:CO
ACTA PHILOSOPHICA FENNICA VOL. 48
I co •o
Ijp OWLEDGE AND THE SCIENCES IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL
CONGRESS OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
(S.I.E.P.M.)
VOL.1
Edited by
MONIKA ASZTALOS JOHN E. MURDOCH ILKKA NIINILUOTO
HELSINKI 1990
KNOWLEDGE AND THE SCIENCES IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL
CONGRESS OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
(S.I.E.P.M.)
Helsinki 24-29 August 1987 VOL. I
Edited by
MONIKA ASZTALOS JOHN E. MURDOCH ILKKA NIINILUOTO
ACTA PIIILOSOPHICA FENNICA VOL. 48 HELSINKI 1990
ISBN 951-9264-09-4 ISSN 0355-1792
Helsinki 1990 Yliopistopaino
PREFACE
The Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (Societe Internationale pour PEtude de la Philosophic Medievale) was held in Helsinki, Finland, 24 - 29 August 1987. The general theme of the congress was Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy. The program consisted of plenary sessions with invited papers, sections with contrib uted papers, and meetings of the commissions of the S.I.E.P.M. The titles of the sections were as follows: (1) The Origin of Medieval Notions of Science and the Divisions of the Sciences, (2) Basic Epistemological Issues as Related to Medieval Conceptions of Science, (3) Trivium and the Sciences, (4) The Nature and Methods of Theoretical Sciences, (5) The Nature and Methods of Practical Sciences, (6) Theology as a Science, (7) New Conceptions of Science in Late Medieval and Early Renaissance Philosophy.
The reports of the commissions have been published in the Bulletin de Philosophic Medievale 29 (1987), pp. 12-70 and 30 (1988), pp. 10-38. Invited papers and contributed papers are published in the present three volume work, edited by the members of the program committee (Monika Asztalos, Sten Ebbesen, Dagfinn F^llesdal, Simo Knuuttila, Anja Inker! Lehtinen, John E. Murdoch, Ilkka Niiniluoto) in collaboration with Reijo Tyorinoja. Toivo Holopainen has served as assistant to the editors. Volume I (Acta Philosophica Fennica, vol. 48) contains the invited papers. The contributed papers of the sections (l)-(3) are included in volume II (Publications of Luther-Agricola Society, B 19). Volume III (Annals of the Finnish Society for Missiology and Ecumenics, 55) contains the contrib uted papers of the sections (4)-(7). All papers offered are published.
Every volume is provided with an index of manuscripts and an index of names. Ancient Greek and medieval Western names are in a Latin form.
The congress was financially supported by the Ministry of Education of Finland, the Finnish Cultural Foundation, the Academy of Finland, the UNESCO, and the University of Helsinki.
Helsinki, 15 August 1990 The Editors
CONTENTS
Preface iii
Contents v
Plenary Sessions
Georg Henrik VON WRIGHT, Dante Between Ulysses and Faust
(Opening address) 1
Tullio GREGORY, Forme di conoscenza e ideal! di sapere nella
cultura medievale 10
Jaakko HINTIKKA, Concepts of Scientific Method from Aristotle to
Newton 72
Michael E. MARMURA, The Fortuna of the Posterior Analytics in
the Arabic Middle Ages 85
L.M. DE RIJK,, The Posterior Analytics in the Latin West ... 104
Wfedystew STRO2EWSKI, Metaphysics as a Science 128
Alain DE LIBERA. Le developpement de nouveaux instruments
conceptuels et leur utilisation dans la philosophie de la nature
au XfVe siecle 158
Arthur Stephen McGRADE, Ethics and Politics as Practical
Sciences 198
Symposium on the Theoretical and Practical Autonomy of Philosophy as a Discipline in the Middle Ages
Linos G. BENAKIS, Die theoretische und praktische Autonomie der
Philosophie als Fachdisziplin in Byzanz 223
Hans DAIBER, Die Autonomie der Philosophie im Islam . . . . 228
Colette SIRAT, La philosophie et la science selon les philosophes
juifs du Moyen-Age 250
John MARENBON, The Theoretical and Practical Autonomy of Philosophy as a Discipline in the Middle Ages: Latin Philosophy, 1250-1350 262
Indices
Index of Manuscripts 277
Index of Names . 278
PLENARY SESSIONS
GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT
Dante Between Ulysses and Faust
(Opening address)
1. One of the most moving and also most enigmatic passages in the Divine Comedy is Dante's encounter with Ulysses. It is described in the twentysixth Canto of the Inferno. We are now in the region called Malebolgc, deep down on the ladder of sin where treacherous councellors suffer eternal punishment. The place is full of flames and in each flame a human being is enclosed. Dante is struck by one flame which is cloven at the top and asks his guide Virgil, who is burning in it. Virgil answers that it is Ulysses together with his companion in the war against Troy, Diomedes. They suffer, we are told, for the stratagem with the wooden horse which deceived the Trojans and brought about the fall of the city.
Dante in great excitement asks permission to speak to the flame. Virgil does not grant him his request, although he thinks it laudable - "degna di molta loda" - and agrees to address the approaching flame himself. Virgil now asks Ulysses to tell him where he went to die. Ulysses from inside the flame tells his interlocutors the following story:
After he had left Circe, who held him captive for more than a year, neither affection for his son, nor veneration for his old father, nor love for his faithful Penelope could restrain his burning desire to get to know the world and every vice and valour of which man is capable ("divenir del mondo esperto, e degli vizi humani e del valore"). Thus he set out on another voyage with the few surviving companions from his previous travels. They sailed westwards passing through the strait of Gibraltar, where Hercules had placed his pillars as a sign that man should proceed no farther ("accio che I'uom piu oltre non si metta"). Neglecting the prohibition Ulysses urged his men to follow him to explore a world where no human being had as yet put his foot. "Consider", he exclaimed, "that you are not destined to live like brutes, but to aspire after virtue and knowledge" ("Fatti non foste a viver come bruti, Ma per scguir virtute e conoscenza"). And so they continued across the waters, making their oars wings on a flight which no-one had dared to undertake before
2 von Wright
them. Finally, after months of travel, they sighted a coast with an enormous mountain. A wind blew up from the land, hit the ship, whirled it round three times, the vessel was sucked into the depths - "and over us the booming billows clos'd". Thus perished the horror-stricken Ulysses and his crew. Here the tale ends; upright and with dignity the flame then moves away from its stupefied audience.
This version of how Ulysses ended is not known from elsewhere and may well be Dante's invention. The cliff which Ulysses approached before his shipwreck could have been the mountain of Purgatory; the description of its location fits Dante's conception of geography. If this was so, interpreters may ponder over the symbolic significance of its inaccessibility for the pagan adventurer. I shall not develop this theme here.
2. Dante was obviously shaken by the tale Ulysses had told him. In the Homeric adventurer he must have recognized if not himself, at least a kindred soul. Dante was also in search af a world which no living man had visited before. Like Ulysses he was curious about the things he witnessed. The questions he constantly puts to his companion testifies to this. Therefore he was, so to speak, "doubly curious" about Ulysses whose curiosity had led him to disaster.
What is new with Dante's conception of Ulysses is, in the first place, that he adds a new dimension to the Homeric hero's guilt. Traditionally, Ulysses was censured for cunningness and treacherous behaviour. In the Latin tradition in particular, he was an evildoer as he had brought about the fall of Troy. We should remember that the leading survivor among the Trojans, Aeneas, was regarded as a sort of "protofounder" of Rome, the city which was destined to become the acknowledged capital of Western Christendom. That the author of the Aeneid should think Ulysses deserving of eternal punishment is not in the least surprising. The author of the Commedia does not, at least not in words, question the grounds of the verdict as presented to him by his guide through Inferno. But whether or not Dante thought these grounds sufficient, he placed the unhappy sufferer in the fires of Hell in a new perspective by adding to his load of guilt unlimited curiosity, unrestrained pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, as an end in itself.
With this change of perspective Dante in fact transformed the Homeric figure completely and gave him a symbolic significance which he
Dante between Ulysses and Faust 3
did not possess in the Greek tradition but which has since been prominent in Western poetry and thinking. This by itself is a major achievement of Dante's. As one commentary on the Ulyssean tradition observes,1 Dante turned Ulysses, the centripetal, homeward bound traveller who finally settles down in peace after a life full of restless search, into a centrifugal adventurer who never comes to rest but constantly moves on in search of the new and as yet untried. He is a spiritual kinsman of two other illfated fictional seafarers, the Flying Dutchman and Captain Ahab in Melville's immortal novel. In Tennyson's words a "gray spirit yearning in desire/ to follow knowledge like a sinking star/ beyond the utmost bound of human thought".
I am by no means the first to note that Dante, by making Ulysses a symbol of man's unquenchable thirst for knowledge, was in fact heralding the great changes in the spiritual climate of Europe which were to take place in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. "Ulysses' voice", it has been said, " - - as Dante gives it life speaks prophetically for the spirit of the Renaissance".
Not too long after Dante wrote, his Ulysses transformed found an incarnation in flesh and blood in a figure who was then himself going to be transformed into a symbol maybe even more congenial than the Greek hero to the spirit of our Western Civilization. This incarnation was an infamous German, Doctor Johann Faust, who lived in the turbulent early decades of the Reformation. Dante's centrifugal Ulysses is an anticipation of Faust - not so much of the man as of the symbol.
3. The idea that it is not befitting for man to know every truth and that unrestricted pursuit of knowledge may be sinful is deeply ingrained in our Judeo-Christian religious tradition. Its earliest expression is the myth of the Tree of Knowledge with its Forbidden Fruit in the first book of the Bible. In the Christian moral teaching of the Middle Ages curiositas is deemed a sinful disposition. Saint Augustine prays that God save us from it, and Saint Thomas too condemns it.
The idea that there are truths beyond human grasp which man should not aspire to get to know is related to certain ideas about authority and revelation. One could speak about the Authority of the
W.B. Stanford and J.V. Luce, The Quest for Ulysses, Phaidon Press, London, 1974, p. 189.
2 Ibid.
4 von Wright
(Revealed) Word - an idea which in its turn has its roots in an archaic view of the relation between language and reality. Words have a natural meaning. To understand this meaning is to possess the truth. Such understanding, however, is not given to common men but is mediated by interpreters who are accepted as trustworthy by those who exercize the authority. In the orbit of Christian mediaeval culture this authority got its weight partly from the fact that it was ancient, handed down since times immemorial, but partly also from the fact that, if challenged, it could mobilize in its support the worldly power of the Church.
It was this view of authority in matters of knowledge and truth that was contested by awakening science during the Renaissance. Not agreement with the Word marked opinions as true, but agreement with the contingent facts of a Nature which lay open to inspection by the inquiring mind. The challenge did not concern only the authority of the Christian tradition but also that of the Ancient writers whom the umanisti of the time were busy reviving and trying to reconcile with their inherited creed.
The conflict between the old and the new view is epitomized in the encounter - as told to us - between Galileo and the university professors in Florence who refused to look in the telescope and see the revolving moons of Jupiter, on the ground that Aristotle had shown such bodies to be impossible, "an authority whom not only the entire science of Antiquity but also the venerable Fathers of the Church acknowledge".3 This was three hundred years after Dante. The learned men who bowed to authority unwittingly ridiculed their own party in a conflict which had by then deteriorated into one between truth and naked power.
4. Even though Dante's centrifugal Ulysses can truly be said to herald a new spirit which eventually, after centuries of struggle, came to prevail in our Western World, it would be a great mistake, I think, to regard Dante himself as an early partisan of this spirit. Dante is firmly rooted in the culture of the Christian Middle Ages. His work, one feels tempted to say, is the consummation and crowning achievement of this culture. At a moment when the potentialities inherent in the seed had reached their climax and doubts and cleavage were already beginning to affect the plant, Dante's Commedia presented a vision of the supranatural realm
Quoted from Brecht, Leben des Galilei, pt. 4.
Dante between Ulysses and Faust
which Christian spirituality has tried to fathom, more loaded with symbol, more beautiful and profound than any ever attempted either before or after.
No reader of the Commedia can fail to be impressed by the violence with which Dante condemns signs of corruption and decay in the Church and his wrath at the factionism which was ravaging the political life of practically every town in Italy. This factionism had made Dante himself an exile from his beloved Florence.
But as a critic of his times Dante is aiming at restoration not at reformation. This is true not least of his political thinking. It is essentially a plea for an order in which the Pope and the Emperor reflected two aspects of the same universal body political, a Civitas Dei. Dante is yearning for an ideal which was threatened with being lost; he is not looking forward to the new world which a reborn Ulysses might yet discover.
5. With the rise of science and the secularization of society it became part and parcel of intellectual morality that the search for knowledge and truth should not be curtailed by prohibitions. It became conventional to distinguish sharply between the pursuit and possession of knowledge on the one hand and its application and use on the other. Many philosophers proclaimed knowledge an intrinsic good and something worth pursuing as an end in itself. Therefore one who pursues and finds it cannot be held responsible for the doubtful or even evil use which others might make of his findings.
This moral position can be upheld as long as one is reasonably sure that bad use of acquired knowledge does not constitute a potential threat to the very basic conditions of human well-being or even to the self-preservation of the race, and as long as one retains a faith that enlightenment will also contribute to the moral progress of humanity, make men more "humane" - as the revealing phrase goes.
This faith and assurance was for a long time characteristic of the ethos of Western civilization. It had a decisive breakthrough at the time of the French Revolution and it culminated in the century of European world-domination which ended with the 1914-1918 war. It was greatly reinforced by 19th-century evolutionistic ideas in nearly all fields of study and it nourished a widely spread optimistic belief in progress
6 von Wright
through science, technology, and the rational organization of human institutions.
This faith in the basically blissful, beneficial consequences of man's pursuit of knowledge no longer stands unchallenged, however. Doubts about it have come to loom heavily over cultural debate in this century. They found an expression, for example, in Edmund Husserl's last work, the posthumously published Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften. It was written before the apocalyptic prospects conjured up by the nuclear arms-race, genetic technology, and large-scale automation and robotization of work had become reality for us. Today, half a century later, Husserl's concerns have assumed immediate urgency. It can no longer be taken for granted that "those who lead us into new realms of scientific knowledge" are "prudent and trustworthy guides conducting us to higher levels of civilization" and not "false councellors, luring us on to atomic destruction" - to quote the words of W. B. Stanford4 one of the leading writers on the Ulyssean theme.
The question whether the unrestriced pursuit of knowledge is more for good or for evil rests ultimately on value premisses the acceptance or rejection of which is not a matter of truth or falsehood. But it also seems obvious that the optimistic belief in progress through scientific enlightenment and technological innovation has very little rational foundation and should therefore rather be abandoned altogether. Nor have we the slightest reason to place our hopes in a return to a stage when the Authority of the Word will again reign supreme in matters relating to knowledge and truth. Such retrograde moves, though abortive, have not been unknown in our century. The possibility cannot be ruled out that they will be followed by others, more subtle and therefore more successful ones than those we witnessed in Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia. A culture may thrive under the Authority of the Word as long as there is a living belief in its divine inspiration or otherwise sacred nature. Such was the case in the Middle Ages. But when the Word is seen to express only the whims and wishes of worldly power, clinging to its authority has no rational justification and is a regress into barbarism and the irrational.
What befits us to do, instead, is to take a critical attitude to our own capabilities and doings. To this end we would be well advised to
4 W.B. Stanford, The Ulysses Theme, 2nd. ed., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1963, p. 182.
Dante between Ulysses and Faust 1
reconsider the wisdom embodied in the great works of reflection on the human condition of such teachers of mankind as Homer and Dante and Goethe.
So let us cast a brief glance at what guidance they may be able to offer us.
6. The centrifugal Ulysses of Dante was condemned because he transgressed the limits set by divine authority on the freedom of human cognitive enterprise. There can be no doubt but that Faust, in Dante's opinion, would have been equally illfated, deserving to be the devil's booty, as indeed he was made to be in the first major work of literature dealing with the subject, Christopher Marlowe's drama "Doctor Faustus". Goethe's Faust is also a doubtful character and a reader may well wonder whether he deserved to be rescued and go to heaven after his anything but spotless earthly career had come to an end. At least one can reasonably doubt whether his unending striving and refusal to rest content with his achievement by themselves justified his redemption.
Be this as it may, Goethe's Faust is saved - and the same may be said of the centripetal hero of the Homeric epic. Not only Dante's ascent from Inferno through Purgatorio to Paradiso but also the narratives of the knight errants of Homer and Goethe are dramas of man's road to salvation. The Ulysses of the Odyssey came home to her who had been patiently awaiting his return all those years, never losing trust in the traveller's final return to a life of mutually shared love and happiness. Dante is kept safe on his wanderings through the abyss by the divine light of which he first saw a reflection in the love of his youth and which was eventually to take him, the restless exile from his home on earth, to eternal beatitude in heaven. And Faust in rescued from the clutches of the devil and lifted to heaven by the chorus of angels in which she whom he once loved but then deserted sings of "das Ewig- Weibliche" which lifts us above the inconstancies of fate to union with the higher.
7. It is striking that in all three cases the power which saves the wanderer from disaster is incarnate in a female figure: Penelope, Beatrice, Gretchen. We need not overemphasize, however, the femininity of this common element of the three tales. The three figures are first and foremost symbols. The same holds true of their male counterparts. Yet
8 von Wright
what they symbolize as couples, Penelope and Ulysses, Beatrice and Dante, Gretchen and Faust, can naturally be related to those qualities which are traditionally held to be symbolic of womanhood and manhood - not only in Western culture. On the one side protective care, self- effacing love, and an intuitive sense of the boundaries which one can overstep only on peril of destruction. On the other side lust for dominating power and self-centered glory, untempered enterprize and an indomitable will to transscend set boundaries. The two are the Yin and the Yang of ancient Chinese wisdom.
Of our three heroes, Faust no doubt is the one who deviated most widely from the paths set to men by convention and rule. Unlike the other two, he is not striving for a goal. His enterprize has no telos external to itself. In Faust's perpetual push forward Spenglcr saw a symbol of the spirit which has animated Western Culture. He therefore called this culture of our Abendland "Faustian". How appropriate this name is, has become fully obvious only in our century when science-based technological developments in combination with the mechanized industrial mode of production has nourished a myth of perpetual economic growth and expansionism. The managerial type of rationality of which modern natural science is in origin the outflow has acquired a domination under which other forms of human spirituality - artistic, moral, religious - are either thwarted or relegated to the underground of irrational belief and uncontrolled emotion. In no other culture, surely, has Yang come to dominate as completely over Yin as in our own in its later days.
The cultures of which the other two heroes, Homer's Ulysses and Dante of the Commedia, are representatives, viz. the culture of Ancient Greece and that of the Christian Middle Ages, struck a happier balance between the two opposing forces. Greek mythology and philosophy emphasizes throughout the necessity for man to stay with the melron befitting his capabilities and not lapse into hybris which is then corrected by nemesis, the goddess-guardian of equilibrium in the kosmos. Christian religion and philosophy is inherently ambiguous on man's freedom in relation to the created natural order of things. But it paves a road to salvation for those who curb their selfish will and put their faith in God's superior wisdom and care for their well-being.
There is no way back for us moderns either to Ancient belief in a self-preserving cosmic harmony or to Dante's dream of the restoration on a universal Christian commonwealth. We must try to attain our own
Dante between Ulysses and Faust 9
self-reflective understanding of our situation. And I have wanted to say that it belongs to this achievement that we take warning of the fate which the poet foresaw for the non-Homeric Ulysses who steered his vessel beyond the pillars of Hercules and thereby entered the road to self-annihilation.
Academy of Finland
TULLIO GREGORY
Forme di conosccnra c idcali di sapcrc nclla cullura mcdicvalc
In una forcsta vicino a Parigi, Raimondo Lullo se no stava prcsso una sorgente, triste c desolate, assorto nell'csame delle false dottrine insegnate da alcuni filosofi e affidate ai loro scritti, del tutto contraric alia teologia che e signora della filosofia... Mentre Raimondo si domandava con stupore come Dio - somma vcrita e sapienza - permetta tanti errori in questo mondo, arrivo un filosofo di nome Socrate e, salutato Raimondo che aveva in mano un libro sugli errori di alcuni filosofi, gli chiese perche era cosi triste e assorto. Raimondo, restituito il saluto, rispose che stava cercando come poter mettere d'accordo teologia e filosofia secondo la concordia che ci si aspetta fra causa e effetto. Socrate di rimando gli disse che anche lui, da molti anni, desiderava conoscerc quclla stessa concordia.1
In questo immaginario incontro di Raimondo Lullo con Socrate e nella problematicita della risposta del filosofo greco si potrebbe esser tentati di ritrovare emblematicamente riassunto tutto 1'itinerario del pcnsiero medievale, sc non si corresse il rischio di ipostati/./.are in due termini - philosophic! e theologia - un piu complesso discorso lungo il quale, secondo prospettive diverse, si e venuto organi/./ando e sistemando nel corso dci sccoli il patrimonio delPesperienza cristiana. La stessa polivalen/a di significati che dall'cta patristica alia fine del Medioevo vengono assumendo i termini philosophic! e theologia (dalla philosophic! Christi alia philosophic! Aristolelis, dalla theologia varroniana alia teologia come scienza) indica come sarebbe fuorviante pretendere di seguire la loro concordia o discordia attravcrso i secoli della cultura medievale, quasi si trattasse di categorie permanenti c intcmporali di cui fosse compito dello storico individuarc la varia manifestazione nel tempo.
Dcclara; :••> Raymundi per moduni dialogi cdita, cd. O. Keichcr, Raymundus Lullus und seine Stellung zur arabischen Philosophic (Bcitrage zur Gcschichte dcr Philosophic des Mittelalters, VII, 4-5) Miinster, 1909, p.95.
Fomie di conoscenza e ideali di sapere 1 1
Analoga ampiezza di significati assumono scientia c sapienlia (di cui philosophia e thcologia pretendono cssere esprcssioni supreme), termini usati ora per distinte forme di sapere, ora come sinonimi per indicare una gamma di esperienze vastissime, di ideali di conoscenza e di vita, con significati tutti autorizzati tanto dalla tradizione classica, quanto dal latino biblico e dalle traduzioni medievali di opere filosofiche. Anche qui sarebbe facile allineare testi che confermano la polisemia di sapienlia - dalla sapientia Dei d&WEcclesiastico alia sapienlia come universalis scientia "primorum principiorum et causarum" di Aristotele - cosi come la varicta di significati di scientia, dalla scientia carisma alia scientia quae inflat, dalla sua identificazione con la metafisica alia scienlia lemporalium reriim; ne certo pud ricondursi il concetto medievale di scienlia alia definizione degli Analitici di Aristotele se non a patto di rinserrare nel nemus aristotelicum tutto il complesso itinerario di una cultura alia ricerca di un sapere non effimero. Anche la classica distinzionc agostiniana fra sapienlia e scienlia ("Si ergo haec est sapientiae ct scientiae recta distinctio, ut ad sapientiam pertineat aeternarum rerum cognitio intellectuals, ad scientiam vero temporalium rerum cognitio rationalis") e messa in discussione dallo stesso Agostino ("Nee ista duo sic accipiamus, quasi non liceat dicere vel istam sapientiam quae in rebus humanis est vel illam scientiam quae in divinis. Loquendi enim latiore consuetudine utraque sapientia, utraque scientia dici potest") e tale oscillazione di significati variamente soggiace a tutta la tradizione medievale.2
Osservazioni non diverse potrebbero farsi su altri termini stretta- mente connessi a quelli sin qui ricordati come ratio e intellcctus, visio e Iheoria, doctrina e disciplina.
Cio non vuol dire che la storia di queste parole e dei significati che via via son venute assumendo non costituisca una trama utile al nostro discorso che dovra tuttavia puntare a individuare, se possibile, quali contenuti essi veicolino, senza presumere di avere una preliminare definizione di cos'e scienlia o sapere e senza privilegiare la teorizzazione di un metodo in rapporto al quale si credesse possibile individuare cosa e scientia e cosa non lo e: presupposto che talora soggiace alle sottili
Agostino, De Trinitate, XII, xv, 25; XIII, xix, 24, ed. W.J. Mountain - Fr. Glorie, Turnholti, 1968, pp. 379, 417; "nomen sapientiae accipitur pro scientia et e converse, ut docet Augustinus..." annotera Roberto di Kilwardby riferendosi a questi luoghi (Roberti Kilwardby De natura theologiae, ed. Fr. Stegmiiller, Monasterii, 1935, p. 45).
12 Gregory
indagini storiografiche sul grande dibattito che dividera i vari indirizzi teologici fra XIII e XIV secolo attorno alia concezione dclla teologia come scienza, ove la scientificita e stata spesso misurata sul metro della logica aristotelica.
"II cristianesimo e la dottrina del Cristo, nostro salvatore, costituita di pratica, fisica e teologia": cosi, in un testo ben noto, Evagrio Pontico all'ini/.io del suo Trattato pratico o il monaco?
Se sul finire del IV secolo 1'identificazione di cristianesimo e di filosofia era acquisita - seguendo del resto Pevoluzione del termine stesso <pi~\ocro<pLa in eta ellenistica da tempo risolta in eucre/3et,a ("nullum post nos habiturum dilectum simplicem, qui est philosophiae, quae sola est in cognoscenda divinitate frcquens obtutus et sancta religio")4 - dovra qui essere sottolineata la risoluzione nella "dottrina (So^r/ia) di Cristo" delle discipline filosofiche (secondo un tradizionale schema tripartito), intese come momenti di un itinerario spirituale: la Tipa/crc/cY) realizza quell'im- passibilita che e presupposto per i successivi momenti della ^ryctXTTtKT); la fisica (yi^xrcc, <pv(TLK.ri) o "scienza (^ywcrtc,) vera dcgli esseri" iden- tica al "regno dei cieli" e la OeoAo^CKT] - "regno di Dio" o "scienza (•yyoxTLC,) della santa Trinita", "coestesa alia sostanza delPintelletto".5
Un'esperienza cruciale della patristica greca era definitivamcnte fissata: non solo la filosofia prepara all'intelligenza della fede, ma la realizza in una tensione cscatologica ove l'6/jocwcrcc, Ge0 e il regno di Dio, contcmplazione faccia a faccia dclla verita. L'insegnamento evangelico - "haec est autem vita aeterna ut cognoscant te, solum verum Deum et quem misisti lesum Christum" (JoH., 17, 3) - e il versetto paolino (/ Cor., 13, 12) "videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate, tune autem facie ad faciem", orientano 1'itinerario della speculazione cristiana come tensione dalla fede alia visione: la filosofia - una volta identificata con la a'yaxrLC, e I'eixre/Seta, conoscenza dei misteri e pratica della vita
' Evagre le Pontique, Traite pratique ou le moine, ed., trad., comm. par A. Guillaumont et Cl. Guillaumont, Paris, 1971, t. II, p. 499.
1 Asclepius, 12, ed. A.D. Nock, trad. A.-J. Festugiere, in Corpus Htrmeticum, t. II, Paris, 1945, p. 311.
1 Evagre le Pontique, op. cit., pp. 499, 501 e cfr. p. 498 n. 1; per il particolare significato della TTPOOCTCKT) in Evagrio, cfr. 1'introd., 1. 1, pp. 48 sgg.
Forme di conoscenza e ideali di sapere 13
cristiana - assume una densita nuova poichc conscguc, in forza dclla mediazione di Cristo, quclla picnczza di conoscenza vanamente cercata dalla filosofia pagana.
In questa prospettiva •• ove il conoscere costituisce la struttura portante perche termine ultimo della vita del credente e la conoscenza della verita - la riflessione cristiana, rivendicando il titolo di vera filosofia, realizza un sapere che trova il suo fondamento nella rivelazione di Dio, nella Bibbia parola di Dio, nella storia della salvczza al cui centre sta quell'evento unico e irripetibile che e 1'incarnazione del Verbo, ratio e sapientia di Dio: la fede nel Dio che ha rivelato agli uomini i disegni della sua economia costituisce 1'orizzonte di una nuova esperienza dalla quale trae alimento un sapere che trascende, poiche storicamente piu ricco, la cultura pagana:
Qui non crediderit, non experietur; et qui expertus non fuerit, non cognosce!.
Conoscere, intelligere sara quindi leggere e decifrare i misteri e i sacramenti di cui e tessuta la Bibbia portatrice non solo di una rivelazione salvifica, ma di un sapere e di una scienza totale. Sarebbe quindi difficile escludere da una delineazione degli ideali medievali di scienza e di conoscenza quella forma di sapere propria del cristianesimo che nasce dal progressive approfondimento del testo sacro in tutta la sua rnira profunditas: quando i Padri greci riconducono tutte le arti e le discipline filosofiche all'esegesi, alia scienza della Scrittura o di Dio (delta anche teologia), essi non si limitano a trasferire in campo cristiano 1'ideale della paideia greca con il rapporto propedeutico delle arti rispetto alia filosofia ("quel che i filosofi dicono della geometria e della musica, della grammatica, della retorica e delPastronomia, essere le ausiliarie della filosofia, noi - scriveva Origene - Papplicheremo alia filosofia in rapporto al cristianesimo"), ma compiono un'operazione assai piu significativa: indicano nella Bibbia le origini delle arti e della filosofia nella loro integrita e purezza e rivendicano la priorita di una tradizione che ha trovato nei sapienti greci imitatori e seguaci. II tema e chiaramente svolto da Origene nel prologo del commento al Cantico dei Cantici: a Salomone risale I'inventio delle discipline filosofiche ("quas Graeci ethicam,
' Anselmi Epistola de incarnations Verbi, 1, ed. F.S. Schmitt, Opera Ommia, Edimburgi 1946, vol. II, p. 9.
Philocalia, 13, in Gregoire le Thaumaturge, Remerciement a Origene suivi de la lettre d'Origene a Gregoire, par H. Crouzel, Paris, 1969, p. 189.
14 Gregory
physicam, cnopticen appcllarunt, has diccrc possumus - aggiungc forse Rufino - moralem naturalcm inspectivam")8 e a ciascuna dcllc tre parti/.ioni corrisponde uno dci suoi libri ("primo ergo in Provcrbiis moralem docuit locum... Secundum vero qui naturalis appellatur, comprehendit in Ecclesiaste... Inspectivum quoque locum in hoc libello tradidit... id cst in Cantico canlicorum"; da questi libri deriva tutta la sapienza greca: "haec ergo ut mihi videtur, sapientes quique Graecorum sumpta a Salomone... sed haec Salomon ante omnes invenit et docuit per sapientiam quam accepit a Deo").9 Secondo un'analoga prospettiva, che riconduceva le discipline filosofiche alia Bibbia come al loro fonte, Origene indicava altrcsi nei tre patriarch! Abramo, Isacco e Giacobbe i maestri rispettivamente della filosofia morale, naturale e inspectiva. I parallelism! e le genealogie poste da Origene avranno larga fortuna nel Medioevo e con essi il tema, variamente articolato, della risolu/.ione delle discipline filosofiche nella divina philosophia; le sette colonne su cui la Sapien/a ha costruito la propria dimora ("sapientia acdificavit sibi domum excidit columnas septem", Prov., 9, 1) saranno presto identificate con le sette arti liberal! e i libri della Bibbia assegnati alle varie parti della filosofia:
Inveniuntur omnes illae tres nhilosophiae Graecorum etiam in divina Scriptura. Et omnis etiam philosophia et omnes modi locutionum ante fuerunt in Scriptura divina, quam apud sophist as saeculares, quia si quid habuerunt, de Dei dono habuerunt, ipso largiente.
Tutto questo trovava conferma significativa nelle mitologiche genealogie tese a dimostrare la dipenden/a storica della cultura greca dai patriarch! e dai profeti ebrei, ora indicando in Abramo colui che avrebbe insegnato la scien/a agli Egi/i dai quali 1'apprese Mose, ora invece attravcrso I'identifica/ione di Mose con Museo, capostipite della filosofia
1 Origcnis Commentariunt in Cant. Canticonim, Prologus, cd. W.A. Bachrcns, Ix;ip/.ig, 1925, p. 75; in luogo di cnopticen, G. Dahan ("Origene et Jean Cassicn dans un Liber de philosophia Salomonis", Archives d'histoire doctrinate et litterairc du Moyen Age, LI I (1985), p. 137, n. 11) propone di leggcre epopticen come attestato da alcuni manoscritti. Dello stcsso Dahan, cfr. "L'nc introduction a la philosophic au XIIC siccle. Ix; Tractatus quidam dc philosophia et partihus eius", Archives d'hist. doctr. et lilt, du M. A., XLIX (1982), pp. 155-193 (e la hibl. ivi indicata per i problcmi inercnti le varie classifica/ioni delle scien/.c filosofiche).
9 Origene, op. cit., p. 75-76; cfr. Ambrosius, F^cpositio Evangelii secundum Lucam, prol., 2,I\L. 15, 1608B-1609A.
1 Origene, op. cit., pp. 78-79.
Christiani Druthmari Ex. in Matthaeum Evangelistam, 2, P.L. 106, 1284-85.
Fonne di conoscenza e ideali di sapere 15
grcca, o facendo di Platonc un disccpolo dei profcti cbrci;12 temi non estranei alia cultura ellenistica - "cos'e Platone se non un Mose che parla grcco", aveva scritto Numcnio - e che rientrano in quclla disputa sull'originc orientale della filosofia grcca alia qualc gia Taziano aveva attinto per difendere la supremazia della "filosofia barbara"; altri invece, in una piu ampia visione dell'economia della salvez/a, cercheranno, come Giustino e Clemente Alessandrino, nella comune ispirazione del logo pedagogo la giustificazione delle affinita tra la filosofia dei greci e dei cristiani.
Sarebbe qui di scarsa utilita soppesare quanto della cultura antica perduri e sia utilizzato nell'ambito della riflessione cristiana, quasi che il valore di questa possa dipendere dalla maggiore o minore misura di quella utilizzazione; cio che interessa sottolineare e il definirsi di un ideale di conoscenza e di sapere che proprio per il suo essere totalizzante include ogni arte e disciplina, sostituendosi agli ideali culturali del mondo precristiano. La forma piu alta di questa nuova conoscenza, 1'orizzonte piu vasto di questo nuovo sapere e offerto dall'esegesi, via di accesso alia scientia divina trasmessa dalla Bibbia:
Scriptura sacra spiritualis ac divina scientia plena est; eademque scientia ex qua ipsa Scriptura condi coepit, augeri semper ac multiplicari non desmit.
II metodo per decifrare i misteri riposti in questa spiritualis scientia e costituito dalla dottrina dei sensi della Scrittura, sviluppo sistematico della tensione dalla lettera allo spirito secondo le suggestion! di Origene, ovunque present! nel Medioevo. Precisa 1'insistenza sull'ordo, le leges, le rationes e le consequentiae che debbono essere osservate nella lettura del testo sacro: a questo sapere si coordinano tutte le discipline poiche "nulla
12
Su tutto il tema, cfr. il classico H. de Lubac, Exegese inedic\>ale. Lcs quatre sens
de I'Ecriture, I, 1, Paris, 1959, in partic. pp. 74-94.
Numcnius, Fragments, par Ed. des Places, Paris, 1973, fr. 8, p. 51.
Si ricordino i due temi esegetici classici, la donna schiava catturata in guerra che deve avere unghie e capelli tagliati prima di esser presa per moglie (Dent., 21, 10 sgg.), e le ricchezze rubate agli Egizi dagli Ebrei al momento della fuga (Esodo, 3, 22 e 12, 35), per giustificare 1'utilizzazione della cultura pagana e il suo ruolo ancillare rispetto aU'esegesi e alia teologia: cfr. II. de Lubac, Exegese nicdie\>ale, cit., pp. 290 sgg. e J. de Ghellinck, Le mouvement thcologique du Xlf siecle, Bruxelles-Paris, 1948", pp. 94-95.
15 Rabano Mauro, In Ex., Ill, 10, P.L. 108, USA.
16 Gregory
enim sacra scriptura cst que regulis liberalium careat disciplinarum".16 Tanto piu feconda di frutti sara la lettura del testo, quanto piu ricca la scienza delPinterprete: in quella summa esemplare della cultura del secolo XII che e il Didascalicon, Ugo di San Vittore, come necessaria premessa alia lettura della Bibbia, rende paradigmatica la sua personale esperienza:
Ego affirmare audco nihil me unquam quod ad eruditionem pertineret contempsisse, sed multa saepe didicisse, quae aliis loco, aut deliramento similia viderentur... Omnia disce, videbis postea nihil esse superfluum. Coartata scientia iucunda non est.
Anche all'esegesi quindi si applica la classificazione delle discipline filosofiche che in essa rientrano tutte di pieno diritto. E' Eucherio che afferma, alle soglie del Medioevo, una dottrina maturata gia nella patristica greca e latina in una pagina giustamente famosa:
Sapientia autem mundi huius philosqphiam suam in trcs partes divisit: physicam, ethicam, logicam, id est naturalem, moralcm, rationalem. .. Quam tripartitam doctrinae disputationem non adeo abhorret ilia nostrorum in disputatione distinctio, qua docti quique hanc coelestem Scripturarum philosophiam secundum historiam, secundum tropologiam, secundum anagogen disserendam putarunt.
Non diversamente Giovanni Eriugena, nelPomelia sul prologo giovanneo, indichera il preciso parallclismo fra scrittura e mundiis intelligibilis, fra discipline filosofiche e sensi della Scrittura, veri strumenti ermeneutici della "theoria" che dalla vallis historiae sale al vertex mantis theologiae:
Divina siquidem scriptura mundus quidam est intelligibilis, suis quattuor partibus, veluti quattuor dementis, constitutus. Cuius terra est veluti in medio imoque, instar centri, historia; circa quam, aquarum similitudine, abyssys circumfunditur moralis intelligentiae, quae a Graecis H8IKH solet appellari. Circa quas, historiam dico et ethicam, veluti duas praefati mundi inferiores partes, aer ille naturalis scientiae circumvolvitur: quam, naturalem dico scientiam, Gracci vocant <J>TCIKHN. Extra autem omnia et ultra, aethercus ille igneusque ardor cmpyrii cacli, hoc est, superae contemplationis
1 Giovanni Eriugena, Expositiones in ierarchiam coelestem, cd. J. Barbel, Turnholt, 1975, p. 16: "Ut enim multe aque ex diversis fontibus in unius fluminis alueum confluunt atque dccurrunt, ita naturales et liberates discipline in unam eandemque interne contemplationis significationem adunantur, qua summus fons totius sapientie, qui est Christus, undique per diversas theologie speculationes insinuatur... Nulla enim sacra scriptura est que regulis liberalium careat disciplinarum".
17 Ugo di S. Vittore, Didascalicon, VI, 3, P.L. 176, 799-801.
18 ' Eucherius, Formularum spiritalis intelligentiae ... liber units, P.L. 50, 728; cfr.
Cassiani Conlatio xiv, 8, ed. E. Pichery, vol. II, Paris, 1958, pp. 189-192.
Forme di conoscenza e ideali di sapere 17
divinae naturae, quam gracci theologiani nominant, circumglobatur; ultra quam nullus cgrcditur intellcctus.
Le testimonianze potrebbcro moltiplicarsi; qucl chc interessa e il dcfmirsi sin dall'eta patristica, c il permanerc in tutto il Mediocvo, di una "vera scripturarum scientia"20 chc si realizza ncll'csegesi "rcrum ct verborum scientia",21 di cui le arti sono "subsellia et quasi substructura".22 Qucsta forma di conoscenza e di sapere si definira di volta in volta come scienza della Scrittura, intelligentia, intellectus, theoria o theologia (secondo la matrice patristica del termine greco), seguira i procedimenti della piu esuberante conoscenza simbolica, applichera i piu sottili strumenti delle scienze del discorso e della dialettica - secondo 1'insegnamento di Agostino e 1'esempio degli Opuscula sacra di Boezio - o piu raramente, come nell'Eriugena, utilizzera le tecniche neoplatoniche della 6cacpeTLK77 e dell'ai>aAirr<,KT7 nelPesercizio della vera ratio, lascera spazio alle piu saporose medita- zioni spirituali (sapida sapientia) e al volatiis allegoriae, ma si porra sempre come una forma di conoscenza a fide incoans ad speciem tendens: "inter fidem et speciem intellectum quern in hac vita capimus esse medium intelligo".23
Non e il luogo per accennare qui Pitinerario e Pevoluzione dcll'intelligere da Agostino a Anselmo: e nota Pimportanza che nella storia del metodo teologico assume il precetto boeziano "in divinis intellectualiter versari" e piu ancora Particolazione dialettica dell'intelligere anselmiano che sottende una trattatistica non direttamente legata al testo biblico, con il parallelo passaggio da un intellectus come contemplazione dei misteri e dei sacramenti della Scrittura a un piu decisive impegno per enucleare la rationes necessariae di un patrimonio dogmatico ormai costituito. L'opera di Anselmo - come e stato piu volte sottolineato - pur restando fortemente legata all'esperienza e alia religiosita monastica, segna Pinizio di una costruzione sistematica e non
19
Giovanni Eriugena, Homelie sur le Prologue de Jean, ed. Ed. Jeauneau, Paris, 1969,
pp. 270-272.
Cassiani Conlatio xiv, 10, cit., p. 195; cfr. Alcuini Compendium in Canticum Canticorum, 8, vers. 9, P.L. 100, 663.
21 Walafridus Strabus, Liber ecclesiasticus, 34, P.L. 113, 1217.
99
Petrus Cantor, De tropis loquendi, cit. in Ed. Dumoutct, "La theologie de 1'eucharistie a la fin du XIIe siecle", Archives d'hist. doctr. et litt. du M. A., XIV (1943-1945), p. 182. 93
Anselmi CurDeus homo, Commendatio opcris, ed. Schmitt, vol. II, p. 40.
18 Gregory
esegetica dclla riflessione tcologica, intesa come approfondimento delle strutture razionali e nccessarie dell'oggetto di fede (ratio fidei), della sua interna coerenza; cosi come gia il De sacra coena di Berengario - pur nel suo continue riferimento alle autorita di Agostino e di Ambrogio - annunciava un progressive distacco dalla tradizione patristica e agostiniana con la perdita di tutte le "inclusion! simboliche"24 del mistero eucaristico in forza di decisive distinzioni dialettichc. Tuttavia non solo 1'uso della ratio e sempre ancorato alia rivelazione, ma la capacita stessa di indagare la ratio fidei ("nostrae fidei rationem inquirere") trova il suo fondamento in quella ratio summae naturae che sola rende Puomo capace di verita: "lux ilia, de qua micat omne verum, quod rationali menti lucet". E' la luce del Verbo - il maestro intcriore secondo rinsegnamento di Agostino - che si manifesta nella rivelazione e apre aWintelligere spazi infiniti. Intclligo te illuminante: non deve sfuggire il valore essenziale, in tutta la tradizione agostiniana, della dottrina deH'illuminazione che non e una metafora, ma indica lo statuto proprio della mente umana, la sua condizione e natura che la rende idonea a intelligere la necessitas delle verita di fede. Ratio veritatis nos docuit scriveva Ansclmo sottolineando il fondamento ontologico della ragione nella quale si deve riconoscere - ricordava Berengario - I'imago Dei ogni giorno riscoperta nell'uso della dialettica; e Abelardo, riproponcndo un tema che fu gia di Clemente Alessandrino, potra dire che il Verbo, Ao^oc, e Patris summa sophia, ci ha resi a un tempo cristiani, filosofi e logici.25 II primato della ratio e anzitutto il primato del Verbo; Punita del sapere, il coordinarsi di tutte le discipline alia lettura della sacra pagina e all'intellectus fidei, ha il suo principio in quell'unica ratio fonte di verita in cui tutte le cose sono state create, che illumina la mente umana e si e manifestata nell'economia della salvezza; non a caso nella tradizione patristica e altomedievale ritorna costante 1'esaltazione della ratio che soggiace ai mysteria e ai sacramenta della storia sacra e ne guida la piu profonda intelligentia: ratio sacramentomm, mystcrionim ratio, ratio facti, ratio allegoriae, ratio
24 H. dc Lubac, Corpus mysticum. L'cucharistie et I'eglise au Moyen Age, Paris, 1949-, p. 254.
25 Anselmi Cur Deus homo, I, 3; II, 19, ed. F.S. Schmitt, vol. II, pp. 50, 130; Proslogion, 14, 4, ed. Schmitt, vol. I, pp. 112, 104; Monologion, 9, ed. Schmitt, vol. I, p. 24. Berengario, De sacra coena adversus Lanfrancum, 23, ed. W.H. Beekenkamp, Ilagae Comitis, 1941, p. 47; P. Abaelardi Ep. XIII, P.L. 178, 355.
Forme di conoscenza e ideali di sapere 19
mystica, historia propriam habet rationem, interioris inlelligentiae ratio, cuncta divinae rationis sunt plena ,26
* * *
Un mutamento radicalc si avra quando un diverse concetto di ratio si verra proponendo all'Occidente latino attraverso la conoscenza di esperienze e forme di sapere estranee alia tradizione patristica e altomedievale, con una concezione del mondo e dell'uomo, con una fisica e una metafisica ignote all'esile pedagogia delle sette arti liberali. E' la scoperta di una cultura profana, 1'irruzione di autori pagani intonsi et illoti21 nel nuovo ambiente scolastico cittadino lungo il secolo XII a segnare una svolta profonda, a marcare una periodizzazione precisa, come rilevarono subito le prime storie della cultura medievale scritte in eta umanistica: in concreto sono le traduzioni di testi filosofici e scientifici greci e arabi che fanno scoprire una nuova idea di natura e con essa una nuova concezione di ragione e di scienza non piu rette dalle leggi, da\\'ordo e dalla ratio dell'esegesi. Se gia i progress! della dialettica awiavano a una perdita del valore simbolico dei mysteria e dei sacramenta di cui e tessuta la parola di Dio e la vita cristiana, ancor piu nettamente il nuovo sapere filosofico e scientifico, trasmesso dai testi via via tradotti, metteva in crisi le strutture profonde del simbolismo medievale che aveva trovato il suo piu ampio spazio non solo nei commenti biblici ma nei trattati de natura remm, trasformando il liber creaturae in sistema di simboli, oggetto di una lettura non diversa da quella praticata nell'esegesi del testo sacro.
Componente essenziale della mentalita medievale, modello di conoscenza e di sapere destinato a perdurare nei secoli successivi come
' Hilarii Tractatus mysteriorum, I, 31, ed. J.-P. Brisson, Paris 1947, p. 126; Ambrosii De Mysteriis, I, 2, P.L. 16, 406; Ambrosii Enarrationes in XII Psalmos Da\>idicos, In Ps. I, 41, P.L. 14, 987; Lanfranci De corpore et sanguine Domini, 15, P.L. 150, 425; Gaudentii Tractatus, VIII, 6 (51), ed. A. Glueck, Vindobonae-Lipsiae. 1936, p. 62; Cassiani Conlatio xiv, 8, cit. p. 191; Origenis In Leviticum, horn. IX, 9, P.G. 12, 521; Ruperti In Exodum comm. I, 28, P.L. 167, 596; ex Origene Selecta in Ezechielem, 28, P.G. 13, 821-22; In Genesim, horn. II, 2, P.G. 12, 167-68; Hilarii In Evangelium Matthad commentarius, 14, 3, P.L. 9, 997; Ruperti In Exodum comm., II, 5, P.L. 167, 612.
L'espressione - che si riferisce all'episodio biblico di cui a n. 14 - ricorre nel significativo contesto della Disputatio catholicorum patrum contra dogmata Petri Abailardi di Thomas Moreniensis (ed. N.M. Ha'ring, Studi medievali, XXII (1981), p. 368): "philosophies Platonem, Virgilium, Macrobium, intonsos et illotos, ad convivium supcrni regis introduxit".
20 Gregory
patrimonio vitale dell'esperienza cristiana, la concezione e 1'inter- pretazione simbolica della natura rispondevano a una dottrina precisa: 1'essere il mondo create un libro scriptus digito Dei, calamo Dei inscriptus^ attraverso il quale Dio si rivela e indica la via per risalire a lui: il liber creaturae sarebbe stato sufficiente all'uomo se il peccato non avesse reso necessaria la Scrittura anche per Pintelligenza della natura creata.29 Sulla priorita della natura rispetto alia Scrittura giovera insistere per meglio comprendcre che in questo contesto parlare della natura come libro scritto da Dio non e usare una metafora, ma designare cio che la natura veramente e, il suo esser segno e tipo di un ordine intelligibile. Conoscere le nature e le proprieta delle cose comporta quindi decifrarne il messaggio secondo quello stesso dinamismo che, ncll'esegesi biblica, va dalla lettcra allo spirito, poiche anche il discorso de natura renim e 1'esegesi di un testo sacro. Strumenti della rivelazione divina ("Duplicitcr ergo lux aeterna seipsam mundo declarat, per scripturam videlicet et creaturam"),30 natura e Scrittura si richiamano e si corrispondono in una puntuale concordia ("natura interrogata, vcl Scriptura consulta, unum eumdemque sensum pari loquuntur concordia"),31 e come nella Scrittura res ipsae sunt figiirac?2 cosi nella natura "singulae creaturae quasi figurae quaedam sunt non humano placito inventae, sed divino arbitrio institutae ad manifestandam invisibilium Dei sapientiam".33
28 Ugo di San Vittorc, De tribus dicbus, 4, P.L. 176, 814; Alexandri Ncckam DC naturis rerum, II, prol., ed. T. Wright, London, 1863, p. 125.
Cfr. II. de Lubac, Exegese medie\'ale, I, 1, pp. 121-125; cfr. il bcl tcsto di Bonaventura, Coll. in Hex., XIII, 12, Opera, V, p. 390A: "Certum cst, quod homo stans habcbat cognitioncm rerum crcatarum et per illarum repraesentationem ferebatur in Deum... Cadente autem nomine, cum amisisset cognitionem, non erat qui reducerct eas in Deum. Unde iste liber, scilicet mundus, quasi emortuus et deletus erat; necessarius autem fuit alius liber, per qucm iste illuminaretur, ut accipcret metaphoras rerum. Hie autem liber est Scripturae, qui ponit similitudines, proprietates et metaphoras rerum in libro mundi scriptarum. Liber ergo Scripturae rcparativus est..." (ed. F. Delorme, Firenze-Quaracchi, 1934, p. 150).
Giovanni Eriugena, Homclie sur le Prologue de Jean, cit. p. 254. Riccardo di S. Vittore, Benjamin major, V, 7, P.L. 196, 176.
' Cosi in una "quaestio" de theologia ed. G.H. Tavard, "St. Bonaventure's Disputed Questions 'De theologia'", Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale, XVII (1950), p. 230 (si tratta di un'anonima compilazione: cfr. II. Fr. Dondaine, nelle stesse Recherches Th. A. M., XIX (1952), pp. 244-270).
33 Ugo di San Vittore, De tribus diebus, P.L. 176, 814; cfr. Comm. in Nahum Prophetam, 34, di scuola vittorina, P.L. 96, 723B.
Forme di conoscenza e ideali di sapere 21
Di qui il nesso, non estrinseco parallclismo, natura-Scrittura (Scriptura explicat quae creatura probai)^ quindi 1'identita di strumcnti esegetici che permettono di cogliere, anche nella creatura, inscgnamcnti religiosi e morali, realta rivclate da Dio, prcfigurazioni di eventi cruciali dclla storia sacra.
Non sarebbe difficile seguire il vario articolarsi della lettura simbolica nell'esegesi e nei trattati de natura rerum come nella vita sacramentale e liturgica, il suo esplodere nelle arti figurative, ma piu interessa sottolineare che la lettura simbolica non e uno sprofondare nel mondo del fantastico e deH'immaginario, ne un semplice processo di interpretazione allegorica come quello applicato alle favole antiche: essa rappresenta invece una forma di conoscenza, un modo per afferrare la ratio che soggiace ai misteri e ai sacramenti di cui 6 tessuta la parola di Dio, una tecnica dimostrativa coerente alia struttura stessa della realta e al rapporto ontologico fra simbolo e significato, una via anagogica per la piu alta theoria.
"Symbolum, collatio videlicet, id est coaptatio visibilium formarum ad demostrationem rei invisibilis propositarum":35 cosi Ugo di S. Vittore nel suo commento allo Pseudo Dionigi il cui pensiero - congiuntamente agli sviluppi eriugeniani - orienta nel senso piu forte il simbolismo medievale dando a esso un fondamento metafisico con la dottrina della discesa e del ritorno, della manifestazione teofanica e della reductio analitica. Simbolo e 1'intero mondo delle teofanie intelligibili e sensibili che il processo anagogico dissolve per risalire alPunita ineffabile; punto d'incontro e di snodo del metodo dell'affermazione e della negazione, il simbolo costituisce, nella tradizione dionisiana, la struttura portante di tutto il discorso teologico, di Dio e su Dio: "simplicitatem divinam ex symbolorum varietate irrationabiliter cognosci".36
Sullo sfondo di questa concezione della realta come complesso di simboli, con i corrispondenti processi "dimostrativi" secondo analogia e tipologia, simiglianza e dissimiglianza, meglio si comprende il mutamento profondo in tutto 1'orizzonte del sapere per 1'irruzione nella cultura
•34
Miscellanea in appendice alle operc di Ugo di San Vittore, P.L. Ill, 505A.
Ugo di San Vittore, Expos, in Hier. cael, III, P.L. 175, 960; cfr. Gamier de Rochefort, Sermo, 23, P.L. 205, 730: "symbolice colligit et coaptat formas visibiles ad invisibilium demonstrationem".
Wilhelmus Lucensis, Comentum in teriiam ierarchiam Dionisii que est De divinis nominibus, ed. F. Gastaldelli, Firenze, 1983, p. 54.
22 Gregory
occidentalc dclla scienza grcca c araba chc - imponendo una divarica/ionc fra Scrittura e natura colloca 1'uomo in un univcrso non piu sacramentum salutaris allcgoriae oggetto di conosccnza simbolica, ma nesso di cause (causanim series, nexiis, ordo, machina} ove trova spazio una ratio naturalis lontana dall'intellectus agostiniano.
Si delinea un nuovo ideale di sapere per 1'uomo che voglia essere degno del mondo in cui vive:
Dicis enim ut in domo habitans quilibet, si materiam eius el compositionem quantitatem et qualitatem sive discriptioncm ignoret, tali nospicio dignus non est, ita si qui in aula mundi natus atque educatus est tarn mirande pulcritudims rationcm scire negh'gat, post discretionis annos indignus atque si fieri posset eicicndus est.
Cosi Adelardo di Bath, uno dei promotori della nuova scienza del XII secolo, traduttore di testi arabi e autore di due scritti De eodem et diverso e Naturales quaestiones che rispecchiano il nuovo clima culturale e 1'ansia per acquisire i nuovi tcsori di scienza che affiuivano dall'Italia meridionale e dalla Spagna:
Quod enim gallica studia nesciunt, transalpina reserabunt; quod apud latinos non addisces, Graecia facunda docebit.
Precisa la delineazione dei nuovi compiti della ratio e del sapere secondo 1'insegnamento di Platone "in physicis causarum effectibus ethicisque etiam consultibus Platoni te penitus conscntire") e degli Arabi ("Arabicorum studiorum sensa") in significativa convergenza con altri maestri contemporanei.38 La lettura del Timeo con il commcnto di Calcidio e del commento di Macrobio al Somnium Scipionis - testi present! nelle biblioteche altomedievali ma restati sempre ai margini •• si viene a coniugare con i testi scientifici cha affiuivano attravcrso le nuove traduzioni, soprattutto di medicina, fisica, astronomia e alchimia, aprendo nuovi orizzonti e indicando il valore di una conoscenza della natura fondata sulla ratio e non sulVaiictorilas:
De animalibus difficilis est mea tecum dissertio. Ego enim aliud a magistris arabicis ratione duce didici, tu vero aliud auctoritatis
•^ Dalla prcfazione di un trattato sull'astrolabio di Adelardo di Bath, in Ch.H. Haskins, Studies in the history of mediae\-al science, New York, 1960, p. 29.
38 Adelardo di Bath, De eodem et diverso, ed. H. Willner (Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittclalters, IV, 1), Miinstcr 1903, p. 32; Quaestiones naturales, 24, prol., ed. M. Muller (Beitrage zur Gesch. der Phil, und Theol. des Mittelalters, XXXI, 2) Miinster 1934, pp. 31, 20.
Fortne di conoscenza e ideali di sapere 23
pictura captus capistrum sequeris Si quid amplius a me audirc desideras, rationem refer et recipe.
Questa ratio - impegnata a cogliere la dinamica delle vires naturae
- invade anche il campo dell'esegesi e impone un'intcrpretazione della genesi secundum physicam che riconduce tutto Vomatus al gioco degli elementi, all'azione del fuoco ("ignis est quasi artifex et efficiens causa") e dei cieli (gli "dei figli di dei" del Timeo), secondo un ordo naturalis in cui rientra anche la formazione dei corpi della prima coppia umana; respinto il valore storico della lettera, la creazionc di Adamo e di Eva
- che una veneranda tradizione esegetica aveva caricato di significali tipologici - rientra nel complesso ordinato delle cause naturali:
Istis sic creatis ex aqua effectu superiorum - scrive Guglielmo di Conches - ubi tenuior fuit aqua, ex calore et creatione praedictorum desicata, apparuerunt in terra quasi quaedam maculae, in quibus habitant homines et alia quaedam animalia... Ex quadam vero parte, in qua elementa aequaliter convenerunt, humanum corpus factum est et hoc est quod divina pagina dicit deum fecisse hominem ex limo terrae. ... ex vicino limo terrae corpus mulieris esse creatum verisimile est, et ideo nee penitus idem quod homo nee penitus diversa ab homine nee ita temperata ut homo, quia calidissima frigidior est frigidissimo viro, et hoc est quod divina pagina dicit, deum fecisse mulierem ex latere Adae. Non enim ad litteram credendum est deum excostasse primum hominem.
L'interpretazione del racconto genesiaco in termini fisici, secondo una ratio che intende spiegare come Dio operi per naturam, non risponde solo alle leggi della cosmologia timaica, ma presuppone un canone ermeneutico precise:
Auctores veritatis philpsophiam rerum tacuerunt, non quia contra fidem, sed quia ad aedificationem fidei de qua laborant, non multum pertinebat.
E' nota la reazione degli ambienti monastici per bocca di Guglielmo di Saint-Thierry:
Homo physicus et philosophus, physice de Deo philosophatur... Deinde creationem primi hominis pnilosophice, seu magis physice describens, primo dicit corpus eius non a Deo factum, sed a natura, et animam ei datam a Deo, postmodum vero ipsum corpus factum a
39
Adelardo di Bath, Quaestiones naturales, 6, ed. cit., pp. 11-12.
40
Guglielmo di Conches, Philosophia, I, 42-43, ed. G. Maurach, Pretoria, 1980, p. 38
(P.L. 172, 55-56); Teodorico di Chartres, De sex dierutn operibus, 1, 14, 17. ed. N.M. Ha'ring, Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and his School, Toronto, 1971, pp. 555, 561, 562.
Guglielmo di Conches, In Boethium, ed. P. Courcelle, "Etude critique sur les Commentaires de la Consolation de Boece (IXe-XVe siecles", Archives d'hist. doctr. et I'M. du M. A., XII (1939), p. 85.
24 Gregory
spiritibus, quos daemones appellat, et a stellis... In creatione vcro mulieris palam omnibus Icgentibus est, quam stulte, quam superbe irridct historiam divinae auctoritatis; scilicet excostasse Deum primum hominem, ad faciendam de costa eius mulierem. Et physico mud sensu interpretans, nimis arroganter veritati historiae suum pracfert inventum.
AlVinventum physico sensu del maestro di Conches che annulla la lettera ("non enim ad litteram credendum est"), Guglielmo di Saint-Thierry oppone la veritas historiae densa di un magnum sacramentum come insegnava San Paolo (Eph., 5, 30-32): la creazione di Eva de costa Ade e infatti forma futuri, la prefigurazione profetica dell'unione di Cristo e della Chiesa. "Hoc si crederet non irrideret".42
La divaricazione tra 1'auctoritas della tradizione ecclesiastica e la verita rappresentata dal nuovo sapere fisico si configura subito come insanabile opposizione:
Sunt enim - si legge in un anonimo trattatellp sul compute del 1175 - quidam novitatis yenatores et antiquitatis improbi calumpniatores qui etiam in doctrina Christiana locum ab auctoritate tamquam inartificiosum superciliose repudiant et de suo confidentes ingenio aliter quam tota ecclesia soli sentire volunt ut soli scire videantur. Sed, quod deterius est, vidi equidem doluique videre scripto quoque commendatum quedam aliter se habere sccundum ecclesiam, aliter secundum veritatem. 3
Se la contrapposizione di due verita puo considerarsi un'estra- polazione polemica, che sara poi quella di Stefano Tempier, registra pur sempre un'esperienza precisa: la rottura di un ideale di sapere unitario e finalizzato alia lettura della Bibbia per il dischiudersi di nuovi campi d'indagine e di conoscenza, di forme di sapere che rivendicano una propria autonomia e priorita anche rispetto alia tradizione: "Quoniam nondum inscitia pallemus, ad rationem redeamus", scrive Adelardo troncando il discorso del suo interlocutore che intendeva riferire direttamente a Dio ogni fenomeno naturale ("universorum effcctus ad Deum magis referendus est").44 II tema torna con insistenza e riconduce all'opposizione fra una natura intesa come diretta espressione della volonta divina e una natura come ordo e nexus causarum:
quqniam ipsi nesciunt vires naturae, ut ignorantiae suae omnes socios habeant, nolunt aliquem eas inquirere, sed ut rusticos nos credere nee rationem quaerere, ut iam impleatur illud profeticum, "Erit sacerdos sicut populus"... Nos autem dicimus in omnibus
42 Guglielmo di Saint-Thierry, De erroribus Guillelmi de Concliis, P.L. 180, 339-340. 1 Ch.H. Haskins, Studies, cit., p. 87.
Adelardo di Bath, Quaestiones naturales, 4, p. 8.
Fornie di conoscenza e ideali di sapcre 25
rationcm csse quaerendam, si potest inveniri... Sed isti... malunt nescire quam ao alio quacrcrc, el si inquirentcm aliqucm sciant, ilium esse hacrcticum clamant plus de suo capucio pracsumcntes quam sapicntiac suae confidentcs.
L'allusionc polcmica alia tradizionale cultura monastica non potcva essere piu chiara cd 6 subito sottolincata da Guglielmo di Saint-Thierry: "In viros religiosos invehitur". II tema torna costante:
Sensisti vero et tu nonnullos hiis in temporibus cause quam ignorant iudices audacissimos, qui ne minus scientes videantur, quecunque nesciunt inutilia predicant aut profana. luxta quod Arabes dicunt: Nullus maior artis inimicus quam qui eius expers est... Horum siquidem error sive coloratus honesto malicioso quoque predictorum testimonio fretus, apud imperitos quorum maxima est multitudo in bonarum neglectum arcium efficacissime peroravit, ut iam numerorum quidem mensurarumque scientia omnino superflua et inutilis, astrorum verum studium ydolatria estimetur... Super nubes eorum conversatio, atque in ipso summe sinu sapientie sese requiescere gloriantur. Mundanam desipiunt sapientiam, eique vacantium deliramenta subsannant.
Cosi nella prefazione di una versione siciliana dell'Almagesto; e Hugo Sanctallensis, presentando una compilazione fisico-astrologica di origine araba, insiste nella polemica:
Nam humani generis error, ut qui inscientie crapula sui oblitus edormit stulticie nubibus soporata iudicip philosopnantium sectam estimans laciyienti verborum petulantia, sicut huius temporis sapere negligit, sapientes et honestos inconstantie ascribit, ventatis concives imperitos diiudicat, verecundos atque patientes stolidos reputat.
A questi spregiatori della "setta dei filosofanti" Ugo contrappone la scienza orientale - degli Arabi, degli Indi, degli Egizi - che egli intende far conoscere per soddisfare Vinsatiata philosophandi aviditas "ut saltern, dum ipsius philosophic vernulas arroganti supercilio negligunt, scientie tamen quantulamcumque portionem vix tandem adeptam minime depravari contingat sed potius ab eius amicis et secretariis venerari".47
Mundana sapientia: cosi ama definirsi il nuovo sapere che viene costituendosi lungo il secolo XII trovando il suo metodo nell'ordinata ricerca di cause ("propius intuere - ammonisce Adelardo - circumstantias adde, causas propone, et effectum non mirabere")48 e il suo fondamento
45 Guglielmo di Conches, Philosophic! , 44-45, p. 39 (RL. 172, 56).
46 Ch.H. Haskins, Studies, cit., pp. 192-193.
47 Ch.H. Haskins, Studies, cit., p. 75.
Adelardo di Bath, Quaestiones naturalcs, 64, p. 59.
26 Gregory
nell'universale causalita dci cicli cui Dio stesso ha affidato di compicrc Vopus naturae:
Apud universes philosophic professores ratum arbitror et constans - scrive Hugo Sanctallensis quicquid in hoc mundo conditum subsistendi vice jprtitum cst haud dissimile exemplar in superior! circulo possidere.
L'astrologia afferma cosi il suo primato come fondamento di tutte le scienze della natura:
Unde tam Ypocrati ct Galeno quam ceteris fere omnibus philosophis compertum astrologiam plane physice ducatuin obtinere, ut qui astrologiam damnet, phisicam necessario destruit.
E' un testo di Albumasar, assiduamente ripetuto: 1'astronomia- astrologia si pone ormai come il principio e il vertice di tutto il sapere filosofico:
Et sic sciverunt sapicntes - si leggeva in un opuscolo di Alkindi tradotto nel XII secolo - quod homo non est imbutus in philosophia nisi scit earn usquequo dinumerare possit cum sciencia impressiones supcriores.
Proprio perche, come ribadisce Alkindi nel DC radiis, "stellarum dispositio mundum elementorum disponit" e nulla esiste "quod in celo suo modo non sit figuratum", Pastrologia si pone come la scienza piu alta, rispondente sancto sapientie desiderio; essa e scienza dell'universalc c del particolare che procede sillogismo et probacione, capace di conoscere il corso della storia (causa turn per causam} penetrando il tessuto della celeste armonia:
Si enim alicui datum esset totam condicionem celestis armoniae comprehendere, mundum elementorum cum omnibus suis contentis in quocumque loco et quocumquc temporc plenc cognosceret tanquam causatum per causam. ... Unde qui totam condicionem celestis armonie notam haberet tam preterita quam presentia quam futura cognosceret. Vice quoque versa unius individui huius mundi cpndicio, plene cognita, tanquam per speculum celestis armonie condicionem totam presentaret, cum omnis res huius mundi sit exemplum universalis armonie.
49 Ch.H. Haskins, Studies, cit., p. 78.
Albumasar, Introductorium in astronomiatn, I, 4, Vcnetiis 1506, b Ir.
Liber Alkindi dc nnuacione tcmpomm, cit., in R. Lcmay, Abu Ma'shar and latin Aristotclianism in the Melfth centuiy, Beirut 1962, p. 47 n. 2.
' Alkindi, De radiis, ed. M.-T. d'Alverny-F.Hudry, Archives d'hist. doctr. et. lilt, du M. A., XLI (1974), pp. 218, 217, 223; cfr. Liber Alkindi de mutacione temporum, cit., p. 47 n. 1.
Fortne di conoscenza e ideali di sapcre 27
L'astrologia, assicurando la conosccn/a per causam, rcalizza il modello aristotclico di scicn/a con tutta la sua necessita: non solo ogni parlc del mondo si corrispondc c ciascuno divicnc un punto di vista dal qualc si puo ritcsscrc 1'ordinc dell'intero univcrso, ma si dissolve ricondotta all'ignoran/a dcllc cause - ogni pretesa contingen/a e tutto rifluisce neH'inflessibile causalita celeste:
Si autem omnia scita essent ab aliquo, ipse rerum causalitatem ad invicem nqtam haberet. Sciret ergo quod omnia que Hunt el contingunt in mundo elementorum a celesti armonia sunt causata, et inde cognosceret quod res huius mundi ad illam relate ex necessitate proveniunt. ... Est ergo ignprantia hominis causa opinionis eyentuum Futurorum et per hoc medium est ignorantia causa desiderii et spei et timoris.
Pur senza giungere a questo esito estremo - contro cui polemizzera duramente 1'autore del DC erroribus philosophonun - tutta la scienza fisica medievale accogliera il nodo centrale della tradizione astrologica greca e araba, il necessario nesso fra cielo e terra come rapporto fra causa e causato e da questo punto di vista poteva proporre una nuova classificazione delle scienze filosofiche secondo due fondamentali partizioni, come scrive Daniele di Morley:
Maxima divisio scientiarum fit in scientiam de celo et scientiam de omni, quod continetur sub celo.
Non e un caso se 1'astronomia, uscendo dall'ambiguo statuto di una delle sette arti liberali, non solo riassorbe il quadrivio, ma abbraccia tutte le discipline che in altre classificazioni rientravano nella scientia naturalis e si propone come la scienza dei principi primi della natura da cui dcriva ogni altra conoscenza e arte, dalla medicina all'agricoltura, dalla scientia de iudiciis alia scientia de speculis, dall'alchimia alia scientia de imaginibus. Nella conoscenza dei moti celesti trovano fondamento tutte le tecniche che permettono all'uomo una manipolazione della natura ("recipit potentiam inducendi motus in competenti materia per sua opera"), di piegare gli influssi celesti, di scendere nelle viscere della terra con la forza delle voces e delle imagines, di decifrare il messaggio profetico che per influsso dei cieli si rivela nei sogni, di prolungare la vita umana:
Oui enim ignorat celescium principia corporum et qualitates temporum constat eum ignorare naturas temporalium. Cum speculari
53 Alkindi, De radiis, pp. 226-227, 228.
Daniclc di Morley, De philosophia, cd. K. Sudhoff, Archiv fur die Geschichtc der Natuiwissenschaftcn und dcr Technik, VIII (1917), p. 24.
28 Gregory
seu mederi incipit - si legge ncllo pscudp ermetico DC VI renim principiis - fallitur ct fallit..7Hinc ergo nobUc ingenium vitac cursum Dene prorogare ct melius conservare intendit.
Ratio imperat coelo et avertuntur flagitia: il detto di Albumasar bcnc riassume tutta una zona del nuovo sapcre che costituisce una partc per piu aspetti essen/iale della storia dclla scien/a mcdievale e che trova nclPastrologia - e in tuttc le scicn/e ad cssa coordinate - il suo culminc piu significativo. L'astrologia, per difendersi dai tonsurati che denunciavano come empio "de coelestibus tractare", cerchera i suoi titoli di credito nella Bibbia, nella Stella dei Magi, nell'epistolario paolino, vorra proporsi come momento preliminare per esercilare Vacies mentis e addentrarsi in theological uscra dcll'oroscopo delle religioni per dimostrare la verita deH'incarna/.ione di Cristo; tuttavia e indubbio che essa tendeva a porsi come il vcrtice di una sapientia mundana del tutto estranea alia trepida medita/.ione della sacra pagina, ove la conoscenza dc\\'ordo causanim costituisce Pideale di un sapere che reali//a la dignita deH'uomo e lo conferma signore del creato:
Viderit in lucem mersas caligine causas, / Ut natura nichil occoluisse queat / ... omnia subiicial, terras regal imperet orbi: / Primatem rebus pontificiemque dedi.
Anche le classifica/.ioni delle scien/.e nel secolo XII risentono di un nuovo clima e del delinearsi di nuovi modi e pratiche del sapere: chi legga il Diduscalicon di Ugo di San Vittore o il De divisione philosophiac di Gundissalinus - tutto intessuto di riferimenti alia tradi/.ione araba, Alfarabi soprattutto e Avicenna coniugati con la tradi/ione latina- tardoantica rileva subito, rispetto alle scarne classifica/.ioni
altomedievali derivate da Marciano Capella e Boe/.io, da Cassiodoro e Isidore - un'articola/ione piu ricca, con 1'assidua ripresa di alcuni temi significativi: il rapporto logica-filosofia, la necessita per ciascuna disciplina di regole e metodi ben dcfiniti, il valore della civilis scicntia ove primeggiano la retliorica e la scicntia legiitn, la forte presenza delle arti meccaniche o de ingeniis collocate a picno diritto tra le discipline filosofiche. Soprattutto importante l'insisten/.a sul nesso sapicntia- eloquentia, per il loro uso civile, c la difesa della cohaercntia artium:
' Alkindi, De radiis, p. 230; Liber Hcrmetis Mcrcurii Triplicis dc VI renim principiis, cd. Th. Silverstein,/lrc7uVt>5- d'hist. doctr. et lilt, du M. A., XXII (1955), pp. 296, 291.
1 Cfr. il testo di Raimondo di Marsiglia in R. Lxmay, op. cit., p. 153 n. 1, e la prcfazionc a una trad. dctt'Almagesto in Ch.H. Haskins, Studies, pp. 192-193.
Bernardus Silvestris, Cosmographia, cd. P. Dronkc, Leiden 1978, p. 141.
Forme di conosccnza e ideali di sapcre 29
Verumtamcn in septem libcralibus artibus fundamcntum est omnis doctrinae... Hac quidern ita sibi cohaerent, ut altcrnis vicissim rationibus indigent, ut si una defuerit, caeterae philosophum facere non possint. Undc mihi crrarc vidcntur qui non attendentes talcm in artibus cohacrcntiam, quasdam sibi c£ ipsis eligunt, et cactcris intactis, his so posse fieri perfectos putant.
Non e un topos ma il scgnale di una crisi aperta nella cultura del XII secolo, da un lato per il rapido ampliarsi e specializzarsi degli insegnamenti delle singole discipline, dall'altro per una dinamica sociale che sollecitava verso alcune attivita di piu sicuro successo: una chiara testimonianza di tale situazione e offerta da Giovanni di Salisbury nelle pagine che dedica ai cosiddetti seguaci di Cornificio. Sono costoro i portatori di una cultura estremamente sommaria ("ficbant summi repente philosophi"), senza alcun interesse per le buone lettere ("poetae, historiograph!, habebantur infames"; "insultans eos qui artium venerantur auctores") o per le scienze del quadrivio ("nominare... aliquid operum naturae instar criminis erat"), desiderosi di apparire non di esser sapienti ("cum inertes sint et ignavi, videri quam esse sapientes appetunt"), i loro discorsi sono verbosi ("sufficiebat ad victoriam verbosus clamor" e pieni di sofismi, la loro dialettica e misera, Veloquentia senza regole ("sine artis beneficio"). Questi awersari della cultura esemplarmente rappresentata da maestri come Teodorico di Chartres, Guglielmo di Conches, Bernardo di Chartres, "non modo trivii nostri sed totius quadrivii contemptores", hanno trovato la loro sistemazione in professioni lucrative ("exercent foenebrem pecuniam... et solas opes ducunt esse fructum sapientiae"), presso le corti dei principi, nell'attivita di medici o nei convent! ove continuano, coperti dall'abito monastico, la loro invidiosa polemica contro uomini di cultura.59
Sarebbe facile raccogliere in altri autori testimonianze analoghe: "nos magistri in scholis soli relinquimur nisi multos palpemus et insidias auribus fecerimus", protesta Teodorico di Chartres attaccato dalla "invidia" e dalla "fama" ("Theodoricum ubique accusat et ignominiosis nominibus appellat");60 non diversamente Guglielmo di Conches denuncia il venir meno della studii libertas per il prevalere di studenti arrogant! e incolti
CO
Ugo di San Vittore, Didascalicon, III, 4-5, P.L. 176, 769.
59
Giovanni di Salisbury, Mctalogicon, I, 2-5, P.L. 199, 828-833 passim.
Dal Commento di Teodorico di Chartres al De invcntione di Cicerone ed. W.II.D. Suringar in Historia critica scholiastarum latinoriim, Lugduni Batavorum, 1854, pars. I, pp. 213-214; ed. P. Thomas, "Un commentaire du Moyen Age sur la Rhetorique de Ciceron", Melanges Granx, Paris 1884, pp. 41-42.
30 Gregory
("unius vcro anni spacio negligcnter studcntcs totam sapicntiam sibi cessisse putantcs"), protetti da prclati e vescovi che "sapientes et nobiles ab ecclesiis suis cxcludunt... insipicntes et ignobiles, umbras clcricorum non clericos includunt"61 e Ugo di San Vittore: "Scholastic! autem nostri aut nolunt aut nesciunt modum congruum in discendo servare, et idcirco multos studentes, paucos sapientes invenimus".
Siamo in presen/a di un fenomeno che puo considerarsi tipico di una societa in rapida espansione che non intende seguire percorsi scolastici complessi: si ha Pimpressione che, appcna delineato, 1'ideale di un sapere come cohacrentia artium sia gia entrato in crisi. Pur andra sottolincata I'insisten/.a con la quale alcuni maestri tornano sul necessario nesso fra trivio e quadrivio (termini antichi che coprono ormai realta diverse), fra scien/e del discorso c scicn/e delle cose come essen/iale carattcristica di un sapere utile alia societa civile (civilis scientia nell'uso di una civilis ratio)^ II rifcrimento a un luogo del De inventions ciceroniano e costante:
Qupniam, ut ait Tullius in prologo Rhetoricprum, eloquentia sine sapientia nocet, sapientia vcro sine eloquentia etsi parum, tamcn ahquid, cum eloquentia autem maxime prodest, errant qui postposita proficiente et non nocente, adhaercnt nocenti et non proficienti,
scrive Guglielmo di Conches nella prefa/.ione della sua Philosophia,M e Giovanni di Salisbury:
Sicut enim eloquentia non modo temeraria est sed etiam caeca, quam ratio non illustrat; sic et sapientia, quae usu verbi non proficit, non modo dcbilis est sed quodam modo manca; licet enim quandoque aliquatenus sibi prodesse possit sapientia elinguis ad solatium conscicntiac, raro tamen et parum confert ad usum societatis humanae ... Haec autem est ilia dulcis et fructuosa coniugatio rationis et verbi, quae tot egregias genuit urbes, tot conciuavit et foederavit regna. tot univit populos et charitate devinxiti ut hostis omnium publicus merito censeatur quisquis hoc, quod aa utilitatem omnium Deus coniunxit, nititur scparare. Mercurio Philologiam invidet et ab amplexu Philologiae Mercurium avellit ... Brutescent homines, si concessi dote priventur eloquii.
Guglielmo di Conches, Dragmaticon, Argentorati 1567, pp. 2, 157. 62 Ugo di San Vittore, Didascalicon, III, 3, P.L. 176, 768.
Dominicus Gundissalinus, De divisionc philosop/iiac, ed. L. Baur (Beitrage zur Geschichtc der Philosophic des Mittclalters, IV, 2-3). Miinster 1903, p. 64: "civilis racio dicitur sciencia dicendi aliquid racionabiliter et facicndi, quod hec quidem racio sciencia civilis dicitur, cuius pars integralis et maior rcthorica est. nam sapiencia i. e. rerum concepcio secundum carum naturam et rethorica civilem scienciam componunt".
^ Guglielmo di Conches, Philosophia, I, prologus, ed. cit., p. 17 (P.L. 172, 41-43).
Forme di conoscenza e ideali di sapcre 31
Non divcrsamente Tcodorico di Chartrcs: "sapicntia idest rcrum conccptio secundum earum naturam et rhctorica civilcm scicntiam componunt".65
Ne sara inutile notare che la crisi di qucsto idealc di "sapcre civile" e individuata ncl prcvalcre di una dialcttica isolala dalle altre discipline ("dialectica, si aliarum disciplinarum vigore destituatur, quodammodo manca est et inutilis fere"),66 di un sapere puramente formale, fatto di vuoti nomi che pretendono di sostituirsi alle res:
res omnes a dialectica et sophistica disputatione exterminaverunt, - si legge nel Dragtnaticon - nomina tamen earum receperunt eaque sola esse universana vel singularia praedicaverunt. Deinde supervenit stultior aetas, quae et res et earum nomina exclusit, atque omnium disputationem ad quatuor fere nomina reduxit.
Giovanni di Salisbury awerte con chiarezza 1'awentura verso cui s'incammina la nuova logica ("Vilescit physica quaevis, littera sordescit, logica sola placet"), che presto dara luogo all'intricato sottobosco fatto di voces, di suppositiones, di sophismata e di consequentiae: la sua polemica batte insistente contro coloro che invecchiano nello studio della logica ("in ea, quam solam profitentur, non decennium aut vicennium, sed totam consumpserunt aetatem") discutendo sillabe e vocali, numquam ad scientiam pctvenientes ', nella totale ignoranza delle cose di cui parlano.68 Non diversa sara la polemica umanistica, e gia del Petrarca, contro i barbari britanni.
La discussione coinvolge tutta la concezione della fllosofia, la funzione della logica, il valore della dialettica: il Metalogicon, scritto in difesa della logica, ne celebra il valore come ratio e sdentia disserendi, parte essenziale della filosofia "ut per omnia membra eius quaedam spiritus vice discurrat" - sicche chi non si serve di essa toglie alia sapientia ogni struttura razionale ("qui vero sine logica philosophiam doceri putat, idem a sapientie cultu omnium rerum exterminet rationes, quia eis logica presidet"). Giovanni insiste su questa connessione fra logica e filosofia - sono le nozze di Mercuric e filologia - e insieme individua, contro una sinonimia prevalente - la posizione peculiare della dialettica, come disputandi sdentia che si colloca nella zona del discorso
65 Giovanni di Salisbury, Metalogicon, I, 1, P.L. 199, 827; Teodorico di Chartres,
Comm. al De inventione, ed. Suringar, pp. 217-218.
66
67
66 Giovanni di Salisbury, Metalogicon, II, 9, P.L. 199, 866.
Guglielmo di Conches, Dragtnaticon, p. 5. 68 Giovanni di Salisbury, Entheticus, P.L. 199, 967; Metalogicon, II, 7, P.L. 199, 864.
32 Gregory
probabilc, vicino alia retorica, distinta quindi dalla tcoria del discorso propriamcnte dimostrativo/'9 La testimonian/.a di Giovanni di Salisbury e particolarmcnte significativa del crcsccntc intcressc per la logica e per la sua defmizione (ora identica a dialettica ora distinta), per i problcmi del metodo, dcll'inventio c della dimostra/.ione, per 1'analisi dclle voces e la loro impositio^ per il rapporto tra le strutture formali deH'argomenta/ione e le res oggetto delle altre discipline filosofiche: problcmi tutti che puntualmente ritornano nei testi logici che si intensificano fra XII e XIII secolo e che e merito del De Rijk avere sistematicamente portato alia luce. Ove andra sottolineato, per il vario definirsi di nuovi campi di ricerche e orizzonti del sapere, il ripresentarsi del problema della collocazione della logica in rapporto alia filosofia, come sua parte o come strumento - riprendendo un problema gia discusso da Boezio sulla scorta di Temistio - e la sua determinante influenza nello sviluppo dclle singole discipline: dalla grammatica, portata presto sulle stradc dcll'analisi del linguaggio come grammatica speculative che trovcra nei secoli XIII e XIV la massima cspansione nei trattati DC modis significandi, sino alia teologia. In questa zona privilegiata del sapere la logica aveva da tempo fatto valere la propria influenza, prima nelFesame della proprietas c della recta impositio vocum (le regole definite nei classico prologo del Sic et non sono la sistemazione di una problematica ben presente nelle scuole) e nell'assunzionc degli schemi assiomatici di origine boeziana e euclidea (si pensi alle opcre di Gilberto Porretano e alle Regidae di Alano di Lilla), poi piu decisamentc imponcndo una teoria della scienza e della dimostrazione con 1'awento della logica nova. Ma interessa notare come proprio per il suo porsi come scicntia scicntianun la dialettica venga subito a competere con il primato riconosciuto alia teologia:
Dialetica est ars artium, scientia scicntiarum, que sola scit scire et nescientem manifestare. Contra. Theologia est scientia scientiarum; non ergo dialetica. Dialetica est, quia nulla scientia perfecte scitur sine ilia.
II testo e del secolo XIII e non a caso corre parallelo alle Quaestiones "utrum theologia sit scicntia".
Sarebbe tuttavia fuorviantc legare lo sviluppo del metodo scolastico alia sola influenza della logica nova nella struttura delle varie discipline e
1 Giovanni di Salisbury, Metalogicon, I, 10, P.L. 199, 837; II, 1, col. 857; II, 3, col. 85V 860; II, 5, col. 861; II, 6, col. 862.
70 L.M. DC Rijk, Logica modemorum, vol. II, 2, p. 417; cfr. II, 1, pp. 428, 431.
Forme di conoscenza e ideali di sapere 33
soprattutlo nclla teologia: quasi chc la logica aristotclica con la sua tcoria dclla scicnza come scire per causas, con la definizione dei modi del sillogismo scientifico, non fosse coerenle con tutto il sistema fisico e metafisico, e questo non condizionasse Pevolu/.ione della specula/ione medievalc, dal secolo XIII, moeto al di la dell'influenza escrcitata dagli Analitici, dai Topici, dagli Elenchi sofistici. Che proprio il dibattito sul significato della filosofia della natura di Aristotele, sulla sua compatibility con la philosophia Christi e il punto cruciale di tante polemiche che lungo il Duecento approfondiscono le tensioni gia aperte nella cultura del secolo XII, dopo il primo ingresso di una philosophia mundana nell'orizzonte cristiano. Ne sono testimonianza le condanne di Aristotele agli inizi del Duecento quando il sistema aristotelico veniva a imporsi come filosofia naturale o semplicemente filosofia e trovava spazio nelle nuove strutture scolastiche, le facolta delle arti. Non a caso quelle condanne - del 1210 e 1215 - colpiscono le opere di filosofia naturale e la metafisica non gli scritti logici, e la celebre lettera di Gregorio IX del 1228 alia facolta parigina di teologia, tutta tessuta dei riferimenti biblici tradizionalmente addotti per il ruolo ancillare delle arti liberali, batte insistente sulla crisi in atto nel sapere teologico per 1'invasione nei confini della teologia delle "profane vanita" della doctrina philosophica naturalium, delle scientiae naturalium, della ratio naturalis seguita dai naturalium sectatores. L'opposizione fra la mundana scientia e la theologica puritas e nettissima e il tema torna puntualmente nei sermoni universitari degli anni trenta:
Quando tales veniunt ad theologiam, vix possunt separari a scientia sua, sicut patet in quibusdam, qui ab Aristotele non possunt in theologia separari.
Da un lato la philosophica sapientia, la theologia tutta dispiegata nella Bibbia, dalPaltro le philosophicae rationes, la lingua philo- sophonim.11
Precisa altresi la nota testimonianza di Ruggero Bacone:
principalis occupacio theologorum istius temporis est circa questiones, et maior pars omnium questionum est in terminis Philosophic cum tota disputacione, et rehqua pars que est in terminis Theologie adhuc yentilatur per autoritates et argumenta et soluciones philosophic ... maior pars questionum in studio tneologorum cum tota disputacione et modi solvendi est in terminis philosophic, ut notum est omnibus theologis qui exercitati fuerunt ad plenum in philosophicis, antequam veniebant ad theologiam. Et alia pars
Cfr. H. Denifle - A. Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, Parisiis 1889, t. I, pp. 114-116; M.M. Davy, Les sermons universitaires parisiens de 1230-1231, Paris 1931, pp. 85 n. 3, 252, 292.
