragmatists, likewise, emphasize (indeed, over-emphasize) the fact that assumption is a subjective demand. In F. C. S. Schiller's essay on "Axioms as Postulates," there are many passages like the following: "Theoretic truths are the children of postulates. . . .Without purposive activity there would be no knowledge, no order, no rational experience, nothing to explain, and no means of explaining anything." "For, ever before the eyes of him whose wisdom dares to postulate, will float in clearer or obscurer outline the beatific vision of that perfect harmony of all experience which he in all his strenuous struggles is striving to attain. And instead of immolating his whole life to the enervating sophism that it is all an 'appearance to be transcended by an unattainable reality,' let him hold rather that there can be for him no reality but that to which he wins his way through and by means of the appearances which are its presage."[3] The same aggressiveness of spirit is seen in James' essay on "The Will to Believe." It is here said that "the intellect, even with truth directly in its grasp, may have no infallible signal for knowing whether it be truth or no."[4] And so he brings in the "willing nature"—by which is meant not only such

[1] cf. C. H. Williams: The Schematism in Baldwin's Logic; Philosophical Review, Jan, 1910.

[2] Royce: The Religious Aspect of Philosophy; p. 298.

[3] Schiller, F. C. S.: Personal Idealism; p. 121.

[4] James: The Will to Believe, etc.; p. 16.

deliberate volitions as may have set up habits of belief that we cannot now escape. . . .but all such factors of belief as fear and hope, prejudice and passion, imitation and partisanship, the circumstances of our caste and set."[1] Then in natural sequence to these statements we have the following one: "It matters not to an empiricist from what quarter a hypothesis may come to him; he may have acquired it by fair means or by foul; passion may have whispered, or accident suggested it; but if the total drift of thinking continues to confirm it, that is what he means by its being true."[2] Plainly the pragmatist is ready to agree that the subjective is a potent factor in deciding what things shall be true. But there is yet further evidence for a positive, aggressive, inner control, which demands satisfaction for our interests, whether those interests be the undifferentiated interests of the pre-logical stage, when the individual is trying to find some ground that is safe from the flood of doubt, or whether they be the individual interests (the practical, intellectual or æsthetic) of the logical mode. This further evidence is found in Meinong. In his two books on assumption ("Annahmen" and "Ueber Annahmen"), and in Bertrand Russell's review and interpretation of them, there are passages that support the view that assumption mediates a goal in behalf of the subjective. Take for example the following (a translation by Russell from the 3d chapter of "Ueber Annahmen"—a chapter enumerating the most familiar instances of assumption): "The hypothesis of mathematical propositions, literary works of art, children's pretenses, lies, and the theories of philosophers, can none of them be understood without assumptions. When an argument begins with 'Let a right-angled triangle be given, having one of its sides double the other,' we have to do with the proposition which is not asserted; hence, we have an assumption, and not a judgment. Scientific hypotheses again, at least in their inception, are unasserted, and afford instances of assumption. When children pretend, it is quite plain that they are not taken in by their own fancies; these fancies constitute assumptions; and the same applies to reading a novel. A liar wishes to produce in another belief in a proposition which he himself does not believe; if he is to be successful, he will have to

[1] The Will to Believe, etc.; p. 9.

[2] Ibid.; p. 17.

entertain the assumption of the proposition in question. And this is why liars tend to believe their own lies. . . .A question expresses, if the answer to it is yes or no, the desire to have an assumption turned into the corresponding judgment or its opposite. And in all desire, since the opposition of yes and no occurs in the object of desire, we are necessarily concerned with an assumption; for mere presentation is inadequate, and the truth of what is desired is obviously no part of desire."[1] Again, in the fifth chapter, which treats of the psychic and its nature, as having objects (Gegenstandlichkeit), assumption appears with the same peculiar power to project objects and withhold belief; with the same privilege of transcending presentation; of transcending the thing of present knowledge. This chapter focuses on the question as to how presentation that is pure, and judgment that is negative, can have an object. A judgment that is true provokes no question as to its object; because the very fact that it is a true judgment settles the matter; it has an object, either an existing or a subsisting object. But whether the judgment is a true negative or a false affirmative, we come upon a difficulty. These judgments cannot have the objects they would have if true and affirmative. Such judgments, it would seem, must then fall back upon presentation for their objects. But presentation usually does not have an object; in fact, pure presentation has only the capacity for an object, as in the case of the memory of a melody, one does not have the melody. "When, therefore, we seem to perceive direction to an object, this arises through the presence of an affirmative assumption; the object is presented 'as if it were real'." Still again, this same interpretation of assumption is implied by Meinong in his "Annahmen," where he considers the difference between assumption and judgment to be a matter only of attitude toward the "objective." In this connection Russell translates Meinong as pointing out that "Judgment has two elements: (a) conviction and (b) affirmation, or denial; and that in a large class of common facts, which are called assumptions, the second occurs without the first.[2] We find this same thought in "Ueber Annahmen," it being there argued that assumption is more than mere

[1] Mind: New Series; vol. XIII, p. 340.

