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KOREA’S
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1947
DEPARTMENT OF STATE Publication 2933
Far Eastern Series 1 8
Released October 1947
DIVISION OF PUBLICATIONS OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office Washington 25, D. C. Price 15 cents
CONTENTS
Page
Korea and the United Nations 1
Wartime and Postwar Commitments 1
The Cairo and Potsdam Declarations 1
The 38th Parallel and Early Unification Efforts ..... 2
The Moscow Agreement 2
Negotiations Under the Moscow Agreement 3
The Joint Conference 3
The Joint Commission, 1946 Meetings 4
The Hodge-Chistiakov Letters 5
The Marshall-Molotov Letters — April-May 1947 6
The Joint Commission, 1947 Meetings 7
Continued Efforts To Achieve Korean Independence . . 9
Annexes
I. Excerpt From an Address by the Secretary of State Delivered Before the General Assembly of the
United Nations, September 17, 1947 15
II. The Cairo Conference: Joint Declaration by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, Released December 1,
1943 16
III. Excerpt From the Proclamation Defining Terms for
Japanese Surrender, Potsdam, July 26, 1945 . ... 17
IV. U.S.S.R. Declaration of War Against Japan, August 8,
1945 17
V. Excerpt From the Report of the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist i Republics, the United States of America, and the
United Kingdom, Moscow, December 27, 1945 (The
Moscow Agreement) 18
VI. Excerpt From Communique No. 5 Issued by Joint
U. S.-U. S. S. R. Commission, April 18, 1946 ... 19
VII. Exchange of Letters Between Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, Commanding General, United States Army Forces in South Korea, 'and Guard Col. Gen. I. M. Chistia- kov, Commanding General, Soviet Forces in North Korea, May 9, 1946-February 28, 1947 20
III
IV
Annexes — Continued page
VII. Exchange of Letters, etc. — Continued
A. General Hodge to General Chistiakov (Excerpt), May 9,
1946 20
B. General Hodge to General Chistiakov (Excerpt), June 15,
1946 21
C. General Chistiakov to General Hodge, August 6, 1946. ... 21
D. General Hodge to General Chistiakov, August 12, 1946 ... 22
E. General Chistiakov to General Hodge, October 26, 1946. . . 23
F. General Hodge to General Chistiakov, November 1, 1946 . . 26
G. General Chistiakov to General Hodge, November 26, 1946. . 28
II. General Hodge to General Chistiakov, December 24, 1946. . 30
I. General Chistiakov to General Hodge, February 28, 1947 . . 31
VIII. Exchange of Notes Between the Secretary of State and the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, April 8, 1947-May 12, 1947 32
A. The Secretary of State to the Soviet Minister for Foreign
Affairs, April 8, 1947 32
B. The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of
State, April 19, 1947 35
C. The Secretary of State to the Soviet Minister for Foreign
Affairs, May 2, 1947 38
D. The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of
State, May 7, 1947 39
E. The Secretary of State to the Soviet Minister for Foreign
Affairs, May 12, 1947 41
IX. Decision No. 12 of Joint (U.S.-U.S.S.R.) Commission,
June 12, 1947 41
X. Brown-Shtikov Statement to Representatives of Korean Parties Eligible for Consultation Under Joint
Decision No. 12 45
XI. Letter Submitted to Joint Commission by Member
Organizations of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee . 49
XII. Exchanges of Notes Between the Secretary of State (and Acting Secretary) and the Soviet Minister for For- eign Affairs, August 11, 1 947-September 17, 1947. . 50
A. The Secretary of State to the Soviet Minister for Foreign
Affairs, August 11, 1947 50
B. The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of
State, August 23, 1947 52
C. The Acting Secretary of State to the Soviet Minister for
Foreign Affairs, August 26, 1947 53
D. The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of
State, September 4, 1947 57
E. The Acting Secretary of State to the Soviet Minister for
Foreign Affairs, September 17, 1947 59
Korea and the United Nations
ON SEPTEMBER 17, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Mar- shall in his address before the General Assembly of the United Nations 1 stated that, despite the efforts of the United States Government to reach an agreement with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to restore the independence of Korea through the Joint (U.S.-U.S.S.R.) Commission and otherwise, today the independence of Korea is no further advanced than it was two years ago. Since it appeared evident that further attempts to solve the Korean problem by means of bilateral negotiations would only serve to delay the establishment of an independent, united Korea, the Ameri- can Secretary of State declared that “It is, therefore, the intention of the United States Government to present the problem of Korean inde- pendence to this session of the General Assembly”. The General Assembly of the United Nations on September 23, 1947, by a vote of 41 to 6, decided to place the problem of Korea on its agenda for current- session consideration.
Wartime and Postwar Commitments The Cairo and Potsdam Declarations
The cornerstone of Allied policy toward Korea was formulated dur- ing the course of World War II when at Cairo 2 in December 1943 the United States, the United Kingdom, and China joined in declaring that, “mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea”, they were determined “that in due course Korea shall become free and inde- pendent”. This multilateral pledge was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration3 of July 1945. The U.S.S.R. subscribed to the Potsdam Declaration upon entering the war against Japan.4
1 See annex I.
2 See annex II.
3 See annex III.
4 See annex IV.
1
2
/Core o’s Independence
The 38th Parallel and Early Unification Efforts
A wartime decision prompted by military considerations to effect the defeat and surrender of Japan in Korea provided that Japanese troops north of 38° in Korea surrender to Soviet forces, while those south of 38° were to surrender to United States forces. This decision was incorporated in General Order No. 1, which defined areas of responsibility for accepting the surrender of all Japanese military forces and which was issued by the Supreme Com; tander for the Allied Powers to the Japanese Government on September 2, 1945. By September 8, 1945, the date on which U.S. troops entered Korea, Soviet forces had occupied Korea down to 38° north latitude. On Septem- ber 9, U.S. troops accepted in a formal ceremony the surrender of J apanese forces south of that line.
Since the directive governing the surrender did not contemplate a permanent geographical division of the peninsula at the 38th parallel, the American commander initiated negotiations during the early days of the occupation to effect a relaxation of travel restrictions and to secure the unification of the economy and administration of Korea. The strict interpretation by the Soviet authorities of their responsi- bilities over the northern zone, however, changed into a barrier the line agreed upon to effect the surrender of the Japanese. This barrier not only has disrupted normal Korean social relationships but, by separating the predominantly agricultural south from the more indus- trial north, has deeply and adversely affected the economy of the coun- try. The unsuccessful attempts by the American commander to over- come this barrier to the resumption of normal Korean life led him finally to recommend that the problem be considered at a higher level.
The Moscow Agreement 5
In December 1945 the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union met at [Moscow. With a view to reestablishing Korea as an independent state, liquidating the re- sults of Japanese domination, and creating conditions for the devel- oping of the country on democratic principles, it was agreed, with the later adherence of the Chinese Government, that a provisional Korean democratic government should be set up. The carrying out of the appropriate preliminary measures, and assistance in the formation of this government, was to be the task of a Joint Commission represent- ing the commands of the two occupying powers. The recommenda- tions of the Joint Commission, drawn in consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, were to be presented for the consideration of the Governments of the United States, U. S. S. R.,
* See annex V.
The Joint Conference
3
United Kingdom, and China prior to a final decision by the two Gov- ernments represented in the Commission.
The Joint Commission was also to work out, with the participation of the provisional Korean democratic government and Korean demo- cratic organizations, the assistance required to promote political, eco- nomic, and social progress and to establish the national independence of Korea. These measures of assistance were then to be considered by the four powers in working out an agreement of trusteeship for Korea covering a period of up to five years.
In addition, and in advance of the formation of a Joint Commission, the urgent administrative and economic problems occasioned by divi- sion of the peninsula and the lack of coordination between the two oc- cupying powers were to be considered by a conference of representa- tives of the United States and Soviet commands in Korea. The Mos- cow Agreement provided for this conference to be convened within a period of two weeks.
Negotiations Under the Moscow Agreement
The Joint Conference
The Joint Conference to consider economic and administrative co- ordination, composed of 10 representatives from each of the two com- mands in Korea, met from January 16 through February 5, 1946. The early discussions indicated, however, divergent approaches to the prob- lem. The American Delegation sought a broad solution that would permit the unified operation of Korean railroad, electric-power, and communication facilities; uniform fiscal policies to be applied to bank- ing, currency, foreign-exchange, and commerce operations; the free flow of goods and of certain categories of persons; and the establish- ment of joint control posts on a non-fortified 38th parallel. The So- viet Delegation, however, desired discussion on a limited number of specific subjects such as the flow of electric power from the north, the exchange of certain commodities and equipment, and the re-establish- ment of rail and automotive traffic between the two zones. Any uni- fied operation of utilities that would impinge upon the absolute com- mand authority over the north was opposed by the Soviet Delegation. The disclosure that, because of an influx of refugees into south Korea and poor yields occasioned by wartime restrictions upon the use of chemical fertilizers, no rice supplies were available in the south for ex- change on a barter basis led the chief of the Soviet Delegation to ex- clude from consideration by the conference discussion of electric-pow- er supply and the exchange of foodstuffs, raw material, fuel, industrial equipment, and chemical products. As a result, the Joint Conference
4
Korea’s Independence
achieved only limited agreement in the fields of exchange of mail ; allo- cation of radio frequencies; liaison between the two commands; rail, motor, and water-borne transpoi-tation ; and the movement of persons between the two zones. Subsequent attempts by the U.S. command to implement even these limited agreements met with little success; results of the conference were therefore confined to intermittent exchanges of mails and the exchange of small military liaison teams.
The Joint Commission , 1946 Meetings
Ox March 20, 1946, the Joint Commission provided for in the second paragraph of the Moscow Agreement convened in Seoul and, until its adjournment on May 6, held 24 sessions. There was apparent general approval by Koreans of the initial task of the Commission prescribed by the Moscow Agreement : that of assisting the formation of a provisional Korean government. The additional provision call- ing for a period of aid and assistance to Korea through a four-power trusteeship agreement, however, brought forth widespread condem- nation by Koreans, who associated any form of outside control or supervision with the hated Japanese “protectorate” which was the forerunner of outright annexation of Korea in 1910. Under the terms- of the Moscow Agreement, the nature of the trusteeship for Korea was to be a future issue dependent upon the terms agreed to by the four powers after consultation with a Korean provisional gov- ernment. The voicing by Koreans of their opinion on the subject was considered by the American Delegation to be fully within the right of freedom of expression due to any people, and it therefore sought immediate implementation of the prescribed primary duty of the Commission to assist in the fonnation of a provisional Korean government. At the outset of the discussion, however, the Soviet Delegation raised the issue of “anti-trusteeship activity” and asserted that the provisional Korean government must be formed after con- sultation with only those political parties and social groups fully in favor of the Moscow Agreement. Such a polic}? would have had the effect of excluding from consultation a large portion of the parties in south Korea and, in fact, of the population in the entire peninsula, most of whom had at some time expressed disapproval of the trustee- ship provision of the Moscow Agreement.
This initial divergence of views was thought resolved when the Commission agreed, and published as Communique No. 5 6 its decision to consult with groups “truly democratic in their aims and methods” who would declare their willingness to “uphold the aims of the Mos- cow Decision”, “abide by the decisions of the Joint Commission
9 See annex YI.
The Hodge-Chistiakov Letters
5
in . . . the formation of a provisional Korean Government”,
and cooperate with the Commission “in the working out by it . . .
of proposals concerning measures foreseen by paragraph 3 of the Moscow Decision”. However, the Soviet Delegation then insisted that, regardless of the adherence by a party to the formula contained in Communique No. 5, no party could be represented by an individual who had expressed opposition to the trusteeship provision of the Mos- cow Agreement. The U.S. Delegation could not accept this proposal on the ground that such an exclusion would constitute a violation of the principle of freedom of speech. The U.S. Delegation then sought to discuss under paragraph 2 of the Moscow Agreement measures, such as the integration of the country's economy and administration, necessary to prepare the country for a provisional government. The Soviet Delegation however refused to consider these questions. With- out progress on the basic issue of party consultations and with an unwillingness on the part of the Soviet Delegation to consider other aspects of the problem of creating a Korean provisional government under the terms of the Moscow Agreement, the Commission adjourned sine die on May 8, 1946.
The Hodge-Chistiakov Letters
On the day following the adjournment of the Joint Commission, the U.S. commander dispatched to the Soviet commander in north Korea the first of several letters seeking a resumption of negotiations.7 In this exchange of views, the aim of the American commander was' to secure specific agreement on the troublesome issues of party con- sultation and “anti-trusteeship activity” that had led to the adjourn- ment of the Commission’s work.