34 Gregory
questionum in usu theologorum quo cst in tcrminis thcologic, ut de Beata Trinitate et lapsu primqrum parcntum, et do gloriosa Incarnatione, et dc peccatis, et virtutibus, ct donis, ct sacramentis et de desideriis ct pena, ventilatur principalitcr per autoritates et raciones et solutiones tractas ex phifosophicis consideracionibus: et ideo quasi tota occupacio questionum iheologorum est iam philosophica tarn in substancia quam in modo. z
Non e solo la reazione di teologi conservatori: e lo scontro di ideal! diversi di sapere, e in discussione il valore della sdentia trasmessa dalle Scritture ("qui vult discere, quaerat scientiam in suo fonte, scilicet in sacra Scriptura")73 di fronte a una conce/.ione del mondo e dell'uomo, a una fisica e a una metafisica che si impongono come visione totale e coerente della realta, chiusa a ogni esito soprannaturale, priva di ogni valore simbolico.
Noi sappiamo che la famosa condanna del vescovo Tempier (1277) di quanti "dicunt ... ea esse vera secundum philosophiam, sed non secundum fidem catholicam, quasi sint duae contrariae veritates"74 e frutto della capitositas - come dissc qualchc contcmporaneo - di un gruppo di teologi conservatori e che la cosiddetta dottrina della doppia verita non trova riscontro, ne poteva trovarlo, nelle opere dei filosofi o artisti contemporanei; loro fu piuttosto - e in modo estremo in quanti piu da presso scguivano 1'esegesi averroista - la netta distinzione fra quanto e dedotto dai principi della filosofia di Aristotele e quanto e insegnato dalla Chiesa, fino a constatare un'inconciliabilita delle diverse posi/ioni su problemi cruciali sottolineando 1'autonomia, pur nei suoi limiti, della ricerca filosofica: divarica/.ione ben nota ad Alberto fin nel suo primo intento di rendere Aristotele intelligibile ai latini e polemicamente sottolineata dagli agostiniani. Tuttavia la condanna del 1277 - con le altre che scandiscono il secolo XIII - indica non solo 1'asprezza di un dissidio, ma il dcfinirsi di modi diversi di concepire i procedimenti e i limili della conoscen/.a e della scienza, della filosofia e della sacra doctrina.
La delineazione della vita philosophi nel DC summo bono di Boezio di Dacia rappresenta in modo esemplare la ripresa dell'antico ideale del /Bcoc,
Rogcri Bacon Compendium studii thcologiae, ed. II. Rashdall, Aberdoniae 1911, pp. 25,35.
Bonaventurae Collationcs in Hexacmeron, ed. F. Delorme, Fircnze-Quaracchi 1934, p. 215.
74
R. Hissette, Enauete sur les 219 articles condamncs a Paris le 7 mars 1277,
Louvain-Paris 1977, p. 13.
Forme di conoscenza e ideali di sapere 35
summum bonum, quod est homini possibile secundum intellectum spcculativum, cst cognitio veri in singulis et dclcctatio in eodcm. Item, summum bonum quod est homini possibile secundum intellectum practicum est operatic boni ct delectactio in eodem... Et quia summum bonum quod est homini possibile est eius beatitude, sequitur quod cognitio veri et operatio boni et delectatio in utroque sit beatitudo humana.
Questa beatitudine e realizzata esclusivamente nella vita filosofica che consiste nell'assidua speculatio veritatis: "Ideo philosophus vivit sicut homo innatus est vivere et secundum ordinem naturalem".75
"Philosophia est humano generi appetenda pre ceteris et amanda" aveva scritto Alberico di Reims, maestro alia Facolta delle arti, aggiungendo - sulla scorta di Averroe - "non est homo nisi equivoce qui cam ignorat".
In questa prospettiva, per quanto Boezio non escluda la vita futura con una beatitudine alia quale il filosofo e piu di ogni altro vicino, tutto 1'itinerario filosofico si scandisce secondo una ratio e un ordo naturalis che ha come proprio fine (in hoc vita) la contemplazione delle sostanze separate e di Dio causa prima: "felicitas - scrive Jacopo da Pistoia - nihil aliud est quam continue sicut possibile est homini intelligere substantias separatas et precipue Deum ipsum"; qui peccato e quanto ostacola tale contemplazione, bene quanto la promuove, sicche la "vita filosofica" resta del tutto estranea all'economia della salvezza, senza escatologia. Queste dottrine - che ritornano costantemente in vari commenti averroistici all'Ethica e ogni volta si discuta della felicita come nel perduto De felicitate di Sigieri, o delle virtu intellettuali e che hanno una precisa eco nella Monarchia dantesca - non potevano sfuggire alia condanna dei teologi che ne sottolineano con teologica consequenzialita tutti gli esiti:
Quod non est excellentior status quam vacare philosophiae. ... Quod sapientes mundi sunt philosophi tantum. ... Quod pmnes scientiae non sunt necessariae, praeter philosophicas disciplinas.
' Boethii Daci De summo bono, in Opera, VI, 2, ed. N.G. Green-Pedersen, Hauniae, 1976, pp. 371, 375; per il luogo citato piu avanti, p. 371. La Philosophia di Alberico di Reims (rettore a Parigi 1271-72; il breve scritto e forse del 1265) e stata pubblicata da R.A. Gauthier ("Notes sur Sigier de Brabant, II Siger en 1272-1275. Aubry de Reims et la scission des Normands", Re\'ue des sciences philosophiqucs et theologiqucs, LXVIII (1984), pp. 3-48; il testo alle pp. 29^48) che opportunamente sottolinea come 1'autore riferisca alia "filosofia del filosofi" tutti gli appellativi che la Bibbia, 1'esegesi e la liturgia attribuivano alia Sapienza di Dio o alia Vergine Maria (per il passo cit., p. 31 e 33). La Questio de felicitate di Jacopo da Pistoia - dedicata a Guido Cavalcanti - e stata edita da P.O. Kristeller in Medioevo e Rinascimcnto - Studi in onore di Bruno Nardi, Firenze 1955, vol. I, pp. 425^53 (il luogo cit. a p. 452).
76 R. Hissette, op. cit., pp. 15, 18, 26.
36 Gregory
Si ha 1'imprcssione che proprio nolle discussion! sul fine ultimo dell'uomo - problema che implica tutta la conce/ione della natura umana e della storia - la filosofia accentui un piu precise distacco dalla teologia e dall'antropologia cristiana: si dcfinisce un ideale di felicita (delectatio intellectualis) senza riferimento alia dottrina del peccato, della redenzione e della grazia, tutto concluso nell'esercizio dell'attivita speculativa. A questo fine si coordina anche 1'organizzazione politica che deve assicurare la pace, annotava Boezio di Dacia, "ut... cives possint vacare virtutibus intellectualibus contcmplantes verum et virtutibus moralibus operantes bonum": insegnamento averroistico di cui si ricordcra Dante che proprio sulla necessita di garantire una pace universale come condizione per attuare la potenzialita dell'intelletto possibile, fondera 1'ideale dell'universale Monarchia, organizzazione politica dell' Humana civilitas, autonoma rispetto alia Chiesa perche pcrmette di realizzare in terra, con i documenta philosophica, il fine proprio dell'uomo.
Si comprende facilmente la razione di un Bonaventura, negli anni Settanta, quando piu prepotente si faceva la rivcndicazione di un sapere costituito tutto secondo la ragione naturale: di qui la denuncia degli inevitabili errori della ragione lasciata a se stessa esemplarmente rappresentata dalla filosofia di Aristotele. Era la sapienza cristiana che rivendicava il suo primato come vera filosofia che trova in Cristo la logica e la ratiocinatio nostra, il maestro e il mediatore di ogni scienza; vera filosofia cioe sapere totale - scicntia perfecta - che ha nella Bibbia il suo fondamento ("Qui ergo scientias sacculares vultis intrarc, sacram Scripturam consulite") e nell'interpreta/ione simbolica, analogica, tipologica il metodo che permette una lettura della natura preclusa ai filosofi ("Hunc librum legere est altissimorum contemplatorum, non naturalium Philosophorum").77 Era la risposta piu matura dell'agostinismo del secolo XIII che di fronte all'esperienza storica di una filosofia naturale dichiarava la propria sufficienza, anzi la capacita di superare lo
Bonavcnturae Collationes in Hcxacmcron, cit., pp. 144-145, Bre\'iloquium, I, 1, in Opera, V, p. 210. Cfr. R. Bacon, Opus mains, ed. J.H. Bridges rist. anastatica, Frankfurt/Main 1964, vol. I, p. 43: "lit proptcr hoc omnis creatura in se vcl in suo simili, vel in universal! vel in particulari, a summis coelorum usque ad terminos eorum ponitur in scriptura, ut sicut Deus fecit creaturas et scripturam, sic voluit ipsas res factas ponere in scriptura ad intellectum ipsius tam scnsus literalis quam spiritualis. Sed tola philosophiae intentio non est nisi rcrum naturas et proprietates evolvere, quapropter totius philosophiae potestas in sacris literis continetur; et hoc maxime patet, quia longe certius ac melius et verius accipit scriptura creaturas, quam labor f hilosophicus sciat eruere".
Forme di conoscenza e idcali di sapere 37
stcsso antagonismo fra Platonc e Aristotclc attraverso 1'insegnamcnto di Agostino78 al quale attinge 1'ideale di un conosccrc chc e espansionc dclla fede: "crcdibile transit in rationem intclligibilis", nella continua tcnsionc dalla fcde alia visionc, come in Anselmo c in Riccardo di San Vittorc; significativamente proprio citando un testo di Riccardo, Bonavcntura insiste sulle rationes latentes nella fides nostra e il modus ratiocinativus sive inquisitivus della scienza teologica trova il suo sostegno in una ratio "elevata" per fidem et donum scientiae et intellectus che ha per oggetto un credibile "quod habet in se rationem pritnae veritatis" .79
Altra significativa testimonianza della crisi del XIII secolo e degli atteggiamenti diversi che poteva assumere 1'esperienza cristiana di fronte ai nuovi orizzonti aperti dalla scienza greca e araba e offerta dall'opera di Ruggcro Bacone: qui se da un lato prosegue la polemica contro una filosofia "secundum se considcrata" ("philosophia infidelium est penitus nociva") e piu ancora contro il distacco della teologia dall'esegesi per il prevalere di question! squisitamente filosofiche nei commenti allc Sentenze, dall'altro si afferma con forza la consapevolezza della dignita e del valore di un sapere volto ai segreti della natura e al mondo degli uomini, capace di promuovere una riforma religiosa e politica della respublica Christiana. Cos! la ripresa di un motive costante nella tradizione medievale - la dipendenza di tutte le conoscenze dalla Scrittura cui hanno attinto anche i filosofi greci ("volo... unam sapientiam esse perfectam ostendere, et hanc in sacris literis contineri") - si articola in un piu ampio disegno di storia della sapienza che, rivelata da Dio ai patriarch! e ai profeti ("philosophiae perfectio fuit primo data sanctis, Patriarchis et Prophetis, quibus lex Dei similiter fuit ab uno et eodem Deo revelata"), e compito del lavoro filosofico riscoprire e restaurare: "ideo philosophia non est nisi sapicntiae divinae explicatio per doctrinam
on
et opus .
La perfecta sapientia posta a principle niundi diviene 1'ideale verso cui cammina la storia dell'umanita, in progresso continue: "semper
78
Bonaventurae Sermo IV, Christus units omnium magistcr, 18-19, Opera, V, p. 572.
79
Bonaventurae / Sent., Proemii q. I, Rcsp., Opera, I, p. 7; q. II ad 5, p. 11: "Et
quod obicitur, quod credibile est supra rationem; verum est, supra rationem quantum ad scientiam acquisitam, sed non supra rationem ele\>atam per fidem et per donum scientiae et intellectus. Fides enim elevat ad assentiendum; scientia et intellectus elevant ad ae quae credita sunt intelligendum"; per gli altri luoghi cui si facenno, m, Proem, q. I, ad 5-6, p. 8; q. II, sed contra 2, p. 10.
80
Roger Bacon, Opus mains, ed. J.H. Bridges, cit. vol. I, pp. 33, 64, 65.
38 Gregory
cresccrc potest in hac vita studium sapicntiac, quia nihil est pcrfcctum in humanis inventionibus". Si ricostruiscc cosi ncl tempo ("additio et cumulatio sapientiae") tutta 1'enciclopedia del sapere (imam sapientiam) in cui non solo si realizza una nuova e feconda connessione fra teologia e filosofia ("Non igitur mircntur philosophantes, si habeant elevare philosophiam ad divina et ad theologiae veritatcm... Et sancti non solum loquuntur theologice, sed philosophice, et philosophica multipliciter introducunt"), ma vengono collocate in posizione preminente discipline marginali nel contcmporaneo ordine degli studi, quali le lingue, la matematica, \ascientia experimentalist
Al centro della nuova enciclopcdia la matematica, scienza dei principi primi e della corretta dimostrazione, in luogo della metafisica e deH'cpistemologia aristotelica: "Porta et clavis scientiarum quam sancti a principio mundi invenerunt", la matematica costituisce il fondamento e il metodo che unifica tutte le scienze, dalla teologia alia scientia civilis:
patet quod si in aliis scientiis debemus venire in certitudinem sine dubitatione et ad veritatem sine errore, oportet ut fundamenta cognitionis in mathematica ponamus; quatenus per earn dispositi possumus pcrtingere ad certitudinem aliarum scientiarum, et ad veritatem per exclusionem erroris": solo nella matemajica infatti "sunt demonstrationcs potissimae per causam necessariam". -
Ncll'Opus mains Baconc riprende puntualmente il commento di Roberto Grossatcsta ai Sccondi Analitici, ove con molta chiarezza erano dislinte le tecniche dimostrative delle varic discipline filosofiche che procedono tulte "magis probabiliter quam scientifice", mentre solo alia matematica veniva riconosciuto lo statuto di scienza propriissime dicta che procede dimostrativamente per causam propriam et necessariam, tale quindi da offire un modello e un metodo esemplare rispctto al quale tutte le altre forme di sapere sono subordinate: "In solis enim mathematicis est scientia et demonstratio maximc et principaliter dicta".83 Appoggiandosi a una metafisica della luce che permetteva una cosmologia fondata sulle leggi dcll'ottica e della prospettiva, la matematica offre Tunica possibile struttura dimostrativa alia scienza della natura: "tutte le cause degli effetti natural! debbono darsi secondo linee, angoli, figure. Aliter enim
81 Roger Bacon, op. cit., I, pp. 30, 57, 20, 63.
82 Roger Bacon, op. cit., I, p. 106; cfr. pp. 105, 108.
oo
Robertus Grossetcste, Commentarius in Postcrionim Analyticorum Libros, ed. P. Rossi, Firenzc 1981, pp. 178-179; cfr. pp. 189, 216-217, 256-257.
Fortne di conoscenza e ideali di sapere 39
impossibile est sciri 'propter quid' in iV/w".84 II nesso matcmatica- esperien/a, la tcoria del duplicc proccsso di risoluzionc e composi/.ionc che trova il suo momento tcrminalc nella vcrifica o falsifica/ionc ("reductio ad impossibilia") danno come e noto a Grossatcsta un posto di particolarc rilicvo nella storia del metodo scientifico. Bacone ricorda Grossatesta fra coloro "qui per potestatem mathematicae sciverunt causas omnium explicate"85 e accentua, nel suo piano di una nuova enciclopedia, il valore fondamentale delle matematiche in ogni ramo del sapere, fino alia teologia: "Necesse est ut theologus sciat mathematicam".86
Giovera anche insistere sul nesso - gia proposto da Grossatesta ma qui piu ampiamente svolto - fra matematica e scientia experimentalis , fra argiimentum e experimentum: perche se nella matematica si realizza il modum cognoscendi per argumcntum, la verifica, la certificazione si realizza via experientiae: "argumentum non sufficit, sed experientia".87
II detto aristotelico per cui il sillogismo e demonstratio faciens scire ha dunque valore solo se lo si intende come procedimento conoscitivo legato alPcsperienza ("si experientia comitetur, et non de nuda dcmonstratione"); tutto il famoso passo della Metafisica che antepone i sapientes agli experti, la scienza dei primi principi alle singole scienze, assume un significato radicalmente diverso nell'esegesi baconiana non appena gli experti sono intesi come coloro i quali "solum noscunt nudam veritatem sine causa" e contrapposti a colui "qui rationem et causam novit per experientiam": questi solo e il vero sapiente.88 Non a caso del resto Bacone aveva insistito sul primato dell'individuale in polemica con gli impend, maldestri ripetitori degli Analitici posteriori: "impend adorant universalia".89
84
De lineis, angulis et figuris, ed. L. Baur (Beitrage zur Gesch. der Philos. dcs
Mittelaltcrs, IX) Miinster 1912, p. 60.
85
Roger Bacon, Opus maius, ed. cit., I, p. 108: "Inventi enim sunt viri famosissimi, ut
Episcopus Robertas Lincolniensis, et Prater Adam de Marsico, et multi alii, qui per potestatem mathematicae sciverunt causas omnium explicare, et tam humana quam divina sufficienter exponere".
o/r
Roger Bacon, op. cit., I, p. 175.
R7
Roger Bacon, op. cit., II, p. 168.
88
Roger Bacon, op. cit., II, p. 168; cfr. Opus tcrtium, ed. A.G. Little, Pan of the
Opus tertium of Roger Bacon, Aberdeen 1912, p. 43: "argumentum persuadet de veritate, scd non certificat".
89
Roger Bacon, Liber I Communium not., 8, ed. R. Steclc, Oxonii, 1909, p. 96.
40 Gregory
La scientia experimentalis nella sua conncssione con la matcmatica c per il suo fondamento ultimo nell'illuminazione divina vicne a porsi come scienza nuova ("a vulgo studentium poenitus ignorata"): di essa Bacone illustra ampiamente le prerogativae insistendo soprattutto sulla sua finalita pratica e operativa perche solo attraverso di essa, riprendendo un vecchio detto aristotelico, intellectus speculativus fit practicus. recuperando forme di conoscenza respinte ai margin! della cultura universitaria e insistendo sull'inutilita di un sapere che sia puro contemplare, Bacone esaltera la scienza - congiunta all'industria manuwn - in quanto capace di prolungare la vita umana o di produrre da materie vili 1'oro91 e piu ampiamente di investigare i secreta naturae a vantaggio della respublica fide Hum :
hacc enim praccipit ut fiant instrumenta mirabilia, et factis utitur, et etiam cogitat omnia secreta propter utilitatcs reipublicae et personarum; et imperat aliis scientiis, sicut ancillis suis, et ideo lota sapientiae speculativae potestas isti scientiae specialiter attribuitur.
Non deve sfuggirc questa posizione egemone assegnata alia scientia experimentalis rispctto a tutte le altre discipline e la potestas che essa realizza: le opera sapientiae sembrano essere lo scopo ultimo di tutto il messaggio di Bacone teso a preparare la Chiesa alPultima lotta contro 1'Anticristo del cui awento imminente sono segni premonitori le vittorie dei Tartari sui Musulmani. In questa prospettiva - ove 1'escatologismo cristiano trova sostegno nella scientia experimentalis - un'altra necessaria verifica (certificatio) dell'utilita della matematica (mathematicae utilitas} e offerta dall'astrologia (indicia astronomiae):^ 1'efficacia delle medicine, i tcmperamenti dei singoli e dei popoli, la successione delle leggi e dei costumi, il destino dei regni e delle religion! si fanno chiari all'astronomo "propter gloriosas utilitates quae possunt evenire ex judiciis mathematicae verae".94 Tutta un'antropologia, una sociologia, una storiografia c un'apologetica ("oportet theologum... scire bene radices astronomiae") si vengono cosi costituendo sotto gli auspici dell'astrologia ulteriore
on
Roger Bacon, Opus tertium, cap. I, ed. J.S. Brewer, London 1859, p. 10.
Roger Bacon, Opus mains, II, pp. 204 sgg., 214-215; cfr. Opus tertium, ed. A.G. Little, cit., pp. 44-46.
92
Roger Bacon, Opus maius, II, p. 221.
' Roger Bacon, Opus maius, I, pp. 238-239.
94
Roger Bacon, Opus maius, I, p. 253.
Roger Bacon, Opus maius, I, p. 193.
Forme di conoscenza e ideali di sapere 41
conferma dclla potestas mathematicae - mcntrc 1'anima razionale divicnc capace di opcre mirabili con la forza chc i verba, i carmina, i characteres hanno ricevuto dai cieli; la sapientia con la sua potestas si impone sovrana al corso degli eventi: "et sic dc mundo faciet quod desiderabit".96
II dibattito sullo statute scicntifico dell'astrologia e la sua collocazione nella classificazione dcllc scicnze costituisce un capitolo di estrema importanza nella delincazione dcgli ideali del sapere: abbiamo visto come gia nel XII secolo 1'astronomia, come scienza dei moti celesti e dei loro influssi sul mondo sublunare, si ponesse quale fondamento delle scienze della natura. Dal secolo XIII - ampliata la conoscenza della cultura greca e araba - Pastrologia trova il suo piu precise fondamento scientifico nell'assioma aristotelico della dipendenza dai moti dei cieli di tutte le forme di mutamento nel mondo sublunare e ripercorre gli sviluppi di questo principle alia luce della scienza astrologica araba: queH'assioma - cruciale per tutto il sistema di Aristotele e universalmente acccttato come fondamentale principio del divenire fisico anche dai teologi piu cauti rispetto all'insegnamento dello Stagirita - assegnava all'astrologia un posto privilegiato come scienza dei primi principi dell'essere e del divenire. L'astronomia o astrologia, scriveva Guido Bonatti, e quindi la scienza piu di ogni altra capace di dare all'uomo la verita che ardentemente ricerca ("nee potest earn per aliquam scientiam, ita veraciter et ita plenarie apprehendere, sicut per Astronomiam") e, gareggiando con la metafisica, indica la via piu sicura per la conoscenza di Dio ("et scire de ipso quantumcumque mens humana plus possit altingere").
Con maggior precisione Pietro d'Abano, congiungendo la dottrina aristotelica della scienza quale formulata dagli Analitici con la metafisica, nel Conciliator e piu ampiamente nel Lucidator discute lo statute scientifico del sapere astrologico ("an astrologia, cum hiis quae ipsius, extet scientia"): scientia admirabilis et divina, nobilissima per il suo
1 Roger Bacon, Opus maius, I, 396-397, 399; cfr. Opus tertium, ed. A.G. Little cit., pp. 52-53.
97
G. Bonatti, De astronomia tractatus decem, Basileae 1550, c. 1.
98 ' Pietro d'Abano, Conciliator, Venetiis 1565, p. 17ra; ho potuto leggere il Lucidator
nella trascrizione di G. Federici Vescovini che ne prepara 1'edizione critica sulla base dei tre manoscritti Parigi, Bibliotheque de la Sorbonne, lat. 581 (S), Parigi, Bibliotheque Nationale, lat. 2598 (N), Citta del Vaticano, Pal. lat. 1171 (V): di tale generosita devo qui ringraziarla. Per i luoghi citati piu sotto nel testo: S. f. 412 rb, N. f. 99 ra, V. f. 320 ra; S. f. 417 vab, N. f. 103 vb-104 ra, V. f. 323 vb-324 ra; S. f. 413 ra, N. f. 99 va, V. f. 320 ra; S. f. 417 vb, N. f. 104 ra, V. f. 324 ra; S. f. 420 rb, N. f. 106 rb, V. f. 325 vb; S. f. 416 ra, N. f. 102 rb, V. f. 322 vb; S. f. 419 ra, N. f. 105 vb,
42 Gregory
oggetto ("omnium corporum nobilissimum, simplex et incorruptible") e per il suo metodo ("cum sumat demostrationes suas ex scientia numeri et mensure, id est arismetrice et geometrie, quae etiam investigat et considerat ea quae semper uno se habcnt modo"), 1'astrologia ("scientia qualitatum et motorum caelestium in se ac eorum effectibus universaliter considerata") precede deduttivamente da principt universal! ed e quindi scienza a pieno titolo, certa et non conieclurativa: "Ita ut sua certitude superet valde negotium divinum seu metaphysicum ipsum".
L'astrologia, con le sue classiche distinzioni della parte excertitativa (de revolutionibus , de nativitatibus, de interrogationibus, de electionibus), si pone cosi come principio e fondamento di ogni altra conoscenza teorica e pratica, pienamente adcguata a saziare 1'umano desidcrio di sapcre: "scientia... nobilis et perfecta et omni parte sui intellectus satiativa". Distinta dalle pratiche magiche demoniache ad essa subalternate, e difesa contro i divini e deicole hypocrites "volentes omnia immediatius divine dispositioni subesse"; con accent! analoghi a quelli di una celebre pagina della Swnma contra gentiles, Pietro d'Abano afferma 1'autonomia dcll'ordine naturale oggetto di conoscen/.a scientifica (i loquentes "ordinem corrumpunt et frustrant naturae") e non esita ad indicare la possibilc utili/za/ione apologetica della scienza dcgli astri, appoggiandosi - come nel Conciliator - a testi di San Paolo e della Sapienza: 1'astrologia infatti - asserisce Pietro d'Abano con significative riferimento al XII della Metafisica "duck nos potissimc in cognitionem divinam". Tuttavia dall'opera di Pietro d'Abano si ha 1'impressione chc non sia 1'esito "teologico" dell'astrologia il suo intercsse primario, quanto piultosto la difesa di una scienza tutta mondana capace di leggere il corso della storia e migliorare la vita degli uomini.
Abbiamo detto del fondamento che la metafisica aristotelica offriva al piu saldo sapere astrologico; ma non andra dimenticato che, nella sua storia, 1'astrologia era venuta assorbendo motivi stoici, neoplatonici, ermetici, inserendo la causalita celeste in un mondo tutto vivo, percorso da forze che si richiamano e si corrispondono da parte a parte ("quod est superius, est sicut quod est inferius ad perpetranda miracula rei unius") raccogliendosi nell'uomo-microcosmo e rendendolo capace di operazioni mirabili ("recipit potentiam inducendi motus in competenti materia per sua
V. f. 325 ra. 99
Tabula smaragdina, ed. J. Ruska, Heidelberg 1926, p. 182.
Forme di conoscenza e ideali di sapere 43
opera... consequitur vim movendi res extra positas suis radiis"; "totum magisterium est ut superius fiat inferius et inferius superius").100 Sarebbe quindi difficile isolare 1'astrologia da tutto il complesso delle scienze magiche de secretis, de experimentis, dalle tecniche degli incantesimi e del magistero alchemico. "Radices magice sunt motus planetarum" aveva scritto Picatrix spiegando che scire non e solo legare cielo e terra, ma ripercorrere a ritroso i momenti della produzione del molteplice (reverti wide venit) per cogliere 1'unita originaria, Dio come "radix et principium omnium huius mundi rerum" e conoscere in lui "qualis est mundus et eius effectus, et quomodo per eius creatorem factus sit". Per questo il sapere che Picatrix propone si colloca al di sopra del trivio e del quadrivio, al di la della metafisica, come donum Dei ("maius donum et nobilius quod Deus hominibus huius mundi dederit est scire"), scienza dei mutamenti radicali ("omnia que homo operatur et ex quibus sensus et spiritus sequuntur illo opere per omnes partes et pro rebus mirabilibus quibus operantur") e in questo senso nigromantia .10
Non diversa la struttura teorica della scienza alchemica che inizia fra XII e XIII secolo la sua storia complessa, destinata a affascinare la cultura europea fino a tutto il Rinascimento. Scientia che precede "per demonstrationes et causas et syllogisticas rationes" - precisa il Liber quartonun Platonis - 1'alchimia riprende i moduli risolutivi e anagogici della dialettica neoplatonica nella ricerca, al di la delle mutevoli specie, di un'unita originaria ("omnia entia unum sunt ex una radice"; "unam radicem et substantiam et materiam invenies"; "natura perpetua ac omnia coequans"),103 Videntitas di Platone, 1'uno di Euclide:104 di qui e possibile ridiscendere - ripercorrendo i momenti delYartificiutn summi Creatoris - per produrre quelle operationes mirabiles che ampliano la conoscenza e il potere dell'uomo:
100
Alkindi, De radiis, cit., p. 230; Turba philosophorum, in Theatrum chemicum, vol. IV, Argentorati 1659, p. 576.
Picatrix, ed. D. Pingree (Picatrix, The latin version of the Ghayat Al-Hakim, London 1986), pp. 32, 3-4, 32-33, 3-5.
Liber quanorum Platonis, in Theatrum Chemicum, vol. V, Argentorati 1660, p. 157.
Liber quartonim Platonis, cit., p. 105; Morienus, Liber de compositione alchemiae, in Mangeti Bibliotheca chemica curiosa, Coloniae Allobrogum 1702, vol. I, p. 513B; Turba philosophorum, in Theatrum chemicum, vol. V, p. 1.
104
Liber quanorum Platonis, cit., p. 107.
44 Gregory
Sic habebis gloriam totius mundi - promette la Tabula smaragdina -, id est hoc lapide sic composite, gloriam huius mundi possidebis. Idco fugiet a te omnis obscuntas. Id cst, omnis inopia et aegritudo.
Esperienza mistica, riflcssione metafisica, tecniche pratiche convergono ncl delincare una "scientia nimis profunda et fortis intellectui" che colloca 1'uomo in una posizione privilegiata nella grande catena dclPessere, al vertice del creato:
Scias quod sciencia est quid valde nobile et altum - proclama Picatrix - et qui studet in ea et per earn operatur suam recipit nobilitatem et altitudinem. ... Et ille est perfectus qui scienciae gradum attingit ultimum... et est separatus ab animaiibus in suis magistcriis et scienciis... Et est in eo virtus Dei et sciencia iusticie pro civitatibus gubernandis... Et invenit magisteria subtilia et eorum subtilitates, et Tacit miracula et ymagines mirabilcs, et scientiarum formas retinet. Et est separatus ab omnibus aliis animaiibus sensibilibus. Fecitque ipsum Deus compositorem et inventorem suarum sapientiarum et scientiarum et explanatorem suarum qualitatum et omnium rerum mundi receptorem spiritu prophetico sua sapiencieque thesaurum, intellectorem omnium rerum et coniunctionum in maiori mundo exsistencium. Et cciam ipse homo comprehendit omnes intelligencias et composiciones rerum huius mundi suo sensuz et ipse non comprehendunt cum; et omnia serviunt ei, et ipse nulh eorum scrvit. Et sua voce assimilatur unicuique animali quando ei placet.
Forse proprio nei testi astrologici, magici, alchemici, ai margini della cultura delle scuole, si viene delineando una forma di scien/a ove la teoria si coniuga con la pratica aprendo nuovi ori/zonti alia creativita e alia potenza del sapicnte. Come nci tcsti ermetici tardoantichi, anchc in questa letteratura, che spcsso si richiama al mitico Ermcte, la conoscenza delle forze vive che percorrono il mondo e dei rcciproci influssi fra le diverse nature, e strettamente connessa alia celebrazione della dignita delPuomo.107
Impossibile seguire tutle le varie articolazioni delle scienze sperimentali ("qui in hac sciencia se intromittere intendit scire oportet quod propter opera et experimenta que fiunt in hoc mundo scientiarum profunditates et secrcta sciuntur, et ex operibus et expcrimentis solvuntur dubia...") impegnate assiduamente a difcndere la propria dignita contro i sospetti c le condanne teologiche attraverso la distinzione fra una magia che e conoscenza e utilizzazione delle forze della natura e una magia che
Tabula smaragdina, cit., p. 182. 106 ricatrix, cit., p. 26.
Cfr. F.. Garin, Mediowo e Rinascimento, Bari, 1954, p. 154. 108 Picairu cit., p. 170.
Forme di conoscenza e ideall di sapcrc 45
precede con 1'aiuto degli spirit! infernali. Limitandoci qui all'astrologia che di tuttc costituisce il fondamento, deve esscre sottolineato il confronto che nccessariamente veniva a porsi con la teologia, affermandosi entrambe come scienze cui le altre si coordinano e che invenstono la posizione delPuomo nel mondo, i suoi rapporti con Dio, la sua storia. Non a caso i problemi cruciali dell'astrologia coincidono con quelli della teologia, a cominciare dalla conciliazione fra necessita e libero arbitrio, fra I'inflessibile moto dei cieli e la realta contingente: il problema si pone costantemente dallo Speculum astronomic a Guido Bonatti e Pietro d'Abano in riferimento alia discussione di Albumasar sul concetto di possibilis, secondo un testo del De interpretatione di Aristotele.10' Con molta chiarezza 1'autore dello Speculum richiama 1'antico problema teologico:
Et fortassis attingentius intuenti, eadem aut saltern similis genere est ista dubitatio ei dubitationi, quae est de divina proyidentia; nam in his quae operatur dominus per caelum, nihil aliud est caeli significatio quam divina providentia. ... Unde in libro universitatis... potuit figurare, si voluit, .quod sciebat; qupd si fecit, tune eadem est determinatio de comrjossibilitate liberi arbitrii cum divina providentia et cum interrogation^ significatione. Si ergo divinam providentiam stare cum libero arbitrio annullari non possit, neque annullabitur quin stet magisterium interrogationum cum eo.
Del resto tutti i teologi debbono fare i conti con Pastrologia, posto che essa rappresenta per tutti - dopo 1'acquisizione del sistema aristotelico - la coerente applicazione di una legge fisica universalmente accettata, la causalita dei cieli sul mondo sublunare ("cerium est per Aristotelem, - ricordava Bacone - quod coelum non solum est causa universalis, sed particularis, omnium rerum inferiorum"):111 di qui le discussioni sui condizionamenti fisiologici del libero arbitrio, la funzione degli angeli, motori dei cieli, nel corso della storia, la difficile distinzione fra previsione astrologica e profezia: i quesiti del generate dell'ordine domenicano Giovanni di Vercelli a Roberto di Kilwardby e a Tommaso
109
Aristotele, De interpretatione, 9, 18a28-19b4; cfr. P. Duhem, Le systeme du
monde, t. II, Paris, 1974 (nouveau tirage), pp. 296-297; 374-375.
Speculum astronomiae, ed. S. Caroti, M. Pereira, S. Zamponi, P. Zambelli, Pisa, 1977, p. 44.
Roger Bacon, Opus maius, cit., I, p. 379.
46 Gregory
d'Aquino sono un tipico esempio dei problcmi posti al teologo dalla fisica peripatctica.112
Ne andra sottovalutata 1'utilizzazione apologetica dcll'astrologia come ermeneutica scientifica della storia sacra (Concordia astronomiae cum historica narratione, secondo il titolo di uno scritto di Pietro d'Ailly), sino a recuperare 1'oroscopo delle rcligioni per confermare il primato del cristianesimo e leggere negli astri i segni precorritori dell'Anticristo. Qui anche 1'apocalittica cristiana sembra trovare nell'astrologia il suo complemento e la sua conferma, mentre in altri contesti e proprio la scienza dci moti e degli influssi celesti a ridurre in termini naturali la successione storica delle leges e persino 1'opzione religiosa: "licite homo debet insequi septam in qua naturaliter inclinatur - scrive Biagio Pelacani da Parma -, quia naturaliter inclinabitur a constellationc".113
Della teologia come scienza, delle polemiche sulla possibilita di applicare al discorso teologico i procedimenti della scienza dimostrativa teorizzata negli Analitici, molto si e scritto, soprattutto dopo il classico saggio di Chenu che ha messo in rilevo il significato e 1'originalita della posizione dell'Aquinate, sullo sfondo di un lento ma radicale processo di trasformazione del modo di intendere il lavoro teologico.114 Non e quindi il caso di ripercorrere qui le tappe di un dibattito di capitale importanza da Remigio di Auxerre a Odo Rigaldi e Tommaso d'Aquino sino ai maestri del XIV sccolo. Andranno tuttavia ricordati alcuni problemi che tornano
Tommaso d'Aquino, Opusculum X: Responsio ad magistrum Joannem de Vcrccllis dc articulis XLII, ed. Vives, t. XXVII, pp. 248-255; la risposta di Roberto di Kilwardby in M.-D. Chcnu, "I^s rcponses dc S. Thomas ct de Kilwardby a la consultation de Jean de Verceil (1271)", in Melanges Mandonnet, Paris 1930, t. I, pp. 191-222; ivi cfr. anche J. Destrez, "La lettre de S. Thomas au lecteur de Vcnise", pp. 103-189 che corre in piu punti parallela alia lettera a Giovanni da Vercelli.
113
Cfr. G. Fcderici Vescovini, Le Quaestiones de aninia di Biagio Pelacani da Parma,
Firenze 1974, pp. 81-82; p. 142: "per coniunctiones astrorum varias diversae gentcs compelluntur insequi diversas septas". Per tutto il problema sia permesso rinviare al mio saggio "Temps astrologique et temps Chretien", in Le temps de la fin de I'Antiquite au Moyen Age, llf-Xllf siecles, Paris, 1984, pp. 557-573.
M.-D. Chenu, La theologie comme science an Xllf siecle, Paris 1957 (la prima redazione del volume comparve nelle Archives d'hist. doctr. et lilt, du M. A., II (1927), pp. 31-71). I ben noti luoghi di Tommaso d'Aquino cui si fara riferimento piu avanti sono: / Sent., prol. q. I, a. 3; Super libnim Boethii De Trinitate, q. 2, a. 2; Summa thcologica, I, q. 1, a. 2, 7, 8.
Fornie di conoscenza e ideali di sapere 47
con insistcnza nel corso di quel dibattito mcttcndo in discussione la validita del modello aristotelico, una volta trasposto nell'orizzonte dclla riflessione sui misteri della fede, e il presupposto parallclismo fra i principia da cui muove il discorso scientifico c gli articulifidei.
Gia nella prima meta del secolo, soprattutto nelle quaestiones degli anni Trenta e Quaranta, si vengono definendo alcuni nodi problematici fondamentali che torneranno poi sempre a riproporsi: tralasciando la qitaestio "de subiecto theologiae" del ms. Douai 434 e quella De divina scientia trasmessa in due redazioni (Bib. Vat., Vat. lat. 782; Praga, Univ. IV, D. 13), Odo Rigaldi - nel commento alle Sentenze e piu nettamente nella Dispiitatio de scientia theologiae (1245)115 - svolge in tutta la sua complessita il tema utrum theologia sit scientia, mettendo in evidenza il difficile rapporto fra il modello epistemologico aristotelico e la riflessione teologica. Viene in primo piano Pambiguita del paragone tra i principi non dimostrati da cui muove il discorso scientifico (per se noti o dati da una scienza superiore) e gli articuli fidei accolti in forza della rivelazione, ed e quindi messa in discussione la possibilita di applicare alia teologia la teoria della subalternazione che costituisce, come notava Chenu, "le pivot sur lequel est bade et la preuve par laquelle est demontree la structure de la theologie comme science".
Se PAquinate affermera con decisione 1'analogia fra la perspective che si subalterna alia geometria e la scienza teologica che si subalterna alia scienza di Dio e dei beati, gia 1'anonimo di Douai, discutendo del medesimo problema ("quod linea visualis habeat se ut scientia subalternans et subalternata, ita videtur quod scientia de Deo et creaturis se habeant"), aveva notato: "Nee est ratio ea univocans"; con piu precise e articolato discorso Odo Rigaldi sottolineava una differenza radicale:
in hoc est differentia, quia in aliis scientiis suppositiones sunt manifestae ipsi rationi sine adminiculo extrinseco... Sed in theologia indigent adminiculo gratiae fidei.
L. Sileo, Teoria della scienza teologica. Quaestio de scientia theologiae di Odo Rigaldi e altri testi inediti (1230-1250), 2 voll., Roma, 1984. I testi di Odo nel II vol., ove sono pubblicate fra 1'altro la "quaestio" De subiecto theologiae del ms. Douai 434, I, f. 101 ra (pp. 115-16) e la Quaestio de divina scientia nelle due redazioni del ms. Praga, Univ. IV, D. 13, ff. 79rb-80vb e del ms. Bib. Vat., Vat. lat. 782, ff. 123ra- 124rb (pp. 131-148, 151-164): per la possibile datazione di questi testi, vol. I, pp. 71- 76. E' merito del Sileo aver insistito suH'importan/.a del dibattito sulla teologia come scienza nel corso degli anni Trenta e Quaranta del Duecento e averne pubblicato cospicui documenti.
48 Gregory
Per questo propriamente la teologia e sapientia, come Aristotele defmisce sapienza la metafisica in quanto "cognitio causarum altissi- marum"; puo invece dirsi scientia "quantum ad conclusiones ex illis principiis illatas", ma non simpliciter, sed fidei. U(
Nella complessa elaborazione teorica della teologia come scienza, problema che ormai tutti i maestri erano obbligati ad affrontare in via preliminare commentando le Sentenze, la posizione di Tommaso d'Aquino (nelle diverse ma omogenee formulazioni, dal giovanile commcnto al Lombardo sino al commento al De Trinilate di Boezio e alia Summa theologica] e determinante perche conduce qucll'elaborazione all'esito piu radicale, assumcndo in tutta la sua valenza la dottrina della subalter- nazione e fondando su di essa il carattere eminentemente speculativo della scienza teologica: qucsta, traendo i suoi principi (quae sunt articuli fidei} dalla scienza di Dio, procede discurrendo de principiis ad conclusiones e ricostruisce nei modi umani 1'ordine della conoscenza e della realta sub ratione Dei. Non meraviglia quindi che il dibattito sulle possibilita di applicare alia teologia il metodo del discorso scientifico abbia come punto di riferimento costante 1'Aquinate, tornando a mettere in discussione la validita del parallelismo fra i principi di una scienza subalterna e gli articuli fidei in nome di una rigorosa interpetazione della teoria aristotelica.
Non videtur convenienter dictum scriye Gerardo da Bologna ricordando la tesi tomista - quod ad racionem scientie subalterne sufficiat scientcm credere habenti superiorem scienciam, sicut musicus credit principiis sibi traditis ab arismetrico, et perspectives principiis sibi traditis a gcometra; et eodem modo, ut dicunt, sacra doctrina credit principia revelata a deo
cosi da estendere alia teologia la nozione di scienza subalterna per sostenerc che "eciam fidelis potest habere scienciam de illis que concluduntur ex articulis fidei". "Ista stare non possunt", insiste Gerardo, perche dei "principia fidei" si ha noticia enigmatica et obscura, niente affatto evidens ed e quindi "impossibile quod de conclusionibus habcatur sciencia sive noticia evidens, et hec ratio traditur a Philosopho..."; falsum est id quod assumitur, conclude contestando il valore epistemologico della teoria della subalternazione in campo tcologico. E' evidente infatti, aveva sostenuto Goffredo di Fontaines, che
1 Odo Rigaldi, Quaestio de scientia theologiae, cd. Sileo, p. 13; per 1'anonimo del ms. Douai 434, h>i, p. 116.
Forme di conoscenza e ideali di sapere 49
ex principiis creditis vel opinatis non acquiritur certa scicntia de conclusione. Nee est differentia in hoc inter principia quorum est habitus fidei et opinionis... Et idep sicut irrationale est dicere quod ex j>rincipiis solum opinatis acquiritur certa scientia cqnclusionum ex ipsis elicitarum, ita etiam in proposito ex principiis creditis.
Pretendere di costruire una scienza in senso proprio muovendo dagli articuli fidei "est dicere contradictoria... nullus sanae mentis intelligit quod scientia subalternata sit vere scientia", conclude, ricordando a proposito dal paragone di subalternazione fra perspectiva e geometria che "numquam erit perfectus in perspectiva qui non fuerit instructus in geometria per scientiam superiorem".
Non diversa la reazione di Pietro d'Auriol:
falsum est... quod articuli fidei sint principia in nostra theologia... stare non potest - insiste polemicamente contro Tommaso d'Aquino - quod dicit ad scientiam subalternam sufficere notitiam creditivam respectu principiorum, nee exigi respectu eorum alium habitum nisi fidem... impossibile est quod conclusio scientifice cognoscatur quocumque habitu scientiae etiam subalternae, et quod principium tantummodo credatur et teneatur habitu creditivo... noc est omnino falsum.
Se fosse vera Panalogia proposta dalPAquinate il perspectivus non potrebbe mai divenire geometra, cioe conoscere dimostrativamente i principi ricevuti dalla scienza subalternante, il che e evidentemente falso, mentre il teologo non potra mai avere simile conoscenza degli articuli da cui precede:
si fides esset habitus principiorum perspectivi, numquam aliquis simul esset geometra et perspectivus... ergo non est verum quod scientia siibalternata procedat ex principiis cognitis haoitu creditivo.
Le prime dodici questiones della Summa di Gcrardo da Bologna sono edite da P. de Vooght, Les sources de la doctrine chretienne, Bruges, 1954: per i luoghi cit., pp. 309- 310; Petri Aureoli Scriptum super Primum Sententiarum, proem, sect. 1, ed. E.M. Buytaert, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. 1952, vol. I, pp. 140-141; Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines, par M. De Wulf-A. Pelzer, Louvain, 1904, Quod. IV, q. 10, pp. 261-263; cfr. anche Quod. IX, q. 20, ed. J. Hoffmans, Louvain 1928, pp. 188-189. Non diversamente Giovanni di Bassolis, discepolo di Duns Scoto, sottolineava che "in quocumque processu theologie que est circa mere theologica principium est creditum tantum... ergo impossibile est quod conclusio per istum habitum unquam sit scita...", per questo la teologia nostra "nee est scientia nee possibile est ipsam esse propriam scientiam sicut impossibile est hominem esse asinum"; parimenti categorico il rifiuto dell'analogia di subalternazione: "non potest aliquis scire perspectivam nisi habeat evidentiam principiorum vel sciat ea reducere in sensum immediate vel in prima principia que omni intellectui stanti nota sunt ex terminis... Dico quod aliquem scire perspectivam et non geometriam est unum nihil dictu et ignorare vocem propriam" (Opera Joannis de Bassolis... In quatuor Sententiarum libros, Parisiis 1517, Questio prol. 5, a. 3 e 4, f. 21vb-22ra; 22rb; si sono corretti alcuni evident! errori di stampa). Tommaso d'Aquino collocava nella dinamica del passaggio dalla fede alia visione la
50 Gregory
Dal canto suo Occam defmira pucrili le posizioni di Tommaso d'Aquino e per gli stessi argomenti:
Unde nihil est dicere quod ego scio conclusiones aliquas, quia tu scis principia quibus ego credo, quia tu dicis ea. Et eodem modo puerile est dicere quod ego scio conclusiones theologiae, quia Deus scit principia quibus ego credo, quia ipse revelat ea.
Inutile ricordare che una precisa separazione fra il metodo dimostrativo del discorso scientifico e il metodo tcologico era stata fortemente sottolineata da Sigieri:
pessime volunt procedere illi qui in ilia scientia [scil. theologia quac est sacra scriptura] volunt procedere in omnibus modo demonstratiyo. Principia enim demonstrations dcbent esse riot a > via sensus, memoriae et experiment!. Principia autem illius scicntiae nota sunt... per revelationem divinam.
Obiezioni che colpiscono tutta la teoria tomista della subaltematio
sottolineando la divaricazione fra la scienza secondo Aristotele e la
scientia fidei e imponendo di riscontro alia teologia uno statuto radicalmente diverso:
Nam Philosophus - aveva scritto Gerardo da Bologna - qui ea que de subalternacionc scienciarum dicuntur vidctur quasi primus et solus tradidisse, nunquam posuit subalternacionem inter fidem vel opinionem et scienciam, scd solum inter scienciam et scicnciam.11
possibilita di conoscerc (sicut modo principia demonstrationist gli articuli fidei: "in future, quando Deus videbitur per essentiam, articuli crunt ita per se noti, et visi, sicut modo principia demonstrationis" (/// Sent., d. 24, q. I, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 2); "huius scientiae principium proximum est fides, sed primum est intcllectus divinus, cui nos credimus, sed finis fidei est in nobis, ut perveniamus ad intelligendum quac credimus, sicut si inferior sciens addiscat supcrioris scientis scientiam, et tune fient ei intellccta vel scita, quae prius erant tantummodo credita" (Super libnim Boethii De Trinitate, q. 2, a. 2 ad 7).
' Guillclmi dc Ockham Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, Ordinatio, lib. I, prol., q. VII, in Opera philosophica ct theologica cura Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae, ed. G. Gal, St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1967, p. 199; Sigier de Brabant, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, lib. VI, q. 1, comm. I, ed. W. Dunphy, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1981, p. 361.
119 Gerardo da Bologna, Summa, ed. cit., p. 305; cfr. pp. 306, 309. Anche i piu fcdeli discepoli di Tommaso sono costretti a difendere la teoria della subaltematio con sottili distinzioni e restringendone 1'uso: "Unde mihi vidctur - scrive Hervaeus Natalis nella Defensa doctrinae D. Thomae - quod, quando frater Thomas in aliquo loco dicit, theologiam esse scientiam subalternam, quod non intcndit, quod theologia sic sit scientia subalterna, quantum ad hoc, quod scientia subalterna inventa ab homine habet processum scientificum, sed quantum ad hoc, quod habet similitudinem cum ea" (testo edito dal Krebs, Thcologie und Wissenschaft nach der Lehre der Hochscholastik (Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittelalters, Bd. XI, 3-4), Munster i. W. 1912, p. 37*, cfr. anche p. 10*).
Forme di conoscenza e idea I i di sapere 51
Ne meno interessante sarcbbc ripcrcorrcre un'altra serie di obiezioni, mosse dal rifiuto di chiudere nei procedimcnti universalizzanti del discorso aristotelico le realta contingenti di cui e tcssuta la storia sacra. Odo Rigaldi nella sua Disputatio de scientia theologiae avcva insistentemcnte riproposto il dilemma fra Pepistemologia aristotclica e il discorso teologico:
Item, "omnis scientia est de universalibus et incorruptibilibus", sicut dicit Philosophus; sed theologia est de singularibus et corruptibilibus Quantum ad magnam sui partem (ut de historialibus quae sunt gesta circa singularia), ergo theologia non est scientia, - aut ilia non sunt de theologia, quod manifeste falsum est.
La risposta a questa obiezione era stata complessa e sfumata: ammesso che la theologia non sia scientia se il termine e preso proprie (sic est nomeri) ma solo se si prende communiter come "intellectiva cognitio certa", i singularia, gli historialia possono rietrare nella teologia in quanto vengono assunti non secondo la lettera - cioe nella loro individuality storica - ma "quantum ad sensum interiorem", come segni e esempi di valore universale ("et ratione illius habent universalitetem"). Sed non est sic in aliis scientiis, annota come insoddisfatto, proponendo un'altra soluzione con la quale si e del tutto fuori dalla logica del discorso scientifico: le scienze infatti che procedono per humanam rationem non possono mai giungere a una conoscenza certa delle realta individuali ("circa singularia non potest ratio humana certa reperiri"); la teologia invece e scienza capace di conseguire, anche dei gesta singularia, una conoscenza assolutamente certa - pari in evidenza alia matematica - per lumen fidei substratum: "unde - conclude - possunt cadere singularia in hac scientia; non sic autem in aliis scientiis".120
La distanza fra scienza aristotelica e teologia viene cosi fortemente sottolineata e gli historica sono acquisiti di pieno diritto, nella loro
Odo Rigaldi, Quaestio, cit., pp. 6, 11, 15-17. Non diversamente la Summa Halesiana: "scientia... est intelligibilium; relinquitur ergo quod doctrina Theologiae non est scientia. Item, sicut dicit Philosophus, in principio Metaphysicae: 'Experientia singularium est, ars vero universalium..."; sed doctrina Theologiae pro magna parte non est universalium, sed singularium, ut patet in narratione historica; relinquitur ergo quod non est ars vel scientia"; e la risposta: "Introducitur ergo in historia sacrae Scripturae factum singularc ad significandum universale, et inde est quod eius est intellectus et scientia" (Alexandri de Hales Summa theologica, I, tract, intr., q. I, c. 1, ed. Studio et cura PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, t. I, Ad Claras Aquas, 1924, pp. 1-2; 3). Per il complesso problema dei rapporti di priorita fra Odo Rigaldi e la compilazione della Summa, cfr. ed. cit., t. IV, Prolegomena, Ad Claras Aquas, 1948, pp. CXCIX sgg.; Sileo, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 76 sgg. (e la precedente bibliografia ivi citata). Ricorre insistente il richiamo ad Agostino: "Alia sunt quae semper creduntur, et numquam intelliguntur: sicut est omnis historia, temporalia et humana gesta percurrrens" (De div. quaest. LXXXIII, q. 48, P.L. 40, 31).
52 Gregory
singolarita, all'interno di una scientia il cui statute e radicalmente diverse da quello definite ncgliAnalitici.
II problema non sfugge a Tommaso d'Aquino che sceglie la soluzione restata marginale in Odo Rigaldi: alPobiezione "scientia non est de singularibus. Sed sacra doctrina tractat dc singularibus...", egli risponde abbassando Yhistoria a livello di exemplum :
singularia traduntur in sacra doctrina, non quia de eis principalitcr tractetur, sed intrpducuntur turn in exemplum vitae sicut in scientiis moralibus, turn etiam ad declarandum auctoritatem virorum per quos ad nos revelatio divina processit.
Quanto piu rigoroso pretendera di essere il metodo scientifico nel discorso teologico, tanto piu netto sara il distacco dalle categoric storiche della rivelazione, della teologia scienza dall'esegesi: e la tendenza che si manifestera nel tomismo posteriore. Ma gia Pietro d'Auriol, in serrata polemica con 1'Aquinate, denunciava il rischio di distruggerc la teologia ("magna pars habitus thcologici detruncaretur") se si riducesse il suo oggetto alle verita nccessarie e immutabili; la thcologia noslra e infatti tutta tessuta di realta contingenti, di interventi di Dio nella storia:
clarum est quod in theologia nostra tractantur multae veritates contingentcs, quod Christus fuit incarnatus et mundus creatus, et similia, quae pendent mere ex voluntate divina
per questo non puo essere scienza. "Relinquitur igitur praedicta positio - si riferisce a Tommaso - ut impossibilis ad tcnendum".122 II problema e cruciale e torna insistente:
Particularia gesta, quibus tota scriptura plena est, faciunt dubitationem an theologia sit scientia
aveva annotate Ulrico di Strasburgo. Piu ancora che nella discussione sull'analogia fra i principia e gli articuli fidci, si pone qui il dilemma fra la storicita del messaggio cristiano e I'intemporalita del discorso scientifico; un'obiezione torna costante nel corso delle quaestiones, sin dalle prime battute: "scientia non est de singularibus", "scientia est de intelligibilibus et universalibus". Se per questo molti maestri rifiutavano di considerare la teologia una scienza nel senso proprio del termine, altri - per rispondere alPobiezione - anche sc davano alia scienza teologica fondamenti ed esiti non riducibili all'epistemologia aristotelica, erano condotti a risolvere la singolarita dell'evento, la temporalita della lettera,
Tommaso d'Aquino, Summa theologica, I, q. 1, a. 2 ad secundum. Petri Aureoli Scriptum, proem, sectio 1, ed. cit., pp. 144-145.
Forme di conoscenza e ideali di sapere 53
entro paradigm! di valore universale, strumenti dell'economia divina. Cosi Ulrico di Strasburgo, pur assumendo il tcrmine scientia "communiter... pro omni firma apprehensione", e piu decisamcntc Enrico di Gand che difendc il carattere scientifico della tcologia, pur riservando 1'evidenza dclla cononoscenza teologica ai pochi invcstiti di una spccialc illuminazione ("simplicitcr et absolute dicendum quod ista est certissima scicntiarum, quia est de rebus certissimis in sua veritate et ex parte scientis securissima et evidentissima viro spirituali lumine intellectual! illustrate"): le gesta della storia sacra non rientrano come tali nella loro singolarita (sensibilia historica), nella scienza teologica, ma solo con funzione pedagogica, esplicativa:
hoc modo historiae et gesta particularia et sensibilia in hac scientia introducuntur, non tarn propter necessitatem scientiae, quam propter declarationem eorum quae pertinent principaliter ad scientiam... Unde et ista sensibilia historica in hac scientia sunt quasi exempla in aliis.
Ma la contingenza radicale che sottende tutta la storia della salvezza torna insistente a negare il carattere di scienza alia teologia: in una quaestio dedicata all'esame delle varie tesi sul metodo teologico, e in serrata polemica con la teoria del lumen supematiirale di Enrico di Gand, Giacomo di Therines insisteva sul carattere peculiare degli oggetti propri del discorso teologico,
quarum necessitas et exigentia dependet ex divina ordinatione et arbitrio libere yoluntatis, sicut quod mundus inceperit et quod tempore determinate Filius Dei sit incarnatus, et quod substantia pams convertatur in corpus Christi; et quia talia vera sunt - proseguiva - de facto et in ordine ad Deum, poterunt aliter se nabere, quia potuisset non incarnari; ideo de tahbus non est scientia
Eroprie aicta, quia scientia est eorum que impossibile est aliter se abere et que sui impermutabilem substantiam sortiuntur.
Enrico di Gand, Summae quaestionum ordinariarium, in aedibus lodoci Badii Ascensii 1520 (reprint St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1953), a. VI, q. 2, fo. XLIXv, XLIIIr. Ulrico di Strasburgo che aveva awertito in manicra pungente il problema, e della teologia - scientia affectiva o sapientia - sottolineava il limite in noi ("in se scientia est, et tamen in nobis non general scientiam, sed fidem... que tamen fides etiam scientia vocatur"), non rinunciava ad assorbire i gesta negli exempla unh-ersalia o in strumenti della pedagogia divina: "Omnia autem particularia huius scientie vel sunt manuductiones nostri materialis intellectus in divina, ut sunt aparitiones Dei et huiusmodi, vel sunt universalia exempla vivendi, ut gesta Patrum et ipsius christi" (Summa de bono, lib. I, tr. 2, 2, ed. J. Daguillon, Paris, 1930, p. 30).
La quaestio di Giacomo di Therines e stata pubblicata da J. Leclercq, "La theologie comme science d'apres la litterature quodlibetique", Recherches de theologie ancienne et medie\'ale, XI (1939), pp. 351-374 (il testo di Giacomo alle pp. 360-365, il luogo cit. a p. 361, corretto in un punto; cfr. la conclusione, p. 364: "quod theologia quam habent et habuerunt communiter Sancti et Doctores de Deo, secundum statum presentis vite, non sit scientia").
54 Gregory
Come salvare il contingente, che inerisce alia storia della salvezza, nelle strutture del discorso teologico non e peraltro che uno degli aspetti di un piu ampio problema della fede cristiana, ove 1'esperienza della contingenza costituisce un elemento portante: per questo esso ritorna in tutte le zone delle riflessione teologica e investe anzitutto la scienza propria di Dio e il suo conoscere ab aetemo quello che contingcntemente si realizza nel tempo. Proprio discutendo delle vcrita contingenti "in primo obiecto theologico" in rapporto allo statute epistemologico della scienza, Duns Scoto e condotto a delineare le condizioni trascendentali del conoscere in Dio e a privilegiare (perfectior est) il criterio della certezza e deU'evidenza rispetto alia necessita dell'oggetto ("in scientia illud pcrfectionis est, quod sit cognitio certa et evidens; quod autem sit de necessario obiecto, haec est condicio obiecti, non cognitionis"), proponendo un modello non riconducibile agli Analitici, mcntre Giovanni di Ripa, discutendo della conoscenza dei futuri contigenti, e condotto a porre in Dio stesso la ratio contingens rispondente "cuilibet vero contingenti de creatura" cosi da introdurre "la contingence dans I'entedement archetype meme, lieu de 1'intelligible".125
In tutto 51 complesso dibattito "utrum theologia sit scientia" si awerte che non era solo in gioco un'astratta possibilita di far rientrare il discorso teologico negli schemi del discorso scientifico teorizzato negli
124 Joannis Duns Scoti Ordinatio, prol., pars 4, q. 1, Opera omnia... studio et cura Commissionis Scotisticac... pracside C. Balic, Civitas Vaticana, vol. I, 1950, pp. 144-145; ivi, pp. 145-146: "Si igitur aliqua alia cognitio est certa et evidens, et, quantum est de se, perpctua, ipsa vidctur in sc formaliter perfection quam scientia quae rcquirit necessitatem obiecti. Scd contingcntia ut pertinent ad theologiam nata sunt habere cognitionem certam et cvidentem ct, quantum est ex parte evidentiae, perpetuam... Igitur contingentia ut pertinent ad theologiam nata sunt habere pcrfectiorem cognitionem quam scientia de ncccssariis acquisita.
Sed numquid cognitio eorum est scientia? Dico quod secundum illam rationem scientiae positam I Posteriomm, quae requirit necessitatem obiecti, non potest de eis esse scientia, quia cognoscerc contingens ut nccessarium, non est cognosccre contingens; tamen secundum quod Philosophus accipit scientiam in VI Ethicorum, ut dividitur contra opinionem et suspicionem, bene potest de eis esse scientia, quia et habitus quo determinate verum dicimus. Magis tamen proprie potest dici quod theologia est sapientia secundum se, quia de necessariis contentis in ea ipsa habet evidentiam et necessitatem et certitudinem, et obiectum perfect issimum et altissimum et nobilissimum. Quantum autcm ad contingentia, habet evidentiam manifestam de contingentibus in se visis ut in obiecto theologico, et non habet evidentiam mendicatam ab aliis prioribus; unde notitia contingentium ut habetur in ea magis assimilatur intellectui principiorum quam scientiae conclusionum".
125 Jean de Ripa, Conclusions, ed. A. Combes, Paris 1957, pp. 229-230; cfr. P. Vignaux, La philosophic medievale dans le temps de I'Eglise, ora in De Saint Anselme a Luther, Paris 1976, p. 75.
Forme di conoscenza e ideali di sapcre 55
Analitici: era in discussione la possibilita c la natura della riflcssionc teologica fra la fede e la visone bcatifica. Dictro le obiezioni contro 1'analogia fra gli articuli fidei e primi principi (con il rifiuto della subalternazione della teologia alia scienza di Dio), dietro 1'insistenza sul carattere contingente delle verita della storia sacra oggetto proprio del sapere teologico e quindi sul modus historialis, exemplificativus, revelativus, sybmolicus della sacra doctrina126 legata all'esegesi e alia sua dimensione temporale, si awerte la preoccupazione che la verita rivelata - di assoluta evidenza per Dio e per i beati - perda nel discorso teologico il suo carattere enigmatico e simbolico proprio dell'oggetto di fede: di qui la divaricazione - sottolineata da Gerardo da Bologna - fra la certitudo evidencie della scienza e la certitudo veritatis o securitas adesionis propria della teologia e della fede; scienza la teologia non e, ma per la certezza che la caratterizza impegna assai piu di quella: nessuno infatti andrebbe incontro alia morte per difendere una verita matematica, mentre per la fede - ove e in gioco la salvezza - anche 1'eretico, che segue senza saperlo dottrine false, "ita exponit vitam, et ita sibi caput amputari dimittit... sicut et catholicus".127
Andrebbero anche approfonditi i valori diversi di cui il termine scientia si viene caricando, per identificarsi o distinguersi dal sapere teologico: 1'insistenza posta nel differenziare la scienza aristotelicamente intesa dalla sacra dottrina, anche in chi ne sostiene 1'analogia, la distinzione fra scienza divina inspiratione e Humana inve.ntione ("scientia aliter accipitur apud theologos et sanctos, et aliter apud Aristotelem", sottolineava Roberto di Kilwardby), 1'uso ricorrente delle espressioni scientia large o improprie per la teologia, il suo coniugarsi costante con la scientia secundum affectum pietatis o sapientia a sapore affectionis carica di significati etici e religiosi (onde minus proprie "prima philosophia, quae est theologia philosophorum... dicitur sapientia", notava la Summa Halesiana), il dibattito se la teologia sia scienza pratica o speculativa o si ponga al di la di tali distinzioni come scientia affectiva, sono tutti segni di un problematico rapporto.128
\
Cfr. M.-D. Chenu, La theologie comme science, cit., pp. 41, 43.
Gerardo da Bologna, Summa, ed. cit., p. 300. Sulla certitudo evidentiae propria della scienza e la certitudo adhaesionis della theologia (come scientia fidei) cfr. Goffredo di Fontaines, Quod. IX, q. 20, ed. Hoffmans, cit., pp. 287-288.
1?8
' Per le espressioni cui si allude nel testo, cfr. Roberti Kilwardby De natura
theologiae, ed. Fr. Stegmuller, Monasterii 1935, p. 41-42; il luogo citato prosegue:
56 Gregory
Ne andranno dimenticati altri modi di dare al discorso teologico modelli scientific! estranei all'orizzonte aristotelico: basterebbe ricordare il compito eminentemente apologetico e teologico dell'arte lulliana che alia scientia instabilis fondata sulla logica tradizionale vuole sostituire um metodo argomcntativo i cui principi siano i principi stessi della realta - quindi Dio e le "dignita divine" - per dedurre da questi (per causas superiores} in maniera infallibile, secondo precise simbologie e modelli combinatori, 1'intera struttura del reale; arte "suprema omnium humanarum scientiarum" in cui logica e metafisica coincidono ("ista ars est et logica et metaphysica"), capace di ripercorrere la ratio della creazione e penetrare la ratio fidei facendo emergere le rationes necessariae che soggiacciono ai piu alti misteri.129 Per molti aspetti 1'arte di Lullo pud considerarsi un tentativo di dare una struttura apodittica e un fondamento metafisico al metodo teologico di Anselmo e di Riccardo di San Vittore, autori ai quali costantemente si riferisce.
Ma il problema del metodo della scienza teologica si pone anche fuori da un diretto riferimento alia sacra pagina, con significativo recupero della dialettica neoplatonica riscoperta, al di la della tradizione dionisiana, nelle opere capital! di Proclo tradotte da Guglielmo di Moerbeke. Basta leggere le pagine iniziali del grande commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg alia Elementatio thcologica di Proclo: qui la scienza teologica quale si scandisce nel testo procliano si propone - alia luce della tradizione platonica e neoplatonica, ermetica e dionisiana - come "philosophia omnium scientiarum excellentissima seu divinissima et difficillima", le cui "regulae" sono costituite dalle praepositones dc\\' Elementatio "in quibus est sermo de divinis sive dc Deo" "extra publicam rationum viam". Scientia dignissima che precede "secundum coordinationem et disgregationem theorematum sive elementorum", essa permette uno "scalaris ascensus per rationem indeatam ad rationem
Theologi enim et sancti scitum dicunt omne quod mcntc cognoscitur, sive credatur sive videatur. Sed Aristoteles nihil dicit scitum nisi conclusionem causaliter demonstratam... Unde iliac rationes de Aristotele sumptae non contingunt Sacram Scripturam, nee usquam locum hahent nisi in scientiis humana investigatione inventis" (pp. 42^3); Alexandri de Hales Summa theologica, tract, intr. q. I, c. 1, ed. cit., t. I, p. 2; Ulrico di Strasburgo, Summa dc bono, I, tr. 2, c. IV, pp. 36-37 (in dipendenza da Alberto Magno, I Sent., d. 1, ad. 4, ed. Borgnet, p. 19a).
Raymundi Lulli Introductoria Artis demonstrativae, 1, in Opera, Maguntiae 1722, t. Ill, p. 1.
Forme di conoscenza e ideali di sapere 57
divinam"130 collocandosi come sapientialis scientia al di la dclla mctafisica pcrchd non e solo scicnza del primi principi di Aristotclc (principiorum entiiim), "scd ctiam principiorum, quac sunt super entia" ("sapientia non solum entium sed superentium").131 Questa divinalis sapientia che procede secundum modum proprium scientiae, trova il suo fondamento in quel superiore principium cognitivum che Platone, Proclo e Dionigi chiamano unum animae vel unitas, perche 1'anima "efficiatur quasi Deus".
L'irruzione deU'esperienza neoplatonica spezza gli schemi degli Analitici (validi solo "usque ad intellectualem cognitionem"), propone un modello di scientia che, con un itinerario diverso da quello della sacra doctrina, recupera la piu alta dialettica platonica - scientia platonica1^2 - e con essa una tradizione piu antica e autorevole della stessa filosofia peripatetica:
Plato autem et ante Platonem theologi laudant cognitionem supra intellectum, quam divulgant esse divinam maniam, et dicunt ipsam talem cognitionem esse unum animae - in tali enim uno, quoc vocal Dionisius... "unitionem (vel secundum aliam translationem unitatem) superexaltatam supra mentis (seu intellectus) naturam", idem est cognitivum et cognitio... sed cognitivum huius nostrae divinalis theologiae est excedens non solum cognitiva omnium scientiarum, sed etiam excedit... ipsum intellectum, qui secundum auctorem ibi supra in nobis est melior omni scientia et est ipsius animae.
II presentarsi di un ideale di sapere come divinalis philosophia -
... . i"Vl
supers apientia eppure venssime et propmssime scientia - in cui convergono Platone e Proclo, Ermete Trismegisto e Dionigi, e testimonianza significativa della molteplicita dei modelli conoscitivi che si delineano nella cultura medievale; e non e casuale se Giovanni da Ripa potra assimilare 1'esperienza mistica, e la theologia mystica, a una forma di sapere scientifico (notitia scientifica). In particolare si dovra insistere sul significato e 1'importanza della tradizione neoplatonica - resa piu precisa dalle traduzioni di Proclo - per orientare una critica filosofica della metafisica e della noetica di Aristotele come metafisica e noetica del finito: "omne esse dicit clausionem finitatis alicuius" si leggeva nello
Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio super Elcincntationcm theologicam Prodi, ed. M.R. Pagnoni Sturlese-L. Sturlese, Hamburg 1984, Exposilio tituli, pp. 47-49.
Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, cit., Praeamb., pp. 66-67.
1 ^9
Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, cit., Praeamb., pp. 61, 65, 68.
Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, cit., Praeamb., p. 65.
134
Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, cit., Praeamb., p. 69.
58 Gregory
pseudo-ermetico Liber XXIV philosophomm, tcsto ben noto a Eccart: la critica eccartiana dell'ontoteologia - ove Vauctoritas del Liber de causis ("prima rcrum creatarum est esse") si congiunge con 17/z principle erat Verbum del Vangelo giovanneo - segna una svolta fondamentale, con la netta affermazione del primato in Dio dcirintelligcre, fondamento deU'esse;136 op/.ionc che orienta tutta la teoria della conoscenza sino agli esiti estremi della speculazione estatica. La ripresa di temi platonici porta sempre a circoscrivere la scien/.a aristotelica all'umbratile mondo "dalla sfera della terra alia luna", mentrc "secundum Augustinum et Platonem intellectus, veritas, virtus, scientia sunt de mundo et regione super- naturali".
Sul limite intrinseco alia filosofia aristotelica insisteva del resto tutta la tradizione agostiniana: non solo perche I'esperienza cristiana ha fatto conoscere agli indotti quello che non avevano compreso i filosofi ("quae latuerunt philosophos et nunc manifestae sunt Christianis simplicibus"),138 ma anche per scclte precise compiute da Aristotele rispetto a Platone, quindi prima e fuori di quella esperienza: infatti - insiste Bonavcntura poi costantemente riprcso - proprio la negazione della dottrina dclle idee c dclPilluminazionc e stata la causa degli errori di Aristotele su Dio, sulla Prowidcnza, sull'immortalita delPanima, mentre 1'insegnamento platonico, integrato da Agostino con la dottrina del Verbo, apriva la via a riconosccre in Cristo il "medium omnium scientiarum", il fondamento quindi di tutto il sapere filosofico in quanto egli e "medium" come "veritas", "principium essendi et cognosccndi":
Verbum ergo exprimit Patrem et res... Hoc est medium mctaphysicum reducens, et haec est tota nostra metaphysical de emanatione, de exemplaritate, de consummatione, scilicet illuminari per radios spirituales et reduci ad summum.
1 Liber XXIV philosophonim, ed. Cl. Bacumkcr (Beitrage zur Gesch. dcr Philosophic und Theol. dcs Mittclalters, XXV, 1-2) Munstcr Wcstf. 1927, p. 210.
' Magistri Ik-hardi Quaestioncs Parisienscs, I, cd. B. Gcyer, Die lateinischen Wcrkc, V, Stuttgart-Berlin 1936, pp. 4CM1; e cfr. il vol. collcttivo Maitre Eckhart a Paris, Une critique mcdic\'alc de I'onto-theologie, Paris 1984, che ne costituisce un commento (pubblicando, con trad, francese, le Quacstiones).
1 37
P.O. 'ITiery, "Le commcntaire dc Maitre Lxkhart sur le livre de la Sagcsse",
Archives d'hist. doctr. et lilt, du M. A., IV (1929-30), pp. 361, 306.
1 vt
' Bonaventurae Sent. ///, d. 24, a. 2, q. 3 ad 4, Opera, III, p. 524.
Bonavcnturae Collationes in Hexaemcron, I, 11, 13, 17, Opera, V, pp. 331-332; cfr. ed. F. Delorme, cit., p. 7.
Forme di conoscenza e ideali di sapere 59
Prospettiva nella qualc sarcbbc del tutto fuorviantc tcntarc di isolarc una filosofia indipcndcntc dalla riflessione tcologica, introducendo una distinzione rifmtata da Bonaventura e dagli agostiniani. Si dovra piuttosto sottolincare come proprio alia luce dell'esperienza cristiana si costruisca una teoria della conoscenza e del sapere • "teologia della conoscenza"140 - che dichiara chiusa e superata la filosofia pagana, anche se utilizza temi dei philosophi illuminati una volta inseriti, con i patriarch! e i profeti, nella storia della salvezza; la filosofia di Aristotele e in genere dei filosofi antichi rappresenta il frutto della ragione "iudicio proprio relicta", 1'inconsapevole assolutizzazione della condizione dell'uomo dopo il peccato, mentre diverse sono le possibilita della ragione illuminata dalla fede e dalla grazia: "Coacti sunt etiam philosophi confiteri - scrive Ruggero Marston - non sine gratia, divinitus a Deo data, posse ad veram philosophiam pervenire".14
Altre significative limitazioni alia teoria aristotelica della scienza erano peraltro dettate dalPesperienza della fede: di particolare rilievo, per gli sviluppi che avra nella speculazione scotista, la puntuale discussione di Roberto Grossatesta, nel corso del grande commento agli Analilici Secondi, sui modi e gli strumenti della conoscenza.
All'affermazione che e impossibile avere scienza dove manchi la sensazione (An. Post., I, 18, 81a38 sgg.), Grossatesta premette un discorso fortemente limitative per circoscrivere la teoria aristotelica allo stato dell'uomo dopo il peccato e difende la priorita, in linea di principio, di una conoscenza scientifica del tutto esente dal medio della sensibilila:
Dico tamen quod possibile est quamlibet scientiam esse absque sensus adminiculo. In mente enim divina sunt omnes scientie ab eterno et non solum est in ipsa cqgnitio universalium certa, sed etiam omnium singularium... Siminter intelligence recipientes irradiationem a lumine primo in ipso lumine primo vident omnes res scibiles universales et singulares... Est igitur in his que carent sensu scientia completissima. Et similiter si pars suprema anime humane, que vocatur intellectiva et que non est actus alicuius corporis neque egens in operatione sui propria instrumento cprporeo, non esset mole corporis corrupt! obnubilata et aggravata, ipsa per irradiationem acceptam a lumine superiori haberet cornpletarn scientiam absque sensus adminiculo, sicut habebit cum anima erit
Alludiamo alia felice formula piu volte suggerila da P. Vignaux: cfr. per es. fra i saggi raccolti nel volume De Saint Anselme a Luther, cit., pp. 71, 202.
Rogcri Marston Quaestiones disputatae, q. 2, ed. Coll. S. Bonav., Firenze- Quaracchi 1932, p. 187; cfr. testo di Bonaventura cit. alia n. 145.
60 Gregory
cxuta a corpore et sicut forte habent alioui penitus absoluti ab amore et phantasmatibus rerum corporalium.
II modo di conoscere proprio di Dio, dclle intelligen/e separate e delle anime libere dal corpo mette in crisi la tcoria aristotelica e la riconduce in un ambito storico determinato, del tutto prowisorio: essa e relativa alPintelletto umano quails est adhuc in nobis non quails debct esse secundum statum sui optimum. ^~
Se tutta la tradi/ione francescana lungo la scconda meta del XIII secolo accoglieva con sempre maggiore cautela la dottrina aristotelica della conoscenza, imponendo forti limiti alia tcoria dell'astrazionc e delle species, fino alia radicale posizione delPOlivi circa il primato della conoscen/a intellettiva diretta della rcalta individual ("actus cognitivus obiecti individualis est terminatus in ipsum, in quantum est hoc individuum et non aliud"),14" la critica del Grossatesta costituira un punto di riferimento importante per la forma/ione della dottrina scotista della conoscenza e della scienza: al commento del vescovo di Lincoln si riferira direttamente 1'autore del De anima (forse lo stesso Scoto) nel delimitare la dottrina aristotelica e tomista della conoscenza alia condizione umana dopo il peccato ("necessitas recurrendi ad phantasmata est nobis inflicta propter peccatum"): il procedimento astrattivo con tutta la sua problematica - diviene la descrizione di uno stato di fatto prowisorio (dc facto, pro statu isto} al quale Aristotele si e attenuto quiet nihil scivit de peccato /7/0,145 mentre ex natura potentiae si deve affermare la priorita dell'intuizione intellettuale senza ricorso al fantasma ("intellectus, exsistens eadem potentia naturaliter, cognoscet per se quiditatem substantiae immatcrialis", scrive Duns Scoto in diretta polemica con
142
Robcrtus Grossctcstc, Commentarius in Posteriorum Anafyticorum libros, cit., pp.
212-213.
Robcrtus Grossctcste, Commentarius, cit., p. 257.
144
Pctrus Johannis Olivi, Quacstiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, q. 72, ed. B.
Jansen, vol. Ill, Ad Claras Aquas 1926, p. 37.
145
Scoto (o di scuola), DC anima, q. 18, 4, Opera omnia, Lugduni 1639, II, p. 554B
(per 1'attribuzionc, cfr. 1'Intr. alle Opera omnia, cd. cit., vol. I, Civitas Vaticana 1950, p. 152). Si ricordi Bonaventura, // Sent., d. 30, a. 1, q. 1 Resp. (Opera, II, p. 716A) per la denuncia del limite intrinseco dci philosophi antichi i quali, seguendo una ratio "iudicio proprio relicta" e procedendo "per viam sensus et experientiae" hanno assolutizzato uno stato dell'uomo corrotto dal peccato, ignorando la condi/ione nella quale era stato creato ("eis videbatur esse valde rationabile hominem sic fuisse conditum; cum tamen catholicis doctoribus non solum fide, scd etiam rationum evidentia certitudinaliter eius contrarium appareat esse verum").
Fonne di conosccnza e ideali di sapcre 61
1'Aquinate)14' c quindi anchc la conoscen/.a dirctta del particolarc (singiilare est per se intelligibile}.
Tesi queste variamcntc present! nella tradizione francescana legate al problema della conoscenza di Dio e degli angeli, della scientia Christi e della visione beatifica ma che assumono in Scoto una particolare importanza perche orientano tutta la sua spcculazione, approfondendone la distanza dalle posizioni tomiste. Si dovra altresi sottolineare che nella rigorosa costruzione metafisica e teologica di Scoto si delinea con forza un modello di conoscenza e di sapere per il quale e determinante la dottrina del peccato e della grazia, e una nozione di Dio che non puo in alcun modo ricondursi nelPambito dclle strutture della filosofia aristotelica. Quest'ultima non e la filosofia, ma un sapere storicamente concluso - e intrinsecamente fallace superato
dall'csperienza cristiana la quale offre un ideale di sapere assoluto, identificato con la "teologia in se" - che ha per oggetto "Dio in quanto Dio" (Deus sub ratione deitatis) e "quae soli intellectui divino sunt naturaliter nota" - scienza propria di Dio (theologia divina), abissalmente distinta dalla "teologia in noi" (theologia nostra} come dalla filosofia prima:14 "Haec scientia nulli subalternatur... Nee etiam ipsa etiam sibi aliquam aliam subalternat".
La divaricazione fra una teologia in se, vera scienza, e una in noi che scienza propriamente non e, e per piu aspetti significativa e soggiace al dibattito teologico anche fuori della radicale teorizzazione di Scoto: era la contrapposizione fra due modelli di conoscenza, uno assoluto e proprio di Dio, Paltro relative allo stato dcll'homo viator.
Ideo dico aliter - scrive Guglielmo di Ware - quod accipiendo scientiam proprie et perfecte, haec scientia in se perfecta est, immo perfectissima, et hoc est ex eyidentia rei; homini tamen viatori, et hoc de lege communi, non est scientia.
Non diversamente Gerardo da Bologna affermera che le verita di fede oggetto della teologia "in se sunt magis noscibilia, quia et cerciora intellectui divino vel beato quam ea que sunt aliarum scienciarum", ma
Joannis Duns Scoti Ordinatio, I, d. 3, q. 3, in Opera omnia, cit., vol. Ill, Civitas Vaticana 1954, p. 70. Per le citazioni che seguono, Ordinatio, prol. pars 3, q. 4; pars 4, q. 2, in Opera omnia, cit., vol. I, pp. 102-103, 146.
147
Sul tema ha insistito tutta la storiografia, ma si vedano le acute considcrazioni di
P. Vignaux (op. cit., pp. 201-202) per situare Scoto nella storia della filosofia "par sa doctrine du savoir absolu identifie a la theologie".
148
' Guglielmo di Ware, / Sent., prol., q. 3 (Cod. Vindob. 1438, f. 5va) cit.
nell'apparato di Occam, Ordinatio, cit., vol. I, p. 193.
62 Gregory
non sono tali per 1'intelleUo dell'uomo in questa vita.149 Alia stessa distinzione fara ricorso Roberto di Holkot per scartare la tesi tomista sulla scientificita della teologia, divenuta tanto piu autorevole per la santificazione dell'Aquinate:
Quando autem dicit quod Theologia est scientia, vult dicere quod veritates Theologicae sunt in se scibiles, hoc est, ita verae quod de eis potent esse scientia, et tamen quod istae sint verae nos credimus tantum.r5i
Distinzione questa puntualmente connessa da Occam alle opposte obiezioni dei filosofi contro la teologia come scienza, obiezioni che per la loro coerenza non possono essere confutate dal teologo se non in base ad auctoritates:
Alii tencnt partem negativam. Et hoc dupliciter. Quidam, sicut philosophi, tenent quod ad omnem scientiam nobis possibilem possumus naturaliter attingere, et ideo nihil est credibile, mere nisi quod potcst sciri cvidenter. Sed ista opinio non potest imprpbari per rationes naturales sed tantum per auctoritates... Alia est opinio quae ponit quod quamvis credibilia possint evidcnter sciri, non tamen a nobis pro statu isto de communi lege.
Nella quaestio del Natale 1306, Giacomo di Therines aveva soslenuto:
nunquam enim aliquis usque ad ista tempora adducit aliquam rationem ad probandum aliquam conclusionem pure theologicam ratione cuius intellectus necessitetur ad assentiendum.
A un secolo dall'ingresso dell'aristotclismo nelle universita, la riflessionc cristiana sembra avere esaurito tutte le possibilita di assimilare un pensiero ad essa estraneo senza riuscire "de Aristotele haeretico facere omnino catholicum".
II fallimento di ogni tentativo concordislico e denunciato nei primi decenni del XIV secolo dal domenicano Roberto di Holkot in termini particolarmcnte efficaci:
potest dici generaliter quod non habemus ab aliquo philosopho demonstrative probatum quod aliquis angelus est, neque de deo, neque de aliquo incorporeo.
La rigorose dimostrazioni con le quali altri aveva ritenuto di costruire una teologia naturale non hanno alcun valore:
Gerardo da Bologna, Summa, cit., p. 299.
' Robert Holcot, Utrum thcologia sit scientia, cd. J.T. Mucklc, Mediaeval Studies, XX (1958), p. 147.
151 Guillelmi de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. VII, pp. 192-193; si ricordi una delle tesi condannate nel 1277: "Quod nihil est credendum, nisi per se notum, vel ex per se notis possit declarari" (Hissette, op. cit., p. 21); per il testo di Giacomo di Therines, cfr. J. Leclercq, art. cit., p. 364.
Forme di conoscenza e ideali di sapere 63
dico brevitcr quod nee Aristotcles nee aliquis homo umquam probavit hanc: deus est accipicndo propositioncm mcntalcm quam calholicus accipit.
Tutto quanto i filosofi, e soprattutto Arislotclc, hanno detto su realta immateriali c forsc solo un pallido rcsiduo di un sapcrc rivclato ai primi parent! ("vestigium umbrosum cognitionis dei a primis parentibus"), piu ancora un'ibrida mescolanza di speculazione filosofica e tradizioni religiose, non diversa da quella tentata da piu recenti teologi:
Philosophi auterrij turn quia curiosi, quia etiam ambitiosi, volentes reddere causam in omnibus etiam in his quae vulgus opinabatur, miscuerunt Philosophiam suam cum dictis legislatorum et prophetia fidei... non quod ipsi per naturalem rationem aliquod incorporeum, ut deum, vel angelum, vel animam esse convincerent... .
I percorsi diversi del pensiero medievale, la critica assidua della filosofia per le istanze della teologia, cosi fortemcnte sottolineate da Gilson, rendono a nostro awiso impossibile seguire 1'illustre maestro nel tentativo di individuare una "metafisica nuova" creata dalla teologia scolastica, fuori del tempo, la cui "verita", "independente de 1'etat de la science en tout moment de 1'histoire, reste aussi permanente que la lumiere de la foi dans laquelle elle est nee".153 Puo darsi che questa metafisica nuova - libera da ogni condizionamento storico - possa costituire un utile e pio sostegno ai fautori della philosophia perennis nel cielo dei purissimi enti di ragione ove anche la chimera puo rivendicare un suo posto; ma lo storico dovra piuttosto sottolineare come, pur partendo da una comune esperienza di fede, la riflessione teologica venga utilizzando e trasformando concetti filosofici ereditati dal passato cosi da creare sistemi speculativi diversi in rapporto alle differenti opzioni filosofiche, che ne condizionano a loro volta le strutture e gli esiti.
Con grande acutezza Tommaso d'Aquino registrava come le diversita fra le scuole teologiche passassero attraverso le differenti esperienze filosofiche dei maestri in sacra pagina, e dal canto suo Giovanni Peckham denunciava addolorato il rischio che tutto 1'edificio ecclesiastico crollasse
1 52
Robert Holcot, Utrum theologia sit scientia, cit., pp. 144-145, 149.
1 Et. Gilson, "Les recherches historico-critiqucs et 1'avenir de la scholastique", in Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda, Acta Congressus Scholastic! Internationalis, Romae anno sancto MCML celebrati, Romae 1951, p. 141.
64 Gregory
una volta abbandonate le fondamentali tcsi della tradi/ione agostiniana relative all'illuminazione divina e alle regiilae actemae, alle potenzc dell'anima, alle ragioni seminali: nc mcglio si potevano constatare i mutamenti profondi della cultura crisliana nel corso del secolo XIII, gli esiti diversi, i contrasti irriducibili.
Chi ne segua lo sviluppo, soprattutto dalla fine del XIII secolo, al di la delle polemiche fra i due ordini mendicanti ("cum doctrina duorum ordinum in omnibus dubitabilibus sibi paene penitus hodie adversetur", aveva scritto Peckham) e le variegate posizioni dei maestri, non potra non constatare la pluralita di prospcttive metafisiche e, con essc, i modi diversi di concepire e organizzare la sfera delle conoscenze di cui 1'uomo si ritiene capace. Quello che rendc omogenea la tradi/.ione speculativa medievale non e una metafisica unificante i diversi sistemi, ma la tensione continua fra la Parola di Dio e gli strumenti concettuali offerti dai diversi contesti cultural!, nella ricerca delle vie di intelligibility delPesperien/,a di fede e nella consapevolezza delle radical! novita contenute nella rivela/ione rispetto al patrimonio di conoscenze trasmesse dalla cultura "profana".