[2] Loc. cit. above; p. 206.

presentation and less than judgment; that it holds a sort of middle ground between judgment and presentation." [1]

In the light of the foregoing views, assumption may be summarized somewhat as follows: It is the intrinsic power the mind has of leading experience into larger fields of meaning, by expanding the "is" into the "may-be;" of discounting the future to meet present wants and interests. But it is important to go yet farther into the subject of assumption, to take account indeed of distinctions made within the meaning itself—distinctions discovered by the application of the genetic method to consciousness. In recent psychological literature on the cognitive consciousness, one is frequently meeting with such terms as "pre-discursive" and "post-discursive;" "pre-judgmental" and "post-judgmental;" "pre-logical" and "post-" or "hyper-logical." It is upon this division as a basis that the distinction in assumption rests. We have seen the credulous reality-feeling and unthinking presumption were saved from destroying doubt and led away toward the high ground of logical conviction and judgment. But with judgment reached, all doubt does not cease. Consciousness never attains such a degree of present sufficiency that it has no need of assumption to bridge it over some intercepting doubt or want. According to this view, which is the one maintained by Baldwin in his Genetic Logic, and by W. M. Urban in his book on Valuation, there are two kinds of assumption, named in order of appearance, lower assumption and higher assumption; or, just assumption and postulation. Baldwin explains the two meanings as follows: "Over against this (presumption), also in the prelogical modes, there is, however, the contrasted attitude toward what is not presumed but assumed—made schematic for further determination. The 'assumption' is the use of a meaning in a control or with a reference that is not yet established, not yet presumption. When a child, for example, cries for an object in the next room, he 'presumes' its existence and availabilitly in the world of his practical interests; but when he goes through the process of 'feeding his toy dog,' he 'assumes' a sphere that he does not regularly 'presume.'" "In the logical mode, the existence-marks harden into a dualism of spheres (mind and body), and the intent of existence or control becomes itself a separable

[1] Meinong: Ueber Annahmen; p. 61.

or predicable meaning. And this existence, or reality-meaning, may be again entertained in two ways: it may be specifically asserted in a judgment of existence, or taken for granted as something capable of such assertion; or it may be set up hypothetically and schematically. These two attitudes are for the logical mode what the 'presumption' and the 'assumption' are for the pre-logical."[1] Urban writes, corroborating Baldwin, as follows: "Assumption as a cognitive attitude has two meanings. According to its first meaning it is an acceptance, a taking as existent of an object when there is an underlying sense of the possibility of its being non-existent. In this sense, it is a half-way stage between the primitive presumption of reality, and the existential judgment. In this sense also it is a secondary movement or act of cognition, within a developing sphere of reality, bounded by the primitive presumption of reality, and the existential judgment, affirmative or negative. From the point of view of conation, it is an act determined by the momentum of the subjective disposition or interest. In its second meaning, it is not pre-judgmental, but post-judgmental; it presupposed dispositions created by acts of judgment, and is derived from the judgment-attitude."[2]

Such a distinction within assumption makes it all the more evident that this activity is the moving principle in mental development and in the growth of experience; it is the function of growth in all modes of cognition. Assumption is the active nature or inner control which belief must satisfy when it comes. Until then, assumption remains quasi-belief—*i. e.*, it acts towards the object as if it were real.

CHAPTER VI.

Belief and Judgment.

In the historical and psychological divisions of this discussion it was found that belief is in intimate and essential relation to the cognition of reality, and to the active disposition. That is to say, belief, whether considered from a philosophical or a psychological point of view, always appears to be rooted in a reference to reality, and at the same time to take its life from the inner

[1] Baldwin: Genetic Logic; vol. II, p. 12.