Three points in the Soviet commander’s letter of November 26, 1946, 8 were thought to represent an approach to a common under- standing. They were that the Joint Commission (1) “must consult those democratic parties and organizations which uphold fully the Moscow decision”, who, in turn, (2) “will not voice opposition” or “incite others to voice opposition to the Moscow decision”. Such opposition would allow, by mutual agreement, (3) the exclusion of the offending group from consultation.
Since these points appeared to offer consultation to all democratic groups that would pledge future cooperation with the Commission, the American commander suggested in his letter of December 24 9 that the Joint Commission be reconvened on the basis of the Soviet
7 See annex VII.
8 See annex VII G.
0 See annex VII II.
762628° — 47 2
6
Korea's Independence
proposals, which were interpreted to assure full freedom of Korean opinion. To this end the American commander suggested that: (1) the signing of Communique No. 5 to support the Moscow decision and the work of the Commission be accepted as a declaration of good faith entitling the signatory to initial consultation by the Commis- sion; (2) each party have the right to determine the representatives it desired ; “mutual agreement” between the two delegations based on “good reason” alone could require the party to name a substitute rep- resentative; (3) a party or an individual be eliminated from con- sultation with the Commission only by mutual agreement and only on the ground of fomenting or instigating active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission, the fulfilment of the Moscow deci- sion, or one of the two powers. The Soviet commander, however, did not accept this interpretation, and the Joint Commission remained adjourned.
The Marshall-Molotov Letters — April-May 1947
The lack of progress toward the goals envisaged in the Moscow Agreement prompted the American Secretary of State on April 8, 1947, to address a letter to Foreign Minister Molotov.10 After re- viewing the events that led to the stalemate in the Joint Commission, and in the subsequent negotiations between the U.S. and Soviet commanders, the Secretary asked “that our governments agree to instruct our respective commanders in Korea to reconvene the Joint Commission as soon as possible . . . on a basis of respect
for the democratic right of freedom of opinion [and that] a date be fixed for a review by the two governments of the progress made . . . by the Joint Commission.” Mr. Molotov, in a reply dated April 19, reiterated the position previously adopted by the Soviet Dele- gation and the Soviet commander in north Korea. Without clari- fying the issue or confirming the basis suggested by Secretary Mar- shall for a renewal of consultations, he agreed that the Joint Com- mission be reconvened and proposed the date of May 20. In reply, the Secretary of State on May 2 requested that Mr. Molotov, in agreeing to a resumption of negotiations “on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea”, confirm the inclusion in that basis of a respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion.
Mr. Molotov replied on May 7, offering as a basis for reconvening the Joint Commission the interpretations of the American com- mander that were not accepted when they were proposed in the letter to the Soviet commander of December 24, 1946.* 11 The Amer-
10 See annex VIII A.
11 See ante, p. 5, and annex VII.
The Joint Commission, 1947 Meetings
7
ican Secretary of State on May 12 acknowledged this agreement to reconvene on the basis of the American commander’s letter. On Maj' 21, 1947, the Joint Commission meetings were resumed.
The Joint Commission , 1947 Meetings
It was believed that the exchange of letters between Secretary Marshall and Foreign Minister Molotov had resolved the divergent views that culminated in the adjournment of the 1946 sessions of the Joint Commission. Nevertheless, on the question of consultation with Korean parties the Soviet Delegation disagreed with the interpreta- tion of the U.S. Delegation. By June 12, howevei’, it appeared that an understanding had been reached when the Joint Commission issued its Decision No. 12 that set the standards for party consultation and prescribed the schedule to be carried out in meeting with the Korean groups.12 This decision quoted from the letter of Foreign Minister Molotov his acceptance of the interpretations contained in the U.S. commander’s letter of December 24, 1946. It included a statement that the Joint Commission would consult with Korean democratic groups “which are truly democratic in their aims and methods” and which signed the statement in the former Communique No. 5. The De- cision invited the application of Korean groups on this basis and solicited in written form the views of the applicant groups regarding the structure, principles, and basic policies of the projected provisional government. The Decision directed that, after the compilation and approval of the list of parties and formal and separate consultations with the groups representing them in north and south Korea, the Joint Commission was to undertake oral consultation with each indi- vidual party in order to allow a further presentation of views on the nature of the provisional Korean government to be set up.
Thirty-eight organizations in north Korea and 422 organizations in south Korea submitted applications for consultation with the Joint Commission in accordance with the Commission’s Decision No. 12. Formal meetings were held by the Commission with representatives of the signatory parties in Seoul on June 25, 1947, and in Pyongyang on July 1, 1947. The proceedings were limited to the reading of a pre- pared statement by the chief Soviet and American commissionei’s.13 Following these meetings, in Joint Commission discussions on the problem of compiling lists of parties to be consulted, the Soviet Dele- gation reverted to the position it had assumed in the 1946 meeting of the Joint Commission by stating that it would not permit the inclusion
12 See annex VI.
13 See annex X.
8
Korea’s Independence
on a list of parties or representatives of parties who were members of a so-called “Committee Against Trusteeship”. Such groups, it was claimed, did not fully uphold the Moscow Agreement. The Soviet Delegation could not be moved from this position despite reference to the fact that the 15 parties who were members of the “Committee Against Trusteeship” had, in addition to signing the declaration con- tained in the Joint Commission’s Decision No. 12, submitted a full statement reaffirming their desire to cooperate with the Joint Commis- sion under the terms of the Moscow Agreement.14
This action of the Soviet Delegation was considered by the United States Delegation to be a violation of the understanding between Foreign Minister Molotov and Secretary Marshall in which they agreed that “signing the Declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow decision and will make the signatory party or organ- ization eligible for initial consultation.” It was also believed to be in violation of that portion of the understanding providing that an organization eligible for consultation remained so until such time as by mutual agreement, and for specified causes, it was declared ineligible. This Soviet position was substantially the same as the one it had assumed in the Joint Commission meetings of 1946.
Despite failure to obtain agreement under the terms on which the Joint Commission was reconvened, the U.S. Delegation continued to seek, within the framework of the Commission’s terms of reference, a means of establishing the Korean provisional government described in the Moscow Agreement. In an effort to surmount the party- consultation barrier, the U.S. Delegation on July 29 proposed that the Soviet Delegation conduct consultations with the parties in north Korea and the American Delegation hold consultations in the south. This suggestion was rejected as not constituting “a serious proposal”. On August 1 the American Delegation offered to consult jointly with all parties the Soviet Delegation was willing to hear and to consult alone, for the whole Commission, those parties to which the Soviet Delegation objected. This proposal was likewise rejected by the Soviet Delegation.
Having received from the Soviet Delegation no counterproposals or other suggestions for solving the party-consultation issue, the U.S. Delegation on August 12 submitted a third proposal. It recommended that oral consultations be dispensed with and the written question- naires completed by the applicant parties be accepted as consultation under the Moscow Agreement. It proposed that the Commission set up the framework of a provisional government for all Korea, speci-
14 See annex XI.
Efforts To Achieve
9
fying the elective and appointive offices to be filled and providing proper procedure for appointments and for the holding of an imme- diate general election to select a national legislature and other elected personnel. The election would allow free electioneering and secret and multi-party balloting and would be under international super- vision.
The U.S. Delegation in offering this proposal believed that the opin- ion of the Korean people, unobtainable because of lack of agreement on methods of oral consultation, could be alternately expressed through the medium of a free election.
The Soviet Delegation replied to the American proposal with a counterproposal that agreed to dispense with oral consultation of parties but advocated the creation of a “provisional assembly”, on a basis of equal representation from the north and south, of those parties that “fully support the Moscow Agreement”. The proposal for equal representation from north and south Korea in such an assembly could not in the opinion of the U.S. Delegation be reconciled with the dis- parity in numbers between the populations of the two areas, south Korea containing approximately two thirds of the peninsula’s total population of some 29 million. The other provisions of the Soviet proposal did not appear to constitute any substantial change in the previous Soviet position.
Continued Efforts to Achieve Korean Independence
Despite the many approaches, as outlined above, that had been at- tempted by the United States and its Delegation on the Joint Com- mission to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement, the position of the Soviet Union remained unchanged. The concern of the United States Government over the continuance of this condition prompted the American Secretary of State to communicate again with Foreign Minister Molotov on August 11, 1947. 15 Referring to Mr. Molotov’s suggestion,16 in the exchange of letters prior to the resumption of Joint Commission negotiations, that the Joint Commission report its prog- ress in July or August, the Secretary of State requested that the Joint Commission report by August 21 the status of its deliberations so that “each government may immediately consider what further steps may usefully be taken to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement, namely the establishment of an independent, united Korea which can take its proper place among the United Nations.”
“ See annex XII A.
16 See annex VIII B.
10
Korea's Independence
In his reply of August 23, 17 Mr. Molotov restated the Soviet position, made an accusation that the arrest of certain persons for subversive activity in south Korea was hampering the work of the Joint Com- mission, and suggested that the two Delegations continue their delib- erations, but he agreed to the framing of a joint report.
The Joint Commission, however, was unable to agree even on this report covering the status of their negotiations. All efforts to recon- cile the drafts prepared by the two Delegations were unsuccessful. The U.S. Delegation, while not approving of the draft prepared by the Soviet Delegation, offered to accept the Soviet views as a statement of position, providing the Soviet Delegation would accept the American draft and allow the two to be forwarded under a covering letter explaining that neither side agreed fully with the report of the other. Upon Soviet refusal to follow this suggestion or to discuss others that were made, and after affirming that they had no proposals of their own to make, the U.S. Delegation proposed the two Delegations agree that their divergence of views precluded agreement on a joint report. To this proposal the Soviet Delegation consented.
The obvious stalemate in the Joint Commission and the failure of the Commission to accomplish even the first step of its important task indicated that the aims of the Moscow Agreement were in fact being defeated by a continuation of the attempt to achieve them through bilateral negotiations. Accordingly, the Acting Secretary of State on August 26 18 dispatched a letter to the Soviet Foreign Minister and to the Governments of the United Kingdom and China in which he pi-oposed that “the four powers adhering to the Moscow Agree- ment meet to consider how that agreement may be speedily carried out.” Accompanying the letter were proposals which were to be used for discussion in the projected four-power conference. They included provision for early elections in north and south Korea to establish zonal legislatures, representatives from which would constitute a national provisional legislature to be charged with the duty of setting up a provisional government for a united Korea. This provisional government, meeting with representatives of the four powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement, would work out the measures of aid and assistance needed to establish firmly Korean independence. Observers from the United Nations were to be invited to be present to assure the representative and independent character of the above elections and consultations. The Korean provisional government and the pow-
17 See annex XII B.
18 Sec annex XII C.
Efforts To Achieve
11
ers concerned were also to agree upon a date by which all occupation forces in Korea would be withdrawn.
The proposal of the Acting Secretary of State was accepted by the United Kingdom and China. The Soviet Foreign Minister, how- ever, in his reply of September 4 19 stated that the action of the Acting Secretary in proposing a meeting of the four powers and the accompanying suggestions for solving the issues at stake were not within the framework of the Moscow Agreement. He therefore saw “no possibility of accepting the proposals advanced. . . .”
This was the position, then, when the Secretary of State presented the problem of Korean independence to the General Assembly on September 17, 1947.
“ See annex XII D.
.
’
Annexes
762628° — 47 3
ANNEX I
Excerpt From an Address by the Secretary of State Delivered Before the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 17, 1947
I turn now to the question of the independence of Korea. At Cairo in December 1943, the United States, the United Kingdom, and China joined in declaring that in due course Korea should become free and independent. This multilateral pledge was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945 and subscribed to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics when it entered the war against Japan. In Mos- cow in December of 1945, the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States concluded an agreement de- signed to bring about the independence pf Korea. This agreement was later adhered to by the Government of China. It provided for the establishment of a Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission to meet in Korea and, through consultations with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, to decide on methods for establishing a provisional Ko- rean government. The Joint Commission was then to consult with that provisional government on methods of giving aid and assistance to Korea, any agreement reached being submitted for approval to the four powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement.
For about two years the United States Government has been trying to reach agreement with the Soviet Government, through the Joint Commission and otherwise, on methods of implementing the Moscow Agreement and thus bringing about the independence of Korea. The United States representatives have insisted that any settlement of the Korean problem must in no way infringe the fundamental democratic right of freedom of opinion. That is still the position of my Govern- ment. Today the independence of Korea is no further advanced than it was two years ago. Korea remains divided at the 38th parallel with Soviet forces in the industrial north and United States forces in the agricultural south. There is little or no exchange of goods or services between the two zones. Korea’s economy is thus crippled.