Non a caso, mentre dopo le condanne e la polemica dei corrcctoria 1'opera di Tommaso d'Aquino sembrava trovare un autorevole avallo nella sua canonizzazione, dal fronte della tradi/ione francescana - dopo le reviviscenze apocalittiche della seconda meta del XIII secolo - torna a esplodcre una radicale opposizione tanto al generoso concordismo dell'Aquinate, quanto, c piu duramente, al simmctrico e ordinato mondo aristotelico. Basta pensarc al rilievo che assume nel secolo XIV il tcma della potentia Dei absoluta che mette in crisi le slrutture della filosofia aristotelica portando alle estreme consegucnze un motivo che piu volte si era affacciato nella tradizione cristiana contro i tentativi di chiudere entro orizzonti di razionalita umana il Dio della Bibbia. Ed e inutile lo sforzo di quegli storici che tentano di circoscrivere a un ambito squisitamente teologico le conseguenze piu radicali della fede cristiana nel Dio principio creatore assolutamente libero: in realta quella fede nella potentia Dei absoluta non costituisce solo un richiamo costante alia radicale contingenza dell'ordine creato, ma investe tutto Pambito delle
Tommaso d'Aquino, // Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 2; Giovanni Peckham, Rcgistrum Epistolarum, III, pp. 871-872, 901 (lettere del 1 gcnn. 1285 e 1 giungo 1285), cfr. F. Ehrle, "John Pecham iiber den Kampf des Augustinismus", in Gesammelte Aufsdtze zur englischen Scholastik, Roma 1970, pp. 70-71, 75-76.
Forme di conoscenza e ideali di sapcre 65
conoscenze umanc c divicne uno strumento di analisi, verificazione c falsificazione delle piii sicure strutturc della filosofia aristotclica c dclla tcologia chc le aveva assuntc nell'ambito della sacra doctrina.
"Parisius, Parisius, ipse dcstruis ordinem Sancti Francisci".15- In realta proprio un franccscano, Guglielmo di Occam, esprime nclla maniera piu radicale il rifiuto di chiudcrc entro il "carcere aristotclico" 1'esperienza cristiana: e nota 1'ampiezza di applicazioni che assume in Occam il principle dell'onnipotenza divina (il "credo in unum Deum patrem omnipotentem") che, strettamente connesso alle piu sottili analisi logico- linguistiche, disarticola tutto 1'orizzonte della riflessione filosofica e teologica. II Venerabilis inceptor frantuma il mondo delle essenze ponendo la realta come tutta individuale e assoluta, oggetto di conoscenza intuitiva, riduce la categoria della relazione a un "nome di seconda imposizione", scompone le scienze - dalla teologia alia metafisica e alia fisica - in un aggregate di abiti, mette in crisi 1'ingenua fiducia ncll'adequatio rei et intellectus dissociando 1'oggetto e 1'intuizione e prospettando la possibilita della conoscenza intuitiva del non esistente.
Lungo il secolo XIV, mentre si vengono costruendo nuovi modelli logici e analitici con i piu arditi giochi dell'ipotesi e dell'immaginazione, si approfondisce la divaricazione tra il normale cursus naturae e 1'ordine della potentia Dei absoluta (tema variamente utilizzato entro e fuori la tradizione occamista), fra Pambito della scientia aristotelica e la veritas rei, apud Deum (come sottolinea Enrico di Harklay discutendo delPinfinito) ed entra in crisi 1'idea di una scienza fondata sull'evidentia simplex, posto che Dio puo causare la conoscenza del non esistente e creare 1'assenso a una proposizione falsa:
potest causare propositionem falsam et ponere in intellectu, Posse autem Deum precipere aliquod falsum credi, non est dubium etiam dicitur quod Deus posset obligare ad credendum contradictor ia.
Si e parlato di scetticismo, con termine equivoco e inutilmente gravato di valenze negative: meglio sara parlare di una critica della ragione aristotelica che puo orientarsi tanto nel senso di un ricorso a
' Dicta Bead Aegidii Assisiensis, Ad Claras Aquas, 1905, p. 91; cfr. Jacopone, Laude 91, 2: "Mai vedemo Parisi, che ane destrutt'Asisi" (Jacopone, Laude, ed. F. Mancini, Roma-Bari 1974, p. 293).
' Sul problema, sia permesso rinviare al mio saggio "La tromperie divine" nel vol. collettaneo Preuve et raisons a I'Univcrsite de Paris. Logique, ontologie et theologie au XIV* siede, ed. par Z. Katuza-P. Vignaux, Paris 1984, pp. 187-195 e, ivi, cfr. J.Fr. Genest, "Pierre de Ceffons et 1'hypothese du Dieu trompeur", pp. 197-214.
66 Gregory
Dio come principio fontale di verita, quanto verso un uso critico, limitato dalla ragione soddisfatta di un'evidentia secundum quid, e verso la definizione di un principio di evidenza non piu legato all'adaequatio e al solido mondo delle essenze.
Del resto non e un caso se proprio fra i modemi vicini all'occamismo, mentre sempre piu problematico diviene il ripercorrere le vie della scienza aristotelica ("philosophia Aristotelis - dira al termine di una lunga tradizione Pietro d'Ailly - seu doctrina magis debet dici opinio quam scientia"),157 1'attenzione si volge ai problemi del mondo del contingente, della natura e degli uomini, delle rcalta individuali.
"Quaelibet res singularis se ipsa est singularis": 1'assioma occamista orienta tutta una nuova teoria della conoscenza come intuizione diretta della rcalta individuale, non solo del senso ma dcll'intclletto:
obiectum motivum intellectus est praccisc singulare... omne singulare potest intelligi notitia intuitiva, quantum est ex natura animac et intellectus nostri.
II paradiso degli universal! dilcgua come un fie turn, insieme alia teoria della species e dell'individuazione tramite la materia; il concetto, ritrovato il suo esse obiectivum in anima, e ricondotto a immagine che "suppone" per molti o meglio a signum natural? che puo entrare in un sistema di proposizioni, oggetto di scienza, ma senza una propria realta fuori dell'anima ove il suo esse sta nell'esser conosciuto (eorum esse est eorum cognosci}.^ Giunge con Occam a termine un lento processo di erosione dell'assioma scnsus est pariicularium, intellectus universalium, con tutta la mctafisica che esso presupponeva, mentre assume nuova dignita il mondo degli individui i soli realmente esistenti: "Omne ens verum est particulare et si sic, ergo nullum univcrsale est verum ens".15'
Senza inoltrarsi nei pericolosi sentieri storiografici della continuita fra certe discussioni scientifiche del secolo XIV e le origini della scienza moderna, troppo tortuosi e ambigui i sentieri della ragione, e senza lasciarsi sedurre dal gioco dei precorrimenti e degli svolgimenti omogenei, troppo profonde sono le cesure e le svolte, non si puo non rilevare che nell'orizzonte teologico e filosofico del suo tempo il rasoio semplificatore
Petri de Alliaco Quaestiones super primum, tcrtium et quartum scntentiarum, Parisius s. d., ed. J. Petit, I Sent., q. 3, a. 3, p. 83va-b.
158 Guillelmi de Ockham Ordinatio, I, d. II, q. VI; d. Ill, q. VIII; d. II, q. VIII, in Opera, vol. II, ed. S. Brown, St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1970, pp. 196, 540, 273.
Quaestio de universali secundum viam et doctrinam Guilelmi de Ockham, ed. M. Grabmann, Monasterii 1930, p. 27.
Forme di conoscenza e idcali di sapere 67
di Occam, recidendo il nesso fra gli csistcnti cd eliminando un presupposto rcticolato di essenzc etcrnamcntc date, csaltando la priorita c fecondita dclla conoscenza intuitiva dell'individuale, dischiudcva orizzonti e possibilita nuove. In ambicnti occamisti c sotto la potente spinta del mcrtoniani, si viene aprcndo un dibattito destinato a grandc fortuna su questioni cruciali, fuori dall'orizzonte aristotclico. L'applicazione rigorosa dell'analisi logico-linguistica ai problemi dclla filosofia e dclla teologia, 1'impcgno dci calculators per dare una descrizione doH'intensio et remissio fortnarutn in rapporto al tempo e allo spazio, lontana dai modelli sostanzialistici di Aristotele e orientata verso una rappresentazione geometrica quantitativa delle variazioni qualitative, con i vari tentativi di definire i gradi delTintensio e della latitudo delle qualita - estesi anche ai problemi delle perfezioni divine - , le discussion} sulla reactio del paziente rispetto all'agente, le analisi de maximo et minimo, le ipotesi sull'esistenza degli indivisibili e sulla possibilita di un infinite in atto, lo sviluppo amplissimo dei problemi di dinamica e di cinematica a partire dal grande Tractatus de proportione di Thomas Bradwardine, sono strade diverse che, anche quando si svolgono secundum imaginationem articolandosi disputationis causa - senza pretendere di costruire nuove concezioni della natura - convergono tuttavia nell'elaborazione di nuovi modelli mentali e di linguaggi analitici che investono settori non marginal! della scienza aristotelica con inevitabili ripercussioni in tutte le zone del sapere, dalla logica alia fisica, dalla metafisica alia teologia.
Parallelamente la sempre piu netta distinzione fra il dominio della filosofia naturale e quello della fede - in cui per piu aspetti averroismo e occamismo finivano per convergere - insieme alia crisi di un universe gerarchizzato secondo una scalarita di essenze, mettevano in discussione le pretese teocratiche che di quell'universo erano state la trascrizione teologico-politica. Proprio muovendo da una rigorosa analisi filosofica dell'origine e della natura della societa civile ("demonstrabo intenta viis certis humano ingenio adinventis, constantibus ex proposicionibus per se notis"), Marsilio da Padova riconduce la statuizione delle leggi umane a una sola "causa", Yuniversitas civium (ipsius est auctoritas lacionis legum)160: questa e legislator e factor di tutti gli ordinamenti che derivano ex arbitrio humanae mentis, ad essa spetta definire "quid eligendum et quid spernendum", secondo le varie esigenze dei tempi e dei
Marsilii de Padua Defensor Pads, ed. R. Scholz, Hannoverae, 1932-1933, vol. I, pp. 9, 63, 66.
68 Gregory
luoghi ("secundum exigentia tcmporum ct locorum"), sen/a rifcrimento a intemporali modelli mctafisici o religiosi;161 di qui I'individua/.ionc - per demonstracionem - del fine mondano e temporale della vita civile che deve garantire il bene vivere dei cittadini, e 1'affermazione dell'autonomia del potere politico rispctto alia chiesa che le pretesc temporali del pontefice e dei sacerdoti hanno ridotto, da "corpo mistico", a corpus monstruosum et inutile^62
Ouando alia meta del secolo - suscitando la violenta rea/.ione e la condanna dell'autorita ecclesiastica Nicola di Autrecourt denuncera 1'inutile atteggiamento di quanti preferiscono invecchiare sui logici sermones di Aristotele e di Averroe invece di rivolgersi ad naturam rci e ad res morales et curam boni communis,16^ e quando affermera - placeat vel non placeat - che Aristotele in tutta la sua filosofia non ebbe nolizia evidente "de duabus conclusionibus et fortasse nee de una",164 indicava non solo 1'csito di una sua ricerca personale - extra gregem \nilgi - ma forse anche Pesaurimento di un'epoca con il suo ideale di scienza:
Ex eo, quod aliqua res est cpgnita esse, non potest evidcnter evidentia reducta in primum nrincipium vel in certitudinem primi principii inferri, quod alia res sit.
Mentre con il principio di causalita e messo in discussione tutto 1'ordinato e compatto mondo aristotelico - ridotto a modesto complcsso di proposi/.ioni ormai ncppurc probabili ("sicut multo tempore visa sunt csse probabilia dicta Aristotelis quorum probabilitas nunc forsan diminuetur, sic
Marsilii dc Padua Defensor Pads, vol. I, pp. 62, 71, 64. 162 Marsilii dc Padua Defensor Pads, vol. I, p. 17; vol. II, p. 459.
' Nicola di Autrecourt, Satis cvigit ordo, cd. J.R. O'Donnell, "Nicholas of
Autrecourt", Mediae\'al Studies, I (1939), pp. 181, 185: "falsum, crroneum ct
revocandum", "prcsumptuosum", si Icggc nclla condanna (J. I^ppe, op. cit., alia nota segg., p. 37*).
Dai testi ed. J. I^ppc, Nicolaus von Autrecourt. Scin Lcbcn, seine Philosophic, seine Schriftcn (Beitragc zur Gcsch. dcr Philosophic dcs Mittelalters, VI, 2), Miinstcr 1908, pp. 12*-13*, 17*, 25*.
' J. Lappe, op. cit., p. 9*; cfr. pp. 15*-16*, 31*: tcsi condannata come "falsa e erronea" (pp. 31*, 37*); a essa andra collegata la tcsi condannata come "falsa, erctica e erronea": "hec consequentia non est evidcns: a est productum, igitur aliquis producens a est vel fuit" (p. 34*). Con il principio di causalita e rifiutata anche la finalita, come recita la tcsi "quod aliquis ncscit evidenter, quod una res sit finis alterius", condannata come "falsa, eretica e blasfcma" (p. 33*). Gli scritti di Nicola furono bruciati a Saint Germain-des-Pres "tamquam multa falsa, pcriculosa, prcsumptuosa, suspccta et erronea et heretica continentes" (p. 43*).
Fortne di conoscenza e ideali di sapere 69
veniet unus qui toilet probabilitatem ab istis") - un altro principio di
certezza e di cvidcnza si vicne dcfinendo: e la conoscenza chiara e
evidente dei primi principi e "de actibus nostris". Un'affermazione solenne si leva in Vico degli Strami:
Universaliter et conversive quicquid est clarum et evidens intellectui est verum... Deus non distinguitur ab homine in clarius cognoscere
res.
Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, Universita di Roma
' Satis exigit ordo, cit., p. 187: "excusatio vulpina", recita la condanna (Lappe, op. cit., p. 39*).
Satis exigit ordo, cit., pp. 235, 239; J. Lappe, op. cit., pp. 6*, 8*; la tesi ricorrente negli scritti di Nicola "quod certitude evidentie non habet gradus" e condannata come "falsa" (J. I.appe, op. cit., p. 32*).
70 Gregory
ABSTRACT: Forms of Knowledge and Ideals of I .earning in Medieval Culture
There were various models and ideals of knowledge and science in the Middle Ages. Beginning with a specific definition of science and scientific method and then proceeding to search for its application in medieval writers is a process which would lead us astray. We must therefore attempt to determine just what these various models of knowledge and learning were, conscious of the fact that even basic terms like philosophy and theology, science and wisdom, ratio and intcllectus take on meanings and values which change drastically in various times and contexts.
The identification of Christianity and philosophy which was asserted by Greek patrology quite early on, allows the reduction of philosophical disciplines to the philosophia Christi. Christian thought, which claims the title of true philosophy for itself, puts into practice a form of knowledge whose foundations are to be found in the revelation of God, in the Bible, word of God. Faith in God who revealed to men the designs of His economy forms the horizon of a new experience and this faith nurtures a learning which transcends pagan culture because, historically speaking, it is far richer.
Knowing, intclligcrc thus means reading and deciphering the mysteries and sacraments woven into that Bible which brings not only a revelation of salvation but a learning and total science as well. 'ITie highest form of this learning can be found in exegesis, the access to that scicnlia divina which the Bible has transmitted. It should also be pointed out that intelligence of the Scriptures, just as with intcllectus which is placed between faith and beatific vision, leads to the greatest possibility of deepening comprehension of the mysteria and the ratio fidci in order to participate in the ratio divina which manifests itself through revelation (ratio veritatis nos docet).
A radical mutation in medieval culture, with the emergence of new methods and areas of knowledge, took place when a different conception of natura and ratio was proposed to the I^itin West through the knowledge of new Greek and Arabic philosophical and scientific texts between the 12th and 13th centuries. A sapicntia mundana arose outside of the symbolism of the High Middle Ages (which, in any case, had represented a precise model of interpretation and knowledge of natura rcrum). This found its tools in a ratio, separate from exegesis, which had the construction of natural knowledge as its goal. Nature, no longer sacramentum salutaris allegoric became nexus and ordo causarum. Its enquiry reached its peak in astronomy/astrology, that new science which linked heaven and earth and which found its most valid bases in the physics and metaphysics of Aristotle and his method in the syllogistic structure of scientific discourse. For this reason the importance of astrology in medieval culture and the new ideals of science cannot be underestimated and the same is true of the value which "magical" sciences assumed. The constant comparison between astrology and theology was quite important as was the use of astrology for scientific apologetics, for the demonstration of the truth of Christianity, for the hcrmcncutics of sacred history.
Aside from a defense of the legitimacy of a knowledge whose object was the causa and the ratio of events, new models of knowledge and learning developed through the 12th century primarily through the debate over coerentia artium and the relations between logic, dialectics and philosophy. At the same time new methodologies were adopted for theological discourse which was separated from the sacred text. New tools of logical-linguistic analysis or axiomatic procedures were adopted and exegesis was forced to come to terms with the science of nature.
The beginnings of Aristotclianism, especially after its insertion in university studies, posed problems of relations not only with a new model of scientific discourse but with a world system in which logic, physics and metaphysics were solid. There were various positions and options, from the revival of the Aristotelian-Averroistic ideal of intelligere as the highest good according to nature and reason, to the polemics against Aristotelianism in the name of a learning and reason whose basis was to be found in
Forme di conoscenza e idea I i di sapere 71
Christ's mediation. The theme of sapicntia Christiana was also the basis for models of scientific knowledge such as that model proposed by Roger Bacon for the supremacy of mathematics and the accentuation of the cognitive value of experientia which was connected to the glorification of a form of learning capable of modifying reality to humanity's advantage.
Certain particular problems in the debate over theology as a science should be underlined: Odo of Rigaud's prior position on the theme, the theory of subalternatio which was rigorously followed by St. Thomas Aquinas, the relationship between the singularity of those event which make up sacred history and the atemporal network of Aristotelian science.
While it comes from a common experience of faith, theological reflection uses and transforms philosophical concepts inherited from the past thus creating different speculative systems. That which makes medieval speculative tradition homogeneous is not a metaphysics which unifies the various systems nor any identical scientific ideal, but rather the constant problematic reference to Christian experience. If, on one hand, this experience tends to absorb elements from ancient cultures and is itself ultimately modified, on the other hand it vindicates its own autonomy, professing ideals of knowledge and learning which cannot be traced back to the terms of profane philosophical traditions. We should keep in mind the importance which the theme potentia Dei absoluta assumed in the 14th century and the turmoil it created for all the structures of Aristotelian philosophy, taking a theme which was frequently considered in Christian tradition to its logical conclusion. It is useless to attempt any limitation of the radical consequences of Christian faith in God as the absolutely free principal creator to a purely theological sphere. It is actually that faith in potentia Dei absoluta which breaks down any attempt at necessitarianism and transforms the world into a fabric of divine initiative, of radical contingency. Scepticism has been spoken of as a term both equivocal and unnecessarily negative. It would be better to speak of a criticism of Aristotelian reason which may be oriented both in the sense of a recourse to God as the originating principle of all truth and towards a search for a principle of evidence no longer linked to the adequatio and the solidity of essence. On the other hand it is no accident that, while turning back to Aristotelian science becomes increasingly problematic, the circles close to Ockhamism concentrated their attention on the contingent world, on nature and on man. In Ockhamist circles, under the powerful influence of the Mertonians, a debate on crucial matters which lead outside the Aristotelian world was taking place. Political thought became a rigorous philosophical analysis of the origins of the nature of civil society with no reference to atemporal metaphysical or religious models. The criticism of Nicholas of Autrecourt not only denied the fundamental structures of Aristotelian metaphysics but formulated a new principle of evidence as well.
JAAKKO HINTIKKA
Concepts of Scientific Method from Aristotle to Newton
In this paper, I shall not try to present any results concerning the history of philosophy or concerning the history of philosophers' ideas about the scientific method in the middle ages. Instead, I shall comment on the conceptual frameworks which have been used, or can be used, in such historical studies. It seems to me that our understanding of what actually happened in the middle ages can be greatly enhanced by a suitable conceptual framework in which the specific historical problems can find their appropriate niche. I shall also suggest that in the study of the history of the scientific method, as in so many other walks of philosophical scholarship, the best way of finding the right framework (in the sense of the historically relevant and useful framework) is to go back to the main Greek philosophers, especially to Aristotle, and to try to reach a deeper understand of their ideas. Their philosophy was the most important backdrop of medieval thought, which often can be looked upon as a gradual transition from Greek ideas to ours. In other respects, too, will an appropriate map of the conceptual situation help to fit different actual historical developments together as pieces of a larger overall picture.
In this spirit, I am led to ask: How do we twentieth-century thinkers view the scientific process, and how do our ideas differ from Aristotle's ideas in this respect? This question might seem to be too general and ambiguous to admit of a clear response, but in reality there is a clear and yet informative answer to it. A twentieth-century philosopher is likely to think of scientific inquiry as consisting of making observations (and gathering other kinds of empirical evidence) and then of using them as a stepping-stone to general explanatory theories. The step form data to theories is sometimes called a (species of) scientific inference. It is generally agreed that this so-called inference cannot be deductive. The main watershed between different overall conceptions of science is the question whether there is a nondeductive kind of inference, usually called inductive inference, to mediate the step from observations
Concepts of Scientific Method 73
to general theories or whether this step is in principle a matter of hypothesis. According to the latter idea, we cannot infer theories or other general truths from phenomena, but we can test them by comparing their deductive conclusions with observations. Thus we obtain two of the main types of modern models of scientific inquiry: the inductivist model and the hypothetico-deductive model. Although these two models do not quite enjoy any longer the monopoly they used to have among philo sophers of science, they are being widely used tacitly or explicitly by historians of philosophy as a part of their conceptual framework.1
The basic idea of the Aristotelian conception of scientific inquiry can also be indicated very simply. Aristotle conceives of scientific inquiry literally as inquiry, that is, a questioning procedure. This is shown amply by the Topics, among other things. One precedent for such a procedure were the Socratic questioning games practiced in the Academy.2
Originally, even deductive inferences were simply special kinds of moves in these questioning games, viz. answers that every rational person would have to give, given his earlier admissions. Aristotle soon realized the special role of such preordained answers or admissions and tried to systematize them in his syllogistic logic. He even tried to make syllogisms the only vehicle of putting the first principles of a science to use for the purpose of explaining various phenomena. But even then the road to these first principles remained a dialectical one.
The interrogative or erotetic concept of inquiry is thus amply in evidence in Aristotle. In a more traditional terminology, it would be called the dialectic method. I am avoiding this label, however, because on the long way to twentieth-century philosophy it has acquired all sorts of misleading associations.
It is fairly clear that something like the interrogative model of science remained influential in the middle ages. For instance, the various
Their restrictive character is shown by the difficulty of fitting major historical figures into either pidgeonhole. Was Newton an inductivist or a hypothetico-deductivist? Neither shoe fits very well. And the same question can be raised about the medievals.
What is needed is a wider and more realistic conceptual framework for understanding the actual history of philosophical, scientific, and theological thought. That is what I shall try to provide here for the history of the scientific method, just as I have (with several others) tried to provide a new framework for studying the history of the concept of being. That earlier attempt is documented in Simo Knuuttila and Jaakko Hintikka, editors, The Logic of Being: Historical Studies, Synthese Historical Library, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986. 2
See here my paper, "The Fallacy of Fallacies", Argumentation vol. 1 (1987), pp. 211-
238, and the literature referred to there.
74 Hintikka
commentaries on Aristotle freely use Aristotle's interrogatively loaded terminology of "admissions", "acceptances by the learner", etc.
This fact is enough to put one facet of medieval thought into a new light. If there indeed was a relevant element of interrogative knowledge-seeking in medieval epistemology and philosophy of science, it is to be expected that the logic of such interrogative procedures should have been studied in so many words. This expectation is fulfilled by the important but incompletely understood obligationes tradition.3 Whatever detailed problems there is about the interpretation of these question- answer dialogues, in their standard form (antiqua responsio) they were not, and could not have been, a form of counterfactual deductive reasoning, as has been claimed. For in them one was not examining what follows logically from the initial positum or what is inconsistent with it, but rather what follows logically from, or is inconsistent with, the positiim plus the rcsponder's earlier admissions. This is in fact charac teristic of interrogative or "erotctic" knowledge-seeking. Admittedly, later in the fourteenth century obligation-games were given a more deductive twist by some logicians. But this merely illustrates my recommendation of viewing medieval thought as a transition from the Greek to the modern viewpoint.
Admittedly, at first sight the obligationes might not seem to have a great deal to do with conceptions of scientific method. However, their close link with the sophismata provides a bridge, for problems concerning knowledge-seeking and science were frequently dealt with in the form of sophismata in logic, theology, and natural philosophy, and in this context the obligations terminology was largely employed.
In general, obligation-games illustrate several features of inter rogative knowledge-seeking. We can study this kind of knowledge- seeking by means of what I have called the interrogative model of inquiry.4 This codification of the dialectical conception of knowledge-
Here the work of Simo Knuuttila and his associates promises to be decisive. I am here relying on their results. See, e.g., Simo Knuuttila and Mikko Yrjonsuuri, "Norm and Action in Obligational Disputations" in O. Pluta, ed., Die Philosophic im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert, B.R. Griiner, Amsterdam 1988, pp. 191-202.
The work on this model is largely still in progress. For interim expositions, cf., e.g., my "Knowledge Representation and the Interrogative Model of Inquiry", forthcoming in a volume of new papers on epistemology, edited by Keith Lehrer and Marjorie Clay, Jaakko Hintikka and Merrill B. Hintikka, "Sherlock Holmes Confronts Modern Logic", in E.M. Barth and J.L. Martens, eds., Argumentation: Approaches to Theory Formation, Benjamins, Amsterdam, 1982, pp. 55-76; and "The Logic of Science as a Model-Oriented
Concepts of Scientific Method 75
seeking is the main conceptual framework I am recommending to the historians of scientific method.
The interrogative model seems at first sight to be simplicity itself. In it, an idealized inquirer starts from a given initial premise T. The inquirer may put questions to a source of information. Depending on the intended application, we may call this source of information "the oracle" or nature. The inquirer may draw deductive conclusions from T together with the answers. The aim of the game (or the inquirer's aim) is to prove a given conclusion C or (in another variant of the model) to answer a question "B or not-B?" Normally, the presupposition of a question must have been established before the question may be asked.
How does this model, applied to scientific inquiry, differ from the received models of science? It turns out to be more flexible than its rivals in several respects.
For one thing, the Oracle's answers need not be observations. In some of the most interesting variants of the model, controlled experiments are conceived of as a scientist's questions to nature. But the oracle's answers may instead be intuitions of innate ideas or, as in Aristotle, well-established general opinions, endoxa.5 They need not even be all true, just as endoxa sometimes are deceptive. But all that happens then is that the inquirer has to ask further questions to establish the veracity of the oracle's particular answers.
One especially important corollary of this wider conception of what nature can tell us or what we can otherwise establish interrogatively is the following: An important parameter in the interrogative model is the logical complexity of the answers that the oracle can provide to the inquirer. In the received models of science, both in the inductivist and in the hypothetico-deductive model, it is assumed that nature (who in the game of science plays the role of the oracle) can only provide particular (i.e., quantifier free) propositions as answers to the inquirer's questions. In the wider model, there is no longer any reason to accept this "Atomistic Postulate", as I have called it. And if the Atomistic Postulate is not assumed, the rationale of both of these models collapses. For then
Logic", in P. Asquith and P. Kitcher, eds., PSA 19S4, vol. 1, Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, 1984, pp. 177-185. See also the work referred to in other notes.
5 For the concept of endoxa and for their role in Aristotle's argumentation, see. G.E.L. Owen, Tithenai ta Phainomena", in S. Mansion, ed., Aristote et les problemes de methode, Louvain, 1961, and. cf. my "The Fallacy of Fallacies", op. cit.
76 Hintikka
there is no reason to conclude that general theories could not be arrived at deductively from nature's answers to the inquirer's questions or, as Newton puts it, could not be deduced from the phenomena.6
Now there are at least two historically important ways in which a scientist can be thought of as being able to obtain general truths as immediate (non-inferential) answers to his or her questions.
The first way is post-medieval. It is the way of controlled experimentation. For the typical outcome of a successful controlled experiment is to find a dependence between two variables, the controlled and the observed one. The codification of such an "answer" is no longer a quantifier-free proposition. It has at least one existential quantifier dependent on a universal one. This was essentially Newton's way.8
The other way is Aristotle's. It is deeply rooted in his psychology of thinking according to which to think of X is for one's soul to take on the form of X. This is as genuine a realization of the form as any external one. And if so, any other form Y which necessarily accompanies X will also be present in the soul. Thus any necessary connection between forms can be ascertained simply by thinking about them, according to this Aristotelian psychology (and metaphysics) of thinking.9
This means that for Aristotle general truths can be seen immediately in one's own soul, of course after suitable preparation. In terms of the interrogative model, this means that the oracle is assumed to give an Aristotelian scientist general answers, and not only particular ones. In the light of what was said earlier, it is therefore small wonder that neither the inductivist nor the hypothetico-deductive model of science played any appreciable role in medieval philosophy.
This does not mean, however, that the Aristotelian idea of direct access to general truths was universally accepted in the middle ages. As soon as scientific inference was conceptualized as involving a step from
1 Cf. note 4 above.
See here my paper, "What Is the Logic of Experimental Inquiry?", Synthese vol. 74 (1988), pp. 173-190. t>
See here Jaakko Hintikka and James Garrison, "Newton's Methodology and the Interrogative Logic of Inquiry", forthcoming in the proceedings of the April 1987 symposium on Newton in Jerusalem, o
This pecularity Aristotelian psychology of thought is so striking that it is barely
been acknowledge in its full strangeness (strangeness from our twentieth-century viewpoint, that is to say). For indications of it, cf. my paper "Aristotelian Infinity", Philosophical Re\'iew vol. 75 (1966), pp. 197-219.
Concepts of Scientific Method 77
particulars to a general truth, it became clear that such a step was not unproblematic, and could not be thought of as nature's direct answer to a scientist's question. In the middle ages, the rise of nominalism seems to mark an important watershed in this respect. This is only to be expected in view of Aristotle's idea of the realization of universal concepts in the form of "forms" in the human soul as a source of scientific truths. Indeed, this Aristotelian background helps us to understand why the rejection of universals was as crucial a development in medieval thought as it in fact was. This helps us to understand the impact of nominalism in general. For instance, nominalism cannot be construed as a skeptical philosophy, as several speakers at this very congress will emphasize. Its impact is seen by comparison with Aristotle's methodology which in effect means giving up, at least partly, the idea that nature can give us general answers to suitable questions by means of a realization of the relevant forms in one's mind.
Did this mean a radical change in philosophers' idea of the scientific process? The interrogative model suggests an interesting answer, which is no. For the interrogative model shows that you can often compensate for the effects of an additional restriction on the oracle's (nature's) answers by strengthening the initial theoretical assumption T.10 In fact, logicians know that even if answers to questions are restricted to (negated or unnegated) atomic propositions, there can be theories T which jointly with nature's answers to questions enable the inquirer to establish any true proposition. (These are the theories that are known as model- complete ones.)
These observations throw highly interesting light on developments in the medieval period. The very same philosophers who began to think of scientific inference as a passage from particular observations to general truths were also among the first ones to evoke prior general propositions to back them up. Duns Scotus is an especially interesting case in point. He writes as follows:11
As for what is known by experience, I have this to say. Even though a person does not experience every single individual, but
Cf. here my The Logic of Science as Model-Oriented Logic", op. cit.
In general, the possibility of partial trade off between strong assumptions as to what is answerable and strong a priori premises is an extremely interesting fact which can throw light on several other historical phenomena.
Duns Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, i, d.3, q.4, translated in Wolter, Duns Scotus: Philosophical Writings, p. 109.
78 Hintikka
only a great many, nor does he experience them at all times, but on frequently, still he knows infallibly that it is always this way and holds ror all instances. He knows this in virtue of this proposition reposing in his soul: "Whatever occurs in a great many instances by a cause that is not free, is the natural effect of that cause." This proposition is known to the intellect even if the terms are derived from erring senses, because a cause that does not act freely cannot in most instances produce an effect that is the very opposite of what it is ordained by its form to produce.
This quotation is interesting in that it illustrates what for a thinker like Duns Scotus was the alternative to the idea that nature can answer questions concerning universals. Even though nature doesn't do so apud Scotum, the intellect knows certain completely general truths like the regularity of nature with a certainty that is not derived from sense- experience. They are therefore of the character of initial premises of the scientific enterprise rather than answers (new facts) contributed by nature.
What is important here is that this novelty docs not turn Duns Scotus away from the interrogative conception of inquiry. What it does is to shift the focus from nature's answers to initial theoretical premises. One symptom of this is what Duns Scotus says in so many words in the quoted passage, viz., that the results based on the principle of the regularity of nature are infallible, even though they are based only on a sample of the individuals covered by the generalization. In this respect, I can say, they are just like the results of an interrogative inquiry. Thus Duns Scotus does not anticipate Hume's doubts about induction nor even the twentieth-century conception of induction, even though one recent author refers in this context to Duns Scotus's "inductive evidence".12 Admittedly, soon afterwards Duns Scotus says that in this way we can only reach "the very lowest degree of scientific knowledge". But this inferior degree does not mean a lower level of certainty, for the principle of the regularity of nature is said to remove in such cases all "uncertainty and infallibility".
Thus it is in principle misguided to see in medieval thinkers like Duns Scotus anticipation of Hume's problems or even anticipations of the hypothetico-deductive or the inductivist models of science. These models came about only when the skeptical ideas found two different inroads into
12 See N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg, eds., The Cambridge History of Later Medie\'al Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, p. 511.
13 Op. cit., i, d.3, q.5; Wolter, p. 119.
Concepts of Scientific Method 79
the interrogative conception of scientific inquiry. It was not enough to restrict nature's answers to negated or unnegated atomic ones. One also has to eliminate in principle all nontrivial initial premises. It is for this reason why is was crucially important for modern empiricist philosophers like Locke and Hume to attack the doctrine of innate ideas.
The same observation explains why Newton's overall conception of the structure of science bears striking resemblances to Aristotle in spite of its mathematical character.14 For according to Newton nature can yield general answers to a scientist's questions, of course not answers concerning necessary connections between "forms" as in Aristotle but answers taking the form of functional dependence between variables, typically obtained through a controlled experiment. No wonder Newton, too, believed that general truths can be deduced from phenomena.
It is of interest to see a little bit more closely what is involved in the abandonment of the Aristotelian idea of direct access to general truths. One corollary to the Aristotelian theory of thinking as a realization of forms in the soul is that whatever follows as a matter of the nature of things in question, that is, as a matter of their essential forms, can be established in thought. There is therefore no distinction in Aristotle between logical and natural ("formal") necessity. This conclusion, which has of course been misunderstood time and again, is shown to be a genuine Aristotelian doctrine in my monograph on Aristotle's theory of modality.15 Another corollary is that whoever does realize the premises clearly and distinctly in his or her mind, cannot avoid drawing the conclusion. Full-fledged akrasia is as impossible in logic as it is in rational action (i.e., in a practical syllogism).16 All these Aristotelian views have their echoes in medieval thought.
Of course, in order to be able to see what necessarily accompanies a form one must first realize fully the form in one's mind. Hence the crucial task for an Aristotelian scientist is not inference from particulars to general truths, but the formation of general concepts ("forms"). Accordingly, the first premises of an Aristotelian science are definitions,
See Hintikka and Garrison, op. cit. The view we reject is represented, e.g., by I. Bernard Cohen, The Newtonian Revolution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980.
Jaakko Hintikka (with Unto Remes and Simo Knuuttila), Aristotle on Modality and Determinism (Acta Philosophica Fennica, vol. 29, no. 1), Societas Philosophica Fennica, Helsinki, 1977.
' See here my "Aristotle's Incontinent Logician", Ajatus vol. 37 (1978), pp. 48-65.
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and the way to reach them is the dialectial process which leads up to the definition of a concept (i.e., a full grasp of its essential "form").17
All this is part and parcel of what I meant by saying that for Aristotle questions concerning general propositions were (directly) answerable. To give up this answerability assumption can therefore take the form of giving up the identification of logical (metaphysical) necessity and natural necessity. In so far as this natural necessity is construed as nomic necessity, the step away from Aristotle took the form of denying the identification of unrestricted generality and metaphysical (conceptual) necessity. As Knuuttila and others have spelled out, this step was taken most resolutely by Duns Scotus.18
Now we can see that this step was not an isolated change in scholastic philosophers' ideas about necessity and other modal concepts. It affected their outlook on the entire structure of the scientific search of knowledge.
These general observations can be illustrated by applying them to the history of one particular concept, that of induction. There exists a useful study of the history of this concept by Julius Weinberg, but unfortunately he assumes throughout his essay something essentially tantamount to the twentieth-century notion of induction as an inference from particulars to general truths.19
At first sight, the story of induction within an interrogative framework might look rather like the "curious incident of the dog in the night-time" in Sherlock Holmes: the dog didn't do anything. Likewise, there does not seem to be any niche for the notion of induction in the interrogative conception of scientific investigation. Even if we relax our model and allow for answers by nature that are true only with a certain probability (and hence can be false), the result is not the inductivist model of science but its mirror image.20 In inductive logic, we study uncertain (nondeductive) inferences from data that are typically assumed to be unproblematic. In the loosened interrogative model we are studying
17 Cf. "The Fallacy of Fallacies", op. cit.
10
Cf. Knuuttila's own contribution to Simo Knuuttila, ed., Reforging the Great Chain of Being, Synthese Historical Library, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981.
19
Julius Weinberg, Abstraction, Relation, and Induction: Three Essays in the
History of Thought, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison and Milwaukee, 1965.
See here my paper, "The Interrogative Approach to Inquiry and Probabilistic Inference", Erkenntnis vol. 26 (1987), pp. 429-442.
Con cepts of Scien tific Meth od 81
deductive (and hence certain) inferences from uncertain answers by nature.
This negative finding is nevertheless itself quite remarkable, just as its counterpart was in Conan Doyle. It is indeed remarkable how little the medievals had to say about induction in anything like the twentieth- century acceptance of the term.
There is more to be said of this concept, however. Even if the twentieth-century notion of induction is an uninvited guest in the house of interrogative inquiry, there is a historically important namesake notion that arises naturally from the idea of scientific inquiry.21
This can be seen as follows: Even if nature's answers can be general truths, they can be partial. For instance, in an Aristotelian search for a definition of pride or magnanimity (megalopsychia, cf. An. Post. B 13), we can directly find out only what characterizes each of a number of subclasses of pride. Likewise, an experimental scientist can find what functional dependence obtains between the variables he or she is interested in over a number of intervals of values of the controlled variable. The experimentally established dependence can even be different over the different intervals. Such general but restricted answers lead to the problem of reconciling these partial answers with each other. Thus Aristotle writes:
I mean, e.g., if we were to seek what pride is we should inquire, in the case of some proud men we know, what one thing they all have as such. E.g. if Alcibiades is proud, and Achilles and Ajax, what one thing do they all [have]? Intolerance of insults; for one made war one waxed wroth, and the other killed himself. Again in the case of others, e.g. Lysander and Socrates. Well, if Tiere it is being indifferent to good and bad fortune, I take these two things and inquire what both indifference to fortune and not brooking dishonour have that is the same. And if there is nothing, then there will be two sorts of pride.
This reconciliation procedure, I have shown elsewhere, is precisely what Aristotle elsewhere calls epagoge or induction.22 What I did not know when I wrote my earlier paper was that essentially this inter pretation of Aristotle's concept of induction was fairly common among subsequent Aristotelians. Thus Aquinas assimilates to each other induction
See here my paper, "The Concept of Induction in the Light of the Interrogative Model of Inquiry", forthcoming in the proceedings of the Pittsburgh Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science.
In "Aristotelian Induction", Revue Internationale de Philosophic, vol. 34 (1980), pp. 422^39.
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and the method of looking for definition by means of the method of division. "... the same thing happens in the method of division as happens in the method of induction."23 Here the method of division is "used in obtaining the quod quid of a thing". The context makes it clear that Aquinas is thinking of an interrogative search for definitions. This is shown by statements like the following:24
For one who induces through singulars to the universal does not demosntrate or syllogize from necessity. For when something is proved syllogistically. it is not necessary to make further inquiry concerning the conclusion or ask that the conclusion be conceded; what is necessary is that the conclusion is true, if the premises laid down are true. [Emphasis added.]
However, Aquinas mistakenly thinks that the search for definitions described in An. Post. B 13 (by means of magnanimity example) is intended by Aristotle to be a method different from division and alternative to it. It is nevertheless significant that, in discussing the famous last chapter of An. Post. B, Aquinas assimilates induction and the search for definitions along the lines of B 13 to each other, and even refers to one of the examples employed there.
There identity of the two apparently different processes of definition-seeking (seeking for the quod quid of a thing) and induction throws some light on the history of the notion of induction. For instance, we can see in what sense Aristotelian induction must be complete: the different kinds of megalopsychia whose definitions have to be reconciled with each other must collectively exhaust the entire field of all instances of magnanimity. This means at one and the same time to exhaust different subclasses of magnanimity and all the particular instances of magnanimity. Of course, in Aristotle the real action in induction lies in the reconciliation of the definitions of the subspecies, not just in the exhaustion of all instances.
This shows how thin the line is from Aristotelian induction to the modern conception. This line was repeatedly transgressed as early as in the middle ages.
What is the inductive reconciliation process like? An answer to this question is facilitated by a comparison with the quantitative version of the extension and reconciliation problem. In this problem, different
Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, Magi Books, Albany, N.Y., 1970, p. 177.
Thomas Aquinas, loc. cit.
Concepts of Scientific Method 83
partial functions with exclusive ranges of definition are to be subsumed under one single comprehensive functional dependence. I have shown elsewhere that this kind of reconciliation problem occurs often in the history of science and at crucial junctions in the development of science.25
It is easily seen that the reconciliation cannot be subject to simple rules. It involves experimentation with the mathematical expressions of the different functions to be reconciled with each other, and hence has a definite element of conceptual analysis to it. It represents a type of scientific reasoning, including the use of mathematics in science, that has not been discussed very much by philosophers.
Here the similarity between the reconciliation problem in modern science and Aristotelian induction is particularly close. For, as the megalopsychia example shows Aristotle understood inductive search of definitions to contain a heavy dose of conceptual analysis and even conceptual reorganization, including the partial rejection of some of the relevant endoxa. One is tempted to say that Aristotelian induction is merely a qualitative version of the modern reconciliation process.
Here a couple of challenging tasks open both to systematic and to historical research. One is to try to understand what goes into the inductive reconciliation process, both in its quantitative and its qualitative forms. Another problem is to understand the development of the concept of induction in its Aristotelian sense into an integral (though not always explicitly recognized) part of the methodology of modern science. I have argued that the functional extrapolation and reconciliation task is what Newton meant by induction. But where he got his ideas from and, more generally, what happened to the notion between Aristotle and Newton largely remains to be investigated.
Certain things can nevertheless be said. It is unmistakable that the modern conception of induction began to rear its ugly head in the fourteenth century. Such writers as Ockham, pseudo-Scotus etc. discuss induction unmistakably as a step from particular cases to a general law that falls short of necessity. This is for instance stated explicitly by pseudo-Scotus who says that incomplete induction cannot provide
See op. cit., note 21 above.
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necessity, only evidence.26 This is a far cry from the Aristotelian idea of induction sketched earlier.
In a wider perspective, an especially interesting point seems to be a connection between this change in philosophers' concept of induction and the rise of nominalism. This connection is shown by the Aristotelian background mentioned above, and it helps us to understand why nominalism meant such a break with earlier ideas of human knowledge- seeking. A nominalist could not conceptualize thinking as a realization of a form in one's mind and therefore could not assume that necessary connections between forms could be seen simply by realizing them in one's mind. A nominalist, in brief, could not assume that nature answered general questions, at least not directly, only particular ones. This helps us to appreciate the impact of nominalism in general.
This is an instructive example of how observations of the kind proposed here can throw light on major issues in the history of philosophical thought.
Florida State University
26 Super Pr. Anal. II, 9, 8.
MICHAEL E. MARMURA
The Fortuna of the Posterior Analytics in the Arabic Middle Ages
It is perhaps risky to begin a paper by suggesting a possible change of title, particularly if the suggested change approximates a reversal of the original. This may seem flippant. The risk, however, is worth taking, the purpose being to press home a point. When first asked to read a paper entitled, "The Fortuna of the Posterior Analytics in the Arabic Middle Ages," I thought the title could very well be changed to read, "The Fortuna of Arabic Philosophy after the Entry of the Posterior Analytics into Medieval Islam," for its influence on Arabic philosophy was powerful and pervasive. On further reflection, however, a change of title did not seem necessary; for part of the fortuna of this work is the influence it exerted. But perhaps more to the point is the truism that it was influential in the way it was understood. Influence and interpretation go hand in hand.
I
In terms of the history of the transmission of Greek thought to medieval Islam, the Posterior Analytics was a relatively late arrival. A complete Syriac version was made by the Nestorian scholar Ishaq Ibn Hunayn (d. 910) and then, based on this Syriac version, another Nestorian scholar, the logician Abu Bishr Malta (d. 940) made the Arabic translation that has survived.1 The work became the object of intensive study by the
This is the translation mentioned in the medieval Arabic sources and which has been edited by A. Badawi and published (see n. 12 below). The research of L. Minio- Paluello ["note sul Aristotile Latino medievale IV; La tradizione semitico-Latina del testo dei secondi Analytici," Ribista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica, 42 (1951), Fasc. II, republished in L. Minio-Paluello, Opuscula: The Latin Aristotle (Amsterdam, 1972), 127- 54] indicates that Averroes used, in addition to the translation of Abu Bishr, another Arabic version by an unknown translator. R. Walzer has raised the possibility that this other translator may be the Maraya, twice mentioned in marginal comments in the Paris manuscript of Abu Bishr's translation. See R. Walzer, Greek into Arabic (Oxford, 1962),
86 Marmura
tenth-century Baghdad! school of logicians that included the philosopher Alfarabi (al-Farabi) (d. 950) .2 There are indications, however, that such earlier philosophers as Kindi (al-Kindi) (d. ca. 870) and his student al- Sarakhsi (d. 899) had some knowledge of the work.3 But, properly speaking, the credit for its introduction to the main stream of Arabic philosophy belongs to the school of Baghdadi logicians.
Its entry into medieval Islam marked a turning point in the development of Arabic philosophy. It provided the conceptual framework within which philosophical and scientific investigations operated. Its precepts became part of the texture of Arabic philosophical discourse, as the world came to be perceived through the medium of logical connections, expressed in the language of middle terms. Its influence, moreover, went beyond philosophy to reach Islamic speculative theology, hahm. Thus, in the eleventh century, as will be indicated more fully, Ghazali (al-Ghazalf) (d. 1111), a leading member of the then dominant school of kaCam, the Ashcarite, suggested ways for retaining the Aristotelian requirements for demonstration within a non-Aristotelian occasionalist view of the world.
But while the Posterior Analytics exerted an immense influence on medieval Arabic philosophy, it itself was influenced by its new intellectual environment. In their attempt to understand this work and resolve some of the difficulties inherent in it, philosophers like Alfarabi and Avicenna
99-100.
2 Alfarabi states that he studied the Posterior Analytics with his teacher, the Nestorian scholar, Yuhanna Ihn Haylan, but we have no details about this. One of our earliest, though by no means infallible, sources for the history of the transmission of Greek thought to Islam, Ibn al-Nadlm (d. 995), informs us in his Fihrist _that a first partial translation of the Posterior Analytics was made by Ilunayn Ibn Ishaq (d. 873), and that his son Ishaq made a complete Syriac translation, on which Abu Bishr based his Arabic translation. He further informs us that Abu Bishr studied this work with his teacher al-Marwa/.I who taught in Syriac and also with Quwayri who wrote an exposition of the Posterior Analytics. Ibn al-Nadlm mentions commentaries by Abu Bishr, Alfarabi, Thcmistius and John Philoponus, the two latter presumably in their Arabic translation, but states that the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias was not available. Ibn al-Nadlm, al-Fihrist (Tehran, 1971), 309, 321-22.
3 Fihrist, 316, 317, where we are told that these two philosophers wrote epitomes on this work. Kindi lists this work, referring to it as Apodictica, in his short treatise enumerating Aristotle's works, adding a few sentences about its content: al-Kindi, Ra- s'a'il al-Kindi al-Falsafiyya, ed. M.A.A. Abu Rida (Cairo, 1950), 367, 368. See also N. Rescher, Studies in the History of Arabic Logic (Pittsburgh, 1963), 34, 36. Ibn al-Nad[m also states that the physician-philosopher al-RazI (d. 926) wrote a work entitled, Kit'ab al-Burhan (The Book of Demonstration), consisting of two chapters. Fihrist, 357.
77i<? Posterior Analytics in the Arabic Middle Ages 87
(Ibn Sma) (d. 1037) offered interpretations and expansions on it. Some of these expansions reflect the influence of the epistemology of the katem. Thus, before Ghazali's endorsement of Aristotelian demonstration, it had already had some interaction with the kalam.
In what follows we will attempt to convey an idea of how the Posterior Analytics fared in the Arabic middle ages. We will begin with three examples illustrative of different ways it affected philosophical thought. We will then indicate some of the ways it was interpreted and expanded on, concluding with a section devoted mainly to the Ghazalian attempt to accommodate Aristotelian demonstration within an atomist, occasionalist theological metaphysics.
II
For our first example of the way the Posterior Analytics affected medieval Arabic philosophy, we will turn to Alfarabi's political theory. This theory offers, in effect, an interpretation of Islamic religious and political institutions in Platonic terms. The ideal city, or, as Alfarabi terms it, "the virtuous city," is hierarchically organized. Each level of its society fulfills a special function, all acting harmoniously under the leadership of a philosopher-ruler, a philosopher also endowed with exceptional practical ability and wisdom. The law governing the city is the revealed law. This law is an expression of philosophical truth, but in a language the non-philosopher can understand, that is, the language of the image and the symbol. It is within such a community that happiness in this life, leading to ultimate happiness in the hereafter, is attainable.
To realize this happiness, Alfarabi states at the very beginning of his political treatise, Tfie Attainment of Happiness, four kinds of things are required: "theoretical virtues, deliberative virtues, moral virtues and practical arts." He then discusses the "theoretical virtues" which consist of "the sciences whose ultimate purpose is to make the beings and what they contain intelligible with certainty."4 Before discussing these sciences, he offers a brief, but interpretive digest of the Posterior Analytics. He
Alfarabi, The Attainment of Happiness, in the trilogy, The Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, translated with an Introduction and Notes by Muhsin Mahdi (New York, 1962), 13.
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discusses, for example, the division of knowledge into the primary, the self evident, and that which is acquired through "investigation, inference, instruction and study." He differentiates between the demonstration that yields the fact only and that which gives the reasoned fact. With the former, he explains, the principles of instruction are other than the principles of being; with the latter, they are the same. He then identifies the principles of being with the four Aristotelian causes, drawing in discussing them on the second part of the Posterior Analytics (II, 1, 89b 23; also, II, 2, 89b 36).
Then, in terms of this digest, Alfarabi introduces the theoretical sciences beginning with mathematics where, he explains, only the formal cause in involved.5 He then introduces physics, metaphysics and, what concerns us here most, political theory, where the ideological cause, the perfection of man, plays the dominant role.6 Political theory, one of the theoretical virtues the philosopher-ruler must have, is a demonstrative science.7 Alfarabi's concept of the ideal state, which is basically Platonic, is arrived at, not through the dialectic of the Republic, but through Aristotelian demonstrative reasoning. Here, however, a qualification is needed. Alfarabi's epistemology has a Neoplatonic element, basic to his explanation of prophetic revelation.
For the realization of the ideal state, the first ruler at least must be both a philosopher and a prophet receptive of the revealed law. Revelation takes place when the philosopher-prophet's rational faculty conjoins with the Active Intellect, the last of a series of celestial intelligences emanating from God. The prophet-philosopher's rational soul becomes inundated with the intelligibles proceeding from the Active Intellect. These, in turn, descend on the prophet's imaginative faculty which transforms them into particular images that symbolize them. These symbols are then expressed in the language which all people, non-
' Ibid., 19. See also al-Farabi", Kitab al-Musiqa al-Kablr (The Great Book of Music), ed. A. Khashaba (Cairo, 1967), 90-91, where Alfarabi expands on this. The source of his discussion is Posterior Analytics, I, 13, 78b 35 - 79a 10.
Attainment of Happiness, 22-23. 7 Ibid., 23.
The Posterior Analytics in the Arabic Middle Ages 89
philosophers and philosophers, can understand, the language of the scriptures.8
It should be stressed, however, that the intellectual knowledge the prophet-philosopher receives from the Active Intellect does not differ in kind from the knowledge the ordinary philosopher acquires more laboriously through demonstration. It is demonstrative knowledge. Religion, in other words, offers symbolic expression of demonstrative knowledge. Since Alfarabi's religious model is Islamic, what his political philosophy provides in effect is an accommodation between the Posterior Analytics and the Qurran, an accommodation that becomes more explicitly expressed by Averroes (Ibn Rushd) (d. 1198) who in his political theorizing is very much the disciple of Alfarabi.
For our next two examples, we will turn to Avicenna's metaphysics and begin with his theory that God knows particulars "in a universal way." Underlying this theory is the epistemological ideal of the Posterior Analytics that knowledge is of the universal. The object of God's eternal, intellectual knowledge is the universal. Some particulars, however, are in some sense known to God individually. These are the particulars, entities and events related to them, in the celestial world. In Avicenna's triadic emanative scheme, each celestial entity, whether intellect, soul or body, in each of the triads proceeding from the first of the emanated intellects, represents the only member of a species. God knows these species. But knowledge of these universals does not entail the knowledge that each is confined to one member. God knows that they are so confined as a consequence of His causality, where in the celestial realm the principle that from the one only one proceeds is operative. Thus God knows (a) the celestial species and (b) that its universal qualities are confined to one individual. It is in this sense that God knows celestial particular entities and, by extension, particular celestial events such as eclipses that relate to them.9
' For a fuller discussion of prophetic revelation in Alfarabi, see the author's "The Islamic Philosopher's Conception of Islam," in Islam's Understanding of Itself, eds. R.G. Hovannisian and S. Vryonis, Jr. (Malibu, California, 1981), 94-96.
Some medieval Islamic philosophers have interpreted Avicenna as holding that God knows each and every particular in both the celestial and terrestrial world by intellectual, conceptual knowledge. Textual evidence showing that this cannot be Avicenna's view is overwhelming. For a detailed discussion of this question and of the Avicennan theory, see the author's, "Some Aspects of Avicenna's Theory of God's Knowledge of Particulars," Journal of the American Oriental Society, 82.3 (July-
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Included in this theory is Avicenna's definition of the universal in the Metaphysics of his Shifa' (Healing), namely as "that whose very conception does not disallow its being predicable of many." It may be actually predicated of many, as with "man," he explains, of none, as with a "heptagonal house," or of one, as with "earth" and "sun." That there is only one sun is not included in the universal concept, "sun," and is due to an extraneous cause.10 This idea, however, is first given in the Demonstration of his Shifa'?1 in an expansion on Posterior Analytics I, 5, 74a 4-12, an expansion, however, that reflects the medieval Arabic translator's interpretation of this passage.
In this passage Aristotle states that we may inadvertently err in taking a conclusion to be universal in its primary, widest sense, when it is not. He then gives three reasons for this error. The first occurs when (to use the Oxford translation) "the subject is an individual or individuals above which there is no universal to be found." Abu Bishr Malta's translation of this passage gives a different interpretation of the error one is prone to commit. According to this translation it consists of two things: (a) mistaking a conclusion which in fact is universal not to be so, that is, thinking it to be a particular; and (b) the opposite of this, thinking the particular conclusion to be a universal. The translator then gives the first of the reasons for error as applicable to (a). It occurs when there is nothing "higher other than the things that are particular and solitary (wahlda}."12 Both Avicenna and Averroes interpret this as referring to particulars like the sun, each of which is the sole member of its species.13 In the Demonstration, Avicenna stresses the distinction between the universal sun and its particular only instance. The universal
September 1962), 299-312.
Ihn Sina (Avicenna), al-Shifa': al-Ilahiyyat (Metaphysics}, ed. G.C. Anawati, S. Dunya and S. Zayid (Cairo, 1960), 195-96. This work will be abbreviated, Metaphysics, in the notes.
Ibn Sma (Avicenna), al-Shifa': al-Mantiq (Logic) V; al-Burhan (Demonstration), ed. A.A. Affifi (Cairo, 1956), 144-46. This work will be abbreviated, Demonstration, in the notes.
Aristotle, Analutlqa al-Av,~akhir (Posterior Analytics), tr. Abu Bishr Malta, ed. A. Badawi in Mantiq Aristu (Aristotle's Logic), 3 vols. reissued (Beirut, Kuwait, 1980), II, 345-46.
13
Demonstration, 144; Averroes (Ibn Rushd), Middle Commentary and the Posterior
Analytics, ed. M.M. Kassem, completed, revised and annotated by C.E. Butterworth and A.A. Haridi (Cairo, 1982), 53. This strongly suggests that both were using Abu Bishr's translation.
Tlie Posterior Analytics in the Arabic Middle Ages 91
sun does not include the information that there is only one sun. This distinction in Avicenna, as we noted, is part of his theory of God's knowledge of particulars "in a universal way." It first occurs as an interpretation of Posterior Analytics, I, 5.
For our final example, we shall turn to Avicenna's proof from contingency for God's existence.14 This is an a priori proof in the sense that it operates exclusively in terms or rational concepts that are independent of our perception of the observable world. Just as there are self-evident logical propositional truths, he argues, there are also primary, very general, concepts such as "the existent," "the thing," and "the necessary." The impossible cannot exist and hence the existent is either in itself necessary or only possible. If necessary, it can be shown that it would be uncaused, necessarily one, simple. If in itself only possible and we suppose it to exist, then it can be shown that it would require for its existence the existent necessary in itself. In either case, since there is existence, there must be an existent necessary in itself. This is God. Once the existence of God is proved, then the existent that is only possible in itself, the world, is inferred from His existence.
That this is the pattern of argument intended is indicated in the Metaphysics of the Shifa': Avicenna writes15:
It will become clear to you anon through an intimation that we have a way of proving the existence of the First Principle, not by the method of evidential proof from the things perceived by the senses, but by way of universal rational premises that render it necessary that there is for existence a principle that is necessary in its existence, that makes it impossible for this principle to be in anv way multiple, and makes it necessary that the whole is necessitated by Him according to the order possessed by the whole.
Because of our incapacity, Tiqwever, we are unable to adopt this demonstrative method which is the method of arriving at the secondary existents from the primary principles and the effect from the cause, except with some groupings of the ranks of existing things, not in detail.
These "groupings of the ranks of existing things" mentioned above are the celestial emanated triads in Avicenna's emanative scheme. Their proceeding sequentially from God parallels the demonstrative ideal of
In his writings Avicenna gives several (closely related) versions of this proof. The most comprehensive of these is in the Metaphysics where, however, it is scattered in different discussion and has to be reconstructed. See the author's, "Avicenna's Proof from Contingency for God's Existence in the Metaphvsics of the Shifa"', Mcdiac\~al Studies, XLII (1980), 337-52.
15 Metaphysics, 21.
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arriving at the secondary existents from the primary, at the effect from the cause. That Avicenna here is referring to the demonstration of the reasoned fact is not difficult to discern. Not that the way he goes about inferring the existence of the celestial triads is convincing. His argument, as Gha/ali's devastating criticism of it shows, is seriously flawed.16 But the demonstrative ideal of inferring the effect from the cause, enunciated in the Posterior Analytics, is very much there. It is God, the cause, that explains the fact of the world, not the other way around.
Ill
How then did the Posterior Analytics fare at the hands of its medieval Islamic interpreters? It was "The Book of Demonstration" and demonstration meant to them the perfection of syllogistic reasoning, its ultimate goal. "Our primary and essential purpose in the art of logic," Avicenna writes, "is knowledge of syllogisms and that part of [the art] that examines demonstrative syllogisms." "The use of this for us," he continues, "is the acquisition of the demonstrative sciences."17 Again, after explaining in the first chapter of the Demonstration of the Shifa' that properly speaking this work should he entitled, the Book of Demonstration and Definition, he writes18:
Once we mention the book's purpose which is to bestow the methods productive of assent that is certain and conception that is true, the benefit of the book becomes clear. It is to arrive at the cognitions that are certain and conceptions that are true, nay necessary for us when we engage in using tnis instrument, that is logic, and begin to weigh with its scales the theoretical and practical sciences.
Whatever else the Posterior Analytics may have meant for these philosophers - Alfarabi, for example, emphasi/.es its pedagogical intent19
1 Al-Gha/ali, Talnifut al-Falusifa (Incoherence of the Philosophers), cd. M. Bouygcs (Beirut, 1929), 110-132.
Ihn Sina (Avicenna). al-Sliifa': al-Mantiq (Logic) IV; al-Qiyas (Syllogism), ed. S. /ayid (Cairo, 1964), 3. This work will he abbreviated, Syllogism, in the notes.
IX
Demonstration, 18.
19
See D.L. Black, The Logical Dimension of Rhetorica and Poetics: Aspects of Non- Demonstrative Reasoning in Medie\'al Arabic Philosophy, Doctoral Dissertation (University of Toronto, 1987), 116-21. See also M. Galston, "Al-FarabF on Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration," Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism, ed. P. Morewedge (Delmar, New York, 1981), 31. See, in particular, Alfarabi, Book of Letters (Kitab al-Humf), ed.
Tfic Posterior Analytics in the Arabic Middle Ages
- it was a work of logic, providing the criterion, "the scales," for ascertaining knowledge in the true sense, knowledge that is certain. It also presented an exacting, ideal definition of knowledge. Scientific demonstration, in the best sense, does not only ascertain the facts but gives the reason for them. The ideal hence is the demonstration of the reasoned fact, where both the middle term and its referent in reality are the cause of the conclusion and its referent in reality. The premises of demonstration are universal, necessary and eternal. The ideal syllogistic form for scientific argument is the first mood of the first figure.
This conception of scientific demonstration posed for the Islamic philosophers, as it did for their predecessors and successors, many a question - for example, the relation of the universal to the particular, the necessary to the contingent, the role of observation in all this. The Posterior Analytics, however, while enunciating stringent conditions for realizing scientific knowledge, is not without statements suggestive of flexibility. Science is not confined to the demonstration of the reasoned fact. Demonstration establishing the fact is also acknowledged. The object of scientific knowledge, to be sure, is the universal. But demonstration can be - in an accidental manner of the perishable particular.20 Observation certainly plays a role in scientific investigation. True, in one passage, Aristotle states that if we were on the moon and saw the earth obstructing the sun's light, we would experience the eclipse without understanding the reason for it. He immediately adds, however, that frequent observation of a fact enables us to grasp the universal and attain demonstration.21 The Islamic philosophers expanded on these and related points, and extended the range of premises admissable in demonstration to include assertions of particular experiential facts.
This can be seen particularly in the writings of Aviccnna. He discusses, for example, different kinds of the demonstration of the fact (burh'an inna).22 These include for him a type of inductive argument where there are finite instances, allowing the induction to be complete,
M. Mahdi (Beirut, 1970), 151-52. This does not contradict Alfarabi's view that it is_ also a criterion for ascertaining what is certain and a means of arriving at it: Al-Farabi, Ihsa'al-cUlum, ed. U. Amin (Cairo, 1949), 64.
20 Posterior Analytics, I, 8, 75b 25-27; Avicenna reiterates this in Demonstration, 172-73.
21 Posterior Analytics, I, 33, 87b 39 - 88a 4.
22 Demonstration, 79-80.
94 Marmura
these instances expressed in a disjunctive premise.23 He warns his readers against believing that this kind of argument is not a demonstration. He also urges them not to pay any attention to the claim that demonstration is confined to the attributive syllogism. The most common type of demonstration of the fact, which he terms daftl, "evidential proof," involves the inference of the cause from the effect. In one place he illustrates this type of demonstration by using a conditional syllogism: If there is a lunar eclipse, then the earth intervenes between sun and moon; there is a lunar eclipse; therefore the earth intervenes between sun and moon. The repeated premise, "there is a lunar eclipse," he states, acts as a middle term.24 The most general demonstration of the fact, however, is the one in which two effects are necessitated by one cause. In such a case, the existence of the one effect is inferrable from the existence of the other. Al-sarsam, brain fever due to the swelling of the membrane envelopping the brain, and viscous white urine, Avicenna states, are concomitants, two effects of the same cause, namely the movement of the acrid humours towards the head.
Turning to the modality of demonstrative syllogisms, Avicenna urges the reader to pay no attention to the contention that necessary premises are demonstrative, those possible for the most part, dialectical, the equally possible, rhetorical, the least possible, sophistical, and the impossible, poetical.26 There can be demonstrations of the possible (of whatever degree). His position, which in effect includes the distinction
In Demonstration, 79, Avicenna refers to this as a conditional syllogism called "the divided," al-muqassam (possibly, "the dividing," al-muqassim}, stating that these instances are expressed in a disjunctive premise. The different kinds of this syllogism, including the inductive, are discussed in Syllogism, Bk. VI, Ch. 6, 349-59. For a translation and commentary on the different kinds of this syllogism, see N. Shehaby, The Prepositional Logic of Avicenna (Dordrecht and Boston, 1973), 152-60, 262-65.
Ibn Sina (Avicenna), al-IsHarat wa al-Tanbihat (Vol. I: Logic), ed. S. Dunya (Cairo, 1953), 536-37. This edition, which will be abbreviated, Isharat, includes the commentary of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi. For an English translation, see Ibn Sina, Remarks and Admonitions: Part I; Logic, tr. with an Introduction and Notes by S.C. Inati (Toronto, 1964), 155.
25 Demonstration, 79-80.
Qiyas, 4; Isharat, 512. Avicenna in this criticism may well have had in mind Alfarabi who adopts this position in his short treatise, Qawanin al-Sht r, edited and translated by A.J. Arberry: A.J. Arberry, "FarabF's Commentary on Poetry," Rivista delga Studi Orientali, 267-78, 268. I owe this reference to D.L. Black. For a full discussion of this passage and the issues involved, see her doctoral dissertation, cited in note 19 above, p. 142ff.
The Posterior Analytics in the Arabic Middle Ages 95
between modalities de dicto and de re, is summed up by his follower, the scientist philosopher Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (d. 1274)27:
Demonstrative syllogisms consist of propositions whose acceptance is necessary. These are the ones to which assent is necessary, regardless of whether they are in themselves necessary or possible. If necessary in themselves, then their conclusions are necessary according to both circumstances, and if possible in themselves, necessary in terms of acceptance. In short, demonstrative syllogisms are certain, materially and formally.
In the case of premises that are in themselves necessary, Avicenna raises the question of the duration of their necessity. A predicate, he maintains, will always belong necessarily to a subject if the latter always exists - for example, in the statement, "God is one." In universal statements about corruptible things, however, a predicate belonging necessarily to a subject will always exist as long as the subject exists, as in the statement, "all men are animals." The same applies when a description associated with a subject has a necessary predicate. A white object has a necessary predicate, its being of a color distinguishable (presumably as definitely white) to sight. Then there is the necessity of the predicate existing as long as the predicate exists (a man is necessarily seated when he is seated). Finally, there is the necessity associated with a particular event at a specific time, such as a lunar eclipse.28
This analysis, which includes questions regarding the meaning of existential (assertoric) premises and their relation to the modal, was severely criticized by Averroes who maintains that universal statements about corruptibles are still universal. Hence when we state that man is necessarily an animal, the predication is eternal, "regardless of whether or not each man exists necessarily and always." Avicenna's conditions, Averroes observes, apply to particular, not universal statements. Whatever the strengths or weaknesses of Avicenna's analysis, it should be remarked that it appears in several of his works, often in discussions of modality arising from the Prior Analytics. One of its fullest expressions,
27 Ishar'at,5U.
28 Qiyas, 53; Demonstration, 121. Cf. Posterior Analytics, I, 8, 75b 33-36.
Arabic text published by Dunlop. See, D.M. Dunlop, "Averroes (Ibn Rushd) on the Modality of Propositions," Islamic Studies, Vol. I (1962), 33. For an English translation with an Introduction and comments, see N. Rescher, Studies in Arabic Logic, 91-105.
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however, occurs in the Demonstration of the Shifa'^ as an expansion on Posterior Analytics, I, 6.
As mentioned earlier, philosophical expansions of this work were also influenced by the epistemology of the katam. The school of katam that concerns us most here is the Ashcarite. According to this school, human knowledge divides into "necessary" and "reflective," the latter being inferential knowledge based on the former.31 Necessary knowledge is created in us directly by God. It includes self-evident logical truths, knowledge of our own existence and our psychological and physical states, knowledge of the world around us attained immediately in association with our senses and knowledge based on tawatur. This latter is knowledge of individual historical events and geographical places rendered certain through innumerable individual corroborative reports, ultimately based on veridical observation. Tawatur in Islamic theology and religious law is very significant. It gives certitude about events in the past, particularly religious events, the existence of the prophet Muhammad, for example, his utterance of revelation, some of his actions and sayings.32
Now Avicenna includes all these cognitions as usable in the premises of demonstration. He thus includes particular empirical premises arrived at through direct observation and tawatur. He and his followers, however, insist that in the case of the former, sensation is always accompanied by judgement. It is only thus that utterances about particular observables are either true or false, certain or uncertain.33 Avicenna, moreover, goes beyond this to include as premises of demonstration universal empirical
"Ul - - - -
Demonstration, 120-24. See also, Isharat, 308-16; Syllogism, 32-33 and Ibn Sina, al-
Nafat (Cairo, 1938), 20-21.
For a discussion of the Ashcaritc theory, see my article, "Gha/.ali's Attitude to the Secular Sciences and Ixtgic," Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, ed. G.F. Hourani (Albany, New York, 1975), 104-105.
See B. Weiss, "Knowledge of the Past: The Theory of Tawatur According to Ghazali," Studio Islamica, LXL (1985), 90-105.
Demonstration, 58, where Avicenna is reluctant to admit apprehension by the senses as constituting knowledge, but elsewhere he affirms that particular premises based on observation are admissible in demonstration: Isharat, 389ff. Al-TusI, in his Talkhls al-Muhassal (Tehran, 1980), 112-13 is very explicit in insisting that particular premises based on sense experience must include judgment, otherwise they would not constitute propositions that are cither true or false, certain or uncertain.
Tfie Posterior Analytics in the Arabic Middle Ages 97
statements of the form, whenever A then B. These consist of two related kinds, al-mujarrab~at, "the experienced," and alhadsiyyat, "the intuited."
A discussion of the experienced premises occurs in Alfarabi's Great Book of Music (Kitab al-Musiqa al-Kabir) devoted to both musical theory and practice. In this work he locates harmonics within the epistemological confines of the Posterior Analytics and discusses aspects of the latter.34 According to Alfarabi, the process of arriving at the certainty of these experienced premises begins with sensation and imagination, followed by the mind's activity of separating and combining images. Then the mind uses a special natural power for a specific action, enabling it to arrive at certain knowledge from the recurrence of the events observed. He does not indicate, however, what this natural power is and of what its action consists. He only states that induction does not involve this mental activity and hence does not provide the certainty required in demonstrative premises.35
In his treatment of both the experienced and intuited premises, Avicenna is more explicit about the role of the mind in arriving at their certainty. Both these kinds of premises depend on the observation of regularities in nature. In the case of the experienced premises, the regular association of events is directly perceived, as for example, fire and the burning associated with it. With the intuited, the association is not directly perceived. Avicenna's example of this derives from Aristotle's definition of "quick wit" in Posterior Analytics, I, 1, 34. Thus, as Avicenna puts it, "an example of this would be for a person to observe the moon and that it gives light according to its various shapes and from the side facing the sun. The mind then seizes a middle term, namely that the cause of its light is the sun."36
The observation of regularities in arriving at both types of certain premises, while necessary, is not sufficient. In addition to this, Avicenna argues, there is always a hidden syllogism to the effect that if the regular association of events was coincidental it would not have continued always or for the most part. From this argument, which has a background in Physics, ii, 5, 196b, 10-16, he concludes that the regularity derives
34 Alfarabi, Kitab al-Musiqa al-Kablr, 92-98.
35 Ibid., 97-98.
"Vi
Demonstration, 259.
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from the inherent causal properties in natural things.37 As we shall
shortly see, Ghazali uses the same argument, but draws from it a different conclusion.
IV
It is to Ghazali that we must now turn. He wrote a number of expositions of the logic used by the Islamic philosophers, urging his fellow theologians and lawyers to adopt it.38 He argued that it did not differ from their logic in essentials only in terminology, in its greater refinement and more exhaustive treatment. Furthermore, he maintained, it is a neutral tool of knowledge, not committed to any one philosophy or doctrine. But the aim and perfection of logic, according to the philosophers, is demonstration. Explanatory reasoning in demonstration hinges on the Aristotelian four causes. Is it not then committed to a specific metaphysics of causality?
Of the Aristotelian causes, the efficient, in particular, posed a difficulty for Ashcarite acceptance of demonstrative logic. This concept of cause, as developed by Avicenna,39 embodied a necessitarianism, which when applied to divine agency, was totally unacceptable to Ashcarism. According to this concept, the proximate, essential, efficient cause and its direct effect coexist, the priority of cause to effect being ontological, not temporal. When all the causal conditions obtain, barring impediments, the cause necessitates the effect. In extramcntal reality, the relation between cause and effect is irreversible, that is, one can only remove the effect by removing the cause. In the mind, however, the inferential relation between cause and effect is reciprocal. The connection between the proximate efficient cause and its effect is a necessary one, its disruption impossible. Hence certain miracles reported in the scripture, involving such a disruption, are impossible and the language reporting them must be read as metaphor.
37 Demonstration, 95, 96, 223-24; Isharat, 394-96.
38 ' See, "Ghazali's Attitude to the Secular Sciences and Logic."
See the author's, The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality in Avicenna," Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor of G.F. Hourani, ed. Michael E. Marmura (Albany, New York, 1984), 172-78.
TJie Posterior Analytics in (He Arabic Middle Ages 99
Ghazali himself, a leading Ashcarite theologian, criticized and rejected this causal concept. His theological school was occasionalist. It denied secondary causes, conceiving the world to consist of transient atoms and accidents inhering in them. These entities are created ex nihilo by the divine voluntary act, related to form bodies40 and sustained in temporally finite spans of existence. There is no causal interaction between these created entities, only concomitance. The orderly flow of events has no inherent necessity. It is a habit, c~ada, or a custom, sunna, decreed by God, but can be disrupted at His will. How then would the Posterior Analytics relate to this scheme of things?
To see how this question arises in Ghazali's writings and how he attempts to answer it, we will first turn to his influential Tah'afut al- Fafasifa (Tfie Incoherence of the Philosophers), written to refute the Islamic philosophers, not to affirm his own doctrine. In its seventeenth discussion, he argues for the possibility of certain miracles deemed impossible by the philosophers. One can show the possibility of such miracles either in terms of the Ashcarite causal theory or even an Aristotelian theory when properly modified. Ghazali expounds and defends both the Ashcarite and the modified Aristotelian theory as possible, without explicitly committing himself in this work to either.41 In introducing the Ashcarite theory, he begins with his well-known argument that the connection between what is habitually believed to be the cause and its effect in observable things is not logically necessary and that hence one can affirm either one and deny the other without contra diction. After giving examples of such habitual causes, he concludes :
The connection of these things is due to the prior decree of God, who creates them side by side, not to any inherent necessity in these things that would render their separation from each other impossible. On the contrary, it is within God's power to create satiety without eating, death without decapitation, to prolong life after decapitation and so on in the case of all concomitant things.
Ghazali then continues with his argument that observation shows only concomitance, not necessary causal connection.
For the subtleties involved in the question of what constitutes a body in Ashca- rism, see R.M. Frank, "Bodies and Atoms," Islamic Theology and Philosophy, 39-53.
See the author's, "Al-Ghazali's Second Causal Theory in the 17th Discussion of the Tahafut," Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism, ed. P. Morewedge (Delmar, New York, 1981), 278-79.
42 Ghazali, Tahafut al-Falasifa, 278-79.
100 Marmura
In the above passage, however, special attention should be given to the example of decapitation, which recurs in two key passages in two different works associated with the Tah'afut and written in the same period.43 The first of these is his Iqtisad fi al-Ftiqad (Tfie Golden Mean of Belief), written shortly after the Tah'afut, a work in which he affirms and defends his Ashcarite theology. In it he subjects the theory of generated acts of the rival Mucta/,ilite school of kafam, which he identifies with the philosophers' theory of efficient natural causality, to criticism and rejects it.44 He affirms unequivocally the Ashcarite causal theory, proclaiming it to be the true theory.45 The example of decapitation occurs in a discussion of al-ajal, the individual's predestined time of death. If a man is decapitated, does he die because of decapitation or his ajaH Ghazali writes46:
Killing means the cutting of the neck. This reduces to accidents that are motions of the hand of the striker with the sword, accidents that are separations in the parts of the neck of the one being struck, another accident being associated with these, namely, death.
If there is no bond between the cutting and death, the denial of death would not follow necessarily from the denial of cutting. For these are created together, connectedly in accordance with habit (c'ada), there being no bond of the one with the other. They are similar to two separate things that are not habitually connected.
After further discussion, including an explanation of the philo sophers' causal position, he concludes47:
It ought to be said that he died by his ajal, ajal meaning the time in which God creates in him his death, regardless of whether this occurs with the cutting of a neck, the occurrence of a lunar eclipse, or the falling of rain. For all these things are for us associations, not generated acts, except that with some their connection is repeated according to habit, but with some they are not repeated.
' In Posterior Analytics, I, 4, 73b 15-16, decapitation is given as an essential cause in the killing of an animal. That a similar example (though with reference to people) occurs in Ghazali's discussion of causality may well be coincidental.
^ Al-Ghazall, al-Iqtisad ft al-ftiqad, eds. I.A. (^ubukqu and H. Atay (Ankara, 1962), 95-99; for an explicit identification of the Muctazilite theory of generated acts and the philosopher's theory of efficient causality, see Tahafut, 377.
45 Iqtisad, 224, line 8.
46 Ibid., 223-24.
47 Ibid.,225.
TJie Posterior Analytics in the Arabic Middle Ages 101
It is with this example as it occurs in the Tah'afut and the Iqtiiad in mind that we shall turn to the third work, the logical treatise he appended to the Tah'afut, his Micyar al'Ilm (Tlie Standard of Kfiowledge). This is essentially an exposition of Avicenna's logic where the causal language in the discussion of demonstration is for the most part Aristotelian. There is, however, a reminder of Ashcarism. It occurs in his discussion of the mujarrabat, "the experienced" premises. Following Avicenna, he argues that we arrive at the certain knowledge of these empirical generalizations through (a) observation of the regular association of events, and (b) the hidden rational argument that if this regularity was coincidental or accidental it would not have continued always or for the most part. Avicenna, as we have seen, draws from this the conclusion that this certainty derives from the causal, natural powers of things, and the necessary causal connections between natural things. Ghazali does not make this conclusion. Instead, he reports a possible objection to his analysis of these premises and answers it. He writes48:
Someone may say: How do you consider this certain when the theologians have doubted this, maintaining that it is not decapitation that causes death, nor eating satiation, nor fire, burning, but that it is God, the Exalted, who causes burning, death and satiation at the occurrence of their concomitant events, not through them.
We answer: We have already directed attention to the depths and true nature of this problem in the book, The Incoherence of the Philosophers. It is sufficient here to say that when the theologian informs the questioner that his son "has been decapitated, the theologian does not doubt his death - no rational man doubts this. The theologian admits the fact of death, but inquires about the manner of connection between decapitation and death.
As for the inquiry as to whether this is a necessary consequence of the thing itself, impossible to change, or whether this in accordance with the passage of the custom (sunna) of God, the Exalter, due to the fulfillment of His will that can undergo neither substitution nor change, this is an inquiry into the mode of connection, not in the connection itself.
If we read Ghazali aright, nature proceeds in a uniform manner. God decrees the creation of regularly associated events we habitually regard as causes and effects. But they are not true causes and effects, only concomitants. They have, however, an order in their relation to each other that parallels that of the Avicennan essential efficient causes and their effects. Thus the habitual cause coexists with the habitual effect, its priority to it being ontological, not temporal. In extramental
48
Al-Ghazall, Mfyar afllm, ed. S. Dunya (Cairo, 1961), 190-91.
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reality the order of the habitual cause and the habitual effect is normally irreversible, but in the mind their inferential relation is reciprocal. This inferential relation is not based on any necessary connection between them, but on a uniform pattern decreed arbitrarily by God. This order can thus be disrupted. God in His goodness, however, disrupts it only on the rare occasion when a miracle is needed. As Ghazali tells it in his Tah'afut^ God creates in us the assurance that the uniformity will continue: when a miracle takes place, he refrains from creating in us knowledge of the uniformity, creating knowledge of the miracle instead. Under normal circumstances, however, we have the assurance from God that the order of the world will continue. On this basis we can have scientific demonstrations about the natural order.
To be sure, there are difficulties in this epistemology. But what is significant for our purpose here is that one of Islam's most important and influential theologians did not discard demonstration, but sought to adapt it to his religious metaphysics. Not that all Islamic religious thinkers looked kindly on demonstration. A case in point is the renowned Islamic lawyer Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), for whom the object of knowledge is what exists extramentally, this being the singular in its singularity. Demonstration, which for the Aristotelian purists is concerned with the universal, cannot arrive at such knowledge. It thus does not arrive at the existence of the unique, one God, but only at the universal concept of deity, a universal "whose conception docs not disallow partnership therein." He writes50:
Universal, general propositions do not exist externally as universal and general. They are only universal in [our] minds, not in concrete existence. Regarding external existents, these are specific things, each existent having a reality proper to it, differentiating it from what is other, no other sharing [the reality] with it.
As such, it is impossible to arrive at the particularity of a specific existent through the syllogism. [The logicians] acknowledge this, stating that the syllogism does not indicate a specific thing. They may express this by saying that it does not indicate a particular, but only the universal, intending by the particular that whose conception prevents the occurrence of partnership in it. [Now] every existent has a reality proper to it whose conception prevents the occurrence of partnership in it. Hence the syllogism does not bestow knowledge of a specific existing thing. Every existent is a specific existent. [The syllogism] thus does not bestow knowledge of the realities of existing things, but only of universal,
49 Tahafut, 286.
50 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Radd cala al-Mantiqiyyin, ed. S. Nadawi (Bombay, 1949), 344.
Tfie Posterior Analytics in the Arabic Middle Ages 103
absolute things, supposed in the mind, not reali/ed in specific existence.
We have spoken of this and other things at greater length elsewhere, where it was shown that none of the things the theore ticians mention regarding the syllogistic arguments they term demonstration for proving the existence of the Creator, may He be praised and exalted, indicate anything about His specific existence, but only an absolute universal thing, whose conception does not disallow partnership therein.
The concluding remark is a barbed insinuation, since associating a partner with God is Islam's cardinal sin.
All things considered, however, in its medieval Islamic journey, the Posterior Analytics, fared very well. It exerted enormous influence on Arabic thought. Its sponsors, the Islamic philosophers, developed its ideas, widening its epistemological range, while a leading theologian, Ghazali, "the proof of Islam," sought to render its canons operative within a non-Aristotelian view of God and the world.
University of Toronto
L.M. DE RIJK
The Posterior Analytics in the Latin West
1. Preliminary: Aristotle on True Knowledge
It is common knowledge that Aristotle had the conviction that all reality was to be found within our world of sensible experience and that Plato's assumption of another, Transcendent World of Perfect Being was merely 'empty talk and poetic mataphor' (Metaph. A9, 991a20). Indeed, Aristotle took Plato's Forms to be quite useless for explaining the possibility of true knowledge about our world. However, like his master, Plato, Aristotle stuck to the Parmenidean conviction about the real existence of unchanging formal principles of being. As is well-known, his formal principles are in things as their immanent dynamic natures (eide).
For Aristotle, true knowledge concerns the essential natures immanent in things (see e.g. Metaph., 991al2-3; 999a24-9; 1018b36; 1032M ff. ct alibi). To be sure, all being is individual being and so Aristotle is compelled to answer the quite intriguing question: if the proper object of true knowledge is universal nature and everything real is a particular, how, then, are we able to gain genuine knowledge about the things in their own right? In his Posterior Analytics Aristotle explains what he understands by truly knowing things. Well, quite in line with his philosophical stand, Aristotle claims that all scientific knowledge is concerned with discerning a universal nature as immanent in a particular. In 12, 72a25-7 e.g., it is explicitly said that the elements of the deduction are such and such in concreto (cf. 73a29-31). For Aristotle, demonstration in fact concerns some phenomenal state of affairs of which the investigation aims to clarify the essential structures.
Let us start, now, with a sketch of the basic tenets of scientific proof according to Aristotle and list the key terms involved.
TJic Posterior Analytics in the Latin West 105
2. Tlie Nature of Scientific Attribution (Predication)
For there to be a true demonstration (apodeixis) the way in which attributes are assigned to their subjects has to meet special conditions. (14, 73a26 ff.)
(1) The attribute should belong to the subject kata pantos (universaliter), i.e. hold good for each member of the subject's class: 'Every S is P'
(2) it should belong kath' hauto or per se, i.e. be said of the subject in virtue of a thing's proper nature: 'P belongs to S in virtue of the nature of S' or 'in virtue of the nature of P'
(3) it should belong kath' holou, i.e. be said of the subject in virtue of the latter's entire nature: 'S is P in virtue of the entire nature of S'.
Nota bene. This kath' holou is commonly read as katholou and rendered 'universally', which is highly confusing. Rather it should be printed kath' holou and rendered 'commensurately applying'. The proper Latin trans lation would be: de toto = de tola intentione or ratione, but all translations have quite unfortunately, the substantive noun universale.
In fact, these requirements are cumulative such that the third one 'kath' holou' comprises the first two and adds to them the notion of hei auto ('as such'). The kath' holou requirement is intended to prevent the demonstrator from picking out an attribute which is 'per se' but does not belong to the subject in virtue of the whole of its essential formal constituents. E.g. when seeking the appropriate subject for the attribute 'having angles equal to two right angles', the kath' holou requirement makes you reject the isosceles triangle as the proper subject because that property is not related to its complete nature, but only to part of it, viz. its being a triangle. In other words, the kath' holou requirement does not allow the demonstrator to use the sentence: 'Every isosceles has its angles equal to two right ones' as an appropriate scientific premiss, although it \sper se true.1
These requirements also play an important role in the Ramistic philosophy of science, and later on when they as lex veritatis, lex justitiae and lex sapientiae developed into the criteria constitutive and discriminative of the diverse arts and sciences. See e.g. Petri Rami, Dialecticae libri duo, Audomari Talaci praelectionihus illustrati, Parisiis 1566, pp. 224-38. It is noteworthy that this edition prints kath' holou. See Cesare Vasoli, La dialettica e la retorica dell' Umanesimo. Invenzione e metodo nella cultura del XV e XVI secolo, Milan 1968, pp. 554 and 584 (for the 1592 edition). - I owe this information to the kindness of my colleague, Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans.
106 De Rijk
The question may arise, now, by what kind of questions scientific enquiry should commence. Aristotle lists four: the 'that' (quid}, the 'why' (propter quid}, the 'whether' (si est or an est) and 'what' (quid). It should be noted that quia and propter quid ask about some state of affairs (pragma) whereas the other two concern the subject involved in that state of affairs. A crucial role is played by the meson, which is not 'middle term' but rather 'middle', or intermediate pragma. The Medicvals are quite right in speaking of medium (not, terminus mediusl).