[2] Urban: Valuation: Its Nature and Laws; p. 48.

accommodating and asserting powers of our nature. Thus at the end of Chapters I and II our investigation brought us to this conclusion: objectively taken, belief means belief in something—something that is real; subjectively taken, it means an activity that expresses and satisfies the whole self. And now, since in the genetic study we have returned to this subject, we must enter again upon its consideration. It is a question this time of finding whether belief, when regarded from a genetic and epistemological point of view, has the same character as when regarded from a psychological point of view; whether, that is, we shall continue to find belief in essential conjunction with the cognitive and the active phases of our nature.

Assumption is, as we have seen, a vital factor in the growth of consciousness; in fact, it is a question whether, without it, life would not be static and stagnant. It seems that without assumption thought would be shut in by an impassable wall—the wall of habit; with it, thought can push out into new experience, and thus satisfy the demands of positive interests—interests that of their own nature seek satisfaction in objects or ends. Assumption is the genetic interpretation of Professor Royce's statement that "at every moment, we are not merely receiving, attending, recognizing, but we are constructing.[1] Assumption is the individual in action; productive, cognitive action; the individual, seeking a clearer insight into nature, climbing to a higher ground of outlook, infusing new meaning into life. Assumption is the spontaneous, initiative energy of conscious life, expressing itself through cognition. But in addition to this, it should be noted that its object is tentative. When making an assumption, the individual is well aware that the assumed object may fail to fit the conditions that test its reality; that he may have chosen the wrong alternative. There is no taking for granted here as there was in "presumption." Belief is suspended. But suspended for what reason? For the reason simply that it has not found a co-efficient that will satisfy the demands of reality. And whenever, through the creative function of assumption, consciousness succeeds in setting up an object that gains objective sanction, all will be well, and belief will no longer hold back, but go forth in unreserved and final indorsement of that object as real; the two

[1] Royce: Religious Aspects of Philosophy; p. 321.

controls—that of the inner and that of the outer, will be satisfied in a mutual ownership.

But what is meant by saying that quasi-belief passes into belief proper when the schematic object of assumption wins the approval of the objective? Does it mean that assumption has become judgment? If judgment has reference to existence or reality, and is not mere ideas that have their truth in a sort of *a priori* consistency, and if it is a construction that mediates the Self, then the coming of belief does mean the coming of judgment, and from this conclusion it follows that, if all judgment is existential, and at the same time incorporates our evaluating personal nature, then judgment is belief, which is our thesis.

Section I: Direct Evidence.

(A) From objective point of view.

From a genetic and epistemological point of view, Baldwin finds that judgment in every instance takes cognizance, explicitly or implicitly, of existence; and Urban in his book, "Valuation: Its Nature and Laws," accepts and utilizes Baldwin's general conclusions. Meinong, by a semi-genetic and epistemological investigation of experience, comes likewise to the conclusion that "judgment is transcendent." Bradley, although approaching the subject from a yet different side—the logical—comes to maintain that all judgment is in the end existential. And again, from the psychological point of view, we have Brentano strongly affirming the same fact.

To appreciate fully the force of Baldwin's argument (Genetic Logic, Vols. I and II) for the existential nature of judgment, it is necessary to take account of assumption at its two different levels of cognitive progression; to take account both of assumption and postulation (these terms being understood as meaning, respectively, lower and higher assumption). Schematism is the general term which includes both meanings. Assumption as serious experimentation with psychic objects—that is, as instrumental knowledge, grows out of the semblant or play consciousness. "In experimentation, play merges into earnest, and through its demand for control, issues in adjustment and discovery."[1]

[1] Genetic Logic; vol. II, pp. 119 ff.

Play, or semblance (or rather, earliest semblance, for art too is semblance) is described as a "mode of reconciliation and merging of two sorts of control." It is neither inner nor outer control exclusively; that is, the play object is neither a sense-object nor a fancy-object, but an object swinging between and partaking of the nature of both. It is in this power of the mind to semble—to construct an object partly free from the old controls of sense and fancy—that Baldwin finds the first movements of that process which is to prove of such "wide-reaching importance" to the mind in its career; the process, namely, of experimentation. Experimentation at this stage, however, does not issue in anything that the individual can indorse and believe; it here reaches no final conclusion. The semblant object when tested simply becomes either a sense-object or a fancy-object; with the result, though, that "the great distinction between the inner and the outer realms is extended and made more definite." But consciousness has a long course to run before reaching that stage in cognitive development in which experimentation eventuates in the experience of an ordered system of objects individuated as particulars under a general, and given meanings "necessary" and "without exception."