The Korean people, not former enemies but a people liberated from 40 years of J apanese oppression, are still not free. This situation must not be allowed to continue indefinitely. In an effort to make progress
15
16
Korea’s Independence
the United States Government recently made certain proposals de- signed to achieve the purposes of the Moscow Agreement and requested the powers adhering to that Agreement to join in discussion of these proposals. China and the United Kingdom agreed to this procedure. The Soviet Government did not. Furthermore, the United States and Soviet Delegations to the Joint Commission have not even been able to agree on a joint report on the status of their deliberations. It ap- pears evident that further attempts to solve the Korean problem by means of bilateral negotiations will only serve to delay the establish- ment of an independent, united Korea.
It is therefore the intention of the United States Government to pre- sent the problem of Korean independence to this session of the General Assembly. Although we shall be prepared to submit suggestions as to how the early attainment of Korean independence might be effected, we believe that this is a matter which now requires the impartial judg- ment of the other members. We do not wish to have the inability of two powers to reach agreement delay any further the urgent and right- ful claims of the Korean people to independence.
ANNEX II
The Cairo Conference: Joint Declaration by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, Released December 1, 1943
The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising.
The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Iiepublic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other terri- tories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and inde- pendent.
Annexes
17
With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the un- conditional surrender of Japan.
ANNEX III
Excerpt From the Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, Potsdam, July 26, 1945
(1) We — the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Min- ister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.
(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out. . . .
ANNEX IV
U.S.S.R. Declaration of War Against Japan, August 8, 1945 1
Foreign Commissar of the USSR Comrade Molotov received Jap- anese Ambassador Sato and in the name of the Soviet Government gave him the following statement for transmission to the Government of Japan :
After the defeat and capitulation of Hitlerite Germany, Japan re- mained the only great power which still stands for the continuation of the war.
The demand of the three powers, the United States, Great Britain and China, of July 2G for the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces was rejected by Japan. Thus the proposal made by the Japanese Government to the Soviet Union for mediation in the Far East has lost all foundation.
1 Vol. V, No. 82, Embassy of the Uuiou of Soviet Socialist Republics, “Informa- tion Bulletin”, dated August 11, 1913.
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Korea’s Independence
Taking into account the refusal of Japan to capitulate, the Allies approached the Soviet Government with a proposal to join the war against Japanese aggression and thus shorten the duration of the war, reduce the number of casualties and contribute toward the mosf speedy restoration of peace.
True to its obligation as an Ally, the Soviet Government has ac- cepted the proposal of the Allies and has joined in the declaration of the Allied powers of July 26.
The Soviet Government considers that this policy is the only means able to bring peace nearer, to free the people from further sacrifice and suffering and to give the Japanese people the opportunity of avoid- ing the danger of destruction suffered by Germany after her refusal to accept unconditional surrender.
In view of the above, the Soviet Government declares that from to- morrow, that is from August 9, the Soviet Union will consider her- self in a state of war against Japan.
ANNEX V
Excerpt From the Report of the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, and the United Kingdom, Moscow, Decem- ber 27, 1945 (The Moscow Agreement)
III.
Korea :
1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on demo- cratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.
2. In order to assist the formation of a provisional Korean govern- ment and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appro- priate measures, there shall be established a Joint Commission consist- ing of representatives of the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea. In preparing their pro- posals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic par-
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ties and social organizations. The recommendations worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the Govern- ments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the two Governments represented on the Joint Commission.
3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the participa- tion of the provisional Korean democratic government and of the Korean democratic organizations to work out measures also for help- ing and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social prog- ress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self- government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.
The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultation with the provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the Governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for the work- ing out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years.
4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both southern and northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet com- mand in northern Korea, a conference of the representatives of the United States and Soviet commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks.
ANNEX VI
Excerpt From Communique No. 5 Issued by U.S.-Soviet Join Commission, April 18, 1946 1
The U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission continued discussion on the question of conditions of consultation with democratic parties and social organizations. Col. Gen. T. F. Shtikov, Chief of the Soviet Delegation, was chairman on sessions held on April 8, 9, 11, and 13, 1946, in the Tuk Soo Palace, Seoul, Korea, and Maj. Gen. A. V. Arnold, chief of the U.S. delegation, was chairman at the session, April 17, 1946.
As a result of a thorough investigation and analysis of the points of view of the Soviet delegation and the delegation of the United States,
‘Issued in Seoul over tlie signatures of Col. Gen. T. F. Slitikov and Maj. Gen. A. V. Arnold.
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Korea’s Independence
the Joint Commission reached the following decision on the first point of the joint program of work covering the conditions of the consulta- tion with democratic parties and social organizations:
“DECISION
“The Joint Commission will consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations which are truly democratic in their aims and methods and which will subscribe to the following declarations :
“We declare that we will uphold the aims of the Mos-
cow Decision on Korea as stated in paragraph 1 of this decision, namely:
“The reestablishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles, and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the pro- tracted Japanese domination in Korea. Further, we will abide by the decisions of the Joint Commission in its fulfilment of paragraph 2 of the Moscow decision in the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government; further, we will cooperate with the Joint Commission in the working out by it with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government of proposals concerning measures foreseen by paragraph 3 of the Moscow decision.
“Signed
Representing the
Party or Organization”
The procedure for inviting representatives of Korean democratic parties and social organizations to consult with the Joint Commission is being worked out by Joint Sub-Commission No. 1. When details of the procedure are completed it will be announced publicly.
ANNEX VII
Exchange of Letters Between Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, Commanding General, United States Army Forces in South Korea, and Guard Col. Gen. I. M. Chistiakov, Commanding General, Soviet Forces in North Korea, May 9, 1 946-February 28, 1947
A. General Hodge to General Chistiakov ( Excerpt )
May 9 , 1946.
The Americans stand ready and willing to continue the work of the Commission in carrying out fully the Moscow Decision upon one day
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notice. All accommodations used by the Soviet Delegation remain open for their use.
If there remain any other issues to be cleared up before the Commis- sion reconvenes, I suggest that we meet for a personal conference at such place and time as you request. I will gladly come to Pyongyang for such a meeting, or I will be delighted if you would accept my long standing invitation to visit with me in the Korean metropolis of Seoul.
B. General Hodge to General Chistiakov (Excerpt)
June 15 , 19)6.
Although it has been more than one month since I wrote you sug- gesting we meet to discuss and clear up between us any misunderstood points of difference between our two delegations on the US-Soviet Joint Commission, I have not had the honor of a reply.
As indicated in my letter, the American Command stands ready to resume negotiations in the Joint Commission at anytime you suggest, in order fully to carry out the Moscow decision in accordance with the principles of freedom of expression as enunciated in the Atlantic Charter to which both of our governments have adhered. Therefore, I reiterate the invitation indicated in my letter of May 9, that you return your delegation to Seoul at an early date to resume negotiations for the complete fulfillment of the terms of the Moscow decision in the cooperative spirit in which that decision was made.
Should you decide to accept this invitation, I request advance notice of arrival of the Soviet Delegation in order to rearrange for their housing and messing.
I will appreciate an early reply.
C. General Chistiakov to General Hodge
August 6 , 19)6.
I have received your letter of 15 June 1946 pertaining to reconven- ing the Soviet-American Joint Commission in Seoul.
Having studied the material of the work of the Soviet-American Joint Commission, I have come to the conclusion that the stand taken by the Soviet Delegation in its negotiations, which took place in Seoul, was correct.
The Soviet Delegation was motivated by the necessity for the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision of three Foreign Ministers on Korea, the only document in which is laid out the program of the Allies, foreseeing the creation of a democratic government in Korea and also the measures of assistance for developing Korea on demo- cratic principles and the establishment of an independent Korean State.
762628° — 17 4
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Korea’s Independence
As you know, the break in the work of the Joint Commission, ful- filling this decision, came about on the initiative and suggestion of the American Delegation.
Regrettably, your letter did not state whether the American Dele- gation in the Joint Commission will uphold the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and consult only with those parties and organi- zations and their representatives which fully, without any reserva- tions, support this decision and did not compromise themselves by active opposition to this decision.
Upon receiving your consent to resume negotiations on the basis of the above mentioned, I am ready at any time to send a representative of the Soviet Command to the city of Seoul for conducting negotia- tions in the Soviet- American Joint Commission for the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea.
D. General Hodge to General Chistiakov
August 12 , 19^6.
This is in answer to your letter of 6 August 1946 in regard to resumption of negotiations by the Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission in Korea.
I note with interest your statement that the Soviet Delegation is motivated by the necessity for the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. I take this opportunity to state that the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision is and always has been the mission of the American Delegation, and is exactly what it will try to accomplish when the Commission reconvenes.
However, there are certain factors in this connection that I am im- pelled to point out. These are :
a. There is nothing the U.S. Delegation can read into the Moscow Decision that requires or implies that only those parties and organiza- tions are to be consulted by the Joint Commission which fully, with- out any reservations, support this decision and did not compromise themselves by active opposition to this decision. Reading this inter- pretation into the Moscow Decision is purely unilateral.
b. There is nothing in the Moscow Decision or in the general usage of the word “democratic” throughout the world that restricts its application only to organizations or parties belonging to schools of social thought favoring certain classes in the community over others, which seemed to be the interpretation given in practice to the word by the Soviet Delegation. The American Delegation can apply the word “democratic” only as it is applied in common usage throughout the world, which normally would exclude only parties or organizations
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opposed to popular rule by elected representatives and to equal rights for all classes of the people.
c. There is nothing in the Moscow Decision that prohibits Koreans in conferences with the Commission or elsewhere from expressing freely their wishes and desires in formation of their own government.
d. There is nothing in the Moscow Decision that makes any pre- determination of the terms or nature of the Four-Power Trusteeship beyond the one provision imposing a limit of five years’ duration. On the contrary, the Moscow Decision states positively that “The pro- posals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted following consul- tation with the Provisional Korean Government for the joint con- sideration of the Four Powers for the working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship for Korea for a period of up to five years.” I see no reason for the Joint Commission or the Korean people to enter into commitments concerning a Four-Power Trustee- ship before the Korean Provisional Government is formed.
In view of the Soviet Delegation's interpretation of the Moscow Decision during the sessions last spring, that Delegation might wish to restudy the Decision in the light of the views expressed above.
Since the Moscow Decision was made by our Foreign Ministers in good faith and is the only legal vehicle for setting up the independ- ence of Korea, the U.S. Delegation has no alternative but to carry it out exactly and in full, and has no intention of making changes in the Decision or of asking for any repudiation. However, I can assure you that the U.S. Delegation cannot be a party to any arbi- trary, exclusive or punitive tactics in dealing with the accredited representatives of the Korean people on grounds not specifically stated in the Moscow Decision itself, and inconsistent with the world-accepted definition of the word “democratic.”
On the basis given above, I not only welcome but invite the Soviet Delegation to return to negotiations of the Joint Commission and suggest that you send your representative to Seoul at an early date to make preliminary arrangements.
E. General Chistiakov to General Ilodge
October 26 , 191+6.
In your letter of August 1, 1916 concerning the resumption of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, you, speaking of the intentions of the American delegation to resume the discussions of the Joint Commission, at the same time have advised the Soviet delena-
O
lion to restudy its position.
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Korea’s Independence
In answer to this, I must declare that the Soviet delegation is guided in its work by the terms of the Moscow decision of the three Foreign Ministers on Korea and intends to steadfastly adhere to this decision.
I again assure you that the Soviet delegation is always ready to resume the work of the Joint Commission on the basis of strict fulfil- ment of the Moscow decision on Korea.
As far as the question of the discontinuing of the work of the Joint Commission is concerned, as you will know it was the American dele- gation itself which after a time in the course of the discussions sug- gested that the work of the Joint Commission be suspended, and finally at its suggestion the work of the Commission was suspended May 5, 1946. In your letter you stated that “the exact fulfilment of the Mos- cow decision is and always has been the mission of the American delegation.”
I must, however, note that during the work of the Joint Commission the American delegation did not, in fact, evidence such a readiness and many times even declared that it did not quite understand the Moscow decision on Korea.
Your assertion that the Soviet delegation allegedly interprets uni- laterally the Moscow decision concerning the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the consultation on the subject with Korean political parties and social organizations is unfounded.