The initial process of acquiring knowledge may now be described as follows: The senses produce some sensation which, in turn, is presented to the intellect as an as yet unanalyzed phenomenon (pragma). Next, the intellect sets out to analyze it into subject and attribute by hitting upon the appropriate meson. E.g. the pragma 'somc-noise-occurring-in-the- clouds' is analy/ed, through the medium 'thcre-being-a-quenching-of-fire', into 'the noise is <or is caused by> quenching of fire' and 'quenching of fire is <or: causes > thunder'. The pre-existent knowledge in this case is the supposition that thunder is a noise in the clouds caused by the quenching of fire in them.
So Aristotle views scientific enquiry as a movement from a rough idea provided by sense-perception and experience to a full understanding of what some kind of thing or type of event is, as John Ackrill2 aptly expresses it.
The following rules of thumb concerning the four questions may now be described as follows:
hoti esti (quia) introduces some state of affairs (pragma); even in the case of a simple term used, e.g. 'animal', it should read: 'some-x-being-an-f
ei esti (si est) introduces some subject somehow qualified or being in a certain state; the formula does not ask for the existence of some unqualified hypokeimenon, as the latter is already presented by sense-perception
ti esti (quid est) asks for the correct categorization of the hypokeimenon (subjectum) of the phenomenon; this question mainly concerns the subject's formal identification
dioti (propter quid) asks for the why of the state of affairs involved.
2 Aristotle, the Philosopher, Oxford 1981, 102 f.
TJic Posterior Analytics in the Latin West 107
Definition plays an important role in this process. (See e.g. 118, 93al6-33; 93M5-8; 110, 93b29-94a7). Aristotle distinguishes four types of definition:
(1) definition taken as a non-causal essential categorization of the proper subject of the state of affairs involved
(2) definition taken as a causal (and essential) categorization of the state of affairs
(3) definition as performed by the conclusion of the apodcictic syllogism which reveals the essential nature of the proper subject involved in the state of affairs under discussion
(4) definition qua definition of the 'immediates' (amesa) which is the indemonstrable assumption of their essential nature.
In 1113 Aristotle offers some recipes for discovering useful defini tions and what is called 'the hunting for essential attributes' (96a22-3). This part of the scientific process amounts to correctly connecting the specific terms just mentioned, i.e. subject, attribute and definiens.
The role (and indeed the precise nature) of 'essential attribution' and, generally speaking, essential categorization also appear from Aristotle's discussion of the relationship between the quid est and si est items (118, 93a20-2S; 10, 93b34-5).3 Why must knowledge that there is such a thing as (x) precede enquiry into what (x) is? Would it not be possible to seek x's nature, quite apart from our knowing whether or not x exists?
In order to answer this question one should be aware of the empirical framework of what Aristotle means by scientific enquiry. What Aristotle intends to do is to seek the essential nature of particulars as occurring in the daily world, (cf. above, p. 104) The first thing to achieve, then, is to define a phenomenon by properly categorizing it and thus grasp its essential nature. However, Aristotle's claim that the state of affairs (including its hypokeimenoti) is familiar to us does not imply that we should know this subject as qualified such-and-such but rather that the demonstrator should be aware of what I have called above (p. 106) an as yet unanalyzed phenomenon. What he has to investigate, then, is whether the essential categorization he has in mind really obtains. In my opinion that is precisely what Aristotle means when remarking that it is not sufficient to be familiar with some thing under a non-essential
3 Cf.Ackrillop.d/., 101-2.
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categorization.4 For example, supposing there is some noise in the clouds. One may come up with some god in order to explain this phenomenon (e.g. Zeus). However, a rational explanation requires the true definition or true categorization of the cause, namely 'quenching of fire'. Moreover essential categorization is not sufficient as long as it is still at the level of nominal definition; it should also reveal the 'why' (propter quid) of the pragma involved (93b38-94a7).
Let us now pick up some important items. First Aristotle's notion of 'necessity'. Aristotle is quite explicit about the nature of the object of scientific knowledge (16): it cannot possibly be otherwise than it is and therefore demonstration is based on necessary premisses. However, what exactly should we understand by 'necessity'? Well, it must strike the reader of Posterior Analytics that first and foremost necessity is a property required for the demonstration and its premisses, not of the things they are about. In other words, demonstration is about necessary connections between subjects and attributes. So Aristotle speaks of the principle that "demonstration implies necessity, that is: if something has been proved, it cannot be otherwise" (16, 74M3-5). Something's being per se is not sufficient; we shall know it as aperse connection.
Well, what is proved is not a thing but a state of affairs, as signified by a necessary connection between subject and attribute (see esp. 16, 75a28 ff.). Aristotle even argues that something's 'being per se' is not a sufficient explanation; we rather have to know its being as a per se connection between its essential constituents. In his philosophical lexicon (Book D of Metaphysics, cap. 5) Aristotle confirms this once more (1015b6-9).
In Anal. Post. 18 the author claims that the conclusion of a demonstration must be eternal and that, accordingly, there can be no demonstration of knowledge in the strict sense of what is corruptible. In the next lines it is a proposition (or premiss) that is called corruptible, not the thing itself it is about.
Besides, in Physics 119 Aristotle clearly argues that in expressions as 'Men must be made of flesh, blood' etc., the necessity is only hypothetical, i.e. it depends on whether they exist at all. He rejects Democritus' view that the expression means 'men of flesh and blood must
See 1110, 93529-37. H.g. calling thunder 'noise' or Callias 'a white <thing>'.
772t' Posterior Analytics in the Latin West 109
be\ And in Metaphysics D5 just mentioned the author concludes his discussion of 'necessary' as follows (1015b9-15):
Now, some things owe their necessity to something other than themselves; others do not, but are themselves the source of necessity in other things. Therefore the necessary in the primary and strict sense is the simple (to haplouri); for this does not admit of more states than one. ... If then, there are any things that are eternal and unmovable, nothing compulsory or against their nature attaches to them. (Oxford translation}
To my mind, in Posterior Analytics Aristotle is not interested in the eternity of things but rather in the perpetuity of the truth of certain propositions (premisses and conclusions). For that reason, the quite interesting controversy5 among modern interpreters about Aristotle's adherence to the statistic conception of necessity may be left aside for the moment.
I shall conclude this survey of important issues taken from Posterior Analytics with a short discussion of the apprehension of the so-called First Principles (or 'immediates', amesa kai archai).
Not all knowledge is demonstrative, Aristotle argues as early as in 12 (72bl9-22); rather demonstration is made possible thanks to our previous acquaintance with 'immediates' or first principles. Well, the latter type of cognition is discussed at length in the famous final chapter of Posterior Analytics (II 19). In this chapter Aristotle describes in a way similar to that found in Metaph. Al the apprehension of the first principles as proceeding from sense-perception through the intermediate stages of 'memory' and 'experience', or the framing of a universal cognition on the basis of repeated memories. Such a transition is possible because sense-perception already has an element of 'universality' in it (e.g. we perceive Callias as a 'man'). Starting from such rough 'universals' we arrive at higher ones and finally come to the highest ones, the 'unanalyzables', or highest categories. This passage from particulars to the 'universal' inhering in them is called induction (epagoge). Incidentally, this kind of induction should be well distinguished, I think, from the kind
See esp. Jaakko Hintikka, Time and Necessity. Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality, Oxford, etc. 1973 and Jeroen van Rijen, Aristotle's Logic of Necessity (diss. Leyden), Alblasserdam 1986 (forthcoming in Reidel's Series: Synthcsc Historical Library: Aspects of Aristotle's Modal Logic) esp. chs 8 and 9.
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of induction as found elsewhere in our treatise (e.g. 72b9; 78a34; 81a38- b9).6
Aristotle's description of induction and its role in the scientific process fits in remarkably well with what he has earlier remarked about the process of proper categorization. Referring to the well-known battle simile - how a general retreat comes to an end after one man makes a stand, and then another etc. -, the author argues that "as soon as one of the undifferentiated < percepts > makes a stand, there is a primitive universal in the mind ... until the highest genera <have been reached >" (1119, 100al4-b4).
The faculty, or rather cognitive attitude, by which we become familiar with the first principles is the Nous or intellective apprehension. Well, just as the Nous precedes all principles (such as axioms etc.), in the same way scientific knowledge covers the whole domain of states of affairs (pragrnatd), Aristotle concludes (100bl6-17).
Let us try, now, in the next sections, to discover the Medievals' doctrinal reception of the Posterior Analytics by discussing their views of some themes characteristic of Aristotle's scientific method. It would be useful, to that end, to single out the following items: the Medievals' discussion of the well-known four questions, their views of the three requirements for 'hunting essential attributes', their (different) views of necessity, and, finally, the Medieval conceptions of induction and our knowledge of the First Principles.
3. Hie Four Basic Questions Involved in Apodeixis
One should clearly notice, at the outset, that the Medievals were in no way preoccupied with epistemological problems. They did not ask themselves whether knowledge as such is really possible at all. They rather started from the firm conviction that knowing things is possible. What they were interested in, in the footsteps of the Ancient thinkers, esp. Plato and Aristotle, was the question how to arrive at true knowledge about things, and to determine the latter's nature or status. On this footing the Medievals were interested in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. At the same time, they were fully aware of our capacity of
' Cf. Kurt von Fritz, 'Die Epagoge bei Aristoteles' in Grundprobleme der Geschichte der antiken Wissenschaft, Berlin-New York 1971, 623-76, esp. 655.
TJic Posterior Analytics in the Latin West 1 1 1
knowing a great many of truths not attainable by scientific demon stration, among which not only all kinds of theological truths but also direct experiences about our sublunar world. They were particularly interested in the Posterior Analytics precisely because this work intends to afford a rational foundation of strict knowledge and place it within the framework of human cognitive processes in general.7
To turn now to the specific items announced, quite naturally, every Medieval commentator extensively discusses the four questions that are so indispensable for any scientific proof; in their terminology: quia, propter quid, si est, quid est. As we have seen before, the first two concern a pragma or 'state of affairs', the other pair are about the appropriate subject as involved in the state of affairs.
3.1. Robert Grosseteste (not after 1168 - 1253)
Allow me to start with a pertinent quotation from Me Evoy's excellent study8 of the philosophy of Robert Grossesteste [1982:320]:
While the modern preoccupation with epistemological problems should not be read back into the Schoolmen, there is a deal of interest to be found in inquiring how a theologian of the thirteenth century, writing out of the background of Augustinian ideas, reacted to the theory of knowledge created by Aristotle in his struggle to free himself from Platonism.
As a matter of fact, Me Evoy mainly confines himself to elucidate that tension in Grosseteste between Augustinian (neo-Platonic) and Aristotelian thought. He is right in arguing that Grosseteste did not really see any harm in assenting to Aristotle's scientific method as far as our transient world is concerned. You might think, now, that his assent is global, of the kind so generously given by people who are not really interested in logical matters. However, Grosseteste is not only quite open towards Aristotle's way of thought but succeeded well in providing the Latin West with an extensive commentary, which goes into many
For the reception of the Posterior Analytics in the Middle Ages, see also Eileen Serene, in The Cambridge History of Latin Medieval Philosophy (eds. Norman Kretz- mann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg, associate editor Eleanore Stump), Cambridge etc. 1982, 496-517.
8 James Me Evoy, The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste, Oxford 1982. I used the Rossi edition (Robertus Grosseteste, Commentarius in Posterionim Analyticorum libros. Introduzione e testo critico di Pietro Possi. Firenze 1981).
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interesting details, and more importantly, (I really must say this) quite profitable for modern commentators too. For that matter, many a modern interpreter could have saved himself the trouble of asking and answering questions (rather unsuccessfully, at times) that had been solved with all due understanding as early as in the thirteenth century.9
Grosseteste is quite explicit in distinguishing the two different pairs of questions and points out that si est (or: an est) and quid est ask about what he calls the essentia rei whereas quid and propter quid concern the complcxio rei. However, unlike Aristotle, he starts with the questions concerning the subject: (a) is it really given and (b) what is its essential nature?; next, the questions concerning the state of affairs in which the subject is involved ('complexio rei'), come up for discussion (290, 64-70 ed. Rossi). Robert is fully aware of the fact that for there to be a real apodeixis the occurrence of a complexio rei or state of affairs must be our startingpoint rather than the question whether this or that subject as such does exist.
What is under consideration at the outset is, not, for example, the sun or the moon as such but their being involved in some condition such as an eclipse. And so, some lines further on (292, 100-10), Robert quite rightly explains the four questions in the correct order, and, more importantly, he describes the complexio rei as a product of sensation; he adds the gloss per sensum to Aristotle's lemma: Ut scicntes (III, 89b29).
Further, Grosseteste nicely explains the role of the medium and our 'hunting' for the correct attribute (292, 111 ff.). Unlike many a modern commentator he understood the true sense of medium very well, in not thinking of some terminus medius but precisely that causal or explicative state of affairs responsible for what we are up to prove (see esp. 294, 145-6). Accordingly, Grosseteste formulates four theses (Conclusiones II- V) about the role of the medium, the fifth one explicitly stating quod
Thus Robert finds no difficulty in the phrase in numerum ponentes, (89b25) where Barnes (Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, translated with notes, Oxford 1975) speaks of a 'bizarre phrase' (apparently ignoring that the Greek arithmos as the Latin nutnerns always stand for a plurality of things (terms), our 'number', one being not a number to Ancient and Medieval mind, but the principium numerandi. For Robert's correct interpretation of this phrase, sec 290,77-291,93.
Thus the phrase complcxio rei does not only refer to any enuntiatio whatsoever including that of the form: 'Sol est' but, more precisely, to a three piece proposition ('S est P'). Incidentally, all iMedicval commentators had the right understanding of this important issue (Cf. Thomas Aquinas, 407-11).
Tfie Posterior Analytics in the Latin West 113
omnia que quenuitur sunt questiones medii ( = Aristotle, Anal.Post. 112, 90a35).
3.2. Tliomas Aquinas (1225- 74)
Thomas Aquinas, (who could doubt about that?) gives quite a clear exposition about the four questions. He starts with clarifying the purport of Book II, taken as a whole (nr. 407 ed. Spiazzi). Next he deals with the four questions (408-13). He discusses them in the correct order (see esp. 409) and is quite explicit about the fact that the quid and propter quid questions ask about some state of affairs.
Next, St Thomas clearly shows that in fact both the si est and the quia est question ask whether there is an appropriate medium, since, indeed, the medium is the ratio of the state of affairs under consideration.
The final words of the passage (412, see our note 11) are important but their meaning is somewhat confused by the incorrect punctuation given in the editions. What Aquinas is quite right in pointing out, is that the original question concerning some sensation did not as yet put the phenomenon in the light of the appropriate medium11 and that our hunting for the appropriate medium is precisely the first thing to do in order to arrive at the scientific explanation of the phenomenon under consideration. You will remember: as long as we take 'some noise in the clouds' as just some noise, rather than something caused by quenching of fire, we will never succeed in arriving at the scientific explanation of the phenomenon of thunder.
Thus the pivotal role of the medium and our hunting for it is nicely explained by Aquinas. At the same time, our author understands remarkably well the semantic aspect of the procedure (which we have labelled before: the 'correct categorization'), where he remarks (415) that Aristotle seems to claim that the definition (read: definiens; see above, p. 108) of the attribute (passio) is the medium. In this connection
So you should read: id quod est medium est ratio eius de quo quacritur an hoc sit hoc (vel an simpliciter, ut infra dicetur), non tamen quaeritur sub ratione medii, and translate: "that which is the medium is the proper element ('ratio') of that about which the predicative question (or else the simple one as will be said below) is asked, although not <yet> under the proper aspect ('ratio') of the medium". (I have used the Leonina edition as printed by R.M. Spiazzi, Marietti).
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Thomas points out that the definition of say whiteness in fact concerns album or a white subject. Thus, it becomes absolutely clear, again, that Aquinas too is aware of the fact that the object of scientific proof is always the particular as somehow qualified, rather than some essential nature taken as such.
3.3. William of Ockham (c. 1285- 1347)
A preliminary remark. To my understanding, Aristotle's Posterior Analytics deals with the scientific procedure of apodeixis in general rather than apodeictic syllogism in particular, the latter being merely the vehicle for correctly framing a scientific proof. For that reason, when reducing scientia to a set of propositions ordered in the (most) appropriate way into a so-called demonstratio potissima, Ockham tends to reduce Aristotle's theory of scientific proof to a theory of apodeictic syllogism. This leads the Venerable Inceptor to deal with Aristotle's doctrine of scientific proof in a somewhat different perspective from that of the Master himself.12 In this pioneering and still interesting study of Ockham's theory of demonstration Father Webering fell victim, I am afraid, to similar optical errors as did indeed Gordon Leff as well (op. cit., 300 ff.).13 Nevertheless, Ockham's exposition of the Posterior Analytics is quite important, not only as a personal interpretation but also as an elucidating commentary.
Turning now to the famous four questions, unlike Aristotle, Ockham does not see them as four elementary stages in any scientific procedure.
To he honest, the confusion is not quite alien to other Mcdicvals either. So the well-known three qualities which are characteristic of a per se proposition (viz. per se nota, self-evident and easily rccogni/.ed) are, in fact, for Aristotle not specific qualities of the per se proposition but rather of the principles of scientific knowledge, as Webering rightly argues (I). Webering, Theory of Demonstration according to William Ockham, St. Bonaventure, N.Y./Ixnivain/Padcrborn, 1953 (Franciscan Institute Publications, Philosophy Series, 10), p. 42). On the other hand, like the Schoolmen Webering failed to recogni/.e that Aristotle discusses the terms of demonstrative proof, rather than the propositions of demonstrative syllogism, so that Webering's opposing the two (21-31 and 32-57) is rather unfortunate, in that it entirely obscures the main issue of the correct categori/.ation; for the latter, see above, p. 107 ff.
Gordon I^ff, William of Ockham, The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse, Manchester 1975.
Tiie Posterior Analytics in the Latin West 115
Rather he considers tl-em as four different questions,14 the two pairs of which lead to two different types of demonstration, viz. a priori and a posteriori demonstration, to the extent in fact that Ockham even uses a priori and propter quid demonstration as equivalent expressions as well as a posteriori and quia demonstration. It is most significant, then, that Webering felt compelled to remark [1953:11] that when we study Ockham carefully, this identification "is not entirely justified." In this respect it is interesting to note that in his TJieological Summa (I, 912 art. 2) Thomas Aquinas has the same identification, but Aquinas certainly did not reduce the two pairs of questions to types of demonstration; and quite right he was.
Another characteristic of Ockham's treatment of the questions is still more worthwhile to consider. Once Ockham has made Aristotle's si est question the question of the demonstrability of some thing's real being, quite an important divergence between Ockham and Aristotle unavoidably comes in. Indeed, with Aristotle the question merely concerns the applicability of this or that categorization to the subject of the pragma under consideration, whereas its real existence is quite out of the question (see above, p. 107). But to somebody who, as Ockham does, makes the si est question concern the demonstrability of the subject's real being, the latter's actual existence is not a matter of fact as yet. More importantly, it is as such no guarantee for universal and necessary knowledge, since the actual existence of all beings, except that of God, is contingent and individual. For that reason, Ockham is bound to give the si est question a wider range; indeed it covers, not only actual existence but also the possibility of existence.15 By doing so, he reveals a concern quite different from what Aristotle had in mind when devising the si est question.
See Webering (op.cit., 80-172) who failed, however, to see the quite different issues involved in the four questions put forward by Aristotle.
Summa logicae III-2, cap. 25, 550, 7-10: Est autem primo sciendum quod quaestio si est terminatur per hoc quod evidenter cognoscitur quod res est. Quod fit si sciatur propositio in qua esse existere per propositionem de inesse vel de possibili praedicatur de subiecto. See Webering, op.cit., 28-31 and 88-106; Leff, op.cit., 257.
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4. Ttie Tiiree Requirements for Scientific Predication
In fact, Aristotle's requirements for 'hunting' essential attributes were, quite understandably, taken by the Medicvals as rules for scientific predication as accomplished in framing adequate premisses. Of course, the most interesting question here is whether the Medievals did in fact have the right understanding of the kath' holou requirement (unlike quite a lot of modern commentators, for that matter). Admittedly, the different Latin translations were not in favour of the correct interpretation. James of Venice, the Anonymous named Johannes, Gerard of Cremona and William of Moerbeke as well all render katholou (14, 73b25 ff.) by using the substantive noun univcrsale. A similar disadvantage was to affect their understanding of the whole passage anyway. However, as usual the Medievals' affinity with Ancient doctrine made them overcome many a difficulty and pick up other unequivocal hints from the text.
4.1. Robert Grosseteste and Tlwmas Aquinas
Grosseteste gives a fine exposition (110, 35-116, 62 ed. Rossi) of the three requirements. First, of what Aristotle labels kata pantos or the requirement of universalitas tarn ex parte subiecti quam ex parte temporis (110, 36). Then, the kath' hauto and the kath' holou requirements are described as et quod predicatum dicatur de subiecto per se et quod de subiecto primo. An excellent interpretation, first and foremost, in that Grosseteste rightly indicates that the three requirements merely concern three ways of attributing something to something. As to the per se requirement his Latin translation was bound to put him (as the other Medievals) on the wrong track in rendering the phrase kath' hauta d'hosa hyparchei (at 73a35): "per se autem sunt quaecumque sunt". However, Robert does not hesitate to phrase: "est autem per se alterum de altero et dicitur per se alterum dc altero" (111, 51-2), and he is wise enough to start from the logical rather than the ontological sense as is quite clear from his gloss (112, 79): "Dicit ergo Per se autem sunt, supple: altera de alteris vel dicuntur." Robert's explanation of kath' holou is quite to the point. He apparently interprets this requirement as what I took the liberty of translating into de toto (-de tola intentione or ratione\ see above p. 105); i.e. the special attribute is appropriate to the subject's
TJic Posterior Analytics in the Latin West 111
whole intension, not merely to part of it.16 Of course, Robert avoids the rendition katholou -- 'universaliter' and speaks of did de subiecto primo (after picking up the useful clue found at 73b34 and elsewhere). And so our author exactly hits the mark.
Thomas Aquinas also clearly sees that the three requirements are cumulative and that the third one, the katholou requirement comprises the other two. He straight-forwardly explains katholou (universale) as primo (sc. praedicari) and gives an interpretation which closely fits in with Aristotle's sayings on this score.17 He warns his readers that universale here is not used in the well-known Porphyrian sense.18 From the viewpoint of modal logic it is also noteworthy that Aquinas clearly sees that the 'necessity' claim is only implied in the kath' holou requirement (i.e. not in the de omni requirement) so that no extensional conception of modality is involved.19
4.2. William of Ockham
In his Summa logicae Ockham extensively discusses the three require ments, de omni, per se and what he labels, quite in line with the Medieval tradition, primo vera (III-2; capp. 6-8; 514-21; cf. Ordinatio, prologue, q.4, pp. 144,17-145,2 and 152,6-17).20 In order to trace Ockham's own views of scientific proof and his personal interpretation of Posterior Analytics we have to pay special attention to his definition of
Nichil est in triangulo quod non sit causa respectu habitus trium angulorum etc., nee est aliquid in hahitu trium angulorum etc., quod sit non causatum respectu trianguli. (115,148-116,150); cf. 115,141 ff.
' In PostAnal. 78: Oportet enim in propositionibus demonstrationis aliquid universaliter [= kata pantos] praedicari (quod significat dici de omni); et per se [kath' hauto]; et etiam primo (quod significat universale). Haec autem tria se habent ex additione adinvicem (...). Primo vero dicitur aliquid praedicari de altero per comparationem ad ea quae sunt priora subiecto et continentia ipsum. Nam 'habere tres angulos etc.1 non praedicatur primo de isoscele, quia prius praedicatur de priori, scilicet de triangulo; cf. 91-96.
18 Ibid., 91.
19
Ibid., 93: Manifestum est quod universalia praedicata, prout hie sumuntur, ex
necessitate insunt rebus de quibus praedicantur.
20
Webering's treatment (op.cit., 50-3) of Aristotle's view of kath' holou
('commensurately universal') is vitiated by his following the (wrong) common interpretation of the phrase, and his discussion (53-7) of Ockham's propositio primo vera is not free of confusion either.
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the propositio primo vera (S.L. III-2, cap. 8, 519, 5-7): "that proposition is primarily true (primo vera) in which the predicate does not belong earlier21 than to its own subject to any other subject which is more general than the former, or to a subject which is not predicable of its own subject". In that case the predicate is called 'universale' with regard to this subject22, and the subject is called 'first subject of that predicate', at least if it is predicable in the second mode of essential predication", Ockham elucidates (ibid. 7-10).
Well, the second part of the definition contains an additional requirement for a proposition to be primo vera which is not mentioned by the other Medieval commentators (and not found in Aristotle either) in requiring that the attribute do not belong earlier to some subject which is not predicable of its own subject. The reason that forces Ockham to make this addition is worthwhile to examine. The extra requirement is intended to prevent misattributing to a concrete particular a passio which, properly speaking, belongs 'earlier' (prius) to its abstract. Take for example, the property of heat-giving (calefactivurri), which is predicable of heat (calor) before it is predicable of something hot (calidum), since only if there is first heat something can become hot through calefaction. On the same footing is his earlier remark (cap. 4, 510, 10-20) that the principle expressed in the proposition: 'Every hot thing is heat-giving' presupposes as its further principle the proposition 'All heat is hcatgiving.'
It cannot be denied that Ockham thus has a special problem concerning the kath' holou requirement. It should be recalled that this requirement is meant to prevent us from wrongly categorizing the appropriate subject of a demonstration. Well, take the proposition (the example is Ockham's):
'Omne calidum est calefactivum' 'Every hot thing is heat-giving'.
Ockham has to recogni/e, now, that just as the 2 R property (= 'having two angles equal to 180°') belongs to 'triangle' before it belongs to 'isosceles triangle', in the same way heat-giving belongs to the property or quality 'calor' before it belongs to the concrete hot thing. So of all people Ockham should be the one to set a thing's forma apart and give it
21
'earlier' (prius) refers to logical priority.
22 ' Cf. Thomas Aquinas, 78: Primo vero dicitur aliquid praedicari de altero per
comparationem ad ea quae sunt priora et continentia ipsum.
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logical priority to the concretum it informs.23 One need not to be surprised, then, that Ockham's exposition of the problem starts from the counterfactual condition, 'if nothing were heat-giving other than heat ... etc.'24 However, most fortunately, as Ockham seems to suggest, there are hot things, so that 'heat-giving' does primarily belong to 'hot thing'. It is true that as far as qualities of the calor type are concerned, there is not much of a problem since Ockham's ontology does admit of them. But what then to do about forms such as paternitasl The latter problem is not raised by Ockham, let alone solved.
However, returning to the calidum example, this view still seems to contradict the kath' holou requirement since the complete ambitus of the concept 'hot thing' contains definitely something more than merely the forma 'heat' (e.g. the forma, 'iron').
The same problem is found in the Ordinatio, prologue, q.4, but there things are explained in greater detail, whereby Ockham's personal view inevitably comes to the fore. Ockham sets out to define the relation between the first subject and its attribute due to which (relation) a proposition is primarily true (primo vera). This relation is stated through defining the notion of 'first subject': "I call 'first subject' that (1) to which <the attribute involved > can < still >^ belong when any other subject has been ruled out and (2) which <can belong > to no other subject when it has itself been ruled out".26 In other words: the 'first subject' can still possess the attribute when every other subject that may possess it, is ruled out, while every other subject can possess it only through the first subject. Ockham adds an example: E.g. 'capable of
Of course, the forma calor is nothing else but the particular heat inhering in this or that particular hot thing and an individual 'thing' itself as well as the hot thing. But all the same, remarkable it is, if you think of formae (like fatherhood; e.g. in 'Every father has a child') which, unlike calor etc., are not distinct from the particulars involved. For a related question, see Ordinatio, prol. q.4.
24 S.L. cap. 8, 520, 23. Both Webering (op.cit., 55) and Leff (op.cit., 288) failed to notice the modus irrealis (For that matter, Leff used a bad text). For another counter- factual startingpoint, see S.L. III-2, cap. 7, 517, 75-83.
See the adverb adhuc used in the following example (144,20); see below.
Leffs translation 'with everything else excluded and nothing of the attribute excluded' (p. 288) is rather awkward and quite ungrammatical (nulli being a dative). The difficulty lies in the fact that nulli (dative) does not correspond with omni (which here is an ablative case, not a dative) but with cut; further circumscribere has the sense of 'to take away, rule out or destroy'; cf. nomine destrncto in the example given at 145,3; finally, the adhuc found twice in the example, is pivotal for a correct understanding of the passage.
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learning' has the intellective soul as its first subject because, even when every other < subject > has been ruled out, the soul still (adhuc} is capable of learning and <on the other hand> nothing is capable of learning when the intellective soul has gone. And the examples may easily be multiplied, the author argues: "the same applies to other accidents that belong to a whole through one of its parts."
Again, the author cannot help upgrading a subject's property at the cost of the subject itself, in spite of the fact that the latter is something subsistent and the property merely something inherent. However, such a view does not seem to fit in well with Ockham's basic philosophical doctrine, which is founded upon the ontological primacy of the individual. Well, unlike in the Summa logicae (where he took refuge in counterfactual suppositions; see above), in the Ordinatio Ockham's tackling of the problem is somewhat more realistic. He distinguishes the notion of subject: either it is used to stand for only27 one thing of which something can be predicatd or for everything of which something can be predicated. Ockham instances this by opposing the definition (rather the definiens) of triangle ('something which has 2 R'28) to triangle, that is to say, the property of having 2 R to a figure which has 2 R. In the former sense of 'subject' the property is the 'first subject', while in the latter sense it is the figure taken as a whole which is the first subject.
As is easily seen, Ockham's doctrine of the primacy of individual subsistent being is bound to meet with some difficulties in Aristotle's kath' holou (primo vera) requirement for there to be a truly scientific predication.
5. Some Important Divergencies about 'Necessity'
All Schoolmen follow Aristotle unanimously in affirming that necessity is the characteristic of a scientific proof. It is scientific predication
The termino of the edition is not correct, I presume and should be read: tantum or rather tantummodo (which is paleographically (tm for tmm) quite easy te explain); aliquo uno tantum is opposed to omni illo. The edition's reading (termino) forces the reader so supply omni illo <termino> at 145,20 which gives a clumsy sentence.
28
'has 2 R' should read 'has its interior angles equal to two right angles'.
TJie Posterior Analytics in the Latin West 121
accomplished according to the three requirements, dc omni, per se and primo vera, that warrants the premisses and conclusions being necessary.
It should be noted at the outset that for the greater bulk of Medieval commentators, the problem of necessity goes beyond the limits of logic since it has great impact on the ontological status of the objects of true knowledge. Thus unlike Aristotle, these Medievals paid much attention to the question of whether the objects of demonstration have to be incorruptible. However, if they really are, what, then, about the contingency of this sublunar world?
5.1. Robert Grosseteste29 and TTiomas Aquinas
Some remarks, first, about the incorruptibility of the proper objects of knowledge. As we have noted before (p. 108) Aristotle speaks of the phtharta (corruptibilia) as states of affairs signified by certain propositions, definitely not things that are themselves corruptible by nature. So he argues (75b24 ff.) that when trying (in vain, of course) to frame a strict demonstration of corruptibilia (corruptible states of affairs, you should recall), our minor premiss must be non-universal and corruptible (where the author is clearly referring to the universal and incorruptible truth of propositions, not things, as appears from what follows, at 75b28-30). Well, in spite of the Latin translation ad locum correctly running 'propositionem esse universalem et corruptibilem' , Thomas as well as Grosseteste take the liberty of making Aristotle discuss propositions concerning incorruptible and eternal things. Thomas even anticipates (140-1) Aristotle's remark about the superfluity of Platonic Forms (at 77a5 ff.; see Thomas, nr 166). By this move, Robert and Thomas (and others) in fact changed the subject. Small wonder that Ockham felt no qualms about being strictly faithful to Aristotle's sayings, this time!
Turning now to the issue of incorruptibility, Grosseteste deals with it by asking himself (17, 139, 96 ff.) how the objects of demonstration can be incorruptible, given the fact that the universals featuring in scientific knowledge are found in particulars which are themselves corruptible. As a matter of fact the principle according to which a
29
Sec the fine exposition on this account in Me Evoy, 327-9.
122 De Rijk
particular is known is its substantial form and scientific knowledge is obtained through the definition of the genera and species involved. However, a mind not capable of knowing a thing after its substantial nature can only know the accidents accompanying its true essential nature. Grosseteste is somewhat hesitant on account of the incorrupti bility of these principles of knowledge (141, 145 ff.). His guess is that a form is not corruptible in itself, even though matter is, or else that the permanence of a species is preserved by the fact that at some place or another in the world it is instantiated.
Thomas Aquinas' stand is well-known on this score; see e.g. In Anal.Post. I 140 f.; 166. Knowing things amounts to setting apart their universal form by means of the most characteristic operation of the human mind, abstraction. Even though material things are corruptible and not intelligible, they are made intelligible by taking away the characteristic marks of their material constitution. Sensation and abstraction together enable the human mind to grasp the material things such as they essentially are. In principle Thomas' doctrine of scientific proof is truly Aristotelian: scientific knowledge is substantially a set of conclusions syllogistically deduced from principles and for its procedure definition and attribute-hunting is pivotal.
5.2. William of Ockham
To begin with, Ockham did not find Aristotle's sayings about 'incorruptibles' hard to swallow. On the contrary, he (S.L. III-2, cap. 5, 512, 19-34) closely joins the text of Posterior Analytics and explains it (correctly, it should be recalled) as referring to propositions. However, his own, quite specific contribution to the discussion cannot wait for long. For to his mind, even speaking of necessary propositions sounds imprudent, as only God is a necessary Being. For that reason, although Ockham's view of scientia as a set of propositions is as such not in opposition with the Aristotelian view, his notion of 'necessary proposition' basically differs from that of Aristotle. The latter thinks in terms of propositional content (pragma), but Ockham acknowledges this content only as long as a proposition is actually framed by somebody. So a proposition is necessary and eternal and incorruptible when it is always true and never false // it is framed (si formetiir, S.L. 512, 30-2). That is
The Posterior Analytics in the Latin West 123
to say: the prepositional content is necessarily the case... etc. but without a proposition framed no prepositional content exists.
However, what are the conditions for its always being true (always being the case)? Ockham claims that either it should be about eternal Being (God) or framed quite independently from actual being ('the existential order'). Those of the latter sort are the negative ones, the hypothetical and the de possibili ones, because they do not presuppose their subject's actual being. E.g. 'Man is a rational animal' is not necessarily true, since it is false when no man exists, but its alternatives are: 'if x is a man, x is a rational animal', or 'man can be a rational animal', (ibid., 513,51-514,2; cf. Ord. prol. q.4, 157,1-16).
Finally, how do we know a proposition is necessary? Ockham answers (quite in line with the Medieval tradition, for that matter): if one knows that its contradictory opposite involves a contradiction (Ordinatio, prol. q.2). (Of course, unlike other Medieval thinkers such as Aquinas, for Ockham, the absence of contradiction implies possibility only, but the latter suffices for there to be a necessary proposition de possibili).
Thus Ockham, unlike Aquinas, does not attribute necessity to universal forms. To his mind, the things' contingent nature should never be left out of consideration and does not need to be considered either for the sake of demonstration. It simply suffices to use a way of logical framing which takes ontological contingency into account, e.g. when you say: 'si est homo, est animal' instead of 'homo est animal', which can only refer to some man actually being an animal.
6. Tlie Apprehension of the First Principles. Induction.
All deductive knowledge is ultimately based on self-evident first principles, which are required as the foundation of every true proposition. Quite naturally, the Schoolmen too are really interested in the question of how we obtain such principles, above all, that called 'universale'.
124 DC Rijk
6.1. Robert Grosseteste and Tliomas Aquinas
Through sensation, which is never a cause of knowledge but its occasio only (114, 212, 195), we apprehend some determinate particular determinately in space and time. It cannot grasp, therefore, the universal (265, 135 ff.). How we do obtain knowledge of the universal is explained by Grosseteste in closely following Aristotle's famous exposition in II 19. As with Aristotle, the human intellect abstracts the universal from the data provided by the external and internal senses.
It is striking that Grosseteste, who describes31 the process both as induction and abstraction, does not accept any Platonic innatism or anamnesis. The intellect certainly has its own specific role but it cannot but start from sensory experience, from which it abstracts or induces the universale incomplexiun (see 214, 250-2).
Thomas Aquinas basically adheres to the Aristotelian conception of intellectual cognition through abstraction.32 In his commentary on Anal. Post. 1119 he uses the word 'induction' to describe the process by which universals are generated.33
6.2. William of Ockham
The main characteristic of Ockham's opinion about the apprehension of principles is that he takes the latter as propositions (S.L. 522, 22-8), rather than incomplex universals as Aristotle and most Medievals do. For that matter, Ockham does know of the simple apprehension of contingent notions through the senses which is at the basis of an intellectual
•in
See Me Evoy,op.cit., 340-5.
114, 212, 207-11. Cum inductio sit ex singularibus, deficicnte aliquo sensu deficict inductio acccpta a singularibus ... et deficicnte inductione accepta ab illis singularibus deficit apud intellectum cognitio universalis eorum singularium, quia ipsum universale non est acceptum nisi per inductionem. For this important passage, see Me Evoy, 329- 35. See also 116 (ad Anal. Post. 1119) 406, 67-9: universalia prima, composita sicut et simplicia, ex inductione a sensibilibus facta nobis sunt manifcsta. The notion of abstraction is found at 214, 246-50.
32 See esp. S.Th. I 85, qq. 1 and 2 and Contra gentes 144; II, 77; 82.
595, ad fin.: Quia igitur universalium cognitionem accipimus ex singularibus, concludit manifestum esse quod necesse est prima universalia principia cognoscere per inductionem. Sic enim, scilicet per viam inductionis, sensus facit universale intus in anima, inquantum considcrantur omnia singularia.
T)ic Posterior Analytics in the Latin West 125
cognition, but to his understanding this apprehension acts only as an initial stage of the inductive acquisition of prepositional principles.34 One need not be at all surprised to find Post-Anal. II 19 constantly explained by Ockham on the same footing since the Venerable Inceptor is only interested in induction inasmuch as questions about demonstrability and immediateness of propositions are under consideration, just as for him the medium demonstrations is always associated with the middle term of the premisses of a scientific syllogism.
7. Conclusion
Generally speaking the Medievals proved to be well acquainted with the basic tenets of the Posterior Analytics. To my mind, in one respect only (but quite a decisive one, I am afraid) all Medieval commentators deviated from Aristotle's basic purpose. While Aristotle first and foremost intended to give a scientific procedure to clear up diffuse phenomenal data by discerning essential structures in them, his commentators, and not only the Medievals, all seem to take demonstration, ultimately, as a scientific proof of certain well-formed theses at hand which are put forward as candidates for the warrant of verification. On the other hand, the Medieval interpreters of Posterior Analytics were certainly right in considering this treatise as something more than merely a logical treatise about argumentation. Rather they took it as dealing with the kind of knowledge we may obtain about things which is of a higher rank than mere opinion about them.
It is because of its epistemological impact (or rather philosophical impact, in Medieval terminology) that Posterior Analytics was differently interpreted and assessed by diverse commentators, as according to their own diverse philosophical and theological stands. Let us finally take a general look at the different interpretations.
34 S.L. III-2, cap. 10, 523, 9-14; cf. cap. 4, 511, 42-7. See also Webering, 70-9; 161 and Leff, 282-3. For Ockham's doctrine about the First Principles, see Webering, 58 ff.
126 De Rijk
7.1. Robert Grosseteste
For Grossesteste, Aristotle's theory of scientific knowledge is unrestrictedly valid on the level of human knowledge in its present limited condition when man is scientifically inquiring into the unchanging incorruptible principles of nature which underly ephemeral things. However, the highest part of the human soul, the intelligentia, would have complete knowledge by illumination, without any help from the senses, were it not encumbered and darkened by our present status of fallen man. Accordingly, when set free from this earthly body after this life, it will enjoy that very knowledge (see 114, 213, 22S-214, 238). The knowledge attainable in this life, however, is just a stage on our way to beatific vision. Truly, Aristotle was not aware of the fact that the universal principles he was after are the created products of other Principles, the Eternal Ideas in God's Mind. Me Evoy is quite right in saying that Grossetcste had no doubt whatsoever about the validity of the Aristotelian methodology but, at the same time, no illusions about its comprehensiveness (op.cit., 345).
7.2. Tfiomas Aquinas
St Thomas was a faithful adherent of the Aristotelian view of demonstrative knowledge, even when discussing various other roads to knowledge, such as Revelation. Especially in commenting upon the Posterior Analytics he proves to be a thinker congenial with the Greek Master. At the same time, there is nothing slavish in his behaviour. He rather vindicates his own rights as a Christian thinker and never fails to see the limits imposed on thought by what Gilson has labelled 'Greek necessitarism'. In a way similar to Grosseleste Thomas knows how to give the Aristotelian theory of knowledge its proper place within philosophical and theological thought.
7.3. William of Ockham
Unlike Robert and Thomas, Ockham could not help being rather unfaithful to Aristotle. More importantly, he is fully aware of what he is doing,
Vie Posterior Analytics in the Latin West 127
which appears from the many occasions he opposes Christian faith (secundum fidem catholicani) or rational truth (secundum veritatem) to Aristotle's sayings (e.g. S.L. 1 112, cap. 5, 512, 34ff.).
On the one hand, when adhering to the general framework of the Posterior Analytics Ockham affords many refinements to the Master's theory of demonstration. Whereas Aristotle never explicitly differentiates degrees of demonstration, Ockham does and, accordingly, makes an important distinction between self-evident principles which are indemon strable and indemonstrable principles whichs are not self-evident and, thereby, not necessary.
On the other hand, Ockham starts from a notion of necessity, rather different from Aristotle's. Furthermore, his theory of demon stration, as Leff rightly observed (op.cit., 273), "is governed by the epistemological scope and limits of what can be known self-evidently and absolutely by intuitive cognition", and this made Ockham also give experience priority to demonstration, not only as its precondition but also as a higher form of cognition. Both his Christian belief in the radical contingency of all creatural being and his ontology of the strictly individual make for important divergencies from Aristotle. Still, Ockham was deeply convinced that he himself was always on the safe track of the intentio Aristotelis. To him, the Aristotle of Posterior Analytics really was the authority, but, as so often, Ockham took himself as the Philosopher's most reliable spokesman.
University of Leiden
WLADYSLAW STROZEWSKI
Metaphysics as a Science
The topic of this paper may be understood in many different ways, yet two of them appear to be the most promising:
1. to investigate the topic from the point of view of modern conceptions of science,
2. to investigate it from the point of view of science in its mediaeval sense.
In the first case we would be asking whether metaphysics meets all the scientific criteria considered valid today. It is obvious that we would then have to begin by specifying whether under the notion of "scientific" we understand some general idea of science, which constitutes a botium commune of the contemporary philosophical thought, or a concept of science proclaimed by some philosophical orientation.
In the second case the problem would be to confront metaphysics with the concept of science as it was understood in the Middle Ages, particularly in the period to which we would like to limit ourselves. The question that should be posed would read: is metaphysics a science under the mediaeval understanding of the notion of scientia, which again may be an idea of "scientificity" common to a certain period or concepts of science defined by various philosophers.
Yet both of these formulations of the subject appear to be wrong. The first is anachronistic. Moreover, the investigations of the scientific character of metaphysics would have to be "intermediated" by an investigation of the notion of science itself and by the comparison of its mediaeval formulations with its modern understanding. All this would rather draw us away than bring us closer to the essence of the matter.
The second formulation is simply needless. The question whether metaphysics was considered to be a science in the Middle Ages has a positive answer in all cases. None of the mediaeval philosophers doubted that metaphysics was a science, nor - what may be more important - that it was the most important of all sciences, cultivated by the natural intellect.
Metaphysics as a Science 129
Thus we must rephrase the question posed at the beginning. Without questioning the scientific character of metaphysics, I would like to answer the problem of the specificity of this scientific character, especially as we recall that metaphysics is treated as the most important, the highest, of all sciences. I shall try to answer the question of this specificity with the criteria commonly used to determine the essential features of each science: its subject, material and formal, and its relation to other sciences.
It appears that each of those features bears some, so to say "constants" and "variable"; in other words: aspects characteristic of all (or practically all) mediaeval philosophers and certain individual opinions which often vary greatly from one thinker to the others.
Let me also draw to your attention the considerable progress accomplished in the last years in the subject of our concern. A number of excellent works, to name just those of Albert Zimmermann, Armand Maurer, James Doig, John Wippel, Ralph Me Inerny, Zofia Wlodek and others, have - on the base of detailed source investigations - answered a number of questions and proposed interesting interpretations of them.1 I am deeply indebted to their achievements.
At the beginning let us recall the basic opinions about metaphysics expressed by mediaeval philosophers, opinions in which they did not differ from one another:
1. Metaphysics is a science (scientia),
2. As such it belongs to the category of habitus - i.e. intellectual disposition,
3. Metaphysics is the highest science, the first and the most noble one (prima et nobilissima),
4. As such it is also considered to be wisdom (sapientia),
5. Synonyms - with some limitations - of "metaphysics" are:
[ A. Zimmermann, Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion uber den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Ja/irhundert. Texte und Untersuchungen, Leiden - Koln 1965; A.A. Maurer, "The Unity of Science: St. Thomas and the Nominalists", in: St. Thomas Aquinas 1274 - 1974. Commemorative Studies, Toronto 1974, vol. II, p. 269-291; A.A. Maurer, "Ockham's Conception of the Unity of Science", Mediae\'al Studies XX, 1958, p. 98-112; J.C. Doig, Aquinas on Metaphysics. A historico-doctrinal study of the Commentary on the Metaphysics, The Hague 1972; J.F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas, Washington D.C. 1984; R. Me Inerny, Being and Predication. Thomistic Interpretations, Washington D.C. 1986; Z. Wtodek, Filozofia bytu (Dzieje filozofii sredniowiecznej w Polsce t.III), Wroctew 1977; Z. Wtodek, "Koncepcja mctafizyki wedfug Jana Burydana", Studio Warminskie IX, 1972, p. 215-230.
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theologia, theosophia, scientia divina, philosophia prima, transphysica, sapientia,
6. Metaphysics has its own proper subject (or subjects), different from subjects of other sciences,
7. Metaphysics demands a specific way of procedure (it has its own scientific method),
8. Metaphysics is characterized by a specific unity (it is one),
9. Metaphysics is a difficult science, it demands a special preparation, and being the first in the system of sciences it should be the last in teaching,
10. Metaphysics belongs to a system of sciences, and is - despite its specificity - interrelated with other sciences.
These cautiously formulated statements as I have tried to present them, have not been questioned. Yet each one of them was interpreted in many ways. And so, e.g., it has been agreed that metaphysics belongs to the category of habitus, but it was not clear whether it is one or many habitus: also an answer to the question concerning the character of metaphysics' "unity" (the "substantial" unity - St. Thomas and others; or "accidental" - as in Ockham) depended on whether it was one or many habitus. Many notions of metaphysics were used commonly, but their sense was explained differently.
It has been agreed that metaphysics has its own specific subject, but in answering the question what this subject is, we would probably come across a very grat range of answers. The same applies to the methods of analysis, or, more widely, the conditions of procedure in metaphysics. Lastly, the relation of metaphysics to other sciences was also viewed in different ways.
I. "Tfie names" of Metaphysics
Let us begin with a point which may seem to be not very important, but which in reality designates the most general character of the various approaches to metaphysics, namely its names. All of them, except for the notion "metaphysics" itself, have common roots which go back to Aristotle. He also gave the classical interpretation of their meaning. Mediaeval authors do not, for the most part deviate from his
Metaphysics as a Science 131
interpretations, yet the stresses attached to various justifications are significant.
Various names attributed to metaphysics have usually been treated in three manners: 1) as thoroughly synonymous; thus the subject explanation of the character of metaphysics is not related closely to the meaning of various designations (Roger Bacon, St. Albert the Great), 2) with preference of one name with the omission or distinct secondary treatment of others (Dominicus Gundissalinus), 3) with a distinct differentiation of each designation, leading to the extraction of all aspects of metaphysics and its many-sided, but specific character (St. Thomas).
(1) Scientia divina. The name which appears most often and is most understanding is scientia divina - the Latin equivalent of Aristotle's "theology". Yet already the translation of the logos of "theology" it was erroneously replaced by scientia. Replaced, but at the same time limited in its meaning and moved towards the Platonic-Aristotelian episteme. It is hard to determine whether it has any essential meaning or whether the translation is merely a linguistic one. The notion "theology" will be shared with the revealed theology, sacra doctrina, from which it shall of course deeply differ.
Dominicus Gundissalinus, whose treatise De divisione philosophiae is the initial point of our deliberations, having divided philosophy into the practical and the theoretical, describes the three parts of the latter in the following way: "... tercia dicitur theologia siue scientia prima, siue philosophia prima, siue metaphysica".2 Yet when he turns to making it more precise, he changes the notion theologia to scientia divina, defining it at once in three ways: "diuina sciencia est sciencia de rebus separatis a materia diffinicione". - item: "diuina sciencia est philosophia certissima et prima". - item: "diuina sciencia est sapiencia certissima",3 of which only the first one is, in reality, a definition, while the next two are assessments designating more specifically this kind of knowledge. These three definitions are the most general and apply to divine knowledge and its synonyms. Thus the notion: scientia divina - and it is this notion that always appears first - is justified by the fact that it applies to God: it
Dominicus Gundissalinus, DC divisione philosophiae. Herausgegeben ... von Ludwig Baur (Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittelalters, B. IV, H. 2-3), Miinster 1903, p.15.
3 Ibid., p. 35.
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enquires (inquirit} whether He is and demonstrates (probat) that He is: "ipsa de deo inquirit an sit, et probat quod sit".4
We find similar definitions, but with more concise motivations in Michael Scot, except that the notion theology is not to be found in Scot's works; instead he constantly uses the name scientia divina or simply divina.5 This name is applicaple "... quia de rebus diuinis et spiritualibus tractat".6
Avicenna is undoubtedly a common root for these conceptions. Metaphysics is a divine science since it deals with God (although He is not its direct subject!), with being which has the highest dignity as it is completely separated from the nature: "... et hunc nominabitur haec scientia ab eo, quod cst dignus in ea scilicet vocabitur haec scientia, scientia divina".7
Similar arguments are to be found in St. Thomas. The notion of scientia divina applies to metaphysics since it deals with knowledge of the being most separated from nature. Although we get to know them indirectly and only through the consequences of their acts, yet it is enough to designate them as the most divine, the more so since their prime cause is God. Thus: "Dicitur enim scientia divina sive theologia, inquantum praedictas substantias considerat".8
A somewhat different emphasis is found in St. Albert the Great's works. Although he also maintains that the reason for calling metaphysics a divine science are the first causes with which it is concerned and which, they in themselves, are "divina et optima et prima".9 Yet, he adds, that the notion divina applies to those aspects of created objects, which are the most evident (manifested), noble and the most fundamental in relation to others. These aspects are connected with the main subject of
4 Ibid., p. 38.
' Ibid., Anhang. Die bei Vinccntius Bcllouacensis im Speculum doctrinale erhaltenen Fragmente einer Einleitungsschrift des Michael Scotus, p. 399.
6 Ibid., p. 400. 1 Metaph., t. I, c.4, fol. 71v. Cf. J.C. Doig, op. cit., p. 85.
Q
In Duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotclis expositio, Proemium; Cf. In Boethium De Trinitate, 5, 4 c.
n
"Vocatur autem et divina, quia omnia talia sunt divina et optima et prima, omnibus aliis in esse praebentia complementum. Esse enim, quod haec scientia considerat, non accipitur contractum ad hoc vel illud, sed potius est prima effluxio dei et creatum primum, ante quod non est creatum aliud." Alberti Magni ... Metaphysica. Libros quinque priores. Ed. Bernhardus Geyer, Monasterium Westfalorum in Aedibus Aschendorff 1960, p. 2-3.
Metaphysics as a Science 133
metaphysics: being, existence, esse. "Nee denominatio ideo fit, quod divina dicitur. Omnia enim apud naturam omnium rerum manifestissima sunt divinissima et priora omnibus, et haec sunt ens et entis partes et principia."1(
(2) Philosophia prima. While the same arguments were usually used in defining the notion of scientia divina, the explanations of "first philosophy" were often quite different.
1) First philosophy is such because, whereas other sciences refer to it, seeking in it their final premises, it does not appeal or base itself on any other. First philosophy poses questions which no other science poses and, at the same time, is the only science that testifies all its assessments. The priority of first philosophy is evidently methodological, in particular, it is established by its relation to other sciences. So, among others, St. Thomas views it when in his comments to the De Trinitate of Boethius he writes: "Dicitur enim philosophia prima, in quantum aliae omnes scientiae ab ea sua principia accipientes earn consequuntur. Et exinde etiam est quod ipsa largitur principia omnibus aliis scientiis, in quantum intellectualis consideratio est principium rationalis, propter hoc dicitur prima philosophia."11
2) First philosophy owes its name to the priority of beings with which it deals: spiritual substances and, above all, God. The justification of the name is not of a methodological, but of an ontological character; it appeals not to primary premises, but to the primary causes on the existence and the functioning of which depends everything that exists. It is due to this that Dominicus Gundissalinus defines it as scientia primanim causanim.12 In his Proemium to his Commentary on the Metaphysics St. Tfiomas also draws our attention to its relation to immaterial substances; his argumentation here differs from the earlier one found in the Commentary to Boethius' De Trinitate. Avicenna maintained that, since philosophy treats of the first cause, it has itself to appear as prime and also as sapientia and scientia nobilissima. The same thought
10 Op. cit.,p. 5.
Sancti Thomae de Aquino, Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate, ed. B. Decker, Leiden 1959, p. 166 and 212.
12 Op. dr., p. 38 and 268.
13 Cf. J.C. Doig, op. cit., p. 85.
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was beautifully formulated by St. Thomas: "Itaque prima philosophia tota ordinatur ad Dei cognitionem sicut ad altimum fmem."14
St. Albert the Great again enriches the ontological argumentation. First philosophy applies to what is first, and what, at the same time, is the most divine and most connected with God of all things: in being itself, and in its parts and principles.15 And as it considers being in its whole universality and not only partly, from this point of view it also deserves the designation "first".16
3) Besides the methodological and the ontological argumentation, another type, which we could call pragmatic, appears. And so, in addition to the fact, or possibly because of the fact, that it applies to the first causes, first philosophy is first in the order of love (if I may say so here): "dicitur etiam prima philosophia quia primo ab homine desiderata, et etiam quia est secundum sui partem de primo principiorum omnium, et etiam de omnibus primis principiis...."1 This formulation comes from Roger Bacon.
(3) Metaphysica. Like philosophia prima, metaphysica has been interpreted at least in three ways. It depended on how was the first part of this name, namely meta, was understood: as supra, trans or post.
1) In the first case metaphysics was treated as a science dealing with the supra-physical, immaterial, existing autonomically spiritual beings: pure intelligences and God. Argumentation is similar to the case ofscientia divina or philosophia prima (2).
2) In the second case, metaphysics deals with abstracts which, omitting the moment of materiality and the quantitative determination, make up a class of terms that, in respect of contents, is the most general and of the broadest range. The abstract with which metaphysics deals is, above all, the idea of being. Its separation from matter is double: as a
14
Summa contra gentiles III, 25.
"Omnia enim apud naturam omnium rcrum manifestissima sunt divinissima et nobilissima et priora omnibus, et haec sunt ens et entis partes ct principia ..." Op. cit. p. 5.
"Et ideo et honorabilissimorum et mirabilissimorum et certissimorum per totum et non in quadam sui parte cst scientia ista, quam ideo merito primam vocamus philo- sophiam," ibid., p. 5.
Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, fasc. XI Questiones altere super libros prime philosophic Aristotelis, ed. R. Steele collaborante P.M. Delorme, Oxonii 1930, p. 30.
Metaphysics as a Science 135
notion it belongs to intellectual beings, as an abstract (relative to its contents) it constitutes the highest genus.
According to St. Albert the Great metaphysics is called transphysica as it deals with the general principles that are fundamental for anything which belongs to nature: "... transphysica vocatur, quoniam quod est natura quaedam determinata quantitate vel contrarietate, fundatur per principia esse simpliciter, quae transcendunt omne sic vocatum physicum.
St. Thomas thinks similarly: the name of metaphysics, or trans- physics, is related to the place it holds in the process of analysis (via resolutionis), where the more general is discovered after the less general: "Haec enim transphysica inveniuntur in via resolutionis, sicut magis
• n1 9
commuma post minus commuma.
Duns Scotus' arguments are worth special attention. Metaphysics, in accord with the most essential meaning of its notion, is a science treating transcendentals. "Necesse est esse aliquam scientiam universalem, quae per se considcret ilia transcendentia, et hanc scientiam vocamus metaphysicam, quae est dicitur a meta, quod est trans, et physis, scientia, quasi transcendens scientia, quia est de transcendentibus."20 Thus transcendentals have been, expressis verbis, considered the subject of metaphysics; as being is the first among them, metaphysics is a science of being as transcendentale.
3) In the third case, when meta is understood as post, we can distinguish two orders: (a) of cognition or discovery, and (b) of teaching. The subject of metaphysics is discovered by us due to the investigations carried on before, and in the field of, physics. From the point of view of our cognition (quoad nos), metaphysics appears to be a science posterior to physics; yet, from the point of view of the objective theoretical order, it is prior. This opinion, probably formulated for the first time by Avicenna, was shared very likely by all scholastics.21 Similarly, the
18
Metaphysica, liber I, c. 1, p. 2.
19
In Met., Prooemium.
Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings. A selection edited and translated by Allan Wolter, Edinburgh 1962, p. 2.
"Nomen vero huius scientiae est, quod ipsa est de eo quod est post naturam. Intelligitur autem natura virtus quae est principium motus et quietatis; ... quod vero dicitur post naturam haec posteritas est in respectu quantum ad nos ... unde quod meretur vocari haec scientia considerata in se haec est, ut dicatur quod est ante naturam. Ea enim de quibus inquiritur in hac scientia per eandem sunt ante naturam."
136 Strofcewski
conviction was common concerning the second case: metaphysics could be studied only after becoming acquainted with natural science and it is thus posterior to physics (post physicam} in the order of teaching.22 This is due to the fact that it seeks examples in physics, but also because it is more difficult than physics, and the way of teaching should lead from easier through more difficult matters.
(4) Sapientia. This name appears either as a synonym of "metaphysics" or as a narrower definition of this science.
All the essential features characteristic of wisdom are also fulfilled by metaphysics. Wisdom is the knowledge of first principles, is the cognition of greatest certainty, and, being the knowledge of the noblest objects, is also noble itself. Due to these three features, wisdom is also ruler of all the sciences.
According to Aviccnna, metaphysics "... est etiam sapientia quae est nobilior scientia qua apprehenditur nobilius scitum".23 Roger Bacon writes that "hec est nobilissima, quia ipsa est regula scientie speculative et practice", and adds: "sapiens habet cognoscere in particular!, scilicet, omnia particularia in universali, ut omnes partes entis, ct omnia universalia in particular!, ut omnes causas universales et primas, et ita verissime cognoscit."24 Most significant are the well known words of St. Thomas Aquinas: "Omnes autem scientiae et artes ordinantur in unum, scilicet ad hominis perfectionem, quae est eius beatitudo. Unde necesse est, quod una earum sit aliarum omnium retrix, quae nomen sapientiae recte vindicat. Nam sapientis est alios ordinare."25
Aviccnna, Met., T. 1, c. 4, fol. 71v. Cf. J.C. Doig, op. cit., p. 85; "... quae alio nomine dicitur metaphysicsa, id est trans physicam, quia post physicam dicenda occurit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus oportet in insensibilia devenire," S. Thomas Aq., In Boet. De Trinitate, cd. Decker, p. 166, 2-4.
"... Metaphysica enim nuncupatur quia transcendit physica, vel est post physica in quantum doctrina, post tamen in quantum scientia, unde meiha trans vel post latine; ..." Roger Bacon, op. cit., p. 30.
' Avicenna, Met., T. 1, c. 2, fol. 71r HF; cf. J.C. Doig, op. cit., p. 85; cf. Dominicus Gundissalinus, op. cit., p. 35-36.
Roger Bacon, op. cit., fasc. X, p. 11.
S. Thomas, In Met., Prooemium; "Hie igitur de sapiente conceptionibus sic suppositis, dicimus illam scientiam vere esse sapientiam, quae per se est scientia ista, quod sui ipsius ipsa causa est, hoc est, quam gratia sui ipsius quaerimus scire et volumus, et hoc est cuius finis, propter quem scire volumus, est in ipsamet ista scien tia." Alberti Magni Metaphysica, Tractatus 2, c. 1, p. 18.
Metaphysics as a Science 137
II. Ttie subject of Metaphysics
The problem of the subject is crucial for our topic. Aristotle himself was the origin of the mediaeval controversies over this problem. In the his Metaphysics he defined the subject of that science which he himself called wisdom, first philosophy or theology many times. Let us recall the most important of those definitions: "Wisdom is knowledge about certain principles and causes" (A,l,982a 1-3); "There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature" (r,l,1003a 16); "We are seeking the principles and the causes of the things that are, and obviously of them qua being" (E,l,1025b 1-2) - the two last quotations due to subsequent precising statements which make things more precise are specially important for us: "... the question which raised of old and is raised now and always, and is always the subject of doubt, viz. what being is, is just the question, what is substance" (Z,l,1028b 3-4); "The subject of our inquiry is substance; for the principles and the causes we are seeking are those of substances" (L,l,1069a 18-19); "There are three kinds of theoretical sciences - physics, mathematics, theology ... and of these themselves the last named is best; for it deals with the highest of existing things" (K,7,1064b 1-5). 26
Although the aforesaid formulations apply to a variety of subjects, it is not impossible harmoniously to bring them together into one contention. It seems that this was evident for Aristotle himself. Similarly, the appropriateness of numerous definitions of metaphysics has not been questioned either by his direct followers or by his mediaeval commentators. The latter - as we may see from St. Thomas' Proemium to his Commentary on the Metaphysics - rather tried to demonstrate how metaphysics was a unity despite the variety of its subjects and to find the basis that would motivate such a unity. Controversies arose largely over the problem of what aspect to accent. There was no doubt as to the fact that the subject of metaphysics is being as being, yet whether it is preoccupied with all being or only with substantial being were among the questions that were posed. Studies were undertaken to determine how one might understand first principles: are they concrete, non-material beings, or principles of demonstrations, or both, and if so, do they
26
All quotations in translation by W.D. Ross.
138 Stro£ewski
remain in any specific mutual relation? It was also agreed that metaphysics is a science which has to deal with the first cause - God, yet the problem of whether He is directly or indirectly (as the reason of being) the subject of its investigations found no common answer.
This last point is especially relevant since the two greatest Arab philosophers, whose ideas were always respected by Christian thinkers, namely, Avicenna and Averroes, had given contrary answers to the question of the subject of metaphysics. According to Avicenna, the main subject of metaphysics is being as being and its ultimate causes: "Nulla enim alia inquirit de causis ultimis nisi ista scientia; si autem consideratio dc causis fuerit inquantum habent esse, et de omni eo, quod accidit eis sccundum hunc modum, oportebit tune ut ens inquantum est ens sit subiectum quod est convenientius".27 At the same time metaphysics is the only science which seeks to find the existence of the first cause of being - God. But because God is for metaphysics the object of the question an sit, He cannot be its subject: all sciences assume their subjects as already existing. Metaphysics docs this in relation to being, but it cannot assume the existence of God. "Dico ergo impossibile est esse ut ipse Deus sit subiectum huius scientiae, quoniam subiectum omnia scientiae est res, quae conccditur esse, et ipsa scientia non inquirit nisi dispositiones illius subiecti."2* The following phrase puts it even more explicitly: "Dc eo autem inquisitio fit duobus modis: unus est quo inquiritur an sit, alius est quo inquiruntur eius proprietates. Postquam autem inquiritur in hac scientia an sit, tune non potest esse subiectum huius scientiae. Nulla enim scientiarum debet stabilire suum subiectum."29
Avicenna's position was countered by Averroes: God is the proper subject of metaphysics. Metaphysics may omit the question of the existence of God as it is posed and answered in physics which prove the existence of the Prime Mover: "Substantia enim aeterna declarata est in naturalibus in fine octavi Physicorum."-^ Unfortunately we cannot undertake a closer analysis of the argumentation of these two
Philosophia prima sive scientia divina, Opera Philosophica , Venisc 1508, Reimpr. Ixmvain 1961, fol. 70v E, cf. J.C. Doig, op. cit., p. 24.
28
Avicennae pcripatetici philosophi ac medicorum facile primi opera in luce redacta
ac nuper quantum ars niti potuit per canonicos emendanda, Venetiis 1508, f. 70ra-b; cf. A. Zimmermann, op. cit., p. 109.
29
Ibid. C 70rb, cf. Zimmermann, op. cit., p. 110.
•Jfl
Averroes, in: Aristotcles, Opera latine cum commento Averrois, ed. Nic. Varnia, Venetiis 1483, II, com 22.
Metaphysics as a Science 139
philosophers; let us merely notice the fact that Averroes accepts a different conception of God than Avicenna: his God is a God of physics, an unmoved Mover explaining the phenomenon of movement, while Avicenna's God is the prime cause of contingent being. Those two concepts of God assume two radically different conceptions of metaphysics and lead to two divergent and far reaching consequences.
In general mediaeval thinkers followed Avicenna's conception, yet with significant difference in detail. Albert Zimmermann who has devoted an excellent and thoroughly documented work, Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion iiber den Gegemtand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert?1 to this problem has distinguished three fundamental solutions:
1) God is one of the main subjects of metaphysics. This concept was shared, among others, by Roger Bacon, Giles of Rome, Peter Aureoli, William Ockham and John Buridan,
2) God is the cause of the subject of metaphysics, i.e. of being (as being); among the thinkers sharing this position we find St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas,
3) God is a part of the subject of metaphysics; this idea was proclaimed, among others, by Siger of Brabant, Henry of Ghent, but also by Augustine of Ancona, Peter of Auvergne, Alexander of Alexandria and Joan Duns Scotus.
Each of the above opinions was shared by a number of unidentified commentators, whose texts have been published by Zimmermann in his work.
The problem of God as a subject of metaphysics is crucial for its definition. Yet it appears that, from the point of view of the further development of metaphysics or possibly even its fate as a science, the problem of its relevance to those prime causes understood as the unmovable Movers of celestial spheres was of a special importance. To put it simply, if it were to appear that the hypothesis of their existence was false, at least one of the reasons for the existence of metaphysics as a science would have to be omitted. Should we not, then, see one of the reasons of a crisis within metaphysics in the late Middle Ages in the
31 Albert Zimmermann, Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion uber den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert. Texte und Untersuchungen (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, hrsg. von Joseph Koch, Bd. VIII), Leiden-Koln 1965.
140 Stro£ewski
appearance of a rival hypothesis explaining the movement of the celestial spheres, e.g., of Buridan's theory of impetus? Going further, was not the substitution of the notion of metaphysics for ontology in the seventeenth century significant testimony of a need for a new formulation of the subject of its investigations, especially in view of the fact that what had formerly been considered supra-physical - celestial movements - had then been included in the Newton's general laws of gravitation?
Let us return to our main problem. The order of presentation shall be governed by a single criterion, the criterion of the unity, or rather the integrity, of metaphysics. Metaphysics may, or even must, consider various subjects, yet I would like to bring to our attention the problem of how these subjects were brought together so as to achieve the unity of the fundamental subject of this science.
(1) The view according to which the essential subject of metaphysics is exclusively being, has been expressed by Michael Scot: "huius scientiae subiectum est ens, non Deus ucl quattuor causae, sicut quidam credi- derunt. Teste cnim Aristotele nulla scientia subiectum suum inquirit. In hac autem queritur de Deo quid sit et similitcr de causis...."32 This opinion has been stated by Dominicus Gundissalinus: the subject, or to use Dominicus' terminology, the matter of metaphysics is being, which "communius et euidencius omnibus est".33 This general being designates the four parts of metaphysics, which vary depending on whether they treat of beings completely isolated from matter, beings mixed with matter but not constituted by it, beings which can exist both with and without matter (e.g. causality, unity), and finally material beings in their most general aspects (e.g. in movement or motionless). From another point of view metaphysics may be divided into species corresponding to the division of being itself into substance and accident, what is universal and what is particular, cause and effect, and act and potency.34 Yet God does not enter into the range of metaphysics' subjects, since no science seeks the existence of its own subject, but only assumes it. Dominicus clearly follows Avicenna in his argumentation.
•59
Dominicus Gundissalinus, op. tit., Anhang, p. 400.
Dominicus Gundissalinus, op. cit., p. 37. 34 Ibid., p. 37.
Metaphysics as a Science 141
(2) Being is the main subject of metaphysics for Albert the Great as well. In the Book I, chapter 2 of his Metaphysics he presents three opinions as to the essential subject of this science: God, first causes, and being as being. Rejecting two first while arguing similarly to Avicenna ("Deus autem et divina separata quaeruntur in ista scientia. Ergo subiectum esse non possunt"), "cum omnibus Peripateticis," he insisted that the third opinion is the correct one: "ens est subiectum inquantum ens est, et ea, quae sequuntur ens inquantum est ens et non inquantum hoc ens, sunt passiones eius."35 The condition: "non inquantum hoc ens" is specially important: metaphysics does not deal with specific kinds of being, but with all being from the point of view of its entity. However, since the full meaning of this claim is that it is substance that is being, it is substance in the final analysis that is the main subject of metaphysics' interest, and thus the metaphysical search for causes and principles apply to the causes and principles of substance.36 The unity of metaphysics is in any event guaranteed.
In stressing the role of substance as the subject of metaphysics, St. Albert the Great is not alone; similar opinions are to be found in other thirteenth century thinkers, to mention but only one, an anonymous Oxonian commentator on the Metaphysics used the same arguments to justify the dignity of metaphysics: "quia subiectum huius scientia est substantia vel ens universum".37 Other thinkers from this circle, such as Robert Kilwardby or Adam of Buckfield, have specified the subject of
*\Q
metaphysics as ens inquantum ens.
(3) St. Thomas followed the line favored by Aristotle, Avicenna and St. Albert the Great: Being as being is the subject of metaphysics, thus defining both the material and formal subject of this science. As in all
' Metaphysica, p. 4.
*\£\
"Oportet pritnum philosophum ... habere scientiam substantiarum; et quia scientia non habetur nisi per causas et principia, oportet philosophum habere causas et principia substantiarum", op. cit., p. 165; cf. Zimmermann, op. cit., p. 156.
37 Daniel A. Callus, "The subject-matter of metaphysics according to some thirteenth-century Oxford masters", in: Die Metaphysik in Mittelalter. ffir Ursprung und Bedeutung... (Miscellanea Mcdiaevalia, Bd. 2), Berlin 1963, p. 394.
38 Ibid., p. 396-399.
142 Strozewski
knowledge, it is its formal subject that decides about its quality, and this is what is here expressed in the words "as being" - inquantum ens?®
The notion of being taken in its whole range, but simultaneously in its specific indefinableness means everything that is in any way. We could say that the notion of being covers both the material and the immaterial, the actual and the potential, what is finite and what is infinite, what is necessary and what is contingent. The most general notion of being is virtually transcendental, yet taken as denominating the essential subject of metaphysics i.e. - as what metaphysics assumes - it limits itself to beings which are presented to us directly. It is here that we should look for the reason why St. Thomas attachs such importance to the fact that being is the first datum of our intellect. This conviction - formulated already in His DC cntc ct essential "ens autem et essentia sunt quae primo in intellectu concipiuntur"40 - shall never change: "Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones rcsolvit, est ens",41 "... in prima quidem operatione est aliquod primum, quod cadit in conceptione intellectus, scilicet hoc quod dico ens...."42
We cannot emphasi/.e too strongly this cognitive fact of being's priority, since it is basically this which assures the autonomy of metaphysics in relation to other sciences and guarantees the possibility of determining its subject. In other words: metaphysics, as every science, has to be based on certain initial assumptions, yet what it assumes is what is cognitively first, direct, and not referring to anything else.
The a priori hori/on of the notion being is infinite, yet what is given to us as a being, i.e., what is directly experienced, cognitively appears as having existence: "ens simpliciter est quod habet essc". - So experienced and so defined, being is the essential subject of metaphysics. At the same time it marks the ways of the investigation of being. The first way deals with its essence as a being: what does it mean, to exist, to be something? What is the relation between what a thing is (essentia}
Cf. S. Thomas Aq., 5.7'. I, 1, 4c and commentary by Thomas Gilby O.P in: St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I,atin text and English translation, Introduction, Notes, Appendices and Glossaries, vol. I, Christian Theology, Blackfriars, Cambridge 1964.
DC ente et essentia, Proocmium. 41
40
De veritate 1, Ic.
42 In Met. IV, 1.6, 605.
Summa theologiae I-II, 26, 4c.
Metaphysics as a Science 143
and that it is (es.se)? Answers to these questions, among others, render more precise the essence of substance as a being par excellence, but also of its parts and its accidents. A second way of investigating being is determined by the question: Why does something exist, i.e., have essel This determines the horizon of the search for the first cause, for being whose esse and essentia is the same. The direction of the first way is horizontal, of the second, vertical.
St. Thomas' metaphysical dictionary is rich in additional definitions of being which were to raise controversies among his commentators in the future. Ens quod ens, ens inquantum ens, ens simpliciter, esse simpliciter, ens commune - are among the most important of them. Especially troubling was the notion of common being, ens commune. What is its range? Does it not suggest its univocity, contrary to the explicitly expressed assumption by St. Thomas' that being is an analogical notion?
When St. Thomas uses the formula ens commune, he doubtlessly does not mean any special species of being nor, even more so, the hypostasis which was directly created by God. It seems that ens commune is a being in its widest range, yet such as is accessible to our direct cognition. It is due to this that it is the essential subject of metaphysics since it is the being assumed by other sciences dealing either with it per se, or with its domains, its variations or aspects, yet these other sciences do not investigate it in the aspect of its beingness. Starting with the totality of sciences, metaphysics finds its subject in what is common to them all. Similar remarks may be made with regard to being as divided into categories. Common and analogical to all of them, it is not exhausted by any of them. "Et sic patet quod multiplicitas entis habet aliquid commune, ad quod fit reductio."44
Commentators who limit the range of ens commune to created being seem to be right: "ens commune est proprius effectus causae altissimae, scilicet Dei".45 I know of no text in which St. Thomas would insist that ens commune included God as well, although the name Qui est attributed to Him finds its reason of existence also in its absoluteness, and the less a notion is determined and is more general and absolute, the more correctly it may be referred to God: "quanto aliqua nomina sunt minus determinata et magis communia et absoluta, tanto magis proprie dicuntur
44 In Met. XI, 1, 2197.
45 5.7. MI 66, 5 ad 4.
144 Strozewski
de Deo a nobis".46 The notion of being that could apply to God has to transgress all the range limitations (and I believe that ens commune limits itself to categorial being) and thus be considered as a transcendental designation. This, of course, also falls within the domain of metaphysics.
(4) The problem of the subject of metaphysics with John Duns Scotus is more complicated. He also rejects Averroes' opinions and accepts Avicenna's proposition that metaphysics is a science about being qua being. But God is being as well and since Scotus assumes the univocity of the term "being", God's nature should be easier to understand than with St. Thomas' assumption of the analogy of being. Isn't God then the second and equivalent subject of metaphysics beside being or, according to Zimmermann, part of the subject?
I cannot take up a discussion of this problem here (by the way: it seems to me, that the notice of a mediaeval scholiast: "Certe quae in hac questione tradit Doctor videntur humanum ingenium superare appears to be still valid!). Let us recall what remains beyond any doubt:
1) being is the subject of metaphysics,
2) the notion of being that defines the subject of metaphysics should cover virtually all other notions which are attributed to metaphysics,
3) the notion of being is a transcendental notion, covering virtually not only the coextensive transcendentals (passiones entis convertibiles), but also disjunctive transcendentals, such as finite-infinite, necessary- accidental, in potentia-in actu, causatum-causa,
4) God is a being and thus falls within the range of the general notion of being. The point of departure of metaphysics is being and its task is the analysis of being as a transcendental: "Necesse est esse aliquam scientiam universalem, quae per se consideret ilia transcendentia, et hanc scientiam vocamus Metaphysicam, quae dicitur a meta, quod est trans, et physis scientia, quasi transcendens scientia, quia est de transcenden- tibus."48 But this analysis, as applying either to being as being or to its transcendental qualities (passions) or finally to disjunctive transcenden-
46 S.T. I, 13, lie.
47 Cf. J. Owens, "Up to What Point is God Included in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus?" in: Mediaeval Studies X, 1948, p. 163.
Duns Scotus, Quaestiones subtilissimae in Metaphysicam Aristotelis, Prol., n. 5; cf. Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings, op. cit., p. 2.
Metaphysics as a Science 145
tals, must lead on to show the prime being, which is God.49 In this way God, not being the point of departure of metaphysics, becomes its rightful subject as the point of arrival. No other science exists that would investigate Him as Being, as physics reaches Him as the First Mover, and theology treats of Him in the respect of His divinity. Although the notion of God appearing in metaphysics is general and not perfect (generality is, in any event, the attribute of the subject of any science, but only theology will speak of God ut hie), yet it is doubtlessly attributable to 1. God, 2. God who is infinite. As such an infinite being, God becomes the subject of metaphysics.50 Averroes was not mistaken, when he maintained that God is the subject of metaphysics, but he was wrong when he insisted that He was taken over by it from physics as the unmovable Mover. Metaphysics does not adopt the notion of God from physics nor from theology: it comes to accept the necessity of His existence when analyzing being as being, an analysis which, at the same time, enables us to display, not clearly, but certainly, some features of His essence.
There is no doubt about unity of metaphysics. After all, it is being determined by the wmvocity of the notion of being. God is part of the subject of metaphysics as He is the highest Being, to whose discovery metaphysics is led through the analysis of the transcendentals. And it is this aspect in which He is being investigated by metaphysics; from the point of view of His divinity He is investigated by theology, to which metaphysics as metaphysics has no access.
(5) Where the unity of the subject of metaphysics is concerned, the position taken earlier by Siger of Brabant is less clear. Being in general, esse universal, is the subject of metaphysics. Within its limits we must clearly distinguish beings which are results and those which are causes. The problem is whether theorems which would apply and be true about both exist (e.g., general phrases stating that every being as being (ens secundum ens) has its cause are false since beings having no cause
49 "Unde et actu et potentia, finitate et infinitate, multitudine et unitate, et ex multis talibus, quae sunt proprietates et passiones Metaphysicae potest concludi in Metaphysica Deum esse, sive primum ens esse." Rep. Par., Prologus III, 1. Cf. J. Owens, op. cit., p. 170.
50 Cf. J. Owens, op. cit. passim; Jacek Widomski, "Przedmiot metafizyki u Jana Dunsa Szkota. Proba rozgraniczenia zagadnien ontologicznych i metafizycznych w obre>ie jego filozofii", Studio Mediewistyczne 19, 2, 1978, p. 49-73.
146 Strozewski
exist).51 Thus God is a being among beings, it is a being that is the cause of those that are results, yet no common denominator exists that would enable us to speak about Him as well as about contingent beings within a single subject of metaphysics.52
(6) It seems to me that the problem of the integrity of the subject of metaphysics has not been solved any more completely by Roger Bacon than by Siger. Analyzing Aristotle's Metaphysics, he arrived at the conviction that the Philosopher has passed through three topics connected with three subjects of metaphysics: being as being, substance and God. We should stress that these are the three equivalent subjects of this science or, put in another way, that its subject may be defined in three ways: "subiectum in metaphysica tripliciter dicitur".53 The common point of reference is God rather than being as being, God as the first cause of being: "ista tamen tria ad unum reducuntur, scilicet ad causam primam".54
The fact that Bacon treats the range of the notion of being as the first subject of metaphysics ("subiectum primo modo dictum est ens") very widely, is worthy of note. One of the questions from his Comments on the Metaphysics reads: "an metaphysicus habeat considerare significa- tiones nominum". The answer is positive. A metaphysician regards the meaning of names in a way different from a logician, treating them as beings: "... et cum sermo sit pars entis, licet diminuta, ideo metaphysicus considerat sermonem".
How then, finally, should one justify the unity of metaphysics when it is not grounded in its subject? Bacon's solution is of a pragmatic character: first philosophy is the subject of prime desire for those who desire knowledge, thus its relation to the cognizance of details is like that of happiness to virtues: although there are many virtues, there is only one happiness (beatitudo).
"Tamen entis, secundum quod ens, non est principium, quia tune omne ens haberet principium", Cornelio Andrea Graiff, Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la Metaphysique . Texte inedit, Louvain 1948, p. 5.
<52
"Cum ens secundum quod ens non habeat causas et principia, quia non omne ens, ...
haec scientia non considerat nisi causas et principia, quae communia sunt omnibus entibus causatis." Op. cit., p. 364.
53 Op. cit., vol. XI, p. 121.
54 Ibid., p. 21, 22.
55 Ibid., p. 95.
Metaphysics as a Science 147
(7) A still different solution is given by William Ockham. He did not, unfortunately, write a commentary on the Metaphysics so, for the problem of interest to us, we must base our speculations on his opinions expressed in works not devoted directly to this problem. A sentence from the Prologue to the Commentary on The Physics is significant: "Sometimes one subject is first as regards one sort of priority, while another is first as regards another sort of priority. For instance in metaphysics 'being' (ens) is the first subject of all as regards priority of predication, whereas the first subject as regards priority of perfection is God."5<) The priority of a subject of a certain science depends on the point of view which could be one of many, methodologically all being equally qualified. The fact that the plurality of subjects for a specific science seems to undermine its unity does not have any significance for Ockham: the unity of science is, in his view only something accidental and is not based on any principle: science, being an aggregate of certain premises and conclusions, does not have to be characterized by some essential unity to be a science. This applies to metaphysics as well since its equal subjects are being and God; thus the following sentences are equally true: "in metaphysica primum inter omnia subiecta primitate attributionis est ens" and "in metaphysica ... primum (i.e. subiectum) primitate perfectionis est Deus".57
The review presented above of the positions taken in regard to the subject of metaphysics is not, of course, complete. It also does not entitle us to arrive at any far reaching conclusions. One thing appears to be certain: the cement which best assures the unity of metaphysics' subject is the notion of being, treated either univocally or analogically. Being assures the unity of the formal aspect of metaphysics as well, since it enables it to deal with everything that falls within its scope on behalf of features that tell us something is being as being. The reduction of the subject of metaphysics to something other than being: substance, prime cause, or even God, does not generate its integrity. It is lost even more, if we assume that the crucial notion of metaphysics, namely being, is equivocal.
56 William of Ockham, Philosophical Writings. A Selection, transl. Ph. Boehner, Indianapolis - New York 1964, p. 11.
Expositio super libros Physicorum, Prol.; cf. supra.
148 Strozewski
III. Metaphysics and other sciences
What is the place attributed to metaphysics in the system of the sciences? We must, above all, state the fact that metaphysics, despite its characteristic features (which could have been observed even when examining the problem of its subject), is an integral part of a system constituted by the sciences. What is more, in the common opinion of all mediaeval philosophers, without it this system would have been impossible.
(1) A whole range of problems exist, which are common to all sciences, yet which each of them separately or together cannot cope with due to the limitations of their subjects. These are basically the problems of being, essence, and existence, but also problems of relations: whole-part, act-potency, etc.58 The ens commune as defined by St. Thomas seems to be the being considered by metaphysics as the common subject of all sciences. Yet it does not exclude the problems of being as ens simpliciter, which, being the subject of prime interest to metaphysics, is considered as a transcendental and allows analogous procedure also in regard to the Prime Being.
The notion of being is assumed by all sciences. They receive it from metaphysics with the most general notion of which they make use, not caring to work out its fundamental contents. This is also a task for metaphysics, which, in its development in the Middle Ages, examined various ways of making it more precise as well as of referring it to reality. In the first case the reference was to abstractions, yet different from that abstractions in physics or metaphysics. A different opinion was expressed by St. Thomas, who maintained that the notion of being is not to be obtained through abstraction, but through separation.59 Due to it he did not mix immaterial abstractions with individual, concrete immaterial beings such as pure forms (substantiae separatae).^
When it comes to the semantics of the notion of being, all possibilities that could take place have been exhausted. Duns Scotus maintained that "being" applies univocally to its designations, St. Thomas
58 Cf. S.T. I-II 66, 5 ad 4; In Met. XI, 1.1, 2146.
CO
In Boeth. De Trinitate, 5 and 6.
60
"Et veritas haec est, quia nihil est in rerum natura praeter singularia existens, sed
tantum in consideratione intellectus abstrahentis communia a propriis." In Met. XI, 1.2, 2174.
Metaphysics as a Science 149
that it docs so analogically, and finally, Ockham that it applies equivocally. It would be interesting to investigate to what extent these solutions had influence on the character of metaphysics, and also on other sciences that drew their foundations from metaphysics.
(2) Each science assumes not only general notions, but specific principles as well. It assumes them as being evident or justified in another science which is responsible for their validity. It is this that metaphysics does; it not only makes use of first principles, but analyzes them and defends their validity: It was St. Thomas who said: "Et ideo sapientia non solum utitur principiis indemonstrabilibus, quorum est intellectus, concludendo ex eis, sicut aliae scientiae; sed etiam iudicando de eis, et disputando contra negantes."61
St. Albert the Great analyzes this problem in detail. When a physicist assumes the existence of moving bodies or a mathematician the existence of dimension, they assume them to be existing. Yet they cannot derive being as being from their theorems; this has to be demonstrated on the basis of principles concerning being itself.62 This can be only done by metaphysics which provides the ultimate theoretical foundations for all sciences: "inter theoricas autem excellit haec divina, quam modo tractamus, eo quod fundat omnium aliorum subiecta et passiones et principia, non fundata ab aliis."63 St. Thomas confirms it: "Et sicut nulla scientia particularis determinat quod quid est, ita etiam nulla earum dicit de genere subiecto, circa quod versatur, est aut non est. Et hoc rationa- biliter accidit; quia eiusdem scientiae est determinare questionem an est, et manifestare quid est.'
St. Thomas formulates the fundamental question of metaphysics, namely the question about the essence and existence of being. They are fundamental and ultimate at the same time, since all questions about the causes rely upon them, i.e., questions of the quid est?, quia e^t? and propter quid est?. If one could not demonstrate that the cause at issue exists and also that one could demonstrate what it is, posing such
61 S. T. 1-1166,5 ad 4.
Alberti Magni Metaphysica, p. 2.
63 Ibid., p. 3.
64 In Met. VI, 1.1, 1151.
150 Strozewski
questions would be senseless. And let us add that no other science analyzes questions about essence or the questions about existence.
(3) The third area of interest to both metaphysics and to other sciences is the problem of immaterial substances, pure forms, even when they are understood as unmovable movers. Metaphysics covers the problem of unmovable movers in its scope, yet it does not seek to answer the question of their existence, but accepts the existential judgment about them from physics. Thus it appears that metaphysics bases itself not only on what is given in direct, i.e., everyday experience, but also on what comes from scientific experience.
