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PURCHASED FROM

THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTS, EVIDENCE,
AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

INVESTIGATION OF THE MURDER OF THOUSANDS OF
POLISH OFFICERS IN THE KATYN FOREST NEAR
SMOLENSK, RUSSIA

PART 4

(LONDON, ENGLAND)

APRIL 16, 17, 18, AND 19, 1952

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of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre



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SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION OF THE
FACTS, EVIDENCE, AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE KATYN FOREST
MASSACRE

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THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 16, 1952

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE,
London, England.

The select committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 111, Kensington Palace Hotel, De Vere Gardens, W. 8, Hon. Ray J. Madden (chairman) presiding.

Present: Messrs. Madden, Flood, Machrowicz, Dondero, and O'Konski.

Also present: Roman Pucinski, investigator for the committee.

Chairman MADDEN. The committee will come to order.

This is the fourth of a series of meetings of the special committee created by Congress in September 1951, to investigate the Katyn Forest massacres. In October the committee met to take testimony in Washington. Again, in February, the committee held a series of hearings in the city of Washington. In March the committee held a series of hearings in the city of Chicago.

The meetings here in London, England, will be for the purpose of recording essential testimony pertaining to the Katyn Forest massacres, which were committed in the Katyn Forest, near the city of Smolensk, in Russia, during the early part of World War II.

Mr. DONDERO. Mr. Chairman, I hope the record will show all members who came abroad are present.

Chairman MADDEN. I was going to mention that.

Present this morning are Congressman Flood, of Pennsylvania; Congressman Machrowicz, of Michigan; Congressman Dondero, of Michigan, and Congressman O'Konski, of Wisconsin. Congressman Furcolo of Massachusetts, and Congressman Sheehan, of Illinois, were unable to attend these meetings in London.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that you instructed Committee Counsel John Mitchell to introduce the following documents into the record. With your permission, I will read them into the record at this time. They are the invitation this committee extended to the Polish Government in Warsaw and that Government's reply.

Mr. MADDEN. Proceed.

Mr. PUCINSKI. The first document is the letter of invitation extended by this committee to the Polish Government in Warsaw. It is dated March 18, 1952, and is as follows:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE,
Washington, D. C., March 18, 1952.

His Excellency the AMBASSADOR OF POLAND.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: The House of Representatives of the United States of America on September 18, 1951, unanimously passed House Resolution 390. A copy of this resolution is attached for your information.

This resolution authorizes and directs a committee of Congress to conduct a full and complete investigation and study of the facts, evidence, and extenuating circumstances both before and after the massacre of thousands of Polish officers buried in a mass grave in the Katyn Forest on the banks of the Dnieper in the vicinity of Smolensk, U. S. S. R.

This official committee of the United States Congress respectfully invites the Government of Poland to submit any evidence, documents, and witnesses it may desire on or before May 1, 1952, pertaining to the Katyn Forest massacre. The committee will be in Europe during the month of April to hear and consider any testimony which may be available.

These hearings and the taking of testimony from witnesses are being conducted in accordance with the rules and regulations of the House of Representatives of the United States of America.

Sincerely yours,

RAY J. MADDEN,
*Chairman, Select Committee To Conduct an Investigation and Study of the
Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre.*

Mr. MADDEN. That now becomes part of the record of this committee.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, the second document is the reply which this committee received from the Polish Government in Warsaw through the United States State Department.

Mr. MADDEN. Proceed.

Mr. PUCINSKI. This letter was dated March 31, 1952 and is as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 31, 1952.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The American Embassy in Warsaw has received a note from the Government of Poland, a translation of which is as follows:

"On March 24, 1952, the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Washington received a note from the Department of State transmitting a communication from Mr. Madden, Member of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress, to the Polish Ambassador, in which as chairman of the Committee of the House of Representatives for Katyn Affairs he invites the Polish Government to present documents and witnesses in this matter.

"The transmission of the above invitation of the chairman of the congressional committee of the United States who, contrary to binding international customs, usurps to himself the right to extend invitations to sovereign governments has no precedent in the history of international relations.

"The attitude of the Polish Government re the activities of this committee was expressed in a declaration of the Polish Government published on March 1, 1952, and the Polish Government does not intend to return to this matter again."

Sincerely yours,

JACK K. McFALL,
Assistant Secretary,
(For the Secretary of State).

HON. RAY J. MADDEN,
*Chairman, Select Committee to Investigate the Katyn Forest Massacre,
House of Representatives.*

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, the third document is a letter of invitation extended to Gen. Wladyslaw Anders, who was Commander in Chief of the Polish armed forces during World War II and personally directed the extensive search for the missing Polish officers.

Mr. MADDEN. Proceed.

Mr. PUCINSKI. This letter was dated March 20, 1952, and is as follows:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
 SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE,
 Washington, D. C., March 20, 1952.

POLISH GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE,
 7 Waverton Street,
 London W. 1, England.

DEAR GENERAL ANDERS: The special committee created by the United States House of Representatives to investigate the Katyn massacre will hold hearings in London during the month of April. Congressman Alvin E. O'Konski, a member of this committee, and Roman Pucinski, the investigator, are sailing this evening on the *Queen Elizabeth* and will contact you when they arrive in London.

Our committee is aware that the Polish Government-in-exile began inquiry in 1941 about the fate of the Polish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union, and began accumulating pertinent evidence with respect thereto. In 1943, at the time of the disclosure of the Katyn Forest massacre, the Polish Government-in-exile sought an independent, impartial investigation, but such an investigation was not permitted.

Our committee invites the Polish Government-in-exile to cooperate with us in every way and submit whatever testimony, evidence, documents, and witnesses they desire while we are holding hearings in London and on the Continent.

These hearings and the taking of testimony from witnesses are being conducted in accordance with the rules and regulations of the House of Representatives.

Sincerely yours,

RAY J. MADDEN,
*Chairman, Select Committee To Conduct an Investigation and Study of the
 Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre.*

Mr. O'KONSKI. Mr. Chairman, upon my arrival here in London I conducted a series of conferences with General Anders, members of his staff, and officers of the Polish Combatants Association in an effort to arrange these hearings in London. I want to report to this committee that the whole-hearted and sincere cooperation which we received both from General Anders and his associates was beyond all my expectations.

Chairman MADDEN. The first witness will be W. J. Furtek.

Mr. Furtek, will you give your address?

Mr. FURTEK. Sixty-nine Parkview Court, S.W. 6.

Chairman MADDEN. Mr. Furtek, before you make your statement, it is our wish that you be advised that in giving this testimony you would be open to a possible risk of action in the courts if any individual or set of individuals might suffer injury by reason of your testimony. At the same time, I wish to make it clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as the result of your testimony.

Are you prepared to be sworn?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes, sir.

Chairman MADDEN. Raise your hand.

Do you swear, by the God Almighty and Omniscient, that you will, according to your best knowledge, tell the pure truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; so help you God?

Mr. FURTEK. I do.

Chairman MADDEN. I might say, for the record, that Mr. Roman Pucinski, of Chicago, Ill., will act as special interrogator in the absence of Counsel John Mitchell, who has just left London for Germany where he is preparing our next set of hearings which will begin in Frankfurt on April 21.

**TESTIMONY OF WLADYSLAW JAN FURTEK, 69 PARKVIEW COURT,
SW. 6, LONDON, ENGLAND**

Mr. PUCINSKI. Do you want to give us your full name?

Mr. FURTEK. I do. Wladyslaw Jan Furtek.

Mr. PUCINSKI. We have your address.

Where were you born, Mr. Furtek?

Mr. FURTEK. I was born in Poland; Cieszanow, Poland; county of Lwow.

Mr. PUCINSKI. When were you born, sir?

Mr. FURTEK. 1921.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Did you serve in the Polish Army subsequent to September 1, 1939?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes, I did. I joined the Polish Army on the 30th of September, 1938.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Were you ever taken prisoner by any enemy forces while a member of the Polish armed forces?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes, I was.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Would you like to tell us when and where?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes. I was a cadet officer in the Polish Cadet Officers' School at Komorowo, regular army officers' school.

I took part in the September campaign in Poland and I was captured by the Russian forces in Tarnopol on the 18th of September 1939. From there I was sent to a transient camp, which was called Tiotkino. I stayed there for about 3 weeks, and afterward, as my parents lived in a part of Poland which was occupied by the Russian forces, I was promised to be sent home. A transport was formed, in which I was included, and we were sent home.

Well, we were told we were being sent home, but instead of being sent home we were sent to Kriwoj Rog, which is in the iron basin of the Ukraine, and I was forced to work as a miner in the mines. I refused to do it and, as a punishment, I was sent to several prisons in that locality. I was interrogated by several political commissars and finally I was sent to Kharkov. That is in Russia, the Ukraine.

After several days of interrogations, I was sent to Kursk. From there I went to Orzel, from that place further on to Smolensk. Finally, from Smolensk, I was sent to Kozielsk, where I arrived—I don't remember the date, but it was somewhere in the middle of January 1940.

Mr. PUCINSKI. How long did you stay at Kozielsk?

Mr. FURTEK. Till the 26th of April 1940. For the first few days I was kept in solitary confinement.

I don't want to go into much detail, but there was one part of the compound which was surrounded by barbed wire, and it was actually a sort of tower in which they kept prisoners in solitary confinement. But after 6 or 7 days I was released and was given freedom. I could move, go and see my friends, and I could live the ordinary life of a prisoner of war in that camp.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Could you tell us what Kozielsk was?

Mr. FURTEK. As a matter of fact, I have an original picture of part of the Kozielsk camp with me, which I smuggled out of Kozielsk. Would you like to see it?

Mr. PUCINSKI. Would the committee like to see that picture?

Chairman MADDEN. Have you the picture with you?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes; I have it on me.

Chairman MADDEN. You might submit it to the committee if you have it with you.

(The witness produced a photograph.)

Chairman MADDEN. I will hand this to the reporter to mark "Exhibit 1," which the witness says is a picture of the prison camp at Kozielsk.

Mr. FURTEK. That is right.

(The picture referred to was marked "Exhibit 1" and is shown below:)




Photo of prisoner-of-war camp at Kozielsk.

Mr. FURTEK. Kozielsk itself was an old monastery, a very old monastery. I don't know the history of the monastery, but the buildings and the churches and chapels told us it was a monastery.

Mr. PUCINSKI. While you were there, was Kozielsk a camp for prisoners of war?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes.

Mr. PUCINSKI. What prisoners of war; what country?

Mr. FURTEK. Polish officers.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Would you say how many there were in that camp?

Mr. FURTEK. About five thousand. I can't swear, can't remember the exact number, but between 4,500 to 5,000.

Mr. PUCINSKI. On April 26, when you were evacuated from that camp, approximately how many were there?

Mr. FURTEK. About 800.

Mr. PUCINSKI. What happened to the others that were there?

Mr. FURTEK. Well, the others disappeared and some of them were found in Katyn, but a few of them joined us in Pawliczew Bor.

That was the camp we were sent to from Kozielsk. There was a very insignificant number; you could count them on your hands.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Do you have any information, based on your stay or experience at Kozielsk, which may be helpful to this committee in determining what may have happened to those of your friends who were evacuated prior to your own departure on April 26?

Mr. FURTEK. Well, they completely disappeared and we never heard anything about them. Well, the story is this: Before April, we knew something was coming but we didn't know what it was. The news was spread that we were going to be sent to Germany and, of course, everybody was rather excited because we thought we would leave Russia.

Nobody liked Russia at that time because the conditions were pretty grim and, of course, we wanted a change after stagnation and a stagnated life in the camp.

The political commissars were telling us, "Well, you are going home. You will be exchanged at the border." And the town of Bzescz was mentioned, and I believe it was the 3d of April. The first names were called out and the first from my block was the commanding officer of my block No. 1. I was accommodated in block No. 1. His name was Captain Bychowice. They called out about 150 to 180 or 200 men altogether.

There was a search in a club of the camp—that was a club that we had for entertainment—and after that they were taken not through the main gate but through the cellar of one of the blocks. There was another search there, a very strict one. They were deprived of all personal effects and belongings, and that is all we saw of the first group.

Chairman MADDEN. Who did the searching?

Mr. FURTEK. The Russian staff; well, the guards.

Chairman MADDEN. Russian guards?

Mr. FURTEK. Russian guards.

Mr. PUCINSKI. When you say personal belongings, what do you mean?

Mr. FURTEK. Pen knives, pens, combs, spoons; everything.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Do you mean also correspondence, letters, and diaries?

Mr. FURTEK. Well, no. For instance, I had a few private photographs of my family, and when they searched me they left it on me. I had some notes scribbled, some poems that I used to write in camp, and they left that.

Of course, I tried to hide the things. For instance, I was not very cautious and some of my papers, playing cards, that were made in the camp were taken away from me.

Mr. PUCINSKI. But they did permit you to keep your letters, pictures, diaries?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes, they did; they didn't take that off me.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Proceed.

Mr. FURTEK. And I believe 2 days afterward, another group was formed and again taken away.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Another group of about 200?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes. I can't really remember the exact number, but the groups were in 100 to 300; maybe 120 to 150.

Chairman MADDEN. Did this happen each day?

Mr. FURTEK. It didn't happen each day. There was always a break of 1 day, sometimes 2 days. I remember even one time there was a break lasting 4 days. We didn't know what was going on.

Mr. FLOOD. Just a minute. I do not want to interrupt you, but the record is not clear.

You, of course, were not present at any of the examinations given to any of the other groups, were you?

Mr. FURTEK. No.

Mr. FLOOD. You were only present as one of the group of which you were a member; is that right?

Mr. FURTEK. That is right.

Mr. FLOOD. When you described what was taken from you and what was left with you and the men in your group, that is all you know about it as a fact, is it not?

Mr. FURTEK. That is right.

Mr. FLOOD. You take for granted that the same kind of investigation was conducted on the other groups?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. Let the witness proceed, Mr. Chairman, with what happened after he was searched.

Just tell your own story; that is what we want to know.

Mr. FURTEK. There was a small incident during the search of the group that I was in, namely, Colonel Grobicki.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Is his first name Jerzy?

Mr. FURTEK. That is right.

He had a fountain pen. It was taken from him and he objected strongly and demanded from the commanding officer of the guards for that pen to be returned. And that officer said, "Well, of course, they wouldn't take a pen from you; it's a harmless thing."

"But they have taken it from me."

So he turned around to the guard and said, "Well, give it back. Don't do any more stealing—when they see it."

There is one, to my mind, very important aspect. Before I was taken away from the compound, there was that group waiting to enter that cellar where the search was being made, and before we entered, the political commissar of the camp, Dymidowicz, looked at our group and said, "Well—"

(The witness made a statement in his native tongue.)

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, the witness at this point would like to say something in Polish and would like to have it translated.

Chairman MADDEN. All right, Mr. Pucinski, will you be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear the interpretation you will give of the testimony of the witness, as interpreter, will be a true interpretation?

Mr. PUCINSKI. I do.

The witness repeated a statement made to him by a Russian guard, in the Russian language, which he then translated into Polish. He said that the Russian guard told him that, "For you people, you got away with it."

Mr. FURTEK. One correction: He didn't tell it to me, and it wasn't a guard; it was a political commissar of the camp, Dymidowicz, and it was just said to almost everybody. He looked at us and said, "Well, you got away with it."

Mr. PUCINSKI. When was this?

Mr. FURTEK. It was on the 26th of April; an hour before we left camp.

Mr. PUCINSKI. At Kozielsk?

Mr. FURTEK. At Kozielsk; within the compound.

Mr. FLOOD. What was that date?

Mr. FURTEK. 26th of April.

Mr. FLOOD. What year?

Mr. FURTEK. 1940.

Mr. FLOOD. By that time, I take for granted that several groups of your fellow prisoners had been removed from time to time?

Mr. FURTEK. That is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. To where, you do not know?

Mr. FURTEK. No.

Mr. FLOOD. Under the circumstances and in the manner that you have just described?

Mr. FURTEK. Precisely.

Mr. FLOOD. Finally, or ultimately, they came to another group and you were included in that group; is that right?

Mr. FURTEK. That is right.

Mr. FLOOD. And you were in that group that you are discussing now, were you?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. You were lined up in the compound?

Mr. FURTEK. That is right.

Mr. FLOOD. Had you been examined at that point and investigated and searched?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes; I was searched in that cellar that I described.

Mr. FLOOD. Everything was all over, you were being lined up in the compound ready to be transported some place?

Mr. FURTEK. That is right.

Mr. FLOOD. While you were lined up there, the Russian political commissar whose name you have given was standing in front of you; is that right?

Mr. FURTEK. That is right.

Mr. FLOOD. He turned to your group and repeated the words that you have just stated?

Mr. FURTEK. That is right.

Mr. FLOOD. Did he say anything else that you remember?

Mr. FURTEK. We were within the compound when he addressed us.

Mr. FLOOD. You were in the compound.

Mr. FURTEK. Before entering the searching cellar, the cellar in which we were searched.

Mr. FLOOD. You were lined up in the compound, and before you were searched, the Russian commissar turned and made the statement to your group, which you have just repeated?

Mr. FURTEK. That is right.

Mr. FLOOD. You said, before you made that statement, that you had an incident of considerable importance to state to the committee.

Mr. FURTEK. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Was that the incident?

Mr. FURTEK. That is right.

Mr. FLOOD. Why do you think it was of any importance?

Mr. FURTEK. To begin with, we didn't know what he meant. But I thought there was some significance attached to it.

Mr. FLOOD. I understand that. What do you mean by "significance"?

Mr. FURTEK. Because it came back to me in 1943, when the discovery of Katyn was made, that he addressed us in that way.

Mr. FLOOD. In 1943, after the discovery of Katyn was made, then your mind went back to the statement made by this commissar?

Mr. FURTEK. Precisely.

Mr. FLOOD. As of 1943, what particular significance did you attach to that statement made to you and your group in 1940? Why was it significant to you in 1943 and why is it significant to you today?

Mr. FURTEK. Because in 1943, when the discovery was made, I personally was convinced that the massacre was done by the Russians.

Mr. FLOOD. What massacre?

Mr. FURTEK. Katyn.

Mr. FLOOD. Had you heard about it before 1943?

Mr. FURTEK. No. But I am talking about 1943. And that statement that he made to our group brought back to me the circumstances in which we were evacuated from Kozielsk, and I had the conviction that he knew what was going to happen to us.

Mr. FLOOD. I am sure I understand what you mean and I know you know what you mean, but probably, because of the language difficulty, you are not quite able to make it clear to the committee. Let me see if I can help you. During the time that you were in Kozielsk, as you have described, certain groups of your fellow prisoners were being removed periodically, after a search and examination, to some place.

Mr. FURTEK. That is right.

Mr. FLOOD. You did not know where they went?

Mr. FURTEK. No.

Mr. FLOOD. You heard rumors they were going to Germany?

Mr. FURTEK. That is right.

Mr. FLOOD. You heard rumors they were going to some place else; you did not know. After 1940 to 1943 you never heard from any of those men, is that correct?

Mr. FURTEK. That is right; 1940 to 1943.

Mr. FLOOD. You never heard of them after?

Mr. FURTEK. No.

Mr. FLOOD. Your group was removed from Kozielsk?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Your group survived Pawlizezew Bor and ultimately you were with General Anders?

Mr. FURTEK. That is right.

Mr. FLOOD. In 1943, when you heard of Katyn and the names of the men who died at Katyn, then your mind went back to this incident in the compound and the words of the Russian commissar when he said—what?

Mr. PUCINSKI [translating]. "You have succeeded."

Mr. FLOOD. "You have succeeded?"

Mr. FURTEK. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Then you understood that to mean, "You are lucky; your group are not going to Katyn, your group are not going to be liquidated; you are going to survive"; is that what you mean?

Mr. FURTEK. That is precisely what I mean.

Mr. DONDERO. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that the memorandum handed to us says, "You sure are lucky."

Is that what you mean?

Mr. FURTEK. It is very difficult to give an exact translation, even from Russian into Polish.

Mr. DONDERO. That is what he meant?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Would you put the expression you made as a sort of colloquial Polish expression, something like the English "You got away with it; you are lucky"?

Mr. FURTEK. That is right; a very idiomatic expression.

Mr. FLOOD. In my interpretation of your phrasing, I was not putting any words into your mouth, was I?

Mr. FURTEK. No.

Mr. FLOOD. It is precisely what you mean?

Mr. FURTEK. It is perfectly correct.

Mr. FLOOD. In 1943 and as of today?

Mr. FURTEK. That is right.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Furtek, what was your rank?

Mr. FURTEK. Cadet officer.

Mr. FLOOD. When you went to Pawlizezew Bor with this group, what was the next camp?

Mr. FURTEK. Griazowice.

Mr. FLOOD. When did you leave Griazowice, about?

Mr. FURTEK. 2d or 3d of September, 1941.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you advised at Griazowice that you were going to be permitted to join General Anders' Polish Army?

Mr. FURTEK. I joined the Army in Griazowice.

Mr. FLOOD. You ultimately joined General Anders, served through the war and came to England?

Mr. FURTEK. I came to England in 1942.

Mr. FLOOD. Are you testifying voluntarily?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes.

Mr. O'KONSKI. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman MADDEN. Congressman O'Konski.

Mr. O'KONSKI. These people at the camp were mostly cadet officers; they were the heart of the military in Poland, were they not?

Mr. FURTEK. Do you mean in Kozielsk?

Mr. O'KONSKI. Yes.

Mr. FURTEK. No.

Mr. O'KONSKI. What were they?

Mr. FURTEK. Mostly officers. It was only a small group of cadet officers because all noncommissioned officers and privates and cadet officers were removed from Kozielsk prior to the officers' arrival, of the officers from various camps.

Mr. O'KONSKI. You have since seen the names of the Polish people who were found in the graves at Katyn; have you not?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes.

Mr. O'KONSKI. As you read over that list of names, did you recognize any names that were in the Kozielsk camp at the time that you were there?

Mr. FURTEK. I did.

Mr. O'KONSKI. From the names that you saw, were those names among those groups of 100 to 300 that they took out periodically and said they were going some place?

Mr. FURTEK. That is correct.

Mr. O'KONSKI. In other words, those lists of names of the people that were found buried in the Katyn graves were names that you recognized, who were in that camp, who were taken out in those groups periodically during the month of April of 1940?

Mr. FURTEK. That is correct, sir.

Mr. DONDERO. Mr. Chairman, might I ask if this witness knows anything further about this, personally?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes. After being searched, we were taken by lorries to the—well, it wasn't the marshaling yard, it was a siding of the Kozielsk station. There we saw a train waiting for us; about—well, I don't remember how many carriages, but carriages of the prison type; the ordinary carriage—well, it wasn't ordinary; specially built, with a corridor along, and small compartments.

Chairman MADDEN. Railroad car?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes. It had a grated door first, a steel grated door, and then a steel ordinary door with a small hole or opening for the guard to look inside.

We were very crammed in those carriages because there was usually private place for 8 and in my compartment there were 24 of us. We were almost packed like sardines. All we got was very little bread and a few herrings; and, of course, we always refused to take the herrings because we knew of the Russian practice not to give you water afterward.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you see any inscriptions on these cars?

Mr. FURTEK. That is what I am coming to.

I was lying on the upper shelf. There were three shelves. You can unfold them and they form a platform, the first platform, second platform; but there is no platform on the third shelf. I was lying on a shelf with Commander Dzienisiewicz, and then I noticed on the board an inscription. It might have been made—I don't know if it was a pencil or match, or any other object that could leave a black or grayish mark on a white-painted board. It read, as far as I remember now: "Two stations past"—or behind—"Smolensk, disembarking, being loaded on lorries"; or something of that kind. I remember "being loaded" or "entering lorries" or "being taken by lorries." Anyway, "Two stations behind"—or past—"Smolensk, disembarking and being taken"—or "being loaded—on lorries."

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Of course, that was in the Polish language, is that right?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes; and the date might have been the 12th or 13th of April.

Mr. FLOOD. By the date, do you mean the date was marked on there also?

Mr. FURTEK. That is right.

Mr. FLOOD. 1940?

Mr. FURTEK. 1940, that is right.

In our compartment was Colonel Prokop—

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Are you still continuing about the inscription?

Mr. FURTEK. I am still continuing with the inscription—who was very interested in the inscription. He said, "Well, I believe this is a mark left by my friend with whom I arranged to leave some sign, if possible."

Well, of course, I don't know whether it is true, or not.

And he mentioned the name of Colonel Kutymba.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Was there a signature to it?

Mr. FURTEK. No; there was no signature to it; there was only his assumption. It was only an assumption; it might have been him or it might have been somebody else.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. At any rate, it was a Polish inscription?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes. It was written in Polish, and I say it was either a pencil or piece of match, or any other object that could leave a dirty gray mark on white paintwork.

Chairman MADDEN. "Two stations behind Smolensk" would be where, if you know?

Mr. FLOOD. You do not know that, do you?

Mr. FURTEK. I don't know that.

Mr. FLOOD. I want to be sure about the date. What figures did you see on the inscription; what numbers?

Mr. FURTEK. I would say "12" or it might have been "13/4/40." But I am not certain whether it was "12," or "13."

Mr. FLOOD. Would you mark down in writing and show to the chairman what you saw indicating the date?

Mr. FURTEK. Certainly [writing].

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Before you go any further; in explanation of that, so there will not be any misunderstanding on the part of the committee, let me say that in the Polish language, the day of the month is stated first and then the month and then the year.

Mr. FURTEK. That is right.

Mr. FLOOD. The witness has shown to the chairman the numbers, written in his own handwriting on a piece of paper, in the presence of the committee.

Mr. FURTEK. It might have been "12" or "13."

Mr. FLOOD. "12" or "13"?

Mr. FURTEK. It was blurred.

Mr. FLOOD. The next number is "4" and the final number is "40"; is that right?

Mr. FURTEK. That is right.

Mr. FLOOD. The first number means which date; the "12" or "13"?

Mr. FURTEK. 12th or 13th.

Mr. FLOOD. "4" means what month?

Mr. FURTEK. April.

Mr. FLOOD. And "40" means what?

Mr. FURTEK. Year.

Mr. FLOOD. What year?

Mr. FURTEK. 1940.

Mr. O'KONSKI. May I ask you: Referring to this arrangement that this officer made, for someone to leave a sign or something, did you find the person who supposedly wrote that sign that you saw? Did you find his name among those bodies that were found at Katyn?

Mr. FURTEK. Well, I really don't remember whether the name of Colonel Kutymba is on the list.

Mr. DONDERO. Kutymba was not killed, because he went out with you.

Mr. FURTEK. No; Prokop. He made the arrangement with Kutymba. He might have been the man who made the sign.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What was Kutymba's first name?

Mr. FURTEK. I couldn't tell you, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. I now show the witness a document, which is the list of names of the Polish officers discovered at Katyn. The document has already been placed in evidence in the hearings thus far conducted in the United States. I direct the attention of the witness to page 94 of said document, and especially to that part of page 94 where is found, third from the bottom, the name of Jozef Kutyla and ask the witness if that is the spelling or the pronunciation of the name Kutyla that he mentioned in his previous testimony this mornin'?

Mr. FURTEK. That is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did Colonel Prokop tell you what rank Kutyla had?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What was his rank?

Mr. FURTEK. Colonel.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What rank appears in that list?

Mr. FURTEK. Lieutenant colonel.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. So it is the same rank.

Mr. FURTEK. Yes; because we don't distinguish in Polish whether it is colonel or lieutenant colonel.

Mr. FLOOD. It is the practice in the Polish Army, as in all armies, to refer to a lieutenant colonel, by courtesy, as colonel?

Mr. FURTEK. That is right.

Mr. DONDERO. Do you know anything more about this, personally?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes. The train that we entrained in Kozielsk consisted of several carriages—there might have been up to five—and after we entrained, another group was brought into the station, and they were put in the remaining carriages. But we lost those carriages somewhere on the way; where, I don't know.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you see any other inscriptions besides the one that you described?

Mr. FURTEK. I personally didn't.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Was there anyone in your group who reported to you any other inscriptions that they saw?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What were they? Just tell us briefly: Were there any other inscriptions that were found by others in the group, in your group?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes. Before we entrained, everybody was called out by name. We all had to kneel down. Then we were called out, our names were called out. We answered "Yes" and then we were taken and put in a compartment. And while we were waiting, in front of carriages, one of our men, whose name was Lieutenant Abramski, had noticed an inscription on the outside wall of the carriage, "Gniezdowo." And he pointed it to Dr. Skotlewski, the dental surgeon, and said something to this effect: "Look, we are going to Gniezdowo." And that was heard by the Russian guard—we were surrounded by the guards—and he said—

(The witness made a statement in his native tongue.)

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness, Mr. Chairman, has quoted in Polish, the guard, who spoke in Russian, as saying "they found out."

Mr. FURTEK. Yes. And then he said, "How did you find it out?" And he was cross with Abramski.

Abramski said, "Well, it's simple. Look." And he pointed to the inscription on the carriage. That was the end of the incident.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Where is Gniezdowo?

Mr. FURTEK. Well, I am not very good at geography, but Gniezdowo is the station for Katyn, as far as I remember.

Mr. O'KONSKI. The last station before Katyn, actually.

Mr. DONDERO. When you speak of the carriage you mean a railroad car, do you?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes, railroad car.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you present, waiting to get aboard yourself? Did you hear the conversation?

Mr. FURTEK. I didn't hear the conversation.

Mr. FLOOD. Was it subsequently reported by one of your group?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes; by a friend of mine.

Chairman MADDEN. Are there any further questions?

Mr. O'KONSKI. Do you know the man who told you that?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes, I do.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Is he here in London?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes, he is in London. I can give you his telephone number and address.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I have just one other question. Did you see any of your comrades of those groups that preceded you on these trips in the cars, after they left your camp?

Mr. FURTEK. Never.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you know of any in your group that ever saw any of them?

Mr. FURTEK. No.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In other words, that was the last time?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes, that was the last; that is right. I received two post cards while I was in the army, from the families of men who were missing, asking me to help them in tracing them.

Mr. PUCKINSKI. Mr. Furtek, what is that man's name?

Mr. FURTEK. Skotlewski.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Do you know his first name?

Mr. FURTEK. Czeslaw.

Mr. FLOOD. I think the record should show that during the course of the hearings in Washington and Chicago, a member of this committee, the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Furcolo, repeatedly directed interrogations to other witnesses who were in Kozielsk as to whether or not they knew of the witness who is now testifying, by name and in person.

Chairman MADDEN. Are there any further questions?

Mr. DONDERO. No questions.

Chairman MADDEN. Mr. Furtek, from your experiences in the prison camp at Kozielsk and from the further testimony that you have outlined here, of your experiences and the statements which you heard made by your comrades and by Russian guards, would you be in a position to state your opinion as to who was responsible for the murders at Katyn? You can answer that yes or no.

Mr. FURTEK. Yes, of course, I can answer that.

Chairman MADDEN. Who, would you say, was responsible and committed the massacres at Katyn?

Mr. FURTEK. Well, my personal and private opinion is that the murder was done by the Russians.

Mr. O'KONSKI. May I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman MADDEN. Proceed.

Mr. O'KONSKI. You have since seen descriptions of these bodies and the clothing that they wore when they were dug out of the graves at Katyn, have you not?

Mr. FURTEK. That is right.

Mr. O'KONSKI. To your recollection, is that the way those people left the camp, dressed as they were found in the graves, with overcoats on, boots?

Mr. FURTEK. That is precisely the case.

Mr. O'KONSKI. In other words, the way they were found in the graves is exactly the way you saw them leaving the camp; is that correct?

Mr. FURTEK. That is correct.

Mr. O'KONSKI. In April of 1940?

Mr. FURTEK. Yes. Because you must remember the climate should be taken into consideration. April in that part of Russia is quite a chilly and cold month.

Chairman MADDEN. Mr. Furtek, we wish to thank you for coming here and offering your testimony.

Let me ask you this: You have not been promised any remuneration in any way, have you?

Mr. FURTEK. I never expected it, sir.

Chairman MADDEN. The witness is excused.

TESTIMONY OF MR. W.

Just state your name for the record.

Mr. W. I will state my name but not for publication, because I have relatives in Poland.

(The witness stated his name for the information of the committee.)

Chairman MADDEN. I might state, for the record, that this witness, for the reason that he has relatives in Poland, wishes that his name be not recorded. However, for the record, I can state that the members of the committee have the name and address of the witness about to testify, and he will be referred to in the record as Mr. W., in accordance with his suggestion.

Let me state, sir, that before you make your statement, it is our wish to advise you that any testimony that you may make that possibly might be interpreted by somebody as libel or slander will be your responsibility; that you will be responsible for any statements of that kind that might develop into legal action against yourself, and, further, that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives does not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings that may arise as a result of your testimony.

Mr. W. I am aware of that.

Chairman MADDEN. Now, will you be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you give in the hearing now in trial will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. W. I do.

Chairman MADDEN. I will say this, Mr. Witness: I would suggest that, if you can, you just narrate your statement very briefly and confine it to what you know regarding the Katyn massacre. It will aid the committee in conducting this hearing and help to dispose, in

better time, of the testimony of the great number of witnesses we expect to hear.

Mr. W. Yes, sir.

I had been brought to the Kozielsk camp in the first days of November 1939. Later, I worked in the kitchen as a stoker, and I saw quite often, in the course of my duties, the Russian staff of the camp, both the administration of the camp and the civilians. When the discharging of the camp commenced on the 3d of April, and even before that—

Mr. DONDERO. What year?

Mr. W. 1940.

There were plenty of rumors about our future. It was obvious that because of congestion and the lack of sanitary amenities, we couldn't stay longer than just the first months in the spring, otherwise we would have been killed by epidemics and other things. One rumor had it that we would go to Germany. The second was that we would go to Poland, and the third rumor was that we would be simply transferred to another camp, in Russia.

These rumors, of course, were the result of the talks of the prisoners themselves, but those talks were made quite often in the front of the Soviet administration of the camp.

The direction of the Soviet administration, I may mention here an Urbanowicz, who was the head of our economic department, I would say.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What do you mean by "our economic department"?

Mr. W. I mean the camp's department.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. He was a prisoner, though, was he?

Mr. W. No. Urbanowicz was a member of the Soviet staff, and he just was responsible for our feeding, for our food. When we mentioned to him, we were seeking repudiation of those rumors, or his approval. They were various; they varied from time to time. He never denied anything, but he never confirmed anything, either.

But I can remember that there was a talk that, "Oh, you will be welcomed by bands and you will go home." That is definitely what I remember of those Soviet staffs saying about our future.

When those batches of officers and other ranks and civilians were moving, they were given food for their journey. The instructions were to the effect—as I was in the kitchen, stoker—we noticed that the instructions were various. Some batches got better food or more plentiful, some not. And we simply could not make any idea where those prisoners were going. When we were looking from the inside of the camp, there was a hill in the camp. We couldn't see more, only that the prisoners, when taken out of the wall of the camp, were taken by lorry and that was all. No news whatsoever returned back from them.

Once we understood that there was a careful search of all of them leaving the camp, but we had no idea whatsoever whether we were going to Turkey or to Germany or to another camp.

On the 26th of April my name was called, and I took my things. Chairman MADDEN. 1940?

Mr. W. 1940, of course.

On the 26th of April 1940 I took my things. I joined the party. We were 107. The senior officer, I could see, was General Wolkowicki.

We were given food and then we were taken out to the little hut which was at the entrance of the wall. A search of all of us was made. I mean we had to take off our shoes. We were to give up all sharp weapons. But still I managed to hide my knife in the tooth powder. I had a box of tooth powder and I managed to put my knife into the powder, and it went like that, the search did not notice it.

After the search we were taken to a lorry in a very bad congestion, and under the threats of the guards, who pointed to us their guns, we had to kneel or sit in the lorry whether we could or not. We were taken to a railway siding, and when we were approaching that siding, I remarked I noticed two railroad carriages, but prison carriages.

This was the first time that we were carried in those carriages having the bars on their windows; before, we used to travel in cattle trucks, which was much more comfortable.

I was put in a compartment with some other officers. We were 15 or 16 in a compartment which usually is used for 8 persons. Being one of the youngest, I was put on the shelf. There were two levels of the shelves, one being, in this case, three seats to one shelf, and the second shelf, which was quite on the top of the carriage. And I couldn't sit there even; I had to crouch or to lay.

When I was laying there I noticed that there were various inscriptions on the roof of the coach—some in pencil, some definitely with the nail. I could read some Christian names; but I don't remember them.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. When you say nail, you mean fingernail do you?

Mr. W. Yes; because the nails were supposed to be taken away.

I remember very well that there was an inscription saying: "Disembarking at Gniezdowo." It was in Polish, "Disembarking at railway station, Gniezdowo." It was written in pencil and it was—I still can see—in a corner of the right-hand shelf, where I was lying.

Mr. DONDERO. How old are you now?

Mr. W. I am now 39.

The voyage was not very pleasant because we had in our compartment at least two men who were known for their Communist activities in the camps. One of them, by the way, was my colleague from the Army, a cadet officer, as I was, Kukulienski.

Mr. DONDERO. Pardon me, Mr. Witness; you have not told us what your rank was when you were taken prisoner.

Mr. W. I was a cadet officer.

And practically the whole time we were discussing and nearly worrying about our future and about our attitude toward the politics.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you know what happened to Kukulienski later?

Mr. W. He was taken to Moscow with Berling.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you mean Colonel Berling, who later became a part of the puppet government in Poland?

Mr. W. That is right.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And he is still there, as far as you know?

Mr. W. Yes.

Kukulienski went with him. Because I was in the same regiment with Berling before 1939, and Kukulienski kept company with Berling, and they went together to that villa.

We traveled for about 2 days. I remember that we had passed a railroad station, Sukennice, and I remember that in the morning we

stopped at a station. We were tired and we didn't pay too much attention. I remember it was a nice day, and suddenly Colonel Maramaja exclaimed that the station was Babenino and that a camp was nearby called Pawlizzzew Bor.

After several hours we were taken out of the railway carriages. We were put on the lorries. We traveled in the countryside for 2 hours also and were put in the camp called Pawlizzzew Bor. Several days later we were joined by a group of 63 officers, candidate officers, and civilians, I think, who came from Starobielsk.

I remember those figures very well because I was still in the kitchen and I had to make the appropriate number of meals.

Then after, we were joined by a smaller group from Ostashkov and other groups, making up to nearly 400 people. We still believed then that all our colleagues were sent to another camp as we were, and as the accommodation was better, we thought that it was done in view of the difficulties at Kozielsk. And I must say that we were rather hopeful, as far as the near future was concerned.

After several weeks we were told that we would move out of that camp, and I remember a Mr. Lacinski, with whom we became friendly, and who was from Kozielsk, as myself. This Mr. Lacinski, having told me that our Politruk, Alexandrovitch, assured him that we were going to another camp, bigger in size, more comfortable, as far as accommodation was concerned, and having a river.

Mr. FLOOD. By Politruk do you mean the Russian political commissar?

Mr. W. Alexandrovitch; who was at Kozielsk and then also, after, came to Griazowiec.

And we were indeed once again put in the railway coaches, the same prison wagons, and this time the trouble was rather uneventful because we felt sure we had—the first time we had confidence that at last the Bolsheviks told us the truth and were sure that we were going to another camp. And this became truth; in June we were transferred to Griazowiec.

Mr. DONDERO. In June 1940?

Mr. W. June 1940. I remember that it was about the 18th because the news of the collapse of France caught us when we were on truck.

Mr. FLOOD. After you left Griazowiec, you later on were permitted to join the Polish Army, and you did and you joined General Anders some place, and ultimately, after the war, you came here; is that correct?

Mr. W. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. You mentioned in your testimony that when you were in this prison car, you saw written on the roof of the car, or some place on the car, somehow or other, certain words. Will you write down what those words were that you saw, in Polish?

Mr. W. Yes, sir.

(The witness wrote on a blank sheet of paper.)

Mr. FLOOD. The witness has written certain words on a blank piece of paper, and we will ask the interpreter to read into the record the Polish wording and translate it.

Chairman MADDEN. Read the Polish.

Mr. PUCINSKI. "Wysiadamy na stacji Gniezdowo."

The translation is: "We are getting off at the station in Gniezdowo."

Mr. FLOOD. Is that correct, Mr. Witness?

Mr. W. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you see any dates, that you remember?

Mr. W. I don't remember any dates, but the whole roof—there were so many inscriptions. And, as a matter of fact, we did not realize then, as there was nothing which would give us some guidance or any specific news—

Mr. FLOOD. But you remember this language in particular?

Mr. W. This language I remember very clearly.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you remember any other words or phrases just as clearly?

Mr. W. No, sir. I remember they were Christian names, but I wouldn't remember whether it was a Janek or whatever it was.

Mr. FLOOD. You saw dates but are not sure?

Mr. W. No; I didn't.

Mr. FLOOD. The reason it had significance at the time and you were interested in this was because you were interested in the station yourself; is that about right, is that it?

Mr. W. As a matter of fact, we were even expecting, when we were put on the railway, that we would join at least some of our previous transport at the place of destination.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you ever see any of the prisoners who were with you at Kozielsk, who left Kozielsk with you; to this date, have you seen them since?

Mr. W. No, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you know of anybody who ever did?

Mr. W. No; I don't know of anybody who did.

Mr. O'KONSKI. When was the first time you heard about them again?

Mr. W. Only after the Germans had broadcast the news of the Katyn Forest in 1943.

Mr. FLOOD. And when you saw the list?

Mr. W. When I saw some of the names. I remember very well the name of General Smorawinski, which was one of the first to be given, because I remember very well the moment how General Smorawinski was leaving Kozielsk.

Mr. O'KONSKI. In other words, you knew the people who left the camp?

Mr. W. Yes, sir.

Mr. O'KONSKI. And when you saw the list of people who were found in the Katyn graves, you recognized them as being the same people who left at that time?

Mr. W. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. FLOOD. You were there the early part of November of 1939?

Mr. W. 1939.

Mr. FLOOD. What part of the month, about?

Mr. W. The 1st or the 2d of November it was.

Mr. FLOOD. You were there in the very early days of the establishment of the Kozielsk camp?

Mr. W. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you working in the kitchen all the time?

Mr. W. Not all the time—

Mr. FLOOD. Most of the time until you left in April?

Mr. W. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Mr. Witness, in the light of what you now know as to the fate of some of your comrades at Kozielsk, do you have any explanation in your own mind as to why you were spared their fate?

Mr. W. No, sir. That is what always puzzled me when the fate of those other colleagues had become known. I can't remember of any specific moment during my interrogations in the camp. I remember only that my last interrogation at Kozielsk camp was carried out by a woman, and I had just a conventional conversation with her. The interrogation made an impression on me that it was just a routine one, that they didn't try to find out something new out of me.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You were one of the younger officers, were you?

Mr. W. Yes, sir.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Was there anything particular about the people that were with you; were they all younger officers?

Mr. W. There was no rule in accordance with which we could make a guidance that, for instance, there were just people coming from one part of Poland or one regiment, one service, or whatever it might be, whether they were blond or brunette. It was absolutely impossible to find any principle in accordance of which this choice of 107 people was made.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Did you see these boys leave the camp? As these groups left the camp, did you see them as they were dressed?

Mr. W. Yes, sir. They were dressed in the dress we usually had. Nobody had—I don't think there were lucky people who had more than one dress, which they were wearing on them.

Mr. O'KONSKI. There is no disagreement between the Germans and the Polish people as to how these soldiers were dressed when they were found in the graves. You have read the descriptions, have you not, about how these bodies were dressed that were found in the graves?

Mr. W. Yes, sir.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Is that the way you saw them leave the camp?

Mr. W. It is perfectly clear. And I may say that during Kozielsk, our stay in Kozielsk, all badges of rank were very carefully preserved.

Mr. DONDERO. Were they dressed in their uniforms of Polish officers?

Mr. W. Yes; because I say when we were later in Giazowice, we didn't care so much for the badges. I mean our dress was being worn out and, obviously, we couldn't replace the badges or something like that; so it was the custom not to wear badges if one could have them.

Mr. DONDERO. Did they wear shoes, or boots?

Mr. W. It depended.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You are speaking now about Giazowice; but what was the state of your uniform at Kozielsk?

Mr. W. It was in a fairly good condition. I mean that some of the officers who had received the new uniforms, they were still wearing them and they were in a fairly good condition, because we were very careful about preserving our dress. I remember how we used to conserve and preserve our shoes, for instance, that we shined, to get some fat and to preserve, to put the fat on the shoes so that they would last longer, because we were well aware that we may not easily get new shoes.

Chairman MADDEN. Any further questions?

Mr. W. I have something more to add then. After we have been in Griażowiec, and when we were allowed to write to our families in Poland, which I did sometime in August 1940, among other replies to my letters I received one from one of my sisters, and one of the paragraphs of that letter read like this: "When you were in Kozielsk there was a cadet officer of the name" so-and-so—the name was given but I cannot remember now what the name was. "This cadet officer is the fiancée of a good friend of mine. Could you ask him to write to his fiancée because she is much worried about the lack of news from him." I wrote back saying: "Unfortunately this cadet officer is not with me, but I am convinced that he must be in one of the camps like ours, and I am sure he will write soon to his fiancée."

Chairman MADDEN. Is there anything further now?

Mr. W. I should like to emphasize the difference between when we were leaving Kozielsk and when we were leaving Pawlizezew Bor. As I said before, there were many rumors as far as our near future was concerned; and the Bolsheviks, who never told us the truth were keeping us in an atmosphere of uncertainty, and of never knowing the truth. They kept the destination of Kozielsk perfectly in that atmosphere. They let us have our explanation, and they were sometimes only stirring up our imagination; whereas when we were leaving Pawlizezew Bor, through this Lacinski—who was, I would say, on speaking terms with this Alexandrovicz—we got the assurance and we got clear-cut information: "You are going to another camp, and you will be much better off there." That is the only time I can remember that the Bolsheviks told us the truth.

Chairman MADDEN. Is there anything further regarding the massacre?

Mr. W. Maybe you have some questions?

Chairman MADDEN. That is all. Now considering your experience as a prisoner in these camps and all the extenuating circumstances, would you be in a position to state your personal opinion as to who committed the massacres at Katyn?

Mr. W. In my own mind, and from the best of my knowledge of all the facts which were accompanying my 2½ years in Russia, and all the circumstances, for me there was no doubt that those people disappeared in April and May 1940 directly after they had been taken out of Kozielsk, and that the first time when we realized it was October in 1941.

Chairman MADDEN. Who did it?

Mr. W. The Russians.

Chairman MADDEN. That is all. We wish to thank you for coming here to testify today. There has been nobody make any promises to you regarding any recompense or emoluments for coming here to testify, is there?

Mr. W. No, sir. I would say that against many difficulties when I have been trying to point to this affair in 1943, when I was in the Middle East, it was rather unpleasant to speak about this.

Chairman MADDEN. That is all. We wish to thank you.

I might state for the record that the witness now to be heard has relatives behind the iron curtain and prefers that his name be concealed from publicity; but the committee has his name and address and are familiar with his authenticity. For the purpose of the record this witness will be identified as witness Mr. A. Proceed.

TESTIMONY OF WITNESS A. (THROUGH INTERPRETER, MR. ROMAN PUCINSKI), LONDON, ENGLAND

Mr. PUCINSKI. This witness has indicated that because of his language difficulties he would like to have a translator. He also desires his identity be concealed because of relatives in Poland.

Mr. FLOOD. May I say for the record, in order that all witnesses have very clear understanding of the warnings that are being presented to them by the chairman of this committee, I think that in all cases the identical language should be read to each witness either by the chairman or by a representative of the committee, so that in all cases of witnesses the identical warning is the same on the record. Mr. Pucinski, will you read to the witness in Polish the translation of the warning that we give? Mr. Stenographer, take this on the record. This is the admonition to the witness. Before you make a statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who considered he had suffered injury. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as the result of the testimony.

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness states that he understands that clearly.

Chairman MADDEN. Have him sworn. You solemnly swear by Almighty God that you will, according to your best knowledge, tell the pure truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and will not conceal anything?

Mr. A. Yes, sir.

Chairman MADDEN. Now you might state to the witness that he can proceed and tell just what he knows regarding the Katyn massacres in his own words. Since the witness indicated he doesn't want his name revealed, we will refer to him as Witness A even though his full identity is known to the committee.

Mr. A. I arrived at the camp at Starobielsk on October 11 with a group of other Poles consisting of a few thousand.

Chairman MADDEN. In what year?

Mr. A. 1939—from Woloczyska. These were primarily Polish officers who had capitulated in Lwow according to an agreement reached between General Langner, of the Polish Army, and the Russian Marshal Timoshenko. I was merely attached to this transport.

Mr. FLOOD. In what capacity, in what rank?

Mr. A. I was wounded and became a Russian prisoner on October 1.

Mr. FLOOD. What was your rank?

Mr. A. I was a major. I remained at Starobielsk from October 11, 1939, until April 25, 1940. During that time there was a constant procedure of segregating the officers at the camp through long examinations by NKVD officers from Moscow. They were selecting officers from the military police, officers from the border guard, officers from the Second Division, also chaplains of all faiths, judges and prosecutors. The interrogations and selectivity of these men lasted until December 1939.

These specially selected officers were removed from the camp to an unknown destination, but the interrogations continued without end

until the end of January. In February we began to hear rumors that we would be removed from this camp to Germany according to a Russian-German agreement. In March we heard another rumor which was started by the Russian authorities that we will be taken into a neutral country, and on April 5 large-scale evacuation of the camp began. The first transport left on April 5. The evacuation proceeded in a very systematic manner in groups ranging from 250 to 360 officers, who were loaded into specially prepared prison rail cars consisting in many instances of 37 cars. There were 75 men to a car. (The witness corrected the translation to indicate that there were two or three prison rail cars to each train and there were up to 75 prisoners in each car.) Before our departure there was a very rigid inspection of the men. We were given bread and herring for the road. So our friends concealed various personal items including notes and knives—particularly knives, because knives were always very important—in between the bread and the herrings. At the gates before we left I noticed personally how the prison guards took away the bread and the herring from these men and gave them another piece of bread and herring. On April 25 I was summoned to a transport along with 65 others. From this group one other member had left by a previous transport, and another one was very seriously ill. So that day there were 63 of us who actually went to the railroad station. They were three-tier rail cars and I sat on the third tier. I noticed an inscription: "We are being removed or unloaded in Kharkov." The inscriptions were written in pencil on the ceilings of the cars and on the walls. We, however, passed Kharkov and, by way of Orzel and the city of Zuchenice, we were brought to the railroad station at Babanino on May 1. From there, in two trucks we were taken to a camp at Pavlishchev Bor. There we met our comrades from Kozielsk and Ostashkov. We were very much surprised. I say particularly surprised, because this was a very small camp, in comparison, for instance, to Starobielsk, where there were 4,000 of us. During the period of just a few days there arrived at this camp approximately 400 of us from these three camps. I prepared a list of those who survived from those three camps. I am presenting this list to the committee.

Mr. O'KONSKI. By "the camps," he means that those people came from Starobielsk, from Kozielsk, and from Ostashkov?

Mr. A. That is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. The witness has presented to the committee a document and I will ask to have this marked as "Exhibit 2" by the stenographer.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 2").

I now show the witness exhibit 2 and ask him, is it true, as he stated, that this exhibit 2 is a list of the names of the fellow prisoners of the witness from the three camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov, at Pavlishchev Bor with him, and he made the list of these names at Pavlishchev Bor?

Mr. A. This list I had prepared at Cairo, but it does represent the 400 men who did come from the three camps that you named.

(Exhibit No. 2 follows:)

4.	Prk. st. p. tech.	COZYK	Łódź	4. III. 1898.
5.	Komander por. kab.	STANISŁAW STANISŁAW	Stanisław	4. I. 1897.
6.	Prk. st. p. tech.	WAZIERSKI	Wazierski	
7.	Prk. st. p. tech.	ŁADYŃSKI	Ładyszki	30. IV. 1894.
8.	Prk. st. p. tech.	ŁADYŃSKI	Ładyszki	25. III. 1890
9.	" st. p. tech.	ŁADYŃSKI	Ładyszki	1892
10.	" " "	ŁADYŃSKI	Ładyszki	24. VIII. 1893.
11.	" " kab.	ŁADYŃSKI	Ładyszki	24. VIII. 1889
12.	" " lek.	ŁADYŃSKI	Ładyszki	26. III. 1892
13.	" apl. st. p. tech.	ŁADYŃSKI	Ładyszki	26. III. 1892
14.	" st. p. tech.	ŁADYŃSKI	Ładyszki	23. IV. 1891
15.	" apl. st. p. tech.	ŁADYŃSKI	Ładyszki	14. VII. 1893
16.	" apl. st. p. tech.	ŁADYŃSKI	Ładyszki	6. I. 1894
17.	" apl. st. p. tech.	ŁADYŃSKI	Ładyszki	1898.
<u>ŁADYŃSKI</u>				
1.	Prk. st. p. tech.	ŁADYŃSKI	Ładyszki	1899
2.	" st. p. tech.	ŁADYŃSKI	Ładyszki	" "
3.	" rez. p. tech.	ŁADYŃSKI	Ładyszki	24. VIII. 1890
4.	" w. st. p. tech.	ŁADYŃSKI	Ładyszki	6. IV. 1895

5. oficer. st. art. R I D Józef
 6. " st. spec. zwiad. LANKOWSKI Jan
 7. st. kowalen Ks. TYCZOMSKI Franciszek

K A P I T A N O W I I G o t o r a d o

1. kpt. rez. B A V C H R -
 2. kpt. w st. sp. adm. BIAŁICKI Szymon
 3. kpt. rez. kaw. CZAPKI Józef
 4. kpt. sztab. art. GUMBYN Władysław
 5. oficer. st. art. DĄBÓJ Andrzej
 6. kpt. sztab. spec. BIAŁYCYC Witold
 7. kpt. rez. art. MĄKOWSKI Wład
 8. kpt. pow. rez. ląd. ar. ŁOŹLIK Stefan
 9. " w st. sp. adm. K U R E L I -
 10. " sztab. łącz. KOSZCZI
 11. " sztab. łącz. SIEDLIK Stanisław
 12. " rez. art. KATYŃSKI Adam
 13. " lek. DR. KAWCZYŃSKI Józef
 14. " sztab. sztab. art. GUMBYN Władysław
 15. kpt. rez. kaw. STANISZEW Stanisław

- str. 3
 - 5.11.1897
 - 14.VI.1898
 - 10.X.1892.

- - -
 - 1893 D.O.K.V.
 - 1895 S. r. kł.
 - 1896 szkola młz
 pob. rez. art. Wic-
 ołamek w Włocławku
 - w pociągach Lubelska
 - 1896
 - 18-4 D.O.K.V.
 - 1894 Sztab. Nr. 405
 - - -
 - w pociągach z Paw-
 liczycami w kie-
 szce
 - 1902 L.O.I.
 - 1898 S. P. A. J.
 - 1898 Sztab. 409
 - w pociągach, ze sz-
 tab. art. 405

str. 4

16.	Wojewoda, powiat Kielce	Wojewoda Kielce	1897 U.S.A.
17.	" " " "	Stefan	"
18.	komendant Kielce	Władysław	1895 - 1918. Kaw. Nowogródek
19.	Wojewoda, powiat Kielce	Edward	1887 12000 Armii gen. Łoskowskiego

20. wojewoda, powiat, Kielce

KIELCE

POZYCZNIKI (liczeniowi)

1.	Wojewoda, powiat Kielce	Julian	1891 D.O.K.V.
2.	" " " "	Andrzej	1899 D.O.K.V.I.
3.	" " " "	Otto	1899 200 P.F. Jaworów
4.	" " " "	"	"
5.	" " " "	Konstanty	1898 I P.A.I. 108.
6.	" " " "	Grzegorz	1890 H.K.P. 4 P. ul.
7.	" " " "	"	"
8.	" " " "	"	"
9.	Wojewoda, powiat Kielce	Julian	1898 kierownik Kielce
10.	" " " "	Edward	"
11.	" " " "	Władysław	"
12.	" " " "	Henryk	1890 3 P. lot,
13.	" " " "	Jan	D.O.V

str. 6

14.	1942	Poland	Województwo Lubelskie	1895 4 Decem Belg.
15.	"	"	"	1881 Art. Warszawa
16.	"	"	"	1897 D.O.K.II
17.	"	"	"	1891 Smit. 503
18.	"	"	"	"
19.	"	"	"	1892
20.	"	"	"	1900 Kapit. 104
21.	"	"	"	1899 D.O.K.III
22.	"	"	"	1892 Kapit. 240. 2. VII.
23.	"	"	"	1893
24.	"	"	"	1900 1 Pr. 146.
25.	"	"	"	1906 Ost. Art. 2
26.	"	"	"	1900 Oczek. 222 Art. II

No.	Name	Rank	Regiment	Notes
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nr.	licznosc, piosch.	rodzina	FR	data
44.	licznosc, piosch.	RODZINA	FR	-
45.	" "	RODZINA	"	- z dnia 10.10.1941
46.	" "	RODZINA	licznosc	- 1921 75 p.p.
47.	" "	RODZINA	licznosc	- 1918 50 p.p.
48.	" "	RODZINA	Antoni	- 1864 15 p.p.
49.	" "	RODZINA	Antoni	- 1909 21 p.p.
50.	" "	RODZINA	Antoni	- 1911 3.0.1.
51.	" "	RODZINA	Jerzy	- 1900
52.	" "	DR. RODZINA	Kazimierz	- 1907 Kapit. Dworki
53.	" "	RODZINA	Wiktoria	- 1909 74 p.p.
54.	" "	RODZINA	Wiktoria	- 1907 Kapit. 1951
55.	" "	RODZINA	Wiktoria	-
56.	" "	DR. RODZINA	Jan zwojenny z czoza	- 1900 5 p. ul.
57.	" "	RODZINA	Antoni	- 1894 4 Kapit. 06.09.
58.	" "	RODZINA	Wiktoria	- 1908 Wiktoria 17.5.1907
59.	" "	RODZINA	Wiktoria	- 1902 24 p.p.
60.	" "	RODZINA	Wiktoria	- 1902 24 p.p.
61.	" "	RODZINA	Wiktoria	- 1902 24 p.p.
62.	" "	RODZINA	Wiktoria	- 1902 24 p.p.
63.	" "	RODZINA	Wiktoria	- 1902 24 p.p.
64.	" "	RODZINA	Wiktoria	- 1902 24 p.p.
65.	" "	RODZINA	Wiktoria	- 1902 24 p.p.

66.	prof. rez. lek.	ROZIMIN	Jan	-	-
67.	" "	DR. SANCZYKI	Stanislaw	-	1904 Sept. Pol. 303
68.	" "	STROMBAUR	Jozef	-	1899 12 Dyr. Plesch
69.	" "	WLODKA	Henryk	-	1899 3 P. m. k.
70.	" "	WYDAL	Henryk	-	1898 D. O. K. K.
71.	" "	lek. dent. WOLINSKI	Stanislaw	-	-
72.	" "	DR. WLODKA	Stanislaw	-	1908 Sept. Pol. 301
73.	" "	WOLSKI	Stanislaw	-	1896 L. O. K. II
74.	" "	WOLSKA	Stanislaw	-	1912 3 P. P. 189.
75.	" "	lek. DR. WOLSKA	Stanislaw	-	1899 Sept. Pol. 301
76.	" "	WOLSKA	Stanislaw	-	Wolenskiy a obsau
77.	" "	WOLSKA	Stanislaw	-	" "
78.	" "	WOLSKA	Stanislaw	-	5 P. P. 189.
79.	" "	" "	Stanislaw	-	25 P. P.
80.	" "	" "	Stanislaw	-	-
81.	" "	lek. WOLSKA	Stanislaw	-	1910 Sept. Krak. 91
82.	" "	WOLSKA	Stanislaw	-	-
83.	" "	lek. WOLSKA	Stanislaw	-	-
84.	" "	WOLSKA	Stanislaw	-	-
85.	" "	lek. WOLSKA	Stanislaw	-	-
86.	" "	lek. WOLSKA	Stanislaw	-	2 P. m. k.

					str. 20
86.	prof. med. doct. dent.	KROMA	Leonard	-	-
87.	" " "	DRUGALER	Teofil	-	-
88.	" " "	PAWLOSKI	Wlodek	-	1905 Duch O. K. Krosna
89.	" " "	WACHOWSKI	Wladyslaw	-	1911 K.O.F.
90.	" " "	DRZAZGALAR	Teofil	-	-
91.	" " "	WILCZYNSKI	Stanislaw	-	1906 72 str.
92.	" " "	WILCZYNSKI	Teofil	-	-
93.	" " "	DR. WILCZYNSKI	Leon	-	1899 Sept. 20. 12
94.	" " "	WILCZYNSKI	Aleksander	-	27 p. 12.
95.	" " "	WILCZYNSKI	Wlodek	-	-
96.	" " "	DR. WILCZYNSKI	Teofil	-	1903 Sept. 20. 11
<u>27 C B A Z O N I J (Czech names)</u>					
1.	docent. med.	WOLFF	Wladyslaw	-	1892 7 Duch Krosna
2.	" " "	P. S. A. N. O.	Josef	-	1890 K.O.F.
3.	" " "	WILCZYNSKI	Josef	-	1899 Piotrkowska
4.	" " "	WILCZYNSKI	Karel	-	1895 45 p. 1.
5.	" " "	WILCZYNSKI	Stanislaw	-	1898 K.O.F.
6.	" " "	WILCZYNSKI	Wladyslaw	-	str.
7.	" " "	WILCZYNSKI	Stanislaw	-	1899 K.O.F.

1941

TABLE 2. B. A. 10712

1.	Pačok, rec. 1941.	1001111	1917	Bocharov, Semyon
2.	"	"	1908	"
3.	"	"	1910	Gr. Kap. Golin
4.	"	"	1917	Gr. Golin
5.	"	"	1918	Gr. Golin
6.	"	"	1918	Gr. Golin
7.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
8.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
9.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
10.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
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12.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
13.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
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18.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
19.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
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22.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
23.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
24.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
25.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
26.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
27.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
28.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
29.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
30.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
31.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
32.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
33.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
34.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
35.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
36.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
37.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
38.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
39.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
40.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
41.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
42.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
43.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
44.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
45.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
46.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
47.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
48.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
49.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
50.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
51.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
52.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
53.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
54.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
55.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
56.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
57.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
58.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
59.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
60.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
61.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
62.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
63.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
64.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
65.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
66.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
67.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
68.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
69.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
70.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
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74.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
75.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
76.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
77.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
78.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
79.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
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83.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
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88.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
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93.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
94.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
95.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
96.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
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98.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
99.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin
100.	"	"	1921	Gr. Golin

1942

20.	rol. plut. rez. piech.	SAMOWSKI	Włodzisław	- 1916 5 p.p. 196.
21.	" " sierż. rez. szk.	YARBE	Jan	- 1911 21.11.191.504
22.	" " plut. " piech.	WAWRZONOWSKI	Aleksander	- 1912 77 p.p.
23.	" " " " prz.	KAMFLACH	Leopold	- 1918 08.10.191.191 MIAŁO POLSKA
24.	" " plut. rez. piech.	KIMBLIC	Józef	- 1919 77 p.p.
25.	" " " " rez. kaw.	KLICK	Teodor	- 1917 20 p.p.
26.	" " sierż. rez. szk.	KOHN	Josiah	- 1911 6 Dzia. Saborow
27.	" " plut. szk. kaw.	KOZŁA	Wiktor	- 1916 2 przel.
28.	" " " " rez. piech.	KOZŁOWSKI	Edmund	- 1912 22 p.p.
29.	" " plut. rez. piech.	KOZYRUCHI	Jerzy	- 1916 2 Dzw. piech.
30.	" " " " kaw.	KOZŁOŃSKI	Czesław	- 1917 26 p.p.
31.	" " " " kaw.	KOŁYNSKI	Seward	- 1916 1 p.p.
32.	" " prz. rez. piech.	KOZŁOŃSKI	Antoni	-
33.	" " " " " "	KOZŁOŃSKI	Czesław	- 1917 6 p.p. 196.
34.	" " " " " "	KROLD	Michał	- 1914 22 p.p.
35.	" " plut. rez. " "	KRZYWICKI	Stanisław	-
36.	" " " " rez. lot.	KRZYWA	-	-
37.	" " kap. rez. str.	KRZYWICKI	-	- 1918 2 p.p. 196.
38.	" " plut. rez. piech.	KRZYWICKI	Leon	- 1918 2 p.p.
39.	" " " " rez. piech.	KUBICKA	Teodor	- 1918 2 p.p. 196.

40.	Pol. K. r. roz. har.	Janusz Pazyra	Szczecin	1916	20 P. ul.
41.	" "	Jacek Kuczmarski	Jozef	1917	5 P. P. 192.
42.	" "	Wiza	Staszyn	zmarl w Brzozow	
43.	" "	Ant. roz. wit.	Wojciechowski	1917	53 B. A. I.
44.	" "	K. r. roz. wit.	Kuczmarski	1905	K. B. B. roz. wit. Sienicki
45.	" "	" "	Szczecin	1905	12 P. P.
46.	" "	" "	W. B. roz. wit.	1912	82 P. P.
47.	" "	Wojciechowski	Staszyn	1913	79 P. P.
48.	" "	Wojciechowski	W. B. roz. wit.	1913	
49.	" "	Wojciechowski	Szczecin	1916	20 P. ul.
50.	" "	Adam roz. wit.	Adam	1917	12 P. P.
51.	" "	Wojciechowski	Wojciechowski	1919	54 P. P.
52.	" "	" "	Szczecin	1916	54 P. P. 192.
53.	" "	Wojciechowski	Wojciechowski	1916	84 P. A. I.
54.	" "	Wojciechowski	Aleksander	-	-
55.	" "	Wojciechowski	Wojciechowski	1916	
56.	" "	Wojciechowski	Wojciechowski	1916	82 P. P.
57.	" "	Wojciechowski	Wojciechowski	1905	55 P. P.
58.	" "	Wojciechowski	Wojciechowski	1912	79 P. P.

Dr. 11.

1. 1941. 7. 20. 1941. 7. 20. 1941.
 2. 1941. 7. 20. 1941. 7. 20. 1941.
 3. 1941. 7. 20. 1941. 7. 20. 1941.
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 2. 1941. 7. 20. 1941. 7. 20. 1941. 7. 20. 1941.
 3. 1941. 7. 20. 1941. 7. 20. 1941. 7. 20. 1941.

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1. 1941. 7. 20. 1941. 7. 20. 1941. 7. 20. 1941.
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Continued (continued)

1947.

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| 16. | " | Przema | " of | -1950 | |
| 17. | " | UDZIELIŃSKI | Władysław | -1918 | przy - granica |
| 18. | " | ROZKOWSKI | Jan | -1904 | " |
| 19. | " | R. D. B. | Jan | -1912 | " |
| 20. | " | LAUREN | Władysław | -1908 | " |
| 21. | " | WŁADY | " | " | Województwo Lubelskie
w Górze W. i. S. P. |
| 22. | " | WŁADY | " | " | " |
| 23. | " | WŁADY | Stanisław | -1900 | " |
| 24. | " | WŁADY | " | " | Województwo Lubelskie
w Górze W. i. S. P. |
| 25. | " | WŁADY | " | " | " |
| 26. | " | WŁADY | " | " | " |

WYCIĄG KATYŃSKI: (Mowa Główna)

| | | | | | |
|----|-------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------------------|
| 1. | 1901. | WŁADY | Władysław | -1900 | Województwo Lubelskie |
| 2. | " | WŁADY | Jan | " | " w Warszawie |
| 3. | 1908. | WŁADY | Jan | -1897 | Wł. |
| 4. | " | WŁADY | Jan | -1897 | Województwo Lubelskie |
| 5. | 1901. | WŁADY | Jan | " | " w Warszawie |
| 6. | " | WŁADY | " | " | " |
| 7. | 1908. | WŁADY | Władysław | -1894 | Województwo Lubelskie |

1942.

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|-----|---------|-----------|------|------|-------------|
| 1. | 10.000. | WOLSKA | 1942 | | |
| 2. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 3. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 4. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 5. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 6. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 7. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 8. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 9. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 10. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 11. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 12. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 13. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 14. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 15. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 16. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 17. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 18. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 19. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 20. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 21. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 22. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 23. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 24. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 25. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 26. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 27. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |
| 28. | 10000. | GRABOWSKI | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 - 1942 |

1942

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| 29. 27. 1941. | 200 000 000 000 | 1000000 | 1000 |
| 30. 1942. | 1000000 | 1000000 | 1000 |
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| 40. 1942. | 1000000 | 1000000 | 1000 |
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| 42. 1942. | 1000000 | 1000000 | 1000 |
| 43. 1942. | 1000000 | 1000000 | 1000 |
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No. 50.

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| 01. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 70 | -1941 |
| 02. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 80 | -1941 |
| 03. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 90 | -1941 |
| 04. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 100 | -1941 |
| 05. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 110 | -1941 |
| 06. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 120 | -1941 |
| 07. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 130 | -1941 |
| 08. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 140 | -1941 |
| 09. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 150 | -1941 |
| 10. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 160 | -1941 |

1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. (Barrack Police)

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|-----------------------------------|-----|-------|
| 11. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 170 | -1941 |
| 12. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 180 | -1941 |
| 13. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 190 | -1941 |
| 14. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 200 | -1941 |
| 15. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 210 | -1941 |

2. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. (Barrack Police)

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|-----------------------------------|-----|-------|
| 16. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 220 | -1941 |
| 17. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 230 | -1941 |
| 18. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 240 | -1941 |
| 19. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 250 | -1941 |
| 20. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 260 | -1941 |

3. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. (Barrack Police)

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| 21. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 270 | -1941 |
| 22. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 280 | -1941 |
| 23. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 290 | -1941 |
| 24. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. 1. 1. 1941. | 300 | -1941 |

1943

| No. | Name | Rank | Unit | Notes |
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| No. | Name | Rank | Regiment | Notes |
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| 41 | ... | ... | ... | ... |

Mr. FLOOD. The exhibit will speak for itself. The first page of the exhibit indicates that what the witness has said is correct; but the point I want to make is that exhibit 2, which we are about to introduce on the record is a list of names of the survivors who were at Pavlishchev Bor and Griazowiec with this witness and who came from the three camps we have mentioned; is that correct?

Mr. A. That is correct. Notations on that list were made by General Wolkowicki.

Mr. FLOOD. You prepared this list yourself and were associated in its preparation and notation by others; is that correct?

Mr. A. No; I prepared this list personally, but I took advantage of the notes that had been made by General Wolkowicki.

Mr. FLOOD. A translation of the first page of exhibit 2, which is written in Polish, confirms the statement the witness has just made. Now, in order to save time, I want to get this information from this witness through the interpreter. Ask the witness: he has heard of the Katyn massacre?

Mr. A. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. He knew that there were some 4,000 Polish officers at Kozielsk?

Mr. A. There were more than 4,000.

Mr. FLOOD. He knows that there were some 4,000 bodies discovered at Katyn?

Mr. A. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. For the purpose of this discussion we will not use exact and precise figures, which the record already has.

Mr. A. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. Has the witness heard or read at any time—and you can tell him that we have evidence which supports these statements—that the prisoners in batches being taken from Kozielsk were taken in the same kind of cars that his batch were taken from at Starobielsk?

Mr. A. The same kind of cars were used at Starobielsk.

Mr. FLOOD. Has the witness heard or read in any accounts or conversations he has had in connection with Katyn that the same kind of writings that he told us he saw on the prison cars which took him from Starobielsk, only using different destinations, were found on the roofs of the prison cars transporting the prisoners from Kozielsk?

Mr. A. When we arrived from these three camps at Pavlishchev Bor we began to discuss our respective trips and exchange our observations on those trips.

Mr. FLOOD. As the result of the conversations had at Pavlishchev Bor and Woloczysko with prisoners from Kozielsk and Ostashkov, this witness found out that similar writings were on other prison cars from the other camps?

Mr. A. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. I am interested now only in the writings on the cars that the witness saw from Starobielsk. Will you ask the witness to write down on a piece of paper what he saw on the car leaving Starobielsk. The witness, in the presence of the committee, wrote the following on a piece of paper, and we will ask the interpreter to read the Polish on to the record and then translate it into the record.

The INTERPRETER. The Polish is as follows: "Wysadzono nas w charkowie". The translation is: "We are being unloaded at Kharkov." Mr. Flood, I think I want to point out here that the wording of the

English translation is almost identical and similar to the translation of the previous witness.

Mr. FLOOD. That does not make any difference. I am only interested in what the words were. The words will speak for themselves. Mr. Chairman, I have pursued this last line of questioning for this purpose: in the entire investigations that have been made by this committee and other committees heretofore with reference to the fate of Polish military and civilian prisoners of various categories at the Russian prison camps at Kozielsk and so on, there is considerable evidence as to the fate of the prisoners at Kozielsk. There is little, if any, evidence as to the fate of the prisoners who have not yet been discovered alive from the camps at Starobielsk or Ostashkov. I would like the attention of the committee to the following analogy: we have quite a good deal of testimony describing certain writings found upon the prison cars taking the Polish prisoners from the camp at Kozielsk. Those writings indicate that those prison cars were stopped at and the prisoners unloaded from the cars at the railroad station for the town of Katyn, and it was the practice of prisoners in these cases and in many others to leave those writings as information for their friends who might follow. It is clear from the testimony that the prisoners taken from Kozielsk on these prison cars were later disposed of at Katyn. Since so far we have no evidence of what happened to the missing prisoners from Starobielsk, it is interesting to observe that the prisoners from the camp of Starobielsk were taken from the same in about the same number of batches with about the same number of prisoners to a batch; were inspected in the same way that they were at Kozielsk; were placed in the same kind of cars that the prisoners in Kozielsk were placed in and were transported following the same series of rumors as to destinations that were experienced by the prisoners at Kozielsk. This witness describes the marking on a car which says that the prisoners taken from Starobielsk were being disembarked at the station of Kharkov. I suggest that it is a perfect analogy to indicate that the prisoners from Starobielsk were disposed of in the vicinity of Kharkov in the same manner that the prisoners from Kozielsk were disposed of in the vicinity of the railroad stations mentioned by witnesses from the Kozielsk camp, namely, Gniczdovo. If it is so, that the guilty party of this case was Soviet Russia, this permits the theory that special execution depots were set up for various geographic areas for the disposal of prisoners from camps within that area, and that at sometime or other, if the circumstances would ever permit an investigation of the area geographically surrounding Kharkov as took place surrounding Katyn, it could conceivably produce the answer as to the fate of the missing officers from Starobielsk.

Do I understand you to say you have some other comments to make in connection with Kharkov?

Mr. A. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you tell us what that is?

Mr. A. After we arrived at Kharkov, our train car was not disconnected from the train, but a porter came by and he began cleaning out our car. I began a discussion with him and asked him, "Are we going to proceed further?" He replied in Russian, "Your people previously had been unloaded here."

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, I have been advised by the interpreter that this witness has some additional testimony having to do with his

being taken subsequently by the Russians to Moscow to a place known as Villa of Bliss. I am advised and have been presented with certain documents purporting to be statements heretofore made by the witness to authorized representatives of the so-called London Polish Government. These are in Polish and should later be translated. I am advised that there is present the custodian of these documents of the so-called Polish London Government who is prepared to identify them. Will you mark for identification these two documents Nos. 3 and 4.

(The documents referred to were marked by the stenographer "Exhibit 3" and "Exhibit 4".)

I now show the witness exhibits 3 and 4 and ask him whether or not these are statements which he gave to authorized representatives of the so-called London Polish Government.

(The witness examined exhibits 3 and 4.)

Mr. MACHROWICZ. He does not have to read it all; just identify it.

The INTERPRETER. The witness says exhibit 4 is a proper document and a report made by him.

Mr. FLOOD. The answer is "Yes"?

Mr. PUCINSKI. Yes, the exhibit 3 is his own personal document.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. The witness states that it is his own personal account of what happened to him when he was in Russian hands?

Mr. A. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you ask the witness to step down for a minute, and ask the other man to take the chair.

(NOTE.—Exhibits 3 and 4 later were withdrawn from the record when exhibits 5 and 6, photostatic copies of exhibits 3 and 4 were introduced at the conclusion of this witness's testimony.)

TESTIMONY OF JERZY LUNKIEWICZ

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, this witness is being called solely, I think, to identify the custody of the documents which we have been discussing.

Mr. LUNKIEWICZ. I am not a witness; I am rather an expert.

Chairman MADDEN. You solemnly swear by Almighty God that you will, according to your best knowledge, tell the pure truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth and will not conceal anything?

Mr. LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Have you been and are you identified with the so-called London Polish Government in any way?

Mr. LUNKIEWICZ. Yes; I am in the service of the Polish London Government in London.

Mr. FLOOD. I now show you exhibits Nos. 3 and 4 which you have just heard identified and discussed by the witness who has just stepped from the stand. Is that correct?

Mr. LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you identify these as having been handed by you to me?

Mr. LUNKIEWICZ. Yes; I do. These exhibits are in my custody for many years.

Mr. FLOOD. As a representative of the Polish Government, exhibits 3 and 4 have been in your custody until such time as you presented them to me this morning; is that correct?

Mr. LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. That is all; thank you; step down. Now will Mr. A. step back into the chair.

TESTIMONY OF WITNESS A—Resumed

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Now, Witness, sometime in October, 1940 were you taken from Giazowice to Moscow?

Mr. A. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How large a group was there with you? Were there seven of you?

Mr. A. Just 1 second and I will give you the answer. [The witness looked at documents.] There were seven.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were those all high-ranking officers?

Mr. A. One colonel, four lieutenant colonels, one major.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were not there two colonels?

Mr. A. And one more colonel.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Two colonels, four lieutenant colonels, and yourself, the major—the lowest ranking officer?

Mr. A. Yes; I was.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And, without going into detail as to the others who were there, one of those in that group was the Colonel Zygmunt Berling of whom we have heard testimony; am I right?

Mr. A. That is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. From what you later learned, is it true that this group of officers of which you were a member was to be made the nucleus of the officers of the new Polish Army; is that correct?

Mr. A. It is. That was true; that was the purpose of this group; but shortly thereafter some of the members of this group began to drop out.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. But the purpose, as you later understood, of having transported this group of seven to Moscow was to create the nucleus of a new Polish Army?

Mr. A. That is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. After you arrived in Moscow, did you personally participate in any discussions with any high ranking Russian officers, and, if so, with whom?

Mr. A. The first discussion I had was at Butelka, which was a gaol, and there I spoke to a high Russian NKVD officer.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you remember his name?

Mr. A. His name was Jegorow.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What was your conversation with him?

Mr. A. He merely took a deposition as to my background.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In the course of the discussion did he attempt to find out whether or not you had any political affiliations?

Mr. A. No; they did not talk to me on that subject.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Subsequent to that did you have any conversations with any other high ranking Russian officers?

Mr. A. After we were transferred from the prison at Butelka to the prison called Lubianka—

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What happened at Lubianka?

Mr. A. First they interrogated the oldest officers.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Before we go into that, do you speak Russian?

Mr. A. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And when you refer to conversations, either to those to which you have already referred or those which you will discuss in the future, in what language were those discussions?

Mr. A. They talked to us only in Russian.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You were talking about the conversations between the high-ranking officers and NKVD officers; is that correct?

Mr. A. I talked with only two of them—Jegorow and Mirkulow.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. When did you talk to Mirkulow?

Mr. A. I talked to Mirkulow during the latter part of October.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Who was Mirkulow?

Mr. A. He introduced himself to me as the Minister of the Security of the Interior—State Security.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In this discussion this committee is particularly interested in what had been said in relation to the officers who were killed at Katyn.

Mr. A. Yes; I understand that.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Will you tell us whether, in the course of your discussion with Mirkulow, anything was said about the fate of the lost officers?

Mr. A. First I must tell you the discussion with Beria.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. There was a discussion with Beria in which you did not participate; is that correct?

Mr. A. No, I did not, but I was told immediately about it.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. We will get to that later; I will get to that point of the discussions with Beria, but I want first to find out what your personal discussions with Mirkulow were.

Mr. A. At these discussions with Mirkulow there was present another Russian officer, who did not introduce himself to me, but who I believe was named Raichman.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What was your discussion with these last officers?

Mr. A. He asked me if I could command an artillery brigade. I told him "Yes." I told him that the number of cannon in a brigade like that of artillery would not make too much difference to me; but I asked him "From where will we get other officers, since there are no artillery officers in Giazowiec." I asked him if we could not get any Polish officers from either Starobielsk or Kosielsk. To this I received a reply from Mirkulow: "We have committed an error."

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I want to get the whole statement: What else did he say?

Mr. A. "We have committed an error. These men are not available. We will give you others."

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That was the conversation in which you personally participated with Mirkulow?

Mr. A. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. When was that, approximately?

Mr. A. This was in the latter part of October.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. 1940?

Mr. A. 1940.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you inquire from Mirkulow why these officers were not available?

Mr. A. No; I did not ask him any further questions.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did he say anything else with relation to these officers in Starobielsk?

Mr. A. No; that I do not recall at this time.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you have any other conversations personally with any other high ranking Russian officers regarding these lost comrades of yours from Storobielsk and Kozielsk?

Mr. A. No; I did not.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Now, I think you mentioned also the fact that some of this group of seven which went with you to Moscow had conversations with Beria; is that correct?

Mr. A. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. First of all, identify who Beria is; who is Beria?

Mr. A. Beria is a Minister of the Home Police.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. He was a Minister of the NKVD; is that correct—at that time?

Mr. A. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is the Interior Police?

Mr. A. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. He is now Vice Premier of Russia?

Mr. A. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You were not present during that conversation, were you?

Mr. A. No; I was not.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you know when it took place?

Mr. A. These were before my discussions by a few days.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Sometime in October 1940?

Mr. A. Yes; after the 10th of October 1940.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you know who were those who participated in that discussion other than Beria?

Mr. A. Yes, I do.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Who were they?

Mr. A. Lieutenant Colonel Berling; Colonel Gorczynski; Lieutenant Colonel Bukojenski; and Lieutenant Colonel Tyszynski.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How did you learn of these discussions and when?

Mr. A. Beria first invited them to his office and then he invited them for dinner.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How did you find out about this discussion, and when?

Mr. A. Lieutenant Colonel Gorczynski told me of these discussions when he returned that night.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That same night?

Mr. A. Yes. He suggested to me that we go to the wash room, because he wants to tell me something very important.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did he then tell you?

Mr. A. We knocked on the door and were released from our cells to go to the washroom. We sat down on the stools in the washroom, and he proceeded to tell me of his conversations earlier that evening with Beria.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In other words, that was the same evening as the conversations took place?

Mr. A. They returned after midnight; so this was early in the morning.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. A few hours after the conversations?

Mr. A. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Will you tell us exactly what he related to you as to the conversations with Beria?

Mr. A. He said that there was a discussion proposing the formation of a Panzer division. Beria said that he wants to form or organize a Panzer fist. To this Berling asked or inquired: "And where will we get officers? I would want to have my officers from Starobielsk and from Kozielsk." Ostashkov did not enter into the conversation because Ostashkov had primarily border police and guards. To this Beria replied—in Russian, of course—that "We have committed a great blunder"; and he repeated that twice: "We have made a great mistake; we have made a great mistake."

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What else was said there?

Mr. A. The conversation was extremely interesting and among other things he gave this detail: he took them to large map—a military map. He pointed to this large map and he pointed to the Ukraine and he said: "We will retreat in the Ukraine and we will attack from the north."

Mr. MACHROWICZ. When Beria said "We have made a mistake: we have made a great mistake," did he indicate to these Polish officers to whom he was talking what he was referring to?

Mr. A. The mistake was made with the Polish officers.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And Colonel Gorczynski, in his conversation with you, indicated that that was the way he understood that?

Mr. A. Yes; that is the way he understood it.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And, so far as you know, that is the way the others who participated in that conversation understood it also?

Mr. A. Yes; the same way.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you ever discuss that conversation with any of the other three Polish officers who participated in it?

Mr. A. In this prison you had to be extremely careful and cautious.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Then you did not discuss it with Berling or Bukojenski?

Mr. A. And until some additional officers arrived at this camp from Kozielsk No. 2, I related my discussions with Berling to Captain—

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you have discussions with Berling?

Mr. A. No—with Beria. I related my discussions with Gorczynski to Captain Lopianowski, whom I trusted unequivocally.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you discuss this conversation with Colonel Berling?

Mr. A. No.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you discuss it with Lieutenant Colonel Bukojenski?

Mr. A. No; because he was to me the most suspected of the group.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Suspected of Communist affiliation?

Mr. A. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you discuss it with Tyszymski?

Mr. A. No, I did not. It was extremely difficult to discuss these things with him, because he was for close collaboration with the Russians.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you ever have any other discussions with any other high ranking Russian officers regarding the fate of these officers?

Mr. A. I did discuss this with General Przewdziecki when we were brought to the Ukraine.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In other words, you related to him the conversation which you reported to us a few minutes ago?

Mr. A. Yes, but that was after, of course, we were removed from the villa. We did not want to cooperate with the Russians. Gorzynski and myself did not want to participate in these cooperations, when we learned that they are starting to send us Communists into this unit that was to be formed and when they demanded of us that we cooperate and work with Wanda Wasileska.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Wanda Wasileska was one of the Polish cooperators with the Russians?

Mr. A. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. So far as the officers in Katyn are concerned or any of the Polish lost officers, you had no other discussions with any other high ranking officers; am I right?

Mr. A. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. I now ask the stenographer to make as exhibits 5 and 6 these two documents. I show the witness exhibits Nos. 5 and 6 and I ask him if exhibit No. 5, which is a photostatic copy of exhibit No. 3, is a proper reproduction of No. 3?

Mr. A. Yes; it is.

Mr. FLOOD. I show the witness exhibit No. 6, and ask him whether or not exhibit No. 6, which is a photostatic copy, is an exact reproduction of exhibit No. 4?

Mr. A. Yes; they are, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you ask the witness to step down from the chair for a minute? I am now recalling to the witness stand the witness Jerzy Lunkiewicz.

TESTIMONY OF JERZY LUNKIEWICZ

Mr. FLOOD. I show the witness exhibits Nos. 5 and 6, and ask him if they are photostatic copies of exhibits Nos. 3 and 4, which he presented to me this morning.

Mr. LUNKIEWICZ. Yes, they are.

Mr. FLOOD. We now return to this witness exhibits Nos. 3 and 4, and offer for the record exhibits Nos. 5 and 6.

(Exhibits 5 and 6 follow:)

EXHIBIT 5

ПОДАВЕКОВНИКЪ КЪРЪЛЪЕРИЪ

1.

2.

РЕЛАЦИЯ

Ит. 5.9.1897 ЕУКАНОНИ'ОБ пос. БРЕСКО, Губерн КРАКОВ
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w/cor Józef LIS nr. 13751/P

W dniu 9. 10. 1939r. powstała w sądzie wojskowym komisja
 z zadaniem zbierania dowodów z rej. nr. 10021861 powiat
 MOSAJSKA - powiatów ten sam w Lwów do WOJEWÓDZK
 a następnie 11. 10. 1939r. zwróciła uwagi z Tomaszowa
 tam kilkunastu oficerów do obrotu STAROBYLSK
 1) Kod 25.4. 1940 roku zwróciła uwagi z Tomaszowa
 oficerów do PAWLISZCZEW DORĘ Kuba JUCHONIA, a także
 13. 11. do obrotu N.R.W.3. GRJAZOWIEC.

W dniu 8. 10. 1940 zwróciła uwagi z grupy 7 oficerów
 SŁUBOWIEC do BUTYREK i MOSKWI

Wskazał ty grupy wchodzący oficerów: 1) p/leż. GORCZYŃSKI
 EUSTACHY, 2) p/leż. BŁ. KUNSTLER STANISŁAW

3) p/leż. BŁ. BERLING ZYGMUNT

4) p/leż. BŁ. BUKOJEŃSKI LEON

5) p/leż. BŁ. MORAWSKI MARIAN

6) p/leż. BŁ. TYSZYŃSKI LEON

7) mjr. BŁ. LIS JOZEF.

Przebieg o nas 3mi klasa powojna około 1940 do MARKNY
 9. 10. 1940r. został ustanowiona komisja, na do BUTYREK
 bez względu na miejsce, nas razem w całej obwodzie.

Wojenne i tak, zawsze przetrwałe bez względu na miejsce
 ROZHONY - PRZESTĘPCZYM: z oficerami wchodzący w skład
 WŁ. NARCOM MIERKUCION i p/leż. M.K.W. JEGOROW
 razem z innymi oficerami w składzie JEGOROW - w składzie
 nie, nie jestem w stanie powiedzieć o ich miejscu, o ich miejscu
 oficerów w składzie. p/leż. BŁ. LIS JOZEF i Mierkucion

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15. 4. 1948.

[Translation copy]

Lt. Col. Artillery Corp, (Blank)

STATEMENT

Born: 5 Sept. 1897, in LUKANOWICE, county BRZESKO, wojew. KRAKOW, certificate of completed secondary education issued in 1919 in DEBICA, of Roman Catholic religion, married, two children with wife in Poland. Completed British Staff College in Haifa, Palestine in 1946 with a British diploma P. S. C.

6. VIII. 1914—Volunteered to the Polish Legions and assigned to 2-nd Infantry Reg. of Legionaires,
 28. X 1914—dangerously wounded,
 1918—Austrian Army—Artillery,
 1. XI. 1918—1-st Artillery Legionaires Regiment,
 24. XII. 1918—Commissioned as 2/Lieut.,
 31. VII 1920—wounded,
 12. IX. 1939—wounded,
 1939—I went to war as commanding officer of the 3-rd howitzer battery attached to the 41-st Infantry Division /General PIEKARSKI/—
 I remained with this division throughout the campaign until the capitulation which took place on the 27-th of Sept. 1939 in the vicinity of KRASNOBROD. In an endeavour to break through enemy occupied country towards Hungary with a part of my battery I covered the distance from TYSZOWIEC to MOŚCISKA near PRZEMYŚL,
 25. VIII. 1941—Joined the Polish Army in the U. S. S. R.,
 1. I. 1942—appointed commanding officer of the 6-th Field Artillery Regiment in the U. S. S. R. within the 6-th Infantry Division,

In June and August 1944 wounded in Italy.

- October 1944 appointed 1-st Artillery Staff Officer of the 3-rd Corps,
 1. III. 1946 to 15. VIII. 1947 Director of Independent Dept. in the Higher Institute of Military Studies /I.W.S.W./,
 3. XII. 1947—commissioned with the P.R.C. /Polish Resettlement Corps/ Ref. No. 13751/P.R.C. and appointed Director of Archives No. 3.

On the 1-st of October 1939 I was taken prisoner by the Russians together with the staff of my battery, in the vicinity of the village PODLISKI in the county MOŚCISKA. I was taken via LWÓW to WOŁOCZYSKA from where on the 11-th of October 1939, I was deported with a transport of a few thousand Polish officers to the Starobielsk camp. On the 25-th of April 1940, with a group of other officers I was transferred to PAWLISZCZEW BOR near JUCHNÓW and, from there, on the 13-th of June 1940 to the N. K. V. D. camp in GRIAZOWIEC. On the 8-th of October 1940 I was sent together with a group of 6 staff officers, to the BUTYRKI prison in MOSCOW.

Our group consisted of:

- 1/Col. GÓRCZYŃSKI, /Engineer Corps./,
 2/P. S. C. Col. KÜNSTLER STANISŁAW, /Artillery Corps./,
 3/P. S. C. Lt./Col. BERLING ZYGMUNT, /Infantry Corps./,
 4/Lt./Col. BUKOJEMSKI LEON, /Artillery Corps./,
 5/P. S. C. Lt./Col. MORAWSKI MARJAN, /Artillery Corps./,
 6/P. S. C. Lt./Col. TYSZYŃSKI LEON, /Engineer Corps./,
 7/Mjr. LIS JÓZEF, /Artillery Corps./.

We were taken to Moscow in a 3-rd class compartment of a passenger train and on the 9-th October 1940, we were sent from the station in a prison van to the BUTYRKI prison where, without being searched, we were placed together in a large cell. Food and treatment were good although strictly in accordance with prison regulations.

INTERROGATIONS AND TALKS: with certain from among our group of officers were carried on by NARKOM MIERKUŁOW and by N. K. V. D. Lt./Col. JEGOROW. I had only a short talk with JEGOROW during which he told me that I had an opinion of a talented artillery officer and asked me whether I want to fight against the Germans. Our conversation ended upon my giving a positive answer to this question. Two days later we were transferred in a passenger car to the ŁUBIANKA prison. Col. KÜNSTLER remained alone in the cell in BUTYRKI.

ŁUBIANKA: Several conversations took place with BERJA to which were called only GÓRCZYŃSKI, BERLING, BUKOJEMSKI and TYSZYŃSKI. BERJA entertained them with a supper at which cognac was served; there was

talk about the organisation of a Polish armoured brigade and about a not far off war with Hitler; that in the UKRAINE the Russians will retreat till the Volga whence a decisive offensive will be launched. To BERLING'S question of where to find so many officers and whether our comrades from STAROBIELSK and KOZIELSK were not available BERJA uttered the words: "WE COMMITED A MISTAKE"/"MY ZDIELALI OSHIBKOU"/. Col. GORCZYŃSKI repeated to me these words the same evening or maybe it was on the morning after when I was with him in the toilet room.

MY CONVERSATION WITH MERKULOW: After 14 days I was led and shoved through a cupboard into MERKULOW'S office. He watched me in silence until the coming of General RAJCHMAN. The latter asked me unexpectedly: "Are you a member of the Intelligence Service?" /"Wy nie robotnik wtorawa otdielenia?"/. I denied—although in the years 1925-1930 and 1934-1935 I worked in fact as an officer in the Intelligence Service in its branch directed against Germany. After which MERKULOW asked me whether I was capable of commanding a regiment and larger units. I answered in the affirmative and then I asked the question: "Will the officers from STAROBIELSK be available because in the GRIAZOWIEC camp there were only few left. To which I got the following answer from MERKULOW: "No, don't count on these. A certain mistake had taken place. We shall find others"/. /"Etch nie patuczytie-wyszta kakaja to oshibka, drugih najdom?"/. At the time, in October 1940, I presumed that these officers had been sent back to territories occupied by the Reich. It was only in February 1941 when I received several enquiries in letters from Poland asking what had happened with the inmates of STAROBIELSK that I began to feel strong suspicions about the whole case.

THE JOURNEY TO MALACHOWKA: On the 1-st of November 1940 we were transferred from LUBIANKA to a villa in MALACHÓWKA where we were placed in rooms in twos. The food was of a type served in best boarding houses in Zakopane. We had our own kitchen, own bathroom, luxurious cutlery and crockery, a separate cook and a maid. We were given a few Polish books and a lot of Russian literature to read. A few days later Col. MORAWSKI was sent back to BUTYRKI prison on account of a memorandum he wrote in the matter of the organisation of the Polish Army, the creation of the Polish Committee and the future Russian-Polish frontier.

THE ARRIVAL OF OTHER GROUPS OF OFFICERS: In December 1940 a group of officers from GRIAZOWIEC arrived whose members had obvious pro-communist inclinations. To this group belonged Col. DUDZINSKI KAZI-MIERZ, Cpt. ROZEN-ZAWADZKI, Flight Lieut. WICHERKIEWICZ TADEUSZ, Lieut. of the reserve IMACH, and SZCZYPIORSKI and ensign KUKULINSKI. Towards the end of December 1940 arrived a few more officers formerly interned in LITHUANIA, namely Cpt. LOPIANOWSKI NARCYZ, Lieut. SIEWIERSKI, Lieut. TOMALA, and Lieut. X.

With the arrival of the new groups the entire atmosphere changed immediately and took on a pro-communist aspect. Studies of regulations were introduced which had to be translated from Russian. N. K. V. D. Lt./Col. JEGOROW'S visits became frequent during which he held long conferences with Col. BERLING. One day, in answer to a question put to him by Cpt. LOPIANOWSKI, JEGOROW said that in all 15% of the Poles from Polish territories had been deported to Russia.

POLITICAL SCISSIONS: Following a suggestion put forward by the communist group—SZCZYPIORSKI, IMACH, WICHERKIEWICZ and ZAWADZKI—who requested that the portraits of LENIN and STALIN be hung in the dining room—a general voting took place at which LOPIANOWSKI and I voted against this proposal while ensign KUKULINSKI threw in a blank card.

During a discussion on the problem of the U. S. S. R. in the presence of all of us I pointed to a map of Europe and said that the attitude of the U. S. S. R. towards Poland is best expressed by this map on which half of Poland had been already included for good within the boundaries of the U. S. S. R. a thing which had not been printed even in respect of Abissinia which was occupied by the Italians.—Hearing this BERLING wanted to beat me up, called me a swine and a fascist. Some time later Lt./Col. DUDZINSKI suggested that we write a declaration of collaboration with the editorial office of the "NOWE WIDNOKRĘGI" /"New Horizons"/ and a lively discussion ensued during which Cpt. LOPIANOWSKI declared that he wished to be taken back to prison. Once again a voting was held at which Col. GORCZYŃSKI, and Cpt. LOPIANOWSKI and I voted against the idea.

On the 25-th of March 1941, I was transferred together with Cpt. LOPIANOWSKI back to the BUTYRKI prison. On the way there in LUBIANKA, N. K. V. D. Lt./Col. JEGOROV beat me up and kicked me. In April 1941 we were taken together with 21 other officers to a camp in GLINSKIJ MONASTYR near PUTYWL in the UKRAINE. On June the 22-nd 1941 we were sent back to GRIAZOWIEC where we were kept however in isolated quarters and allowed to join the other group of officers only towards the end of August 1941.

I request that everything that I have stated above to be treated as court evidence and I wish to draw the attention to my former statements made in the Near East in BAGDAD and * * * /illegible/ * * *.

Everything I have said above is true to the best of my conscience and of my memory.

(Blank) Lt./Col. of the Art.

FOXLEY n/r HERFORD,
ENGLAND,
15-th of April 1948.

EXHIBIT 6

13 Ląd Polowy Staw JWSH.
L. dr. Ser. 64/45.

11

Protokół przesłuchania świadka

Miejscowość 23 grudnia 1945 r.
Porządek o godzinie 11⁰⁰.

W sprawie przestępstwa:

Obecni: bpi. aud. Lucyjszek Jan
protokolaant: pmi. Rokmayevski Jan

Przede wszystkim zapytanie o art. 81. k.p.k. o od-
pawie umieszczenia w zakładzie karnym - podaje:

Nazwisko i imię: p.publi. [REDACTED]

Data i miejsce urodzenia: 5. 12. 1897 r. Lubanowice
Jan. Borszko

Wykształcenie: gym. - kat. Stan: żonaty

Lawista: ofic. służ. staty. Lęborki wyższy. p.p.konrad of. pmi.

Przedmiot studiów: Staff College Hajfa. M. E. F.

Miejsce zamieszkania w Polsce: ul. Koszwicka

Miejsce zamieszkania obecnie: Hajfa Staff College.

Śledzenie do podległości jako członek [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Uprzedzony o prawie świadkowania na statku
w dniu 20. 10. 1945 r. w [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Przede wszystkim zapytanie jak wyglądał:

W roku 1937 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

2-eg 1/12 p.a. i w [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

W dniu 13 września 1937 r. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

W dniu 13 września 1937 r. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

W dniu 13 września 1937 r. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

W dniu 13 września 1937 r. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

W dniu 13 września 1937 r. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

W dniu 13 września 1937 r. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

W dniu 13 września 1937 r. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Berja raportuje nas z wyjątkiem br. Gromyckiego:
 w tym czasie wzięto do niewoli Polaków i Polki, Rosjan-
 i Polki. Po powrocie z wyjątkiem ośmiu ocalałych:
 wzięto do niewoli i Rosjan i Polki i wy-
 ianów.

W Berja wzięto do niewoli Polaków i Polki i Rosjan-
 i Polki i wy- ianów. Po powrocie z wyjątkiem ośmiu ocalałych:
 wzięto do niewoli i Rosjan i Polki i wy- ianów.

W tym czasie wzięto do niewoli Polaków i Polki i Rosjan-
 i Polki i wy- ianów. Po powrocie z wyjątkiem ośmiu ocalałych:
 wzięto do niewoli i Rosjan i Polki i wy- ianów.

W tym czasie wzięto do niewoli Polaków i Polki i Rosjan-
 i Polki i wy- ianów. Po powrocie z wyjątkiem ośmiu ocalałych:
 wzięto do niewoli i Rosjan i Polki i wy- ianów.

W tym czasie wzięto do niewoli Polaków i Polki i Rosjan-
 i Polki i wy- ianów. Po powrocie z wyjątkiem ośmiu ocalałych:
 wzięto do niewoli i Rosjan i Polki i wy- ianów.

W roku 1941...
wraz z innymi...
policji i...
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Wskazywanie...
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Instalacja: Porozumienie...

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[Translation copy]

The 13-th Field Court Martial,
of the J. W. S. W. Command,

RECORD OF THE HEARING OF WITNESS

In the field, 23-rd December, 1945, started at 11 a. m.

In the case against:

In the presence of: Cpr. Auditor LUCZYWEK JAN,

Recorded by: Sergeant ROZMARYNOWSKI JAN.

After having been cautioned in accordance with Para. 81 of the Military Penal Code about the responsibility for giving false evidence the witness stated:

Surname and Christian name: Lieut. Col.

Date and place of birth: 5.IX.1897, LUKANOWICE, county of BRZESKO,

Religion: Roman Catholic,

Civil status: married,

Profession: regular officer,

Rank: Lieut. Col. Artillery Corps,

Unit and allotment: Staff College, Haifa M. E. F.,

Residence in Poland: Ostrów Mazowiecka,

Present residence: Haifa, Staff College,

Relationship to defendant and/or other persons concerned with the case:

Advised about his right to withhold answers pertaining to circumstances referred to in Para. 80 of the Mil. Penal Code declares that he will not avail himself of this right.

The witness then testified as follows:

In peace time I held, in the rank of a major, the post of Commander of the 2-nd Battery in the 18 Light Artillery Reg. in Ostrów Mazowiecka. I went to war on the 11-th Sept. 1939, as Commander of a Battery of the 51-st L. A. Reg. attached to the 41-st Infantry Division under the command of General Piekarski. On the 12-th Sept. 1939, I was wounded in a battle near Żelechów. However I retained the command of the battery of howitzers attached to our division until the day of capitulation which took place on the 27-th Sept. 1939 in the district of Krasnobród. From the 27-th Sept. till the 1-st of Oct. I tried to break through with part of my battery to Southern Poland. On the 1-st of Oct. 1939 I found myself surrounded in the neighborhood of Sambor and I was taken prisoner by the Bolsheviks.

I was transported first to Lwów and then to Wotoczyska where I was joined to a transport of a few thousand Polish officers / from the capitulation of Gen. Langner /. On the 11-th of Oct. 1939 I found myself in the Starobielsk camp / about 3.800 officers /. At the time of the disbandment of the camp I was transferred on the 25-th of April 1940 to a camp in Pawliszczew Bor from where again, after six weeks, I was sent to the Gрязowiec camp in the Wologda district. On the 10-th of October 1940 I was transferred to the Butyrki Prison in Moscow together with: P. S. C. Col. Kuństler, Col Gorczyński, P. S. C. Lieut. Col. Berling, P. S. C. Lieut. Col. Tyszyński, P. S. C. Lieut. Col. Morawski and Col. of the Artillery Corps Bukojemski. In the Butyrki prison we were interrogated each of us separately. My questioner was Lieut. Col. of the N. K. V. D. Jegorow who asked me about my experiences as a battery commander in the fight against the Germans. He also asked me whether I was willing to fight on against the Germans to which I answered that I cannot imagine a Pole who would not be willing to fight them. After which I was sent back to my cell. After another few days we were transferred in a passenger car to the Łubianka prison. We were taken there by the commander of the Łubianka prison, N. K. V. D. Col. Mironov. In the Łubianka I was once asked whether I had at any time served in the II-nd Section /Intelligence/. I denied it and stated that I had always served as an officer of the Artillery Corps although, in truth, from 1925 to 1930 and from 1934 to 1935 I had been posted as an officer of the II-nd Section in Poznań, Katowice and Bydgoszcz.

I would like to mention that before my departure to Moscow I was instructed by Gen. Wolkowicki and P. S. C. Lieut. Col. Domoń to observe closely everything I was going to see and not to put my signature to any documents.

Towards the end of October 1940, Narkom. Berja invited Col. Gorczyński and Lieut. Cols. Berling, Tyszyński and Bukojemski to a party. After coming back from it they told us that they had been treated with food and brandy. Moreover they stated that:

1/ Berja spoke about war with Germany in the near future, and pointed to a map of Southern Russia saying:—"We shall retreat till the Volga and we shall strike at the Germans from the direction of the North Caucasus.

2/ That Russia was going to form a Polish armoured army and when one of the present officers remarked that for this purpose the officers of the camps of Kozielsk,

Starobielsk and Ostaszów will be needed Berja replied: "We made a mistake, yes, we made a mistake". /"My zdielali oshibkou, da zdielali oshibkou"/.

On the 1-st of November 1940 we were transferred to an isolated villa in the neighborhood of Moscow. There we were supplied with a number of Polish and Russian books and some Russian service regulations.

In December a group of Polish communist officers joined us /Cpt. Zawadzki, 2/Lieut. Imach, 2/Lieut. Szczypiórkowski, Flight Lieut. Wicherkiewicz and ensign Kukuliński/ and later on a few officers from the Kozielsk camp formerly interned in Lithuania. Various discussions ensued. During one of them, pointing to a map, I said to Berling that the lack of Poland on that map should give to us, Poles, sufficient indication of Russia's attitude towards Poland. There was also the question of hanging Stalin's portraits on the walls to which I objected. Further to that we were coaxed to signing a declaration of collaboration with Wanda Wasilewska. I refused to sign this declaration as did Cpt. Łopianowski Narcyz. After which I was removed to Lubianka where N. K. V. D. Lieut. Col. Jegorov threatened me in various ways. Later I found myself back in the Butyrki prison in the cell of Col. Künstler. There, N. K. V. D. Cpt. Ivanov tried to persuade me once again to cooperate with them stressing that they were in need of Polish nationalists and good patriots. I answered that I was quite satisfied with the prison and that I did not want to return there.

On the 7-th of April 1941 we were transferred together with a group of 21 officers headed by Gen. Przeździecki from Butyrki to Putywl camp on the river Sejm. On the 16-th of June 1941, we were sent back to Gruzowice.

I reported the story described above to Gen. Przeździecki and to Gen. Wołkowiński and on the 25-th of August 1941 to Gen. Anders. In November 1942, when serving in the Intelligence service in Baghdad I wrote a report in this matter about 30 pages long. It would be difficult for me today, after so long a time, to recall from memory all the details described therein, but I beg to take into consideration as evidence the above mentioned report which I herewith confirm in full to be true and valid.

I wish to add—I have just remembered it—that in 1940 in a place of which I cannot recollect the name, when handing to me a letter from my brothers in America an N. K. V. D. officer suggested to me and asked whether I would not consider working for them as an agent in America. He told me that I had plenty of time to think it over and that having done so I should contact him about it. I did not avail myself of this offer.

Having read this whole statement over I have signed it—

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| Recorder: | / signatures / (Blank) Lieut. Col. Art.
Military judge: |
| Rozmarynowski, Serg. | /illegible signature/
Łuczywek Jan, Capt. Auditor. |

Mr. DONDERO. The record does not show what position the witness holds with the Polish Government in exile.

Mr. FLOOD. That has already been stated.

Mr. Dondero. I did not hear it, and I would like to know what position he holds.

Mr. LUNKIEWICZ. I am a representative of the Polish Government in exile here.

TESTIMONY OF WITNESS A—Resumed

Mr. FLOOD. I ask the stenographer to identify exhibits Nos. 7, 8, 9, 9A, 10, 11, and 11A. The witness has handed to him committee documents now marked "Exhibits Nos. 7, 8, 9, 9A, 10, 11, and 11A and we ask the witness, what are these documents?"

Mr. A. These are letters that I received in Moscow from my wife in which the various families of officers who were interned at Starobielsk with me were inquiring of her as to their whereabouts; they are seeking information as to whether I know where they may be. Since I knew these officers very well, I replied that I had no idea where these men were—that they were removed from Starobielsk earlier that year.

(Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 9A, 10, 11, 11A and their translations into English follow:)

EXHIBIT 7

Uwaga, podobno była przetrwala
niektórzy ze 2-3 tys. osób. ich
liczba wynosiła - liczenia w ujęciu
Absender



Goybors. 11.10.1941
Zupełnie nie wiem.



wielu przetrwało 20. września.
w. p. 1941. W. - brni p. 1941. 10.10.1941
S. w. 1941. 10.10.1941. 10.10.1941
20. września. 10.10.1941. 10.10.1941
nie 2 tys. osób. 10.10.1941. 10.10.1941
A. 10.10.1941. 10.10.1941. 10.10.1941
W. 10.10.1941. 10.10.1941. 10.10.1941
S. 10.10.1941. 10.10.1941. 10.10.1941
p. 10.10.1941. 10.10.1941. 10.10.1941
10.10.1941. 10.10.1941. 10.10.1941

C.C.P.

POSTKARTE

Ruszkow

Moskwa

10.10.1941



10.10.1941

Województwo Lubelskie



Moskwa

Moskwa

10.10.1941

10.10.1941

10.10.1941

REVERSE SIDE OF EXHIBIT 7

[redacted] - wika die kauer wistelow 6. III. 1941.
 kich - o. lababz wauz uwe srenny do zolotnara wia. - 9 lei panna
 do pinal Stefau. ie wad cielw misolawuoci storobi i uenry au,
 ie kuzer i peca uhor - a ich pauer, allo, wuic paf sola jak
 li wistelow. wie wotla stobha. sarnary. - bo ich leh lo pumfka.
 mto koto e, jo. woty bym mictal kledo poytel. - wice uie o.
 spaci nig. - ledy bychikendto niao pinal to moin, ju se 1 do -
 nnu mnamy. Kple se pauer, ley uke nycine kypic t m aboiu, -
 o. zento, co bwaszickari do ycio, potrabna na jek originawu.
 ja joda puzq do towa i puzkujis brye moy ju wpla eye my. -
 pabra. dulo o. To wrole do awue woli Flabakos. Feb. 14
 Morisau jek lei Jozu gubie's blikto blicie. - wozie paf wicz
 skowuwikujecic. - zowda to wrotu spakoi rarykha. - Toban
 uocakos. - Stochobekhu moruawichu - Woziwobaru
 kanyia ths. 14 c. - 41 f. - byj uoty jo, jek kowoz z Jabra? - ju.
 uierpme se thw. tna ho jik Tumbuki zyi nie deya. - boi nie nidoa
 me pmai - jehie jwi hieby; mwoz yidny wopowud. - Dy uo wozje.

[Translation from Polish]

MARCH 6, 1941.

DEAR (censored word follows): A few days ago I sent you a letter. Now I have a few problems to settle. First, Stefan wrote that they have heard from you and that made them very happy that you are alive. As regards their assistance for me, it is as I have already written you, it is not worth the trouble. It would cause them considerable expense, and I would gain but little. When you write them, tell them that the house brings us an equivalent of a hundredweight's worth of grain, and as for the rest, that which is indispensable for human life is not to be had in any case. I repair clothes as best I can, and we manage somehow with the rest. The other problem is that Mrs. Halszka Jedrz. wrote to me. *Her Marian is somewhere near you. Perhaps you shall manage to communicate with him; it is always nice to meet a friend.* The address is Moscow, Post Office, Post Office Box No. 11/c-41. Is Matyja with you? Gina is dying of fright, because Pomruki makes her life difficult. Obviously she fears experiences which we have already suffered together. Is she right? Majek [a nickname] has lost so much weight that only skin and bones are left. The Zielonkis have changed their place of residence and moved into the town, and Mrs. Tosia does not like it. Big Klara married a young doctor and now ridicules all those did not want her. Michalowa Klepacka has a new finacé. Fondest kisses.

IRA.

Daddy, did you get my letter, after that one for Christmas? I shall write shortly again. I kiss you, Daddy.

OLENKA.

From: Irena -----, Grybow, Cracov District, German Mail East.

Address: U. S. S. R., Russia, Moscow, Post Office Box 686.

Joseph, son of Stanislaw ----- [in Russian]

Major, son of Stanislaw ----- [in Polish]

Moscow.

Main Post Office, Post Office Box No. 686.

EXHIBIT 8

B. B. F. F.

18. II. 47.

Шеклава-

Успенск. Бр. 20. 10. 1941

Дне

Тав. Л. Х. К. 13. 10. 1941

Порт. Бр. 17. 686.

249/17 15/1




Русская

Москва

Городской Совет
Кремлевский пр. 17. 686.

д/п

15. 12. 41




RETURN ADDRESS ON EXHIBIT 8



Handwritten:
Geführt
D. 12. 11. 1940
Kriegsministerium
Berlin

IX

Gepufft



LETTER ENCLOSED IN EXHIBIT 8

14. 1. 1944.

Pochylny Tatusku!

- Drugaj dostalismsy wlasnie 3ci list z Moskwy... nie pisze juz nawet jak bardzo, wspanaly nie cieszymy. - Z listu Tatusa wiadomuje ze wyborozila sobie now Tatus takimi, jakimi nas zostawil, jadac na wojne. A tu myzaja juz prawie 2 lata, jak sie nie wiczbialismy a my zmienilismy sie i woswetonnie i zebetonnie Wierio bardzo wroci i ma 1m. i 10cm. a ja 1m. 60cm wlasnie przed chwila mierzyalismy sie). Wierio wnet skonczy 12 lat i duze z niego chiopsytsko, chiedi w miebie do staj klady, obrzedniczył po Tatusu zamulowanie do filatelistyki i „sioga” ukrochciem znaciki od „Mlewska” ktore do naszego „marnika” ktore „mlewska” szkodnie skladu dla Tatusia. - A ze mnie liotki sie smieja ze bednie „nadrabiaci” mina wiec znen... ~~...~~ Jaki juz Gura. Wierioi nie ma kto opowiadai bajek, wiec je sam opyta, ale jakos nie bardzo to lubi, woli zagladai do atlasu. Jlinie boli cheto garolio, ale poradzylm jostemny zdrowsi. Porozyczylam sobie narty (bo nasze horiumy i warty zginely) i w tatanowych spodniach jezdzie po bohinie, malalam duzo dobrych zjazdow, ale zawsze wspominam ostatnie ferie zimowe przed wojna, ktore spędzilismy tutaj we twrke. Imieia klase juz skonczylam, wogole z nauka mamny bardzo duze trudnosc, najwle ze wien eliaciego. - z „matematyka” daje sobie nawet dobry radle. Najgorzej z „krawcauskim” bo nie ma kto mnie pokierowaci, a sama z tym sobie nie mogę dac radly, ale myśle ze z czasem w wyspietku sie nadrobie. Na drugi jazyk o ktorym Tatus pisal nie mam czasu... zresztą myśle ze nie bednie potrzebny. Za to mamusia upora sie na jazyk staryka i „Gana” i robi ~~...~~ postępy. Wzyscy mamymy o tej chwili kiedy sie znowu spotkamy i bedniemy juz razem i w nowim wlosnym domu. - Uczytysimy sie czenie Teraz duze nieczy, mamy na ktore w normalnych czasach w ogole sie nie zwracata uwagi. ~~...~~ Mozig ze nie ma tego ztego eoby na dobre nie wyszlo, wole i wojna sie na to przydosta. Np. ja nuczylismy sie wieszai, nowy plener rownie po myslu i w razie (czego dawno nie bywato) Wierio „pucuje” cheto buty, zely, byly ferne dluzo nie zmierzone i wygladaly jak nowe. Mlewszek zuchiera ze „krawcauskich” katek w wlym domu sukienki z wely, pruje, mierzicie i robi nowe skomparki, rekawiczki i t.p. wazyskie ciotki robiu to samo. Wogole od wasa do wieszera to cerowanie Tatusie i mierzicie, wnet na poniedzach wiecy bednie cer niz wladawcyj poniedzach. To sa tylko drobne przykladly. -
- Ja mam znowu kłopot ze nowimi zębami i muszę jezdzie do M. Siera, bo na miejscu dentysty nie ma, a to wyspietko trwanie cheto kosztuje, a pieniedzy nie ma, wiec „reszta” magnackiej kłotki spmedozjemy. Ale mimo „wyspietko” trzymammy sie dobrze i jasno patrzemy w przyszłosc. Np. ja juz sie chce napiszai or i „Mlewszek” chce woi nadrobaci. - Wierio przysyjam Tatusowi duze uwalowami. - Olenka.

SECOND PART OF LETTER IN EXHIBIT 8

Kochowcy janczerki! - To jest drugi list z tym roku 1941. -
 w tym celu dwa Twoje pismo z listopada już dawno kilka dni
 odpisałem. - Ten ostatni Twój jest datowany 10.XII. - Myślałem, że
 może może nieś więcej podłży ale widzę że chwila or miżycie. -
 Ciężko mi, że jesteś pełen dobrotych myśli i wrodziej - my też nie
 wie, że my się zbudynni przeciwko ci - i wierzymy, że i dla nas
 może przodek. wisteci. - Jaka więc powiemmy zjedny, uswet piwie,
 porobiki zwinie. - bo my się tylko oby nie było gorzej. - Oleiko
 będzie ubito, i klona - uwie wole, się ja chowac miła wśladzie
 namy wk. - więc nie straciłoby być taka hiale. - Była tylko koniec był
 bliki. - a w. to jaś pimen nie mo. - był stiel na obryj -
 No ale mimo to duch nie upoda. - wotore myślo, tam, że
 zleady z parobier niku nie chłoi się dobrze - to był wlich
 z glosy, - o. do tego nie wiedział, co się z wa. nił dzieje. -
 Ale teraz usperuo już lepiej się erujer. - bo i my ter. - Myślę o
 Tem że Ty jeduce do was pimen w. iu ni. Istowaj były tolu gocie
 i Ty nie się nie wole waja. - Jeśli em wien o lierhianku - Hojrusie
 i jalmu etu nopro o nieli - pivo. tam już o Tem ale nie wieu
 eruj tolu te listy wotly. - o. tu jest z tego powodu wielkie
 w. kieprohicie. - Wieru wiuzi o wotnia nopro muo, uscy
 się obryj dobrze - i woi nie jak zydowski procent. - Jeśli chobri
 o dom to diewody zmiejrzły się - o. ryba. ~~to~~ ~~to~~ ~~to~~ myśle,
 o schoinowce / Oleiko, milie kandyje bO et micie eruje. - o. Teror
 kowibimuz 300 et wo. zely, bo się jez gwałtownie pouja -
 i do wo. p. mym prodzie. - Myślę że polich Wollero, nie było.
 by opłocowa, o. było, by tylko oficj. lba. - bo 5 et wotł jel
 istolek p. b. niery. - Za parę dni uioz uopine. - Serdecnie
 Cię cotupemy i polecamy Tsoye nie Alkchoni. —

Jrew.

Jew-

Gylbor - hotel Morsgo Lazow
 Deutsche Post Ostern

14. I. 1941.

[Translation from Polish]

JANUARY 14, 1941.

DEAREST DADDY: We have just received your third letter from Moscow. I shall not even try to tell you how glad we are. From your letter it would seem that you imagine us such as we were when you left us for the war. But it is two years since we have seen each other, and we have changed both physically and mentally. Wiesio has grown up. He is 1 meter 40 centimeters, and I am 1 meter 60 centimeters tall (we have just measured ourselves). Wiesio will be 12 shortly and is a big boy. He is in the fifth grade, has taken after you, and likes philately. He "steals" stamps secretly from "Metuszek" to put them in his album, the stamps which "Metuszek" studiously collects for you. My aunts mock me that "the good father will try to keep a straight face * * *" the rest you know. There is nobody now to read a bedtime story to Wiesio, so he reads it himself, but he prefers to look at the atlas. I suffer often from a sore throat. Otherwise we are all well. I borrowed skis (our skis and skiing clothes were lost) and in your trousers I ski in Sosnina, where I have discovered a number of good runs, but I shall always remember the winter vacations which the three of us spent together.

I have finished the third class, but in general we have difficulties with learning. I think you know why. In math I am doing well. I am not so good in French and there is nobody to assist me there. I think, however, that in time everything will be well. I have not time for the other language of which you wrote—and I think that it will not be necessary. Mama, however, decided to learn the language of Uncle Stefan and is making progress. We all live for the moment when we shall meet again and be together in our own home. We have learned to appreciate many things which escaped our appreciation in normal times. They say that there is nothing bad which will not eventually turn into good, and even war can be useful. And so, for instance, I have learned to hang up my coat after coming home (which I never did before). Wiesio polished his shoes so that they may last and look new for a long time. Metuszek "robs" our dolls of their woolen dresses and turns them into socks and gloves, etc., and the aunts are doing the same. From morning till evening repairs and refashioning—there will be shortly more repairs on our stockings than original material. These are only small examples. I have trouble with my teeth and I have to go to the dentist in N. Sacz, because there is none locally, and as this costs an enormous amount of money we are selling the rest of our possessions. But in spite of all that, we keep our spirits up and look with hope into the future. I have written enough and now "Metuszek" wants to write a few words. With fondest kisses, my Daddy.

OLENKA.

MY DEAREST JOSEPH:

This is already the second letter in 1941. I have replied several times to your two letters written in November—your last letter is dated December 10. I thought you had been moved, but I see now that you are still in the same place. I am glad you are full of hope—we also are not discouraged. We are sure that one day our happiness will be restored, and we manage as we can. What we are afraid of is that worse may come to us. Olenka will go into the fourth class, perhaps she will manage to finish it before the new school year comes. That way she would not lose much. If only all this would end soon, but that, as you write, is not very probable. But we do not despair. I felt that in October you were unwell, and I was down and out. In addition, I did not know what was going to happen to us, and you did not know what was happening to us. But I am quite sure that now you feel better, and we do too. *I always console myself that you write to us, while others who were in the same place with you give no sign of life. If you happen to know something about Cierniok, Haiman, or others let us know—I have already written about it to you, but am not certain whether the previous letters have reached you, and here there is great anxiety for that reason.* Wiesio constantly talks of Tulus, makes good progress in the school, and grows like debts. The income from the house decreased and expenses have gone up. Olenka costs me some 60 zl. per month. Now I am trying to get some 300 zl. for the dentist, because her teeth are deteriorating in front. Wolter's assistance would amount to nothing practical but would be purely nominal, because one unit of their currency is worth 5 zl. In a few days I shall write again. We all kiss you, and may God protect you, not Allah.

IRENA —, GRYBOW.

JANUARY 14, 1941. Near Nowy Sacz, German Rail East.


EXHIBIT 9

Rusland

Moskwa

Glomy Wood Factory
Smyka. Nr. 686.

Mjr. ~~_____~~ ~~_____~~ ~~_____~~
fozef



C. C. C. P.

Wochbe

Prabrovi Tomasz
Tomaszki Punkt. Nr. 686.
590337
Wocuzi due Jozef
dwa straszabow



RETURN ADDRESS ON EXHIBIT 9



General Government Tolau



M. J. O. S. W. L.
C. J. S. W. L.
R. J. S. W. L.



LETTER ENCLOSED IN EXHIBIT 9

1. 'Dobrym, janczem! - Znowe radosi bratniej z ^{12. XII. '40.} waszych perzech
 i domni, golfe przyredl Troj 31 list - drugi g dziej jme po ob. -
 Wrosmie sie cieme, ie moiez do was przye - bo to popmedie pi.
 sernie g dziej z jstow z wielko, niewiadomo, czy doj dze Troich
 wch bylo bezwadijne. - list Troj przye 13. XI. - wyredl z dlochy
 28/XI o brisioj jest 12. XII. - sredl rze wie sie - propmedie ltko
 3 tygodnie. - ale wojowniejze, ie przyredl. - bo im ne Sowie, kto
 ie usoj w rch tam g dziej. Ty jstow - nie nie otrzymuj. -
 Troli zii z dmeryki, ie powetke wydalil wle wroci. Wajin
 sie o ile moiez do Genery - aby wozie otrzymuj. ja-
 kieje pmeryki do: liebie skierowali ja, na Troj obczy
 wales - bo powetki wyzyle idz jmer niezdrum, wozowu
 brerowu Ruzji. - a Hefan jstow se woz wyzyle, ki pme-
 sylke - jemu ci kiepko sie powodri - ale Wlad, dchori do do-
 bnie. - Godybym ja moglo, li ci wyzyle - to wyzyle bym ci
 wielozny - bo 1 porz nowotowalam i sherpelki wyzyle
 muris. edrowie, bo wam ci 3 porz - ale wozow nie
 moiez. bo nie nie przyjmuj. - Try jstow do Lisowkiego
 on siedri w starym miejscu. - i miwie przedri ci loskiego
 mi qby li powie. - ie starych wozow. - je na to miejsce
 powalobym ci jego wycho wankowi, katorz jest z nieroli kutaj
 z katorzem exoscu o ile wyzyle powogaler - niezyle spron-
 olzie ale se. mo, niezyle wam. - Mubto sami nie jstow
 my - obwie jest qdy jest mleko lub horse z chlekiem. - Drie
 ciom exoscu ci podetlanc - ale dowoli wozow nieli o tym
 produkcie katorz obwie jest b. w. z droziny jstow byi. - Nie myil
 jednak ie przy mierowu g dziej - toka ile nie jest - bo wyzyle -
 bo co kto mo. z fory shlo. do. my wosem i jstow sie zije.

Najpierw czyż nie było to...
 Lekarstwo nie ma, ale wo. chleb i skromny porządek sto. rezy-
 tym. Wobec tego że z starości, nie się nie kąpije - bo i nie ma
 zoko, obrucje niemo. golic - tylko to co naj. robić się. - Puno-
 ru nie brzoimny i kochaję życie swojej - i nie wygny się gnie. zółka
 i dło. mas. zis. radei. -

A teraz chęć li napisać co wst. koroba się z zowie. uch. - ości
 i zwoje zw. orki - g. obintel i p. to. ry - p. o. n. i. n. o - f. o. l. e. l. e i k. r. o. m. o. p. h. o
 nie. k. o. k. z p. r. o. d. p. o. k. o. j. e i u. m. y. s. l. o. k. o. l. t. r. o. c. h. e. s. k. o. r. u. p. - M. u. s. z. e. t. o. s. b. -
 z. o. w. i. e. s. t. o. s. t. o. t. y. l. k. o. r. e. s. t. k. i. t. e. g. o. e. o. n. i. e. n. i. e. s. t. y. t. u. k. t. o
 z. t. r. o. i. c. h. w. e. c. y. t. y. l. k. o. t. p. a. c. k. i. e. b. i. s. m. y. m. u. k. l. o. d. n. o. b. u. t. y. e. s. i. 3. s. t. o. r. y
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 b. u. t. y. - t. p. o. l. l. u. c. i. k. i. i. t. r. o. i. e. k. o. h. i. e. r. y. o. w. a. r. k. e. s. t. o. r. e. b. u. t. y. b. r. o. n. z. o. w. e
 u. o. z. i. t. i. c. h. i. e. j. s. k. o. r. e. - U. b. r. o. n. i. e. i. b. u. t. y. t. e. n. i. s. t. i. e. b. r. o. n. z. o. w. e. p. e. r. u. s.
 s. p. e. c. i. a. l. n. e. - N. o. w. a. r. i. e. j. e. z. e. n. e. n. i. e. o. l. e. m. o. z. i. e. t. r. e. b. a. b. e. g. o. d. i. e. -

i t. l. o. w. o. t. y. j. e. z. e. n. e. 3. b. y. z. o. u. y. - t. i. l. i. m. y. - p. l. o. t. e. y. - k. r. u. p. i. t. o. l. y. - e. o. t. y
 k. o. n. z. b. i. e. l. i. z. o. i. m. o. i. e. l. a. - t. r. o. j. e. u. b. r. o. n. i. e. p. o. t. o. z. z. e. b. u. t. y. d. r. i. e. i. e.
 n. e. k. a. z. i. w. i. a. k. i. i. t. p. o. t. r. a. y. t. k. o. p. r. e. p. a. d. t. o. - z. p. o. i. e. l. i. u. o. n. e. k. o. l. o. b. u. y
 p. i. e. t. a. n. e. i. 3. p. o. d. i. e. n. k. i. b. o. i. c. h. t. a. n. e. r. y. t. a. n. z. e. s. o. b. a. i. s. t. o. j. e. o. w. a. r.
 b. r. i. e. t. l. i. n. e. o. b. o. l. i. s. t. e. w. e. c. y. k. i. o. r. e. t. e. i. m. i. e. l. i. s. m. y. z. e. s. o. b. a. - b. u. y.
 t. o. e. o. w. o. t. o. u. t. r. y. m. o. n. e. m. i. e. m. o. d. o. m. o. - o. l. e. u. o. z. o. r. i. e. j. e. t. -

Nowakiej w. p. o. t. o. w. o. z. t. o. 150 z. - W. n. o. z. y. c. h. w. e. c. z. e. l. i. m. i. e. n. k. a
 j. a. t. e. r. a. r. k. o. k. o. l. o. r. y. n. i. e. u. i. n. e. r. y. n. i. z. s. t. a. y. t. k. e. - N. e. j. z. o. n. i. e. j. e. z. e.
 d. u. a. k. t. o. o. b. y. s. i. e. z. e. z. i. l. i. z. i. e. w. o. j. n. o. s. t. u. i. e. r. y. l. o. - o. t. e. n. t. a. p. i. e. d.
 b. e. d. i. e. - t. b. r. i. e. w. a. r. g. n. i. e. k. o. s. i. e. z. b. i. z. i. o. - c. h. e. i. o. b. o. l. y. m. - a. b. y.
 n. i. e. d. r. i. e. l. - z. e. u. y. t. i. n. y. i. z. e. t. h. u. i. n. y. z. o. t. o. b. z. - o. z. d. u. l. i. e. z. i. g. i. t. i.
 n. a. m. e. z. i. e. c. o. i. u. y. t. i. t. e. i. t. e. i. p. o. n. y. t. o. l. i. e. b. e. d. a. z. u. o. d. i. e. j. a. z. e. u. o. s. t. -
 p. u. o. z. i. g. i. l. i. o. j. a. z. i. n. o. p. i. e. l. e. o. b. c. h. o. d. z. o. n. o. b. e. d. i. e. - t. e. r. o. k. e. r. u. e.
 k. i. e. e. a. t. u. j. e. - o. b. i. e. c. i. t. e. i. - t. r. o. t. a. b. z. o. n. o. m. o. p. i. a. t. e. k. -
 t. r. e. n. o. ~~.....~~ - G. y. l. b. o. w. - k. r. o. k. o. w. s. k. i. e. - G. e. n. e. r. a. l. g. o. u. v. e. r. n. e. m. a. n. t.
 T. o. l. e. n.

[Translation from Polish]

Translation of envelope, addressed both in Polish and in Russian:

RUSSIA—MOSCOW—Main Post Office, Box Office No. 686, Major ———
Jozef ———

In left corner of envelope, registration label R—Grybow 075.

At the bottom of the envelope, two postal stamps issued by the German General Government, one to the value of 60, the other 50 (no monetary unit indicated). The stamps bear cancellation postal marks Grybow 12.12.40.15.

At the back of the envelope, sender's name and address:

I. ——— GRYBOW,
Krakowskie General Governement, Polen.

Over the name of the sender, a postal cancellation stamp in Russian, bearing the date 22.12.40, Moscow Main Post Office.

Under sender's address, a German cancellation stamp which reads: The High Command of the German Army, Postal Service's examination.

Below in red pencil, the names M. Golebiowski, Cierniak, Badecki, names mentioned in the letter, where the writer inquires about their whereabouts at the Kozielsk camp.

MARCH 20, 1940.

DEAR JOSEPH: There is again happiness in our hearts and at home because your third letter has arrived. The second one was lost somewhere. I am terribly happy that you are able to write to us because writing as before, somewhere into the great unknown, never being sure whether it will reach you, was hopeless. Your letter dated the 13th of November left Moscow the 28th of November, and today is the 12th of December. It therefore took a month; the previous letter took only three weeks. *But the most important thing is that it arrived, because other ladies whose husbands are where you are don't receive any letters.* They have written me from America that they have sent a parcel but that it was returned. So write if you can to Geneva that in case they receive any parcels for you they should be forwarded to your present address, because parcels are usually forwarded through the International Red Cross. Stefan wrote that they will send you another parcel. He doesn't seem to be doing too well but Wladek is doing very well. If I could send you something, I would send you some of your linen, because I managed to save one pair, and some socks, so that you wouldn't have to mend. I have about three pairs. However, I cannot send them because they will not accept parcels. *Have you written to Lisowski? He is still in the same place and perhaps will be in a better position to send something to you from his old supplies.* I would in exchange send something to his foster son who is a prisoner of war over here and whom I try to help as much as I can, although I have not very much myself. We ourselves don't eat any butter. We are well off when we have milk or coffee with bread. I try to get some from time to time for the children, but the adults have forgotten about this produce, which costs about 6 times as much as before. Don't think, however, that we are starving. It isn't that bad because we put together any money that we have and somehow manage to live. Of course there are no luxuries, but we have enough for bread and a modest meal, the more so because we don't buy any clothing, first of all because we do not have any money for it and secondly because there is none to be had, except what is most essential. We keep our spirits and courage, and believe that our star will once again shine for us.

And now I would like to tell you what was saved in the turmoil. Well then, your stamps, the dining room and study, the piano, the easy chairs and settee, the clothes-stand from the entrance hall, the washroom, and a little bit of crockery. I am calling it crockery because they are only the remnants of what has not been broken. From among your personal belongings, only a pair of shirts, your uniform, shoes, 3 pairs of socks and 6 collars, one suit which was in Gr. [Grybow], your skiing shoes, one pair of shoes, the pair of old patent leather shoes, and the old brown pigskin pair, remain. I think I will sell the suit and the two pairs of shoes—not just now, but perhaps later I shall have to. Oh yes! Three carpets also survived. The rugs, the silver, glass, and china, a whole basketful of linens and bedding, your suits, coats, shoes, the children's winter coats, etc., everything was lost. From among the linens, I still have the quilts, the eider-down, and 3 pillows, because I carried them with me; also my own and the children's clothing, which we also had with us. Whether what was left will survive I cannot say, but it is still there. I paid Nowacka 150 zl. for it. Our belongings

are being used by tenants, so everything is being ruined. The most important thing, however, is that the war should end happily; then the rest will be all right. Because Christmas is near, I want you to know that we think of you and long for you, and on Christmas Eve our hearts and thoughts will be with you, with the hope that we may celebrate the next one together. I kiss you with love; so do the children.

IRA.


I enclose a Christmas wafer.

IRENA ——— GRYBOWA,
Krakowskie—General Governemant, Polen.

Along the edge of the letter: on one side—Please write whether you have any news about Cierniak, Feliks Badecki. It is important. Also about Mieczyslaw Golewowski.

On the other side, continued: Camp Kozielsk, Smolensk Province, Box Office No. 12, from Nowy Sacz 1 P. S. P. reseves. Please try to write to Kozielsk.

EXHIBIT 9A



[Translation from Polish]

MY BELOVED ONES: Days, weeks, and years pass, yet it is only the beginning of the chaos of the old world; the destruction of war is now added to the sufferings of the world, and the flames of war begin slowly to envelop both hemispheres. War, destruction, hunger, and misery among nations are already old phenomena in the small sector of the globe on which we live. We must, however, persevere and await our fate, mindful of our national posts and of the inexhaustible values of the spirit of our nation. Mohammed said, "Nobody can escape fate, because Allah is great!"

I cannot describe to you how I yearn for you all; great poets, like our Adam Mickiewicz, have expressed it in words. Often in my dreams I am together with you all. I remember Wiesio as a small boy to whom I was telling so many fairy stories; how is he developing? And Olenka without school, for this so-called study is really no education at all. No, there is none anywhere; I suppose she does not want to know what Filachowska has written about marriage. Education gives contentment, self-assurance, and assures a permanent basis for one's existence. Despite my 43 years I am still learning, because as Socrates, the greatest of all philosophers, said: "I know that I do not know anything." Let Olenka pay special attention to mathematics and foreign languages; of course, in order to learn one has to have health, peace, and something in one's stomach, and also good intentions.

Irena, I am awaiting a reply from you to my two letters of October and November. I hope you have received them and that you will not worry about me. Winter here is somewhat late; since the first snow in October, which has now disappeared, none has fallen so far. I have rubbers so that I don't think I shall have wet feet. I also have my own socks and foot-clouts for wrapping up my feet. I live under hygienic conditions, am able to have a bath, to walk, and to read a lot of good books. Many things of which I have been ignorant I now understand, and I have benefited a lot. I would like for our children to learn a few foreign languages; I only now appreciate how one benefits from it, since I am able to read with ease books in a foreign language when none in our language are available.

Irena, darling, you need not worry about me at all. The worst has already passed, in particular the beginning of the road, when I was so weak that I was unable to enter the railway carriage, and later when anemia and finally apathy set in. All this has luckily passed, however; you all manage somehow and I have regained my health, strength, and faith in the future. I am keeping informed of the (international) situation better than you are able to, for I read communiques of both sides, as well as commentaries in the press.

I still have no letter from Stefan, but I shall try again to write to him. As to the severe winter, please do not worry. It is not so bad; the polar circle is still quite far from here, and I do have warm shelter and sufficient food. I have not as yet seen any bears, not even brown ones, [nothing] except crows and other birds. During the summer I was sunbathing and swimming in the river. Be of good cheer, for as the proverb goes: "He who is to hang will not drown." After all, I can't lose what I no longer possess, and moreover, the naked do not fear robbery.

EXHIBIT 10

S. E. C. C. F.

Stocks

19. 12. 11.

due to Jack

Investment in stocks

From Robert Forman

Forman's check 686



Rusland

Stocks

~~_____~~
July _____

George Wood Bentley

Stock No. 117. 686.

REVERSE SIDE OF EXHIBIT 10

Senec  Jany bar

Wroclawskie

Deutsche Post Osten



SZAFRAN
CIERNIA
BUDZIS

RECEIVED
MAY 1941

LETTER ENCLOSED IN EXHIBIT 10

1 grudnia 1940.

Docho, miy 'Joiesekku' -

List który dzisiaj pise, pismo dopiero około swiat
 dojdzie do Ciebie. - Jakie to bedo, szcilo? - Bardzo nam
 bolubro smutno, ze Ciebie z nami nie ma - wopierzo nam
 kocho, sobie popio, czemu jak zagle myi kochich blawioch.
 Dobne, ze myi wojniacy, niemi co nie z toba, dzieje. - i, ze
 dzieja sobie wole, - bo zentego roku bylo gorzej - Chociaz
 mo tych okropnych z miesta, czuych do rapotach, - wstaj-
 mo do porzecznie ze uoderliwmy sie, woznie pod dochem
 i spinyi w kochach a nie ud podlodac. - woznie czesto ty.
 mo wlo, miy potocz jako niemi i woznie koch dzie.
 Ale to jasi woznie, nie wolez do komunistycznej pryncipi
 o. myi to sie i jasi to przed uderz. - Woznie jasi je dzie do
 z wole - Myi moze i, perca, koch, bliznie Ciebie - chociaz
 woznie jasi miy wole. - Myi, niemi w woznie miemi
 mi i cichych dobych dzie, ch kochie tomi jasi miy
 kochie mi i kochie miy miy woznie koch, jasi je
 chwicieby koch miy - ale woznie. - i miy to wole je
 nie miy bliznie? - Terzo chcoz nie dzie jak Terzo re-
 jemy. - Jasi dzie nie woznie. - o, jasi, woznie ze kochie je-
 boleu woz kochie, koch woz kochie koch. - to zu. Jedem kochie
 owo, jasi je jasi, woznie miy; do woznie jasi kochie ze wole
 do z kochie, kochie miy nie kochie miy. - Moze jasi je
 woznie je to nie niednego jasi. - jasi kochie
 sie o kochie kochie woznie - jasi kochie, woznie woz-
 o, woznie mi kochie to kochie go tomi kochie kochie.

tełt miōi skōd no dole i spiy nie tełt pier woy jōkoj
 i wosnu se do chō, bōdriemy hōndō woi. cōnu nō do...
 oby pōnryje tełt wojciōzi nuy chōres. - Mōłko tełt uo
 skłep wōdōsielery z wōtō-dōto, mi. - o. pōpōs Mōłko,
 wōpōn hōwicerulē cōy cier nōskō hōy i do wōbielōku z tōh
hō dōu, dōry nōstō, tyłkō 1 kōrłō z 29 li dō pōdō. - i wōs-
 tōwō nō jōt ogōwōnuc cō z miu jōt. - Dpōn wōc i sōpō
 hō cō wōch o miu - jōk tełt o do wōbielōku jō wōsō wōc mōłk
 z Wōluc. - kōry tełt hōy i do wōbielōku. - o. kolōre o tōh
Bo dōlekiu. - o tōh tełt nōc nōc nōc nōc jōkō jōmōłt
 jōwōc - Pōmōk pōdōri jōwōc u pōbiē - ołō spōdōri wō-
 nuy nō, i kōwōdōj chōwōi jōpō pōryjō rōdō z wōdōri nō, tōtōj -
 Mōłkō pōwōc jōk uōgō, zōjō, - dōj kōpōj wōjō jōwōc tō, kō
 rō uōjō nōzō i i pōi tōbi nōchōwōkōj - dōjō uōjō wō
 ty dōriō nō, dōwōi i wōl cōmō dō cōwōi pōi nō, dōe. - tōk
 iō skōwōmō nōtōkō wōl zōjō uōgō. - tōkō G. pōwōc uō pōdōj
 ołō. jōhō kōwōjō hō. - jōdōry chōwōi i uōgō gō rōchōj bō-
 hōiōtō kō. Nōwōłkōwō, uōtōry nōjōc sō z kōkōj. - tōkō, dōwō,
 uō. i W. kōwōfōkō - z rōwōtō, spōdōrōli pōc i W. wō, kōłkō
 dōriōł tōjō. wōjō bō dō, nōc jōmō jōmō kōłō. - Gōmō, jōt
 i tōi. hō uōjō kō jōj pōryjōtō, pōi nō, dōe. i tełt klōwō nō
 o skłep z wōdōsielery. - jōk hō dōwō i pōwōc tōk pōbiē
 wōdōri. - o uōjō hō o uōi ch pōryjō wō, nōch? - tōkō wō
 z dōwō rō chōwō. - o. o pōtōj nō, jōk nōgōj jōmōłt tō. -
 tōkō zōjō jōwōi i wōgōłō sōdōcōrōi cōi cōłōjō i oci o hōm
 tōchōnōmō tōtōwōiōi sōcōtōsōnōi i zōcōnōi sōiōtōcōnōi. tō.
 i zōbōmōj sōcōłōwōi dōwōkōłōi, nōwōtōpōnyh i o bōchōdōrōi jō rōrēm i jōwō
 u nōbiē, pōryjōi tōkōkō i Nōiō.

[Translation from Polish]

DECEMBER 1, 1940.

DEAR JOSEPH: The letter which I am writing now will perhaps reach you by Christmas. What [kind of] Christmas will it be? We shall be very sad as you will not be here with us. Surely we shall even weep somewhat as we usually do on such occasions. It is well that I at least know what has been happening to you and that you are managing for yourself, because it was not going very well last year.

After those terrible 3 months of ordeal, a relaxation has come and we live at last under a roof and sleep on beds, not on the floor with my own coat serving as a straw sack and a blanket. Happily it has passed away as a nightmare. The future and the morrow are ahead of us.

With reference to Christmas—our thoughts and hearts will be with you, although we are far away from each other for the time being.

I often think about our home and the quiet happy days we lived through there. When shall we have a home in this world? A modest [home] hut of our own! Is this dream remote or near? Perhaps you want to know how we are living? The children are learning now. Stacha and I are cook and chambermaid by turns. This means that one week she cooks and I do housework and the next week our turns are reversed. We do not have a maid for reasons of frugality. I hope, however, that things will improve in the not too distant future, because I am seeking a commission-shop. If I am granted permission for a shop I will open it where Konfteil had a store, at the back of the house, below in this first room. And then together Stacha and we will carry on trade [selling] whatever [it is] possible [to sell], in order to survive this most difficult time. Mother also has a shop, for distributing textiles.

Apropos of Mother, do write positively whether Cierniak was with you at Starobielsk, because she received only one post card of [dated] November 29. She is enormously grieved over what is happening to him. Describe everything you know about him, as well as about Szafran Jaroslaw, the colonel from Vilna who also was at Starobielsk, and about Felck [Felix] Budecki. We do not know anything about Tolek (Anthony). He has discontinued writing. Romek (Roman) is still living as he did before, but at any time we are expecting him to arrive here with his family. Our ladies are living as [best] they can. Those whose husbands are in German captivity are much the happier, because they receive news [from them] every week and money from time to time. Although they live modestly, still they are able to live.

Tola (Antoine) G. works at the station of Ostr. as a cashier and Jedrychowska works at the municipal library. Mrs. Nowak lives by lecturing, Mrs. Sztark has a tobacco shop at W. They sold a lot at W. for a few tens of thousands (of zlotys), so they will not suffer want. Gina is at Ostr. because Moyek sends her money, and she also is seeking to open [a shop,] a liquor shop. Everyone shifts for himself as best he can. What do you think about my undertakings? The children are doing well and have appetites as never before.

On the occasion of Christmas and, in general, I kiss you and embrace you heartily.

IRA.

P. S.—To beloved father, kisses and Christmas wishes—may we live happily and see and celebrate next Christmas together already in our own home,

FROM OLENKA and WIESIU.

[Envelope addressed to:] Russia, Moscow, ——— Joseph ———, Central Post Office, P. O. Box No. 686

[From:] Irena ———, Grybow, Krakow, German Eastern Post.


EXHIBIT II

G. G. G. T.Mockro

19. 5. 1943

Trodruhi Tomosum
Tomobuui Ruula 686

Wagon

Luc Jozef Smo. Ruos.
Aobur

STAATSDRUCKEREI WIEN

RuslandMockroGlemy Wozd Poelony
Janyska Nr. 686

mp.

Jozef

32
1943/4

REVERSE SIDE OF EXHIBIT 11



LETTER ENCLOSED IN EXHIBIT 11

[Faint, illegible handwritten text, likely a letter, with some words like 'Dear', 'I', and 'you' visible.]

[Translation from Polish]

OCTOBER 31, 1940.

DEAR IRENE AND CHILDREN: At the beginning of October I received at last two postcards from you, from Ramek, and from Tolek. Since they were the first postcards since April, you may imagine how very pleased I was at having them. Often [two words illegible], but the reality is different, and distant as a dream. On the day of my departure, I received the photographs of the children, at Starobielsk. This gave me great joy, as I may look upon them often with tears in my eyes. How differently everything is developing, and all the forecasts deny the stubborn reality. In spite of all, I am optimistic, and I believe that after this long storm the sun will shine for us, too.

You are eager to know what I am doing and how I look. All summer long I was taking sun-baths in the polar sun and swimming. I play chess and read newspapers, magazines, many books by Soviet writers, and [two words illegible]. I now have a moustache, a beard, and some grey hair. I was in the ranks until October 1, 1939. I am well; I recovered long ago from the wounds I received on September 12. I suffered much, but it is getting better and better. I feed myself well—sometimes I even have butter, and there is no lack of tobacco, even though I smoke so much. The uniform and linen I wear are military, Polish, because mine was torn by bomb fragments and stained with blood. My boots are patched, but suitable enough for wear. I try to get galoshes for winter. From my entire equipment [one word illegible], only a blanket, a cap, a pair of old boots, and a watch were left. I survived the winter in the south—at -35° —well, although I had no warm clothing but an overcoat without a lining. In spite of this, I have been well. Don't worry about me. I know the language well and I am still improving in it. Generally, I feel better and better, and I have slept outside all the time. Now I would like to know how you shift for yourselves, because I know, more or less, what the situation there is. Unfortunately, I am not able to help you for the time being. I have not even been able to send you my greetings on your name-day [birthday] unless things change.

I have received only two letters from America. They were both dated April and I have not received the parcel sent from there. I wrote to Tolek; do write yourself to Romek. I am pleased that at least the stamps are saved. Olenka is perhaps a big girl already, and Wiesio a big boy. I have not seen you all for such a long time, although only 14 months have passed, and how many months will yet pass * * *. Every beginning must have an end and an epilogue. After a storm, nice rainbow weather comes.

There were many acquaintances from Ostrow, Bydgoszcz, and so forth at Starobielsk, but I do not know where they are now. Give me the address of Bronia Sz. and [one word illegible] Kalinkowa; perhaps I shall be able to write to them. This is about all. As I finish I kiss all of you heartily.

JOSEPH.

Russia, Moscow, Central Post Office, P. O. Box No. 686, Major -- Joseph -----

EXHIBIT 11A

25 XI. 1940.

Stocho, wdy jone eska!

Wie wyobrażam sobie jaką ogromną, rozległą gęstwinię nam swoim listem - wreszcie pierdząca olbrzymia wiadomość od Ciebie bo dotychczas było tylko jedno, kartka, z 29 listopada 39 i dopiero z 20 marca, ze St. Sobiechowskiego - o. potem już tylko jedno wiadomości że jesteś w Głogowie. - Działaczem więc toła uosilep i mordercą olbrzymią się że te moje kartki jedyną do Ciebie trafiły. - List trój osobliwym głosem z domu - o. potem kartki jeszcze kartki, które nie go studiować obojętnie - wo i wyjątkiem wojennym też się go czytają. - Ciężko się, że ja - choć tam dojeżdżam sobie woda i że jesteś dobytek myśli i uosobione - Głównie się nie przejmował - o. woda no. wo. myślenie - i co tuś być to uos. wie ominię. - A gdy już będzie koniec tej tuż, erce i trzeba, więc trochę się był nowy dom więc sobie stworzyć. - Naturalnie że z zonić uosie wone erce wyjątkie pogięły z wyjątkiem trochę wielki latore też nie wiadomo jeszcze jakie los erce. - z tych troich zwrócić - Brytanij, jst. tenij - Rosja - i cały kraj z wielkimi, - powieła i ubranie, mi trzejmi i uosiem wyjątko fonebada - Wo. to ty tylko że tenki latore uia tam z zonić uosie i latore obojętnie uos. wo. było uosie. - Wone zycie obecne to węgiewo, z dwoj. wo. dwoj. - o. była jonej. - Trini uos. jonej. o. my dotych erce zwrócić uosie uos. - chwoci zycie onerzanie. Dzieki chwoci do nholij - t. j. Wierio do 5 hł. Wlecho, też się uos. - Choc. aby zwrócić do wo. wo. 4 hł. - Trini, jone zwrócić procent. - i wyro. wo. ze zwrócić uosie erce - ale to się, jonebi kłama

[Translation from Polish]

NOVEMBER 25, 1940.

DEAR JOSEPH: You can't imagine how immensely happy you have made us with your letter. It is the first extensive news we have had from you. *Only the postcard of November 29, 1939, and a telegram of March 20, from Starobielsk reached us, and afterwards there was only a confused report that you were at Graizowiec.* I wrote so at random, I wonder that my postcards ever reached you. We read your letter out loud at home, everyone studied it personally several times after that, and we read it to our friends as well.

I am pleased that you shift for yourself, and that you are full of good thoughts and cheerful. "Take it easy" should be your principle, and the rest will come by itself. We shall not escape our destination. When there is an end to this homelessness, you should be strong enough to establish a new home for yourself.

All our belongings have been lost in this storm, of course, except for some furniture and your stamps, and no one can know what will happen to them. Our crystal, plates, pictures, and all the baskets with linen, bedding, my suits and yours—everything has been lost. Only things which I had in suitcases and which could be carried easily have been saved.

Our present life is day-to-day vegetation. To survive is the question. Other people live in even worse conditions, and we do not suffer so far from the lack of the necessities of life, although we live economically. The children go to school. Wiesio goes to the third class. Olenka also learns. I hope she will finish the fourth class before vacation. They grow like Jewish usury, and outgrow their clothes. But I alter this, and make that longer, and in this way I keep them dressed. Olenka has an overcoat cut down from my old navy-blue one. Just after our arrival in December last year, I bought Wieslaw a sheepskin coat. So the children are well dressed. You saw them in the photograph. We were very pleased that you received it and that having it, you will be able to look at it sometimes.

I received a letter from America saying that they had sent you a parcel containing the articles you wanted, but that this parcel, which weighed 11 kilograms, had returned smaller by half. But they are going to send you another one. Write them if you can, because they do not know your present address and you may not receive it again. Wieslaw continues his father's hobby, collecting stamps for daddy. He woke up the morning after your departure and did not know that you had tried to wake him; he started to cry because his father had left. We have been touched many times, remembering this.

The address to Bronia is attached. Write her that the efforts to help her are being made here. Kazachstan-Aktiubinska, Oblast Andrejewsko post region, Lewnocki-Selo settlement, Krasnojarsk. Write her that Tad goes to a commercial college. I do not know the address of Mrs. Kalinkowa. *Was Cierniak with you at Starobielsk, and what has happened to him? Mola asks you for news. Do you know anything about Felix Badecki? If you have any news, do write.*

Imagine that on October 2, 1939, Rowne left for Bialystok. Do not worry about us. We shift for ourselves. Take care of yourself and keep well, because we are waiting for your return. There is so much left to write about, and the page has ended. I kiss you ardently, ardently.

IRA, WIESIO.

I saw mother at Lukanowice. She is doing well. As they have enough to eat, they will not suffer.

Print your address, as it is difficult to read it.

P. S. We are mad with joy at having received a letter from daddy, and we read it 100 times. In the next letter Wiesio and I shall write, because this letter would be too long.

Olenka.

[Envelope]

Addressee: Russia, Moscow, The Central Post Office, P. O. Box No. 686, Major Joseph -----.

Sender: Irena -----, Grybow, Kracow, German East Post.

Chairman MADDEN. From your experience as a prisoner, and during the intervening period, have you decided in your own mind who committed the massacres at Katyn?

Mr. A. There is no doubt in my mind that this was the act of the NKVD.

Chairman MADDEN. The Russian NKVD?

Mr. A. Yes.

Chairman MADDEN. All right. We want to thank you for your testimony here. Have you received any promises of emoluments or recompense from anybody for your testimony here?

Mr. A. No; I have not received any such promises or offers.

TESTIMONY OF WITNESS B

Chairman MADDEN. I might state for the record that this witness is testifying under an assumed name, and his original name, which is identified with his experiences in the Polish Army, is known in the record with the committee.

Mr. FLOOD. Before you make a statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who considered he had suffered injury. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf in respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as the result of the testimony. That statement was just read to you by the interpreter in Polish.

Chairman MADDEN. Do you agree to that statement which has been read to you?

Mr. B. Yes; I agree.

Chairman MADDEN. Let the witness be sworn. Do you swear by the God Almighty that you will, according to your best knowledge, tell the pure truth, and that you will not conceal anything?

Mr. B. Yes; I swear.

Chairman MADDEN. Proceed. I might state that if you can just confine your statement to what you know regarding Katyn without going into any long historical review of your experiences, it will help the committee a great deal.

Mr. FLOOD. You were taken prisoner by the Russians?

Mr. B. Yes; I was taken prisoner on September 28 together with my unit in Poland.

Mr. FLOOD. And you were taken to the camp at Kozielsk?

Mr. B. I was taken before——

Mr. FLOOD. Well, you ultimately got to the camp at Kozielsk?

Mr. B. Yes, but before I was in the camp——

Mr. FLOOD. I think it will help us reach the pertinent part of your testimony if you just answer my questions. You were at Kozielsk?

Mr. B. Yes; I was.

Mr. FLOOD. When did you get to Kozielsk, in what month, if you remember?

Mr. B. On November 2, 1939.

Mr. FLOOD. On November 2, 1939, the Russians finally got you to Kozielsk after taking you to other places, is that right?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And when you were there, there were other Polish officers there with you?

Mr. B. Yes; there were.

Mr. FLOOD. 4,000 or 5,000 in round numbers?

Mr. B. I cannot tell the number because many officers were coming and going at that time. Just at the beginning of November was the time the transports were coming to Kozielsk from various directions.

Mr. FLOOD. While you were at Kozielsk, and during the time you were there, we understand that the Russians were taking groups of Polish officers, fellow prisoners, out of Kozielsk, taking them away—is that correct?

Mr. B. I heard only that there were some Polish military prisoners before us.

Mr. FLOOD. No, I mean at the time you were there?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Were they taking any away while you were there?

Mr. B. Not in November, but afterward.

Mr. FLOOD. After November?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. When did you leave there?

Mr. B. I left Kozielsk on April 29, 1940.

Mr. FLOOD. And you got there in November 1939?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Now between the time that you got there in November of 1939 and the time you left in April of 1940, there were a number of Polish brother prisoners taken out of Kozielsk, is that correct?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Then in April of 1940, your turn came, and you were also called up to be taken out, is that correct?

Mr. B. Yes, this is correct, but the general liquidation of the camp started on April 3, 1940. Before April 3, 1940, there were only some particular cases of some prisoners being taken away from the camp.

Mr. FLOOD. But you were taken away—do you remember the day in April?

Mr. B. Yes, I remember the beginning of the general liquidation of the camp.

Mr. FLOOD. But what was the day when you were taken?

Mr. B. On April 29.

Mr. FLOOD. And about how many men went with you when you were taken?

Mr. B. About 300.

Mr. FLOOD. And were you taken down and given an investigation, an inspection? Did they take things from you?

Mr. B. Yes, before they transferred us to the other guard at the gate of the camp, and then we were examined and all sharp objects were taken from us.

Mr. FLOOD. And then you were placed in a prison car?

Mr. B. No, just an ordinary car.

Mr. FLOOD. You were not placed in prison cars?

Mr. B. Not at Kozielsk gates.

Mr. FLOOD. But I mean after you got on the railroad train?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Regular prison cars?

Mr. B. Prison wagons.

Mr. FLOOD. And your whole group was placed on the train?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. In different prison wagons?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And where was the first place you stopped after you left Kozielsk?

Mr. B. Smolensk.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you stop any place after Smolensk?

Mr. B. Yes; it was the place where the unloading of the transport took place.

Mr. FLOOD. What was the name of that place?

Mr. B. I do not know; I gather from what I know now that it was Gniezdovo.

Mr. FLOOD. Now we have you on the prison train with all your brother prisoners, and you are now at the first stop at Smolensk?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you tell us now in your own words what happened, what you say the minute the train left Smolensk from then on? Take it from there on in your own words.

Mr. B. Yes. We stayed at Smolensk for only a few minutes. We come to Smolensk at dawn, and the general impression which struck me during this transfer was that we were going very fast, comparatively fast, because usually the prison transports were very slow because other trains had priority before them, but we were traveling very fast. From Smolensk we traveled for a few minutes—it may be half an hour—in a northwestern direction, and after we traveled about 10 miles the train stopped, and unloading started.

Mr. FLOOD. The train stopped for the unloading of the prisoners?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Now what time of day, if you remember, did you make the first stop after you left Smolensk, do you remember?

Mr. B. It was very early.

Mr. FLOOD. Early in the morning?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Was it daylight?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Could you see well?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. The sun was up?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. The weather was good?

Mr. B. Yes, it was a very nice day.

Mr. FLOOD. What happened; they unloaded the prisoners?

Mr. B. Yes. After some time—maybe after three-quarters of an hour or an hour—a column of NKVD entered our car and called my name and told me that I should be separated and brought me to another prison wagon.

Mr. FLOOD. Was that on the same train or a different train?

Mr. B. On the same train; it was a neighboring wagon because the prisoners had left the wagon before; it was an empty wagon. They put me in a separate compartment in that wagon; the compartment was locked up, and a special guard was placed in the corridor.

Mr. FLOOD. Was there anybody else in the entire wagon with you?

Mr. B. My feeling was that there were only two people locked up in the compartment, myself and the guard.

Mr. FLOOD. You are certain there was nobody else in your compartment?

Mr. B. I am certain there was nobody else; no.

Mr. FLOOD. And so far as you know, there was nobody else in the compartment but you and the guard?

Mr. B. That is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. All right.

Mr. B. The construction of the wagon is such that there is no window in the compartment, only a very small slit or opening just under the ceiling. So I got on the upper bunk in the compartment, and I was trying to show that I was going to sleep, but in the meantime the guard was looking in the other direction, and I tried to see what was outside.

Mr. FLOOD. Could you see out through that crack or opening?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you try to see out?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you see anything?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. What did you see?

Mr. B. The wagon was standing not at the station, but somewhere behind the station, and there was some kind of square before the wagon; it was a square covered by grass, so it was a kind of lawn maybe, or square surrounded by small trees and very heavily guarded by the guards of the NKVD with fixed bayonets. There were two cars on the square, one autobus and another car of prison type without any windows.

Mr. FLOOD. Both were motor vehicles?

Mr. B. Yes, both were motor vehicles, both motor cars, and besides the guards of NKVD there were two NKVD officers, two Russian officers, standing there, one of them a colonel. I was very impressed by this fact because he was a very high ranking officer in the NKVD, and usually officers of such a high rank do not travel in the transports. The other officer was a captain of the NKVD. This autobus was approaching to the wagon.

Mr. FLOOD. To the railroad car?

Mr. B. Yes, to the railroad car, and the entrance to the autobus was from the back doors. The prisoners were asked to go into the autobus, and not stopping on the ground, but just to go from the railroad wagon immediately into the back door of the autobus. The autobus was of quite an ordinary type. The windows were painted, or rather smeared, with some white color—I imagine it was just smeared with lime—and the autobus took about 30 people. Then it went away, and returned after more or less half an hour—I cannot tell exactly, because I had no watch with me, but about half an hour—to take the next party, and it was proceeding for some hours. Then when the unloading had been finished, I was transferred by this colonel into the hands of the captain who was standing there, and I learned afterward that the captain was the head of the prison in Smolensk. He took me into that second prison car with a very heavy guard, because there were, I think, about five people with rifles besides the captain of the NKVD, and he brought me to the prison in Smolensk, not the

general prison, but to a special prison of the NKVD called an internal prison of the NKVD, in the basement, as I understand, of the main building of the NKVD, and I was put there into the basement into a separate cell. My impression was that I was the only prisoner in that basement, and I stayed there for about a week. I was not badly treated. The head of the prison came every day to see me and brought me some books. I got permission to buy various things from the prison shop, and the head of the prison, who used to come every day to see me, sometimes remained in my cell for about half an hour or three quarters of an hour.

Mr. FLOOD. At any time that you were in the NKVD prison in Smolensk, did you have any conversations with anybody, with fellow prisoners or Russian soldiers or NKVD, the superintendent or anybody about what you saw at the station?

Mr. B. Yes, I asked the captain of the NKVD, who was the head of the prison, what was the reason for my being separated from my comrades, and he did not give me any definite answer. He told me that he does not know why, because he is only the head of the prison, and he had an order to keep me for some time until a new order would come.

Mr. FLOOD. What is your opinion today? Why do you think you were separated, if you have any idea?

Mr. B. Yes. I was brought to Moscow from Smolensk after a week into the Lubianka prison, and I was incarcerated there for 10 months. As far as I understand, there were two reasons for taking me to Moscow. The first reason was that I was a professor of economics at a university in Poland, and I was at the head of the group which was doing research on the Russian economy, and I was connected with the research work of the German research institutes which were interested in eastern economic problems, so they considered me a very interesting person; in Moscow they knew my publications and my books, and they considered me a very interesting prisoner who could tell them very many things about the organization of anti-Soviet intelligence. I did not know anything about the organization of anti-Soviet intelligence, but they thought I knew.

Mr. FLOOD. Then the only reason why you think they kept you and separated you from the prisoners at the station and that you survived is because they thought that you could be of some further use to them?

Mr. B. Yes, that was the first reason. The second reason is because I was given the indictment; I was accused. They started legal proceedings against me. The second reason was that in one of the Soviet proceedings before the court in 1937, when there were various deviations in the Communist Party, my name was mentioned, and so the documents which I saw in connection with that legal proceeding were from 1937; and there was one Russian, who was apparently shot (because on that document it was told only that he was sentenced) who mentioned my name as a Polish economist who was connected with the Polish General Staff in making various investigations.

Mr. FLOOD. Professor, I want to establish a very clear fact again; although I think you have already made it very clear, I want it repeated for the record. Will you repeat for us the day that you left Kozielsk, the date, April the what?

Mr. B. April 29, 1940.

Mr. FLOOD. You left on April 29, 1940?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And you left with how many other Polish officers?

Mr. B. About 300.

Mr. FLOOD. And you left Kozielsk on a wagon or a prison train, a train made up of prison wagons?

Mr. B. I do not know.

Mr. FLOOD. At least, yours was?

Mr. B. I know only about my wagon.

Mr. FLOOD. Yours was?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Now do you know the time of day when you left Kozielsk?

Mr. B. Just after dark.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you know or remember how long you traveled, how many hours before you made the first stop, or can you guess?

Mr. B. I do not remember any stop before Smolensk. There might have been stops, but I do not remember; if there were stops, they were very short.

Mr. FLOOD. But the first stop that you do remember was Smolensk?

Mr. B. Smolensk at the time of sunrise.

Mr. FLOOD. Very well. At sunrise you got to Smolensk?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. How long were you at Smolensk before you moved on, about?

Mr. B. A quarter of an hour.

Mr. FLOOD. You stopped at Smolensk a quarter of an hour? You were at Smolensk for about 15 minutes?

Mr. B. Yes, or maybe a little more, maybe between 15 minutes and half an hour.

Mr. FLOOD. But no more than half an hour?

Mr. B. No more than half an hour.

Mr. FLOOD. Then you left Smolensk?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. How many stops did you make after leaving Smolensk before these officers were taken out?

Mr. B. There were no stops.

Mr. FLOOD. Only one?

Mr. B. Only one.

Mr. FLOOD. About how far in miles, if you know, or about how long in time, if you know, was there between Smolensk and that first stop?

Mr. B. My comrades and I tried to estimate, and our estimation was about 12, 13, or 15 kilometers.

Mr. FLOOD. And you checked that with other officers in your compartment, talking back and forward?

Mr. B. Yes, really it was the estimate of several officers.

Mr. FLOOD. But that was the consensus?

Mr. B. Yes, the general consensus.

Mr. FLOOD. And you remember that distinctly?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. All right.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. About these 300 men that you left the camp with, did you know any of those 300 personally?

Mr. B. Yes, some of them I remember.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You have seen lately, or later you have seen, the list of these bodies that were uncovered at Katyn?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you recognize in that list which was published the names of any men that left the camp with you as some of the 300?

Mr. B. I have known three names. There are only three names that I remember, because these people were usually mixed up; they took people from different barracks and different parts of the camp, but I remember three names.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And the last time you saw them was at this railroad station where you were separated from them?

Mr. B. Yes, and other names I have known on the list. I can say those names. The first was Mr. Tucholski. He was a lecturer at the Technical Institute in Warsaw. The second was Mr. Korowajczyk, and the third one Lieutenant Zoltowski.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What was his first name; was it Marcelli?

Mr. B. I think so; yes.

Mr. O'KONSKI. So you definitely identify three names of those from whom you were separated on that last journey?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Now you have seen descriptions which the Germans and Russians both agree on as to what the bodies were wearing that were buried at Katyn. Now the last time you saw these men, were they wearing the clothes in which they were buried in the graves at Katyn, overcoats, boots and so on?

Mr. B. Yes, because we were all wearing overcoats and boots; it was at a time when the snow was lying.

Mr. O'KONSKI. In other words, the way you have learned now and lately in the reports that are coming out, the way the bodies were found in the graves at Katyn, those are the clothes they were wearing when you last saw them?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. Just one or two questions. Were you taken to Moscow?

Mr. B. I was taken to Moscow from Smolensk. I was about 2 weeks in prison at Smolensk, and from there I was transferred under special guard to Moscow.

Mr. DONDERO. You were put in prison at Moscow?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. Did you talk with some Russian officers?

Mr. B. In Moscow?

Mr. DONDERO. Yes.

Mr. B. I talked to many prisoners there.

Mr. DONDERO. No. Did you talk with Russian officers?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What Congressman Dondero wants to know is did you talk with any high-ranking Russian officers regarding the fate of your comrade officers?

Mr. B. I was asking my interrogation judge and some higher officer of NKVD, whose name I do not know, to whom I was brought by my interrogation judge—

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did he tell you anything about the fate of your comrade officers?

Mr. B. They told me: "The fate of your comrades is very nice. They are being sent home to their families"; but they told me that because I conducted anti-Soviet spying, I have to stay in prison; that is what they answered me.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. One other question. When you were at this station Gniezdovo, did you hear any shouts or any other strange sounds?

Mr. B. No.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. There was nothing unusual that you heard?

Mr. B. I heard nothing unusual.

Mr. FLOOD. Now I show you a list of names of the bodies that were discovered at Katyn which is already in evidence in the hearings in America, it was exhibit 5A in Chicago, and direct your attention to page 83 thereof and ask you if you recognize this name of Leonard Korowajczyk?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. I now direct your attention also to page 176 of the same exhibit, and ask you whether or not you recognize the name of Tucholski?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. The first name is Tadeusz. I also direct your attention to page 198 of the same document exhibit and ask you if you recognize the name of Zoltowski. There are several Zoltowski's mentioned. Just see if you can identify from any additional information in this document the particular Zoltowski that you knew and mentioned in your testimony?

Mr. B. As far as I remember his name it was Marceci Zoltowski.

Mr. FLOOD. You identify Marceci Zoltowski as the man you knew?

Mr. B. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And I believe you said as far as you knew, he was a cavalry officer?

Mr. B. Yes, he was a cavalry officer.

Chairman MADDEN. That is all. Now let me say this: From your experiences as a prisoner and from the testimony related here, have you in your own mind decided who was responsible for the murders and massacre at Katyn—in your own mind?

Mr. B. Certainly when I was in Russia—

Chairman MADDEN. Just answer briefly.

Mr. B. There is no evidence as far as I know of the actual murder, but there are very many corroborating circumstances which show that this was done by the Russians.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Is that your personal opinion?

Mr. B. That is my personal opinion.

Chairman MADDEN. That is all. Now nobody has promised any recompense or emoluments to you for coming here to testify today, or any day? Nobody has promised you anything to testify here, have they?

Mr. B. Certainly not.

Chairman MADDEN. That is all. We want to thank you for your testimony. The committee will now adjourn and will reconvene at 2. (Whereupon, at 1:30 p. m., the select committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p. m.)

Chairman MADDEN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. PUCINSKI. The next witness is Col. Stanislaw Lubodziecki.

Mr. FLOOD. Colonel, before you make a statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who considered he had suffered injury. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as the result of the testimony. Mr. Interpreter, will you interpret that in Polish to the witness?

(The admonition was interpreted to the witness.)

Mr. FLOOD. Ask him if he clearly understands the admonition.

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness says he is a former judge and that he understands the admonition very clearly.

Chairman MADDEN. You will be sworn. You solemnly swear by the God Almighty that you will, according to the best of your knowledge, tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and not conceal anything, so help you God.

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL STANISLAW LUBODZIECKI (THROUGH INTERPRETER, MR. ROMAN PUCINSKI), 54, SOLENT ROAD, LONDON, N. W. 6.

Mr. FLOOD. What is your full name, Colonel?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. Stanislaw Lubodziecki.

Mr. FLOOD. You are a former colonel in what Army?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. In the Polish Army.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you a colonel in the Polish Army in 1939?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. From 1919.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you on active duty in 1939?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. In 1931 I went into retirement.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you recalled up as a reservist in 1939?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. No.

Mr. FLOOD. How did you appear in a Russian prison camp?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. As a retired officer of the Polish Army, I was entitled to wear the Polish Army uniform.