In the decision on Korea reached by the Moscow Conference of the three Foreign Ministers, a series of measures were laid out which aim at the reestablishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for the development of the country on democratic prin- ciples and the speedy liquidation of the ruinous after-effects of long Japanese domination in Korea. Therefore, the Soviet delegation, being guided by the aims and spirit of the Moscow decision, deems that it would not be right to consult on the question of methods of fulfilling the Moscow decision with those parties and those, who for tactical considerations, although declaring their support of the de- cision, at the same time make such stipulations which convert their statement of support of the INI oscow decision into an empty declaration.
In regard to that part of your letter concerning the definition of the word democratic , the Soviet delegation would like to point out that in this question it is necessary to consider not the declarative announce- ments of the party, and not the names of separate parties and organ- izations, but the actual policies pursued by a given party.
In as much as the Moscow decision has outlined the necessary meas- ures for the democratic reconstruction of Korea, it is the opinion of the Soviet delegation that the attitude of different parties and groups toward the Moscow decision is the most important criterion of their
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true democratic nature and of their striving to see Korea a demo- cratic state.
Thus, the position of the Soviet delegation on the question of con- sultation of the Joint Commission with the Korean democratic parties and organizations fully corresponds to the Moscow decision.
At the same time it is impossible not to note that there is an obvious contradiction between the interpretation in your letter of the word democracy and the actual position which the American delegation assumed during the period of the work of the Joint Commission.
It is well known that the American delegation has included in the list of political parties and organizations for consultation with the Joint Commission on the question of the creation of the provisional Korean democratic government, all political parties and organizations which had voiced their opposition against the Moscow decision and only three democratic parties which upheld the Moscow decision. It is completely obvious that the American delegation, when it excluded from participation in consultation with the Joint Commission such democratic parties and organizations of mass character as the Korean national revolutionary party, the all-Korean Confederation of Labor, the all-Korean Women’s Union, the all-Korean Youth Union, the all- Korean Farmers Union and a number of other organizations, guided by other than their democratic principles.
As regards the freedom for the Koreans to express their position toward formation of the Korean Government or the realization of the Moscow decision on Korea, the Soviet delegation has never anywhere made proposals directed against the freedom of expression by the representatives of Korean parties and organizations, wherever they may be, and it is accordingly understood that any part or group as well as any individual Korean citizen can express similar ideas or present them to the Joint Commission.
I cannot agree with the interpretation set forth in your letter on the question of trusteeship because such an interpretation actually places in doubt the decision of the Moscow Conference on this question, as it is known the Moscow decision states : “it shall be the task of the Joint Commission with the participation of the Provisional Korean Govern- ment and of the Korean democratic organizations to also work out measures for helping and assisting (non-trusteeship) the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-goveiTiment and the establishment of the national independence pf Korea.”
Thus, among the tasks of the Joint Commission is included the preparation of proposals dealing with the establishment of a tnistee- ship in regard to Ivoi’ea with the stipulation that these proposals relat- ing to Ivoi’ea for a period up to five years, will, after consultation with
26 Korea’s Independence
the Provisional Korean Government be submitted for joint considera- tion to the governments of the four powers.
From the above it is clear that the question of the establishment of the trusteeship as a measure which must aid in the democratic trans- formation of Korea has been definitely decided by the Moscow Confer- ence and on this basis there must be prepared concrete proposals for the eventual working out of the agreement of trusteeship.
During the interruption in the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission many events have occurred in South as well as in North Korea. All these events testify that the Korean people are striving to unite their country, to have a democratic government and to carry out their democratic transformation.
It is the opinion of the Soviet delegation that the delay in the for- mation of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government impedes the so necessary unification of Korea into a single state; it is having a negative effect on the economic and political situation of the Korean people and is holding back the realization of democratic transforma- tion in all Korea.
The Soviet delegation is greatly concerned that the negotiations of the Joint Commission, interrupted on the initiative of the American Delegation in May 1946 have not jret been resumed and wishes to resume those negotiations as soon as possible on the basis of exact fulfilment of the Moscow decision.
If after taking this into account, along with the foregoing state- ment, you will express your consent to resume the work of the Joint Commission, the Soviet delegation will always be ready to resume the work.
F. General Ilodge to General Chistiakov
November I, 1916.
Dear General Chistiakov : I thank you for your letter of October 26, 1946, and agree with you that the continuation of the division of Korea into two parts works great hardship on the Korean people. It also weakens the prestige of two great Allies who cooperated so fully to bring a victorious end to the bitterest Avar in history. Each added month of this division tends to make more difficult the im- plementation of the Moscow decision on Korea made by the Foreign Ministers of the Allies last December.
For the purposes of reconciling the differences between the United States and the U.S.S.R. delegations, which are not fully resolved in your letter, I propose that the following basis of agreement for reconvening the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission be accepted by both the Soviet and American delegations with view to the early resumption of the sessions of the Joint Commission. It is agreed
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to interpret paragraphs Two and Three of the declaration in commu- nique no. 5 of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission dated April 17th, 1946, to mean that such individuals, parties and social organi- zations shall not foment or instigate mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfilment of the Moscow decision. Those individuals, parties, and social organizations which do foment or instigate such opposition shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties, and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission.
In consideration of this interpretation of the declaration estab- lished in communique no. 5 of the Joint Commission, dated April 17th, 1946, both delegations agree that they will not oppose consultation with any individual, political party, or social organization which subscribes to and abides by the declaration published in joint com- munique no. 5.
In order to eliminate any possible future misunderstanding, I believe it is advisable briefly to restate the position of the United States at this time.
(A) The United States has always favored the exact fulfilment of the Moscow decision by the Joint Commission. This decision ob- viously includes the preparation of proposals “for the working out of an agreement concerning a Four Power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years” which “shall be submitted for the joint consideration” of the Four Powers “following consultation with the provisional Korean Government”. However, there is nothing in the Moscow decision which predetermines the terms or nature of a Four Power trusteeship except that it shall be a method “for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-govern- ment, and the establishment of the national independence of Korea” to be worked out “with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government,” and a limitation placed upon its duration.
(B) The United States has always favored the exercise of freedom of speech in Korea. The United States believes that all Korean democratic parties and social organizations should be permitted to make known their desires in the formation of their own government. The representatives of the United States see a great difference between (1) the instigation of mass opposition to the work of the Joint Com- mission and the fulfilment of the Moscow decision, and (2) the proper exercise of freedom of expression by Korean individuals, democratic parties, and groups concerning their wishes and desires in the forma- tion of their own government.
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Korea’s Independence
On the basis of the United States’ position herein stated and the suggested interpretation of paragraphs Two and Three of the declara- tion in communique no. 5 to the Joint Commission which is approved for the United States delegation, the American Command proposes that the Joint Commission resume its work without delay and I again cordially invite Soviet delegation to return to Seoul at an early date for the purpose of resuming negotiations. I shall be pleased to hear from you as early as possible in order that the necessary preliminary arrangements can be effected.
G. General Chistiakov to General Hodge
November £6, 1016.
I acknowledge the l’eeeipt of your letter dated November 1, 1946.
It is with regret that I have to conclude that the conditions upon which you propose to renew the negotiations of the Joint Soviet- American Commission in substance do not differ from the position laid down in your previous letter, which, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation is in contradiction to the Moscow Decision on Korea.
Actually, you propose that the Joint Commission should consult with any person, political party or social organization which adheres to and abides by the declaration published in communique number 5, moreover, such persons, parties or social organizations must not and will not instigate or foment mass opposition to the woi’k of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.
Thus, according to this formula, the Joint Commission must consult not only with democratic parties and social organizations which uphold the Moscow Decision, but also with those parties and organizations which are hostile to this Decision. Furthermore, these latter parties and organizations are even given an opportunity to continue these activities directly against the Moscow Decision with the exception that they should not instigate or foment mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.
The acceptance of such proposal would appear, rather as call to reactionary parties and groups not to retreat from their hostile posi- tion towards the Moscow Decision, but merely to curtail temporarily their activities directed against this Decision so that they may have an opportunity to take part in the consultations with the Joint Commis- sion. I must remind you that it was precisely in such manner that these parties accepted your public announcement of April 27, 1946 which contained an analagous interpretation of the agreement embodied in communique number 5.
The result was that the parties and organizations which had voiced their opposition to the Moscow Decision agreed to sign the declaration,
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but on the very second day after the termination of the work of the Joint Commission, prominent leadei’s of these pai'ties and organizations again returned to an active fight against the Moscow Decision and its supporters.
There is no doubt that participation by those elements in the con- sultations would be utilized by them with the aim of sabotaging the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and would only facilitate their activities in that direction. I must again declare that if we are aiming at actual and complete realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea, then, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation, it is impossible to consult on the question of methods of fulfilling this Decision with those persons, parties and organizations who voice opposition to the above mentioned Decision and who are aiming at sabotaging its fulfillment, whom, for tactical considerations, may for the period of consultation with the Joint Commission temporarily and in part limit their activities directed against the Moscow" Decision in order that they may renew these activities in full force as soon as consulta- tion with Joint Commission is terminated.
The foregoing in no way limits the fi'eedom of Korean democratic parties, social organizations or individuals to express their position regarding the formation of the Korean Government or other ques- tions connected with the realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea.
In my previous letter I have already directed your attention to the fact that the Soviet delegation has never made proposals directed against the freedom of individuals, parties or organizations to ex- press anywhere their views on these questions and it is accordingly understood that any party or social organization as well as an indi- vidual Korean citizen can express similar views or present them to the Joint Commission.
Desiring to fulfill the Moscow Decision on Korea speedily and as definitely as possible, the Soviet side advances the following proposals ^s basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission.
1. The Joint Commission must consult those democratic parties and organizations which uphold full}7 the Moscow Decision on Korea.
2. Parties or social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not nominate for consultation those rep- resentatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow Decision.
3. Parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not and will not voice opposition nor will they incite others to voice opposition to the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. If such be the case such parties and
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Korea’s independence
social organizations, by mutual agreement of both delegations, will be excluded from further consultations with the Joint Commission.
In the event you should agree to the foregoing proposals the Soviet delegation is prepared, without delay, to arrive in Seoul for the re- sumption of the negotiations of the Joint Commission.
Chistiakov
H. General Ilodge to General Chistiakov
December 24, 1946.
I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 26, 1946.
I have had attached to this letter a copy of your letter of November 26, 1946 with paragraphs numbered to facilitate reference. (Para- graph numbers follow paragraphs of letter as passed by you.)
From a careful reading of Paragraphs II to VIII, both inclusive, the impression I receive is that the Soviet delegation believes that pro- posals previously submitted by the United States delegation appear to encourage “reactionary parties and groups” to continue hostile opposi- tion to the Moscow Decision. I assure you that the United States delegation has no such intention and desires to cooperate with you in preventing such hostile opposition. Paragraphs IX and X of your letter guarantee on the part of the Soviet delegation complete freedom of expression to Korean political parties, social organizations and indi- viduals “regarding the formation of the Korean Government and other questions connected with the realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea”. The views expressed in these paragraphs are identical with the position assumed by the United States delegation.
The last three paragraphs of your letter numbered 1 to 3, although apparently in conflict with paragraphs IX and X nevertheless provide a basis for further discussion.
In view of the closeness of our position, I suggest that your proposals and the following modifications be made the basis for reconvening the Joint Commission.
Proposal number 1 to be interpreted as follows : Signing the Declara- tion in communique number 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consulta- tion.
Proposal number 2, I consider it the right of a declarant party or organization to appoint the representative which it believes will best present to the Joint Commission its views of the implementation of the Moscow Decision. However, should such representative for good rea- son be believed to be antagonistic to the implementation of the Moscow Decision or to either of the Allied Powers, the Joint Commission may,
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after mutual agreement, require the declarant party to name a sub- stitute spokesman.
Proposal number 3, it is suggested that it be reworded as follows : “Individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission shall not after signing the declaration con- tained in communique number 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. Those individuals, parties and social organizations which after signing the declaration contained in communique number 5 do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision shall be excluded from fur- ther consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission*’.
I trust that the basis proposed above will be acceptable to you and trust you will notify me so that I may make the necessary preliminary arrangements for reconvening the Joint Commission.
Hodge
I. General Chistiakov to General Hodge
February 28, 191ft.
Confirming the receipt of your letter of December 24, 1946, it is with satisfaction I note that as a result of our correspondence the positions of both sides have actually drawn closer together.
1. I take note of your declaration that you are ready to accept as a basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission, the proposals set forth in my letter dated November 26, 1946. I agree with your interpretation of proposal number 1, bearing in mind that the matter may not and must not be confined merely to expressions of good intentions to uphold fully the moscow decision on the part of those parties and organizations which will sign the declaration con- tained in Communique Number 5. Subsequent action of these parties and organizations who have signed the above mentioned declaration, and consequently have accepted the obligation to uphold fully the Moscow decision on Korea, likewise must be consonant with that obligation.