To attain such experience or objective content, semblance operates in yet another way than by actual experimentation; that is, by the process called "sembling;" what Lipp calls "Einfuhlung." This character of the semblant object, which is implicated in the inner nature of the entire construction, is especially germinal to reflection. By this "innocent looking process," an object has a greater or less degree of subjective control attributed to it. This "process implies that all the objects so treated are already materials of the inner life as such. . . .It implies that any material of the inner life may be so treated. . . .It means finally that any such bit of 'sembled,' of 'semblable, psychic stuff has its own opposed meanings; on the one hand, that of the object pure and simple, existing under the co-efficient reinstated by the semblance; and on the other, that of a self-determined whole, free from these co-efficients so long as it itself does not terminate its freedom, and fulfilling its role simply by being in this vibrating semblant mode. . . This mode of construction, moreover, constitutes any content in turn, either *subject or object*. . . .In so far as it (the

content) is itself held in control by 'outer' co-efficients of this sort or that, in so far it is set up as a psychic *object;* but whenever in turn it is used as inner means of control to other contents, it has a sembled inner life of its own and becomes *subject.* This is the rudiment, or first suggestion, of that higher mode—*Reflection."* [1] Thus we see the importance of sembling. In reflection the inner life of the different contents that are their own subjects is pooled in one inner control—the *Subject,* or *Ego.* And that part of the content which was held in control by outer co-efficients of "this sort or that" is still under co-efficients of control, now existence-control, as psychic objects. But all these objects are of inner experience—are objects of thought—in short, are ideas.

This examination of the outer (experimental) and inner (sembling) nature of the play-mode reveals clearly the character and significance of assumption, and at the same time opens the way for a rapid advance to the judgment-mode. Play experimentation, developing into serious experimentation (under the motive furnished by the problems set by the body in taking an ambiguous position in experience and refusing to be permanently either inner or outer, either internal or external), comes soon through the pressure of negative experience—though unreality-feeling which is the "genetic impulse" to further determination—to the stage of disjunctive or alternative meanings—this or that.[2] The early distinction of the hypothetical or assumptive meaning thus approaches the true general, for the alternative meaning is a stage in the passing of a semblant schema into a general concept. "The alternative expectation has so determined experience that the issue will be *one of the two."* The negative meaning has thus passed from the privation of all other to the experimental inclusion of this other. With the next movement of cognitive growth, the object ceases to be a mere make-up that only subsists;[3] it becomes instead a real, self-sufficient object. By individuation, the object is transferred from the group that says other cases might have done, to the class that says what other cases might have done;[4]

[1] Genetic Logic; vol. II, p. 124.
[2] Ibid.; p. 217.
[3] Genetic Logic; vol. II, p. 167.
[4] Baldwin: Genetic Logic; vol. II, p. 221.

the semblant object, in short, hardens into a meaning that is necessary and without exception, and is "passed back into the sphere of existence of the co-efficients of actual fact and external control." Of this outcome of assumption Baldwin writes as follows: "The uncertainty which made its (the assumptive object's) meaning hypothetical, now disappears, therefore, and a positive construction stands firm, no longer open to question. The meaning of definiteness and relation attaches to the finished, made-up thing, of which there is no further event. The control, now external, has issued once for all *in this meaning and no other.* The note has been converted into the gold coin of existence, which is to be circulated with a value that is once for all established." [1]

With the discovery of existence and judgment, the growing world of experience seems to end in a fixed and final reality; but this is only in seeming, for the schematic development of existence (now of more existence) still goes on. With the coming of judgment, assumption did not disappear by being extinguished, but by being transformed into a process of a higher nature; that is, into postulation. In postulation, theoretical interest finds itself, and consciously seeks satisfaction by enlarging the boundaries of experience. As it was the function of assumption to bring determination into an indeterminate world, so it is the function of postulation, using the chart thus defined by assumption, to make definite, foreplanned prospecting trips beyond the bounds of known experience. Postulation that proves true, ends in presupposed existence—existence which may then be made explicit in an existential judgment. That postulation thus eventuates if it enters the sphere of judgment is shown by the following example: "When Columbus sailed westward, he *postulated* a world in which certain astronomical and geographical relations held. Luckily, he found a patron willing to postulate it with him. Since he discovered it, however, all sailors presuppose the world he postulated." [2]

Meinong's system of epistemology, while very difficult of comprehension in detail, does stand out in some of its larger features rather clearly. Judgment, he evidently holds, means more than the mere idea of which it is composed; it has not simply an object

[1] Baldwin: Genetic Logic; vol. II, p. 224.
[2] Ibid.; p. 110.