Mr. FLOOD. How did you become a Russian prisoner?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. While I was near the village of Zbaraza on September 17, 1939, a Russian unit had taken me prisoner.

Mr. FLOOD. What were you doing in uniform?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. I left Warsaw in uniform because I was anticipating that I would be recalled for active duty. I had notified the Polish Army that I was available and ready for recall to active duty.

Mr. FLOOD. To what camp did the Russians take you?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. First I was taken to a camp at Putivl District, Sumy County.

Mr. FLOOD. On what date, if you remember, were you taken to either of the three camps connected with this investigation?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. I was removed from the camp that I just named on November 2 and I arrived at Kozielsk on November 3, 1939.

Mr. FLOOD. You arrived at Kozielsk on November 3, 1939. How long did you remain at Kozielsk?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. To the 8th March 1940.

Mr. FLOOD. About how many of the original group of officers at Kozielsk during the time you were there were in Kozielsk when you left there on March 8, 1940?

Mr. PUCINSKI. The question was how many remained?

Mr. FLOOD. Yes, how many remained.

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. In excess of 4,000.

Mr. FLOOD. When you left on March 8, 1940?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Now where were you taken?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. Myself and 14 others, consisting of Polish Army officers and civilians, were taken by rail car from Kozielsk to the city of Smolensk. I am able to give you some of the names of those 14 that were with me.

Mr. FLOOD. What happened to the 14?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. After remaining at the Smolensk camp for 1 day, I and another Polish officer, Capt. Leopold Lichnowski, were taken to Kharkov and we remained there 1 day and then we were transferred to Kiev.

Mr. FLOOD. What information do you have in connection with the Katyn matter?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. First, when we were still at Kozielsk, we were told that we would be taken out of there. They told us that they would take us to the German occupation zone, and later we were told that we would be taken to western Siberia, to the town of Barnaul. My friends told me that they were told by a Russian NKVD officer, who was a Pole, a Major Urbanowicz, that they are going to evacuate these prisoners from this camp.

Mr. FLOOD. What camp?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. Kozielsk, but that if they knew where they would be evacuated to, their eyes would virtually pop out. When I arrived at Kiev, an NKVD officer, a lieutenant, told me that hereafter this train will be used primarily for transferring prisoners from Kozielsk.

Mr. FLOOD. To where?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. He did not tell me where.

Mr. FLOOD. How long were you a prisoner at any of the camps in Russia? When did you leave Russia?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. When I arrived at Kiev, the NKVD officer reported to his superiors that he had brought two officers from the camp numbered 13, and at that time I learned that our camp Kozielsk was known as camp 13.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you, to this day, ever meet or see or hear from any of your brother officers who were in Kozielsk at the time you were there, between November 3, 1939, and today?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. After I had remained at Kozielsk a few days, a group of 100 officers and civilians arrived there, and shortly thereafter they were again removed from the camp. In that group were included Colonel Widacki, who was the mayor of Tarnopol, and Lieutenant Colonel Kornilowicz, whose wife was the daughter of the famous Polish author, Henry Sienkiewicz. From this group I had met one of the officers, an artillery lieutenant named Bober, who was in the original group of 100, and I met him in the prison in Kiev in October of 1940. He subsequently joined the second division of the Polish Army and fought in Italy and is still today alive.

Mr. FLOOD. Did that officer ever tell you that he had been taken from Kozielsk to Pavilishchev Bor at any time?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. No.

Mr. FLOOD. Is there anything else you have to say in connection with Katyn? Did you discuss it with anybody? Did any Russians or any Poles ever discuss Katyn or Smolensk with you?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. I have always been very much interested in this matter. I have done considerable research and I have lectured on the subject and I have prepared a little brochure of my own.

Mr. FLOOD. What I want to know is: What direct information can you give us from your own experience, not from your research?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. A Polish officer had told me while I was at Kiev—he was being tried there also—that somewhere in the middle of 1940 he had observed in Kharkov, and in other villages where the NKVD was interrogating various Polish prisoners, large posters in color on which was a picture of a Russian bayonet and pierced through this bayonet on these posters were the caps of Polish officers, and there was some writing on these posters which said in effect: "This is the end of the bourgeoisie army."

Mr. PUCINSKI. I would like to ask this witness, Mr. Chairman, if he can identify from the official list of the corpses that were found at Katyn any of the names of those 14 that were taken with him to Smolensk and he had lost track of.

Mr. FLOOD. Suppose you let him take this list and go out in the other room and look at it. Meantime, we can take another witness. There is nothing further with this witness, is there? The witness is now being shown the official copy of the list of those who were discovered at Katyn and is being requested by the committee to examine that list to determine whether or not from that list he can find the names of any of the 14 brother officers who were taken by the Russians from Kozielsk with him to Smolensk. If he does so, he can notify the committee and we will immediately recall him for identification.

Mr. PUCINSKI. The next witness is Mr. Zygmunt Luszczyński.

Mr. FLOOD. Before you make a statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who considered he had suffered injury. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as the result of the testimony. Now, Mr. Interpreter, will you translate that for the witness?

(The admonition was interpreted to the witness.)

Mr. FLOOD. Do you understand the provisions of the admonition?

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness says that he does understand.

Chairman MADDEN. Do you swear by the God Almighty that you will, to your best knowledge, tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and not conceal anything, so help you God?

Mr. LUSZCZYŃSKI. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF MR. ZYGMUNT LUSZCZYNSKI (THROUGH INTERPRETER, MR. ROMAN PUCINSKI), 43, ANGEL ROAD, LONDON, N. W. 3

Mr. FLOOD. What is your full name?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Zygmunt Luszczyński.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you ever a member of the Armed Forces of Poland?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Yes, I was.

Mr. FLOOD. When and where?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. I was a captain in the Polish Army, and just before the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 I was the chief of the police in the province of Polesia, Brzesc.

Mr. FLOOD. When and where did the Russians take you prisoner?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. I was taken prisoner on the 24th September while I was in civilian clothes, and I had been informing General Kleberk of the strength and disposition of Russian troops in Brzesc.

Mr. FLOOD. To which of the three camps connected with this investigation were you taken by the Russians?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. I was arrested in Brzesc. I stayed there for 3 days and then I was transferred to Ostashkov.

Mr. FLOOD. When did you arrive in Ostashkov.

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. The trip lasted 2 weeks, and I arrived at Ostashkov in the middle of October 1939.

Mr. FLOOD. How long did you stay at Ostashkov.

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Until April 24, 1940.

Mr. FLOOD. Where were you taken on April 24, 1940?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. We were loaded into a train at Ostashkov. There were 7 cars and approximately 300 people in this particular train load.

Mr. FLOOD. To where were they taken?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. We were severely beaten as we were loaded into these prison cars. We were taken from Ostashkov to Wiasma, where we remained at the siding for 3 days; then six of the seven cars were disconnected and they went in some other direction, and the car in which I was present was taken to Babynino.

Mr. FLOOD. You finally were taken then to the camp at Pavlishchev Bor.

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And at that camp at Pavlishchev Bor did you meet any other Polish officers from any other Russian camps?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Yes. At that time I met approximately 200 officers from other camps.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you meet any officers from Starobielsk?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you meet any officers from Kozielsk?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. You were from Ostashkov?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And you were at Pavlishchev Bor with Polish officers who had come from Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Pavlishchev Bor?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. How many went with you in that one car that was detached from the train from the Ostashkov camp to Pavlishchev Bor?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Approximately 50.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you ever hear from anybody—military, civilian, or anybody else—that was in those other six cars that left on the seven-car train with you from Ostashkov, to this day? Have you ever heard of them since?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Never. I have never heard of those people again.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you ever talk to anybody who, in any way, directly or indirectly, had ever heard one word from any of the people that were in those other six cars that left that train?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. I have never; but, prior to our departure from Ostashkov, there were regular departures of trains every day consisting of some 200 prisoners that were removed from Ostashkov. They were going to the trains.

Mr. FLOOD. When you got to Ostashkov on October 15, 1939, you must have been one of the first prisoners that got to Ostashkov, were you not?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. Ostashkov was quite a big camp?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Yes; it was a large camp on an island.

Mr. FLOOD. If you guess, or know, or ever heard, about how many prisoners at the most were ever at Ostashkov during this period of time?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. There were first of all the Polish police, approximately 2,000; then there was the border guard, approximately 300; Polish jail guards, or prison guards from Poland, approximately 200; the military police and officers and noncommissioned officers.

Mr. FLOOD. And civilians?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Civilians and clergy.

Mr. FLOOD. Judges?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. District attorneys?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Lawyers?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Priests?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Approximately 100 clergymen, priests.

Mr. FLOOD. Priests, Rabbis, and Protestant ministers?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Prominent businessmen?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Yes; and landowners.

Mr. FLOOD. Professors?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Intelligentsia?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Public officers.

Mr. FLOOD. Government bureaucratic officials?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Yes; members of the courts too.

Mr. FLOOD. About how many, in a round number?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Approximately 5,500.

Mr. FLOOD. From the time that you arrived at Ostashkov, October 15, 1939, what was done, if anything, by the Russians with any of the inmates?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. We were all interrogated during the time.

Mr. FLOOD. I mean, were any of the people who were in Ostashkov during the time you were there ever taken out of the camp?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. No.

Mr. FLOOD. Were they ever removed from time to time in transports by train, taken some place else?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Individuals were removed.

Mr. FLOOD. Did they ever take any trainloads of 300 or 400 like your trainload out of Ostashkov at any time between October 15, 1939, and April 24, 1940, when you left?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Up to the 1st of April the evacuation consisted of individuals. After the 1st of April there was a steady evacuation, almost daily, of trainloads consisting of from 200 to 300.

Mr. FLOOD. Of all the people that you saw, met, and talked to, Poles, who were in the camp at Ostashkov between October 15, 1939, and April 24, 1940, with the exception of the one carload who went to Pavlishchev Bor with you, have you ever seen or heard of any of those people since?

Mr. PUCINSKI. No. The witness wants to explain here that after he had arrived with his group at Pavlishchev Bor, about 2 weeks later another trainload of approximately 100 Poles arrived at Pavlishchev Bor.

Mr. FLOOD. From Ostashkov?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. From Ostashkov. We were told at Ostashkov that we were being taken into the forests to cut timber when we left Ostashkov.

Mr. FLOOD. Ask him if he has anything further in connection with the camp or the people?

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness points out that after the amnesty in 1941 he was a Polish intelligence officer, and that he and others participated in an extensive search, being given complete freedom in Russia, in an effort to find the missing officers from that camp, without any success.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you one of the investigators named by General Anders to cooperate with Czapski?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Yes; I supplied information. I was one of those named, and I supplied information to Czapski.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you a member of one of the several commissions that was set up by General Anders, with the permission of the Russians, that operated in several different districts in Russia, looking for the Polish missing officers?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. I was not a member of one of those commissions, but I was the man who compiled and evaluated the information coming in from those commissions.

Mr. FLOOD. Where were you located?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. I was in Tockoie.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you stay in that one place?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. I was the chief of the intelligence division of the sixth division.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you have any conversations with any NKVD officers or with any Russian officials, civilian or military, at any time during the course of your search for the Polish officers with reference to the missing officers?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. I was in constant communication and discussion with the NKVD officers, because that was the most frequently discussed topic.

Mr. FLOOD. Do I understand you were chief of intelligence of the sixth army group?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Yes; I was.

Mr. FLOOD. Sixth Division of the Polish Army?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. What was a sample conversation that you had of all these conversations you had with the NKVD officers with reference to the missing Polish officers?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. I shall give you the name of Colonel Gulakewicz, who was an NKVD officer, who was assigned as liaison officer to our division.

Mr. FLOOD. What happened? What did he talk about?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. He had given me repeated assurances that the search for these missing Polish officers was continuing without end at the central headquarters of the NKVD.

Mr. FLOOD. Is that the only kind of answer you got?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. That is the only kind of answer we got.

Mr. FLOOD. Is that the kind of answer you got all the time?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. More or less these were the same kind of answers, evasive answers, which had apparently for their purpose a delaying effort.

Mr. FLOOD. And, as far as you are concerned, your search as intelligence officer for one or any of the Polish missing officers was without success.

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. We had tirelessly questioned everybody, every Pole, that came from all parts of Russia, from the northernmost parts of Russia, in an effort to find at least one name of those who were interned in any of those camps, and we were without success. There were at first indications that these officers may have been taken to the St. Francis Islands way up in the northern part of Russia, but our subsequent investigation proved that this was not so.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you ever get any hint, did you ever get any rumors, did you ever get any lead of any kind, from any Russians of any category, civilian, military or police, having to do with the missing Polish officers?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. We always thought that we were on the right track and that we would very shortly find them, but it all developed that our ideas and our beliefs were misleading.

Mr. FLOOD. That is not the answer to my question.

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. No; we did not.

Mr. DONDERO. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask a few questions. What do you know personally, if anything, regarding the Katyn massacre?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. I was convinced during my search in Russia that these people were dead.

Mr. DONDERO. The question is: What do you know personally, if anything?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. I have never been in Katyn, either before or during the actual investigation or search for these officers.

Mr. DONDERO. And you never talked with anyone who had been there?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. No; I never talked to those people, because they are not alive now. All our investigations kept pointing toward Katyn, and we used to send our own officers into that general area to talk to the inhabitants of the area, hoping that they might come back with some information or what-have-you.

Mr. DONDERO. You answered Mr. Flood that you had been in touch with many NKVD officers and what I want to know is: Did you talk with any of them who had any connection with Katyn?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. No.

Mr. DONDERO. And all the investigations made in search of these Polish officers were made in Russian territory?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Yes. We had complete freedom of movement. We had a free hand.

Chairman MADDEN. Let me ask you this: With all your experiences in the camp and then the work you did within Russian territory after you were out of prison, have you come to any conclusion as to who committed the murders, massacre, at Katyn?

Mr. LUSZCZYNSKI. Unquestionably Russia. There is no question about it. I have observed the tactics of the NKVD from the borderlands of Poland for the past 20 years, and I am well familiar with their tactics.

Chairman MADDEN. That is all, and we want to thank you for coming here and testifying today.

Col. Stanislaw Lubodziecki, recalled.

Mr. FLOOD. Colonel, you previously had testified, and at the end of your testimony the committee submitted to you a list of the officers who were found at Katyn, and we asked you whether or not you would find on that list any of the names of the 14 fellow officer prisoners who were taken by the Russians with you to Smolensk. Have you examined that list?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. Yes; I have.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you find on that list any of the names of the 14?

Colonel LUBODZIECKI. Yes. I have found all five of the names that I had previously submitted.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Interpreter, will you read into the record, and give the page from the exhibit, and see that the record shows the names that the colonel identified from the list.

Mr. PUCINSKI. The first name that the witness points out is that of Capt. Josef Graniczny, whose name appears on page 58. The next name is that of Lt. Col. August Starzenski, whose name appears on page 160. The next name is that of a civilian, Julian Wasowski, whose name appears on page 180. The next name is Captain Lichnowski, no first name given, and the name appears on page 371.

Chairman MADDEN. We want to thank you for testifying, Mr. Lubodziecki.

**TESTIMONY OF MRS. JANINA KNOPP, (THROUGH INTERPRETER,
MR. ROMAN PUCINSKI), 54 SOLENT ROAD, LONDON, N. W. 6**

Mr. FLOOD. Before you make a statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who considered he had suffered injury. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which

may arise as the result of the testimony. Mr. Interpreter, will you translate that for the witness?

(The admonition was interpreted to the witness.)

Mr. FLOOD. Will you ask the witness if she clearly understands the admonition?

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness understands the admonition.

Chairman MADDEN. Do you swear by God the Almighty that you will, according to your best knowledge, tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. KNOPP. Yes; I do.

Mr. FLOOD. How long have you been in London?

Mrs. KNOPP. From September 1947.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you born in Poland?

Mrs. KNOPP. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you married to a Pole?

Mrs. KNOPP. My husband was a lieutenant colonel in the Polish Army.

Mr. FLOOD. Was he in the Polish Army in 1939?

Mrs. KNOPP. Yes; he was on active duty in 1939.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you married to him at that time?

Mrs. KNOPP. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Was he taken prisoner by the Russians?

Mrs. KNOPP. As the commanding officer of his regiment he was retreating when the Russian invasion took place and he was taken prisoner.

Mr. FLOOD. To which of the three camps that we have been discussing in this investigation was your husband taken?

Mrs. KNOPP. He was taken to Starobielsk on the 1st October 1939.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you ever write to him when he was at Starobielsk?

Mrs. KNOPP. Yes; I wrote to him.

Mr. FLOOD. How frequently would you write to him—once a week?

Mrs. KNOPP. I wrote more frequently. I wrote at least every one week after he was there.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you ever send him any pictures of yourself or of your family or your friends, or newspapers, or anything?

Mrs. KNOPP. No. He had written me requesting that I send him a picture of myself and our little daughter, which I did, but he never received it.

Mr. FLOOD. Did he write to you frequently? Did he answer your letters?

Mrs. KNOPP. They were permitted to write only once every month, but for some reason or other I received letters from him about once every 3 weeks.

Mr. FLOOD. How did you first find out or learn that he was a prisoner of the Russians and at Starobielsk?

Mrs. KNOPP. In the 1st or 2d October I received a card from him in which he gave me his address as Camp 15, Starobielsk.

Mr. FLOOD. When did you first write to him—right away?

Mrs. KNOPP. Almost immediately.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you remember or recall, the date of the last letter that you had from your husband?



Mrs. KNOPP. This which I hold here is the last card that I received from him, dated the 6th of April 1940.

Mr. FLOOD. The witness shows the committee a post card which we will ask the stenographer to mark as exhibit 12.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. May I state for the record that the date in Polish appears in the reverse of what it does in the United States. The day is first and then the month. "6/4" is the 6th day of April.

(Post card referred to was marked as "Exhibit 12," and is shown below:)

EXHIBIT 12



(NOTE.—A translation of this card appears on following page immediately Eafter exhibit 13.)

Mr. FLOOD. The witness is shown for identification exhibit 12; and I ask her: Is this the card that you tell us was the last word you received from your husband at the camp at Starobielsk?

Mrs. KNOPP. Yes, this is the last card I received from my husband, and I received this card in mid-June. I had been taken to Russia around the middle of April and this card had gone to Lwow and it was then forwarded to me in Russia, where I was put to work in a factory making bricks.

Mr. FLOOD. By the Russians?

Mrs. KNOPP. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. But the card was addressed to your home address by your husband?

Mrs. KNOPP. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And was received at the home address?

Mrs. KNOPP. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And forwarded to you in Russia; is that correct?

Mrs. KNOPP. My husband addressed this card to Lwow, where I was staying with his parents. I was a fugitive. I was captured and I was taken to Russia, and the card was then forwarded to me.

Mr. FLOOD. I direct the attention of the witness to that part of exhibit 12 whereon is to be found the date, and ask her to read from the card what was the date of the card.

Mrs. KNOPP. 6th April 1940.

Mr. FLOOD. And was that date put on there in your husband's handwriting?

Mrs. KNOPP. Yes, of course.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you identify that card and the writing of that date and that handwriting as that of your husband?

Mrs. KNOPP. Yes, I do. There is on the card, in a different handwriting and a different pencil used, the notation that he has left Starobielsk in April and this notation was made on this card by a friend of his, apparently. I presume he was evacuated from Starobielsk and he probably left this card with a friend to have it posted and forwarded to me from Starobielsk, and the additional writing on here was apparently put on by that friend. I have the text of the card in which he says he is being evacuated from Starobielsk and that he will forward me the address. He says: "Do not write to me until I give you my new address."

Mr. FLOOD. The witness shows the committee a copy of the written matter by the husband on exhibit 12, which I will ask the stenographer to mark "Exhibit 13."

(Transcription of the material written on exhibit 12 was marked as "Exhibit 13," and is shown below:)

EXHIBIT 13

Karta pocztowa adresowana: "Lwow, ul. Sobieskiego 32, Janina Knoppowa". Adres nadawcy: "C. C. C. P. Starobielsk, skrzynka pocztowa Nr. 15, Tadeusz Stanislawowicz Knopp". Stempel pocztowy "Starobielsk" "12.4.40". Adres do Lwowa przekreślony i napisane: K. C. C. P. miasto Semipalatynsk, Cegielnia Nr. 2. Stempel pocztowy C. C. C. P. Zana Semei Wsch. Kazachstan 21.6.40".

Na odwrocie:

z Starobielska wyjechał w kwietniu

Najdrozsza moja i najukochansza Janko i Ty moje kochanie Inus. Depesze otrzymałem i ciesze się, zescie zdrowe. Bardzo się ciesze, że masz zamiar wyjechać do Mamy i chciałbym bardzo, byś jaknajprędzej to uskuteczniła, zawsze będziesz z Mama i będzie Ci razniej—bardzo bym chciał, byś pojechała. Do mnie obecnie nie pisz, aż ja do Ciebie napisze. Ja jestem zdrow i trzymam się. Do Michała

jesli bedzie Ciocia pisac, niech go serdecznie ode mnie ucaluje. Caluje Was obie moje najdrozsze jaknajserdeczniej. Twój Tadzik. Dla Cioci ucalowanie raczek. Od Halskiego Stefana i Genka ucalowanie raczek. O ile wiem, to jakies rzeczy maja bye u p. Nowachowiczowej. 6.4.940.
Ex. 13

Mr. FLOOD. The witness is now shown exhibit 13, and I ask her if that is an exact transcription of the material written on the card by her husband that she told us about.

Mrs. KNOPP. It is.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you have that translated for the record? Read it to the committee now.

Mr. PUCINSKI. The card is addressed to Lwow, Sobieski Street, 32, and it is addressed to Janiana Knoppwa. The address of the sender is given as "C. C. C. P. Starobielsk." The stamp mark is number 15, and the name Tadeusz Stanislawowicz Knopp. The mailing stamp shows "Starobielsk, 12th April, 1940." The message on the postcard is:

My Dearest and my lovely Janko and you—my dear Inus. I received your telegram and am very happy that you are healthy. I am very happy that you are planning to go to mother, and I would like very much for you to do this as soon as possible. It will always be easier for you with mother. I would want very much for you to go there. Do not write to me at this time until I write to you. I am healthy and holding together. If our aunt writes to Michael, let her hug him for me. I send both of you my most sincere hugs and kisses. Your Tadzik. Also for aunt best wishes. Also best wishes from Halski, Stefan and Eugene. As far as I know there should be some things with Mrs. Nowochowicz— and the date is given as the 6th of April 1940.

Mr. FLOOD. Have you ever seen a list of the names of any of the officers that were found at Katyn?

Mrs. KNOPP. Yes, I did in the book entitled "The Massacre of Katyn".

Mr. FLOOD. We now show you the list that has been placed in evidence at hearings in the United States of the men who were found at Katyn and direct your attention to page 264 thereof and ask you if you can identify the name as marked.

Mrs. KNOPP. Yes, I do, except that the age is incorrect. The age is shown as 10 years too much. It is a mistake.

Mr. DONDERO. Have you ever heard from your husband since that card was received?

Mrs. KNOPP. Not a single word.

Chairman MADDEN. Nobody offered you any recompense or emolument for coming here today to testify, did they—any pay?

Mrs. KNOPP. No; of course not.

Mr. FLOOD. The witness is shown exhibit 14 and asked where she received that card, where did she get it.

Mrs. KNOPP. My mother was in the German zone. In 1942 she died and when she died some of her personal belongings were sent to me and amongst those was this card.

Mr. FLOOD. To whom is the card addressed?

Mrs. KNOPP. This card is addressed to my husband, my mother's son-in-law, at Starobielsk.

Mr. FLOOD. At the camp at Starobielsk.

Mrs. KNOPP. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. There is a stamp on the face of the card marked "Ret ur parti" and there is also a postmark from Moscow. Will you

read into the record the date of the cancellation stamp, postmark from Moscow, on the face of the card?

Mr. PUCINSKI. The date of the postmark is the 5th of June 1940.

Mr. FLOOD. That indicates with a stamp that the card was returned as stamped, as I have just read, to the sender, in this case the witness's mother, and the date was from Moscow; is that correct?

Mr. PUCINSKI. Yes, that is correct.

(Post card referred to was marked as "Exhibit 14," and is shown below:)

EXHIBIT 14



Kochany Tadeu! Nie pisalem dotychczas
do Ciebie bo Lenka pisala podajac adres
re lepiej sie pisac - ale mi nie
ucopiai - bo paczki miodomoi u mnie
nie idzie co 2 miesiacu - ostatnio pisala
re robi staracis aby przyjechał ale teraz
swoty idz, i za two koncem a ja z Lenka
nie ma - jak ukeam tak i ukeam aby
przyjechali - jak re wrociem Tadeu
Tadeu? Iluie ony nie dopinaj - 24.5.1940
Kerdecnie Cis wlezy i Ludmika dl - wiec
Ludmika nie gnie jest jego brat. Stawek 11? Czytam z

[Translation from Polish]

[Post card]

[Addressed to:]

USSR

Tadeusz Knopp

Starobielsk

Post Office Box 15

[From:]

Eugenia Zenerman

Rzeszow Gerinekstrasse 6

Dear Tadziu! I have not written to you, because Janka wrote, gave the address, and counseled not to write. Today, however, I have decided to write, because through Janka I get news only once every two months. Lately she informed [me] that she tried to get here, but although transports are coming to an end, she and [illegible] have not arrived. I am expecting them and wish they were already here. How is your health? My eyes are failing me. I kiss you fondly, [and] also Ludwik M. Perhaps Ludwik knows where his brother Staszek M. is? Eugenia Z. May 24, 1940.

Chairman MADDEN. We wish to thank you for your testimony.

TESTIMONY OF TADEUSZ FELSZTYN

Mr. FELSZTYN. I speak English.

Chairman MADDEN. Will you give your name?

Mr. FELSZTYN. Tadeusz Felsztyn.

Chairman MADDEN. Before you make your statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you will run the risk of actions in the courts by anyone who considers he has suffered injury. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as a result of your testimony.

Mr. FELSZTYN. Yes, I understand that.

Mr. DONDERO. Do you agree to that?

Mr. FELSZTYN. Yes. Thank you very much.

Chairman MADDEN. Do you swear by the Almighty God that you will according to the best of your knowledge tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. FELSZTYN. I do.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Where do you reside, Mr. Felsztyn?

Mr. FELSZTYN. I reside in Spink Hill near Sheffield, in England.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were you an officer of the Polish Army?

Mr. FELSZTYN. I was, yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. When?

Mr. FELSZTYN. Since 1914 of the Polish Legion.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Where were you in 1939?

Mr. FELSZTYN. In 1939 I was in the Institute of Armament Research.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In what capacity?

Mr. FELSZTYN. I was head of the general department; it was investigation of new discoveries.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were you taken prisoner by the Russians?

Mr. FELSZTYN. Yes, I was taken prisoner on the 17th of September 1939.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Where were you taken to?

Mr. FELSZTYN. I was taken as prisoner near Mizoez. I was a Commander of the Military Transport and the Institute of Research of Armament.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Where were you taken from there?

Mr. FELSZTYN. From there I was taken to Szepeitowka and from Szepeitowka to a camp in the Ukraine near Sumy, and from there to Kozielsk.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. When did you arrive at Kozielsk?

Mr. FELSZTYN. It was the 1st day of November 1939.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How long did you remain in Kozielsk?

Mr. FELSZTYN. I remained until the end of April—the 26th of April.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What happened on the 26th of April 1940?

Mr. FELSZTYN. We were taken to a military transport. There was a personal search. I was one of the last and it was rather a very superficial one, so that I could keep many of the papers which I had with me without any difficulty. The first were searched very exactly.

Chairman MADDEN. Talk a little more slowly.

Mr. FELSZTYN. Yes. The first were searched very exactly, but as I was one of the last, I was searched very lightly. I could keep many papers with me without any difficulty.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Where were you taken from Kozielsk?

Mr. FELSZTYN. From Kozielsk our train went to Sukiennicze. It is a Russian name.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were you released there?

Mr. FELSZTYN. No; we saw an inscription in our train. We were waiting to go west to Smolensk. There was an inscription that we were alighting west of Smolensk.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What do you mean by "inscriptions"—where were they?

Mr. FELSZTYN. You see, the Russian cars are done in such a way that at the end there is a hinge, and on a hinge is a bench, so that you can put it this way or horizontally.

Chairman MADDEN. The witness indicates the moving of a bench up and down.

Mr. FELSZTYN. Yes. There was an inscription below the bench. The bench was horizontal; and in the corner of the bench—in a dark corner—there was a Polish inscription.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you know how that got there?

Mr. FELSZTYN. Yes. The inscription was: "We were unloaded two stations west of Smolensk"; and there were some signatures. I did not know any of the signatures. I do not remember the names. There were three or four people who signed their names.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What happened to you after that?

Mr. FELSZTYN. After that the train stopped there. We were stopped some hours, and after I was moving, instead of west, to east, and were taken to Pavlishchev Bor.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How long did you remain at Pavlishchev Bor?

Mr. FELSZTYN. At Pavlishchev Bor Camp I think we remained a month.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Then where did you go to?

Mr. FELSZTYN. Then we came to—what is the name?—Griazowiec.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What happened at Griazowiec?

Mr. FELSZTYN. I was in Griazowiec till General Anders came to us.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And then you became a part of General Anders' Army?

Mr. FELSZTYN. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Are you an expert in ammunition matters?

Mr. FELSZTYN. I was Head of the Infantry Research Commission for 4 years.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is 4 years prior to 1939?

Mr. FELSZTYN. Yes; it was 1926 to 1930. Later I was in the Military Institute of Research, and I was always very interested in ammunition, from my personal point of view, as from the point of view of sport, shooting sport, in which I was connected very strongly.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you ever have any opportunity to examine bullets allegedly used at Katyn?

Mr. FELSZTYN. No.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What experience have you had in ballistics? You understand the word "ballistics"?

Mr. FELSZTYN. Yes; I understand. I was lieutenant of ballistics, at Warsaw University during 10 years.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Are you also an expert in small arms?

Mr. FELSZTYN. Yes; I was an expert on a Polish-German incident in 1930 or 1931. I was a Polish expert in this frontier incident.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Also on munitions and small arms?

Mr. FELSZTYN. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Have you ever seen any bullets allegedly used at Katyn?

Mr. FELSZTYN. No. The question that was put to me by the Polish command when the Katyn report came was: How could Russians use the 7.65 German ammunition?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You have not seen the bullets?

Mr. FELSZTYN. No, I have not.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. But you were given an account of the fact that 7.65 bullets were used?

Mr. FELSZTYN. Not bullets, but cases. Ammunition cases were found in the graves.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Shells?

Mr. FELSZTYN. Shells.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Have you made any report on that?

Mr. FELSZTYN. Yes, I have made a report.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Will you give us the report of your findings?

Mr. FELSZTYN. Yes; the report is the following: We had in Poland plenty of German Geco ammunition. The 7.65 caliber was very frequently found in Poland.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What is Geco ammunition?

Mr. FELSZTYN. It is of German manufacture. It was also of the best German ammunition, and, as we did not produce much ammunition of 7.65 caliber in Poland, we imported plenty of German ammunition, mainly for private purposes, for shooting purposes, for sporting purposes. Many officers had 7.65 revolvers with them.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you know what type of revolvers were used by Russians?

Mr. FELSZTYN. The Russians had a Nagan gun.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What caliber is that?

Mr. FELSZTYN. I cannot tell you exactly. I have not much practice with them. I think it was 7.62.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Can you use 7.65 ammunition in 7.62 guns?

Mr. FELSZTYN. No; but they have another revolver, a pistol, the Tokarew pistol.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What kind of gun is that?

Mr. FELSZTYN. It is a pistol which uses 7.65 ammunition.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And is that a type of gun used by the Russians?

Mr. FELSZTYN. I have seen this gun in Russia myself.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Have you seen it in substantial amounts?

Mr. FELSZTYN. I cannot tell you. We had two or three of them to teach our soldiers all different kinds of ammunition. I remember very well we had two or three of them as models.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Was that a standard issue for NKVD officers?

Mr. FELSZTYN. I do not know that it is a standard issue, but I have seen it personally, and cavalry officers carrying these pistols, and I have seen them carry Polish pistols.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Could you tell us whether that type of gun could use 7.65 ammunition?

Mr. FELSZTYN. 7.65—it is just their caliber.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. It is their caliber?

Mr. FELSZTYN. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. 7.65?

Mr. FELSZTYN. 7.65.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Then do I understand you to state that German ammunition could be used in that type of gun used by Russian officers?

Mr. FELSZTYN. Certainly it would. Certainly when you have to shoot much, it is far easier to shoot with the 7.65 pistol than with a Nagan, which has a very hard trigger; it is a very good revolver, but it is rather a tiring one if you have to shoot much.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Is there anything further that you wish to add in relation to this matter to which you have just testified?

Mr. FELSZTYN. About ammunition, no; but I have two things perhaps to add from the Kozielsk camp.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What is there that you want to add?

Mr. FELSZTYN. I was living in the same building at the same time with General Minkiewicz, and he reported the talks he had with Comrade Zarubin. I remember two talks which are I think characteristic. One was the following one: It could be about February 1940, as this was a psychological seesaw in our camp and plenty of rumours, and General Minkiewicz came to the camp and asked him: "Do not make us nervous, as all the rumours are spreading, but tell us what do you want to do with us." Comrade Zarubin told him: "I do not think it would be right. Let us suppose we have decided to keep you to the end of the war. It could last 5 or 6 years. You would get mad if I told you. I assure you it would be inhuman. I assure you, general, it is better for you not to know what we want to do with you."

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were you a personal witness of this conversation, or was that conversation reported to you by the general?

Mr. FELSZTYN. The conversation was repeated to me by the general immediately after he came back.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you know anything else having any bearing on Katyn?

Mr. FELSZTYN. When the transport started, Captain Alexandrowicz was asked by General Minkiewicz: "Where are the transports going?" The answer was: "You are going to the transit camps where

you will have to decide: Do you want to be given back to the Germans or do you ask to remain in Russia? Those of you who will have a very strong will can perhaps go to a new country." This is what Alexandrowicz said the moment the transports were ready to leave.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Have you personally ever seen Zarubin?

Mr. FELSZTYN. Yes, I have seen him many times.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Have you seen Zarubin who was the Ambassador in London?

Mr. FELSZTYN. I have seen only his photograph.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you find any resemblance in the two?

Mr. FELSZTYN. It looks to me to be the same person.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Your best judgment is that the Zarubin who was at that time at Kozielsk—

Mr. FELSZTYN. It is my best impression—only from a photograph. I have never seen the man since. I recognized, when I was shown the photograph, very well the face and especially the hands of the man, as he used to speak keeping his hands on the table. I have a vivid impression of his hands, and when I saw the hands on the photograph, I had no doubt they are the same ones.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Is there anything further that you wish to add to the testimony?

Mr. FELSZTYN. I do not think so.

Chairman MADDEN. Well, we wish to thank you for your testimony.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. JAN KACZKOWSKI, 43 BROMLEY ROAD, LONDON, E 17

Mr. PUCINSKI. Major Kaczkowski.

Chairman MADDEN. What is your name and address?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Maj. Jan Kaczkowski, 43 Bromley Road, London, E. 17.

Chairman MADDEN. Before you make your statements, I wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in courts by anyone who considered he had suffered injury. At the same time I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf in respect of libel or slander proceedings which may arise as the result of your testimony. You understand that?

Major KACZKOWSKI. I understand that and I agree.

Chairman MADDEN. Now you are to be sworn: Do you swear by the Almighty God that you will, according to the best of your knowledge, state the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Major KACZKOWSKI. I swear.

Mr. FLOOD. You are a major in the Polish Army?

Major KACZKOWSKI. A reservist.

Mr. FLOOD. A reserve major in the Polish Army?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. You were a reserve major on active duty?

Major KACZKOWSKI. I was there in Russia as reservist captain.

Mr. FLOOD. You are aware of the problem arising out of the Katyn investigation?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. You know of the thousands of officers whose bodies were discovered there?

Major KACZOWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. You have heard and read, as we have been advised by other witnesses, of the frantic efforts made by the friends and the families and relatives of the missing officers to find out where they were?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes, I do.

Mr. FLOOD. As a result of that I am advised that the Polish Government of General Sikorski, with the cooperation of General Anders, took some steps to try and be of assistance to the families and the friends of the missing officers; is that correct?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you identified with such a project?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes. May I speak Polish?

Mr. FLOOD. At this point the witness wishes to talk in Polish. Mr. Pucinski will translate. You were identified with that Polish Government project?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes (through interpreter).

Mr. FLOOD. Will you tell us in your own words what you did in your capacity and how this was set up?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes. In November of 1941 a special Bureau which would deal with the families of the officers who had been in these three camps was set up in General Anders' staff and I became the chief of that bureau. The purpose of this bureau was to try and locate all the soldiers who had been evacuated or transferred into Russia, to bring them back into the Polish Army, and then to give material assistance to their families. At the beginning Mr. Czapski was especially assigned to prepare a special project with our bureau of those Poles who had been taken prisoner and sent to the three camps, Kozielsk, Ostashkov, and Starobielsk. Later, however, that duty was assigned exclusively to myself and Mr. Czapski was assigned to go into Russia; that is, to go all over Russia in an effort to locate these men.

We had received hundreds and thousands of letters—thousands of letters every day from families both in Poland and in Russia seeking out help in establishing contact with their relatives and for material help. Included in these letters were hundreds of postcards written in these three camps, Ostashkov, Starobielsk, and Kozielsk, written to the women who subsequently were writing to us asking us to locate their husbands or their sons. The cards were attached to the letters as evidence that these people had been in these three camps. I retained about 150 of these postcards as evidence that these people were in those camps, but I had returned all the others because the return of these cards had been in most cases requested by the families; they wanted to keep the cards as mementoes. Most of the postcards that I had seen had the last dates either in February, March, or the first few days of April. Now, most of the families that had been writing to us from Russia had been evacuated from Poland during the early days of April 1940.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you say most or all of those cards?

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness says that none of these cards that came into his hands and which he examined were dated later than about the 10th or 15th April, 1940.

Major KACZKOWSKI. In all the correspondence that was sent to us the families stated that they had lost contact with their husbands or sons no later than about the middle of April, 1940.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In all these many thousands of letters which you received, have you received one from any person inquiring about his loved one in any of these three camps which indicated that they had heard from them after April 1940?

Major KACZKOWSKI. No; none.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Not one?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Not one card or brief—not one. In every instance where these letters came to us they assured us that following or subsequent to about the middle of April these families had endeavored to get some information about their husbands or sons by either writing direct to the NKVD in Moscow or writing direct to the commanders of their respective camps. In all of these cards that I have seen which were returned from the camps or from Moscow there was a notation that the card had been censored in Moscow and that the prisoner who was being sought had either left or his whereabouts were unknown. Up to July or August of 1942 these families kept writing and inquiring about these men and they kept getting these answers. There is not much more that I can add to my testimony.

Mr. FLOOD. All of this testimony you are giving now, all of this reference to letters from the families, deals particularly with the camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov; is that correct?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Not all.

Mr. FLOOD. Others?

Major KACZKOWSKI. There were some cards, some briefs, letters, written about persons who were not in these camps.

Mr. FLOOD. But most of them?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes, most of them.

Mr. FLOOD. Most of them were about men who were in those three camps?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes, they were about men who were in those three camps.

Mr. FLOOD. You had 150 cards that you had not returned?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. What did you do with those 150 cards?

Major KACZKOWSKI. I left all the papers at my office in August of 1942 in Russia for Lieutenant Rudnicki, who was military attaché in Kuybishev—all papers.

Mr. FLOOD. All the records of your bureau?

Major KACZKOWSKI. All the records, money, and so on. Only one officer of my bureau, that is Mr. Voit, was left in Russia, and was sent to Kuybishev together with Lieutenant Rudnicki.

Mr. FLOOD. At the time when you left Russia, you were then chief of this bureau that we are talking about?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And when you left charge of the bureau, you left all of your records and money, including these 150 cards, with the military attaché you have just named?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes; Rudnicki.

Mr. FLOOD. During the time that you were chief of this bureau, did you yourself engage in any conversations or any communica-

tions with Moscow, Russian attachés in Kuybishev or any place else in connection with the search for the missing Polish officers?

Major KACZKOWSKI. I was in Kuybishev at the Polish Embassy; I was sent there by General Anders. I had been asked to seek these Polish officers also, but we accepted the answer we received from the Polish Embassy that Moscow answered there are none.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you yourself ever engage in any conversations with any of the Russians?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Never. The wife of a lieutenant veterinary, Dr. Drapalski, told me that she was in Kolhus in Siberia, and she has written many letters and every day had gone to the chief of the NKDV asking where is her husband who was in Kolhus. After some time this Russian officer became very interested in this wife; she was very young; and he told her: "You will not see him in Europe alive. You seek another husband, because it is not possible that you can find your husband in your life." That was the only thing that showed that something was wrong with him.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you know the name of that woman you talked to?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes; she is now in London, but the address is unknown to me.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you ever see a list of the names of the officers whose bodies were found at Katyn?

Major KACZKOWSKI. We have grouped these names.

Mr. FLOOD. What was the name?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Drapalski.

Mr. FLOOD. What was the first name?

Major KACZKOWSKI. I cannot tell you.

Mr. FLOOD. Was it Erazem?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Veterinary doctor, lieutenant.

Mr. FLOOD. Now I direct the attention of the witness to the list of the names of the Polish officers who disappeared from these three camps and specifically to page 41 thereof and ask him whether or not the Drapalski now found there with the description of his rank in the army and duty in the army is the name of the officer whose wife he was talking to.

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes, that is the same. I have known this man, this lieutenant, and his wife.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you read from the document you are now holding the man's name and spell it correctly, and the information thereon describing him.

Major KACZKOWSKI. Drapalski. Now comes the Christian name: Erazm; second lieutenant, veterinary doctor.

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness is reading from page 41.

Chairman MADDEN. Is there anything further?

Mr. FLOOD. I would like you to give us the names of any associates who were with your Bureau during this work that you were carrying on, as you describe it, who might be available to testify here.

Major KACZKOWSKI. Here is a lieutenant or captain named Voit; then Captain Lubomirski. These two men are here.

Mr. FLOOD. Are these two men whose names you have just given us here now?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And they were identified with you and the work you described in Poland and Russia?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes.

Chairman MADDEN. Thank you for testifying today.

Mr. PUCINSKI. You heard the last witness describe who the next witness is.

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. My name is Eugeniusz Lubomirski, captain of the Polish Army.

Chairman MADDEN. Captain, before you make a statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who considered that he had suffered an injury. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as a result of your testimony. You understand that?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. Yes, I understand.

Chairman MADDEN. Now you are to be sworn. Do you swear by Almighty God that you will, according to your best knowledge, testify to the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. What is your rank and name?

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN EUGENIUSZ LUBOMIRSKI

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. My name is Eugeniusz Lubomirski; my rank is captain.

Mr. FLOOD. You have been and I believe still are identified with the London Polish Government?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. In what official capacity are you identified with that organization today?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. I was A. D. C. to General Anders during the whole war and during the whole campaign in Italy and since then I am his personal secretary here in London.

Mr. FLOOD. I believe it has been brought to the attention of the committee that you act as interpreter for the general?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. So that you understand English and Polish quite well?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. You heard the previous witness, the Major, who has just testified?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. You were in a position here where you could hear that testimony?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Every word as he gave it?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you subscribe and corroborate the testimony given by the Major?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. I can completely confirm. I heard what he said and I confirm completely 100 percent what he said, because I worked with him and he was my superior in that office for military families in Gangi Gul in Russia.

Mr. DONDERO. You have not anything to add to that report?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. I have here the written statement which I made in 1949 and left it in the archives of the organization of former Polish prisoners in Russia. It says practically the same about those letters which, while doing my work, I read. In most of those letters the thing which struck me was that all of the families seeking information about their husbands, brothers, sons, and so on, repeatedly stated: "The last news I had about him was March, April, 1940." That was striking, and I usually put a red mark about it.

Mr. FLOOD. The purpose of the question was to find out whether or not you had anything that you could add to what the other witness before you said?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. I do not think I can add anything.

Mr. FLOOD. While this is being read in Polish by my colleague Mr. Machrowicz, may I ask you this: You heard the former witness recollect a conversation that he just happened to remember that he had with a certain lady?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Beyond what the major testified to, will you tax your memory for a minute and see if you can recall any such particular incident which was peculiar and personal to your experience in this job which either the major or your other associates might not have known about—any conversations, any personal experience, any telephone talks, any particular letter or incident during the entire job of this nature that you think would be helpful to the committee. Can you think of any such thing?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. No; during the time of my work in that office I could not add anything beyond that which is said in the written statement. Only I remember that during the whole time also when I was with General Anders and acting as interpreter, always the question of those officers came up.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you have any conversations or communications of any nature whatsoever with any Russians of any standing—military, civilian, or N. K. V. D.—during the course of this search for the missing Polish officers?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. No, nothing.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Subsequent to the time that you were working with Major Kaczkowski, you became adjutant of the commander of the Second Corps in Italy?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you continue in that capacity to receive letters of the type that you had been receiving when you were working with Major Kaczkowski?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. There again in Italy while working as adjutant to General Anders at our office, we received, of course, a great number of letters, including several letters from France, Switzerland and other countries in Europe. They were all from families who had written of having received letters from Kozielsk and Starobielsk, in 1940 and never again since 1940.

Mr. FLOOD. Did any of those letters indicate a date subsequent to April 1940?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. Again the same phrase was repeated there: "March or April."

Mr. FLOOD. And nothing beyond?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. There were perhaps five or six letters.

Mr. FLOOD. The witness has shown the committee a document which I will ask to have marked as "Exhibit No. 15." I now show the captain exhibit 15 and ask him if that is the statement that he gave in 1949 in connection with this same matter?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. Yes, it is.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you submit that now as an exhibit for the committee?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. Yes.

(The report was marked "Exhibit 15" and entered in the record.)

Ex. 15

Eug. LUBOMIRSKI, kpt.
6, Fairholt Street,
London, S. W. 7.

Dnia 15 czerwca 1949.

Do:

Polskie Stowarzyszenie b. Więźniów Sowieckich, Londyn.

Oswiadczenie.

Stwierdzam, że w czasie mojej pracy w Biurze Rodzin Wojsk. i Poszukiwań Armii Polskiej w ZSRR na czele którego stał kpt. Kaczkowski, w czasie od kwietnia 1942 do lipca 1942 w Jangi Jul, przez moje ręce przeszło bardzo dużo listów i kartek, które pisane były przez osoby poszukujące swoich krewnych oficerów i szeregowych, co do których z korespondencji od nich otrzymywanej wiedzieli, że znajdowali się w końcu roku 1939 i w zimie i na wiosnę 1940r. w obozach Kozielsk, Starobielsk lub Ostaszkowie. Znamiennym w tych listach było, że prawie we wszystkich podkreślano, iż nie mogą zrozumieć dlaczego poprzednio, to znaczy do marca i kwietnia 1940r. (i te daty stale się powtarzały), raczej regularnie od nich otrzymywali wiadomości i odpowiedzi na listy do nich kierowane, a od powyżej podanego czasu wszelka korespondencja się urwała. Takich listów mam wrażenie było aż kilkaset. Podkreślałem w tych listach te daty czerwonym ołówkiem, gdyż wówczas kiedy właściwie nie konkretnego o losie tych jeńców nie było wiadome, te daty najbardziej rzucały się w oczy jako stale powtarzające się. Listy te były adresowane do Biura Poszukiwań Armii i pochodziły oczywiście od krewnych wywiezionych do Rosji, którzy zarówno przed wywiezieniem, a następnie i na terenie Rosji od jeńców otrzymywali korespondencję. Listy te były zbierane i winny się znajdować w archiwach Biura Poszukiwań, które o ile mi wiadomo zostały przekazane przez kpt. Kaczkowskiego przed jego opuszczeniem Rosji, attaché wojskowemu przy ambasadzie R. P. w Kujbyszewie, płk. Rudnickiemu. Sam takich listów czy też kartek nie posiadam.

Później w czasie mojej pracy w adiutanturze D-cy 2 Korpusu we Włoszech mogę stwierdzić, że wpłynęła tak samo pewna ilość listów od osób przebywających na terenie Szwajcarii, Francji i innych, którzy nawet przebywając w 1940r. na zachodzie, otrzymali kartki z tych obozów w Rosji i w których to listach znowu się te same daty powtarzały. Z datą późniejszą od kwietnia 1940r. nikt od nich korespondencji nie otrzymał. Te listy oddawałem do Oddziału Kultury i Prasy, zwracając uwagę że należałoby je pieczołowicie przechowywać. Powinny one zatem znajdować się w archiwach Oddz. Kult. i Prasy 2 Korpusu.

EUGENE LUBOMIRSKI, Kpt,
EUG. LUBOMIRSKI, Kpt.

[Translation from Polish]

Captain Eugene Lubomorski
6 Fairholt Street
London, S. W. 7.

June 15, 1949

To the Polish Union of Former Soviet Prisoners, London:

Deposition

I certify that during my work with the Bureau of Families of Men in the Service in search of the Polish Army in the U. S. S. R., headed by Captain Kaczkowski, a large number of letters and postcards went through my hands from May 1942 to June 1942 in Jangi Jul; these letters were written by persons in search of their

relatives, officers and enlisted men. These persons knew from correspondence with their relatives in the service that the latter were placed by the end of 1939 and in the winter and spring of 1940 in the camps in Kozielsk, Starobielsk, or Ostaszkowo. It is noteworthy that all of these letters [to the Bureau of Families] emphasized, I do not know for what reason, that before March and May of 1940 (these dates are continuously repeated) they received information rather regularly [about their relatives] and replies to letters sent to them, but that from the above-mentioned date all correspondence ceased. I have the impression that there were several hundred such letters. In them the above-mentioned dates were underscored by red pencil, although at that time nothing was known definitely concerning the fate of these prisoners of war. And these dates hit the eye, since they were constantly repeated. The letters were addressed to the Bureau for Search of the Army, and evidently were sent by the relatives of those who were deported to Russia. Both before and after the deportation, the relatives received correspondence from the prisoners in the territory of Russia. These letters were collected and must be kept in the archives of the Bureau for Search which, so far as I know, were handed over by Captain Kaczowski before he left Russia to the military attache of the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev, Colonel Rudnicki. I do not possess any such letters or postcards.

Later, at the time when I worked at the adjutant's office of the commander of the second corps in Italy, I may certify that similarly a certain number of letters was received from persons who resided in the territory of Switzerland, France, and other countries. While these people remained in the West in 1940, they received postcards from the camps in Russia, in which letters the same data were repeated. None of these persons has received any correspondence with a date later than May 1940. These letters I gave to the section of Culture and the Press, drawing their attention to the fact that they should be carefully preserved. They must be available in the archives of the Section for Press and Cultural Affairs of the Second Corps.

Signed,
Eugene Lubomirski,
Captain.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you have any of those letters which you received or do you know where they are at present?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. No; the unfortunate thing is that those letters, as Major Kaczowski said, were sent to Kuybishev to the military attaché and I think they never left Russia. It was difficult to get things out. So that there are none. There are some of those letters which were collected from different people here in England which Dr. Stahl had.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What about those you received in Italy?

Captain LUBOMIRSKI. They may be in some of the archives but difficult to find because when it was moved to England at very short notice, all those things were packed together, and it is possible that in some of a great number of boxes some of those cards are still there, but it is very hard to find because a great number of boxes were stored all over England for the better times when we can arrange a better storage for them.

Chairman MADDEN. Captain, we want to thank you for coming here. Now will the next witness state his name and address?

Mr. VOIT. Roman Voit, 48 Holland Road, London, W. 14.

Chairman MADDEN. Before you make your statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who considered he had suffered injury. At the same time I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as the result of your testimony.

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness does not understand English too well, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MADDEN. We want the record to show that the admonition read in English now is being translated for the witness into Polish.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you understand the provisions in the admonition?

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness says that he does understand.

Chairman MADDEN. Do you swear by God Almighty that you will according to your best knowledge tell the truth, the pure truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. ROMAN VOIT. I do.

TESTIMONY OF ROMAN VOIT (AS TRANSLATED BY MR. ROMAN PUCINSKI)

Mr. FLOOD. What is your name?

Mr. VOIT. Roman Voit.

Mr. FLOOD. You were at one time, I understand, identified with the Polish Government of General Sikorski and of General Anders?

Mr. VOIT. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. You were identified with that part of the Government which was a bureau set up for the purpose of rendering aid and information to the relatives and the families and the friends of the missing Polish officers?

Mr. VOIT. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. You were present here in the room, I believe, and you heard the evidence of the last two witnesses?

Mr. VOIT. Not too well; I do not hear too well.

Mr. FLOOD. You can hear me?

Mr. VOIT. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. You were identified with a bureau set up by General Sikorski and General Anders under the command of Major Kaczkowski?

Mr. VOIT. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. You were also working with Major Kaczkowski, and with you was Captain Felsztyn, who just left the stand?

Mr. VOIT. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. They told us that they received in this bureau thousands of letters from relatives and friends and the families of the missing officers; is that correct?

Mr. VOIT. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you employed at that bureau during the same period of time with the other two officers whose names I have just mentioned?

Mr. VOIT. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. The other officers testified that these communications came in all during that period of time by the thousands; is that right?

Mr. VOIT. Maybe not in thousands, but as far as I know from my own contact there were hundreds of those letters.

Mr. FLOOD. Many of these communications were post cards?

Mr. VOIT. Most of them were post cards.

Mr. FLOOD. That had been received by the relatives and friends and families from the men who were in Kozielsk and Starobielsk?

Mr. VOIT. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. And those were the cards that these people sent to your office to see if you could help locate those officers?

Mr. VOIT. That is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you yourself ever have any conversations or communications with any Russians, military, civilian or NKVD, of any category in connection with the missing Polish officers?

Mr. VOIT. No; only with the Polish families in the Russian territory.

Mr. FLOOD. What was the date that was stressed in your mind as the last date or dates that any of these families or friends had received any word or information from the missing officers in the three camps?

Mr. VOIT. As far as I can remember, the dates were January, February, March, and possibly some in April of 1940.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you have any personal reminiscence, any personal incident, by telephone, in writing or in conversation with any of the relatives, families or friends or anybody else, Polish, Russian, or anything any time any place anywhere, which would be of help to this committee?

Mr. VOIT. There was constant fear and theory that these men had disappeared, that these men had been killed, and this bureau tried to console these families with the hope that they would be found.

Mr. FLOOD. Now after the major, the chief of this section, left Russia, did you remain?

Mr. VOIT. Yes, I did; I went to Kuybyshev with Colonel Rudnicki.

Mr. FLOOD. When the major, who just left here, who was chief of the section, turned over the files and records to Colonel Rudnicki, who went to Kuybyshev, did you go with Colonel Rudnicki to Kuybyshev?

Mr. VOIT. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you take the records and documents with you?

Mr. VOIT. Yes, and I personally packed them.

Mr. FLOOD. When was the last that you saw the documents in Kuybyshev?

Mr. VOIT. I took them with me.

Mr. FLOOD. From where? What I want to know is what happened to the documents after they got to Kuybyshev. Did they leave Kuybyshev?

Mr. VOIT. The Russian authorities objected to my staying at Kuybyshev, so then I left for Iraq, but the documents remained there with Colonel Rudnicki.

Mr. FLOOD. And was he the Polish military attaché at Kuybyshev?

Mr. VOIT. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. So the last that you know of the documents and records is that when you left Kuybyshev to go to Iraq, the documents and records were at Kuybyshev in the possession of the Polish military attaché, Colonel Rudnicki?

Mr. VOIT. That is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. That is all.

Chairman MADDEN. Any further questions?

Mr. VOIT. May I make a further statement? I know as a matter of fact that when Russia broke off diplomatic relations with Poland in 1943, the Polish officials in these various locations were burning and destroying their records and documents; but we continued our search for these officers and kept contact with these families after the whole operation was transferred to Iraq, to Palestine, and to Egypt.

Mr. FLOOD. After you left Kuybyshev, did you ever get word any place or ever hear anything in that bureau from any of the officers at Kozielsk, Starobielsk, or Pavlishchev Bor about these missing officers?

Mr. VOIT. No.

Chairman MADDEN. We want to thank you for coming here this afternoon and testifying.

Mr. PUCINSKI. This gentleman coming up now is the only surviving Polish general who was interned in either of these camps.

Chairman MADDEN. General, will you give the reporter your full name and address?

General WOLKOWICKI. My name is Jerzy Wolkowicki, and my address is Penross Camp, Pwlllelli, Wales.

Chairman MADDEN. Before you make a statement, General, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of actions in the courts by anyone who considered he had suffered an injury. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as the result of your testimony.

Mr. FLOOD. The witness will now have interpreted for him in Polish the admonition just rendered by the chairman. Does he understand the provisions of the admonition?

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness says that he does understand the provisions of the admonition.

Chairman MADDEN. General, do you solemnly swear by God Almighty that you will according to your best knowledge to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General WOLKOWICKI. I do.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. JERZY WOLKOWICKI, PENROSS CAMP, PWLLELLI, WALES

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Your name is Jerzy Wolkowicki?

General WOLKOWICKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were you a general of the Polish Army in 1939?

General WOLKOWICKI. Yes, I was a general from 1927.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In what branch of the service were you in 1939?

General WOLKOWICKI. I was a commander in the reserve army of Gen. Dom-Biernacki, and then I was the commanding officer of the combined division entitled or named "W".

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And while in such command, were you taken prisoner by the Russians?

General WOLKOWICKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. When?

General WOLKOWICKI. September 26, 1939.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And were you subsequently interned at Kozielsk?

General WOLKOWICKI. Yes; I arrived at Kozielsk at the beginning of November.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Of 1939?

General WOLKOWICKI. 1939.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How many Polish generals were there at the Kozielsk camp at that time?

General WOLKOWICKI. Five.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And how long did you remain at Kozielsk?

General WOLKOWICKI. Until April 26, 1940.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What happened to you on April 26, 1940?

General WOLKOWICKI. On that date I, and a group of approximately 96, were taken from this camp after undergoing a very intensive search at the camp.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were the other four generals in that group, too?

General WOLKOWICKI. No; three of them were removed before I was, and one after.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you know what became of those three who were removed before you?

General WOLKOWICKI. No; I do not. I do know that they were subsequently found among those in Katyn.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you know their names?

General WOLKOWICKI. General Minkiewicz, General Smorawinski, General Bohaterewicz, and Admiral Czernicki.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I hand you this exhibit 5A of the Chicago hearings, which shows the list of the officers found in Katyn and direct your specific attention to page 114, and ask you to find the name of General Minkiewicz there?

General WOLKOWICKI. Yes; Henryk Minkiewicz.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. He was among those who were found dead at Katyn?

General WOLKOWICKI. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I ask you to look under the letter "S" and see if you find the name of General Smorawinski?

General WOLKOWICKI. Yes; Mieczyslaw Smorawinski.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And you find it at what page of the exhibit?

General WOLKOWICKI. Page 157.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Now I direct your attention again to the same exhibit, and ask you whether you find under the letter "B" the name of General Bohaterewicz?

General WOLKOWICKI. Yes; Bronislaw Bohaterewicz.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. On what page?

General WOLKOWICKI. On page 24.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I direct your attention again to the same exhibit and ask you whether you find therein the name of Admiral Czernicki?

General WOLKOWICKI. Yes; Ksawery Czeruicki.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And you find it on what page?

General WOLKOWICKI. On page 36.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. So that all four of your colleagues, the three generals and the admiral, are in the list of those who were found dead at Katyn, is that right?

General WOLKOWICKI. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you know when they left Kozielsk? If you do not know the exact date, can you give us the approximate date?

General WOLKOWICKI. No; I do not recall the exact date.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. When did you leave?

General WOLKOWICKI. April 26.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. April 26 of 1940?

General WOLKOWICKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And did they leave before you?

General WOLKOWICKI. Three of them departed before I did, and those are General Minkiewicz, General Smorawinski, and General Bohaterewicz.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How long before you did they depart?

General WOLKOWICKI. About 10 days.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Then I understand that Admiral Czernicki was still at Kozielsk when you left?

General WOLKOWICKI. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you have any knowledge as to how long after you Admiral Czernicki left Kozielsk?

General WOLKOWICKI. I had learned from a subsequent group which had arrived at Pavlishchev Bor after our arrival there that Admiral Czernicki was evacuated from Kozielsk about 3 days after my departure.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. During the time that you were at Kozielsk did you at any time have any opportunity or occasion to talk to any of the Russian officers regarding the fate of your fellow officers who left before you?

General WOLKOWICKI. I frequently asked them where these men were taken.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And what answers did you get?

General WOLKOWICKI. That they do not know.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you ever get any answers when you had any other occasion to inquire about their whereabouts?

General WOLKOWICKI. I do not recall who this officer was, but I did talk to one White Russian officer at the camp who told me that these men would be turned over and surrendered to the Germans.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Now from Kozielsk you were taken to Pavlishchev Bor, is that right?

General WOLKOWICKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How long did you stay there?

General WOLKOWICKI. We remained there 1 month.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And during the time you were at Pavlishchev Bor, did you have any opportunity or occasion to inquire of any of the Russian officers there as to the fate of the other Polish officers?

General WOLKOWICKI. Yes. We were not permitted to carry on any correspondence. I, however, on September 9, 1940, wrote the following communication to the NKVD.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. The NKVD at Pavlishchev Bor?

General WOLKOWICKI. In Griazowiec.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And is this paper which you now hand to the committee a copy of the letter which you sent?

General WOLKOWICKI. Yes; that is a copy of the letter which I wrote. I always made a separate copy for myself of any letter to them.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And in that letter you complained about the lack of knowledge as to the fate of these officers who left the camp before you did, is that right?

General WOLKOWICKI. As the result of this letter which I had written to the NKVD headquarters in Griazowiec, we were permitted thereafter to correspond with relatives and friends.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Prior to this letter, you were not given the right to correspond with your relatives?

General WOLKOWICKI. No, prior to this they permitted us to write only two letters, and we had never received any answer to those letters.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And as the result of this letter, was that changed?

General WOLKOWICKI. In October of 1940 they permitted us to correspond with the outside world, and then we started getting letters from Poland.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And did these letters indicate that the families and relatives of these officers were unable to hear from them, is that correct?

General WOLKOWICKI. My wife had written me a letter inquiring about three people in particular.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you make any inquiry of any Russian authorities as to the whereabouts of any of those people?

General WOLKOWICKI. I then went to the Russian officials and inquired of them why they are permitting us to write letters and not permitting those others to write letters to their loved ones.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Who did you go to?

General WOLKOWICKI. I went to captain of the NKVD Wasilewsky.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. When you say those others, you mean those which your wife had written to you about, is that right?

General WOLKOWICKI. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What answer did you get from this captain?

General WOLKOWICKI. His reply was that he did not know in which camp these men were, but that most probably they did not want to write to their families.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Other than that did you have any other conversations with any Russian authorities about these officers, or any other missing officers?

General WOLKOWICKI. I received another subsequent letter from the wife of a colonel whose name I would rather not reveal at this time, and she was inquiring about her brother. Later more of the people in the camp began coming to me and telling me that they also are receiving letters from families in Poland inquiring why their relatives are not writing to them.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. As a result of these complaints which had come to you from these various relatives, did you make any other attempts with the Russian authorities to find out the whereabouts of these missing officers?

General WOLKOWICKI. In January of 1941 I again went to Captain Wasilewsky of the Russian NKVD and had a conversation with him.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What did he tell you?

General WOLKOWICKI. I told him that many others are receiving letters similar to those that I am receiving, and I threatened at that time to write a letter to the headquarters of the NKVD.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What did the captain tell you?

General WOLKOWICKI. He told me the same thing: "They most probably do not want to write to their families."

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you do anything further about it?

General WOLKOWICKI. I told him that I could understand if one or two or three were reluctant to write to their families, but when we are getting hundreds of letters, that I cannot understand.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you do anything further about learning of their whereabouts?

General WOLKOWICKI. He assured me that he personally would write to the NKVD, and that the NKVD would contact these various prisoners that the families were inquiring about and instruct them to

write to their families. He asked me to prepare for him a list of names of those who were making the inquiries and said that he would forward that list to the NKVD and have those men instructed to write home to their families.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you give him such a list?

General WOLKOWICKI. I informed all the others about this assurance, and I was brought 130 names, and these names I took and gave to Captain Wasilewski.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you hear further from him about it?

General WOLKOWICKI. This discussion was in February. In March, again I went to Captain Wasilewski and I asked him what results he had obtained, because I was continuing to get these letters. He told me that he had written a letter to the NKVD and that I most probably would have an answer.

In April, at the end of April 1941, I again inquired on this subject. Captain Wasilewski told me he doesn't know why I am not getting a reply.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you hear anything further from him after that?

General WOLKOWICKI. After that, the Germans declared war on the Russians.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And you had no other contacts with any Russian authorities regarding the whereabouts of these lost Polish officers?

General WOLKOWICKI. No; I did not. But I did report to General Anders in Moscow.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You reported to General Anders the things that you just told us; is that right?

General WOLKOWICKI. That is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Is there anything further that you can tell us regarding the whereabouts of these lost Polish officers?

General WOLKOWICKI. I can leave this letter with you.

(The witness produced a document.)

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I think that is a letter you received asking your assistance to locate certain lost officers; is that right?

General WOLKOWICKI. That is correct.

Mr. DONDERO. Is that going to be made a part of the record?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you have any objection to a copy of this letter which you sent to the NKVD being made a part of the record?

General WOLKOWICKI. No objections. I will leave that for you.

Mr. FLOOD. Have this marked as "No. 16."

(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit 16.")

Mr. FLOOD. The witness is shown exhibit No. 16, which is a copy of a letter that he testified he wrote on the date mentioned, to the NKVD, in connection with these matters.

Will you look at the exhibit, and I will ask you if that is such a copy?

General WOLKOWICKI. Yes; that is.

Mr. FLOOD. That will be offered in evidence.

Chairman MADDEN. It is accepted.

(The document marked as "Exhibit 16" was received in evidence and is shown below:)

EXHIBIT 16

Order jeńców wojennych
"Gryzaniowie"
6/IX/49/401

Komisarz at. Łachowy Sprawy Więziennej
(N. K. W. D.)

Wzrost do spraw jeńców wojennych.

Jako najstarszy oficerowie wojennych żołnierzy
w obozie jeńców "Gryzaniowie" porzuciłem sobie
zwrocić się do N. K. W. D. z prośbą o wyłączenie
oświadczenia: od wyjazdu z Moskwy
Stanisława i Estera z żoną, z wyjątkiem
i innych, w tym samym obozie, w tym celu
zgodę Komisji. Za parę dni negocjacje
prawie nie ma i nie otrzymałem jeszcze
wiadomości o wyjeździe od wyjazdu.

Porzuciłem wasi dalszy ciąg z tego czasu
przebieg do rodzin, jednakże nie udało się
otrzymać śladu dotąd ani jednej odpowiedzi.

Musię ze smutkiem stwierdzić, że w ostat-
nim tego sprawie w obozie wciąż nie ma
zobowiązania, które wyjątkowo swój wyjazd
w ich trybie rozmawiać o listach i nie-
pokojem o los rodzin. Wychodzi mi się,
że z tego powodu mogą nawet rajd
wypadki samobójstwa. Nadto nie
chcę wiedzieć w tym zakresie, gdzie
opozycyjnie, że rzekomy nasi nie mają

i że dlatego nie ma listów.

Proszę więc N. H. W. D., aby sprawił ko-
 rrespondencyjną rozpatrzono ponownie i
 uregulowaną je stać, jemu to było widmo-
 wych oszrostach. Jeśli drugie listy są, niemo-
 żliwe, to korespondencyjną można wypracować
 na warunkach fachowych i administracyjnych, z podjęciem
 drugim przesłaniem. Chcielibyśmy natomiast post-
 ąpić od przycięcia jej dla siły nieprzewodności o-
 bliższych. Daje może N. H. W. D. zabrać się o
 złowasie ustalania korespondencyjnej jemu i
 redimować dla terenu, rajstych, przez W. S. D.
 przy pomocy powierzonego osobnego tempa,
 a dla terenu, rajstych, przez inżyniera, przy
 pomocy polskiego osobnego tempa, w li-
 bracji. To ostatnie już było przetykowane.

Nadmieniam przy tym, że z otymczasem
 dawniej listów jest nam wiadomości, że w
 znaczu niekonieczności wolno pisać o ma-
 tyłach, otymczasem zaś korespondencyjną
 słów nieogramiczną.

Włodzisław
 generał brygady B. P.

[Translation from Polish]

PRISONERS OF WAR CAMP "GRJAZOWIEC"

September 6, 1940

People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (N. K. V. D.)
Office for P. O. W. Affairs

As senior officer of the Polish Army in the Grjazowiec POW camp, I take the liberty to address myself to the NKVD with the following declaration: Over four months have passed since our departure from Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostaszkow and our arrival at the present camp. Since that time practically nobody has received any communications from his family.

During that time we were permitted to write to our families twice, but we have received no reply to our letters.

I must state with distress that the prisoners have become extremely despondent; the only topic of conversation is the lack of correspondence and their anxiety about their families. I fear that suicides may take place. Nobody believes the explanations of the camp authorities: that our relatives do not write, and that explains why there are no letters.

I therefore request the NKVD that the matter of correspondence should be reviewed and arrangements made as they were in the winter camps. If long letters are impossible to arrange, proper typical correspondence cards could be introduced. Even the slightest information is better than the depressing lack of information about nearest relatives.

It is suggested that perhaps the NKVD could make the proper arrangements through the Soviet Red Cross as regards correspondence with families on the territories occupied by the USSR, and for the territories occupied by the Germans, through the Polish Red Cross in Warsaw. This last method has been practiced in the past.

It is known from the correspondence which we have been receiving that in the German POW camps it is permitted for [the prisoners] to write once a week, and the reception of letters is unlimited.

Wolkowicki,

Major General, Polish Army

General WOLKOWICKI. This is the original, and I had written the Russian version of this letter to the NKVD.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. The letter you sent to the NKVD was in Russian, but this is a copy of that same letter written in the Polish language; is that correct?

General WOLKOWICKI. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. General, why is it that of all the general officers at Kozielsk—and general officers are very important people—why would it be that of all the general officers there, as well as the admiral who was there, that you were the only one that survived? You do not know the reason, but what guess do you have?

General WOLKOWICKI. I am a former Russian naval officer. Before World War I, I was a Russian—

Mr. MACHROWICZ. General, that was before Poland was formed in 1919; is that right?

General WOLKOWICKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. There was no Poland at that time, and you were then a Russian naval officer?

General WOLKOWICKI. I was a Russian naval officer before World War I.

Chairman MADDEN. And you attribute that fact to the reason that you were spared death?

General WOLKOWICKI. I was also in the battle of Tsushima. I was on the ship which was surrendered by a Russian admiral to the Japanese. I was the only officer who opposed the surrender of this ship, and that is why their attitude toward me was one of considerable interest.

Chairman MADDEN. How old are you?

General WOLKOWICKI. Sixty-nine.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you offered any command with the Polish Armies under the Russian command?

General WOLKOWICKI. No.

Mr. FLOOD. After August of 1941?

General WOLKOWICKI. No; because I already was a deputy commander of the Sixth Division under General Anders, and then my attitude toward them was such that they wouldn't dare make me such an offer.

Chairman MADDEN. Is that all?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is all.

General WOLKOWICKI. I have with me here a certificate of an inoculation against typhus, which all of these men received. I wish to point out that it was these certificates that were found in great numbers on the Polish soldiers whose bodies were discovered at Katyn.

Chairman MADDEN. May we see that?


(The document referred to was handed to the committee.)

General WOLKOWICKI. This is the only document that the Russians permitted me to keep. They had taken all of my other documents, including my letters, away from me.

Mr. FLOOD. Will the reporter mark this as "Exhibit 17"?

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 17" and is shown below:)

EXHIBIT 17



[Translation from Russian]

Wolkowicki Jerzy S. [son of] Tadeusz

[Written in Polish:] Wolkowicki Jerzy S. [son of] Tadeusz

Wolkowicki has undergone injections against typhoid fever and paratyphoid twice: December 6, 1939. The physician of the camp of the NKVD [Peoples' Commissariat for the Interior] in Kozielsk.

[Signature illegible]

General WOLKOWICKI. All my other documents were taken away at the time I left Kozielsk.

Mr. FLOOD. The witness is shown the document marked for identification "Exhibit 17" and I ask him whether or not this is the typhus-innoculation certificate to which he referred?

General WOLKOWICKI. Yes; it is.

Mr. FLOOD. Were all of the officers and prisoners at Kozielsk inoculated against typhus and given one of these certificates, as far as you know?

General WOLKOWICKI. I believe that all of them were.

Mr. FLOOD. And of all the things they were permitted to keep with them, as far as you know, when they left Kozielsk, as in your case, this certificate was one of those things?

General WOLKOWICKI. I had mine in my pocket, and when the soldier that was searching me looked at it he gave it back to me.

Mr. FLOOD. You have seen certificates subsequently, that were found on the bodies of the soldiers at Katyn, that were similar to the certificates of inoculation at Kozielsk?

General WOLKOWICKI. That is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. This is offered in evidence as well.

Chairman MADDEN. That exhibit is received in evidence.

Are there any further questions?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I might say, for the record, that I am now looking through the exhibit which is the list of the names of the officers found at Katyn. I have found quite a number of notes that such inoculation cards have been found on the bodies.

Chairman MADDEN. General, from your broad experience as a former Russian officer, naval officer, and from your experience in contact with the Russian people over these long years, and also from your experience in the prison camp at Kozielsk, and also from the experience and the information you have received since you were released from the prison camp, can you state, in your opinion, who you think committed the massacres and murders at Katyn?

General WOLKOWICKI. On the basis of my own personal observations, it is my belief that the massacre at Katyn was perpetrated by the Russians.

Chairman MADDEN. That is all, General. We want to thank you for your testimony here today; it is very valuable.

General, did anybody promise you any pay or consideration or emolument or any reward to come here to testify today?

General WOLKOWICKI. Nobody.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Gentlemen, this is Mr. Moszynski.

Chairman MADDEN. Mr. Moszynski, would you spell your full name for the record?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. M-o-s-z-y-n-s-k-i; Adam.

Chairman MADDEN. And your address?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Penhros Camp, near Pwllheli, in north Wales.

Chairman MADDEN. Before you make your statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who considered he had suffered injury as a result of your testimony. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as a result of your testimony. Do you understand that?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes.

Chairman MADDEN. Now, will you be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear, by God the Almighty, that you will, according to your best knowledge, testify the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. O'KONSKI. I suggest he make a brief statement on how he prepared the book and then we can interrogate him.

TESTIMONY OF ADAM MOSZYNSKI, PENHROS CAMP, NEAR PWLLHELI, NORTH WALES (WITH THE AID OF INTERPRETER ROMAN PUCINSKI)

Chairman MADDEN. Will you proceed and make a statement in your own words regarding what information you would like to convey to the committee?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. I will report in Polish because I understand English, but it is easier for me to speak in Polish.

Mr. FLOOD. Before you begin: This committee has had before it at its hearings in the United States of America and here in London today a document to which it has been referring and to which it has asked certain of the witnesses to refer for the purpose of identifying the names of the Polish officers whose bodies were found at Katyn. We now show you that document and ask you if you were identified with its preparation in any way? [It is exhibit 5-A, introduced in Chicago.]

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes, of course. I have a copy. Yes; this is the same.

Mr. FLOOD. What is it?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. This is the list of all prisoners of war who were in three camps: in Kozielsk, in Ostashkov, and in Starobielsk.

Mr. FLOOD. Have you been identified in any way with the particular document to which you refer? Have you prepared it or been connected with its production?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. I prepared this document on the ground of the German official book *Amtliches Material zum Massenmord von Katyn*.

Mr. FLOOD. Are you referring to the so-called German white book?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes; entitled "*Amtliches Material zum Massenmord von Katyn*; ausgegeben in 1943, in Berlin."

Here is the list of some 2,000, with some hundred, prisoners of war who were exhumed in Katyn in 1943. It was the first set.

The second set was the list which was prepared by the Polish Red Cross in Katyn during exhumation in 1943. Then the third set was

the list which was prepared in the Polish Army in Russian through Dr. Kaczkowski.

Then I have identified the names with official yearbooks of officers. I have received these books from the general staff. In addition to that, I had compared the annual officers' yearbooks that are in the possession of the Polish Army General Staff here in London, in exile.

Mr. DONDERO. Where did you get those names? Where did they come from originally, the names that made up that book by the Germans and then copied by you into your book?

What I want to know and what the committee wants to know is: Where did that list of names come from that made up that book by the Germans?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I want to ask a question on that. Do you know how the Germans assembled their list, the Amtliches Material zum Massenmord von Katyn?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. The Germans had prepared this list on the ground of documents found in the graves.

Mr. DONDERO. That is what we want to know.

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. But there were many mistakes because there were the names written in Russian letters, in Polish letters, and they were read by the Germans; and, therefore, I must identify the names if it was possible for me.

Mr. DONDERO. Kanst du Deutsch lesen? [English translation: Can you read German?]

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Just one question, Mr. Moszynski.

There has been some talk about the German list not being a completely reliable list. Can you make any comment as to that?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. I can verify the fact now, on the basis of my own investigation, that the bulk of those names included in the German book agree with the list prepared independently by the Polish Red Cross at Katyn and also with the list prepared by the bureau which was headed by Mr. Kaczkowski, the Family Service Bureau.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Mr. Moszynski, as I tried to explain, the Germans prepared their list—that is in answer to Mr. Dondero's question—on the basis of the documents which they found on the bodies.

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes, sir.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. But such a list could be in error because there could be some occasions when one person might have a document bearing someone else's name?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Of course; of course.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And such instances were found; were they not?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. As, for instance, the case of Franciszek Biernacki, which has been mentioned by some.

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You are familiar with that instance?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Can you explain the error in that case?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. It is conceivable that one of the corpses found at Katyn may have had in his possession a letter or something which had

been written by Biernacki. As far as I recollect the details on that, Biernacki had left behind, when he was evacuated from Poland, his bankbook, and one of his friends, who was close by, had taken the book and then subsequently the friend had fallen in Katyn, and it was Biernacki's book that was found on another body.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. So that the natural conclusion of the Germans was that this man, other than Biernacki, who had Biernacki's book, was Biernacki?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Other than such occasional errors, you found the German list in substance to be correct; did you?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. It might be interesting to observe for the record at this point that when this committee goes to Frankfurt, where it will sit next week to conduct hearings, there will be present and testifying the various former German Government officials who, under the direction of Von Ribbentrop and Goebbels, prepared the white book and in other ways conducted the investigation at Katyn.

Mr. DONDERO. Mr. Chairman, I want the record to show that I had asked the witness in the German language whether or not he could read German, and he answered "Yes."

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. I personally had translated from German into Polish the various notes that are included, notations that are included in the German text of items that were found on the bodies of these men.

Mr. DONDERO. Were you at Katyn personally?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. No. I am a prisoner of war at Starobielsk camp and I am alive; so is the General Wolkowicki from Kozielsk, so I am from Starobielsk. I had been interned at Starobielsk, and we met together in Pavlischev Bor and then in Griazowiec.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Have you also used the list of a group of Poles who were examining the bodies at Katyn under German supervision? You used, in preparation of this document, a list prepared by a group of Poles who were in Katyn during the German occupation?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. German occupation, yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And you have made several revisions of this book; have you?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. I had to rectify some names on the ground of the official yearbooks of officers.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How much time have you spent on the preparation of this book?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Eleven months.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And, to the best of your knowledge and belief, that is as complete a record of the lost officers at the three camps as is at the present time available?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes. This list was in the beginning published in the weekly White Eagle, a newspaper. This list was also further corrected when the list was reprinted in the Polish newspaper White Eagle, and on the basis of the publication of these names in this newspaper I had had some correspondence, including a letter from one Pole whose name had been listed as dead, and he, in fact, is alive.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. But none of the officers who were in Kozielsk, in Starobielsk, or in Ostashkov, later proved to be alive; is that not correct?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. This list does not include any names of those who are known to be alive.

Mr. DONDERO. The Russians claim that the Germans shot these men. Did the Russians make a list of the dead?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. I have no knowledge of such a list.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. If there were such a list, you would probably have heard of it; is that right?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes; I would have most probably heard about it. I was in that type of service in the Polish Army that I had access to various secret documents, which probably would have borne that out.

Mr. DONDERO. The Germans were the first to make a list of these men who had been shot; were they not?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes; that is correct.

Chairman MADDEN. Did you have any knowledge as to the number of clergymen—ministers, priests, rabbis—that were in these camps, these prison camps?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. How many?

Chairman MADDEN. Do you know of any that were there at all—clergymen, priests, ministers?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes; of course.

Chairman MADDEN. About how many would you say, just roughly?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. For instance, there were about 440 doctors in Kozielsk; in Starobielsk, where I was, were also about 400 doctors. Then there was in Starobielsk a group of judges; they were brought to Starobielsk from Lwow. Then there were about 10 priests. In Starobielsk also was a rabbi.

Chairman MADDEN. Any ministers?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. In Starobielsk, no ministers, but in Kozielsk there were.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Have you the total number of names found, in this book of yours?

Mr. DONDERO. Wieviel? [How many?]

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. There are 3,794 names from Camp Kozielsk.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Of those who were lost from Camp Kozielsk?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That represents what percentage of the total lost from that camp?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. 73 percent.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. So that you have assembled the names of 73 percent of those who were lost at Kozielsk; have you?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Actually, it is a little more than 73 percent. I have here a letter from one of the Polish policemen who was interned in Kozielsk No. 2. That camp was established in the period following the liquidation of Kozielsk No. 1. This policeman had read on the wall in the kitchen in Kozielsk camp an inscription written with a knife which carried the following message, in Polish: "There were five thousand of us Polish officers here."

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Will you tell us how many your list contains of those from Ostashkov?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. It is very little; it is only 1,231. It is about 20 percent.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Twenty percent of those who were known to have disappeared from Ostashkov?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes. I arrived at the total number of Polish prisoners at Ostashkov on the basis of information furnished by those gentlemen who survived the Ostashkov liquidation.

And from Starobielsk it is better.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How many do you have?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. 3,343 names. It is 87 percent.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Besides that, what other names do you have?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Besides that, there were 2,703 without names and also 145 without names, only the items found on their bodies in Katyn are described.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In Katyn?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. In Katyn.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. All in all, you have 9,515 names; do you?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And that represents what percentage of the total number of lost officers at Kozielsk, Ostashkov, and Starobielsk?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. The total number I count about 15,400 persons. They are not only of officers, but other persons, because we know that the graves also contained bodies of civilians and clergy.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You account for 15,000 lost persons in those three camps?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes; 15,400.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And you have assembled, of those 15,000, 9,515 names, or about 53 percent of the total. Is that correct?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Of the remainder, about whom all the rumors have been going around as to what may have happened to the officers that have never been found or whose bodies have never been found, you are aware, as is the committee, that there had been a lot of rumors as to what may have happened to them or where they went. From your experience in this matter, do you care to offer your opinion or your guess as to what happened to the remainder of the prisoners from Ostashkov and from Starobielsk?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. I am sure there are three Katyns in the world. One Katyn is in the Katyn Forest, near Gniezdovo (Smolensk); the second Katyn, of Starozlsk, could be near Kharkov, and the prisoners of Ostashkov, near the White Sea.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is your best opinion; is that correct?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes.

Chairman MADDEN. When you mention the White Sea, are you referring to those thousands that were allegedly drowned on the barges.

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes. To the best of my knowledge, based on considerable research on the subject, the prisoners in Ostashkov were placed on two very old barges, and when the barges were towed out to sea they were destroyed by Russian artillery fire.

Mr. FLOOD. About how many, would you say, drowned on the barges in the White Sea at that time?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. More than 5,000. It is the whole remainder to the total number of Ostashkov prisoners. There are alive only 120 from Ostashkov.

Mr. FLOOD. You feel that somewhere in the vicinity of Kharkov there must be graves similar to those found at Katyn, which contain the bodies of those not yet discovered from Starobielsk?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Yes. When I left Starobielsk on May 12th with 19 others in my group, there remained in that camp 11 Polish officers from a total of 3,920. Another officer and myself sitting in the rail car on our way away from Starobielsk had observed an inscription carved with a pen knife. The inscription was: "We arrived at the station at Kharkov. Most probably we will be unloaded or removed from the train."

Chairman MADDEN. Is that all, Mr. Machrowicz?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is all.

Chairman MADDEN. Would you have any opinion as to why you were saved and not murdered?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. Those of us who have survived have thought about that a great deal. Looking over this group of the 400 survivors, we have come to the conclusion, if the Russians had any particular reason for selecting us, that reason was that they wanted a complete cross section of all the Polish prisoners that were ever detained so that they could subsequently say, "Why, you have these prisoners here."

Chairman MADDEN. From all your experience in research in the prison camp and outside, since the beginning of the war, have you formed an opinion as to who committed the massacres at Katyn?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. No other; only the Bolsheviks.

Mr. DONDERO. Do you mean by that the Russians?

Mr. MOSZYNSKI. The Russians.

Chairman MADDEN. We wish to thank you for your testimony; it is very valuable.

The committee will meet at 10 o'clock in the morning.

(Whereupon, at 6:20 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m. Thursday, April 17, 1952.)

THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

THURSDAY, APRIL 17, 1952

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE,
London, England.

The Select Committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 111, Kensington Palace Hotel, De Vere Gardens, W. 8, Hon. Ray J. Madden (chairman) presiding.

Present: Messrs. Madden, Flood, Machrowicz, Dondero, and O'Konski.

Also present: Roman Pucinski, committee investigator and interpreter.

Chairman MADDEN. The committee will come to order.

The record will show that present at the hearing today are the Chairman, Congressman Flood, Congressman Machrowicz, Congressman Dondero, and Congressman O'Konski.

We will now proceed.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Gentlemen, this is General Bohusz-Szyszko, who was the first military attaché of the Polish Government in Moscow after Poland and Russia reestablished diplomatic relations in 1941.

Chairman MADDEN. Just state your name to the reporter.

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Lieutenant General Bohusz-Szyszko. The first name is Zygmunt Peter. The address is Chester; 44 Lower Bridge Street.

Mr. FLOOD. Before you make a statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who had considered he had suffered injury as a result of your testimony. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as a result of your testimony.

Mr. Interpreter, will you translate that admonition for the witness? (The interpreter translated the admonition.)

Does the witness clearly understand the provisions of that admonition?

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness says he does understand the provisions of that admonition.

Mr. FLOOD. Will the witness rise and be sworn?

Do you swear, by God the Almighty and Omniscient, that you will, according to your best knowledge, tell the pure truth and you will not conceal anything; so help you God?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. I do.

**TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. ZYGMUNT PETER BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO,
44 LOWER BRIDGE STREET, CHESTER, ENGLAND. (WITH THE
AID OF INTERPRETER, ROMAN PUCINSKI.)**

Mr. FLOOD. What is your name?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. My name is Bohusz-Szyszko.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you at any time identified with the Polish Army?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes, I was in the Polish Army before the war and during the war in the present Polish Army.

Mr. FLOOD. What was your rank?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Lieutenant general.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you a lieutenant general in the Polish Army in 1939?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. No, in 1939 I was major general.

Mr. FLOOD. I understand that at one time you were a military attaché for the Polish Government.

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Not attaché; I was first chief of the Polish Military Mission in Moscow.

Mr. FLOOD. When was that? What year was that?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. From the 1st of August 1941 to the last of December 1941.

Mr. PUCINSKI. December 31?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. December 31.

Mr. FLOOD. Who appointed you to that position; who named you?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. General Sikorski.

Mr. FLOOD. General Sikorski at that time was the chief of the Polish Government; was he not?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes; he was Prime Minister.

Mr. FLOOD. Who went with you? I am not interested in the names especially, but what was the make-up of the Polish Military Mission?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Two persons. One is a high Polish officer and the second, secretary of the Polish Embassy in Moscow.

Mr. FLOOD. If those are all there were, will you give me the names, please?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes, sir. It was a Major Bortnowski, and the secretary was Mr. Arlet.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you go from Kuibishev to Moscow?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. No; I went from London, from London by airplane to our hangars in Moscow.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you put up by the Russians or by the Polish Ambassador? Where did you stay? How were you put up there in Moscow?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. First in a hotel and later in the Polish Embassy.

Mr. FLOOD. Who was the Ambassador for the Poles at that time?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Mr. Kot.

Mr. FLOOD. What is his full name?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Stanislaw Kot.

Mr. FLOOD. And Stanislaw Kot was the Polish Ambassador in Moscow on August 1, 1941, when you arrived there as chief of the Polish Military Mission?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes. But Ambassador—Professor Kot arrived later, a month later, the 1st day of September.

Mr. FLOOD. But during your term as chief of the Military Mission, Ambassador Kot, starting in September, was the ambassador to Moscow, was he?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. The answer to your original question is "Yes."

Mr. DONDERO. What year?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. 1941.

Mr. FLOOD. So that, from August 1, 1941, until that day in September when Ambassador Kot arrived in Moscow, you were the chief representative of the Polish Government in Moscow?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. Of course, one of your chief missions, I suppose, was to inquire as to the whereabouts of certain missing Polish officers; was it not?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes; because I was this officer who was designated to make a military agreement with the Russian Government.

Mr. FLOOD. You were the military officer who participated in the protocol with the Russian military?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you just go on in your own words and describe for us the thing in which we are chiefly interested at this time, which is: Any conversations, any communications, that you, as the ranking Polish representative, as chief of the official Polish Military Mission in Moscow, conducted with any Russians? Tell us who they were, their names, rank, and the tenor and the nature of the entire conversation until Ambassador Kot got there.

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. After the military agreement between Poland and Russia was established or reached, several conversations followed with representatives of both the Russian Government and the Russian Army. Among those authorized by the Russians to carry on these conversations was Major Zhukov, who was the chief of the security division of the Russian Army. That particular position is comparable to a general in the Army. He had the title of Plenipotentiary of the Soviet Government.

Representing the staff of the Russian Army was Major General Panfilov. The Polish Government was represented by General Anders and myself in these discussions. At that time, General Anders already had been nominated by General Sikorski as the Chief of Staff of the Polish Army being formed in Russia.

Mr. FLOOD. At that point, I want to make the record clear.

Although General Anders was with you in the conversations, the fact remains that you were the chief of the Military Mission and General Anders was Chief of Staff of the Polish Army; is that right?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. No; General Anders was not chief of staff; he was commander in chief of the Polish Army.

Mr. FLOOD. But you were chief of the Military Mission?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Military Mission, yes.

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness was asked whether General Anders had already been on the scene there at the time the witness arrived in Moscow. He said that General Anders was in Lubianka prison at that time.

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. At the first conference, which was conducted during the middle of August 1941, one of our first demands—

Mr. FLOOD. The first conference took place in the middle of August in Moscow, did it not? And by that time General Anders already was released from Lubianka prison and joined you in this conference.

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes; in Moscow. General Anders was released.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you tell us, as you best-recall, who appeared for the Russians?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. General Panfilow and General Zhukov, these two.

Mr. FLOOD. And for the Poles?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. General Anders and I.

Mr. FLOOD. Very well.

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Our first request was that we be supplied with a list of all the Polish officers who were at that time being held in Russia, because neither could the London Government nor the English mission, which was there at the time, give us this information. And we had no definite details as to the names or the number of Polish officers being held in Russia. The only basis of information that we had as to the numbers was a speech made by Molotov in 1939, who at that time had announced that the Russians had taken prisoner in excess of 250,000 Polish soldiers and an excess of 10,000 Polish Army officers.

Mr. FLOOD. What was the occasion of the Molotov statement?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. He made that announcement after the cessation of hostilities in Poland.

Both Zhukov and Panfilow assured us that they would provide us with such a list of names; and at a subsequent conference, not the next one but the one immediately following the next one, or the third conference that we held, they did give us a list of Polish officers from Griazoviec.

The list was composed of a pad of names which were typewritten, and we received a carbon copy and it contained 1,100 names of Polish officers and about 300 names of noncommissioned officers and police officers, and a few civilians. The names were all Poles.

We immediately began to study this list in the presence of the two Russian delegates at this conference. General Anders and I began studying the names contained in that list because we wanted to determine immediately who was on this list and which of those men on the list could be utilized in the proposed Polish Army, which of them could be commanding officers of divisions and various other Army units. We immediately registered our surprise after examining this list, that there were virtually no names of high-ranking Polish officers. There were only three generals on this list.

There appeared on this list the names of only three generals, who were Generals Walkowicki, Przedziecki, and Jarnuskiewicz; and just a few colonels and lieutenant colonels. We realized immediately that there should have been many higher-ranking Polish officers on this list. We asked them at that time in which camps and, "Where are the rest of the Polish officers and when will their names be furnished us?"

To this, General Zhukov, the NKVD head, replied that those names would be furnished us later because at that time they could not locate and assemble the names.

We did not pursue our demand for these names any further at this particular conference, but we did single out at this conference the names of three particular Polish officers that we were seeking.

Mr. DONDERO. Did General Anders speak Russian, or was it done through an interpreter?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. General Anders understood Russian.

Mr. DONDERO. Did you understand what they said?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Myself, again, I speak Russian fluently.

The three that we named in particular were Lt. Col. Adam Soltan, who was formerly the Chief of Staff for General Anders; Colonel Janiszewski, who was a very good friend of mine and my own aide, and Dr. Major Delawau.

Mr. DONDERO. Mr. Chairman, I want the record to show that I asked the question whether this witness understood Russian, and he answered that he did and that General Anders understands Russian and speaks Russian.

The purpose of that question is to be sure there was no misunderstanding between the Polish representatives and the Russians.

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes. You are completely correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. All right, now, will you proceed with your statement, General?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. These three particular officers we wanted very badly because we knew of their experience and we needed them to help in the organization of the Polish Army in Russia. We received no adequate information on these men either at this particular conference or at any other subsequent conference that we held when we repeated the demand for additional information as to their whereabouts.

I later learned that two of these men definitely were on the list of the Katyn victims. Soltan and Delawau were definitely on the Katyn list, and I am not certain of the third one, Janiszewski. At no time during the six conferences that we held with them regarding the formation of Polish armies were we successful in obtaining any details of information as to the whereabouts of the Polish officers that we were seeking.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You have now mentioned six conferences. You have already related three. Would you be able to state within what period of time these six conferences took place: Were they within a short period of time?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. About 6 weeks—one conference each week.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. At this point would you state what the general attitude was of the Russians at the first, second, and third conferences: Was it of hostility, or was it an amiable attitude; what was it?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Their attitude in general was a very pleasant one, except whenever we raised the question of the whereabouts of the Polish officers; then they appeared to become very much disturbed and rattled, and they always managed to evade the particular subject.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did that attitude continue during all six conferences?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Now proceed with the rest of your story.

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. At that time we had no idea what was the fate of these Polish officers. We suspected that they might be somewhere in the far northern prison camps of Russia and that they cannot be immediately delivered to us, and because of that our demands for their return at these particular conferences ended. At the end of our particular conferences our Ambassador Kot had arrived in Moscow, and we thereafter assigned the whole effort to locate these soldiers to the diplomatic staff, namely, Mr. Kot, who was now in Moscow.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Are we correct in assuming, then, that from that moment on, all further negotiations with regard to these lost officers were carried on by Ambassador Kot; is that correct?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you subsequent to that, as chief of the Polish military mission in Moscow, have any other conferences or discussions with any Russian officers or officials?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. As to the fate of these Polish officers?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes, the whole time, because I was in the Embassy.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You then became a member of the staff in the Embassy?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In what capacity—as military attaché?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. As chief of military mission.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In the Embassy?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Will you tell us what your subsequent conversations or discussions were with regard to these lost officers?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. What I have now just related was the first phase of our efforts to locate the Polish officers.

Mr. FLOOD. May I interrupt. I am sorry, General, that I had to leave the room when I was questioning you. We had a telephone call in from the chief of the American mission at Berne, Switzerland, in connection with Professor Naville, whom you will remember. Before you go into the second phase, I would like to ask you this: I understand that up to this point in all your conversations with your Russian opposite numbers you had complete cooperation for the purpose of your military mission?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In everything except whatever had to do with talks about missing Polish officers?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes, you are right, sir.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Up until this time did you have any conversations with Stalin, Vishinsky or Molotov?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. No.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Or Beria?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. No, only with Field Marshal Shaposhnikov, who was Chief of Staff of the Red Army, but not about the officers.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Not about the officers?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. No.

Mr. FLOOD. Can you detail for us, if there is any such, any incident of particular interest, any really important incident which you think the committee should know about; with any of the Russians, military, civilian or otherwise, in the conferences or outside the conferences, socially or officially, before you go to the second phase—regarding the Polish officers only now?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes. We discussed this matter with them very frequently, and, just like in all our conversations, they were very amiable and discussed things very freely with us; but the moment that we raised the point of the Polish officers our conversation ceased and there was a war between us.

Mr. FLOOD. Even socially, having a drink at some place?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Even socially. I can give you one concrete example of my own personal conversation with General Zhukov, who, whenever we learned definitely the name of a Polish officer and his whereabouts and we asked General Zhukov to help us get this man released, he was very agreeable and did that almost immediately; but when I asked him for the third time in one of our private discussions for the release of Colonel Janiszewski and Dr. Major Delawau, he told me very bluntly: "Please do not ask me about these men, because in this particular case I cannot help you."

Mr. FLOOD. Was there any mention at any time made by you to any of the Russians in connection with camps at Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. What was said about any of those three camps?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. They never gave us any concrete answer as to the whereabouts of the officers from these three particular camps. Subsequently at Pavlishchev Bor and Starobielsk there were Polish soldiers and our own people went there to mobilize these Polish soldiers, but they found no officers.

Mr. FLOOD. We are interested in just your particular job at this time.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. General, now will you relate to us an account of this so-called second phase or your discussions in Moscow, when they were, and so forth?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes; our second phase of the conversations consisted mostly of our discussions with them giving the information that we had available as to the names of officers who we believed should be in Russia, and we provided them with such a list. A strange circumstance arose in that we received absolutely no assistance from the Russians in compiling a list of the Polish officers that we were seeking, and whenever that subject was brought up, they would then ask us: "Well, who specifically are you looking for: who do you believe should be in Russia?" It was then that we began preparing the list of Polish names which we gathered from other Poles who had reported to us and who had had conversations with Polish officers in Russia at some time or other. Every Polish soldier who reported to the Polish Army in Russia was very carefully interrogated and was directed to search his memory for the names of any Polish officers that he may have seen at any camp in Russia where he himself may have been interned. This list was necessary so that we would have a basis for official diplomatic intervention through our own Ambassador in

Russia. The preparation of this list and gathering this information lasted approximately another 6 weeks. It was obvious that the lists that were prepared at first were incomplete. But our first list, even though it was incomplete, already contained approximately 3,500 names of Polish officers, names which we were able to get from other Poles reporting to us. It was this list that formed the basis for our official diplomatic intervention through Ambassador Kot with the Russians, and then subsequently through General Sikorski personally, who conducted the conversations with Stalin in November of 1941. Neither the official intervention by Ambassador Kot nor the personal conversations of General Sikorski with Stalin resulted in any particular success.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What personal part, if any, did you play in the interventions of Ambassador Kot in this matter: did you participate in the conferences he had, or what part did you play?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes; I prepared the material and the list, but I did not personally participate in those conversations which were conducted by Ambassador Kot.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And I imagine the same is true—you did not personally participate in any of the conferences held directly by General Sikorski with Stalin?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Have you anything further to add in that respect?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes; the last phase of my particular investigation was that since we had no success in our official negotiations with the Russians, we returned again to an effort through the military to locate these officers. This, of course, was done in two ways: Through official channels and through unofficial channels. Officially Major Czapski was nominated by General Anders to deal with the military in an official way. He had the proper letters of authorization for him to do this particular work. His assignment was to contact the top command of the NKDV, and through them it was his assignment to try and learn as to the whereabouts or fate of the Polish officers. Our unofficial efforts consisted in sending our own people to the various locations and camps that had been suggested from time to time where these Polish officers might be still held captive. Particularly did we send people to the far north. Those are the points from which there were no Polish officers reporting to us when the Army was being formed. From among those that we had sent unofficially and secretly into these northern sections of Russia to get some information on the Polish officers, very few returned, and those who did manage to return could not give us any additional information. At this time I already had been named as Chief of Staff of the Polish Forces in Russia; and since I was the Chief of Staff then I was directly in command of sending Major Czapski into the official channels and these various other people through the unofficial channels into northern Russia.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Just to make the record clear, when you speak of the Polish Army in Russia, you are referring to General Anders' army; is that right?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes. This all happened during the summer of 1942. This for the most part consists of the highlights of

the knowledge that I have of our efforts to locate these Polish soldiers. If you have any particular questions, I shall be happy to answer them.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. There were no further direct contacts made with any Russian officials other than those about which you have told us, so far as it relates to the missing Polish officers?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. We had made constant efforts not only when I first arrived there but also when I became the Chief of Staff to locate or get some information as to the whereabouts of these Polish officers, and all through 1942 our efforts were completely without success.

Mr. DONDERO. Did all of this happen before Germany attacked Russia?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. All of this was after Germany had attacked Russia and the Poles established diplomatic relations with the Russians.

Mr. DONDERO. What was the date of the German attack?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. The 22d of June 1941, and I arrived in Russia on the 4th of August 1941.

Chairman MADDEN. Let me ask the general this: In the conferences that you had with the Russian officials regarding the missing officers, their statements to you, as I understand it, were that they did not know anything about these missing officers; is that right?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes.

Chairman MADDEN. You are familiar with the time when the Germans, the Nazis, made the broadcast announcing the finding of the graves at Katyn, are you not?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes.

Chairman MADDEN. How soon after this Berlin broadcast announcing the finding of the thousands of bodies at Katyn did the Russians come out in a broadcast and state that the Germans killed these Polish officers?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. This broadcast was in 1943 and the Polish Army was in the Middle East at this time. We left Russia in 1943.

Chairman MADDEN. I understand it was within 24 or 48 hours that Moscow came out and stated that the Germans killed these people?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. We at that time, of course, no longer were in Russia; the entire Polish Army had been moved out of Russia and we were in the Middle East.

Chairman MADDEN. But do you know how long after the Berlin broadcast announcing the finding of the graves was it that Russia broadcast and accused the Germans of killing them?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. I do not recall exactly; it is difficult for me to fix the exact time; but it was very shortly after that.

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness points out that they were shocked and taken by complete surprise when the Russians announced their version, particularly after the German announcement, and they were extremely disturbed over the question; "Why did not the Russians tell us where these men were if they had known that they were there during our entire negotiations?" They had claimed all along that these Polish officers had been sent to labor camps somewhere in the Smolensk area. Why could not they have told us at that time that "We had sent them to these labor details in Smolensk," and that the

Germans had taken them prisoner. Instead we received the reply from Stalin that maybe these men had fled or escaped to Manchuria. ¶ Mr. MACHROWICZ. General, I want to hand you now the official exhibit which was identified yesterday by Mr. Moszynski as the so-called Katyn list of the missing officers of the Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov camps. You have mentioned three persons in whom you were particularly interested in finding, Lieutenant Colonel Soltan, Colonel Janiszewski, and Dr. Major Delawau.

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I hand you the exhibit I have just described and call your attention to page 291, and ask you whether you find there the name of Maj. Adam Soltan, whom you were trying to locate at that time?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you find there his name as one of those who were found missing in Katyn?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Now I will call your specific attention to page 259 and ask whether you find there the name of Colonel Janiszewski whom you have also mentioned?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes, the same.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is the same person?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I have been unable to find in that exhibit the name of Dr. Major Delawau. Do you find it there?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Delawau is not there.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I want to correct myself, when I say that the names of Lieutenant Colonel Soltan and of Colonel Janiszewski are on the list of Katyn, I want to correct that as being on the list of those who have never been heard of.

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. It is my understanding that Colonel Soltan was among those found in Katyn.

¶ Mr. MACHROWICZ. At any rate, General, he has not been seen since April 1940; is that correct; he has never been seen alive?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. That is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. General, I have just three final questions to tie your testimony altogether here, with particular reference now to the so-called second phase of your investigation after Ambassador Kot reached Moscow. In all of your conversations with the Russians from that point on, regardless of who they were publicly, officially, or privately, did you still find the same attitude any time you mentioned missing Polish Officers?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Otherwise, there was an atmosphere and an attitude of cooperation in everything but the question of missing Polish Officers; is that true?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. You mentioned that during this period of time after the Ambassador arrived, the second phase, you were getting lists of names of officers from different Polish prisoners that were released and were coming in to Polish camps from all over Russia; you were getting names from them as best you could?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. But at no time from no one, Pole or otherwise, did you get any names of any officers who were at Koziesk, Starobielsk or Ostashkov except those who had been taken to Palvlishchev Bor?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Finally, as the Chief of the Polish Military Mission and as a ranking Polish general and as subsequent Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Forces under General Anders, you, of course, at that time were fully aware of that provision in the protocol of rapprochement between the Soviet and the Poles which provided that the Russians were to release all Polish prisoners of all categories, military and civilian; is that not correct?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. That is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. And yet, despite that protocol, in all conversations you had at any time with any Russians, military, civilian or NKVD, about missing Polish officers, the Russians insisted that the Poles produce lists of names; is that not right?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And at no time did they assume the burden that they had agreed to under the protocol of releasing everybody?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Several times, in reply to our demands that there are still many Poles being interned, and that they should be released, we received official answers. One of those answers came directly from Mr. Stalin, who said: "If all of these Poles are not released, it is the fault of the lower echelons within the NKVD."

Mr. FLOOD. But the fact remains that they were not released?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. That is all.

Mr. DONDERO. Have you been promised any reward or pay for coming to testify or did you come here voluntarily?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. I came here voluntarily, without any compulsion. I have been offered no remunerations for my testimony.

Mr. DONDERO. As a result of your experience and contact with the Russians and the position you held, what is your opinion now or then as to who committed this crime of killing the officers in Katyn?

General BOHUSZ-SZYSZKO. There is no doubt or misunderstanding in my mind. I am certain that this could have been done only by the Russians.

Mr. FLOOD. May I say for the committee, General, that we are very grateful that you would take your time to come here. We know that you welcome the opportunity of stating the truth, but, even so, we appreciate it very much.

**TESTIMONY OF EDWARD RACZYNSKI, 7, ARMITAGE ROAD,
LONDON, N.W.11**

Mr. FLOOD. Before you make a statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who considered that he had suffered injury. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as the result of the testimony. You understand that admonition clearly?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes, I do.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you rise and be sworn, please. Do you swear by Almighty God that you will, according to the best of your knowledge, tell the pure truth and you will not conceal anything, so help you God?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, will you tell us your connection with the Government of General Sikorski, the Polish Government in London, during the years that you were here in that connection?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. I was appointed Polish Ambassador.

Mr. FLOOD. By whom?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. In London, by the former Polish Government. The Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time was Colonel Beck in 1934—that is in prewar days—and I was Ambassador in London since November 1934.

Mr. FLOOD. You continued to be Ambassador in 1939?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. I continued to be Ambassador throughout until recognition from the Polish Government was withdrawn in July 1945. So I remained Ambassador in London for 11 years.

Mr. FLOOD. For 11 years from 1934?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. From 1934, November, until July 1945. I have to add that during General Sikorski's prime ministership, after the signature of the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30, 1941, there was a change in the Polish Government. The Polish Minister of the day, the Honorable A. Zaleski, withdrew and presented his resignation and in August 1941 I was entrusted with foreign affairs of Poland first as Acting Foreign Minister of Poland and a few months later as Minister of State in Charge of Polish Foreign Affairs.

Mr. FLOOD. But during that period of time that you have just described, when you took over your new position in the Polish London Government, you were still in residence in London?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. What capacity do you now hold with the so-called London Free Polish Government?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. I am holding no official position at all. I have for some days been chief Polish adviser to the British Minister of Labor and National Service.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you recall who was Ambassador from the Soviet to London in 1943?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. The Ambassador of the Soviet Government to the British Government in London was Mr. Myski.

Mr. FLOOD. Can you tell us in what capacity the Soviet representative, Bogomolow, served in London?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes. Bogomolow was the Soviet Ambassador to the Polish Government.

Mr. FLOOD. In London?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. In London.

Mr. FLOOD. During what period of time?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. I could not tell you the exact date of his appointment, but he was appointed, in any case, the first and the only Soviet Ambassador accredited with the Polish Government in 1941, and remained as the Soviet Ambassador to the Polish Government up to the day of the breaking of the Polish-Soviet relations.

Mr. FLOOD. For our purposes, Mr. Bogomolow was the Russian Ambassador to the Polish Government in London during the time of conversations and communications dealing with the Katyn incident.

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you, in your own words, and paying as particular attention as you can to the Katyn matter only, describe for the committee your conversations, if any, and your communications, if any, with Mr. Bogomolow, or with any other governments or any other persons on the Katyn matter.

Mr. RACZYNSKI. The question of Katyn, as you know, I think, from other sources, has caused very serious concern to the Polish Government immediately after it was realized that at the moment of the release of the civilians and of military persons in Russia, a very large number of Polish officers did not turn up. This had become clear already before the end of the year 1941, and had been, as you will remember, discussed by General Anders and by other officers and by General Sikorski during his visit to Moscow in his conversations with Marshal Stalin at the beginning of December 1941. The same information came, naturally, our way here in London and we were trying to check every piece of news in order to find some clues pointing to the whereabouts of the missing Polish officers. After so many years, one's recollections cannot be located with absolute precision to 1 day or 1 hour, but I do remember that on several occasions in these days at that time we received contradictory and curious information regarding the presence of some of the missing Polish officers in very far away regions in Russia. According to one information which is present to my memory, the Polish officers apparently had been sent to the Kolyma district, which is situated far north on the Arctic Ocean and it is not accessible except in certain weeks.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. When you speak of these representations made to you, would you be specific and state on the record who gave you the information and when, rather than a general allegation.

Mr. RACZYNSKI. It was not information communicated to us in any way officially. It was hearsay news coming from fellow Poles from Russia. A certain large number of Poles had been released. These were flocking in large numbers to certain points, like the Polish Embassy in Moscow and later in Kuybyshev, and other points. Polish agents were established under a welfare organization under the Polish-Soviet Treaty and these refugees were flocking to these centers and they were anxiously questioned as to whether they had any information to supply regarding missing Polish officers.

Mr. FLOOD. As a result of all of this information, as a result of these rumors, as a result of all these communications and personal writing that was coming to you as the Polish Ambassador here in London, did you communicate with the Soviet Ambassador to the Polish Government, Mr. Bogomolow?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. I did.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you tell us the first time you made such a communication in writing any person?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. The first communication in writing which I made was on the 28th January, 1942. I have the text here.

Mr. FLOOD. May I see the document, please?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. I even had a copy made.

Mr. FLOOD. May I have it?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. This document is published in this volume, the Polish-Soviet Relations 1918-43, Official Documents, which was issued by the Polish Embassy in Washington by authority of the Government of the Republic of Poland. These documents are absolutely authentic.

Mr. FLOOD. The witness shows the committee a copy of a letter just mentioned, and will the Stenographer mark this as "exhibit 18."

(The letter referred to was marked as "exhibit 18," and is shown below:)

EXHIBIT 18

[Translation copy]

NOTE OF JANUARY 28, 1942, FROM MR. RACZYNSKI, POLISH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO AMBASSADOR BOGOMOLOV, CONCERNING THE FAILURE TO SET FREE A NUMBER OF POLISH CITIZENS, AND SPECIFICALLY A NUMBER OF POLISH OFFICERS

No. 49/Sow/42

LONDON, *January 28, 1942.*

Mr. AMBASSADOR: The Polish Government regrets to have to bring to Your Excellency's notice that, according to information just received, the liberation of Polish citizens detained on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in labour camps and other places of detention has not been completely carried out. In a number of cases the local administrative authorities of the Union do not apply in full the provisions of the Soviet Decree dated August 12, 1941.

In this respect I have the honour to mention in particular the painful fact, that of all the officers and soldiers registered in the prisoner of war camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov, 12 generals, 94 colonels, 293 majors and about 7,800 officers of lesser rank have so far not yet been set free. It must be emphasized that investigations carried out in Poland and in the Reich, have made it possible to establish definitely that these soldiers are not at present in occupied Poland, nor in prisoner-of-war camps in Germany.

According to fragmentary information that has reached us, a certain number of these prisoners find themselves in extremely hard circumstances on Franz Joseph Land, Nova Zembla and on the territory of the Yakut Republic on the banks of the Kolyma River.

I must add that the question of the fate of Polish citizens, civilians and military, has been the subject of several consecutive interventions by the Polish Embassy at Kuybyshev, which will soon be in a position to submit a new list of names of all these persons to the Government of the Union. The same question was also the subject of a conversation in Moscow on December 4, 1941, between the Polish Prime Minister and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. During the course of this conversation General Sikorski was relieved to receive an assurance that the necessary instructions would be issued to the competent Soviet authorities and that all the prisoners would be set free.

Referring to the letter and spirit of this conversation and of the understandings reached by our two Governments, I have no doubt that Your Excellency will share my conviction that the efficient and speedy execution of the provisions of the supplementary Protocol to the Polish-Soviet Agreement signed in London on July 30, 1941, concerning the liberation of Polish citizens, imprisoned or detained in prisoner of war camps or labour camps, rests on imperative motives of humanity and justice. Your Excellency will no doubt also share the Polish Government's opinion that special importance should be attached to the favourable development of our mutual relations, as desired by the political leaders of both our countries united in the common struggle against the invader.

In requesting Your Excellency to be so good as to bring the contents of this Note to the attention of Your Government, I take this occasion to assure Your Excellency of my highest consideration.

I have the honour to be, etc.

RACZYNSKI.

His Excellency
Ambassador Alexander Bogomolov
Ambassador of the U. S. S. R. to the Polish Government.

Mr. FLOOD. I show the witness for his attention exhibit 18 marked for identification and ask him whether or not exhibit 18 is a copy of the letter sent by him to Mr. Bogomolow on January 28, 1942. Just answer yes or no.

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you tell us the substance of that communication? What was that letter?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. This letter was the first official note which I addressed to Bogomolow to tell him of the information available at the time regarding the number of the missing officers in Russia and asking him to give us information on the subject.

Mr. FLOOD. By the way, exhibit 18 is an English translation of the letter of which you speak, is it not?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes; it is.

Mr. FLOOD. What was in the letter in substance?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. As you will note, in this note I am mentioning the fact that we had received some information, or alleged information, regarding the presence of some of these men in the Franz Joseph Land, Nova Zembla, and the territory of the Yakut Republic and the Kolyma River, which I mentioned before.

Mr. FLOOD. That is the gist of the letter, which will speak for itself and will be in the record. Did the Russian Ambassador Bogomolow reply in writing?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. The Russian Ambassador Bogomolow did give me a reply in writing.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you have a copy of that reply, or the original?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. No, I have not the original. I have a copy of that reply. I have not a copy made, but it is in this collection of documents.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you tell me on what page of the document Bogomolow's reply is to be found?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. It is to be found at page 118 under No. 38.

Mr. FLOOD. At this time the committee shows the stenographer a document to be marked as "exhibit 19."

(Document headed "Polish-Soviet Relations 1918-43" was marked as "exhibit 19" and appears in the appendix of the record of the London hearings.)

Mr. FLOOD. For identification, exhibit 19 is referred to as "Polish-Soviet Relations 1918-43, Official Documents, issued by the Polish Embassy in Washington by authority of the Government of the Republic of Poland," marked "Confidential," and I show exhibit 19 to the witness and ask him if he can identify, as an official representative of that said Polish Government, that document.

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. You tell me that on page 118 of exhibit 19 is to be found the reply of Bogomolow to your communication; is that correct?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. That is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. What is the date of Bogomolow's reply to your first letter?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. March 13, 1942.

Mr. FLOOD. At this time we offer in evidence that part of exhibit 19 only which is called No. 38 and is to be found at pages 118 and 119 of exhibit 19. It will be marked "exhibit 19A" and entered

at this point in the record. Will you tell us the gist of Bogomolow's reply?

EXHIBIT 19A .

No. 38

NOTE OF MARCH 13, 1942, FROM AMBASSADOR BOGOMOLOV TO MR. RACZYNSKI, POLISH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IN REPLY TO HIS NOTE OF JANUARY 28, 1942

The Embassy of the U. S. S. R. to the Polish Government.
No. 57.

LONDON, *March 13, 1942.*

MR. MINISTER: In reply to your Note of January 28, 1942, I have the honour, by order of the Soviet Government, to bring the following to your notice:

The Soviet Government cannot agree to the statements contained in Your Excellency's Note. According to these statements the liberation of Polish citizens, including officers and soldiers, detained on the territory of the U. S. S. R. in labour camps and other places of detention, has not been completed, because, it is alleged in the Note, the local Soviet authorities have not applied to their full extent the provisions of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R. of August 12, 1941, concerning the amnesty of Polish citizens.

In the reply by M. V. M. Molotov's Note of November 8, 1941, addressed to Mr. Kot, and in the Aide-Mémoire of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of November 19, it had already been announced that the amnesty of Polish citizens had been strictly carried out. An appropriate investigation conducted by competent Soviet authorities after the conversation held on December 4, 1941, between the Polish Prime Minister, General Sikorski, and the Chairman of the People's Commissars of the U. S. S. R., J. V. Stalin, completely confirmed the above statement; besides the People's Commissar in the spirit of his Note No. 6 of January 9, 1942, addressed to the Embassy of the Republic of Poland, gave additional detailed explanations on the carrying out of the amnesty in favour of Polish citizens.

As the Polish officers and soldiers were liberated on the same basis as other Polish citizens under the Decree of August 12, 1941, all that has been said above applies equally to the Polish officers and soldiers.

As regards the statements contained in Your Excellency's Note, alleging that there are still Polish officers who have not yet been set free, and that some of them are on the Franz Joseph and Nova Zembla islands, and the banks of the river Kolyma, it must be stated that these assertions are without foundation and obviously based on inaccurate information. In any case, whenever it is learned that there are certain isolated instances of delay in setting free Polish citizens, the competent Soviet authorities immediately take measures necessary for their release.

The Soviet Government takes this opportunity to declare that it has put into full effect the measures concerning the liberation of Polish citizens in accordance with the Supplementary Protocol to the Soviet-Polish Agreement of July 30, 1941, and that thus the Soviet Government is doing in this respect all that is necessary for the future favorable development of the Soviet-Polish relations.

I have the honour to be, etc.

BOGOMOLOV.

MR. RACZYNSKI. Bogomolow's reply was of a very formal character. It just kept maintaining that the so-called law of amnesty had been implemented, and that all persons, whether civilian or military, who under that law should have been released were actually released.

MR. FLOOD. Did you communicate subsequently with Bogomolow or anybody else on this same subject?

MR. RACZYNSKI. Yes, I did.

MR. FLOOD. When?

MR. RACZYNSKI. I cannot give you the dates, but on several occasions during our many conversations at regular intervals with Bogomolow in reviewing different Polish-Soviet questions, we often reverted to that point, but always with the same negative result.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. So that we have the proper continuity, Mr. Ambassador, have you had any official communication from Ambassador Bogomolow prior to the one dated March 13, which you identified in this book?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. No.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I refer you particularly to one of November 14, 1941. Do you remember one of that date?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. I cannot recollect offhand.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you have your records?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you find a note which Ambassador Bogomolow is alleged to have delivered to you on November 14, 1941? Incidentally, to refresh your memory, it is the note in which I understand he was to have informed you that all the Polish officers who were on Soviet territory had already been released.

Mr. RACZYNSKI (having referred to exhibit 19). This note of November 14—

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What year?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. November 14, 1941. It is a note from Ambassador Bogomolow addressed not to me but to General Sikorski. It is on page 115 of your exhibit 19.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. But it was delivered to you?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. That is a difficult question for me. I believed that it must have been delivered to General Sikorski directly.

Chairman MADDEN. You do not recall that?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. No.

Mr. FLOOD. Is it entirely possible that any communications addressed to the head of your Government by Bogomolow in London would have been transmitted officially through the channels of your office and would have been probably a procedural matter only; is that correct?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. That is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. In the conversations you had with Bogomolow after his reply to your first letter, were they personal or telephone conversations?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Personal.

Mr. FLOOD. And in London?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. In London.

Mr. FLOOD. They were conversations which had to do with the general matters between Ambassadors of the two countries?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. During the course of those conversations, you would repeatedly refer to the missing Polish officers?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. What in every instance would be the reply and the attitude of Bogomolow on that question?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. The reply of Bogomolow in every case was purely and entirely formal. He repeated, like Soviet representatives often do, obviously an instruction which was given him, and as he seemed to be anxious to avoid any mistake or to make any slip, he kept to more or less the same wording, repeating it formally.

Mr. FLOOD. Of all the conversations that you had with Bogomolow on this subject during that period of time, that particular part we are concerned with, Katyn, will you give us a sample of what you said to

him and what he said to you, not exact, but as you best recall, an illustration?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. By way of illustration, I can say that I was trying to induce Bogomolow to speak freely and to give his reasons, and I appealed to his reason and to his understanding in quoting arguments and in saying: "It is impossible that you should not be able to trace at least one of these missing men. We have had information to the effect that some had been seen here or there. It is not possible that such a large number of people should have vanished into thin air." Those are the kind of arguments which I was trying to put to him. His answer was always entirely formal. He said to me: "My dear Minister, the Soviet government executes to the letter its obligations. It has undertaken to release these people. It has released everybody."

Mr. FLOOD. Did you ever communicate with Bogomolow in writing after this first letter which you told us about on this subject?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes, but only after the crime at Katyn was known, when I wrote him another note.

Mr. FLOOD. That was in 1943?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Is this correct: Before the crime at Katyn was discovered, you wrote to Bogomolow only once?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. You talked to him on four occasions, and the gist of the conversation on those occasions on both sides was as you have just indicated?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. All of these conversations, Mr. Ambassador, took place here in London?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, will you now take us down to that time in 1943 when the Germans announced their discovery of the crime at Katyn, and tell us how the matter first came to your attention unofficially, and then officially?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. The news of the discovery of Katyn came to my knowledge, as to everybody's knowledge, through the publication of the German Government which was released to the press.

Mr. FLOOD. When was that date? Do you recall the exact date?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. April 15, I think; we had no other information—

Mr. FLOOD. Just a moment. Will you give me the exact date that you first heard of the German announcement about Katyn, the day, the month and the year?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. April 13, 1943.

Mr. FLOOD. And at that time you were still Ambassador for the Polish Government in London?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. I was still Minister of State in charge of foreign affairs of the Polish Government.

Mr. FLOOD. You were then Minister of Foreign Affairs?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Minister of State in charge of foreign affairs.

Mr. FLOOD. As soon as this German announcement was brought to your knowledge and attention, what was the first thing that you did either in reference to the German Government or the Soviet Government, or anybody else?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. We did nothing with regard to the German Government.

Mr. FLOOD. Very well. When was the first day that you heard of the Russian reply to the German announcement? Do you remember the day that the Russians made their first announcement in reply to the German announcement?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. On April 15.

Mr. FLOOD. April 15. As soon as you heard of the Russian reply to the German charge about the massacre of Polish officers at Katyn then what did you do in your unofficial capacity?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. The Polish Government discussed the matter.

Mr. FLOOD. With whom?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Amongst ourselves—that means General Sikorski, the Prime Minister; the Polish Minister of Defense; the former Polish Ambassador in Russia, and also the Minister of Information.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you recall if at that time, and as the basis for the discussions of the Polish Government that you are now describing, having received any communication from the Polish General Anders on April 15, which was the day of the Russian announcement? Do you recall any such incident?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes; a telegram was received on April 15, 1943, from General Anders pointing out to the Russians the painful impression created by this discovery in the minds of the Polish forces.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you now tell us what transpired at the meeting on April 15, 1943, of the Polish Government?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. At this meeting we realized that this information, first of all, had the appearance of authenticity, and also we did feel that it could not remain without a strong reaction on our part. We felt that it was above all essential that the information should be impartially verified—

Mr. MACHROWICZ. May I interrupt one second, Mr. Ambassador? Did you participate yourself in the meetings of the Council of Ministers as they were held around that time?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes, I did—and it occurred to us that the best authority for verifying the information, and for stating officially the best view on the authenticity of this discovery would be the International Red Cross at Geneva. We therefore—

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Mr. Ambassador, do you remember participating in the meeting of the Council of Ministers which was held on April 17, 1943, as the result of this announcement by the Germans?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You participated in that meeting?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you remember then, as the result of that meeting, it was decided to make one final attempt to appeal to the Soviet Government, and a note was accordingly issued and sent and delivered to the Soviet Ambassador on April 20, 1943?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes, that is my note of April 20.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That was before the appeal was made to the International Red Cross?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes, but the note was actually sent after.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Well, it was delivered to the Soviet ambassador, Mr. Bogomolow, on April 20?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you have a copy of the note of April 20 that was dispatched to Bogomolow?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes, I have a copy here.

Mr. FLOOD. May I have that, please?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Certainly.

(Mr. Raczynski handed the copy of the note of April 20, 1943. The copy of the note referred to was marked as "Exhibit No. 20 for identification," and follows:)

EXHIBIT 20

[Translation copy]

NOTE OF APRIL 20, 1943, FROM MR. E. RACZYNSKI, POLISH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO MR. A. BOGOMOLOV, AMBASSADOR OF THE U. S. S. R., DEMANDING AN EXPLANATION OF THE FATE OF POLISH PRISONERS MISSING IN THE U. S. S. R.

755/Sow.

LONDON, *April 20, 1943.*

MR. AMBASSADOR,

Foreign telegraph agencies publish a report of the German military authorities concerning the discovery at Kozia Góra near Katyn in the vicinity of Smolensk of a mass-grave containing the bodies of the Polish officers allegedly killed in the spring of 1940. During the first few days 155 bodies were identified among which the body of Major General Mieczyslaw Smorawiński is supposed to have been found.

This report, although emanating from enemy sources, has produced profound anxiety not only in Polish public opinion but also throughout the world.

In a public statement on April 17, 1943, the Polish Government categorically condemned Germany's attempt to exploit the tragedy of Polish prisoners of war in the U. S. S. R. for her own political ends. But more than ever the Polish Government unalterably maintains its attitude that the truth about this case so cynically exploited by Hitlerite propaganda must be fully elucidated.

You are no doubt aware, Mr. Ambassador, that after the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, the Polish Government repeatedly approached the civil and military authorities of the U. S. S. R. with requests for information concerning the prisoners of war and civilians who were in the camps of Kozielsk /East of Smolensk/, Starobielsk /near Kharkov/ and Ostashkov /near Kalinin/.

According to information of the Polish Government there were in all at the beginning of 1940, 15,490 Polish citizens, including 8,700 officers, in the three above mentioned camps. From April 5, 1940, until the middle of May 1940, the Soviet authorities proceeded to break up these camps, deporting the inmates in batches every few days. Prisoners of the Kozielsk camp were deported in the direction of Smolensk, and from all the three camps only 400 men were transferred in the last batches, first to the Yukhnovski camp—railway station Babynino—and subsequently in June 1940, to Griazovetz in the Vologda district.

When after the signing of the Polish-Soviet military agreement on August 14, 1941, the Polish Government proceeded with the organization of the Polish Army in the U. S. S. R., the camp of Griazovetz, to which in the meantime military and civilian prisoners from other camps had arrived, was also broken up and from the above mentioned group of 400 prisoners more than 200 officers reported for service in the Polish Army before the end of August 1941. All the other officers however, who were deported to an unknown destination from the camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov have neither been found nor have they given any sign of life. So it became apparent that more than 8,000 officers were missing who might have supplied the cadres of senior and junior officers of the army in formation and who would have been of inestimable value in the military operations against Germany.

From October 1941, both Ambassador Kot and General Anders, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army in the U. S. S. R., constantly intervened, both orally and in writing, in the matter of the missing officers. Ambassador Kot discussed this subject with Premier Stalin, with Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and with Mr. Vishinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, demanding a list of the prisoners detained in the three camps mentioned above and an explanation as to their fate. During the visit to Moscow in December 1941, General Sikorski also intervened in the above matter in a

conversation with Mr. Stalin and on that occasion handed him a list containing the names of 3,845 Polish officers. On March 18, 1942, General Anders gave Mr. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, a supplementary list of 800 officers. On January 28, 1942, I had the honour to send you, Mr. Ambassador, a Note in which I emphasized the anxiety of the Polish Government at the failure to find many thousands of Polish officers. Lastly, on May 19, 1942, Ambassador Kot sent the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs a Memorandum in which, reverting again to the question of the missing officers, he expressed his regret at the refusal to supply him with the list of prisoners, and his concern as to their fate.

I regret the necessity of calling your attention, Mr. Ambassador, to the fact that the Polish Government in spite of reiterated requests, has never received either a list of the prisoners or definite information as to the whereabouts of the missing officers and of other prisoners deported from the three camps mentioned above. Official, verbal and written statements of the representatives of the U. S. S. R. have been confined to mere assurances that, in accordance with a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R., dated August 12, 1941, the amnesty was of a general and universal character as it included both military and civilian prisoners, and that the Government of the U. S. S. R. had released all the Polish officers from prisoner of war camps.

I should like to emphasize that the Polish Government, as can be seen from their many representations quoted above, entirely independently of recent German revelations, has never regarded the question of the missing officers as closed. If, however, as shown by the communiqué of the Soviet Information Bureau of April 15, 1943, the Government of the U. S. S. R. would seem to be in possession of more ample information on this matter than was communicated to the representatives of the Polish Government sometime ago, I beg once more to request you, Mr. Ambassador, to communicate to the Polish Government detailed and precise information as to the fate of the prisoners of war and civilians previously detained in the camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov.

Public opinion in Poland, and throughout the world has rightly been so deeply shocked that only irrefutable facts can outweigh the numerous and detailed German statements concerning the discovery of the bodies of many thousand Polish officers murdered near Smolensk in the spring of 1940.

His Excellency, ALEXANDER BOGOMOLOV

Ambassador Extraordinary of the U. S. S. R. to the Government of the Polish Republic in London.

Mr. FLOOD. I show the witness marked for identification exhibit No. 20, and ask him whether or not this is the communication addressed by the Polish Government by him dated April 20, 1943, as the result of the meeting of the Polish Council of Ministers on April 17 to Bogomolow?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes; it is.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you state for the record, without reading the letter (which speaks for itself) the gist of your note of April 20 to Bogomolow?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. The gist of my note of April 20 is to remind the Soviet Government of the whole story, first of all of the promised so-called amnesty to the Polish civilians and to the Polish military, and to remind him also of all the former occasions on which we had demanded information, requested information, on the missing officers without ever receiving a satisfactory reply.

Mr. FLOOD. The tenor of your note of April 20 to Bogomolow emphasized that there was no desire on the part of the Polish Government to break relations with the Soviet Government?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. That is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. The letter indicates that there was no such intention?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. There was never such an intention.

Mr. FLOOD. We offer that document in evidence. Now did you ever receive a reply from Bogomolow or from any other Soviet representative to the Polish note we are just discussing of April 20, exhibit No. 20?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. No.

Mr. FLOOD. Now you told us that, for the reasons you stated, it was the determination of the Polish Council of Ministers to communicate with the International Red Cross as an impartial tribunal?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Was such a communication ever directed by the Polish Government in London to the International Red Cross in Geneva?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes; through the Polish representative in Switzerland we requested the International Red Cross to take action.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you have a copy of such a communication in your files?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. I have not got it handy here at the moment, but it is available.

Mr. FLOOD. I am advised that Ambassador General Kukiel will appear and testify to the committee and will have these documents, and that certain representatives of the Polish Government, who also have in their custody documents of this nature, will also appear here and testify and produce such documents. Then for the purpose of this morning, Mr. Ambassador, will you give us the gist of the communication that the Polish representative in Geneva made to the International Red Cross in this matter?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. The Polish Government requested the International Red Cross as an impartial institution to investigate the crime at Katyn, to investigate all the facts connected with the crime which was disclosed at Katyn, in order to establish the truth.

Mr. FLOOD. Did the International Red Cross reply to that request?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes; the International Red Cross replied, pointing out certain difficulties in carrying out this request.

Mr. FLOOD. What was the nature of the reply of the International Red Cross? What was the gist of it?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. As far as I remember, the difficulty to which the International Red Cross pointed was that it was a one-sided request on our part. The answer of the International Red Cross was that it would be prepared to take action if requested by all interested parties.

Mr. FLOOD. And "by all interested parties," we understand you to mean the Russian Government and the German Government?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Now do you know whether or not the German Government also made a request to the International Red Cross for the same purpose?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes; it did.

Mr. FLOOD. At or about the same time?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes; it did.

Mr. FLOOD. Are you aware from your memory of the general nature of the German request to the International Red Cross?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes. As far as I remember, and as far as my memory goes, the German request was to the effect that the International Red Cross should investigate, and was promising every collaboration.

Mr. DONDERO. Which request came first, Mr. Ambassador, the Polish request or the German request, to the International Red Cross?

Mr. FLOOD. Will you give me the date of the Polish request and the date of the German request to the Red Cross?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. The German request was on April 16.

Mr. FLOOD. April 16 of what year?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. 1943.

Mr. FLOOD. And the date of the Polish request?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. The Polish Government decision was taken on April 15—

Mr. FLOOD. Yes, I know.

Mr. RACZYNSKI. But its execution took place on April 17.

Mr. FLOOD. Thank you. Now do you have any information from Bogomolow as to any communications that were made by the Russians to the International Red Cross? Were you advised by Bogomolow of the Russian reply? What did the Russians say to the international Red Cross, if you know?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. No, I was not advised by Bogomolow about it; Bogomolow kept absolutely silent.

Mr. FLOOD. So none of the communications between the International Red Cross and the Soviet Government with reference to either the Polish note or the German note requesting Red Cross intercession was handled through London?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. No.

Mr. FLOOD. So far as you know, it may have been handled through Kuybyshev?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you communicate through your office in London with any other governments in connection with the Katyn matter, or any other Sovereigns?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes; we were in contact with the British Government at the time, keeping them informed.

Mr. FLOOD. Was your communication with the British merely to keep them informed of what you were doing?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. That was the entire nature of your association with the British on this matter?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you ever at any time communicate with the Vatican officially on this matter?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. I will give you the best of my memory.

Mr. FLOOD. Yes; the best of your recollection.

Mr. RACZYNSKI. We kept all Polish representatives abroad, of course, fully informed of what we were doing, and it was natural for them to keep the governments to which they were accredited informed of events.

Mr. FLOOD. But as far as you remember, you, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs here in London, did not communicate directly with the Vatican on this subject at that time?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. I do not remember it.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you know whether or not, to the best of your recollection as Minister of Foreign Affairs—did it ever come to your attention that the Vatican communicated with the Soviet Ambassador at Istanbul, if you recall, at that time on this subject?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes; I seem to recall that, but I had no special knowledge.

Mr. FLOOD. You recall some such matter?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes; I do.

Mr. FLOOD. Now, Mr. Ambassador, was that the extent of your official connection with the Katyn matter, and either the German, the Russian, and the International Red Cross groups on the Katyn matter—is that all of your official connection with it?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you have any other official reports in your possession which you had in your capacity at that time made available to the Polish Government in exile?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. I would like to call your attention to the statement of policy adopted by the Polish Government on April 17 through its Council of Ministers which was publicly issued that day regarding the discovery of the graves at Katyn. I have it here, if you wish to see it.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, if you will give me the statement we will enter it in the record at this point as exhibit 21.

(The document was handed to Mr. Flood and was marked "Exhibit 21," which follows:)

EXHIBIT 21

STATEMENT OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT OF APRIL 17, 1943, PUBLISHED IN LONDON, APRIL 18, 1943, CONCERNING THE DISCOVERY OF GRAVES OF POLISH OFFICERS NEAR SMOLENSK

The Council of Polish Ministers at a meeting held in London on the 17th of April 1943, after acquainting itself with all information received in the matter of Polish officers whose bodies had been recently discovered near Smolensk and having taken notice of a report in this matter received from Poland, issued the following statement:

"No Pole can help but be deeply shocked by the news, now given the widest publicity by the Germans, of the discovery of the bodies of the Polish officers missing in the U. S. S. R. in a common grave near Smolensk, and of the mass execution of which they were victims.

"The Polish Government has instructed their representative in Switzerland to request the International Red Cross in Geneva to send a delegation to investigate the true state of affairs on the spot. It is to be desired that the findings of this protective institution, which is to be entrusted with the task of clarifying the matter and of establishing responsibility, should be issued without delay.

"At the same time, however, the Polish Government, on behalf of the Polish nation, denies to the Germans any right to base on a crime they ascribe to others, arguments in their own defense. The profoundly hypocritical indignation of German propaganda will not succeed in concealing from the world the many cruel and reiterated crimes still being perpetrated against the Polish people.

"The Polish Government recalls such facts as the removal of Polish officers from prisoner-of-war camps in the Reich and the subsequent shooting of them for political offenses alleged to have been committed before the war, mass arrests of reserve officers subsequently deported to concentration camps, to die a slow death—from Cracow and the neighboring district alone 6,000 were deported in June 1942; the compulsory enlistment in the German Army of Polish prisoners of war from territories illegally incorporated in the Reich; the forcible conscription of about 200,000 Poles from the same territories, and the execution of the families of those who managed to escape; the massacre of 1½ million people by executions or in concentration camps; the recent imprisonment of 80,000 people of military age, officers and men, and their torture and murder in the camps of Maydanek and Tremblinka.

"It is not to enable the Germans to make impudent claims and pose as the defenders of Christianity and European civilization, that Poland is making immense sacrifices, fighting and enduring suffering. The blood of Polish soldiers and Polish citizens, wherever it is shed, cries for atonement before the conscience of the free peoples of the world. The Polish Government condemns all the crimes committed against Polish citizens and refuse the right to make political capital of such sacrifices, to all who are themselves guilty of such crimes."

Mr. FLOOD. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. RACZYNSKI. May I make one short general remark on this matter?

Mr. FLOOD. Yes.

Mr. RACZYNSKI. Because I think this is the proper place for me to do it. It has occurred to me that one important element pointing to the responsibility of the Soviet Government, and the authorship of the Soviet of the crime, has not been sufficiently underlined so far, and that is this: Although the Soviet Government has not signed the Geneva Convention relating to war prisoners, it has nonetheless generally pretended to have observed that convention. In this case the Soviet Government, caught in its own mesh of fiction, has declared to the world that it had actually employed thousands of Polish officers, including more than a hundred generals, admirals, and colonels advanced in age, in breaking stones on the roads near Smolensk. I think that this kind of employment, this kind of occupation, for senior officers is scandalous in itself, and I may go one step further and say that so far as I am aware from all available evidence, this has not been done by the Soviet Government. They have been cruel to the prisoners; they have for a time kept them in very primitive conditions; they have deprived them, for instance, of noncommissioned officers as aides at certain stages of their detention, but the Soviet Government has certainly not sent senior officers of the rank of general and admiral to break stones. This has not been done by any belligerent anywhere during the great war, and would be, as I say, scandalous in itself; but to my mind it is additional evidence showing that, having been caught in their own tissue of stories, they did not know how to explain this fact away, and I think that this should be underlined as an additional point of circumstantial evidence showing the responsibility for the crime.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, the committee appreciates very much your interest in these proceedings, and the fact that you would come here today and testify before us. Now have you been offered any emoluments or any promises of any sort by anybody to appear here and give this testimony today?

Mr. RACZYNSKI. No.

Mr. FLOOD. Thank you very much for coming.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Gentlemen, the next witness is Mr. Rowinski, an officer in the Polish Air Force, and he is an attorney.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you just state your name, and give the correct spelling of your name and your present address to the reporter?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Zbigniew Rowinski, and my address is No. 11, Hereford Square, London, S. W. 7, England.

Mr. FLOOD. Before you make a statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who considered he had suffered injury as the result of your testimony. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as the result of your testimony. Do you understand?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes, I do.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you raise your right hand and be sworn? Do you swear by God Almighty that you will, according to your best knowledge, tell the pure truth and that you will not conceal anything, so help you God?

Mr. ROWINSKI. I do.

TESTIMONY OF ZBIGNIEW ROWINSKI, LONDON, ENGLAND

Mr. FLOOD. Were you a member of the Polish armed forces at any time?

Mr. ROWINSKI. I was a reserve officer in the Polish Army, in the air force.

Mr. FLOOD. During the year 1939?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And were you called up to active duty by the Polish armed forces in 1939?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. When?

Mr. ROWINSKI. On September 25, 2 months before the war started.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you subsequently taken prisoner?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. By whom?

Mr. ROWINSKI. By the Germans.

Mr. FLOOD. And where were you taken to—what German prison were you taken to?

Mr. ROWINSKI. First I was taken to Brunswick in Germany.

Mr. FLOOD. And where were you in 1943, in what prison?

Mr. ROWINSKI. I was at Woldenberg.

Mr. FLOOD. When was the Katyn Forest massacre first brought to your attention?

Mr. ROWINSKI. So far as I remember, and according to my notes, I heard of it first on April 14; it was in the German press which we got from Stettin.

Mr. FLOOD. You were then a prisoner in the German prison camp at Stettin?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And you read this information in a German newspaper?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. What action (if any) was ever taken by you in relation to the Katyn Forest massacre? In what connection were you ever identified in connection with the Katyn Forest massacre?

Mr. ROWINSKI. I was called in, I think, by accident.

Mr. FLOOD. Was that by the German authorities at your camp?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes. So far as I remember, the German authorities there asked the Polish authorities to provide somebody.

Mr. FLOOD. They asked the Polish authorities at your camp?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And did the Polish authorities at your camp designate you as one of the Poles?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. You were one of those designated?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes—because the German authorities refused at first to accept some of the officers designated by the Polish authorities.

Mr. FLOOD. But anyway, you were designated by the Poles and accepted by the Germans?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. For what purpose?

Mr. ROWINSKI. We were told by the Germans that we have to go to Stettin to identify a list of names of Polish officers.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you go?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes, we did.

Mr. FLOOD. And you went with whom?

Mr. ROWINSKI. With another Pole, Major Nowosielski, and Captain Adamski.

Mr. FLOOD. Now, you went to Stettin for the purpose, so the Germans said, of checking or examining a list of what?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Of the names of Polish soldiers or officers found in the grave at Katyn.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you go to Stettin?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; we did.

Mr. FLOOD. With the Germans?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And did you see such a list?

Mr. ROWINSKI. No. We were brought to the German general in charge of this area, and he told us that we will go somewhere (he did not tell us where) which will be a very interesting journey for us, and he asked us to note all we will see there. Then he asked us if we can give him our word that we will not try to escape. Colonel Mossor, who was in charge of our group—I have forgotten to mention that they brought also other Polish officers from different camps to Stettin.

Mr. FLOOD. When you got to Stettin, in addition to the Polish officers from your camp, there were similarly other Polish officer prisoners who had been collected at Stettin by the Germans from other German prison camps for the same purpose?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes, under German escort.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you remember how many were at Stettin?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Eight as far as I remember.

Mr. FLOOD. What happened then; where did you go?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Then we were sent to Berlin.

Mr. FLOOD. All of you?

Mr. ROWINSKI. All of us.

Mr. FLOOD. What happened at Berlin?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Excuse me. When Colonel Mossor told him that we cannot give him our word we will not try to escape, we were again escorted by German military escort to Berlin.

Mr. FLOOD. Then the Polish officer in command of this group of eight Polish officers refused to give parole not to escape?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. Just a moment. I do not think the witness said that the eight were Polish officers.

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; all Poles from different Polish camps.

Mr. FLOOD. So, you went to Berlin?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And what happened there?

Mr. ROWINSKI. From there we were taken by plane to Smolensk.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you talk to anybody in Berlin at the Propaganda Ministry?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; but not myself; it was Colonel Mossor, and he gave us a report of all his speeches.

Mr. FLOOD. When you arrived at Berlin, Colonel Mossor was taken to the German Propaganda Ministry?

Mr. ROWINSKI. That is right.

Mr. FLOOD. After he came back from the Propaganda Ministry, did Colonel Mossor tell his brother officers what happened there?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; he told us all about it.

Mr. FLOOD. What did he say?

Mr. ROWINSKI. He said he was asked to go to Katyn with us, and then to give a report about all he saw, and the Germans said they would organize radio communication and have reporters there and they also wanted Colonel Mossor to give reports to representatives of the Polish papers in Cracow; I do not remember the title of the newspapers at the moment.

Mr. FLOOD. Did Colonel Mossor tell you to whom he spoke at the Propaganda Ministry in Berlin?

Mr. ROWINSKI. No; he did not.

Mr. FLOOD. Very well. Did you then go to Katyn?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Tell us what happened there.

Mr. ROWINSKI. We went to Smolensk and first of all we met the officer in charge of the excavations.

Mr. FLOOD. You went to Smolensk?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. That is, the eight Polish officers under German escort by air?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. When you got to Smolensk, you were taken where?

Mr. ROWINSKI. To some "digs" prepared for us.

Mr. FLOOD. Quarters?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Quarters; and after a while we saw the officer in charge of the excavations. So far as I remember, it was a man named Slowenczek.

Mr. FLOOD. Was he Polish or Russian?

Mr. ROWINSKI. No; he was German—an Austrian as far as I remember.

Mr. FLOOD. He was an Austrian in the German Army?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; an Austrian in the German Army.

Mr. FLOOD. Now, as you best remember, can you tell us the date, the day, the month, and the year that you arrived in Smolensk?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes, if you allow me to look at some notes that I have.

Mr. FLOOD. Yes, of course; you may refresh your memory.

Mr. ROWINSKI (after referring to notes). It was April 15 when he left.

Mr. DONDERO. April 15 of what year?

Mr. ROWINSKI. In 1943, when we left Stettin for Berlin, and we started for Smolensk on April 16.

Mr. FLOOD. And you got to Smolensk when?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Late on the same day.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you tell us what the German officer told you?

Mr. ROWINSKI. The German officer brought us photographs of documents which were already recovered from the grave, and also photographs of statements of witnesses taken by the German authorities; especially there were translations of statements of Russian witnesses, Russian railway employees.

Mr. FLOOD. Are these statements of the Russian railway employees the statements of witnesses who had been at the grave?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Documents allegedly to have been taken from the bodies?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Were presented to you by this German officer?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes, and photographs; they were left with us, and we were asked to study them, and we were told the following day we would be taken to the grave.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you study them that night?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. What comments, if any, were made by you and your brother officers? What was the consensus, if any, that night after you looked at these things?

Mr. ROWINSKI. We had doubts about the number of bodies which the Germans expected to be found in the graves.

Mr. FLOOD. How many bodies did the Germans tell you?

Mr. ROWINSKI. 12,000.

Mr. FLOOD. And you had doubts about that number?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. All right. Go ahead.

Mr. ROWINSKI. More specifically we found out that the statements of the Russian witnesses are not very clear regarding the transport and the number of Polish officers brought to the small station Gniezdovo. So, Colonel Mossor, who spoke Russian, decided to put some questions to the Russian witnesses.

Mr. FLOOD. Just a moment; we have not got that far yet; we are still in the "digs" at Smolensk.

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And all that you have in front of you now are statements.

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. You examined those statements, and were not satisfied with them?

Mr. ROWINSKI. No.

Mr. FLOOD. What other opinions were expressed that night in Smolensk by the eight Polish officers who were together regarding this matter, if any?

Mr. ROWINSKI. The opinion in our group was that this was probably another German trick.

Mr. FLOOD. Propaganda?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes. We all believed that most probably the Germans constructed this mass grave, put into the grave the bodies perhaps not even of Poles, but other bodies, then put the Polish uniforms on the bodies and that they just filled it in. This was the general opinion of the camp. Therefore, we decided to try and find out the truth and to get our own impression about this. So, first of all, when we had all the documents and all the photographs of the documents found in the grave, we started to examine them and tried to find out if they could be forged. The general impression was that they were genuine, especially because there were a lot of Polish savings-bank books, a lot of them. They were quite distinct; you could see the stamps of the different places where the money was drawn.

Mr. FLOOD. So, that first night you took a look at these exhibits, and you had the general impression that, while they were only photographs, they were photographs of authentic original documents?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; but, as we had some doubts about the statements of the Russian witnesses, Colonel Mossor decided to put some questions to these witnesses, because we were told by the Germans that we would be able to meet the witnesses the following day and put some questions to them if we wanted to.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you decide anything other than what you have told us regarding your decisions that night?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes. We agreed to put some questions to the witnesses the following day, and Colonel Mossor prepared some questions after studying their statements.

Mr. FLOOD. Now, what happened the next day?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Next day we were taken to the place where the graves were found.

Mr. FLOOD. Where was that?

Mr. ROWINSKI. It is not far from the railway station at Gniezdovo.

Mr. FLOOD. About how far is Gniezdovo from Smolensk?

Mr. ROWINSKI. I think it is the second railway station from Smolensk.

Mr. DONDERO. About how far in miles?

Mr. ROWINSKI. It took us about 20 minutes by car.

Mr. FLOOD. And about how far were the Katyn graves from the station at Gniezdovo?

Mr. ROWINSKI. About a kilometer or a kilometer and a half.

Mr. FLOOD. You were taken to Katyn in motorcars under German escort?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. What happened when you arrived at the graves, as you best remember?

Mr. ROWINSKI. When we arrived at the graves we were introduced to Professor Buhtz. He was in charge of the excavations, and when we were introduced to him I thought I would try some way to get a better understanding with him, because, as I told you, we left the camp with the general feeling that this is a German trick; and, as a lawyer, as a prosecutor, I personally wanted to find out what the facts were, to have my own personal opinion about it. Therefore, I approached him in this way: I asked him if he is the author of a book which I knew he wrote——

Mr. FLOOD. About what?

Mr. ROWINSKI. About traffic accidents, which I used when acting as a prosecutor in Poland.

Mr. FLOOD. Was Professor Buhtz an authority on forensic law at the time?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; in Breslau, as far as I remember, before the war. Well, he was rather surprised to hear that I knew his work, and he asked me "How is it" that I knew of it. So, then I had the opportunity of explaining to him that I am a lawyer as well; that I am a prosecutor in Poland, and he was then very helpful, and he treated me like a fellow lawyer, like a younger one. Anyhow, he gave me great assistance.

Mr. FLOOD. The atmosphere and attitude of the German officers at this time was one of full cooperation?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Tell us what happened then. What did you see; what did you do and so on?

Mr. ROWINSKI. We were shown roundabout the graves. There were at the time about five places where the big grave was excavated. I have a sketch of it here. In one of the graves we found bodies with hands bound with cord. I have a piece of the cord here.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you say that you have a piece of the cord with you?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you say that the piece of the cord that you have with you is a piece of the cord that you yourself took from one of the graves at Katyn on the day that you visited it?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Not myself. Professor Buhtz in my presence took it off the hands and gave it to me.

Mr. FLOOD. You say Professor Buhtz, who was in charge of the German investigation, removed this particular piece of cord which you now have here from the hands of the body of a dead Polish officer?

Mr. ROWINSKI. That is right.

Mr. FLOOD. In one of the graves at Katyn?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you let me see that?

(Mr. Rowinski handed the piece of cord, referred to, to Mr. Flood.)

Mr. FLOOD. The witness has shown the committee a piece of what looks like sash cord, in American parlance, very strong, about 6 inches long; and we will ask the stenographer to mark this as "Exhibit 22"

(The cord referred to was marked "Exhibit 22," a photograph of which is shown below.)

EXHIBIT 22




Photo of cord identified as a piece which was removed from the body of one of the victims found dead in Katyn.

Mr. FLOOD. The witness is shown now, marked "Exhibit 22," the piece of cord spoken of. Do you identify this as the piece of cord or rope that we have just discussed?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Definitely. It was in my possession the whole time.

Mr. FLOOD. This exhibit has been in your custody since the time you received it from the hands of Professor Buhtz at the graves in Katyn until the moment you have just presented it to this committee this morning?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. That is offered in evidence. What else after this incident took place did you see or do? We have a great deal of evidence already in the record describing the scenes and circumstances of the grave, and we will have a great deal more from German witnesses, but we would like a paragraph or so from you as to what you saw.

Mr. ROWINSKI. I put it all in detail in the book there, but it is in Polish.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. One of the first things I presume that occurred to you as a Polish officer, and because of the suspicions that you had that this might be German propaganda was whether or not these were actually Polish officers; am I right?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you make any attempt to convince yourself whether or not these were actually bodies of Polish officers?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; I did.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How did you determine that they were Polish officers?

Mr. ROWINSKI. I found one of my acquaintances, the body of Captain Sidor.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you then direct your attention in any way to the matter of uniforms?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What did you do and what did you find with regard to the uniforms on the bodies that were found in the grave?

Mr. ROWINSKI. I checked the uniforms so far as I could. I saw that they were Polish—there was no doubt—and I saw also Polish stamps of different manufacturers on the shirts and underwear.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did it occur to you that these uniforms might have been planted on bodies which were not those of Polish officers? Did that thought come to you?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; certainly. It was one of the principal things that I wanted to find out.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I understand you, with your background as a prosecutor, wanted to check for yourself whether or not the Germans had planted this incident.

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. As you just said, one of the questions that occurred to you was that they might have planted Polish uniforms on bodies of non-Poles?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What did you do?

Mr. ROWINSKI. First of all, I found the original Polish uniforms. So there was the consequent question whether those Polish uniforms could be planted on different bodies which were not Polish. So far as I could see, and judging after my short experience, I came to the conclusion that the uniforms were on the bodies at least from the time when they were put into the grave.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What led you to that conclusion?

Mr. ROWINSKI. On some of the bodies the uniforms were completely pasted to the skin, stuck together, showing that they were very long in the grave; and, besides, there were some folds in the uniforms which rather showed that the body, when it was put into the grave, must have been still warm, because it is rather impossible that the uniforms could have all these folds.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Generally speaking, the fact that these uniforms were so closely molded into the body, led you to the conclusion that they could not have been planted on the bodies?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How many graves did you find?

Mr. ROWINSKI. We were told there was one big grave, but four holes were dug into the place and we saw four big graves.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did it occur to you also that possibly these bodies might have been moved, or touched, before you got there?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes. Those are the questions which I wanted to investigate as well.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you do anything to investigate that?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes. Professor Buhtz allowed us to go down into one of the graves, especially the graves where the bodies were with their hands bound. He allowed us to choose any body in the grave and excavate it; so we did. We chose a body which, in our opinion, had not been touched before. We took it out and it looked just like a date out of a box. The body which we found lying on the stomach had a hole here in the stomach where the head of another body lying under this body was completely stuck in.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In other words, the body on top had its head indented into the stomach of the body just below it?

Mr. ROWINSKI. No; it is the contrary. It is the other way.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. The head into the stomach?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes. We could see it was not touched before because it was completely pressed in. It was lying in this way probably about 2 years.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That indicated to you that these bodies were not removed or planted?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did the question of the caliber of the bullets interest you?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you make any investigation in that respect?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes. I looked for some bullets, but I could not find any, of course, so I asked one of the German gendarmes. He could not give me any reasonable answer. He just told me that most probably the cartridges were somewhere here in the dump, and later on we would probably find them, but he could not tell me what happened to the cartridges; so we presumed that the shots were fired from the Russian type of revolver where there is only a drum and the cartridges are not shaken out automatically. This was my presumption, but, later on, it turned out that it was false, because the cartridges were of German origin.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you find any grave there which had bodies which gave you indications of having been there longer than those bodies you have been describing now?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Not myself. Colonel Mossor went across the road to another grave which was also discovered by the Germans, where he told us he found bodies of civilians, so far as he thought, in long boots and civilian clothes, which, as to his opinion, must have been in there much longer, about 6 to 8 years.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You were there in 1943?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. The other grave contained bodies which, to Colonel Mossor, appeared to have been there 6 to 8 years?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Which would bring it to about 1937?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were the hands of these bodies tied in the same way as the others?

Mr. ROWINSKI. The same way, and, according to the statement of the Russian witnesses, they were bodies of different Russians which were shot there in the same place.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were you, because of your legal background, interested in trying to determine the length of time these bodies were there by the documents found on the bodies?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes, I did.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What did you do in that respect?

Mr. ROWINSKI. I found different letters addressed to the officers.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How did you find these letters?

Mr. ROWINSKI. When we visited the graves, we were then taken to a small house not far from the graves, where the Germans had collected all the documents. They were at our disposal. We could touch them and we could examine them. Among others, I found some letters addressed from Chorzow. On the envelopes of the letters there were marks done probably by the officer who received the letters when he received the letters. I examined about three or four such envelopes, and the dates on the envelopes never exceeded the end of March, so far as I remember now.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What year?

Mr. ROWINSKI. I have it here [the witness perused some documents]; 1940, of course.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You have just been looking at certain notes. What are they?

Mr. ROWINSKI. They are notes I took down just after visiting the graves in Smolensk.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Immediately after visiting the graves?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Those notes bear the last date of these letters as what?

Mr. ROWINSKI. The end of March and the beginning of April.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What year?

Mr. ROWINSKI. 1940.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You are positive?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes, I am quite positive. I checked them among others. I found a letter addressed to an officer, sent from his wife who was at this time living in the house of a friend in Chorzow.

Mr. FLOOD. Are those notes to which you are referring for the purpose of refreshing your memory made in your own writing?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And made immediately after your visit to Katyn?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Will you find in those notes any reference to any diaries that you may have found?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes. I remember that we found a diary in which the officer put a note at the moment when he was brought to Gniczdovo, this small station near Katyn.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. May I direct your particular attention and ask you whether or not you have any recollection now of having found a diary of a Second Lt. Jan Bartys? Would you refresh your memory by looking at your notes?

Mr. ROWINSKI. I cannot find it here.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Does this help you at all [showing document to witness]?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Will you tell me what you found with regard to the diary of Second Lt. Jan Bartys?

Mr. ROWINSKI. In this memo—it was only a small calendar—he puts the note: “We have just arrived at the Gniezdovo station,” because he could see the inscription, probably, “and I see NKVD people standing from the railway station up to the woods,” which were not far from the railway station. This he saw, apparently, from the window of the rail car.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you know the date of the last notation on that calendar?

Mr. ROWINSKI. March 15, 1940.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were the remaining pages of that calendar still intact?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; they were. I examined the calendar, so far as I remember now, because some people said it was all prepared by the Germans, and they have probably torn out the unnecessary pages and left only those which were suitable for them.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Tell me if there was anything significant about that particular calendar which attracted your attention?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Only the fact that he stated in his note that he is seeing the NKVD people standing along the road leading from the station to the woods.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. The remaining portion of the calendar after March 15—

Mr. ROWINSKI. There was no note at all; the pages were intact—blank.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you, in checking these various papers, letters, calendars, diaries, and notes that you found, find any one which had a date later than March 1940?

Mr. ROWINSKI. No.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you yourself remove any papers or documents from any of the bodies?

Mr. ROWINSKI. From the bodies, no.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you ask Professor Buhtz for permission to select for yourself any body which had not yet been removed from the grave?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What did Professor Buhtz say?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Professor Buhtz agreed, and he let us go down to one of the graves, choose one of the bodies which we found there and just take it out.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you remember what layer it was?

Mr. ROWINSKI. It was in the grave where all the bodies were lying with their hands tied.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What layer from the top?

Mr. ROWINSKI. The fourth, because the first were already removed. We had to go down.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were there any other significant matters or any other significant details you have not mentioned yet which you

found with regard to these bodies which led you to any conclusions as to the guilt of either the Russians or the Germans?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes. We found two letters amongst the documents which were addressed to Poland by officers in the same camp in Kozielsk camp. We found them amongst the documents. We thought perhaps those letters were given to the officers who were told by the Russians that they are going back to Poland.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Was there any attempt made, during the time you were at Katyn, by any German to either compel you to do anything against your will or to force you to announce any conclusion which was not based upon your own findings?

Mr. ROWINSKI. No.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you have a free hand there?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; a completely free hand.

Mr. DONDERO. I have some questions I want to ask. Was there anybody at the grave when you got there besides you Polish prisoners of war; I mean other prisoners of other nationalities?

Mr. ROWINSKI. I saw there Russians who were helping to excavate bodies.

Mr. DONDERO. No other nationality?

Mr. ROWINSKI. No.

Mr. DONDERO. Will you describe to the committee how that area looked where the graves were found; what kind of country is what I mean.

Mr. ROWINSKI. It was in a wood, but it was rather a part of the wood where there were only a few big trees, big fir trees, so far as I remember. But amongst those trees there were small fir trees, not very high.

Mr. DONDERO. Were there any trees on the graves?

Mr. ROWINSKI. No, I have not seen any on the graves.

Mr. DONDERO. What did the ground look like—what color?

Mr. ROWINSKI. It was rather sandy.

Mr. DONDERO. Kind of yellowish?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yellowish like sand. There was only one grave where we found already some ground water. Because the ground was going slowly down, in one place was rather wet.

Mr. DONDERO. How many layers deep were these men buried?

Mr. ROWINSKI. In one of the graves I saw something like a special pit. The Germans make a pit in order to check the layers.

Mr. DONDERO. How many bodies did you see?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Already excavated?

Mr. DONDERO. Or in the graves.

Mr. ROWINSKI. I could not tell you because I saw only about 160 which were already excavated and they were lying in rows.

Mr. DONDERO. Could you see how long or deep the graves were?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes, I could see the one grave. There were, so far as I remember, about 13 layers of bodies.

Mr. DONDERO. Thirteen deep from top to bottom?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; completely pressed together.

Mr. DONDERO. Have you any judgment or any estimate you want to give the committee as to the number of Polish officers who were buried in those graves that you saw?

Mr. ROWINSKI. I remember we just took over this number because, from the beginning, we doubted that there could be 12,000. We came to the conclusion there could not be more than about 8,000.

Mr. DONDERO. On the bodies that you saw, were the uniforms those of Polish officers?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. Did they have their overcoats on?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Not all of them.

Mr. DONDERO. Did some of them?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. Did they have their boots on?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; nearly all of them had their boots on.

Mr. DONDERO. Did you examine the boots?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. What condition were they in?

Mr. ROWINSKI. In a very good condition indeed. Some of them had even something like a wooden sole in order to protect the leather. The officers probably did them in the camps.

Mr. DONDERO. Were they worn much or did they look fairly new?

Mr. ROWINSKI. They looked very good indeed. I thought it would be an excellent advertisement for the firm who manufactured them if it was not so sad a moment.

Mr. DONDERO. These Russians who were there at the graves with you, were they soldiers or civilians?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Civilians.

Mr. DONDERO. How many?

Mr. ROWINSKI. I saw about 12.

Mr. DONDERO. Did you talk with any of them?

Mr. ROWINSKI. No. I do not speak Russian.

Mr. DONDERO. Were you permitted to talk to them?

Mr. ROWINSKI. I do not think so, but we were not told that it is forbidden to speak.

Mr. DONDERO. When you went to the graves at the suggestion of the Germans, you were naturally prejudiced and bitter towards the Germans?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. Did your brother officers feel the same way you did and express themselves?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Exactly: They even despised me because those officers agreed to go——

Mr. DONDERO. After you had been to the graves, what conclusion or opinion did you arrive at with your brother officers who went there?

Mr. ROWINSKI. In my private opinion I was completely convinced it was done by the Russians.

Mr. DONDERO. What did your other officers think?

Mr. ROWINSKI. All other officers as well.

Mr. DONDERO. They came to the same conclusions?

Mr. ROWINSKI. The same conclusions, only we did not express it properly because the Germans wanted to use this report of ours for propaganda purposes. So we agreed only to say what we saw, drawing no conclusions—only what we have seen there.

Mr. DONDERO. And you expressed no opinion?

Mr. ROWINSKI. No opinion at all.

Mr. DONDERO. But you were satisfied then that the Russians did it?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. Did you examine any of the clothes of these men?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes, I did.

Mr. DONDERO. Did you find any bullet holes?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. Where?

Mr. ROWINSKI. We always found here [indicating] a smaller bullet hole and a bigger one here [indicating].

Mr. DONDERO. For the record, you mean at the base of the skull?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes, somewhere here [indicating]—always nearly in the same position.

Mr. FLOOD. The witness is now indicating entry of bullet at the base of the skull and indicating exit of the bullet on the far side of the hairline.

Mr. DONDERO. Were they all shot the same way?

Mr. ROWINSKI. It appeared to be done in the same way.

Mr. DONDERO. Their hands were tied behind them?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Not all of them, only some of them.

Mr. DONDERO. What can you say of the others who were not tied that way?

Mr. ROWINSKI. I suppose only those people who tried to defend themselves were bound, because I saw some bodies with sawdust in their mouth and some of them had even their heads covered with their overcoats, then a string round the neck connected with string at the hands. So when they started to struggle to free the hands, they must have choked themselves.

Mr. DONDERO. You saw several that way?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes, I saw several and I saw also bullets through the overcoat here [indicating]—I mean the hole.

Mr. DONDERO. As you looked at the bodies in the grave, were they buried face up or face down?

Mr. ROWINSKI. They were in different positions. They looked to me like they were thrown into the grave in different positions.

Mr. DONDERO. They were not in layers?

Mr. ROWINSKI. No; they were just mixed.

Mr. DONDERO. Thrown in?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. In any position?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. They were in a state of decomposition?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes. Some of the faces of the bodies were like they were caught in the last moment of a cry.

Mr. DONDERO. How long, how wide and how deep were the graves you saw?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Would you allow me to look at something?

Mr. DONDERO. Refresh your memory.

Mr. ROWINSKI. I see the graves, but I could not tell you the size of the graves. I know that there were two big graves and two smaller ones.

Mr. DONDERO. Can you describe to the committee and for the record about how big they were?

Mr. ROWINSKI. I think it is in the report.

Mr. DONDERO. If you cannot find it, during the lunch hour refer to your notes and give it to the stenographer afterwards.

Mr. ROWINSKI. I will find it, because I have it down somewhere.

Mr. DONDERO. How old a man are you?

Mr. ROWINSKI. I am now 46.

Mr. DONDERO. How long were you a prisoner of the Germans?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Five years.

Mr. DONDERO. That is all.

Chairman MADDEN. Mr. Witness, I might say for the record that in our former hearings in Washington, a couple of different witnesses testified regarding the sawdust that was placed in the mouths of some of these bodies previous; that is, they did not have their hands tied behind them, but some of them had sawdust in their mouths, which confirms the testimony that you just related.

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. I would like to amplify that by saying that that is particularly true of a certain witness in Washington who testified with a mask over his head, and that witness testified that some of these bodies found with sawdust did have their hands tied behind their back as well.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. May I ask you whether or not you would be willing to leave those notes of yours as an exhibit in this case?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes, certainly. They are in Polish.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Those are in Polish?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. But they were made immediately after you were there?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Immediately after. It is rather the rough sketch of the report we prepared for the Germans.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. It was immediately after your visit to Katyn.

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. They are your impressions as of that time immediately after you were in the graves?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes, and the text of the same report is in the book.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Will you let me have those notes, please?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Did you find any bodies with wire?

Mr. ROWINSKI. No.

Mr. FLOOD. I now ask the stenographer to mark for identification a series of documents or notes of this witness consisting of five pages—to mark them as exhibits 23, 23A, 24, 24A, and 24B, being a sketch or a map. I now show the witness the exhibits as I have just indicated and ask him whether or not those are the original notes in his own handwriting made by him immediately after his visit to Katyn for the purpose of being the basis for the report to the Germans?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And are those the notes with which he has been refreshing his testimony thus far before the committee this morning?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Those are offered in evidence as exhibits 23, 23A, 24, 24A, and 24B and follow.

EXHIBIT 23

14. 8. 43 ... 6⁴³ ... [1]

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17.IV.1943, 8^h rano do laski k. tona do laski
 20 km. w. zamość.

[Faded handwritten notes, possibly describing military movements or events related to the Katyn massacre, including dates like '17.IV.1943' and '20 km. w. zamość'.]

[Translation from Polish]

April 14, 1943: Movement order (Wednesday) 06.43 hours from Waldenburg.
 April 15, 1943: Szezećin, 10:30 hours. 19.00 hours to Berlin 21.25.

April 16, 1943: Start to Warsaw [by plane] from Staak aerodrome to Warsaw. Officers from the nearest camps were selected to speed up the departure. General Chmurowicz, 8 officers: 2 2nd lieutenants, 3 captains, Lt. Col. (G. S.) all from WK II, camps IIC, IID, IIE.

General Chmurowicz, unable to fly owing to his heart ailment, was left in Berlin. On the aerodrome a captain informs us that we have to fly to Smolensk. The colonel requests that [either he or the group] be released from that duty and another delegation selected.

April 16: Arrival in Warsaw at 10.40 hours, Okecie. Major Nowosielski released; left in Warsaw. 11.30 hours—start for Smolensk. Arrival 15.30 hours. Military police interested. In the evening, detailed explanation of the purpose of our arrival. Copies of the depositions of witnesses and the list of casualties, 300 bodies. The Colonel made his standpoint clear. We are detailed by order, and were not informed of the purpose of the journey. We do not consider ourselves official representatives, and still less a delegation of prisoner-of-war officers. And therefore we are unable to make any declarations or statements. We request that we not be photographed, filmed, or asked to hold press conferences. We can, however (1) observe whatever we shall see on the spot; (2) transmit our observations exclusively for the information of prisoner-of-war officers, not through the medium of the public press; (3) all other statements of fact belong to the International Red Cross, the international press, etc. After some time, the Colonel received a reply that no conferences, declarations, or filming or radio broadcasting would be required, and that photographs taken by the noncommissioned officers would be kept at the O. K. W. for documentation. They will be satisfied with preparation of a report for the use of the prisoners of war, as bringing delegations from all POW camps is not technically possible.

April 17, 1943: 08.30 hours. Departure to Katyn Forest, the area of exhumation in the vicinity of the railway station Gniaszdowa, 20 kilometers West.

Basic points:

(1) Condition of bodies, partly mummified in the dry sand, features not recognizable, documents, badges of rank, color of hair, service colors, buttons, the quality of cloth, all distinguishable. Documents and photographs in a good state of preservation. It is difficult to determine the length of interment by the condition of the bodies.

(2) Bodies are dressed in uniforms, with badges of rank, other marks; officers' boots undoubtedly Polish. Polish paper money is scattered around. (Colonel Dr. Bullitz present on the spot determined the period of interment as two years.) The state of decomposition of the uniforms corresponds to this period and to the condition of the bodies. A small number in civilian clothes.

(3) All exhumed bodies (one body exhumed personally) show pistol shot holes. Entry of the bullets was in the back of the head; exit in the occiput or temples. Some of the bodies have the hands bound at the back (one body personally exhumed). Similarly bound bodies were exhumed on the other side of the road, where, according to the depositions of the witnesses and (illegible) the bodies of Bolsheviks were buried 5 to 8 years ago.

[Translation from Polish]

(4) At the presumed area of the burials 4 excavations were made, in which a mass or many layers of bodies was found, some 1 to 2 metres deep. The top layer of bodies was removed and arranged on the surface for identification (some 300). Of these, some 160 were identified on the basis of documents, cigarette cases, (illegible), correspondence, identification tags, etc. The rest impossible to identify, including civilians, because badges of rank and documents are absent. The lower layers are still not removed. There are presumably some 12 layers of bodies to the ground water level. In the corner of each excavation shafts were sunk. The bottom of the shaft was covered with loose earth. The thickness of the mass from the second layer is $1\frac{1}{2}$ metres.

(5) The total number according to the German estimate is 10,000 to 12,000, and they quote the following bases [for their estimation]:

The surface of the general mass grave, and the thickness of the layer of bodies. Partly ascertained thickness of the layer visible in the shaft: $1\frac{1}{2}$ metres. From all sides of the excavations heads or limbs are sticking out, which indicates that between four opened graves bodies are also present—it is not known how many. Depositions of witnesses regarding the number of railway transports to Gniasdowa station and from the station to the place of execution in GPU trucks. In our presence the witnesses confirmed their depositions as regards the number of transports in reply to our direct questions.