The meeting of metaphysics and physics in this case is very peculiar. Physics, proving the existence of unmovable Movers, at the same time interprets them as if they had to be pure forms, that is, had to be immaterial. But because of the methodological limitations of physics to the realm of material objects, it cannot deal with them further. Thus it turns them over, as it were to metaphysics which, in turn, does not investigate them thoroughly, but only under the aspect of their entitas. First causes (prima principia) thus transgress not only the cognitive possibilities of physics, but of metaphysics as well. "Quomodo autem causa prima ubique sit et quomodo virtutes corporum celestium ubique sint et quomodo intellectus fit ibi ubi est illud inlelligatur ... altioris est negotii et non est nostre possibilitatis explanare" wrote Robert Grosseteste in his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics.65 And we could think that he wrote it from the point of view of a physicist, were it not for the fact that this phrase is a part of a larger whole of a typically metaphysical character.
Thus we could ask why metaphysics deals with subjects of which it is known from the beginning that they transgress its cognitive possibilities? There is but one answer: it is the postulate of faithfulness towards reality, the taking into consideration of everything, of what is given in any way, even indirectly through other sciences that causes it to deal with such subjects. If this were not done by metaphysics, it would be like the metaphysics of modern science, which would, e.g., declare a
Commcntarium in Posteriorum Anafyticorum libros, I. 18, f. 19rb. Cf. A.C. Crombie, Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science 1100-1700, Oxford 1953, p. 128.
Metaphysics as a Science 151
complete disinterest in regard of elementary particles or the "black holes" in the universe.
In any case, some thinkers had an even more important reason to be interested in prime causes. They related them closely to the first principles of cognition on which the sense of the whole of knowledge depends. Such ties may be traced to Robert Grosseteste; his relation to the spirit of neoplatonic philosophy is not without importance here. Complete cognizance of prime beings, immaterial prime substances, would guarantee the certainty of our cognition. Unfortunately it is not accessible to our intellect in its present condition, and we have to be satisfied with the certainty connected with mathematical subjects.66
Further, St. Albert the Great points to the fact that first causes are maxima scibilia. Although for the human intellect they are cognitively the most difficult due to their abstractness, they nevertheless guarantee the certainty of the cognizance which refers to them. Complete knowledge is a knowledge based on the cognition of causes; thus metaphysics seeking the prime causes guarantees certainty both to its own cognitive results and to the sciences which refer to it.67 Metaphysics itself may be considered the aim of all sciences and its own cause: "dicimus illam scientiam vere esse sapientiam, quae per se est scientia ista, quod sui ipsius causa est, hoc est, quam gratia sui ipsius quaerimus scire et volumus, et hoc est, cuius finis, propter quem scire volumus, est in
» ... AC
ipsamet ista scientia".
(4) All the arguments cited above demonstrate that metaphysics is not only first in the system of sciences, but that it is the ruling one. Roger Bacon, recalling Aristotle and Avicenna, maintains that: "hec est nobilissima, qui ipsa est regula scientie speculative et practice quare habet potestatem supra omnem partem philosophic". In another place he writes that the task of metaphysics is to determine the origin, number,
Robertas Grossctcste, Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum libros, Intro duzione e testo critico di Pictro Rossi, Firenze 1981, p. 255-256. Cf. De veritate, in: Die Philosophise he Wcrke dcs Robert Grosseteste Bischofs von Lincoln, Zum erstensmal vollstandig in kritischer Ausgahe besorgt von Dr. Ludwig Baur (Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic dcs Mittelaltcrs, B. IX), Munster i. W. 1912; p. 137-138; cf. A.C. Crombie, op. cit., p. 52-53.
Alberti Magni Metaphysica, ed. cit., p. 21.
68 Ibid., p. 18.
69
Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, ed. cit., fasc. X, p. 13.
152 Str62ewski
and order of the sciences, and even the explanation of their specific features, for which reason some investigators of Bacon's philosophy consider him to be a precursor in treating metaphysics as preceding the methodology of other sciences.70
Siger of Brabant, stressing that metaphysics deals with "the aim of all theoretical sciences, what is God" sees a leading role in relation to the other sciences: "et iterum, haec scientia ordinal alias scientias".71
St. Albert the Great notices that metaphysics, is among other sciences, maxime doctrinalis and as wisdom orders all: "ista sapientia sit antiquior et prior omni alia scientia, quae formulatur ... Cuius signum est, quod iustum et dignum esse dicimus officium sapicntis, quod non ab alio quodam ordinetur, sed ipse ordinet omnia alia."72
Let us end this list of quotations with St. Thomas. In his Summa contra gentiles he writes: "Hoc autem modo se habet philosophia prima ad alias scientias speculativas, nam ab ipsa omnes aliae dependent, utpote ab ipsa accipientes sua principia et directionem contra negantes principia: ipsaque prima philosophia tota ordinatur ad Dei cognitionem sicut ad ultimum fincm, unde et scientia divina nominatur."73
IV. Dignity of Metaphysics
Several justifications of the names of metaphysics directly aim at showing its particular dignity. We can see this especially where reference of metaphysics to the first, immaterial causes and, most of all, to God is emphasi/ed. Avicenna claimed that the dignity of the object gives dignity to the science which is subordinated to it; "... et tune nominabitur haec
"... Metaphysica, cujus proprium est distingucrc omncs scientias, et dare rationem universalem de omnibus, quia est communis omnibus rebus et scientiis specialibus et in omnes suam influit potestatem." Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, fasc. Ill, Liber primus Communium naturalium Fratris Rogeri, ed. by R. Steele, Oxford 1911, p. 9. "Nam nobilis pars Metaphysica, cum sit communis omnibus scientiis, est de origine et distinctione et numero et ordine scientiarum omnium, ostendens propria cuilibet et demonstrans" ibid.; cf. E. Charles, Roger Bacon, sa vie, ses ouvrages, ses doctrines d'apres dcs textes inedits, Paris 1861, p. 142; M. Frankowska, "Scientia" w ujfdu Rogera Bacona, Wroclaw 1969, p. 57.
7* C.A. Graiff, Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la Metaphysique. Texte inedit, Louvain 1948, p. 7-8.
72 Metaphysica, I, tract. 2, cap. 3, p. 20.
73 Contra gentiles III, 25.
Metaphysics as a Science 153
scientia ab eo, quod cst clignus in ca scilicet vocabitur hacc scicntia, scicntia divina".74 This view came to be shared by all scholastic commentators on the Metaphysics.
However, the knowledge which refers to the first causes, and especially to the most superior of them, also deserves the name of wisdom. "... Et haec est philosophia prima, quia ipsa est scientia de prima causa esse ... et est etiam sapientia quae est nobilior scientia qua apprehenditur nobilius scitum. Nobilior vero scientia, quia est certitudo veritatis et nobilius scitum, quia est Deus...."75 We find a distinct trace of these statements in the definitions of "divine knowledge" included in De divisione philosophiae of Dominicus Gundissalinus who, having identified it with wisdom, states the reason for this identification with precision: "... hec autem tres proprietates sapiencie [i.e., cognition of what is most dignified, highest certainty, and reference to the first causes] conueniunt huic sciencie: ergo ipsa est sapiencia, que est nobilior sciencia, qua comprehenditur nobilius scitum, nobilior uero sciencia est, quia est certitudo ueritatis, et nobilius scitum, quia est deus et cause que sunt post cum, et eciam cognicio causarum ultimarum omnis esse et cognicio del."
The problem of the certainty of metaphysics deserves separate consideration. Let us see how this certainty is justified by one of the first commentators on Aristotle, Robert Grosseteste. In his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, he states that that knowledge is more certain which is logically prior, i.e., relates to primary things (est de prioribus}. At this moment, however, he introduces a new, neoplatonic element: primary things are more certain because they are better adjusted to the spiritual light which pervades our mind. Thanks to it, knowledge about immaterial substances is more certain than knowledge about material things. Furthermore, it appears that this certainty is not presently accessible to us. The human intellect in the state in which it now is must be content with the certainty of mathematical truths. If, however, it rose to the state in which it should be, the divine things would become most certain for it: "Intellectui igitur humane, qualis est adhuc in nobis, sunt res mathematice certissime ...; sed intellectui tali qualis debet esse
74 Met., t. I, c. 4, fol. 71v C; cf. J.C. Doig, p. 85.
75 Ibid.,c. 2, fol. 71rE-F.
De diuisione philosophiae, p. 36, 3-8.
154 Strozewski
sccundum statum sui optimum sunt res divinae certissime, et quanto res sunt priores et natura sublimiores tanto certiores."77
Argumentation of Thomas Aquinas is worth considering here. In the Proemium to his Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, the methodo logical arguments he refers to are anchored in assumptions made in ethics and even in politics. The goal to which all sciences and arts are subordinated is man's perfection as identified with his happiness: "Omnes autem scientiae et artes ordinantur in unum, scilicet ad hominis perfec- tionem, quae est ejus beatitudo." This close connection of wisdom and happiness -in same respects resembling the teachings of Socrates - is here a matter of the utmost importance: first of all, it allows us to treat knowledge as a coefficient of human perfection and therefore as belonging most strictly to man's essence; secondly, it becomes the starting point of the compound analogy between the hierarchy of the sciences, the hierarchy of cognitive powers, and social hierarchy. Hierarchy in the domain of knowledge is parallel to hierarchy within human society: the most intellectual knowledge, namely wisdom, is at the top and rules all other kinds of knowledge, just as those who are intellectually most efficient should rule and reign people of weaker intellect. Here Thomas Aquinas makes direct reference to Aristotle's Politics. We must notice, however, that the spirit of this argumentation is clearly Platonic: one step more and we will be able to identify sages (who, as will soon appear, are metaphysicians) with rulers. Among cognitive powers the most supreme is that which deals with objects requiring the purest intellectual cognition (maxime intelligibilia). They are objects which satisfy (together or separately) the following conditions: 1) they guarantee cognitive certainty, 2) provide the most general information, 3) are most adequate for intellectual cognition. These conditions are satisfied by: 1) first causes which guarantee absolute cognitive certainty, 2) Being and that which is connected with it as being, for there is nothing more general than that, 3) beings which are completely separated from matter, e.g., God and pure intelligences whose cognition is absolutely independent of material conditions and is therefore strictly subordinated to intellectual powers only.78
Commcntarius in Posterionim Analvticorum libros, ed. P. Rossi, Firenze 1981, p. 257.
78
Compare this argumentation with Aristotle's Metaphysics A, 2 982a.
Metaphysics as a Science 155
It is from these three objects and the manners of their cognition that knowledge which deals with them receives not only its supreme dignity, but also its names: first philosophy, metaphysics, divine science, or theology.
As a conclusion for this chapter, let us quote an opinion which is obviously eclectic, but which perhaps collects all of the reasons to be found to prove the dignity of our science. In the Proemiwn to his Commentary on the Metaphysics, John of Gtogow, a XVth century philosopher from the University of Cracow, claims: "Dignitas itaque primae philosophiae et praestantia ultra alias disciplinas, ut expositores metaphysicac Aristotelis ostendunt, ex sex potest persuaderi: primo ex eius perfectibilitate, secundo ex eius sublimitate, tertio ex eius utilitate, quarto ex eius iocunditate, quinto ex eius firmitate, sexto et ultimo ex eius necessitate. (...)
"Primo metaphysicae vel primae philosophiae dignitas ex eius accipitur perfectibilitate, ipsa enim perficit maxime intellectum nostrum. Terficit enim metaphysica', ut dicit Albertus primo 'Metaphysicae', 'intellectum nostrum vel animam secundum illud, quod est divinum in ea'.
(...)
"Secundo metaphysicae dignitas vel primae philosophiae accipitur ex eius sublimitate; est enim ipsa metaphysica secundum Aristotelem primo 'Metaphysicae' dea scientiarum et eius ilia possessio plus divina quam humana est. Ipsa enim habet firmare et dirigere alias scientias, regere autem et gubernare sublimium et magnorum est. Omnes etiam aliae scientiae metaphysicae subserviunt et famulantur, ipsa enim sola est libera et gratia sui. Versatur etiam circa substantias separatas divinas, quibus nihil praestantius, sublimius et dignius invenitur. (...)
"Tertio metaphysicae sive primae philosophiae accipitur dignitas ex eius utilitate, utile enim est homini cognoscere omnium causas, sine quibus nihil perfecte sciri potest. (...) Utile etiam est maxima scibilia cognoscere, ab eorum enim cognitione omnium aliorum cognitio oritur et dependet. (...)
"Quarto metaphysicae vel primae philosophiae dignitas accipitur ex eius iocunditate. Delectabile enim est intellectui hominis ea noscere, quae nobilissima, dignissima et altissima sunt; metaphysica autem, ut dictum est, circa res divinas, altissimas ct nobilissimas est. (...)
"Quinto metaphysicac vel primae philosophiae dignitas accipitur ex eius firmitate. Ostendit enim Aristoteles primo 'De anima', quod una
156 Strozewski
scientia est dignior altera duplici modo: primo rationc ccrtitudinis, sccundo 'ex eo quod quidem et mcliorum et mirabiliorum est'. Metaphysica autem est certissimorum principiorum et causarum primarum speculatrix. Oportet autem divina esse immortalia, intransmutabilia et ab omni corruptione aliena.
"Sexto et ultimo metaphysicae dignitas accipitur ex eius necessitate; necessaria enim est disciplina huius scire ultra omnes alias disciplinas. Quod pulchre deducit Alexander in prooemio scripti sui super primo 'Metaphysicae', cum dixit in haec verba: 'metaphysica versatur circa ens inquantum ens et quae ens sequuntur; ens enim et ea quae sequuntur ens communia sunt omnibus, de quibus consideratur in scientiis particularibus. Scientia autem propriorum acquiri non potest sine scientia communium, eo quod communium virtus ingreditur cognitionem cuiuslibet specialis scientiae'. Concludit Alexander: 'Necessaria est una scientia, in qua determinatur de natura entis et omnium communium, quae sequuntur ens inquantum ens; et haec est metaphysica'."
The aim of this paper was by no way to exhaust its subject, something that would have been unrealisable in any case; nor was it to propose new interpretations, which I could not have aspired to do. If I have managed to recall and systematize some basic and very well known matters, I shall find myself satisfied with having accomplished my goal.
In conclusion let me pose a question which might move us not as historians of philosophy, but as philosophers. It reads: Is mediaeval metaphysics nothing more than an historical monument today or does it carry any vivid and important values for metaphysics "as such", metaphysics which, after a period of its detronization by positivism, today witnesses a calm, but unquestionable, renaissance?
Instead of a direct answer, let me refer to the thoughts of three contemporary philosophers whose opinions I see as confirmation of the value of at least some of the questions that are posed and answered by metaphysics.
First is Roman Ingarden. Faithful to the program of classical phenomenology in his works, he posed the essential question of the
Jana z Gtogowa Komentarz do Metafizyki (Commentarius in Metaphysicam Aristotelis), wydafRyszard Tatarzyriski, Warszawa 1984, fasc. 1, p. 19-21.
Metaphysics as a Science 157
quid est type, but also stressed the role of questions about existence, an cst, about modes of being and of the existential moments that constitute them. According to Ingarden, the problem of real, individual essence realized within the frame of real existence (being) is the main subject of metaphysics.80 Does this subject differ essentially from that formulated by the scholastics?
The second thinker I would like to refer to is Nikolai Hartmann. In metaphysics he saw a science which was the only one to take up the problem of mystery and to approach the areas which are wrapped in it by necessity. In this context Hartmann speaks neither of God, nor about the so-called prime causes, the adequate cognition of which, according to scholastics, transgressed the cognitive possibilities of a human. Instead, he spoke of the sense of mystery common to them. The more so, as it is related to what in reality is the most fundamental: existence through its subject.
Lastly, Martin Heidegger. His efforts to restore the rightful position and importance to the problem of being - Sein - are worth the highest respect, even though they were accompanied by a bitter conviction that European philosophy had long since forgotten about being. I believe that mediaeval philosophy should be excluded from this indictment. Its metaphysical roots are active right now, enlivening our reflections about being and existence. Paths indicated by various trends of mediaeval metaphysics are indeed worthy of our attention and our following today.
Uniwersytet Jagielloriski
or\
R. Ingarden, Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, B. 1, Tubingen 1964, §§ 5 and 6.
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Le developpement de nouveaux instruments conceptuels et leur utilisation dans la philosophic de la nature au XIVe siecle
Tant dans la tradition philosophique proprement dite (Heidegger)l que dans la perspective specifique de 1'histoire des sciences (Koyre) Petude des sciences et de la philosophic de la nature au Moyen Age a, jusque dans un passe recent, etc dominee par deux decisions theoriques: (1) les sciences de la nature sont reduites a la physique, (2) dans la physique est privilegie ce qui appartient a la mecanique et par consequent a la theorie du mouvement local. Ces deux decisions cxpliquent que Ton considere la problematique medievale des sciences de la nature a partir d'une comparaison retrospective entre la conception du mouvement elaboree par les artisans de la mecanique classique (Galilee, Descartes, Newton) et la conception "aristotelicienne" des medievaux plus ou moins identifiee a ce qu'on appelle la conception "ordinaire". C'est dans cetle perspective que Ton a pris 1'habitude de distinguer la physique de Page classique et la physique nouvelle forgee au XIVC siecle par les "nominalistes parisiens", en utilisant Phistoire de Pevolution et de la formation de la pensee de Galilee comme fournissant "le tableau synthetique de Pevolution de la physique pre-galilcenne": physique aristotelicienne, physique nominaliste (dile de {'impetus), physique archimedienne, en meme temps que Pinstance critique et le terrain de tous les cnjcux: la "mathematisation". Avec Galilee on voit done se scandcr les etapes d'une histoire en meme temps que se delimiter des conceptions archetypiques du mouvement et de Pespace: le mouvement-processus de la physique aristotelicienne (qui implique "la neccssite de Paction continuelle de la cause-moteur contigue au mobile") et la conception "nominaliste" du mouvement-effet de la force imprimee dans le mobile "qui s'epuise en produisant son cffet" impliquant toutes deux P"arret necessaire du mobile" sont abandonnees au profit du mouvement-etat (ou "translation simple") qui "comme tout ctat dure sans qu'aucune cause soil necessaire pour expliquer cette pcrsistance"; la conception de Pespace "subit une transformation
1 Cf. M. Heidegger, Qu'est-ce qu'une chose?, trad. Reboul-Taminiaux, Paris 11971, p. 92-106.
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analogue": "a 1'cspacc physique d'Aristote", ensemble de lieux qualitativement distincts, se substitue 1'espace abstrait, homogene, de la geometric (espace archimcdien), ce qui entraine la "disparition du cosmos de la physique medievale"2.
II n'est pas question de remettre ici en cause les resullats des analyses de Koyre dans les annees 1935: il est acquis que la dynamique de Galilee n'est pas le "prolongement naturel" de la physique de ^impetus et meme qu' "elle lui tourne le dos, comme elle tourne le dos au sens commun et a I'experience commune". II n'est pas non plus question de revenir sur les analyses de Heidegger, formulccs a la meme epoque3, dans un autre conlexte et scion d'autres perspectives. Nous voudrions, au contraire, au seuil d'aborder "une pensee qui n'est plus la notre", suivre un des preceptes fondamentaux de la methodologie d'Alexandre Koyre: "oublier les verites qui sont devenues partie integrante de notre pensee" et "adopter" les "modes", les "categories de raisonnement" et les "principes metaphysiques qui pour les gens d'une epoque passee etaient d'aussi valables et d'aussi sures bases de raisonnement et de recherche que le sont pour nous les principes de la physique mathematique et les donnees de 1'astronomie".
Envisager le developpement d'un nouvel "outillage conceptuel" et son "utilisation dans le domaine de la science" ou de la "philosophic de la nature" au XiVe siecle consiste done, dans un premier temps, a oublier la
2 Sur le developpement de ces themes chez A. Koyre, cf. entre autres, "Galilee et Platon", trad, franchise d'un article "Galileo and Plato", paru dans le Journal of the History of Ideas, IV/4 (1943), p. 4CXM28, repris dans A. Koyre, Etudes d'histoire de la pensee scientifique, Paris: 1966, p. 166-195; "Galilee et la revolution scientifique du XVIIe siecle", trad, franchise de 1'article paru dans la Philosophical Re\'iew (1943, p. 333-348), repris dans Etudes d'histoire de la pensee scientifique, p. 196-212. Voir egalcment 1'etude sur Die Vorldufer Galileis im XIV. Jahrhundcrt, in: Archives internationales d'histoire des sciences, IV/16 (1951), p. 769-783, et la reponse d'A. Maier, "Die naturphilosophische Bedeutung der scholastischen Impetus-Thcoric" , Scholastik, 30 (1955), p. 321-343. Sur revolution des perspectives historiques et methodologiques d'A. Maier, cf. J. Murdoch & E. Sylla, "Anneliese Maier and the History of Medieval Science", in: Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier, A. Maieru & A. Paravicini Bagliani (eds.), Roma 1981 (Storia e Letteratura, 151), p. 7-23 [avec une bibliographic d'A. Maier, p. 15-23].
3 On sail que Die Frage nach dcm Ding. 7,u Kants Lehre von den Transzendentalcn Grundsdtzen, Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1962, reprcnd en fait le texte d'un cours professe durant le scmcstre d'hiver 1935-1936 a 1'Universite de Fribourg-en-Brisgau. Les travaux de Koyre sur "les annees d'apprentissage de Galilee", dont nous extrayons nos citations, sont exactement contemporains. Cf. "Resume de la Conference d'Alexandre Koyre au Comite international d'histoire des sciences, lors de sa Vile reunion annuelle. 26-27 juin 1935", Archeion, 17 (1935), p. 250 sq.\ "Proces-vcrbal de la seance de la section d'histoire des sciences du Centre international dc synthese",/lrcto'o/j, 18 (1936), p. 238 sqq.; documents repris dans A. Koyre, Dc la mystique a la science. Cours, conferences et documents, 1922-1962, P. Redondi (ed.), Paris: Fxiitions des I'Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociales, 1986, p. 38^40.
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problematique des "precurseurs" ou des "predecesseurs" de Galilee, la mise en parallele de la conception aristotelicienne avec la conception dite "ordinaire" du mouvement, la predominance du mouvement local sur les autres formes de mouvement ou de changement etudiees par les medievaux, a tenter de degager les "modes", les "categories" et les "principes" qui ont effectivement determine la production d'un ensemble d'enonces philosophiques et theologiques ou se dit une certaine conception de la nature caracteristique des savoirs et des pratiques scientifiques du XIVe siecle.
C'est une donnee aristotelicienne, constante depuis le XHIe siecle, que la philosophic naturelle ne se laisse pas uniformement reduire a la physique*. C'est done sur le fond traditionnel d'une mise en ordre des ecrits naturels aristoteliciens (ou pseudo-aristoteliciens) qu'il faut comprendre la determination des six parties de la philosophic naturelle selon Guillaume d'Ockham: (1) de condicionibus communibus et magis notis omnium naturalium, (2) de corporibus coelestibus et eorum proprietatibus, (3) de corporibus inanimatis et eonim passionibus, (4) de corpore animato anima rationali et actibus eius (5) de ceteris animalibus et eorum proprietatibus, (6) de plantis. Pour etre effectivement comprise, cette classification appelle, cependant, trois observations complementaires:
- Si la theorie des mouvements naturels est un element essentiel de la scientia naturalis, la science du corpus mobile (ou de Vens mobile} ne se laisse pas ramencr a un domaine dc problemes homogenes a la stride problematique du mouvement local, qui seule autoriserait une evaluation retrospective de la "physique" du XIVe siecle a partir des visees et des enjeux philosophiques et epistemologiques de la "mecanique" classique; en d'autres termes: la physique de V impetus ne peut a elle seulc constituer un terrain d'observation historico-philosophique suffisant pour reconstruire "la" conception de la nature caracteristique du XIVe siecle sous les especes d'une physique nominaliste', la triade "physique aristotelicienne, physique nominaliste, physique classique" n'offre pas une grille de lecture suffisamment
4 Pour Roger Bacon la scientia naturalis comprend la perspective, Yastronomia iudiciaria et operativa, la scientia pondcrum, Valkimia, Vagricultura, la medicina, la scientia experimentalis . Pour Albert le Grand les sciences naturelles se divisent en trois: la science du corps nature! mobile per se ou physique, la science du corps nature! mobile materiel et simple, qui comprend, par exemple, la theorie de la generation et de la corruption, du ciel et du monde, du lieu, des proprietes des elements, la science du corps nature! mobile materiel et mixte, englobant notamment les meteorologiques, la psychologic, les mouvements des aninvux, la botanique, la zoologie.
Le dcveloppement dc nouveaux instruments conceptuels 161
fine pour apprecier les phenomenes qui ont determine, si elle existe, la pratique specifique des maitres du XlVe siecle.
- la scientia naturalis de la scolastique tardive est un moment particulier de la "reception d'Aristote". Cette "reception" ne peut etre correctement appreciee aux seuls niveaux de la delimitation de Pobjet de la philosophie naturelle (la delimitation de Pextension du domaine des naturalia) ni de ses accointances supposees avec les donnees de 1'experience commune et de la "representation habituelle" : la mesure des innovations, des continuites et des ruptures apportees par les auteurs du XlVe siecle suppose la consideration d'un aristotelisme total ou la doctrine generate de la connaissance, les differents types d'instrumentation conceptuelle et les propositions de Pontologie ou de la philosophie premiere doivent necessairement aussi trouver leur place. Autrement dit: on ne saurait a la fois reprocher aux medievaux d'avoir elabore une physique qualitative proche des donnees de 1'experience commune et d'avoir precede "d'une maniere purement dialectique tournant en une analyse" ou un "poeme"5 conceptuels "sans assise"6 - pourtant la conjonction de ces griefs est traditionnelle dans Phistoriographie.
- la scientia naturalis de la scolastique tardive est aussi, mais non exclusivement, un moment particulier dans Phistoire de la pensee mathematique qui exige "une representation fondamentale des choses qui contredit la representation habituelle" et, de cefait meme, ne reclame pas non plus d'"experimentation" effective pour "offrir corps a une representation intuitive". L'essence du projet mathematique scolastique ne reside pas dans la mathematisation de la physique mais dans un ensemble de procedures et de methodes de calcul portant sur des determinations et des enonciations anticipantes, ou propositions, qui constituent autant de prises prealables et de variations sur la maniere dont se construisent des processus de changement. Cette construction ne vise ni a decrire ni a reconstituer ce qui se passe en realite mais a definir une verite normative pour le "savoir naturel" congu comme auto-enchainemcnt d'enonces portant sur des objets, les mobiles, soumis par la pensee a des stipulations autonomes sinon arbitraires (casus). En ce sens Pobjet de \aphilosophia naturalis est moins la Nature, ou meme la Nature scion Aristote, qu'un ensemble d'entites ou de processus physiques formule sur la base de la typologie "aristotelicienne" des mouvements et de Pontologie categorielle qui la supporte.
5 M. Heidegger, Qu'est-ce qu'une chosel, p. 100
6 M. Heidegger, Qu'est-ce qu'une chose! , p. 93.
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Cette derniere caracteristique est bien connue. Mais son sens meme reste problematique. Vue dans les termes de 1'opposition entre via nommalium et via realium elle correspond au fait que dans 1'ontologie ockhamiste la quantite, le mouvement, 1'espace et le temps n'ont d'autres objets de reference que les substances et leurs qualites: cette "meconnaissance des realites physiques" aurait pour effet de degrader la philosophic naturelle en semio-physique, 1'analyse quantitative des processus reels en analyse logique d'enonces quantificationnels portant sur les substances et les qualites impliquees dans les changements. A terme, "la quantification" deviendrait "plus affaire de logique et de langage que de science physique", ce qui expliquerait "peut-etre pourquoi les successeurs d'Ockham se sont bientot lances dans toutes les varietes possibles de sophismala calculatoria, s'attardant a d'interminables subtilites logiques n'ayant que peu de valeur quant a la mise en oeuvre d'une veritable comprehension de la nature"7. Cette appreciation negative a au moins un merite. Elle met clairement en lumiere le caractere philosophique du projet caractcristique du XIVc siecle ainsi que son trait interne: 1'entre-implication de la logique et de 1'ontologie. Mais elle manque le principal: les auteurs de sophismata et les Calculators n'ont pas un projet de comprehension de la nature. Les techniques du "calcul" ne sont pas destinees a 1'investigation systematique des phenomencs naturels. L'accent principal est mis sur des "experiences de pensce", secundum irnaginationern, qui n'ont aucun rapport avec une realisation concrete, et qui, pour une large part, ne sauraient meme trouvcr place dans le cadre de la "nature".
Les nouveaux "outils conceptuels" du XIVc siecle ne sont pas de simples instruments destines a assurer le transfer! des raisons physiques dans le domaine de la logique, ce sont des systemes conceptuels delimitant des reseaux de relations organisees logicc ou sophistice loquendo sans reference originaire au reel, naturaliter ou physice loquendo^. Ces "outils", ou plutot ces "langages" analytiqucs - De incipit et desinit, De maximo et minimo, De intensione et remissione fonnamm, De proportionibus ont deux caracteristiques principals: (a) ce sont tous des langages mathematiques ou au moins quantitatifs dont les interferences sont reconnues et explorees pour
7 W.A. Wallace, Causality and scientific explanation 1 (Ann Arbor 1972), p. 54.
8 Sur le sens de ces expressions, cf. C. Wilson, William Heytesbury. Medieval Logic and the Rise of Mathematical Physics, (The University of Wisconsin. Publications in Medieval Science, 3), Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1956, p. 24-25.
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elles-memes, (b) leur terrain originaire commun est le genre litteraire des sophismata, ou s'exprime la pratique universitaire d'un genre particulier de disputatio, plutot que le genre, oriente vers le "reel", que constituent les commentaires de la Physique et du De caelo.
Pour comprendre le sens de 1'introduction des langages "analytiques" au XlVe siecle on doit done s'interroger autant sur les conditions effectives de leur apparition et les changements des mentalites et des paradigmes scientifiques que sur les modalites pratiques de leur application. On constate alors que les "nouveaux outils conceptuels" des Calculators sont le fruit d'une evolution dans la conception de la science et de la scientificite en general plutot que d'un changement dans la representation particuliere de la nature ou d'une modification dans la perception de la rationalite naturelle. S'il est vrai que les langages analytiques portent sur des objets non empiriques librement construits par 1'imagination sans pour autant cesser de produire du savoir, il faut postuler un changement radical dans la perception des rapports entre le rationnel et le reel (au-dela ou en dec,a du clivage traditionnel entre Yens reale et Yens rationis, le verum et \&fictum) en meme temps qu'une refonte et une redistribution des notions "habituelles" du necessaire, de 1'impossible et du contingent, telles que les avait elaborees la doctrine de la matiere des propositions categoriques .
Nous tenterons de decrire cette evolution en analysant les points suivants:
(1) le changement des conceptions de la demonstration et de la "certitude" occasionne par la resorption des topiques dans la theorie et la pratique des consequentiae\
(2) 1'accroissement pratique de ces resultats dans le nouvel espace mental ouvert par le obligationes;
(3) le developpement de nouveaux modeles pour les modalites (possible, impossible, necessaire, contingent) sur la base des acquis ou des problemes de la theologie de potentia Dei absoluta;
(4) 1'aboutissement de ces convergences dans le "format" theorique des sophismata.
Avant d'entamer cette analyse, il nous faut, cependant, revenir sur la notion meme d'"outil analytique". La notion de "langage conceptuel" appliquee au domaine de le philosophic naturelle du Moyen Age tardif a, comme chacun sait, ete introduite par le Professeur John Murdoch. Afin d'en saisir la nature et la portee effectives il convient d'en rappeler brievement les traits
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caracteristiques. Dans "Philosophy and the Enterprise of Science in the Late Middle Ages", J. Murdoch a defini un changement de perspective dans la scolastique tardive presentant la double caracteristique de s'eloigner d'Aristote sans pour autant annoncer Galilee9. Le facteur initial ou Pelement determinant de ce changement consiste dans le "developpement de nouveaux langages conceptuels permettant de trailer les problemes traditionnels de la philosophic naturelle tout en inventant et en resolvant de nouveaux problemes". Ces nouveaux langages sont de deux types. Les deux premiers sont "mathematiques" ou "quasi mathematiques", il s'agit: (1) du langage de 1'intension et de la remission des formes, avec les concepts solidaires de degres et de latitudes; (2) de celui des proportiones applique notamment par Bradwardine aux variables du mouvement local, mais utilise de maniere beaucoup plus generate pour comparer tout accroissement arithmetique dans un ensemble de choses donnees avec un accroissement geometrique dans tel autre ensemble. Un autre langage, le plus extensif quant au champ de ses applications effectives, est logique: il s'agit (3) du langage des suppositiones, autrement dit du langage formule dans le cadre de la theorie semantique medievale de la reference, langage caracterise par Murdoch comme un "outil analytique" permettant de trailer toutes sortes de problemes logiques, epistcmologiques, ontologiques, metaphysiques, physiques ou plus specifiquement de motu. Le langage des suppositiones n'est evidemment pas une creation du XIVc siecle: on sail, grace aux travaux du Professeur L.M. De Rijk, qu'il a etc mis au point dans la seconde moitie du XIIe siecle10; J. Murdoch marque done la specificite du XlVe siecle dans la combinaison de ce langage ancien avec une ontologie nouvelle, le Nominalisme, ou plus exactement 1'ontologie "particulariste" d'Ockham. A ces trois langages, il faut ajouter: (4) une nouvelle "prescription pour la recherche" plutot qu'un langage analytique proprcmcnt dit: le recours a la potentia Dei absoluta, qui permet de "pousser I'examen d'une question au-dela des limites des possibilites physiques recues comme licites a Pinterieur de la philosophic naturelle et de s'engager dans le champ plus large de ce qui est logiquement permissible". Enfin, on doit prendre en compte (5) toute une "constellation de concepts dont 1'operativite se verifie" de maniere plus qu'englobante, et que
9 Cf. J. Murdoch, "Philosophy and the Enterprise of Science in the Late Middle Ages", in: The Interaction between Science and Philosophy, Y. Elkana (ed.), Humanities Press, 1974, p. 58.
10 Cf. essentiellement: L.M. De Rijk, Logica modernorum, II, 1: The Origin and Early Development of the Theory of Supposition, Assen: Van Gorcum, 1967.
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1'on pcut rcgroupcr sou:: Ic litre dc "valcurs infmies", qu'il s'agissc dc poids, dc forces, de durees ou d'intensites de toutes sortes.
Telle que la presente "Philosophy and the Enterprise of Science", la place prise par le langage des suppositiones dans la reformulation des problemes traditionnels de la philosophic naturelle est double: reduction des termes connotatifs a une "une fonction" des termes absolus; elimination des "fictions" representees par des termes comme "instant", "point", "ligne" et transfer! du role joue par ces termes a des propositions epurees dans lesquelles ils ne figurent plus. Dans un texte posterieur: "Prepositional Analysis in Fourteenth-Century Natural Philosophy"! 1, la solidarite entre langage semantique et ontologie particulariste est definie comme donnant corps a une veritable methode, l'"analyse propositionnelle". C'est dans cette ligne de pensee que s'inscrit "Scientia mediantibus vocibus", prononce au Symposium de BonnR On parle desormais d'une "analyse metalinguistique des problemes de philosophic naturelle", veritable "outil methodologique" completant ou encadrant 1'utilisation des autres "langages analytiques". Ce recours a la notion d'analyse metalinguistique permet en outre de reclasser certains langages selon une distinction entre traitement de re et traitement de intentionibus. C'est ainsi que le probleme aristotelicien de 1'instant du changement est assume de re au niveau du "langage objet" forme par le langage analytique de primo et ultimo instanti en termes de premier ou de dernier instant de 1'etre ou du non-etre d'un sujet donne, alors qu'il est assume de intentionibus au niveau du "metalangage" offert par 1'outil metalinguistique que constitue 1'analyse, l'"expositio", d'une proposition, en termes de commencer et de finir, de incipit et desinit^.
11 "Prepositional Analysis in Fourteenth-Century Natural Philosophy: A Case Study", Synthese, 40 (1979), p. 117-146.
12 'Scientia mediantibus vocibus. Metalinguistic Analysis in Late Medieval Natural Philosophy", in: Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittclalter, (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 13/1), 1981, p. 73-106.
13 Sur la problematique de incipit /dcsinit et de primo/ultimo instanti, cf. A. Maier, Die Vorlaufcr Galilei im XIV. Jahrhundert (Storia e Letteratura, 22), Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura,1949, p. 9-25; Zwischcn Philosophic und Mechanik (Storia e I^etteratura, 69), Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1958, p. 3-59; N. Kretzmann, "Incipit/desinit", in: Motion and Time, Space and Matter, P. K. Machamcr & R. G. Turnbull (eds.), Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1976, p. 101-136; S. Knuuttila & A. I. Lehtinen, "Change and Contradiction: A Fourteenth-Century Controversy", Synthese, 40 (1979), p. 189-207; A. de Libera, "Apollinaire Offredi critique de Pierre de Mantoue: Le Tractatus de instanti et la logique du changement", in: English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th Centuries. Acts of the 5th European Symposium on Medie\'al Logic and Semantics. Rome 10-14 November 1980, A. Maieru (ed.), (History of Logic, 1), Naples: Bibliopolis, 1982, p. 253-291; R. Sorabji, "Stopping and Starting", in: Time, Creation and the Continuum. Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, Londres: Duckworth, 1983,
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Si le developpcmcnt de langages quantitatifs et de langages logiques constitue le trait distinctif de la science naturelle du XlVe siecle, c'est 1'interaction de ces langages ou de ces outils qui permet de comprendre le sens du projet mathematique specifique de la scolastique tardive. Cette interaction apparait a differents niveaux.
Tout d'abord par la predominance d'une problematique de la mesure et de la mensuration entendue comme probleme logique de denomination^ , essentiellement appliquee a des distances spatiales, temporelles ou essentielles; a des continuums statiques dont les elements presentent une relation d'ordre; aux diverses sortes de changements et de mouvements distingues par Aristote dans les Categories et la Physique: changement substantiel instantane, processus accidentels deployes sur un intervalle de temps au triple point de vue de la qualite (alteration), de la quantite (croissance, decroissance) et du lieu (mouvement local).
La seconde manifestation de 1'interaction entre la problematique de la mesure et 1'analyse logique reside dans les croisements repctes qui marquent 1'application des regies de mensuration quant aux langages analytiques memes qu'ellcs mettent en oeuvre: c'est ainsi que, tout en etant formulee dans le langage des proportiones la "Regie dynamique" de Bradwardine associant la progression arithmctique de la vitesse d'un mobile a la progression gcometrique du rapport de ses causes (forces/resistances) est egalement traduite dans le langage de 1'intcnsion ct de la remission des formes.
En outre, et c'est le troisiemc point, chaque regie de mesure peut etre "testee" par rapport a "toutes les variations concevablcs" secundwn imaginationem d'une qualite, d'une puissance ou de quelque autre entite "mesurable" que ce soil. Cette "rule-testing activity"15 n'cngage aucune confrontation du calcul avec Pexperience ou 1'expcrimcntation active, son but n'est pas la connaissance du reel commun ni la verification d'une hypothese, mais la production de nouvellcs regies ou 1'engendrement de nouveaux
p. 403-421; S. Knuuttila, Remarks on the Background of the Fourteenth Century Limit Decision Controversies, in: The Editing of Theological and Philosophical Texts from the Middle Ages, Acts of the Conference Arranged by the Department of Classical Languages, University of Stockholm, 29-31 August 1984, M. Asztalos (ed.), (Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis. Studia Latina Stockholmiensia, XXX), Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell International, 1986, p. 245-266.
14 Cf. J. Murdoch, "Philosophy and the Enterprise of Science...", p. 62. Sur 1'interaction entre les aspects logiques et les aspects physico-mathematiques de 1'analyse medievale des mesures, cf. C. Wilson, William Heytesbury..., p. 21-25.
15 Cf. J. Murdoch, "Philosophy and the Enterprise of Science...", p. 66.
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"puzzles logiqucs", Ics sophismata: comme le souligne Murdoch, le progres sc fait ici sur le terrain de {'analyse logique non sur celui de 1'induction a la Duhem. Enfin, il est clair que la mesure envisagee par le philosophe naturel du Moyen Age tardif n'a de valeur qu'a Pinterieur de cet espace de jeu imaginaire du possible logique: lorsqu'un Richard Swineshead se represente ou plutot se propose un corps dote d'un degre de chaleur egal a 1 sur sa premiere moitie, a 2 sur le quart suivant, a 3 sur le huitieme suivant, a 4 sur le seizieme suivant et ainsi de suite jusqu'a Pinfini, et qu'il demontre que ce corps, pris comme un tout, est a un degre de chaleur 2, autrement dit un degre de chaleur fini comme tout, meme si en lui la chaleur augmente a Pinfini, il n'a en vue aucun corps concret donne dans une experience ou manipulable dans une experimentation^; pour autant, il ne se livre pas a une "experience de pensee" ou "experience imaginaire", telles que, apres Mach, ont pu les decrire ou les problematiser Koyre, Kuhn ou Popperl?.
Pour comprendre ce point difficile, il nous faut nous interroger sur le statut epistemologique et philosophique de la methode de raisonnement "imaginaire" des scolastiques tardifs. De prime abord, la dimension de I'imaginatio designe un domaine de speculation ouvert par le mode de consideration specifique de lapotentia Dei absoluta. Pour determiner ce qu'il en est de la mathesis ou du "projet mathematique de la nature" au XlVe siecle il nous faut done analyser les relations qu'entretiennent ces deux notions. La demarche secundum imaginationem des medievaux n'est pas ce que Koyre appelle, a propos des "experiences de pensee" de Galilee, une "realisation de Pideal", "operant avec des objets theoriquement parfaits, que 1'experience imaginaire" veritable "intermediate entre le mathematique et le reel" vient "mettre en jeu": surfaces planes "veritablement" planes, surfaces spheriques "veritablement" spheriques, corps "parfaitement" rigides ou "parfaitement" elastiques qui n'existent pas et ne peuvent d'ailleurs pas exister in renim
16 Pour une analyse de ce cas, cf. J. Murdoch, "Philosophy and the Enterprise of Science...", p. 67-68, n. 39; "Infinity and continuity", in: The Cambridge History of Later Medical Philosophy, Cambridge, 1982, p. 588-590.
17 Cf. K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, New York, 1959, App. XI, p. 442 sqq.; A. Koyre, "Le De motu gravium de Galilee. De 1'experience imaginaire et de son ahus", Rwue d'histoire des sciences, 13 (1960), p. 197-245; Th. S. Kuhn, "A Function for Thought Experiments", in: Melanges Alexandre Koyre, Paris, 1964, vol. 2, p. 322 sqq. Sur le sens medieval de 1'experience de pensee et pour une comparaison avec 1'age classique, cf. A. Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Voir egalement, du meme auteur: "The Dialectical Preparation for Scientific Revolutions", in: The Copemican Achie\>ement, R. Westmann (ed.), Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1975, p. 163-203.
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natura; 1'experience "imaginaire" des mcdievaux ne va pas de I'ideal au reel, non plus que la science medievale ne vise, de son cote, a "expliquer le reel par 1'impossible"!8. On 1'a vu, tel que le defmit J. Murdoch, le role de 1'argumentation secundum imaginationem consiste a fournir un moyen de pousser 1'analyse d'un probleme "au-dela des limites des possibilites physiques licites a 1'interieur de la philosophic naturelle d'Aristote" jusqu'a atteindre le domaine plus large de "tout ce qui est logiquement acceptable", autrement dit: ce qui ne comporte pas de contradiction interne. Pour Murdoch cette caracteristique de la mcthode secundum imaginationem n'est comprehensible qu'a partir de la notion de potentia Dei absoluta puisqu'elle ne fait qu'exprimer au niveau de la pensee humaine le principe, valable au niveau de I'agir divin, selon lequel: "Deus potest facere omne quod fieri non includit contradictionem". Autrement dit: on ne va pas ici de Pimpossible au reel, mais du possible reel au possible logique. La these de J. Murdoch se ramene done pour finir a deux affirmations essentielles: (a) 1'appel a la potentia Dei absoluta rend compte non seulement de la possibilite mais dufait meme de 1'existence de procedures secundum imaginationem dans la theologie et la philosophic naturelle du XIVc siecle; (b) parallelement le foisonncment de casus ct de rationes fondes sur Papplication des nouveau langagcs analytiques rend compte du dcploiement effectif d'un nombre significatif d'elemcnts secundum imaginationem traites de potentia Dei absoluta. L'entre-implication du raisonncment de potentia Dei absoluta et de la mise en oeuvre dc casus et de rationes secundum imaginationem est done le phenomene saillant, presuppose dans tout ce qui suit.
II va de soi qu'une etude complete des "nouveaux outils conceptuels du XIVe siecle et de leur utilisation dans le domaine de la philosophic naturelle", devrait aborder trois problemes distincts: (a) 1'origine des langages analytiques; (b) la maniere dont ils sont appliques; (c) les conditions qui ont permis ou rcndues possibles voire necessaires leur application: etant entendu que parmi ces conditions ccrtaines tiennent a la prcssion meme des problemes, par une sorte de necessite interne, tandis que d'autres tiennent a 1'evolution des mcntaliles concernant les normes de la scientificite en general
18 Cette belle formule se lit dans A. Koyre a propos de Galilee et de son concept du mouvement, cf. "Galilee et la revolution scientifique", in: Etudes d'histoire de la pensee scientifique, p. 199. II va de soi qu'"impossible" a ici le sens d'"idealement pariah", non celui d'"impossible opinable" que nous alleguons plus bas (sections 2 et 3) avec Burleigh.
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et la nature dc 1'activite philosophique dans sa double dimension intellectuellc, ou conceptuelle, et sociale, c'est-a-dire institutionnelle. C'est ce dernier point que nous abordons ici.
1. Topiques et consequences an debut du XIVs siecle
La modification de la perception des rapports entre le raisonnement demonstratif et le raisonnement dialectique est le premier element qui favorise la mise en place du complexe forme par les nouveaux langages analytiques, le raisonnement de potentia Dei absoluta et la methode secundum imaginationem.
Lorsque nous considerons un sophisma, ses stipulations fantaisistes, son architecture apparemment extravagante, nous eprouvons d'emblee le sentiment d'avoir affaire a un mode particulier de demonstration et d'enchainement propositionnel qui suppose une extraordinaire valorisation des relations topiques dans la representation generale de ce que peut etre la pertinence d'un raisonnement et la nature de 1'affect spccifique d'assentiment qui, normalement, 1'accompagne.
Prenons un exemple simple. Lorsque nous lisons chez Burleigh des inferences comme Sortes currit, igitur Deus est, ou Homo est asinus, igitur Sortes currit et que nous voyons qu'il les considere comme parfaitement valables, notre premier mouvement est de nous demander quel sorte de jeu preside a des constructions de toute evidence aussi vaines qu'absurdes. II y a pourtant la un resultat notable de la pensee logique du Moyen Age, en meme temps qu'une condition indispensable au fonctionnement des differents langages ou concepts analytiques caracterisant le projet logico-mathematique de la scolastique tardive. En d'autres termes: 1'univers technique mais aussi mental et conceptuel du sophisma ne saurait exister sans la perception de la validite de telles inferences.
De quoi s'agit-il, en fait? De Papplication de deux regies absolument courantes au XlVe siecle, mais dont les premiere formulations remontent au Xlle siecle, ou la premiere est designee sous le litre de consequentia Adamitonim, regies qui sont egalement bien attestees au XIIIe siecle, i.e.: ex impossibili quidlibet^9, necessarium ex quolibet 20, soil:
19 Cette regie est decrite comme la consequentia Adamitonim dans le Tractatus Emmeranus de impossibili positione, ed. De Rijk, in: "Some Thirteenth Century Tracts on the Game of Obligation", Vivarium, 12 (1974), p. 118. Elle est egalement mentionnee - positivement - chez
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nOp -» (p -» q)
-i
O-iq -> (p -> q)
Dans Ic DC puritatc arils logicac, Tractatus brevior, Burlcigh admet ces deux regies qu'il cite sous la forme ex impossibili sequitur quodlibet, el necessarium sequitur ad quodlibet. Mais sur quoi fonde-t-il sa decision et son assentiment? Precisement sur une relation topique: le locus a minori, les deux inferences argumentant per locum a minori affirmative^. La memc analyse est fournic dans le Tractatus longior^: Si impossibile sit verum, sequitur per locum a minori, quod quodcumquc aliud erit verum. Cctte relation topique s'inscrit a Pintericur d'un dispositif plus large consistant dans une distinction entre deux types dc "consequences": les consequences naturelles et les consequences accidentelles23. Mais, comme on le voit des la definition de ces deux sortes d'inferences, les relations topiques fonctionnent comme cadre general d'elucidation. II y a consequence naturelle quand 1'antcccdent inclut le consequent, ce qui veut dire que la validite dc la consequence cst determince
Alexandra Ncckham, Dc naturis rcrum, cd. T. Wright, Alexandri Neckham Dc naturis rcrum libri duo with (lie Poem of the Same Author Dc laudibus divinac sapicntiae, Ixindrcs, 1863, p. 288. On pcut done la fairc rcmonter avant les annees 1200, les Adamiti etant les clcvcs ou partisans d'Adam du Pctit-Pont (Adam dc Balsam, Par\-ipontanus). Sur ce point, Cf. P.O. I^wry, O.P., "Robert Grossctcste's Question on Subsistence: An Ixho of the Adamites", Mcdiac\'al studies, 45 (1983), p. 11-12. Sur la signification precise du passage cdite ct commente par Dc Rijk, cf. les rcmarqucs critiques d'H. Stump, "William of Sherwood's Treatise on Obligations", Historiographia linguistica, 1 (1980), p. 263-264, n. 12. On notera aussi que la mcme regie cst attribucc aux Nominates dans les Communes obiectiones ct rcsponsioncs (ms. Vat. tat. 7678, f. 81rb) particllcmcnt cditc'cs par II. A. G. Braakhuis, in: De 13de Eeuwse Tractaten over Syncategorematische Tcrmcn, I, Inlcidcndc Studie, Diss. Ixiden, 1979, p. 63, les Reales soutenant au contrairc que ex impossibili nihil sequitur. Ix; point de vue "rcalistc" cst apparemment dcfcndu dans un autre tcxtc du XIIe siecle: YArs Meliduna (voir 1'extrait public par De Rijk, in: Logica Modernorum, II, 1, p. 389 ct les commcntaircs dc Braakhuis, Dc Llde Euwse Tractaten..., p. 39).
20 Cf. par cxcmplc les Abstractioncs d'llcrve le Breton, maitre es arts a Paris vers 1230, sophismata n° 110, 117 et 133, cd. A. dc Libcra, "Ix;s Abstractiones d'Herve le Sophistc", Archives d'histoire doctrinalc ct litteraire du Moycn Age, (1986), p. 199, 201, 204. Ix recucil ^Abstractioncs oxonicn attribuc a Richard dc Cornouailles (Magistcr Abstractionum) est un dcuxiemc tcmoin dc ex impossibili sequitur quidlibct consequcntia accidcntali, dc meme que les Syncategorcmata d'un autre contemporain d'Hcrvc, Ic maitre parisien Jean Le Page (cf. Braakhuis, Dc 13de Euwse Tractaten..., p. 188). II n'cst pas jusqu'a Pierre dTuspagne qui, dans scs Svncatcgorcmata, nc connaisse ct n'acccpte une version "realiste" de la regie (cf. Braakhuis, p. 282).
21 Cf. Gauthier Burlcigh, De Puritatc Artis Logicae. Tractatus bre\<ior, cd. Ph. Bochner (Franciscan Institute Publications. Text Series, 9) St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1955, p. 248,24 - 249,3.
22 cf. Gauthier Burlcigh, Dc Puritatc Artis Logicac. Tractatus longior, cd. Boehner, 1955, p. 61, 10.
23 Cette distinction cst attcstce des le XIIIe siecle, cf., notamment, Guillaume de Sherwood, Syncatcgoremata, ed. J. R. O'Donncll, Mediac\'al Studies, 3 ( 1941), p. 78-82.
Le devcloppement dc nouveaux instruments conceptuels 171
par un "lieu intrinseque", il y a consequence accidenlelle, quand 1'antecedcnt n'inclut pas le consequent, ce qui veut dire que la consequence tient par 1'application d'une "regie cxtrinseque". C'cst le cas d'une inference comme Si homo est asinus, tu sedes. Cette consequence est bonne; elle est bonne de par la regie ex impossibili sequitur quodlibet, laquelle repose elle-meme sur le locus a minori, c'est-a-dire, en derniere analyse, sur le fait que 1'impossiblc parait moins vrai que n'importe quoi d'autre - d'ou resulte que si ce qui parait le moins vrai est vrai, ce qui parait plus vrai que le moins vrai necessairement est vrai. Bref, les regies consequentielles du type de: omnis consequential est bona, in qua consequens est necessarium ou omnis consequential est bona, in qua antecedens est impossibile reposent en fin de compte sur des principes topiqucs.
Cc que nous venons de voir sur un exemple aussi eloigne que possible de 1'intuition naturelle est un trait universel et caracteristique de la theorie dite "des consequences" qui connait son age d'or au XIVe siecle. Le phenomene general qui le supporte a ete decrit par E. Stump comme l'"absorption des topiques dans les consequences"24. Cette formule designe un changement d'ensemble beaucoup plus complexe dont il faut epeler tous les elements: tout d'abord, naturellement, le fait que les arguments topiques sont designes en termes de consequences a partir du XIIIc siecle; ensuite 1'apparition du genre litteraire des consequentiae qui se substitue progressivement aux commentaires des Topiques; enfin la prise dc conscience graduelle qu'il y a une necessite des inferences topiques et la montce progressive de theses telles que "tout syllogisme tient par la relation topique du tout quantitatif, dont les maximes sont constituees au niveau syllogistique par les principes du did de otnni, did de nullo"25. Ce dernier trait, le plus important, est exprime de differentes manieres: dans raffirmation ockhamiste que les syllogismes tiennent grace a des "moyens extrinseques", c'est-a-dire la plupart du temps des maximes topiques2^, ou dans le deploiement de la these selon laquelle les syllogismes de la seconde et de la troisieme figures
24 Cf. E. Stump, 'Topics: Their Development and Absorption into Consequences", in: The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambrige, 1982, p. 273-299.
25 Cf. E. Stump, Topics...", p. 289; J. Pinborg, Topik und Syllogistik im Mittelalter", in: Sapienter ordinare. Festgabe fur Erich Kleincidarn, !•". Hoffman et al. (eds.), (Erfurt Theologischc Studien, 24), St Benno Verlag, 1969, p. 166-167; cf. egalement S. Ebbesen (ed.), Incertonim Auctorum Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos, (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, 7), Gad, 1977, p. 34-35
26 Cf. Guillaume d'Ockham, Summa logicae, ed. Boehner-Gal-Brown, The Franciscan Institute, 1974, p. 588, 23-35; E. Stump, Topics...", p. 295.
172 de Libcra
dependent des "consequences" de la premiere figure du syllogisme, c'est-a- dire des principes did de omni/de nullo fonctionnant pour elle comme des maximes topiques. Bref, le phenomene d'absorption des topiques dans les consequences peut-etre ultimement decrit par le fait que la theorie des consequences absorbe fmalement et la conversion et le syllogisme27.
Cette evolution generate qu'il n'est pas question de suivre dans le detail de ses distinctions techniques ne nous interesse pas en tant que telle, mais dans les modifications qu'elle apporte a la representation sociale de ce que peut etre un raisonnemcnt. La theorie des consequences n'a de sens que dans la mesure ou il y a une pratique concrete du raisonnement consequentiel, ou elle peut fonctionner comme une technologic de 1'imaginaire, une methode de manipulation du non-realise, du non-empirique, ou elle permet de trailer des relations entre propositions n'ayant plus de lien direct avec le monde de 1'intuition immediate, ni avec les contraintes de Pontologie.
Le benefice le plus immediat de la theorie des consequences est qu'elle habitue le savant du XI Ve siecle a trailer les sequences d'arguments deconcertants comme des enthymemes, a decouvrir une possibilite permancnte de validation du non-empirique dans le recours a des premisses ou a des regies additionnelles.
Encore faut-il noter le caractere tout a fait particulier de ce type de validation. Le sens commun ne s'en satisferait pas, non plus probablement qu'une mentalite strictement aristotclicienne. Pourtant, il me semble qu'au XIVe siecle, le philosophe de la nature, et pour une large part le theologien, s'en satisfont pleinement et qu'ils ne demandent rien d'autre a Voutil logique. C'est done, je pense, a bon droit que Ton peut considerer le dcveloppement de la theorie des consequences comme un vecteur epistemique, psychologique, en meme temps qu'epistemologique au sens strict de la science de la nature. C'cst en ce sens que cet episode hyper-technique de 1'histoirc de la logique formelle peut etre considere comme un nouveau factcur intellectuel, et qu'il trouve sa place dans une dynamique particuliere de la vie sociale, dans un changement typique de mentalites.
27 Cf. Albert de Saxe, Penitilis logica 1522, fol. 26ra s. Sur ('interpretation particuliere du did de omni et de nullo chez Albert de Saxe, cf. A. Maieru, "Logique et theologie trinitaire dans le moyen-age tardif: deux solutions en presence", in: The Editing of Theological and Philosophical Texts from the Middle Ages, Acts of the Conference Arranged by the Department of Classical Languages, Unn'ersity of Stockholm, 29-31 August 1984, M. Asztalos (ed.), (Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis. Studia Latina Stockholmiensia, XXX), Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell International, 1986, p. 186 et 194.
Le developpement de nouveaiix instruments conceptuels 173
2. Les jeiix d'obligations el leur application a des questions scientifiques
L'histoire dcs origincs du genre litteraire et de la pratique scolaire des obligationes est encore mal connue28. Une chose est certaine: 1'extraordinaire fccondite du XIVc siecle en ce domaine. En temoignent plusieurs editions de textes, notamment de Richard Lavenham, de Robert Fland et de Roger Swineshead, dues a P. V. Spade29. Cependant, il n'y a pas de consensus des historiens sur Pobjet et la fonction meme des Obligationes: certains auteurs, comme A. Perreiah, y voient une methode scolaire d'examen destinee a tester in vivo les aptitudes d'un etudiant a la logique30; d'autres, comme Spade, une esquisse medievale de la logique des contrefactuels31.
Dans ces conditions, en quoi les Obligationes regardent-elles 1'historien de \aphilosophia naturalist En quoi jouent-elles un role dans la mise en place du complexe forme par les nouveaux langages analytiques, le raisonnement de potentia Dei absoluta et la methode secundum imaginationeml
En ce qu'elles s'inscrivent dans le mouvement general de la valorisation des relations topiqucs; en ce qu'elles communiquent avec le processus d'absorption des topiques dans les consequences, puisque, comme 1'ecrit E. Stump, il s'agit d'y theoriser les difficultes particulieres que 1'on a pour evaluer certaines consequences du fait meme du contexte disputationnel de
28 Les premiers temoins connus, qui remontent au XIIIe siecle, ont etc edites par L. M. De Rijk dans une serie d'articles: "Some Thirteenth Century Tracts on the Game of Obligation", Vivarium, 12 (1974), p. 94-123; 13 (1975), p. 22-54; 14 (1976), p. 26-49.
29 Cf. P.V. Spade, "Richard Lavenham's Obligationes: edition and comments", Rivista critica di storia delta filosofia, 33 (1978), p. 225-242; "Robert Hand's Obligationes: an edition", Mediaeval studies, 42 (1980), p. 41-60; "Roger Swyneshed's Obligationes: edition and comments", Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen Age, 44 (1977), p. 243-285.
30 Cf. A. Perreiah, "Insolubilia in the Logica parva of Paul of Venice", Medioe\'o, 4 (1978), p. 155.
31 Cf. P.V. Spade, "Three Theories of Obligationes: Burley, Kilvington and Swyneshed on counterfactual reasoning", History and Philosophy of Logic, 3 (1982), p. 1-32. Sur 1'interpretation des Obligationes, cf. M.A. Brown, The role of the Tractatus de obligationibus in mediaeval logic", Franciscan Studies, 26 (1966), p. 26-35; E. Stump, "Obligations: from the Beginnings to the Early Fourteenth Century", in: The Cambridge History of Later Medie\>al Philosophy, Cambridge, 1982, p. 315-334; P.V. Spade, "Obligations: developments in the fourteenth Century", in: The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, p. 335-341; C.H. Kneepkens, "The Mysterious Buser Again: William Buser of Heusden and the Obligationes Tract Ob rogatum", in: English Logic in Italy...., p. 147-166; E. J. Ashworth, "English Obligationes Texts after Roger Swyneshed: rllie Tracts beginning Obligatio est quaedam ars", in: The Rise of British Logic. Acts of the 6th European Symposium on Medie\>al Logic and Semantics. Oxford 19-24 June 1983, P.O. Lewry (ed.), (Papers in Mediaeval Studies, 7), Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1985, p. 309-333.
174 dc Liber a
Icur occurrence-^; enfin, en ce qu'elles constituent une tentative de codification de la dispute.
Qu'est-ce qu'une obligation Pour autant qu'on puisse en juger, un jeu rassemblant deux joueurs ayant chacun un role a tenir : le respondens qui s'"oblige" a maintenir une certaine vue ou une certaine attitude au cours de la dispute, I'opponens qui s'efforce de le contraindre a la redargntio^, en 1'occurrence, a maintenir des contradictoires. II y a differentes sortes d'obligationes. Les especes d'obligalions resultent d'une combinaison entre ce a quoi est oblige le repondant (un acte ou une disposition) et ce que couvre son obligation (un complexe ou un non-complexe).
Prenons un exemple, celui de \apositio, ou le repondant est oblige a une disposition et ou son obligation couvre un complexe, c'est-a-dire une proposition qu'il doit done maintenir comme vraie tout au long de la dispute.
On a d'abord un ca.sus, c'est-a-dire une stipulation concernant la nature de la realite exterieure a la dispute obligationnelle, par exemple: Socrate et Platon sont noirs.
Suit \cpositum ou obligalum, qui, en general, est en discordance avec le casus, par exemple: Socrate est blanc, puis le proposition, et la serie des proposita. Le repondant doit repondre conformement a des regies, etant entcndu qu'a un certain moment 1'opposant lui fournira un proposition auquel il ne pourra pas repondre, car toute rcponse qu'il ferait 1'enfermerait dans une contradiction.
Quelles sont ces regies? Dans la perspective traditionnellc au debut du XIVc siecle, celle de Burleigh, il y a trois regies34:
(1) ce qui suit de Yobligatum et d'une proposition (ou des propositions) accordee(s) ou de 1'oppose (ou des opposes) d'une proposition (ou de propositions) correctemcnt refusee(s), etant connu lei, doit etre accorde.
(2) ce qui est incompatible avec V obligation et une proposition (ou des propositions) accordee(s) ou 1'oppose (ou les opposes) d'une proposition (ou de propositions) correctement refusee(s), etant connu lei, doit etre refuse.
(3) ce qui est irrelevant (impertinent) doit etre accorde, refuse ou mis en doute selon sa qualite epistcmique : si nous savons que c'est vrai, nous
32 Cf. E. Stump, "Obligations...", p. 328.
33 Cf. E. Stump, "Obligations...", p. 316.
34 Nous suivons ici la formulation de E. Stump, "Roger Swyneshed's Theory of Obligations", Medioc\'o, 7(1981), p. 137.
Le developpement de nouveaux instruments conceptuels 175
accordons, si nous savons quc c'est faux, nous refusons, si nous ignorons si c'est vrai ou faux, nous meltons en doute.
Est irrclevante unc proposition a laqucllc ne s'applique ni la regie (1) ni la regie (2).
E. Stump a donne une version Ires convaincante de la fonction des Obligationes au XIVc siecle. Selon elle, il faut distinguer deux phases: celle de Burleigh, celle des Calculatores . Dans 1'etape burleyenne: 1'objet des Obligationes semble rcsider dans "les paradoxes logiques ou semantiques fondes sur une sorte de reflexivite qui ressemble aux paradoxes de la sui- reference ou insolubilia, tout en etant plus faibles dans la mesure ou leur caractere paradoxal depend du contexte disputationnel"35; le contexte disputationnel contribuant, le plus souvent, a la generation d'un paradoxe par 1'utilisation d'indexicaux, les Obligationes portent sur les phenomenes occasionnes par la substitution des indexicaux par leurs referents relativement a la validite generale d'un argument36. Chez les Calculateurs, en revanche, bien que 1'interet pour les insolubles et les indexicaux, persiste, l'"insistance est principalement mise sur la logique epistemique".
En quoi cela nous concerne t-il ici? De prime abord, la logique epistemique n'a pas d'interct pour la science de la nature.
Pourtant, si nous supposons un savoir "naturel" qui se deploie dans la dimension de la dispute, le sophisma, nous voyons qu'une telle forme de production des enonces scientifiques implique la construction d'une theorie des attitudes propositionnelles dans un contexte disputationnel. Or, il est clair que les Obligationes ont non seulement trait a ce probleme, mais qu'elles en constituent, pour ainsi dire, la mise en argument. Dans la mesure ou la scientia natiiralis se fait mediantibus vocibus et, pour une large part, dans le cadre de sophismata calculatoria, on peut done considerer que les Obligationes non seulement constituent une maniere de raisonner epistemiquement par rapport a un univers de discours assume dans une discussion, mais encore ouvrent la voie a une maniere de raisonner imaginairement sur des univers definis en termes de casus et dc positum: en cela elles preparent les sophismata physicalia et le raisonnement secundwn imaginationem.
35 Cf. E. Stump, "Roger Swyneshed's...", p. 172-173.
36 Cf. E. Stump, "Roger Swyneshed's...", p. 173.
176 dc Libera
Cette these peut etre defendue en examinant la maniere meme dont Burleigh et Ockham ont concu certains aspects fondamentaux des Obligationes.
Nous avons insiste dans la section precedente sur 1'importance de la regie decrite comme consequentia Adamitonim: ex impossibili quidlibet. Cette regie est la septieme regie generale des consequences selon Ockham. Or, comme 1'a montre E. Stump, Ockham distingue soigneusement la position d'une proposition impossible et la consequence formee de propositions impossibles37. La consequence Dieu n'est pas trine, done Dieu n 'est pas Dieu est valide, c'est une consequence materielle, fondee sur la regie des Adamiti. En revanche, si dans une obligation on prend comme positum 1'antecedent de cette consequence, le repondant devra refuser le consequent. Cette these est explicitee ou completee par deux decisions que Ton peut qualifier de limitatives a 1'egard de la pratique obligationnelle: (1) on ne peut prendre comme positum n'importe quelle proposition impossible, mais seulement celles qui ne conticnnent pas une contradiction "manifestc"; (2) on ne peut appliquer toutes les regies des consequences dans le cas ou le positum est impossible: notamment on ne peut pas appliquer les cons6quences ut nunc ou matcriellcs38. On trouve quelque chose de comparable chez Burleigh, lorsqu'il rapporte que certains soutiennent qu'on ne peut prendre comme positum qu'une proposition impossible "opinable" (opinabile), ou quand il affirme lui-meme qu'on ne peut prendre qu'un "impossible n'incluant pas formellement d'opposes"39. DC meme, Burleigh refuse 1'utilisation de la regie ex impossibili quidlibet et de necessarium ex quolibet dans une positio impossibilis ct soutient qu'on ne peut y utiliser que des consequences naturelles, c'est-a-dire, on 1'a vu, celles ou le cons6quent est inclus dans 1'antecedent (et ou 1'antecedent ne peut etre vrai sans le consequent)40.
La raison de la reaction conjointe de Burleigh et Ockham est claire: si 1'on derogeait a ces principcs les disputes obligationnelles scraient triviales ou impossibles: le repondant devrait tout accepter comme "sequentiellement relevant" (pertinens sequens) ou tout refuser comme "incompatiblement
37 Cf. E. Stump, "Obligations...", p. 332-333.
38 Cf. E. Stump, "Obligations...", p. 333.
39 Cite par P.V. Spade & E. Stump, "Walter Burley and the Obligationes Attributed to William of Sherwood", History and Philosophy of Logic, 4 (1983), p. 17.
40 Cf. P.V. Spade & E. Stump, "Walter Burley...", p. 18.
Le developpement de nouveaux instruments conceptuels 177
relevant'41. II n'y aurait plus dc dispute. Selon Stump42 la restriction des consequences manipulates dans une positio impossibilis aux seules consequences formelles est done destinee ultimement a en preserver 1'interet philosophique. Reste a s'entendre sur ce qui est "philosophiquement interessant". C'est ici que nous rejoignons la scientia naturalis.
On peut evidemment longuement reflechir sur ce qu'est en soi "un impossible opinable" par rapport a un "impossible inopinable"43. Ockham se contente de dire qu'on peut prendre comme positum toute proposition dont on ne peut tirer une contradiction aux moyens de regies evidentes par soi, per se notae, et de premisses dont aucun intellect ne saurait douter44. Dans son article de la Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, E. Stump suggere que la reflexion sur Vimpossibilis positio est une amorce de logique des contrefactuels appliquee a une "classe restreinte de propositions": Pobjet des disputes obligationnelles ex impossibilis positione serait de voir ce qui est implique si 1'on prend comme vraie une proposition comme Dieu n'existe pas^. Nous y voyons, quant a nous, une autre utilite encore, qui regarde precisement la philosophic naturelle.
Se donner un corps dote d'un degre de chaleur egal a un sur sa premiere moitie, a deux sur le quart suivant, et ainsi de suite, c'est prendre pour positum un impossible: la proposition correspondant a une situation ou la chaleur d'un corps augmente a 1'infmi. De quel type est cet impossible? Nous disons qu'il y a la impossibilite physique, mais y-a-t-il impossibilite logique? Poser cette question, c'est faire intervenir la definition du possible logique comme n'entrainant pas de contradiction, mais aussi, du meme coup le principe sous-tendant la theologie de potentia Dei absoluta, selon lequel Dieu peut faire tout ce qui n'implique pas contradiction, et la definition de la methode de raisonnement secundum imaginationem accordant pour recevable tout cas, distinction ou probleme ne contenant pas de contradiction logique
41 Cf. P.V. Spade & E. Stump, "Walter Burley...", p. 18.
42 Cf. E. Stump, "Obligations...", p. 333.
43 Dans ses Obligationes, Burleigh distingue precisement les deux puisqu'il donne en regie que: "Posito impossibili opinabile, non est concedendum impossibile inopinabile", cf. P.V. Spade & E. Stump, "Walter Burley...", p. 18.
44 Cf. Guillaume d'Ockham, Summa logicae III-3, ch. 42, ed. cit., lignes 24-27, cite par. P.V. Spade & E. Stump, "Walter Burley...", p. 17.
45 Cf. E. Stump, "Obligations...", p. 333-334. Dans "Roger Swyneshed's...", p. 169 sqq., en revanche, E. Stump rejette toute interpretation des Obligationes en termes de logique des contrefactuels.
178 dc Libera
formclle. Ce sont la va-t-on dire des choses bien differences. Demandons- nous, pourtant, si la proposition "la chaleur du corps A augmente a 1'infini" implique une contradiction au sens d'Ockham, ou si dans les termes de Burleigh elle "inclut formellemcnt des opposes". Notre impression est qu'il y a la le type meme de ["'impossible opinable".
On peut refuser ces rapprochements. Niera-t-on, pour autant, qu'une pensee du degre de credibilite de 1'impossible prepare non plus seulement psychologiquement mais bien aussi conceptuellcment un raisonnement secundum imaginationeml L'interet de la theorie des Obligationes pour la philosophic naturelle est qu'elle travaille la dimension epistemique du possible et de 1'impossible. Certes, ce n'est pas dans le strict cadre de Yobligatio que Ton fait la science de la nature, fut-elle, scion la belle formule de J. Murdoch, une "science de la nature sans la nature". Pourtant, il ne peut y avoir de science secundum imaginationem sans une logique du possible logique et de 1'impossible credible, et de leur maniement dans la discussion argumentee. De fait, comment appliquer des langages de mesure a ce qui nc fait pas partie du monde actuel, si 1'on nc sait pas ce que c'est que travailler conceptuellement avec 1'impossible?
La partie porteuse de Yobligatio, la reflexion sur la positio impossibilis a etc esquissee au XII le siecle, de meme 1'appareil formel de la theorie des consequences, qui permet dc 1'articuler et d'y legiferer, on peut done dire que lamathesis du XI Vc siecle rcc,oit tout cela en heritage. Notre these est qu'elle transforme cct heritage en le faisant communiquer avec d'autres notions. C'est ce que nous allons examiner dans notre troisieme partie.
3. Du possible reel au possible logique: theorie modale, theologie de la puissance absolue et raisonnement imaginaire
La place prise par les concepts modaux et la theorie logique des modalites dans la constitution de la scientia naturalis du XIVc siecle peut etre envisagee d'une multitude points dc vue. Pour 1'historien des sciences, cela veut dire que 1'impact de la theorie des modalites sur la philosophic naturelle se situe aux points de convergence ou de divergence de trois ensembles bien definis: la theorie de \apotentia Dei absoluta et de lapotentia Dei ordinata\ la distinction entre possibilites logiques et possibilites naturelles; la distinction entre necessites naturelles et necessites absolues. C'est ce redoutable entrecroisement qui preside a la caracterisation de Inexperience de pensee"
Le developpemcnt dc nouveaux instalments conceptuels 179
du physicicn medieval. Dire, avec J. Murdoch, que de potentia Dei absoluta, le savant medieval peut "considerer de maniere licite, secundum imaginationem, toutes les possibilites logiques", avec pour seule limitation le principe de contradiction46, c'est s'obliger a trailer d'une maniere aussi synthetique que possible ces trois domaines de problemes, a en scruter les affmites conceptuelles tout en en marquant les continuites et les discontinues historiques effectives. Ce geste en implique d'autres: prendrc, sur ce terrain precis, la mesure de 1'effet des condamnations de 1277 un theme vigoureusement debattu depuis Duhem, notamment chez A. Koyre, et plus pres de nous chez E. Grant47; faire toute sa place a la discussion de la conception dite "statistique" de la modalite de Boece a Thomas d'Aquin et, correlativement, a la nouvelle conception de la modalite defendue par Duns Scot en des termes evoquant la theorie dite des "mondes possibles"48.
Ne pouvant developper en detail chacune de ces questions, nous nous centrerons sur les correlations conceptuelles, laissant de cote le probleme de la signification historique des condamnations de 1277.
La distinction de la potentia Dei absoluta et de la potentia Dei ordinata est sans aucun doute la piece centrale du dispositif conceptuel de la science de la nature. Sa signification n'en est pas moins problcmatique49. C'est que
46 Cf. J. Murdoch, "Philosophy and the Enterprise of Science", p. 68.
47 Cf. E. Grant, "The Condemnation of 1277, God's Absolute Power and Physical Thought in the Late Middle Ages", Viator, 10 (1979), p. 211-244.
48 Sur la theorie statistique des modalites, cf. J. Hintikka, "Gaps in the Great Chain of Being: An Exercise in the Methodology of the History of Ideas", in: Reforging the Great Chain of Being. Studies of the History of Modal Theories, (Synthese Historical Library, 21), S. Knuuttila (ed.), Dordrecht: Reidel, 1981, p. 1-17; "Aristotle on the Realization of Possibilities in Time", ibid., p. 57-72; S. Knuuttila, "The Statistical Interpretation of Modality in Averroes and Thomas Aquinas", Ajatus, 37 (1978), p. 79-98; "Duns Scotus' Criticism of the "Statistical" Interpretation of Modality", in: Sprache wui Erkenntnis im Mittelalter. Acts of the Sixth International Congress of Medical Philosophy, Bonn, 29 August-3 September 1977, (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 13/1), 1981, Berlin-New York: 'De Gruytcr, 1981, p. 441-450; "Time and Modality in Scholasticism", in: Reforging the Great Chain..., p. 163-257;
49 Sur cette distinction, cf. P. Vignaux, "Nominalisme", in: Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, XI-1, Paris: Beauchesne, 1930, col. 763-769; Nominalisme au XIV? siecle, Paris, 1948, p. 22-24; II. A. Oberman, The Honest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism, Grand Rapids (Michigan), ^1961; W. J. Courtenay, "Covenant and Causality in Pierre d'Ailly", Speculum, 46 (1971), p. 94-119; "The King and the Leaden Coin: the Economic Background of the "Sine qua Non" Causality", Traditio, 28 (1972), p. 185-209; "John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on Whether God can Undo the Past", Recherches dc Theologie Ancienne et Medifralc, 39 (1972), p. 224-256; 40 (1973), p. 147-174; "The Dialectic of Omnipotence in the High and Late Middle Ages", in: Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Mcdiae\<al Philosophy, T. Rudavsky (ed.), Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985, p. 243-270; repris dans Covenant and Causality in Mcdie\<al Thought, Londres, 1984; J. Marrone, "The Absolute and Ordained Powers of the Pope: A quodlibetal Question of Henry of Ghent", Mediaeval Studies,
180 de Libera
1'idce meme d'un devcloppcment continu et lineaire de la notion de puissance absolue est aujourd'hui battue en breche. Au minimum, on doit dire qu'il y a deux modeles, deux interpretations divergentes de la distinction, dont les figures paradigmatiques sont, au XlVe siecle, Ockham et Scot. Pour E. Randi, qui a clairement mis en evidence le phenomene, ces divergences sont loin d'etre mineures, puisqu'elles concernent a la fois: (1) la dynamique interne (pour Scot \apotentia absoluta excede en pouvoir \& potentia ordinata, pour Ockham 1'une est "anterieure" a 1'autre); (2) le sujet (pour Scot tout agent per voluntatem et intellectum dispose d'une puissance absolue et d'une puissance ordonnee, pour Ockham la distinction concerne exclusivement Dieu et la Toute-Puissance divine); (3) les manifestations (pour Scot la puissance absolue couvre 1'ensemble des choses possibles de facto aux agents doucs de volonte et d'intellect, pour Ockham "Dieu maintient de iure sa propre puissance absolue, mais de facto a agi, agit et agira de potentia ordinata"); (4) les connotations (pour Scot la distinction est liee "a un vocabulaire et a des concepts cthico-juridiques", pour Ockham, "a 1'analyse logico-philosophique")50.
Etant donnee la divergence de ces modeles, on ne saurait considerer de maniere uniforme la signification du recours a \apotentia Dei absoluta dans la strategic conceptuelle et argumentative du philosophus naturalis du XIVe siecle. Autrement dit: on ne peut, semble-t-il, eviter les questions suivantes: 1'argumentation de potentia Dei absoluta a-t-elle le meme sens ou la meme fonction scion qu'on se trouve en milieu ockhamiste ou en milieu scotiste; peut-on determiner un usage methodologique ou epistemologique de la distinction qui, etant donnee la possible universalite d'un meme modelc argumentatif, permettrait de laisser de cote son interpretation theologique,
35 (1974), p. 7-27; I". Oakley, "Medieval Theories of Natural Law: Ockham and the Significance of Voluntarist Tradition", Natural Law Forum, 6 (1961), p. 65-83; "Christian Theology and the Newtonian Science: The Rise of the Concept of the Laws of Nature", Church History, 30 (1961), p. 445 sqq.\ Omnipotence, Covenant and Order. An Excursion in the History of Ideals from Abaelard to Leibniz, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984; E. Randi, "Potentia Dei conditionata. Una questione di Ugo di saint-Cher sulla onnipotenza divina", Rh'ista di Storia delta Filosofia, 39 (1984), p. 521-536; "La vergine e il papa. Potentia Dei absoluta e plenitude potestatis papale nel XIV sccolo", History of Political Thought, 5 (1984), p. 425-445; L. Bianchi, "Uccelli d'oro e pesci di piombo: Galileo Galilei e la Potentia Dei absoluta", in: Sopra la volta del mondo. Onnipotenza e potenza assoluta di Dio tra medioevo e eta moderna, A. Vettese (ed.), Bergamo: Pierluigi Lubrina Editore, 1986, p. 139-146. Le meme volume contient une Bibliografia essenziale preparee par E. Randi (p. 175-183).
50 Cf. E. Randi, // soprano e I'orologiaio. Due immagini di Dio nel dibattito sulla "potentia absoluta" fra XIII e XIV secolo, (Pubblicazioni della Facolta di Lettere et Filosofia dell'Universita di Milano, CXXI. Sezione a cura del Dipartimento di Filosofia, 11) Firenze: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1987, p. 108.
Le developpement dc nouveaiix instruments conceptuels 181
voire metaphysiquc plus simplement: la distinction potentia
absoluta/potentia ordinata pcut-clle etre consideree comme un "outil methodologique" univcrscl, fonctionnellement independant des significations qui lui echoient en theologic systematique?
Ces questions nous conduisent au probleme de la conception "statistique" de la modalite.
Comme 1'a recemment rappele S. Knuuttila, le probleme metaphysique de 1'inscription d'evenements singuliers contingents dans le cadre, apparemment deterministe, des theologies chretiennes de la Providence et de la "necessite providentielle", est aborde, depuis Bo6ce, a partir d'un ensemble bien circonscrit de paradigmes de la modalite5!.
Nous en retiendrons ici deux: (a) la theorie des "proprietes necessaires des substances" interpreters de maniere temporelle, comme "leur appartenant aussi longtemps qu'elles existent" et decrites en termes d' "actualisation de potentialites" qui "ne peuvent rester irrealisees", en vertu du principe aristotelicien scion lequel "la nature ne fait rien en vain"; (b) la definition parallele des notions modales comme "outils" permettant d'exprimer differentes "frequences temporelles ou generiques": est "n6cessaire", ce qui est toujours le cas (ou est toujours vrai), "impossible", ce qui n'est jamais le cas (ou est toujours faux), "possible", ce qui est quelquefois le cas (ou quelquefois vrai). Ce modele, dit "statistique", a la suite de Hintikka, permet de distinguer necessite simple et necessite conditionnelle: la necessite simple est P"actualite uniforme sans limites temporelles", la necessite conditionnelle, l'"invariabilite sur une periode de temps donnee"52.
Nous ne discuterons pas ici la pertinence generale de cette interpretation^, comme 1'ont fait notamment Jacobi54, Weidemann55 et Van
51 Cf. S. Knuuttila, "Possibility and necessity in Gilbert of Poitiers", in: Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains. Aux origincs de la Logica modemorum. Actes du VIIe Symposium europeen d'histoire de la logique et de la semantique medievales, J. Jolivet & A. de Libera (eds.), (History of Logic, 5), Naples: Bibliopolis, 1987, p. 181 et 185.
52 Selon S. Knuuttila, une interpretation statistique de style boecien peut etre aussi fondee "sur la maniere dont differentes qualifications sont realisees dans les membres d'un groupe de reference": une propriete "instantice dans tous les membres" peut etre appellee necessaire, tandis qu'une propriete qui n'est "instantiee en aucun membre" est impossible, et qu'une propriete "instantiee en quelques membres au moins", est possible.
53 Cf. a ce sujet A. de Libera, "Bulletin d'histoire de la logique medievale", Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, 69 (1985), p. 281-291.
54 Cf. K. Jacobi, "Statements about Events. Modal and Tense Analysis in Medieval Logic", Vh'arium, 21 (1983), p. 85-108.
182 dc Libera
Rijen56, nous n'en retiendrons quc la these centrale, scion laquelle, au moins dans la tradition boecienne, l'"actualisation dans 1'histoire actuclle du monde est plus ou moins explicitement consideree comme le critere d'authenticite d'une possibilitc". De fait, cette these permet de poser le problcme qui oriente une partic essentielle des speculations theologiques du XlVe siecle. D'une formulc: si les notions modales renvoient a des proprietes structurelles ou a des traits caracteristiqucs du monde actuel et dc toutes les entiles qui en font effectivement partie, quelle sera la nature du rapport entre les necessites naturellcs exprimant 1'ordre d'actualisation des proprietes intrinseques des substances et la Toute-Puissance divine, supposee illimitee?
Scion Knuuttila, cc probleme cst claircment formule des le Xlle siecle chez Gilbert de Poitiers, quand il rappelle que la sapientia hums mundi, autremcnt dit: la Philosophic, opere avec unc notion de la neccssite "dcrivee des rcgularites naturellcs considcrees comme immuables - necessitas consuetudini accomodata" -, et que "certains au nom de cctte neccssite veulent rcstrcindre la Toutc-Puissancc divine".
Dans cctte perspective, la reponse apportce par Gilbert cst unc anticipation des discussions ct de certains des choix thcoriques du XIVc siecle: la philosophic doit ctre corrigce par la thcologie, tout particulicrcmcnt la conception scion laquelle sont nccessaires "les etats de choscs qui sont toujours actucls", que ce soil simpliciter ou seulcment "sous certaines conditions". La "prevalence" de tel ou tcl invariant dans le monde actuel est conditionnce par la volonte divine. Les "necessites naturellcs", autremcnt dit les "rcgularites" inscritcs dans le plan divin effectivement actualise sont et restent en elles-memes "theologiquement contingentcs", d'une part, "parce qu'il n'est pas necessaire quc quoi que ce soil existe", d'autre part, parce qu'il n'est pas "evident a priori que les choscs qui existent soient comprises dans les autrcs programmes providenticls que Dicu aurait pu realiscr" a la place de cclui qu'il a effectivement actualise57.
Cette conception dc la contingence theologique, ou mieux thconomiquc, des necessites naturellcs, ne signifie pas pour autant qu'il n'y a pas de "limitation logique a la toute puissance divine". II y a des necessites
55 cf. II. Wcidcmann, "Zur Scmantik dcr Modalbegriffe bei Peter Abelard", Mcdioe\'o, 1 (1981), p. 1-40.
56 Cf. J. Van Rijen, The Principle of Plenitude, the de omni-per se Distinction and the Development of Modal Theory", Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophic, 66 (1984), p. 61-88.
57 Cf. S. Knuuttila, "Possibility and necessity...", p. 195, d'apres Gilbert dc Poitiers, DTrin I, ed. Haring, p. 164, 34-41; CEut, ed. Haring, p. 322, 39^9.
Le developpement de nouveaux instruments conceptuels 183
conceptuelles dont la validite n'est pas relative^. "La verite dc ccs principcs necessaires, fondee sur Ics lois de Pidentite et de la contradiction est independante du vouloir divin". Autrement dit, Gilbert de Poitiers formule a sa maniere la distinction, supposee typique du XlVe siecle, entre necessites logiques et necessites reelles ou physiques^.
Mieux encore, Gilbert anticipe Duns Scot, en proposant une formulation precoce de la theorie scion laquelle "la signification des notions modales ne peut etre epelee qu'en considerant simultanement differents etats de choses alternatifs". Les lois de la nature "qui sont choisies pour etre en vigueur dans le monde actuel ne sont pas inevitablement comprises dans tous les programmes providentiels alternatifs", elles ne sont done pas absolument necessaires; de meme, "il y a un nombre illimite de possibilia qui ne sont pas compris dans le monde actuel"; en revanche, il y a des "principes absolument necessaires qui ne sont enfreints dans aucun monde possible".
Sans prejuger de 1'exactitude de la reconstruction de la theorie gilbertienne chez Knuuttila, nous pouvons retenir, au moins heuristiquement, un point fondamental pour 1'histoire de la scientia naturalis: dans les theologies de la Providence fondces sur une conception non-statistique de la modalite faisant appel a un concept plus ou moins inchoatif des "mondes possibles" et de la semantique particuliere qui en precede, nous retrouvons 1'opposition entre des necessites naturelles ou reelles qui ne sont que des formes de regularites radicalement contingentes, suspendues a la Toute- Puissance divine, et des necessites logiques, dont le principe de contradiction est la figure eminente, et peut-etre unique, qui, semble-t-il s'imposent a Dieu lui-meme.