2. In reference to paragraph number 2 of my proposals, I should like to explain that the Soviet Delegation considers it expedient that parties and organizations which will take part in consultation with the Joint Commission be informed beforehand that they must not designate for consultation such representatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow decision.
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Korea’s Independence
Bearing tliis in mind, and taking into consideration j-our observa- tions, I propose the following wording for paragraph number 2: “A party or organization signatory to the declaration contained in Communique Number 5 has the right to appoint such a representa- tive who in its opinion can best present to the Joint Commission its views regarding the fulfillment of the Moscow decision, and who has not compromised himself by actively voicing opposition to that de- cision. However, if the appointed representative, for completely valid reasons, be considered antagonistic toward the fulfillment of the Moscowr decision or toward either of the Allied powers, then the Joint Commission, following mutual agreement, may demand that the party having made such a statement (declaration) should designate another representative in his place.”
3. I agree with your wording of proposal number 3. I assume, however, that by the concept “individuals” shall be understood rep- resentatives of parties and social organizations invited to participate in consultations in accordance with the provisions set forth in para- graph number 2 above.
I would deem it more expedient to substitute for the word “in- dividuals” the words “and their representatives” wdth the result that the first sentence of your third proposal would be worded as follows : “Parties and social organizations and their representatives invited for consultations,” etc. According to the text.
The remainder of the warding of this proposal is accepted by me without change.
4. Concerning your observations regarding the alleged existence of conflicts between paragraphs 9 and 10 of my letter, and the proposals set forth in that letter, I must say that I do not discern any such conflict.
I hope that agreement by us on the conditions of consultation will assure a speedy and successful resumption of the work of the Joint Commission.
ANNEX VIII
Exchange of Notes Between the Secretary of State and the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, April 8, 1947-May 12, 1947
A. The Secretary of State to the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs
Aprils , 19Jt7.
I wish to call your attention to the situation in Korea. The repre- sentatives of the Soviet Union and the United States on the Joint
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U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission in Korea have been unable to make progress toward the establishment of a Korean Provisional Government. It has been nineteen months since the Japanese surrender, yet Korea has profited little. The country is divided into two zones. The Soviet Commander in Northern Korea has refused to permit freedom of movement and free economic exchange between these zones. This has precluded freely chosen political amalgamation of the Korean people and has resulted in grave economic distress.
The policy of the United States toward Korea has the following- basic objectives :
(1) To assist in the establishment as soon as practicable of a self- governing sovereign Korea, independent of foreign control and eli- gible for membership in the United Nations.
(2) To insure that the national government so established shall be representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people.
(3) To aid the Koreans in building a sound economy as an essential basis for their independent and democratic state.
The United States, in the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, declared its determination that in due course Korea should become free and independent. The United Kingdom and the Republic of China were parties to the same declaration. The Cairo Declaration was spe- cifically reaffirmed by the Three Powers in the Potsdam Declaration, which defined terms for the Japanese surrender. The U.S.S.R. in its declaration of war on Japan on August 8, 1945, declared its adherence to these declarations.
Upon the surrender of Japan, United States and Soviet forces ac- cepted the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea in the areas respec- tively south and north of a line arbitrarily assigned for this purpose, the thirty-eighth degree parallel. This line of demarcation became in effect a boundary between zones of occupation. At the conference of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. in Mos- cow in December, 1945, the serious consequences of the bizonal division of Korea were discussed and an agreement regarding Korea was reached and published in part three of the communique of the confer- ence. The Republic of China subsequently subscribed to this agree- ment.
On March 20, 194G, the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission ap- pointed under the terms of the Moscow Agreement met and began its task, as outlined in the agreement, of assisting in the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government as a first step in assuring the establishment of an independent and sovereign Korean nation.
It was the hope of the Government of the United States that speedy action would be taken by the Joint Commission, a provisional Korean
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Korea’s Independence
government would rapidly be established, the unfortunate results of the line of demarcation between the United States and the Soviet forces would be overcome and Korea could be started on the way to attaining an independent and democratic government.
Unfortunately the work of the Joint Commission became stale- mated after a short time through the failure to agree on the definition of the word “democratic” as it pertained to the representatives of the parties and social organizations mentioned in the Moscow Agreement to be consulted by the Joint Commission in its task of assisting in the formation of a provisional government. As it became evident that no agreement could be reached at the time, the Joint Commission ad- journed sine die on May 8, 1946.
The United States Commander in Korea has several times suggested to the Soviet Commander that the Commission reconvene and get on with its work.
However, the Soviet Commander has insisted on a formula which would result in eliminating the majority of representative Korean leaders from consultation as representatives of Korean democratic parties and social organizations, and has reiterated this position in a letter to the American Commander as recently as February 28, 1947. It has therefore been impossible to agree upon a basis for reconvening the Commission.
Now in April 1947, almost sixteen months since the agreement pertaining to Korea was reached in Moscow, there has still been no real pi’ogress made toward the implementation of that agreement.
In fulfillment of the intent of the Agreement and Declaration made at Moscow in December 1945, the Government of the United States desires to further the work of establishing a free and independent Korea without additional delay.
To this end I ask that our Governments agree to instruct our respec- tive Commanders in Korea to reconvene the J oint Commission as soon as possible and charge it with expediting its work under the terms of the Moscow x\greement on a basis of respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion. I further suggest that a mutually accept- able date during the summer of 1947 be fixed for a review by the two Governments of the progress made to that date by the Joint Com- mission. In the meantime, the United States, mindful of its obliga- tions under the Moscow Agreement, sees no alternative to taking without further delay such steps in its zone as will advance the purposes of that agreement.
I am furnishing copies of this letter to the British and Chinese Governments.
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B. The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of State
April 19, 1947.
Dear Mr. Marshall: In reply to your letter of April 8 on the question of Korea, I am communicating the following :
At the Moscow meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom in December 1945, an agreement was reached which determined the policy of the three powers with respect to Korea. A basis for this agreement were the proposals of the Soviet Government, to which the Gov- ernment of the U.S.A. also agreed, having consequently abandoned its first intention not to establish a National Korean Government in Korea. The Moscow Agreement held the establishment of a provi- sional democratic Korean Government which could take all the neces- sary measures for the development of Korean industry, transport, agriculture and the national culture of the Korean people, to be a problem of primary importance.
Having made these proposals, the Soviet Government deemed that the unification of Korea under the leadership of the Korean National Government was the most important prerequisite for the restoration of Korea as an independent state and the establishment of bases for the development of the country on democratic principles.
The Soviet Government continues to adhere to this point of view and insists on a steadfast implementation of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, being certain that, on the basis of the execution of this agree- ment Korea would be successfully developed along democratic prin- ciples and would become an independent and prosperous state and an equal member of the United Nations.
However, the legislative program provided for Korea by the Moscow Agreement has not yet been carried out. A provisional democratic Korean Government has not been established. The work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, established for the purpose of collab- orating in the establishment of a provisional democratic Korean Government was suspended as a result of the fact that the American delegation on this Commission took a stand contrary to the Moscow Agreement on Korea. Furthermore, the American Command in southern Korea did not agree to a serious consideration of the proposals by the Soviet Command in northern Korea on the question of an economic exchange between the two zones, which made it impossible to reach an agreement on this question.
In the course of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commis- sion during the period from March to May, 1946, the Soviet delega- tion made every effort to effect the execution of the aforementioned agreement on Korea and, first of all, provide for a prompt establish-
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Korea’s Independence
ment of a provisional democratic Korean Government and for the unification of Korea under its leadership. However, the Soviet dele- gation met not only with difficulties in this connection, but also with direct counter-action on the part of the American delegation. Basing itself on the agreement on Korea, which provides that the Joint Com- mission, in formulating its proposals, should consult Korean demo- cratic parties and social organizations, the Soviet delegation insisted on a wide-scale attraction of such parties and organizations to consul- tation with the Commission. The American delegation excluded participation by a whole series of large democratic organizations in southern Korea and insisted on consultation with groups which had taken a stand in opposition to the Moscow Agreement, consultation with which, natural^ could not facilitate the execution of this agree- ment. The American delegation included in the list of parties and organizations submitted by it for consultation with the Joint Commis- sion, seventeen political parties and social groups of southern Korea which took a stand against the Moscow Agreement, and only three democratic parties which supported the agreement. The American delegation excluded such large democratic parties and social organi- zatioiis as the All-Korean Labor Confederation, the All-Korean Peasant Union, the Korean National Revolutionary Party, the All- Korean Youth Union, etc., from participation in consultation. Deem- ing it impossible to agree to this position of the American delegation, the Soviet delegation nevertheless did its utmost to find a way to reach an agreed decision. This, however, appeared impossible and the work of the Commission, on the suggestion of the American delegation, was curtailed.'
The intolerance of the resulting situation is evident. As a result of this, as you know, it was necessary to take new measures in en- deavoring to find a way out of such a situation.
The Soviet Commander in his relations with the American Com- mander endeavored to find a basis for the renewal of the work of the Joint Commission. As a result of an exchange of letters, there has been a considerable rapprochement of the points of view of both sides, which fact was noted by both commanders. It was expected that an agreement would soon be reached and the Joint Commission would begin its work very shortly. However, no reply has been received to date from the American Commander to the last letter of February 28, from the Soviet Commander and the proposed agreement was not reached. Disagreement of action was a serious obstacle for the op- portune fulfillment of the program of measures proposed in the Mos- cow Agreement of Korea as a whole.
In connection with northern Korea, during the period beginning with the capitulation of Japan, considerable progress was made in
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the field of democratization, and also with respect to the restoration of national economy and culture. Wide democratic reforms have been made which guarantee political freedom and raise the standard of living of the population. I have in mind, first of all, the introduction of an over-all electoral right; a law on equal rights for women; the establishment of local authority agencies and the People’s Committee of Northern Korea on the basis of free democratic elections; land reform, as a result of which 725,000 landless peasant farmers and those having little land received more than 1 million hectares of free land, which formerly belonged to Japanese colonists and their accomplices in Korea; the nationalization of former Japanese industries, the 8 hour work-day, safeguarding of labor and social insurance; public educational reform, as a result of which the Korean language has been reestablished, the net work of schools was increased and the number of students was increased, etc. However, such wide demo- cratic reforms have been carried out only in northern Korea, where there is only two fifths of the population of Korea.
The Soviet Government, closely adhering in their policy toward Korea to the program planned in the Moscow Agreement, believes the following to be points of primary importance:
1. The establishment of a provisional democratic Korean Govern- ment on the basis of a wide-scale participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations, in order to expedite the political and economic unification of Korea as a self-supporting state independent of foi’eign interference, which would do away with the division of the country into two zones.
2. The establishment of democratic authority agencies through- out Korea by means of free elections on the basis of a general and equal electoral right.
3. The aiding of Korean people in the restoration of Korea as an independent democratic state and in the development of its national economy and national culture.
In conformity with the steadfast aspiration on the part of the Soviet Government for the prompt I’estoration of Korea as a united sovereign state and elimination of difficulties arising from the fact (hat Korea to date has not been unified and does not have a national government, I propose that the Joint Soviet- American Commission resume its work on May 20 of the current year in the city of Seoul, on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, and that the Commission present the result of its work on the elabora- tion of recommendations with respect to the establishment of a pro- visional democratic Korean Government for consideration by the two governments in July and August 1917.
38 Korea’s Independence
I am sending copies of the present letter to Mr. Bevin and to the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow.
I beg you [etc.] V. Molotov
C. The Secretary of State to the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs
May 2, 1947.
Dear Mr. Molotov: I have considered your letter of April 19, 1947 in which you accept our proposal to reconvene the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission and suggest that the Commission resume its work on May 20 of this year. I have also noted your statement that resumption of the Commission’s work shall be “on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea”.
In order to avoid any future misunderstanding with respect to the phrase “exact execution” I wish to make clear my interpretation of the phrase. In my letter to you of April 8 I stated that the Joint Com- mission should be charged with expediting “its work under the terms of the Moscow Agreement on a basis of respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion”. In making this statement I had and have in mind the well-known position of the Government of the United States that Korean representatives of democratic parties and social organizations shall not be excluded from consultation with the Com- mission on the formation of a provisional Korean government because of opinions they might hold or may have expressed in the past con- cerning the future government of their country, provided they are pre- pared to cooperate with the Commission.