It is beyond doubt that this is a mass grave and that the number of bodies involves thousands. The exact number can be ascertained only after exhumations are completed. According to the witnesses, during April and (illegible) 1940 they saw 3 to 4 rail transports composed of 3 to 4 prisoner cars. Truck could carry 16 persons each (daily; 480 during 28 days) (three covered trucks plus one light truck for luggage).

(6) Exhumation work is under the direction of an officer of the Germany military police, who is assisted by the professor of medicine of Wroclaw University with the rank of Hauptarzt (?). On the spot there are three delegates of the Polish Red Cross from Warsaw, who will remain until the work is finished. They assist with the identification of the bodies and the arrangement of a common grave. Each body, after exhumation and eventual identification, receives a metal tag about the neck with a number which is identical with that on the list of exhumed bodies and with that on the envelope with the documents.

(7) The documents found are kept, after being dried, in a neighboring forester's house in improvised showcases, with their numbers and envelopes. They are deciphered, translated, partly photographed, etc. Some of them (diaries) will be subject to chemical treatment in order to make illegible spots readable. The state of documents satisfactory, some photographs and correspondence in a good state of preservation, easy to read or to recognize.

(8) General Smorawinski's documents, particularly army identity card and the Postal Savings Banks of Lublin book, well preserved. Trousers on the body with general's stripes.

EXHIBIT 24

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Pł. Bp. Stefan Nowe
 Pł. Bp. Jan Cylewski
 Pł. Bp. Konstanty Adamski
 Pł. Bp. Eugeniusz Kleban
 Pł. Bp. Stanisław Gostkowski
 Pł. Bp. Aleksander Nowosielski
 Pł. Bp. Stefan Mosor
 Pł. Bp. Jan Burkys

[Translation from Polish]

badges of rank of major general distinct, the face unrecognizable. A silver cigarette case with illegible gold inscriptions was found on General Smorawinski.

(11) Correspondence addressed from Poland found, almost exclusively post-cards addressed to Camp Kozielsk. Latest dates of dispatch—January and February 1940 (replies).

(12) On two bodies short diaries were found in calendars, one brought to January 1, 1940, the other to March 15, 1940 (2nd Lt. Jan Burkys, Cracov).

These particulars agreed on by all officers present.

13.40 hrs., flown out from Smolensk, 17.45 in Warsaw. Medical examination of the crew (the escort and ourselves). Major Nowosielski rejoined the party. 18.39 hrs. departure, arrival in Poznan 20.40, night in Poznan. April 18, start for Berlin 7.25 hrs., arrival in Berlin 9.00 hrs. Staaken airport.

Lt. Col. STEFAN MOSOR.

Capt. STANISLAW CYLEWSKI.

Capt. KONST. ADAMSKI.

Capt. BENTMAN.

Pol. [illegible] SLAWICZEK.

Maj. ALEKSANDER NOWOSIELSKI.

Capt. EUGENIUSZ KLEBAN.

2nd Lt. STANISLAW GOSTKOWSKI.

[Translation from Polish]

Deszczka, Władysław, cartographer, born March 2, 1892 in Ostroza, address—Warsaw, Aleje Ujazdowskie, Major of the 27th Railway Battalion, army book well preserved, with a photograph.

Zbroja, Dr. Franciszek.

Szymankiewicz, Captain, born May 26, 1896, address—Warsaw.

Freidenreich, Ya. Second Lieutenant.

Fryssberg, dr. Adam, Captain.

Halacinski (Halasinski?), Andrzej, Lt. Colonel.

Smorawinski [illegible], address—Lublin, Litewski Sq. 3, Postal Savings bank-book, certificate of the Army Cross, born December 25, 1892 [illegible] identity document [illegible].


Bohatyrowicz, Bronisław [illegible] Rejtan Str. 3-28., letter written by him, two photographs, a rather large sum of money.

Lopusko, Edward, a card from Witold Lopusko, Vilna, Antokolska 4, firm Lopusko, Vilna.

Kuzmiski, Arkady, student, January 29, 1907, Warsaw, Akademicka 5.

Wirszillo, Tadeusz.


Wlasienko, Włodzimierz, civilian, Maria Wlasienko, Wilna, Sosnowa 40.



[Translation from Polish]

Railway Station
Gnezdowa

[Arrow] to Minsk and Vitebsk.
 [Arrow] to Minsk.
 [Arrow] to Smolensk.



[In Russian:] KATYN FOREST.

[In Polish:] (Katyn Forest).

Legend: 1 centimeter equals 10-15 meters for the middle of the drawing; on the outer parts of the drawing marks were placed for the purpose of orientation.

Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, Polish mass graves; excavations with Russian bodies; 5, excavation to receive exhumed bodies; 6, the guardhouse; 7, elevation for photographing and the Red Cross flag.

GPU House [In Russian:] KATIA MOUNTAIN.

So-called "Zofiwka" [In Polish:] (Katia Mountain).

[Arrow] Dnieper River.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you know where Colonel Mosser is now?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes, in Poland in prison. He was sentenced, I think, to life imprisonment. He became a general, and I think he became a director of a military school in Kharkov; but later on he was tried and he is now in prison.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is the colonel who was in charge of this expedition?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. I may ask you just one question about that colonel. You told us that the first night that you got together in Smolensk, amongst other things you decided to do was to have the colonel interview certain Russian workers?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; right.

Mr. FLOOD. Who had made certain statements shown to you by the Germans?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Right.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you know if the colonel did interview those Russians?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; he did.

Mr. FLOOD. When—the next day?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; when we visited the graves.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you see him talking to them?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; I did.

Mr. FLOOD. Can you give us the gist of the colonel's conversations with the Russians?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; he told us that his impression is that they are telling the truth, only they are slightly exaggerating, he thought, regarding the amount of the people who were brought to the camp.

Mr. FLOOD. The colonel reported back about Polish officers?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. That he had the conversation?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. You know that he did in fact have one?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. The gist of his conversation with the Russians was that he was satisfied that the statements he made which were shown to you by the Germans were honest statements, except that there was an error here and there about the numbers of bodies; is that correct?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. There is one paragraph in Colonel Mosser's report which I would like to read to you and ask you whether you remember that paragraph. [Reading:]

In May 1943 the known propaganda was started with regard to Katyn. I found myself in a group of officers who were taken to the locale for the purpose of showing the empty graves and the bodies. The very fact that these thousands of Polish officers were killed in the spring of 1940 in those woods is not subject to any doubt.

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ (reading):

They tried to use us for radio, press, and film propaganda, to which I categorically effectively was in opposition. I did, however, agree only for the statement of our actual findings given for the information of Polish officer prisoners.

Do you remember that section of this report?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes; I even remember that he was completely convinced, and when I heard about him going back to Poland, I was rather shocked to hear it.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I am reading now from the book: The Katyn Murders in the Light of Documents in which that paragraph of Colonel Mosser is included. I am reading from page 261 of that book. So that Colonel Mosser, who was major and subsequently colonel, did agree with you that there was no question in his mind but that these people were killed in the spring of 1940?

Mr. ROWINSKI. Yes, there was no question about it.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. This group of yours made a report. Is that report available?

Mr. ROWINSKI. It is in the same book you are reading.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. The report of this particular witness appears in the book which I have read, but it appears without his name.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Flood, I believe we should state for the record that while the book Mr. Machrowicz is referring to has not been placed in the record because it is so voluminous, it is part of the committee's file and is always available.

Mr. FLOOD. The committee will take note of that. Mr. Rowinski, you have not been paid or promised any benefits of any kind, have you, for appearing here today, by anybody?

Mr. ROWINSKI. No.

Mr. FLOOD. The committee wish to thank you for giving your time and your attention to the matter we are trying to investigate, and we appreciate your testimony this morning very much indeed.

Mr. ROWINSKI. Thank you very much.

(At 1:30 p. m. the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p. m.)

AFTER RECESS

(The committee reconvened at 2:45 p. m.)

Chairman MADDEN. The committee will come to order.

You may proceed, Mr. Flood.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you just give your name and your British address to the stenographer, please?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Lt. Gen. Tadeusz Bor Komorowski, 3 Bowrons Avenue, Wembley, Middlesex.

You can take the rest of it from this statement.

(A document containing the following statement was handed to the reporter:)

Born in L.VI. 1895 in Chorobrow, Southeastern Poland, Galicja. Took part in First World War as Cavalry officer in the Austrian Army. From 1918 joined the newly formed Polish Army. From 1918 till to 1920 took part in the Russo-Polish War. In 1920 decorated with the Virtuti Militari Cross, the highest Polish military decoration. After the end of the war remained in the regular army. From 1927 till 1938 commanded the 9 Lancers Regiment.

In 1938 in the rank of colonel, appointed commander of the Cavalry Training Center in Grudziadz.

Took part in the German-Polish War in 1939. After the defeat in 1939 went underground and was one of the organizers of the Polish Home Army.

From 1939-41 commander of the Cracow and Silesia districts of the Underground.

In 1940 promoted to the rank of general.

From 1941-43 deputy commander of the Home Army/HQ in Warsaw.

In 1943 in July nominated commander in chief of the Home Army in the rank of lieutenant general. Commanded the Home Army till the end of the Warsaw uprising, October 1944. After the capitulation of Warsaw, taken prisoner of war by the Germans. In May 1945 liberated from German captivity by the U. S. A. Army.

From May 28, 1945 commander in chief of Polish forces abroad. In 1946, November 8, resigned from the post as C. I. C. of Polish Forces.

Mr. FLOOD. Before you make a statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who considered he had suffered an injury as a result of your testimony. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as a result of the testimony.

Do you understand that?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes, I understand.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you raise your right hand, please, to be sworn?

Do you swear, by God the Almighty and Omniscient, that you will, according to your best knowledge, tell the pure truth and you will not conceal anything; so help you God?

General KOMOROWSKI. I do.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you be seated, please?

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. TADEUSZ BOR-KOMOROWSKI, 3 BOW- RONS AVENUE, WEMBLEY, MIDDLESEX, ENGLAND

Mr. FLOOD. What is your full name?

General KOMOROWSKI. Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you at any time identified with the Polish armed forces?

General KOMOROWSKI. In the underground army, home army. From 1939 till the end of 1944 I was in Poland.

Mr. FLOOD. What was your title, your rank, in the underground army?

General KOMOROWSKI. In the beginning, general, and in 1943, lieutenant general.

Mr. FLOOD. During all of the time that you were in command of the so-called Polish home army, or underground army, your headquarters were generally in Warsaw, were they?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes, sir, the headquarters. But I was not all the time commander; I was till 1943 deputy commander, and from 1943 after the commander in chief, General Rowski, was arrested, I became commander.

Mr. FLOOD. I direct your attention to the late summer of 1941, at which time the rapprochement took place between the Soviet and Poland. You are aware of that time?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And of the protocol?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And you remember that the protocol between the Soviet and the Poles called for the Russians to release all Polish prisoners, of all categories?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes. And at this time we received an order from General Sikorski to look for the prisoners of war in camps of prisoners of war in Germany and in areas occupied by the Germans in Russia, as he saw that it may be possible that the Polish prisoners of war were taken by the Germans.

Mr. FLOOD. Because of the confusion and because of the uncertainty as to where the Polish prisoners may have been, since there was no trace of them and because it was possible that they may have been taken prisoner by the Germans as well as the Russians, General Sikorski, then head of the Polish state, directed you, at your headquarters in the underground in Poland, to do everything possible to try and find the missing Poles; is that right?

General KOMOROWSKI. That is right.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Mr. Chairman, I might suggest that he is maybe going to cover that in his statement.

Mr. FLOOD. That is what we are going to do now.

I have been advised, General, that you have a prepared written statement that you would like to read to the committee at this time.

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Would you so do?

Mr. DONDERO. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MADDEN. Mr. Dondero.

Mr. DONDERO. Before you proceed with your statement, General, I have one question. You said on the record that you made an effort to search for the Polish officers in the belief that they might have been taken by the Germans. Did you not get word from these officers back to their families that they had been taken by the Russians and not by the Germans, before that time?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes; but it was not our opinion. General Sikorski gave an order and in his order he believed maybe possibly that they were taken by the Germans, "so you must look all over to determine if some of the prisoners of war taken by the Russians are in any camp in Germany," the General wrote.

Mr. FLOOD. As a matter of fact, General, there had been a number of Poles who had been taken prisoner by the Germans in the earlier days; is not that right?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And they were then in prison camps in Germany?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. You were present here this morning, were you not, when the last witness testified that he, a Polish officer, was a prisoner of the Germans in a German prison camp?

General KOMOROWSKI. That is right.

Mr. FLOOD. All right, go ahead now.

General KOMOROWSKI. In September 1939, a large part of the Polish Army retreating before the German onslaught had found itself in eastern Poland, where the men were taken prisoner by the Russians. After some time, the families of these men, mostly officers, began to receive censored letters from them. The postmarks revealed that the men had been grouped in three large prisoner-of-war camps at Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov. The last letters to be received from these camps were dated April 1940. All letters sent to them after that month were returned stamped "Retour-parti"—"Return to sender; addressee gone away."

Grave anxiety reigned among the numerous families who had their relatives in Russian captivity. Nobody could understand why the letters written after April 1940 had been sent back. If they had been transferred to other camps, why had the letters not been sent on instead of being returned?

We had news from London, from General Sikorski, sent us by radio and by clandestine couriers, that more than 8,000 Polish Officers had been taken prisoner of war by the Russians. Of these, only about 400 men had been traced and found after the Russo-Polish Agreement.

General Sikorski had ordered the commander in chief of the home army to conduct a thorough search in the prisoner-of-war camps in Germany and in the areas under German occupation, as he did not exclude the eventuality that the missing officers had been taken over by the Germans during their advance in 1941. The intensive search undertaken by the home army, which had clandestine liaison with the prisoner-of-war camps in Germany yielded no results. Not a single Polish officer of the 8,000 mentioned was in a German prisoner-of-war camp; not one was discovered on Soviet territory occupied by the Germans.

There were in this last area a few civilians who during the years 1939, 1940, and 1941 had been deported from Poland by the Russians. They said that in the spring of 1940, Polish prisoners from the camps at Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov had been removed from these camps and had probably been sent to forced labor camps in northern Russia. We could learn nothing more through the channels of information at our disposal. All news which we had we sent immediately by radio to London to General Sikorski.

At the beginning of April 1943, the chief of the German Propaganda Service for the Warsaw district summoned a number of Poles to the Bruhl Palace, headquarters of the Nazi Governor of Warsaw. They were received by a delegate of the German Ministry of Propaganda, from Berlin. He announced the discovery of mass graves of victims of Soviet terrorism near Smolensk. Simultaneously, similar meetings were summoned in Cracow and Lublin. In all cases, the Poles were told they were to be prepared for a journey, they were to be taken by plane to the actual scene of the graves, where they would see for themselves the truth of the German assertions.

On April 10, 1943, a delegation left Warsaw by plane for Smolensk. It was composed of the Chairman of the RGO, Seyfried, Ferdinand Goetel, E. Skiwski, Dr. K. Orzechowski, Dr. Grodzki, W. Kawecki from the press; a photo reporter, Didur; and a worker, F. Prochownik.

After their return to Warsaw, the commander in chief of the home army, General Rowecki, received precise reports about all they had seen and heard. He sent, on the 22d of April 1943, an exact report to London, radiograms Nos. 625/1, 625/2, 625/3, and 625/4; 689/FFB, 690/KMS, 691/STW, 692/ZZK, from the 22d of April 1943.

I have all the telegrams with me, but they are in Polish.

Mr. FLOOD. We will take that up later. Just finish your statement now.

General KOMOROWSKI. A second delegation was sent from Cracow and Warsaw: Father S. Jasinski, Dr. A. Schebesta, Dr. T. Susz Praglowski, S. Klapert, M. Martens—all from Cracow—and K. Skarzynski, L. Rojkiewicz, J. Wodzinowski, Dr. H. Bartoszewski,

S. Kolodziecki, Z. Dmochowski, and Boyan Banach, from Warsaw. We also received reports from some members of the second delegation, sent by the Germans to Katyn. General Rowecki, commander in chief of the home army, sent, on May 7 and 13, 1943, a collective report to London: 692/1, 692/2, 755/1, 755/2, and 755/3.

I had the opportunity to send to Katyn my own observer, a trustworthy man of the underground. Before his departure, I had a long talk with him in which I told him what to look for. Only the commander in chief, General Rowecki, knew that I had sent this man.

After 2 weeks' time my observer from Katyn was back. His account began with a confirmation that the German figure of 10,000 corpses was exaggerated. When he reached Katyn, seven of the graves had been opened, and he estimated that the graves did not contain very many more than 4,000 bodies at all. He worked among the exhumers for some days. He personally took out from the pockets of the exhumed men, notebooks, diaries, letters, and prewar zloty bank notes, which were in a good state of preservation.

Chairman MADDEN. What kind of bank notes?

General KOMOROWSKI. Zloty; which is Polish money.

His account of all he had seen is too well known from reports of other witnesses and therefore I do not cite it. He put on the table before me a parcel containing copies of notebooks, diaries, and memoirs taken mostly in his presence from the pockets of the murdered men. There were 15 diaries, which I read immediately. The most important, in my opinion, was the diary of Maj. Adam Solski, written up to the last time, and indicating the place where they had been brought.

I am quoting the last words of this diary:

April 8, 3:30: Departure from Kozielsk depot westwards; at Jelnia station since 9:45.

April 8: We have been at a siding at Smolensk since 12 o'clock.

April 9: Morning, some minutes before 5, reveille in the cars and preparation to leave. We are going somewhere by automobile. What next?

April 9: Ever since dawn it has been a peculiar day. Departure in lorries fitted with cells; terrible. Taken to forest somewhere, something like a summer resort. Very thorough search of our belongings. They took my watch, which showed time as 6:30, 8:30; asked about my ring, which was taken; ruble belt, penknife.

These were the last words written by Major Solski.

The outstanding point of all these diaries was in their all breaking off short at the same point, either on leaving the camp at Kozielsk or on arrival at Katyn in April 1940.

One of the diaries had belonged to an officer who had been a close friend of a colonel of the staff of the home army, Janusz Bokszezanin. He was in possession of his friend's notes, which he had made when they had been at the higher military academy together. Both the diary and the notes were handed to a handwriting expert, who confirmed beyond all doubt that both had been written by the same person.

The 15 copies of the diaries handed me personally by my observer had been sent to London in July 1944 by a courier, Colonel Rutkowski, "Rudy." Other copies were hidden and buried in different places in Poland, which had been known to my observer.

Russia's refusal for the examination of the Katyn graves by the International Red Cross caused consternation and embarrassment in Communist circles in Poland. In PPR circles, at secret meetings

and conferences, the Communists openly admitted that "Polish reactionaries" had been liquidated. They also initiated a whispering campaign in Warsaw to the effect that a mutiny had broken out in one of the camps and that some of the officers had been executed.

That is all I know, being in Poland in this time as deputy commander, about the Katyn matter.

I would like to tell one thing more, as a further point. My observer brought a cord with which the hands were bound, and we gave this cord to an expert in Warsaw. The expert concluded that the cord was made from material not known in Poland and in Western Europe. It was the opinion of the expert in Warsaw.

Chairman MADDEN. General, I want to express my appreciation for your statement, but on account of having a severe cold, I am going to excuse myself for this afternoon. Congressman Flood will carry on in my place.

Mr. FLOOD. General, you mentioned that you have some telegrams with you, to which you referred in your prepared statement as being telegrams sent from your underground home command to the Polish Government in London in connection with this matter.

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes; but they are all in Polish.

Mr. FLOOD. It does not matter. Can you just let me have them? (The witness produced documents.)

Mr. FLOOD. We want these marked for identification. General, you have presented to the committee these telegrams to which you and I have referred. I understand that these are the original records taken by you from the files of the home army and that, under the circumstances, you cannot leave these original documents with the committee, but you have no objection to letting us have photostatic copies of these telegrams for our files.

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. We will insert them in the record as part of the permanent record and return to you these originals which I now hold.

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you mark for identification these three separate folders as exhibits 25, 26, and 27? Only the English translations of these exhibits will be published in the official record and the photostats of the originals shall be placed in the committee's permanent file.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit 25," "Exhibit 26," and "Exhibit 27" for identification and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT 25

[Translation from Polish]

Seal.

Special Detachment of the
Commander in Chief's Staff.

File No. 1833.

Date: April 17, 1943.

Secret.

RADIOGRAM No. 650/WH

From Wanda I

Accepted April 16, 1943 Hr. 2100

Read April 17, 1953 1645

Commander in Chief

Near Smolensk the Germans have discovered a mass grave containing a few thousand officers of ours from the Kozielsk Camp who were murdered in March and April 1940. A few Poles from Warsaw and Cracow, who were specially brought to the grave, have taken part in its examination. Their reports allow

no doubts as to the truth of this mass murder. Public opinion is aroused. I shall report details in the next few days.

Kalina 575—April 14.

[Illegible handwritten notations in several places on the page.]

EXHIBIT 25

[Translation from Polish]

Seal
Special Detachment of the
Commander in Chief's Staff
File No. 1942
Date: April 23, 1943
Secret

Radiogram No. 689/FFB

From Wanda I.

Accepted April 22, 1943 Hr. 1635
Read April 22, 1943 2100

I report in connection with Cabel 575:

On April 10 at 9 a. m. the committee which was organized by the Germans was flown to Smolensk. Under their instigation the following persons took part in the examination as witnesses: Seyfried, the Chief Director of the RGO, Ferd. Goetel and E. Skiwski, Dr. K. Orzechowski, Director of the Municipal Hospital Services, Dr. Grodzki from RGO, the gutter snipe journalist Wl. Kawecki, a photoreporter (f.), Didur, and the laborer Fr. Prochownik.

After the arrival of the committee at 1 p. m. in Smolensk the German officer Slowentschik explained that in the Spring of 1942 a group of Polish laborers who were staying in that area at that time found a grave of Polish soldiers in the forest, near Gniazdowo. At the place of its discovery the laborers set two crosses made from birchwood. In the first months of 1943 the German Intelligence Service received some information about this grave; it reported the case to the OK [German High Command], and interrogated the local population. This interrogation showed that many executions were performed during March and April of 1940 in the forest close to the Resting House Wd, near Gniazdowo. The Polish prisoners were transported in trucks [from the trains]. One person testified that, while working as a railway employee, he had seen bills of lading issued in Kozielsk. The trains were made up of carriages. The prisoners were taken to the forest in motor cars. It has been established on the spot that there are three huge mass graves in sandy soil, under pines of a few years growth, about 15 kilometers from the locality of Gniazdowo or Katyn, on the highway from Smolensk to Witebsk, in the forest known as Kozice Gory.

It is estimated that in one of the mass graves lie about three thousand bodies and in the other about five thousand. The third mass grave has not yet been touched. The estimate is based upon excavations made so far. Besides there is still another, somewhat older, mass grave which probably contains bodies of Russians. A number of the exhumed bodies have been identified.

To be continued. Kalina 625/1.
April 22, 1943.

EXHIBIT 25

[Translation from Polish]

File No. ——

RADIOGRAM No. 690/KMS

From Wandy 1

Accepted April 22, 1943 Hr. 1703
Read April 23, 1943 1300

Continuation 625

On April 11 at 9 a. m. the Polish delegates reached Kozice Gory where they were received by a few German officers. An explanation was given by Colonel Dr. Gehrard Buhtz, professor at the University of Breslau and director of the University Institute for Forensic Medicine and Criminology, who was directing the exhumation and autopsy. A few excavations were inspected. The first mass was several meters long and a few meters wide. About a meter beneath the ground it contained layers of bodies found by the staff instructed to make the excavations. The corpses were stuck into the soil, lying one beside the other with their faces

down. The greater part of the bodies were wearing Polish boots. The officers' uniforms were in fairly good condition. The autopsy of bodies showed shots in the backs of their heads. Some of the bodies had hoods on their heads made of sacks and coats. Some of the bodies had oakum in their mouths. Other excavations were on a smaller scale. The Polish delegates paid homage to their murdered countrymen.

In an adjoining building the commission had an opportunity to look at documents, identifying marks and letters which had been found on those corpses already exhumed. There were memoirs which broke off in March or April of 1940. One of the letters was sent from Warsaw on January 17, 1940. The established list of names of the soldiers killed corresponds almost exactly to the number of the exhumed bodies.

The German experts were not familiar with the Polish language nor with Polish organization. This fact suggests that quite a lot of identifying data may have been overlooked. They did not know, for instance, that an officers' camp had been run in Kozielsk. Not until the Polish delegates arrived, were invoiced addresses of consignments linked with this camp.

The present list reads:

To be continued. Kalina 625/2.

[Illegible notation.]

EXHIBIT 25

[Translation from Polish]

File No. —

RADIOGRAM No. 691/STW

From Wandy 1.

Accepted April 22, 1943 Hr. 1740
Read April 23, 1943 1440

Continuation 625:

- 1/ Adamek, Jozef, without address and rank;
- 2/ Bohatyrewicz, Bronislaw, Brig. Gen.;
- 3/ Dr. Chomiccki, Ludwik;
- 4/ Chrystolin, Bernard, Chorzow;
- 5/ Czajkowski, Bohdan, (Kutno ?);
- 6/ Florkiewicz, Zbigniew, Lublin;
- 7/ Gestping, Jerzy;
- 8/ Jakubowicz, Stanislaw, Lt.;
- 9/ Halacinski, Andrzej, Col.;
- 10/ Kalinowski, Michal, Lt. Sieradz;
- 11/ Kaplanski, Henryk Leopold—Grodno;
- 12/ Kiczka, Jozef, Major;
- 13/ Kozlinski, Stefan, Captain, Warsaw;
- 14/ Kraezkiewicz, Kazimierz, Legionowo;
- 15/ Dr. Kukulski, Eugeniusz, Col., physician, Cracow;
- 16/ Lukas, Romuald of
- 17/ Lutomski or Lutowski, Andrzej
- 18/ Maczynski, A., Warsaw;
- 19/ Maykowski, Janusz, Lt.;
- 20/ Nelken, Jan, Col., physician, Warsaw;
- 21/ Niemiec, Henryk, Major, Warsaw;
- 22/ Nowicki, Tadeusz;
- 23/ Nobis, Wincenty, Tyszkowice;
- 24/ Ochasso, Zygmunt, Lt. of the Reserves, Field hospital 362;
- 25/ Ochenkowski, Andrzej, Lt., near Rymanowo
- 26/ Ostrowski, Jerzy, Warsaw;
- 27/ Paczulski, Romuald;
- 28/ Radzenowski, Bronislaw, Warsaw;
- 29/ Smorawinski, Mieczyslaw, Brig. Gen.;
- 30/ Sliwinski, Michal, Plock;
- 31/ Spytkowski, Stanislaw, Cracow;
- 32/ Tatarka, Alfred, Bochnia;
- 33/ Tobiasz, Michal, Major, physician, Choszczow near Warsaw;
- 34/ Wisniewski, Artur, Col., Warsaw;
- 35/ Zajackowski, Roman, engineer, Warsaw;
- 36/ Zbroja, Franciszek, physician;
- 37/ Zelislawski, Kazimierz, Col., Cracow.

To be continued. Kalina 625/3.
April 22, 1943.

EXHIBIT 26

[Translation from Polish]

RADIOGRAM No. 692/ZZK

File No. —

| | | | | |
|--------------|----------|----------------|-----|------|
| From Wanda I | Accepted | April 22, 1943 | Hr. | 1800 |
| | Read | April 23, 1943 | | 1400 |

Continuation No. 625

The authenticity of what was discovered and identified in several cases has been settled. It is difficult to estimate the number of bodies because all the shafts shown do not reach the bottom of the grave. It seems that the number 10 thousand is an exaggeration. The Polish members of the expedition estimate that the number is at least from 6-8 thousand. The place discovered is now being excavated intensively and the local military authorities expressed the conviction that the Polish institutions would take it over. The Poles present [on the spot] expressed their views that it is a task for the Polish Red Cross. Numerous expeditions of German and neutral correspondents are arriving now at the place of execution. The Polish delegation returned to Warsaw on the evening of April 11. The first press announcement was issued on April 14.

The second Polish delegation is en route, [and] among it the man in our confidence is hidden.

Kalina 625/4—April 21, 1943.

[Illegible handwritten notation probably made in the London office.]

EXHIBIT 26

[Translation from Polish]

[Seal:]
Special Detachment of
the Staff of the Com-
mander in Chief
2290
May 13, 1943

RADIOGRAM No. 778

| | | | | |
|--------------|----------|--------------|-----|------|
| From Wanda 6 | Accepted | May 12, 1943 | Hr. | 0845 |
| | Read | May 13, 1943 | | 1430 |

A very sensible and close participant in the inspection of the graves near Smolensk on behalf of the Polish Red Cross, [who is a] Lieutenant Colonel [and] a military doctor, has submitted to me the following report:

1. At the foot of the hill there is a mass grave in the shape of the letter "L," the whole grave is open, the dimensions of the grave are 16 meters wide by 26 meters long by 6 meters deep. The bodies of the murdered are carefully laid down in 9-12 layers one on top of the other, each layer with the heads in opposite directions. The uniforms, notes in the pockets, identity cards, military distinctions [are] well preserved, the skin on the bodies, hair, and tendons [are] well preserved, the skin and tendons have to be cut when a skull is trepanned; however, it is impossible to identify the face.

2. The second mass grave is placed at right angles to the first grave, [is] partially opened, its dimensions [are] 14 meters by 26 meters, the hands of all the bodies in this grave are bound with a string at the back, the mouths of some of them are gagged with handkerchiefs, rags, the heads of some are wrapped in coat tails.

3. 906 bodies have been exhumed up to now, 76 percent of which have been identified by means of identity cards, letters, and the like found on the bodies.

4. According to the foregoing, presumably 2,500-4,000 bodies are lying in both mass graves, mainly officers' [bodies, and some bodies, although] not a great number, [are] in mufti, [who were] reserve officers.

5. On behalf of the Polish Red Cross there are 12 persons employed in excavating the graves, in [doing] identification work, and in collecting the documents that are found [a doctor and 3 medical noncommissioned officers].

6. It is characteristic that there was nothing taken away from the murdered but watches, in the pocket portfolios there is money and documents and sometimes rings [are] on fingers.

Kalina 692/1.

[Illegible handwritten notation probably made in the London office.]

EXHIBIT 26

[Translation from Polish]

File No. 2290/secret/1943
May 14, 1943

RADIOGRAM No. 779

From Wanda 6

Accepted May 13, 1943 Hr. 0925
Read May 14, 1943 1030

Continuation of 692.

7. All of the skulls of the bodies are wounded by bullets fired from the back. Participants in the exhumation on behalf of the Polish Red Cross put emphasis on the collection of bullets removed from the skulls of the murdered, on the revolver shells [and] ammunition lying about in the mass grave, and on the strings with which the hands of the murdered were bound. All the material discovered is being shipped as occasion permits to Warsaw to the Polish Red Cross, in care of Doctor Gorezycki. All the bullets are 7.65 caliber. The shells are inscribed "Ceco," the strings [are] twisted.

8. In the presence of the reporter, a diary written up to April 21 was taken out of the suit of Major Solski. He stresses that they were transported from Kozielsk in prison carriages to their destination (on 5 [the next seven letters have no meaning for translation] 6 axes), [and] were brought to Smolensk, where after passing a night, reveille was sounded at 4 o'clock in the morning on April 21, and they were put into prison automobiles, they were unloaded from the automobiles in a glade in the forest and at 6.30 led to buildings placed on the spot, where they were ordered to give up their jewelry and watches, and the diary finishes on this.

9. The Polish Red Cross delegates are carrying on the exhumation, the dissection of the bodies, and the collection of documents under the supervision of the German authorities, and in addition private connections with the local population have been entered into. All the identified bodies are given tags with a number of the Polish Red Cross, on a steel wire and bound to a bone, afterwards the bodies are laid in a freshly dug common grave. Among the victims identified up to now all but one come from the camp of Kozielsk, one comes from Starobielsk.

10. The forest glade near Katyn comprises a large area of several square kilometers on which the rest houses of the NKVD were standing. The local civilian population says that in March and April of the year 1940 every day 1 transport of Polish officers, amounting to 200-300 persons, was brought in.

Kalina 692, 2-5.V

[Illegible handwritten notation probably made in the London office]

EXHIBIT 27

[Translation from Polish]

File No. 2575/secret/43
26 May

Radiogram No. 851

Accepted May 23, 43
hour 1805

From Wanda VI

Read May 26, 43
hour 1680

At 18.33 of April 19. Composition of the first delegation appointed by the Germans and conveyed [to Katyn] April 10: Edmund Seyfried, RGO [Central Council of Welfare] Krakow, Doctor of Medicine Konrad Orzechowski municipal hospitals Warsaw, Doctor of Medicine Edward Grodzki of Polish Welfare Committee in Warsaw, Ferdynand Goetel and Jan Emil Skiwski, Kazimierz Prochownik factory foreman of the factory Zieleniewski Krakow, Wladyslaw Kawecki director of German-sponsored agency Polpress Krakow, Kazimierz Didur, photo reporter Krakauer Ztg. and Widera, photographic correspondent of Glos Lubelski.

The second delegation, which visited Katyn composed of: from Krakow—Rev. Dean Stanislaw Jasinski, Doctor of Medicine Adam Sehebesta, Doctor of Medicine Tadeusz Susz, Praglowski, Stanislaw Klapert—all three from the Polish Red Cross, Journalist Marian Martens. From Warsaw—Kazimierz Jerzy Skarzynski, Ludwik Rojkiewicz, Jerzy Wodzinowski, Doctor of Medicine Hieronim Bartoszewski, Boyan Banach—all from the Polish Red Cross. The delegation was of a technical character, part of it remained on the spot as personnel [and was] later supplemented to the number of 12 persons.

The summary of Seyfried's report: The delegation was housed in the Wehrmacht quarters, where the story of the discovery was told: In October 1942 a group of Polish workers located at the settlement of Gniezdowo Kozie Gory was told by the local population about the graves of the executed Polish officers. The German authorities only learned of this fact in February this year, against the Soviet partisans [sic], and a test digging was ordered about the forest area near the NKVD rest house in Porparka.

Kalina 755/1
May 13, 43

EXHIBIT 27

[Translation from Polish]

Seal
Special Detachment of the
Commander in Chief's Staff
May 25, 1943
Secret

Radiogram No. 852

Accepted May 23, 43, 19.40 hrs.
Read May 25, 43, 15.15 hrs.

From Wanda

Continuation of /755/2. One mass grave 28 by 14 meters and 6 meters deep was dug up, and the entire area of the cemetery was fixed. At a distance of 300 and 500 meters from the officers' graves, graves of civilians at least 10 years old were discovered. The rest of the explanations as in telegram 625. The assistance of the German Army was officially offered, subject, however, to conditions of security and housing. The technical problem, it is hoped, will be taken over by the Polish people * * * an adequate announcement that it is within the competence of the Polish Red Cross. The delegates have found two dug-up pits on the spot; about 250 bodies have already been exhumed, among other the bodies of Generals Smorawinski and Bohatyrowicz. The documents have already been removed to a separate showcase. The bodies in uniforms [with] officer's boots, stripes, decorations, and two bodies in generals' uniforms with decorations and a general's stripes [on the trousers]. Seyfried, after inspecting the graves, with the permission of the Germans, made the following speech, whose contents were affirmed by another delegate: "I call upon you gentlemen to take off your hats, bow your heads, and pay tribute to these heroes who gave their lives that Poland might live." The Germans saluted. The entire proceedings were filmed, photographed, and sound-recorded. The participants have expressed * * * a sound recording was also made. One kilometer from the place of execution at the dissection building [were displayed] the documents, letters dated with the last dates, September 1, and diaries, General Smorawinski's silver cigarette case with an engraving of General Zielinski, scapulars, medals, identity cards, visiting cards, on the basis of which 47 names were then identified.

Kalina 755/2
May 13, 43

EXHIBIT 27

[Translation from Polish]

Radiogram No. 853

File Number 2575/secret/43
May 26, 1953

From Wanda

Accepted May 23, 43, 2000 hrs.
Read May 26, 43, 1330 hrs.

Continuation of 755/2. Skarzynski's report for the Polish Red Cross and the action of the Polish Red Cross. Skarzynski submitted on April 16 the following report:

1. At the locality of Katyn near Smolensk there are partially uncovered graves of Polish officers.

2. On the basis of an inspection of bodies exhumed up to now, one may state that these officers were murdered by means of bullets fired at the back of the heads [15 meaningless letters]. There is no doubt, however, that the execution was skillfully performed.

3. The murder did not have robbery as a motive because the bodies are in uniforms, with decorations, in boots, and on the bodies were found a great number of Polish coins and bank notes.

4. Judging from papers found on the bodies, the murder was committed in March or April of 1940.

5. Up to now there have only been a small number of bodies identified by name (about 150). This report with the motion for raising the number of the technical group by 6 persons was forwarded on April 17 to the district authorities and on April 19 a memo [was forwarded] in connection with the suggestion of sending Polish Red Cross delegates to the officers' prison camps in Germany. The Polish Red Cross answered pointing out that the Polish Red Cross was ready to cooperate with the German authorities within the limits of international conventions on condition that its sphere of activities, restricted now to the operation of an information bureau, be restored, in particular:

1. The activity of the Polish Red Cross would have to be permitted over the entire areas from which the Polish army had been recruited.

2. Prisoners of war in case of release would be permitted to come back also to the GG [Government General] (Prohibition 1941).

3. Prisoners of war would not be handed over from camps to the police authorities for alleged prewar offenses.

Kalina 755/3

May 13. 43

Mr. FLOOD. General, I show you marked for identification exhibits 25, 26, and 27 and ask you whether or not these are copies of the original files taken by you and kept in your custody from the records of the Polish Home Army in Warsaw, dealing with the matters you referred to in your prepared statement, and that within these exhibits are contained the particular telegrams and other matters dealing with the Katyn incident? Is that correct?

General KOMOROWSKI. That is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. In your prepared statement, General, you mentioned the name of Maj. Adam Solski.

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. I now show you a list of names of the officers whose bodies were found at Katyn, which list has been made a part of this record, and ask you to look at page 158 thereof and see if you can identify the name of Adam Solski, to which you referred?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes; it is the same; Solski, Adam.

Mr. FLOOD. We have been showing in the record, through various witnesses, the widespread effort that was made by General Sikorski and General Anders and the Polish Government generally to find some trace of the missing Polish officers and Polish prisoners. That effort was further carried out by your home command and the underground working under your command in Warsaw; is that correct?

General KOMOROWSKI. That is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. You carried on extensive efforts in executing General Sikorski's order, did you not?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. You had your underground agents operating in the German prison camps, is that correct?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes. We had liaison with nearly all the camps.

Mr. FLOOD. And any place where the Germans were in occupied territory?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. At any time, did you issue any specific orders or instructions in this general search, for the search of officers from the camps of Kozielsk, Starobelsk, and Ostashkov?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes; that is right.

Mr. FLOOD. During the entire investigation conducted by your contacts of the underground, did you ever receive any information with reference to the Polish prisoner officers, the missing ones, from the camps Kozielsk, Starobielsk, or Ostashkov?

General KOMOROWSKI. No.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you, through your underground, or you yourself, in person, or any of your command, have any contacts or liaison with any of the Russian authorities, civil, military, or political?

General KOMOROWSKI. No.

Mr. FLOOD. Were all of your efforts made in Polish and German-occupied territory?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes; which the Russians didn't have. But there were Poles that were taken by the Russians in 1939 or 1940, and that we found in the areas taken by the Germans, of the Russian territory.

Mr. FLOOD. After the rapprochement of the summer of 1941, between the Soviet and the Poles, you still continued in command of the home army in Warsaw, did you?

General KOMOROWSKI. In 1941 I was deputy commander.

Mr. FLOOD. The Germans were then in occupation but you were deputy commander?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Where were you in 1943 when you first heard of the Katyn massacre as announced by the Germans?

General KOMOROWSKI. We heard immediately when a delegate from the German propaganda came to Warsaw. The next day we knew what he told. And some days after, in all the press—it was only in the German propaganda issue—were these findings of the graves in Katyn disclosed. And by radio, the Germans gave news every day about the discovery at Katyn.

Mr. FLOOD. What was the reaction of yourself and your command at home headquarters in Warsaw when the Russians, on April 17, 1943, 2 days after the Germans made their announcement on April 16, 1943, when the Russians announced that this was a German crime and not a Russian crime?

General KOMOROWSKI. In the beginning we all, nearly all Poles in Poland, thought that the crime had been committed by the Germans. It was the general opinion in Poland that the crime was committed by the Germans as we knew how many crimes the Germans had committed. Only when I received the diaries of my observer sent to Katyn and when he told me of what he had seen, in this moment I was convinced that this crime had been committed by the Russians and not by the Germans.

Mr. FLOOD. Where are the diaries now and the documents that your observer brought back from Katyn and left with you in Warsaw; do you have any idea? What did you do with them?

General KOMOROWSKI. He brought copies of these documents and they were sent here to London, and they are in London. I also have copies of these diaries.

Mr. FLOOD. Let me see some of those, please.

(The witness produced some documents.)

Mr. FLOOD. Will you have this marked as exhibit No. 28? (So marked by the stenographer.) General, I show you exhibit 28 and

ask you whether or not this exhibit contains the original copies made by your underground agent?

General KOMOROWSKI. No, these are copies.

Mr. FLOOD. These are copies of the originals made by your people?

General KOMOROWSKI. By the staff here in London.

Mr. FLOOD. Your agent brought back from Katyn copies of diaries?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Those copies were shown to you?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. You had copies made of those copies, and the original copies you sent to London. So exhibit 28 is the copies which you had made of your agent's copies of the original documents found on the bodies at Katyn in his presence; is that correct?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And you tell us that this exhibit 28 contains the copies of 15?

General KOMOROWSKI. Here are 10.

Mr. FLOOD. Here are 10 of the 15?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. The originals were 15 that you saw?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And I have in this exhibit copies of 10 of those diaries?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. General, would you remove from this group of diaries your copy of Major Sol'ski's diary? I believe you mentioned him. And also select the copy of at least one other diary and we will make those exhibit 28. I believe it won't be necessary at this time to include all 10 diaries in the record.

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes, I will.

(The two excerpts and their English translations were handed to the reporter and marked "Exhibits 28, and 28A," photostatic copy of which follows:)

EXHIBIT 28

REPORT OF THE POLISH COMMISSION ON THE KATYN MASSACRE


REPORT OF THE POLISH COMMISSION ON THE KATYN MASSACRE


The Commission was established by the Polish Sejm on 15 October 1946 to investigate the Katyn massacre. It consisted of 15 members, including 10 Polish citizens and 5 Soviet citizens. The Commission's report, published in 1953, concluded that the massacre was the result of a premeditated plan by the Soviet NKVD to eliminate the Polish officer corps.


The report states that the NKVD was responsible for the massacre and that the Soviet government was aware of the actions of its agents. The Commission also found that the NKVD had used various methods to identify and capture Polish officers, including the use of informants and the seizure of documents.

The report further stated that the NKVD had used the Katyn forest as a site for the massacre because it was a remote and isolated area. The Commission also found that the NKVD had used various methods to dispose of the bodies, including burial in mass graves and the use of incinerators.

The report concluded that the Katyn massacre was a crime against humanity and that the Soviet government was responsible for the actions of its agents. The Commission also recommended that the Soviet government should take steps to identify and punish those responsible for the massacre.







[Translation from Polish]

COPY FROM A DIARY

Envelope No. 0490/SOLSKI, Adam, major.

[Page 15] September 28, 1939. Thereafter from Jozefow 12 to Osuchow, 5 kilometers to Lukow, where we (billeted until 7 a. m.). From Lukow 14 kilometers to Tarnograd, Anielek, Szarajowka, Korchow-Tarnograd. Jastrzebiec.

Taken prisoner 11:55 A. M.

11:50 A. M.: the spearhead (advance unit) stopped by Soviet forces in Tarnograd.

Dzikow—billeted in a barn after an 8-kilometer march to Rozaniec, then by cart to Dzikow. At Dzikow, after a longer stop in front of the post office, transfer to the barn on barley straw. After 2 hours of sleep, organized into groups of prisoners of war and marched off to Cieszanow.

[Page 67] September 29. On leaving the barn, divided into groups 1-10.

II. group

1. Lieut. Sypniewski Marjan 58.
2. Second Lieut. Andrzejewski Bogdan 58.
3. Second Lieut. Wielebinski Wladyslaw 55.
4. Second Lieut. Buczkowski Waclaw 55.
5. Second Lieut. Szmagiel Jan 58.
6. Second Lieut. Olzewski Alfons 55.
7. Second Lieut. Bondke Edmund.
8. Second Lieut. Gliszczynski Jerzy.
9. Second Lieut. Wiedanek Ferdynand.
10. Second Lieut. Mogietko Tadeusz.

Reporter's note: names under 7 and 8 crossed out but legible; position under 10 crossed out and illegible.

Dzikow 29th. On the way to Cieszanow via Dzikow we are escorted by a corporal who (allows) no stops—churl (?). Marched on foot 16 kilometers; arrived in Cieszanow and halted in a garden at 13.30 hours. Page 68.

5 P. M. Departure from Cieszanow to Lwow by trucks (without benches, on straw—uncomfortable). Arrival in Lwow after midnight. The Janowski railway station destroyed, the theater destroyed. The city decorated with red flags.

30th. After a rest in room No. 46 at the Main City Command Building (chief of equipment). At noon left by car to the barracks of p. a. e. (defenders of Lwow), wherefrom after being given some bread and bacon, departure to Tarnopol via Winniki.

Slowita—from 2 P. M. to 2:45 rest, thereafter to Tarnopol via Zloczow-Zborow at 7 P. M.

(Comrade Gryszenko) the driver of the car; from there, 48 kilometers to Woloczyska by car, to a stables at the sugar refinery. Billeted here at midnight in the stables, the straw in shreds. Cold. I sleep between Lieut. of the reserves Bukowski and Lieut. Olszewski.

[Page 69] October 1. 6 A. M. reveille. The weather sunny but cool. Taking of our personal data rather detailed. About noon we received peeled barley and black coffee (too sweet because of the sugar refinery). In the evening into the railway car. 76 kilometers * * * with a transport heading east towards Komarowka. Have fainted twice during the night.

October 2. We wakened at 6 A. M. on the station of Hredczany between Podwoloczyska and Plaskirow. At the station we received bread, 1 (loaf) between 4 men, two herrings each, and sugar. 11:50 A. M., Doraznia station. 3:40 P. M.—arrival at Komarowka.

October 3. 6 A. M. Passed Winnica; before Koziatyn toilet. At Koziatyn breakfast—water with sugar—herrings and $\frac{1}{2}$ loaf of bread.

[Page 70] A short stop at Czarnorudka. 11:55 A. M.—have reached a larger (new) station, Frastow Bojarka near Kiev. 1:50 P. M. (their time 3:55 P. M.) arrived in Kiev. We have our supper. Halted since October 1 outside depots and workshops. Kiev is a large city—has it been rebuilt since 1920?

4. Awakening at the station of Niezyn, Czernichow province. * * * At 8:30 A. M. on October 4, Bachmaz station (reporter's note: name of the station also written in Russian). Short stop. 10:00 A. M.—short stop at the junction station, Konotop. Weather sunny—wind northeasterly, cold. Have not shaved since September 27. Last shaved in the apothecary of Mr. Gajewski at Lukowa near Bilgoraj. This short stop at Konotop lasted until 12:25 P. M. We have no idea where they are sending us now, whether towards Moscow or Charkow. * * * Since yesterday's supper at Kiev until now, without food.

[Page 71] At the town Worozb supper—sauerkraut soup, groats, tea.

Oct. 5. Morning. At the station of the village Ciotkonia (reporter's note: name of the station also written in Russian), until 8:30 A. M. Thereafter we disembarked about 12 kilometers from the camp. "Peat—separation—mud" Boloto (sic).

At the monastery. (Reporter's note: The word monastery has been crossed out but is legible.) Here we were divided for billeting at a school or some such place. Crowded and dirty. In the evening, bread and fish conserves—one for 4 people—also dirty hot water. Prayers are not allowed; singing. Have slept through the night; in the morning, snow, as in Poland in December. After breakfast a glass of water and lots of promises. Our money has no value here whatsoever. We remain idle. Quarrels, criticism, brawling—up to midnight we have received nothing to eat, apart from the boiled water.

Oct. 8. We were awakened during the night and given $\frac{1}{4}$ loaf of bread each, and soup (a bit salty). Winter is here in full; snow.

[Page 72] Oct. 8. It is supposedly Sunday—holiday. Here work is bustling, with wires being put up and nailing up (sic) * * * and nails. It is a cloudy day but fairly warm. A lean breakfast at 9 A. M. (7 A.-M.).

Oct. 9. Monday. I woke up during the night. I dreamed about Danka. After the morning wash, carried wooden planks. At 9:30 A. M. (11:30 A. M.) waiting for breakfast. Received extra ration of boiled water. Playing of bridge is being suggested. Yesterday played 2 rubbers—lost 1.60.

October 10. Tuesday. A cool night. We sleep lying one next to the other; it is crowded and stuffy. 7:00 A. M.—getting up. no change in the food * * * soup twice a day and water once. I went to see the doctor; the sciatic pains are worse. I am released from work.

October 11. Have met Captain Radzikowski. A clear day. The group is on duty from noon. Yesterday they conducted a new registration. Where are Danka, Ewa, Mother? General Trojanowski is supposed to be in the Gorodok monastery nearby.

[Page 73] October 12. Nice frosty weather. I dreamt at night about my darling Ewuska. I dreamt that I carried her and took her away from a Hungarian raft, and after that, through all sorts of dangers, obstacles, transferred her and put her down on a sunny hill, from which she was to go to Aunt Witolda.

October 13. A fairly warm day. In the afternoon, a bath and doing laundry—that is, my one and only shirt and a towel given to me by Capt. of the 34th infantry division Braniewski. I also washed some handkerchiefs which I kept; they were left behind by my adjutant. Supper was late because of the commission which conducts the examination and in reality confiscates identification papers, notebooks, gold and silver watches, etc. This notebook was saved because was together with a picture of Saint Teresa.

October 14. A clear day, the change of wind will not bring anything good from the west.

[Page 74] October 14, 1939. We have started work on our bunks, which means that our miserable existence will be prolonged. The food is very poor. The bread (dynamite) keeps us alive.

15. [Oct.]. Sunday. Working at putting up the bunks. Breakfast will be around 11 A. M. (Mass at 9:00 A. M.).

15th. Building of bunks and getting settled.

October 16. After spending the night on the hard boards, continued our preparations for settling down. They have taken away from among us policemen, noncommissioned officers, and other nonofficers. They are supposedly to be sent back to their homes. I have not seen anyone that I know. I cannot find out anything about Kazik. There is nobody from the 18th armored division from Lona [sic; maybe Lomza]. I have a premonition that he has been critically wounded or killed and was taken prisoner by the Germans. I have spoken today with Major Lesniak, who is also here. He fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks near Uscilug. He has no news of his wife or his children. We are not as yet allowed to write any correspondence. I do not know whether Tadzik has been notified in Lwow, or whether he notified Warsaw that I am in Russian captivity.

[Page 75] October 17. Nothing worth noting happened. I was acting as orderly and carried breakfasts, lunches, and suppers from the kitchen. Towards the evening some infantrymen from the Kielec province arrived from the Starobielsk region, but they do not know what to do with them, whether to send them back to the border and hand them over to the Germans or whether to keep them here. They have found no volunteers among us to remain. Even one who had already been punished in Poland for Communism, does not wish to

remain. The things he does not like here in the U. S. S. R. are the monotony of life, the continuous deception of each other, and the paying of homage to the new idols, Lenin-Stalin-Molotov. The Red Army liberator of nations.

[Page 76] Some higher official (GPU) was supposedly here and made a great many promises to improve our lot here and to satisfy our needs, but one cannot count on that here in Russia, especially under the present system. They consider us prisoners of war although they were not at war with us. However, their friendship with the Germans, no doubt on orders from Ribbentrop, had brought this about. How long we will remain here God only knows.

18th. I was learning German vocabulary. I am homesick when I think of Danka, Ewa, and the family. Mother. What has happened with Kazio? Janek—he is a settler.

19th. News from the French front is very good. The French are supposed to have advanced. Nothing interesting to report for the 20th and 21st. We received sets of games: chess, dominoes, and checkers.

[Page 77] We play with great zeal in order to pass time in this captivity during this cloudy and unpleasant weather. The food is somewhat more substantial (more fat content). It seems there is less pilfering among the Bolsheviks.

21st Oct. Transports of police and priests. * * *

22nd Oct. The weather is sunny and cold. In the morning, as usual, reveille ["powierka"] [Reporter's note: the word "powierka" is written also in Russian characters.] Morning exercises and awaiting breakfast (soup, peeled barley, lentil, or gruel). Today is Holy Sunday, but in the Soviet land there is no God.

23rd Oct. A slight frost. I have caught 2 fleas, the messengers of our misery.

24th Oct. Freezing cold. My second bath; in the tub I found a third flea. Washed my one and only shirt the second time (they don't give us any linen).

[Page 78] Yesterday they gave us soap, 200 grams each. "Prisoner of war." Today they gave us one package of shag-tobacco per five men. Barter trade is flourishing. Bread in exchange for sugar, tobacco for sugar, etc. The soldiers from the province of Kielce are to leave today, therefore barter trading is brisk. They wanted 50 zl. for a pair of gloves [value—1 zl.] Through one of the soldiers I gave my address to my father-in-law * * * and to Witolda. The other day I had a shave and haircut, so I look quite human again.

28th Oct. Today at 11:35 A. M. a month has passed since I became a captive of the Russians. The month went quickly, but the two months of war are terrible. I last saw Danka on the 4th of September at the Muchnow estate (Kutno province). I bid goodbye to mother and to my darling Ewusia a few days before [P. 79] my departure from Poznan.

It was stupid of me not to send part of my things with them to the in-laws in Warsaw. I have left my wife and child (8 years) destitute. How will they manage, and mother too?

Today is the nameday of Tadeusz Lesniak. I went to see him, and I learned that he saw Rysiek Solski (son of Felix, from Warsaw), also Wasowicz's mother, 15 kilometers east of Siedlce. They were going to Lwow, and were in good spirits. There is a lot of persistent talk going around that we are to leave these barracks, and that by the 10th of November, all camps are to be liquidated in Russia. I don't know, but I think that we shall remain in captivity until May. If one could only notify the family. For two days, we haven't received any sugar (per 30.35 grams) so we live on tea without sugar. For breakfast, thick grits and manna, cooled with oil. Altogether, for the last few days, all meals are cooked with oil without onions and flour. Yesterday evening there was no electric light, so today they are burning lights all day, although it is nice and sunny. Yesterday was wet.

31 Oct. The last days of October go by with continuous and insistent rumors that they are to send us from the local barracks back to the Germans via Szepietowka or Lwow, and perhaps even further to the east or to Starobielsk. So many different rumors, yet no news as to whether Mother, Danka, and Ewusia know what has happened to me—that I am alive, in good health, and with a good appetite for this food here (lentils, manna grits cooked with oil, and sauerkraut soup or beet soup with meat). They also give us black bread and sugar, and [page 81] from time to time this shag tobacco (I have already half a package for sale, in exchange for roubles). Wonder whether Ewusia has as much sugar as Daddy has? During the afternoon and evening rumors have spread that we are leaving these barracks in Boloto.

Nov. 1, 1939. Reveille at 4 A. M. (our time, 2:00 A. M. at night). I'm sure we are leaving. I am given as a senior of the group, tea for the whole group. Early breakfast and assembly; we march off to the railway tracks and get into freight cars used previously for carrying peat.

9-10 A. M. we start, and at 10 we are at the sugar refinery Ciotkino, wherefrom we march through the village to the tracks of the wide-gauge railway.

2nd Nov. We rode on the train till 7 P. M. to the town of Kozielsk [reporter's note: the name Kozielsk is also written in Russian], where we were awakened at midnight and marched till 6 A. M. November 3 to the former monastery a few kilometers from the station. The former monastery buildings overlooked the woods. The treatment we received during the journey was terrible. On November 3rd we marched from the station of Kozielsk to (a summer resort) camp 4 to 7 kilometers from Kozielsk on a muddy road. In the early morning we were received by the new administration of the camp Kozielsk. The treatment was better from Lt. Col. to General, a separate bath, new registration, and roll call. Food twice a day, a piece of bread (white once a day) and soup.

Nov. 4. Further registration. Up till 12 noon they gave us nothing to eat.

Nov. 5. Morning. 12 noon. Walked to the bathhouse. The bath in a basin of water, then naked through the anteroom into the room for dressing. Looking for billets. An extra ordinary thing. On Nov. 4 I met [page 82] Professor Kawa Wladyslaw, my wife's (Danka's) uncle. Married to Szenora Trojanowska, mother of Zbyszek Trojanowski, captain in the communications corps of General Anders. On Nov. 11 Kazik (brother) waited for me at the entrance to the bathhouse. He is a prisoner of the Bolsheviks, and has been since the 18th of September. He was taken captive on leaving home in Baranowicze. There are about 2,400 mouths to feed in the Kozielszczyna camp. Among them a large number of officers, older men, retired or drafted, doctors, etc., who had very little to do otherwise with the army.

22 Nov. 1939. Wednesday. For some time nothing of importance to report in my notebook. Today snow started to fall. A lot of talk here about the departure of cadet officers and noncommissioned officers and privates to German-occupied territory. Who is to know? Only God. They don't know anything and won't tell. Continuous secrecy * * * and uncertainty of the hour and day. Already the registration [page 83] has been conducted. The other day they woke me up at 11 P. M. at night (our time 9 P. M.) * * * to lead ten men for registration. In the night from Sunday to Monday, I believe, I had an ugly dream. I saw Danka in my dream in a black dress. She was distant and unapproachable. Later the dream changed into a sunny one. Two days ago, a notice was issued that we are permitted to write and receive letters once a month [one letter a month]. There is great joy because of that, but even in this respect there are difficulties, as in everything. Lack of leather for shoe repairs; I took the oldest pair of shoes, and altogether the worst suit. I left everything in the car with Capt. Madalinski.

[P. 84] Today, 21/22 Nov. 1939, I had a ghastly dream. I dreamt that Felix's wife (Maryna) came to my billet and said that the "deceased," that is, Danka, died under some operation or abortion. I dreamt that I fainted, shouting "Oh, Oh" and that because of trying to save money on the operation, specialist (sic) Maryna Solska (Felix's wife) said. In the morning I told my dream to Kazik, and I shall speak (to Professor Kawa) Wladyslaw. No news about our dearest ones—Danka, Ewa, Mother, or about Janek and Stefa. There is no news as to our department, nor is there any hope of an end to this "sightseeing" of the U. S. S. R. Whether they will hand us over to the Germans or whether and where we shall be kept, either here or in Germany. * * * A severe winter is approaching, and we are without shoes or warm clothing. Here they promise us everything. If only my dream doesn't come true. "Heaven forbid!"

27 Nov. Today five men out of our group of ten from Poznan left to (sic) work on a collective farm. They returned and told us of unexpected surprises and about the prospects of communal farming (machines, farm buildings, equipment, food, etc.).

28 Nov. In the morning we decided to buy stamps and send a letter for Capt. Dr. Kosinski Jerzy Dyonizowicz, who sent a letter to Pniewy addressed to Miss Dorota Pyzelek—Pniewy Germany, Province Poznan, Poznan Street 7. Today at 11:55, two months of captivity were completed, under circumstances unknown so far, and without any news from my dear ones.

[P. 86] Dec. 12, 1939. Vigil of St. Nicholas: we wonder how the children will celebrate this happy feast in Poland. Darling Ewusia, have you received anything from your beloved Mama for St. Nicholas' Day? They say that supposedly letters from Poland have arrived. Kazik has not been to see me today—probably doing laundry and mending socks or other things. I struggle as commandant of Corps No. 15 (a barracks with 950 occupants) * * * "office—prisoner of war." I am kept occupied, therefore the end of this terrible adventure as a prisoner of war in the U. S. S. R. is nearing quickly. * * * w ZSSR /CCCR/.

Dec. 15, 1939. Yesterday after duties I went to Major Czerniakowski to a "prisoner-of-war" concert of songs in Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian. A better spirit, and hope that the treatment may perhaps improve entered into us "prisoners of war." Colleagues from the "Skid" came—about 1,800. We are about 3,300 altogether, including four generals, that is, the old general Bohatyrewicz, Minkiewicz, Wolkowicki, and Smorawinski, the last commander of O. K. VII.

Dec. 16. Today freezing cold (14–20°). In the morning, pleasant news that a list has been put up and that Kazio received a postcard. When he got it, it was a postcard instead of a letter from Jagusia, and he learned that at the end of November Hala went to Torun and on the way stopped on the new German-Russian border of occupation at Zareby * * * near Malkinia. I on the other hand learned with surprise that Danka, Ewusia, and mother-in-law (Tojanowscy) are in Lwow with Tadzik, and that mother is with Stefa, and that Stefa is married and her husband Swistelniczki is in Hungary.

I regret now that on October 1, when I was escorted through Lwow (having been taken captive by the Bolsheviks in Tarnograd near Bilgoraj) I did not know that they are [sic] all in Lwow. So many months have passed already since I saw mother and Ewusia, to whom I bid my farewell in Poznan, hoping that we shall see each other soon, and since my goodbye on September 13 to Danka at Muchnow on an estate (so strange). I did not expect that Danka would stop at Lwow. What is their fate? Will they now send them to Warsaw for the winter?

[Page 88] Here in my barracks (block/corps/bldg. No. 15) I met a close neighbor of Kazik from Filipowka/Lt. of the Reserves Marczak, Stanislaw from B. G. K. Today he received a cable with a prepaid reply that all at his home are well and together (including the maid). I am awaiting with impatience news from mother and Danka. Since I addressed my letter to Warsaw I'm sure I won't get any reply from there [sic]. Perhaps Andrzej or Edek or Zbyszek Trojanowski's father will write.

Dec. 20, 1939. Today Tuesday. I have submitted Kazek's application for a transfer, that is, from Bolshevik captivity to German captivity. Four months have passed since I bid farewell to mother and Ewusia. I forgot to enter in my diary that on December 16 Kazik received a postcard from Jadzia Sol, from Lida.

Jan. 3, 1940. Wednesday. Four months passed today since I last saw Danka on October 4, 1939, on the estate in Muchnow near Kutno. On September 9 I did not find my wife in Warsaw at Marszałkowska Street No. 81 at Apt. 22. I know nothing certain as to where she has gone. From the post card which I received from Jagusia dated Nov. 6 we know that she was with Tadzik in Lwow. Whether she is still there and what they are doing now—how Ewusia is—whether Danka is well, and what the results are * * *.

[Page 90] [Reporter's note: bit of page torn off] July 21, 1939 (!) in Promieniek * * * Jan. 10, 1940. Frost 30° Réaumur (47° Centigrade). The food is miserable. Pea soup with peas half cooked. Yesterday for breakfast sauerkraut and fish (kilki). Lack of water. Everywhere, water for boiling, "lawoczki," long queues. Legs freeze at work.

Jan. 24, 1940. Five months have passed since I last saw and said goodbye to mother and Ewusia in a train compartment at Poznan. Ewusia cried then, but whether because the "negress" was to remain, or whether she sensed that it would be such a long separation from her daddy. * * * Mother bidding goodbye sensed that the separation would be for a longer time, perhaps even forever. Terrible is the fate of man—a Pole.

[Page 91] Jan. 28, 1940. Today at 6 A. M. five months have passed since the departure [Reporter's note: the page is torn off here] from Poznan to Kutno/Strzelec Kujawskie [Reporter's note: torn off].

Today at 11:55 A. M. four months have passed since I fell into the hands of the Bolshevik army in Tarnograd on the Tanwia. There is no change in our stay. Yesterday on the 27th Major Rogozinski, after being interrogated by a Bolshevik major, told us that the latter assured him that before the Spring they should hand us over to the Germans. We shall then have to experience captivity and cruelty from the Germans. There is nothing new with us, and nothing has changed.

The days are longer. The food for a change, after sauerkraut and kilki (a fish)—little herrings for breakfast, and peeled barley for lunch. For the last ten days we have not received any sugar or tea. Bugs showed up in our room. They took the dogs away from the camp. A list of mail which was not delivered from the previous mail delivery (letters from families) has been displayed. Except for

a few lines on a postcard from Bialystok I haven't received anything from Danka. How does she manage with Ewusia and her parents during this severe winter? Are there any people who are helping her? In a few days, February 3-4, I shall write the third letter; since August 4th we haven't written anything and we have no news of each other; after so many years we were left on ice without even the most essential things. Who could have thought that it would end like that? I hope, however, that this is not for long, and that everything will soon end well for my family. What will the next few weeks bring us? The weather today, Sundays, Jan. 28, 1940, is beautifully sunny, although frosty (15-29°). Our quarters are in a small room in which ten of us live (Captain of the Artillery Hoffman, older than I, officer of the reserves, employee of the sugar refinery in Opalew. The rest are 3 Lts. and five Sub-Lts., all from the 55th, 57th, and 58th infantry division. What is going to happen to us and when shall it end?

[P. 93] Sunday, February 1, 1940. Evening. The weather is beautiful but cold. From the bunk I sunned myself through the window panes, especially my sciatic pains, which trouble me. There is news in the night that Romania confiscates arms and * * *. Poland. Is this good news? I believe it is. * * * Maybe * * * it will shorten our stay. Yesterday I sent a postcard to Kama, and today I am writing to Danka. What is new at home? How are Danka and Ewusia living? And mother with Stefa in Lwow? During the night of March 11-12, from Monday to Tuesday, I had an extraordinary dream. I saw, in my dream, mother, somewhere in the second room of our apartment. I was tuning the radio to music, and was fighting with myself—with my double. I cried and hissed terribly. When I awakened, as did my fellow comrades, I was lying on my back and my heart was beating terribly. Perhaps because I was running last evening at 11 P. M. to the mailbox to post a card from Wielich to Danka. How weak I am from this "prison"—I beg your pardon—on this "prisoner of war" diet. This dream augurs something bad.

Today, 13th of March, nothing of importance.

Today, 4th of April. Only today, in the second day of the excitement because of our departure, I am looking into these notes. The holidays have passed. Have received cards and messages from Danka, with news that apart from my first letter of November 24, 1939, which she received January 6, nothing arrives from this "land of paradise."

[Page 95] Sunday, April 7, 1940. Morning. After yesterday, allocation * * * Skitowcy—pack our things * * * till 11:40 A. M. for the departure to the club for inspection. Lunch in the club * * *. After inspection, at 2:55 P. M., we left the walls and barbed wires of the Kozielsk camp. The house * * * named after Gorski. At 4:55 P. M. (2:45 P. M. Polish time) we were put into prison cars on the railway siding Kozielsk. I have never seen such cars in all my life. They say that of all passenger railway cars in the USSR, 50% are prison cars. Together with me is Jozef Kutylba, Kpt. Szyfter Pawel, and also majors, lt. cols., and captains; altogether twelve, while there is room for seven at the most.

April 8, 3:30 A. M. Departure from Kozielsk station to the west. 9:45 A. M. at Jelnia station.

April 8, 1940. From 12 noon we are standing at Smolensk on a railway siding.


April 9, 1940. A few minutes before 5 in the morning reveille in the prison cars and preparation for departure * * *. We are to go somewhere by car, and what then?


April 9, 5 A. M.

April 9. From the very dawn, the day started somewhat peculiarly. Departure by prison van in little cells (terrible); they brought us somewhere into the woods—some kind of summer resort. Here a detailed search. They took the watch, on which time was 6:30 a. m. (8:30), asked me for my wedding ring, which they took, roubles, my main belt, and pocket knife.

EXHIBIT 28A

Excerpts from diary of a Polish soldier found dead in Katyn





[Translation from Polish]

The copy of notes from the notebook.

Envelope No. 0424 (Kruk) Waclaw.

Note in the Polish Red Cross list: 0424, military, N.N. (unknown), pencil drawing with inscription "Kozielsk 1940, diary, holy medallion."

The notebook (larger) was probably made by the owner himself by bending and binding, together with sheets of white unlined paper, with no watermarks. The notebook has no covers and consists of 54 leaves. Of these only the first two were written upon; the rest is blank and bears only the marks of a chemical pencil which, put inside, dissolved and permeated a number of pages with violet color. Also, traces of lines of a poem are visible; it was written on a separate sheet and put inside the notebook. Similarly, traces of an impression of figures drawn on a separate sheet of paper are noticeable, it would appear from the contents of the notebook that they represent checker pieces, which are mentioned by the author in his notebook.

There was also in the notebook a pencil drawing representing a bearded man signed "Kruk Waclaw", Kozielsk, 1940. On the other smaller sheet was a caricature of the same man, signed "Kruk." In this notebook a sheet with the address "Herrn Sigmund Brodaty Sto/ck/holm Birger Sweden (the word Sweden is written in Russian characters).

The first leaf of the notebook, that is, the first two pages, is covered with Russian words, which may indicate that the owner of the notebook was learning Russian. The proper notes start on page three, and end on page four. The copy of these notes follows:

April 8, 1940. I have written nothing until now, because it seemed to me that nothing noteworthy had happened. Recently, that is by the end of March and the beginning of April, departure rumors were current. We thought them to be the usual gossip. But it turned out that they were true. In the first days of April, transports, initially small, started leaving from "Skit," taking several persons each time. Finally it [Skit] was liquidated on Saturday the 7th, and we were transferred to the main camp. Temporarily we were located in the major's block. Yesterday a transport of senior officers left—3 generals, 20 to 25 colonels, and a similar number of majors. Judging by the method of discharge, our chances were of the best. Today my turn came. I took a bath in the morning, and washed my socks and handkerchiefs * * * generally "to * * * with things." After accounting for camp equipment, a search was carried out in hut No. 19, and from there * * * we were led out through the gate to trucks which took us out to the station, and not to Kozielsk (communications with Kozielsk were cut by the flood). There we were put into prison cars under a strong guard. In the prison cell (which I saw for the first time) we were thirteen. I have not as yet acquainted myself with my comrades in distress. Now we are waiting for the departure * * *. As before I was optimistic, I now expect

* * * this journey bodes ill for us. The worst is that * * * it is doubtful whether we shall be able to discover the direction of our journey. But patience. We move in the direction of Smolensk. The weather * * * it is sunny, there is plenty of snow on the fields.

April 9, 1940. Tuesday. We had a more comfortable night than in the old cattle cars. There was more room and we did not shake so badly. The weather today * * * as in winter. It snows and it is cloudy. It is impossible to ascertain what our direction is. During the night we passed Spass-Demenskoje [name written in Russian but incorrectly]. I have seen no such station on the map in the direction of Smolensk. I am afraid that we are being moved either North or Northeast, which seems to be confirmed by the weather. During the day it is as it was in former times. Yesterday in the morning they gave us a ration of bread and some sugar, and in the train some cold boiled water. Now noon is nearing and we have received no food. The treatment * * * is also rough. We are allowed nothing. We are even allowed access to the privies only as it pleases the guards. Requests or shouts help us not at all.

To get back to "Skit," my best comrades were Sucharski, a teacher from the Bialystok area, and Szafranski, bookkeeper from the co-op "Spolem." We formed a kind of triumvirate in the Major's Bloc. Upon departure I gave Szafranski my army pullover. He wanted to buy it, and give me his watch and 50 roubles, but I refused to accept. Maybe I shall regret it. I gave it to him although it was difficult to part with it, but I felt sorry for him. He suffered badly from cold. Before leaving "Skit" we had an unofficial choir concert. My sculptures made me quite popular. I had to make two reliefs for Major Goleb (a highlander and the Holy Mother), a cross for captain Deszert, tobacco case, and * * * but most admired were my checkers. I was afraid I would lose them, because the gossip was that during the search all wooden objects would be confiscated. Fortunately it was only a rumor. But they took my knife. At 14.30 hours we arrived in Smolensk. We waited on the marshalling yards. It is an enormous station, like most of the newer Russian railway stations; marshalling yards spread for several kilometres. We are in Smolensk, however. The evening came, and we passed Smolensk. We arrived at Gniezdowo station. It looks as though we may be unloaded here, because a number of military are present. In any case we have received nothing to eat as yet. Since yesterday we have subsisted on a piece of bread and some water.

Mr. DONDERO. General, you have said that the original diaries were somewhere here in London?

Mr. FLOOD. No.

General KOMOROWSKI. No—the copies.

Mr. DONDERO. Where are the original diaries?

General KOMOROWSKI. My observer brought me copies of the original and these copies I sent to London that my observer handed me. The original diaries were taken in his presence mostly from the pockets, though he could see the original. He saw the original diaries and he made a copy and this copy he brought to me.

Mr. DONDERO. And the originals were left there at the grave?

General KOMOROWSKI. No.

Mr. DONDERO. Well, where are they now?

General KOMOROWSKI. No, they were taken by the Polish Red Cross to Warsaw. What happened to them I do not know. They were brought to the Polish Red Cross in Warsaw.

Mr. O'KONSKI. General, I was looking over some documents; your testimony ended rather abruptly and there were quite a number of pertinent questions I wanted to ask you which I think will help this committee. As commander of the home army in Warsaw, you were the leader in the Warsaw uprising in July and August 1944; were you not?

General KOMOROWSKI. In August and September.

Mr. O'KONSKI. In August and September of 1944?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. O'KONSKI. About how many people of Warsaw were killed by the Germans in that uprising?

General KOMOROWSKI. I know exactly how many soldiers were lost, but it is very difficult to tell exactly how many from the civilian population were killed, as a lot of houses and blocks were bombed and the bodies of the people were buried; but in my personal opinion I think that nearly 100,000 of the civilian population were killed. The German propaganda immediately on the second day after the uprising was finished announced that 200,000 people were killed. From where could they have got this news? It was only their propaganda. They could not in 2 days discover. And the Russian propaganda repeated 250,000 and 300,000.

Mr. O'KONSKI. The Russian propaganda was that between 250,000 and 300,000 were killed in the uprising?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Now, General, when you led that uprising, you already knew in your own mind, and so did the leaders who were helping you, that it was the Russians that committed the murder at Katyn?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. O'KONSKI. You were pretty convinced of that fact, were you not?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Yet your underground army supported the Allied cause, including the Russians, in the uprising; so there was not any prejudice or personal animosity against the Russians after you knew they had committed the murders; is that correct?

General KOMOROWSKI. Right.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Now here is what I want to ask you: In the Warsaw uprising the Russian Army was how far away from Warsaw?

General KOMOROWSKI. Fifteen miles in the beginning, but after 6 weeks they were just across the Vistula.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Now, in the Warsaw uprising, that lasted for some 2 months, it would have been very easy for the Russians to come to the aid of the home army in Warsaw; could they not have?

General KOMOROWSKI. There was only the river dividing us, and there was no difficulty at all in the summer to cross the river—no difficulty at all.

Mr. O'KONSKI. In other words, General, there is no question in your mind whatever that the Russians deliberately stood by, hoping that there would be more of the home army and the so-called resistance groups in Poland massacred and liquidated. Would you agree with that opinion?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes, it is my opinion.

Mr. O'KONSKI. General, the reason why I ask that question is this: Do you see any analogy between the Katyn murders by the Russians and the refusal of the Russians to come to the aid of the Warsaw Home Army; do you see any analogy in the two?

General KOMOROWSKI. In my opinion it is the same policy of the Russians.

Mr. O'KONSKI. What would you say that that policy was?

General KOMOROWSKI. This policy was to destroy all the national elements of Poles.

Mr. O'KONSKI. In other words, any reasonable person then would have a right to conclude that, since the Russians, who were able to come to the rescue, saw the massacre, according to their own propaganda, of 250,000 to 300,000 Poles in Warsaw in the uprising, if they stood by and saw that because they had a very definite reason, hoping that that would be done, it would not be beyond them to slaughter or massacre 15,000; is that your conclusion?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. Who did the bombing of their city?

General KOMOROWSKI. The Germans.

Mr. DONDERO. Did they do the bombing?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes; but the Germans could not have made it except they knew the Russians were not helping us; they did not give us cover by plane. If one Russian plane had come over Warsaw in the sky, the German planes would have disappeared; but not one plane from the Russians came to help.

Mr. DONDERO. And they were 15 miles away?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes; in the beginning; and after they were only on the other side of the Vistula; we saw them.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Now, General, let me ask you another question: Is it true that your gallant home army was made up of the most intelligent, most able, and the most capable people in Warsaw and Poland at that time?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. O'KONSKI. It was made up of the best type, the most trusted patriots that you could find in all Poland gathered in Warsaw; they were the heart and the core of the home army; is not that correct?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes; and the headquarters was in Warsaw not only of the home army but also the underground government of Poland.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Now let me ask you another question: In other words, these people that were found in the graves at Katyn were just as important for the heart of Poland as the composition of the home army at Warsaw: they were the best that the Polish people had to offer, were they not?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. O'KONSKI. They were the most likely to form resistance to Communism or Nazism or any form of dictatorship, if they had survived. They would have been the most potent leaders in Poland to resist any kind of dictatorship, if they had survived; is not that right?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. O'KONSKI. In other words, there is no doubt in your mind at all that Katyn and the refusal of the Russians to come to your help during the Warsaw uprising were clearly and unequivocally a Russian program of genocide, to liquidate the potent patriotism which might survive in Poland?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes, no question; and in eastern Poland in the area of Nowogrodek on the body of a killed Russian officer was found an order to kill all the officers from the Polish underground.

Mr. O'KONSKI. In other words, General, the refusal of the Russians to aid Warsaw uprising was merely a continuation of the Russian policy?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Of which Katyn is an example; to wipe out any possible opposition and not to leave in Poland any kind of group of patriots that might form a resistance in Poland after the war?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes, that is my opinion.

Mr. O'KONSKI. That is your definite opinion?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. O'KONSKI. I think that is very important, gentlemen, and those are the questions I want to ask, because when I study this Katyn situation and also study the million or more civilians of Poland that were transported to Siberia, and then this Warsaw uprising, they all seem to tie up, and the picture must be considered as a whole if one wants really to get at the basic facts at Katyn. Those are the only questions I have and you have answered them very well.

General KOMOROWSKI. It did not finish with the Warsaw uprising. After the Warsaw uprising, 50,000 of the home army were arrested by the Russians and deported to Russia.

Mr. O'KONSKI. I am glad you mention that. In other words, you say there is a parallel even after, as the Russians themselves say, between 250,000 and 300,000 of the people of Poland perished in the Warsaw uprising. When the Russians came in, the job was not yet complete enough. They themselves arrested 50,000 members of the home army?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. O'KONSKI. To make a complete job of the liquidation?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. O'KONSKI. That is very significant; that is all I have to ask.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Just one question along the lines opened up by Mr. O'Konski. In September 1939 Marshal Timoshenko was in command of the army in eastern Poland?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And at that time, before the cessation of hostilities, are you familiar with the fact that Marshal Timoshenko issued certain pamphlets circulated amongst Polish soldiers inducing them to revolt against the officers?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I have before me a photostatic copy of one of his pamphlets which I would like to translate and ask you if you have knowledge of the fact that such a pamphlet was circulated. The pamphlet is as follows:

Soldiers: In the course of the last few days the Polish Army has been completely demolished. The soldiers of the cities of Tarnopol, Halicz, Rowno, Dubno, in number over 60,000 have voluntarily passed over to our side. Soldiers, what is there left for you? What are you fighting for and with whom? Why do you risk your lives? Your defense is impossible. Your officers are forcing you to a murder without any sense. They hate you and they hate your families. They are the ones who shot your delegates whom you sent with the proposition to give up. Do not believe your officers. Your officers and your generals are your enemies; they want your death. Soldiers, beat up your officers and generals. Do not listen to the orders of your officers. Chase them from your land. Come over to your brothers in the Red Army. Here you will find care and tenderness. Remember, only the Red Army can save the Polish Nation from the unfortunate war and there will you find a possibility of starting a peaceful life. Believe us, the Red Soviet Army is your only friend. Signed, S. Timoshenko.

Do you remember such pamphlets being circulated?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes. I have the original pamphlets—not in my hands, but I know the text.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That also was part of their plan to disorganize the Polish Nation?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And to start a revolt against the so-called intelligentsia, was it not?

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That was circulated in September 1939.

General KOMOROWSKI. Yes, I know very well. I not only have the original pamphlets in my hand, but people coming from Eastern Poland told me this when I was in Poland.

Mr. FLOOD. General, have you received any promises of emoluments of any kind from anybody for appearing here today and testifying?

General KOMOROWSKI. No.

Mr. FLOOD. Then the committee wish to say to you that we are very pleased that a distinguished witness of your caliber would be interested in these proceedings. We know you are. We thank you for giving your time and effort to come here to help us to solve this matter. The committee appreciate your appearance very much indeed.

General KOMOROWSKI. Thank you.

Mr. FLOOD. General, will you please give your name and your present address?

General KUKIEL. Lieutenant General Marian Kukiel, 55 Arthur Road, London, S. W. 19.

Mr. FLOOD. Before you make your statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of actions in any court by anyone who considered he had suffered injury. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as a result of your testimony. Do you understand that, General?

General KUKIEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you stand and be sworn then. You swear by God the Almighty and Omniscient, that you will, according to your best knowledge, tell the pure truth and you will not conceal anything, so help you God.

General KUKIEL. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MARIAN KUKIEL

Mr. FLOOD. What is your full name?

General KUKIEL. Marian Kukiel.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you at any time identified with the Polish armed forces?

General KUKIEL. I have served in the Polish armed forces since they were reconstituted in Poland in 1918 and before in the Polish Legion.

Mr. FLOOD. What was your rank?

General KUKIEL. Lieutenant colonel.

Mr. FLOOD. Where were you serving at the time you first heard of the Katyn matter?

General KUKIEL. I was at that time Minister of National Defense in our Government in London—in General Sikorski's Government.

Mr. FLOOD. Where were you serving and in what capacity in the late summer of 1941 after the rapprochement between the Soviet and the Polish Governments?

General KUKIEL. At that time I was still in command of the First Army Corps in Scotland and I was not in London; but I had been since many decades a close friend of General Sikorski. I can say I enjoyed his confidence and friendship. I was informed about all his important troubles, his ordeals, his difficulties; and I knew very well his approach to the problem of Polish war prisoners in Russia already since 1939, because when our Government and our high command were reconstituted in France, in Paris, we already knew what happened: that the Russians, the Soviets, have rounded up big masses of Polish officers, that they have violated the convention of Lwow, because Lwow has surrendered to the Soviets on September 22, and there was a convention in which the Soviets insured to the officers the right of free movement and the right of leaving Poland for another country to fight on. It was in the capitulation, and it was violated; they had been marched eastward.

In the month of January 1940 I think we already had news about the situation of the big masses of Polish officers. They were brought by three of them who managed to escape and to reach General Sikorski and other headquarters in Paris. They were, I think, Colonel Lewicki, Major Kosuczki, and Captain Kiedacz. They escaped from a great transit camp at Szepietowka in the Russian part of Wolynia. They reported that the prisoners are starving, are freezing, they are deprived of any medical help and entirely cut off from any contact with the homeland. It was perhaps the first stage before they were transported later to the three camps, Kozielsk, Ostashkov, and Starobielsk, but General Sikorski was extremely depressed by the news, and he decided to do all he could to help them, to try to get an intervention from the Western Powers, and especially from the United States. We had approached the United States Ambassador, whose Government was our great and generous friend, Mr. Biddle; and I arranged a conference in our Embassy in Paris of our Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Zalski. I had the opportunity to inform Ambassador Biddle of the situation of our war prisoners of the many thousands—we did not know exactly the number—and he promised to appeal to the President of the United States for an intervention. After, during the years 1940 and 1941, that idea, that 1 million or so Poles are deported to Russia and that our war prisoners are in Russian hands probably in appalling conditions, haunted General Sikorski. It greatly influenced his attitude during negotiations with the Russians and with the British Foreign Office for concluding a pact with Soviet Russia. Later on, when he already knew that masses of Poles are released from prisons and from concentration camps from "Lagry" and that they joined the army, he told me with great emotion: "You know that in those difficult days of July 1941, I was not so sure if it is right that I am concluding the pact, that perhaps by waiting we could make it better than it was; but I had the impression of hearing the voices of masses of people who are begging me: 'Hurry; do not wait; we are perishing.'" Certainly it was one of the most important factors of his decisions.

I was here in London at the end of the year 1941, appointed by General Sikorski for the time of his journey to Moscow as his deputy,

deputizing for him as Minister of Defense, of Military Affairs, and commander in chief; and, of course, I was informed of exactly what happened at that time in Russia. I already knew that there is a great problem of many thousands of Polish officers who simply disappeared; that the list is already being established by General Anders and his officers, and that it is a very great problem. Then in the account of the conversation of General Silorski with Stalin and Anders and Kot, we were together with him, with Stalin at the Kremlin, and I noticed Stalin's words that probably they escaped to Manchuria. I got a very disagreeable impression; it sounded like mockery, like a quite sinister joke. At that time—it was still before Tehran—we did not realize that that kind of humor was peculiar to Mr. Stalin. At Tehran there was a memorable scene when Stalin at dinner with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill proposed a toast to the 40,000 or 50,000 German officers who must be shot.

Mr. DONDERO. Was it at Yalta?

General KUKIEL. It is spoken of in Mr. Churchill's memoirs.

Mr. DONDERO. Where; was it at Tehran where that proposal was made by Stalin?

General KUKIEL. No; but I have got it confirmed before by our Prime Minister of the year 1944, Mr. Mikolajczyk, who was heard the same story almost exactly as it is presented by Mr. Churchill from President Roosevelt himself and told me long before I have read it in Mr. Churchill's memoirs. So it seems for me quite sure that Stalin really spoke about shooting 40,000 German officers. It is true that when Mr. Churchill left the room upset at that kind of joke, he was joined by Stalin, who embraced him and assured him that it is a mere farce.

Mr. FLOOD. General, that is very interesting, but I would like to get you back to your official connection with any conversations or any communications that you had in any official capacity at any time and any place in connection with Katyn.

General KUKIEL. Yes, I shall do so. I can only tell you that our anxiety about the fate of those missing Polish officers was increasing during the year 1942, and at that time we still had some hope that they were somewhere in the most distant parts of Siberia, in the Arctic regions, and that they could not be ever liberated from those parts of Siberia during the wintertime, that possibly they can reappear in the summertime; but those hopes were deceived. If I recollect, now the Russian replies to our questions and notes, I have the impression that they already have told us: "Do not insist more. Their fate is closed." I get the impression now that it was the sense of all those replies; for instance, if Mr. Bogomolow insists that they have released all the prisoners they have, it is genuine. He thinks probably he was directed to tell that there are no more Polish officers war prisoners to be released, that they do not exist; but at that time we could not yet follow that course of thinking.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you have any direct communications with Bogomolow yourself?

General KUKIEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Where?

General KUKIEL. Here in London when he was appointed.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you talk to Bogomolow; about the missing Polish officers?

General KUKIEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. In London?

General KUKIEL. In London.

Mr. FLOOD. About how many times?

General KUKIEL. I was appointed at the end of the month of September, Minister of Military Affairs.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What year?

General KUKIEL. 1942. I came to London. By October 12 I had already taken over. Immediately I got an invitation from Mr. Bogomolow and we had a long talk on October 19. It lasted for 3 hours, and an account of this talk was written immediately after, the same afternoon, and given to General Sikorski.

Mr. FLOOD. You mentioned that at this conversation the first conversation you had with Bogomolow in London, as soon as the conversation was over, you had transcribed into writing the minutes of that conversation?

General KUKIEL. Yes; and I sent it to General Sikorski.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you have a copy of those minutes with you?

General KUKIEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. I now ask the stenographer to mark for identification exhibits 29 and 30. Exhibit 29 purports to be a copy of the minutes of the conversation just described, and exhibit 30 is a photostatic copy of that instrument.

(Copy of minutes and photostatic copy of minutes referred to were marked "Exhibit 29" and "Exhibit 30." After proper identification, exhibit 29, the original copy of the report, was returned to the witness, and the photostatic copy, exhibit 30, is shown below:)

EXHIBIT 30

Rozmowa Ministra Spraw Ojczyźnaczy, gen. dyw. Kukiele
z gen. powiekskim Rogoznowem
dn. 19 październ. 42 r.

Rozmowa cynkika z zaproszenia przez gen. Rogoznowa na śniadanie.

Wprowadzono temat do tematu skroczony potęgi jesiennego. Dwa nakrycia, w parę sekund wszedł ambasador. Kształt gromadności. Od razu do stołu. Obiad skroczony - "Główny", jak w domu polskiego inteligenta. Wino, bez nalegania. Usługa rozrywkowa. Rozmowa czasu przyjęto towarzyskie, stopniowo przechodzi na tematy historyczno-wojskowe, historyczno-polityczne. Mocno koncentracja na zagadnieniu szybkiego rozstrzygnięcia wojny.

Gen. Rogoznow, tonem zadziwiająco szorstkości, mówi o grozie postępowej, która ugniatłaby dla Świdła w ranie podbrzu Rocij przez Niemcy. Co Świdła, gdy opowiada oły przemysł rosyjski z tym na Syberii, który jest potężniejszy od niemieckiego? Tyż niezwykłość. Odważa się, jakby ta możliwość była powadnie brana pod uwagę. Ani słowa, któreby wskazywało na możliwość odgrania się własnej siły. Podkreśla mocno, że przedkier rozstrzygnięcia wojny akcja od Zachodu jest kwestia bytu różniąc dla narodu polskiego, że tutaj zbliżenie wojny. Mocno potwierdza.

Rozmowa o możliwościach ofensywy na Zachodzie. Ofensywa afrykańskiej nie przypływałby powiększo wojny na przesbieg wojny.

Rozmowa na temat przygotowań Świdła na plan się od odpowiedzi na pytanie, co będzie z ich przekazyłem, bez którego ten naród istnieć już nie może. Żalnia ten kłopot na bardziej kompetentnych.

Uderze miało, że gdy komplementuje Świdła, iż w katastrofii, rozwoju lotnictwa i broni pancernej weszły na drogę wojny nowoczesnej od długo przed "lucerna", Rogoznow odrb. je wykręcić, że to było właśnie wiadomości o tym, co w tej dziedzinie robił Niemcy. Daje, że nie rozumie, gdy zarzuca uwagę na porządek chronologiczny.

Rozmowa lutowo "niechciej potęga nasze słomanki, przy czarnej kowce /bez wstawienia od stołu/, wchodzi pęk. Słowa, zaproszony. Rozmowa żywa o naszym korpacie, o ożożkach etc., o smutni naszym na Świdła Macielicki. Silnie podkreślam, że woja naszego korpata było jej - istnienie w Rosji i walka naszą w rządy. Co żaluje ją, iż sprawy sąły-wienia i ustrojzenia skłonyły rząd sowiecki do propozycji jej wycofania.

Mimo niewygodnej sytuacji /przy Świdła - sam bez świdła/, skroczona rozmowa na tematy aktualne. Świdła wyprost, jak waiły przeważnie problem naszymi rezerwa ludzkimi, że mamy duże możliwości na kontynuację, ale w tej chwili jedyna dostępna rezerwa, na którą mamy prawo liczyć, jest w ich rękach. Świdła o 8.000 zastawionych oficerów, o naszych jeńcach i pół oficerów. Rogoznow odajła do nich wyznaczeniowych z tej sprawy. Akcentuję całą sprawę dla rozwoju naszych stosunków sojusznicy. Z wyraźnym sedowaniem mówi mi o uwolnieniu naszych funk-cjonariuszy i delegatów. Upodrzam się o pozostałych 18-tu. Świdła bęka, że mocno podejrzani. Mocno upewndza, że sprawy nie są, że była tam jakaś-świdła akcja polska przeciw nim zaręczona. Przyjąłem ten szorstkości i bezpodrobności. Potwierdza się, że mówię jako obywatel polski z oływa takiego sowieckimi.

Rogoznow przechodzi do tematu kontraktów. Już przed tym, z uporem wyprzedzał naszą prasę. Takto było wyprzedził się Macielicki i Nowakowski, choć co do Nowakowskiego wyjątkowo z zarzutem, że drukuje to na papierze o. min. trojskiero. Nie podoba mi się

- 2 -

"Polska Walczona" nie przeczuje, o co mianowicie idzie, a że nie chce się dopytywać. Wielki szlak na prez. Grabkiewskiego i jego powiedzenie o roli Polaki, jako zapory przeciw obu totalitaryzom: hitlerowskiemu i stalinowskiemu, przytacza cały ustyp z pałajki. Podkreśla wagę emnacji, jako pochodzącej z ust prezesa Rady Narodowej. Rpisuje on do Grabkiewskiego i Strolskiego, przytaczając fakta świadczące o ich stałej polityce pojednania w stosunku do Rosji.

Rozmowa bardzo żywa i długa, przebiega cały okres naszych stosunków od traktatu ryskiego, który traktuje jako a i pojednanie i uzielenienie z naszej strony; Ignaliły emnacji, niż Rada Komisarzy oficerowała nam poprzednio. Tywy, gwałtowny pojedynak na fakty. Bogomolow atakuje Pilsudskiego i Becka. Rpisuje jako przeciwnik ich obu, /Bogomolow przywiedza, wie, że wyszedłem z wojska w r. 1927/ że przedział nie poweli na współdziałanie z Niemcami przeciw Rosji. Bogomolow przyznaje i daje bardzo krafną charakterystykę polityki "języka w nagi". Później proponuje, by dać spokój historii wojny nas rozdzierali, wyście dwa razy najechałi Moskwy, napędziacie nas w czasie naszej wojny domowej - jak będzimy sobie to wdaję wspominać, nie pozostało do współdziałania we współnej walce. Odpowiada, że on do przeszedłsi trzeba przyjeź hełto ich cara Aleksandra I. "paszono l'ępouge sur le passé". Ale są problemy tarczajstności. Do nich należą sprawy naszyd. jaićów, wyznaców, poborowców. Bogomolow troni się przeciw powroscniu do tych spraw - były noty sta. Stwierdza, że nie byłoby tego całego kłopotu, gdyby nie wywieziono do Rosji naszy Polaków. Teraz stanowi problemat, który rozciągnęły być musi dla dobra przystajęci stosunków obu narodów.

Bogomolow jest zagnany i zlamany. Sąd, że Rosja zrobiła dla nas ogromnie wiele. Ze parus pieruszy w dziejach NKWD dopuszczono organa obcego pa sta do działalności opiekuńczej, że jedyną wyjątkiem w dziejach Rosji jest dopuszczenie tworzenia się na terytorie Rosji zupełnie niezależnej armii obcej. Ze zmiatł użenie, upoty-kaję się ciągnę rekrutacje i oskierzenia. Do nich zalicza też warunki postawione na ścieło przez naszą oabistość /gen. Januszajtina/, której naszawa nie chce wylicenia. Powraca z naciskiem do sprawy naginających do Strolskiego, Kozickiego, Salskiego. Tywy sprzecznia. Podkreśla, że naszawa ograniczeń przez Niemców. Stwierdza, że wiado, iż byli wywiezieni wiozng i że nie ma ich w Niemczech ani w Polsce. Wyraża nadzieję, że niedługo zdoła ambasadorowi ostarczyć wskazówek, które może ułatwić postępowanie. Nie odpowiada - przysiębiony, i - powiedziałbym - niepokojęci bezradny.

Rozwija sprawę rekrutacji. Bogomolow opisał, że te rzeczy będą traktowane przez amb. Rosera w Moskwie. Ono podkreśla, że poruszony do sprawy nie po to, by dźwinić, chwycerz generalie, ale po to, by uprzedzić przeszkody, postębnic współpracy i przyjeści, którą rząd gen. Sikorskiego chce uprutować. Odpowiada nam w tym - siles nous.

Ambasador wyzerperny uzupełnia. Regna się /po 3 1/2 godz. rozmowy/. Parę ciepłych słów, oświadczenia sojaskimoz przyjeści.

/rozmowa w cztery oczy toczyła się po francusku, przy Siozwie ambasador odwił po rosyjsku, ja po angielsku do Siozwie, po francusku do ambasadora, który tłumaczył Siozwowi całe stępy; ambasador dobrze rozumiałeń.

Odniesiona wrażenia następujące: Szło in o wykład co do przyszłości naszego stosunku do nich przez "prześwieślenie" nowego członka Szędu, a w związku - jak sądzę - z rozważaniem nowego kursu, bardziej pojednawczego z ich strony.

- 3 -

Wydaje ci się, nieestety, że sprzą 8.000 oficerów
naszych należy uważać za bezwzględnie i że Rogoziński wie, że uginął.

Zaczekał, że cała prasa rozeszła się w to-
nie bardzo przyjaznym. Ambasador zrobił wrażenie człowieka bardzo in-
teligentnego i racjonalnego, skłopotanego w trudnej sytuacji.
Pułk. Sidor, wice dywizji rosyjskiej, mówi mi, że czas potaku-
je Rogozińskowi.

Co do mnie, starałem się zataić wrażenia zrozumi-
niałem i racjonalność naszej polityki wobec Rosji, a zwłaszcza uporu co do
naszych praw i żądań.

Londyn, dnia 20 października 1943 r.



A. Kakiel, gen. dyw./

[Translation copy]

CONVERSATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KUKIEL, POLISH MINISTER OF WAR
WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR BOGOMOLOV ON THE 19TH OF OCTOBER 1942

The conversation followed a lunch to which Ambassador Bogomolov had invited me.

I was shown into a very modest dining room. The table was laid for two. A few seconds later the Ambassador entered. An exchange of courtesies. We immediately sat down to table. A modest dinner—"homely," similar to what one would expect to get in a middle-class Polish home. Wine—without forcing you to drink it. Russian servants. Conversation initially indifferent—"social", gradually turns to military—historical and historically-political subjects. Strong focus on the problem of how to end the war in the quickest way.

In a mood of exceptional frankness Amb. Bogomolov speaks to me about the threat to the world which would arise if the Germans were let to run Russia down. What will happen if they lay hands on the entire Russian industry including Siberia which taken together were even greater than the German industry? They would become invincible. It seems that such a possibility is seriously taken into account. No word about any hope of beating off the onslaught by their own means. I strongly stress that a swift ending of the war by means of an attack coming from the West is just as much a matter of existence to Poland, that in that respect our aims are absolutely concurrent. He strongly confirms.

Talk about the possibilities of an offensive in the West. He does not count much on the African offensive having a decisive influence on the progress of war.

Talk about the future of Germany. I avoid the answer to the problem of what is to be done with their industry without which they cannot exist. I refer this worry to more competent authorities.

It strikes me that when I pay a compliment to the Soviet Union for having applied the theory of modern warfare long before the Germans did in respect of motorisation, development of air-force and of armour—Bogomolov tries to evade this issue and to imply that it was only because they had information of what the Germans were preparing. He pretends not to understand when I point out the chronological order of events.

The conversation barely touches upon our own problems. During coffee [which is served without our moving from the table], Col. Sizov joins us. He has been invited to do so. Brisk conversation about the Polish Corps, about tanks, etc., about our Army in the Near East. I underline with emphasis that it was the will of our Government to let it remain in Russia and fight arm to arm. That we regret that in view of the food and armament situation the Soviet Government had been induced to suggest its evacuation.

In spite of my adverse situation [I have no witness—he has], I turn the conversation to topical problems. I frankly tell him about the seriousness of the problem I have taken over: the question of our men-power reserves. That we have great possibilities on the Continent, but that at that very moment the only accessible reserves on which we have the right to count are those in their hands. I speak about our 8,000 missing officers, about our prisoners and recruits. Bogomolov refers me to the notes exchanged on this subject. I stress the importance of this matter for future development of our friendly relations. He tells me with visible pleasure about the release of our officials and delegates. I claim the remaining 16. He mutters something about their being very suspect. I firmly assure him that there is absolutely no question of anything being undertaken over there which would be in any way hostile towards them. I assume a tone of sincere frankness. I stress that I am speaking now as a Polish citizen to Soviet citizens.

Bogomolov embarks on a number of counter-attacks. Already before he obstinately reproved our press. It was easy for me to disown Mackiewicz and Nowakowski, although as to the latter he comes back with the charge that his stuff is printed on paper supplied by Minister Stroński. He does not like the "Polska Walcząca" ["Fighting Poland"].—[He does not specify what he has actually in mind and I do not wish to press him about it.] Then he turns his guns against Chairman Grabski and the latter's statement about the role of Poland as a barrier against both the Nazi and Soviet totalisms. He quotes the entire passage from memory. He stresses the importance of this statement as coming from the Chairman of the National Council. In the matter of Stroński and Grabski I retort by quoting facts which prove their constant policy of reconciliation with Russia.

A long and lively conversation follows which covers the whole period of our relations from the Treaty of Riga which I claim to have been an act of conciliation

and moderation on our part: we asked for less than what the Council of People's Commissars had offered to us previously. A lively impetuous duel of facts, Bogomolov attacks Pilsudski and Beck. I retort as their former adversary [Bogomolov confirms: he knows I had left the Army in 1927] that, after all, they refused to enter into collaboration with the Germans against Russia. Bogomolov acknowledges this and gives a most pertinent description of the policy of the "balance of powers." After which he suggests to leave history aside: we dismembered you, you raided Moseow twice, you assaulted us during the civil war—if we constantly accuse one another of these deeds it will not do us any good in furthering our present common fight. I answer that in respect of the past we should adopt the maxim of their Tsar Alexander the I, who said: "Passons l'éponge sur le passé." But there exist present day problems. I count as such the question of our prisoners, deportees and recruits. Bogomolov resists to be drawn back into discussing these matters once again—he refers me to the notes etc. I insist and declare that all this problem would have never arisen if they had not deported all these masses of Poles to Russia. Now they have in fact become a problem which must be solved for the sake of future relations between the two nations.

Bogomolov is obviously tired and has become nervous. He tells about how much Russia had done for us. That for the first time in history of the U. S. S. R. institutions of a foreign State had been allowed to operate and take care of groups of people on Soviet territory; that it was the only instance in the history of Russia that a foreign independent army was being allowed to organise itself on Russian territory. That instead of appreciation they hear nothing but reproaches and recriminations. He includes among these the terms of co-operation recently placed before him by a very well known personage whose name he would rather not mention [Gen. Januszajtis]. Stubbornly, I drive the conversation back to the problem of the missing prisoners from Starobielsk, Kozielec and Ostaszków. A lively exchange of words. I am told that they had probably fallen into the hands of the Germans. I declare that we know that they had been transferred from their camps in the spring and that they are neither in Germany nor Poland. I express the hope that I will be shortly in a position to give the Ambassador some indication which might be helpful in the search. He does not answer—depressed and—I should even say—alarmingly helpless.

I develop the question of recruitment. Bogomolov thought that these matters were going to be dealt with by Amb. Romer in Moscow. I strongly stress that we are raising these questions not in order to irritate, "pour chercher querelle" but in order to remove the obstacles, to deepen our friendship and co-operation, which the Government of Sikorski is anxious to consolidate. Do help us in this aim—aidez nous.

The Ambassador is completely exhausted / after two and a half hours of conversation /. A few warm sentences and assurances of mutual friendship.

/ The conversation while we were alone was carried in French, in the presence of Sizov the Ambassador spoke in Russian, I spoke in English to Sizov, in French to the Ambassador who next translated whole passages to Sizov; I understood well everything the Ambassador said /.

My general impression is that by "turning the light" on a new member of our Government they wanted to sound out the future course of our attitude towards them, because of their playing with the idea of changing their own attitude towards us to—I think—a more conciliatory one.

I have come to the conclusion that in the case of our 8,000 officers, unfortunately, all hope should be abandoned, and that Bogomolov knows that they have perished.

I should add that the whole conversation was carried out in a very friendly tone. The Ambassador gives the impression of a very intelligent man, well disposed towards us and rather embarrassed by his difficult position. Col. Sizov, except for a moment when the conversation turned to technical problems, spoke little and only by nodding from time to time showed his approval to what Bogomolov was saying.

As to myself, I tried to give the impression of the sincerity and straightforwardness of our attitude towards Russia, stressing at the same time our stubbornness in claiming our rights and insisting on the fulfilment of our requests.

Signature,

/ M. Kukiel, Lieut. Gen

London, the 20-th of October, 1942.

Mr. FLOOD. I show the witness exhibits 29 and 30 and ask him whether or not exhibit 29 is an authentic and exact copy of the minutes of the conversation he has just described and whether or not exhibit 30 is a photostatic and exact reproduction of exhibit 29.

General KUKIEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you describe for us the general thought, without too much detail but the general substance, of the conversation of which these exhibits are minutes?

General KUKIEL. Before the conversation, I was instructed by General Sikorski to raise the problem of the missing officers, and also the problem of continuing our recruiting of other countrymen who still remained in Russia for our Polish Forces, although our army of General Anders had already left Russia. So, the two items came into the foreground of our very long discussion.

Mr. FLOOD. General, what is the gist of the subject matter in these papers that you handed me with reference to the missing Polish officers? That is what we want to know about today.

General KUKIEL. Upon the mystery of the disappearance of big masses of our officers, I was told once more that all had been released.

Mr. FLOOD. That is by Bogomolow?

General KUKIEL. By Bogomolow. I tried to convince him that it was not true, because we have the lists. He raised the suggestion that probably they were dispersed somewhere. I assured him that it is quite not possible; they would be found by the authorities; they must be somewhere in Russia in their hands. He had another suggestion: that possibly they fell in German hands. I told him that is not possible because they were liberated long before in the spring of the year 1940 from their camps and evacuated, surely, somewhere to the east; not to the west. He had nothing to answer, but two or three times he repeated a suggestion that it is enough to speak about the past; we must think about the common future. I replied that it is not a past affair for us; it is our present and our future of our officers who are still there. We were tired by the long discussion, and I made a suggestion that perhaps we shall be able to supply him with some indications about the place where they last had been contacted or seen, and I observed a change in his attitude; he was greatly upset. The conversation, which was a very friendly one, broke somewhat abruptly, but we parted on the best terms. But, when I analyzed what I had heard, I got the impression I have put down in my account: that Bogomolow behaved as if our officers were no more alive.

Mr. FLOOD. General, in 1943, did you attend a meeting of the Councils of the Ministers of the Polish Government in London between April 15 and April 17?

General KUKIEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. At which time it was decided, for many reasons, to bring the matter of Katyn to the attention of the International Red Cross?

General KUKIEL. Yes. The news about the discovery of the Katyn graves we got during the day of April 14th, and, of course, we were under a very strong impression from what we heard, but we did not suspect a mass murder; we had several other suspicions as to the fate of our soldiers, but we could not understand what could be the purpose.

Mr. FLOOD. After the Germans made their announcement on April 15th and after the Russians made their counterannouncement on April 17th, did you participate in the action of the Polish Government in requesting the International Red Cross to make an investigation?

General KUKIEL. Yes. I shall tell exactly the dates of our decisions. During the day of 14th we had only the German news about the discovery of the graves. I think that on the 14th or early 15th there already was the first Soviet communiqué about the German lies, and they thought that the Germans were liars. The Russians maintained that there were at this place archeological discoveries, a prehistoric cemetery at Gniezdovo. Of course, when compared with the German text, it was evident that the Soviets has nothing to answer but to speak archeologically, and from the German information it was already clear that the corpses were not archeology but bodies of our comrades in arms.

Mr. FLOOD. I want to know if you are aware of any communications addressed by the Polish Government in London in April to the International Red Cross in Geneva. Do you know about that?

General KUKIEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Was there one?

General KUKIEL. It was decided on April 15th in the morning at a session of the Political Committee of our Cabinet. General Sikorski presiding, and we all who attended had the conviction that we must react and immediately react to the German communiqué, but only because we cannot rely upon all what the Germans say to take further action; we must appeal to the only international authority or institution which still is able to intervene—it is the International Red Cross. General Sikorski decided that approach must be made by the Minister of National Defense, by myself as the Minister responsible for the problems of the war prisoners; and so I was directed to sign a communiqué which would be published that our Government had approached the International Red Cross, asking for investigation of the case.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you have a copy of that communiqué?

General KUKIEL. Yes; it was published. It is the communiqué dated 17th. Three Ministers had to cooperate on the text of the communiqué—the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Information, and myself—and we have together established the final text on April 16th before noon; we have signed the draft and I brought it to General Sikorski, who had to change the words and signed it, too. So, it was his decision, but it was published as my communiqué of the Minister of National Defense. I have the document here.

Mr. FLOOD. The document will be marked "Exhibit 30-A" and submitted into the record at this point.

EXHIBIT 30A

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ON APRIL 17, 1943, BY THE POLISH MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE CONCERNING THE FATE OF POLISH PRISONERS OF WAR IN THE CAMPS OF KOZIELSK, STAROBIELSK, AND OSTASHKOV

LONDON, April 17, 1943.

On September 17, 1940, the official organ of the Red army, the Red Star, stated that during the fighting which took place after September 17, 1939, 181,000 Polish prisoners of war were taken by the Soviets. Of this number about 10,000 were officers of the regular army and reserve.

According to information in possession of the Polish Government, three large camps of Polish prisoners of war were set up in the U. S. S. R. in November 1939: (1) in Kozielsk, east of Smolensk; (2) in Starobielsk, near Kharkov; and (3) in Ostashkov, near Kalinin, where police and military police were concentrated.

At the beginning of 1940 the camp authorities informed the prisoners in all three camps that all camps were about to be broken up; that prisoners of war would be allowed to return to their families and, allegedly for this purpose, lists of places to which individual prisoners wished to go after their release were made.

At that time there were—

(1) In Kozielsk, about 5,000 men, including some 4,500 officers.

(2) In Starobielsk, about 3,920 men, including 100 civilians; the rest were officers of whom up to 400 were medical officers.

(3) In Ostashkov, about 6,570 men, including some 380 officers.

On April 5, 1940, the breaking up of these camps was begun, and groups of 60 to 300 men were removed from them every few days until the middle of May. From Kozielsk they were sent in the direction of Smolensk. About 400 people only were moved from all the three camps in June 1940 to Griazovetz in the Vologda district.

When after the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet Treaty of July 30, 1941, and the signing of the military agreement of August 14, 1941, the Polish Government proceeded to form the Polish Army in the U. S. S. R., it was expected that the officers from the above-mentioned camps would form the cadres of senior and junior officers of the army information. At the end of August 1941, a group of Polish officers from Griazovetz arrived to join the Polish units in Buzuluk. Not one officer, however, among those deported in other directions from Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov appeared. In all, therefore, about 8,300 officers were missing, not counting another 7,000 n. c. o.'s, soldiers, and civilians who were in those camps when they were broken up.

Ambassador Kot and General Anders, perturbed by this state of affairs, addressed to the competent Soviet authorities inquiries and representations about the fate of the Polish officers from the above-mentioned camps.

In a conversation with Mr. Vishinsky, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, On October 6, 1941, Ambassador Kot asked what had happened to the missing officers. Mr. Vishinsky answered that all prisoners of war had been freed from the camps and, therefore, they must be at liberty.

In October and November, in his conversations with Premier Stalin, Mr. Molotov, and Mr. Vishinsky, the Ambassador on various occasions returned to the question of the prisoners of war and insisted upon being supplied with lists of them, such lists having been compiled carefully and in detail by the Soviet Government.

During his visit to Moscow, Prime Minister Sikorski, in a conversation on December 3, 1941, with Premier Stalin, also intervened for the liberation of all Polish prisoners of war; and, not having been supplied by the Soviet authorities with their lists, he handed to Premier Stalin on this occasion an incomplete list of 3,845 Polish officers which their former fellow prisoners had succeeded in compiling. Premier Stalin assured General Sikorski that the amnesty was of a general and universal character and affected both military and civilians, and that the Soviet Government had freed all Polish officers. On March 18, 1942, General Anders handed Premier Stalin a supplementary list of 800 officers. Nevertheless, not one of the officers mentioned in either of these lists has been returned to the Polish Army.

Besides the interventions in Moscow and Kuybyshev, the fate of Polish prisoners of war was the subject of several interviews between Minister Raczynski and Ambassador Bogomolov. On January 28, 1942, Minister Raczynski, in the name of the Polish Government, handed a note to Soviet Ambassador Bogomolov, drawing his attention once again to the painful fact that many thousand Polish officers had still not been found.

Ambassador Bogomolov informed Minister Raczynski on March 13, 1943, that in accordance with the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of U. S. S. R. of August 12, 1941, and in accordance with the statements of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of November 8 and 19, 1941, the amnesty had been put into full effect, and that it related both to civilians and military.

On May 19, 1942, Ambassador Kot sent the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs a memorandum in which he expressed his regret at the refusal to supply him with a list of prisoners, and his concern as to their fate, emphasizing the high value these officers would have in military operations against Germany.

Neither the Polish Government nor the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev has ever received an answer as to the whereabouts of the missing officers and other prisoners who had been deported from the three camps mentioned above.

We have become accustomed to the lies of German propaganda and we understand the purpose behind its latest revelations. In view, however, of abundant and detailed German information concerning the discovery of the bodies of many thousands of Polish officers near Smolensk, and the categorical statement that they were murdered by the Soviet authorities in the spring of 1940, the necessity has arisen that the mass graves discovered should be investigated and the facts alleged verified by a competent international body, such as the International Red Cross. The Polish Government has therefore approached this institution with a view to their sending a delegation to the place where the massacre of the Polish prisoners of war is said to have taken place.

Mr. FLOOD. Did the Red Cross reply to that communiqué?

General KUKIEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. You signed it as Minister of Defense?

General KUKIEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Did the Red Cross from Geneva reply to you? Did they answer it in writing?

General KUKIEL. We got a reply of the Red Cross in Geneva on April 23. It was already after the violent attacks.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you have a copy of that reply?

General KUKIEL. Yes, I would like to give you the four documents which describe our efforts to get an International Red Cross investigation and their reply.

Mr. FLOOD. They will be marked "Exhibit 30 B, C, D, and E."

EXHIBIT 30 B

[Top right corner stamped with a rectangular red stamp with the word "INTELLIGENCE" within the rectangle.]

Staff of C-in-C.

Intelligence Department.

Ref. No. 1847/Int./43.

In the field 21.IV.1943.

Urgent

THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, CHIEF OF POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

DELIVERY OF DIPLOMATIC NOTE

I inform about a cable dated 19th April 1943 received from the Polish Legation in Berne of which I quote below excerpts in their exact wording:

"On April the 17th 1943 at 4.30 p. m. Radziwill delivered a Note to the International Red Cross which he handed to Rueger [former Swiss envoy in Rome] with a request to send a delegation to Smoleńsk.

Thirty minutes earlier a similar Note had been delivered by the German delegate.

Rueger told Radziwill that the the request will be taken into consideration only because it had been received from both sides. [Memorandum of 13 September 1939.]

Probably on the 20th of April a Commission will assemble which will appoint the delegation.

I shall inform of its composition the moment its members will be chosen.

Further details via the I. R. C. will be disclosed after the return of the Commission from Smoleńsk.

Within the I. R. C. prevails the opinion that the German informations are true.

I shall watch closely the whole case and send on any information I receive. Burchard at present in Lisbon".

Chief of Int. Service
Żychoń mjr.

Office
Dossier "S".

EXHIBIT 30C

[Translation copy]

[Printed heading]

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

LONDON, 20th April 1943.

SECRET

For the President of the P. R.,
 For the Prime Minister /2 copies/,
 For the Minister of National Defence,
 Bern No. 151.

Acting upon my instruction Radzwill delivered to the International Red Cross the Note suggesting the sending of a delegate to Kozię Góry. The Note coincided with an identical move on the part of the Germans.

Minister Rueger who received the Note in the name of the International Red Cross told Radiwill that if our proposal had been one-sided the International Red Cross would have been obliged to refuse it on the strength of the Memorandum of the 12th Sept. 1939. In view of the fact that the request had been sent in from both sides, the International Red Cross would examine the case and will give an answer in the next few days after the meeting of the Committee.

LADOŚ.

Truly certified:

[illegible signature].

[Bottom left corner stamped with a rectangular stamp bearing the following legend and figures, the latter in ink]:

Office of the C-in-C. and of
 the Min. of Nat. Def.

Documents: *secret*—public.

This day 20 month 4

No. 356 / year 1943

Cert.— Dealt with by: _____

EXHIBIT 30D

[Translation copy]

[Printed heading]

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

London, 21-st April, 1943.

SECRET

For the President of the P. R.,
 For the Prime Minister /2 copies/,
 For the Minister of National Defence,
 Bern, No. 154.

The International Red Cross acknowledged in writing the receipt of the Note from Radziwill, adding to its answer a short memorandum in which:

1/ It stresses that the I. R. C. is studying with greatest attention the Polish suggestion and that it will not fail to inform, when only it will become possible, about the future course it will be able to give to this matter.

2/ That, already at this stage, the I. R. C. is ready to undertake to pass on to the families the information about identified officers the moment such information will be received.

3/ That, in accordance with the spirit of the Memorandum of the 12-th Sept. 1939, the International Red Cross cannot, in principle, take into consideration the participation in the technical procedure of identifying the bodies by means of sending out its own experts otherwise than with the consent of all parties concerned.

The Germans received an identical memorandum. No meeting of the Committee has yet taken place and it is improbable that it will be held before the Easter recess. From a conversation with R. it is apparent that the I. R. C. will postpone the issue being in doubt as to whether it can undertake an investiga-

tion without the consent of the third party concerned i. e. of the U. S. S. R.

I do not think it advisable to press things further from our side and I have agreed with R. that, for the time being I shall refrain from taking any new steps. On the other hand I do think that, in case of refusal or of an equivocal answer, there will be time and opportunity to take action and to obtain, at least a declaration that the whole thing had failed due to the attitude of the Soviet side. However, it must be reckoned with that the whole matter will last for a considerable time.

Truly certified:

[Illegible signature].

ŁADOŚ.

[Bottom left corner stamped with rectangular stamp bearing the following legend and figures, the latter in ink].

Office of the C.-in-C. and of the Min. of Nat. Def.

This day: 22, month 4, No. 365/year 34,

Cert.

Dealt with by:

EXHIBIT 30E

[Translation copy]

THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
MINISTER'S OFFICE—POLITICAL DEPT.

Ref. No. 544/WPol/43.

London, 4th May, 1943.

THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTATION.

I enclose a copy of a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 27.IV.1943, containing information about the attitude of the International Red Cross to the suggestion of investigating the graves near Smolensk.

Deputy General Aide-de-Camp,
Lunkiewiez Staff Col.

1 encl.

[Translation copy]

[Printed heading],

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

LONDON, THE 27th APRIL, 1943.

SECRET

For the President of the P. R.

For the Prime Minister [2 copies],

For the Minister of National Defence,

[stamped with a rectangular stamp bearing the following legend and figures, the latter in ink:]

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

This day 28th, Month 4, 1943.

Enclosures 1. ASSIGNED TO

Ref. 1192/43.

Bern, No. 157.

I quote below the text of a note from the International Red Cross dated 22nd April 1943 addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

"In reference to our preliminary answer given to Prince Radziwill on the 20th of April, we wish to express in the first place to Your Excellency how very grateful we are for the new proof of appreciation shown to us by the Polish Government in that it had approached our Institution. The International Red Cross is ready to appoint neutral experts provided all parties concerned will ask us to do so and also on the understanding that it will be agreed between the Committee and the parties concerned as to the "modalities" of the eventual mandate. These conditions are in accordance with the principles laid down in reference to such cases in the Memorandum addressed on the 12th Sept. 1939 to belligerent States and published in the September 1939 issue of "The International Red Cross Review", and which deal with the possibilities of the Committee's participation in the investigation.

We would beg the Polish Government to keep us informed about such steps which will be undertaken with the purpose of gaining the consent of the Soviet Government or else to send us their suggestions in this matter.

In case of an agreement being reached by the parties concerned and in anticipation of such an event taking place we are endeavouring already today to find neutral persons with adequate qualifications."

Signature: Chairman of the I. R. C. MAX HUBER.

The Germans received an analogous reply with a suggestion that they try to obtain the consent of the Soviet Union through the intermediary of a "Puissance Protectrice".

The Int. Red Cross suggests that we endeavour to obtain the consent of the Soviet Union either directly or through the intermediary of one of the Allied States and the possibility of a direct intervention is not ruled out. In my opinion the latter would be most advisable.

The Commission would be under the Chairmanship of a Swiss and would include members of Swedish, Portuguese and Swiss nationality.

As to the delegating of a ballistic expert, Radziwill will submit appropriate suggestions, although in view of the great amount of Russian arms which the Germans have in their possession I doubt whether this argument would count for much.

It is absolutely necessary that the action of the Central Red Cross Committee in Warsaw be synchronised with ours.

Truly certified: /initialed/.

Mr. FLOOD. You were aware that the Russians, 2 days after the Germans, made an announcement saying that the Germans did it?

General KUKIEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you have in your possession the copies of any communications, in addition to the ones you have just mentioned, from your office as Minister of National Defense to the International Red Cross, or to the Soviet Government in connection with Katyn? Do you have any other copies?

General KUKIEL. I do not know exactly, because I am no more in office myself. The correspondence was largely of our Foreign Ministry.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you, as Minister of National Defense, in touch with any other governments or any other sovereigns about the matter of the missing prisoners at Katyn?

General KUKIEL. No.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you ever conduct any conversations or did you ever conduct any other communications with the Russians about the missing officers at Kozielsk, Starobielsk, or Ostashkov after that time?

General KUKIEL. No.

Mr. FLOOD. Your personal connection in connection with the missing officers at Katyn ended when you signed the communique in April; is that correct? Was that the end of your official activity in the middle of April when you signed that communiqué after Katyn had been disclosed?

General KUKIEL. I still sat at the council of ministers.

Mr. FLOOD. You still sat on the council of ministers?

General KUKIEL. On April 17th, and attended the meeting when they decided to issue a declaration of our Government.

Mr. FLOOD. But I mean that you did not act separately or independently as Minister of Defense?

General KUKIEL. No.

Mr. FLOOD. Any actions that you took part in later you took part in as a member of the Polish Government Council of Ministers?

General KUKIEL. Yes. If I say that my duties continued, it was with the work. We immediately started to study the German evidence; to get evidence from our country and to establish our own

dossier of the Katyn affair, to have our own judgment, and it was made in my office and continued for years.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. General, at that time, when these charges and counter charges by the Germans and Russians were made as to their respective guilt for the Katyn massacre, did the Polish Government in exile, of which you were a member, take any official position siding with one side or the other?

General KUKIEL. No.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. On the contrary, did you take some positive action in that respect?

General KUKIEL. Yes. On the contrary, when we addressed the Red Cross, we expressly said that it is because we cannot rely on the presentation of the case by the Germans.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I have here before me among the papers that were presented by General Bor-Komorowski, his file of communications, with the underground movement. I have here the original of a letter signed by yourself and I ask you, first of all, to identify whether that is your signature.

General KUKIEL. Yes, it is my signature.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What is that?

General KUKIEL. It is an instruction for all Polish commanders on how the problem of Katyn is to be handled, how it is to be approached, in conversations, and especially in conversations with our allies. It must be stated that the Polish Government did not maintain that it knew that our prisoners were murdered by the Russians, but that they had disappeared in Soviet captivity without any indication of their fate, and so on, the same as what was told in my communiqué.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In other words, that is an official statement of your position and that statement gives instructions that you cannot accept the German version, neither can you accept the Russian version, but that the Polish Government will make all efforts to make an independent investigation to determine guilt.

General KUKIEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Regardless of the claims and counterclaims of the Germans and the Soviet?

General KUKIEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That was the official position of the Government, was it not?

General KUKIEL. Yes. It is the same position which you will find in the book Polish-Soviet Relations, the statement of the Polish Government of April 17, 1943.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I notice also, General, that in a despatch which you sent to the underground on June 26, 1943, you specifically refer in the last paragraph, which I will read now, as follows:

Please give us the final number of the bodies found in Katyn. In case of the discovery of new graves around Charkow or Kremienezug, inform us immediately, before that may be done by the German radio.

Do you remember such a despatch?

General KUKIEL. I do not remember it.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I am showing you that letter now.

General KUKIEL. That was signed by the colonel. I have not seen it at all.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I notice that your name is typed, but the colonel signed it for you.

General KUKIEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Changing the subject for a moment, I would like to get something in the record, which I think we do not have yet, and which may be of some material value. You are the author of a book *Six Years of Struggle for Independence*; is that correct?

General KUKIEL. Yes, the booklet.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I notice that in that booklet you refer to the size of the Polish forces in September 1939. What was your official capacity in September 1939?

General KUKIEL. In 1939 I was not in active service. I volunteered after mobilization and I joined one or other commands and tried to do something. I attended to the affairs at Lwow, and after capitulation of the city, I remained in civilian clothes at Lwow. I was there for some weeks under Soviet occupation and I had the opportunity to see the appeal of Timoshenko on the walls of the city.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is the appeal I read previously?

General KUKIEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In this booklet you said as follows, and I am quoting you:

On September 16, the day before the Soviet intervention, there were 25 Polish divisions still fighting.

Is that about a correct statement, that there were 25 Polish divisions?

General KUKIEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Then later on in the statement you state that the Germans at that time had sufficient ammunition only for 10 or 15 more days.

General KUKIEL. It is from the Nuremberg trial. It was stated by Jodl and Keitel.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You are quoting there General Jodl at the Nuremberg trial?

General KUKIEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Then you state further that Haller had mobilized 1,200,000 soldiers?

General KUKIEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Would that be about a correct statement?

General KUKIEL. I am not quite sure if entirely correct, but approximately. I do not remember the figure which was given in our detailed study of our general staff which was issued now, the first volume of the history of our forces in the last war.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Your estimate, then, is on September 16, the day before the Soviet attacked Poland, Poland had under arms 25 divisions and had mobilized about 1,200,000 soldiers.

General KUKIEL. Yes. Very much more than 40 divisions we had. We improvised divisions which were improvised during the few weeks of the campaign. There remained still 25 on that date.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. The point I am driving at is this, that you state further, that the Germans had only sufficient ammunition for 10 to 15 days?

General KUKIEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And that therefore had not the Russians intervened on September 17, the Poles could have offered effective resistance against the German onslaught?

General KUKIEL. It is difficult to say that they could, but, in any case, they could resist much longer; for instance, the so-called Rumanian bridgehead. The part of Poland adjacent to the Rumanian frontier could be probably held for a much longer time.

Mr. FLOOD. General, a few minutes ago we were discussing exhibits 29 and 30, and exhibit 29 you identified as a true copy of your communication, and you identified exhibit 30 as a photostatic and true copy of exhibit 29, I will return exhibit 29 to you at this time since exhibit 30—a photostatic copy of that document already is in the record.

Mr. FLOOD. General, you have not been offered any payment or any gifts or emoluments of any kind for coming here and testifying? You have not been offered anything?

General KUKIEL. No.

Mr. FLOOD. From your experiences as a very high military and civil official of the Polish Government, from your experiences and associations with the Russians down through your lifetime in various ways, from your particular experiences and information as a result of information brought to you in connection with all communications doing with the Katyn matter, have you formed any opinion as between the German and the Russian Governments as to which one of these two was responsible for the massacre of these Polish officers at Katyn? Have you such an opinion?

General KUKIEL. My opinion was based on the evidence. I am quite convinced that it could be done only by the Russians, because certainly it was done in the year 1940, not later, and the Russians never had given any explanation which could be interpreted in such a way that it could be really done by the Germans.

Mr. FLOOD. We realize that it was some bother for you to come here today, and we want you to know that the committee appreciates very much that a man in your position would make the sacrifice. We know how interested you are, but, nevertheless, we are very grateful that you did come and give us this very important testimony. Thank you very much.

TESTIMONY OF STEFAN ZAMOYSKI OF 20 ST. STEPHENS CLOSE, LONDON, N. W. 8

Mr. FLOOD. Before you make a statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who considered he had suffered an injury. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf in respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as the result of the testimony. You understand that?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you rise and be sworn. Do you swear by God the Almighty and Omniscient, that you will, according to your best knowledge, tell the pure truth and you will not conceal anything; so help you God?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. That is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you at any time connected with the Polish armed services?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. Yes. I served in the Polish Army from the beginning of the war, or, rather, from before, as a reserve officer in Poland, later on in France and the United Kingdom, and then I was sent in 1942 as assistant military attaché to the Polish Embassy in Washington.

Mr. FLOOD. During your period of service as assistant military attaché in Washington, did you ever have any conversations with the Russians in Washington in connection with any of the officers who were missing at Katyn?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. Only one.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you state with whom you had that conversation and the gist of it?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. I had the conversation I think the morrow after the news broke out in Washington of these Katyn discoveries by the Germans.

Mr. FLOOD. Could that have been on April 16, 1943?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. 16th or 17th, something like that; that exact date is on my statement. I wrote a memo on my conversation.

Mr. FLOOD. Let me refresh your memory with this statement, and see if you can identify the date now that you refreshed your memory of that conversation.

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. It was the 23d of April 1943.

Mr. FLOOD. With whom did you have that conversation and where did it take place?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. With Major Barajew.

Mr. FLOOD. Who was he?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. He was the assistant military attaché at the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. FLOOD. Where did you have your conversation with him?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. In my office, in Washington.

Mr. FLOOD. What did you talk about?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. He called me during the morning stating that he wished to see me. I was a little surprised then because although I used to see a lot of him and all the Russian representatives until that date, the news had broken out. I felt sure that he knew, that he had the same information at least that I had from the communiqués, and so on, and therefore I was a little surprised, taken aback, in anticipation of what he wants to say to me; I was just wondering what he was going to say. We used to meet often unofficially, because that was partly my duty to have contact with the Russian Embassy. That day, when he wanted to see me, I decided that I should receive him in my office, and I also, to make sure, spoke with one of our intelligence officers, suggesting that he might come in during the conversation, perhaps 10 minutes or a quarter of an hour later, because I thought something important might be said. So I arranged that meeting, I think, for the afternoon, and I think a pretty precise story is told in this memo.

Mr. FLOOD. We will discuss the memo in a minute, but will you tell us now for our purpose just now your best recollection of the conversation between you two men.

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. He started on quite a different subject, which was not so surprising to me, because, as this news was very astounding, I did not think it would sort of come out very easily. He started on

information on the United States Army. He probably thought that I knew quite a lot more and that I had more available information, so he was going on to that sort of theme. Rather breaking off at a certain point, he turned to the story of Katyn, and the gist of the story was that he was astounded and surprised; that it cannot be true; that it must be nonsense; that it must be German propoganda and really nothing concrete at all.

Mr. FLOOD. At that point, will you tell who else was in the room and present?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. It was a Lieutenant Piotrowski.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. He was with you?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. He was with me. He came in during the conversation.

Mr. FLOOD. He was the Polish intelligence officer you mentioned?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. He was a Polish intelligence officer with Colonel Minkiewicz who I was also with.

Mr. FLOOD. There was just the two of you?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. No; the three of us with the Russian.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you make any rejoinder to the Russian? Did you comment about the communiqués on Katyn?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. As far as I remember, I made no comment. I did make a comment about the missing officers, of which, of course, I knew.

Mr. FLOOD. What kind of comment, as you best remember, did you make? What did you say about the missing officers?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. I believe I mentioned that the whole thing will be straightened out, that the Polish Government had, I think, asked the International Red Cross to investigate the matter, and I rather did not wish to discuss this matter with him.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you ask him about the fate of any particular officer or friend of yours at that time?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. I do not recollect that.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you ever have any other conversations with this particular Russian?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. No.

Mr. FLOOD. Or any other Russians on the subject of the missing Polish officers?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. No.

Mr. FLOOD. Then, as far as your service is concerned in Washington, that is the extent of your connection officially with the Katyn matter?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. That was the end.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you ever have any subsequent official identity with the Katyn matter in any way in London or any place else?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. No.

Mr. FLOOD. You were offered no emoluments or gratuities of any kind for offering to testify here today or any gifts of any nature, were you?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. No; but I would like to make one more statement which might be perhaps of some use to the committee. I have a young Australian friend who was an airman during the war who was shot down in the Channel and picked up by the Germans. Subsequently he was interned, escaped once and then a second time, and found his way to Poland. This young Australian spent 2 years in Warsaw collaborating and under, say, the guidance of the Polish

home army. I know about this because my brother was really in charge of all the Anglo-Saxon Allied escapees in Warsaw. This officer spent 2 years in Warsaw, of which 1943 was one. I thought, as this officer has arrived in Europe from Australia, that it might be most useful for him to testify because, being an Australian in Warsaw at that time, and having heard and known and seen people connected in some way or another, or, at any rate, the Poles with whom he was then, with the Katyn murder, and having been present in Warsaw when that shock came to Warsaw, I thought perhaps the committee might wish to have evidence from him. He actually arrived in the United States during the war, because my brother had sent him through Germany back to England during the war.

Mr. FLOOD. Where is this Australian now?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. He is today in Paris. He was in London. He is probably going to be in Paris a few months because he is a wool buyer.

Mr. DONDERO. What does he know personally about this Katyn massacre?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. It is very difficult for me to say what he personally knows.

Mr. FLOOD. If you will let us have the name and address of this Australian we will arrange to have representatives of the committee interview him in Paris and forward to this committee, which is moving from here to Frankfurt this coming week, any information and we will at that time determine if we think it advisable to call him. Would you give us the name?

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. Squadron Leader Keith Chisholm, care of Wenz & Co., 1, Rue de Metz, Paris 10.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I note that in your final sentence of this account of the meeting you had with Mr. Barajew you state you received the impression that you were called for the sole purpose of having them determine what your official viewpoint is on the matter.

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. Did I put that down?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Yes; if you read the last paragraph.

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. I did not write "The sole purpose," but it seemed to me that I could not find another reason.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. The impression you got was that the only reason he called you was to find out from you what the Polish authorities feel about the loss of these officers.

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. That is what I deducted, because the only alternative I could find was that the officer was one of those individuals there who could not believe that such a thing was possible.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Not to give you any information about it, but rather to get information from you about it.

Mr. ZAMOYSKI. Sooner, yes; certainly not to give me information.

Mr. FLOOD. We appreciate very much that you would take the time to come here. We know you are interested, of course, but, nevertheless, we are grateful you came and offered us this testimony. Thank you very much.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Gentlemen, this is Mr. Goetel, who was living in Warsaw in April 1943.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Goetel, will you state your full name, the correct spelling of your name, and your present address to the reporter?

Mr. GOETEL. Ferdinand Goetel. My address is: No. 14, Empress Place, London, S. W. 6, England.

Mr. FLOOD. Before you make a statement, Mr. Goetel, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who considered he had suffered injury as a result of your testimony.

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as the result of your testimony. Do you understand?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes; I understand.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you raise your right hand and be sworn? Do you swear by God the Almighty and Omniscient that you will, according to your best knowledge, tell the pure truth, and that you will not conceal anything, so help you God?

Mr. GOETEL. I do.

Mr. FLOOD. Be seated, please.

TESTIMONY OF FERDINAND GOETEL, NO. 14, EMPRESS PLACE, LONDON, S. W. 6, ENGLAND

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Your name is Ferdinand Goetel?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Where do you reside?

Mr. GOETEL. In London.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What is your address?

Mr. GOETEL. No. 14, Empress Place, London, S. W. 6.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You are a literary man, an author?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes, I am a writer.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In April 1943, where were you residing?

Mr. GOETEL. In Warsaw.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And at that time were you called to a conference by the occupation authorities of Warsaw?

Mr. GOETEL. By the German propaganda office in Warsaw, by Dr. Grundman.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Who was Dr. Grundman?

Mr. GOETEL. He was a State councilor in the propaganda in Warsaw.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Where did they call you to?

Mr. GOETEL. They called me to a meeting and Dr. Grundman told me they have discovered near Katyn big graves and discovered that the graves are full of the bodies of Polish officers.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Before we get to the details of what you were told, were you called to this meeting alone or with a group of other people?

Mr. GOETEL. He called me there first alone, and afterward he made a meeting of several people he invited there of the City Council of Warsaw—

Mr. MACHROWICZ. The Kipa?

Mr. GOETEL. The Kipa, yes—the Bishop of Warsaw Kozeurski and the welfare committee.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is the municipal welfare committee?

Mr. GOETEL. It was the social committee, the leader was Count Roniker.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Who is now in Detroit, Mich.?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And on behalf of that council were Mr. Martyn Machucki and Mr. Wachowiak present?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Who else was there?

Mr. GOETEL. Then there was a writer, Mr. Skiwski, and a judge whose name I do not know.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. A representative of the supreme court?

Mr. GOETEL. A representative of the supreme court, yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And who was there on behalf of the German occupation authorities?

Mr. GOETEL. Well, there was Mr. Monzes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. He was the chief of the Warsaw propaganda?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And Mr. Grundman?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes, Mr. Grundman.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. They called you there all together, and what did they tell you?

Mr. GOETEL. They told me what was told me by Mr. Grundman; they gave more details.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. They informed you of the finding of the graves at Katyn?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes; and they asked us to go there.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And did you agree to go?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes; I agreed to go.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And the others also?

Mr. GOETEL. No, not everyone. Mr. Machucki did not agree; Mr. Wachowiak said "No," and Mr. Skiwski also said "No," but these said they would send their representatives there.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. But as the result of this conference, a group of you did go to Katyn?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes, including two physicians, one a member of the city council, Mr. Seyfried; the name of the other I do not know.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Dr. Orzechowski?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And Dr. Grodzki?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you go to Katyn?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You went by plane?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes; by plane.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Will you tell us what happened when you got to Katyn?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. Would you tell us the year and the day, as near as you remember, when you went to Katyn?

Mr. GOETEL. The year was 1943; the exact day I cannot say, but I think it would be the 8th or 9th April.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. To refresh your memory, Mr. Goetel, according to the report which you gave previously it was on April 10.

Mr. GOETEL. That may be.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Of 1943?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes, maybe.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What did you find when you arrived at Katyn?

Mr. GOETEL. It was after dinner the next day I think we were taken to Katyn. The excavation then was only at the beginning; only one big grave was excavated, with about 200 bodies. The second one and the third one—

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Pardon me. This was before the other delegations had arrived; yours was the first to arrive?

Mr. GOETEL. No, coming to Katyn we crossed a delegation of foreign journalists; they were the first—no, it was not at Katyn that we crossed this delegation, but at Smolensk, at the staff post. We could not speak with them. Then in the officers mess in Smolensk we met the man who had to speak with us, Oberleutenant Slowencyk. We spoke a long time with him, and our impression was that they insisted there had been in the graves at Katyn 10,000 Poles, 10,000 dead Poles, but they did not know these Poles were from Kozielsk. Slowencyk asked me, what is Kozielsk, because they had already found several cards addressed to Kozielsk. I told him Kozielsk was one of the chief camps for Polish prisoners, and Starobielsk and Ostashkov. My impression, as well as that of the other people in the group, was that he, as also the Oberleutenant Voss from the home police, both did not know Kozielsk and had then heard of it for the first time. They knew only that 10,000 or 11,000 Polish officers had disappeared because they heard it from the radio, and they had been already requested by General Sikorski—they insisted the whole time that in the graves there there must be 10,000 to 11,000 Polish officers, more than 10,000 officers. Coming there to the forest ourselves, we had not the impression that there were 10,000, but we were not sure.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How many bodies were exhumed at that time?

Mr. GOETEL. About 200.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. This was at the very beginning of the excavation?

Mr. GOETEL. At the very beginning; yes. We had full freedom to speak with the people there and to go any place we wanted. Dr. Buhtz, who was the military surgeon there, asked us to see one of the bodies they had kept there, and he showed the bullet hole here [indicating] in the head and again here [indicating].

Mr. FLOOD. The witness indicating that he showed the bullet entering the base of the head, and the point of exit in the forehead at about the hair line—is that correct?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes. Our impression was certainly that the work has been done by the Russians.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What led you to that impression?

Mr. GOETEL. First the graves themselves; they were all planted with young pine trees.

Mr. DONDERO. Will you say that again?

Mr. GOETEL. The graves have all been planted again with young trees so high [illustrating].

Mr. DONDERO. On top of the graves?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. The witness indicates with his hand the height of the young trees to be about 3 feet—is that correct?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes; about 3 feet—and in the forest around the place they have been big trees for several years.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Why did that factor have any significance? Why did that have an special meaning to you?

Mr. GOETEL. Because the murder must be done several years ago, 2 or 3 years—the trees were sound and strong.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Now will you tell us what other factors you noticed there which led you to the conclusion that it must have been the Russians?

Mr. GOETEL. There were witnesses there from the people there.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You mean local people?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes; local people.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you talk to them?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were you alone with these people or in the company of Germans?

Mr. GOETEL. We were alone; we could speak with them alone. I speak Russian perfectly, but several of our members could not speak Russian, and they had to have an interpreter. The interpreter was a young man whose mother was a Pole, and he spoke both Polish and Russian.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you speak Russian?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes, I speak Russian.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Who did you talk to of the local people, do you know?

Mr. GOETEL. The name of the old man, the chief witness there, is given in my statement by me, Kisielew.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. He was an old man?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes, he was an old man who resided nearest the camp.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And how did you happen to find him?

Mr. GOETEL. He had been there.

Mr. DONDERO. You mean near the graves?

Mr. GOETEL. Near the graves, yes, but his home was near the forest.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How did you happen to find him?

Mr. GOETEL. He was there.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What was he doing there?

Mr. GOETEL. He was taken there by the Germans for the opportunity to speak with us, as well as the other one, Kriwozerczew, but he was the most silent one.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Kriwozerczew was silent?

Mr. GOETEL. He was the most silent of them.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What about the first man you spoke to, Kisielew? What did he tell you?

Mr. GOETEL. Kisielew told us that in April 1940, he heard shots and people crying there in the woods. Afterward, when the Germans came in, he was the first one to take them and post them there in the forest, and he must have been already informed about the place for the digging of graves, because it was marked by two crosses.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What you mean to tell us is that Kisielew is the one who probably led the Germans to the graves?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes; he was the one who led them to the graves.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And that he had previously marked them?

Mr. GOETEL. No, not he; the graves were marked by Poles.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What did Kisielew tell you?

Mr. GOETEL. Kisielew told me that the two crosses were set up there by Poles who worked near Smolensk, in a working command who were sent there by the Germans from Poland to make clean the railroad cars from destroyed trains, and to pick out the iron. The Poles there came first to the graves there. They found that in the graves were Polish officers and they set there two crosses, one small one and the bigger one. When we have been there the smaller one was still there. The bigger one was not there any more.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Now will you continue with what Kisielew told you?

Mr. GOETEL. It was all what he told me.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You say that Kriwozerczew was there also?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What, if anything, did he tell you?

Mr. GOETEL. There at that time, nothing.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You say "at that time." Did he tell you something at some other time?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes. I met Kriwozerczew in Italy.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. When?

Mr. GOETEL. In 1945.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How did you get to meet him in Italy in 1945?

Mr. GOETEL. I was a public relations officer in General Anders' army.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What was he doing there?

Mr. GOETEL. He was sent there from Germany by our officers.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. For the purpose of establishing a record as to what he knew?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes; to be a witness.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you talk to him?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What did he tell you?

Mr. GOETEL. His relation is a very long one.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. We want your version of it. You talked to him?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes. I lived with him more than 2 weeks together in one house, Villa Barducci in Ancona.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What did Kriwozerczew tell you?

Mr. GOETEL. Kriwozerczew told me a very long story of his.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Can you tell us in brief what he knew regarding this?

Mr. GOETEL. He worked at that time near Katyn, near Gniezdovo; he worked there and he saw one day a train coming from the direction of Smolensk with four cars.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did he tell you when that was?

Mr. GOETEL. That was April.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Of what year?

Mr. GOETEL. April 1940. He told he already knew that the forest in Katyn was the place of executions, and when the train came he thought as well as the peasants there that the people sent there were Finnish officers; he thought the people sent there were Finns, because it was the time of the war with Finland. But the next day he spoke to a man there who was a soldier in the first war with Poland and he told him: "They are not Finns; they are Poles." And afterward every day he watched to see and to mark the trains. The matter was that

his father, being a peasant there, a kulak, as they are called, was murdered by Bolsheviki. A kulak is a landowner and he was murdered by Bolsheviki. He attended the trains coming in, and his relation was this, that the main train came always to Smolensk, and half of it, four cars, were sent to Gniezdovo, and the other stayed still in Smolensk. The other part, when it came to Gniezdovo, the next four cars, the first party was already finished.

Mr. DONDERO. You mean they had been killed?

Mr. GOETEL. They have been killed already, yes; and the matter was this, the purpose was this, that Gniezdovo is a small siding; the big train cannot come into Gniezdovo, only on the main station, and on the main station the people could see what is coming in.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. A dead-end track?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes. That was the purpose, that it was divided always, the train coming in to Smolensk in two parts, and one being sent to Gniezdovo in the morning; they have been finished, and afterward came the second part.

Mr. FLOOD. Just so we can have a statement on the record particularly about what you have said, what you said was this: When the trains bringing the Polish officers came into the Smolensk area, they were broken into two parts?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes, into two parts.

Mr. FLOOD. Because of the fact that the railroad siding at Gniezdovo was so small and only a spur or a side track, it could not accommodate the full train?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. But could only handle four cars of the train at one time?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. So what they did was to take four cars in the morning?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Into Gniezdovo on the side track, the spur track, and whoever was in those cars was disposed of or finished, as you say?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Then they would take out those four empty cars and then later on bring in the four other cars that were still waiting at the original stop?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And so on and so on?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Is that right?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes; and so on and so on.

Mr. DONDERO. How long did that continue?

Mr. GOETEL. Up to the 20th or 21st April. It may be he said that a small party of Poles may have been executed in Katyn after that date, but the main work had been done before April 25, 1940.

Mr. DONDERO. You were at Katyn?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. What was the color of the ground?

Mr. GOETEL. The color of the ground—it was sandy lime—very dry. The water was only 2 or 3 yards under the surface.

Mr. DONDERO. White sand or yellow sand?

Mr. GOETEL. The sand was yellow—yellow sand; but there on the ground the sand was black from this.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You have told the committee of your conversations with Kisielew and with Kriwozerczew.

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Are there any other conversations that you had with other witnesses there relative to this matter?

Mr. GOETEL. No; I was not interested in them. I was more interested in the graves themselves.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Is there anything that you found in the graves themselves which you want to tell this committee as having special significance?

Mr. GOETEL. In the graves, special significance—well, perhaps the newspapers.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What can you tell us about newspapers found?

Mr. GOETEL. They were dispersed—several newspapers.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Where were they?

Mr. GOETEL. On the ground there you found at this time Polish money, zloties lying there and papers.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What about these newspapers?

Mr. GOETEL. They were Russian newspapers mostly.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What date?

Mr. GOETEL. Only dates before April 1940.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Of what year?

Mr. GOETEL. Before 1940—April 1940.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. All the newspapers that you saw there were dated not later than April 1940?

Mr. GOETEL. Not later.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What was the condition of the uniforms?

Mr. GOETEL. Very good.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What about the shoes?

Mr. GOETEL. Very good—excellent—excellent condition; but the corpses were already decaying. Bohaterowicz, I could see his face. I knew him and that was he; but there were other people too.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You said also in your report that you found military officers' belts; is that correct?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And were they in good condition?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes, everything was in splendid condition.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And also the medals?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. All were in very good condition?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You recognized the bodies of people, I understand. Is that correct?

Mr. GOETEL. Of one.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is General Bohaterowicz?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes—General Bohaterowicz.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You recognized him?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes, because he has a mustache and sides, and then the form of his face. That was he.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Was he in a separate grave?

Mr. GOETEL. No.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And what about the body of General Smorawinski: did you find his body?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes, I have seen it, but I could not recognize it.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How did you know it was General Smorawinski's body?

Mr. GOETEL. Because they told me that there was a register of the body, that documents have been found on him.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And the uniform?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And the insignia?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes, and the insignia.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Based on what you found, did you come to any conclusion as to when the executions took place?

Mr. GOETEL. Several years ago.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And who in your opinion was responsible for the executions?

Mr. GOETEL. The Russians.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Is that the opinion of those who were with you also?

Mr. GOETEL. All—everyone.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Of everyone who was with you?

Mr. GOETEL. Of everyone, yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you sign a report for the Germans?

Mr. GOETEL. For the Germans; no.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did they ask you to?

Mr. GOETEL. No. I only made a report which has a form of an open letter.

Mr. DONDERO. Did the Germans allow you to go through these graves willingly, freely?

Mr. GOETEL. Everything. We could do there everything we wanted.

Mr. DONDERO. They did not stop you?

Mr. GOETEL. No. We went to the second grave. The chairman of our group has a short speech to us in Polish language, and they went.

Mr. DONDERO. You said the newspapers were all Russian newspapers. Were there any Polish newspapers?

Mr. GOETEL. No.

Mr. DONDERO. They were only Russian?

Mr. GOETEL. Only Russian, yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you have a copy of that report which you made?

Mr. GOETEL. Not here, no. My report disappeared.

Mr. DONDERO. Your report disappeared?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes. I will tell you about it later. I made a report there, an open letter, yes. I had a very difficult thing to do to force the opinion and to force the Polish Red Cross to take the matter in its hands, but I could not believe that the truth is to be given only by Germans and I wanted that the Polish Red Cross take the matter in its hands.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And they did that, did they not?

Mr. GOETEL. No, not in the first moment. After my letter I forced them to it, and the second mission to Katyn was already from the Polish Red Cross organized by the Polish Red Cross. At that time—General Komorowski told it also already—the opinion of Warsaw was it has been done by Germans at Katyn; the whole of the people believed it was done by the Germans—they have done this.

Mr. FLOOD. You made an open report in Warsaw?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. To whom did you give it?

Mr. GOETEL. I sent it to General Roweski.

Mr. FLOOD. Who was he?

Mr. GOETEL. He was the chief of the underground army there.

Mr. FLOOD. General Roweski was the predecessor of General Bor?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. As commanding general of the home army in Warsaw?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you have a copy of that?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Have you got it in your possession?

Mr. GOETEL. No; it was burned with my house—all my personal documents.

Mr. FLOOD. Then we have no copy of your report, unless it is in the files of the home army?

Mr. GOETEL. No. It can be in the German materials.

Mr. FLOOD. If we can find it in the German Wehrmacht records, that is where it should be?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes; because the main purpose of it was that I requested the commission of the International Red Cross. That was my request there.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Is there anything further that you wish to add to your report, Mr. Goetel?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What is it?

Mr. GOETEL. There are several other things which I find important, that of Kriwozerczew, the chief witness, and my record in Poland when the Bolsheviks came in.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. We are going to get the Kriwozerczew report later in the hearing. Is there anything further you want to add now?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes. That is the record in Poland when the Bolsheviks came into Poland in February 1945. I was not firstly requested by them, but in June 1945, they posted a notice that I am a man who is wanted by them.

Mr. DONDERO. Did they post a list?

Mr. GOETEL. No; only I. I was the number one man wanted by them. I was at that time in a cloister in Cracow. I sent word to the chief investigator of Katyn, Sawicki, and asked: "What is the matter, what do they want from me?" He answered there, "Oh, we have nothing against Mr. Goetel, who is a famous writer, but if he signs a statement that he was kept by force at Katyn and that his main impression in Katyn was that the massacre was done by Germans, Oh, we have nothing; he can live here and write books and so on." I refused.

Mr. DONDERO. Was that in February of—

Mr. GOETEL. It was June, 1945.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Is there anything further that you had to add, Mr. Goetel.

Mr. GOETEL. Nothing more.

Mr. FLOOD. I might say that is a very interesting observation because of the fact that one of the members of the International Scientific Commission, the Bulgarian member, Markov, we have been

advised, has subsequently changed his story. It is interesting to have this kind of observation in that connection.

Mr. DONDERO. Perhaps Mr. Markov was subjected to the same pressure to which this gentleman was subjected.

Mr. FLOOD. You, of course, Mr. Goetel, have not been offered any payment by anyone, you have not been offered any promises to come here and testify, have you; you have not been made any promises of any kind to come here and testify?

Mr. GOETEL. No.

Mr. FLOOD. And you appear here voluntarily?

Mr. GOETEL. Yes; certainly.

Mr. FLOOD. The committee appreciates the time that you have taken to come here and help us gather this testimony. We appreciate very much the fact that you have given us this very important testimony that you have presented. We thank you very much.

We will now recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 5:45 p. m., the special committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Friday, April 18, 1952.)



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

FRIDAY, APRIL 18, 1952

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE,
London, England.

The select committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 111, Kensington Palace Hotel, De Vere Gardens W. 1, Hon. Ray J. Madden (chairman) presiding.

Present: Messrs. Madden, Flood, Machrowicz, Dondero, and O'Konski.

Also present: Roman Pucinski, investigator and interpreter.

Chairman MADDEN. The committee will come to order.

I want the record to show that at this third day of our hearings in London, Congressman Flood, of Pennsylvania; Congressman Machrowicz, of Michigan; Congressman Dondero, of Michigan; and Congressman O'Konski, of Wisconsin, are present with the chairman.

TESTIMONY OF ADAM SAWCZYNSKI, 20 PRINCES GATE S. W. 7, LONDON, ENGLAND (WITH THE AID OF INTERPRETER, ROMAN PUCINSKI)

Chairman MADDEN. Would you state your name, please?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Sawczynski.

Chairman MADDEN. And your first name?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Adam.

Chairman MADDEN. What is your address?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. 20 Princes Gate, London S. W. 7.

Chairman MADDEN. Before you make a statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who considered he had suffered injury as a result of your testimony. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as a result of your testimony.

Mr. FLOOD. Let the record show that while the witness feels he understands the English language, nevertheless, he prefers to have the interpreter translate it, to be sure.

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness indicates that he understands the statement.

Chairman MADDEN. Will you raise your right hand now and be sworn?

Do you swear, by God the Almighty, that you will, according to the best of your knowledge, tell the pure truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; so help you God?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Yes.

Chairman MADDEN. Proceed.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What is your name, again?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Adam Sawczynski.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Where do you live?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. In London; Princes Gate, London S. W. 7.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In 1939, were you an officer of the Polish Army?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In what rank?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Colonel.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were you taken prisoner by the Germans?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In the summer of 1940, were you in a German prison camp?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Where?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Arnswalde.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is in Western Pomerania, in Germany; is that correct?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Who was the commander of that camp?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. The German Colonel Loebecke.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you speak German?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Fluently?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Yes; I speak it fluently.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And did you make an acquaintanceship with Colonel Loebecke?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you have frequent opportunity to have conversations with him?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. I was commander of a prisoner battalion. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. At that time, were discussions being held regarding exchange of prisoners between Germany and Soviet Russia?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you apply to be exchanged on the basis of that arrangement, to be exchanged to Soviet Russia?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. No; I didn't; but many of my colleagues had applied.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you have any conversations with Colonel Loebecke regarding this exchange?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Yes; I had a conversation with him about that.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you at any time in the course of your conversations with him have opportunity to discuss the fate of the Polish officers who were in Russian hands?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Will you tell us when that was?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. It was in June 1940.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Could you give us the substance of that conversation, insofar as it relates to the fate of the Polish officers in Soviet hands?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Will you tell us, in your own words, now?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Colonel Loebecke asked me what is the matter that the Polish officers will be exchanged, will go into Russia.

(The witness made a statement in his native tongue.)

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness indicates, Mr. Flood, that he would prefer to testify in Polish, that it is easier for him to express himself that way.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Go ahead in Polish, and the interpreter will give us the substance of the testimony.

(Through interpreter:)

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. The German colonel had asked me why the Polish officers were agreeing and were desirous of taking advantage of the agreement for the exchange of prisoners between the Germans and the Russians, and he asked me why the Poles wanted to transfer to Russia.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. By the way, that agreement never did go into effect, did it?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Oh, yes. The agreement was being executed, but it was only a one-sided execution of the agreement. Transports of prisoners were arriving from Russia into Germany, and even some transports arrived at the camp in which I was interned. These transports, however, consisted only and exclusively of soldiers, enlisted men.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. No officers?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Private soldiers; no officers. Some officers did come in disguise.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you mean they pretended to be privates?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Will you give us the rest of your conversation?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. When the German colonel asked me why our men were willing to go to Russia, I explained to him that Russia at that time was not in formal stage of war with the West and that for other reasons, on conditions prevailing in the camp, the Polish soldiers felt that they could go to Russia and become more active in the war effort.

Mr. FLOOD. Of course, is it not also true that Russia was not at war with Poland, either, at the time?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Many in the camp considered that Russia and Poland were at war.

Mr. FLOOD. I do not blame them for that, under the circumstances. But I mean that, technically and actually, there was no state of war between Soviet Russia and the Republic of Poland.

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. That is correct; but, actually, it was considered that there had been a war.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. All right, will you continue now with your conversation with Colonel Loebecke?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. We discussed this matter for a considerable length of time with the colonel, but the thing that I recall most vividly is the ending of that conversation. At the end of our conversation, the colonel asked me, "Don't you know what they are doing with you?"—meaning "your soldiers."

I replied that, "We know Russia very well," and I assured him that, "We are well aware of the fact that before our conditions can be improved, they could conceivably become much worse."

He leaned toward me then and told me in German, "Why, they are murdering your people; they are murdering you."

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Was that the end of the conversation?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did he indicate to you how he had received such information?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. No.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you know Lt. Alfons Koehler?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Who was he?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. At one time he was my aide. He was a Polish officer who was my aide at one time. Later, however, he was released from the Army and he worked as a civilian in the intelligence unit.

Mr. DONDERO. Of what government?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Of the Polish Government. His activities were directed against Russia.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Was he also in this prison camp at Arnsvalde in 1940?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. From the beginning, he was not. At first he had been interned in Lithuania.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did he, in July 1940, come to this camp?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Yes. He arrived in July of 1940.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you have any conversation with him? Did you receive any information from him which would have any relation to the lost Polish officers in Russia?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Yes. I talked to him shortly after his arrival at the camp, and our conversation eventually led to a discussion of our mutual friends who had been interned in Russia. He told me at that time the method he used to escape or be transferred from Lithuania to Germany. He said that he had reported to superiors in Lithuania and explained that he wanted to be transferred to Germany because the Russians were taking over Lithuania; the Russians were taking over prison camps in Lithuania.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did he have any conversations with any Lithuanian authorities at that time relative to the Polish officers lost in Russia?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. When he was granted permission for the transfer, he reported to the Lithuanian authorities and he had carried on several conversations with officers of the Lithuanian Intelligence Department.

In these conversations, a Lithuanian officer discussing the Polish officers in Kozielsk, said, "Why, those in the camp at Kozielsk had been murdered." Koehler refused to believe this and said, "It is impossible, because there were several thousand people there." The Lithuanian officer replied, "Whether this is true, or not, I don't know; but that is the information that we have."

My discussion or conversation with Koehler was in July of 1940.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Was that the end of your conversation with Koehler?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is all.

Mr. FLOOD. That is all.

Mr. DONDERO. That is all.

Chairman MADDEN. You have not been promised any pay or recompense for coming here to testify today, have you?

Mr. SAWCZYNSKI. No.

Chairman MADDEN. We wish to thank you for coming here today to testify.

**TESTIMONY OF JERZY LEWSZECKI, 2 QUEENSBOROUGH TERRACE
W. 2, LONDON, ENGLAND (THROUGH INTERPRETER ROMAN
PUCINSKI)**

Chairman MADDEN. Just state your name to the reporter, and spell it.

Mr. LEWSZECKI. The name is Jerzy Lewszecki. The address is 2 Queensborough Terrace W. 2, London.

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness indicates that he prefers to testify in Polish, that he understands and can express himself better that way.

Chairman MADDEN. Mr. Lewszecki, before you make a statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who considered he had suffered injury as a result of your testimony. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as a result of the testimony.

For the record, the interpreter will repeat this statement in Polish. (The interpreter made a statement in Polish.)

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness indicates that the statement is clear to him.

Chairman MADDEN. Will you raise your right hand and be sworn?

Do you swear, by God the Almighty, that you will, according to your best knowledge, tell the pure truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; so help you God?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. I do.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What is your name?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. Jerzy Lewszecki.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Where do you live?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. In London.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In 1939, were you an officer of the Polish Army?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. Yes; Regular Army.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In what rank?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. Rank of first lieutenant.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were you taken prisoner by the Germans?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. To what camp were you taken?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. In Lubeck.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were you there in 1940?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. In 1942.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. While in that camp, did you have occasion to meet any Russian officers?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. Yes. During the spring of 1942, the older son of Stalin was brought to this camp. There was some mystery about his arrival prior to his arrival; but as soon as he arrived at the camp, everybody in the camp knew about it.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What was his first name?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. Jacob.

Mr. FLOOD. Just a moment. May I interrupt there? What last name was he using?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. Jacob Dzhugashvili.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you know whether or not, or have you heard that that is the correct name of Stalin?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. He told me himself.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And it is a matter of general knowledge, is it not, that Stalin is the accepted name but his actual name was the one you just mentioned?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. That is correct. Stalin is the literal translation of the name Dzhugashvili from Georgian into Russian.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How was he brought in there; as a prisoner of war, or what?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. He was brought there as a prisoner of war.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Was he an officer of the Russian Army?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. He was a senior lieutenant, or oberleutnant. It is not quite correct because they have actually three ranks of lieutenant in the Russian Army.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were there other Russian officers in this camp?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. No; there were no other Russian officers in this camp. There were some Belgian officers there and there was also a Belgian general. The Chief of Staff of the Belgian Army was there.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were there any special quarters prepared for him?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. Yes. The other generals and staff officers of the other armies had separate quarters, and Stalin himself had a separate room, and there was a window in the room and there was a guard constantly at this window.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. A special guard assigned to Stalin alone, is that correct?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. Yes. And there was a book there that whoever visited Stalin had to register.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you get to become acquainted with Jacob Stalin?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. Yes, I did.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you speak Russian?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. Yes, I do.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you speak it fluently?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. Very well.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Would you tell us how you became acquainted with him, in view of this guard being there, and what conversations, if any, you had with him regarding the fate of the Polish officers who were in Russian hands?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. When he first arrived, he was very weak and undernourished. We were giving him packages and we tried to restore him back to health through nourishment.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Was that permitted, in view of the guard?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. At first the Germans did not permit us, but we had our own methods of getting the food to him, and we used to give American cigarettes to the guard over there and he became cooperative. That was the best currency at the time, the American cigarettes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And as a result of this exchange of food and cigarettes, did you become acquainted with Stalin?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. The Germans were very easily bought over in those days. Undoubtedly, that did contribute considerably to the friendship that we established.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Tell us how this conversation with young Stalin was brought about and what he told you.

Mr. LEWSZECKI. I asked him who he was, and he told me that he was Jacob Dzugasvilli, who was the oldest son of Stalin, by his first marriage.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Now tell us what he told you regarding the Polish officers in any of these three camps—Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov.

Mr. LEWSZECKI. He did not name any of those three camps in particular, but we did receive letters. These letters were from our families and from our friends to our camp, and they were about our friends who were being held prisoner in Russia. In one of the letters I received there was a notation: "As to my friend Victor Kaczynski, I will not see him again." This was a letter that was written to me from Poland.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you discuss this letter and other similar letters with Stalin?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. Yes, I took these letters to him in order to translate them to him in Russian.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did he make any comment about them?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. His first reaction was one of shock. Then later he recalled that he had heard that there was a prison camp with Polish officers in the Smolensk region, and that there had been an uprising there, and that this uprising had been suppressed. He had heard that there was shooting there, and that there were some victims who fell dead. He terminated that part of our conversation and changed to another subject. A few days later, I began pressing him again on this particular subject. When we talked about the collectivization of the Ukraine, he told me that during that process there were about 3 million of our people—

Mr. MACHROWICZ. By "our people," you mean Russians?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. I mean his, Stalin's people, the Russians, were murdered, about 3 million, "so," he said, "why are you surprised that your people should be murdered also?"

Mr. FLOOD. Well, actually he means Ukrainians, not Russians.

Mr. PUCINSKI. He was speaking of the 3 million victims as being Ukrainians, but he did not make a particular distinction between the Ukrainians and the Russians.

Mr. FLOOD. No, but I did.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Now will you continue the conversation regarding these Polish officers?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. The letters continued coming, and I told Stalin that there is something wrong. I said: "Something is not in order over there," and he said: "Yes, that's right." He said: "Why, those were the intelligentsia, the most dangerous element to us, and they had to be eliminated." He told me exactly (and this I remember very well) that this is an element which is not very easily converted, because the younger people were capable of being converted, of educating; but he assured me that the murders must have been committed with a humanitarian method, unlike the brutal tactics of the Germans.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did he say anything further on that subject?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. No; he just said in Russian that they had to be destroyed, that they had to be removed.

Mr. FLOOD. As I understand the witness, as he understood Stalin's conversation, that it was necessary for the Russians for various reasons to dispose of these Polish officers; is that correct?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. But it was a nice clean human murder rather than a messy job; is that the understanding?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. Yes; that is correct; Stalin tried to point out that it was not done with the same method that the Germans used to destroy the people. My impression, on the basis of these conversations with him, was that he did not realize, did not take cognizance of the fact, that these murders could have been something deplorable; he considered that it was a national and government necessity.

Mr. DONDERO. Where did you have these talks with Stalin—in his room, or out in the prison camp?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. In his room. I spent most of my time in his room.

Mr. DONDERO. Were there any other people present?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. Normally he was hesitant to converse when others were present, but on several occasions there were others present.

Mr. DONDERO. Did you inform Stalin that you were a Polish prisoner of war?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. Yes; of course; I was in the Polish uniform, and he knew that. As a matter of fact, I told him that I belonged to Pilsudski's legion, and I was an open foe of the Russians.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And he understood that?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. Yes; he understood that.

Mr. DONDERO. Was he friendly or did he appear to be angry toward them?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. Generally he behaved very well, but on many subjects we disagreed, and our conversations would end abruptly.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That's all.

Mr. FLOOD. You had the impression, did you, that Stalin, in all of these conversations about the disposition or the killing of these Polish officers, gave the impression of no sense of immorality or injustice or inhumanity, but that it was an administrative and political necessity for the Russians to so act?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. I frequently called his attention to the fact that these murders were not humanitarian, but he merely told me that they were a government necessity. The problem of humanity or humanitarianism did not at all interest him; this did not enter into his thinking at all.

Mr. FLOOD. Then as I understand it, Stalin gave evidence of a state of mind which could be described as unmoral, amoral, rather than immoral?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. The question of morality or immorality never entered into his mind; he thought that it was a necessity of the state, and that was it.

Chairman MADDEN. Is that all? Any further questions? Mr. Lewszecki, has anybody promised you any pay or recompense or emoluments for coming here today to testify?

Mr. LEWSZECKI. Absolutely none.

Chairman MADDEN. We wish to thank you for your testimony here this morning.

**TESTIMONY OF JOSEF GARLINSKI, NO. 104 HOLLAND ROAD,
LONDON W. 14, ENGLAND**

Chairman MADDEN. Just state your name to the reporter, and the correct spelling of it.

Mr. GARLINSKI. Josef Garlinski.

Chairman MADDEN. And your address?

Mr. GARLINSKI. My present address is No. 104 Holland Road, London W. 14, England.

Chairman MADDEN. Before you make a statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who considered he had suffered injury as a result of your testimony. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as the result of your testimony. You understand that?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes; certainly.

Chairman MADDEN. Now raise your hand and be sworn. You swear by God Almighty, that you will, according to the best of your knowledge, tell the pure truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. GARLINSKI. I do.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Your name is Josef Garlinski?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And you are a resident of London?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were you previously an officer of the main command of the Polish National Army?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes, I was an officer of the Reserve.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And in 1943 were you arrested by the Gestapo in Warsaw?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes; on April 20, 1943.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And where were you taken to?

Mr. GARLINSKI. First they sent me to the prison camp Pawiak; it was in Warsaw, inside the Warsaw ghetto. As you know, the Germans organized a ghetto for Jews, and it was inside there.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were you later taken to the concentration camp in Wittenberg, Germany?

Mr. GARLINSKI. First I was sent to Oswiecim (Auschwitz).

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Eventually did you get to Wittenberg?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Wittenberg was the third one.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In the spring and summer of 1944, were you in Wittenberg?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In the concentration camp there?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And while you were in that camp, did you meet any Russian soldiers?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes. It was a small camp; about 400 people altogether, but a branch of the big camp, and we worked in a factory there; we were sent there to work in this factory. There were about 400 people in there, the majority of them Russians, so I met there a large number of Russians, all types of Russians.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. While in that camp, did you meet any soldiers or officers of the Russian army who were not Russians?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes; definitely.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Are there any you particularly remember?

Mr. GARLINSKI. When you say Russians, they were not all born Russians, but they were all the citizens of Soviet Russia, and they were all soldiers or officers of the Russian forces.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you meet any of Greek origin?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes, I remember one of them; his Christian name was Aleksiej, but unfortunately I do not remember his surname.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did it sound like Georgopolos?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes, it was a typical Greek name, but I just do not remember.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. About how old was this man?

Mr. GARLINSKI. I think he was about 30 at that time.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Was he a rather intelligent person?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes; he was definitely an educated man.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you become well acquainted with him?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes. We were not friends, of course, but his Russian language was very good, and he wanted to improve my Russian, because I speak Russian, and it was a very good chance to have good Russian conversation.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Was he a former officer of the Red army?

Mr. GARLINSKI. I think so; he did not say this, but I think he was definitely.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Now did you discuss with him Russia and the life in Russia?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes. We discussed this very carefully, of course, because a concentration camp is not the best place to discuss things.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did he ever tell you that he was in or around Charkow?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes. He told me he was born there and lived there for several years, as far as I know, although he is of Greek origin, but he was born in Russia.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Now did he tell you whether or not he was in or around Charkow in the spring of 1940?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Can you tell us what he told you about that?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Well, when we have spoken about the life in Russia and everything, once he told me that in the spring of 1940, 1 year before the Russo-German war started, he had seen there some work which the Bolsheviks started there. It was not in Charkow, but near Charkow. Firstly, they started to build a big wall—I do not remember this word in English—not from bricks, but from wood.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. A sort of fence?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes, a fence to protect something from the view of the public.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. A sort of tall fence?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes; and the people were told that they must not be interested in this, that they must not go near to this fence and see what is on the other side. This was nothing special in Russia because it happened very often after some work of this type, so he did not know at that time what happened there behind this wall. But later, when the Germans came to this part of Russia, after the

beginning of the war in 1941, the Germans discovered that there are some people killed there, and the bodies of these people were there in the mass like in Katyn, like the same type.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did Aleksiej draw you a map or plan?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes; he presented me with a plan on a piece of paper. I do not remember this plan, but it showed how this was made; and the people from Charkow and from suburbs of Charkow and the neighboring villages came in because the Germans, of course, organized big propaganda about this, that the Bolsheviks killed people there; and the Russian people who lived in Charkow and the suburbs of Charkow and the small villages there found their relations there.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You mean, among the bodies that were recovered?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes; they found their relations. I must tell you that Aleksiej did not mention to me that Poles were found there; he did not tell me that. I did not ask him more about this because it was very dangerous in a concentration camp to speak about such a rather difficult political subject; but as I knew already about Katyn, and all this business—because you will remember the Germans arrested me in April 1943—

Chairman MADDEN. What day?

Mr. GARLINSKI. It was April 20, 1943—and I have known already from the German press that the Katyn grave was discovered. As far as I remember, I think they started to print articles about this in January 1943—at the beginning of 1943—so before they arrested me, I have known this already.