(using the author's terminology); it includes also an "objective;" that is, a transcendental reference to something which is known—this, of course, provided the judgment be true. In Chapter VI, Section 34, which treats of the "thetic and synthetic" function of judgment and assumption, Meinong criticises Brentano's effort to reduce all judgment to the existential, and argues that besides the "thetic" judgment there is also a "synthetic" judgment. But in this criticism he does not deny the existential import of judgment. On the contrary, he refers transcendence to both types; the transcendence of the former he calls absolute transcendence; and that of the latter, relative transcendence, meaning by the adjective relative, that through such a recognition neither term of a synthetic judgment is taken for itself alone, but each only relative to the other. "That sorrow is a feeling" has as much the objective reference (Gerichetsein) as does "there is sorrow."[1]

That Meinong holds to the existence-import of judgment seems to be the opinion also of Bertrand Russell (in the articles already mentioned) and of Urban (Valuation). Russell interprets Meinong as follows: "In fact, relations, attributes and all complexes require objectives, which occur everywhere except in the simple, or speaking not quite precisely, in cases of complete intuitiveness and mere presentation. It is always Objectives—*i. e.*, that something should exist or should not exist, that we desire, and to which we attach value."[2] Urban's interpretation is, of course, from the side of worth, but it is especially in point on account of the fact that he finds Meinong standing on about the same judgmental basis with himself; which is, as was indicated above, an existential basis. Worth for both rests upon some *universe of reality,* which is presupposed in all judgments that assert existence, either categorically, hypothetically, or disjunctively."[3]

The positions of Bradley and Brentano with regard to the existence-import of judgment, are too well known to need more than mere mention. For Bradley, the coming of ideas that exist only as they mean something else, marks rather a decline in experience

[1] Meinong: Ueber Annahmen; p. 146.
[2] Urban: Valuation; p. 352.
[3] Ibid.; p. 42.

than a rise. Those ideas, in fact, signify that consciousness has fallen from its first estate of immediate intuition of reality, and is attempting to gain what it lost. Ideas, Bradley declares, are themselves no part of reality; but they qualify, mean, symbolize, reality; and to expect to find reality in them or through them is to meet the same disappointment that Tantalus met in the ancient fable, for reality recedes before our ideas, just as the water from his touch. The subject of every judgment is reality, which is individual and timeless, and which, accordingly, no judgment ever expresses, but only qualifies.

This notion, that judgment cannot get down to true being, that it is neither image nor fact, but mutilated content, receives further emphasis from his treatment of those peculiar ideas, the "real" and the "this." "The idea of reality, like the reality of 'this' is not," Bradley states, "an ordinary symbolic content, to be used without any regard to its existence."[1] These ideas are of facts immediately present to sense; they are elements in actual existence, which we encounter directly, and cannot in judgment be removed from this and transferred to another reality. In these instances the "particular" is present in fact, and it is idle to have an idea of it. This "particular" of presentation—the "real," judgment, being discursive, cannot contain, and it must therefore look beyond itself for the existence it asserts.

Brentano declares for the existential reference of judgment on the grounds of a fundamental distinction between presentation and judgment. They are, he says, intrinsically different classes of psychic phenomena. "Nothing, indeed, is judged, which is not presented, but we maintain that, while the object of a presentation becomes object of an acknowledging or rejecting judgment, consciousness steps into a completely new kind of relation to it. It is then doubly taken up in consciousness as presented and as held for true or as denied."[2]

This new relation that consciousness takes to the object of presentation when it becomes the object of judgment, Brentano explains as being a matter of the existence or non-existence of an object. All judgment has just this difference from presentation,

[1] Bradley: Logic; p. 80.
[2] Brentano: Psychologie; p. 266.

for in no other respect—neither in intensity nor kind of object, is there any difference in these two phenomena. Judgment is not distinguished from presentation by a relational character; it is an assertion or denial of existence. In agreement with Bradley, he says that judgment is a single idea. This position argued through for the existential proposition, holds in natural course for the categorical and hypothetical propositions, for the latter are reducible to the former.

(B) From the subjective point of view.

From the objective side there is growing evidence that belief expresses itself as judgment. But what of the evidence from the subjective side? Does it also show that judgment is more than content; that it is also control? That there is no "that" which is not also a "what;" that "is" always means "exists?" If a thing, to exist, must exist somewhere, necessarily it must exist for somebody. Existence implies an inner control. But the question here is whether there is direct evidence that judgment contains that inner force which seems to be one of the essential conditions of being.