You mention three points which the Soviet Government believes to be of primary importance in its policy towards Korea. Your state- ment concerning the importance of establishing a provisional demo- cratic Korean government on the basis of wide-scale participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations has from the be- ginning been accepted by the United States Government as basic to its policy of assisting in the establishment of a self-governing sov- ereign Korea, independent of foreign control and eligible for member- ship in the United Nations.
I interpret your second point with respect to the establishment of “democratic authority agencies” throughout Korea as referring to lo- cal, provincial and national government agencies chosen, as you state, by means of free elections on the basis of a general and equal electoral right.
I welcome the assurance contained in your third point with regard to the importance you attach to aiding in the restoration of Korea as an independent democratic state and in the development of its national
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economy and national culture. The United States Government has un- der consideration a constructive program for the rehabilitation of the economy of Korea and for its educational and political development.
In order that I may direct the United States Commander in Korea to make preparations for opening the sessions of the Joint Commis- sion in Seoul on May 20, 1947, may I receive an early confirmation that we are mutually agreed as to the basis on which the Commission shall resume its important work?
I am furnishing copies of this letter to the Governments of China and the United Kingdom.
Please accept [etc.] George C. Marshals.
D. The Soviet Foreign Minister to the Secretary of State
May 7, 191/T.
Dear Mr. Marshall : I acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 2 concerning the resumption of the work of the Joint Soviet- American Commission on Korea.
Your proposal, as I understand it, is to the effect that before the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission an agreement should be reached concerning the conditions for consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations.
This question was the subject of an exchange of correspondence between the Soviet and American Commanders in Korea as a result of which, as I already answered in my previous letter, the points of view of the two sides were brought considerably closer.
The Soviet Commander in his letter of November 2G, 1946 advanced the following proposals as a basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission:
“1. The Joint Commission must consult those democratic parties and organizations which uphold fully the Moscow decision on Korea.
“2. Parties or social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not nominate for consultation those repre- sentatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow decision.
“3. Parties and social organizations invited for consultation with Joint Commission must not and will not voice opposition nor wTill they incite others to voice opposition to Moscow decision and the work of the Joint Commission. If such be the case such parties and social organizations by mutual agreement of both delegations will be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission.”
The American Commander in his letter of December 24, 1946 agreed to accept these proposals of the Soviet Commander with the following
40 Korea's Independence
changes as the basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission :
“Proposal number 1 to be interpreted as follows : signing the declara- tion in communique number 5 will be accepted as declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation.
“Proposal number 2, I consider it the right of a declarant party or organization to appoint the representative which it believes will best present to the Joint Commission its views on the implementation of the Moscow decision.
“However, should such representative for good reason be believed to be antagonistic to the implementation of the Moscow decision or to either of the Allied powers, the Joint Commission may, after mutual agreement, require the declarant party to name a substitute spokesman.
“Proposal number 3, it is suggested that it be reworded as fol- lows: individuals, parties and social organizations invited for con- sultation with the Joint Commission should not after signing the declaration contained in communique number 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow decision.
“Those individuals, parties and social organizations which after signing the declaration contained in communique number 5 do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow decision shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission.
“The decision excluding such individuals, parties, and social or- ganizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission.”
With a view to expediting the resumption of the woi'k of the Joint Commission and the creation of a temporary Korean democratic government, I am prepared to accept the amendments set forth above proposed by the American Commander. I hope that there will thus exist no further reasons for postponing the convocation of the Joint Commission.
In your letter you state that the Government of the United States is at the present time considering a constructive program for the reconstruction of Korean economy and its cultural and political de- velopment. I presume that the Joint Commission, in accordance with the Moscow Agreement on Korea, after the completion of the work connected with the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government should consider with the participation of this govern- ment proposals from the American and Soviet sides concerning meas-
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ures of aid and assistance for the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic autonomy, and the establishment of the state independence of Korea and present agreed recommendations on these questions.
I am sending a copy of this letter to the Governments of the United Kingdom and China.
Please accept [etc.] V. Molotov
E. The Secretary of State to the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs
May 12, 1947.
My Dear Mr. Molotov: I have received your letter of May 7, 1947 and am pleased to note the agreement of your Government to the reconvening of a Joint Commission on the basis of the proposals made in the American Commander’s letter of December 24, 1946 to the Soviet Commander in Korea. Those proposals were authorized by this Government and are identical in purpose to the statement contained in the second paragraph of my letter of May 2, 1947.
I am instructing the American Commander in Korea to make im- mediate preparations for reconvening the Commission in Seoul. A copy of this letter has been sent to the Governments of the United Kingdom and China.
I convey [etc.] George C. Marshall
ANNEX IX
Decision No. 12 of Joint (U.S.-U.S.S.R.) Commission, June 12,
1947
1. In consulting with Korean democratic parties and social organ- izations, the Joint Commission shall be guided by the conditions stated in the letter of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., V. M. Molotov, of May 7, 1947, and accepted by the Secretary of State of the U.S.A., George Marshall, in his letter of May 13, 1947. The ap- propriate quotation from the letter of Foreign Minister Molotov is given below :
The Soviet Commander in his letter of November 26, 1946, advanced the fol- lowing proposals as a basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Com- mission :
“1. The Joint Commission must consult those democratic parties and organ- izations which uphold fully the Moscow decision on Korea.
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Korea’s Independence
“2. Parties or social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not nominate for consultation those representatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow decision.
“3. Parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not and will not voice opposition nor will they incite others to voice opposition to Moscow decision and the work of the Joint Commission. If such be the case, such parties and social organizations by mutual agreement of both delegations will be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission.”
The American Commander in his letter of December 24, 1946, agreed to accept these proposals of the Soviet Commander with the following changes as the basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission :
“Proposal number 1 to be interpreted as follows : signing the declaration in communiqud number 5 will be accepted as declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation.
“Proposal number 2, I consider it the right of a declarant party or organization to appoint the representative which it believes will best present to the Joint Com- mission its views on the implementation of the Moscow decision.
“However, should such representative for good reason be believed to be antagonistic to the implementation of the Moscow decision or to either of the Allied powers, the Joint Commission may, after mutual agreement, require the declarant party to name a substitute spokesman.
“Proposal number 3, it is suggested that it be reworded as follows : individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commis- sion should not after signing the declaration contained in communique number 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow decision.
“Those individuals, parties and social organizations which after signing the declaration contained in communique number 5 do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow decision shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission.
“The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission.”
With a view to expediting the resumption of the work of the Joint Commis- sion and the creation of a temporary Korean democratic government, I am prepared to accept the amendments set forth above proposed by the American Commander.
2. The Joint Commission will consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations which are truly democratic in their aims and methods and which will subscribe to the following decla- rations :
We declare that we will uphold the aims of the Moscow decision on Korea as stated in paragraph 1 of this decision, namely: the reestablishment of Korea as an independent state, the ci’eation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles, and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea.
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Further we will abide by the decision of the Joint Commission in its fulfill- ment of paragraph 2 of the Moscow decision in the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government.
Further we will cooperate with the Joint Commission in working out by it with the participation of the provisional Korean democratic government, of proposals concerning measures foreseen by paragraph 3 of the Moscow decision.
Signed by , representing the party or
organization.
3. Democratic parties and social organizations of northern and southern Korea are hereby invited to submit their applications for participation in consultation with the Joint Commission. Every party and organization must submit only one application through its central zonal organ.
The application should be accompanied by a copy of the declara- tion given in paragraph 2 above duly signed and sealed with the seal of its central organ and also signed by the designated repre- sentative. The application shall contain the following information :
(a) The full name of the party or organization, the address of its central office, the date of establishment, the membership number and location of branches, and total membership.
(b) The full name of a designated representative given in Chinese characters and, where possible, in English and Russian translation, the place and home address. Applications for participation in con- sultation shall be submitted to the Joint Commission at address in Seoul or address in Pyongyang by June 23, 1947.
4. Democratic parties and social organizations of northern and southern Korea which have signed the declaration contained in para- graph 2 may submit to the Joint Commission in written form their considerations regarding the structure and principles of organization of the provisional Korean democratic government and local organs of authority (provisional charter), and also the political platform for this government may be in accordance with a questionnaire ap- proved by the Commission. This questionnaire shall be published in the press and printed copies will be available at the Joint Com- mission headquarters in Duksoo Palace, Seoul, and (address) Pyongyang.
The applications for considerations shall be submitted to the Joint Commission by July 1, 1947.
5. Subcommission number 1, upon receiving the applications for consultation, shall compile a list of all democratic parties and social organizations and their designated representatives of North and South Korea which have signed the declaration in paragraph 2.
6. Following the approval by the Joint Commission of the list of democratic parties and social organizations and their representatives,
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Korea’s Independence
mentioned in paragraph 5, the Joint Commission shall convene in Seoul on June 25, 1947, a joint meeting to which it shall invite the above-mentioned representatives of parties and social organizations in South Korea. A similar meeting of representatives of parties and social organizations in North Korea shall take place in Pyongyang on June 30, 1947. The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation shall preside over the meeting in Seoul, and the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation shall preside at the meeting at Pyong- yang. In such meetings the chief of the delegation in whose zone the assembly is being held will present a statement elaborated by the Joint Commission.
7. Representatives of parties and social organizations of both northern and southern Korea which are included in the list referred to in paragraph 5 above will be invited to individual oral consulta- tion regarding the structure and principles of organization of the Korean provisional democratic government and local organs of au- thority (provisional charter) and also regarding the x>olitical plat- form for this government. For this purpose the Joint Commission will appoint the necessary numbers of subcommittees and shall notify each representative of the time and place he is to appear for con- sultation.
Oral consultation shall commence on July 5, 1947, and take place in Seoul and Pyongyang.
8. The Joint Commission will present the consideration and pro- posals received from the Korean democratic parties and social organ- izations of North as well as South Korea for study and elaboration of coordinated proposals to the corresponding subcommissions which will create, for this purpose, the necessary members of subcommit- tees. Advisors, experts, and technical personnel for the work in the joint subcommissions and subcommittees will be appointed by the heads of the corresponding delegations.
9. For the purpose of consultation and aiding the Joint Commis- sion in elaboration by it of recommendations regarding the structure and principles of organization of the Koi'ean provisional democratic government or the local organs of authority (provisional charter) and also the political platform for this government, rep resent atives of parties and social organizations shall be invited from among parties and organizations included in the list mentioned in paragraph 5.
The number of such representatives of various parties and organi- zations shall be determined by the Joint Commission in accordance with their membership and, as far as possible, taking into account their influence. The Joint Commission shall convene a joint meeting with such representatives and may also call upon them to take part in the elaboration of recommendations by subconnnissions and sub-
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committees. The time and the agenda of the joint sessions of the Joint Commission with such representatives will be appointed by the Chief commissioners.
10. Democratic parties and social organizations of both northern and southern Korea shall have equal rights and opportunities in consultation with the Joint Commission.
11. The coordinated proposals elaborated by the subcommissions shall be submitted for consideration to the Joint Commission which shall examine such proposals and shall grant its provisional approval. Following this, the Joint Commission shall appoint a drafting com- mission to which it shall give the necessary instructions regarding the compilation of the final text of the I’ecommendations concerning the structure and principles for organization of the Korean provisional democratic government and local organs of authority (provisional charter) and also the political platform for this government. The texts of recommendations elaborated by the drafting commission shall be approved by the Joint Commission.
12. Following the approval of the texts of recommendations sub- mitted by the drafting commission, the Joint Commission shall pro- ceed with elaboration of recommendation regarding the personnel of the Korean provisional democratic government.
ANNEX X
Brown-Shtikov Statement to Representatives of Korean Parties
Eligible for Consultation Under Joint Decision No. 12 1
Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, In the name of the Ameri- can-Soviet Joint Commission I welcome you — representatives of democratic parties and social organizations of Southern/Northern Korea.
W e are gathered together to begin one more phase of the task of re- establishing Korean independence. It is our purpose so to carry out this great work that we may be able to erect a democratic state of power and dignity, which will be a worthy political edifice for the people of this ancient and cultured race.
Under the heavy yoke of Japanese imperialism, Korean people for decades have dreamt of the day when they would finally obtain liberty
1 Statement read at Seoul on June 25, 1947, and at Pyongyang on June 30.
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Korea’s Independence
and the opportunity of independently governing their country. This opportunity is the result of the victory of the allied nations, which in the course of their prolonged and bloody war have decisively defeated the aggressors, both in the Occident and the Orient. The freedom- loving Korean people who have long endured the hardships and in- sults of colonial slavery now once and for all have been freed from the shackles of Japanese domination.