Well, Aleksiej said to me about this Charkow. Well, it was rather something very interesting for me also from this point of view, that my father was taken prisoner of war by the Russians and was sent to Starobielsk. Starobielsk was the nearest camp to Charkow. So it was that this information from this Aleksiej was very important also from my personal point of view, as my father was prisoner of war in Starobielsk, and I did not find his name among those named by the Germans when they discovered Katyn. They started to print the names of Polish officers found there, in the German press published in Poland at that time. I did not find the name of my father there. So when Aleksiej said that they discovered something almost the same near Charkow, it was quite possible that my father was found there. So it was very important information from my personal point of view—not only from the Polish point of view.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you find out anything further from Aleksiej regarding who was in these graves?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Well, he said that in his opinion they killed these people of Russian nationality who were against the Government and against what they wanted to do for the near future, because everybody was sure in Russia at that time that the war against Germany will start in the near future; and it happened 1 year later.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Now one other question: Did Aleksiej tell you how many bodies were found in those graves at Charkow?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Well, as far as I remember, he said thousands, but it is difficult for me to say now.

Mr. FLOOD. Now here is one thing we are trying to presume: as you know or have heard, we seem to have accounted for the missing Polish officers from the camp at Kozielsk.

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Because of the names that have been listed from the graves at Katyn; but nobody seems to be able to account for the missing officers from Starobielsk and Ostoshkov.

Mr. GARLINSKI. No.

Mr. FLOOD. It has been suggested, and we are trying to develop the theory, that the Russians may have had execution camps or execution spots set up for various districts or geographic areas. Do you understand?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. That is why your testimony is important, because it indicates that possibility. Now, I want to emphasize that your friend did not mention Polish officers, did he, at that time?

Mr. GARLINSKI. No; he did not.

Mr. FLOOD. He mentioned thousands of bodies—yes or no?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes; thousands of bodies.

Mr. FLOOD. Did he indicate that his information was that there were executions taking place in the Kharkov area at this spot you are talking about in 1939 and 1940?

Mr. GARLINSKI. 1940.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. There is one other question there I want to bring up: You were released in 1945 and came to England; is that correct?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes; I was released by American forces, the American Army, in May 1945, and came here in November 1945.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you at that time, when you came to England in May 1945, relate the very same story as you are now telling this committee?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. To the Polish Government in exile?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. So that this matter which you have told us today has been related by you in exactly the same text in November 1945?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Immediately upon your arrival?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Not in November 1945—a bit later.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. When?

Mr. GARLINSKI. It is difficult to say.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Shortly after November?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Even later. I think it was 1946 or 1947.

Mr. FLOOD. By the way, did you ever hear, then or later, of any German announcements or reports or propaganda having to do with executions in the Kharkov area?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Not German propaganda; no.

Mr. DONDERO. Where were you from 1943 until 1945, when you were released and came to England?

Mr. GARLINSKI. From 1943 to 1945 I spent this time in the German concentration camps.

Mr. DONDERO. That is what I want to know; that is all.

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes; there were other camps. You may be interested, if you would like to hear this: Just before the war, in 1938, my father was married again, the second time; because my parents were separated—you know—divorced, when I was still a small child. He married a young girl. She is only, I think, 2 years older than my wife.

And we were friends. My father was mobilized in 1939 as a major of reserve. He was still not too old—only 49 or 48; and he disappeared during the war. We did not know what had happened to him. At this time we stayed in Warsaw—I with my wife, and we were friendly with his second wife. It was the beginning of 1940, as far as I remember. My wife is here. My wife is Irish—not Polish. She may be a good witness for you. She spent all the war in Poland. And suddenly the second wife of my father got a post card from my father from Starobielsk. It was the first information about him, where he is. It was one post card. I remember that she got another one also in January or February of 1940; and later the last news from him was a telegram sent through Moscow and Berlin for her. Her Christian name is Maria. This may be important for the date. [The witness looked at a diary.] It is the 25th March.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What year?

Mr. GARLINSKI. 1940. She got this telegram from him, with wishes. You know, it is the Polish custom; we always remember the name—the Christian name—not the birthday. Her Christian name is Maria and Mary is March 25.

Mr. FLOOD. By the name day? You mean the saint's day, do you not?

Mr. GARLINSKI. The saint's day, yes.

Mr. FLOOD. It is the Polish custom to send greetings on your name day or saint's day?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes, that is it.

Mr. FLOOD. Rather than on the natal day or birthday?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes, that is true.

Mr. FLOOD. Her name is Maria; her saint's day is St. Mary's day. The husband from the camp at Starobielsk sent her a telegram saying "Happy Birthday"?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Or "Happy Saint's Day"?

Mr. GARLINSKI. Yes. That is through Moscow and Berlin; it was the way of this telegram. It was March 25, 1940. It was the last news from him. Later, nothing.

Chairman MADDEN. Are there any further questions? Has anybody promised you any pay or recompense for coming here to testify?

Mr. GARLINSKI. No, no.

Chairman MADDEN. We want to thank you for your testimony here today. It is very valuable testimony. Thank you.

Mr. GARLINSKI. Thank you very much.

Mr. PUCINSKI. This is the wife of the last witness.

Chairman MADDEN. State your name and address.

Mrs. GARLINSKI. Eileen Frances Garlinska, 104 Holland Road, London, W. 14.

Chairman MADDEN. Before you make your statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts if anyone considered he had suffered an injury by reason of your testimony. At the same time I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility on your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as a result of your testimony. You understand that?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. I understand that.

Chairman MADDEN. Now will you raise your hand and be sworn. Do you swear by God the Almighty that you will, according to the best of your knowledge, tell the pure truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. I do.

Chairman MADDEN. What was your name before you were married?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. Short.

Chairman MADDEN. Where were you born?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. Liverpool.

Chairman MADDEN. How long were you in England before you met your present husband?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. I was in England until 1935. I went out to Poland in 1935. I met him in 1936 and we were married in 1939.

Mr. FLOOD. The last witness who has just testified is your husband?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. He is my husband; yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you hear his testimony?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. You heard everything he said this morning?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. You heard him say that you and he were living together as husband and wife in Warsaw; is that correct?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And at that time your father-in-law's second wife was also living in Warsaw?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. Yes; for a time we lived in the same house as she did.

Mr. FLOOD. The three of you lived together?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. Yes; with her mother too.

Mr. FLOOD. You heard your husband say she had received on different occasions two cards from her husband at Starobielsk?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Are you aware of that fact?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you see the cards?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. I did.

Mr. FLOOD. Can you corroborate the testimony given by your husband?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. I can.

Mr. FLOOD. As true and correct?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Of your own knowledge?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you recall of your own memory the date of the last card that the wife received from her husband?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. The last was a telegram. In fact, I remember the date chiefly—I remember that this had come for her Name's Day or Saint's Day on March 25, 1940. We saw it. She always showed us the correspondence she had from him. I know that she tried frequently to get news. I was in contact with her until 1945 personally and I still write to her. We were always very good friends.

Mr. FLOOD. Your nationality is not Polish?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. No; I am Anglo-Irish—more Irish.

Mr. FLOOD. Anglo-Irish?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. Yes, but more Irish than Anglo.

Mr. FLOOD. That is all; thank you.

Chairman MADDEN. Nobody has made any promise to you to pay you any emoluments for coming here to testify?

Mrs. GARLINSKA. No.

Chairman MADDEN. We wish to thank you for your testimony.

Mrs. GARLINSKA. Thank you.

Chairman MADDEN. Will you state your name and address?

Mr. SZLASKI. Janus Prawdzic Szlaski, of 22 Buer Road, London, S. W. 6.

Chairman MADDEN. Before you make your statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who considered he had suffered injury. At the same time I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as the result of your testimony. You understand that?

Mr. PUCINSKI. This witness has indicated that he wants to testify in Polish.

Chairman MADDEN. Yes. Will you interpret that. (The admonition was interpreted to the witness.)

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness has indicated that he understands the statement and the admonition.

Chairman MADDEN. Now, if you will be sworn. Do you solemnly swear by God the Almighty that you will, according to your best knowledge, tell the pure truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

TESTIMONY OF JANUS PRAWDZIC SZLASKI, OF 22 BUER ROAD, LONDON, S. W. 6.

Mr. O'KONSKI. The witness has given his name and address for the record. Will you ask the witness where he was and what his capacity was in the year 1944?

Mr. SZLASKI. I was the commanding officer of an underground army, district Nowogrodek.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Ask him if that was what is commonly known in America as the Polish Home Underground Army that participated in the Warsaw uprising at the instigation of the Allies during the months of August and September of 1944?

Mr. SZLASKI. Yes.

Mr. O'KONSKI. That is correct? Ask him if it is not true that that home army was made up of the greatest patriots and the so called intelligentsia of what was left of Poland and particularly Warsaw, at that time?

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness said that in his particular battalion 40 percent of those in the underground unit that he commanded were White Russians.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Ask him what he knows about any Russian order or any Russian attempt to liquidate any leadership or any intelligentsia in Poland?

Mr. SZLASKI. I had several opportunities to observe these tactics. When the Russian Armies were virtually destroyed by the Germans in 1941 many of the Russian Officers and NKVD officers transferred their allegiance and worked with the German Gestapo, and these

officers, especially in this district of Nowogrodek, began then an intensive campaign of collecting the intelligentsia of that area and surrendering it to the Germans. As soon as we discovered this in the Polish underground, we began intense efforts at destroying this procedure of these Russian NKVD officers selecting the intelligentsia and transferring it to the Germans.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Why did they transfer these intelligentsia to the Germans?

Mr. SZLASKI. They wanted to eliminate all of the pro-Polish elements in that particular region. After we had succeeded in destroying the intelligence union of the NKVD officers working with the Germans, then those who survived began efforts and contacted us with an effort to try and work with our units against the Germans. We had several conversations with their leaders and we did reach an agreement and we did work together and we did manage to destroy many of the installations in various German towns. During this period of cooperation with the remainder of the Russian NKVD with which we were working, we had several conversations to work out various details of points that came up and questions that came up. On the December 1, 1943, the Russians invited some of our officers for a series of discussions. After inviting us, and we told them to come to one of our underground meeting places, when the Russians got there, they attacked us by surprise. They had succeeded in this attack in killing some of our people and capturing others of our people, whom they had taken back to Russia.

Mr. O'KONSKI. In other words, the Russians asked for a meeting with the leaders of the underground home army?

Mr. SZLASKI. Yes.

Mr. O'KONSKI. And then, when they set the time and place of the meeting, the Russians came, and, instead of meeting with them, arrested them and killed some of them; is that correct?

Mr. SZLASKI. Yes. Those of our people who were away on patrol duty managed to escape this ambush, and then we started a bitter war with the Russian Partisans. They frequently attacked our villages and our meeting places.

Mr. O'KONSKI. That is, the Russians attacked?

Mr. SZLASKI. The Russians, and they murdered many of our people, and during one of these battles a Russian Army Staff officer was killed. One of our officers who searched the body of this dead staff officer came across a package of papers. This officer is now in the United States.

Mr. O'KONSKI. What is his name and address, if he knows?

Mr. SZLASKI. His name is Josef Niedzwiecki. He lives in Buffalo, and I will have to give you his exact address a little later. Among the papers that were found on this dead staff officer was an order in the Russian language issued by the commanding officer of the Partisan Russians named Ponomarynko, who until recently was President of White Russia and is now a member of the Russian Politburo.

Mr. O'KONSKI. In other words, it was a very high ranking Russian officer?

Mr. SZLASKI. Yes. The order stated that as of the December 1, 1943, all efforts should be made to destroy these Polish underground battalions and to particularly select the officers and noncommissioned officers.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Ask him if he has a complete copy of that order in his possession.

Mr. SZLASKI. I have a copy of that order here which has been translated onto the Polish language. The original of this order I have in Poland.

Mr. FLOOD. Let me see the document. [Document handed to Mr. Flood.] Show this document handed to me by the witness to the stenographer and have it marked as exhibit 31. As I understand it, exhibit 31, this document now marked for identification, is a copy of the order you have just described found upon the body of this Russian officer. Is that correct?

Mr. SZLASKI. Yes.

(The order referred to was marked as "Exhibit 31" and is shown below).

EXHIBIT 31

Строго секретно

Декабрь 27.

За разсекретивание вперед всей операции называется

Боевое распоряжение

Командиру и Комиссару

Партизанского отряда Бри. им. Сталина

30-го ноября 1943 года — 1500 часов.

Во исполнение приказа начальника центрального штаба партизанского движения при ставке Верховного Главно-командования Красной Армии ген-лейтенанта Фономина и уполномоченного центрального штаба партизанского движения при ставке Верховного Главно-командования как В.Р. П/С/К. и.о. Богдановичей области им. лейт. Плеханова.

13 декабря 1943 года передайте ровно в час дня, по всей населенной территории районов присутствия и безвозвратному уничтожению состава польских легионеров и партизан.

Обратной рукописи и документов заготавливать, а личный состав легионеров вместе с обратными рукописями доставить в тыловой лагерь Милитерского в рай. деревни Милитеровичи, Ивницкого района.

При выполнении во время обзора убитых со стороны немцев, партизан на месте разстреливать,

С получением данного приказа немедленно строго секретными пакетами рассылать в распоряжение в районы оперирования ваших групп, рот и взводов с задачей выполнения данного приказа,

Приказ держат в строгом секрете,

За разсекривание приказа с какой-либо группами будут отвечать лично командиры отрядов.

Командир Бриз. им. Сталина (-) полк. Гудевич
 Подполковник Бриз. им. Сталина (-) полк. Муранов
 Начальник штаба Бриз. им. Сталина (+) полк. Карпов

Отпечатано 10 325 экземпляров

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М.ш. В. Р. Жуков и командир
 бригады им. Угелкина.

(English translation of the above exhibit appears on the following page under remarks of Mr. Machrowicz.)

Mr. FLOOD. You have the original document in your possession, but it is in Poland in safekeeping; is that correct?

Mr. SZLASKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. I now show you exhibit No. 31 and ask you, after you examine that, to state whether or not that is an exact copy of the original document taken from the Russian officer's body which you say is in Poland. Will you examine it and say?

Mr. SZLASKI. It is an exact copy.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Ask the witness if, in his observation, particularly during the Warsaw uprising before and after, he feels that that order was actually being carried out by the Russians.

Mr. SZLASKI. Yes. I saw it being executed.

Mr. FLOOD. I have just examined the document to which we referred, exhibit No. 31, and I notice that you also have a Polish translation of exhibit 31. I understand that the original order, of course, found on the dead Russian officer's body was in Russian and this is an exact translation, as I understand it, of the Russian order. Is that correct?

Mr. SZLASKI. Yes, it is correct.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Ask him if the refusal of the Russians to come to the aid of Poland during the Warsaw uprising was part of the pattern of getting the leadership of Poland liquidated.

Mr. SZLASKI. Yes, it was; but I, however, did not participate in the Warsaw uprising. I was in Russian-occupied territory of Poland.

Mr. O'KONSKI. When the Russians moved forward and they kept on taking over more and more of the Polish territory and Polish people, what was the policy of the Russians concerning anybody who worked in a Polish underground or who was left as a possible leader of Poland? What happened to them?

Mr. SZLASKI. They arrested them and removed them to Russia.

Mr. O'KONSKI. In other words, ask him if it was not a general policy on the part of the Russians to destroy every segment of any possible Polish resistance of any nature.

Mr. SZLASKI. Yes, that was their policy. I worked together with these people and we had participated in the attack on Wilno. When the Polish Army attacked Wilno we were supported by the Russians and we subsequently guarded the flank of the Russian units. I was then removed from my present post and transferred to another assignment to form Polish units near Wilno.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Ask him if he sees any similarity in the Russian actions during his experience under the Russians in that territory, if he sees any similarity in the Russian order to eliminate and liquidate all possible oppositions, if he sees any similarity between that and the mass murders at Katyn.

Mr. SZLASKI. I see no difference between the two.

Mr. O'KONSKI. In other words, it was a part of an over-all picture to wipe out the Polish leadership, the Polish intelligentsia and any possible Polish resistance?

Mr. SZLASKI. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. DONDERO. Did you personally see that order which you found on the body of this dead Russian officer actually carried out against any of your people?

Mr. SZLASKI. Yes. I was a prisoner of the Russians in 1941 in a Russian prison, and they had me scheduled for an execution.

Mr. FLOOD. Exhibit No. 31 is very short. It is in Polish; and, for the information of the committee, I would suggest that it be read in English, so that we can hear exactly what that order from the Russian officer's body actually said.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. If the chairman wishes, I will give my translation of it. It is very short.

Chairman MADDEN. Proceed.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. On the very top the words are contained:

Strictly secret. Copy No. 7. An earlier publication is subject to penalty-Military order to the commandants of the Partisan detachments of the Stalin Brigade, dated November 30, 1943, 15 o'clock. In execution of the order of the Chief of the Staff of the Partisan movement attached to the General Commander of the Russian Army, Lieutenant General Ponomarenko and of the authorised Chief of Staff of the Partisan movements, Baranowski Serge, Major General Platonow.

On December 1, 1943, you are ordered at punctually 7 o'clock in the morning to publish and announce that in all occupied points commence immediately the personal disarmament of all Polish Legionnaires and Partisans. The guns and ammunition and documents taken from them to be registered and the Legionnaires, together with their guns, to be taken to the Milaszewski camp in the region of the village of Niestorowicze in the Iwieniecki region.

In case of resistance during the time of disarmament on the part of the legionnaires and partisans, they are to be immediately shot.

Immediately upon receipt of this order it is to be immediately sent by strictly confidential message for execution in the operational regions of our groups, companies and sections, with instructions for immediate execution of this order.

This order is to be kept in strict confidence.

The commanders of the various sections will be personally responsible for the publication or for the revealing of this order for any reason whatsoever. Signed by the commander of the Stalin Brigade, Colonel Gulewicz, and the commissar of the Stalin Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Muranow. Also the chief of staff of the Stalin Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Karpod.

This order is issued in 10 copies.

Then follows the names of the various detachments to whom the copies are to be delivered. Sealed by a round seal of the Stalin Brigade.

Mr. FLOOD. That should be submitted in evidence.

Chairman MADDEN. That is accepted in evidence. (To the witness): Has anybody promised you any pay or emoluments to come here today to testify?

Mr. SZLASKI. No.

Chairman MADDEN. We wish to thank you for your testimony here today, very valuable testimony.

Mr. SZLASKI. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF MR. C.

Chairman MADDEN. Before you make a statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you will run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who considers he has suffered an injury. As the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives does not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as the result of your testimony. You understand that?

Mr. C. Yes.

Chairman MADDEN. Do you swear by the God Almighty that you will, according to the best of your knowledge, tell the pure truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. C. Yes.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, for the record, this witness has relatives behind the iron curtain, and he requests that his identity be preserved exclusively for the knowledge of the members of the committee and be not made a part of the public record.

Chairman MADDEN. Have we his address?

Mr. PUCINSKI. Yes, we have his name and address. His identity is known to the committee.

Chairman MADDEN. If he is known as "Mr. R" is that all right?

Mr. PUCINSKI. "Mr. C."

Chairman MADDEN. All right. You proceed, then.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Where were you born?

Mr. C. In the Province of Pomorze.

Mr. PUCINSKI. When were you born?

Mr. C. Twenty-eighth November, 1900.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Did you have occasion to serve in the Polish Armed Forces?

Mr. C. Yes, I did.

Mr. PUCINSKI. In what rank and when?

Mr. C. Staff sergeant.

Mr. PUCINSKI. When?

Mr. C. Do you mean before the war or during the war?

Mr. PUCINSKI. When did you first join the Polish Armed Forces?

Mr. C. Seventh September, 1919.

Mr. PUCINSKI. In other words, you are a career soldier, a professional soldier?

Mr. C. I joined the Polish Border Guards after the mobilization in 1922.

Mr. PUCINSKI. You were in the Polish Border Guards in 1922, and did you remain in that organization right on through the war?

Mr. C. Yes.

Mr. PUCINSKI. You were in the Polish Border Guards on September 1, 1939, when Poland was invaded by the Germans?

Mr. C. Yes, I was.

Mr. PUCINSKI. And you were in the Polish Border Guards on September 17, 1939, when the Russians moved into Poland?

Mr. C. No; I was a soldier then. I was incorporated again into the Army.

Mr. PUCINSKI. What were your duties?

Mr. C. Fighting; nothing else.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Your rank was that of staff sergeant?

Mr. C. No; it was sergeant then.

Mr. PUCINSKI. You were a sergeant at that time?

Mr. C. Yes.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Were you ever taken prisoner by either the Germans or the Russians?

Mr. C. I was arrested by the Russians on the 25th October, 1939. They ordered a registration of all newcomers to the town I was living for that moment, and I went there to register myself and my family. My family has been evacuated from the western part of Poland to the eastern part.

Mr. PUCINSKI. How long did you remain a prisoner of the Russians?

Mr. C. From the 25th October, 1939, till the 24th August, 1941.

Mr. PUCINSKI. During that period of internment did you ever have occasion to be interned either at the camp of Ostashkov, Starobielsk, or Kozielsk? Just answer "Yes" or "No."

Mr. C. Yes.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Which of those three camps were you interned in at any given time?

Mr. C. Among others, I was in Ostashkov.

Mr. PUCINSKI. When did you arrive at Ostashkov?

Mr. C. We arrived in Ostashkov on the 11th February, 1940.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Am I correct in assuming that you were taken there by the Russians?

Mr. C. Yes.

Mr. PUCINSKI. At the time that you arrived at Ostashkov on the 11th February 1940, how many other Poles were there in this camp?

Mr. C. About 7,000.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Who were these people at that camp?

Mr. C. Most of them were Polish policemen. There were a certain number of officers of all ranks, mostly police and the border guard, but there were some civilians like priests, lawyers, and other classes of people.

Mr. PUCINSKI. There were 7,000 is all?

Mr. C. In all about 7,000. I did not count them personally.

Mr. PUCINSKI. How long did you stay at Ostashkov after you arrived there on February 11th?

Mr. C. I stayed there till the 13th May, 1940.

Mr. PUCINSKI. How long did the other 7,000 inmates or prisoners in that camp stay at Ostashkov after you arrived there on February 11th?

Mr. C. They were there.

Mr. PUCINSKI. How long after that did they remain there?

Mr. C. I was among the last ones to leave Ostashkov.

Mr. PUCINSKI. You were the second from the last group to leave Ostashkov?

Mr. C. That is right.

Mr. PUCINSKI. What date was that?

Mr. C. I was among a group of about 70 people to leave. And there remained after us about the same number—that means about 70 people—who I later learned left Ostashkov the next day.

Mr. PUCINSKI. You left on what date?

Mr. C. The 13th May, 1940.

Mr. PUCINSKI. What happened to the rest of the 7,000 inmates that you had seen when you arrived there?

Mr. C. I cannot tell you what happened.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Were they taken out of the camp between the 11th February and the 13th May?

Mr. C. They were being taken away from the camp.

Mr. PUCINSKI. They were evacuated?

Mr. C. Evacuated.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Can you tell us in your own words the method of evacuating these men?

Mr. C. Every day in the morning a certain number, say about 70 to 130, were read from a list, and they took their mattresses and

blankets, went to the church—there was a big hall—and there was a division. They left there these mattresses. Then there was a ring of guards. They took them through another door straight into the guards ring and then in a group, like soldiers, they were marched away from the camp.

Mr. PUCINSKI. When did that evacuation begin, as far as you remember?

Mr. C. Fourth April, 1940.

Mr. PUCINSKI. As far as you know, then, the first group ranging from 70 to 130 left Ostashkov on April 4th?

Mr. C. The first group left Ostashkov on the 4th April 1940.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Then do I understand you correctly that subsequently in similar groups they left every day thereafter?

Mr. C. Sometimes three groups a day left.

Mr. PUCINSKI. How were they actually evacuated from the camp? How did they leave the camp?

Mr. C. Marching away singing in fours.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Did you see them boarding trains or trucks, or anything?

Mr. C. No. They were taken to a station which was far away from the camp.

Mr. PUCINSKI. How do you know that they were taken to the station?

Mr. C. Because I was taken there myself.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Do you have any idea what happened to these men that were evacuated prior to your own departure?

Mr. C. I cannot tell. Just one thing which strikes me is that in the beginning of May 1940 there was gossip among the prisoners there, the Poles.

Mr. PUCINSKI. When you say "gossip," you mean rumors?

Mr. C. Yes, speaking about it, that the first thousands of Ostashkov men have been put on the ships and pulled up the river to the White Sea.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Up what river?

Mr. C. I could not tell you which river, but a river which leads to the White Sea, and the ships with the people were sunk in the rivers. That is what we heard.

Mr. PUCINSKI. When did you first hear those rumors?

Mr. C. I cannot tell you the date, but in the first days of May 1940.

Mr. PUCINSKI. That is when the rumors started, more or less?

Mr. C. Yes.

Mr. PUCINSKI. That was the first 1,000. Did you hear any other rumors regarding the other approximately 6,000?

Mr. C. I personally heard only this one.

Mr. PUCINSKI. About the first 1,000.

Mr. C. No, not 1,000; of the first thousands.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Would you say how many thousands?

Mr. C. No, I cannot.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Do you have any idea where those rumors started?

Mr. C. No, I cannot tell you.

Mr. PUCINSKI. When you heard those rumors repeated to you, did your friends tell you where they heard it from?

Mr. C. My friend could not tell who started, as I cannot tell you who started.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Did you ever talk to any of the camp officials about these rumors?

Mr. C. No, never.

Mr. PUCINSKI. You never asked them?

Mr. C. No.

Mr. PUCINSKI. And they never volunteered any information?

Mr. C. No.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Did you believe those rumors at that time?

Mr. C. There are certain things which one who has been in Russia can take for granted.

Mr. PUCINSKI. May what?

Mr. C. May take for granted; you may take it as the truth.

Mr. PUCINSKI. As far as you know, then, only on the basis of rumors, the first thousands of men who were evacuated from that camp were taken down the river to the White Sea and placed on barges, and there the barges were sunk off the coast line?

Mr. C. That is what we heard.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Did those rumors indicate where; how far off the coastline?

Mr. C. No, they could not.

Mr. PUCINSKI. You left on May 13, 1940?

Mr. C. Yes.

Mr. PUCINSKI. How did you leave that camp?

Mr. C. The same way as my friends before. I was read out of a list by Russian guardsmen. I took my mattress and blankets into the church there and I have put down the things, and a severe personal revision was made; everything was taken away.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Were your personal belongings taken away from you?

Mr. C. They were taken long before in Poland.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Were letters and pictures taken away from you?

Mr. C. Everything.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Everything?

Mr. C. Everything, which means pens and papers and things.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Letters and pictures also of your family?

Mr. C. No; they were not allowed to a prisoner. Everything was taken away.

Mr. PUCINSKI. After you marched out of the camp, where did you go?

Mr. C. We were led out of the camp to, I believe, the nearest station and loaded into wagons.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Into trucks or trains?

Mr. C. Into trains with bars, of course.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Prison cars on a train?

Mr. C. That is it.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Where were you taken from there?

Mr. C. Again to Pavlishchev Bor.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Do you know the name of that station?

Mr. C. No; not this one. I know that one which I came into Ostashkov. It was Ostashkov as well.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Do you know of your own knowledge whether the other men that preceded you who left the station were taken away by train?

Mr. C. I have not seen with my own eyes, but I do not think in those regions there is a possibility of taking people on foot.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Were there roads around there?

Mr. C. I think so.

Mr. PUCINSKI. But there were large numbers being evacuated?

Mr. C. You mean groups?

Mr. PUCINSKI. Some 70 to 130.

Mr. C. As I said before, about 70 to 130 people at a time.

Mr. PUCINSKI. When you boarded this train, did you see any inscriptions in the train cars regarding any hint as to where the men from Ostashkov may have gone?

Mr. C. No. There were different things of this kind, but nothing about the people from Ostashkov. Perhaps there may be, but I did not see any.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Did you, while you were still back at the camp and while these men were being evacuated, reach any agreement, or did you instruct the men leaving before you to leave you any clues on the trains, if they could, as to where they were going?

Mr. C. No. The camp was newly created, so I had very few friends there. There were days in which you were unable to get in touch with the people. We could not speak honestly to each other because you could not trust. You should understand one thing in Russia. In any group of people they put somebody in who takes from you and gives the information to the Russians. So you cannot trust anybody.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Do you know if any of the inmates of that camp had made any arrangements with those leaving the camp to try and leave some clue as to where those leaving before you were going?

Mr. C. No; I did not hear that.

Mr. PUCINSKI. You do not know that?

Mr. C. No.

Mr. PUCINSKI. You say you did see inscriptions. Can you tell us very briefly what some of those inscriptions were?

Mr. C. Big places of Russia, say Briansk. I have forgotten the names—I do not remember them now—but the first thing of a prison in Russia—

Mr. PUCINSKI. Do you remember any other names besides Briansk?

Mr. C. It is too far away. I cannot remember the places.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Can you tell me from your own personal knowledge where is Briansk in relation to the White Sea?

Mr. C. It is in the Province of Smolensk.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Briansk is?

Mr. C. Yes.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Do you know of your own knowledge whether a trip from Ostashkov to the White Sea would require you to go through Briansk?

Mr. C. You may, but there are other ways as well.

Mr. PUCINSKI. I notice that you have been referring to a little board here in answering some of these questions. What is this board?

Mr. C. This is part of a Polish knapsack, before the war. Everything what means paper was taken away. I was sure I couldn't keep all these dates and places in my mind; so, finally I got the idea to write them down with little pieces of pencil and kept it in the proper place, which is between two boards.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Those are the staves for your knapsack; aren't they?

Mr. C. Yes, sir. And all these hundreds of observations were my personal observations taken. I got the idea that there were things like this.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Why did you keep this so-called diary?

Mr. C. Because in case I would be murdered, because we believed they are able to do so, somebody may find the thing, and in case I would stay alive it will help me to tell the people where I was and to where I went. That is the idea I kept the dates in the place.

Mr. PUCINSKI. This is not very long. It shouldn't take very long. Would you briefly give us the notations you have on that staff?

Mr. C. Yes, sir. It is in Polish.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Would you translate that into English?

Mr. C. The 25th of October, arrested in Bolechow, taken to Dolina. The 2d of November, taken to Stanislaw.

Mr. PUCINSKI. This is still 1939?

Mr. C. Yes, sir.

The 3d of November, taken from Stanislaw to Tarnopol and through Podwoloczyska, in Russia, Proskirov, Szypytkowa, Konotop, Bryansk, to Babinino. The 25th of November 1939, we arrived at the camp of Juchnow.

The 2d of December to the 16th of that month, I was very sick in that camp.

The 21st of December that year, the police were taken away from us; just a border guard remained, were left there.

The 30th of January 1940, we left that camp.

The 11th of February 1940, we came into the camp of Ostashkov. The 13th of May, I left that camp through Torzok, Rzjew, Bryansk.

The 16th of May 1940, again I arrived into the camp of Pawlisczew Bor. There are two names: Juchnow and Pawlisczew Bor.

The 13th of June 1940, we left Pawlisczew Bor and came into the camp of Giazowice—at the 18th of June 1940.

The 30th of July 1941, a treaty took place between the Russians and the Polish Government in Lublin. The 12th of August 1941, we were told that we are a free people, told by the Russians.

Mr. PUCINSKI. You were given your freedom?

Mr. C. Yes.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Let me ask you here: Do you have any idea why you and the other 140 from Ostashkov were singled out as those who were to go to Pawlisczew Bor? Do you have any idea why you were in that group?

Mr. C. That is a question I often put to myself, and I found only one answer to that question. The first protocol was put down by the Russians in Bolechow. They asked me whether I had been serving in the Polish Army during the Polish-Bolshevik war in 1920. Although I took part in it, I told them I didn't; I was born and brought up and did my duty only on the western part of Poland, on the German border. That is what may be the cause they sorted me out, for my best friend, with whom I was doing my duty before the war for 10 years, being born as well at the western part of Poland, he vanished because, as he told me during our stay in Ostashkov, he was put down in the protocol that he was fighting against the Russians in 1920. And that is what, I think, may be the cause I was sorted out.

Mr. PUCINSKI. You subsequently joined General Anders' Polish Army in Russia?

Mr. C. I did.

Mr. PUCINSKI. When did you first hear of the discovery of bodies in Katyn?

Mr. C. In 1943, in Jerusalem.

Mr. PUCINSKI. At the time that you heard of this discovery, what reaction did that have on you in regard to your own personal experiences at Ostashkov, if any?

Mr. C. It only came true what I was thinking all the time after we had been searching for those people and we couldn't get any reply from the Russians, and we couldn't find them and they didn't join the army.

Mr. PUCINSKI. What, in your own opinion, do you think happened to the rest of the men who were interned with you at Ostashkov?

Mr. C. They had been slaughtered in the same way as at Starobielsk.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Not at Katyn?

Mr. C. No; not at Katyn, because there are, as I believe, more Katyns in Russia.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Would you have any idea, in your own mind, on the basis of your stay at Ostashkov and some of the things that you heard there, where these men could have been exterminated?

Mr. C. It is only as I suggested before, they were drowned in the White Sea, according to reports I heard.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Did you believe those reports?

Mr. C. I believed this was possible, on the basis of what I knew about the Russians.

Mr. PUCINSKI. How far is the White Sea from Ostashkov?

Mr. C. Hundreds of miles.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Approximately how many hundreds?

Mr. C. I can't tell.

Mr. PUCINSKI. You don't know?

Mr. C. No.

Mr. PUCINSKI. You have heard, no doubt, since the discovery of the bodies at Katyn, that those at Starobielsk and at Kozielsk had read inscriptions on the trains, of where these men were going; haven't you?

Mr. C. No.

Mr. PUCINSKI. You have not heard that?

Mr. C. No. I can't tell because I didn't see it personally. I can tell only things which I experienced or saw myself.

Mr. PUCINSKI. But have you heard, in your subsequent study of this whole case, that some of the men did notice them?

Mr. C. No; I didn't.

Mr. PUCINSKI. I can tell you that some of the witnesses here did testify that they had seen inscriptions on the train, of their compatriots which were intended as a clue as to where they were going. The reason I ask you this question is to determine if you have any idea, any opinion, since you say there were no inscriptions on the train that you traveled in giving you some clue as to where your men from Ostoshkov were sent?

Mr. C. I don't deny there were inscriptions, but I haven't seen them and, therefore, I can't describe them. But I don't deny it; it is possible.

Mr. PUCINSKI. And you have no idea why those names may not have appeared, or why these men didn't leave any clues as the others did?

Mr. C. No.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Is there anything else you would like to add to your statement at this time that might give us an opportunity to establish who was responsible for the disappearance of these men?

Mr. C. Personally, I believe that the slaughter of the Polish prisoners had been done by the Russians, because when we were searching for them in Russia and were waiting for them, the staff officers of the Polish Army, knowing that there is a big search going on, they couldn't tell us where the prisoners were. But when the Germans discovered the mass graves in 1943, they rapidly found out that they were at Smolensk in a camp from which nobody came out and nobody knows about such a camp.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Did the Germans ever occupy, to the best of your knowledge, the camp at Ostashkov?

Mr. C. Yes. I have photographs, but I haven't them here, in an English magazine. In that camp are German prisoners.

Mr. PUCINSKI. I want to know whether the German Army, after the Germans invaded Russia in 1941—did the German Army ever reach Ostashkov?

Mr. C. Never in 1941.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Did they reach there subsequent to that?

Mr. C. I wasn't interested then.

Mr. PUCINSKI. As far as you know, they did not?

Mr. C. As far as I know, they weren't.

Mr. PUCINSKI. As far as you know, the German armies never occupied Ostashkov?

Mr. C. No.

Mr. PUCINSKI. As far as you know, when you left Ostashkov on April 4, 1940—

Mr. C. No; May 13, 1940.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Excuse me. As far as you know, when you left Ostashkov on May 13, 1940, there were approximately 70 more Poles remaining in that camp?

Mr. C. After my leaving the camp, about 70 people remained and came after me the next day into Pawlisczew Bor.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Witness, I think you have answered all of our questions.

Does anyone else have any questions.

Chairman MADDEN. Are there any questions?

Mr. MACIROWICZ. No questions.

Mr. DONDERO. No questions.

Chairman MADDEN. Is there anything further now?

Has anybody promised you any pay or emoluments to come here today to testify?

Mr. C. Heaven forbid.

Chairman MADDEN. Thank you for coming here today.

Mr. C. Thank you, sir.

Mr. PUCINSKI. At this time, Mr. Chairman, we will have Mr. Lankiewicz, who is the custodian of the Polish archives of documents and files relating to the various correspondence and efforts made to clear up this matter of Katyn. Mr. Lankiewicz has with him the

originals from their files and he has duly authenticated photostatic copies which he will then hand over to this committee.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL LUNKIEWICZ—Resumed

Mr. FLOOD. Colonel, you are the same Colonel Lunkiewicz who was called by the committee yesterday and sworn for the purpose of reappearing today and having in your custody and possession for the purpose of presenting to the committee certain documents of the London Polish Government; is that correct?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you now have with you such documents?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Yesterday you were requested by the committee, as far as time and circumstances would permit, to bring here with these documents a short statement in connection with each one as you proposed to introduce it; is that correct?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. A short statement about each document?

Mr. FLOOD. About each document that you intend to comment on.

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Very well. Now, what is the first document that you are prepared to present?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. May I speak generally of these documents first? All these documents were used by the Polish Investigation Committee for making a big report and an additional report. These two reports I gave yesterday to Congressman O'Konski, a big report of the Polish Government and an additional report.

Mr. FLOOD. Colonel, you are about to give us the title of certain reports prepared under the auspices and direction of the Polish London Government on the Katyn Massacre; is that correct?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. What are the official titles of those reports?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. The official title of the first report is "Facts and Documents About Polish Prisoners of War in U. S. S. R."

Mr. FLOOD. Do both reports bear the same title?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. No.

Mr. FLOOD. What is the other one?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. The other one was after we got the additional evidence in 1947, a supplementary report of facts and documents concerning the Katyn Massacre.

Mr. FLOOD. Let me have those two documents, the original report and the so-called supplement. [Reports handed.] For the purposes of this record, we will mark the supplementary report of facts and documents concerning the Katyn Massacre as exhibit 32 and the other document will be marked as exhibit 33.

Colonel, I show you exhibits Nos. 32 and 33 and ask you whether or not these are the reports to which you have just referred?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. They are to be admitted. At this time the committee would like to state on the record that all of these documents and exhibits that are being presented by the colonel at this time will be marked for identification on the record and will be admitted with the understanding that only those parts of such documentary exhibits will be printed in the official record of these hearings as this committee

at the time sees fit and proper and considers material to the investigation.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I would like to add to that. The committee considers them all material, but only those we may consider as necessary will be printed.

Mr. FLOOD. Necessary and essential.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is right.

(Reports referred to were marked "Exhibit 32" and "Exhibit 33" and will be found in a separate volume, pt. 6, of this committee's record of proceedings.)

Mr. FLOOD. What is the next document, Colonel.

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Documents produced to us for report, and now I present only some of the more important documents divided in three groups. The first group is concerning prison camps. The second is a question of discovery of the Commission of Polish Red Cross in the Kriwoserezew case. The third is the diplomat documents.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. By that you mean the exchange of diplomatic notes between Poland and Russia?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Russian minutes of talks in conferences with Stalin, Molotov, Sikorski-Stalin conference, and so on, and certain special notes about missing Polish officers. The last is only four documents, not connected with the Katyn affair. Two of the documents were asked for by Mr. Pucinski and two documents are given by me. The first is the proclamation of Timoshenko that Mr. Pucinski yesterday asked about, and the second document is an instruction on how to deport the civilian population from Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you have the original of that Timoshenko proclamation?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. No; I have not.

Mr. FLOOD. Just a copy?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. It is a photographic copy. I think the original is somewhere in London. Probably it is in the Sikorski Institute. I am not sure.

Mr. FLOOD. Is that all?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you let me have those documents in this order: First I want the document referring to the camps.

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Here is the testimony of Mr. Komarnicki. It is the best relation about Kozielsk Camp. I also have the original report of Narceys Lopianowski, who was taken by the Russians to the Villa of Bliss, where the Reds tried to convert him to Communism.

Mr. FLOOD. Let me have the entire folder dealing with the camps. As I understand it now, this exhibit deals with comments and documents and written material dealing with the camps.

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you have the stenographer mark that as Exhibit 34?

(The document referred to is an original document. It was marked "Exhibit 34" and subsequently withdrawn when exhibit 35, a photostatic copy of this document was introduced. Exhibit 34, the original, was returned to the witness.)

(Exhibit 35, English translation of the Komarnicki Report and Exhibit 35A, translation of the Lopianowski report follow:

[Translation copy of exhibit 35]

9—th Field Court Martial
 Supreme Command of
 The Armed Forces in London.

Sow: 29/43.

RECORD OF HEARING OF WITNESS

LONDON, the 21—st of May, 1943.
 Time—11 a. m.

Criminal case against: N. N.

PRESENT:

Military Judge: Cpt. Aud. Dr. KURATOWSKI ROMAN,

Recorder: u. c. BAGINSKA STEFANIA.

The witness having been cautioned and informed in accordance with art. 81 of the Military Penal Code about the responsibility for making untrue statements and after having taken oath in accordance with the 83—rd art of the M. P. C. stated as follows:

- 1/ Name and Chr. name: KOMARNICKI WACLAW,
- 2/ Date and place of birth: 29.VII.1891, WARSAW,
- 3/ Names of parents: TYTUS and JOZEFA, born SUSZYCKA,
- 4/ Religion: Rom. Cat.,
- 5/ Family status: married,
- 6/ Nationality: Polish,
- 7/ Citizenship: Polish,
- 8/ Military rank: 2—nd Lieut. of general conscription,
- 9/ Allocation: The Ministry of Justice,
- 10/ Relationship to parties concerned: no objections.

I was brought to Kozielsk with a transport of prisoners of war from the Ukraine in the beginning of November 1939. I had spent the first two months of captivity in the Sumska Oblast /district/ to the South of Kursk. I lived first in huts erected for the use of peat diggers /in Boloto near the Tiotkino railway station/ and then in the Sofrono monastery. The conditions of life were atrocious: we slept on an overcrowded floor; it was extremely cold in the huts and we were kept starving/ the only food we received was lentil soup and black bread /.

During those first two months the officers were being segregated from other ranks. The latter were removed from the camp and at least some of them found themselves back in Poland after having been handed over to the Germans. According to an account of N. K. V. D. Captain Wasilewski—which I heard from him in Griazowiec—the handing over was to have taken place in Brześć. I know of one such case which has been confirmed: a Warsaw practitioner Dr. Bauer, after having been taken from the Sofrono Monastery with a transport which left in October 1939, visited in Warsaw the wife of Zieliński [professor of the Poznań University] and is now in Palestine, after having escaped from German imprisonment.

After the other ranks had left [in groups formed according to the districts in which they had resided] the officers assembled in the Sumska District [there were 4 camps quartered in huts and one in the monastery] were directed by way of Briansk to Kozielsk.

In Kozielsk we found about a 100 other ranks left over from the inmates of the former camp which existed there. In that first camp there were allegedly many Bielo—Russians and Ukrainians who had initially adorned their breasts with red cockades which however soon vanished when disillusionment replaced their initial enthusiasm. I learned about this from the Rev. Canon Kamil Kantak, a professor of the Pińsk Seminary whom I had encountered in Kozielsk and who is now in the Carmelite Monastery in Baghdad.

Later on, other prisoners from other camps began to arrive. An unusually large transport arrived in the latter half of November from Szepietówka [Kazimierzak now in Nairobi] whose members complained of exceptionally hard conditions which had existed in that camp. In the beginning of December arrived a strongly guarded convoy counting well over a hundred persons which was placed in an isolated block of the camp, separated from the rest by barbed wire. It was allegedly composed of judges, military and civil prosecutors who had already received sentences of long term confinement in penal labour camps. From among these I recollect the name of Col. KORNIŁOWICZ. They looked awfully ill—treated and the only contact we had with them was in the latrines. In less than three weeks they were removed from our camps. If they were not sent to Ostaszów—and this was impossible in respect of those who had been already

sentenced—it is possible that some of them might be still in penal labour camps. Gen. WOLKOWICKI had a list of their names.

The Kozielsk camp was composed of two parts completely isolated one from the other. The first part was a cluster of former monastery buildings which in pre-Bolshevik times had been an Orthodox Seminary and since the revolution had been turned into a rest house named after Gorkij. [The prisoners paraphrased the name calling it "BITTER-REST HOUSE" instead of "GORKIJ'S REST-HOUSE". *Translator's note:* GORKIJ in Russian means BITTER]. The second part of the camp was the so called SKIT or "hermitage" where at one time the Bolsheviks had set up a rest house for mothers with babies.

The first part formed quite a little town surrounded by a high wall within which were 22 buildings called by the Bolsheviks "Corps", while the prisoners called them "Blocks".

Staff officers were separated from the subalterns and were concentrated:—Generals and colonels in blocks No. 7 and No. 22 while the majors were quartered in block No. 14 which stood in the nearest neighbourhood of block No. 7. An order existed of which nobody took any heed, forbidding the inhabitants of one block to pay visits to other blocks. In particular anyone visiting block No. 7 was persecuted. In block No. 15 a few rooms were reserved for civilians. The camp had a hospital fairly adequately equipped, an infirmary, a pharmacy and Turkish baths. These sanitary arrangements were under the supervision of a Georgian doctor Gelenidze whose behaviour was full of sympathy for the prisoners. Polish doctors were employed in the maintenance of health with Col. STEFANOWSKI and Col. SZARECKI, acting as senior medical officers. The hygiene of the camp was entrusted to Lieut./Col. Dr. MILLAK, the kitchen was supervised by Cpt. Dr. WROCZYŃSKI.

There was a cinema within the camp, also a club with billiard tables and a reading room with Russian and foreign books. The interiors of the blocks were crammed with board beds sometimes in four condignations and they were stuffy, dark, full of dust, dirt, bugs and lice and at no time quiet. Only the blocks 7 and 22 where the staff officers were quartered had beds.

In the "Skit" there were several small barracks and one large block in which the kitchen was placed. The whole was meant to be a garden. I only spent one night there and therefore cannot describe in detail the lay-out of the "Skit".

In the "Skit" were quartered officers who had lived in the Soviet occupied part of Poland. They were given much better food. In the main camp the food, although better than in the UKRAINE, was very insufficient. We were always hungry. The administrative staff stole rations. In March 1940 the officers from the Soviet occupied zone were transferred to the main camp and mixed with the officers from the German and Lithuanian zones.

The total number of prisoners detained in Kozielsk can be accurately estimated. Incessant lists were being compiled in the camp for various purposes [general records, food rationing, camp outfit, medical for various inoculations, etc.]. We were assured that copies of all these lists were sent to Moscow. The Soviet Government had to have an accurate record. Further to that, various posts in the camp were entrusted to the prisoners themselves such as the senior officer of the camp, block commanders, etc. These functionaries kept strict records. Basing my calculation on those various lists I can estimate the strength of the camp to be round about 5,000 [closer to 4,700].

Included in this figure were a hundred other ranks, about a hundred ensigns and some forty civilians. /POHOŃECKI—President of the Codification Commission of the Polish Republic./ The rest were all officers.

Among the officers were the following generals: MINKIEWICZ [taken prisoner from his land allotment near Breześé and therefore even without his uniform but dressed in a very shabby light brown suit with knickerbocker trousers wrappers and a cyclist cap; the poor man was so embarrassed to show himself dressed like that that he mostly remained in block No. 7 from where he issued orders as the highest ranking Polish officer in the camp]. The other generals were: BOHATYREWICZ [pensioned], WOLKOWICKI and SMORAWINSKI [very active] and Rear-Admiral CZERNICKI. The number of colonels and lieut./colonels amounted to about a hundred and there were over 300 majors.

There were a few chaplains with the Rev. Prelate WOJTYŃIAK, Deputy of the Field Bishop as their senior. Also the Rev. Prof. KANTAK, the Rev. Mjr. ZIOLKOWSKI, the Rev. Prof. NOWAK and Rev. Father SKOREZ. Occasionally the priests celebrated mass on Sundays, heard confessions and in general were very active. They were strongly persecuted by Soviet authorities. Three of them were held under arrest.

Further to the sum of military knowledge and value which the officers concentrated in Kozielsk represented, they were undoubtedly the pick and choice of the Polish intellectual elite. The most numerous were the doctors. There were quite a few university professors /PIENKOWSKI from Cracow, STRASZYNSKI and ZIELINSKI from Poznan, lecturer MISHURA from Warsaw, MORAWSKI and lecturer SIENICKI from the Warsaw Polytechnic College, KOMARNICKI, GODŁOWSKI and SWANIEWICZ from Wilno/.

There were therefore numerous lectures given daily in the camp and they covered various fields of science. They were mostly forbidden by Soviet authorities /with a few exceptions/ who, however, did not persecute us unduly about them. Mjr. SKOCZYNSKI the "Senior" officer of block No. 10 edited together with Lieut. GINSBERT a "Bulletin of the 10-th block"; some 10 numbers of it were issued but they were finally caught at it and both were punished with a few weeks of arrest.

There was also one woman prisoner in the camp. A Mrs. LEWANDOWSKA but allegedly her true name was DOWBOR-MUSNICKA.

Commissar KORALIEW was the camp commander. However, it was Brigade Commissar /Kobrig/ ZARUBIN who, till the middle of April 1940, was the head of the camp authorities. He spoke many languages /German, French, English/ and had a general Soviet standard of education. In his talks with our high-ranking officers / in particular with Col. KUNSTLER / he showed strong political sympathies for the Germans.

As 2-nd in command we had N. K. V. D. Mjr. ELMAN—an Estonian, a silent and sickly man who was, however, polite in his behaviour towards the prisoners. From mid-April he took over ZARUBIN'S post.

ZARUBIN'S A. D. C. and his right hand was N. K. V. D. Cpt. ALEKS-ANDROWICZ a busy-body individual who catered for popularity among the prisoners by distributing small favours which were of tremendous value in prison-camp life such as the sending out of letters in advance of the prescribed time, the supplying of certain books, paints etc.

Another important functionary was Lieut. DEMIDOWICZ who was the camp's Commissar. In the political field were active: a certain Cpt. WASILEWSKI, a lawyer who claimed himself to be a Pole, a rather un-interesting character, also a drug-addict Lieut. GUBAJEW, while the administration was in the hands of a Lieut. BOGDANOWICZ who also maintained that he was a Pole.

Further to these there were numerous other political and administrative functionaries.

The six months during which the Polish officers remained in the Kozielsk camp were spent on the de-coding of their political affiliation. For this purpose a numerous staff of N. K. V. D. commissars experienced in carrying out inquests interrogated the prisoners. These hearings called "doprosvy" were held night and day. They were different from normal inquests confined only to the sphere of military activities and, contrary to the latter, probed into the political and social opinions of each prisoner.

The prisoners were questioned as if they were criminals. Although, in principle, it was already a crime to be in the service of a "bourgeois Army" and to have taken part in the "world counter-revolution" against the Soviet Union, the inquests were aimed at picking out the qualified culprits such as the officers of the 2-nd Section/Intelligence Service/and those actively engaged in anti-communist activities, while the most commonly ascribed crime was the "endeavour to wrench away Bielorussia and the Ukraine from the Soviet Union". We were questioned about our whole lives in particular to what political parties we belonged to which most of us answered that we were independent and non-party. This caused consternation among the questioners who could not understand how it was possible that intelligent people were not interested in politics. In the U. S. S. R. the principle is that everything is political. They were interested in our contacts with foreign countries. At that time the attitude of the Soviet authorities was distinctly pro-German. It was Great Britain who was mostly to blame for the outbreak of the war, by having used Poland as an implement to launch an aggression against Germany. Poland was always referred to as "the late Poland", /"Poland no longer does and never will exist again"/ and the Polish Army as "the late Polish Army", against which the questioned officers protested. Sympathizers of the Bolshevik regime were also sought for among those questioned. Two photographs, one "en face" and one from the profile, were taken of every single prisoner.

As a result of these investigations certain officers were removed from the camp either individually or in groups. One of the 24-th of December 1940

/Christmas Eve/the group of chaplains left the camp/with the exception of Father ZIOLKOWSKI who was under arrest/. From among them only the Rev. Father KANTAK had been found later. He was a citizen of Gdańsk and had been in the meantime in the Ostaszków camp and in the Łubianka prison. On the 8-th of March 1940 a group of seven officers was removed. Of these only Col. LUBODZIECKI had been found alive later on. The officers were taken away to prisons, for further questioning and many of them were sentenced to corrective labour camps.

The prologue to the general evacuation was the removal of other ranks from the camp which took place in the middle of March 1940. Together with them was sent a lecturer of gynecology from the Wilno University whose name I no longer recollect. This departure was commented upon in two different ways: some said that our soldiers were being sent to work while optimists maintained that they were being sent to Poland and gave them messages to be passed on to their families. Anyhow the departure made a great impression on those remaining in the camp.

Rumors began to circulate about the liquidation of the camp which was to take place shortly. Initially the Soviet commissars talked about the breaking up of the camp into smaller units /"rozgruzenie"/, because of its overcrowding. "Its quite impossible to allow people to live in such a terrible congestion—think of what would happen if a disease broke out?"

When the regular evacuation started i. e. on the 6th of April 1940 the official comment given by the Soviet authorities was: "homeward bound". Those from under the Soviet occupied part of the country were to be sent to their respective places of residence, and the prisoners even began to worry that once they were going to lose their status of prisoners of war which after all did give them some hope of claiming rights under international law, that they would be "disposed of in no time" by local Soviet authorities. As to the prisoners whose residence was on German occupied territory, it was maintained that an agreement existed which stipulated their handing over to the Germans. When I asked cpt. ALEKSANDROWICZ where they were going to send us he answered: "Westward—closer to your families". The same ALEKSANDROWICZ was supposed to have shown to col. MISIURA a frontier station on the map where the handing over of the prisoners to the Germans was to take place and where his camera would be returned to him. Under the influence of these hints spread by the Bolsheviks an atmosphere of joyful excitement seized the inmates of the camp. People left the camp without any fears, in excellent spirits. The authorities treated them not unkindly, at the time of departure and even the herrings supplied for the journey were wrapped up in clean white paper, a most unusual thing to happen in the U. S. S. R. At the research to which those leaving were submitted and which took place in block No. 21, the functionaries carrying out the search were dressed in white aprons and they confiscated all sharp implements and occasionally letters and notebooks.

Among the first to leave were three generals: MINKIEWICZ [dressed as a civilian as described above], BOHATYREWICZ and SMORAWINSKI. Also Col. STEFANOWSKI. The Bolsheviks arranged a farewell party at which they treated them to pancakes. The generals left in a radiant mood through rows of cheering officers who ranged themselves to bid them farewell. It happened on a beautiful, sunny, spring day.

From then on transports left nearly daily in groups of up to 200 persons. Sometimes there were a few days of interval but on some days one group left in the morning and another in the afternoon. On the 27-th of April the largest transport numbering about 400 people left the camp.

The order in which the prisoners were chosen for departure was accidental. We were unable to work out a clue as to how the choice was made. What happened was that in the morning an N. C. O. came to the block and called out the names of those who were to leave which he read from a slip of paper. Various ranks, zones of occupation and places of birth were all mixed together. The Bolsheviks maintained that they received their instructions by telephone from Moscow, the prisoners—that a parrot drew the names from a hat. In that way friends were separated and only one case was given consideration when father and son were sent together.

This mixing up of the groups which left was explained by the Bolsheviks by the fact that all were being sent to transit camps in which the sorting out was going to be carried out. We still thought it to be rather odd. From the 22-nd of April departures were interrupted till the 10-th of May. The prisoners remaining in the camp were all concentrated in one corner of the camp—in block No. 10. Silence and boredom reigned in the camp. It was beautiful springtime. Of the

staff officers only Rear-Admiral CZERNICKI, with whom I lived in one room now, and Mjr. KOPEC were left. We were awfully depressed at being left behind. However one of the Bolsheviks had whispered to one of the prisoners: "Don't grumble. The later you leave the more you win".

It was only on the 10-th of May that the disbandment was resumed. A small batch of up to twenty officers left and another group went on the 11-th. Rear-Admiral CZERNICKI left with that group. On the evening of the same day barbed wire was set up around block No. 10. I felt uncommonly depressed.

The next morning at 7 a. m. we were woken up and told that we were leaving. The names of those who were to stay behind were read out. There were 9 of them.

After breakfast when everything was ready we left. I accompanied Mjr. KOPEC who led the column. We were stopped at the gates of the camp. We waited there for quite a time under the blazing sun. I started talking with Commissar DEMIDOWICZ who stood leaning against the gate. He was the one who always formed the transports. "Where are we going"—I asked. "You are going in the direction of Smoleńsk"—he answered.—"Is Smoleńsk a nice town"—I asked. "Its a large and nice city but you will not see it"—replied DEMIDOWICZ. This was in conformity with what we had been told by the Bolshevik servicemen from Kozielsk who maintained that: "Your men are sent towards Smoleńsk". The escort and the railway team were always the same and returned to the camp after each transport. "What are we waiting for"—I asked the Commissar. "We are waiting for ELMAN who is speaking on the phone with Moscow". "I would like to see him"—I said—"because he had lent me a book from the library. "The Gardemaryn", a novel about the life of Imperial Navy cadets and about the revolution in Kronstadt. ELMAN came up at last and taking DEMIDOWICZ aside talked to him for a while. A superficial search was carried out. We were loaded into lorries and left. It was a joy to drive through the open fields even though under strong escort. On the station which was about 3 km. from the camp, one stop from Kozielsk we were loaded into prison railway coaches on which the name "BABYNINO" was scribbled in chalk. After a journey which lasted over 24 hours and was made in unheard of conditions we arrived to the Babynino Station and after remaining there for a good few hours we were transferred once again into lorries. It was Whit Sunday. The heat and dust were awful. We travelled 40 kms in the trucks. We finally arrived to Pawliszew Bor and we were placed in the so-called Juchnowskij camp. We encountered there the group of officers from Kozielsk which had left on the 26-th of April. In that group were: Cols. SZARECKI, KUNSTLER, FELSZTYN, Commander ZEJMA, Lieut. GINSBERT and a number of ensigns. They were all dressed in clean underwear which had been just issued to them. The ensigns were playing net-ball.

A beautiful forest surrounded the camp but we were separated from it by barbed wire. We were led to a shower bath the only one I had ever seen in the U. S. S. R. and then assembled in a dining room where there were tables covered with tablecloths. Till now we had always eaten on our plank-beds. The food we received was in more than ample portions.

The camp was under the command of Mjr. KADISZCZEW, who was very particular about discipline and even touchy about elegance in the camp. However a few days later arrived from Kozielsk: ELMAN, ALEKSANDROWICZ and WASILEWSKI together with most of the politruks. We were rather astonished to learn that they had all followed our group. "Your comrades have gone to Germany"—they assured us—"You will follow them soon".

Soon after that a group of officers arrived from the Starobielsk camp. They were also the last group to have left that camp / CZAPSKI, CZERNY, SLIZIEN and others /. A few days later about 180 men arrived from Ostaszów. There were 3 officers among them, the rest were policemen, other ranks, civilians and a few convicts from the St. Cross prison.

We left Pawliszew Bor on June the 12-th. We travelled through Moscow where we were held up for 24 hours. On the 18-th of June we arrived to GRIAZOWIEC in the Vologda district. We found the same old team of our Kozielsk politruks already there: ALEKSANDROWICZ, ELMAN, WASILEWSKI.

The correspondence with our families, [one letter per month], had been interrupted since the end of February. [On March the 4-th KOMBRIG ZARUBIN left Kozielsk for Moscow, as it became known later on, for the purpose of discussing there the problems of our evacuation. I remember the date so well because he had arranged to interrogate me on that day promising to talk to me "three to four hours" ["Tri-czetyrie czasika"] and I was rather scared of that interview and therefore very happy when the Kombrig left for Moscow on the same

day]. In Pawliszczew Bor letters to our families were collected only once but we found later that they never were sent. Correspondence with our families was re-established only late in September 1940 from Griażowiec. However a new rule had been imposed forbidding us to write in our letters about any of our comrades. We began to receive enquiries from families of those who had left Kozielsk "to go home". We were unable to answer these enquiries but it became plain that none of the others had reached either German occupied territories or Germany proper.

As late as the last days of August, at one of the long inquests /"dopros"/, which lasted 5 hours, ELMAN promised me that "you will be sent home as have been all your comrades—your turn has come now"—but after that no mention was made about it and when late in Autumn I once asked WASILEWSKI whether we would ever be sent home he answered: "Did you ever hear about prisoners of war being released while the war lasted? It may be that you will remain to live in the Soviet Union even after the war". "What about our comrades who had been sent to the German occupied zone?"—I asked. "That is a different matter"—answered WASILEWSKI and changed the subject.

Another time he complained to me that he "a political functionary of the Smoleńsk district" was ordered to come to this Northern country for two months only and now he was kept here so long, in this rotten climate which affected his health.

And in fact we were ordered to organize the camp as if we were meant to stay in it for good. We were allotted plots of land for planting vegetables. Hitherto forbidden Polish lectures were given approval. A Russian woman was appointed organiser of our cultural and educational life. We were allotted a monthly quota of books which was fixed at 14 kilograms a month. Food had improved considerably. We were granted a monthly wage which amounted to 20 roubles for officers and 10 roubles for the other ranks. We were supposed to remain thus till the end of the war. We were released on the strength of the Agreement signed in July 1941.

Before it happened, towards the end of June 1941,—1300 more prisoners were sent to the camp among them a thousand officers treated as "internees", who had been captured in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. On the other hand officers of German nationality were removed from the camp.

The worst month of the entire captivity was July 1941. A special commission from Moscow came to the camp before which officers were summoned individually, mostly those who were of greater potential military value. Before the interview started they were requested to sign an undertaking that everything that was going to be said during the hearing would be kept strictly secret under the penalty of several years of imprisonment. After which they were coaxed to join the Red Army and threatened that all who refuse would be executed. A few officers were removed from the camp. But the general attitude of the officers remained unyielding and the exceptions were few and were confined to those who attended the so called "Red Corner gatherings." The Soviet commissars usually got the answer: "We are soldiers of the Polish Army. We have our own Supreme Commander in the person of General Sikorski. We will report to wherever he tells us to report."

The Bolsheviks cut our food rations by half. Hunger spread. The camp unrelentingly resisted to yield. The discussions with the commissars became more and more heated. On the 31-st of July, the day of the signing of the Soviet-Polish Pact the attitude of the Bolsheviks changed abruptly for the better and shortly after Polish authorities took over the control of the camp.

In answer to the appropriate questions put to him the witness replied: from among those who were removed from Kozielsk I have never seen again neither have I heard anything about:

Prof. of the Cracow University Mjr. PIENKOWSKI,

Prof. of the Wilno University Lieut. GODŁOWSKI

Prof. of the Warsaw Polytechnic School Lieut. MORAWSKI;

Generals: MINKIEWICZ, SMORAWINSKI, Rear-Adm. CZERNICKI, BOHATYREWICZ;

Clergymen: The Rev. Mjr. ZIOLKOWSKI, The Rev. Father SKOREL, The Rev. Col. NOWAK, The Rev. Col. WOSTYNIAK—Deputy Field Bishop, The Rev. Col. PESZKE, The Rev. Minister Col. KORNIŁOWICZ;

Doctors: MOGILNICKI—from Łódź, Mjr WIRSZYŁŁO—from Warsaw, Cpt. ZALEWSKI Jerzy—St. Lazarus Hospital in Warsaw, Cpt. WROCZYŃSKI—former Deputy Minister of Health, KEPINSKI—optician from Warsaw, SŁEFANOWSKI—from Warsaw, ZUBERBIER—from Warsaw, Cpt. FREIDA and KALICŃSKI—from Warsaw, ROGOZIŃSKI,—Col. NELKEN;

Also: Col. DZIURZYNSKI—brother of the Prof. of Cracow University, Lieut. WIRSZYLO—solicitor from Wilno, Col. LEWAKOWSKI—from the Geographical Institute, Col. MARYNOWSKI—from Wilno, retired Col. OLSZOWSKI—from Southern Poland, Col. LEUKOS-KOWALSKI—Commander of the Riflemen's Association, Engineer SREBRNY—brother of the prof. of Wilno University, the Deputy President of the District Court of Appeal in Wilno whose name I forget, Mjr. SKOCZYCKI, Col. ROSNOWSKI—Prof. of the Wilno University, the Custodian of the Artizans' Museum in Warsaw in the rank of a major but whose name I forget.

I cannot recollect any more names for the moment.

I wish to add that in January 1941 I was summoned to the camp Command in Griazowiec by N.K.V.D. Capt. WASILEWSKI who read to me a report sent from Wilno that ALEKSANDER ZWIERZYNSKI who lived in Wilno had allegedly stated that we had often talked before the war about the necessity of detaching Bieolorussia and the Ukraine from the Soviet Union. I denied this, following which, the statement was forwarded to Moscow, and after a few weeks the inquest against me was discontinued of which I was informed, being told at the same time that I had been put on the list of the group of officers who were to be extradited to the Germans.

Upon which the hearing ended at 11.30 a. m. and after the record had been read over it was signed.

/Signatures/.

Bagińska,

Wacław Komarnicki,
Kuratowski, Lieut. Aud.

[Translation copy of Exhibit 35A]

RECORD OF STATEMENT:

Taken down in writing on the 13-th October 1942 in the office of the II Section of the 1-st Armoured Corps Command/Dept. of Counter-Espionage/by Cpt. Giedronowicz N. and given by Cpt. Lopianowski Narycz and relating to the subject of "Malaehówka".

Cavalry Cpt. Lopianowski Narycz, born 29-th Oct. 1898 in the country estate Stoki—county of Wilno, son of Ignacy and Mary, born Woronków; Religion: Rom. Cat. Regular officer states as follows:

The outbreak of the German-Polish war found me in Augustów in the 1-st Lancers Regiment as commander of their anti-aircraft defence unit. I took active part in air battles; I was then sent, in accordance with our mobilisation plans to the 101-st Lancers Reg. which was being formed in Białystok. On the 6-th of September 1939 in fights with German airmen in the neighbourhood of Starosielec I brought down a ME109 aircraft and damaged another one. I was using then a German Ac-ac gun No. 34 which we had taken from the enemy. In the night of 6-7-th Sept. I moved together with my regiment to Wołkowysk where we were joined to the group "Wołkowysk" commanded by Gen. Przeździecki.

On the 23-th Sept. we had our first encounter with the Bolsheviks in Dziębrowo. The Soviet infantry was destroyed and the prisoners taken were shot. The tanks extricated themselves without losses. It was a cavalry charge. During the night of Sept. 21-st our units occupied Grodno after having forced the Bolsheviks out of the town. The fighting in the suburbs of Grodno lasted till noon of the 21-st Sept. On the 22-nd Sept. a battle took place in Kodziówka. The Red Army threw 40 tanks against us of which 17 remained on the battle-field and their infantry was wiped out. The entire 101-st Regiment was engaged in the fight. Our losses included Mjr. Żuchnowski—O. C. of the Regiment, two squadron commanding officers, one platoon commander. The casualties of the 2-nd Squadron which was under my command amounted to 50% of the men and 75% of the horses. In this battle I commanded a group of 2 squadrons. The O. C. of the Regiment personally led the other half of the Regiment. The day was ours. The Bolshevik casualties amounted to 800 men. In spite of all my attempts to stop them the Lancers finished off the wounded and the prisoners.

On the 23-1 of Sept. 1939 at 8 p. m. the Regiment crossed the Lithuanian frontier on orders of our Group Commander Gen. Przeździecki. When crossing over the border we had practically no ammunition left. In Lithuania we were interned in the camps of Rakiszki and Kaūwauia.

On the 11-th of June 1940 following the Soviet occupation of Lithuania we were transferred to prisoner of war camp in Kozielsk in the Ukraine. On Sept. the 9-th

1940—21 of us with Gen. Przeździecki at the top of the list were transferred to the "Butyrki" prison in Moscow. This group included among others:

- 1/. Gen Przeździecki,
- 2/. Lieut. Col. Konezye,
- 3/. Mjr. Zaorski Kazimierz,
- 4/. Mjr. /now col./ Gudakowski,
- 5/. Mjr. Stoezkowski,
- 6/. Artil. Capt. Święciecki,
- 7/. Cpt. /now mjr./ Ziobrowski,
- 8/. Cavalry Cpt. Pruszyński Andrew /Brother of Xavier/,
- 9/. Lieut. Tacik,
- 10/. Lieut. Siewierski,
- 11/. Lieut. Tomala,
- 12/. Lieut. Szumigalski.

I cannot recollect the names of the others. We were first placed in cell No. 94. After a short inquest Gen. Przeździecki together with 10 other officers were transferred to the Łubianka prison. I was interrogated,—I learned his name only later,—by the Chief of Staff of the N. K. V. D., Lieut. Col. Jegorov. He was about 40, slightly over average height, well build, light blond with a lean clean shaven face. He was elegantly dressed in a military N. K. V. D. uniform. After a short questioning about my health, morale etc. he asked me about my family, where I came from, was I married, had I any children, was I a regular officer and had I given up the idea of fighting against the Germans. The conversation lasted about 10 to 15 minutes and took place between midnight and 1 a. m. I was then sent back to the cell.

Two days later we were transferred to the Lubianka prison as mentioned above. They placed us in cell No. 62, very small and dark, with a small little electric bulb attached to the ceiling which was lit day and night. After having been put through a number of formalities such as the checking of our identity and personal details, having been photographed a number of times from all possible angles we were given a supper and were allowed to go and rest. At midnight Gen. Przeździecki was summoned for interrogation. 10 minutes later my turn came and I was called out and led in the company of a N. K. V. D. Lieut. Colonel and two guardsmen through various corridors till we came up to an iron door in the wall. This turned out to be a passage which connected directly the Lubianka prison with the N. K. V. D. Beyond the iron door we found ourselves in a wide corridor with coconut mats on the floor. At the far end of the corridor was a board with "IV floor—main entrance" written on it and a marble plate with the following inscription:—"Member of the N. K. V. D.—take example from the Chekists of how to destroy the people's enemies". Beneath were inscribed the names of those who had given their lives in the fight for "freedom". As first figured the name of "Felix Dzierżyński" inscribed in guilt letters. After passing several more corridors and staircases we stopped before a door numbered 523. The N. K. V. D. Lieut. Colonel who accompanied me took off his cap before that door and tried to peep through the key-hole. He then opened the door and went in leaving me behind. A moment later he summoned me to enter; I found myself in a very large room with walls covered with grey tapestries and luxurious office furniture. To the right, very close to the entrance I noticed an ash-wood cupboard of abnormal height. That cupboard caught your eye against the background of the grey tapestries. Upon the words: "go ahead" which a female clerk present in the room uttered the N. K. V. D. colonel opened the cupboard with a little key and disappeared behind the door. My two guards ordered me to stand with my face to the wall. After some time a voice invited me to enter the cupboard. I went in, found myself before a door and a dark red curtain. I waved it aside and entered another room. The Soviet Lieut. Colonel remained in the neighbouring room behind me. Before me I saw JEGOROV sitting in an armchair behind a desk. To his left stood a man in civilian clothes with a blank expression on his face. Another man dressed in a grey civilian suit was pacing the room in quick unsoldierly steps with his hands behind his back. /Four months later I saw these two men on a photograph and learned that the man with the blank face was Mereulov—a Security Commissar and the other one was Berja the N. K. V. D. Commissar. On Jegorov's request I sat down in an armchair which stood before the desk. After preliminary questions about my health etc. he asked me why we were overcome so swiftly by the Germans in 1939. I answered that we succumbed not to the Germans alone but also to the Bolsheviks who thrust a knife into our backs. Did I fight against the Bolsheviks in 1939?—Yes.—"Where"?—I did not give an answer to that and told them that being an officer I am not allowed to answer that question. They did not raise this matter again.

"What do you think about the present situation?"—I answered that nothing had changed and that Poland was in a state of war with the Bolsheviks—"Where do you know this from?"—I replied that Sikorski's Government issued a declaration to that effect in October 1939. To which Jegorov said—"The Sikorski Government is an impostrous Government which has nothing to say in Polish matters. The Polish Nation will form its own Government". He then asked—"And how do you like the Soviet system introduced on the Soviet occupied territories?"—I answered that I can understand their behaviour in respect of the soldiers and men who were capable of fighting against the Bolsheviks but what was the offence committed against them by the innocent children and unhappy women to cause them to be deported to Siberia and to the North in order that they may perish there from hunger and cold. Col. Jegorov answered that we should be grateful to them because our women and children were taken away in order to save them from the vengeance of the local inhabitants.

Merkulov asked me only one question—"Why are you so stupid—you are a brave officer and yet you are incapable of understanding "the great issues".—

Upon which ended the inquest on the first day. Having returned to our cell I related to Gen. Przeździecki and my other comrades what I was asked about and in what form. Gen. Przeździecki informed us that the questions put to him were similar with the difference that he was also asked on what conditions would he agree to organise Polish units in the U. S. S. R. The General had answered that if he receives an order to that effect from London he would execute it.

I would like to mention additionally that I was also asked by Jegorov whether I would agree to co-operate in the organising of a Polish Army on U. S. S. R. territory. I answered that being an officer I would always do it on orders from my Commander-in-Chief. I heard sarcastic laughter and the next question was:—"And would you do it on receiving such orders from any particular general?"—I answered that I would comply with the orders of any man duly authorised by the Government in London.

Similar inquests were repeated frequently and lasted till the second half of December 1940. All the interrogations were conducted in more or less the same manner.

In November the question of my wife and of my two children,—aged 3 and 6, was raised. When to a question put to me by Col. Jegorov I replied that my wife was in Warsaw, I was told that was "a mockery on my part". My wife together with my children was in the hands of the N. K. V. D. for 6 months and had escaped to Warsaw with the help of my soldiers in May 1940/. Two weeks later I was summoned up once again and I was allowed to write a letter to my wife to Warsaw. At that occasion Col. Jegorov told me that my wife had in fact "disappeared somewhere" and that what I had said was true and that he only wanted me to inform him by what means did my wife manage to escape. I answered that I was most grateful to the N. K. V. D. authorities for helping my wife to escape because I could not believe that a helpless woman with a couple of babies could have possibly escaped otherwise onto the German side having to go through a couple of rows of barbed wire and through trenches. Round about the 20-th of December 1940. Gen. Przeździecki renewed his request—made I do not know how many times already before—that we be given a larger cell because in the small one we were kept in, the eleven of us literally suffocated. After a major row the General was led to the Chief of Staff of the N. K. V. D. from where he came back with an assurance that we were going to be given better accommodation.

And in fact on the 24-th of December the General together with 5 other officers were removed from the cell. Those who remained were: Cpt. Lopianowski, Lieut. Siewierski, Lieut. Szumigalski, Lieut. Tomala and Lieut. Tacik. That evening we wished one another a happy Christmas. About 8 p. m. the door was suddenly opened and a man dressed in the uniform of a Polish colonel entered the cell. He was accompanied by a man in civilian clothes. The colonel gave his name as—Gorczyński. The civilian introduced himself as Staff Col. Berling. Both were without caps and coats. After short greetings Col. Berling tried to engage us into conversation solely on political topics. Not inclined to talk to strangers we answered very reluctantly. In the meantime, on Col. Berling's request a supper for two was brought to the cell from a restaurant. Col. Berling invited us to have also a supper which could be brought on his orders from a restaurant. This deepened even more our suspicions that these were not prisoners like we were but men sent to us for some special reasons. The more so that Col. Berling was unable to explain to us why were they looking so well if they were

kept in jail. Lieut. Tacik who could not resist from being dragged into the discussion, very vehemently protested against accusations which Col. Berling raised against Poland and the Polish Nation. That visit lasted about two hours. When Col. Berling knocked on the door of the cell it was opened and our guests left, assuring us, that we would meet again on the following day. The next day on the 25-th of December I was summoned for the first time in the morning hours to a hearing. Col. Jegorov handed to me a letter from my wife. Although the letter was sealed, when taking it from the Colonel I noticed a Russian translation of it. I had to read the letter in the presence of Col. Jegorov and some other individual who sat in an armchair in the shadow in such a way that I could not recognise his face. I, on the other hand, had been placed in the only armchair opposite the desk of Jegorov with my face turned towards the light. /Room No. 507/. Col. Jegorov suddenly asked me casually:—"Why did you fight in 1939 against the Red Army?"—I replied that I am an officer, that I was in command of the detachment and it was my duty. The Colonel told me then in a brutal form that—"In that battle several excellent Soviet soldiers were killed and how did you dare to do it and to incite your lanciers to fight against the Bolsheviks?"—He wanted me to tell him what methods I had used to force my soldiers to fight with such determination. I answered that they were Polish soldiers who fought in the performance of their duty and in defence of their honour. The individual who sat in the armchair turned to Jegorov and said in a quiet voice:—"Leave him alone, he only did his duty".

After I had returned to the cell we received orders to eat quickly our dinner and prepare ourselves for departure. About 2 p. m. on the same day a Lieut. Colonel whom I had already met before / the one who had conducted the preliminary interrogations came to our cell and bid us to follow him. We went after him and we were not even astonished that we were not accompanied by guards. Downstairs in a closed courtyard passenger cars awaited us. We got into one of them together with the Lieut. Colonel. Our things were shoved into the second car. We drove alongside the river Moskwa and our guide pointed to us the bridges built across the river the theatre and, in the distance, the Kremlin. I could not make out in what direction we were driving. Only after about 30 km. we passed a bridge over a railway track and on a crossroad I saw a road-sign which informed that our road led to Riazan'. After having covered about 40 km. counting from Łubianka we turned into a forest lane from which the snow was cleared. We arrived to a fence. The gate was opened by a Soviet soldier. The car stopped before a villa. A group of men came out to greet us. They were unequally dressed—some in Polish officers' uniforms, some in civilian clothes others in a combination of both. I recognised among them Col. Gorczyński. Col. Berling greeted us as if we were expected guests and led us into a dining room for tea. After that he showed us our bedroom which had seven beds. In this room further to our group lived ensign Kukuliński and Lieut. Szczypiórski who was to join us later.

A short characteristic of the villa: it was modern with central heating and a bathroom with constant hot and cold water. The house had 7 rooms and a kitchen. One of the rooms was used as a dining room and in it lectures and talks took also place. The furnishing of the bedrooms seemed to me then to be luxurious. Spring beds with mattresses, quilted bed covers, feather pillows, divans and even soft armchairs. The service was female—two young chambermaids, a woman cook with aristocratic features and a male cook called Fomicz / from the Kremlin /, a footman to polish the floors and chop the wood and a few Soviet soldiers. The rules were: freedom of movement within the enclosure was unrestricted from 8 a. m. till 9 p. m. During the night we were forbidden to leave the house under the pretext that there were vicious hounds which could do us harm. One evening I decided to go out to find out whether that was true and all I discovered was a Soviet soldier sitting on wires which were drawn across between the two doors. He was fast asleep with his face turned towards our entrance door.

On the 31-st of December 1940 Col. Jegorov arrived and asked Col. Berling to pass on to us all his best New Year wishes. He also declared that in accordance with Polish customs he wished to arrange for us a New Year's party. The details were fixed between Jegorov and Berling. We were not allowed to enter the dining room till 11 p. m. At 11 p. m. Berling invited us to come in and we found the tables covered with white table-cloths and laden with cold meat, fresh fruit, brandy, red and white wine. . . . Waitresses attended. After completing all preparations the servants were offered a glass of brandy and then left the house.

At midnight the "International" was played on the radio. With a few exceptions the Polish officers stood to attention. The first to do so was Col. Tyszyński.

When the tones of the "International" had died out, Lieut. Szczypiorski raised the toast: "Long live the Communist Party!"—I crushed the glass I held in my hand and left the dining room. The officers who had arrived with me followed me out. Next day, early in the morning Col. Berling had a long / and hour and a half / speech to us in which he tried to smooth out the incident. He explained that those were Communist excesses, that he himself was not and never would be a Communist but that there were many things which we should understand and which we were most surely going to understand after we had stayed here long enough. This lecture was given to us in our bedroom. None of the occupants of the villa who had been there before our arrival was present.

After the 15-th of February 1941, Col. Berling suggested that we ask the Soviet authorities to send us portraits of the leading men who ruled the Soviet Union with the purpose of hanging them on the walls of our villa. I looked at him like I would at a madman and declared that it was impossible that he, a Polish officer held in prison could ask his enemies for such a thing. Cpt. Rosen-Zawadzki turned to me and asked:—"What do you mean by that? You are no longer in prison".—I answered that whether in the Butyrki prison, in the Lubianka jail or here in this villa I was always a prisoner. Maybe only in slightly better conditions here. In a resigned tone Cpt. Rosen remarked:—"Oh well—in that case it is hopeless to talk to you about it". Col. Berling announced that we were going to vote to decide this question and did not allow us to discuss the matter. The voting was to take place in the following manner: Each of us would go to Col. Berling's room and place a little card on a plate lying on the table in the presence of Col. Bukojemski. On the card we were to write the symbol of plus for "yes" and of minus for "no". The card was to be folded. On Berling's request I took a card lying on the table and with a sharp pencil I drew a line across it making a hole in it. It was supposed to be a "minus". Without folding up the card I put it on the plate. I thought that the secret voting would reveal a majority which understood that to make such a request was a disgrace not only on the part of an officer but of every Pole. I thought that the four officers who had arrived with me would vote against the motion and also that ensign Kukuliński would do the same. I also counted partly on Mjr. Lis, Col. Gorczyński and on one or two others. After the counting of the votes by Col. Berling and Col. Bukojemski it turned that out there were 12 votes supporting the proposal, 2 were against and one card was blank. I learned later that the other card against was cast by Mjr. Lis and the blank one by ensign Kukuliński. All the others voted in favour. The portraits were hung on the walls. When hanging the portrait of Kaganowicz over my bed Col. Berling remarked sarcastically:—"I hope that this won't cause you to have cramps, captain" I replied that it was of no significance whatever to me and that if he wished he could paste the entire walls of the villa with such portraits once it had already happened that a Polish officer had sent such a disgraceful request to the Soviet authorities.

In the second half of March 1941 Col. Berling requested all officers who had assembled for dinner that they lend their support to the proposal of sending a declaration which had been drafted by Lieut. Col. Dudziński and which ran more or less as follows: "We, the undersigned officers of the Polish Army declare that the Polish Nation had been hitherto deceived and exploited by the proprietor's class. It was only the Soviet Union which had pointed out the right way by means of which happiness could be brought to all men".—The declaration ended with the sentence:—"A great part of the Polish Nation has already benefited from the Staliniist Constitution. Let us hope that the time will come as soon as possible in which the remainder of Poland will also join and become one of the happy nations of the Soviet Union".—I quote only a short synopsis of the text of this declaration not being able to reconstruct it in full from memory. The quoted passages modestly reflect what it contained and anyhow do not change its character of a declaration of homage and servile submission.

Col. Berling told us that this was Col. Dudziński's suggestion, his proposal and his draft and that we should immediately proceed with the voting as to whether to send this declaration or not. Remembering the sad experience in the matter of portraits I tried to prevent the voting. I clutched frantically with my hands at a great wrought iron vase / probably originating from some aristocratic residence / and did my best not to hurl it at Berling's head. I requested that the voting be abandoned anyhow for the time being. Berling asked:—"Why should we?"—2-nd Lieut. Imach noticed that I was on the brink of bursting out and asked me whether I was ill.—"Not I!"—I retorted—"probably all of you, gentlemen, must be ill".—Anyhow Lieut. Imach supported by suggestion arguing that this was indeed a most important problem and that it would be advisable to wait

a few hours with the voting. Col. Berling agreed and left the dining room. I followed him to his room and asked him to be allowed to talk to him. I then said:—"Do you really intend to permit this voting to take place?"—He answered in the affirmative. I tried to persuade him that nothing worse could happen after that, that it was bad enough that such an idea could have ever been conceived, that it would have been better to disregard it completely since the very thought of such a thing was disgraceful to any Polish officer. Col. Berling tried to convince me that the signing and sending of such a letter would increase the confidence the Soviet authorities had in us which was the most important thing from our point of view. I replied that it was beyond me why we should strive for gaining the confidence of people who had done us so much wrong and with whom we were in a state of war. Col. Berling burst into a rage and exclaimed that I was incapable of understanding "the great issues" and requested me to tell him I really had against the signing of that kind of a slip of paper. I told him that I did not want to have anything to do with the henchmen of the Polish Nation and I have no intention of gaining their confidence. Col. Berling angrily, told me that he did not believe that those were my true motives for refusing to sign that paper and that he wants to know the truth as to what were the aims I really had in mind in acting as I did. To which I answered that for the offense contained in his words he should pay me with his blood.—Not being able to act in the customary way I declared that I had nothing else to do but to leave the room asking him to request immediately the Soviet authorities that I be removed from this place. I then left the room. I had a nervous breakdown that evening—my temperature jumped up to 104°. On the same evening the voting over Dudziński's proposal took place. Before the voting started Col. Berling explained that Col. Gorczyński and Capt. Lopianowski would not take part in it—the first because he was afraid of the repressions which the German authorities might apply to his family which was under German occupation—the second because of his lack of confidence in the Soviet Union.

I must add here that Col. Gorczyński had declared already earlier that he would not take part in the voting for the given reasons. The voting took place and the proposal was approved unanimously. I remained two days in bed with a high temperature. On the second day /it was Sunday/ I went out of the house before 8 a. m. to take a breath of air. Mjr. Lis noticed me and came up to me. He told me that I had done very well in condemning the action of Berling and of the other officers, that he fully agreed with me and that he would not sign that declaration. Before noon on the same day the declaration was signed by all—including Mjr. Lis.

Col. Berling, Cpt. Zawadzki and Col. Bukojemski came several times to my bedside urging me to change my mind and to sign the declaration. Those sleeping with me in the same room also begged me to sign it, arguing that being the eldest of our group if I left them they would be unable to counteract the reactionary behaviour of the other inhabitants of the villa who had been in it longer than we had. While I was in bed Col. Berling paid me a visit together with Cpt. Zawadzki on the 24-th of March 1941 for the last time. They tried to prove to me that it was my duty to comply; they spread before me mirages of a glorious future in which I appeared as commander of a regiment stationed in Warsaw; that I would spend my leave in the sunny Caucasus and indulge to my heart's content in my hobby of hunting. Determined to end once and for all similar conversations I begged Col. Berling to grant me the greatest of favours, namely to persuade the Soviet authorities that they shoot me on the steps of the villa in the hope that this would bring them all back to their senses. Berling answered:—"Well,—in that case,—there is nothing more to be done". That was our last interview. That declaration was never sent in its original wording because it was censured by our "three communists"/Cpt. Zawadzki, 2-nd Lieut. Imach and 2-nd Lieut. Szczypiorski/who decided that the Soviet authorities might feel insulted by the phrase—"we the undersigned officers of the Polish Army"—and that this should be changed into—"we the undersigned officers of the LATE Polish Army". The amendment was approved but the declaration had to be re-written. This was done by Lieut. Szumigalski. Three officers did not sign this new copy of the declaration, namely: Col. Gorczyński, Cpt. Lopianowski and Mjr. Lis. Initially Lieut. Siewierski also refused to sign it but by some means which I cannot understand they finally induced him to do it. The declaration was handed to Col. Jegorov who after consulting with Col. Berling summoned us all to the dining room and made the following declaration:

"Some of you accuse the Soviet Union that it treats badly your women and children who have been deported. I, therefore, officially declare that all Polish

families live in very good conditions, that every family has its own room and larger families have even two. Does that satisfy you?

The last question was aimed at me. I replied that I did not believe it.

On the 26-th of March at noon a car drove up to the villa. Mjr. Lis and I received the order to take seats in the car side by side with the guards. We were driven to the N. K. V. D. and led once again into room No. 523 through the cupboard door which we already knew. Col. Jegorov who was sitting behind his desk ordered the two guardsmen to leave the room. He then started telling us in a raised voice that we were ungrateful, that we were incapable of appreciating the goodness of the Soviet Government. He turned to me:—"You, Lopianowski, who are you? You so brave an officer, so martial. . . . Your name could be inscribed one day in historical annals. And now you want to be more clever and more worthy than Berling or Wanda Wasilewska".—I told him that I was only an officer. Col. Jegorov went on talking on this subject for a long time. I did not give any answers, which ended in his saying:—"You do not say anything. Take care that you are not silenced for ever".—I said then:—"I renew my plea—which was—shoot me. . . ." Col. Jegorov turned then with a few words to Mjr. Lis, repeating once again that we were ungrateful. He ended up by getting up from his seat and, standing to attention, he informed us that by order of the Supreme Commissar we would be placed in the Butyrki prison. He then rang the bell for two wardens who drove us to the Butyrki prison, where we were placed in cell No. 95. There we encountered Col. Künstler Stanislas, Col. Morawski /retired/ and Lieut. Tacik whom I greeted with the greatest joy as the only person whom I knew. I immediately related to all present—especially to Col. Künstler—the whole story of the "Malachówka" villa. I was afraid that Col. Künstler would not believe me but it turned out to be the opposite and he did all he could to help me in regaining my mental balance. I owe it to him that my state swiftly improved. I only avoided Col. Morawski, of whom I had heard, while still in the villa, that he had sent a memorandum to the Soviet authorities about the formation of a Polish Government and of Polish red rifle-men's units under his command.

On the 28th of March 1941 at 3 p. m. I was summoned to a hearing. Leaving the cold and damp cell I found myself in a warm corridor and then I was shoved through an iron door into a large hall in which a large number of women walked to and fro smoking eigarettes. I crossed the hall to the opposite side. I was told to stand with my face to the wall. The wall in this place subsided and I was pushed into a round chamber which had the shape of a well of about 3 and a half yards in diameter which had an oval shaped cupola instead of a ceiling. The walls were of a steel-like colour, the light coming through from the middle of the well allowing to discern the contents. The light was of a greenish shade. In the middle of the well stood an antique chair. On closer inspection I noticed that the back of the chair must have been frequently used because the paint was worn out in places. I tried to move the chair. It was light and was not fixed to the floor. However I hesitated whether I should sit down or not. After some time I felt a drowsiness overcoming me as a result of the warmth. I sat on the chair and fell asleep. A voice woke me up. I opened my eyes and saw an opened door before me with a curtain hanging over it and again I heard the voice beckoning me to enter. I went through the door and found myself in a large room. From behind a desk an N. K. V. D. captain rose to greet me and asked me about my health. I refused to shake his outstretched hand. He asked me to take a seat in an armchair by the desk. After a long conversation with no particular point or aim he explained that he was Col. Jegorov's emissary and asked me whether I had not changed my mind and if I would not like him to communicate something to Jegorov on my behalf. I told him that everything I had to say—I had said already long ago, and that I had nothing to add. He repeated his question three times intermixing the whole with casual and polite conversation. When at the third time I answered asking him to thank Jegorov for his friendly concern the captain rose from his seat came up to me and with an outstretched hand said:—"What a pity, what a pity—you are an honest man". This time I did shake his hand and left. It was my last interview with a representative of the N. K. V. D.

I wish to mention that in the middle of February one day Mjr. Lis condemned in very harsh words the fact of the disappearance of Poland from the Soviet map / a new edition /, which simultaneously retained however Abissinia in its original frontiers. I had myself pointed this out to Mjr. Lis. Col. Berling reacted violently to this remark made by Lis, shouting:—"Damn you, Lis, shut up!"—A stormy interview followed in Berling's private room.

On the 1-st of April 1941 we received orders to make ready for departure. From 6 a. m. a survey and searches were carried out. In the afternoon we were transferred into a large waiting room. The door suddenly opened and I saw Gen. Przeździecki entering followed by the other officers whom I had left in cell No. 91 of the Butyrki prison. After short greetings and yet another search we were all loaded into prison vans and driven to the station where we were transferred into a railway prison coach. The train took us to a station called Putywel. After unloading we were driven in lorries to an isolated camp in a former orthodox monastery. I do not know the name of that monastery. It is situated over the river Sejim close to the railway station Wezha in the Ukraine. We regained our strength there because the conditions were not bad and we were allowed to make the most of the fresh air during daylight of course within the limits of the enclosure surrounded with barbed wire and guarded by soldiers.

On the 15-th of June 1941 we were loaded once again into prison railway trucks on the Putywel station and sent through Moscow to the station of Giazowiec near Wologda. On our way we observed war preparations and rejoiced that probably the long expected war would break out at last in the near future.

On the 22-nd of June 1941, after crossing the Volga we were standing on a small railway station. Through the barred window Gen. Przeździecki overheard a railway worker telling his comrade that the Germans had attacked Russia, that Lomza and Kolno were taken and that Leningrad and Sebastopol had been bombed. It was 10 a. m. There were no limits to our joy. We raised such a noise in the wagon that our guardsmen rushed up to us together with the commander of the convoy who arrived coatless—shouting:—"What's all that?—a revolt?" Being the nearest to him I answered:—"We are expressing our joy. Hitler has caught Stalin by the throat. There's a WAR!"—He told me I had gone crazy. In the meantime a crowd of workers began to gather. I pointed with my hand to them. The convoy commander ran off to them still without his jacket. When he returned we no longer saw the guardsmen around us. They just stood quietly by the door. Instead of the usual salted fish we were given sausages. In the afternoon of the same day we reached the station of Giazowiec. An N.K.V.D. Lieut. Col. awaited us there accompanied by a woman doctor. His first words were:—"Is the General among you?" We answered:—"yes"; The colonel said he wanted to speak to the general. The general answered:—"If the colonel wants to speak to me let him come to me". The colonel's first questions were—how did we feel, was our health good, had we any wishes? He very much apologised for not being able to give us all the comfort he would wish but he had been only just informed about our arrival. The cars would be there any moment; having got out of the railway coach we mounted onto two motor lorries and accompanied by a strong convoy we were taken to a prisoners camp also called Giazowiec.

We were placed in an enclosure surrounded with barbed wire adjoining the camp. A little house stood in the middle of our enclosure. The space to walk was 8 steps wide and just the length of the little house. Water, food and fuel wood was supplied to us by the Bolsheviks. We had to cook our own food.

On the 30-th of July 1941 we were at last let into the main prisoners camp.

On August the 27-th 1941 Gen. Anders arrived together with Gen. Szyszko-Bohusz and took command of the camp. All officers and other ranks who expressed their wish to serve in the Polish Army were immediately and automatically reinstated as members of the newly formed Polish Forces. On the same day I was summoned to General Anders to report about everything which had taken place in the Malachówka villa. Gen. Anders had already heard about the villa from Gen. Przeździecki who had told him about it. I had related to Gen. Przeździecki everything in detail on the very first day of our encounter which I had thought to be accidental. I did that because I was very much determined not to let the memory of that villa disappear together with me. As a subordinate of Gen. Przeździecki it was my duty to give him all the details. Gen. Anders told me that he acknowledged having received all the information I gave him but that at the present moment the political situation was of such a nature that he must enroll any available men for the formation of the Army, and that he orders me, therefore, not to raise this matter any more. Complying with his wish I had not spoken of it to anyone. However, having left the U. S. S. R. I no longer feel compelled to remain silent.

On September the 7-th 1941, I joined the 5-th Infantry Division. I was appointed to the Divisional Staff. I took with me Lieut. Chomiński whom I placed in the capacity of chief of the operational section. I reported to Col. Grobicki the 2-nd-in-Command of the 5-th Division. While I was giving my report Col.

Berling appeared on the scene. It caused quite a little consternation. After Col. Berling had left, Col. Grobicki took me to his room and asked:—"Have you met Col. Berling anywhere before?"—I answered with a question:—"On what grounds do you assume that I had met him at all?"—Col. Grobicki then told me that he cannot recollect ever seeing a man with such a terrified expression as that with which Col. Berling stared at me while I was talking with the 2-nd-in-Command, with my back to the door. I then said that I had in fact met Col. Berling quite frequently in Moscow and that I have rather painful recollections of those encounters. Two days later I was removed from the Staff of the Division. That day I spent the night on the verandah together with Lieut. Chomiński. The windows of Col. Berling's room showed onto that verandah. We were preparing to lie down to rest. Through the opened window we could see that Col. Berling was already in bed. Suddenly the door of his room opened and the O. C. of the 5-th Division—Gen. Boruta—Spiechowicz entered and gave him some orders or made some remarks which must have been very much to the dislike of his Chief of Staff, because when the General left the room and the door closed behind him we saw Col. Berling sitting on his bed shaking his clenched fists in the direction in which the General had gone. Lieut. Chomiński turned to me with an expression of awe on his face:—"Well, Captain, are we supposed to go into action with such a man who is capable of shaking his fists at his own Division Commander?"—I told him not to worry because as I knew all about it he, therefore, had no obligation to report it to anyone. Cpt. Wilezowski the Chief of the Intelligence Section of the 5-th Inf. Div. knows about this incident.

On the 9th of September 1941, I met Lieut. Imach. He came up to me and said:—"Well, Captain, what did you gain by it all? There we are together in the Polish Army—do not think, however, that we have given up our work". I told him:—"If you want to speak to me, first of all stand to attention and stop waving your hands before my face, after which I may answer you".—Imach complied with my orders. I then told him:—"Do you imagine that any State in the world will allow anarchists to rule it? The Polish Nation will have gallows for such men".—2-nd. Lieut. Imach answered:—"Maybe the Nation will have gallows".—I never talked to him again.

In the middle of September I met for the first time with Captain Rosen-Zawadzki who told me:—"You see . . . we are together again. The Republic in her Majesty has granted us pardon. We shall work together again. Was it worth kicking up all that row? Nobody would have known about it, anyhow".—I do not remember what I answered him then.

Towards the end of October Mjr. Choroszewski came to me to tell me that I had a great friend in the person of the Chief of Staff,—Col. Berling. I asked him why. Mjr. Choroszewski told me that the question of the promotion of captains to the rank of major and higher ranks had been discussed and that Col. Berling had immediately suggested my name for promotion. Mjr. Choroszewski added that he was sorry to have been forestalled in proposing it. I told him that if my promotion was to be granted with the help of Col. Berling I thank for the favour but I do not wish to receive it from his hands. Mjr. Choroszewski remarked:—"You are a queer man. It will be much more difficult to get that promotion in Poland. You will have to pass the Staff School in Rembertow etc."—I answered:—"I know that, but nevertheless I cannot accept anything from the hands of Col. Berling".

On the 6-th of November 1941, Col. Grobicki, Lieut. Col. Bukojemski, 2-nd Lieut. Szymanowski Korwin, Cpt. Lopianowski and one more officer were ordered to leave as the nucleus of a new Infantry Division which was to be formed in Tashkent. We reported at the Army H. Q. in Buzuluk on the 14-th of November 1941, where we had to wait for our order of travel to the appointed district. We left only on the 13-th January 1942. In the Staff of our Army I encountered Col. Korezyński and Lieut. Col. Tyszyński who greeted me as if I was an old friend. During our stay in Buzuluk Col. Bukojemski tried to discredit me in which he partly succeeded. My former comrades and friends began to avoid me. Wherever I arrived I found myself to be alone. Initially I could not understand what was going on. It was only after one of the Intelligence officers asked me whether I had ever been stationed together with Col. Bukojemski that it dawned upon me what was the reason of my increasing solitude. Watching closely the development of things I soon had proof that I was right in my suspicion as to Bukojemski's endeavours to isolate me. This discovery was a severe shock to me. I turned for help to initiated people i. e. to General Przeździecki and Col. Künstler but there was no way out of it. I got so unstrung nervously that on the 6-th of January 1942, during some presentation in the reception hall of

our Staff, I lost consciousness and had to be carried out of the room. However, the watching of Col. Bukojemski led to unexpected results. It was proved that he purposefully acted so as to cause harm to our Army. A girl friend of Bukojemski/Col. Künstler knows her name/repeated his words: "What a marionette Army this is! It must fall to pieces. It is only we—the Communists—who can form a strong army. Here there is nothing but chaos in this Staff of ours! What a pleasure it is to go to the airmen's mess. There's everything there, everything can be got and its always open to me".

On the 13-th January 1942 I left with the nucleus of the 8-th Infantry Division, under the command of Gen. Rakowski, to the place assigned for the formation of the new divisions.

In May 1942 I was summoned to the II Section/Intelligence/to Teheran by Cpt. Zumpft and requested to make a detailed statement about the whole matter. This statement was required for the purpose of sending it to London. I wrote it out in my own handwriting on 16 sheets of office paper. At that occasion Cpt. Zumpft informed me that Col. Bukojemski had been sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment for his activities in Buzuluk which was equivalent with degradation. He was handed over to the Soviet authorities as a German spy.

Twice during my stay with the 5-th Infantry Division in Tatisbehev my belongings were searched in the tent—I do not know by whom and who could possibly have done it. The second time the search was carried out while I was out taking part in a hunt which we had organized with Mjr. Choroszewski.

CHARACTERISTICS OF ALL THE PERSONS WHO HAD BEEN INMATES OF THE MALACHÓWKA VILLA AND OF SOME OTHERS WHO ARE MENTIONED IN THIS RECORD

VILLA MALACHÓWKA:

1/. Lieut. Col. BERLING:

A man with excessive personal ambition. Talented, enterprising, absolutely without any scruples. Would sacrifice anything to satisfy his own whims. In his plans worked out jointly with Cpt. Zawadzki he included the deportation of the entire Polish intelligentsia into the depths of the Soviet Union together with women and children. This referred to the part of Poland under German occupation, which was to be incorporated into the U. S. S. R. as the 17-th Union Republic. He might be used to a useful purpose if given the illusion of absolute independence, otherwise his brutality and ruthlessness would not allow him to be directed by anyone.

2/. Lieut. Col. GORCZYNSKI:

A man of indisputable honesty with a weak will and aiming at saving himself for the sake of his own family. Could work usefully under normal conditions. He did not sign the "declaration of homage".

3/. Lieut. Col. BUKOJEMSKI:

Of vehement and uncontrollable temper would sacrifice everything for women and vodka. Apart from that courageous, obstinate, capable of anything, vindictive. He told me in Buzuluk: — "I hold no grudge against you. You came to us as our enemy from the start. And you remained as such till the end. But as for Mjr. Lis, he sneaked into our confidence as Berling's comrade and then followed you. When I shall leave the U. S. S. R. I will shoot him. You remain silent now while he spreads around untrue rumours. I repeat my positive intention of shooting him the moment we find ourselves abroad" — He repeated this threat several times. The Chief of the II Section / Intelligence / of the Polish Army in the U. S. S. R. knows about it.

4/. Lieut. Col. TYSZYNSKI:

A talented, intelligent man capable of thorough work. Heedful of his own comfort to exaggeration. Scared out of his wits at the prospect of changing his prosperous existence for the wretchedness of prison life. A Pole only by name.

NOTE:

These four officers constituted the Committee appointed by the N. K. V. D. authorities for the purpose of regulating the inner mode of life of the Malachówka collective. Col. Berling presided over the whole.

5/. *Mjr. LIS:*

Shrewd, agile and nervous, curious and eager to know everything—appeared to me rather an enigmatic figure. I was rather suspicious of his behaviour because when alone in our room, he used to hold patriotic speeches but the moment all the other officers were present he became another man. He put his signature to the first draft of the declaration in spite assuring us that he would not do it. He did not sign the revised text and he followed me. He compiled a detailed essay about the population of the U. S. S. R., based on Soviet sources and containing the distribution of the Union's population according to nationality and the development of the Soviet industry in particular of the heavy industry. His essay exists in spite of the searches.

6/. *Lieut. Col. DUDZINSKI:*

A limited intellect with tremendous self-assurance; followed blindly Col. Berling's indications and used by the latter whenever he required someone to play the role of an initiator of some action. Courageous and capable of anything, he uncompromisingly maintained the necessity of getting rid of the entire Polish educated class from the future 17th Union Republic.

7/. *Cpt. ROSEN-ZAWADZKI:*

A man of indisputable talent consciously heading to his chosen goal. He played the part of Berling's "Chief of Staff". On his initiative were held various lectures on communist topics which glorified the ideology of Leninism and Marxism and the Stalinist Constitution. Knowing that I had fought against the Bolsheviks in 1939 he quoted his own example of how as a battalion commander he rode over to the Bolsheviks to report to them that his soldiers were not going to fire at the Red Army. Together with 2nd Lieut. Imach, 2nd Lieut. Szezypiorski and later on also with 2nd Lieut. Wicherkieicz they formed the communist intellectual team which decided what can and what cannot be done or what should or should not be done in accordance with the teachings of Engels and Marx. They constantly lectured on communist topics and advised all others to know at least as much as they did about communism.

8/. *2nd Lieut. WICHERKIEWICZ:*

A man incapable of having an idea of his own, of limited intelligence and with an unhealthy mania of equalling his three "communist" comrades. He once had a very long lecture about the origins of the family. The lecture would have served as a welcome contribution to the most pornographic gutter paper.

9/. *Lieut. SIEWIERSKI:*

A courageous young man rather of an impetuous character greatly concerned with his personal comfort. He constantly maintained that when back in Poland at the head of his battalion he would instantly run away from the Bolsheviks at the very sight of the Polish Army. He refused to sign the revised text of the "declaration of homage" but after long persuading was forced somehow and did sign it in the end.

10/. *Lieut. SZUMIGALSKI:*

A quiet level-headed and sensible man wanted to preserve his strength "for Poland".

11/. *Lieut. TOMALA:*

Limited intelligence. He only thought about his own comfort and had no idea at which point the road to disgrace began.

12/. *Ensign KUKULINSKI:*

An honest man and patriot, educated in a clerical seminary. Subordinate of Col. Berling while still in Poland, accustomed to execute his orders. No family background. No orientation where "good" ended and "evil" started. Courageous.

NOTE:

Those numbered from 9 to 12, in normal conditions would have been good officers and would have performed their duties quite well but in the given circumstances when it came to choose between personal comfort and the misery of imprisonment they chose the former.

13/. 2-nd Lieut. IMACH:

A confirmed adherent of communist ideology. He started working for them already in Poland and had done so till most recent times. He believed that humanity will be happy only if and when communism will gain power in the whole world. An ideological communist executive.

14/. 2-nd Lieut. SZCZYPIORSKI:

Active Polish socialist and a zealous assistant of Berling and the whole communist group. An impetuous man with no ethics at all, ready to sentence without a wink the entire Polish intelligentsia, including women and children, to deportation from the future 17-th Union Republic.

GENERAL REMARKS.

The facts related above had taken place during the most critical stage of the present war. Towards the end of 1940 and at the beginning of 1941, it was impossible to imagine that any human force could induce the Soviet Union to release from its concentration camps and prisons the Poles they kept in their hands. All believed in a final victory over the Germans and in the rebuilding of Poland. At that time the power of the Soviet Union was steadily increasing and was aimed at overpowering Poland and all Western Europe. The leaders of the U. S. S. R. maintained that with the collapse of Germany the Red Army would enter Poland and that at its head would march Polish Red troops and that everybody would be therefore greeted with flowers and acclaimed as liberators. The entering of the Soviet Army into Germany was supposed to be, according to the plans of the III International, accomplished amidst joyful celebrations held throughout Germany. To my remark that the Germans even if defeated would still have sufficient arms and ammunition to resist the Soviet Army, Col. Jegorov told me that I was very naive to think so. There were very many communists in Germany who were going to prepare thoroughly the reception of the Red Army. At the present time the greatest enemy of the Soviet Union was—England.

People with foresight began to seek other ways out without taking any heed of whether the road they were taking led to disgrace or not. Today I recall the words of Col. Berling who, when trying to persuade me to sign the declaration I have already spoken about, used the argument that after all if by some miracle Poland would be rebuilt there would be a general amnesty because there would be thousands of people who would have done the same as we had and it would be an impossibility to sentence all of them. At the time I thought this to be a most prudent way of taking things. After that conversation when the inmates of my room endeavoured to make me change my mind I answered that I did not wish my son or my wife to have to say that his father or her husband was a traitor. All that time I had no illusions about the possibility of a happy ending of the whole affair. What happened next seems to me like a fairy tale from the "Thousand and one nights" because I was absolutely sure that I would never regain freedom again.

To end up I give the characteristics of a few persons who had nothing to do with the "Malachówka" villa:

Staff Col. MORAWSKI:

A man with an obsession to become "a great man". Liked to drink vodka. Made himself known because of two memoranda he had sent to the N. K. V. D. in which he suggested the creating of a Polish Government and of "Red Riflemen" under his command. Later on he was Commander of the Reserve Centre of the 5-th Infantry Division in Tatishehev. In October 1940 he had spent a few days in the "Malachówka" villa but was removed from there probably on Col. Berling's request.

Lieut. Col. GUDAKOWSKI:

Wanted and tried to oblige all representatives of the Soviet authorities without exception. He once said that he would rather be a "Soviet tractor-driver than a Polish officer". Gen. Przędziecki knows all about this incident.

I wish to stress that Gen. Przędziecki Wacław could give the most exhaustive explanations on all these matters, having watched over, cared for and taken lively interest in the lives of all the officers throughout that time for doing which he had adequate possibilities, namely, an organisation which aimed at taking notice of everything that was going on.

As to Col. Morawski, Staff Colonel Künstler and Mjr. Lis could give details about the memoranda deposited by him with the N. K. V. D.

The whole team /"collective"/ assembled in Malachówka was chosen and moulded by the N. K. V. D. authorities /Col. Jegorov/ as well as by Berling and his group of "communists" assembled in the villa, with the purpose of performing important tasks in the creation of a Red Poland which would become the 17-th Union Republic. From among the members of that team was to be formed a nucleus of the future Government and Army of a Red Poland which was to march at the head of the Soviet Army to facilitate its task of taking over German occupied Poland.

Col. Berling together with his collaborators openly mentioned about such aims being prepared. N. K. V. D. Col. Jegorov also spoke unequivocally to this effect.

I would also like to mention that in that same villa a communist Government for Finland had been trained before our arrival there and which did in fact turn up in Finland in the beginning of 1940. We had established this fact by discovering Finnish cigarette holders and newspapers of Finnish origin with Finnish inscriptions they must have left behind and also by what we were told by the female members of our servant staff. Col. Rosen-Zawadzki had also mentioned it to us.

Re: THE BATTLE OF KODZIÓWKA.

Kodziówka is a village situated 7 km. west of Sopoćkinie. Close to the village there is a farm of the same name. In the battle with the Bolsheviks which took place on the 22-nd September 1939 only the 101 Lancers Regiment took part, strengthened by a platoon of pioneers and a signal squadron. We had no anti-tank arms except for one anti-tank rifle with 4 cartridges which was in the hands of one of the Lancers in the O. C.'s Colour Party.

The Bolsheviks had two groups of tanks accompanied by motorised infantry. Each group had 18 heavy tanks/Medium Krestians/plus two light tanks. In all the enemy engaged into action 40 tanks. At 8 p. m. on the 21-st September 1939 our advanced patrols established the presence of enemy tanks. I sent on reconnaissance an officer's patrol and went myself to the Regiment Commander who had his post on the farm. After half an hour's talk with the O. C. I returned to the village to put into effect his orders. At 0.1.20 a. m. 7 enemy tanks rolled through our lines of protection and cut off the farm from the village. The night was very dark and a drizzly rain was falling. We managed to retain contact between the farm and the village. At 3 a. m. the Regiment Commander together with 2-nd-in-Command and the A. D. C. came to my post. The O. C. asked me what was the morale of the men and when I answered that I could wish no better he asked: "Well, what are we going to do? Do we fight or withdraw?"—and without waiting for me to reply he said: "I know what you will answer and therefore we will fight . . ." He left me in command of the village giving me further to my own 2-nd squadron, the 1-st squadron, a platoon of pioneers and half of the machine-gun squadron with its commanding officer to help me. The whole was formed into a cavalry battalion. The rest as the second cavalry battalion which he retained under his personal command took up positions round the farm. We fixed 4 a. m. as the time in which we would simultaneously launch an attack against enemy infantry which had stopped nearby apparently without setting up guards for protection. At the appointed time the O. C.'s battalion went to the attack and precisely at the same time the Bolsheviks launched an attack upon the village I occupied, throwing 12 tanks and their infantry into action. Twelve times they tried to storm the village during which eleven of their tanks were put out of action by means of bottles of petrol which we flung at them. From my observation point I could see six more enemy tanks immobilised by the O. C.'s battalion—in all 17 tanks were destroyed. The battle ended in our favour at twenty past eight.

Our casualties were very high. The 2-nd squadron which bore the brunt of the enemy's attack lost 50% of its men and 70% of the horses. The soldiers behaved in a heroic way—Among other feats, corporal Choroszuca and lancer Poloczanyu jumped upon enemy tanks and with the butts of their own rifles damaged the tank machine-guns by smashing the barrels thus making them harmless.

Among those fallen were the regiment commander, two squadron commanders and one platoon commander. The commander of the 2-nd squadron was wounded and suffered from shell-shock, the officer commanding the pioneers' platoon was also wounded.

The casualties of the enemy, according to Soviet sources, amounted to 12 tanks and about 800 men. According to informations received by the O. C. of the

"Wolkowysk" group /Gen. Przędziecki—was the commander of the group / the total of the destroyed tanks was 22.

Everything I have stated in the above record has been described exactly as it had happened without exaggeration—rather moderately if anything—and strictly according to truth which I confirm with my own signature.

/—/ Lopianowski Nareyz,
Cavalry Captain.

Heard by:

/—/ Giedronowicz Nareyz, Capt.

[TRANSLATION COPY. PART II, EXHIBIT 35A]

Capt. LOPIANOWSKI Nareyz,
14-th May, 1943.

In reference to my statement recorded in writing at a hearing which took place on the 13-th of October 1942 in the 2-nd Section of the Staff of the I Armoured Corps—I wish to state that:

In view of the development of the political relations between Poland and the U. S. S. R. I relate herewith, reconstructed to the best of my memory and knowledge, the statements made by the People's Commissar of the U. S. S. R.—BERJA, by the future People's Commissar of Security—MERKUŁOW, and by their executive N. K. V. D. Lieut. Col.—JEGOROW whom I shall refer to in this statement as "Chief of Staff".

I would like to stress that my first interrogation took place on the night of 13-14-th October 1940, between midnight and 0.3 a. m., in room No. 523 at the Supreme H. Q. of the N. K. V. D./People's Commissariat of Interior Affairs of the U. S. S. R./ This room was the office of the People's Commissar himself. The questions were put to me by the Chief of Staff. This statement deals only with those questions which referred to political problems and leaves out the usual questions about health and about what I thought of the Communist regime in the U. S. S. R. Where I use the Polish form of "Sir" /"Pan"/ the Russian form "you" /"wy"/ was used throughout the hearing. /TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—In English the form "you" is used/. I also wish to add that my answers were given in Polish.

"Would you like to fight once again against the Germans?"

"Why don't you put this question to a Polish child, a Polish woman or any youth.—Their answer would be yes".

"On whose orders would you agree to take an active part in the fight against the Germans?"

"On orders of the Polish Government residing in London".

"But that Polish Government in LONDON is an imposturous Government which has nothing in common with the Polish nation. The Polish nation does not recognize this Government. You, an officer of proletarian descent must surely realize that only the Soviet Union can assure a happy future to Poland—but you must also help us in that. If you expect to receive help from Great Britain you are in error. England after making the most of the Poles will sell them if only she will gain anything from doing so. While to us—England is enemy number one. As long as British Imperialism exists and until it is destroyed the Soviet Union will be unable to spread the idea of freedom throughout the nations of the world. Remember that if England will not sell you it will be only because she will turn you into her slaves, as she has done with the yellow and black races in her colonies. If and when the whole of Europe organised by us will march with us under the Red banner, the overthrow of England will not be a difficult task to achieve. We can easily launch an attack against India which would be a deadly blow to British imperialism, and would force America to join hands with us."

"What then do you imagine will be done about Germany with which you have signed a non-aggression pact and, if I am right, even a treaty of friendship".

"The Soviet Union has a realistic approach to the problems of tomorrow. Sentimental considerations do not exist. The only thing which exists is materialism and the strength of the nations of the Soviet Union. The nations of the Soviet Union will conclude any kind of pact with everyone of their enemies but no such agreement is valid. It is only a means to reach an aim decided upon by the Communist Party which strives for freedom, happiness and wealth of all the nations of the world. The Red Army is powerful and will fight with enthusiasm for the achievement of this aim."

"Do you think that the Germans will greet with flowers the entering Red Army? Don't you think they have enough iron and steel to resist your march to the West."

"The Germans, tired out by their struggle with England will try to force an issue by invading the British Isles and will suffer such heavy losses that they will be unable to resist us with their Fascist Army. The German nation seeing that we bring with us freedom and wealth will undoubtedly greet us as its liberators from the yoke of capitalism. We have enormous stocks of food, which are being kept for the purpose of distributing them to the starving West. Once we overpower Germany we will have no difficulties with France because she is ours anyhow while Czechoslovakia being our friend will help us in the South. In about ten years time when we complete the re-organisation of the European Continent in a common effort we shall destroy the British Empire. And only after that shall we proceed all together with the building of a happy life for all the nations of the world."

"I know that the war in 1939 had been arranged in Moscow between Ribbentrop and Molotov with the cooperation of Stalin himself, and therefore I know that when thrusting a knife into our backs you had more in mind than just to liquidate Poland who had in no way caused you any harm".

"Yes, quite so. We did want this war to break out, because this war will enable us to free the subjugated nations from the yoke of capitalists and landlords. If we do not make the most of this war the capitalists will want to destroy us. Poland was hostile to the Soviet Union and was subservient to capitalists who oppressed the Polish Nation ruled by a Fascist-Capitalist Government which defended the interests of the capitalist Western States and, as such, Poland was a hindrance and we therefore made an agreement with Germany in result of which Poland ceased to exist as a State. We want to rebuild a strong Poland which would be friendly towards us in order to be able to work together towards the aim of destroying other capitalist States. Do you need better proof than the case of Czechoslovakia. When the Germans were entering Czechoslovakia the Polish Government prevented us from helping her. As if that was not enough it even helped the Germans—by grabbing part of Czechoslovakia for itself."

Similar discussions went on and on till the 25-th of December, i. e. until P. S. C. Lieut. Col. BERLING Zygmunt appeared on the scene.

The hearings were mostly conducted by the Chief of Staff.

I emphasize that the Soviet authorities were in no way embarrassed by what they told us and shamelessly disclosed to us their plans creating thus the appearance of frank sincerity by which they hoped to win for their cause the cooperation of the chosen Polish officers. Moreover they treated us as living dead who anyhow would not have a chance to repeat to anyone what they were told.

When watching today the fantastic blackmail on which the Soviet Union has engaged, I see that, in spite of the change of circumstances and a different balance of strength, the same plans which I have sketched above are consistently being put to life, and that the present development is treated as a test of the American and British resistance to the unilateral decisions undertaken by the Kremlin and aimed at destroying the defence wall which Poland represents in their drive to the West. They go even further than that and try to find partners who would back them in their present action so as to be able to make use of their cooperation at a later stage.

The thought of a strong and independent Poland deprives the Kremlin rulers of their sleep. They incessantly return to this subject and raise it in their speeches broadcast on the air and printed in the press which is anyhow nothing else but the voice of the ruling clique. Soviet authorities do not deny the existence of a Poland but their main effort is concentrated upon the attempt to establish a Poland which would become another Soviet republic or, at least, to create a Poland which would be so weak as to present no obstacle to Red imperialism.

To uninitiated people the plans described above may look like phantasies or the products of a morbid imagination. The same applied to Hitler's plans as described in his "Mein Kampf". Scarcely anybody took heed of what seemed to be utterances of a sickly brain. Nevertheless the programme of the Kominform is just as much a reality as was "Mein Kampf" with the difference that it is being put to life with even greater brutality and ruthlessness.

The rulers of the U. S. S. R. will stake everything on one card to achieve their goal because if they fail to take advantage of the results of the present war it would postpone indefinitely if not make completely unfeasible their plans of a world-wide revolution.

In the fulfilment of their plans the Bolsheviks had assigned a special role to the chosen Polish officers. The selection of the officers who were to become the pioneers of the future Red Army was entrusted to P. S. C. Lieut. Col. Z. BERLING who had chosen them with the approval of the highest N. K. V. D. authorities and had them trained at special courses organised in the neighbourhood of Moscow.

In my earlier statement I did not give details of the programme which was worked out in the "MALACHÓWKA" villa. It ran as follows:

1/ The change of Poland's political structure enforced with the help of the Red Army.

2/ The incorporation of Poland into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the 17-th member Republic.

3/ The consolidating of the newly imposed structure by getting rid in a humanitarian way of elements hostile to the new order, i. e. of the officers' families, of the class of civil servants and all others who would dare to voice their disapproval. The getting rid of these elements was to be achieved by their deportation to distant districts of Soviet Russia.

Lt. Col. Berling maintained that one had to look ahead and understand the "major issues". There was nothing to fear from the prospect of Poland becoming one of the happy nations of the Soviet Union as the 17-th Soviet Republic. The Poles were a talented race, the present generation was well prepared and capable of playing a major part within Soviet Russia. Those in power in the U. S. S. R. had limited intelligence and inadequate education which opened before the Poles enormous possibilities and unlimited horizons. In a short time all key positions would fall into the hands of the Poles and they would soon rule the entire Soviet Union. If those who refuse to comply and join us will perish it would be through no fault of ours and we therefore need not feel any pangs of conscience in respect of people who are unable to grasp the "major issues".

I would like to quote here Berling's version of the talks about the missing Polish officers. Among them there were many whom he wanted to draw into his plan of collaboration with the U. S. S. R. During one of the conversations with People's Commissar Berja in the presence of N. K. V. D. Lieut. Col. Jegorow, Berling explained to the People's Commissar his intention of making use of these officers. Berja had favourably received the suggestions and turning to his Chief of Staff had said: "Well then, I think we should hand over to Berling these officers if he wishes to have them". To which the Chief of Staff replied: "Unfortunately I think it will be rather difficult, if at all feasible, to trace these officers". The People's Commissar then said: "It was a great mistake". The Chief of Staff added: "We shall try to find them—perhaps it can still be done".

I relate the exact wording of this conversation to the best of my memory, according to how it was repeated by Berling himself and by Cpt. Rozen-Zawadzki. To my question about what could have happened to these officers Cpt. Rozen-Zawadzki replied that they had probably been sent to such places from which the Bolsheviks were unable to retrieve them. One thing is sure—that not a single one of these officers had been found up till the end of March 1942.

The conversation between Berling and the People's Commissar related above took place either in October or in November 1940.

To conclude I will quote an episode which occurred in result of Lieut. Col. Berling's constant assertions that it was essential to gain at all price the confidence of the Bolsheviks. I, on my part constantly maintained that I did not wish to have anything in common with the henchmen of the Polish Nation who sentenced to a slow death innocent Polish children and unhappy Polish women. My attitude began to influence to a certain degree the "younger" adherents of Berling's group. Towards the end of March 1941 the Chief of Staff arrived one day and after a long talk in Berling's room a roll-call was ordered at which all officers living in the "Malachówka" villa were to be present. When we were all assembled the Chief of Staff accompanied by Berling turned up and assured us once again that all Polish families deported to Russia were living in good conditions and he ended his speech with the following sentence; spoken in a raised voice: "Maybe some of you are afraid that by some miracle a Poland will be revived which will hold you responsible and want to punish you. I assure you that the Soviet Union is sufficiently strong and powerful to ensure in any circumstances safety and care to all who co-operate with the U. S. S. R."

NOTE: By "first interrogation" I mean the inquests which were started in the prison of Lubyanka, as it was from then on that I became the object of their regular "sounding" and "shaping" procedure.

/Signed/ ŁOPIANOWSKI N.
Cavalry Capt.

Mr. FLOOD. I now show the witness exhibit 34 and ask him whether or not these are the documents to which he refers dealing with matters about the prison camp, and have they been in his possession until the time they were presented to the Commission.

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. I now show the witness exhibit 35 and ask him whether or not exhibit 35 is an exact photostatic reproduction of exhibit 34.

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. At this time we offer in evidence translations of exhibit 35 and return to the witness exhibit 34.

Now let me have the Red Cross folder, the documents dealing with the Polish Red Cross reports? Will you separate from the documents which you have before you, Colonel, all of the documents that refer to the Polish Red Cross reports, or the Polish Red Cross matter in connection with Katyn? Do you have them separate?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Now will you give to me all the documents you have in your possession that deal with the Polish Red Cross report relating to Katyn?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. I am not presenting all these documents, because they were presented by Mr. Skarzynski.

Mr. FLOOD. They were referred to by him?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And you have the documents?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Only a medical opinion of the doctor of Polish Red Cross who worked in Katyn.

Mr. FLOOD. Those are all the documents you have on that subject?


Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. I present only these documents. This is a plan of the cemetery in Katyn as made by Polish Red Cross after the victims were exhumed and reburied.

Mr. FLOOD. I want you to take every document you have in front of you that deals with the Polish Red Cross at Katyn and give it to me in one folder—everything. (Documents produced.)

Now we present to the stenographer, to be marked for identification, exhibit 36 and exhibit 37.

(The folder referred to was marked as "Exhibit 36" and the photostatic copy thereof as "Exhibit 37.")

EXHIBIT 37



[Translation copy of Exhibit 37]

MEDICO—LEGAL OPINION

As the result of the work of exhumation undertaken with the assistance of the Technical Committee of the Polish Red Cross between, April 29-th 1943 and June 3-rd 1943, on the site of the crime at Katyń Forest situated about 16 km. to the west of Smoleńsk, I arrived at the following final conclusions:

1/ The exhumed bodies numbering 4.145 were buried in eight mass graves. Seven of the above mentioned graves, lying close together, were situated on a sandy mound at a distance of about 500 m. from the Orsha-Smoleńsk main road.

The largest grave which was "L" shaped contained about 2.500 bodies, the remaining from 700 /grave No. 2/ to 50 /grave No. 5/.

The exhumed bodies were closely packed in layers side by side and for the most part face downwards and only in the upper layers of grave No. 1 were they thrown in at random.

The grave No. 8 situated at a distance of about 100 m. from the group of the other graves was only partially emptied but on the strength of comparison of its dimensions with those of the other graves it could contain about 150-200 bodies.

2/ Taking into account the fact that in the large majority of cases the bodies were dressed in Polish officers' uniforms and were provided with inoculation certificates from Kozielsk camp, it must be assumed that they were bodies of the Polish officer prisoners of war of 1939, interned in the Kozielsk camp.

3/ The post mortem examinations of the bodies established the cause of death to be a shot in the skull, damaging the vital centres of the brain / for the most part the medulla / and causing instantaneous death.

This shot, aimed as a rule from the back slightly below the occipital protuberance and running upwards and towards the front of the cranium, for the most part terminated in an exit wound within the upper part of the forehead.

Only in a few cases was a double or even a triple shot in the back of the head established.

4/ This stereotyped bullet channel proved the executioners to be both systematic and experienced.

5/ All the shots were fired from pistols and the ammunition used bore the trade mark "Greco 7'65 D".

The fact that it was often found that the edges of the wounds were singed and that grains of unburnt powder were stuck round them, proved that the shot had been fired from a very close range.

6/ The relative large number of cartridge cases and bullets in the vicinity of the graves, under the pine needles and even inside the graves, were a sufficient basis for the supposition that the execution was carried out over the graves or even after the victims had been led into the graves, previously dug out.

7/ The absence of any traces of a struggle having occurred before death led to the supposition that the victims were overpowered by assistants and only then shot by proper executioners. The fact that in nearly 20% of the cases the hands were bound behind the back with a cord tied in a double slip knot, suggested that this method was used as a preventive measure against selfdefence with individuals who could offer resistance / physically fit /.

Also the throwing of the greatcoats over the heads of the victims / grave No. 5 / and the tying of them with a cord at the height of the neck and connecting this knot with the knot typically used for the binding of the hands behind the back, suggested that this refined method of disabling the victims was intended to prevent any shouting before the execution.

8/ The precision with which each victim was shot, the fact that the layers of bodies were spread over with a calcium compound / grave No. 1 /, the period covered by the dates of the Soviet newspapers and diaries found on the bodies and finally the careful arrangement of the bodies in each grave / with the exception of the upper layers of grave No. 1 / sufficiently proved that the crime was carried out over a long period of time.

9/ It was impossible to fix exactly the length of time the bodies had lain under the ground by the degree of the putrid decomposition only. It is true that the research of Prof. Orsos / Budapest / is supposed to have established that an incrustation of calcium salts on the inner side of the skull does not occur before a body has lain in the earth for three years. But this phenomenon, which was met with several times on the Katyń bodies, has still not been definitely accepted in the field of forensic medicine and cannot, therefore, be used as a basis for the calculation of the exact period of time the bodies had lain in the earth.

The exhumed bodies showed a varying degree of putrid decomposition depending on the layer of soil, its reaction, the accessibility of air, humidity and the pressure under which they were lying. Thus in the upper sandy layers the bodies were light and brittle and presented a picture of a partial mummification, whereas in the lower layers of clay or peat / grave No. 1 / they showed signs of the formation of the so called adipocere which was characterised by the preservation of the general features of the body.

The skin of these bodies was covered with a sticky, grey grease which had an unpleasant, strong smell which had also permeated the clothes of the bodies.

The above mentioned layer of grease protected from external influences not only the bodies, but also the documents found on the bodies. The clothes on the bodies in the upper layers were faded and fragile and in the lower layers they were strong and the colours were preserved.

10/ The above mentioned degree of putrid decomposition being dependent on external factors and the exact adherence of contiguously lying bodies, proved that the original arrangement of the bodies had not been disturbed.

11/ The presence of wooden soles /"apelówki"/ attached to the boot legs by means of a string or by leather straps found on quite a considerable number of bodies in grave No. 1, and the absence of them in the other graves, led to the supposition that grave No. 1 was filled with the victims of the first executions, carried out in the colder part of the year, and that the other mass graves had been filled one by one at a later time in the season.

From notes found in the diaries of the exhumed bodies it could be calculated that the time in which the first seven mass graves had been made was the end of March and the month of April 1940.

Grave No. 8, discovered on the first of June 1943, was the latest and I calculate that it was made in the first half of May 1940. The bodies in it were, clad in summer uniforms and the Soviet newspapers found on them were dated the first days of May 1940.

12/ The examination of the material evidence found on the bodies such as anti-typhoid inoculation certificates from the prisoners camp at Kozielsk, identity cards, P. K. O. savings books / Post Office Savings Bank /, diaries, letters received at Kozielsk or not yet sent from Kozielsk, military aluminium identity discs, visiting cards, sketches, photographs etc. made it possible to establish for the greater number of the victims their surname, Christian name, military rank, profession, age, the locality from which they came, religion etc.

13/ The above mentioned material evidence and more than anything else the diaries and note books made it possible to establish more precisely the time of the crime. They all ceased in the second half of March and April 1940.

These made it also possible to establish the route along which the Polish prisoners were brought to the scene of the crime, which was Kozielsk, — Smoleńsk, — Gniezdowo. The further route was covered in prison cars to the place of execution in the Katyń Forest. So, for instance, the diary of Major Adam Solski, No. 490, finishes on the 9-th of April 1940 with the note: "We have been brought to a wood, hour 8'30—they take away watches, belts, pen knives, roubles".

14/ The data collected as a result of the examination of the scene of the crime and the exhumation of the bodies agreed with the depositions of the Russian witnesses, who in the spring of 1940, saw the Polish prisoners being brought in parties in prison wagons, to Gniezdowo Station and from there being driven in prison cars in the direction of the Katyń Forest/Zacharov, Kiselev/:

The witness Kiselev, who lived nearby, had even heard shots and shouts from the direction of the forest.

15/ The finding, in the area of the Katyń Forest, of quite a number of other graves containing Russian bodies with typical shot wounds in the skull led to the supposition that the Katyń Forest had already been used for some time as a place of execution.

Judging by the degree of putrid decomposition of the bodies in the different Russian graves the time that they had lain in the earth should be calculated as being from 5-15 years.

16/ The expert reserves to himself the right of giving a supplementary forensic medical statement after he has finished the analysing of further material.

Mr. FLOOD. I show to the witness exhibit 36 and ask him whether or not exhibit 36 is a report of the Polish Red Cross in connection with the Katyń massacre and direct his attention to that part of exhibit 36 which is a map purporting to be a map of the graves and the number of graves found at Katyn, and ask him for the record to designate

from the number of graves how many graves in number are shown on that map. These are the graves shown on this map which were dug by the Polish Red Cross at the time they reburied the bodies of the Polish officers that were dug up by the Germans at Katyn, and the comment is significant for the purpose of showing the contrast between the number of graves as marked on the map by the Polish Red Cross and the number of graves subsequently the Russians said they found at Katyn, namely, one.

Colonel, will you state from the map the number of graves marked on the Polish Red Cross report?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. It is six large graves and two small, two individual graves.

Mr. FLOOD. I show the witness exhibit 36 and ask him whether or not exhibit 36, which I have just shown him and he has read from the map and the other document, is the report of the Polish Red Cross on the Katyn matter which has been in his custody until presented to the committee today?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. I now show the witness exhibit 37 and ask him whether or not exhibit 37 in its two parts, including a photostat of the said map, is a true translation of exhibit 36?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. We now offer in evidence exhibit 37 in two parts and return to the witness exhibit 36.

Will you now let me have all documents in one exhibit referring to the Kriwoserczew case? [Documents produced.]

Would you have this exhibit, which contains three separate documents, marked as exhibit 38 and the photostat thereof marked as exhibit 39.

(Documents referred to were marked as "Exhibit 38" and the photostatic copy thereof as "Exhibit 39.")

Mr. FLOOD. I now show you, Colonel, marked for identification, exhibit 38, which contains three separate documents and ask you whether or not exhibit 38 in its three parts contains references in your files to the Kriwoserczew case, and has this exhibit been in your possession until such time as it was presented to the committee today?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. I now show you exhibit 39 and ask you whether or not that is an exact photostatic reproduction of exhibit 38 in its three parts?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. We now offer in evidence exhibit 39 and return to the witness exhibit 38.

EXHIBIT 39

No. 5/5

Sąd Polowy

Znak akt. ~~XXXX~~ 929. 5/45.

PROTOKÓL PRZESLUCHANIA ŚWIADKA

M.p. dnia 22 maja 1946. r. początek o godzinie 14.30.

Sprawa karna przeciw

Obecni:

Sędzia Wojskowy por. skł. Lewicki Karol

Protokółant plut. Futer: Stanisław

Świadka upomniano i pouczono w myśl art. 81 k.w.k.

po czym świadek podaje:

- Nazwisko i imię: FRYZWILERGHE Iwan, syn Grzegorz,
- Data i miejsce urodzenia: 30. VII. 1915 r. Włocławek, gm. Fatyn, okręg Smoleńsk.
- Wyznanie: prawosławny.
- Stan rodzinny: kawaler.
- Stożek wojskowy—zawód: tekarz metalowy.
- Przynależność służbowa—adres: Zmieszkały przed wojną w miejsc. urodzenia.
- Stosunek do oskarżonego, albo innych w sprawie karnej interesowanych osób: _____
- Świadka zaprząsaczono w myśl art. E3 K.W.P.K. po uprzednim pouczeniu go w myśl art. 82 para. 2 K.W.P.K.

*41457:38950/429 1/46 Pm (2) JC&S 88

Przesłuchanie przeprowadzone w języku polskim, wyjaśniając od czasu do czasu świadkowi mniej znane określenia w języku rosyjskim, przy pomocy por. Heitzmana Mariana ze Sztabu Głównego w Londynie. Świadek rozumie zupełnie język polski.

Świadek składa zeznanie o treści, jak na załączonych kartach 1/..9/.

3.1 4.1

Kurtk (Kurtkopyes)

Kurtkopyes

Kurtkopyes

M. Heitzman

[Translation copy of Exhibit 39]

[The document translated below is written on a printed form / No. 5/S/. The names and data are typed in the spaces between the printed text. The printed text has been italicized in the translation.]

Field Court Martial.

*No. 5/S.
Doc. Ref. Sow. 6/46.*

RECORD OF HEARING OF WITNESS

In the field, Day 22-nd May 1946, Started at 2.30 p.m.

Criminal case against:

PRESENT

Military Judge Lieut. Auditor LEWICKI KAZIMIERZ,

Recorder Sergeant HUBERT STANISLAW,

The witness having been cautioned and instructed in accordance with art. - 81 of the Military Penal Code, - stated as follows.

1/ Name and Chr. name: KRIWOŻERCOW IWAN son of GREGORY,

2/ Date and place of birth: 20.VII.1915, NOWE BATOKI, borough of KATYN, District of SMOLENSK,

3/ Religion: Orthodox,

4/ Family status: bachelor,

5/ Military rank - profession: metal turner,

6/ Allocation - address: resided before the war at his birth place,

7/ Relation to defendant and/or other parties concerned in this case: -

8/ The witness was sworn in accordance with art. 83 of the Military Penal Code having been first instructed in accordance with art. 82 point 2 of the M.P.C.

The hearing was conducted in Polish. Now and then the less usual Polish expressions were translated into Russian to the Witness by 2/Lieut. Heitzman Marian from the General Staff in LONDON. The Witness understands Polish perfectly. The Witness gave evidence as recorded on the attached sheets No. 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Follow four signatures,
St. Hubert,

KRIW / KRIWOŻERCOW/ /in Russian/,
LEWICKI, Lieut,
M. HEITZMAN.

EXHIBIT 39A

Strona 1/, protokołu przesłuchania sn. Kriwozierow Iwana.

W początkach marca 1940 r. zwróciła mi uwagę, że N.K.W.D. będzie stawało jakies budynki w lesie na Kozich Gorach, gdyż kupie sie doły pod fundamenty. Były to kopali oświetli Niemców przyjechał za trzech lub czterech samochodach pod strażą N.K.W.D. z wiezionia w Smolensku. Przewoźnicy tych wiezionow widzieli na własne oczy. Roboty te rozpoczęły się w początkach marca. Przepuszczaniem, że byli to wiezionie ze Smolenska, że ciemnowi jedyni z twardego kierunku.

Kiedy roboty te zostały zakończone zaczęły przychodzić transporty oficerow na stacje Gaisnowa. Przepuszczam sobie, że transporty te zostały przychodzic wtedy kiedy samoty został pokój z Finlandja i nawet dlatego ludzie początkowo myśleli, że N.K.W.D. wsiadł fińskich oficerow. Ale już drugiego dnia niektórzy z obywateli mieszkansow paszali polskie mundurki i były wiadome, że to są transporty polskich jeńcow wojennych, oficerow.

Transporty te były przywożone specjalnymi pociągami składającymi się z samoty i 3-4 stojypink. Ciężarami były to mniejsze wagony dwusławowe, a czasem większe czterocławowe.

Cały pociąg przedstawiano na boczny tor jako magazyna, gdzie był mały placyk. Tam znajdował tyłek do wagonu czarny wagon i do niego ładowano oficerow. Były dwa czarneje wagony, opuszcz tego alewaracha na kłur. Ładowano rano oficerow i osoboty samochod. Ciemnowi samochodem jednal naomniak, oficer N.K.W.D. Jedynak nie widzieli odznak, ale staje mi się, że miał jeden osob. Po ładowaniu oficerow do czarnych wagonow, cała kolonna otworach samochodow jedynala w stronę Kozich Gór, a potem wchodziła po następną partię.

Mieszkańcy okolicznych wsi twierdzili, że oficerow tych wsi N.K.W.D. na Kozie Gory, żeby ich tam rozstrzelawa. Wprawdzie nikt z nich nie widzieli, ale wiadomo było, że w lesie na Kozich Gorach miała miejsce obota, a później miejsce to było znane jako miejsce stracenia od szeregu lat.

Eksperte stacowali ankwiżisicni ze Smolenska, a jednego szofera który jednal czarnym wagonem znałem osobinicie; nazwisko jego było Jakim BILWAJEW a wożono go krotko KIM. Później wiadomo mi, że szofer Pietka, nazwiska nie pamiętam, który prowadził ciemnowe na której wożono rano oficerow do lasu na Kozie Gory i który został wygnany ze służby w N.K.W.D. i pracował w Smolensku w Sejustrans, opowiadał jeszcze przed wojną o straceniu przyjeździec Niemcow, że oficerow tych N.K.W.D. rozstrzelawało.

Moż krewny opowiadał mi, że kiedy przetransowa wagony z oficerami na słupek tor, zabawiał w eksperte swego znajomego ekwiżisicista. Wiedział nie z nim w rozmowie i szepotał czy przywoza tych ludzi do obotow. Na co ten odpowiadał: i gdzie tu u was są oboty? Co ty takie głupstwa mówisz, ty nie chcesz gdzie sie takich ludzi wsiad?

Personel dawcy N.K.W.D. składał się tylko z 3 lub 4 osob, ponieważ na te dane ekwiżisicist przyjezdził tylko na krotko i tam nie mieszkał. Niedaleko od dawcy N.K.W.D. we wsi Barok znajdowało się duże sanatorium NKWD. Za oknami niemieckich na dawcy N.K.W.D. mieszkał jakiś wyznay oficer niemiecki, podobno generał ze swaim adiutantem, ale sadnego oddzieleni wojskowego tam nie było. Razem z tym generałem mogła tam mieszkać około 10 ludzi.

Po wojnie w 1939 r. sadnych obotow polskich jeńcow wojennych w okolicy Gaisnowa i Katynia ani dalej na sadnie nie było. Sadnych tor robot drogowych w tej okolicy nie prowadzono poza normalnym poprzaniem drog przez draminow.

Wojska niemieckie zajęły okolicę Gaisnowa 27 lipca 1941 r., a Smolensk (głowa obot miasta) około 16 lipca. Przechodził ani do przyjeździec wojsk niemieckich nie było sadnej władzy i każdy robił co chował. Były wprawdzie roboty cofajace się oddzieleni sowieckie, z których ostatnie wycofały się 26 lipca zwracamy most kolejowy i drogowy, ale sadnego porzadku nie było.

Na wiosnę 1942 r. robotnicy polscy, którzy pracowali tam w organizacji Todta zbierajac już salamy dowiedzieli się od miejscowej ludności,

W. Tarkow

- 2 -

na w lesie na Koszich Górach znajdują się groby rozstrzelanych polskich oficerów. Ja sam skrywałem taką rozmowę. Od Kiszilewa wiem, że robotnicy od byli u niego przesłany im pokazali mogiły i Kiszilew ich zaprowadził na groby na których oni postawili wiadomości krzyż drewniany. Ten krzyż ja sam widziałem.

W styczniu 1943 r. ukazał się w gazecie Nowy Put' wydawnictwo po rozjaśnieniu przez Niemców w Smoleńsku artykuł epimajny sbrodnie popełnione przez bolszewików na terenach zajętych w 1939 r. Była tam nowa o aresztowaniach, o wywiezieniu na Syberię setek tysięcy ludzi, których aresztami oses tam wymiarła i wreszcie wspomniano tam, że gen. Sikorski nie mógł w Rosji odnaleźć kilku tysięcy polskich oficerów, kiedy organizował w Sovietach armie polską. Kiedy przeczytałem ten artykuł, zacząłem na ten temat rozmawiać z tłumaczem niemieckim i m. i. powiedziałem: "Gdzie oni szukają tych oficerów w Rosji, skoro oni leżą tu rozstrzelani w lesie na Koszich Górach". Tłumacz ten, który pracował w Głównym Biurze Polityki nie nie na to nie odpowiedział, ale na kilka dni później, który pracował przy koniach w Gen. P. P. powiedział mi, że na drugi dzień miałem się udać do podoficerami z Gen. P. P. Na drugi dzień, kiedy zgłosiłem się do G. P. P. pojechał z nami ja i jeszcze dwóch nieznajomych w kierunku Koszich Gór. Z nami na motocyklach pojechali dwaj funkcjonariusze G. P. P. Jeden z nich nazwiskiem Arhelski czy Kichhalski miał być wyk. rozjaśn. Jestem pewnie pewny, że spotkałem go w marcu lub kwietniu tego roku 1946, jako jeńca wojennego w obozie w Fallingboom. Tenże Arhelski czy Kichhalski mógł być może właściciel informacji o osobie Iwana Konstantinowa Andriejewa z K. Butek, który razem z sobą omawiał się z Kichhalskim do Niemca, gdzie urzędował się na obozie. Co się z nimi dalej stało nie wiem.

Kiedyś przyjechali na dacie N. E. W. D., ci dwaj podoficerowie szczytali sobie gdzie znajdują się groby polskich oficerów. Odpowiedziałem, że nie wiem ale pojeżdż do Kiszilewa, który blisko mieszka i który z pewnością będzie coś wiedział. Kiszilew był w domu i leżał na plecach, kiedy na powitanie powiedział, że on chciał zdradzić, że już wcześniej roku pytał się o to same polscy robotnicy, jak już o tym wspominałem poprzednie. Ja to nie odpowiedziałem, że to nie byłoby groby rozstrzelanych. Kiszilew uśmiechnął się, wyszedł ze mną i zaprowadził nas do grobów.

Wtedy najpierw kilofem rozebraliśmy murów ziemie, a potem zaczęliśmy na miejscu kopiec kopaczek. Kiedyś desyć głęboko ja się wykopali poznaczili murów trupi. Po chwili miałem dwaj kolejarzy nie mogli tego muru wytrzymać i szli do niego na wyrosty, a ja dalej tego muru naciskałem, na odczyn komu kopaczek ja. Przez cały czas kopaliśmy przez piasek a na dnie była cienka warstwa osadziła się w pod którą leżał trup. Zobaczyłem piasek w jakiejś odległości od piasku, że trup leżał twarzą w dół. Wtedy odwróciłem guzik od drugiego oczyszczenia i zobaczyłem że jest to guzik z orzechem. Po chwili guzik Niemca, który go obserwował, poognął się do niego w papier, przemienił robotę i pojechał z powrotem.

Kiedyś przyjechali do Gaisdowa, przyjechali tam leutenant Voss sekretarz Gen. F. F. Pol. Pokazał Vossowi guzik, opowiedziałem wtedy wykopali Iwana, wspominałem, że z jamy wydobym się silny smród trupi, wobec czego Voss wziął z sobą butelkę spirytusu na wypadek gdyby się komu szło do wyrosty, poczem wskazywał mi smród przedtem i Voss pojechał z powrotem na Koszich Góry samochodem i motocyklem. Kiedyś przyjechali na miejsce, Voss zaczął rozmawiać z nami, odjął głowę od trupa i wydobym ja z jamy. Voss obserwował głowę, zaczął ja z powrotem wkładać do jamy i przyspieszył trochę miejsca. Potem Voss pojechał po lesie, poszedł na drugą stronę dolinki na błoto, poczem wrócił do Gaisdowa.

Tego samego dnia interwizjusz, Austriak Penka przez tłumacza Arhelskiego odebrał ode mnie zeznanie, pytając co wiem o rozstrzelaniu polskich oficerów. Razem ze mną przejechał także Andriejewa Iwana z K. Butek przeszedłszy Ruchta. Zaczęliśmy, że podczas składania zeznań tylko pytałem się co wiem i nikt mi nie mógł nie grozić, ani na mnie nie krzywić. Tak samo odebrałem się do Andriejewa, który przy mnie zeznał. Przy zeznaniach innych mieszkańców nie byłam, ale gdyby kimś przy zeznaniach kopce bliżej guzik, byłby o tym z pewnością słyszał. Zresztą najlepiej z zeznaniami się przejechał, innych świadków, że Kiszilewa Niemca był bardzo stary nie wyznano do Gaisdowa, ale Penka razem z tłumaczem pojechali do niego do domu i tam odebrali od niego zeznanie. Kiszilewa widziałem desyć często potem i był między innymi obywatel stary, a w ostatni dzień kiedy omawiałem

Wspomnienie
Kiszilew

Wspomnienie
Kiszilew

sie na zachod t. m. 21. września 1943 r., widziałem Kisielow jak szedł z mną i pojął przed sobą tasaki. Zreszta nie było powodu aby bogos z tych, którzy byli przewidziani nie czy grzebić im, bo zarówno Kisielow jak i inni szanowali dobrowolnie.

Potem na kilka dni przyjechała komisja Czerwonego Krzyża, wywieszono wielką flagę Czerwonego Krzyża, w tym samym podjeździe, że teraz to terytorium jest w rozporządzeniu Czerwonego Krzyża. Komisja Czerwonego Krzyża z nami rozmawiała, wypytywane nas co wiemy o rozstrzelaniu oficerów, ale byli przy tym obecni tylko Niemcy. Rozmawialiśmy zupełnie swobodnie i nikt na nas nie krzykował.

Rozmawiałem także z delegacją polskich jeńców wojennych. Pomocnik rozmawiał przy nas tłumacza ale jednym z delegacji polskich jeńców wojennych oficer z imieniem lub nazwiskiem podał mi wiadomości, że on się musiał po rozstrzeleniu i sam okazał z nami mówić po rozstrzeleniu tłumacza. W tej delegacji był polski podpułkownik, ale ten po rozstrzeleniu nie mógł.

Rozmawiałem także z delegacją angielskich jeńców wojennych. Anglikowie obejrzeli groby, potem podszedł do nas, był z nim mieszkał szef propagandy. Między innymi wojażer "delmator", a wtedy z grupy Anglików odszedł nie jeden oficer wysoce, w okularach, podszedł do nas i słychać rozmawiając językiem polskim powiedział: "Północnik chociaż smut' skłóka płacik nas dajęć Germanij". Kisielow powiedział, że mu nikt nie nie powiedział. Potem jeździł Anglikowie przez tego angielskiego oficera nas wypytywali, jak belaruskim oficerów wzięli, a potem poszli oglądać mogiły ruskich wystrzelanych.

Rozmawiałem także z członkami polskiego Czerwonego Krzyża. Pamietałem, że raz jak wyjechał jednego trupa, Polacy jak zobaczyli jego dokumenty, podawali coś duże między sobą mówiąc, że używają go jak mogli "Pamiętniki". To mi nie powiedział, podał mi bliżej i używał go o się stało. Wtedy mi pokazał dokumenty i powiedział, że znalazł trupa osobistego lekarza Pilsudskiego, Kaledzińskiego.

Z koniec maja, Niemcy zaczęli rozkopywać siedem grobów z tej strony błota. Wtedy już wszystkie trupy z tych siedmiu grobów były wyjęte. Z czegoś niedużego grobu z drugiej strony błota Niemcy wyjęli truche trupów, ale potem wnosili z powrotem do grobu i dalej nie rozkopywali.

Pamiętam tydzień, który spędziłem przed Niemcami szanując był Iwan Andrejew że wai byłki prasowickim Szlepcowem, w miejscu ośmiu dniem kilka lat, ale drugi nie Iwan Andrejew przonożnikiem "Ramba" (to miał krajem nogi), który emigrował się. W lecie 43 r. jak zaczęły chadzać złyki, że Czerwona Armia nie zbliża, wtedy sama Szlepcowski wyrzuciła go z domu, powiedział, że nie chce z nim żyć. Wtedy ja znowu powiedział, że on boi się, że jak czerwoni przyjdą, to wszyscy którzy szanowali siebie Niemców będą na to odpowiedzialni.

Przez cały rok 41 i 42 po przyjeździe Niemców na dany nie było żadnych dodatków, mieszkał tylko jak podał pogrzebnie jakis wysocy oficer niemiecki. Także i cały teren lasu nie był zabezpieczony, nad obywatelstwo postawiamy, nawet głośno nie było, bo szedł restauracji na śniadanie. Nie było swobodnie chadzać, ja sam chodziłem na grzyby. Niemcy nie zakazywali chodzić po lasie szukać grzybów. Nie widziałem też żadnych przyjeżdżających samochodów poza jednym samochodem osobowym tego oficera, który tam mieszkał.

Luźność okoliczności nie bardzo przeszkadzała mi interesować się sprawą, bo na Konich Gorach wiadomo było, że N.K.W.D. ściera rozstrzelanych i budy wiedział jak było.

Andrejew Sienon z H. Bujak, który pracował w warsztacie przy składowości w Kraje Borsie, dokąd dojechał kilka, używał do kolejarzy, że oficerów polskich N.K.W.D. wzięli z Kozłowską. Nigdy nie używaliśmy, aby ktoś mówił, że wozono także oficerów ze Starobelskiej czy Ostaszkowa. Andrejew emigrował się do Rosji przed Niemcami.

Nie było swobodnie chadzać, ja sam chodziłem na grzyby. Niemcy nie zakazywali chodzić po lasie szukać grzybów. Nie widziałem też żadnych przyjeżdżających samochodów poza jednym samochodem osobowym tego oficera, który tam mieszkał.

[Handwritten signatures and notes at the bottom of the page, including "Pamiętniki" and "A. Hachun"]

Strona IV, wrotów, za przesłuchanie an, Kriwozierden Iwona,

- 4 -

Wiem on nie pamiętał i wyjechał samochodem z klaszarem niemieckim
Toszegun, którego nazwiska nie znam. Ja odwiedziłem nie tego z rżni szlachy,
ale mnie nie pamiętał. Ja dopiero później na dzień albo na dwa wynajmowałem
na noc i przejechał niemieckiego lekarza który regulował ruch na noc, aby
aby mi umożliwić ewakuację. On zatrzymał jeden samochód, który jechał
do Cragy i w ten sposób wyjechałem.

Słyszałem nazwisko Klamazgina, który był rzeczoznawcą śladów
w Smoleńsku za niemieckich czasów, ale nie wiem gdzie on nie z nim stała.
Przypuszczam, że ewakuował się z Krasnami.

Wiedząc o tym, że kiedyś on przyjechał do Smoleńska i był tam
z niemieckimi, dlatego nie wiem nazwiska, który nie pamiętam
dokładnie, ale nie wiem jego nazwiska, tylko wiem, że nie pamiętam
kiedy go zobaczyłem, ale wiem, że nie pamiętam, że nie pamiętam, że nie
pamiętam, że nie pamiętam: jak nie wiem, że i nie pamiętam, że nie
pamiętam.

Na stronie II, w rotaku, w numerze 12 od dołu, wiadomo
"Owotaw", na stronie III, w numerze "Kriwozierden" "Kriwozierden",
w numerze "Kriwozierden" "Kriwozierden", w numerze "Kriwozierden".

Po c...

Kriwozierden Iwona
Kriwozierden Iwona
Kriwozierden Iwona
Kriwozierden Iwona

[Translation Copy of Exhibit 39A]

In the beginning of March 1940 rumours circulated that the N. K. V. D. was going to build some houses in the KOZIE GÓRY wood because diggings of the foundations had already been started. The pits were dug out by civilian prisoners brought over under N. K. V. D. guard in three to four cars from the Smoleńsk prison. I saw the arrivals of these convicts with my own eyes. The works were started in the first days of March. I reckon they must have been convicts from Smoleńsk because the cars were coming from that direction.

When these works were completed transports of officers began to arrive to Gniezdowo. I remember that they began to arrive at the time of the armistice with Finland and even because of that people initially said that the N. K. V. D. transported Finnish officers. But already on the second day some of the local inhabitants recognised Polish uniforms and it became known that those were transports of Polish prisoners of war—of officers.

The transports were brought by special trains composed of an engine and 3 to 4 prison coaches /stotypinki/: Sometimes the coaches were of the smaller two-axle type at other times they were the large four-axle ones.

The whole train was moved to the side track near the storage building opposite the little square. There the "black-raven" /"czornyj-woron"/ prison cars moved up with their backs towards the railway carriages and the officers were transferred into them. There were two "black-ravens" and a lorry on to which the belongings of the officers were loaded and also a passenger car. In the latter travelled the commander, an officer of the N. K. V. D. I could not see precisely his badges but I think he had one strap. After the officers had been loaded into the "ravens" the whole column drove off towards Kozie Góry and then returned for the next batch.

People said that the N. K. V. D. was taking them to Kozie Góry for the purpose of shooting them there. Although nobody witnessed the executions it was known that there was no camp in the Kozie Góry forest and moreover the place was known to have been an execution place for many years.

The escort was composed of an N. K. V. D. team from Smolensk, and I even knew the driver of one of the "black-ravens"; his name was JAKIM ROZUWA-JEW known by the nick-name of KIM. Further to that I know that PIETKA—I forget his surname—the driver of the lorry, on which the officers' luggage was transported to Kozie Góry and who, later on, was thrown out of employment with the N. K. V. D. and worked in the Sojuztrans in Smolensk, told people even before the Germans had arrived that the N. K. V. D. had executed these officers.

A relative of mine told me that one day while the train was being shuttled on the station he recognised among the N. K. V. D. escort a man he knew personally. He began to talk to him and asked him whether these men were taken to a camp. To which he got the answer: "Where did you see any camps over here? Why do you ask stupid questions as if you did not know where they are taken to?"

The personnel of the N. K. V. D. "datcha" /villa/ numbered not more than 3 to 4 persons because the members of the N. K. V. D. used to come there only for a very short time and they did not live there. Not far from the N. K. V. D. villa, in the village of BOREK there was a large N. K. V. D. Sanatorium. After the Germans had taken over, the N. K. V. D. villa was occupied by a high ranking German officer, allegedly a general who lived there with his A. D. C. but no military unit was stationed there. Including the general not more than 10 people lived there.

After the war of 1939 there were no prisoner of war camps in the neighborhood of Katyn and Gniezdowo nor were there any further westward. Neither were there any road repairs undertaken in that district apart from the normal work done by the local road guards.

The German troops occupied the Gniezdowo district on the 27th July 1941 while Smolensk /the upper part of the town/ was taken already on the 16th of July. During 13 days the district was a no-mans-land and everyone could do what he wanted. True enough there were some disorganised units of the Red Army which remained in the district till the 26th and then withdrew after blowing up the railway and the road bridges but there was no order at the time.

In the spring of 1942, Polish workers who worked there as members of the TODT organisation and were employed in collecting steel scraps, learned from the local inhabitants about the existence of the graves of Polish officers shot in the Kozie Góry forest.

I myself witnessed such a conversation. I know from KISIELEW that the Polish workers had visited him and had asked him to show them the graves.

Kisielew took them to the site on which they raised a small wooden cross. I saw that cross myself.

In 1943 an article appeared in the "NOWYJ PUT" a Smoleńsk newspaper printed in Russian by the Germans—about the crimes committed by the Bolsheviks on territories they had occupied in 1939. The article described the mass arrests, the deportations of hundreds of thousands of people to Siberia, of which the majority had perished there, and it also mentioned that Gen. Sikorski was unable to trace in Russia a few thousand of Polish officers at the time when he was organising a Polish Army on Russian territory. After having read this article I raised the subject when talking to the German interpreter and I said among others: "Why are they searching for these officers in Russia when they had been shot and buried here in Kozie Góry". The interpreter who was employed by the "Geheime Feld Polizei" made no comment at the time but a few days later a relation of mine who looked after the horses of the Geheime F. P. told me that I was to be sent somewhere the next day with n.c. officers of the Geh. F.P. I was loaded on to a cart together with two local inhabitants and we were driven in the direction of Kozie Góry. We were accompanied by two corporals of the Geh. F.P. on motorcycles. One of them called Arholtz or Eichholtz spoke Russian. I am nearly certain that I had seen him since either in March or in April 1946. He was then a prisoner of war in the Fallingsbosted camp in Germany. The same Arholtz or Eichholtz could probably give some information about the fate of IWAN WASILIEWICZ ANDREJEW from NOWE BATOKI who was evacuated together with his wife and Eichholtz to Mińsk, where his wife gave birth to a daughter. I do not know what happened to them after that.

When we arrived to the N. K. V. D. villa the two German N. C. O.'s asked me where were the graves of the Polish officers. I said I did not know but that I would go and ask Kisielew who lived close by and who was sure to know something. Kisielew was at home lying on the stove and when I told him what it was about he said that last year already Polish workers had asked him the same question. I told him that now we were going to dig up the graves. He dressed and followed me and then showed us where the graves were.

We broke up the frozen earth with pick-axes and took turns in digging up the mound. When we had already dug a fairly deep hole a cadaverous smell spread around. As my two comrades could not stand the stench and began to feel sick while I somehow proved more resistant I was the one to dig the last shift. Up till now we had dug through sand but at the bottom of the hole I struck now on a thin layer of black soil under which I finally uncovered a corpse. I first saw the military overcoat or rather its back belt since the body was lying face downwards. I wrenched off a button from the back belt and cleaning it I could see that it had an eagle on it. I handed over the button to the Germans and after they had inspected it I wrapped it up in a piece of paper. After which we interrupted the digging and returned to the village.

When we were back in Gniezdowo Lieut. Voss, the secretary of the Gen. F. P. arrived. I showed him the button and told him how we had dug out a hole and about the cadaverous stench which exhaled from it. On hearing which Voss took a bottle of spirit in case anyone felt sick again and took us all back to Kozie Góry. This time we went by car accompanied by the motorcycles. When we arrived on the spot Voss ordered us to widen the hole and to remove the head from the body and take it out of the pit. He took a good look at it, ordered us to replace it and to cover up the body with a thin layer of earth. He then strolled around the wood, crossed the little swamp at the bottom of the hollow between the mounds and then took us all back to Gniezdowo.

Later the same day the Austrian N. C. O./Unteroffizier/GUSTAW PONKA, with the help of the interpreter Arholtz or Eichholtz, took down in writing a statement which I made answering questions about what I knew of the shootings of the Polish officers. Together with me they also questioned IWAN ANDREJEW knick-named "RUMBA" from Nowe Batoki. I wish to stress that during the hearing I was asked to tell only what I knew and nobody threatened me about anything, neither was I shouted at. Andrejew who was questioned in my presence was treated in the same way. I was not present during the hearings of the other inhabitants of the neighbourhood but if the Germans had beaten up or even threatened anyone I would have undoubtedly heard of it. The best proof of the behaviour of those questioning us was that knowing that Kisielew was an old man they did not summon him to Gniezdowo but Ponka with the interpreter went to his house to take down his statement in writing. I saw Kisielew many a time after that and he was in excellent health although he was very old. On the day of my evacuation to the West, that is on the 24-th of Sept. 1943 I saw Kisielew

walking together with his wife, and he was even pushing a wheelbarrow before him. Anyhow there was no reason for beating up or threatening anyone of those who made statements because all of them including Kisielew gave evidence of their own free will.

A few days later a Red Cross Commission arrived and set up a Red Cross flag on the site. The interpreter told us that from then on the whole place was under the control of the Red Cross. The members of the Red Cross Commission interviewed us and questioned us about everything we knew of the execution of the officers and only the interpreter was present during these hearings. We talked quite freely and nobody shouted at us.

I also talked to the delegation of the Polish prisoners of war. Initially we spoke through the intermediary of the interpreter but one of the Polish prisoners of war—an officer with two or three stars—told the interpreter that he spoke bad Russian and began to speak to us in Russian himself without the help of the interpreter. Among the members of that delegation was a Polish Lieut. Colonel but he did not speak Russian.

I also talked to the delegation of English prisoners of war. The Englishmen first inspected the graves and then came towards us accompanied by the German Propaganda Chief. The Germans began to shout for the "Dolmetcher" / interpreter /. At this moment one of the British delegates, a tall officer with spectacles, broke away from the group, and came up to us and in rather broken Russian asked us: "Półkownik choczet znat' skoliko platit nam dzienieg Giermany?" / "The Colonel wants to know how much the Germans pay you" /. Kisielew answered that nobody pays him anything. Later on the British questioned us through the intermediary of that English officer and asked us about how the Bolsheviks had transported the officers. After which they went off to inspect the graves of the executed Russians.

I also spoke to the members of the Polish Red Cross team. I recollect that one day after a certain body had been unearthed, the Poles after inspecting his documents began to talk excitedly among themselves and I overheard the name "Piłsudski" repeated once or twice. Interested, I moved up and asked them what had happened. To which they showed me the documents they held and told me that they had found the body of KALICINSKI—Piłsudski's personal physician.

Towards the end of May the Germans had finished the exhumation of the seven graves at this side of the swamp. At that time all the bodies from these seven graves had been taken out. Out of the eighth small grave on the other side of the swamp the Germans took out only a few bodies which they put back into the grave and ordered all exhumation works to be stopped.

Among those who gave evidence before the Germans was IWAN ANDREJEW from the village ZYTKI, nick-named "SZŁOPECZKA", over forty years old, not to be mixed up with the other IWAN ANDREJEW nick-named "RUMBA" / because of his crooked legs / who joined the evacuation to the West. In the summer of 1943 when rumours began to circulate that the Red Army was approaching the wife of SZŁOPECZKA threw him out of the house and declared she did not wish to live with him any longer. I understood then that she was afraid that when the Reds would come back all those who had testified before the Germans would be made responsible for it.

Throughout the years 1941 and 1942, after the Germans had taken over, no troops were ever stationed in the N. K. V. D. villa except for the high ranking German officer who, as I have already mentioned, lived there. Neither was the territory of the wood out of bounds and there were no guards around it, not even a fence the latter having been broken up for fuel. Anybody could stroll over the wood—I myself walked about it in search of mushrooms. The Germans never forbade us to walk in the neighbourhood of the villa. Neither did I ever see any cars arriving there except for the passenger car which belonged to the officer who lived there.

The people in the neighbourhood did not pay much attention to the whole matter because it was known to all that the N. K. V. D. had used Kozie Góry as an execution place for years and everyone knew how it was done.

SIEMON ANDREJEW from NOWE BATOKI who worked in the workshop at the 95 Depot in KRASNY BOR to where he travelled daily by train, heard from the railway workers that the Polish officers were brought over by the N. K. V. D. from Kozielew. I never heard anyone say about officers being brought also from Starobielsk or Ostaszów. ANDREJEW had moved further East to Russia before the Germans had arrived.

When the Red Army came up closer I decided to evacuate together with the Germans. IVAN ANDREJEW / "RUMBA" / who was an acquaintance of mine hesitated whether to go or to stay but I advised him to go West unless he wished to be shot by the N. K. V. D.

So he finally made up his mind and went Westward by car with the German interpreter THEODOR whose surname I forget. I wanted to go with them but they left me behind. It was therefore only a day or two later that I went out onto the highway and begged a German military policeman who regulated the traffic to help me to be taken West. He stopped a passing car which was going to ORSZA and that was how I left.

I have heard the name of MIENSZAGIN, who was the commandant of the city of Smoleńsk during the German occupation, but I know nothing of what had happened to him.

I wish to state additionally that when I first gave evidence before the Germans, the first one to be questioned was WASYLKOW, who was the third from among those who went to Kozie Góry for the first digging up of the graves. Wasyłkow, who was rather cowardly, when asked what he had seen answered that he had seen nothing and knows nothing to which the interpreter said: "Well, if you know nothing and you do not want to say anything you'd better go home".

On page 2 of this record in the 12-th line from the bottom the word "GUSTAW" has been written in; on page 3 in the 6-th line from the top the word "interpreter" has been added while in the 7-th line from the bottom "E 5" has been deleted and "95" inserted instead.

After having been read over, signed

/signatures/

S. Hubert.

KRIW /KRIWOŻERZOW/, in Russian/
K. Lewicki, Lieut.

H. Heitzman.

EXHIBIT 39B

Tel: KEN. 34-41
ext. 320.

8200/Stat./II/48.

Do: Komisja Likwid. M.O.N.
Pan Plik. Dypl. Lunkiewicz.

INSPEKTORAT GENERALNY PEPR:
Oddział Statystyczny
15, Egerton Gardens,
London, S.W.3.

29. paźdz. 1948.

POUFNE

Sprawa: Michał Łoboda / Kriwożerców / 1
Jan Chomiak - poszukiwanie.

Sledem pisma L. 8200/Stat./II. z dnia 12.X.48.
melduję Panu Lunkownikowi:

Władze brytyjskie powiadomiły mię, że Michał
Łoboda vel Kriwożerców zmarł w 1947r.

Zs Janem Chomiakiem trwają nadal poszukiwania.

.....Major
Szef Oddz. Stat. Insp. Gen. P.R.C.

[Translation copy Exhibit 39B]

Tel. KEN. 34-41.
Ext. 320.

8200/Stat./II/48.

To:
The Liquidation Committee, M.O.N.
P.S.C. Col. LUNKIEWICZ JERZY,

GENERAL INSPECTORATE OF THE P.R.C.
Statistical Department,
15, Egerton Gardens
London S. W. 3.

29-th October, 1948.
/ stamped with the word SECRET /.

In the matter of: MICHAŁ ŁOBODA / KRIWOŻERCÓW / and JAN CHOMIAK—
S E A R C H.

Further to my letter Ref. 8200/Stat./II dated the 12-th Oct. 1948 I report the following:

British Authorities have notified me that Michał ŁOBODA vel KRIWOŻERCÓW died in 1947.

The search as to the whereabouts of Jan CHOMIAK is still in progress.

/ Illegible signature / Major,
Chief of the Stat. Dept. of the Gen. Insp.
P.R.C.

Mr. FLOOD. For the benefit of the record, and to orient these exhibits which are being considered later by the committee, will you just state briefly the elements of this Kriwoserzew case, and its significance to the Katyn matter?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Kriwoserzew——

Mr. FLOOD. I want to know who he was, how he came to the attention of the Polish London Government, and what connection he has (or his case has) with Katyn. Just give me in one paragraph Colonel, for the purpose of the documentary record, the significance of this man to this case.

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Kriwoserzew was an inhabitant of a village near Gnizdowa. There he has many friends, and from them he learned about the fate of the Polish officers in Katyn Forest. Later, when the Russians started the offensive, he fled to Germany and worked in Berlin. Later he went to the western zone of Germany where he went to the Polish authorities declaring that he is a witness of the Katyn massacre.

Mr. FLOOD. Did this man come to London?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. He was in communication with you here in London?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And he was subsequently found dead in London?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Not in London, in the provinces.

Mr. FLOOD. In England?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. In England, yes.

Mr. FLOOD. At this time I will ask this witness to step aside while we place on the stand the investigator for the committee, Mr. Pucinski.

TESTIMONY OF ROMAN PUCINSKI, [INVESTIGATOR FOR THE COMMITTEE

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Pucinski, you have already been sworn in this matter. I am advised that you have to present to the committee a document having to do with the Kriwoserzew case, is that correct?

Mr. PUCINSKI. That is correct, Mr. Flood.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you present that to me at this time?

Mr. PUCINSKI. Yes. [Document handed to Mr. Flood.]

Mr. FLOOD. I now ask the stenographer to mark as exhibit No. 40 the document just handed to me by the investigator.

(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit No. 40" and follows:)

EXHIBIT 40

I KRIWOSERZEW Ivan
born on ^{in Krasnodar, Russia, Russian Army} 20.7.1915 reported
to the first Polish officer
I met to ~~ref~~ tell the
whole story of the
massacre of the Polish
officers at Katyn in 1940.
My village was situated
about 3 kilometers from
the wood where the shooting
took place.
When the place ^{was} ~~was~~
occupied by the
Germans ~~but~~ I stayed

there in my home village, ^{Gierdank}
 In 1943 I learned from the
 Germans that they were
 interested ^{in finding the missing Polish off} in the massacre
 of Polish Officers, and
 that the matter is of
 international importance.

I reported to them ^{and to different ~~institutions~~}
 them all I knew ^{and to different ~~institutions~~} ^{for}
 I was the first to show them the graves
 three months on opening the
 mass graves of Polish Officers
 when Russians moved forward
 I was sent by the Germans
 into Germany and worked as
 a railway worker in Berlin
 Before Russians occupied Berlin
 I fled on foot here.
 I state the above solemnly in
 place of oath. (Signed) (Xpudizg)

Verden 31.5.45

[Translation of Exhibit 40]

I KRIWOSERZEW Ivan born at Gniezdowo, Russia, Russian Citizen, on 20.7.1915 reported to the first Polish officer I met to tell the whole story of the massacre of the Polish officers at Katyn in 1940.

My village was situated about 3 kilometers from the wood where the shooting took place.

When the place was occupied by the Germans I stayed there (in my Home village, Gniezdowo). I learned from the Germans that they are interested in finding the missing Polish officers, interested in the massacre of Polish officers, and that the matter is of international importance. I reported to them and told them all I knew and to different International inquiring committees. I was the first to show them the graves. I worked for three months in opening the mass graves of Polish officers.