That the inner active nature of the individual must not be counted a zero, but a real factor, in the production of reality, has become in recent literature a most patent fact. To dissuade the mind of its old-time bias for abstract, changeless reality, and to implant instead a conception of reality that is concrete, living, growing; that includes the purposes, interests and activities of persons, is the central motive in the pragmatic regime. Reality, the pragmatists say, is in us, and we are in it, and all is a flux of experience. "Things are surcharged valuations, and consciousness is ways and ends of believing and disbelieving."[1] Brute fact could not be real without consciousness, any more than consciousness could be real without brute fact. "The world has meaning only as somebody's, just as a cake is had only by the eating of it." Reality is not something in a ready-made, fixed and finished form, which mind must keep "hands off" and judge only at a distance; but reality is a flux, and "specific conscious beings.....exercise influence upon its character and existence."[2]

[1] Dewey: Beliefs and Realities: Presidential Address, 1895; p. 114.
[2] Ibid.

The flux has an inner life with which concepts quite fail to connect us.[1]

Worth-theory vies with pragmatism in putting emphasis upon the potency of the conative in determining reality. Consider for a moment what Urban says in his chapter on "Valuation and Evaluation" in comparing the meanings of truth and value, or of existence and reality. These meanings, he concludes, have a "relative indifference" to each other; there is "merely a partial identity of normative with factual and truth objectivity." Truth and value seem to be not identical; value judgments do not throughout have presuppositions that can be expressed in retrospective and logical terms. Just as on the plane of scientific thought the principle of psycho-physical parallelism forbids the reduction of the psychical to the physical or the physical to the psychical, so also on the plane of the axiological, the principle of relative indifference forbids our reducing all values to factual and truth objectivity; all worth experiences to mere effects of social processes or means to social ends.[2]

The insufficiency of the concept of existence and truth to exhaust all worth experience, indicates an intrinsic nature that will not be mastered by thought as content, but masters thought as control. In this nature originate the ever-widening circles of growth that expand into increased experience and reality; and though it cannot incorporate this objective expanse into itself, yet it is not lost in the expanse, but remains the source of the creative interests that make impossible a stagnant world; it is the "alogical," the "center of activity," and the source of experimentation. This is the principle that even in the most abstract and formal reasoning, sustains reflection as its presupposition.[3]

Whether, then, we approach judgment from the objective side or the subjective, it is found to be more than mere content—it has controls in reality to which it is anchored as a mediating context. Judgment mediates the real both as objective reference and as personal satisfaction. But these are the marks we found attaching to belief as its accepted criteria. If, therefore, we correctly interpret the different writers to whom we refer, and make

[1] James: Pluralistic Universe; p. 246.
[2] Urban: Valuation, etc.; p. 424.
[3] Baldwin: Genetic Logic; vol. II, p. 328.

correct deductions from these different interpretations, then, it must be concluded as a matter of course, that judgment, whatever else it may mean, means belief. But there are two facts that have a special signification in substantiating this view of judgment. There is, first, the question of bare denial, and secondly, there is the question of whether pragmatism, denying retrospective thought, and allowing only prospective or instrumental thought, ever obtains real belief.

Section II: Indirect Evidence.

(A) Interpretation of Negative.

Bradley declares that a judgment which is merely a negation of an affirmative, is a judgment without a quality; it in no way qualifies reality. But Keynes and Sigwart take an opposite view, and maintain the utility of such a judgment. A judgment of bare negation is, according to their explanation, a judgment that has its ground of denial, not in opposition, but in a deficiency. But how can there be denial except through the contrary? This is an old question, with a big history. Our interest, however, is simply to contrast in a brief way the nature of denial that is based upon judgment-belief with bare denial, which is based upon formal judgment. Several examples of a negative judgment of efficiency are offered by these writers. It suffices to criticise but one of them, that of Keynes, where he imagines a search for a man supposed to be on a certain train to have ended finally with the discovery that he was not there. "I have arrived at the conclusion that a man did not start by a given train, because I searched the train through before its departure," he says, "and did not find him there." "I have gained no positive knowledge of the whereabouts of the man in question (by the case of bare denial), but it certainly cannot be seriously maintained that the denial is meaningless or useless, say to a detective."[1] But would not a detective, it may be asked, in searching for a man, set up some bounds to his search? He surely would not search without some alternative or alternatives in mind, which would profit by the denial. If the man is not on that train, he has taken to the woods, is being harbored by some friend, etc. This is about what would be the thoughts of a real detective in such circumstances. He

[1] Keynes: Formal Logic; p. 123.

would, in other words, presuppose a larger sphere of belief, and the negative would issue only as it took impulse from a positive ambition to find which of the possible alternatives in the sphere which they altogether exhaust, is true. With judgment, meaning the active espousal of reality, *i. e.,* belief, the bare negative would be meaningless, and that because such judgment would refer to universes of reality that are real existence spheres, and would be necessarily an expression of some interest. H. W. B. Joseph, in "an introduction to Logis (p. 161)," maintaining the existential view of judgment, states that there is always a positive character as the ground of negation.