During the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, Decem- ber 194:5, there was achieved an historic decision which opened to the Korean people clear perspectives for its national renaissance. Three Allied Powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, which were eventually joined also by the Chinese Republic, have outlined in this decision a program for restoration of Korea as an independent state, creation of conditions for developing the coun- try on democratic principles, and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea.
The Moscow Decision provides that the initial task shall be the for- mation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, which could take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea, and the national culture of the Korean people. The formation of such a government on the basis of broad participa- tion of Korean Democratic parties and social organizations, as stipu- lated in the Moscow Decision, wfill lead to political and economic unification of Korea and will constitute the most important step on the way toward the creation of an independent democratic Korean state, free from foreign interference.
The present stage of the work of the Joint Commission is devoted to the fulfillment of this task. Following the completion of this first stage, the Joint Commission shall initiate, in participation with the provisional democratic government and with collaboration of Korean democratic parties and social organization, the elaboration of meas- ures for helping and assisting the political, economic and social prog- ress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-govern- ment and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.
This meeting today marks a momentous step in the fulfillment of paragraph II of the Moscow Decision, which prescribes how the Provisional Government of Korea shall be established. This meeting is the first formal step towards oral consultation with the leaders of Korean democratic parties and social organizations. Such consulta- tion will be carried out in the best democratic traditions in order that the voice of the people may be given paramount consideration in the creation of the Provisional Government. Inasmuch as the people
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make their desires known through parties and organizations, the importance and seriousness of the task of their designated representa- tives is very great.
It is the intention of the Joint Commission to determine through consultation the government which is desired by and which best ful- fills the interest of the Korean people and to recommend to the powers that such a Provisional Government be established, assure the enact- ment of the desired democratic reforms, the renaissance of Korea as an independent democratic state, and the development of the national economy and culture. In order that the Commission may succeed in this work, it requires the whole-hearted assistance of the Korean people, and the full cooperation of you who are to represent the views of the parties and organizations to the Joint Commission.
It is inevitable that the great number of political parties repre- sented here should have divergent opinions on the creation of a Pro- visional Government. While Koreans are agreed on the general de- sire to achieve independence and carry out democratic social and economic reforms which will enable their country to take its proper place in the modern world, there is natural disagreement as to the policies and means by which these objectives should be achieved. Dif- ference of opinion must not, however, lead to lack of harmony or to non-cooperation with the work of the Joint Commission.
For the purpose of consultation the Joint Commission has worked out and published questionnaires regarding the structure and princi- ples of organization of a provisional Korean democratic government and local organs of authority, and also regarding the political plat- form for this government. These questionnaires embrace a wide circle of problems which are vitally important to the Korean people.
The Joint Commission has also elaborated and published the pro- visions governing the order of consultation with the Korean demo- cratic parties and social organizations. In accordance with this order of consultation. Korean democratic parties and social organizations which have signed the declaration are invited to present in written and oral form their views regarding the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.
The agreed order of consultation also provides that representatives of Korean democratic parties and social organizations who shall be later nominated in accordance with the membership of such parties and organizations, and taking into account as far as possible their in- fluence, shall be invited for consultation and aiding the Joint Com- mission in elaboration of recommendations.
We are now about to start the process of oral consultation. Because a great many parties and organizations have applied for consultation,
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Korea ’s Independence
it will be impossible for the Joint Commission as a whole to consult with each representative. However, subcommittees will be formed who will carry out this work under the instructions and supervision of the Joint Commission. In order not to unduly delay further progress in the development of recommendations regarding a Korean Democratic Provisional Government, oral consultation will deal specifically with necessai’y explanation or elaboration of answers submitted to the ques- tionnaires. The subcommittees will confer with individual party and organization representatives in accordance with a schedule which will be made known to the individual. Representatives invited for oral consultation will be notified of the time and place of consultation. The results of the discussion will then be given proper consideration by the subcommissions and by the Joint Commission in making its studies.
The Joint Commission earnestly urges the Korean democratic parties and social organizations to approach this task in full awareness of their responsibility, to explain widely to the people the contents of the questionnaires, and to submit to the Joint Commission views which faithfully reflect the opinions and aspirations of the Korean people. Personal predilections should be abandoned in the course of the solu- tion of this important problem. The interests of the Korean people must be placed above those of individual parties and leaders.
The Commission further appeals to the representatives of the Ko- rean press, which during these historic days in the life of Korea, must execute the important task of expounding to the Korean people the decisions of the Joint Commission and must organize widespread explanation of the efforts of the democratic parties and social organi- zations in submitting to the Joint Commission their views regarding the formation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.
The Joint Commission believes that the democratic parties and social organizations which are represented here and which by signing the declaration, have expressed good faith with respect to upholding the Moscow Decision, will render the Joint Commission all aid in its work and thus fulfill their duty to the Korean people. It is your proud responsibility to contribute to the rebirth of your nation. The Joint Commission believes that you appreciate the honor which your parties and organizations have bestowed upon you.
The Joint American-Soviet Commission wishes to assure you, the representatives, as well as the Korean people that it will use all its efforts to fulfill the Moscow Decision on Korea and, as our first duty, to form, with all possible expediency, a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.
This is a most important and significant occasion. The Joint Com- mission hopes that Koreans, Russians and Americans together working
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with good will, will reach solutions to the complex questions related to the formation of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government.
Approved 21 June 1947.
Albert E. Brown Major General , U. S. Army Chief of the American Delegation
T. F. Shtikov Colonel General Chief of the Soviet Delegation
ANNEX XI
Letter Submitted to Joint Commission by Member Organizations of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee
July 28, 1947.
TO: Chief Commissioners
Soviet and American Delegations US-USSR Joint Commission
Gentlemen : This is on behalf of the member organizations of the United Council, to express our sincere appreciation of the hard and fine work that you and your colleagues have been rendering in the US-Soviet Joint Commission for the cause of Korean independence, and, at the same time, to offer to you our loyal cooperation in every possible way to a successful conclusion of the great and difficult task that is, we feel, both yours and ours also.
Wo are informed that one of the issues upon which the U.S. and the Soviet delegations have not been able to come to an agreement is the membership in the so-called anti-trusteeship committee of some of our member organizations. The position of the Soviet dele- gation as reported in the press is that certain parties who were for- merly active in the anti-trusteeship committee should be excluded from consultation with the Joint Commission.
It is true that the anti-trusteeship committee had been formed with a view to oppose in the future the trusteeship that is foreshadowed but not explained in the Moscow Decision. However the basic right of free expression of opinion has been guaranteed to the Koreans, as you will readily agree, in the official letters exchanged between General Marshall, the U.S. Sscretary of State and Mr. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Commissar* prior to the reconvention of the Joint Commission at Seoul on May 21. Furthermore, we can assure you that the anti-trusteeship committee has never actively opposed or in- stigated active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission. This
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Korea’i Independence
is well proved by its action that, in the early part of June, the com- mittee called its member organizations together in a great conference for discussion on the matter of the participation in the Joint Com- mission and upon the finding that the organizations could not come to an agreement it was decided that the matter of participation in the Joint Commission should be left to the free choice of each individual organization affiliated with the anti-trusteeship committee and that there should be no active opposition between those organizations which will consult with the Joint Commission and those which will not.
Furthermore none of the organizations which applied for con- sultation participated in any way in the so-called June 23 demon- stration.
Those organizations which are members of the anti-trusteeship com- mittee and have applied for consultation with the Joint Commission are definitely of the opinion that they should fully cooperate with the Joint Commission in the formation of a provisional government which is its task in the first stage, and, after the formation of the provisional government, in the discussion of the measures of aid and assistance that is its task in the second stage by expressing their honest opinions, and by expressing even an honest expression of difference to any measure should it infringe upon Korean national sovereignty or interfere with Korean internal politics. Apart from these reservations of right the organizations have never instigated, nor will instigate, any active opposition to the work of the Joint Committee. An active opposition to it is indeed contrary to their own policy of consultation with the Joint Commission.
(Signed with seal by)
Yr, Yun Ytjng
Vice Chairman of the United Council
ANNEX XII
Exchanges of Notes Between the Secretary of State (and Acting Secretary) and the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 11, 1947-September 17, 1947
A. The Secretary of State to the Soviet Jlinister for Foreign Affairs
August 11 , WJfl.
Dear Mr. Molotov : In your letter of April 19, 1947, you suggested that the Joint Soviet- American Commission on Korea resume its work
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on May 20 in Seoul “on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea'5 and that the Commission should present the result of its work for the consideration of the Soviet and United States Governments in July and August, 1947. According to all reports received from the American delegation to the Joint Commission, it has been impossible for the two delegations to agree on the issue of broad consultation with Korean political parties and social organizations. This situation has continued without material change for more than one month and is a matter of great concern to the government of the United States.
You will recall that in my letter to you of May 2, I referred to your statement that the work of the Commission should be “on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement” and that in order to avoid future misunderstanding I made clear my interpretation of that phrase. I pointed out that it had been the consistent and well-known position of the United States Government that “Korean representa- tives of democratic parties and social organizations shall not be ex- cluded from consultation with the Commission on the formation of a provisional Korean government because of opinions they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future government of their country, provided they are prepared to cooperate with the Commission”. In your reply of May 7 you did not take exception to this position. You accepted as a basis for reconvening the Commis- sion the suggestion outlined by General Hodge in his letter to General Chistiakov of December 24, 194G, which was in accordance with the United States position described above. In furtherance of this policy the American delegation to the Joint Commission has maintained that there should be the widest possible participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations and that in such participation there shall be no restriction on freedom of expression and opinion by all Koreans. In an effort to expedite matters the United States delega- tion has several times offered to limit oral consultation to parties and organizations with membership in excess of 1,000, or any other reason- able figure proposed by the Soviet delegation. This proposal, how- ever, has not been accepted by the Soviet delegation.
The United States Government believes that, in justice to the Ko- rean people whose hopes of independence have been so long postponed, there cannot be further delay. It is the desire therefore of this Gov- ernment that by August 21, 1947, the Joint Commission report the status of its deliberations so that each government may immediately consider what further steps may usefully be taken to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement, namely the establishment of an independ- ent, united Korea which can take its proper place among the United Nations.
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I am providing copies of this message to the Governments of China and the United Kingdom.
I have [etc.]
George C. Marshall
B. The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secreta?y of State
August 23, ldlfH.
Dear Mr. Marshall: I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of August 12, 1947, on the question of the work of the Joint Soviet-Amer- ican Commission.
As is knowm, the work of the Joint Commission was resumed on the basis of the three conditions for consultation with Korean demo- cratic parties and social organizations which were textually set forth in my letter of May 7, 1947, and accepted by you in a letter of May 13. The Soviet Delegation was instructed to be guided in questions of consultation specifically by these conditions. In accordance with these conditions the Joint Commission should consult with those democra- tic parties and social organizations which fully support the Moscow Decision on Korea.
However, applications to participate in the consultations were also submitted by parties and organizations belonging to the Anti-Trus- teeship Committee.
The Soviet Government considers that the admittance of such parties and organizations to the consultations could take place only in the event that these parties and organizations officially break with the above-mentioned Committee and announce their withdrawal from the Committee, without which consultations with them should not be carried on.
The Soviet Government, standing on the position of wide consulta- tion with Korean democratic parties and organizations, does not con- sider that the Joint Commission should consult with such organiza- tions as have in their ranks only tens or hundreds of persons. Such organizations exist in large number and consultation with them would not be effective in view of their lack of authority. Furthermore, con- sultation with such small groups would drag out the work of the Joint Commission for many months, and would lead to the postpone- ment of the creation of a Government of Korea for a long time. The Soviet Government considers that consultation can be conducted with parties and organizations whose members number more than 10,000 persons.
With reference to your observation that in conducting consultations there should be no restriction on freedom of speech and opinion, this should be extended in the first place to parties and organizations which
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are assisting in carrying out the Moscow Decision. Furthermore, recently the parties and organizations of Southern Korea which sup- port the Moscow Decision are being subjected on the part of the American authorities in Southern Korea to the severest restrictions and crudest persecutions, which contradicts democratic principles and is entirely out of accord with the decision of the Moscow Conference. The premises of such parties and organizations are being seized by the police authorities ; their leaders and members are being arrested ; their press organs are being closed. The Soviet Government considers such a situation abnormal and inadmissible, excluding the possibility of the correct fulfillment of the decision of the Moscow Conference of the three Ministers on Korea, provided these persecutions of democratic organizations and individuals in Southern Korea do not immediately and completely cease.