When Russians moved forward I was sent by the Germans into Germany and worked as a railway-worker in Berlin. Before Russian occupied Berlin I fled on foot here.

I state the above solemnly in place of oath.

(Signed) (Kriw)
Kriwozerzew
(in Russian)

Verden, 31.5.45.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Pucinski, I now show you exhibit No. 40, and ask you to identify what that exhibit is.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Flood, this is an original statement reportedly in the handwriting of Kriwozerzew, made to a Polish officer, and signed in his own handwriting—

Mr. FLOOD. Whose own handwriting?

Mr. PUCINSKI. In Kriwozerzew's handwriting, his own signature, on May 31, 1945, in a displaced persons camp at Verden in Germany. This statement was taken by a Major Gruber, who had been referred to by our undisclosed witness in Chicago, and subsequently turned over—

Mr. FLOOD. By "undisclosed witness", you mean a witness that we had called and sworn in Chicago, whose identity was known to the committee, but for the reason of his having relatives behind the iron curtain, the committee did not disclose his name?

Mr. PUCINSKI. That is correct; and this statement subsequently was turned over to the Polish Government in exile, and it was given to me the other day by Mr. Jankowski—

Mr. FLOOD. By whom?

Mr. PUCINSKI. By Mr. Jankowski, on instructions of the President of the Polish Government in exile, Mr. Zaleski.

Mr. FLOOD. And the document has been in your possession ever since until such time as you present it to the committee now?

Mr. PUCINSKI. That is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. We will offer that in evidence.

Now, Colonel Lunkiewicz, will you return to the stand?

TESTIMONY OF COL. JERZY LUNKIEWICZ—Resumed

Mr. FLOOD. Will you let me have in one folder all of the communications, telegrams, memoranda and so forth, which you referred to as dealing with the matter of Katyn?

Will you describe briefly what those documents are?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. These are statements of the visiting Polish journalist, Mr. Goetel, in Katyn. They were made in 1946 so you can see he didn't think those things up just recently.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Goetel was a witness who testified before this committee on yesterday's hearing?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes. This is the testimony of Mrs. Ostromecka about the body of her sister which was found in the Katyn grave.

Mr. FLOOD. As I understand it, Colonel, the lady to whom you now refer with reference to this particular document is the sister of the only female whose body was found with those of the Polish officers at Katyn, and that female was a Polish aviatress?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. And this is a document of her sister?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Anything else?

Mr. LUNKIEWICZ. No, that is all, in this matter.

I now ask the stenographer to mark for identification exhibits No. 41 and No. 42.

(Documents referred to marked "Exhibit No. 41" for identification, and "Exhibit No. 42" for identification.)

Mr. FLOOD. I now show you, Colonel, exhibit No. 41 and ask you whether or not that is the exhibit containing the document to which you have just referred in your testimony, namely, statements with reference to Katyn from Mr. Goetel?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. I now show you exhibit No. 42 and ask you whether or not it is an exact copy of statements made by Mrs. Musnika.

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. It is, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. In that case we offer in evidence translations of exhibit No. 41 and exhibit No. 42. Photostatic copies of the original statements will remain as part of this committee's permanent file.

[Translation copy of Exhibit 41]

REPORT BY FERDYNAND GOETEL ON HIS VISIT TO KATYN

In the first days of April 1943, I received a telephone call from Wladyslaw Zyglarski, the Secretary of the Society of Authors and Journalists and during the Occupation, one of the members of the so called Literary Committee of the R.G.O. /Central Council of Welfare/. He informed me that I was being sought in some urgent matter by Dr. Grundman from the "Abteilung Propaganda" of the "General Gouvernement". Thinking that I was wanted about something which had to do with the canteen kitchen in the building of the Literary Society I went to town to find out whether something had occurred in the canteen. In the meantime, Grundman had found out from Zyglarski that I lived in Zoliborz, 56, Mickiewicz Street and had come to my house by car. Not having found me at home he repeated to my wife that he had a very urgent matter to see me about and he made a note of the telephone number in the nearest little shop. I usually made use of the telephone belonging to the photographer who lived in the basement of out house. Zyglarski and one or two others knew of its existence.

Having decided that something new must have happened I went to see Grundman even before noon on the same day. He told me that in the vicinity of Smolensk in a place called Kozie Góry the Intelligence Service of the German Army had discovered enormous mass graves in which were buried murdered Polish officers. The exhumation works had already begun and the results were most startling. There were to be several thousand victims. The German Authorities greatly stirred by this discovery had decided to send to the place a Polish delegation to which all help would be given without asking in return for any public statements including such which could be used by German propaganda.

I was taken aback by this news which immediately brought to my mind the idea that this might well be a clue to the mystery of the missing Polish prisoners of war who had vanished from the camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostaszów.

After some quick thinking I asked Grundman why did not he approach the Polish Red Cross in this matter, it being the most suitable institution to deal with such a case, both because of its statutory aims and because of the importance the Polish public would attach to its opinion. Grundman replied that although in his opinion the P.R.C. should in fact be asked to take this matter in hand there were reasons which made the relations between the German Authorities and this Institution difficult. He hinted that probably I knew what these reasons were.

Which in fact I did. The P. R. C. was the only institution in the General Government which persisted as a remnant and vestige of the sovereign Polish State. Shielded by International Law the P. R. C. successfully resisted the several attempts to liquidate it undertaken by the Germans. As a result its existence was little more than a formality and its activities were reduced to the narrowest frames of taking care of the invalides of the 1939 campaign.

Realizing that, if the news about Kozie Góry would turn out to be true, the position of the P. R. C. might all of a sudden greatly gain in strength, I stipulated that in the event of my going to Katyń I was going to send a report about my observations made there to the P. R. C. In the first place, however, I would like to be told who was supposed to participate in the delegation. Grundman stated that invitations to join the delegation had been sent out to representatives of the Central Board of the R. G. O., and of the Warsaw branch of the R. G. O., to the clergy, to the Warsaw Municipal Council and to the Judicature. I was going to meet the representatives of all these institutions at an informative conference in the "Propagandaamt" which was to take place tomorrow morning. The departure by air would take place in the morning of the third day. I declared then that in given circumstances I was willing to take part in the delegation subject however to my opinion about what I was going to see not being hampered in any way since I would be going there in the capacity of a counsel to Poland. I warned that I had no intention of concealing whatever I was about to see in Kozie Góry and that I would do my utmost to acquaint Polish public opinion with my observations. Grundman agreed to my conditions.

Having left Grundman I immediately tried to establish contact with the "Underground" and with the institutions Grundman had mentioned to me. I was a member of the O. P. W. ("Fighting Poland") and at the time I was editor of the "Nurt" /"Undercurrent"/. I had no direct contact with Julian Piasecki who was my superior. My liason "Karol" would be contacting me only in a few days time. I therefore made use of another channel and through the intermediary of a neighbour of mine Marjan Buezkowski and his liason "Marta" I passed the information about my interview with Grundman to Hubert who was then Chief of Propaganda of the Underground Army for the Warsaw district.

According to Buezkowski Hubert did not take my news very seriously and was supposed to have said that: "The Germans are trying to put a fast one on Goetel". However, he gave his consent to my going to Smoleńsk requesting that I give him a full report upon my return.

Next I got in touch by telephone with President Kulski and Machnicki from the R. G. O. Neither of them denied that they had been invited to undertake the journey but they also seemed to take the whole matter rather lightly and were somewhat scared of it. The attitude of Hubert as that of the others rather annoyed me. The element of aversion for any initiative on the part of the Germans did not seem to me to be a sufficient excuse in this particular case. I was aware that the Katyń case was going to be a painful and dangerous venture to whoever was going to be mixed up with it. Because whatever we were going to discover there we were liable to becoming targets of an attack—either from the Germans or from the Bolsheviks. A foretaste of the latter already began to let itself be felt in Warsaw.

At the meeting which took place the next day in the "Propagandaamt" I met representatives of the City of Warsaw in the persons of Dr. Kipa and Dr. Zawistowski, President Kulski having excused himself because of pressure of work. The Warsaw R. G. O. was represented by director Machnicki and Wachowiak, the Clergy by the Rev. Prelate Father Kozubski, the judicature by someone I did not know. There were a few other persons present whose names I do not recollect and also Emil Skiwski, the writer, whose name was not mentioned to me by Grundman the day before. Grundman repeated to us the story about the Kozie Góry adding to it fresh details and then read to us the list of institutions and individuals who had been invited to participate asking us one by one whether we were willing to go. Father Kozubski declined giving as excuse the illness of Mgr. Szlagowski the Bishop of Warsaw and also his own awe of a journey by

aeroplane. Machnicki and Wachowiak also refused, however, they named someone else who would be going as a representative of the R. G. O. Dr. Kipa also gave a name of a doctor who would be sent as a delegate of the City of Warsaw while the man representing the judicature said that the President of the Court of Justice was seriously ill but that a delegate would be nominated and that he would report at the airport. If I remember rightly Father Kozubski gave finally a similar promise in the name of the Clergy. /Neither the representative of the Clergy nor of the judicature ever turned up the next day at the airport.

The following day at the airport I met two doctors, one from the City Council and one from the R. G. O. There was also Emil Skiwski and a few photographers. No representatives of the official press were present. There was however, a gentleman who introduced himself as the editor of a Lublin newspaper. From Cracow, by air, came Edward Seydriz, Director of the Central Board of the R. G. O. and Olenbusch, Chief of the German Propaganda for the whole of the General Gouvernement accompanied by a German cameraman in uniform. Finally there arrived a Pole allegedly from the Cracow Broadcasting Service who introduced himself by the name of Wasowicz.

We reached the Smoleńsk airport at noon. During the afternoon the Germans took us for a tour round the town and in the evening in the officers' mess they introduced to us three officers from the Propaganda Unit attached to the Smoleńsk Army. Two of them were lieutenants, one was a captain. The Katyn case was explained to us by Lieut. Slovencik, an officer of the reserve, allegedly a journalist by profession from Vienna. Of the other two one introduced himself as a sculptor from Innsbruck. A lieutenant with the badges of the "Geheimpolizei" listened to our conversation from time to time. I guess that this must have been Voss of whose existence I learned only later.

Slovencik acquainted us with a more exact version about Katyn and showed us photographs of the forest, of the bodies and of the documents found on the bodies. He also showed us a few original documents which had already been disinfected.

One or two details of his story are worth mentioning. In the first place, the details about how the graves had been discovered. First traces of these had been found by the "Feldpolizei" [Field Police] which, at the time, was carrying out intelligence investigations among the local inhabitants. Apparently, those living in the neighborhood of the Kozie Góry forest—a part of the larger Katyn wood which stretches along the Dnieper river and the Smoleńsk-Witebsk highway—maintained that in the Kozie Góry forest, which for years had been a place of execution guarded by the NKVD, several thousand Polish officers had been shot and buried in mass graves. Allegedly, these mass graves had been discovered later on by Polish workers enrolled in the "Todt" organization who, having dug up one small place and having made certain that it was really Poles buried there, had raised a wooden cross on the spot of which there even existed a photograph. The cross itself must have been destroyed during the first major exhumation works. Anyhow it had served to indicate from where to start the digging. To our question of whether any of those Polish workers had been traced Slovencik answered in the negative.

Another even more interesting detail of our conversation with Slovencik was that although he was inclined to describe the whole case as a most dramatic incident from the Polish point of view—he had no idea where could have come from all these bodies of Polish officers. All he knew was what the local inhabitants had told him that they had been brought in transports arriving from the direction of Smoleńsk. As he already had in hand photographs and, I think, even originals of some of the letters and postcards found on the bodies he asked us whether we could explain why the address of Kozielsk repeated itself so often on many of the cards. I told him in short what I knew about the camps of Kozielsk, Ostaszów, and Starobielsk and I closely watched his reaction to this piece of news. It was most lively and convinced me beyond all doubt that Slovencik had learned about Kozielsk only from us. It was the only detail of our conversation of which he made a note. A moment later, after we had finished our talk, I heard him repeating the news about Kozielsk to Olenbusch and to the other Germans. I think that Voss was no longer in the room at that time.

Early next morning we were driven in cars to Kozie Góry. Turning into the wood we drew up not far from a large dug up site. It had the shape of a long ditch dug out probably along the whole length of the grave and right to its bottom but not to its full width which was made evident /x del. P.9./ by the feet and the heads of the corpses visible to both its sides. The sectional view of the grave showed that the bodies were lying in good order ranged in a few layers one on top of the

other. The grave excavated in the hilly site of Kozie Góry had in its upper part a dry soil composed of a mixture of sand and clay but in its lower part showed signs of subterranean water seeping through the soil. Not far away we were shown preliminary works for the unearthing of a second grave in which only the top layers of bodies had been uncovered. In both the graves local Russians were employed for digging out the bodies.

On the very spot and very close to the graves stood a small provisional hut in which worked the exhumation team under the supervision of Dr. Butz, professor of forensic medicine of the Wrocław University. Prof. Butz was in uniform in the rank of a colonel.

The works were only barely started. Nor far from the graves, on a clearing in the wood, about 200 bodies already unearthed were lying awaiting dissection. The bodies were numbered and ranged in a few rows. Near Dr. Butz's hut a number of other bodies were lying about probably those already examined by the professor. Parts of the uniforms taken of the bodies were hanging about on neighboring trees and branches. The whole gave the impression of a job only just started and not quite organized as yet. Dr. Butz asked us to choose any of the bodies we wished and that he would order them to be exhumed and examined in our presence. We pointed to a body in the middle of the grave. The dissection showed a skull pierced through by a bullet with both the entry and the exit holes visible. From a pocket cut open with a dissecting knife Dr. Butz pulled out a postcard addressed to a cavalry captain whose name I no longer remember. The card was written by his wife from the county of Grodzisk and was addressed to Kozielsk.

Among the bodies already identified which were lying around the hut were the bodies of General Smorawiński and General Bohatyrewicz. Answering my request Dr. Butz cut off one of the shoulderstraps from the uniform of General Smorawiński and tore off the ribbon of the *Virtuti-Militari* Cross from Gen. Bohatyrewicz's overcoat. I took these back with me to Warsaw together with a few buttons and a pinch of earth from the grave. I had these relics in my care till the Warsaw rising during which they were burned together with the whole flat and house in which I lived.

We then walked round over the whole of the area of the graves and we soon learned how to discern the graves as yet untouched. Their sides were slightly hollow, their surface uneven and they were covered up by young pine trees undoubtedly planted upon them in order to conceal them. Those small trees were all of an equal size and were clearly discernable against the background of the fairly young but wild and unkept pine wood surrounding them. The little pines planted over the graves were healthy and must have been growing upon the graves for more than one year.

From Dr. Butz I also received a list of names of those bodies which he was able to identify. There were about 30 of them. I added supplementary names to this list and checked it again in Gruszczenka on our way back.

During our stay in Kozie Góry German propaganda operators transmitted their observations about our visit there and several times they coaxed us to speak to the microphone and declare that the crime had been perpetrated by the Bolsheviks. We evaded these suggestions every time, finally however, urged and bored by the incessant coaxing I did say one sentence into the microphone in which I stated that in my opinion the bodies lying in these graves were those of the prisoners of war from Kozielsk of whom nothing had been heard since April 1940.

The man who had introduced himself to us as Wąsowiec made a long and pompous speech to the microphone.

Before leaving Kozie Góry I asked the Germans to leave us alone for a while at the graves because we wanted to honour the memory of the fallen victims. I had agreed the day before with Dir. Seyfried to make this move. The Germans withdrew and, as we stood over the graves, Dir. Seyfried uttered the following sentence: "I call upon the Polish Delegation to honour by a short silence the memory of our countrymen fallen here who had given their lives so that Poland could live". I wrote down these words and later on I included them into the statement sent to the Polish Red Cross with a request that a copy be sent to the Office of Propaganda.

Apart / x - del. P. 9. / from the episode with the radio propaganda we were unmolested by the Germans. /xx/del. P. 9./ We were given complete freedom of our movements and our talks with the local inhabitants were conducted in absolute freedom.

On our way back to Smoleńsk we stopped in the village of Gruszczenka where, in a house by the road, we were shown various objects and documents from Kozie Góry already classified. Some of them were displayed in glass cases.

I would also like to mention that during our visit to Kozie Góry certain members of our group talked to representatives of the local inhabitants. I listened to these without taking active part in them myself. These people confirmed in full the German version both as to the Kozie Góry site being an old place of execution and about the Bolsheviks having shot the Polish officers. I did not participate in these talks myself, because the circumstances in which they took place i. e. the hurry and the nervousness, made difficult both a methodical questioning and coherent answering.

We returned to Warsaw on the same evening. Upon my return I wrote a report to the Polish Red Cross. Through Buczkowski I sent a copy of this report together with further comments and the list of the first identified bodies to Hubert and another one through "Koral" to Julian Piasecki. When delivering my letter to the Polish Red Cross I asked that a copy of it be sent to Dr. Grundman of the "Propagandaamt". The reason for doing so had nothing to do with any sort of "co-operation" with the Propagandaamt in the matter of Katyń. By means of sending a copy of my report to Grundman I wanted on the one hand to force the German authorities into entrusting the investigating of the Katyń case to the Polish Red Cross while at the same time I hoped that by doing so I would succeed in breaking the reluctance shown in the matter of Katyń by the Polish Red Cross and other institutions.

In order to bring home my point even more drastically I made a few extra copies which I distributed to trustworthy persons. It is difficult for me to say today who had read and who remembers this report of mine. However, I know for sure that from among those who have remained in Poland it was read by the following personalities of the literary world: Jerzy Zagórski, Marian Buczkowski, Wilam Horzyca; of those residing in other countries, Józef Targowski and Alfred Wysocki must have read it as also did Mr. Wiesław Wóchnout and Lieut. Witold Tróscianko who are at present in England.

This report contained a description of our trip to Katyń and my impressions of what I saw there. In its conclusion the report stated that in all probability in the graves were buried all officers from Kozielek and maybe other victims as well. Further to that I stated that "I had made no other statements in this matter neither do I intend to do so", and finally I appealed that the carrying out of a thorough investigation of the Kozie Góry graves should be entrusted to the International Red Cross Commission.

I give these details about my report because when a warrant for my arrest was issued in 1945 I told my daughter to ask the Polish Red Cross for a copy of it. I had not a single one left because it was burnt together with all my documents in Warsaw. The Red Cross answered that it had no such letter. If that was really true it would be rather interesting to find out what had happened to it.

A few days after my return from Katyń I was informed through Hubert that my report was instantly passed on to General Rowecki who requested that I be told that "I had rendered service to the Polish cause by the attitude I had taken in the Katyń case". The report was to have been radioed to London. These informations had been passed on to me by Marian Buczkowski who was my Liaison with Hubert. Buczkowski cooperated with the propaganda unit of the Warsaw Underground Army in which he acted as the commander of section "R".

After the entry of the Bolsheviks into Poland and after a warrant for my arrest had been issued I still remained in Poland for a while. The prospect of my eventual trial rather interested me because I believed that I could drag out to light the Katyń case during the proceedings. Seeing however that such a possibility was becoming more and more remote and that the search after my whereabouts considerably slackened;—that, on the other hand, the Polish Red Cross had lost trace of my report and that the majority of those Poles who had visited Katyń had signed a declaration which the Public Prosecutor's Office had given them to sign and which contained the statement that they had been taken to Katyń by the Germans under duress and, when there, they had come to the conclusion that the Katyń massacre had been perpetrated by the Germans—I realised that under no account would I be given an opportunity to let myself be heard. I therefore left Poland in December 1945 to arrive to Italy in January 1946 and finally land in England in October 1946.

—/— Ferdynand Goetel.

London, 19-th December 1946.

[Translation copy of exhibit 42]

REPORT OF MRS. JANINA DOWBÓR-MUŚNICKA

Mrs. Janina Dowbór-Muśnicka, born in 1910, daughter of General Joseph Dowbór-Muśnicki, was a member of the Poznań Aeroclub. She married Col. Lewandowski in the summer of 1939. In January 1941, Mr. Rafał Bniński, from Samostrzel in the district of Poznań who had escaped from Soviet imprisonment to territories incorporated into the Reich and later on had found his way through to Warsaw and who was a good friend of the family Dowbór-Muśnickiś, related to me in Warsaw that Mrs. Janina born Dowbór-Muśnicka was imprisoned by the Soviets in Kozielsk. She had been taken prisoner by the Russians because after the outbreak of war on September 1-st 1939 she took an active part in it and while on duty on a reconnaissance flight over Eastern Poland was shot down by the Red Army and taken prisoner as a Lieutenant of the Polish Airforce and deported eastward. As to the conditions and her mode of life in the Kozielsk camp Mr. Bniński informed me that she was kept in separate premises and that she was taking active part in the secret religious activities of the camp taking part in clandestine Services and baking out wafer altar Bread for which reason she was persecuted by the camp authorities who carried out several searches of her premises.

Mr. Rafał Bniński lost his life later on having been shot by the Germans during the occupation.

/Signed/ Mrs. ALEXANDRA ZOFIA OSTROMECKA,
born Dowbór-Muśnicka, daughter of General
Konstantine Dowbór-Muśnicki,
brother of General Joseph Dowbór-Muśnicki.

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. What are they?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. I have here a document which gives instructions by the NKVD about Baltic prisoners—

Mr. DONDERO. Let me ask this: Do those instructions follow the line of the type to which Father Braun testified in the United States?

Mr. PUCINSKI. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. As to the disposition of Baltic and Polish prisoners?

Mr. PUCINSKI. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. They were to be disposed of, or liquidated or killed, or whatever word you want to use?

Mr. PUCINSKI. That is correct, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. Then mark it for identification as exhibit No. 43.

(Instructions referred to marked "Exhibit No. 43 for identification.")

(Exhibit No. 43 is as follows:)

EXHIBIT 43

MINISTERSTWO OBRONY NARODOWEJ
WYDZIAŁ WYWIADU OBRONNEGO

TAJNE 1839/W.P.R. 143

Szef Wydziału Politycznego MON.

L. Sz. 6006 / W. 143.
Londyn, dnia 21. XII. 1943 r.
Sowieckie Instrukcja o wysiedla-
niu ludności z okupowanych
Krajev Bałtyckich- inf.

W z i e j s c u . 3

97

Przesyłam w załączeniu do wiadomości odbitkę fotograficzną
sowieckiej "Instrukcji o przeprowadzeniu wysiedlenia
ludności z terenów okupowanych Litwy, Łotwy i Estonii, wro-
go ustosunkowanej do władzy sowieckiej".

Wymieniona instrukcja została zamieszczona w wydawnictwie
litewskim, wydanym przez Komitet badania skutków okupacji
sowieckiej na Litwie pod nazwą "Archiwum litewskie Tom I."
wydany w Kownie w 1942 r..

Zal. 1. SZEF WYDZIAŁU WYWIADU OBRONNEGO MON.

Otrzymuje : *Florausk*
O R Ł O W S K I
ppłk. dypl.

Szef Oddziału Specjalnego Szt.n.W.

*P. T.
Przewodniczący
Komitetu*

Instrukcja powyższa była ściśle wykon-
na również na terenach okupowanych
Polski 4 W.

Moskvos instrukcija trijų tautų sunaikinimo reikšiai

Moskva, norėdama likviduoti Pabaltijo tautas ir nušalinti jas nuo žemės paviršiaus, parengė šurpią šių trijų tautų sunaikinimo instrukciją. Tai nepaprastai svarbus ir reikšmingas istorinis dokumentas. Jis dedamas šia išlisai foto nuotraukų pavidale.

СЕКРЕТНО СЕКРЕТНО.И Н С Т Р У К Ц И Я

о порядке проведения операции по выселению антисоветского элемента из Литвы, Латвии и Эстонии.

1. Общие положения.

Выселение антисоветского элемента из Прибалтийских республик представляет собой задачу большой политической важности. Успешное разрешение ее зависит от того, насколько умелыми оперативными группами и оперативными штабами сумеет оперативно разработать план проведения операции и предусмотреть заранее все необходимое. При этом надо исходить из того, чтобы операция прошла без шума и паники, так, чтобы не допустить никаких выступлений и других эксцессов не только со стороны выселяемых, но и со стороны известной части окружающего населения — в основном настроенного по отношению к Советской власти.

Ниже изложены указания о порядке проведения операции. Их следует придерживаться, однако в отдельных случаях сотрудники, проводящие операцию, исходя из особенностей конкретных условий операции и чтобы правильно оценить обстановку, могут и должны принимать иные решения, направленные к той же цели — без шума и паники выполнить данное им задание.

2. Порядок инструктирования.

Инструктаж оперативных групп умелыми группами проводится накануне, за максимальный короткий срок до начала операции, с учетом необходимого времени на проезд к месту операции.

Уездным тройкам заранее получить необходимый транспорт для переброски оперативных групп в село к месту операции.

По заданию выданный необходимого количества автотранспорта и грузового, уездные тройки договориваются на местах с руководящими советско-партийных организациями,

Появление для инструктажа должно быть тщательно заранее подготовлено, учтена известность, выходы и входы и возможность проникновения в него посторонних лиц.

Во время инструктажа здания должны быть обеспечены охраной из числа оперативных работников.

В случае, если на инструктаже кто-либо не явился из состава учетчиков операции, уездная тройка немедленно принимает меры и замене найденного из резерва, который охрана должна быть предусмотрена.

Через участковые тройки сообщают собраниям о решении правительства, о высылке с территории данки республики для района учетного антивоенского контингента. При этом коротко рассказывают, что выселяемые на себя представляют.

Обратить особое внимание присутствующих на инструктаже советско-партийных работников /на жестику/, что выселяемые являются врагами Советского народа, а поэтому не исключена возможность совершения вооруженного нападения со стороны выселяемых.

3. Порядок получения документов.

После общего инструктажа оперативных групп, последним необходимо выдать документы на выселяемых. Личные дела на выселяемых должны быть заранее подобраны и разложены по оперативным группам, водостям и селам, чтобы при выдате не было никаких задержек.

После получения личных дел старшей опергруппы знакомится с личными делами семьи, которые ему предстоит выселять. При этом устанавливает состав семьи, наличие необходимых вещей для вывоза на высланный, наличие транспорта для перевозки высланных и получает исчерпывающие ответы на все ему вопросы.

Одновременно с выдачей документов условно можно разъяснить каждому старшему опергруппы, где расположено место выезда семьи и рассказывает маршрут движения к месту выезда. Устанавливает также пути следования оперативного состава с высланными семьями к железной дорожной станции для отправки. Немедленно также указывает место резерва рабочей группы в случае необходимости выезда во время казнь-либо эксцессов.

У всего оперативного состава проводится проверка и составление оружия и боеприпасов. Оружие должно быть в полной боевой готовности, заряжено, но патроны в магазин не закладываются. Оружие применяется в крайнем случае, когда на опергруппу производится нападение или охвачено вооруженное нападение, или сопротивление.

4. Порядок проведения выселения.

В том случае, если в населенном пункте проводится выселение нескольких семей, тогда назначается один из оперативников старшим по выселению в этом селе, под руководством которого и следует оперативный состав в данный день.

Приехав в село, оперативные группы связываются /при необходимости необходимой конспирации/ с местными представителями власти: председателем, секретарем или членами сельских советов /и выписки у них точные местожительства выселяемых семей. После этого оперативные группы, вместе с представителями власти, которые выделены на производство описи имущества,

направляется к выселенным семьям.

Операция будет начата с наступлением рассвета. Волею в дом выселенного, старший оперативной группы собирает все семьи выселенного в одну комнату, принимает при этом необходимые меры предосторожности против возможности каких-либо эксцессов.

Проверка состав семей по списку, выясняет местонахождение отсутствующих и наличие больных, после чего предлагает сдать имеющееся у них оружие. В зависимости от того, будет ли дано оружие или нет, проводится личный обыск выселенных, в затеи и обыск всего помещения, с целью обнаружения оружия.

Во время обыска помещения для наблюдения за поведением выселенных назначаются один из членов оперативной группы.

Если при обыске обнаружено оружие в небольшом количестве, то его выбирает опергруппа, распределяет между собой. Если оружия найдено много, то оно, с вынужденными затворами, складывается на повозку или автомашину прибывшей опергруппы. Вооруженные укладываются и грузятся вместе с кинтовками.

При необходимости, для перевозки оружия мобилизуется подвоз с соответствующей охрanoi.

В случае обнаружения оружия, контрреволюционной литературы, иностранной валюты, большого количества ценностей и т.д., об этом составляется на месте краткий протокол обыска, в котором указывается об обнаруженном оружии как контрреволюционной литературе. При оказании вооруженного сопротивления, о лицах оказавших вооруженное сопротивление решается вопрос уездными тройками о необходимости их ареста и доставки в уездный отдел НКВД.

На лиц, из числа выселенных сврзавшихся до выселения или больных, составляется акт с подписью представителя

совєспартакіза.

После производств обшкы выселяючы обявляю-
са, что она по решению Прравительства будут выселены в другие об-
ласти Союза.

Выселяючы разрешается взять с собой вещи для ма-
шого обихода, весом не более 100 кг.

1. Одежду;
2. Обувь,
3. Велье,
4. Постельные принадлежности,
5. Посуду столовую,
6. Посуду чайную,
7. Посуду кухонную,
8. Продовольствие - из расчета месячного запаса на семью,
9. Имяющиеся у них деньги,
10. Сундуки или ящики для упаковки вещей.

Промоудные вещи брать не рекомендуется.

При выселении контингента в сельских местнос-
тих, разрешается брать с собой мелкий сельско-хозяйственный ин-
вентарь: топоры, пилы и другие вещи, которые складываются вместе
и упаковываются отдельно от обиходных вещей с тем, чтобы при послед-
стве в эшелон они были бы погружены в отдельные специально выде-
ленные товарные вагоны.

Чтобы не смешать с чужими вещами, на упаковочном
инвентаре надлежит сделать надпись - имя, отчество, фамилию высе-
ляемого и деревни.

При погрузке этих вещей на подводу, принимается
меры к тому, чтобы выселяемый не мог ими воспользоваться для
оказавшихся случайными во время движения колонны на шоссе.

Одновременно с погрузкой оперативными
группами, при участии в этом представители советско-партий-
ных организаций должны следить за инвентарем и организацией его

хранение в соответствии с подученными или указанными.

Если выселяемый располагает собственным средством передвижения, то его имущество грузится на подводу и вместе с семьей направляется на назначенный пункт погрузки.

Если у выселяемых средства передвижения нет, то направляются в село подводы через известную власть по указанию старшего отборгруппы.

Все лица, которые во время производства операции войдут в дом выселяемых или не будут находиться там к моменту проведения операции, должны быть задержаны до окончания операции, при этой выясняют их отношение к выселяемым. Это делается с той целью, чтобы выявить скрывающихся от розыск полиции — слуг, замаскированных и других лиц.

После проверки задержанных и установления, что они являются лицами не интересующего нас континента, таковых освободить.

Если у дома выселяемого во время производства операции начнут собираться жители села, то надо им предложить расойти по домам, не допуская при этом образования толпы.

Если выселяемый отказывается открыть дверь своего дома несмотря на то что ему будет известно, что придется потрудиться НКВД, дверь необходимо взломать. В отдельных случаях привлекается на помощь соседние оперативные группы, проводящие в данной местности операцию.

Доставка выселяемых из села на сборный пункт железнодорожно-дорожной станции производится обязательно в течение светлого времени дня, следует стараться при этом, чтобы сбор каждой семьи продолжался не более двух часов.

Действовать во время операции во всех случаях необходимо твердо и решительно, без малейшей суеты, шума и паники.

Отобрать лично-либо всеми выселяемых, за исключением оружия, контрреволюционной литературы и валюты, а также пользоваться продуктами питания выселяемых - категорически воспрещается.

Предупредить всех участников операции о строгой судебной ответственности за попытку присвоения отдельных вещей выселяемых.

5. Порядок разделения семьи выселяемого от главы.

Ввиду того, что большое количество выселяемых должно быть арестовано и размещено в специальные лагеря, а их семья следует в места специальных поселений в отдаленных областях, поэтому необходимо операции по настигу, как выселяемых членов семьи, так и главы их, проводить одновременно на об"являя им о предстоящем их разделении. После того, когда проведен обыск и оформлены соответствующие документы для личного дела, в квартире выселяемого, оперативный работник заполняет документы на главу семьи, вкладывает их в личное дело на него, а документы, оформленные на членов семьи, вкладываются в личное дело выселяемой семьи.

Сопровождение же всей семьи до станции погрузки производится на одной подводе и лишь на станции погрузки главу семьи помещают отдельно от семьи, в специально предназначенный для глав семей вагон.

Во время сбора в квартире выселяем их предупредить главу семьи о том, что личные вещи не выносятся в отдельный чемодан, так как будет проходить самостоятельная высадка семьи мужчинами отдельно от женщин и детей.

На станциях погрузка по указанию комендантов аресту, грузить в особые отведенные для них вагоны, которые будут указывать выделенный для этой цели округ, район или станция.

6. Порядок химвисерованки вагонов.

Сотрудники, выполняющие работу выгрузки и доставки на подорожках, садиться на подорожки и отвечать на вопросы. Сотрудники должны следить за тем, чтобы вагоны выгружались. Старшие должны периодически проверять все вагоны, проверять правильность доставки.

При выполнении работы выгрузки и доставки, а также при выполнении работы доставки, должны следить за тем, чтобы не было нарушений, не допускали таких вещей, как нарушение правил доставки и т.д.

7. Порядок доставки в вагоны.

На каждой станции погрузки обязательно за погрузку выделены все оперативные службы и персонал выделенный для этой цели.

В день выполнения работы погрузки, обязательно с начальником вагона и конной войска НКВД, ознакомлены представители военной дороги, с точным указанием в вагонах их всех необходимых /материалы, инструменты, фонари, лампы и др./ и условия с начальником вагона о порядке доставки в вагоны.

Сотрудники погрузки обязательно ознакомлены с правилами доставки в вагоны НКВД.

Старшие оперативные службы передают начальнику вагона свои указания по доставке в вагоны. Начальник вагона

по стону спуска вызывает выселенных, каждому выдается твистельно проверят и укажут место в вагоне.

Вагины грузятся вместе с выселенными в вагон за исключением малозначительного сельско-хозяйственного инвентаря, который грузится в отдельный вагон.

Выселенные грузятся в вагоны по семьям, дробить семьи не разрешается /за исключением голов семей подпадающих аресту/. Надо рассчитать таким образом, чтобы было до 25 человек на вагон.

После того, как вагон заполнен, необходимым количеством семей, он закрывается.

После приема и посадки людей в вагон, начальник эшелона несет ответственность за всех переданных ему людей и доставку их к месту назначения.

Старший опергруппы после передачи выселенных получает рапорт о проведенной их операции на имя начальника уездной оперативной группы, в котором кратко указывается фамилия выселенного, обнаружено ли оружие и контрольно-кассовая литература, а также как происходила операция.

После посадки в эшелон выселенных в эшелон рапортов о результатах проведенной операции, уездными опергруппами считается свободными и действует по указаниям начальника уездного отдела НКВД.

ЗАМЕСТИТЕЛЬ НАРОДНОГО КОМИССАРА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ
БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ СССР С. С. Р.
КОМИССАР ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ В РЯЗНИ-

/ СЕРГЕЕ /

Верно: *М. С. Сергеев*

[Translation Copy of Exhibit 43]

[Large red stamp:
SECRET]

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.

COUNTER-ESPIONAGE DEPT.

Ref. No. 6076/W/43.

London, the 12th December 1943.

Soviet instruction about the Deportation of the population from the occupied Baltic States.

To the Chief of the Political Dept. of the Min. of Nat. Def.

For your information I send enclosed a photo-copy of the Soviet "Instructions regarding the manner of carrying out the deportation of the anti - Soviet elements from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia".

This instruction has been published in a Lithuanian publication issued by the Committee for the investigating of the results of Soviet occupation of Lithuania, which appeared in Kowno in 1942, under the title of "LITHUANIAN ARCHIVES, Vol. I."

Chief of the Counter-Espionage Dept. of the Min. of Nat. Def.

Signature ORŁOWSKI,
P. S. C. Lieut. Col.

Encl. 1.

Send to: Chief of Special Dept. of the General Staff of the C.-in.-C.

(The above instructions were strictly carried out also in occupied Poland.)

[Translation copy]

MOSCOW'S INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXTERMINATION OF THE BALTIC STATES

Aiming at the liquidation of the Baltic States and their wiping out of the earth's surface—Moscow has prepared an atrocious instruction in the matter of carrying out the destruction of these three nations. This is a most important and revealing Document. We give below photocopies of the full text of this instruction.

[Translation copy]

Plan of extermination of the Baltic States.

[STRICTLY SECRET]

INSTRUCTIONS

REGARDING THE MANNER OF CONDUCTING THE DEPORTATION OF THE ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS FROM LITHUANIA, LATVIA AND ESTONIA

1. General situation

The deportation of anti-Soviet elements from the Baltic States is a task of great political importance. Its successful execution depends upon the extent to which the county operative triumvirates and operative staffs are capable of working out a meticulous plan for putting the operations into effect and of foreseeing in advance all the indispensable factors. Moreover, the principle should be applied that the operations must be conducted without noise and panic, so as not to permit any demonstrations and other excesses to be raised not only by the deportees, but also by a certain part of the surrounding population known to be hostile to the Soviet administration.

Instructions regarding the manner of conducting the operations are described below. They should be adhered to, but in individual cases those conducting the operations may and should, depending upon the particularity of given circumstances of the operation and provided they evaluate correctly the situation, make such different decisions which would better suit the same purpose, viz., to execute the entrusted task without noise and panic.

2. Manner of issuing instructions

The instructing of operative groups should be done by the county triumvirates on the eve and within as short a time as possible before the beginning of the operations, taking into consideration the time necessary for traveling to the place of operations.

The county triumvirates will previously make ready the necessary transport for transferring the operative groups to the villages where the operations are to be carried out.

In regard to the question of allotting the necessary number of motor-lorries and carts for conveyance, the county triumvirates will consult the leaders of the Soviet party organizations on the spot.

Premises on which the instructions will be issued must be carefully prepared in advance, and their capacity, exits, entrances and the possibility of strangers entering them must be taken into consideration.

During the time of the issuing of the instructions the building must be securely guarded by administrative workers.

In case anyone from among those participating in the operations should fail to report for instructions, the county triumvirate should immediately take measures to substitute the absentee from a reserve force, which should be provided in advance.

The triumvirate through its representative should notify those assembled of the decision of the government to deport a listed contingent of anti-Soviet elements from the territory of the respective republic or region. Moreover, a brief explanation should be given as to what the deportees represent.

Special attention of the /local/ Soviet-party workers, assembled for instructions, should be drawn to the fact that the deportees are enemies of the Soviet people and that, therefore, the possibility of an armed attack on the part of the deportees should be reckoned with.

3. *Manner of obtaining documents*

After the issuing of general instructions to the operative groups, they should be supplied with documents regarding the deportees. Personal files of the deportees should be previously collected and grouped according to the operative groups of townships and villages, so as to avoid delays in issuing them.

After receiving the personal files, the senior member of the operative group acquaints himself with the personal files of the family which he will have to deport. He must check the number of persons in the family, the supply of necessary forms to be filled in by each deportee, and the existence of transport means for moving the deportee, and he should be given exhaustive answers to any questions in matters which are not clear to him.

At the time of issuing of the files the county triumvirate must explain to each senior member of the operative group where the deported family is to be re-settled and describe the route to be taken to the place of deportation. Routes to be taken by the administrative personnel with the deported families to the railway station for embarkation must also be fixed. It is also necessary to point out the places where reserve military groups will be held in case it should become necessary to call them out during possible excesses.

Possession and the state of arms and ammunition of the whole operative personnel must be checked. Weapons must be completely ready for use, loaded, but the cartridge should not be kept in the chamber. Weapons should be used only as a last resort, in case of the operative group being attacked or threatened with an attack, or when resistance is shown.

4. *Manner in which deportation should be carried out.*

Should a number of families be deported from one spot, one of the operative workers is appointed senior in regard to deportation from the village, and his orders are to be obeyed by the operative personnel in that village.

Having arrived to the village, the operative groups must get in touch /observing the necessary secrecy/ with the local authorities: Chairman, secretary or members of the village soviets, and should ascertain from them the exact dwelling places of the families to be deported. After that the operative groups together with the local authorities go to the families which are to be deported.

The operation should be started at daybreak. Upon entering the home of the person to be deported, the senior member of the operative group should gather the entire family of the deportee into one room, taking all necessary precautionary measures against any possible excesses.

After having checked the members of the family against the list, the whereabouts of those absent and the number of persons sick should be ascertained, after which they should be called upon to give up their weapons. Regardless of whether weapons are surrendered or not, the deportee should be personally searched and then the entire premises should be searched in order to uncover weapons.

During the search of the premises one of the members of the operative group should be left on guard over the deportees.

Should the search disclose a small quantity of hidden weapons, they should be collected and distributed among the operative group. Should a large number of

weapons be discovered, after having removed the locks, they should be piled into the wagon or motor-lorry which brought the operating group. Ammunition should be packed and loaded together with the rifles.

If necessary, a convoy for transporting the weapons should be mobilized with an adequate guard.

Should weapons, counter-revolutionary pamphlets, literature, foreign currency, large quantities of valuables, etc., be disclosed, a short record of the search should be drawn up on the spot, which should describe the hidden weapons or counter-revolutionary literature. Should there be any armed resistance, the question of arresting the persons showing armed resistance and of sending them to the county branch of the People's Commissariat of Public Security should be decided by the county triumvirates.

A record should be drawn up regarding those hiding themselves before the deportation and of the sick, and this record should be signed by the chairman of the Soviet-party organization.

After the search the deportees should be notified that by a decision of the Government they are being deported to other regions of the Union.

The deportees are permitted to take with them the following personal and household belongings of not more than 100 kilograms in weight:

- 1/. Clothing,
- 2/. Footwear,
- 3/. Underwear,
- 4/. Bed linen,
- 5/. Dishes,
- 6/. Glasses,
- 7/. Kitchen utensils,
- 8/. Food—an estimated month's supply for a family,
- 9/. The money in their possession,
- 10/. Haversack or box in which to pack the articles.

It is recommended that large articles should not be taken.

Should the contingent be deported to rural districts, they are permitted to take with them small agricultural implements: axes, saws, and other articles, which should be tied together and packed separately from other articles, so as to load them into special freight cars, when embarking on the deportation train.

In order not to mix them with articles belonging to others the name, father's name and village of the deportee should be written on his packed property.

When loading these articles into the carts measures should be taken to prevent the deportee from using them as means of resistance during the movement of the column along the highway.

At the time of loading the operative groups together with representatives of the Soviet-party organisations shall prepare a list of the property and the manner in which it is to be preserved in accordance with instructions they have received.

If the deportee has his own means of transportation, his property is loaded into his vehicle which, together with his family, is sent to the designated point of embarkation.

If the deportees do not have their own means of transportation, wagons are mobilized in the village by the local authorities upon directives of the senior member of the administrative group.

All persons entering the home of the deportees during the execution of the operations or found there at the start of these operations must be detained until the conclusion of the operations, and their relationship to the deportee should be ascertained. This is done in order to disclose policemen, military police and other persons hiding from investigation.

Having checked the detained persons and ascertained that they are persons in whom the contingent is not interested, they are liberated.

Should the inhabitants of the village begin to gather around the home of the deportee during the operations, they should be called upon to disperse to their homes, and crowds should not be permitted to be formed.

Should the deportee refuse to open the door of his home in spite of the fact that he is aware that members of the People's Commissariat of Public Security are there, the door should be forced. In individual cases neighbouring operative groups performing operations in that vicinity should be called upon to assist.

The conveyance of the deportees from the villages to the gathering place at the railway station must in all event be done during daylight; moreover, efforts should be made that the gathering of each family should take not more than two hours.

Throughout the operations, in all cases which might arise, firm and decisive action should be taken without the slightest confusion, noise and panic.

It is categorically forbidden to take any articles away from the deportees—except weapons, counter-revolutionary literature and foreign currency—or to use the food of the deportees.

All members of the operation must be warned that they will be held strictly responsible for attempts to appropriate individual articles belonging to the deportees.

5. Manner of separating deportee from his family.

In view of the fact that a large number of deportees must be arrested and placed in special camps while their families will be re-settled at special points in distant regions, it is necessary to execute the operation of deporting both the members of his family as well as the deportee simultaneously, without informing them of the separation confronting them. After having made the search and filled in the necessary documents of identification in the home of the deportee, the administrative worker shall draw up documents for the head of the family and place them in his personal file, but the documents drawn up for the members of his family should be placed separately in the personal file of the deportee's family.

However, the moving of the entire family to the station should be done in one vehicle, and only at the station should the head of the family be placed separately from his family in a railway car specially intended for the heads of families.

While gathering together the family in the home of the deportee, the head of the family should be warned that personal belongings of the men should be packed into a separate suitcase, as a sanitary inspection of the deported men will be made separately from the women and children.

At the stations the possessions of the heads of the families subject to arrest should be loaded into railway cars assigned to them, which will be designated by special operative workers appointed for that purpose.

6. Manner of convoying the deportees.

It is strictly prohibited for the operatives convoying the vehicle-drawn column of deportees to sit in the wagons of the deportees. The operatives must follow along-side and at the rear of the column of deportees. The senior operator of the convoy should periodically go up and down the entire column to check the correctness of movement.

The convoy must act particularly carefully in conducting the column of deportees through inhabited spots as well as at the encounter of passers-by; they should see to it that there are no attempts made to escape, and no exchange of words should be permitted between the deportees and passers-by.

7. Manner of embarking.

At each point of embarkation the members of the operative triumvirate and a person specially appointed for that purpose shall be responsible for the embarkation.

On the day of the operations the chief of the point of embarkation together with the chief of the echelon and of the convoying military forces of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs shall examine the railway cars furnished to see whether they are supplied with all necessities—/bunks, bed pans, lanterns, railings, etc./ and shall discuss with the commander of the echelon the manner in which the latter will take over the deportees. The embarkation station shall be encircled by the soldiers of the convoying troops of the Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

The senior member of the operative group shall deliver to the commander of the echelon one copy of the list of deportees in each railway car. The commander of the echelon will thereupon call out the deportees according to this roll and will carefully check each family and designate their place in the railway car.

The possessions of the deportees should be loaded into the car together with the deportees, with the exception of the small agricultural implements, which should be loaded into a separate car.

The deportees will be loaded into railway cars by families; it is not permitted to break up a family / with the exception of heads of families subject to arrest/. An estimate of 25 persons to a car should be observed.

After the railway car has been filled with the necessary number of families, it should be locked.

After the people have been taken over and loaded into the echelon train, the commander of the train will bear responsibility for all the persons turned over to him and for their reaching their destination.

After handing over the deportees the senior member of the operative group shall draw up a report to the effect that he has performed the operations entrusted

to him and address the report to the chief of the county operative triumvirate. The report should briefly contain the name of the deportee, whether any weapons and counter-revolutionary literature were discovered, and how the operations ran.

Having placed the deportees on the echelon of deportees and after submitting reports of the results of the operations performed, members of the operative group will be considered free and will act in accordance with the instructions of the chief of the county branch of the People's Commissariat of Public Security.

DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF STATE

SECURITY OF THE U. S. S. R.

Commissar of State Security of the Third Rank.

----- signed: / SEROV / .

Correct: / signed / MASHKIN.

Mr. FLOOD. Colonel, the Catholic priest, Father Braun, who testified before this committee in Washington, made reference in his testimony to certain instructions in writing given to the NKVD having to do with the disposition of Polish prisoners. I now show you exhibit No. 43, and ask you whether or not that is a copy of such instructions?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. We now offer in evidence exhibit No. 43.

There have been handed to me two additional exhibits in the form of notices signed by Timoshenko. I ask that the stenographer mark the original notice for identification "Exhibit No. 44," and the photostat thereof for identification as "Exhibit No. 45."

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 44 for identification" and "Exhibit No. 45 for identification." Exhibit No. 44, the original, was returned to the witness, exhibit No. 45 is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 45

ŻOŁNIERZE!

W ciągu ostatnich dni armja polska została ostatecznie rozgromiona. Żołnierze miast: **Tarnopol, Galicz, Równo, Dubno** w ilości przeszło 60.000 osób dobrowolnie przeszli na naszą stronę.

Żołnierze! Co pozostało wam? O co i z kim walczyć? Dla czego narażacie życie? Opór wasz jest bezskuteczny. Oficerowie pędzą was na bezsensowną rzeź. Oni nienawidzą was i wasze rodziny. To oni rozstrzelali waszych delegatów, których posłaliście z propozycją o poddaniu się. Nie wiercie swym oficerom. Oficerowie i generalowie są waszymi wrogami, chcą oni waszej śmierci.

Żołnierze! Bijcie oficerów i generalów. Nie podporządkowujcie się rozkazom waszych oficerów. Pędźcie ich z waszej ziemi. Przechodźcie śmiało do nas, do waszych braci, do Armji Czerwonej. Tu znajdziecie uwagę i troskliwość.

Pamiętajcie, że tylko Armja Czerwona wyzwoli naród polski z nieszczęsnej wojny, i uzyskacie możność rozpocząć pokojowe życie.

Wiercie nam! Armja Czerwona — Związek Radziecki — to wasz jedyny przyjaciel.

Dowódca frontu Ukraińskiego S. TIMOSZENKO.

M E 570/1/5

[Translation copy of Exhibit 45]

PROCLAMATION TO POLISH SOLDIERS ISSUED IN SEPTEMBER 1939 BY MARSHAL TIMOSHENKO, SOVIET COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE "UKRAINIAN FRONT", AFTER THE CROSSING OF THE POLISH FRONTIER BY THE RED ARMY

SOLDIERS: In the last few days, the Polish Army has been finally destroyed. The soldiers from the towns of Tarnopol, Halicz, Równo, Dubno, numbering over sixty thousand, have crossed over to us of their own free will. Soldiers, what has been left to you? What are you fighting for? Why are you risking your lives? Your resistance is useless. Your officers are driving you to senseless slaughter. They hate you and your families. It was they who had shot the delegates whom you sent to us with a proposition of surrender. Do not believe your officers. It is the officers and generals who are your enemies and they wish your death!

Soldiers—strike against your officers and generals! Do not obey the orders of your officers. Drive them out of your land. Do not fear us, come over to us, to your brethren, to the Red Army. Here you shall find care and esteem.

Remember that only the Red Army will deliver the Polish Nation from this unfortunate war and you shall have an opportunity to restart your lives anew. Believe us—the Red Army is your only friend!

/Signed/ S. TIMOSHENKO,
C-in-C. of the Ukrainian Front.

Mr. FLOOD. I now show you exhibit No. 44, Colonel, and ask you whether or not that is the copy which you have had in your possession until you presented it to the committee today, of the Timoshenko order urging Poles to desert to the Russians discussed in his testimony by General Komorowski yesterday before the committee?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. I now show you exhibit No. 45, and ask you whether or not that is an exact photostatic reproduction of exhibit No. 44?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. We now return to you exhibit No. 44, and offer in evidence exhibit No. 45. Is that all?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. That's all, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. We appreciate very much, Colonel, the time that you have spent with this committee in assisting us all week long at these very long and very important hearings held here in London, and especially do we thank you for your patience and industry in assembling from the vast library of documents on this subject in the possession of the Polish Government in London these particular documents which you have presented to us for identification today, and for the time and trouble you have taken in the photostating of these important exhibits. Now I understand you have an additional statement you desire to make?

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. No, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. I am sure you appreciate the committee understands fully that you are acting as the so-called head of an organization operating under General Anders and the Polish Government, an extensive organization that has been accumulating these documents, analyzing them and preparing them for this presentation.

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you express our compliments to your fellow workers as well.

Colonel LUNKIEWICZ. Thank you very much. It is my duty to do it; it is my duty toward my friends and comrades who are buried in Russia. It was my duty to help you in your very difficult task.

Mr. FLOOD. Thank you very much.

FURTHER TESTIMONY OF MAJ. JAN KACZKOWSKI

Mr. FLOOD. Major, yesterday you testified in connection with your duties as chief of the Aid or Assistance Bureau of the Polish Government in rendering aid and assistance to the friends, relatives, and families of Polish officers missing in Russia, and you now appear today for the purpose of identifying and presenting to the committee a list of names which was accumulated by your organization; is that correct?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Upon which was predicated one and perhaps the first source of information, that list of names of the Polish officers missing in Russia; is that correct?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. I now show you two volumes of such list of names presented to the committee. Volume 1, which contains the names alphabetically arranged from A to L, and volume 2, containing the names alphabetically from L to Z.

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Now will the stenographer mark for identification as exhibit 46, volume 1, and as exhibit 47, volume 2. (The documents were marked accordingly.) Major, I now show you exhibits Nos. 46 and 47 and ask you whether or not they are, in two volumes, the list of names just described as having been compiled by your organization of the names of the missing officers at Katyn?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. They will be offered in evidence.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Major, that is the first list that was made the basis of the list which was later identified by Adam Sawczynski?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. Where did you get the names to make up these two volumes?

Major KACZKOWSKI. All soldiers who came to the Polish Army in Russia have been——

Mr. MACHROWICZ. May I suggest it has been testified previously that all the various Polish soldiers and officers were instructed to assemble from their memories and from whatever records they had, the lists of all the officers whom they knew of in any of these three camps. Is that correct?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That information was all put together in one booklet and is contained in these two exhibits; am I right?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. That is the testimony which in part you gave to us yesterday?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Supported by your two colleagues who worked in the bureau with you?

Major KACZKOWSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Who also testified yesterday and corroborated your testimony?

Major KACZKOWSKI. O. K.

Mr. UCINSKI. I should like to point out that there are 9,989 names in these two volumes.

Mr. FLOOD. You have now pointed it out. Thank you very much, Major. Because the last two exhibits are so voluminous, they will not be published as part of this record but will remain as part of the archives of this committee's records when those eventually are turned over to the Library of Congress.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH MACKIEWICZ (THROUGH ROMAN C. PUCINSKI, INTERPRETER), 44 MARLBOROUGH PL. LONDON, NW. 8, ENGLAND

Mr. PUCINSKI. This witness tells me he will testify in Polish.

Chairman MADDEN. State your full name and address.

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Joseph Mackiewicz, 44 Marlborough Place, London, N. W. 8.

Mr. FLOOD. Is this witness testifying under his own name?

Mr. PUCINSKI. Yes.

Chairman MADDEN. Before you make a statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you run the risk of actions in the courts by anyone who considers that he has suffered injury. At the same time I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as the result of the testimony. Now the interpreter will repeat that admonition in Polish. (This was done.)

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness indicates that he understands the instructions and admonition.

Chairman MADDEN. The witness will be sworn: Do you swear by God the Almighty that you will, according to the best of your knowledge, tell the pure truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. I do.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Your name is Josef Mackiewicz; is that correct?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You are a journalist and author?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were you ever at Katyn?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes; I was.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In what year?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. 1943.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That was about May 20th; is that correct?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. It was subsequently to the 20th of May. I do not recall the exact date.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How did you happen to go there?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. I was invited to go there by the Germans, and I contacted the commanding officer of the Polish Underground Army in Vilna—I cannot recall the name at this time—and inquired of them whether or not I should go to Katyn.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. When I said that you were there in May, I do not remember whether I mentioned the year. Was it 1943?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And you had an opportunity to see the graves and the bodies?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You have made a record of your findings?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Since that time you have made a careful study of the entire Katyn incident; and, as a result of your investigations and the facts which you have assembled, you have written a book on it; is that correct?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. That is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Now I would like to state also to you that I myself and several other members of the committee have had the opportunity to read your book, and we find the information there very valuable. At this time I would like to direct your testimony rather to the Russian report. Are you familiar with it?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes; I am.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Have you made a careful study of it?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes; I did.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Have you made attempts to determine the authenticity of statements made in it?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes; I have made such an analysis, and I have reported some of it in my books.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Now would you care to give this committee the benefit of any observations that you wish to make regarding the official report made by the Russian authorities?

Mr. DONDERO. I do not know whether you have the Russian report, but may I suggest that if it is possible to put in the Russian report, it should be put in, and then from that let him begin to point out discrepancies.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I may say that we have it in our files in Washington. I do not know whether you brought it with you, Mr. Pucinski?

Mr. PUCINSKI. Yes; we did. It is part of exhibit 4 in part III.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Show it to the witness. [The Russian report was handed to the witness.]

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Now, Mr. Mackiewicz, would you care to give us the benefit of any observations which you wish to make regarding that report and point to the section of the report to which you have reference?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. I would like, if it is agreeable, to avoid any comments on any portions of the Russian report which deal with the medical findings, because I myself am not a doctor—if that is agreeable.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is very good, Witness. Go ahead.

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. First of all, I would like to make some general observations. The Russians accused the Germans of this crime in 1941.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I wonder if the interpreter got the answer correctly. Did the Russians make the accusation in 1941, or did the Russians accuse the Germans of having committed the crime in 1941?

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness clarified his statement by saying that the Russians have accused the Germans; that they committed this crime in 1941.

Mr. FLOOD. Witness, will you talk more loudly, because certain members of the committee understand Polish as well as the interpreter, and they would like to hear the original Polish.

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. So, will you talk louder instead of just talking to the interpreter?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Yes; thank you.

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. The Bolsheviks claim that the Germans committed this massacre in 1941. The Germans claim that the Bolsheviks did this in 1940. But why are they saying that the Russians did this in 1940? Because if they themselves, the Germans, had committed these massacres in 1941, it would have been more convenient and easier and simpler for them to claim that the Russians committed this massacre in June of 1941. Then there would be eliminated the entire difference in the medical examinations of these bodies and the medical findings, the dates of the documents. They would not have to subject themselves to the Russian accusation that they have fabricated many of the details as to the crimes committed at Katyn.

Mr. DONDERO. When he says "documents," does he mean the documents found on the bodies?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes; that is correct. More so since when the Russians were retreating in 1941 it is known that they committed many murders and mass atrocities in their retreat, as, for example, the mass murders in Provieniska in Lithuania, in Berzeweż; in Willejka; in Lwow. In neither one of these instances of mass atrocities committed by the Russians did the Germans accuse the Russians of committing these atrocities prior to the summer of 1941. And I stress that it was known at that time that the Russians in their retreat were murdering large numbers of people. Therefore, it would have been very simple for the Germans to claim that the Katyn massacre was committed in the summer of 1941 by the Russians. It is therefore difficult to imagine that the Germans, who themselves had committed many atrocities, would not have orientated themselves in this particular situation and recognized the convenience of placing the date in June of 1941.

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness says he would like to know whether this particular point that he makes is understood by the committee.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You might state to the witness that I think it is very clear, and I believe the committee follows him thoroughly.

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. The Germans, it is known, did not commit any mass atrocities against the soldiers, against entire camps. It is then reasonable to ask, why would they make an exception in this case and at a time when they were at war with the Russians to murder those who were being held prisoner by the Russians? In connection with this, I would like to stress or place emphasis on the camp at Ostashkov. In Ostashkov there were more or less 6,500 people, and there they kept primarily the police, who were for the most part dressed in uniforms which differed considerably from the Regular Army uniforms. When the Germans invaded Poland—particularly that part of Poland which they called Ostland—they retained part of the Polish police force which was there, and they continued to search for additional Polish soldiers and recruits from among the police that were in this Ostland district beyond 1941. I recall that in August of 1941 they gave considerable publicity to a recruiting campaign to

recruit former Polish policemen so that they could keep order and maintain order in that area as civilians. Why then would they want to kill off some 5,000 Polish policemen who were in the camp of Ostashkov and who were very definitely and bitterly opposed to bolshevism.

Mr. DONDERO. Before he goes on, ask him to state for the record whether or not it is not the fact that Ostland refers to east Poland; that is, Ostland is German for east land.

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. No. I am speaking of that part which took in Lithuania, White Russia, a part of eastern Poland and Latvia. That has become known and popularly referred to as Ostland.

Mr. DONDERO. However, that is the east part of Poland, mostly?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. That is correct. Therefore, the Germans did not murder these policemen in Katyn because these policemen were not found in Katyn. Nobody had noticed them or observed them, and certainly they would have been observed, because they were in different uniforms. Neither the Germans nor the Russians claimed that at Katyn there were the bodies of policemen. In connection with this it is important to consider the number of bodies found at Katyn. The Russian communiqué claims that there were found at Katyn 11,000 bodies, but actually there were found only slightly more than 4,000, and these policemen were not there. The Bolsheviks, therefore, used the figure 11,000, because even if assuming that those 4,000 that were found in Katyn had been murdered by the Germans, the question arises: What happened to the rest? Furthermore, the latter of the correspondence becomes associated here. The Russians claimed that they had found correspondence on these bodies which indicated that these men had corresponded with their families in Poland up to 1941. If there were 11,000 bodies in Katyn, each one of them then most probably had some family in Poland ranging anywhere from 1 to 6 people.

The number of potential witnesses in Poland who could have been summoned to testify that they had corresponded with any members of their family in these camps up to and including 1941 would have reached the figure, roughly, of 20,000 to 30,000. The Germans, who had, of course, capitalized on a tremendous propaganda to their own advantage, would have taken into consideration the fact that, in a country where the people were generally adversely disposed toward the Germans, the news that the Germans had lied would have certainly spread very quickly through Poland, and the Germans would have never permitted to be compromised to that extent. These are the general observations that I wanted to give you. There is one more that I would like to raise: the question of the Jews. The Germans had conducted very active anti-Semitic action, and they tried to prove that the Jews and the Bolsheviks were one and the same. As proof of this, I can present to you a little brochure that was published by the Germans, in which they pointed out—

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Would you tell the witness that that brochure is in the hands of the committee? The committee has already analyzed it.

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. In this booklet there is frequent reference that the murderers at Katyn were the Jews. If, therefore, they had falsi-

fied the documents found on the bodies, it would have then been very simple for them to have destroyed those documents which in themselves indicate that among the victims at Katyn were many Jews, because that obviously would have hurt and curtailed the propaganda value; but the Germans did not want to jeopardize the truth of their allegations to that extent or to such an extent that they actually named and showed the Jews who were included among those killed at Katyn; for instance, Waltenberg, Mantel, Lippman, Glikman, and so forth, and there are others with first names which indicate clearly that they were Jewish, such as Abraham Engiel, David Godel, Samuel Rozen, Izaak Guttman, and so on. Now I would like to point out some specific points in the Russian report. The Russian Commission claims that these Poles had been brought to the rail station at Gniezdowo in the year 1940, that they were not murdered but instead placed into three camps, No. 1 ON, No. 2 ON and No. 3 ON, at a distance of from 25 to 45 kilometers to the west of Smolensk, and that during the time of the German offensive they fell captive into the hands of the Germans. This, of course, is a lie, because there were no such camps in that locality. The Russian Communiqué does not specify exactly where were those three camps. Naturally, if those three camps had actually existed, they could have notified Ambassador Kot, General Sikorski, General Anders and Mr. Czapski, who had conducted a long search for these men.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What you mean there is that they would have answered the many requests by those people whom you have just referred to by giving the exact location of the prisoners. Is that what you have reference to?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes; that is correct. Furthermore, the Russian communique or report claims that the commanding officer of the Russian camp No. 1 ON was a major of the NKGB, Wietosznikow, and that when the Germans were approaching that area, the commanding officer had communicated with the commanding officer of the transport forces in Smolensk, Iwannov, with a request for rail cars in order to evacuate these Polish prisoners. Since he was unsuccessful in obtaining these railroad cars, consequently these Polish prisoners fell into the hands of the Germans, but Wietosznikow himself remained with the Russian forces and did not fall into captivity of the Germans. Therefore, if Wietosznikow, who was the commanding officer of the security forces, knew about the whereabouts of these soldiers, why did not Stalin and Molotov and Vishinky know about their presence virtually within the shadow of Moscow? and as a consequence, for 2 years they ostensibly searched to find an answer as to the whereabouts of these soldiers. Wietosznikow certainly must have reported to his superiors as to what happened to these prisoners, and when Czapski made his frequent inquiries to the NKVD, they would have immediately told him that these men fell captive to the Germans.

Mr. FLOOD. And that is especially so when we have in mind certain evidence of telephone conversations that Stalin purported to have in the presence of the Polish negotiators with the Chief of the NKVD on just this very problem.

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes; and the NKVD ostensibly told him that they do not know where these men are. Assuming that Wietosznikow could not get the rail cars from Iwannov as he had requested, he could have evacuated the soldiers from these prison camps by foot, especially when you consider that the claim is that Wietosznikow appealed to Iwannov for these cars on the 12th of July; but the official Soviet communiqué of the 23d of July 1941, claimed that the Russians were still in control and possession of Smolensk.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Witness, in that connection Wietosznikow claims he was unable to secure the necessary cars to evacuate these prisoners; am I right?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes; he claims that.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Then he remained in Russia, as you have stated a few moments ago; is that not right?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes. He himself ran away, but he claims that he left the camps there.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Would it not have been his duty to report to his superior officers then that he was unable to get the cars and unable to evacuate the officers?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Undoubtedly it would have been.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And, therefore, as a result thereof, the higher echelon of the Russian authorities would have known right then in July 1941 of the fate of these Polish officers; is that correct?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes. I mentioned that.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Despite that, even after 1941, in response to the numerous requests by the Polish authorities, the Russians continued to state that they do not know the whereabouts of these officers; is that right?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. It is also interesting to observe at that point on this detail and others of a like nature to keep in mind the peculiar genius the Germans had and have for keeping a complete record and documentation and list of all names and all possessions of any prisoners that came under their charge.

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. And the Germans, because of that very interesting psychological quirk, could not even resist keeping a list and even the details of the physical characteristics of people they executed?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. And especially, despite their many other bad habits during warfare, they paid great attention to keeping a list of names of all prisoners of war of any category?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And regardless of what records the Germans kept of civilians, even though they were good, they made especially good records of all military prisoners?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. That is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. And it is difficult to imagine that the Germans would have in their custody several thousand Polish military officers and that there be no record any place of such prisoners of war, contrary to all German practice?

Mr. MACKIFWICZ. Undoubtedly, they would have had such records.

Mr. FLOOD. And, so far, we have not been able to discover any Wehrmacht records of such Polish prisoners in that area during this period?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. That is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You may proceed now with your statement.

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. The Russians admit, in their report, that they unloaded or detained these Poles at the railroad station at Gniezdovo in the spring of 1940, but they do not explain in their report why they selected Gniezdovo to unload these men when they were planning to intern them in camps which were up to 45 kilometers away and there were many closer stations to those alleged camps that existed there.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In other words what they claimed they did is that they took them off at Gniezdovo and drove them by trucks or automobiles 15 to 30 miles, when they could have taken them all that distance by train; is that correct?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. No; they do not claim in their report that they transported them by truck; they merely claim that they unloaded them at Gniezdovo. But the question of how they were taken to these alleged camps is moot.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. But they do not explain in their report how they got 15 to 30 miles from Gniezdovo when they could have easily been taken there by train, is that correct?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes; that is correct. Undoubtedly, they would have taken these men by train to these camps if they actually had not been loading them on trucks and taking them to the Katyn Forest.

Mr. DONDERO. Let me ask there: Were there similar buildings or camps at other places?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I believe, for the record, I might state that the witness has testified that there is no record of any of those camps.

Is that correct?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. There actually were no camps in the location that the Russians claim that they had taken these men to, and I had substantiated that to my satisfaction on the basis of my conversations with inhabitants of the general area and my conversations with Kriwozercow. All of them told me that there had never been any such camps in that area. Furthermore, I would like to call your attention to one more little detail.

The attitude in Poland and in Russia was so bitterly anti-German in 1943 that when they released the news of Katyn, that is, the Germans, in the spring of 1943, the announcement gave birth to a mess of various versions of what happened, which could have refuted the German version.

At that time, because communications, especially radio communications, had been severely curtailed, many people had not heard the German version. As a consequence, the Russian agents, who were very actively operating in all these parts, started rumors of their own version, merely to destroy and discredit the German version.

As an example, when I was in Katyn, there were with me two Portuguese correspondents. One of these men told me that he had

been taken to look at a little village, to which the Germans had taken him, and then he asked me repeatedly whether I felt certain that this was the work of the Russians. I asked him, "Why do you ask?" He said that he had talked to a young girl in this village, who told him that those murdered men "are really Jews who have been dressed in Polish uniforms."

Even such fantastic stories were circulated when if, in effect, and in actuality, there were those three camps in this area, they would have said that the Poles were in these camps and the Germans came by and captured these Poles and that they murdered them. Nobody at all has ever heard of any such camps in that area.

Mr. DONDERO. Do you mean by that that there were no German camps in that area, or any camps, since this was on Russian territory?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. There were no camps there at all.

Now, regarding the documents which the Russians claim that they had found on these bodies and which bore dates later than the spring of 1940, they have presented nine documents in all, from which the first and second number represent post cards which were mailed from Poland. So they could have very easily held these cards at the post office and they could have taken them whenever they needed them. They could have been authentic cards.

Next, there are receipts or scripts of notes, ostensibly written in these camps. These could have very easily been fabricated, and the last one is a letter belonging to one Stanislaw Kuczynski, written on the 20th of June 1941. This letter could have been actually written, but Kuczynski actually had been interned at Starobelsk and he had been evacuated from Starobielsk as early as December of 1939.

And I stress that he alone, Kuczynski, individually, had been removed from that camp on that date, and he disappeared and nobody every heard from him, and he conceivably could have been held captive in some other jail; he could have been executed without any definite knowledge now as to when or what year. He had never been to Kozielsk and his body had never been found in Katyn.

Now, the Russians claim in one phase or one portion of their communique that the Germans had very carefully examined these bodies. In another portion of their report, they claim that the examination was only superficial. But regardless of which is correct, it is known that the Germans had examined only 4,143 bodies. But the Russians insist on claiming that there were 11,000 bodies. So, what happened to the documents on the remaining 7,000 bodies which the Germans never examined?

If the Germans claim they found, on 4,143 bodies, a total of 3,940 documents, letters, and other writings, then it is reasonable to ask: Why could not the Russians find, on the bodies of 7,000 of these Poles who had not been inspected by the Germans, more than nine letters? It is perfectly clear, then, that if the Russians were retreating and the Germans were advancing, it is unquestionable then, it is reasonable, that if the Russians were retreating and the Germans were advancing, these 11,000 soldiers in those three camps certainly would not have sat by and done nothing.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In other words, what you want us to understand is that after the Russians retreated and before the Germans took over, there would have been some period of time when there was no control over these camps?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And some of these prisoners would certainly have had a wonderful opportunity to escape?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. They would not just wait for the Germans to pick them up.

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes. I am personally convinced that during that time of the retreat and advance, there would not have remained one single soldier in those three prisons. They certainly would have all scattered, they would have fled.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I know that you made a very thorough investigation of these 11,000-some officers who were alleged by the Russians to have been in these camps. Have you heard of one who escaped?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. No, I have not heard of a single one.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Is it logical to assume that out of 11,000 officers, with a certain period of time elapsing with no one controlling; that at least one would have been able to escape and tell his story?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes.

I repeat and emphasize that if it were as they claimed, then all 11,000 would have fled and not one would have remained in those camps, and you would not only find one but you would find thousands of witnesses who could have told you exactly what happened and how it happened. On the other hand, we haven't found a single one.

You must take into consideration the tactics which I had an opportunity to personally observe, of the German method of advancing into various military areas. They had advanced in panzer points, leaving behind them vast territories completely unoccupied and unguarded. There were instances when, during their spearhead panzer advances, they left entire armies of the Russians behind and leaving them even armed.

I will give one example, near Wilno, of a forest or a woods called Rudnicki. The Germans had advanced almost up to the very border of Moscow, the city limits of Moscow, and still there were large Russian units in this forest. It is absurd to believe that the Germans would have selected these three camps in their advance and quickly placed a guard around these three camps to retain the prisoners in them, when they had left entire armies behind them armed.

Mr. DONDERO. Russian armies?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes; Russian armies.

The country was virtually wide open for many, many long months, and you could easily move around and walk from wherever to wherever you wanted to. So these Polish prisoners could have escaped either to the Russian zone or they could have moved back to their families in their own homeland.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. To emphasize the absurdity of the Russian claim and the fact that not one officer was found who escaped, is not it a historic fact that not thousands but tens of thousands of Polish officers and soldiers have actually escaped from various Russian camps, even as far as Siberia, and have joined the Allied forces? Is not that true?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. I do not know of any escapes by the Poles from Russian camps, but I do know that many many Poles escaped under much more difficult conditions. When there was not the hasty retreat present they escaped from German camps and rejoined the

Allied forces. To get a clear picture of the terrain and the conditions that existed around Smolensk at that time, I call your attention to an article that I had read in the Russian newspaper *Izvestia*, volume 224, the 22d September 1945, written by one Mr. Isakowski, titled "In the Smolensk Country," in which he describes how the Soviet Partisans had operated in that area and how they had roamed throughout the area destroying bridges and supply depots and various other underground activities. To consider that under these circumstances 11,000 officers could not have escaped, not 1 single officer to have been able to escape, is absurd.

Furthermore, the official Russian report claims that a few of these Polish officers did escape, but this was when the camps were under the control of the Germans, and that the Germans had captured these men and, according to the Soviet communiqué, they claimed that all of these men had been recaptured. This, of course, is not true, because under the conditions that existed at the time which I previously described they could not have captured all of them. I inquired about this particular point in the Soviet report in my discussions with Kriwozercow, and he said that there had never been any particular hunt or search except one big man hunt for a Soviet woman partisan. This is the only instance that he recalls. I would like to call your attention also to that portion of the Russian communiqué which quotes depositions from many witnesses. You must understand the value of such testimony by Soviets testifying before a Soviet commission. It is known that since 1939 in all the judicial and legal processes and hearings that have been held in Poland and in Hungary and in all these other occupied countries those who are accused almost always inevitably confess their guilt to the crime. These people, of course, are accused and are indicted; so what can you expect from witnesses who would not dare to testify to anything but what they have been told to testify? This is, of course, a fact notoriously known, and you must constantly keep that fact in mind as you proceed to evaluate this report.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In that connection, I wonder if you would care to comment for the record on the testimony of one particular witness that you refer to in your book, I believe; that is, Moskowskaja.

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. I mention her in my book, and I want to make it clear here that I personally had not talked to her. I do not even know if a person like that exists.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. But you have read her statement; is not that right?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes, I have read her statement.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What do you care to say about her statement?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. I want to assert here that the testimony or the statement of this Moskowskaja is the most important point in the Russian report, because the Germans uncovered these graves, exhumed all these bodies, laid them out and then laid out all the documents and letters which they removed from these bodies. I was there and I saw this. When we were brought there we were told by the Germans that we are permitted a free hand to do whatever we want; we may examine these bodies, examine these documents, study these documents, take these documents for souvenirs, we may have anything that we see in that woods.

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness corrects the interpretation to say "not all the documents." The witness points out that documents which were related to establishing the identity of a victim had all been compiled and placed in the one pile, but all other items, such as combs or cigaret holders, money, and various other personal belongings, were permitted to examine freely. The Germans took all these personal belongings and just threw them into the woods, and it was laying all around the woods there. So, when I arrived there, one of the first things that I observed was the large number of newspapers. In some instances they were entire newspapers, and in some instances they were clippings from newspapers; in other instances just pieces of newspapers. In some cases, tobacco was wrapped in newspapers. I began examining these newspapers and I concluded that either on the basis of the text of these newspapers or the actual dates on these newspapers none of them were later than April or the spring of 1940.

Mr. DONDERO. Ask the witness what becomes of this woman.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. He is getting to it now. That is introductory.

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. The question is: In what possible or conceivable manner could 4,000 people who had all these documents and newspapers have ceased having these things as of April of 1940? The letters they, of course, could have kept for souvenirs, but it is incredible that such a large number of people could have been in the habit of saving old newspapers; and, as a matter of fact, they could not have kept them that long, because those newspapers were of a particular inferior type of newsprint and they probably would not have lasted a year and a half. They could not conceivably have had these newspapers on their persons from 1940. There was no sense to it, nor was there any purpose to it, to keep these papers, and, if they did have a reason for them, then these papers would have been so old and so badly worn that that would have been obvious and apparent.

Chairman MADDEN. Ask him how long he was there at the graves during the exhumation—a week, or month, or how long?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. I was there 3 days.

Chairman MADDEN. Ask him if he knows how long this exhumation of the bodies proceeded. Was it a week, or a month?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Approximately 2 months.

Mr. DONDERO. Also ask him, just in a few words, describe the country where these graves were found, the nature of the soil and the color.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Could I first finish the testimony about this woman?

Mr. DONDERO. Yes; go ahead.

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Therefore, if the Russians claim that the Germans falsified the documents on these bodies, they not only would have had to remove from these bodies everything that carried a later date than the spring of 1940, but to believe that they would have gone so far that they would have thought of getting thousands of newspapers from that particular date and bring them and place them on the bodies of these dead men is virtually inconceivable. This would have required tremendous effort and tremendous preparation. As I was there and observed these corpses lying in the graves, they were lying there like sardines, completely pressed together. The pockets had to be slit open with a knife at the exhumation. The tops of the boots had to be cut with knives, and from there they removed

these various documents. To substantiate the Russian claim that these documents had been placed on these bodies by the Germans and then these bodies buried, and then to believe that a month later the Germans would have brought the people from the area in there and said, "Look, we found these bodies here," is absolutely absurd. That would have been a superhuman effort; and to all of the superhuman effort, this vast project which the Russians claim that the Germans staged and effected, they have only one witness, and that witness is Moskowskaja, who claims that one morning when she was going to the store and she left her home she had observed a Russian prisoner named Jegorow, and this Jegorow ostensibly or allegedly told her in complete detail how this plot was executed.

One of the fatal coincidences in this whole analysis of the Russians is that they had made a mistake, they had erred, and they claim that she had seen this Jegorow in March.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Of what year?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. March of 1943, and that this Jegorow gave her the complete details, and then he proceeds to tell her what happened in April of 1943. Obviously a man could not be describing to her in March of 1943 what was happening in April of 1943.

Mr. DONDERO. What was the month in which the Germans overran the country?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. In July 1941.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you want to complete your story now?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. I maintain that everything that the Russians claim in their official statement is a lie and that everybody who reads that statement realizes that it is a lie to such an extent that nobody has noticed this error in the official Russian communiqué and to the extent that the official Russian communiqué was published on the 5th March of this year with the mistake still included.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I want to state, Mr. Mackiewicz, that you have not explained yet, I think, what it was in March 1943 that Jegorow told Moskowskaja about what happened in April 1943.

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. He told her that from camp 126, from the German prison camp where Russian prisoners were held, also without naming the exact location of this camp, 500 prisoners were removed which the Germans ostensibly brought to Katyn, and it was these 500 prisoners who were assigned the task of going through the vast process of exhuming these bodies and removing all the papers on the bodies, under, of course, the German command and jurisdiction.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. These 500, according to the Russian report, were Russians; is that right?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes, they were Russians and, like these 500, were all executed, and that only this one, Jegorow, managed to survive, and for reasons which are unknown the official Russian communiqué does not state why these 500 were shot and where their graves are now, and this Jegorow subsequently was also captured by the Bolsheviks, and he only had time to tell all of this to Moskowskaja.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. But in March 1943 he told Moskowskaja about work done by these prisoners in April 1943; is that right?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. Did this Russian witness have a reputation for clairvoyance that you have ever been able to discover?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. I suspect personally that this man had never actually existed.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. With regard to these 500 Russians, then according to the Russian version they were compelled by the Germans to help exhume the bodies and to falsify the records; is that correct?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes, under German direction.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And according to the Russian version, after they completed this work, the Germans shot them—is that right?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. That is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Five hundred of them—that is the Russian version?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Have you ever heard anywhere in any Russian version any statement that the graves of these 500 Russians were found anywhere?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. I have never heard of the whereabouts of these graves, and the official Russian communiqué makes no mention of them either.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. So that these 500 Russians who were supposed to have been compelled by the Germans to dig these graves, and were then shot by them, just vanished into the air so far as the record is concerned?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Yes, that is correct; and I want to stress here that not only does the Russian report fail to say where these graves are, but it also fails to say where this camp was from where these men were brought.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Camp No. 126?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. Camp No. 126.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you ever make an investigation as to the whereabouts of one so-called Menshagin alleged to have been burgomeister of Smolensk, appointed by the Germans and alleged to have been a lawyer, who was alleged by the Russians to have made certain statements with reference to the Germans killing the Poles?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. No. I personally have never seen Menshagin, and I have not had any contact with this man; but just recently I have read in a newspaper in Paris that a Russian who had fled from Russia issued a statement that Menshagin's statement and testimony was false.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you know whether or not there ever was such a person at all as Menshagin?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. No, I do not know that.

There is one more point that I have not covered in my testimony. All of the Russian witnesses who are mentioned in the Russian communiqué, when they mention the date of the murders, say that these murders were committed in August and September of 1941. This is the witnesses' account. As an example, a witness named Fatkow testified that after September the mass executions had ceased. Witness Aleksiejewa testifies that the Germans had committed these executions toward the end of August—

Mr. FLOOD. 1941?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. 1941. The same statements are made by their friends Michajlowa and Kochanowskaja, also Menshagin, of whom Mr. Flood inquired, had ostensibly told Bazylewski that by the 15th

September all of the Poles had been executed. There is not a single witness who has said that these men were executed either in October or November. Meanwhile, in the official communiqué—in the statement of the Russian communiqué—the claim is made that these men were murdered between September and December 1941, and none of these witnesses even mentions August.

The question then arises, why should there be such a difference between the conclusion reached in the official Russian communiqué and the testimony of the witnesses? Why does not the Russian communiqué place faith and trust in the testimony of its own witnesses, and say that these soldiers were executed in August or September, but merely confines the period to that between September and all the way through December? The puzzle here is solved in this manner, that the correspondence was taken by the Russians to Katyn from Moscow. Observe that a considerable proportion or percentage of the dead soldiers were dressed in warm clothing. Unquestionably nobody would wear that sort of clothing in that area during August and September when it is very hot in that region.

This was a point so conclusive that the Russians at the very last moment had changed their official text to include the period from September to December to explain why some of these people were wearing winter clothing. If you tell them today that these Poles were found buried in winter clothing, they reply:

“Well, yes, it is cold in that area during November and December.” There is no justification or any further explanation for the discrepancy between the testimony of the witnesses, and the official conclusion drawn in the Soviet report.

Mr. FLOOD. Now with reference to this newspaper produced by the witness, I might say that I have taken this up with members of the committee, and we feel that, in view of the fact that we have in evidence the entire Russian reply, there is not much use in putting in this newspaper other than to observe that we have before us presented by this witness the newspaper *Sztandar Młodych* published in Warsaw on March 5, 1952, and to observe that on page 2 thereof begins the printing of the Russian report on the Katyn matter, which finishes on page 6 thereof, and that it is printed in this Warsaw newspaper on that date without any comment whatsoever.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I would like to add an observation there, that it is quite a coincidence that so many years after the original report was filed, on March 5, 1952, immediately after the commencement of the hearings by this very congressional committee, the Russian authorities evidently saw fit and necessary to republish their entire report not only in this newspaper but in every other newspaper in Poland.

Mr. DONDERO. I now ask the witness to describe to the committee in a few words the appearance of the area—the soil, the trees, and so on.

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. The woods consisted mostly of small fir trees, small bushes, and small trees; not large. The soil was sandy and yellow in color. This was common where there were the seven graves. Further over, where there was the eighth grave, the soil was more clay.

Mr. DONDERO. Were the trees thick or thin? I mean were there many or only a few?

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. They were comparatively thin and sparse.

Mr. DONDERO. That's all.

Chairman MADDEN. Is that all? Are there any further questions? Ask the witness if anybody offered him any pay or emoluments or compensation to come here today to testify.

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. No.

Chairman MADDEN. Tell the witness that he has made a very important contribution to the work of this committee, and the members of the committee are very thankful for his testimony.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Mr. Chairman, there is one question that we ordinarily ask every witness, which I think would seem rather superfluous in this case, but I think it proper for the record we should ask him, namely, whether he has come to any conclusion as to who was guilty of the Katyn massacre.

Mr. MACKIEWICZ. I am convinced that the crimes were committed by the Bolsheviks.

Mr. FLOOD. I might say we have had a great deal of testimony having to do with the autopsies and post mortems, and I think we should express our appreciation to this witness for the autopsy and post mortem which he has carried out upon the Russian commission's report.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, the witness says that he is very grateful to the committee, and that he has dreamt about the day and hoped that some day he might be able to make his deposition and state his conclusions and his findings before a body such as this.

Chairman MADDEN. The committee will now recess and will reconvene at 7:15.

EVENING SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 7:40 p. m.)

Chairman MADDEN. Give your name and address.

Mr. KOT. Kot, Stanislaw, 63 Rue de Richelieu, Paris.

Chairman MADDEN. Mr. Ambassador, in compliance with the rules here, I am going to repeat this statement to you. Before you make a statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who considered he had suffered injury. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as a result of the testimony. We have read that same statement to each witness who has testified.

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness indicates that he understands the statement and admonition.

Chairman MADDEN. Now you will be sworn, Ambassador. Do you swear by the God Almighty that you will, according to your best knowledge, tell the whole truth, so help you God?

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness indicates that he does.

TESTIMONY OF STANISLAW KOT, PARIS, FRANCE (THROUGH ROMAN PUCINSKI, INTERPRETER)

Chairman MADDEN. What is your name?

Mr. KOT. Kot, Stanislaw.

Chairman MADDEN. You are now a resident of Paris, France; is that so?

Mr. KOT. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you formerly hold any office in the Polish Government?

Mr. KOT. When?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Well, start in 1939.

Mr. KOT. Yes, I was Minister in the Polish Government.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Minister of what?

Mr. KOT. I was taking the place of General Sikorski in Angiers, France, and I had to deal with all of the matters pertaining to the Polish Government both politically and nationally.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were you subsequently appointed to any other office?

Mr. KOT. When the Polish Government was transferred to London, I was formally appointed Minister of the Interior.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were you at any time the Ambassador of Poland to Moscow?

Mr. KOT. After the Soviet-Polish pact was signed on the 30th of July 1941, I was appointed the Ambassador of Poland to Moscow, but I retained my title of Minister of Interior here; I remained in my capacity as envoy of the Polish Government here in London. The decision to send me to Moscow was a very hasty one and I retained that position here also.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. When did you go to Moscow?

Mr. KOT. I left here on the 3d of September 1941, through Archangel, and on September 4 I arrived in Moscow.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And you remained in Moscow as the Ambassador of the Polish Government until when?

Mr. KOT. Until the Polish Embassy in Moscow was evacuated on the 17th of October 1941. The entire Polish Diplomatic Corps and the Russian Government, all of the diplomatic corps were transferred to Kuybishev, and I remained there until the middle of July 1942 in Kuybishev.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, after you arrived in Moscow as the Ambassador from the London Polish Government, there were many duties that you had to perform as Ambassador?

Mr. KOT. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. But, because of the circumstances connected with that part of the protocol between the Soviets and the Poles dealing with the release of all Polish prisoners from Russia, one of your chief concerns personally as a Pole and officially as an ambassador was to do everything possible to get information and to obtain the release of all Poles?

Mr. KOT. That is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. From whom, if anybody, did you receive any particular instructions with reference to obtaining the release of Poles?

Mr. KOT. I had received those instructions from General Sikorski before I had left London. I must state here that the problem of the disappearance of these Polish soldiers concerned us very much already while we were here before my departure, and we had frequent conversations and conferences on that subject. These things may not be well known, but they should be called to your attention.

Mr. FLOOD. I think what you are indicating, Mr. Ambassador, is that as soon as the protocol, the rapprochement between the Soviets and the London Polish Government was brought about in the late

summer of 1941, the London Polish Council of Ministers immediately became interested in the missing Poles?

Mr. KOT. Even before the rapprochement we were concerned over these men and we held conferences as early as June of 1941 when Sir Stafford Cripps arrived in London from Moscow. When Sir Stafford Cripps returned to London from Moscow and it was evident that there was going to be a war between Germany and Russia, at that time General Sikorski already told me that he was concerned about the high ranking Polish officers who were interned in Russia.

Mr. FLOOD. In any event, at the time you got to Moscow as Ambassador, you were very much concerned personally and officially as to the whereabouts of missing Poles?

Mr. KOT. Considerably before that.

Mr. PUCINSKI. The witness is emphasizing it.

Mr. FLOOD. I understand that about "considerably before." I am concerned now only with your arrival at Moscow, and your answer is the same—Yes.

Mr. KOT. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Very well. As ambassador, your concern was not only with soldiers but with all Poles, civilian and military?

Mr. KOT. There is no question about that. However, the point or the question of the officers was particularly important, because 6 weeks prior to that, then General Sikorski already was thinking and hoping to form Polish Armies in Russia, he had to find out what officers would be available to him for service and duty in that Army.

Mr. FLOOD. We understand that very clearly. Now, as soon as you arrived in Moscow, did you receive any communications from General Anders with reference to the investigation on your part to discover the whereabouts of the missing officers: Did General Anders caution you not to press too hard for the moment with the military?

Mr. KOT. That is correct. The first day after my arrival in Moscow I had a conference with General Anders.

Mr. FLOOD. What I want to know is, how did it happen that General Anders happened to be in Moscow the first day you arrived there?

Mr. KOT. General Anders was released from a Russian prison a month earlier—from Lubianka—when, at the request of General Sikorski, who could not find the chief of staff of the Polish forces, Gen. Stanislas Haller, he had to see what staff officers were available, and he selected Anders as the chief of staff or the commander-in-chief.

Mr. FLOOD. Well, at your first conference with General Anders after you arrived at Moscow as Ambassador, with reference to the Polish officers, what did he say to you?

Mr. KOT. He told me that he has not been able to get any information as to the whereabouts of the Polish soldiers and cannot locate them; that he had had frequent conversations with the top Russian authorities on this question and that he had high hopes that those Polish officers would be found.

Mr. FLOOD. General Anders told you at that time that he had already had several conferences with high Russian military authorities trying to discover the whereabouts of the missing Polish officers?

Mr. KOT. He told me that he had several conferences with the military and that they understood the necessity and urgency for

locating these Polish officers, but up to that time they had no given him a satisfactory answer as to their whereabouts.

Mr. FLOOD. Did General Anders suggest to you at that time that as Ambassador you should not press too hard on the Russian military until he had at least another opportunity to contact the Russian military authorities about the officers?

Mr. KOT. He suggested to me not to press the issue with the Russians. He impressed on me that I should not even touch on that matter with the Russian diplomats. I had no contact with the Russian military; and that he had hope that he might work out some solution with the military. He expressed a fear that if I made some official diplomatic enquiries about these Polish officers, then the Russian military might be hindered in its efforts to help us.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, let us go now to the beginning of your conversations with the Russian diplomats.

Mr. KOT. During my first conversations with the Russian diplomats, which were held on the instructions from General Sikorski, I had discussed at length the release of all Poles in Russia, but I had purposely refrained from touching on the subject of the Polish officers.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you give us the date, if you can, remember, or refresh your memory from your notes, of your first conversation with Molotov and Vishinsky, with reference to the release of Poles, civilian or military.

Mr. KOT. On the 20th of September 1941 was my first conference with them, and at that time I expressed great concern and great heartbreak—

Mr. FLOOD. Just a moment. That conference was with Vishinsky alone, was it not; not with them.

Mr. KOT. Yes, the conversation was only with Vishinsky, because Vishinsky was the man who was in charge of the matters.

Mr. FLOOD. Let us develop this carefully.

Mr. Ambassador, your first meeting in Moscow, as Ambassador, with the Russian diplomats, was on the date you gave, September 20th, and only Mr. Vishinsky was there for the Russians.

Mr. KOT. I had previously visited all of the top Russian officials, including President Kalinin and Molotov, but my first official conversation on this subject was on the 20th of September 1941, with Vishinsky.

Mr. FLOOD. Then the answer is "Yes"?

Mr. KOT. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, of course there were interpreters present?

Mr. KOT. Always. It has become traditional since the 16th Century, in all Polish-Russian relations, that each country has its own interpreters and translators.

Mr. FLOOD. Even though the Russians understand Polish and the Polish understand Russian?

Mr. KOT. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. As you best recollect or refresh your memory from your notes, will you give us the gist; the form of the conversation you had with Vishinsky at the first meeting September 20th?

Mr. KOT. I have here in front of me the entire discussion that we had that day according to the notes which were made by my translator.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you let me see that document, Mr. Ambassador? (A document was handed to Mr. Flood by the witness.)

Will you mark this for identification, through the stenographer, as Exhibit No. 48?

(The document referred to was Marked "Exhibit 48.")

Mr. FLOOD. I show the witness a document marked for identification "Exhibit 48" and ask him whether or not this is a copy, in Polish, of the minutes of the conversation between the witness Ambassador and Vishinsky, for the Russians, on the date of September 20, 1941, prepared by the interpreter and secretary of the Ambassador witness, as he has indicated? I also ask him if this attached document is a true translation of the Polish version of exhibit 48?

Mr. KOT. Yes, it is.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, I now show you Exhibit No. 48 for the purpose of your testifying about the meeting, and may we ask—as I am sure you wish to—that you refer only to those sections of the minutes of your conversation which had to do with the missing Polish officers. The English translation of exhibit 48 will be inserted at this point in the record.

AMBASSADOR KOT DISCUSSION OF SEPT. 20, 1941

(Translation from Polish of exhibit 48)

Conference between Dr. Kot, The Polish Ambassador to Moscow, and Mr. Vyshinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on September 20, 1941.

Present: Director Novikov—interpreter, Mr. W. Arlet, secretary of the Embassy.

AMBASSADOR (after a few words of welcome and introduction). I suggest that we discuss a series of problems of a practical nature which have arisen since our last discussion held 10 days ago. There is no doubt that in the sphere of Polish affairs in the Soviet Union much is taking place. However, the information conveyed to the Embassy by the Soviet authorities is completely insufficient. In military matters action is progressing smoothly. Questions relating to the protection of the civilian population are going less well. News on the latter problem is urgently needed, not only for the purpose of informing the Polish Government in London, which is eagerly awaiting it, but also the Polish people in Poland, England, and the United States. Many real achievements made up to now have not as yet reached the Polish authorities. There is a constant lack of data concerning the numbers and the present location of Poles in several republics and districts. [As proof of the fact that Soviet authorities have given improper information to the Embassy, the Ambassador exhibits a list of 13 persons released from prison furnished by the *Narkomindel* (Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs) on September 10. Many more persons on the Polish list, to which the list shown by the Ambassador is an answer, have actually been released.]

VYSHINSKY. I acknowledge the necessity of furnishing the Embassy with the required data. The Soviet authorities themselves are in a difficult situation in this matter as they do not have at their disposal accurate statistical material. Besides, the Polish population is now migrating in great numbers and is, therefore, difficult to keep track of in statistical numbers. Despite this fact, the Embassy will receive, in the very near future, presumably not later than 5 days from today, a list comprising the number of Poles released from prison, camps, places of deportation according to republics, regions, and districts—in numbers of thousands if it is not possible to establish the more exact numbers for the time being. I do not guarantee that this deadline will be met in the case of the more remote regions which have not yet reported. But, in any case, I shall order that reports be forwarded to the Embassy as soon as we receive the data.

AMBASSADOR. That is our friendly request. May I call your attention to the fact that details of what the Soviet authorities have done for Poles, residing in the Soviet Union, might be used for propaganda purposes. I am especially concerned over the anxiety caused by the lack of news on the release of Poles staying in the north, in what is for them a deadly climate, the Kloyma and Pechora

regions, and the northern Yenisei region. They should be immediately released and transported to more suitable regions.

VYSHINSKY. I promise that I shall take an interest in this matter and make every effort to see that these people are shipped away from these improper conditions. What, however, should be done with them after release and transportation from the north? Technically they are already released, but what is to be done with them later?

AMBASSADOR. I shall take the liberty of returning to this topic later. However, as the subject of releases has been mentioned, I would like to know where the peasants have been located after their deportation from Poland. [Ironically:] One hears so far of the release of [government] officials, counts, and Jews; but there is no news as to where the peasants who were deported in entire villages from Poland are being relocated. In this connection, I have in mind a proper utilization of their affection for land, love of labor and their skill. In the matter of the deportation of the Germans from the Volga Republic, there might be the possibility of settling Polish peasants there. It might be of tremendous propaganda significance. The Germans are expelling Poles from their own land, and the Soviet Government is handing land from which Germans have been removed over to Polish peasants. The moral significance of this fact could well stir the entire world. Two large *kolkhozes* were handed over to the Poles there, but it was more in the nature of an unrelated fact: there simply happened to be present on the spot a group of Polish civilians who had arrived in that region with people enlisting in the army, and the group of civilians was placed in those *kolkhozes*. I am intent, however, on a broader plan—that the Polish peasants, who are excellent workers, cease to fell trees in Siberia, for this is only a waste of their abilities. Please enable me to discuss this plan with some competent authority of the Commissariat of the Interior who would appreciate its political significance.

VYSHINSKY. I do not know whether or when the inhabitants of this or that Polish village were deported. I have heard about the deportation of settlers [Polish farmers settled in Eastern Poland since 1920] and foresters, who appear on the cost accounts of the Soviet authorities as separate groups. One should first prove that facts of this kind really occurred.

AMBASSADOR. Whole villages were deported from Galicia and from, among others, the districts of Moseice, Sambor, Podhayce, and Rohatyn. Local committees composed of Ukrainians decided upon the deportations in order, in this way, to get rid of the Poles. The number of deported settlers was much smaller than the number of deported peasants, most of whom had lived in these districts for centuries.

VYSHINSKY. I have no responsibility for internal matters. I know, however, that the *kolkhozes* cleared of the Volga Germans were immediately handed over to peasants evacuated from front-line areas. After all, they are not the sort of Germans the Soviet Union is now fighting. If they are being moved from the Volga region, it does not result from any hostility of the Soviet administration towards them, but is simply a preventive measure.

AMBASSADOR. The Poles know the Germans well and they do not labor under the delusion that they can be separated into good and bad. They are simply not to be trusted.

VYSHINSKY. Surely in Germany there are many millions of people hostile to the Hitlerite regime.

AMBASSADOR. From the experience of Poles, who know the Germans, having often travelled there, having relatives and friends there, and above all from a mass of our compatriots in Westphalia and in other parts of Germany, we know that only elderly people, over forty, are disappointed with Hitlerism. The youth is totally under its control. It is an illusion to believe in the German revolt against Hitlerism.

VYSHINSKY. As our conversation has approached this subject, I want to state that, in my opinion, two forces will decide the defeat of Hitlerism: one, external, i. e. armed forces of the Soviet Union, England, America and brotherly nations such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, which are joined now to the Soviet Union. After the military defeat the other force will go into action—internal disaffection. Hitlerism was opposed not only by Rauschning and Strasser but also by the peasants, workers and millions of those who will take up arms against Hitlerism and will complete the military defeat.

AMBASSADOR. When I spoke of illusion, I had in mind the naive ideas of some lords and even English professors regarding the existence of good Germans. When I was given an honorary degree at Oxford University, a distinguished scholar told me: "Hitler certainly does not know what his administration is doing in Poland."

VYSHINSKY (laughing). I do not believe lords and professors. I am permitted to say this because I am a professor of criminal law myself, and a member of the Academy of Science. Your Excellency, as a historian, knows better than I that in the past there were many instances to prove that tyranny which is supported by the masses always falls down in the end.

AMBASSADOR. I agree with you, of course, but we must not remain under the illusion that a revolt in Germany may take place soon.

VYSHINSKY. I also agree, however, a military defeat may radically change the situation in a short time.

AMBASSADOR. Turning back to the condition of the Polish population in Russia, I would like to draw your attention to the lack of any plan and the complete chaos accompanying the freeing of Poles from the prisons, camps, and places of compulsory settlement. I would like the Soviet Government to suggest concrete proposals in this regard. These should be jointly worked out by the Mixed Commission. Perhaps certain regions could be selected, perhaps it would be possible to assemble a part of our population in special camps made available for that purpose, where it could work while enjoying the rights of free citizens.

VYSHINSKY. There are no camps in our country, except forced labor camps of a penal character. Our system of the administrative restriction of freedom provided for three degrees: (1) individual deportation to a determined locality, where a person lives quite freely and has a choice of employment; however, he does not have the right to leave the place and is under police surveillance, (2) settlement on special farms, sometimes equipped, the so-called "special settlements" (*specialnoje posielenie*), where work is organized under normal conditions, and the deportee has complete freedom of movement in the area, but is not allowed to travel farther than the nearest market town, and is not permitted to change his occupation; (3) placement in forced labor camps, with a total deprivation of liberty. I repeat there are no camps in the USSR where the inmates do not work.

AMBASSADOR. At any rate I request that you should quickly prepare a plan and submit it to us.

VYSHINSKY. I shall take this matter up in the nearest future.

AMBASSADOR. I request that a plan of resettlement and employment be jointly agreed upon. Unfortunately the Embassy has no data to prepare a plan of their own, because information received from Soviet authorities is totally inadequate. [Saying this the Ambassador submits a summary list by separate *oblastii* [regions] of Polish scientists, artists and specialists, handed over to Polish representatives in the Mixed Commission on the 17th day of the current month.] Such information is quite useless for us. It means nothing to us that in a given locality there live a certain number of doctors, when their names and addresses are not given. The number of lawyers is strikingly low; where are the judges, state attorneys, police officers? The list is not only incomplete but without practical value.

VYSHINSKY. I spoke with the Commissar for Health about the use of Polish doctors. It is possible that the list prepared by us is not complete.

AMBASSADOR. Most certainly. In Volhynia, in one place alone, 800 doctors were captured. Not only doctors but other professions are involved. For example, justices and state attorneys. Obviously Russia has no quarrel with these. If it is anybody's, it is our business [he laughs].

VYSHINSKY. I shall endeavour to supply detailed information in the shortest possible time. I shall examine all aspects of the case.

AMBASSADOR. I would like to touch upon two other problems of basic significance: the organization of the welfare of the Polish population and the problem of means. If you will permit me, I shall begin with the second.

VYSHINSKY. As you wish.

AMBASSADOR. In the initial period when Polish citizens were released from prisons and camps they were paid allowances of 15 rubles per day and given tickets to places of chosen settlement. In some places only persons leaving to join the army were accorded that treatment, in some others they received no money. Some, upon leaving a camp, received a lump sum, others received nothing. Letters and wires reach us with complaints that more and more often cases occur in which, after being freed, our people have no means of existence and are unable to leave the place. I would like to hear from you what the Soviet Government is preparing to do to settle such cases, and to provide means to meet these needs.

VYSHINSKY. The released receive a free railway ticket and allowances of 15 rubles per day, according to government instructions. If there are places where this money was not paid, we shall look into it. [Novikov intervenes, and explains that instructions concerning tickets and allowances refer to persons re-

leased from prisons and labor camps.] There is another group of expenses, which is to cover transportation to and living costs in, a new place, of those Polish citizens who were not imprisoned in prisons and camps, but settled in special settlements. The first group of expenses is covered by the Soviet Government, the second should be borne by the Polish Government.

AMBASSADOR (laughs). Polish Government! But we have no means, we have no money. One part of Poland was occupied by Germans, the other by you. Our government is abroad. We have no control over Polish resources. The Polish population was brought to the USSR against their will. You have thrown masses of the population into extremely difficult conditions of life. You have uprooted them from normal and organized life, from farms, and workshops. The Soviet Government is responsible for the presence of the Polish population in this country. It is obliged to provide the means to assist the Polish population.

VYSHINSKY. We have borne expenses connected with freeing the Polish population, we cannot bear the expenses for their moving from place to place.

AMBASSADOR. There are 18,000 Polish citizens in Switzerland, who were not brought there by the government of that country, but came there as political refugees or interned prisoners of war. The Swiss Government, however, not only pays their support, but also cares for their employment and studies.

VYSHINSKY (who in the meantime had thought out a reply to the last part of the Ambassador's declaration). I cannot agree with any statement which charges the Soviet Government with the responsibility for what happened, and judging its actions as guilty ones. Once we shall go into the past we shall dig out many claims and counterclaims. We do not consider the position of the Soviet Government as not right, and we do not recognize the Soviet Government responsible for the maintenance of those Polish citizens who have found themselves here. The Soviet Government is not, after all, the successor of the Polish Treasury, and has not taken over any of its obligations. If the Polish Government wished to present the problem in that manner, then it should have been brought up during the negotiations of the agreement, and not now. What we did in 1939 was entirely the result of strategic motives. The Germans threatened our frontier, we had to keep them away from it at a distance. By occupying Polish territories we have not committed an act of aggression. The present war entirely confirmed this premise. After all, we expressed it quite openly, then as well as now, even in the press. If what had been done then, had not taken place, the Germans would today be in Moscow, and perhaps even as far as the Urals. [In the course of the translating of this statement made by Vyshinsky, who became excited and spoke with a pronounced stress, Vyshinsky interrupts the interpreter and adds.] It is better indeed that during the negotiations of the agreement, the question of the alleged guilt of the Soviet Government for the events of 1939, had not been brought up. We have never acknowledged this guilt, and shall never do so. In regard to the merits of the financial problem, the Soviet Government, after all, covers the outlay of expenses for railway and river transportation. It will, for example, be able to provide farm implements and seeds, but we cannot agree that the problem be put in such a manner that the Soviet Government is now to carry the financial burdens, because of political reasons. The Soviet Government has conducted political actions which it thought necessary and it shall never agree with the statement that it had abused its power towards one or another group of people.

AMBASSADOR. I have not touched the problem of aggression or non-aggression at all. These are not matters for the present discussion. I have not come here to debate them. My Government, in concluding the agreement, did not take up that discussion, in order not to obstruct the negotiations. I was not making any political comments on the financial matters. I have only stated the undisputable fact that the Polish population found itself in the USSR against its will, and you, Mr. Minister, will not after all maintain that the prisoners or persons deported to labor camps arrived here according to their own wishes as tourists.

VYSHINSKY. Mr. Ambassador, you have nevertheless touched the problem of aggression by saying that one half of Poland was occupied by Germany and the other half by the USSR. I can not agree with such a formulation. We can not be placed on the same level with them. If there can be any question of guilt, then it is the guilt of the German Government. I hope that the Soviet Government together with the Polish Government shall one day make that claim in Berlin.

AMBASSADOR. The discussion of a political character resulted because of an inaccurate translation. I said that the Polish Government has no money, because one part of Poland has been occupied by Germany, and the other by the

USSR. In that way the Polish national wealth disappeared. The interpreter left out the first part of this sentence. In the future, I suggest that he translate in shorter passages.

(Vyshinsky admits that this of course changed the meaning of the statement, and emphasizes twice, that he therefore considers this discussion as not having taken place.)

AMBASSADOR. The Polish Government is willing to take upon itself part of the obligations to render assistance to the population, because it is our population, but we have no means with which to do it. A way out of this situation has to be found.

VYSHINSKY. Naturally, I agree with it entirely.

AMBASSADOR. If I were a representative of a wealthy country and had brought with me bags of money, I would simply distribute it among the needy population, without regard to anything. I hope the Soviet Government will take this situation under consideration. Even Solomon could not pour out of an empty vessel.

VYSHINSKY. Of course, we shall think about it. I shall talk with our financial experts about these matters; nevertheless, I would ask you, Mr. Ambassador, to consider several sources from which the Polish Government could obtain money.

AMBASSADOR. Part of the expenditure which is of an immediate character is already covered, or is being met by the Soviet Government. It is a problem of further expenditures for the care of people unable to work, those who are still awaiting assignment to work, also for a wider assistance program. I propose therefore that the Soviet Government grant a loan to the Polish Government for these purposes. Unfortunately the financial resources of the Polish Government will allow only the meeting of expenses for the upkeep of the Embassy and its personnel.

VYSHINSKY. I shall discuss this proposal with the Government, and our financial experts, and shall return to this matter at our next conference.

AMBASSADOR (jokingly). I do not trust financial experts, I prefer to deal with politicians, with executive heads. It would be desirable to submit this matter to Vice President Molotov or President Stalin. In order to solve this problem properly political reasoning must be applied. After all, fiscal considerations should not be allowed to constitute obstacles in bringing together our two countries.

VYSHINSKY (laughing). Our financial experts do not act at their own will, but carry out strict Government directives. They can be trusted.

AMBASSADOR. I would like to turn now to the matter of the organizational forms of care for our population in the U. S. S. R. Unfortunately the sending of Embassy delegates will not yield basic results because of the shortage of personnel. I could send 3 to 4 people to tour the country in order to find out at first hand about the needs of our population, and to report these to me. Such an inspection tour is important and should take place as soon as possible. It does not in itself, however, solve the problem of care for the population on the spot. The representatives of the Embassy who would remain permanently on inspection duties in the country would have to be completely trustworthy people. Our difficulty lies in this, that we do not know these people as yet.

VYSHINSKY. The list of candidates of trusted men or delegates which has been sent to the Embassy, came about in this way. The local soviets submitted at our request the names of people whom they had been in contact with. After all everybody has his reasons and it is difficult to decide whether, for instance, Kubik is suitable or not. I am of the opinion that one has to start on a minor scale and, without using the name "committee," select from among those people who call on the Embassy, and who appear to be most active. If it appears from the correspondence that someone is able to present the needs of a local group, and also prepare statistical data, he may be entrusted to deal with some matters. After all, a trusted man need not be selected forever, he may be changed. Moreover, the Embassy will be able to have, in the area, people known by their names, and select them to become trusted men. It is better to start with 10 to 15 people and later the whole problem will develop on its own. I am not afraid of committees, I had enough to do with them in my life [he laughs], but I believe that it would be a waste of time to discuss, now, this or other organizational forms. The people of whom we speak, in instances where they are not known to the Embassy, could remain as trusted men of the local Poles although not yet trusted men of the Embassy. I would ask you, Mr. Minister, to intervene with the local authorities that they do not interfere with the organizational phase under the pretext that an unauthorized forming of committees is taking place. While all that the trusted men do is simply select a few local Poles, or confer

with them on problems of the given group and then together decide on the fairest means of distribution in kind, or in money.

VYSHINSKY. This can be done. The conception of trusted men does not in itself raise any objections, because it does not constitute any complications in organizational methods. If a committee is set up, there arises immediately the question of its authority, its relations with the local authorities, and its scope of activities. That is where complications may set in. In my opinion, I believe it still would be better to work at once with men who are available. Let the Embassy become the Central Committee, you, Mr. Ambassador, the chairman [he laughs] and the trusted men, act as representatives of the committee. As regards the list of candidates submitted, it will have to be, of course, supplemented. We have to find out the occupation of the particular people and receive their brief personal data.

AMBASSADOR. Thus, in the particular localities selected the people shall deal with Polish affairs, but they will have to have advisers. And now still another formal matter. The date of the issuance of Polish passports set for November 22. cannot be met. The printing of the temporary passports has not even started. I would ask you, Mr. Minister, to assure for us the allocation of a supply of suitable paper.

VYSHINSKY. What kind of paper does it have to be [at the same time he questions Novikov as to how the matter of printing the passports stands, and says that it will have to be speeded up].

AMBASSADOR. It should be a strong paper which will not tear but will wear well. Although the form of the passports is entirely a matter for the Poles themselves, we have resolved to insert, in the temporary passports, a Russian text also for the convenience of the Soviet administrative authorities. At the same time I would like to ask you, Mr. Minister, to issue instructions that the question of selecting appropriate places for the passport and consular agencies, which will deal with the issuance of passports to our people, be discussed with representatives of the Embassy.

VYSHINSKY. I shall take care of these matters. The date of November 22 can of course not be maintained, and it shall be extended.

AMBASSADOR. The question of American help for our people is very important; a great many foodstuffs and relief goods have been collected. It is now a matter of getting assistance from the Soviet authorities. I have heard that a delegation of the American Red Cross is to arrive here, and the problem remains, therefore, that gifts intended for Poles should reach us and that their distribution be left in Polish hands.

VYSHINSKY. I give my assurance that this matter will be settled.

AMBASSADOR. Apart from the problem of the distribution of these gifts there arises also the question of transportation. If the transportation is to be free, American generosity will increase. It would be a gesture on the part of the Soviet Government, which will be fully and properly appreciated by American public opinion.

VYSHINSKY. For transports of that kind we provide for reduced tariffs. After all, free transportation would mean that the Soviet Government would have to pay for it. We have, after all, already agreed to exempt these transports from customs duty.

AMBASSADOR. Has this matter been settled finally? Mr. Minister, I nevertheless want to ask you to see to it that free transportation be granted.

VYSHINSKY. As to exemption from customs duty, in principle a positive decision has been reached. It now remains only to carry it out in details. As to free transportation it will be difficult.

AMBASSADOR. A special form of American help which is of great propaganda value are individual parcels. May this type of consignment be permitted into the U. S. S. R.?

VYSHINSKY. I believe, yes. I shall consult with the Commissariat of Postal and Telegraph Communications in this matter.

AMBASSADOR. Polish organizations in America have collected a great quantity of used clothing. A transport of them to the U. S. S. R. had already been planned when the Soviet Embassy in Washington began to make some difficulties. The clothing donated by the Americans is in good condition and of good quality. The question of sanitation should not enter into this matter.

VYSHINSKY. They could be disinfected.

AMBASSADOR. It would be a pity to do that, the clothes may thus be ruined.

VYSHINSKY. I promise to instruct the Embassy in Washington not to raise any difficulties.

AMBASSADOR. The great volume of correspondence which is coming to the Embassy necessitates an increase of the Embassy staff. In addition to this matter I have to ask people over to Moscow who are to become delegates of the Embassy, in order that I may get to know them and instruct them accordingly. I would like to ask that the formalities connected with permits for their arrival be dealt with in the speediest manner.

VYSHINSKY. There is a state of war in Moscow. Arrivals of all kinds must be limited as much as possible. Mr. Ambassador, I am not asking you to give me the number of people who are to arrive here, but to take into consideration the existing state of war and the basic restrictions which are in force here.

AMBASSADOR. In conclusion I would like to submit to you, Mr. Minister, two lists of persons as to whose whereabouts I am very much concerned. The first list pertains to political personalities, some of whom we would like to send over to London in order that they may complete our National Assembly. On this list are also names of some Ukrainians whom we know to be positively anti-German. Today, when the areas inhabited by Ukrainians are occupied by the Germans, one has to counteract their attempts in solving the Ukrainian problem. Let the world know that there are also other Ukrainians who oppose the Germans. Let the Ukrainian population and also the local pro-Germans become aware of it. The second list contains the names of private individuals without any political significance. Some are families of our Embassy officials and of other Polish institutions.

VYSHINSKY [accepts the list and promises to settle the matter].

AMBASSADOR. Finally I wish to submit to you, Mr. Minister, my official as well as private wish. Namely, whether I could be received by President Stalin in order to present to him some matters. The propaganda value of such a conversation would constitute a positive factor in our mutual relations, and would gain wide publicity abroad.

VYSHINSKY. Mr. Ambassador, from the manner in which you formed your wish, I note that you are aware of how very busy Chairman Stalin is at the present time, but I shall of course submit your proposal to him.

AMBASSADOR. I shall be very grateful to you, Mr. Minister. [He gets up and bids his goodbye.] Mr. Minister, you will begin to hate me if I shall always bother you as long as I did today. Perhaps we could see each other more frequently and for shorter periods, instead.

VYSHINSKY. Why more frequently, but briefly? More often and longer, Mr. Ambassador [he laughs]. It is very good that we meet. After all, we should talk all these problems over with each other.

AMBASSADOR (pointing at Novikov). This is all his fault. If the Mixed Commission would only work properly and speedily and if it consisted of people who could make decisions in these matters, I would not have to come to you with everything, Mr. Minister. These, after all, are matters for them to deal with.

The conversation was conducted in a lively manner, in an informal, sometimes light tone. It lasted from 6:00 P. M. until 9:30 P. M. Moscow, September 21, 1941.

Mr. KOR. In the first conversation I was so embarrassed in my discussion by the instructions given me by General Anders, who was not present at the conference. While I did not say specifically that I was inquiring about the Polish officers, I did make an inquiry about Poles in the northern part of Russia around Kolyma and Peczory and Jenisielskow and Winni, where we had suspected that these Polish officers were being imprisoned or detained, in these points. We suspected that our officers were being held at those points.

When General Anders arrived on the 24th of September—

Mr. FLOOD. Just a minute. We will get to that in a minute, Mr. Ambassador. All I want to know at this point is: What did you say to Mr. Vishinsky and what did Mr. Vishinsky say to you on September 20? Then we will get on to the next meeting.

Mr. KOR. Vishinsky told me that the Embassy will receive a report on the number of Poles who had been released but that his information

is not complete and he is still lacking information as to the camps in the far north. But he promised to make an effort to release these people from the far north, but he did not indicate or say to me at the time that I was inquiring about the Polish officers but merely about the Poles.

Mr. FLOOD. That was the extent, since it was just a detail of a general conversation, of talk about the missing Poles on that day?

Mr. KOT. There were many other things discussed at this meeting, but this particular phase of our conversation I understood it to be in regard to our Polish officers.

Mr. FLOOD. When was the first time, after September 20, that you had your first meeting with Mr. Molotov?

Mr. KOT. With Molotov it wasn't until the 22d of October.

Mr. FLOOD. Your first meeting with Molotov was on what date in October?

Mr. KOT. The 22d.

Mr. FLOOD. Between your first meeting with Vishinsky on September 20 and your first meeting with Molotov in October, you had several other meetings with Vishinsky?

And Vishinsky was the man you always were in touch with until you first met Molotov?

Mr. KOT. Always with Vishinsky.

Mr. FLOOD. Now will you go back to the second meeting you had with Vishinsky? What was the date of the next meeting with Vishinsky? The 20th was the first; when was the next?

Mr. KOT. The 6th of October 1941.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you not have another meeting with Mr. Vishinsky after September 20?

Mr. KOT. I did not have a meeting, but I did dispatch a note to Vishinsky inquiring about the release of the Poles, and this note was sent on the 27th of September 1941.

Mr. FLOOD. So the first contact was a meeting on September 20 with Vishinsky, the second was a note dispatched to Vishinsky on September 27, inquiry about the missing Poles. Now, do you have a copy of the dispatch that you sent to Vishinsky on the 27th of September?

Mr. KOT. I do not have it here.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Mr. Ambassador, that note of September 27 dealt with a number of complaints you had received from various Polish citizens, which you related to Mr. Vishinsky; is that correct?

Mr. KOT. I would have to have that note in front of me. I cannot remember the details of that note.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did it not deal with the complaint that Polish citizens were kept at forced labor, that they were not given the right to contact with the Embassy and were not given the right to move from place to place?

Mr. KOT. I had filed and sent more than 50 notes on that subject. I would have to have the note to refresh my recollection.

Mr. FLOOD. But, anyhow, you are sure that in that note of September 27 you did raise the question of the missing Poles, among other things?

Mr. KOT. I did not say officers, I merely demanded information as to the release of Poles from these camps.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you get a reply from Mr. Vishinsky to that dispatch of September 27?

Mr. KOT. No. But at my meeting on the 6th of October, I then specifically raised the question of the Polish officers.

Mr. FLOOD. Between your dispatch of September 27 to Mr. Vishinsky and before you had your first meeting with Molotov, did you have any other meetings or communications, in any way, with Mr. Vishinsky on the question of the missing Polish officers?

Mr. KOT. I will name them.

October 6, 1941, a conversation with Vishinsky; and I have the minutes here.

The 13th of October 1941, a note was sent to Vishinsky. In this note the question of the military people is definitely raised and clearly raised.

The 14th of October, a conference with Vishinsky. I have the minutes of that in front of me. As a result of my conference with Vishinsky on the 14th, General Sikorski sent a note to Bogomowo here in London the same subject, because Sikorski and I had conferred or contacted each other on this matter.

Mr. FLOOD. After the September 27 note, what was the next date of contact with Vishinsky? Was it October 6?

Mr. KOT. October 6.

Mr. FLOOD. Was that a note, or a talk?

Mr. KOT. A conference. And here are the minutes of that conference. And here for the first time we mentioned specifically the Polish officers.

Mr. FLOOD. October 6?

Mr. KOT. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you tell us at this moment, referring to the note you have before you, the gist of the conversation with Vishinsky on October 6, dealing with missing Poles or missing Polish officers only?

Mr. KOT. I complained that 9,500 Polish officers were evacuated or were taken from Poland to Russia, and that, "Meanwhile, today, we only have 2,000 Polish officers in the Polish Army; what happened to the 7,500 Polish officers?"

To this, Vishinsky and his aide, Novikow, attempted to convince me that what I am saying is not true. But they did not give me any arguments to support their allegation.

To this, I told them that, "We have been making constant effort to find those people," that we suspected that they were surrendered to the Germans, "We have searched for these men in the German prison camps, in occupied Poland; every place where they could conceivably have been found," that I would understand if we were missing a few tens of these people, or even a few hundred, but not several thousand.

To this Vishinsky and Novikow became somewhat confused and they said, "Well, what do you think happened to these men?" I told them that, on the basis of our earlier speculation as to what happened to these men, we believed that in the fall of 1940, we believed these men were transferred by ship to the far north, we knew of a shipment of 1,500.

Vishinsky replied that that information could not be correct and he demanded to know where we received such information. To that I replied, "From Archangel."

I further pointed out to him that on the terrain of the Soviet there was a camp located at Ostashkov, in which were interned the gendarmes and the police, "The camp actually no longer does exist, but from among tens of thousands of Poles who have already reported for duty to our Army, there isn't a single one from that camp."

I further demanded to know what was happening to our Polish officers who were still being detained in camps near Soswa, Kolyma, and also a camp near Omsk. To this Vishinsky replied, "They must be among the 300,000 Polish nationals who already have been freed." To this I said, "From those camps that I have named here, there are no Poles among us." And I added, "For example, the doctors and the professors of our higher institutions of learning who were in these camps, they are now nowhere to be found."

Vishinsky was very unhappy about this. I gave them the impression that if they would promise to give us the names of all those who had been freed, then we would be able to draw or reach some conclusion as to who has been released and who hasn't. That was the gist of the conversation that day.

Mr. FLOOD. Thank you very much.

Now, Mr. Ambassador, your next contact with Mr. Vishinsky was on October 13, at which time you tell us you dispatched to him a note.

Mr. KOT. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you have the gist of that note with you?

Mr. KOT. In this note I complained that up to that time I did not get the promised list of names of those released and that, furthermore, the people that I am looking and searching for are not being released, and that the military and the reservists are not being released from the prisons. Naturally, I kept General Sikorski completely informed as to the nature of my discussions.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, can you at this time give us excerpts of your October 6 conference and also a copy of your note of October 13, 1941?

Mr. KOT. Here they are.

(A document was handed to Mr. Flood by the witness.)

Mr. FLOOD. Mark this for identification as "Exhibit 49 and 49A."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 49 and 49A" for identification.)

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, I now show you exhibit No. 49 marked for identification and ask you whether or not that is the copy of the minutes of the conversation between you and Mr. Vishinsky on October 6, as you have just discussed?

Mr. KOT. Yes, it is.

Mr. FLOOD. We will offer those in evidence, and for the purpose of the record, the committee, in its judgment, will determine to print that part of those minutes dealing with the conversations about the missing Poles as discussed by the Ambassador, after they have been translated into English.

[Translation of exhibit 49]

KOT DISCUSSION OF OCT. 6

Excerpt 2.

Conversations between the Ambassador of the Polish Republic, Professor Kot, and the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyshinsky, which took place on October 6, 1941 (Present: Director, Novikov—interpreter, Secretary of the Embassy, W. Arlet.)

VYSHINSKY. The lack of data regarding prisoners is sometimes due to the fact that in the occupation part of the territory of the U. S. S. R. by the Germans, prisoners were evacuated separately and the files with their records were moved separately also. [Novikov adds a few examples of such prisons.]

AMBASSADOR. Apart from the fact that I am unable to trace a number of persons whose names have been listed on orders from London, and who will be sent to join the National Assembly, I also wish to submit the following figures: A total of 9,500 officers were imprisoned in Poland and deported to the interior of the U. S. S. R., while at the present time we have in the army only 2,000 officers. What has happened to the 7,500 men?

(Vyshinsky and Novikov both contend that this is impossible. They cannot, however, present any arguments to the contrary.)

AMBASSADOR. We have tried to find these people everywhere. We thought that they were handed over to the Germans, therefore we have tried to trace them in German prisoner-of-war camps, in occupied Poland, and wherever they might possibly be. I could understand it if about thirty to ninety men were missing, or even several hundred, but never several thousand.

(Vyshinsky and Novikov, embarrassed, they themselves ask questions as to what has happened to these persons.)

AMBASSADOR. In the autumn of 1940 a transport of 1,500 of our officers was sent north from Archangelsk by ship.

VYSHINSKY. This is surely wrong information. Where do you get it from?

AMBASSADOR. From Archangelsk. A prisoner camp was located at Ostaszkow in the Moscow province, in which our military police and policemen exclusively, were kept. To be sure this camp does not exist any more, but among the tens of thousands of people who reported to join the army, not one prisoner from that camp is included. And what of the camps in which our officers are still being kept, on the Soswa, Kolyma, not far from Omsk?

VYSHINSKY. I am sure they are among the 300,000 or so Polish citizens who have been freed.

AMBASSADOR. No officers whatsoever from the afore-mentioned camps are to be found in the army; and what about the doctors and university professors?

VYSHINSKY. During our previous conversation, Mr. Ambassador, I mentioned 591 Polish doctors of medicine (physicians); surely there must be 600 physicians in all. Perhaps some of them listed a different profession.

AMBASSADOR. Meanwhile we have about 30 of them in the army. The general health of army personnel leaves much to be desired, and there is no one to administer medical treatment.

VYSHINSKY. I promise to meet your request, Mr. Ambassador, and to assign a greater number of doctors to the army.

The final conversation is conducted rather rapidly, since Vyshinsky is in a hurry to attend another conference. The Ambassador mentioned the problem of publishing, by radio, the names of Poles freed, the demands of the Home Front (in Poland) relative to this problem, the intended transfer of part of the Embassy offices of Czelabinsk or Swierdlowsk, [Vyshinsky's attitude towards the latter idea was one of reluctance. The Ambassador declared that he would return to this matter], the question of Mr. Gruj's departure for Archangelsk as a delegate of the Embassy, [Vyshinsky agreed, but at this point made an unfriendly remark regarding the Consulate] and also expressed hope that the dates set forth by Com. Vyshinsky will be kept.

The conversation lasted from 6:30 to 7:45 in the evening.

AMBASSADOR:

Moscow, October 8, 1941.

[Translation copy of Exhibit 49A]

NOTE OF OCTOBER 13TH, 1941, FROM AMBASSADOR KOT TO MR. VISHINSKY, DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN MOSCOW, DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE INCOMPLETE FULFILMENT OF SOVIET OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING POLISH CITIZENS, UNDER THE AGREEMENT OF JULY 30, 1941.

The EMBASSY of the REPUBLIC of POLAND.

D.538/41.

Moscow, October 13, 1941

MR. COMMISSAR: Referring to the Note of the Charge d'Affaires ad iterum of the Republic of Poland addressed to the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, No. 30/41 of August 22, 1941, and the Note Verbale of the Polish Embassy, No. D.467/41 of

September 27, 1941, I have the honour, Mr. Commissar, to inform you of the following:

In both the aforesaid Notes, as in my conversation with you, Mr. Commissar, I emphasized particularly the need for the fulfillment by the Soviet Government of the provisions of the Agreement concluded between the Polish Government and the Soviet Government on July 30, 1941, and of the provisions of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. of August 12, 1941, concerning the release of Polish citizens from prisons, labour camps and localities of compulsory residence at the earliest possible date, at least before the coming winter, during which the departure from many of the camps would be most difficult if not altogether impossible. The question of release was also brought up by the Polish delegation at the two meetings of the Mixed Polish-Soviet Commission, when emphasis was laid on the special urgency of this problem.

During my conversation with you, Mr. Commissar, on September 20, I received your assurance that the Soviet authorities would take care that Polish citizens detained in distant Northern regions, where the climate is unsuitable for Poles, were transported to more suitable districts before the winter season sets in. During my conversation on October 7, I quoted figures relating to Polish citizens who were still detained in large numbers in camps and mentioned the fact that certain categories among them had been transferred to very remote Northern regions. In spite of repeated Polish requests and the assurances given on behalf of the Soviets, this Embassy has not as yet received the list of localities nor the exact numbers of Polish citizens released.

Contrary to the assurances that, except for a small number of individuals suspected, indicted or convicted of espionage on behalf of Germany, whose names and dossiers up to now have not been communicated to the Embassy, all Polish citizens had been set free and that in a small number of cases only was delay caused by purely technical considerations, the Embassy is in possession of information that there are still in a number of prisons and camps thousands of Polish citizens who were not informed of the Agreement concluded on July 30, 1941, or were informed that the provisions of this Agreement and of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R. of August 12 did not apply to them.

By way of example, may I state that Polish citizens are still being detained in prison at Saratov, Gorki, Balshov, Tschelabinsk, Kizel and in compulsory labour camps in the Primorski Kray in the North-Eastern extremity of the Yakut district/near the mouth of the Kolyma on the Arctic Ocean/, near Aldan, in the region of Tomsk, Karaganda, in the mines of Karabash /Tschelabinsk district/, in the Iygiel camp /Svierdlovsk district/, in the Archangel district and in the Republic of Komi, along the railway line under construction between Kotlas and Pechora and at other points.

More detailed information concerning the numbers and conditions of these Polish citizens is given in the Annex to the present Note. As will be seen therefrom the local authorities either did not receive detailed orders concerning the treatment of Polish citizens after the conclusion of the Agreement of July 30, or, in some cases, the local authorities were content to deal with the matter in a purely pro forma way / the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs withdrew police supervision of the 2,000 Polish citizens employed in the mines of Karabsh-Voloshynowski-Rudnik, but left the persons concerned where they were which actually made their position worse than before/, or with a partial execution of the orders issued. It is to be assumed that various considerations have dictated this treatment and in some instances local authorities may have desired to secure for themselves virtually unpaid manpower, whence the tendency to release sometimes elderly, invalid or ailing persons, while the stronger and healthier are retained for compulsory labour.

I have the honour to draw your attention, Mr. Commissar, to another characteristic feature of the conduct of local government authorities towards Polish citizens who are released, or who approach them with the request for employment or for the assignment of a residence. This conduct, without doubt unknown to the Central authorities, which should cease in the interests of good relations between the Polish and Soviet Governments, consists in informing those concerned that the blame for their difficult situation rests with the Polish Government and their representatives in the U. S. S. R. Naturally Polish nationals are not misled by this, but it arouses unnecessary mistrust among the Polish population.

Information issued abroad by the Polish Government, entirely in line with good Polish-Soviet collaboration, is to the effect that Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have been liberated from prisons and camps. I pre-

sented to you, on the 7-th of this month, copies of communiqués issued by the Polish Telegraph Agency in London and New York. The Polish Government is of the opinion that such official information should correspond to the real situation of the Polish population in the U. S. S. R. In the common interest of both Governments the Polish-Soviet Agreement should be fully carried out so that in foreign countries no elements unfriendly to this collaboration and hostile to the U. S. S. R., should find in the difficult position of the deported Polish population a theme for their propaganda.

The Polish Government could in no case agree that, as a result of the Agreement of July 30, 1941, the lot of Polish citizens residing in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should become worse or that local authorities should carry out its provisions in a manner contrary to the declarations and statements of the representatives of the Soviet Government.

Consequently, in its Note, No. 30/41 of August 22, 1941, the Embassy presented a number of proposals forming a logical whole with a view to the practical solution of the problem of the Polish population in the U. S. S. R., in accordance with the interests of this population and of both Governments. The fact that the suggestions contained in point 2 were only carried out in part, and that points 3 and 4 were left completely unfulfilled, has meant that such Polish citizens as have been released have not been able to improve their living conditions and a large number of them have been forced to wander aimlessly and compelled to camp at railway stations or in the open air in the localities newly chosen for their residence. In view of the approaching winter which in some parts of the Soviet Union has already set in, many of them are threatened with death by starvation. Their position is rendered still worse by the fact that the local authorities not only refuse to carry out the suggestions of the Embassy, but do not even comply with the assurances given by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs contained in the Aide-Mémoire of August 28, 1941, with regard to free railway fares, travelling subsidies, subsistence allowances and, most important of all, employment for the persons released.

I also venture to draw your attention, Mr. Commissar, to the fact that the organization of the Polish Army in the U. S. S. R. is not progressing in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Agreement of July 30, 1941, or with the intentions of the two Governments.

The Supreme Command of the Polish armed forces in the U. S. S. R. has vainly waited four weeks for a decision on the formation of further Polish divisions and the designation of the localities in which this formation is to take place. In consequence, numerous Polish citizens reporting for military service and rallying en masse to the Polish Army stream into the two already overcrowded camps, which lack the necessary number of tents, adequate food supplies and medicines. Thus a situation, harmful alike to the troops and to the common cause is being created. The local administrative authorities very often do not carry out the instruction issued by the central authorities with regard to questions concerning the Polish Army and create new additional difficulties, as for instance by declining to release from prisons and camps all Polish citizens, military and reservists, and in many instances by detaining the more physically fit elements, which reduces the military value of the units already formed. Moreover, considerable numbers of Polish citizens enrolled in the Red Army and subsequently transferred to the so-called labor battalions, have not up till now been directed to the Polish Army.

Thus the Polish contribution to the common struggle against Germany, contrary to the intentions of the Polish and Soviet Governments and to the unanimous will of the Polish citizens, is being weakened to the detriment of the cause of all the Allies.

In the profound belief that the Soviet Government attaches no less importance than the Polish Government to the development of friendly relations between the two States, I have the honour to request you, Mr. Commissar, to take measures to put into full effect all the proposals contained in the Note of the Embassy of August 22, and in particular the immediate release from prisons, camps and localities of compulsory domicile of all Polish citizens, the friendly treatment of those who are unfit for military service and the acceleration of the decision concerning the formation of further large units of the Polish Army, in accordance with the letter and Spirit of the Agreement of July 30, 1941.

I have the honour to be, etc.

/—/ STANISLAW KOT.

His Excellency A. J. VISHINSKY

Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in Moscow.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, we are now up to the point of the conversation on October 14, between you and Mr. Vishinsky.

Mr. KOT. In order to understand my conversation of the 13th, I must state here that—

Mr. FLOOD. Just a moment. Your contact of the 13th was not a conversation; a note.

Mr. KOT. On the 14th, I was saying that General Sikorski was planning on coming to Moscow.

Mr. FLOOD. As I understand it, Mr. Ambassador, as the basis of your talk with Vishinsky on the 14th, you have advised us that you had information from General Sikorski about his coming to Moscow as soon as possible.

Mr. KOT. That is correct. Because of the unfavorable results of my previous conversations, I sent a dispatch to General Sikorski advising him that he should not come to Moscow, for various reasons. Among them, one of them, was the reason that they had not released the Polish officers. There were actually two dispatches sent, one on the 12th and one on the 14th.

Mr. FLOOD. You sent these telegrams of the 12th and the 14th to Sikorski suggesting that he not come, for the reasons you have just stated?

Mr. KOT. That is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. I want to point this up, if I can, if you recall, or not. Did the Russians invite Sikorski to come, or did Sikorski volunteer to come—if you know?

Mr. KOT. As early as July 30, 1941, when the pact was being signed, General Sikorski said that he wanted to come to Moscow as soon as the actual formation of the Polish forces would begin.

Mr. FLOOD. But, of course, it is also reasonable to assume that the Russians were most anxious to have Sikorski come and be of assistance in the formation of Polish forces?

Mr. KOT. I tried to find out and determine whether they really wanted him to come or didn't want him to come.

Mr. FLOOD. Anyhow, that was in the background, and now we have the conversation of October 14 between you and Vishinsky.

Mr. KOT. At this conversation, I expressed the opinion that Sikorski should not come to Moscow because I had observed during our conversations that that was very important to them, his arrival.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You do not mean, do you, that that is what you told them?

Mr. KOT. The entire conference consisted of my openly telling them this.

Mr. FLOOD. Very well. Then, as a matter of fact, when I suggested to you just a minute ago that the Russians were anxious to have Sikorski come, you agreed because that was the tenor of the conversation with Vishinsky on the 14th?

Mr. KOT. It was my conviction or impression that they did want him to come, but they were not so much concerned with the formation of a Polish Army as they were with the exploitation, propagandawise, all over the world, of a Pole's arrival in Moscow.

Mr. FLOOD. What was Vishinsky's reaction to your declaration that you advised Sikorski not to come?

Mr. O'KONSKI. Just a second; may I interrupt there?

He did not finish his entire statement to Vishinsky as to why he urged to Vishinsky that Sikorski not come.

Mr. FLOOD. We will develop that. This whole conversation is about that.

Mr. KOT. You must understand that the Russians are very clever and that they never indicate openly whether they want or don't want something. They vacillate and maneuver around. You must study this whole conversation. Understand this: There was an hour and 15 minutes devoted to this conference.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, we understand quite well. What we would like you to give us, as you have been doing so excellently, is the gist of the conversation and the atmosphere surrounding the parties.

Mr. O'KONSKI. That is what I want to hear.

Mr. KOT. I pointed out to them that the proposal of Sikorski's trip to Moscow was suggested at the conferences with Churchill. Vishinsky told me that he was well aware of that and that the Russians had given complete instructions to expedite the general's arrival in Moscow. I told him that I must make clear to him the motives behind General Sikorski's proposed trip to Moscow, but to go into that now requires a great deal of time and I don't know whether you have the time to go into this.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, are you prepared to give us, in substance, in a paragraph or so, the thought of the motive, that is, without too much detail?

Mr. KOT. I emphasized that General Sikorski wanted to demonstrate to the whole world that the Poles were ready and prepared to fight with the Russians against Hitlerites, and this came at a time when the tides of war were going bad for the Russians and the Germans were already boasting to the world that they were going to defeat the Russian Armies.

I emphasize further that the faith, the belief, of the Poles that the Germans would not be victorious and that the Poles would help in the struggle would be a great moral victory for the world.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Just a moment. Mr. Ambassador, am I correct in stating that the gist of your conversation is that you finally told Mr. Vishinsky that you had hopes that by the time General Sikorski would come, that these Polish officers would be released? Is that correct?

Mr. KOT. I emphasized further that the Polish soldiers must be released by the time General Sikorski arrives in Moscow.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Is it not true, Ambassador, that the conference closed with Vishinsky giving you the assurance that he would give you all the Polish officers under control, those that were still there, but he said he could not give those that he did not have?

Mr. KOT. More or less, that is correct. Yes. I could go into greater details. While the conversation was larger in scope, those words that you mentioned are in my conversation.

Mr. FLOOD. You mentioned to us before that, as a result of your meeting on October 14, with Vishinsky, Sikorski directed a communication to Bogomolow here in London on the same question; is that correct?

Mr. KOT. That is correct; to the Russian Ambassador attached to the Polish Government.

Mr. FLOOD. And, as I understand it, no answer was received from the Russians to Sikorski's dispatch on that subject at that time?

Mr. KOT. There was, but it didn't come until the 19th of November of 1941, and the content of that reply will become evident from the conversations that I continued.

Mr. FLOOD. Now you have the next meeting with Mr. Molotov. What was the date of the meeting?

Mr. KOT. 22d of October.

Mr. FLOOD. With Molotov?

Mr. KOT. With Molotov.

Mr. FLOOD. Who was present besides you and Molotov?

Mr. KOT. Only Molotov's translator and my secretary, Mniszek.

Mr. FLOOD. Just you and Molotov? All right.

Mr. KOT. And the discussion lasted an hour and 15 minutes.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you just relate for us that part of your discussion with Molotov dealing with the missing Polish officers?

Mr. KOT. I made a request that my efforts to contact the NKVD be facilitated, that while my dealings with him were not diplomatic, they were in an effort to find the missing soldiers.

As an example, I mentioned to them our efforts to locate General Sikorski's adjutant, to whom he was very much attached. Molotov asked, "Is he here in Russia?" I replied that he was in a Russian prison camp in Russia and later he was transferred into the depths of Russia.

Molotov asked, "What is his name?" I replied, "Major Furman, Jan Furman." Molotov said, "Everything will be done to find him."

And immediately he instructed his translator, Narkomindielu, to write down correctly that name. To this I replied, "If, by some misfortune, this adjutant should not be alive, please inform us immediately because the worst thing that can happen to us is the uncertainty."

I also cited the names of two outstanding Polish generals, Orlik Lukowski and Kmicic Skrzynski, about whom we have had to this date absolutely no information. Also, I said I had several other names, with which I did not want to burden him at that time.

Molotov said, "Please send me the list." I to Molotov: "General Anders already has submitted a list to competent military authorities. Please give the proper instructions to expedite this matter. General Sikorski is very much concerned about this in regard to his arrival here." Molotov: "We will try to do everything possible."

And then we discussed further affairs.

Mr. FLOOD. I am leading you up to the meeting with Stalin, but now, before you had the meeting with Stalin, you had one or two other meetings with Molotov and Vishinsky.

Mr. KOT. No. Molotov left for Moscow, because all this happened in Kubyishev, and my subsequent conversation with Vishinsky.

Mr. FLOOD. You had several subsequent conversations after the meeting of October 22 with Molotov, you had several conversations with Vishinsky, and in the early part of November, you tell us you sent a note to Molotov.

Mr. KOT. The 1st of November.

Mr. FLOOD. November 1 was the date of the note to Molotov.

Mr. KOT. Yes; my note on November 1 was about the failure of the Russians to carry out the amnesty agreement and again pointing out that General Sikorski should not come to Moscow.

Mr. FLOOD. That was the note to Molotov?

Mr. KOT. Yes; November 1.

Mr. FLOOD. Now, you had a meeting with Vishinsky on November 2?

Mr. KOT. Yes. Here we had a detailed discussion regarding the question whether or not these Poles are in the Russian prisons or whether they are not. We were at that time accused of giving exaggerated figures and that we were exaggerating the number of men we were seeking.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, we are now ready to talk about the meeting with Stalin; but, first of all, I want to get the atmosphere and the attitude of Vishinsky and Molotov from the first day you met with them right down to the day you met with Stalin. How did they act at first? Was there any change? What do you think caused the change, and what kind of change was it?

Mr. KOT. There was a change in attitude, but only in the last moment. I could not understand, myself, what was the reason for that change in attitude. On the other hand, I asked Ambassador Cripps to support my efforts, and on November 4, Cripps went to Vishinsky in an effort to intervene on the matter that I had talked about.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Before that, did not Ambassador Cripps, on November 3, issue a note to Molotov asking for assistance, intervening on your behalf?

Mr. KOT. At this moment, I don't recall, but Cripps did tell me the details of his conversations. And I sent a report to General Sikorski informing him of this conversation.

Ambassador Cripps' intervention had no effect, and on the 8th of November, I received a note from the Russians informing me that all of the Poles have been released. Then the Americans intervened—specifically, a telegram from Harriman to Stalin.

Mr. DONDERO. This was all in September, October, and November of 1941. In all of those conversations, did either Stalin, Molotov, or Vishinsky ever say one word about these men falling into the hands of the Germans?

Mr. KOT. No; never; not once.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What happened as a result of Harriman's telegram?

Mr. KOT. Harriman's telegram was sent on the 11th of November. On the 12th, I had a conference with Vishinsky, and for the first time, Vishinsky was very pleasant. And he asked me if I am prepared to tell Stalin why I am objecting to Sikorski's trip to Moscow.

As regards the matter of the Polish officers during this conference, he asked me whether we had submitted to the Foreign Office the list of names to them. To this I replied, "Regarding these officers, General Anders had submitted a list to the NKVD, but only the list of prisoners who were in Starobielsk. But those who were in Kozielsk and Ostashkov, the list of names is now in the stage of preparation."

Vishinsky replied, "I am again asking you about this matter because these people, in my opinion, have been released. The only thing that remains now is to determine where they are. If any of them are not

free at this time, they will be released immediately. For me, this problem does not even exist."

Mr. DONDERO. Just for the sake of the record, let it be noted that while all these conversations took place, these men were already in their graves, and they knew it. That is my own comment.

Mr. FLOOD. It is significant, as I understand it, that during all of these conversations, Vishinsky and Molotov kept insisting that the Poles produce lists of names of officers?

Mr. KOT. Yes. That question always comes up. I will come back to that, but after I had discussed my conversations with Stalin.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, you may like to take a glass of water and smoke a cigarette. You have had quite a long stretch of testimony.

(There was a short recess.)

Mr. FLOOD. Do you feel ready now?

Mr. KOT. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Now we come to the date of the meeting with Stalin, and what was that date?

Mr. KOT. November 14.

Mr. FLOOD. What year?

Mr. KOT. 1941.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you just detail for us or give us the outline of the meeting with Mr. Stalin? Tell us who was present for the Poles and who was present for the Russians.

Mr. KOT. With Stalin was Molotov and a translator. With me there was just the translator-secretary, Arlet. Molotov virtually did not participate in the discussion except for one instance.

Mr. FLOOD. How was the meeting with Stalin arranged? How did you come to have a meeting with Stalin? Why?

Mr. KOT. Because of my opposition to General Sikorski's arrival in Moscow; that was the basis for calling this meeting.

Mr. FLOOD. Who called this meeting?

Mr. KOT. Please remember that at this time General Sikorski already was in Cairo, and he was being asked publicly there whether he planned to leave for Moscow. He, on the other hand, on the basis of the dispatches that I sent to him cautioning him that the Soviets want to exploit his arrival there for their own purposes and are not willing to release our soldiers, Sikorski publicly announced that he had not decided whether he would go to Moscow or whether he would return to London.

It was my impression that Sikorski's arrival in Moscow meant so much to Stalin that he had arranged this conference and invited me in an effort to determine why I was objecting to the general's arrival there.

Mr. FLOOD. Very well. Will you tell us the gist of the meeting, the conversation with Stalin; with particular reference to the missing Polish officers?

Mr. KOT. In the general conversations, we discussed the entire Polish-Soviet relationship. Stalin expressed his opinions as to the character of the Polish people, about the future of Poland. I emphasized that they did not want to permit us to form a large Polish Army in Russia because they had reduced our rations to such a point that we were forced to release 14,000 of our volunteers.

We continued our discussion on this subject, and it led to a conflict between myself and Molotov; and Stalin decided in my favor. At this time I raised the question of the missing Polish officers.

Shall I read now the part of our exact conversation?

Mr. FLOOD. Yes. I would like to hear that. If it is in Polish, let the interpreter read it into the record.

(Following is the translation by the interpreter:)

AMBASSADOR: I have already taken much of your valuable time, Mr. President. However, I have one more matter. May I raise this question?

STALIN (very politely). Please do, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. FLOOD. I want to emphasize this, Mr. Ambassador: What is now going to be read into the record are the minutes of the conversation which took place between you and Stalin, with particular reference to the missing Polish officers.

Mr. KOT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. The interpreter is getting tired. I will help.

(Following is a continuation of the translation by Mr. Machrowicz:)

AMBASSADOR. You are the author of amnesty for the Polish citizens in Soviet Russia. You made that gesture. I would be very grateful to you, Mr. President, if you would see to it that that gesture would be executed.

STALIN. Are there still some Poles not released?

AMBASSADOR. From the camp in Starobielsk, which was broken up in the spring of 1940, we have not yet received a single officer.

STALIN. I will look into that matter. However, the matter of the discharges is sometimes very curious. What was the name of the commander of the city of Lwow? If I am not mistaken, his name was General Langner.

AMBASSADOR. General Langner, Mr. President.

STALIN. That is right; General Langner. We released him last year; we brought him to Moscow; we talked with him. In the meantime, he escaped outside of the boundaries, as far as I know, to Rumania.

(Molotov confirms this.)

STALIN. Our amnesty knows no exceptions. But the same thing might have happened with some of these military people as happened with General Langner.

AMBASSADOR. We have names and lists; as, for instance, we have not, to this day, found General Stanislaw Haller. We are still missing the officers from Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and Ostashkov, who were sent away from there in April and May of 1940.

STALIN. We released all; even those people who were sent to us by General Sikorski so that they would destroy bridges and kill Soviet people, even those people were released by us. After all, it was not General Sikorski who sent them, but his Chief of Staff, Sosnkowski.

AMBASSADOR. He resigned already. And as far as the people whom General Sikorski sent here, you can count on them to the fullest extent. That is the best element.

STALIN (laughing). I know about that.

AMBASSADOR. So my request to you depends on your giving instructions that the officers whom we need, to organize our Army, be released. We have records as to when they were sent away from the camps.

STALIN. Do you have accurate lists?

AMBASSADOR. All the names are entered in the records of the Russian commanders of these camps when they daily call them for daily calls. Furthermore, the NKVD had special interrogations with each one of them. Not one officer of the staff of General Anders' army, which he led into Poland, has been released.

(Stalin for a few minutes got up and walked slowly around the table lighting a cigarette, listening attentively and answering questions. He then walks with a fast step to the telephone on the bureau and calls the NKVD. Molotov arises and also walks to the telephone. "That is not the way to get the connection." He then moves the telephone and sits at the conference table.)

Mr. O'KONSKI. In other words, the record should show that Stalin did not know what connection to use to contact the NKVD.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is right.

STALIN (speaking into the telephone). This is Stalin. Have all the Poles already been released from jail? (Then there is a moment of quiet while he is listening to an answer.) For the Polish Ambassador is here in my office and he tells me that not all.

(Again he listens to the answer and then puts the telephone aside. He returns to the conference table.)

And then Stalin is talking:

I also would like to ask you a question, Mr. Ambassador. When and where do the Polish troops care to act against the Germans? Do you have any material on that matter? If so, answer me.

I am told that following that is another subject. I am now omitting a number of questions and answers which do not relate directly to the subject matter and am returning again to the conversation on this matter:

(Stalin arises from his seat when the telephone rings and is listening most probably to the answer to the question which he gave a few minutes ago regarding the release of the Poles. He puts aside the receiver and returns, not saying one word.)

That is the end of the conversation on that subject.

Mr. FLOOD. We are very grateful to our colleague, the gentleman from Michigan, for his very excellent translation of those minutes.

Mr. Ambassador, you were present, of course, during all that time?

Mr. KOT. The conversation was with me.

Mr. FLOOD. You observed all of these movements of Stalin and Molotov as described in the minutes?

Mr. KOT. Yes. I was very much interested.

Mr. FLOOD. Of course, you do not know whether Stalin actually talked to anybody on that telephone, or not; do you?

Mr. KOT. I could be skeptical on that point.

Mr. FLOOD. What do you mean by "that point"?

Mr. KOT. I considered that or regarded that as some sort of a theatrical gesture.

Mr. FLOOD. Play acting?

Mr. KOT. Since he had nothing to say to me later and he discontinued that subject of the conversation and moved to another subject, then I was led to believe that he was trying to create the impression with me that he didn't know anything about these missing officers and that he was just then beginning to make inquiries as to their whereabouts.

Mr. FLOOD. What was the attitude of Stalin during the period of time of your conversation when you talked about the missing officers? How did he act, how did he seem to act? What was your impression on just that one point?

Mr. KOT. Stalin is a man who is unequivocally calm and very cold. He has unusual control of every one of his gestures and every word he utters. Stalin does not show normally how he reacts to any given suggestion, the way he is thinking.

Mr. FLOOD. Very well. That terminates, then, the meeting on November 14 with Stalin, insofar as the subject of officers is concerned? I will instruct our interpreter to have the minutes of this entire conversation translated and insert them into the record at this point as exhibit 49B.

EXHIBIT 49B

MINUTES OF THE CONVERSATION OF AMBASSADOR KOT WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLES' COMMISSARS OF THE U. S. S. R., J. STALIN, AT THE KREMLIN ON 14TH NOVEMBER 1941, IN THE PRESENCE OF W. MOLOTOV, COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND OF MR. W. ARLET, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE POLISH EMBASSY

(Literal translation from Polish)

Ambassador Kot. I hold it as a great privilege to be introduced to you, Mr. President, with whose name is bound the historical moment of the reestablishment of mutual relations between Poland and the U. S. S. R.

STALIN. I am pleased to meet you, Mr. Ambassador; we, the Soviet people, all of us, maintain that the relations between the Soviet and the Polish nations should be as good as possible. I hope, inasmuch as it depends on the Soviet people, that we shall be able to do everything we can in this respect. I think that we can turn a new leaf in the history of the relations between our two countries and base them on friendship.

Ambassador Kot. It was a great pleasure to hear you say that, Mr. President, and on my part may I assure you that the leaders of the Polish state and of the Polish nation are themselves adherents of the idea of a deep and permanent Soviet-Polish cooperation. We simply do not see a single reason and no problems which could become a source of any conflicts between us—neighbors.

STALIN. We are not only neighbors, we are also of the same stock.

Ambassador Kot. In view of the terrible lesson given to us and to the world at large by Hitler the more so should you and we demonstrate this kinship of ours.

STALIN. You are quite right.

Ambassador Kot. It is held in certain circles that there exist problems which divide us, such as for example the Ukrainian or the Lithuanian question. But it is precisely by means of our cooperation that these problems can be solved. I think that they become one more reason of drawing us closer together.

STALIN (confirms by nodding).

Ambassador Kot. In the meantime, however, a war is being waged which has absorbed every single Pole. We wish to engage all our possibilities on this side of the fighting world. Our position is not easy: Polish territories are, under German occupation, our Government is abroad, material means are practically nonexistent. But in spite of all that the Germans themselves have to admit that the Poles represent a formidable force. They know and are afraid of the fact that every Pole under their occupation, when the decisive moment will come, will fulfill his soldiery duty. The Polish nation bears its share of the struggle by its endurance and perseverance which induces it to keep up the fight loyally till the very last on the side on which all democratic values have been engaged. You know no doubt, Mr. President, the love of freedom of the Polish nation. The Germans failed to find a single quisling in Poland, nor did they succeed in forming a puppet government [*gouvernement fantôme*]. There is, however, one more characteristic value which Poland brings into the democratic block. We are the only Catholic nation which fights on the side of the Alliance of the Anglo-Saxon Powers and the Soviet Union. And this fact is of inestimable value as it makes it impossible for Hitler to assume the role of defender of faith. At the same time the attitude of Poland prevents the Vatican from openly backing the Axis States. As far as we are concerned, however, our main ambition is to create the strongest possible Polish Army abroad. After all this war is not only your war—it is our war as well. And that is why we ask you to favor our endeavors to build up a powerful Army. The Poles have given ample proof that they can and will fight Hitler to the last. Our forces are dispersed over Egypt, Palestine and Great Britain—they are fighting on the seas and in the air. However, our greatest manpower resources are in the Soviet Union. This is then the main problem, which General Sikorski desires to settle with you. General Sikorski is a statesman with a great temperament but also a soldier who knows how to force an issue. Rigor of character and a strong will are his main traits. He has proved them in his determination to conclude the Polish-Soviet pact in spite of a strong opposition. He is highly esteemed by the leaders of all Allied nations. There is therefore every reason to believe that, together with you, Mr. President, and with Churchill and Roosevelt, he will be included within the privileged group of men who will be called upon to decide the future of the world.

STALIN. I well understand the necessity of forming a Polish Army. I have met with Polish soldiers on many a battlefield and I am aware of their value.

This is obvious—I am ready to give all necessary assistance. Be so good, Mr. Ambassador, as to tell me exactly with what you are dissatisfied, and with what are dissatisfied the Poles in Russia—and what are their wishes. If General Sikorski wishes to come to the U. S. S. R. he will be our welcome guest and I hope that we will be able to reach full agreement.

Ambassador KOT. Does this mean, Mr. President, that you are ready to listen to our complaints and requests?

STALIN. Indeed I am.

Ambassador KOT. A friendly atmosphere should be the basis of cooperation and of good mutual relationship. The Poles who since the sixteenth century have suffered so much from the hands of the Russians really need such a friendly atmosphere. It is not so much a question of principles it is more the emotional approach which counts the most. There is a deeply rooted false notion among the Russian people that the Poles are a nation of landlords. This is definitely untrue. We are a nation of peasants, artisans, and working people—in fact a deeply and sincerely democratic nation. I would like to emphasize the fact that this notion is very common among the lower Soviet executive functionaries which creates various difficulties for the Poles. We would, therefore, be very grateful to you, Mr. President, if by using your authority you would remedy this state of affairs, having already proved your good will by your readiness to cooperate with us.

STALIN. There is one point which I would like to make clear for the sake of historical exactitude. It was not only the Poles who had suffered from the hands of the Russians ever since the sixteenth century—it was the Russians who had also suffered from the Poles. After all you have twice captured Moscow in that time. Let bygones be bygones. I can well believe that isolated cases of improper treatment of the Poles by certain authorities do occur. But this unfriendly atmosphere will be stopped [Budiet likwidirowana.] I know also that the Poles are a nation of peasants and working people. There exist at present all the necessary circumstances to enable us to forget all our historical grievances and to join hands in a common effort to fight our common enemy—Hitlerite Germany. As far as the Polish Army is concerned—we have undertaken to set on foot 30,000 soldiers in 1941, which amounts to two infantry divisions, one reserve regiment, an officers' training center and the respective staffs. The First Division is to be equipped by us—the Second by the Poles. To put it bluntly [Goworia grubo]—both divisions, the whole of those 30,000 soldiers have to be fed by the Russian people. The Soviet Union has undertaken to do that and we shall keep our promise. Is that correct? [Eto prawilno?]

Ambassador KOT. This is not quite so. The Polish Army in the U. S. S. R. should be as large as manpower reserves we dispose of in the Soviet Union will permit. If we used every single man available we could form an army counting 150,000 men. In making this rough estimate I am considering only those physically fit—otherwise it could be even larger. We will certainly do our best to obtain equipment and maintenance from abroad.

STALIN. However, the existence of a protocol limiting the number of soldiers to 30,000 for the year 1941 cannot be denied. This is not my last word [Ja nie szezitaju etowo naszym poslednim slowom]. I only stress the fact of the existence of such a protocol.

Ambassador KOT. This is not the only protocol. There is one, if I remember rightly, dated the 12th of August, drawn up at the first meeting of the Polish-Soviet Military Commission. This protocol states clearly that the two divisions were only meant to be the first stage—that they would only be the nucleus of an army, which was to be formed straight away. Already the following month new protocols were drawn up about the creating of further units.

MOLOTOV. But those later protocols have not been signed or ratified by the Government. I have here the document in question [holds up the paper and points to the date, 1.X.1941.]

Ambassador KOT. (Pointing to the same date). Do show me, please, where it says that in the year 1941—only two divisions were to be formed. As far as I know the protocol states that the two first divisions have to be ready on the 1st October 1941. The meaning is completely different. There is no limit as to the number of men in the army for the year 1941.

MOLOTOV (reluctantly). Yes, indeed. In any case no other protocols have been ratified by the Government.

STALIN. The Russians have not broken the agreement. If the Poles are dissatisfied they have every right to forward further proposals. The Russians have not gone back on their word.

Ambassador KOT. Our intention was to form further 3 divisions. Two of them were to be labor units which were created for the purpose of building winter quarters for the army.

STALIN. But up till now you have only got one division.

Ambassador KOT. We have two of which only one fully armed, although it was agreed that both would be supplied with the necessary equipment. It was only in September that the U. S. S. R. military authorities informed us that they were unable to supply the second division with the necessary armaments.

STALIN. Yes, indeed. I seem to remember.

Ambassador KOT. Not being a soldier—I do not claim the right to discuss technical matters. I am concerned rather with the principle of the whole thing, than with minor details.

STALIN. We, the Soviet people, wish to have the strongest possible and battle-fit Polish Army. [Kak mozno bolszoi i wojennospobnojoj polskoj armii.] We are willing to share with you everything we possess and what we feel our duty to supply you with but the Poles must bear in mind that the U. S. S. R. is waging a war and that we have to equip our own reserves. Don't forget that we have suffered great losses. Consider the fact, Mr. Ambassador, that we may not be able to keep up with the necessities of equipment and maintenance of our front-line armies, our reserves, and the Polish Army as well. We have to feed many millions already engaged in fighting. All we can do is to provide for two Polish divisions. One of them is fully equipped and ready. I have nothing against the raising of five, six, or seven Polish divisions on our territories, as many as you can manage with the men and equipment you have. But I repeat, we are fighting on a wide-spread front and we risk to fail to supply our own armies. The Poles themselves should make every possible effort to find arms and equipment for their troops. It is possible that the situation might improve and then—it will become a different matter. [Tozda rozgovor drugoi.]

Ambassador KOT. I thank you, Mr. President, for this statement. If I have well understood it means that we can form as many divisions as our manpower resources will permit, subject to our obtaining the necessary food and equipment supplies from abroad.

STALIN. Yes, that is what I meant.

Ambassador KOT. As all the candidates fit to bear arms will be enrolled—there remains only one thing to be settled, namely the choosing of the places where these units would be formed, chosen in a way which will make deliveries of maintenance and equipment from abroad as easy as possible.

STALIN. I agree, in principle. A suitable place will be found. However, it cannot be Uzbekistan, to where the Poles keep traveling illegally.

Ambassador KOT. We do not insist on Uzbekistan. It was the place indicated to our command by the Soviet military authorities. I was always much against all this disorderly shifting of the Polish population, but it had to happen as, in spite of numerous requests, I was unable to obtain the plans of resettlement. It was the Soviet authorities which directed our people to Uzbekistan. I have even a telegram to that effect to prove it.

STALIN. Where is it from?

Ambassador KOT. From Nowosybirsk where the local Soviet authorities direct our people southward. It was only natural that all those who left prisons and labor camps in the far north should in fear of the hard winter, strive to get to the south. I quite agree that such a disorderly mass movement is quite intolerable in times of war, but for my part I was completely helpless in the circumstances which have arisen.

STALIN. A suitable district will be chosen tomorrow.

Ambassador KOT. I have to renew my request to consider in choosing the place, the suitability of climatic as well as transport facilities indispensable to our being supplied from abroad.

STALIN. Are you talking about a place where the Army should be concentrated—or about the districts designated for the civilian population? Haven't those been assigned to you?

Ambassador KOT. The district chosen for the formation of the first Polish divisions has been overcrowded by the constant arrival of volunteers for the Army. The Polish military authorities were forced, therefore, to direct those people somewhere—which they did according to the indications of the Soviet authorities which stipulated that the transports should be sent to the place where the next divisions were to be formed. This was apparently the Wrewojske station in the Uzbekistan where sufficiently large barracks allegedly existed.

MOLOTOV. This particular place has not been approved by the Government and therefore the sending there of those people was pointless. The Polish Embassy and her employees have even been sending telegrams to various centers inhabited by the Poles advising them to go to Uzbekistan.

Ambassador Kot. The Soviet authorities kept directing those transports southward, for example, to the Farab station. It was they who requested from General Szyszko-Bolusz the sending of a telegram to that effect.

STALIN. I am asking you once again, Mr. Ambassador, are we talking about a place required for the formation of an army or about districts chosen for the settlement of civilians? Do we have to solve two problems or one?

Ambassador Kot. This is a very difficult question.

STALIN. Which districts am I to decide upon for tomorrow?

Ambassador Kot. The indication of both districts is, of course, a matter which has to be settled by the Soviet Government. I have already formulated what our wishes are in respect of the districts destined to form the Army. In choosing the places for civilian settlements could you, please, take into consideration not only the climate but also the possibility of employment in the place of settlement. There is, however, no necessity to make a decision about it—tomorrow. On the contrary I would ask you, Mr. President, to postpone the decision in this matter till the arrival of General Sikorski and after discussing it over with him.

STALIN. All right. I repeat once more that although we would like to see a numerous and well-equipped Polish Army—we are at war and quite unable to maintain at present more Polish divisions. It is likely that in 3 months time the material situation will improve but for the time being we have to give priority to our own divisions many of which have to be organized. It might happen that even in 2 months time there will be a change for the better.

Ambassador Kot. I thank you, Mr. President; General Sikorski will be informed about it.

STALIN. After all we are allies. And who wants a weak ally? We will share with the Poles everything, like with brothers. We'll do for you whatever we can.

Ambassador Kot. I entirely realize your difficulties. However, in the matter of maintaining the units which are about to be formed I have to ask you for a definite promise of keeping up the supply of rations for some time at least.

STALIN. We will do for you whatever will be possible.

Ambassador Kot. After all there can't be any possible comparison between the needs of your immense army and our few divisions.

STALIN. And yet it happens that a man can lift 100 pounds and will collapse under the weight of one more ounce. We'll do whatever human power will permit us, but I don't want to give promises which I won't be able to fulfill.

Ambassador Kot (hands to Molotov the copy of the order of the plenipotentiary of the Red Army for the formation of the Polish Army, dated 8th February 1941). Here is the copy of the order.

Molotov hands it to Stalin who gives it to the Secretary.

STALIN. What sort of order is it? Who has signed it?

The INTERPRETER. Panfilov.

STALIN. He has no right to issue such orders. [This is said with a clearly displeased tone.] This is not an order at all.

Ambassador Kot. I have already taken up a great deal of your time, Mr. President, when you have such important matters to attend to. But there is still one more important question—may I raise it?

STALIN. [Politely.] Certainly, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Kot. You are the author of the amnesty for Polish citizens in the U. S. S. R. You made that gesture. I would be extremely grateful to you if you would use your influence to have it put into full effect.

STALIN. Are there still any Poles in captivity?

Ambassador Kot. From the camp in Starobielsk, which was dissolved in the spring of 1940, we have not yet regained a single officer.

STALIN. I will look into the matter. But after release many things can happen. What was the name of the commander of the defense of Lwow? General Langer, if I am not mistaken?

Ambassador Kot. General Langner, Mr. President.

STALIN. Exactly, General Langner. We released him last year. I had him brought to Moscow and talked with him. Later he escaped abroad, probably to Rumania.

MOLOTOV. [Confirms this.]

STALIN. There are no exceptions to our amnesty, but with certain servicemen the same thing may have happened as with General Langner.

AMBASSADOR KOT. We have the names and lists. For example, General Stanislaw Haller has still not been found; officers from Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and Ostashkov, who were removed from these camps in April and May 1940, are still missing.

STALIN. We have released everyone, even people who were sent to us by General Sikorski to blow up bridges and kill Soviet people; we have set free even those people. Actually it is not General Sikorski who sent them, but his Chief of Staff, Sosnkowski.

AMBASSADOR KOT. He has already resigned. As far as people sent here by General Sikorski are concerned you may rely on them—they represent a first-rate element.

STALIN (smiling). I know it.

AMBASSADOR KOT. So my request to you, Mr. President, is that you should give instructions for the officers, whom we need for the organization of the Army, to be released. We possess records of when they were removed from the camps.

STALIN. Are there any accurate lists?

AMBASSADOR KOT. All names are recorded by the Russian camp commanders who held a roll call of all prisoners every day. In addition the NKVD carried out an investigation of every person. Not one officer of the staff of General Anders's Army, which he commanded in Poland, has been handed over.

STALIN (who stood up a few moments before and was slowly pacing round the table, smoking a cigarette, but listening carefully and answering questions, walks quickly to the telephone on Molotov's desk and connects himself with the NKVD).

MOLOTOV (also gets up and goes to the telephone). It does not work like that [he turns the switch and sits down again at the conference table.]

STALIN (telephoning). Stalin here. Have all Poles been released from prison? [Silence for a moment, while he listens to the reply.] I have with me here the Polish Ambassador who tells me that not all [he again listens to the reply, puts down the receiver and returns to the conference table]. I would also like to put a question to you, Mr. Ambassador. When and where does the Polish Army want to operate against the Germans? Do you possess any material in this matter? If so, will you kindly report about it to me.

Ambassador Kot. I am not a soldier. That is a subject for General Sikorski. I must explain that we Poles do not look upon the army as a theatrical performance. Yet we do not wish to send to the front one or two divisions which would be lost among the numerous Red Army divisions. We desire to be entrusted with some important sector of the front so that we, the Poles, may show what we have to say to Hitler. We wish our army to fight here in the East, and our agreement should be sealed by the brotherhood of arms.

STALIN. The Czechs collected a battalion and wanted to fight, but I did not permit it. I understand your attitude. The Poles should form a corps or an army.

Ambassador Kot. I take the liberty of stressing the fact that every item of news about the formation of a Polish division is of great importance to bringing about an atmosphere among the people in Poland which would be sympathetic to a Polish-Soviet rapprochement.

STALIN. Of course, I understand it [rises as the telephone rings and listens—probably to the answer to his inquiry of a few moments before concerning the release of the Poles. Puts down the receiver and, without saying a word, resumes his seat].

Ambassador Kot. I wish to thank you, Mr. President, in the matter of the further formation of our army and the release of our nationals. The army and the release—these are the two vital words [Rises to take farewell]. In leaving I wish to tender you my wishes that the halo of the defender of Moscow which surrounds you today, may in the future be transformed into the glory of the final vanquisher of Hitler.

STALIN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Would you tell me when the arrival of General Sikorski is to be expected?

Ambassador Kot. Unfortunately it is not possible to communicate directly from here with Egypt. But I'll do it as soon as I get to Kujbyszew. It is probably the question of another few days. I will not take up any more of your precious time, Mr. President, but I do want to assure you that the Poles remember and won't forget that it is your name which is linked with the Soviet-Polish agreement and the amnesty.

STALIN. I am personally anxious to be of help in the rebuilding of an independent Polish state, without being concerned with its internal structure.

Ambassador KOT. I thank you, Mr. President, for this statement. May I make a note of it and make it known to all. It would be of the greatest importance. Or would you consent to make this declaration publicly?

STALIN. I'll do it gladly at the first opportunity.

Ambassador KOT. I am very grateful to you, Mr. President. It will be of great consequence. There is, however, one more thing. I know that sometime ago you gave your consent to the creation of a Polish newspaper. Unfortunately we have encountered with many difficulties.

STALIN (turning partly to Molotov). Is there still no Polish paper?

Ambassador KOT. I am afraid not. We are constantly being told that there are no printing facilities; no type, etc.

STALIN (not hiding his dissatisfaction). Who said so?

Ambassador KOT. I would rather not mention names. But I would be grateful to you, Mr. President, if you would give some instructions in this matter.

STALIN. I'll certainly do it. Do you know Wanda Wasilewska?

Ambassador KOT. Of course, I do. She was one of my pupils. After all, by profession I am a university professor.

STALIN. A year ago, yes, I remember well—exactly a year ago, while talking to her, I asked her to try and find some Polish officers, who would undertake the formation of a Polish Army on Soviet territories. I stress the fact that it was a year ago, which means at the time when the pact of nonaggression with Germany was still valid. Wasilewska failed to find such officers.

Ambassador KOT. I thank you once again, Mr. President, for taking such interest in our problems. May I hope to be granted another interview in case of urgent questions arising in the future.

STALIN. Yes, of course. [He says good-by to the Ambassador.]

Ambassador KOT (turning to say good-by to Molotov). As I still have many important matters to discuss with you, Mr. Commissar, with which I do not want to take up the President's time—could I come and see you tomorrow?

MOLOTOV. Yes; please. [The Ambassador takes his leave and withdraws.]

The conversation lasted from 7 p. m. to 9:10 p. m. Molotov's interpreter translated. The Ambassador spoke in French; Stalin and Molotov in Russian.

Stalin who during the interview was composed and self-possessed spoke in a low voice. Several times he showed his discontent when from what the Ambassador told him it became apparent that he was not kept fully informed by the Soviet authorities about what was going on. Initially his behavior was marked by a certain reserve and mistrust which little by little subsided however. He addressed the Ambassador with courtesy throughout the interview. Several times he got up and paced up and down along the length of the conference table at the end of which the Ambassador was sitting. Molotov hardly took any part in the conversation.

KUJBYSEW, the 16th of November 1941.

Mr. FLOOD. When was your next communication, either in person or in writing, with Stalin or Molotov or Vishinsky on this one subject of the missing officers?