(B) Argument from Pragmatism.

To come now to the problem whether pragmatism is equally immature in belief and judgment. It is a fact of common knowledge that the pragmatists do not limit the belief-function to acquiescence. Take for example James in his "Will to Believe," and Dewey in his Presidential address (1905), "Beliefs and Realities." In the first, we read that there are "passional tendencies and volitions which run before, and others which come after belief; and it is only the latter that are too late for the fair; and they are not too late when the previous passional work has been already in their own direction." An hypothesis that is living, forced and momentous, we read again, means "willingness to act," and this James declares to mean belief, for "there is always believing tendency where there is willingness to act." Belief is, in fact, but the backing of an hypothesis against the field," because "no bell in us tolls to tell us for certain what truths are in our grasp." Dewey is in agreement with these expressions of James, and says that "beliefs are willful;" are "adventurous;" are "working hypotheses."

If we turn to the pragmatic theory of judgment, do we not find this same hypothetical character? Judgment is prospective; instrumental. It is inquiry. Thought as logical process has truth and validity only as a mediating function; only, that is, as it stretches forward to some goal. And this means that truth and validity never are, but are to be, realized. Indeed, what place for the "will to believe" is there in thought unless the thought be schematic and experimental; unless, that is, it has its object still

amenable to further manipulation by subjective choice? If thought should pass from the plastic state of "tentative, prospective plan into the crystallized state of objective, retrospective fact," it would be with the result, certainly, of making the will to believe a "fifth wheel to the coach," for in that event belief would be no longer a matter of taste and privative choice, but of acquiescing in what has been found to hold finally in the nature of things, and what has taken a set beyond the power of will or wish to change. The pragmatist will concede no world of objective existence that is mediated in a context of thought, and that forms a dualism with the subjective which is mediated in the same context. Thought for him never means a finished experience; it comes to no end after is own kind, but only a practical end. That is to say, thought is always instrumental and never acts for itself. He denies that it ever exercises itself within a sphere of established and universalized meaning, by making new arrangements in co-ordination, subordination, etc., as it is said to do in higher mathematics and in logic. He denies that by the use of the syllogism we gain insight into experience yet unknown, by taking stock of what we have, and by weighing its significance. The pragmatist will not permit thought to be its own guarantee. "Truth" must apply to "good" for its credentials; the only worth is practical worth.

Further, if all thought is only inquiry, instrumental to an end it never reaches as thought, then, it is but assumption. It has not yet come to maturity in the logical mode, where, as judgment, it reduces, by a redistribution of all earlier meanings, a world of experience that is undifferentiated and uncertain, to a world that is systematized and held under definite controls. It is not thought that by an intent of belief has referred its objects to existence-spheres in which objects once universalized and classified are held secure against impulse and desire, and in which change is allowed only when new facts arise that demand a resetting of old concepts—a readjustment of extension and intension—in order to incorporate them.[1] The pragmatist, in his attempt to escape the dualism of judgment and its object, stops thought before it gets to judgment, and disperses it in the feeling of practical satisfaction that comes with a redintegration of experience.

[1] Baldwin: Genetic Logic; vol. II, p. 194. Hibben: The Philosophical Aspects of Evolution; Philosophical Review; March, 1910.