The Soviet Government considers it necessary that the American Delegation in the Joint Commission receive appropriate instructions for the fulfillment of the agreement reached between the Governments of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in April of this year, and does not object to your proposal that the Joint Commission report on the status of its work in order that each Government may immediately consider what steps could be usefully undertaken for the fulfillment of the objectives of the Moscow Decision.
The Soviet Delegation has been instructed in the above sense.
Copies of this letter are being sent by me simultaneously to the Gov- ernments of Great Britain and China.
Accept [etc.] V. Molotov
C. The Acting Sea'ctary of State to the Soviet Minister for Foreign
A /fairs
Augxcst 26, 10/7.
Dear Mr. Molotov : In your letter of August 23, 1947 to Secretary Marshall the position of the Soviet Delegation to the Joint Commission has been set forth in terms which corroborate a recent report received by this Government from the United States Delegation to the Joint Commission. The report of the United States Delegation was in com- pliance with the desire of Secretary Marshall as set forth in his letter to you of August 12 that a report from the Joint Commission should be submitted by August 21 in order that our governments might imme- diately consider what further steps may be useful to achieve the long- delayed unification and independence of Korea. The report of the United States Delegation makes it clear that the Joint Commission has been unable to reach agreement regarding the basis on which repre- sentatives of democratic Korean parties and social organizations shall
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Korea’s Independence
be consulted by the Joint Commission. The United States Delegation also reports that it has been unable to obtain the agreement of the Soviet Delegation to any alternative method of completing the task of the Joint Commission.
As pointed out in your letter it was agreed in the interchange of correspondence in May of this year that “the Joint Commission should consult with those democratic parties and social organizations which fully support the Moscow Decision on Korea”. You will, however, recall that in your letter of May 7 you expressly agreed to the inter- pretation of the above phrase as proposed by the United States Commander in Korea that “signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation”. The parties and organizations mentioned by you as belonging to the Anti- Trusteeship Committee did sign Communique No. 5 and are, in the opinion of the United States Government, eligible for initial consulta- tion. Your letter of May 7 also provided that any decision excluding individuals, parties and social organizations for active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission “shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission”. Accordingly, the United States Delegation has re- peatedly, but without success, attempted to obtain from the Soviet Delegation agreement to criteria for consultation with Korean parties and social organizations applying for such consultation in accordance with the terms embodied in your letter. The Soviet Delegation has insisted on the unilateral right to exclude parties which have expressed distaste for “trusteeship”, even though such parties have declared and reiterated their intention fully to support the Joint Commission and have in fact, since signing the declaration not instigated active opposi- tion to the work of the Commission. The Soviet position is not only contrary to the specific terms of the agreement between you and Sec- retary Marshall, it is also contrary to the democratic principle of freedom of opinion. .
In Secretary Marshall’s letter to you of August 11, 1947 reference was made to the fact that the United States Delegation has several times offered to limit oral consultations to parties and organizations with membership in excess of one thousand, or any other reasonable figure proposed by the Soviet Delegation. The United States Delega- tion reports, however, that when the Soviet Delegation proposed limit- ing consultation to parties of 10,000 or more, the Soviet Delegation submitted a list which omitted 24 such parties which claimed total membership of 15,200,000 and refused to consider any other list or alternative proposal.
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The United States Government denies categorically that there has been oppression or persecution of Korean parties or individuals in the United States zone as charged in your letter. The arrests which you mention have been necessary to control subversive activities aimed at the destruction of constituted government and law and order in the American zone. United States forces are charged with the responsi- bility for maintaining law and order in south Korea without inter- ference with democratic rights. That they have done so successfully is amply proven by the freedom with which all shades of political opinion are expressed and respected in the United States zone.
It is noted that you have no objection to the proposal that the Joint Commission furnish an agreed report to our two governments. The United States Delegation has accordingly been instructed to take im- mediate steps to reach agreement on a joint report of the status of the deliberations of the Joint Commission. In view of the position set forth in your letter and the report already rendered by the United States Delegation, however, it is apparent that a joint i-eport can ac- complish little other than a formal delineation of the issues which have prevented the fulfillment of the Moscow Agreement.
For almost two years the Government of the United States has devoted its utmost efforts to carrying out the terms of the Moscow Agreement on Korea. The present stalemate in the Joint Commis- sion negotiations and the failure of that Commission to accomplish even the first task of its mission have made it abundantly clear to all that bilateral negotiations on the subject of consultation with Korean political parties and organizations will only serve to delay the im- plementation of this agreement and defeat its announced purpose of bringing about early independence for Korea. The United States Government cannot in good conscience be a party to any such delay in the fulfillment of its commitment to Korean independence and pro- poses that the four powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement meet to consider how that agreement may be speedily carried out.
The United States Government therefore submits for the considera- tion of your government the enclosed outline of proposals designed to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement on Korea. The United States Government proposes that these suggestions be considered at an early date by the powers adhering to that Agreement. It is therefore hoped that the Soviet Charge d’Affaires at Washington or an author- ized deputy may be designated to participate in four-power conversa- tions on this problem at Washington beginning on September 8, 1947.
It is believed that the Joint Commission’s report on the status of its deliberations might be helpful in consideration of the United States proposals during these four-power conversations. The United States
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Korea’s Independence
Delegation lias accordingly been instructed to endeavor to reach agree- ment with the Soviet Delegation on a joint report to be submitted not later than September 5, 1947.
Copies of this letter are being transmitted to the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and China together with invitations to partici- pate in the four-power conversations referred to above.
Please accept [etc.] Robert A. Lovett
United States Proposals Regarding Korea
1. In both the U.S.S.R. and U.S. zones of Korea there shall be held early elections to choose wholly representative provisional legislatures for each zone. Voting shall be by secret, multi-party ballot on a basis of universal suffrage and elections shall be held in accordance with the laws adopted by the present Korean legislatures in each zone.
2. These provisional zonal legislatures shall choose representatives in numbers which reflect the proportion between the populations of the two zones, these representatives to constitute a national provisional legislature. The legislature shall meet at Seoul to establish a provi- sional government for a united Korea.
3. The resulting Provisional Government of a united Korea shall meet in Korea with representatives of the four Powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement on Korea to discuss with them what aid and as- sistance is needed in order to place Korean independence on a firm eco- nomic and political foundation and on what terms this aid and assist- ance is to be given.
4. During all the above stages the United Nations shall be invited to have observers present so that the world and the Korean people may be assured of the wholly representative and completely independent character of the actions taken.
5. The Korean Provisional Government and the Powei’S concerned shall agree upon a date by which all occupation forces in Korea will be withdrawn.
6. The provisional legislatures in each zone shall be encouraged to draft provisional constitutions which can later be used as a basis for the adoption by the national provisional legislature of a constitution for all of Korea.
7. Until such time as a united, independent Korea is established, public and private Korean agencies in each zone shall be brought into contact with international agencies established by or under the United Nations and the presence of Korean observers at official international conferences shall be encouraged in appropriate cases.
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D. The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of State
September J, 19^7.
Dear Mr. Marshall,: In acknowledging receipt of Mr. Lovett’s letter of August 26, 1947, I consider it necessary to draw to your at- tention that the preliminary elaboration of measures to assist the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government, in accord- ance with the decision of the Moscow Conference of the three Min- isters for Foreign Affairs, is to be carried out by the Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the Soviet Command in northern Korea and of the United States Command in southern Korea. For the consideration of the four Governments, including the British and Chinese Governments, according to the Moscow decision, there should be submitted the recommendations worked out by the Joint Commission prior to adoption of a final decision. Furthermore, the Governments of Great Britain and China will take part, together with the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., in the con- sideration of the proposals worked out by the Joint Soviet-American Commission concerning measures for helping and assisting (trustee- ship) the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government, and the establishment of the national independence of Korea, in order to work out an agree- ment concerning a four-power trusteeship with relation to Korea.
The task of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, as is known, is to render assistance in the formation of a single provisional dem- ocratic government for all Korea.
The Joint Commission has still, in fact, done little in this direction, but this situation is primarily the result of the position adopted by the American delegation on the question of consultation of the Com- mission with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, as was pointed out in my last letter to .you. If the American delegation had shown the necessary desire to render assistance in the creation of a really democratic government in Korea, the work of the Joint Commission would have been more successful, the task laid upon it would have been fulfilled, and there would not be that stagnant sit- uation in the work of the Joint Commission which in Mr. Lovett’s letter is called an impasse.
As you know, the Soviet delegation, wishing to resolve the situation which had been created in the Joint Commission and seeking to ex- pedite the work of creating a provisional Korean democratic govern- ment, agreed with the proposal of the American delegation not to carry on oral consultations with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, and on August 26, 1947 introduced a new proposal for the establishment of a consultative organ — the provisional general
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Korean peoples’ assembly of representatives of democratic parties and social organizations of all Korea. This proposal in our opinion should meet no objection on the part of the American delegation in as much as it might remove the difficulties which the Joint Commis- sion has encountered.
I consider it necessary to add to the above that the successful reali- zation of the measure set forth in the proposal of the Soviet delegation is possible only on the basis of free and unfettered activity of the democratic parties and organizations, representatives of which at the present time in southern Korea are subjected to arrests and other repressions, which is incompatible with the principles of democracy and legality and also with the obligations which the Governments of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. took upon themselves with respect to Korea.
In connection with the assertions contained in Mr. Lovett’s letter concerning the position of the Soviet delegation to the Joint Com- mission, the sense of which is that the Soviet delegation does not display sufficient understanding of the proposals of the American delegation, I see no necessity for stopping on these assertions in view of their obvious unsoundness.
At the same time I cannot fail to express regret concerning unilat- eral acts undertaken by you such as the despatch of an invitation to the Governments of Great Britain and China to take part in the dis- cussion of this question, fixing the place and date for the conference.
The Soviet Government considers inexpedient your proposal to submit the question of the establishment of a provisional Korean democratic government to the consideration of the Governments of the four countries in as much as the Joint Commission is still far from exhausting all its possibilities for working out agreed recom- mendations, which is entirely possible. The “United States proposals concerning Korea” set forth in Air. Lovett’s letter are also un- acceptable.
These proposals cannot fail to entail the further division of Korea in as much as they envisage the establishment of separate provisional legislative assemblies in the south and in the north of Korea (in the Soviet and American zones) whereas the vital task is to achieve as rapidly as possible the establishment of a single, even though provi- sional, organ of authority — the General Korean Provisional Demo- cratic Government. The American proposal does not correct the situ- ation qow existing in Korea — the division of the country into two zones, to the liquidation of which all efforts should be directed — but on the contrary consolidates this abnormal situation.
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Having in mind that the proposal for the consideration of the ques- tion of Korea in a joint conference of the representatives of the four powers does not stem from the Moscow decision of the three Ministers for Foreign Affairs concerning Korea, and taking into consideration the views set forth above, the Soviet Government sees no possibility of accepting the proposals advanced in Mr. Lovett’s letter.
Copies of this letter are being sent by me to the Governments of Great Britain and China.
Please accept [etc.]
V. M. Molotov.
E. The Acting Secretary of State to the Soviet Minister for Foreign
Affairs
September 17, 191f7.
Dear Mr. Molotov : The decision of the Soviet Government as con- veyed in your letter of September 4, not to participate in Four Power discussions of proposals of the United States Government designed to achieve the speedy realization of tire aims of the Moscow Agreement on Korea is deeply regretted. For almost two years the United States Government has been faithfully endeavoring to reach agree- ment with the Soviet Government to carry out the terms of the Mos- cow Agreement but with no appreciable success. It has even proved impossible for the Soviet and United States Delegations on the Joint Commission in Korea to agree upon a joint report of the status of their deliberations up to the present. Thcx-e is no sign of the early setting up of a Korean Provisional Government. Korea remains divided and her promised independence unrealized.
The United States Government believes that this situation must not be permitted to continue indefinitely. In view of the fact that bilateral negotiations have not advanced Korean independence and that the Soviet Government does not agree to discussions among the powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement, there is but one course remaining. It is the intention therefore, of my Government to refer the problem of Korean independence to the forthcoming session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is suggested that the members of the Joint Commission hold themselves in readiness to give such aid and assistance to the General Assembly as may be re- quired during the Assembly’s consideration of this problem.
It is the hope of my Government that consideration of this problem by the General Assembly may result in bringing about the early
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restoration of freedom and independence to the long suffering people of Korea.
Copies of this letter have been furnished to the Governments of the United Kingdom and China.
Accept [etc.] Robert A. Lovett
Acting Secretary of State
o