Mr. KOT. That same day, I requested an audience with Molotov in the Kremlin. Molotov already was in Moscow and I presented him with a pro memoria, and I stressed and underlined that there must be complete amnesty through the release of those people for whom I was searching.

I will add here that I received a reply to this note, this pro memoria, on the 19th of November, where they again stressed that the amnesty is complete and that everybody has been released; that the only people whom they have not released are those who are being incarcerated for criminal offenses and also those whom they consider as agents of the Hitlerites. I want, at this time, to tell you what my reaction to my conversation with Stalin was.

I was convinced that, unless we prepared a complete list of the names of the people that we were seeking, we cannot succeed, because that was our weak point in these negotiations. And immediately upon my return to Kuybishev, on the 17th of November, I dispatched a letter to General Anders.

I have an excerpt here of that letter, although I do not have the complete letter here with me.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, will you read into the record at this point that excerpt which is material.

Mr. KOT. I reacted very painfully that—

Despite my frequent requests, I have not to date received a detailed list. I beg you to prepare, within a week, the information from all of those who were interned in Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and Ostashkov—

the list of names which they may recall—

and from this list prepare a master list of names. It is conceivable that we may have an opportunity to present such a list.

General Anders, in turn, applied pressure to his own officers to get this information, and he issued instructions that everyone who was in these camps should try to recall every name possible to obtain the names for this list. But, since the human memory is weak, many of those did not recall the names of the people that they were interned with.

So at that time, I decided to transfer the preparation of this list to the Embassy, to the press office of the Embassy, and I asked General Anders to send me Czapski, and I assigned additional help to Mr. Czapski. On the basis of all the information, we began preparing the list.

Mr. FLOOD. Just a moment. I think it is important for us to point out on the record at this time that all of the conversations you are talking about and all of your service as Ambassador at the time you mention, since the date of the transfer, is taking place at Kuybishev, with the exception of the conversation with Stalin, which you went to Moscow to fulfill; is not that correct?

Mr. KOT. The first weeks were in Moscow, but after the evacuation in Moscow, that is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. You went to Moscow to meet Stalin?

Mr. KOT. And also I talked to Molotov.

Mr. FLOOD. And then you went back to Kuybishev?

Mr. KOT. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And your conversations with Vishinsky were at Kuybishev?

Mr. KOT. Yes. And at this time I was supervising and most concerned about preparing this list. So, the list is being prepared in the Embassy, where I can keep a constant eye on it, and a constant vigil, to make this list, so that when General Sikorski arrives he will have such a list available.

Mr. FLOOD. Very well. Now, we come to your next communication or talk with the Russians in December. What was that date, the first one in December?

Mr. KOT. General Sikorski was invited to Moscow, and either on the 1st or 2d—I do not recall—we made the trip with General Sikorski to Moscow.

Mr. FLOOD. Just a minute. Who invited General Sikorski to Moscow?

Mr. KOT. Stalin. No one else could do that.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you have any record of a note dated December 1?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Mr. Ambassador, did you prepare some material for General Sikorski for his talks with Stalin; which material was dated December 1?

Mr. FLOOD. That is what I meant.

Mr. KOT. First, I prepared the list; which, incidentally, the night before his arrival, we worked all night and it was removed from the machines in the early morning hours for his arrival. The list contained approximately 3,000 names of some 8,000 missing officers. We considered even this list very large and important because we now had the names of the people that we were seeking. And then we also prepared a private note for General Sikorski's information regarding soldiers.

Mr. FLOOD. Now, Mr. Ambassador, you were on the way from Kyubishev to Moscow to meet with Stalin at the meeting requested by Stalin to have Sikorski come there. Now, who was with Sikorski—you, Sikorski, and who else?

Mr. KOT. General Anders, with his chief of staff, Okolnicki.

Mr. FLOOD. Where did General Anders come from?

Mr. KOT. General Anders previously had already flown to Tehran to meet General Sikorski and returned to Kyubishev with General Sikorski.

Mr. FLOOD. So, Sikorski, Anders, and Kot left for Moscow?

Mr. KOT. There were more people there.

Mr. FLOOD. I know; but those were the main ones?

Mr. KOT. General Anders' adjutant, Klimkowski. And with me there was a press attaché, Prusinski.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, I am not concerned too much with who made the trip. Now, take us to the meeting in Moscow with Stalin and Sikorski and tell us who was present at the meeting on December 3d.

Mr. KOT. From the Russian side, there was only Molotov and his translator.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And Stalin?

Mr. KOT. And Stalin.

Mr. FLOOD. All right; for the Russian side, Stalin, Molotov, and the Russian translator.

Mr. KOT. That is right.

Mr. FLOOD. On the Polish side?

Mr. KOT. General Sikorski, Ambassador Kot, and General Anders.

Mr. FLOOD. And, of course, a Polish translator?

Mr. KOT. No. General Anders was our translator, who speaks very well in the Russian language.

Mr. FLOOD. You, of course, will give us a copy of the minutes later on; but now, will you give us the gist of the conversations dealing with the missing Polish officers at that time? And, Mr. Ambassador, we would appreciate very much if you would let our colleague, Mr. Machrowicz, read into the record that part of the minutes of the meeting of December 3d which has to do with the missing Polish officers.

Mr. KOT. I will, of course, give you that information, but I want to note here that the actual notes of this conversation were made by myself. General Anders was the translator, and I was making the notes. My notes are based on that here. And, later, both General Anders and I edited this memorandum.

Mr. FLOOD. Of course, Mr. Ambassador, the fact that you made these notes yourself gives them additional legal value.

Mr. KOT. Yes. But the conversation lasted for 2½ hours. At times it was exceedingly heated; and, since I am not a stenographer, I was not able to make all of the notes.

Mr. FLOOD. I would say that the Ambassador, as usual, did very well.

Mr. KOT. Unfortunately, all of the conversation is not included in this memorandum.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I will now read and translate those portions which the Ambassador has pointed to me as having relation to this particular issue [reading]:

General SIKORSKI. I am returning to our matter. I want to affirm before you, Mr. President, that your statement regarding amnesty has not been executed. Very many, and some of the most valuable people of ours, are still in labor camps and prisons.

STALIN (making a note). That is impossible, for the amnesty concerns all, and all the Poles are released.

(The last two words he directed to Molotov, and Molotov nods his head. General Sikorski then asked General Anders to give the details as to those who have not been released.)

General ANDERS. This is not in accordance with the true state of affairs, for we have the most definite data that first there were released in those camps those who were the least physically capable for heavy work.

General SIKORSKI. It is not up to us to furnish the Soviet Government an accurate list of these people, for the commanders of the camps have such lists. I have with me a list of about 4,000 officers (which he then placed on the table) who have been taken away by force and who are now still in prisons and labor camps. And even this list is not complete, for it has only those names which we were able to assemble from memory. I have given instructions to verify whether or not they are in Poland, with which I have close contact. I have found that none of them is there, as also they are not in the camps of our war prisoners in Germany. These people are right here; none of them has returned.

STALIN. That is impossible; they ran away.

General ANDERS. Where could they run away to?

STALIN. Well, to Manchuria.

General ANDERS. That is impossible that all could have run away, especially since all correspondence with their families has broken off from the time they were taken away from their prison camps to the labor camps. I know absolutely definitely from the officers who already returned, even from Kolyma, that there are there still many officers mentioned here by name. I know that there were even transports of Poles prepared already for departure and discharge, who, in the last moment, were stopped. I even have information that our people are on the island Novaya Zemly. I know personally a great number of the officers mentioned in this list. There are among them my staff officers and commanders. Those people are being lost there and are dying in terrible conditions.

STALIN. They were certainly released; only, they have not yet arrived.

General SIKORSKI. Russia is large and also has great difficulties. Maybe the local authorities did not execute your orders. Those who are arriving and who are freed confirm the fact that the others are just vegetating and working. If any one of them would have gotten beyond the boundaries of Russia, he would have surely reported to me.

STALIN. I want you to know that the Soviet Government has not the slightest reason to retain even one Pole. I even released the Sosnkowski agents who arranged attacks upon us and who murdered our people.

General ANDERS. However, we are receiving reports of people well known to us, with their prison numbers and cell numbers in which they are locked; and I know the names of many camps where great numbers of Poles have been retained and must continue to work.

That is the end of the discussion, insofar as it relates to the lost officers. The balance of the discussion relates to other matters.

Mr. FLOOD. Just a moment. The committee appreciates again Congressman Machrowicz's translation of the minutes as just given.

Mr. Kot. The subsequent conversation was very dramatic, when General Sikorski demanded that the welfare and the conditions of the Polish Army in Russia be improved. He insisted that they be fed better and that they be given better clothing, and he asked that they be permitted to go south to Iran to build themselves up and regain their health, and then he assured Stalin that they would return to the battlefield.

Stalin became very irritated and said, "If you do go south, you will never come back; and, if you insist on going, then go and don't come back."

This was the only time that I had ever observed Stalin in a state of irritation. He said, "The whole world will laugh at us that we were unable to reach some sort of agreement on this matter." And he attributed this lack of agreement to the efforts of the British, who, he claimed, were trying to get the Poles to transfer to London.

General Sikorski protested very sharply to these charges and said that the Polish Army was being formed in Russia for mutual assistance to the Allies and that, even if his soldiers were removed to Iran, he would bring them back personally and, if necessary, he would even bring the soldiers from Scotland to participate in the battles.

Stalin then regained his composure and calmly began discussing the possibility of where the Polish Army should be transferred in the south, so that they could rebuild themselves and not go to waste freezing in Russia.

Mr. Flood. I will instruct our investigator to have the entire memorandum of this conference translated into English and insert it as exhibit 49-C at this point.

EXHIBIT 49C

MINUTES OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN GEN. WŁADYSŁAW SIKORSKI, PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC AND JOSEPH STALIN, PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLES' COMMISSARS, AT THE KREMLIN ON THE 3D DECEMBER 1941, IN THE PRESENCE OF PROFESSOR KOT, THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW, MR. W. MOLOTOV, PEOPLES' COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, GENERAL ANDERS, O. C. OF THE POLISH FORCES IN THE U. S. S. R. AND MR. MOLOTOV'S SECRETARY. (LITERAL TRANSLATION FROM POLISH.)

General SIKORSKI. I am exceedingly glad to greet you as one of the real creators of contemporary history and to congratulate you on the heroism of the Russian Army in the struggle against Germany. As a soldier I express my admiration of the heroic defense of Moscow, so efficiently directed by you who stayed on in the capital. At the same time I thank you for the most generous hospitality which I have enjoyed from the moment when I first set foot on U. S. S. R. soil.

STALIN. I thank you for your kind words and it gives me great pleasure to see you in Moscow.

General SIKORSKI. I shall begin by saying that I have had nothing to do with and shall never agree with the policy directed against Soviet Russia for the last 20 years. I therefore had a moral right to sign the agreement, which may be the crowning of the theories which I have held for so long. Moreover, in this most important issue for the future I have the backing of the Polish Nation just as much within our country as among the Poles living abroad in such large communities as in America where some 4½ million Poles reside, in Canada, in France where there are 600,000 of them and in other smaller Polish communities scattered all over the world. Those who disapprove of such a policy as mine are against me. I do not want the slow realization of the terms of the agreement to weaken the policy of close cooperation between our two countries. On the loyal fulfillment of the agreement depends whether we now stand at the cross-roads of history. That depends on yourself whose decisions are final in this country. Our agreement must be put into effect, so that our people will cease to be harassed and driven. I am

well aware of the difficulties in which Russia finds herself. Four-fifths of the whole armed forces of the German Reich has descended upon you. I realize this and am therefore upholding your cause in London and in the USA. Already several months ago I have deposited materials emphasizing the necessity for creating a second front in the West.

STALIN. Thank you, what you say is just and right.

General SIKORSKI. But it is no easy task we are faced with. There are great difficulties, especially as regards shipping. It is no easy task to ship across the Channel a large number of troops and to capture and develop suitable positions on the Continent. This type of operations must be prepared very carefully and thoroughly and in detail; pressure cannot be exerted for fear of a repetition of the Dakar incident.

STALIN. You are right, should such an operation fail, it would shake the morale badly.

General SIKORSKI. But I must return to our affairs. I declare to you, Mr. President, that your announcement of an amnesty has not been fulfilled. A great many, and indeed the most valuable of our people are still in labor camps and prisons.

STALIN (makes a note). That is impossible, because the amnesty applied to all and all the Poles have been set free. [The last words are directed at Molotov, who nods.]

General ANDERS (at the request of General Sikorski gives details). That does not correspond to the real state of affairs; we have absolutely accurate data showing that first Jews were released from the camps, then Ukrainians, and finally the physically weaker Polish manpower. The stronger ones were detained, only a small proportion of them have been released. I have people in the Army who were freed only a few weeks ago from such camps and who affirm that in certain camps there still remain hundreds, even thousands, of our compatriots. The Government's orders are not put into effect there, because the commandants of the particular camps, having an obligation to carry out the production plan, do not want to lose their best labor, without which the execution of the plan would sometimes become impossible.

(Molotov smiles, nods his head.)

General ANDERS. Those people completely fail to understand the whole importance of our common cause, which is thus suffering a severe set-back.

STALIN. Those people ought to be brought up for trial.

General ANDERS. Yes, indeed.

General SIKORSKI. It is not our business to provide the Soviet Government with exact lists of our people, about whom your camp commandants have complete lists. I have with me a list of about 4,000 officers, who were forcibly deported and who are at present still in prisons and labor camps; but even this list is not complete, containing only names compiled from memory. I ordered an investigation to be made to ascertain whether they are in our country, with which we are in permanent contact. It appears that none of them are there, neither are they in camps for Polish prisoners of war in Germany. These people are here; not one of them has returned.

STALIN. That is impossible. They escaped.

General ANDERS. Where could they have escaped to?

STALIN. Well, to Manchuria.

General ANDERS. It is impossible that they could have all escaped, especially since, from the moment of their transfer from prisoner of war camps to labor camps and prisons, correspondence with their families has ceased entirely. I know definitely from officers who have already returned even from Kolyma that many of our officers, whose names they mentioned, are still there. I know that there were even convoys of Poles already prepared for release and departure, who at the last moment were detained. I am informed that our people are to be found even in Novaya Zemla. A great many of the officers named on this list are personally known to me. Among them are my staff officers and commanders. Those people are perishing and dying there under the most terrible conditions.

STALIN. They have certainly been freed, but have not yet arrived.

General SIKORSKI. Russia is immense and so are her difficulties. Perhaps the local authorities have not carried out their instructions. Those who have been released and have arrived say that the others are vegetating and working. If anyone had crossed the frontiers of Russia, he would certainly have reported to me.

STALIN. You must know that the Soviet Government has not the slightest reason for detaining a single Pole. I have even released Sosnkowski's agents, who attacked and murdered our people.

General ANDERS. But reports are reaching us about people who are well-known to us, giving the names of prisons and numbers of cells in which they are confined. I know the names of a great many camps, in which a tremendous number of Poles are detained and are forced to go on working.

MOLOTOV. We have only detained people who committed crimes, carried out diversionary activities, set up radio stations, etc., after the outbreak of war. Surely you are not concerned with them.

Ambassador KOR. Obviously not, but I have already requested, on many occasions, to have lists of these people because very frequently these accusations are levelled at persons whom I know to be good patriots and who are wholly innocent.

MOLOTOV [nods his head].

General SIKORSKI. Let us not touch on matters dating from the war. It would be a good thing if you were to issue a public explanation with regard to this matter, so as to bring about in Russia a fundamental change of attitude toward the Poles. These people are not tourists, they are people forcibly deported from their homes. They did not come here of their own will but have been deported and have undergone untold sufferings.

STALIN. The people of the Soviet Union are friendly to the Poles. Mistakes are only likely to be committed by officials.

General ANDERS. It is not only officials who carry out their instructions badly. The point is that the Russian people should understand that it is not of their own free will that Poles are concentrated in large groups in certain localities. We are particularly anxious to insure good relations with the local population.

General SIKORSKI. I say in Kuybyshev a transport of our people which created an appalling impression upon me. They must receive instant assistance. I divide our people into two categories—first, those who can work and those ought to be given work with as good conditions as possible.

STALIN. On the same conditions as Soviet citizens.

General SIKORSKI. Not even on the same conditions as long as they are just bearable. It is in the interest of the common war effort to make proper use of our people. You naturally understand, Mr. President, that a specialist in building tanks who is cutting trees in a forest is not being made full use of, nor is an eminent chemist, who is doing manual labor in the fields. The second category are those unfit for labor—old people, women, and children who ought to be concentrated in localities with a suitable climate and conditions, so that our Embassy may look after their welfare. Everyone should be immediately freed from the camps, leaving only those who have settled in tolerable conditions. The uncoordinated transfer of people here and there only creates bad morale, for they find themselves in very bad conditions and so it appears to them that in making an agreement with you I have done them a wrong. People are dying as a result of the terrible conditions. Those corpses will greatly weigh on our future relations. These people must be helped and it is hardly worth-while haggling over a few million rubles—a sum, which especially in wartime, is of no importance whatever. A large-scale loan must be granted to the Polish Government. It is also imperative that delegates of the Embassy should be allowed access to all those localities where there are large concentrations of Poles and that they be granted genuine and not fictitious powers. For example, our delegate in Archangiel'sk is not in a position to extend any assistance to the Polish people and his work is limited to the dispatch of transports. He cannot even distribute warm clothing among them. I am most anxious to set up an office of the Delegate of the Embassy in Vladivostok, in view of the fact that Poles in America have collected large numbers of clothes for Poles in Russia, the despatch of which has been made conditional upon the possibility of handing them over to the Delegates of the Embassy.

STALIN. I agree to the delegates, and in Vladivostok too.

MOLOTOV. I do not think it is possible that your people are still in the camps.

General ANDERS. Nevertheless I state most definitely that they are; I repeat that the strongest are retained there because workmen are needed. By not freeing our people they are doing a bad service to the common cause.

STALIN. That will be arranged. Special instructions will be issued to the executive authorities, but it must be remembered that we are waging war.

General SIKORSKI. And you are waging it jolly well too.

STALIN. No, no. Only moderately well. Our transport was terribly overstrained. We removed our wounded, we evacuated the population, we trans-

ferred 70 large factories. We had to transport army units both ways. I want the Poles to understand the tremendous difficulties we were confronted with. But things will improve.

General SIKORSKI. The Polish population ought to be transferred to districts with a better climate.

STALIN. Let us consider which districts would be suitable for the Poles. To Fergana and Uzbekistan we normally supply grain because we mostly grow cotton there and we have even issued special instructions forbidding the cultivation of grain crops in these districts. From that point of view they are therefore unsuitable. But the southern parts of the Semipalatynsk District would be more adequate. We can anyhow see how it looks on the map. [All present get up and cross over to the map. Stalin points out on the map.] Therefore—Tashkent, Alma-Ata, and the entire southern Kazakhstan.

Ambassador KOT. For those from the Far East perhaps Barnaul and Novosibirsk would be better.

STALIN. Its very cold there, although a lot of bread.

Ambassador KOT. But where to send those who are now in the Archangielsk and Komi districts?

STALIN. Also to Southern Kazakhstan. [They sit down at the table.]

General SIKORSKI. As to the loan I think that a hundred million roubles would solve the matter for a long time, also because it would not make a bad impression and would prevent the raising of voices who might reproach you of making difficulties over such trifles.

MOLOTOV. Haven't we already given 65 million?

Ambassador KOT. But that was for the Army.

General SIKORSKI. Hitler has taught us all how, without gold but merely by hard work, great things can be accomplished. Do not imitate the ministers of finance in the West, Mr. Commissar, who had initially quarreled over every million.

STALIN. (nodding). All right.

General SIKORSKI. That would be about all I wanted to say in the matter of the Polish civilian population. I now have various military problems I wish to raise. Should I first speak about the military question as a whole, or shall we discuss the various points one by one?

STALIN. As you wish, General.

General SIKORSKI. To us Poles war is not a mere symbol but we understand it as a real fight.

STALIN. [Acknowledges with a gesture.]

General ANDERS. We want to fight here, on the Continent, for Poland's independence.

General SIKORSKI. In the country we have at our disposal a powerful military organization which I have forbidden to boast about since over there one is shot for a single word. [Stalin nods, General Sikorski describes various details of the methods by means of which the Polish nation continues its fight against the Germans.] Our army fights everywhere. In the United Kingdom we have a corps which needs men to complete its establishments. We have a navy which functions most efficiently. We have in action 17 air squadrons which are supplied with the newest British aircraft and which fight magnificently. Twenty percent of the German air force losses over Great Britain were caused by Polish pilots.

STALIN. I know that Poles are courageous.

General SIKORSKI. If well directed. Thanks to Providence, and of course also due to you, Mr. President, we have General Anders who is my best soldier and whose eight stars for his eight wounds speak best of his courage. You put him to prison for having attempted to join me. He is a loyal commander, not a politician, who will not allow his subalterns to indulge in politics.

STALIN. The best policy is to fight well. [Turning to Anders.] How long were you kept in jail?

General ANDERS. For 20 months.

STALIN. How were you treated?

General ANDERS. In Lwów very badly—slightly better in Moscow. But you know, Mr. President, yourself what "better" means in prison when you have been sitting there for 20 months.

STALIN. Can't be helped. Such were the conditions.

General SIKORSKI. I have a brigade in Tobruk which will be transferred to Syria and transformed into a mechanized division with two tank battalions. If needed I can throw it over to the east. I have a number of warships. After I had decorated with medals the crew of one of our submarines stationed in Malta for

having sunk an Italian battle cruiser and a transport ship—the men got so excited that the next thing they did was to enter a Greek harbor and in spite of a damaged periscope they sunk one more cruiser and yet another transport ship. They returned with no damage or loss. That is how Polish soldiers will fight anywhere when under good leadership. Our country is occupied and the only reserve of young men we have is over here. I wish to send as supplements to Scotland and Egypt some 25 thousand—the remainder should be used for the formation of about 7 divisions. It is of greatest importance to those in the country which look toward this army as to a symbol of their resistance and the nation's independence. We want to fight and, therefore, our troops stationed in Scotland will be used as the vanguard in the formation of a western front or they may be even transferred here to the east. In which case I would personally take over the command. The present difficulties of maintenance, equipment, and training worry me because units formed in such conditions will be quite worthless. Instead of sacrificing their health and life for furthering our common cause they vegetate here or perish to no avail. This war will be a long one. Great Britain and the United States have disarmed to such an extent that their armament industry, especially the American one will need considerable time to attain full capacity again. In due course an avalanche of equipment will overtake us. But even already now I have the assurances from both Roosevelt and Churchill that our divisions will be armed together with yours without impairing the delivery of equipment to the Red army, subject however, to the condition that the formation of our army will take place in districts which will be easily accessible for our deliveries to reach us. The present armament of our divisions is wholly inadequate. The divisions in their present state are of no use in the field as they have not received the equipment they need. General Anders will explain this in detail.

(General Anders describes in detail the amount of equipment received already and the general requirements of armament for Polish troops and underlines the insurmountable difficulties he daily encounters.)

STALIN (Asks about certain details as to artillery equipment). Russia had entered the war with divisions which had establishments of 15,000 men but which proved to be too heavy and we therefore changed to a type of a lighter division counting only about 11,000 men.

General SIKORSKI. The present conditions in which the Polish Army is being formed are inadequate. The soldiers freeze in summer tents, they lack food and they are simply sentenced to slow death. I therefore suggest that the whole army together with the rest of the Polish manpower of military value should be transferred for example to Persia where the climate together with British and American supplies will contribute to their swift recovery and will allow us to organize a strong army, which would then return here and take over a whole sector of the front. This plan has Churchill's approval. On my part I am ready to make a separate declaration that this army will return to the Russian front and that it could be even strengthened by a few British divisions.

General ANDERS. [Proceeds with describing the state of organization of his troops and declared that under existing conditions of maintenance, accommodation, sanitary equipment, and climatic conditions the formation of units which would be capable of taking up the fight is quite impossible.] It is nothing else but a poor vegetation in which the entire energy is directed into the effort to survive and to live pretty badly at that. After all the main issue is to form as quickly as possible a battle-ready Polish Army which could fight for Poland side by side with the Allies. This is quite out of the question in present conditions. That is why it is absolutely essential to transfer these troops to climatic conditions which together with adequate maintenance and better deliveries of equipment, would at last move things forward. In view of the difficulties with which Russia was struggling, the British and American facilities of delivering supplies should be considered. Persia would be the most suitable region. All soldiers and all men capable of bearing arms should find themselves there. Once we take up the fight the blow delivered by our Army cannot be merely a symbolic blow. It must serve its purpose and further our aim for which we are fighting all over the world in our struggle for Poland.

General SIKORSKI. I would very much appreciate if the Soviet Government had confidence in my proposal. I am a man who if he says "yes" he means "yes," and if he says "no" he means "no," if I say nothing that means that either I cannot or I do not want to tell the truth.

STALIN. [In an irritated tone and obviously displeased.] I am an old and experienced man. I know that once you leave for Persia you will never come

back here. I see that England has plenty to do and is in need of the Polish soldiers.

General SIKORSKI. We are bound to Great Britain by an alliance which she fulfills loyally. We also have our full sovereignty in England. I can even transfer my corps from Scotland to Russia and I assure you that the British will not make me any difficulties about it. In the same way I can add to our Army over here the units I have in Tobruk.

Ambassador KOR. A Pole fights the better the closer he is to his country.

STALIN. Persia is not so far off but the British can force you to fight with the Germans in Turkey and tomorrow Japan may also join in the war.

General ANDERS. We want to fight for Poland. We believe that not even the strongest air force or navy can end a war. It will be decided on the battlefields of the Continent. All of us, without exception, love our country and we want to reenter it, before all others, we want to be ready to fight as soon as possible but under present conditions we cannot prepare ourselves for this fight.

General SIKORSKI. England today, compared with what she was before is like heaven to earth. The British have now enough troops to defend their isles, they, therefore, have no purpose to prevent our corps from leaving.

MOLOTOV. [Suggests the summoning of General Panfilov and instructs the secretary to go and fetch him.]

General ANDERS. (Explains the difficulties of organization and the conditions of life in Koltubianka, Tatiszczew, and Tockim, the nonfulfilment of delivery of food, fodder, equipment, implements etc.) "This is nothing but a miserable vegetation and months of wasted time. Its quite impossible to form an army under such conditions."

STALIN. (Irritated) If the Poles don't want to fight let them go. We cannot retain the Poles. If they wish, then let them go.

General SIKORSKI. If we were given the chance to organize ourselves we would be fighting already, but how much time has been wasted here through no fault of ours. In our present dislocation we have no means of training our soldiers. [A silence.] May I therefore ask for some alternative solution.

STALIN. If the Poles do not want to fight here let them tell me straight forwardly—"yes" or "no". I am 62 and I know that there where an army will be formed there it will remain.

General SIKORSKI (sharply). Please find me another solution, because here the conditions are such as to make it quite impossible to form an army and I do not want to let my men perish to no avail. This is not an ultimatum, but in the conditions of a severe winter when gales and frost decimate my men I cannot just watch and remain silent.

General ANDERS. The temperature has at times fallen already to 33 centigrades below zero. The people are quartered in single-ply tents mostly without stoves, which are not supplied in sufficient quantities. They wake up in the morning with frostbitten noses and ears. This is not the organizing of an army, but a doleful vegetation.

General SIKORSKI. One cannot throw against the Germans untrained soldiers. We cannot risk being discredited. The Polish Army must be adequately armed and fight as an organized whole.

General ANDERS. As it is, I cannot but admire our soldiers who, in spite of the acute sufferings they have gone through in the last 2 years and in spite of their present abominable conditions—they had only received boots a few weeks ago and up till that time 60 percent of them went about barefooted—in spite of all that, they never complained—not even in spite of never receiving in full the food rations which are due to them and, for a long time, not even getting their pay.

General SIKORSKI (curtly). You have insulted me, Mr. President, by saying that our soldier does not want to fight.

STALIN. I am vulgar (in Russian, "grubnyj") and I want to be told plainly—do you or don't you want to fight.

General SIKORSKI (firmly). That we do want can be proved by facts not by words.

General ANDERS. The reason why we are organizing ourselves is to fight—here, on the mainland. According to my calculations I can have 150,000 men the equivalent of eight divisions. As things stand now we have only two divisions and with limited possibilities of making them battle-ready at that. We do not receive sufficient maintenance supplies and any promises given in that respect are never kept.

STALIN (to General Sikorski). As you wish.

General SIKORSKI, I do not wish to force such an issue. I still await alternative suggestions and I am ready to accept any reasonable solution.

STALIN (with irony). I see that the British must be truly in need of good soldiers.

General SIKORSKI. This is not correct. They appreciate us in England but do not exploit us. I also know Churchill very well and I know he wishes to do everything he can to help Russia.

General ANDERS. I have 60 percent of soldiers of the reserve among my men, but they need to recover after the 2 years of hardships and they must be trained. The volunteers which join us also arrive in a deplorable state and must undergo adequate training for which time and suitable conditions are needed.

STALIN (irritated). Which means that we are nothing but barbarians and there is nothing which we can improve. It boils down to this that a Russian can only oppress a Pole but can do nothing to help him. But we can do without you. We can give them all away. We will manage alone. We shall reconquer Poland ourselves and then hand it back to you. But what will people say to that? The world will laugh about that we cannot do anything here now.

General SIKORSKI. I still have not received an answer to my question—Where am I to form an army which could take part in the fighting instead of having to perish in atrocious climatic conditions? Please give me a positive counterproposal. I declare once more and categorically that we want to fight for Poland and arm in arm with you.

STALIN. Once you go to Iran you will have to fight maybe in Turkey against the Germans. Tomorrow Japan will join in and then against Japan. Wherever the British will order you to do so. Perhaps in Singapore.

General ANDERS. We want to fight against the Germans here on the Continent, for Poland. Our men have not seen their country for so long and no other men love their country as much as the Poles do. The shortest way is from here.

General SIKORSKI. Polish patriotism needs no certificates to prove it. I repeat that I am still awaiting a positive counterproposal.

STALIN. If you categorically insist—one corps, from two to three divisions, can leave. While if you really want I will give you the place and the means to form seven divisions. However, I see that the British are in need of Polish soldiers. Haven't I received requests from Harriman and Churchill in which they want me to evacuate the Polish Army?

General SIKORSKI. Things are not so desperate with the British as to contend that the Polish Army formed over here was going to decide about their fate. They are slow but today they already represent a formidable force. It was I who had requested Churchill to make the move about the evacuation of our Army. But I shall give you a proof of my good will and I am willing to leave the army in Russia provided you allot us a suitable district for concentrating our men and give us an assurance of maintenance and dislocation which would create conditions suitable for its training.

MOLOTOV. Panfilov is ready. Have you anything against General Panfilov coming in? [All nod their approval, enters General Panfilov, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Red Army.]

(A conversation follows between Stalin, General Anders, and General Panfilov about the conditions in which the Polish Army could be organized. Both sides quote a number of details.)

General ANDERS. I categorically state that I do not receive sufficient food, and not enough fodder for the horses. The divisions have not received all the food they were entitled to, neither have they been supplied with such an essential thing as the little stoves for the tents. Since the promise was made to supply me with tractors months have gone by and they haven't reached me yet. All my pleas have no result while the promises from Soviet military authorities remain unkept. Cases of typhoid fever have been reported from certain units but my urgent pleas for a sanitary train bring no response. For several months the soldiers haven't received any soap, no tools, no building materials, no boards, no nails. The soldiers do not receive any vegetables. A great number of food products is not added to our rations. Transport equipment is quite insufficient and in a very poor state. A few weeks ago, all of a sudden, the number of food rations had been reduced from 44,000 to 30,000 and in spite of the promise of President Stalin to our Ambassador that the rations will be raised back to 44,000 this has not yet taken place till today. The camp in Tockim has not received any rations at all for the day of 1st December. [He enumerates a number of other shortcomings in food and equipment.] It is untrue that we haven't sent complaints. I perpetually reminded about it Colonel Wolkowyski our liaison

officer and I myself have sent numerous cables and a number of letters. [Panfilov remains silent.] I personally made several journeys in connection with these matters.

STALIN (very sharply to Panfilov.) Who is responsible for all that?

General PANFILOV. The appropriate instructions have been issued, the orders were given by General Chrulov.

STALIN. When did I order to increase the number of food rations?

General PANFILOV. Two and a half weeks ago.

STALIN. Then why have my orders not been put into effect till now? Are they to eat your instructions? [All this part of the conversation is conducted by Stalin in a very sharp tone. Panfilov stands to attention blushing and becoming pale in turn.]

General SIKORSKI. Only too great difficulties which we encounter and impossible conditions have forced me to adopt such a course in this matter.

STALIN. We can give the Polish Army the same conditions in which the Red Army has to carry on.

General SIKORSKI. In hitherto existing conditions not even a corps can be set on foot.

STALIN. I understand that they are bad; our troops are being organized in better conditions. I say that honestly that if you can get better conditions in Iran, as far as we are concerned we are in a position to give you only such which we give to our own army. And the food that our soldiers get is better than that of the Germans.

General ANDERS. If they get the full amount which is allotted to soldiers, I deem it sufficient but it must be really delivered without these perpetual shortcomings which we are faced with. I must be given the opportunity to manage the supplies myself and to build up my own stock so as not to live from hand to mouth and if a transport fails—to leave the men hungry.

General SIKORSKI. I restate once again our wish to fight alongside with you against our common enemy—the Germans.

STALIN. It seemed to me that the British were in need of your troops.

General SIKORSKI. No. It was I who—seeing the difficulties which we encounter over here—persuaded the British and the Americans to enable us to move our soldiers into better conditions.

General ANDERS [gives detailed explanations about the numbers of Polish soldiers located at present in the southern districts of the U. S. S. R. and names the respective places of their whereabouts. A discussion takes place about possible areas of concentration. The names of Uzbekistan, Turkestan and Trans-Caucasia are mentioned]. I count on roughly 150,000 men, therefore on 8 divisions together with noncombatant services. Perhaps there are even more of our men but amongst them quite a lot of Jewish element which is not keen on military service.

STALIN. Jews are poor soldiers.

General SIKORSKI. Many from among the Jews who have reported are speculators and men who have been sentenced for smuggling and they will never make good soldiers. I have no use for these in my army.

General ANDERS. 250 Jews deserted from Buzuluk at the false news that Kuybishev was bombed by the Germans. Over 60 deserted from the Fifth Division the day before the announced distribution of arms to the soldiers.

STALIN. Yes. The Jews are no good as soldiers.

(A discussion follows between Stalin, Anders and Panfilov about the armament and its deficiencies. Checking and counting from lists.)

General SIKORSKI. When will we be allotted new assembly areas and learn other details about the formation of the units?

(Stalin deliberates aloud with Panfilov and mentions for guidance the names of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Transcaucasia.)

General SIKORSKI. After completing the formation and training, all the units should be assembled together into one whole so as to strike as an army because only that will appeal to the imagination of the Polish Nation.

STALIN. It will take a long time.

General ANDERS. No—if everything will be carried out in a proper way the formation of the units after the supplying of arms will not take long.

(Stalin raises the question of forming an army without the formation of separate corps.)

General SIKORSKI. Maybe it would be better. We shall accept this suggestion, but so much stronger will have to be the equipment and armament of the divisions.

STALIN. An organization without corps units is better because the commander of an army which is divided into corps shifts over the responsibility upon corps

commanders with the result that no one is responsible for anyone. It would be better if your army had simply seven divisions similar to what we have in our armies.

General SIKORSKI. I shall look to it that the equipment from abroad reaches you in a constant stream. With a little good will it can be done.

STALIN. We will supply part of it, the British should send the rest. But sea transports often fail to reach us on schedule. They can be delayed and this should be borne in mind.

General SIKORSKI. I must withdraw 25,000 men from here because I need them for the air-force, the navy and the armored troops. Further to that we can set on foot seven divisions. It is here that we have our only manpower reserve. Have you enough of aircraft?

STALIN. There can never be enough of aircraft. In numbers we are not worse off than the Germans, as for quality we are even better. On the other hand our situation in respect of tanks is much worse.

General SIKORSKI. Lybia has already swallowed up a considerable part of the German Air Force.

STALIN. For the last 2 months we no longer feel the superiority of the German Air Force. They use very young and inexperienced pilots now. Their planes are relatively slow. How many planes has your squadron?

General SIKORSKI. 27, of which 18 in the first and 9 in second line.

STALIN. This corresponds to our regiment.

General SIKORSKI. We could send a few air squadrons from Great Britain to our army over here.

(Stalin: praises British airmen who are at present in Russia.)

General SIKORSKI. Our airmen have excellent eyes and a quick orientation.

STALIN. Slavs are the best and the most courageous airmen. They act swiftly because they are a young race which has not used itself up as yet.

General SIKORSKI. The present war will rejuvenate the Anglo-Saxons. The British are not like the French who are in fact already done for.

STALIN. I do not agree to that.

General SIKORSKI. Perhaps the lower classes still have something in them but the upper class in its majority presents but little value.

(Follows a lengthy discussion about Petain, Veygand, and others.)

STALIN. The Germans are strong, but the Slavs will overpower them.

General SIKORSKI. I would like to undertake a journey now to inspect the troops and visit the assembly camps of the civilian population, after which I would like to return to Moscow so as to be able to see you once again, Mr. President.

STALIN. By all means—do. I am at your service.

General SIKORSKI. I shall broadcast tomorrow in the name of the German-occupied nations. The text of my speech was to be sent to you by Commissar Wyszynski.

STALIN. Yes, I have read it. It will be very good if the transmission takes place.

General SIKORSKI. I think it will do the world a little good. The B. B. C. and America will take it up.

STALIN. In Russia, I have ordered to translate your speech into 40 languages.

General SIKORSKI. May I ask you to introduce my speech. I suggest that we sign a common political declaration. I do not insist but I leave you, Mr. President, a draft of the text. [He hands over the draft of the declaration.]

STALIN. In principle I agree. I will read it and we shall settle it together tomorrow.

General SIKORSKI. I take it for granted that the questions relating to the army have been mutually agreed upon. In the mixed commission which should hold a meeting as soon as possible in order to settle these matters General Anders will deputize for me. Would you be so good as to appoint your trustees for the visiting tour of the camps.

STALIN. I quite agree. [He mentions Panfilov and Vishniński asking whether they would be agreeable to General Sikorski.]

(General Sikorski answers in the affirmative and bids farewell. Ambassador Kot and General Anders do the same. They leave but Stalin retains General Anders.)

(The conversation between Stalin and Anders lasts a few minutes. Stalin asks whether the cooperation with Panfilov is satisfactory. Anders states that they got along quite smoothly but that Panfilov was unable to do much.)

General ANDERS. Now that you have promised to solve our difficulties, Mr. President, I do believe that the formation of our army will be satisfactorily accomplished.

STALIN. I regret not to have met you before.

General ANDERS. It was not my fault that I had not been asked for an interview, Mr. President.

STALIN. I would very much like to see you from time to time.

General ANDERS. Mr. President, I am at your disposal at any time and will come when only you wish to see me.

(The conversation lasted two and a half hours.)

(These minutes were taken down to General Anders' dictation based on notes made by Ambassador Kot throughout the interview.)

Kujbyshev, December 6, 1941.

Mr. FLOOD. You may proceed, Mr. Kot.

Mr. KOT. As a result, we left with the impression that the fate of our missing soldiers continued to be a mystery. We were led to believe and understand that if Stalin was not returning these men to us, then possibly these men were no longer in existence.

On the other hand, we reasoned that since it was such a severe winter in Russia, it was conceivable that these men were somewhere in the far north and that during the winter months they could not be brought back and that as soon as the thaws would come and it became warmer, conceivably they may rejoin our forces.

As a result, we considered this particular discussion and conversation without any aim, but formally we continued the discussions, stating our objectives. Therefore, that same day, the 3d of December, we sent back a reply to the Soviet note of November 19, charging again that the amnesty has not been applied to all of the Poles in Russia.

Mr. FLOOD. Just a minute.

For the record: By sending a reply on December 3 to the Russian reply of November 19, by the Russian reply of November 19 you mean the Russian reply to General Sikorski's note to Bogomolow in London; is not that correct?

Mr. KOT. Yes, I believe that is correct. There were so many of these procedural notes that I cannot recall all of them.

Mr. FLOOD. I want to enter in the record at this point a copy of General Sikorski's note of October 15, 1941, to Bogomolow in London. It will be marked "Exhibit 49D" after being translated into English.

EXHIBIT 49D

NOTE OF OCTOBER 15, 1941, FROM GENERAL WLADYSLAW SIKORSKI TO AMBASSADOR BOGOMOLOV IN LONDON CONCERNING THE FAILURE TO RELEASE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF POLISH OFFICERS FROM SOVIET PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS (TRANSLATED FROM POLISH TO ENGLISH)

No. 4684/XIV/6

LONDON, October 15, 1941.

EXCELLENCY,

May I request Your Excellency to convey to the Soviet Government the assurance that the Polish Government appreciates the good will shown by the Soviet Government in carrying out the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941. However, certain difficulties have become apparent which do not seem to have any connection with those arising from military operations. Thus, in view of the approaching winter, the immediate release of Polish citizens deprived of their freedom appears necessary as well as the finding of means of assuring their existence. The fate of several thousand Polish officers who have not returned to Poland and who have not been found in Soviet military camps, continues to remain uncertain. They are probably dispersed in the northern districts of the U. S. S. R. Their presence in Polish Army camps is indispensable.

May I also request Your Excellency to draw the attention of the Soviet Government to the necessity of increasing the aid essential to the formation and development of this Army.

At the same time I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that in view of existing military operations I have issued instructions to intensify sabotage and subversive activities by Poles in German occupied Poland.

I have the honor to be, etc.

/—/ SIKORSKI.

His Excellency
Ambassador BOGOMOLOV
16, Kensington Palace Gardens,
S. W. 8.

Mr. KOT. That same day I presented a pro memoria to Molotov. The Soviets replied to my pro memoria on the 19th of November. Therefore, I had to formally reply to that November 19 note on the 3d of November so that that note would not go unanswered.

And on the 9th of January 1942, they again replied to my note of December 3.

But the exchange of these notes was virtually empty because both sides maintained the same points.

On the 28th of January 1942, here in London, Ambassador Raczynski submitted another note to Bogomolow. I objected to this move because I maintained that these types of notes seemed to devalue themselves.

Mr. FLOOD. Just a moment, Mr. Ambassador.

Before we touch on that: After you finished the conversation with Stalin, at which Sikorski and Anders were in attendance on December 3, 1951, you then left Moscow and went back to Kyubishev?

Mr. KOT. No; not quite yet.

Mr. FLOOD. Two or 3 days later?

Mr. KOT. The following day, General Sikorski had spoken over the radio to the whole world, and later, there was a big reception at Stalin's which lasted from 8 in the evening until 2 in the morning.

Mr. FLOOD. At the dinner given in Moscow by Stalin in honor of Sikorski, I take for granted that Stalin offered a toast to Poland and to Sikorski?

Mr. KOT. Yes. There were toasts presented to Poland and also in principal tribute to the close harmony and to the plans for a strong Poland of the future. But in these toasts, there was no political significance. There were many speeches made. Stalin himself spoke and even dwelt on some of his own experiences with the Poles. Molotov presented toasts to everyone, including the lowest-ranking adjutants. Among these was Colonel Okulicki, who today is being held in jail in Moscow.

After the banquet, there were informal discussions, and then we were invited to view a film. And then Stalin and Sikorski talked with each other, but not very long. And then there was the formal signing of a declaration of friendly cooperation. This was signed by Stalin, for the Russians, and General Sikorski, for the Poles. And since it was late at night, we then went home.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, I think now that we have come pretty much to the end of your experiences as Ambassador insofar as the search for the Polish officers is concerned—is not that correct—and you returned to Kyubishev—

Mr. KOT. There is the second phase now when things got a little hotter, but that is when the weather got warmer.

Mr. FLOOD. At Kyubishev you continued as Ambassador to maintain your contacts with Vishinsky and to still try formally to press your case for the missing officers?

Mr. KOT. The contact was very active and very much alive because General Sikorski was seeking permission to make a tour around Russia to visit the various Polish Army camps, and he requested that Stalin give him his confidante, who would escort him on this tour. And Stalin assigned Vishinsky to this mission.

Vishinsky toured Russia for a week with us and, as a result, we spent a great deal of time with Vishinsky and his aides. But the question of the missing Polish officers was not raised because we were anxious to settle other matters, positive matters that we had to settle.

Mr. FLOOD. What I mean, Mr. Ambassador, is that there is nothing further, as far as you are concerned, except formal negotiations with reference to the missing officers?

Mr. KOT. The next point is on March 18, when General Anders visited Stalin. But this, of course, General Anders will relate to you personally.

My next action begins in May.

Mr. FLOOD. By the way, when did you leave Kyubishev as the Polish Ambassador to the Soviet?

Mr. KOT. The 13th of July.

Mr. FLOOD. 1942?

Mr. KOT. 1942.

Now, the following action took place during May and June.

Mr. FLOOD. Where?

Mr. KOT. In Kyubishev.

First, I went to see the new British Ambassador, Carr, and sought his assistance in this matter. He promised to assist me by intervening, and he inquired of his own Government. I also asked or requested the United States Ambassador, Admiral Stanley, and, at the same time, I prepared a very long and detailed memorandum on the 19th of May, in which I listed all of our pleas and charges regarding the failure to release Poles—not only soldiers but civilians. Stanley had attempted to assist us, and he made some efforts. But these were on such wide and general terms that he did not specifically raise the points that we were most interested in.

As to Ambassador Carr, I am not under the impression that he did anything in particular or specific to assist us.

In this memorandum of May 19, I referred to 42 different notes that we had sent to the Russians inquiring about the missing Polish officers and civilians.

On the 13th of June I submitted another note regarding the war prisoners, taking advantage of information obtained from two people who were in Russian prisons but were released earlier.

On the 20th of June, I was again instructed by General Sikorski to renew my conversations regarding these matters. I replied by cable to General Sikorski that I would like to wait a little while to see whether there would be any results from the intervention promised by the United States Ambassador and the British Ambassador. Seeing nothing which would lead me to believe—since it was getting pretty close to the date when I was supposed to leave Russia, I once more raised the question of the Polish officers during my last formal visit, when I went to bid my farewell to Vishinsky.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What was the date of that?

Mr. KOT. This was on the 8th of July.

Shall I read here what I said during that conversation with Vishinsky? This is important.

Mr. DONDERO. Was that July 8, 1942?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is right.

That was with Vishinsky, was it not?

Mr. KOT. With Vishinsky.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Reading from the notes which Ambassador Kot gave me here:

The second matter is the matter of those Polish civilians who have not as yet been released; among these, thousands of judges, prosecutors, police, and other officials. And particularly lies heavy on my heart the matter of 8,000 officers, of whom—and I say this with the full sincerity of my heart—not one of these has been released.

Taking advantage of the summer period, which affords us the possibility of communications, I beg you for the opportunity to establish contact with these men. These men are not criminals but war prisoners, and the best of our officers.

It is an impossibility for so many people to have disappeared at one time. You cannot explain that or convince anyone of that. The inability to find these men continues to be the sharpest point in the Russo-Polish relations.

I repeat once more, with deepest sincerity and complete responsibility for my statement, that not one of these has been given his freedom. I implore you, Mr. Minister, that I do not want another answer similar to those which you have so frequently given us in all of your notes to this date dealing with this painful matter to us, but for actual help toward their discovery. I am particularly appealing this matter to you before my departure with you Mr. Commissar, and with the Soviet Government.

Among other things, Vishinsky replied to this statement, "As to the matter of detaining the Poles in jails or camps, or at hard labor, I can assure you, Mr. Ambassador, that I have personally attended to these matters and I have investigated them, and that, really, these people are not there. I see a tendency of considering our replies to you as purely formal. I had judged that this really was different. In the meantime, this does not agree with reality. Besides the small group detained as Hitlerite agents, there aren't any others; there are none of the others up north, nor in the near north, or anywhere else. Maybe they are beyond the U. S. S. R.; maybe a part of them has died.

"For instance, as a matter of fact, in a recent note from the Embassy, you yourself had canceled out a previous appeal for the release of a certain individual explaining to us that this person had been found in Poland. Maybe the same thing has happened with the others. All of these people are free. A part of them were released before our war with the Germans and part of them later."

(The translation was continued by Mr. Machrowicz, as follows:)

AMBASSADOR. As to the officers, I must state that I have received many letters from their families in Poland, full of fear for their fate, for they are not there, not one of them.

SOKOLNICKI. If our prisoners have been released then please give us the lists of those who have been released, also the dates and the places from which they were released.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you identify Sokolnicki?

Mr. KOT. Sokolnicki was a legal aide of the Embassy, and he was my translator, and who later was to be the chargé d'affaires after my departure.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Continuing, Sokolnicki states:

The Soviet authorities have many times made lists of these prisoners in camps, and the furnishing of such a list to us could not present any difficulty.

VISHINSKY. Unfortunately, we have no such list.

Mr. KOT. The memorandum bearing this particular conversation was not edited by myself; it was edited by Sokolnicki. But at the time, Sokolnicki, in a discussion with the Polish military attaché,

recalled one more statement that Vishinsky had made, which is not included in this memorandum—and this is very important—

Maybe these people are beyond the borders of the U. S. S. R.; maybe part of them have died, some of them have been released before the war with the Germans.

Mr. FLOOD. Who was supposed to have made that statement?

Mr. KOT. Vishinsky.

Mr. FLOOD. As a matter of fact, that statement was contained in the minutes, as read.

Mr. Ambassador, that finishes your immediate statement, does it? Do you have any questions, Mr. Machrowicz?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. No questions.

Mr. KOT. One more reply from the Russians, a note on the 10th of July, which is an answer or reply to my memorandum of the 19th of May.

Their reply was very large and wide in scope, but as to any reply or comment on the Polish officers, they maintain, as they always have, their position that all of them had been released.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I have just one question there, Mr. Ambassador.

In that note they give various reasons why you or the Polish Government did not hear from these Polish officers; is that right?

Mr. KOT. You cannot answer that yes or no because all of their replies are very loose and you cannot put your finger on them. But they describe in detail the difficulties that they encountered in releasing these officers.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I understand, Mr. Ambassador. But there is one question that is very important and that I want you to answer for me. Did they, in that answer, or in any other note, notify you that the reason that these officers have not been returned to you was that they were captured by the Germans?

Mr. KOT. Never.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. At neither one of the prior notes or in that note of July 10th?

Mr. KOT. As long as I had been in Russia, in all my communications with them and my dealings, there had never been the slightest statement or hint that these men had been taken prisoners by the Germans.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In those notes, they gave you various reasons at times, namely, that they may have been too far away and there were no communications; that they may have died, that they may have wanted to return?

Mr. O'KONSKI. That they went to Manchuria.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. But never was there any statement to you that they were taken prisoner by the Germans?

Mr. KOT. Never.

In connection with this, I want to make something clear. It was only Stalin that mentioned Manchuria. But that was just a general statement. When the Germans discovered these graves in Katyn and the Polish Government at that time was preparing some sort of a statement, I already was in London as the Minister of Information in the Polish Government. At that time, a high dignitary of the Soviet Embassy came to me and he told me that he is paying his visit to me on instructions from the Kremlin, and he asked me to make a public pronouncement that these Poles had been murdered by the Germans.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. When was this? Do you know the date?

Mr. KOT. More or less, as best as I can recall, it was the 16th of April. It was the same day during the evening of which the official statement of the Polish Government was released.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. But was it after the Goebbels announcement of the finding of the graves?

Mr. KOT. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. The German announcement.

Mr. KOT. Yes, it was after that. But this was before the official announcement of the Polish Government.

He asked me to make such a statement. To this I replied that, "I cannot do such a thing, because I have been in Russia and I have made frequent inquiries and I have asked Stalin, and why didn't either Molotov or Stalin ever tell me that these Polish officers had fallen into the hands of the Germans? How can you demand today that I issue such an opinion when you have never indicated that to me before?"

He was most dissatisfied with my attitude and he left.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you know who this person was?

Mr. KOT. Unfortunately, I am not certain of the name today. I did not pay any particular attention to it then, but possibly, as I go through my diaries, I may find it. I have an idea who it was, but since I am not certain, I don't think that I ought to name it.

He was not personally known to me, but he was a counselor in one of the Russian embassies; either the Russian Embassy attached to the British Government or to the Polish Government.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, this has been a very long and a very illuminating and an extremely informative session for this committee. We would like to ask you, as we have asked all witnesses: Have you been offered any payment of any kind, or any gratuities of any kind, by anyone, for coming here and testifying?

Mr. KOT. No; not at all.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, do you appear here and testify voluntarily?

Mr. KOT. Voluntarily.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, in view of your long and distinguished career as an Ambassador and a Minister of the London Polish Government; in view of your long and wide acquaintance with the Russians generally; in view of your official capacity and the information that you have had an opportunity to examine and that has been brought to your attention with reference specifically to the massacre of the Polish officers in the forest at Katyn; what, in your opinion, or which of the two governments, in your opinion, the Russian, or the German, was responsible for this massacre?

Mr. KOT. In all of the efforts that I had made until the spring of 1942, I was convinced that these people were still alive, but during that period, I reached the conviction that the whole mystery of this affair can be traced to the fact that these people are not alive any longer and they ceased living immediately after the evacuation of the three camps in which they were interned.

That was the spring of 1940.

When the Germans announced the entire matter at Katyn from the material that then became available, my suspicion that these men had been killed immediately after the evacuation of those camps was confirmed, and the method of their liquidation, that is, those responsible, points to the Russians.

But I always asked myself the question: What was the attitude of the Germans to this matter? Because you must remember that in 1940 the Russo-German relations were very amiable and the Germans knew everything as to what was happening to the Polish prisoners. In occupied Poland, they knew of all the officers through their families, what was happening to these officers who were interned in Russia. Through their hands passed all of the correspondence from the families in Poland to the prisoners and from the prisoners in Russia to their families in Poland.

The fact that all the correspondence broke off in the spring of 1940 could not have been unknown to the Germans. The Germans, before then, had many negotiations with the Russians about the transfer of Polish prisoners, particularly to those Polish prisoners in which the Germans attributed considerable interest; specifically, to the Poles from Western Poland, whom they considered within their own sphere. And also among those Polish officers were Poles of German ancestry. Therefore, the Germans had to know what happened to these Polish officers; whether the liquidation was with the knowledge of the Germans could never be established.

Please keep in mind that the German Embassy in Moscow and several of the German military attachés knew what was going on in Russia and especially with the Polish officers.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ambassador, that is a very interesting analysis, and we, of course, are very glad to have it, based upon your experience and knowledge of both the Germans and the Russians and their methods of operation and their thinking. However, at this moment, that does not contribute directly in answering my question.

My question is not concerned with whether or not the Germans knew what the Russians did or whether or not the Russians knew what the Germans did—as interesting as that analysis is. I want to know only what is your opinion, as one man, because of your knowledge of all the facts and circumstances; what, in your opinion, is the answer? It is a very simple answer. Was the massacre committed, in your opinion, by the Russians, or by the Germans?

Mr. KOT. In my opinion, by the Russians. But I am convinced that it was with the cooperation and knowledge of the Germans in this matter.

Mr. FLOOD. That is very interesting; but you are satisfied that the massacre itself was committed by the Russians, as I understand your answer.

Mr. Ambassador, we realize there was considerable sacrifice for you to appear here tonight and present this very important testimony. We know of your other engagements and that it was at our special invitation that you were kind enough to come here and go to this trouble. Thank you very much.

Mr. KOT. I value the work of this committee, not only from the standpoint of legal procedures but from the moral service you are performing here for all of humanity.

I am happy to have been here, and I wish you great success in reaching a triumph in the public opinion of the entire world.

Mr. FLOOD. The committee is very grateful for that expression from the Ambassador.

The committee will adjourn until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. (Whereupon, at 10:50 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Saturday, April 19, 1952.)

THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

SATURDAY, APRIL 19, 1952

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE,
London, England.

The select committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 111, Kensington Palace Hotel, De Vere Gardens, W. 1., Hon. Ray J. Madden (chairman) presiding.

Present: Messrs. Madden, Flood, Machrowicz, Dondero, and O'Konski.

Also present: Roman Pucinski, investigator and interpreter.

Chairman MADDEN. The committee will come to order.

This is the fourth day of the meetings of the special congressional committee for the investigation of the Katyn Forest massacres, held in London. Present at the meeting are the Chairman, Congressman Flood, of Pennsylvania; Congressman Machrowicz, of Michigan; Congressman Dondero, of Michigan, and Congressman O'Konski, of Wisconsin.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. WLADYSLAW ANDERS, 7 WAVERTON STREET, W. 1; SHAFTSBURY AVENUE, KENTON, MIDDLESEX; LONDON, ENGLAND. (THROUGH INTERPRETER ROMAN PUCINSKI)

Chairman MADDEN. General Anders, you are the first witness this morning. If you will, give the reporter your full name and address, please.

General ANDERS. Wladyslaw Anders. In London, Shaftsbury Avenue, Kenton, Middlesex.

Chairman MADDEN. General, I will read a statement here.

Before you make a statement, it is our wish that you be advised that you would run the risk of action in the courts by anyone who considered he had suffered injury as a result of your testimony. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that the Government of the United States and the House of Representatives do not assume any responsibility in your behalf with respect to libel or slander proceedings which may arise as a result of your testimony.

Do you understand that?

General ANDERS. Yes.

Chairman MADDEN. Now will you be sworn?

Do you swear, by God the Almighty, that you will, according to your best knowledge, tell the pure truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; so help you God?

General ANDERS. I do.

Mr. FLOOD. General Anders, you, of course, have been identified with the armed services of Poland; have you not?

General ANDERS. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you tell us in what capacity, in what way; your rank and so on?

General ANDERS. I was a Polish general since 1933.

Mr. FLOOD. It is important, because of your distinguished military career, that the committee have a little bit of your military background.

I believe that at one time you were an officer in the old Imperial Russian Army. Is that correct?

General ANDERS. That is correct. I was born in the part of Poland near Warsaw. This part was under Russian domination and I was in the Russian Army as a soldier, and later, I was an officer of the reserve. I was a student in Riga Polytechnikum in 1914. With the beginning of the war, I was mobilized in the Russian Army. I spent all of the time at the German Front.

Mr. FLOOD. So you served as an officer in the Russian Army?

General ANDERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. In what branch of the service?

General ANDERS. I was in the Cavalry, later in the Military Staff School, and then I was Chief of Staff of the Seventh Division of Riflemen.

Mr. FLOOD. That was in the Imperial Russian Army in World War I; was it?

General ANDERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. What happened when the Bolshevik revolution took place at the end of World War I?

General ANDERS. After the revolution, I was in the First Polish Lancer Regiment that was organized following the revolution.

Mr. FLOOD. Was the Republic of Poland formed?

Gen. ANDERS. It was not the Republic of Poland, but after the first revolution it was the beginning of the formation of the Polish unity. And there were two Polish corps being formed. I was in the First Polish Corps, in the First Lancer Regiment. After, I was Chief of Staff of the First Infantry Division. It was during the time I was in Russia.

After I was in Poland in 1918 I participated in the revolution against the Germans in Warsaw, and later, in Poznan, and I was Chief of Staff in Poznan, of General Dowbar-Muszynski, who was Commander of the Poznan Army.

In April 1919 I was nominated Commander of the First Polish Lancers in Poznan. I was in the battle of Poznan against the Germans, and from July 1919, I was transferred to the eastern front against the Bolsheviks, who were attacking Poland.

Mr. FLOOD. And you engaged, as a military officer, in what became known as the Polish-Russian War?

Gen. ANDERS. Yes, I participated in the Russo-Polish war until its conclusion, with the exception of 6 weeks when I was hospitalized, suffering from very serious wounds.

Mr. FLOOD. General, in your own words, will you take us down briefly, stressing any military or diplomatic or civil governmental positions you held in Poland; will you take us down briefly to the beginning of hostilities in World War II?

Gen. ANDERS. I returned to Poznan from the battle front in January of 1921, together with my corps. In the fall of the same year I was assigned to the Military Staff Command School in Paris; the Ecole Superieur de Guerre. I completed the course of that school by the fall of 1923 and after various assignments in France, I returned to Poland in the fall of 1924. I was nominated Chief of Staff of the General Inspector of the Cavalry, and subsequently, to 1926, in September, I was nominated Commander of the Cavalry Brigade Rowne.

Mr. FLOOD. What was the form and nature of the Government of Poland, and who headed it during these years?

General ANDERS. The governments had changed; up to May of 1926, the Government and the Premiers had changed several times. I had never participated in the political aspects of the Government.

Mr. FLOOD. Was this known as the Republic of Poland?

General ANDERS. Yes, it was known as the Republic of Poland.

When in 1926 there were the well-known incidents in Poland, the Premier was Witos and the President was Wojciechowski. In the military struggles of that period, I was with the President and with the Government.

Mr. FLOOD. General, we would like you to take us, as soon as possible, to the outbreak of hostilities in World War II. Just as rapidly as you can, bring us to the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and Poland in World War II.

General ANDERS. I had been assigned to various commands up until 1939 in the eastern part of Poland. In March of 1939, when the threat of the German invasion became apparent, I was mobilized and I was transferred to the western part of Poland, to the border of eastern Prussia; and I was there at the beginning of the war, on the 1st of September 1939. I participated in those battles.

Mr. FLOOD. That was in the area of the so-called Polish Corridor, was it?

General ANDERS. No. That was more in the general direction of Mlawa.

After the third day of battle, I was named the commander in chief of the entire group in that region. We participated in very heavy battles.

Later, I was transferred to the outskirts of Warsaw and there I participated in the battles, and then I received an order to transfer in the direction of Lublin, and there we had to fight our way out of a German encirclement.

After the battle in Lublin, I was again transferred or directed to proceed south, and it was at this time that we received the horrible news that Russia had attacked us from the east. I proceeded in the constant running battles toward the south, fighting constantly with the Germans, and at dawn of the 24th of September, we had our last battle against the Germans, and by 4 o'clock that afternoon, I found myself battling against the Russians.

Mr. FLOOD. At that point, let me ask: By "battling against the Russians," do you mean that the Poles and the Russians were engaged in actual gunfire?

General ANDERS. Yes. I was right in the middle.

Mr. FLOOD. And up until that moment, there had been no declaration of war by Russia against Poland, or vice versa?

General ANDERS. There was no declaration of war. As a matter of fact, there were reports that the Russians were coming to help us as our friends.

Mr. FLOOD. Tell us what happened as soon as the hostilities ceased between the Russians and the Poles.

General ANDERS. The battle had not ended. In the ensuing severe battles, I was twice very seriously wounded.

Mr. FLOOD. By the Russians?

General ANDERS. Once by the Russians and twice by the Germans.

Mr. FLOOD. And I believe you subsequently became a prisoner of the Russians; is that correct?

General ANDERS. Yes. I was transferred to a hospital in Lwow. I had been very seriously wounded.

Chairman MADDEN. General Anders, before you get into that phase of it, let me ask you this: On the day that you started fighting the Germans in the morning and wound up fighting the Russians in the afternoon, what happened? Did the Polish Army, in part, fight the Germans from then on and part of the Polish Army fight the Russians, or what procedure followed in that battle?

General ANDERS. I had to fight with one and then the other. I had attempted and my plans and my desires were to get my entire group into Hungary. Whoever got in my way, that was the one that I fought with or against.

Mr. FLOOD. As I understand the situation tactically at that time, the instructions from the Polish High Command to all field generals were to extricate their commands in whatever way was possible, to the south and across the border. Is that right?

General ANDERS. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. And you were gradually being forced into a pocket by the Germans on one side and the Russians, on the other, until the situation became impossible?

General ANDERS. Not only was this a pocket, but the Russians had blocked my attempt to take my units into Hungary. My original attempt, my original plan, was to try and negotiate with the Russians for permission to evacuate my forces across the border, but when they attacked us openly and began firing on my units and killing my men, then I had no alternative but to fight back.

Mr. DONDERO. General, at that time, did the Russian Army attack or fire at the German Army?

General ANDERS. No. They were great friends.

Mr. DONDERO. That came later.

General ANDERS. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. All right, General, we now have you, unfortunately in a hospital in Lwow. Now what happened?

General ANDERS. During my stay in the hospital in Lwow, I oriented myself as to the general situation. I already know of the orders and the appeals issued by General Timoshenko to the Polish forces for the enlisted men to murder their officers and transfer into the Red Army.

Mr. FLOOD. Those are the appeals printed by Timoshenko and published throughout the cities in that area, including Lwow; which, I think you have been advised, were inserted in the records yesterday.

I show the witness exhibit No. 48 and ask him whether or not he

identifies exhibit No. 48 as an exact reproduction of the so-called Timoshenko order of that nature?

General ANDERS. Yes. This is a photograph of the order. That was scattered all over the area, and I saw tens of these in the area. I knew then that the Russians were murdering large numbers of our people, that they were evacuating larger numbers out of our country. So I had drawn a fairly good conclusion as to what this ostensible "friend" of ours looked like.

The entire effort of the Russians was to thwart or block any efforts on the part of our people to cross the borders either into Hungary or Rumania. I was arrested by the Russians and I was detained in a jail in Lwow, called Brygitki, during December of 1939 and January and February of 1940. I was then transferred to Moscow, to the Lubianka prison.

Mr. FLOOD. Now that you are in the Lubianka prison in Moscow, how long were you in the Lubianka prison until you were released later in 1941?

General ANDERS. I remained, during that entire period, in the Lubianka prison, with the exception of 2 months, when I was transferred to a prison in Moscow called Butyrki, and then I was returned to Lubianka. I was released on the 4th of August 1941.

Mr. FLOOD. While this investigation, General, is concerned primarily with the Katyn massacre and the question of missing Polish officers as related thereto, is there anything, briefly, which would be important to this investigation, even in the nature of general observations, that you would like to make to the committee, as far as concerns the nature of any interrogations to which you were subjected while in Lubianka, by the Russians, before release?

General ANDERS. That is a very lengthy subject because I had been interrogated hundreds of times, sometimes for four or five nights in a row. The interrogations frequently were most unpleasant. I can say, however, that the line of questioning during my stay in Lubianka during 1940 and 1941 up until the invasion of Russia by the Germans, the line of interrogation indicated that Russia will wait until France, England, and Germany destroy each other and then she will proceed to occupy the whole of Europe, and that Russia will terminate the war there where she began it.

I asked, "Where will that be?" and I was told, "In Spain."

Mr. FLOOD. I take for granted these interrogations were by the Russian NKVD rather than by the Russian military, since Lubianka was an NKVD citadel?

General ANDERS. The military never interrogate prisoners in Russia; it is always done by the NKVD.

Mr. FLOOD. Is there any other significant factor, before we come to your release on August 4th, that the committee or the world generally would like to know, do you think, in connection with your interrogations at Lubianka, other than the very important promise you have just stated?

General ANDERS. It is difficult to repeat here all of my conversation and there isn't time for that, but, basically, you have to accept one thing: the understanding that the desires and plans of Russia are aimed at the occupation and control of the entire world; Soviet Russia is only the core, the center of an attempt to occupy the entire world.

Mr. FLOOD. Then you are satisfied, General, that the result and the nature of the investigations by the NKVD, of you, during your incarceration in Lubianka, clearly indicated that regardless of any alliances made by the Russians with Western Powers, it was merely an alliance of expediency and world conquest was their ultimate end, regardless of any alliances with anybody?

General ANDERS. Most certainly.

Mr. FLOOD. All right, General, that brings us now down to 1941 and the moment when the Germans attacked Russia; which produced your release on August 4. Will you now direct your attention to the incidents bringing about your release from Lubianka on August 4, 1941?

General ANDERS. I would like to add one more thing before I go into that. In 1941, before the war, there was a moment when I was transferred to a general cell. Prior to this, for 7 months, I had been in solitary confinement. To this cell was brought a Polish army captain named Kuszel. He was brought to the Lubianka prison from the prison camp at Starobielsk; it was from him that I first learned of the three large internment camps at Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and Ostashkov.

Mr. FLOOD. I know it is a difficult question, General, but is it possible for you to help the committee by telling us now what month or what part of the month it was that Captain Kuszel was brought to your cell?

General ANDERS. Kuszel had been taken from Starobielsk to Pavlishchev Bor; he was among that more or less group of men who had been transferred from Starobielsk to Pavlishchev Bor.

Mr. FLOOD. That is very clear, General, but what we would like to know, if possible, is whether you could give us the day and the month in 1941 when you first talked to Captain Kuszel.

General ANDERS. I had talked to him approximately during either May or June of 1941.

Mr. FLOOD. Was there anything significant, other than the mere fact, that Captain Kuszel told you?

General ANDERS. I learned from him first of all that the Starobielsk prison had been evacuated during the months of March and April 1940, and that he and his small group that were taken to Pavlishchev Bor had met with other Polish prisoners from Ostashkov and Kozielsk, and the entire group numbered about 350.

Mr. FLOOD. I suppose, General, even though you were in solitary confinement and in prison during the time you were in Lubianka, you knew or heard or guessed that many Polish officers, and many Poles of all categories, were in prison in Russia?

General ANDERS. Yes, I knew that there were many because I had had occasion to observe already in Lwow the transfer of a large number of Poles as prisoners. I also had occasion to read the official Russian communique, which stated that 181,000 soldiers were taken prisoner into Russia, and in this group were included some 10,000 Polish officers.

Mr. FLOOD. And, of course, because of your record and background, General, you speak and read Russian fluently?

General ANDERS. Yes, just as well as I do in Polish.

Mr. FLOOD. Now after the incident of your conversation in May or June with Captain Kuszel, General, and your first knowledge of

the three camps that we refer to all through this hearing, is there any other detail of any importance which you would like to tell us before we come to the day of your release?

General ANDERS. It was through Kuszel that I found out about this rather small group being evacuated from these three camps, but he had no knowledge of what had been done to the remaining prisoners in these camps.

Mr. FLOOD. During this entire period of your imprisonment in Russia or anywhere else, General, were you permitted any communication at all with any other of your Polish brother officers?

General ANDERS. No, not at all.

Mr. FLOOD. All right, General. Would you now bring it up to the date of your release, and detail for us, as best you can recall, the incidents immediately prior and immediately subsequent to your release from Lubianka?

General ANDERS. When the war started with the German invasion of Russia, we had first learned of this act when the Germans began bombing Moscow. At that time all of our windows were painted over, and the building was sandbagged, and they discontinued permitting us a slight walk through the prison. The prison guards at Lubianka told us and explained to us that these were merely training maneuvers——

Mr. FLOOD. By "us" and "we," you mean your fellow brother Polish officer prisoners?

General ANDERS. All of the prisoners in the prison. But you could hear and imagine immediately that these were not training maneuvers, but something a great deal more serious.

Ten days after this attack, they had called me for another interrogation; they had not been interrogating me during that 10-day period, and their attitude toward me was considerably changed; they were very friendly. They told me that most probably we will have to reach some sort of agreement for mutual cooperation, that we must forget about what had happened in the past, and our task now will be to fight together against the Germans. It was more or less on June 20—no, this was around July 20—when I was again called up for interrogation, and again they were very friendly, and they improved my daily diet; they even took me to a barber and permitted him to shave off my beard, and they even gave me some cologne water.

Toward the end of July they informed me that negotiations had been cleared with the English, and said: "We are now arranging discussions with the Polish Government." On August 4 I was called out of my cell in the regular manner, but I could immediately notice that this was something very important, because they had already stopped twisting my arms behind my back, and there was present not only the regular jail guards, but the commander of the prison, the head of the NKVD. I was still limping at that time——

Mr. DONDERO. What was his name, if you know?

General ANDERS. I do not recall his name at this moment, but I think I could probably find that in my book; he was a colonel of the NKVD.

Mr. FLOOD. If later the name of this officer recurs to you, General, will you so advise the committee at your convenience?

General ANDERS. Certainly. They led me out of the cell. They had, of course, to assist me because I was on crutches. As we proceeded, I could notice that the entire surrounding was becoming better; there were more rugs and nicer quarters.

Mr. FLOOD. At that moment were you on crutches as the result of wounds received in combat, or as the result of physical abuse received in Lubianka, or both?

General ANDERS. I was unable to walk because of wounds which I suffered; to this day I still have a bullet in my leg. I, of course, could not restore myself to my normal health because of the extremely poor diet in Lubianka. I can give as an example the fact that normally I weigh 90 kilograms, and when I was released from Lubianka I weighed not quite 59 kilograms.

Mr. FLOOD. Very well. They have taken you from the cell, and they are taking you some place.

General ANDERS. Eventually I found myself in a large room in the presence of two men, both of them dressed in civilian clothing. They introduced themselves, one as Beria, and the other as Merkulov.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you identify Beria and Merkulov by official position?

General ANDERS. Beria was the commander of the NKVD, which he is today, and Merkulov was commander of the NKGB, which was commissariat of the interior security. The NKGB was under the command (or was subject to the command) of the NKVD, but subsequently the two agencies were separated and were given separate commands.

Mr. FLOOD. What was the NKGB as distinguished from the NKVD?

General ANDERS. The NKVD consists of all of the interior security agencies; it takes care of all the affairs of the Ministry of the Interior and all other agencies; but the NKGB was responsible exclusively for the jails and the prisons.

Mr. FLOOD. Very well, General. We are now in the room.

General ANDERS. The conversation lasted a very long time. They informed me that I had been nominated as the commander in chief of the proposed Polish Army which was to be formed in Russia, and that I am from this moment a free man.

Mr. FLOOD. Did they indicate who had named you as commander in chief?

General ANDERS. At first they told me that they had nominated me. When I asked them, "What do you mean, you nominated me?", they then told me that it was actually the Polish authorities in London that had nominated me, and that they have agreed to that nomination.

Mr. FLOOD. Then what happened, General?

General ANDERS. The conversations consisted mainly of generalities, and the oft-repeated assurances that we must now cooperate and work together, and that we must now fight together against the Germans. They gave me tea, and they gave me cigarettes, and we discussed for 4 hours.

Chairman MADDEN. General Anders, at that time was there any word spoken regarding the possibility of the great number of Polish officers that would be available for your army?

General ANDERS. No; they merely told me at that time that all of our prisoners would be released.

Mr. FLOOD. Now, General, for the purpose of expediting our hearings, although we want to give you full leeway to present anything you think important, will you now bring us to the formation of the Polish Army under your command, and in your own way tell us of your difficulties in a reasonable period of time so we can come at once to the question of where are the Polish officers to help you staff an army?

General ANDERS. I was released on August 4. I was given a home, an apartment. A few days later they made it possible for me to contact General Bogusz-Szyszko, who was sent to Moscow as the chief of the Polish military mission from London. It was from him that I learned the details of the invasion of Russia, the beginning of the war, and the agreements that had been reached between the Polish Government and the Russian Government subsequent to that attack. He gave me at that time the orders prepared by the commander-in-chief, General Sikorski, General Sikorski being also the Premier of the Polish Government in exile, and I began to prepare for organizing the army.

I had many discussions with Russian authorities, and shortly after that one thing came up which to me was extremely important, and that was the very small number of Polish soldiers and officers that the Russians claimed they held in Russian territory. They told me that in all there were approximately 1,000 Polish officers available, and approximately 20,000 Polish soldiers.

I had been reading the Russian press at that time, and I knew that there had appeared in the Russian newspaper Pravda an article during the year 1940. This article appeared on the first anniversary of Russia's invasion of Poland, and the article stated that there were some 225,000, if I am not mistaken, of Polish prisoners taken at that time.

Mr. FLOOD. Your conversations up till this time, I gather, General, on this subject of establishing the Polish Army, were with Russian military authorities, and not with the diplomatic or political leaders?

General ANDERS. I had not carried out any conversations with the diplomatic corps. However, I want to point out that even at the discussions with the military, the NKVD were always present.

Mr. FLOOD. What I meant was that you had had no conversations up to this moment with Stalin, Molotov or Vishinsky?

General ANDERS. No, that is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. Very well.

General ANDERS. Since the evening of the day when I was released from prison, the Russians brought to me Lieutenant Colonel Berling, from whom I had learned that evening the same information that I had previously learned from Captain Kuszel, and I knew then that the approximate number of Polish officers in those three camps should be somewhere around 15,000. So I immediately began asking the Russian military authorities why their figure is so low, and what happened to the rest of the Polish officers. Their answers repeatedly were that these men are in Russia, and if they are, they will be found. It is interesting to note that I have the minutes of at least six conversations that I had with them, and that in none of those conversations did they raise the point of these officers.

Mr. FLOOD. General, do I understand that you have here in your possession the original minutes of the conversations with the Russian

military authorities as you have just described with reference to the missing Polish officers?

General ANDERS. The references to these Polish officers are not in these minutes or protocols, because they had deleted all of those conversations from the official minutes. These conversations had been carried on in the presence of General Bogusz-Szyszko and also of Okulincki.

Mr. FLOOD. Then, General, may I ask you this: Does he have in his possession any minutes made by himself or any of his attaches during these conversations with the Russians during this period having to do with missing Polish officers?

General ANDERS. I have here the originals of the six conferences that were held. I do not have any notes of my own personal, because there were tens and hundreds of these conferences; but General Bogusz-Szyszko, who was present at these conferences, could confirm that the point of the Polish officers had been raised. I have the original of a memorandum prepared by myself and delivered by Mr. Czapski to the NKDV in which I again raised the point of the Polish officers. The memorandum was in the Russian and I have the Polish version.

Mr. FLOOD. Excellent. We will get to that in a moment; but I just want to be sure that the general does not have in his possession any minutes of the six meetings with the Russians during the period we are just at—whether in those minutes there is any reference to the Polish officers. Now, the general told us that the Russians deleted such references. I want to be sure we have no exhibits with reference to the officers?

General ANDERS. No, that is correct; there are none.

Mr. FLOOD. Now will you go on and describe your conversations with reference to the officers?

General ANDERS. During my conversations with the Russians I repeatedly attempted to find out how many of those people are available. They told me that all of our officers have been grouped together at Grazowiec. I went to Griezowiec and there I found not quite 400 of our Polish officers who had been brought there from Ostoshkov, Starobielsk and Kozielsk.

Mr. FLOOD. Can you tell us, General, if you recall the date of your visit to the camp at Kozielsk? [The witness consulted a book.] General, we are not concerned about the exact day. The month and the year, under the circumstances, will satisfy us?

General ANDERS. I believe it was in August of 1941.

Mr. FLOOD. All right, will you take it from there, then, General?

General ANDERS. I also found there a group of Polish officers who had been interned in Lithuania and who had been brought to Griezowiec from those camps. All told, there was a little more than a thousand of the Polish officers brought from Lithuania, and it was there that I learned more details from those Polish officers who had been brought from Pavlishcher Bor as to the other Polish officers who had been interned at the three camps. This disturbed me very much. I was even more disturbed with the fact that these men told me that since their evacuation from those three camps they had had absolutely no contact with the others who had been evacuated earlier, since all of those who were at Griezowiec had carried on frequent correspondence with relatives in Poland. In the letters and corres-

pondence that came from Poland to these men in Giazowiec they had been told that the people back in Poland had lost all contact with the soldiers interned at the three camps since March and April of 1940. Some of the men that I talked to already then told me that they have a premonition that something horrible had happened to those men. I was convinced that these men most probably had been taken to labor battalions far up in the north and that all communication with them had ceased. I instructed all of those at Giazowiec to immediately commence preparing lists of those names that they could remember in the three camps where they had been interned. This, of course, was very difficult.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you recruit the officers who were at Giazowiec into the Polish Army at that time?

General ANDERS. Yes, all of these men were immediately recruited into the Polish Army, and many of them were assigned to the General Staff of the Polish Army.

Mr. DONDERO. How large a Polish Army were you able to establish in Russia?

General ANDERS. First of all, the Russians had turned over to me the 20,000 Polish soldiers and the possibly 1,700 Polish officers; but when the Polish soldiers began to be released from the various prisons in Russia, they began reporting to me in considerably larger numbers.

Mr. FLOOD. General, at what point now have you set up your first headquarters?

General ANDERS. My first headquarters were set up at Buzuluk.

Mr. FLOOD. In what part of Russia?

General ANDERS. In the central part of Russia, near the Urals.

Mr. FLOOD. And there you had gathered the number of soldiers that Mr. Dondero has just inquired about?

General ANDERS. Yes; but this number kept constantly increasing until we transferred our headquarters to the region of Tazhkent.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you tell me the month and the year that you set up your new headquarters at Tazhkent?

General ANDERS. In February 1942.

Mr. FLOOD. Now, General, the committee is concerned primarily from now on with your orders, your instructions and your efforts to find out where are the missing Polish officers. What instructions did you give, what sort of an organization did you set up, what contact did you have with the Polish London Government to do exactly that one thing. Since the general has requested that he be permitted to have present, as well as the interpreter here of the committee, his own personal interpreter (to which the committee have no objection) may I suggest that that interpreter now be sworn.

(Mr. E. Lubomirski was sworn as follows:)

Chairman MADDEN. Do you solemnly swear that you will interpret the testimony given by the witness now on the stand truthfully, so help you God?

Mr. E. LUBOMIRSKI. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Of course, you understand that the interpreter for the committee will proceed as long as possible and that the general will consult his personal interpreter only from time to time.

General ANDERS. I think this is better, because Mr. Lubomirski was with me in Moscow from 1941.

Mr. FLOOD. But we will use our interpreter as long as he is physically able to continue.

General ANDERS. The translation is excellent.

Mr. FLOOD. He has worked very hard.

General ANDERS. I had made all my reports; I reported everything to London; but I cannot find the officers who were interned in those three particular prisons. I knew personally many of the officers who were interned in those camps who were in my various groups and under my command. I had repeatedly asked the Russians for the whereabouts of these men and their repeated answers were evasive, stating that they would eventually be found. Eventually there were 73,000 Polish soldiers who had assembled at our assembly points. There even arrived a group of soldiers from Kolyma, but of this particular group of officers in these three camps not a single one.

Mr. FLOOD. Why did you say "even from Kolyma"?

General ANDERS. Because Kolyma was a horrible place, and these were the only people who came out alive from Kolyma. From a total of 10,000 Poles who had been sent to Kolyma there returned and survived only 160.

Mr. FLOOD. General Anders, could you very briefly explain what you mean by Kolyma being a horrible place?

General ANDERS. I have described Kolyma in detail in my recent book. I can tell you here, however, that it was the most horrible prison in Russia, where it was extremely unusual for anyone to survive longer than one winter.

Mr. FLOOD. Where is it located?

General ANDERS. Kolyma is in the northeasternmost part of Russia, away up near Kamchatka.

Mr. FLOOD. What is the type of temperature there in the worst part of the winter?

General ANDERS. It is approximately 70° C. below zero.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Could you explain what that is Fahrenheit: could you translate 70° C. to Fahrenheit?

General ANDERS. More than 100° F. below zero. In Kolyma the main occupation is the mining of gold. The general opinion in Russia is that you do not return from Kolyma.

Mr. FLOOD. You would not describe Kolyma as a camp of happy workers, would you, under any circumstances?

General ANDERS. I doubt if a place like this has ever existed before anywhere in the world.

Mr. FLOOD. It is so bad, you mean?

General ANDERS. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Now will you take us back to what you did and what kind of an organization you set up in conjunction with the London Polish Government for the existing Polish officers?

General ANDERS. First of all, there were my personal efforts to locate them. I appealed to our Polish Ambassador in Moscow to take up this subject with the Russian diplomatic staff.

Mr. DONDERO. Who was he?

General ANDERS. Ambassador Kot; and I know from his reports that he had frequently taken this matter up with the Russians. When General Sikorski was planning to come to Russia, we succeeded in obtaining a list of 4,000 names. I had set up and organized a special

agency, a special office, which would seek the whereabouts of these officers. I had named Major Czapski as the head of this bureau.

Mr. FLOOD. What is his first name?

General ANDERS. Joseph—Josef Czapski. Major Czapski had visited these various camps where the Poles were being mobilized, and he had also conducted frequent conversations and discussions with the Russians, and finally I sent him to Moscow, where he delivered the note that was prepared by myself to the Russian authorities on this matter of Polish officers. I will be very happy to have the original note photostated and give it to this committee.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you have the original note in your possession now, General, at this moment here?

General ANDERS. Yes, I do.

Mr. FLOOD. May I see it, please?

General ANDERS. I have here the Russian copy of that note in the Russian language. [Handing same to Mr. Flood.]

Mr. FLOOD. This Russian copy was prepared by whom?

General ANDERS. By Czapski under my order.

Mr. FLOOD. Under your direction?

General ANDERS. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And this is a copy of the note transmitted by Czapski?

General ANDERS. By Czapski to General Rajchman in Moscow.

Mr. FLOOD. I ask the stenographer to mark this as "Exhibit No. 50." [The document was marked accordingly.] Now, General, I show you this document which you have handed to me, as you have just described, marked for identification "Exhibit No. 50," and ask you whether or not this document in the Russian language is a copy of the note transmitted?

General ANDERS. Yes; this is the copy of the notes.

Mr. FLOOD. Transmitted by Mr. Czapski at your direction to the Russian General Rajchman?

General ANDERS. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Now, General, I understand that you are willing to have a photostatic copy of that document placed in the hands of the committee as soon as possible?

General ANDERS. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Pucinski, when that is received, will you see it is marked and placed in the record as "Exhibit 50A" and you will return the original which is marked exhibit 50 to General Anders.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Yes, sir.

EXHIBIT 50A

*Memorial story in Moskwa Gen. Rajchma
now in Kubinka 2/IV 1942 by Gen. Jan.
Kozłowski z. Krasickiego.*

Wojenne wspomnienia

Wojenne wspomnienia z lat 1914-1918, 1939-1945, 1945-1948, 1948-1950, 1950-1953, 1953-1955, 1955-1958, 1958-1960, 1960-1963, 1963-1965, 1965-1968, 1968-1970, 1970-1973, 1973-1975, 1975-1978, 1978-1980, 1980-1983, 1983-1985, 1985-1988, 1988-1990, 1990-1993, 1993-1995, 1995-1998, 1998-2000, 2000-2003, 2003-2005, 2005-2008, 2008-2010, 2010-2013, 2013-2015, 2015-2018, 2018-2020, 2020-2022.

1914-1918

Wojenne wspomnienia z lat 1914-1918. W tym czasie służyłem w armii niemieckiej, a później w armii austriacko-węgierskiej. Doświadczyłem wielu trudnych sytuacji, które kształtowały moje postępowanie i światopogląd.

1939-1945

Wojenne wspomnienia z lat 1939-1945. W tym czasie służyłem w Armii Krajowej, walcząc o wolność ojczyzny. Były to lata niezwykle trudne i pełne poświęceń.

1945-1948

Wojenne wspomnienia z lat 1945-1948. Po zakończeniu wojny wróciłem do kraju i kontynuowałem służbę w Armii Krajowej, która została przekształcona w Wojsko Polskie.

1948-1950

Wojenne wspomnienia z lat 1948-1950. W tym czasie służyłem w Armii Radzieckiej, walcząc na froncie wschodnim.

1950-1953

Wojenne wspomnienia z lat 1950-1953. W tym czasie służyłem w Armii Radzieckiej, a następnie w Armii Czerwonej.

1953-1955

Wojenne wspomnienia z lat 1953-1955. W tym czasie służyłem w Armii Radzieckiej, a następnie w Armii Czerwonej.

1955-1958

Wojenne wspomnienia z lat 1955-1958. W tym czasie służyłem w Armii Radzieckiej, a następnie w Armii Czerwonej.

1958-1960

Wojenne wspomnienia z lat 1958-1960. W tym czasie służyłem w Armii Radzieckiej, a następnie w Armii Czerwonej.

1960-1963

Wojenne wspomnienia z lat 1960-1963. W tym czasie służyłem w Armii Radzieckiej, a następnie w Armii Czerwonej.

1963-1965

Wojenne wspomnienia z lat 1963-1965. W tym czasie służyłem w Armii Radzieckiej, a następnie w Armii Czerwonej.

В мае 1941 г. в Катинском лесу были расстреляны 217 польских офицеров. Среди них были: 100 человек, прибывших в лагерь в апреле 1941 г., 100 человек, прибывших в лагерь в мае 1941 г., и 17 человек, прибывших в лагерь в июне 1941 г. Среди расстрелянных были: 100 человек, прибывших в лагерь в апреле 1941 г., 100 человек, прибывших в лагерь в мае 1941 г., и 17 человек, прибывших в лагерь в июне 1941 г.

Список офицеров, прибывших в лагерь в мае 1941 г.

Среди офицеров, прибывших в лагерь в мае 1941 г., были: 100 человек, прибывших в лагерь в мае 1941 г., и 17 человек, прибывших в лагерь в июне 1941 г.

Среди офицеров, прибывших в лагерь в июне 1941 г., были: 17 человек, прибывших в лагерь в июне 1941 г., и 100 человек, прибывших в лагерь в мае 1941 г.

Список офицеров, прибывших в лагерь в июне 1941 г.

Среди офицеров, прибывших в лагерь в июне 1941 г., были: 17 человек, прибывших в лагерь в июне 1941 г., и 100 человек, прибывших в лагерь в мае 1941 г.

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Разве торжественно не звучит слово СТАЛИН
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Польских военнопленных, но ставший нем жалким, ни то, что
им по крайней мере будет ясно, где находится их бывшие товари-
щи, и - если они погибли - кем и когда это случилось.

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УПОЛНОМОЩЕННИЙ ПО ДЕЛАМ
В. ИВАНОВИЧ В СССР

/-Подпись и печать

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[Translation from Russian of Exhibit 50.1]

[On the top a pencil mark:] Memorandum submitted in Moscow to the Gen. Raichmann in Lublianka [seat of N. K. V. D.] on April 2, 1942, by Capt. Czapski.

MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE POLISH PRISONERS OF WAR FROM STAROBEL'SK, KOZEL'SK AND OSTASHKOV, WHO DID NOT RETURN

The prisoners of war, who from 1939 until April 1940, were in Starobel'sk, Kozel'sk and Ostashkov (numbering more than 15,000, of whom 8,700 were commissioned officers) did not return from exile, and the place of their confinement is unknown to us; an exception are 400-500 men, that is approximately three percent of the total number of prisoners of war, who were released in 1941, after one year's imprisonment in Griassovets near Vologda or in other prisons.

Camp in Starobel'sk No. 1

Shipments of prisoners of war used to arrive in Starobel'sk camp from 30 September to 1 November 1939 and when the clearing of the inmates of the camp began, the number of the Polish Prisoners was 3,920 men including generals and colonels who were kept separately. There were also several scores of civilians, about 30 cadet-officers (podkhorunzhii) and ensigns (khorunzhii). All others were commissioned officers, of whom at least 50 percent were of the regular army, 8 generals, more than 100 colonels and lieutenant-colonels, about 250 majors, approximately 2500 first and second lieutenants of all branches of the service and auxiliary services. Among them there were 380 doctors, several professors of institutions of higher learning, etc.

Kozel'sk No. 1 and Ostashkov were camps for prisoners of war, both formed and cleared approximately at the same time.

The camp in Kozel'sk

On the day when the clearing of the camp began—on April 3rd, 1940—the camp had approximately 5,000 prisoners, among them 4,500 commissioned officers of all ranks and of all branches of the service.

Camp in Ostashkov

On the day when the clearing began—on April 6, 1940—this camp contained 6,750 men, among them 380 commissioned officers.

The clearing of the Camp in Starobel'sk

On April 5, 1940, the first group, consisting of 195 men, was sent from Starobel'sk Colonel Berezhkov the Soviet commandant, and commissar Kirshin official assured the prisoners of war, that they are being sent to the distribution center, from where they will be sent to the places of their residence, to Poland, both, to the German or the Soviet part.¹ Up to April 26, inclusive, groups consisting of from 65 to 240 men were shipped.

On April 25, after the customary announcement concerning the sending of more than 100 men, a special list of 63 men was read, to whom the order was given to stand separately during the departure to the station.

After April 26 there was an interruption in the clearing of the camps until May 2, when 200 men were sent. After that the rest of the prisoners were sent with small groups on the 8th, 11th, and 18th of May. The group, which included me, among others, was sent to Pavlishchev Bor (Smolensky region), where we met the whole "special group" of 63 men, who were sent on April 25. Thus we numbered 79, almost all being commissioned officers from Starobel'sk, who were, after one year, released from Griazovecky camp. Adding to this number 7 more commissioned officers, who were shipped individually during the winter of 1939-40 from Starobel'sk, the total number of those commissioned officers who were released will make 86 out of 3920 men, i. e., slightly more than 2 percent of the total number of prisoners in Starobel'sk.

The clearing of the camps of Kozel'sk and Ostashkov

It proceeded in like manner. In Pavlishchev Bor we found about 200 commissioned officers from Kozel'sk and about 120 men from Ostashkov. The proportion between the number of people brought to Pavlishchev Bor from these camps and the number of people confined there differed slightly from the proportion relating to Starobel'sk.

¹ According to the numerous letters received in Poland in the winter of 1940-41, we know for sure that nobody was then sent from Starobel'sk, Kozel'sk, and Ostashkov back to Poland.

The camp in Griazovets

After a month's stay in Pavlishchev Bor the whole of the camp, approximately 400 people, was shipped to Griazovets near Vologda, where we remained until the day of [our] release. About 1,250 commissioned officers and enlisted men also arrived there, they were previously interned in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and stayed as internees (not as prisoners of war) in Kozel'sk No. 2 from the fall of 1940 till the summer of 1941.

The camp in Griazovets was known to us as the only PW camp consisting mostly of commissioned officers of the Polish Army, which existed in the U.S.S.R. from June 1940 to September 1941, and the population of which, after their release, almost in full number, joined the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R.

Almost 6 months had passed since the "amnesty" to all Polish PW's and internees was proclaimed on August 12, 1941. Polish commissioned officers and enlisted men, released from confinement to which they were subjected when trying to cross the border after September 1939 or those arrested at places of their residence, were arriving, in groups or individually, to join the Polish Army. But despite the amnesty, inspite of the explicit promise given by the President of the Sovnarkom (Soviet of People's Commissars) Stalin himself, in November 1941, to our envoy Kot that PW's be returned to us, despite of a strict order to locate and liberate the PW's from Starobel'sk, Kozel'sk, and Ostashkov given by Stalin on December 4, 1941, in the presence of the Commanding General of the Polish Army Sikorski and General Anders, inspite of all this not a single prisoner of war appeared from Starobel'sk, Kozel'sk and Ostashkov (except the group from Griazovets mentioned before and a few scores of persons who were separately interned and liberated as early as in September).

No appeal for help from the PW's interned in the camps mentioned above has ever reached us.

Insipite of the interrogation of thousands of persons returning from all the camps and prisons of the U. S. S. R. we shall have not obtained any reliable information on their [the prisoners, in Starobel'sk] whereabouts, except for the following rumors coming from second-hand sources: that from 6 to 12 thousands commissioned and noncommissioned officers were sent to Kolyma via Bukhta Nachodka in 1940;

That more than 5,000 commissioned officers were collected in the mines of the *Frants Iosif Islands*; that there were deportations to *Novaya Zemlia*, *Kamchatka*, and *Chukotka*; that in the summer of 1941, 630 commissioned officers, PW's from Kozel'sk, were working 180 kilometers from *Pestraiia Dresva*; that 150 commissioned officers, clad in their uniforms, were seen north from the river *Sos'va* near *Gar'*; that some Polish commissioned officers, prisoners of war, were transported on huge towed barges (1,700-2,000 men to a barge) to *Severnye Ostrova* and that three such barges sank in *Barents sea*.

None of this information was confirmed sufficiently, although the information on *Severnye Ostrova* and *Kolyma* seems to be the most probable.

We know that every prisoner of war was registered, and that the "case records" of all us, with the numerous records on interrogations together with the documents, identified and checked photographs, were kept in special files. We know how carefully and exactly this work of the NKVD was conducted, so that none of us, [former] prisoners of war, can believe for a second that the whereabouts of 15,000 PW's of which more than 8,000 are commissioned officers, could be unknown to the higher authorities of the NKVD. The solemn promise of the *Predsovnarkom* Stalin himself and his strict order to ascertain the fate of the former Polish prisoners of war permit us to hope that at least we could know where our brothers in arms are and, if they have perished, how and when it happened.

Number of commissioned officers of the Polish Army, former prisoners of war, who did not return

On April 5, 1940, the day of the beginning of the clearance of the camp of inmates in *Starobel'sk*, the total number of commissioned officers, prisoners of war, with the exception of some civilians and approximately 30 ensigns and cadet-officers was 3,920.

The number of prisoners of war in *Kozel'sk* on April 6, 1940, the day when clearing of the camp of inmates began, amounted to 5,000, among them commissioned officers constituted 4,500.

The number of prisoners of war in *Ostashkov* on April 6, 1940, the day when the clearing of the camp of inmates started, was 6,570; the commissioned officers constituted among them 380. Total 8,800 commissioned officers.

By deducting several scores of civilians from Starobel'sk the number of commissioned officers constitutes 8,700.

Some 300 commissioned officers from *Griassovets*, former prisoners of war from Starobel'sk, Kozel'sk, and Ostashkov, have returned to the Polish Army and furthermore several scores were released from prisons, into which they were sent from the above-mentioned camps, and returned, which makes the total number of returned commissioned officers not more than 400.

Consequently the following figure shows the number of commissioned officers who did not return from Starobel'sk, Kozel'sk, and Ostashkov camps—8,300 men.

All officers of the Polish Army, the number of which as of January 1, 1940, amounted to approximately 2,300 persons, were formerly confined or interned in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, but they were not prisoners of war (with the exception of the above-mentioned 400 persons).

Being unable to define with similar precision the grand total number of all those who did not return, we give solely the figures of the prisoners of war from Kozel'sk, Starobel'sk, and Ostashkov, the majority of which are officers, because we were able to determine their number with relative precision.

Because we were now expanding, by virtue of the decision of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Stalin and of General Sikorski, our army in the south of the U. S. S. R., a continuously growing need is felt for these officers who disappeared; we are losing in them the best military experts, the best commanding personnel.

No special explanation is required to realize the extent to which the disappearance of many a thousand of brothers-in-arms obstructs the work of the creation in our army of confidence in the Soviet Union, which confidence is so much needed for a sound development of mutual relations between the two allied armies in their struggle against the common sworn enemy.

Commissioner for the Affairs of
Former Prisoners of War in the USSR
Captain of the Cavalry JOZEF CZAPSKI

Moscow, February 2, 1942.

Mr. FLOOD. Very well, General.

General ANDERS. When General Sikorski arrived, I informed him of our entire efforts to locate these.

Mr. FLOOD. May I interrupt: when General Sikorski arrived where?

General ANDERS. General Sikorski arrived in Russia. I went to meet him in Tehran in November of 1941.

Mr. FLOOD. And then you had a conversation with General Sikorski in Tehran?

General ANDERS. To Kuybishev, in Kuybishev during our trip to Moscow.

Mr. FLOOD. Then, as I understand it, when General Sikorski arrived in Teheran, you went to meet him in Teheran, and during your stay in Teheran with General Sikorski, during your trip from Teheran to Kuybishev, during your stay in Kuybishev, during your trip from Kuybishev to Moscow, you discussed this question of the missing Polish officers?

General ANDERS. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. At Kuybishev you met, I believe, Ambassador Kot?

General ANDERS. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Did Ambassador Kot travel to Moscow with you and General Sikorski?

General ANDERS. Yes, that is right.

Mr. FLOOD. That, I think, brings us to the meeting in Moscow on December 3?

General ANDERS. December 4 was the meeting with Stalin and Molotov.

Mr. FLOOD. At the meeting at Moscow with Stalin, who was present on the Russian side?

General ANDERS. Stalin and Molotov, and I think Mr. Pawlov, the translator; I am not sure.

Mr. FLOOD. On the Polish side who were present?

General ANDERS. General Sikorski, Mr. Kot, and I.

Mr. FLOOD. Were you serving as interpreter for the Poles' side?

General ANDERS. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you, in your own words, detail for us as best you recollect or by referring to any minutes that you may have, the tenor of the conversation that took place on that date with Stalin and Molotov, and, as you recall, any atmosphere or attitude or conduct that prevailed on either side?

General ANDERS. The Russians, as usual, never give the complete minutes of political discussions. So we prepared our own minutes; that is, General Sikorski, Mr. Kot, and myself. Three copies of these minutes were made. General Sikorski had the first copy, the original; Mr. Kot got the second copy. Excuse me—this was not the 4th it was the 3d of December. The meeting was on the 3d of December.

Mr. FLOOD. By "the meeting" you mean the meeting with Stalin?

General ANDERS. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. When you referred to the meeting you meant the meeting with General Stalin that we are discussing; and when you said December 4 a minute ago, after having consulted your notes and the minutes of the meeting, you now wish to change that date and make it December 3; is that right?

General ANDERS. That is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. Now, General, I think you would like to know that at the meeting of the committee and the hearings last night Ambassador Kot was present and he presented us with a copy of the minutes to which you now refer; he confirmed that he had a copy of it, and that is already in the record, it is exhibit 49C. So you can proceed to testify.

General ANDERS. Yes, that is right. This is No. 3 [indicating a carbon copy document]. The most important thing as far as the missing Polish officers are concerned during this conference was when General Sikorski personally inquired about these missing officers. Stalin replied that he does not need to detain these officers and that he does not have them. We inquired, "Well, where could they have gone?" To this Stalin replied: "They escaped." I inquired where could they have escaped? And Stalin replied: "To Manchuria." I said that this was impossible. This already was a great disturbance for us because we started becoming convinced that if Stalin says that these men had been transferred to the far north and that they escaped to Manchuria, we began to suspect that these men were no longer alive. At that particular time the idea that these men could all have been murdered was inconceivable. General Sikorski handed Stalin a list of some 4,000 names.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you know from what source or from whom General Sikorski had received that list?

General ANDERS. From me.

Mr. FLOOD. Proceed.

General ANDERS. We were under the impression at that time that these men had been taken to camps in the far north and that most probably the larger number of these people are no longer alive, but

that it is possible that a portion of these men will be found. At General Sikorski's departure—

Mr. FLOOD. Just a moment. Now, that was the gist of the conversation at the meeting with Stalin on December 3?

General ANDERS. Yes, it was the gist. It was a long meeting and there were other things but I am not going into those at this time.

Mr. FLOOD. If you recall anything of interest, the committee is also interested in the attitude of Molotov and Stalin, their manner, attitude, conduct, and the atmosphere among the parties?

General ANDERS. During the moments when we made these specific enquiries regarding these missing Polish officers, they appeared very unclear. After General Sikorski's departure, we kept revising and improving and compiling more names to that list.

Mr. FLOOD. I understand that now you have returned to your headquarters—where?

General ANDERS. To Buzuluk. After I escorted General Sikorski back to Teheran, I returned to Buzuluk.

Mr. FLOOD. And continued your directions to others in your command and your own efforts to discover the whereabouts of the missing officers?

General ANDERS. Yes, that is correct; and I also urged Ambassador Kot to continue his efforts from the diplomatic front to get some information of these missing officers.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you at some subsequent date, after December 3, attend any conference with Stalin on this same subject?

General ANDERS. I was at subsequent conferences with Stalin, and this came about when I was at Jengi-jul and I had already some 70,000 soldiers. At that time I received instructions and orders or I was advised by the Russians that they are reducing my rations to provide for only 26,000 men. The Russian food portions were extremely small—you had to feed not only 70,000 soldiers, but also 40,000 women and children, because you could not buy any rations in Russia. This, therefore, was an effort to starve out the entire group of Poles. I had sent two telegrams to Stalin on this matter.

Mr. FLOOD. What were the dates of the telegrams to Stalin?

General ANDERS. I do not recall the dates of those telegrams, but I have in my possession here the original reply from Stalin to my telegrams. I received that telegram on the 9th of March.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you tell us in your own words the substance of the first and second telegrams to Stalin?

General ANDERS. My telegram stated that the situation is impossible, that these people will starve, that this is not consistent with our agreement, and that I urge him to investigate this matter; and if this cannot be done, I am prepared personally to come to see him to explain and describe the situation.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you let me see the reply? [The witness handed the document to Mr. Flood.]

General ANDERS. Here is the original. Here is a translation.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you mark for identification as exhibit No. 51 this document which is the original reply from Stalin as well as the translation in English. (The document was accordingly marked by the stenographer.) General, I show you marked for identification exhibit 51 and ask you whether or not that is the original reply of Stalin to your telegrams as just described by you, as well as the translation in English?

General ANDERS. Yes, it is.

Mr. FLOOD. And do we understand that you will arrange as soon as possible that the committee may have photostatic copies of this document?

General ANDERS. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Pucinski, when received will you see that they are inserted as exhibit No. 51A. At this time we will ask the Investigator to read the English translation of the Stalin replies.

ORIGINAL RUSSIAN TELEGRAM MARKED AS EXHIBIT 51A

СЕКРЕТНО

ТЕЛЕГРАММА

| Время приема | Особые отметки |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|
| из МОСКВЫ ИР 2806 ТАВРЕНТ НКРА | |
| | Курс, 2007
Зарплата |

ВНИМАТЕЛЬНО ПЕРЕЧЕТАТЬ И ПЕРЕПИСАТЬ В ЯНГИ-ВОЛ
ПОДВОДИСКОМУ ИССЛЕДУЮЩИМ ТЕЛЕГРАММУ ГОСАРХИВА СТАВКА
НА Имя КОМАНДУЮЩЕГО ПОЛЬСКОЙ АРМИЕЙ ГЕНЕРАЛА АНДЕРСА
С ОБЪЕДИНЕННОГО ФОРУМА АДРЕСАТУ :

... ЗАКОННАЯ СОР ГОР. ЯНГИ-ВОЛ КОМАНДУЮЩЕМУ
ПОЛЬСКОЙ АРМИИ В СССР ГЕНЕРАЛ-ЛЕЙТЕНАНТУ АНДЕРСУ
ИЗУЧИТЕ ОБЪЕДИНЕННУЮ ТЕЛЕГРАММУ В ПОДПОДВОДИСКОМ
ПОДРАЗДЕЛЕНИИ ПОЛЬСКОЙ АРМИИ И РАСПОРЯЖЕНИИ ГЕНЕРАЛ-
ЛЕЙТЕНАНТА ХРУЩЕВА. ИЗУЧИТЕ ВСЕ МАТЕРИАЛЫ, ЯВЛЯЮЩИЕСЯ
ДОКАЗАТЕЛЬСТВАМИ, ЧТО ПОДПОДВОДИСКОЕ ПОДРАЗДЕЛЕНИЕ ВРАЖДЕБНО
УСЛОЖНИЛОСЬ В СВЯЗИ С ПЛАНАМИ ПОПЫТКИ НА АНГЛИЮ И США
СОВМЕСТНО НА ДАЛЬНЕМ ВОСТОКЕ РАССУДИТЕ ТОМУ, ЧТО ПОДПОД-
СТАВКА НЕ ДОЛЖНА ПРОПУСКАТЬ СЛЕД В СССР НА АМЕРИКАНСКОМ
ПАРОВОЗЕ, А ИЛИ ВОЗМОЖНОСТИ ТОЖЕ ОГРАНИЧЕН. НЕ ДОЛЖНО
ПОЛУЧАТЬ ИЛИ ОНА БОЛЬШЕ ОДНОГО КОМПЬЮТЕРА ТОЖЕ ЧТО ИЛИ
А ПОЛУЧАЕТ ИЛИ 100 ТЫСЯЧ ТОЖЕ, ТРИЛИОН ТОЖЕ ПРИХОДИТСЯ
ПЕРЕВОЗЧИКАМ ПЛАН СЛАБЫХ АРМИИ В ПОДПОД-
СТАВКА ИЛИ ЗА СЧЕТ АМЕРИКАНСКОГО ПЕРОВОЗЧИКА

Передал:

Принял:

СЕКРЕТНО

ТЕЛЕГРАММА

| | | |
|--------------|---|--|
| Время приема | Общая отчетка | |
| | УТВЕРЖ. УВ. Д. Д.
С. А. Д. Д. Д. Д.
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| | В. Д. Д. Д. Д. Д.
А. Д. Д. Д. Д. Д. | |

... .. ДВИЖЕНИЯ ПОЛЬСКОЙ АРМИИ В СССР
 КОЛИЧЕСТВО
 ПЕРЕ
 ПОДСТЕ
 ОБЪЕДИНИТЬ ВАС С
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... .. ЗНАЕТЕ ЛИБЕ

В. Д. Д. Д. Д. Д.
А. Д. Д. Д. Д. Д.
Г. Д. Д. Д. Д. Д.

Передат

Принят

(NOTE.—Translation follows:)

Mr. PUCINSKI (reading):

Translation from Russian from Moscow No. 2806 to Tashkent NKDV. Please send immediately by special courier to Jengi-jul to Wolkowyski, the following telegram: "From Comrade Stalin for General Anders, Commander of the Polish Army in U. S. S. R. to be immediately handed to the addressee." Then there is the word "Usibehshaya S. S. R. Jengi-yul. Message for Military General Anders, Commander Polish Army in U. S. S. R.: I received both of your telegrams concerning the food situation of the Polish Army and Lieutenant General Chrulev's decision. After having analyzed all materials I came to the conclusion, that the food situation of the Red army became complicated in connection with Japan's attack on England and the United States of America. The war in the Far East has caused that Japan refuses to let pass grain into U. S. S. R. on American ships and our own shipping tonnage is limited. We hoped to receive from United States of America more than 1 million tons of wheat and we received less than 100,000 tons. In view of the above, we had to reconsider the maintenance plan of the army, favoring the actually fighting divisions at the expense of nonfighting divisions. In spite of that I succeeded, though with great difficulties, to maintain the present level of supplies to the Polish Army in U. S. S. R. up to March 20, after which date it will be indispensable to curtail the quantity of rations for the Polish Army to a maximum of 30,000 rations. If you deem it purposeful, you can come to Moscow, I shall be ready to listen to you with pleasure. Respectfully yours, J. Stalin." Colonel Wolkowyski—the fulfillment of the above to be reported to me immediately—Fiedolof. This telegram was received at Jengi-jul on March 9, 1942, at 0720 hours.

Mr. FLOOD. As a result of these communications, I understand you had another meeting with Stalin?

General ANDERS. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Did that meeting have anything to do with a discussion about the missing Polish officers, or was it concerned only with the question of food supplies?

General ANDERS. I raised both the point of the rations and also the question of the missing officers, and I have in my possession here the minutes prepared by General Okulincki. He was then Colonel Okulincki. He was my chief of staff.

Mr. FLOOD. First of all, tell us the date of this meeting you are now describing with Stalin?

General ANDERS. The 18th of March.

Mr. FLOOD. Where did it take place?

General ANDERS. At the Kremlin.

Mr. FLOOD. In the Kremlin at Moscow?

General ANDERS. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Who was present on the Russian side?

General ANDERS. On the Russian side, Stalin, Molotov, and a secretary.

Mr. FLOOD. And who was present for the Poles?

General ANDERS. I and Okulincki.

Mr. FLOOD. I understand you have at present in your possession minutes of that meeting; is that correct?

General ANDERS. I have the original minutes.

Mr. FLOOD. Made by whom?

General ANDERS. By Colonel Okulincki.

Mr. FLOOD. May I see them. Will the stenographer mark this document as exhibit 52. (The document was marked accordingly.) General, I now show you, marked for identification "Exhibit 52," and ask you whether or not this document is the minutes of the meeting you have now described, with Stalin and the others present?

General ANDERS. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. And do I understand that you will provide for the committee a photostatic copy of those minutes with particular reference to that part of the minutes having to do with the missing officers only?

General ANDERS. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Will you now, as you best recall it and by referring to the minutes, tell us of the conversation with Stalin at that date having to do with the missing officers?

General ANDERS. I gave Stalin a new list which was a supplemental list to the original, and I informed him that none of the officers named on that list has as yet reported to me. Stalin to this replied, "Well, what good would they be to us? Why would we want to be keeping them or detaining them?" And here for the first time he told us a new version—that they must have fled and become separated when the Germans invaded Russia.

Mr. FLOOD. At this time and up until this time, General, in any of your conversations with any of the NKVD, with any of the Russian military or with Stalin or any of the diplomatic or civil leaders of Russia, in your requests for information about the missing Polish officers, had anybody at any time said they were German prisoners?

General ANDERS. Never. And this to us was one of the most disturbing factors, because we knew that the Bolsheviks had made very long and lengthy and complete lists of all of their prisoners; we knew that centralization has progressed so far there that everything is assembled eventually in Moscow. If you compare his first statement that possibly these men had fled to Manchuria with the theory that these men had been detained in prison camps which had become overrun by the Germans, the question then becomes apparent: Why were these men denied any correspondence? And the further question is, Why would these men have been concentrated in such large numbers when it is known that the Russians never concentrated such large numbers of any one nation. And why, if it is true that these men had escaped or fled during the German invasion, has not a single one of them reported either to his home in the homeland or to our forces.

Mr. FLOOD. All right, General. We are now on the conversation with Stalin again and talking about the officers. What new explanations did he have?

General ANDERS. Actually, none. He did not want to discuss this subject; they did not want to give us an answer on it.

Mr. FLOOD. Was that the result then of the conversations you are now describing with Stalin?

General ANDERS. Yes; essentially in brief form, that is it. Naturally they accepted our supplemental list, and assured us they would continue searching for these men.

Mr. FLOOD. At that time did you specifically mention to Stalin the camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov?

General ANDERS. Yes; at this time I named the three camps, and I had previously mentioned the three camps in my note.

Mr. FLOOD. And as I understand it, General, up till this moment, despite the extensive search made by you and your colleagues of the London Polish Government, and despite all the sources of information coming to your headquarters, and that of the London Polish Government, of which you were advised, at no time and from no one was any

information obtained about any of the missing officers from Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov?

General ANDERS. That is correct. There was absolutely no information about these men.

[Translation copy of Exhibit 52]

MINUTES OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN GENERAL ANDERS AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS, J. STALIN, AT THE KREMLIN ON MARCH THE 18TH, 1942

SUMMARY

At 5:30 p. m. punctually at the appointed time Lieut. Gen. W. Anders, O. C. Polish Forces in the U. S. S. R., accompanied by P. S. C. Colonel Okulicki was received by President Stalin in the presence of Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. W. Molotov and a stenographer.

After greetings had been exchanged.

STALIN. You have come to me to inquire why was the number of rations supplied to the Polish Army reduced. I shall tell you quite frankly why: You see—in October when Harriman and Beaverbrook were here we had agreed with America that they would supply us with 2,200,000 tons of wheat monthly. From this source we should have received by now a million tons of wheat and 1,800,000 tons till the end of July 1942. On this wheat we based the maintenance estimates of our army. The deliveries were to be made by American ships as our tonnage is limited. Well, what we received up till now—would make a cat weep. [Translator's note: idiomatic expression meaning practically nothing.] I don't blame anybody, but all that has reached us was barely 60,000 tons. The Japs let through our ships but the American ones which sail without a convoy are being sunk. They have already sunk four. The war with Japan has reshuffled the cards. The American tonnage can be written off as far as our supplies of bread are concerned. That is the reason why we had to revise [pieresmatret] completely the plans of maintenance of our army. We have been forced to form rear-guard units and territorial troops of which you can find proof on the spot. This had to be done in order to provide food for the front-line units which are fighting well. We have also greatly reduced our cavalry. That is why General Chrulew had ordered that you will receive rations for your full establishments only up till the 20th of March and from then only 40,000 rations. I would not like people to say that Soviet authorities do not keep their promises, but until conditions change, your army must be curtailed to three divisions plus one reserve regiment.

General ANDERS. I do understand all that and that is why I have come here. There must be some way out of this situation. After having received General Chrulew's cable, before your telegram had reached me, Mr. President, I did not mention the whole thing to anybody. After your cable was received I informed General Sikorski by whom I have been notified that 2,000,000 rations have been directed to me. The strength of our army amounts today to 75,000 to 78,000 men; I cannot allow those above your official figure to die of starvation. I see the following way out: Give us maintenance for full establishments until British food will reach us. I want to fly to London to discuss this matter. General Sikorski has agreed to it and wants me to be there as soon as possible. At this moment he's on his way to Washington where he will probably discuss the problem of the maintenance of our army in the U. S. S. R. I want to do something really good for Poland and I am trying to find the best possible solution. I hold that to disperse our military efforts would do no good and that is why I endeavor to create the strongest possible Polish Army on U. S. S. R. territory.

STALIN. The men who join your army, are they suitable? Are you pleased with them?

General ANDERS. Yes. On the average they are quite good as far as their morale is concerned. Physically they are exhausted but they swiftly recover. At the present moment we are suffering from an epidemic of typhoid fever. I count greatly on the element from the labor battalions and those from the Red Army. Most of them are young.

STALIN. And do you know what ravages typhoid fever is making in Poland? It should not happen here. We have enough soap and should be able to quench it. How many divisions have you organized?

General ANDERS. Six, but not all of them have full establishments; two are complete but the others will be ready soon—its only the question of the men reaching us because the skeleton regiments and the command framework are ready.

STALIN. Is that possible? What a pity that in present conditions you cannot have more than three divisions—one corps. If you manage to get help in maintenance from America it will be possible to expand.

General ANDERS. General Sikorski is flying to America. I'm sure he will do all he can to get that help.

STALIN. Deliveries of food are only possible through England. The Americans send their ships not in convoys. The Japanese sink them while the British ships sail in convoys and all arrive on schedule. I have raised this matter with Roosevelt but he never answered to my suggestions. If the British won't supply with their own means American deliveries might fail.

General ANDERS. That food I have mentioned already, the 2,000,000 rations promised by Sikorski, will arrive most certainly through Persia. I don't know the date yet. I am also sure that further deliveries will follow.

STALIN. In that case I will give you food for 40,000 men.

General ANDERS. What am I to do with the rest?

STALIN. Perhaps the rest can go to work on the kolehoz farms?

General ANDERS. That is out of the question. All Polish subjects capable of bearing arms should find themselves in the Polish Army. They know about your agreement with General Sikorski and about your promise, Mr. President. We cannot allow it because of the morale of the army. Besides, the kolehozes are also short of food and those remaining on them starve also.

STALIN. Hitherto the Polish troops had been feeding the civilian population from the rations they received. I do not think it to be wrong and I understand that the civilians must be helped somehow.

General ANDERS. I admit that this has in fact taken place; the Polish civilian population is in such a deplorable state that we have to aid her even at the cost of soldiery rations. The initiative to do so came from the soldiers themselves.

STALIN. One cannot allow to reduce soldiery rations; the more so if you receive a physically exhausted element.

General ANDERS. I have already issued orders forbidding it.

STALIN. I cannot do otherwise. You will receive 44,000 rations. This will be sufficient for three divisions and a reserve regiment. You will have plenty of time for organizing and training your army. We do not press you to go to the front. I quite understand that it will be much better to let you enter into action when we shall move closer to the Polish frontier. You should have the honor to cross it first and be the first to set foot upon Polish soil.

General ANDERS. In that case, if nothing else can be done, the rest should be transferred to Persia.

STALIN. I agree—44,000 of your soldiers will remain here and the rest will be evacuated. Can't be done otherwise. Others will say and go on saying that we cheated you. I know—not the soldiers, but, for example, your Kot says so to strangers, and others also say many unkind things about us. If it was not for the war with Japan the things we talk about now would have never arisen. We, Soviet people, have the custom of fulfilling the promises we make.

Colonel OKULICKI. And would not it be possible to supply us the food for the full establishments until we receive the food from the British? This should not last very long.

STALIN. Impossible. We haven't got the food. We cannot reduce the rations supplied to the front. The Germans have famished the country. We have now entered districts which were occupied for a long time and we absolutely cannot count on local supplies; every 1,000 tons of food is of the utmost importance to us and we, therefore, cannot give you more. I decide today, 44,000 rations.

General ANDERS. This is most painful.

STALIN. Can't be otherwise. Bielorussia, to where the war has shifted now, has been gnawed to the bone by the Germans. The army must be given everything. An army which fights cannot starve. We cannot give you more than 44,000 rations.

General ANDERS. What can be done to transfer to Persia as quickly as possible all those for whom there is no food over here. This cannot be done in the next few days. They must be fed till the time of their departure.

MOLOTOV. How many men have you got?

General ANDERS. The last figures date from March the 8th; they showed 66,000; about a 1,000 to 1,500 arrive each day, which means that we should reckon

with 80,000 today. This figure increases with every day and will increase as much in the future. At the present moment the problem of a speedy evacuation to Persia should receive top priority. A transit base should be set up in Krasnowodsk, to which I have not received yet the consent, and maybe another one in Ashabad.

STALIN. How much food can the British supply to those evacuated?

General ANDERS. To start with 27,000 rations for 7 days subject to sending that food from Pahlewi to Krasnowodsk.

STALIN. Requests to be connected by the telephone with General Chrulev. Where are you located at present? Is there no malaria there?

General ANDERS. Just now there is an epidemic of typhoid fever. Malaria, diarrhea and enteric typhus take more time to break out. Preventive measures have been applied.

STALIN. What about equipment?

(General Anders hands over a list which Stalin studies with interest. General Chrulev rings. Stalin asks him how many rations the Poles receive. After Chrulev's answer Stalin returns to the table and says:)

STALIN. We prolong the supplying of rations for full establishments till the end of March. [Takes his seat.] Which division was armed first?

General ANDERS. The fifth infantry division was equipped first, but later on we divided the arms among all the units for training purposes.

(Molotov asks Anders for the numbers of the other divisions.)

STALIN. We changed the establishments of our divisions. We increased them and we strengthened their fire capacity. Instead of 16 guns they have now 20 and 12 howitzers. We increased the numerical strength of the companies. The total establishment of a division amounts now to 12,700. What guns did you receive?

(Colonel Okulicki hands over a list of arms, type 1939.)

STALIN. Very good arms. Range up to 14 kilometers. Can be used as anti-tank guns. [He looks through the list.] Didn't the second division receive any arms?

General ANDERS. No. In spite of numerous interventions ever since General Sikorski's visit we have received nothing, even though you promised it yourself.

STALIN. Indeed, we did promise you. The second division should be armed forthwith. We produce a lot—330,000 rifles a month and even that is not enough. [He studies the list of equipment once again.] Has the third division been already formed?

General ANDERS. Yes. There are four newly formed divisions practically ready. The organization of the skeleton and commands is complete. The establishments of these divisions are not in full strength, but they grow rapidly.

STALIN. Have these divisions their numbers?

General ANDERS. Yes, from 5 to 10.

MOLOTOV. How many divisions can you have out of the 44,000 men?

General ANDERS. I can't say that. It depends on the establishments. If we take the figure Mr. President quoted just now, it will make up 3 divisions and not much will be left for the reserve regiment and supplementary units.

STALIN. It should be enough for 3 divisions and the reserve regiment. Have you got any airforce units?

General ANDERS. Yes. They are grouped all together and for quite a time now ready to be evacuated.

STALIN. You want to evacuate them?

General ANDERS. According to the agreement with General Sikorski they were to be evacuated together with seamen and 25,000 others.

STALIN. Where will the airmen go?

General ANDERS. To England where they will have favorable conditions for training.

STALIN. By southern or northern route?

General ANDERS. By the southern route through Persia. They are ready for evacuation for a long time but in spite of persistent efforts we cannot get it started.

STALIN. Do we obstruct in any way the sending of your airmen to England?

General ANDERS. I do not know for what reason permission for their evacuation has not been granted till now but it does depend from you. They could have been sent already long ago.

STALIN. Why? Did you communicate in this matter with Panfilov?

General ANDERS. Yes; several times. It even was promised but nothing happened in spite of that. Lately I have been refused permission to set up a base in Krasnowodsk.

STALIN. The airmen will be evacuated. Narkomindiel will attend to it immediately." [He makes a note in his notebook.]

MOLOTOV. It will be done.

General ANDERS. To complete the formalities quickly your authorized representative should be attached to us on the spot otherwise the whole thing will drag on once again without bringing positive results.

STALIN. You are quite right. We shall send you such a man. I think General Zhukov would be the best. Where is Zhukov?

MOLOTOV. Here in Moscow.

STALIN. I thought he was supposed to be in the South.

General ANDERS. He was with me all the time but he returned to Moscow a few days ago. He cooperates with us from the very start and he will surely do all he can to help us.

STALIN. What more do you need?

General ANDERS. First and foremost is the problem of organizing the evacuation and therefore we need the base in Krasnowodsk so as to dispatch immediately those for whom we have no rations.

STALIN. Right. This will be done. What else?

General ANDERS. The next most urgent thing to do is to send drivers and the necessary personnel to take over the trucks and equipment which are already there.

STALIN. [Makes a note.] Anything else?

General ANDERS. I shall fix the technical details of the evacuation with General Zhukov. In view of the new situation which will result I ought to be as soon as possible in London and may I therefore ask for an aircraft which would take me to Cairo and perhaps also for a personal representative of yours who would accompany me—maybe someone authorized to organize A. P.'s.

STALIN. [Makes a note.] Why do you need a Russian to go with you? They will immediately say in London that we have sent a "guardian" from the CHEKA to spy on you. That is how they look at it from over there and you may have more worries than help because of him.

General ANDERS. I'm not afraid of that and anyhow the whole question of the evacuation, maintenance, etc., must be synchronized with the British General Staff.

STALIN. [Interrupting.] All right, but I still do not see of what use would a Russian be there.

General ANDERS. Not there, but on my journey back he could be of great help in Tehran if he will be empowered to make decisions.

STALIN. [Making a note.] Yes, the evacuation through Krasnodarsk may be insufficient. We could arrange it also from Ashabad over Meshed by a land route. [He goes to the map, looks for an atlas, requests another map.] Our troops will help you in that—they know the conditions existing there. [All of a sudden]—"I doubt whether the English will give you any arms at all".

General ANDERS. They already do. [He gives to Stalin a list of the first delivery of British arms.]

STALIN. [Takes the list, studies it, makes some notes.]

MOLOTOV. This comes over through Persia.

General ANDERS. Yes, this transport is already on its way and should arrive shortly. There is also some sanitary equipment, already in Persia, placed at my disposal to establish hospitals. Apart from that there are large stocks of armament equipment in Persia for the use of the Persian Army which could be easily shifted to us if you would give your consent to it.

STALIN. [Making a note.] I do not object to that but most of what they had there were rifles of which we have already taken some. [He asks Molotov.]

MOLOTOV. Yes, a 100,000 rifles.

General ANDERS. According to the informations I have there were from 250,000 to 300,000 rifles and further to that machine guns, antitank and anti-aircraft guns. [He produces a list and wants to quote exact figures.]

STALIN. We did not take these and you may have them.

General ANDERS. All those arms are for German ammunition. You must also have captured a lot of German arms. Our soldiers are very well acquainted with such arms; they can be, therefore, temporarily used for training until the British arms arrive.

STALIN. [Making a note.] This is quite possible. [After a short silence he suddenly says:] A lot of Poles act as interpreters attached to German staffs.

General ANDERS. Every community and every nation has a certain number of worthless individuals. You have them also among you. [Stalin nods.] But no

conclusion should be drawn from this fact. We have a way of dealing with such people. [Stalin nods. A map is brought. Stalin studies it. All gather around him.]

STALIN. There is a route along the coast of the Caspian Sea which could be also used. [He points it out on the map.]

General ANDERS. I do not know this route, I only know about the one running through Meshed. [They return to their seats.] I would like to be in London in the first days of April, to be there when Sikorski returns from Washington. The matter is urgent.

STALIN. You want a plane for Cairo. [Makes a note] You'll get it. Is that all?

General ANDERS. Please return to the Polish Army all Poles from the labor battalions and from the Red Army in accordance with your promise, Mr. President.

STALIN. We can return them but they must be fed and you haven't the food for it.

General ANDERS. There's plenty of excellent, young, soldiery element among them. I'll retain the strongest within the frames of the 44,000 and I will evacuate the rest.

STALIN. [Makes a note.] All right. We will return them to you.

General ANDERS. Moreover, many of our people are still in prisons and labor camps. Only recently released prisoners are reporting all the time. So far not a single officer removed from Kozielsk, Starobielsk or Ostashkov has turned up. You certainly must have them. We have collected additional information about them. [He hands over the lists of names which are taken by Molotov.] Where can they be? We have traces which point to them being on the Kolyma River.

STALIN. I have already given all necessary orders that they are to be freed. They say they are even in Franz Joseph Land, but there is no one there. I do not know where they are. Why should we retain them? Perhaps they were in camps in territories which have been taken by the Germans and were dispersed.

Colonel OKULICKI. Impossible—we would have learned about it.

STALIN. We have detained only those Poles who were spying for the Germans. We even freed those who later on crossed over to the Germans as for example, Kozłowski.

General ANDERS. Kozłowski has been sentenced to death by a field court martial. I approved the verdict and it will be most certainly carried out, maybe even by our own men in the country.

STALIN. Where is Beck?

General ANDERS. Interned in Rumania.

STALIN. Well, the Germans will not hurt him, he is a friend of theirs. And where is Śmigły?

General ANDERS. According to informations which have reached us from the country he is in Warsaw allegedly very ill. He's got angina pectoris.

STALIN. He's hiding most surely.

General ANDERS. Of course.

STALIN. Well, Rydz-Śmigły is not a bad commander. In 1920 he did well in the Ukraine.

General ANDERS. Yes, but in this war as commander in chief he let the reins out of his hands already after a few days.

STALIN. The reason for your defeat was your lack of good intelligence service.

General ANDERS. That is not true—our intelligence was quite good, the informations were very correct but there was no one who knew how to make use of them. I was stationed before the outbreak of hostilities on the Prussian frontier and I knew in every detail what I had before me. I also knew very well about the German concentration in Slovakia.

STALIN. Well, yes. For you Poles the work of agents on German territories should not be very difficult. There are scores of Poles over there.

General ANDERS. Quite so. I, for example, was informed by the Mazurians inhabiting East Prussia.

STALIN. The Mazurians are still holding out. That is excellent.

General ANDERS. Yes, they still hold on and they will do so most certainly till the end. There is one more thing which General Sikorski instructed me to repeat to you, Mr. President, namely that enormous stocks of winter clothing which had been collected at the fall of winter all over the Reich, were burnt to the ground in Poznan. This should be a serious contribution to the cause of victory.

STALIN. That's not bad.

General ANDERS. General Sikorski was supposed to fly on the 15th of March to Washington; he requests from Churchill and Roosevelt the launching of a major operation on the western front. He claims that the formation of one division in 1942 is worth more than the raising of three in 1943. Everything on our part does prove of our friendly attitude towards the U. S. S. R.

STALIN. Hitler is a confirmed enemy of the Slavs. He's afraid of the Slavs. [Quite suddenly and casually.] Our airman Lewoniewski, a hero of the U. S. S. R., a magnificent character, obstinately and against advice pursued his aim. When he was killed we sent money to his mother. We would like to raise a monument to his memory in his birthplace.

Colonel OKULICKI. His brother, a very good airman of ours also got killed.

STALIN. Yes, I know about it.

General ANDERS. Hitherto the cavalry was the most important of arms. Especially our hussars who today have passed on their wings to the air force, and their armor to the tanks. But the spirit of the cavalymen has remained. The Slavs are especially talented for the air force. Your airmen, for example, are magnificent and our pilots hold first place in Great Britain.

STALIN. Yes, you are right. Everywhere the cavalry has a gallant spirit. Have you any other problems?

Colonel OKULICKI. There is very little time left for the evacuation. It would be best to direct it through the base in Krasnowodsk, but instructions should be dispatched forthwith otherwise the whole thing may be postponed and the food will come to an end on the 31st of March.

STALIN. Quite right. We must speed it up. I shall issue the appropriate orders.

General ANDERS. So as not to take up your time, Mr. President, I shall discuss the technical details with General Panfilov, if you empower him to deal with these matters.

STALIN. All right. Let Panfilov handle them.

General ANDERS. Will you allow me, Mr. President, to recapitulate our conversation. [Stalin nods his approval.] We can then rely that the whole surplus for whom there is no food will be quickly evacuated onto Persian territory.

STALIN. Yes.

General ANDERS. In connection with the evacuation and the reduced 44,000-strong army the recruitment will not be stopped and Poles from the labor battalions and from the Red Army will be released and directed to the Polish Army.

STALIN. Yes.

General ANDERS. We can count on the armament lying now on Persian territory. You have no objections to that. Can I announce that to General Sikorski and to the British?

STALIN. Yes; I have no objections.

General ANDERS. In connection with my journey to London I can count on a Soviet aircraft to take me there and back to Cairo?

STALIN. Yes; I will order that an aircraft be given to you but I am not going to send anyone with you; there are people among you who do not trust us—they would say that the Cheka is sending a supervisor.

General ANDERS. I am not concerned with the opinion of fools of whom there are plenty everywhere. Positive work is important. I thought that your representative might be of help in Tehran.

STALIN. There are not only average stupid people among yours who think so; lately the chairman of your National Council, Grabski wrote a very unpleasant article about us.

Colonel OKULICKI. Today, our hopes about forming here the strongest possible army which would fight its way through by the shortest route to Poland have been shattered.

STALIN. It's hard—but it can't be otherwise. If it was not for the Japanese, you could have done it—we keep our promises. Things have changed through no fault of ours.

General ANDERS. We want our thrust to be a strong one. Only then will it bear full fruit, not only among our soldiers but, most of all, in the country itself. Maybe it will be possible to organize part of them on Persian territory who, later on, together with those who will remain in the U. S. S. R., would go to the front.

STALIN. (Nods approvingly.) Then you will get rations same as all our front-line divisions do.

General ANDERS. We want to be the first to enter upon Polish soil; we know that that is our duty toward our country and that our brethren over there await us with impatience. At the present moment, following the decision you have

taken, Mr. President, the most important thing is the evacuation which should start as quickly as possible.

STALIN. Yes, indeed. I shall issue instructions to check the conditions of the rail and sea transport involved and the military conditions, after which I shall issue the appropriate orders. When will you fly off?

General ANDERS. I don't think I can manage tomorrow, I must talk things over with Panfilov, but I would like to start the day after tomorrow. I think that that is about all. (Stalin gets up and bids farewell. He shakes hands several times with the Polish C in c. Molotov also bids them farewell very warmly.)

STALIN. I wish you luck. (To a military bow he waves his hand in a friendly way.)

End of conversation at 7 p. m. The pace of the conversation very brisk, the whole atmosphere—friendly.

OKULICKI,
Colonel, Recorder.

Mr. FLOOD. Did you have any subsequent dealings with Stalin in which this particular subject was discussed?

General ANDERS. No. I did not have any further or subsequent conferences with Stalin, but the results of this conference with Stalin started the movement of the first evacuation of my troops from Russia into the Middle East.

Mr. FLOOD. Then, as I understand the situation at this point, General, you have now evacuated your troops out of Russia—a certain number of them—into Iraq, and ultimately into the Middle East, and eventually with the famous Second Corps under your command into combat in Italy. Now during all that period of time between the date of the last conversation you had with Stalin, and until you heard of the Katyn massacre as disclosed by the Germans, you continued your efforts in every way possible to find the missing officers?

General ANDERS. Yes. At this conference we decided on the first evacuation. I remained further in Russia, but the Russians at that time had completely cut off the flow of new people to our headquarters, to our camps. I had thousands of people who had already starved to death; there was no medicine; they did not give us any arms. We were in an impossible situation. Then I continued my efforts to evacuate my entire forces, and I received a message from the Russian Government—I do not have it here, but I do have the original—

Mr. FLOOD. Just a moment. What did that communication say?

General ANDERS. That the Russian Government, in deference to the efforts of General Anders, agrees to permit the evacuation of all the Poles to the Middle East.

Mr. FLOOD. And will you provide the committee, General, with a photostatic copy of that Russian communication to be inserted at this time in the record as exhibit No. 53?

General ANDERS. Yes.

EXHIBIT 53

SECRET

SECRET 2035 / 1224

SECRET. [Illegible text]

[Illegible text]

[Illegible text]



W. Murray

441

G. 1942

[Translation from Russian]

For Immediate Delivery

From Moscow No. 2651/1224.

Rush. Governmental. Yngi-yul to the Commander of the Polish Army in the USSR, Lt. Gen. Anders.

The Government of the USSR agrees to grant the petition of the Commander of the Polish Army in the USSR, Lt. Gen. Anders, concerning the evacuation of the Polish units from the USSR to the Middle East Theater of Operations, and does not intend to set up any obstacles whatsoever to the immediate carrying out of the evacuation.

COMMISSIONER OF THE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS, FOR THE AFFAIRS OF THE POLISH ARMY IN THE USSR, MAJOR OF STATE SECURITY.

CZUKOV.

The copy is correct. Deputy of the Chief Liaison Officer of the People's Commissariat of the Interior of the USSR, attached to the Polish Army.

[Stamp over the Signature makes it illegible],

Captain of State Security.

[Stamp (referred to above) of the Chief Liaison Officer of the People's Commissariat for the Interior of the USSR, attached to the Command of the Polish Army.]

Mr. MACHROWICZ. One question there, General. Do you remember who was the British liaison officer with the Polish troops at that time?

General ANDERS. Lieutenant Colonel Hulls.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And he was the one who went with your troops to the Middle East?

General ANDERS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That's all.

Mr. DONDERO. From the very time that you took charge of these officers and the army in Russia, General—from the time you began your negotiations with Stalin till this present hour—these missing Polish officers have never been heard from; is that correct?

General ANDERS. That is right.

Mr. DONDERO. None of them have ever returned alive?

General ANDERS. Not one of them.

Mr. FLOOD. Can we take you now to April of 1943, General, and ask you how you first heard of the Katyn matter?

General ANDERS. Through the Berlin radio on either the 12th or 13th April.

Mr. FLOOD. Where were you?

General ANDERS. I was in Iraq. We all listened to the broadcast.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. There is one point I want to get before we go to 1943, General. Did you at any time have any meetings with Mr. Winston Churchill regarding these Polish troops?

General ANDERS. I discussed the matter with Mr. Churchill in Moscow in 1942, some time in August.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Would it be about August 22?

General ANDERS. I do not recall the exact date.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Was it in Cairo?

General ANDERS. In Cairo, yes; I think it was at the beginning of September.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In the conversation in Cairo, did you discuss with Mr. Churchill your anxiety about the failure of these Polish officers to be returned to you?

General ANDERS. Yes, naturally.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you ask his cooperation?

General ANDERS. I asked him for assistance, not only in the case of these officers, but also in improving the conditions of all the Poles in Russia, and particularly the children.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Could you very briefly recall what Mr. Churchill's answer to you was?

General ANDERS. Actually it was indecisive. He told me that conditions are very difficult at this time—"but if the opportunity arises, why, these questions will be taken up".

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Because of the shortage of time, General, I am going to ask you a direct question: you can answer it "Yes" or "No." Do you remember Mr. Churchill saying he would be the judge himself as to what could be done, and what would be the right moment for making the approach to Stalin?

General ANDERS. That is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Referring to your conference in August 1942, with Mr. Churchill, and to save time, I am just going to refer to the statements made in your own book, General, and I want you to record whether or not these statements are correct. You state in your book that Mr. Churchill told you that the reason why the officers were not returned was probably because the Russians were averse to letting them go for fear of lies being spread around about their treatment. Do you remember that statement?

General ANDERS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That he thought it possible that the Russians were averse to letting them go for fear of the stories they might spread about their treatment?

General ANDERS. That was only part of the statement. It was part of their effort, because during 1939 and part of 1940 they had repeatedly attempted to convert these Polish officers to communism, and in some instances they succeeded—such, for example, as Berling—but in all those cases where they did not succeed in their attempt to convert them, they murdered the men because they realized they were all of them potential foes of Bolshevism.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Again referring to your own statement in the book, General, did Mr. Churchill at that time advise you not to be antagonistic to the Russians because no good could come of such action?

General ANDERS. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. FLOOD. What was your personal reaction, General, and what was the general reaction at your headquarters and among your troops and associates when you heard the German announcement from Katyn?

General ANDERS. There was not a single person in my group who did not believe and was not convinced that in this particular case the Germans for once have told the truth.

Mr. FLOOD. When you heard the Russian announcement 2 days later—as I suppose you did?

General ANDERS. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. What was your opinion then?

General ANDERS. Nobody believed it. The Russian announcement was of such a nature that it was self-evident that there was lie upon lie, and that the entire announcement lacked any logic.

Mr. FLOOD. General, because of your very distinguished career as a military leader of world repute; because of your past experience as an

officer in the Polish army in Russia; because of your many years of residence in Russia; because of your wide acquaintanceship and understanding of Russia and the Russians and the Communists and the Bolshevik section of the Communists; because of the information that you have been in a peculiar position to receive from all sources with respect to the Katyn massacre; in your opinion, as between the Germans and the Russians, who was responsible for the massacre of the Polish officers at the Katyn Forest?

General ANDERS. There is absolutely no question here. The 15,000 Polish officers from those three camps were unquestionably murdered by the Russians. We must remember that when the Russians were retreating under the heavy German advance, they absolutely did not leave any prisoners to fall into the hands of the Germans. They evacuated them through forced marches if necessary, and they shot any prisoners who could not retreat with the Russians during that advance. In many instances they murdered many prisoners in jails, in the prisons, when the Germans were advancing.

Mr. FLOOD. You are aware, General, that in the mass graves at the Katyn Forest were found only some 4,000 and so bodies?

General ANDERS. Yes, I know.

Mr. FLOOD. The records indicate that undoubtedly those were the missing Polish officers from the one camp at Kozielsk; you are aware of that?

General ANDERS. I understand that.

Mr. FLOOD. There are still thousands of missing officers from the camp at Starobielsk and Ostashkov that have not to date been accounted for, or, if they are dead, their bodies have not been discovered; you are aware of that?

General ANDERS. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Is it your opinion that the Russians have disposed of the missing Polish officers at Ostashkov and Starobielsk in some similar way to the manner in which the Russians disposed of the missing officers at Kozielsk?

General ANDERS. Yes. There is no doubt, no question, that in Russia there are many more similar Katyns.

Mr. FLOOD. I have this one final question, General: It has been suggested to the committee (and the committee is examining this possibility) that the massacre of these Polish officers at the three camps was not so much a military atrocity in time of war as it might be part of an over-all extensive conspiracy to remove the reserve officers corps and the intelligentsia and the leaders of the Polish Nation, committing what has come to be known as the crime of genocide. Do you have an opinion on that suggestion?

General ANDERS. I am deeply convinced that the murder of these 15,000 Polish soldiers is only a part of a deliberate and careful plan created over a period of many years toward the extermination of all the people who may oppose bolshevism. I am deeply convinced that what has happened at Katyn and other Katyns is the aim of the Bolsheviks throughout the world.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you have a final warning or a final message to the world, General, as a result of your opinion in this matter?

General ANDERS. I have for many years cautioned and warned the world to understand that bolshevism, whose chief aim is the

complete occupation of the world, will continue in its efforts to achieve that aim through all methods similar to Katyn.

Chairman MADDEN. General Anders, on behalf of the committee I want to thank you for coming here today and testifying. As you know, our committee has taken testimony in Washington and Chicago, and today and during this week in London. Next week we are going to Frankfurt, Germany. As you have probably been informed, General, we have issued an invitation, sometime back, to the Russian Government and to the Polish Communist Government to come before our committee and testify, and they have rejected our invitation.

I want to extend to you, and to the Polish folks here in London, our thanks for the cooperation we have received in holding our hearings this week here in London, and if there is anything further that you have to say to the committee, General, we will be glad to hear it; but if you have nothing to say further, the hearings in London will now be adjourned.

General ANDERS. I would like to say at this time, Mr. Chairman, that not only the Polish people, but the entire world should be thankful and grateful for the work being done by this committee, and particularly to you gentlemen, because this is a matter which concerns not only the Polish people, but one that concerns the whole world.

I would like to add one more observation, if I may. When I was in Italy, and the Nuremberg trials were being held, the defense attorney for Goering communicated with me. The defense attorney for Goering wrote me a letter asking me to testify in behalf of General Goering. This lawyers' name was Otto Stahmer. I replied to him that I cannot be a witness for Goering, but if the military tribunal will request my cooperation, I shall be happy to cooperate with them. I was not summoned by the international military tribunal.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. General, in the letter of Dr. Stahmer to you, he referred to the Katyn matter specifically; did he not?

General ANDERS. Yes; that is correct. He wanted me to testify as to my knowledge of Katyn, and that was the end of that. In 1949, when I published my book, which was translated into the English language, entitled "An Army in Exile," I sent a copy of this book, among others, to Mr. Jackson, who was the United States prosecutor at the Nuremberg international military tribunal; and in a letter written by himself to me, Mr. Jackson states that he has read my book, and that he never received from me my offer to appear before the military tribunal. I have here a copy of the original letter sent to me by Mr. Jackson.

Chairman MADDEN. The committee will now adjourn.

(Whereupon at 12:40 p. m. the committee was adjourned.)

APPENDIX

EXHIBIT 19

Confidential

POLISH-SOVIET
RELATIONS
1918-1943



Official Documents

Issued by the
POLISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON

By authority of the
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND




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Introductory Note

THE POLISH nation's struggle for liberation from Russian rule lasted for one hundred and twenty-six years. It ended with the Treaty of Riga, signed on March 18, 1921, between Russia and the Ukraine on the one hand, and Poland on the other. Despite Poland's victorious defence in 1920 this treaty was based on a compromise. To establish a true peace in Eastern Europe and bring about complete understanding and good neighborly relations with Soviet Russia, Poland advanced no claims during the peace negotiations that might have been difficult of acceptance by the other party, and took no advantage of the defeat of the Soviet forces on the Vistula and the Niemen in 1920.

That the Treaty of Riga was a compromise, found official expression in the preamble which reads: "Poland on the one hand, Russia and the Ukraine on the other, being desirous of putting an end to the war, and of concluding . . . a final, lasting and honorable peace based on a mutual understanding, have decided to enter into negotiations . . ."

In their speeches after the signature of the Treaty of Riga, the Chairmen of the Polish and the Russian Delegations laid great stress on the peace being a compromise peace, based on mutual understanding, and not a peace imposed by force. Mr. Jan Dabski, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Polish Delegation, said:

"By common agreement we have traced the frontiers and have decided that neither party shall interfere in the

internal affairs of the other; we have granted every privilege to national minorities; we offer the greatest possible facilities for the choice of citizenship; we have come to an understanding on many complicated questions concerning economics and the settlement of accounts; we have laid the foundations for future relations both economic and political; we have endeavored to solve all questions in a fair and just manner; we have each made concessions, not only in order to reach agreement, but to render our future relations easier."

Replying to this speech Mr. Adolf Joffe, Chairman of the Russo-Ukrainian Delegation, an experienced diplomat who had previously negotiated the treaties with the Baltic States, spoke in similar terms:

"I have already experienced the importance to any peace negotiations of the atmosphere in which they are carried on. I should like to emphasize that although international conditions changed several times during the Polish and Russo-Ukrainian Peace Conference, the atmosphere in Riga was invariably one that favored the carrying out of negotiations and rendered it easier to reach a satisfactory conclusion."

The conciliatory character of the Treaty of Riga found expression in the practical solution of a number of complicated Polish-Soviet matters, first and foremost in the way frontier and territorial problems were settled. Poland's concessions in this field went very far indeed, it being her sincere desire that the Treaty should provide a basis for good neighborly relations between Poland and Soviet Russia, and not be merely a temporary armistice to be followed in the more or less distant future by retaliatory action or another war. Throughout the world war, the independence of Poland was the principal aim of the subjugated Polish nation, which was firmly resolved to regain its independence. This was recognized by the great Powers taking

part in the war. Already in 1916, the Central Powers adopted the principle of independence for Poland, which was taken up by Prince Lvov after the fall of the Czarist régime. It found its final and most realistic expression in the thirteenth of President Wilson's Fourteen Points. At that time the Communist Party, struggling for power in the territories that formerly constituted the Russian Empire, also included in its programme the liberation of all subjugated and enslaved peoples after the world war.

On August 29, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Federal Soviet Republic, under the chairmanship of Lenin, issued a Decree annulling forever all agreements and acts concluded by the former Russian Empire with the Kingdom of Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire concerning the partitions of Poland, as being inconsistent with the principle of the self-determination of nations. This Decree, published on September 5, 1918, in No. 191 of the *Izvestia* and again on September 9 of the same year in No. 64 of the *Official Journal of Laws and Decrees* recognized the indisputable right of the Polish nation to be independent and united.

The repudiation by the Soviet Government of all the partition treaties and its formal notification to the Governments of Germany and Austria, constituted as far as Russia was concerned a legal and political return to the *status quo ante* of Polish-Russian territorial relations, that is to the frontier which existed before the first partition of Poland, in other words the frontier of 1772.

But the Polish Government never claimed this historical frontier of Poland, either during the Polish-Soviet war of 1918-1920, or in the course of the peace negotiations at Riga. Poland's territorial claims were exceedingly moderate and restricted to territories essential to safeguard her economic and strategic independence, to territories where Poles had lived for centuries in close harmony with other peoples, notably Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, Jews, Lithuanians and Tartars, amongst

whom the Poles had always formed a numerical majority. Polish culture, based on the concept of individual liberty, always predominated and still predominates in those regions and in such centres as Lwów, Wilno, Nowogródek, Krzemieniec, Pińsk.

The Eastern frontier of Poland as agreed upon in the Treaty of Riga, left to Soviet Russia 120,000 square miles of land which belonged to Poland in 1772. According to Soviet statistics 1,500,000 Poles remained on that territory, the descendants of families who had lived there for centuries as farmers or craftsmen. These Poles were deeply attached to their traditions, faith and language, and had fought for more than 100 years against the policy of russification pursued by the Czars, who spared no pains to stamp out their nationality. The number of Russians on Polish territory did not exceed 150,000; they formed an alien element composed mostly of former Czarist officials and their descendants who, after the fall of the Russian Empire, preferred to remain in Poland rather than return to their own country, although they had the right to do so.

Finally the frontiers agreed upon in the Treaty of Riga were more favorable to Russia than those proposed by the Soviet Government in their declaration of December 22, 1919 concerning peace conditions, and by the Council of People's Commissars in their declaration of January 28, 1920. The latter gave unrestricted recognition to the independence and sovereignty of Poland and formally defined an armistice line which the Soviet forces would not cross. It added: "There is not a single question, territorial, economic or other, that could not be solved in a peaceful way through negotiation, mutual compromise or agreement." However it left no doubt that the armistice line proposed by the Soviet Government was regarded by it as the future frontier between Poland and Soviet Russia.

In its North-Eastern sector this line runs from 60 to 90 miles and in its South-Eastern sector from 30 to 50 miles to the East of the frontier established by the Treaty of Riga.

That the Polish-Soviet frontier was settled in a spirit of mutual agreement and conciliation is plain from Article III of the Treaty of Riga, which reads: "Russia and the Ukraine abandon all rights and claims to the territories situated to the West of the frontier laid down by Article II of the present Treaty. Poland, on the other hand, abandons in favor of the Ukraine and White-Ruthenia all rights and claims to the territory situated to the East of this frontier . . ."

From the moment the Treaty of Riga was signed until Germany attacked Poland on September 1, 1939, no territorial claim was ever made against Poland by Soviet Russia. On the contrary, the Soviet Government repeatedly declared that the Treaty of Riga, including Article III, constituted the foundation of mutual relations between the two countries. From 1921 to 1939 those relations developed normally and were gradually extended and improved. Thus, during the years that followed the signing of the peace treaty, a number of conventions were concluded in a spirit of good neighborhood. Railway, postal, consular and passport conventions were signed, as well as a number of commercial agreements. Various other agreements of a political nature were concluded with the object of strengthening the peace ties between the two countries, and maintaining peace in Central-Eastern Europe. On February 9, 1929, a Protocol was signed repudiating war as an instrument of national policy; on July 25, 1932, a Pact of Non-Aggression; on July 3, 1933, a Convention for the Definition of Aggression; on May 5, 1934, the validity of the Pact of Non-Aggression was extended until December 31, 1945. Both the Protocol of 1929 and the Convention for the Definition of Aggression were of multilateral character and signed not only by Soviet Russia and Poland but also by Russia's other neighbors, notably by the Baltic States and Rumania. Finally, on November 26, 1938, a joint Polish-Soviet declaration was issued to the effect that relations between the two States would continue to function with the fullest respect for

all agreements and treaties concluded by both parties and that commercial relations were to be extended. On the strength of this Protocol, a commercial treaty was signed on February 19, 1939.

On September 17, 1939, while the Poles were resisting the overwhelming onslaught of the German army, the Government of the U.S.S.R. unexpectedly declared that the Polish State had ceased to exist and, without declaring war on Poland, ordered the Soviet army to enter Polish territory, on the pretext of taking "under their protection the lives and property" of the Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian population. A deliberate violation of the Polish-Russian Pact of Non-Aggression.*

One result of the joint Soviet-German action against Poland was the treaty concluded on September 28, 1939 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the German Reich in which both contracting Parties implied that the Polish State was non-existent, by using the expression "former Polish State." They partitioned Poland's territory, recognized as final the frontiers drawn by them to suit their mutual interests, and declared that they would resist any interference by other Powers.

In a communiqué issued in Kutu, on Polish territory, on September 17, 1939, the Polish Government solemnly protested against the unilateral violation by Soviet Russia of the non-aggression Pact, against the entry of Soviet troops into Polish territory and against the motives advanced by the Soviet Government to justify its action. Subsequently similar protests were made by the Polish Government, forced to leave Polish terri-

* There is a striking analogy between the arguments employed by Catherine the Great who justified the partition of Poland in the XVIIIth century as necessary for the protection of followers of the Greek-Orthodox Church in Poland, and those employed by the Soviet Government which, although it condemned in 1918 the criminal policy of the Czarist governments regarding Poland and annulled the partitioning treaties, 21 years later endeavored to justify its action against Poland in the eyes of the world by putting forward a pretext similar to that used by the Empress of Russia.

tory by the advance of the Soviet forces, against the Soviet-German agreement of September 28, 1939; the cession of Polish territory to Lithuania by an agreement signed on October 10, 1939; and against various Soviet regulations introduced in occupied Poland for a census of the population, the forcing of Soviet citizenship on Polish citizens, elections to so-called national assemblies, conscription of Polish citizens for service in the Soviet army, all flagrant breaches of the general principles of international law, and specifically of the provisions of the IVth Hague Convention of 1907.

The Soviet Government must have been aware of the negative value of such an arbitrary extinction of a nation of 35,000,000 inhabitants, whose Government was fighting side by side with the Allies,—an act of violence against a nation which had a legal Government recognized by all world Powers except the Axis.

So now the Soviet Government seeks a new argument: the “freely expressed will of the people” to justify the incorporation of Polish territory in the Soviet Union. This has been extensively used in the Soviet press and set out in official notes to the Polish Government.

It is therefore necessary to throw light on the circumstances in which the people of Poland’s eastern territories occupied by the Soviet troops “expressed their free will.”

To provide an *ex-post facto* excuse and some semblance of justification in international law for the stipulations of the Soviet-German agreement, General Timoshenko, commander-in-chief on the Ukrainian front, and the members of the Soviet Military Council of the Ukraine, announced on October 6, 1939, *i.e.* eight days after the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement, “the date of elections to the National Assembly” and the “date of the convocation of the National Assembly of the Western Ukraine.”

Pressed as it was for some legal excuse to justify in the eyes of the world the partition of Polish territory by Germany and the

U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government did not at first realize that the decrees of the military authorities of occupation, being of a strictly political character, — exceeded the limits of their authority and were *ultra vires* in international law. When this was discovered, the search for a suitable legal excuse was renewed and it was finally decided to make it appear that the initiative for the elections emanated from the local population and not from the military authorities of occupation.

On October 11, 1939, *i.e.* four days after the promulgation of the "Decision of the Military Council of the Ukrainian Front on the date of elections to the National Assembly" and "the date of the convocation of the National Assembly of Western Ukraine," the official organ of the Soviet Government, *Izvestia*, published a despatch of the Soviet Press Agency Tass dated October 10. It reported that "the Temporary Administration of the City of Lwów had issued a proclamation to the people of the Western Ukraine calling upon them to elect a People's Assembly of the Western Ukraine by universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage, to decide the problem of the existence of the Western Ukraine as a State." On the following day the "Temporary Administration" of the city of Bialystok was also reported to have made exactly the same announcement to the people of Western White-Ruthenia.

Before any attempt to decide whether the proclamations of the "Temporary Administrations" of both cities, as reported by Tass, were a real expression of local public opinion, it must be stated that as soon as they had occupied Eastern Poland the Soviet authorities removed all members of the State and local government administrations from office, placed most of them under arrest and appointed so-called "temporary administrations" in their place, all in violation of the Hague Conventions. Contemporaneous reports published in the Soviet press show that these "temporary administrations" were in the majority composed of Red Army officers appointed by the military authorities, of

Soviet officials accompanied for the sake of appearances by so-called "representatives of the local working class,"—not selected by that class but appointed by the Soviet military authorities.

The Soviets were also well represented on the two committees set up in Lwów and Białystok "for the organisation and conduct of the elections." According to a Tass communiqué, these committees approached the Presidiums of the Supreme Councils of the Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republics with a request for delegates to these bodies. In response the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic sent as its representatives to the Lwów committee M. S. Gretchuha, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and A. E. Korneychuk, then member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, later appointed Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and in February, 1944, appointed Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the White-Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republic was represented on the Białystok committee by N. J. Natalevitsh—chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the White-Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republic, N. G. Grekhova, chairman of the Supreme Council of the White-Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republic, and L. P. Pankov.

In the "Election Procedure" published on October 7, with no indication whatever of the authority responsible for its issue, the date of the election was fixed as October 22. Thus the whole election procedure, *i.e.*: the compilation of a list of voters in a war-torn country where part of the population had been mobilized and large-scale migrations had taken place,—the checking of this list and dealing with complaints of persons not included as voters, the organization of 11,967 electoral zones and 2,424 constituencies, the choice of candidates, the printing of election ballots, etc., etc.—was all accomplished in a fortnight, while in

peacetime any European country, where the political organization already exists, normally requires from six to eight weeks to prepare for an election. Yet despite the short time available, 96.71% of the total electorate was said by the Soviets to have voted in the election to the Assembly in Lwów, and 92.83% to the Assembly in Bialystok.

According also to Soviet sources, a total of 2,411 persons were elected to the two Assemblies, votes from thirteen constituencies not having been returned. As the number of candidates equalled the number of persons to be elected, the voter had no choice between several candidates and was obliged to vote for a single candidate officially accepted by the election committee.

Furthermore the names of all the persons elected were never made public by the Soviet authorities, so it has been impossible to ascertain how many of the "local citizens" elected were Polish and how many were Soviet citizens.

Despite the physical impossibility of compiling electoral lists in two weeks, the Polish Government is in possession of proof that Soviet citizens organized the elections, sat on all election committees and voted in the election. As a matter of fact Soviet citizens were actually elected to the National Assemblies in Lwów and Bialystok, as reported by the Soviet press.

On October 15, 1939, No. 286 of *Pravda* reported that among candidates for the National Assembly of Western White-Ruthenia were the following: Ponomarenko, a member of the Military Council of the White-Ruthenian Front, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of White-Ruthenia; General Kovalev, C.-in-C. on the White-Ruthenian front, and Gaysin, chairman of the Temporary Administration of Bialystok. The same paper on October 19, 1939, announced that in constituency No. IV, that is in Krzemieniec, the following were candidates to the Lwów Assembly: V. Molotov, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and

K. Voroshilov, Marshal of the U.S.S.R. A Tass dispatch published on October 16, 1939, in the *Soviet Voice* reported that in a Grodno constituency, one of the candidates to the Bialystok Assembly was a woman, N. G. Grekhova, chairman of the Supreme Council of the White-Ruthenian S.S.R., and, as has already been said, delegate of White-Ruthenia to the Election Committee.

The above facts, emanating from Soviet sources, show the conditions under which the elections to the Lwów and Bialystok National Assemblies took place. They were carried out under the eyes of 700,000 Soviet troops who—as the Soviet press pointed out—took an active part in canvassing voters. Disregarding the illegality of this procedure in the light of international law, and in particular the flagrant violation of the IVth Hague Convention of 1907, this is further proof that these elections were not “a free expression of the will of the people” as the Soviet Government would have public opinion believe. For these reasons the resolutions for the incorporation of the Eastern Polish territories in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as passed by the National Assemblies in Lwów on October 27, and in Bialystok on October 29, are null and void.

Since Germany's attack upon the Soviet Union in June, 1941, Soviet politicians and the Soviet press have frequently pointed out that the entry of Soviet troops into Polish territory on September 17, 1939 was an act of self-defence on the part of the Soviet Government, since it resulted in the German army establishing positions at a fairly considerable distance from the Soviet frontiers. Thus a sort of foreground was created for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which it was alleged would greatly facilitate fighting conditions for its troops, who would now be operating outside their own territory. This “foreground” thesis ultimately gave birth to the claim that to eliminate any danger from the West the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics must possess strategic frontiers and that such “security frontiers”

should follow a line considerably west of the Polish-Soviet frontier agreed upon in the Treaty of Riga.

These "foreground" and "strategic frontier" theories, intended to guarantee the security of the Soviet Union, were disproved entirely by the Russo-German campaign. Although very substantial Soviet forces and vast quantities of war material were massed in the occupied Polish territories, Soviet resistance in this area lasted but a few days and the Soviet army sustained serious losses in killed and prisoners.

When the Germans attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the initiative for the re-establishment of relations came from the Polish Government on whose behalf the Prime Minister, General Sikorski, declared in a speech on June 23, that the Polish Government and nation were ready to forget the recent past and the injuries inflicted by the Soviets on Poland when the latter was engaged in a deadly struggle with the German armies. By this conciliatory move Poland contributed to the establishment and maintenance of a common front of all the nations united in the struggle against Germany, and thus helped to frustrate German efforts to represent the Soviet-German war as a war in defence of European culture and civilization threatened by communism.

The Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, concluded in London through the good offices of the British Government, restored diplomatic relations between Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which had been broken off by the Soviets when their forces entered Polish territory on September 17, 1939.

Even before this Agreement between Poland and the U.S.S.R. was signed and political as well as military collaboration established, Soviet forces were hurriedly evacuating the Eastern territories of Poland under pressure of the German onslaught. The Polish-Soviet Agreement provided for friendly collaboration of the two States during the war, and for their political rela-

tions after the war. The Soviet Government recognized the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 concerning the partition of Poland as having lost their validity; the two Governments mutually agreed to render one another aid and support of all kind in the war, and furthermore the Soviet Government

- 1) undertook to release from prison and labor camps all Polish citizens, military and civilian,
- 2) agreed to the formation of a Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R.

As virtually the whole of Polish territory was in German hands when the Treaty was signed, the only stipulations of the Agreement that could be put into effect were (a) those affecting the masses of Polish citizens deported from Poland to the U.S.S.R., Polish prisoners of war and such Polish citizens as had been conscripted for service in the Red Army during the occupation; and (b) the formation of a Polish Army in Russia.

The Polish Government attached the greatest importance to a satisfactory settlement of these matters, to which the Prime Minister, General Sikorski, gave special prominence in the negotiations preceding the signature of the Agreement of July 30, 1941. The Polish Government also showed the utmost good will in facilitating the execution by the Soviet Government of the obligations it had undertaken. In spite of the war, the Soviet Government had it within its power to fulfill its obligations if it had sincerely desired to do so.

* * *

The present publication is divided into two parts. The first contains six chapters dealing in detail with various aspects of Polish-Soviet relations after September 17, 1939. The second part comprises official documents, many of which have never yet been published, arranged in eleven chapters and covering all issues of importance that have arisen between Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the quarter of a century from 1918 to 1943.

Part I

CHAPTER I

Mass Deportations from Poland by the Soviet Authorities

Soviet Forces entered Polish territory on September 17, 1939, and soon afterwards a Soviet administration was set up in the occupied districts. Its first and perhaps most important object was to deprive of their freedom such Polish citizens as the Soviet authorities looked upon with suspicion. A considerable number of persons were arrested during the first weeks, especially just before the elections to the so-called "National Assemblies" in Lwów and Bialystok, which took place on October 22, 1939. Those arrested were principally social workers and politicians of all shades of opinion, including the Left; civil servants and local-government officials, especially judges, attorneys and policemen; university professors, priests, businessmen and farmers. Relatively few of them were deported at once, except members of the Polish armed forces, demobilized officers, non-commissioned officers and other ranks. In this initial period deportation occurred in the form of the forced recruiting of more than 30,000 men of the working class who were sent to the industrial establishments and mines in the Donetz Basin.

Mass-deportation of Polish citizens began on the night of February 8, 1940, and continued until the Autumn of that year.

It involved both the urban and rural population throughout the entire area occupied by the Soviets. In February, farm settlers, private and state forestry employees and members of the police force were chiefly affected. Not only men but also their wives and children were deported. The Polish Government is in possession of proof that during February 1940 alone, 70,000 persons from the three provinces of South-Eastern Poland and 30,000 persons from the province of Wilno were deported to Russia.

From some villages all the inhabitants without exception were deported, whether Poles or Ukrainians. This occurred for instance in Strzalkowice, Biskupice, Wojszyce and Nadyma in the district of Sambor, Grzymalów and on the Rumanian border. Persons already imprisoned were deported as well as social workers, judges, public prosecutors, and local-government officials, who had so far been left at liberty. Between March 4 and March 6 there passed through the station of Baranowicze alone ten train-loads of these unhappy beings, torn from their homes and hearths to face an unknown and tragic future.

Again in April, the Soviet authorities organized mass-deportations from the entire territory. On this occasion the principal victims were families of persons who had gone abroad or were missing, of Polish prisoners of war in Germany and of soldiers, policemen, officers, workers, members of the educated classes, farmers and tradesmen previously imprisoned or deported. Former deportations had mainly affected Poles, but this time a number of Jews, Ukrainians and White-Ruthenians were also included. Although inhabitants of the towns were principally affected, the rural population was also involved in the persons of small farmers and laborers from confiscated estates. From Lwów and its neighborhood some 30,000 were deported, from Drohobycz 5,000, from Boryslaw 2,000, from Stanisławów 4,000. Large numbers were also deported from the city of Pinsk, from the whole of Polesie and from the district of Braslaw. Seven hundred families were deported from

Lida. In addition to the mass-deportations carried out in April, the Soviet authorities continued to arrest large numbers of the inhabitants of the territories under their occupation. In Lwów alone, some 25,000 persons were arrested in four days, from April 12 to April 15.

In May, the number of deportations was smaller than in the preceding months, and affected the North-Eastern regions, in particular the Bialystok, Lida and Grodno districts. Besides Poles and Jews, considerable numbers of White-Ruthenians were deported. During this period 250 high school boys were deported without their families from Drohobycz in the South-East.

In June and July 1940, a fresh wave of large-scale deportations took place throughout the entire territory under Soviet occupation. In addition to permanent residents, war refugees from other parts of Poland, who had sought shelter in the Eastern provinces, were also taken. The Soviet authorities had already carried out a registration of these persons and now deported 85,000 of them from Lwów and its neighborhood, other thousands from Volhynia and, following its reoccupation by the Soviet armies, further thousands from the city and district of Wilno. Here a very considerable number of small merchants, professional men and women, intellectuals and teachers were deported.

The fourth and last wave of deportations occurred just before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war. It affected chiefly political prisoners and what social workers and educated persons had remained free, as well as children from summer camps and orphanages. Many train-loads of deportees left Wilno, Bialystok, Lomza, Czortków, Lwów and other stations throughout the entire occupied area. Eight hundred prisoners were driven on foot from Wilejka to Borysów. When so exhausted that they could no longer walk, they were shot by the Soviet military escort. Three hundred of them thus met their death.

To sum up, persons affected by the four mass-deportations may be classified as follows:

I. February 1940: From towns: civil servants, local government officials, judges, members of the police force; from the country: the forestry service, settlers and small farmers—Polish, Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian (several entire villages were thus bereft of their population).

II. April 1940: Families of persons previously arrested, families of those who had gone abroad or were missing, tradesmen (mostly Jews), farm laborers from confiscated estates and more small farmers of the three nationalities.

III. June 1940: Virtually all Polish citizens from Central and Western Poland who had sought refuge in Eastern Poland from the horrors of the German invasion; mostly Jews, small merchants, professional men and women, intellectuals, teachers, etc.

IV. June 1941: All of the above mentioned groups who had so far evaded deportation; prisoners; children from summer camps and orphanages.

Deportations ceased with the German attack on the Soviet Union, but that further deportations on a vast scale were contemplated is apparent from an article in the Russian daily *Sovietskaya Ukraina* No. 69 of March 23, 1941, which stated that the plan for deporting agricultural laborers from South-Eastern Poland to the interior of the Soviet Union would be carried out on a larger scale in 1941 than in 1940. Deportations were planned to the districts of Khabarovsk, Altay, Chelabinsk, Novosibirsk and Omsk in Siberia, and to the Yakut, Kirghiz and Kazakh Republics.

It is thus evident that deportation plans for 1941 had been carefully prepared. They were only frustrated by the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, and not by any change in the policy of the Soviet authorities towards the population of the occupied territories.

It is difficult to estimate the total number of people deported, but it undoubtedly exceeded 1,000,000, or more than 7 or 8% of the total population of that part of Poland occupied by the Soviet armies. Of those deported 50% were Poles. Deportation figures for the various Polish regions are estimated approximately:

- 1) from the provinces of Bialystok, Lida, Grodno and Wilno, more than 300,000 persons;
- 2) from Polesie and the province of Nowogródek, more than 200,000 persons;
- 3) from Volhynia, about 150,000 persons;
- 4) from South-Eastern Poland, about 400,000 persons.

Deportations were carried out under extremely drastic conditions. The victims were rounded up at night and allowed only one hour to collect such baggage as they could carry themselves. Transportation was usually in unheated freight cars crowded without regard to the number they could reasonably accommodate. In these circumstances many of the weak and ailing, especially children, died in the cars of exposure and starvation. Their bodies were removed from time to time by Soviet guards, either while the trains were standing in stations, or were simply thrown out on to the track, en route. When at long last the deportees reached their destination, some were placed in prisons, others in labor camps, the remainder in settlements that afforded them neither shelter nor work, or else on collective farms (kolkhozes) where they were housed in abandoned cabins with no stoves, no windows and no floors, or simply in sheds or stables, and compelled to labor long hours in return for most inadequate food. These people, torn from their homes, insufficiently clad, unaccustomed to the severe Russian climate, and forced to perform heavy work irrespective of their qualifications or education — died in vast numbers. The Polish Government has proof that the death-rate among the deportees and in particular among the children and the young amounted to at least 20%.

CHAPTER 2

Release of Polish Deportees in the U.S.S.R.

By the Protocol attached to the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, the Soviet Government undertook to "grant amnesty to all Polish citizens who are at present deprived of their freedom on the territory of the U.S.S.R. either as prisoners of war or on other adequate grounds." The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics complied with this obligation by issuing a formal Amnesty Decree on August 12, 1941.

Both the international obligation contained in the above Protocol, and the Soviet Decree of August 12, 1941, were of a general and unconditional character. They granted freedom to all Polish citizens deprived of their liberty by the Soviet authorities, the only requirement for the release of any given person being that the person in question was a Polish citizen, irrespective of the reasons for which such person had been deprived of his or her freedom. The Soviet Government acknowledged the general character of the amnesty and in a conversation with the Polish Ambassador on November 14, 1941, Premier Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., declared that the amnesty granted to Polish citizens extended to all without exception.