Quelles sont les consequences de cette observation pour 1'historien de la philosophia naturalist II peut se demander si la nouvelle definition intensionnelle du possible est compatible avec la delimitation traditionnelle de la puissance absolue et de la puissance ordonnee. II peut ensuite tenter de mettre en relation cctte definition synchronique avec Phypothese, solidement etayee, d'une divergence entre le modele scotiste et le modele ockhamiste de la potentia absoluta pour voir quelles en sont les consequences sur la notion meme de legalite naturelle. Enfin, il doit probablement se demander (a) si le modele scotiste de la puissance absolue ne retentit pas sur la conception que
58 Cf. CEut. p. 310, 56-63; 318, 34-36; 337, 95-338, 2; 353, 41-42; cites par S. Knuuttila, "Possibility and necessity...", p. 194.
59 Cf. S. Knuuttila, "Possibility and necessity...", p. 194.
184 dc Libera
Ton peut se faire de l'"impossible opinable", ct (b) si la notion d'imaginatio est rcdevable a la notion scotiste dc programmes providentiels altcrnatifs, a sa notion de potentia absoluta de facto, aux deux a la fois ou a aucune des deux.
De fait, si Pimpossibilite d'une realisation simultanee d'etats contradictoires est une maniere legitime d'exprimer le contenu du principe de contradiction au niveau de la nature, il est clair que les notions d'impossible opinable et d'impossible inopinable ne peuvent avoir le meme statut epistemologique scion que le possible est ou non defini par rapport a la necessite d'une actualisation a un moment donne de 1'histoire du monde actuel ou bicn defini dans le royaume des contrefactuels entendus comme ce qui tout en n'etant pas actuellement le cas dans le monde actuel aurait pu, dans une histoire alternative, y trouvcr place, et trouve effectivement place dans un nombre indetermine pour rhomme de programmes providentiels alternatifs.
Si 1'on en juge par les travaux recents, il semble que c'est le modele ockhamiste de la potentia absoluta, la notion statistique de la modalite et 1'interpretation commune du principe selon lequel Dcus potest facere quidquid non contradictionem includit qui a servi de cadre predominant a la mise en place de la methode de raisonnement naturel de potentia Dei absoluta. Je ne puis, sur ce point, que renvoyer aux textcs eux-memes, par exemple aux questions du scotiste Hugues de Neuchateau recemment editees par E. Randi^O, ou, a propos de la question traditionnelle Utmm Deus possit facere multitudincm actu infmitam je lis cet axiome qui me paratt bloquer toute interpretation non-standard de la puissance absolue en domaine naturel: Dico quod Deus eodem modo potest res facere quo modo eas intelligit factibiles, non quomodo eas intelligit ex partc sufi\.
Reste le probleme de la demarche secundum imaginationem qui est d'autant plus embarrassant que de potentia Dei absoluta et secundum imaginationem recouvrent ou non le meme ensemble: la sphere du non- contradictoire.
II est evidemment tentant de rapporter 1'imaginaire casuel des Calculators, a une perception naissante de Pinfinite des possibilites divines, des possibles non actualiscs. Le casus imaginaire serait en quelque sorte la lai'cisation d'une infime partie des programmes providentiels alternatifs de la theologie des "mondes possibles".
60 Cf. E. Randi, II soprano e I'orologiaio..., p. 133-172.
61 Cf. E. Randi, // so\rano e I'orologiaio..., p. 156, 158-160.
Le developpement de nouvcaiix instruments conceptuels 185
L'histoire dcs casus fait partic de 1'histoire du genre litteraire et pedagogique des sophismata. Cette histoire a commence au XIIc siecle sans rapport structurel a la problematique de la modalite. On peut done, dans un premier moment, etre tcnte d'admettre que la marche constante du casus vers Pimpossible physique a etc au XIVe siecle stimulee par le modele des "mondes possibles" voire meme par le modele scotiste de la potentia absoluta comme puissance de facto. Cependant, on pourrait aussi bien admettre qu'elle a ete non moins stimulee par la conception ockhamiste de la puissance absolue et de la puissance ordinaire, ou encore qu'elle est le fruit normal de ce que J. Murdoch a appele la "rule-testing activity".
II nous semble, quant a nous, vraisemblable de soutenir que 1'imaginaire casuel est une donnee transversale, qui n'est liee a aucune ontologie, semantique ou metaphysique particuliere, et que la divergence des modeles ethico-juridique ou logico-philosophique de la puissance n'y joue a 1'origine aucun role fondateur.
Cependant, dans la mesure ou Pimaginable scientifique recouvre la classe du possible logique et ou le possible logique peut recevoir deux interpretations, 1'une extensionnelle et diachronique, 1'autre intensionnelle et synchronique, nous concedons que la question reste ouverte de savoir: (a) si cette divergence a une signification pour le philosophe naturel, et (b) quel modele a joue un role effectif dans le developpement de la scientia naturalis.
Pour 1'heure, il semble que ce soit la definition burleyenne du possible comme n'incluant pas de contradiction formelle qui ait joue un role significatif.
Ceci, toutefois, ne clot pas Penquete. Qu'adviendrait-il, en effet, si nous constations que le champ de Pimaginable identifie a tout ce qui n'implique pas contradiction, autrement dit au domaine du possible de potentia Dei absoluta, au sens logico-philosophique du terme, n'epuisait pas le champ du licitement assumable par le philosophe calculateur? Autrement dit: qu'adviendrait-il si le domaine de Pimaginable n'etait qu'un sous-ensemble de Pargumentable? On aurait, ce qui nous parait etre une caracteristique notable du Calcul, a savoir: Paffirmation d'une possibilite d'argumenter au-dela meme de Pimaginable, gratia disputationis .
Ceci nous amene a notre dernier point.
186 de Libcra
4. Au-dela de I'imaginable: I'univers des Sophismata et la conception d'un argiunentable disputationis gratia
Les sophismata ne sont pas la scule source disponible pour 1'historien de la scientia naturalis du XlVe siccle: les materiaux existent, en nombre surabondant, dans des oeuvres theologiques, comme les Commentaires des Sentences, dont 1'importance philosophique est sans aucun doute plus grande puisque c'est la que se noue le dialogue effectif des disciplines et des doctrines, la que se trouvent les enjeux theoriques, la que se definissent les grandes positiones et la surtout que se situent, sous la pression meme des objets, les principales innovations de portce reellement generale62. De meme, au strict point de vue de la theoric logique et de 1'analyse propositionnelle comme telle, il cxiste toute une gamme de genres litteraires assumant a un niveau theorique plus eleve 1'ensemble des problemes traites dans les sophismata: c'est le cas des monographics De incipit et desinit, De primo et ultimo instantiQ DC maxima ct minimo, De intcnsione et remissione formamm, De proportionibus, De scnsu composito et divisoM, De tribus praedicamenlis, De motu; mais c'est aussi le cas de copicuses portions des Commentaires de la Physique et du De caelo, voire des Sommes de logique elles-memes ou des Commentaires issus de 1'exposition ou de la lecture de monographies devcnues elles-memes standard dans tel ou tel milieu, telle ou telle Universite.
L'importance des sophismata dans le processus que nous avons essaye de decrire est neanmoins decisive65. C'est dans les sophismata que Ton essaye les positions et que 1'on teste les regies ou les propositions generates de mesure, c'est dans les sophismata que Ton pousse litteralement a bout le jeu complexe de ('argumentation de potentia absoluta et du raisonnement secundum imaginationcm, mais surtout, c'est dans les sophismata que s'est formee concretement la mcntalite scientifique ouverte a une pratique des
62 Sur cc point, cf. S. Knuuttila & A. I. Ixhtinen, "Change and Contradiction...", p. 189 sqq.
63 Sur les problemes assumes dans ces traites, cf. N. Kretzmann, "Continuity, Contrariety, Contradiction and Change", in: Infinity and Continuity in Ancient and Medie\*al Thought, N. Kretzmann (cd.), Ithaca-I^ndres: Cornel! University Press, 1982, p. 270-284; P. V. Spade, "Quasi-Aristotelianism", ibid., p. 297-307.
64 Sur ce genre, et son contcnu, cf. N. Kretzmann, "Scnsus compositus, Sensus divisus, and Prepositional Attitudes", Medioe\-o, 1 (1981), p. 195-229.
65 Sur le genre littcraire des Sophismata, cf. N. Kretzmann, "Syncategoremata, Exponibilia, Sophismata", in: The Cambridge History of Later Medie\>al Philosophy, p. 21 1-245.
Lc. developpement dc nouveaux instruments conceptuels
"nouvcaux langagcs" tant dans la scientia naturalis que dans la theologie66. En outre, c'cst dans Ic format du sophisma que sc sont manifesles les cffcts des changcmcnts dc paradigmcs ou dc modeles scicntifiqucs quc nous avons pu observer avcc la resorption des topiques dans les consequences, le developpement des theories de la modalite, et la place croissante prise par les obligationes dans la reflexion sur la connaissance.
L'histoire des sophismata est encore mal connuc et d'une grande complexite dans la mesure ou, plus que tout autre, elle joue au double niveau de la forme litteraire et de la pratique scolaire. On peut neanmoins en esquisser les grandes lignes grace aux travaux ou aux editions de N. Kretzmann, L.M. De Rijk, J. Pinborg67, S. Ebbesen68 et H.A.G. Braakhuis. Originellement, c'est-a-dire des le XIIc siecle, un sophisma est une proposition, ou comme 1'ecrit Kretzmann: "a sentence puzzling in its own right or on the basis of a certain assumption, designed to bring some abstract issue into sharper focus"69. L'analyse et la discussion de sophismata est une donnee constante de la logica modemomm, tous genres litteraircs confondus: on en trouve la trace dans toutes les Sommes de logique du XHIe siecle et dans tous les traites consacres aux proprietes des termes syncatcgorematiques (De syncategorematibus). Parallelement, tout indique que 1'analyse de sophismata a etc d'emblee considered comme un excrcice scolaire indispensable et, de ce fait, developpee comme pratique pedagogique autonome. En temoignent, principalement, les recueils de regies composes aux XIIe et XIIIe sieclcs pour aider, semble-t-il, les mattres et les etudiants a resoudre plus facilcment leurs difficultes specifiques. Ces recueils, initialement modeles sur les Distinctiones theologicae, ont pris la forme de Summae de sophismatibus et distinctionibus puis d'abreges tcls que les Abstractions de Richard de Cornouailles particulieremcnt en faveur a
66 Sur cct aspect de la littcrature sophismatique, cf. J. Murdoch, "From Social into Intellectual Factors: An Aspect of the Unitary Character of I^te Medieval Learning", in: The Cultural Context of Mediwal Learning, J. E. Murdoch & E. D. Sylla (eds.), Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975, p. 303-307; "Scientia mediantibus vocibus...", p. 100-104; "Mathematics and Sophisms in Late Medieval Natural Philosophy", in: Les genres litteraires dans les sources theologiques et philosophiqiies nicdie\'alcs, definition, critique et exploitation. Actes du Colloquc International de I,ouvain-la-Neuve, 25-27 mai 1981, Louvain-la-iNeuve: Publications de 1'Institut d'etudes medicvales (2e serie, vol. 5), 1982, p. 85-100.
67 Cf. J. Pinhorg, "Die Ixigik der Modistae", Studio Mediewistyczne, 16 (1975), p. 39-97; "Radulphus Brito's Sophism on Second Intentions", Vivarium, 13 (1975), p. 119-152.
68 Cf. S. Ebbesen & J. Pinborg, "Studies in the logical Writings Attributed to Boethius de Dacia", Cahiers de 1'Institut du Moyen Age grec et latin, 3 (1970), p. 1-54.
69 Cf. N. Kretzmann, "Socrates is Whiter...", p. 6.
188 dc Libcra
Oxford dans la premiere moitie du XHIe siecle. Les Regiilae solvendi sophismata de Heytcsbury sont les heritieres lointaines de ce genre litteraire. A une epoque que 1'on ne peut encore situer avec precision, la discussion de sophismata s'est organisce a la fois formellement et institutionnellement sur le modele, plus ou moins fidelement respecte, des Quaestiones disputatae. On peut, a partir de la, considerer le sophisma comme une unite discursive autonome, possedant sa structure argumentative propre, refletant une discussion complexe, rassemblant plusieurs intervenants, terminee par la solution d'un Maitre. Les sophismata de Boece de Dacie, avec leur architecture compliquee de probationes, d'improbationes, de solutiones et de responsiones, qu'il s'agisse de la "reponse du Bachelier" ou de la responsio propria Magistri, sont un bon exemple de cette configuration.
On retrouve la meme donne au XI Vc siecle: le sophisma est une dispute effective organisee autour d'une proposition particuliere, deja riche de toute une histoire argumentative. II y a cependant, apparemment, une difference fondamentale: les sophismata du XIIIc siecle n'utilisent ni cas "imaginaire" ni raisonnement sccundiun imaginationcm, ils n'utilisent pas les outils ou les langages mathematiques, et surtout, ils semblent principalement destines a elucider ou a manifester les proprietes des tcrmes syncategorematiques et les phcnomcnes syntactico-semantiques determines par les relations entre categoremes et syncategoremcs a 1'intericur de la proposition discutee. C'est ainsi que meme lorsque le sophisma semble porter sur une question de scicntia naturalis, comme c'est le cas des nombreux sophismata de incipit/dcsinit contenus tant dans les Sommes de logique que dans les traites De syncatcgorematibus du XIIIc siecle, il s'agit toujours de determiner 1'import des proprietes syntactico-semantiques des syncategoremes incipit et desinit plutot que d'utiliser le sophisma comme pretexte a une analyse metalinguistique des problemes ou des paradoxes du continu. Ce changement dans la comprehension de la fonction epistemologique du sophisma exprime 1'evolution d'une conception de la theorie logique centree sur la semantique des termcs (dc proprietatibus tenninoruni) et articulce sur le couple categoreme-syncategorcme, a une utilisation de 1'outil logique fondee sur un "passage au niveau propositionncl" pour explorer secundum imaginationem toutes les possibilites logiqucs d'une situation ou d'un probleme epistemologique, physique, ou epistemique. J. Murdoch a clairement caracterise cette evolution en comparant le traitement de sophismata
Le developpcment de nouveawc instruments conceptuels 189
standard dans 1'unc ct 1'autrc tradition^: c'esl ainsi, par excmplc, que le sophisma neiitrum oculwn habendo, tu poles videre qui servait au XHIe siecle a determiner la fonction de "neuter" comme signe distributif et son effet de composition et de division du sens propositionnel, devient chez Heytesbury un instrument d'analyse de la virtus visus et des minima visibles, ou que Omne animal fuit in archa Noe, naguere consacre aux proprietes syntactico- semantiques de quodlibet est applique au probleme de maximo/minimo, sous une forme qui aurait, sans doute, ravi un humaniste italien: y a-t-il une quantite minimum d'eau "capable" de faire flotter 1'arche ou une quantite maximum incapable d'en assurer la flottaison?
Cela pose, nous voulons souligner un point qui nous parait essentiel: le sophisma est 1'unite de discours ou s'organise Papplication des nouveaux langages et ou se deploie 1'analyse metalinguistique, le sophisma est une methode, mais c'est aussi, et sans doute d'abord, un genre particulier de dispute.
Les sophismata du XlVe siecle se presentent, pour la plupart, comme des "limit-decision sophisms". Ce changement n'est pas un simple changement de contenu, c'est surtout un changement de perspective, ce qui fait que meme lorsqu'on utilise des materiaux traditionnels, on les utilise differcmment. Bref, il y a une maniere "moderne" de trailer les questions les plus classiques.
Albert de Saxe peut nous servir ici de guide et de temoin. Dans ses Sophismata, du moins tels que les transmet le ms. Lot. 16134 de la Bibliotheque Nationale de Paris71, Albert examine 31 sophismes portant sur le probleme de incipit/desinit. Sur ces 31 sophismes, 12 au moins relevent du genre dit des Sophismata physicalia. Selon Albert, ces Sophismata sont "traites par certains modernes"72, mais de maniere peu satisfaisante. II convient done, nous dit-il, "de les trailer de maniere plus penetrante", magis lucide, "pour 1'usage des ecolicrs, afin qu'ils exercent leur propre intelligence", propter utilitatem scolariwn ad exercitum proprii intellectus™ . La finalite
70 Cf. J. Murdoch, "Scicntia mediantibus vocibus...", p. 100-101.
71 Cette version manuscrite est sensihlement differente de la version imprimee a Paris en 1502 (reproduite par Olms, Hildesheim, 1975). Notamment, les sophismata 123 a 133 compris ne figurent pas dans le ms. 16134, qui, a la place, porte (fol. 45ra-vb): Sortes incipit esse albior quam ipsemet incipit esse, Sortes incipiet esse ita albus sicut ipsemet erit, Sortes incipiet esse ita albus sicut Plato erit albus, Sortes erit albior quam Plato erit albus.
71 On notera que le ms. Nat. lat. 16134 contient les Sophismata de Richard Kilvington (fol. 56 sqq.) et de Guillaume de Heytesbury (fol. 81 sqq.).
73 Cf. ms. Nat. lat. 16134, fol. 46va.
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pedagogique clu sophisma determine, scmble-t-il, les choix theoriques d'Albert. Comme dans sa grande Somme de logique, la Perutilis logica, il mentionne divcrscs solutions?-*. Id, toutefois, il abandonne la these "particulariste" de style "ockhamiste" qu'il y avail defendue, et tranche au profit d'une demarche secundum imaginationem, fortement apparentee dans ses resultats a une interpretation caracteristique de Burleigh75. A en croire Albert, Panalyse de type "ockhamiste" a le double inconvenient d'etre inusitee dans la littcrature sophismatique et, ceci expliquant cela, d'etre incapable d'assumer avec la "precision" souhaitee ces "instants indivisibles que Ton imagine dans le temps, meme s'ils n'existent pas dans la realite"; au contraire, Panalyse de type "burleyen" est a la fois utilisec dans la litterature sophismatique et compatible avec la demarche "imaginaire": "[...] ista usitata est et secundum illam precisius loqui possumus ymaginando instantia indivisibilia in tempore licet talia in rei veritate non sint76."
Dans sa bricvete meme, ce texte nous permet, je pense, de "fixer" le rapport existant entre la pratique du sophisma et la methode de raisonnement "imaginaire"?? comme caracteristique d'un point de vue "moderne".
La methode secundum imaginationem a pour lieu naturel le sophisma; elle ne consiste pas uniquement a mettre en scene des situations empiriquement non attestees, voire bi/arres, elle permet aussi et surtout d'introduire dans la discussion philosophique un ensemble d'entites qui ne font pas partie du monde reel, un ensemble d'entites fictives ou abstraites. En ccla, ajoute Albert, le logicien s'egale a 1'astrologue qui "imagine une
Sur revolution d'Alhcrt cf. A. dc I.ibera, "fcpositio et probatio per causas veritatis chcx. Albert dc Saxc ct Marsiic d'lnghen", in: Prcuvcs ct raisons a I'Unirersitc dc Paris. Logique, ontologic et theologie au XIV*-' stcclc, /.. Kahj/.a & P. Vignaux (cds.), (Etudes dc Philosophic mcdievale), Paris, 1984, p. 127-147.
Albert avail dc'ja soutcnu ccttc interpretation dans son Kvpositio dcs Conscqucntiae dc Guillaume de Sutton (ou plutot d'un commcntaire de ces Conscqucntiae), ms Nat lot 14715 fol. 77rb-77va.
76 Cf. ms. Nat. lat. 16134, fol. 43va.
II va de soi que nous n'acccptons pas 1'interpretation qu'en donne C. Wilson, William Heytesbury..., p. 41, pour qui I'analysc a laquelle "revient" Albert est "celle du Dc exponibilibus des Summulae logica/cs de Pierre d'lispagne", parce qu'elle est "en accord avec 1'usage commun", presumably among Schoolmen. En effet, le De exponibilibus n'est pas une ocuvre de Pierre d'Espagne (Wilson a, sans doute suivi, sur ce point une indication fautivc dc Petrus Sanitus, dans I'e'dition de Venisc, 1522, fol. 2213 de la Perutilis logica); d'autre part, Pusage" dont il s'agit ici n'cst prcciscment pas 1'usage commun des "Maitrcs" en tant que tels, mais bicn uniquement 1'usage hautemcnt technique predominant dans le genre pedagogique et litteraire des Sophismata.
Le developpement dc nouveaiix instruments conceptuels 191
multitude de ccrclcs dans les cicux" ct au geometre qui "imagine dcs points indivisibles", alors que ni les uns ni les autres n'existent dans la realite.
Reste a indiquer ce qui justifie et finalise cette procedure. A lire Albert, on n'y trouve qu'une raison: 1'utilite pedagogique, propter meliorem et faciliorem traditionem scientianun . Autrement dit: le but de la mcthode n'est pas de decouvrir de nouvelles verites ni meme de tester la validite de regies anciennes, mais purement et simplement de transmettre plus efficacement un savoir constitue en integrant 1'exercice actif de Pintelligence au processus meme de sa transmission. Hors du sophisma pedagogique, la methode n'est plus licite du moins par rapport aux prescriptions de Pontologie.
Cette caracterisation de la fonction epistemologique du sophisma par la pedagogic demande, toutefois, une confirmation. De fait, Albert ne souscrit pas lui-meme a la pratique des modemi; or, ce qui interesse 1'historien des sciences, ce sont precisement les sophismata tels que les traite le groupe de philosophes d'Oxford que 1'on a longtemps appeles les Mertoniens, et que Ton designe maintenant du titre moins specifique de Calculatores d'Oxford.
La question est done la suivante: la pratique oxonienne du sophisma vise-t-elle comme chez Albert de Saxe le seul niveau de 1'exercice de Pintelligence?
L'historiographie des sophismata calculatoria d'Oxford presente en general deux caracteristiques: (a) elle distingue differentes sortes de sophismata en fonction de repartitions disciplinaires: les sophismata grammaticalia, les sophismata logicalia, les sophismata physicalia, (b) elle considere que les sophismata physicalia sont la maniere typiquement "mertonienne" de faire de la physique.
Cette vue traditionnelle a ete recemment refutee par E. Sylla, avec des arguments tires de 1'etude des statuts universitaires d'Oxford78.
On peut resumer ainsi sa these: "Si les savants ulterieurs ont remarque et apprecie 1'oeuvre des calculateurs d'Oxford pour son contenu physique et mathematique, neanmoins dans le contexte academique meme de 1'Oxford du XIVe siecle, 1'oeuvre des Calculateurs n'est pas apparue sous la forme de mathematiques ou de philosophic naturelle reconnues comme telles, mais a 1'interieur de la pratique standard de la dispute Iogique79."
78 Cf. E. Sylla, The Oxford Calculators", in: The Cambridge History of Later Medical Philosophy, p. 540-563.
79 Cf. E. Sylla, "The Oxford Calculators", p. 542.
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Sans entrcr dans Ic detail complique des obligations statutaires de 1'etudiant d'Oxford, on peut tirer des analyses de Sylla un ensemble d'informations qui semblent aller assez dans le sens de 1'hypothese "pedagogique" que nous avons tiree d'Albert de Saxe, et done, par la-meme, singulierement relativiser la portee scientifique du sophisma.
Tout d'abord, le sophisma concerne exclusivement les etudiants avances: apres deux annees d'audition de cours magistraux (lecturae), les aspirants au Baccalaureat es arts, doivent, pendant un an, servir d'opponens puis de respondens dans des disputes de sophismatibus (statut de 1268) ou de parviso (aux alentours de 1350 et en 1409); apres quoi, ils sont admis a repondre de questione puis, ensuite seulement, a "determiner" dans leur ecole ou dans celle d'un autre maitre (durant le Careme). Ils sont alors bacheliers. Le fait fondamental est ici la distinction entre les disputes ordinaires des maitres ou disputes in scolis, completant leurs lectures ordinaires, et determinees par eux, et les disputes destinees aux etudiants non bacheliers, de sophismatibus ou in parviso, c'est-a-dire: a Pexterieur de PecoleSO. Ces disputes "sur le parvis" ont pour seule fonction 1'apprentissage de la logique, comme en temoigne entre autres le fait que les participants sont appcles sophistae. Les rccueils de Sophismata des Calculators sont composes par les maitres pour les etudiants, ils ne retracent pas des debats directs comme les disputes in scolis, ils sont concus comme des "munitions pour les etudiants, sans determination magistrale particuliere"81. Par la meme, le sens de la distinction traditionnelle entre sophismata logicalia et sophismata physicalia, perd toute pertinence institutionnelle, done conceptuelle.
Pour E. Sylla, les sophismata physicalia ne font pas partie de 1'education des etudiants dans le domaine de la philosophic de la nature. Ccci ne veut pas dire qu'il n'y a pas de philosophic naturelle ou de mathematique dans 1'oeuvre des Calculatores: ceci veut dire, plus simplement, que le contexte social de leurs productions intellectuelles est la dispute logique et 1'apprentissage de la logique. Autrement dit: on ne peut sainement evaluer la
80 E. Sylla tend a considcrcr comme synonymes les expressions "disputes de questione" et "disputes in scolis", d'une part, "disputes de sophismatibus" et "disputes in parviso". Noter, toutcfois cette precision, p. 545, n. 12: "One cannot claim an absolute identity between disputations de sophismatibus and disputations in pan'iso. There were certainly disputations de sophismatibus not in pan'iso - for instance in the "determinations" of new bachelors in Lent and probably also in disputations connected with the ordinary lectures on logic. Later there may have been disputations in pan'iso not on logic. I am arguing that in the period of the Oxford Calculators most disputations in pan'iso would have been de sophismatibus and vice versa."
81 Cf. E. Sylla, "The Oxford Calculators", p. 546.
Le developpement de nouveaux instruments conceptuels 193
portee et la signification du sophisma comme instrument de savoir sans distinguer au prealablc disputes ordinaires et disputes in parviso. C'est parce que les disputes de sophismatibus sont, contrairement aux disputes ordinaires, detachees du contexte immediat de la lecture d'un manuel scolaire de logique qu'elles peuvent etre le theatre d'injections massives de materiaux non- logiques d'origine physique ou mathematique.
Le resultat des travaux de Sylla est, il faut 1'avouer, un peu decourageant. Ainsi la partie porteuse de Panalyse propositionnelle et de 1'utilisation des nouveaux langages conceptuels que nous voulions considerer comme la plus novatrice dans la scientia naturalis du XlVe siecle serait un simple exercice scolaire destine aux non-bacheliers pour parfaire leur culture logique... On peut se consoler en songeant aux extraordinaires aptitudes intellectuelles dont devaient faire preuve les etudiants d'Oxford. Mais on peut aussi depasser cette premiere reaction.
Tout d'abord, si les recueils de Sophismata composes par les maitres ont une destination principalement pedagogique, ils servent eventuellement de materiaux pour la confection de traites scientifiques de niveau superieur; d'autre part, on ne peut detacher la science medievale de son contexte culturel: la dispute n'est pas un trait exterieur, secondaire, du mode de production des enonces scientifiques, elle en est 1'un des organes essentiels; enfin, c'est peut-etre parce que son point d'application dans 1'institution universitaire se trouve, comme on dit, in parviso, que la pratique de la disputatio oxonienne de sophismatibus permet une autonomisation de la scientia naturalis par rapport aux donnees contraignantes de la physique et de la cosmologie aristotelicienne - detachement assurement plus difficile a obtenir in scolis a fleur de commentaire. De ce point de vue, on peut sans doute tirer argument de la situation parisienne ou les sophismata, apparemment disputes dans I'ecole, semblent moins permeables aux innovations des calculationes .
En d'autres termes, la reference aux statuts universitaires et a la pratique pedagogique effective de 1'Universite d'Oxford est sans doute le moyen le plus economique d'aborder le phenomene memc de la logicisation du savoir naturel. Nous avons essaye de degager un certain nombre de facteurs conceptuels appelant une transformation des representations collectives de la scientificite, de ses criteres, de ses methodes; cette tentative serait sans objet si Ton ne pouvait la situer dans un cadre social defini. II n'y a pas d'histoire des mentalites, fussent-elles scientifiques, sans une histoire des facteurs sociaux et institutionnels ou elles prennent corps. Les debats sur ce
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quc J. Murdoch ct E. Sylla ont appele Tlie cultural context of medieval learning ne peuvcnt pas ne pas integrer Ic phenomene meme dc 1'Universite, dc son idcntite ou dc sa physionomie propres. L'histoirc dcs statuts universitaircs fait partic dc 1'histoirc de la science medievalc: c'est une expression centralc du "caractere unitaire" de la science dcs scolastiques tardifs.
Ccla pose, il cst clair que 1'histoirc de la science ne saurait non plus ncgliger 1'histoirc dcs genres ou dcs formes litteraires. Si les innovations du XIVe siccle sont, avant tout, anglaises, si, de ce point de vue, clles peuvent etre reconduitcs a 1'organisation oxonicnne de la disputalio logique, lesdites innovations ont largcmcnt cssaime en dehors d'Oxford, et 1'on on rctrouve de multiples traces sur Ic Continent, quellcs qu'y soient les formes particulieres d'cxistencc formcllc ct institutionncllc du genre sophismatique. Les Subtilitates anglicanae sont connues dans le Paris du XIVe siccle, ou ellcs pcnctrent largemcnt 1'univcrs des Commentaires de Sentences**2. Elles sont omniprcscntes dans les XIVe ct XVe siecles italiens.
La situation italicnnc pcut scrvir de rcvclateur de la manicrc dont s'est gencralisec 1'approchc mctalinguistiquc.
On pcut dccrire ccttc generalisation comme 1'intcgration de 1'univcrs theorique ct instrumental du sophisma aux autres formes discursives: ce que J. Murdoch appclle "sophismata -based reasoning" ou "sophismata without announcement"^. Cettc evolution est sans doute prcsupposce par la manicrc dont un Orcsme critique Aristotc, en s'appuyant sur unc ingenieuse combinaison dc la theorie des conscqucntiae et de la theorie dcs possibilites logiques, qu'un recent article d'H. Hugonnard-Rochc a bicn misc en valeur&t. II me scmblc qu'cllc cst aussi particuliercment apparcntc dans la Wirkungsgeschichtc des Rcgulae solvcndi sophismata de Heytesbury en Italic. La en cffet, la distinction cntre 1'approche de re lice a unc ccrtaine interpretation du cadre et du langage aristoteliciens, d'unc part, ct 1'approchc mctalinguistiquc ou dc intcntionibus, d'autre part, tend a se rcsorbcr par Punivcrsalisation dcs instruments d'analyse et des principes argumentatifs du sophisma de style anglais. C'cst ainsi, pour prendre un seul exemplc, que les
82 Cf. J. Murdoch, "Subtilitates Anglicanae in Fourteenth Century Paris: John of Mirecourt and Peter Ceffons", in: Machaut's World. Science and Art in the Fourteenth Century, M. P. Cosman & B. Chandler (eds.), (Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 314), 1978.
83 Cf. J. Murdoch, "From social into intellectual factors...", p. 306.
84 Cf. II. Hugonnard-Roche, "Lx>gique et philosophic naturelle au XIVe siccle: la critique d'Aristote par Nicole Orcsme", s.p.
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traitcs de primo et ultimo instanti d'un Pierre de Mantoue ou d'un Apollinaire Offredi integrent systematiqucment les cas, les regies et les arguments sophismatiques dans une strategic metalinguistique d'ensemble, dont la visee n'est plus pedagogique, au sens ou elle serait liee a un mode particulier d'institution de la dispute, mais scientifique, au sens ou le sophisma est un cadre conccptuel pour la discussion de regies generates d'analyse propositionnelle de problemes classes et ordonnes selon 1'ordre des matieres ou 1'ordre des raisons85. Les regies pour resoudre les sophismata de maximo et minima sont desormais, avant tout, des regies pour trailer le probleme metalinguistique du maximum et du minimum. Le format pedagogique du sophisma devient le format meme de la science comme activite discursive. On peut decrire cette universalisation du format sophismatique en notant quelques-uns de ses traits structurels:
le casus, univers de reference indispensable a Panalyse vericonditionnelle d'une proposition, designe desormais un modele "experimental" de 1'univers explicitement centre sur un petit nombre de variables detachees sur le fond d'un univers total suppose invariant, grace a la clause: ceteris paribus (toutes choses egales par ailleurs). Cette limitation de 1'univers casuel fonctionne comme un principe methodologique. Son application concrete peut, cependant, etre mise en cause au nom de principes scientifiques generaux. II s'agit, par exemple, de montrer que la clause n'est pas effectivement appliquee ou n'est pas reellement applicable dans le casus delimite par un auteur. C'est ainsi qu'Hugues de Sienne objecte au cas (utilise par Pierre de Mantoue) d'un patient soumis uniformement a 1'action d'un principe actif que "toutes choses ne sont pas egales par ailleurs", puisqu'il ne peut y avoir action uniforme d'un agent sur un patient si celui-ci n'est pas aussi uniformement dispose, ce qu'interdit la difference meme de ses parties prochaines et de ses parties eloignees86.
- L'argumentation ex suppositione n'est plus limitee aux seuls cas definissant 1'univers de reference, elle s'etend aussi bien aux propositions theoriques elles-memes. C'est ainsi qu'on peut accepter ou refuser: (a) la validite de certaines theses d'ontologie presupposees dans un corpus, comme "Pidentite du compose suffit a 1'identite de la forme" ou "la grandeur d'une
85 Pour tout cela, cf. A. de Libera, "Apollinaire Offredi critique de Pierre de Mantoue...", p. 266 sqq.
86 Sur ce point, cf. A. de Libera, "Apollinaire Offredi critique de Pierre de Mantoue...", p. 267- 268, note 26. La Quaestio de augmcntatione de Hugues de Sienne (Ugo Benzi) est mentionnee par C. Wilson, Medical Logic..., p. 200, note 58.
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meme forme etendue pout varier selon la plus ou moins grande extension de la matiere"; (b) celle de certaines suppositiones physiques telle que "tous les mouvements uniformes, a egalite de temps et de vitesse, produiront des effets egaux, en quelque categoric que ce soit"; (c) celle des conclusiones qui leur sont associees dans telle ou telle opinio, comme: aliquid successive producendum erit, quod in nullo instanti erit.
- Enfin: la clause ceteris paribus peut etre legitimement appliquee a une suppositio afm de reduire la portee de 1'argument qu'elle supporte.
Ces remarques sur 1'universalisation du format sophismatique nous amenent a notre conclusion.
Le moment de critique interne et d'auto-limitation de 1'imaginaire que comporte 1'universalisation du "sophisrnata -based reasoning" que nous venons de decrire et de souligner n'est pas destine a lever 1'imputation d'"irrealisme" ou de "non-realisme" pesant sur la logicisation de la philosophia naturalis du XlVe siecle. Dans 1'extension de ce type de raisonnement, la toute-puissance de 1'imaginaire ne se heurte pas - enfin! diraient certains - au reel; au contraire, elle vient s'auto-limiter dans le fait meme de son universalisation. La methode "imaginaire" obtient son triomphe veritable au moment oil elle revient sur elle-meme, rcditione completa. Toute analyse peut, en principe, etre rectifiee, parce qu'a tous les niveaux elle procede ex suppositione: dans 1'univers-test qu'elle sc donne, dans les principes et les regies qu'elle applique, dans les conclusions qu'elle tire de ses hypotheses les plus generales.
On comprend pourquoi le probleme de la decouverte des lois de la nature n'est pas ici premier ni meme ultime: c'est que les procedures devaluation, les realites a evaluer et le niveau de pertinence des tests de validation sont compris comme essentiellement conventionnels. Les seules lois qui restent sont celles de la pensee, non pas celles de la pensee en general, mais bicn celles de la pensee aux prises avec elle-meme, de la pensee disputante plutot que ratiocinante.
C'est ce mode de pensee agonistique qu'ont forge les reflexions sur le possible logique et le possible naturel, sur le statut de la positio impossibilis dans les jeux d'obligations, sur 1'impossible opinable et ses differents niveaux de credibilite, sur le fondement topique des raisonnements formels; c'est lui qui se profile dans Pemergence des formes nouvelles qui encadrent et accompagnent la montee de 1'imaginaire - obligationes et consequentiae -, c'est lui qui se cherche dans la redefinition des notions traditionnelles de la
Lc dcveloppement de nouveaux instruments conceptuels 197
puissance absoluc et do la puissance ordinaire. A terme, la pensee agonistique fmit par rcsorbcr jusqu'a 1'imaginaire lui-meme. C'est ce que nous dit Heytesbury dans scs Sophismata: par la grace de la dispute, on peut admettre ce qui n'est pas possible mais imaginable, autrement dit ce qui ne contient pas formellement de contradiction, mais on peut aussi admettre jusqu'a Pimpossible que Ton ne "saurait bien imaginer": Et ideo gratia disputationis potest admilti totus casus tamquam imaginabilis, et non tamquam possibilis [...] Unde breviter quilibet casus qui non claudit contradictionem formaliter sen tale impossibile quod non bene potest imaginari [...], satis potest admitti gratia disputationis^.
C'est ce mode de raisonnement disputationis gratia qui constitue le centre perspective des nouveaux langages et des nouveaux outils conceptuels du XlVe siecle, un mode de pensee que, nous esperons 1'avoir montre, Ton ne saurait ni trouver ni comprendre a 1'etat isole.
Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris
ABSTRACT:
The Development of New Conceptual Tools and Their Use in the Philosophy of Nature in the 14*h Century
The paper deals with the major conceptual tools that have been used in what could be termed the dialectical preparation for the XlVth century natural science and/or natural philosophy. Conceptual tools are not considered as mere logical tools; one assumes that they also include the methods of teaching as well as the literary genres. Thus, the paper builds on the recent work that has been done in the following fields: (1) the development of the topical tradition in the late XIIItn and early XlVth centuries and the conceptual, scientifical import of the so-called "absorption of the Topics into Consequences"; (2) the games of Obligations and the application of ideas related to them to questions of natural science; (3) the development of different models or interpretations for possibility and necessity, both real and logical, the theology of potentia Dei absoluta and the secundum imaginationem reasoning; (4) the social and cultural context of the sophismata-bascd teaching and scientifical inquiring at Oxford, the main stages in the evolution of the genre and its final achievement: the admission as a conceptual tool (disputationis gratia) of counterfactuals that cannot be fully "imagined" (impossibile quod non bene potest imaginari).
87 Sophismata, fol. 161vb-162va, cite par C. Wilson, p. 174, note 65.
ARTHUR STEPHEN MCGRADE
Elhics and Politics as Practical Sciences
The proper place to begin a discussion of medieval Latin ethics and political philosophy in the context of the sciences is with the progressive recovery and development of Aristotelian moral philosophy starting in the 13th century, and that indeed is where I will begin; but if you will permit me a moment of philosophical patriotism beforehand, I should first like to chart the chronologically circuitous course of this talk by reference to the Constitution of the United States. As the bicentennial of the Constitution approaches, we may do well to ponder a remark of Alexander Hamilton's, in one of a series of essays urging his fellow citizens to ratify the new constitution. According to Hamilton, the central question in the post-Revolutionary American political debate was whether mankind are really capable or not of establishing good government "from reflection and choice" or are forever destined to depend for their political institutions on "accident and force".1 As I understand it, the constitution devised by Hamilton and his associates was intended to be not only a product but a continuing embodiment of reflection and choice. Reflection and choice, rather than the implementation of momentary popular impulse, or the preservation of a given social order, or the enforcement of given scientific or religious views, were to be, so to speak, the essence of the American political process. It is this autonomy of reflection and choice and the autonomy of the practical science which reflects on reflection and choice that I want to use to give some focus to an inevitably partial examination of a vast and challenging literature. In the first section of the paper I shall consider briefly the development of an implicitly autonomous scicntia practica which began in the 13th century. My thesis here will be that this development continued well into the 14th century - that Ockham's nominalism in particular represents an intensification of the pursuit of
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, introd. and commentary by Garry Wills (Toronto and New York: Bantam Books, 1982), numbers 1 (p. 2) and 9 (pp. 37-38).
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rationality in morality and moral philosophy, not an authoritarian or positivist rejection of that project. In the remaining sections of the paper I shall be concerned with two sorts of doubts or difficulties regarding this project, two challenges to the autonomy of scientia practica. There are, first, the claims to priority that can be made on behalf of such speculative sciences as natural theology or philosophical anthropology. In my attempt to assess these claims, I shall come back in time to Thomas Aquinas. The autonomy of practical science can be challenged, however, not only by other sciences, but also, and more profoundly, it seems to me, by a wisdom transcending all science. In the final section of the paper I will take up this challenge as it is presented by St. Augustine.
1. The Autonomy and Continuity of Scientia Practica in the 13th and 14th Centuries
The 13th-century beginnings of Latin Aristotelian moral philosophy and the maturation of that enterprise in Thomas Aquinas have been well studied. The work of such scholars as Lottin and Gauthier continues to serve as a basis for research in this rich field, and recent German scholarship is exceptionally illuminating on the very nature of scientia practica. Georg Wieland's Ethica - Scientia practica2 is a guiding light for further investigation of the early Latin commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, and Wolfgang Kluxen has admirably abstracted the principles of a genuinely philosophical ethics from the theological synthesis of St. Thomas.3
It is a special merit of Professor Kluxen's work, if I may say so, that it distinguishes Thomas's philosophical ethics from his moral theology in somewhat the same fashion as Aristotle marks off the objects of mathematics from the objects of natural science - in thought, that is, not in being. There is no suggestion, in other words, that St. Thomas actually did ethics in a purely philosophical way. The idea is, rather, that
2 Georg Wieland, Ethica - Scientia practica: Die Anfange der philosophischen Ethik im 13. Jahrhundert, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge, Band 21 (Miinster: Aschendorff, 1981). And see now Anthony J. Celano, "Peter of Auvergne's Questions on Books I and II of the Ethica Nicomachea: A Study and Critical Edition," Mediaeval Studies, 48 (1986):1-110.
Wolfgang Kluxen, Philosophische Ethik bet Thomas von Aquin, Zweite, erweiterte Auflage (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1980).
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his use of philosophy as a servant of theology required that the servant have some genuine abilities in order to be of use. It is thus not possible to assemble 'the moral science of Thomas Aquinas' by copying out passages here and there from Thomas's writings. Yet by a method of disciplined reflection on Thomas's Ethics commentary and his theological works it is possible to arrive at some definite results as to the character a properly Thomistic and properly philosophical moral science would have.
On this reading of St. Thomas, it is theology which provides the systematic whole in which a philosophical ethics may be embedded. A purely philosophical Thomistic ethics would have access to objectively correct practical first principles. It would be able to develop a coherent account of the moral and intellectual virtues. It would be the scientific counterpart to - although not identical with - a true and truly moral prudence with regard to particular choices in the circumstances in which we find ourselves. It would thus, in the terms of this paper, articulate the essential characteristics of a life of reflection and choice. Yet such an ethics, apart from the theological context of creation and providence and without reference to the ultimate human good of supernatural beatitude, would necessarily have a certain incompleteness or openness to it. Far from being a defect, this openness would be a mark of scientific adequacy. From Thomas's standpoint, Aristotle is a more scientific ethicist in lacking a doctrine of beatitude than were the Averroists in positing a fulfilling union with the Intelligences in the conditions of the present life.
I want to pursue the relationship of Thomistic moral science to theology and other disciplines further in the next section of this paper, but first I would like to persuade you, if I can, that the history of medieval scientia practica is on the whole a continuous one from the 13th well into the 14th century - a continuous history, not in the sense that universally agreed on moral facts were gradually accumulated and added to the conclusions already reached by Aristotle and St. Thomas, but continuous in the sense that philosophically trained thinkers continued to reflect upon the problems of personal and social morality on the assumption that rational analysis and reflection were relevant to such problems. A chief objection to this thesis of a continuous history is that the leading movement in 14th-century philosophy, Ockhamism or nominalism, was opposed to the program of an autonomous rational scientia practica and instead regarded morality as irrational, willful, or
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authoritarian. If this objection is correct, then such discussions of moral science as we find in this period, including Ockham's own quodlibetal affirmation that there indeed is a science of morals, would be contrary to the main intellectual trend of the time, and we should perhaps have to wait for the Thomistic revival of the 16th century for a legitimate continuation of the medieval Aristotelian project.
I will not attempt to depict William of Ockham as a Thomist. I would like to suggest, however, that the effect of Ockham's thought is to maintain - if not, indeed, to clarify and strengthen - the role of rational reflection and choice in human action.
Ockham's persistent emphasis on reason in ethics would be impossible to overlook, I think, were it not for our fascination with his occasional discussions of God's moral omnipotence, God's authority to command us to do things which apart from His command would be utterly irrational. This is not the place to assess the rational status of Ockham's version of divine-command morality.4 For present purposes two points must suffice. First, Ockham himself held that loving God above all else and making God the end of all one's actions did in fact accord with right reason. Second, Ockham was by no means alone in holding that what would otherwise be murder, adultery, or theft - hence irrational and a violation of natural law - is not murder, adultery, or theft if done in obedience to a divine command. As is well known, the same position is taken by St. Thomas.5 Ockham, like Thomas, believed that it was rational to obey divine commands. But he was like St. Thomas also in having much to say about morality apart from such commands.
If we are prepared to recognize it, we find that the demand for, and the analysis of, reflection and choice are recurrent themes in Ockham. Thus, for example,in a substantial question on the connection of the virtues Ockham argues strenuously that an actual exercise of right reason is required for virtuous action and that right reason in some degree must indeed be included in the object willed in a virtuous act.' To
f For this and for much further illumination see Marilyn McCord Adams, The Structure of Ockham's Moral Theory," Franciscan Studies, forthcoming. Also see Lucan Freppert, The Basis of Morality According to William Ockham, (Chigaco: Franciscan Herald Press, 1988).
' Summa Theologiae, lallac, qu. 94, art. 5, obj. 2 and ad 2.
6 Ockham, Prindpium Bibliae sive Quaestio de Connexione Virtutum, Opera Theologica, cura Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: St. Bonaventure University, 1967-1984), 8:393^02.
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act virtuously, it is not enough if I willingly do something which happens to be reasonable and which I remember thinking was reasonable yesterday. I must be actually aware that what I am doing is reasonable, and further, I must do it because it is reasonable. Yet more precisely, the 'right reason' because of which I act may be more or less a matter of principle, hence more or less rational, and this will affect both the grade or level of my virtue in a particular action and also the strength of the connection between my acting well on one occasion, or one sort of occasion, and my acting well on completely different occasions.7 Thus, for example, peace may be the specific right reason for acting courageously on certain occasions, and if I am brave for the sake of peace in those cases I will be acting virtuously, but on Ockham's analysis I will be operating at a higher level of virtue if I practice courage precisely because right reason dictates that in those cases peace is to be sought by being courageous, and my habitual commitment to right reason as a principle will incline me to act as right reason dictates even on occasions when considerations of peace and courage are not directly relevant.
Such passages display both technical precision and moral sensitivity. The same can be said for Ockham's discussions of praxis and of the distinction between practical and speculative science, although here I must restrict myself to the technical aspect alone. Duns Scotus had extended the notion of praxis or behaviour to include volitions as well as overt action. Ockham characteristically tries to go Scotus one better by arguing that operations of the speculative intellect also count as praxes insofar as they are voluntary. This has the consequence, which Ockham is pleased to accept, that logic, grammar, and rhetoric become practical sciences, since these disciplines show us how to construct valid arguments, grammatical expressions, and persuasive speeches - and all of these constructions are praxes? It does not follow, however, that every argument or expression is practical. Every science is a praxis, but not every science is practical. That is, every instance of scientific knowing is a praxis in the sense that it comes about because someone, with some more or less reasonable end in view, pursues it or engages in it. But what one knows in an act of scientific knowing determines whether the knowing is practical. This is to say that practical and speculative sciences
7 Ibid., pp. 335-337 and 347-350. c ' Ockham, Scriptum in Librum Primum Sentcntiarum Ordinatio, Prologus, qu. 10, OTh,
l>280-285 and qu. 11, p. 316.
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are distinguished in accordance with their 'objects', the propositions known in those sciences. If what we are engaged in knowing is a proposition directive of some operation within our power, then our knowledge is practical. If what we are engaged in knowing is not a proposition that either shows us how to perform an operation or directly or indirectly dictates some operation, then, although our knowledge is a praxis, it is not practical.9
Time does not permit discussion of the moral import of these distinctions, but in our day perhaps no argument is needed to show that insight into the fact that we are doing something when we engage in science must indeed have moral import. I might add here that the micro scopic approach to human action exhibited in these passages is also characteristic of Ockham's political writings. In these, too, I would argue, the result is not irrational authoritarianism but a rather sober reasonableness.10 All I would urge for present purposes is that at least in Ockham's case the equation of nominalism with divine or human moral positivism overlooks a great deal ofscientiapractica.
But if this is so - if Ockham does not provide an irrationalist foil to his great 13th-century predecessors - how are we then to describe the moral philosophy produced in the period when he was a leading influence in logic and metaphysics? Ockham is, of course, not the only legitimate orientation point if we would trace the shape of 14th-century moral philosophy, but he is a useful one. In my opinion, there is no simple answer to questions about his influence, as the example of John Buridan will attest.
If what I have said about Ockham is right, then the fact that a metaphysical and logical nominalist like Buridan does not espouse an ethic of unreflective obedience to arbitrary divine commands no longer shows that he was not influenced by Ockham in moral philosophy, but, of
9 Ibid., qu. 11, pp. 311-312 and 315. Besides qq. 10-12 of the prologue to the Ordinatio and the question De Connexione Virtutum, other Ockham texts on the nature of moral science include Opera Theologica, 4:507-522; 6:419^26; 8:143-149 and 281-284; and 9:176-178; on the grades of virtue also see Dialogus, part 1, bk. 6, chap. 77 in J. Trechsel, ed., Opera Plurima (I,yons: 1494-1496; reprint Farnborough, Hants., England: Gregg Press, 1962), 1, fol. 90 -9QVa. Ockham's reduction of final causes to objects loved and willed by conscious agents (Opera Theologica, 8:98-155) must be read with the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable volition (as in the first passage cited in this note) clearly in mind.
' Arthur Stephen McGrade, The Political Thought of William of Ockham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).
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course, neither does this show that he was influenced by him. The problem is further complicated by Buridan's intimation at the beginning of his questions on the Ethics that he will in effect suppress some 'new reasons', 'however plausible they may appear', in favour of older opinions, which have never led him astray.11 Whose reasons and opinions does he mean? Buridan cites St. Thomas frequently and explicitly in this work, always, by my reckoning, in order to agree with him. On some questions, however, he takes positions which Ockham would have found more congenial than St. Thomas, and he concludes his defense of St. Thomas's position on the unity of speculative and practical intellect by invoking Ockham's ra/.or. I have found no sign of Buridan's having read Ockham on the connection of the virtues, even when it would have been helpful for him to have done so. On the other hand, his extensive discussion of the beatific enjoyment of God, which has been cited as a good example of nominalist linguistic analysis, also shows an awareness of the central issues in Ockham's discussion of the same topic - yet Buridan does not resolve the question as Ockham does. He seems rather to back away from Ockham's solution. Could this be a case of following older views even where a later position appears more plausible?
With one striking exception, Buridan's questions on Aristotle's Politics are similarly mixed in relation to Ockham. Buridan is generally clear and analytic, and here and there he takes positions which Ockham would have found especially congenial, but for the most part his political thought is neither markedly pro- nor anti-Ockhamist. The one exception is his fifth question on Book VIII of the Politics, where he asks whether
lohannis Buridani ...Quacstioncs in Decem Libras Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum (Oxford: Hxcudcbat L.L., Impensis Hen. Cripps, Fxl. Forrest, Hen. Curtayne, and loh. Wilmot, 1637), pp. 1-2: "...scntcntiis & auctoritatibus doctorum antiquorum, magis quam novis rationihus, ctiam quantumcunque mihi apparcntibus, adhaerebo. Pluries enim me invcni deccplum rationibus novitcr emergentibus, antiquorum autem sententiis nunquam, specialiter in moralibus." Discussed by lidmond Faral, Jean Buridan, Maltre es Arts de I'Universitc de Paris, Fxtrait de 1'Histoire Litteraire de la France, Tome 28, 2 Partie (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1950), pp. 122-123. See also James J. Walsh, "Nominalism and the Ethics: Some Remarks on Buridan's Commentary" Journal of the History of Philosophy, 4 (1966):1-13. I regret that the following came to my attention too late for consideration in this paper: James J. Walsh, "Buridan on the Connection of the Virtues," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 24 (1986): 453-482; Gerhard Krieger, Der Begriff der praktischen Vcrnunft nach Johannes Buridanus, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge, Band 28 (Miinster: Aschendorff, 1986).
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it is expedient for the whole world to be subject to one secular ruler.12 Here his arguments for and against world monarchy are taken wholesale from Ockham's treatment of the same question, and his resolution of the question substantially overlaps Ockham's. Seven of the eight arguments Buridan advances on the affirmative side are virtually verbatim excerpts from the rather down to earth reasoning deployed by Ockham for this position in the Third Part of his Dialogus^ and all four of Buridan's negative arguments are similarly drawn from Ockham. On neither side of the question, however, does Buridan use all of Ockham's arguments, and he does not develop any of them as fully as Ockham does. Furthermore, although he agrees with Ockham that the expediency of secular world monarchy varies with times and circumstances, he is less willing than Ockham to endorse the legitimacy of Christians and non-Christians participating in the same political community - his position on this matter is drawn from St. Thomas.14
Ockham and Buridan are not the 14th century. I have focussed on them in order to underline the continuity and the variety of philos ophical reflection about reflection and choice in this period. Ockham was no Thomist, but neither was he a moral positivist. Hence Buridan's rational approach to philosophical ethics was by no means inconsistent with his nominalism on speculative questions - but neither were his positions in moral philosophy simple derivations from Ockham. Question by question comparisons suggest a common commitment to the analysis of a wide range of positions and arguments and a basic consensus with regard to moral values, but little in the way of ideological allegiance to a single philosophical analysis or justification of those values. I believe that a wider survey would confirm this account. Vigorous activity is to be found in moral philosophy in the mid-14th-century, and this activity can properly be described as scientia practica. It is not the case that a single abstract system of rational morality was built up, and this may be disappointing if our model for moral science is the second part of the Summa Tlieologiae. As we have seen, however, it can be argued that the systematic character of St. Thomas's moral doctrine owes more to
Johannes Buridan, Quaestiones super Octo Libras Politicomm Aristotelis (Paris: 1513; repr. Frankfurt: Minerva G.M.B.H., 1969).
13 Dckharn, Dialoeus, Part 3, Tract 2, bk. 1, chaps. 1 and 2, Opera Plurima, 1, fols. 230*-232IV
Summa Theologiae, Ilallae, qu. 10, art. 9.
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theological context than philosophical method. At any rate, if we think of science as the rational investigation of inherently problematic questions, then lack of consensus on a single moral-philosophical system may not seem troublesome, and the free pursuit of alternative lines of inquiry will appear as an expression of autonomous scientific reason, not a collapse into relativism. Mid- and late 14th-century anti-Pelagianism can certainly be seen as a reaction against the self-confidence of human recta ratio, yet an appreciation of Aristotelian scicntia practica and an analytical approach to the understanding of human action is to be found even in such doctores gratiae as Gregory of Rimini, Thomas Bradwardine, and John Wyclif, while the unparalleled involvement of philosophically trained thinkers in the political controversies of the day indicates a common assumption that a rational approach to such matters was logically possible and could be practically effective.15 I conclude, therefore, to draw this section of my argument to a close, that the 13th and 14th centuries together constitute a significant unit in the development of an implicitly autonomous scicntia practica.
This conclusion occasions a doubt, however, the first of the two doubts or difficulties I want to consider regarding the autonomy of rational morality. St. Thomas discussed the virtues in the context of a natural theology and philosophical anthropology in which the existence and many of the attributes of God, as well as the subsistent immateri ality, immortality, and metaphysical unity of the human soul, could be scientifically demonstrated. While the conclusions of these demonstrations continued to be held by faith in the 14th century, the demonstrations themselves came under heavy criticism. Does this not suggest that there
Alan Gcwirth's exposition of the Dcfcnsor Pads as containing a substantially coherent political philosophy (Marsilius of Padua and Medical Political Philosophy, New York Columbia University Press, 1951) was greeted with some incredulity by scholars used to thinking of Marsilius's ferocious anti-papalism as an amalgam of any notions that might serve a ruling laicist passion, but it has subsequently been argued that Marsilius actuali/.ed the true secularist potentialities of Aristotle's Politics (Walter Ullmann, I*rinciples of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, I^ondon: Methuen and Co., 1961). Marsilius's opposition to hicrocratic political ideas need not be taken as anti-Christian, but whether medieval peace was defended or in fact attacked by Marsilius, the use of Aristotelian ideas by such thinkers as Ockham and Oresme represents a noteworthy attempt to understand contemporary problems by the application of scientia practica. Maistre Nicole Oresme, Le Livre de Politiques d'Aristote, ed. Albert Douglas Menut, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series, Vol. 60, Part 6 (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1970). Susan M. Babbitt, Orcsme's "Livre de Politiques" and the France of Charles V. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series, Vol. 75, Part 1 (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1985).
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was, after all, a radical interruption in the history of scientia practical If nominalist criticism did not involve a direct attack on the rationality of morality, may it not still be the case that nominalism deprived morality of a necessary metaphysical basis for its rationality by sapping its speculative foundations?
2. Practical Science and Speculative Science
This suggestion fits well with a traditional view of Thomistic natural law as a system of obligations deriving its content from our God-given human nature and having imperative force because of God's will that we live up to the nature He has given us. On this view, which has been found in such leaders of the 16th-century Thomistic revival as Vitoria, Vazquez, and, most mfluentially, Suarez, we might expect that in a period critical of natural theology and philosophical anthropology, there should also be an ultimately corrosive lack of systematic order in moral philosophy, stemming from a lack of metaphysical foundations.
One of the most interesting recent developments in Anglo-American philosophical ethics is the challenge to this view of Thomistic moral philosophy posed by Germain Grisez and John Finnis in their presentation of Thomistic natural law as an ethics of practical reason not resting on speculative principles concerning God or on facts about human nature. Like Professor Kluxcn, Grisez and Finnis place great emphasis on Thomas's appropriation of Aristotle's distinction between practical and speculative reason, but their concern with the Anglo-American Humean philosophical topos of 'is' and 'ought' produces such sharp formulations of this distinction as to make some critics imagine that they have turned St. Thomas into a mere Kantian. What are we make of this debate, which is so directly relevant to the theme of an autonomous scientia practical
16 Germain G. Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason," Natural Law Forum, 10 (1965):168-196. Reprinted in an abridged version in Anthony Kenny, ed., Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976; 1st ed. Doubleday Anchor Books, 1969). John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Clarendon Law Series (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1980, repr. with corrections 1982); criticism of 16th century theories, pp. 42-48 and 54-55. Ralph Mclnerny, The Principles of Natural Law," American Journal of Jurisprudence, 25 (1980): 1-15. John Finnis and Germain Grisez, "The Basic Principles of Natural Law. A Reply to Ralph Mclnerny," American Journal of Jurisprudence, 26 (1981):21-31.
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Enucleating Thomas's conception of practical reason from the theological and anthropological context in which he actually presented it is a delicate operation. Thomistic moral philosophy as St. Thomas presented it is a part not only of a theological synthesis in which every human action is ordered to the attainment of eternal beatitude but also of a metaphysical and natural-scientific synthesis which seems to make a ideologically construed, divinely ordered human nature the inevitable presupposition even for an ethics of this present life. By the time we have reached the second part of the Summa Tfieologiae the conception of the good as fulfillment of inherent potentialities is well entrenched in an overall vision of creation and providence which suggests quite readily that a rational, moral human life consists of satisfactorily performing a naturally and divinely preordained task. Furthermore, in virtue of being promulgated in the Decalogue natural law does in fact have the status of a set of divine commands for St. Thomas. It would seem, then, that there is a more than ample basis for the Suare/.ian interpretation.
And yet the texts appealed to by the revisionists are also there before us in the same Sunimas. The first precept of natural law - 'good is to be done and pursued and evil to be avoided' - really is presented as the first, underived, self-evident principle of practical reason, a governing principle for practical reasoning on a par with the principle of non contradiction in speculative reasoning. To my knowledge, St. Thomas never formally pronounced upon the validity of natural law if, per impossibile, there were no God.17 Yet since he held that the existence of God was not self-evident but must either be demonstrated (and that with difficulty) or else held on faith, it seems clear that - notwithstanding the theological order of his presentation and notwithstanding the 'positive' confirmation of natural law in the Decalogue - Thomas would grant that natural law does in principle have a standing independent of theistic assumptions.
The possibility of a Thomistic scientia practica independent of a determinate view of human nature is considerably less obvious. St. Thomas
Gregory of Rimini towards the middle of the 14th century addressed the matter briefly in explaining why he defined actual sin as voluntarily doing or omitting something 'contra rectam rationem' instead of 'contra rationcm divinam': "Nam, si per impossibile ratio divina sive deus ipse non esset aut ratio ilia esset errans ... adhuc, si quis ageret contra rectam rationem angelicam vel humanam aut aliam aliquam, si qua esset, peccaret," Gregorii Ariminensis OESA Lectura super Primum ct Sccundum Scnten- tiarum, 6, ed. A. Damasus Trapp OSA and Venicio Marcolino (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), p. 235, commenting on Bk. 2, dists. 34-37, qu. 1, art. 2.
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argues at several places that certain ends are naturally conveniens or connaturalis to us and that we have a natural capacity for apprehending those ends. In acquiring the various moral virtues we develop and refine this natural grasp of what is truly agreeable or suitable to us, and it is in this way that practical reason gains a clearer view of the particular goods it is to do and pursue. It seems, then, that a determinate view of human nature is an integral part of Thomistic moral philosophy, not only a background for the historical presentation of that philosophy but an essential foundation for it.
Alan Gewirth, no stranger to medieval philosophy, has recently objected to Thomistic natural law on precisely this ground.18 Gewirth distinguishes here between St. Thomas and Aristotle. Aristotle, unlike St. Thomas, recognized how very difficult it is to reach an adequate definition of a thing's essential nature. Accordingly, Aristotle located the human good in actions and habits approved of by reason, rather than in the fulfillment of natural tendencies and the curbing of unnatural or perverse ones. St. Thomas, on the other hand, reasoned from a view of ideal human nature which is debatable in itself and arbitrarily leaves aside, as unnatural, human tendencies which are morally dubious but arguably innate.
I am not the ideal respondens for St. Thomas to reply to Alan Gewirth as opponens, but I am reluctant to concede that St. Thomas's moral philosophy essentially depends on a problematic view of human nature. To be sure, as a theologian and philosophical anthropologist Thomas holds views about the ontological status and ultimate possibilities of human action which greatly affect his treatment of morality. He does indeed think he knows what human beings at bottom are and what they may finally attain to, and he seeks to determine the significance of what we do in the context of those views. Yet there are passages which show a recognition on St. Thomas's part that from the viewpoint of a moral agent human nature is not a directly given norm for human action. These passages suggest that in the practice of morality and in the philosophical reflection on that practice with which we are concerned this morning, the discovery of our nature might come at a relatively late stage.
In article 1 of question 63 of the Prima Secundae St. Thomas asks whether we have any virtuous habits by nature. Following Aristotle, he
18 Alan Gewirth, "The Ontological Basis of Natural I^w: A Critique and an Alternative," American Journal of Jurisprudence, 29 (1984):95-121.
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holds that, strictly speaking, we do not, but here, too, following Aristotle - he observes that individuals vary considerably in temperament from birth in ways facilitating or impeding the acquisition of various virtues. It seems evident from this discussion (and from lallae, q. 94, a. 4, obj. 3 and ad 3) that we cannot simply read off what is 'natural' in the normative sense from our own individual inclinations, however basic.
More broadly relevant is Thomas's discussion of sensuality in question 91 of the Prima Secundae (art. 6). His problem as a theologian at this point is to understand how a human propensity to behave like irrational animals fits into an overall rational order of things. In this passage he takes it as given that we do in fact have an innate propensity for being strongly attracted by objects or goals which do not accord with our best reflective judgments. While Thomas's description of the radical evil in our empirically encountered human nature does not accord in detail with the nihilism of a Callicles or a Nietzsche, this passage leaves room in principle for as much congenital irrationality in human beings as any opponent of natural law could desire. To be sure, as a Christian theologian St. Thomas has a doctrine of original sin, and thus he can distinguish between a pristine human nature and the condition to which we all find ourselves born, but such a distinction is surely no part of moral philosophy. In any case, just as an individual may come to realize that he or she has irrational innate impulses, so we as a species in history may come to a similar recognition.
Such passages suggest an understanding of connaturality which differs from the understanding of the concept implicit both in the traditional interpretation of natural law and in Gewirth's criticism. St. Thomas does not assume, it seems to me, that we begin our moral deliberations with a direct intuition of our underlying or ideal essential nature, on the basis of which we can assess actions as agreeing or disagreeing with that nature. We do not start out by intuiting what our potentialities and their fulfillments are and then conclude that we ought to do and pursue the latter and avoid 'unfulfilling' results. In order to act rationally, we do indeed need to know what is possible for us, but the judgment that a given possibility is a fulfillment rather than a frustration of our human nature, comes after the judgment that the action is a good one for us to perform. In other words, instead of reading St. Thomas as holding that we apprehend an action or an end as connatural and therefore to-be-pursued, connaturality is better understood
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as a mctacthical concept useful for describing after the fact what goes on when we grasp something as a good, as an end suitable to serve as a starting point for practical reasoning.
St. Thomas is indeed committed to the view that judgments about goods and evils are objectively true or false, and he carries this commitment through even to judgments about those ideal goods which, as Gewirth observes, are highly debatable. But while Thomas might well concede that the dcbatability of a good is a reason for not prescribing it in our legal codes or demanding it as a categorical moral obligation, he would not see this as a basis for dropping it from ethics.19 In summary, then, the doing and pursuing of good is for St. Thomas an inherently valid and rational human project, but one which need not set out from a given speculative framework (contra a traditional view of Thomism) and need not be limited in its rationality to ends which are so closely tied to the necessary conditions for human action itself as to be logically undeniable by any agent at any time.
I conclude, therefore, that the philosophical ethics contained as a potential part within the Thomistic synthesis is separable in principle not only from the supernatural context of Christian revelation but from the contexts of the speculative-scientific disciplines of natural theology and philosophical anthropology. In thus suggesting that the first difficulty about the autonomy of moral science can be met from a Thomistic standpoint, I do not at all mean to advocate indifference to the questions about human nature and ultimate reality discussed in those other disciplines. On the contrary, I would suggest that those questions are more fruitfully posed when the openness or incompleteness of our common moral experience is respected. The truth about God, freedom, and immortality is best pursued when affirmative views on these subjects are neither required as a precondition for moral discourse nor spun out as postulates of a supposedly purely rational morality.
But this brings us to the second and more fundamental difficulty about the autonomy of practical science - a difficulty, indeed, about the autonomy of science in general. If there is not a sufficient basis in Thomas himself for the Suarezian perception of natural law as essentially a matter of comparing possible actions with our known nature and paying heed to the commands of a divine superior, is there some other basis for
19 As Grisez and Finnis emphasize, the scope of Thomistic practical reason is broader than the domain of strict legal or moral obligation.
212 McGradc
such a perception? To answer this question we must, I think, go beyond the bounds of scientia practica to consider a philosophical tradition oriented not around science but towards wisdom.
3. Science and Wisdom
The tradition I refer to is that of St. Augustine. It is clear enough on the level of broad generalities that we have here an alternative to the autonomous scientia practica we have so far considered. Instead of an implicitly autonomous science of practical reason, Augustine champions a wisdom grounded in humility before the eternal source of a rational human nature which is lost to itself just because of its autonomy. Only the contemplation of eternal things is wisdom in this account, and only in the light of such wisdom can we have a science of rightly using temporal things instead of a vain curiosity that inflates and degrades us. The alternatives of pride and humility in relation to God our creator dominate virtually every page of the City of God. Equally important, however, is the alienation from self following the Fall, a derangement of our very nature. The just punishment of rejecting free servitude to God is that we are no longer masters of ourselves.
I should say at once that I am not primarily concerned to argue for a direct, conscious acceptance of this Augustinian framework by Suarc/ and others as a basis for their version of natural law. The situation here is complicated. Although Suare/, for example, refers to Augustine do/ens of times in his discussion of natural law, he does not cite him on the question before us, and he was indeed opposed to sola gratia and predcstinarian theological positions which the protestant reformers derived in part from their reading of Augustine. One could also argue that a readiness to take it as axiomatic that all obligation must be grounded in some sort of relation of superior to inferior has a wholly unphilosophical basis in this period. The disintegration of the western church in the 16th century, combined with the strengthening of national political units, posed the question of political obedience in an especially acute form. In these circumstances, the transformation of Thomistic moral philosophy into a theory of sovereignty and obedience should be no more surprising than the emergence of such secular sovereignty theories as those of Bodin and Hobbes.
Ethics and Politics as Practical Sciences 213
On the other hand, Augustine was increasingly in the air from the mid-14th century onwards, not only residually, as a source of author itative citations to support positions arrived at by other means, but as a resurgent inspiration for personal spiritual quests and, more surprisingly, as W.J. Bouwsma has argued for the Renaissance,20 as an inspiration for positive, constructive efforts in politics. But whatever the situation may be with regard to conscious influence, I would urge that Augustine is our own best way of understanding how these thinkers (or anyone else for that matter) could take so completely for granted a hierarchical ordering of the moral universe which would not have seemed self-evident to St. Thomas and would seem quite problematic to most philosophers today.
As I have argued above, I do not think that this is an appropriate starting point for an Aristotelian practical science. But what does follow for moral science if one begins with Augustine instead of simply reflecting on reflection and choice? What would an Augustinian political science or ethics look like, and how would such a derived political science or ethics comport with the autonomous moral philosophy of Aristotle and his medieval appropriators?
Augustine himself provides us with a formula for answering these questions in the distinction between wisdom and science in the De Trinitate to which I have already alluded. Wisdom, contra Cicero, is not the science of things divine and human but only the contemplation of things divine. Temporal matters are to be dealt with by science - by science instrumentally conceived as knowledge of how to use temporal things in the light of wisdom.21 If we attempt to use this formula to derive Augustinian scientific prescriptions for the use of temporal things, however, the result is at first quite baffling. It would take far longer than the vanishing space of time remaining in this paper to sketch even in outline the major interpretations of Augustine's views on the matters that concern us, but it will be useful to give a brief indication of the
William J. Bouwsma, "The Two Faces of Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought" in Hciko A. Oberman, ed., with Thomas A. Brady, Jr., Itinerarium Italicum: The Profile of the Italian Renaissance in the Mirror of its European Transformation (Leiden: E.J. Brill. 1975), pp. 3-60; pp. 12 and 51-52. While Stoicism theoretically called for dutiful involvement in a public order which, theoretically, mirrored a rational cosmic order, it in fact encouraged contemplative withdrawal. By contrast, while Augustinianism recognized the patent unintelligibility (to us) and the pervasive sinfulness of human affairs, its profoundly social orientation demanded caring yet pragmatic attention to secular needs and institutions.
21 De Trinitate, 12.14.22, PL 42:1009; 12.15.25, PL 42:1012; 14.1.3, PL 42:1037.
214 McGradc
range of interpretations. I hope you will forgive the kaleidoscopic character of the following recital. It does not do justice cither to Augustine or to his interpreters, but it is important, I think, that we have clearly in mind the diversity of implications for practice which Augustine has seemed to offer.
The thirteen relatively recent assessments which follow may serve as a sample of that diversity. I present these interpretations in the order of constructive practical import which they find in Augustine, beginning with readings in which he is found to have had quite considerable negative effects on practice and concluding with interpretations in which he provides inspiration for more or less radical efforts to transform the world for the better. In the middle are studies which propose in essence that Augustine correctly perceived the practical hopelessness of morally legitimate constructive action in the conditions of this life.
To begin at the negative end of the range, then, Augustine's contribution to the disgraceful history of Christian anti-scmitism, while not as flagrant as that of John Chrysostom, is nonetheless substantial in Rosemary Ruether's account,22 and Elaine Pagels finds Augustine's doctrine of original sin to be in sharp and unfortunate contrast with earlier patristic tradition (including especially John Chrysostom), in which human autonomy is affirmed rather than diminished.23 For Hans Blumenberg this same doctrine of original sin is a mistaken solution to the problem of evil, a solution from which humanity has freed itself only in the modern age through the assertion of theoretical curiosity.24 For Pagels the Augustinian move from autonomy to obedience as a spiritual ideal is part of an accommodation of the Church to its newfound legal domicile in the Roman Empire. The break with an earlier anti-statist tradition of the north African church which this accommodation involved is signalled by Augustine's rejection and eventual persecution of the
22
Rosemary Radford Ructhcr, Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti- Semitism (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), pp. 173-174.
Elaine Pagels, The Politics of Paradise: Augustine's Exegesis of Genesis 1-3 versus that of John Chrysostom," Hazard Theological Rc\'iew, 78 (1985):67-99.
Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modem Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, 1983), pp. 127-136.
Ethics and Politics as Practical Sciences 215
Donatist church, an episode on which W.H.C. Frend has focussed attention.25
Instead of being negative about Augustine, however, others are inclined to accept Augustine's own negativity about the present life, this life, if one can call it that, which testifies with its evils that we mortals have been damned from our origin.26 Augustine takes for granted as an ordinary part of such a life the necessity of judicial torture.27 His bleak view of what is demanded of those who would maintain some degree of order in public life suits him to be a mediator between Christ and Machiavelli, as in Giuseppe Prezzolini's Cristo e/o Machiavelli^ Or if the City of God provides no positive support for the darker side of earthly politics, it will still offer but little encouragement for practical reason in this life if its vision of human and angelic community in the enjoyment of God is interpreted purely eschatologically, as by Wilhelm Kamlah.29
For such scholars as Joseph Ratzinger and R.A. Markus, the concepts of the sacramental or of the Augustinian signum offer a way of recognizing the holiness of the Church and its mission in this world, while avoiding the ideological delusion of secular utopianism.30 A less ecclesial but similarly positive inspiration is found by Eticnne Gilson in Les metamorphoses de la Cite de Dieu, a work in which Augustine appears as the most relevant of all political thinkers for a world inevitably
For a survey of research following Frend's The Donatist Church (Oxford, 1952), see R.A. Markus, "Christianity and Dissent in Roman North Africa: Changing Perspectives in Recent Work" in Derek Baker, ed., Studies in Church History, 9, Schmism, Heresy and Religious Protest (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 21-36, repr. as selection 8 in R.A. Markus, From Augustine to Gregory the Great: History and Christianity in Late Antiquity (London: Variorum Reprints, 1983).
26 De Civitate Dei, Bk. 22, chap. 22.
27 De Ch'itate Dei, Bk. 19, chap. 6.
Oft
Giuseppe Prezzolini, Cristo e/o Machiavelli (Milan: Rusconi Editore, 1971).
29 Wilhelm Kamlah, Christentum u. Selbstbchauptung, historische u. philosophise he Untersuchungen zur Entstehung dcs Christentums u. zu Augustins 'Burgcrschaft Cones', Zweite, neubearbeitcte und erganzte Auflage (Stuttgart and Cologne: W. Kohlhammcr, 1951), p. 339.
Joseph Ratzinger, Die Einheit der Nationen: Eine Vision der Kirchenvdter (Salzburg-Miinchen: Anton Pustet, 1971). Ratzinger distinguishes his sacramental view from Kamlah's eschatological interpretation in "Herkunft und Sinn der Civitas-Lchre Augustins," Augustinus Magister (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, [1954?]), 2:965-979. R.A. Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 154-186.
216 McGrade
destined to become a global community.31 The discovery in Augustine of concrete positive implications for culture or civilization in the present life sometimes emerges from a study of his radical break with classical culture, as in the work of Henri-Irenee Marrou, who found that Augustine was the first among the church fathers to recognize the full meaning of the decadence of his time. Accordingly, he devoted himself to the total reconstruction of culture on a new plane. A more politically oriented yet philosophically and theologically acute presentation of the same combination of clear perception of morbidity in the classical empire and the projection of a new order of human relationships based on adherence to God is to be found in C.N. Cochrane's Christianity and Classical Culture.^ But one need not immerse oneself in the decline of Rome to find positive significance for our time in St. Augustine. Francesco Cavalla has argued persuasively that the hollowness and inauthenticity of modern life call directly for the recovery of an interiority, dialogue, and genuine intersubjectivity of truth and value to which Augustine preeminently points the way.34 Finally, Augustine has been pressed into the service of liberation theology by those who take his account of what human life might be like at its best as directly relevant to their revolutionary struggle against the imperialism of our time.
It seems that, hermeneutically speaking, Augustine brings not peace but a sword. Given this range of interpretations, how shall we understand him, and what shall we say about the challenge posed by Augustinian wisdom to the autonomy of scicntia practical In the climate of modern philosophy, there is some temptation to reject any whole-hearted and single-minded orientation to the transcendent, a temptation to argue that Augustinian contemplation of eternal things leads not to a consistent
Etiennc Gilson, Lex metamorphoses de la Cite de Dicu (Ix)uvain: Publications universitaires de Ix>uvain/ Paris: Lihraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1952).
Henri-Irence Marrou, Saint Augustin ct la fin de la culture antique (Paris: H. DC Boccard, 1937), p. 356.
1 Charles Norris Cochrane, Christianity* and Classical Culture: A Study of Thought and Action from Augustus to Augustine, rev. ed. (Ixmdon-New York-Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 500-501.
1 Francesco Cavalla, Scientia, Sapientia ed Esperienza Sociale, \:La ricerca della Verita come fondamento del pcnsiero giuridico-politico di S. Agostino, 2:Le due citta di S. Agostino: societd, diritto e giustizia (Padua: Cedam, 1974).
Richard Shaull, Heralds of a New Reformation: the Poor of North and South America (Maryknoll, New York: Orhis Books, 1985), p. 66.
Ethics and Politics as Practical Sciences 217
moral science but to an unlimited clash of moral and in some cases immoral opinions. That is not the conclusion I would draw.36
Although it will not provide an easy solution to our problem about the autonomy of practical reason, I believe that it will help us to live with that problem and come to grips better with Augustine, if we take seriously both parts of the philosophical identifying label most frequently applied to him: Christian Platonist. The contrasting depictions of the human condition, which are a major source of the divergences in inter preting his writings, stem from a Platonic vision of pure Forms, relative to which historical reality is itself a mass of contradictions. In writing de fmibus bononim et malonim on the limits of goods and evils Augustine confronts a range of ideal human possibilities for good or evil which goes beyond the bounds of ordinary experience. At the same time his faith in the Incarnation makes him see these eternal possibilities with a vividness and a sense of direct relevance to present experience which sharply separates him from his Platonic and Neoplatonic predecessors. Above all, God's personal call for total devotion gives every action and every human relationship a potentially infinite weight in relation to eternity.
If this brief reflection on Augustine's character as a Christian Platonist helps us to understand somewhat better the range of plausible interpretations of his writings, it does not provide an easily negotiable relationship between Augustinian wisdom and a single, objective, reasonable moral science. Augustine has been the inspiration for a whole host of more or less fully developed ethical and political theories, but no one specific interpretation of his thought can reasonably claim to be the uniquely derivable moral-scientific consequence of Augustinian contempla tion, for each such claimant is subject to objections from all the others. Yet neither can we put all the interpretations together: any 'balanced' or 'moderate' interpretation of St. Augustine is false on the face of it, for Augustine is nothing if not radical. He is thus even more challenging than Plato, for he is like Plato in eluding specific interpretation but more
36 The extraordinary overall unity of the De Civitate Dei is shown in Jean-Claude Guy's lucid study, Unite et structure logique de la "Cite de Dieu" de saint Augustin (Paris: Etudes Augustinienncs, 1961). For the interlocking of Augustine's terminology in the crucial discussion of peace in Book 19 with that of his more technical works, see Joachim I^ufs, Der Friedensgcdanke bet Augustinus: Untersuchungen zum XIX. Buch des Werkes De Civitate Dei, Hermes, Zeitschrift fur klassische Philologie, Einzelschriften- Heft 27 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1973).
218 McGrade
insistent than Plato that we make the attempt to interpret him nonethe less.
So far as the attempt to state a systematic relation of Augustinian wisdom to scientia practica is concerned, we are, I think, at an impasse. The contemplation of eternal things and the love of God do not relieve us of the responsibility of thinking for ourselves and acting accordingly. In this sense, practical reason, whatever the personal inspiration of those who engage in it, must proceed on its own principles. There is no rational alternative. Hence, to the extent 16th-century Thomism did indeed regard natural law itself as something received from above in the manner of a command from a superior, I believe it was in error. Yet this does not at all invalidate Augustine's account of the circumstances or basic conditions in which we do in fact exist, live, and think. Augustine holds that we cannot in fact think for ourselves or rule ourselves except by the grace of God. Acknowledgement of this situation is the beginning of wisdom. Rejection of whatever awareness we may have of this situation is incapacitating. So far as I can see, nothing in the principles or legitimate conclusions of practical reason counts against this position.
Conclusion
My own conclusion, therefore, is that the relationship of wisdom to moral science is both extraordinarily important and extraordinarily difficult to get right. This conclusion will no doubt strike the present audience as a pretty obvious one, yet it is not so obvious to the world at large, and hence it may deserve some closing emphasis with a suggestion of contemporary relevance. Let us observe, then, that late medieval thinkers were most definitely able to think for themselves - but they were able to think for themselves in large part because of the culture in which they lived, a culture built up on liberating as well as repressive Augustinian principles. More recently, when Alexander Hamilton and his associates proposed as an alternative to accident and force a government the essence of which was reflection and choice, they recogni/ed an underlying religious consensus as an important factor favoring the success of their proposal, a factor no less important for not being formally
Ethics and Politics as Practical Sciences 219
incorporated in the processes of secular politics.37 More recently still - and more philosophically - Wittgenstein held that Augustine was not in error when he invoked God on every page of the Confessions, "except where he formulated a theory."38 We may do well to substitute 'science' for 'theory' in this dictum and to say accordingly that Augustine was not in error when he exploited the topos of pride and humility before God on every page of the City of God, except when he attempted to derive from this relationship a science of living. Perhaps Augustine himself, despite many appearances to the contrary, was not committed to such derivations. Perhaps the whole tradition of augustinisme politique, in which it is especially important for this congress to include the great 13th-century Augustinian technocrat, Roger Bacon, rests on a misunderstanding of Augustinian principles.39 In any case, it is surely a perilous undertaking to apply the City of God directly to the problems of personal or social morality, and it is especially perilous - perilous to the point of fanaticism - to make such applications under the impression that one is being scientific in doing so. Yet it is also perilous - and perilous also to the point of fanaticism - to suppose in the name of science that there is no point to the quest for wisdom. To bring back the Middle Ages, in the sense of making our morality and our legal institutions unfold as directly as possible from an officially endorsed code of spiritual values, is not, I think, a project most medievalists would endorse. On the other hand, to relegate the alternately imperceptible and overwhelming eternal things contemplated in Augustinian wisdom to the realms of historical curiosity or personal fantasy, as most intellectuals do today, makes no sense at all.
The importance of both material conditions and a common religious tradition was recognized by John Jay in Federalist Paper no. 2 (The Federalist Papers, ed. cit. in n. l.p.7).
38 From Wittgenstein's "Bemerkungen iiber Frazer's The Golden Bough'", as quoted by Herbert Spiegelberg, "Augustine in Wittgenstein," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 17 (1979):319-327; p. 323.
39 R.A. Markus has argued (Saeculum, pp. 152-153) that the sort of political Augustinianism implied in the notion of constraining public law and morality to unfold from theology shows a misunderstanding of the fundamental theological structures of Augustine's thought and (pp. 174-176 and 211-230) that it is rather the Christianized Aristotelianism of St. Thomas which provides a rationale for the deliberate religious shaping of society. Professor Markus concedes, however, that his interpretation of Augustine involves not remaining content with what Augustine actually said about the duties of Christian rulers and subjects.
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Augustine, in part just because he is so disturbing, remains a vital resource for us all.40
It may be that one or another 13th- or 14th-century thinker offers us a correct and systematic statement of the relationship between science and wisdom, but until that is demonstrated I would propose that the distinctive and great value of medieval moral philosophy lies not so much in any achieved system as in the uneasiness of its combination of immanent scientia practica with an authentic response to the transcendent. Even if the two approaches in moral philosophy should remain forever incommensurable in theory, the medieval period at its best exhibits an exceptional vitality in practice - and especially in the practice of disciplined reflection and argument. In their own struggle against accident and force, medieval thinkers may show us, even if they cannot fully explain to us, how reflection and choice may live with providence and grace.
The University of Connecticut
Some recent studies which come to grips with difficult aspects of Augustine's thought: Margaret Ruth Miles, Augustine on the Body, American Academy of Religion Dissertation Series, ed. H. Ganse Little, Jr., No. 31 (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1979) and Peter Brown, Augustine and Sexuality (Berkeley, California: The Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture, 1983).
SYMPOSIUM
ON THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL
AUTONOMY OF PHILOSOPHY AS A DISCIPLINE
IN THE MIDDLE AGES
LINOS G. BENAKIS
Die thcorctischc und praktischc Autonoraic dcr Philosophic als Fachdisxiplin in Byzanz
Im Refcrat werden folgcndc Grundcinsichtcn zur Thematik vertrctcn, gcstiitzt auf die Ergebnisse der neueren Forschung im Bercich der Byzantinistik.1
Literatur zum Thcma: AT. MTTCIXXJCTIC;, "CH crnovSri TT]C, Bv^avT LVTIC, <$>tAocro<ptac;.
1949-1971": *tAo<ro<pca (Athen) 1 (1971) 390-433 (Deutsche Zusammcnfassung: Byzantinische Philosophic. Forschungsbericht 1949-1971). - P. I,cmerle, Le premier humanisme byzantin. Notes et remarques sur enseignement et culture a Byzance des engines au Xe siecle, Paris 1971, 327 S. - G. Weiss, Die sogenannte Universita'tsgriindung 1043 und die Ausbildung der Beamtenschaft: Ostro- mischc Beamte im Spiegel der Schriften des Michael Psellos, Mtinchen 1973, 65-76, 186- 192. - P. Speck, Die kaiserliche Universitdt von Konstantinopel , Miinchen 1974, 120 S.- R. Browning, "Enlightenment and Repression in Byzantium in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries": Past and Present No 69 (1975) 3-23. - W. Wolska-Conus, "Les ecolcs de Psellos et de Xiphilin sous Constantin IX Monomaque": Travaux et Memoires 6 (1976) 223-243. - J. Gouillard, "La religion des philosophies": ibid. 305-324. - G. Podskalsky, "Zur Bedeutung des Methodenproblems fur die byzantinische Theologie": Zeitschrift fur kathol. Theologie 98 (1976) 385-399. - G. Podskalsky, Theologie und Philosophic in Byzanz. Der Streit um die theologische Methodik in der spatbyzantinischcn Geistesges- chichtc (14. /15. Jh.), seine systematischen Grundlagen und seine historische Entwick- lung, Miinchen 1977, 268 S. - P. Lemerle, "Le gouvernement des philosophes. Notes et remarques sur 1'enseignement, les ecoles, la culture": Cinq etudes sur le Xf s. byzan tin, Paris 1977, 195-248. - II. Hunger, Philosophic, § 3 Philosophic und Theologie: Die profane hoclisprachliche Literatur der Byzantiner, Miinchen 1978, Bd. I, 42-53 (Neugrie- chische durchgesehene Ubersetzung, Athen 1987, Bd. A, 92-107). - I. Medvedev, "Neue philosophische Ansatze im spa'ten Byzanz": Jahrbuch Ostencichischen Byzantinistik 31/2 (1981) 529-548. - G. Podskalsky, "Orthodoxe und westlichc Theologie": ibid. 513-527.- L. Clucas, The Trial of John Italos and the Crisis of Intellectual Values in Byzantium in the Eleventh Century, Miinchen 1981, 266 S. - A. Kazhdan-G. Constable, People and Power in Byzantium. An Introduction to Modern Byzantine Studies, Washington 1982, 218 S. - G. Podskalsky, "Die gricchisch-byzantinische Theologie und ihre Mcthode": Theologie und Philosophic 58 (1983) 71-87. - A. ZLCCCTOC;, "SaAocrcxpocTJ O.UO&CLK.-CLK.T) K.O.L
/3l£AtKTJ TTCOTT) <7T7)l> OCVT LUpOK\C Ctt UpOLJ \iO.r CLO. TOU NtKOAttOU Me#CJl>7Jc;":
'Entcrc. 'Enci. ScoAor. Z^oAfjc; ITafCTr. 8e<ro-aAoytK7)<; 28 (1985) 387-415. - P. Schrciner, Byzanz (§ 2. Grundprobleme und Tendenzen der Forschung), Miinchen 1986, 97-154. - G. Weiss, Byzanz. Kritischer I-'orschungs- und Literaturbericru 1968-1985 (272- 301: Geistesgeschichte): Sonderheft 14 der Historischen Zeitschrift, 1986. - L.G. Benakis, "Neues zur Proklos-Tradition in Byzanz": Proclus et son influence. Actes du Colloque intern, du Neuchatel 1985, Neuchatel 1987, 241-253. - L.G. Benakis, "Commentaries and Commentators on the Logical Works of Aristotle in Byzantium": Gedankenzeichen. Festschrift fiir Klaus Oehler, Tubingen 1988, 3-12.