That the pragmatic theory thus dwarfs thought in its growth is evident from the illustration which such theory holds to be typical of all thought, and which is intended to show how judgment is instrumental to life—the illustration, namely, of the man lost in the woods and trying to find his way home. The problem is to determine the nature of the cognitive processes that get the man home, and to determine also how these processes terminate, *i. e.,* what makes them true. The pragmatist's solution is as follows: Thought, if it is to mean more than "facts qua presentation or existences," must look forward—never backward. For the lost man, thought has but one reference—the forward reference; it is a "plan," a working hypothesis. Thus far the solution is quite acceptable, for until the man finds his way out of the woods, thought is certainly schematic—that is to say, it is an assumption. But what of the solution given the second phase of the problem—the truth of the plan? How do the facts that are now "doubtful qua meaning" later secure position and relationship in experience? In answering this question, pragmatism goes awry; for it holds that it is the practical reorganization of disrupted experience that gives truth to thought, and not that it is the truth of thought (plan) that makes such reorganization possible. When the man finds his way home, the ideas that meant—that mediated—something, have found that something, declares the pragmatist, in a mended and enriched whole of experience. But thought cannot live to enjoy its own fruits, for the redintegrated experience is an immediacy—a whole of experience that knows no dualism; "thought must lose its life to find it."[1] Just as thought would pass over into the logical mode and come to full realization in an object that is no longer schematic, but universal, the pragmatist springs a trap, and thought drops into an immediacy of feeling. Of such judgment, it must be said that it can never have more than a tentative meaning, and that belief remains always in suspense. In such judgments the individual would never reach the point where personal satisfaction goes out upon an object as having found admission into objective experience as a real, existing fact—a fact that has within its very make-up the categories of identity and non-contradiction.

That pragmatism stops short of judgment, and also, of belief, is given further emphasis by making a turn upon the above illustra-

[1] Moore: Psychological Bulletin; vol. —, p. 415.

tion. Let us suppose that the person lost in the woods is a child, and not a man, and that it is too cloudy to see the sun. After repeated failure to get his bearings, he happens to notice that the trees have moss on one side, and tentatively concludes that this side of the trees is opposite the sun. He proceeds upon this assumption and reaches home. It certainly cannot be said that his reaching home made it true that moss grows on the north side of trees, but on the other hand, it certainly can be said that the schematic judgment, "Moss grows on the north side of trees," though held only as an assumption—a tentative belief—was even then true in the sense that it was destined not to contradict, but to agree with, and at the same time, extend earlier objectified, established experience or reality, by being classifiable as universalized meaning, and referable by belief-intent to an existence-sphere.

A further argument showing that thought, which is instrumental, has not reached its culmination, is furnished by science. It is a far-fetched conclusion that holds the problems in the laboratory to be set for science wholly by practical exigency. Such a conclusion is too much like saying that the mind cannot think until it has first set for itself practical alternatives. Evidently there is in science a theoretical interest. The end and aim of science—unless it is an experimental station—is the object itself—the building up of an objective sphere of truth.

CONCLUSION.

The aim of this essay, as indicated in the introduction, has been to investigate the phenomena of belief and judgment, with the intention of finding whether the relation between these two series of psychic facts is so intimate as really to reduce them to a single series. Should judgment be found thus coinciding with belief (in its most generally accepted sense, as meaning objective reference to reality and subjective reference to person), it would establish the view that judgment operates in and for experience, and not beyond experience as a play of empty and irresponsible forms.

Whether this investigation has contributed to such a view is not for me to decide, but I may state my case as it stands. Briefly put.

the evidence for agreement between judgment and belief is as follows: (a) The increasing investigation of the "existential theory" directly indicates that judgment, like belief, refers to objective reality. (b) Pragmatism and certain worth-theories show that both judgment and belief have the inner control of an appraising and evaluating self. (c) Such a belief-view of judgment gives significance to the negative. (d) Pragmatism in limiting judgment to the instrumental and schematic, to a mere inquiry, unavoidably limits belief to assumption.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.

The writer of this dissertation, Thomas Albert Lewis, was born March 17, 1878, in Livingston County, in the State of Missouri. He received his preliminary education in the public schools of his native county and in a private normal school. After a year's teaching in district schools, he matriculated at William Jewell College, Liberty, Missouri, in 1899, where he graduated with the degree of Bachelor of Arts in 1905.

At the conclusion of his college course the author resumed teaching as principal of the public school at Polo, Missouri. He resigned this position at the close of the first year in order to take up work in the Johns Hopkins University as a graduate student. He chose Philosophy as his principal, and Experimental Psychology and Biology as his subordinate, subjects. He held the Fellowship in Philosophy and Psychology during the year 1909-10, and was admitted to the degree of Doctor of Philosophy June 14, 1910.

The writer has attended the lectures of Professors Baldwin, Stratton, Griffin, Buchner and Andrews, and Doctors Dunlap and Furry, to all of whom he is deeply indebted for the inspiration of their teaching and for their helpful interest. He would express an especial indebtedness to Professor Buchner and Dr. Furry for the encouragement and sympathetic criticism they have given him in the writing of this dissertation.