The liberation of Polish citizens from prisons, labor camps and exile was begun at the end of August 1941. However, those who were then set free immediately drew the attention of the Polish Embassy in Moscow to the fact that the Soviet authorities were still detaining many Polish citizens in various camps and

prisons. In view of this and of the necessity to set up a suitable relief organization, the Polish Embassy asked the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs early in September 1941, to furnish a list of all Polish citizens still detained by the Soviet authorities, and to inform the Embassy each time a person was released. This request was renewed in conversations that the Polish Ambassador, Professor Kot, had with Mr. Vishinsky, the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on September 20, October 7 and October 14, 1941. Despite a definite promise that this list would be furnished and reiterated requests, although Commissar Vishinsky assured the Polish Ambassador on November 2, 1941, that the Soviet authorities possessed lists of all Polish citizens, whether dead or alive, who had been deprived of their freedom, the Polish Embassy never received any such list.

In a Note of October 13, 1941, addressed to Commissar Vishinsky, the Polish Ambassador pointed out that Polish citizens, a list of whom was appended to the Note, were not being set free from the camps and prisons. Speaking to Commissar Vishinsky on November 12, 1941, Ambassador Kot returned to this subject and again received the reply that if for technical reasons certain persons could not be immediately located it might be advisable for the Embassy to supply lists of missing persons to be located and set free in the first instance. Such lists, containing the names of hundreds of prominent scientists, politicians, civil servants, judges and lawyers, priests and rabbis, social workers, artists, writers, journalists, whom the Polish authorities knew had been deported to the Soviet Union — were presented in vain to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on various occasions in September, October and November, 1941.

As the Polish Embassy in Moscow was never given this information concerning citizens detained or liberated, it was compelled to undertake the difficult task of collecting from those already released information about Polish citizens still deprived

of their freedom. On the basis of data thus obtained the Polish Embassy sent several Notes to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, giving the surnames and christian names of Polish citizens still under detention, the names of the camps or prisons in which they were detained and in some cases even the exact cell or hut within the prison or camp itself. During the first six months of 1942, the Polish Embassy intervened in this way in respect of 4,514 Polish citizens, but received replies in respect of only 1,547 persons, of whom, according to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, 1,026 had already been set at liberty, although the date and place of their release were not indicated; 196 could not be traced and 325 were still detained. This last group included 286 Polish citizens mostly with Jewish names, whom the Soviet authorities claimed as their own citizens, refusing to acknowledge the Polish Embassy's right to intervene on their behalf.

Including interventions in individual cases in 1941, the Embassy approached the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in respect of 5,500 Polish civilians still detained. This figure does not include any of the 8,000 officers taken by the Soviet authorities in the Spring of 1940 to an unknown destination from the prisoners of war camps in Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov. The Embassy knew the names of 65 camps and prisons on Soviet territory, besides groups of camps and centres where Polish citizens were still detained. At a most conservative estimate, the number of Polish citizens deprived of their freedom and known to the Polish authorities by name, did not exceed 5% of the total number of Polish citizens detained.

The Soviet Government's unwillingness to execute the provisions of the Protocol attached to the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and of the Amnesty Decree, found expression as early as November 8, 1941, in a note in which Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, informed the Polish Government that all Polish citizens who had been detained by the

Soviet authorities as prisoners of war or on other adequate grounds had now been released in conformity with the Amnesty Decree. However, in later notes, sent in reply to Polish Embassy interventions, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs announced the liberation of a further number of Polish citizens in November and December 1941, and in January, February and March, 1942. Thus, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs officially disproved the statement contained in Mr. Molotov's Note of November 8, 1941.

However, even as late as 1943, Polish citizens are known to have been released from prisons and camps. The Polish Government has indisputable proof of this in the form of certificates issued by the Soviet authorities to the persons released.

Having failed to reach an understanding on the subject of a quicker and more complete execution by the Soviet authorities of the Protocol attached to the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and of the Amnesty Decree of August 12, 1941, the Polish Embassy on May 19, 1942, summarized the results of its interventions in a Memorandum presented to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, emphasizing the failure of the Soviet Government to carry out their obligations in this matter. Besides arguments of a general nature, the Memorandum referred by name to 39 representatives of Polish learning and culture, 36 former senators, members of the Diet and prominent local government officials, and 84 high officials of the civil service and of the judiciary—who had not been set free by the Soviet authorities, and about whom these authorities had failed to supply any information whatever. The reply of the Soviet authorities, received on July 10, 1942, was purely formal and did not give the problem the attention it deserved. It threw no light upon the fate of any of those whose release the Polish authorities had so frequently demanded. In this memorandum of July 10, the Soviet authorities for the first time referred to the death in Soviet prisons and camps of some of the persons the Embassy was endeavoring to locate.

CHAPTER 3

Polish Army in the U.S.S.R.

When the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, was signed and after the conclusion of the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, the Polish Government hoped to form in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a Polish Army of about 300,000 men.

This was based on the following facts:

1) According to figures published in the newspaper *Red Star* on September 17, 1940, there were 181,000 Polish soldiers in Soviet prisoner-of-war camps, including 12 generals, 58 colonels, 72 lieutenant-colonels, 5,131 regular officers and 4,096 reserve officers.

2) About 100,000 Polish citizens of the 1917, 1918 and 1919 classes, conscripted for the Red Army by the Soviet Government in the Spring of 1941, were serving with the Soviet Forces.

3) The Military Agreement provided not only for voluntary enlistment in the Polish Army, but also for conscription of Polish citizens deported to the U.S.S.R. This was to be carried out by Polish draft boards with the participation of Soviet authorities (Article 6 of the Military Agreement) and the numerical strength of the Polish Army was to depend solely on the manpower and supplies available (Article 4 of the Military Agreement).

When in August, 1941, the Soviet authorities began to discharge Polish officers and other ranks from prisoner-of-war camps, these men reported en masse to the Polish Army, then in the process of formation. The influx of volunteers, despite transport difficulties due to the vast distances in the U.S.S.R. and to the war, was so great, that before the end of October 1941 the number of officers and other ranks exceeded 46,000. Nevertheless as early as November 6, Major General Panfilov, in the name of the Supreme Command of the Red Army, informed General Wladyslaw Anders, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the Soviet Government contemplated the supply of equipment and food rations for only 30,000 men, and that therefore all soldiers in excess of that number must be discharged. An identical declaration was presented to Ambassador Kot by Commissar Molotov.

Although Premier Stalin told Ambassador Kot on November 14, 1941, that the Soviet Military Authorities had no right to take such a decision, it remains an indisputable fact that the Polish Army in process of formation received a severe blow by the reduction of its food rations, which not only forced the Polish Military Authorities to stop voluntary enlistment for the time being, but also to discharge 16,000 men from the ranks of the Army.

It would have seemed that the problem of the numerical strength of the Polish Army was finally and definitely settled at the time of General Sikorski's visit to Moscow, in December 1941. In the course of the conversation he had with Premier Stalin, the strength of the Polish Army to be formed on Soviet territory was established at 6 divisions, each of 11,000 men, with a reserve of 30,000 men, thus bringing the total to 96,000 men. It was moreover decided that 25,000 men would be evacuated to the Middle East to reinforce Polish units fighting in Libya and that 2,000 airmen and sailors would be sent to Britain. The

total number of Polish soldiers to be recruited on Soviet territory was thus 123,000 men.

However, immediately after General Sikorski's visit the organization of the Polish Army encountered new and unforeseen obstacles. The Soviet authorities adopted the attitude that Polish citizens of Ukrainian, White-Ruthenian and Jewish origin from the Eastern half of Poland occupied by the Soviets in 1939, were not Polish but Soviet citizens, and that only persons of Polish origin could, by way of exception, be regarded by the Soviet authorities as Polish citizens. This attitude of the Soviet authorities restricted both the number of volunteers for the Polish Army and the number of persons subject to conscription. Moreover several weeks later the Soviet authorities acted inconsistently with the principle of Article 6 of the Military Agreement by setting up, in certain districts, recruiting boards composed of Soviet members only, excluding the Polish military authorities—although Article 6 laid down that the Soviet authorities were merely to “participate” in these recruiting boards. This move provided unlimited opportunities to prevent the recruiting of Polish citizens even of Polish origin for the Army on various pretexts, as for instance physical unfitness.

Moreover, according to the Polish Government's information, many Polish citizens were called up for “work behind the lines” and placed in so-called Labor Battalions.

In the Spring of 1941 the Soviet authorities had conscripted for the Red Army the 1917, 1918 and 1919 classes of men on the territory of the Republic of Poland. These men were taken to the interior of the U.S.S.R. From the population of the Polish territories occupied by the Soviet armies, it may be assumed that these conscripts numbered more than 100,000 men. In August and September 1941, part of the Polish citizens recruited on Polish territory were discharged from the ranks of the Red Army following an order of the Soviet authorities, and transferred to these Labor Battalions.

On August 16, 1941, General Anders approached Major General Panfilov, the Representative of the Supreme Command of the Red Army, with a request that all Polish citizens conscripted by the Soviet Government for military service be transferred to the Polish Army. On August 19, General Panfilov replied to General Anders that "wishing to satisfy the Polish Command, the Command of the Red Army is complying with its request for a voluntary transfer to the Polish Army of Poles serving with units of the Red Army."

However, from many letters received by the Embassy it was clear that the transfer of Polish citizens from the Red Army and from Labor Battalions was never put into effect, that repressive measures were even taken against soldiers who applied for transfer on hearing that a Polish Army was being formed in the U.S.S.R.

Thus, only a limited number of men, from the conscripted classes of 1917, 1918 and 1919, managed to get themselves transferred to the Polish Army. Moreover the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of December 1, 1941, clearly stated that Polish citizens of Ukrainian, White-Ruthenian and Jewish origin, were being retained in the Labor Battalions, which already limited the numerical strength of the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Despite repeated oral and written representations by the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev on April 16 and May 4, 1942, and by the Polish military authorities on January 21, February 28 and April 13, this matter was never satisfactorily settled, although in its Note of May 14 the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs repeated its assurance that only Soviet citizens were enrolled in the Labor Battalions.

All these factors greatly limited the strength of the army in formation and moreover up to the middle of March 1942 the Soviet authorities had taken no steps to evacuate the 25,000 men

agreed upon in General Sikorski's conversation with Premier Stalin.

On March 18, 1942, Premier Stalin informed General Anders that on account of difficulties in providing supplies, the Soviet Government was obliged to limit the strength of the Polish Army to 44,000 men. This decision reduced the agreed strength of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. by 52,000 men and constituted a breach of the bilateral understanding of December 3, 1941, which fixed the strength of the Polish Army on Soviet territory at 96,000 men. As a result of this unfortunate decision the surplus over and above the 44,000 soldiers, which then amounted to 30,000, was evacuated to the Middle East with the agreement of the British Government.

Although in the course of a conference with General Anders, Premier Stalin had agreed to the continuation in the U.S.S.R. of normal recruiting for the Polish Army, it was to be feared that unless the Soviet authorities changed their attitude, the existing strength of the Polish Army could not be increased because: 1) recruiting was limited to persons of Polish origin only; 2) recruiting was carried out by the Soviet authorities alone; 3) 8,000 Polish officers were missing, and 4) on the pretext of preventing unnecessary travel, a ban had been placed on the sale of railway tickets to Polish citizens, who were thus forced to remain in their temporary residences. This prevented volunteers from reaching the Polish Army.

In view of the unsatisfactory news from the Soviet front, General Sikorski sent a message to Premier Stalin on April 9, 1942, to inform him that the Polish soldiers evacuated from the U.S.S.R. would be immediately attached to Polish units in the Middle East, and employed in the struggle against Germany in which Poland was engaged with the other Allies and the Soviet Union. General Sikorski emphasized the importance he attached to the increase of the fighting strength of the Polish forces and said that he relied on continued recruiting of Polish

citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Polish Army, and the evacuation of further surplus men to the Middle East, in view of the limitation of the numerical strength of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. to 44,000.

As the Polish Government attached the greatest importance to the organization and development of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R., it returned again and again to the problem of recruiting. Thus, independently of the above message, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs sent an Aide-Mémoire to Ambassador Bogomolov on May 1, 1942, and a Note on June 10. In addition, Ambassador Kot presented a Note to M. Molotov on May 4, 1942.

Ambassador Kot's Note began by recalling the understanding arrived at by General Sikorski and Premier Stalin on December 3 of the previous year, concerning the strength of the Polish Army, and Premier Stalin's subsequent decision, imparted to General Anders, concerning the limitation of the number of Polish soldiers in the U.S.S.R. to 44,000. This had been accompanied by Premier Stalin's assurance that recruiting for the Polish Army would be continued, that Polish citizens serving in the Red Army and in Labor Battalions would be transferred to the Polish Army, and that the surplus number of soldiers would be evacuated to the Middle East. The Note continued by stating that after the evacuation of 30,000 Polish soldiers to the Middle East recruiting had in effect stopped, that Polish feeding and registration centres had been closed, that cases of Polish citizens being conscripted to the Red Army or Labor Battalions were becoming increasingly common. The Note ended by expressing the hope that the Soviet Government would issue adequate instructions to enable recruiting for the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. to be continued and soldiers over and above the fixed contingent to be evacuated, in the interest of the war that Poland and the U.S.S.R. were waging in common against Germany.

Replying, on May 13, 1942, to General Sikorski's message asking that the recruiting and evacuation of Polish soldiers be continued, Premier Stalin said that he felt obliged to recapitulate the reasons he had given General Anders, which were that the reduction of the contingents fixed for the Polish Army resulted from the necessity to reduce supplies to units that were not taking part in the fighting. As conditions remained the same, it was not possible to make any change in the contingents fixed in March, 1942, for the Polish Army.

Mr. Molotov's reply on May 14, 1942, to Ambassador Kot's Note went much further than Premier Stalin's message. Mr. Molotov asserted that: 1) in the course of Premier Stalin's conference with General Anders the number of Polish soldiers was reduced to 44,000 and all soldiers in excess of that number were to be evacuated within a fixed period, so evacuation must now be considered to have ended; 2) further recruiting or voluntary enlistment for evacuation to the Middle East was impracticable for the same reasons that had dictated the establishment of the numerical strength of the Polish Army at 44,000; 3) Ambassador Kot's reference to a declaration Premier Stalin was said to have made during his conversation with General Anders, to the effect that the recruiting of Polish citizens would be continued and that Polish citizens serving in the Red Army and the Labor Battalions would be transferred to the Polish Army and subsequently evacuated, must have been based on a misunderstanding, as Premier Stalin had never touched upon these questions with General Anders; 4) this being the state of affairs, the Soviet Government considered further recruiting for and voluntary enlistment in the Polish Army for subsequent evacuation, purposeless—as would also be the resumption of the activities of Polish military institutions, such as feeding centres, medical centres, registration officers' posts, etc. set up in connection with recruiting for the army; 5) as regards the conscription of Polish citizens for the Red Army or Labor Battalions, the

Note asserted that only Soviet citizens were liable for service in the Red Army and in the Labor Battalions.

It is obvious from the above that the decision of the Soviet Government to curtail the strength of the Polish Army and prevent further recruiting was utterly inconsistent with the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, and the understanding reached on December 3, 1941, between General Sikorski and Premier Stalin. The stopping of voluntary and conscripted enlistment from all parts of the U.S.S.R. to the Polish Army was proof that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics wished neither the expansion of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. nor of the Polish Army in the Middle East.

On June 13, 1942, the Polish Government issued a statement to the effect that Poland was not responsible either for the failure of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. to attain the strength laid down in December 1941, or for its not being properly armed and equipped to go into action. The statement emphasized, moreover, that the Polish Government was unanimous in their desire that the Polish Army should remain in the U.S.S.R. and fight side by side with the Red Army.

However, several weeks later without consulting the Polish Government the Soviet Government decided to evacuate from the U.S.S.R. the remainder of the Polish Army, which then numbered 42,000 men. The Soviet Government informed the British Government of this decision and the latter notified the Polish Government of the Soviet move on July 2. Taken unawares by this entirely unexpected decision, the Polish Government, in cooperation with the British Government, evacuated its remaining troops to the Middle East.

Before the remainder of the Polish Army left the U.S.S.R., General Anders was instructed by the Polish Government to insist that a recruiting staff be left on Soviet territory to continue the enlistment of Polish citizens for the Polish Army.

The Soviet authorities refused General Anders' request because, they asserted, the Polish Government not having found it possible to employ the Polish divisions formed in the U.S.S.R. on the Soviet-German front, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could not permit the recruiting or formation of any Polish units whatever in the U.S.S.R. Thus recruiting for the Polish Army was *de facto* stopped by the Soviet authorities in March 1942, though this was not officially confirmed by Mr. Molotov in his Note of May 14, 1942, to Ambassador Kot.

The evacuation of the Polish Army from the U.S.S.R. was entirely and exclusively initiated by the Soviet Government. The assertion that the Polish Army was unwilling to fight side by side with the Soviet Army was without the slightest foundation. The Soviet Government was not only informed of the importance attached by the Polish Government to the formation of a Polish Army on Soviet territory, but was told that the Polish Army would fight side by side with the Red Army on U.S.S.R. territory against the German forces. This was expressly stated in the Declaration made by General Sikorski and Premier Stalin on December 4, 1941, which established the principle of cooperation between the Polish Army and the Red Army, and in frequent public declarations by General Sikorski.

Moreover the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs stated in his Note of June 10, 1942, addressed to Ambassador Bogomolov, that "it is possible that the Polish Army formed in the Near East may, after it is equipped and trained, also be used on the front of the U.S.S.R. in case the military situation should so require." That is why the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his Note of August 27, 1942, to Ambassador Bogomolov, declared that the Polish Government considered the allegation made to General Anders that the Polish Army declined to fight side by side with the Soviet Army as entirely unfounded and inconsistent with the true state of affairs, and that they could not take into cognizance

the motives alleged for the refusal to allow further recruiting for the Polish Army.

Replying to this Note on October 31, Ambassador Bogomolov admitted that the organization of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. had encountered a number of difficulties and that the initiative to reduce the strength of the Polish Army had come from the Soviet Government; at the same time he accused the Polish High Command of showing no desire whatever to send any units of the army to the Soviet-German front, and of continuing to keep all units far behind the lines. In the same Note Ambassador Bogomolov stated that "the Soviet Government did not consider it possible to press the Polish Command in this matter but . . . in February 1942, the Soviet Government enquired when the Polish formations would begin to fight against the Hitlerites. Mention was then made of the 5th Division which had completed its training."

These passages from Ambassador Bogomolov's Note might justify the supposition that the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R., particularly its 5th Division, was fully trained and equipped, and that fully armed units were kept far behind the lines because the Polish Government or the Polish High Command did not wish to use them on the Russian front.

Ambassador Bogomolov's statement concerning the equipment and training of the Polish Army or any one of its divisions in the U.S.S.R. was contrary to the true state of affairs. In the Note that the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in London on December 18, 1942, detailed information was given as to the equipment of the Polish Army. In this Note the Minister of Foreign Affairs recalled that uniforms for the army were sent from Great Britain shortly after the signing of the Polish-Soviet Military Agreement, but that they had only reached the Polish Army on October 23, 1941, until which time only 40% of the soldiers were issued with boots. In the initial period of its formation,

the Army was to be supplied with arms by the Soviet Government. It was not until October 22, 1941, however, that Mr. Molotov notified Ambassador Kot, that the Soviet Union was experiencing certain difficulties with regard to the supply of arms and inquired whether the Polish Government could not obtain equipment from the United States and Great Britain. A similar declaration was made by Ambassador Bogomolov to General Sikorski on October 25, 1941. On learning of these difficulties, the Polish Government immediately approached the Governments of Great Britain and the United States with a request for arms and equipment. However, transport difficulties over long distances, the necessity of supplying the U.S.S.R. itself, and of accumulating arms and equipment in the Near East had all made it impossible to equip the Polish Army.

Despite all these difficulties, only the 5th Division was partly armed and equipped—but even this unit was lamentably deficient in comparison with a Soviet infantry division, and it was in no way prepared for action. The Note of December 18, 1942, sets out that the 5th Division was equipped as follows: it had not a single 45 mm anti-tank gun (though it was to have 18), not one 76 mm anti-aircraft gun (the establishment stipulated 4), no synchronized anti-aircraft machine-guns (establishment 18), no 12,7 mm machine-guns (establishment 9). Furthermore, the 5th Division had never received the 76 mm infantry guns (establishment 18) or the ammunition carriers for these and for the 104 mm howitzers. The 5th Division was also sadly deficient in other equipment.

As regards the other divisions, it would be pointless to speak of their equipment, as in all they had only 200 rifles, a fact that obliged General Anders, who did not wish his men to remain idle, to divide part of the 5th Division's equipment among the remaining units for training purposes.

As far back as March 18, 1942, General Anders had given Premier Stalin detailed information of this state of affairs and

handed him a statement of the amount of arms possessed by the Polish Army and the amount required to complete its equipment.

This proves beyond doubt that the Polish Army as a whole and the 5th Division in particular did not go into action on the Russian front, not because of any alleged reluctance on the part of the Polish Government, but because no single unit of that army was suitably trained or equipped, none was ready for action.

Prohibition by the Soviet authorities of conscription and voluntary enlistment, the reduction of the strength of the Polish Army by unilateral decision, the evacuation of that Army without previous consultation with the Polish Government, the refusal to allow depots for recruiting to be left on Soviet territory, and finally the refusal to transfer to the Polish Army, Polish nationals who had been forcibly conscripted in Poland by the German army and were now Soviet prisoners of war, all lead to the conclusion that the Soviet Government, contrary to the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941 and the Moscow Declaration of December 4, 1941, had no desire to see a Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R. participate in the fighting on the Eastern Front side by side with the Soviet Army.

CHAPTER 4

The Missing Polish Officers

According to official figures given on September 17, 1940, in the *Red Star*, published by the People's Commissariat for Defense of the U.S.S.R., the number of Polish officers taken prisoner on Polish territory by the Soviet forces after September 17, 1939, amounted to 9,369, including 12 generals, 58 colonels, 72 lieutenant-colonels, 5,131 other regular officers and 4,096 reserve officers.

This number was increased by several hundred officers arrested by the Soviet authorities during their occupation of Polish territory after actual fighting had ceased, and by 900 officers interned in the Baltic States, when the latter were occupied by the Soviet armies in June 1940. Thus the total number of Polish officers who became Soviet prisoners of war amounted approximately to 11,000.

The Polish officers were placed in some ten prisoner-of-war camps, of which the three largest were: 1) Kozielsk, to the East of Smolensk, 2) Starobielsk, near Kharkov, and 3) Ostashkov, near Kalinin.

The officers interned in these three camps were permitted to correspond with their families in Poland through the Polish Red Cross. Early in 1940 many of them notified their families that the camp authorities had informed them that all three camps would soon be broken up, and they would be able to

return home. During this period the Soviet authorities compiled detailed lists of the prisoners, presumably to ascertain where each of them wished to go on being released.

According to information in possession of the Polish Government the number of prisoners interned in these three camps early in 1940 was as follows:

1) in Kozielsk: 5,000 prisoners including 4,500 officers of various ranks;

2) in Starobielsk: 3,920 officers, including 8 generals, about 100 colonels and lt.-colonels, about 250 majors, 1,000 captains, approximately 2,500 lieutenants and second-lieutenants, and 30 cadets. Apart from these there were also 380 doctors, some of them eminent specialists, several university professors, judges, officials and army chaplains;

3) in Ostashkov: 6,570 persons, mostly judges, public prosecutors, civil servants and policemen, with 380 officers of the police, frontier guard and six regiments of Frontier Defence Corps.

The total number of Polish citizens interned in these three camps was 15,490, including some 8,700 officers.

The breaking up of these camps began early in April 1940. Every few days, until the middle of May, groups of 60 to 300 persons were transferred from the three camps to an unknown destination. Only the prisoners from Kozielsk were transported in the direction of Smolensk. The last group from the three camps consisted of only 400 men who were assembled at the camp at Yuchnowsk in Pavlishchev Bor near the military station of Babynino and later in June 1940 transferred to Griazovetz in the district of Vologda. However, at a later date more than 1,000 officers and civilian prisoners arrived at this camp from smaller prisoner-of-war camps, with some 900 officers who had previously been interned in the Baltic States.

In May 1940, correspondence between the officers interned in the three camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov and

their families in Poland ceased abruptly, and officers interned in Griazovetz were forbidden by the Soviet authorities to mention names of their former colleagues in the letters they wrote home.

When after the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, the Polish Government proceeded to form a Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R. they expected that officers from these three camps would constitute the command of the army. By the end of August 1941, the officers from the camp in Griazovetz, some 2,300 in all, had reported to the Polish units stationed in Buzuluk, but not a single one of the officers transferred from Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov to unknown destinations, appeared or gave any sign of life. So the Army was short of more than 8,000 officers, 7,000 non-commissioned officers and other ranks who would have been of the utmost value in fighting the Germans, to say nothing of the civilians also interned in the three camps.

This alarming state of affairs led the High Command of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. and representatives of the Polish Government in Kuybyshev and London to make frequent representations to the Soviet authorities for the release of the missing officers. To Ambassador Kot, Mr. Vishinsky declared that all Polish prisoners of war had been released from the camps and must therefore be free.

As there continued to be no sign of the missing officers, in October and November 1941, Ambassador Kot made frequent reference to them in the course of his conversations with Premier Stalin, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Vishinsky, insisting that detailed lists of all officers who had been interned by the Soviet authorities be furnished him, as he knew that such lists had been compiled by the Soviet authorities.

At the same time, on October 15, General Sikorski, in a letter to Ambassador Bogomolov, drew the Soviet Government's attention to the Polish Government's anxiety as "to the fate of

several thousand Polish officers who have not returned to Poland and have not been found in Soviet military camps." Replying on November 14, Ambassador Bogomolov assured General Sikorski that ". . . all Polish officers on the territory of U.S.S.R. have also been set free. Your supposition, Mr. Prime Minister, that a large number of Polish officers are dispersed throughout the Northern regions of the U.S.S.R. is obviously based on inaccurate information."

When visiting Premier Stalin in Moscow in December 1941, General Sikorski again intervened for the release of all Polish prisoners of war, and as the Soviet authorities had not supplied a list of their names, he took the opportunity to present to Premier Stalin a list of Polish officers, compiled by their former fellow-prisoners and containing 3,845 names. Premier Stalin then assured General Sikorski that the amnesty was of a general and all-embracing character and included military personnel as well as civilians. In the same conversation with General Sikorski, Premier Stalin while declaring that all the prisoners of war had been released, expressed the belief that they might have escaped to Manchuria. It is obvious that the trip across the entire territory of the U.S.S.R. of men in Polish uniform was something that could not possibly have taken place.

On March 18, 1942, General Anders delivered to Premier Stalin an additional list containing the names of some 800 other officers.

The question of the missing officers was also dealt with exhaustively in the Note of the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Bogomolov of January 28, 1942. After calling attention to the fact that the administrative authorities of the Soviet Union had not fully applied the provisions of the Amnesty Decree of August 12, 1941, the Note laid special emphasis on the failure to release many thousands of senior and junior officers.

In this Note the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasized that "investigations carried out in Poland and in the Reich have made it possible to establish definitely that these soldiers are not at present in occupied Poland nor in prisoner-of-war camps in Germany." The Note specifically requested that all the arrested officers be released from the prisons and camps in which they were interned, adding that the Polish Government attached the greatest importance to the loyal execution of the provisions of the Agreement of July 30, 1941 and to the development of friendly relations between both countries in the interest of the common struggle against the aggressor.

Ambassador Bogomolov's reply on March 13, to the note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, introduced no new elements to throw light on the question of the 8,000 missing officers. Ambassador Bogomolov referred to Mr. Molotov's Note of November 8, 1941, and to the Aide-Mémoire of November 19, presented to Ambassador Kot, containing the assurance that the amnesty had been fully carried out in respect of all Polish citizens, civilian and military. In regard to the Polish Government's assertion that many Polish officers were to be found near the River Kolyma, on Franz Joseph Land and in Nova Zembla, Ambassador Bogomolov considered this devoid of all foundation.

In view of the utter failure of his frequent verbal and written demands for an elucidation of the whole question, Ambassador Kot, on May 19, 1942, submitted a Memorandum to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, in which he expressed regret at the Soviet authorities' refusal to supply a list of prisoners as the Polish Government had repeatedly requested for several months, and he gave expression to his great anxiety about the fate of these officers.

When, in April 1943, foreign news agencies published a report issued by the German military authorities that a mass-grave containing the bodies of Polish officers had been discovered at Kozia Gora near Smolensk, and when the Soviet Govern-

ment stated in a communiqué published by the Soviet Information Bureau in Moscow on April 15, that in 1941 Polish prisoners of war were employed on fortification work to the West of Smolensk where they fell into German hands after the Soviet forces withdrew from that region, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a new Note to Ambassador Bogomolov on April 20.

Beginning with the statement that in a public declaration made on April 17, the Polish Government had most emphatically condemned the attempts of the Germans to exploit the tragedy of Polish prisoners of war to further their own political ends, the Note recalled the repeated representations made since October 1941 by the Polish Government to the Soviet Government concerning the missing officers from Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov. The Note went on to say that the Polish Government had never received a list of the prisoners nor any detailed information as to where they were, while the verbal and written declarations of representatives of the Soviet Government were confined to general assurances that all Polish officers had been released from prisoner-of-war camps. The Polish Government, as shown by its frequent interventions, had never considered the question of the missing officers closed, and as it appeared from the communiqué of the Soviet Information Bureau, that the Soviet Government was in possession of fuller information concerning the missing Polish officers than had earlier been communicated to the Polish Government, it renewed its request to the Soviet Government for detailed and accurate information concerning the fate of the prisoners of war and civilians at one time detained in the camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov. The Note ended by stating that Polish public opinion was so justly and deeply stirred that only irrefutable facts could outweigh the detailed German statements about the discovery of the bodies of many thousand Polish officers in the vicinity of Smolensk.

The correspondence between the Polish Government and the Soviet Government and the series of verbal interventions by representatives of the Polish Government proved: (1) that from the very moment diplomatic relations were re-established in July 1941, the Polish Authorities had considered the question of the missing officers one of the fundamental problems, a thorough elucidation of which was not only in the interest of Polish-Soviet relations, but also in the interest of the United Nations; (2) although they possessed lists of persons interned in prisoner-of-war camps, the Soviet Government never presented them to the Polish Authorities for examination; (3) the Polish Authorities, to facilitate the search, supplied the Soviet authorities with a list containing the names of more than 50% of the missing officers; (4) despite Soviet Government assurances that the officers interned in Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov had been released, their correspondence with their families in Poland had ended abruptly in the Spring of 1940, and they were not to be found either in the Soviet Union, in Poland or in German camps; (5) furthermore the Soviet Government never informed the Polish Government that Polish officers were working on fortifications near Smolensk and there fell into German hands. This the Polish Government first learned from a communiqué of the Soviet Information Bureau on April 15, 1943.

The Soviet Government made the question of the missing officers their reason for severing diplomatic relations with Poland. In his Note of April 25, 1943, which Ambassador Romer did not accept, Mr. Molotov omitted all reference to the frequent interventions concerning the missing officers and with complete disregard of the above mentioned facts and Polish representations, expressed his astonishment that the Polish Government did not consider it necessary to approach the Soviet Government for an explanation of the whole case. He also alleged the Polish Government's connivance with the German

Government in a common campaign of defamation of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government made the case of the missing officers a political question, and entirely disregarded its human aspect to which the Polish Government attached the greatest importance.

The total number of soldiers and civilians interned in the three camps in question exceeded 15,000. In addition to regular army officers, there were thousands of reserve officers from all professional groups in Poland, the very elite of the Polish educated class, that class which has been so ruthlessly exterminated by the Germans in the course of this war. The fate of these 15,000 persons was therefore the object of intense concern not only to their relatives in Poland, dispersed throughout the world or else serving in the Polish Army, but also to the entire Polish nation which for the last four years has fought so well and sacrificed so much in its occupied homeland for the future victory of the Allies.

Faithful to these principles the Polish Government for nearly two years made repeated demands on the Soviet authorities for an explanation of the fate of the missing prisoners of war. Not only did the Soviet Government fail to acknowledge the natural right of the Polish Government to concern themselves with the fate of missing Polish citizens, but despite their responsibility for the life and safety of prisoners of war they constantly refused to supply any kind of relevant information that might have thrown light on this tragic affair.

CHAPTER 5

Relief for Polish Citizens in the U.S.S.R.

The conclusion of the Agreement of July 30, 1941, between Poland and the Soviet Union, made it possible for the Polish Embassy in the U.S.S.R. to organize relief for Polish citizens. However, in the Autumn of 1941 and early in the Winter of 1942 the carrying out of these plans was opposed by the Soviet authorities, who did not agree to the Embassy's proposal that a certain number of consulates be established, and would permit neither organized assistance by the Polish Red Cross, nor the creation of Citizens' Committees elected by the Polish citizens concerned.

Meanwhile the condition of the Polish population released from prisons, camps and places of exile, was rendered more precarious by the approach of winter. The Soviet authorities continued to oppose plans for the settlement of released Polish citizens, and informed the Embassy early in November, 1941, that the transportation of groups of Poles must cease, because the rail facilities were absorbed by the requirements of the front.

The visit of General Sikorski, Polish Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief, who came to the U.S.S.R. in December 1941, brought about a change in the attitude of the Soviet authorities as regards two fundamental Polish requests, i.e., the admission of Embassy Delegates to Polish settlements throughout the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the granting of a credit to permit assistance to be given to Polish citizens unfit for

work and deported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against their will.

As a result of General Sikorski's visit an agreement was reached on December 23, 1941 between the Polish Embassy and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and Notes exchanged establishing the "Rules regulating the scope of activity of Delegates of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland." This provided for the appointment of nineteen Embassy Delegates and their staffs on Soviet territory, with the joint approval of both Governments. Some days after this agreement had been concluded, a new agreement with the Soviet Government was signed on December 31, for a loan of 100 million roubles for the relief of the Polish civilian population. Of the nineteen Embassy Delegates, nine were regular Embassy officials with diplomatic status and the rank of secretaries or attachés. In addition to relief work, Embassy Delegates were empowered to extend legal protection to Polish citizens, and in particular to issue them with passports and other personal documents. This was most important as Polish citizens deported to Russia had been made to surrender their personal documents and had received in return either passports as Soviet citizens or Soviet passports as stateless individuals. If in camps or prisons they had been left without any papers at all and on their release received only jail delivery certificates valid for three months. Delegates were under the direct control of the Embassy and supervised the local representatives, whose duties were more restricted and who acted as the regional executives of the Delegates. These representatives were appointed from among responsible Polish citizens in provincial centres.

On December 1, 1942, the Embassy had at its disposal 387 representatives of whom 297 were Poles, 82 Jews, 8 Ukrainians and White-Ruthenians.

The Embassy Delegates began their work in the middle of February 1942, and organized relief for Poles in 46 adminis-

trative districts including 2,600 Polish settlements. The efforts of the Embassy Delegates and representatives soon began to produce substantial results. In addition to distributing financial assistance to those most in need, in one year—by the middle of February 1943—they had established 83 kindergartens for 5,300 children, mostly orphans. This represented 7% of all Polish children in Russian and about 70% of the orphans. They also set up 175 elementary schools, and 176 feeding centres for children. For adults, 58 homes for invalids, 13 hostels, 15 feeding centres and 47 workshops had been organized. Medical aid was supplied in 41 health and hygiene centres as well as in 10 hospitals and convalescent homes. Moreover 43 educational centres for children were set up. In short the Polish Embassy through its Delegates and representatives organized 807 social institutions for deported Polish citizens, both adults and children.

Thanks to the efforts of the Polish and Allied Governments and of charitable institutions in the United States and the British Commonwealth, the first substantial shipments of relief in kind for Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics began to arrive during the winter of 1941. From then till the middle of 1943 these enabled the Delegates of the Polish Embassy to supply Polish citizens with some 5,000 tons of food, clothing and medical supplies, that were distributed chiefly to families having a large number of children.

The generous assistance of the United States Government in extending substantial aid under the Lend-Lease Act to the Polish Government for the families of Polish soldiers inducted into the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. is especially acknowledged and emphasized. Mention should also be made of invaluable relief sent to the deported Polish citizens by organizations of Americans of Polish descent, as well as by numerous Jewish welfare organizations in America.

A principle to which the Embassy and its staff strictly adhered was to grant financial aid and assistance in kind first of

all to persons unfit for work, i.e., children, women and old people, who often made up more than half the Polish population of the various centres because the Soviet authorities had deported en masse the wives and children of Poles who were prisoners of war in Germany or in the U.S.S.R., and able-bodied men had voluntarily enlisted in the Polish Army being formed on Soviet territory.

However relief work of the Embassy and its Delegates was not sufficient to produce any basic change for the better in the material situation of the Polish deportees as a whole, because of the impossibility of reaching many of the more distant localities. Transport difficulties brought about by the war prevented the rapid dispatch of supplies where they were most needed. Yet, thanks to the substantial supplies from abroad, many of the Polish citizens deported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics received at least clothes or underclothing, shoes and foodstuffs of high quality.

During the initial period the work of the Delegates and their staffs was not hampered to any great extent by the Soviet authorities who, however, as early as March 1942, began to restrict the scope of their activity. It was during this period that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs approached the Embassy with a demand that the Delegates should refrain from intervening with local authorities on behalf of Polish citizens, large numbers of whom were still detained in Soviet camps and prisons in violation of the Agreement of July 30, 1941 and of the Amnesty Decree of August 12, 1941. The Soviet authorities also began to place difficulties in the way of Polish citizens of Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian and Jewish origin who were being assisted by the Embassy's relief organization. In so doing, these authorities acted on a unilateral decision of December 1, 1941, declaring that such Polish citizens would henceforth be regarded as Soviet citizens.

As Polish relief increased in volume and the activity of the Embassy Delegates developed, to the benefit of hundreds of thousands of Polish citizens, the attitude of the Soviet authorities towards the Polish relief organization began to undergo a change. Manifold difficulties arose, mainly with local authorities who raised objections in matters that had been already settled with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. The usual explanation was that they were without instructions from the central authorities. Numerous conferences held between March and July 1942, between representatives of the Polish Embassy and of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs were almost entirely devoted to these difficulties. Towards the end of May the attitude of the Soviet authorities changed abruptly and they began to put obstacles in the way of the Delegates and representatives who wished to report to the Embassy, and to arrest certain representatives, especially those who had shown initiative and energy. To all Embassy representations, the stereotyped reply was that those arrested were engaged in activities hostile to the Soviet Union.

This hampering of the activities of Embassy Delegates came to a head on June 29, 1942. On that day the Embassy Delegates in Vladivostok and Archangel, although members of the Embassy staff and carrying diplomatic passports and identity cards, were arrested by the State Security Police. The Soviet authorities also arrested the entire staff of the Polish relief office in Archangel and sealed the stores without even informing the Embassy that the Polish diplomats had been arrested. The Embassy only learned of this from another source on July 7, 1942. After the Polish Ambassador had lodged a vehement protest, both diplomatic officials were set free on July 10. The Soviet authorities failed, however, to provide any satisfactory explanation of their action, which was without precedent in international relations, and without producing any evidence

merely stated that the persons in question were carrying on activities hostile to the Soviet Union.

In the course of diplomatic negotiations of the Polish Ambassador and Chargé d'Affaires with Mr. Vishinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, the Soviet representatives gave assurances that the agreed Rules regulating the scope of activities of the Delegates of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland remained in force and that the Soviet Government did not intend to change its benevolent attitude towards the Embassy's relief work. The Soviet authorities demanded, however, that the Embassy either recall its diplomatic officials who occupied posts as Delegates, or else revoke their diplomatic privileges. Having no choice the Embassy recalled all its diplomatic officials to Kuybyshev and officially informed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that this had been done. How the Soviet authorities respected the principles of international law concerning the personal immunity of diplomats and of the archives of foreign States, may be judged by the fact that, after Mr. Vishinsky, in the presence of the Polish Ambassador, had formally stated that the agreement concerning the relief work of the Polish Embassy remained in full force and effect, all Embassy Delegates, whether enjoying diplomatic immunity or not, and the principal members of their staffs were arrested by the Soviet authorities, and their archives, money and seals seized by the State Securities police.

Following very strong representations by the Polish Government, the Soviet authorities decided to set free the diplomatic officials, nine persons in all, while all the other Delegates, office staff and representatives, totalling 109 persons—remained in prison until the end of October 1942, when 93 persons were released. The remaining 16 persons have never been released.

On July 20, 1942, when all Embassy Delegates had been arrested, their offices closed and their supply stores sealed, Commissar Vishinsky announced to the Chargé d'Affaires of the

Polish Embassy, Mr. H. Sokolnicki, that the Soviet Government would no longer permit the existence of the Delegates' offices, alleging that instead of organizing relief the Delegates were engaged in activities hostile to the Soviet Union and in intelligence work. The Soviet authorities constantly reiterated this accusation in response to all further representations of the Polish Government or the Polish Embassy on behalf of the arrested officials, without furnishing any proof in support of the charge.

However, at the same time the Soviet authorities declared their readiness to accept a new relief organization for Polish citizens, and said that they awaited Polish suggestions. As the most experienced and valuable social workers were under arrest and a feeling of terror was spreading among the Poles who feared further mass detention in labor camps and prisons, the Embassy was unable to set up any kind of new relief organization. Furthermore, the Polish Government could not negotiate under pressure, with more than a hundred Polish officials in prison.

The Soviet Government had other reasons than the allegedly hostile activities of the Embassy Delegates for closing the Embassy's relief offices. Their real grounds may be inferred from the closing in August 1942 of kindergartens and medical centres, which could not be suspected of carrying on activities hostile to the Soviet Union. First, despite their formal promises, the Soviet authorities placed difficulties in the way of the purchase of food rations by these institutions, and then began to participate directly in their administration or to close up orphanages, homes for invalids, feeding centers, etc. For instance, in the districts of Kustanay, Akmolinsk, Southern Kazakhstan, Semipalatynsk and Pavlodar, the Soviet authorities insisted that the Polish children be transferred to Soviet orphanages. These actions constituted a flagrant breach of the assurances given by the Soviet Government to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev and to the Polish Government in London by Ambassador Bogo-

molov, who emphasized that the Soviet Government had no wish to obstruct the work of relief to Polish citizens.

The Soviet Government's negative attitude to the Polish Government's suggestion that 50,000 Polish children be evacuated from the U.S.S.R. and placed in Allied countries for the duration of the war at the expense of the Polish Government and Allied charitable institutions, is characteristic of the Soviet Government's attitude toward the Poles in Russia. Despite the appalling death rate among these children, who were decimated by hunger and disease, the Soviet Government refused to discuss the technical details of the suggestion and rejected the principle of evacuation.

The arrest of the Embassy Delegates in July 1942, rendered impossible the concentration of several thousand Polish specialists in the area where the Polish troops were quartered in the U.S.S.R., and consequently their evacuation with these forces to the Middle East. These specialists included technicians, doctors, engineers, scientists and journalists, all of whom were employed as lumberjacks in the Siberian forests or on other kinds of hard physical work and dispersed throughout the vast area of the Soviet Union. Thus the 30,000 Polish civilians evacuated from Russia to the Middle East in August 1942, like the 12,000 Polish citizens evacuated in March and April 1942, included only some of the families of Polish soldiers and persons who had reached the vicinity of the Polish Army camps by themselves and often quite accidentally.

Despite continued efforts by the Polish Government, the lot of the Poles in the Soviet Union showed no substantial improvement because the Embassy's relief work was prevented from reaching all the centers in the Soviet Union to which Poles had been deported. Moreover, as Polish citizens were forbidden to change their place of residence or to use public transportation, they were *de facto* interned in their place of residence and could not themselves improve their conditions or even

attempt to leave the northern regions where the climatic and health conditions were most unfavorable.

Not until late October 1942, when 93 of the arrested members of the Embassy's relief organization were released, did the atmosphere become more appropriate for a renewal of negotiations to establish some new form of relief. Aware of the Soviet Government's objections to the system of Embassy Delegates the newly appointed Polish Ambassador, Mr. Tadeusz Romer, suggested that the whole system of relief be entirely reorganized. This suggestion was accepted by Mr. Vishinsky on December 23, 1942, but was never put into effect for, in the Note of January 16, 1943, the Soviet Government unilaterally proceeded in violation of the Protocol attached to the Agreement of July 30, 1941, to declare that all Polish citizens present on November 1 and 2, 1939, on Polish territory occupied by the Soviet forces had automatically acquired Soviet citizenship. Despite the Polish Government's Note of protest of January 26, 1943, the subsequent negotiations between Ambassador Romer and Mr. Molotov concerning the Note of January 16, the Soviet authorities forcibly took over the Polish Embassy's relief institutions and proceeded immediately by moral and physical pressure to force Polish citizens to accept Soviet passports. It did not deem it necessary even to inform the Embassy of these actions.

The purpose of these measures was to destroy the Polish relief organization and to suppress all relief work as such. In view of these facts the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs on March 30, 1943, presented a Note to Mr. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R. to the Polish Government in London. This Note recalled that the relief organization of the Polish Embassy was set up by joint agreement with the Soviet Government, and it protested emphatically against the withdrawal of that organization from the Embassy's administration and against the methods employed by Soviet authorities. The Note reserved

the Polish Government's right to demand the return by the Soviet Government of all property belonging to the Polish State taken over by Soviet authorities or institutions, and compensation for loss or damage already suffered or that might ensue in the future from the taking over of that property.

Thus since early in the Spring of 1943, hundreds of thousands of Polish citizens deported to the U.S.S.R. have been deprived of the protection of their legal Government, and of help and relief from them, from the Governments of the friendly United Nations and welfare organizations throughout the world which had spared neither funds nor efforts to succor these Polish deportees.

CHAPTER 6

Citizenship of Polish Deportees and Soviet Territorial Claims

By the Protocol attached to the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, the Soviet Government undertook to "grant amnesty to all Polish citizens who are at present deprived of their freedom on the territory of the U.S.S.R., either as prisoners of war or on other adequate grounds" without distinction as to the origin, creed or race of the citizens concerned. Similarly the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. of August 12, 1941, implementing the amnesty granted to all Polish citizens detained on Soviet territory, never contemplated any discrimination whatsoever between Polish citizens of different origins.

Part of the Polish deportees, including persons of Ukrainian, White-Ruthenian and Jewish origin, were released from labor camps and prisons in the first months following the signing of the Agreement. A considerable percentage of Polish citizens of Jewish, Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian origin volunteered for service in the Polish Army during the initial period of its formation.

The first case of discrimination by the Soviet authorities against Polish citizens of other than Polish origin occurred in the Republic of Kazakhstan in October 1941. According to information received by the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev, the

Military Commissar of that Republic, General Shcherbakov, issued an order in Alma-Ata, for the enlistment in the Red Army of all Polish citizens of military age fit for service, deported by the Soviet authorities from occupied Polish territories and in possession of documents issued to them by the Soviet authorities showing they were of Ukrainian, White-Ruthenian or Jewish origin.

As soon as it heard of this order the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev in a Note of November 10, 1941, declared it contrary to the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, and to the Polish-Soviet Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, and demanded that the right of every Polish citizen to serve in the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. be respected.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs replied to this Note on December 1, 1941, that it could not agree with the Polish Embassy that the calling-up by the Red Army of persons of Ukrainian, White-Ruthenian and Jewish origin who had left the territories of Western-Ukraine and Western White-Ruthenia was inconsistent with the Agreements of July 30, 1941, or August 14, 1941. In the opinion of the Soviet authorities, the wording of neither of these Agreements provided any grounds for the views expressed in the Embassy's Note of November 10. The Note of the Soviet Government further stated that in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R., of November 29, 1939, all citizens of the Western districts of the Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republics who were present in those districts on November 1 and 2, 1939, acquired the citizenship of the U.S.S.R. as laid down in the Citizenship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Act of August 19, 1938. The Note ended by stating that "The Soviet Government's readiness to recognize as Polish citizens persons of Polish origin, who resided until November 1 and 2 on the aforementioned territory, gives evidence of good will and compliance on the part of the

Soviet Government, but can in no case serve as a basis for an analogous recognition of the Polish citizenship of persons of other origin, in particular those of Ukrainian, White-Ruthenian or Jewish origin, since the question of the frontiers between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Poland had not been settled and is subject to settlement in the future."

In its reply dated December 9, 1941, to the Soviet Note quoted above, the Embassy pointed out that: 1) Polish legislation was founded on the principle of the equality of all citizens, regardless of their origin or race, and that the Polish Embassy was not aware of the existence of any Soviet laws, which introduced or sanctioned any discrimination or differentiation of this kind. As the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, made no reference to the principle of national origin or race in any of their stipulations relative to Polish citizens, these provisions must apply to all Polish citizens without exception. 2) The possession of Polish citizenship by any given person was governed by Polish law, namely the Polish State Citizenship Act of January 30, 1920. For this and the reasons stated above, the Embassy found itself unable to accept the Soviet Government's statement that it was prepared to acknowledge as Polish citizens only those of Polish origin among the persons resident on November 1 and 2, 1939, on the territory of the Republic of Poland temporarily occupied by the military forces of the Soviet Union. 3) The Citizenship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Act of August 19, 1938, could not be applied to Polish citizens for "its introduction on the territory of the Republic of Poland occupied by the Soviet Union from the latter half of September 1939 until June or July 1941, would be contrary to the provisions of the IVth Hague Convention of 1907." The Embassy's Note ended by pointing out that the Soviet Note contained a self-contradictory thesis, stating as it did that on the one hand the Soviet authorities did not recognize the Polish

citizenship of persons of Ukrainian, White-Ruthenian and Jewish origin, and on the other hand that the question of the frontiers between the U.S.S.R. and Poland had not yet been settled and was to be settled in the future. While maintaining its fundamental attitude as set out above, the Polish Embassy also pointed out that the Soviet attitude would mean a unilateral settlement by the Soviet Union at the present time of a problem which according to the statement of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs itself was to be discussed in the future.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs replied to this Note on January 5, 1942, stating that it saw no grounds for changing its attitude as set out in the Note of December 1, 1941. As to the Embassy's reference to the IVth Hague Convention of 1907, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs considered that the provisions of that Convention applied to a state of occupation of enemy territory, and that the term "occupation" would be quite unjustifiable in the case of the Western-Ukraine and Western White-Ruthenia, for the entry of the Soviet forces in the Autumn of 1939 into Western-Ukraine and Western White-Ruthenia was in their view not an occupation: the incorporation of these territories in the U.S.S.R. was at the express will of their people.

In consequence of this attitude adopted by the Soviet Government, Polish citizens of Ukrainian, White-Ruthenian and Jewish origin ceased to be treated by them as Polish citizens.

This was no mere legal controversy, but involved consequences of the utmost practical importance to the persons concerned. The Soviet authorities prevented them from enlisting in the Polish Army and made it impossible for them to apply to the Polish Embassy for relief or legal protection. The Embassy's interventions for the release of Polish citizens, still detained contrary to the Amnesty Decree in prisons and labor camps, were refused where these persons were concerned. There

were also cases of Polish citizens being re-arrested on the pretext that they had communicated with agencies of the Polish Embassy and had thus infringed the Soviet regulations forbidding Soviet citizens, under severe penalty, to communicate in any matter whatsoever with representatives of foreign States. Moreover and of particular importance to Polish citizens of Jewish nationality who had relatives in Palestine, the United States and Great Britain, they were prevented from leaving the U.S.S.R., exit permits being as a rule refused, though the persons concerned had often completed all the necessary passport and visa formalities. In many cases Polish passports, valid for travel abroad, and endorsed with British, Palestinian and Iranian visas were confiscated when their holders applied to the competent Soviet authorities for exit permits from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

To compel the Polish Government to accept its view on the citizenship of persons forcibly deported from the territory of the Republic of Poland to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Soviet Government also endeavored to limit the powers of the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to issue Polish passports to Polish citizens, a sovereign right of every State. This was emphasized in a Note of June 9, 1942, from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Polish Embassy. In this Note the People's Commissariat laid down that it was essential that lists of persons to whom the Embassy wished to issue Polish passports should be supplied to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, which would then advise the Embassy of any objections the Soviet authorities might have to the issue of Polish passports to any of the persons whose names appeared upon the lists. The Soviet Note added that all persons on the said lists to whose issue with Polish passports the competent Soviet authorities had no objection, would then be provided with permits of residence as aliens. In addition the Soviet Note demanded that the Soviet authorities be supplied

with lists of persons who had already been issued with Polish passports by the Polish Embassy.

To the above, the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev replied in its Note of June 24, declaring that "in accordance with the fundamental principles of international law, the Government of the Republic of Poland asserts that the matter of Polish citizenship rests with them and they do not consider it possible that when verifying lists of Polish citizens demanded of the Embassy, the Soviet authorities should decide the citizenship of Polish citizens resident on the territory of the Republic of Poland, and who between 1939-1942 found themselves as is known not of their free will on the territory of the Soviet Union." The Note went on to point out that the issue of passports to Polish citizens was carried out by the Embassy and its Delegates in accordance with Polish laws and regulations in force. According to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and Polish law, origin, religion, race or place of residence within the frontiers of the Republic of Poland, have no influence on the citizenship of any given person. The note concluded thus, "Taking into consideration that the aforementioned Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs is aimed at imposing a procedure in issuing passports, unprecedented in relations between sovereign States, the Government of the Republic of Poland sees no possibility of discussing the principles of this question on the basis of the suggested procedure."

In replying to this Note on July 9, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs did not discuss the arguments contained in the Polish Embassy's Note of June 24, but confined itself to stating that it continued to insist on the Polish Embassy's adoption of the suggested procedure for the issue of passports. The Polish Government, unable to consent to such a procedure and unwilling to aggravate the misunderstanding

over this matter, instructed the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to suspend the issue of passports to Polish citizens.

Towards the end of December 1942, the Polish relief crisis appeared to have come to an end when the Soviet authorities gave their consent to the establishment of a new form of relief organization in place of the Embassy Delegates, and it was then hoped that the conflict over Polish citizenship and the issue of passports would also be satisfactorily settled. These hopes proved vain as the Soviet Government adopted an attitude calculated to increase and intensify the conflict.

On January 16, 1943, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs sent a new Note to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev in which it declared that despite the good will shown in its Note of December 1, 1941, when it agreed by way of exception, to recognize as Polish citizens persons of Polish origin (although persons of Ukrainian, White-Ruthenian and Jewish origin were thenceforth considered by the Soviet Government as Soviet citizens), the Polish Government had adopted a negative attitude to the said declaration of the Soviet Government and had not only refused to take suitable action, but had put forward demands conflicting with the sovereign rights of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with regard to the territories in question. In consequence of the above, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had been instructed by the Soviet Government to state that the declaration contained in its Note of December 1, 1941, that an exception would be made in respect of persons of Polish origin must be considered no longer valid and that there was thus no longer any question of exonerating these persons from the regulations applicable to Soviet citizens.

Thus the Soviet Government not only extended its unilateral decision to force Soviet citizenship on all persons residing on Polish territory occupied by the Soviet authorities, but also asserted the sovereign rights of the Soviet Union to that

territory, which meant in fact that the Soviet Government raised territorial claims to Polish territory.

The question of Soviet claims to Polish territory was first raised in Mr. Molotov's circular Note of January 6, 1942, concerning the atrocities committed on the Russian population by the German armies. In that Note the City of Lwów was included among towns situated on Soviet territory. Acknowledging receipt of Mr. Molotov's Note, Ambassador Kot stated that the inclusion of Lwów among Ukrainian cities must have been the result of a misunderstanding, for history, international law and the ethnical composition of its population prove that Lwów was and remains a Polish city. In reply to Ambassador Kot's Note, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs stated, on January 17, 1942, that it considered the Embassy's view expressed in the Note and in other documents, in which Lwów, Brześć, Stanisławów and other towns of the Soviet Union were included among towns situated on the territory of the Republic of Poland—unjustified, and advised the Embassy that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs would not in the future be able to accept for examination any further Notes from the Embassy containing statements to that effect.

In its Note of January 16, 1943, the Soviet Government again stated, this time quite plainly, that their territorial claims were not limited to certain towns in Poland, but to the entire territory which under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of September 28, 1939, had fallen to the Soviet Union. The tenor of this Note was in flagrant contradiction to Article I of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, which provided that "The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes in Poland as having lost their validity."

In replying to the Soviet Note of January 16, 1943, the Minister of Foreign Affairs presented on January 26, a Note to the Soviet Ambassador to the Polish Government, in the

opening paragraph of which he recalled the refusal of the Polish Government to take cognizance of the Note of December 1, 1941, because the granting or withdrawal of Polish citizenship was an exclusive and undeniable attribute of the sovereignty of the Polish State. The Polish Government therefore maintained their fundamental attitude as regards Polish citizenship, and found with the deepest regret, that the Soviet Note of January 16, 1943, was inconsistent with the spirit of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the joint Declaration of both Governments of December 4, 1941, which aimed at the re-establishment of relations based on confidence between both States, and left no doubt as to the nullification of the Soviet-German agreements of 1939, together with their political and legal consequences. The Note recalled, moreover, that in the Protocol attached to the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, the Soviet Government undertook to release all Polish citizens deprived of their freedom on Soviet territory, irrespective of the reason for their detention. On the day the Agreement was signed there was on Soviet territory no category of Polish citizens other than those whose Polish citizenship the Soviet Government now refused to recognize, and the amnesty referred to above applied precisely to these persons in their status of Polish citizens. The Note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs ended by declaring that the Polish Government refused to recognize any unilateral decisions taken by the Soviet Government during the period in which Polish-Soviet relations had ceased, for decisions of this kind were contrary to international law, as for instance the IVth Hague Convention of 1907 and the Atlantic Charter to which the U.S.S.R. had adhered, and that therefore the Polish Government insisted that the Soviet Government should treat all Polish citizens in conformity with the spirit and letter of the Agreement of July 30, 1941.

Ambassador Bogomolov's reply of February 17, to the Polish Note of January 26, brought no new elements to the problem

under consideration, nor did it provide any relevant explanations. It merely stated that the Soviet Government did not consider it possible to discuss the problems of citizenship and that the Polish Government's assertion concerning the inconsistency of the Soviet views with the IVth Hague Convention of 1907 and the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, as well as the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941—was without foundation. In the opinion of the Soviet Government the people of the western districts of the Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian Republics had acquired Soviet citizenship at the "freely expressed will of the people."

When the Polish Government's attention was called to the fact that despite all protests and although Ambassador Romer was negotiating with Mr. Molotov in Moscow, the Soviet Government had proceeded to apply pressure to force Soviet citizenship on Polish citizens, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs presented a new Note to Ambassador Bogomolov on March 29, 1943, in which he re-affirmed that in the light of the Agreement of July 30, 1941, binding both parties, the attitude of the Soviet Government must be regarded as illegal and unjustifiable, for: (a) it was inconsistent with the Protocol attached to the Agreement referred to, which granted amnesty to all Polish citizens in the Soviet Union, and which as a bilateral legal act could not be modified or infringed by any unilateral Soviet decisions, and (b) the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. of November 29, 1939, as to citizenship, enacted as it was in consequence of the Soviet-German treaties of 1939, and even containing a direct reference to one of them, must have been invalidated by Article I of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941. In view of the fact that the Soviet Government did not agree to suspend the enforcement of its order concerning Polish citizens, the Polish Government had but one course, to protest emphatically and to state that it did not recognize this infringement of the sovereign

rights of the Polish State and that it reserved the fundamental right to repudiate in the future any accomplished fact either of a general character or affecting individual Polish citizens, brought about by the attitude of the Soviet Government.

In the course of the conversations which Ambassador Romer had in Moscow between February 20 and March 18, 1943, with Premier Stalin and Commissar Molotov it was established that the Soviet authorities did not consider as Soviet citizens all Polish citizens who happened to be in the Eastern part of Poland which the Soviet Government consider as incorporated in the U.S.S.R., but not domiciled there. Negotiations were then initiated with a view to determining a suitable procedure for issuing Polish passports; Ambassador Romer insisted that the Soviet authorities define their attitude with regard to those persons in the U.S.S.R. whom they recognize as "indisputably" Polish citizens. In order to make this clear the Soviet Government supplied the Polish Embassy with extracts from the Civil Codes of the Russian and Ukrainian Republics. From these it was possible to learn what Soviet legislation understood by "persons domiciled." In the light of these documents a person "domiciled" is one residing permanently in a given locality or else attached to it by his work, property or principal source of employment. The Soviet authorities were instructed to comply with this legislation, to revoke any orders incompatible with it and to return the Polish documents that had been confiscated. On April 16, 1943, the Polish Ambassador received a Note informing him that the competent Soviet authorities had received the necessary instructions for supply certificates of residence (*vid na zhitelstvo*) to Polish citizens on Soviet territory. When issuing these documents, the local Soviet authorities fixed a period of two months as a time limit for acquiring Polish passports from the Embassy. This they considered entirely sufficient.

In theory, the Government of the U.S.S.R. raised no further objection to passports being issued by the Embassy without consulting the Soviet authorities on the citizenship of the persons concerned. In practice, however, only such Polish citizens could apply for passports as had already been given a certificate of residence by the Soviet authorities. Passports issued to other categories of Polish citizens would have made them liable to prosecution by the Soviet authorities.

Although the above procedure was not applied to any appreciable extent because of the rupture by the Soviet Government of diplomatic relations with Poland, it nevertheless remains evidence of the fact that even Soviet legislation recognizes a great number of Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as "indisputably" Polish citizens, with the right to acquire Polish passports and leave the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Romer's conversations with high Soviet officials and the procedure arrived at as described above prove that the attitude of the Soviet Government with regard to the problem of Polish citizenship in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, first defined in the note dated December 1, 1941, and then on January 16, 1943, was once again changed.

However the Note of January 16, 1943, had much wider and deeper implications. It marked the beginning of a new era in Polish-Soviet relations, an era in which the Soviet Government has been trying to deal unilaterally with Poland, the first victim of the 1939 German aggression, and this in their own way without the slightest regard for international law and justice, or consideration for the high principles in defence of which all other United Nations are fighting this war.

Part II

CHAPTER 1

Polish Soviet Relations Prior to the War

No. 1

Decree of the Council of People's Commissars No. 698 issued in Moscow, August 29, 1918, abrogating the agreements of the Government of the former Russian Empire with the Governments of the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, the Kingdoms of Prussia and Bavaria, the Duchies of Hesse, Oldenburg, Sachsen-Meiningen, and the City of Lubeck.

Art. 1.

Art. 2.

Art. 3. All agreements and acts concluded by the Government of the former Russian Empire with the Governments of the Kingdom of Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in connection with the partitions of Poland, are annulled for ever by the present Resolution, in view of the fact that they are contrary to the principle of the self-determination of peoples and to the revolutionary, legal conception of the Russian nation, which recognizes the inalienable right of the Polish nation to decide its own fate and to become united.

Art. 4.

Art. 5.

Signed: Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars:
V. ULYANOV-LENIN.

Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs:
L. KARAKHAN.

Executive Secretary of the Council of People's Commissars:
VLAD. BONTCH-BRUYEVITCH.

No. 2

Declaration of the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic to the Polish Government and the Polish Nation, issued in Moscow, January 28, 1920.

Poland is now confronted with a decision that for many years to come may have grave repercussions on the lives of both nations. Everything shows that the extreme imperialists of the Entente, the supporters and agents of Churchill and Clemenceau are directing at present all their efforts to draw Poland into a futile, ill-considered and criminal war with Soviet-Russia.

Conscious of its responsibility for the fate of the Russian working masses and wishing to prevent new and innumerable disasters, sacrifices and devastation threatening the two nations:—

1. The Council of People's Commissars declares that the policy of the U.S.S.R. towards Poland is based not on any occasional, transient considerations of war or diplomacy but on the inviolable principle of self-determination of nations and it has recognized and recognizes unreservedly the independence and sovereignty of the Polish Republic and declares this recognition to be the basis of all its relations with Poland from the moment of the formation of an independent Polish State.

2. While regarding the last peace proposal of December 22 put forward by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs as still fully valid, the Council of People's Commissars, which has no aggressive intentions whatever, declares that the Red Army will not cross the present line of the White-Ruthenian front that passes near the following points: Dryssa, Dzisna, Polock, Borysow, Parycze, Railroad Stations Ptycz and Bialokozowice. As regards the Ukrainian front, the Council of People's Commissars declares in its own name and in the name of the provisional Ukrainian Government that the army of the Federated Soviet Republic will not engage in military operations to the West of the present line, running near the localities of Budouwa, Pilawy, Dereznia and Bar.

3. The Council of the People's Commissars declares that the Soviet Government has not entered into any agreements or pacts, with Germany or any other country, aimed directly or indirectly against Poland, and that the character and spirit of international policy of the Soviet authorities excludes the very possibility of similar agreements, as well as attempts to exploit eventual conflict between

Poland and Germany or Poland and other countries in order to violate Poland's independence and her territorial integrity.

4. The Council of People's Commissars declares that so far as the essential interests of Poland and Russia are concerned there is not a single question, territorial, economic or other, that could not be solved in a peaceful way, through negotiation, mutual compromise or agreement, as is now the case in the negotiations with Estonia.

While recommending to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that it obtain at the next session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in February, a confirmation by the Supreme Body of the Republic of the above stated basis of Soviet policy towards Poland, the Council of People's Commissars considers on its part that by this categorical declaration it is fulfilling its duty towards the peace interests of the Russian and Polish nations and hopes that all controversial matters will be settled by friendly negotiations between Russia and Poland.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars:

V. ULYANOV-LENIN.

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs:

TCHITCHERIN.

People's Commissar for Army and Navy:

TROTSKY.

No. 3

Treaty of Peace between Poland, Russia and the Ukraine, signed at Riga, March 18, 1921.

PREAMBLE

Poland—on the one hand—and Russia and the Ukraine—on the other—being desirous of putting an end to the war and of concluding a final, lasting and honorable peace based on a mutual understanding and in accordance with the peace preliminaries signed at Riga on October 12, 1920, have decided to enter into negotiations and have appointed for this purpose as plenipotentiaries:

The Government of the Polish Republic:

MM. Jean Dabski,
Stanislas Kautzik,
Edouard Lechowicz,
Henri Strasburger and
Léon Wasilewski.

The Government of The Federal Socialist Republic of the Russian Soviets, on its own behalf and with the authorization of the Government of the White-Ruthenian Socialist Republic of Soviets and of the Government of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic of Soviets:

MM. Adolphe Joffé
 Jacob Ganetski
 Emmanuel Kviring
 Leonide Obolenski and
 Georges Koutshoubinski.

The above-mentioned plenipotentiaries met at Riga, and having exchanged their full powers, which were recognized as sufficient and found to be in good and due form, agreed to the following provisions:

Riga, March 18, 1921.

ARTICLE 1

The two Contracting Parties declare that a state of war has ceased to exist between them.

ARTICLE 2

The two Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of national self-determination, recognize the independence of the Ukraine and of White Ruthenia, and agree and decide that the eastern frontier of Poland, that is to say, the frontier between Poland on the one hand, and Russia, White Ruthenia and the Ukraine on the other, shall be as follows:

The frontier shall follow the course of the Western Dzwina, from the frontier between Russia and Latvia, to the point at which the frontier of the former Government of Wilno meets the frontier of the former Government of Witebsk; thence it shall follow the frontier between the former Governments of Wilno and Witebsk as far as the road running from the village of Drozdy to the town of Orzechowno, leaving the road and the town of Orzechowno to Poland;

It shall then cross the railway line near the town of Orzechowno, and, turning towards the south-west, shall run along the railway line, leaving the station of Zahacie to Poland, the village of Zahacie to Russia, and the village of Stelmachowo to Poland;

Thence it shall follow the eastern frontier of the former Govern-

ment of Wilno as far as the meeting point of the districts of Dzisna, Lepel and Borysow;

Thence it shall follow the frontier of the former Government of Wilno at an approximate distance of one kilometre, as far as the point at which this frontier turns westward near Sosnowiec;

Thence the frontier shall continue in a straight line towards the sources of the River Czernica to the east of Hornowa and thereafter it shall follow the Czernica river as far as the village of Wielka-Czernica, which it shall leave to White Ruthenia;

Thence it shall continue in a south-westerly direction, across the Lake of Miadziol, to the village of Zarzeczyck which shall be left to White Ruthenia together with the village of Chmieleszczyzna; on the other hand, the villages of Starosiele and of Turowszczyzna shall belong to Poland:

Thence the frontier shall run in a south-westerly direction to the confluence of the River Wilja with an unnamed stream on the west of the village of Drohomicz, leaving to White Ruthenia the following villages: Uhly, Wolbarowicze, Borowe, Szunowka, Beztrock, Daleka, Klaczkówek, Zazantów, Maciejowyce, and the following to Poland: Komajsk, Raszkówka, Osowa, Kusk, Wardomicze, Solone, Milcz;

Thence the line shall follow the river Wilja to the road on the south of the town of Dolhinowo;

Thence it shall pass to the south as far as the village of Baturyn, leaving to White Ruthenia all that road and the villages of Rahożin, of Tokary, of Polosy and of Hluboczany, and to Poland the following villages: Owsianiki, Czarnorucze, Zurawa, Ruszczyce, Zaciemień, Borki, Czerwiaki and Baturyn;

Thence it shall run to the town of Radoszkowicze, leaving to White Ruthenia the villages of Papysze, Sieliszcze, Podworany, Trusowicze North, Doszki, Cyganowo, Dworzyszczce, and Czyrewicze, and to Poland the villages of Lukawiec, Mordasy, Rubce, Lawcowicze North, and Lawcowicze South, Budzki, Klimonty, Wielkie Bakszty and the town of Radoszkowicze;

Thence it shall follow the River Wiazówka, to the village of Lipienie, leaving the latter village to Poland, then running in a south-westerly direction, crossing the railway and leaving the station of Radoszkowicze to White Ruthenia;

Thence it shall run southward as from the town of Raków, leaving to White Ruthenia the villages of Wiekszyce, Dolzenie,

Mietkowa, Wielka Borozdynka and Kozielszczyzna, and to Poland the villages of Szypowaly, Macewicze, Stary Raków, Kuczuny and the town of Raków;

Thence the frontier shall continue as far as the town of Wolma, leaving to White Ruthenia the villages of: Wielkie Siolo, Malawka, Lukasze, and Szczepki, and to Poland the villages of Duszkowo, Chimorydy, Jankowce, and the town of Wolma;

Thence it shall follow the road from the town of Wolma as far as the town of Rubiezewicze, leaving that road and the town to Poland;

Thence it shall continue southward as far as the unnamed inn situated at the point at which the Baranowicze-Mińsk railway crosses the Nowy Swierzeń-Mińsk road (see map, scale one English inch to ten versts, above the letter M at the beginning of the word Miezinowka; and map, scale one English inch to twenty-five versts, near Kolosowo) leaving the inn to Poland; the villages of Papki, Zywica, Poloniewicze, Osinówka, shall go to White Ruthenia and the villages of Lichacze and of Rozanka shall go to Poland;

Thence the frontier shall pass across the center of the Nieświcz-Cimkowicze road to the west of Kukowicze, leaving the villages of Swerynowo, Kutiec, Lunina, Jazwina North, Bieliki, Jazwin, Rymasze, and Kukowicze (all three) to White Ruthenia; the villages of Kul, Buczne, Dwianopol, Zurawy, Posieki, Juszewicze, Lisuny North and Lisuny South, Sultanowszczyzna and Pleszewicze to Poland;

Thence it shall pass halfway between Kleck and Cimkowicze (between the villages of Puzowo and Prochody), leaving to White Ruthenia the villages of Rajówka, Sawicze, Zarakowce, and Puzowo, and to Poland the villages of Marusin, East Smolicze, Lecieszyn, and Prochody;

Thence it shall continue as far as the Warsaw-Moscow road, crossing it to the west of the village of West Filipowicze, and leaving the village of Ciechowa to White Ruthenia and the village of Jodczyce to Poland;

Thence it shall run south as far as the Morocz river, near Choropol, leaving the villages of Stare Mokransy, Zadworze, Mokransy and Choropol to White Ruthenia, and the villages of Ciecierowic, Ostaszki, Lozowicze, and Nowe Mokransy to Poland;

Thence it shall follow the Morocz river as far as its confluence with the river Slucz of Mińsk;

Thence it shall follow the river Slucz as far as its confluence with the River Prypéc;

Thence it shall continue towards the village of Berezce, leaving the villages of Lubowicze, Chilczyce, and Berezce to White Ruthenia, and the villages of North Lutki and South Lutki to Poland;

Thence it shall follow the road from the village of Bukcza, leaving the road and the village of Bukcza to White Ruthenia and the village of Korma to Poland;

Thence it shall continue as far as the Sarny-Olewsk railway, which it shall cross between the stations of Ostki and Snowidowicze, leaving to the Ukraine the villages of Wojtkowicze, Sobiczyn, Michałówka, and Budki Snowidowickie, and to Poland the villages of Radziwilowicze, Raczków, Białowiska, Białowiz, and Snowidowicze;

Thence the frontier shall continue towards the village of Myszakówka, leaving to the Ukraine the villages of Majdan Holyszewski, Zaderewie, Marjanpol, Zolny, Klomowa, and Rudnia Klonowska, and to Poland the villages of Derć, Okopy, Netreba, Woniacze, Perelysianka, Nowa Huta, and Myszakówka;

Thence it shall continue as far as the mouth of the River Korczyk, leaving the village of Mlynek to the Ukraine;

Thence it shall run up the River Korczyk, leaving the town of Korzec to Poland;

Thence it shall continue as far as the village of Milatyn, leaving to the Ukraine the villages of Poddubce, Kilikijów, Dolzki, Narajówka, Ulaszanówka, and Marjanówka, and the villages of Bohdanówka, Czernica, Kryłów, Majków, Dolha, Friederland, Po-reba Kuraska, and Milatyn to Poland;

Thence it shall follow the road leading from the village of Milatyn to the town of Ostróg, leaving the villages of Moszczanówka, Krzywín, and Solowie to the Ukraine, and the villages of Moszczanica, Bodówka, Wilbowno, the town of Ostrog and the road to Poland;

Thence it shall run up the River Wilja as far as the village of Chodaki, which remains to Poland;

Thence it shall continue as far as the town of Białozórka, leaving to the Ukraine the villages of Wielka Borowica, Stepanówka, North Bajmaki and South Bajmaki, Liski, Siwki, Woloski, the town of Jampól, the villages of Didkowce, Wiazowiec, and Krzywcyki, and to Poland the villages of Bolozówka, Sadki, Obory, Szkro-

botówka, Pańkowce, Grzybowa, Lysohorka, Mołodzków, and the town of Białozórka;

Thence it shall continue as far as the River Zbrucz, leaving the road and the village of Szczesnowka to Poland;

Thence it shall follow the River Zbrucz, as far as its confluence with the River Dniester.

ARTICLE 3

Russia and the Ukraine abandon all rights and claims to the territories situated to the west of the frontier laid down by Article 2 of the present Treaty. Poland, on the other hand, abandons in favour of the Ukraine and of White Ruthenia all rights and claims to the territory situated to the east of this frontier. The two Contracting Parties agree that, in so far as the territory situated to the west of the frontier fixed in Article 2 of the present Treaty includes districts which form the subject of a dispute between Poland and Lithuania, the question of the attribution of these districts to one of those two States is a matter which exclusively concerns Poland and Lithuania.

ARTICLE 4

.....

ARTICLE 5

Each of the Contracting Parties mutually undertakes to respect in every way the political sovereignty of the other Party, to abstain from interference in its internal affairs, and particularly to refrain from all agitation, propaganda or interference of any kind, and not to encourage any such movement.

Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to create or protect organisations which are formed with the object of encouraging armed conflict against the other Contracting Party or of undermining its territorial integrity, or of subverting by force its political or social institutions, nor yet such organisations as claim to be the Government of the other Party or of a part of the territories of the other Party. The Contracting Parties therefore, undertake to prevent such organisations, their official representatives and other persons connected therewith, from establishing themselves on their territory, and to prohibit military recruiting and the entry into their territory and transport across it, of armed forces, arms, munitions and war material of any kind destined for such organisations.

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No. 4

Decision of the Conference of Ambassadors, on the subject of the frontiers of Poland, March 15, 1923.

The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, signatories with the United States of America, as the principal Allied and Associated Powers, of the Versailles Treaty of Peace:

Considering that by the terms of Article 87, paragraph 3, of the said Treaty, it is for them to fix the frontiers of Poland, which have not been specified by that Treaty;

Considering that on February 15, 1923, the Polish Government addressed to the Conference of Ambassadors a request inviting the Powers there represented to avail themselves of the rights conferred on them by the said Article;

That, for its part, the Lithuanian Government has already, in its Note of November 18, 1922, shown itself anxious to see the said Powers avail themselves of the said rights;

Considering that by the terms of Article 91 of the Treaty of Peace of Saint Germain-en-Laye, Austria has renounced in favor of the principal Allied and Associated Powers all its rights and titles to the territories which previously belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and which, situated outside the new frontiers of Austria, as they are described in Article 27 of the said Treaty, are not actually the subject of any attribution;

Considering that it is recognized by Poland that in so far as the eastern part of Galicia is concerned, the ethnographical conditions necessitate an autonomous régime;

Considering that the Treaty concluded between the principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland on June 28, 1919, has provided for special guarantees in favour of racial, language and religious minorities in all the territories placed under Polish sovereignty;

Considering that so far as its frontier with Russia is concerned, Poland has entered into direct relations with that State with a view to determining the line;

That in so far as the frontier between Poland and Lithuania is concerned, there is cause to take into account the actual situation resulting, notably, from the Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations on February 3, 1923:

Have charged the Conference of Ambassadors with the regulation of this question.

In consequence, the Conference of Ambassadors:

1. Decides to recognize as the frontiers of Poland:

(1) With Russia:

The line drawn and delimited by the agreement between the two States and on their responsibility dated November 28, 1922.*

(2) With Lithuania:

The line below described (according to the German map, scale 1 : 100,000):

From the point where the northern administrative limit of the district of Suwalki meets the frontier of Eastern Prussia (the point common to Eastern Prussia, Poland and Lithuania) and as far as the most southerly point of re-entry of the limit of the district of Suwalki, a point situated at about seven kilometres to the north-west of Puńsk, the northern administrative limit of the district of Suwalki;

Thence towards the south-east as far as a point on the road Berzniki-Kopciowo, situated about two kilometres to the south-east of Berzniki;

A line to be determined on the spot, leaving Puńsk to Poland, traversing Lake Galadus from its north-westerly extremity as far as a point situated about two kilometres to the north of Zegary, then passing towards the east, then parallel with the line of small lakes situated between Berzniki and Zegary at about two kilometres to the east of these lakes;

Thence as far as a point about two kilometres 500 metres to the east of Zelwa on the River Marycha, a line to be determined on the spot;

Thence, down the course of the River Marycha as far as the confluence of a small tributary situated on the left bank of this river and immediately above Studzianka;

Thence, a line to be determined on the spot as far as the source of the River Igorka, then the course of this river which passes to Warwizki as far as its confluence with the Niemen;

Thence, down the course of the River Niemen as far as the confluence of the River Grawe;

* Polish-Soviet Delimitation of Frontiers Agreement, signed November 28, 1922, under the Treaty of Riga.

Thence, the River Grawe as far as the point where it intersects the high road from Merez to Rotnica;

Thence, a line to be determined on the spot as far as the confluence of the River Skroblis with the River Merezanka;

Thence, the course of the Merezanka, as far as a bridge about 300 metres to the south-east of Podkamień;

Thence and as far as frontier post 142 at about two kilometres to the north-east of Strzelciszki;

A line to be determined on the spot, leaving to Lithuania the localities of Podkamień, Karpiszki, Strzelciszki, to Poland those of Bortele, Kukle, and passing by way of the intersection of the roads from Bobryszki to Olkieni and from Orany to Wojtowo on the railway from Grodno to Wilno;

Thence as far as a point to be determined on the course of the River Wilja at about 800 metres to the west of Siurmańce;

A line to be determined on the spot, leaving to Lithuania the localities of Kalańce, Szpiengleniki, Giccieniszki, Uzuleje, Prybańce, Greczówka, Ismańce, Jagielany, Dergiańce, Kopciszki, Zailgi, Chwoszczyzna, Niedzwiedówka, Janczuny, Daniliszki, Jerzówka, Nowy Dwór, Promysłówka, Walakiszki, Kurkliszki, Kalejkiemie, Wiluniszki, Kiermanczyszki, Bialolesie and Owsieniszki, and leaving to Poland the localities of Wójtowo, Puzkarnia, Czarnókwale, Kol-Lejpuny, Wejksztelańce, Ejgielańce, Markowszczyzna, Strazn, Skobsk, Wizgirdy, Dombrowo, Dembniaki, Stanisławówka, Kotysz, Staszkuniszki, Lebedzie, Mejluszki, Podworańce, Glity, Pietkieniszki, Kiermeliszki, Kudrany, Poniewiezka, Mejdany, Miciuny, Lojcziszki, Mejryszki, Barcie, Jateluny, Puzanowo, Kazimirówka and Siurmańce;

Thence, the course of the River Wilja as far as a point situated about one kilometre 200 metres to the south of Sejmieniszki;

Thence and as far as a point to be determined at the southwestern extremity of Lake Dubińskie to the south of Zaltynie;

A line to be determined on the spot, leaving in Lithuanian territory Pospierze, Kejmińce, Sketery, Olinowo, Pory, Kontromiszki, Kiele, Awizańce, Nieczańce, Bojary, Olany, Palki, Ollis, Okmianka, Towkiele, Aleksandryszki, Gawejki, Zaltynie, and in Polish territory the localities of Podworańce, Podgaj, Drawcza, Mejluny, Papiernia, Bortkuszki, Uzubledzie, Lipówka, Poblyńdzie, Zyndule, Astyki, Szalkowszczyzna, Romaszkańce, Pogiry, Borówka, Santoki,

Pustylki, Gudejki, Stolewyszczyna, Zylwiszki, Szmilginie, Gawejki, Sidabry;

Thence, a line traversing Lake Dubińskie as far as a point to be determined on the north-east bank at about 500 metres to the south-east of Olka;

Thence and as far as a point to be determined on the south bank of Lake Prowal to the east of Surgańce;

A line to be determined on the spot, leaving in Lithuanian territory the localities of Olka, Lake Bolosza, Labejszyszki, Mlynek, Janiszki, Szerejkiszki, Surgańce, and in Polish territory the localities of Jankuniszki, Purwiniszki, Szarkiszki, Maciejowo, Ormiany, Skardzie, Nowosiółka, Grzybiańce;

Thence and as far as a point to be determined on the southern edge of the lake on the bank of which is Antolkony and at 500 metres to the west of this locality;

A line to be determined on the spot, leaving in Lithuanian territory the localities of Madejki, Mazule, Szakaliszki, Andrulańce, Zukowszczyzna, Zemajtyszki, Prudziszki, Poluknis, Pozenis, Zwirbliszki, Sidoriszki, Melejszany, and in Polish territory the localities of Maldziuny, Rutowszczyzna, Baranowo, Antoledzie, Berniuny, Lyngmiany, Antokalny;

And thence as far as the frontier of Latvia;

A line to be determined on the spot running towards the north-east then towards the north, passing between Lake Bolosza and Lake Dringis, and leaving in Lithuanian territory the localities of Auksztenis, Achramiańce, Rejnie, Azany, Sadziuny, W.-Derewnia, Suntupie, Kalniszki, Szablowczyzna, Mugliszki, Jurkokalnie, Smolweczki, Werugiszki, and in Polish territory the localities of Kozaczyzna, Mejluny, Wardzikiemie, Alicjuny, Sakiszki, Pozemiszki, Karaczuny, Smolwy, Paukszteliszki, Smolwy (north), Dulkiszki, Matejkiszki;

The tracing of this line on the spot is left to the care of the two Governments concerned, who will have every latitude to proceed, by mutual agreement, to rectifications of detail which they may recognize on the spot as indispensable.

2. Decides to recognize to Poland, which accepts all rights of sovereignty over the territories comprised between the frontiers above defined and the other frontiers of the Polish territory, with reserve to the dispositions of the Treaty of Peace concluded at Saint Germain-en-Laye concerning the charges and obligations incumbent

upon the States to which any territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is transferred.

Done at Paris, March 15, 1923.

Eric Phipps.

R. Poincaré.

Romano Arezzana.

M. Matsuda.

The undersigned, duly authorized, declares, in the name of the Polish Government, his acceptance of the foregoing dispositions.

Done at Paris, March 15, 1923.

Maurice Zamoycki.

No. 5

Note of April 5, 1923 from Hon. Hugh Gibson, Minister of the United States of America in Warsaw, to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, taking cognizance of the Decision of the Council of Ambassadors of March 15, 1923.

Warsaw, April 5, 1923.

Excellency:

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that my Government has taken cognizance of the decision of the Council of Ambassadors at Paris of March 15, 1923 with regard to the Polish frontiers, this decision being in harmony with the assertions of territorial Sovereignty of Poland.

In view of this the officials of the American Government charged with the administration of the immigration law have agreed that for the balance of the present fiscal year the quotas of the regions of Pinsk and Eastern Galicia shall be merged into that of Poland.

I take the occasion to express, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

HUGH GIBSON.

No. 6

Protocol between Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Rumania, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for the immediate entry into force of the Treaty of Paris of August 27, 1928, regarding renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, signed at Moscow, February 9, 1929.*

The Government of the Estonian Republic, the President of the Latvian Republic, the President of the Polish Republic, His Majesty

* Briand-Kellogg Pact.

the King of Rumania, and the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, being desirous of promoting the maintenance of peace between their respective countries and for this purpose of putting into force without delay, between the peoples of those countries, the Treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, signed at Paris on August 27, 1928, have decided to achieve this purpose by means of the present Protocol and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries.....

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The Treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, signed at Paris on August 27, 1928, a copy of which is attached to the present Protocol as an integral part of that instrument, shall come into force between the Contracting Parties after the ratification of the said Treaty of Paris of 1928 by the competent legislative bodies of the respective Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 2

The entry into force in virtue of the present Protocol, of the Treaty of Paris of 1928 in reciprocal relations between the Parties to the present Protocol shall be valid independently of the entry into force of the Treaty of Paris of 1928 as provided in Article 3 of the last-named Treaty.

ARTICLE 3

1. The present Protocol shall be ratified by the competent legislative bodies of the Contracting Parties, in conformity with the requirements of their respective constitutions.
2. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited by each of the Contracting Parties with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics within one week of the ratification of the present Protocol by the respective parties.
3. As from the date of the deposit of the instruments of ratification by two of the Contracting Parties, the present Protocol shall come into force between those two Parties. In reciprocal relations between the other Contracting Parties and the States for which it

has already come into force, the Protocol shall come into force as and when their instruments of ratification are deposited.

4. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall immediately notify the deposit of the several ratifications to all the signatories to the present Protocol.

ARTICLE 4

In order to give effect to Article 1 of the present Protocol, each of the Contracting Parties, after ratification by its legislative bodies of the Treaty of Paris of 1928, shall immediately notify the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all the other Parties to the present Protocol, through the diplomatic channel.

ARTICLE 5

The present Protocol shall be open for the accession of the Governments of all countries. Notification of final accession shall be made to the address of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall duly notify all the other Parties to the present Protocol. Immediately on receipt of such notification of accession, the present Protocol shall be put into force in reciprocal relations between the acceding State and all the other Parties to the present Protocol.

ARTICLE 6

The entry into force, in virtue of the present Protocol, of the Treaty of Paris of 1928, in reciprocal relations between the acceding State and all the other Parties to the said Protocol, shall be effected in the way laid down in Article 4 of the Protocol.

ARTICLE 7

The present Protocol has been drawn up in a single copy, an authentic copy of which shall be communicated by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to each of the signatory or acceding States.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol and have affixed their seals thereto.

No. 7

Pact of Non-Aggression between Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Moscow, July 25, 1932.

The President of the Polish Republic, of the one part, and the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of the other part,

Desirous of maintaining the present state of peace between their countries, and convinced that the maintenance of peace between them constitutes an important factor in the work of preserving universal peace;

Considering that the Treaty of Peace of March 18, 1921, constitutes, now as in the past, the basis of their reciprocal relations and undertakings;

Convinced that the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the exclusion of all that might be contrary to the normal condition of relations between States are the surest means of arriving at the goal desired;

Declaring that none of the obligations hitherto assumed by either of the Parties stands in the way of the peaceful development of their mutual relations or is incompatible with the present Pact;

Have decided to conclude the present Pact with the object of amplifying and completing the pact for the renunciation of war signed at Paris on August 27, 1928, and put into force by the Protocol signed at Moscow on February 9, 1929, and for that purpose have designated as their Plenipotentiaries.....

Who, after exchanging their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1

The two Contracting Parties, recording the fact that they have renounced war as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations, reciprocally undertake to refrain from taking any aggressive action against or invading the territory of the other Party, either alone or in conjunction with other Powers.

Any act of violence attacking the integrity and inviolability of the territory or the political independence of the other Contracting Party shall be regarded as contrary to the undertakings contained in the present Article, even if such acts are committed without declaration of war and avoid all possible warlike manifestations.

ARTICLE 2

Should one of the Contracting Parties be attacked by a third State or by a group of other States, the other Contracting Party undertakes not to give aid or assistance, either directly or indirectly, to the aggressor State during the whole period of the conflict.

If one of the Contracting Parties commits an act of aggression against a third State the other Contracting Party shall have the right to be released from the present Treaty without previous denunciation.

ARTICLE 3

Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to be a party to any agreement openly hostile to the other Party from the point of view of aggression.

ARTICLE 4

The undertakings provided for in Articles 1 and 2 of the present Pact shall in no case limit or modify the international rights and obligations of each Contracting Party under agreements concluded by it before the coming into force of the present Pact, so far as the said agreements contain no aggressive elements.

ARTICLE 5

The two Contracting Parties, desirous of settling and solving, exclusively by peaceful means, any disputes and differences, of whatever nature or origin, which may arise between them, undertake to submit questions at issue, which it has not been possible to settle within a reasonable period by diplomatic channels, to a procedure of conciliation, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention for the application of the procedure of conciliation, which constitutes an integral part of the present Pact and shall be signed separately and ratified as soon as possible simultaneously with the Pact of Non-Aggression.¹

ARTICLE 6

The present Pact shall be ratified as soon as possible, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Warsaw within thirty days following the ratification by Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, after which the Pact shall come into force immediately.

ARTICLE 7

The Pact is concluded for three years. If it is not denounced by one of the Contracting Parties, after previous notice of not

¹The Convention for Conciliation between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was signed at Moscow, November 23, 1932.

less than six months before the expiry of that period, it shall be automatically renewed for a further period of two years.

ARTICLE 8

The present Pact is drawn up in Polish and Russian, both texts being authentic.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Pact and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Moscow, in two copies, July 25, 1932.

PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE NO. 1

The Contracting Parties declare that Article 7 of the Pact of July 25, 1932, cannot be interpreted as meaning that the expiry of the time-limit or denunciation before the expiry of the time-period under Article 7 could have as a result the limitation or cancellation of the obligations arising out of the Pact of Paris of 1928.

Done at Moscow, in two copies, July 25, 1932.

PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE NO. 2

On signing the Pact of Non-Aggression this day, the two Parties having exchanged their views on the draft Conciliation Convention submitted by the Soviet Party, declare that they are convinced that there is no essential difference of opinion between them.

Done at Moscow, in two copies, July 25, 1932.

No. 8

*Convention for the Definition of Aggression, signed at London,
July 3, 1933.*

His Majesty the King of Rumania, the President of the Estonian Republic, the President of the Latvian Republic, the President of the Polish Republic, the President of the Turkish Republic, the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia, and His Majesty the King of Afghanistan;

Being desirous of consolidating the peaceful relations existing between their countries;

Mindful of the fact that the Briand-Kellogg Pact, of which they are signatories, prohibits all aggression;

Deeming it necessary, in the interests of the general security, to define aggression as specifically as possible, in order to obviate any pretext whereby it might be justified;

And noting that all States have an equal right to independence, security, the defence of their territories, and the free development of their institutions;

And desirous, in the interest of the general peace, to ensure to all peoples the inviolability of the territory of their countries;

And judging it expedient, in the interest of the general peace, to bring into force, as between their countries, precise rules defining aggression, until such time as those rules shall become universal;

Have decided, with the aforesaid objects, to conclude the present Convention, and have duly authorized for this purpose.....

Who have agreed on the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to accept in its relations with each of the other Parties, from the date of the entry into force of the present Convention, the definition of aggression as explained in the report dated May 24, 1933, of the Committee on Security Questions (Politis Report) to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, which report was made in consequence of the proposal of the Soviet delegation.

ARTICLE 2

Accordingly, the aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute, be considered to be that State which is the first to commit any of the following actions:

1. Declaration of war upon another State;
2. Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State;
3. Attack by its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State;
4. Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State;
5. Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take, in its own

territory, all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.

ARTICLE 3

No political, military, economic or other considerations may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred to in Article 2 (for examples see Annex).

ARTICLE 4

The present Convention shall be ratified by each of the High Contracting Parties in accordance with its laws.

The instruments of ratification shall be deposited by each of the High Contracting Parties with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

As soon as the instruments of ratification have been deposited by two of the High Contracting Parties, the present Convention shall come into force as between those two Parties. The Convention shall come into force as regards each of the other High Contracting Parties when it deposits its instruments of ratification.

Each deposit of instruments of ratification shall immediately be notified by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to all the signatories of the present Convention.

ARTICLE 5

The present Convention has been signed in eight copies, of which each of the High Contracting Parties has received one.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done in London, July 3, 1933.

ANNEX

To Article 3 of the Convention for the Definition of Aggression.

The High Contracting Parties, signatories of the Convention for the Definition of Aggression.

Desiring, subject to the express reservation that the absolute validity of the rule laid down in Article 3 of that Convention shall be in no way restricted, to furnish certain indications for determining the aggressor.

Declare that no act of aggression within the meaning of Article 2 of that Convention can be justified on either of the following grounds, among others:

(a) The internal condition of a State:

E.g., its political, economic, or social structure; alleged defects in its administration; disturbances due to strikes, revolutions, counter-revolutions, or civil war.

(b) The international conduct of a State:

E.g., the violation or threatened violation of the material or moral rights or interests of a foreign State or its nationals; the rupture of diplomatic or economic relations; economic or financial boycotts; disputes relating to economic, financial, or other obligations towards foreign States; frontier incidents not forming any of the cases of aggression specified in Article 2.

The High Contracting Parties further agree to recognize that the present Convention can never legitimate any violations of international law that may be implied in the circumstances comprised in the above list.

PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE

It is hereby agreed between the High Contracting Parties that should one or more of the other States immediately adjacent to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics accede in the future to the present Convention, the said accession shall confer on the State or States in question the same rights and shall impose on them the same obligations as those conferred and imposed on the ordinary signatories.¹

No. 9

Protocol signed at Moscow, May 5, 1934, between Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics prolonging until December 31, 1945, the Pact of Non-Aggression of July 25, 1932.

The President of the Republic of Poland, and The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Being desirous of providing as firm a basis as possible for the development of the relations between their countries;

Being desirous of giving each other fresh proof of the unchange-

¹On July 22, 1933, the Republic of Finland adhered to this Convention.

able character and solidity of the pacific and friendly relations happily established between them;

Moved by the desire to collaborate in the consolidation of world peace and also for the stability and peaceful development of international relations in Eastern Europe;

Noting that the conclusion on July 5, 1932, at Moscow, of the Treaty between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has had a beneficial influence on the development of their relations and on the solution of the above-mentioned problems;

Have decided to sign the present Protocol, and have for this purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries.....

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and true form, have agreed on the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1

In modification of the provisions of Article 7 of the Treaty of Non-Aggression concluded at Moscow on July 25, 1932, between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the date and manner in which that Treaty shall cease to have effect, the two Contracting Parties decide that it shall remain in force until December 31, 1945.

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall be entitled to denounce the Treaty by giving notice to that effect six months before the expiry of the above-mentioned period. If the Treaty is not denounced by either of the Contracting Parties, its period of validity shall be automatically prolonged for two years; similarly, the Treaty shall be regarded as prolonged on each occasion for a further period of two years, if it is not denounced by either of the Contracting Parties in the manner provided for in the present Article.

ARTICLE 2

The present Protocol is drawn up in duplicate, each copy being in the Polish and Russian languages and both texts being equally authentic.

The present Protocol shall be ratified as soon as possible, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged between the Contracting Parties at Warsaw.

The present Protocol shall come into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Moscow in duplicate, in the Polish and Russian languages, the 5th day of May, 1934.

FINAL PROTOCOL

In connection with the signature on this date of the Protocol prolonging the Treaty of Non-Aggression between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of July 25, 1932, each of the High Contracting Parties, having again examined all the provisions of the Peace Treaty concluded at Riga on March 18, 1921, which constitutes the basis of their mutual relations, declares that it has no obligations and is not bound by any declarations inconsistent with the provisions of the said Peace Treaty and in particular of Article 3 thereof.

Consequently, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics confirms that the Note from the People's Commissar, G. V. Tchitcherin, of September 28, 1926, to the Lithuanian Government cannot be interpreted to mean that the Note implied any intention on the part of the Soviet Government to interfere in the settlement of the territorial questions mentioned therein.

Done at Moscow in duplicate, in the Polish and Russian languages, the 5th day of May, 1934.

No. 10

Notes exchanged in Moscow on September 10, 1934, between the Polish Government and the Soviet Government in connection with the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the League of Nations.

Moscow, September 10, 1934.

Mr. People's Commissar,

In connection with the eventuality of the entry of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into the League of Nations, the Government of the Republic of Poland proposes to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics a reciprocal recognition that after the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has entered the League of Nations the relations between the Republic of Poland and the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will in all their extent continue on the basis of all existing agreements between them, including the Pact of Non-Aggression and the Convention for the Definition of Aggression.

HENRYK SOKOLNICKI.

Mr. Mikolai Krestinski,
Director of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
in Moscow.

Moscow, September 10, 1934.

Mr. Chargé d'Affaires,

In reply to your Note of even date, I have the honor to communicate to you in the name of my Government that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics completely agrees with the Polish Government on the question that, after the eventual invitation to and entry of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into the League of Nations, the relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Poland will remain on the basis of the treaties existing between them, all of which, including the Pact of Non-Aggression and the Convention for the Definition of Aggression, will continue to preserve all their force.

M. KRESTINSKI.

Mr. Sokolnicki,
Chargé d'Affaires of the Republic of Poland in Moscow.

No. 11

Joint Communiqué issued in Moscow, November 26, 1938, by the Polish and Soviet Governments on the subject of Polish-Soviet relations.

A series of conversations recently held between M. Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., and M. Grzybowski, Polish Ambassador in Moscow, has led to the following statement:

1. Relations between the Polish Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are and will continue to be based to the fullest extent on all the existing Agreements, including the Polish-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression dated July 25, 1932. This Pact, concluded for five years and extended on May 5, 1934, for a

further period ending December 31, 1945, has a basis wide enough to guarantee the inviolability of peaceful relations between the two States.

2. Both Governments are favorable to the extension of their commercial relations.

3. Both Governments agree that it is necessary to settle a number of current and longstanding matters which have arisen in connection with the various agreements in force, and, in particular, to dispose of the various frontier incidents which have lately been occurring.

CHAPTER 2

Soviet Aggression and Polish-Soviet Conflict arising therefrom

No. 12

Despatch of September 17, 1939, from Mr. Grzybowski, Polish Ambassador in Moscow, to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs reporting his conversation with M. Potemkin, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

Moscow, September 17, 1939.

Mr. Potemkin sent for me today, September 17, at 3 a.m., and read me a Note from his Government, signed by Premier Molotov. The Note communicates that the Soviet Government have ordered their troops to cross the Polish frontier. The motives given in the Note were of such a nature that I refused to take it into cognizance and categorically protested against its contents. In view of the absence of Soviet diplomatic representatives from Poland, I agreed only to transmit the above information. I await instructions.

No. 13

Text of Note of September 17, 1939, read by M. Potemkin, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to M. Grzybowski, Polish Ambassador in Moscow.

The Polish-German War has revealed the internal bankruptcy of the Polish State. During the course of ten days' hostilities Poland

has lost all her industrial areas and cultural centres. Warsaw no longer exists as the capital of Poland. The Polish Government has disintegrated, and no longer shows any sign of life. This means that the Polish State and its Government have, in fact, ceased to exist. Therefore the Agreements concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Poland have ceased to operate. Left to her own devices and bereft of leadership, Poland has become a suitable field for all manner of hazards and surprises, which may constitute a threat to the U.S.S.R. For these reasons the Soviet Government, which hitherto has preserved neutrality, cannot any longer observe a neutral attitude towards these facts.

The Soviet Government further cannot view with indifference the fact that the kindred Ukrainian and White Ruthenian people, who live on Polish territory and who are at the mercy of fate, are left defenceless.

In these circumstances, the Soviet Government has directed the High Command of the Red Army to order the troops to cross the frontier and to take under their protection the life and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia.

At the same time the Soviet Government proposes to take all measures to extricate the Polish people from the unfortunate war into which they were dragged by their unwise leaders, and enable them to live a peaceful life.

No. 14

Communiqué issued on September 17, 1939, by the Polish Embassy in London.

London, September 17, 1939.

On September 17, at 4 a.m., Soviet troops crossed the frontier of Poland at many points and were met immediately with strong resistance on the part of the Polish national army. A sharp encounter in particular is being fought near the frontier in the region of Molodeczno.

The pretext which the Soviet Government advance in order to justify this flagrant act of direct aggression is that the Polish Government has ceased to exist, and that it has abandoned the territory of Poland, thus leaving the Polish population on territories outside the zone of war with Germany without protection. The

Polish Government cannot enter into any discussion of the pretext which the Soviet Government has invented in order to justify the violation of the Polish frontier.

The Polish Government, responsible to the President of the Republic and to the duly elected National Parliament, are functioning on Polish territory and are carrying on the war against the German aggressors by all the means in their power.

By the act of direct aggression committed this morning the Soviet Government have flagrantly violated the Polish-Russian Pact of Non-Aggression concluded in Moscow on July 25, 1932, in which both parties mutually undertook to abstain from all aggressive action or from attack against each other. Moreover, on May 5, 1934, by the Protocol signed in Moscow, the above Pact of Non-Aggression was prolonged until December 31, 1945.

By the Convention concluded in London on July 3, 1933, Soviet Russia and Poland agreed on a definition of aggression, which clearly stamped as an act of aggression any encroachment upon the territory of one Contracting Party by the armed forces of the other and furthermore, that no consideration of a political, military, economic, or any other order could in any circumstances serve as a pretext or excuse for committing an act of aggression.

Therefore, by the act of wanton aggression committed this morning, the Soviet Government stands self-condemned as a violator of its international obligations, thus contradicting all the moral principles upon which Soviet Russia pretended to base her foreign policy since her admittance into the League of Nations.

No. 15

Communiqué issued in Kutyn on September 17, 1939, by the Polish Government, protesting against the Soviet aggression.

The Polish Ambassador in Moscow has refused to accept the Note presented to him to-day by the Soviet Government.

The Polish Government has approved this attitude of their Ambassador who has asked the Soviet Government for his passports.

The Polish Government solemnly protest against the unilateral violation of the Non-Aggression Pact by Russia and against the invasion of Polish territory at a moment when the whole Polish Nation is making a supreme effort to repel the German aggressor,

The Polish Government protests against the motives alleged in the Note of the Soviet Government because the Polish Government are carrying on their normal activities and the Polish Army is successfully resisting the enemy.

No. 16

*Note of September 18, 1939, presented by the Polish Ambassador in Paris to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs.**

On the instruction of his Government the Polish Ambassador has the honor to communicate the following to the Government of the French Republic:

To-day, September 17, 1939, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics committed an aggression against Poland. At dawn large Soviet forces crossed the Polish frontier at several points. The Polish troops resisted. In view of the superiority of the Soviet forces, the Polish troops withdrew, fighting.

The Polish Government have protested to Moscow, and have instructed their Ambassador to demand his passports. The Polish Government await from the Allied French Government a categorical protest against the aggression committed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Polish Government reserve the right to call upon their Allies in regard to the obligations devolving upon them by virtue of the treaties in force.

No. 17

German-Soviet Communiqué of September 18, 1939, concerning military co-operation on Polish territory.

In order to avoid all kinds of unfounded rumours concerning the respective aims of the Soviet and German armies operating in Poland the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German Government declare that the operations of these armies do not involve any aim contrary to the interests of Germany and of the U.S.S.R. or to the spirit and the letter of the German-Russian pact of non-

* A similar Note was presented to the British Foreign Office by the Polish Ambassador in London.

aggression. On the contrary, the aim of these armies is to restore peace and order destroyed by the collapse of the Polish State and to help the Polish population to reconstruct the conditions of their political existence.

No. 18

German-Soviet Communiqué of September 22, 1939, on the demarcation line between the German and Soviet military zones.

The German Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have established a demarcation line between the Soviet and the German armies along the course of the river Pissa to its confluence with the river Narew; further the river Narew to its confluence with the river Bug; then the river Bug to its confluence with the river Vistula.

No. 19

Soviet-German Agreement signed in Moscow, September 28, 1939.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German Government, following the collapse of the former Polish State, consider it as exclusively their own task to restore peace and order in these territories and to assure to the peoples inhabiting them a peaceful existence which will correspond to their national characteristics. With this object in view, they have concluded the following Agreement:

ARTICLE 1

The Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German Government establish, as the frontier between their respective State interests in the territory of the former Polish State, a line which is marked on the attached map and which will be given in more detail in a supplementary Protocol.

ARTICLE 2

Both countries recognize as final the frontier between their respective State interests, as set out in Article 1, and will resist any interference with this decision on the part of other Powers.

ARTICLE 3

The German Government will carry out the necessary State reconstruction on the territory west of the line indicated in Article 1, and the Soviet Government on the territory east of this line.

ARTICLE 4

The Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German Government regard the above-mentioned reconstruction as a reliable foundation for the future development of friendly relations between their peoples.

ARTICLE 5

This agreement is subject to ratification. The exchange of instruments of ratification is to take place as soon as possible in Berlin.

The agreement enters into force from the moment of its signature.

MOLOTOV

RIBBENTROP

 No. 20

*Polish Government's protest of September 30, 1939, against the German-Soviet Agreement of September 28, 1939, presented by the Polish Ambassador in London to the British Foreign Office.**

In face of the flagrant violation of the sacred rights of the Polish State and the Polish Nation constituted by the Agreement of September 28 between Germany and the U.S.S.R., disposing of territories of the Polish Republic for the benefit of the two aggressor States, in the name of the Polish Government I make the most formal and solemn protest against this machination woven between Berlin and Moscow in contempt of all international obligations and all human morality.

Poland will never recognize this act of violence, and strong in the justice of her cause she will not cease to struggle for the day when, her territory liberated from the invaders, her legitimate rights will be established in their entirety.

By the heroic resistance of her army, by the patriotic sacrifice of all her population which has been demonstrated in the heroic defence of the capital city of Warsaw, of Lwów, of Gdynia, of Modlin and of so many other towns, the Polish nation has clearly proved to the world its steadfast will to live in freedom and independence.

Basing herself on the unanimous sympathy of all the countries which respect liberty and good faith in relations between peoples,

* A similar protest was presented by Polish diplomatic representatives abroad to the respective Governments to which they were accredited.

and confident in the steadfast support which is guaranteed her by her treaties of alliance, Poland will continue the struggle by all means in her power, confident in her future and in ultimate victory.

No. 21

Soviet-Lithuanian Agreement signed in Moscow, October 10, 1939.

With a view to furthering the friendly relations established by the Treaty of Peace of July 12, 1920, between the U.S.S.R. and the Lithuanian Republic, which are based on the mutual recognition of political independence and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other State, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. on the one part and the President of the Lithuanian Republic on the other part:

Being of the opinion that the treaty of non-aggression and peaceful settlement of differences has continued, since it was signed on September 28, 1926, to serve as the foundation of their mutual relations and obligations;

Being convinced moreover that it is in the interests of the two Contracting Parties to define the exact conditions of their guarantee of mutual security and of a just decision as to sovereignty over the city and district of Wilno, which were illegally detached from Lithuania by Poland;

Have deemed it necessary to conclude the present Agreement for the restoration of the city and district of Wilno to the Lithuanian Republic, as well as a pact of mutual assistance between the U.S.S.R. and Lithuania, and for this purpose have appointed their Plenipotentiaries

Article 1

In order to strengthen the friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Lithuania, the city of Wilno and the district of Wilno are hereby returned to the Republic of Lithuania by the U.S.S.R. to be reunited with the territory of the State of Lithuania. The boundary between the U.S.S.R. and the Republic of Lithuania is demarcated as shown in the attached map. This boundary line is to be more exactly described in a supplementary Protocol.

No. 22

Polish Government's protest of October 18, 1939, against the Soviet-Lithuanian Agreement sent to Allied and Neutral Governments through Polish diplomatic representatives.

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Polish Government, having learned of the Pact of Mutual Assistance signed on October 10, 1939, between the U.S.S.R. and Lithuania, have presented a formal protest to the Lithuanian Government against the acceptance by the said Government of any territory ceded by the U.S.S.R. which does not belong to that Union.

 No. 23

Polish Government's protest of October 21, 1939, against the holding of a plebiscite by the Soviets on Polish territory temporarily occupied by the U.S.S.R. sent to Allied and Neutral Governments through Polish diplomatic representatives.

By order of my Government, I have the honor to submit the following for your Excellency's information:

The Polish Government have just learned that on Polish territory temporarily occupied by the U.S.S.R. a plebiscite is to be held to ascertain the will of the population on the question of the transfer of such territory to the U.S.S.R.

The Polish Government hereby declare that the holding of such a plebiscite in areas under military occupation is contrary to International Law. Therefore they will consider such a plebiscite as null and void, and in no case will they recognize it as having force of law.

 No. 24

Decree of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. issued in Moscow on November 1, 1939, concerning the incorporation of Western Ukraine into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its union with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics having heard the report of the Authorized Committee of the National Assembly of Western Ukraine has decided as follows:

1. To comply with the petition of the National Assembly of Western Ukraine to incorporate it in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to unite it with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

2. To instruct the Presidium of the Supreme Council to fix a date for the election of representatives of Western Ukraine to the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.

3. To propose to the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic the admission of Western Ukraine to the Ukrainian S.S.R.

4. To instruct the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. to submit to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. for examination a plan for the demarcation of boundaries between the provinces and districts on the borders of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic and the White-Ruthenian Socialist Soviet Republic.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme
Council of the U.S.S.R.

M. KALININ.

Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme
Council of the U.S.S.R.

A. GORKIN.

No. 25

Decree of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. issued in Moscow on November 2, 1939, concerning the incorporation of Western White Ruthenia into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its union with the White Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics having heard the report of the Authorized Committee of the National Assembly of Western White Ruthenia has decided as follows:

1. To comply with the petition of the National Assembly of Western White Ruthenia to incorporate Western White Ruthenia into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to unite it with the White Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republic.

2. To instruct the Presidium of the Supreme Council to fix a date for the election of representatives of Western White Ruthenia to the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.

3. To propose to the Supreme Council of the White Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republic the admission of Western White Ruthenia to the White Ruthenian S.S.R.

4. To instruct the Supreme Council of the White Ruthenian S.S.R. to submit to the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. for examination a plan for the demarcation of boundaries between the provinces and districts on the borders of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the White Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme
Council of the U.S.S.R.

M. KALININ.

Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme
Council of the U.S.S.R.

A. GORKIN.

No. 26

Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. issued in Moscow on November 29, 1939, concerning the acquisition of citizenship of the U.S.S.R. by the inhabitants of the Western districts of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian S.S.R.

1. In conformity with the Citizenship of the U.S.S.R. Act of August 19th, 1938, it is decreed that the following are henceforth citizens of the U.S.S.R.:

- a) former Polish citizens who were on the territory of the Western districts* of the Ukraine and White Ruthenia when these became part of the U.S.S.R. (November 1 and 2, 1939).
- b) persons who arrived in the U.S.S.R. on the basis of the agreement of November 16, 1939, between the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German Government as well as those who arrived as a result of the cession by the U.S.S.R. to Lithuania of the city of Wilno and the district* of Wilno in accordance with the agreement of October 10, 1939.

2. Former Polish citizens resident in the Western districts* of the Ukraine and White Ruthenia who were not present in the territory of these districts* on November 1 and 2, 1939, and do

* *Oblast.*

not possess Soviet citizenship can acquire the citizenship of the U.S.S.R. by the procedure provided in Article 3 of the Citizenship of the U.S.S.R. Act.

3. Such persons enumerated in Paragraph 1 of the present Decree as were deprived of Soviet citizenship under the Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. of December 15th, 1921 may acquire citizenship of the U.S.S.R. by the procedure provided in Article 3 of the Citizenship of the U.S.S.R. Act.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme
Council of the U.S.S.R.

M. KALININ.

Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme
Council of the U.S.S.R.

A. GORKIN.

No. 27

Polish Government's Protest of February 3, 1940, against the conscription of Polish citizens by the Red Army, sent to Allied and Neutral Governments through Polish diplomatic representatives.

By order of my Government I have the honor to submit the following for Your Excellency's information:

The Soviet authorities have proceeded on the territories of the Republic of Poland occupied by the armies of the U.S.S.R. to carry out a military census of all men aged from 18 to 50 and of all women who have attended nursing courses, and this as a preliminary step to their military service.

Further to its protest against the decision to incorporate the above mentioned territories in the U.S.S.R. and having regard to the stipulations of international law in force, the Polish Government protests against this new violation of international law and custom.

In drawing attention to the fact that the use of force to compel Polish nationals to serve in the army of a State which occupied by violence part of the territory of Poland, will entail a large number of victims, the Polish Government here and now hold responsible therefore the Government of the U.S.S.R.

No. 28

Polish Government's Protest of July 25, 1940, against the annexation of the district of Wilno, sent to Allied and Neutral Governments through Polish diplomatic representatives.

By order of my Government I have the honor to submit the following for Your Excellency's information:

The Government of the U.S.S.R. has proceeded to annex the territories of the three Baltic Republics. This annexation also includes the territory of Wilno which was already illegally occupied by Soviet troops in September 1939 and retroceded to the Lithuanian Government in October 1939, and is now reoccupied by Soviet troops simultaneously with the Lithuanian territory.

The Polish Government solemnly protests against this new violation of international law by the U.S.S.R. and formally reserves all its rights to the territories of the Republic of Poland occupied by Soviet troops, whether in September 1939 or recently. This act of violence committed by the U.S.S.R. confers upon it no rights whatsoever to the territories thus occupied, and the Polish Government reserve the right to claim at the appropriate time reparation from the Soviet Government for damages which the Soviet occupation has caused or may cause to Poland and Polish nationals.

No. 29

Polish Government's Protest of February 21, 1941, against the forcing of Soviet citizenship on Polish citizens, sent to Allied and Neutral Governments through Polish diplomatic representatives.

By order of my Government I have the honor to submit the following for Your Excellency's information:

The Polish Government has recently been informed that the Soviet authorities acting now on the Polish territories occupied by the U.S.S.R. are proceeding to register the population and are forcing Polish citizens, under threat of reprisals, to renounce formally their Polish nationality, to cease all activity aimed at the restoration of the independence of Poland, and to declare that they will henceforward consider themselves loyal citizens of the U.S.S.R.

The Polish Government protests against this new and flagrant breach of the elementary principles of international law and justice

by the U.S.S.R. which, in agreement with the German Reich, invaded Polish territory in arms.

The Polish Government here and now declares that it will consider null and void any declaration of the sort indicated above, that Polish citizens may be driven to make under duress by Soviet authorities.

CHAPTER 3

The Polish-Soviet Agreement of 1941

No. 30

Polish-Soviet Agreement signed in London, July 30, 1941.

The Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have concluded the present Agreement and decided as follows:

1. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes that the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 relative to territorial changes in Poland have lost their validity. The Government of the Republic of Poland declares that Poland is not bound by any Agreement with any third State directed against the U.S.S.R.

2. Diplomatic relations will be restored between the two Governments upon the signature of this Agreement and an exchange of ambassadors will follow immediately.

3. The two Governments mutually undertake to render one another aid and support of all kinds in the present war against Hitlerite Germany.

4. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expresses its consent to the formation on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of a Polish Army under a commander appointed by the Government of the Republic of Poland, in agreement with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be subordinated in operational matters to the Supreme Command of the U.S.S.R. on which there will be a representative of the Polish Army. All details as to command,

organization and employment of this force will be settled in a subsequent Agreement.

5. This Agreement will come into force immediately upon its signature and without ratification. The present Agreement is drawn up in two copies, each of them in the Russian and Polish languages. Both texts have equal force.

PROTOCOL

1. As soon as diplomatic relations are re-established the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will grant amnesty to all Polish citizens who are at present deprived of their freedom on the territory of the U.S.S.R., either as prisoners of war or on other adequate grounds.

2. The present Protocol comes into force simultaneously with the Agreement of July 30, 1941.

WLADYSLAW SIKORSKI

I. MAISKI

No. 31

*Communiqué issued by the British Foreign Office in London,
July 30, 1941.*

1. An agreement between the Republic of Poland and the Soviet Union was signed in the Secretary of State's room at the Foreign Office on July 30. General Sikorski, Polish Prime Minister, signed for Poland; Mr. Maiski, Soviet Ambassador, signed for the Soviet Union. Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden were present.

2. The agreement is being published.

3. After the signature of the agreement, Mr. Eden handed to General Sikorski an official Note in the following terms:

“On the occasion of the signature of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of today, I desire to take this opportunity of informing you that in conformity with the provision of the agreement of mutual assistance between the United Kingdom and Poland of the 25th of August 1939, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have entered into no undertakings towards the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics which affect the relations between that country and Poland. I also desire to assure you that His Majesty's Government do not recognize any terri-

torial changes which have been effected in Poland since August 1939.'

General Sikorski handed to Mr. Eden the following reply:

"The Polish Government take note of your letter dated July 30 and desire to express sincere satisfaction at the statement that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom do not recognize any territorial changes which have been effected in Poland since August 1939. This corresponds with the view of the Polish Government which, as they have previously informed His Majesty's Government, have never recognized any territorial changes effected in Poland since the outbreak of the war."

No. 32

Declaration of Friendship and Mutual Assistance signed in Moscow on December 4, 1941, by General Sikorski for the Government of the Republic of Poland and by Premier Stalin for the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Government of the Polish Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, animated by the spirit of friendly understanding and fighting collaboration, declare:

1. German Hitlerite imperialism is the worst enemy of mankind—no compromise with it is possible.

Both States together with Great Britain and other Allies, supported by the United States of America, will wage war until complete victory and final destruction of the German invaders.

2. Implementing the Treaty concluded on July 30, 1941, both Governments will render each other during the war full military assistance, and troops of the Republic of Poland located on the territory of the Soviet Union will wage war against the German brigands shoulder to shoulder with Soviet troops.

In peace-time their mutual relations will be based on good neighborly collaboration, friendship and reciprocal honest fulfillment of the obligations they have taken upon themselves.

3. After a victorious war and the appropriate punishment of the Hitlerite criminals, it will be the aim of the Allied States to ensure a durable and just peace. This can be achieved only through a new organization of international relations on the basis of unification of the democratic countries in a durable alliance. Respect for inter-

national law backed by the collective armed force of the Allied States must form the decisive factor in the creation of such an organization. Only under this condition can a Europe destroyed by German barbarism be restored and a guarantee be created that the disaster caused by the Hitlerites will never be repeated.

For the Government of the
Republic of Poland
SIKORSKI

By authority of the
Government of the Soviet Union
STALIN

CHAPTER 4

Release of Polish Citizens and Prisoners of War

No. 33

Decree of August 12, 1941, by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. granting amnesty to Polish citizens deprived of their freedom on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

An amnesty is granted to all Polish citizens on Soviet territory at present deprived of their freedom as prisoners of war or on other adequate grounds.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme
Council of the U.S.S.R.

M. KALININ.

Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme
Council of the U.S.S.R.

A. GORKIN.

No. 34

Note of October 13th, 1941, from Ambassador Kot to Mr. Vishinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in Moscow, drawing attention to the incomplete fulfillment of Soviet obligations concerning Polish citizens, under the Agreement of July 30, 1941.

Moscow, October 13, 1941.

Mr. Commissar

Referring to the Note of the Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of the Republic of Poland addressed to the Commissar for Foreign

Affairs, No. 30/41 of August 22, 1941, and the Note Verbale of the Polish Embassy, No. D. 467/41 of September 27, 1941, I have the honor Mr. Commissar to inform you of the following:

In both the aforesaid Notes, as in my conversation with you, Mr. Commissar, I emphasized particularly the need for the fulfillment by the Soviet Government of the provisions of the Agreement concluded between the Polish Government and the Soviet Government on July 30, 1941, and of the provisions of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. of August 12, 1941, concerning the release of Polish citizens from prisons, labour camps and localities of compulsory residence at the earliest possible date, at least before the coming winter, during which the departure from many of the camps would be most difficult if not altogether impossible. The question of release was also brought up by the Polish delegation at the two meetings of the Mixed Polish-Soviet Commission, when emphasis was laid on the special urgency of this problem.

During my conversation with you, Mr. Commissar, on September 20, I received your assurance that the Soviet authorities would take care that Polish citizens detained in distant Northern regions, where the climate is unsuitable for Poles, were transported to more suitable districts before the winter season set in. During my conversation on October 7, I quoted figures relating to Polish citizens who were still detained in large numbers in camps and mentioned the fact that certain categories among them had been transferred to very remote Northern regions. In spite of repeated Polish requests and the assurances given on behalf of the Soviets, this Embassy has not as yet received the list of localities nor the exact numbers of Polish citizens released.

Contrary to the assurances that except for a small number of individuals suspected, indicted or convicted of espionage on behalf of Germany, whose names and dossiers up to now have not been communicated to the Embassy, all Polish citizens had been set free and that in a small number of cases only was delay caused by purely technical considerations, the Embassy is in possession of information that there are still in a number of prisons and camps thousands of Polish citizens who were not informed of the Agreement concluded on July 30, 1941, or were informed that the provisions of this Agreement and of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. of August 12 did not apply to them.

By way of example, may I state that Polish citizens are still being detained in prison at Saratov, Gorki, Balashov, Tschelabinsk, Kizel and in compulsory labour camps in the Primorski Kray in the North-Eastern extremity of the Yakut district (near the mouth of the Kolyma on the Arctic Ocean), near Aldan, in the region of Tomsk, Karaganda, in the mines of Karabash (Tschelabinsk district), in the Ivgiel camp (Sviedlovsk district), in the Archangel district and in the Republic of Komi, along the railway line under construction between Kotlas and Pechora and at other points.

More detailed information concerning the numbers and condition of these Polish citizens is given in the Annex to the present Note. As will be seen therefrom the local authorities either did not receive detailed orders concerning the treatment of Polish citizens after the conclusion of the Agreement of July 30, or, in some cases, the local authorities were content to deal with the matter in a purely *pro forma* way (the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs withdrew police supervision of the 2,000 Polish citizens employed in the mines of Karabsh-Voloshynowski-Rudnik, but left the persons concerned where they were which actually made their position worse than before), or with a partial execution of the orders issued. It is to be assumed that various considerations have dictated this treatment and in some instances local authorities may have desired to secure for themselves virtually unpaid manpower, whence the tendency to release sometimes elderly, invalid or ailing persons, while the stronger and healthier are retained for compulsory labour.

I have the honor to draw your attention, Mr. Commissar, to another characteristic feature of the conduct of local government authorities towards Polish citizens who are released, or who approach them with the request for employment or for the assignment of a residence. This conduct, without doubt unknown to the Central authorities, which should cease in the interests of good relations between the Polish and Soviet Governments, consists in informing those concerned that the blame for their difficult situation rests with the Polish Government and their representatives in the U.S.S.R. Naturally Polish nationals are not misled by this, but it arouses unnecessary mistrust among the Polish population.

Information issued abroad by the Polish Government, entirely in line with good Polish-Soviet collaboration, is to the effect that Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have

been liberated from prisons and camps. I presented to you, on the 7th of this month, copies of communiqués issued by the Polish Telegraph Agency in London and New York. The Polish Government is of the opinion that such official information should correspond to the real situation of the Polish population in the U.S.S.R. In the common interest of both Governments the Polish-Soviet Agreement should be fully carried out so that in foreign countries no elements unfriendly to this collaboration and hostile to the U.S.S.R., should find in the difficult position of the deported Polish population a theme for their propaganda.

The Polish Government could in no case agree that, as a result of the Agreement of July 30, 1941, the lot of Polish citizens residing in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should become worse or that local authorities should carry out its provisions in a manner contrary to the declarations and statements of the representatives of the Soviet Government.

Consequently, in its Note, No. 30/41 of August 22, 1941, the Embassy presented a number of proposals forming a logical whole with a view to the practical solution of the problem of the Polish population in the U.S.S.R., in accordance with the interests of this population and of both Governments. The fact that the suggestions contained in point 2 were only carried out in part, and that points 3 and 4 were left completely unfulfilled, has meant that such Polish citizens as have been released have not been able to improve their living conditions and a large number of them have been forced to wander aimlessly and compelled to camp at railway stations or in the open air in the localities newly chosen for their residence. In view of the approaching winter which in some parts of the Soviet Union has already set in, many of them are threatened with death by starvation. Their position is rendered still worse by the fact that the local authorities not only refuse to carry out the suggestions of the Embassy, but do not even comply with the assurances given by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs contained in the Aide-Mémoire of August 28, 1941, with regard to free railway fares, travelling subsidies, subsistence allowances and, most important of all, employment for the persons released.

I also venture to draw your attention, Mr. Commissar, to the fact that the organization of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. is not progressing in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Agree-

ment of July 30, 1941, or with the intentions of the two Governments.

The Supreme Command of the Polish armed forces in the U.S.S.R. has vainly waited four weeks for a decision on the formation of further Polish divisions and the designation of the localities in which this formation is to take place. In consequence, numerous Polish citizens reporting for military service and rallying en masse to the Polish Army stream into the two already overcrowded camps, which lack the necessary number of tents, adequate food supplies and medicines. Thus a situation, harmful alike to the troops and to the common cause is being created. The local administrative authorities very often do not carry out the instructions issued by the central authorities with regard to questions concerning the Polish Army and create new additional difficulties, as for instance by declining to release from prisons and camps all Polish citizens, military and reservists, and in many instances by detaining the more physically fit elements, which reduces the military value of the units already formed. Moreover, considerable numbers of Polish citizens enrolled in the Red Army and subsequently transferred to the so-called labor battalions, have not up till now been directed to the Polish Army.

Thus the Polish contribution to the common struggle against Germany, contrary to the intentions of the Polish and Soviet Governments and to the unanimous will of the Polish citizens, is being weakened to the detriment of the cause of all the Allies.

In the profound belief that the Soviet Government attaches no less importance than the Polish Government to the development of friendly relations between the two States, I have the honor to request you, Mr. Commissar, to take measures to put into full effect all the proposals contained in the Note of the Embassy of August 22, and in particular the immediate release from prisons, camps and localities of compulsory domicile of all Polish citizens, the friendly treatment of those who are unfit for military service and the acceleration of the decision concerning the formation of further large units of the Polish Army, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Agreement of July 30, 1941.

I have the honor to be, etc.

Kot.

No. 35

Note of October 15, 1941, from General Wladyslaw Sikorski to Ambassador Bogomolov, in London, concerning the failure to release a certain number of Polish officers from Soviet prisoner of war camps.

London, October 15, 1941.

Excellency,

May I request Your Excellency to convey to the Soviet Government the assurance that the Polish Government appreciates the good will shown by the Soviet Government in carrying out the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941. However, certain difficulties have become apparent which do not seem to have any connection with those arising from military operations. Thus the immediate release of Polish citizens deprived of their freedom appears necessary in view of the approaching winter; as well as means of assuring their existence. The fate of several thousand Polish officers who have not returned to Poland and who have not been found in Soviet military camps, continues to remain uncertain. They are probably dispersed in the Northern districts of the U.S.S.R. Their presence in Polish Army camps is indispensable.

May I also request Your Excellency to draw the attention of the Soviet Government to the necessity of increasing the aid essential to the formation and development of this Army.

At the same time I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that in view of existing military operations I have issued instructions to intensify sabotage and subversive activities by Poles in German occupied Poland.

I have the honor to be, etc.

SIKORSKI.

No. 36

Note of November 14, 1941, from Ambassador A. Bogomolov to General Sikorski, in reply to the Note of October 16, 1941.

London, November 14, 1941.

Mr. Prime Minister,

In reply to your Note of October 16, 1941 I am instructed by the Soviet Government to inform you, Mr. Prime Minister, that all

Polish citizens to be set free in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. of August 12, 1941, have been set free, and certain specified categories of those released have received material help from the Soviet Authorities (free passes for railway and waterway travel, subsistence allowances during their journeys, etc.). All Polish citizens released and not called up by the Polish Army are given an opportunity to work on conditions identical to those enjoyed by Soviet citizens and this without any special obligation whatsoever on the part of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

All Polish officers on the territory of the U.S.S.R. have also been set free. Your supposition, Mr. Prime Minister, that a large number of Polish officers are dispersed throughout the Northern regions of the U.S.S.R. is obviously based on inaccurate information.

Concerning your reference, Mr. Prime Minister, to the necessity of further aid from the Soviet Government in respect of the organization of the Polish Army, such aid is unflinching being given in accordance with the Soviet-Polish Military Agreement to grant the Government of the Republic of Poland a non-interest bearing loan of 65 million rubles to meet the expenses of the Polish Army during the period ending January 1, 1942.

The Soviet Government have taken special note of your statement, Mr. Prime Minister, concerning your instructions for the intensification of sabotage and subversive action in German occupied Poland.

I have the honor to be, etc.

BOGOMOLOV.

No. 37

Note of January 28, 1942, from Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador Bogomolov, concerning the failure to set free a number of Polish citizens, and specifically a number of Polish officers.

London, January 28, 1942.

Mr. Ambassador,

The Polish Government regrets to have to bring to Your Excellency's notice that, according to information just received, the

liberation of Polish citizens detained on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in labour camps and other places of detention has not been completely carried out. In a number of cases the local administrative authorities of the Union do not apply in full the provisions of the Soviet Decree dated August 12, 1941.

In this respect I have the honor to mention in particular the painful fact, that of all the officers and soldiers registered in the prisoner of war camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov, 12 generals, 94 colonels, 263 majors and about 7800 officers of lesser rank have so far not yet been set free. It must be emphasized that investigations carried out in Poland and in the Reich, have made it possible to establish definitely that these soldiers are not at present in occupied Poland, nor in prisoner-of-war camps in Germany.

According to fragmentary information that has reached us, a certain number of these prisoners find themselves in extremely hard circumstances on Franz Joseph Land, Nova Zembla and on the territory of the Yakut Republic on the banks of the Kolyma river.

I must add that the question of the fate of Polish citizens, civilians and military, has been the subject of several consecutive interventions by the Polish Embassy at Kuybyshev, which will soon be in a position to submit a new list of names of all these persons to the Government of the Union. The same question was also the subject of a conversation in Moscow on December 4, 1941, between the Polish Prime Minister and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. During the course of this conversation General Sikorski was relieved to receive an assurance that the necessary instructions would be issued to the competent Soviet authorities and that all the prisoners would be set free.

Referring to the letter and spirit of this conversation and of the understandings reached by our two Governments, I have no doubt that Your Excellency will share my conviction that the efficient and speedy execution of the provisions of the supplementary Protocol to the Polish-Soviet Agreement signed in London on July 30, 1941, concerning the liberation of Polish citizens, imprisoned or detained in prisoner of war camps or labour camps, rests on imperative motives of humanity and justice. Your Excellency will no doubt also share the Polish Government's opinion that special importance should be attached to the favourable development of our mutual

relations, as desired by the political leaders of both our countries united in the common struggle against the invader.

In requesting Your Excellency to be so good as to bring the contents of this Note to the attention of Your Government, I take this occasion to assure Your Excellency of my highest consideration.

I have the honor to be, etc.

RACZYNSKI.

No. 38

Note of March 13, 1942, from Ambassador Bogomolov to Mr. Raczynski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, in reply to his Note of January 28, 1942.

London, March 13, 1942.

Mr. Minister,

In reply to your Note of January 28, 1942, I have the honor, by order of the Soviet Government, to bring the following to your notice:

The Soviet Government cannot agree to the statements contained in Your Excellency's Note. According to these statements the liberation of Polish citizens, including officers and soldiers, detained on the territory of the U.S.S.R. in labor camps and other places of detention, has not been completed, because, it is alleged in the Note, the local Soviet authorities have not applied to their full extent the provisions of the Decree* of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. of August 12, 1941, concerning the amnesty to Polish citizens.

In the reply by M. V. M. Molotov's Note of November 8, 1941, addressed to M. Kot, and in the Aide-Mémoire of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of November 19, it had already been announced that the amnesty to Polish citizens had been strictly carried out. An appropriate investigation conducted by competent Soviet authorities after the conversation held on December 4, 1941, between the Polish Prime Minister, General Sikorski, and the Chairman of the People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., J. V. Stalin, completely confirmed the above statement; besides the People's

* *Ukase.*

Commissar in the spirit of his Note No. 6 of January 9, 1942, addressed to the Embassy of the Republic of Poland, gave additional detailed explanations on the carrying out of the amnesty in favour of Polish citizens.

As the Polish officers and soldiers were liberated on the same basis as other Polish citizens under the Decree of August 12, 1941, all that has been said above applies equally to the Polish officers and soldiers.

As regards the statements contained in Your Excellency's Note, alleging that there are still Polish officers who have not yet been set free, and that some of them are on Franz-Joseph and Nova Zembla islands, and the banks of the River Kolyma, it must be stated that these assertions are without foundation and obviously based on inaccurate information. In any case, whenever it is learned that there are certain isolated instances of delay in setting free Polish citizens, the competent Soviet authorities immediately take measures necessary for their release.

The Soviet Government takes this opportunity to declare that it has put into full effect the measures concerning the liberation of Polish citizens in accordance with the Supplementary Protocol to the Soviet-Polish Agreement of July 30, 1941, and that thus the Soviet Government is doing in this respect all that is necessary for the future favorable development of Soviet-Polish relations.

I have the honor to be, etc.

BOGOMOLOV.

No. 39

Communiqué issued on April 17, 1943, by the Polish Minister of National Defence concerning the fate of Polish prisoners of war in the camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov.

London, April 17, 1943.

On September 17, 1940, the official organ of the Red Army, the *Red Star*, stated that during the fighting which took place after September 17, 1939, 181,000 Polish prisoners of war were taken by the Soviets. Of this number about 10,000 were officers of the regular army and reserve.

According to information in possession of the Polish Government, three large camps of Polish prisoners of war were set up in the U.S.S.R. in November 1939:

- 1) in Kozielsk, east of Smolensk,
- 2) in Starobielsk, near Kharkov, and
- 3) in Ostashkov, near Kalinin, where police and military police were concentrated.

At the beginning of 1940 the camp authorities informed the prisoners in all three camps, that all camps were about to be broken up, that prisoners of war would be allowed to return to their families and, allegedly for this purpose, lists of places to which individual prisoners wished to go after their release were made.

At that time there were:

- 1) In Kozielsk, about 5,000 men, including some 4,500 officers.
- 2) In Starobielsk, about 3,920 men, including 100 civilians; the rest were officers of whom some were medical officers.
- 3) In Ostashkov, about 6,570 men, including some 380 officers.

On April 5, 1940, the breaking up of these camps was begun and groups of 60 to 300 men were removed from them every few days until the middle of May. From Kozielsk they were sent in the direction of Smolensk. About 400 people only were moved from all the three camps in June 1940 to Griazovetz in the Vologda district.

When after the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet Treaty of July 30, 1941, and the signing of the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, the Polish Government proceeded to form the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R., it was expected that the officers from the above mentioned camps would form the cadres of senior and junior officers of the army in formation. At the end of August 1941 a group of Polish officers from Griazovetz arrived to join the Polish units in Buzuluk; not one officer however, among those deported in other directions from Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov appeared. In all therefore about 8,300 officers were missing, not counting another 7,000 N.C.O.'s, soldiers and civilians, who were in those camps when they were broken up.

Ambassador Kot and General Anders, perturbed by this state of affairs, addressed to the competent Soviet authorities inquiries and representations about the fate of the Polish officers from the above mentioned camps.

In a conversation with Mr. Vishinsky, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on October 6, 1941, Ambassador Kot asked what had happened to the missing officers. Mr. Vishinsky answered, that

all prisoners of war had been freed from the camps and therefore they must be at liberty.

In October and November, in his conversations with Premier Stalin, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Vishinsky, the Ambassador on various occasions returned to the question of the prisoners of war and insisted upon being supplied with lists of them, such lists having been compiled carefully and in detail by the Soviet Government.

During his visit to Moscow, Prime Minister Sikorski in a conversation on December 3, 1941, with Premier Stalin, also intervened for the liberation of all Polish prisoners of war, and not having been supplied by the Soviet authorities with their lists, he handed to Premier Stalin on this occasion an incomplete list of 3,845 Polish officers which their former fellow-prisoners had succeeded in compiling. Premier Stalin assured General Sikorski that the amnesty was of a general and universal character and affected both military and civilians, and that the Soviet Government had freed all Polish officers. On March 18, 1942, General Anders handed Premier Stalin a supplementary list of 800 officers. Nevertheless not one of the officers mentioned in either of these lists has been returned to the Polish Army.

Besides the interventions in Moscow and Kuybyshev, the fate of Polish prisoners of war was the subject of several interviews between Minister Raczyński and Ambassador Bogomolov. On January 28, 1942, Minister Raczyński, in the name of the Polish Government, handed a Note to Soviet Ambassador Bogomolov, drawing his attention once again to the painful fact that many thousand Polish officers had still not been found.

Ambassador Bogomolov informed Minister Raczyński on March 13, 1943, that in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of U.S.S.R. of August 12, 1941, and in accordance with the statements of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of November 8 and 19, 1941, the amnesty had been put into full effect, and that it related both to civilians and military.

On May 19, 1942, Ambassador Kot sent the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs a Memorandum in which he expressed his regret at the refusal to supply him with a list of prisoners, and his concern as to their fate, emphasizing the high value these officers would have in military operations against Germany.

Neither the Polish Government nor the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev has ever received an answer as to the whereabouts of the

missing officers and other prisoners who had been deported from the three camps mentioned above.

We have become accustomed to the lies of German propaganda and we understand the purpose behind its latest revelations. In view however of abundant and detailed German information concerning the discovery of the bodies of many thousands of Polish officers near Smolensk, and the categorical statement that they were murdered by the Soviet authorities in the spring of 1940, the necessity has arisen that the mass graves discovered should be investigated and the facts alleged verified by a competent international body, such as the International Red Cross. The Polish Government has therefore approached this institution with a view to their sending a delegation to the place where the massacre of the Polish prisoners of war is said to have taken place.

No. 40

Statement of the Polish Government of April 17, 1943, published in London, April 18, 1943, concerning the discovery of graves of Polish officers near Smolensk.

No Pole can help but be deeply shocked by the news, now given the widest publicity by the Germans, of the discovery of the bodies of the Polish officers missing in the U.S.S.R. in a common grave near Smolensk, and of the mass execution of which they were victims.

The Polish Government has instructed their representative in Switzerland to request the International Red Cross in Geneva to send a delegation to investigate the true state of affairs on the spot. It is to be desired that the findings of this protective institution, which is to be entrusted with the task of clarifying the matter and of establishing responsibility, should be issued without delay.

At the same time, however, the Polish Government, on behalf of the Polish nation, denies to the Germans any right to base on a crime they ascribe to others, arguments in their own defence. The profoundly hypocritical indignation of German propaganda will not succeed in concealing from the world the many cruel and reiterated crimes still being perpetrated against the Polish people.

The Polish Government recalls such facts as the removal of Polish officers from prisoner-of-war camps in the Reich and the

subsequent shooting of them for political offences alleged to have been committed before the war, mass arrests of reserve officers subsequently deported to concentration camps, to die a slow death,—from Cracow and the neighboring district alone 6,000 were deported in June 1942; the compulsory enlistment in the German army of Polish prisoners of war from territories illegally incorporated in the Reich; the forcible conscription of about 200,000 Poles from the same territories, and the execution of the families of those who managed to escape; the massacre of one-and-a-half-million people by executions or in concentration camps; the recent imprisonment of 80,000 people of military age, officers and men, and their torture and murder in the camps of Maydanek and Tremblinka.

It is not to enable the Germans to make impudent claims and pose as the defenders of Christianity and European civilization, that Poland is making immense sacrifices, fighting and enduring suffering. The blood of Polish soldiers and Polish citizens, wherever it is shed, cries for atonement before the conscience of the free peoples of the world. The Polish Government condemn all the crimes committed against Polish citizens and refuse the right to make political capital of such sacrifices, to all who are themselves guilty of such crimes.

No. 41

Note of April 20, 1943, from Mr. E. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R., demanding an explanation of the fate of Polish prisoners missing in the U.S.S.R.

London, April 20, 1943.

Mr. Ambassador,

Foreign telegraph agencies publish a report of the German military authorities concerning the discovery at Kozia Góra near Katyn in the vicinity of Smolensk of a mass-grave containing the bodies of the Polish officers allegedly killed in the spring of 1940. During the first few days 155 bodies were identified among which the body of Major General Mieczyslaw Smorawinski is supposed to have been found.

This report, although emanating from enemy sources, has produced profound anxiety not only in Polish public opinion but also throughout the world.

In a public statement on April 17, 1943, the Polish Government categorically condemned Germany's attempt to exploit the tragedy of Polish prisoners of war in the U.S.S.R. for her own political ends. But more than ever the Polish Government unalterably maintains its attitude that the truth about this case so cynically exploited by Hitlerite propaganda must be fully elucidated.

You are no doubt aware, Mr. Ambassador, that after the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, the Polish Government repeatedly approached the civil and military authorities of the U.S.S.R. with requests for information concerning the prisoners of war and civilians who were in the camps of Kozielsk (East of Smolensk), Starobielsk (near Kharkov) and Ostashkov (near Kalinin).

According to information of the Polish Government there were in all at the beginning of 1940, 15,490 Polish citizens, including 8,700 officers, in the three above mentioned camps. From April 5, 1940, until the middle of May, 1940, the Soviet authorities proceeded to break up these camps, deporting the inmates in batches every few days. Prisoners of the Kozielsk camp were deported in the direction of Smolensk, and from all the three camps only 400 men were transferred in the last batches, first to the Yukhnovski camp (railway station Babynino) and subsequently in June 1940, to Griazovetz in the Vologda district.

When after the signing of the Polish-Soviet military agreement on August 14, 1943, the Polish Government proceeded with the organization of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R., the camp of Griazovetz, to which in the meantime military and civilian prisoners from other camps had arrived, was also broken up and from the above mentioned group of 400 prisoners more than 200 officers reported for service in the Polish Army before the end of August 1941. All the other officers however, who were deported to an unknown destination from the camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov have neither been found nor have they given any sign of life. So it became apparent that more than 8,000 officers were missing who might have supplied the cadres of senior and junior officers of the army in formation and who would have been of inestimable value in the military operations against Germany.

From October 1941, both Ambassador Kot and General Anders, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R., con-

stantly intervened, both orally and in writing, in the matter of the missing officers. Ambassador Kot discussed this subject with Premier Stalin, with Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and with Mr. Vishinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, demanding a list of the prisoners detained in the three camps mentioned above and an explanation as to their fate. During his visit to Moscow in December 1941, General Sikorski also intervened in the above matter in a conversation with Mr. Stalin and on that occasion handed him a list containing the names of 3,845 Polish officers. On March 18, 1942, General Anders gave Mr. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, a list of 800 officers. On January 28, 1942, I had the honour to send you, Mr. Ambassador, a Note in which I emphasized the anxiety of the Polish Government at the failure to find many thousands of Polish officers. Lastly, on May 19, 1942, Ambassador Kot sent the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs a Memorandum in which, reverting again to the question of the missing officers, he expressed his regret at the refusal to supply him with the list of prisoners, and his concern as to their fate.

I regret the necessity of calling your attention, Mr. Ambassador, to the fact that the Polish Government in spite of reiterated requests, has never received either a list of the prisoners or definite information as to the whereabouts of the missing officers and of other prisoners deported from the three camps mentioned above. Official, verbal and written statements of the representatives of the U.S.S.R. have been confined to mere assurances that, in accordance with a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R., dated August 12, 1941, the amnesty was of a general and universal character as it included both military and civilian prisoners, and that the Government of the U.S.S.R. had released all the Polish officers from prisoner of war camps.

I should like to emphasize that the Polish Government, as can be seen from their many representations quoted above, entirely independently of recent German revelations, has never regarded the question of the missing officers as closed. If, however, as shown by the communiqué of the Soviet Information Bureau of April 15, 1943, the Government of the U.S.S.R. would seem to be in possession of more ample information on this matter than was communicated to the representatives of the Polish Government sometime

ago, I beg once more to request you, Mr. Ambassador, to communicate to the Polish Government detailed and precise information as to the fate of the prisoners of war and civilians previously detained in the camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov.

Public opinion in Poland and throughout the world has rightly been so deeply shocked that only irrefutable facts can outweigh the numerous and detailed German statements concerning the discovery of the bodies of many thousand Polish officers murdered near Smolensk in the spring of 1940.

CHAPTER 5

Organization of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R.

No. 42

*Polish-Soviet Military Agreement signed in Moscow on
August 14, 1941.*

MILITARY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE POLISH HIGH COMMAND AND THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND

1. The military agreement derives naturally from the political agreement of July 30, 1941.
2. A Polish army will be organized in the shortest possible time on the territory of the U.S.S.R., wherefore:
 - a) it will form part of the armed forces of the sovereign Republic of Poland,
 - b) the soldiers of this army will take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of Poland,
 - c) it will be destined with the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. and other Allied States for the common fight against Germany,
 - d) after the end of the war, it will return to Poland,
 - e) during the entire period of common operations, it will be subordinated operationally to the High Command of the U.S.S.R. In respect of organization and personnel it will remain under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces, who will coordinate the orders and

regulations concerning organization and personnel with the High Command of the U.S.S.R. through the Commander of the Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R.

3. The Commander of the Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R. will be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces; the candidate for this appointment to be approved by the Government of the U.S.S.R.

4. The Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R. will consist of units of land forces only. Their strength and number will depend on manpower, equipment and supplies available.

5. Conscripts and volunteers, having previously served in the Polish Air Force and Navy, will be sent to Great Britain to complement the establishments of the respective Polish services already existing there.

6. The formation of Polish units will be carried out in localities indicated by the High Command of the U.S.S.R. Officers and other ranks will be called from among Polish citizens on the territory of the U.S.S.R. by conscription and voluntary enlistment. Draft boards will be established with the participation of U.S.S.R. authorities in localities indicated by them.

7. Polish units will be moved to the front only after they are fully ready for action. In principle they will operate in groups not smaller than divisions and will be used in accordance with the operational plans of the High Command of the U.S.S.R.

8. All soldiers of the Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R. will be subject to Polish military laws and decrees.

Polish military courts will be established in the units for dealing with military offences and crimes against the establishment, the safety, the routine or the discipline of the Polish Army.

For crimes against the State, soldiers of the Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R. will be answerable to the military courts of the U.S.S.R.

9. The organization and war equipment of the Polish units will as far as possible correspond to the standards established for the Polish Army in Great Britain.

The colors and insignia of the various services and military rank will correspond exactly to those established for the Polish Army in Great Britain.

10. The pay, rations, maintenance and other materiel problems will be in accordance with regulations of the U.S.S.R.

11. The sick and wounded soldiers of the Polish Army will receive treatment in hospitals and sanatoria on an equal basis with the soldiers of the U.S.S.R. and be entitled to pensions and allowances.

12. Armament, equipment, uniforms, motor transport etc. will be provided as far as possible by

- a) the Government of the U.S.S.R. from their own resources,
- b) the Polish Government from supplies granted on the basis of the Lend-Lease Act (an Act to promote the defense of the United States, approved March 11, 1941).

In this case, the Government of the U.S.S.R. will extend all possible transportation facilities.

13. Expenditures connected with the organization, equipment and maintenance of the Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R. will be met from credits provided by the Government of the U.S.S.R., to be refunded by the Polish Government after the end of the war.

This problem will be dealt with in a separate financial agreement.

14. Liaison will be established by

- 1) a Polish Military Mission attached to the High Command of the U.S.S.R.,
- 2) a Soviet Military Mission attached to the Polish High Command in London.

Liaison officers attached to other commands will be appointed by mutual agreement.

15. All matters and details not covered by this agreement will be settled directly between the High Command of the Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R. and the corresponding authorities of the U.S.S.R.

16. This agreement is made in two copies, in the Polish and Russian languages, both texts are equally valid.

Plenipotentiary of the Polish
High Command.

SZYSZKO BOHUSZ,
Brigadier-General.

Plenipotentiary of the High
Command of the U.S.S.R.

A. WASILEWSKIJ,
Major General.

Moscow, August 14, 1941.

No. 43

Message of April 9, 1942, from General Sikorski to Premier Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, concerning the evacuation of part of the Polish Army to Iran, and recruiting in the U.S.S.R., delivered to Ambassador Bogomolov on April 13, 1942.

Gask, April 9, 1942.

General Sikorski was happy to learn that as a result of conversations held in Moscow, President Stalin has graciously expressed his definite agreement to the evacuation to the Near East of Polish soldiers over and above the strength contemplated for the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. Pursuant to this decision about 30,000 men have already arrived in Iran. They will immediately be incorporated in Polish units and equipped to take part in the struggle carried on by Poland, together with the Soviet Union and the other United Nations, against Germany.

General Sikorski hopes that President Stalin agrees in view of the probable development of the military situation in the Near East, and as this theatre of operations forms an integral part of the front on which the Soviet armies are so heroically fighting, that it is most desirable to form strong Polish units in this sector.

General Sikorski has expressed his conviction to the British Government and to the Government of the United States that it is essential the Western Powers should undertake offensive action against Germany at a time when that country's principal forces are engaged on the Russian front. In particular he emphasized this point of view and the necessity of concentrating the main effort in the first place against Germany, in his conversations with President Roosevelt, who said that he shared these opinions. In further conversations with American officials General Sikorski returned to this subject, insisting on the necessity of speeding up preparations for an offensive in Western Europe.

As Polish Armed Forces stationed on British territory may be called upon to take an active part in such an operation, General Sikorski attaches great importance to the increase of their effectives and fighting strength.

General Sikorski is happy to find that President Stalin fully appreciates this necessity. He is thus strengthened in his conviction that, in spite of the difficulties that may have arisen, recruiting in

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of Polish citizens for military service, and their evacuation will be resumed and happily completed.

General Sikorski hopes that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by carrying out these proposals as well as by respecting Polish rights and by a friendly attitude towards Polish interests, will enable every Polish citizen capable of bearing arms to take part under the national flag in the struggle for common victory.

No. 44

Decision of the Polish Cabinet of April 30, 1942, to leave part of the Polish Forces on the territory of the U.S.S.R.

The Polish Cabinet expresses its approval of the fact that a number of Polish soldiers have been evacuated from the U.S.S.R. in accordance with the Agreement of December 1941, and hopes that the Soviet Government will place no difficulties in the way of the further recruiting and evacuation of soldiers and volunteers for the Polish Forces, thus enabling the Polish Army fighting for the common cause of the Allies to increase its strength.

The Polish Cabinet reaffirms that it would be in accordance with Polish interests and with the policy that found expression in the Agreement concluded with the Soviet Government on July 30, 1941, to leave on Soviet territory part of the Polish Armed Forces which would subsequently fight on the Eastern front side by side with the Soviet Army.

No. 45

Note of May 13, 1942, from Mr. I. Tchitchaiev, Chargé d'Affaires of the U.S.S.R., to Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, containing a message from Premier J. Stalin to General Sikorski, Polish Prime Minister.

London, May 13, 1942.

Mr. Minister,

In reply to the Message from General Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, to J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Coun-

cil of People's Commissars of the Union of S.S.R., I have the honor to communicate the following through your good offices:

J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., having carefully studied General Sikorski's Message, thanks him for the information concerning his conferences with the British Government and with Mr. Roosevelt, President of the United States, regarding preparations for concerted action against Germany and proposals for the participation of Polish armed forces in this action. As regards General Sikorski's proposals for the resumption of recruiting in the U.S.S.R. of Polish citizens for military service and their evacuation, J. V. Stalin deems it necessary to recall the grounds he submitted to General Anders on March 18, last, on which the strength of the Polish army was definitely fixed at 44,000 men because of circumstances connected with restrictions in supplies for units not taking part in fighting. Owing to the fact that up to the present moment these circumstances have not changed, it is impossible to introduce any change whatever in the strength of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R., as determined last March. J. V. Stalin does not doubt that Polish citizens called to their national colors will make their contribution to the cause of the common struggle against the Hitlerite aggressors.

I have the honor to be, etc.

TCHITCHAIEV.

No. 46

Note of June 10, 1942, from Mr. Raczynski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, concerning further recruiting and evacuation of Polish Forces from the U.S.S.R.

London, June 10, 1942.

Mr. Ambassador,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt from Your Excellency of the Message from M. J. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, addressed to General W. Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, which was communicated to me on May 13, 1942, by Mr. Tchitchaiev, Counsellor of Embassy.

In reply to this communication I have the honor to inform

Your Excellency that General Sikorski, after having duly studied the contents of the message, has directed me to submit to you certain remarks in connection therewith and to request that Your Excellency will be pleased to convey them to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

The Polish Government fully appreciates the temporary difficulties as regards supplies in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and for this reason has not insisted on an increase in the number of food rations for the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The object of General Sikorski's message was not to increase the strength of the Polish Army, nor, as would have followed, the supplies for the Polish Armed Forces on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Polish Government desires to be able to continue on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the recruiting of Polish citizens capable of bearing arms, so as to widen the cadres of the Polish Army in Britain and in the Near East, and thus to give every Polish citizen fit for military duties the opportunity of active service in Polish units.

The Polish Government are ready to undertake temporarily the service of supplies for the number of men over and above the established strength of 44,000, during their transit through the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on their way to the Southern ports of the Caspian Sea, or, as the case may be, to Ashabad and Meshed. For this purpose a reserve of one million food rations has been constituted in Teheran and this reserve could be placed at the disposal of General Anders without delay in the event that evacuation be resumed.

The Polish Government are determined to use the Polish Armed Forces now in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the Near East and in Great Britain, in the struggle for the common cause against the common enemy: the Polish Army will thus serve the allied cause as a whole.

The losses recently sustained by the Polish Armed Forces are eloquent proof of this determination of the Polish Government; these losses include, among others, two* warships sunk while escorting a convoy of war materials from Britain to the Union of

* Three, according to later reports.

Soviet Socialist Republics. The part played by the Polish Air Force in recent operations is illustrated by the fact that 101 Polish bombers took part in the recent raids on Cologne and the Ruhr.

It is possible that the Polish Army formed in the Near East may—after it is equipped and trained—also be used on the front of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in case the military situation should so require. Certain units of this army have already taken a noteworthy part in the defence of Tobruk, and in fighting in the desert. The fact that the Polish Army has not yet fought side by side with the Red Army is solely due to the armament difficulties experienced by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as the shipping difficulties that beset Great Britain and the United States.

If the Polish Government insists on the full execution of the agreements concluded by it with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it does so solely in the well understood interest of all.

The strength of the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was fixed at 96,000 men; besides which 25,000 men were to be evacuated to the Near East, exclusive of the 2,000 trained sailors and airmen. Thus the total Polish armed forces recruited in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from Polish citizens was to amount to 123,000 soldiers. At present the contemplated strength of cadres in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is only 44,000 men, not counting the 30,000 already evacuated. The Polish Government is of opinion that in order to arrive at the stipulated number of 123,000 men, a complement of 49,000 men should be recruited on Soviet territory, and, should it prove impossible to attach it to the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—should be evacuated to the Near East.

Referring to his conversations in Moscow with the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, General Sikorski appeals to Premier Stalin and asks him to make possible continuation of recruiting of Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the evacuation to Iran and Palestine of contingents over and above the number of 44,000 soldiers.

I have the honor to be, etc.

RACZYNSKI

No. 47

Minute of Mr. E. Raczyński's conversation on July 2 and July 4, 1942, with Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of

State for Foreign Affairs, concerning the evacuation of the remainder of the Polish Army from the U.S.S.R., and the Polish Government's Memorandum presented on the occasion of these conversations on July 3, 1942.

London, July 4, 1942.

On July 2, I visited the Foreign Office at the request of Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, who notified me of the contents of a telegram he had received from Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in the U.S.S.R. who is at present in Moscow. The Ambassador had received from Commissar Molotov a statement of Premier Stalin, in connection with Mr. Churchill's conversation with Mr. Molotov in London when Mr. Churchill made a suggestion to transfer part of the Polish Forces from Soviet territory to the Middle East. Mr. Stalin now suggests that three Polish divisions "well trained, but not yet fully armed" be moved to that region. Sir Alexander Cadogan asked me to notify him as soon as possible of the Polish Government's decision in this matter. He added that the British Government would be satisfied with such a solution and would be prepared to take immediate steps to receive these Forces and to assure them the necessary equipment.

I promised Sir Alexander a reply in the shortest possible time.

On the evening of July 4, I delivered the enclosed Memorandum to Sir A. Cadogan. The Memorandum defines the conditions which in the opinion of the Polish Government should be fulfilled in the event of the Polish divisions leaving Soviet territory.

Sir Alexander undertook to communicate the contents of the Memorandum to the British Ambassador in Moscow and to instruct him to submit the Polish conditions to the Soviet Government. Sir Alexander added that he was not aware of the reasons for which the Soviet Government had chosen to negotiate with us through the intermediary of the British Government, on grounds which he was in no position to judge. He thought that at the present stage this method should be maintained until the situation cleared in the course of the British Ambassador's introductory negotiations with Mr. Molotov. In the light of these negotiations we should be able to consider the most suitable steps to be taken next. I agreed to such an attitude.

MEMORANDUM

1. The Polish Government are gratified to be afforded an opportunity to help in the defence of the Near East with the Polish troops from Russia.

2. They are, however, compelled to draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to the duty of the Polish Government to assist their citizens in Soviet Russia. The presence of Polish troops in Russia has up to now enabled the civilian Poles to obtain the necessary means of existence.

3. Therefore the Polish Government feel they are entitled to hope for His Majesty's Government's collaboration in obtaining from the Soviet Government the fulfillment of the following request:

- a) After the departure of three Polish divisions from Russia the Polish recruiting center shall remain in Russia and recruiting of all Polish citizens able to carry arms shall be resumed until such time as the complete mobilization of all available men shall have been effected.
- b) Auxiliary military services of women and boy-scouts shall leave Russia together with the aforesaid three divisions as well as the families of the officers and men leaving Russia.
- c) The necessary measures shall be undertaken to begin the evacuation from Russia of 50,000 Polish children accompanied by 5,000 mothers or guardians who would be given refuge outside Russia through the collaboration of the British authorities. The Polish Embassy in the Soviet Union whilst maintaining fully its protection over Poles remaining in the Union on the basis of arrangements now in force, will be given the opportunity to cooperate through its appointed representatives in this evacuation. President Roosevelt has expressed his personal interest in the fate of these children and has pledged the assistance of American authorities in facilitating the withdrawal of a first contingent of 10,000 from Russia in order to save them from starvation.

4. Finally, the Polish Government hope for the collaboration of His Majesty's Government in the further search for the Polish officers missing in Russia. These officers would prove of great service in the formation of Polish divisions after the withdrawal of three divisions. The matter is urgent as it is only in the short summer

months that access is possible to the Northern regions to which these officers have presumably been removed.

London, July 3, 1942.

No. 48

Note of August 27, 1942, from Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador A. Bogomolov, concerning the continuation of recruiting for the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R.

London, August 27, 1942.

Mr. Ambassador,

The Government of the Republic of Poland has been informed by General Anders, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have adopted a negative attitude towards the Polish Government's efforts and endeavours to maintain a reserve depot on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics so as to be able to continue recruiting Polish citizens for the Polish Army.

The authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics explained their refusal as follows:

"As the Polish Government does not find it possible to use the Polish divisions formed on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Soviet-German front, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics cannot allow the formation of any Polish units whatsoever nor any recruiting in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

As regards the adoption by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of such an attitude in a matter as important to the Polish Government as the problem of carrying on recruiting of Polish citizens for the Polish army, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency of the following:

The political Agreement of July 30, 1941, and particularly the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, provided for the organization of a Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, by voluntary enlistment and by normal recruiting. In view of the explicit terms of this Agreement, the Polish Government was entitled to expect that the organization of the army would not meet with any difficulties from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and that its executive au-

thorities would in the measure of their possibilities extend their help to the Polish Embassy and the Polish Army Command in their efforts to form an Army of Polish citizens capable of bearing arms and willing to fulfill their duty to their country in its Armed Forces. Unfortunately actual events have not justified these hopes of the Polish Government, and the facts given below will show that the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have not lent their support to the development and organization of the Polish Army.

Thus, when in November last, before the recruiting boards were set up, and the strength of the Polish Army already amounted to 46,000 men, the Military Authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics informed the Polish Command that the strength of the Polish Army could not exceed 30,000 men and that the establishment and rations for the Army had been limited to that number. Although Ambassador Kot immediately intervened with Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, this unilateral decision was not changed and as a result the Polish Command was forced to discharge from the ranks of the Army 16,000 soldiers who had enlisted as volunteers. This was the first serious setback that hampered the organization of the Polish Army.

It would have seemed that the problem of the numerical strength of the Polish Army was finally and definitely settled in December of last year during General Sikorski's visit to Moscow. General Sikorski together with Premier Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, established the numerical strength of the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at 96,000 men, exclusive of 25,000 men to be evacuated to the Near East to reinforce the Polish units fighting in Libya, and the 2,000 airmen and sailors to be evacuated to Great Britain. Thus the total number of Polish soldiers to be recruited on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was to amount to 123,000.

Hardly had three months elapsed, however, before this decision agreed upon by both parties, underwent an unexpected unilateral change. Thus in March 1942, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars informed General Anders, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the strength of the Polish Army could not exceed 44,000 men and that the surplus over and above that number would be evacu-

ated to the Near East. The decision to reduce the strength of the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from 96,000 to 44,000 men was a new obstacle to the organization of the Polish Army.

The Polish Government, thus faced with an accomplished fact, received this decision with genuine regret. The Polish Government had hoped that thanks to the continuation of recruiting for the army, that had been promised to General Anders, a considerable number of soldiers over and above the established strength of 44,000 would also be evacuated to the Near East to reinforce the Allied armies fighting the enemy. These hopes were openly expressed in General Sikorski's message of April 9, 1942, to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, delivered to Your Excellency on April 13; in my Aide-Mémoire of May 1, 1942, to Your Excellency; in Ambassador Kot's Note of May 4, to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs; and in my Note of June 10, 1942, to Your Excellency. I should moreover like to add that in accordance with the Declaration made on December 4, 1941, by General Sikorski and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, which established the bases of cooperation between the Polish Army and the Soviet Army, and in accordance with the frequent public statements made by General Sikorski about the common struggle of the Polish Forces and the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against the German forces, I stated in my Note of June 10, that even those Polish soldiers who had been evacuated from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would take part, after they had been adequately equipped and trained and should the necessity arise, in fighting on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, side by side with the soldiers of the Army of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The answer sent by Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on May 14, 1942, in reply to Ambassador Kot's Note of May 4, surprised and astonished the Polish Government. The reply in question contained a statement that the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars in his conversation with General Anders never touched upon the problem of continued recruiting for the Polish Army, and further that the recruiting, supply and medical centres of the Polish Army, intended to facilitate the dispatch of volunteers to that Army, must also be closed.

This decision to reduce the strength of the Polish Army, the refusal to allow recruiting and voluntary enlistment, already restricted by the ban on Polish citizens leaving their places of temporary residence and the suspension of railway passes, prove that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics did not desire an increase in the strength of the Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or in the ranks of the Polish units fighting in the Near East.

The negative attitude of the Soviet Government to the further development of the Polish forces is also proved by the fact that more than 8,000 Polish officers, who in the spring of 1940 were interned in the prisoner of war camps of Ostashkov, Starobielsk and Kozielsk, are still missing despite frequent interventions by the Polish Government, and although incomplete lists of the names of these officers were delivered to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars by General Sikorski in December, 1941, and in March, 1942, by General Anders.

Taking into consideration all the aforementioned indisputable facts concerning the organization of the Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to inform you, Mr. Ambassador, that the Government of the Republic of Poland considers the allegation that the Polish Army declines to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Army of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as entirely unfounded and inconsistent with the true state of affairs, and that the Government of the Republic of Poland cannot take into cognizance the motives alleged for the refusal to allow further recruiting for the Polish Army.

I have the honor to be, etc.

RACZYNSKI.

No. 49

Note of October 31, 1942, from Ambassador A. Bogomolov to Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, concerning the organization of the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Mr. Minister,

London, October 31, 1942.

In reply to your Note of August 27, 1942, I have the honor to inform you of the following:

1) As is known, in accordance with the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, a Military Agreement, was signed on August 14, 1941, between the High Command of the U.S.S.R. and the High Command of the Republic of Poland, with a view to forming on the territories of the U.S.S.R. a Polish Army for the prosecution of the war against Germany in common with the Soviet armies and those of the other Allied countries.

To carry out this purpose the representatives of the Soviet and Polish High Commands started from the necessity of completing the formation of the Polish Army in the shortest possible time, with a view—as was emphasized on many occasions by the representatives of the Polish High Command, Generals Anders and Szyszko-Bohusz—to the earliest possible participation of these units in active warfare.

Such a plan for the organization of the Polish Army necessitated the immediate setting up of recruiting boards and that Polish citizens throughout the Soviet Union be at once notified of the formation of a Polish Army, and of the possibility as Polish citizens of joining this Army as volunteers.

As is known, all this was undertaken at the time (the end of August) with the fullest possible cooperation of the Soviet military and local civilian authorities.

Also, at that time an agreement was reached between the Soviet and Polish Commands that the strength of the Polish Army be fixed at 30,000 men (two rifle divisions, one reserve regiment, a military school for officers, the staff and staff offices), and it was decided that the formation of the two rifle divisions and a reserve regiment should be completed by October 1, 1941. This date was decided upon to meet the desire of the Polish Command for the quickest possible organization of a Polish Army. For the same reason, and in accordance with a proposal of the Polish representative (General Anders), it was agreed to send one or the other of these divisions to the Soviet-German front as soon as it was ready.

The Soviet military authorities, acting upon instructions from the Soviet Government, cooperated with the Polish Command in the fullest possible measure to assist it in the most successful solution of all the intricate problems connected with the formation of a Polish Army, namely: food supplies, stocks, billeting of military units, staffs and the various staff institutions, billeting facilities for officers, supplying newly formed units with arms, etc.

As regards the method of providing the Polish forces with supplies, the Soviet Government arranged to ensure that the Polish Army should be included within the Red Army supply system, which greatly facilitated the whole task of forming the Polish units. Thus, food supplies were to be the same as those for the Red Army behind the front, until the advance of the Polish units into the front line. Forage, fuel, grease, training ammunition, were also issued in quantities equal to Red Army standards. To this should be added that the use by the Polish Army of military barracks, staff billets, means of communication, transport, lighting, etc. was paid for according to normal rates fixed for the Red Army.

All these arrangements connected with the formation and maintenance of the Polish Army were financed through a non-interest bearing loan of 65 million roubles made by the Soviet Government to the Polish Government. This loan fully covered all expenses connected with the army until January 1, 1942. In fact the financial credit given by the Soviet Government for the organization of the army exceeded the amount of the non-interest bearing loan, for this loan did not include considerable grants amounting to an additional 15 million roubles made to the officers corps of the Polish military units in formation.

2) Regardless of the fact that the organization of the Polish divisions was not completed within the period originally fixed, by October 1 of that year, which indeed could not but create many difficulties and adversely affect the further development of the Polish Army, the Soviet Government expressed itself fully agreeable to the proposal of the Polish Government that the Polish Army be increased to the strength of 96,000 men, including officers, non-commissioned officers and men.

As a result, in December 1941, the Soviet Government gave its consent to this increase and the Polish Army was to be expanded from two divisions to six divisions of 11,000 men each.

Furthermore the Soviet Government consented that the effectives of the schools for officers, the service of supplies, the reserve units and complementary units, and the staffs and personnel of the staff offices, originally fixed at 3,000, be increased to 30,000.

In view of this large increase in the strength of the Polish Army, the Soviet Government also raised the amount of the loan for the maintenance of the Polish Army from 65 million roubles to 300 million roubles, on the same easy terms (non-interest bearing loan,

repayment over a period of ten years beginning from the sixth year after the end of the war, etc.).

This increase in the strength of the Polish Army to 96,000, made necessary the establishment of a number of complementary services, both administrative and economic. All these were set up at the time of the transfer of the Polish Army to the Soviet Republics of Uzbek, Kirgiz and Kazakstan, as desired by the Polish Command.

Climatic conditions were the main reason for this transfer to the Southern regions of the U.S.S.R., but it was also connected with the need for more space than was afforded in the central regions for the Polish divisions already organized, and the tens of thousands of Polish citizens to be recruited. This necessarily involved a tremendous amount of work, for camps had to be erected, quarters found for the staffs, locations for the military schools, sanitary institutions and accommodation for the officers, etc.

As may be well understood in these circumstances, the execution of this programme of more than trebling the size of the Polish Army from that contemplated in the original plan (from 30,000 to 96,000) was fraught with many difficulties as regards organization, transport and materials, these difficulties were particularly complicated and increased by the barbarous warfare waged on the Soviet nation by the German occupants. But all these difficulties were overcome and by February-March of 1942, the Polish Army had reached a strength of nearly 70,000 men.

Such an increase in the strength of the Polish Army in a relatively short period, and the increase by more than four and a half times of the expenditure for the maintenance of that army, from 65 million roubles to 300 million roubles, is ample proof of the Soviet Government's interest in the creation of a Polish Army and in assisting the Polish nation to take its honorable place in the war against the Hitlerite brigands.

3) However the further development of the Polish Army met with certain difficulties caused by such unforeseen circumstances as the non-delivery of wheat to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from the United States and England as a result of the outbreak of war in the Pacific Ocean.

Since the U.S.S.R. could not receive supplies of foodstuffs it became necessary to cut down the quantity distributed to the non-fighting divisions of the army, so as to ensure supplies to the fight-

ing forces. As the Polish Commander-in-Chief showed no inclination to direct any of his divisions to the German-Soviet front, and continued to keep the Polish Army well behind the fighting lines, the Soviet Government was compelled to treat these units as a non-fighting force, and accordingly the decision to cut down the rations of non-combatant units was applied to them.

In view of these circumstances the Soviet Government took the following decision as regards the Polish Army: from April 1 of that year the number of rations to be reduced to 44,000 and the Polish Army over and above these 44,000 to be sent to Iran in accordance with the wish of the Polish Government.

This decision was taken by the Soviet Government on March 18. Already at the beginning of April about 30,000 Polish men and officers left the U.S.S.R. and proceeded immediately, under instructions of the Polish Government to Iran. Some three months after this evacuation of the Polish military units to Iran, the remaining 44,000 men and officers followed in their footsteps, having been sent outside the U.S.S.R. frontiers by the Polish Government—to Iran, Syria, Palestine and North Africa.

Thus the question of the Polish Army's participation together with the Soviet Armies in the campaign against Hitlerite Germany was removed by the Polish Government from the agenda. The Polish Government came to a negative decision on this problem, despite its previous assurances and despite the solemn declaration it made in this respect on December 4, 1941, that "the army of the Republic of Poland which is now on the territory of the Soviet Republic will wage war against the German brigands shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet armies." Such a decision by the Polish Government was however not unexpected. In spite of the repeated assurances of the Polish Commander-in-Chief that he was determined to bring his detachments into action as soon as possible, in actual fact the date of the despatch of these detachments to the front was constantly postponed.