224 Bcnakis
1. Trotz der radikalcn Inbesitznahme des Begriffs <pL\O(TO(pLOt durch den Sieges/ug dcs Christentums fiir christliche, asketische und monchische Weisheit, blicb Philosophic wahrend dcr ganzen byzantinischcn Zeit (9.-15. Jahrhundcrt) die Wisscnschaft von dcr Erkenntnis allcr fiir Mensch und Welt grundlegenden Dinge. In der Regel wurde diese "Hellenische Philosophie" als fj e^cjtfey oder f) dvpot-dcv <pcAocro<pca bezeichnet, die man der »cai?'f)/iac, <pcAocro</)La, der Theologie, gegeniiberstellte.2
2. Die aus der Tradition dcr Theologcnschule von Alexandreia (Klemens, Origenes, Didymos) stammcndc, auf Philon zuriickgehende und in der lateinischen Formel philosophia theologiae ancilla gcpragte Ansicht von dcr untcrlegcnen und dicnendcn Stcllung der Philosophie gegeniiber der Theologie wurde zwar von dcr gricchischen Vatern (die sich der antiken Philosophie hinfort fiir die Excgese zu bediencn wuBten) bcgicrig aufgcnommen, reprasentiert aber nicht die herrschende Position in Byzanz, wo es niemals zu einer Integration der Philosophie (insbes. der philosophischen Logik) in die Theologie, wie im Westcn, gekommen ist.
In der Tat, wegcn einer ticf vcrwurzeltcn und nic aufgclosten Uncntschlossenhcit hinsichtlich des Wertcs der philosophischen Dialektik als Mittel zur Untcrsuchung und Prazisicrung thcologischcr Fragen - ja sogar wcgcn cincs gewissen Horrors vor eincm erkenntnisthcoretischcn Eindringcn mil zwanglaufig heidnischcn intcllektucllen Mitteln in das heilige Mysterium - und trotz der eigentlich traditionellen Verehrung dcr gricchischen Philosophie blieb in Byzanz cine systematische theologischc Methodc untcr freicr Anwcndung dcr Dialektik zum groBten Teil immcr in den Ansatzen stcckcn. Weil also der Philosophic und Logik bcstenfalls cin dcr Theologie vor- odcr untcrgeordncter Stcllenwcrt eingcraumt wird, muB man fiir Byzanz von einer traditionellen Trennung von Philosophic und Theologie sprechen.3
So II. Hunger, Die profane hochsprachliche Litcratur der Ryzantincr, I 42. Vgl. den Ausdruck oL e^w TTJC, TjjaeTcpcu; auA7)<; in einem unedierten Traktat des "Fiirsten der Philosophen", 'Ilieodoros von Smyrna (12. Jh.), "Uber die Natur und die Prin/.ipien der Natur nach den antiken Philosophen". •i
Zum besseren Verstandnis dieser These konnte sicherlich cine Analyse des wahren
Charakters der byzantinischen Philosophie beitragen. In diesem Zusammenhang werden meine eigencn Forschungsbeitrage (kommentierte Texteditionen und Studien, s. "Beitrage zur Erforschung der Byzantinischen Philosophie in Griechenland 1972-1985": Bulletin de Philosophie Medie\>ale 27 (1985) 197-201) der letzten 15 Jahre (in Ubereinstimmung mil Thesen von Kl. Oehlcr und Th. Nikolaou im selben Zeitraum) den Ausgleich der byzant. Philosophie zwischen Antike und Christentum, zu dem ein Universalismus tritt, in dem diese Philosophie eingebettct ist, herausarbeiten. So G. Weiss in seinem jiingsten Forschungsbericht (1986). - Hier ware auch zu beachten, daB die Verehrung der
Die Autonomie der Philosophic in Byzanz 225
3. Zur Frage der praktischcn Autonomie der Philosophic als Fach- disziplin ist zunachst die Situation der Hoheren Schulen in Byzanz zu untersuchen. Nach ncueren Erkenntnissen waren die byzantinischen "Universitaten" in erster Linie Funktionarsschulen allgemein weltlicher Bildung mil vorwiegendem Privatcharakter, stehen aber unter kaiserlicher Protektion und werden gelegentlich auch vom Patriarchen und der Synode unterstiitz.t (solche Schulen werden oft im Bereich eines Klosters unter- gebracht, ohne "geistliche" Schulen zu sein. Theologieschulen fiir Theologen und Kleriker gab es in Byzanz nicht).
Wie aus konkreten Fallen hervorgeht (Verurteilung von bedeutendcn Philosophieprofessoren "wegen VerstoBe gegen die Orthodoxie"), spielen vor allem politische Motive die Hauptrolle bei Prozessen, welche einen Eingriff der staatlichen und kirchlichen Behorden in das Schulwesen bedeuten. Dabei aber ist als Langzeitfaktor die gesellschaftlich schwache Stellung des Intellektuellen und Lehrers, der immer nur als Privatmann, nicht im Rahmen eines von Kirche oder Staat organisierten Bildungs- systems das philosophische Bildungsgut vermittelte, in Rechnung zu stellen. Und wo immer ein Aufschwung des Bildungswesens und der philosophischen Studien zu vermerken ist, liegt der eigentliche Grund dafiir im auBerordentlichen Charakter der Personlichkeiten selbst, die gerade in dieser Zeit wirken.
SchlieBlich aber gab es in Byzanz keine korporative Autonomie der Philosophielehrer gegeniiber kirchlichen und staatlichen (kaiserlichcn) Gewalten, im Gegensatz zum westlichen Mittelalter, wo die Entwicklung sehr viel anders verlief, unter anderem als Folge des Konkurrenzkampfes zwischen staatlichen und kirchlichen Machttragern, der fortschreitenden Urbanisierung, d.h. der politischen und sozialen Dezentralisierung. Eine zunehmend eigenstandige Position konnte sich die Philosophic in Byzanz nicht erringen, dcnn oft wurden die Versuche, die Stellung der Philosophic aufzuwerten und ihr aus der Antike ererbtes Instrumentarium auch auf theologische Fragen anzuwenden, von der der christlich-
griechischen Philosophic eine nie geendete Tradition in Byzanz gehabt hat. Dabei muB man insbesondere von der Beschaftigung mit der Logik sprechen (selbstverstandlich ist hier die aristotelische Logik gemeint), und zwar sowohl auf didaktischer Ebene (s. L.G. Benakis, "Grundbibliographie zum Aristoteles-Studium in Byzanz": Aristoteles. Werk und Wirkung. Paul Moraux gen'idmet, Bd. II, Berlin 1987, 352-379) wie auch auf der Ebene der Kommentierung und der Interpretation (s. jetzt L.G. Benakis, "Commentators and Commentaries ...", 1988), aber auch, was die systematische Behandlung von erkenntnis- theoretischen Problemen angeht, so zum vieldiskutierten Problem der allgemeinen Begriffe (s. meine Studie von 1978/79 iiber den Begriffsrealismus der Byzantiner).
226 Bcnakis
orthodoxen Tradition verpflichteten Fiihrungsschicht als Bcdrohung vcrstandcn und zum Schcitcrn gcbracht.4
4. Die Abgrcnzung der Philosophic von den wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen, vor allcm dcs Quadriviums, ist nicht sehr ausgepragt. Es sind namlich weitgchend die Lehrer der Philosophic, die diesc Disziplinen lehren, was zugleich zu einer philosophischen Einfarbung jener Disziplinen, vor allcm der Harmonielehre, der Astronomic u.a. fiihrte. In der Harmonielehre z.B. ist es interessant, die theoretischen Stromungen zwischen Pythagoreismus und der Aristoxenos-Schule zu verfolgcn, wobei in Byzanz sich die Lehre von den Tonabstanden auf pythagoreische Grundgedanken stiitzt (arithmetischcs Vcrhaltnis), aber in der Harmonie lehre die aristoxenische Methode zu Anwendung kommt. Fur cine Verbindung der Philosophic mit den wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen spricht auch die Tatsachc, daB in Byzanz die groBe Mehrheit der als Philosophielchrer hcrvorgctrctcncn Manner den Typus des Polyhistors reprasentiert, d.h. des vielscitigen und in mehrercn Disziplinen schriftstcllcrisch und didaktisch tatigen Gelehrten.5
Akadimia Athinon, Athinai
Diesc Ansicht ist chcnfalls der modcrncn Forschung y.u verdanken. DaB man bei der Erforschung geistcsgcschichtlicher Phanomcne auch die soziale, wirtschaftliche und politische Faktoren bcriicksichtigen soil, gchort eben der modcrnen historischen Betrachtungsmcthode an (s. z.B. A. Ka/.hdan-G. Constable, People and Power in Byzantium, 1982). - Was die Konfrontation der byzantinischen Philosophielehrer mit der Fiihrungsschicht der christlich-orthodoxen Tradition betrifft, sollte man - so ge- rechtfertigt die hier vertretcne Ansicht auch sein mag - nicht glaubcn, daB sic sich auf ofter vorgekommene Falle stiitzen kann. Inquisitionsahnliche Geschehnisse gab es in Byzanz nie.
Zur Bcurteilung der Verwandtschaft bzw. Abgrenzung der Philosophic hinsichtlich der wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen des Triviums und des Quadriviums sind hauptsa'chlich die Inhalte des Studiums nach den reichlich vorhandenen Quellen, die uberlieferten didaktische Werke und das umfangreiche Schrifttum der bedeutendsten Vertreter der byzantinischen Gelehrsamkeit auszuwerten.
Die Autonomie der Philosophic in Byzanz 227
ABS'I'RACT:
The Theoretical and Practical Autonomy of Philosophy as a Discipline in Byzantium
The findings of recent research in Byzantine studies regarding the theoretical and practical autonomy of philosophy as a discipline in Byzantium support the following theses:
(a) Although the early Christian writers dealing with the ascetic theory of life had adopted the term philosophia, the record shows that philosophy as a discipline remained throughout the period from the ninth to the fifteenth century in Byzantium the science of the cognition of fundamental truths concerning man and the world. This science "from without" (e^oxtfev or dvpaticv) was contrasted as a matter of rule with the "philosophy from within", namely theology.
(b) Theoretical autonomy: The view that philosophy is ancllla theologiae, one that the Greek Church fathers derived from Philo and the Alexandrian school of theology, does not represent the dominant position of Byzantium as is the case in the West. Philosophy, and logic in particular, never came under theology either as background or as a basic instrument. By the same token, theology in Byzantium did not become a systematic method for the dialectical elaboration of Christian truths, that is, a science. As a result, the initial distinction between philosophy and theology remained intact.
(c) Practical autonomy: At the level of autonomy in institutional practice it should be noted that while theological schools and studies did not exist in Byzantium, the fact is that the purpose of higher studies was mainly to train state functionaries. On the whole, this instruction, based on philosophy and the Quadrivium, had a private character despite the support it received from the Emperor and the Church. We hear of occasional interference on the part of either secular or ecclesiastic authorities, which was possible due to the lack of professional organization of teachers of philosophy. Furthermore, Byzantium did not have independent universities in cities or ones that were instituted by monastic orders, as was the case in the West due to different social and political developments. Finally, philosophy protected itself from possible involvement in theological controversies arising from time to time. In general, philosophy has a different development from that of Western Scholasticism.
(d) Autonomy vis-a-vis the other sciences: Regarding the autonomy of philosophy in relationship to the other sciences, it should be noted that the prevalent model of thinker in Byzantium was a type of encyclopaedic teacher of philosophy, a polyhistor, i.e. a erudite master of scholarship who maintained close touch with the other sciences that comprised the Quadrivium etc. as well as one who set the philosophical tone of the scientific subject-matters and of the problems under investigation.
HANS DAIBER
Die Autonomic dcr Philosophic im Islam
"Philosophic" ist niemals Bestandtcil dcs islamischen Untcrrichtsbetriebes gcwesen. Sic ist cin Erbc dcr Gricchcn. Wcr sich damit beschaftigte, tat dies nebcn scincm Brotcrwcrb odcr konntc sich der Forderung durch den Kalifcn crfrcucn. Die Abbasidcn fordcrtcn zunachst die Ubersetzung griechischer wisscnschaftlicher Tcxtc, wobei haufig praktische Interesscn (z.B. Medizin, Astronomic, Mathcmatik) cine Rolle spicltcn.1 Gleichzeitig und keincswegs ausschlicBlich "im Schlcpptau dcr arztlichen Kunst"2 entwickelte sich cin ticfcs Intcrcssc an "Philosophic", par excellence griechischer Philosophic, wobei vor allcm Logik und Bcwcisfiihrung fur islamischc Thcologcn und Juristen wegweisend gewordcn ist. Philosophic ist hicr primar dcr Wcg zur Erkcnntnis und Tcil der Wisscnschaften, die dem Muslim letzten Endcs dem Nachwcis von Gottcs Wundertatigkeit in der Schopfung dientcn.4 Von theorctischer und praktischer Autonomie schcint hicr kcinc Rede scin zu konncn. Doch betrachtcn wir zunachst den Begriff "Autonomie" miher.
Der Begriff Autonomie gewinnt erst in der Ncuzcit an Bedcutung, zunachst in den Rcchtswisscnschaftcn und dann - scit Kant - in der Philosophic.5 Dariiber hinaus entspringt das Interessc an der Eigcn- gesetzlichkcit und Eigenstandigkcit dcr Philosophic wic andercr Wisscnschaften moderncr Wissenschaftsthcorie, die sich mit Strukturen und Methoden bcschiiftigt.
Vgl. II. Daihcr, "Anfange und Entstehung dcr Wisscnschaften im Islam", in: Saeculum 29, Freiburg/Miinchcn 1978 (S.356-366), S.363 untcn.
Diese These hatte Rudi Paret, Der Islam und das griechische liildungsgut (Tubingen 1950 = Philosophic und Gcschichte 70), S.lSff. aufgestellt; vgl. dazu Daiber in: Gnomon 42, 1970, S.540f.
3 Vgl. George Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges (Fxlinburgh 1981), S.107.
4 Vgl. Reuben Ixvy, The Social Structure of Islam (Cambridge 1957; repr. 1979), S.458ff.
Vgl. Art. "Autonomic" in: Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophic. Hrsg.v. Joachim Ritter. I. Darmstadt 1971.
Die Autonomie dcr Philosophic irn Islam 229
Die Ubcrtragung modcrncr Fragcstcllungen auf das Gcbiet dcr klassischen islamischcn Philosophic ist durchaus Icgitim. Dcnn sic ermoglicht uns, Zusammenhange bcsser zu erkennen und zu verstchcn. Gleichzeitig kniipft sic an die im Mittelalter6 vor allcm scit Thomas von Aquin gestcllte Frage nach der Wissenschaftlichkeit der Theologic an.
Die Wissenschaftlichkeit der Theologie ist von ihren islamischen Vertretern nicht bezweifclt worden; cilm al-kalam in seiner klassischen Auspragung bedient sich formal und inhaltlich der Philosophic, der Logik und der Ontologie bzw. dcr Dialcktik und Metaphysik. Philosophic erscheint wie in patristischcr und mittelalterlicher Tradition als ancilla theologiae. Doch langst vor den Diskussionen in Mittelalter und Neuzeit war das ancilla-theologiae-Ri\d im Islam Anderungen unterworfen. Man hat im Rahmen des islamischen, von Koran und religioser Uberlieferung bestimmten Wcltbildes und unter dcm Eindruck griechischer Philosophien und Wissenschaften der Philosophic einen eigenen Stellenwert verliehen. Gleichzeitig ist der Tenor uniibersehbar, in Ubereinstimmung mil dem damaligen religiosen Weltbild nicht von der Symbiose von Religionen und Wissenschaften abzuweichen. Autonomie und Gebundenheit der Wissen schaften einschlieBlich dcr Philosophic stehen so in standigcm Ducll; dies macht die islamische Szene zu einem interessanten Schauplatz fur die Entwicklung eines Philosophiebegriffes, der sich standig mit den Glaubensforderungen islamischcr Orthodoxie arrangieren muBtc.7
Bevor wir den islamischen Philosophiebegriff im Einzelncn erortern, sollten wir beachten, wic die den Arabern ja wohlbekannte gricchisch- pythagoraische Etymologic von Philosophic als "Liebe zur Wcisheit"8 mit
Vgl. Martin Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode.l.ll. Darmstadt 1956; Charles Lohr, Theologie und/als Wissenschaft im friihen 13. Jahrhundert", in: Internationale katholische Zeitschrift: Communio 10, 1981, S.316-330.
7 3
Vgl. A.J. Arberry, Revelation and Reason in Islam, London 1971; George F. Hourani,
Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy (London 1976), S.2ff. - Umgekehrt haben auch im kalam - wenn man von Parallelentwicklungen absieht - philosophische Gedanken Eingang gefunden: vgl. R.M. Frank, "Reason and Revealed Law: a sample of parallels and divergences in kalam and falsafa", in: Recherches d'Islamologie. Recueil d'articles offert a Georges C. Anawati et Louis Gardet par leurs collegues et amis. Louvain 1977 (= Bibliotheque philosophique de Louvain 26), S.123-138.
o
Vgl. Ammonius, In Porphyrii Isagogen ed. A. Busse (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 4, Berolini 1891), S.9,7ff.; ubernommen z.B. im 9. Jh. von Kind!, Ris'ala fi hudud al-asya' wa-rusumiha ed. Abu Rlda (Rasa'il al-Kindl l-falsaflya, Kairo 1950), S.172 (Neuedition mit Ubersetzung und Kommentar: F. Klein-Franke, "Al-Kindi's 'On Defini tions and Descriptions of Things'", in: Le Museon 95, 1982, S.191-216) oder im 10. Jh. von Qosta Ibn Luqa in einer titellosen Abhandlung iiber die Einteilung der Wissenschaft, Hs. Aya Sofya 4855, fol.SOrSf.
230 Daiber
dcm in dcr islamischen Traditionsliteratur bereits friih den Glaubigen empfohlcncn Strcbcn nach Wissen9 parallelisiert wcrdcn kann: Wissen und Handcln gehoren im islamischen Glaubensbegriff zusammen.10 Das Wissen umfaBt zunachst das religios-juristische Wissen von Koran und Uberlieferung. Im Zuge der Expansion des islamischen Imperiums seit dem 7. Jh. sieht sich der Muslim zunehmend mil zahlreichen Kulturen konfrontiert; Wissen umfaBt mehr und mehr auch die fremden Wissen- schaften, vor allem die Philosophic und die Naturwissenschaften der Griechen. Die Philosophic, namlich Logik und Mctaphysik, lieferte das Riistzcug fur die Formulicrung und Abgrenzung des islamischen Dogmas gegeniiber nichtislamischcn Rcligionen und gnostisch-dualistischen Bewegungcn.11 Philosophic erschcint hier als Wissen um die Hilfsmittel dcr Thcologic, als ancilla theologiae. Ein typisches Beispiel ist die Muctazila, cine scholastische Bewegung, die sich im 8. Jh. im Irak zu entwickeln begann und in dcr Formulicrung und Begriindung der uberlieferten Glaubcnslchrcn traditio durch ratio zu ersetzen suchte. Ihre Begriindung dcr Religion mil Argumcntcn des Verstandcs fiihrte - teilwcisc unter griechisch-hellenistischcm EinfluB - zu verfeincrtcn Tcchniken in dcr islamischen theologischen Disputation (kafam) und dicntc glcichzcitig als Rcchtfcrtigung fur die Beschaftigung mit den Wissenschaften.13
Allerdings ist man schncll an die Grenzcn mcnschlichcn Wissens und Erkenncns gclangt. Bereits fiir Wasil Ibn cAta' (gest. 748 oder 749), dcr als Begriindcr dcr Muctazila gilt, konncn "die mit Wissen ausgestattcten Menschen" (al-c~aliniiiti) bzw. "die mit Sprachc (odcr: Vernunft) Begabtcn" (an-n~atiqiui) Gott nur schr unvollkommcn bcschrcibcn, namlich sowcit Gott
Vgl. Fran/. Roscnthal, Knowledge Triumphant (I^idcn 1970), S.70ff.; Daiber, "Anfa'ngc" (wie Anm. 1) S.358.
Vgl. Daiber, Das theologisch-philosophische System des Mucammar Ibn cAbbad as- Sularnl (gcst.830n.Chr.) (Beirut 1975 = Bciruter Texte und Studicn 19), S.143f., Anm. 7.
11 Vgl. Daiber (s.vor.Anm.) S.16ff.; 123ff.
Vgl. Josef Van Ess, The logical Structure of Islamic Theology", in: Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, Wiesbaden 1970, S.21-50; id., "Disputationspraxis in der islamischen Theologie", in: Re\'ue des Etudes Islamiques 44, Paris 1976, S.23-60.
1-3 c
So findet man in der Tat bci den Mu taziliten schon friih interessante Erorte- rungen naturwissenschaftlicher Fragen; vgl. Daiber (s.Anm. 10) S.283ff. und id., "Anfange" (s.Anm. 1). - In gleichem Sinne schreibt im 10. Jh. Abu 1-Hasan al-cAmiri sein Buch iiber die Vorziigc des Islam (Kitab al-flam bi-manaqib al-Islam); vgl. G. Endress, "Grammatik und Logik" (in: Bocnumer Studien zur Philosophic 3, Amsterdam 1986, S.163-299), S.216.
Die Autonomie dcr Philosophic im Islam 231
im Koran "sich selbst fur Seine Schopfung ... beschrieb". Schon hier bahnt sich das Problem der spateren islamischen Attributenlehre an. Fur Wasils Schiiler Dirar Ibn cAmr (gest. 796) sind Gottes Attribute nur in Negationen ihres Gegenteils beschreibbar; oder fur den Mucta/,iliten cAbbad Ibn Sulaiman (gest. 864) sind gottliche Attribute lediglich sprachliche Zeichen, "Benennungen", die nicht mil dem Be/eichneten identisch sind.16 Hier klingt das Prin/ip der negativen Thcologie an; die bereits koranische17 Unendlichkeit Gottes ist fur Sprache und Dcnken des Menschen nur unvollkommen erfaBbar.
Diese rigorose Einstellung formt den Nahrboden fur die spiitere islamische Adaption neuplatonischer Gedanken iiber die Unendlichkeit Gottes. Man interessiert sich nicht nur fur die Logik der Griechen, sondern auch fiir die Enneaden Plotins, die in einer "Theologie des Aristoteles" genannten Paraphrase den Arabern bereits im 9. Jh. vorliegen.18 Ungefahr um dieselbe Zeit erhielt man Kenntnis von Proclus' Institutio Iheologica in der Bearbeitung des Liber de causis. Diese neuplatonischen Werke haben den Philosophiebegriff der islamischen Philosophen von Beginn an gepragt.
Der erste islamische Philosoph, Abu Yiisuf Yacqiib Ibn Ishaq al- Kindi (gest. nach 866) definiert unter anderem20 die Philosophic in Anlehnung an Aristoteles21 und Platon22 als "Wissen um die wahre Natur
14 Hittbat Wasil ed. Daiber (Wa$il Ibn cAta' als Prediger und Thtologe, Leiden 1988 = Islamic Philosophy and Theology. Texts and Studies 2), fol.87v22ff.; vgl. Kommentar S.42.
15 Vgl. Daiber, Mucammar (s.Anm. 10) S.136.
Vgl. Daiber, Mifammar (s.Anm. 10) S.211C. - Solche theologischen Diskussionen iibcr die gottlichen Attribute formen den Nahrboden fiir spatere, unter dcm EinfluB der griechischen Logik weiterentwickelte Erorterungen iiber das Verhaltnis von Sprache und Denken; vgl. Endress (s.Anm. 13); Wilfried Kiihn, "Die Rehabilitierung der Sprache durch den arabischen Philologen As-Sirafi", in: Bochumer Studien zur Philosophic 3, 1986, S.301-402.
17 ?
Vgl. z.B. Sure 3,174; Art. "Ghayb" in: Encyclopaedia of Islam I (I^idcn, London
1965); Daiber, Mifammar (s.Anm. 10) S.117ff.
10
Vgl. den Sammelband Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages. Ed. by Jill Kraye, W.F. Ryan and C.B. Schmitt. Ixtndon 1986. Dazu die Besprechung v. Daiber in: Dcr Islam 65, 1988, S.130-134.
Jetzt neu herausgegeben von Charles Taylor, Liber de causis (Kalam ft mahd al- khair). Diss. Toronto 1981.
?f)
Vgl. G.N. Atiyeh, Al-Kindi, the Philosopher of the Arabs (Rawalpindi 1966; repr.
1984), S.lSff.
21 Metaph. II 1.993b20 (eirtcmi^T} TTK
232 Daiber
der Dinge, soweit cs fiir den Mcnschcn moglich ist"23 sowie die Metaphysik, "die erste Philosophic", als "Wissen um die Erste Wahrheit, die die Ursache jeglicher Wahrheit ist". Hier wird der aristotelischen Erklarung, daB "dasjenige, was abgeleitete Wahrheiten als wahr erweist, am wahrsten ist"24 in Anlehnung an Plotin und Proclus25 sowie an den koranischen Begriff haqq "Wahrheit" = "Gott"26 eine neuplatonische Pointierung mit islamischer Komponente gegeben. "Dcnn das Wissen um die Ursache ist vortrefflicher als das Wissen um die Wirkung".27 Diese Aussage ist entscheidend gcwordcn fiir die Entwicklung des islamischcn Philosophicbegriffes; Philosophic beschaftigt sich in crstcr Linie mit der gottlichen Ursache alien Scins und strebt nach der Erkenntnis dieser "ersten Wahrheit" (al-haqq al-auwal). Hierbei soil sie Kind! zufolge auf den Erkenntnisscn friiherer Generationen und andcrcr Volker aufbauen.28 Diesem Grundsatz getrcu und untcr Beriicksichtigung koranisch-islamischer Theologie von der creatio ex nihilo entwickelt Kindi die These, daB Universum, Korper, Bcwegung, Zeit und Anfang nicht ohne einander existieren und cine Ursache auBcrhalb haben, die absolute Einheit, das wahre Eine.29 Hicraus entstcht in Emanationcn (faid) das Sein (tahawwi} jedcs Wahrnchmbaren (al-mafysus). In der Emanation werden die rationalen und mctaphysischcn Dinge zu etwas Wahrnehmbarem, zu etwas,
"~ Thcaet. 176 A.B; darnach Ammonius (s.Anm. 8) 3,8f.; vgl. Alfred L. Ivry, Al-Kindi's Metaphysics (Albany 1974), S.117F.
23 I'd. Abu Rlda (s.Anm. 8) I 97,9/Ubers. Ivry (s.vor.Anm.) S.55.
24 Metaph. 993H27.
Vgl. G. Hndress, ftoclus Ambus (Beirut 1973 = Beiruter Texte und Studicn 10), S.152; 286.
26 Sure 10,32(33).
27 Vgl. ed. Abu Rlda (s.Anm. 8) I 101,1/Ubers. Ivry (s.Anm. 22) S.56.
28 Vgl. ed. Abu Rlda (s.Anm. 8) I 102/Ubcrs. Ivry (s.Anm. 22) S.57, Kommentar S.126 (zur aristotelischen Inspirationsquellc) und A. Cortabarria, "III metodo de Al-KindF visto a travers de sus Risalas" (in: Orientalia Hispanica I, Leiden 1974, S.209-225), S.210-212. - So tragen nicht nur die Vorlaufer aus der Antike, sondern alle Zeiten in gleicher Weise zum wisscnschaftlichen I;ortschritt bei, wie im 12. Jh. der Astronom al- Asturlabl und der Mathematiker as-Samau'al folgerten; vgl. Franz Rosenthal, "Al- Asturlabi and as-Samaw'al on Scientific Progress", in: Osiris 9, 1950, S.553-564. - Zum Fortschrittsgedanken im Islam vgl. Tarif Khalidi, "The Idea of Progress in Classical Islam", in: Journal of Near Eastern Studies 40, 1981, S.277-289.
Vgl. zur Bewcisfiihrung Kindls Michael Marmura, "Die islamische Philosophic des Mittelalters" (in: W.M. Watt/M. Marmura, Der Islam, II Stuttgart, Berlin, Koln, Mainz 1985 = Die Religionen der Menschheit 25,2), S.332ff.
30 Vgl. ed. Abu Rida (s.Anm. 8) I 162,2ff./Ubers. Ivry (s.Anm. 22) S.I 13.
Die Autonomie der Philosophic im Islam 233
wovon in der menschlichcn Sccle sich ein Abbild (mital) formen kann; im Untcrschied hicrzu existicrcn die Universalien, die Gattungen und Arten nur im Geiste.31 Hierbei 1st die erste Wahrheit weder Genus noch Spezies,32 sondern formt die essentielle Einheit, was wir akzidentell in den Dingen finden.
Philosophic ist hier zum Wissen um die gottliche Ursache sowie um die nur im menschlichen Geiste existierenden Universalien und die in der Seele in Form von Abbildern vorhandenen wahrnehmbaren Partikularien geworden. Dieses Wissen ist "Wissen um die wahre Natur der Dinge" (cilm al-a^ya' bi-haqa'iqih~d)?^ Das Streben des Philosophcn nach diesem Wissen ist fur Kind! im AnschluB an die aristotelische Einteilung der Philosophic in theoretisches und praktisches Wissen mil den Zielen Wahrheit und Handeln34 auf die "erste Wahrheit, die Ursache jeder Wahrheit"35 und "das wahrheitsgetreue Handeln" (al-camal bi-l-haqq)^6 gerichtet.37
Diese praktisch-ethische Komponente der Philosophie erscheint hier bei Kind! nicht naher ausgefiihrt und beschrankt sich auf das aktive Streben des Menschen nach Wissen um die wahre Natur der Dinge; diese emanieren aus dem wahren Einen und sind eine creatio ex nihilo. Gctreu koranischer Vorstellung (Sure 55,6) ist das Universum geschaffen, um Gott zu dienen und ihn zu verehren.38 Hier, aber auch in weiteren spezifischen
31 Ed. Abu Rlda (s.Anm. 8) I 107f./Ubers. Ivry (s.Anm. 22) S.61ff.; vgl. auch Kindls noch nicht herausgegebene Risala fi sarh ma li-n-nafs dikruhu minima kana laha fi c~alam al-caql id_ s'arat fi calam al-hiss wa-m'a laha dikruhu mimm'a laha fi c'alam al- hiss in sarat fi calam al-caql und dazu G. Endress, "Al-Kindi's Theory of Anamnesis", in: Islao e Arabismo na peninsula iberica. Adas do XI congresso du uniao europeia de Arabista e islamologas (Evora-Faro-Silves, 29 set.-6 out. 1982). Ed. por Adel Sidarus. Evora 1986, S.393-402.
32 Vgl. ed. Abu Rlda (s.Anm. 8) I 113ff.; 123ff./Ubers. Ivry (s.Anm. 22) S.67ff., 76ff.; dazu Marmura (s.Anm. 29) S.334ff.
33 S. oben zu Anm. 23.
34 Vgl. Aristoteles, Metaph. II 1.993b20.
35 S. oben zu Anm. 20.
36 Vgl. ed. Abu Rlda (s.Anm. 8) I 97,10/Ubers. Ivry (sAnm. 22) S.55.
^7 T r -
Vgl. hierzu Ivry (s.Anm. 22) S.117f.; Kindis Philosophiedefinition hat bei Ibn Sina, as^Sifa', al-Mantiq, al-Mudhal ed. G.C. Anawati, Mahmud al-Hudain u. Ahmad Fu'ad al- Ahwani (Kairo 1952) S.12 nachgewirkt; vgl. dazu M. Marmura, "Avicenna on the Division of the Sciences in the Isagoge of His Shifa'", in: Journal for the History of Arabic Sciences 4, Aleppo 1980, S.239-251.
' Das zeigt Kindls Schrift Fi l-Ibana can sugud al-girm al-aqsa wa-tacatihi li-llah ed. Abu Rlda (sAnm. 8) I S.238-261.
234 Daibcr
Lehren39 zcigt sich der religios-islamische Rahmen; Philosophic steht nicht im Widcrspruch zur Offcnbarung.
Sie ist aber nicht ancilla theologiae: philosophische Interprctationcn religioser Sprache, wie sic Kindis Schrift iiber die Verehrung Gottcs durch das Univcrsum bictct (s.o.), weiscn Icdiglich auf die Uberein- stimmung von Philosophic und Qffcnbarung. Philosophic ist autonom und weist den Weg zum Wissen und zu aktivem Streben nach diescm Wisscn. Hierbei unterschcidct Kindl crkenntnisthcoretisch zwischen Wahrnehmung und Abstraktioncn im Gciste (s.o.). Die religiose Offenbarung tritt in den Hintcrgrund: sic ist zwar nicht im Widcrspruch zur Philosophic, aber es wird ihr keine bcstimmtc Rolle im philosophischen ErkenntnisprozeB zugcwicscn. Sie stcht nicht im Widcrspruch zu dem, was Philosophcn durch cigcne geistigc Anstrcngung bcweisen konnen - auch wcnn deren Erkenntnisse letzten Endcs nicht an die Offenbarung des Propheten heranreichen.40
Kind! hat sich nicht vicl iibcr die spezifische Rolle der religioscn Offcnbarung gcgcniiber der Philosophic gcauBcrt. Vielleicht hat dies nachfolgende Philosophcn zu ciner cindcutigeren Stellungnahme heraus- gefordcrt. Der Arzt und Philosoph Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn Zakariya' ar- Razi (Rhazcs im lat. Mittclalter; starb 925 odcr 932) hat mil Kindis These von der Autonomie der Philosophic Ernst gemacht. Seine Ablehnung der Notwendigkeit von Propheten und geoffenbartcn Religionen bcgriindet er mit der Unabhangigkeit des Denkens, mit der Philosophic. Alle Menschcn sind zu Philosophic fahig, es gibt keine Bcvorzugung - ebcnsowenig wie cin gerechtcr, barmhcrziger Gott seine Offcnbarung nur einem Einzelnen oder cinem bestimmtcn Volk zukommen laBt. Philosophic befahigt den Menschcn zur Kontrollc seiner Lcidenschaften durch die ratio, zur Erlosung der Seele von den korperlichen Trieben und zu ihrer Aufwarts- bewegung (Seelcnwanderung) zu hoheren Lebensformcn nach dem Tode des
39
Vgl. Marmura (s.Anm. 29) S.337; Hmilio Tornero, "Religion y filosofia en al-Kindi,
Averroes y Kant", in: al-Qantara 2, Madrid 1981, S.89-128.
Vgl. Riialat al-Kindi ft kannyat kutub Aristutalis ed. Abu Rlda (s.Anm. 8) I 372f.; dazu M. Marmura, The Islamic Philosophers Conception of Islam", in: Islam's Under standing of itself. lid. by R.G. Hovannisian and Speros Vryonis. Malibu/Cal. 1983 (= Giorgio Ixvi della Vida Riennial Conference 8), S.87-102, hier S.91; R.Walzer, Greek into Arabic (Oxford 1962, 21963) S.lSlff. - Im 11. Jh. folgt Kindls Anschauung der spanische Philosoph Ibn Hazm, vgl. A.G. Chejne, Ibn Hazm (Chicago 1982) S.72ff., bes. 80. Ibn I.Iax.m erweist sich auch sonst als nicht unkritischer Kenner von Kindls Philo- sophie: vgl. Daiber, "Die Kritik des Ibn Ha/.m an KindFs Metaphysik", in: Der Islam 63, 1986, S.284-302.
Die Autonomie der Philosophic im Islam 235
Menschen.41 Die von Gott in seiner Gnade den Menschen verliehene Vernunft, eine Emanation aus Seinem Wesen, befahigt den Menschen, seine Seele aus dem korperlichcn Schlummer zu wecken und in ihren urspriing- lichen Zustand zurikkkehren zu lassen. Die universelle Secle bildet eins der fiinf ewigen Prin/ipien, neben Materie, Raum, Zeit und Schopfer.42 Diese erscheinen in einem demokritischen atomistischen Entwurf platonischer Pragung, worin die koranische creatio ex nihilo keinen Platz hat, sondern die Schopfung in der (Neu-)Anordnung der bereits aktuell praexistenten ewigen Atomen besteht.
Philosophic erschcint hier als autonomes, alien Menschen und Volkern gerneinsames Denken mit ethischer Komponente. Die "philo- sophische Lebensweise" (as-sira l-falsafiya)44 ist Vorbild, nicht mehr das Leben des Propheten. Philosophische Erkenntnis befahigt den Einzelnen zu rationaler Kontrolle der Leidenschaften, zur Befreiung der Seele von diesen - oder, wie es nach ihm Miskawaih (gest. 1030) unter EinfluB von platonisch-aristotelischer Ethik und mit etwas abweichender, farabiani- scher Akzentuierung im Titel eines Buches formulierte - zur Verbessening des Charakters (Tahdib al-ahlaq).45 Sic bedarf dazu nicht der religiosen Offenbarung.46
Hierin ist dem Abu Bakn ar-Razi ein zeitgenossischer Kontrahent, der Ismailite Abu Hatim ar-Razi (gest. um 933 oder 934) nicht gcfolgt. In seinem Buch iiber Die Beweise des Prophetentums (Acfam an-mibliwa)41
41 Vgl. Marmura (s.Anm. 29) S.344C.
42 Vgl. Marmura (s.Anm. 29) S.339ff; --, "Islamic Philosophers Conception" (s.Anm. 40) S.92f.
4^ Vgl. im Einzelnen Shlomo Pines, Bcitrdgc zur islamischen Atonicnlehre (Berlin 1936) S.34ff.
44 Vgl. die gleichnamige Schrift ed. Paul Kraus in: ar-RazI, Rasa'il falsafiya (Kairo 1939), S.99-111.
45 Miskawaihs Tahdib al-ahfaq wurde von C. Zurayk 1966 in Beirut herausgegehen und 1968 tiberset/.t (The Refinement of Character)-, vgl. dazu Rez. v. Daiber, Oricntali- stische Literaturzeitung 67, 1972, Fine franz. Ubers. veroffentlichte Mohammed Arkoun (Miskawayh: Traite d'ethiquc. Damas 1969).
46 Hierin ist ihm offcnbar der Dichter Abu l-cAla' al-Macarn (973-1057) gefolgt: vgl. R. Kevin I^ccy, Man and Society in the Luz'umiyyat of al-Macam (thesis Harvard 1984) S.146ff. u. 160f., wo auf RazF als mogliches Vorbild verwiesen wird (zu einer weitern Parallele s. S.273ff.).
47 Hrsg. v. Salah al-Sawy, Teheran 1977. Teilubersetzung v. F. Brion, Kit'ab Acfam al- nubuww'at. Traduction el commentaire des pages relatives a la philosophic de la religion. Universite Catholique de Louvain, memoire de licence dactylograph. 1985 (vgl. nachfolg.Anm.). Vgl. dazu meine Analyse "Abu Hatim ar-Razl (10th century A.D.) on
236 Daiber
versucht er nachzuweisen, daB auch die Vielzahl dcr Religionen nicht deren transzendcnte Einheit zerstoren konne. Ihre Unterschiedlichkcit riihre von der Verschicdcnhcit der Volker her. - Philosophic ist wie religiose Offenbarung gottlich und bedarf des Vermittlers, ebenso wie in der Vergangenheit Astronomic, Astrologie und Alchemic durch Idris bzw. bei den Griechen durch Hermes vcrmittelt werdcn muBte. Die gottliche Offenbarung des Korans spreche in Form von Bildern (amtal} und man musse nach dcr univcrscllcn Bedeutung (macn~a) diescr Bilder und ihrer auBeren Erscheinungsformen (zahir al-alfaz) fragen und forschen.48
Abii Hatim ar-Razi hat cine Ehrcnrettung dcr These von der religiosen Offenbarung durch eincn Propheten gcsucht, indem er auf die universelle Wahrhcit dcr Religionen vcrwies; diese universcllc, transzendente Wahrheit sci mil dcr Philosophic identisch und wie diesc gottlichen Ursprungs. Sic bedarf eincs Vermittlers, eines Propheten. Die iibcrmittcltc Botschaft, die Bilder ihrerseits bediirfcn dcr Interpretation (ta'wll), um zu dcren univcrsellen Bedeutung gclangen zu konnen. Die universelle Wahrhcit (kullu macrifatin) habc ihren Ursprung in Gott, und wcrdc durch den Propheten vermittclt, "dcm ersten Weisen" (al-hakim al- auwal). Das Wisscn dcr Menschen hicrum bauc auf vorherigcs Wisscn auf. Auch diese Tatsache bcwcisc die Existenz cines vorhcrigen prophctischcn Vermittlers.49
Abu Hatim ar-Razis Symbiose von Philosophic und rcligioscr Offen barung durch die Annahme cincr gcmcinsamen transzendenten Wahrheit entpuppt sich als Wcitercntwicklung von Gedanken seines Vorgangers Kindi; das Wisscn des Philosophen hat letztlich scinen Ursprung in Gott und stimmt mit dcr religioscn, durch den Propheten ubermittcltcn Offen barung ubercin; ihr Inhalt liegt den Menschen in Form von Bildern vor, deren Bedeutung durch Interpretation verstandlich wird.
Gleichzcitig erscheint hicr Kindis erkenntnistheorctische Untcr- scheidung zwischcn Bildern des Wahrnehmbaren in der Seelc und Abstraktionen des Geistcs aufgcgcben; das Bild der religioscn Sprache ist
the Unity and Diversity of Religions", in: Dialogue and Syncretism. An Interdisciplinary Approach. Currents of Encounter 1. Amsterdam 1989.
48 c -
Vgl. A lam an-nubuwa ed. al-Sawy (s.Anm. 47) S.104ff./franz. Ubers. F. Brion,
"Philosophie et revelation: traduction annotee de six extraits du Kitab Aclam Al- Nubuwwa d'Abu Hatim AI-Razi", in: Bulletin de philosophic medievale 28, 1986 (S.134- 162), S.152ff.
49 Vgl. ed. al-Sawy (s.Anm. 47) S.314ff.
Die Autonomie der Philosophic im Islam 237
konform mit dcm Gcdankcn. Religion hat eine symbolische Bcdcutung, zu dcrcn Verstandnis man durch Interpretation kommen kann.
Wir erkennen hier im Ansat/, einen Gedanken, den Abu Hatim ar- Razis jiingerer Zeitgenosse Farabi (gest. 950) zur Hauptthese seiner politischen Philosophic gemacht hat.50 Fur Farabi sind Religionen - sic unterscheiden sich in einer an Abu Hatim erinnernden Weise lediglich in der Symbolik und nicht im Symbolisierten51 - die symbolische Wiedergabe philosophischcr Wahrheit, "Nachahmung" der Philosophic. Dies begriindet Farabi mit der aristotelischen These von der Wechsclbeziehung zwischcn Denken und Wahrnehmung; die Seele denkt in Wahrnehmungsbildern, in- dem ihre Vorstcllungskraft Wahrnehmbares "nachahmt". Im Gegensatz zu Kind!, der zwischen Wahrnehmungsbildern der Seele und gedanklichcn Abstraktionen unterschiedcn hatte, haben bei Farabi die Universalien der Philosophic ein bildliches Pendant in den Partikularien, in der Religion. In origineller Weise hat nun Farabi diese Konstellation parallelisiert mit der aristotelischen und von Kind! nur gestreiften Zweiteilung der Philosophic von Theorie und Praxis, Wisscn und ethischem Handeln; die ethischc Komponente, die bereits Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn Zakariya' ar-Razi als Mittel zur Lautcrung der Seele durch die ratio miteinbezogen hatte, dient dazu, um in platonischem Kontext mit aristotelischem Vorzeichen die Verwirklichung der wahren Philosophic in der ethischen Vervollkommnung des Einzelnen im Idealstaat moglich zu machen. Hierzu leitet die Religion mit ihren Vorschriften an. Da diesc gleichzeitig die einzig mogliche, dem Erkennen aller Mcnschcn zugangliche Wiedergabe philosophischer Wahr heit, der Universalien in Form von Symbolen, Bildern und die einzig mogliche Verwirklichung der Philosophic durch das ethisch vollkommcne Handeln des Einzelnen im Mustcrstaat ist, schrankt hicr Religion die Autonomie der Philosophic in einer besonderen Weise ein. Religion ist nicht nur ein erkcnntnistheoretischcr und ethischer Faktor, sondern zum unentbehrlichen "Instrument" der Philosophic gewordcn.52 Dariibcr hinaus erweist sich religiose Offenbarung als unentbehrlich fur das philosophischc Erkennen und fur den logischcn Nachweis der spezifischcn Natur der
50 Vgl. zum Nachfolgenden Daiber, "Prophetic und Ethik bei FarabT (gest. 339/950)", in: L'homme et son univers au moyen age. Louvain-la-Neuve 1986 (= Philosophes medievaux 26-27), S.729-753; --, The Ruler as Philosopher, Amsterdam/Oxford/New York 1986 = Mcdcdelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, afd. Letterkunde, n.r. d.49, no.4 (= S.129-149).
c -i W~
Vgl. Farabi, as-Siyasa l-madaniya ed. P.M. Naggar (Beirut 1964) S.85C. 52 Vgl. Naheres bei Daiber, Ruler (s.Anm. 50) S.14f.
238 Daibcr
Dingc bzw. dcr im Musterstaat nachzuahmenden Struktur des Universums durch die Mcnschen, den Prophct-Philosophen par excellence. Menschliches Erkcnncn ist unvollkommcn und bcdarf dcr Inspirationen des gottlichen aktiven Intellektes. Alexander von Aphrodisias' und Aristoteles' psychologische Lehren dienen hier da/u, um islamische Prophetic und religiose Offenbarung in der Philosophic zu vcrankern. Religion ist nicht nur bildlichc, symbolische Wicdcrgabe philosophischer Wahrhcit fur den Nichtphilosophcn, fur die Masse, sondern auch Verwirklichung der wahren Philosophic, indcm sic das cthische Vcrhalten des Einzelnen im Muster staat bestimmt sowic prophetische Inspirationsquelle dieser Philosophic ist. Der Regent des Mustcrstaates ist daher Philosoph und Prophet.
Mil scincn Lehren hat Farabi den Philosophiebegriff der nach- folgenden Zcit maBgebend beeinfluBt, scheint es ihm doch gelungen zu sein, Philosophic und religiose Offenbarung in philosophisch iiberzeugender und fiir den muslimischen Glaubigcn akzeptabler und vcrstandlicher Weise miteinander zu verbinden. Religion erscheint eincrseits als ancilla filosofiae und andererseits verwirklicht sich die Philosophic in dcr Religion. Dicse gcnialc Losung hat auf spatcre Philosophcn groBen Eindruck gemacht, wobei es Modifikationen und Kritik gegebcn hat.
Der bcruhmte Arzt und Philosoph Ibn Sina (gcst. 1037) hat Farabis Auffassung dcr Religion als Nachahmung der Philosophic in Form von Symbolcn mit cinigen Andcrungcn iibcrnommcn.53 Philosophic ist nicht der ungebildcten Masse zugiinglich; daher muB dcr Prophet dicsc in Symbolcn ansprcchcn, ohnc den Eindruck zu wcckcn, daB gewissc Kcnntnisse ihr vorcnthaltcn wcrdcn. Dicsc Ermahnung Ibn Sinas implizicrt die Annahmc philosophischen Wisscns, das nicht fiir die Masse bestimmt ist.54 Denn Religion ist nicht mehr die notwendige Verwirklichung wahrer Philosophic, wie Farabi mil cpistemologischcr Argumentation crklart hattc; sic ist ausschlicBlich Symbol- und Bildcrsprache gcwordcn, die iibcr Gottcs
Vgl. iMarmura, "Islamic Philosophers Conception" (s.Anm. 40) S.98C.
Vgl. hierzu z.B. Ihn Sina, Ahw'al an-nafs ed. Ahmad Fu'ad al-Ahwam (Kairo 1952) S.141F.; — , Risalat al-qadar, wo/.u man G.F. Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics (Cambridge 1985) S.227-248, bes. 240ff. vergleiche (dazu Rez. Daiber in: Der Islam). - Ibn Sma ist hier von Farabis Ikschreibung der Methode des Aristoteles angeregt: vgl. Farabi, Ma yanbagi an yuqaddam qabl iac allum falsafat Aristu ed. F. Dieterici (Alfarabls philosophische Abhandlungcn , Leiden 1892, S.53f.)/Ubers. Dieterici (Leiden 1892) S.89; Farabi seinerscits folgt hier alexandrinischer Tradition: vgl. Elias, In Porphyrii Isagogen ct Aristotelis Categorias commentaria ed. A. Bussc (Berlin 1900 = Commentaria in Aristotelem Gracca 18/1) S.124.25ff. und dazu E.K. Rowson, Al-cAmirt on the Afterlife (thesis Yale University 1892) S.341 (zu S.99f.).
Die Autonomie der Philosophic im Islam 239
Majestat und Unvcrgleichlichkcit, liber Auferstehung, ewigc Gliickscligkeit und Verdammung spricht.55 Folglich kann man bei Avicenna zwei Arten des Prophetcntums finden:56 1) das imaginative Prophetentum, worin der Prophet von den himmlischen Seelen, "den wirkenden Engeln" sein Wissen in Form von Bildern und Symbolen des universellen Wissens empfangt; 2) das intellektuelle Prophetentum, worin der Prophet ohne Mithilfe der Seele durch Intuition (hads) die intelligiblen vom wirkenden Intellekt empfangt. Diese hohere Form der Erkenntnis laBt sich den Nichtphilo- sophen in der Sprache von Bildern und Symbolen iibermitteln, wobei - wie gesagt - ihnen einiges vorenthalten werden muB.
Diese esoterische Einstellung, die FarabI kritisiert hatte,57 recht- fertigt Avicenna mit dem Eingestandnis, daB es neben den primaren, von alien Menschen direkt rezipierbaren Intelligiblen auch solche gibt, die nur Propheten aufnehmen konnen, Menschen, die des demonstrativen und abstrakten Denkens fahig und zu logischen SchluBfolgerungen imstande sind.58 Diese Intelligiblen konnen den Nichtphilosophen nur in beschranktem MaBe sowie nur in Symbolen weitergegeben werden; die menschlische Vernunftseele soil mit diesem Wissen - par excellence das geoffenbarte Gesetz, eine symbolische Widerspiegelung philosophischer Wahrheit - lernen, die animalischen Leidenschaften zu beherrschen, um nach dem Tode, vom Korper befreit, in ewiger Seligkeit, in der Schau der himmlischen Wesen und von Gott zu verweilen. - Dieser Auffassung von der Symbolsprache gegeniiber stehen Avicennas Beweise fur seine von FarabI beeinfluBte Auffassung von Gott als dem in seiner eigenen Wesenheit notwendig Seienden, worin die Kette essentieller Ursachen und ihrer koexistierender Wirkungen endet, welcher sich selbst erkennt und
55 Vgl. Ibn Sma, as-^ifa', Uahiyat X ed. Muhammad Yusuf Musa, Sulaiman Dunya, Sa°Id Zayid (Kairo 1960) S.443/engl. Ubers. Marmura in: Medie\>al Political Philosophy: A sourcebook. Toronto, Ontario 1963, S.lOOf.; franz. Ubers. G.C. Anawati, Avicenne, la metaphysique du Shifa', livres de VI a X, Paris 1985 (= Etudes musulmanes 27), S.177.
56 Vgl. Ibn Sma, Ahw'al an-nafs ed. Ahwam (s.Anm. 54) S.114ff.; Avicenna's De anima (Arabic Text) being the psychological part of Kit'ab Al-Shifa' ed. F. Rahman (London 1959) S.173ff.; -- , Itb'at an-nub'uwat ed. M. Marmura (Beirut 1968) S.45ff./engl. Ubersetzung Marmura in Medieval Political Philosophy (s.Anm. 55) S.114ff. - Dazu Marmura (s.Anm. 29) S.363; Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal, "De la Multiplicite des modes de la prophetic chez Ibn Sma", in: Etudes sur Avicenna. Dirigees par Jean Jolh'et et Roshdi Rashed. Paris 1984, S.125-142; J.R. Michot, La destinee de Vhomme selon Avicenne (Louvain 1986 = Academic Royale de Belgique - Fonds Rene Draguet. Classe des lettres V) S.104ff., bes. 120ff.
57 Vgl. Daiber, Ruler (s.Anm. 50) S.17f.
58 Vgl. Marmura (s.Anm. 29) S.361f.
240 Daibcr
wie die (lurch ihn notwendigc himmlische Intelligenz die Einzeldinge nur "auf eine allgemeine Weise" kennt.59
Religiose Symbolik und philosophische Wahrheit formen bei Ibn Sina nicht mehr die innige Verbindung, wic wir sic bci Farabi gefunden batten. Dies hangt mit einer wichtigcn Neuerung /.usammen, die Ibn Sina - vielleicht unter dem Eindruck der Enzyklopadie der Ihw'an as-Safa', eine vor 959/960 verfaBte philosophisch-naturwissenschaftliche Begriindung des Sufitums zur Lauterung der Seele60 eingefiihrt hatte, namlich die nachdriickliche Einbeziehung der Mystik in die Philosophic. Fiir Ibn Sina ist daher der Prophet ein Mystiker, der die Menschen durch seine Verkiindung des gottlichen Gesetzes auf den mystischen Pfad fiihren will.61 Der mystische Pfad ist der einzige Weg, der die Vernunftscele vom Korper und seinen Leidenschaften befreien und zur vollstandigen Schau (mutfahada) Gottes fiihren kann.62 Mit dieser mystischen Komponente steht Ibn Smas Philosophiebegriff in krassem Gegensatz zu Farabis Auffassung von der Philosophic als Weg zur Gliickseligkeit im ethisch vollkommenen Vcrhalten des Einzelnen im Musterstaat. Er beriihrt sich mit dcm neuplatonischen coipay/iwi/'-pLoc.-Ideal des Philosophen, der sich besser aus der Gesellschaft zuriickzieht; vor Ibn Sina hatte der 1017 verstorbene ncstorianische Christ Ibn al-Hammar diesem Thema eine Abhandlung gewidmet.63 Er hat eine poetische Wiedergabe erfahren in Ibn Smas Allegoric Hayy Ibn Yaqz'anM und in seinem Gcdicht iiber die Seele,65
' Vgl. Marmura (s.Anm. 29) S.359-361.
Auf die Bckanntschaft Ihn Sinas mit den Ihwan as-Safa' wcist Susannc Diwald, "Die Bcdcutung des Kitah Itiwan as-^afa' fur das islamischc Dcnkcn", in: Convegno sugli Ik/wan as-Safa' (Roma 25-26 ottobrc 1979), Roma 1981 (= Accademia Na/.ionale dci Lincei, Fonda/.ione Ix;one Cactani), S.5-25. hcs. 23f. - Zum Philosophiehcgriff der Ihwan vgl. ed. Hairaddm az-/irirkir III (Kairo 1928) S.325ff./0bers. S. Diwald, Arabische Philosophic und Wissenschaft in der Enzyklopadie (Wiesbaden 1975) S.427ff.
Vgl. im Hinzclncn Marmura, "Aviccnna's Theory of Prophecy in the Light of
Ashcarite Theology", in: The Seed of Wisdom. Essays in honour of T.J. Meek. Ed. by
W.S. McCullough (Toronto 1964) S. 159-178; -, "Aviccnna's Psychological Proof of Prophecy", in: Journal of Near Eastern Studies 22, 1963, S.49-56.
'" Vgl. Ix)uis Gardet, La pensec rcligieuse d'Avicenne (Ibn Sina), Paris 1951, Kp.5; Marmura (s.Anm. 29) S.363.
al-Hasan Ibn Suwar Ibn al-Hammar, Maqala fl sifat ar-ragul al-failasuf hrsg.u.ubcrs. v. B. Lewin, "L'ideal antique du philosophc dans la tradition arabe", in: Lychnos 1954-5 (Uppsala 1955), S.267-284; vgl. dax.u Joel L. Kraemer, Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam (I^iden 1986) S.128.
64 - - -
Arab. Text ed. Ahmad Amin, Hayy Ibn Yaq^an li-bn Sina wa-bn Tufail wa-s-Suh-
raward'i (Kairo 1966) S.4CM9/Ubers. mit Kommentar in A.M. Goichon, Le recit de Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, Paris 1959. Vgl. den Art. "Hayy B. Yakzan" in: Encyclopaedia of
Die Autonomie der Philosophic im Islam 241
bcides symbolische Bcschreibungcn dcr Wegc der Scclc wcg von den Fesseln des Korpers, von dcr Dunkelheit der Materie und hin zum himmlischen Licht des reinen Intellekts, zur Einswerdung mil Gott.
Ibn Smas mystische Orientierung des Philosophiebegriffes im Sinne eines intellektuellen Aufstieges zu hoheren Formen der Erkenntnis hat sich nicht sofort durchgesetzt und hat erst ein Jahrhundert spater, bei Ibn Bag^a ein Echo gcfunden. In der Zwischenzeit hat Ibn Smas Philo sophic einen Bewunderer, aber auch Kritiker in Abu Hamid al-Gazzall (gest. 1111) gefunden. Gazzali reduziert die Bedeutung der Philosophic auf ihre Funktion als ancilla theologiae; in seinem Tah'afut al-falasifa (Destructio philosophorum)66 weist er auf Unstimmigkeiten der Philosophen und auf Aussagcn, die im Widerspruch zu Theologen seiner Zeit, den As^ariten stehen; zu nennen ist hier vor allem der Widerspruch der Philosophen zur Lehre von Gottes ewigem Willen und schopferischem, in der Zeit stattfindenden Handeln. Gazzali lehnt die philosophischen Theorien von der Vorewigkeit der Welt,67 von Gottes Kenntnis der Einzeldinge in universeller Weise und von der individuellen Unsterblichkeit der Seele mit AusschluB des Leibes ab. Doch die Logik bleibt unein- geschrankt Instrument der Erkenntnis auch fiir Theologie und Recht- wissenschaft. Diese hat ihn am meisten an Ibn Sina fasziniert und diese benutzt er, um die Philosophen, namlich Ibn Sina und Farabi, zu kritisieren.68 Gazzalfs as^aritisches und von seinem Lehrer GuwainI69 inspiriertes Konzept von Gottes allmachtigem Wissen, Willen und Handeln fiihrte nicht nur zur Leugnung der philosophischen Vorstellung, daB alles, was verursacht ist, eine Ursache haben miisse; Gott habe die Dinge zunachst nebeneinander erschaffen und bestimme mit seinem Willen und
Islam III (Leiden-London 1971) u. dort gegebene Literaturverweise.
Arab. T. mit Studie in: Fathallah Hulaif, Ibn Sina wa-madhabuhli fl n-nafs (Beirut 1974) S.129-131; franz. Ubers. H. Jahier, A. Noureddine, Anthologie de textes poetiques attribute aAvicenne (Alger 1961) S.30-36.
66 Hrsg. v. M. Bouyges, Beyrouth 1927. Das Buch war dem Mittelalter bekannt, auch in lateinischen Ubersetzungen der Widerlegung des Averroes seit dem 14. Jh.; vgl. Beatrice H. Zedler (Hrsg.), Averrois Destructio destructionum philosophiae Algazels in the Latin Version ofCalo Calonymos, Wisconsin 1961.
67 Vgl. dazu M. Marmura, The Conflict over the World's Pre-Eternity in the Tahafuts ofAl-Ghaz'ali and Ibn Rushd (thesis Michigan 1959).
68 Vgl. im Einzelnen Marmura (s.Anm. 29) S.366ff.
69 Vgl. dazu W.M. Watt in: Der Islam II (s.Anm. 29) S.404ff.
242 Daiber
seiner Allmacht den Zusammenhang zwischen diesen.70 Gazzali leugnete damit auch Ibn Smas neuplatonische Emanationslehren, folgt ihm aber in der Einbeziehung der Mystik in den Gottesglauben: In seinem Werk iiber Die Wiederbelebung der Religionswissenschaften (Iljyh' curum ad-dln)71 sucht er cine Synthese zwischen Sufi-Tugenden der Gottesliebe, koranischer Ethik und aristotelischer Lehre von der Tugend als Goldene Mitte.72 Philosophic wird mehr zum logischen Werkzeug fur die geistige Beschaftigung mil der Religion, fur die Theologie. In der Theologie finden - wie bereits vorher bei den Muctaziliten - seit Gazzali zunehmend auch philosophische Lehren Eingang.
Im Gegenzug hat Gazzali versucht, den Partikularien der Religion mehr Nachdruck zu verleihen. Das Streben nach Vollkommenheit orientiert sich am islamischen Gesetz und an den koranisch-islamischen Jenseits- erwartungen einer mystisch gcpragten Frommigkeit des einzelnen Glaubigen. Die menschliche Gesellschaft, Farabis Musterstaat als Rahmen fur die Verwirklichung der Philosophic im tugendhaften Handeln dcs Menschen tritt in den Hintergrund; ebenso der erkenntnistheoretische Aspekt der Philosophic, den Gazzali von Ibn Sina nicht uncingeschrankt ubernommen und vielfach auf den Einsatz der Logik als Mittel der Beweisfiihrung durch die philosophische Elite73 reduziert hat.
Erst der spanische Philosoph Ibn Bag^a (gest. 1139) hat Ibn SInas Begriff der Philosophic im Sinnc cincs mystischcn Aufstiegs zu stets hohcrcn Formcn der Erkcnntnis wciter ausgcbaut. Ziel ist die Bcfreiung der Scele von der Materie und ihre Einswerdung mit dem aktiven Intellekt, eincr Emanation Gottes, wodurch sie zu einem zunehmend abstrakten Begriff des aus Materie und Form zusammengesetzten sinnlich Wahrnehmbaren kommt.74 Hierbei hat Ibn Bag^a das Schlagwort vom
Vgl. im Einzelncn Marmura, "Gha/.ali and Demonstrative Science", in: Journal of the History of Philosophy 3, 1965, S. 183-204 und Daiber, Mifammar (s.Anm. 10) S.284f. gcgebcne Hinwcise.
Hrsg. in 4 Bandcn in Kairo 1862; seithcrsind mehrere Nachdrucke crschicnen.
Vgl. dazu O.E. Chahine, L'originalite creatrice de la philosophic musulmane (Paris 1972) S.lOSff.; ferner Gazzalis Schrift Mizan al-camal ed. Sulaiman Dunya, Kairo 1964 /Obers. Hikmat Hachem, Critirc de I'action, Paris 1945.
Vgl. dazu Gazzalis Ilgam al- awamm min cilm al-kalam in: al-Qusur al-cawati min rasa'il al-Imam al-tiazzali, Kairo 1964.
74 ~ w c
Vgl. Ibn Bagga, Risalat lttis,al al- aql bi-l-insan ed. M. Fakhry, Opera metaphysica
(Beirut 1968) S.155ff.; -, Tadb'ir al-mutawahhid ed. Macn Ziyadeh, Beirut 1978; dazu Mongi Chemli, La philosophic morale d'Ibn Bajja (Avempace) a tra\<ers le Tadblr al-
Die Autonomie der Philosophic im Islam 243
"cinsamcn" Philosopher, gcnannt al-mutawahhid, cntwickclt. Er gibt hier cincr Aussage cine neue Pointierung, worin Farabi eingesteht, daB ein tugcndhaftcr Mcnsch odcr Philosoph /.uweilen untcr nichttugendhafter Hcrrschaft lebcn muB und wie "ein Fremder in der Welt" ist. Ibn Bagga beschrankt sich nicht auf Farabis Pessimismus, wonach fur den tugend- haften Mensch, der keinen tugendhaften Staat findet, "der Tod besser ist als das Leben". Denn der "einsame" Philosoph, der nicht seinesgleichen fmdct, muB sich wie ein Sufi von der Gemeinschaft, von den anderen Menschen - unter denen er wie "Unkraut" (pi. naw'abii) leben muB - abkapseln. Obzwar - ubereinstimmend mil Aristoteles - der Mensch von Natur ein politisches Lebewesen ist, sei diese Abkapselung unter diesen Umstanden akzidentell etwas Gutes.76
Der Philosoph in der Abgeschiedenheit von der Welt sowie in mystischer Kontemplation und intellektuellem Aufstieg entpuppt sich bei Ibn Bag^a als Rechtfertigung fur autonomen Alleingang der Philosophie ohne - farabianisch formuliert - die Partikularia dieser Welt zu benotigen. Diese These vom Alleingang des Philosophen hat ein jiingerer Zeitgenosse von Ibn Bag^a, der spanische Philosoph Ibn Tufail (gest. 1185 oder 1186) zum Thema seines philosophischen Romans Hayy Ibn Yaqzan gemacht und dabei Farabi, Gazzali und Ibn Bag^a kritisiert.77 Hierbei erweist sich Ibn Tufail als Schiiler des Ibn Sma.78 Er ubernimmt dessen These von der Gottesschau durch mystische Kontemplation und von der Einheit aller Dinge, die eine erste notwendige gottliche Ursache habe.79 Gleichzeitig ubernimmt er die farabianisch-avicennianische These von Religion als symbolisches, alien Menschen verstandliches Spiegelbild philosophischer
Mutawahhid, Tunis 1969; Georges Zainaty, La morale d'Avempace, Paris 1979 = Etudes musulmans 22; Joel L. Kraemer, "Ibn Bajja y Maimonides sobre la perfeccion humana", in: / congreso international "Encuentro de las culturas" (3-7 octubre 1982), Toledo 1983, S.237-245.
75 Vgl. Farabi, al-Fus'ul al-muntazaca, ed. P.M. Naggar (Beirut 1971) S.95; -, Kit'ab al- Milla ed. M. Mahdi (Beirut 1968) S.56f./0bers. Marmura (sAnm. 29) S.354 oben; dazu Endress (s.Anm. 13) S.233ff.
lf\
Vgl. Marmura (s.Anm. 29) S.375f.; G. Endress, "Wissen und Gesellschaft in der
islamischen Philosophie des Mittelalters", in: Pragmatik. Handbuch pragmatischcn Denkens. Hrsg. v. Herbert Stachowiak. I (Hamburg 1986, S.219-245), S.236.; vgl. dazu Oliver Leaman, "Ibn Bajja on Society and Philosophy", in: Der Islam 57, 1980, S.109- 119, bes.HSf.
Vgl. Marmura (s.Anm. 29) S.377f.; -, The Philosopher and Society: Some Medieval Arabic Discussions", in: Arab Studies Quarterly 1, Detroit 1979 (S.309-323), S.318ff.
78 Vgl. dazu auch Z.A. Siddiqi, Philosophy of Ibn Tufayl (Aligarh 1965) S.133ff.
79
Vgl. oben zu Anm. 59.
244 Daiber
Wahrheit, nicht aber Farabis Einschatzung der Religion als Vcrwirklichung der Philosophic im tugendhaften Vcrhalten des Einzelnen im Musterstaat: Die Religion von Absal, der um die verborgene Wahrheit der Offenbarung weiB und sich im Unterschied zu Salaman nicht auf die a'uBere Form, den Buchstaben sowie die vorgeschriebenen Rituale beschrankt, widerspricht nicht der philosophischen Erkenntnis, die Hayy Ibn Yaqzan in mystischer Abgeschiedenheit auf der Insel erworben hatte.80 Da Philosophic den Nichtphilosophen nur durch die Symbolik der Religion ubermittelt werden kann, bleibt Hayy Ibn Yaqzan gczwungenermaBen der "einsame" Philosoph, wie er es von Anfang war; Absal leistet ihm Gesellschaft, weil ihm seine Kenntnis um die symbolische Bedeutung der Religion den Zugang zur philosophischen Wahrheit vermittelt hat. Hierbei erscheint bei Ibn Tufail dieselbe esotcrische Einstellung, die wir bei Ibn Sina gefunden hatten: die Mehrheit der Leute ist nicht in der Lage, die tieferc Bedeutung der Religion zu verstehen, sollte daher nicht mit den Lehren der Philosophen konfrontiert werden und - eincr as^aritischen Maxime folgend - ohne weiteres Fragen (bi-la kaifa) die religiosen Vorschriften einhalten.81
Die Einschatzung der Philosophic als tiefcre Bedeutung der Religion ubernimmt Ibn Tufails jiingerer Freund Ibn Rus'd (gcst. 1198). Er bietet in scincm Fasl al-maq'al (Die entscheidende Abhandlungf2 cine juristische Verteidigung der Philosophic. Die Philosophic sei nach dem Gcsetz Pflicht, das logische Argumcntieren und die Erforschung von Gottes Schopfung zum Zwcckc der Gottesschau sei vom Koran (z.B. Sure 59,2) bcfohlen.83 Doch wie in der farabianisch-aviccnnianischen Auffassung des Ibn Tufail ist nicht jedcr zu philosophischcr Erkenntnis in der Lagc; Ibn Ru^d untcrscheidet die philosophische Elite, die zu logischen Schliissen fa'hig ist - er nennt sic nach Sure 3,7 Leutc, "die cin griindlichcs Wissen habcn"84
80
Im Unterschied hicr/.u kommt 1 Jh. spater bei Ibn an-Nafis der Theologus auto-
dictatus durch Kontakte mit der AuBcnwelt zu dem SchluB, daB der Mensch die Gesell schaft notig hat; ferner cntdcckt er durch eigenes Nachdenken seine religiosen Pflichten, die Notwendigkeit eines Propheten und die Zeichen des kommenden Unter- gangs der Welt; s. Max Mcyerhof, Joseph Schacht, The Theologus Autodidactus (ed. with an introduction, translation and notes. Oxford 1968) S.30f.
01
Vgl Ibn Tufail, Hayy Ibn Yaqzan ed. Leon Gauthier (Beirut 1936) S.153f./0bers. Lenn Evan Goodman, Ibn Tufayl's Hayy Ibn Yaqzan (New York 1972) S.164f.
8^
Hrsg. v. George F. Hourani, Ix;iden 1959; engl. Ubers. v. Hourani, Averroes on the
Harmony of Religion and Philosophy (s.Anm. 7).
83 Vgl. Marmura (s.Anm. 29) S.381f.
84 Vgl. dazu I lourani (s.Anm. 7) S.52, Anm. 74 u. S.54, Anm. 87.
Die Autonomie der Philosophic im Islam 245
- von denen, die sich mil rhctorischen Uberredungen bcgniigcn miissen; cr fiigt abcr zwischen bciden Klassen die Schicht der Theologen (mutakal- limun) ein, die nicht iiber das dialektische Argumentieren hinaus kommen.
Jeglicher Konflikt zwischen Philosophic und Religion ist Ibn Rusd zufolge nur scheinbar und beruht darauf, daB schwierige Texte der religiosen Offenbarung wortlich und nicht metaphorisch ausgelegt sowie von Leuten interpretiert werden, die nicht zur Beweisfiihrung fahig sind. Doch im Unterschied zu (jazzali, dessen Kritik an den Philosophen86 er in seinem Tah'afut at-tah'afuf*1 zuriickweist, ist Irrtum in der Einschatzung der Offenbarung als wortlich oder allegorisch zu interpretierende Texte noch nicht "Unglaube" (kufr). Ein Beispiel ist die religiose Uberlieferung iiber die Auferstehung, wo es unsicher sei, ob sie hinsichtlich der Unsterblichkeit der Seele wortlich oder philosophisch interpretiert werden musse; Ibn Ru^d nimmt sie sowohl wortlich und betrachtet sie als Bestatigung fur die individuelle Unsterblichkeit der Seele. Aber er bietet auch eine philosophische Interpretation, wobei er gegen Gazzali zur Leugnung der individuellen Unsterblichkeit kommt: Dies begriindet Ibn Ru^d mit seiner Theorie vom aktiven ewigen Intellekt.88 Dieser ist die Form des Hyle-Intellektes, welcher - vergleichbar der Form-Materie- Verbindung - seinerseits Form der Seele ist. Somit ist die Form der Seele, der Hyle-Intellekt, ewige Potentialitat und besitzt die Disposition (isti- cd~ad\ um unter Einwirkung des aktiven Intellekts die Intelligiblen durch die Vorstellungskraft aufzunehmen und das erworbene Wissen mit dem aktiven Intellekt zu verbinden. Diese Verbindung (ittis'al, itlihad) ist die vollkommenste Form menschlicher Erkenntnis, die der spekulative Intellekt des Menschen in standiger Beschaftigung mit den Wissenschaften erlangen
85 Vgl. im Einzelnen Marmura (s.Anm. 29) S.382-4.
86 Vgl. Marmura (s.Anm. 29) S.384ff.
87
Hrsg. v. M. Bouyges, Beyrouth 1930/cngl. Ubers. v. Simon Van Den Bergh (I-II,
London 1969, repr. 1978). - Zwischen beiden Werken sucht cAla'addm at-Tusi (gest. 1482), ad^Datura (= Tahafut al-falasifa) zu vermitteln. Das Werk ist von Rida Sa ada 1981 in Beirut neu herausgegeben worden.
oo
Vgl. A.L. Ivry, "Averroes on Intellection and Conjunction", in: Journal of the American Oriental Society 86, 1966, S.76-85; — , Towards a Unified View of Averroes' Philosophy", in: The Philosophical Forum IV/1 (new series), Fall 1972 (Boston, Mass. 1973), S.87-113.; Marmura (sAnm. 29) S.385ff.; Kalman P. Bland, The Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect by Ibn Rusnd with the Commentary of Moses Narboni (New York 1982), Einl. S.lff. und Text; Ovey N. Mohammed, Averroes' Doctrine of Immortality, Waterloo, Ontario 1984.
246 Daiber
kann. Als Folge dicser Verbindung dcr Seele mil der ewigcn Form dcs aktiven Intellcktes und den verganglichen imaginarcn Formcn des Hyle- Intcllcktcs gibt es fur Avcrrocs kcine individuelle Unstcrblichkeit der Seele.90
Bedeutsam ist in in dieser epistemologischen Stellungnahme zur Unsterblichkeit die Beziehung zwischen sinnlichen, verganglichen Einzel- wahrnehmungen und abstrahierten ewigen Allgemeinbegriffen, zwischen Intellekt und Sinneswahrnehmung. Ibn Rus'd fiihrt hier in modifizierter Form Gedanken des Farabi und des Ibn Bag^a weiter;91 der aktive Intellekt ist das Bindeglied zwischen der absoluten Einfachheit und Ewigkeit von Gottes Wissen und dcr Vielheit des erworbenen Wissens um die sichtbare, vcrgangliche Welt. Seine Verbindung mil dem erworbenen Wissen ist Aufgabe der Philosophcn, welche hiermit ohne Zuhilfenahme der gottlichen Offenbarung zu jeder Zeit und an jedem Ort Gliickseligkeit, namlich Unsterblichkeit erlangen konnen.92
Hiermit hat Ibn Rus'd die farabianisch-avicennianische Auffassung von der gottlichen Offenbarung durch den Propheten als etwas fiir die mcnschliche Erkenntnis Unentbehrliches cingeschrankt. Ferner hat er Ibn Bag^as und Ibn Tufails mystische Lehre vom "cinsamen" Philosophen nicht iibernommen und kniipft stattdessen an Farabis Lehre von der Gliickselig- keit des Menschen in der Gemeinschaft an.93 In seiner These von der Konjunktion dcs erworbenen Wissens mit dem aktiven Intellekt hat Ibn Rus'd jcdoch abgesehen von Farabis Parallelisierung von aristotclischcr Abhangigkeit dcs Dcnkcns von der Wahrnehmung mit philosophischer Theorie und Praxis, Einsicht und Ethik. Denn die Gemeinschaft ist eher Hindernis philosophischer Erkenntnis.94
Indessen weisen auch bei Ibn Ru^d die Partikularien auf Univer- salien, auf allgemeine Begriffe, die durch die theoretische Fahigkcit des Menschen abstrahiert werden konnen. Hier erscheint Farabis These von
Vgl. Cbcrs. Bland (s.vor.Anm.) S.36; 69 (wo Ibn Rusd sich damit ausdriicklich gcgen die Sufis wendet); 103ff.; Mahmoud Kassem, Theorie de la connaissance d'apres Averroes et son interpretation chez Thomas d'Aquin (Alger 1978) S.235ff.
Vgl. zu weiteren Argumcntcn gcgcn dicse I^ehre des Gaz/ali Marmura (s.Anm. 29) S.386-388. 91
Vgl. Bland (s.Anm. 88) S.4ff. 93
92 Vgl. Bland (s.Anm. 88) S.6f.
Vgl. Ubers. Bland (s.Anm. 88) S.108f. 94 Vgl. Bland I.e.
Die Autonomie der Philosophic im Islam 247
dcr Religion als Spicgclbild und Instrument der Philosophie erset/.t durch die kompliziertere These vom philosophischen Wissen des Menschen um die Manifestation gottlichen Wisscns durch die Verbindung seiner Seele mil der ewigen Form des aktiven Intellektes und mit der verganglichen Form des Hyle-Intellektes; nicht mehr der Philosoph, Prophet und Regent des Musterstaates (Farabl), nicht mehr der mystische und einsame Wahrheits- sucher (Ibn SIna, Ibn Bag^a, Ibn Tufail), sondern diese dem gesamten Menschengeschlecht zur Aufgabe gesetzte Verbindung fiihrt zur Gliick- seligkeit.95 Philosophie ist zur hochsten Form universaler mensch- licher Kenntnis religioser Wahrheit geworden. Wie bei Farabl, Ibn Sina, Ibn Bag^a und Ibn Tufail ist sie nicht fur jeden begreiflich. Selbst Philosophen konnen sich hierbei irren, da auch die theoretische Fahigkeit der Menschen auf Bilder angewiesen ist. Somit muB es zuweilen unklar bleiben, ob ein Gedanke allegorisch auszulegen ist oder nicht.
Averroes' Auffassung formt den Endpunkt einer Entwicklung, die einen ersten Hohepunkt in Farabl erreicht hatte. Dieser hat mit seiner Harmonisierung von Philosopie und Religion den Philosophiebegriff dcr nachfolgenden Zeit entscheidcnd gepragt. Philosophie wird zum autonomen Wissenszweig, dessen Inhalt sich sowohl an den griechischen Philosophen von Platon und Aristoteles bis Proclus, als auch am Islam, an Koran und religioser Uberliefcrung orientiert und dessen Ideen wie erkenntnis- theoretischen Methoden zunehmend die einzelnen Wissenschaften in ihren formalen und inhaltlichen Pragungen und abgrenzenden Einteilungen,96 auch die islamische Theologie97 gepragt haben. Wahrend ihres Duells mit
Vgl. hier Shlomo Pines, "La philosophic dans 1'economie du genre humain scion Averrocs; une reponse a al-Farabi?" In: Multiple Averrocs (Paris 1978) S. 189-207; Endress (s.Anm. 76) S.239f.
96
Vgl. Ahmad A. al-Rahc, Muslim Philosophers Classifications of the Sciences: al-
Kindl, al-Farabi, al-Ghazali, Ibn Khaldun. Thesis Harvard (Cambridge, Mass.) 1984; G. Endress (s.Anm. 76) S.219ff., bes. 223ff.
Genannt seien hier Ibn Tumart (gest. 391/1001), as-Sahrastani (12. Jh.), Nasiraddin at-TusI (13. Jh.), Ibn Tairmya (13./14. Jh.) und Ibn Abl gumhiir al-Ahsa'i (15. Jh.): s. Georges Vajda, "Une synthese pcu connue de la revelation et de la philosophic: Le
"Kanz al-culum" de Muhammad H. CA1I Ibn Tumart al-Andalusi", in: Melanges Louis
v y, - -
Massignon 3, Damas 1957, S.359-374. - W. Madelung, "As-Sahrastanis Strcitschrift gegcn
Avicenna und ihre Widerlegung durch Naslraddln at-TusI", in: Akten des J.Kongrcsses fur Arabistik und Islamwissenschaft (= Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Gottingen, philol.hist. KI., 3.F. Nr.98), Gottingen 1976, S.250-259; Svahrastanls Mu- saracat al-falasifa und Tusis Masarf al-mus.arf sind von Mahmud al-Marcasi u. Hasan al-Mucizz! 1405/1984 in Qumm hcrausgegcben worden. - §abih Ahmad Kamali, Types of Islamic Thought (Aligarh 1963) S.53ff. (zu Ibn Taimiya); Thomas Michel, "Ibn Taymiyya's Critique of Falsafa", in: Hamdard Islamicus 6/1, Karachi 1983, S.3-14. - W. Madelung,
248 Daibcr
religioser Offcnbarung, das auf cine wechselhafte Gcschichte lebhaftcr, tcilweise politisierter Diskussioncn zuriickblicken kann,98 hat sich islamische Philosophic ebcnso profiliert wic die iibrigen Wissenschaften und das religiose Denken und Handeln des Islam. Sie hat das damalige BewuBtsein so sehr gepragt, daB der beriihmte islamische Historiker Ibn Haldiin (gest. 1406) cine nicht unkritische Zusammenschau von islamischer Gesellschaft, religios-politischem Geset/ und Philosophic bieten kann, die Einfliisse des von Farabi bis Averroes entwickelten philosophischen Weltbildes verrat" und nach Averroes' Vorbild die universalhistorische Bcdeutung der auf richtige Weise gepflegten100 Philosophie fur die Menschheit unterstreicht. Seine Geschichtsdarstellung und seine philo- sophische, von Einsichten in so/.iale Gegebenheiten und Erfordernissen gcpragte Schau der Geschichte hat er nicht nur fur cine Minderheit von Gebildeten geschrieben, sondern fur alle;101 auch hier greift Ibn Haldun auf Vorbilder der Vergangenheit zuriick.
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
"Ibn Abl gumhur al-AhsaYs Synthesis of kalam, philosophy and Sufism", in: La signification du bos moycn age dans I'histoire et la culture du monde musulman. Actes du 8me congres de I'Union Europeennc des Arabisants et Islamisants. Aix-en-Provence septembre 1976, S.147-156 (auch: — , Religious Schools and Sects in Medie\'al Islam. London 1985).
98 Vgl. Endress (s.Anm. 76) S.233f.
99 Vgl. hierzu Muhsin Mahdi, Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History (Ixmdon 1957; ^Chicago 1971) S.84ff.; — , "Die Kritik der islamischen politischen Philosophie bei Ibn Khaldun", in: Wissenschaftliche Politik. Eine Einfuhrung in Crundfragen ihrer Tradition und Theorie. Hrsg. v. Dieter Oberndorfcr. Frciburg/Br. 1%2, S.117-151; B.J. Rosenthal, "Ibn Jaldun's Attitude to the Falasifa", in: -, Studio Semitica II, Cambridge 1971, S.I 15-126.
100 Vgl. al-Rabe (s.Anm. 96) S.171C.; 187ff.
101 Vgl. Mahdi (s.Anm. 99) S.113ff.; Ferial Ghazoul, The Metaphors of Historio graphy: a study of Ibn Khaldun's Historical Imagination", in: In Quest of an Islamic Humanism. Arabic and Islamic Studies in Memory of Mohammed al-Nowaihi. Cairo 1984, S.48-61.
Die Autonomie der Philosophic im Islam 249
ABSTRACT:
The Autonomy of Philosophy in Islam
The paper gives a survey of the concepts of philosophy hold by Islamic _philosophcrs (Kindi, Abu Bakr ar-Razi, Abu Hatim ar-Raz[, FarabF, Ibn Sma, al-Gazzali, Ibn Bagga, Ibn Tufail, Ibn Rusd, Ibn Haldiin). The dominant concept of philosophy as an epistemological instrument and as a way to the knowledge of God started from Koranic-Islamic assumptions like the idea of a transcendent God, the emphasis of the search after knowledge and first rational methods of arguing and thinking about_ God and world as developed by the Muctazilites of the 8th/9th century. For Kind! who followed Aristotelian and Neoplatonic ideas, philosophy is Jcnowledge of the divine cause and does not contradict religion and its revelation. Abu Bakr ar-Razi took over Kindi's conception of the autonomy of philosophy and even denied the necessity of revelation; all people are able to philosophy. This was sharply criticized by his contemporary, the Ismaili scholar Abu Hatim ar-Razi whose ideas reappear in a modified manner in his younger contemporary, the famous philosopher Farabi: he declared religion as "imitation", as a "picture" of philosophy which is realized in an ethical manner, in the religion of the perfect state; religion and philosophy need each other as the regent of the state, the philosopher must be a prophet whose imperfect intellect gets its divine inspirations from the intellects agens. Farabi paralleled this correlation between religion and philosophy with the Aristotelian correlation of praxis and theory and with Aristotle's thesis of the correlation between thought and sense-perception. - Farabl's unique conception of philosophy influenced later philosophers who modified it. According to Ibn Sma religion is solely a language of symbols and pictures which the prophet received from the "active angels" and which not in every case can be transmitted to the people. Ibn Sma classified the prophet as a mystic who wants_ to guide people to the mystic pad. This mystical reorientation is taken over in Gazzali's synthesis between Sufi virtues, Koranic ethics and the Aristotelian conception of virtues as golden mean; philosophy is reduced mainly to a logic tool for argumentation in favour of religion. - The neglect of the community^he perfect state as a frame for the realization of philosophy is continued in Ibn Bagga's concept of philosophy as mystical ascension of the soul to higher forms of cognition. His concept of the "solitary" philosopher played a central role in Ibn Tufail's philosophical novel Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, where we can detect the Farabian-Avicennian conception of religion as symbolical mirror image of philosophical truth which can be understood by non- philosophers. - This estimation of philosophy as deeper meaning of religion is taken over in a specific manner by a younger friend of Ibn Tufail, the famous philosopher and jurist Ibn Rusd; according to him every conflict between philosophy and religion is caused by wrong interpretation of revelation. The philosopher must take care for more and more intensive connection between the divine active intellect and acquired knowledge. This conjunction is no more an exclusive task of a Farabian prophet- philosopher and leader in the perfect state, of a solitary mystic as suggested by Ibn Sma, Ibn Bagga and Ibn Tufail; on the contrary, it is an obligation of every man, the whole mankind. Philosophy is the highest form of universal human knowledge about religious truth. Ibn Rusd's conception turns out to be the end of a development which had reached its first highlight with Farabi. - Philosophy had become an autonomous branch of science; it continues Greek philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, his commentators, Plotin and Proclus and keeps to Islamic religious traditions of Koran and Sunna. With its contents and epistemological methods it has shaped more and more single branches of sciences, including Islamic theology. The duel between philosophy and religious revelation has shaped Islamic philosophy and sciences as well as religious thought and acting. Therefore the famous historian Ibn Haldiin could present a critical synopsis of Islamic society, religious-political law and philosophy, in this he stressed by following the model of Ibn Rusd - the universal importance of correctly understood philosophy to mankind. His history and his description of discovery of permanent social factors and demands in history addresses all people and not only an educated minority. Here too Ibn Haldun appears to be inspired by Islamic philosophers.