Indeed when the Polish Army was first being organized the date for its readiness for action was fixed, as is well known for October 1, 1941, and the Polish Command in this connection declared it was considered advisable to send individual divisions to the front as and when their organization was completed and they were ready for action. Though the preparations connected

with the different divisions were delayed, even if it were not possible to fulfill this obligation by October 1, it could nevertheless have been done later. However, the obligation has not been fulfilled, and not once has the Polish Command raised the question of sending the organized divisions to the Soviet-German front.

The Soviet Government did not consider it possible to press the Polish Command in this matter, but nearly five months after the organization of the Polish military divisions had begun, namely in February 1942, the Soviet Government became concerned as to when the Polish divisions would begin to fight against the Hitlerites. Mention was then made of the 5th Division, which had completed its training. At the same time the Soviet Government emphasized that it was important, both for political and military reasons, that Polish Units which were in readiness should be sent as soon as possible to fight against the Germans. When raising this question the Soviet Government based itself on the clear and explicit provisions of the Soviet-Polish Military Agreement concluded on August 14, 1941, point 7 of which reads as follows:

“Polish units will be moved to the front only after they are fully ready for action. In principle they will operate in groups not smaller than divisions, and will be used in accordance with the operational plans of the High Command of the U.S.S.R.”

Regardless of this categorical provision of the Military Agreement, excluding the possibility of any reservation whatsoever or refusal as to the propriety of moving to the front separate units ready to go into action, the Polish Government adopted an entirely different attitude in this matter. In reply to the Soviet Government's question, General Anders informed the Soviet Commander-in-Chief that he considered it inadvisable and purposeless to send single divisions, although the Poles were fighting even in brigades on other fronts.

Incidentally, General Anders gave his promise that the whole Polish Army would be ready to take part in the campaign against the Germans by June 1 of the present year. Neither by June 1 nor at a much later date did the Polish Army, or rather the Polish Command and the Polish Government show their willingness to fight the Germans on the Soviet-German front. Furthermore the Polish Government even formally declined to move their units to the Soviet-German front on the grounds that “the employment of

single divisions would give no result," that "the possible readiness for action of one division does not correspond to our expectations" (telegram from General Sikorski of February 7).

4) While refusing to send its army to the Soviet-German front, the Polish Government at the same time obstinately demanded the consent of the Soviet Government to carry out on Soviet territory supplementary recruiting for the Polish Army.

However, as not a single Polish detachment had taken part in active warfare, the Soviet Government was unable to give its consent. J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., in a message addressed to General Sikorski, and V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in a Note of May 14, drew the attention of the Polish Government to these circumstances.

Nevertheless the Polish Government repeated its request to carry out supplementary recruiting for the Polish Army amongst the Polish citizens residing on Soviet territory. In its Note of June 10, however, the Polish Government explicitly stated a projected use of the Polish fighting forces organized in the Soviet Union, that was nothing else but a refusal to use them on the Soviet-German front.

In reply to this statement, transmitted by Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Bogomolov, Soviet Ambassador to the Polish Government in London, the Soviet Government informed the Polish Government that in view of the fact that in spite of agreements between the U.S.S.R. and Poland, the Polish Government did not deem it possible to employ the Polish divisions organized in the U.S.S.R. on the Soviet-German front, the Soviet Government could not permit the further organization of Polish units in the U.S.S.R.

The above facts prove that the Soviet Government used every means to ensure a successful organization and development of the Polish Army on the territory of the Soviet Union, that the Soviet Government made all the necessary arrangements, and supplied all the necessary means and facilities for this purpose.

The agreement of July 30, 1941, and the declaration of December 4, 1941, clearly and explicitly defined the aims of the Soviet Government and the Polish Government, to unite the forces of the Soviet and Polish nations in the common struggle against the Hitlerite brigands and occupants, to create a Polish Army imbued

with this high ideal and to give it an opportunity to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Red Army for the independence of their motherland, their homes and their native soil.

The Soviet Government did everything that was necessary for the realization of this aim. The Polish Government took a different path. The Polish Government showed no inclination to send their divisions—neither the first divisions formed, nor those subsequently formed—to the Soviet-German front, they refused to employ the Polish Army on this front against the Germans hand in hand with the Soviet divisions, and thereby declined to fulfil the obligations they had undertaken. Therefore, the Polish Government must assume full responsibility for the breach that has occurred in the continued organization on Soviet territory of their army from among the Polish citizens in the Soviet Union.

I have the honor to be, etc.

BOGOMOLOV.

No. 50

Note of December 18, 1942, from Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. V. Valkov, Chargé d'Affaires of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, containing a reply to the Soviet Note of October 31, 1942, concerning the organization of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R.

London, December 18, 1942.

Mr. Chargé d'Affaires,

In respect to the negative attitude adopted by the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with regard to the efforts of General Anders to have one reserve depot left on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to continue the recruiting of Polish citizens for the Polish Army, I had the honor to represent in my Note of August 27, 1942, addressed to Ambassador Bogomolov, the consistent and sustained efforts of the Polish Government to organize a numerically strong army of Polish citizens, fit for military service and anxious to fulfil their duty to their motherland in the ranks of the armed forces. To recall these continued efforts of the Polish Government I quoted in my Note a series of facts and referred to the abundant correspondence in the matter between the representatives of the Polish Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I wish to emphasize that in his reply of October 31, 1942, to my Note mentioned above, Ambassador Bogomolov neither questioned nor denied any of the facts quoted by me. On the contrary, Ambassador Bogomolov, referred in his Note to the decision taken on March 18, 1942, to reduce the Polish forces to 44,000 men, a decision which, as I had the honor to remark in my Note of August 27, 1942, was taken unilaterally by the Soviet Government, without any consultation whatsoever with the representatives of the Polish Government, and which was contrary to the bilateral Polish-Soviet understanding of December 3, 1941, on the formation of a Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 96,000 men, apart from the evacuation of 25,000 infantry and 2,000 air and navy personnel. He also emphasized that "the further development of the Polish Army met with certain difficulties caused by such unforeseen circumstances as the non-delivery of wheat to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from the United States and England as a result of the outbreak of war in the Pacific Ocean." So without questioning in any way my statement concerning the negative attitude of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with regard to the numerical development of the Polish Army, moreover, himself emphasizing that the reduction of that Army in March, 1942, was due to the outbreak of war in the Pacific Ocean and not to any fault on the part of the Polish Government, Ambassador Bogomolov arrives at the end of his Note at a conclusion which I completely fail to understand, namely, that it is the Polish Government which should bear the entire responsibility for the discontinuation of the organization of their army from among the Polish citizens living on the territories of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Before discussing in further detail the various statements made by Ambassador Bogomolov in his Note of October 31, 1942, I wish first of all to observe that a considerable part of this Note is devoted to the enumeration of all measures and facilities granted by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to make possible the creation of a Polish Army. Ambassador Bogomolov includes in this list the setting up of recruiting boards, the notifying of Polish citizens of the organization of a Polish Army, the collaboration of Soviet military authorities with the Polish High Command for the most satisfactory solution of various problems connected with the organization of the Army, viz.: furnishing ap-

propriate premises, barracks, food and other supplies, munitions for training purposes, etc., as well as a non-interest bearing loan originally of 65 million roubles, raised subsequently to 300 million roubles, granted to the Polish Government by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to cover the cost of all the above mentioned services and deliveries in kind. The Polish Government fully appreciated the efforts the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics made to this end, efforts undoubtedly great and complicated in view of the war waged on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—and this is why they pressed no demands in this respect. If, however, there were serious shortcomings in matters concerning barracks for the army, food supplies, fodder for horses, which led to repeated representations by General Anders and by General Sikorski on December 3, 1941, in his talk with Premier Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, those complaints were not made as a reproach to the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics nor to place their efforts in doubt, but to draw their attention to the fact that these shortages and failures to deliver supplies must evidently impair the rapidity with which the Polish Army could be made ready for action.

In his Note of October 31, 1942, Ambassador Bogomolov mentions that in accordance with the understanding between the Soviet and Polish High Commands, the strength of the Polish Army was fixed at 30,000 men and that the formation of two Polish rifle divisions and of one reserve regiment should have been completed by October 1, 1941, and further, that in accordance with the proposal made by General Anders it was agreed to send the divisions as and when formed to the Soviet-German front without delay.

Ambassador Bogomolov's assertion that the strength of the Polish Army was fixed at 30,000 men is obviously contrary to the Polish-Soviet Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, to which Ambassador Bogomolov frequently refers in his Note. Article 4, of the above mentioned Military Agreement, reads as follows:

"The Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R. will consist of units of land forces only. Their strength and number will depend on the man-power, equipment and supplies available."

As results from the above text, the Military Agreement—that is the basic document governing the organization of the Polish armed forces—does not fix any restriction as to the strength, making it dependent solely on the man-power and equipment available. Moreover, at the signature of the Military Agreement, the Polish Government deliberately abstained from putting forward any definite figure as to the strength of the Army, on the assumption that the Polish armed forces fighting against the Germans would include all Polish citizens capable of bearing arms and eager to fulfil on the fields of battle their duty to their motherland. The Polish Government were fully convinced that on the territories of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics a numerically strong Polish Army could be raised in view of the man-power available there. These hopes of the Polish Government were based on three factors:

1. The number of Polish citizens, prisoners of war according to the figures published in the *Red Star*, the organ of the Red Army, on September 17, 1940 was 181,000 men, including 12 generals, 58 colonels, 72 lieut. colonels, 5,131 officers of lesser rank and 4,096 reserve officers.
2. In the Army of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics there were about 100,000 Polish citizens from the classes of 1917, 1918 and 1919, conscripted on Polish territory in the spring months of 1941.
3. Among those deported from Polish territory, there were considerable numbers of men of military age, who could join the Polish Army in formation, as volunteers or regular recruits, according to the provisions of Art. 6 of the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941.

Several months after the conclusion of the Military Agreement, to be exact, on December 3, 1941, a bilateral decision was reached by General Sikorski and Premier Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, with regard to fixing the strength of the Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As I mentioned above and in my Note of August 27, 1942, the Polish armed forces were to consist of 96,000 men, apart from 27,000 men evacuated to the Middle East, or a total of 123,000 men.

As Ambassador Bogomolov in his Note refers to an alleged fixing of the strength of the Polish Army at 30,000 men during General Anders's negotiations with the Soviet High Command, this refers probably to the so-called Protocol No. 2, of August 19, 1941. I

desire to recall in this connection the explanations communicated by Ambassador Kot to Premier Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, on November 14, 1941, and on November 15, 1941, to Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, which were taken into cognizance. Consequently Protocol No. 2 did not contain any limitation of the strength of the Polish Army—as this would have been contrary to Art. 6 of the Military Agreement signed a few days previously—but provided for a gradual formation of the Army by stages, according to the influx of recruits and the supply of technical equipment, which could be delivered to the Polish Army in formation only by the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and without which the formation of any armed force whatever was completely inconceivable. This Protocol, at the wish of the Polish Command—as emphasized by Ambassador Bogomolov in his Note—fixed a short time limit, October 1, 1941, for the organization and military preparedness of two divisions and one reserve regiment. This extraordinarily short period provided for the organization and military training of the Army, on the initiative of the Polish Command, is irrefutable proof of the eager desire of the Polish Army to take part in war operations on the Eastern front at the earliest possible date. It is obvious, however, that the problem of the military training of two divisions and one reserve regiment in a period of six weeks from the date of the signature of the Military Agreement has no connection whatsoever with the totally different problem of the strength of the Polish Army, as a separately organized entity that was to be formed in accordance with the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and of the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941. Therefore I must consider as wholly unjustified the assertion as regards a definite fixing of the strength of the Polish Army at 30,000 men during the negotiations with General Anders. Equally devoid of all foundation is the attempt to represent the understanding of December 3, 1941, which actually for the first time fixed the number of divisions to be formed on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the number of soldiers to be evacuated, as a concession made to the Polish Government.

In the above mentioned Note, Ambassador Bogomolov tries to burden the Polish Government with responsibility for the fact

that the two divisions mentioned above did not achieve their military preparedness by October 1, 1941, and that these and other divisions were also not ready to fight at a later date, and finally he asserts that the Polish Government deemed it undesirable to send single divisions to the front, and even refused to send their Army to the Soviet-German front.

I wish to draw your attention, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, to the fact that the Government of the U.S.S.R., at the time of the conclusion of the Military Agreement with the Polish Government were well aware that the Polish Government disposed of considerable man-power out of which many army divisions could be formed, but that on the other hand, they did not possess their own armament or munition factories. Therefore Article 12 of the Polish-Soviet Military Agreement explicitly provided that "armament, equipment, uniforms, motor transport, etc., will be provided as far as possible by (a) the Government of the U.S.S.R. from their own resources, (b) the Polish Government from supplies granted on the basis of the Lend-Lease Act."

The first care of the Polish Government when proceeding with the creation of the Polish Army was to take measures to fully provide the troops with the necessary equipment in the shortest possible time. Thanks to the efforts of the Polish Government a few weeks after the conclusion of the Military Agreement shipments of uniforms for the Polish Army were already despatched from Great Britain. General Anders received the first consignment of uniforms and boots from Soviet authorities only on October 23, 1941, and up to that date the soldiers were in rags, and 40% of them went barefoot. During the initial period of the formation of the Army, arms were to be supplied by the Government of the U.S.S.R. But it was only on October 22, 1941, that Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, notified Ambassador Kot that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had some difficulties as regards armaments and asked whether there was any possibility that the Polish Government might obtain armaments from the United States and Great Britain. An identical statement with regard to armament difficulties was made by Ambassador Bogomolov to General Sikorski and myself on October 25, 1941.

If I mention this matter here it is not with the aim of imparting any blame; I merely record facts which show that in spite of the

best will on the part of the Polish Government, Polish armed forces could not be adequately armed within the period of time originally fixed and that the Polish Government cannot assume any responsibility on that score.

The Polish Government informed by the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the difficulties concerning the arming of the Polish Army, immediately approached the Governments of Great Britain and of the United States with a request for arms and equipment. As you are aware, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, the necessity of continuing supplies to the U.S.S.R. on the one hand, and the imperative need of massing arms and munitions in North Africa on the other, together with complications arising from the great length of the journey were responsible for the fact that the arms could not be delivered at the dates fixed.

As a result it was only possible to arm and equip the 5th Division of the Polish armed forces on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and even that division very inadequately compared to a Soviet infantry division, so it was in no case ready to fight. The division did not possess any of the eighteen 45 mm anti-tank guns the establishment called for, it had no 76 mm anti-aircraft guns (establishment 4), also it did not possess any synchronized anti-aircraft machine guns (establishment 18) nor any 12,7 mm machine-guns (establishment 9). The 5th Infantry Division had not received any 77 mm field guns, although according to the establishment it should have had 18, and finally it was without munition carriers for 77 mm guns or 104 mm howitzers. As for the 37 mm anti-aircraft guns, it had only four instead of the six called for in the establishment. Finally the 5th Division was also very short of equipment: the division had only 10% of motor-cars, 56% of field kitchens, 80% of two-horse carts, 45% of ambulances, 60% of one-horse carts and 85% of the horses provided for in the establishment. As far as the other divisions were concerned there was actually no question of their being armed, as all they had was only 200 rifles, a number insufficient even for training purposes, so that in order to prevent the soldiers from remaining idle, General Anders was obliged to distribute among them part of the firearms of the 5th Division.

When on March 18, 1942, General Anders informed the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of this state of affairs and simultaneously presented him with a list of arms already re-

ceived and an estimate of additional arms required to complete the needs of the Polish Army, Premier Stalin said: "You will have enough time to organize and to train your Army. We do not press you to go to the front. I understand that it will be better for you to go to the front when we shall have advanced to the Polish frontiers. You should have the honor to be the first to step on Polish soil."

The facts quoted by me above prove that if neither the Polish Army as a whole nor any part of it, such as the 5th Division frequently mentioned by Ambassador Bogomolov, took part in the fighting on the Eastern front, it was not because the Government of the U.S.S.R. deemed it impossible to exert pressure on the Polish Command, but because no part of this Army was either properly trained or adequately armed, consequently, it did not meet the explicit and simple requirements set down in Art. 7 of the Military Agreement, in the following words: "The Polish units will be moved to the front only after they are fully ready for action."

In his Note Ambassador Bogomolov also refers to the second part of this Article, which reads: "In principle they (the Polish units) will operate in groups not smaller than divisions and will be used in accordance with the operational plans of the High Command of the U.S.S.R.," and at the same time he expresses the opinion that the sentence quoted above excludes the possibility of any reservation whatever or refusal as to the propriety of moving to the front separate units ready to go into action. Although I have already had the honor of proving that for lack of armaments none of the Polish divisions had reached the stage of full readiness for action, and consequently none was in a position to participate in the fighting, I now take the liberty of drawing your attention, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, to the fact that the interpretation of this part of this Article may be twofold, that is to say, that Polish military units not smaller than a division *might* be or *must* be moved to the front. In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding in the matter and to give to this Article a uniform interpretation which would exclude all ambiguity, General Sikorski on August 23, 1941, instructed General Szyszko-Bohusz to have a further talk with the High Command of the Red Army to explain that the Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-

publics would operate as a whole under Polish Command and that individual Polish divisions would not be sent to the front. Requesting such an interpretation of Article 7, General Sikorski took the stand that not only military considerations but the prestige of Poland demanded that the Polish Army should operate as a whole and have a special sector of the Eastern front entrusted to it under a Polish general. He also took into consideration the propaganda value that the taking over of a particular sector of the front by the Polish Army would have in Poland and in the whole world. The throwing up to the front of one Polish division and the splitting up of the Polish Army into single units would cause not only unfortunate consequences in the organization of the Polish Army, but would also have undesirable effects for the U.S.S.R., as far as propaganda was concerned. After carrying out his instructions, General Szyszko-Bohusz informed General Sikorski on September 11, 1941, that he had been officially informed, on September 10, by the Government of the U.S.S.R., through the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Panfilov, that the said Government interpreted Article 7 of the Military Agreement in accordance with the suggestion of the Polish Government and recognized entirely the necessity of using the Polish Army at the front as a homogeneous whole. Also in his conversations with the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, General Sikorski made explicit reservations against employing individual Polish divisions at the front and against splitting the Polish Army into single units which would be lost in the immense Red Army.

I am obliged to take the most emphatic exception to the assertion of Ambassador Bogomolov that the Polish Government removed from the agenda the question of the participation of the Polish Army in the common fight together with the Soviet forces against the Germans. The Polish Government were and continue to be firmly resolved to respect all Polish-Soviet agreements, the Agreement of July 30, 1941, the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941 and the Polish-Soviet Declaration of December 4, of the same year. Evacuation of a part of the Polish Army, agreed upon in the negotiations between General Sikorski and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, resulted from the necessity of the speediest possible arming of the Polish troops so that they might be thrown into the battle against Germany. An evacuation of part or even the whole of the Polish Army did not exclude a continuation of recruit-

ing of Polish citizens fit for military service as clearly provided for in the Military Agreement and did not depend on the earlier or later participation of the Polish Army in the battles at the front. In accordance with the provisions of the above mentioned Agreement, recruiting should be continued until the man-power resources of Polish citizens residing in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are exhausted. The recruiting was stopped without agreement with the Polish Government, in spite of the fact that being informed of the difficulties in feeding the troops in the rear of the Army, on June 10 of the current year, they made a proposal to the Soviet Government to supply food rations for recruits over and above the figure of 44,000 pending evacuation to the Middle East. As you are well aware, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, this offer was not accepted by the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the recruiting of Polish citizens for the Polish Army was stopped.

In the final paragraph of his Note of October 31, Ambassador Bogomolov asserts that in my Note of June 10 of the current year, the Polish Government declared themselves in favor of such a use of the Polish armed forces formed on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that meant nothing else than a refusal to use them on the Soviet-German front. Desirous to demonstrate that the above assertion can be based only on a misunderstanding, I take the liberty of quoting the paragraph of my Note of June 10, referring to the use of the Polish Army on the Eastern front among others. I wrote then: "The Polish Government are determined to use the Polish Armed Forces now in the U.S.S.R., in the Near East or in Great Britain in the struggle for the common cause against the common enemy." Moreover, I did not preclude in the above mentioned Note the possibility of the return of evacuated units of the Polish Army to the fighting on the Eastern battle-front, as shown by the following sentences: "It is possible that the Polish Army formed in the Near East may—after it is equipped and trained—also be used on the front of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in case the military situation should so require. Certain units of this army have already taken a noteworthy part in the defence of Tobruk and in the fighting in the desert. The fact that the Polish Army has not yet fought side by side with the Red Army is solely due to armament difficulties experienced by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as well as to the shipping difficulties that beset Great Britain and the United States."

As you see, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, the excerpts from my Note of June 10, quoted above, are perfectly clear and unequivocal and they contradict Ambassador Bogomolov's assertion concerning the alleged declaration of the Polish Government against the use on the Soviet-German front of Polish armed forces organized on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. All the facts quoted by me above irrefutably testify that the Polish Government, attaching great importance to the possibility of forming a Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, fulfilled with complete loyalty all the obligations they assumed, and most zealously spared no efforts to make that Army as strong numerically as possible. The Polish Government also did everything in their power and spared no steps to obtain as soon as possible from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and from the Governments of Great Britain and the United States the necessary arms and equipment for the Polish Army to enable it to take part in the fighting on the Eastern front. It is through no fault of the Polish Government that their efforts in this direction, owing to a whole series of unforeseen circumstances, did not bring the hoped for results within the time foreseen, as a consequence of which the training of the Army and its readiness for action were also delayed. On the other hand, the decision to reduce the strength of the Polish Army and to stop recruiting for that Army was taken by the Government of the U.S.S.R. alone without any attempt at consultation with the Polish Government in the matter. Consequently, full responsibility for those decisions must be borne solely by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Bearing in mind that the interests of the United Nations in the present war against the aggressor States demand that all available man-power be utilized to wage a most successful war against them, and in view of the fact that many thousands of Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics capable of bearing arms have not yet been recruited for the Polish armed forces, and, moreover, the possibility that when those Polish units already organized enter into action in the near future, casualties and losses must ensue which will necessitate replacements in the fighting ranks,—the Polish Government cannot alter their opinion that the continuation of recruiting for the Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, interrupted several months ago, is in the common interest of all Allied Nations.

I have the honor to be, etc.

RACZYNSKI

CHAPTER 6

**Transfer to the Polish Army of Poles forcibly conscripted
by the German Army and subsequently taken
prisoner by the Red Army.**

No. 51

Note of January 18, 1942, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, concerning the transfer to the Polish Army of Poles, forcibly conscripted by the German Army, and now in Soviet Prisoner of War Camps.

Referring to its Notes D. 713/41 of November 8, 1941, and D. 48/42 of January 7, 1942, the Polish Embassy has the honor to submit the following for the information of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs:

In the second half of December, 1941, groups of prisoners of war, soldiers of the German Army, passed through Tatishchevo and Saratov, among them were many Polish citizens forcibly conscripted by the German Army. These prisoners on seeing Polish soldiers of the 5th Infantry Division at stations en route asked their countrymen to report their fate to the Polish authorities and to make endeavours to have them set free from prisoner of war camps and enrolled in the Polish Army in formation on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Submitting the above for the information of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, this Embassy has the honor to renew its request that instructions be issued with a view to collecting in a separate center prisoners of Polish nationality who were forcibly mobilized by the German authorities of occupation, and after particulars as to their identity, etc., have been investigated and their nationality ascertained, make it possible to enlist them in the Polish Army.

Kuybyshev, January 18, 1942.

No. 52

Note of January 23, 1942, from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev, refusing special treatment to Poles, prisoners of war from the German Army.

In reply to the Notes of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland of November 8, 1941, No. 713/41 and January 7, 1942, No. 48/42, and of January 18, 1942—No. 164/42, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has the honor to communicate the following:

In the Notes mentioned above the Embassy referred to the transfer to the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. of Polish citizens, prisoners of war from the German Army, on the assumption that these prisoners surrendered of their own will, supposedly wishing to join the Polish Army in formation on the territory of the U.S.S.R.

The People's Commissariat considers itself obliged to declare, that it cannot agree to the Polish Government's proposal and that it sees no grounds for adopting any regime for German prisoners of war of Polish nationality other than the regime established for all German prisoners of war.

Further to the above, the People's Commissariat deems it necessary to inform the Embassy that an overwhelming majority of Poles—soldiers in the German Army—were taken prisoner with arms in their hands, having actively resisted the Soviet forces, and not as a result of voluntary surrender.

Kuybyshev, January 23rd, 1942.

No. 53

Note of February 6, 1942, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev containing a reply to the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of January 23, 1942, and demanding the transfer to the Polish Army of Poles, prisoners of war from the German Army.

In reply to the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs No. 13 of January 23, 1942, the Polish Embassy has the honor to submit the following:

When it approached the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs with the request that Poles be separated from prisoners of war, former soldiers in the German Army, taken prisoner by the Red Army, this Embassy was prompted by the following considerations:

The conscription of Polish citizens by the German Army constitutes a flagrant breach of the fundamental rules of international law, and should be met, in the common interest of all Allied States, not only by condemnation, but also by counter-action both on the

part of the Polish Government and on the part of the friendly Government of the U.S.S.R. The Germans are endeavoring to mobilize every force to combat the Democracies, and spare no effort to put at the disposal of the German High Command the greatest possible man-power, including even hostile elements. One of the important tasks of both our Governments is to counteract this action.

The Poles, constituting as they do an element decidedly hostile to the Germans, are, as a rule, distributed on conscription by the German Army among different units, in small groups or singly so as to prevent any organized resistance, as for instance mass desertion to the Allied Forces. That the Germans do not trust the Poles conscripted by force is illustrated by the fact that Poles are not admitted to commissioned and non-commissioned rank in the German Army, nor to branches of the service requiring individual action, as for instance tanks, air force, signals, but are given auxiliary duties in supply columns or in infantry units, where an individual soldier surrounded by a mass of Germans would face immediate death at their hands should he lay down his arms.

The Polish Government has, for its part, undertaken appropriate steps on the German occupied territory of the Republic of Poland to deal with the disastrous results of the conscription of Polish citizens by the German Army, issuing secret instructions to Poles to surrender to the soldiers of the Red Army at the earliest opportunity. The Polish Government intends to extend this action as soon as possible. The principle of deserting from the ranks of the German Army, encouraged on the territory of the Polish Republic, is not fruitless: as best shown by public statements of Soviet authorities. Among others, a report in the *Comsomol Pravda* No. 308 of December 30, 1941, fully supports the attitude adopted in the present Note, and requires no further comment. (A copy of this report is forwarded herewith.)

Besides, last November the Soviet authorities organized a meeting of Slav prisoners of war, former soldiers in the German Army, at which a resolution accepted by all the Slav nations oppressed by Germany was passed. This resolution, signed on behalf of the Poles by Kurt Klauzen, a worker from Bydgoszcz and former soldier of the 106th German Infantry Division, and Ryszard Slibo, from Chorzów, former soldier of the 29th German Infantry Division (*Izvestia* November 29, 1941)—fully corroborated the correctness of this

Embassy's reasoning, submitted to the People's Commissariat in the Notes D. 731/41 of November 8, 1941, D. 48/4^r of January 7, 1942, and D. 164/42 of January 18, 1942.

In the opinion of the Embassy, to restrict to propaganda in the Soviet press the results of this action, aimed at encouraging Poles to surrender to the soldiers of the Red Army, is not enough in the present period of friendly collaboration between both States, a collaboration which aims at the fullest mobilization of every force for the fight against the common enemy, and to which expression was given in the Moscow Declaration of December 4, 1941.

At the same time the Polish Embassy has the honour to draw the attention of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the undesirable consequences which would ensue should information reach occupied Poland that Poles conscripted by force are treated by the Soviet authorities on being taken prisoner, in the same manner as German prisoners-of-war. Information of this kind would immediately be utilized by German propaganda not merely to hinder the Polish Government's action with regard to desertion by Polish citizens, but also endanger the principle of Polish-Soviet collaboration on the territory of the Republic of Poland.

This being the state of affairs, this Embassy has the honor to request the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to reconsider its hitherto negative attitude to the transfer of Polish prisoners, former soldiers in the German Army, to the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, an attitude expressed in the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of January 23, 1942.

Kuybyshev, February 6, 1942.

No. 54

Note of December 15, 1942, from Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. V. Valkov, Chargé d'Affaires of the U.S.S.R., concerning the transfer to the Polish Army of Poles, prisoners of war from the German Army, and the cessation of tendentious broadcasts concerning the part played by Poles in the German Army.

Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, London, December 15, 1942.

Radio stations on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have on several occasions recently broadcast news of the

mass participation of Poles in the German Army, and even of the formation of special Polish units allegedly commanded by Polish officers. This information was given in such a form as to create the impression that there existed voluntary cooperation between the Poles and the German Army against the Red Army.

At the same time the Polish authorities have had the opportunity to ascertain by reports from Poland that many Polish officers and other ranks, residing in territories illegally incorporated in the Reich, have been forcibly conscripted by the German Army and sent to various German fronts. Poles, thus mobilized, have found themselves in Fieldmarshal Rommel's army in Libya, and in German units which took part in the fighting at Dieppe. Availing themselves of the first opportunity, these men surrendered to Allied units and are today in the ranks of the Polish Army, preparing to fight against their age-old enemy.

The Government of the Republic of Poland have therefore instructed Ambassador Romer to explain to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the real reasons for the existence of a certain number of Polish soldiers in the German Army. At the same time Ambassador Romer has instructions to submit to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the aforementioned broadcasts throw a false light upon the part played in the German Army by the forcibly conscripted Poles, whose only desire is to concentrate their efforts against the German oppressor.

Replying to a verbal intervention by Ambassador Romer, the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Lozovsky, stated, that from investigations carried out among individual prisoners, the authorities of the U.S.S.R. estimate the number of Polish soldiers at three hundred thousand. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics possesses information to the effect that these soldiers are under strong German supervision. Desiring to influence these soldiers by propaganda, the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have distributed to them appeals and proclamations in Polish.

As can be seen from the statement of Mr. Lozovsky, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, anti-German sentiments prevail among the soldiers referred to, a fact the Polish Government never doubted.

The lowering of Germany's war potential is indisputably an aim common to all the United Nations. Its realization in respect of

Polish soldiers conscripted by the German Army against their will and contrary to international law ought in the common interest to belong primarily to the Polish Government. The success of appeals addressed to Polish soldiers in the German Army would beyond all doubt be greater if the Polish Government were in a position to assure them that on surrendering they would be separated and sent to special camps under the care of Polish Authorities and would be able subsequently to transfer to the ranks of the Polish Army.

I am deeply convinced that a considerable number of Poles forcibly conscripted by the German Army and ordered against their will to fight the Allied Armies could already find themselves in the ranks of the Polish Army, thus contributing to strengthen the forces fighting for the common cause.

Therefore I should like to express the hope that in view of the increasing importance of this problem, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will take into account the Polish Government's suggestion and reconsider the attitude hitherto adopted towards Poles who are already Soviet prisoners of war, or may be taken as such in the future, and will consider issuing orders to the effect that broadcasts on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should cease to interpret the tragic fate of the victims of this forcible conscription in a way that may prove a source of misapprehension harmful to them.

I have the honor to be, etc.

RACZYNSKI.

No. 55

Note of January 11, 1943, from Mr. V. Valkov, Chargé d'Affaires of the U.S.S.R., to Mr. E. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, containing the refusal of the Government of the U.S.S.R. to separate Poles, prisoners of war from the German Army and to transfer them to the Polish Army.

London, January 11, 1943.

Mr. Minister,

On behalf of the Government of the U.S.S.R. I have the honor to remind you that on the question of German prisoners of war of Polish nationality, which is the subject of your Note of December

15, 1942, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has already had occasion to communicate to you, in the Note of January 23, 1942, that for reasons indicated in this Note it does not find it possible to apply to Poles among German prisoners of war any regime other than that established for all German prisoners of war in general.

The attitude of the Soviet Government, as set forth in the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of January 23, 1942, was confirmed twice: by the People's Commissariat in Kuybyshev and by the Soviet Embassy in London.

In reply to your Note of December 15, 1942, on the same question I have the honor to inform you that the Soviet Government cannot see any reason to reconsider their decision.

In regard to the Soviet radio broadcasts concerning the creation of Polish units in the German Army under the command of Polish officers, it is necessary to mention that the radio broadcast, the only one of its kind to take place in the course of the last two months, was based on positive facts. In the above broadcast the undeniable fact was recorded of the presence in the German Army of whole groups and units, consisting exclusively of Poles under Polish commanders whose names were given in the broadcast: Maritime Regiment, Colonel Polkowski; Commander of the 4th Company, Colonel Rakowski.

I have the honor to be, etc.

VALKOV.

CHAPTER 7

Citizenship of Poles in the U.S.S.R.

No. 56

Note of November 10, 1941, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, concerning conscription by the Red Army, of Polish citizens of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Jewish origin.

The Polish Embassy has the honor to submit the following for the information of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs:

According to information received, the War Commissar for Kazakhstan at Alma-Ata, General Shcherbakov issued orders that all Polish citizens deported by the Soviet Authorities from occupied Polish territory and possessing documents issued to them by these authorities, endorsed to the effect that they are of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian or Jewish origin are to be enrolled in the Red Army if they meet the age and fitness requirements.

After an intervention by the interested parties and by representative of this Embassy, General Shcherbakov declared that he was acting on instructions from the Central Authorities, who are alleged to have directed him to treat as citizens of the U.S.S.R. all citizens of the Republic of Poland of other than Polish origin possessing Soviet passports. Among others the following Polish citizens, despite protests on their part, were among those conscripted and sent it would seem to the Far East: Aleksander Rotstein, Silberspitz and Kotok.

This same discrimination between Polish citizens according to origin or race, devoid of any impartial basis and contrary to the provisions of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, is being practiced by the military authorities in Alma-Ata, who also explain to the Polish citizens reporting to them to settle various formalities connected with their enlistment in the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that they are acting on instructions from the Central Authorities. Only Polish citizens of Polish origin are given permits to travel to centers where the Polish Army is being organized, while Polish citizens of Ukrainian and Jewish origin are, it seems, categorically refused permits by the aforementioned authorities.

The Polish Embassy has the honor to request the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to cause instructions to be given to the War Commissar in Kazakhstan to apply impartially to all Polish citizens residing in the area under his authority, the principles resulting from the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the Polish-Soviet Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, which guarantee the right to serve in the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. to every Polish citizen who is capable of bearing arms.

Kuybyshev, November 10, 1941.

No. 57

Note of December 1, 1941, from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in reply to the Note of the Polish Embassy of November 10, 1941, concerning the conscription by the Red Army of Polish citizens of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Jewish origin.

In reply to the Note of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland No. D. 740/41 of November 10, 1941, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has the honor to state the following:

Referring to the fact of the conscription by the Red Army in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, as Soviet citizens, of citizens of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Jewish origin who left the territories of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia, the Embassy of the Polish Republic calls in question the existence of a legal basis for this order, considering that it is contrary to the principles of the Soviet-Polish Agreement of July 30, 1941 and the Soviet-Polish Military Agreement of August 14, 1941.

The People's Commissariat cannot agree with this point of view of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland. No foundation to support the point of view expressed in the Note of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland, referred to above, can be found in the Agreement of July 30, or in the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941. In accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. of November 29, 1939, all citizens of Western districts of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian S.S.R. who found themselves on the territory of the said districts on November 1 and 2, 1939, respectively, acquired the citizenship of the U.S.S.R. in accordance with the Citizenship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Act of August 19, 1938. The Soviet Government's readiness to recognize as Polish citizens persons of Polish origin, who resided until November 1 and 2, 1939, on the aforementioned territory, gives evidence of good will and compliance on the part of the Soviet Government but can in no case serve as a basis for an analogous recognition of the Polish citizenship of persons of other origin, in particular those of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian or Jewish origin, since the question of the frontiers between the U.S.S.R. and Poland has not been settled and is subject to settlement in the future.

With regard to the Polish Embassy's reference to an order issued in Alma-Ata by General Shcherbakov, according to the

information of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs no order was issued calling the aforementioned citizens to the ranks of the Red Army, but orders were given to call them up for work behind the lines, as is also done in the case of other citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Kuybyshev, December 1, 1941.

No. 58

Note of December 9, 1941, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs concerning Polish citizenship.

The Polish Embassy acknowledges receipt of the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of December 1, 1941, and has the honor to bring the following to the notice of the People's Commissariat:

1) Polish legislation is founded on the principle of equality before the law of all citizens, regardless of their origin or race. The Polish Embassy is also not aware of any Soviet laws which would introduce or sanction any discrimination or differentiation of this kind.

The Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, do not introduce in any of their provisions relative to Polish citizens (amnesty, military service) the notion of origin or race, and thus they concern all Polish citizens without exception.

In this state of affairs, this Embassy sees no possibility of changing its attitude as expressed in its Note of November 10, 1941, which stated that it was contrary both to the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, that only Polish citizens of Polish origin should be able to enlist in the Polish Army, while Polish citizens of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Jewish origin were enlisted in the Red Army by the War Commissariat in Kazakhstan.

2) The fact of the possession of Polish citizenship by a given person is regulated by Polish law, in particular by the Polish State Citizenship Act of January 20, 1920. For this reason and for the reasons stated above under Paragraph 1, this Embassy has the honor to declare that it finds itself unable to take into cognizance

the statement included in the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of December 1, 1941, to the effect that the Soviet Government is prepared to recognize as Polish citizens only persons of Polish origin from among the persons who found themselves on November 1 and 2, 1939 on the territory of the Republic of Poland temporarily occupied by the military forces of the Soviet Union.

3) The Citizenship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Act of August 19, 1938 cannot be applied to Polish citizens, for its introduction on the territory of the Polish Republic occupied by the Soviet Union from the latter half of September, 1939, until June or July, 1941, would be contrary to the provisions of the IVth Hague Convention of 1907.

4) The Polish Embassy does not connect the matter referred to in Note D. 740/41 of November 10, 1941, with the problem of Polish-Soviet frontiers. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs points out in the Note in question that it does not recognize as Polish citizens persons of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Jewish origin who possessed Polish citizenship before November 1-2, 1939, "because the problem of the frontiers between the U.S.S.R. and Poland has not been settled, and is subject to settlement in the future." The Polish Embassy is bound to state that such a thesis is self-contradictory. Maintaining fully the fundamental attitude expressed above in Paragraphs 1-3, this Embassy has the honor to point out that such a view would be tantamount to a unilateral settlement by the Soviet Union at the present time of a problem which, in accordance with this same statement of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, is subject to settlement in the future.

Kuybyshev, December 9, 1941.

No. 59

Note of January 5, 1942, from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev, concerning Polish citizenship.

In reply to the Note of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland No. 902/41 of December 9, 1941, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has the honor to communicate the following:

1. After taking note of the considerations set out in the Note of the Embassy of December 9, 1941, on the question of the former Polish citizens forming part of the population of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia—Ukrainians, White Ruthenians and Jews—the People's Commissariat cannot see any reason to change the attitude set forth in its Note of December 1, 1941.

2. The assertion of the Embassy that the law concerning citizenship of the U.S.S.R. of August 19, 1938, could not be applied to the territories of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia in the period between the middle of September 1939 and the middle of July 1941, as this would be incompatible with the provisions of the IVth Hague Convention of 1907, is incorrect. The provisions of the IVth Hague Convention of 1907, which the Embassy evidently has in view, refer to the regime of occupation on enemy territory, whereas the assertion of "occupation" in respect to Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia is, in this case, devoid of all foundation, alike from the political as from the international point of view, because the entrance of the Soviet forces into Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia in the autumn of 1939 was not an occupation but an attachment of the districts mentioned to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the result of the freely expressed will of the population of those districts.

Kuybyshev, January 5, 1942.

No. 60

Note of June 9, 1942, from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev on the issuing of Polish passports in the U.S.S.R.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs taking into consideration that the Polish Embassy and, under the arrangement relating to the scope of action of the Delegates of the Embassy of the Polish Republic, its Delegates in the Republics and Districts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its representatives are proceeding to issue Polish national passports, has the honor to state that the competent Soviet authorities find it indispensable that, to properly order this matter, the Embassy should present to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs alphabetical lists of Polish citizens to whom it proposes to issue

national passports. These lists, made out separately for each district inhabited by Polish citizens, should be presented in four copies with a Russian translation attached to accelerate the procedure. The lists should include all persons above the age of 16. These lists should indicate:

- a. Surname, name and father's name;
- b. Year and place of birth;
- c. Origin;
- d. Religion;
- e. Present address in full;
- f. Citizenship and place of residence until November 1939;
- g. If covered by the Amnesty Decree of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. of August 12, 1941, when and where arrested and sent out, number of jail delivery certificate, when and by what office of the People's Commissariat of the Interior it was issued;
- h. If not a permanent inhabitant of Western Ukraine or White Ruthenia, when and how arrived on the territory of the U.S.S.R.;
- i. Whether married or single. If married, place and date of marriage; citizenship of husband and wife since the time of marriage;
- j. Present and past citizenship and place of residence of parents.

These lists may be drawn up in descriptive form or in the form of questionnaires.

All objections of competent Soviet authorities to the issue of Polish national passports to these or other persons included in the lists will be notified by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Embassy on the return of these lists.

Persons included in the above mentioned lists to whom the competent Soviet authorities raise no objection will receive, on presentation of their Polish national passports, permits of residence for foreigners, issued by Militia Headquarters of the respective counties through the Militia Office of their district or town.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs also has the honor to inform the Embassy that it is indispensable to include in the above mentioned lists all persons who have already been issued with Polish national passports.

Kuybyshev, January 9, 1942.

No. 61

Note of June 24, 1942, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, replying to the Soviet Note of June 9, 1942; on the issuing of Polish passports (excerpt).

Referring to the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs No. 107 of June 9, 1942, the Polish Embassy, on the instruction of its Government, has the honor to submit the following for the information of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs:

In accordance with the fundamental principles of international law, the Government of the Republic of Poland assert that the matter of Polish citizenship rests with them and they do not consider it possible that, when verifying lists of Polish citizens demanded of the Embassy, the Soviet authorities should decide the citizenship of Polish citizens resident on the territory of the Republic of Poland and who between 1939-1941 found themselves, as is known, not of their free will on the territory of the Soviet Union.

In particular this attitude of the Polish Government is also in accordance with the Agreement concluded on July 30, 1941, between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. . . . The issue of passports to Polish citizens is carried out by the Polish Embassy and its representatives under existing Polish laws and regulations. According to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and Polish law, origin, religion, race or place of residence within the frontiers of the Republic of Poland have no influence on the citizenship of a given person.

Taking into consideration that the aforementioned Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs is aimed at imposing a procedure in issuing passports, unprecedented in relations between sovereign States, the Government of the Polish Republic see no possibility of discussing the principles of this question on the basis of the suggested procedure.

Kuybyshev, June 24, 1942.

No. 62

Note of January 16, 1943, from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev, claiming as Soviet citizens all persons who on November 1-2, 1939,

found themselves on Polish territories occupied by the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has the honor to inform the Embassy of the Polish Republic of the following:

In connection with the exchange of Notes in the years 1941-1942 between the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the Embassy, concerning the citizenship of persons who previously lived in the Western districts of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republics, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs informed the Embassy on December 1, 1941, that all inhabitants of the above-mentioned districts who found themselves on the territories of these districts at the time of their entry into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (November 1-2, 1939), had acquired Soviet citizenship in accordance with the Decree of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. dated November 29, 1939, and the Citizenship of the U.S.S.R. Act of August 19, 1938.

In its Note of December 1, 1941, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs informed the Embassy that the Soviet Government were prepared, by way of exception, to regard as Polish citizens persons of Polish origin living in the territories of the above-mentioned districts on November 1-2, 1939. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs is bound to state that despite the good-will of the Soviet Government thus manifested, the Polish Government has adopted a negative attitude to the above statement of the Soviet Government and has refused to take the appropriate steps, putting forward demands contrary to the sovereign rights of the Soviet Union in respect to these territories.

In connection with the above, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, on instructions from the Soviet Government, gives notice that the statement included in the Note of December 1, 1941, regarding the readiness to treat some categories of persons of Polish origin on an exceptional basis must be considered as without validity and that the question of the possible non-application to such persons of the laws governing citizenship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has ceased to exist.

Kuybyshev, January 16, 1943.

No. 63

Note of January 26, 1943, from Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R., in reply to the Note of January 16, 1943, concerning Polish citizenship in the Soviet Union.

London, January 26, 1943.

Mr. Ambassador,

In the Note of the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev of December 9, 1941, the Polish Government notified its refusal to take into cognizance the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of December 1, 1941, in which the Soviet Government declared its readiness to exonerate, by way of exception and favor, certain categories of persons of Polish origin from the application of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of November 29, 1939, as well as from the laws which confer upon them the status of citizens of the Union. The aforementioned Note of the Polish Embassy pointed out that the conferment or withdrawal of Polish citizenship was an exclusive and inalienable attribute of the sovereignty of the Polish State, whose laws, moreover, make no distinction between the origin, race or faith of its citizens.

Since then a year has passed during which the aforementioned categories of Poles residing in the Union have been treated in accordance with their status as Polish citizens. However, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has informed the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev by its Note No. 12 of January 16, 1943, that the Soviet Government considers it necessary to cancel the declaration contained in the Note of December 1, 1941, and that in consequence the possibility of exonerating from laws governing Soviet citizenship the said persons of Polish nationality has now ceased to exist.

Maintaining its point of view in principle on the question of citizenship, the Polish Government records with deep regret that the Soviet communication of January 16, 1943, is incompatible with the spirit of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the joint Declaration made by both Governments on December 4, 1941.

These documents were based on the mutual conviction of the two Contracting Parties, that the re-establishment between them of normal and confident relations in the interest of their cooperation in

the present struggle against the common enemy and of their good neighborliness after the war, calls for the nullification of a recent pact that was contrary to these arrangements. Thus these documents leave no room for doubt as to the annulment of the Soviet-German Agreements of 1939 and their political and legal consequences.

I must recall that according to Paragraph 1 of the Supplementary Protocol to the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, the Soviet Government undertook to set free all Polish citizens detained on Soviet territory for whatsoever reason. On July 30, 1941, there were on Soviet territory no other categories of Polish citizens than those to whom this status is now denied by the Soviet Government. So it was precisely to these persons in their status of Polish citizens, that the amnesty applied. It must be emphasized that the point mentioned above which was the subject of laborious negotiations, constitutes one of the essential clauses of the Agreement of July 30, 1941.

The Polish Government has always refused to recognize the validity of the unilateral decisions of the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, taken when there were no Polish-Soviet relations; among them was the decision concerning the forcing of citizenship of the Soviet Union upon Polish citizens. It may be added that decisions of this kind are incompatible with international law as defined by the IVth Hague Convention of 1907, and with the provisions of the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, to which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adhered in the Declaration of the United Nations, dated January 1, 1942.

Always desirous for its part to maintain with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the best of relations, based on the observance of all treaties and arrangements existing between the two countries, the Polish Government see themselves obliged to insist that the Soviet Government grant to all Polish citizens residing in the Soviet Union, a treatment in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the principles of equity and liberty on which rests the collaboration of all Powers united in the struggle against the common enemy and oppressor.

I have the honor to be, etc.

RACZYNSKI.

No. 64

Note of February 17, 1943, from Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R., to Mr. Raczynski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs,

containing a reply to the Note of January 26, 1943, concerning Polish citizenship in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Minister, London, February 17, 1943.

With reference to your Note of January 26, 1943, I have the honor to inform you that the Soviet Government do not regard it as possible to reconsider the subject of the citizenship of those persons who on November 1-2, 1939, found themselves on the territory of the western districts of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republics, since this matter remains wholly within the sovereign rights of the Soviet Union over these territories.

As to your assertion regarding the incompatibility of the Soviet Government's statement of January 16, 1943,* with the spirit of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, the Declaration of December 4, 1941, the IVth Hague Convention of 1907 and the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, such an assertion is devoid of all foundation. The Soviet Government also emphatically reject the statement of the Polish Government contained in the Note of January 26, about the alleged forcing of Soviet citizenship upon the above-mentioned persons, as entirely unfounded and a distortion of the true state of affairs.

The Soviet Government consider it imperative to recall that citizens of the western districts of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian Socialist Soviet Republics acquired Soviet citizenship exclusively on the strength of the freely voiced will of the population which found its expression in the unanimous resolutions adopted by the people's assemblies of the districts in question, and the Decree of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, issued on November 29, 1939, in accordance with these resolutions.

I have the honor to be, etc.

BOGOMOLOV.

No. 65

Note of March 8, 1943, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, concerning the forcing of Soviet citizenship upon Polish citizens.

The Embassy of the Republic of Poland has the honor to inform the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that reports from a

* i.e. in the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev.

number of places in the U.S.S.R. indicate that local Soviet authorities are employing methods of compulsion described in the Embassy's Note No. 307/21/43 of March 6, 1943.

In the town of Syzran, district of Kuybyshev, officials of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs are threatening with imprisonment or confinement in labor camps all Polish citizens who refuse to accept Soviet passports. Endeavours are also being made to persuade those who resist by the argument that "Poland no longer exists," which is flagrantly inconsistent with the obligations undertaken by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Those refusing to accept Soviet citizenship are as a rule kept in confinement without food or water until they sign a document agreeing to accept a Soviet passport.

Similar reports are coming in from the Krasnoyarsky Kray, and the Kirov, Kuybyshev and Akmolinsk districts. In the town of Kuybyshev three inmates of the Embassy's Home for Invalids are still under detention without food or drink.

Fragmentary information which has succeeded in reaching the Embassy indicates that many hundreds of persons have been affected by these arrests.

The Polish Embassy has the honor to renew its request to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to instruct local authorities immediately to abandon the use of force and to set free Polish citizens who have been deprived of their freedom without committing any offence whatsoever.

Kuybyshev, March 8, 1943.

No. 66

Note of March 29, 1943, from Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R., containing the protest of the Polish Government against the forcing of Soviet citizenship upon Polish citizens.

London, March 29, 1943.

Mr. Ambassador,

It has come to the knowledge of the Polish Government that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the strength of the Notes of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs addressed to the Polish Embassy at Kuybyshev on December 1,

1941, and January 16, 1943, and in disregard of the reservations expressed by the Polish Government on each occasion, and invoking the Decree* of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of November 29, 1939, has proceeded to force Soviet citizenship upon Polish citizens who find themselves in considerable numbers and not of their will on the territories of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In these circumstances the Polish Government deem it necessary to declare once more that in the light of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, which is binding on both parties, they consider the principles underlying the attitude of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in this matter as unjustified and unfounded, because:

a) The aforesaid attitude is contrary to Paragraph 1 of the Supplementary Protocol to the above-mentioned Agreement of July 30, 1941, granting amnesty to all Polish citizens within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which bilateral legal instrument cannot be infringed or changed by any unilateral Soviet order.

b) The Decree* on citizenship of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of November 29, 1939, resulting from the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 referring to territorial changes in Poland, and invoking *expressis verbis* one of these treaties, must obviously have lost its validity together with these same treaties from the moment of the German aggression against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on June 22, 1941, as recognized by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Article 1 of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941.

In view of the fact that regardless of the outcome of the present conversations in Moscow between the two Governments which seek agreement on their attitude in this matter in the spirit of mutual friendliness and collaboration that underlies their present relations, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has not agreed to the suspension, at least during the course of the conversations in progress, of the execution of its orders in respect of Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Polish Government find themselves regretfully compelled to lodge a deter-

* *Ukase*.

mined protest against this and to declare that they cannot recognize this infringement of the sovereign rights of the Polish State; they reserve to themselves the fundamental right to call into question in the future all *de facto* conditions, both as regards general matters and those affecting individual citizens, resulting from the aforesaid attitude of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and the right to claim compensation for any losses sustained by Polish citizens in consequence of this attitude.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

RACZYNSKI.

No. 67

*Excerpts from the Civil Code of the Russian S.F.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R. containing the definition of domicile as interpreted by Soviet Law, delivered to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev on April 2, 1943.**

CIVIL CODE OF THE R.S.F.S.R.

II. Subjects of the law (persons).

11. A place of domicile is a place where a person remains constantly or for the greater part of time in connection with his or her official employment, or usual occupation, or the presence therein of his or her property.

By the place of domicile of persons under age or in custody is meant the place of domicile of their legal representatives (parents, adopters, guardians or trustees) (November 14, 1927) (G.U. No. 115, art. 770).

CIVIL CODE OF THE UKRAINIAN S.S.R.

II. Subjects of the law (persons).

11. A place of domicile is a place where a person remains constantly or for the greater part of time in connection with his or her official employment, or usual occupation, or the presence therein of his or her property.

By the place of domicile of persons under age or in custody is meant the place of domicile of their legal representatives (parents or guardians).

* Cf: Minute of Ambassador Romer's conversation with Mr. Molotov, Document 87.

CHAPTER 8**The Execution of Wiktor Alter and Henryk Ehrlich**-----
No. 68

Note of March 8, 1943, from Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R., protesting against the execution of W. Alter and H. Ehrlich.

London, March 8, 1943.

Mr. Ambassador,

Excerpts have been published in the American and British press of a letter from the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington addressed to Mr. William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor, containing information on the execution of Wiktor Alter and Henryk Ehrlich, who were sentenced to death by the Soviet authorities on the charge of complicity in subversive action against the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, giving assistance to Polish Intelligence and appealing to the Soviet army to cease bloodshed and conclude an immediate peace with Germany.

In connection with the above information the Polish Government refer to Notes regarding Wiktor Alter and Henryk Ehrlich addressed by the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and beg to state as follows:

1. The Councillor of the capital city of Warsaw, Henryk Ehrlich (born in Lublin in 1882), and ex-Councillor and Sheriff of the city of Warsaw, Wiktor Alter (born in Mława, province of Warsaw, in 1890), were released from prison on September 13, 1941, by the competent authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the provisions of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, and a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of August 12, 1941, granting amnesty to all Polish citizens domiciled and detained in the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The fact of their release was communicated to the Embassy of the Republic of Poland at Moscow in a Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on September 23, 1941, which clearly proves that Messrs. Alter and Ehrlich had been recognized by the Soviet authorities as Polish citizens.

2. Henryk Ehrlich and Wiktor Alter were widely known and distinguished leaders of the Jewish Socialist movement in Poland; furthermore Mr. Ehrlich was a member of the Executive Committee of the Socialist Labor International, and Mr. Alter a member of the Executive Committee of the International of Trade Unions.

In consideration of his services with the Jewish labor movement in Poland, the Polish Government had intended to appoint Mr. Ehrlich a member of the National Council, and with this aim in view had taken steps to facilitate his journey from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Great Britain. Mr. Alter was to be appointed assistant at the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev in relief work for Polish citizens on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The political and social activities of Messrs. Alter and Ehrlich for many years well-known throughout Poland and in international labor circles, their patriotism and loyalty as Polish citizens during the German invasion of Poland and also in the light of the desolation caused throughout the Polish nation and the Jewish population by that invasion, are absolute guarantees that they could not even indirectly have been sympathizers with or tools of any action whatsoever in favor of Germany, and even less so in favor of Hitlerism. At the same time the charge that Messrs. Ehrlich and Alter worked against the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics at any period whatever in conjunction with the alleged Polish Intelligence must be firmly rejected as being entirely imaginary and contrary to fact.

On the contrary, it was well known to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that during the period between their release from prison and their re-arrest in December 1941, Henryk Ehrlich and Wiktor Alter proceeded, with the knowledge and consent of the Soviet authorities, to organize in Moscow an International Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, the object of which was to unite all Jewish masses throughout the world in the war effort against Germany and Hitlerism.

On the strength of the above statement, the Polish Government firmly repudiate the motives put forward in the letter of the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington to Mr. Green and protest against the execution by shooting of the Polish citizens Henryk Ehrlich and Wiktor Alter.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

RACZYNSKI.

No. 69

Note of March 31, 1943, from Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R., to Mr. E. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, in reply to the Note of March 8, 1943, protesting against the execution of W. Alter and H. Ehrlich.

London, March 31, 1943.

Mr. Minister,

In reply to your Note of March 8, 1943, I have the honor to inform you that the Soviet Government reject the entirely unfounded protest of the Polish Government concerning the execution of Ehrlich and Alter, sentenced on account of their activities directed against the U.S.S.R. at the end of the year 1941, which went so far as to appeal to the Soviet armies to cease this bloodshed and to conclude an immediate peace with Germany; this at the time of the hardest struggle of the Soviet armies against the advancing armies of Hitler.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

BOGOMOLOV.

CHAPTER 9

Relief Organization for Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R.

No. 70

Rules regulating the scope of activities of Delegates of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in the U.S.S.R., coordinated as a result of negotiations between representatives of the Polish Embassy and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on December 23, 1941.

RULES GOVERNING THE SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES OF DELEGATES
OF THE
EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

General Provisions.

1. The Delegates of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in the republics and districts (*oblasts*) where more important con-

centrations of Polish citizens exist, are the executive representatives of the Embassy authorized to carry out, in close collaboration with the Soviet authorities, such duties towards Polish citizens as arise from the Agreement of July 30, 1941.

2. The functions of Embassy Delegates are temporary. They act as long as concentrations of Poles exist in a given locality, or until they have completed their duty toward Polish citizens, in their capacity as Delegates.

Duties of Embassy Delegates.

The duties of Embassy Delegates include the following:

1. To inform the Embassy of the requirements and situation of Polish citizens.

2. To supply Polish citizens with information and guide them according to the spirit of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941.

3. To register Polish citizens in a given area, to record their movements, their fitness for military service, for work, and their professional qualifications; to search for missing members of their families and their near relatives.

4. To cooperate with local Soviet Authorities in directing Polish citizens to suitable work in accordance with the labor legislation in force in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

5. To exercise due care that Polish citizens unfit for work are assured the minimum means of subsistence, by distributing among them aid in the form of money or in kind, except in cases where the Soviet authorities are obliged to assure them means of livelihood in accordance with existing Soviet legislation.

6. To organize cultural aid for adults and education for youth.

7. To supply Polish citizens with essential documents (passports, certificates, etc.).

8. To receive, dispatch, store and distribute shipments of aid in kind from abroad for the relief of the Polish civilian population.

9. To seek out representatives for regions or localities where Polish citizens are resident. These representatives perform in the districts allotted to them the duties provided under Paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the present Regulations, and on instruction of the Delegates the duties provided for in Paragraphs 1, 3 and 8. Candidates for representatives selected by a Delegate are subject to

approval by the Embassy. The Delegate exercises direct supervision over the activity of the representatives.

10. In areas where there are no Embassy Delegates, their duties are performed by travelling Embassy Delegates.

Cooperation with Soviet Authorities.

1. Embassy Delegates, their deputies and travelling Delegates are appointed by the Polish Ambassador. Their names are immediately notified to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, which on its part notifies their nomination and the character and scope of their activity to the Soviet authorities of the given Republic or district, instructing them to accord all necessary assistance to the Embassy Delegates.

2. The scope of activity of Embassy Delegates requires their close collaboration with the competent officials of the Soviet authorities in their district, and in particular with the local representatives of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, *Oblispolkoms*, *Rayispolkoms*, and the district and regional officials of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. The Embassy Delegates shall acquaint the local Soviet authorities with the situation and requirements of Polish citizens and settle with them all practical questions arising from the situation of the Polish population.

No. 71

Note of July 6, 1942, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, protesting against the infringement of the diplomatic immunity of the Embassy Delegate in Archangel, and against the arrest of his staff.

The Polish Embassy has the honor to call the following to the attention of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs:

After the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the Polish Government and the Soviet Government as a result of the conclusion of the Agreement of July 30, 1941, the "Rules governing the scope of activities of Delegates of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland" were established by an exchange of Notes, No. 48 of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, of December 23, 1941, and No. D. 1078/41 of the Polish Embassy of December 24, 1941.

On January 23, 1942, during a conversation which aimed at establishing in greater detail the legal status of these Delegates,

their privileges and rights, their personal security and the immunity of their archives, correspondence and offices, Mr. Vishinsky, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. stated to Mr. Kot, the Polish Ambassador, that when dealing with the problem of Embassy Delegates, the Soviet authorities realized it was indispensable to grant them a special position in relation to the local authorities, who received instructions to treat the Delegates as representatives of a foreign Embassy and as official persons. When asked by the Polish Ambassador whether this statement would be considered a guarantee that the Delegates would enjoy personal immunity, immunity of their archives and official correspondence, freedom to organize their offices and to choose their office staff and the liberty to travel, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars declared that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had done all in its power to secure these conditions for them, and requested the Ambassador to inform him should any difficulties of a local nature arise, adding that these difficulties would be removed.

On July 2, 1942, at about 4 p.m. Mr. Józef Gruja, Polish Embassy Delegate in Archangel, 2nd Secretary of the Polish Embassy, was obliged to go on official business to Murmansk, leaving behind as his deputy in Archangel (in agreement with the local authorities) Mr. Waldemar Kuczyński, one of his officials. A few hours after the Embassy Delegate had left, three officials of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs accompanied by two women employed in the local Inturist Hotel, entered the office of the Archangel Delegate, carried out a thorough search and for several hours questioned the officials present in the Delegate's office. Finally, according to information received by the Embassy, the officials of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs took the liberty of removing all the archives and official correspondence of the Embassy Delegate in Archangel, his seal and his money, and after having arrested the officials of the Delegate's office, that is to say, the acting Embassy Delegate, Waldemar Kuczyński, the storekeeper, Anna Witkowska, the assistant storekeeper, Marjan Pytlak, and office-worker Zdzisława Wójcik, they drove these persons away to an unknown destination, leaving with Mr. Kuczyński's wife previously prepared documents concerning the search they had carried out.

In view of the fact,

1. That the action described above was taken by officials of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, a considerable number of hours before this Embassy was informed, on the night of July 3-4, 1942, of the unilateral decision of the Soviet authorities that the maintenance of an Embassy Delegate in Archangel would serve no further purpose because his principal tasks had been carried out—this at a time when even from the Soviet authorities' point of view there existed a Polish Embassy Delegate in Archangel who was acting legally, i.e., in accordance with the Polish-Soviet agreement, concluded by Notes exchanged on December 23 and 24, 1941 and on January 8 and 9, 1942;

2. That, in connection with the above, the action taken by the officials of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, the entry into the office of the legally officiating Polish Embassy Delegate, the carrying out of a search therein, the violation of the immunity and the carrying away of the archives and official correspondence and a seal and money belonging to the Polish Embassy in the U.S.S.R., constitute a flagrant violation of the rights enjoyed by Polish Embassy Delegates and their offices, expressly guaranteed by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.;

3. That the Polish citizens, acting Delegate Mr. Kuczyński, in the temporary absence from Archangel of the Embassy Delegate, and the three afore-mentioned officials of the Delegate's Office were deprived of their liberty seems all the more unjustified as the Soviet authorities had not only failed to raise any objection or complaint against the activities of the Office of the Archangel Delegate, but even expressed, through the medium of Mr. Novikov in his conversation, on March 9, 1942, with Mr. Arlet, 1st Secretary of the Embassy, their appreciation of the activities of that office.

The Polish Embassy is obliged:

To regard the action taken by the Soviet authorities in Archangel as altogether inconsistent with the rules and customs accepted in international relations, and as entirely opposed to the principles of friendly collaboration, which found their expression in the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the Declaration of December 4, 1941;

To protest against this action of the Soviet authorities; and

To ask the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to cause:

1. the immediate release of the officials of the office of the Polish Embassy Delegate in Archangel, that is the Polish citi-

zens Messrs. W. Kuczyński, M. Pytlak, A. Witkowska and Z. Wójcik;

2. the immediate restoration to Mr. J. Gruja, 2nd Secretary of the Polish Embassy, on his return to Archangel, of all the archives and official correspondence of the Polish Embassy Delegate in Archangel and of the seal and money, constituting the property of the Polish Embassy;

3. that investigations be immediately ordered and that the Soviet officials, guilty of taking the action described in this Note, be punished.

Kuybyshev, July 6, 1942.

No. 72

Note of July 19, 1942, from Mr. Sokolnicki, Chargé d'Affaires of the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev, to Mr. A. J. Vishinsky, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, on the unilateral decision to close the offices of various Delegates and the arrest of Polish Embassy Delegates in the U.S.S.R.

Kuybyshev, July 19, 1942.

Mr. Chairman,

In the course of your conversation with the Polish Ambassador on July 8, 1942, when you discussed with him the latest actions of the Soviet authorities with regard to the network of local offices of Embassy Delegates established in accordance with the corresponding agreements between this Embassy and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, reference was made to the unilateral decision of the Soviet authorities to close the offices of the Delegates in Aldan-Yakutsky, Vladivostok, Archangel, and Saratov; the arrest of Mr. M. Zalenski, 1st Secretary of Embassy, acting Embassy Delegate in Vladivostok; the arrest of the entire staff of the office of the Embassy Delegate in Archangel; searches carried out in the offices of the Embassy Delegates in Vladivostok and Archangel; the violation of the immunity of the Embassy's archives in the offices of these Delegates; the seizure by the local authorities of a number of documents, of money and of seals belonging to the Embassy, and the closing and sealing of the Embassy's stores. In the course of this conversation the Polish Ambassador asked a question, which I now again put to you, that is do the above actions of the Soviet authori-

ties denote a change in the policy of the Soviet Government as initiated on July 30, 1941, in respect of that portion of the Polish population, which as a result of well known events found itself forcibly on the territory of the Soviet Union. It is the opinion of the Ambassador that if this action on the part of the Soviet Authorities was aimed at the destruction of the entire welfare and relief organization for Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R., created with such difficulty by this Embassy in agreement with the People's Commissariat, then it would be better to state this clearly instead of creating a fictitious situation in which one cannot be certain of the fate either of people or of institutions.

It was to be inferred from your reply, Mr. Chairman, that the Soviet Government did not propose to change the attitude that it had hitherto adopted towards Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R. and their relief organization set up by this Embassy, and that general conclusions should not be drawn from specific cases based on misunderstandings of local officials or resulting possibly from criminal actions of individuals.

During the ten days that have passed since the aforementioned conversation took place, this Embassy has been informed of new facts, which seem to signify that the organization of Embassy Delegates on the territory of the U.S.S.R. is actually being closed down; this is accompanied by the arrest of those members of this Embassy's staff who have been most active in bringing relief to Polish citizens in their districts, the seizure by the local authorities of official archives and documents of this Embassy, the blocking of this Embassy's accounts in branches of the State Bank of the U.S.S.R., the closing and sealing by the Soviet authorities of warehouses containing relief goods from the Allied States addressed to the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in the U.S.S.R.

Apart from the arrest of Mr. M. Zalenski, 1st Secretary of Embassy; Mr. Gruja, 2nd Secretary of Embassy and the staff of the Delegate's office in Archangel, already the subject of separate diplomatic correspondence, I am obliged, Mr. Chairman, to bring the following further facts to your notice:

On July 16, 1942, this Embassy received news of a search having been carried out by the local authorities in the office of the Embassy Delegate in Barnaul, the arrest of the Embassy Delegate Dr. J. Mattoszko and his staff, M. Siedlecki, D. Wajetner, J. Kowalewski

and K. Bartosz, and of the seizure by these same authorities of the archives and seal of the Delegate's office and the closing of the Embassy's current account in the local branch of the State Bank.

On July 17, 1942, this Embassy received news of a search having been carried out by the local authorities in the office of the Embassy Delegate in Samarkand and the arrest of Mr. M. Heitzman, Attaché of Embassy, who enjoys diplomatic immunity, and of the Delegate's staff, K. Kazimierzak, F. Kowol, K. Jaroszewski, and F. Mantel.

On July 18, 1942 this Embassy received news of a search having been carried out by the local authorities in the office of the Embassy Delegate in Kirov, where is located the greatest clearing warehouse on the territory of the U.S.S.R. for goods arriving from Allied States for the Polish Embassy in the U.S.S.R. At the same time Mr. A. Wisinski, the Embassy Delegate in Kirov whose appointment to this post received the approval of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on June 26, 1942, was arrested, together with his staff, T. Slucki, F. Dubrowski, S. Fink and Z. Piotrowski.

On July 19, 1942, this Embassy received news that the office of the Embassy Delegate in Petropavlovsk had been *de facto* deprived of its freedom of action, while stores of relief goods sent to the Polish Embassy from Allied States, located at the station of Mamlutka, were closed and sealed by the local authorities.

On the same day, this Embassy received similar information concerning the office of the Embassy Delegate in Syktyvkar, where Dr. Winiarczyk, the Embassy Delegate was arrested.

Further details of the aforementioned steps taken by the Soviet Authorities with regard to the local offices of this Embassy are as yet unknown to me. I do, however, possess information to the effect that telegrams addressed to this Embassy and containing reports on these events, are not delivered to this Embassy and that this Embassy's telegrams to certain of its Delegates and representatives are being intercepted. The dispatches in question included those sent by the Ambassador and intercepted and not delivered to Attachés of Embassy Ploski and Lickindorf and to Secretaries of Embassy Glogowski and Gruja, which contained instructions in accordance with the contents of this Embassy's Note to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, of July 10, 1942, No. D. 2871/42. This constitutes a new infringement of diplomatic immunity and privileges, established by law and international custom.

Though I intend to return to each of the matters just mentioned on receipt of more concrete and detailed information, I have, perforce, to limit myself at present to protesting against the action of the Soviet authorities in closing down the Embassy's relief organization; and to insist that the Delegates and their staffs who have been arrested, be immediately set free, and that the archives, seals and money belonging to the Embassy be returned.

At the same time I have to state, that as a consequence of instructions issued by the Soviet Authorities during the last three weeks:

1. Four out of the twenty, that is 20% of the offices of Embassy Delegates established in agreement with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, namely the offices of Embassy Delegates in Vladivostok, Archangel, Aldan Yakutsky and Saratov have been closed down by unilateral order of the Soviet authorities;

2. According to information so far received by this Embassy, five other offices of this Embassy's Delegates, namely those in Barnaul, Samarkand, Kirov, Petropavlovsk and Syktyvkar are *de facto* no longer able to function because the Soviet authorities have arrested most if not all of their staff;

3. In this way the Soviet authorities have actually paralyzed the activity of 45% of all the Embassy Delegates, appointed in accordance with a joint agreement between the Embassy and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and operating in districts where there are at present more than 170,000 Polish citizens, according to the as yet incomplete registration figures;

4. In view of the fact that the offices of nine Embassy Delegates have been prevented from functioning, the issue of food and clothing to tens of thousands of Polish citizens, some of them in very difficult circumstances, has had to be stopped in the districts served by these Delegates. The same applies to the distribution of financial aid to Polish citizens, unfit for work. Food, clothing, and medical stores, worth millions, and consisting of goods sent to the Polish Embassy in the U.S.S.R. from Allied States are left entirely unprotected. Further shipments of food, clothing and medical supplies which are on their way to the offices of individual Delegates, will no longer go to persons duly authorized to receive them. Preventive inoculation against typhus will have to be suspended. Homes for orphans and the aged, maintained by individual Delegates, will be left without suitable care;

5. In view of the fact that the relief activities of this Embassy's agencies are being formally or actually rendered impossible, the responsibility for every consequence of this action rests with the Soviet authorities;

6. In view of the effective stopping, closing and sealing by the Soviet authorities of food, clothing and medical stores, collected at great expense and effort by the Polish Government, as well as by the Governments and peoples of the Allied States, destined for Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R. and delivered to Soviet ports by Polish and Allied sailors, who sacrificed much and risked their lives to accomplish this task,—the responsibility for the destruction and deterioration of these goods which may ensue, must also rest with the Soviet authorities.

I have the honor to be, etc.

SOKOLNICKI.

No. 73

Note of September 1, 1942, from Mr. Raczynski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R., concerning the closing of the Delegates' Offices, and the new organization of relief.

London, September 1, 1942.

Mr. Ambassador,

Many weeks have elapsed since the arrest of the Delegates of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, their staffs and representatives. One hundred and thirty Polish citizens recognized by the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as possessing official status and who, as I may state, have in the majority of cases carried out their duties of bringing help and relief to their countrymen with sacrifice and devotion under difficult conditions, are still in prison. The Polish Government has made several interventions on their behalf either through your good offices, Mr. Ambassador, or through the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev. All these interventions have so far been without result.

The Polish Government is not, of course, in possession of detailed information concerning the fate and treatment of those imprisoned. From the scarce and of necessity fortuitous information

reaching us, it is to be feared, that their fate is particularly hard. At the same time the relief organization for Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, only just created with great difficulty, has been closed down.

I need not repeat, for I have done so orally and in writing more than once, that the Polish Government consider that bringing relief to Polish citizens, who, neither of their own fault nor of their own will, find themselves on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is their fundamental right and duty which they will not and can not surrender. These citizens, in a foreign country, in strange conditions and surroundings, torn away from their homes and occupations, deprived of any funds whatever—have become more than anyone else the victims of a situation difficult for all, a situation caused by war, and therefore in greater need of help than others. Moreover, Mr. Ambassador, you are fully aware how difficult it was from the very first moment after the conclusion of the Agreement of July 30, 1941, to find and agree upon a form of relief administration. I shall confine myself to stating that the organization finally accepted was the result of prolonged negotiations between the Polish Embassy and the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and that the principle of entrusting specifically the responsibility for the entire organization to no one else but Embassy Delegates, who were endowed with an official status, and Embassy's representatives, was initiated by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, after the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had rejected the plan to set up Consulates, to restore the activities of the Polish Red Cross or to form Social Welfare Committees, chosen by the Polish citizens concerned. Once the laborious preparations, which lasted until last February and March, were completed, the field organization set up enjoyed comparative freedom from interference during the first period of its activity. It is, however, particularly significant, that the moment its work commenced to develop, when relief in the form of food, clothing and medicine began to reach Polish citizens, the local authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics began to show distrust of the Delegates, and to place difficulties in the way of the Delegates and their staffs. Subsequently, when supplies arrived and their distribution started on a large scale, there followed the arrest of the Delegates, the seizure of their archives and the closing down of all these activities.

I desire to state here with all firmness and with that frankness which ought to characterize our mutual relations, that the assumption that the problem of re-establishing the relief organization can be separated from the problem of the arrested Delegates would be a denial of reality. A re-establishment of the relief and welfare organization without the release of all those arrested, and the return of the archives, is impossible not only in principle, but also for purely practical reasons. The deportation and imprisonment of the Delegates and their staffs, i.e., of people enjoying the fullest confidence of the Polish citizens under their protection, inevitably caused uneasiness and confusion in the minds of those citizens. Were there no other obstacles, the lack of faith in the probable effectiveness of their work and the fear of persecution by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on grounds incomprehensible to the general public, would make it impossible to find persons suitable to manage the work of relief, while their predecessors were suffering the torture of imprisonment for precisely the same work.

Far be it from me to criticise or even to judge the administrative arrangements and legal principles in force in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It is an internal affair of your country, in which no outsider has the right to mix or interfere. You will, however, agree with me, Mr. Ambassador, that the arrangements and principles in question differ in many respects from those accepted in other European States, particularly the countries of Central and Western Europe or on the American Continent. I am only mentioning this in order to suggest that it is conceivable that some of the activities carried on in good faith by the Delegates, and in complete accord with Western European conceptions, laws and customs to which they were used and among which they had grown up, may have come into formal conflict with the more rigorous and unfamiliar regulations in force in the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

I must, however, categorically reject the allegation of any action having been consciously undertaken by the Delegates to the detriment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The supposition that any of these persons, numbering more than one hundred and selected with the utmost care, should have undertaken of their own accord and independently, action inconsistent with the line indicated by the Polish Government, is devoid of any traces of likeli-

hood. As regards the general line laid down for the entire field relief organization by the Polish central authorities through the intermediary of the Polish Embassy, this was exclusively directed at the concentration of all the efforts of this organization to assure the utmost aid and relief to the Polish citizens dispersed throughout the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Polish Government always considered and continues to consider this activity an integral and important part of the common struggle against the enemy, who has adopted as one of his most cruel but at the same time most effective methods of total warfare the biological extermination of nations whose love of freedom opposes them to him. It is to this struggle, in which Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stand together, that the Polish Government subordinates all its undertakings.

One of the basic conditions of the victory of our common cause is the establishment of relations of confidence and sincere collaboration between the United Nations. Prompted by this principle the Polish Government has endeavored to give the least possible publicity to the difficulties which it has encountered in protecting the welfare of its citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; in so doing this Government has trusted that these difficulties will be rapidly overcome by mutual good will. The prolongation, however, of the period of the forced inactivity of the relief and distribution organization has created circumstances which, quite independently of the will of the Polish Government, make further silence on this subject impossible. The piling up and even partial deterioration of relief goods in stock, received originally from America, and the inability to distribute them among those for whom they are intended, oblige the Polish Government to warn the institutions donating them of the state of affairs created by the arrest of the Delegates.

News of the stoppage of the distribution of aid to Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has already reached Polish territory occupied by the Germans, and is spreading feelings of understandable anxiety and bitterness, reflected in reports received by the Polish Government from its agencies, political organizations and individuals. It would, of course, be entirely contrary to the intentions of the Polish Government, should this anxiety exercise a detrimental effect on the preparedness for action of the people in occupied Poland, or should it arouse sentiments likely to impede

the development of future good-neighborly relations between Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in conformity with the Declaration signed in the Kremlin on December 4, 1941, by General Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government, and Premier Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

If I insist again, Mr. Ambassador, on the release at the earliest possible moment of the arrested Delegates of the Polish Embassy, their staffs and representatives, and at the same time express my readiness to persuade them to leave the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as soon as they are released, I do so not merely in defense of my imprisoned countrymen and colleagues, as is my right and duty; I come forward not merely in the interest of those hundreds of thousands of Poles, who from one day to another have found themselves deprived of the aid and care which, not infrequently, in the present wartime conditions, constituted for them the sole means of safeguarding their lives; I address myself to you in the name of those supreme interests for which Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are fighting in the ranks of the United Nations, and in the name of what I believe to be the common aim of both our nations, the laying of foundations for future co-operation between our countries, based on good neighborly relations.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

RACZYNSKI.

No. 74

Note of September 5, 1942, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on the release of the arrested Embassy Delegates, representatives and staffs.

With reference to the statement made by Mr. J. Vishinsky, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., on July 20, 1942, his personal Note of July 20, 1942, Note No. 138 of July 24, 1942, and the Aide-Mémoire of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of July 27, 1942, the Polish Embassy has the honor to communicate the following:

1. This Embassy categorically rejects the allegation contained in the Statement of July 20, 1942, that all the arrested Delegates of the Embassy, and their staffs, instead of loyally carrying out their duties of bringing relief to Polish citizens—were engaged in actions hostile to the Soviet Union and in intelligence work.

It is impossible that all the Delegates without exception, most of the members of their staffs and many of their representatives who were continuously and consistently instructed by the Embassy to cooperate with the Soviet authorities in accordance with the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the Declaration of December 4, 1941—in the spirit of the common struggle against Hitlerite Germany, could have at the same time carried on actions hostile to a State allied with the Republic of Poland. Most of these persons, and especially the Delegates, are well known personally to this Embassy and have always shown exceptional ability in social work and devotion to the welfare of the Polish population in the U.S.S.R.

The charges brought against those arrested, lacking any semblance of proof, must have been based on some tragic misunderstanding, highly injurious to the persons arrested. Indirectly—in view of the wholesale and simultaneous arrests—it shatters the entire relief organization of the Embassy and in consequence adversely affects, both from the moral and the material point of view, all Polish citizens residing on the territory of the U.S.S.R.

This Embassy again asks the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to cause the immediate release of all those arrested, and asserts that their official activities, carried on in conformity with the Rules governing the scope of activity of Embassy Delegates, for instance furnishing this Embassy with information concerning the requirements and condition of Polish citizens, can in no way provide a basis for their being charged with intelligence work in the U.S.S.R.

2. This Embassy cannot agree with the statement of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs alleging that up to now the activities of the Delegates have shown their lack of usefulness. The tremendous tasks which the Delegates had to perform were in no way decreased as the same masses of Polish citizens still remain, requiring help and feeling its lack today more than ever. The institution of the Embassy Delegates was created out of practical considerations, and in future the only really practical solution of the problem of relief for Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R. must be based on some intermediary organization or other to go between the central body—the Embassy—and the field representatives working in Polish centers dispersed throughout the vast territory of the U.S.S.R.

3. This Embassy cannot consider as closed the matter of the arrest by the Soviet authorities of Secretaries of Embassy Zalenski

and Gruja, as well as other Polish diplomats. Avoiding formal discussion as to whether the local authorities were or were not informed of the diplomatic status of these officials who, in point of fact, were well known in the localities where they worked and who possessed diplomatic identification cards issued to them by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, this Embassy wishes to state that it has not as yet received appropriate satisfaction either for their illegal arrest or for their equally illegal detention in Soviet prisons.

The Embassy wishes also to correct a fundamental inexactitude contained in Paragraph 7 of the Personal Note of July 27, 1942, stating that this Embassy agreed to deprive of their diplomatic rights and privileges, as from July 6, persons with whom Note No. 128 of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was concerned. To the proposal contained in Note No. 128 of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs "that Embassy Delegates occupying diplomatic posts, be relieved by the Embassy either of their duties as Embassy Delegates or of their diplomatic posts," this Embassy replied in its Note No. 8. D-287/42 of July 10, 1942, protesting against a unilateral decision in a matter settled by mutual agreement, and informing the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of its decision to recall from posts as Embassy Delegates persons of diplomatic status, of which decision those concerned were immediately informed by telegraph.

4. The Embassy cannot agree that the return of the official seals, archives and money of the Embassy held illegally by the Soviet authorities, be made conditional on the completion of whatever kind of investigation, and once more requests the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to return them to this Embassy without further delay.

Kuybyshev, September 5, 1942.

No. 75

Aide-Mémoire of September 10, 1942, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs concerning the fate of Polish children in the U.S.S.R.

AIDE-MÉMOIRE.

The fate of Polish children is a subject of special concern to the Polish Government which is sparing no effort to provide the best

possible conditions to enable them to survive the present war. In view of the methods applied by Hitlerite Germany which by mass murder, systematic persecution and de-nationalization is endeavoring to destroy the youth of Poland, every Polish child outside the homeland and especially in Allied and friendly countries is of priceless value to the future of the Polish nation.

One of the ways by which the Polish Government is endeavoring to provide effective relief is the dispatch from abroad of food-stuffs and clothing for Polish children. Last year the extent of such relief in the U.S.S.R. was quite considerable, but unable as it was to satisfy all needs in the past, it will also not be able to satisfy them in the future.

Conditions for effective relief to Polish children in the U.S.S.R. were created by the following orders issued by the Soviet authorities in agreement with the Polish Embassy:

1. Granting of special food quotas to Polish citizens, especially to non-working members of families (*izhdiventzy*) which in practice chiefly favored children;

2. Permission for the Embassy to establish relief institutions in the form of orphanages (*diet-dom*), kindergartens (*diet-sad*), etc.

The order granting food quotas for Polish citizens was only carried out in part and irregularly by the local Soviet authorities. In practice the carrying out of this order varies considerably in different districts and generally the *izhdiventzy* receive no food rations at all, or at the best, in *kolkhoses*, half the bread ration. As the average food ration for a working person amounts to 400 grammes of bread as well as soup, he is in no position to give any of this ration to other members of his family who are not working.

On the whole, while the Embassy Delegates were still functioning, the development of orphanages and kindergartens proceeded satisfactorily. At present, however, the Embassy is continually receiving information that local Soviet authorities are closing the orphanages and kindergartens established with such great difficulty, and even the soup kitchens, especially in the Kazakh S.S.R. The number of children in relief institutions is constantly decreasing instead of increasing according to needs.

This being the case the Embassy's concern for the fate of Polish children during the approaching winter is easily understood. Parents cannot be expected to be able to feed their children from the

modest food rations they receive, and it is doubtful whether it will be possible to set up new relief institutions for children in view of existing conditions.

In order to save Polish children from the consequences of this state of affairs the Embassy deems it necessary—

1. To develop the present system of orphanages and kindergartens in the various districts and regions, and to extend the system of food quotas to all Polish citizens unfit for work, especially to all children. The Embassy is of opinion that it would be especially desirable to supplement the existing relief institutions for children by setting up in the most suitable places ten or twelve large orphanages, each to accommodate 1500 to 2000 children. The provisioning and administration of such institutions would be considerably easier and more effective. They would remain under the direct control of the Embassy which would supply the staff and provide special food for the children from foreign relief consignments. The local Soviet authorities would provide suitable premises for these institutions and the essential foodstuffs.

2. Since whatever the efforts of the Embassy and the Soviet authorities the proposed measures could not, in existing war conditions, provide for all Polish children requiring assistance, the Embassy renews its suggestion to evacuate a certain number of Polish children from the U.S.S.R. to those Allied countries which have already declared to the Polish Government their readiness to support these children for the duration of the war. If such evacuation were extended over a long period and consisted of small parties of ten to fifteen children and guardians at a time, it would not require the provision of special transport. The Embassy, on its part, would provide food and medical assistance for the children on their journey.

Kuybyshev, September 10, 1942.

No. 76

Note of September 16, 1942, from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev on the closing of Embassy Agencies.

In reply to the Note of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland of September 5, 1942, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has the honor to communicate the following:

1. The question of the reasons for the arrests of Embassy Delegates and local representatives of the Embassy and the closing of their offices was exhaustively dealt with in the declaration made by Mr. A. J. Vishinsky to Mr. Sokolnicki, Polish Chargé d'Affaires, on July 27, and in a series of subsequent conversations between the representatives of the People's Commissariat and the representatives of the Embassy, and for this reason the People's Commissariat sees no necessity to return to this question. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs can only confirm that, in spite the repeated declarations of the Embassy concerning the loyalty to the U.S.S.R. of all its delegates and the alleged lack of grounds for their arrest, the investigation of their actions now in course provides considerable evidence entirely corroborating information in possession of the Soviet authorities, as to their intelligence work hostile to the U.S.S.R.

In view of the reasons stated above, the request of the Embassy for the immediate release of the arrested persons cannot be granted, as this question can only be decided after the conclusion of the investigation and will depend upon its results.

2. The question of Embassy delegates in the field, raised in Paragraph 2 of the Note, was fully exhausted in the Personal Note of Mr. A. J. Vishinsky to Mr. Sokolnicki on July 27, 1942, and the People's Commissariat does not see any reason to reconsider its point of view in this matter.

3. The question of the arrest of Messrs. Zalenski, Gruja and others raised by the Embassy in the first part of Paragraph 3 of its Note, was also exhaustively dealt with in the Notes of the People's Commissariat No. 130 of July 10, 1942, No. 138 of July 24, 1942, and in the Personal Note of Mr. A. J. Vishinsky to Mr. Sokolnicki of July 27, 1942.

As to the question raised in the second part of Paragraph 3 of the above mentioned Note of the Embassy, the People's Commissariat deems it necessary to make clear that in Paragraph 7 of the Note of the People's Commissariat of July 27, the assent of the Embassy was given only to the cessation in future of the state of affairs under which diplomatic collaborators of the Embassy, while discharging the duties of local Embassy Delegates, retained their diplomatic rights and privileges. This viewpoint of the Embassy was confirmed in the Note No. D. 2871/42 of July 10, 1942, concerning Embassy Delegate Mr. Heitzman in whose case the Em-

bassy consented not to claim diplomatic immunity for him during the period of his activity as Embassy Delegate in Samarkand.

4. To the question raised in Paragraph 4 of the above mentioned Note, the People's Commissariat has already given answer in the Note of July 27, 1942 and for the time being does not see any reason to change its attitude as therein defined.

Kuybyshev, September 16, 1942.

No. 77

Aide-Mémoire of October 16, 1942, handed by Mr. Novikov of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Sokolnicki, Polish Chargé d'Affaires, concerning the termination of investigations in respect of the arrested members of the staff of the Polish Embassy.

Investigations in respect of the arrested Polish citizens have now been brought to a close.

The cases of 15 persons, namely: F. A. Meller, G. A. Ochnik, G. Malinowski, R. Iliniczowa, J. F. Lubowicki, G. G. Rylko, M. B. Ryczak, M. J. Matuszek, B. B. Kon, S. G. Wachtel, F. J. Mantel, Z. A. Piotrowski, A. A. Juszkiewicz, G. A. Winczewska, and M. W. Nowosad, have been dismissed and orders have been issued to release these persons from detention.

The cases of 16 persons, charged with intelligence work hostile to the U.S.S.R., namely: J. J. Mieszkowski, Z. J. Bochniewicz, M. S. Sawicz, W. S. Mattoszek, G. S. Zółtowski, A. P. Saraniecki, Z. M. Kuczyński, M. T. Twarkowski, B. I. Szwajzer, E. G. Stawiński, W. J. Janczuk, W. F. Bugajski, S. A. Winter, F. W. Bednarz, L. M. Artamanowa-Pest and W. W. Zarudny—have been referred to the courts.

In respect to the remaining 78 persons, a decision was reached at a special meeting of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs whereby these persons compromised by actions hostile to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are subject to deportation from the U.S.S.R.

Kuybyshev, October 16, 1942.

No. 78

Note of November 17, 1942, from Mr. E. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R.,

on the arrests of the Delegates and representatives of the Polish Embassy in the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Ambassador, London, November 17, 1942.

I have already had the honor to inform you in my Notes of July 11, July 24, and September 1, 1942, and in conversations with yourself, that I consider the charges brought against the diplomatic officials of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kuybyshev, its Delegates, representatives and office staffs, to be entirely unfounded. The Memorandum, you delivered to me, Mr. Ambassador, on October 31, repeats these same charges in a form derogatory to the dignity of Polish officials and Polish authorities, to which I am obliged to take categorical exception.

For my part I desire therefore to further state that, fully maintaining the attitude previously adopted, I most categorically reject the supposition that the distinct instructions of the Polish Government along lines of collaboration with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the struggle against the common enemy, were not carried out by persons who devoted themselves with much sacrifice to the welfare of their fellow citizens dispersed throughout the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and many of whom had already had opportunity to give proof of their efficiency and loyalty in carrying out duties entrusted to them in other posts.

After a thorough examination of the matter, for which it is indispensable, as already stated in Ambassador Romer's conversation with Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on October 31, 1942, to have all the documents and archives seized from the Embassy Delegates and their representatives by the police authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, returned to the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kuybyshev, I shall reply to each of the points raised in the Memorandum you delivered to me.

At the same time I should like to express my deep conviction, that an early settlement of this incident would be desirable in the interests of the satisfactory development of mutual relations between Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and should simultaneously include the resumption of relief work for Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the release of those Delegates and representatives who are still under arrest.

I have the honor to be, etc.

RACZYNSKI.

Note of January 23, 1943, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on the evacuation of Polish children from the U.S.S.R.

The Embassy of the Republic of Poland has the honor to notify the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the following:

In the course of the conversation he had on September 5, 1942, with Mr. Lozovsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sokolnicki returned once more to the subject of the evacuation from the U.S.S.R. of a certain number of children possessing Polish citizenship. In compliance with Mr. Lozovsky's request Mr. Sokolnicki despatched an Aide-Mémoire on September 10, 1942, which included suggestions for the evacuation of a certain number of Polish children in small groups at a time, the whole plan to operate over a long period. In reply to this Aide-Mémoire a representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs informed a representative of the Polish Embassy on September 28, 1942, that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had no objection to the evacuation of a certain number of orphans possessing Polish citizenship and that it awaited concrete information from the Embassy concerning the number, destination, and method of evacuation of these children.

On the basis of this statement, the Polish Embassy advised its Government that the decision of the Government of the U.S.S.R. was a favorable one. Accordingly the Polish Government approached the British Government, which agreed to receive up to 10,000 Polish children in India and in British Africa as soon as possible. Orphanages and distribution centers were immediately arranged for in those countries as well as in Iran, and preparations were undertaken for providing the children with food and medical aid.

At the same time, in compliance with a request of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the Polish Embassy began to elaborate a plan for the evacuation of specified groups of children from a number of localities in the U.S.S.R., whereby about 1000 were to be evacuated per month during the initial period.

In the course of a conversation which took place on October 26, 1942, a representative of the Polish Embassy notified a representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that several groups of children were now ready to leave. Having taken into

cognizance this information, the representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs requested the Embassy to submit the entire evacuation plan, and in particular data concerning the number of children and the dates and localities of their departure. As a result of this conversation it was definitely settled that owing to the difficulties involved in drafting a comprehensive and detailed plan within a short time, the Embassy would submit to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs a plan for the first stage of the evacuation while the subsequent ones would be communicated to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs as and when further groups were made ready for departure.

In the course of a conversation which took place on November 3, 1942 in Moscow, Mr. Molotov, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars, notified Mr. Romer, the Polish Ambassador, that while he did not in principle object to evacuation, he considered it expedient that it be carried out as soon as possible.

When speaking to Mr. Vishinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs on November 12, 1942, Mr. Romer, the Polish Ambassador, presented the final plan for the evacuation of 19,000 children, pointing out that by an extension of the existing relief arrangements, 10,000 orphans and semi-orphans could be accommodated in the orphanages and kindergartens organized by the Embassy. In view of the above statements made by representatives of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the reply given by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars at this conversation that the total evacuation was to be reduced to the 600 children who were in Ashabod, or whose names had previously been notified to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, came as a complete surprise. This statement by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars fundamentally changed the evacuation plan and rendered useless the preparatory work which the Polish Government had undertaken on what appeared to be firm grounds. Such being the state of affairs, the Embassy reported the position to its Government and is awaiting appropriate instructions.

Without determining the final settlement of this problem, on November 13, 1942 a representative of the Embassy presented to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs a plan for the evacuation of 600 children. In the course of the conversations which took

place on November 27, 1942, December 21, 1942, and January 11, 1943, representatives of the Polish Embassy provided representatives of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs with detailed information concerning the number of children in Ashabad at the respective dates, the number of children en route, details regarding the groups from among the children included in the quota of 600, who were to leave and the names of persons who were to act as guardians. In the course of each of the aforesaid conversations representatives of the Polish Embassy requested the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to issue suitable instructions to enable the children who had been in the Embassy's orphanage in Ashabad for some time to leave that town since they were all included in the 600 listed for evacuation.

According to information in the possession of the Embassy there are at present in the orphanage in Ashabad 555 children ready to be evacuated; furthermore, the following groups of children are ready to leave: 40 in Tayshet, Irkutsk district; 40 in the Zyriensk and Teguldetz regions of the Novosibirsk district; 30 in Tomsk, Novosibirsk district; 30 in Semipalatynsk; 40 in Syktyvkar, Komi A.S.S.R. The Embassy has at the same time to state that from September 29, 1942 up to the present day only one group, numbering 61 children has so far left Ashabad.

Since all the details concerning the evacuation of the children included in the quota of 600 have already been submitted to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in an exhaustive form, and since it must be considered inadvisable from the point of view of hygiene to accumulate too great a number of children in the orphanage in Ashabad, the Polish Embassy has the honor to request the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to issue final instructions which would enable the departure for other countries of the children who have in most cases been in Ashabad for several months, and of the five groups mentioned above—in all 594 children.

Kuybyshev, January 23, 1943.

No. 80

Note of March 30, 1943 from Mr. E. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R.,

protesting against the sovietisation of the relief institutions of the Polish Embassy in the U.S.S.R.

London, March 30, 1943.

Mr. Ambassador,

The Polish Government has received information to the effect that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has proceeded to take over the administration of the relief institutions (orphanages, homes for invalids, etc.) of the Polish Embassy in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The above-mentioned institutions were set up on the strength of an agreement between the Polish Embassy and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics contained in the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of February 12, 1942. In this Note the Polish Embassy was assured that the aforesaid institutions would receive food allotments (*fondy*) from appropriate Soviet organizations, and was encouraged to set up these institutions on the understanding that from then on the responsibility for the welfare of Polish citizens would rest with the Polish Embassy. In a verbal statement made by a representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to a representative of the Polish Embassy on September 26, 1942, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expressed its consent to the further extension of the network of the Embassy's relief institutions.

In accordance with the above, the Embassy set up on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, at considerable effort and great expense, several hundred relief institutions, and supplied them throughout their existence with substantial quantities of foodstuffs, clothing and medical supplies from abroad, either purchased by the Polish Government, or presented as a gift by Allied Governments and scores of welfare associations in Allied and neutral countries.

To the surprise of the Polish Government the Soviet authorities have recently begun to take over the administration of these institutions and, I state with regret, the Soviet Government did not even deem it necessary to inform the Polish Embassy thereof. In taking over the administration of these relief institutions the local Soviet authorities are at the same time dismissing some of the employees and inmates and are introducing different educational methods for those children remaining there.

The Polish Government also learned with regret that independently of the outcome of the present conversations in Moscow between the two Governments, with a view to reaching an agreement on their attitude in this matter, in the spirit of mutual friendship and collaboration underlying their present relations, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has not agreed to the suspension, at least during the course of the conversations now in progress, of the execution of its orders in respect of Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In such circumstances, the Polish Government find themselves regretfully compelled to lodge a determined protest against the very fact of removing the relief institutions from the administration of the Polish Embassy, as well as against the procedure adopted by the Soviet authorities in the matter. In the legal and *de facto* status of institutions, functioning on the basis of a bilateral agreement between the two Governments and disposing of property belonging to the Polish State, no changes could be made unless by mutual agreement of the two parties.

At the same time the Polish Government reserve their right to demand from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the restoration of all property belonging to the Polish State or to institutions taken over by Soviet authorities in these circumstances, also compensation for all damage and loss already sustained, or which may in future be sustained or brought to light in connection with the taking over of the Embassy's relief institutions.

I have the honor to be, etc.

RACZYNSKI.

CHAPTER 10

Soviet Territorial Claims

No. 81

Note of January 9, 1942 from Mr. Kot, Ambassador of the Republic of Poland, to Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on the status of Lwów as a Polish city.

Kuybyshev, January 9, 1942.

Excellency,

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of January 6, 1942, in which you brought to the notice of

all Governments maintaining diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the facts concerning the unheard of treatment of the defenceless civilian population by the German Army in the territories temporarily occupied by it as a result of recent war operations.

While fully sharing the Soviet Government's view that responsibility for these inhuman and barbarous actions of the German forces rests with the criminal Hitlerite Government of Germany, I have the honor to remark that this responsibility is also shared to a large extent by the obedient and zealous executors of that Government's will, that is to say German officers, non-commissioned officers and other ranks, and members of the various formations of the German National Socialist Workers Party who take part in the war operations and in the administration of the occupied territories. I have the honor to recall that in my Note to your Excellency of November 27, 1941, I already pointed out the bestial treatment of the civilian population on the territories of the Republic of Poland by the Germany Army, and I supplied facts as to pogroms and executions in Lwów, Brześć nad Bugiem, Stanisławów, Komarno and other localities.

At the same time I have the honor to draw Your Excellency's attention to the fact, that the inclusion of Lwów among "other Ukrainian cities" in your Note of January 6, 1942, must be the result of a misunderstanding, for from the historical point of view and from that of international law, and as far as the ethnological constitution of its population is concerned, Lwów was and remains a Polish city.

I have the honor to be, etc.

Kot.

No. 82

Note of January 17, 1942; from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev on the status of Lwów, Brześć and Stanisławów.

With reference to the Personal Note of Mr. Kot, Ambassador of the Republic of Poland, of January 9, 1942, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs has the honor to present to the Embassy the following declaration on behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

The People's Commissar deems unjustified the statement by the Embassy in the above mentioned Note and in certain other documents, in which the towns of Lwów, Brześć, Stanisławów and others on the territories of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the White Ruthenian S.S.R. belonging to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, are referred to as cities which are on the "territories of the Republic of Poland."

While finding it impossible to enter into a discussion on the historical and legal bases on which the city of Lwów or any other town on the territories of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the White Ruthenian S.S.R. belong to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the People's Commissar deems it his duty to inform the Embassy that in future he will not be able to accept for consideration Notes of the Embassy containing declarations of this kind.

Kuybyshev, January 17, 1942.

No. 83

Declaration of the Polish Government of February 25, 1943, concerning Polish-Soviet relations.

The Polish Government, at a meeting in London on February 25, presided over by General Sikorski, discussed Polish-Soviet relations and issued the following declaration:

The Polish Government affirm that neither before the outbreak of this war nor during it has the Polish nation ever agreed to any co-operation with the Germans against the Soviet Union. In her relations with the U.S.S.R. Poland has not ceased to be ready to co-operate with the Soviet Union in the prosecution of the war and in maintaining friendly, neighborly relations after the victory.

The Polish Government repudiate most definitely the malicious propaganda which accuses Poland of indirect or direct inimical tendencies towards Soviet Russia. It is absolutely absurd to suspect Poland of intentions to base the eastern boundaries of the Polish Republic on the Dnieper and the Black Sea, or to impute to Poland any tendencies to move her frontier farther to the east.

The Polish Government, representing Poland in the boundaries in which Poland, first among the Allied nations, took up the fight imposed on her, have, from the moment of the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet Treaty of July 30, 1941, maintained the unchange-

able attitude that so far as the question of frontiers between Poland and Soviet Russia is concerned, the *status quo* previous to September 1, 1939, is in force; and they consider the undermining of this attitude, which is in conformity with the Atlantic Charter, as detrimental to the unity of the Allied nations.

The Polish Government consider close co-operation and confidence between all the Allies to be an indispensable factor for victory and a permanent peace, and condemn all acts and suggestions tending to wreck or weaken the common front of the United Nations.

The declaration of the Polish Government is fully supported by the following resolution passed unanimously by the Polish National Council on February 26:

"The National Council, maintaining, in unanimous agreement with the Government, its attitude that the difficulties which exist in creating mutual trust in the collaboration between the United Nations must be removed, declares that the integrity of the territory of the Polish Republic within its frontiers of September 1, 1939, and its sovereignty, are inviolable and indivisible. No unilateral acts or illegal activities, from any quarter whatever, directed against either the territory and sovereignty of the Republic of Poland or the rights of its citizens residing in Poland or outside her territorial boundaries, can in any way alter this state of affairs."

No. 84

Soviet Declaration of March 1, 1943, in reply to the Polish Government's Declaration of February 25, 1943.

The Soviet news agency issued on March 1 the following official Russian statement replying to the Polish declaration:

The declaration of the Polish Government in London bears witness to the fact that the Polish Government refuses to recognise the historic rights of the Ukrainians and Bielo-Russian peoples to be united within the national States.

Continuing to regard as legitimate the aggressive policy of imperialist States, which partitioned among themselves the traditional Ukrainian and Bielo-Russian lands, and disregarding the universally known fact of the reunion of the Ukrainian and Bielo-Russian peoples within their national States which has already taken place, the Polish Government thus comes out as an advocate of a partition

of the Ukrainian and Bielo-Russian lands in favour of the policy of plundering the Ukrainian and Bielo-Russian peoples.

The leading Soviet circles are of the opinion that the denial of the right of the Ukrainian and Bielo-Russian peoples of reunion with their blood brethren bears witness to an imperialist tendency, whereas the references of the Polish Government to the Atlantic Charter have no foundation whatever. The Atlantic Charter does not entitle anyone to encroach on the national rights of the Ukrainians and Bielo-Russians, but on the contrary it has its origin in the principle of the recognition of the national rights of peoples, including the Ukrainian and the Bielo-Russian peoples.

Even the well-known British Minister, Lord Curzon, in spite of his inimical attitude to the U.S.S.R., realized that Poland cannot put forward a claim to the Ukrainian and Bielo-Russian lands, but the Polish ruling circles still show no understanding in this matter.

The assertion of the Polish ruling circles that Poland until the beginning of this war refused to collaborate in any way with Germany against the Soviet Union does not correspond with reality. The whole world knows of the pro-Fascist policy of rapprochement with Germany of the Polish Government and its Minister Beck, who tried to oppose Poland to the Soviet Union.

If the present war teaches us something it is above all that the Slav peoples must not quarrel among themselves, but must live in friendship in order to rid themselves of the danger of the German yoke. The Polish ruling circles have learned nothing if they put forward claims on the Ukrainian and Bielo-Russian lands, and thereby cultivate enmity between the Polish people and the peoples of the Ukraine and Bielo-Russia. Such a policy of the Polish leading circles weakens, in the first place, Poland herself and breaks the united front of the Slav peoples in their struggle against German invasion.

The declaration of the Polish Government bears witness to the fact that the present Polish ruling circles do not reflect in this matter the genuine opinion of the Polish people, whose interests in the struggle for the liberation of their country and for the restoration of a strong and united Poland are indissolubly linked with the strengthening to the utmost of mutual confidence and friendship with the brotherly peoples of the Ukraine and Bielo-Russia, as well as with the Russian people and the other peoples of the U.S.S.R.

No. 35

Communiqué of the Polish Telegraph Agency of March 5, 1943, concerning the Eastern frontiers of Poland and containing a reply to the Soviet Declaration of March 1, 1943.

The Polish Telegraph Agency has been authorized by the Polish Government to issue the following reply to the Russian statement:

Until the conclusion of agreements between the U.S.S.R. and the Third Reich concerning the partition of Polish territories, the Treaty of Riga and its frontier clauses, approved in 1923 by the Conference of Ambassadors and by the United States, were never called in question by Russia. The Russo-German agreements were cancelled by the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30, 1941. The question of any return to the German-Soviet frontier line of that year requires no further comment.

The so-called "Curzon line" was proposed during hostilities in 1919-1920 solely as an armistice line and not as a frontier.

The polling ordered by the Soviet-occupying authorities in Eastern Poland in 1939 was contrary to international law. It constitutes one of those unilateral acts which are not recognized by the Allied nations. Therefore it cannot form a basis for any legal acts, and cannot, in particular, deprive Polish citizens of their title to Polish citizenship or to relief organized for their benefit by the Polish Government with the aid of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States.

All German proposals previous to 1939, which were aimed at gaining the co-operation of Poland in military action against Russia, were repeatedly rejected, and this led finally to a German attack on Polish territory in September 1939.

The declaration of the Polish Government of February 25, 1943, unanimously supported by the entire Polish nation, was not intended to produce controversy which would be so harmful at the present moment. It only stated the indisputable Polish rights to these territories, in which the Polish nation will continue to live in harmony with its Ukrainian and White Ruthenian fellow-countrymen in accordance with the principles proclaimed by the Polish Government. The Polish Government, categorically rejecting the absurd insinuations concerning alleged Polish imperialistic claims in the East, has expressed, and continues to express, to the Soviet Government its readiness for an understanding based on friendly mutual relations.

CHAPTER 11

The Crisis in Polish-Soviet Relations-----
No. 86

Letter of February 9, 1943 from General Sikorski, Polish Prime Minister, to Premier Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, concerning the conference to take place between Premier Stalin and Ambassador Romer.

London, February 9, 1943.

Mr. President,

The great victories won by the Red Army over our common enemy fill the whole world with admiration. I also wish to congratulate you most sincerely as Supreme Commander of the Soviet armed forces. I never doubted their success, for I always recognized their true value.

I regret that for the moment the forces I command are only taking part in this struggle on distant fronts and not by the side of your forces on the Eastern front of Europe. Awaited with impatience, the final crushing of Germany is near. It will also bring, I am certain, the independence of Poland. Meanwhile she continues to offer to the oppressor a heroic resistance that the recent offers of the enemy, seeking to win the collaboration of the Polish people by promising to give up the reign of terror, fail to weaken.

Thus the outcome of the war presents itself to us in a reassuring light. However, I see myself obliged to point out to you the increasing concern of the Polish Government and of public opinion in Poland at more and more serious difficulties that go up against the path of the Polish-Soviet entente inaugurated in 1941 by you, Mr. President, and by myself. These difficulties threaten to compromise this entente and to disserve the interests of our two countries and of our common cause. They seem neither justified nor inevitable and I continue to believe that if examined by both sides in a broad spirit of understanding and of mutual conciliation, they can be removed.

Such at least is the desire of the Polish Government which remains firmly convinced of the advantages of a policy of rapprochement and collaboration between Poland and the Soviet Union, as

much in view of the prosecution of the war against Germany as of future good neighborly relations between our two countries. To be acceptable to the Poles, to be lasting, to be considered in accordance with the great principles that are common to all in the present struggle, this policy cannot, however, neither because of existing conditions nor of the disproportion of forces involved, consist in the elimination of difficulties that arise by asking Poland to abandon any principles or to make unilateral sacrifices. The exceptional trials my country has endured and the way she has known how to meet them, in the sight of the whole world, entitle her—I have no doubt—to special consideration of her interests and her aspirations at a time when the war of liberation is entering into a decisive phase.

It is in this spirit that I recently had the opportunity to exchange views with President Roosevelt and with the American Government on the subject of the conduct of the war and of the steps its conclusion may call for, including the final elimination of the German danger, and the task of economic reconstruction of the Europe of tomorrow. These same problems are the subjects of consultations of the Polish Government with the British Government and of the Governments in London of various European countries under German occupation.

I have not failed to emphasize, on various occasions, that the Polish Government would be desirous of examining on the same bases the said problems with the Soviet Government, within the framework of our mutual relations formed by the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and of our joint Declaration of December 4, 1941.

If you share my point of view in this matter, I shall be obliged if you will devote a moment of your precious time to receiving Ambassador Romer, who returns to his post after having been in touch with his Government and with myself and who, enjoying my full and complete confidence, is charged by me to acquaint you with the details of my recent negotiations and with the point of view of the Polish Government. This interview will also give him an opportunity to speak to you in my name of the Polish-Soviet difficulties to which I have alluded in this letter and which seem to me to deserve your serious attention.

I have the honor to be, etc.

SIKORSKI.

No. 87

Excerpts from the Minutes of the negotiation conducted by Mr. Tadeusz Romer, Polish Ambassador in Moscow, with Premier Stalin and Mr. V. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, concerning the Polish citizenship of persons deported to the U.S.S.R. and the Embassy's relief organization.

I. EXCERPTS FROM AMBASSADOR ROMER'S CONVERSATION WITH MR. MOLOTOV, PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AT THE KREMLIN ON FEBRUARY 20, 1943.

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ROMER: We find ourselves at present, Mr. Commissar, in a historical moment as far as Polish-Soviet relations are concerned. The steps we take now will decide the course of those relations for many years to come. Bearing this in mind, I think, we ought to avoid the discussion of such issues as cannot be settled today and which would only strain our relations. On the other hand what we should discuss is the problem of relief for the Poles in the U.S.S.R. whose fate is causing the Polish Government special concern.

MOLOTOV: The basis of this problem is our Note of January 16, last, in which the Soviet Government declined to recognize as Polish citizens persons who on November 1 and 2, 1939 found themselves in the western districts of the Ukraine and White Ruthenia.

ROMER: What are the reasons, Mr. Commissar, for this change in the attitude of the Soviet Government?

MOLOTOV: The reasons are explained in the Note. Our good will did not meet with an appropriate response from the Polish Government. Now we simply confirmed this.

ROMER: Truly, Mr. Commissar, I fail to see any motive for this sudden decision which fundamentally changes the problem of relief for the Polish population.

MOLOTOV: Mr. Ambassador, December 1941 went by and so did the whole of 1942 and in spite of this the Polish Government never accepted the proposals put forward by the Soviet Government.

ROMER: The January Note came unexpectedly at a time when negotiations concerning relief for the Poles were well advanced and reaching their final stage. I fail to understand what new development occurred to bring about such a decision on the part of the Government of the U.S.S.R.

MOLOTOV: This subject has been discussed not only with you, Mr. Ambassador, but also with your predecessor. The problem could not have come as a surprise after our Note of December 1, 1941; on the other hand, however, the attitude of the Polish Government has remained unchanged ever since. This could not continue.

ROMER: This matter is for us of paramount importance. An attempt to deprive us of hundreds of thousands of Poles who are in the U.S.S.R. not of their own will, and this at a time when the population of Poland is being decimated as a result of the atrocities committed by the German occupants, is for us a most painful blow and cannot but have a serious effect on Polish-Soviet relations.

MOLOTOV: It is not proper, Mr. Ambassador, to connect this problem with that of German persecutions in Poland. The Government of the U.S.S.R. has waited long enough for a reply to the proposals it advanced, only by way of exception and good will.

ROMER: I point out that this matter has never been raised before in the course of my conversations with you and with Commissar Vishinsky.

MOLOTOV: On the contrary, Mr. Ambassador, during your tenure of office, we have received Notes in which our attitude was not recognized.

ROMER: Am I to understand, Mr. Commissar, that the attitude of the Soviet Government to this problem is connected with the future Polish-Soviet frontier, or is it confined to citizenship?

MOLOTOV: Our Note merely concerns our attitude towards citizenship, which in turn is connected with the problem of the frontiers of the Soviet Union.

ROMER: I cannot share your attitude with regard to citizenship, Mr. Commissar. The Government of the U.S.S.R. could not unilaterally force Soviet citizenship upon Polish citizens. In our eyes, and in the eyes of impartial foreign observers, the matter could only have been settled on the basis of an agreement between the two Governments concerned.

MOLOTOV: No foreign observers will be able to change decisions taken by the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. with regard to the incorporation of the territories in question, which took place on the basis of a plebiscite in which the people freely expressed themselves.

ROMER: I do not wish to go deeper into the discussion of this problem. But I shall make two remarks. First—what you referred to as a plebiscite took place within the frontiers set up by the Soviet-German treaty, which the Soviet Government later solemnly renounced in the Polish-Soviet Agreement. Second—Soviet legislation governing citizenship is contrary to its territorial principle as it grants Soviet citizenship not according to domicile, but according to where a given person happened to be at a given time. These are merely incidental remarks independent of the fundamental attitude of my Government to this problem as a whole.

MOLOTOV: Our Note refers to the Soviet citizenship of persons who found themselves on the territories in question on November 1 and 2, 1939. Persons who arrived there subsequent to that date are Polish citizens.

ROMER: Does it not then seem unnatural, even from the Soviet viewpoint, that persons who have no connection whatever with these territories should be considered Soviet citizens against their own will?

MOLOTOV: I do not agree with your view. In accordance with Soviet legislation, the Soviet Citizenship Act also applies to persons who came to Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia from the Western districts of Poland.

ROMER: I want to make it quite clear, Mr. Commissar. Am I, therefore, to understand that the relief work to assist our people in the U.S.S.R. is to be regarded as at an end?

MOLOTOV: We examined this problem in our Note of January 16, 1943. Exceptions were made in respect of persons whom we recognize as Polish citizens, that is those who arrived in the territories we consider to be Soviet after November 1 and 2, 1939.

ROMER: Practically, one would then be able to count the number of Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R. on one's fingers. Do you realize, Mr. Commissar, what consequences will result from the application of the Note of January 16, 1943, and in what position the Poles in the U.S.S.R. will find themselves?

MOLOTOV: Their position will not suffer as a result of it, Mr. Ambassador. All that was being done for them before, we shall continue to do as for our own citizens.

ROMER: Irrespective of the deep and painful impression which a decision of this kind would make on the Polish Government and

on our people in occupied Poland and abroad, representing as it does, in the present extremely hard circumstances, an entirely unjustified attempt to force foreign citizenship upon a considerable part of our nation, and this against their will, sentiments and traditions which are bound up with the struggle for independence and our most sacred ideals, I want again to draw your attention to the impression this will make abroad, and especially in the countries which collaborated with us in bringing relief to several hundred thousand Polish citizens, and who from one day to the next will learn to their surprise that these people have ceased to be Poles and no longer require their assistance.

MOLOTOV: As you are aware, Mr. Ambassador, there have been for many years considerable number of Poles in the U.S.S.R., Soviet citizens and who have never considered themselves treated any worse than Soviet citizens of other origins. There was never any question of restricting their rights, for our Constitution severely punishes all actions contrary to our principle of national equality. But as regards the subject referred to by you, Mr. Ambassador, I wish once more to state that the entire blame rests with the Polish Government. Now, as early as 1941, we made a concession and agreed not to apply our legislation, showing our good will to recognize Poles as Polish citizens. The Polish Government did not appear to be willing to accept our good will, on the contrary it rejected our proposals. We waited a month, two months, a year—and the attitude of the Polish Government remained unchanged, nor has it changed since your arrival, Mr. Ambassador. Thus, the Polish Government bear the entire responsibility for the consequences.

ROMER: I must point out, that the Polish Government never rejected the Soviet Government's readiness to recognize Poles in the U.S.S.R. as Polish citizens, but it could not accept the terms on which this readiness was conditional, and in particular it had to reject the attempt to distinguish between Polish citizens and divide them into categories for discriminatory treatment, that is unknown to Polish law. I must emphasize once again that this is the first time since I am Ambassador in the U.S.S.R. that this problem has been raised, and I see no reason for the change made by the Note of January 16, 1943 in the previous attitude of the Soviet Government.

MOLOTOV: I have already stated the position of the Soviet Government, Mr. Ambassador. It is clear and irrevocable.

ROMER: The problem is so fundamental and its consequences so serious, that I shall have to inform my Government of your declaration, Mr. Commissar, and at the same time refer the matter to renewed consideration by ourselves. For the time I only renew my request that you transmit the letter of Prime Minister General Sikorski to Premier Stalin and beg him to receive me so that I may submit to him the matters I have already referred to and learn his views on the difficulties in Polish-Soviet relations.

MOLOTOV: I shall forward the letter, Mr. Ambassador, and when I find out about your visit to J. V. Stalin, I shall let you know.

2. EXCERPTS FROM AMBASSADOR ROMER'S CONVERSATION WITH PREMIER STALIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS, AND MR. MOLOTOV, PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AT THE KREMLIN DURING THE NIGHT OF FEBRUARY 26-27, 1943.

.....

ROMER: I should still like to discuss the problem of Polish-Soviet relations which unfortunately are passing through a crisis, causing anxiety. We have just ended a friendly discussion on a number of important subjects dealing with military collaboration between our countries. But such collaboration can actually bear fruit only as and when accompanied by mutual friendly feeling. First of all in this connection, the fate of Polish citizens in the Soviet Union is of special interest to the Polish Government and public opinion. The Soviet Note of January 16, 1943, introduced new and unexpected elements and implications which have filled us with deep concern and which it is my duty to elucidate in this conversation with you, Mr. President.

STALIN: I am listening, please.

ROMER: As a result of the Agreement of July 30, 1941, the amnesty proclaimed by the Soviet Government affected a vast number of Polish citizens, not excluding national minorities, whose Polish citizenship was only called into question on December 1, 1941, in a note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Set free from camps and prisons our citizens began to rally en masse to the Polish Army then in formation. With the assistance of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, and of a number of social welfare organizations and institutions, the Polish

Government organized relief work on a large scale for their families and for those who remained at work in their places of exile. The need for this relief did not in the least imply a desire to assure to the Polish population an existence in any way privileged as compared with their surroundings, nor even an allegation, never put forward by us, that Polish deportees received worse treatment at the hands of the Soviet authorities than the local population. Their position was worse for other reasons. They had been deported at an hour's notice and as a rule with no money, clothing or food, torn away by force from the surroundings in which they had grown up. Frequently they were separated from their families and were taken under most difficult circumstances to distant, foreign countries, often with extremely severe climates differing greatly from that to which they were accustomed. They were settled among an alien people whose language and customs were foreign to them, and where they lacked the adequate living quarters and vegetable gardens at the disposal of the local population. They were made to do work of which they had no previous experience, for instance intellectuals were given heavy manual work which they had never done before. They were also suffering from disease. For these reasons relief in the form of food, clothing and medical supplies was and remains an absolute necessity.

STALIN: Whom do you refer to as the Polish population, Mr. Ambassador? The whole Polish population which found itself in Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia?

ROMER: According to Polish legislation, I consider as Polish citizens all those persons who possessed Polish citizenship in 1939. There is a difference of opinion between our two Governments on this subject, the more so since, as was made clear by the Soviet Note of January 16, 1943, and its interpretation which I heard from Commissar Molotov several days ago,—the Soviets extended their citizenship to all persons who were in the disputed territories on November 1 and 2, 1939, even if they found themselves there quite temporarily and by accident and had no connection whatever with the place where they were staying.

MOLOTOV: That is not exact. There is reference in the Note to the Citizenship Act which differentiates between permanent and temporary residents: the former have become citizens of the Soviet Union by virtue of the law, while the citizenship of the latter is a matter for individual examination.

ROMER: The note of January 16, 1943, states quite explicitly that all persons present in the disputed territories acquired Soviet citizenship.

STALIN: But at the same time there is reference to the Soviet Citizenship Act.

ROMER: May I remark that we have received a number of Notes from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs stating that all residents in these districts have become Soviet citizens. The Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev has even received a written warning that intervention on behalf of individual persons will not be considered until evidence is produced showing the whereabouts of such persons on November 1 and 2, 1939.

STALIN: Distinction is made between those who happened to be in those territories and those who lived there permanently.

MOLOTOV: Citizens of a number of States could have been there at the time, as for example Rumanians, Hungarians, Frenchmen and others, but obviously they did not acquire Soviet citizenship on this account. Our Constitution provides distinctly for such eventualities, which, however, have to be examined individually.

ROMER: This is an entirely new situation to me. I find this interpretation, which I hear for the first time, extremely interesting. Hitherto, ever since its note of December 1, 1941, the Soviet Government has adhered consistently to the attitude that especially that category of Polish citizens who found themselves in the territories in question at the time specified acquired Soviet citizenship.

STALIN: Excuse me, Mr. Ambassador, but persons whose presence in these territories was merely transitory did not automatically acquire Soviet citizenship.

ROMER: I can quote a whole series of concrete cases of the attitude hitherto held by the Soviet Government. I do not remember them all, but a classical example is that of the two Warsaw city councillors, Alter and Ehrlich, who despite our objections and representations were classified as Soviet citizens.

MOLOTOV: There may have been individual cases.

ROMER: What is then the official Soviet interpretation in this matter, Mr. President? All Soviet Notes and statements have indicated hitherto that in practice all Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R. have lost their citizenship. We cannot agree to that.

STALIN: The Polish Government persists in considering as Polish citizens all Poles now in the U.S.S.R. That is wrong. Truly,

a number of Soviet offices have overstepped their authority in certain individual cases, but we must put a stop to extremes. I must moreover point out that it also depends on the person concerned what citizenship he wishes to choose. Thus everybody must be asked. Take, Mr. Ambassador, the example of Wanda Wasilewska, a Pole from Warsaw who considers herself a Soviet citizen. The people's wishes must be given consideration, one cannot force citizenship upon them. There is in our Note a reference to the Citizenship Act. I must admit that not all Soviet bureaus have always acted along uniform lines and correctly. But not all the Poles who lived and were domiciled in Polish territory will be Polish citizens. That has to be stopped. There are some who are coming over to us.

ROMER: Many Poles, Soviet citizens, have lived in the territories of the U.S.S.R. for many years. We do not claim them, nor have we ever raised this question.

STALIN: I was thinking of Poles domiciled in the western parts of the Ukraine and White Ruthenia.

ROMER: I therefore note, Mr. President, that you recognize the will of each person concerned as an important element in determining his or her citizenship. On our part we shall gladly agree to such a criterion for we have no desire to have citizens who do not wish to be Polish citizens. I must, however, emphasize that a large number of practical issues are bound up with the citizenship problem. Of these I will mention the continuation of relief to our people and permission for individuals to go abroad without of course burdening Soviet railways engaged in war transport. I have in mind particularly Polish children and the families still left in the U.S.S.R. of soldiers serving in the Polish Army in Great Britain and in the Near East, and also families of Polish State officials and welfare workers. The fact that they are separated from their bread winners can neither be explained nor understood by any one

ROMER: Reverting to the subject of citizenship, in view of the practical consequences involved for hundreds of thousands of our people and thus also for Polish-Soviet relations, I must insist that this be settled not unilaterally but by mutual agreement between our two governments. It is unthinkable that a large and valuable portion of our Nation be thus abruptly cut off against its will from the rest.

STALIN: If we consider the Ukrainians and White Ruthenians as nations, we must recognize that a reunion (*vossoyedinienie*) has taken place between the lands they inhabit and Soviet White Ruthenia and Soviet Ukraine. Surely the Ukrainians are not Poles! Surely the White Ruthenians are not Poles! We have not joined a single Polish province to the Soviet Union. All Polish territories have been occupied by the Germans.

ROMER: Since you refer to the plebiscites in our Eastern provinces, Mr. President, I must recall that they were carried out within the boundaries set up by the German-Soviet agreement which was subsequently solemnly repudiated in the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941.

STALIN: It was the German attack on the U.S.S.R. which rendered the German-Soviet agreement invalid, and especially the non-aggression pact.

ROMER: At the time the Soviet Union took our territory we were in opposite camps, and we have not recognized any acts of violence committed at our expense. Since July 30, 1941, we are in the same anti-German camp, which entitles us to expect that no changes will be made in the lands that are ours or in our fundamental rights without our agreement. In default of this we must maintain the attitude that the former Polish-Soviet frontiers, established by the Treaty of Riga, remain always in force. . . .

ROMER: We must have a friendly discussion on all subjects of friction between our two Governments, a friction that is of no benefit to either party but only serves Germany. It is in such a spirit that the problems connected with relief for Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R. and with their departure should be discussed.

STALIN: What problems?

ROMER: This is a historical moment which will decide the course of Polish-Soviet relations for many years to come. We must approach the decisions it calls for with mutual and full understanding and good will, excluding for the time being from our discussions such matters as cannot now be decided and which, if raised, merely lead to friction in Polish-Soviet relations and provoke public controversies.

STALIN: The Soviet Government keeps consistently silent on the subject and so should the Polish Government.

ROMER: It is easier to remain silent when one is acquiring something than when one is losing it. As a result of the Soviet Note of January 16, 1943, we are threatened with a loss of several hundred thousands of our citizens who are all the more important to us as we have lost so many at the hands of the Germans. Furthermore we are threatened with the loss on Soviet initiative of the whole eastern part of our territory. No wonder, then, that Polish public opinion is embittered.

STALIN: The territory we have lost is larger than the whole of Poland.

ROMER: But the Red Army has already reconquered vast regions and will undoubtedly regain everything. And, moreover, these territories are only a small part of the Soviet Union.

STALIN: Mr. Ambassador, after the Red Army has beaten the Germans on Russian soil it will enter Polish territory and help to chase the Germans out of Poland and then it will immediately return these lands to the Polish Government, and then, Mr. Ambassador, will you say that this will be a unilateral action adversely affecting good mutual relations?

ROMER: It will not be as bad as that.

STALIN: Mr. Ambassador, we want a strong Poland; we shall give you the whole of German-occupied Poland regardless of the fact that we are being insulted (*niesmotria na to tshto nas rugayut*). But we can take these insults on our shoulders!

ROMER: Thank you, Mr. President, for these words. I shall remember them. And do you agree with me as to the need for coming to a mutual agreement regarding the problem of the citizenship of Poles at present in the U.S.S.R. and of further relief and assistance for them from our own resources?

STALIN: There will be Poles who wish to acquire Soviet citizenship.

MOLOTOV: We are, of course, referring to citizens other than those from Western Ukrainian or Western White Ruthenian territories. This problem should furthermore be examined for the purpose of determining the citizenship of persons whose presence in those territories was only temporary.

ROMER: According to what Mr. President has said, the will of the persons concerned must be given consideration. Since on the strength of an understanding between the two governments it will be made possible for such persons to express their wishes quite

freely, I have no doubt that the atmosphere will be easily and smoothly cleared, since all those in whom we are interested will never reconcile themselves to the thought of parting with their Polish citizenship.

STALIN: It must nevertheless be carried out in accordance with our legislation relating to citizenship. The problem of persons serving in the Red Army presents another difficulty. Out of a desire to evade further service, they may express their wish to go, say to Australia in the capacity of Polish citizens. Desertion might thus be facilitated. Apart from the will of the persons concerned, other considerations will therefore have to be taken into account. The nationality of such people and their origin will have to be looked into.

ROMER: A problem of vital interest to me in this connection is that of our children. There are several tens of thousands in the Soviet Union and they will be of great value to the future of resurrected Poland. From the point of view of bringing to agreement our conflicting views on citizenship, we attach great importance to the fate of the orphans. We should like to make it possible for these orphans to go to other countries where they would find favourable conditions of existence and education and be a minimum financial burden to the Polish Government.

STALIN: In accordance with our legislation this depends on a variety of factors. It is difficult to generalize.

ROMER: I think that the problem of citizenship can only be resolved by means of a formal, bilateral agreement.

STALIN: We cannot infringe our laws.

MOLOTOV: Obviously not.

ROMER: We have seen that in the past Soviet legislation did not preclude a large measure of elasticity in its application. I think that on such a premise a way would be found to an understanding on the basis of mutual good will.

STALIN: If conversations take place then all these problems will be cleared up.

ROMER: Do you see any possibility, Mr. President, of such negotiations being begun?

STALIN: If you, Mr. Ambassador, see such a possibility, I make no objection.

ROMER: Well, we shall go into this matter further.

STALIN: Thus according to you we have as subjects for our

negotiations, the question of propaganda, the question of citizenship and the problem of frontiers (*vopros o granitzach*).

ROMER: No, I understood differently and emphasized that in order to improve our relations it would be better to avoid discussing frontiers for the time being; on the other hand I suggested that we should begin negotiations on the subject of preventing unfriendly propaganda on both sides, on the problem of citizenship and its practical consequences.

STALIN: Very well, Mr. Ambassador.

MOLOTOV: A declaration of the Polish Government was published in London yesterday. Its contents are unfriendly to the Soviet Union.

STALIN: The declaration is more than a newspaper reply. It is in fact an official statement (*eto zayavlenye*). Where Soviet territory is concerned there is no Soviet Government prepared to waive (*otkazalsia by*) any provisions of our Constitution. And the adherence of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia to the Soviet Union has been included in the Constitution.

ROMER: On the other hand you will not find a single Pole who would deny that Wilno and Lwów are Polish. I myself so declare it in your presence, Mr. President, with the fullest conviction.

STALIN: I understand your viewpoint. We also have ours. We are quits. Perhaps we should act similarly to the Polish Government as regards frontiers and also publish a statement.

ROMER: In the interest of our common front in the fight against Germany which occupies first place in your thoughts and in ours, I insist on agreement, by means of Polish-Soviet negotiation, on the standpoint and behavior of both parties in the difficult sphere of citizenship and the problems arising from it; also for mutual cessation of public statements and propaganda unfriendly to one another. Would you authorize me, Mr. President, to suggest this to my Government?

STALIN: You are right, Mr. Ambassador. I congratulate you on your good idea. The matter must be examined, we must find out whose citizens these people are, each case must be considered.

ROMER: May I count on our being enabled to continue our relief work until our negotiations concerning citizenship are concluded?

STALIN: I do not know, Mr. Ambassador, that depends on the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

ROMER: It is a vital problem for us. We could thus avoid in the event of the suspension of our relief work all consequences which might arise in other countries interested in it, such as England and America. It would be much better if we could reach an understanding without intermediaries.

STALIN: You are right. I cannot promise you anything definite in advance, but negotiations can be started.

ROMER: Am I to conduct these negotiations in Moscow with Mr. Molotov, the People's Commissar?

STALIN: Yes, do.

MOLOTOV: If it is convenient for you, Mr. Ambassador, I am at your disposal.

ROMER: I shall report the above to my Government and ask for instructions, whereupon I shall take the liberty of communicating with Mr. Molotov. In any case, I consider the attitude of the President as an assurance that the problems under consideration will be examined with good will and I hope that the negotiations will lead to an understanding which will remove all existing difficulties.

3. EXCERPTS FROM AMBASSADOR ROMER'S CONVERSATION WITH MR. MOLOTOV, PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AT THE KREMLIN ON MARCH 9, 1943.

ROMER: Before entering upon the actual subject of our conversation to-day I regret to have to communicate to you a number of events which to my painful surprise have recently occurred in this territory.

The arrests of local representatives of the Embassy continued throughout the whole second half of 1942 and increased in number in January and February last. In these two months twenty-one representatives were arrested whose names, previously, had been regularly made known to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and who, for the most part, had been confirmed in their functions. The Embassy has not, in one single instance, been informed of these arrests, nor of the reasons thereof.

The authorities have begun to carry out the instructions contained in the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs

of January 16 last, concerning citizenship. They are forcing Polish citizens to accept Soviet passports. At Kirov, employees at the local Embassy warehouse were summoned to take out Soviet passports. The vast majority of these employees refused to do so and were arrested together with their families. One of our largest warehouses serving a wide expanse of territory in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was thus deprived of its staff and immobilized. In this connection it must be noted that the fate of shipments of relief goods sent from abroad for the Polish population and already under way from Archangel has not yet been ascertained.

A similar procedure was applied at Kirov and Kustanay with regard to all Polish citizens living there; the number of those arrested in these circumstances already amounts to about two hundred.

The same principles are applied with regard to families of members of the Polish armed forces now on active service in Great Britain and the Near East. Thus the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs refused to allow a group of families of Polish military men to leave the Soviet Union, although before my departure from Kuybyshev, to be precise on December 23, 1942, that is to say before the issue of the Soviet Note of January 16, 1943, I had received the most formal undertakings from Deputy Commissar Vishinsky on behalf of the Soviet Government that the permission would be granted. I personally attach great importance to this matter, as it gives me the measure of how assurances given to me are carried out.

On the other hand, the Polish citizenship of Mrs. Wolska from Warsaw has been questioned; she is the wife of the Embassy Delegate at Alma-Ata, who was arrested and then expelled from the Soviet Union. The same applies to Mrs. Bardecka and to the Pajonk family whose bread-winners have been deported abroad by the Soviet authorities. The Polish citizenship of Mrs. Eleonora Winczewska has been likewise challenged although she is a Polish citizen from Warsaw who in 1939 was living as a refugee in Wilno, that is to say on territory not within the scope of the Soviet Note of January 16, 1943. I must emphasize that Mrs. Winczewska is now living at the Embassy with the full consent of the Soviet authorities and that she, as well as Mrs. Wolska, is under my protection.

Throughout the territories of the U.S.S.R., Polish welfare institutions, such as orphanages, homes for invalids, etc., are being

sovietized. The home for invalids and the orphanage at Bolshaya Konstantinovka in the Kuybyshev area, organized by the Embassy on the basis of a special agreement with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, were taken over in the following circumstances. On February 22, 1943, a Commission composed of members of district and regional authorities arrived on the spot and demanded the handing over of the administration of the institution. They declared that these proceedings had been agreed to by the Embassy. In other similar cases the authorities declared that the Embassy no longer existed.

Subsequently, the whole personnel and the adult inmates of the institution were summoned to accept Soviet passports. Terrorized and yielding to direct threats twelve old and ailing persons accepted the Soviet passports. All the other adults in the institution numbering about thirty, were ousted from the building. Later a school-mistress arrived. She is, according to information received, of Volga-German origin. Lessons are in Russian only. The children, regardless of nationality, refuse to be taught in Russian and, despite orders and threats, they sing religious hymns and national songs in Polish.

Before I report on these cases to my Government, I should like to ask you, Mr. Commissar, whether you have any knowledge of these facts and whether they have occurred with the knowledge and consent of the Soviet Government?

MOLOTOV: I have not heard anything about the facts you mention, Mr. Ambassador. I will now reply to your statements, dividing my remarks in two parts:

First: I would advise that the Embassy instruct its representatives throughout the country to conform to the Note of January 16, was applied, it is not excluded that local authorities may have less misunderstandings because if applied the principles laid down in our Note will make it possible to avoid all incidents.

Second: As regards specific cases in which the Note of January 16 was applied, it is not excluded that local authorities may have carried it out wrongly. For instance, inhabitants of Warsaw do not as a matter of law become Soviet citizens. Such cases of a faulty interpretation of the Note may have occurred, but they were quite accidental. If mistakes were made, they will be rectified. I can assure you of this, Mr. Ambassador. On the other hand I must request that the Embassy cooperate with us in this matter.

ROMER: I must remark that the Note of January 16 does not say anything about the taking over by Soviet authorities of Embassy institutions, such as orphanages, homes for invalids, and that we were never notified about this. I must further emphasize in this connection that the local authorities are taking over property owned by the Polish State and I don't know on what grounds this is being done. As for the Note of January 16, it refers exclusively to the legal position of persons regarding themselves and also regarded by us as Polish citizens and on whom Soviet citizenship is now being forced.

I must lay special emphasis on the fact that this action is exceptionally painful to me and that it cannot fail likewise to affect the Polish Government and the Polish people. As you, Mr. Commissar, now appeal to us to cooperate in this matter, I must record that the way the Soviet authorities are proceeding excludes such cooperation on our part.....

ROMER: On what legal grounds are orphanages and other Embassy institutions being taken over by the Soviet administration?

MOLOTOV: If we establish that Soviet citizens are found there, then these institutions become subject to appropriation by the Soviet authorities. I desire, Mr. Ambassador, to leave no room for misunderstanding in these matters.

ROMER: These institutions and everything belonging to them are the property of the Polish State. As far as citizenship is concerned, however, from our point of view, these people are Polish citizens and, in part, would also seem to remain Polish citizens, even from the Soviet viewpoint. The state of affairs thus created is quite inadmissible

ROMER: I am forced to inform my Government about these facts. If we are to discuss in a friendly spirit questions relating to citizenship, in accordance with what was agreed on in my conversation with Marshal Stalin, then I must ask you, Mr. Commissar, what interest can the Soviet Government possibly have in arousing Polish public opinion, and also in exciting public opinion abroad where these facts will undoubtedly become known. I have precise information showing that the local authorities deal with these matters drastically. I think the only reasonable solution

corresponding to the spirit of my conversation with Marshal Stalin and with you would be the suspension of all steps of this nature by the local Soviet authorities, at least for the period of the negotiations we are to conduct.

MOLOTOV: The local authorities who received instructions on the grounds of the Note of January 16, must put them into operation. For these authorities the question is not controversial at all and it is their duty to carry out their instructions. The way in which this was done may, indeed, have provoked friction. But I must assure you, that it is the intention of the Soviet Government that conditions of life of the Polish population not only shall not suffer any deterioration but on the contrary be improved.

ROMER: I must state once again, that the manner in which these instructions are carried out by the local authorities has been extremely ruthless, and they are applied to matters that have not been agreed upon between us, although the authorities concerned referred to an alleged consent of the Embassy. I see no grounds whatever for taking over welfare institutions of the Embassy and Polish State property assigned to them.....

ROMER: How do you contemplate, Mr. Commissar, the problem of further relief aid and of handling shipments from abroad of food, clothing and medical supplies, as well as their distribution through the Embassy at least to those Polish citizens whose citizenship is regarded by both Governments as incontestable?

MOLOTOV: The Embassy may continue to assist these people.

ROMER: But if difficulties are already now being made?

MOLOTOV: We shall elucidate this matter in a spirit of collaboration.

ROMER: It would be better to settle this matter at once. I am informed that the activities of the Embassy warehouse at Ashabad through which all shipments of relief goods pass on the southern route are paralysed, since our chauffeurs are not allowed to drive from Ashabad to Badjigiran and the Soviet Embassy in Teheran refuses to grant visas valid for several crossings of the frontier to sixteen chauffeurs of Iranian nationality who were also to bring these goods to Ashabad from Iran. Owing to this, our Ashabad warehouse which serves the greater part of the territory of the Soviet Union is virtually immobilized.

MOLOTOV: It seems to me, Mr. Ambassador, that your views as to the complete cessation of relief work in the interests of the Polish population are exaggerated. This work can be continued and in point of fact is functioning in numerous places. I will have the case of Ashabad investigated.

The main object at present is to ensure that the change over to new forms of organization, as regards relief work in aid of the Polish population, should not lead to a deterioration of the condition of that population. The Soviet Government is also anxious that not only its material conditions should not be depressed but that its cultural requirements should also be safeguarded. The Soviet authorities have already received detailed instructions to this effect. . . .

ROMER: And what in your view will be the possibilities of distinguishing between the two categories of people, those who for both sides are and remain indisputably Polish citizens, and those whom the Soviet Government now considers Soviet citizens?

MOLOTOV: This problem is purely practical. It will be dealt with within the scope of our legislation.

ROMER: I have precise information, Mr. Commissar, that Polish citizens are being arrested for not accepting Soviet passports and I am unable to reconcile this procedure with the stand taken by Marshal Stalin in his conversation with me.

MOLOTOV: You simplify this matter, Mr. Ambassador. The moment is difficult. Truly there is friction. If a Pole resists the orders of Soviet authorities, we shall deal with that as with a hostile action. . . .

ROMER: In the cases on which we have most detailed reports, the Soviet authorities failed to take into account the will of individuals. Whereas, during my conversation with Marshal Stalin, the latter laid emphasis on the fact that precisely this factor would have to be taken into serious consideration. We, on our part, give due attention to this circumstance, and therefore you, Mr. Commissar, will not, for instance, have to deal with any claim on our part with regard to the citizenship of Wanda Wasilewska, of whose case mention was made.

MOLOTOV: Your reference to Marshal Stalin is incorrect. Comrade Stalin spoke of two factors and you, Mr. Ambassador, mention only one. Stalin said that one must take into consideration: first,

Soviet legislation; and second, the will of the citizen. As to Wanda Wasilewska, she voluntarily accepted Soviet citizenship although she was born in Warsaw.

ROMER: I very well remember the stand taken by Marshal Stalin and I must emphasize that the Soviet authorities only count with the one of the two factors which, according to the Marshal, were to influence the determination of citizenship, namely, Soviet legislation; but they totally ignore the second factor, the will of the person concerned. Therefore, even in the light of Marshal Stalin's explanations, the procedure applied by the authorities is unfair and unjust.

MOLOTOV: We will verify all these facts, and I will inform you of the outcome.

ROMER: I must now ask you to give me some explanation regarding citizenship laws in force in the Soviet Union and also to clear up some points which come to my mind in connection with the Note of January 16.

MOLOTOV: I am listening.

ROMER: Leaving aside, for the moment, the Polish stand in the matter of citizenship, and we know it is opposed to that of the Soviets, I would like to be informed, as accurately as possible, about Soviet guiding principles, so as to be able to eliminate from our further discussion that special category of persons whose Polish citizenship is not questioned by the Soviet side. I know from Marshal Stalin's declarations and from your own that such a category of persons actually exists according to your views and that it consists of individuals who found themselves fortuitously in the contested territory on November 1 and 2, 1939. A definition of this category of persons, for which I ask, would restrict the field of our controversial discussion.

MOLOTOV: In the Note of January 16, 1943, two laws are mentioned, the Citizenship Law of the U.S.S.R. of August 19, 1938 and the Decree of the Supreme Council on citizenship of November 29, 1939. They govern this matter. I will endeavor to give you in writing, shortly, a legal definition of the category of persons who do not come under these laws. For the moment I can only explain that the persons we regard as Soviet citizens are those who resided at the time we have in mind in the territories of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia which entered the Soviet Union. In so far as the inhabitants of these territories were not

citizens of a second or a third state—for such persons may have been there likewise, for instance Japanese, British, Rumanians or other nationals, as I have already mentioned, and insofar as this is not understood to include persons who were there fortuitously and who consequently after all may not have acquired Soviet citizenship—these cases must be cleared up individually—persons belonging to all remaining categories have become Soviet citizens. As regards military families there may be cases, for instance, the wife of a member of the Polish armed forces now in Iran may not wish to join her husband and desire to retain her Soviet citizenship. When such a person acquires Soviet citizenship, the different citizenship of her husband cannot constitute an obstacle. Cases bearing on citizenship must be dealt with individually. True, persons originating from Warsaw, Poznań and other Polish territories are Polish citizens, but, as I say, their cases ought to be treated individually, for these persons may wish to acquire Soviet citizenship and if they acquire can no longer be regarded as Polish citizens.

ROMER: May I request you to send me the text of the Decree of the Supreme Council of November 29, 1939?*

MOLOTOV: Yes, I will send it to you.

ROMER: In the notes of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of December 1, 1941 and January 16, 1943, the terms citizens of the *oblasti*** of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia are used, whereas the Law on Citizenship makes use exclusively of the terms: Citizens of the Soviet Union and citizen of the various Republics forming the Union. How then should one understand the term citizen of an *oblast* which is unknown in law?

MOLOTOV: Mr. Ambassador, all Republics are made up of *oblasti*. Thus, for instance, there can be a citizen of the Kiev *oblast* of the U.S.S.R.

ROMER: The law says nothing about this. I do not think, for instance, that there can be any such thing as a citizen of the Kuybyshev *oblast*.

MOLOTOV: Yes—yes—there can be such a thing as a citizen of the Kuybyshev *oblast*. But in that case he will be a citizen of the R.S.F.S.R. and so in all Republics.

* See Document No. 26.

** District.

ROMER: In the Soviet law on citizenship mention is made of citizens of the State, and not of a province, therefore, the use of the term: citizen of an *oblast* in both notes of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs is not clear to me, the more so as at the time in question, the territories referred to did not form a part of the Soviet Union. To whom does the term employed in the Notes actually refer?

MOLOTOV: The Soviet citizens of the *oblasti* of Western Ukraine and of Western White Ruthenia and of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and of the White Ruthenian Socialist Republic were until November 1, 1939 in various legal positions, for some were only becoming Soviet citizens while others were already citizens.

ROMER: Now, what persons were actually implied in the term used in the Notes of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, which, as we see, causes such a confusion of legal concept.

MOLOTOV: No law can provide for all practical cases. There is no such thing in the world as a perfect law.

ROMER: Has one not to do here, simply with Polish citizens, as the inhabitants of those territories at that time must have been considered even by Soviet legislation?

MOLOTOV: You are quite right, we do not deny this. The population there formerly possessed Polish citizenship.

ROMER: We can therefore stand on the ground that in the light of Soviet interpretation, we were dealing with Polish territories and Polish citizens.

MOLOTOV: I do not know what inferences you are making in connection with this matter, or what you are aiming at. Not all *oblasti* entered the Soviet Union at the same time. From part of the *oblasti*, the Soviet Union was formed in 1918. Other *oblasti* belonging to this Republic were incorporated in 1939. The Ukrainian Republic was not erected at one stroke, but step by step. We cannot help that.

ROMER: To fix the interpretation of these questions is a matter of great practical importance. As has become manifest, it is impossible to decide upon fundamental principles of citizenship, quite independently of territorial questions, and the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of December 1, 1941 is a signal

proof of this. It states clearly that the unsolved question of frontiers between Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be settled in the future.

MOLOTOV: What does your question aim at, Mr. Ambassador?

ROMER: I merely quote a sentence from the Note of December 1, 1941, to throw light on the problem of citizenship, in the Soviet interpretation.

MOLOTOV: The question of frontiers will certainly be subject to future settlement. We will further discuss this matter. Do you perhaps wish to enter into a conversation on this subject now?

ROMER: No, Mr. Commissar, as I already told Marshal Stalin, I do not think that it would serve a good purpose for our two governments at present, in the interest of an improvement of their relations.

MOLOTOV: The territorial boundary of the Soviet Union as confirmed in 1939 by the Supreme Council, is the frontier of the Soviet Union; however we shall not decline* to discuss in more concrete terms the subject of frontiers. Rectifications are possible. I mean a few. In the matter of citizenship I will send you an interpretation in writing.

ROMER: Thank you. I should prefer, as a means of facilitating our further conversations, if you would send me a draft of this interpretation first, so that we could still discuss it before it is given final form. I should like, in particular, to emphasize that the discussion on citizenship which we have had was only of an informative nature and that it merely aimed to enlighten me as to the standpoint and views of the Soviet Government in this matter, without affecting any change in the fundamental viewpoint of the Polish Government on this subject. I should like it to be well understood, that in asking you these questions, I do not cease to support entirely our different viewpoint in this matter. I shall inform my Government of the regrettable incidents I communicated to you at the beginning of our conversation to-day and shall also advise them of your assurance that these facts will be investigated without delay and that the result will be made known to me.

MOLOTOV: I shall do so immediately after I receive the explanations.

* In Russian: "*Nie otkazyvayemsia.*"

ROMER: Well, it is always better to clean up all matters in an amicable way, to avoid further incidents that can only complicate the situation.

MOLOTOV: I understand.

ROMER: Do you wish to inform me of the date of our next interview, Mr. Commissar, or is it more convenient to you for me to suggest it?

MOLOTOV: I am at your service, Mr. Ambassador.

4. EXCERPTS FROM AMBASSADOR ROMER'S CONVERSATION WITH MR. MOLOTOV, PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AT THE KREMLIN ON MARCH 18, 1943.

ROMER: In the course of our last conversation, three days ago you promised to send me an explanation in writing concerning the manner in which Soviet laws on citizenship are to be interpreted, and also on a number of events affecting our interests, which occurred in Soviet territory.

MOLOTOV: I must also ask you a question. Did you receive the Decree of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. of November 29, 1939? (The Ambassador nods assent.) I shall now answer your question.

During our last conversation I had not at hand the above Decree. On reading it, I saw that the matter of citizenship is quite explicitly dealt with. The text refers to inhabitants of the districts of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia. Within the meaning of this Decree, therefore, any person who was not an inhabitant of these *oblasti* remains a Polish citizen. The Decree deals with this question quite exhaustively and does not require any further elucidation; it says everything there is to say.....

ROMER: To revert to the written interpretation of Soviet legislation on citizenship which you promised to give me during our last conversation, I again emphasize the great importance I attach to receiving it. The Decree actually speaks of inhabitants whereas the Soviet Notes of December 1, 1941, and January 16, 1943, mention persons who found themselves on the contested territories on November 1 and 2, 1939. All this is not clear, and consequently the local authorities interpret their instructions in a divergent and arbitrary fashion.

MOLOTOV: There is no intrinsic difference in the texts, although different expressions are used. We base ourselves on the Decree. I see no need for issuing an interpretation in writing, since obviously the term inhabitant is perfectly understandable. We refer to permanent inhabitants, residing on this territory. What is it, that is not clear in this?

ROMER: Your explanation on this point is valuable to me in itself, but the whole matter nevertheless still presents certain doubts. The question is to define the Soviet principle in accordance with which permanent residence is established.

MOLOTOV: There is no one law in the world that could be applied to all cases arising from life. However detailed a law, it will never decide all possible individual cases. If controversial questions arise, we shall be able to discuss them. Personally, I think, that the law is quite clear.

ROMER: But the application of the law is relevant, the more so as it exposes our citizens to still greater hardships.

MOLOTOV: Is it necessary to explain what inhabitant means? During our last conversation you did not have the text of the Decree. Do you really require additional explanations, although in the meantime we sent you the text of the Decree?

ROMER: I propose, Mr. Commissar, to postpone this discussion until later, so that the concrete cases I intend to present to you may furnish practical illustrations.

MOLOTOV: Willingly I agree, this will be more appropriate.

ROMER: The facts I have to bring to your notice are very painful, because they do not show that the Soviet authorities act in a way consistent with the spirit of friendship that ought to be the rule between our two governments. I shall divide these facts into the following categories:

First: The forcing of Soviet citizenship about which we already have information, fragmentary but sufficient to draw the conclusion that this is a mass procedure ordered by the central authorities and applied to the entire Polish population in the U.S.S.R. This procedure is carried out on lines of moral and physical compulsion that arouse my deepest indignation, as being inadmissible in relations between Allies and in the midst of a hard war against our common enemy. We have proof that Polish citizens, men and women, subjected to this procedure are detained for examination for days on end, that they are even deprived of food and drink to break

their resistance. Such arguments are made use of for this purpose, as statements that there is no longer any Polish Embassy in the U.S.S.R., or that Poland no longer exists. Those who resist are thrown into prison. Local authorities do not, as a rule, investigate the place of origin of a given person, and consequently do not respect the differentiation implied in the interpretation of the Soviet law on citizenship that I received from Marshal Stalin and from you.

Second: The taking over by the Soviet authorities, Mr. Commissar, of the relief institutions of the Polish Embassy, a proceeding likewise carried out on a mass scale. These institutions—they number about 570—were created and operated on the basis of agreements between the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the Embassy; they were subordinated exclusively to the latter and had at their disposal, in all cases—in larger or smaller measure—Polish State property, equipment, supplies of food, clothing and medicines, school utensils, etc. On grounds unknown to me and in a totally inadmissible manner, the Soviet authorities are taking over these institutions and disposing of them and also of Polish property without the consent of the Embassy, to whom the rightful ownership of and control over these objects belongs. They do not even give any warning of what they intend to do. As regards the taking over the home for invalids and orphanage at Bolshaya Konstantinovka, in the Kuybyshev district, under conditions I described to you during our last interview, the Embassy has received a Note from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, dated March 10, giving as justification for all this that no Polish citizens were found there. This allegation has no foundation in truth. It was precisely Polish citizens refusing to accept Soviet passports who together with the manager of the establishment were expelled from it. The citizenship of children was obviously decided by higher authorities without any investigation, despite opposition put up by the children themselves. I am therefore compelled to state once again, that methods of actual terrorism were employed by the local authorities, methods wholly incompatible with the spirit of Polish-Soviet friendship and collaboration.

MOLOTOV: Mr. Ambassador, it is very easy to speak about friendly understanding in the matter of incidents that have occurred, but here I do not see anything of this sort on your part. Your reproaches on this subject are unfounded and out of place. I shall not reply to them.

However, as regards Polish State property, I already told you the last time and I repeat once more, that all losses will be made good.

If the Embassy should obstruct our action, the result will be anything but good. I see that you do not want to get reconciled to our standpoint, and the Embassy still continues to follow its old line of procedure. This has nothing to do with assurances of friendship. I must remark that the Embassy's attitude towards these problems is strange, for it does not issue instructions in accordance with our laws. No good can result from this. All this is quite incomprehensible to me.

ROMER: Your expostulation, Mr. Commissar, I shall answer later when I substantiate my statement with facts. I will now submit to your consideration a further series of facts, and, in doing so, I would—in connection with point three—emphasize that the Embassy has been exposed of late to various vexations and difficulties. Even I, personally, have trouble when I speak over the telephone with Kuybyshev. Long distance telephone calls of the Embassy are not attended to. An ever increasing number of telegrams from outlying places are not delivered to the Embassy. Callers leaving the Embassy are forced to show their identity papers and are arrested. Worse, cases are known in which such persons have been beaten up in public. If you so desire, I can give further particulars as well as the dates of the incidents. Families of Embassy officials and of employees of institutions under it in outlying districts are forced to accept Soviet passports.

(The Ambassador deals at length with the cases of Mrs. Zagórska, Mrs. Kasińska, Mrs. Maksymowicz, Mrs. Emchowicz, Mrs. Winczewska, Mrs. Wolska and of Messrs. Kulyba, Cygler and Wójtowicz, and shows that none of the persons involved originated from the contested territories or were resident therein.)

I will now revert to the matter touched on by you, Mr. Commissar, concerning the taking over of relief institutions by the Soviet authorities. I am obliged to emphasize, once more, that the Embassy never agreed thereto and was not even notified by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in this matter, and that a policy of accomplished fact is being applied. The institutions are closed down before the question of citizenship of the staff and inmates has been established. This is not indicative of any good will on the part of the Soviet Government. I suggest, on my part, that the local authorities discontinue this action at least until our

conversations have been brought to a close, as they are intended to bring about a friendly settlement of pending difficulties. At the present juncture it is difficult to arrive at an understanding. Whilst we are discussing questions of principle, things are happening out there in the provinces that are apt to change the whole situation. The Polish Government cannot be indifferent to these happenings.

MOLOTOV: I would like to ask, Mr. Ambassador, at what you are actually aiming? We shall verify the individual facts mentioned by you. (Molotov repeats this twice.) What more can you wish? If you start by not recognizing our laws, then all attempts to achieve an understanding will be futile. From the conversations we have had hitherto I have gained the impression that you continue uninterruptedly to maintain your standpoint of not recognizing the Decree of November 29, 1939.

I will make several remarks:

First: I have the impression that what you actually have in mind is that we should ask each individual inhabitant of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia what citizenship he wishes to retain. Here I must state that there can be no question of any individual citizen, who acquires Soviet citizenship by virtue of the Decree declaring his or her consent. That would be contrary to Soviet legislation.

Second: Within the meaning of the Decree the place of birth of a given citizen is irrelevant; what is relevant, however, is whether that citizen resided in the territory of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia.

Third: I should like to emphasize that if the Embassy hampers our action of issuing passports to Soviet citizens in accordance with our Decree, and if it induces such persons not to accept Soviet passports, then no good will come of it. There will be unnecessary incidents. If, however, the Embassy will cooperate with us in a helpful spirit then we shall be able to investigate individual cases very carefully and rectify any possible mistakes. You certainly do not possess, Mr. Ambassador, general information as to how this whole action is being carried out.

ROMER: On the contrary, Mr. Commissar, I have a large number of facts affecting not only Embassy officials. I can for instance mention the case of Mrs. Sigmund, born and domiciled in Warsaw, now residing at Kustanay, a daughter of the well-known writer Adolph Nowaczyński.

MOLOTOV: We will verify these facts.

ROMER: Persons who know beyond any doubt that even within the meaning of the Decree they may retain their Polish citizenship and who consequently refuse to accept Soviet passports, are sentenced to imprisonment for this in violation of every principle of law. I can in this respect refer to the cases of three employees of the Embassy's warehouse at Kirov who were sentenced each to two years in prison. What I want is that the local authorities should not consider the question of citizenship from different angles, and that we should draw practical conclusions from the facts, Mr. Commissar.

MOLOTOV: Right!

ROMER: I wish to obtain a precise definition of that special category of persons who even from your viewpoint, for all that it does not as we know correspond to our own, remain Polish citizens within the meaning of the Decree.

MOLOTOV: I agree with you, Mr. Ambassador, that persons not falling within the scope of the Decree may be classed separately as Polish citizens. However as Soviet legislation on citizenship is questioned on the Polish side, I must remark that our authorities will execute the legal enactments that are binding upon them. What I am concerned with is that no obstacles, in the nature of a demonstration, be placed in the way of these orders.

ROMER: The Embassy never did anything of the sort, but on the contrary always advised Polish citizens to loyally obey orders of the authorities. On the other hand, our citizens must have the possibility of appealing to the superior authorities and also to their Embassy, against decisions which they consider legally unjustified. I may add that, as bearers of Soviet passports thrust upon them by sheer force, they are—under severe penalties—deprived of the possibility of applying to the Polish Embassy and that they would likewise not be in a position to appeal against the unjust decisions of which they may be victims. I am, therefore, first of all anxious to make sure that Soviet authorities do not wrongly interpret the rules set down by the law. Besides, I should like to point out once more, that the local authorities compel the Polish population by various means to accept Soviet passports and that they destroy and deride their national identity papers, which justifies the terms used by me in presenting this matter. I recall that according to the statements of Marshal Stalin, the free will of the persons concerned was also to be an important factor in deciding the question of citizenship. Do

you authorize me to assure my Government that in the future, at least pending the termination of our conversations, the method of compulsion in the question of citizenship will be abandoned?

MOLOTOV: I do not agree, Mr. Ambassador, I cannot agree. The authorities are carrying out the Soviet law on citizenship, and they cannot remain passive in the face of resistance. You refer to your conversation with Comrade Stalin and you say, you had the impression that he made the matter of citizenship dependent upon an expression of will. The case of Wanda Wasilewska was mentioned then, and the question was whether she wished to be a Polish or a Soviet citizen. Such individual cases may arise, when Polish citizens not falling within the scope of the Decree are concerned. But it appears, Mr. Ambassador, that you wish that every citizen be asked his opinion.

ROMER: I should like to further discuss the category of persons of incontestable citizenship.

MOLOTOV: We will verify these cases.

ROMER: The local authorities undoubtedly are acquainted with a series of successive Soviet legal enactments of various dates, the Amnesty Decree, the Note of December 1, 1941, the Note of January 16, 1943. The contents of these documents differ in each case. This leads to a variety of interpretations and is a source of confusion for local authorities, as they do not know how to proceed with regard to Polish citizens, and unnecessary incidents arise. In my view—quite apart from the conflict of principle existing between us—the local authorities ought to receive more precise instructions.

MOLOTOV: If local authorities have applied the law wrongly, Mr. Ambassador, we shall check these facts. But, I should like to remark that the Decree on Citizenship of November 29, 1939, and the Soviet Note of January 16, 1943, constitute the basis of action by our authorities.

ROMER: I revert to the discussion we had at the beginning of our conversation to-day. A more precise definition of the terminology used in Soviet legislation as to who is a resident of the contested territories will contribute to remove friction and difficulties.

MOLOTOV: I do not see any need or necessity to further elaborate such a definition. We shall never reach an ideal formula. Everybody understands what is meant by inhabitant. It is better to deal with these cases individually.

ROMER: There can be no question of individual cases since the authorities apply the law to all and compel even persons, incontestably Polish citizens in the meaning of Soviet law itself, to accept Soviet passports.

MOLOTOV: These facts must be verified.

ROMER: I am in possession of accurate information. Nine days ago you promised to send me an interpretation in writing. The facts occurring throughout the country are becoming more numerous and causing many unnecessary additional difficulties.

MOLOTOV: There will be no difficulties; the local authorities apply the laws correctly.

ROMER: I revert now to the matter of Embassy institutions and relief establishments taken over by Soviet authorities. Would you be willing to authorize me to assure the Polish Government that this action will be suspended at least for the duration of the conversations now proceeding between us?

MOLOTOV: The principal consideration by which we are actuated is that the condition of the Polish population should not be impaired. I do not exactly know how far the transfer of these institutions to Soviet administration has been accomplished. But I can state that the entire property of the Embassy and all the possessions of the Polish State will be restored in full or compensation paid.

ROMER: In each of these 570 institutions are objects belonging to the Polish State. I make the formal proposal that the action of taking over these establishments be stayed until we reach an agreement.

MOLOTOV: The interests of the Embassy shall be safeguarded in any case.

ROMER: But here we deal with the infringement of property rights and management of these Embassy institutions.

MOLOTOV: To avoid misunderstandings, let me quote an example: if butter was taken away, the same quantity of butter will be returned.

ROMER: Is the Administration of the said institutions being changed?

MOLOTOV: You will understand that at present a large number of persons belonging to the management have turned out to be Soviet citizens.

ROMER: It would appear to be fairer, if the questions themselves were first cleared up and deductions reached later, after this has been done. Meantime the institutions should be able to carry on as heretofore. Moreover, there are many children there whose citizenship has not yet even been verified.

MOLOTOV: There are institutions where the employees may have been ill or unable to fulfill their duties, and others which do not function properly. For this reason the Soviet administration was bound to intervene and appoint people who will better fulfill their tasks. The procedure, Mr. Ambassador, is of no importance, what really counts is that the population should not suffer.

ROMER: Only the Embassy could decide who worked well in its own institutions. I really do not see any valid grounds on which the local authorities can interfere in the matter. And I must further remark that the Embassy issues instructions to these institutions, supplies them with funds and assistance in kind, and that it is not even notified when they pass into other hands. This causes unprecedented and most harmful confusion.

MOLOTOV: The main thing, Mr. Ambassador, is that the material condition of the population should not suffer.

ROMER: Have any instructions been given out by the central authorities for these institutions to be taken over? Why were we not notified of this in advance?

MOLOTOV: I repeat once more that the central authorities, acting on the grounds of the decision of the People's Commissars of January 15, 1943, gave categorical orders to the local authorities that the taking over of these institutions by the Soviet Administration must not entail any hardship on the population. But I wish to emphasize that the Embassy will have very little to say in the matter of institutions whose staff and inmates are now for the most part Soviet citizens. The majority of these people acquired Soviet citizenship by virtue of our Note of January 16, 1943. Today is March 18, and the whole matter is now about to be closed.

ROMER: How could it happen that the Embassy was not previously notified of this decision nor of the orders issued under it which do not respect Polish State property? Besides, this is wholly contrary to our previous agreements, under which the relief institutions of the Embassy were called into being.

MOLOTOV: The authorities have received instructions to the

effect that the situation of the Polish population must not suffer any deterioration.

ROMER: It is also our concern, and it was precisely thanks to the work of the Embassy in the field that the Polish population was provided with substantial relief.

MOLOTOV: The Embassy will not lose a farthing.

ROMER: That matter, in truth, is secondary. But the violation of principle is inadmissible.

MOLOTOV: Persons who are found to be Soviet citizens must obey the orders of the authorities who are—as a matter of fact—concerned in not allowing the situation of the population to deteriorate. The authorities have been instructed to see to this, irrespective of the sentiments of individual persons.

ROMER: I must emphasize once more that the taking over, by an officially recorded act, of relief institutions belonging to the Embassy is illegal and incompatible with their interests, as well as with those of persons benefited by them.

MOLOTOV: What are you aiming at?

ROMER: I want the transfer of these establishments to the Soviet Administration to be suspended. I repeat my question whether I may assure my Government that this will be done?

MOLOTOV: I have already told you that the central authorities formally ordered the local authorities to take over these institutions. Apart from this, these institutions have now become Soviet institutions, since the persons serving them are now Soviet citizens. The inviolability of the property of the Polish State will be safeguarded.

ROMER: How do you contemplate the question of further relief in kind now due to arrive, bought or ordered abroad by the Polish Government and already shipped with the collaboration of Allied Powers, or donated by friendly Governments and welfare institutions in allied and neutral countries? I am now looking at the practical side of the problem.

MOLOTOV: In principle, I regard all assistance as being desirable if it serves the interests of the Polish population. I am ready to discuss this matter separately.

ROMER: Finally, I would like to ask you, Mr. Commissar, to give me an assurance that compulsory methods in the matter of citizenship will not be applied.

MOLOTOV: I regard this demand as unfounded, since our Administration is proceeding in accordance with the instructions.

ROMER: Then I have no other choice but to appeal to my Government. And may I count on receiving a written interpretation of the term inhabitant, as contained in the Decree of November 29, 1939?

MOLOTOV: I have already answered this question, Mr. Ambassador.

No. 88

Note of April 25, 1943, from Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Romer, Polish Ambassador in the U.S.S.R., severing relations between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government.

Moscow, April 26, 1943.

Mr. Ambassador,

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to notify the Polish Government of the following:

The Soviet Government consider the recent behavior of the Polish Government with regard to the U.S.S.R. as entirely abnormal, and violating all regulations and standards of relations between two Allied States. The slanderous campaign hostile to the Soviet Union launched by the German Fascists in connection with the murder of the Polish officers, which they themselves committed in the Smolensk area on territory occupied by German troops, was at once taken up by the Polish Government and is being fanned in every way by the Polish official press.

Far from offering a rebuff to the vile Fascist slander of the U.S.S.R., the Polish Government did not even find it necessary to address to the Soviet Government any inquiry or request for an explanation on this subject.

Having committed a monstrous crime against the Polish officers, the Hitlerite authorities are now staging a farcical investigation, and for this they have made use of certain Polish pro-Fascist elements whom they themselves selected in occupied Poland where everything is under Hitler's heel, and where no honest Pole can openly have his say.

For the "investigation," both the Polish Government and the Hitlerite Government invited the International Red Cross, which is compelled, in conditions of a terroristic regime, with its gallows and mass extermination of the peaceful population, to take part

in this investigation farce staged by Hitler. Clearly such an "investigation," conducted behind the back of the Soviet Government, cannot evoke the confidence of people possessing any degree of honesty.

The fact that the hostile campaign against the Soviet Union commenced simultaneously in the German and Polish press, and was conducted along the same lines, leaves no doubt as to the existence of contact and accord in carrying out this hostile campaign between the enemy of the Allies—Hitler—and the Polish Government.

While the peoples of the Soviet Union bleeding profusely in a hard struggle against Hitlerite Germany, are straining every effort for the defeat of the common enemy of the Russian and Polish peoples, and of all freedom-loving democratic countries, the Polish Government, to please Hitler's tyranny, has dealt a treacherous blow to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government is aware that this hostile campaign against the Soviet Union is being undertaken by the Polish Government in order to exert pressure upon the Soviet Government by making use of the slanderous Hitlerite fake for the purpose of wresting from it territorial concessions at the expense of the interests of the Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Byelorussia and Soviet Lithuania.

All these circumstances compel the Soviet Government to recognize that the present Government of Poland, having slid on the path of accord with Hitler's Government, has actually discontinued allied relations with the U.S.S.R., and has adopted a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union.

On the strength of the above, the Soviet Government has decided to sever relations with the Polish Government.

MOLOTOV.

No. 89

Note of April 26, 1943, from Mr. Romer, the Polish Ambassador, to Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, stating his reasons for refusing to accept the Soviet Note severing relations between the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Government of Poland.

Moscow, April 26, 1943.

Mr. People's Commissar,

You were good enough to receive me today at 0.15 a.m. at your own invitation and for the purpose of reading to me a Note dated

April 25, 1943, signed by yourself and addressed to me, notifying me of the decision of the Soviet Government to sever relations with the Polish Government. Upon hearing the text of the Note, I declared that there was nothing I could do but accept with regret the news of this decision of the Soviet Government, which will be held fully and exclusively responsible for this step. At the same time, however, I most emphatically refused to be a party to the motives and conclusions set forth in the Note that was read to me, and which ascribed to the Polish Government in an inadmissible form, conduct and intentions entirely inconsistent with the facts, thus making it impossible for me to accept your Note. I stated, moreover, that contrary to the allegations contained in the Note, the Polish Government had striven for close on two years to obtain from the Soviet Government information concerning the fate of the missing Polish officers, and had as recently as the 20 inst. returned to this matter in a Note to Ambassador Bogomolov.

Since despite my refusal to accept the Note, I received it later at my hotel in a sealed envelope of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, I have the honor to return it herewith in conformity with my attitude as set forth above.

I have the honor to be

ROMER.

No. 90

Statement of the Polish Government of April 28, 1943, concerning the decision of the Soviet Government to sever relations with the Polish Government.

The following statement was issued on April 28, 1943, by the Polish Government in London:—

The Polish Government emphatically declare that their policy aiming at a mutual friendly understanding between Poland and Soviet Russia on the basis of the integrity and full sovereignty of the Republic of Poland was and continues to be fully supported by the Polish nation.

Conscious of their responsibility towards their own nation and towards the Allies, whose unity and solidarity the Polish Government consider to be the cornerstone of future victory, they were the

first to approach the Soviet Government with a proposal for an understanding, in spite of the many tragic events that had taken place from the moment of the entry of the Soviet Armies on the territory of the Republic, that is from the day of September 17, 1939.

Having settled their relations with Soviet Russia by the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and by the Declaration of December 4, 1941, the Polish Government have strictly discharged their obligations.

Acting in close union with their Government, the Polish nation, making unheard of sacrifices, fights unswervingly in Poland and abroad against the German invader. It produced no traitor Quisling and accepted no collaboration with Germany. In the light of facts known throughout the world, the Polish nation and the Polish Government have no need to defend themselves from any charge of contact or understanding with Hitler.

In a public statement of April 17, 1943, the Polish Government categorically denied to Germany the right to abuse the tragedy of Polish officers for her own perfidious aims. They unhesitatingly denounced the effort of Nazi propaganda to create mistrust between the Allies. About the same time a Note was sent to the Soviet Ambassador accredited to the Polish Government asking once again for information which would help to elucidate the fate of the missing officers.

The Polish nation and the Polish Government look to the future. They appeal in the name of the unity of the Allies and of elementary human principles for the release from the U.S.S.R. of the thousands of families of soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces, engaged in the fight or preparing in Great Britain and the Middle East to take their part in the fight, tens of thousands of Polish orphans and children for the education of whom they would take full responsibility and who now, in view of the German mass slaughter, are particularly precious to the Polish people. The Polish Army, in waging the war against Germany needs as reinforcements all Polish men able to fight who now find themselves on Soviet soil. The Polish Government appeal for their release. They reserve their right to plead the cause of all these persons before the world. Finally, the Polish Government appeal for the continuation of relief for the mass of Polish citizens who remain in Russia.

In defending the integrity of the Republic of Poland, which accepted the war with the Third Reich, the Polish Government never

claimed and do not claim, in accordance with their statement of February 25, 1943, any Soviet territories.

It is and will be the duty of every Polish Government to defend the rights of Poland and of Polish citizens. The principles for which the United Nations fight, and the strengthening by all means of their solidarity in this struggle against the common enemy, remain the unchanging bases of the policy of the Polish Government.

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