COLETTE SIRAT
La philosophic et la science scion les philosopher juifs du Moycn-Agc
Tout le long de I'histoirc dc la philosophic juive, 1'etude dcs sciences et 1'etude de la Revelation ont etc appliquees a resoudre les memes problemes, a tenter de repondre aux memes questions, a expliquer Dieu et le monde. II n'y a pas cu de partage entre les domaines auxquels seule la foi ou seule la raison pouvaient prctendre. La difference entre la philosophic et la foi est done celle de definition, de methode de pensce.
II y a eu quelques penseurs opposes a la philosophic ct a 1'apprentissage des sciences. Ainsi Salmon ben Yeruhim (karaite, Palestine, vers 910-970) affirme:
"Desirer d'autres [livres que les livres revcles] c'est acquerir Pignorance [et s'encombrer de] ce qui ne renferme point la sagcsse...Celui qui porte interet a la sagcsse des "autres", des etrangers, devient un disciple des incroyants...
Ces deux themes - les sciences sont extcrieures a la religion et elles eloignent d'elle - seront rcpris et amplifies durant la querellc au sujet des etudes philosophiques, en France du Sud, en Espagne et en Italic durant le Xllleme siecle.
Les premiers penseurs rationalistcs, partisans du Kalam, ont affirme cepcndant quc la raison est une manifestation de Dicu, ainsi Qirqisani et Yefet ben Eli parmi les Karaites, Saadia Gaon, parmi les Rabbanites (tous trois du Xeme siecle, Orient). Scion eux, la recherche et le raisonncment font partie de 1'homme en tant qu'il se distingue des animaux. Comme eux, il a, ccrtes, unc ame vivante, mais la sienne est diffcrente en ce qu'elle est une ame "parlante", c'est-a-dire rationnclle grace a sa comprehension et son discernement qui incluent le langage. De plus, il y a une homogencitc du savoir qui, en elle-meme, est preuve de sa neccssite: prenons une connaissance acquise par 1'investigation rationnelle; elle est prouvee par une autre connaissance acquise egalement par 1'investigation
G. Vajda: Deux commentaires karaites sur I'Ecclesiaste, Leyde, 1971, p. 82.
La philosophic et la science scion les philosopher juifs 25 1
rationncllc, mais ccttc dcrniere cst prouvec par la connaissancc intuitive qui se trouvc ainsi ctrc la base dc tout raisonncmcnt logiquc.
L'amc humainc, par sa disposition naturcllc, tcllc qu'cllc a etc crece par Dieu, pense et comprend les definitions vraies des choses et a le pouvoir de faire un choix. "L'imagc et la ressemblance de Dieu", c'est cette capacite de discerner le bon du mauvais, de choisir, de percevoir les evenements passes et futurs; les animaux se contentent d'acquerir ce qui est necessaire a la survivance physique.
La speculation rationnelle apporte une preuve a un processus psychologique qui existe de toutes facons, car le besoin de connaitre et de chercher existe dans tous les hommes et nul n'est heureux lorsqu'on le traite d'ignorant.
La raison est ce qui distingue rhomme des animaux et le besoin de connaitre est naturel a 1'homme. La science est aussi, deja, un corpus homogene. A la question: la speculation rationnelle doit-elle s'appliquer a la religion? nos trois auteurs repondent decidement oui: la revelation est multiple puisque juifs, chretiens, musulmans ont chacun leur revelation. Seule la raison permet de decider de Pauthenticite d'une revelation. II faut done que le processus intellectuel, rationnel, precede et justifie 1'acceptation d'une prophetic quelle qu'elle soil. Or, meme dans la Bible, nous voyons qu'il y cut des faux prophetes. Plus encore, avant mcme d'accepter la prophetic, il faut etre convaincu qu'un Dieu, bon et sage, est a 1'origine de cctte prophetic; il convient done en premier lieu de prouver, par la raison, 1'existence de Dieu.
A la seconde question: pourquoi la revelation ctait-clle necessaire? les reponses different mais sont basees sur 1'utilite et la necessite politique.
Chez les philosophies juifs du Xeme-XIIeme siccle qu'on a coutume d'appeler les neo-platoniciens, la definition de la raison est celle des philosophes grecs mais le probleme des rapports entrc la raison c'est-a- dire - la philosophie ct la science - et la revelation nc semble pas avoir ete brulant; il leur scmblait evident qu'il n'y avail ni difference ni incompatibilite entre les deux. Citons ici un texte de Joseph b. Jacob Ibn Tsaddiq (Espagne, vers 1110-1150):
"Nous avons dit que le chemin de la connaissance du Tout est la connaissance par 1'homme de son ame, car en connaissant son corps, il connait le monde corporel et en connaissant son ame, il connait le monde spirituel; par cette connaissance, 1'homme attemt la connaissance de son Createur comme il est dit dans Job XIX, 26: a partir de ma chair, je verrai Dieu. Ne t'imagines pas que cette
252 Sirat
connaissance puisse s'accomplir sans etude ni recherche; Pabsurdite de cette idee est evidente puisque ce n'est pas en vain que Dieu a donne a 1'homme Pintellect et la faculte de raisonnement mais justement pour cette raison; ensuite le Createur, beni soit-il, n'est pas objet de sensation ni de comprehension (immediate) et Phomme ne peut le connaitre que par Pintellect apres des etudes et des recherches comme il est dit a propos d'Abraham notre pere: qu'ij chercha et pensa et reflechit et, lorsqu'il cut compris, le Saint beni soit-il se revela a lui. Nous voyons bien que cette connaissance de Dieu attribuee a Abraham est consideree dans la Bible comme le plus eminent et le plus important de tous les dons que Dieu donnera a Israel: "ils n'auront plus a instruire chacun son prochain, chacun son frere en disant: Connaissez le seigneur car tous me connaitront, du plus petit au plus grand" (Jer. XXXI, 34) et la raison de cette connaissance est la prophetic selon le verset: Et alors, je repandrai mon esprit sur toute chair; vos fils et vos lilies prophetiseront" (Joel III, 1) et a ce sujet, les philosophes ont dit que ne peuvent servir la Cause des Causes qu'un hornme prophete par nature dans sa generation ou un philosophe reconnu".
Cette identification entre prophetic et philosophic pose des problemes, car la philosophic inclut nombre de sciences qu'il est bien difficile d'attribucr au peuple juif recevant la Tora sur le Mont Sinai'; Ibn Tsaddiq resout la question en affirmant que lors du don de la Tora, Dieu a donne la prophetic a tout le peuple, car telle ctait sa volonte; mais comme, actuellement, nul ne peut atteindre la philosophic, c'est-a- dire la prophetic, si ce n'est par Pintermediaire de la science, tous doivent gravir les degres de la science.
Pour les partisans du kalam comme pour les neo-platoniciens, il ne peut pas y avoir de conflit entre la philosophic et la revelation: ce sont deux rameaux d'une meme branche. Avcc Abraham Ibn Daoud (Espagne, Xlleme siecle) nous cntrons dans la periode aristotelicienne. Et tout de suite on ressent Popposition entre philosophic et religion:
"La Tora et la philosophic sont en contradiction flagrante lorsqu'il s'agit de decrire Pessence divine: pour les philosophes, Dieu, incorpprel, n'est aucunement susceptible de changement; la Tora, au contraire, relate les deplaccments de Dieu, ses sentiments... Etant donne que la philosophic et la Tora sont a ce sujet en contradiction, nous sommes dans la situation d'un homme ayant deux maitres, dont Pun est grand et Pautre n'est pas petit; au premier il ne peut complaire qu'en transgressant Popmion du second, en consequence, si nous trouvons un moyen de les mettre d'accord, nous nous en trouverons fort heureux.
Abraham Ibn Daoud apportera dans son livre le temoignagc des textes religicux et les preuves de la philosophic vraie. Ces preuves, que
2 Ha-Olam haqatan, ed. S. Horovitz, Breslau, 1903, p. 21. 5 Emuna Rama, ed. S. Weil, Francforts/Main, 1852, p. 82.
La philosophic ct la science selon les philosophes juifs 253
sont-elles? ellcs sont dcs premisses et des raisonnements qui s'enchainent les unes aux autres, ainsi il faut d'abord exposer les premisses de la physique et de la mctaphysique lesquelles nous ameneront necessairement a la connaissance des attributs divins et de ses actions, mais la verite de cette connaissance des attributs divins ne sera assuree que si Ton prouve d'abord son existence et que Ton apporte la preuve de son unite. ..celle-ci ne sera veritablement prouvee que si la precede d'abord la preuve de 1'existence des substances simples etc...
Pour Ibn Daoud, la philosophic est un corpus de raisonnements qui s'enchainent les uns aux autres et forment un tout englobant 1'ensemble des sciences et couronne par la connaissance des attributs divins. Les temoignages des textes religieux viendront ensuite fortifier les conclusions.
Pour Maimonide: 1'intellect humain, est capable de distinguer le vrai du faux; il est le stade ultime de la perfection humaine et le but de son existence.
Dans son introduction logique, Maimonide definit 1'un des trois genres de "parole" comme etant:
Tintelligible lui-meme que 1'homme a deja intellige. on 1'appelle aussi parole interieure...L'art de la logique qu'a fonde Aristote et qu'il a complete en huit livres, montre a la faculte de raison les chemins intelligibles, c'est-a-dire de la parole intericure; c'est lui qui la preserve de 1'erreur, lui montre la voie juste et la fait parvenir a la verite dans tous les domaines ou la faculte humaine peut atteindre la verite. La philosophic theorique, qui se compose des sciences mathematiques, physique et metaphysique a pour but la connaissance dps choses depourvues de matiere et elle recherche la verite. La logique, pour les philosophes, ne fait pas partie des sciences elle est 1'outil des sciences et Ton ne peut ni enseigner ni apprendre de maniere ordonnee si ce n'est par Part de la logique: elle est 1'outil de toute chose et ne vient d'aucune chose."4
Ainsi, la boucle est bouclee et dans ce tableau de 1'intellect, des sciences et de la verite, la religion n'intervient pas: son domaine est celui du bien et du mal et non celui du vrai.
Le texte revele doit confirmer les conclusions vraics et s'il ne le fait pas a premiere vue, c'est que le niveau exoterique est destine au vulgaire. Le philosophe saura deceler la verite sous le manteau du langage exterieur. Mais la science n'a pas reponse a toutes les questions ainsi elle ne donne pas de reponse assuree quant a Peternite du monde ou a sa
4 Millot hahygayon, ed. L. Roth ct D.H. Bancth, Jerusalem, 1965, chap. XIV, p. 101 sqq.
254 Sirat
nouveautc. Si clle le faisait, le tcxtc biblique, convenablcmcnt expliquc, vicndrait le confirmcr.
Dans Icurs grands traits, 1'attitudc d'Abraham Ibn Daoud ct ccllc dc Maimonidc concordcnt: la verite doit etre recherchee par la philosophic - c'est-a-dire la science - la tradition rcligicusc se pliera a la verite ainsi obtenue.
Parmi les successeurs de Maimonidc, Ics caracteristiques de la science se dessinent quelquefois avec plus de details:
D'abord che/ Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen, espagnol qui se rendit en Italic a la cour dc Frederic II ct, en 1245 traduisit lui-meme en hcbreu 1'encyclopedic qu'il avait redigee en arabc: "L'expose sur la science".
Les deux parties scientifiques: mathcmatique-astronomie et physique sont encadrees par des developpements relevant de la "science divine": chacunc des sciences s'appliquc a un monde different: le monde d'ici-bas, le monde des spheres, le monde divin. Les methodes des sciences different comme different leur objet d'etude: la science divine, seule, attcint le non-corporel ct les deux autres sciences decoulent d'elle:
"L'auteur, Juda ha-Cohen b. Salomon ha-Cohen de Tolede dit: lorsque tu refiechis et occupes ta pensee de ces sciences afin d'acquerir la connaissance de tout cc qui existe du debut a la fin, tu verras a la fin que tu nc connaitras que fort pcu de choses en ce qui concerne les deux mondes perc,us nar les sens: le monde des spheres et celui de la generation et de la corruption. Quant au monde spirituel meme si tu connaissais par cocur les trei/e livres d'Aristote sur la science divine, tu n'en tirerais pas plus que la connaissance du premier moteur, rqchcr, un vivant, qui n'est ni corps, ni force dans un corps et qu'il y a pour chaque sphere un intellect scpare, c'est tout ce que tu apprendrais a propos de cc monde (spirituel) si tu occupes ta pensee de ces traites...Les philosophies se sont efforces a connaitre ces trois mondes, par {'opinion (conjecture) seulement. laquelle est science d'unc connaissance qui s'enracine dans la sensation comme Aristote 1'a mentionne dans "la demonstration" \Analytiques] et Tame" [Dc Anirna]. Aussi, ce serait vraimcnt miraculeux de pouvoir, a nartir de la sensation, connaitre, comprendre et atteindre quelquc chose qui n'est aucunement sensible; aussi, ce peu que (les philosophes) ont atteint, bien que ce soit comme unc goutte d'eau dans la mer, n'est pas peu pour celui qui 1'a atteint par une opinion de l'intellect dont la base est la sensation. Or (Dieu) n'est aucunement sensible comme il est dit: "Aucun oeil humain n'a vu Dieu" (Is. LXIV, 3) car nous ne percevons que les corps. Puisqu'il en est ainsi et que nous nc pouvons user de 1'opimon, comment atteindrons-nous les details de cette science qui est la base, la cause et le debut des sciences des deux mondes (inferieurs)? Ne conyient-il pas de dire a propos de celui qui ne s'est occupe que des sciences de ces deux mondes: "vous tous, venez done de nouveau et je ne trouverai pas un sage parmi vous" (Job XVII, 10) car n'est appelee "sagesse" que la sagesse certaine, celle qui est "spirituelle" et celui qui la connait est appele sage comme le dit Aristote dans le Livre III de la Metaphysique\ en
La philosophic et la science selon les philosophes juifs 255
cffct, le mondc (spirituel) precede les autres par toutes sortes de precedences et celui qui connait cette sagesse n'a pas besoin de fatiguer son esprit des deux sciences infeneures, car il les connait immediatement avec facilite, mais celui qui ne connait que ces deux sciences a encore besoin de connaitre la sagesse. Etant donne que nous ne pouvons atteindre cette sagesse par le seul raisonnement, nous avons besoin de la recevoir {le-qabbeia\ oralement, d'homme a homme, a partir de la Puissance divine [Dieu].
De meme different entre elles les deux sciences inferieures:
"Les genres de demonstration apportcs en physique sont le contraire de celles qu'apportent les sciences matnematiques: dans ces dernieres, on ya de 1'anterieur au posterieur tandis qu'en physique, on va du posterieur a 1'anterieur, et comme les choses connues par les sciences mathematiqucs le sont generalement par les sciences physiques, les demonstrations des sciences mathematiques sont absolues, tandis que celles de la physique ne sont pas completement connues, absolument et en soi, aussi les demonstrations qui sont faites dans cette science physique sont-elles appelees preuves.
Cette comparaison entre les preuves apportees par la physique et les demonstrations apportees par les mathematiques commente le tout debut du Livre I de la Physique ou Aristote decrit le processus d'analyse dans les sciences de la nature sans reference aux mathematiques. On trouve cette comparaison dans VEpitome d'Averroes et, de maniere plus explicite et elaboree, dans le Commentaire moyen, source du Midrash ha-Hokhma.
Et ici Juda ajoute:
"Bien plus, toutes les choses dont on dit qu'elles sont expliquees dans cette science (physique) ne le sont pas convenablement, meme
traduit dans C. Sirat: Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen philosophe, astronome et peut-etre Kabbaliste de la premiere moitie du XHIeme siecle, dans Italia, II, 1977, pp. 39-61.
En d'autres mots: The propositions and observation statements of science have empirical furniture only: In epistemological principle, they have all to do with ships, shoes and sealing wax, etc. To say as much is not in any way to diminish science, for the material world is full of wonderful and inspiring things. Some are commonplace and ordinary, to be sure - among them perhaps raindrops, pebbles and water fleas - but others are awe-inspiring or in the literal sense tremendous: the multitudinous seas round Cape Horn, where the Atlantic and Pacific oceans fight it out to see which is the greatest; and the great dome of heaven, as we may become aware of it on a high plateau, for nowhere else does the world seem so large. All are part of the empirical mise -en-scene of the world. The law of Conservation of Information makes it clear that from observation statements or descriptive laws having only empirical furniture there is no process of reasoning by which we may derive theorems having to do with first and last things; it is no more easily possible to derive such theorems from the hypotheses and observation statements with which science begins than it is possible to deduce from the axioms and postulates of liuclid a theorem to do with how to cook an omelet or bake a cake - accomplishments that would at once unseat the I,aw of Conservation of Information. I do not believe that revelation is a source of information, though I acknowledge that it is widely believed to be so - and that Coleridge judged theology Queen of the Pure Sciences for that very reason." P. Medawar: The Limits of Science, Oxford, 1986, pp. 81-82.
256 Sirat
par ces demonstrations appelces "preuves" mais quelques unes d'entre elles seulement. II en resulte que Pinferiorite de la physique est due a trois defauts hierarchiquement disposes:
(1) Les premisses ne sont pas toutes basees sur les evidences premieres.
(2) II n'y a pas de demonstration parfaite comme dans les demonstrations mathematiques, mais seulement des preuves.
(3) Nombre de fails ne sont pas expliques, meme par des preuves." (ibidem).
En fait, conclut Juda, il faudrait pouvoir apporter en physique des preuves manifestes au sens, des demonstrations experimentales qu'on ne puisse mettre en doute, comme le sont les experiences dans les sciences mathematiques et astronomiques. En 1'absence de ces demonstrations, on nc pcut choisir entrc les theories physiques opposees, et les debats entre physiciens ne sont que discussions oiseuses.
Shemtob b. Joseph Falqera (Provence, 1225-1295) considere que le domaine de recherche de la philosophic et celui de la religion coincident: cepcndant, ni la science ni la religion n'ont la prerogative de la verite:
Deux voies s'offrent a 1'homme: la voie prophetique et la voie scientifique. Celui sur qui s'epanchc Pinflux de Pintellect et qui est prophete atteindra la verite sans recherche, aux autres hommes s'ouvre seulement la voie scientifique, celle que Maimonide a decrite dans Le Guide des Egares; elle consiste a examiner, a scruter et a comprendre tout ce qui existe, dans ses details et dans son ensemble, car il n'y a de prcuve de Pcxistence de Dieu que par cette realite existant devant nos yeux; mais, pour tirer de cette realite sensible la prcuve de 1'existence d'un autre ctre, nous devons nous la representer intcllectuellement selon sa nature et sa forme, et cela ne peut se faire que par Petude des livres rediges par les philosophes non-juifs car, si les juifs ont compose des ouvrages de philosophic, ceux-ci se sont perdus au cours de Pexil.
Dans cette recherche de la science vraie, tout ce qui a etc dcmontre veritablement et qui concorde avec la foi religieuse doit etre admis par le savant, quelque soit la source de la demonstration. Et citant Aristote, Falqera reaffirme Puniversalisme de la science et de la philosophic: on ne doit preter attention qu'a ce qui est dit et non point a celui qui le dit; la verite reste la verite quelle que soit la bouche qui Penonce, quelle que soit la religion de celui qui Penonce.
L'education, les habitudes de pensee prises des Penfance jouent ici un role important: il est des verites evidentes que Phomme tend a rejeter, sans meme les examiner, car elles lui paraissent etranges et inhabituelles; si, a premiere vue, ces idees lui paraissent le contraire de la verite, c'est
La philosophic et la science selon les philosophes juifs 257
parce qu'elles sont le contraire de ce qu'il a appris. Et Falqera cite Porphyre pour dcmandcr instamment a ses lecteurs d'cxaminer avec soin et sans prejuges toute idee nouvelle; il ne faut ni 1'adopter, ni la rejeter precipitamment mais rechercher, avec soin et patience, si cette idee nouvelle est vraie ou non, si elle est vraie en partie et en partie douteuse, comme c'est le cas de la plupart des idees.
Toutes les explications du monde qui ont ete enoncees ou toutes celles qui pourraient Petre doivent etre patiemment etudiees et il faut choisir celle qui est meilleure que les autres, celle qui repond le mieux a la realite sensible et aux intelligibles tires de cette realite; et cela, meme si dans cette explication du monde il demeure des choses cachees...
Pour Falqera, cependant, la verite est une.
Pour Isaac Albalag, son contemporain, il se peut qu'elle soil double:
"de meme qu'il faut etre philosophe pour saisir Pintention du philosophe, de meme seul un prophete est a meme de saisir ['intention du prophete. Ceci parce que les modes flitteralement: "voies"! de Papprehension philosophique et de 1 apprehension prophetique sont divers et meme contraires: le philosophe apprehende ['intelligible au mqyen du sensible, alors que le prophete apprehende le sensible par Pintelligible. II n'est pas douteux que [le contenu respectif de] leurs apprehensions ne soil aussi divers que leurs modes d'apprehension, si bien que Pun peut apprehender, en partant d'en bas, le contraire de ce qu'apprehende Pautre en partant d'en haut. II ne faut done pas mettre en contradiction Pun avec Pautre mais le sage doit croire le philosophe lorsque celui-ci apporte une demonstration et recevoir Penseignement du prophete par mode de foi simple. Meme si les paroles oe Pun contredisent celles de Pautre, aucun [des deux] ne doit ceder |a place a Pautre, car c'est une qualite specifique de la foi scripturaire que, dementie par la demonstration, elle peut rester vraie. En effet, ce qui est impossible devant la recherche syllogistique sur le plan de Pordre de la nature, Papprehension prophetique peut le saisir comme necessaire sur le plan de la toute-puissance du Maitre [de la nature]. C'est pourquoi il existe beaucoup de choses impossibles devant la doctrine speculative qui sont possibles devant la doctrine scripturaire. II advient aussi que, a la Taveur de sa recherche, le philosophe apprehende quelque cnose qui n'est saisi par le prophete qu'a la faveur de ce qu'il possede de speculation [rationnelle], non a la faveur de la prophetic. Cela non pas a cause ae Pimperfection de la prpphetie. mais parce que son mode d'apprehension est superieur a ce [lui du philosophe]".
Les philosophes du XlVeme siecle, en Provence comme en Espagne, ont generalement suivi Averroes (Resume des Parva Naturalia, ed. H.
Les croyances des philosophes, introduction, traduit dans C. Sirat: La philosophic juive au Moyen-Age selon des textes imprimes et manuscrits, Paris, 1983, pp. 284-285.
8 G. Vajda: Isaac Albalag, averroiste juif, traducteur et annotateur d'Al-Ghazali, Paris, 1960, pp. 154-155.
258 Sirat
Blumbcrg, p. 58-59) et affirmcnt que la science est acquise par un enchainement de raisonnements, de syllogismes; on ne peut sauter les etapes. Ainsi Nissim de Marseille (debut du XlVeme siecle) ecrit:
"II n'est pas possible que les connaissances et les apprehensions que 1'homme a la capacite d'acquerir par la speculation et la reflexion puissent parvenir a rhomme dans une vision ou dans un reve prophetique car si cela etait possible, la speculation syllogistique et la connaissance du raisonnement seraient superflues.
Trois consequences a cette affirmation: 1) le role du prophete n'est pas lie a la science mais a la prevision de 1'avenir et la faculte spccifiqucment prophetique est la faculte imaginative, 2) en matiere de science, les prophetes peuvent se tromper et, de fait, se sont trompes, 3) le prophete peut aussi etre philosophe, auquel cas il atteint la perfection dans les deux facultcs: imaginative et intellectuelle; ce fut le cas de Moi'se.
Nous trouvons ces idees chc/ Nissim de Marseille, Joseph Caspi, Moi'se de Narbonne10, Isaac Pulgar et Gersonide, ct a ce propos ils cvoquent 1'adage talmudique (Talmud de Babylone, Baba Batra, 12 a): "le sage est superieur au prophete". Isaac Pulgar fait ressortir un autre trait de la science:
"La difference entre le sage (le savant) et le prophete tient au [domainej apprehende comme a la route qui mene a la perfection [en ce domainej: le savant atteint les chpses cachces et il comprend comment il les apprehende en verite et totalement- en effet, 1'intellect est comme une recherche et une reflexion afin de faire sortir le cote cache de ce qui est connu; il fait ressortir le terme moyen [du syllogisme] et en 1'exprimant, il joint la mineure a la majeure et les lie, de sorte qu'il pose la question recherchee comme conclusion du syllogisme et ote tout oostacle. Seul le prophete apprehendera un sujet sans savoir comment cette connaissance lui est venue ct pourquoi c'est a lui qu'elle s'est revelee. Si un contradicteur eleve des objections, il ne pourra pas lui repondre car il ne connait pas le chemin [qui mene a cette connaissance]. En cffet, la prophetie repose sur la faculte imaginative (ne vas pas t'imaginer autre chose!) et non pas sur la faculte discursive (tu te tromperais grandcment!) et lorsqu'il a besqin de se representcr quelque chose, il manque jau prophete] la voie qui mene de 1'un a 1 autre. Aussi un sage a-t-il eu raison de dire: "le sage est superieur au prophete" c'est la une objection absolue et une preuve evidente
o
Ma ase Nissim, ms. hehrcu 720, fol. 36b, lere colonne, cite dans Ch. Touati: Le
probleme de 1'inerrance prophetique dans la theologie juive du Moyen-Age, dans Revue de I'Histoire des Religions, n° 174, 1968, p. 178.
Cf. le Commentaire sur Les Intentions des philosophes, d'Algazel, Paris, Bibliotheque nationale, ms. hebr. 956, fol. 181 recto.
La philosophic et la science selon les philosophes juifs 259
que le prqphete nc pcut pas enscigner a autrui quoi quo cc soit dc sa prophetic".
Gersonide (1288-1344) partage avcc ses contcmporains 1'opinion que la prophetic est essentiellement liee a la faculte imaginative et qu'elle prevoil les evenements futurs. Certes, les propheles et, en particulier, Moi'se furent aussi des "sages", des savants; mais tous ne le furent pas.
Pour Gersonide, aucun sujet ne peut etre interdit a la recherche scientifique, le probleme se posait a propos de la creation du monde. Maimonide, ne trouvant aucune preuve scientifique decisive en faveur de Peternite ou de la creation du monde, avait conseille de s'en remettre au texte revele, lequel etait en faveur de la creation du monde. Cette decision de Maimonide, est due a Pincapacite ou il se trouvait alors de fournir des preuves scientifiques; non pas a Pimpossibilile essentielle de fournir ces preuves. Or, Gersonide peut prouver que la creation du monde a pris place dans le temps, a partir d'une matiere premiere depourvue de forme laquelle se trouve a Petal primitif entre les spheres celestes.
En faveur de cette creation temporelle, Gersonide evoque d'abord ce desir profond et naturel de Phomme, ce besoin de savoir et de comprendre les sujets importants et nobles comme celui de la creation, ensuite des fails historiques:
1) il y a un progres des sciences el loutes ne sont pas au meme niveau de perfeclion:
"les anciens onl p9ur chaque science apporle leur Iribut mais chacune de ces sciences n a alleinl sa perfeclion qu'apres un cerlain lemps ainsi la science [physique] n a alleinl sa perfeclion qu'avec le philosophe [Arislole] el une aulre science [la medecine] n'esl parvenue a complelude que lorsque vinl Galien; dans Paslronomie nous n'avons pas Irouve qu'elle ful parfaile chez aucun des anciens; celle science la a eu besoin d'une periode de lemps plus longue pour se perfeclionner.
En effel, ayanl besoin des sens, sa perfeclion esl venue plus lard. Les sciences malhemaliques: geomelne et arilhmelique onl ele les premieres a se perfeclionner car les savanls qui ont precede Arislole onl ecril des livres parfails, selon ce qu'on raconte a ce propos. En revanche, la physique avait besoin des sens plus qu'elles, aussi esl- elle venue a perfeclion plus lard; quanl a la medecine, elle avail besoin plus encore des sens el en parliculier de ce que Pon apprend des experiences el de ce qu'on apprend de la chirurgie aussi esl- elle parvenue a perfeclion plus lard encore. L'aslronomie avail
11 Ezer Hadat, ed. J.S. Levinger, Tel-Aviv, 1984, p. 88 et S. Pines: "Sur quelques idees communes au Ezer Hadat d'Isaac Polgar et a Spinoza", dans Etudes de Kabbale, de philosophic et de pensee juives (en hebreu) offertes a I. Tishby a 1'occasion dc son 75eme anniversaire, Jerusalem, 1986, p. 423.
260 Sirat
besoin de sens a tcl point qu'il n'etait pas possible qu'elle vint a perfection si ce n'est apres un temps d'une longueur tres remarquable. Si cette perfection est venue si tard c'est que ces sciences Jastronomiquesj elevent l'homme au degre de la perfection: il les desire naturellement avec grande force. II n'est done pas possible que 1'humanite soil eternelle et que ces sciences soient nouvelles..." .
Le quinzieme siecle fut, pour les Juifs, un siecle de retrait et de lutte centre les persecutions. Les philosophes moins nombreux qu'auparavant, durent defendre la philosophie et les sciences contre les attaques de partisans d'une religion moins ouverte aux courants exterieurs. De nouveau, on rcprocha aux sciences d'etre exterieures au judai'sme et de dctourner les fideles de leur religion.
Dans son Dcrekh Emouna, Abraham Bibago dcfinit les sciences comme introduisant a une perfection proprement humaine a laquelle s'ajoutera la perfection du juif croyant.
"La science "grecque" n'est pas la science de la recherche demonstrative dont nous parlons car cette science dc la recherche est une science intellectuelle que Phomme acquiert en tant qu'homme; elle est done science proprement humaine et non pas science "grecque"; la science grecque est celle qui est particuliere a la Grece et n'est pas cejle des autres pcuples...ces sciences sont done des sciences humaines et non pas grecques, des sciences intellectuelles et intcrieurcs [a |'homme et au juif en tant qu'homme] et non des sciences exterieures. "L
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris
' Les guerres du Seigneur, ed. Riva di Trento, 1560, fol. 48b, 2eme colonne. ed. Constantinoble, 1522, fol. 46 verso.
La philosophic et la science selon les philosophes juifs 261
ARSTRACT:
Science and Philosophy: the Jewish Philosophers in the Middle Ages
In the Middle Ages, Jews did not restrict the realm of philosophical investigation: all fields of knowledge, including religious ones, were subjected to philosophical inquiry. It was accepted by every one that human reason has the right to ask questions; however one of the most frequent criticisms was that philosophy was not the way Jews have to ask these questions. Jewish philosophers never accepted these criticisms and tried to build systems where Science and Revelation were parallel or complementary.
For Jewish Mutakallimun (X1 century) as for those called neoplatonists (XII century), philosophy is a corpus of sciences, which is homogenous and learnt with effort, contrary to prophecy which is given by God, however, they are two branches stemming from the same tree.
With Abraham Ibn Daud and Maimonides, there are clearly felt the differences between the revealed God and Aristotle's First Mover. For them, as for the other Aristotelian philosophers, Truth is learnt by learning the sciences; from them onwards, the philosophers tried often, with the help of arguments found in Aristotle's Metaphysics, to define the field of the Sciences, their methods and the degree of perfection they are able to reach.
The most original opinions were those of two philosophers specialised in astronomy: Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen (Spain-Italy, 13 century) and Gersonides (Provence, 14 century).
For Juda b. Salomon ha-Cohen, the demonstrations of the mathematical sciences are absolute while those of physics are not known completely, absolutely and in themselves; one should be able to adduce in physics proofs manifest to the senses - experimental demonstrations that one cannot question, like experiments carried out in the mathematical and astronomical sciences. In the absence of these demonstrations, one cannot choose between conflicting theories in physics.
For Gersonides, the progress of the sciences is far from being complete and has not reached an equal level in the different branches of knowledge. Astronomy is a science where observation by the senses is so necessary that perfection came very late.
At the end of the Middle Ages, Jewish Philosophers had to defend themselves against the critique that philosophy induced them to abandon their faith for an alien lore. The answer given by one of them - Abraham Bibago - was that "Greek Wisdom is not the demonstrative science of research; the science of research is an intellectual science, an attribute of man as a human being and, in consequence, it is a human science, not a Greek science".
J. MARENBON
The Theoretical and Practical Autonomy of Philosophy
as a Discipline in the Middle Ages:
Latin Philosophy, 125(M350
I
Was philosophy an autonomous discipline in the Christian West during the later Middle Ages? Most historians of medieval philosophy have regarded this question as a challenge to their chosen profession - a challenge too serious to be met without the assistance of a venerated figure, dominating the pages of their books and justifying their claims to be truly historians of philosophy. The identity of the figure varies. For some he is the Arts Master - a 'new, urban type of teacher with 'a basically unclerical conception of the scientific enterprise', 'critical' and 'questioning' of authorities, seeking truths as yet unknown and 'guaranteed only by reason.'1 For others he is Thomas Aquinas, Doctor of the distinction between faith and reason, creator of a 'sound synthesis' between Aristotelianism and Christianity which preserved the rights of both philosophy and theology." For yet others he is the Christian Philosopher, whose treatment of the problems of philosophy is made no less philosophical, but all the more percipient by his adherence to the faith.3
C.H. Ix>hr, 'The Medieval Interpretation of Aristotle' in N. Krct/.mann, A. Kenny, J. Pinhorg (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medie\'al Philosophy, pp. 81-98: see pp. 86, 90-1, 95. Behind Lohr's phrases are ideas of J. Le Goffs: cf. Les intellectuels au moyen age (Paris, 1969), esp. pp. 63-9.
This point of view is put forward with particular clarity by F. van Stecnherghen: see his La philosophic au XHIe siecle (Ix)uvain/Paris, 1966), esp. pp. 46-54 and his Introduction a I'etude de la philosophic medie\'ale (Ix>uvain/Paris, 1974), pp. 78-113. For a discussion of this, and other approaches to medieval philosophy, see J. Marenbon, Later Medical Philosophy (1150-1350). An Introduction (Ix^ndon, 1987), pp. 83-90.
The notion of 'Christian philosophy' is associated particularly with E. Gilson, who expounds it in many of his earlier works and, perhaps most fully, in L'Esprit de la philosophic medie\'ale (Paris, 1944 ). In his late work, however, Gilson was less keen to stress the distinctiveness of a 'Christian philosophy', and more eager to see the great scholastic thinkers as theologians: see esp. 'Les recherches historico-critiques et
Autonomy of Philosophy as a Discipline 263
I shall answer the question about the autonomy of philosophy without the aid of these spectral figures, because I consider that the question raises many interesting problems, but only one real challenge: that of recognizing its ambiguity. 'Philosophy5 is an ambiguous word when used by a medieval historian. Either it can mean the subjects called philosophia in the Middle Ages; or it can mean philosophy - that is, the subject which, nowadays, is studied by those who call themselves philosophers. The main subject of this paper will be the autonomy of philosophia - first, its autonomy in practice; then, its autonomy in theory. I shall end with a few remarks about the relation between philosophia and philosophy.
II
Although the word philosophia itself had a number of different meanings in the Middle Ages,4 there is one usage of it which predominates in thirteenth and fourteenth-century university texts (and which, alone, I will be considering here). By this usage, philosophia is what men can discover by reason and observation, without the aid of revealed knowledge.
The organization of studies in medieval universities ensured the practical autonomy of philosophia in this sense, because faculties of arts were faculties of philosophia, where students studied only disciplines open to natural reason - such as grammar, logic, biology, physics and meta physics - using especially the works of Aristotle, the Philosophus, as their text-books.5 Historians sometimes give the impression that this autonomy was constantly under attack from conservative theologians and the Church authorities, who saw the freedom of rational speculation as a
I'avenir de la scolastique', Antonianum 26 (1951), pp. 40-8 [reprinted in his Etudes medievales (Paris, 1986), pp. 9-17] and Introduction a la philosophic chreticnne (Paris, 1960).
On the term 'philosophia' see E.R. Curtius, 'Zur Geschichte des Wortes Philosophic im Mittelalter', Romanische Forschungen 47 (1943), pp. 290-300; but unfortunately, Curtius ends his survey with the twelfth century.
1 On the curriculum of the arts faculties, see G. Leff, Paris and Oxford Unh'ersities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries (New York/London/Sydney, 1968), chapters 1 and 2; P. Glorieux, La faculte des arts et ses maitres au XUIe siecle (Paris, 1971); J. Weisheipl, 'Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century', Mediae\'al Studies 26 (1964), pp. 143-85.
264 Marenbon
threat to Christian doctrine.6 They cite the condemnations of 1277 and the cases of Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. But such instances of discord were very much the exception. The foundation of teaching in the arts faculties always remained logic and grammar - subjects which posed no challenge to the faith; and, even in the other arts, the possibilities for conflict with Christian doctrine were few, and were rarely taken.
The condemnations of 1277 themselves provide evidence for this view, so long as two distinctions are carefully observed: that between autonomy and hegemony, and that between theoretical and practical autonomy. By directing his decree against those engaged in the arts who exceeded the 'limits of their faculty'7, Bishop Tempier endorsed - indeed required - the autonomy of the arts masters in the practice of their disciplines. He went on, in a series of prohibitions, to censure claims (some of which may never in fact have been made) for the hegemony of philosophia - claims that philosophia could take the place of theological enquiry.8 And, by condemning absolutely certain propositions, which might be reached as the result of natural reasoning, Tempier attacked the very
' For instance - to take two recent discussions - Ix>hr (op. cit., p. 92) writes: '...in the thirteenth century the newly translated philosophical and scientific sources rendered questionable the simple concordances which the twelfth century had made between authorities limited to the I^tin ecclesiastical tradition. In this new situation some rejected the new literature and attempted by ecclesiastical condemnations to prevent its being read; others, like Bonavcnture and Olivi, saw in Aristotle the apocalyptic beast of the last days...'; whilst M. Haren [Mediwal Thought (Ixmdon, 1985), p. 5], having explained that 1250-77 was 'a period during which Aristotle was being studied in the major arts faculty of Hurope, in a formal, exegetical fashion, divorced from the wider theological considerations with which it was soon to be confronted', adds that ''ITiis confrontation with radical teaching in the arts faculty at Paris was a dramatic manifestation of the intellectual tensions felt at the time.'
'Magnarum et gravium pcrsonarum crebra zeloque fidei acccnsa insinuavit relatio, quod nonnulli Parisius studentcs in artibus propriae facultatis limites excedentes quosdam manifestos et exsecrabiles errores ... quasi dubitabiles in scholis tractare et disputare praesumunt': ed. in R. Hissctte, Enquete sur les 219 articles condamnes a Paris le 7 mars 1277 (Louvain/Paris, 1977), p. 13.
8 Articles 1 - 7 in Hissette, op. cit., pp. 15-27: Quod non est excellentior status quam vacare philosophiae; Quod sapientes mundi sunt philosophi tantum; Quod ad hoc quod homo habeat aliquam certitudinem alicuius conclusionis, oportet quod sit fundatus super principia per se nota; Quod nihil est credendum, nisi per se no turn, vel ex per se notis possit declarari; Quod homo non debet esse contentus auctoritate ad habendum certitudinem alicuius quacstionis; Quod nulla quaestio est disputabilis per rationem, quam philosophus non debeat disputare et determinare, quia rationes accipiuntur a rebus. Philosophia autem omnes res habet considerare secundum diversas sui panes; Quod omnes scientiae non sunt necessariae, praeter philosophicas disciplinas; et quod non sunt necessariae, nisi propter consuetudinem hominum.
Autonomy of Philosophy as a Discipline 265
basis of the theoretical autonomy of philosophia, but imposed only a slight reservation on the arts masters' autonomy in practice.
The only important restrictions on the practical autonomy of philosophia came from within. Arts masters were, in general, young; their pupils very young. Students usually began their studies in the arts faculties when they were fourteen or fifteen; after about seven years (the figure was less fixed in Paris than at Oxford) they became masters. Few of them went on teaching arts once - in their mid-twenties - they had completed two years of obligatory teaching ('necessary regency'); and, even among the exceptional masters who remained in the faculty and made a career there, none before Buridan (1295/1300 - after 1358) could compete with the theologians in depth of reading and analytical skill. It is not surprising, then, that they turned to theological writings for help in their pursuit of philosophia (witness Siger of Brabant, whose differences with St Thomas should not obscure the extent of his debt to him9). Nor is it surprising that they tended to concentrate on the literal exegesis of Aristotelian texts (even in quaestio-commcntaries), learning the lessons of natural reason, not by reasoning but from authority.
What of the theologians? They read and used works of philosophia (usually with greater comprehension than the arts masters). But, just as the arts faculty was organized around the autonomous study of philo sophia, so the theology faculty was organized around the autonomous study of theology. The theologians' set-texts were the Bible and the Sentences of Peter the Lombard; the aim of their long studies was to increase their understanding of the faith. None the less, many historians claim that there are two important ways in which the theologians engaged in the autonomous practice of philosophia. First, many theologians wrote individual works entirely dedicated to philosophia for instance, Aquinas's De imitate intellectus and his commentaries on Aristotle, or Ockham's Summa logicae. Second, there are many passages in theological works which, it is said, are devoted to natural reasoning and can be detached from their theological context. Both these claims call for serious qualification.
9 See R.A. Gauthier, 'Notes sur Siger de Brabant. I. Siger en 1265', Re\'ue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques 67 (1983), pp. 201-32, esp. pp. 212-32. Even Radulphus Brito, one of the most sophisticated arts masters, who spent about ten years teaching in the faculty (c. 1296-1306) before going on to study theology, draws heavily on Aquinas: cf. Marenbon, op. cit., pp. 140-1.
266 Marcnbon
Even when he sets out to write a whole work on a subject belonging to philosophic!, a theologian does not forget what he knows as a theologian. For example, Aquinas's Christian understanding of man and his status in this life implicitly informs the way he reasons, without using revealed premisses, about the potential intellect in De imitate intel/ectus, and it shapes his grasp of Aristotle in his commentaries, despite his close scrutiny of the letter of the text; whilst for Ockham, the theologian has an explicit role to play even in logic, where God's power to create and annihilate, and Christ's sinlessness, are used as the basis for arguments in favour of an anti-realist theory of univcrsals.10
These considerations apply with yet greater force to the claim that passages of philosophic! are detachable from their contexts in theological works. When an historian tries to understand a text from the past, he is attempting to grasp the writer's intention, as expressed in the text. But the character of an intention depends on the whole complex of intentions to which it belongs. It cannot be isolated for close study, in the way that, say, natural science can study the individual atoms which make up a molecule. The historian who detaches passages of philosophic! from their theological contexts is imposing autonomy, not discovering it.
There are, then, strong arguments against the position that philosophic! was practised as an autonomous discipline by later medieval theologians. By contrast, the practical autonomy of philosophic! was the organi/.ing principle of the arts faculties, although it was restricted by the age and inexperience of most masters there.
II!
I come now to the theoretical autonomy of philosophic! - a topic so large that I shall restrict myself to three, connected illustrations - from the arts master Boethius of Dacia, and from the masters of theology Aquinas and Duns Scotus. I shall then suggest a few more general conclusions.
Summa Logicae [ed. P. Bochner, G. Gal and S. Brown (New York, 1974)], p. 51:29- 37, 42-4. J.E. Murdoch ['From Social into Intellectual Factors: An Aspect of the Unitary Character of I^te Medieval learning' in J.E. Murdoch and E. Sylla (eds.), The Cultural Context of Medical Learning (Dordrecht/Boston, 1975), pp. 271-348] provides many examples of how, in fourteenth-century thought, concepts derived from theology were used in mathematical and physics discussions.
Autonomy of Philosophy as a Discipline 267
In his De aetemitate mundi (c.1271/2)11 Boethius of Dacia discusses a problem known to Christian thinkers for centuries.12 According to natural reason and to Aristotle, it seems that the world is eternal; according to Christian doctrine, the world had a beginning. Can the two positions be reconciled? The main thread of Boethius's argument involves a peculiarly precise - and peculiarly narrow - statement of this familiar problem. The natural scientist, says Boethius, is compelled to deny the statement that the world had a beginning. Influenced by the widely- studied Posterior Analytics, Boethius holds that each discipline within philosophia has its own principles and contains only truths which are based on them.13 He does not, however, believe that the exponent of one discipline is compelled to deny a statement, simply because it cannot be known from the principles of his own discipline. For instance, the natural scientist can accept statements about geometry which he cannot demon strate within natural science.14 But if a statement actually goes against the principles of a discipline, then the exponent of that discipline is compelled to deny it. For the natural scientist, this is the case with the statement that the world had a beginning, since it goes against the principle of his discipline that every motion is caused by a preceding one.15
The problem, then, for Boethius is to show that, when the natural scientist denies that the world had a beginning - which he must do - he is not contradicting the revealed truth that the world did have a beginning. Boethius solves the problem by arguing that, not only is each discipline based on its principles, but its conclusions must be qualified by these principles. Whenever a natural scientist, for example, says 'p is true', what he is really asserting, according to Boethius, is that 'p is true according to the principles of natural science'. And it is a matter of
11 N.G. Green-Pedersen (ed.), Boethii Dad Opera Vl.ii (Copenhagen, 1976), pp. 335-66.
12
For a survey of the tradition, see R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum
(London, 1983), pp. 193-252.
Ed. cit., pp. 347:335 - 348:336: '...nullus artifex potest aliquid causare, concedere vel negare nisi ex principiis suae scientiae.'
Ibid., p. 351:438-444: '... veritates, quas naturalis non potest causare ex suis principiis nee scire, quae tamen non contrariantur suis principiis nee destruunt suam scientiam, negare non debet. Ut quod "circa quemlibet punctum signatum in superficie sunt quattuor recti anguli possibiles" habet veritatem, naturalis ex suis principiis causare non potest, nee tamen debet earn negare, quia non contrariatur suis principiis nee destruit suam scientiam.'
15 Ibid., pp. 348:345-56; 350:394-8.
268 Marenbon
elementary logic to note that the statement 'p is true according to something' (for instance, 'according to the principles of natural science') does not contradict the statement that 'p is false'.16 The natural scientist, then, is forced to say The world had no beginning', but because in his mouth this sentence means 'The world had no beginning according to the principles of natural science', he has not been forced to contradict the revealed truth - which, says Boethius, is truth without qualification (simpliciter).
Boethius thus succeeds in providing an elegant solution to the problem in the precise terms in which he has stated it.18 But the solution immediately raises awkward, wider questions. One of them Boethius seems to have anticipated elsewhere in his work. If every statement within a branch of philosophia is to be understood merely as a statement about the conclusions which follow from that discipline's principles, how is it possible to investigate the relation between the principles of the various disciplines? This, says Boethius, is the special function of metaphysics.19 But there is another, related question: what is the relation between the principles of the sciences and the 'truth of Christian faith'?
Boethius can provide no answer to this question. Aquinas can, and does. Like Boethius, Aquinas analyses the disciplines of philosophia in Aristotelian terms: each has its own principles from which its conclusions are drawn. Unlike Boethius, he feels able to order these disciplines in relation to revealed truth. He can do so because, in his view, theology is a scientific discipline in the Aristotelian sense, like mathematics, physics and metaphysics.
' Ibid., eg. p. 352:468-75: 'Quicquid enim naturalis sccundum quod naturalis negat vel conccdit, ex causis et principiis naturalibus hoc negat vel concedit. Unde conclusio in qua naturalis dicit mundum et primum motum <non> esse novum accepta absolute falsa est, sed si rcferatur in rationes et principia ex quibus ipse earn concludit, ex illis sequitur. Scimus enim quod qui dicit Socratcm esse album, et qui negat Socratem esse album secundum quaedam, uterque dicit verum.'
17 Ibid. p. 351:422.
1 8
1 Other scholars' analyses of Boethius's argument take his focus to have been
wider. The fullest is by J. Pinborg ['Zur Philosophic des Boethius de Dacia. Ein Uber- blick', Studia Mediewistyczne 15 (1974), pp. 165-85, esp. pp. 175-82 (reprinted in his Medie\>al Semantics (London, 1984)], with bibliography. See also P. Wilpert, 'Boethius von Dacien - Die Autonomie des Philosophen' in P. Wilpert (ed.), Beitrdge mm Berufs- beH'usstein des mittelalterlichen Menschen, Miscellanea Mediaevalia III, (Berlin, 1964), pp. 135-52.
See Pinborg, op. cit., pp. 170-2 and the texts quoted by him in n. 12.
Autonomy of Philosophy as a Discipline 269
This position requires some explanation. The principles of theology are the articles of faith which, St Thomas recogni/es, are not self- evident to earthly theologians, in the way that Aristotle requires of a scientific discipline. They are self-evident, however, to the blessed in heaven. Aristotle recognized that some disciplines are subalternate to others: such disciplines are based on principles which are self-evident only in the higher discipline to which they are subalternated. For instance, optics takes its principles from geometry; music from arithmetic. Similarly, according to Aquinas, earthly theology is subalternated to the theology of the blessed; and earthly theologians are enabled to accept the principles of the subalternating discipline by the 'light of faith'.20
Aquinas accepts that there is a branch of philosophia dealing with every sort of being; but this does not mean, for him, that theology is superfluous (or, as it does for Boethius, that there is an inexplicable gap between the unqualified truth of faith and the true statements made within the disciplines of philosophia - which are true because they are statements not about the world, but about the disciplines to which they belong). Just as a natural scientist and an astronomer can reach the same correct conclusion that the earth is round, each in his different way - the astronomer by abstract mathematical calculation, the natural scientist by material measurement; so, in general, the exponents of philosophia and theology discuss the same things, each of them within the framework of a scientific discipline, but in different ways - the philosophi by the light of natural reason, the theologians by the light of faith.21
Aquinas does not, however, consider that these ways are of equal value. Like Hume, though for very different reasons, he finds the 'condition of mankind ... a whimsical' one.22 The end which man seeks by his nature and which, using his natural reason, he can attain, is not
20 Sfumma] Tfheologiae] I, q.l, a. 2; cf. Commentary on De trinitate, q.2, a.2, ad 5 & 1 and see M.-D. Chenu, La theologie comme science an Xllle siecle (Paris, 1957), pp. 64-100.
ST I, q.l, a.l, ad 2: '...diversa ratio cognoscibilis diversitatem scientiarum inducit. Eandem enim conclusionem demonstrat astrologus et naturalis, puta quod terra est rotunda: sed astrologus per medium mathematicum, idest a materia abstractum; naturalis autem per medium circa materiam consideratum. Unde nihil prohibet de eisdem rebus, de quibus philosophicae disciplinae tractant secundum quod sunt cognoscibilia lumine naturalis rationis, et aliam scientiam tractare secundum quod cognoscuntur lumine divinae revelationis.'
22 An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, XII,2 [ed. L. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1902 ), p. 160]: '... the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations...'.
270 Marcnbon
his true end. Although by nature he seeks to know God, he does so only through created things; but his true end (which he cannot attain in this life) is to enjoy the immediate vision of God. All the enquiries of philosophia are based on an understanding only of man's natural end, not of his true one.23 As St Thomas puts it:
The perfection of a rational creature consists not only in what is fitting for him by his naturet but also in what is attributed by a kind of supernatural participation in God's goodness. For this reason it is said ... that the final happiness of man consists in a kind of supernatural vision of God But man cannot attain this vision save in the manner of a pupil learning from God, his teacher...
Duns Scotus was a severe critic of Aquinas's conception of theology and its relation to philosophia. He rejects the view of earthly theology as a subalternate discipline to the theology of the blessed.25 And he will not accept that the theologian knows the same things as the exponent of philosophia, but in a different and higher way. He refers directly to St Thomas's own example and turns it back on itself. Once the physicist knows, by his measurements, that the earth is round, then he does not need to know from the astronomer that his calculations also show the earth to be round.26 Scotus insists that the same piece of knowledge is
See eg. Commentary on Sentences, Prologue, q.l, a.l: '...omnes qui rectc senserunt posucrunt fincm humanac vitac dci contcmplationcm. Contemplatio autem del est dupliciter: una per crcaturas, quae impcrfccta est ... in qua contcmplatione Philosophus felicitatem contcmplativam posuit, quac tamen est fclicitas viae; et ad hanc ordinatur tola cognitio philosophica, quac ex rationihus crcaturarum proccdit. Rst alia dei con- templatio, qua vidctur immediate per suam cssentiam; et haec perfecta est, quae erit in patria et est homini possibilis sccundum fidci suppositioncm. Undc oportet ut ca quae sunt ad fincm proportionentur fini, quatcnus homo manducatur ad illam contemplationcm in statu viae per cognitioncm non a creaturis sumptis, scd immediate ex divino lumine inspiratatam; et hacc est doctrina theologiac'; and ibid., Ill d.24, q.l. a.3a, ad 2: 'per rationem ergo naturalem potest cognosci summum bonum, secundum quod diffundit se communicatione natural!, non autem sccundum quod diffundit se communicationc supcr- naturali; et secundum hanc rationem summum bonum est finis nostrae vitae: de quo oportet haberi fidem, cum ratio in illud non possit.'
24 ST, 11-2, q.2, a.3; cf. De veritate, q.14, a. 10.
75 '
For the (non-)scientific character of theology, see Ordinatio [in C. Balic (ed.),
loannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia I (Vatican, 1950)], Prologue, pars 4, q.1-2. Scotus rejects Aquinas's teachings on subaltcrnation at pp. 148:12-149:13. Cf. A.-M. Vellico, 'De charactero scientifico sacrae theologiae apud Doctorem Subtilem', Antonianum 16 (1941), pp. 3-30.
Ordinatio, ed. cit., Prologue, q.l. Scotus explicitly quotes (p. 48:1-7) the passage from Aquinas's ST which is reproduced in n. 21 above, and then comments (11. 9-14): 'Contra: si de cognoscibilibus in theologia est cognitio tradita vel possibilis tradi in aliis scientiis, licet in alio lumine, ergo non est neccssaria cognitio theologica de eisdem. Consequentia patet in excmplo eius, quia cognoscens terram esse rotundam per medium physicum, non indigct cognitione per medium mathematicum, tamquam simpli-
Autonomy of Philosophy as a Discipline 271
the same piece of knowledge, whatever way it is discovered. He therefore believes that theology would be superfluous, if philosophia could provide knowledge about every sort of thing. But, as he goes on to argue, it cannot: although philosophia considers every sort of thing that can be speculated on, it does not treat everything which can be known about them, because some have properties about which the philosophi are inevitably ignorant.27 For instance, the philosophi assert that God causes whatever he causes necessarily. Wrongly - because it is one of God's properties to cause things contingently.28 But they cannot know this by natural reason.
IV
Before trying to draw any conclusions about the theoretical autonomy of philosophia from these three illustrations, it is important to recognize that, like 'philosophy', 'autonomy' is a term with more than one meaning.29 To state that, in the later Middle Ages, philosophia was autonomous in theory might be to make any one of three, different claims. The weakest of these claims would be that it had autonomy of definition; a stronger claim would be that it was autonomous with regard to the truth of its individual conclusions; strongest of all, that it was autonomous with regard to truth about the subjects it considered.
Arts masters and theologians in the medieval universities unhesitatingly granted philosophia autonomy in the weakest sense: autonomy of definition. Just as, in practice, philosophia was autonomous
citer necessaria.'
Ibid., p. 50:l^t: '...in illis scientiis speculativis etsi tractetur de omnibus specula- bilibus, non tamen quantum ad omnia cognoscibilia de eis, quia non quantum ad propria eorum...'. Scotus then refers back to a passage earlier in the quaestio (pp. 22:15 ff.), which begins: '...VI Metaphysicae: cognitio substantiarum separatarum est nobilissima, quia circa nobilissimum genus; igitur cognitio eorum quae sunt propria eis est maxime nobilis et necessaria, nam ilia propria eis sunt perfectiora cognoscibilia quam ilia in quibus conveniunt cum sensibilibus. Sed ilia propria non possumus cognoscere ex puns naturalibus tantum'(my italics).
28
Ibid., p. 24:7-10: Troprietas etiam istius naturae ad extra est contingenter causare;
et ad oppositum huius magis effectus ducunt, in errorem, sicut patet per opinionem philosophorum, ponentium primum necessaria causare quidquid causal.'
29
I am very grateful to Professor Amos Funkenstein for asking a question about
'autonomy' when this paper was read, which has led me to clarify the different, potentially confusing meanings of this term.
272 Marenbon
in the arts faculties, so its distinctiveness from theology was recognized in theory. The subjects belonging to philosophia were based on self- evident premisses, observation and reasoning, whereas theology also made use of revealed knowledge.
The example of Boethius of Dacia shows how difficult it was for arts masters to discuss the autonomy of philosophia in any sense which went beyond this weak one. They were ill-equipped to theorize about the boundaries of philosophia, as opposed to discussing its internal divisions. To scrutinize the boundaries of philosophia, they needed a discipline which, unlike any of the arts, is not itself based on natural reason, but rather places and describes natural reason within a wider context.
The illustrations from Aquinas and Duns Scotus show, by contrast, how carefully theologians examined the claims of philosophia to a less weak form of autonomy. Their conclusions varied about its autonomy with regard to the truth of individual conclusions. Aquinas allowed philosophia this second, stronger autonomy. He considered that, so long as reason was correctly used and began from self-evident premisses, no statement that it found true could be false.30 Philosophia could therefore be relied upon, without external correction, to arrive at true conclusions. Duns Scotus disagreed. He argued that, without revelation to correct their findings, the exponents of philosophia could not avoid concluding the truth of various statements which are, in fact false (for instance, 'that God causes necessarily', whereas in fact he causes contingently).
Duns Scotus's refusal to grant philosophia this second, stronger form of autonomy, which Aquinas allows it, has often led historians to state that St Thomas recognized the autonomy of philosophia, whereas Duns Scotus did not. But this assessment is misleading, for both Aquinas and Duns Scotus and, I would add, almost every later medieval theologian - were united in denying the autonomy of philosophia in the third, strongest, and most important sense. Even if, as Aquinas (but not Scotus) thought, philosophia asserted no actual falsehoods, theologians were agreed that, nevertheless, it was radically deficient in its efforts to find the truth. Natural reason could not but be ignorant of man's end and therefore could not but misjudge man's present position and cognitive capabilities. Were its conclusions to be considered as an autonomous
30
These views are implied by the illustrations discussed above. Aquinas develops
them more explicitly in his Commentary on Boethius's De trinitate q.2, a.3, ST I, q.l, a.8, Summa contra Gentiles I, 7 and at the end of De unitate intellectus.
Autonomy of Philosophy as a Discipline 273
body of knowledge, philosophia would therefore mislead. Its value to the theologians depended on their ability to gauge its limitations.
By denying philosophia autonomy in the strongest sense, later medieval theologians therefore did much more than to insist that the truths of philosophia needed to be supplemented by the truths of theology. They pointed out that the picture of man and the universe offered by philosophia - its account of topics as various as cognition, causality, volition and virtue - was mistaken. It was for this reason that, whilst they accepted the autonomous practice of philosophia in the arts faculties as a propaedeutic, the theologians did not themselves practise philosophia autonomously. In their view, the great thinkers of antiquity had been forced, by the accident of their time of birth, to seek 'the invisible things of God' only through what was made. The Christian was in a more fortunate position. For him, philosophia must be placed - whether institutionally, or in a scheme of a work, or in a single work - within the disciplined search for a truth not attainable without the guidance of faith.
There is a more general conclusion to be drawn from all that I have been saying. There are, doubtless, many similarities, some of them close, between the problems and methods of medieval thinkers and those of modern philosophers. But, regarded as disciplines, philosophia and modern philosophy bear little resemblance.
Few of the many subjects included in philosophia are now parts of philosophy, although many of them are still studied, independently. Philosophia provided a general education, taken by all who pursued their studies beyond a basic level; philosophy, by contrast, is a specialist subject. Philosophia was recognized as a lower set of disciplines, from which students could pass on to higher disciplines, such as theology. Modern philosophers take a less modest view of their studies. And, although some modern philosophers might claim that the distinguishing mark of their discipline - like that of philosophia - is its basis in natural reason, there are two ways in which this apparent similarity is deceptive. First, there are many other subjects nowadays besides philosophy which can equally well be said to be based on natural reason. The philosopher
274 Marenbon
will therefore have to find some additional characteristic to distinguish his pursuit. Second, in the Middle Ages natural reason was understood by contrast - with supernatural cognitive powers and with revelation. Outside this context, the meaning of the term - if it retains any - is different.
If, then, philosophia and modern philosophy are so unlike, study of the autonomy of philosophia in the Middle Ages cannot be used - as many historians of medieval thought have tried to use it - to establish the claim that their material is 'truly philosophy' and that they are truly 'historians of philosophy'. Rather, it should make them aware of the dangers of assuming that the organization of knowledge in past times will conform to modern expectations, and lead them to reflect on the problems posed by the very notion of the 'history of philosophy'.31
Trinity College, Cambridge
1 A useful companion to such reflection is provided by the essays in R. Rorty, J.B. Schneewind and Q. Skinner (eds.), Philosophy in History (Cambridge, 1984). This collection includes articles on ancient, early modern and more recent thought. But no period raises the problems its contributors explore more pointedly than the Middle Ages. Historians of medieval philosophy have much to learn from - and perhaps even more to contribute to - such theoretical discussion.
INDICES
Index of Manuscripts
DOUAI
Bibliotheque municipale 434 47. 48
ISTANBUL Aya Sofya 4855 229
PARIS
Bibliotheque Nationale hebr. 720 258
hebr. 956 258
lat. 2598 41
lat. 14715 190 lat. 16134 189. 190
Bibliotheque de la Sorbonne
lat. 581 41
PRAHA
Univerzitm Knihovna IV. D. 13 47
WIEN
Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek
VPL 1438 61
VATIC-\NO (CITTA DEL) Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana
lat. 782 47
lat. 7678 169
Pal. lat. 1171 41
Index of Names
Abbad ibn Sulaiman 231 Abraham Bibago 260, 261 Abu Macshar (sive Albumasar) 26, 28. 45 Abu Rkla, M.A.A. 86, 229, 232-234 Ackrill, J. 106, 107
Adam Balsamiensis Parvipontanus 169 Adamdc Bockfeld 141 Adams, M. McCord 201 Adclardus dc Bath 22-25 Acgidius Assisicnsis 65 Acgidius Romanus 139 Affifi. A.A. 90
al-Ahsa'Iibn AbF Djumhur 247 al-Ahwani, A.F. 233, 238, 239 Alanus dc Insulis 32 Albalag Isaac 257 Albcricus dc Rcmis 35
Albcrtus Colonicnsis (Magnus) 34, 55, 131, 132, 134-136, 139, 141, 149, 151, 152, 155, 160
Albcrtus dc Saxonia 172, 189-192 Alcuinus 17
Alexander dc Alexandria 139, 156 Alexander Aphrodisicnsis 86, 238 Alexander dc Hales 51,55 Alexander Neckham 20, 169 Ambrosius Mediolancnsis 14, 18. 19 Amm,A. 240 A mm, U. 92
al-cAmin, Abu al-Hasan 230, 238 Ammonius 229, 231 Anawati, G. 90, 229, 233, 239 Ansclmus Cantuariensis 13, 17, 18, 37,
54, 55, 59
Apollinaris Offredi 165, 195 Arbcrry, A.J. 94, 229
Aristotclcs 4, 10, 11, 26, 33, 34, 36, 37, 41, 45, 47, 48, 50, 55, 57-60, 62, 63, 66-68, 70. 71, 72-77, 79-84, 85-88, 90, 92, 93, 97-99, 101, 102, 104-118, 120- 122, 124-127, 130-132, 134, 137, 138, 140, 141, 144, 146, 151, 153-156. 159, 161, 164, 166, 168, 179, 194, 198-201, 204-207, 209, 210, 213, 219. 223. 224, 229, 231, 233, 238, 243, 247, 249, 253- 256, 259, 261, 262-269 Aristotcles (Pseudo-) 231 Aristoxenus 226 Arkoun, M. 235 Ashworth, H.J. 173
Asquith, P. 74
al-Asturlabl 232
Asztalos, M. 165, 172
Atay, H. 100
Atiych. G.N. 231
Augustinus (Aurclius) 3, 11, 17, 18, 37,
51,58, 111, 139, 199,212-220 Augustinus Triumphus de Ancona 139
Babbit. S.M. 206 Badawi, A. 85, 90 Bachrcns, W.A. 14 Bacumkcr, C. 58 Baker, D. 215 Balic, C. 54, 270 Bancth, D.H. 253 Barbel, J. 16 Barnes, J. 112 Barth, ILM. 74 Baur, L. 30,39, 131, 151 Beekenkamp. W.I I. 18 Bcnakis, L.G. 223, 224 IkrcngariusTuroncnsis 18 Bcrnardus Carnotcnsis 29 Bernard us Silvcstris 28 Bcrtoldus Mosburgcnsis 56, 57 Bianchi, L. 179 Black, D.L. 92, 94 Bland, K.P. 245, 246 Blasius Pelacani dc Parma 46 Blumbcrg, H. 258 Blumcnbcrg, II. 214 Boehner, Ph. 147, 170, 171, 266 Ikx:thius (A.M.T. Severinus) 17, 23, 28, 32, 46, 48, 49, 132, 133, 135, 148, 179, 181 Boethius de Dacia 34-36, 187, 188, 264,
266-269, 272
Bonaventura 20, 34, 36, 37, 58-60, 264 Borgnet, A. 55 Bouyges, M. 92, 241, 245 Braakhuis, II.A.G. 169, 187 Brady, T.A. 213 Brecht, B. 4 Brewer, J.S. 40 Bridges, J.H. 36.37 Brion, F. 235, 236 Brisson, J.-P. 19 Brown, M.A. 173 Brown, P. 220
Index of Names
279
Brown, S.F. 66, 171, 266 Browning, R. 223 Busse, A. 229,238 Butterworth, C.E. 90 Buytaert, E.M. 49
Callus, D.A. 141
Caroti, S. 45
Cassiodorus (Flavius Magnus Aurclius) 28
Cavalla, F. 216
Celano, A.J. 199
Chahine, O.E. 242
Chalcidius 22
Chandler, B. 194
Charles, E. 152
Chatelain, A. 33
Chejne.A.G. 234
Chemli, M. 242
Chenu, M.-D. 46, 47, 55, 269
Christianus Druthmarus 14
Cicero (Marcus Tullius) 29, 30, 213
Clay, M. 74
Clemens Alexandrinus 15, 18, 224
Clucas, L. 223
Cochrane, C.N. 216
Cohen, I.E. 79
Coleridge, S.T. 255
Combes, A. 54
Constable, G. 223, 226
Constantinus IX 223
"Cornificius" 29
Cortabarria, A. 232
Cosman, M.P. 194
Costa ben Luca vide Qusta b. Luqa
Courcelle, P. 23
Courtenay, W.J. 179
Cripps, H. 204
Crombie, A.C. 150, 151
Crouzel, H. 13
Cubukc,u, I.A. 100
Curtayne, H. 204
Curtius, E.R. 263
Daguillon, J. 53
Dahan, G. 14
Daiber, II. 228, 230, 231, 234, 235, 237-
239, 242
d'Alverny, M.-Th. 26 Daniel Morleius 27 Dante Alighieri 1-5, 7, 8, 36 Davy, M.M. 33 Decker, B. 133, 135 De Ghellinck, J. 15 de Lubac, H. 15, 18, 20 de Libera, A. 158, 165, 169, 181, 190, 195 Delorme, P.M. 20, 34, 58, 134 Denifle, H. 33
de Rijk, L.M. 32, 104, 164, 169, 173,
187
Descartes, R. 158 Destrez, J. 46 de Vooght, P. 49 De Wulf, M. 49 Didymus de Alexandria 224 Dieterici, F. 238
Dionysius Areopagita (Pseudo-) 21, 57 Dirar ibn cAmr 231 Diwald, S. 240 al-Djuwaini 241 Doig, J.C. 129, 132, 133, 135, 136, 138,
153 Dominicus Gundissalinus 28, 30, 131,
133, 136, 140, 153 Dondaine, H.F. 20 Doyle, A.C. 81 Dronke, P. 28 Duhem, P. 45, 167 Dumoutet, E. 17 Dunlop, D.M. 95 Dunphy, W. 50 Dunya, S. 90, 94, 101, 239, 242
Ebbesen, S. 171, 187
Eckhardus de Iloheim 58
Ehrle, F. 64
Elamrani-Jamal, A. 239
Elias 238
Elkana, Y. 164
Endress, G. 230-233, 243, 247, 248
Euagrius Ponticus 12
Eucherius 16
Euclides 43, 255
Fakhry, M. 242
al-Farabl, Abu Nasr 28, 86-89, 92, 94,
97, 237-244, 246-249 Faral, E. 204
Federici Vescovini, G. 41, 46 Festugiere, A.J. 12 Finnis,J. 207,211 Forrest, E. 204 Franciscus Petrarca 31 Frank, R.M. 99, 229 Frankowska, M. 152 Frazer, J.G. 219 Frend, W.H.C. 215 Funkenstein, A. 167,271
Gabriel Bielus 179
Gal, G. 50, 171, 266
Galenus 26,259
Galilei, G. 4, 158-160, 164, 165, 167,
168, 179 Galston, M. 92
280
Index of Names
Gardet, L. 229,240
Garin, E. 44
Garnerius dc Rupeforti 21
Garrison, J. 76, 79
Gastaldelii, F. 21
Gaudentius Brixiensis 19
Gauthier, R.A. 35, 199, 265
Gauthier, L. 244
Genest, J.F. 65
Gerardus de Bononia 48-50, 55, 61, 62
Gerardus Cremonensis 116
Gersonides vide Levi b. Gerson
Gewirth, A. 206,209-211
Geycr, B. 58, 132
al-Ghazall, Abu Hamid 86, 87, 92, 96, 98-
103, 241-243, 245-247, 249, 257, 258 Ghazoul, F. 248 Gilbertus Porretanus (sive Pictavicnsis)
32, 181-183 Gilby.T. 142
Gilson, E. 63, 215, 216, 262 Glorie, F. 11 Glorieux, P. 263 Glueck, A. 19
Godefridus de Fontibus 48, 49, 55 Goethe, J. 7 Goichon, A.M. 240 Goodman, L.E. 244 Gouillard, J. 223 Grabmann, M. 66, 229 Graiff, C.A. 146, 152 Grant, E. 179
Green-Pedersen, N.J. 35, 267 Gregorius I papa (Magnus) 215 Gregorius Ariminensis 179, 206, 208 Gregorius 'ITiaumaturgus 13 Gregory, T. 10 Grisez, G.G. 207,211 Gualterus Burlacus 168, 170, 173-178, 190 Guido Bonatus 41,45 Guido de Cavalcantibus 35 Guilclmus Buser 173 Guilclmus de Conchis 23-25,29-31 Guilelmus Hentisberius 162, 166, 188-190,
194, 197
Guilelmus Lucensis 21 Guilelmus de Moerbcka 56, 116 Guilelmus de Ockham 50, 61, 62, 65-67,
71, 83, 114-115, 117-127, 129, 130, 139,
147, 149, 160, 162, 164, 171, 176-180,
198, 200-206, 265, 266 Guilelmus de Sancto Theodorico 23-25 Guilelmus Shirovodus (sive de Shyreswood)
169, 170, 176
Guilelmus de Sutton 190 Guilelmus de Ware 61 Guillaumont, A. 12
Guillaumont, C. 12 Guy.J.C. 217
Hachem, H. 242
Ha1 ring, N. 19,23, 182
Hamilton, A. 198,218
Haren, M. 264
Haridi, A.A. 90
Hartmann, N. 157
al-Hasan al-Mucizz[ 247
Haskins, C.H. 22,24-26,28
Heidegger, M. 157, 158, 159, 161
Henricus de Gandavo 53, 139, 179
Henricus Harkelaeus (sive Harkeley) 65
Hermes Trismegist us 28,44,57
Hcrvaeus Brito 169
Hervaeus Natalis 50
Hilarius Pictavicnsis 19
Hintikka, J. 72-77, 79-81, 109, 179, 181
Hintikka, M.B. 74
Hippocrates 26
Hissettc, R. 34,35,62,264
Hoffman, F. 171
Hoffmans, J. 49,55
Homcrus 2, 7, 8
I lorovit/., S. 252
Hourani, G. 96, 98, 229, 238, 244
Hovannisian, R.G. 89, 234
Hrabanus Maurus 15
Hudry, V. 26
Hugo Bcnzi 195
Hugo de Novocastro 184
Hugo de Sancto Caro 179
Hugo dc Sancto Victore 16, 20, 21, 28-
30
Hugonnard-Roche, H. 194 Hume, D. 78,79,207,269 Ilunain ibn Ishaq 86 Hunger, H. 223,224 Husscrl, E. 6
lacobus de Bencdictis (si\'e de Todi) 65 lacobus Foroliviensis (sive de Turre) 53,
62
lacobus Pistoricnsis 35 lacobus Venctus 116 Ibn Badjdja, Abu Bakr (sire Avcmpacc)
241-243, 246, 247, 249 Ibn Da'ud, Ibrahim 252-254, 261 Ibn Ha/.m, Abu Muhammad cAli 234 Ibn al-Khammar 240 Ibn Khaldim, Wall al-Dm 247-249 Ibn Miskawaih, Abu CAH 235 Ibn al-Nadim. Abu al-Faradj 86 Ibn al-Nafls, eAla' al-Dm 244 Ibn Rushd, Abu al-Walid (sive Averrocs)
35, 68, 70, 85, 89, 90, 95, 138, 139,
Index of Names
281
144, 145, 179, 229, 234, 241, 244-249,
255,257 Ibn Sina, Abu cAIi (sive Avicenna) 28,
86, 87, 89-98, 101, 132, 133, 135, 136,
138-141, 144, 151, 152, 233, 238-244,
247, 249
Ibn Taimiyya 102, 247 Ibn Tufail, Abu Bakr 240, 243, 244, 246,
247, 249
Ibn Tumart 247
Ibn Yunus, Abu Bishr Malta 85, 86, 90 Inati, S.C. 94 Ingarden, R. 156, 157 loannes de Bassolis 49 loannes Buridanus 139, 140, 203-205, 265 loannes Cassianus 14, 16, 17, 19 loannes Chrysostomus 214 loannes Duns Scotus 49, 54, 60, 61, 77,
78, 80, 135, 139, 144, 145, 148, 179,
180, 183, 202, 266, 270-272 loannes Duns Scotus (Pseudo-) 83 loannes de Glogovia 155, 156 loannes Italus 223 loannes de Mirecuria 179, 194 loannes Pagus 169 loannes Peckham 63, 64 loannes Philoponus 86 loannes de Ripa 54, 57 loannes Sarisberiensis 29-32 loannes Scotus Eriugena 16, 17, 20 loannes de Vercellis 45, 46 loannes Wiclefus 206 loannes Xiphilinus 223 Isaac Pulgar 258, 259 Ishaq ibn Hunain 85, 86 Isidorus Hispalensis 28 lustinus 15 Ivry,A. 231-233,245
Jacobi, K. 181
Jahier, H. 240
Jansen, B. 60
Jay.J. 198,219
Jeauneau, E. 17
Jolivet, J. 181,239
Joseph ibn Caspi 258
Joseph ben Jacob ibn Zaddlq 251, 252
Juda ben Salomon ha-Cohen 254-256, 261
Kahaza, Z. 65, 190
Kamali, S.A. 247
Kamlah, W. 215
Kant, I. 159,207,228,234
Kassem, M. 90,246
Kazhdan.A. 223,226
Keicher, O. 10
Kenny, A. 78,111,207,262
Khalidi,T. 232
Khashaba, A. 88
al-Khudain, M. 233
Khulaif, F. 240
al-Kindl, Abu Yusuf 26-28, 43, 86, 229,
231-234, 236, 237, 247, 249 Kitcher, P. 74 Klein-Franke, F. 229 Kleineidam, E. 171 Kluxen, W. 199,207 Kneepkens, C.H. 173 Knuuttila, S. 73, 74, 79, 80, 165, 179,
181-183, 186 Koch, J. 139
Koyre, A. 158, 159, 167, 168, 179 Kraemer, J.L. 240,242 Kraus, P. 235 Kraye,J. 231 Krebs, E. 50 Kretzmann, N. 78, 111, 165, 186, 187,
262
Krieger, G. 204 Kristeller, P.O. 35 Kuhn, W. 231 Kuhn.T. 167
Lacey, R.K. 235
Lanfrancus Cantuariensis 18, 19
Lappe, J. 68, 69
Laufs,J. 217
Leaman, O. 243
Leclercq, J. 53, 62
Leff, G. 114, 115, 119, 125, 127, 263
LeGoff,J. 262
Lehrer, K. 74
Lehtinen, A.I. 165, 186
Leibniz, G.W. 179
Lemay, R. 26, 28
Lemerle, P. 223
Levib. Gerson 258,259,261
Levinger, J.S. 259
Levy, R. 228
Lewin, B. 240
Lewry, P.O. 169, 173
Little, A.G. 39-41
Locke, J. 79
Lohr, C. 229,262,264
Lottin, O. 199
Luce,J.V. 3
Luther, Martin 54, 59
al-Macarn, Abu al-cAla' 235 McCullough, W.S. 240 McEvoy.J. 111,121,124,126 McGrade,A.S. 198,203 Machamer, P.K. 165 Mclnerny, R. 129, 207
282
Index of Names
Macrobius 19, 22
Madclung, W. 247
Madison,J. 198
Mahdi, M. 87, 92, 243, 248
Maier, A. 159, 165
Maieru, A. 159, 165, 172
Makdisi, G. 228
Mancini, F. 65
Mandonnet, P. 46
Mansion, S. 75
al-MarcashF, Mahmud 247
Maraya 85
Marcolino, V. 208
Marcnbon, J. 262, 265
Markus, R.A. 215, 219
Marlowe, C. 7
Marmura, M.H. 85, 89, 91, 98, 99, 232-
235, 238-246 Marrone, J. 179 Marrou, H.-I. 216 Marsilius de Inghen 190 Marsilius Patavinus 67, 68, 206 Martens, J.L. 74 Martianus Capclla 28 al-Marwa/.i, Ibrahim 86 Massignon, I,. 247 Maurach, G. 23 Maurer, A. 129 Medawar, P. 255 Meek, T.J. 240 Melville, H. 3 Menut,A.D. 206 Mcyerhof, M. 244 Michael Scotus 132, 140 Michael Pscllus 223 Michel, T. 247 Michot, J.R. 239 Miles, M.R. 220 Minio-Paluello, L. 85 Mohammed, O.N. 245 Moises b. Maimon (sive Maimonides) 242,
253, 254, 256, 259, 261 Moises ibn Tibbon (sive Moises
Narboncnsis) 245, 258 Moraux, P. 224 Morewedge, P. 92, 99 Morienus 43 Mountain, W.J. 11
Mucammar ibn cAbbad al-Sulami 230 Muckle, J.T. 62 Miiiler, M. 22 Murdoch, J.B. 159, 163-168, 178, 185,
187, 188, 189, 194, 266 Musa, M.Y. 239
Nadawi, S. 102 Nadjdjar, P.M. 237, 243
Nardi, B. 35
Newton, I. 72, 73, 76, 79, 83, 140, 158
Nicolaus de Methone 223
Nicolaus Oresme 194, 206
Nicolaus de Ultricuria 68, 69, 71
Nicolettus Vcrnias 138
Nietzsche, F. 210
Nikolaou, T. 224
Nissim de Massilia 258
Nock, A.D. 12
al-Nowaihl, M. 248
Nuchelmans, G. 105
Numenius 15
Oakley, F. 179 Oberman, H.A. 179,213 Oberndorfer, D. 248 O'Donnell, J.R. 68, 170 Odo Rigaldi 46-48, 51, 52, 71 Oehler, K. 223, 224 Origenes 13-15, 19, 224 Owen, G.H.L. 75 Owens, J. 144, 145
Pagels, II 214
Pagnoni Sturlesc, M.R. 57
Paravicini Bagliani, A. 159
Paret, R. 228
Parmenides 104
Paulus Venetus 173
Pelzer, A. 49
Pereira, M. 45
Perreiah, A. 173
Petit, J. 66
Pctrus Abaelardus 18, 19, 179, 181
Petrus de Abano 41,42,45
Petrus de Alliaco 46, 66, 179
Petrus de Alvcrnia 139, 199
Petrus Aureoli 49,52, 139
Petrus Cantor 17
Petrus Ceffons 65, 194
Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis 169, 190
Petrus loannes Olivi 60, 264
Pctrus Ix)mbardus 48, 265
Petrus Mantuanus 165, 195
Petrus Sanitus 190
Philo Alexandrinus 224, 227
Pichery, E. 16
Pinborg, J. 78, 111, 171, 187, 262, 268
Pines, S. 235,247,259
Pingree, D. 43
Plato 15, 19, 22, 37, 43, 57, 58, 87, 88,
104, 110, 111, 121, 124, 131, 154, 159,
217, 218, 231, 247, 249 Plotinus 231,232,249 Pluta, O. 74 Podskalsky, G. 223
Index of Names
283
Popper, K. 167
Porphyrius 117,229,238,257
Prezzolini, G. 215
Proclus 56, 57, 223, 231, 232, 247, 249
Qalonymos ben Qalonymos 241 al-Qirqisani, Abu Yusuf 250 Qusta b. Luqa 229 Quwairi, Abu Ishaq 86
al-Rabe, A.A. 247,248
Radulphus Brito 187, 265
Rahman, F. 239
Raimundus Lullus 10, 56
Raimundus Massilicnsis 28
Ramus, P. 105
Randi, E. 179, 180, 184
Rashdall, II. 34
Rashed, R. 239
Ratzinger, J. 215
al-Razi, Abu Bakr (sive Rhazes) 86, 234,
235, 237, 249
al-Razi, Abu Hatim 235-237, 249 Redondi, P. 159 Remes, U. 79
Remigius Altissiodorensis 46 Rescher, N. 86, 95
Rhabanus Maurus vide Hrabanus Maurus Ricardus Kilvington 173, 189 Ricardus de Lavenham 173 Ricardus Rufus Cornubicnsis 169, 187 Ricardus de Sancto Victore 20, 37, 56 Ricardus Swyneshed 167 Ritter, J. 228 Robertus Fland 173 Robertus Grossatesta 38, 39, 59, 60, 111,
112, 116, 117, 121, 122, 124, 126, 150,
151, 153, 169 Robertus I lolcot 62,63 Robertus Kilwardby 11, 45, 46, 55, 141 Rogerus Baco 33, 34, 36-41, 45, 71, 131,
134, 136, 139, 146, 151, 152, 160, 219 Rogerus Marston 59 Rogerus Swyneshed 173-175, 177 Rorty, R. 274 Rosenthal, E.J. 248 Rosenthal, F. 230, 232 Ross, W.D. 137
Rossi, P. 38, 111, 112, 116, 151, 154 Roth.L. 253 Rowson, E.K. 238 Rudavsky, T. 179 Ruether, R.R. 214 Rufinus 14
Rupertus Tuitiensis 19 Ruska, J. 42 Ryan, W.F. 231
Saadia Gaon 250
Sacada, R. 245
Salmon ben Ycruhim 250
al-Samau'al 232
al-Sarakhs! 86
al-Sawi, S. 235, 236
Schacht, J. 244
Schmitt, C. 231
Schmitt, F.S. 13, 17, 18
Schneewind, J.B. 274
Scholz, R. 67
Schreiner, P. 223
Selby-Bigge, J. 269
Serene, II. Ill
al-Shahrastani 247
Shaull, R. 216
Shehaby, N. 94
Shem-tob ben Joseph ben Falaquera 256,
257
Siasos, L. 223 Sidarus, A. 233 Siddiqi, S.A. 243 Sigerus de Brabantia 35, 50, 139, 145,
146, 152, 264, 265 Sileo, L. 47,48,51 Silverstein, T. 28 al-Slrafi, Abu Sacld 231 Sirat, C. 250,255,257 Skinner, O. 274 Sorabji, R. 165, 267 Spade, P.V. 173, 176, 177, 186 Speck, P. 223 Spengler, O. 8 Spiazzi, R.M. 113 Spiegelberg, H. 219 Spinoza, B. 259 Stachowiak, II. 243 Stanford, W.B. 3,6 Steele, R. 39, 134, 152 Stegmullcr, F. 11,55 Stephanus de Aurelianis (sive Tempier)
24, 34, 264 Strozewski, W. 128 Stump, E. Ill, 169, 171, 173-177 Sturlese, L. 57 Sudhoff, K. 27 Suringar, W.II.D. 29,31 Sylla, E.D. 159, 187, 191-194, 266
Tatarzynski, R. 156
Tatianus 15
Tavard, G.H. 20
Taylor, C. 231
Tennyson, A. 3
Themistius 32, 86
Theodoricus Carnotensis 23, 29, 31
Theodorus Smyrnaeus 224
284
Index of Names
Thery, P.O. 58
Thomas de Aquino 45-50, 52, 61-64, 71, 81, 82, 112-118, 121-124, 126, 129-137, 139, 141-144, 148, 149, 152, 154, 179, 199-201, 204-213, 218, 219, 229, 246, 262, 265, 266, 268-270, 272
'ITiomas Bradwardinus 67, 164, 166. 206
Thomas, P. 29
Tishby, I. 259
Tornero, E. 234
Touati, C. 258
Trapp, A.D. 208
Trechsel, J. 203
Turnbull, R.G. 165
al-Tiisi, cAla' al-Dm 96, 245
al-f iisl, Naslr al-Dm 94, 95, 247
Ullmann, W. 206
Ulricus Argcntoratensis 52, 53, 55
Vajda, G. 247,250,257
Van den Ikrgh, S. 245
Van Ess, J. 230
Van Rijcn,J. 109, 182
Van Stccnhcrghcn, F. 262
Vasoli, C. 105
Vcllico, A.-M. 270
Vcrgilius (Puhlius V. Maro) 1, 2, 19
Vettcse, A. 179
Vignaux, P. 54, 59, 61, 65, 179, 190
Vincentius Bcllovacensis 132
von Frit/., K. 110
von Wright, G.H. 1
Vryonis, S. Jr. 89,234
Walafridus Strabo 17 Wallace, R.M. 214 Wallace, W.A. 162 Walsh, J.J. 204
Walzer, R. 85, 134
Wasil ibn cAta 230, 231
Watt, W.M. 232,241
Webering, D. 114, 115, 117, 119, 125
Weidemann, H. 181
Weil, S. 252
Weinberg, J. 80
Weisheipl, J. 263
Weiss, B. %
Weiss, G. 223,224
Westmann, R. 167
Widomski.J. 145
Wieland, G. 199
Willner, H. 22
Wills, G. 198
Wilmot, I. 204
Wilpcrt, P. 268
Wilson, C. 162, 166, 190, 195, 197
Wippcl, J. 129
Wittgenstein, L. 219
Wtodek, 7. 129
Wolska-Conus, W. 223
Wolter, A. 77, 78, 135
Wright, T. 20, 169
Yefct ben Eli 250 Yrjonsuuri, M. 74 Yuhanna ibn Hailan 86
/ainaty, G. 242
Tambclli, P. 45
/amponi, S. 45
Tayid, S. 90,92,239
/edler, B.H. 241
/immermann, A. 129, 138, 139, 141, 144
al-7irikll, H. 240
7iyadeh, M. 242
7uraiq, C. 235
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1987
V.I
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ISBN 95 1-9264-09-4 ISSN 0355-1792 Helsinki 1990 Yliopistopaino